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**Political cartoons and the perception of Arab-Israeli conflict**

**Modlin, Joanne B., Ph.D.**

**City University of New York, 1987**

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POLITICAL CARTOONS AND THE PERCEPTION OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

by

JOANNE B. MODLIN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in  
Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the City University of  
New York.

1987

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Abstract

POLITICAL CARTOONS AND THE PERCEPTION OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

by

Joanne B. Modlin

Adviser: Professor Stephen P. Cohen

The purpose of this research was to examine American perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and demonstrate the usefulness of political cartoons as a source of information on national images. In order to be able to look at trends over time, the events chosen for study were the wars of 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and the peace process of 1977-1978. The data consisted of matched samples of cartoons, editorials, and headlines from six American newspapers.

The frequencies of the actors (main and less significant) and themes were recorded for all three media. More extensive analyses were performed on the cartoons, including an examination of the symbols and images of the main actors. Lastly, the frequencies of political leaders used to represent the actors in the cartoons and headlines were compared.

The results of the themes and images analyses were specific to each event yet there was a pattern in the way the actors changed over the course of the five events. The focus evolved from a global perspective to a more regionally-oriented one. The essential difference among the three media was that the cartoons focused on the affective dimension,

the editorials emphasized the U.S. role and policy concerns, and the headlines tended to report the actual events. The political leader analysis showed that cartoons used leaders as a form of representation much more often than headlines — further emotionalizing their message. Both media used leaders more frequently in peace than in war which suggests that peace is perceived as dependent on people, and conflict on nations.

This study has shown that political cartoons present a more affectively-oriented view of political events than headlines and editorials which are more cognitive. In order to understand the dynamics of conflict and peace, it is essential to consider both of these dimensions. Thus, including cartoons in the data set for research on the Middle East conflict adds critical information which has been lacking in previous studies.

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I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to my Chairperson, Dr. Stephen P. Cohen, for his guidance and to acknowledge the tremendous impact he has had on my intellectual development. When I began my graduate studies at the City University of New York, I had little knowledge of the field of conflict resolution as well as Middle Eastern affairs. While taking Professor Cohen's course in conflict resolution, I was inspired by his enthusiasm for this area of study and became interested in his research at the Institute for Middle East Peace and Development, of which he was Director. My own involvement at the Institute was a major aspect of my graduate studies because it was there that I learned a lot about these and other closely related areas.

I had the privilege of studying under Professor Cohen for a number of years, learning much about political psychology and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unfortunately, he left the University when I was in the beginning stages of my dissertation. Nevertheless he continued to be supportive and extremely helpful throughout these past two years. Without Professor Cohen's sense of dedication and commitment to continue serving as my adviser, this research study might not have been completed as successfully. His encouragement, inspiration, enduring patience, and especially his valuable contributions to this project are deeply appreciated.

As a professor par excellence, Dr. Cohen has instilled in me the

importance of independent thinking -- for this I am grateful. As an adviser, Dr. Cohen gave me the confidence to develop and pursue my ideas -- for this I am encouraged. But above and beyond his professional expertise that I have come to admire and respect, Professor Cohen has also been a friend. I look forward to a continuing professional association with him in the years ahead.

I would also like to thank the other two members of my committee, Dr. Florence Denmark and Dr. Charles Winick, for their encouragement, support, and guidance. Dr. Vita Rabinowitz and Dr. Harriet Arnone, my two outside readers, were most helpful and I am deeply appreciative.

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## CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND

"Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets."

-Napoleon<sup>1</sup>

In order to understand the role that the United States has played, and possibly will play, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, it is important to know how the conflict has been perceived in America. And, to understand the events of today in the Middle East, it is helpful to know the history of the conflict. Thus, I propose to investigate national perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict as reflected in six American newspapers. Specifically, the data will consist of political cartoons, editorials, and headlines. In order to gain a historical perspective, this study will focus on the four Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982, as well as the Israeli-Egyptian peace process of 1977-1978. Some questions that I will attempt to answer are: what are seen as the major issues involved in the Middle Eastern conflict and thus, the primary concerns of the U.S.?; what are Americans likely to conclude from reading their daily newspapers?; and how do political cartoons compare to headlines and editorials?

Cooley (1981) sums up many of my questions when he asks a few of his own:

---

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in A. Lilienthal (1978). The Zionist connection: what price peace?. Pennsylvania: Haddon Craftsmen Inc., p. 271.

...to what extent are newsmen and news executives, the gatekeepers of the news who decide on story priorities and assign newsmen to cover them, simply feeding preconceived images and stereotypes to their readers, viewers or listeners? And to what extent do such images and stereotypes, nourished or even conjured up by the media, affect vital decisions about the Middle East made in the White House, Congress...(p. 466)

### THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Nimmo and Sanders (1981) note the recent trend in the social sciences of bringing together various academic disciplines, merging them, and studying them as a new gestalt. It is their contention that political communication is such an emerging field. They admit that research in this area has lagged behind similar work in other fields of social science, yet recently its development has begun to accelerate. There is no question that the mass media have profound effects on people. Recently, research has been conducted on this issue in the form of studying its effect on opinions, as well as the consequences of viewing violence on television.

In order to be informed about the political world, the public is dependent on the media since many events cannot be experienced first-hand. Thus, the media serve an important function by creating as well as changing our political cognitions (Becker, McCombs, & McLeod, 1975). Newspapers and broadcasting services play a powerful role in society because they determine which political issues will be focused on and also, how much attention they will receive. In other words, they determine the salience of particular political issues and this is called

the agenda-setting function of the media (McCombs, 1981). In addition, they often present opinions about how events and issues should be interpreted as well as how political personalities should be judged (Becker et al, 1975). Finally, Zukin (1981) points out that public officials pay attention to the media in order to gauge the mood of the public and more specifically, mass opinion since it has important implications for what actions and policies can and will be pursued.

The media are the major channels used by policy-makers to explain policy and to rally support for government positions. They are also the avenue for nongovernmental opinion makers, interest groups and the mass public to express their views. Thus, the press can be viewed as both a transmitter and as a shaper of opinion on foreign policy matters (Trice, 1979). Cohen (1973) maintains that the major point of contact between government officials and the public is the press in that State Department officials tend to equate newspaper opinion with public opinion -- the press is viewed as the voice of the people. Thus, it would follow that the press influences the formulation of foreign policy by communicating the opinion of the people, but James Reston (1967) does not believe it has as much impact as is thought:

The influence of the American press on American foreign policy, in my view, is usually exaggerated. Its influence is exercised primarily through the Congress, which confuses press opinion with public opinion; through foreign embassies and the foreign press in Washington, which think we know more than we really do; and through the universities of America, which, ironically, have a kind of intellectual contempt for the press, but read it more avidly, more critically, and probably more accurately than we read it ourselves. (p. 63)

## AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Trice (1981) notes that each year, pro-Israel and pro-Arab groups conduct major campaigns to win the support of the American people and government officials. But, the competition is fairly one-sided since the pro-Israel lobby is much more developed than its Arab counterpart. This lobby that actively supports the government of Israel consists of over 75 organizations. Trice contends that in every aspect, from letter writing to meetings with government officials, the pro-Israel lobby has been more successful and efficient than the Arab one. More importantly, Congress has been quite receptive to demands made by the pro-Israel lobby. But probably most important, the pro-Israel lobby has been very successful in winning the support of non-Jewish groups. This is an important goal of interest groups because if they can enlist the support of many different segments of the American population, then it will appear as if there is a national consensus for their actions and policies.

In contrast, the pro-Arab group, which includes anti-Zionist factions (mostly Jews), is weak and fractionated. First of all, there is a very small population of Arab-Americans in the United States. Second, besides trying to coordinate both Jews and Arabs, the native- and foreign-born Arabs often cannot agree among themselves -- let alone with potential Jewish allies. Thus, a major problem is that the ethnic and religious composition of the lobby is quite varied and consequently, they have difficulty coordinating their actions and policies.

One of the purposes of an interest group is to rally public opinion in favor of their policy preferences and thus influence the decision-

makers. There has been a long-heated debate over whether opinion influences policy or if policy affects opinion. More relevant here is the question of whether the media reflects opinion or influences it. Cooley (1981) maintains that "...[newsmen] exercise an incalculable effect on American perceptions, and therefore upon public opinion, Congressional action and ultimately, the U.S. policy process" (p.466). Rikardsson (1981) suggests that newspapers are influenced by the results of polls or could be influenced by other newspapers that change their opinions due to polls. But Lichter (1981) does not believe that the media simply reflect public opinion because their support for Israel far exceeds the population's. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to know in which direction influence flows, but it does remain important to examine polling results in order to discover the extent to which the media and public opinion are congruous.

Many more Americans have supported Israel rather than the Arabs throughout the protracted conflict (Lipset, 1978). Suleiman (1980) reports that from 1947 to 1979, sympathy for the Jewish people and the state of Israel was fairly high, ranging from a low of 24% in 1947 to a high of 56% during the 1967 war. In addition, he concludes that opinion in favor of Israel has been highest during the wars (specifically, the 1967 war, the war of attrition, and the 1973 war). In contrast, sympathy for the Arabs was found among a very small percentage of Americans, ranging from 16% during the struggle in Palestine in 1947 to a low of 1% during the 1967 war (Suleiman, 1980). Also, he examined public opinion regarding the placement of blame and found that Americans tend consistently to blame the Arabs more than the Israelis for causing or continuing the conflict, though a large percentage could not answer the

question (i.e. "don't know"/ "no opinion"). Finally, an important finding is that many Americans (approaching 50% and sometimes even more) do not have any opinion, do not care about either side, or sympathize equally with both sides (Suleiman, 1980).

According to Curtiss (1986), there were two events during which major shifts were seen in American public opinion: (1) Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and (2) the Israeli invasion of Lebanon but specifically, the Sabra-Shatilla massacres. First, as far as Sadat's peace initiative, Curtiss notes the following changes in public opinion: (1) sympathy for the Arabs rose from 8% to 11%, the first increase in four years and (2) a 15% increase in the span of two months (prior to and after the trip) in people who believed Egypt "wants a just peace" and more interestingly, a higher percentage who believed Egypt "wants a just peace" as compared to Israel wanting it. Second, a Gallup poll taken right after the massacres showed an almost even split in sympathies for Israel (32%) and the Arabs (28%). Curtiss points out that as compared to previous polls, this was a significant decline in sympathy for Israel (the figure has not been this low since February 1978 when it was 33%) and a huge increase in sympathy for the Arabs (a 100% increase from any percentage ever recorded) yet by January of 1983, the percentages returned back to practically the pre-invasion levels (49%-Israel; 12%-Arabs).

Interestingly enough, one of the most revealing findings about opinion poll results concerns what has been excluded. After extensive searching, Suleiman (1980) concludes that the pollsters are totally obsessed with the Jews and Israel and neglect the issue of the Palestinian Arabs. Thus, he writes that "when one looks up 'Palestine'

or 'Arabs in Palestine' in the index of the typical public opinion reports, [he cites Gallup Polls: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, Volume 3] for instance, one is referred to 'Jews: Colonialization' or 'Israel'" (Suleiman, 1980, p. 24). In addition, Suleiman (1980) claims that when the Palestinians are mentioned, which is considerably rare, they are treated as a "non-people." He cites a 1944 NORC survey in which the following question was asked: "Do you think the Jews should be given a special chance to settle in Palestine after the war, or if all people should have the same chance to settle there" (p. 24). Thus, Suleiman claims that Palestine is being treated as if it was uninhabited and consequently, the Palestinian people living there are being completely ignored.

Finally, Curtiss (1986) examined whether the percentage of sympathy for Israel was different depending on whether it was asked in relation to Palestinians versus the P.L.O. He discovered that when people are asked which side they sympathize with more, the percentages are much greater in regard to Israel when it is asked in connection with the P.L.O. than with the Palestinians. Thus he concludes that Americans have a consistently more negative image of the Palestine Liberation Organization than they do the Palestinian people. This example demonstrates how dramatically different the results of opinion polls can be depending on the wording used, in this case which term is used to denote the Palestinian people. Suleiman (1980) makes a similar point when he discusses how answers are biased when different wording is used for questions that are meant to be the same:

In 1967, for instance, Harris and Associates avoided asking the public "who do you feel started the latest war in the Middle East- the

Arabs or Israelis?" Yet this was the exact wording used in October 1973. In 1967, however, Harris asked the American people "whether they tended to agree or disagree that the Arabs wanted to start war; that Israel wanted to start war." Thus, instead of securing results that would show Israel starting the war, the data would reflect the American public's attitude toward the parties- already strongly anti-Arab and pro-Israeli. (p. 28)

### THE PRESS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Where do people get their opinions from? Do the American people get their information and opinions straight from the press? It has been suggested that the flow of mass communications may be less direct than was thought. Katz's (1965) two-step flow of communication proposes that the mass media influence "opinion leaders" who then pass on this information to others. These opinion leaders, who are described as highly involved and politically committed individuals (Cohen, 1973), are more informed and more exposed to the mass media than those they influence. But regardless of how information from the press is transmitted, either directly or by opinion leaders, it still gets to the public and therefore, merits study.

There are a number of possible reasons why the American press may not transmit an accurate picture of the Middle East, besides being influenced by the fact that Israel is an important ally of the United States and has the support of the public, as evidenced by opinion poll results. First of all, it has been argued that the American press could not be objective about the Arab-Israeli conflict because Jews are disproportionately represented in the mass media (Lichter, 1981;

Lilienthal, 1978). Although Jews constitute less than 3% of the American population, they make up 25% of the Washington press personnel (Lichter, 1981). In addition, the alleged media bias may be due to a reporter's fear of being accused of anti-Semitism (Lilienthal, 1978). It has been noted that both Jewish and non-Jewish American reporters "complain bitterly in private that if they dare express one word of sympathy for Palestinian Arab refugees, they are flooded with Jewish hate-mail accusing them of anti-Semitism" (Stone, 1978, p. 230: quoted in Hudson, 1980, p. 91). Hudson (1980) claims that some people believe that there is a Zionist conspiracy which prevents objective reporting about the Middle East.

Another factor that might contribute to unbalanced reporting is that there is a problem with access to news and news sources in the Arab world. Lilienthal (1978) notes that there were no permanent correspondents in Arab countries prior to 1973 and as a result, most of the reporting about the Middle East came from Israel. Suleiman (1970) reports that 60% of the coverage of the 1967 war did in fact come from Israel. An increase in reporting from Arab countries has been documented by Terry and Mendenhall (1974) who suggest that it was due to more lenient policies towards journalists on the part of Egypt as well as Syria. In addition, more permanent correspondents were placed in the Middle East in 1973 because of new interest in the region generated by the oil embargo (Chafets, 1985). But most Arab countries are still difficult to get into and Chafets (1985) claims that even when reporters are granted a visa, they know that if they write something unfavorable, they might not be able to return. In addition, they have difficulty finding people who will talk to them as well as being severely

restricted in where they are allowed to go (Chafets, 1985).

A third factor of growing importance in recent years is the journalist's fear of what Alexander (1982) calls "Arab terror." Chafets (1985) claims that the Syrians, the P.L.O., and to some extent other Arab regimes, have used threats and physical intimidation to control the news to their own advantage. He writes that at various times, Reuters, Time, Newsweek, the New York Times, the Washington Post, C.B.S., A.B.C., the Associated Press and other news organizations were the victims of intimidation and violence on the part of the Syrians or the P.L.O. Chafets maintains that the consequence of these practices is that journalists tend to engage in self-censorship and ignore potentially dangerous subjects. This is in contrast to the more open society of Israel where journalists have much freedom and consequently, events there are usually scrutinized and reported in great detail (Chafets, 1985).

Lastly, one other factor that might have an effect on what is reported from the Middle East is the language problem. Chafets (1985) argues that when Arab leaders and officials, especially Arafat and the P.L.O., talk in English for the foreign audience, they sound more moderate than when they speak in Arabic for the local audience. In addition, he notes that they will often claim that they were mistranslated when something is reported that they do not like. Finally, when reporters are limited to English-speaking sources, it makes it even more possible that they will be getting an atypical perspective (Chafets, 1985).

## The Alleged Bias in the Press

The American media have been accused of being pro-Israel in their reporting and editorials since Israel emerged as a state (Bagnied & Schneider, 1981). I have not come across any systematic investigations of the American press for the 1948 war, but there have been many studies concerning the coverage of the other major Arab-Israeli wars. For instance, studies have shown that Israel received much more support from the American press than did the Arabs during the 1956 war (Batroukha, 1961; Suleiman, 1965) the 1967 war (Suleiman, 1970; Trice, 1979) and the 1973 war (Padelford, 1973; Terry & Mendenhall, 1974; Trice; 1979).

Some believe that the American press has consistently portrayed the Arabs as the villains whereas the Israelis are seen as heroes who can do no wrong. Suleiman (1970) claims that the Arabs are always seen as threatening Israel and as being determined to destroy her, whereas when Israel strikes at the Arabs, mistreats Israeli Arabs, and annexes new territory, such actions are always justified by the press. He strongly believes that there is extreme reluctance on the part of the press to criticize Israel. Yet Trice (1979) found that the press did criticize Israel on the following issues: the annexation of Jerusalem, policies concerning the occupied territories, and their retaliatory raids. Unfortunately, he does not report the frequencies of these editorials so it is possible that although there was criticism of Israel, it was a rare occurrence. But one must be cautious in drawing conclusions from this comparison because Suleiman's study included only the 1967 war whereas Trice's sampling period extended from 1966 to 1974. In other words, it is possible that the press began to criticize Israel some time after Suleiman's sampling period.

Lilienthal (1978) claims that the press always extensively explains the Israeli positions whereas it portrays the Palestinians in a negative fashion: as a terrorist group and never sympathetically as a liberation movement. In addition, the plight of the Palestinian refugees has received little attention and he suggests that this may be due to the fear that these people will receive some sympathy that has always been reserved for the Israelis. Suleiman (1974) conducted interviews of teachers and found that both Israelis and Palestinians were seen as people who had suffered. But, the Jews in Israel were seen as "victims of persecution" whereas Palestinians were viewed as the "victims of circumstance". He makes the argument that the main difference between these two labels is that a persecuted people will receive the sympathy and support:

The persecution label is accusatory, implying guilt and involving some responsibility on the part of the observer for securing justice, whereas an "act of nature" as portrayed by the term "victim of circumstance" specifically relieves the observer of any serious responsibility or involvement. (Suleiman, 1974, p. 120)

Suleiman (1974) suggests five "myths" which he believes have been perpetuated by the American press: (1) The Israelis have been portrayed as the underdogs of the Middle East, capable of victory against incredible odds due to their intelligence and perseverance; (2) The Israelis did not evict the Palestinians from their homeland; they were invited to stay but left on account of advice from their fellow Arabs; (3) The Jews have "made the desert bloom" whereas the Palestinians did not attend to their homeland; (4) Zionism serves the support of all those who are lovers of freedom; and (5) The Arab-Israeli conflict is

rooted in anti-Semitism towards the Jews whereas the Jews have good intentions towards the Arabs. In conclusion, he contends that as a result of these "myths", people have come "...to see the Middle East problem as a conflict in which it is basically the Arabs who are the religiously bigoted aggressors, while the Israelis are just, peaceful and productive" (Suleiman, 1974, p. 113).

### Changes in the Media

Chafets (1985) strongly believes that after the 1973 war, the media became more even-handed in their approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict because of the oil embargo. In other words, the media began to devote more attention to the perceptions and concerns of the Arabs because the oil boycott made good relations with the Arabs both urgent and extremely necessary. Terry and Mendenhall (1974) mention that there is a widespread belief that the press became more sympathetic to the Arab viewpoint after the 1973 war but that due to the shortness of their sampling period, they could not investigate this claim. But there are a few studies that demonstrate that such a change did occur.

First, Suleiman (1974) found support for this notion when he compared the data from his studies of American press coverage of the 1967 and 1973 wars. Specifically, he found that in 1973 as compared to 1967, the press gave more attention to the viewpoint of the Arabs and the Arabs were portrayed less frequently as determined to destroy Israel as well as treating her improperly. Second, Trice's (1979) study demonstrated that editorials were less supportive of Israel and were slightly less critical of Arabs in 1973 than in 1967. The third study was conducted by Belkaoui (1978) who used a fascinating methodology to

determine whether there were more favorable images of Arabs and less favorable images of Israelis in the press in 1973 as compared with 1967. Verbs were coded from news articles to see what style or image was being attributed to the speaker. She found that in 1967, Israelis speakers tended to "tell, say, or announce" whereas the Arabs were more likely to "declare, demand, accuse and threaten". There was a dramatic change in 1973 in that the Israelis were more likely to speak in an "angry, bitter, and insistent" manner whereas the Arabs style of communication was much more moderate than their former "aggressive, angry, or threatening style". Another change noted was that in 1973 as compared to 1967, Israel no longer had the winner image whereas the image of the Arab world shifted from that of loser to winner. Belkaoui concludes that these shifts in the images of Arabs and Israelis were due to the economic concerns resulting from the oil embargo.

A more specific change in the press in 1973 as compared to earlier years, noted by Terry and Mendenhall (1974), was that the Palestinians appeared in the press as a "separate entity": the Palestinians were referred to by name 600% more in 1973 than during the three previous wars combined. It seems that with the 1973 war, according to Chafets (1985), the American public began to support and sympathize with the P.L.O. He says that the American Left needed a new cause to fill the void left by the Viet Nam war and adopted the Palestinian liberation movement. A consequence of the P.L.O. becoming the new underdog was that Israel became a target for harsh criticism and attitudes toward her became both negative and hostile (Chafets, 1985). In addition, the P.L.O. had become an extremely urgent issue because the supplying of oil had become linked with the solution of the Palestinian problem. In other

words, the Arabs made it clear that the flow of oil would depend on the satisfaction of their political demands and number one on their list was the Palestinian issue (Chafets, 1985). Chafets (1985) claims that in the mid-1970's, these attitudes of the New Left began to influence many journalists.

Many people have written about the bad press that Israel received during the invasion of Lebanon and Chafets (1985) believes that these new attitudes contributed to it. Israel was seen as a villainous invader intent on exterminating the P.L.O. whereas the Palestinians were portrayed as freedom fighters and heroes, justified in their cause (Gervasi, 1986; Maurer & Goldman, 1986). Because of this image of Israel, many drew a parallel between Israel and Nazi Germany. Podhoretz (1986) reports that the words genocide and holocaust appeared frequently in the media and cartoonists portrayed West Beirut as the Warsaw ghetto with the P.L.O. as the Jews and the Israelis as the Nazis. Gervasi (1986) discusses a study done by the American Jewish Committee on press coverage of the invasion of Lebanon. One finding of this investigation was that nearly half of the political cartoons examined were clearly hostile towards Israel, portraying her in a negative way. In addition, they found that editorials were no longer predominantly pro-Israel: only 21% were categorized as supportive of Israel.

No one denies that Israel brought much death and destruction to Lebanon but many believe that there was gross distortion and exaggeration in the reporting of casualties and damage. For example, it was reported that 600,000 people in southern Lebanon were driven out of their homes; but local Lebanese authorities have stated that the total population of this area was 510,000 (Podhoretz, 1986)! Second, it was

said that Israel indiscriminately bombed Lebanon, but Peretz (1982) spoke to Christians and Moslems when he traveled to Lebanon and found that they believed that for the most part, Israel aimed at military targets. Peretz also claims that Israel avoided bombing mosques and other public buildings and Gervasi (1986) maintains that she took great pains to minimize civilian casualties. It seems that reporters did not notice that much of the damage attributed to the Israeli military was caused by the brutal fighting that had been going on in Lebanon for the previous seven years (Peretz, 1982). Finally, it has been argued that the press rarely mentioned that the Lebanese people were the victims of the P.L.O.'s "reign of terror" for many years before the invasion (Chafets, 1985) and that many religious groups and factions in Lebanon were grateful to Israel for ridding them of the P.L.O. (Maurer & Goldman, 1986).

### POLITICAL CARTOONS

The study of political communication includes such diverse areas as political language, political rhetoric, political advertising and propaganda, political debates, political socialization, election campaigns, public opinion, public policy, political movements, and government-news media relations (Nimmo & Sanders, 1981). Political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists have used various forms of communication effectively as data yet little attention has been paid to the political or editorial cartoon. "...Even in the age of the mass-produced Ph.D., the academic study of caricature and political cartooning

has suffered from considerable neglect, partly no doubt because it lies in a peculiar no-man's-land where several disciplines meet, and so tends to be scorned by the purists" (Coupe, 1969, p. 79).

Political cartoons can definitely be considered a form of mass communication. Since they are in almost all newspapers, and even some magazines, they reach a wide audience. Thus, because they are read by millions of people and convey much information, they should be examined more closely. Another reason to study cartoons is that they provide abundant information about political attitudes (Nir, 1976) and a nation's cultural history (Harrison, 1981). Yet they have not been subjected to systematic and rigorous study (Nir, 1977) nor is their social and psychological impact well understood (Harrison, 1981). In addition, a generally accepted theory of the political cartoon is lacking (Nir, 1976) and it has been suggested that this is due to its interdisciplinary nature (Coupe, 1969).

At the outset, to insure that there is no ambiguity concerning terminology, a distinction is made between cartoon and caricature. Streicher (1967) maintains that caricature refers to "grotesque or ludicrous representation of scorn or ridicule of human vices or follies and exaggeration of their most characteristic features by means of graphic images" (p. 431). On the other hand, he says that the term cartoon is concerned with "both 'build-up' and 'debunking' techniques of graphic presentations of the actors on the human stage" (p. 431). According to various dictionaries, cartoons can be considered a humorous drawing or sketch that symbolizes some action or subject whereas caricature refers to an amusing drawing that exaggerates peculiarities or distinctive features. It is the contention of the present author that

the word cartoon is the more appropriate one of the two since the term caricature pertains only to the style in which something is drawn whereas the term cartoon refers to the gestalt or all aspects of the picture. In other words, since caricature refers to a technique, the word cartoon is a more inclusive term. It has been noted though that the two words have been used synonymously throughout the literature (Streicher, 1967). For example, Kris (1953), whose ideas will be discussed later, uses the term caricature but points out that he is using the term broadly and therefore interchangeably with the word cartoon.

Can political cartoons substitute for written articles? According to Streicher (1966), "for the man in a rush or the reader of only the headlines or lead paragraphs the caricature is a way of catching at a glance the meaning of an event, a person in the news, or a pictorial summary of a current power constellation" (p. 1). In a subsequent article, Streicher (1967) points to the usefulness of political cartoons when he states that "...the press reader who grazes headlines here and there and impatiently or never reads the grey mass of smaller type....would seem better reached by imagery in the pages, especially the lines of caricatures, than by the printed line of type" (p. 434). He goes on to suggest that imagery can substitute for words: "The increase of comics in the last 50 years and, the more recent success of television may be partial evidence of the successful competition of imagery with the printed word" (p. 434).

Although political cartoons and editorials share the same objectives of conveying interpretations of political events and persons as well as influencing public opinion, they can in fact differ. The goal of some

editorials and commentaries is to influence the reader about how to evaluate personalities in the news and/or what opinions to have about current events. Others, however, do not communicate a particular viewpoint but rather are informative in aim and present the reader with information (Becker et al., 1975). In contrast, the political cartoon is rarely neutral since by distorting and exaggerating, some sort of judgement is being expressed.

It has been suggested that the political cartoon is more powerful than the editorial because "...it evokes a visceral reaction that not even the most stirring editorial can duplicate" (Adler & Whitmore, 1980, p. 75). Shaked (1980) believes they are more influential because they must come right to the point and make their message clear whereas the editorial can hedge and be vague. Other reasons for the cartoon's superior effectiveness have been advanced:

The political cartoon is stronger even than the written editorial for the simple reason that it is a picture, because it communicates more surely with the emotions of the reader, because it speaks visually in a tongue that knows no barrier of language or education, because it often strikes some half-forgotten aspiration that transcends geography and is common to all men everywhere. (Long, 1962, p. 56: quoted in Carl, 1970, p. 39)

Finally, it seems that cartoonists have more freedom of expression due to the nature of their medium. Adler and Whitmore (1980) write that "cartoonists have become the collective journalistic id, drawing what some of their colleagues would secretly like to write" (p. 77). They go on to say that cartoonists are able "...to commit outrages that would read like lunacy in print" (p. 78).

## Political Significance of Cartoons

The political cartoon is generally believed to be a form of persuasive communication. It has been credited with the power to create and manipulate public opinion (Coupe, 1969). In addition, the cartoon itself has been described as consisting of practically "pure opinion" (Damon, 1983). Thus, "the study of political cartoons of a particular period leads to a succinct outline of the opinion makers of that time" (Damon, 1983, p. 144).

The cartoon is believed to be quite effective at persuasion because it operates on an emotional level rather than an intellectual one. Thus, Harrison (1981) claims that because of its emotional content, it is difficult to disagree with the message conveyed by a cartoon on a logical and intellectual basis. But it should be pointed out that besides changing opinions, political cartoons can also act to reinforce opinions that people already hold.

Press (1981) maintains that political cartoons are a form of propaganda. Basically, propaganda involves "the advancement of a position or view in a manner that attempts to persuade rather than to present a balanced overview" (Winick, 1984, p. 79). Most cartoons certainly fit that description, but not all. Kris and Leites (1972) maintain that propaganda deals only with controversial issues and I do not believe that all cartoons do so. They also claim that if it serves to merely clarify an issue, than it is not propaganda. Clearly the objective of some cartoons is to make an issue clearer and more understandable to the reader. Therefore, it seems reasonable to say that many cartoons could be considered to be propagandistic in nature yet to attribute such a quality to all cartoons would be incorrect since some

of them deal with non-controversial issues and/or seek merely to clarify political events for the reader.

### Psychological Significance of Cartoons

In an age in which we are constantly being bombarded with information, political cartoons serve a very useful function. Press (1981) claims that cartoonists save the reader time and energy because they explain what the politicians are up to. He claims that people do not just want information but that they want to know what it means. Thus, ready-made interpretations save the reader much effort and time since he does not have to do a lot of reading in order to acquaint himself with all the facts and arguments nor does he need to reflect on what he has read in order to understand what the implications are. In addition, people find the political cartoon satisfying because it consolidates a complex news story into one picture, thereby simplifying it and making it easier to understand. Harrison (1981) expresses these ideas succinctly when he states that cartoons are "communication to the quick."

Cartoons are also read because they are humorous and therefore entertaining. According to Adler and Whitmore (1980), today's cartoonists seem to be drawing more humorous cartoons and consequently, are attracting a larger audience. Some would argue that this type of humor satisfies an important need because people are being given an opportunity to laugh at something that they would ordinarily fear or tend to worry about (Coupe, 1969). Viewed as such, humorous political cartoons serve an adaptive function since they help people cope with difficult ideas or events. But Alba (1967) notes that not all cartoons

are inherently funny but people may still laugh or smile at them if the cartoonist ridicules someone that the reader wishes to see treated as such. Thus, it seems that Nir (1976) might have a valid point when he suggests that the pleasure derived from political cartoons acts like a defense mechanism in that fear is being controlled through the use of the imagination.

Some see the political cartoon as a vehicle for the expression of hostility (Alba, 1967) and aggression (Kris, 1953). Harrison (1981) claims that a cartoon's effectiveness appears to depend on its emotion, the primary one being anger. Essentially, cartoons are seen as negative characterizations of political situations although "...there are many degrees of negativity ranging from gentle irony to angry condemnation" (Hill, 1978, p. 307). Yet if one believes that cartoons are a form of visual satire, as many people do, then this component of negativity is an inherent feature of them. But Coupe (1969) points out that sometimes the cartoon expresses some degree of admiration or affection. Thus it seems that political cartoons are predominantly negative although there are rare exceptions to this rule.

It seems possible that the political cartoon might function as an outlet for the reader's aggressive impulses. Nir (1976) maintains that "because of its destructive capacity, it can convert the image, symbol, or concept it depicts into a scapegoat for the reader's aggression" (p. 14). The reader can derive pleasure from the political cartoon when he sees an enemy destroyed by a symbolized action or by seeing him depicted in a derogatory and distorted fashion (Nir, 1976). Freud (1960), in his discussion of the purpose of jokes, claims that "by making our enemy small, inferior, despicable or comic, we achieve in a roundabout way the

enjoyment of overcoming him..." (p. 103). Similarly, when authority figures are degraded and ridiculed, thus robbed of their dignity and authority, tension could be released. According to Freud (1960), rebellion against authority is pleasurable because it acts to liberate one from the "pressure" of authority. Finally, it seems that cartoons save mental energy since aggressive impulses are liberated or to put it another way, energy is no longer used on suppression (Kris, 1953).

A second reason that the reader derives pleasure from cartoons is what Kris (1953) refers to as the "relation to infantile life." He notes that the primary process, an activity of the id characterized by immediate wish-fulfillment, operates in both a child's drawing and the cartoon. In addition, the cartoon's simplicity closely resembles the child's scribbling and therefore serves to "renew infantile pleasure." In essence, Kris believes that cartoons are more like a psychological mechanism than a form of art.

### Studies of Political Cartoons

Finally, previous studies include content analyses of political cartoons depicting the German revolution of 1848 (Coupe, 1967), a comparison of political life in Mexico directly prior to the Mexican revolution and contemporary Mexico (Alba, 1967), portrayals of Nixon before and after Watergate (Wheeler & Reed, 1975), Carter during his triumphant Presidential campaign in order to see if his success was predicted (Hill, 1978), the Presidential campaign of 1976 (Bormann, Koester, & Bennett, 1978), and July 4<sup>th</sup> cartoons (assumed they would reflect American culture) from 1870 to 1976 to see how women have been depicted over time (Meyer, Seidler, Curry, & Aveni, 1980). In the next

section, three studies of political cartoons dealing with the Middle East will be discussed in detail.

### POLITICAL CARTOONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

It is important to examine previous studies relevant to the present research so we will now discuss three studies that analyzed political cartoons of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although two of these investigations used cartoons from foreign newspapers, it is still interesting to look at some of their findings.

Nir (1976, 1977) attempted to understand the official Soviet attitude towards the Middle East conflict by examining relevant political cartoons from different Soviet newspapers for the period of June 5, 1967 to June 5, 1972. His most detailed analyses were conducted on his sample from two major papers and these are the findings that will be summarized here. He found that the Western nations and the United States were represented as a united bloc supporting Israel. Thus, the U.S., the West, and Israel were portrayed as the unified enemy. The Arabs received little attention in Soviet cartoons and when they did, they were portrayed as being oppressed by Israel. Thus, Arabs were used in cartoons to show that Israel was "bad." Surprisingly, the Soviet role in the conflict was hardly depicted. The most frequent themes in regard to the roles of the United States and Israel in the conflict were: Israel as the major aggressor, the U.S. supporting Israel, and Israel leaning on U.S. support. Finally, Nir found that cartoons about the two wars appeared long after the events in question. The explanation he

offers for this finding is that the purpose of cartoons in the Soviet press is to evaluate the general situation rather than give a direct commentary on a particular event.

Shaked (1980) was interested in studying Egypt's perceptions of the United States and did this by examining the images used by an Egyptian cartoonist from March 2, 1962 to March 20, 1978. Of the five American presidents that were in this sample (Nixon, Johnson, Kennedy, Ford, and Carter), Nixon received the most unsympathetic treatment in the cartoons. From 1962 to 1965, the most frequent theme in the sub-sample of cartoons that included the United States was American domestic matters. By 1968, the two themes of American-Israeli relations and the United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict were most frequent in this particular group of cartoons. As far as U.S.-Israeli relations, three specific themes were identified: normal bilateral relations, American support to Israel, and American pressure exerted on Israel. Concerning the U.S. and the conflict, there were three specific themes: the U.S. as a directly involved power, the U.S. as mediator, and the U.S. as instigator. A fourth theme in this category -- the U.S. as peacemaker -- appeared after 1973. Unfortunately, Shaked does not give the frequencies of these portrayals of the different roles of the United States. He concludes that the varying number of U.S.-related cartoons as well as the change in the image of the United States was associated with increased American involvement in the Middle East.

The final study to be discussed was conducted by Damon (1983) and it involved the analysis of political cartoons from four newspapers for two months each during the 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars. He found that the cartoons fell into the following categories for all four wars:

summarized the events in a neutral way, attacked an Arab leader, contained an Arab stereotype, were anti-Arab by implication, attacked an Israeli leader, used an Israeli stereotype, and were anti-Israeli by implication. There were only a small number of cartoons that could be considered to fit into the last three categories and this finding is believed to reflect the editorial positions of the newspapers. In contrast, there were many anti-Arab cartoons, most of which portrayed Arab leaders. In addition, he found that many cartoonists used Arab stereotypes and these increased in frequency over the years. Unfortunately, Damon did not quantify the various stereotypes in order to discover which ones were most widely used during the various wars. Damon claims that just like there are some nomads in Arab countries, a frequently used stereotype to depict Arabs, there are some Orthodox Jews in Israel -- yet only one cartoon in his entire sample included this stereotype and in a positive situation at that! He believes that because Israelis are mostly portrayed in Western clothes and with Western features, the sympathy of the reader is easily elicited because the Israeli looks like an American. Finally, Damon maintains that his findings reflect the power of the Israeli lobby and the inability of the Arab-American community to change the predominant images.

### STEREOTYPES AND POLITICAL CARTOONS

It has been suggested that the cartoonist frequently uses stereotypes in his drawings (Harrison, 1981). The reason for this is that cartoonists must simplify political events due to the fact that

they have limited space and therefore are forced to limit their scope. Thus, by the use of a single stereotype, a lot of information is conveyed to the reader due to associations he will make in regard to that image. Specifically, values and opinions are transmitted as a result of the particular stereotype chosen by the cartoonist to aid him in making his point. It also serves to "emotionalize" the message because it conjures up a lot of feelings about the stereotyped group. Finally, the stereotyped image tends to be familiar to the reader.

In 1922, Walter Lippman characterized stereotypes as "pictures in our head" (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981). A formal definition of stereotypes is "the attribution of psychological characteristics to a large human group" (Tajfel, 1969, p. 82). Basically, the process of stereotyping involves ignoring unique aspects of the person. In other words, we categorize the person according to what group he fits in and this can be considered overgeneralizing. Thus, some feature of the person is a trigger to assign him to a group and attribute to him qualities that are assumed to be characteristic of that group (Miller, 1982). In essence, the perceiver assigns dispositional qualities to an individual which are not directly observable.

Ethnic stereotypes involve a consensus among members of a group about the attributes of an ethnic group (Taylor & Aboud, 1973). Ethnic prejudice, according to Allport (1954) consists of two necessary components: hostility and overgeneralization based on categorization. The process of categorization, which Taylor (1981) calls a "least effort" process of organization, involves large classes or clusters to which we assimilate a related object (Allport, 1954). As a result, we can quickly identify someone and know a lot about them, or at least

believe that we do. These categories are rigid and very resistant to change; information that does not fit is ignored.

Yet stereotyping and its inevitable process of categorization are adaptive in a sense. We live in a complex world and it would be impossible to process and retain information specific to each individual we encounter. Thus, the stereotype is a strategy that acts to simplify information processing since it involves fitting people into categories rather than treating each person as unique. More specifically, the process of categorization allows one to simplify their environment, to have expectations of others which has implications for one's own behavior, and to process a greater amount of information (Wilder, 1981).

In conclusion, since cartoonists simplify political news, it is therefore not surprising that they employ stereotypes in their drawings. In other words, by using a stereotype, the cartoonist is saving time since he is taking advantage of information that people already have. In the next section, we will discuss the claim that negative stereotypes of Arabs appear quite frequently in the media.

### **ARABS AND STEREOTYPES**

One of the most widespread charges levelled against the press is that it frequently makes use of Arab stereotypes (Cooley, 1981; Curtiss, 1986; Greenfield, 1977; Hudson, 1980; Lilienthal, 1978; Mortimer, 1981; Suleiman, 1983). As Curtiss (1986) points out, "the leering, hand-rubbing Arab oil sheikh, with a line of fat veiled wives trailing behind his dirty robes, has become a familiar fixture to American newspaper

readers" (p. 322). Another way that Arabs are stereotyped is when the term "Arab" is used when speaking of the people of the many nations that constitute the Arab world rather than referring to them as Egyptians, Saudis, Syrians, Palestinians, etc. (Greenfield, 1977; Lilienthal, 1978).

Since many Americans have never visited the Middle East, their knowledge must come from other sources such as television, radio, the press, and even the movies (Suleiman, 1974). Thus, images of Arabs have become familiar to a large number of people and a consensus has developed about what an Arab is like. Lilienthal (1978) believes that anti-Arab stereotyping, which he claims begins in elementary school, is acceptable to people because of the historical Christian antagonism towards Islam. It has also been suggested that these negative images or stereotypes are fueled by fear, mostly the fear of Islam and Muslims (Oxtoby, 1980). It seems that to many Americans, the terms Arabs and Muslims are the same and therefore, negative images about Islam are transferred to Arabs (Suleiman, 1983).

Suleiman (1983) argues that Hollywood has greatly contributed to these negative images of Arabs by portraying them as "mean-looking, dagger-wielding individuals lurking outside someone's tent (or door of a house) ready to stab him in the back at the first opportunity" (p. 339). Shaheen (1980) points out this negative image of the Arab appears regularly on television entertainment programs and he discusses specific episodes to illustrate this point. In general, he contends that:

the prime time entertainment shows...depict  
Arabs as cruel, cowardly, and decadent people.  
Arab leaders and their associates are seen as  
men who are either blood-feuding Bedouins or  
oil blackmailers. They are depicted as sex-

starved pimps, cheats, and back-stabbers. Oil-rich desert shayks own camels and expensive cars, usually large, sleek black limousines, and inside are these swarthy-looking fellows wearing dark glasses- very sinister. (p. 40)

Stereotyping of Arabs is most apparent in cartoons and Suleiman (1970) maintains that "cartoons...practically constitute a hate campaign against the Arabs." (p. 154). Greenfield (1977) elaborates on this point in terms of how the use of caricature dehumanizes the Arab and why it is acceptable:

That caricature, incidentally, is one of the very few "ethnic jokes" still indulged by our cartoonists and stand-up comics. It is somehow considered permissible where comparable jokes are not, and I do not think this is wholly owing to the absence of a big enough Arab-American political constituency to raise hell. There is a dehumanizing, circular process at work here. The caricature dehumanizes. But it is inspired and made acceptable by an earlier dehumanizing influence, namely, an absence of feeling for who the Arabs are and where they have been. (p. 110)

Some have pointed out that there is a similarity between the current stereotyping of Arabs and that of Jews during the Nazi era:

...a thoughtful lobbyist for Israel in Washington, has described the style of portraying a hook-nosed Arab, either armed to his jagged teeth or fondling the gas pump to which his camel is tethered, as a manifestation of anti-Semitism just as vicious as anything ever directed against the Jews in the U.S. in earlier eras. Thomas Stauffer, a frequent writer on Middle East affairs, and a Harvard University faculty member, cites close parallels in technique between recent depictions of Arabs by American cartoonists and anti-Jewish newspaper cartoons from the Nazi era in Germany. (Curtiss, 1986, p. 322)

Oxtoby (1980) points out that since the 1967 war, the terrorist has become a common Arab stereotype and due to the oil embargo in 1973, the negatively portrayed oil sheikh emerged as another popular image. In his study of political cartoons, Damon (1983) found that in 1973, cartoonists frequently portrayed "the snickering Arab stereotype holding up the world for its own gain" (p. 151) to represent the oil embargo. Although Terry and Mendenhall (1974) do not discuss what stereotypes were found in the sample of cartoons examined, they do say that in cartoons from 1973 that dealt with the oil issue, "Arabs were usually depicted as the bad guys and in clearly unfavourable racist caricatures" (p. 123).

Finally, many have referred to America's "Abscam" operation in order to demonstrate how deeply rooted this negative Arab stereotype is in the United States. In 1978, the F.B.I. exploited the image of the Arab as a liar and a cheat in order to expose bribe-taking on the part of Congressmen and businessmen (Hudson, 1980; Suleiman, 1983). The F.B.I. believed this image would be credible since these beliefs are so widely held, and they were right. Suleiman (1983) argues that they did not even realize they were maligning anyone and also, that a Jewscam or a Blackscam would never have been conducted since it would not have been tolerated by the American people.

### IMAGES AND BELIEFS

It is difficult to ever know exactly what the "objective reality" of a situation is because perceptions are mediated by one's beliefs. People

construct their own version of reality insofar as what is actually perceived is shaped by pre-existing beliefs. Thus, people have their own "definition of the situation" or image of it which may not correspond to reality. Basically, images consist of cognitive, affective, and evaluative or action components (Boulding, 1959; Scott, 1965). In other words, when we talk about an "image", we are referring to a person's perception of something, their evaluation of it, and the meaning they attach to it (K.J. Holsti, 1967). Due to the fact that images are basically simplified and structured beliefs about the nature of the world, they are a way of making sense out of a complex and confusing environment (George, 1969; O. Holsti, 1976; Tetlock, 1983a).

Thus, beliefs and images play a powerful role in determining what is perceived. Not only do people see what they expect to see based on the images they hold, but they also assimilate new information to fit those images (Jervis, 1976). But people are extremely reluctant to abandon or even modify their beliefs and images even when they are faced with information that clearly contradicts them (Tetlock, 1983b).

Evidence for this tendency to persist in one's beliefs to an unwarranted degree, called belief perseverance, comes from cognitive social psychology. Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) used the "debriefing" paradigm in order to see whether people still hold on to their beliefs when the basis for them has been undermined. The purpose of the debriefing strategy in deception research is to discredit the false information given for the purpose of the study, thus eliminating any potentially harmful consequences it might have on the subject. They found a high degree of what they called "post-debriefing perseverance": people still believed the information about their own or another

person's performance after being told that the score had been decided at random before they had even arrived for the experiment. Thus it appears that one's beliefs can survive the total discrediting of the basis on which they were originally formed.

In addition, if people cannot ignore information that is inconsistent with their beliefs, they will distort it in such a way as to make it compatible (Jervis, 1976). For example, Ole Holsti (1967) writes that John Foster Dulles did not perceive a Soviet troop cut in 1956 as evidence that the Russians were backing down and trying to ease tensions, but rather as a result of economic difficulties. Thus, he was able to maintain his belief that the Soviet Union was still as hostile as always. A second example involves the American interpretation of the evacuation of Soviet civilians from Egypt immediately before the start of the October 1973 war. At this time, the United States strongly believed that the Arabs were too weak to initiate a war. So, rather than interpret this event to mean that war would soon break out, their explanation was that some sort of crisis broke out between Egypt and the Soviet Union (Jervis, 1976). Therefore, the U.S. was able to maintain its image of the Arabs as weak and the concomitant belief that war was not imminent. Thus we see that people will use whatever strategies necessary in order to maintain their beliefs and images.

### Impact of Images and Beliefs on Policy-Makers

The role played by images and beliefs on perceptions has important implications in the political realm since policy-makers act on the basis of their images of a situation rather than responding to "reality" (O. Holsti, 1969). Thus, K.J. Holsti (1967) writes that "in policy-making,

it is not the state of the environment that matters so much as what government officials believe to be that state" (p. 158). For example, Boulding (1959) states that it is a nation's image of the hostility that will determine its reaction rather than the "real" hostility. Yet although images serve a useful function for policy-makers since they simplify the international environment, the drawback is that they may actually oversimplify or misrepresent it (Tetlock, 1983a). More importantly, Jervis (1976) notes that decision-makers tend to be overly-committed to their beliefs and therefore, are quick to reject discrepant information. The result of such perseverance is that they tend to maintain inaccurate images and as a result, continue to adhere to policies that are no longer valid (Tetlock, 1983a).

George (1969, 1979) has advanced the notion of the operational code in order to explain as well as understand how decision-makers are influenced by their beliefs. Basically, an operational code consists of beliefs and premises which influence the policy-maker's perceptions and interpretations of political events as well as their choice of strategies and tactics. Two sets of beliefs constitute the operational code: the philosophical beliefs (the nature of the political world and one's opponents, the prospects for achieving one's political goals, whether the political future can be predicted, whether one can control and influence history, and the role of chance) and the instrumental beliefs (the best approach for selecting and pursuing one's goals, how to deal with risks, the role of timing when taking action, and the different means used to advance self-interests) (George, 1969).

Although the operational code aids the decision-maker in processing information and deciding on the most effective policies to pursue, it

can also cause him to misperceive a situation or an actor's behavior. For example, George (1979) notes that if one's image of the opponent is hostile, ambiguous situations will be perceived as threatening and ambiguous behavior on the part of the opponent will be perceived as dangerous. In essence, the operational code influences the decision-maker's perceptions and the policies that are consequently chosen. Finally, the concept of the operational code illustrates the fact that due to the complexity of the political world, decision-makers cannot process information as objectively as they would like; they invoke their beliefs in order to simplify situations and as a result, are prone to make incorrect interpretations.

### Research on Images and Beliefs

Many studies have been conducted to show how particular policy-makers have been influenced by their beliefs (for example, see George, 1969; O. Holsti, 1967, 1969). In addition, rather than use the individual as the level of analysis, other analyses have focused on the images that one country has of another.

One popular topic has been the mirror-image, by which is meant that one's own group is seen as "white" (good) whereas the opposing group is seen as "black" (bad). Both parties to a conflict have a similar black-and-white picture of themselves and their opponent; what is white and black for one side is black and white for the other. Both aspects of the mirror-image, the virtues on one's own side and the evilness of the enemy (especially their leaders), tend to be exaggerated (White, 1965).

Bronfenbrenner (1961), after many conversations with Russian citizens, found that their perception of the United States was very

similar to American perceptions of the Soviet Union -- thus, a mirror image. He was able to delineate five themes common to both the American and Soviet perceptions of each other: they are the aggressor, they are untrustworthy, they exploit their people, their people don't support their government, and their policies are utterly unrealistic. The danger of these mirror-images is that they are self-perpetuating and due to the powerful role of expectations, Bronfenbrenner fears that these images could propel either side into nuclear war.

White (1965) studied the Soviets' images of their own country and of the United States and found them to be quite similar to those that Americans have of their own country and the Soviet Union. He found that the Soviet people perceive their country as peaceful and that this image extends to their leaders and to governmental policy. As far as their image of the United States, although they tend to see the American people as friendly, they perceive the political leaders as "threatening" because of such policies as the establishing of American bases close to their borders and proliferating nuclear arms. White suggests that this enemy-image of the United States is dependent on the Soviet Union's self-image. Therefore, because the Soviets see their own country as peaceful, they have no choice but to perceive American action and policies as offensive since to be perceived as defensive would be inconsistent with their self-image. Also, they preserve their self-image because any policies or actions of their government that could be seen as inconsistent with this image, are seen as defensive, as a reaction to the enemy-image of the United States. Finally, White points out that Americans see their country as peaceful and see the rulers of the Soviet Union as threatening them. In addition, they see America's "power-

oriented policies" as purely defensive whereas the Soviet Union's are offensive. Thus, we see that there are similar processes of perceptual distortion operating on each side.

Finally, in another study by White (1977), Arab and Israeli perceptions of each other were examined. One interesting finding was that each side viewed the other as the aggressor in the first four Arab-Israeli wars. More specifically, the Arabs perceived Israel as the aggressor in the wars of 1956 and 1967. Concerning the wars of 1948 and 1973, although the Arabs perceived themselves as initiating them, they believe they were provoked by Israel and consequently, that makes her the aggressor in actuality. Similarly, Israel perceived the Arabs as the aggressor in the 1948 and 1973 wars whereas they admit that they started the wars of 1956 and 1967 but only because they were provoked and therefore that makes the Arabs the real aggressor. Thus, White notes that initiating hostilities as well as provoking the other side constitute aggression in the minds of both Arabs and Israelis and such a "shifting definition" allows each party to maintain its black and white picture.

#### **OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT STUDY**

K.J. Holsti (1967), O. Holsti (1976), and Jervis (1968, 1976) all maintain that our images and perceptions of political events are often biased in that they do not correspond to objective reality. But what is "objective reality"? The primary assumption of this research is that the United States has its own "reality" of the Arab-Israeli conflict and an

attempt will be made to discover what that "reality" is.

Lau (1986) notes that people live in a political environment in which they have little control over the information they receive. In other words, people necessarily receive political information indirectly because it comes from secondary sources such as politicians, the media, and opinion leaders (Fiske, 1986). In essence, "others" determine what information the public receives as well as its interpretation. Thus, political perception is basically what Fiske (1986) calls "mediated perception." She notes that an important consequence of this kind of perception is that a double filtering process occurs in that the information is structured by the individual as well as by the packager. In addition, she argues that much work has been done on how people process this information but the "prepackaged" aspect has been largely ignored. In other words, Fiske suggests that attention must be given to the actual packaging of political information or more specifically, to the political stimuli that are presented to the public.

Thus, this study will examine American "mediated" perceptions of Middle Eastern affairs by looking at cartoons, editorials, and headlines depicting the four wars of 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and the peace process of 1977-1978. One shortcoming of the research in this area that will therefore be addressed is that studies of media coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict have generally been limited to examining editorials whereas investigations of political cartoons are quite rare. A major goal of this investigation is to show that political cartoons are a useful data source for learning about a nation's images.

By focusing on cartoons about the Arab-Israeli conflict, we will be able to see which images predominate at a given time, and how those

images change in relation to critical events. It is important to know how Americans perceive the Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S. has a clear interest in the region and has often been involved in attempts to resolve the conflict. How Americans will interpret future events, as well as be supportive or critical of them, will depend to an extent on their pre-existing beliefs and images — revealed in cartoons. Halperin (1974) contends that the images of the government rarely diverge from those of the public. If this is true, then identifying national images will help us to understand future policy decisions and behavior.

The first set of questions for this research concerns the content of U.S. press coverage of Middle East events. Who are the main actors? What are the principal themes? What images and symbols are used to convey these themes? We will be looking to see how the concerns of American newspapers have changed over time — perhaps providing more information about the assertions presented in this literature review. By systematically analyzing the content of cartoons, editorials, and headlines, we will hope to provide more information on such perennial issues as: are Israelis "heroes" and Arabs "villains," are the Palestinian people largely ignored or are they just seen as terrorists, and has the U.S. media become more even-handed since the oil embargo in 1973?

In addition, we will be looking to see whether American political cartoons present a systematically different view of events than either editorials or headlines. Due to the inherent characteristics of the three media, it is conceivable that they will transmit systematically different messages. Perhaps cartoons are the "id" which contain the stereotypes and other evaluative messages complained of by so many --

and not the headlines or editorials. In that case, perceptions of media "bias" might have more to do with the relative power of the different media than a consistent approach by all three.

## **CHAPTER TWO: METHODS**

The data for this study consisted of cartoons, editorials, and headlines for the following five events: (1) the 1956 war, (2) the 1967 war, (3) the 1973 war, (4) the beginning of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process in 1977 and the Camp David peace accords of the subsequent year, and (5) the 1982 war. Each sampling period began five days before the justification date in order to ensure that any foreshadowing of the event was included. In addition, the sampling periods extended two days beyond the justification dates because there is often a delay in news coverage from the Middle East. The actual sampling dates and the respective justification dates for each event were as follows:

### **The 1956 War: July 22 to November 23, 1956**

July 27, 1956: "Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal and imposes martial law there in retaliation for American and British withdrawal of support for the financing of the Aswan Dam. Income from the canal will be funneled into building costs of the dam" (Tarr & Daves, 1986, p. 244).

November 21, 1956: "British, French, and Israeli troops withdrawals from Egypt begin. Eisenhower, according to sources, is reported to have sent private messages to the British and French governments urging complete troop withdrawal from the area" (ibid., p. 245).

### **The 1967 War: May 10 to September 3, 1967**

May 15, 1967: "The U.A.R. alerts its military forces because of mounting tension with Israel. Syria also announces that its military forces are ready for action" (ibid., p. 251).

September 1, 1967: "Arab heads of state, meeting in Khartoum, agree to seek a non-military solution to the tensions with Israel" (ibid., p. 251).

### **The 1973 War: October 1, 1973 to January 20, 1974**

October 6, 1973: "War breaks out in the Middle East on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. Egyptian forces cross the Suez Canal and Syria attacks the Golan Heights" (ibid., p. 255).

January 18, 1974: "The accords are signed. The chief provisions are: Israel is to abandon its West Bank bridgehead and to withdraw on the East Bank about 20 miles from the canal; Egypt is to keep a limited force on the East Bank; a U.N. truce force is to patrol the buffer zone between the two; the pullback is to be completed in 40 days. Sadat says he will press Syria to open talks with Israel" (ibid., p. 258).

### **The 1977, 1978 Peace Process:**

#### **(a) September 16, 1977 to December 27, 1977**

September 21, 1977: "President Carter and Secretary of State Vance meet with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy as part of the pre-Geneva peace talks. Fahmy reports Arab countries are prepared for the first time to accept Israel as a Middle East country to live in

peace...in secure borders'" (ibid., p. 265).

December 25, 1977: "Begin and Sadat hold a summit in Ismailia, Egypt, to draft guidelines for establishing peace in the Middle East. Talks conclude with no substantive agreement on any major issue" (ibid., p. 266).

**(b) August 3, 1978 to September 26, 1978**

August 8, 1978: "U.S. announces that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin will meet with President Carter in September at Camp David, Md., to explore ways to resolve the Middle East deadlock" (ibid., p. 267).

September 24, 1978: "The Israeli Cabinet approves Camp David accords." ("The Egyptian Cabinet unanimously approves the Camp David agreements"- September 19, 1978) (ibid., p. 268).

**The 1982 War: June 1, 1982 to September 22, 1982**

June 6, 1982: "Israeli tanks and infantry cross Lebanese border while being supported by air strikes and sea landings" (ibid., p. 279).

September 20, 1982: "Lebanese leaders request return of peacekeeping force to Beirut; participants agree, but Reagan stipulates that Israel must give permission and pull back forces in area." (ibid., p. 280).

The newspapers that were used to sample from were the Atlanta Constitution, the Chicago Tribune, the Christian Science Monitor, the Detroit News, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and the San Francisco

Chronicle<sup>1</sup>. The sampling procedure was that if a political cartoon dealing with the event was found, then and only then were editorials and headlines examined. In other words, the appearance of a relevant cartoon determined whether editorials and headlines were sampled. The rationale for this strategy was that since the focus of this study was political cartoons, this procedure allowed for matched samples of the other two media. Graphs were plotted by month for each of the five events in order to demonstrate the frequency of relevant political cartoons appearing in the newspapers.

Headlines were taken from the front page; if none were found, then the first five pages were examined. The unit of analysis for the headlines was the individual line, whether it was an actual headline or a lead into an article. The only exception to this was if the lead-in to the article was merely an elaboration of the headline and in such a case they were combined into one unit.

The data collected for this study consisted of: 622 cartoons, 372 editorials, and 753 headlines. Broken down by event, they each consisted of: (1) 1956 War: 118 cartoons, 60 editorials, and 154 headlines; (2) 1967 War: 133 cartoons, 93 editorials, and 200 headlines; (3) 1973 War: 131 cartoons, 83 editorials, and 151 headlines; (4) 1977, 1978 Peace Process: 118 cartoons, 72 editorials, and 117 headlines; and (5) 1982 War: 122 cartoons, 64 editorials, and 131 headlines.

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<sup>1</sup> The criteria for choosing these particular newspapers were as follows: (1) availability of cartoons -- that the newspaper printed political cartoons for all of the five events, (2) geographic distribution in major regions of the U.S., and (3) publication originates in a major city.

Content analysis was used to analyze the political cartoons, editorials and headlines for the five sampling periods. "Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). "Potentially, content analysis is one of the most important research techniques in the social sciences, it seeks to understand data not as a collection of physical events but as symbolic phenomena and to approach their analysis unobtrusively" (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 7). In addition, this analysis involved calculating the relative frequencies of the various categories for each subset of data.

### 1. Actors

The number of times each main actor was mentioned in each medium -- cartoons, editorials, headlines -- was recorded for each of the five events. A priori decisions were made to track mentions of only those actors who -- from other sources -- seemed to be the main (or potentially significant) actors. Less significant actors were noted and their frequencies were calculated in all three media for each event.

### 2. Themes

The frequencies of the themes mentioned in cartoons, editorials and headlines were also computed. For the most part, every unit of data could be classified into one theme. If, for example, one cartoon (editorial or headline) could be categorized as more than one theme, each was given a score of (0.5).

### 3. Symbols and Images

Since political cartoons were the focus of this study, more extensive analyses were performed on this medium. Symbols used to portray each of the main actors in the cartoons were noted and the frequencies recorded. If in any of the cartoons there were two symbols that were used simultaneously to represent a primary actor, then each was given a score of (0.5). To learn about differences in media, the frequencies of political leaders being used to represent the main actors (excluding the United Nations) in cartoons was then compared with frequencies in headlines. (The frequencies of political leaders for the cartoons were taken from the symbols analyses.)

In addition, images used to depict the main actors in the cartoons were coded and counted for each event. Then, in order to examine how these images changed during the course of the five events studied here, it was necessary to re-code them according to some standard procedure. It was decided to determine whether each image was active or passive as well as its valence (positive, negative, or neutral) for the purpose of comparison over time. At first this coding was done according to how the American reader would perceive a particular image though when it came to deciding upon the valence, the author realized that this was an inappropriate strategy to use because in some cases this was extremely difficult to determine. For example, an image of the Soviet Union supplying arms to Egypt in the 1956 war could confidently be coded as a negative image yet when it came to an image involving the Palestinians losing their struggle to Israel in the invasion of Lebanon, it was unclear whether this would be perceived as positive or as negative. In other words, since there was no independent measure of attitudes, there

was no way to know whether a particular perceiver would like or dislike such an image. Therefore it was decided that this way of coding the images involved, more so in some instances than in others, assuming or "guessing" how the typical American reader would have viewed them and this would have resulted in quite unreliable conclusions.

In addition, another problem that was encountered while attempting to use this coding strategy was that in some cases the author found positive images of negative events. For example, when cartoonists portrayed the image of Egypt being closely allied with the Soviet Union in the 1956 war, they would show Khrushchev and Nasser hugging each other: this could be viewed as a positive image though according to American perceptions of this event, it would be seen as negative. These specific images were therefore difficult to code because they were open to different interpretations.

Therefore in order to have some sort of consistency in the coding of these images as well as attempting to do it with some degree of reliability, it was realized that the best alternative was to determine the valence as objectively as possible and this meant focusing on the nature of the specific behavior or action rather than how it might have been perceived.

Thus the decision to code a particular image as positive, negative or neutral was made in terms of a behavioral analysis for that particular actor. This strategy eliminated the possibility of making incorrect assumptions as well as the possibility of confirming the alleged bias of the American press. Neil Kressel (1987) recently wrote an article in which he discussed this problem and it was entitled: "Biased judgments of media bias: a case study of the Arab-Israeli

dispute." In reviewing the existing literature in this area he found that there have been many articles that accuse the media of being against Israel and even more that claim it is anti-Arab. Kressel believes that the reason for these "conflicting accusations" is that the pro-Israeli and the pro-Arab writers critique the media in accordance with their own political beliefs. Thus, these researchers tend to perceive media stimuli in accordance with the political views they hold and this results in them being able to confirm their beliefs. In other words, Arab supporters and Israeli supporters could study the same piece of data and each make the claim of media bias. Kressel's biggest complaint with all these studies is that after performing a content analysis and finding unfavorable media coverage, the charge is made of media bias. He writes that "content analytic studies explore what messages the media send; they cannot assess the validity or fairness of these messages" (p. 217).

Therefore, since the goal of the present research is not to demonstrate media bias, then to attempt to judge these images in terms of the American reader would only be an exercise in confirming what is believed to be these national perceptions. In other words, in order to maintain an objective approach in examining the datum collected for this study, it is only possible to interpret the valence of the images found in these political cartoons in terms of the act itself as opposed to trying to attribute a general American perception without being able to do so with any degree of consistency or reliability.

Finally, an attempt was made to apply Azar's (n.d.) COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank) coding strategy which is used to monitor as well as to analyze both international and domestic events. Specifically, the

COPDAB 15-point international scale was utilized and the seven different points to assess conflict as well as the seven to assess cooperation were each collapsed in order to have two basic categories in addition to the neutral one. One basic problem encountered while trying to use this scale was that many of the images in this study were not directed at a particular "target" and as a result, it was difficult to re-code them in this manner. Nonetheless, the system was quite useful in many instances to support coding decisions, particularly for images where the American perceiver might see the image as negative though in a objective behavioral analysis, it would be coded as positive. For example, the image of the Soviet Union "supplying arms, giving support to Egypt, Arabs" (found in the 1967 war) was coded as positive since it is essentially a cooperative act. In essence, the COPDAB international scale was used to facilitate the re-coding of these images in those cases where it was applicable; the terms "negative" and "positive" were retained for the purpose of consistency.

## CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS

### I. THE 1956 WAR

#### Who are the Actors?

Table 1 shows that in all three media, Egypt was the most frequently represented main actor whereas Israel received the least attention. In the cartoons, the second most frequent actor was the Soviet Union, which occurred less than half as often as Egypt, although the United Nations, the United States, and then Britain were only slightly less frequently seen. In the editorials, Britain was mentioned second most often, followed closely by the United States. In the headlines, Britain was also the second most frequently represented actor, followed by the United States and then the United Nations. The imbalance between Egypt and Israel is striking. Egypt was represented in nearly two-thirds of the sample of cartoons, in almost all of the editorials, and in slightly less than half of the headlines; Israel was seen in fewer than 10% of the cartoons and headlines, yet in 40% of editorials.

Less significant actors are detailed in Table 2. Arab(s) or the Arab world were the most frequent "minor" actors in all three media. As far as specific Arab nations, Jordan was represented in the cartoons and editorials, though almost equally as infrequently, yet not at all in the headlines. It should be noted that Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,

Iraq, Syria, and Iran were all mentioned in the editorials, though infrequently, and were not represented at all in the cartoons or the headlines.

### What are the Themes?

Looking at Table 3, we see that there was no one theme that was especially prevalent in any of the three media. The most frequent theme in the cartoons, accounting for one-fifth of the sample, was "Nasser's [or Egypt's] power and aggressive power" and it received slightly less attention in the editorials (third most frequent) and somewhat less in the headlines (fourth most frequent). The second most frequent theme in the cartoons was "the U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies" which received half as much attention in both the editorials and the headlines. Third in the cartoons was the theme of "the U.N.'s role and/or actions" and this received more attention in both the editorials (in which it was the most frequent theme) and in the headlines (third most frequent). The theme of "uncertainty of peace" was fourth most frequent in the cartoons and it occurred more frequently in the editorials (fourth most frequent) but less often in the headlines. Most frequent in the headlines was "British and French involvement" yet this theme occurred quite infrequently in both the cartoons and editorials. The second most frequent theme in both the editorials and headlines was the "U.S.'s role and/or policies" which occurred half as frequently in the cartoons. Finally, it should be noted that the four most frequent themes for each medium accounted for the majority of each sample.

### What are the Symbols and Images?

Turning now to the symbols used to represent the main actors in the cartoons, Table 4 shows that Egypt was most often portrayed by Nasser (accounting for nearly two-thirds of this sample). The other seven symbols were all used quite little in comparison and these were: the words "Egypt"/ "Egyptian," pyramids, the word "Nasser," a ship, a camel, Foreign Minister Fawzi, and a tank.

The Soviet Union was most often symbolized by Khrushchev, accounting for nearly one-third of the portrayals, and second by a man or men. These two symbols accounted for nearly half of the portrayals of this country. The next two most frequent representations of the U.S.S.R., occurring equally often were: Premier Bulganin (used as a symbol one-third as often as First Secretary Khrushchev) and a soldier. Other symbols included the Russian symbol, the bear, the word "Reds," Foreign Minister Shepilov, the word "Russian," and a tank (see Table 5).

Table 6 shows that the United Nations was most frequently symbolized by the police force and the words "United Nations"/ "U.N."; both of these two symbols were used equally often and accounted for nearly half of the sample. The next two symbols most often used were the U.N. building and a man. Finally, occurring less frequently were a ship and a door whereas Secretary-General Hammarskjold, the U.N. Charter book, and a fire department were the symbols least often used to portray the United Nations.

Depictions of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were the most popular way to portray the United States, although Uncle Sam was used almost as often; these two symbols accounted for the majority of this sample. Other symbols were: the words "U.S."/ "American," a man,

President Eisenhower, and the word "Dulles" (see Table 7).

As far as the symbols used to represent Britain, portrayals of Prime Minister Anthony Eden were by far the most common, accounting for slightly more than two-fifths of the sample. The second most frequent symbol was a man, followed by the words "Britain"/ "England," a ship, and finally the word "Eden" or a tank (see Table 8).

France was most often symbolized by a man and secondly, by illustrations of Premier Mollet (these two symbols accounted for slightly more than half of the sample). The next most frequent symbols were Foreign Minister Pineau, the words "France"/ "French, and then a ship or a tank (see Table 9).

Israel (see Table 10) was represented in the cartoons, primarily by the words "Israel"/ "Israeli" (accounting for two-thirds of this sample). The remaining three symbols were all only found to occur in one cartoon apiece: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, a weapon, and a tank.

Table 11 illustrates how often political leaders were used to represent the main actors (excluding the United Nations) in both cartoons and headlines. In cartoons, Egypt was represented by political leaders more often than any other actor and Israel the least often. In the headlines, the United States was most often represented by political leaders whereas Israel (with the Soviet Union a close second) the least. Finally, in comparing the two media one can see that political leaders are the subject-matter of cartoons, occurring more than twice as often than in headlines in all instances (Egypt, U.S.S.R., Britain, France, Israel) except the United States for which the margin between the two media was not as large.

Turning now to the images of the main actors in the cartoons, Table

12 specifies those of Egypt. The most frequent depiction of this country was that of "stealing, seizing, nationalizing the Suez Canal" and second most often was another aggressive image -- "threatening, arguing, or intimidating others (U.S. and/or U.N. and/or Britain and/or France)." These two images together accounted for more than one-fourth of the portrayals of Egypt. As far as other images, five involved some sort of conflict imagery: (1) "threatening the peace," (2) "preparing for or involved in war," (3) "involved in conflict with, fighting with, or hostilities being initiated by Israel," (4) "angering the Arab world," and (5) "hoping to learn from Hitler by reading Mein Kampf."

As seen in Table 13, the most frequent images of the Soviet Union (each accounting for nearly one-fourth of this sample) were: (1) "threatening to send or sending volunteers to Egypt" and (2) "closely allied with and supporting Egypt [Nasser]." Four of the six remaining images can be described as ascribing negative intent to the U.S.S.R.: (1) "seeking to dominate the Arab world," (2) "refusing to give aid for Aswan Dam or giving phony offers of aid," (3) "threatening to or using the veto," and (4) "threatening the peace with propaganda."

The most frequent image by far of the United Nations, as can be seen from Table 14, was that of "hoping, trying to resolve the crisis in the Middle East." The second most frequent image was a variation of the preceding one although much more concrete: "police force is trying to keep the peace and/or keep the Russian volunteers out of the Middle East." These two images amounted for slightly more than half of this sample. Finally, there were three quite different images insofar as they were somewhat pessimistic, describing the U.N. as being worried or disturbed: (1) "troubled by Nasser's [or Egypt's] aggressiveness," (2)

"uncertain about ability to bring peace to the Middle East or the world," and (3) "troubled by the U.S.S.R. and Egypt because they are threatening world peace."

Table 15 demonstrates that one image of the United States predominated, accounting for nearly one-third of this particular sample: "advocating diplomacy, negotiations; trying to keep or restore the peace." A similar image, although more specific in detail, occurred less frequently: "supporting and promoting the User Association or Cape of Good Hope detour." But the picture has another side as well. An equal percentage of this sample as accounted for by the two preceding images (42%) portrayed the United States as having difficulties, problems or obstacles: (1) "scared of, shocked by, or intimidated by Nasser and his aggressiveness," (2) "disagreeing with, trying to restrain, or opposing Britain and France," (3) "U.S. foreign policy is failing," (4) "arguing with or questioning Nasser," (5) "shocked by Soviet involvement in Suez crisis," and (6) "uncertain how to deal with Nasser."

The most frequent image of Britain during the 1956 war, accounting for one-fourth of the sample, was "arguing with or questioning or opposing Nasser." Yet there were two other images that also involved Britain's difficulties with Nasser, although combined they were not as frequent: (1) "scared of or intimidated by Nasser's aggressiveness" and (2) "uncertain how to deal with Nasser." The second most popular image of Britain was "advocating diplomacy, negotiations and willing to negotiate" and there was another image, though it occurred half as frequently, that was similar though more concrete: "seeking help from the U.N. or the U.S." In contrast to these two images were three others that were quite negative portrayals of Britain: (1) "intent on going to

war or involved in war," (2) "criticism at home concerning policies pursued," and (3) "losing prestige in the Middle East" (see Table 16).

Like Britain, the most popular image used to portray France was "arguing with or questioning or opposing Nasser" and it accounted for slightly more than one-fourth of this sample. In addition, the other two images describing Britain's difficulties with Nasser ("scared of or intimidated by Nasser's aggressiveness" and "uncertain how to deal with Nasser") were used to portray France. Yet only one of the negative portrayals of Britain was used in connection with France and it was the second most frequent image: "intent on going to war or involved in war." Occurring less frequently, though equally as often, were two images that were more positive portrayals: "advocating negotiations and willing to negotiate" and "seeking help from the U.N. or the U.S." (see Table 17).

As Table 18 demonstrates, there were two images of Israel that occurred equally as often and each accounted for one-third of the sample: (1) "conflict with Jordan is coupled with the Suez crisis and is making peace more unlikely" and (2) "involved in conflict, fighting with Egypt." The next most frequent image also involved conflict: "initiating hostilities with Jordan or Egypt."

**Table 1****Main Actors: 1956 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Egypt	61.86 (73)	96.67 (58)	46.75 (72)
U.S.S.R.	24.58 (29)	65.00 (39)	12.34 (19)
U.N.	22.88 (27)	66.67 (40)	25.32 (39)
U.S.	22.03 (26)	83.33 (50)	27.27 (42)
Britain	20.34 (24)	85.00 (51)	33.77 (52)
France	12.71 (15)	73.33 (44)	16.88 (26)
Israel	7.63 (9)	40.00 (24)	7.14 (11)

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Note. Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=118; editorials: n=60; headlines: n=154).

**Table 2****Less Significant Actors: 1956 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Arab(s), Arab World	8.47 (10)	43.33 (26)	3.90 (6)
Jordan	3.39 (4)	5.00 (3)	-
Palestine	-	5.00 (3)	-
Saudi Arabia	-	3.33 (2)	-
Lebanon	-	3.33 (2)	-
Iraq	-	3.33 (2)	-
Syria	-	1.67 (1)	-
Iran	-	1.67 (1)	-

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Note. Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=118; editorials: n=60; headlines: n=154).

**Table 3****Themes: 1956 War**

Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Nasser's [or Egypt's] power and/or aggressive policies	20.34 (24)	18.33 (11)	12.99 (20)
U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies	17.80 (21)	8.33 (5)	8.44 (13)
U.N.'s role and/or actions	14.41 (17)	24.17 (14.5)	17.53 (27)
Uncertainty of peace	11.86 (14)	16.67 (10)	7.14 (11)
U.S.'s role and/or policies	9.32 (11)	20.83 (12.5)	19.16 (29.5)
Opposition towards Nasser [or Egypt] and his policies	8.47 (10)	1.67 (1)	2.60 (4)
Middle East oil threatened	5.08 (6)	3.33 (2)	3.25 (5)
British and French involvement	3.39 (4)	3.33 (2)	21.10 (32.5)
Disunity of the Western alliance	3.39 (4)	-	.65 (1)
Opposition towards Eden	2.54 (3)	-	.65 (1)
Israel's role and/or policies	1.69 (2)	1.67 (1)	3.90 (6)
Alliance between Egypt and the U.S.S.R.	1.69 (2)	1.67 (1)	2.60 (4)
N	118	60	154

**Table 4****Symbols Representing Egypt in the Cartoons: 1956 War**

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Category	%
President Nasser	67.12 (49)
"Egypt", "Egyptian"	9.59 (7)
Pyramid(s)	9.59 (7)
"Nasser"	5.48 (4)
Ship	4.11 (3)
Camel	1.37 (1)
Foreign Minister Fawzi	1.37 (1)
Tank	1.37 (1)
N	73

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**Table 5****Symbols Representing the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1956 War**

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Category	%
Khrushchev (First Secretary of the Communist Party)	31.03 (9)
Man or men	17.24 (5)
Premier Bulganin	10.34 (3)
Soldier	10.34 (3)
Russian Symbol	6.90 (2)
Bear	6.90 (2)
"Reds"	6.90 (2)
Foreign Minister Shepilov	3.45 (1)
"Russian"	3.45 (1)
Tank	3.45 (1)
N	29

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**Table 6**Symbols Representing the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1956 War

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Category	%
U.N. Police Force	22.22 (6)
"United Nations", "U.N."	22.22 (6)
U.N. Building	14.81 (4)
Man	14.81 (4)
Ship	7.41 (2)
Door	7.41 (2)
Secretary-General Hammarskjold	3.70 (1)
U.N. Charter Book	3.70 (1)
Fire Department	3.70 (1)
N	27

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**Table 7**

Symbols Representing the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1956 War

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Category	%
Secretary of State Dulles	34.62 (9)
Uncle Sam	26.92 (7)
"U.S.", "American"	11.54 (3)
Man	11.54 (3)
President Eisenhower	7.69 (2)
"Dulles"	7.69 (2)
N	26

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**Table 8****Symbols Representing Britain in the Cartoons: 1956 War**

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Category	%
Prime Minister Eden	41.67 (10)
Man	25.00 (6)
"British", "England"	16.67 (4)
Ship	8.33 (2)
"Eden"	4.17 (1)
Tank	4.17 (1)
N	24

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**Table 9****Symbols Representing France in the Cartoons: 1956 War**

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Category	%
Man	33.33 (5)
Premier Mollet	26.67 (4)
Foreign Minister Pineau	13.33 (2)
"France", "French"	13.33 (2)
Ship	6.67 (1)
Tank	6.67 (1)
N	15

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**Table 10****Symbols Representing Israel in the Cartoons: 1956 War**

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Category	%
"Israel", "Israeli"	66.67 (6)
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion	11.11 (1)
Weapon	11.11 (1)
Tank	11.11 (1)
N	9

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**Table 11****Political Leaders in the Cartoons and the Headlines: 1956 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of headlines
Egypt	73.97 (54) n=73	22.22 (16) n=72
U.S.S.R.	44.83 (13) n=29	5.26 (1) n=19
U.S.	50.00 (13) n=26	39.29 (16.5) n=42
Britain	45.83 (11) n=24	17.31 (9) n=52
France	40.00 (6) n=15	11.54 (3) n=26
Israel	11.11 (1) n=9	4.55 (.5) n=11

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**Table 12****Images of Egypt in the Cartoons: 1956 War**

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Category	%
Stealing, seizing, nationalizing the Suez Canal	15.07 (11)
Threatening, arguing, or intimidating others (U.S. and/or U.N. and/or Britain and/or France)	12.33 (9)
Begging, pleading for aid money for Aswan Dam	6.85 (5)
Controlling or jeopardizing oil	6.85 (5)
Uncertain about the idea of Soviet volunteers	6.85 (5)
Threatening the peace	5.48 (4)
Disrespectful of international agreements	5.48 (4)
Closely allied with the U.S.S.R.	5.48 (4)
Preparing for or involved in war	5.48 (4)
Concerned about User Association or Cape of Good Hope detour	5.48 (4)
Willing to negotiate or meet with 5 nation committee	5.48 (4)
Having economic difficulties	4.11 (3)
Involved in conflict with, fighting with, or hostilities being initiated by Israel	4.11 (3)
Being questioned by others (Britain and/or U.S. and/or France)	2.74 (2)
Angering the Arab world	2.74 (2)
Hoping to learn from Hitler by reading <u>Mein Kampf</u>	2.74 (2)
Trying to unify the Arab world	1.37 (1)
Hoping to rule the Arab world	1.37 (1)
N	73

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**Table 13**Images of the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1956 War

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Category	%
Threatening to send or sending volunteers to Egypt	24.14 (7)
Closely allied with and supporting Egypt [Nasser]	24.14 (7)
Seeking to dominate the Arab world	10.34 (3)
Refusing to give aid for Aswan Dam or giving phony offers of aid	10.34 (3)
Coupling of involvement in Hungary and the Middle East	10.34 (3)
Threatening to or using the veto	10.34 (3)
Threatening the peace with propaganda	6.90 (2)
Allied with the Arab world	3.45 (1)
N	29

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**Table 14**

Images of the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1956 War

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Category	%
Hoping, trying to resolve the crisis in the Middle East	33.33 (9)
Police force is trying to keep the peace and/or keep the Russian volunteers out of the Middle East	18.52 (5)
Troubled by Nasser's [or Egypt's] aggressiveness	14.81 (4)
Uncertain about ability to bring peace to the Middle East or the world	14.81 (4)
Troubled by the U.S.S.R. and Egypt because they are threatening world peace	7.41 (2)
Resolutions are being vetoed by the U.S.S.R.	7.41 (2)
Being asked for help by Britain and France	3.70 (1)
N	27

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**Table 15****Images of the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1956 War**

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Category	%
Advocating diplomacy, negotiations; trying to keep or restore the peace	30.77 (8)
Refusing to give aid money to Egypt for Aswan Dam	15.38 (4)
Scared of, shocked by, or intimidated by Nasser and his aggressiveness	11.54 (3)
Supporting and promoting the User Association or Cape of Good Hope detour	11.54 (3)
Disagreeing with, trying to restrain, or opposing Britain and France	7.69 (2)
U.S. foreign policy is failing	7.69 (2)
Arguing with or questioning Nasser	7.69 (2)
Shocked by Soviet involvement in Suez crisis	3.85 (1)
Uncertain how to deal with Nasser	3.85 (1)
N	26

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**Table 16****Images of Britain in the Cartoons: 1956 War**

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Category	%
Arguing with or questioning or opposing Nasser	25.00 (6)
Advocating diplomacy, negotiations and willing to negotiate	16.67 (4)
Criticism at home concerning policies pursued	12.50 (3)
Intent on going to war or involved in war	12.50 (3)
Scared of or intimidated by Nasser's aggressiveness	8.33 (2)
Uncertain how to deal with Nasser	8.33 (2)
Seeking help from the U.N. or the U.S.	8.33 (2)
Withdrawing aid offer to Egypt for Aswan Dam	4.17 (1)
Losing prestige in the Middle East	4.17 (1)
N	24

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**Table 17**Images of France in the Cartoons: 1956 War

Category	%
Arguing with or opposing Nasser	26.67 (4)
Intent on going to war or involved in war	20.00 (3)
Advocating negotiations and willing to negotiate	13.33 (2)
Scared of or intimidated by Nasser's aggressiveness	13.33 (2)
Uncertain how to deal with Nasser	13.33 (2)
Seeking help from the U.N. or the U.S.	13.33 (2)
N	15

**Table 18**Images of Israel in the Cartoons: 1956 War

Category	%
Conflict with Jordan is coupled with the Suez crisis and is making peace more unlikely	33.33 (3)
Involved in conflict, fighting with Egypt	33.33 (3)
Initiating hostilities with Jordan or Egypt	22.22 (2)
Being a problem to Nasser	11.11 (1)
N	9

## II. THE 1967 WAR

### Who are the Actors?

Table 19 shows that in the cartoons, the Soviet Union was the most frequently represented actor, followed by Egypt, and then Israel. Yet in both the editorials and the headlines, Israel was the dominant actor. In addition, the second most frequent actor in the editorials was the United States yet in the headlines it was Egypt. In contrast the three media were more in agreement about the least frequently mentioned actor. In essence, Jordan and Syria received the least attention and it was practically the same percentage within each medium. It should be noted that although Syria was not found in any of the cartoons, Jordan was only in one whereas both received more attention in the headlines and quite a lot more in the editorials.

Concerning the less significant actors (see Table 20), Arab(s) or the Arab world was seen very often in editorials, less than half as often in the cartoons, and much less in the headlines; for all three media it was the most frequent "minor" actor. Britain and France were seen in approximately one-fifth (somewhat more often in the case of Britain) of the editorials but in comparison were both seen quite minimally in the other two media. An interesting finding was that "Arab refugees" were mentioned in the cartoons, editorials and headlines whereas "Palestinian refugees" were only referred to in the editorials. As far as other Arab nations, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, and Libya were all found in both the cartoons and editorials but not at all in the headlines. The only other Arab nation that was included in all

three media was Algeria. Finally, Palestine was represented in the cartoons and editorials but not in the headlines.

### What are the Themes?

Table 21 demonstrates that for both the cartoons and the headlines, there was one theme that occurred a great deal more frequently than any of the others yet in the editorials, such a prevailing theme did not exist. In the cartoons the most frequent theme, accounting for nearly one-third of the sample, was the "U.S.S.R.'s role and /or policies" which received less than half the attention in both the editorials and headlines. The second most frequent theme, although occurring approximately one-third less often, was the "downfall and defeat of Nasser [or Egypt]" and in comparison, it received very little attention in both the editorials and headlines. Third in the cartoons was the "U.N.'s role and/or actions" which occurred slightly more frequently in the editorials and even more often in the headlines; it was the second most frequent theme for both these media. The fourth most frequent theme was "superpower relations: hostile, competitive, or cooperative" and it received slightly more attention in the editorials though occurred quite infrequently in the headlines. Turning to the editorials, the most frequent theme, though not a dominating one, was the "U.S.'s role and/or policies." Although this theme received almost as much attention in the headlines, it was hardly represented at all in the cartoons. As far as the headlines, the prevailing theme, accounting for nearly one-fourth of the sample, was "Israel's role and/or policies and/or military achievements and military superiority." This particular theme was expressed nearly half as frequently in the editorials whereas in the

cartoons it was hardly represented at all.

### What are the Symbols and Images?

Turning now to the symbols used to represent the main actors in the cartoons, Table 22 shows that Premier Kosygin was by far the most popular symbol used to portray the Soviet Union, accounting for slightly more than half of this sample. The second most frequent symbol was Brezhnev, which occurred approximately one-fifth as often. The remaining symbols were used less frequently and they were, in descending order of occurrence: a man, the words "U.S.S.R."/ "Soviet," arms and assorted military equipment, the word "Kosygin," the Russian symbol, a soldier, a ship, a bear, U.N. Ambassador Fedorenko, and missiles.

Tables 23 shows that again, Egypt was primarily symbolized by President Nasser, accounting for three-fourths of all of the portrayals of this country. The second most frequent symbol, which occurred much less often, was the word "Nasser." Other symbols used to represent Egypt were the word "Egypt," a soldier(s), and a pyramid(s) (all of which were found in only two cartoons each) and least frequently, a camel and the sphinx.

As far as the symbols used to represent Israel, the words "Israel"/ "Tel Aviv"/ "Israeli" were again (excluding "Tel Aviv") the most popular, accounting for slightly more than two-fifths of the sample, whereas a soldier(s) was the second most frequent though it was used less than half as often. These two symbols accounted for nearly two-thirds of all of the portrayals of Israel. The third most frequent symbol was the star(s) of David, followed by Defense Minister Dayan. Other symbols used to represent Israel were Foreign Minister Eban, a

man, a tank, a ship, and a woman (see Table 24).

Table 25 demonstrates that President Johnson was by far the most popular symbol used to depict the United States, accounting for nearly half of this sample. The second most frequent symbol was the words "U.S."/ "U.S.A."/ "American" and third was Uncle Sam. The other five symbols used to represent the United States occurred the least frequently, being found in only one cartoon apiece: a soldier, missiles, the American flag, U.N. Ambassador Goldberg, and George Bundy (counted as one-half since he was in a cartoon with the President).

The words "United Nations"/ "U.N." were the most frequently used way to represent this actor, followed by depictions of Secretary-General U Thant which occurred less than half as often. These two symbols accounted for two-thirds of all the portrayals of the United Nations. Other symbols used were the U.N. emblem, a fireman or the fire department, and U.N. cease-fire observers, all of which occurred equally as often. Finally, the least frequently used symbols, found in only one cartoon each, were the U.N. peace-keeping force, the U.N. building, and a policeman (see Table 26).

As Table 27 demonstrates, Jordan was in only one cartoon and it was symbolized by a man.

Table 28 illustrates how frequently political leaders were used to represent the main actors (excluding the United Nations) in both the cartoons and the headlines. In the cartoons, Egypt was by far the country most frequently portrayed by political leaders and Israel was least. As far as the headlines, the United States was most often represented by political leaders and Israel was the least likely. In comparing the cartoons and headlines, the largest difference was seen

with Egypt where political leaders were used slightly more than four times as often in the cartoons than in the headlines. In addition, political leaders were used much more often in the cartoons than in the headlines to portray both the Soviet Union (more than three times as often) and the United States (almost two times as often). In contrast, political leaders were used slightly more often in the headlines than in the cartoons to depict Israel. In addition, both Jordan and Syria were represented by political leaders more often in the headlines than in the cartoons but such a conclusion is a bit unfair since there was only one portrayal of Jordan and none of Syria in the sample of cartoons.

The most frequent image of the Soviet Union, as can be seen from Table 29, was "supplying arms, giving support to Egypt, Arabs." The second most popular image was somewhat similar: "closely allied with and influencing Egypt." These two descriptions of the U.S.S.R. accounted for slightly more than one-third of all of the portrayals of this country. Six of the remaining thirteen images all described the Soviet Union as having difficulties with or being critical of the United States and/or Israel: (1) "denouncing Israel and demanding return of the Arab territories," (2) "having difficulties with the U.S. concerning the Middle East and Viet Nam at the same time," (3) "linking the U.S. and Israel in committing aggression and denouncing them both," (4) "distrustful of or uneasy with the U.S. concerning the Middle East," (5) "competing with the U.S. for influence in the Middle East or the Arab world," and (6) "possibility of a direct confrontation with the U.S." Yet the two most frequent images discussed above accounted for a slightly higher percentage of the total sample of portrayals of the Soviet Union than these six did. Finally, it is important to note that

out of a total of 15 images, there was only one really positive one of the Soviet Union, though it was relatively infrequent: "cooperating with the U.S. to end the Middle East crisis."

Table 30 demonstrates that by far the most frequent image of Egypt, accounting for slightly more than one-fourth of the sample, was: "portrayed as the loser- embarrassed, afraid, dejected, or physically injured and bandaged up." There were four other images that were somewhat similar to this first one in that they all portrayed Egypt as having specific problems or difficulties: (1) "loss of prestige or influence in the Arab world," (2) "alliance with the U.S.S.R. is in doubt," (3) "opposition and criticism from the U.S.," and (4) "having economic difficulties." These five images that portrayed Egypt as "losing" in one way or another or as having difficulties accounted for slightly more than half of the portrayals of this country. Finally, the second most frequent image of Egypt was "threatening war, making war plans" yet there were two other conflict images which specifically involved Israel, although combined they only occurred half as often: (1) "hostile towards and fighting with Israel" and (2) "as one of many Goliaths against David."

"Winning or victorious over Egypt [Nasser]" was the most frequent image of Israel (see Table 31). One of the two second most frequent images was "being denounced by the U.S.S.R. and ordered to return the Arab territories" whereas the counterpart image, "insistent about keeping the Arab territories," only occurred half as often. Another image involved being criticized by the Soviet Union but it was found only half as frequently as the one previously mentioned: "linked by the U.S.S.R. with the U.S. in committing aggression and being denounced for

it." Four images of Israel involved conflict: (1) "hostile towards, ready to fight, or fighting with the Arabs or the Arab world," (2) "threatened by, fighting with Egypt or Nasser," (3) "hated by the Arabs," and (4) "as David against many Goliaths." These four images accounted for nearly one-third of all of the portrayals of Israel.

The most frequent image of the United States, although not by much of a margin, was described as follows: "having difficulties with the U.S.S.R. concerning the Middle East and Viet Nam at the same time." There were four other images that involved problems or difficulties with the Soviet Union: (1) "linked by the U.S.S.R. with Israel in committing aggression and being denounced for it," (2) "possibility of a direct confrontation with the U.S.S.R.," (3) "distrustful of or uneasy with the U.S.S.R. concerning the Middle East," and (4) "competing with the U.S.S.R. for influence in the Middle East or Arab world." These five images describing negative relations between the superpowers accounted for slightly more than half of all of the portrayals of the United States. There was one other image involving the Soviet Union which was actually positive but it occurred relatively infrequently: "cooperating with the U.S.S.R. to end the Middle East crisis." Finally, there were two images, occurring equally as often and combined they accounted for slightly more than one-fifth of the sample, which described the United States' position in the conflict: (1) "supplying arms, giving support to Israel" and (2) opposing and criticizing Nasser" (see Table 32).

Table 33 shows the images of the United Nations. Most prevalent (accounting for slightly more than one-fourth of the sample) was: "the U.S.S.R. is adamantly pursuing and arguing its case and/or creating trouble and difficulties." The second most frequent image was "achieving

a cease-fire and sending observers to the Middle East." In addition, there were two other positive images of the United Nations which combined with the preceding one, amounted to more than one-third of the sample: (1) "hoping, trying to resolve the crisis, or keep peace in the Middle East" and (2) "coupling of its attempts to try to resolve the Middle East crisis and the Viet Nam war." Finally, there were four other images, accounting for slightly more than one-fourth of the sample, which portrayed the U.N. negatively and as having specific difficulties: (1) "having problems with resolutions," (2) "unable to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict," (3) "peace-keeping force is kicked out," and (4) "U Thant pleading with Nasser."

The most frequent image of Jordan was the only one since there was just one portrayal of this country: "ravaged by the war and requesting arms from the U.S." (see Table 34).

**Table 19****Main Actors: 1967 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
U.S.S.R.	45.11 (60)	78.49 (73)	22.50 (45)
Egypt	40.60 (54)	79.57 (74)	30.00 (60)
Israel	30.83 (41)	91.40 (85)	49.00 (98)
U.S.	21.05 (28)	83.87 (78)	26.00 (52)
U.N.	20.30 (27)	77.42 (72)	27.50 (55)
Jordan	.75 (1)	21.51 (20)	6.00 (12)
Syria	-	22.58 (21)	5.50 (11)

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Note. Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=133; editorials: n=93; headlines: n=200).

**Table 20****Less Significant Actors: 1967 War**

Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Arab(s), Arab World	30.08 (40)	86.02 (80)	12.50 (25)
Arab Refugees	6.02 (8)	9.68 (9)	1.50 (3)
Palestinian Refugees	-	5.38 (5)	-
Britain	3.01 (4)	27.96 (26)	3.50 (7)
France	3.01 (4)	19.35 (18)	1.00 (2)
Saudi Arabia	1.50 (2)	7.53 (7)	-
Palestine	.75 (1)	6.45 (6)	-
Iraq	.75 (1)	4.30 (4)	-
Kuwait	.75 (1)	3.23 (3)	-
Algeria	.75 (1)	1.08 (1)	.50 (1)
Iran	.75 (1)	1.08 (1)	-
Libya	.75 (1)	1.08 (1)	-
Qatar	.75 (1)	-	-
Bahrein	.75 (1)	-	-
Yemen	-	4.30 (4)	-
Morocco	-	2.15 (2)	-

Note. Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=133; editorials: n=93; headlines: n=200).

**Table 21****Themes: 1967 War**

Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies	30.83 (41)	9.68 (9)	11.00 (22)
Downfall and defeat of Nasser [or Egypt]	10.53 (14)	2.15 (2)	2.50 (5)
U.N.'s role and/or actions	9.77 (13)	11.83 (11)	14.75 (29.5)
Nasser's [or Egypt's] power and aggressive policies	9.77 (13)	8.60 (8)	10.75 (21.5)
Superpower relations: hostile, competitive, or cooperative	9.02 (12)	10.75 (10)	2.75 (5.5)
Relations between Israel and Arabs or Arab nations: hostile, antagonistic, tense	5.26 (7)	9.68 (9)	8.00 (16)
Coupling of the Middle East crisis with the Viet Nam war	4.51 (6)	3.23 (3)	-
Defeated, discouraged Arabs or Arab nations and/or policies	4.51 (6)	4.30 (4)	4.50 (9)
Uncertainty of peace	3.76 (5)	8.60 (8)	3.50 (7)
Middle Eastern oil in jeopardy	3.76 (5)	-	.50 (1)
U.S.'s role and/or policies	3.01 (4)	15.05 (14)	12.00 (24)
Problem of refugees	3.01 (4)	3.23 (3)	1.00 (2)
Israel's role and/or policies and/or military achievements and military superiority	2.26 (3)	10.75 (10)	23.25 (46.5)
Cooperative relations between Israel and Egypt and/or Syria and/or Jordan	-	2.15 (2)	3.50 (7)

(table continues)

Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Israel attacks the U.S.S. Liberty	-	-	2.00 (4)
N	133	93	200

**Table 22****Symbols Representing the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1967 War**

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Category	%
Premier Kosygin	51.67 (31)
Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Communist Party)	10.00 (6)
Man	6.67 (4)
"U.S.S.R.", "Soviet"	6.67 (4)
Arms, assorted military equipment	5.00 (3)
"Kosygin"	5.00 (3)
Russian Symbol	3.33 (2)
Soldier	3.33 (2)
Ship	3.33 (2)
Bear	1.67 (1)
U.N. Ambassador Fedorenko	1.67 (1)
Missiles	1.67 (1)
N	60

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**Table 23****Symbols Representing Egypt in the Cartoons: 1967 War**

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Category	%
President Nasser	75.93 (41)
"Nasser"	9.26 (5)
"Egypt"	3.70 (2)
Soldier(s)	3.70 (2)
Pyramid(s)	3.70 (2)
Camel	1.85 (1)
Sphinx	1.85 (1)
N	54

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**Table 24****Symbols Representing Israel in the Cartoons: 1967 War**

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Category	%
"Israel", "Tel Aviv", "Israeli"	43.90 (18)
Soldier(s)	19.51 (8)
Star(s) of David	9.76 (4)
Defense Minister Dayan	7.32 (3)
Foreign Minister Eban	4.88 (2)
Man	4.88 (2)
Tank	4.88 (2)
Ship	2.44 (1)
Woman	2.44 (1)
N	41

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**Table 25**Symbols Representing the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1967 War

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Category	%
President Johnson	48.21 (13.5)
"U.S.", "U.S.A.", "American"	25.00 (7)
Uncle Sam	10.71 (3)
Soldier	3.57 (1)
Missiles	3.57 (1)
American Flag	3.57 (1)
U.N. Ambassador Goldberg	3.57 (1)
Bundy (Special Assistant to the President)	1.79 (.5)
N	28

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**Table 26****Symbols Representing the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1967 War**

Category	%
"United Nations", "U.N."	48.15 (13)
Secretary-General U Thant	18.52 (5)
U.N. Emblem	7.41 (2)
Fireman, Fire Department	7.41 (2)
U.N. Cease-Fire Observers	7.41 (2)
U.N. Peace-Keeping Force	3.70 (1)
U.N. Building	3.70 (1)
Policeman	3.70 (1)
N	27

**Table 27****Symbols Representing Jordan in the Cartoons: 1967 War**

Category	%
Man	100.00 (1)
N	1

**Table 28****Political Leaders in the Cartoons and the Headlines: 1967 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of headlines
U.S.S.R.	68.33 (41) n=60	31.11 (14) n=45
Egypt	85.12 (46) n=54	20.00 (12) n=60
Israel	12.20 (5) n=41	14.29 (14) n=98
U.S.	53.57 (15) n=28	36.54 (19) n=52
Jordan	- n=1	33.33 (4) n=12
Syria	- n=0	18.18 (2) n=11

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**Table 29**Images of the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1967 War

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Category	%
Supplying arms, giving support to Egypt, Arabs	25.00 (15)
Closely allied with and influencing Egypt	10.00 (6)
Disappointed in or embarrassed by Arabs and war	8.33 (5)
Arguing its case, opposing or supporting resolutions, or failing at the U.N.	8.33 (5)
Denouncing Israel and demanding return of the Arab territories	6.67 (4)
Having difficulties with the U.S. concerning the Middle East and Viet Nam at the same time	6.67 (4)
Seeking to dominate the Middle East or the Arab world	5.00 (3)
Linking the U.S. and Israel in committing aggression and denouncing them both	5.00 (3)
Alliance with Egypt is in doubt	5.00 (3)
Causing trouble in the Middle East	5.00 (3)
Distrustful of or uneasy with the U.S. concerning the Middle East	3.33 (2)
Cooperating with the U.S. to end the Middle East crisis	3.33 (2)
Competing with the U.S. for influence in the Middle East or the Arab world	3.33 (2)
Possibility of a direct confrontation with the U.S.	3.33 (2)
Trying to save prestige in the Middle East	1.67 (1)
N	60

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**Table 30**Images of Egypt in the Cartoons: 1967 War

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Category	%
Portrayed as the loser- embarrassed, afraid, dejected, or physically injured and bandaged up	27.78 (15)
Threatening war, making war plans	14.81 (8)
Receiving arms, support from the U.S.S.R.	12.96 (7)
Loss of prestige or influence in the Arab world	9.26 (5)
Hostile towards and fighting with Israel	5.56 (3)
Alliance with the U.S.S.R. is in doubt	5.56 (3)
Opposition and criticism from the U.S.	5.56 (3)
Closely allied with the U.S.S.R.	3.70 (2)
Trying to unite the Arab world	3.70 (2)
Having economic difficulties	3.70 (2)
As one of many Goliaths against David	1.85 (1)
Cause of a possible direct confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.	1.85 (1)
Kicking out the U.N. peace-keeping force	1.85 (1)
Ignoring U Thant's pleadings	1.85 (1)
N	54

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**Table 31****Images of Israel in the Cartoons: 1967 War**

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Category	%
Winning or victorious over Egypt [or Nasser]	17.07 (7)
Being denounced by the U.S.S.R. and ordered to return the Arab territories	14.63 (6)
Hostile towards, ready to fight, or fighting with the Arabs or the Arab world	14.63 (6)
Threatened by, fighting with Egypt or Nasser	9.76 (4)
Insistent about keeping the Arab territories	7.32 (3)
Receiving arms, support from the U.S.	7.32 (3)
Linked by the U.S.S.R. with the U.S. in committing aggression and being denounced for it	7.32 (3)
Hated by the Arabs	4.88 (2)
Preparing to present its case at the U.N.	4.88 (2)
Victorious over Jordan	2.44 (1)
Reluctant to go to the bargaining table	2.44 (1)
Concerned that victory may be tainted by the refugee problem	2.44 (1)
As David against many Goliaths	2.44 (1)
Inadvertently helping to unify the Arab world	2.44 (1)
N	41

---

**Table 32**Images of the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1967 War

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Category	%
Having difficulties with the U.S.S.R. concerning the Middle East and Viet Nam at the same time	14.29 (4)
Supplying arms, giving support to Israel	10.71 (3)
Opposing and criticizing Nasser	10.71 (3)
Linked by the U.S.S.R. with Israel in committing aggression and being denounced for it	10.71 (3)
Possibility of a direct confrontation with the U.S.S.R.	7.14 (2)
Cooperating with the U.S.S.R. to end the Middle East crisis	7.14 (2)
Distrustful of or uneasy with the U.S.S.R. concerning the Middle East	7.14 (2)
Competing with the U.S.S.R. for influence in the Middle East or the Arab world	7.14 (2)
Concerned that oil supplies are threatened	7.14 (2)
Hoping to be successful at the U.N.	7.14 (2)
Overwhelmed by the issues involved in the Middle East crisis	3.57 (1)
Uncertain whether to supply arms to Jordan	3.57 (1)
Uncertain how to deal with the Arab governments that severed diplomatic relations	3.57 (1)
N	28

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**Table 33**Images of the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1967 War

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Category	%
The U.S.S.R. is adamantly pursuing and arguing its case and/or creating trouble and difficulties	25.93 (7)
Achieving a cease-fire and sending observers to the Middle East	18.52 (5)
Hoping, trying to resolve crisis, or keep peace in the Middle East	11.11 (3)
Hearing speeches and/or holding debates concerning the Middle East crisis	11.11 (3)
Coupling of its attempts to try to resolve the Middle East crisis and the Viet Nam war	7.41 (2)
Having problems with resolutions	7.41 (2)
Unable to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict	7.41 (2)
Peace-keeping force is kicked out	7.41 (2)
U Thant pleading with Nasser	3.41 (1)
N	27

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**Table 34**

Images of Jordan in the Cartoons: 1967 War

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Category	%
Ravaged by the war and requesting arms from the U.S.	100.00 (1)
N	1

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### III. THE 1973 WAR

#### Who are the Actors?

Table 35 illustrates the frequency of the main actors in the cartoons, editorials, and headlines. In cartoons, the United States was by far the most frequently represented actor, followed by the Arabs and then Israel. Yet in both the editorials and the headlines, Israel was the most frequent and the United States was second. It should be noted that in the headlines, Egypt was nearly as frequently represented as the U.S. Finally, as far as the least frequent main actors, it was Syria in the cartoons, the United Nations in the editorials, and the Arabs in the headlines though Syria was represented only slightly more frequently.

The less significant actors are shown in Table 36. Palestinians and/or the P.L.O. and Saudi Arabia both received a great deal more attention in the editorials than in the other two media. Whereas Britain was slightly less frequent than the Palestinians and/or P.L.O. in the cartoons and headlines, she was only seen half as often in the editorials. France was seen almost as often as Britain in the editorials though less in the cartoons. As far as other Arab nations, Libya was represented in the cartoons and editorials but not in the headlines whereas Jordan was found in the headlines and much more frequently in the editorials though not at all in the cartoons. Although Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Palestine, Morocco, Algeria, and Kuwait were all mentioned in the editorials, they were not found at all in the cartoons or in the headlines.

### What are the Themes?

The most frequent theme in the cartoons, accounting for slightly more than one-fifth of the sample, was "Arabs' use of oil to threaten, scare, and/or as a political weapon" (see Table 37). It received much less attention in both the editorials and headlines. Second was the "U.S.'s role and/or policies which occurred approximately as frequently in the headlines but slightly less in the editorials in which it was one of the two most frequent themes. The third most frequent theme in the cartoons was "superpower relations: hostile, competitive, or cooperative" which was nearly as frequent in the editorials though it occurred less often in the headlines. As far as the editorials, the other most frequent theme was "uncertainty of peace" and it received less attention in the cartoons and even less in the headlines. Finally, as far as the headlines, the most frequent theme by far, accounting for more one-fourth of the sample was "Israel's role and/or policies and/or military superiority" yet it occurred less than half as often in the editorials and less than one-third as much in the cartoons.

### What are the Symbols and Images?

Turning now to the symbols of the main actors in the cartoons, Table 38 shows that Henry Kissinger was the most popular symbol used to represent the United States and the second most frequent was Uncle Sam; these two symbols accounted for more than half of the sample. The words "U.S."/ "U.S.A./ "America" were the third most frequent way used to symbolize this country, followed by President Nixon. It is important to note that portrayals of Nixon were used less than one-third as often as

those of the Secretary of State. The remaining six symbols were used quite little in comparison and these were, in descending order of occurrence: a plane, a man, Senator Jackson, the White House, an eagle, and a tank.

Table 39 shows that three-fourths of all of the representations of Arabs were symbolized a man or men. The second most frequent symbol was the words "Arab states"/ "Arab"/ "Arabs" and occurring next most often was a soldier(s). The only other way Arabs were symbolized in the cartoons was by a woman although it only occurred once.

Israel was by far most often represented by portrayals of Prime Minister Meir, followed by the words "Israel"/ "Israeli" which were used slightly less than half as often. There were two symbolizations that were third most frequent and these were a man and a soldier(s). The other four symbols used to represent Israel were the least frequent: Defense Minister Dayan, a tank(s), a grave(s), and the star of David (see Table 40).

As can be seen from Table 41, half of all of the representations of the Soviet Union were symbolized by portrayals of Leonid Brezhnev. The words "U.S.S.R."/ "Moscow"/ "Soviet"/ "Russian" was the second most popular symbol used to represent this country, accounting for almost one-third of this sample. Finally, a bear was used in two cartoons whereas Premier Kosygin, a tank, and missiles were the least frequently used symbols.

The most popular way of representing Egypt was with portrayals of President Sadat, accounting for slightly more than one-third of this sample. The next most frequent symbol was used a little less than half as often and this was a tank(s). These two symbols accounted for half of

all of the representations of Egypt. The next two most frequently used symbols were a man and the words "Egypt"/ "Cairo", followed by a soldier(s), then pyramids, and finally graves which was the least frequent (see Table 42).

Table 43 shows that two symbols were used most often to portray the United Nations: a man and the peace-keeping force. The other two symbols were least frequently: a fireman and the U.N. building.

As can be seen from Table 44, the most frequent symbol of Syria was a soldier and this accounted for two of the three portrayals of this country. There was only one other symbol and it was used once: a tank.

Table 45 illustrates how frequently political leaders were used to represent the main actors (excluding the United Nations and Arabs) in the cartoons and in the headlines. As far as the cartoons, the Soviet Union was most often represented by political leaders, though the United States was portrayed this way almost as often. On the other hand, Egypt was the least frequently represented in this manner. In the headlines, the United States was by far most frequently portrayed by political leaders whereas Israel was least often represented this way. But for both media, Syria was in actuality least frequently portrayed this way since political leaders were never used at all. As far as comparing the two media, it is clear that political leaders were consistently used more often to represent these actors in the cartoons than in the headlines. More specifically, the largest difference was seen in the case of Israel (seven times as often) whereas the smallest difference in comparison was with the United States.

Turning now to the images of the actors in the cartoons, Table 46 specifies those of the United States. The most frequent image was "being

threatened, blackmailed by Arabs with oil," accounting for nearly one-fourth of the sample. There was another image involving oil but it occurred one-fourth as often: "concerned, worried about Middle East oil." The second most frequent image was "mediating, negotiating between or with Israel and/or Egypt, Arabs" and the third most frequent was a more general version of this one: "hoping, trying to make peace in the Middle East." These two images of the United States as peace-maker accounted for approximately one-third of the sample, which was slightly more than the two images involving oil. There were two images involving aid to Israel: "supplying arms, aid, and/or giving support to Israel is linked with the U.S.S.R. doing the same for Egypt, Arabs" and occurring less than half as often was "supplying arms, aid to Israel." But there was one image which portrayed negative relations between the United States and Israel though it was relatively infrequent: "having problems, disagreeing with Israel." Finally, there were three images involving problems with the Soviet Union: (1) "detente with the U.S.S.R. is threatened," (2) "possibility of a direct confrontation with the U.S.S.R.," and (3) "shocked by Soviet involvement in the Middle East." It is important to note that there was one other image involving the Soviet Union which was actually positive though it only occurred once: "cooperating with the U.S.S.R. in cease-fire and peace talks."

There was one predominant image of the Arabs, accounting for slightly more than half of this particular sample: "using oil to threaten, scare, and/or as a political weapon; oil is often portrayed as being used like an actual weapon, sometimes in a 'hold-up' type scenario." The second most frequent image, although occurring less than one-fourth as often, was "receiving arms, aid, and/or support from the

U.S.S.R." and slightly less often was the image of Arabs as "unwilling to negotiate." Finally, there were other images that were similarly negative portrayals of Arabs but they were relatively infrequent: (1) "hostile relations with Israel" (2) "threatening the peace," (3) "demanding Israel return the Arab territories," and (4) "as Goliaths against David" (see Table 47).

Table 48 specifies the images of Israel and as can be seen, there were no dominating ones. The most frequent image was "receiving arms, aid, and/or support from the U.S." and second was "alliance with the U.S. is threatened by Arabs and/or oil." One of the two images that were third most frequent images also involved the United States: "restrained by and/or negotiating with the U.S. concerning conflict with Egypt, Arabs." In addition, there was a similar image though it was less frequent: "making progress towards peace with Egypt with help from the U.S." It should be noted that there was one other image involving the United States which was somewhat negative in comparison yet it was relatively infrequent: "having problems, disagreeing with the U.S." These five images, all of which involved the United States, amounted to nearly half of the sample. Finally, there were three images that described conflict with Arab nations or Arabs, accounting for only one-fifth of the sample, and these were, in descending order of occurrence: (1) "involved in conflict with Egypt and/or Syria," (2) "hostile relations with Arabs or Arab states," and (4) "as David against Goliath(s)."

As far as the images of the Soviet Union, Table 49 shows that the most frequent one, accounting for more than one-fourth of this sample, was "supplying arms, aid, and/or giving support to Egypt and/or the

Arabs is linked with the U.S. doing the same for Israel". One of the two second most frequent images was quite similar to the preceding one: "supplying arms, aid, and/or giving support to the Arabs." These two images of the Soviet Union helping the Arabs and/or Egypt accounted for almost half of all of the portrayals of this country. There were two images that involved difficulties with the United States and amounted to nearly one-third of this sample: (1) "detente with the U.S. is threatened" and (2) "possibility of a direct confrontation with the U.S." Finally, it should be noted that there was one image that described positive relations with the United States, though it was found in only one cartoon: "cooperating with the U.S. in cease-fire and peace talks."

The most popular image of Egypt, as can be seen in Table 50, was "hostile towards Israel and/ or eager to fight." In addition, there were two other images that involved difficulties or conflict with Israel though each occurred only once: "depressed that Israel still controls the Sinai" and "as Goliath against David." These three images of Egypt which involved problems with Israel accounted for slightly more than one-third of this sample. One of the two images second most frequent was "receiving arms, aid, and/or support from the U.S.S.R." The other one was "restrained by and/or negotiating with the U.S. concerning conflict with Israel" and occurring next most often was a similar image: "making progress towards peace with Israel with help from the U.S." These two images involving the United States' help with resolving the conflict with Israel accounted for nearly one-third of all of the portrayals of Egypt.

As Table 51 demonstrates, there were only two images of the United

Nations and they occurred with equal frequency: (1) "ineffective and incompetent as far as resolving the Middle East crisis" and (2) "hoping to make peace in the Middle East."

There was only one image of Syria and it described all three portrayals of this country: "hostile towards Israel and/or eager to fight" (see Table 52).

**Table 35****Main Actors: 1973 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
U.S.	51.91 (68)	89.16 (74)	38.41 (58)
Arabs	41.22 (54)	83.13 (69)	6.62 (10)
Israel	35.88 (47)	92.77 (77)	52.32 (79)
U.S.S.R.	19.85 (26)	69.88 (58)	17.88 (27)
Egypt	17.56 (23)	73.49 (61)	37.75 (57)
U.N.	4.58 (6)	36.14 (30)	9.27 (14)
Syria	2.29 (3)	56.63 (47)	7.28 (11)

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Note. Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=131; editorials: n=83; headlines: n=151).

**Table 36****Less Significant Actors: 1973 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Palestinians, P.L.O.	3.05 (4)	16.87 (14)	.66 (1)
Britain	2.29 (3)	8.43 (7)	-
Saudi Arabia	1.53 (2)	14.46 (12)	2.65 (4)
France	.76 (1)	7.23 (6)	-
Libya	.76 (1)	4.82 (4)	-
Jordan	-	13.25 (11)	.66 (1)
Iraq	-	7.23 (6)	-
Lebanon	-	4.82 (4)	-
Iran	-	2.41 (2)	-
Palestine	-	1.20 (1)	-
Morocco	-	1.20 (1)	-
Algeria	-	1.20 (1)	-
Kuwait	-	1.20 (1)	-

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Note. Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=131; editorials: n=83; headlines: n=151).

**Table 37****Themes: 1973 War**

Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Arabs' use of oil to threaten, scare, and/or as a political weapon	22.90 (30)	7.23 (6)	5.30 (8)
U.S.'s role and/or policies	19.08 (25)	15.66 (13)	19.54 (29.5)
Superpower relations: hostile, competitive, or cooperative	12.21 (16)	12.05 (10)	7.95 (12)
Uncertainty of peace	10.69 (14)	15.66 (13)	5.96 (9)
Israel's role and/or policies and/or military superiority	8.40 (11)	12.05 (10)	27.48 (41.5)
Middle Eastern oil in jeopardy	5.34 (7)	3.61 (3)	2.65 (4)
U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies	5.34 (7)	7.23 (6)	6.62 (10)
U.N.'s role and/or actions	4.58 (6)	1.81 (1.5)	5.30 (8)
Relations between Israel and Arabs or Arab nations: hostile, antagonistic, tense	3.82 (5)	7.23 (6)	3.31 (5)
Cooperation between Egypt and Israel	2.29 (3)	7.23 (6)	7.95 (12)
Problems between U.S. and N.A.T.O. countries	2.29 (3)	3.61 (3)	-
Egypt's role and/or policies	1.91 (2.5)	4.82 (4)	7.28 (11)
Problem of Palestinian refugees	.76 (1)	1.20 (1)	-
Syria's role and/or policies	.38 (.5)	.60 (.5)	.66 (1)
N	131	83	151

**Table 38****Symbols Representing the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1973 War**

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Category	%
Secretary of State Kissinger	38.24 (26)
Uncle Sam	21.32 (14.5)
"U.S.", "U.S.A.", "America"	16.18 (11)
President Nixon	11.03 (7.5)
Plane	4.41 (3)
Man	2.94 (2)
Senator Jackson	1.47 (1)
White House	1.47 (1)
Eagle	1.47 (1)
Tank	1.47 (1)
N	68

---

**Table 39**

Symbols Representing Arabs in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Man or men	75.93 (41)
"Arab states", "Arab", "Arabs"	12.96 (7)
Soldier(s)	9.26 (5)
Woman	1.85 (1)
N	54

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**Table 40****Symbols Representing Israel in the Cartoons: 1973 War**

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Category	%
Prime Minister Meir	40.43 (19)
"Israel", "Israeli", Man	17.02 (8)
Soldier(s)	12.77 (6)
Defense Minister Dayan	4.26 (2)
Tank(s)	4.26 (2)
Grave(s)	4.26 (2)
Star of David	4.26 (2)
N	47

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**Table 41****Symbols Representing the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1973 War**

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Category	%
Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Communist Party)	50.00 (13)
"U.S.S.R.", "Moscow", "Soviet", "Russian"	30.77 (8)
Bear	7.69 (2)
Premier Kosygin	3.85 (1)
Tank	3.85 (1)
Missiles	3.85 (1)
N	26

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**Table 42**

Symbols Representing Egypt in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
President Sadat	34.78 (8)
Tank(s)	15.22 (3.5)
Man	13.04 (3)
"Egypt", "Cairo"	13.04 (3)
Soldier(s)	10.87 (2.5)
Pyramids	8.70 (2)
Graves	4.35 (1)
N	23

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**Table 43**Symbols Representing the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Man	33.33 (2)
Peace-keeping force	33.33 (2)
Fireman	16.67 (1)
U.N. Building	16.67 (1)
N	6

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**Table 44**Symbols Representing Syria in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Soldier	66.67 (2)
Tank	33.33 (1)
N	3

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**Table 45****Political Leaders in the Cartoons and the Headlines: 1973 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of headlines
U.S.	50.74 (34.5) n=68	39.66 (23) n=58
Israel	44.68 (21) n=47	6.33 (5) n=79
U.S.S.R.	53.85 (14) n=26	11.11 (3) n=27
Egypt	34.78 (8) n=23	14.04 (8) n=57
Syria	- n=3	- n=11

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**Table 46**Images of the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Being threatened, blackmailed by Arabs with oil	23.53 (16)
Mediating, negotiating between or with Israel and/or Egypt, Arabs	20.59 (14)
Hoping, trying to make peace in the Middle East	11.76 (8)
Supplying arms, aid, and/or giving support to Israel is linked with the U.S.S.R. doing the same for Egypt, Arabs	10.29 (7)
Detente with the U.S.S.R. is threatened	7.35 (5)
Concerned, worried about Middle Eastern oil	5.88 (4)
Supplying arms and/or aid to Israel	4.41 (3)
Possibility of a direct confrontation with the U.S.S.R.	4.41 (3)
Rift in relations with N.A.T.O. countries	4.41 (3)
Having problems, disagreeing with Israel	2.94 (2)
Shocked by Soviet involvement in Middle East crisis	2.94 (2)
Cooperating with the U.S.S.R. in cease-fire and peace talks	1.47 (1)
N	68

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**Table 47**Images of Arabs in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Using oil to threaten, scare, and/or as a political weapon; oil is often portrayed as being used like an actual weapon, sometimes in a "hold-up" type scenario	55.56 (30)
Receiving arms, aid, and/or support from the U.S.S.R.	12.96 (7)
Unwilling to negotiate	11.11 (6)
Hostile relations with Israel	5.56 (3)
Threatening the peace	3.70 (2)
Restrained by the U.S. in conflict with Israel	3.70 (2)
Demanding Israel return the Arab territories	1.85 (1)
Supporting Egypt in the war	1.85 (1)
Causing problems for the U.S. with N.A.T.O.	1.85 (1)
As Goliaths against David	1.85 (1)
N	54

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**Table 48**Images of Israel in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Receiving arms, aid, and/or support from the U.S.	14.89 (7)
Alliance with the U.S. is threatened by Arabs and/or oil	12.77 (6)
Restrained by and/or negotiating with the U.S. concerning conflict with Egypt, Arabs	10.64 (5)
Problems and less flexibility at peace talks because of election and results	10.64 (5)
Involved in conflict with Egypt and/or Syria	8.51 (4)
Hesitantly agreeing to cease-fire and disengagement accords	6.38 (3)
Hostile towards the U.S.S.R. because of involvement	6.38 (3)
Hostile relations with Arabs or Arab states	6.38 (3)
Insisting on secure boundaries and keeping the Sinai	6.38 (3)
Making progress towards peace with Egypt with help from the U.S.	6.38 (3)
As David against Goliath(s)	4.26 (2)
Having problems, disagreeing with the U.S.	4.26 (2)
Coupling of the many Israeli and Egyptian lives lost from 1948 to 1973	2.13 (1)
N	47

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**Table 49**Images of the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Supplying arms, aid, and/or giving support to Egypt and/or the Arabs is linked with the U.S. doing the same for Israel	26.92 (7)
Supplying arms, aid, and/or giving support to the Arabs	19.23 (5)
Detente with the U.S. is threatened	19.23 (5)
Hoping to benefit from the war and make gains in the Middle East	15.38 (4)
Possibility of a direct confrontation with the U.S.	11.54 (3)
Acting friendly towards Israel	3.85 (1)
Cooperating with the U.S. in cease-fire and peace talks	3.85 (1)
N	26

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**Table 50**Images of Egypt in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Hostile towards Israel and/or eager to fight	26.09 (6)
Receiving arms, aid, and/or support from the U.S.S.R.	17.39 (4)
Restrained by and/or negotiating with the U.S. concerning conflict with Israel	17.39 (4)
Making progress towards peace with Israel with help from the U.S.	13.04 (3)
Hesitantly agreeing to cease-fire and disengagement accords	8.70 (2)
Depressed that Israel still controls the Sinai	4.35 (1)
Considering going to peace talks and being opposed by Khadafy	4.35 (1)
As Goliath against David	4.35 (1)
Coupling of the many Egyptian and Israeli lives lost from 1948 to 1973	4.35 (1)
N	23

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**Table 51**

Images of the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Ineffective and incompetent as far as resolving the Middle East crisis	50.00 (3)
Hoping to make peace in the Middle East	50.00 (3)
N	6

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**Table 52**

Images of Syria in the Cartoons: 1973 War

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Category	%
Hostile towards Israel and/or eager to fight	100.00 (3)
N	3

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#### IV. THE 1977, 1978 PEACE PROCESS

##### Who are the Actors?

Table 53 shows that in the cartoons, Egypt was the most frequently represented actor, followed by Israel, and then the United States. Yet in both the editorials and the headlines, Israel was the most frequently mentioned actor and as a matter of fact, she was mentioned in every editorial in the sample. In the editorials, the second most frequent actor was Egypt and the United States was third whereas both these actors occurred second most often in the headlines. Finally, the United Nations was the least frequently represented main actor in all three media.

Among less significant actors, "Arab(s)" or "Arab world" occurred in all three media; this actor was seen in more than three-fourths of the editorials yet in less than one-fifth of the other two media samples. As far as other Arab nations, ten were found in the cartoons, twelve in the editorials (including Palestine), and six in the headlines. More specifically, there were five Arab nations that were found in all three media: Syria, Libya, Jordan, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia. Finally, it should be noted that although Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were all represented relatively infrequently in the cartoons and headlines, they were mentioned quite often in the editorials: Syria was in nearly half, Jordan in more than one-third, and Saudi Arabia in more than one-fourth of the sample (see Table 54).

### What are the Themes?

As Table 55 demonstrates, the "U.S.'s role and/or policies" was the most frequent theme in all three media, though it was one of two in the editorials, accounting for approximately one-fifth of each sample. The second most frequent theme in the cartoons was "Arabs' or Arab nations' policies or opposition towards Egypt [or Sadat], Geneva, or peace" which occurred much less often in both the editorials and the headlines. The theme of "optimism about, striving toward, or achieving peace" was found third most often in the cartoons and was much less frequent in the headlines and it occurred even less in the editorials. As for the editorials, the other most frequent theme was "Israel's role and/or policies" which was somewhat less frequent in the headlines, in which it was one of two that occurred second most often, whereas it received a lot less attention in the cartoons. The theme of "Egypt's role and/or policies" was next most frequent in the editorials and it occurred slightly less often in the headlines, in which it was the other second most popular theme, whereas it was even less frequent in the cartoons. Finally, it should be noted that there were no themes that dominated any of these media; the three most frequent ones for each, which were discussed here, accounted for slightly more than half of their respective samples.

### What are the Symbols and Images?

Turning now to the symbols used to represent the actors in the cartoons, Table 56 shows that President Sadat was by far the most popular symbol used to portray Egypt, accounting for four-fifths of all

the depictions of this country. The second most frequent symbol, occurring one-sixth as often was the word "Sadat". The other three symbols were used quite infrequently in comparison: a tank, the word "Egypt", and a man.

Table 57 demonstrates that Prime Minister Begin was used frequently to represent Israel, occurring in nearly two-thirds of this sample. The other eight symbols were used much less often in comparison and these were, in descending order of occurrence: the word "Begin", Foreign Minister Dayan, the word "Israel", a man, a soldier, a tank, the star of David, and a woman.

As far as the symbols used to represent the United States, portrayals of President Carter were clearly the most popular, accounting for slightly more than four-fifths of this sample. The other four symbols were relatively infrequent and they were: Secretary of State Vance, Uncle Sam, the word "Carter", and the word "U.S." (see Table 58).

Table 59 shows the symbols used to represent the Palestinians. Most popular were the words "Palestinian"/ "Palestinians"/ "P.L.O." Two symbols were used next most frequently yet they each occurred half as often as the preceding one: Chairman Arafat and a man. Three other symbols were least frequent, found in only one cartoon apiece: a plane, a camel, and a sheep.

The vast majority of depictions of the Soviet Union were symbolized by portrayals of Leonid Brezhnev, accounting for nearly four-fifths of this sample. There was one other symbol used to represent this country and it was found in only one cartoon: the word "Soviet" (see Table 60).

As Table 61 shows, the United Nations was represented in only one cartoon and it was symbolized by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

Table 62 illustrates the frequency with which political leaders were used to represent the main actors (excluding the United Nations) in the cartoons and in the headlines. Both the United States and Egypt were most frequently portrayed by political leaders in cartoons; the Palestinians were by far least likely. In the headlines, Egypt was by far the country most often represented by politicians whereas the Palestinians and the Soviet Union were least likely. In comparing the two media, it is clear that political leaders were used more frequently to represent these actors in the cartoons than in the headlines. More specifically, the largest difference was seen in the case of the Soviet Union: nearly four-fifths of the representations in the cartoons were of political leaders as compared to none in the headlines. Finally, political leaders accounted for the majority of the representations of Egypt, Israel, and the United States in both the cartoons and in the headlines.

Turning now to the images of the actors in the cartoons, Table 63 specifies those of Egypt. The most frequent image was "friendly towards, cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Israel" and occurring slightly less often was a similar image: "cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Israel and the U.S." These two images accounted for slightly more than one-third of all of the portrayals of Egypt. It should be noted that there was a third image of Egypt that described positive relations with Israel although it was relatively infrequent: "happy, pleased about visiting Israel and wishing good will towards Israel." On the other hand, there were two images that were not as positive in describing relations with Israel, though combined they only accounted for slightly less than one-tenth of the

sample: (1) "having disagreements, difficulties, or problems with Israel concerning the West Bank" and (2) "suspicious of Israel." The third most frequent image of Egypt was "denounced by, opposed by, or angering Arab countries and/or the Palestinians." But there were two quite different images although combined, they occurred less than half as often: (1) "hoping, trying to get Arab countries to participate in the peace process" and (2) "wanting the Palestinians to participate in the peace process, concerned about Palestinian rights." Finally, there were four images, accounting for one-fourth of the sample, which involved Egypt's desire for peace and they were, in descending order of occurrence: (1) "pleased, happy that peace has been achieved and hoping it will last," (2) "concerned that the Cairo conference or Camp David will fail," (3) "tired of war and wanting peace," and (4) "going to Camp David and hoping it will be successful."

Similar to those of Egypt, the most frequent image of Israel was "friendly towards, cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Egypt" and occurring slightly less often was a similar image: "cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Egypt and the U.S." These two images accounted for slightly more than one-third of all of the portrayals of Israel. There was another image, though it was relatively infrequent, that involved cooperating with the United States: "offering plans, proposals to the U.S. and/or meeting with the U.S." Yet occurring slightly less often than the preceding image was one that described Israel as having problems with the United States: "having disagreements, difficulties with the U.S." Again similar to the images of Egypt, there were two of Israel that were not as positive in describing relations with Egypt, though combined they only accounted for

slightly less than one-tenth of the sample: (1) "having disagreements, difficulties, or problems with Egypt concerning the West Bank" and (2) "suspicious of Egypt." The third most frequent image of Israel was "pleased, happy that peace has been achieved and/or hoping it will last" and there were two other images that involved Israel's desire for peace: (1) "going to Camp David or Cairo conference and hoping it will succeed" and (2) "tired of war and wanting peace and/or willing to make concessions at the peace talks." These three images combined accounted for nearly one-fourth of this sample. Finally, there were three images, though each occurred relatively infrequently, that described Israel's attitudes towards the Palestinians and the Arabs: (1) "hostile towards the Palestinians and against Palestinian rights" and (2) "considering Palestinian participation in the peace process, hoping to end hostilities with Palestinians" and (3) "concerned about opposition from Arab countries and/or hoping they will participate in the peace process" (see Table 64).

Table 65 shows that the most frequent image of the United States, though only accounting for nearly one-fifth of the sample, was "cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Egypt and Israel." One of the two images second most frequent was "hoping that Camp David succeeds and/or desperately trying to make it succeed;" there was another image, although it was less frequent, which was similar and it was "worried that Camp David will fail." These two images which described concern about Camp David accounted for slightly more than one-fifth of this sample. The other second most frequent portrayal of the United States was "happy that peace was achieved, pleased with role played and/or hoping peace will last" and there was another image,

although it occurred slightly less than half as often, that was also concerned with peace: "optimistic about achieving peace and/or pleased with progress made towards peace." It should be noted that there were three images of the United States, although they did not occur that frequently, which were concerned with involving others in the peace process: (1) "wanting the Palestinians to participate in the peace process or supporting Palestinian rights," (2) "trying to get the Arabs or Jordan to participate in the peace process," and (3) "trying to get the U.S.S.R. to participate in the peace process." Finally, there were two quite different images, occurring equally as often though they were relatively infrequent, which dealt with the nature of relations with Israel: (1) "having disagreements, difficulties with Israel" and (2) "receiving plans, proposals from Israel and/or meeting with Israel."

The most frequent image of the Palestinians, accounting for slightly more than one-fourth of this sample, was "opposed to Sadat and/or the peace process." In addition, there were two other images that also portrayed this antagonistic attitude although combined they accounted for less than one-fifth of the portrayals of the Palestinians: (1) "opposed to Camp David" and (2) "opposed to the framework for the Geneva conference." The second most frequent image used to portray the Palestinians was found in slightly more than one-fifth of the sample and it involved a completely different attitude: "considering the possibility of participating in the peace process." Finally, there were two quite different images involving relations with Israel, one of which was "having difficulties with or hostile towards Israel" and the other one, occurring one third as often, was "considering the possibility of ending hostilities with Israel" (see Table 66).

Table 67 demonstrates that the most frequent image of the Soviet Union by far, accounting for more than one-third of the sample, was "denouncing or opposing Sadat and his peace objectives." There were two other images which also described opposition towards the peace process though they were less frequent: (1) "opposed to the peace process" and (2) "unwilling to go to the Cairo conference." These three images amounted to nearly two-thirds of the sample. Finally, the other two images were of a more positive nature: (1) "supporting the Palestinians and their rights," which was the second most frequent image, and (2) "considering going to the Geneva Conference."

There was only one image of the United Nations since there was just one portrayal of this actor: "concerned about the difficulties involved in reconvening the Geneva Conference" (see Table 68).

**Table 53****Main Actors: 1977,1978 Peace Process**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Egypt	56.78 (67)	95.83 (69)	36.75 (43)
Israel	53.39 (63)	100.00 (72)	42.74 (50)
U.S.	44.92 (53)	84.72 (61)	36.75 (43)
Palestinians	19.49 (23)	66.67 (48)	4.27 (5)
U.S.S.R.	6.78 (8)	34.72 (25)	8.55 (10)
U.N.	.85 (1)	8.33 (6)	.85 (1)

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Note. Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=118; editorials: n=72; headlines: n=117).

**Table 54****Less Significant Actors: 1977,1978 Peace Process**

Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Arabs, Arab World	17.80 (21)	83.33 (60)	11.11 (13)
Syria	7.63 (9)	45.83 (33)	4.27 (5)
Libya	5.08 (6)	16.67 (12)	.85 (1)
Iraq	4.24 (5)	12.50 (9)	-
Jordan	2.54 (3)	40.28 (29)	10.26 (12)
Algeria	2.54 (3)	5.56 (4)	.85 (1)
Lebanon	1.69 (2)	16.67 (12)	-
South Yemen	1.69 (2)	4.17 (3)	-
Saudi Arabia	.85 (1)	27.78 (20)	4.27 (5)
Iran	.85 (1)	1.39 (1)	-
Sudan	.85 (1)	-	.85 (1)
Palestine	-	4.17 (3)	-
Kuwait	-	2.78 (2)	-
Morocco	-	1.39 (1)	-

**Note.** Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=118; editorials: n=72; headlines: n=117).

**Table 55****Themes: 1977,1978 Peace Process**

Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
U.S.'s role and/or policies	18.22 (21.5)	19.44 (14)	22.65 (26.5)
Arabs' or Arab nations' policies or opposition towards Egypt [or Sadat], Geneva, or peace	15.25 (18)	7.64 (5.5)	8.55 (10)
Optimism about, striving toward, or achieving peace	13.56 (16)	4.17 (3)	8.55 (10)
Egyptian-Israeli relations: friendly, cooperative, meeting together, holding talks	11.02 (13)	11.81 (8.5)	11.11 (13)
Uncertainty of peace, Geneva or Cairo Conference	11.02 (13)	11.11 (8)	6.84 (8)
Egypt's role and/or policies	9.75 (11.5)	16.67 (12)	14.96 (17.5)
Problem of West Bank and/or Palestinians and/or their possible participation in the peace process	9.32 (11)	6.25 (4.5)	2.56 (3)
Israel's role and/or policies	5.08 (6)	19.44 (14)	14.96 (17.5)
U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies	3.39 (4)	2.08 (1.5)	2.99 (3.5)
News black-out of Camp David	2.54 (3)	1.39 (1)	.85 (1)
Possibility of Jordan participating in the peace process	.85 (1)	-	5.13 (6)
U.N.'s actions	-	-	.85 (1)
N	118	72	117

**Table 56**Symbols Representing Egypt in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Category	%
President Sadat	80.60 (54)
"Sadat"	13.43 (9)
Tank	2.99 (2)
"Egypt"	1.49 (1)
Man	1.49 (1)
N	67

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**Table 57****Symbols Representing Israel in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process**

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Category	%
Prime Minister Begin	65.87 (41.5)
"Begin"	7.94 (5)
Foreign Minister Dayan	7.14 (4.5)
"Israel"	4.76 (3)
Man	4.76 (3)
Soldier	3.17 (2)
Tank	3.17 (2)
Star of David	1.59 (1)
Woman	1.59 (1)
N	63

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**Table 58**

Symbols Representing the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Category	%
President Carter	84.91 (45)
Secretary of State Vance	7.55 (4)
Uncle Sam	3.77 (2)
"Carter"	1.89 (1)
"U.S."	1.89 (1)
N	53

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**Table 59**Symbols Representing the Palestinians in the Cartoons: 1977,1978Peace Process

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Category	%
"Palestinian", "Palestinians", "P.L.O."	43.48 (10)
Chairman Arafat	21.74 (5)
Man	21.74 (5)
Plane	4.35 (1)
Camel	4.35 (1)
Sheep	4.35 (1)
N	23

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**Table 60**

Symbols Representing the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Category	%
Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Communist Party and President)	87.50 (7)
"Soviet"	12.50 (1)
N	8

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**Table 61**

Symbols Representing the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Category	%
Secretary-General Waldheim	100.00 (1)
N	1

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**Table 62**

Political Leaders in the Cartoons and the Headlines: 1977,1978 Peace Process

Category	% of cartoons	% of headlines
Egypt	94.03 (63) n=67	81.40 (35) n=43
Israel	80.95 (51) n=63	54.00 (27) n=50
U.S.	94.34 (50) n=53	67.44 (29) n=43
Palestinians	21.74 (5) n=23	- n=5
U.S.S.R.	87.50 (7) n=8	- n=10

**Table 63**Images of Egypt in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Category	%
Friendly towards, cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Israel	19.40 (13)
Cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Israel and the U.S.	14.93 (10)
Denounced by, opposed by, or angering Arab countries and/or the Palestinians	13.43 (9)
Pleased, happy that peace has been achieved and hoping it will last	10.45 (7)
Having disagreements, difficulties, or problems with Israel concerning the West Bank	7.46 (5)
Concerned that the Cairo Conference or Camp David will fail	5.97 (4)
Tired of war and wanting peace	5.97 (4)
Being denounced by the U.S.S.R.	4.48 (3)
Severing relations with Arab countries	4.48 (3)
Hoping, trying to get Arab countries to participate in the peace process	2.99 (2)
Wanting the Palestinians to participate in the peace process, concerned about Palestinian rights	2.99 (2)
Happy, pleased about visiting Israel and wishing good will towards Israel	2.99 (2)
Going to Camp David and hoping it will be successful	2.99 (2)
Suspicious of Israel	1.49 (1)
N	67

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**Table 64**Images of Israel in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Category	%
Friendly towards, cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Egypt	20.63 (13)
Cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Egypt and the U.S.	15.87 (10)
Pleased, happy that peace has been achieved and/or hoping it will last	12.70 (8)
Having disagreements, difficulties, or problems with Egypt concerning the West Bank	7.94 (5)
Hostile towards the Palestinians and against Palestinian rights	6.35 (4)
Considering Palestinian participation in the peace process, hoping to end hostilities with Palestinians	4.76 (3)
Going to Camp David or Cairo Conference and hoping it will be successful	4.76 (3)
Offering plans, proposals to the U.S. and/or meeting with the U.S.	4.76 (3)
Tired of war and wanting peace and/or willing to make concessions at the peace talks	4.76 (3)
Concerned about opposition from Arab countries and/or hoping they will participate in the peace process	4.76 (3)
Uncertain whether to go to the Geneva Conference or concerned that the Cairo Conference will fail	3.17 (2)
Visited by Sadat and wished good will	3.17 (2)
Having disagreements, difficulties with the U.S.	3.17 (2)
Suspicious of Egypt	1.59 (1)
Talks with Sadat denounced by U.S.S.R.	1.59 (1)
N	63

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**Table 65**Images of the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Category	%
Cooperating with, meeting with, or holding talks with Egypt and Israel	18.87 (10)
Hoping that Camp David succeeds and/or desperately trying to make it succeed	13.21 (7)
Happy that peace was achieved, pleased with role played and/or hoping peace will last	13.21 (7)
Trying to reconvene and/or having problems with the Geneva Conference	9.43 (5)
Worried that Camp David will fail	9.43 (5)
Wanting the Palestinians to participate in the peace process or supporting Palestinian rights	5.66 (3)
Optimistic about achieving peace and/or pleased with progress towards peace	5.66 (3)
Trying to get the Arabs or Jordan to participate in the peace process	5.66 (3)
Having disagreements, difficulties with Israel	3.77 (2)
Trying to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians	3.77 (2)
Worried about not being included in Egyptian-Israeli talks and/or the possibility of a separate peace	3.77 (2)
Receiving plans, proposals from Israel and/or meeting with Israel	3.77 (2)
Overwhelmed by all the potential problems with the peace process	1.89 (1)
Trying to get the U.S.S.R. to participate in the peace process	1.89 (1)
N	53

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**Table 66****Images of the Palestinians in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process**

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Category	%
Opposed to Sadat and/or the peace process	26.09 (6)
Considering the possibility of participating in the peace process	21.74 (5)
Having difficulties with or hostile towards Israel	13.04 (3)
Opposed to Camp David	13.04 (3)
Receiving support for rights from the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.	13.04 (3)
Opposed to the framework for the Geneva Conference	4.35 (1)
Considering the possibility of ending hostilities with Israel	4.35 (1)
Being supported politically by Jordan	4.35 (1)
N	23

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**Table 67**

Images of the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Category	%
Denouncing or opposing Sadat and his peace objectives	37.50 (3)
Supporting the Palestinians and their rights	25.00 (2)
Opposed to the peace process	12.50 (1)
Considering going to the Geneva Conference	12.50 (1)
Unwilling to go to the Cairo Conference	12.50 (1)
N	8

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**Table 68**

Images of the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Category	%
Concerned about the difficulties involved in reconvening the Geneva Conference	100.00 (1)
N	1

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## V. THE 1982 WAR

### Who are the Actors?

Table 69 shows that in the cartoons, the Palestinians were the most frequently represented actor, followed closely by Israel. The third most frequent was the United States and fourth was Lebanon; both these actors occurred less than half as often as the first two. In the editorials, both the Palestinians and Israel were the most frequently represented actors, followed by Lebanon and then the United States. It should be noted that each of these four actors were mentioned in more than 90% of the editorials. As far as the headlines, Israel was the most frequently mentioned actor, followed by both the United States and Lebanon, and the next most frequent was the Palestinians. Concerning the least frequently represented actor, it was the United Nations in all three media although in the editorials, the Soviet Union occurred equally as infrequently.

"Arab(s)" or "Arab world" was the only less significant actor appearing in all three media (relatively infrequently in the cartoons and headlines but in nearly two-thirds of the editorials). As far as other Arab states, none were found in the cartoons but Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan were mentioned in both the editorials and the headlines whereas Jordan, Palestine, Iran, Iraq and Libya were found only in the editorials. It should be noted that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were mentioned more than ten times as frequently in the editorials than in the headlines whereas the Sudan was relatively infrequent in both. Finally, Britain and France were only seen in the editorials; both were relatively infrequent and France occurred one-third as often as Britain

(see Table 70).

### What are the Themes?

Table 71 demonstrates that for all three media, the most frequent theme was "Israel's role and/or policies and/or military aggressiveness" and it accounted for more than one-fourth of the cartoons and headlines, and nearly one-third of the editorials. The second most frequent theme in both the cartoons and editorials, yet the third in the headlines, was "Palestinians' role and/or policies and/or issues of rights and/or homeland." The theme that was second most frequent in the headlines was "U.S.'s role and/or policies," which occurred fourth most often in both the cartoons and editorials. Lastly, the third most frequent theme in the cartoons and editorials was fourth in the headlines and it was "uncertainty of peace and/or trouble in Lebanon, and/or uncertainty about Lebanon's future." Thus, we see that all three media are in agreement about the four main themes, which accounted for three-fourths of the cartoons and slightly more of the editorials and headlines.

### What are the Symbols and Images?

Turning now to the symbols used to portray the main actors in the cartoons, Table 72 shows that Yasir Arafat has become the most popular symbol of the Palestinians, accounting for more than half of this sample. The second most frequent symbol, used slightly less than one-third as often, was the words "Palestinian"/ "Palestinians"/ "P.L.O." and the third most frequent was soldiers. The remaining symbols were used much less often: a man or people, the word "Arafat," a tank, a

camel, a crocodile, and a cat.

Table 73 shows that Prime Minister Begin was used to symbolize Israel in slightly more than half of the portrayals of Israel. The second most frequent symbol, accounting for nearly one-fourth of the sample, was soldier(s) and/or tanks. The remaining symbols were all used infrequently in comparison and these were: the words "Israel" and "Begin," Defense Minister Sharon, map(s) of Israel, the star of David, Israeli people, a crocodile, and a lion.

Nearly half of all the portrayals of the United States were symbolized by President Reagan. The second most frequent symbol, occurring less than one-third as often, was Special Envoy Philip Habib. The third most frequent was Uncle Sam and the next one was a man. The remaining seven symbols were used least frequently, found in only one cartoon each: a U.S. Marine, the President's office, and the words "U.S.," "U.S. Marine Corps," "Reagan," "Habib," and "Representative McCloskey" (see Table 74).

Table 75 demonstrates that the most popular way of symbolizing Lebanon was the words "Lebanon"/ "Lebanese", accounting for slightly more than half the sample. The second most frequent symbol was the words "Beirut"/ "West Beirut" and the one other symbol, used the least frequently, was people or a man.

There were only four representations of the Soviet Union and half of them consisted of a soldier, making it the most popular symbol used to portray this country. There were two other symbols which were each used once: Leonid Brezhnev and an ostrich (see Table 76).

Table 77 demonstrates that there were three symbols used equally often to represent Syria and since there were only three portrayals of

this country, each occurred once: a soldier, the Syrian flag, and a plane.

There was only one representation of the United Nations in the cartoons: three men of the U.N.I.F.I.L. (see Table 78).

Table 79 illustrates how frequently political leaders were used to represent the actors (excluding the United Nations) in both the cartoons and the headlines. In cartoons, the United States was by far most often represented by political leaders whereas the U.S.S.R., Lebanon, and Syria were the least. In the headlines, the United States was also most frequently portrayed this way and Syria and Lebanon were least likely. In comparing the two media, we see that the Palestinians, Israel, and the United States were much more frequently represented by political leaders in the cartoons than in the headlines whereas Lebanon was more often portrayed this way in the headlines than in the cartoons in which it never was at all. Finally, the Soviet Union was represented by political leaders equally as often in the cartoons and headlines, accounting for one-fourth of all portrayals of this country in both media.

Turning now to the images of the actors in the cartoons, Table 80 specifies those of the Palestinians. The most frequent image, accounting for approximately one-fourth of this sample, was "wanting, looking for a homeland, wanting rights." The second most frequent image occurred slightly less often and was described as: "refusing to give up fight against Israel or to recognize Israel, in direct conflict with Israel, conflict with Israel remains unresolved." There was another image, though it was found one-third as often, that echoed this same attitude but in a more general way: "refusing or reluctant to negotiate,

uncertain about wanting peace." The third most frequent image described a somewhat different view of the struggle against Israel than the one discussed above: "worried or fearful about defeat and/or Israeli military aggressiveness, losing struggle with Israel or defeated." These two images involving Israel accounted for one-third of all of the portrayals of the Palestinians. Finally, there were two images concerning the Palestinians' departure from Lebanon and combined they accounted for nearly one-fifth of the sample: (1) "leaving Lebanon" and (2) "leaving Lebanon as heroes, pleased with new image or media coverage, believe they won the war."

Table 81 shows that that the most frequent image of Israel, though by only a very slight margin, was "intent on destroying the P.L.O., refusing to recognize the P.L.O., adamantly opposed to a Palestinian homeland, in direct conflict with the P.L.O. or Palestinians, conflict remains unresolved." There were two other images concerning the P.L.O. though they were much less frequent: "intimidating, scaring, or arrogant towards the P.L.O. or Arafat" and "winning in struggle against the P.L.O. or claiming victory." These three images which specifically involved the P.L.O. accounted for nearly one-third of all portrayals of Israel. The next three most frequent images, after the first one mentioned above, all consisted of negative portrayals of Israel although they involved different issues: (1) "nobel peace prize winner is involved in war, Israel is bent on aggression or war, reluctant to negotiate and/or doesn't seem to really want peace;" (2) "problems with the U.S. concerning war, peace, West Bank settlements; adamantly opposed to Reagan's peace plan, angering the U.S. and jeopardizing aid;" and (3) "tarnished image because of war and/or massacre, beset with problems

from the war, refusing to accept any blame for the massacre."

The most frequent image of the United States by far, as can be seen from Table 82, accounted for two-fifths of all of the portrayals of this country: "problems with Israel concerning war, peace, Reagan's peace plan, West Bank settlements; angry at Israel and uncertain about giving aid." The second most frequent image was found less than half as often and it was "trying hard to advance a plan for peace, trying to find a peaceful solution, trying to help Lebanon." There was another image which was similar though it was much less frequent: "trying hard to negotiate between or keep peace between the P.L.O. and Israel." These two images which described the United States' desire for peace accounted for nearly one-fourth of this sample. The third most frequent image was "marines are seen as 'sitting ducks' and/or should not have been sent to Lebanon; against U.S. involvement." Finally, there were three images that involved a positive attitude towards the Palestinians or Arafat, though combined they amounted to less than one-sixth of the sample: (1) "concerned about the Palestinian question or issue of a Palestinian homeland" and (2) "helping Arafat find a place to go," and (3) "McCloskey speaks well of Arafat." It should be noted that there was one image involving Arafat that was not as positive but it was relatively infrequent: "frustrated in attempts to negotiate with Arafat."

Table 83 shows that the most popular image of Lebanon, accounting for nearly half of this sample, was: "war is destroying Lebanon; Lebanon or West Beirut is in ruins, Lebanon is the innocent victim of the war, Lebanese people are the real losers of the war." There were two images that were somewhat more optimistic yet they only amounted to one-fourth of this sample: (1) "being helped by the U.S., asking the U.S. for help"

and (2) "hoping for peace." Finally, there were four other images, though they each occurred relatively infrequently, which were similar to the first one discussed as far as being more pessimistic than these last two: (1) "believe that the cease-fires are worse than the war," (2) "don't feel that Lebanon is for the Lebanese anymore," (3) "need for help is being ignored by the U.S.S.R. and the Arab world," and (4) "unhappy about Israeli and Syrian forces remaining in Lebanon after departure of the P.L.O."

There were only four images of the Soviet Union and each occurred equally often since there were only four representations of this country: (1) "condemning Israel for invading Lebanon," (2) "offering Arafat the opportunity to re-order weapons," (3) "problems with the U.S. concerning Lebanon," and (4) "ignoring Lebanon's need for help" (see Table 84).

Table 85 demonstrates that the most popular image of Syria, accounting for two-thirds of this sample (which only totaled three) was: "remaining in Lebanon after the P.L.O.'s departure." The only other image was found in just one cartoon: "being badly defeated in the war."

The most frequent image of the United Nations was the only one since there was just one portrayal of this actor: "invasion catches the U.N.I.F.I.L. by surprise" (see Table 86).

**Table 69****Main Actors: 1982 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Palestinians	51.64 (63)	98.44 (63)	35.88 (47)
Israel	50.82 (62)	98.44 (63)	46.56 (61)
U.S.	24.59 (30)	90.63 (58)	39.69 (52)
Lebanon	18.85 (23)	93.75 (60)	39.69 (52)
U.S.S.R.	3.28 (4)	25.00 (16)	3.05 (4)
Syria	2.46 (3)	42.19 (27)	6.87 (9)
U.N.	.82 (1)	25.00 (16)	1.53 (2)

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**Note.** Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=122; editorials: n=64; headlines: n=131).

**Table 70****Less Significant Actors: 1982 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Arab(s), Arab World	2.46 (3)	64.06 (41)	6.87 (9)
Egypt	-	32.81 (21)	.76 (1)
Jordan	-	25.00 (16)	-
Saudi Arabia	-	21.88 (14)	1.53 (2)
Palestine	-	15.63 (10)	-
Iran	-	10.94 (7)	-
Iraq	-	10.94 (7)	-
Britain	-	9.38 (6)	-
Libya	-	6.25 (4)	-
France	-	3.13 (2)	-
Sudan	-	1.56 (1)	2.29 (3)

---

Note. Percentages are based on the total number of data for each medium (cartoons: n=122; editorials: n=64; headlines: n=131).

**Table 71****Themes: 1982 War**

Category	% of cartoons	% of editorials	% of headlines
Israel's role and/or policies and/or military aggressiveness	27.87 (34)	27.34 (17.5)	32.06 (42)
Palestinians' role and/or policies and/or issues of rights and/or homeland	20.08 (24.5)	19.53 (12.5)	15.65 (20.5)
Uncertainty of peace and/or trouble in Lebanon, and/or uncertainty about Lebanon's future	15.57 (19)	18.75 (12)	12.21 (16)
U.S.'s role and/or policies	11.89 (14.5)	17.19 (11)	22.52 (29.5)
Israeli-Palestinian relations: hostile, antagonistic	11.48 (14)	4.69 (3)	4.58 (6)
U.S.-Israeli relations: problematic, strained	7.38 (9)	7.81 (5)	1.53 (2)
Policies of Arabs or Arab nations or Arab world	2.87 (3.5)	1.56 (1)	6.87 (9)
U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies	2.05 (2.5)	3.13 (2)	1.53 (2)
Superpower relations: hostile or strained	.82 (1)	-	1.53 (2)
Syrian aggression	-	-	1.53 (2)
N	122	64	131

**Table 72****Symbols Representing the Palestinians in the Cartoons: 1982 War**

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Category	%
Chairman Arafat	56.35 (35.5)
"Palestinian", "Palestinians", "P.L.O."	17.46 (11)
Soldiers	13.49 (8.5)
Man, people	4.76 (3)
"Arafat"	1.59 (1)
Tank	1.59 (1)
Camel	1.59 (1)
Crocodile	1.59 (1)
Cat	1.59 (1)
N	63

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**Table 73****Symbols Representing Israel in the Cartoons: 1982 War**

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Category	%
Prime Minister Begin	51.61 (32)
Soldier(s) and/or tanks	24.19 (15)
"Israel"	4.84 (3)
"Begin"	4.84 (3)
Defense Minister Sharon	3.23 (2)
Map(s) of Israel	3.23 (2)
Star of David	3.23 (2)
Israeli people	1.61 (1)
Crocodile	1.61 (1)
Lion	1.61 (1)
N	62

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**Table 74****Symbols Representing the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1982 War**

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Category	%
President Reagan	46.67 (14)
Special Envoy Habib	13.33 (4)
Uncle Sam	10.00 (3)
Man	6.67 (2)
"U.S."	3.33 (1)
U.S. Marine	3.33 (1)
"U.S. Marine Corps"	3.33 (1)
President's office	3.33 (1)
"Reagan"	3.33 (1)
"Habib"	3.33 (1)
"Representative McCloskey"	3.33 (1)
N	30

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**Table 75**Symbols Representing Lebanon in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
"Lebanon", "Lebanese"	52.17 (12)
"Beirut", "West Beirut"	30.43 (7)
People or man	17.39 (4)
N	23

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**Table 76**Symbols Representing the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
Soldier	50.00 (2)
Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Communist Party and President)	25.00 (1)
Ostrich	25.00 (1)
N	4

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**Table 77**

Symbols Representing Syria in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
Soldier	33.33 (1)
Syrian flag	33.33 (1)
Plane	33.33 (1)
N	3

---

**Table 78**

Symbols Representing the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
Three men of the U.N.I.F.I.L.	100.00 (1)
N	1

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Note. U.N.I.F.I.L. stands for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

**Table 79****Political Leaders in the Cartoons and the Headlines: 1982 War**

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Category	% of cartoons	% of headlines
Palestinians	57.94 (36.5) n=63	14.89 (7) n=47
Israel	59.68 (37) n=62	11.48 (7) n=61
U.S.	70.00 (21) n=30	36.54 (19) n=52
Lebanon	- n=23	5.77 (3) n=52
U.S.S.R.	25.00 (1) n=4	25.00 (1) n=4
Syria	- n=3	- n=9

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**Table 80**Images of the Palestinians in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
Wanting, looking for a homeland; wanting rights	23.81 (15)
Refusing to give up fight against Israel or to recognize Israel, in direct conflict with Israel, conflict with Israel remains unresolved	19.05 (12)
Worried or fearful about defeat and/or Israeli military aggressiveness, losing struggle with Israel or defeated	14.29 (9)
Leaving Lebanon	9.52 (6)
Leaving Lebanon as heroes, pleased with new image or media coverage, believe they won the war	7.94 (5)
Refusing or reluctant to negotiate, uncertain about wanting peace	6.35 (4)
Not welcome by other Arab countries	4.76 (3)
Advocate terrorism, think highly of guns	3.97 (2.5)
Meeting with the Pope, friendly with the Pope	3.97 (2.5)
Asking for help from the U.S.	3.17 (2)
Accused of using Lebanese as hostages	1.59 (1)
Considering Soviet offer to re-order weapons	1.59 (1)
N	63

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**Table 81**Images of Israel in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
Intent on destroying the P.L.O., refusing to recognize the P.L.O., adamantly opposed to a Palestinian homeland, in direct conflict with the P.L.O. or Palestinians, conflict remains unresolved	17.74 (11)
Nobel peace prize winner is involved in war, Israel is bent on aggression or war, reluctant to negotiate and/or don't seem to really want peace	16.13 (10)
Problems with the U.S. concerning war, peace, West Bank settlements; adamantly opposed to Reagan's peace plan, angering the U.S. and jeopardizing U.S. aid	16.13 (10)
Tarnished image because of war and/or massacre, beset with problems from the war, refusing to accept any blame for the massacre	14.52 (9)
Intimidating, scaring, or arrogant towards the P.L.O. or Arafat	8.06 (5)
Remaining in Lebanon after the P.L.O.'s departure	6.45 (4)
Winning in struggle against the P.L.O. or claiming victory	4.84 (3)
Need whole world or the moon in order to have secure borders; insistent on right to exist	4.84 (3)
Opposed to the meeting between the Pope and Arafat, angry at or condemning the Pope	4.84 (3)
Begin trying to restrain Sharon, Cabinet questioning Sharon's competency	3.23 (2)
Denounced by the U.S.S.R. for invasion of Lebanon	1.61 (1)
Shocking the ghost of a holocaust victim with invasion	1.61 (1)
N	62

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**Table 82**Images of the U.S. in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
Problems with Israel concerning war, peace, Reagan's peace plan, West Bank settlements; angry at Israel and uncertain about giving aid	40.00 (12)
Trying hard to advance a plan for peace, trying to find a peaceful solution, trying to help Lebanon	16.67 (5)
Marines are seen as "sitting ducks" and/or should not have been sent to Lebanon; against U.S. involvement	10.00 (3)
Concerned about Palestinian question or issue of a Palestinian homeland	6.67 (2)
Trying hard to negotiate between or keep peace between the P.L.O. and Israel	6.67 (2)
Frustrated in attempts to negotiate with Arafat	6.67 (2)
Problems with the U.S.S.R. concerning Lebanon	3.33 (1)
Helping Arafat find a place to go	3.33 (1)
Worried about Middle East instability	3.33 (1)
McCloskey speaks well of Arafat	3.33 (1)
N	30

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**Table 83**Images of Lebanon in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
War is destroying Lebanon; Lebanon or West Beirut is in ruins, Lebanon is the innocent victim of the war, Lebanese people are the real losers of the war	47.83 (11)
Being helped by the U.S., asking the U.S. for help	17.39 (4)
Believe that the cease-fires are worse than the war	8.70 (2)
Hoping for peace	8.70 (2)
Don't feel that Lebanon is for the Lebanese anymore	4.35 (1)
Need for help is being ignored by the U.S.S.R. and the Arab world	4.35 (1)
Unhappy about Israeli and Syrian forces remaining in Lebanon after departure of the P.L.O.	4.35 (1)
Wondering how long Israel will remain in Lebanon	4.35 (1)
N	23

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**Table 84**

Images of the U.S.S.R. in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
Condemning Israel for invading Lebanon	25.00 (1)
Offering Arafat the opportunity to re-order weapons	25.00 (1)
Problems with the U.S. concerning Lebanon	25.00 (1)
Ignoring Lebanon's need for help	25.00 (1)
N	4

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**Table 85**

Images of Syria in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
Remaining in Lebanon after the P.L.O.'s departure	66.67 (2)
Being badly defeated in the war	33.33 (1)
N	3

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**Table 86**

Images of the U.N. in the Cartoons: 1982 War

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Category	%
Invasion catches the U.N.I.F.I.L. by surprise	100.00 (1)
N	1

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Note. U.N.I.F.I.L. stands for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**




### **I. MIDDLE EAST EVENTS IN THE U.S. MEDIA**

#### **THE 1956 WAR**

The sampling period for the 1956 war was from July 22 through November 23 and as can be seen from Figure 1, political cartoons depicting this event were most frequent during the months of September and November. More specifically, the most concentrated number of cartoons occurred during three time periods: July 28 to August 11, September 11 to September 28, and October 31 to November 16. These three clusterings of cartoons accounted for two-thirds of the entire sample. What events were occurring during these time periods that attracted so much attention from political cartoonists?


The United States had been planning to loan money to Egypt to build the Aswan Dam but after President Nasser made an arms deal with the Soviet Union (under the guise of Czechoslovakia) in September 1955 and then recognized Communist China in May 1956 (Neff, 1981), Secretary of State Dulles reversed the offer on July 19 (Khouri, 1985). On July 26, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal (Hopwood, 1982) which was owned primarily by British and French shareholders (Safran, 1978). The canal was the main route for Western Europe's oil and was

Figure 1. Frequency of Cartoons During the Sampling Period: 1956 War




(figure continues)

October 1956



November 1956



"considered by the British...to be the jugular vein of their empire and commonwealth" (Safran, 1978, p. 354). Prime Minister Eden announced on July 30 that Britain had cut off all aid to Egypt (Eisenhower, 1965).

On August 1, representatives of the United States, Britain, and France met and agreed that the canal should be under international control; they also called for a conference of all Canal users for August 16 (Hopwood, 1982; Stephens, 1971). Eisenhower continuously urged Britain and France not to resort to force and insisted that a peaceful solution was plausible (Druks, 1979). Britain and France froze Egyptian assets in their countries as well as increased their military preparedness (Hopwood, 1982). Also at this time, Nasser called up his army reserves and moved troops into the Canal area (Stephens, 1971).

On September 14, British and French pilots left their jobs at the Canal (Eisenhower, 1965) and by the next day, Egypt took over the full running of it and recruited its own pilots (Hopwood, 1982). Egypt proved to the world that it could run the Canal efficiently even with increased traffic (Stephens, 1971).

The second London conference on Suez took place from September 19 to 21 during which time the plan to set up SCUA (Suez Canal Users Association) was officially announced and discussed (Eisenhower, 1965). On September 23, Britain and France took the dispute to the Security Council (Stephens, 1971; Spiegel, 1985). Finally, during this period there were four clashes between Israel and Jordan (Eisenhower, 1965; Stephens, 1971; Neff, 1981).

The period from the end of October to the middle of November marked the beginning and the end of the war. It began on October 29, 1956 with a drop of Israeli paratroopers 30 miles from the Canal (Safran, 1969)

and the next day the British and French used it as an excuse for intervening (Druks, 1979; Green, 1984; Spiegel, 1985). By November 1, the Canal was closed and the other main route for Middle Eastern oil supplies to Britain and France was blocked two days later when Syrian soldiers blew up the Syrian pipelines (Eisenhower, 1965; Stephens, 1971). Already Eden was defeated in his professed aim of keeping the Canal open (Hopwood, 1982).

On October 30, Britain and France vetoed a resolution put forth by the U.S. at the U.N. Security Council calling for Israeli withdrawal, no force by other states, and no aid to Israel (Eisenhower, 1965; Spiegel, 1985). This prompted the United States to go to the General Assembly which adopted a Canadian resolution on November 2 calling for a cease-fire but was rejected by Britain and France the next day. On November 5, the General Assembly called for the establishment of a United Nations Police force and by November 6, Britain and France agreed to end the fighting (Safran 1969, 1978). Israel was not willing to withdraw and after much diplomatic effort, she finally agreed two days later to evacuate all territory by February except for the Gaza strip (Safran, 1969, 1978; Druks, 1979). At this time, the U.S.S.R. was threatening to send in "volunteers" to help Egypt (Stephens, 1971; Spiegel, 1985) and the U.S. now began financial assistance to Britain (Eisenhower, 1965).

The Canal was blocked by sunken ships and its clean-up and re-opening became a major problem to be resolved. The U.N.E.F. (United Nations Emergency Force) began to arrive in Egypt by mid-November to replace Anglo-French troops (Stephens, 1971; Hopwood, 1982). Also during this period, Eastern Europe was in an uproar. Mass demonstrations began in Poland on October 19 and spread to Hungary by October 29 (Neff,

1981). On November 4, Soviet troops invaded Hungary and re-established a communist regime (Stephens, 1971; Spiegel, 1985).

What do we learn about this series of events from the U.S. media, or more specifically from political cartoons, editorials, and headlines?

### **Who are the Actors?**

For the 1956 war, whichever data source one examines- the cartoons, editorials, or headlines- the most important actor is perceived to be Egypt (see Table 87). The cartoons are dominated by Egypt by far and after that, they tend to focus on the Soviet Union, the United Nations, the United States, and then Britain. In the headlines, the key actor is also Egypt but not by as big a margin, followed by Britain, the United States, and the United Nations. It appears that the key difference between these two media is that the cartoons tend to be much more dominated by Egypt and also give much more attention to the Soviet Union. In the editorials, the key actor is also Egypt followed by Britain, the United States, France, the United Nations, and then the Soviet Union.

Thus, headlines and editorials are similar in identifying Britain as the second most important actor in this event and though they both view Egypt as the key actor, they are not as dominated by this country as the cartoons are. In addition, these two media also portray the Soviet Union as playing a much smaller role in the conflict than do cartoons.

### **What are the Themes?**

In this event we see that each of the three media emphasize

different issues relating to the war (see Table 88).

The most frequent theme in the cartoons is Nasser's [or Egypt's] power and/or aggressive policies. In comparison, this issue is presented slightly less often in the editorials though is much less frequent in the headlines. The second issue that is most emphasized by cartoonists is the Soviet Union's role and/or policies. This particular theme receives a good deal less attention in both of the other media.

Thus, the picture of this event portrayed by political cartoons centers around the roles played by Egypt and the Soviet Union. The emphasis on the negative qualities of Nasser seems to reflect the attitudes of the leaders of the United States, Britain, and France: President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles compared Nasser to Hitler (Spiegel, 1985) as did Prime Minister Eden (Hopwood, 1982) and Premier Mollet (Neff, 1981). In addition, Neff (1981) writes that the Suez Canal was even compared to the Rhineland! As far as the Soviet Union, American policy at this time was especially interested in containing Soviet communism and aggression (Spiegel, 1985). Thus the cartoons, in comparison to the other two media, seem to be heavily over-emphasizing the Soviet Union's role in the crisis and this is probably due to the cold war that existed between the superpowers at this time as well as fears about Soviet expansionist ambitions. In essence, it seems that for the 1956 war, this medium focuses on identifying who the "bad guys" are and their roles in the conflict -- these are presented as the most important issues.

The editorials are primarily concerned with the role and/or actions of the United Nations. (Headlines give this issue less attention and the cartoons give it even less.) It seems that this medium was clearly

reflecting American policy since Eisenhower was adamant about restraining Britain and France from using military force and advocated that the United Nations be given every possible chance to resolve this crisis (Eisenhower, 1965). Actually, Eisenhower was quite concerned about the future of the U.N.: "...we believed that a resort to force, in settling questions such as this one, at such a stage, would be unjustified and would automatically weaken, perhaps even destroy, the United Nations" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 39). Given America's attitude regarding the U.N., it is hardly surprising that the second most frequent issue in this medium regarding this event is the U.S.' role and/or policies. In essence, it appears that the editorials emphasize the United Nations' role since they are interested in advocating a course of action which is consistent with American policy.

The most striking finding regarding the themes for this event is that the headlines present British and French involvement as the most important issue whereas the two other media both give it minimal attention. It is quite surprising that this theme is only focused on in this one medium since British and French involvement was a key issue in this event. Therefore, in comparison to cartoons and editorials, it seems that headlines may concentrate more on describing the actual events that were occurring during the crisis.

### What are the Images?

Looking at the images of the actors in the cartoons (Note: data on "images" concern cartoons only; see page 46) depicting the 1956 event, as can be seen from Table 89, we see that this event is basically perceived as involving active participants that are also evaluated

negatively.

When we look at how Egypt is portrayed in the cartoons, we see that she is depicted as an active actor approximately twice as often as a passive one. In addition, the images of this country are predominantly negative: there are six times as many that are negative as there are positive ones. Thus, Egypt has a clear and definite image in this event as an active-negative actor which is not surprising since the theme of her (or Nasser's) power and/or aggressive policies is seen as the most important issue in this medium as mentioned previously. Similarly, many of these active-negative images depict Egypt as stealing, threatening, arguing, intimidating, angering, or fighting.

Although there are not that many images of Israel for this event, what we do see is that she is depicted nearly equally as often as an active actor as compared to playing a passive role. What is more clear in the case of the images of this country is that all of these images are negative.

The images of the United Nations are also nearly evenly split between active and passive ones. Concerning the valence of these portrayals, these are also mixed although there are slightly more positive than negative images. It should be noted that all the active images are positive ones whereas nearly all of the passive images are negative. In other words, the United Nations is perceived as positive when playing an active role and negative when it is passive.

The United States is basically seen as active in this event. Specifically, there are more than twice as many active than passive images. As far as the evaluative aspect of these portrayals, we see that they are basically equally divided though there are slightly more

negative than positive ones. Interestingly, similar to the United Nations, positive images of the U.S. are associated with an active role; and all involve some sort of peace efforts -- advocating diplomacy or negotiations, promoting the User Association or Cape of Good Hope detour.

Looking at the Soviet Union, we see that the images show her as playing a very active role in this event: there are approximately six times as many active as there are passive images. In addition, this country is portrayed in terms of negative images more than twice as often as positive ones. Thus, the cartoonists present a very clear picture of the U.S.S.R. as being an active-negative actor in the 1956 war. The majority of these particular images that are active as well as negative depict the Soviet Union as threatening to take some action and/or actually taking it.

As far as the images of Britain, there are twice as many active as passive ones. The majority of these depictions are negative and there are less than half as many positive ones though it should be noted that there are some neutral ones. The positive images of this actor all involve wanting to resolve the conflict: advocating diplomacy or negotiations, seeking help. Half of the negative images involve difficulties with Nasser (arguing with, questioning or opposing him, scared of or intimidated by his aggressiveness); some of the others describe her intention or involvement in the war or, criticism at home of policies pursued. In essence, Britain has a general image of being an active-negative actor.

Finally, France is depicted as an active actor more than twice as often as a passive one. In addition, there are twice as many negative as

positive images though there are some neutral depictions. The positive images of France are very similar to the ones seen in the case of Britain: advocating negotiations, seeking help. In addition, all of the negative images of this actor are also seen with Britain: difficulties with Nasser (arguing with or opposing him, scared of or intimidated by his aggressiveness) or, intent on or involved in the war. Basically, France is seen as an playing an active-negative role in this event though it should be noted that it is not as strong an image as seen with other actors because the negative images do not dominate the sample as much.

In conclusion, we see that the images of both Egypt and the Soviet Union are definitely active-negative and therefore we can say that these two countries are perceived as the "bad guys" in this event. Britain and France, also perceived as active-negative, are not as clearly negative and therefore, are the "mildly-bad guys." Finally, it should be stressed that no actors in the 1956 war that are seen as definitely passive (though it was not possible to categorize both Israel and the United Nations on this dimension). In addition, none of the actors were perceived as definitively positive so consequently, there are not any "good guys" per se (though the United Nations and the United States could not be clearly categorized as far as valence).

### The U.S. Media and Historical Accounts

What is probably most surprising about the results for this event is that Israel as an actor is seen so minimally in the media (except for the editorials though in comparison to the other main actors, it is somewhat infrequent). In addition, the theme describing her role and/or

policies is seen quite minimally in all three media though it appears slightly more often in the headlines than in both the cartoons and editorials. The point here is that by looking at the data, without any knowledge of the war, one might not even know that Israel was involved in the war!

**Table 87****Actors in the Five Events**

Category	Medium	1956	1967	1973	1977,78	1982
<b><u>Intra-Regional Actors</u></b>						
Egypt	C	62	41	18	57	0
	H	47	30	38	37	1
	E	97	80	73	96	33
Israel	C	8	31	36	53	51
	H	7	49	52	43	47
	E	40	91	93	100	98
Arabs	C	8	30	41	18	2
	H	4	13	7	11	7
	E	43	86	83	83	64
Palestinians	C	0	7	3	19	52
	H	0	2	1	4	36
	E	5	16	18	68	98
Jordan	C	3	1	0	3	0
	H	0	6	1	10	0
	E	5	22	13	40	25
Syria	C	0	0	2	8	2
	H	0	6	7	4	7
	E	2	23	57	46	42
Lebanon	C	0	0	0	2	19
	H	0	0	0	0	40
	E	3	0	5	17	94
Saudi Arabia	C	0	2	2	1	0
	H	0	0	3	4	2
	E	3	8	14	28	22
Iraq	C	0	1	0	4	0
	H	0	0	0	0	0
	E	3	4	7	13	11
Libya	C	0	1	1	5	0
	H	0	0	0	1	0
	E	0	1	5	17	6

**(table continues)**

Actor	Medium	1956	1967	1973	1977,78	1982
Algeria	C	0	1	0	3	0
	H	0	1	0	1	0
	E	0	1	1	6	0
Iran	C	0	1	0	1	0
	H	0	0	0	0	0
	E	2	1	2	1	11
<u>Extra-Regional Actors</u>						
U.N.	C	23	20	5	1	1
	H	25	28	9	1	2
	E	67	77	36	8	25
U.S.	C	22	21	52	45	25
	H	27	26	38	37	40
	E	83	84	89	85	91
U.S.S.R.	C	25	45	20	7	3
	H	12	23	18	9	3
	E	65	78	70	35	25
Britain	C	20	3	2	0	0
	H	34	4	0	0	0
	E	85	28	8	0	9
France	C	13	3	1	0	0
	H	17	1	0	0	0
	E	73	19	7	0	3

Note 1. All numbers reported in this table represent the percent of times each actor appears in each medium. Percentages, therefore, do not total 100%.

Note 2. The inclusion of actors into this table was made on the basis of whether they occurred 5% or more in any one of the three data sources for any event.

Note 3. "C" refers to cartoons, "H" refers to headlines, and "E" refers to editorials.

Note 4. Included in the category of Palestinians was Arab refugees and Palestinian refugees. Palestine was added in as well but only when it was mentioned separately.

**Table 88**Main Themes: 1956 War

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Category	Cartoons	Editorials	Headlines
Nasser's [or Egypt's] power and/or aggressive policies	20	18	13
U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies	18	8	8
U.N.'s role and/or actions	14	24	18
Uncertainty of peace	12	17	7
U.S.'s role and/or policies	9	21	19
British and French involvement	3	3	21

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Note 1. All numbers reported in this table represent the percent of times each theme is mentioned within each medium. Columns do not total 100% because low frequency themes (i.e. those occurring in less than 10% of the subsamples) have been eliminated from the table for clarity of presentation.

**Table 89**

Images of Actors in the Cartoons: 1956 War

Actor	Valence	Active	Passive
<u>Intra-Regional</u>			
Egypt	+	1	8
	o	0	5
	-	48	11
Israel	+	0	0
	o	0	0
	-	5	4
<u>Extra-Regional</u>			
United Nations	+	14	1
	o	0	0
	-	0	12
United States	+	11	0
	o	0	1
	-	8	6
Soviet Union	+	7	1
	o	0	0
	-	18	3
Britain	+	6	0
	o	0	2
	-	10	6
France	+	4	0
	o	0	2
	-	7	2

Note 1. All numbers reported in this table are frequencies of occurrence, not percentages (as in the prior tables).

Note 2. "+" refers to a positive evaluation, "o" refers to a neutral evaluation, and "-" refers to a negative evaluation.


## THE 1967 WAR

Figure 2 illustrates the frequency of cartoons depicting the 1967 war during the sampling period of May 10 to September 3. Basically, the majority of cartoons were clustered during one time period, starting May 22 and then leveling off around June 22. The cartoons found during this one month period accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total sample. Finally, it should be noted that after July 17, there were hardly any political cartoons that were pertinent to this event. What events were occurring during this time period that received so much more attention from cartoonists than the rest of the sampling period?

Following Nasser's insistent requests and refusal by the Israelis to have them stationed on their soil, the U.N.E.F. was withdrawn on May 19 (Khoury, 1985; Quandt, 1977). On May 22, Nasser announced the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to all Israeli shipping and to vessels carrying strategic goods to Israel (Safran, 1978). In the eyes of Egypt, both of these events served to reverse the losses of the 1956 war; Egyptian troops re-occupied Sharm el Sheikh and for the first time since November of 1956, Egypt was rid of foreign forces (Neff, 1984). In other words, with the removal of the U.N. troops, the settlement from the previous war was essentially undone (Johnson, 1971). Jordan and Egypt signed a mutual defense treaty on May 30, like the one that already existed between Egypt and Syria which was signed in November of 1966 (Neff, 1984; Safran, 1978), and on June 4 one was signed between Iraq and Egypt (Spiegel, 1985).


On June 3, Israel's cabinet voted in favor of a "preventive war", believing that the Arab states had not yet had enough time to coordinate

Figure 2. Frequency of Cartoons During the Sampling Period: 1967 War




(figure continues)

August 1967



September 1967



their plans and make all necessary military preparations (Khoury, 1985). Israel initiated what has come to be called the "Six Day War" on June 5 and on this day she destroyed most of the Egyptian and Syrian air forces on the ground (Quandt, 1977) as well as striking the Iraqi and Jordanian military airfields (Khoury, 1985). Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, the Sudan and Yemen broke off relations with the United States on June 6 due to an Egyptian charge that U.S. planes had taken part in attacks on her (Johnson, 1971). Also on this day the Security Council passed a resolution calling for an unconditional cease-fire; the Russians had wanted a complete withdrawal and a condemnation of Israel in addition but finally settled for this (Khoury, 1985). Whereas Israel was willing to accept it if the Arab states agreed, the Arabs did not respond and the Israelis continued to push forward (Johnson, 1971). In essence, within the span of three days Israel had captured most of the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and Sharm el Sheikh as well as Old Jerusalem and the West Bank (Khoury, 1985). On June 8, there was a cease-fire on the Jordan-Israel front and on June 9, the one on the Egypt-Israel line went into effect (Safran, 1978). Israel now went after Syria and captured the Golan Heights and on June 11, they agreed to a cease-fire (Khoury, 1985).

The Soviet Union continued her efforts in the Security Council to pass a resolution condemning Israel and insisting she withdraw immediately; it failed on June 14 (Neff, 1985). It should be mentioned that on June 10, the Soviets broke off diplomatic relations with Israel (Khoury, 1985). The Soviets called for a meeting of the General Assembly because the Security Council seemed unable to make any progress and it convened on June 17 (Druks, 1979). The Soviet Union introduced a

resolution which called for condemnation of Israel and withdrawal from the territories as well as compensation for Arab war losses- it failed (Neff, 1984). To counter this resolution, U.S. Ambassador Goldberg introduced a draft resolution which essentially embodied Johnson's five principles for peace yet because no other nation supported it, the United States never pressed for a vote on it (Khouri, 1985).

There was more activity at the United Nations: a Russian-backed Yugoslav draft resolution was put forth as well as a Latin American one supported by the United States (Druks, 1979). The former called for conditional withdrawal whereas the latter for unconditional withdrawal (Khouri, 1985). When these two proposed resolution were finally put to a vote on July 4, neither one won the necessary majority (Sachar, 1979). Also at this time, Premier Kosygin and President Johnson held what is referred to as the Glassboro summit on June 23 and June 25 but no agreements were reached regarding the Middle East (Spiegel, 1985).

What do we learn about this series of events from the U.S. media, or more specifically from political cartoons, editorials, and headlines?

### **Who are the Actors?**

In the cartoons portraying the 1967 war, the key actor is the Soviet Union which is followed by Egypt and less frequent is Israel and then the Arabs. Israel dominates the headlines and then Egypt, the United Nations, the United States, and the Soviet Union occur less often in that order. In the editorials there are no actors or combination that clearly dominate; Israel is most frequent, then the Arabs, the United States, Egypt, the Soviet Union, and then the United Nations. Thus, the cartoons accord the Soviet Union a much greater role in this event than

the other two media as was the case in the 1956 war. In addition, the other actor that dominates this data source is Egypt whereas this country does not play as prominent a role relative to the other important actors in the headlines and editorials. Judging from these two events, one could say that the cartoons seem to identify and/or focus in on identifying who the "bad guy" is for the reader in both of these two conflicts.

In the headlines, the focus is primarily on Israel and although this country is the most frequent actor in the editorials, she does not dominate this medium like in the headlines. In contrast, the cartoons accord Israel a much smaller role relative to the other actors in this medium. Finally, it should be noted that the United Nations is seen as a more important actor in this event in the headlines than in the other two media (see Table 87).

### What are the Themes?

As was seen with themes of the 1956 war, the three media differ dramatically as to which theme they present as the major focus of the 1967 war (see Table 90).

The cartoons treat the Soviet Union's role and/or policies as the primary issue in this event by a large margin whereas in the other two media, this theme is approximately one-third as frequent. This is most surprising since the U.S.S.R. was not even directly involved in the war. I would speculate that the cartoons focus in on what most concerns or is of interest to the American reader as well as identifying who the "villain" is. According to Curtiss (1986), the Russians wanted this war very much because it seemed to be a great opportunity to increase her

influence in the region especially because the United States was so busy with Viet Nam. Thus, it seems that the cartoons were interested in emphasizing the extent to which the Soviet Union was involved in the Middle East in terms of aiding as well as supporting the "enemies of Israel." This was definitely of great concern to Americans because it implied the possible necessity of U.S. involvement to counter the Russians which was a tremendous fear to people especially because of being so overly committed in the Viet Nam war. According to Quandt (1977), even President Johnson was preoccupied with these concerns:

The key to understanding Johnson's position was his fear that the United States would be drawn into another war, possibly even a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Vietnam was bad enough, but Vietnam plus the Middle East, plus a possible showdown with the Soviet Union, was virtually unthinkable. (p. 60-61)

But even after the war, the Soviet Union was perceived as playing an important and negative role in the minds of Americans because she was opposing the position of the U.S. in the United Nations. Spiegel (1985) writes that the Arabs and the Russians were trying to regain what they had lost on the battlefield in the United Nations. Thus, it seems that the role of the Soviet Union was the most emotional issue for the American people in the 1967 war and therefore was most emphasized in this medium.

As far as the editorials, they present the U.S.'s role and/or policies as the primary issue in this event. In comparison, this theme is seen less frequently in the headlines whereas the cartoons give it very little attention. The second most frequent theme in this medium is the U.N.'s role and/or actions. Thus we see the same pattern with the

themes in this medium as in the 1956 war though these two issues are reversed in terms of which one is emphasized more. It seems that the editorials tend to be interested in analyzing and/or suggesting policies that the United States should pursue as well as examining her role and its possibilities. Therefore it is not surprising that many of these editorials also mentioned the Viet Nam war and America's role in it. In essence, for the 1967 war it was a central issue as to how involved America should be in the Middle East and what actions she should or should not take.

Finally, the issue that the headlines see as most important in this event, by a very large margin is: Israel's role and/or policies and/or military achievements and military superiority. As far as the other two media, this theme is found approximately half as often in the editorials whereas it receives minimal attention in the cartoons. It seems that this medium, as compared to the other two, is emphasizing the actual events of the war. It is interesting that each of the other two media see the most important issue in this war as the role and/or policies of an extra-regional actor, or more specifically one of the superpowers, whereas in the headlines the focus is on the role of a regional actor. Therefore it seems that the headlines are more inclined to be reporting the events than the other two media since the most frequent theme involves an actor directly involved in the war.

### What are the Images?

From examining Table 91, we see that the general image of most of the actors in the cartoons is essentially negative. There is, however, more active/passive differentiation in this event than there was in the

1956 war.

The images of Egypt are predominantly passive: there are more than twice as many passive as there are active ones. More than half of these passive images portray Egypt as a loser or as losing influence in the Arab world; many of the others involve relations with the Soviet Union (being the recipient of arms and support from the U.S.S.R., closely allied with the U.S.S.R., alliance with the U.S.S.R. is in doubt). Also, we see that this country is depicted as a negative actor almost four times as frequently as she is portrayed positively. Thus, the image of Egypt is quite definite in that she is essentially seen as being a passive-negative actor in this event.

Israel is perceived as playing an active role in this war somewhat more often than she is seen as passive. Given the course of the war, one would have expected a much larger "active" margin. It seems, however, that cartoons at this time showed Israel being denounced by the Soviet Union, a passive image; this accounted for slightly more than half of these passive depictions. Israel is portrayed as negative almost twice as often as she is seen as positive. It should be noted that she is depicted as winning, victorious, or as David (against Goliath) in less than one-fourth of the images and this partly explains why there are fewer positive portrayals than would have been expected given how successfully she dominated this war. In essence, the general image of Israel in this war is of being an active-negative actor.

There was only one image of Jordan so it is difficult to draw any substantial conclusion as to the general image of this country for this event. As far as this image though, Jordan is seen as passive and as negative.

For this event, the images of the United Nations generally portray this actor as more passive than active though the margin is not that large. As far as the valence, the image of the U.N. is essentially mixed although there are slightly more negative images than positive ones. Part of the reason for so many negative evaluations of this actor was that there are a number of images describing how the Soviet Union was adamantly pursuing its case and causing a lot of difficulties.

Looking at the United States, we see that she is seen as playing more of a passive than an active role in this war. In addition, the images of her tend to be negative evaluations: there are more than twice as many negative as compared to positive images. Many of these negative portrayals of the United States involve difficulties with the Soviet Union. Thus, the general image of the United States is that of being passive-negative.

There are a lot more images of the Soviet Union that show her as playing an active role in this conflict. More specifically, there are much more than twice as many active as there are passive images of this country. As far as the valence of these images, there are a good deal more that are considered to be negative evaluations than positive. What is most surprising about the results pertaining to this country is that there are quite a lot of images that are categorized as active-positive. The far majority of these images portray cooperative relations with Egypt and/or the Arabs (i.e. supplying arms and giving support to Egypt, Arabs; closely allied with and influencing Egypt). Nonetheless, the basic picture of the U.S.S.R. is an active-negative one in the 1967 war.

In conclusion, it appears that the images of both Israel and the Soviet Union tend to be primarily active-negative whereas both Egypt and

the United States are perceived as passive-negative. In the cases of Israel and the Soviet Union, the negative evaluations are not extremely predominant and consequently, it seems more appropriate to consider them both as "mildly-bad" guys rather than as "bad guys." It is difficult to even conceptualize these two countries on this dimension of good-bad in this event because we see that the negative images for each of them are essentially divided between being active and passive. Therefore, another way to interpret these results is that one could view Israel as having an "aggressor-type" image since Egypt is essentially seen as having a "victim" image due to her passive-negative role. As far as the Soviet Union, she can also be thought of as having an "aggressor-type" image whereas the United States can be thought of in terms of a "victim" image due to the fact that most of her passive-negative images involve the U.S.S.R. Finally, as in the 1956 war there are not any actors that are portrayed primarily in terms of positive images (though the United Nations could not be clearly categorized as far as valence).

### The U.S. Media and Historical Accounts

There were a number of aspects of the 1967 that were underemphasized in the media. First of all, in most historical accounts a good deal of attention is devoted to the Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty, an intelligence ship which was stationed off the Sinai coast. In Neff's (1984) account of the war, which is an entire book, he devotes a chapter each to June 5, June 6, June 7, June 8, June 9, and June 10. Most interesting, he entitles the June 8 chapter as follows: "U.S.S. Liberty attacked." Thus, not only does he spend a lot of time on this event but he presents this one day in terms of it by giving the chapter this

title. Also, in Curtiss' (1986) book on American perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is one chapter entitled "The Six Day War" and it is followed by another chapter called "An Awkwardness for President Johnson" which deals exclusively with this event. Furthermore, the author is aware of two whole books devoted to this topic: (1) Conspiracy of silence: the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty by Anthony Pearson (London: Quartet Books, 1978) and (2) Assault on the Liberty: the true story of the Israeli attack on an American intelligence ship by James Ennes Jr. (New York: Random House, 1979). Spiegel (1985) points out just how important this incident was — he reports that at first the American government believed that the Soviet Union had attacked the ship and this clearly had grave implications. In addition, Quandt (1977) claims that this reaction proved how Johnson was so concerned with the Russians and the possibility of a superpower confrontation. Although it was a theme in 2% (n=4) of the headlines, it was not found to be an issue in either of the other two media. The reason that this is particularly surprising is that we are dealing here with American newspapers so one would have expected this particular event to have received more, or at least some (in the case of the cartoons and the editorials) attention.

Another result that was surprising was how little attention Jordan and Syria received in the media since they were in fact participants in the war. There seems to be more emphasis given to these two countries in the historical accounts than in the American media. For example, in Neff's (1984) book on the war, the chapter devoted to the day of June 9 is entitled "assault on Syria."

Finally, it is my opinion that the biggest problem with studying the

media coverage for this particular war was that it was so short whereas the actual sampling period was comparatively long. More specifically, the war itself was only six days whereas the sampling period covered nearly four months. The reasons for this were twofold: (1) to ensure that the samples of each medium were of an adequate number and (2) so that this sampling period was of comparable length to the ones chosen for the other events. Thus it seems that it would be appropriate with this particular war, more so than with any of the others examined, to refer to it as the 1967 war and its aftermath.

**Table 90****Main Themes: 1967 War**

Category	Cartoons	Editorials	Headlines
U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies	31	10	11
Downfall and defeat of Nasser [or Egypt]	11	2	3
U.N.'s role and/or actions	10	12	15
Nasser's [or Egypt's] power and aggressive policies	10	9	11
Superpower relations: hostile, competitive, or cooperative	9	11	3
Relations between Israel and Arabs or Arab nations: hostile, antagonistic, tense	5	10	8
U.S.'s role and/or policies	3	15	12
Israel's role and/or policies and/or military achievements and military superiority	2	11	23

Note 1. All numbers reported in this table represent the percent of times each theme is mentioned within each medium. Columns do not total 100% because low frequency themes (i.e. those occurring in less than 10% of the subsamples) have been eliminated from the table for clarity of presentation.

**Table 91**

Images of Actors in the Cartoons: 1967 War

Actor	Valence	Active	Passive
<u>Intra-Regional</u>			
Egypt	+	2	9
	o	0	0
	-	15	28
Israel	+	11	3
	o	0	0
	-	14	13
Jordan	+	0	0
	o	0	0
	-	0	1
<u>Extra-Regional</u>			
United Nations	+	10	0
	o	0	3
	-	1	13
United States	+	5	2
	o	0	2
	-	5	14
Soviet Union	+	24	0
	o	0	0
	-	20	16

Note 1. All numbers reported in this table are frequencies of occurrence, not percentages (as in the prior table).

Note 2. "+" refers to a positive evaluation, "o" refers to a neutral evaluation, and "-" refers to a negative evaluation.



## THE 1973 WAR

The sampling period for the 1973 war was from October 1, 1973 to January 20, 1974 and figure 3 shows the frequency of political cartoons during this period. Basically, the majority of cartoons depicting this event were clustered into the period from October 9 through November 17. The cartoons found during this period accounted for nearly two-thirds of the entire sample. More specifically, it appears that the most concentrated period was from October 9 until October 22. Finally, although the frequency of cartoons leveled off after November 17, there was an increase between December 11 and December 27. What events were occurring during these two periods that received so much attention from political cartoonists?

Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, a day on which Israel was least prepared to defend itself because it was the religious holy day of Yom Kippur. Yet Israeli intelligence had all the information in order to be prepared for it but apparently did not evaluate it accurately (Sachar, 1979).


Israel was in the position of fighting a war on two fronts: against Egypt in the south and against Syria in the north (Safran, 1978). The Arab forces were in the superior position from October 6 to 9 and achieved significant gains (Laquer, 1974). On October 9, Israel began counteroffensive attacks on both fronts (Druks, 1979) and also appealed to the United States for arms (Quandt, 1977). The Israeli counterattack against the Egyptians failed but they were successful against the Syrians (Safran, 1978). By October 10 most of the Golan Heights were regained and the Israeli forces began moving towards Damascus the next

**Figure 3. Frequency of Cartoons During the Sampling Period: 1973 War**




(figure continues)

December 1973



January 1974



day (Druks, 1979). At this time, Iraqi and Jordanian troops joined the Syrians (Aronson, 1978). Also on October 10, the first American resupplies reached Israel and the first Soviet resupplies were received in Damascus (Quandt, 1977).

Israel had been urging the United States for massive aid and Nixon finally began the airlift on October 13 after hearing that Sadat had refused a cease-fire in place (Aronson, 1978; Quandt, 1977). On October 13 and 14, the Israelis crushed a major Egyptian offensive and on October 15, they began crossing over to the Egyptian side of the Canal (Spiegel, 1985). Apparently Sadat was not aware of how badly he was being defeated and on October 18, Kosygin showed him satellite pictures with the result that Sadat authorized him to push for a cease-fire in place (Quandt, 1977).

Arab oil producers announced a 5% cutback in production on October 17 and threatened to follow it with an additional 5% each month until Israel returned to her 1967 borders (Curtiss, 1986). Saudi Arabia announced an embargo on oil shipments to the United States on October 19 in response to Nixon's request for \$2.2 billion dollars from Congress to cover the Israeli airlift (Spiegel, 1985). The next day, other oil-producing nations announced the cutoff of oil exports to the United States (Curtiss, 1986).

On October 20, Kissinger went to Moscow and by the next day, he and Brezhnev agreed to a draft cease-fire agreement which went into effect on October 22 (Laquer, 1974; Nixon, 1978). It was passed by the Security Council and was known as Resolution 338; it called for a cease-fire in 12 hours, an implementation of Resolution 242, and immediate negotiations (Spiegel, 1985).

The cease-fire was quickly violated by Egyptian troops and Israel took advantage; she went on a major offensive and encircled the Egyptian Third Army (Aronson, 1978; Safran, 1978). The Security Council met on October 23 and passed Resolution 339 which called for another cease-fire and for a return to the positions occupied on October 22 (Quandt, 1977).

On October 24, Sadat asked both the Americans and the Russians to supervise the cease-fire; the U.S. rejected the request but the Soviet Union did not (Druks, 1979). Brezhnev sent an urgent message to the White House which said that if the United States did not agree, the Soviet Union would take the necessary action unilaterally. Washington had been getting reports that the Soviets had been putting their army, air force, and transport units on alert (Quandt, 1977). Thus, the U.S. military was put on a worldwide alert in order to deter the Soviets from taking any action. Finally, the Soviets gave up their demand for a joint superpower force to be sent to the Middle East as Sadat had requested and accepted the observer concept (Spiegel, 1985). On October 25, the Security Council passed Resolution 340 which involved sending U.N. military observers to supervise the cease-fire and this time hostilities did end (Druks, 1979; Laquer, 1974).

Talks between Egypt and Israel concerning how to implement Resolution 338 began on October 29 at Kilometer 101 (Aronson, 1978). First Egypt's foreign minister Fahmy held talks with Nixon and Kissinger on October 29 and 30 and then Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel came to Washington on October 31 (Quandt, 1977). After intensive negotiations, both Egypt and Israel agreed to Kissinger's "Six Point Plan" and it was signed at Kilometer 101 on November 11 (Safran, 1978). This agreement consisted of the following issues: to observe the cease-

fire, to begin talks on returning to the October 22 lines, to supply food, water and medicine to Suez city, to transport non-military supplies to Egypt's Third Army, to have joint U.N.-Israeli supervision of the supply route to the Third Army, and to an exchange of POWs (Aronson, 1978). The first exchange of prisoners between Egypt and Israel took place on November 15 (Quandt, 1977).

Kissinger now concentrated on preparations for the Geneva Conference, as called for by Resolution 338 (Khoury, 1985). On December 12, he went on his second Middle East trip and met with leaders of many of the Arab countries as well as Israel to secure their participation in the conference (Quandt, 1977). Kissinger was unsuccessful in his attempts to get Syria to agree to attend because President Assad wanted a disengagement agreement prior to the conference (Spiegel, 1985). The Geneva Conference did convene on December 21 and in attendance was the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.N. Secretary-General, and the foreign ministers of Egypt, Israel and Jordan (Quandt, 1977) yet it proved to be for the most part a ceremonial exercise (Spiegel, 1985).

What do we learn about this series of events from the American media or more specifically from cartoons, editorials and headlines?

### Who are the Actors?

In the 1973 war (see Table 87), the United States dominates the cartoons, followed by the Arabs and then Israel. In the headlines, Israel is the prominent actor by far followed by the United States and Egypt (equally represented). As for the editorials, the most frequent actor is Israel, then the United States, the Arabs and somewhat less frequent is Egypt followed by the Soviet Union.

In essence, it appears that the cartoons are most concerned in this event with the United States though they appear to have again singled out the "villain" in that the Arabs are the second most frequent though the editorials also give the Arabs a good deal of attention. Israel is by far the focus of the headlines and is also the most frequent actor in the editorials yet she is given less importance by the cartoons. Finally, the headlines give Egypt as much attention as the United States whereas this country receives more attention in the editorials yet is given a minor role in the cartoons.

### What are the Themes?

In 1973, the three media again differ as to what they present as the most important issue about this event (see Table 92).

The most frequent theme in the cartoons is the Arabs' use of oil to threaten, scare, and/or as a political weapon. This issue is seen much less often in the other two media: slightly more than one-third as frequent in the editorials and slightly more than one-fourth as frequent in the headlines. For the typical American reader, the Arabs were the real "villain" in this event because of the oil embargo. This was an action that directly affected the United States and caused a lot of concern and worry. According to Laquer (1974), the idea of using oil as a political tool had been advocated for many years before 1973 and even the Soviets had suggested to the Arab nations to take advantage of this "weapon" against the West. In addition, he maintains that the Arab states were interested in showing the United States the cost of her continued as well as seemingly unlimited support of Israel. In essence, this was clearly the most emotional aspect of the 1973 war as perceived

by Americans since it had so much impact "at home" and this is reflected by the fact that it is presented as the most important issue in the cartoons in addition to how it was actually portrayed. The American people were angered by the oil embargo and felt they were being blackmailed -- many cartoons depicted this exact sentiment as well as portraying the Arabs as "threatening and scaring." It should be emphasized that such a description surely fits what one would define as a "villain."

The editorials present two issues as most important in this event: (1) the United States role and/or policies and (2) uncertainty of peace. Although the theme concerned with the United States is less frequent in this medium than in both the cartoons and headlines, it is one of two that occurs the most often in the editorials. As far as the theme involving the uncertainty of peace, this issue is less frequent in the cartoons and much less in the headlines. It seems that these two themes might be somewhat related because of the peace efforts on the part of the U.S., more specifically Kissinger's attempts to bring about an Israeli-Egyptian agreement as well as convene the Geneva conference. This is not meant to suggest that those editorials dealing with the issue of peace focus solely on these American efforts since there were clearly other aspects of this event that are also related to this theme. What I would like to propose is that by treating this issue of the uncertainty of peace as so central in this event, the editorials are essentially focusing in on a policy issue since the government was beginning to realize at this time just how important it was to try to resolve the conflict:

Suddenly, columnists began analyzing the effect

of Middle East oil and the Arab-Israeli dispute on issues as diverse as the economic recession and U.S. relations with the Third World. Regional and global politics overlapped and Arab-Israeli negotiations were treated as critical to global foreign policy. The Middle East demanded constant attention, with the result that decisions were made by top rank officials. Never had an administration felt more pressure to resolve the conflict. (Spiegel, 1985, p. 220)

In essence, one could conclude that the editorials present this conflict in terms of what role the United States is playing or what role she could/should be playing and what issue should or is of most concern to policy-makers or opinion leaders.

As far as the headlines, the most frequent theme in this medium is Israel's role and/or policies and/or military superiority. This issue is seen less than half as often in the editorials and less than one-third as much in the cartoons. Thus it seems that this medium is depicting the actual events themselves much more so than the other two media. In the beginning of the sampling period, the issue was Israel's military successes but after that Israel's role and/or policies was a central issue due to her encircling the Egyptian Third Army and military gains. Consequently she had the "upper hand" in the peace talks after the war and was therefore still playing a central role as she had during the war and this is why she commanded so much attention in the headlines.

### What are the Images?

By looking at Table 93, we see that almost all of the actors, as portrayed in the cartoons, have images which are negative evaluations. Also, we see that most of the main actors are seen as playing passive

roles in this event.

Egypt is perceived as playing a passive role somewhat more often than an active role. Also, she is evaluated positively somewhat more often than negatively. It should be noted that the ratios for each of these dimensions is the same. It is somewhat surprising that in this war Egypt is evaluated as a positive actor. The reason for this result is partly due to the fact that there are quite a number of images which portray her as being cooperative: agreeing to a cease-fire, restrained by and/or negotiating with the U.S. concerning the conflict, making progress towards peace with Israel, and considering going to the peace talks. Thus, the image of Egypt seen in the 1973 war is basically passive-positive yet it is not that clear a picture since the ratios for each dimension are relatively small.

Israel plays a passive role somewhat more often than an active one in this event. In addition, there are somewhat more negative images of this country than positive ones. It should be pointed out that the ratios for each of these dimensions is the same. It is surprising that whereas Egypt is seen as slightly more positive than negative, the reverse is seen with Israel. Part of the reason for this is that there are more images which involve some sort of conflict component: involved in conflict with Egypt and/or Syria, hostilities towards the U.S.S.R., hostilities with the Arab states, problems with the U.S., alliance with the U.S. is threatened by Arabs and/or oil. In essence, the major difference seen with the images of Israel is that there are a number of negative images dealing with difficulties in relations with the United States that are not seen in the case of Egypt. Finally, it can be concluded that in the 1973 war, the image of Israel is passive-negative

although it is not a definitive one since the ratios within each dimension are not that large.

The Arabs are seen as active-negative. There are five times as many active as passive images, and more than four times as many negative than positive. This is how one would have expected to see them portrayed in the cartoons since the most frequent theme in this medium was their use of oil as a weapon. This is not meant to imply that all of the images of Arabs involved the oil issue because they did not although the majority did.

The only other intra-regional actor that was examined is Syria and all the images of this actor fit into the active-negative category. The problem with drawing any conclusions from this finding is that we are only dealing here with three portrayals of this country.

Looking at the United Nations, we see that this actor is viewed as playing an active role as often as a passive one. Also, there are as many positive evaluations as there are negative evaluations. What is interesting here is that all of the images that portray the U.N. as active are positive portrayals whereas all the images that depict a passive role are negative depictions. The problem though with drawing any conclusions from this is that we are dealing with small subsamples: only three active images and three passive images. Thus, even though we are dealing with a small number of portrayals of this actor, the mixed image of the United Nations we saw in 1956 remains in 1973.

For this event, the images of the United States show her as playing a more passive than an active role. In addition, there are many more negative evaluations of this country than there are positive ones. Part of the reason that there are so many passive-negative portrayals is that

there are a lot of images that show the United States being threatened and/or blackmailed by the Arabs with oil. In addition, there are a number of images that describe problems or difficulties with the Soviet Union. It should be noted that most of the active-positive images involved portrayals of the United States as a mediator and as trying to bring peace to the Middle East. In essence though, the general picture of the United States in the 1973 war is of being a passive-negative actor.

The Soviet Union is portrayed as a passive actor more than twice as often as an active one. As far as the valence of these images, we see that there are more than twice as many that are negative as compared to positive depictions. It should be noted that the ratios within each of these dimensions is the same. It is interesting that when the U.S.S.R. is seen as an active actor, she is evaluated positively yet when she is seen as playing a passive rôle, all of these images are negative. These active-positive portrayals are cooperative in nature in that most of them deal with supplying aid, arms and/or giving support to the Arabs. On the other hand, most of these negative-passive images involve competing with the U.S. or potential difficulties in superpower relations. In essence, the general image of the Soviet Union is a passive-negative one.

In conclusion, we see that in the 1973 war the images of Arabs and Syria are active-negative so consequently we can say that they are perceived as definite "bad guys" in this event. Yet in the case of Syria we are dealing with a very small sample so such a description of her is somewhat misleading. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to conclude that the Arabs are seen as the "bad guys" here since this can be said

with more certainty. Both superpowers are perceived as having passive-negative or "victim-type" images and this is partly due to the difficulties within their relationship though with the United States it is more a result of the oil embargo. Israel is also seen as passive-negative though she is not considered to have a "victim-type" image because neither dimension is that definitive. The only actor that is perceived positively in this event is Egypt and she is seen as a passive actor. It is a curious finding that a country that was directly involved in the 1973 war and had (in the recent past) such a clear active-negative image, should emerge as a positive actor.

#### **The U.S. Media and Historical Accounts**

The most surprising finding from the analysis of media coverage for this event is the low frequency with which Syria is represented given that she was directly involved in the war. This result is especially true for the cartoons and headlines whereas in the editorials she is mentioned frequently. Why should Syria be so underemphasized as compared to Egypt since both of them fought in this war? Part of the reason might have to do with the fact that the war Israel fought in the north with her was shorter than the one with Egypt. In addition, there were no additional problems with Syria as with Egypt when Israel encircled the Third Army. Last, the sampling period includes the negotiations between Egypt and Israel (the last day of the sampling is when these accords were signed) whereas the ones between Syria and Israel did not start until afterwards. Yet all of these contributing reasons confuse the fact that she received a good deal of attention in the editorials. Thus, the real question is whether the editorials are overemphasizing Syria or if

the other two media are underemphasizing her -- this is probably a matter of opinion. Finally, given the importance of Egypt in this event as we have just discussed, it is surprising that in the themes analysis her role and/or policies receives as little attention as it does.

**Table 92**

Main Themes: 1973 War

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Category	Cartoons	Editorials	Headlines
Arabs' use of oil to threaten, scare, and/or as a political weapon	23	7	5
U.S.'s role and/or policies	19	16	20
Superpower relations: hostile, competitive, or cooperative	12	12	8
Uncertainty of peace	11	16	6
Israel's role and/or policies and/or military superiority	8	12	27

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Note 1. All numbers reported in this table represent the percent of times each theme is mentioned within each medium. Columns do not total 100% because low frequency themes (i.e. those occurring in less than 10% of the subsamples) have been eliminated from the table for clarity of presentation.

**Table 93**Images of Actors in the Cartoons: 1973 War

Actor	Valence	Active	Passive
<u>Intra-Regional</u>			
Egypt	+	2	12
	o	0	0
	-	7	2
Israel	+	5	15
	o	0	0
	-	15	12
Arabs	+	1	9
	o	0	0
	-	44	0
Syria	+	0	0
	o	0	0
	-	3	0
<u>Extra-Regional</u>			
United Nations	+	3	0
	o	0	0
	-	0	3
United States	+	26	0
	o	0	0
	-	2	40
Soviet Union	+	7	0
	o	0	0
	-	0	19

Note 1. All numbers reported in this table are frequencies of occurrence, not percentages (as in the prior table).

Note 2. "+" refers to a positive evaluation, "o" refers to a neutral evaluation, and "-" refers to a negative evaluation.

## THE 1977, 1978 PEACE PROCESS




Figure 4 shows the frequency of political cartoons portraying the 1977, 1978 peace process. The sampling period for this event consisted of two periods that were treated as one: September 16 to December 27, 1977 and August 3 to September 26, 1978. Almost half of the sample of cartoons were clustered into the period from November 20 to December 20, 1977. In addition, a smaller clustering of cartoons was found during the period from September 3 to September 26, 1978, accounting for slightly more than one-fourth of the sample. What was happening during these two periods in particular that attracted so much more attention from political cartoonists?

On November 9, President Anwar Sadat announced in a speech to the Egyptian Parliament that "...for the sake of sparing the blood of a single Egyptian soldier, he was 'prepared to go to the ends of the earth, even to the Knesset in Jerusalem'" (Safran, 1978, p. 602). On November 15, Prime Minister Begin responded and sent Sadat an invitation through the United States (Quandt, 1986). According to Carter's memoirs, "President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem on November 19 to 21 and his speech to the Knesset were among the most dramatic events of modern history" (p. 297). In reaction to Sadat's initiative, Syria broke diplomatic relations with Egypt and high officials in the Syrian, Libyan, and Iraqi governments wanted him assassinated (Carter, 1982).

On November 27, Sadat called for a conference in Cairo which would serve as a preparatory one for Geneva and he invited all parties to attend (Quandt, 1986). Israel accepted the idea, Syria and the P.L.O. denounced it, and Jordan and Saudi Arabia did not commit themselves. The


**Figure 4. Frequency of Cartoons During the Sampling Period: 1977,1978**

Peace Process




(figure continues)


December 1977



August 1978



September 1978



United States agreed a few days later and Secretary of State Vance traveled to six Middle Eastern nations between December 9 and 14 to muster support and to persuade Arab leaders to participate yet they refused (Reich, 1984). The Soviet Union also refused to attend. The Cairo Conference was held on December 14 but only Israel, Egypt, the United States, and the United Nations attended; it was attended by lower-level officials and no progress was made (Reich, 1984; Safran, 1978)

Prime Minister Begin still needed to make a formal response to Sadat's peace initiative and on December 16, he went to Washington with a 22 point peace plan (Safran, 1978). Carter was encouraged by Begin's plan and consequently called Sadat to suggest another meeting between the two leaders to which Sadat agreed (Spiegel, 1985). Begin and Sadat met in Ismailia, Egypt on December 25, 26 and were unable to agree on anything substantial (Quandt, 1986; Safran, 1978). It was the last time the two leaders met until the Camp David summit (Spiegel, 1985).

President Carter, in a final effort to salvage the peace process, invited Sadat and Begin to come to Camp David for negotiations and it was officially announced on August 8 (Carter, 1982; Khouri, 1985). The meetings were from September 5 to September 17 and they were held in virtual secrecy; there was a news black-out and this resulted in a lot of speculation on the part of the media that often proved to be wrong (Reich, 1984).

The first meeting between the three leaders was held on September 6 and Sadat presented a peace plan which was tougher than anything he had suggested before. The next day Begin responded to each point and explained its unacceptability -- there were angry and heated exchanges

between Sadat and Begin that day. The meetings between the three were so unsuccessful that from then on, they did not meet together (Spiegel, 1985). Reich (1984) notes that there were a lot of disagreements between Israel and the United States and that Carter had to use a lot of pressure tactics on Begin in order to get him to make some concessions.

The summit resulted in agreement on two accords: (1) "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel" (this called for an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty to be signed within three months, the normalization of all relations within a year, a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai within three years, and allowed for a U.N. peacekeeping force and other kinds of security arrangements) and (2) "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" (this would carry out Resolution 242, resolve the Palestinian problem, and provide for "full autonomy" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) (Curtiss, 1986; Khouri, 1985).

After the summit, Secretary of State Vance traveled to the Middle East and went to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria yet each rejected the idea of endorsing the accords (Spiegel, 1985). However, the accords were signed at the White House on September 17; the Egyptian Cabinet approved them on September 19 and the Israeli Knesset did as well on September 28 (Reich, 1984).

What do we learn about this series of events from the U.S. media, or more specifically from political cartoons, editorials, and headlines?

### **Who are the Actors?**

If the cartoons tend to identify who the "bad guy" is, then what happens in a positive event such as the peace process of 1977 and 1978?

For this event, the three media are much more similar to each other than in the previous conflicts (see Table 87). There is no one single actor that dominates — rather there is a leading combination: Egypt, Israel, and the United States (although the ordering of these actors varies). In the cartoons, the most frequent actor is Egypt, closely followed by Israel and then the United States. Israel is the most frequent in the headlines followed by both the United States and Egypt. As far as the editorials, Israel is the most prominent actor followed closely by Egypt and less frequent is the United States and the Arabs.

Basically it seems that both the cartoons and the editorials are most concerned with Egypt and Israel though in the cartoons Egypt is more frequent whereas Israel is in the editorials. In addition, both these media give the United States less attention but the key difference is that the editorials treat the Arabs almost as importantly whereas they receive minimal attention in both the cartoons and the headlines. Israel is the most frequent actor in the headlines as in the editorials but the difference between these two data sources is that the United States is given as much importance as Egypt in the headlines.

Thus it appears that for this positive event the two regional actors are basically the focus of all three media except for the headlines in which the United States is given more prominence than in the other two data sources. The only conclusion to draw about the cartoons is that they focus most on Egypt which is interesting since the key actor in the other two media is Israel. More specifically, judging from past history Egypt had been a "villain" in the Middle East conflict so maybe here the cartoons are emphasizing the drastic change in the perception of this country.

### What are the Themes?

Looking at Table 94, we see that for the first time, all three media are in agreement as to what they present as the most important issue in this event and it is the United States' role and/or policies. According to Reich (1974) the Carter administration put the settling of the Arab-Israeli conflict high on its agenda almost from the beginning. In addition, Spiegel (1985) writes that for Carter, peace in the Middle East was nearly equivalent to world peace. The United States did play a central role in the peace process due to her interest as well as often being forced to by the actual situation. Spiegel (1985) claims that when Begin brought his peace proposal to Washington, he was in effect giving the U.S. a more central role to play. In addition, the failure at Ismailia also resulted in the United States having to be more involved. As far as the Camp David summit, Quandt (1987) notes that without Carter, Sadat and Begin would have probably broken off the talks because of the deep suspicions each held about the other. In essence, without help from the United States, the peace process probably would not have succeeded -- every time it stalled or problems developed between Egypt and Israel, the U.S. managed to keep it alive and eliminate obstacles.

Therefore it is not surprising that all three media give the role and/or policies of the U.S. such prominence as a theme yet one wonders if part of the reason is due to the fact that the sample of newspapers is limited to American ones. Thus, maybe Egyptian newspapers saw Egypt's role and/or policies as the key issue and possibly Israeli newspapers presented the theme of Israel's role and/or policies as the focus. Then the question arises, what about the newspapers from a country that was not involved in the peace process: what theme would they treat as most

important? Such questions must await future research in order to be answered.

Yet in the editorials, the issue of Israel's role and/or policies occurs equally as often as the U.S.'s role and/or policies. Thus, for this medium both of these themes are seen as the most important issues in the peace process. One of the possible reasons that Israel's role received equal attention is because she is a close ally of the United States. In addition, she presented a lot of obstacles and created a lot of difficulties throughout the peace process and the editorials were seen as suggesting what policies she should pursue and/or criticizing her. It should be noted that the theme of Egypt's role did not receive that much less attention in the editorials than these two concerning Israel and the United States.

In comparison, the headlines treat the theme regarding Israel and the one regarding Egypt as equally important and both are second most frequent. Yet in the cartoons, there is a very different pattern in regard to the themes relating to these two intra-regional actors. First of all, the theme regarding Israel occurs half as often as the one about Egypt and in addition, it receives much less attention in this medium as compared to the other two. Second of all, the theme involving Arabs or Arab nations policies or opposition towards Egypt [or Sadat], Geneva, or peace is the second most frequent in the cartoons whereas it receives much less attention in the other two media. Why do the cartoons overemphasize the Arabs and underemphasize the roles of Egypt and Israel in comparison to the other two media? The only possible explanation for this curious finding is that cartoons tend to be negative characterizations of political events so that even in a positive event,

they find some aspect that is negative and give it a good deal of attention. This finding essentially proves that compared to headlines and editorials, cartoons are in fact more negative especially because in this case we are even dealing with a positive event. Further research on cartoons depicting positive events is needed to be certain that this finding is not specific to this event. Finally, one can conclude from this result that even for a positive event, cartoons as compared to the other two media, still identify who the "bad guy" is for the reader. This is accomplished in this case by giving a theme a good deal more attention than seems warranted considering that the other two media agree that Israel's role and Egypt's role are both highly important issues and are much more so than the Arabs' or Arab nations' policies or opposition whereas in the cartoons we see the opposite pattern.

### What are the Images?

From examining Table 95, we see that in general most of the actors are portrayed in the cartoons as playing an active role in this event. More significant is the fact that this is the first time in which we see definite positive evaluations of actors and what we would label as "good guys" (because they are also seen as active).

The images of Egypt are predominantly active though there are a good deal of passive ones as well. Also, there are twice as many positive images of this country than there are negative ones. It seems surprising that there are this many negative evaluations of this actor in a positive event. Many of these negative portrayals of Egypt depict her as being denounced by others -- the Palestinians, other Arab nations, and/or the Soviet Union. In essence, there is a general image of Egypt

as being an active-positive actor in the peace process.

Looking at the images of Israel, we see that she is perceived as playing an active role much more often than a passive one. In addition, there are more than three times as many images that are positive evaluations of this actor as compared to negative portrayals. Therefore, Israel is perceived in this event as having an active-positive image. As far as the negative images, it is interesting that most of them are when Israel is portrayed as an active actor. Many of these particular depictions show Israel having disagreements or difficulties, specifically with Egypt and with the United States.

In the case of the Palestinians, the images are nearly split between perceiving this actor as active and passive although there are slightly more active ones. In addition, we see that as far as the valence of these images, they are also split though there are slightly more negative than positive ones. What is interesting here is that all the active images of the Palestinians are negative and all the passive images are positive. Another way to view this is that all the positive portrayals involve the Palestinians playing a passive role whereas all the negative images are when this actor is seen as active. Basically, these active-negative images depict the Palestinians as hostile or as being opposed to something whereas the passive-positive portrayals involve receiving support and considering peace (as far as participating in the process or ending hostilities).

There is only one portrayal of the United Nations in this event so it is difficult to discuss how this actor is generally perceived. As far as this one image though, it is categorized as being passive as well as neutral.

Looking at the images of the United States, we see that she is portrayed as an active actor much more often than as a passive one. As far as the valence of the portrayals, there are nearly four times as many positive as compared to negative images of this country. Many of these negative depictions involve worry — more specifically, about the possibility that Camp David might fail and about the possibility of not being included in Egyptian-Israeli talks and/or a separate peace. In essence, the general image of the United States in the peace process is that of being active-positive.

Although there are not that many images of the Soviet Union in this event, what we see is that she is almost always perceived as playing an active role. Concerning the valence of these portrayals, they are basically mixed although there are slightly more negative evaluations than positive ones.

In conclusion, we see that Egypt, Israel, and the United States have definite active-positive images. Therefore, one can say that these three actors are perceived as the "good guys" in this event. Such a finding is not that surprising since these three countries were the main actors in what is a positive event. What we do not see here that we have found in the previous events examined is any definitive "bad guy." One could cautiously say that the Soviet Union is perceived as a "mildly-bad guy" but given the small number of portrayals of this actor as well as the small margin of more negative as compared to positive images, such a conclusion seems unjustified. Similarly, the same label could conceivably be applied to the Palestinians except in this case the margin is quite small on both dimensions with the result that it is really quite difficult to categorize this actor at all in terms of a

general image. Finally, it should be noted that there are no actors that are seen as passive in this event (though the United Nations is but there was only one image).

### **The U.S. Media and Historical Accounts**

It seems that the presentation of this event in the media basically agrees with historical accounts. The only surprising finding which was discussed above is that in the cartoons the theme concerning the Arabs is seen as more important than the two themes that deal with Egypt and Israel. In addition, as was suggested above, it was questioned whether the theme involving the United States is given more prominence because the sample was limited to American newspapers. It would be interesting to see how Egyptian newspapers and Israeli newspapers portrayed this event and then to compare the three accounts.

The event we have just examined differs from the other four that are presented here in that it is a positive event. Although there are clear differences in the results, it is difficult to say whether it is due to the fact that it is a positive event or it is on account of the nature of the event. More specifically, in this event we see much more agreement between the three media as far as identifying what the major issues are and who the major actors are. This could be due to the fact that as compared to the conflicts, the peace process was not as complex an event since it essentially involved three actors and their negotiations. In other words, these results may not necessarily be due to the fact that it was merely a positive as opposed to a negative event. In order to resolve this question, more work needs to be done on how the media presents other positive events in order to see whether

these results are representative.

In addition, we have also shown here that cartoons are not always negative characterizations of political events since we see that they do at times present predominantly positive images of various countries. More research on cartoons depicting positive events is needed in order to know if these findings can be generalized or are merely specific to this event. Finally, it should be mentioned that later we will see that the data on political leaders are quite different for this event as compared to the four wars and again, the question will be whether these results are due to the nature of this event or merely because it is a positive event.

**Table 94****Main Themes: 1977,1978 Peace Process**

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Category	Cartoons	Editorials	Headlines
U.S.'s role and/or policies	18	19	23
Arabs' or Arab nations' policies or opposition towards Egypt [or Sadat], Geneva, or peace	15	8	9
Optimism about, striving toward, or achieving peace	14	4	9
Egyptian-Israeli relations: friendly, cooperative, meeting together, holding talks	11	12	11
Uncertainty of peace, Geneva or Cairo Conference	11	11	7
Egypt's role and/or policies	10	17	15
Israel's role and/or policies	5	19	15

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Note 1. All numbers reported in this table represent the percent of times each theme is mentioned within each medium. Columns do not total 100% because low frequency themes (i.e. those occurring in less than 10% of the subsamples) have been eliminated from the table for clarity of presentation.

**Table 95**

Images of Actors in the Cartoons: 1977,1978 Peace Process

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Actor	Valence	Active	Passive
<u>Intra-Regional</u>			
Egypt	+	31	11
	o	0	4
	-	8	13
Israel	+	29	16
	o	0	5
	-	11	2
Palestinians	+	0	10
	o	0	0
	-	13	0
<u>Extra-Regional</u>			
United Nations	+	0	0
	o	0	1
	-	0	0
United States	+	26	12
	o	5	0
	-	2	8
Soviet Union	+	2	1
	o	0	0
	-	5	0

---

Note 1. All numbers reported in this table are frequencies of occurrence, not percentages (as in the prior table).

Note 2. "+" refers to a positive evaluation, "o" refers to a neutral evaluation, and "-" refers to a negative evaluation.



## THE 1982 WAR

The sampling period for the 1982 war was from June 1 to September 22 and figure 5 shows the frequency of political cartoons depicting this event. The most concentrated number of cartoons was found during two time periods: July 7 to July 30 and September 5 to September 22. These two clusterings of cartoons accounted for nearly two-thirds of the sample. What were the events that were taking place during these two periods that attracted so much more attention from political cartoonists?

First some background is needed before reviewing the events in July and September. On June 6, the I.D.F. moved into Lebanon and this marked the beginning of Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee (Gabriel, 1984). The stated goal of this mission was to put the Galilee out of the range of P.L.O. shellings (40 kilometers) and thereby create a security zone (Reich, 1984). The first clashes with the Syrians began on the second day of the war and thus, Israel was fighting two wars — one against the Syrians and one against the P.L.O. (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984). By June 8, the Israeli forces had met their goal and were beyond the 40 kilometers; the P.L.O. had put up little resistance and many of them had withdrawn to the north (Rabinovich, 1985; Sachar, 1987). On June 9, Israel destroyed Syrian missile batteries and successfully shot down over 90 Syrian aircraft (Gabriel, 1984). As a result of these two feats, the Syrian ground forces were left unable to defend against the Israeli air attack.


After receiving a warning from the Soviet Union that further attacks on Syria could mean trouble globally, President Reagan pressured Israel

**Figure 5. Frequency of Cartoons During the Sampling Period: 1982 War**




(figure continues)

August, 1982



September 1982



into a cease-fire which took effect on June 11 (Khoury, 1985). The cease-fire was extended to include the P.L.O. on June 12 yet by the next day heavy fighting resumed (Gabriel, 1984). By June 14, Israel had succeeded in cutting off West Beirut and encircling the P.L.O. (Khoury, 1985). On June 22, Israel agreed to a cease-fire which had been requested by the United States yet by the next day it broke down (Gabriel, 1984). By June 25 Israel had won the battle with the Syrians for the Beirut-Damascus Highway and a cease-fire was declared (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984).

Many of the P.L.O. fighters had fled to Beirut and Israel decided the best strategy to get them out was to lay siege to Beirut rather than to attack directly since many lives would be lost in urban fighting (Gabriel, 1984; Haig, 1984). It seems that Israel had hopes that the Lebanese Front would go in and capture West Beirut but Bashir Gemayel refused (Rabinovich, 1985). On July 1 the siege of Beirut officially began (Gabriel, 1984).

On July 4, the P.L.O. signed an agreement with Lebanon to leave yet they had no place to go; Syria finally agreed to take the P.L.O. as well as to withdraw its own military presence in Lebanon in phases (Haig, 1984). On July 6, President Reagan agreed "in principle" to contribute American troops to a multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut (Spiegel, 1985). Apparently this announcement sparked superpower rivalry to the point that the U.S.S.R. began sending supplies to Syria who then announced on July 9 that they would not accept the P.L.O. and subsequently the P.L.O. reneged on their prior agreement to leave Lebanon (Haig, 1984; Spiegel, 1985).

Artillery and rocket attacks broke out between Israel and the P.L.O.

on July 9. A cease-fire held from July 12 until July 21 when the P.L.O. staged three attacks and this prompted the Israelis to begin a major attack on Beirut. On July 22 fighting broke out between the Israelis and Syrians and this continued to July 25. On July 30, a new cease-fire went into effect but it only lasted until August 1 (Gabriel, 1984). Israel intensified her attacks in August, with particularly fierce ones on August 4, 12 which finally resulted in the P.L.O.'s acceptance of an agreement to leave Beirut (Rabinovich, 1985). On August 19, Reagan announced that U.S. Marines together with French and Italian troops would join together as a peacekeeping force to protect the P.L.O. as they departed (Spiegel, 1985).

The P.L.O. began leaving on August 21 and by September 1, both the Syrian and P.L.O. forces had been evacuated from Lebanon (Khouri, 1985; Reich, 1984). Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger pulled out the American troops on September 10 (15 days ahead of schedule) and the French and Italian contingents left shortly afterwards (Khouri, 1985; Spiegel, 1985).

On September 1, President Reagan announced a peace plan which essentially consisted of the step-by-step approach and direct negotiations. The Arabs responded to this by announcing their own peace plan on September 8. Yet Begin adamantly rejected both plans (Khouri, 1985).

On September 14, Lebanon's President-elect Bashir Gemayel was killed by a bomb and consequently, on September 15 the Israelis sent its army into West Beirut in order to maintain order and stability (Rabinovich, 1985; Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984). In actuality their goal was to destroy the P.L.O. infrastructure that had remained in Beirut and was believed to

consist of 2,000 combatants (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984; Spiegel, 1985). The Israelis took control of West Beirut and this resulted in a large number of civilian casualties; the action was condemned even by the United States and the Security Council passed a resolution on September 17 (Khouri, 1985). From September 16 to 18, Israeli forces allowed Phalangist militias to enter the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps (Gabriel, 1984). This act resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties and it was condemned by the United States as well as denounced within Israel (Spiegel, 1985). The United States, France, Italy, and Britain responded to the massacres by sending another peacekeeping force which began arriving in Lebanon on September 24 (Khouri, 1985).

What do we learn about this series of events from the U.S. media, or more specifically from political cartoons, editorials, and headlines?

### **Who are the Actors?**

In the 1982 war, there are two dominant actors in the cartoons: the Palestinians and Israel. These two actors are also the two most frequent in the editorials, in which they both occur equally often, but they are not dominant since following relatively close behind is Lebanon and then the United States. As for the headlines, Israel is the key actor followed by both Lebanon and the United States, and then the Palestinians (see Table 87).

Thus, the Palestinians are viewed as playing a key role in this event in both the cartoons and editorials yet are not seen as such in the headlines in which the United States and Lebanon are seen as more important.

Another interesting difference is that Lebanon and the United States

are treated as relatively important actors in both the editorials and headlines yet are given minimal attention in comparison to the two dominant actors in the cartoons.

In essence, it appears that the cartoons portraying the 1982 war focus almost exclusively on the Palestinians and Israel whereas (comparatively speaking) Lebanon and the United States are seen as minor actors in sharp contrast to the other two media. Finally, one could cautiously conclude that the cartoons identify who the "bad guys" are in this event if one takes into account the minimal role they accord both the United States and Lebanon.

### What are the Themes?

From Table 96 we see that all three media are in agreement as to what the most important issue is in this event: Israel's role and/or policies and/or military aggressiveness. Israel played a major role in the war and it was seriously questioned as well as criticized, even within Israel (Khouri, 1985).

Israel's image changed dramatically in this event and possibly this is why the theme involving her role and/or policies was presented as most important by the three different forms of news media: "...Israel was earning itself the reputation of a country that indulged in overkill to achieve objectives far beyond its legitimate security needs" (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984, p. 218). In addition, Bavly and Salpeter (1984) write that the image of Israel suffered more harm during this war than at any other time in history:

The war in Lebanon was the first of the six wars waged by Israel in its thirty-four years

of independence that did not enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the population. This was also the first war that was not forced on Israel directly; Israel was not under any immediate threat but initiated the war. The first departure clearly stems from the second. (p. 163)

Thus, between the actual events of this war in which Israel was deeply involved and the controversy surrounding them, it is not surprising that this theme received so much attention and was the most frequent in all three media.

During this war American-Israeli relations deteriorated; as a matter of fact, it is the first event of the five studied here in which there is a specific theme describing strained relations between the two countries. Israel had gone far beyond what she originally said were her objectives and this is what caused the United States to feel deceived (Spiegel, 1985). Already by June 10 the U.S. saw that the Israelis had gone beyond the 40 kilometers and they had not been sincere about not attacking the Syrians (Schiff and Ya'ari, 1984). Thus besides her major role in this event, possibly Israel received even more focus due to the state of relations between her and the United States. The only way one could answer this question would be to look at media coverage from other countries and see whether this theme was as prominent as in the American media.

The issue that was seen as second most important in this event in both the cartoons and the editorials was: Palestinians' role and/or policies and/or issues of rights and/or homeland. Because of the fighting and the duration of it, world attention turned to the plight of the Palestinians and thus, it commanded a lot of attention in the media.

Yet the headlines diverged from the other two media in that they

presented the U.S.'s role and/or policies as the second most important issue in this conflict. In comparison, this theme received less attention in the editorials and even less in the cartoons. There is no question that the United States' role was an important issue yet it is surprising that it occurred more frequently in this medium than the theme about the Palestinians. There are two possible reasons for this finding. First of all, it could be that the headlines might have given the United States' role more focus than the other two media because they are American newspapers and therefore, could possibly give attention to particular news that one would tend not to find as often in the other two media. For example, in examining this sub-sample of headlines I found quite a few that involved public statements by government officials. Second, the editorials and cartoons might have given more attention to the Palestinians because at this time public opinion was changing in regard to them and these two media seem to lend themselves better to reflecting that new mood than do headlines. In other words, some of the attention regarding the Palestinians did not involve actual events but rather the issues of their rights and a homeland and this type of information is not really what one would call typical "headline material" since it is not news per se (being defined here as occurrences or events) but rather an issue or a concern.

### **What are the Images?**

In the cartoons dealing with the 1982 war, most of the actors are depicted as playing an active role (see Table 97). Also, it appears that the general images of these actors are essentially negative though to different degrees.

As far as the images of Israel, she is predominantly portrayed as playing an active role in this event: there are slightly more than twice as many active as passive images. In addition, the portrayals of this country are almost all negative evaluations. It should be noted that the only positive images of Israel in this event involve her being portrayed as winning or claiming victory. Some of these negative images (or parts of their descriptions) are very sarcastic and have quite a "sting" to them: nobel peace prize winner is involved in war, need whole world or moon in order to have secure borders, and shocking the ghost of a holocaust victim with invasion. In essence, the general image of Israel in the 1982 war is one of being an active-negative actor.

Looking at the images of the Palestinians we see that they are portrayed as playing an active role much more than twice as often as a passive one. As far as the valence of these images, there are more negative than positive evaluations though the margin is not as large as with other actors. What is most interesting is that when the Palestinians are portrayed negatively, the images are practically split on the active/passive dimension (though slightly more are active) yet when this actor is depicted positively, almost all of these images are active ones. The majority of these active-positive images are described as follows: wanting, looking for a homeland, wanting rights. Finally, it appears that the Palestinians have a basic image of being active-negative in this event.

As far as the images of Syria, all of them portray her as playing an active role and in addition, they are all negative evaluations. The problem with drawing any conclusions from these findings is that the sample is too small since it only consists of three portrayals of this

actor.

The final intra-regional actor that was examined is Lebanon and almost all of the images of this country depict her as playing a passive role in this event. This is not at all surprising since Lebanon did not actually play that much of a role in the war except for the fact that she was the country in which it took place. Thus, included in the description of one frequent image of Lebanon is the following: Lebanon is the innocent victim of the war. In addition, this country is evaluated negatively almost three times as often as positively. Thus, Lebanon is essentially seen as a passive-negative actor in the 1982 war.

There is only one portrayal of the United Nations for this event so it is difficult to say anything substantial about the general image of this actor. However, this one image shows the U.N. as being a passive-negative actor.

The United States is perceived as playing an active role in this war nearly three times as often as a passive one. Also, there are more negative evaluations of this country than there are positive. In looking at the table, we see that the largest number of images of the U.S. fall into the active-negative category. The far majority of these particular portrayals depict her as having problems with or angry at Israel. In general, the image of the United States is that of being active-negative.

The last extra-regional actor examined is the Soviet Union and she is seen as playing an active role much more often than a passive one. In addition, there are more negative images than positive ones. Thus, the basic image of the U.S.S.R. is active-negative though such a conclusion cannot be said with any degree of confidence since the sample of images

of this actor is quite small (n=4).

In conclusion, we see that the general images of Israel, the Palestinians, and the United States are all active-negative. Yet there is a major difference in the degree of how negative the image of each of these actors is. More specifically, we see that as far as the images of Israel, almost all of them are negative so we can say that she has a very definite and clear image of being active-negative and therefore can be considered a "bad guy." In comparison, although there are more negative than positive images of the Palestinians and the United States, there are still a good deal of positive images so therefore, it seems more appropriate to think of these actors as being perceived as "mildly-bad guys" in this event. It should be noted that none of the actors in this event had a general image that was a positive one and thus, there are no "good guys." Finally, for this event there is one actor who has an image that is distinctly passive as well as being negative and it of course is Lebanon; this is the image of a "victim" which is what one would expect.

### The U.S. Media and Historical Accounts

What is probably most surprising about the results for this event is the relatively little attention given to Syria. As an actor, she is not seen much more frequently than the Soviet Union except in the editorials though in this medium she is seen only somewhat more frequently than Egypt. The point here is that Syria was directly involved in this war yet she does not occur that much more frequently than actors who were not as involved as she was. In addition, the one theme about Syria is limited to describing her aggression and it is seen only in the

headlines and minimally at that. I would expect that in Arab newspapers, Syria would be seen with greater frequency as an actor and as far as themes, there might well be one describing her as a victim rather than solely as just an aggressor, as was seen here. More interestingly, the question to ask would be if non-Arab and non-American (and of course non-Israeli) newspapers present the same picture as the U.S. newspapers studied here of Syria and her role in this conflict.

**Table 96****Main Themes: 1982 War**

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Category	Cartoons	Editorials	Headlines
Israel's role and/or policies and/or military aggressiveness	28	27	32
Palestinians' role and/or policies and/or issues of rights and/or homeland	20	20	16
Uncertainty of peace and/or trouble in Lebanon, and/or uncertainty about Lebanon's future	16	19	12
U.S.'s role and/or policies	12	17	23
Israeli-Palestinian relations: hostile, antagonistic	12	5	5

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Note 1. All numbers reported in this table represent the percent of times each theme is mentioned within each medium. Columns do not total 100% because low frequency themes (i.e. those occurring in less than 10% of the subsamples) have been eliminated from the table for clarity of presentation.

**Table 97**Images of Actors in the Cartoons: 1982 War

Actor	Valence	Active	Passive
<u>Intra-Regional</u>			
Israel	+	3	0
	o	0	0
	-	39	20
Palestinians	+	22	2.5
	o	6	1
	-	18.5	13
Syria	+	0	0
	o	0	0
	-	3	0
Lebanon	+	2	4
	o	0	0
	-	0	17
<u>Extra-Regional</u>			
United Nations	+	0	0
	o	0	0
	-	0	1
United States	+	8	3
	o	0	0
	-	14	5
Soviet Union	+	1	0
	o	0	0
	-	2	1

Note 1. All numbers reported in this table are frequencies of occurrence, not percentages (as in the prior table).

Note 2. "+" refers to a positive evaluation, "o" refers to a neutral evaluation, and "-" refers to a negative evaluation.

## II. CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE PORTRAYAL OF MIDDLE EAST EVENTS IN THE U.S.

### MEDIA

#### ACTORS

The American perception of the Middle East, as reflected in the three types of media materials examined for the five events beginning in 1956 and ending with 1982, seems to have basically changed from a more globally-oriented perspective to one that was more regionally-oriented. Starting with the 1956 war, we see that the regional actors of importance are Egypt, Israel and the Arabs. As far as the extra-regional actors, it appears that the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France are all perceived as major actors in this event.

In the 1967 war, Egypt, Israel and the Arabs continue to be seen as the major Middle Eastern actors by far. It should be noted that Israel is perceived as much more important here as compared to 1956 and that this heightened attention continues hereafter. As far as other regional actors, Jordan and Syria are seen as somewhat important in this event though they are basically minor actors in comparison; Syria is of particular interest because it is here in 1967 that she is beginning to be perceived as an important actor in Middle Eastern affairs. Concerning the international actors, there is a major change with this event in that Britain and France are seen as being much less important and it should be mentioned that these two countries are seen as negligible actors as far as the other events examined in this study. There are

three dominant extra-regional actors in 1967 and they are the United Nations, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

By 1973, there are four intra-regional actors that dominate the American view of the Middle East conflict: Egypt, Israel, the Arabs, and Syria. It should be mentioned that as of this event, Syria has now come to be recognized as a significant actor in the conflict and this pattern continues for the remaining events. As far as the international actors at this time, there are now only two that play significant roles and these are the United States and the Soviet Union. It should be pointed out that the United Nations is perceived as somewhat important but in comparison to the previous events, it has basically come to play a minor role and plays even less of one hereafter.

The most dramatic change in the perception of the Middle East is seen in the peace process of 1977 and 1978. At this time, there are now six regional actors that are seen as important: Egypt, Israel, the Arabs, the Palestinians, Jordan, and Syria. In addition, the countries of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria have come to be perceived as more important actors as compared to previous years though in comparison to the major actors, they are far from notable. In essence, we see that the American perception of the Middle East has significantly changed to a much greater emphasis on and differentiation among regional actors.

It should be emphasized that it is in the peace process that the Palestinians first begin to be recognized as important actors. As far as the extra-regional actors, the United States is now the only one that is seen as playing a prominent role. One should note that the Soviet Union is seen as somewhat important relative to the other international actors though in comparison to previous years, she has assumed a supporting

role.

As far as the war in Lebanon (1982), it appears that this pattern of emphasis on the regional actors continues to hold true. The most important regional actors at this time are Israel, the Arabs, the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon. Palestinians have come to prominence, Egypt seems no longer important. As far as Lebanon, it should be emphasized that in the previous four events, this country was seen as playing a negligible role in Middle Eastern affairs. Finally, the lack of importance attached to the extra-regional actors also continues to exist in that the United States clearly dominates this group of actors by far. In addition, it is interesting to note that in this event the United States is basically perceived to be as important an actor as Lebanon.

To summarize, there is a pattern across the five events in which the focus gradually evolves from a more global view to one that is more regionally-oriented in terms of who are perceived to be the important actors in the Middle East conflict. In 1956, there are three important regional actors and five international ones; in 1967 we see the same three regional actors, and only three extra-regional ones; in the 1973 war, there are now four regional actors and two extra-regional ones. This pattern becomes most pronounced in the peace process: of the seven most significant actors, six are regional actors and only one is international. Lastly, in 1982 there are five important intra-regional actors and only one extra-regional.

## THEMES

### The 1956 War

In the 1956 war each of the three media present a somewhat different picture of this event as far as what issue they give the most attention to. Whereas the cartoons focus on Nasser's (or Egypt's) power and/or aggressive policies, the editorials emphasize the role and/or actions of the United Nations, and the headlines treat the issue of British and French involvement as most important. As for which are seen as the second most important issues, the cartoons focus on the U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies whereas both the editorials and headlines emphasize the U.S.'s role and/or policies. It should be noted that there is another theme that involves Egypt and although it is not that frequent, it is stressed much more in the cartoons than the other two media: opposition towards Nasser [or Egypt] and his policies. These two themes about Egypt are both affectively-laden and are much more frequent in the visual material.

Thus as far as themes, we see that the cartoons give much more attention to a regional actor (Egypt) as well as the Soviet Union than the other two media. These two actors could be considered to be the villains in this event. The editorials focus on the roles of two actors not directly involved in the war: the United Nations and next the United States. Last, the headlines are also concerned with issues relating to the extra-regional actors: Britain and France, participants in the war yet also American allies, and secondly the role of the United States.

## The 1967 War

For the 1967 war we see that each of the three media present a completely different picture as to what the most important issue seems to be in this event. Whereas the most frequent theme in the cartoons is the Soviet Union's role and/or policies, the editorials emphasize the United States' role and/or policies, and the headlines treat the issue of Israel's role and/or policies and/or military achievements and military superiority as most important. The issue that is seen as second most important in the cartoons is Nasser [or Egypt's] downfall and defeat; this theme occurs minimally in the other two media in comparison. There is agreement in the editorials and the headlines in that they both present the role and/or actions of the U.N. as the second most important issue.

Thus, the cartoons are again emphasizing the themes involving the same two actors as in the 1956 war -- the Soviet Union and Egypt -- yet in reverse order as far as importance. Similarly, the editorials are focusing in on the same two actors as the previous war yet give the role of the United States more emphasis than the United Nations whereas it was the opposite in 1956. Thus, the editorials are still not giving the regional actors that much attention in the themes. In contrast, the headlines are now giving the most attention to a regional actor, Israel. It should be noted that a theme involving the British and/or French, which was the most frequent in the headlines in 1956, does not appear at all in this event nor does it in any event hereafter. Thus, for both events the headlines diverge dramatically from the other two media in giving a great deal more attention to a theme which in both cases involved participants in the war.

The headlines and editorials both agree on the second most important theme which they also did for the 1956 war except then it was the role of the U.N. and in this event it is the role of the United States.

Finally, it is interesting that the theme of uncertainty of peace is least frequent in this event as compared with the other four in all three media (see Table 98). This could possibly be due to the fact that this war only lasted six days and Israel had now gained a reputation for being practically invincible.

### The 1973 War

Each of the three media present a different perception as to what is seen as the most important issue(s) in the 1973 war. The most frequent theme in the cartoons is the Arabs' use of oil to threaten, scare, and as a political weapon. In the editorials there are two issues that occur the most often and these are the role and/or policies of the United States and uncertainty of peace. Last, in the headlines the most frequent theme involves Israel's role and/or policies and/or military superiority. Hence we see that both the cartoons and headlines present regional issues as the most important whereas in the editorials, the two themes that were both the most frequent are more globally-oriented. As far as the second most frequent theme in the other two media, they are both in agreement and it is the U.S.'s role and/or policies.

Thus, the cartoons are again identifying the "bad guy" in this event and now it is the Arabs. The themes about the Soviet Union's role as well as Egypt's role are relatively infrequent here and are so in all three media. What is interesting about the Soviet Union is that we see

from Table 87 that she is practically as frequent an actor as she was in the 1956 war (comparing by medium) however, Table 98 shows a dramatic decrease in the appearance of the theme about the Soviet Union (i.e. U.S.S.R.'s role and/or policies) in the cartoons only. (It should be recalled that this theme was also seen much more often in the cartoons as compared to the other two media -- three times as frequent -- in the 1967 war.) Interestingly enough, this theme is now seen slightly less in the cartoons than the other two media whereas in the past two events it was heavily overemphasized in the visual material as compared to both written media. Thus it seems that in the 1973 war the cartoons have a new target which they overemphasize as compared to the other two media: the Arabs.

In editorials, we see the same pattern as in the 1956 and 1967 wars in that this medium still does not focus on an issue involving a regional actor as one of the two most important themes whereas the other two media do. Instead, editorials focus on the role of the United States as the most crucial issue which it had also done in the previous war. It is interesting that the theme involving the uncertainty of peace is perceived as so important in the editorials here because in both of the past events it was also more frequent in this medium than in the other two. As for the headlines, Israel's role was seen as the most important theme in 1967 and it's again now in this event. It should be noted that all three media present the U.S.'s role as very important though only in the editorials is it the most important.

Finally it should be noted that in this event as in 1967 we see a theme involving superpower relations (positive and/or negative) and it receives less attention in the headlines than in the other two media in

both events. In addition, there is a theme which involves the Palestinians (problem of refugees) and it receives extremely little attention as it did in 1967 though it was not seen at all in 1956. As far as the theme of the role of the United Nations, whereas it had been perceived as quite important in both the headlines and editorials in the 1967 war, it has now come to be seen as a relatively insignificant issue in all three media and is not seen at all hereafter (except for one headline in 1977-1978).

### The 1977, 1978 Peace Process

The peace process in 1977-1978 is the first event studied here in which the three media basically agree as to the most important issue and it is the U.S.'s role and/or policies (though in the editorials it is tied with Israel's role and/or policies). In addition, whereas the headlines and editorials both present Egypt's as well as Israel's role and/or policies as important themes, the cartoons give them less attention and instead focus in on a negative issue -- Arabs' or Arab nations policies or opposition to Egypt [or Sadat], Geneva, or peace -- and thus essentially informs the reader that there is a "bad guy" in this positive event.

Thus the cartoons are still identifying the Arabs as the villain in this event as they did in the 1973 war even though this is a positive event. The other two media are more in agreement since they both accord the themes involving Egypt and Israel much more importance. The headlines had been emphasizing Israel's role to a much greater degree than the editorials in the past two wars (it was the most important theme) whereas now it is both forms of written material that are doing

so. As far as the focus on Egypt, none of the three media gave this issue much attention in the 1973 war though prior to that they had (yet the themes themselves were slightly different), and they do again here. What is most surprising is that the cartoons accord Egypt's role much less importance than the other two media and the same is true for Israel's role where the difference is even more dramatic. On the other hand, the cartoons give the theme involving the Arabs much more attention than the other two media.

Interestingly enough, the theme involving the Palestinians (problem of West Bank and/or Palestinians and/or their possible participation in the peace process) is given more prominence in the cartoons than Israel's role and is almost as frequent as the theme dealing with Egypt's role. In contrast, this theme is much less frequent than those dealing with Egypt and Israel in the other two media. Thus it appears that the cartoons are focusing on an issue that is somewhat controversial and problematic and compared to the other two media, are overemphasizing it. In fact, one would expect to see the pattern with this theme in regard to those dealing with Egypt and Israel that one sees in the headlines and editorials since these two actors did play major roles in this event.

The theme of cooperative relations between Egypt and Israel is seen as somewhat important in this event and a similar theme first appeared during the 1973 war in which it was somewhat less frequent, especially in the cartoons. The reason that it was seen in the previous war was because the sampling period included the Egyptian-Israeli talks and negotiations conducted by Henry Kissinger.

There are a few other findings, or lack thereof, that are worthy of

mention. First, we see that again the role and/or policies of the Soviet Union receives slightly less attention in this event than in the 1973 war when it was not that frequent. It seems that the cartoons have replaced the Russians with the Arabs as far as who the villain is as they had in 1973; this theme is again overemphasized in the visual medium in comparison to the headlines and editorials. Second, a theme describing negative relations between Israel and Arabs or Arab nations, which was seen in the 1967 war and slightly less in the 1973 war, is not seen at all in this event or hereafter. Third, the theme involving positive and/or negative relations between the superpowers is also not seen at all in this event. Fourth, the theme of Middle Eastern oil being threatened or in jeopardy had occurred in the first three wars and is no longer mentioned in this event or in the next one; it was not an issue during the peace process nor in the invasion of Lebanon. Finally, it is interesting that the theme involving uncertainty of peace is seen in the peace process practically as frequently as in the 1956 and the 1973 wars but the simple reason for it occurring as often as it does is because for this event it also includes uncertainty about Geneva or the Cairo conference.

### The 1982 War

The invasion of Lebanon is the only war examined in this study for which the three media agree as to what the key issue is: Israel's role and/or policies and/or military aggressiveness. It should be noted that the headlines had been emphasizing Israel's role since the 1967 war. In addition, whereas the cartoons and editorials see the theme involving the Palestinians as the second most important theme, the headlines

present the U.S.'s role and/or policies as more critical. An explanation suggested for this finding is that headlines of an American newspaper might report more news from within the country whereas the cartoons and editorials lend themselves better to either trying to change or reflecting a change in the public mood.

Most significant with this event is that as compared to the previous four, the most important themes are almost all regionally-oriented issues. The theme involving the United Nations is not seen at all and the one dealing with the role of the Soviet Union is very infrequent. In addition, the theme dealing with superpower relations, here it is only negative, is hardly seen at all (in only one cartoon and two headlines). The only major exception is the theme of the role and/or policies of the United States which is presented as quite important in the headlines though comparatively less so in the other two media (especially the cartoons).

There are a couple of themes that are seen for the first time in this event. First is the issue of negative relations between Israel and the Palestinians which is much more frequent in the cartoons than in the other two media. Second is the theme dealing with strained relations between the United States and Israel which is seen practically equally as often in the cartoons and editorials though much less so in the headlines.

As far as the other themes seen in previous events that deal with intra-regional actors, we see that Egypt's role is not seen here at all or is the one dealing with negative relations between Israel and Arabs or Arab nations. The theme that involves Arabs in this event — policies of Arabs or Arab nations or Arab world — is much less frequent in the

cartoons than previous issues involving the Arabs. It is quite difficult to say in this war who the cartoons are identifying as the villain since the only theme that occurs a good deal more often in this medium as compared to the other two, though it is not that frequent, is the one dealing with negative relations between Israel and the Palestinians. Yet neither theme involving either of these actors could be said to be overemphasized in the cartoons as compared to the other media examined here. Finally, it should be noted that the theme of uncertainty of peace occurs more often for each medium in this event (though the margins are relatively small) yet here it also includes trouble in Lebanon and/or uncertainty about Lebanon's future and therefore it is surprising that it is not seen more frequently.

### IMAGES

In the 1956 war we see a number of actors playing active roles: Egypt, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. No one is seen as passive though it was not possible to code both Israel and the United Nations on this dimension (there were practically an equal number of active as there were passive images). In addition, most of the actors in this event are evaluated negatively though to different degrees: Egypt, Israel, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. There are no actors that have positive images in the 1956 war although the United Nations and the United States could not be clearly coded as far as valence.

Thus, there are four actors in the 1956 war that are seen as active-

negative and they are Egypt, the U.S.S.R., Britain, and France. It seems that Egypt and the Soviet Union are perceived as the definitive "bad guys" whereas Britain and France are only "mildly bad" in comparison. It is interesting that there are no actors with "victim-type" images in this war.

In the 1967 war we see a more diversified picture in terms of the active/passive dimension. Egypt and the United States are no longer seen as playing active roles but rather they have now come to be perceived as passive players in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel and the United Nations have come to have more definite images as far as this dimension in that the former is perceived as active whereas the latter is seen as passive. As in 1956, no actor has a general image that is positive though again we see that the United Nations could not be clearly categorized as far as valence.

More specifically, in this event Israel and the Soviet Union are both perceived as active-negative whereas Egypt and the United States are both passive-negative. Egypt's image has changed from being an aggressor in 1956 to now being perceived as a victim. Israel has come to be seen as somewhat of an aggressor in that she is what I consider a "mildly bad guy." The United States is also seen here as having a "victim-type" image. Finally, the Soviet Union continues to be seen as a bad guy yet here she is considered to be "mildly bad" because there are a number of positive images.

In the 1973 war most of the actors now are seen as playing a passive role though to different degrees. Egypt is still seen as passive and now Israel is as well, though for both of these actors the margin is not that large. The United States is still perceived as playing a passive

role though for the first time the Soviet Union is seen this way as well. So who is the active player in this war? The Arabs are really the only actor seen this way. In addition, almost all of the actors in this event are seen as being negative although Egypt is seen as somewhat positive.

In essence, the "bad guy" has now come to be the Arabs whereas the United States has a strong "victim-type" image. Also, whereas both Israel and the Soviet Union were seen as "mildly bad guys" in the 1967 war, now they are both seen as having somewhat of a "victim type" image (neither of these general images are that definitive on the valence dimension). Finally, the United Nations was unable to be coded on either dimension in this event.

In the peace process of 1977-1978, we see a completely different picture than in any of the wars in that a number of actors have clear and definite positive images. Egypt, Israel and the United States are all evaluated positively in this event. Out of the three only Egypt had been seen in this manner previously - in the 1973 war - though it was not as powerful an image. It should be noted that this is the only event in which the United States and Israel have positive images. No actor had a clear negative image in this event though the Palestinians and the Soviet Union were essentially unable to be coded as far as valence. In this event all the actors are seen as playing active roles with the exception of the Palestinians who were not really able to be definitively coded. (The United Nations was seen as passive but the sample only consisted of one image.)

Egypt, Israel and the United States are all active-positive and therefore are seen as "good guys" in this event. This is hardly

surprising since they were the major actors in this peace process. The biggest changes since the 1973 war are with the United States and Israel since they had been seen as both passive as well as negative. As for Egypt, she had been passive and is now seen as active. Last, the Soviet Union had been perceived as passive in 1973 and is now being seen as active again (she had been perceived as such in 1956 and 1967). It should be noted that this is the only event in which there are no "bad guys."

In the 1982 war most of the actors are perceived as playing active roles. Israel is seen as active in this war whereas in the 1973 war she had been portrayed as passive. More striking is that the United States is perceived as playing an active role in this event whereas she had not been seen in this way in a war since the 1956 conflict. The Palestinians have a clearer image than in the peace process since here they are definitely active. Also, both Syria and the U.S.S.R. are seen as active but the samples are quite small for each. For this event there is only one actor that is seen as passive and that is Lebanon. (The U.N. is seen this way as well but the sample only consists of one image.) In addition, all the actors are perceived as having negative images though they differ in degree.

Israel, the Palestinians, and the United States all have active-negative images yet the amount of negative images for each varies. Thus, Israel is the "bad guy" in this event whereas she was perceived similarly in 1967 although she was then only "mildly bad." The United States and the Palestinians are really just "mildly bad guys" in this event. It should be noted that the United States has never been perceived this way before. The only actor with a "victim" image in this

event is Lebanon (passive-negative). There are no "good guys" seen in this event which is true of all the conflicts examined in this study.

To conclude, it is difficult to draw any general conclusions because there seems to be a different pattern in each of the events. The images of the actors appear to evolve over time (in response to different events, alliances, relationships, etc.). Finally, what we can say is that in every conflict there is a "bad guy" or a "mildly bad guy" and no "good guys" whereas only in the peace process are there any "good guys" as well as no real "bad guys."

**Table 98****Themes in the Five Events**

Category	Medium	1956	1967	1973	1977,78	1982
<b><u>Intra-Regional Actors</u></b>						
Egypt	C	29	20	1	8	0
	H	16	13	7	15	0
	E	16	11	5	17	0
Israel	C	2	2	8	5	28
	H	4	25	28	15	32
	E	2	11	12	19	27
Arabs	C	0	5	23	15	3
	H	0	5	5	9	7
	E	0	4	7	8	2
Palestinians	C	0	3	1	9	20
	H	0	1	0	3	16
	E	0	3	1	6	20
Jordan	C	0	0	0	1	0
	H	0	0	0	5	0
	E	0	0	0	0	0
<b><u>Extra-Regional Actors</u></b>						
United Nations	C	14	8	5	0	0
	H	18	15	5	1	0
	E	24	12	2	0	0
United States	C	9	3	19	18	12
	H	19	12	20	23	23
	E	21	15	16	19	17
Soviet Union	C	18	31	5	3	2
	H	8	11	7	3	2
	E	8	10	7	2	3
Britain, France	C	6	0	0	0	0
	H	22	0	0	0	0
	E	3	0	0	0	0

**(table continues)**

Themes	Medium	1956	1967	1973	1977,78	1982
<u>Relationships Among Actors</u>						
Israel and Egypt: positive relations	C	0	0	2	11	0
	H	0	0	8	11	0
	E	0	0	7	12	0
Israel and Palestinians: negative relations	C	0	0	0	0	12
	H	0	0	0	0	5
	E	0	0	0	0	5
Israel and Arabs or Arab Nations: negative relations	C	0	5	4	0	0
	H	0	8	3	0	0
	E	0	10	7	0	0
U.S. and Israel: strained relations	C	0	0	0	0	7
	H	0	0	0	0	2
	E	0	0	0	0	8
Superpower Relations: negative and/or positive	C	0	9	12	0	1
	H	0	3	8	0	2
	E	0	11	12	0	0
<u>Other</u>						
Middle East Oil: threatened, in jeopardy	C	5	4	5	0	0
	H	3	1	3	0	0
	E	3	0	4	0	0
Uncertainty of Peace	C	12	4	11	11	16
	H	7	4	6	7	12
	E	17	9	16	11	19
Optimistic About or Achieving Peace	C	0	0	0	14	0
	H	0	0	0	9	0
	E	0	0	0	4	0

Note 1. All numbers reported in this table represent the percent of times each category of theme is mentioned within each medium. Columns do not total 100% because low frequency themes (i.e. those occurring in less than 5% of the subsamples except when they could be collapsed into one category) have been eliminated from the table for clarity of presentation.

Note 2. "C" refers to cartoons, "H" refers to headlines, and "E" refers to editorials.

### III. POLITICAL LEADERS

The most unique aspect of political cartoons is that there exist many different ways of portraying a country whereas headlines are inherently limited to words. In other words, the political cartoonist has a wide array of symbols available to him with which to depict an actor whereas the headline writer has a small assortment of different words to use. The most fascinating finding of this investigation is that political leaders are used much more frequently as a form of representation in the cartoons as compared to the headlines.

When we talk about political leaders, we are referring to any individual who is involved in the politics in that particular country; this is not necessarily the leader per se of that nation. The symbols data from the cartoons can tell us in general who these people were for the five events: Egypt- President Nasser (1956, 1967), Foreign Minister Fawzi (1956), President Sadat (1973, 1977-1978); Israel- Prime Minister Ben-Gurion (1956), Foreign Minister Eban (1967), Defense Minister Dayan (1967, 1973, 1977-1978 in which he was foreign minister), Prime Minister Meir (1973), Prime Minister Begin (1977-1978, 1982), Defense Minister Sharon (1982); Palestinians- Chairman Arafat (1977-1978, 1982); United States- Secretary of State Dulles (1956), President Eisenhower (1956), President Johnson (1967), U.N. Ambassador Goldberg (1967), Special Assistant Bundy (1967), Secretary of State Kissinger (1973), President Nixon (1973), Senator Jackson (1973), President Carter (1977-1978), Secretary of State Vance (1977-1978), President Reagan (1982), Special Envoy Habib (1982), Representative McCloskey (1982); Soviet Union- First

Secretary Khrushchev (1956), Foreign Minister Shepilov (1956), Premier Bulganin (1956), Premier Kosygin (1967, 1973), General Secretary Brezhnev (1967, 1973, 1977-1978, 1982), U.N. Ambassador Fedorenko (1967); Britain- Prime Minister Eden (1956); and France- Premier Mollet (1956), Foreign Minister Pineau (1956).

The reader should be aware from the symbols tables that some of these people were found to be used relatively infrequently, such as U.N. Ambassador Fedorenko who was used as a symbol in 2% (n=1) of the depictions of the Soviet Union in the 1967 war. In addition, some leaders were used more often as representations in one event as compared to another: Premier Kosygin accounted for 57% (n=34) of the portrayals of the Soviet Union in 1967 yet only for 4% (n=1) in the 1973 war.

The general pattern of results seems to be that roughly half the time a country is depicted in a political cartoon, or more accurately 40%, it is symbolized by a political leader; in some cases the percentage is much higher (see Table 99). In the other instances, the cartoons make use of the names of the countries as well as various other kinds of symbology. Another distinct pattern is that the cartoons consistently use leaders much more frequently than do the headlines when representing the various nations. Thus, the names of the countries are the preferred means of representation in the headlines. It should be noted that at times the cartoonist will use the leader's name rather than drawing a representation; this distinction is reported in the symbols tables whereas for this analysis these different categories have been combined. We will now proceed to examine any exceptions to these patterns and attempt to explain the reasons for them as well as point out any other results that are of particular interest or importance.

## The 1956 War

In the 1956 war, the most striking finding is that Israel is hardly ever portrayed by political leaders in the cartoons although such representation is still more frequent in this medium than in headlines. It should be kept in mind that Israel as an actor is not that frequent in this event to begin with, as seen from Table 87. The consequence of this minimal usage of political leaders by cartoonists to represent Israel is that they have essentially "neutralized" their portrayal of this country; we see from the symbols table (see p. 65) that they tend more often to use the words "Israel" and "Israeli."

A possible explanation is that the cartoonists were reflecting the then current mood of American policy which basically was to improve relations with the Arabs and reverse the trend set by Truman of favoring Israel (Spiegel, 1985). At this point in history Israel was not that closely allied with the United States though more importantly, the American government was opposed to Israel's behavior and there was concern that this position as well as the possible need for U.S. intervention might cost President Eisenhower the upcoming election (Eisenhower, 1965).

A second interesting finding is that in representing the United States, the discrepancy between cartoons and headlines in their use of political leaders is comparatively small. Of all the actors in the 1956 war, the United States is by far the actor most often represented by a political leader in the headlines. One possible reason for this is that the sample of newspapers used for this study are limited to American ones and consequently, there may be differential treatment for this actor. In other words, the readers are most familiar with the American

political leaders so possibly this is why they are seen so much more often in the headlines as compared with the other actors.

### The 1967 War

Of the actors in the 1967 war, Israel is again least often represented by political leaders in the cartoons. From the symbols table (see p. 87) we see that the words "Israel," "Tel Aviv," and "Israeli" are the most popular way for cartoonists to depict Israel. What is even more interesting is that in this event the Israeli political leaders seen in the cartoons are Defense Minister Dayan and Foreign Minister Eban; there are no portrayals of Prime Minister Eshkol. Apparently Eshkol had somewhat of a negative image himself during this crisis as he was seen as self-doubting and weak as well as not having the confidence of his colleagues (Neff, 1984; Safran, 1978). Therefore one could postulate that to represent Israel by depicting Eshkol might be a more negative portrayal than a different political leader or a different symbol altogether.

What is even more surprising in this event is that Israel is represented by politicians slightly more often in headlines than in cartoons and this is quite unusual. We do see in the headlines a few mentions of Prime Minister Eshkol which are completely lacking in the cartoons though this does not seem to explain adequately why Israel is so minimally portrayed by political leaders generally. What about the attitude or mood of the American government at this time? The Johnson administration was very sympathetic towards Israel and American policy was seen to shift closer in Israel's favor (Spiegel, 1985) so the attitude of the government could not even be a potential reason as it

was suggested to be in the case of the 1956 war. One possible explanation could be that the United States was deeply involved in the Viet Nam war and this may have inhibited American support of Israel at this time (Spiegel, 1985); the coupling of these two crises was found to be a theme in some of the cartoons and editorials examined during this event. In other words, cartoonists may have presented somewhat "neutral" depictions of Israel due to concern that she could potentially require American military involvement at a time in which public opposition regarding the Viet Nam war was extremely intense.

### The 1973 War

In the 1973 war Israel is represented by a political leader in the cartoons much more often than in the two previous events and on a equal level with the other actors whereas she is minimally portrayed this way in the headlines; this discrepancy for Israel between cartoons and headlines in 1973 is the largest in the study. One can conclude that it was not until this event that American political cartoonists began to personalize Israel and from the symbols analysis (see p. 110) we see that it is Prime Minister Golda Meir who accounted for nearly all of these kinds of portrayals.

Another noteworthy finding is that in this event, Egypt is symbolized by a political leader in much less than half of the total portrayals found in the cartoons (yet this percentage is a lot higher than the one pertaining to such representations in the headlines). The important point about this result is that in comparison, political leaders are used at least twice as often to symbolize Egypt in the 1956 and the 1967 wars and therefore, the finding here reflects a dramatic

decline in the personalization of this country. A possible explanation for this decrease is that the symbol of Egypt in 1956 and 1967 was President Nasser, who had a very strong and powerful image due to his aggressive policies. Perhaps Anwar Sadat, who came to power in 1970 after Nasser's death (Khouri, 1985) did not elicit as much sentiment in the American reader and therefore was not as potent a symbol. For instance, we see from the symbols analyses of Egypt that tanks are the second most frequent symbol in 1973 (see p. 112) whereas they are not seen at all in 1967 (see p. 86) and minimally in 1956 (see p. 60). Finally, it should be noticed that again, there is a low discrepancy between the two media as far as the use of political leaders representing the United States.

### The 1977, 1978 Peace Process

The pattern as far as the use of political leaders to portray the actors in the peace process of 1977 and 1978 differs dramatically from the previous events in a number of ways. First, political leaders are used to symbolize all actors (except the Palestinians) more than 80% of the time in the cartoons — the largest use of leaders as symbols in any event studied. Second, headlines represent actors by political leaders more than 50% of the time. Thus we see that the peace process is presented much differently: political leaders are used to portray the various countries much more often in both media although what is most interesting is the drastic difference seen with the headlines. It should be noted that headlines mention only three actors: Egypt, Israel, and the United States.

Egypt is the country most often represented by political leaders

(Sadat in this case) in both media (though tied with the United States in the cartoons). As a matter of fact, the percentage of leaders representing Egypt in the headlines is the same as that representing Israel in the cartoons. This is extremely surprising since -- overall -- cartoonists personalize each actor more than do headline writers.

According to Spiegel (1985), Sadat had become a hero in the media and was now seen as a man of peace -- a very different image than he previously had. Possibly the media overemphasized this "new image" of Egypt by using Sadat more often than political leaders portraying the other actors, thereby accentuating this change.

In addition, we see that political cartoonists (not headline writers) are beginning to use Yasir Arafat to portray the Palestinians. The frequency of this symbol is much lower in the cartoons than the usual pattern but it should be pointed out that there is no such representation in the headlines at all. Finally, it should be noted that whereas the Soviet Union is depicted by political leaders quite frequently in the cartoons, there is also no such representation in the headlines; the fact that both samples of media are comparatively small must be taken into account.

### The 1982 War

In the invasion of Lebanon we see that political cartoonists use Arafat to depict the Palestinians much more often than previously whereas the relative frequency for the headlines is much lower in comparison and therefore, this finding fits the general pattern. What is most striking during this event is that there are no political leaders symbolizing Lebanon in the cartoons although there is some such

representation in the headlines but the frequency is very low.

Why don't the cartoons use leaders to portray Lebanon? One explanation might be that for Americans, Lebanon was more of a place in which a war was taking place than an "actor" in the war. Another is that there was great confusion about who the political leaders were, or even whether there were any political leaders who had any power. It should be recalled that from 1975 to 1976 the Lebanese fought their second civil war which left the domestic political system even more unstable and fragile (Khoury, 1985; Rabinovich, 1985). Thus it is suggested that Lebanon is not depicted in terms of political leaders due to the nature of its passive role in this event and because of the internal political confusion as far as who were the political leaders.

Lastly, it should be noted that in this event the Soviet Union is minimally portrayed by a political leader in the cartoons whereas the frequency is the same in the headlines; the samples for both media are extremely small so to interpret or draw any conclusions from this finding is considered inappropriate.

### Discussion

There are a few points that need to be made in regard to changes seen over time in the personalizing of the various actors. First, with regard to the low frequencies of political leaders portraying Israel in both the 1956 war and the 1967 war, it is possible that the politicians at these times did not have strong enough images that would evoke much sentiment in the American reader. Another reason could be that the leaders at these times did not have a strong enough recognition factor and therefore, the American reader would not have realized who was being

portrayed unless they were labeled as "Israel" and as a result, using a particular political person would not have added anything to the image of this country. It could also be possible that the United States government was more preoccupied with national elections in 1956 and with Viet Nam in 1967 than with its relationship with Israel so consequently, the feeling towards her was somewhat distant and the cartoonists reflected this by using more neutral symbology.

Second, we see that there is a comparatively low discrepancy between the two media in representing the United States in terms of its political leaders for the 1956 and 1973 wars though it is also relatively low in the 1967 war. When we come to the peace process, the difference between the cartoons and the headlines is greater and it increases even more for the 1982 war. Yet if we look at the frequencies of political leaders in the headlines across the five events, we see a stable and consistent pattern of percentages, except of course for the peace process which is much higher. In addition, the frequency of political leaders representing the United States in the headlines is the largest in all the events with the one exception of the peace process in which Egypt is personalized even more often.

Thus, it is possible that the headlines personalize the United States at a comparatively higher level consistently throughout the five events because they are writing for an American audience. In order to support such a conclusion, one would need to examine newspapers from other countries and see if they tend to personalize themselves more frequently and consistently than other actors.

Finally, more needs to be said regarding the comparison of the peace process with the four wars. It appears that in comparison to negative

events, both media tend to personify a positive event, such as the peace process of 1977-1978, to a much greater degree. This statement only holds true for the United States, Egypt, and Israel which were really the three main actors involved in this event. (Although the Soviet Union is personalized in the cartoons most often in this event, as compared to the other four, she is not represented this way at all in the headlines.)

Thus, as compared to the four wars studied here it seems that people are perceived as the actors in a positive event and compared to the peace process, nations are viewed as the actors in negative events. Such a conclusion is even more applicable to headlines since here the differences are much more dramatic. As far as the cartoons, some countries are represented by political leaders just as frequently as other countries in the wars as compared to the peace process although if one looks at each nation individually, then the highest percentages are seen in the peace process, with the exception of the Palestinians. However, with some countries the frequency of political leaders as symbols is very high in particular wars so to say that nations are viewed as actors in negative events is only true in comparison to the peace process. A more appropriate conclusion to draw with regard to the cartoons is that they personify political events as compared to the headlines and we will discuss this more in depth in a moment.

Generally speaking, though, it appears that the peace process was perceived differently in both media insofar as it was viewed as being more dependent on particular people than the wars were in comparison. It is difficult to know whether this dramatic finding could be generalized to peace processes or more generally to positive events. The reason this

finding is a fascinating one is because cartoons tend to be negative characterizations of political events so it is interesting that in the case of a positive event, there is such a difference in symbolization using portrayals of leaders.

In conclusion, what now needs to be addressed is the question of why cartoonists use political leaders to represent countries so much more frequently than headline writers do. What does it accomplish? It seems that when a political leader is used to symbolize a country, the cartoonist is able to send a more affectively-laden message to the reader than if a word or a different symbol were used. In other words, when one sees a picture of a particular leader, one sees a "personality" and one is consequently able to make many different associations to it depending on the general image of that particular person. Thus by using pictures of political people, the cartoonist is able to evoke more of an affective response in the reader as well as make the message more powerful or intense. For instance, whereas the headline may say "Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal," the cartoonist will draw Nasser and show him as a thief in the act of stealing the canal. This example demonstrates that the cartoonist identifies an individual with the event and is therefore able to show the country in a situation which is a "familiar scenario" for the reader. Thus he makes the political event easier to understand but more importantly, makes more of an affective statement by portraying people that the reader is familiar with and using imagery that people can easily relate to and comprehend. In addition, when the cartoonist depicts a particular country in terms of a political leader rather than using the name of the country as the headline writer tends to do, the result is that he emotionalizes the

particular political event since it is easier for people to have a feeling about an individual than it is to have one about a country -- a more abstract concept. On this basis one can say that headlines generally tend to be less affectively-laden than political cartoons. In essence, it seems that what the cartoonist basically accomplishes by making such frequent use of political leaders to symbolize countries is that he can elicit more of an affective response to his message as well as make a more emotional statement.

**Table 99**

Political Leaders in the Five Events

Category	Medium	1956	1967	1973	1977,78	1982
<u>Intra-Regional Actors</u>						
Egypt	C	74% (n=73)	85 (n=54)	35 (n=23)	94 (n=67)	--
	H	22 (n=72)	20 (n=60)	14 (n=57)	81 (n=43)	--
Israel	C	11 (n=9)	12 (n=41)	45 (n=47)	81 (n=63)	60 (n=62)
	H	5 (n=11)	14 (n=98)	6 (n=79)	54 (n=50)	11 (n=61)
Palestinians	C	--	--	--	22 (n=23)	58 (n=63)
	H	--	--	--	0 (n=5)	15 (n=47)
Jordan	C	--	0 (n=1)	--	--	--
	H	--	33 (n=12)	--	--	--
Syria	C	--	0 (n=0)	0 (n=3)	--	0 (n=3)
	H	--	18 (n=11)	0 (n=11)	--	0 (n=9)
Lebanon	C	--	--	--	--	0 (n=23)
	H	--	--	--	--	6 (n=52)

(table continues)

Actor	Medium	1956	1967	1973	1977,78	1982
<u>Extra-Regional Actors</u>						
United States	C	50 (n=26)	54 (n=28)	51 (n=68)	94 (n=53)	70 (n=30)
	H	39 (n=42)	37 (n=52)	40 (n=58)	67 (n=43)	37 (n=52)
Soviet Union	C	45 (n=29)	68 (n=60)	54 (n=26)	88 (n=8)	25 (n=4)
	H	5 (n=19)	31 (n=45)	11 (n=27)	0 (n=10)	25 (n=4)
Britain	C	46 (n=24)	--	--	--	--
	H	17 (n=52)	--	--	--	--
France	C	40 (n=15)	--	--	--	--
	H	12 (n=26)	--	--	--	--

Note 1. "C" refers to cartoons and "H" refers to headlines.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

As shown in the review of prior literature, most studies of American media coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict have generally been limited to the examination of editorials and have primarily been interested in the issue of media bias: whether the press tends to be unfair to Arabs or unfair to Israelis. This investigation diverges from previous work because it is not interested in proving whether the press is biased or not. Instead, it is directed towards examining -- as objectively as possible -- what exactly the content of that media coverage is, particularly as revealed by political cartoons. More specifically, it involved a comparison of three different forms of media in an effort to establish the usefulness of political cartoons as a source of information on the Middle East conflict.

People depend on the media to inform them about events in the political world since they cannot experience them first-hand. What this study has shown is that the three media forms -- cartoons, editorials, and headlines -- generally present different pictures of Middle Eastern affairs. The primary interest of this research was to show the value of political cartoons in terms of learning about national perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We have seen that cartoons are quite different from the two other media in that they tend to present a more "affectively-oriented" view of political events. The visual imagery in the cartoons makes a more powerful statement which gets right "to the heart of the matter." Also, we have found that the cartoon often identifies for the reader who the "bad guy" is in a specific event. In

other words, they inform us as to who is to blame or who to direct our anger towards. More generally, the cartoon tells the reader what to feel about some particular aspect of a political event. Finally, this investigation has revealed that the cartoonist frequently uses political leaders to symbolize countries/societies and this has the effect of further "emotionalizing" the message.

In essence, the political cartoon simplifies events into single images, primarily at the affective level. In contrast to the emotional focus of cartoons, the emphasis of both editorials and headlines is more cognitive. In general, the former stress the U.S. role and policies (as opposed to regional actors and/or issues) and the latter report the facts about specific events.

In understanding political events -- particularly events of conflict and peace -- both cognitive and affective dimensions are essential. This research demonstrates that studies of American perceptions of the Middle East which rely solely on the analysis of editorials and/or headlines limit their understanding to the cognitive level and thereby leave out the essential affective dimension. Thus, this investigation proves that adding political cartoons to the set of data examined in research on the Middle East conflict would not produce redundant information. Rather it would add a kind of information -- the affective level of perception -- which is critical in understanding the dynamics of conflict and peace.

Cartoons can be a useful and innovative source of information about national images and perceptions which would supplement the more usual interview data. Not only do their inherent characteristics easily lend themselves to analysis, but they constitute a historical record of national feelings about a wide variety of events distributed over time.

It is also possible to use cartoons from different countries to examine similarities and differences in the national images of the same event. For instance, it would be interesting to study Israeli and Egyptian political cartoons portraying the wars of 1956, 1967, 1973 as well as the peace process in order to compare and contrast the themes, images, and feelings associated with these events. Such a study might demonstrate the existence of a mirror-image, or other possible affective relations, for both these countries and in addition, detail its content. In essence, there is no doubt that political cartoons are a rich source of information from which we can learn new things about national images.

Finally, there were a few limitations of this study which should be pointed out and some of these should be addressed in future research. First, a choice was made as to the newspapers sampled from on the basis of availability of political cartoons, geographical distribution, and wide readership. Perhaps there was an effect attributable to the selection of newspapers for this study and this issue needs to be considered in further work. Other newspapers should be examined which are chosen on the basis of different criteria such as the type of audience the paper is directed towards (for example, specialized newspapers, small town rather than big city papers, etc.). Also, it would be interesting to look at these six newspapers individually to see whether there were systematic differences among them in the specific results of the various analyses. Another point that needs to be addressed concerning the newspapers used in this study is audience. What is the circulation of these papers? Who reads them (i.e. demographic information regarding the audience)? Who reads which parts of the newspaper, what parts of the papers are most consistently read, etc.? An

interesting question for future research is whether the audience reading political cartoons is unique in any respect.

Second, it would be interesting to see how other forms of media compare with those studied here, such as newspaper photographs, television news coverage, magazines, etc. Perhaps television news best combines the affective and cognitive dimensions of perception since it consists of news stories along with visual imagery. Third, the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 should have been included in this study since it would have made a more logical starting point for the discussions of the various analyses of subsequent events instead of the 1956 war. Fourth, future research should examine non-American newspapers to see the similarities and/or differences in the results presented here as well as to determine what findings could be attributed to the fact that this sample was limited to American papers (i.e. that the United States is the actor most frequently represented by political leaders in the headlines in four of the five events, that the editorials emphasize the U.S.'s role, etc.). Finally, more research should be directed at the question of how much as well as what kind of impact political cartoons have on their readers.

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