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CHINESE INTELLECTUALS AS A CLASS AND THEIR ROLE IN
THE CRISIS OF CHINESE MODERNITY

BY

ZHIDONG HAO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, the City University of New York

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
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
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Abstract

CHINESE INTELLECTUALS AS A CLASS AND
THEIR ROLE IN THE CRISIS OF CHINESE MODERNITY

by Zhidong Hao

Adviser: Professor Stanley Aronowitz

In the past five years, the political repression of dissident intellectuals and the rapid development of market economy have put intellectuals in an unprecedented position: they are on their way to becoming a class. The dissertation first delineates a synthetic typology of intellectuals based on their relations to other social groups, i.e. in addition to the general distinction of humanistic and technical intellectuals (or intellectuals and intelligentsia) as Gouldner would propose, I suggest that we view intellectuals mainly according to their political attitudes as Gramsci suggests. Starting from Gramsci's conception of intellectuals, I propose we distinguish between organic, unattached and critical intellectuals. But do they form a class if they have such diverse political interests?

In the dissertation, I try to prove that they can form a class because they share 1) cultural capital as their economic basis as well as political basis, 2) a calling and the culture of critical discourse (CCD) which provide them with more political foundation, 3) intellectual communities in and

outside the country as their organizational basis, and 4) a consciousness fostered by political and economic alienation. The major components of the class will be the unattached and critical intellectuals.

However, a unified class requires that intellectuals develop their national discursive party or parties and the flaws of the CCD and the Chinese culture be overcome. More clearly defined interests and consciousness are also necessary for an intellectual class formation. The development of an intellectual class is important in resolving the Chinese modernity crisis in terms of ecology, ideology, politics, education, and the conditions of the working class. Both historical and contemporary evidence is cited to substantiate the typology and the class hypothesis, and the survey method, the interpretive method and the historical method are used to gather and interpret data.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
I. Intellectuals and Class: Theories and Methodology	4
1.1 Intellectuals and Their Typologies	5
1.1.1 What Is an Intellectual: the Centrality of Culture	6
1.1.2 Who Are Intellectuals: Typologies and a Synthesis	9
1.2 Intellectuals and Class	16
1.2.1 Intellectuals Are Not a Class, Politically and Economically	17
1.2.2 Intellectuals Can Be a Class: a Cultural and Historical Construction	22
1.2.3 The Case of East European Intellectuals and Its Relevance to Chinese Intellectuals as a Class	30
1.3 Research Methodology	34
1.3.1 Some Empirical and Theoretical Questions	35
1.3.2 The Scientific Method: a Survey Analysis	37
1.3.3 The Interpretive Method	41
1.3.4 The Historical Method	46
1.4 Conclusion: Can There Be an Intellectual Class?	51
II. Who Are Chinese Intellectuals: a Substantiation of the Synthetic Typology	53
2.0 Introduction: Gramsci's Perspective	53
2.1 Humanistic and Technical Intellectuals, and Intellectuals in General	57
2.2 How Contemporary Intellectuals Define Themselves	65
2.3 Organic Intellectuals	74
2.4 Unattached Intellectuals	81
2.5 Critical Intellectuals	83
2.6 Political Intellectuals: the Contemporary Bureaucratic Ruling Class	88

2.7	Universities, Academies, and Associations	95
2.8	Conclusion	100
III. "Surviving in the Crack" Between Totalitarianism and Market Economy: What Has Happened to the Chinese Intellectuals in the Past Five Years 102		
3.0	Introduction: Political and Social Conditions Before June 4th, 1989	102
3.1	Opportunities for Organic Intellectuals	105
3.1.1	Bureaucrats, and Some Social and Natural Scientists	105
3.2.2	Bourgeoisified Intellectuals	110
3.2	Opportunities for Unattached Intellectuals, and Alienation	114
3.2.1	Funding System Creating Alienation	114
3.2.2	Promotion, Housing and Income Systems Creating More Alienation	121
3.2.3	Poor Equipment Supply Fostering Alienation	129
3.2.4	Limited Opportunities for Retraining	132
3.2.5	Alienation of Women in Career Opportunities	133
3.2.6	Mechanism to Deal with Alienation	135
3.3	Political Repression and the Struggle of Politically Critical Intellectuals	139
3.4	The Case of Socially and Culturally Critical Intellectuals	147
3.4.1	Academic Social Scientists: Moderately Critical but Crucial	147
3.4.2	Humanistic Intellectuals: Agonizingly Critical but Hopeful	149
3.4.3	Journalists: Aggressively Critical but Careful	153
3.4.4	Popular Artists, Singers, Writers, Painters and Movie Makers: Humorously Critical but Heartful	156
3.5	Status of the University as a Training Ground of Intellectuals	163
3.5.1	Commercialization of Institutions of Higher Learning	164
3.5.2	How Students Choose Their Programs and Pursue Them	167

3.5.3 Exodus of Chinese Intellectuals from Universities 169

3.6 Conclusion: Are Chinese Intellectuals a Class? 173

IV. Chinese Intellectuals on Their Way to Becoming a Class 176

4.1 Cultural Capital: An Economic as well as Political Basis of the New Class 177

4.2 Calling: a Part of the Political Basis of the New Class 190

4.3 CCD: Another Part of the Political Basis of the New Class 197

4.4 Alienation and Their Class Consciousness 204

4.4.1 Political Repression and Class Consciousness 206

4.4.2 Economic Alienation and Class Consciousness 211

4.5 Intellectual Communities: Organizational Basis 216

4.5.1 Communities in the Country 217

4.5.2 Communities Outside the Country and Their Connection with Those in the Country 220

4.4 Conclusion: Chinese Intellectuals as a Class? 222

V. The Crisis of Chinese Modernity and Its Implication for an Intellectual Class 225

5.1 Ecological Crisis 226

5.2 Social and Political Crisis 230

5.3 Ideological and Spiritual Crisis 236

5.4 Crisis in Education 242

5.5 Crisis of the Working Class 252

5.6 Conclusion 259

VI. The Future of Chinese Intellectuals and the Future of China	261
6.1 Factors Preventing the Class Formation	261
6.2 The Failure of Chinese Jacobinism	264
6.3 The Future of Chinese Intellectuals: Some Historical Lessons	269
6.4 The Future of China and the Roles of Intellectuals	276
6.5 Conclusion	282
 Appendix I: A Copy of the Interview Guidelines	 284
Appendix II: A Copy of the Survey Questionnaire	285
Bibliography	297

A List of Tables

Table 1.1	Typology of Intellectuals	15
Table 1.2	Cultural Capital, CCD and Organicity of Intellectuals Compared with Other Classes	26
Table 2.1	Distribution of Intellectuals by Profession	64
Table 3.1	Living Conditions of Intellectuals	122
Table 3.2	Income Distribution of Intellectuals	123

Chinese Intellectuals as a Class and Their Role in the Crises of Chinese Modernity

Introduction

The roles of intellectuals have been so diffused and the scene of the intellectual development has changed so much that questions constantly arise as to who is an intellectual and who is not, and whether we can actually define the group, if there is one. My dissertation is an effort not only to propose a way, a synthesis of Gouldner, Gramsci and others, to sort out the Chinese intellectual complex, but also to propose and substantiate my hypothesis that Chinese intellectuals are on their way to becoming a class and they have important roles to play in the Chinese modernity crisis. The period I cover is the past five years but I provide a socio-historical and comparative outlook into the issues concerned.

During this period, two events took place and have changed the Chinese intellectuals forever: the spring movement in 1989, or what I call "the June 4 Movement," to compare with the May 4th Movement, and the rapid transformation to market economy in 1992 after Deng Xiaoping's visit to Shen Zhen, the most developed economic zone. The June 4 massacre made them question themselves in their loyalty to the Party in over half a century and their own status, and the rapid transformation to market economy throws the intellectuals into the sea of commodities and they have to learn to survive. Thus both

politically and economically they find themselves under siege and in desperate need to redefine and reposition themselves.

In Chapter One, I first examine various theories on the categories of intellectuals and attempt to form a synthetic working typology of the intellectual complex based on their class relations with other social groups, i.e. their attitudes and behavior towards other classes. Then I review theories on Western and East European intellectuals as to whether or not intellectuals are or can be a class and propose my hypothesis that the Chinese intellectuals are on their way to becoming a class based on my own research concerning Chinese intellectuals and parallel development between the East and West. Finally, I outline the methodology I use to substantiate my synthetic typology and class hypothesis, namely the survey method, the interpretive method, and the historical method.

Chapter Two begins with a discussion of Gramsci's perspective on intellectuals and an examination of the definitions and connotations of Chinese intellectuals, argued for by the scholars in the field and the intellectuals I interviewed. But the major part of it is a discussion of the historical development of the various categories of intellectuals in my synthetic typology, where we may see some earlier attempts of class formation. In Chapter Three, I present the empirical findings of my research on what has happened in the past five years to various intellectuals in

the categories. It is a further test of the typology and more evidence of class formation will be provided.

Chapter Four returns to the theme of the dissertation and argues for a cultural construction of class based on the historical and contemporary evidence discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Variables such as cultural capital, the calling, CCD, class consciousness, and intellectual communities are discussed in detail. Chapter Five discusses the crises of the Chinese modernity, i.e. ecological, political, ideological, educational crises and the crisis of the working class, and what roles intellectuals can play as a class. In the final chapter, I discuss the future of intellectuals and the future of China. I outline factors that prevent a class formation and the flaws of the intellectual class. But I end with a positive note that intellectual are on their way to becoming a class after all. I hope the model of analysis can inform a general theory of the intellectual complex and add something valuable to the sociology of intellectuals.

Chapter One

Intellectuals and Class: Theories and Methodology

In the discourse on Chinese as well as Western and East European intellectuals, the debate is frequently about what and who is an intellectual and whether intellectuals can form or are already forming an independent class that will qualify them as a viable historical agent which will compete with other classes for political power. In this chapter, I will review Western theorists' understanding of the formation of intellectuals and develop a synthetic typology of intellectuals based on Gouldner, Gramsci and others that I believe better explains the Chinese case. Meanwhile, note is taken as to whether Western theories on intellectuals and Chinese intellectuals approximate the Chinese reality. Frequently, we may find that the case of Chinese intellectuals are far more complicated than either Weber, Parsons or Gouldner envision. Then, I will analyze the debate in the American scholarship on whether intellectuals can be a class and formulate my hypothesis about Chinese intellectuals, i.e. despite their diverse political attitudes as organic, critical and/or unattached, Chinese intellectuals are on their way to becoming a class. Finally, I will explain the methods I use to substantiate the hypotheses, namely, the survey method, the interpretive method and the historical method.

1.1 Intellectuals and Their Typologies

What is an intellectual and who are intellectuals? These questions seem perplexing both in the Eastern and Western context. In the Western context, there was at first the Russian term "intelligentsia," introduced into the language probably in the 1860s and referring to a group of people whose major concern was ideological and who had a sense of alienation. The word "intellectual" was a Westernization of "intelligentsia" and was first used in France during the Dreyfus trial (1898) when a group of writers signed a protest entitled "Manifesto of the Intellectuals." Then in the following year, American writers began to use the word to refer to themselves. (Bell, pp.121-2)

Lipset defines American intellectuals as "all those who create, distribute and apply culture, that is the symbolic world of man, including art, science and religion. Within this group there are two main levels: the hard core of creators of culture--scholars, artists, philosophers, authors, some editors of newspapers and some journalists; and the distributors--performers in the various arts, most teachers, most reporters. A peripheral group is composed of those who apply culture as part of their jobs--professionals like physicians and lawyers," or appliers of culture. (Nettl, p.97; Italics mine.) The key word here is culture, and there are three kinds of intellectuals: creators, distributors, and

appliers. Professionals as appliers are included as intellectuals albeit on the peripheral. For Lipset, and for others as well, as we will see later, culture defines what is an intellectual. We will now examine this cultural debate on what and who is an intellectual. Meanwhile, I will develop a synthetic typology of intellectuals.

1.1.1 What Is an Intellectual: the Centrality of Culture

Indeed, theorists do not disagree that culture is the core of intellectuals' concern. Weber defines intellectuals as "a group of men who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements considered to be 'cultural values,' and who therefore usurp the leadership of a 'cultural community.'" (Gerth and Mills, p.176) Parsons too emphasizes the cultural role of intellectuals: "I should like to speak of the intellectual as a person who, though as a member of a society in the nature of the case he performs a complex of social roles, is in his principal role-capacity expected--an expectation normally shared by himself--to put cultural considerations above social..." (Parsons in Rieff ed. p.4) These cultural considerations, he believes, concern meanings in symbolic systems, which are normative in nature and "specify what in some sense should be done and evaluate the actual performance accordingly, rather than either describing what in fact is done or predicting what will be." (ibid. p.3)

Shils, one of the most accomplished theorists on intellectuals, states likewise that intellectuals enquire, and desire to be "in frequent communion with symbols which are more general than the immediate concrete situations of everyday life, and remote in their reference in both time and space." (Shils in Rieff ed., p.26) He refers to cultural symbols that concern "man, society, nature and the cosmos." (Lipset and Basu in Gella ed. p.119) Shils further defines intellectuals in their five cultural traditions: 1) scientism, "the testing of everything," being "critical of the arbitrary and the irrational;" 2) romanticism, spontaneity and originality manifested in concrete individuality; 3) revolutionalism, "the belief that the evil world as we know it, so full of temptation and corruption, will come to an end one day and will be replaced by a purer and better world...;" 4) populism, "a belief in the creativity and in the superior moral worth of the ordinary people, of the uneducated and unintellectual;" and 5) anti-intellectualism, "the belief that excessive intellectual analysis and discussion can disrupt the foundations of order." (Shils in Rieff ed. pp.44-7)

This cultural argument of what makes an intellectual is carried on further by Gouldner, who highlights the centrality of culture by emphasizing two key terms in his theories on intellectuals and intelligentsia as the New Class, i.e., cultural capital and the culture of critical discourse (CCD), which distinguish intellectuals from other conventional

classes and provide a theoretical basis for an independent intellectual class. (We will discuss more the definitions and significance of the two concepts in Chapter Four when we discuss intellectuals as a class.) Therefore, Gouldner carries the cultural argument a step further and implies that what makes an intellectual includes not only their cultural roles but their self-groundedness and autonomy granted to them by their culture and therefore their potential political power. In the same vein, Aronowitz emphasizes the centrality, independence, and power of knowledge in the wake of the development of industrial capitalism and thus the potentiality of intellectuals. When "the knowledge mode of production prevails and culture is an ineluctable feature of social rule, intellectuals may become the only genuine political class." (Aronowitz in Robbins, ed. p.52)

From the above discussion, we may assume that most theorists agree that cultural roles and traditions are important variables in intellectual formation. The difference between Gouldner, Aronowitz and others is that the former two emphasize the increasing importance of intellectuals' roles because of the importance of culture and knowledge in the industrial and post-industrial world so much so that they may actually form an intellectual class. Others, however, stop short of saying that intellectuals can be a class even though they also believe in the cultural roles of intellectuals. Gouldner and Aronowitz, on the other hand, emphasize the

potential political power of intellectuals. (We will dwell in 1.2 on the possibility of intellectuals' class formation.) But we may safely conclude that it is the cultural roles, cultural traditions, cultural capital and the culture of critical discourse that make an intellectual. Now we will try to answer the second question: who are intellectuals.

1.1.2 Who Are Intellectuals: Typologies and a Synthesis

We have already seen that Lipset includes creators (philosophers, writers, etc.), distributors (teachers, reporters, etc.) and appliers (doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc.) into intellectuals. Shils includes "professionals" in civil service, journalism, law, teaching, medicine and even students as intellectuals in at least underdeveloped countries. (Shils 1972, pp.390-5) Gouldner identifies two parts of the New Class, the intellectuals, "whose interests are primarily critical, emancipatory, hermeneutic and hence often political," and the intelligentsia, "whose intellectual interests are fundamentally 'technical.'" (Gouldner, p.48) Gouldner's intellectuals would most likely include Lipset's first and second layers, creators and distributors, but exclude most scientists and engineers, whereas intelligentsia would include most scientists, engineers, physicians and some lawyers, or in a word, what we tend to call "professionals."

Gouldner's distinction corresponds roughly to the Chinese distinction of humanistic intellectuals (the former) and technical intellectuals (the latter), the distinction I will use in the dissertation. Humanistic intellectuals include those in humanities and social sciences, both theoretical and applied, and technical intellectuals include those in natural sciences, theoretical and applied. The two part categorization may also be seen as a synthesis of Lipset, Shils, and Gouldner. This is not a distinction without problems, which we will discuss in Chapter Two when we explain the definitions of Chinese intellectuals from both historical and contemporary points of view. I will use it as my one of working typologies, and as I do with other typologies, critique and modify it as we move along.

The humanistic and technical categorization is based mainly on intellectuals' structural location or simply professions, or functions, i.e. humanistic vs. technical. The political orientation of any individual intellectual, however, does not seem to be determined by his or her humanistic or technical profession even though as Gouldner and others observe that the former are more political and critical and the latter tend to be more conservative than the former. For example, Lipset and Basu quotes G. Eric Hansen as observing that engineers, dentists, physicians, and lawyers tend toward the right, while poets, artists and men of letters tend toward the liberal and radical, but it is difficult to make

distinctions between scientists, natural and social. (Lipset and Basu in Gella, p.120)

While it may be useful to distinguish between humanistic and technical intellectuals according to their functions, it may be more important to consider the political attitudes of intellectuals towards various social groups or classes. A particular person can be a scientist or engineer but very critical of the ruling class and politically active; he or she can be a journalist or professor but very technical in orientation and not at all critical or political. Given the ambiguities and for analytical purposes, we might also want to distinguish between organic, unattached, and critical intellectuals, a synthetic typology of intellectuals based on class relations and political attitudes.

Gramsci believes that every new class creates alongside itself the "organic" intellectuals in the field of productive technique as well as in the political and philosophical field, (Gramsci, pp.5-16) or in our words, organic intellectuals among technical and humanistic ones. He does not define organic intellectuals, but we may safely assume from his discussion of them that he means those who believe in the course of a certain class, for example, the moneyed class or the working class, and serve as their political and economic advocates, executive officers, managers and organizers. This includes lower level bureaucrats if we define higher level

bureaucrats as a **bureaucratic ruling class** (BRC), which may come from either humanistic or technical intellectuals. (More discussion on Gramsci's categories in Chapter Two.)

In other words, within each stratum, technical or humanistic intellectuals, there might be a stratum of "organic intellectuals," and we should be able to "measure the 'organic quality' of the various intellectual strata and their degree of connection with a fundamental social group..." (Gramsci, p.12) for example, the new bourgeoisie (the moneyed class -- MC) or the working class (WC). The introduction of organic intellectuals in the discussion of intellectuals may solve the question of whether we can have a technical intellectual whose interests may include not only technical puzzles but also advocating the course of a certain class, say the new bourgeoisie, and criticizing the course of another, say the bureaucratic ruling class (BRC), in which case we may call them "organic technical intellectuals" as an ideal type. By the same token, we may also have a humanistic intellectual whose interests include not only philosophical thinking of humankind but also advocating the course of the working class, whom we may call "organic humanistic intellectuals," i.e. organic to the working class. They can be organic to any of the other classes, too, as is the case of a technical intellectual.

However, everyone does not become a bureaucrat or official and therefore an organic intellectual. They can remain "unattached" or "free-floating." A humanistic intellectual can remain unattached to any of the other classes and interested only in, for example, studying life and distributing knowledge to whomever wants to hear. We call them "unattached humanistic intellectuals," or in Alfred Weber's terms, "socially unattached intelligentsia," (Mannheim, p. 155) Similarly, those whose interests are just technical puzzles or disseminating scientific and technical knowledge are "unattached technical intellectuals." These unattached intellectuals may not be actively participating in political activities or expressing their political points of view, but it does not mean they do not have an opinion.

There are also some who are politically critical of certain interest groups but not necessarily organic to other groups. They can also be culturally critical of society as a whole. These are the political and cultural critics, for example, the "public intellectuals" from the academia who engage in writings and speeches that criticize government policies but not necessarily engage in the organization or advocacy of cultural and political protests; (otherwise, they would be organic intellectuals.) Another example would be the political dissidents in China. Hence, we have a category of "critical" intellectuals in addition to organic and unattached.

To sum up, to provide a more comprehensive and analytical framework of analysis that will make sense of the reality of Chinese intellectuals, I propose two typologies in the analysis of intellectuals: 1) two kinds of intellectuals based mainly on their professional orientations: technical intellectuals, or what Gouldner and others would call intelligentsia, who are mainly technical in orientation and engage in science and technology, and humanistic intellectuals, who are mainly cultural in orientation and engage in humanities and social sciences, and 2) three kinds of intellectuals based on their political attitudes, or closeness, or distance to a specific interest group, namely organic, unattached, and critical intellectuals.¹ These typologies are the first set of hypotheses I am going to substantiate in my research and discuss in the dissertation according to my empirical findings. The following table illustrates the typology, in which I use the Chinese intellectuals as examples.

¹ As Sadri interprets Weber, ideal types are devices that social scientists use to measure reality, and they help us to achieve the knowledge of the concrete social life. "Ideal types do not subsume reality. It is the reality that approximates the ideal types." (Sadri, pp.19-22) Reality is always larger than ideal types. Throughout the whole dissertation, we will see how our ideal types explain what happens in reality but never exhausts it, and intellectuals changing from one categories to another is a constant norm of social life. We will see how relevant and sensitive our measurements are through our actual research in the field.

Table 1.1
Typology of Intellectuals

	Humanistic	Technical
Organic	1. Some Party and state bureaucrats, ideologues, secretaries to Party and state officials, managers of state and privately owned businesses, or "Confucian businessmen," working class organizers and advocates, entrepreneurs of an intellectuals class	2. Most of the Party and state bureaucrats, ideologues, secretaries to Party and state officials, managers of state and privately owned businesses, or "Confucian businessmen," working class organizers and advocates, entrepreneurs of an intellectual class
Unattached	3. Popular fiction writers, college professors in humanities and social sciences, some journalists, etc. who are not interested in politics. They are humanistic professionals.	4. Scientists, engineers, lawyers, doctors, college professors in sciences, who are not interested in politics. They are technical professionals.
Critical	5. Political dissidents, cultural and social critics	6. Political dissidents, cultural and social critics

The table shows the two way classification or typology: a horizontal one of humanistic and technical intellectuals based on their professions mainly (See 3 and 4) and a vertical one of the organic, the unattached and the critical based on their political attitudes. Two typologies crosscut each other; therefore, we can have a humanistic or technical intellectual that is organic, one in Cells 1 and 2, a humanistic or technical intellectual that is unattached, one in Cells 3 or

4, or a humanistic and technical intellectual that is critical, Cells 5 and 6.

The study of the typologies of intellectuals are crucial in the understanding of our next question, intellectuals as a class in formation, because it is often claimed that intellectuals cannot be a class because of their diverse professional and political interests, which is true to a great extent, as we have already seen in the above discussion and will see more in the next section. However, there may be more similarities than differences, hence our second hypothesis: intellectuals, at least Chinese intellectuals, might be actually on their way to becoming a class because of their similarities and because of the historical conditions at the current times. But let us first review what is the debate in the American scholarship concerning intellectuals as a class.

1.2 Intellectuals and Class

In 1.1.1, we discussed the centrality of culture in defining intellectuals. While theorists agree on the importance of culture, their opinions differ when it comes to whether the culture of intellectuals carries them so far as to grant them a class status. Indeed, we have seen how diverse they are in 1.1.2. In this section, I will discuss the debate on whether intellectuals can be a class and illustrate whether a cultural class is possible. I will address the issues of cultural capital, the culture of critical discourse,

alienation, and examine the case of East European intellectuals as explicated by Konrad and Szelenyi and its relevance to the Chinese case. My hypothesis derived from the discussion is that a cultural class of Chinese intellectuals is possible; furthermore, it is in formation, as might be the case in the West and Eastern Europe. But first, let us examine the arguments against the possibility of an intellectual class.

1.2.1 Intellectuals Are Not a Class, Politically and Economically

As is well known, Marx was not able to finish his definition on class when "the manuscript suddenly breaks off" two short paragraphs after Marx declared that he was going to define it. Nevertheless, Marx and Engels went on with their class analysis. They generally define classes according to the economic relations of exploitation and control over the means of production. Therefore, we have their famous declaration in the Communist Manifesto that "Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat." They did not, however, define their own roles in the conflict between the two classes and therefore the roles of intellectuals and their status in class relations.

But that does not prevent other Marxists from developing a theory of intellectuals as a class, albeit a contradictory one, from a Marxist point of view. A Marxist definition of

class would emphasize the location of different groups in the structure of production, owners of the means of production and laborers who sell their labor power for the former to appropriate. The professional managerial class (PMC), many of whom are what we call organic intellectuals, would be situated in the contradictory location between labor and capital, exploiting (or helping the latter to exploit the former) and being exploited by the latter at the same time. (See Wright 1985 and the Ehrenreichs 1979) Thus the PMC would be a contradictory middle class between labor and capital. The PMC does not seem to include unattached and critical intellectuals. Thus a Marxist definition of intellectuals in economic terms seems inadequate to explain the intellectual complex and denies its independent class status.

Parsons, too, does not believe intellectuals can form a class. Though acknowledging the cultural roles of intellectuals as we have discussed earlier, he believes that intellectuals have performed mainly normative functions in the past such as the efforts of the Chinese literati to systematize and canonize their cultural conception of the world and the rules of behavior for both the ruler and the ruled. In the modern world, intellectuals have mainly evolved into professionals because modernity requires that intellectual disciplines in humanities, sciences and social sciences develop applied professions that are incorporated into the capitalist (re)production. (See Parsons 1968, 1969)

Indeed, in his essay entitled "Professions and Social Structure" (1954), Parsons emphasizes the common elements between professions and business in terms of rationality (scientific investigation and normative standards), specificity of function (which gives a person professional authority because of his technical competence in a limited field), and universalism (the standards and criteria independent of particular social relationships). By emphasizing the normative functions of intellectuals and common elements between professions and businesses, Parsons also denies a politically independent status of the knowledge stratum that may contend for power with other classes in society even though he acknowledges that the professional complex "has begun to dominate the contemporary scene in such a way as to render obsolescent the primacy of the old issues of political authoritarianism and capitalistic exploitation." (Parsons 1968, p.549)

Parsons's understanding of the intellectual complex echoes Weber's understanding of modernity, which is characterized by the domination of instrumental rationality. Stable and exhaustive rules, laws, administrative regulations, office hierarchy and impersonality all characterize the modern scene, (Gerth and Mills, p.299) where professionals play a key role. While Weber believes there is a close connection between the prestige of culture symbolized by intellectuals to the prestige of power (ibid. p.448,) as is the case of the

relationship between professionals and the rational legal power, Weber, as Parsons, stops short of saying that intellectuals have an independent class status in society. In the case of Chinese literati, for example, he says, "The educated stratum of China simply has never been an autonomous status group [let alone class] of scholars, as were the Brahmins, but rather a stratum of officials and aspirants to office." (ibid. p.429)

In fact, according to Weber, they have been attached to the ruling class. "For more than two thousand years the literati have definitely been the ruling stratum in China and they still are." (ibid. p.416) He does not, however, mean that all of the literati were part of the ruling class, for "there were also Chinese literati who, in principle, remained unattached to any office. This free and mobile stratum of literati were carriers of philosophical schools and antagonisms" (ibid. p.419. Italics mine.) Furthermore, intellectuals as a whole have not been a class. Even if Weber was talking about intellectuals' status under a mainly traditional authority, we can at least say that he would not believe there is an intellectuals class anywhere, under traditional or rational legal authorities. For class situation today, according to Weber, is typically determined by markets, the labor market and commodity market, and the educated strata are a status group that is characterized by social honor, styles of living and their ensuing economic opportunities.

(ibid. pp.300-1) In other words, intellectuals are not an independent political power that may contend, for example, with the moneyed class.

Daniel Bell goes a step further to define class from both economic and cultural points of view, but he does not think intellectuals form a class, either. He believes that the definition of a class should

be found in the social structure in some institutional arrangements providing the basis for differential position and power/authority/influence and reward. And it must comprise, as well, a cultural outlook providing a coherent view, a common consciousness, and, implicitly, some legitimation for the class itself. In brief, a "class" exists when there is a community and continuity of institutional interest and an ideology that provides symbols of recognition (or codes of behavior) for its members. (Bell, p.155)

Bell thus emphasizes status in terms of power and reward, consciousness, interest, and community. In terms of community, he identifies six groups of knowledge workers, namely knowledge creators, creators of culture, transmitters of culture and knowledge, news and entertainment workers, appliers and transmitters of knowledge, and managers and administrators. (Notice how similar his intellectuals are to Lipset's and ours.) He concludes that "there are few institutional arrangements that bring these groups together, in structural terms, as a coherent class." (Bell, p.158) In terms of interest, Bell identifies four functional interests, scientific and scholarly, technological, administrative, and cultural; and five institutional ones, economic enterprises

and business firms, government, universities and research organizations, social complexes and the military. He concludes, "it is not clear what the common interest of the diverse 'information and knowledge' occupations would be." (ibid., pp.158-9)

For Bell, even culture cannot make much difference in class formation, according to Bell. He says, for example, that cultural attitudes in America make a mentality, not a class since "the dominant cultural mentality in the Western world...is the idea of the antinomian self: the individual, not an institution, is the source of moral judgement; experience, not tradition, is the source of understanding." (ibid., p.161) The individuals of the "new class" make up a "cultural phenomenon that mirrors the breakdown of traditional values in Western society...[and they are] the endpoint of culture in disarray." (ibid., p. 162) Thus Bell does not believe a new class was born.

1.2.2 Intellectuals Can Be a Class: a Cultural and Historical Construction

We have seen that no one of the above theorists defines intellectuals as a viable political class. Maybe whether intellectuals form a class is both a matter of definition and one of historical development. As Aronowitz and DiFazio suggest, "If they are able to constitute a community that shares a common discursive space that leads them to identify

with each other independently of their subordination to capital, the designation 'intellectual' connotes a collective that is in the process of 'class' formation. They can identify independent interests and demand to share economic and political power with the conventional contending classes." (Aronowitz and DiFazio, p.179) Let us now examine how an intellectual class is possible from both a definitional and a historical points of view.

Even though Bell doubts the emergence of a new intellectual class, his indicators of class formation are a valuable addition to the Marxist tradition and are reaffirmed and elaborated fifteen years later by Aronowitz and DeFazio in their cultural construction of class, thus rekindling the discussion in a new historical context and proposing the possibility of the "new class" being in formation as an independent and powerful subject. To clarify the relation of community and culture to class consciousness, they cite Marx in The 18th Brumaire of Luise Bonaparte,

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small holding peasants and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. (Cited by Aronowitz and DiFazio, p.273)

Aronowitz and DiFazio want to demonstrate "the centrality of culture within the formation and reproduction of class--to demonstrate that class is a project in the making and not just a form of reification..." (Aronowitz and DiFazio, p.292) This cultural construction of class is a valuable addition to the economic definition, and in the contemporary context, it may be more meaningful politically.

In fact, this cultural class theory is also based on the theoretical foundations of the New Class outlined by Gouldner, namely cultural capital and the culture of critical discourse. (Gouldner, p.5) Gouldner advances the centrality of culture and elevates it to the status of capital. Capital, he says, is an "object whose public goal is increased economic productivity but whose latent function is to increase the incomes and social control of those possessing it. In this perspective it is plain that education is as much capital as are a factory's buildings and machines." (Gouldner, p.22) Capitalization of cultural skills acquired through education provides incomes to those possessing them through wages, royalties, patents, copyrights, or credentialling. (ibid. p.25) This capitalization of cultural skills is then one of the foundations for the new class of intellectuals.

Another foundation of the new class project is the culture of critical discourse, which states that intellectuals justify their assertions by eliciting voluntary consent, not

by invoking authorities or status in society. That any reliance on the speaker's person, authority, or status in society to justify his claims would be ruled out provides further self-groundedness or autonomy for the new class. Thus as a critique of Shils's five traditions of intellectuals, Gouldner emphasizes intellectuals' self-groundedness or autonomy as a deeper structure that underlies the five traditions. It is this deeper structure that advances the intellectuals' candidacy as a new elite instead of simply being disruptive of social solidarity and breaking with established tradition and opposing constituted authority as is argued by Shils. (ibid. pp.32-4) Therefore, CCD provides the new class not only with an independent class status but also with a common ideology, and common interests to prevent or oppose all censorship of its speech variety. The ideology and interests bind intellectuals and intelligentsia together and also separate them from other classes, as does cultural capital.

My hypothesis is that CCD is, to go a step further from Gouldner, also a common bond between organic, unattached and critical intellectuals, as is also cultural capital. That is why intellectuals may form a class. The following table is an illustration of how CCD and cultural capital separate different classes and how the amount of CCD makes the difference between organic, unattached and critical intellectuals without undermining the fact that they may still

be considered as one class because of cultural capital and CCD.

Table 1.2

Cultural Capital, CCD and Organicity of Intellectuals
Compared with Other Classes

	Any one of the classes like the BRC, MC, or WC	Organic Technical or Humanistic Intellectuals	Unattached and Critical Technical or Humanistic Intellectuals
Amount of Cultural Capital	- to +++	+++	+++
Amount of CCD	- or +	++	+++
Organici- ty	NA	+++	- or +

I propose that the amount of cultural capital separates intellectuals and other classes apart, +++ versus little or none, with the exception of some bureaucrats or bourgeoisie, who may have been intellectuals themselves in the past and still possess a great deal of cultural capital. CCD makes the difference between organic and unattached/critical intellectuals, ++ versus +++, i.e. the more organicity the less CCD, and it also makes the difference between other classes and intellectuals, - or + versus ++ and +++, i.e. the more bureaucratic and bourgeois and working class the less CCD. The fact that organic intellectuals still have some CCD

makes it possible for us to consider them as intellectuals, albeit a different one, a very important point that will be referred to again and again in my dissertation. Organicity can be measured by such indicators as one's interest in the cause of a major class, or to be more specific, one's amount of time and energy spent in promoting the cause of that class in terms of, for example, papers written and specific work done for that cause. Organic intellectuals naturally possess +++ organicity, while unattached or critical intellectuals possess little of none of it. These issues will be further researched in my dissertation.

I would also propose that alienation is a very important factor that helps class formation since alienation fosters a common consciousness and togetherness. Because of their specific qualifications, aspirations, expectations and status, the intellectuals face a different kind of alienation than the working class. Instead of the loss of control over the means of production, Gouldner identifies five ways intellectuals may be alienated: 1) the blockage of their CCD, their right to judge actions and claims of any social class and all power elites according to their CCD; in other words, intellectuals are deprived of their right to use their cultural capital to achieve a status and for an income; 2) the blockage of their upward mobility and access to media, which is in a sense to rob them of their market for their cultural products and therefore also prevent them from earning an income with their

cultural capital; 3) a status disparity between their high culture and low incomes and limited political influence, which naturally grows out of the first two obstacles; 4) the disparity between their belief in keeping the totality of society and their inability to do so, which is a psychological state grown out of the political; and 5) the blockage of their technical interests by the power elites, which is to deprive them even of their means to make a living. (Gouldner 1979, pp.57-73)

Another indication of alienation comes, we assume, from their inability to get professionalized and therefore their inability to control their work process and their incomes, i.e. their inability to use their cultural capital for political and economic gains. According to Freidson, "Professionalization might be defined as a process by which an organized occupation, usually but not always by virtue of making a claim to special esoteric competence and to concern for the quality of its work and its benefits to society, obtains the exclusive right to perform a particular kind of work, control training for and access to it, and control the right of determining and evaluating the way the work is performed." (Freidson 1973, p.22) Professionalization is associated with autonomy, and the lack of it nor doubt creates alienation.

If we talk about consciousness or interests, what could be more important than alienation in shaping a togetherness in intellectuals by defining the limit of their interests and political power. Indeed, the possession of cultural capital and their inability to use it for political and economic gains are one of the factors that causes the alienation of intellectuals, which contributes to the development of a sense of independent consciousness, one of the most important steps in the direction of becoming a class, or a new class. The intellectuals' position in society is of course closely related to their cultural capital, and alienation indicates one kind of position. Alienation thus further defines intellectuals' interests and class consciousness. I will in Chapter Three demonstrate the issue of alienation according to my research findings.

To sum up, as Gouldner proposes, cultural capital makes it possible for intellectuals to access a space in public life, or structural location, for example, education, at a time when knowledge work moves to the center while the working class as the agency of "universal human emancipation" decreases in importance. The culture of critical discourse unites the humanistic and technical intellectuals as the basis of their solidarity. Alienation further strengthens the bond between intellectuals because they are being treated as one group by other social groups, especially the ruling class. As Aronowitz and DiFazio point out, in the American context, the

defunding of education, science and the arts, attacks on "political correctness," and proletarianization of intellectuals threaten the CCD and thus foster a class consciousness. This class thus have the potential of constituting their own political agency, identify their own interests and demand to share economic and political power with the conventional contending classes. (Aronowitz and DiFazio, pp. 152, 179, 188) Thus intellectuals may indeed be a class in the making and will be contending with other classes for more power.

1.2.3 The Case of Eastern Europe and Its Relevance to Chinese Intellectuals as a Class

This class formation could not been seen more clearly than in the case of Eastern Europe, where, Konrad and Szelenyi claim, "the educated middle class is undoubtedly the current ruling elite, if not the ruling class. (Konrad and Szelenyi 1991, p.342) They analyze the formation of an intellectual class in three dimensions: the critical relationship between the cadre elite and intellectuals, the victory of CCD, and the social positions of intellectuals in the post-Communist transition. I will examine their analysis in some greater detail because it not only provides a case of intellectual class formation but has direct relevance to the case of Chinese intellectuals, having come from the same Marxist tradition.

First, intellectuals have entered bureaucratic decision making positions in large numbers since the early 1970s and are on the road to class power, as their 1974 book, Intellectuals on the Road to Power, predicts. But there seem to be some limitations of class formation as they acknowledge: once they become bureaucratized, the intellectuals also begin to be bourgeoisified, which creates cleavages in lifestyles and status between these cadres and intellectuals. They may even become a new "big bourgeoisie" through privatization of state enterprises, although Konrad and Szelenyi do not really think they will. In the political reform, some intellectuals go ahead; others are left behind. Furthermore, conflict exists between humanistic and technical intellectuals as to who gets to be promoted into power positions. (ibid. pp.342-50) This presents a theoretical impasse in terms of intellectual class formation, which I hope to overcome in my analysis of Chinese intellectuals' class formation, which is quite similar to the East European case, by identifying a core group of unattached and critical intellectuals, while viewing bureaucratized intellectuals as on the periphery. The analysis will be based on the historical and contemporary evidence I obtained during my investigation of Chinese intellectuals for the dissertation.

Second, the old cadre elite is losing ground to the critical intellectuals, and claims made on the basis of authority and political power such as the domination of the

Communist party rule and Marxist ideology have been refused. The 1980s witnessed the "great battle of discourses," in which Konrad and Szelenyi believe "the intelligentsia achieved a major victory over the bureaucracy by superimposing its own discourse, the culture of critical discourse, over that [of] bureaucracy." (ibid. pp.351-2) As we discussed earlier, CCD is one of the foundations of the new class, and its triumph certainly indicates the potential power of intellectuals. But Konrad and Szelenyi also point out the moralizing quality of CCD which limits the critical nature of the critical discourse by imposing their views as the only morally correct ones. In fact, Gouldner also points out the paradox of the CCD which seeks to control everything and monopolize truth while claiming to be open to arguments. (Gouldner, pp.84-5) The same phenomenon occurs in China, and I will attempt to address this contradictory quality of the CCD by calling for a transformation and transcendence of Chinese culture. But the victory of the CCD is certainly a very important indicator of intellectual class formation and class power.

Thirdly, "In the current post-Communist transition, the intelligentsia seems to have discovered a nonbureaucratized role for itself. Rather than becoming a class formed around redistributive power, it exercises power of its own as a politocracy or as a mediocracy." (Konrad and Szelenyi, p.354) In other words, intellectuals are mediating, as playmasters, between the state bureaucratic elite and an emergent class of

property owners. (Interestingly, they did not mention the working class.) For example, intellectuals define the core issues of the time through the mass media. A new elite, including some in the bureaucracy, speaking the culture of critical discourse, is in the making. Konrad and Szelenyi claim, half seriously, that if and when the bureaucracy disappears, the intelligentsia elite is the only serious candidate to replace it. (ibid. p.355) My view is that the bureaucracy is not going to disappear: when the old generation of bureaucrats die, new ones will emerge. Even if they are from the intelligentsia, they will lose some or most of their CCD so as to become qualified bureaucrats. Bureaucracy (re)produces itself. Intellectuals, too, (re)produce themselves by some of them not entering the bureaucratic positions but retaining their critical and unattached stance. Therefore, the unattached and critical intellectuals will make the bulk of the new class and their existence in Eastern Europe substantiate my hypothetic typology. I will further explore this issue in the following chapters concerning the Chinese intellectuals.

In terms of class consciousness, compared with the Eastern European intellectuals, Chinese intellectuals face more alienation, according to my research, because of the limitations of the current political and economic reforms, especially the former. So in the Chinese case, I will also stress the importance of alienation in forming a class

consciousness among intellectuals. In the current reform, it is not just that some intellectuals are left behind; maybe most still feel a tremendous amount of alienation. I use the word descriptively, and I will cite Gouldner's discussion of the alienation of intellectuals to describe the case of Chinese intellectuals.

To sum up, Konrad and Szelenyi have advanced the new class project by demonstrating how intellectuals in Eastern Europe are on their road to class power in the form of entering bureaucratic positions, imposing CCD and mediating between the major classes of power. I hold some reservations about their views on bureaucratization of intellectuals being an important indicator of class formation, (if anything, it may be a distraction of class formation,) but I do think it is relevant, and certainly the triumph of CCD and the role of the playmaster are the most important indicators of intellectuals' class power. In the Chinese case, my findings show that an intellectual class is in formation. I will now explain the methods I use to obtain evidence to be discussed in the next two chapters, which are also the methods I use to analyze the findings on which I base my conclusions in terms of the typology and class formation.

1.3 Research Methodology

In 1.1 and 1.2, I have discussed possible typologies of Chinese intellectuals and whether they can form a cultural

class. The synthetic typology and the class formation of Chinese intellectuals are thus the issues of my research. To investigate these issues, I use the following three methods: the scientific, the interpretive, and the historical. But before I discuss each of these methods, I will now list some of the research questions.

1.3.1 Some Empirical and Theoretical Questions

The entry point of my research for the dissertation is an action question, i.e. assuming that intellectuals forming a class is important for the country and for the intellectuals themselves both politically in terms of democracy and economically in terms of a mixed economy of both capitalism and socialism, what then can intellectuals do to accelerate the process of class formation? This leads to a set of empirical and theoretical questions derived from our previous discussion of literature on intellectuals and class, which we must answer through research before we can deal with the action question.

The empirical questions concern but are not limited to the following:

- 1) **Socio-economic conditions** of intellectuals such as their sex, age, highest education received, professional positions and titles, income, housing, family responsibilities, social, family and personal experiences in the past, etc.

- 2) **Their intellectual work** such as the kind of research they do, who decides what to do, what choices they have in their professional work, the funding situation, opportunities to get their work published, the reward system, the supporting system for their work, opportunities for retraining. Do they have professional organizations? What do they do?
- 3) **Their work opportunities** such as their mobility into bureaucratic positions or businesses.
- 4) **Their subjective feelings about themselves** such as how they think about their status in society, etc.
- 5) **General social environment** including political, social and economic changes in recent years in terms of specific events that have happened in the recent past, policy changes of the Party and state, etc.

By asking what intellectuals do in their life and how they do it, we want to find out whether there is a discernable pattern of humanistic and technical intellectuals, and a pattern of organic, unattached, and critical intellectuals. We also want to find out to what extent the indicators of a cultural class exist, such as the cultural capital, CCD if there is any and in what form, class consciousness, common interests, alienation, mobility patterns, and communities. To ask some of the general social environmental questions, we will put the changes in intellectuals in a larger context of historical development.

The theoretical questions consist of the following:

- 1) **Definitions and typologies of intellectuals:** how do the Chinese intellectuals define themselves? Do they think they are intellectuals? If so, is there a distinction between humanistic and technical, organic, unattached and critical intellectuals?

- 2) **Class formation:** Do different intellectuals believe they share a common class consciousness? Is there anything they believe they have in common, or they believe they are vastly different from each other? Do they attempt to form certain kinds of communities?

After answering these empirical and theoretical questions, we will be able to assess the class status of intellectuals and discuss possible strategies of action on the part of intellectuals towards forming a class of their own for the benefit of a democratic polity and a mixed economy.

I will now proceed to the specific methods I use to obtain the answers to these questions and to analyze the findings later. I will discuss their strengths and weaknesses as well as their feasibility under the current political atmosphere. I will also describe how I have used them in my research.

1.3.2 The Scientific Method, or the Survey Method

The scientific logic of inquiry, or the survey method, assumes that a number of factors, or independent variables, "cause" or explain the occurrence of certain events, or dependent variables. In the study of Chinese intellectuals as a class, we may say that the dependent variable is whether or not the contemporary Chinese intellectuals have formed a class of their own. According to our theoretical discussion above, independent variables may include but are not limited to the

following: common class consciousness, class interests, alienation, intellectual organizations and communities, and generic characteristics such as cultural capital, and CCD.

Under the conditions of Chinese politics at the time of research, however, we faced a lot of restraints in using the survey method to study such a politically sensitive issue of Chinese intellectuals as a class. Even the category "intellectuals" is not the politically right topic to do a survey on. When I contacted my friend at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, whose help I needed for the study of intellectuals, the answer I got was "not possible to do such kind of research now." But I insisted on doing the study, so we compromised that we were going to study "technical personnel" instead. I compromised because, as I hypothesized, technical personnel are technical intellectuals, one of the twin parts of intellectuals. As for humanistic intellectuals, I could study them through the interpretive and historical method, which I will discuss in the next two sections.

My dissertation project is a precursor of a larger project involving three institutions in Shanghai (i.e. the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, East China Normal University and Fedayeen University) and three in New York (Center for Cultural Studies at the Graduate Center, CUNY, Asian American Studies Program at Hunter College, CUNY, and St. John's University). The first stage of the research, or

the trial research, on which my dissertation is based, was partly funded by the United Board of Christian Higher Education in Asia and partly by the CUNY Research Foundation. (The next stages are to begin in June 1995.)

Thus, we decided our population of study for the survey research was going to be the technical intellectuals in universities, factories, research institutes, and hospitals, where intellectuals are concentrated. According to a government survey in 1984, the following institutions possessed the largest percentages of total intellectuals in the country: education 31%, industry 24%, state organs 9.4%, public health 8.2% and scientific research 6.9%. (See Goldman ed. 1987, p.156, reproduced in the dissertation as Table 2.1) We could not survey government organs, so the other top four institutions would be our chief research sites. But for the trial research, we were going to do a limited survey of only three institutions with one hundred questionnaires, i.e. East China Normal University, a teachers' university, Fudan University, a comprehensive university, and Shanghai First Television Factory. We chose only the sciences departments in the universities such as the departments of mathematics, physics, chemistry, environmental science, computer science, and the research department of the Factory. These are the places where technical personnel are concentrated. When we chose our sample of one hundred and twenty respondents, we took into consideration of their academic ranks, age, gender,

and made sure that it was representative of different categories, and every technical intellectual had a chance of being chosen for the study.

Apparently, this is a very limited survey representative only of the technical intellectuals in two universities and one factory. We cannot even claim that it is representative of intellectuals in education and industry in Shanghai. We were not able to secure a large size state-run research institute and a hospital as we had planned. Most important of all, we were not able to do a survey of humanistic intellectuals, and in the questionnaires, we were not able to ask questions concerning politically sensitive issues such as political attitudes towards the Party, and the state policies, or whether they believe they were a class. The limitations of the survey makes a full-fledged statistical analysis on the class formation of Chinese intellectuals almost meaningless; therefore, I am compelled to consider the interpretive and historical methods as my chief methods in the study Chinese intellectuals under current political conditions.

Nevertheless, the survey method does provide me with a very important way of thinking about the relationship between class formation and the variables that affect it. And I was able to gather some demographic data concerning some of the empirical questions I listed above such as income and housing, towards answering my theoretical questions. (See Appendix II,

The Survey Questionnaire.) I am now able to compare the survey we did with surveys that others have done, national or local, concerning similar issues, and also compare the survey results with the results obtained through the interpretive and historical methods, which I am going to turn to now.

1.3.3 The Interpretive Method

The interpretive logic of inquiry maintains that reality is socially constructed through interaction between members of society. Durkheim considers social facts as things, and Weber looks for the subjective meanings of them, or as Berger and Luchmann point out, we sociologists are supposed to find out how subjective meanings become objective facticities, (Berger and Luchmann 1966, p.18) hence Weber's meaning of sociology: "a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course [sic] and affects." (Weber 1947, p.88) We are going to understand the meanings that are handled in and modified through an interpretive process in every social interaction between human beings. (Blumer 1969, p.2) Our understanding of social reality will therefore be an interpretive understanding of human beings' interpretive understanding of themselves in social interaction, which is defined by Simmel as sociation. Or sociology is in fact "the investigation of the forces, forms and developments of

sociation, of the cooperation, association and co-existence of individuals." (Frisby 1984, p.53)

So what are the forces, forms and developments of sociation, cooperation and association that lead to a class formation of intellectuals in China, then? What is the interaction process that leads to such a process of formation? To answer these questions, we will first of all have to understand what meanings are given to the concepts concerning class formation of Chinese intellectuals. How would they apprehend the world of intellectuals and how would they interpret the process of class formation? We want to find out how intellectuals themselves think about the typologies of intellectuals and how they think about their class status.

To do this, we need ethnography, the method of the interpretive logic of inquiry. Ethnography describes the way of life, or culture, of a society and identifies the norms, beliefs, understandings, attitudes, and values in the social world (Emerson 1983, p.19), or in our case, the social world of intellectuals. At the beginning of this section on methodology, I have already outlined the questions that I will explore. Some of them can be answered by a questionnaire, but others have to be dealt with in interviews and participant observation. To follow Blumer, I need to "use any ethically allowable procedure that offers a clear picture of what is going on in the area of social life. Thus, it may involve

direct observation, interviewing of people, listening to their conversations, securing life-history accounts, using letters and diaries, consulting public records, arranging for group discussions, and making counts of an item if this appears worthwhile." (Blumer 1969, p.41)

That is what I did in summer 1994, when, together with my Shanghai colleagues, I observed two labs at ECNU and one research institute at Shanghai First TV Factory, and administered 42 personal interviews and 12 group discussions with 36 people. Six of the 36 also participated individual interviews so the net number of people interviewed is 72. Out of these 72 people, 27 of them are at the level of either professors or senior engineers, 21 are at the level of lecturers or engineers, 20 are graduate students or junior engineers, and 4 are Party and institutional administrators. I used the same sampling principle as I did the questionnaire survey. The people interviewed include both humanistic and technical intellectuals, namely professors, researchers, engineers, and Ph.D. students from natural sciences, social sciences and humanities. Among them 41 are from mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, environmental science, computer science, and engineering, and 31 are from Chinese, English, history, philosophy, sociology, education, political science, including several journalists, writers, and artists outside the universities. I also made an effort to test my hypothetical typologies.

Through interviews, I was also able to obtain some personal histories of intellectuals that are relevant to their consciousness as a group but cannot be told in a questionnaire. I was able to assess the social construction of the meanings of intellectuals, which would have to be found out in our conversations with the interviewees and in our observations of what they do in everyday life to see whether they live up to what they believe in. For example, if intellectuals are the "conscience of society," how would they view such political events as the democratic movement in 1989?

I was also able to sit, for example, in a class session taught by a renowned professor of sociology of education and observed the way the professor interacted with his students and analyzed how the intellectual orientations were being handed down from one generation to another. I was not able to sit in their professional meetings partly because I was an outsider and partly because I was not there for long. But I did attend some of their parties, had lunches and dinners together with them. (I paid for them in almost all the cases.)

Interviews and ethnographic studies are very important tools in getting evidence to accomplish the goal. To make up for what I could not do in the survey questionnaire, I was able to ask questions concerning their political attitudes about some sensitive issues such as the socialist market economy, the new bourgeoisie and the working class, the Party,

the June 4 massacre, democratic movements, etc. In this way, I was able to test whether there is a distinction between organic, critical, and unattached intellectuals, and organic to and critical of whom. I was able to ask how they felt as a group called intellectuals, their own definitions of intellectuals and the differences between technical and humanistic intellectuals so as to assess a possible class consciousness. (See Appendix I for a copy of the interview guidelines.) The ethnographic studies, together with the surveys, help me to determine how complicated intellectuals are as a group, or class, and test my hypothesis of typologies of intellectuals and their class status.

The interpretive logic of inquiry has given me more detailed information than I could get through a questionnaire. And the evidence we get this way will not only enhance our understanding of the variables in the scientific logic but provide more insights into the forces that determine the class formation of intellectuals, more than the variables such as income and housing we used in the survey method. In the historical logic of inquiry, we will find even more paradigms of analysis that help us better understand the class status of Chinese intellectuals.

3. The Historical Method

In the discussion of the scientific logic of inquiry, we outlined a more or less linear and sequential model of relationship of class formation being determined by such variables as class consciousness, class interests, and class organizations and communities. The historical inquiry of logic, however, goes a step further to say that there might be a relationship between culture and socio-economic conditions and class formation: change in historical conditions affect the change in class formation. Also, The distinction between organic, critical or unattached intellectuals cannot emerge over night. Is there a history? Furthermore, intellectuals are not passive in defining their own existence. As Alford points out,

Historical analysis assumes that all relationships and processes are interdependent and change over time in their relationships to each other. The essential concepts of this logic of inquiry are: totality (a single case, changing through time), conjunctures (multiple factors are in constantly changing interdependence), and chronology (sequences of concrete and unique events and human actions located in specific times and places. (Alford 1992b, p.1)

And the method of this logic of inquiry "focuses upon comparison of societies, usually by analysis of texts and documents, as the records produced by human actors in concrete times and places." (Alford 1992a, p.1) I will now follow this line of argument and see how I can use the method to enhance

my study. We will keep in mind that the research question is whether Chinese intellectuals are a class in formation.

Like Simmel, Weber and Blumer, Marx's method also focuses on "mutual interaction," or "reciprocal effect," or "reciprocal action" that takes place between various elements in society as is the case of an organic body. (See Ollman 1971, p.17) But he focuses on the totality of elements and their internal relations. Man, for example, is the assemble of social relations. (See Ollman 1971, pp.22, 27) An analytic reading of Marx treats objects as presupposing subjects. In other words, everything is a subject-object unity, or totality, not just an object, a thing out there. Concepts and individuals, for example, are not something without history but they are all grounded in historically specific forms of life and characterized by internal relations, (Bologh 1979, pp.159-60) or subject-object interactions. This is the method of dialectical phenomenology, Marx's method.

According to this method, then, the totality of the relationship between, for example, the Party and the intellectuals cannot be perceived as one of subject and object with the Party or state determining the fate of the intellectuals, but they are acting upon one another and mutually determining each other's existence. It is not just some kind of Party bureaucrats that are directing intellectuals at their will. With this general idea in mind,

we need to find out what active role as a subject the intellectuals played after the Communist take-over. For example, what roles did they play in the various political and economic events such as the "liberation" of the country by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Land Reform movement in the early 1950s, the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957, the Great Leap Forward movement in 1958, the Socialist Education movement in 1964, the Cultural Revolution in 1966-76, Mao's death, Deng's reappearance, Deng's drive for four modernization, the 1989 democratic movement, etc.? What did they do or not do in those movements? How did those movements influence their ways of thinking about themselves? Besides interviewing intellectuals for those questions, we should also consult historical documents such as Party instructions for those movements, responses by intellectuals, in the form of articles in newspapers and magazines, which are direct indicators of Party policies and intellectuals' responses.

Furthermore, do the intellectuals need the Party as much as the Party needs them? For example, do the intellectuals need the Party to secure their right to practice their professions, as much as the Party needs them to help to fulfill the promise of modernization? If this is the case, the relationship between the Party and intellectuals is not one of exclusion but mutual inclusion and accommodation. Intellectuals play an equally important role in their own class formation or non-formation. Intellectuals themselves

become the latent variable in enabling their own existence. This way of thinking also helps us understand the typology of organic intellectuals and explains why intellectuals have always been part of the ruling class -- I mean organic intellectuals. It also explains why a cultural class is possible since intellectuals are not passive tools of the Party.

Talking about conjunctures and chronology, another way to perceive the relationship between the Party and intellectuals is to investigate the particular historical conditions that might affect the relationship. For example, the Cultural Revolution is characterized by anti-intellectualism. What are the socio-economic conditions that made the Party decide to go against intellectuals? Were there ideologies that made the Party distrust the intellectuals? Are there Party documents to back up this belief? What socio-economic conditions have made the Party now decide to reverse the situation and begin to incorporate intellectuals into their modernization drive? What are other social and political forces that obstructed or facilitated class formation? What are the differences in terms of professional organizations, educational systems, credentialing systems, etc.? Although I might not be able to answer all these questions, I will certainly consider the importance of historical conditions in the class formation of intellectuals.

As Alford pointed out earlier, comparative strategies are the method of the historical logic of inquiry. In fact, classical theorists such as Durkheim and Weber are well known for their comparisons of religions and societal systems. Durkheim's variable-based comparative studies and Weber's case-based comparative research both shed light on our understanding of society as a system and understanding it as diversity. (See Ragin and Zaret 1983) In my study, I will compare the cases of Chinese intellectuals in history and Chinese intellectuals now. In other words, the typologies of intellectuals and variables in class formation will be viewed in the totality of historical change and development. One of the most important questions to be investigated here is whether Western experiences apply to the Chinese case, and if so to what extent. We certainly want to avoid a Eurocentric point of view that social change and develop follow one Western model. But I will ask whether there is a system of class formation. If there is a system, we should be able to predict the class formation of the Chinese intellectuals. (See Dogan and Pelassy 1984, pp.163-78; Skocpol 1984, pp.285, 296)

To sum up the section on methodology, we may say that all the three methods are important in testing the typologies and the class formation of Chinese intellectuals. Although it has only a limited use in this study due to political reasons, the scientific method does provide us with some demographic data and an important way of thinking. The interpretive logic

provides us with data that are not easy to get by a questionnaire, and the historical logic modifies the other two models by bringing various dimensions and perspectives so that we can have a fuller understanding of the issue at hand and better able to predict the future movement of intellectuals. The strengths of one are the weaknesses of the other. In the analysis of Chinese intellectuals' typology and class formation, I will marshal the historical and contemporary evidence by using the methodological thinking I outlined above.

1.4 Conclusion: Is There an Intellectual Class?

What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to put the study of Chinese intellectuals into the larger picture of knowledged class in the modern era. Basing my research questions on the discussion of literature, I have outlined my hypotheses that Chinese intellectuals can be understood as humanistic and technical intellectuals on the one hand and organic, critical and unattached intellectuals on the other, and that they may be a cultural class in formation. I have also outlined the methods I will use to test these hypotheses and do my analysis, namely the scientific, the interpretive, and the historical.

To be more specific, I have shown a general framework of a cultural construction of class based on the theories of

intellectuals. What we are dealing with is not an exploiting class or an exploited one in the conventional Marxist sense although economic factors do play a role, especially when we compare different classes. We are trying to find out whether a cultural class can be formed by technical and humanistic intellectuals, who, although possibly different in their professional and political orientations, may have many qualities in common, such as cultural capital (the knowledge and economic base), the CCD, and face similar kinds of alienation. These qualities may define a common interest and consciousness among different intellectual groups including politically different ones. These are the issues I will explore by using the three methods I have outlined. We will find out in what way Chinese intellectuals are similar to or different from Western and East European intellectuals we have discussed, whether they form their own professional organizations and what social and political positions they occupy in society, and most importantly, whether they are on their way to becoming a class as I hypothesized.

In the following two chapters, I will analyze the historical and contemporary data I obtained in my research by using the three methods I outlined. We will see to what extent the ideal types fit reality and whether indicators of class formation exists among Chinese intellectuals.

Chapter Two

Who Are Chinese Intellectuals: A Substantiation of the Synthetic Typology

According to the principle of the historical method, the categories of our typology of intellectuals cannot occur overnight. What historical evidence do we have to substantiate our hypotheses of categories, then? Also, according to the interpretive method, how do intellectuals themselves interpret their own being? In this chapter, I will examine the historical development of intellectuals in the respective categories in my typology by relying mainly on historical research others have done and my own ethnographic investigation. I was not able to spend a lot of time on consulting historical records but by comparing other scholars' research findings, we should still be able to get a rough idea of how intellectual categories have been like historically. I will examine the validity of my typology, modify and qualify it according to the historical evidence.

2.0 Introduction: Gramsci's Perspective

The theoretical foundation of this discussion of the historical and contemporary development of Chinese intellectuals is Gramsci's conceptions of intellectuals. Let me first elaborate how Gramsci understands the intellectual complex.

On the one hand, Gramsci does agree that intellectual activity can be "distinguished in terms of its intrinsic characteristics," by which distinction we have at the highest level the "creators of various sciences, philosophy, art, etc.," and at the lowest lower level "administrators," and "divulgators" of accumulated intellectual wealth. This reminds us of Lipset's creators, disseminators and appliers. Gouldner's humanistic and technical distinction of intellectuals may also be seen as based on the intrinsic characteristics of intellectual activity, i.e. with the former being mainly concerned with theories and principles, while the latter practical application. The only problem is where to put scientists: are they humanistic or technical? Nevertheless, Gramsci would agree with Gouldner on the humanistic and technical distinction, albeit with some reservation, but he also believes this distinction is not the most important in reaching "a concrete approximation of reality." (Gramsci, 12-13)

Indeed, he even calls the distinction based on the above intrinsic nature of intellectual activities "the most widespread error of method." To approximate the reality of intellectuals, he believes that we should view intellectuals in the "ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations." (ibid. p.8) This is where we see the

distinction between organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals. (ibid. 15) I will now explain what he really means by these two terms and whether they approximate the Chinese reality.

The closest definition he gives for organic intellectuals is that they "are for the most part 'specializations' of partial aspects of the primitive activity of new social type which the new class has brought into prominence." (ibid. p.6) In other words, it is these intellectuals that elaborate the various causes of the new class, which is the bourgeoisie. To be more specific, they accomplish this task on two superstructural levels. First, on the level of civil society, they perform the function of ideological hegemony; and second on the level of political society, they perform the function of direct domination, or judicial government. Therefore, "[t]he intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government." (ibid. p.12) As we pointed out in Chapter One, they are the advocates, organizers, and administrators of a (mostly) dominant group. In contrast, traditional intellectuals are the intellectuals of the rural type, "linked to the social mass of country people and the town (particularly small-town) petite bourgeoisie, not as yet elaborated and set in motion by the capitalist system." (ibid. pp.14-15)

As a preliminary assumption based on the Chinese historical facts we know, we may say that Gramsci's organic intellectuals would correspond closely to the scholar-officials in the past who not only elaborated the Confucian ideological hegemony but carried out the daily administrative duties of the feudal rule as well. They would also correspond to intellectuals who served in the CCP and KMT regimes. They carried the two above mentioned functions. Gramsci's traditional intellectuals correspond most closely to the rural gentry including Confucians, Taoists and even Buddhist monks who refused to be involved in state administration but rather wanted to be left alone puzzling over their own existence. In my synthetic typology, they will be distinguished as "unattached" intellectuals. In his essay "The Intellectuals," Gramsci, however, does not seem to have accounted for the category of critical intellectuals. In the Chinese intellectual history, we often see organic intellectuals became critical of current politics after they served the ruling class for some time; we also see those who were critical of the ruling class and mostly did not serve the ruling class in any capacity.

It is therefore the task of this chapter to elaborate the Chinese historical development of not only organic intellectuals and unattached ones ("the traditional") but also the critical stratum of them. I will also discuss a parallel distinction of humanistic and technical intellectuals that

crosscuts those three categories. But first, I will examine the definitions of intellectuals and review how intellectuals themselves understand the term, mainly according to my interpretive research. Then we will see to what extent our typology explains reality.

2.1 Humanistic and Technical Intellectuals, and Intellectuals in General

In the Chinese context, the word zhi shi fen zi (intellectuals), or "knowledge insight elements," was also a later invention or maybe a translation of the Western word "intellectuals." The words used in the past were wen ren (literati), shi (gentry), or another shi (scholar official). (See Jin Yaoji 1987, p.61) But they all refer to a group of people that were well versed in literary and philosophical works and aspired to become officials in a certain part of their lives. In Weber's words, they were the traditional literati that had been taught the knowledge of arts and literature, and to become an official, were to pass examinations that tested "whether or not the candidate's mind was thoroughly steeped in literature and whether or not [they] possessed the ways of thought suitable to a cultured man and resulting from cultivation in literature." (Gerth and Mills, p.428) The centrality of culture in defining intellectuals seems the same for Chinese intellectuals. In addition, however, Chinese cherished a gentleman ideal of self-perfection, the goal of which is benevolence tempered by

classical beauty: officials proved their status quality by demonstrating the canonical correctness of their literary forms. (ibid. pp.436-7)

Thus we see that the traditional literati were mainly what most will call today "humanistic intellectuals" because of the lack of technical training among the knowledge strata. This distinction crosscuts the distinction of organic, unattached and critical. As Weber points out, special skills required for jurists, medical doctors or technicians were not emphasized and tested as they were in the West. Mathematics lost its status in the contents of the ancient education, i.e. the six arts (propriety, music, archery, horse-riding, literature and mathematics) after the Warring Period two thousand years ago; and schools were not concerned with natural sciences. (ibid.pp.427, 431, 432)

This, however, does not mean that humanistic intellectuals were not technical at all. Prof. Lin Tongqi points out that it has been overlooked by most historians that the Chinese "feudal shi was full of technical meanings." The six arts were actually perceived as six techniques. (Lin, however, did not elaborate on this point.) Besides, social activities such as divination, marriage, death, law and punishment, construction, and medicine, were all performed by professionals in the field that had the same social rank as shi. The word shi (scholar and/or official) actually also

meant the same as another shi, meaning "things;" therefore, being a shi is to do things. (Lin in Zhou Yangshan ed. 1980, pp.46-7) However, granted that the feudal shi was "full of technical meanings" and professionals did exist to perform the technical duties, this aspect of intellectualism had never been as developed as the humanistic aspect was. The literati were never tested for it in order to hold an office; instead, literature and Confucian classics were a must. Therefore, it may be fair to say that technical intellectuals in the Western sense and scale did not really exist in ancient times.

But the fact that there was a technical aspect, though overshadowed, in the humanistic intellectuals, or professionals and intellectuals were more often blended than separated in the past, demonstrates an interesting phenomenon. Were (or are) the Chinese intellectuals more oriented toward universalism while the Western intellectuals particularism? Could it be part of the "gentleman ideal?" As Perry Link comments, if the Western modern scholars of literature, ethics, sociology, and political science were to travel to the China of four hundred years ago, (it may even be true today,) "they would be viewed as quaintly narrow specialists working on different aspects of the same thing." (Perry Link, in Daedalus Spring 1993, p. 193) Maybe the humanistic and technical distinction was and still is a little blurred in the Chinese case because of some philosophical underpinnings.

Nevertheless, the ancient literati may still be generally considered as what we call humanistic intellectuals. Although there might have been some technical aspects in the literati, they were not emphasized. Even if a professional stratum might have actually existed in performing technical duties like medicine, they by and large did not have the same status as the literati in the sense that they were not treated as important in obtaining an office, though they were no less important in people's lives. This may have to do with the self-perfection ideal that one was "perfect" only when steeped in literature. So with some reservations, we may conclude that the ancient literati were mainly humanistic intellectuals.

The technically technical intellectuals, on the other hand, did not come into being until about a century and a half ago, as organic intellectuals to the ruling class. The first sizable group of technical intelligentsia in China, the so-called yangwu zhishi fenzi, or "foreign" technical intelligentsia, emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century when a Self-strengthening Movement, or yang wu yundong ("foreign matters movement"), started because China was faced with the Western "rational", imperial and colonial attacks and when the traditional way of government was not able to make the ancient civilization survive. At that time, with the assistance of open-minded officials such as Wen Tung-ho, Li Hung-chang and Zhang Zhidong, new schools teaching "foreign matters," i.e. Western science and technology were

established, and students were sent to Europe and America to learn Western civilization. Upon graduation, they were given jobs running factories, mines, textile mills, communication industries, the military, and the foreign affairs. This is the organic intellectuals Gramsci is most concerned about in his studies, although in this case, the dominant group they were organic to is not the bourgeoisie but the feudal ruling class.

Understandably, however, the newly born stratum of technical intelligentsia with a different set of cultural capital, Western rather than Confucian, ran into trouble with the traditional literati. The former argued that the West was more advanced than China in political, industrial and military spheres, while the latter still believed that China was the center of the world, as the very name of China, Zhong guo, center country, means. The former advocated that to catch up with the West, China had to develop science and technology, yet the latter thought that science and technology were but diao chuong xiao ji, or giji yin qiao, meaning "technology of carving a little wooden worm--insignificant skill," or "odd and wanton technique," compared with Confucianism with thousands of years of tradition.

Since the former were employed according to their Western skills instead of knowledge in the traditional Chinese literature tested in an imperial examination, they were often slandered by the traditional literati as "thugs in town," "

small persons born in lower class families," "foreign devils," "Chinese traitors," "people who don't know how to read and write [of course they mean in traditional Chinese]." Outnumbered by traditional literati, the technical intellectuals more or less succumbed. Many of the schools teaching Western skills later became schools preparing students for imperial examinations, and returned students like Ma Jianzhong, a political scientist from a French college, and Yan Fu, a graduate from an English naval academy, either devoted themselves to the preparation of the examinations or turned to translation of Western literature (Yan) and writing of grammar books (Ma). (Li Changli, pp.33-36) The Self-strengthening Movement declined.

However, the technical intellectuals did not give up entirely. They continued their cause in other ways. They continued mainly as humanistic intellectuals but with Western education and ideology. Yan fu, for example, introduced Western ideas to the Chinese by translating T.H. Huxley's Evolution and Ethics, J.S.Mill's On Liberty, and Logic, Herbert Spencer's A Study of Sociology, Edward Jenk's A History of Politics, etc. Lin Shu translated Alexander Dumas, Charles Dickens, Sir Walter Scott and others into Chinese. They were a blend of Western technical and Chinese humanistic intellectuals, as a phenomenon in the transition from a traditional to a more industrialized society.

The distinction of humanistic and technical intellectuals, however, has survived but they are most of the times lumped together as intellectuals. Ci Hai, one of the most authoritative encyclopedic dictionaries defines intellectuals as "mental workers with a certain amount of cultural and scientific knowledge, including people working in science and technology, literature and arts, teachers, doctors, etc." Both technical and humanistic intellectuals are included. This definition is followed in the Party documents: when policies concerning intellectuals are announced, these are the groups they refer to. Therefore, during the Cultural Revolution, colleges, hospitals, and research institutions were called "places crowded with intellectuals," by which they mean humanistic and technical intellectuals.

The following table on page 64 shows how intellectuals are distributed by profession in the 1980s. We see that two major areas where intellectuals are concentrated are education and industry respectively. If intellectuals in education may be considered as both humanistic and technical intellectuals in humanities, social and natural sciences, intellectuals in industry will be mainly technical ones such as engineers.

Table 2.1
Distribution of Intellectuals by Profession

Field	Intellectuals as % of Total Intellectuals	Intellectuals as % of Total Employed in Field
Education	31.9	12.81
Industry	24.6	1.56
State Organs	9.4	7.08
Public Health	8.2	9.50
Scientific Research	6.9	30.60
Construction	4.3	1.77
Agriculture	2.4	0.03
Communications	2.0	1.02
Commerce	1.7	0.63
Culture and Art	1.6	6.45
Management	1.3	9.87
Geology	1.1	6.69
Party Organs	0.9	4.66
Forestry	0.6	0.97
Animal Husbandry	<u>0.1</u>	0.15
	100.0	

Source: Goldman ed. 1987, p.156; Original source:
Guangming Daily, June 17, 1984.

Other scholars may talk about intellectuals in other terms but we can still discern the distinction of humanistic and technical. Prof. Jin Yaoji of Hong Kong identifies a new knowledge class composed of those engaged in creating and disseminating political, economic and academic culture and knowledge, i.e. mainly scholars, technical specialists and professionals such as political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, physicists, professors, journalists, lawyers, doctors, etc. (Jin Yaoji 1987, pp.34, 63-66, 76, 80-3) Wen

Chongyi of Taiwan identifies the modern intellectuals as professional and managerial class as the Ehrenreichs do. (Wen in Zhongguo Luntan Bianwei Hui, pp. 94-6) Indeed, if we observe how the word "intellectual" is used in the Chinese context, we could not but find that either or both technical (including scientists, lawyers and journalists) and humanistic intellectuals are included. But the problem with their distinction is that the relationship of these technical or humanistic intellectuals with other social groups, especially the dominant ones, is not explained.

The above is how historically the distinction between humanistic and technical intellectuals is like. The distinction is there but not always clear. Let us now see how contemporary intellectuals themselves interpret their social being in terms of intellectuals, or humanistic and technical intellectuals. The following is what I found in my interpretive research in Shanghai.

2.2 How Contemporary Intellectuals Define and Categorize Themselves

First, there seems to be a tendency by humanistic intellectuals to exclude most technical intellectuals from even the category of intellectuals. They hold a narrower definition of intellectuals, and the question then would be what is an intellectual. The distinction between humanistic and technical no longer seems to matter except when

identifying their professional locations, i.e. in humanities, social sciences or natural sciences, both theoretical and applied. Prof. Xiao of history from a university in Shanghai is quite representative of this opinion. He believes that intellectuals in this sense have to possess the spirit of social critique, independent thinking, and have a guilty feeling towards social inequality. They have to say something in the face of social inequality; otherwise, their conscience will hurt. Therefore, a technical intellectual is not a real intellectual if he or she is not very concerned about social problems. He points out that this is also the definition by intellectuals who write for a well-known Hong Kong journal, The Twenty-First Century, therefore representative of the opinion of overseas intellectuals, which seems very much influenced by the Western, especially American, emphasis on the distinction between professionals and intellectuals.

Professionals are not intellectuals, they would propose. Technical intellectuals are actually professionals; therefore, they are not intellectuals. Prof. Wang, a literal critic from East China Normal University, to echo Prof. Xiao, says that technical intellectuals are but "useful machines." When the Party says that intellectuals are part of the working class, it means mainly the technical intellectuals. He implies that the latter have become a group without much of its' own thinking and a sense of social responsibility. He told me that once at a meeting with some members of the Academia Sinica, or

the Academy of Sciences, the highest organ of scientists, he was beginning to admire those famous names when someone else commented that these people were fine except that when they saw the Party and state leaders, their legs would shake, meaning they would be very humble and deferential. He thought the person was right. He believes that the Party and state have since the 1950s trained so many loyal professionals but have refused to train intellectuals with the ability to think critically in social and humanistic issues.

But what about professionals themselves, or technical intellectuals? Do they consider themselves intellectuals? It seems that all of the technical intellectuals I interviewed DO, except some graduate students who had not thought of the question until I asked. These technical intellectuals believe that they are professionals as well as intellectuals. Professor Fang of chemistry believes that intellectuals include those who have received higher education, although there is a difference between "big" and "small" or senior and junior intellectuals, with the former having received more education, or having more cultural capital, and the latter less. He never doubted that technical intellectuals or intellectual bureaucrats (technocrats) are intellectuals. Professor Fang himself was, at the time of the interview, on the faculty of the Chemistry Department but had just served as the Provost of the University for ten years and had been serving as Deputy Director of the Education Commission of the

Shanghai Political Consultative Conference, an advisory organ composed of mainly so-called democratic parties and organizations rather than the CCP. The members of this organ are all senior intellectuals, he said. That is true, but as Professor Wang of literal criticism said, they might be the same group of intellectuals who succumb very readily to power. But they are intellectuals anyway. Prof. Fang never doubted that he is an intellectual even though he is a scientist and once held some bureaucratic positions.

The engineers in the Shanghai Number One Television Factory clearly separate themselves from the workers on the assembly lines, as do the workers separate themselves from the engineers. The engineers talked about themselves as intellectuals doing mental work while those on the assembly-lines as workers doing manual labor. The gap between their lower incomes and workers' higher ones is perceived as an erroneous and upside down relationship between intellectuals and workers.² But even if they may have a lower income, they believe they have higher social status, more autonomy, and possess a higher culture. Ms You, a junior engineer, commented that even if they say that they do not believe intellectuals are somebody, the workers would make every effort to work in the research institute, just because of the status and autonomy (or freedom in allocating one's time). Mr. Yu, the

² The workers earn more because they have a lot of overtime pay, while intellectuals may work home and overtime, they may not get paid.

Party secretary, petitioned in the Workers and Staff Congress (including engineers) that the authorities should recognize "the importance of intellectuals" and grant them appropriate benefits.

Thus from the humanistic intellectuals' point of view, at least most of the scientific and technical personnel are not intellectuals in the strict sense, while the technical intellectuals I interviewed would say otherwise. This poses two questions: 1) how useful the humanistic and technical distinction is other than identifying intellectuals' structural locations, and 2) whether they can be considered as from the same class, a question we will deal with in Chapters Three and Four. The answer to the first question, though, is that we have to identify organic, unattached and critical intellectuals, which will be the topics of following sections. But before we move on to them, we will examine another question, i.e. whether students, journalists, and lawyers are intellectuals.

The graduate students in sciences, whom I interviewed, tended not to have even thought about whether they were intellectuals, whereas students in humanities and social sciences had a more carefully defined consciousness. Science students such as Ms Liu and Ms Zhang, graduate students of mathematics, said they had never thought that they were intellectuals although their parents believed that they had

long been intellectuals already. When I asked whether they knew Kim Min Song of North Korea had just died, they said they did not know and they did not care about politics.

Most graduate students from humanities and social sciences, however, thought of themselves as intellectuals and talked like intellectuals and could not refrain from talking about politics when they opened their mouths. They tended to be very excited and indignant when we talked about the current modernization movement and how intellectuals were shortchanged in income and status because of this modern trend of capitalism. When I was interviewing a graduate student from the History Department, another one of his classmates saw us and jumped in our conversation without being invited. Another time, when I invited one student from the Chinese Department, he brought with him three others, including two lecturers, one of whom from the same department and another from a Chinese Department of another university in Shanghai. They came to my place at 7:30 pm and did not want to leave when it was already 12:30 in the next morning. The hotel was closed at 11:00 pm. Had I not been afraid of being scolded, I would have let them stay longer. But the difference between graduate students in humanities and those in sciences are clear although not absolute: I have not interviewed all the graduate students and there may be variations.

This makes us question whether students, even graduate students are intellectuals. Again, what is the defining characteristic if there is one, cultural capital, or a calling, defined by the ancient Confucian ethic of intellectuals, xiu shen, qi jia, zhi guo, ping tian xia, meaning cultivate and perfect oneself, put one's family in order, run the country and pacify the world, an ideal that is cherished by many intellectuals, part of the gentle man ideal as Weber also describes? If it is the former, then all of the graduate students can be considered as intellectuals even if they may not have the consciousness. If it is the latter, then only most graduate students in humanities and social sciences and some in sciences, who have a calling, are considered as intellectuals. Or maybe they are all intellectuals but are of different kinds, whether they realize it or not. These are the same questions we have encountered in discussing the distinction between humanistic and technical intellectuals. They should become clearer as we discuss the various aspects of the intellectual formation.

The same questions apply to lawyers and journalists. Do they consider themselves as intellectuals? Ms. Ge, a journalist as well as a lawyer, felt a sense of "calling" and enjoyed herself when she helped poor and less powerful clients to win a case in court. She believed that her job changed and even saved people's lives as if she herself was Lei Feng, one of the popular heroes having been advocated and popularized by

the Party since 1964. Her feelings correspond to the traditional calling upon intellectuals to save the world. This is the intellectual tradition. She felt that as a lawyer, she was fulfilling the calling.

On the other hand, she admitted that there were also lawyers whose main interest it was to make money. They would only take cases involving corporations because large sums of money are generally going to change hands and they can be guaranteed a third of it. In a time when the law has just become an important player in social life and the division of labor between lawyers is not quite clear, a lawyer can choose to deal with whatever cases he or she likes without having to have much specialized knowledge. The lawyers who opted for money apparently lost much of the sense of the traditional calling.

The same applies to journalists. Ms. Ge assumes that from a quarter to a third of journalists have a sense of calling, or certain social responsibility. No matter whether they can publish their stories, they will go and visit and write them down. If they cannot publish them, they will wait for that day. A lot of them are waiting. Some of them do get their stories published and are facing the consequences. In 1993, for example, some journalists visited a KTV, one of those night clubs that have become very popular all over China. They disguised themselves as some rich businessmen from Taiwan, and

found that not only the club was ridiculously overcharging its customers but it was backed up by a high official in the city police department. The story was published and everything seemed calm. But one of the journalists was deprived of his passport for no reason when he wanted to go abroad. As long as you are still in their hands, they will punish you whenever there is a chance. Nevertheless many persist in doing their job and doing it right, or to fulfill the calling.

Others, however, have changed their course, and instead of dealing with government and politics, they begin to write about corporations and their businesses. To do so is not only safe but profitable: when a business opens, journalists would be invited to the ceremony and given a big red envelop called hong bao, or red bag, with an unknown amount of money. The journalists are supposed to publish a story of the opening of the business. Compared with the other group of journalists, they apparently have lost much of the sense of the calling of an intellectual, at least temporarily.

To sum up the previous two sections, the distinction between humanistic and technical intellectuals was almost non-existent until the late nineteenth century. It is useful in identifying intellectuals' structural and professional locations but it has many limitations as to their social roles and political attitudes. As Gramsci says, we might achieve a better approximation of reality if we consider their class

relations. Our interviewees would agree with him there but they probably would also agree with Gouldner that there is indeed a distinction between humanistic and technical intellectuals though not without reservations. Gramsci agrees with Gouldner with reservations, too, although he does not believe it is the most important distinction, as we discussed in 2.0. My synthetic typology is therefore one of Gramsci and Gouldner, but I emphasize the political distinction and lean more towards Gramsci. The following sections elaborate this distinction by using historical evidence.

2.3 Organic Intellectuals

According to Weber, "Literati have been the bearers of progress toward a rational administration and of all 'intelligence.'...For more than two thousand years, the literati have definitely been the ruling stratum in China and they still are." (Gerth and Mills, p.416.) By "the ruling stratum," I assume Weber means that the intellectuals are officials or bureaucrats, the typical organic intellectuals in Gramsci's conception. By "bearers of progress and intelligence," I assume he means the political and cultural roles intellectuals play both as bureaucrats and as unattached and critical intellectuals. In his classification of intellectuals, Wen Chongyi identifies two kinds of traditional intellectuals: scholar-officials (shi huan) and the gentry (shen shi). (Wen in Zhongguo Luntan Bianwei Hui, pp.84-94) The

former are the bureaucrats or what we call organic intellectuals and the latter unattached and critical ones, or Gramsci's rural traditional intellectuals. While the former are easy to identify in every dynasty in every history book, some of the latter are recorded in such works as Biographies of Confucians (ru lin zhuan), Biographies of Literary Scholars (wen yuan zhuan), and Biographies of Floating Intellectuals (yin yi zhuan), with over 791 of the first from Han dynasty to Qing dynasty, 837 of the second, and 272 of the third. (ibid. p.91) We will now begin with the organic intellectuals.

Weber correctly points out that as a stratum of officials and aspirants to office, the Chinese literati "strove for princely service both as a source of income and as a normal field of activity" and submitted to the ruler. (Gerth and Mills, pp.420, 429, 444) Indeed, intellectuals have not only acquired cultural capital and distributed knowledge, but they have been the "executive officers" of kings and emperors in various dynasties as well, or their "deputies," as Gramsci would call them. These were the earliest bureaucrats, or the bureaucratized intellectuals.

The bureaucratic function of intellectuals is best embodied in Confucius, who was, first of all, the founder and teacher of Confucianism two thousand years ago, an entire system of ethical precepts for the proper management of society, and the major doctrine that has controlled the

Chinese society in its long history along with Taoism, Legalism, and Buddhism. However, he not only produced the ideology and distributed it but tried to apply it as well: he toured several states in his later years trying to convince the rulers to accept his way of government, i.e. government by gentlemen, or benevolent government.³ And he actually served in a bureaucratic position for some time as a senior official in the Kingdom of Chu. As Weber pointed out, later on anyone who wanted to be an official had to study his doctrines and pass examinations, and many did. In fact, whenever a new dynasty was established, the new emperor would always surround him or herself (mostly him) with scholar-officials.

Intellectuals also participated in establishment of dynasties. Confucians participated in the earliest peasant uprisings such as those of Chen Shen and Wu Guang in the Qin dynasty, Lulin Chimei uprising in late West Han, peasant uprisings in late Sui, and many of them became famous ministers of the new dynasties. (They may be organic to peasants in uprising at first, and organic to the ruling dynasty established by the former peasant uprisings later. Although their organicity seems tricky and needs to be further investigated, they were organic intellectuals nonetheless.) Some of these famous figures include Zhuge Liang (181-234) of

³ Many intellectuals did the same at the time. And it is Confucius who advised one of kings that the way to rule is to let the prince be prince and minister be minister and father father and son son. In other words, for a society to be stable, there have to be subordinates and superordinates.

late East Han and Wei Zhen (580-643) of early Tang. Wei for example was a Taoist monk when young but later joined peasant uprising. He ended up serving Taizong of the Tang dynasty as Jianyi Dafu, the advisor to the emperor whose major role is to criticize him and make suggestions. He became one of the most famous official-scholars in the Chinese history.

As the saying goes, one can win a new dynasty on the horse but cannot govern one on it. To govern a country, the rulers needed the intellectuals. There has been no exception in Chinese history. (See also Jin Yaoji, p.71) No dynasty could succeed without the support and participation of dedicated intellectuals. Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfen rightly pointed out that one reason that the Chinese civilization survived is that every time an old dynasty was destroyed and new one established, Confucian scholars helped reconstruct the society socially, politically and economically. (Jing Guantao and Liu Qinfeng, pp.173-5) The same process was repeated hundreds of times in the last several thousand years. Indeed, the polity (zheng tong) could not survive without the support of the (Confucian) ideology embodied and developed by intellectuals. (Tang Bo, pp.67-9; 72-4)

These bureaucrats then became part of the ruling class and they were then automatically organic intellectuals. The organic intellectuals may also include those who wrote to promote the imperial cause while waiting for a chance to

serve. A lot of them wrote while in office like Zen Guofan (1811-1872), a late Qin politician, general, and diplomat, who wrote volumes as an intellectual. As Weber commented, Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), the successor of Zeng, was proud of his calligraphy and of the fact that he could recite the classics by heart. (Gerth and Mills, p.437) Confucius was organic to the rulers in the Kingdom of Chi when he advised them how to rule and served as a bureaucrat. And he wrote the ruling ideology.

With the perfection of bureaucracy and political and ideological control mechanisms, the intellectuals did not have too much room to exercise their power of criticism since laws were established to prohibit them to talk politics even when they were only students. So when they became officials, they had already learned how to keep silent and had to keep silent when the emperors wanted them to. As a result, even though we had in each dynasty intellectuals who were not moved by wealth and intimidation, we also had intellectuals who learned how to flatter their superordinates in order to keep their positions and income. (Yan Buke, p.28) In other words, organic intellectuals can be either rebellious and critical, or simply obedient. They demonstrate a split personality between the desire to do the right thing and the need to be loyal to the kings and emperors when the two clashed. They could constantly be torn between their instinct to be independent and

autonomous as intellectuals and their dependence on and subordination to the ruling emperors.

Yan comments that shidafu (shi, literati, and dafu, officials,) or the scholar-official, is a combination of culture and administration, which resulted in a tension between Tao and Shi, the former meaning their conscience, and latter power. Their subordinate position to the king determined that they did not have the final say over matters of importance although they might have the full authority over their jurisdiction; but they were often critical of the kings and emperors. There were examples of ministers who committed suicide as a way of persuading their emperors to do what they thought was right. Confucius, too, was sympathetic to ordinary citizens when promoting education in addition to advising the kings.⁴

On the other hand, because of the split personality, organic intellectuals do demonstrate their calling by making efforts in political and economic reforms, and they even went some distance in their efforts. Chinese history is abound with such examples of organic intellectuals demonstrating the critical aspects of their being. The earliest example of organic intellectuals being critical may be Qu Yuan (ca.340-

⁴ One of Confucius's legacies is his doctrine and practice of educating any one regardless of his class origins, (not women though) which has become part of the popular beliefs in the Chinese culture.

278 B.C.), who, because of his criticism of the ruling class he served, was deposed and exiled, and finally committed suicide for not being able to fulfill his political ideals. In late Qing dynasty, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao launched the Wuxu Reform with the help of the emperor, although they too failed and escaped to Japan. There are numerous examples in Chinese feudal history of organic intellectuals being critical.

The reformer and critic role of the organic intellectuals is also demonstrated by intellectuals under the Communist rule. Again numerous examples can be found in the CCP history, from some of the earliest examples of Wang Shiwei in the Yanan era to some of the later examples of Hu Feng at the beginning of the People's Republic, to some of the Rightists in the 1950s, and the "capitalist roaders" such as Deng Tuo, Wu Han and Liao Mosha in the 1960s. Merle Goldman provided a very detailed picture of organic intellectuals under the CCP who are critical in her book China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent. The examples include "the Beijing Party Committee intellectuals (Deng, Wu and Liao), the propaganda department group (Zhou Yang, Tian Han, Xiao Yan, Mao Dun etc.), and the academic community (Jian Bozan, Wu Han, Fen Youlan, Zhou Guchen, Sun Yefang, etc.). (Goldman 1981, pp.18-60) Many of the current dissident intellectuals like Liu Bingyan and Wang Ruowang, too, used to be organic to the Party but are now

banished as enemies because they were critical of the Party policies.

This critical aspect of organic intellectuals is not accounted for in Gramsci, although our discussion in this section does prove his major theme of organic intellectuals. Also I argue that it is a category that existed ever since the earlier days when intellectuals came into being. I will now move to some of the historical evidence of unattached and critical intellectuals.

2.4 Unattached Intellectuals

Some Chinese literati, for example, just did not want to be officials: they wanted to be free floating and engage in their own studies of the world. Zhuang Zi (Chuang-tzu), another founder of Taoism, for example, would like to ponder on his philosophy and "did not wish to be 'harnessed' to an office but would rather exist 'like a [free] pig in a muddy ditch.'" (Weber 1964, p.179) Another story goes that the King of Chu sent two officials to invite Zhuang Zi to come to take the office of prime minister. Zhuang Zi was fishing at the time and did not even pay much attention to them except telling them that he would rather live like a live fish in a muddy ditch than a dead fish in a grand hall. (Zhang Hengshao, p.98) A third story goes that he "was offered a high post by the king of Chu but replied by asking whether it was wise to

be kept and fed like a pig and then be slaughtered and offered up on the sacrificial altar." (Lin Yutang, p.118) He was determined not to become an official but to live his life as a philosopher, a writer, and a political critic. To use Gramsci, he refused to be an organic intellectual, but would rather remain as an unattached and free cultural and political critic.

Yan Buke points out that the Chinese literati, or Shidafu have always played a double role, in the sense that besides those who became officials, there were also a group of intellectuals, or wenxu youshi (floating literary intellectuals) who devoted themselves to the "interpretation of ideology," instead of becoming officials, in either the Confucian, Taoist or Buddhist tradition. In the Warring Period (475-211 B.C.), the time of Confucius, the kings would consult these "floating" literati for the ways to govern their states. (Yan, p.28) The other kind of "floating" literati are called yinshi, or recluse. These are the Taoist scholars like Zhuang Zi who would just build themselves a hut in the mountain and read and write and enjoy their companies with woodcutters and herb-gatherers. This Taoist feeling may be expressed in the following poem:

I asked the boy beneath the pines.
He said, "The Master's gone alone
Herb-picking somewhere on the mount.
Cloud-hidden, whereabouts unknown.

(Lin, p.120)

The status prestige of this group of literati was so high that the Legalists such as Shang Yang and Han Fei in the Warring Periods even suggested that those who refused to become officials, or become organic intellectuals, to serve the country, should be beheaded. (Yan, p.29)

There goes also the great divide in philosophy: Confucianism that advocates active participation of political administration and Taoism that advocates freedom of will, unattached to any political force and do what one wants to do. The division has bred two kinds of scholars, the organic ones and unattached ones, the latter of which corresponds to Gramsci's traditional intellectuals. But the Confucian ideal of active participation in social and political activities also breeds another kind of intellectuals, the critical ones, as historical evidence also shows.

2.5 Critical Intellectuals

There were those who wanted to be involved in politics but not on the side of the rulers. This critical tradition of intellectuals is unaccounted for in Gramsci, but is analyzed in Gouldner, which we will discuss more in Chapter Four when we analyze the culture of critical discourse. In the Chinese tradition, Goldman points out, "Inherent in Confucianism was the obligation for any degree holder to speak out when the government deviated from Confucian ideals," although their

legal rights were not guaranteed but only justified ideologically. (Goldman 1981, p.3;) Derived from the belief, are the qing yi (pure opinion) movements that have run through the intellectual history. (ibid. pp.1-17) Hence there is "the tradition of the principled literati" that has up to this day. (Goldman 1994, pp.5-7) The intellectuals wanted the autonomy to criticize according to this Confucian tradition. One famous example is the case of the tangku, (danggu), or "party cases," in the years of A.D. 166-169 at the end of the Han Dynasty. Over three thousand leading scholars and university students launched a critical movement against the current politics, government policies, the conduct of members of the imperial household as well as the eunuchs and the Emperor. This movement was completely suppressed with two to three hundred scholars and sometimes their whole families being sentenced to death, exile or imprisonment. (Lin. p.50) This was the first largest intellectual protest movement in China and their critical tradition has been handed down to later generations.

Another famous intellectual critical movement originated in the Academies was Donglin Academy Movement, in which students, led by Gu Xianchen, a deposed scholar-official who founded the Academy in 1604, and later led by his disciples after this death, began to criticize corrupt officials in their regular gatherings with scholars from other places, changing their promise at the time of founding the Academy not to get involved in politics. They spoke against the

exploitation of government officials, for open criticism and reform and were hated by the ruling clique headed by an eunuch named Wei Zhongxian, who eventually cracked down on the Dong Ling intellectuals and the academies all over the country, between 1625 and 1626, with some intellectuals being executed and jailed, and academies being destroyed. An early Qing scholar named Chen Ding wrote twenty-four books of 120 Dong Ling intellectuals to commemorate their intellectual tradition and courage. (See also Goldman 1981, p.5)

The intellectuals' rebellion culminated in the emergence of national revolutionary intellectuals led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a medical professional, who turned political and revolutionary by adopting a more radical view than the constitutional reformist Kang and Liang at the late Qing dynasty. He believed that the Chinese cycle of division, disorder, unification, and despotism could be broken only by replacing the monarchy with a republic. He advocated a combination of nationalist revolution to overthrow the Manchu dynasty, a democratic revolution to establish a republic, and a social revolution to equalize land rights and prevent the ills of capitalism, or what is also known as san min zhuyi, three isms: nationalism, democracy, and socialism. He organized first the Revive China Society, and later his own party, the Chinese United League, together with Huang Hsing, a returned student from Japan and Sung Chiao-jen, a traditional intellectual. Their goal was to expel the Manchus,

restore the Chinese rule, establish a republic and equalize the land. They achieved the first two goals.

The critical history of Chinese intellectuals is also demonstrated in the May 4th movement (1915-21) shortly after the establishment of new schools and abolishment of the old examination system. For the first time, schooling and official positions were not directly related. One result is the birth of new intellectuals such as Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, both professors at Beijing University, who launched a cultural movement to advocate Westernization in terms of science and democracy and abolition of Confucianism. Indeed, they were borderline revolutionary. Chen actually started the CCP with Li Dazhao, the librarian of the University. They were joined by Mao, Zhou, Liu and Zhu and finally overthrew the Nationalist government and established the Communist regime in the name of workers and peasants. The revolutionary intellectuals are the critical intellectuals "gone extreme." There were critical intellectuals like Shi Zhecun, a literary scholar, during the civil war period, but they did not seem to have too much influence. Most intellectuals were busy engaging themselves in the pro-CCP vs. pro-KMT debate.

If we categorize Wang Shiwei, Deng Tuo, Liu Bingyan etc. as organic intellectuals turned critical, the new generation of post-Mao critical intellectuals may be the real unattached critical ones because they may not even be Party members. Chen

Ziming, Wang Juntao, Hu Ping, Liu Xiaobo etc. are typical of the generation. They are very critical of the CCP and its policies and very active in dissident activities. This is a whole generation of intellectuals who were mainly brought up "under the red flag," that is, under the Communist regime, have experienced the Cultural Revolution, and have found that the one Party rule is the root of all evil and are now pushing for democratic reforms. It is this generation together with the generation that was born during the Cultural Revolution (meaning having little or no organicity to the Party, the latter being so influenced by the West) that was the main force of the 1989 rebellion. They were of course greatly inspired by the critical spirit of the older generation that used to be the organic intellectuals but later turned critical such as Liu Bingyan, Wang Ruowang, and Fan Lizhi. (For a detailed description and analysis of the situation concerning the 1989 Movement, see Goldman Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China, 1994; Zhidong Hao, "May 4th and June 4th Compared: A Historico-Sociological Perspective" 1991)

In this section, I have tried to describe the historical tradition of critical intellectuals, those who were unattached and not organic to any dominant group. This is a very understudied group for they are often less influential in state decision making than the organic intellectuals who may hold the wheel of history and less famous than the organic intellectuals who become critical and are later deposed. But

they are very subversive and are one of the categories of intellectuals that the ruling class is very watchful of. Again, the critical tradition is not accounted for in Gramsci but may be accounted for in the intellectuals's culture of critical discourse explicated by Gouldner, which we will analyze in Chapter Four.

2.6 Political Intellectuals: the Contemporary Bureaucratic Ruling Class

I will now examine what has become of the political revolutionary intellectuals. Who are the people that have governed China after the victory of the revolution, then, when the old power structure of the ruling family of the court or the warlords versus other classes had been toppled? They are the Party. Who is the Party, then? Again, Gramsci has an answer. "The political party for some social groups is nothing other than their specific way of elaborating their own category of organic intellectuals directly in the political and philosophical field and not just in the field of productive technique." (Gramsci, p.15) The party's function is to elaborate its own component parts and turn them into qualified political intellectuals, leaders and organizers. (ibid. pp.15-16) The party is then dominated by political intellectuals, or organic intellectuals in the capacity of leaders and organizers. That is the CCP.

After the revolution, the royal court, the warlords, and the capitalist class were all overthrown. Although the workers and peasants were supposed to be the masters of the country, the "social group" the Party was supposed to serve, like the bourgeois intellectuals serving the bourgeoisie, it was in fact the Communist revolutionary intellectuals, or the bureaucratic ruling class, the most radical of the former critical intellectuals, that controlled the country and that elaborated its own organic intellectuals and were served by them. The bureaucratic ruling class is the highest level of the Party and is composed of revolutionary intellectuals. Who are these revolutionary intellectuals, and what are their roles in governing the country, then?

These intellectuals are, in fact, of a different composition, or again there is a Party hierarchy. The top leading Party cadres used to be old traditional/humanistic intellectuals who later became political/revolutionary intellectuals and led the wars against the KMT and/or the Japanese: three civil wars and one war against Japan, people like Mao, Liu, Zhou and Deng. The former two were traditional humanistic intellectuals and the latter two returned students from France. They had certain amount of cultural capital and many revolutionary credentials and always made claims like "We fought for this land; therefore, only we have the legitimate right to rule." Now most of them either died or have retired, but some still exert power in one way or another. People who

are nicknamed the "Gang of the Old" headed by Deng, Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, and others belong to this group. They were recruited from urban and country intellectuals but later on became political/revolutionary intellectuals.

Once they become political intellectuals, they have lost much of their CCD even though they still have some cultural capital. For example, they know that economic reform is inevitable for the survival of the CCP but favor only some limited change in political institutions because they are afraid of losing their own political power. They challenge authorities but they would not allow others to challenge themselves. A case in point is Chen Yun, one of the gang of the old, who fervently upholds the four cardinal principles yet ironically encourages the municipal officials of Shanghai not to always obey their authorities, or to do what the books tell them to do, but always seek truth from practice, compare, exchange opinions with others and try again and again to find the best way to accomplish socialism. Basically, they have lost most of their CCD despite the fact they still retain some of the characteristics of intellectuals.

The other group of political intellectuals are recruited from technical yet organic intelligentsia, i.e. organic to the CCP and the old guard, like Li Peng, the Premier who was one of the chief culprits for the 1989 massacre, and Jiang Zeming, who was substituted for Zhao as the Party chief. From the

provincial level down, the leading bureaucratic positions have also been taken by mainly organic technical intelligentsia. These technical intelligentsia have to obey the "Gang of the Old," who are in the advisory committees, partly because they were promoted by these old guys early on, and when they were promoted, they demonstrated qualities that would satisfy the octogenerians, such as obedience to them. When the old ones become dissatisfied with the new ones, they can always kick them out of office. With their advanced ages, though, they have less and less ability to do so and their successors have to struggle for their own lives. These newly recruited political intellectuals in turn elaborate their own organic intellectuals. He Xin, who wrote essays to defend the June 4th massacre, was certainly one of those organic intellectuals they recruited.

We should note that the political intellectuals are the professional revolutionaries in Lenin's terms, the full timers, or the first class elite in Gouldner's terms. They can also be called political managers. As Gouldner further points out, "The machinery of the Vanguard is always in the hands of the full-time functionaries, who are persons to whom politics comes before the intellectual life." (Gouldner, p.79) I would consider those who do part time political management and part time intellectual work as part timers who tend to have more CCD left.

Before we consider the political intellectuals' roles in governing the country, we have to first clarify their relationship with the workers and peasants, because they claim that it is the working class that is the ruling class. First, the political intellectuals have been embodied in the form of the Vanguard, or a series of Party hierarchies from the lowest to the highest levels of power. Statistically speaking, however, the majority of the Party members have been workers and peasants. For example, even though a striking number of intellectuals were recruited in the ten years of reform before 1989, they constituted only somewhere from 15 to 36.3% of the new recruitment in several provinces which were considered to have done the best job. (Saich, p.213) At the grassroots levels in the countryside, for example, the leadership is in the hands of more "intellectual" people, or people with relatively more schooling, for the intellectuals generally do not live in the countryside. Several years ago, the Party secretary in the village where I was born was a high school graduate from the county school where I graduated.

But numbers do not always count. Whose voice gets heard in the Party, and who decides the Party policies? Not the workers, peasants, or soldiers. It is the political intellectuals of the party and the organic intellectuals it has produced who have all along decided the state and provincial policies, as both Gouldner and Gramsci point out in their analysis. As Bourdieu's concept of imposition and

misappropriation state, those who have less or no socially recognized means of opinion production will inevitably have others impose their views on them and have their views misappropriated. (Bourdieu 1984, pp.398-9, 417-22, 426-31) So as Gartman says, "Workers have so thoroughly internalized their own domination that they must rely on the symbolic tools supplied externally by bourgeois [in our case 'proletarian' called by the CCP but which means actually 'political'] intellectuals to organize and express their interests." (Gartman, p.439.) Whether they really represent the workers is another issue. To use Weber's words, "it was not the dictatorship of the proletariat but that of the official was on the march." (Quoted by Gouldner, p.96)

As for the relationship between the peasants and intellectuals, Gramsci says well,

One can understand nothing of the collective life of the peasantry and of the germs and ferments of development which exist within it, if one does not take into consideration and examine concretely and in depth this effective subordination to the intellectuals. Every organic development of the peasant masses, up to a certain point, is linked to and depends on movements among the intellectuals. (Gramsci, pp.14-5)

This is especially true with the relationship between the Chinese intellectuals, especially the political ones, and peasants.

Therefore, the roles of the political intellectuals are 1) control the means of production; 2) monopolize the use of violence; 3) monopolize the production of ideology; and 4) discipline the unattached and critical humanistic and technical intellectuals, as Lenin intended it to do with his Vanguard party. (Aronowitz, 1990, p.21; Gouldner, p.79) The CCP has always been loyal to Leninism, and therefore it has stuck closely to the centralism he advocated, meaning suppression of the freedom of speech not only in the party but in the whole society.

The political and revolutionary intellectuals have become the bureaucratic ruling class by first becoming organic intellectuals. Our three way classification of organic, critical and unattached intellectuals is imperfect because it has difficulty explaining political intellectuals in power. We can only say that some of them at some times are the bureaucratic ruling class but other times are organic intellectuals. On the whole, they are at the periphery of the intellectual class, as organic intellectuals are. Only that they are even farther away from the intellectual class than other organic intellectuals and sometimes may be even the opposite of it as Mao, Zhou and Deng were in the Anti-Rightist Movement and the Cultural Revolution. Gramsci did not seem to have conceived the political intellectuals as a "social group" that might be just like the bourgeoisie and would elaborate its own organic intellectuals. The bureaucratic ruling class

is now challenged by the new bourgeoisie, and may later be challenged by the intellectual class if and when it is formed.

2.7 Universities, Academies and Associations

Historically, education of intellectuals in the Confucian doctrine used to be the priority of not only the feudal rulers but ordinary citizens as well since education was the only way to train administrators for the government and it was the only way for ordinary people (not necessarily the rich) to ascend on the social ladder. Confucius of the Warring Period (475 B.C. - 221 B.C.) ran private schools and claimed to have 3,000 students. In the East Han period (25-220), a private school would produce even more students. Cai Xuan, for example, had taught 16,000 students. Public education became very prosperous, too. In the West Han period (206 B.C - A.D. 25), when every other learning was banned except Confucianism, the central government had central universities, while local government had their local schools.

Boshi, or Ph.D. students at the time, numbered 3,000 during the period of Emperor Wen (179 B.C.-156 B.C.), and at the time of Emperor Shun (126-144) East Han Dynasty, the national school had a student body of 30,000. There were 1,500 classrooms in 240 buildings. Women, too, went to college. Some of the famous women writers were educated at the time such as Cai Wenji, Cao Dajia in addition to men of letters such Jia

Yi, Sima Xiangru as well as the historians Sima Tan and Sima Qian (father and son), Ban Biao and Ban Gu (father and son). (See Yan Qingshi in Zhou Yanshan ed. 1980, p.248) Dong Zhongshu established his place in history as one of the several co-founders of Confucianism for his contribution to its doctrines, one of which is "king governs minister, father governs son, and husband governs wife."

Universities provided a community for the intellectuals, and prompted by the calling, they began to criticize the government. Thus occurred the famous "party cases" we mentioned before, in which thousands of college students staged protests and many were killed, imprisoned and exiled. But since the examination system was established, from Sui Dynasty (581-618) to the Qing Dynasty in the end of the 19th century in a period of 1,300 years, to select government officials according to their ability in understanding and applying the Confucian classics, the intellectual tradition was handed down to later generations. This trend can be seen in some of the later intellectual movements originated in shu yuan, or Academies, private institutions that became popular since the tenth century. Intellectuals again gathered to discuss politics and develop curricula that would be different from that of the government schools. Schools were so thriving that in two hundred years between 1400 and 1600 the number of students having passed local examinations increased to 600,000 from 30,000. (Wakeman in Zhou Yangshan ed. 1980, p.276)

Scholar protest was also in place such as the case of Donglin Academy we mentioned earlier.

With the "calling" and these earlier intellectual movements in mind, it is not difficult to understand the later movements including the Hundred Day Reform led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, the May 4th Movement, the Communist Movement and the Spring 1989 movement. We should note, however, that in addition to universities as a community where intellectuals gather and organize their movements, there have also been associations and even political parties of intellectuals developed later on that played a key role in fomenting political movements.

It is a Confucian teaching that jun zi gun er bu dong, or "gentlemen gather together but don't form a party (for their own private ends.)" They make friends by reading each other's essays and come together to help each other develop virtues, i.e. yi wen hui you, yi you fu ren. Thus, in general, political associations and parties should be avoided because intellectuals should stay neutral and objective in political conflict and their job was to promote virtues in society and in government. As one of the ancient classics, Shang Shu, upholds, wu pian wu dang, wang dao dang dang; wu dang wu pian, wang dao ping ping, meaning when there are no parties and no prejudices, the Way will have its day. (See also Wakeman in Zhou Yangshan ed. 1980, p.279)

In addition to these Confucian values, there were some practical concerns that prevented intellectuals from forming a party. Li Shuqing from Taiwan proposes two more reasons why there were no organized political parties but only some kind of "associations (tuan ti).\" One is that intellectuals did not have their own military prowess and the other is that emperors would crack down on any intellectual parties as soon as they were formed because they knew intellectuals had the potential of rebellion just like the military leaders who helped form the dynasty, two groups closely watched by emperors. (Li Shuqing in Zhou Yangshan ed. 1980, pp.11-13) However, what Li said is true only of intellectuals before the end of the Qing dynasty. It was impossible for intellectuals not to get involved in politics as our examples have shown: history has witnessed universities and academies providing meeting places for intellectual movements. Organized intellectual parties with a political agenda did occur in the late Qing Dynasty.

For fear of political unrest, the early Qing rulers (1652) had special proclamation barring intellectuals from gathering and talking about politics. Academies were rebuilt but they lost their original vigor. Still, in the 19th century, the academies numbered about 4,500 and various associations began to emerge. Different associations had different purposes, but they generally include the following: how to strengthen the country against foreign aggression, constitutional reform, restoring the Chinese right to

railroads and mines, study of classics for practical purposes, religious studies, study of science and translation of foreign works, against footbinding and opium, peasant studies, educational studies, etc. From 1895 to 1911, about 300 associations were established in Beijing as well as other cities in various provinces. Their catchphrase is kai feng qi, kai zhi shi, he da gun, meaning abolish such social practices as footbinding and opium smoking, study new knowledge (mainly from the West), and unite all to strengthen the country. (Wakeman in Zhou Yanshan ed. 1980, pp.296-310)

Out of these associations emerged the leaders of the Wu Xu Reform, the Constitution Reform, and of course, the Xin Hai Revolution, i.e. the Nationalist Revolution, which are all intellectual movements. Out of the 48 leaders of the Wu Xu Reform, 28 were jin shi, the highest degree one could get after passing the royal examinations (the one who took the first place was given the title zhuang yuan) eight were ju ren, (those having passed the provincial examinations and ready for the royal examinations), and five were either gong shen or shen yuan, (those having passed the local examinations but not the provincial ones yet.) In the government agencies established for Constitutional Reform, most officials were from the gentry with one of those titles, and some even had foreign education. Tong Men Association, the bastion of the Xin Hai Revolution, which was established in 1905 and developed a membership from 70 in the first year, 6,000 in the

second, and 20,000 in the year of the revolution, 1911, was mainly constituted by intellectuals, with its leaders mainly educated in Japan. (Zhang Pengyuan in Zhou Yangshan ed. 1980, pp.331-2)

With the May 4th Movement, another intellectual movement but led by mainly intellectuals educated in Japan, Europe and America, two political parties developed: KMT and CCP. The more radical of the movement like Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao established the CCP and the liberals joined KMT, a political party developed later by Sun Yensan on the basis of Tong Men Association. These are the political parties that have actually functioned as political agents to overthrow first a feudal dynasty and later one another. Once intellectuals were in power, as in both the Xin Hai Revolution establishing the later KMT regime and the Communist Revolution establishing the CCP regime, were they still intellectuals? Were they a class? It is probably appropriate now for us to turn to the question of class formation.

2.8 Conclusion

Based on historical and ethnographic evidence, and using Gramsci's conception of intellectuals as my theoretical guideline, I have in this chapter discussed humanistic and technical intellectuals as a typology, its strengths being a useful tool in identifying easily the structural locations of

intellectuals, and its weaknesses being that it does not really explain the political roles and attitudes of them. Therefore, in light of Gramsci's discussion of organic and traditional intellectuals, I have developed another ideal type of organic, critical and unattached intellectuals based on their political orientations. This typology seems best able to explain the political reality of intellectuals but it casts intellectuals in very diverse political groups, which makes one wonder whether intellectuals can really be a class. But before we address this question in Chapter Four, I will examine in Chapter Three, the next chapter, what has happened in the last five years to humanistic, technical, organic, critical and unattached intellectuals so as to better assess their current class situation.

Chapter Three

"Surviving in the Crack" Between Totalitarianism and Market Economy: What Has Happened in the Past Five Years

3.0 Introduction: Political and Social Conditions Before the June 4th Movement

After the discussion of the historical conditions of Chinese intellectuals in their various roles, one wonders whether the political events in 1989 and the past five years of market economic reform has made any difference and whether our typology still holds, and whether there are more signs of class formation or less. I will now address these questions by relying on the evidence I obtained from my interpretive research in Shanghai and the limited survey I did with the help of my Shanghai colleagues as well as material from some secondary resources.

Several years after the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, the intellectuals that were wronged in the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated and the Party was now saying that they were part of the working class. Record number of intellectuals, mainly technical ones, had been promoted to bureaucratic positions in universities, research institutes, hospitals and industrial enterprises. (See Simon in Goldman 1987, pp.141-2) Beginning from 1982, scientists and technical personnel were allowed to get employment as advisors or teachers in work units in scientific research, teaching,

public health, and industrial and agricultural production, mostly on a part time or even basis or for a fee. (Simon in Goldman 1987, p.142; Shaw 1986, p.222) Meanwhile, an economic privatization process had begun. The intellectuals had even been allowed to leave their work unit and start their own private businesses if they so wished and had the capability. At the same time, they were allowed to commercialize their scientific and technological knowledge and expertise in various other ways including selling patents or providing consulting services for a full fee instead of having some of it appropriated by the working unit.

Furthermore, beginning from 1977, the higher education entrance examination were restored and graduate programs established in various universities. Degrees such as BA, MA, and even Ph.D. were awarded and all professionals outside or inside universities had acquired formal titles such as physician, engineers, professors, researchers, technicians, etc. A new system of education and credentialing had been established. (See also Shaw 1986, p.219) Upon graduation, students were beginning to have a choice as to where to go to work, public sector, private sector, or joint ventures, instead of being allocated a job in a place where they might not want to go.

Their status, however, was not much more than subordination to the Party since majority of them still

believed in the Party's right to rule and thanked the Party for rehabilitating them and for no longer considering them as bourgeoisie. They became worker scientists or peasant technicians at best, and continued to subject themselves to the Party authority. They had not become an independent political force. What has happened in the past five years, however, changed their status dramatically though not enough to grant them a class status.

The spring 1989 movement of democracy ended with the June 4 massacre, which completely shattered intellectuals' fantasy of having been liberated and rehabilitated by the Party. They were once again put into red terror: those who were active in the movement were either put into prison or made to undergo numerous self-criticism like they had to in the past; those who were not active still had to write a thorough report on what they had done in those days. They suddenly realized that after all the Party had not really changed: it still wanted to deal with different political opinions with an iron hand. What happened in June 1989 has made the intellectuals really think about their relationship with the Party and the state, and they are beginning to develop a self-consciousness, embarking on the way to becoming an independent force. The contemporary evidence of Chinese intellectuals as a class is based on my research of how different kinds of intellectuals have fared in the past five years and how universities as the training

ground of intellectuals have changed. To echo last chapter, I will begin with the organic intellectuals.

3.1 Many Opportunities for Organic Intellectuals

In contrast with the political repression (which we will discuss later in the chapter) is the rapid transformation to market economy, which provides a chance for intellectuals to excel in areas other than democratic politics. The economic modernization drive started in 1992 has given such an impetus to intellectuals that many have rushed to find a chance to make some money, and some have gotten rich. If the policies concerning intellectuals doing business were still a little restrictive before 1989, as we discussed earlier, the policies now are "anything goes." The calling that cannot be fulfilled in political reform may now be fulfilled by becoming a bureaucrat or a businessman, as many of them do.

3.1.1 Bureaucrats and Some Social and Natural Scientists

As I mentioned in 3.0, a record number of intellectuals had already been recruited into bureaucratic positions before 1989. Despite some setbacks of some critical intellectuals being deposed from their positions in the aftermath of June 4th, the trend of the bureaucratization of intellectuals has continued, as long as the newly bureaucratized intellectuals pledge allegiance to the Party. It is almost impossible for

someone without a college education to be promoted to important government or corporation positions. This bureaucratic elite is governing the country now, and we must see that they are answering the calling even though they may be at the same time serving the Party. Any serious concern of political interests has to include their interests albeit their non-critical appearance.

Another group of organic intellectuals are the social scientists that work closely with the government, both state and local, functioning as their think tank. This is what one of my interviewees, Professor Xiao, calls guo ce pai, "state policy intellectuals." The state policy intellectuals get funding from the state and do research concerning economic and social policies. Hu Angang, for example, together with an overseas Chinese student, wrote about the consequences of state's weakened ability to collect taxes and increased local independent economic power. Their theories were given important consideration in the state's economic policy making. Hu gets more than enough money, several hundred thousand yuan, from the state to carry on his studies. (See also Xiao in Asia Weekly) Prof. Xiao himself is one of the theorists on authoritarianism, favoring a strong government and more control for fear that the country in the transition from traditional to modern may be thrown into turmoil if the government loses its authority by giving individuals too much freedom because of freedom's negative consequences such as

corruption and excessive consumerism. (See Xiao in Strategy and Management, pp.8-11) Economists are often invited to offer suggestions on economic policies.

One of my interviewees, Prof. Wu of sociology from East China Normal University, had been actively involved in the development of Pudong, including devising social welfare programs concerning elder people and writing textbooks on a pioneer course on social work. In 1994, as Vice President of the Chinese Sociological Association, he organized its annual conference in Pudong funded by the Pudong Development Bureau, a city government agency, of course, on the condition that the only theme of the conference was social and economic development in Pudong. His life story tells us vividly that intellectuals like him, i.e. organic intellectuals in our terminology, have done very well not only in academics but also in their personal lives. Here is what he told me in our interview:

After the Cultural Revolution, the change in intellectuals is enormous: they have higher prestige now. I am a senior intellectual, went to college in 1950 and graduated in 1954. I have experienced all the political movements after Liberation. The last ten years is a period I have felt the most happiness and satisfaction. I became a lecturer in 1960 and then the promotion system was stopped and not until 1980 did I become an Associate Professor, and in 1986 I became a full professor.... During the Cultural Revolution, I wrote articles but was not recognized: workers signed the articles as if they were theirs. Now in the past ten years, I have written over a hundred articles and won numerous rewards. I have also served in many administrative functions such as Provost of the University, Director of the National Political Education Committee, and now still the Vice

President of the Chinese Sociological Association. All these say something about the status and prestige of intellectuals.

In terms of income, I earned only 60 yuan when I graduated although 60 was already a lot at that time. But my wife and I had to support three children and parents of both of us, and the money did not seem much. We lived a very modest life, with children wearing patched clothes, not even cotton padded coat in winter. Now my salary level is higher than even a young minister in a government ministry, though I can't compare with rich businessmen. I get various kinds of bonuses, both state and local and from the university. Grey incomes from serving in various committees are about the same as what I earn here at the university. I pay only 40 yuan, or about one fiftieths of my income as rent for a three bedroom apartment. Plus I have free medial care: with a plastic card I can go to any hospital in Shanghai. It is the benefit of a higher state official. With all the cost of electricity, rent, house helper, board, I still live a comfortable life. And the status of intellectuals is still being improved in all these ways.

The state also has researchers creating the official ideology, and they are funded adequately. There is one local foundation in Shanghai that always has more money than applications. That is "The Foundation for Marxist Academic Works," sponsored by the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, with an annual funding capability of 200,000 yuan. The money is never used up. For another example, I visited the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, which has an Institute of Deng Xiaoping Thoughts. The researchers are not only adequately funded, with its members earning a monthly salary of two thousand yuan, double that of a professor in college, but they are well equipped with big desks, leather sofas, and much more space than other researchers who have to crowd themselves into small rooms filled with smaller desks and dilapidated chairs.

These people produce the official ideology to legitimate the current political, economic and social policies. The studies of Deng Xiaoping thoughts are one of the biggest state industries: in the past ten years, about thirty kinds of Deng's selections of works have been published with copies totaling over one hundred million. The third volume of Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping has been released of 24,000,000 copies. Books on studies of Deng's thoughts on politics, economy, philosophy, science and technology, education, law, etc. have numbered over three hundred kinds. (WJ, Dec.4, 1994)

Some scientists are doing quite well, too, in terms of their research. Prof. Wang from ECNU, for example, got money from the State Education Commission (50,000 yuan), the Chinese Academy of Sciences (20,000 yuan), the State Commission on Family Planning (20,000 yuan), and industrial corporations (40,000 yuan) to not only continue some other projects but renovate his labs. He was also able to pull other resources together for his projects by cooperating with other research institutes. Furthermore, he developed what he found in basic research and made commercial products such as a candy using Chinese herbal medicine to prevent coughs and a kind of cosmetics to resist the aging of the skin. Both have been great hits in China.

The above intellectuals, despite their organic nature, feel that they are doing important service for the country. Prof. Xiao, for example, believe the state policy intellectuals, (i.e. those engaging in the studies of Deng Xiaoping included,) are an important bridge between the government and intellectuals, while the other intellectuals are either too academic, romantic or idealistic.

3.1.2 Bourgeoisified Intellectuals

Along with the bureaucratized intellectuals who relish in power and some academically organic intellectuals to the ruling class, the other group of most thriving intellectuals is composed of those who cash in on their technological skills. On March 9, 1992, three technical intellectuals were given a reward of several hundred thousand yuan each and an Audi car for their technical and scientific contributions to the development of Zhuhai City, Guangdong (Canton) Province, the highest cash reward ever given to intellectuals. The recipients said that they had never dreamed this and they were the luckiest among the Chinese intellectuals. "The time has come for thousands upon thousands of Chinese intellectuals and technical personnel to develop their full potential," they said while surrounded by reporters and news camera men. The epic event started a chain of reaction all over the country. In the next month, technical intellectuals from around the country flooded Zhuhai's factories and corporations with

application letters for positions; other provinces and municipalities like Sichuan, Liaoning, Hunan, Jiangsu, Shandong, Anhui, Tianjin, etc. followed Zhuhai's suit and rewarded their technical intellectuals, who had made important contributions in invention of technology that brought in profits to enterprises, with phenomenal amount of cash and even cars. (Liu Zeming et al, pp.140-4)

These events signified not only a change in roles of intellectuals but a change in the intellectual ideology. Confucianism values learning more than anything else, i.e. wan ban jie xia pin, wei you du shu gao, and gentlemen treasure righteousness, not money, i.e. jun zi yan yi bu yan li. But now it seems that to be a millionaire is glorious. Yes, to excel in science and technology and be rewarded for it. What's wrong with that? To excel in their work is an act of righteousness and it is to fulfill a calling, to li gong, or create deeds. Qian Weichang, the former President of the Industrial Institute of Shanghai and now President of Shanghai University, said to a professor who privately and secretly helped a township to develop new products, secretly for fear that he would be scolded, "This is a great thing you've done. You should have done it openly. I would applaud your efforts with all my heart." Song Jian, the Director of the State Commission on Science and Technology, said that scientific and technical entrepreneurs who made great contributions should

have the same glorious honors of members of Academia Sinica.
(See Liu Zeming, et al., pp.205, 211)

Humanistic intellectuals cannot resist the temptation, either. They find their own ways of doing business, as the saying goes, yu you yu lu, xia you xia dao, i.e. "Fish have a way, but shrimps have theirs, too." Some started their own businesses. Hu Wanchun, a "worker writer," who had a very important position in the Writers' Association in Shanghai, first started two bookstores, and now he is doing exporting business with Vietnam. A historian originated a recreation center of Chinese food culture and became a millionaire. Beijing school teachers changed schools into hotels in summer and winter when students were on vocation and not using the classrooms. Majority of the humanistic intellectuals, however, make money by using their skills. They have commenced classes preparing high school students for college examinations, teaching how to "play stocks:" when there is a need, there is a class. Movie directors and actors and actresses initiated movie companies and cultural enterprises. Law professors have launched their own consulting firms. (See also Liu Zeming et al., pp.225-51)

What about writers? They have begun to write popular novels: detective stories, love stories, stories made out of social news. When some Hong Kong writers became popular for their gongfu novels, publishers hire Mainland writers to

imitate them and write their own stories. Then they publish them in the name of these popular writers. I interviewed a Shanghai writer who wrote gongfu novels for a Hong Kong publishing house in the name of a certain Hong Kong author. He got about HK\$4,500, about US\$500 for 100,000 words. By doing this he got no fame, and only money. Humanistic intellectuals also write advertisements for corporations, speeches for corporation heads, and articles introducing commercial products. Newspapers and magazines cooperate with industrial enterprises and publish articles praising them and their products. We mentioned earlier that journalists are often invited to opening ceremonies and given a red envelop of money for the future articles they will write about these businesses. The new genres of "enterprise literature" and "advertisement literature" have emerged. Some writers begin their own publishing houses or start their own magazines. (See also Liu Zeming et al., pp.242-50)

Therefore, the market economy seems to have brought forth unprecedented opportunities in the business world for some intellectuals. As one of the most renowned movie directors, Xie Jin said, after he started his own movie company and became the manager of it, "Today is a historical day for me. I have been dreaming of this day for forty years." (Liu Zeming et al. p.239) These opportunities make it possible for them to say, "Now I have done some deeds, and I am rewarded. I am satisfied." This feeling may be typical of organic

intellectuals in the form of businessmen, whether they are in fact journalists, writers, or lawyers and doctors. However, not everybody has the opportunity, the ability and the interest to do the same deeds. What about them? I will now turn to the unattached intellectuals.

3.2 Few Opportunities for Unattached Intellectuals and Alienation

The unattached intellectuals are those who are not bureaucrats, not doing research or writing papers promoting the Party's course, and not plunging into the commercial "sea" for one reason or another. The important point is that they are the majority. This is the majority of intellectuals I interviewed in Shanghai, and their status is characterized by alienation.

3.2.1. The Funding System Creating Alienation

Overall, it is difficult for intellectuals to get money to do research they are personally interested in, social or scientific and technological. For example, according the Prof. Xue of higher education administration from ECNU, the state funds 100 key labs in the whole country with each receiving one million yuan a year or about US \$125,000. There is only one key lab in ECNU, which is the Research Lab of River Mouths and Sea Shores. (The lab is also one of the five national key specialties in ECNU, others being basic mathematics,

statistics, basic theory of education, and the history of education.)

This means that most research labs have to depend on either limited funding from the state or on their own sources. The state does fund universities like ECNU, but as Prof. Fang of Chemistry, the former Provost of ECNU, commented, the state fund does not seem enough. For example, the state funding for research equipment in the 1980's was 1,800,000 yuan but now it is only 1,200,000 yuan while ECNU has expanded from 13 departments to 25 with 48 specialties. This money does not even seem to be enough for the maintenance of equipment, let alone for new projects.

Therefore, to do scientific research, most researchers depend mainly on three kinds of funding sources: the National Science Foundation, the City research funding, and funding from industrial corporations. The NSF money is not only small in amount, 30,000 yuan (or 4,000 US dollars for three years per person at most) but it is administered by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (the Academia Sinica) and if one institution does not have a member of Academia Sinica to advocate its course, it is very unlikely for its professors to get funding from it. ECNU, for example, did not have one single member of Academia Sinica at the time of this research in 1994.

The city money generally goes to projects that are initiated by the city's own research institutes with the head of the government agency as the principal researcher, because the agency boss wants to have some research credentials for his or her promotion. When asked about their immediate concerns, Prof. Xu of environmental science said that his problem was that he could not find money to do his projects even though he had plenty of qualifications, having presided over a dozen projects and been trained in the West for two years. The city does not want its money to flow into other people's pockets except one of their own attached institutes, i.e. fei shui bu liu wai ren tian, or "our rich water does not flow into other people's fields."

As for support from industrial corporations, he commented that there are fewer projects, or what they call "horizontal projects," from industrial sectors now since corporations tend not to concern themselves with long term goals of environmental protection. As a result, they have to take on some engineering projects which are neither the frontier of scientific research nor their specialties. But they have to do so to keep afloat. As Lecturer Bai of the Instrumental Analysis Lab also commented, "horizontal projects" are done sometimes mainly for money and are therefore not always to their liking.

The chances of getting research money are very slim indeed for most researchers. As a result, they do not have money to support graduate students and therefore cannot take students and they do not have the money even for travelling to attend academic conferences. You cannot do anything even if you have wonderful proposals, or you have to stop in the middle of a project for the lack of money. Prof. Wang of cytobiology, for example, used the Chinese NSF money to start a project on cyto-sociology: the impact of non-cardiac muscle cells on cardiac muscle cells, but he could not continue the project because he did not have 50,000 yuan (about \$6,000) to buy a certain piece of equipment.

Younger people have more difficulty getting funded. Dr. Qian said that she applied to a foundation funding young scholars called qi ming xing, or Venus, the star that shines in the morning to indicate the beginning of the day. She was even supported by a member of Academia Sinica because of the originality and importance of the project, but since she graduated only three years ago, and there was no one in the committee from her university to speak for her, even if she had the brightest idea, she could not get it materialized.

If the full time researchers cannot generate funds to do projects, their positions will be eliminated and they will either have to be transferred to teaching jobs or get employment elsewhere. In fact, each research position that has

been allocated to the department will have to make enough money to pay three thousand yuan to the school, quite an excessive burden to them. When a research person is abroad, those who remain will have to pay for the person for his or her position. (This may not be the case with other universities.) That's one of the reasons why they hold grudges against those who don't return. The researchers themselves have to think of their own survival all the time.

It is true that sometimes they may get money from outside sources like the World Bank, but generally speaking, we did not find much collaborative research between Chinese and foreign scientists in China although we do see social scientists benefiting from collaborative work with foreign colleagues who usually brought research fund with them like our project on intellectuals. Prof. Xue of education told us also that they had had collaborative research with some British and Japanese researchers on subjects like evaluation of higher education, and the coordination of industrial organization, universities, and research institutes. In our survey, 48% of the respondents say that they would like to engage in collaborative projects with foreign institutions and 20% say they would like to do state projects. Forty-three percent of them say that they choose to do this kind of project because of ensured funding and 20% say it is because they can produce in these projects.

The funding for social science research and humanities is even more scarce than that for sciences. The funding sources are about the same as for the natural sciences but the money is far less. Prof. Wu, who was on the national committee of evaluation of social science funding applications, said that vertically there are three foundations that support research with 10,000 to 100,000 yuan for each applicant but only about 20% of the applicants eventually get funded. Eighty percent failed mainly because of the lack of enough foundation money not because they did not meet the standards. There are horizontal funds, too, like for natural sciences, but the chances of getting funded are about as few.

Like the situation of natural sciences, social scientists get funded when their research is related to the goals of interest groups or agencies, whether they are corporations or government branches. Anything short of that would be very difficult. Lecturer Li of literary criticism has written books on the study of Mao Zedong and reevaluation of The Dream of Red Chamber, an ancient classic, but first he could not get any funding writing the books and second he cannot get his books published. Someone promised to help him contact some Hong Kong publishers but the promise was not fulfilled. At the time of interview, he was still seeking chances of publishing. Prof. Deng of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the most popular and well-known social scientist in Shanghai, commented that it is very difficult to get academic works

published. While I was interviewing him, somebody came and asked him to help with the publication of books. He said that he was confronted with the issue almost daily. He told me that one of his teachers in his eighties had difficulty publishing works of a lifetime and probably would not be able to see his books published while alive. He felt guilty about not being able to help.

For those who are not doing corporation or government research, one way is to seek corporations that are willing to fund. Magazines, for example, may be funded by corporations which request that they have control in part of their contents or the magazines carry their ads. Another way is to seek foreign funding, as I mentioned earlier. Prof. Xiao of History told me that The Journal of Social Sciences was partly funded by a Hong Kong corporation, Modernity and Tradition funded by Huo Yingdong, a big Hong Kong capitalist, Life Weekly funded by Zheng Da Corporation. These journals carried their advertisements but critical and cultural intellectuals also had a place to put in their own articles. The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences had done several research projects with foreign researchers including the CUNY-Shanghai project, being funded by foreign foundations and on politically less sensitive topics ranging from life qualities in Shanghai to functions of professionals.

To sum up, the funding opportunities tell us the dilemma faced by intellectuals. Since funding opportunities depend a lot on whether one or one's project is organic either to businesses or government agencies, if one does not have interest in doing corporation or government research and cannot find money through normal application of state and local non-government foundations, he or she has to either give up research, do it at one's own expense like Lecturer Li, or seek foreign fund, which also puts one into a limited role playing.

3.2.2 Promotion, Housing and Income Systems Creating More Alienation

More alienation and independent consciousness are created in intellectuals' struggle in promotion, housing and income. Under the planned economy, there is a connection between one's titles, income and housing. A senior professor, for example, can have a monthly income of over 1,000 yuan and a three bedroom apartment, (as we mentioned in Prof. Wu's example,) an assistant/associate professor, an income of 600 yuan and a two bedroom apartment, a lecturer, an income of 400 yuan and one bedroom in a former student dorm with no private bathroom or kitchen. The income varies from person to person, department to department, university to university, but the above is true in general, and not including other miscellaneous incomes people earn in ways other than teaching and research.

According to our survey of 100 intellectuals including 29 intellectuals with higher professional titles (i.e. full and associate/assistant professors, and senior engineers), 40 with middle level titles (i.e. lecturers and engineers) and 31 with lower level titles (i.e. assistant lecturers and assistant engineers), 16% of intellectuals do not have stable housing, i.e. living either in collective dorms or in other people's homes, 7% live in one bedroom with one's spouse and child(ren), and only 9% of them have a study of their own. In terms of their living space per person, we have the following:

Table 3.1
Living Conditions of Intellectuals

Living Space in Square Meters	% of Intellectuals Occupying the Space
4-5	17%
6-7	27%
8-9	24%
10-11	12%
12-15	2%
19-20	2%
No stable housing	<u>16%</u>
	100%

If we assume that one room is about 10 square meters, we will see that well over 90% of them have less than one room of their own. No wonder when asked how they thought about their housing condition, 44% of them said "very" and "quite unsatisfactory" and 33% said just "average." Only 1% said

"very satisfactory," and 23% said "fine." The following is the distribution of their monthly income:

Table 3.2

Income Distribution of Intellectuals

Monthly Income	% of People Receiving the Income
\$35-\$60	14%
\$61-\$85	28%
\$90-\$110	35%
\$120-\$135	20%
\$140-\$200	<u>3%</u>
	100%

The average salary in Shanghai in 1994 was about \$80 a month, and we see that about 42% of them earn that much or less. Majority of them, 77%, earn about \$100 or less. It is considered as little money in Shanghai, the largest city and one of the most expensive ones in China. Asked how they thought about their salaries, 53% of said "very" and "quite unsatisfactory" and 39% said "average." Only 9% said "fine," and no one said "very satisfactory." It is a social fact that intellectuals generally earn only an average salary and there is a common perception among intellectuals that they are mistreated by the state.

Senior professors generally have better housing and income, but the lines of professorship allocated to the department limits the number of people that can be promoted

and as a result qualified people may not be able to get a chance for promotion and thus are locked in lower income and housing. And this happens most likely to a younger person. Mr. Bai of instrumental chemistry pointed out that the reason he would probably not be promoted to professorship was that there were four or five senior lecturers of no less ability in the department that waited to be promoted. But he still felt that he was lagging behind his own peers in promotion. Even if his lab authorities wanted to promote him as a special case next time, he felt that his chances were miao mang, or "slim."

In fact, whenever the time comes for evaluation and promotion, both the authorities and faculty hoping to be promoted have headaches. Lecturer Gu used to be a worker-peasant-soldier student and graduated in 1977. After graduation, she has taken every opportunity to improve herself such as taking graduate courses in the University. But she has never got a chance to take a masters' degree and the department has always assigned her full teaching load. She suspects that it is because she does not have an MA degree that she is not promoted. Others believe that it is just because there are too many qualified people and too few lines of professorship assigned to the department. She felt that she could not bear it any more and she could not hold back her tears when she talked about her experience at a group interview. Indeed, when we asked what effects the current

rewarding system, 29% cited faulty system of competition, and 26% cited the authority's wielding of power.

Still, educational credentials have to do with promotion. But even if you are promoted, you may still encounter problems such as housing that are beyond your ability to solve. Prof. Gu, an internationally known computer scientist in multi-media technology, ran into trouble with the housing bureaucracy in ECNU. In 1993 just before he returned from Germany where he had been teaching and doing research for two years, the third time he was abroad, his department promised that he would get a professor's housing and his wife would be given a job too at the University. A year had passed and he still was crowded in a one room apartment with his wife, son and mother. He still did not have a telephone in his room, neither in his lab. He applied for one a year ago, but somehow he still could not have it. At the time of the interview, he was wearing a borrowed beeper (he said he could not afford one for a thousand yuan) because he was in the process of a negotiation with the state Ministry of Weaponry concerning a multi-million yuan project.

Prof. Wang of cytobiology lives in a small two bedroom apartment with his wife, daughter and grand daughter. He used to live in one of his brother's two rooms. When his brother returned from outside Shanghai, he had to give up the room and get an apartment at the University. According to the planned

economy, he, a full professor, should be given a three bedroom apartment. The university asked him to move into a two bedroom apartment first and promised that he would be given a three bedroom one later. But a month later, the University ruled that he would be given no more because the university considered that room he used to have at his brother's house is now considered part of his apartment, even if it is not his and even if it is miles away. As a consequence, he works only at his lab, bringing his own lunch, and home only for dinner and sleep. His apartment does not even have room for his Encyclopedia Britannica.

The income system is such that the basic salary is only less than one third of the total income one gets at the end of the month. The major part of it is various kinds or allowances or bonuses depending on your positions and work load. However, the number of bonuses given to a person is not always decided fairly. For example, working in a lab helping students do experiment is either not counted towards one's teaching load or counted as very little. As a result, the faculty have little enthusiasm working with students in a lab. As Prof. Cai said, if they work hard, it is because they want to live up to their conscience.

Mr. Chen Xiong, an assistant engineer from the Research Institute of the First TV Factory lives with his wife, child, and parents in one and half rooms. With his limited income, he

did not feel that he could afford to support his parents especially his father had rectum cancer and medical care was very expensive. He feels that his father probably had to stop using the medicine he was using now given his financial situation. He did not want to leave the factory yet for he felt that the authorities had been pretty nice to him. But he did not exclude the possibility to leave later if the factory did not change its policy and start leaning towards technical intellectuals in terms of their income.

In fact, technical intellectuals have a better chance already for better income and housing because there is more need for them in society than humanistic intellectuals: there are more chances for them to take a job outside the university or research institute. Intellectuals in humanities and social sciences find it difficult to work outside the university and therefore they tend to have a lower income. Prof. Xiao of history commented that his colleagues all smoked cheaper brand cigarettes, for example, Flying Horse, not above Peony, both cheaper ones. Once in a while he would bring a pack of Yun cigarettes, one of the best in China, and everybody would be very excited to share one with him.

Lecturer Li of literary criticism believed that the system of promotion is the most problematic because it is the teacher's right to be promoted when he or she reaches the level required, and promotion should not be given as a favor,

as is very often the case. But in his case, the situation was more complicated. He was not promoted despite his teaching and research record and seniority probably because he was involved in the June 4th Movement and was imprisoned for nine months thereafter. That he regained his teaching position is already a miracle. And he even broke into a dorm room and occupied it until the time of the interview just so that he could have a place of his own to live, and without even being seriously challenged. Thus if you have dissenting political ideology in the academia, you will be even more disadvantaged.

It is one of the constant themes in our interviews that the intellectuals, especially young ones and ones in humanities and social sciences, believe that they are short-changed in income and housing especially when they compare themselves with people of their age working in a joint business venture, who may get five to ten times their salary. Furthermore, intellectuals on the whole believe that those who work with their brain should earn more than those who work with their hand, which is a tradition handed down from Mencius who advocated that those who work with their brain should govern those who work with their mind. It had been true in the past two thousand years but the truth was overturned by the Communist Revolution and now they feel that the tradition should be restored; otherwise, there would still be nao ti dao gua, the upside down of mind and body. Nao ti dao gua was on the lip of almost every intellectual I talked to, and a great

source of alienation in addition to the limited chance of income and housing.

3.2.3 Poor Equipment Supply Fostering Alienation

At East China Normal University, one of the serious concerns by scientists is logistic support by the University Equipment Department. When researchers need something, say a steel cylinder, a certain liquid, they have to first of all apply to their own department. If it doesn't have what they want, they get permission from the department to go to the Equipment Department. (You cannot do it on the phone because there are forms to be filled out and they have to see you in person.) People at this department will see whether they have it in stock. If not, they say they will buy it later at their convenience. So you wait for ten days to twenty days for something you need immediately.

What is worse is that they may not have bought what you actually need and then you have waited in vain, or they have bought more than what you want. Dr. Qian said that once she wanted one type of liquid and they bought her another kind. Want it or not, they would not change it for her. Another time, Lecturer Gu wanted six tube stands, but they bought her sixty. Furthermore, they always paid more for less quality. One of the reasons that the Equipment Department want to do this themselves is that this way they can get some kickbacks

and they thereby increase their monthly income in the forms of bonuses.

Sometimes you may be made to wait for some time, and then they suddenly ask you to go and buy what you need. When you come back, you have to go through your own department, the Equipment Department, and the Finance Department to be reimbursed. If the person in charge is not there, you will have to come next time. One interviewee commented that it takes you a month to do in China what you can accomplish in a week in an American or Japanese research institution.

Prof. Ye of chemistry compared what happens here and his own experience in America. He said that in the United States, if you need a steel cylinder, you make a telephone call and the second day it is at your front door. Here you call the Equipment Department and they will say, "We have several but we don't know which ones are full and which ones are empty. You have to take your own measurement instrument to come and find it out." Lecturer Bai said that in the Japanese lab he worked in, they would not only bring you the steel cylinder the second day but would hook it up for you and at the same time say, "Sorry we have delayed your work." It would never happen here. The purchase or repair may take up to six to eight months, according to Prof. Fang of chemistry, whereas in a foreign country, something that is broken in the morning can be repaired in the afternoon.

A graduate student in the instrumental analysis lab told me that their research is first rate in the world but their instruments made in China are far from that. They have to pay five to six thousand yuan to buy one and all ten of the machines they bought not long ago now have been broken one after the other. He brought eight of them to the manufacturer in Northern Jiangsu Province recently but when he brought them back after repair, he found that three of them had been already damaged on the bus ride home and two went down after he plugged them in. Because of the problem, they have to spend an unusual amount of time to get any test done. Our survey shows that 21% of the correspondents believe that the equipment does not meet their needs, and 45% say it meets their needs only partially. Only 1% say it does meet their needs and 28% say fine.

As a consequence of poor equipment support and inadequate funding, not only their research but their teaching ability is impaired as well. Lecturer Zhang Wei of computer science told us that he teaches a course in computer network, but the students could only imagine how it works and there is no computer for them to work on. Prof. Cai of physics said that in their physics lab, the teachers arrange the instruments and students cannot touch but only watch. You cannot afford to let students touch them because once they are broken, you either have to repair them yourself or find money to do it. Prof. Wu

of biology said that many experiments have been canceled because they cannot afford to buy the liquids they need.

3.2.4 Limited Opportunities for Retraining

Opportunities for retraining are far fewer now than there used to be in the 1980's. Our survey shows that only 34% of the correspondents said they had some kind of retraining in the past ten years. Sixty-two percent of them are either "very unhappy" or "quite unhappy" with their training opportunities, while 30% said "average" satisfaction. Only 6% said "fine" and 1% said "very happy."

One of the reasons for fewer retraining opportunities is that the authorities are afraid that once they have trained someone, the person may not want to stay, which seems especially true at the TV Factory. So they are beginning to charge training fees they have paid for the person if he or she wants to leave within a certain period of time. This includes both graduate and undergraduate students. If they want to leave the country, for example, after graduation without serving for a number of years, they have to pay around 20,000 yuan, depending on how many years of college or graduate school one has attended. Because of all this, both the authorities and scientists think twice about taking a chance of retraining. Furthermore, if there is a chance for retraining and you take it, you have to give up your bonuses.

Since bonuses are a major part of their income, and they cannot afford not to have them, people sometimes choose not to take the opportunity.

As a result, opportunities are fewer now for the scientists to get retrained. To solve the problem, our interviewees suggested that either the university should pay for people's retaining or they should have a sabbatical leave like their Western colleagues. Either way, they should keep their bonuses. It is a dilemma that further alienates the intellectuals.

3.2.5 Alienation of Women in Career Opportunities

In our research at ECNU, we found one very interesting phenomenon: in the Physics Department, out of 218 undergraduate students, 59 or about a quarter, are women, and out of 80 teachers, 9 or about 10% are women; whereas in the Chemistry Department, half of the 240 students are women and 22 or a little bit less than a third of 77 teachers are women. There are certainly more men than women in both disciplines yet there are proportionally more women in chemistry than in physics.

I asked for a reason, and both Professors Sun from chemistry and Din from physics said that one reason is that with the development of market economy, women find it more

difficult to find a job than men in these fields; therefore they would rather study humanities and social sciences. Secondly, Prof. Sun said, there is a misconception that chemistry requires more rote memorization whereas physics needs more flexibility in thinking which men are better at. Therefore more men study physics than chemistry. Prof. Din seemed to believe in this conception, too, although half of the professors in his lab are women.

This phenomenon is also demonstrated in the First TV Factory though in a different way. In the Research Institute, which has about 15 women out of 90 people, there has never been one woman who has been asked to assume responsibility for a project designing new products. Ms. You, an assistant engineer, commented that one of the reasons is that women often have to take care of their kids at home and cannot stay late or even work on holidays like men can. (The legend goes, however, that men in Shanghai are doing most of the housework.) Besides, she believes, "women are not fit for engineering" and generally speaking they are not interested in as many things as men do. Furthermore, there is too much pressure for being a project director who has to beat a deadline for finishing the product; otherwise, the factory is going to suffer in profits.

All things considered, the impact of market economy coupled with this traditional misconception played a very

important role in a person's choosing or not choosing these fields. Equal opportunities in the job market for women are not yet as serious an issue on the table of national debate as it is in the West, if there are any debates at all.

3.2.6 Mechanism to Deal with Alienation

One may wonder whether this outer flow of talented young people could be averted if alienation can be relieved in one way or another, for example, improvement of interpersonal relations. We made a point in finding out whether there is a mechanism that works to this effect. At ECNU our interviewees showed some concerns about the lack of communication between professors and their superiors especially at the university level. Prof. Wang complained that the school authorities pushed him to get some job done but never bothered to come and offer some practical help. (In fact, one of our research team members relayed the message to the Party Secretary, who immediately paid a visit to Wang.) Wang did not try to talk with the university heads about his housing problem in person, either, and as a result, they probably still do not know he has a problem. Prof. Gu had a similar case when he tried to get the communications network done.

There are, however, exceptions to the rule. Alienation may be reduced in a smaller environment. The Instrumental Analysis Lab, one of our ethnographic sites, has two full

professors, two associate professors, five lecturers, two engineers and one assistant lecturer, as we mentioned earlier. They also direct three doctoral and sixteen MS degree students. This is what people call "a good ti dui," or good orderly system of succession. All of the researchers have been abroad except the assistant lecturer who has just graduated, and all have returned, including the younger ones. People seemed to be happy. Several reasons have been given for all these by our interviewees.

First, the lab directors used their contacts abroad to arrange for the younger people to study and do research in a foreign country for a couple of years. The training is usually paid for by the sponsors abroad, generally American or Japanese professors, with some help from the university or the lab itself. Scholars are sent abroad by the lab instead of going on their own, and they will all be given a chance.

Second, there is a better research environment in the lab, or as the members say, the "small environment is good," implying that the bigger one may not be as good. It is good in the sense that they have plenty of projects to do, and so their income level is above average in the university although you still cannot compare with someone working in a joint venture. It is good also because they keep good interpersonal relationship. The group used to meet every two weeks for lunch when they would exchange working notes. The meetings are less

frequent now but they still keep constant contact with each other.

Thirdly, as a result, the young people feel that they have an obligation to fulfill in this working environment. They would feel "sorry to their conscience" if they don't come back. As Lecturer Zhang said, he felt that he "should keep his promise." And they feel a kind of inner pressure from above. Indeed, Prof. Fang, the former director, still has such authority in the lab that he said, "They call me 'the old man.' If 'the old man' doesn't say the words, you can't go even if you want, and you have to go even if you don't want to go."

The example of the Instrumental Analysis Lab shows that alienation can be reduced to a certain extent if efforts are made. But the efforts can be dubious in quality and whether the above efforts made by the lab are possible in other departments is a questionable issue.

The outer flow of technical personnel poses a problem also at the Research Institute of the First TV Factory, which has 11 senior engineers, 33 engineers, 24 assistant engineers and 13 technicians. Several administrators mentioned that talented young people would like to go and work in a joint venture for more challenge and more income. Their institute used to have one of the ten "technical elite" in Shanghai but

he left because he believed that he had a better chance for promotion and for more pay, several times over the pay here. They sent a young man to learn CAD in Singapore for half a year and the contract was that he would serve for three years after he came back. He did serve for three years and then left. Like the universities, the state-owned factories also have great difficulty retaining young and talented people.

Yet I was quite impressed by the Party secretary from the Research Institute of the TV factory and his efforts in reducing dissatisfaction more or less successfully. He acts as a bridge between the engineers and directors of the institute. In order to better serve the rank and file engineers, he moved his desk from the directors' office to one that is across the hallway so that he can have some privacy between him and other engineers. The directors decide how much each engineer is going to get in bonuses and he deals with any discontent that may arise and tries to find a balance. He goes to the Conference of Factory Workers' Delegates, raises the consciousness of workers in valuing the intellectuals in his institute and calls for better pay and better housing for his engineers. He is not always successful but he is there.

Overall, however, lack of mechanisms to deal with discontent involving wider institutional settings seems one of the serious concerns of our interviewees. One wonders whether the authorities will retain more young people, as two of our

examples here show, if they improve communication. But I doubt it because alienation has to do also with the transformation of social and economic systems on the whole, including the transformation of the whole culture, especially the political culture, which we will discuss in later sections.

3.3 Political Repression and the Struggle of Critical Intellectuals

In contrast with the status of organic intellectuals discussed in 3.1 is the situation of politically critical intellectuals. In the aftermath of the 1989 massacre, some of the activists in the spring movement, student leaders for example, escaped the country with the help of some Hong Kong human rights organizations. A number of democratic activists also managed to escape to the West. The rest were arrested and imprisoned or placed under surveillance and criticism. Those who had been already abroad like Liu Binyan decided to stay. In the past five years, every effort has been made by the Party to suppress any serious move of critical intellectuals in faulting the Party on its political rule. There is little room for politically critical thinking in the country.

First, the police continue to arrest anyone who is active in dissident political activities. According to official statistics, until March 1994, those who had charged with "reactionary [i.e. dissident] activities" and imprisoned numbered 1,730, those that had been arrested and waiting for

trial numbered 160, and those on probation numbered 130. (PFG, July 22, 1994) These include some of the human rights activists like Ren Wanting, who had been active ever since the end of the Cultural Revolution, and former Party organic intellectuals like Bao Tong, who had been a top aid to the reformist Party chiefs Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.

The most recent sentences came on December 16, 1994, when nine dissidents who had been held in jail for 30 months were sentenced from three to twenty years in prison. Among them is Hu Shigen, a lecturer at the Beijing Languages Institute, who had received 20 years because he and others had drafted four articles on human rights and workers' rights, mimeographed and distributed them before the 1992 anniversary of the June 4th massacre. (Tylor, NYT, Dec. 19, 1994; Jan. 7, 1995) These sentences were followed by the sentencing of a journalist named Gao Yu a month earlier, who had written about the inner rules of political operation, which is that Deng had always been consulted on high level appointments, an open secret. (Tylor, NYT, Jan.10, 1995) On November 15, 1994, Zhou Guoqiang, a lawyer and poet, having engaged in dissident activities and even organized one workers' strike after the June 4th massacre, was sentenced to three years in prison. (Xing Dao Daily, Dec. 23, 1994) In May and June in 1994, Just before the June 4th anniversary of the massacre, Shanghai police arrested four dissidents and in October they were sentenced to three years of prison. (WJ, Oct.19, 1994)

Wei Jingshen, a Democracy Wall activist who urged a fifth modernization, democracy, was again arrested in April, 1994, now held without trial, after being released from a fourteen year imprisonment. The reason is that he continued writing critical essays and seeing the wrong people, including the Clinton administration's State Department top human rights official, John Shattuck. Wang Dan, one of the student leaders of the Spring 1989 movement had to go into hiding frequently after finding himself unable to bear the 24 hour surveillance and "tailgating." At the time of this writing, Chen Ziming, one of the renowned dissidents, was still closely guarded in his home after being released on medical parole.

Second, the dissidents now living in the West are barred from entering the country. On January 6, 1995, Asia Watch and Human Rights in China made public a blacklist of 49 dissidents whom the Chinese Customs are ordered to intercept if they want to try to get into China. The list includes former organic-turned-critical intellectuals such as Yan Jiaqi, Liu Bingyan, Wang Ruowang, Fang Lizhi, Chen Yizi, and Zhu Jiaming, student leaders in the Spring 1989 movement who now live in the West, and the overseas Chinese students who later turned dissidents. (WJ, Jan. 6, 1995) There has been a number of instances in the past several years when prominent dissidents were barred from entering the country, including Han Dongfan, who organized the Autonomous Workers' Union in Spring 1989, Beidao, a poet, and

Wang Bingzhang and Ni Yuxian, overseas Chinese scholars who later became political activists.

Thirdly, foreign reporters will be harassed if they contact dissidents or write about Chinese sensitive political issues. According to Human Right Watch, in 1994, two South Korean journalists were expelled from the country, reporters from UPI, News Week, NBC, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal have all been harassed, detained, interrogated, or barred from interviewing dissidents. Furthermore, the American government has failed to make the Chinese government keep its promise to talk with the U.S. about stopping the jamming of VOA and let International Red Cross visit political prisoners in China. (WJ, Dec.19, 1994)

Regulations concerning the press are even tougher now. The "four no" policy continues: no foreign newspapers, no foreign investment in Chinese mass media, no opening to foreigners in electronic information industry, no opening of the sky to foreign countries. A Hong Kong newspaper began its publication in September 1994 in China for limited circulations among foreigners but was stopped the beginning of 1995 by the Chinese government, breaking a three year contract. A Guangzhou (Canton) newspaper was suspended for alleged Hong Kong relations. (WJ, Jan.6, 1995)

The regulations are equally strict internally as well. In 1994, a Sichuan newspaper, Family and Life, was suspended for reporting an art exhibition in Beijing attended by Hu Jiwei, the ousted former Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Congress, who had called for the passing of a press law to protect freedom of speech, which is one of his crimes. The report could not be published in Beijing because no one would dare to print Hu's name and the author did not want to back off. A book of biographies of key politicians can not be published because Hu's biography is among them. (PFG, Dec.9, 1994) Thoughts in 1993, a book describing how money has corrupted society, who has benefitted from robbing the country, who has made this possible, and how the ordinary public is raped ideologically, etc. was banned in 1994. A TV series entitled "Great Road" was banned because of its sharp critique of current social and political issues even though it also praised Deng as a hero. (WJ, Nov. 2, 1994)

The author of a gongfu novel was arrested because the main characters' names are Deng Tuoping, the gang leader, Yang Xiakun and Li Xiaopeng, two hatchet men, sound similar to Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, the military leader in the June 4th massacre, and Li Peng. (WJ, Oct.24, 1994) Another author was also arrested because he wrote about how Deng made self criticism to Mao and was restored his positions but pledged never to eat his words. (WJ, Oct. 22, 1994) This is a historical fact, and Deng did eat his words. But as Robin

Munro, the Hong Kong director of Human Rights Watch, commented on Gao Yu's arrest for revealing that Deng was in charge, they have just revealed that the emperor is naked, and emperors don't like that. (Tylor, NYT, Jan.10, 1995)

This high-handed repression, however, does not stop political dissidents from continuing to advocate democracy and engage in activities that anger the Party. Chinese political dissidents and democracy advocates overseas continue to reflect on what has happened and form strategies for a democratic future. Foundations have been established to sponsor studies on the future development of China, and books and articles have been published in studies of modern and contemporary China by the former organic intellectuals and other overseas Chinese as well as foreign scholars. Dissident magazines such as China Spring published by overseas students and Democratic China published by the former Party intellectuals continue to circulate in the world except China.

Despite Clinton administration's decision to unconditionally grant the favorite nation status to China, which pulled out the only effective leverage the U.S. had in influencing human rights events in China, the Chinese democracy movement received enormous support from not only Hong Kong, which faces its own uncertain future beginning in 1997, and Taiwan, but other parts of the world as well. Wei Jingshen and Ren Wanting received the 1994 Robert Kennedy

Award for their struggle for human rights in China. (WJ, Nov.18, 1994) Wei was also named by fifty American Congress men and women for 1995 Nobel Peace Prize. (PFG, Oct.28, 1994)

Even in China, dissidents are still trying to do what they can. Prof. Ding Ziling and Jiang Peikun, who lost their son in the June 4th massacre, have continued their effort to compile a list of victims, investigate the current conditions of their families and provide whatever help they could give, with some overseas support, both financially and morally. But of course their efforts have been constantly obstructed by the police. Foreign donations are intercepted and they are afraid of receiving them for fear that the authorities may think they are making an "organized" effort. (WJ, Dec.14, 1994)

Some critical intellectuals have tried to sue the Party and government officials for violating their civil rights. William P. Alford documented five of the most important cases. Wang Meng, a novelist and former Minister of Culture, sued in 1991 an author and Wenyi Bao (The Literature and Art Gazette), which is sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, for denouncing him because of his short story "Thin, Hard Gruel," which was interpreted by the defendant as an attack on Deng Xiaoping. Dai Qing, a well-placed journalist, sued her newspaper Guangming Daily for accusing her of being a "pawn of reactionary forces in and out of China" during the June 4th movement. She was termed a reporter that was intent on

creating turmoil. Guo Luoji, a professor of philosophy, sued the Nanjing University Communist Party Committee and Director Li Tieying of the State Education Commission for depriving him of his right to teach because his political points of view are different from the Party line.

Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming, two of the most celebrated political dissidents imprisoned several times for their political activities, have had their own lawsuits. Wang's wife Hou Xiaotian, in Wang's behalf, sued the jailers for negligence in allowing her husband to contract hepatitis B, and both Wang and Chen's families sued newspapers for their accusing them of playing a reactionary role in the June 4th movement. (See William Alford, in Daedalus, Spring 1993) All of their litigation was rejected, but the fact that they appealed to the law and were even able to bring a lawsuit shows how much politically critical intellectuals' consciousness of their rights and power and independence has been heightened. There is no doubt that litigation also heightens the consciousness of their political allies and arouses attention of a larger audience, domestic and foreign.

If organized political dissent by critical intellectuals is only focused overseas and there is little room for democratic movement in China, what do critical intellectuals generally do then under the CCP rule? That will be the topic for the next section.

3.4 The Case of Socially and Culturally Critical Intellectuals

By socially and culturally critical intellectuals, I mean intellectuals in social sciences and humanities who are neither organic intellectuals to the ruling Party or the new bourgeoisie, nor as politically critical as the dissidents are. They are more or less independent researchers, as Prof. Xiao might claim when he outlined the four kinds of intellectuals: the state policy intellectuals, academicians, humanists and social critics. Here I am referring to the latter three.

3.4.1 The Academic Social Scientists: Moderately Critical but Crucial

As Prof. Xiao points out, the academic intellectuals keep a distance from politics albeit very interested in it. They have a sense of the problems of modernization and do research on the history of Chinese modernization, civil society, middle range organizations, Confucian tradition and the Chinese character, religion, the relationship between ideology and politics, etc. (See also Xiao in Asian Weekly) They carefully follow the Party line, probe but not provoke anger from the Party.

For example, in an article entitled "Market Economy and the Historical Responsibility of Contemporary Chinese Intellectuals," published in the leading magazine of the

academic intellectuals which is funded largely by Hong Kong corporations, Qin Ling, the author, lavishly talks about the contradictions intellectuals face today, such as the conflict between righteousness and money, public and private, high and low, theory and practice, and calls on the intellectuals to accommodate themselves to modernity characterized by the latter of the two words. At the same time, the author calls for "relative" independence of the former of the two words. That is all very nice but the author just ignores, understandably, how the current power structure prevents intellectuals from any real independence in their theorizing of the modernization in political terms, without which modernization is going to cause and in fact already causing more problems than the academic intellectuals can figure out a way to solve. Nevertheless, the author foresees at the end of the article, "I believe an entirely new ideal society envisioned by intellectuals will come soon." (See Qin Ling, pp.39-41)

The academic intellectuals have done enormous studies on the transformation of the Chinese society albeit their seeming distance from politics. For the modernization of a traditional society like China is itself also a political problem, no matter whether you say it or not. Even if they dismiss the notion of "class" when discussing social stratification, terming, for example, the new bourgeoisie, or private owners of the means of production, as "stratum of new entrepreneurs,"

the ruling bureaucratic political intellectuals as "stratum of managers," and various associations as "middle range/intermediate organizations," they cannot ignore that political and economic interests are the key issue here and different strata and organizations do conflict over them. (See Wang Yin et al., and Jia Ting and Qing Shaoxiang) Issues such as these will be solved and compromised only through power struggles between different "strata" and "organizations." The notion of "stratification" instead of "class", or "organization" instead of "interest groups" gives us a sense of "peaceful coexistence," but that is far from reality. It is "politically correct," though.

Nevertheless, there do seem to be some concerned intellectuals who are neither organic nor dissident but are still critical. We will examine three more groups of non-organic and non-dissident yet still critical intellectuals, according to my ethnographic studies supported by more secondary material.

3.4.2 Humanistic Intellectuals: Agonizingly Critical but Hopeful

The humanistic intellectuals are mainly found in humanities, and they are the direct heir of the ancient literati. The majority of them seem at a loss these days because they have witnessed the value systems they have internalized and worked to instill into their students being

toppled by market economy and also because they find themselves unable to orient to money business for lack of interest, ability, or opportunity. As a result, like the unattached intellectuals, they find themselves earning almost less than subsistence salaries, living in overly crowded quarters, unable to talk politics in the public sphere, unable to publish most of their studies, and dragging on with their humanistic spirit, which is being torn apart with each passing day. They cannot but dwell on issues such as humanist spirit, ultimate concern, human individuality, and humanist ideals.

In Shanghai, I interviewed a young historian, Tian Zhaoyuan and a literary journalist, Jiang Zhenxin, and we talked at length about a debate going on at the time within the literary circle about the construction or reconstruction of humanist spirit. They point out that in talking about reconstruction of humanistic spirit, there is the difficulty of definition and a lack of universally agreed values on which the spirit can be reconstructed. Also, is it "reconstruct," implying that we have our system but new values have to be incorporated, or "rekindle and strengthen," meaning we have our own humanist spirit but it got lost somewhere sometime in the past and now we have to find it and strengthen it?

It is true that there is a revived interest in cultivating the ancient philosophies of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Books about ancient Chinese traditions have

been published. Ancient books like the Confucian and Taoist classics, written in classic Chinese, are translated into modern Chinese. Books about ancient customs such as sex life in ancient China are also published, which was not possible in the past. Furthermore, there is an increased interest in post-modernism. Intellectuals begin to talk about a post-industrial society, post-intellectuals, post-meeting (that has an connotation of various kinds of conferences spending a lot of money on food and drinks after the meeting rather than on substantive subjects), post-civilization, post-newspapers, post-literature and art, post-literary styles, etc. (Prof. Xiao used "post-June 4th" in his article we cited before.) Others think that "post-" is abused and raped, and they want to fight the violence, said Tian and Jiang.

In fact, this "post-" phenomenon is of great significance because China has indeed entered a post-Mao era, which is economic modernization and is entering a post-Deng period, which is modernization not only economically but also politically. It may be about to enter post-modernization, which will mean a more pluralist politics and economy. Like the academians, the humanistic intellectuals can avoid politics in words, and temporarily, but they cannot deny the meaning of their studies, which may eventually have its impact on the future of the political China, because the intellectuals interested in "post-something," i.e. the humanistic intellectuals, are essentially critical.

For another example, in one of their discussions, Fei Zhenzhong comments that the humanistic spirit is torn apart by what we call organic intellectuals, Confucian or Taoist, when they collaborate with the ruling class, either openly or potentially. Wang Gan points out that as the backbone of intellectual existence and an important tool in defending intellectuals' individuality and human respect in the past several thousand years, human spirit, or the spirit of the humanistic intellectuals, has also served as a tool for intellectuals to work for the ruling class. (This reminds us of the calling.) Therefore, intellectuals have never found their real self and an independent existence. (As we discussed earlier, maybe this contradiction IS the intellectual existence.) (Wu Xuan et al., pp.66-74) They call on the intellectuals to challenge themselves, face the world of "cultural and intellectual dessert," and shoulder the cultural and moral responsibility. (Zhang Rulun, et al. p.53)

As can be seen now from our discussion, humanistic intellectuals are the closest to politically critical intellectuals, and they are secret allies and will probably become open allies when the latter are allowed to exist in China. But organic and academic intellectuals are also potential allies to both because of their split personality. I will further illustrate this point in the next chapter.

3.4.3 Journalists: Aggressively Critical but Careful

As we mentioned in 1.1, there are newspaper journalists who struggle to fulfill the calling as the Shanghai KTV incident shows. In recent years, journalists in TV and radio programs, too, are trying to take their responsibility for redressing social ills even though what they do is quite limited. When in Shanghai, I visited a radio talk show program of Shanghai Radio, a de facto government agency.⁵ I sat in the room where calls were screened, and watched the radio talk show host, Mr. Zuo, in the opposite room discussing with his audience a recent deal made by the producer of a TV series and a corporation. Short of money, the producer for the series yielded to the corporation manager's request to buy the copy right of the story and make him the actor and a female convict named Jiang Peiling the actress. Jiang had been imprisoned for hiding robbery and murder criminals but was released and lived a quiet life. It was one of the cases that shook Shanghai so the corporation wanted to use her name and the TV series for advertisement purposes. That is at least what was argued.

Mr. Zuo's guest was Professor Su from Fedayeen University, who had just written an article criticizing the corporation for using the notoriety of a person for its own

⁵ According to the head of the Shanghai News and Press Bureau, there were, in Shanghai, 86 daily newspapers, 3 radio stations, 4 TV stations, 524 periodicals, and 42 publishing houses in 1993. (World Journal, Sept.16, 1993) Most of which are government owned, or at least sponsored by a government agency.

publicity. It goes against the traditional value of "punishing the evil and fostering the good." Some callers believed that Jiang had the right to do whatever she liked; the host also cited the example of Tonya Harding cashing in on her fame after her men cracked Nancy Kerrigan on the kneel. But most callers objected to the practice of the corporation, and Zuo and Su were unmistakably on their side for the same moral reasons. (See also Su Yong, Wenhui Daily, July 12, 1994) "Social consequences and social responsibility" were the issue, said both Zuo and Su.

Mr. Zuo is apparently very sensitive to social issues and very critical, too. Later on he told me in a group discussion about his new book entitled The Voice of Democracy: Conversation between Officials and Common People to be published in 1995 if everything goes well. He also wrote about the origins of talk show radio and in what way it is a democratic device to reflect what ordinary people think. His program, for example, focuses on social issues that concern ordinary people in Shanghai, traffic, living conditions, electricity supply, food supply, etc. When they heard that the businesses wanted to cut down the trees that lined up Huai Hai Road, one of the two chief commercial streets, because trees shadowed their business signs, Mr. Zuo organized a program providing a venue for ordinary folks to air what they thought. Most of them were of course against the businesses' move supported by the city government. Even if efforts such as

these may not help solve the problem, they at least make policy makers think before they leap.

Journalists in TV programs have also made their steps. In June 1994, Channel 8 of Shanghai TV started a program named "News See-Through" in which reporters report what happens on the spot, something they had never done before, especially concerning sensitive issues like social criticism. A month after its debut, they succeeded in reporting such events as deaths on the sidewalk because of the negligence of construction contractors, and the vice director of a city tax bureau refusing to help the injured by offering his government owned and chauffeured car and he was punished. (Wang Jinyuan in Xinming Evening News, July 24, 1994) It remains one of the most popular programs. Journalists have begun to voice concerns of the public.

The Chinese Central TV, the official national network, started a new program in April 1994, "Focused Interviews," that do investigative reports on all kinds of social issues including official corruption, business scandals, youth problems, as well as other important international and national events. It then has become very popular. Its producers say that they take tremendous responsibility and risk in choosing what to report but they feel it is worth all the pressure for they have a sense of success and

contribution. Again, the journalists like them are fulfilling a calling. (Wenhui Movie Times, 7/9/94)

These journalists, like other intellectuals in China, tread on a very thin line. There are rules they have to follow. For example, for a talk show radio host, "don't touch politically sensitive issues; find ways to go around them if callers raise them." A city level radio station should be careful not to criticize city officials but they have pretty much leeway to touch lower level ones like those of the districts (boroughs) or agencies and institutions of lower levels. By the same token, the Central TV, an agency of the Central Government, can criticize provincial agency heads but not high level officials. As people often say, they play net ball.

3.4.4 Popular Artists, Singers, Writers, Painters and Movie Makers: Humorously Critical but Heartful

Since the opening to the outside world, China has been inundated by commercial culture: love songs and popular music from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Singers have begun to imitate the Western ways of singing, and writers have begun to write gongfu novels. There are, however, artists who touch the Party's political nerves more seriously.

Shortly after the June 4th massacre, "cultural T-shirts" were popular for a while but were banned later because they

had such imprints as "I am annoyed; don't bother me." Or "I am so tired." Or "Money is all what life is about." Or "Be an honest person." Or "Some things are like this: if you take them seriously, they do become serious." Or "I have nothing." Or "I have only one weakness." Or after a four character line title of La Jia Dai Kou, meaning having a big family to raise, you see "licenses, working unit ID, personal ID, " and many other things. (China Spring Jan.1992) The words on the T-shirts express exactly the worry, the boredom, the frustration, and the anger of the ordinary folks. (See World Journal, July 30, 1991; Aug.8, 1991. See also China Spring, Jan.1992) The popular mass and liberal writers have always been trying to have their voices heard as long as they don't openly object the four cardinal principles.

The other example would be the popularity of rock 'n' roll among the young people, especially such rock 'n' roll stars as Cui Jian and his ADO. We will look at some of his songs. In "All Over Again,"

I am more and more skilled in talking nonsense,
I am more and more skilled in keeping silence,
And more and more skilled in pretending not to know
anything.

In "Saying One Thing but Thinking Another,"

My anger is no longer shame and regret,
My firmness is no longer hypocrisy,
My courage belongs to me myself,
And my freedom belongs to the heaven and earth.

In "The Last Gunshot," and this was after the Peking massacre,

If this is the last gunshot,
I am willing to accept this greatest honor,
Oh, the last gunshot; Oh, the last gunshot.

After singing, he even asked the audience twice what the title of the song was. When the audience told him twice, he said, "I hope the gunshot I heard last time is really the last gunshot." (Ge, "The Real Cui Jian" in China Spring, Oct. 1991. Translation mine.) The words say it all. We should note, however, that they are not openly against the Party rule.

With the high handed political oppression in place, it is not easy for artists to go this far. The New York Times correspondent Partrik E. Tyler writes in a recent article that with a dwindling number of fans, rock-and-roll has lost a lot of its rebellious edge due to careful police control. Nevertheless, Cui continues trying. In his latest album, "Eggs Under the Red Flag," a cry from the anchorless youth of China for direction, he sings, "Money is fluttering in the wind. We have no ideals." And

The time is now
But who know what we should do?
The red fag is waving
It has no clear direction
Revolution is ongoing
The old men are still in power. (Tyler, NYT, Jan.9, 1995)

While rock 'n' roll and other ways of expressing themselves

like the "cultural T-shirts" can become critical voices,⁶ writers and painters have to use more roundabout ways.

We mentioned Wang Meng, the former Minister of Culture before the Peking massacre, who wrote a short story entitled "Thin Hard Gruel" depicting the life of the Northern peasants. He was criticized for being bourgeois liberal and attacking Deng Xiaoping and his reform, but he certainly did not admit that and even tried to sue the critic because he asserted that his story should not be interpreted that way. The court did not take his suit, though, probably because it would be too sensitive. Behind this criticism was again a group of ultra leftist writers and literary bureaucrats such as He Jingzhi, the then Acting Minister of Culture, and Wang Renzhi, the then Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Party Committee, who believe that all literature and art should bear the stamp of class and class struggle. Any works that are not proletarian should be criticized. (See Luo Bing, "Wang Meng Incident and He Jingzhi's New Offence," in the Cheng Ming magazine, Dec. 1991) They sound so much like Mao.

⁶ But such artists present a question to our synthetic typology: they may not have had any college education but they are fulfilling important intellectual functions. So I include them in the intellectual complex. The same applies to actors and actresses and some artists in the following discussion. They have also been treated by the Party as part of the intellectual "headaches."

In arts, along with the Democracy Wall Movement in 1979 was born the avant-garde movement initiated by the Stars group, so called to emphasize their individuality, which flourished before 1989 and opted Cynical Realism and Political Pop post-1989. A typical piece of Cynical Realism is photo-perfect figurative painting. Fang Lijun, for example, paints one in the middle of an enormous yawn, which reminds one of the famous saying attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, "When China wakes, it will shake the world." Indeed, China may have been awake, but it certainly is still very sleepy. He paints idle characters sitting or swimming or walking around with complete purposeless, or what he calls "the absurd, the mundane and the meaningless events of everyday life." (Andrew Solomon, p.49) As another artist, Liu Wei, says,

In 1989, I was a student. I joined the democracy movement, like everyone, but didn't have an important part of it. After June 4, I despaired. Now I have accepted that I cannot change society: I can only portray our situation. Since I cannot exhibit in China, my work cannot be an inspiration here, but painting helps to relieve my own sense of helplessness and awkwardness. (Quoted by Solomon, p.49)

Indeed, Cynical Realism came, an art critic says, after people had come to an unavoidable conclusion that "extreme resistance" only proves how powerful one's opponent is, and then humor and irony takes its place. However, as Solomon points out, isn't portraying a cynicism the society denies a form of idealism? (Solomon, pp.48, 49)

A typical piece of Political Pop⁷ portrays Mao on the left applauding one of his own principles and Whitney Houston on the right applauding her own music, both copied from real existing photos. Another paints black and white images of idealistic young people in Tiananmen Square. Still others place the names "Band-Aid," "Marlboro," or "Benetton" alongside idealized young soldiers and farmers in Mao caps. One painter explains that he worries that commercialism will harm people's ideas and their ability to have ideas. But is there any difference between one's craze for Coke or Marlboro and a similar craze for the little red book? An artist portrays the hypocrisy, shallowness and cruelty of government campaigns through a video entitled "The Correct Procedure for washing a Chicken," in which a poor chicken is repeatedly covered with soap, rinsed down and laid on a board. One imagines that once the job is done, the chicken is no longer the old one. (Solomon, pp.49, 51) Li Shan once portrayed Mao as a Shanghai hooligan, another time a bisexual. Some of their portraits are sold at the most at \$15,000 in Hong Kong. (WJ, August 24, 1994)

Although these artists avoid talking about democracy or human rights, they are subject to police harassment. In fact, on July 2, 1993, the Mayor of an artists' village was brutally beaten by the police. But the artists did not want to swallow

⁷ Political Pop sells well in the West. One painter's work exceeds the price of \$20,000. (Solomon, p.49)

the pain: they signed a petition and a lawyer took up the case and they were going to bring a lawsuit against the police. Some journalists agreed to write about the suit. As the lawyer said, "Whether we win or lose, I hope we will give to people this idea, that they can protest, that they can find a way to stand up for what they believe, so that they can live as human beings." (Solomon, p.72)

In the movie industry, the so-called fifth generation film directors, the generation that grew up in New China, went through the Cultural Revolution, and benefitted from learning from Western culture after the reform, made some award winning films such as Zhang Yimou's "Raise the Red Lantern," "The Story of Qiuju," "To Live," Chen Kaige's "Farewell My Concubine," and Tian Zhuangzhuang's "Blue Kite." They all depicted life and death in China, especially under the Communist rule. Human rights and democracy are never mentioned and but always implied. Most of the movies they made were funded by Hong Kong and Taiwan producers and some of them are banned from being shown in China. In 1994, Zhang Yimou was forced to suspend the shooting of his new movie "The Rules of the Gang" because he entered his "To Live" in an international movie festival. (WJ, Sept. 28, 1994)

Another movie director, Chen Jialing talked about his principles in movie making when discussing with a reporter about his new 40 episode TV series "Emperor Tang Ming Huang,"

which made no money, and both he and his actors and actresses worked hard but were poorly paid. He says that artists should have a sense of historical responsibility and national responsibility. They should leave something good to their offspring and their artistic conscience should not be washed away by this sea of commodities. To be more specific, he has five principles in movie making: nationalism, patriotism, collectivism but not individualism, heroism, and humanism. (Zhang Qunli, 1993) He seems to be quite idealistic and disgusted with commercialism, which makes him the only serious and humorless intellectual in the group of artists we have discussed. Nonetheless, His is some voice that is going against the current tide of consumerism.

3.5 The Status of the University as a Training Ground of Intellectuals

At the beginning of this chapter, I introduced some of the changes in the post-Mao era such as the examination, credentialing and job allocation systems. Since 1992 and under the impact of the tidal wave of the sea of commodities, however, universities and colleges have gone through so many more tremendous changes that they are almost beyond recognition. I will discuss these changes in terms of commercialization of higher education, practicality of students, exodus of college professors to businesses and abroad,

3.5.1 Commercialization of Institutions of Higher Education

First, public universities are run by the government. Since the immediate goal of the government is to economically modernize the country, it emphasizes that universities meet the demand of market economy, i.e. produce in abundance scientific and technological personnel, especially the latter. As a result, there is an increasing number of technical programs, which teach students practical knowledge that they can use immediately after graduation such as accounting, trade and finance, English language (little literature), word processing, etc. Traditional programs are dwindling: there are just not enough students, for they see little future in learning specialties that are too theoretical and unpractical. Prof. Ding of the optics lab of the Physics Department of ECNU said that the crisis is that if they don't gear toward applied research and teach students knowledge and skills that will enable them to make money later, they are not going to have students because students want to see a future in which they can survive.

In 1994, the physics department has added a new specialty, photoelectron, and then many students applied to the department, which otherwise would have a problem attracting enough students. The professors from the lab, however, have some reluctance to make the turn since they believe their job is to do theoretical research and publish

papers, not to make a machine to sell. Yet to survive, they began to think about it in 1994 even though it is not going to be easy because it involves, for example, making sample machines and finding factories that are willing to produce them in quantity. The overall trend is to be more practical and less theoretical.

Not only have public universities added new practical specialties, some entrepreneurial intellectuals have started their private universities, which numbered sixty in 1994 in cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, etc., to teach over three hundred specialties that are entirely technical such as real estate, how to deal in futures, stock market, word processing, etc. Their principle of adding or canceling specialties is whether there is a market need for these knowledges and skills. The orientation of these private universities is totally commercial in the sense of what they teach as well as how much money they make in running private universities.

Secondly, large numbers of professors and students have "plunged into the sea", as the saying goes, meaning doing business of some kind. One statistic in 1992 says that in ten of Beijing's universities and colleges, 40% of teachers under 35 had a second job. In China People's University in Beijing, 150 teachers went into business or abroad in a period of three months. Until 1992, East China College of Chemical Engineering

had had 40 associate professors plunging into the sea by creating five college level enterprises and fifteen department level ones. (Liu Zeming et al., pp.210-1) As we mentioned earlier, Prof. Wang of ECNU corroborated with businesses to develop a candy and a cosmetic formula.

Some faculty from ECNU also have second jobs. As one of them commented, they have to have a second job because they deserve a decent living and need the money to buy an apartment, or anything else they need. Money is important after all, and some even earn about one thousand yuan a month by doing the extra work, the salary of a full professor. And they wear beepers. The exact number of teachers having second jobs at ECNU is not clear, but our survey show that only 19% of our respondents had second jobs working from two to eighteen hours a week. This figure corresponds to an estimate made by an engineer at the Research Institute of TV factory: he estimated that the number of engineers having second jobs in their institute was about 20%. I suspect the number might be widely applicable in a large number of universities in the country. Students, too, have second jobs outside the university, working as family teachers, office workers, or buying and selling stocks, steel, books, attracting advertisements for newspapers or magazines, etc.

Thirdly, universities have started their own businesses due to the lack of funding for higher education. The

government asks universities to produce knowledge workers but does not give them enough money to do it. As a result, universities have to find money not only to support their teaching and administrative staff but also produce technical knowledge workers the country needs. The public spending on education in 1992 was less than 3% of economic output, even below the average 4.1% for the developing world, let alone the average of industrialized countries. To alleviate the financial difficulties, universities run their own factories, restaurants, trading companies, etc. Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai's MIT, runs a company of five dozen operating units generating nearly \$1.2 million each year. The company specializes not only in high technology, metallurgy, computers which the university does but also real estate, financial futures and even a bronze shop. (Brauchli, WSJ, Nov. 15, 1994) Visit every university in China, and you will find again that "fish have a way, but shrimps have theirs, too."

3.5.2 How Students Choose Their Programs and Pursue Them

As we have seen in our previous discussion on the current working opportunities of intellectuals, it is quite understandable that students choose their majors according to what can bring them more money. After all, it is professional skills that are more likely to bring one a livable income, not some philosophical knowledge, or cultural understanding, in a commercialized society. What is the use of history when your

chances of using history to inform the contemporary times are very limited? What is the use of theoretical physics when you cannot even support a sick wife and an old father? So naturally students choose those specialties we mentioned earlier that have a market use.

Furthermore, students do not work as hard as they used to now, (although they still work harder than a lot of American students.) Dr. Qian points out that in the 1980s, students would fight each other for a seat in the classroom. Now you don't see many of them anyway. A lot of them have jobs outside the university, working as "family teachers," office workers, or buying and selling stocks. Those whose majors are Chinese, philosophy, or history are either pursuing second majors or idling their time away, i.e. by the Chinese standard.

When they graduate, few would like to be college teachers. In the 1980s, Prof. Ye said, the best job after graduation was college teaching; now college teaching is the last choice. In the past you would see faculty proudly wearing the school badge, but not any more. Brauchli quotes a young ECNU student as saying, "Becoming a teacher isn't popular any more. The wages aren't high. Our country needs teachers. But I want to stay in Shanghai." (Brauchli, WSJ, Nov. 15, 1994)

3.5.3 Exodus of Chinese Intellectuals from Universities

There are generally two reasons why intellectuals, especially young people, want to leave: to have a better chance to realize their personal worth and to better themselves economically. Dr. Qian is a typical example of both. As we mentioned earlier, she was not able to raise money to do the research she wanted to do and what's more, she was made to work in a lab that engaged in different research than her own field, the study of parasite immunity, for three years since graduation. She felt that she had wasted her life here and wanted to go to a different institution where she could make use of her ability and really do some world class research while in her prime time.

She was shocked when she compared her situation with her friends and former classmates who came back from America and told her how successful they were in developing their more advanced research and even starting their own businesses, let alone income and housing. At the time of interview, she still lived in one room of 13.5 square meters with her husband and child of three years old, no private bathroom nor kitchen. She believed that

many people returned first and then left forever after concluding: 'It is not that I don't love the country but that the country can't put up with me.' It is a waste of life working here. You could at least do something in America even if you are a second class citizen. You

cannot make use of your ability here; what is the use of being a full citizen or the seeming master in my country?

It is true that some returned on the condition that the university would provide housing but later left because the school did not keep its promise. People like Prof. Gu of computer are rare indeed. In fact, three of the four Ph.D.'s in Dr. Qian's department were busy preparing to go abroad. The only one that was going to remain behind was the one who had got a three bedroom apartment from his wife's working unit.

According to our survey, 16% of the intellectuals had been abroad, 31% thought about going abroad but did not have a chance, 13% thought about going but had given up, 16% thought about it and still trying, and 3% were in the process of applying. This is a 79% of unstable intellectuals. We asked for the reasons why they wanted to go abroad if they had thought about it. Twenty-eight percent chose the reason of looking for further development of their talents and 19% cited for further study and training.

Also, lower income and poorer housing prompted younger people to leave for better opportunities. As we discussed earlier, the majority of them, even if married with children, like Dr. Qian, are crowded into former student dorms, with one family occupying one room and all of the several dozen families on the same floor sharing the one public lavatory and one washing room. Sorry, no hot water. And you are lucky if

you can carve out a space in the hallway where you can put up a stove and cook your meals along side all the bicycles parked there. With the little income they get from working in the university, it is very unlikely they can afford to buy or rent a better "apartment." As Lecturer Bai pointed out, money provides cohesion. Indeed, if there is no money, there are no projects. If there is no money and projects, and the basic living conditions are poor, people are not going to stay. If one does not see some light in the future, the chances are that he or she will leave for a better place, especially now when it has become a possibility thanks to the introduction of the principles of market economy.

There are generally two places to go to if one does not feel like staying: the "ocean," (a foreign country) and the "sea" (of commodities--business). According to some popular estimate, while one percent of them may choose to do business, like starting their own trading companies or restaurants, twenty-five percent of them choose to go abroad with very few returning. Brauchli reports that China has sent a quarter of a million Chinese students overseas and the returning rate is one out of five. (Brauchli, WSJ, Nov. 15, 1994) As we mentioned earlier, living conditions of most of the Chinese intellectuals are far from satisfactory, and the "ocean" and the "sea" always seem to provide better opportunities.

In fact, some scholars returned and are able to stay just because they have been abroad and have improved their living conditions using the money they earned or saved in a foreign country. Lecturer Bai commented that one of the chief factors that made it possible for him to stay and work here is that he earned enough money to buy some of the necessities such as a washer, a color TV, a refrigerator etc. that he otherwise would not be able to buy. For another example, the university has just put up a new residence building. If you are a lecturer and it is your turn now to have an apartment according to various requirements, you will get a one bedroom apartment. But if you can put in 15,000 yuan, you can get a two bedroom apartment. If you don't have any extra income from some other sources, you would not have a chance like this.

Prof. Ye of chemistry commented that it is true that in advanced countries college professors do not always earn the top salaries, but they earn enough to make a decent living, which is not possible in China for most professors. "While the raise of professors' salaries at the beginning of this year [1994] helps and our lives are better, most of us still have a living standard of 'lower middle peasants,'" a term used after the Revolution to describe one of the revolutionary strata next to "poor peasants," revolutionary because they were also poor. It is hard for them to concentrate on their jobs while seeing others making a decent living and they cannot.

Indeed, in a national survey in 1993 of 116 universities in 24 cities, those who did not want to leave numbered only 5.8%. One third or a half of the teachers aged 35 to 45 in universities in Henan Province had left. Out of the 1,442 teachers Fedayeen University hired during 1981 to 1989, 402 had left. The main venues of these "defectors" were institutions of higher learning in the South, abroad, and industrial and commercial enterprises. The three main reasons for deserting the universities are 1) their inability to provide opportunities for intellectuals to use their full potential: 95% of them thought they could not develop their talent there; 2) lower income: in 1990, the average income of educational workers was 2,139 yuan, 8.86% lower than the national average of workers' income; and 3) universities lack an equal competitive atmosphere for young people. (Overseas Chinese News, Nov. 23, 1993) Even if college teachers' salaries have been raised since 1994, majority of them still earn only the average of workers' salaries.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have used the ethnographic and survey data I obtained in the Shanghai research as well material from secondary sources to demonstrate that in the past five year, intellectuals have gone through unprecedented changes in several ways. Because of changes in Party policies to recruit more young and knowledged personnel, more organic

intellectuals have gone into bureaucratic policy making to continue the tradition of scholar-officials. As in the ancient times, other organic intellectuals have joined the bureaucrats in preserving the system. Many become part of the new bourgeoisie or organic intellectuals to the bourgeoisie. More studies, however, have to be done as to what percentage of the intellectuals have really gone into bureaucratic positions and/or businesses nation wide, and whether they think they are fulfilling an intellectual calling.

Similar to the case of Eastern Europe, the gap between the bureaucratized and bourgeoisified intellectuals and other intellectuals is widening. Unattached intellectuals, probably the majority of intellectuals according to our ethnographic data and limited survey, seem to be especially hit economically because they do not have the means either to promote their academic career and economic status. While the moderately critical intellectuals may have managed to get along, the dissident intellectuals are still exiled, under house arrest, or in prison.

The intellectuals of various categories seem to have continued what intellectuals have always done: govern, advise, dissent, and free-lance in their social and scientific roles when they can. But something seems to have changed in the past five years, i.e. the increasing number and a heightened consciousness of unattached and critical intellectuals because

of the forces of political oppression and economic repression. Being caught tighter and tighter between the Scylla of totalitarianism and the Charybdis of the market economy, critical and unattached intellectuals may actually form a class, even with some support from organic intellectuals. I will explore the possibility of class formation in the next chapter by using the theories we discussed in the first chapter and historical and contemporary evidence we have discussed in the second and third chapters. More examples from my research will be given to support my hypothesis of an intellectual class formation.

Chapter Four

Chinese Intellectuals on their Way to Becoming a Class

This chapter elaborates the New Class theory discussed in Chapter One in light of the historical and contemporary empirical evidence presented in Chapters Two and Three. In the first chapter, we concluded that Parsons, Weber, Bell and others do not conceive intellectuals as a class, for they believe that intellectuals lack common interests among their groups, and part of them, the professionals or technical intellectuals at least, may even converge with the moneyed class, or businesses, in the post-industrial world. Gouldner, Aronowitz and DiFazio, Konrad and Szelenyi, on the other hand, emphasize the power of cultural capital, knowledge, and CCD and propose that an intellectual class is in formation in the West and Eastern Europe. In this chapter, I will examine the class formation of Chinese intellectuals in terms of cultural capital as the new class's economic basis, calling and CCD as its political basis, which is further consolidated by alienation, and intellectual communities as its organizational basis. The theoretical model I develop will be a synthesis of Gouldner, Elias, Aronowitz and DiFazio, and Konrad and Szelenyi. The discussion will be informed by the historical and contemporary evidence discussed in previous chapters but more evidence will be presented when necessary.

4.1 Cultural Capital: An Economic as well as Political Basis of the New Class

In this section, I first make a critique of Gouldner, Konrad and Szelenyi on cultural capital as an economic basis of the new class in light of Elias's theory of power explicated by Aronowitz and the conditions of the intellectual complex in China. Then I examine how cultural capital has functioned as the economic basis of the new class, although this cultural capital is already a synthesis of Gouldner, Konrad and Szelenyi, Elias, and Aronowitz. I focus on unattached and critical intellectual because all of these theorists have already proven the importance of cultural capital as the economic basis of organic intellectuals but have not really proven that it is also the case with non-organic ones.

What is cultural capital for Bourdieu? "Without entering into detailed analysis, it must suffice to point out that academic qualifications are to cultural capital what money is to economic capital." (Bourdieu 1977, p.187) Thus education credentials are certainly the most important part of cultural capital. Furthermore, "cultural competence in its various forms cannot be constituted as cultural capital until it is inserted into the objective relations between the system of economic production and the system producing the producers." (ibid., p.186) In other words, the value of cultural capital

is not realized until it is used to produce either material goods or human power. This is where Gouldner takes over.

When Gouldner develops cultural capital as one of the foundations of the New Class, he stresses that he does not mean capital metaphorically; rather, the New Class's cultural capital "is a stock of capital that generates a stream of income (some of) which it appropriates privately." (Gouldner, p.19) These incomes are also enforceable and legitimated intrinsically, "depending on the continued availability or withholding of their services and activities." (ibid. p.23) The most convincing example he gives is technical intellectuals, whose cultural capital has become as important as money capital and whose work and services capitalism cannot do without. For the post-industrial ideology "holds that productivity depends primarily on science and technology and that the society's problems are solvable on a technological basis, and with the use of educationally acquired technical competence." This ideology has provided the technical intellectuals with the power to bargain with the moneyed class and therefore power of the New Class. (ibid. pp.24-5)

This Gouldnerian power of intellectuals may be applied to all organic technical/humanistic intellectuals. But what about unattached and critical technical/humanistic intellectuals? Do they hold the same power, both politically and economically because of their cultural capital? Gouldner tells us little.

Gouldner seems to have made a big jump here from the power of mainly organic intellectuals to the power of the whole class and leaves the economic power (to claim an income) of unattached and critical intellectuals unaccounted for.

In Chapter Three, we reviewed how well Chinese technical intellectuals have fared. While some, especially the organic technical intellectuals, do claim incomes based on their cultural capital, the majority do not seem to do as well. Instead they are faced with enormous alienation partly because they have the much craved cultural capital but they cannot use it to claim a better salary. Humanistic intellectuals face greater income gaps if they are not organic to the bureaucratic ruling class or the new bourgeoisie. The majority of the intellectuals do not seem to be able to make an enforceable income claim. Do they still have power? Either there is a missing link between cultural capital and the intellectuals' economic power or basis, or the Chinese intellectuals do not fit in Gouldner's model. I believe it is the former.

Indeed, Martin and Szelenyi, in their paper "Beyond Cultural Capital: Toward a Theory of Symbolic Domination," criticize Gouldner for taking the capital of intellectuals too literally and for his inability to explain the internal divisions of the educated elite. (Martin and Szelenyi, p.33) They believe that cultural capital should be understood

metaphorically as Bourdieu originally meant it: to "emphasize the centrality of the problem of domination rather than of appropriation or exploitation" in understanding the power and privilege of the highly educated. (ibid. p.25) In other words, the power of the new class is derived from practical mastery, i.e. their human capital aspect of technically useful knowledge and symbolic mastery, ie. their cultural capital aspect of theoretical knowledge, or "the capacity to describe the principles by which those with merely technical knowledge manipulate their worlds." (ibid. p.44) When the former dominates the latter, productivity dictates knowledge, and intellectuals conform to the ruling class. When the latter dominates the former, CCD takes over. (ibid. p.45)

While the Martin and Szelenyi model may help account for the internal diversity of the highly educated, they still have not gone beyond either Bourdieu's or Gouldner's conception of cultural capital. First, while he emphasizes symbolic domination, Bourdieu does imply an economic appropriation by the use of cultural capital. Indeed, the two are closely connected: "relations of power and domination...are set up in pure objectivity between institutions, i.e. between socially guaranteed qualifications and socially defined positions.... (Bourdieu 1977, p.187.) These qualifications and positions will no doubt provide an economic income because they are incorporated into the economic and social production, as an

earlier quote of Bourdieu delineates. (See also, *ibid.*, pp.183-4)

Secondly, Martin and Szelenyi still have not developed a theory to explain the power of the new class as they promised at the beginning of the paper, although they do acknowledge that a microlevel analysis is yet to be done. (*ibid.* p.47) But they may have moved the first step toward going beyond cultural capital and explaining the economic (and political) bases or power of the intellectual class. In their paper entitled "Intellectuals and Domination in Post-Communist Societies," which we discussed at length in the first chapter, Konrad and Szelenyi document one of the intellectuals' class formations as being the playmaster between the bureaucratic ruling class and the bourgeoisie, securing both economic and political power. That might be an application of their theoretical model and a middle level analysis of intellectuals' symbolic power. The Chinese critical intellectuals, political or otherwise, however, appear far less powerful than their former comrades. Does it mean that they as an intellectual class do not have the power yet or their power may lie in some other realms, or both? Martin and Szelenyi seem to have moved a step forward towards understanding the issue but not far enough yet.

To really go beyond the cultural capital to explain the political power (and I also believe economic power) of the new

class, Aronowitz proposes that we use Elias's theory of power to account for intellectuals' domination and authority. Elias believes that power is exercised in four spheres: control or monopoly over the means of economic production; control over the means and norms of violence; knowledge; and the civilizing process. In Elias's theory, Aronowitz points out, knowledge and the civilizing process occupy an equally important position as the means of production. In other words, knowledge and ideas are no longer only as part of the superstructure but have a place in the infrastructure as well since knowledge becomes a productive force. The centrality and independent nature of knowledge, e.g. the rule of law and the value of the neutrality of science, demonstrate the independent status of the knowledge holders, i.e. the intellectuals, who intervene in the state and civil affairs and represent new questions as well as their answers. The normal function of a dynamic society depends on the "free-floating" critical intellectuals to set its directions because it is they who produce noninstrumental knowledge and remain the only learning class because of their distance from economic and social reproduction and from other classes. (Aronowitz, pp.27-34)

As Aronowitz points out, Gouldner's theory of cultural capital as independent of moneyed capital parallels Elias's theory of knowledge as independent of productive forces. Elias, however, posits "knowledge as a structural feature of the constitution of any civilization," while Gouldner believes

it only temporally. (ibid. p.42) **Knowledge as cultural capital thus has a wider application and a longer history.** By postulating knowledge holders as a dynamic social force, Elias and Aronowitz go a step beyond Martin and Szelenyi and provide us with the possibility to have a theory of intellectual class that describes on the macro- as well as micro-level how the knowledge class dominates the civilizing process and thus gain their political as well as economic power. Thus finally we might be able to give also the non-organic intellectuals the economic basis that has been largely left unsaid about by Gouldner and undeveloped by Martin and Szelenyi.

Therefore, to go beyond both Gouldner and Martin and Szelenyi, we have to account for not only the economic basis of organic intellectuals but that of non-organic ones by substantiating the thesis that intellectuals are part and parcel of any civilizing process. That is what I am trying to do next, i.e. to examine how cultural capital has provided an economic basis for Chinese intellectuals. I am not going beyond cultural capital; I am going a bit deeper into it, which I believe is also what Martin and Szelenyi and Aronowitz have actually been doing. I stick to Gouldner's cultural capital as an economic basis of the intellectual class but retain Martin and Szelenyi's symbolic mastery, i.e. stressing domination rather than appropriation, and use Aronowitz's wider application.

First of all, as Weber points out, the Chinese "[l]iterati have been the bearers of progress toward a rational administration and of all 'intelligence.'" (Gerth and Mills, p.416) Chinese history is also a history of both organic and unattached/critical intellectuals as we have demonstrated especially in Chapter Two. One cannot imagine what China would be like without the domination of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, and without intellectuals serving in various feudal and modern administrations. All of these knowledges are what the Chinese literati of all the categories have created, disseminated and transmitted to succeeding generations as cultural capital out of which they have made a living and are still making a living. In contemporary times, even if the dominant ideology is Chinese Marxism, which is also a creature of Chinese intellectuals, various schools of thoughts have been introduced into the country as I mentioned before, and as long as you do not challenge the Party rule, things can be discussed. I mentioned in Chapter Three the revival of Chinese traditional culture, with ancient classics being published in large numbers such as the book of classics I am now using, which I had never read before I came to the U.S..

Cultural capital, or knowledge, is created and disseminated out of the need for the survival of civilization. There is the need in a dynamic society for the spiritual and cultural consumption; intellectuals are playing their part in

the civilizing process. Movie directors, writers, literary critics, journalists are all contributing to the project. Even if there is censorship, it is impossible to censor everything that is produced. People cannot live in ancient, and cultural norms, values and beliefs are even debated except issues concerning the Party rule. There is a need of their activities and services and there is also room for the play of intellectuals.

Second, intellectuals do make a living out of their intellectual activities by using their cultural capital. We discussed their alienation because of the disparity between their income and social status. But even though many of them are unhappy with the status quo and many do leave their current jobs for better opportunities, they are after all different from the peasants who drift into the cities looking for construction jobs, under-paid and poorly-housed or workers who are laid off and wonder what to do next. Intellectuals (those with college education) constitute only a tiny percentage of the population, less than one percent, (0.6% according to the 1982 census; see Ding Xueliang, p.244), and their services are badly needed all over the country. The public educational system, still the largest employer of intellectuals, needs tens of thousands of highly educated intellectuals. That is why we hear unemployment of workers and peasants, but not of intellectuals, at least not yet. Intellectuals have always had a job, unlike the case in the

United States where there is an oversupply of the highly educated. (See Gouldner, p.66-70; Aronowitz and DiFazio, p.255)

The only possibility of intellectual unemployment is the deprivation of the right of critical intellectuals by the Party to teach and publish because of their political views. Guo Luoji was deprived of his right to teach philosophy after the June 4th but he kept writing and publishing. The enormous cultural market of Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and North America has produced ample opportunities for prominent intellectuals, especially critical ones, to publish their cultural products, and many critical intellectuals even left the country if they found they could not make a living with their cultural capital. The majority of unattached and critical intellectuals, however, can find a way to survive without having to leave the country as I examined in Chapter Three. I translated Lin Yutang's My Country and My People from English to Chinese with a friend of mine in 1988 and it sold 150,000 copies. Each of us was paid about 4,000 yuan, about two years' salary at the time. Right now we are publishing a second edition of the book and by selling off the copy right for five years (meaning no royalties however many copies the publishers sell), each of us is going to get 12,000 yuan, a professor's salary for a year. We can imagine how writers and scholars of various kinds are using copy rights, publications, patents etc. to claim an income. For one more example, writers

produce popular novels to subsidize their income as we mentioned in Chapter Three. However, the fact that many intellectuals are managing by using their cultural capital does not deny the alienation caused by a general difficulty in getting their books published and the disparity between their ability and incomes, which we discussed earlier.

It is not new that intellectuals are an organic part of Chinese society and claim an enforceable income. As Weber commented, the traditional Chinese intellectuals, or the *literati*, were a status group and part of the ruling class. But before they obtained the status, they had to demonstrate their educational qualifications.

For twelve centuries social rank in China has been determined more by qualification for office than by wealth. This qualification, in turn, has been determined by education, and especially by examinations. China has made literary education the yardstick of social prestige in the most exclusive fashion, far more exclusively than did Europe during the period of the humanists, or as Germany has done.... (Gerth and Mills 1946, p.416.)

Indeed, to become bearers of progress and part of the ruling class, intellectuals had to have educational credentials. Education thus was part of their cultural capital and legitimized by examinations. Furthermore, education as cultural capital was shared by both organic intellectuals and unattached and critical intellectuals. But what does this elevation of social rank mean, then? What does getting a position in the government mean, then? Not just for vocational

purposes, or a calling, Weber says. "As a rule, the Chinese literati strove for princely service both as a source of income and as a normal field of activity." (Gerth and Mills, p.420) This is a key statement about importance of cultural capital as the economic basis of the life of Chinese intellectuals. The education, the knowledge, and qualifications were what the literati, or intellectuals, used to make a living as well as a vocation. They therefore acquired a social rank and a prestige higher than other classes. Cultural capital is their economic basis.

Another example of using cultural capital to claim an income would be Confucius himself. On the one hand, he is upholding the principles of gentleman: a scholar is devoted to truth without feeling ashamed of poor food and clothing (bu chi er yi er shi); he does not even have to eat one's fill or live in the most comfortable house (shi wu qiu bao, ju wu gui an). (Huang Puming, et al. pp.55, 74) On the other hand, he says, "I teach anyone as long as he gives me ten pieces of meat." Or "zi xing shu xiu yi shang, wu weichang wu hui yan." (ibid. p.97) Meat was a greeting gift in ancient times. He claims at least the minimum income.

As an old saying goes, "wan ban jie xia pin, wei you duo shu gao," meaning that only the study of books is the highest occupation, and everything else is inferior. The reason is not only that schooling provided respect and awe to a person as a

bearer of progress and intelligence, but he would have a chance to live a more comfortable life by claiming an enforceable income. Furthermore, literary qualifications, or the cultural capital, set the literati apart from peasants, craftsmen and merchants and gave them a higher social rank. Mencius says, "Those who work mentally rule those who work manually, and those who work manually are ruled by those who work mentally." It still sounds true today. Cultural capital has always been the economic basis of the intellectual class for not only organic intellectuals but also unattached and critical ones.

As we discussed in Chapter Three, intellectuals of various categories are managing by using their cultural capital, and some of them, especially organic intellectuals, are doing very well because of the Party's policy of emphasizing knowledge, especially scientific and technical knowledge, as a productive force. Furthermore, the fact that the majority of them are not happy with the disparity between their amount of cultural capital and their amount of income shows that one of their vested interests is impaired. We will see in the next section the calling as a political basis as well as a vested interest. My conception of cultural capital is a synthesis of Gouldner, Martin and Szelenyi, Elias, and Aronowitz, i.e. to view knowledge as cultural capital, which provides intellectuals not only a basis for political power

but also for economic incomes. We will now turn to the political basis of the intellectual class.

4.2 The "Calling:" a Part of the Political Basis of the New Class

Knowledge as political power is embodied in how knowledge holders use it to claim domination and authority in the everyday civilizing process. Again, it is easy to understand the influence of organic intellectuals in bureaucratic positions or even ideologues such as the influence of Ai Siqi on Mao's philosophical works. (See Fogel in Goldman ed. pp.36-9) It is also important to understand the influence of unattached and critical intellectuals in the civilizing process. In this section, I explain how the calling that has been instilled into the Chinese intellectuals has become a source of their political class power. In the next section, I will explain how the Chinese intellectuals' CCD forms another part of their political basis.

At the beginning of Great Learning, one of the Confucian classics, Confucius laid down the principle of xiu shen, qi jia, zhi guo, ping tian xia, in short "xiu qi zhi ping," or cultivate and perfect oneself, get one's family in order, guide or govern one's country in the right course, and pacify the world. In addition to Great Learning, Confucius and his disciples promoted the same principle throughout their other works such as The Golden Mean, The Analects, Mentius, etc.

Everything one reads in their books is about how to do these things right. Confucianism thus became the bible of the Chinese intellectuals so much so that anyone who aspired to office in the feudal times had to be well versed in these doctrines.

It is true that in the Chinese history, Confucianism had been battered a number of times, for example, first by Emperor Qin Shi Huang, and later by the Communists, but the Chinese intellectuals used to be immersed in the Confucian teachings promoted by examinations and they have most of the times consciously followed the Confucian principles. Much of the teaching is already melted into the common language that people speak, let alone the language of the intellectuals. Brought up in the Communist society, I did not have a chance to read the above mentioned four classics until fairly recently. I was surprised to find how much I had already known about the teaching and how much of my language was from these four books.

The Confucian teaching has always been the consciousness of Chinese intellectuals, especially "xiu qi zhi ping." According to the Confucian teaching, to perfect oneself is to cultivate and acquire such virtues as love, benevolence, humanity, kindness, courtesy, magnimity, good faith, diligence, loyalty, reciprocity, the golden mean, and not doing to others one doesn't want others to do to oneself. One

is supposed to put one's house in order by applying these and other principles. Then one is ready to go into politics to govern one's country and unify the world, although at that time, the country meant one's own state, and the world probably meant China in general. To enter politics is one of the ultimate goals of an intellectual, which is termed in Chinese gong, or great deeds, others being great virtues and great literary works, as is the saying, li de, li gong, li yan, where li means to create or do, de means virtues, yan means literary words/works that will be handed down to later generations, and gong means great deeds. So another way to put xiu qi zhi ping would be to li de, li gong, li yan, to set an examples of great morals, deeds, and words. This is the "calling" that Chinese intellectuals have followed in whatever they do, consciously most of the time and subconsciously other times. (See also Wen Chongyi in Zhongguo Luntan Bianwei Hui, pp.70-4)

This calling unites various categories of intellectuals and becomes one of their defining characteristics and thus vested interests. It underscores the fact that intellectuals have always been part of every ruling class in the Chinese history, be they the feudal kings and emperors or the Communist or Nationalist regimes. For the calling-motivated organic intellectuals, to serve the ruling class is to serve the people. In this regard, among numerous scholar-officials, we are often reminded of the examples of Zhuge Liang (181-234)

or Fan Zhongyan (989-1052), whose maxims have been handed down from generations to generations such as the former's jugong jingcui, si er hou yi, meaning bending one's back to the task until one's dying day, and the latter's xian tianxia zhi you er you, hou tianxia zhi le er le, or be the first to worry about the troubles of the world and the last to enjoy its pleasures. To become a scholar-official may be the best way to save the world, because they hold the wheel of history.

But even when they are serving the ruling class, the calling-conscious intellectuals keep a critical stance. We gave examples in Chapter Two of organic intellectuals who were critical under the Party rule ever since the early days of the Party history such as Wang Shiwei and later Deng Tuo and Wu Han from the Beijing CCP Committee. The same applies to Chinese intellectuals in Taiwan as well. Hu Shi, one of the champions of the May 4th Movement, was critical of Chiang kai-shek's politics while being the Ambassador of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the U.S. In fact, the magazine he sponsored, Free China, was banned because of articles criticizing the KMT politics and even advocating establishing another party to compete with the KMT. One issue commemorating Chiang's birthday in 1956 published articles advocating protection of freedom of speech, respecting the law and constitution, economic and defense reform. It was in fact an issue of dissent. Hu Shi himself wrote an article entitled "Tell Two Stories of President Eisenhower to Commemorate President

Chiang's Birthday," and suggested that Chiang do more by doing less. As a result of their ideas, not only the magazine was banned but the co-publisher Lei Zhen was court-martialed and imprisoned. Hu Shi questioned the procedure of the trial (the defense lawyer had only one day and a half to consult related materials) and tried every means to save him but failed despite his long time personal relationship with Chiang. (Zhang Zhongdong in Zhonghuo Luntan Bianwei Hui, pp. 363-87)

Tao Baichuan, another well-known intellectual in Taiwan and a member of the State Supervisory Committee, argued that even if Lei Zhen violated the law by speaking his mind, he should be tried in the civil court instead of the military court. The trial itself was a violation of the law. But he failed too in his effort. Tao himself was famous as an upright intellectual in the state government for not only defending intellectuals but impeaching corrupt officials. Even Chiang himself once said to him, "You are a well established intellectual, but you are adamantly against the Party. I am very disappointed." (Li Hongxi in Zhongguo Luntan Bianwei Hui, pp.500, 481-507)

The calling also underscores the fact they all consider publication of their works important in their intellectual lives and the fact that they believe a society of virtues should be established, although people may disagree on what they mean by virtues. As a result, intellectuals may fulfill

their calling not by becoming an official but by doing their own studies. We discussed the unattached intellectuals in the second chapter. While many of the unattached intellectuals may come from the Taoist tradition, like Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi themselves, advocating a different way of governing or calling, a large number of them might be former scholar-officials. Great literary figures in history such as Li Bai (701-762) from Tang dynasty and Tao Yuanming (ca.372-427) from East Jin dynasty belong to this category. After leaving office, they indulged themselves in literary creation and enjoyed their mundane life, remaining unattached to, though sometimes critical of, political powers at the time.

Other than some organic intellectuals, the most important group of calling motivated intellectuals may be the critical intellectuals. From the "Party cases" in East Han, the "Donglin cases" in the Ming dynasty, to the revolutionary movements led by Sun Yen-dan and Mao, and the current democratic movement against the Communist Party dictatorship, we see the tradition of intellectuals' struggle to fulfill the calling. Perry Link notices the similarities of wording in political declarations by the Nationalists, Communists, (especially when they were young,) and the dissident intellectuals in America, such as "people of strong will," offering themselves "to the great mission" and resolutely struggling "for Chinese democracy." (Link, p.198) The wording is mainly not because of the inability of Chinese

intellectuals to escape the mind-set of official language, as some suggest, but because of the mind-set of the calling. We generally do not find such strong sense of calling to save China and the world among other social groups. It is this calling that shakes the foundation of the CCP ruling, as the CCP shook the ruling of KMT fifty years ago.

To sum up, the traditional calling is the first aspect of the intellectuals' political power base and one of their defining characteristics and vested interests. When an intellectual is deprived of his right to serve in the government or publish his works, his interest is impaired. This is an intellectual's mission. As Weber points out, the traditional intellectuals "determined the whole destiny of China." (Gerth and Mills, pp.92-3) Intellectuals are still determining the destiny of modern China, i.e. both organic and unattached/critical intellectuals, not only in the sense of science and technology but also in social and democratic reforms. It would be hard to imagine that economic reform can go very far without the intervention of intellectuals in a political reform. It would be difficult to think that the bureaucratic ruling class will turn a deaf ear to the dissident intellectuals and not allow them some room of political movement once Deng dies. In the past, the ruling class has always compromised by releasing one or two political prisoners under both international and national pressure. We will talk more about the intellectuals' role in these reforms

in the next chapter. Now let us move to CCD as another part of intellectuals' political basis.

4.3 CCD: Another Part of the Political Basis of the New Class

Closely related to the calling, is the culture of critical discourse. As we discussed in Chapter One, Gouldner's notion of CCD refers to the justification of assertions based on voluntary consent instead of invoking authorities. (Gouldner, p.28) It is the ideology that is shared by both technical and humanistic intellectuals, according to Gouldner. In my developed model of the intellectual complex, CCD unites organic and unattached/critical intellectuals, the categories that crosscut humanistic and technical intellectuals. It is also the ideology that gives the intellectuals their political self-groundedness, or independence from other social forces, as the calling does. In this section, I will further define CCD, examine in what forms CCD demonstrates itself in the Chinese intellectuals, and in what way the practice of CCD may be one of the most vested interests of intellectuals.

For Gouldner, the New Class as a speech community upholds CCD as a grammar of its own, i.e. be open to arguments and ground one's judgement on pure persuasiveness instead of authority. What matters is the speech itself, not the social positions of the speaker. The New Class thus defies conformity to authorities and seeks rules by which truth or universal

values may be found. The speech thus becomes de-contextualized and self-grounded. This autonomy or self-groundedness is thus the modern intellectuals' notion of rationality. Because intellectuals are the owners of this speech, it gives the New Class its autonomy and independence from other social groups, i.e. the deeper structure than Shils's cultural formation of intellectuals we discussed in Chapter One, which makes possible the self-movement and self-direction, thereby the power, of intellectuals. In other words, CCD grants intellectuals more political power than what cultural capital and the calling have already granted them.

However, does CCD imply a group power of intellectuals? Here Shils and Chomsky provide some conflicting pictures of intellectuals. While Shils emphasizes the alienative potential of intellectuals, their disruption of social solidarity, of established tradition and opposition to constituted authority, Chomsky stresses their subservience to power, "toadying for favor, advancement, awards, and notice", "eagerness to provide (paid) services and arguments for both industry and the state," and "readiness to be the 'servant of power.'" (Gouldner, pp.32-42) Gouldner agrees with the description by both Shils and Chomsky, though he thinks that they are exaggerating. He tries to explain away the inconsistencies and contradictions of intellectuals by saying that negativity of intellectuals described by Shils could embody "a disguised set of claims advancing their own candidacy as a new elite" to

replace the old class, and it is possible that serving the power is a strategy of intellectuals for their eventual elevation to power. (ibid., pp.32-3, 40)

But if being subversive and defying authorities is consistent with CCD, being servant of power does not really prove that CCD is that important for at least some intellectuals. To resolve the contradiction, we might have to appeal to our distinction between organic intellectuals and critical ones. Apparently, Shils's intellectuals are mainly the latter while Chomsky's are mainly the former. CCD still matters because even if an intellectual becomes organic to, for example, the ruling class, he or she still retains some of the CCD, though less than critical intellectuals, as we discussed in Chapter One. That is why the toadying and subservience. CCD is still a unifying factor for different categories of intellectuals, though, for even if one becomes organic, one can still be very critical as the Chinese case I discussed in Chapter Two shows. In addition, intellectuals want to serve the power maybe because of the calling or to realize one's cultural capital. Furthermore, it is the unattached and critical intellectuals that form the bulk of an intellectual class. Thus the seeming inconsistency may be consistent with an intellectual's calling and the nature of CCD. I will now examine the case of Chinese intellectuals' CCD and see how it unifies the Chinese intellectuals.

It looks paradoxical but Confucianism does have an aspect of CCD while being strict in its patriarchal and authoritative claims, but that may be a problem of CCD itself, which we will discuss in Chapter Six. Confucius advocates wu yi, wu bi, wu gu, wu wo, meaning "do not indulge in wishful thinking, absolute assertion, stubborn insistence and self-righteousness." (Huang Puming, et al. p.112) Another of his famous saying is san ren xing bi you wo shi yan, meaning in a crowd of three, there must be one that could be my teacher. The gist of his teaching here is that we should keep an open mind to others' opinions and always prepared to learn from others. This even transcends CCD. So even though Confucianism is noted for its rigid patriarchal and authoritative ideology, it teaches intellectuals to be modest and question themselves. This may be the first part of the Chinese intellectuals' CCD, i.e. be open minded and always prepared to learn.

Mencius himself upholds the so called hao ran zhi qi, or a will and a spirit that is of a grand scale, strong and upright. (Huang Puming, pp.252-7) He also says that a da zhang fu, or a gentleman, is not to be bewildered by wealth and honor, shaken by poverty and humbleness, or to bend before authorities and force, (fugui buneng yin, pinjian buneng yi, weiwu buneng qu.) (ibid. p.304) The best example is the late philosopher Liang Suming, who was the most outspoken critic of Mao and his policies while being his supporter for a long time. When his colleagues asked him how he felt after being

criticized for several months for "contemning Lin Biao but not Confucius" although he was supposed to do both, he said, "The army can be deprived of its commander-in-chief, but a person cannot be deprived of his will and spirit." (Liang Suming, pp.459-65) That again is a Confucian saying the calling-motivated intellectuals have upheld for thousands of years. This will and spirit may be the second part of the Chinese intellectuals' culture of critical discourse, i.e. be oneself and do not easily succumb to power and authorities.

The third part of the Chinese version of CCD is shi shi qiu shi, or "seeking truth from facts." As Wang Shubai points out, the saying was first used by the historian, poet and biographer Ban Gu (32-92) of the East Han dynasty to describe Liu De. The principle was developed by Yan Shigu (581-645) in his teachings, Gu Yanwu (1613-1682) in his philosophy of practicality in studies, and Zen Guofan (1811-1872) in his movement of practicicism to combine Chinese studies and Western learning in the Self-strengthening movement. Mao further developed it into the motto of the CCP's way of thinking. (Wang Shubai, p.59) Mao says,

"Facts" are all the things that exist objectively, "truth" means their internal relations, that is, the laws governing them, and "to seek" means to study. We should proceed from the actual conditions inside and outside the country, the province, county or district, and derive from them, as our guide to action, laws which are inherent in them and not imaginary, that is, we should find the internal relations of the events occurring around us. And in order to do that we must rely not on subjective imagination, not on momentary enthusiasm, not

on lifeless books, but on facts that exist objectively; we must appropriate the material in detail and, guided by the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, draw correct conclusions from it. (Scram ed. p.131)

According to this principle, Mao and his colleagues, while adhering to Marxism, defied Marx's belief that Communist revolution can only succeed in an industrialized country and at the same time all over the world. It is according to the same principle that Deng and his colleagues launched their reform in the economic field but not really in the political realm. Another example will be Chen Yun, as we mentioned before, one of the gang of the old, who, a couple of years ago when he visited Shanghai, encouraged the municipal officials of Shanghai not to always obey their authorities, or follow books blindly, but always seek truth from practice, compare, exchange opinions with others and try to find the best way to achieve socialism.

The same principle also guided the organic intellectuals' rebellion we discussed in Chapters Two, as well as the activities of the political dissidents, whose rebellion against Marxism once they believed so ardently is the best example of seeking truth from facts. Deep in the Chinese intellectuals' mind-set is the same traditional motto. This is what I consider the third part of Chinese intellectuals' CCD, in addition to the openmindedness and the strong will and upright spirit.

To sum up, the Chinese intellectuals' culture of critical discourse may be considered as composed of three parts, i.e. the Confucian concept of "not indulging in wishful thinking, absolute assertion, stubborn insistence and self-righteousness," Mencius's "gentleman will and spirit," and an intellectual ideal of "seeking truth from facts." All of them imply a defiance of authority and stress an openmindedness to arguments based on evidence and not on the social positions of the speaker. It is this tradition of Chinese CCD that has bred all the prominent intellectuals from Qu Yuan, the poet, Sima Qian, the historian, Wei Zhen, the advisor to the emperor, to Kang Youwi, Liang Qichao, and even the CCP and KMT intellectuals, both organic and critical, intellectuals who have had tremendous influences in the Chinese historical change and development.

More importantly, CCD not only defines the Chinese intellectuals but unites them as well. No matter whether one is organic, unattached, or critical, the same tradition works, although more so in the latter two than in the former. When a scholar-official retreated from his officialdom, he either became again an unattached or critical intellectuals, or both. The will and spirit are the unifying characteristics of Chinese intellectuals although the amount of CCD and how each individual demonstrates it varies according to time and structural locations. To be or not to be able to practice CCD has been the focus of the battles between the rulers of

various dynasties, including the CCP and KMT regimes, and intellectuals, as we have demonstrated in Chapters One and Two. CCD is thus a vested interest of intellectuals of various categories.

4.4 Alienation of Intellectuals and Their Class Consciousness

We have examined in the previous sections how cultural capital, the calling and CCD have bestowed intellectuals the economic and political bases of their existence. But historical and contemporary evidence tells us that their economic and political bases are often shaken by the ruling class, which creates alienation among intellectuals. But this alienation does not destroy the intellectuals; instead, it further consolidates their class consciousness. In this section, I will examine how intellectuals form a new consciousness in the contemporary China.

Class consciousness refers to an awareness that they are different from others. When a person says that he or she is an intellectual, or says that his or her origin, chushen, is intellectual, the person indicates an awareness of where he or she is from and identifies him or herself with people of similar kind. When others refer to either a bureaucrat, Party boss, or a businessman, they might say, "He is from an intellectual origin." When they talk about their background, the bureaucrats or new bourgeoisie may also refer to

themselves as from an "intellectual origin," or zhi shi fenzi chushen, to set themselves apart from workers and peasants. It is in fact the cultural capital and CCD that set the different groups apart.

Therefore, to talk about consciousness of an intellectual, we are talking about an awareness that one has more cultural capital than others, has a deeper "insight" (remember that in Chinese zhi means knowledge and shi means insight) and has a different way of doing things. And this class consciousness is strengthened by the collective experience they have throughout history. Chushen used to be matter of life or death in the Communist revolution and is still a matter that interests people in social interaction. An intellectual chushen used to give an awe and respect until the Cultural Revolution, and it is regaining the old status now although not without bumps, as we have demonstrated in the dissertation.

This consciousness however is further established by alienation of intellectuals by their inability to use their cultural capital to claim an income to their liking and fulfill the mission their calling requires of them and practice their CCD as they are supposed to. In this section, I discuss how political and economic oppression fosters a class consciousness.

4.4.1 Political Repression and Class Consciousness

Political repression of intellectuals has been a social fact several thousand years old. Intellectuals have been subjected to Emperor Qin's being buried alive and having their (Confucian) books burned, and execution and imprisonment of Han, Ming and Qing Dynasties. In modern and contemporary times, history witnessed not only persecution of dissident intellectuals by the Nationalist government but also by the Communist regime, the latter of which continues up to this day. If one may say that most intellectuals heartily supported the CCP in its revolutionary efforts before and after 1949, the events in 1989 have shaken their loyalty and made quite a number of them turn their back on the Party. Many denounced the June 4th massacre immediately after and organized dissident organizations both in and outside the country. Now than ever before, they realize that to protect their own rights of intellectuals, i.e. the freedom to criticize the government as they see necessary, a brand new political system is needed, one that is different from the feudal and totalitarian control. This is the political mission they face now, which they could not see more clearly now after the 1989 events.

The new class consciousness is in place not only with the intellectuals outside the country, humanistic or technical, organic and unattached, especially critical intellectuals, but

with the intellectuals inside the country as well. Reflecting on the events in 1950 of Mao's criticism of the movie "The Story of Wuxun," Xia Yan, the Director of the Cultural Bureau in Shanghai that permitted the shooting of the picture and one of the top Party bosses in charge of arts and literature later, said that he visited many countries and found that it is the Chinese intellectuals who love their country and the Party most. While many East European intellectuals remained in or fled to the West after their revolutions, many Chinese intellectuals returned in contrast. He then said,

Chinese intellectuals support the CCP whole-heartedly. But in the past forty some years, what have they got in return? As is well known, the anti-Rightist movement in 1957, anti-right tendency movement and "criticize-academic-authority" (ba bai qi) movement in 1959, the rectification movement in the Bureau of Culture in 1964, and the "unprecedented" Cultural Revolution, all attacked the intellectuals head on. I have thought about why for a long time but still cannot find an answer. Maybe I can only say that this is a national tragedy. (Xia Yan, 1994)

He must be pondering on the problem of the political system and the political culture, but the quote is how far he can say.

Another former organic intellectual, Wang Yuanhua, the well-known cultural critic, who served after the liberation as the Chief of the Propaganda Department of Shanghai Party Committee, says that in the past few years, many Chinese intellectuals have been quietly reflecting on what has happened to them. They haven't written about it yet, and some

of the changes are deeply buried in their hearts. But when the time is ripe, they will let people know what they have thought. (Wang Yuanhua, p.173)

When I interviewed him, he stressed that the greatest changes had occurred in the past five and six years (i.e. after the June 4th massacre). It is a conscious reflection that sets almost everyone in thinking, although some of what they think can only be detected here and there in their writing and bit by bit. He believes that the greatest changes in the past few years are in people's "spirits," including one's beliefs, academic conscience, changes in one's ways of thinking. He joked that it is like a confession; it is a self-criticism of one's thoughts. He talked with me about how to evaluate the May 4th movement, his dialogues with overseas Chinese scholars on some historical issues concerning the independence of thinking and spirit of freedom. He is one of those who believes in the narrow definition of intellectuals and believes that intellectuals' responsibility is to advocate democracy.

Indeed, more Chinese intellectuals have been re-thinking their past experience. Liu Zaifu, a leading literary critic now in exile, has called on the Chinese intellectuals to confess for their "complicity" in the Cultural Revolution. Ba Jin, one of the most venerated writers, wrote his famous Random Reflections in 1987, Liu Xiaobo, one of the younger

literary critics, wrote Monologue of a Doomsday's Survivor in 1992. This self-criticism seeks for reasons why they seemed to have lost their ability to think independently, their moral courage and personal integrity. They search for the soul of China, as Tongqi Lin states it, or a conscience of society, which intellectuals believe themselves should be. (See Tongqi Lin in Daedalus, Spring 1993) Lin believes Wang Yuanhua to be representative of Chinese intellectuals today and what Wang says in the following represents a definitive meaning of intellectuals and their consciousness:

I believe that the salutary side of the tradition of Chinese intellectuals is that it not only requires a rich professional knowledge but also a profound "concerned-consciousness" (youhuan yishi) for human life--a consciousness that has become the driving force for exploring the secret of knowledge and makes me feel spiritually sublimated. (Lin, *ibid.* 178)

The confession movement of intellectuals is an effort to re-define their consciousness, but this reflection does not concern only the past mistakes. In the interview with me, Wang points out that while the reflections are painful, one should not give up one's beliefs lightly or adopt something new readily. He says that he joined the revolution with the Communist New Fourth Army in the anti-Japanese war but left for not being able to bear their cultural policy. But he returned later. Whether intellectuals remained in Mainland or went to Taiwan, they followed their conscience, and that is the most important thing, no matter whether they are pro-Nationalist or pro-Communist. (See also Wang in Wenhui Reading

Weekly, July 23, 1994) Whatever he has written, he writes with his heart. Even if some of his literary and political ideas in the past seem naive ideals today, he believed them wholeheartedly at the time. "I have never written anything that's not from my heart even if I might have hesitations and puzzlement." (Wang Yuanhua, p.198)

He believes that intellectuals should become an independent social force and detests those who lack moral principles and succumb too easily to stronger political forces. For example, he praised Liang Suming, the renowned philosopher who stood up for himself and sometimes ardently against Mao all along under the Communist rule, while he despised three nationally well-known technical intellectuals, one of whom is now the President of Shanghai University, whose surnames are the same Qian. He says, "three Qian's are not worth one Liang," where qian and liang are puns: qian is also a measurement, one tenths of a liang, which is a different word of measurement but with the same pronunciation. So of course three qian is not worth a liang. In an article entitled "Academic Conscience," he again lavishes his attack on those who become "royal tools" (yu yong gong ju) and serve the ruling class out of personal ends. (Wang, in Wenhui Daily, June 3, 1994)⁸

⁸ It is interesting to notice that the article was actually written in 1982 but published in December 1989, shortly after the June 4th massacre when all we could see in the press was the ideological articles of Party organic intellectuals. The article was reprinted in the Wenhui Daily on the eve of the fifth

These changes among intellectuals are amazing especially because they come from former organic intellectuals, which is another example of CCD and calling functioning in intellectuals, and organic intellectuals can become critical because of them. Deng Weizhi, one of the Vice Chairmen of Chinese Association to Accelerate Democracy, which is one of the nine small political parties, made mainly of intellectuals as is the case of other parties, which subjected them to the rule of the Party after liberation, wrote that intellectuals should learn to become an independent force and struggle for their legal rights in theoretical construction, organizations and system change to guarantee their rights. (Deng Weizhi, p.221) (Deng also detests those intellectuals whose heads he believes are grown on the bodies of their bosses, he said in the interview with me.) Deng's example also illustrates that it is not that intellectuals don't have consciousness of independence as intellectuals but that they are not allowed to express the consciousness.

anniversary of the massacre in 1994, a time when the government had been tightening its control by rounding up dissidents and cautioning various Party and government branches against any political trouble because of the occasion. If I were the boss of the Daily, I would have pulled out the article for fear of political repercussion, especially because I remember in 1957, Mao wrote his famous editorial for People's Daily, "Wenhui Daily's Bourgeois Tendency Must Be Criticized," which launched the attack on the so-called "rightists" especially rightist intellectuals.

4.4.2 Economic Oppression and Class Consciousness

All intellectuals experience alienation, whether they are organic or unattached, especially when they are politically critical. We demonstrated that organic intellectuals constantly find themselves at odds with radically political intellectuals, unattached intellectuals pressed in their economic and academic conditions, and critical intellectuals repressed even more severely, all because they want to maintain an independent status, politically, economically and academically, and all because they want to fulfill the calling bestowed upon themselves by tradition.

The previous section focuses on political repression that produces alienation and hence a class consciousness. We now turn to economic alienation, i.e. their social status derived from their economic status, and see how this also fosters a class consciousness.

Professors and school teachers especially feel that their social status is unfairly low. One saying goes like this, "Viewed at a distance, they look like refugees; when they are in front of you, they look like beggars; when you ask who they are, you find that they are teachers." Mr. Deng of SASS believes that intellectuals lack the essentials for a living. He says that what they ask is not a room to live but a workshop where they can do their job. It is of course both. Even if conditions for senior professors seem to have improved

tremendously, income and housing for younger college teachers seem to indicate they have a lower social status. "No money, no status," as many of them commented. As we reported earlier, they earn about 400 to 600 yuan a month, not including their grey incomes, which most of them do not have. Even if they do, they believe that their grey incomes should not be included because they do not represent how much the state recognize them. Some college teachers say that when they go out with friends for dinner, the friends would say, "Let me pay; you are a college teacher and don't earn much." Lecturer Gu said that people like her dare not go to Huai Hai Road because clothes there are all expensive. Once one of her classmates wanted to sell her a set of cosmetics for 150 yuan. She hesitated and did not buy it because ordinarily she did not even buy cosmetics for over 30 yuan. Her income does not allow her the luxuries.

Prof. Fang says that the problem is that the Party has not really given the intellectuals their due status even though it says that the intellectuals are part of the working class, because they are, after all, different from workers and peasants. Science and technology are the first productive force. He believes that "strategically" the Party may have put intellectuals in their right place but "tactically" it hasn't done much. Younger intellectuals especially have very low pay and low living conditions. When Deng Xiaoping wanted to let some people get rich first, it was not clear who were those

"some people." They should be intellectuals, Prof. Fang commented. Fang kept comparing China with Japan, as many others had done.

Indeed, intellectuals have long complained the phenomenon of nao ti dao gua, "with one's body up and head down," meaning the upside down of the income system with those who use their brain earn less and those who use their hands earn more, as we mentioned earlier. This situation is especially apparent at the First TV Factory, where the engineers tend to earn a little over a thousand yuan a month whereas the workers earn about two thousand. The more you produce the TV sets, the more you earn. It is the workers who are seen every day producing TV sets, although as Mr. Guo, the Deputy Director points out, "In fact, 75% of the profits are produced by the improvement of technology and only 25% by the repetitious production."

As long as the factory heads think they can sell the television, they will not take serious consideration of paying engineers more to develop new technology, and we will have the same nao ti dao gua, or another decade old saying, zuo dao dan de bu ru mai cha ye dan de, meaning "those who make guided missiles earn less than those who sell tea stewed eggs." (The pun is "dan." The "dan" for missiles is pronounced as the same as the "dan" for eggs.) The status of the intellectuals are certainly impaired by their relatively low income.

This proletarianization of Chinese intellectuals puts many of them in a position even worse than some of the working class. But the difference is that the intellectuals write and talk about this situation among themselves, and with others, while the working class may talk about it but not write about it. So a class consciousness is easily formed when intellectuals read each other's writing about their common political and economic status, which will in turn foster a class consciousness. The sayings we have cited, and many more, are obviously intellectual inventions denoting their class consciousness. Even if the Party is wary about an intellectual rebellion derived from this instigative writing, its control can be effective only to a certain extent, especially when meanings are implied. It is very hard to prosecute someone on elusive words. Disparity between their high status and relatively low income thus fosters a consciousness also because intellectuals have the tools to articulate that consciousness.

To sum up, to talk about political and economic repression as fostering class consciousness, we are actually talking about the realization that the intellectuals' vested interests derived from cultural capital, the calling and CCD are being impaired. This is also the beginning of a realization of their power. This realization, of course, is only at the initial stage and it awaits much more organization and consciousness raising. That is why we say that an

intellectual class is a possibility and is only at the first stage of formation. We will now move to one of the key variables of class formation, i.e. communities and organizations.

4.5 Intellectual Communities: the Organizational Basis

One of the most important indicators of class formation, whether it is mainly an economic construction of class or mainly a cultural one, is communities. In the recent Chinese history, workers have organized unions and peasants organized peasant associations with the help of intellectuals. Intellectuals, on the other hand, organized two political parties, the Nationalist and the Communist. But these two intellectual parties have finally been dominated by radical political and military intellectuals (Chiang Kaishek in the former and Zhu De in the latter can be considered as military intellectuals) and have lost much of its intellectual nature, e.g. the CCD. In the case of the Communist Party, as we have demonstrated, the radical political and military intellectuals have turned against critical intellectuals. As a result, Chinese intellectuals are facing the most formidable task of organizing themselves but not falling into dictatorships as their predecessors have. Nevertheless, let us first review what organizations or communities intellectuals do have.

4.5.1 Communities in the Country

There are almost no unofficial intellectual communities in China and if they are official, they cannot be politically critical. So most intellectual communities are either organic or only moderately critical. The most organic intellectual communities are the so-called "democratic parties" in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, (CPPCC), originally established during the revolution years to legitimate the control of the CCP. It was composed of various political forces including the CCP and other small parties and interest groups. It is now composed of eight major parties of mainly intellectuals. But as is the case of the Chinese People's Congress, it is mainly still a tool used by the CCP to show that CCP does not dominate China but is only helped by other political groups, whereas the small parties all pledged allegiance to the Party although they do make suggestions and the Party do recruit higher bureaucrats from these small parties.

As intellectual communities, they gather some very well-known Chinese intellectuals together and occasionally they can be very critical of the Party albeit claiming first that they are loyal. In fact some of the most famous "rightists" in 1957 were from these parties. Mr. Deng Weizhi, one of the Vice Chairmen of the Democracy Promotion Association, is one of the most vocal critics. As soon as I saw him in his office shared

with a dozen people, he began to criticize the Party for neglecting their working conditions by pointing to me how the chairs were broken and how difficult it was even for us to find a place to sit. He finally found two chairs and put some newspaper on the seat to protect our pants from being soiled.

In one of his talks at their association conference, he calls on the CCP to improve one of its policies toward the democratic parties: he says that "long term co-existence" seems doing fine but "mutual supervision" has to be improved, although he does not say how. (Deng Weizhi, in Min Jin, p.8) Prof. Fang, a member of the CCP but also one of the CPPCC, says that since the latter is mainly composed of senior intellectuals, the government treats them like a think tank. ECNU, for example, have a meeting every two months to ask for their opinions. When I asked him what percentage of the opinions were adopted, he said that it was hard to say. Nevertheless, the small democratic parties are communities some intellectuals do have and they do protect their interests and function as intellectuals albeit mainly organic.

Another kind of intellectual community would be various kinds of professional associations such as Chinese Writers' Association, Chinese Journalists Association, Chinese Sociology Association, etc. as well as various local associations organized around activities such as painting, calligraphy, environment science study, or united front

theories study. (See Wang Yin et al.) None of them can be political. If they are unofficial, they have to be strictly technical. This does not mean they can do nothing politically. They can when opportunities arise. In 1989 during the democracy movement, one thousand journalists from the Chinese Journalists' Association signed a petition for a talk with the Party Central Committee members.

While parties and associations are important intellectual communities, other intellectual communities abound: universities, hospitals, research institutes, both official or private, independent or attached to a corporation, and newspapers and magazines. Magazines especially have become more important since other communities are more easily watched and controlled by the Party and government. In the past several years, numerous magazines emerged and some of them are very intellectually oriented focusing on Chinese culture, economic reform, literature, social sciences, etc. Together with the formally established magazines such as Reading, they form what a professor calls "academic spectacle." (PFG, Nov. 25, 1994)

Indeed, as Prof. Xiao reports, currently the "state policy" intellectuals are clustered around Strategy and Management, "academic intellectuals" around Magazine of Social Sciences, humanistic intellectuals around Reading, East, and social critical intellectuals around Magazine of Chinese

Development. Some of these magazines are financed by Hong Kong corporations, as we pointed out earlier. I asked him how they could maintain independence if sponsored by capitalists, he cited me the old Confucian motto, cong dao bu cong jun, meaning one can work for the emperor but still follow one's own principles. While they may carry their commercial ads, the editors control largely what will be in the magazine as long as the content is not sensitively political.

To sum up, even if open and highly critical political organizations are impossible in China now, intellectuals do cluster around certain kind of parties, associations, and other intellectual communities. These communities make it possible for the consciousness to be sustained and their policies formed. But since they are not politically independent, they are not political organizations of interest groups in the full sense. Furthermore, since there is no communication between various organizations to organize intellectual class action, an intellectual class formation is only a possibility, and it remains to be seen how long it can take for it to happen.

4.5.2 Communities Outside the Country and Their Connections with Those in the Country

Communities of intellectual outside the country can be classified into two kinds: political parties, and economic and professional associations. There are mainly three political

parties organized by political dissidents based mainly in the U.S. The Chinese Democratic Alliance was established over ten years ago by overseas Chinese students, and publishes its own magazine China Spring. The Democratic Front is composed mainly of those who fled China after the June 4th massacre, and publishes its magazine Democratic China. The Chinese Freedom and Democracy Party is composed of intellectuals who broke up with the Chinese Democratic Alliance. The Chinese Students Autonomous Federation is a semi-political organization and established after June 4th massacre to supposedly carry on what the Chinese students were not able to do because of the suppression in China. All these organizations advocate democracy in China and favor a pluralist political system.

There are also numerous professional organizations such as the Chinese Students Association of Science and Technology, Chinese Students Association of Business, and Chinese Students Association of Engineering. The major purposes of these associations are to promote economic communication and exchange with Mainland China and to supposedly help each other to establish themselves in America.

The relationship between the political organizations and the political or semi-political organizations in China like what we have described is minimal. The overseas dissident organizations have tried to smuggle newspapers and magazines into China, or help the families of those who have been

imprisoned or suffered after the June 4th massacre, but their effort is often hampered by the authorities and they have achieved little success. The economic and professional organizations want to do business with China and are therefore in constant contact with government and professional organizations in China. Some of them started their own businesses with the help of this contact. They tend to have very good relationship with officials from Chinese embassy and consulates in the U.S. and different factions even court their support in their power struggles. There is little or no relationship between the political and professional organizations in the U.S.

4.6 Conclusions: Chinese Intellectuals as a Class

According to our analysis above, humanistic and technical, organic and unattached/critical intellectuals do share cultural capital that gives them an economic basis, the calling and CCD that provide them with a political basis, a consciousness that may binds them, and intellectual communities that enable them to organize themselves. But can Chinese intellectuals form a class?

In his essay "On Intellectuals," Aronowitz outlines three conditions of cultural class formation: "(1) the occupation of a common structural space; (2) a common discursive (cultural) position that, however, is not presupposed by structural

unity; and (3) political organization exemplified by political parties and national trade unions that also function discursively." (Aronowitz, p.8) Konrad and Szelenyi also emphasize new socioeconomic positions, which corresponds to Aronowitz's structural space, and consciousness, which may correspond to Aronowitz's common discursive position, as conditions of class formation. While Konrad and Szelenyi also require "agents" willing to occupy a new class position, Aronowitz emphasize political organizations. (Konrad and Szelenyi, p.358)

As I point out in Chapter One, Konrad and Szelenyi seem to have overemphasized the role of bureaucratized intellectuals as new agents of the intellectual class in their discussion of the class formation of East European intellectuals. Although it is true that there are calling-motivated organic intellectuals as I analyzed before, these intellectuals are hindered by their bureaucratic obligations and their CCD is constantly questioned. Therefore, in terms of agents, political parties and unions that function discursively over the country are needed for class formation, as Aronowitz points out.

In the Chinese case, we found that Chinese intellectuals do share cultural capital that puts them in certain occupational structure, and they do have the calling and a version of CCD that provide them with a discursive position.

But they do lack a national political party or organization that can function discursively publicly throughout the country because of political repression that is still very strong under the rule of the CCP, in spite of the fact that intellectuals do have numerous organizations in and outside the country.

Nevertheless, what happens in the past five years politically and economically puts critical and unattached intellectuals under siege and forces them to develop an awareness that they seem to have the same fate. Their historical experience reinforces this awareness. Organic intellectuals, either bureaucratized or bourgeoisified, fare much better under the modernization movement, but since they are also cultural capital possessors and still retain some CCD and a calling, they are potential allies of the critical and unattached intellectuals, and remain important in an intellectual class formation. Therefore, there is a discernible group of people in society and they may develop a group consciousness based on their common experience, cultural capital, the CCD and the calling. Their common interests are to use their cultural capital and fulfill their calling. Even if they are not a class yet because of a lack of national organization and clearly defined and recognized interests and consciousness, there is the possibility of a class formation. I will discuss in the next chapter crises of Chinese modernity and the role of intellectuals in resolving them.

Chapter Five

The Crisis of Chinese Modernity and Its Implication for the Chinese Intellectuals as a Class

In the previous chapters, I examined how Chinese intellectuals may be a class in formation. But what is the significance of a Chinese class formation, then? In this chapter, I will outline the crises of Chinese modernity and analyze what roles intellectuals may play in resolving these crises.

Since 1992, China has been overly heated in its economy at the expense of social equality and ecological stability. Even though people's living standard has been raised on the whole and chances have been available for individuals to develop their full potential, the development is uneven and some of the damages done to the environment are irreparable. China already faces many similar problems industrialized societies have been facing. Besides, according to a United Nations Human Development Report in 1993, China still ranked 101th place in human development based on education, income and general happiness, and 142th in per-capita G.N.P. compared with the U.S. of 6th and 10th places in corresponding categories. (Lewis, NYT, May 23, 1993) I will focus on ecological crisis, social and political crisis, ideological and spiritual crisis, crisis in education and crisis of the

working class, and discuss the role of intellectuals in these crises.

5.1 Ecological Crisis

With almost 1.2 billion people, China already houses one fifth of the humanity and its population still increases each year by the number of people in Texas (the second largest state in the U.S. now), about 1,700 million. The population has doubled since the Communist takeover, but the amount of arable land has steadily contracted from 15 percent to a third, and now with an annual loss of nearly 659,000 acres of farmland since 1991 to real estate development, clothing factories, soft drink bottling, hotels and golf courses. A even more startling revelation by the Minister of Agriculture says that from 1992 to 1993, China had lost 4.3 million acres of farmland, 5.5. percent below the 1992 acreage. Yet in the next three decades, China will have to double its annual grain output to feed its growing population, which has only 7 percent of the world's arable land yet 20 percent of the world's population. Not only is the land contracting, the quality of the soil is deteriorating; it is eroding or turning to desert by intensified farming, poor crop rotation and overfertilization. The soils that once flourished from manure-based farming have lost their organic content. And "more than 100,000 people were poisoned by pesticides and fertilizers used in agriculture during 1992 and 1993. More than 14,000 of

them died," according to the Chinese Agriculture Ministry. (Tyler, NYT, Jan. 2, March 27, and Sept. 25, 1994; Shenon, NYT, Sept. 21, 1994)

To make matters worse, air and water pollution has also been intensified by industrial development, causing people to suffer from worsening health and fewer means to make a living. In Chongqing, the capital of Sichun, for example, the death rate from lung cancer, was 47 per 100,000 compared with 20 per 100,000 in a relatively clean area twenty miles away, although cigarette smoking may also be a factor. Air pollution exceeds the World Health Organization standard by five to six times, especially in the North, about seven to eight times as bad as the air quality in New York City, and lung disease is the leading cause of death in China, which climbed 18.5 percent in the major cities from 1988 to 1993. For several years, peasants around Chongqing began to see onions, potatoes and vegetables wither, unripe fruit fall of the trees, forest die from a formerly uninhabiting insect attracted to sulfur-polluted leaves. (WuDunn, NYT, Feb. 28, 1993; Tyler, NYT, Sept. 25, 1994)

While 300 out of 500 of the nation's cities are short of water, factories keep dumping industrial waste into the country's waterways and in 1993 alone, 35.5 billion tons of sewage and industrial wastes were discharged into the country's rivers, streams and coastal seas. Furthermore, as

the United States Embassy reported, "Solid wastes piled outside of cities have leaked toxins into the ground water and the water in many rivers does not meet the standards for bathing much less drinking." As an example from several thousands, Tyler reported that in a week in July 1994, one of China's most important waterways, the Huai River, was turned black and putrid by "a deadly mix of ammonia and nitrogen compounds, potassium permanganate and highly toxic phenols swept down the river from scores of factories that had flushed their waste tanks and ponds," killing more than 26 million ponds of fish and wiping out dozens of fish farms, with an estimated economic loss of \$75 million. "The contamination affected 250,000 people in Anhui and Jiangsu provinces and several thousand peasants as well as city dwellers were treated for dysentery, diarrhea and vomiting." (Tyler, NYT, Sept. 25, 1994)

The area that suffers from acid rain has increased from 1,750,000 square kilometers in 1985 to 2,800,000 square kilometers in 1993, according to Xie Zhenhua, the National Environmental Protection Agency. (Overseas Chinese News, Jan. 7, 1995) The total area of China is 9,650,000 square kilometers, so this means that about one third of the country is suffering from acid rain already. In 1991 alone, acid rain caused "\$2.8 billion in damage to farm crops, forests and buildings across the nation... And factories are expected to pump an increasing amount of sulfur dioxide into the air, from

15.5 million tons in 1991 to more than 1.4 billion tons projected for the year 2000 if the pollution is not controlled." (WuDunn, NYT, Feb. 28, 1993)

What roles do intellectuals play in resolving the ecological problems, then? First of all, we should notice that there are organic intellectuals, for example, in the government and the Academy of Sciences that are very concerned about the issue. It is they who have released a lot of the data to alert the policy makers at all levels. But by and large, intellectuals' role in resolving the crisis is minimal. I mentioned before the pollution of Dianshan Lake near Shanghai and intellectuals' effort to save the resort spot, and also the issue of cutting the trees lining the Huan Hai Road. Intellectuals have tried to make an influence but eventually it is minimal. Can they really have an influence in these issues when they function as a class? Can they make an impact if there is an ecological movement led by an intellectual class? The experience in the West should serve as the answer to these questions. Although intellectuals in the West may not think they have made an enormous difference in such social movements, they have made a lot more difference than the Chinese intellectuals can now.

5.2 Social and Political Crisis

The immediate political crisis the country faces is its political stability after Deng dies. Deng is the last charismatic leader from the older generation that claimed to have the only and full power over the country and his successors all lack the same credentials to control the army and govern the country. At the same time, the country faces numerous divisive forces of nationalism and quasi-nationalism of independent minded Taiwanese, Hong Kongnese, Tibetans, Xingjiang (Uygur Autonomous region) and Inner Mongolia minorities, and to name just a few. To govern the country is going to be extremely difficult: high handed military repression will only add fuel to the fire (whether the military will obey the new leaders is another issue) and the only remaining alternative is a democratic polity, maybe a federation, which has been advocated vigorously by scholars like Yan Jiaqi and discussed among intellectuals circles. But before there can be any consensus on where the country is going, some political unrest seems inevitable, which will pose great challenges to the Communist authorities. (For a discussion on the Chinese national identity crisis, see also Edward Friedman, Daedalus, Spring 1993.)

These divisive forces will also be joined, not necessarily in an organized way, by deep-rooted regional particularisms. Some suggest that Guangdong province, for

example, might team up with Hong Kong and declare autonomous political status. Their common interest and their geographical distance from Beijing make this scenario quite possible if they feel there is a need to do so: people from the region are Cantonese-speaking, and Hong Kong and Guangdong have business and family ties for so long that their social and economic bond will tie them together pretty tightly, and together they may ask for political and economic autonomy from the Beijing government. Indeed, a democratizing movement in Hong Kong to prepare for the Communist takeover is already in full swing, and it will set an example for Guangdong and other more developed regions in the country such as Shanghai. (For a fuller discussion of the potential of South China to seek autonomy from the central government, see Helen F. Siu in Daedalus, Spring 1993)

Furthermore, the dissident intellectuals are not giving up their effort for the democratization of China especially after all the bloody and brutal political repression. In February and March 1995, some dissident intellectuals in the country filed a protest against government corruption and police brutality. Increasingly, intellectuals are beginning to move as a group. The June 4th massacre turned more intellectuals against the Party and the exiled intellectuals will no doubt stage a comeback, once the control is a bit lax, and pose a threat to the Party rule. The Party will soon face political challenges on all sides. Yet, all of the above

political challenges pose a threat only because a host of social crises are also facing the ruling Party. Among them are worker and peasant unrest, rising unemployment, inflation, corruption, and crime, which will add more hostile feelings to the political belligerence and press people to look for an alternative.

According to a leaked secret Government report, there were more than 6,000 illegal strikes in 1993 and more than 200 riots, many of which involved layoffs and unpaid wages. For example, according to the official China Daily, an English language newspaper, between January and February 1993, (the Chinese New Year period when most of the family purchase is done. Sixty percent of the post-offices in Sichuan province were attacked, windows and doors destroyed, by angry peasants, because these post-offices were supposed to pay the peasants on the behalf of the Government which bought their grain. But the post-offices were short of money because the official China Industrial and Commercial Bank that was supposed to supply the money was out of cash. Until the end of 1993, peasants were owed 800 million yuan by the government, or US\$139 million. It has been a common practice for the local governments to issue I.O.U.'s to peasants for their grain. At about the same time, peasants in the North East (three provinces) and Anhui province also staged riots. (See WJ, Feb. 20, 1993; Tyler, NYT, April 10, 1994)

Unemployment is a constant threat. The official figure of unemployment is 2.6 percent but it does not count those who are sent home with a fraction of their wages although nominally they still have their jobs. And official statistic does not calculate many of the 430 million rural laborers who are looking for a job in the cities. (WuDunn, NYT, May 11, 1993) 130 million of them have already left for cities and a similar number of them are about to join, according to the World Bank. (Segal, NYT, May 25, 1994) In Shanghai alone, there are 3.31 million mobil population (people who do not have a permanent residence permit); 74 percent of them, or 2.44 million, either work for corporations or construction companies or engage in their own businesses. (0.8 percent are engaging in cultural and educational activities and others are there for a visit, touring, or seeing a doctor.) (WJ, May 7, 1994) One would wonder once the huge construction job is done, whether the economy can create enough jobs for these 2.44 million people and how they are going to make a living.

The state-owned enterprises number 327,000 nationwide, with 11,000 classified as medium or large-sized ones. Together they employ about 108 million state workers, and the Central Government employs about 34 million staff members. About one third of the state enterprises are losing money and backed up by government loans: 80 percent of the bank loans goes to the state sector with most of them probably unrepaid later. About one third of the state workers and one fourths of the

government staff are unproductive; the number translates into about 40 million strong of surplus workers in the state sector alone. The government has thought about letting some of them go bankrupt and others shed large quantities of workers, but the effort was halted in 1994 for fear of unrest and riots. Yet to increase productivity and survive in a market economy, enterprises will have to employ science and technology, which will mean even more surplus labor. By the end of the century, according to one estimate, we will have at least 200 million surplus laborers from the countryside and about 50 million from the cities, and the unemployment rate could reach one fifth of the population, or the size of the whole population of the U.S., if the economy cannot provide other work opportunities. Another estimate of unemployment rate in six years is 268 million. (See Shu Guang, PFG, June 12, 1992; Tyler, NYT, May 23, Dec. 16, 1994 and Jan. 3, 1995)

Inflation and corruption are rampant. Inflation is running at an annual rate of 26 percent to 30 percent especially in cities. In February 1994, prices for vegetables rose 54% over 1993, for staple grain rose 40 percent, meat about 33 percent. But ordinary people's incomes rise far slower. Meanwhile government officials and state enterprise managers make extra money by taking kickbacks from suppliers, and bankers accepting or even asking for bribes in exchange of easy credit terms. Anyone who has some power is quick to make the best use of it, such as spending public funds on banquets

and foreign tours. Foreign investors supply state enterprise managers and officials with highly priced (sometimes used) machines, and use a fraction of the profit made this way to fund foreign trips of state officials and factory managers. Local officials fix legal cases regardless of the law; as the saying goes, personal power is stronger than state law. (See Shuguang, WJ, May 29, 1994; Tyler, NYT, April 10, 1994)

Coupled with the unemployment, inflation and corruption problems is crime. According to some official statistics, serious crime rose more than 23 percent in 1993. Gang-related violence rose more than 50 percent, and drug trafficking 30 percent. White collar crime like officials looting state factories of machinery and raw materials goes unabated. (Tyler, NYT, May 23, 1994) Markets are full of fraudulent products and services, and there are even markets for kidnapped women and children. (Perry Link in Daedalus, Spring 1993, p.190) Corruption described in the previous section goes unchecked despite the Party Central Committee's warning that if it goes on like this, the Party is going to lose its power to control the country and its legality to govern.

What roles do the intellectuals play in resolving these political and social crises? We discussed in Chapter Three that "state policy" intellectuals are helping design government policies dealing with economic issues but it seems that social scientists in general either lack funding in

researching the above issues or feel unable to break the existent paradigm of Party lines. For example, if the Party insists on its total control over every Chinese society and censors any discussion on the possibility of a federation, there is not much intellectuals can do in the country. Outside the country, however, there has been a great deal of discussion on these social and political issues. But as a Chinese saying goes, it is like "scratching an itch from outside one's boot." Nevertheless, the efforts made by Chinese diasporic intellectuals do prepare themselves for some possible influence once the political pressure is eased in China. Whether that influence is going to be big or small depends on whether there are intellectual parties that function discursively nationwide not only in Mainland China but also in Taiwan, Hong Kong and North America.

5.3 Ideological and Spiritual Crisis

Besides all the ecological, political and social problems, the country, especially the Party, has to reconcile its official ideology and politics with the consequences of Deng's reform. For example, is the country still a socialist one? Majority of the Party would say yes. But if yes, should they guarantee the livelihood of every individual? If they do, they will have a hard time coping with market economy. Socialism and market economy are hardly compatible, unless some serious effort is made to reconcile the two. Once Deng

dies, will socialism survive or is market economy going to take full control? In other words, are pro-socialism Party cadres going to win the power struggle or pro-capitalism Party cadres, or is there going to be a compromise? Where the country is going affects the livelihood of one fifth of the world population; in fact, it affects the whole world since the globe is becoming more and more like a village. (Chinese got Jackson fever and Madonna craze and Americans got Beijing fever and Shandong flu, both literally and metaphorically, in the past. What is going to get us next? It seems that one's business is also every one else's.) Is the Chinese political system still going to be structured in the Maoist fashion?

Thus, the mixture of totalitarianism and market economy breeds not only serious ecological, social and political crises but also an ideological one. Deng's ostrich policy of "not asking whether it is socialism or capitalism" only delays the question and exacerbates the situation without meeting it head on. The Party seems to have realized that the Maoist ideology of class struggle and politics in command does not fit in the Chinese reality, according to the principle of "seeking truth from facts," since it has led to one disaster after another. So it wants to try "(Chinese) socialist market economy," which is in fact totalitarian market economy, although it is an oxymoron. Everything else, for example, democracy, democratic socialism or even capitalism, is forbidden from being discussed and debated because any such

discussion might lead to the questioning of the Party rule. But the banning of the discussion of ideologies only creates confusion in ideologies: people need beliefs in life. If they have no beliefs, and there is what many Chinese as well as American intellectuals call a "morality-vacuum," (Perry Link, *ibid.* p.191) life is going to be chaotic and there is no public civility. And that is what is happening in China now, although it is not so much that people really have no beliefs but that people have no strong beliefs; chaos occurs not only in the material world, as we have discussed, but in people's mind as well.

Before the Communist Revolution, the major ideologies in China were Confucianism, Taoist, and Buddhism; Christianity had some earlier successes but met major setbacks in the Yihe Quan Movement in the Qing Dynasty, when churches were burned down and priests were killed. It revived itself but never got strong enough to take over the country. After the Revolution only Maoist Marxism was allowed to function as the state religion, not even Confucianism although the Confucian tradition has been handed through the word of mouth to generations of people notwithstanding. For example, traditional operas, a crucial vehicle transmitting Confucian ideology, were not banned until 1966.

Even during the Communist Revolution, a Communist morality was always in place, one that goes along with the

traditional Chinese ideologies. For example, young primary and middle school students like me prided themselves in the 1964 "Learn From Lei Feng" campaign on helping others, especially the poor and disabled to do things. Typical examples were helping a worker to push a cart on an upward road, helping a poor disabled man to carry water home and grind grain. There was a time when ordinary Chinese felt that they were really one big happy family. (I am not talking about the banished Rightists or other "class enemies" such as the former landlords and bourgeoisie who obviously had had a miserable life.) There was at least some communitarian ideology that counteracted the tragedies in life. (That is the belief in fact of a lot of intellectuals: when they were criticized, they thought it was for the good of the country.)

Yet the Cultural Revolution and later on the market economy seemed to have destroyed even that bit Communist or communitarian spirit. They, as well as the younger generation brought up in the "Learn From Lei Feng" campaign, felt that they were betrayed and some even felt revengeful. What seems to be taking root now is the spirit of capitalism without the protestant ethic. If there is any ethic that might still be functioning, it is the remnants of Confucianism. An ideology that has been developed and transmitted in two thousand years cannot be totally destroyed in the course of several decades. That is too short a time. As Perry Link points out, even if the "underlying values of education and proper behavior have

seemed to recede...it would be naive to suppose that such a long tradition has suddenly disappeared." (Perry Link, p.192) On the contrary, market economy has played a role in reviving ideologies other than capitalism: while Marxism has been used, abused and almost refused, as is also socialism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and Christianity are making a comeback. Christians, for example, are estimated to number thirty million now as compared with a mere three million before the Communist takeover. (See *ibid.*, p.201)

Faced with the chaos and not allowed to have a meaningful debate, ordinary people act according to their instinct, which is to protect themselves by any means possible. If you believe you need to push others away so as to get onto the bus, do it, even if it is in fact unnecessary, because that is the instinct. If you believe you can cheat in business and get away with it, do it. As Mark Twain comments on the crude capitalist gospel, "Get money. Get it quickly. Get it in abundance. Get it in prodigious abundance. Get it dishonestly if you can, honestly if you must." (Doob, p.382) Honesty in capitalism, however little there may be, only comes when there is a democratic system with an effective judicial structure, through which justice can be served and which will check on dishonest capitalists. That is not the case in China, where there is neither a democratic political system, nor a judicial system that is not affected so much by money and power.

To sum up, the ideological and spiritual crisis in China is what Perry Link calls China's "core" problem, i.e. the problem of morality, propriety and public service, the "core" that used to define China and the Chineseness, a China that can be the example of the world. With the advent of market economy, the Chinese have to figure out what is proper behavior and what makes China distinctive as an example that many Chinese intellectuals believe it should be, however vaguely, and how to prevent a Chinese core from eroding away in the universal solvent of modern commercial culture. (Perry Link, *ibid.* pp. 194, 203)

Our discussion on the revival of Chinese humanism and introduction of post-modernism in Chapter Two is a reflection on this ideological crisis, an effort on the side of the intellectuals to offset the influence of ruthless capitalism. But this kind of discussion needs to be held constantly and research on relative merits and demerits of socialism and capitalism has to be conducted and policy makers have to be informed of their findings. Above all, an effective legal system has to be established to foster the rule of law, and a great number of legal workers have to be trained. A civil society has to be developed and a democratic polity has to be established. If intellectuals determined in the past the destiny of China politically and ideologically as Weber observed, they are still in a position to do so today. However, to what extent they can still determine China's

future depends partly again on whether they are successful in their efforts to form an independent and autonomous intellectual class that celebrates CCD. As the situation stands today, one cannot be too optimistic.

5.4 Crisis in Education

220 million people, or about one fifth, of the Chinese population are illiterate. Li Tieying, the then Director of the State Educational Commission, stated in 1989 that only one third of the youths had had some primary school education, one third had junior high school education, and less than one third had some high school education. (People's Daily, March 25, 1989) Indeed, only three or four out of 100 Chinese high school graduates have a chance to go to some kind of college. In contrast, in the U.S., nine out of ten students have some high school and seventy-five out of 100 high school students have some tertiary education. (Brauchli, WSJ, Nov. 15, 1994) Thus in sheer number of educated population, China is far behind in its ability to modernize itself and to deal with problems coming along with modernization.

But even if when students go to college, they will find that universities have changed in a way that they are less able to deal with modernity issues although on the surface they are more able to because they are offered more practical courses such as computers and accounting. In Chapter Three, we

discussed the commerciali-zation of institutions of higher learning, programs colleges offer, and status of students and faculty. Those changes came at the expense of critical thinking which China needs both for dealing with modernity and consequences of modernity.

Prof. Zhang Renjie of Sociology of Education from East China Normal University cautioned against the negative consequences of market economy: students' choosing their programs according to economic gains and believing that to get rich is worth more than to become a good person. (Guangming Daily, June 19, 1994) I attended his first lesson given to his incoming graduate students, two MA's and one Ph.D., which lasted five hours in the dead heat of summer in a deserted classroom (for it was vacation time) on the eve of his departure to take a position in Guangzhou. The main theme of his five hour lecture is how to become a good person and he talked about the relationship between scientific studies and moral ethics.

Education is more a matter of teaching young students to become a good person than teaching him or her some specific knowledge or technical skills, he said. This reminds us of the Confucian principle of chuan dao, shou ye, jie huo, i.e. teaching the way of thinking and practical knowledge and answering questions in life. He is a very strict teacher, who requires students to read a long list of books in a very

orderly way in addition to the heavy burden of learning to become a good person. But his is becoming a rare voice in a commercialized world, and that is the danger of higher education, which has become so technical and practical, and issues of individual development and perfection, something that is cherished in the traditional Chinese education, is in the danger of being lost. As is shown in a survey on "Chinese and Western Culture, Education and Individual Development" at Tongji Medical University in Wuhan, Hubei province, there is tremendous emphasis on professional training but little on systematic cultural education; there is tremendous emphasis on teaching students technical knowledge and skills but little on teaching how to be a good person. (Guangming Daily, June 19, 1994) This may be the first crisis in education.

Furthermore, development of social sciences and humanities is neglected or intentionally avoided partly because of the political nature of these disciplines and partly because of a belief that science and technology can solve all the modernization problems. (Enrollment in some sociology departments in Beijing and elsewhere was even suspended in the aftermath of June 4th.) Policy makers have yet to realize that science and technology can play a positive role only when social reforms accompany scientific development. Ecological problems, unemployment, inflation, labor unrest, ideological and spiritual problems, conditions of the working class which we will discuss more in the next

section, can be dealt with effectively only when they are studied first. Universities have to train large quantities of social scientists such as sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and historians as well as economists, professionals (social workers included), scientists and technicians, in order to study and deal with these problems. Humanities have to be developed to provide the social and cultural fabric of society.

The emphasis on science and technology and the neglect of social sciences and humanities will finally make the country, everyone involved, pay more later when "modernity" is in full swing. Lack of critical thinking in college teaching will weaken not only social sciences and humanities but also natural science and technology. For science and technology, too, need critical thinking. That is the second crisis, development of professional programs at the expense of critical thinking that might be enhanced in social sciences and humanities as well as in natural sciences, and at the expense of good and general educations. If it went on like this, we would produce only technical tools in colleges instead of thinking intellectuals. Our society would be without its brain.

Thirdly, there are not enough professors left to teach anything anyway. I discussed the exodus of college professors in Chapter Three. Indeed, China is facing a serious crisis in

keeping the colleges open, at least the public colleges. Young people especially shy away from getting a job teaching in colleges. In 1992, 40 percent of the professors were over 61 years old, and 40 percent between 56 and 60, and 11 percent below 35. The situation was even worse in 1994. (Brauchli, WSJ, Nov. 15, 1994) The reason that there is a shortage of professors between 36 and 55 is twofold. The Cultural Revolution suspended education for six years between 1966 and 1972, and even if some of the generation later on went to college as worker-peasant-soldier students such as myself and others had a chance to go to college after the Cultural Revolution, many of them either changed their career or left the country, for academic or political reasons.

Several of our informants say that their departments lack people aged between thirty to forty-five. Prof. Xia of the optics lab that studies laser physics, laser spectroscopy, nonlinear optics, quantum optics and optoelectronic techniques reported that thirty researchers from their lab have gone abroad and only a couple have returned. (She herself has returned from America because she believes that she can do more here in her own country and expand her "effective life.") As a result, they do not have young professors. Prof. Ding told me that none of the MS students entering from 1980 to 1989 has remained after graduation. You simply cannot retain them.

One professor from a different department commented that their researchers are all above fifty, and there are no people between 30 and 45 years of age. Once they retire, is the department, or the university, going to exist? he asked. All of Prof. Gu's classmates at graduate school have gone abroad, all together nine, plus his graduate school professor. Dr. Qian of biology reported that the majority of her college classmates of 1979 have gone abroad. She is now planning to leave because she believes she has not been able to do any research in her field and she just has no future at ECNU.

There is a general concern that the lack of young researchers and professors is going to cause damage to higher education and the research ability of universities. Prof. Zhang, an administrator of Science and Technology Department of the central administration from Fedayeen University, worried that once the senior professors retire, the younger ones won't be able to do as good a job as the senior professors because teaching requires experience. Others, however, cites Prof. Xie Xide as saying that now we have stocked our talents abroad and once the situation is ripe, they will come back like what happens now in Taiwan. We will have to wait and see. For the present, there is a crisis. Another survey by the Academy of Sciences of 43 research institutes, 38 percent of those with graduate degrees and 27 percent of those with college degrees have left. In some

institutes, the loss rate of young researchers reached 80 percent. (Bai Zang, PFG, Feb. 4, 1994)

Fourthly, primary and secondary education also suffer under the current "modernization" movement. The exodus of university teachers is paralleled by the exodus of middle school and primary school teachers, which creates crisis of primary and secondary school education, which in turn affects the quality of university students. Reports show that in 1992, China lost all together 450,000 teachers to private businesses, Shanghai lost 2,300 primary school teachers, and Beijing lost 6,300 from 1990 to 1993. (WJ, June 10, 1994) In a country where there are two hundred million illiterate people, this exodus certainly exacerbates the problem.

One of the chief reasons is their lower income. Not only is the income low, but they do not get their salary on time. It was revealed in 1992 that over seven thousand school teachers did not get paid for seven months in a county in Sichuan. They had to depend on family and friends for a living. Over one hundred school principals submitted their resignations in the county. As a result, the junior high school drop-out rate in the county rose to 50 percent. (WJ, Dec. 25, 1992) The loss of school teachers will obviously result in the loss of already fewer students.

Fifth, privatization makes it is difficult for poorer parents to send their children to school. There are two ways of privatization: for public schools to charge more fees and for individuals to establish private schools. Since the state spends only about 3 percent of its economic output on public education, even less than 4.1 percent, the average of developing countries, according to a 1992 figure, (Brauchli, NYT, Nov. 15, 1994) both primary, secondary schools and universities now have begun to charge fees in order to survive. For example, in 1992, if a primary school student had not passed the junior high school entrance exam (it could even be one or two points less) and the parents still wanted the student to go, they had to pay somewhere between one to three thousand yuan a semester. (WJ, Sept. 17, 1992) The rate is going up with each passing year. Even if you passed the exam, you still have to pay at least several hundred to one thousand yuan for all kinds of fees; and you buy your own textbooks in addition.

Universities too have begun to charge fees though a system of scholarships are also being established. Since 1994, higher education institutions in Shanghai began to formalize the two categories of students, self-sponsored and public-sponsored (having passed the exam). The former have to pay 2,500 to 3,200 yuan a year and the latter 400 yuan with some variations in arts and foreign languages schools. Universities have also begun to set up a system of scholarships, loans, and

work-study fellowships, etc. Still, with openings in universities only for a fraction of high school students, the new system helps only the rich and the most talented. The majority, the poor and the other 96 to 97 percent of high school students, still cannot go to college even if some of them may be more talented than those who go to college because they have money.

The new system only deepens the education crisis and does not solve it. The solution to the education crisis is to invest more money in education, raise the status of school teachers and college professors both socially and economically, train more teachers and build more schools and colleges. Even if the number of college openings has doubled to 2.5 million in the past ten years, the need far outraces the growth, especially in social sciences and pure academics. (See also Blauchli, WJ, Nov. 15, 1994)

While private schools and colleges may be one solution, and they have been established around the country, they have too many limitations. We reported that about sixty private universities have been established already in the country and maybe more, to teach only what is practical. Private elementary and middle schools have also become the order of the day. But they tend to charge such an astronomical amount of money that only the rich can afford to send their children to these places. For example, some of these schools ask

parents to deposit several hundred thousand yuan (without charging other fees), and the money will be returned at the students' graduation. Other schools simply ask parents to pay ten thousand yuan tuition each year. (Xiang Xiaotian, New York Chinese Newspaper, Nov. 12, 1994) A senior college professor may only earn ten thousand yuan a year. It would resemble asking a well-placed American professor to pay \$50,000 a year for his or her child's school tuition alone. They not only ask for more money, but also produce a spiritual aristocracy in society. These schools are often called "aristocrat schools."

Obviously these schools are not for the ordinary public. And how students are treated in these schools, and how they should be integrated into a multilayered school system so that they will benefit the whole society instead of just a few newly rich aristocrats should be studied. The Chinese word "crisis" is composed of two parts: danger and opportunity. So crisis of privatization may also be opportunities, but only when we know its merits and its drawbacks and have the political guts to do something about it.

To sum up, the crisis of education is in fact a crisis of intellectuals. Colleges are the training ground of intellectuals and it is here that generations of intellectuals transmit the cultural traditions of the calling and Chinese CCD. Commercialization of higher education may threaten the development of the intellectual ideals and even thwart the

development of an intellectual class. To raise the issue like Prof. Zhang does help to counteract the trend, but once again intellectuals have to organize themselves and move as a class in order to make some real difference. Otherwise, they will keep getting hit by the crisis, as is the case in the United States.

5.5 Crisis of the Working Class

It is the working class (workers and peasants) constituting the majority of the population that suffer the most in the ecological, social, political, ideological and educational crises. When intellectuals suffer, they cry out to the whole world; when the working class suffer, most of the times they suffer quietly. The strikes or riots are rare as compared with their suffering. This is, however, not to deny the rising living standard and improved living conditions. My own village, where people used to travel three miles in draught years to get drinking water with their shoulder poles and buckets when I was a small child, now has running water, however contaminated it might be. Yet my village may be one out of a hundred that has benefitted from the reform. The majority of workers and peasants have endured suffering and are still grieving.

In 1994, there were already 200,000 so-called san zi enterprises, or "three capital" enterprises, meaning those

owned either entirely by foreign capital alone, owned by joint capital of both foreign and domestic enterprises, and owned through other kind of cooperation between foreign and domestic enterprises. Most of them are private. While white collar workers may fare very well in these enterprises, blue collar workers are subject to all kinds of maltreatment and exploitation. About 500,000 child laborers are among the 8 million transient workers in Guangdong alone. Sweatshop conditions abound and industrial accidents more than doubled in 1993, killing and maiming thousands of workers. (Tyler, April 10, 1994) The situation seemed getting worse in 1994. For example, several fires broke out killing dozens of workers in Shenzhen and Zhuhai in Guangdong because there were no exits or exits were pad-locked. Capitalists were afraid that workers may steal factory property through exits.

Research found that in 217 san zi enterprises in Guangdong province, most workers worked ten to twelve hours a day, sometimes even fourteen hours but are paid a monthly wage. Ninety-five percent of these enterprises researched in Qingdao, Shandong province, had no labor protection procedures. The official City Workers' General Union survey shows that 73 percent of the enterprises made no labor safety regulations in their labor contracts. Thirty-three percent of them had horrible working conditions. In Zhuhai, Guangdong, seven of the enterprises researched emitted poisonous gas eight to ten times higher than the state standard. In one of

the foreign-domestic-joint-capital ceramic factories in Tianjin, dust in the workshop exceeded the state standard by 274 times. In a foreign-capital enterprise in Xiamen, Fujian province, 39 out of 400 workers had had cripple hands in labor accidents. Scolding, hitting and corporal punishment of workers occurred often. (Xu Zhijie, in Democracy and Law, July 15, 1994)

An investigation by Beijing City Labor Bureau found that a township gift company which was jointly owned by a town in Daxing County and a Taiwan businessman violated the state labor regulations seriously in a number of ways. They made the workers, some of whom were former peasants from Henan province, work ten hours a day (the factory rule posted on the wall), sometimes even 12 to 14 hours for four and five days in a row. The workers suffered from poisonous banana oil gas year in and year out in poorly ventilated workshops. Once the workers violated some factory rules, they would be made to run around the factory yard one to three times. They lived in small dorm rooms of less than 15 square meters crowded with six people in one room. (Li Xiaoguang, Beijing Evening News, Aug. 17, 1994)

Even state-owned enterprises have similar problems. The workers from the Capital Iron and Steel Company in Beijing, which has about 200,000 staff and workers, complained that they were made to work 365 days a year and longer hours each

day. After work, they had to attend political study meetings. As a result of the mental and physical strain, not only safety became perilous, but workers' family life became strained. It seemed that the state-owned enterprises are learning from capitalist management styles and one wonders whether workers are going to put up with them, and if not, what they are going to do. (WJ, Feb. 10, 1993)

Women workers in both private and state enterprises suffer the most. Some private enterprises would fire women workers once they got pregnant; if they did not fire them, they would give those who gave birth to a boy 112 days of maternity leave and only 52 days to those who gave birth to a girl. They would still have to work overtime even if they were pregnant or breast-feeding their babies. Women workers in a jointly owned enterprise in Laoshan, Shandong, would have to work 16 hours a day and if they asked for a leave, they would be fired. Many women workers did hard labor but ate poor food, and 70 yuan would be taken away for food from their 150 yuan (\$20) monthly wage. (I have seen construction workers, male though, eating steamed bread and some very thin soup for lunch.) In textile factories, the bosses treated the workers as if they were thieves and would fine them even if they found on them a tiny strip of cloth. (Xu Zhijie, Democracy and Law, July 15, 1994) State enterprises might treat women workers better, but in the Capital Iron and Steel, women were not

allowed to leave for physical reasons unless one was going to have an abortion. (WJ, Feb. 10, 1993)

While the above reports might seem appalling, in the current "get rich quickly by all means" atmosphere, they might be quite accurate, and horrible treatment of workers might actually occur in far more places than we really know. Considering the fact that the Communist Party has never had any real concern for human rights, let alone the feudal emperors, we have reasonable doubts that the situation is going to change very fast. The 1995 women's conference in Beijing is going to resemble a Mother Theresa staying at Trump Tower and having dinner with Donald, while discussing how to help the poor without actually knowing how and where they live. But it is a step in the right direction.

Peasants are also facing the threat of modernization with little or no ability to resist. Riots are rare, as I commented earlier, compared with injustices. We have seen how they cope with working in cities, but in the countryside, their livelihood is threatened by industrial pollutants and expansion in addition to the constant threat of nature's cruelties. And there is nothing much they can do. As we showed earlier, the industrial pollution of the Huai River destroyed the fishing industry in addition to causing villagers to be sick with vomiting and diarrhea. Acid rain cause crop harvest to drop sharply. And their land is being taken away without

much compensation. For another example, an inter-province highway is being built now through my home village, and the peasants were paid 1,000 yuan or \$120 for every mu (6.07 mu = 1 acre), or about the price of three years' crops. This is the land that the villagers created on what used to be the river bed by channelling the river in dams and taking soil from the nearby mountain during the Cultural Revolution in the course of several freezing winters of roaring north west wind mixed with sand and dust. And they fertilized it for two decades. Now they had to sell it for a price of three years' crops. You could not ask for more and it was no use complaining because it was the state and province policy. Organized protest has never been possible: no one would risk being arrested and imprisoned.

Peasants have been not only the majority of the Chinese population, over 800 million, but also the poorest part of it, especially in the North, where drought has always been a threat and success or failure of crops depend on how much rain peasants can have each year. In some places, peasants live in dilapidated houses and take drinking water from the same contaminated pond with animals. (Li Han, Xinmin Evening News, June 29, 1994) In Gansu province, where drought years outnumber rain years 10 to 1, 4 out of 22 million of the population live in poverty, with an annual income of \$34 or less. (Tyler, NYT, March 27, 1994) That is why the Shannxi family of a murdered peasant girl who had worked in the hotel

I stayed at in Shanghai East China Normal University did not complain when they were compensated 5,000 yuan (\$600) or about the amount of money they charged me for a month's stay, in exchange of a life taken away forever from the family. For a poor family in one of the poorest places in China, that might have been a lot of money. As one of the workers I talked to at the University said, the poor peasants might not have even seen a one hundred yuan bill. At the same time, a Chinese property magnate in Beijing could spend \$5,400 on a single gold pen, (See WuDunn, May 8, 1993) about ten times the price of a poor girl's life, if ever they could be compared.

Neither the peasants' land nor their lives cost much in China. No wonder Wan Li, the reformist former Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress is said to have remarked, "Now the peasants don't lack anything; all they need now is Chen Sheng and Wu Guang." Chen and Wu were the leaders of the first peasant uprising in the Qin dynasty that led to the downfall of the first empire. Wan probably meant that even though peasants in general fare much better now than before, they have suffered enough abuse and injustice and their anger will explode one day when the time is ripe and when leaders emerge like Chen and Wu. This brings us right to the roles of intellectuals in the midst of all these crises in the Chinese modernity.

Can intellectuals be Chen Sheng and Wu Guang? Or even if they can, should they? Some intellectuals do advocate the rights of workers and peasants. Zhou Guoqiang, for example, was arrested for doing so as we discussed in Chapter Three. But there are too few willing intellectuals and there is too much risk. It does not look like the intellectuals are going to follow the suits of the CCP to stage an armed uprising, but in the post-Communist era, some peaceful working class movements might be necessary with their organic intellectuals in the lead. But again such development awaits the development of a democratic polity.

5.6. Conclusions

In this chapter, I outlined various crises facing the country in terms of ecology, politics, ideology, education and the conditions of the working class. I propose that intellectuals have a very important role to play, but to have some real impact in resolving the crisis, they have to function as a class. Yet an intellectual class formation depends on both the efforts of intellectuals themselves and some historical opportunities. In fact, intellectuals are already making various efforts in the direction such as doing research on the various development in China. Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming are continuing their research after being released from prison. Those who escaped to the U.S. have also set up their research organizations. Dissident intellectuals have

stepped up their effort to study the events upon the arrival of the post-Deng era. There is a possibility that intellectuals will develop their class power and form a class in the sense we discussed in the previous chapter and again hold the wheel of history.

In the concluding chapter, however, I will caution us against some of the traps of CCD and develop a thesis that intellectuals are a flawed class by using some historical lessons of Chinese intellectuals' roles in social change. But I will end with an optimistic note that if intellectuals can transform themselves while transforming the Chinese culture and succeed in their class formation, China may have an encouraging future with the above crises of modernity abated.

Chapter Six

The Future of Chinese Intellectuals and the Future of China

In the last two chapters, I argued for my thesis of a class formation of Chinese intellectuals and pointed out that such a formation is important in resolving the crises of Chinese modernity. The five chapters end with a affirmative note, I hope, that Chinese intellectuals are a class in formation and it is important for China's future. In this concluding chapter, however, I will discuss the flaws of the possible new class and propose some ideas of how the new class might be able to overcome them. Only when the intellectuals realize their strengths and weaknesses and set out to enhance the former and redress the latter can an intellectual class really be formed and then make a difference in resolving the Chinese modernity crisis.

6.1 Factors Preventing the Class Formation

I have demonstrated in Chapter Four that various categories of intellectuals share cultural capital, calling, and CCD; a class consciousness is fostered especially among unattached and critical intellectuals by political and economic oppression, or alienation; and organizations are being set up in and outside the country. It then seems that a class formation of intellectuals is possible. But it is not

possible unless we also realize some of the pitfalls in the above variables of class formation: cultural capital and calling do not necessarily unite intellectuals, because, for example, bureaucratized intellectuals may have different political interests to answer for albeit sharing cultural capital and calling with critical intellectuals. Consciousness is tricky especially when there is a lack of consciousness raising. CCD especially is problematic as all of the class theorists have already seen.

Gouldner refers to the New Class as a flawed class because of their elitist nature: believing that they know the rule and the theory for practicing CCD and are therefore superior to other classes. There is a certain insensitivity to persons and their feelings, and CCD thus breeds a kind of political brutality. "The new class sets itself above others, holding that its speech is better than theirs...Even as it subverts old inequities, the New Class silently inaugurates a new hierarchy of the knowing, the knowledgeable, the reflexive and insightful. Those who talk well, it is held, excel those who talk poorly or not at all." It sounds like Mencius. The New Class is badly flawed. (Gouldner, p.85)

This has been proven by the case of Chinese intellectuals: when the Party practices seeking truth from the facts, it believes it has the "truth" and other intellectuals are wrong. There is a tendency among the dissident

intellectuals too that they are the group that hold the truth. Several years ago when I was in Hawaii attending a symposium on Chinese culture, my talk of feminism was immediately dismissed by some prominent dissident intellectual for talking about liberation of women because he thinks that it is Marxist language and Marxism is outdated as Yu Ying-shi, Fang Lizhi etc. have long proclaimed.

Furthermore, Aronowitz, in his critique of Gouldner, points out that technical intellectual are a problematic example to demonstrate CCD because they are paradigm bound: "Those challenging the dominant paradigm are consigned to the margins of the communities or, more routinely, completely excluded." (Aronowitz, p.44) But the same applies to humanistic intellectuals, as my example above shows. Konrad and Szelenyi also point out that the New Class may be flawed in that its CCD has a moralizing quality that prohibits others from airing their views. For example, conservatives in the 1970s complained that they could not have engaged any discourse on the necessity of U.S. involvement in South East Asian politics: they were silenced on moral grounds. (Konrad and Szelenyi, p.352) It seems that a true CCD is a sword that cuts both ways, and it should be. In fact, the flaws of the CCD is also demonstrated in the failure of what I call Chinese Jacobinism. Let me explain what I mean.

6.2 The Failure of Chinese Jacobinism

When we reviewed the traditional Confucian calling on the Chinese intellectuals to perfect oneself and pacify the world, we saw a political order that was supposed to be exercised by an informed stratum of society, i.e. the intellectuals, as Confucian says, government by gentlemen. Indeed, Chinese intellectuals in the past two thousand years have just done that, at least tried to do that. Civilizations are strikingly similar in many ways, and the Western brand of this Confucian ideology of government is the Western Jacobinism. It is interesting for us to examine the failure of the Western Jacobinism in order to understand the failure of the Chinese Jacobinism, as a failure of CCD, and inform the theorizing of the intellectuals' class formation and how well intellectuals can play their roles in the crisis of Chinese modernity.

Boggs identifies five kinds of Jacobinism, which I would summarize into: 1) the Platonic form, as expressed in the work of Plato and Hobbes, of a vision of sovereign order organized by intellectualized and knowledgeable politicians, which is, in fact, also Weber's responsible intellectualized politician; 2) a religious form, as expressed in Catholicism and Protestantism, of a state power exercised with a transcendental and spiritual meaning; 3) a Machiavellian form of a strong, secular, creative and intelligent government, which resembles what we would call authoritarianism; 4) a

scientific form of intellectuals as the vehicle of science and technology which would lead to human emancipation from the oppression, alienation, fear and superstition; and 5) a Leninist form of intellectuals as vanguards that will seize the state power and establish a Party-state. (Boggs, pp.17-27)

From our discussion of historical and contemporary Chinese intellectuals, we may conclude that the first variety of Jacobinism parallels the Confucian ideals of government of benevolence, i.e. by not only the kind and benevolent kings and emperors, the Sage Ruler, but also by moral and talented (de cai jian bei) intellectuals. Confucius encourages intellectuals first to cultivate themselves and harmonize their families and then go on to govern the country, or xiu shen, qi jia, zhi guo, ping tian xia, i.e. the calling. Mencius says that benevolent government is for the kings to emphasize moral qualities and talents, respect intellectuals and put them in appropriate positions according to their qualifications. (See Huang Pumin et al ed. pp.2-3, 8, 11, 31-3, 260-1)

This is what I call the first type of Chinese Jacobinism. It has failed to a large extent because even if organic intellectuals have tried in the past to help govern by benevolence, they were frequently overwhelmed by not only the patriarchal power of the kings and emperors and Party bosses but also by their own flaws in believing what they had, for

example, Confucianism or Marxism, was the ultimate truth after seeking all the facts. Therefore they had only very limited successes, as is demonstrated by the Wu Xu Reform and the Maoist socialism. Confucianism itself advocates this patriarchal political culture of "let the king be the king and the minister be the minister," or the patriarchal hierarchy which prohibits intellectuals from using their talents.

The religious form of Jacobinism in the Chinese culture presents some interesting questions. If we regard Confucianism as a religion, we should say that this religious form of Jacobinism has indeed succeeded to a great extent. Confucianism has controlled the Chinese political culture, or the Chinese society in general, for a couple of thousands of years. It is part and parcel of Chinese politics, and traditional Chinese follow the Confucian ways of behavior consciously or subconsciously, although there are fewer and fewer of such people now as modernity progresses. Besides, as we mentioned above, Confucians used to be the best candidates of scholar-officials. These scholar-officials, however, failed in bringing China a lasting peace, stability and prosperity. Taoism is against government: it advocates a government that governs by doing nothing, so-called wu wei er zhi and a Taoist detests becoming an official, as Zhuan Zi did. Buddhism rode the highest tide during the Tang Dynasty around A.D. 700 but they kept largely separated from politics; in fact, Buddhism, like Taoism, functioned as a last resort when official-

scholars were banished from office--they became monks. Christianity, as we said before, has still been trying to get a strong foothold in the Chinese culture. Therefore, a religious Jacobinism has not really materialized in China except in some Confucian forms.

A Leninist form of Jacobinism did succeed: the Communist intellectuals seized power in the name of workers and peasants. But the radical political intellectuals ended up practicing what Weber calls traditional and charismatic domination, and as a result, the workers, peasants, unattached and critical intellectuals and other social classes have been subject to oppression, suppression and exploitation under the rule of Mao and Deng. Intellectuals proved in the first time that even when they are in power, the radical part of them will dominate and the rest, along with other classes, will be subordinated and lose their autonomy. The political culture, especially the totalitarian political system, had made this brand of Jacobinism fail. Or rather, it is the flaw of the CCD that has made this Jacobinism fail.

In the contemporary era, a combination of Machiavellian and scientific Jacobinisms has been in practice, and what we get is the crises of Chinese modernization, ecological, social and political, ideological and spiritual, and crisis in education. As it is the case in the West, science and technology are mainly developed to enhance both the Party rule

and the bourgeois growth. It is true that individuals have more opportunities economically but those opportunities are far from equal, and political freedom and equality are out of the question. This combination of Machiavellianism and scientism may be a demonstration of CCD at its worst.

To sum up, the Chinese Jacobinism has failed miserably although not completely, from the ancient times to the present. And it is partly because of the flaws of CCD. But intellectuals have always played a key role and functioned as a very important historical agent of social change. Xu Fuguan commented that the failure of the KMT in Mainland China was first caused by the "betrayal" of the majority of Chinese intellectuals. (Zhou Yangshan ed., 1980, p.84) Even though Xu is criticizing the intellectuals, it certainly shows what a swinging power intellectuals are in the Chinese politics. The crises of Chinese modernity require that we re-evaluate the intellectual movements in the past in their effectiveness so as to inform us of their roles in the present. The evaluation of the Chinese CCD is part of it. The failure, or partial success, of Chinese Jacobinism tells us that intellectuals do have a certain amount of power but they have to transform and transcend themselves. In the rest of the dissertation, I will focus on the lessons from these intellectual movements and the transcendence of Chinese intellectuals, and what China's future would be like with an intellectual class playing a key role.

6.3 The Future of Chinese Intellectuals: Historical Lessons for a Class Formation

A class formation of Chinese intellectuals in the future requires that intellectuals do a number of specific things of strategic importance. First, it requires that intellectuals realize that they have enormous power and learn to use that power wisely, despite the flaws of CCD. The majority of the bureaucrats have come from the intellectual stratum, especially high level ones, either in Mainland or Taiwan. (See also Jiang Tingfu in Zhou Yangshan ed. 1980, p.57, where Jiang pointed out that in the 1940s, ninety percent of the KMT government bureaucrats were intellectuals.) As we quoted Xu Fuguan earlier, the power of intellectuals can overthrow a regime, as it can help create a regime in the case, for example, of the CCP. But intellectuals need not always play a subordinating role. Indeed, Communist political intellectuals did assume power and become the ruling class but since they cannot transcend themselves and their traditional patriarchal thinking, they failed to live up to the expectation of the rest of the intellectual stratum and other classes in the country.

Second, an intellectual class formation requires an independent intellectual movement and a strong united front. Intellectual entrepreneurs, or the organic intellectuals of the intellectual class have to be created to do the organizing. The May 4th and June 4th movements provide us with

some very valuable lessons. The two movements have a lot in common. For example, they were both intellectual movements of enlightenment and they both advocated democracy. But the May 4th movement succeeded in its major goals of enlightenment and anti-imperialism, whereas the June 4th movement ended in massacre and a temporary setback of the democracy movement. There were many reasons why intellectuals failed in the latter but the main reasons include first of all a lack of independent intellectual movement and secondly a lack of a strong united front. One of the main reasons for the deficiency is the lack of mature intellectual organizers.

During the May 4th period, intellectuals like Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu were not organic intellectuals of the government, whereas during the June 4th period, most of the intellectual leaders involved were either former organic intellectuals such as Yan Jiaqi or Chen Yizi, or formerly-organic-and-only-recently-turned critical intellectuals such as Fang Lizhi and Liu Bingyan. Students too pledged allegiance to the Party. For example, when the Party bosses like Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang went to visit the hunger strikers in hospital, the latter said clear and loud that they were supporting the Party but were just against corruption. The June 4th movement was simply not an independent intellectual movement as the May 4th was.

The lack of a strong united front during the June 4th also contributes to its failure. This deficiency is reflected

in both its lack of an organization that might lead the movement and lack of coordination between students and other social forces. There were several student organizations in the Tiananmen Square, but there was no one to coordinate their operations. Even if a meeting to coordinate was held and all the parties agreed to certain course of action, the agreement would be overturned by one of the factions immediately after. There were also other non-student organizations like a workers' autonomous federation and an intellectuals' united front. But a coordination between them failed miserably, too. In contrast, the intellectuals in the May 4th period not only launched a political and cultural movement but sustained it for several years as a more or less organized fashion. During the protest, independent workers, merchants and industrialists all participated in strikes of their own. There was a headquarters that led the movement. This was almost impossible in the June 4th.

Third, an independent intellectual movement requires intellectuals to form a party or parties of their own, independent of the CCP and other classes in society despite the natural resistance from the ruling class (the revolutionary political and organic intellectuals.) But to be able to form a party means, again, that intellectuals have to transcend themselves and transcend the flaws of CCD by, for example, going back to wu yi, wu bi, wy gu, wu wo. Talking about the difficulty of organizing a party, we discussed

earlier Li Shuqing's two factors, lack of military prowess and a resistance from the ruling class. (Li in Zhou Yangshan ed., p.12) Those two factors in the contemporary time seem to be of less importance than another factor, i.e. transformation and transcendence of themselves. Military prowess can be established and ruling class resistance overcome, as the CCP did. But the weakness of intellectuals pointed out by Sha Xuejun cited by Jiang Tingfu seems even more compelling, which is the most important character of intellectuals that has to be transformed.

In collective activities, they (intellectuals) tend to be petty-minded and intolerant. They have scholarly knowledge but they may not have the ability especially to be a leader and to organize; they tend to be overly confident and self-respecting, therefore lacking discipline and looking down on others. They then become persons who can neither order nor be ordered. (Jiang in Zhou Yangshan ed. 1980, p.57)

This is especially true if we examine the vicissitudes of intellectual movements in the past, including the Communist movement led by Mao, Zhu, Zhou and Liu, and recent democracy movement, which proves the need that intellectuals have to not only know but also practice some real democracy, a system that may serve to check and overcome this intellectual weakness in organizing a party. In 1993, the overseas Chinese Democratic Alliance was going to merge with the Chinese Democratic Front, yet after the conference, a new organization did emerge but dissenters from both organizations also emerged and they decided to keep their old associations: the result of the

merge is more division. Wang Ruowang, the promising candidate for the chairman of the supposedly new organization later charged that the newly elected chairman was a "small Mao Zedong," saying that the small Mao Zedongs conspired to overthrow him, the "bigger Mao Zedong." At the beginning of 1990, Wang Bingzhang, the founder of the Alliance, was forced out of office because of his involvement in some financial scandals.

This political intolerance may not just be a flaw of CCD; it may also be a part of the traditional culture. In their study on Chinese political behavior and attitudes, Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi reported that according to their 1990 national survey, the Chinese are the least tolerant among seven nations, others being Australia, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Austria and Italy. For example, less than 20 percent of the respondents were willing to allow someone who sympathizes with a deviant point of view to express that view at a meeting, compared with 40 to 75 percent of respondents in other countries. (Nathan and Shi in Daedalus Vol. 122, Spring 1993, pp.111-2) One may question that since the question survey was done in a especially repressive time just after the June Fourth massacre, the results may be skewed by the political atmosphere at the time. But the supposition that Chinese are less tolerant of deviant views is also supported by interpretive studies such as those done by Lucian Pye, who states that Chinese political culture knows no

equals, only superiors and inferiors, and Chinese politics perceives a sharp divide between friend and foe. (ibid. p.111)

Furthermore, Nathan and Shi point out, correctly, that the educated elite do not seem to be more tolerant than the rest of the population. (ibid. p. 115) I have cited the example of Communist and dissident intellectuals in their pursuit of political power. Even in academic issues, they do not seem to show a high level of tolerance. My example earlier about a Hawaii symposium demonstrates the point. Some of these new dissident intellectuals just did not want to deal with anything "tainted" by Marxism. Is that tolerance? We are talking about dissident intellectuals who cannot be tolerated by the CCP. Once they are in power, it is doubtful how much better they will do than the Communist intellectuals. All this points to the fact that intellectuals have to transform and transcend themselves and some kind of democratic system has to be established so that a functional party can be established and common good can be promoted with individual interests protected and corruption and scandals prevented and dealt with in a timely fashion.

Fourth, to overcome this weakness of petty mindedness and re-configure their composition and existence, it has to be realized that according to our analysis in the dissertation, both organic intellectuals and critical intellectuals are from

the same origin and it is to their best interest if they can work together. The ancient practice of looking down upon each other, i.e. wen ren xiang qin needs to be cautioned against. It is arrogant, for example, for Yu Yingshi, a Chinese American professor of history who has claimed that once the CCP is in power, he will not visit the Mainland, to criticize the Mainland intellectuals as contaminated by Communism and have to clean themselves. (He Pin in Beijing Spring, March 1994) Yu is very influential in the Chinese intellectual circles in America, partly because he sponsored the escapees after June 4th 1989 at Princeton University. It is also arrogant for Wang Yuanhua, and many others, to be disgusted with technical intellectuals who seem to be only interested in their technical puzzles. Instead, intellectuals should keep an open mind about each other especially those who are different from them and find ways to work together. If they can do that, they are transforming and transcending themselves, and they are transcending the CCD. Yet this transcendence cannot be realized if we do not transform and transcend the Chinese culture itself.

6.4 The Future of China and the Roles of Intellectuals

The future of Chinese intellectuals, as we have just discussed, lies in their overcoming their flaws in CCD. The future of China lies in its overcoming the weaknesses in its culture. In the past, Chinese intellectuals both in China

(Mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong) and the U.S. have been discussing the reconstruction of the Chinese culture, as we mentioned before. Prof. Yin Haiguan of Taiwan, for example, believes in an integration of Eastern and Western moralities by accommodation and adjustment. This is an integration of Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity around democracy and science, and each has to adjust to and accommodate the other according to a democratic and scientific principle. Confucianism has to adjust itself by criticizing its own rigid hierarchical stratification, value of men over women, intolerance of different views, etc. while cultivating such virtues as trust, modesty, flexibility, righteousness, etc. (Yin in Zhou Yangshan 1982, pp.73-116) This is a new culture characterized by morality, freedom, democracy and science, to create this culture is the responsibility of intellectuals. (Yin in Zhou Yanshan ed. 1980, p.150)

Prof. Hao Chang postulates that we have to establish a new knowledge system by integrating Western liberalism and traditional Chinese culture after a critique of both. For example, the Sage Ruler in the ancient Greek and Chinese thinking has to be criticized because humans are not gods and will explode when they have too much power. A democratic system has to be established to check and prevent such a possibility. (See Lin Zhenguo, et al. in Zhou Yangshan ed. 1982, pp.386-7) This change of Chinese culture applies to both Mainlanders and Taiwanese. They seem to believe that the

Western style modernization without incorporating the Chinese traditional values that are still relevant in today's world is not the ideal for China. As Jiang pointed out almost fifty years ago, even the West finds that they are in a dead end street. Prof. Tu proposes creating a new meaning of being Chinese, and hoping that this new identity, or the Chineseness, based on human concerns pregnant with ethical-religious implications such as Confucian humanism and democratic liberalism will someday replace the political, either capitalist Taiwanese or socialist mainland Chinese identity. (Tu in Daedalus Spring 1991, pp.12-4.)

But when they talk about the transformation of Chinese culture, the question of the agents of this transformation is not answered. Even if they imply the agents are the intellectuals, what about the intellectuals themselves? Are not part of the culture? What about their own transformation? These cultural theorists have not really answered the question.

For example, Prof. Yu from Princeton University has long before pronounced the "outdatedness" of Marxism and praised the liberation from the "evil incantations" of it, (Yu 1988, pp.266-7; 1989, pp.480-1) and now he calls on the Chinese overseas intellectuals, especially those exiled, to "deepen their thoughts" by doing research on the Western as well as Chinese culture to prepare themselves for the future, (as if

Marxism does not belong to either the West or the East.) (Democratic China, p.57. Feb. 1991) Yu sounds very condescending, and it is as if the truth is in his hand. But is this not the issue, that the CCD of intellectuals make them feel that they are right and others are wrong? While "deepening" their thoughts, should there be a distinction between Marx's Marxism and Maoist Marxism? Should Marxism still be one of the tools in sharpening one's thinking? Is Confucianism fused with both Marx's Marxism and the Chinese Marxism? If so, in what way? Which Marxism is outdated and should be eliminated? Considering this entanglement, is it possible, and necessary, as Prof. Yu implies, to eliminate Marxism on the mainland without completely eliminating the Chinese tradition?

It seems that to transform the culture, intellectuals have to transform themselves first as we discussed in the previous section because they are the carriers of the culture they want to transform. The Chinese intellectuals' talking about reconstructing the Chinese culture would be just empty talks if they did not realize that they themselves are partly the product of this same culture, whether they were brought up in Mainland China or in Taiwan, and their ways of thinking will have to be transformed as well. Therefore, I propose that for intellectuals to continue to play a more successful Jacobin role in resolving the crisis of Chinese modernity, they have to work on the transformation and transcendence of

Chinese culture, and at the same time, they have to transform and transcend themselves into a politically independent and powerful player albeit a politically equal one. Then we will be able to talk about their roles in the crisis of Chinese modernity.

To be more specific, for a promising future of China, intellectuals face the following tasks. First, in the midst of the Chinese modernity crisis, intellectuals have a very important cultural role to play: in whatever capacity, humanistic, technical, organic, unattached, or critical, intellectuals shoulder the responsibility of transforming and transcending the Chinese traditional as well as Western liberal capitalist cultures and thus creating one that will enable every human being to have an opportunity to develop him or herself, an integration and interaction of Marx's humanistic socialism and Weber's competitive political realism. (See also Tu in Daedalus, Spring 1993, pp. xvii-xviii)

This means that intellectuals face the task of clearing the ideological and spiritual chaos by providing some zhichi dian, or some points of light, a system that people can safely rely on. (See also Perry Link, *ibid.* p.200.) Furthermore, as I said above, transforming the Chinese culture requires Chinese intellectuals to transform themselves by re-configuring their own existence, recognizing each other's

virtues, and learning to work together for the common good of society without always believing they have the ultimate truth. They need to develop their organizations and parties and learn to share power with other classes in society. If a cultural construction of class is possible, then the construction of a cultural party is out of question. So their first role will be to save themselves and save the culture in order to save China from various divisive forces in the post-Deng and post-Communist era.

Then secondly, they will be able to play a role, again in whatever capacity, in various social movements such as the democracy movement, a possible federation movement, workers' movement, peasants' movement, women's movement, consumer's movement, ecological movement, etc. by outlining theories and strategies, and organizing peaceful social protests and mediating social interests, or to use Szelenyi's term, functioning as referees or playmaster. (For the roles of Chinese intellectuals' roles in social movements in Taiwan, see Zhang Xiaochun, and Zhang Maogui, in China Forum Editorial Committee, pp.289-315) The resolving of the political, social, ecological, educational crises as well as the crisis of the working class depends to a great extent on the efforts of the intellectual complex both from the administrative and grassroots levels where intellectuals are found. These movements and their respective civil organizations will be part and parcel of a civil society that is required for a

democratic polity, which goes along with a transformed and transcended Chinese culture.

Therefore, thirdly, intellectuals can play a key role in establishing a liberal democratic polity and more equitable (vis-a-vis a dog-eat-dog) market economy. It is a vested interest of both the intellectuals and the general public to advance such a democratic political system and a free but more equitable economic system to replace either a totalitarian or authoritarian system. In this new system, each human being will at least have a right to choose his or her leaders and speak his or her political views without having to go to prison, and in which each individual has the most room for personal development.

In fact, intellectuals are already performing these roles. What I have argued for is mainly some fundamental changes in intellectuals' ways of thinking about the culture and about themselves so that they will be better able to play these roles. To be more specific, whoever they are and whatever they do, an intellectual class needs to be formed with an intellectual party or parties that provide a base for these intellectuals in their political, social and economic endeavors, a base that trains intellectual activists and provide them with a place for debate and theoretical invigoration. Only when intellectuals can transform and transcend themselves in their political as well as cultural

thinking can such an intellectual class be better able to work and compete with the bureaucratic ruling class, the bourgeoisie and the working class, and together with them create a competitive, dynamic and interactive, yet stable and prosperous society.⁹ It is even possible that China can surpass the West in human history if Chinese intellectuals can make good use of their intellect and maintain their moral integrity. (See also Jiang in Zhou Yangshan ed. 1980, pp.55-56)

6.5 Conclusions

In the dissertation, I have developed a synthetic model of viewing intellectuals as humanistic and technical mainly based on their professions, and organic, unattached and critical based on their class relations. More importantly, I have used the model to further substantiate my hypothesis of Chinese intellectual, mainly unattached and critical intellectuals, as a class in formation. Organic intellectuals are an important part of the class formation but not the major part. During this process, historical and contemporary evidence are used to validate my typology and hypothesis, and the survey, the interpretive and the historical methods are used to both gather and analyze data. The discussion of my synthetic typology and the class formation of Chinese intellectuals are based on Gouldner, Gramsci, Konrad and

⁹ For a full discussion of new social dynamics informed by Marx and Weber, see Bolough's Love or Greatness: Max Weber and Masculine Thinking--A Feminist Inquiry (1990).

Szlenyi, and Aronowitz and DiFazio. But theorists like Weber, Parsons, Bell, Shils, Lipset, etc. are also heavily drawn on to inform the analysis of the intellectual complex.

I hope my analysis has shown that the Chinese intellectuals of various categories share cultural capital as their economic basis, the calling and a Chinese CCD as their political basis, though to different degrees by different categories, and a common consciousness fostered by alienation, and intellectual communities as a basis of organization. But because of a lack of discursive national party or parties and lack of clearly defined interests and consciousness, an intellectual class is yet to materialize. More concrete organizing has to be done by intellectual entrepreneurs, or organic intellectuals of the intellectual class to articulate and disseminate the intellectual interests and organize and coordinate intellectual activities. This process of materialization requires that intellectuals transcend their flaws in the CCD and transforming the Chinese culture, which is also flawed with patriarchy and intolerance of dissenting views. Only then can they talk seriously about resolving the crisis of Chinese modernity. Those are the most important roles for them to play. Following the tradition of May 4th and June 4th movements, intellectuals are indeed on their way to independence and someday class power, although they are not there yet.

Appendix I: A Copy of Interview Guidelines

Interview Guidelines

1. Please tell us something about your teaching and research or simply your job. (For example, what do you teach, what kind of research do you do, do you have administrative duties, etc.?)¹⁰
2. How do you allocate your time every day?
3. What do you think about the current condition and the future of your academic and research fields? (For example, what is the cutting edge research in your discipline, what are people in your discipline interested in doing, etc.?)
4. What are the factors that hinder the development of your discipline? (For example, opportunities for retraining, promotion, the system of rewarding, research equipment, funding, income and housing, interpersonal relationship, communication, others' view of the importance of talented people, i.e. intellectuals, social status, etc.)
5. What is your definition of intellectuals? (For example, their political, economic and administrative roles such as the pursuit of truth in science, of the meaning of life, legitimizing old and new traditions, taking part in administration of various political and economic agencies, etc.)
6. What social, family and personal experiences have influenced your value systems, structure of knowledge and habits of living?
7. What has happened to intellectuals in the past five years? (For example, bureaucratization: who has been entering bureaucratic positions; bourgeoisification: who has left for business opportunities outside intellectual disciplines; politicization: do intellectuals involve themselves in various political movements or government policy making and how if they do; and alienation in their opportunity to criticize and to publish, in the disparity between income and culture, in their inability to influence society as they wish and their inability even to do their daily job as an intellectual.)

¹⁰. Questions in parenthesis are asked when the interviewee has difficulty finding something to say. The same applies to other interview questions in parenthesis in the guideline.

Appendix II: The Survey Questionnaire¹¹

1. Working Unit _____
2. Category 1) Education 2) Research
 3) Enterprise 4) Medicine
3. Ownership 1) State 2) Collective
 3) Private 4) Joint Venture
4. Sex 1) Male 2) Female
5. Age 1) under 30 2) 30-40 3) 40-50 4) 50-60
 5) over 60
6. Education Received
 - 1) Junior High 2) Professional School
 - 3) Senior High 4) Three Year College
 - 5) Four Year College 6) MA, MD or equivalent
 - 7) Ph.D. 8) MA or MD from abroad
 - 9) Ph.D. from abroad
7. The Last Specialty Studied in College
 - 1) Humanities 2) Theoretical Science
 - 3) Practical Science 4) Medicine
 - 5) Agriculture, Mineral 6) Finance, Trade
 - 6) Arts, Physical Education 8) Foreign Language
 - 9) Teachers College 10) Politics and Law
 - 11) Other (Please specify.)
8. Your Current Professional Title
 - 1) Advanced 2) Associate
 - 3) Middle Level 4) Lower Level
 - 5) No Title
9. Your Administrative Title
 - 1) 2)
 - 3) 4)
 - 5) 6)

¹¹ This is the original questionnaire designed by the CUNY-Shanghai Project, of which I have been an Associate Researcher and Field Coordinator. I participated in the preparation of the questionnaire, but the translation is entirely mine. Some changes were made later.

10. Number of Years of Work Experience

1) 1 - 5	2) 6 - 10
3) 11-15	4) 16-20
5) 21-25	6) 26-30
7) 31-35	8) 36-40
9) 41-45	10) 46-50
11) Over 50	

11. You believe the work you have done is

1) Outstanding	2) Somewhat Outstanding
3) Ordinary	4) Below Average

12. What kind of work would you rather see yourself doing:

1) Creative research	2) Routine professional
3) Either of the above	4) Other (Please specify.)

13. What percent of your creativity in research do you think has been utilized?

1) About 25%	2) About 50%
3) About 75%	4) About 100%

14. Please check your degree of satisfaction in the following
(VS=Very Satisfactory; S=Satisfactory; US=Unsatisfactory;
VUS= Very unsatisfactory):

	1 VS	2 S	3 US	4 VUS
1 Health				
2 State of mind				
3 Interpersonal rel.				
4 Communication with superordinates				
5 Work conditions				
6 Social status of your professions				
7 Welfare provided by your unit				
8 Convenience of your work location				
9 Your autonomy in work				
10 Your creativity in work				
11 Opportunity in social recognition and reward				
12 Overall work condition				
13 Your learning and competitive edge				

- 14 Opportunity in further training
- 15 Availability of professional information
- 16 Opportunity in academic exchange with colleagues elsewhere
- 17 Housing
- 18 Marriage
- 19 Family life
- 20 Incomes
- 21 Family finance
- 22 Share of household work

15. How often do you participate in decision making in research topics in your work unit?

- 1) Always 2) Often
- 3) Sometimes 4) Seldom
- 5) Never

16. Can you decide the following?

	Yes	Sometimes	No
		Yes	

- 1 Which research topic to choose
- 2 Who to use in the research
- 3 How to use the research funds

17. What percent of your energy is used in the following:

1	2	3	4	5
90+	70-90	50-70	30-50	30-

- 1 Professional but not scientific research
- 2 Collective research in the unit
- 3 Collective research for other institutions
- 4 Individual research in the unit
- 5 Individual research for other institutions
- 6 Other (Please specify.)

18. What percent of your ability is used in the following:

1	2	3	4	5
90+	70-90	50-70	30-50	30-

- 1 Professional but not scientific research
- 2 Collective research in the unit
- 3 Collective research for other institutions
- 4 Individual research in the unit
- 5 Individual research for other institutions
- 6 Other (Please specify.)

19. Choose three, in the order of importance, from the following factors which you believe are conducive to elicit enthusiasm in scientific research.

1) Solid research topic	2) Full funding
3) Cooperation with others	4) Democratic management
5) Fit in one's personal interest	6) Honorary titles
7) Easy to see results	8) Less bureaucracy

The most important three factors are (Put in the numbers):

1) _____ 2) _____ 3) _____

20. What do you think about the current rewarding system?

1) Excellent	2) Satisfactory
3) Sometimes satisfactory	4) Unsatisfactory
5) Very unsatisfactory	6) Don't know.

21. If unsatisfactory, what are the factors that cause the dissatisfaction?

1) Administrative interference	2) Unfair competition
3) Inflation/cheating practice	4) Traditional prejudice
5) Reward for former achievers	6) Unfair measurement
7) Other (Please specify.)	

The most important three factors in the order of importance are (Put in the numbers): 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____

22. What do you think about the effect of the current rewarding system on scientific creativity?

1) Great	2) Pretty much
3) Not much	4) Little
5) Negative	

23. What do you think about the promotion in professional ranks?

a. The value of promotion lies in

1) Social status	2) Academic level
3) Symbol of experience	4) Basis for personal benefits
5) Honor and achievement	6) Don't know.

b. Concerning your own promotion, you believe it is:

1) Very important	2) Somewhat important
3) Doesn't matter.	4) Not very important
5) Not important at all	

c. What do you think about the requirements for promotion?

1) Very reasonable	2) Reasonable
3) Sometimes reasonable	4) Not very reasonable
5) Not reasonable	

d. What do you think about the effect of the current promotion system on scientific creativity?

1) Great	2) Pretty much
3) Not much	4) Little
5) Negative	

24. Which of the following kinds of research are most appealing to you?

1) State entrusted research	2) Research for other institutions	3) Organized by the unit	4) Joint with foreign institutions
5) Research on one's own			
6) Other (Please specify.)			

Choose two of the most appealing in the order of importance:

- 1) _____ 2) _____

25. Which are the following are the most important reasons why you choose the above:

1) Enough funding	2) High honor
3) Easy to achieve results	4) Opportunity for working abroad
5) Good benefits	6) Promising future
7) More freedom	8) Easy to implement
9) More efficient	10) Other (Please specify.)

26. Does the equipment in your unit satisfy the needs of scientific research?

1) Fully satisfactory	2) Satisfactory
3) Sometimes satisfactory	4) Unsatisfactory
5) Don't know.	

27. Choose four main sources of professional information out of the following:

1) Higher authorities	2) Colleagues in the institution
3) Colleagues in your group	4) Academic conferences
5) Books/periodicals in the institution	
6) Books/periodicals from other institutions	
7) The mass media	8) Book/periodicals owned by oneself
9) Other (Please specify.)	

Main sources of professional information in the order of importance: 1) ____ 2) ____ 3) ____ 4) ____.

28. How many kinds of professional/academic magazines can you access?

1) None	2) 1 to 5
3) 5 to 10	4) 10 to 15
5) 15 to 20	6) Over 20

29. Are there any of the above in foreign languages?

1) No	2) English	3) Russian	4) Japanese
5) German	6) French	7) Other	

30. Tell us about your state or working unit sponsored training or study abroad in the past ten years.

a. How many time have you been abroad (for either training, study, work, observation, visiting, or academic activities)?

1) None	2) Once
3) Twice	4) Three times or more

b. How long did you go all together?

1) A month or less	2) 1 to 3 months
3) 4 to 6 months	4) 7 months to one year
5) One to two years	6) Two to three years
7) Over three years	

31. How many national academic conferences have you been to in the past ten years?

1) None	2) 1 to 3
3) 4 to 6	4) 4 to 6
5) 6 to 10	6) 11 or more

32. How many professional organizations are you a member of?

- 1) None. 2) One. 3) Two. 4) Three or more.

33. Tell us about your professional training in the past ten years.

1 Year	2 Duration	3 Kinds
	1) 1 to 3 Months	1) Full time
	2) 4 to 6 Months	2) Part time
	3) 7 months to a year	3) Sporadic
	4) 1 to one and half years	
	5) One and half years to two years	
	6) Over two years	

1 First time 19
2 Second time 19
3 Third time 19

34. Tell us about how you arrange your time of the day.

a. On the average, how much time do you spend on non-professional work?

1) Less than 2 hours	2) 2 to 4 hours
3) 4 to 6 hours	4) 6 to 8 hours

b. How much time do you spend on scientific research?

1) None	2) Less than 2 hours
3) 2 to 4 hours	4) 4 to 6 hours
5) 6 to 8 hours	6) Over 8 hours

c. On the average, how much time do you spend on administrative management of scientific research?

1) None	2) Less than 2 hours
3) 2 to 4 hours	4) 4 to 6 hours
5) 6 to 8 hours	

d. How much time do you spend each week on various social work?

1) None	2) Less than 2 hours
3) 2 to 4 hours	4) 4 to 6 hours
5) 6 to 8 hours	6) 1 to 2 days

e. How much time do you spend every week on secondary jobs?

1) None	2) Less than 2 hours
3) 2 to 4 hours	4) 4 to 6 hours
5) 6 to 8 hours	6) 1 to 2 days

f. How much time do you spend every day on reading professional literature?

1) None	2) Less than half an hour
3) Half an hour to 1 hour	4) 1 to 2 hours
5) 2 to 3 hours	6) Over 3 hours

g. How much time do you spend every day on household work?

1) None	2) Less than half an hour
3) Half an hour to 1 hour	4) 1 to 2 hours
5) 2 to 3 hours	6) 3 to 4 hours
7) Over 4 hours	

h. How much time do you spend every day on your way to and from work?

1) Within half an hour	2) Half an hour to 1 hour
3) 1 to one and half hours	4) One and half hours to 2
5) 2 to 2 and half hours	6) 3 hours and above

i. How much time do you spend on recreation and physical exercises?

1) None	2) Less than 15 minutes
3) 15 to 30 minutes	4) 30 minutes to 1 hour
5) 1 to 2 hours	6) Over 2 hours

35. Tell us something about your incomes?

a. What is your average income every month, including basic salary, fluctuating salary, bonus, allowances, etc.?

1) 200 to 300	2) 301 to 400
3) 401 to 500	4) 501 to 600
5) 601 to 700	6) 701 to 800
7) 801 to 900	8) 901 and above

b. What is the average income for your secondary jobs?

1) 200 to 300	2) 301 to 400
3) 401 to 500	4) 501 to 600
5) 601 to 700	6) 701 to 800
7) 801 to 900	8) 901 and above

c. What is your average income every month for publications?

1) Less than 50 yuan	2) 51 to 100
3) 101 to 150	4) 151 to 200
5) 201 to 250	6) 251 to 300
7) 301 to 400	8) 401 to 500
8) 501 to 700	9) 701 and above

d. What is your average income every month from other sources including stocks, interests, money from friends and relatives, etc.?

1) Less than 50 yuan	2) 51 to 100
3) 101 to 150	4) 151 to 200
5) 201 to 250	6) 251 to 300
7) 301 to 400	8) 401 to 500
8) 501 to 700	9) 701 and above

36. Tell us something about your housing conditions.

a. Living area in square meters:

1) 15 or less	2) 16 to 30
3) 31 to 45	4) 46 to 60
5) 61 to 75	6) 76 or above

b. Subsidiary area in square meters:

1) 15 or less	2) 16 to 30
3) 31 to 45	4) 46 to 60
5) 61 to 75	6) 76 or above

c. Number of rooms:

1) 1	2) 2
3) 3	4) 4
5) 5 or more	

d. Average individual living area in square meters:

1) 6 or less	2) 12 or less
3) 20 or less	4) Over 20

e. Two generations in one room:

1) Yes	2) No

f. Study and work room:

1) Yes	2) No

g. Gas:

- 1) Yes 2) No

h. Bathroom:

- 1) Yes 2) No

i. Ownership of the house:

1) Inherited	2) Rent on the market
3) Bought on the market	4) Bought from the unit
5) Rent from the unit	6) Rent from the city
7) Other (Please specify.)	

37. Did you choose your specialty out of your personal interest?

- 1) Yes 2) No
3) Other (Please specify.)

38. Are you interested in your own specialty now?

- 1) Yes (Go to Question 39) 2) No
3) Other (Please specify.)

39. The reason why you are not interested:

1) Not what I studied in college	2) No future
3) Too many set-backs	4) Low income
5) I have changed my interest.	

40. How many times have you changed your work unit since you entered the profession?

1) None.	2) Once.
3) Twice.	4) Three times and more.

41. Have you thought about or applied for changing working unit?

1) No. (Go to 42)	2) Thought about but not applied
3) Applied but not agreed	4) Applied and agreed upon

42. The reasons for changing working unit:

- 1) Not satisfied with the job
- 2) Job is not what I learned in college
- 3) Too far away from home
- 4) Income too low
- 5) Housing difficulty
- 6) Difficult interpersonal relationship
- 7) Difficult relationship with superordinates

- 8) Family problems
- 9) Suppression of personal ambitions and creativity
- 10) Other (Please specify.)

Choose three in the order of importance:

- 1) _____ 2) _____ 3) _____

43. Would you like to go abroad and are you in the process of applying?

- 1) Been abroad before, and don't want to go now.
- 2) Been abroad before, and want to go again.
- 3) Have thought about going but don't have means to go.
- 4) Have thought about it but have given up.
- 5) Have thought about it and still trying.
- 6) In the process of applying.
- 7) Have never thought about it. (Go to 44)

44. Reasons for wanting to go abroad:

- 1) Study
- 2) Sharpen competitive edge
- 3) Look for more opportunities
- 4) Need more advanced equipment
- 5) Improve material conditions
- 6) Get out of personal trouble
- 7) Broaden world view
- 8) Join the rest of the family
- 9) Other (Please specify.)

Choose three in the order of importance:

- 1) _____ 2) _____ 3) _____

45. When you entered the profession, did you entertain some kind of ambition?

- 1) Yes 2) No (Go to 46)

46. What is(are) your current ambition in your profession?

- 1) Do first rate research
- 2) Become first rate scientist
- 3) Realize personal values
- 4) Contribute to the modernization of China
- 5) Contribute to the prosperity of human beings
- 6) Other (Please specify.)

47. How often do you feel that you are happy?

- 1) Often 2) Sometimes 3) Occasionally 4) Never

48. For China to achieve even more splendid scientific achievement, what factors do you think are most important?

- 1) Largely improve the material conditions of knowledge workers
- 2) Provide more opportunities for training and study abroad
- 3) Strengthen communication and cooperation with developed countries
- 4) Train large numbers of talented, intelligent, devoted young and creative scientific and technological personnel
- 5) Emphasize such social traditions as discipline, patience, and diligence
- 6) Determined to develop Chinese science and technology under any conditions
- 7) Advanced scientific management of research, equipment and conditions
- 8) The autonomy of the scientific personnel in choosing their own research topics, human resource, and funding
- 9) Stable social and political environment
- 10) An free academic atmosphere

Please choose four in the order of importance:

1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____

That's the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for your cooperation.

Date of Research: _____ Interviewer: _____

Coding Personnel: _____ Computer Technician: _____

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Asia Weekly (Yazhou Zhou Kan), a magazine published in Hong Kong.

Beijing Evening News (Beijing Wan Bao), a newspaper in Beijing.

Cheng Ming, (Contend), a magazine based in Hong Kong.

China Spring (Zhongguo zhi Chun), a dissident Chinese intellectuals' magazine in New York.

Chinese TV News (Zhongguo Dianshi Bao), a Chinese newspaper.

Democracy and Law (Minzhu yu Fazhi), a newspaper sponsored by Chinese Association of Law.

Democratic China (Minzhu Zhongguo), a dissident magazine by Chinese intellectuals who escaped after the June 4, 1989.

Du Shu (Reading), a magazine of humanistic intellectuals'.

Guangming Daily (Guangming Ribao), a Chinese language newspaper of intellectuals, based in Beijing.

Min Jin (Democratic acceleration), a magazine sponsored by one of the small "democratic parties."

Magazine of Social Sciences (Shehui kexue ji kan), a magazine for the so-called "academic intellectuals."

New York Chinese Newspaper (Niu Yue Hua Bao), a Chinese language newspaper in New York City.

NYT, The New York Times

Overseas Chinese News (Qiao Bao), a Chinese government sponsored Chinese language newspaper based in New York City.

People's Daily (Renming Ribao), a Chinese newspaper sponsored by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

PFG, Press Freedom Guardian (Xinwen Ziyou Dao Bao), a dissident Chinese newspaper.

Strategies and Management (Zhanlue yu Guanli), Vol. 1, 1994.
A Chinese magazine run by "state policy" intellectuals.

WJ, World Journal (Shijie Ribao), an overseas Chinese newspaper, pro-KMT, based in New York City.

WSJ, The Wall Street Journal.

Wenhui Daily (Wenhui Ribao), an official newspaper in Shanghai.

Wenhui Movie Times (Wenhui dianying shibao), a newspaper in Shanghai.

Wenhui Reading Weekly (Wenhui Dushu Zhoubao), a newspaper of writers and their books.

Xingdao Daily (Xingdao Ribao), a Chinese newspaper based in Hong Kong, but there is a New York edition.

Xinming Evening News (Xinmin Wanbao), a Chinese newspaper in Shanghai.

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