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Television programming in third world countries: An exploratory study and assessment of "media imperialism" claims and assumptions in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand

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TELEVISION PROGRAMMING IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES:

AN EXPLORATORY STUDY AND ASSESSMENT OF

"MEDIA IMPERIALISM" CLAIMS AND ASSUMPTIONS

IN BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA AND THAILAND

by

K. MUSHTAQ ELAHI

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For Millie

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CHAPTER I

"MEDIA IMPERIALISM:"

AN OVERVIEW OF PERSPECTIVES

Television was introduced to many Third World countries with great enthusiasm by their governments. It was believed to be instrumental not only in their development efforts but also as a bridge between these countries and the rest of the world. It was hoped that the bridge thus built would bring two worlds--developed and developing--together, and foster an atmosphere of mutual understanding. This did not happen. The traffic on the bridge has, however, moved and is still moving mainly in one direction--in the direction of the developing countries.[1]

When television was introduced, the ruling elites in many Third World countries became so conscious about its demonstrative effects and got so wrapped up in their immediate political gain for such steps that in the short run, at least, they didn't think about the content of this new medium and how and where they would acquire or produce the programs (Lent 1982). They soon found that it was beyond their capability to "feed" the "giant." In most instances, the financing for production of the programs was barely enough for the simplest shows. As such, if a realistic program schedule of five to six hours of an evening was to be built, more programs had to be found outside the country. Since the price of American television programs was the lowest and an alternate supply was almost nonexistent, it was to these low cost American imports that

the stations most often turned (Katz and Wedell 1977; Tunstall 1977). As a result, programs produced in the United States started filling the air time of these countries. Gradually, the countries became dependent on such American programs as I Love Lucy, Kojak, Dallas, Charlie's Angels, and the like for their survival.

Such dependency of many poor and impoverished countries on foreign and American programs attracted the attention of both Western scholars and the leaders of several developing countries during the 1970s. They argued that these television programs, music, films and magazines were infiltrating in the developing societies with "alien" cultural content which may not be optimal for the socioeconomic environment of the recipient countries. They also argued that the flow of foreign television programs into developing countries reflected a new form of colonial relationship between the originating nations and their colonies (Beltran 1976; Nordenstreng and Varis 1974). Developing countries do not necessarily consider "decolonialization" as having ended with the achievement of national independence. From their perspective, decolonialization is a process that goes beyond the simple recognition of political sovereignty to the complex act of nation building in the international arena. These countries may assert that they were victims of a form of "neocolonialism" in which political dependence was removed and replaced with economic and cultural dependence on developed industrialized nations. In this view, Western television programs are sold by a combination of aggressive salesmanship and seductive offers of aid tied to assistance from exporting countries.

These countries bring technology and organizational skills of the West to the developing countries and create further dependence.

It is through this network of relationships, it is argued, that the television programs diffuse messages of materialism, unproductive consumption and the legitimacy of status-quo (Beltran 1976). Many Third World leaders, such as Indira Gandhi of India, Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania were uneasy with the possibility that the influx of foreign television programs might also portray consumer products and goods that would create a conspicuous consumption pattern totally unsuitable to the level of economic wealth of their respective countries. In addition, they feared a damaging impact on native industries (Lee 1977).[2]

This recognition of the socio-cultural problems caused by the indiscriminate admission of programs containing values of foreign cultures was used by Herbert Schiller (1969) as evidence to support the "media imperialism" theory concerning the domination of international mass culture. "Media imperialism" reflects the dependency relationship established by the importation of media hardware, programs, and technology as well as the related systems and values that vicariously establish a set of foreign norms, values and expectations which, in varying degrees, may alter the domestic culture and the socialization process. According to Schiller, American television exports are part of an attempt by the American military-industrial complex to dominate the world through the homogenization of world culture. The consequence of this process is

> that the majority of the population is largely unaware of alternative values and alternative reading of history. . . . In the absence of visible alternatives, no mass-based opposition emerges and the structure of control is able to continue unchallenged.[3]

Hall (1960) describes the functioning of the mass media in the cultural sphere as being

> crucial to the reproduction of the dominant culture and ideology that it conveys. This is done by providing the social knowledge through which the reality of others is perceived, so that an imagery coherence is built, in which the contradictory elements are held within the frames of the dominant culture and ideologies. This transforms them into a formidable apparatus for building of consensus and legitimacy.[4]

Several authors explained the term "media imperialism" in a variety of contexts. Prominent among them are Dizzard (1966), Varis (1973), Nordenstreng (1977) and Lee (1977) on television; Katz and Wedell (1977) on broadcasting; Smith (1977) and Boyd-Berrett (1979) on mass media; Tunstall (1977) on mass media and advertising; and Wells (1972) on television and advertising. These authors claim that authentic, traditional and indigenous cultures in many parts of the world are being battered out of existence by indiscriminate "dumping" of large quantities of "slick" media products, mainly from the United States (Tunstall 1977). With regard to television, one of the main assertions concerning the theory is that the imported television programs hinder indigenous cultural activities, resulting in a decline in the traditional art, culture and values of the recipient countries. According to Schiller (1971), the American media and especially their television programs, convey via their images and messages, the beliefs and perspectives that create and

reinforce their audiences' attachment to materialistic Western culture, thus perpetuating Western influence over the poorer nations.

Fred Fejes (1980) argues that, largely due to the influence of American multinational advertising agencies on Latin America, many of the images Latin Americans receive about themselves, their environment, and the outside world through advertising, are inappropriate and even damaging to the cultural integrity as well as socio-economic and political development of the region. Fejes also maintains that television stations show little concern over whether the images conveyed by the programs and the commercials are socially useful and encourage suitable values, life styles, and consumer habits appropriate for Latin Americans.

Luis Ramiro Beltran (1978) contends that a definite character of images is conveyed by the imported programs. The images conveyed, he suggests, support the capitalist system and the status-quo as a natural order. Beltran (1978) also identifies materialism as the dominant strain of imagery in Latin American television programs. He maintains that many shows induce an adherence to the belief that the "main goals of human beings are acquisition of wealth, the accumulation of goods, the enjoyment of services and the achievement of general well being."[5] This promotion of materialism is also associated with the idea that the material satisfaction is to be enjoyed first and foremost by the individual.

Alan Wells (1972) also made similar charges. He said that, "American television programming within South America distorts the

entire economy away from 'producerism' and towards 'consumerism'."[6] He argues that television in that region has been linked functionally to American manufacturers through branches of major American advertising agencies. As a result, Wells observes, it has led most governments in the region to believe that commercial television is free whereas educational television is a luxury. Thus, television is prevented from being used for productive or developmental purposes, such as literacy, skill training, public health projects and information dissemination.

Many scholars accused television of providing a "false-consciousness" to the vast segment of the politically and economically disadvantaged population (Marcuse 1969; Nordenstreng and Varis 1973). Burnett and Muller (1975) have demonstrated that the Peruvian poor embraced the foreign culture portrayed in television because it offered fantasies that permitted escape from the political and economic realities of their country.

There is evidence to show that American television programs reflect American middle class aspirations and fantasies which are often at variance with the cultural values of other societies (Katz and Wedell 1977). The symbolic meanings of these programs may be interpreted out of context since there is no chance of correcting or modifying the meanings by direct observation. As a result, when exported overseas, these programs create changes in social structures that can affect tastes, values, views about the society, human relations and life itself.

Lee (1977) observes that when media-created socially

irrelevant images of the developing countries are exported overseas, and are absorbed in the recipient culture, they can result in changes in many spheres of life. In many Asian countries, he observes, drinking coffee or Coca Cola has become a status symbol among urban residents, making the native-grown tea look inferior. Such changes are indeed not very significant, yet this is how some of the Third World countries are experiencing a "go ahead" kind of mental make-up among the volatile section of urban population. Some Chinese educators are increasingly worried that the bald and flamboyant American television detective Kojak may some day replace historical Chinese figures as the most recognized hero among school children (Hsu 1977). The apprehension is that the next step forward would be a change of belief and understanding among their younger generations.

In the 1970s, the growing concern about the impact of American television programs and other related media products on the national culture of the developing countries became a subject of vigorous international debate. American media dominance met with unprecedented challenge from the Third World. The United Nations and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have taken note of the one-way global media flow and attempted to rectify the problem. For instance, UNESCO attempted to formulate a new international information order, which seeks a restructured system of media and telecommunication priorities in order for the Third World countries to obtain greater influence over their information, economic, and political systems.

The first description of a new world information order grew out of U.N. Resolution 3281 in 1974. It was later articulated at the meetings of the Non-Aligned Nations Group in Algiers and in New Delhi. Following Resolution 3281, the group framed objectives in the field of communication-information:

* to recognize existing communications channels which are the legacy of the colonial past, and which have hampered free, direct, and fast communication;

* to initiate joint action for the revision of existing multilateral agreement with a view to reviewing cable rates and facilitating faster and cheaper inter-communication among South countries;

* to take urgent steps to expedite the process of collective ownership of communications satellites and evolve a code of conduct for directing their use and,

* to promote increased contact between mass media, universities, institutions and research bodies so as to enable developing countries to exchange experience, information, expertise and share ideas.[7]

In these two meetings, the developing countries affirmed the right of cultural and national sovereignty and self-determination--the self-defined right of a nation to protect itself from what has been broadly referred to as "cultural domination" and "media imperialism." They complained that a handful of powerful Western news organizations had a virtual monopoly on the gathering and dissemination of information around the world. They charged that the Western information media were using their power in the information-communication fields to perpetuate economic and cultural dominance of the Western countries. The core of their view was stated by Christopher A. Nascimento, the former Information Minister of Guyana:

> The power to inform is one of the keys to power as such. The communications industry, the development of 'transnational' news agencies, the evolution of electronic information system, the billions expended on pioneering and advancement of space and computer technology, all serve and continue to serve as a means of political, commercial, social and cultural dominance of the of the world by the developed nations. . . . [Because information and economic power are intrinsically linked] the nations that are seeking a new information order, are the same ones that sought the new world economic order. They are the nations that are poor and more of them are getting poorer."[8]

In 1976, at the New Delhi conference on the pool of news agencies, Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, while approving the constitution of the new non-aligned news agency pool, agreed to promote the early adoption of a declaration of fundamental principles for mass media. These principles are supposed to strengthen the press, promote international cooperation and understanding, contribute to the early establishment of a new economic and social order founded on equality and justice, and combat racism, racial discrimination, apartheid, neocolonialism and all other forms of oppression. Earlier, in the 18th general conference of UNESCO in 1974, this Soviet-sponsored declaration provoked intense disputes among UNESCO's member countries--developing and developed--over the definition of appropriate "fundamental principles governing the use of the mass media." After several revisions, the draft finally reached a compromise form, accommodating the Western concept for the protection of journalists under the "free flow" doctrine, Third World concerns over correcting "inequalities in the flow of information to and from developing countries," and Soviet concepts of the proper ends of news.[9]

However, in the 1976 Nairobi general conference, the support

of many developing nations, particularly the African nations, for the Soviet-sponsored draft declaration diminished; they were determined that the first UNESCO General Conference in Africa be a success and not radically alienate the United States, which provides one-third of UNESCO's budget. The issue was postponed until 1978 due to a "lack of consensus." The United States pledged to help developing countries improve their media and communications systems. In view of the strong interest in world communication problems throughout the past decades, evinced particularly by developing nations, UNESCO decided to appoint a special sixteen-member International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems to submit a preliminary report for the 1978 General Conference and also the final report in 1979. Mr. Amadou Mahtar M'Bow of Senegal, the Director General of UNESCO, appointed Mr. Sean MacBride, a former Irish Foreign Minister and Noble Prize winner, as chairman of the commission. The commission, popularly known as the MacBride Commission was established with the following goals:[10]

1. the analysis of the current state of communications;
2. the problems surrounding a free and balanced flow of information and how the needs of the developing countries link with the flow;
3. how, in light of the new international economic order, a new world information order may be created; and
4. how media may become vehicle for enhancing public opinion about world problems.

Since the beginning of the non-Aligned movement, there has been a stormy conflict between First-World supporters of the "free-flow of information" doctrine and non-Aligned leaders attacking it

as a cover up for First-World domination. The two sides were eventually brought together--at a skeletal level of generality--by a UNESCO synthesis: "a free-flow and a wider and more balanced dissemination of information." The MacBride Commission put flesh on this skeleton. The report relates freedom of the press to freedom of expression generally, to the many interpretations of the newly-stated rights to "communicate" and "receive information," rights of reply and correction, and the civil-political and economic-social-cultural rights set forth in the United Nations' 1966 covenants. It points out that freedom for the "strong" and the "haves" has had undesirable consequences for the "weak" and the "havenots." It urges greater access to the media by women, young people and ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities.

In July 1978, the MacBride Commission received a document from Mustapha Masmoudi, the Tunisian delegate to UNESCO, as a background paper, entitled "The New World Information Order." He begins his paper with the remark that while a great many developing nations achieved political emancipation after World War II, colonialism still thrives in the form of disparities, built into the international power system, between developed and developing countries in the economic, information and virtually all other sectors. In defining the goals of the New World Information order, Mr. Masmoudi states that:[11]

> . . . the new order would be the framework for promoting freedom of information and communication as an individual and collective right that must be guaranteed at all levels. There are no groups for thinking that this would limit freedom of information or hamper the dissemination of information.

> It would, above all, allow individuals, communities, and nations to make known their aspirations, their concerns and their problems in struggling to shape a better future. This new order would help the cause of liberty and justice, just as it would help to prevent rabble-rousing; end racism, do away with intellectual and ideological hegemony and maintain peace in the world. It must preserve cultural identity and values of each culture, while promoting knowledge of other cultures and balanced exchanges in the sphere of culture.

Masmoudi divides the imbalances in the present information system into three spheres: the political, the legal, and technical-financial. In the political sphere, he observes that there is a "great disparity between the volume of news and information emanating from the developed world and intended for the developing countries and the volume of flow in the opposite direction."[12] This disparity, according to Masmoudi, reflects the West's "de facto hegemony and will to dominate" with respect to international information which indicates and complements its domination in international economic, technological and other sectors. The main agents of this Western control of news flow are the transnational news agencies, who conceive of information as a commodity. He says, they are indifferent to the problems, concerns and aspirations of the developing world and are only interested in that world insofar as it is a consumer in a market they have cornered and wish to continue to corner and also remains a source of saleable news.

Turning to the legal sphere, Masmoudi complains that the doctrine of freedom of information has come to mean "freedom of the informing agent." He is also disappointed by the ineffectiveness of the right of states to have inaccurate, false or misleading information about them corrected and the lack of regulation and a

code of ethics to govern the profession of journalism.

In the technical-financial sphere, Masmoudi notes that the existing telecommunications links and infra-structures largely inherited from the trade and communication patterns of the developed countries flow from developed to developing countries rather than among developing countries and from developing countries to developed countries. He also points out that 90% of the radio frequency spectrum is controlled by 10% of the world's population in the developing countries.

However, the United States, and particularly the multinational media institutions, characterized the New International Information Order as a sinister design by "enemies of international economic freedom" to be implemented through the U.N [13] Among the large multinational media institutions, some that operate entirely in fields where UNESCO has mandates to regulate felt threatened. They include the big communication industries, from advertising to international news agencies. Believing themselves to be endangered, they led a concentrated campaign against UNESCO. As far as U.S. media were concerned, their criticism resulted in an explicit call for U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.[14] The United States withdrew from UNESCO on December 31, 1985.

Television originally generated great enthusiasm among the political elite in the Third World countries. Some of them wanted to utilize the media as an effective instrument for bringing about national integration, socio-economic modernization and cultural regeneration (Katz and Wedell 1977). Their expectations in this

context have however remained partly unfulfilled (Browne 1975; Elliot and Golding 1974). Most of the Third World countries acquired their broadcasting systems from their colonial rulers. After independence, when these countries introduced television, they continued the colonial pattern.[15] Thus, India and other British colonies followed the system of the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) and the former French colonies patterned their broadcasting systems following the systems of France. As a result, the poor and new states of the Third World replicated the television systems of the developed industrialized nations without any regard to their long-term impact on society. Consequently, in these countries, as Lent (1980) put it, television became "a paraphernalia of modernity."[16]

Third World countries, in general, lack institutional and training facilities that develop skilled human resources, such as actors, artists, technicians, and designers to take part in television programming and production. They also do not have affluent private sponsors to support and sustain the continuity of various shows and programs. As a result, they have no other alternative but to accept ready made programs from abroad. This process creates a dependency situation in programming, training and related areas.

Although both affirmative and negative arguments about the "media imperialism" thesis abound, much of the discussion on the subject seems to be removed from empirical reality. Television has always been criticized for its role in promoting foreign cultural

products in developing countries, but these criticisms have had little impact because of the paucity of relevant data, both in quantitative and descriptive terms. The current dissertation, an empirical study focusing on the flow of American television programming to developing countries, attempts to assess the validity of the "media imperialism" theory. A systematic analysis of television programs in selected developing countries, vis-a-vis an empirical examination of the "imperialist" theory, may help to demonstrate the character of the organization of international broadcasting in general and the application of the "media imperialism" concept, in particular.

In order to present a discussion of the subject matter systematically, the material has been organized as follows:

Chapter II. Parameters of media imperialism have been developed in the context of the proposed study. In this chapter, a research design has been proposed which includes research propositions, data collection procedures, and the delimitation of the scope of study.

Chapter III discusses media imperialism in terms of the following parameters: (a) foreign television program flow with special reference to programs produced in the U.S., (b) transfer of programming practices from the exporting countries, and (c) influence of American programs on indigenous artistic expression.

Chapter IV introduces three Third World countries in which the research propositions were tested.

Chapter V presents a detailed analysis of the findings in the

context of the media imperialism concept.

A concluding chapter summarizes the finding, presents limitations of the study and provides direction to further research dealing with applied media imperialism theory.

NOTES

1. Television was initiated in many of these countries during an era of great faith in the power of mass media. But it is no longer believed that mass media, particularly television, are always at the service of development. Beltran (1974) observed that in Latin America a large amount of mass media content is frivolous, irrelevant and even negative for rural development.

2. Even such apparently innocuous shows as Flintstones (Los Picapiedra) and Sesame Street (Plaza Sesamo) in Latin America portray conservative, conformist and materialistic imagery. Citing the findings of Peruvian analyst Gorki Tapia, Beltran (1978) notes that the Flintstones portrays a "consumer society, plentiful in material well-being and assumedly free of contradictions and conflicts." Beltran also refers to Mattelart's study of Plaza Sesamo and his conclusion that the show depicts a rigid, immutable distribution of roles generally into dominant and submissive categories and that its setting corresponds to the American middle class, implicitly accepting that model as the proper and natural one.

3. Herbert Schiller, Mass Communication and American Empire (New York: Kelly, 1969), p. 112.

4. E. T. Hall, "International Communication: A Guide to Men of Action," Human Organization 19 (1960):5.

5. Luis Ramiro Beltran, "Latin American and the United States: Flaws in the Free Flow of Information," in New Perspectives in International Communication, ed. Jim Richstad (Honolulu: East-West Communication Institute, 1977), p. 166.

6. Alan Wells, Picture Tube Imperialism? The Impact of U.S. Television on Latin America (New York: Orbis, 1972), p. 83.

7. Edward Pinch, "The Third World and the Fourth Estates: A Look at the Non-Aligned News Agency Pool," (Department of State, Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, 19th Session, n.d.), p. 7.

8. Ibid, p. 89.

9. Ibid., p. 108.

10. United Nations General Assembly, 36 1981, "Questions Relating to Information: Progress Report by the Director-General," UNESCO, New York, 1981, p. iv.

11. Cees J. Hamelink, The New International Information Order: Obstacles and Opportunities (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1981), p. 136.

12. Ibid, p. 137.

13. William H. Meyer, Transnational Media and Third World Development: The Structure and Impact of Imperialism, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1988, p. 99.

14. Achal Mehra, Free Flow of Information: A New Paradigm, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986, p. 137.

15. This view of the media as prime defenders of the status quo is often shared by politicians in power and illustrated by the heavy military guard found outside many capital city radio and television stations.

16. Lent (1980) states that the introduction of an expensive medium such as television has often been irresponsibly implemented for curious and haphazard reasons. He mentions that Indonesia, for example, started a television service to cover the Asian games in 1962; Peru established the medium to celebrate the government's first year in power and Thailand went to color to cover a Miss Thailand beauty contest.

CHAPTER II

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Parameters of the "Media Imperialism" Theory

In the previous chapter, the concept of "media imperialism" and its different perspectives were reviewed. Although many of these discussions are concerned with ideological aspects, the literature seems to suggest three testable postulates of the theory.[1] These are:

1. Dependence on American television programs and multinational cultural industries: As indicated in Chapter I, a number of scholars subscribe to the notion of dependence on the American TV programs flows (Guback 1969; Guback and Varis 1982; Nordenstreng and Varis 1974; Varis 1972). Third World countries have been dependent on American cultural industries to fill the gap of their airtime for several reasons. First, these countries do not have the necessary financial resources. Second, these countries lack technical expertise in terms of trained production personnel, technicians, and specialists to produce enough shows for a viable program schedule of several hours an evening. So the countries had to rely on imports from large multinational cultural industries and giant networks or production companies, such as MCA, Warner Brothers, United Artists, Columbia or Twentieth Century Fox, who can deliver high quality entertainment products at a fraction of the original production cost. Third, these imported programs are even

less expensive than producing a simple talk show in a local station.

2. Dependence on external assistance in terms of TV technology and its operational costs: Several authors (such as Boyd-Barett 1969; Katz and Wedell 1977; Katz 1979; Wells 1972) contributed to the notion of extreme dependence on TV technology. It is a fact that, unlike other media, television is expensive to introduce and to operate. So, the developing countries require foreign aid and assistance in introducing the system in their own countries. A few Western industrialized countries, Japan and the Soviet Union, are the only nations capable of providing this assistance. As a result, when a developing nation introduces television, it is usually required to adopt the technological values and practices of the exporting country. This dependency not only continues years after the introduction of the system, but increases as years go by and the system expands.

3. Penetration of foreign programs into the indigenous art and culture: A number of scholars argued that foreign television programs influence the local art and culture (Beltran 1976; Burnett and Muller 1975; Lee 1977; Schiller 1969, 1971). It has been consistently argued that this feature deemphasizes not only the desirable elements of the local and authentic culture of the recipient society but also threatens and puts them on the defensive, because the imported programs are more attractive.

These three parameters of media imperialism, as outlined above, are tested in the present research based on (1) the composition of local and imported television programs and (2) the

relationship of imported programs with some selected socioeconomic and political indicators of three selected Third World countries.

Research Propositions

In order to examine the aspects of the "media imperialism," as outlined above, this study analyzes the following propositions:

1. American television programming accounts for a large share of total broadcasting time in developing countries.

2. Within a group of less developed countries, economically more disadvantaged countries allocate a greater proportion of total broadcasting time to American programs.

3. The degree of consumption of American television programs within a group of Third World countries may vary with the rate of literacy, level of urbanization, number of radio and television receivers in operation, and newspaper circulation.

4. Television programs imported by the Third World countries are likely to be entertainment oriented.

5. The imported television programs are likely to be targeted to the predominantly urban and affluent audience in the Third World countries.

6. Within a group of less developed countries, the import of American television programs is proportional to total American imports. Therefore, those who import more American commodities tend to import more American television programs.

Countries Selected For Study

The countries selected for the purposes of this study are Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand. They are somewhat arbitrarily chosen as typical developing countries representing substantial socioeconomic and political diversity. A number of least developed countries could be selected to gather support for the above

propositions. However, when more than one country is selected, comparability along a number of dimensions is essential for meaningful generalizations. For any comparative sociological enquiry involving various cultures, the concern for non-ethnocentric objectivism is of paramount importance. It is this concern for non-ethnocentric objectivism, coupled with the researcher's personal interests, background, and knowledge that guided the selection of the countries. Finally, easy access to information and the ability to interpret normative data in these countries encouraged the author to undertake this particular project. Although they can all be classified as developing countries, these countries vary a great deal in terms of economic development: Bangladesh is the poorest of the three, while both Thailand and Sri Lanka have attained much higher levels of economic growth. Other social and economic indicators, such as level of urbanization, rate of literacy and degree of industrialization, vary to a significant extent among these countries (see Tables 1 and 2).

However, the reason for selecting countries from one geographical area is their underlying similarity in some social and cultural aspects--such as family structure, social customs, and particularly their broadcast patterns. In addition, television systems are operated under the control of the government in all three countries. Besides, the similarities among these countries increase the possibility of establishing some generalized patterns.

The degree of government control in these countries varies. In Sri Lanka and Thailand, semiautonomous bodies operate television.

TABLE 1

POPULATION AND ECONOMY: BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA, AND THAILAND

	Population (Millions)	Per Capita Income (US $)	Labor Force Agri-culture %	Labor Force Industry %	Gross Domestic Product (Billions)
Bangladesh	89	89	70	13	10.5
Sri Lanka	14	168	54	27	3.4
Thailand	48	444	76	7	21.9

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific (United Nations, 1982) and Martin McLaughlin, The United States and World Development: Agenda 1980, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980).

TABLE 2

POPULATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF TV SETS: BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA, AND THAILAND

	Population (Millions)	Urban Population (Millions)	No. of TV Sets (in Thousands)	No. of TV Sets (per 1000 People)
Bangladesh	89	10.6	256	29.0
Sri Lanka	15	22.4	50	3.3
Thailand	49	13.2	930	19.0

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from World Radio TV Handbook (United Nations, 1982) and Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific (United Nations, 1983).

In Thailand, the structure of control resembles somewhat the American pattern of multi-operator commercial broadcasting, with less interference by the government in the day-to-day affairs relative to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, broadcasting is carried out by the government itself through the Ministry of Information.[2] (The control aspect of broadcasting in these countries is discussed in detail under the section "Structure and Operation" in Chapter IV.)

Thailand was the second nation in Asia, after Japan, to introduce television in 1955, with Bangladesh doing so in 1964, and Sri Lanka being the latest Asian nation to do so in 1979. Sri Lanka is still in the initial stages of television development. Although in 1959 a commission recommended that a limited television service be started as soon as possible, the Sri Lanka government decided to defer the decision indefinitely because television was anticipated to have an adverse effect on the economy of the country.[3] When the West German government offered a gift of television equipment of more than a million dollars in 1966, the Sri Lankan government decided to accept the funds for the purpose of expanding the country's radio coverage (Gunaratne 1977).

Bangladesh acquired television in 1964, when still under the Pakistani regime, at a time when economically more advantaged neighbors such as India, Burma and Indonesia did not attempt to undertake such a venture. Given its economic growth at the time, television simply was a luxury in Pakistan (Dutta 1980). During that period, as Sharif al-Majhid (1977) put it:[4]

> . . . The infrastructure for an extensive network is sadly lacking, levels of urbanization . . . industrialization and per capita income being, by any standard, extremely low, yet it surprised many when the leaders decided to put the country into the television era.

Television, in fact, remained a luxury medium in all these countries. Its services are concentrated in the cities and towns and are available mainly to an urban audience, typically the higher socioeconomic classes in these societies.

As indicated earlier, these countries represent a wide diversity of economic development. In terms of overall economy, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka can be termed poor, according to the standard formulated by the UN.[5] Bangladesh is the poorer with a per capita annual income of only US $89 while that of Sri Lanka is US $168.[6] Thailand is a little better off, with a per capita annual income of US $444 (see Table 1).

While the urban population in Sri Lanka is 22.4 per cent, Bangladesh and Thailand have 10.6 and 13.2 percent, respectively.[7] The rate of literacy is quite high for Sri Lanka and Thailand, with 82 and 81 percent, respectively. In Bangladesh however the percentage is extremely low--only 29 percent.[8] Although Bangladesh apparently seems to be different from the other two countries in terms of its literacy rate, this statistical difference has probably very little bearing on the study because the audience of television programs in Bangladesh, as in Thailand and Sri Lanka, is predominantly one of urban and educated people. All these countries, however, are predominantly agricultural and most of the people are engaged in agriculture for their subsistence. In the

industrial sector, in Bangladesh and Thailand, the labor force in industry represents 13 and 7 percent, respectively[9] (see Table 2).

A comparative perspective uses a set of criteria common to the units of comparison. Toward this end, television programs are categorized, as presented in the following section.

Categorization of Programs

Any system of categorization, classification, and quantification of mass media material, including television programs, may imply philosophical and ideological considerations. Some program statistics often involve three basic categories: information, education and entertainment. But such a classification has little relevance to the proposed study. Therefore, the categories used in this study are derived from an analysis of the format and content of the television programs based on the models developed by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis (1977). These models are derived from an inventory of program imports by 115 countries. Twenty different categories were created to describe the format and content of the respective programs. In these categories, some are clearly "educational," some are "sports" and some are "entertainment" because of the dominant content of these programs. In some cases, their classification was based on the perceived appeal of the program content to a group of audience--for instance, "cartoons" were classified as "children's programs" without exception.

Although this classification combines many different criteria

in one--such as, topic. purpose, audience as well as content and format--a similar pattern is widely followed by the countries under study.

Following Nordenstreng and Varis's guidelines and program listings (which generally categorized the programs), the current study offers six distinct categories, as follows:

1. News and documentaries: includes news programs and commentaries, informational talk shows, political programs, press conferences on national or international issues and wants, magazine format programs of political and social subjects of both national or international interests.

2. Series and entertainment: includes fictional entertainment programs such as situation comedies, Western, hospital dramas, soap operas, police stories, and the like. Most often they are repetitive in the sense that there is some common story-line in each part. Also included are variety shows, music and dance sequences.

3. Sports and games: includes coverage of sports and games such as soccer, hockey, boxing and other sports.

4. Children's programs: includes cartoons and other selected programs especially targeted toward the young audience.

5. Educational programs: includes instructional programs directed to general and specific audience interest, such as formal school programs usually for credit, often integrated into institutional curricula. Other instructional programs such as health care and farming are also included in this category.

6. Others: There are some programs for which published

sources as well as listings of programs could not provide a distinct category. These include readings from religious books (a common feature in Bangladesh television and to some extent in Sri Lankan television), program announcements and occasional programs to celebrate social events, political events, and religious festivals. These may be lumped together as other programs.[10]

Data Sources

It is extremely difficult to gather research-relevant media data from Third World countries for a variety of reasons. First, there is no institutional mechanism to collect and organize data on media consumption. Second, whatever data are available through official channels often lack reliability and validity. Third, bureaucratic and diplomatic protocols often prohibit scholarly research in politically-sensitive media, such as broadcasting.

Given the above limitations, the author utilized a number of internationally acceptable secondary sources of data for the purpose of this study. The sources include the following:

Detailed listing of programs were acquired from such leading national newspapers as the Bangladesh Observer of Dacca, the Daily News of Colombo and the National Review of Bangkok. These newspapers are considered the leading English-language dailies in the respective countries.

Television programming in these countries is affected by many factors: political movements or demonstrations, religious events and festivals, as well as natural calamities. Finding a common time

period affording some control over all these variables was critical for this study. A review of airtime, within the context of the above-mentioned contingencies, provided a sample of programming extending for two weeks--from June 1 to June 14, 1985.

It is imperative to describe how television programming is affected by a single event. Bangladesh, since its creation in 1971, has experienced over a dozen successful and aborted coups d'etat by the military. During and immediately after such maneuvers, television and radio stations remain under the custody of the military. Consequently, regularly-scheduled programs are suspended or interrupted. Such a situation persists until the regime feels secure. In Sri Lanka, the separatist Tamil movement, which persists even today, evokes similar responses from the government. All media are used, following a skirmish, to consolidate support for the government.

Since the daily television airtime of these countries is limited to five or six hours, programs for a period of two weeks constituted the sample of television broadcasting in this study.

NOTES

1. These parameters of the "imperialist" theory are discussed in full detail in the following chapter.

2. Cf. Mujahid, Scandelen and Guanaratne in Lent (1977) for a detailed discussion on the broadcasting systems of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

3. A dissenting member of the Hulugalle Commission which recommended introduction of television in 1959 comments: "The very talk of television will be repulsive in the present context of things where the purpose of good government must be to reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots." (Gunaratne in Lent 1977).

4. John A. Lent, ed., Topics in Third World Mass Communications (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1975), p. 213.

5. Countries having per capital income less than $300 (US) are below poverty line according to the UN.

6. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1982.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Television programmers in Third World countries are hardly concerned about audience preference, ratings, competition and quality, unlike their peers in the United States. Since the programs are not developed through research on audience needs and tastes--rather, they are selected and imported by government officials--the sociological significance of the categories presented above is difficult to assess. As television audiences in Third World countries have no choice but to watch whatever is available in one and/or two channels, a comparison with highly sophisticated U.S. program categories and their offerings would hardly be appropriate.

CHAPTER III

"MEDIA IMPERIALISM" -- REDEFINED

Over the course of history there have been many trends in empire building. The first era was characterized by military conquests, which occurred during the early stages of human history, when Greeks and Romans were involved in empire building by expanding their control over vast areas of land. The second era involved militant Christianity: the Crusades of the Middle Ages are typical examples of this expansionist movement. The third era commenced with the growth of a mercantile economy, fueled by the industrial revolution, and ended abruptly during the middle of the present century. This era was characterized by the desire both to import raw materials and find markets for finished products in colonies all over the world.[1] The colonial powers sought raw materials and other goods unavailable in their countries and, in return, sent finished products to these colonies. To continue and strengthen their control, the colonial powers imposed their language, customs, philosophy and religion over the colonies (McPhail 1981).

During the 1940s and 1950s, with the growth of nationalism, new nations emerged in Asia and Africa. But at the same time, the multinational corporations were allowed to grow and solidify their domestic and foreign markets. With the emergence of a post-industrial economy based on production, processing and distribution of information goods and services rather than on raw muscle power or energy, the Western powers, particularly the United States, moved

toward monopolized control over the world information system. Today, the United States controls 80% of the world's information (Smith, 1975).[2]

Wells (1972), Schiller (1976) and Varis (1973) have observed that there is a one-way flow of information from rich countries to poor countries. This flow reflects the complex social and cultural patterns of domination by the developed countries over the developing countries that parallel economic control.

The penetration of modern communications into developing countries comes easily because their institutional structures are weak and generally unable to offer resistance (Schiller 1973). As a result, communications systems and products, particularly highly sophisticated television technology, its values and practices of operation and programming, have been imposed upon developing countries. In addition, these countries are encouraged to leap over intermediate stages of development (Lent 1979).

Television has always been a key element in the discussion of the "media imperialism" concept for several reasons. First, it is the most visible medium today. Second, television is able to generate great enthusiasm among the leaders of the developing countries. Third, many Western scholars believe that television is an ideal medium to accomplish the task of national development (Schramm 1964). But, in practice, television became a medium through which flows a stream of foreign media material consisting of "junk," sex, trivia and violence, much of which may violate local values and morals and thus debase local initiatives and cultural

sensibilities (McPhail 1981).[3]

The concept of "media imperialism" represents a new and potentially valuable framework for the systematic analysis of international media activities. This framework identifies the structures of different media systems and programming patterns and analyzes these variables within the socio-economic and political environment of the recipient societies. Studies of international broadcasting leave it unclear whether the broadcasting activities described are the product of deliberate commercial-political strategy or deliberate political attempts to induce a homogenized world culture. It is in this context that three dimensions of "media imperialism" were studied in the present research. These dimensions, discussed at greater length earlier in Chapter II, may be restated in the following way:

> (1) American television program flow and the role and importance of the three giant American television networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) and other television and film producing and marketing companies;
>
> (2) the transfer of values and practices associated with the technology of television; and
>
> (3) the imported television programs and their impact on the indigenous art and culture of the recipient society.

American Television Program Flow

Although television was introduced in some major countries before World War II, actual development of the medium began to take place after the war. Television had, in fact, been an offshoot of already existing radio and film industries. Since American

television was developed and perfected on the basis of the rich and powerful traditions of film and radio, the United States has always been ahead of other countries in terms of the medium's technology.

World War II played a large part in determining future trends in television. Thomas Guback (1969) explains why:

> World War II did much to disrupt film business by creating shortages of equipment and materials in most cases, outright destruction in others, making finance scarce, and disorienting national film industries in general. At the end of hostilities, the backlog of American production in the early 1940s rushed into the vacuum and found little competition from local industries which were struggling just to remain alive. Film produced in the United States quickly dominated European screens. . .[4]

During the 1950s, many developing countries had no film industry nor the capability for introducing television. At the end of the 1950s and notably in the 1960s, the Western countries began to provide television hardware, training, and program materials to developing countries. For instance, the United States provided equipment for Thai and Philippines television during the late 1950s with American resident advisors stationed in both Bangkok and Manila, who advised on the import of program materials most of which were American.

Today, approximately one-third of the world's television sets belong to the Americans (Guback and Varis 1982). Until the beginning of the 1960s, the United States had more television sets than the rest of the world combined. It was only in 1962 that more than 53 million television sets owned and operated outside the United States for the first time surpassed the American total of 53 million (Nordenstreng 1974). For the big producers and distributors of television programs in the United States, this change led to new

marketing and production patterns.

Television programs in the United States are produced by networks, television stations, and individual production companies. In most cases, the process of distribution involves physically delivering program packages from one country to another. A small number of programs were transmitted directly via satellite. Television programs produced in the United States began pouring into the international market in the mid-sixties. During the latter half of the 1960s, American television export approached $100 million a year (Nordenstreng 1974). The United States is still the leading originator of television programs.

Lee (1978) suggested that the pattern of television program flow may have a close if not perfect correspondence with the stratification of international power structure, which reflects the relative ranking of politico-economic structure of individual countries. Countries that are politically and economically strong, such as the United States, Great Britain, and France tend to be most media-independent. They are both major exporters of media products to other countries and significant importers of media products. Tunstall (1977) argues that the British media have played the role "not of a progressively defeated competitor, but of a prosperous junior partner" to the dominant American media enterprise. With strategic help from the British, the Americans penetrated into other countries. Out of 20 large corporations which dominate the world media exports, only five are British. British media exports to the rest of the world are still approximately one-third of the value of

American exports (Lee 1978).

Multinational Cultural Industries

The multinational and corporate structures of media organizations in the United States represent an important aspect of "media imperialism." Today's world market economies are characterized by multinational conglomerates. Information production and dissemination are mostly in the hands of a few multinational corporations that have their headquarters in the United States. Basically, this trend was initiated when the industrial economy shifted in the West toward a post-industrial service economy which relies substantially on telecommunication systems, and where traditional geographical barriers to international communications are being rendered obsolete. The post-industrial society, with its information-related service as the cornerstone, impacts significantly on both industrial and nonindustrial nations. Some scholars argue that the direct and indirect impact of these information industries, especially on the consciousness of the people and their culture is tremendous. They also argue that the influence of the information industries is more powerful than that of other major industries (Guback and Varis 1982). Thomas McPhail (1981) writes:

> Essentially how much of the foreign and imported material rubs off on the receiver is the critical issue. The displacement, rejection, altering, or forgetting of domestic and native materials is a major concern for the Third World. . . ("media imperialism") of the 20th century is just as dreaded as mercantile colonialism of the 18th and 19th centuries.[5]

However, we know less about the impact of multinational mass media than we do about multinational business (Read 1969). The structure of the U.S. export of television programs is extremely complex and uncoordinated.[6] As a result, the estimates of total foreign distribution must be tentative.

ABC, CBS and NBC, the three giant American commercial television networks, no longer play an important role in the distribution of American programs. The subsidiaries or international divisions of the large motion picture companies are the leaders in the export of U.S.-made programs. In all, there are about 161 U.S. companies active in the program export and distribution business (Guback 1969).

There is no comprehensive inventory that identifies the major corporations engaged in worldwide exportation of U.S. programs. However, a brief account of some of these companies will provide us with an idea of their dominance in international television markets. Table 3 describes selected broadcasting, motion picture and television program distribution companies of the United States of America.

It should be noted that there is no central organization for commercial media exporters. The Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPAA), is estimated to account for more than 80 percent of the total foreign sales of American television programs. Some members of the MPAA have been involved only in exporting to movie theaters, a few export for television and others export both to theaters and television markets.

The companies that dominate the export of motion pictures and television programs from the United States are big companies--ranking among the 500 largest corporations in America. These companies derive revenue from many diversified commercial activities. The history and structure of these leading American multinational communication companies reveal a large number of similarities, especially in the area of market orientation. Like all big businesses, they tend to reflect a homogeneity of goals as well as similar politico-economic, social and legal backgrounds. Some of the leading multinational cultural industries and their productive capabilities are briefly described in the following pages.[7]

RCA (Radio Corporation of America)

RCA began radio broadcasting in the early 1920s, and in 1926 formed the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) to handle the broadcasting aspects of its business, with two radio networks--Blue and Red.

RCA's interest in international broadcasting increased in 1936 when NBC organized an international division to transmit a regular service to Europe and Latin America. With affiliates in Mexico and Central and South America, NBC's Pan American network operated commercially until the end of World War II, when the service was superseded by the Voice of America.

Formerly, NBC managed and supplied technical advice to foreign television stations. As of the mid-1970s, its foreign broadcasting

activities consisted of small minority equity interests in television stations in Hong Kong, Australia, Venezuela, Mexico and Argentina. NBC does not syndicate television entertainment programs in foreign markets but sells only a few new documentaries abroad. RCA gradually has withdrawn from the television field abroad because of foreign government regulations and shifting priorities of RCA management. Moreover, Federal Communication Commission (FCC) regulations have generally prevented television networks from engaging in domestic program syndication, thereby reducing incentives to invest in entertainment programs that would be available for distribution overseas.[8]

CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System)

Unlike RCA, which started as a patent pool to handle transoceanic communication and to sell radio receivers, the origin of CBS Inc. was firmly in the broadcasting business. Its forerunner was organized in 1927, and two years later the name changed to the Columbia Broadcasting system. CBS purchased its first radio station in 1928. CBS's interest in foreign broadcasting was expanded in 1937 when daily shortwave broadcasts to Latin America began. By 1942, affiliates throughout Latin America were receiving service on CBS's Network of the Americas. These ventures were discontinued after the end of World War II. Since 1960, the company has diversified into marketing services, musical instruments, publishing, educational services, leisure activities and development for other industries and the military.

With more than 100 subsidiaries in 32 countries, CBS's major foreign activities are the manufacture and sale of recorded music and musical instruments, as well as music and book publishing. Since the mid-1960s, CBS has developed a substantial international record music business, making the CBS Records Group one of the world's largest producers, manufacturers and marketers of recorded music.

CBS has a 20 percent investment in a cable television system in Canada, and sells theatrical and television exhibition rights to feature films it has previously financed or produced. In 1967, CBS purchased the Republic Corporation's Hollywood studio and equipment. A subsidiary, Cinema Center Films, was established by CBS to produce feature films for television broadcast and global distribution. In 1970, CBS also established Viacom International, to which it passed rights to CBS motion pictures, television programs and its ownership of domestic cable television subsidiaries. Eventually, Viacom became an independent company when, in compliance with FCC regulations, CBS disposed of its stock ownership. Because of arrangements with Viacom, CBS now distributes television entertainment programs overseas. However, through an agreement with the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), CBS News supplies 18 countries with daily videotapes of news. During 1975, it also began distributing a daily news film service to three Japanese televisions networks and to stations in Puerto Rico. CBS has no investment in foreign television stations, nor does it offer management or technical advisory services.

ABC (American Broadcasting Corporation)

Of all the national networks in the United States, the American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. is the most active and ambitious overseas. ABC's foreign interests in broadcasting have been much more extensive than those of NBC or CBS. In 1959, ABC International was formed to overseas foreign sales and to establish a global system of ownership, management, program production, and distribution. The following year, the Central American Television Network (CATVN) was organized, with ABC assuming responsibility for selling programs to affiliate stations and handling advertising sales. By 1968, the Latin American Television International Network Organization (LATINO) was operating modelled after CATVN.

By 1969, ABC had minority interests in 14 foreign companies operating television stations in Latin America and Far East, and was providing programs for stations in 23 countries. However, by the end of the 1970s, ABC International was no longer a sales representative for foreign stations and has divested itself of interests from the foreign stations. But it continued as consultant to overseas stations and purchased programs on their behalf.

ABC originally hoped to create a worldwide commercial television network based on the American model, but because this deal did not develop satisfactorily from a financial and administrative point of view, it decided to reduce its holdings overseas. Nonetheless, ABC maintains an important advisory role in programming purchases in several countries, many of which are heavily dependent upon American television programs.

It can be concluded that the present foreign involvement of the American networks is growing in activities other than program distribution. One area of common interest is the phonograph record business, with CBS currently leading, followed by RCA and ABC. The manufacture of hardware overseas is the exclusive domain of RCA. With television operating in virtually all the countries of the world, there is no longer much need for management and technical advisory services to help inaugurate broadcasting, although in the past, several systems were started with the assistance of ABC, CBS or RCA.

The exporting of sports and news materials, although perhaps important to receiving countries, is not considered significant by the networks, and revenue from this source is vastly overshadowed by that from other business. In the production and distribution of entertainment programs, the networks have yielded to the major Hollywood film companies. Foreign distribution in particular has shifted to Hollywood corporations that already had overseas marketing arms to handle theatrical feature films, and thus did not have to depend upon the smaller revenue from television sales to keep distribution offices operating abroad. The motion picture companies, therefore, also warrant close examination as international traders in theatrical films and materials for television.

MCA (Music Corporation of America)

The corporation with the largest film and television revenue

in 1979 was MCA Inc., receiving $289 million from theatrical rentals and $189.9 from television. The corporation's total revenue was $811.9 million, of which about $171.3 million (21%) was derived from foreign sales.

The company was incorporated in 1958, and four years later, acquired more than 80 percent of the stock of Decca Records, Inc., which at the time owned 90 percent of the stock of Universal Pictures Inc.

MCA-TV is the global syndication division of MCA Inc. Its average annual revenue is about $200 million, including one-fifth from sales in the domestic market.

The company leads the industry in film production for American network prime-time television. From 1975 to 1979, the series produced by MCA averaged approximately 37 hours a week on network prime time. MCA also produces specials and feature films for initial exhibition on television.

In general, American television shows are produced only under network contracts that provide for license fees covering a major portion of the production costs--which for some one-half hour action program average about $500,000 per episode. Recovery of the balance of production costs and profits usually depends upon success in foreign syndication, domestic syndication, and additional network telecasts in non-prime-time hours. There are various arrangements under which MCA's theatrical films and television films are owned, produced and distributed. Other parties may receive revenue and/or net profits from certain films, but MCA or its subsidiaries

generally own the film and control global distribution.

Warner Communications, Inc.

Warner Communications is the second largest in the communication industry. Of $988.5 million in revenues during 1984, $226.3 million came from abroad, excluding Canada. Canada is considered to be part of the domestic market by the company. Its main operating companies in motion picture and television programs are Warner Bros., Inc (WB) and its subsidiaries. WB's business includes the financing, production and distribution of feature films and the distribution of series and made-for TV films to television networks and other stations. Some of Warner's films are made in California at the Burbank Studios, which the company shares with Columbia Pictures Industries. It produces an average of three dozens of films a year, some of which are solely for foreign theatrical distribution.

Warner Communications has elaborated a specific international distribution strategy. It says:

> Applying domestic release patterns is impossible when dealing with as many markets as there are regions and cultures. Warner Bros.' representatives must be diplomats, economists, union negotiators, specialists in export/import regulations, and tax and censorship experts. Also, in order to give each film the individual (marketing) attention it requires, they must be kept fully appraised of each movie from pre-production to the arrival of the picture in their company.[9]

This strategy, therefore, amounts to selling an international product with advertising and promotional technique geared to specific countries.

Warner Bros. produces pictures in Europe and Asia for

distribution in foreign markets. Overseas production of foreign language features has been growing, and films made in French, Italian, Spanish and Far Eastern languages have contributed to the increasingly profitable business.

Film production is financed directly by Warner Bros. or under arrangements with independent producers. The company also purchases completed films produced by others, or acquires distribution rights to such films. Agreements negotiated with independent producers vary according to the film itself, the amount and type of finance offered by Warner Bros., the territories covered, the period of distribution, and other factors. It is often the case that the producers, directors, writers and actors participate in the revenue and profits of motion pictures in which they are involved.

The company operates a worldwide theatrical film distribution chain, although outside the United States it frequently engage in joint ventures. For example, Warner and Columbia have combined their distribution facilities in some countries in order to reduce overhead expenses. Warner Bros. owns 16 subsidiaries for film distribution overseas, in addition to a production company in Italy. It also has subsidiaries in the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, South Africa, Brazil and the Antilles. Until recently, the company had a 25 percent interest in the Associated British Pictures corporation (ABPC), which operated more than 250 theaters, and produced and distributed theatrical feature films and television programs in the United Kingdom and

other Commonwealth countries all over the world.

Twentieth Century-Fox

In terms of total revenue from distribution to theaters and television, the third ranking company in the United States is Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation with about $527.9 million of assets.

Under terms of an anti-trust consent decree judgment with the American government in 1951, Fox's International Theatre Division owns or operates major theater circuits in Australia, New Zealand, Western Europe, the Middle East, East Africa and all over Latin America.

For international distribution of movies and television programs Fox has about 75 offices, about one-third of which are jointly owned with other companies such as Columbia or Warner Bros. Fox acquires films for distribution outside the United States, with a fee ranging from 25 percent to 35 percent of the distributor's gross receipts. Final decisions about foreign production and pick-up deals are made in the home office in the United States, as in other international companies. In effect, this means that such policy matters affecting foreign film industries as financing, over-all content, production and distribution systems are established in the United States, so that the industries abroad have relatively little autonomy. In the United Kingdom, for example, Fox is not particularly interested in producing pictures exclusively for the British market, but rather considers their likely attractiveness to

the American and world audience. Each year, the company invests between $15 million to $20 million in British productions. A portion of that amount is drawn from distribution earnings in the country, and additional sums customarily are reappropriated from a consortium of American banks with offices in the United Kingdom.

Columbia Pictures

Columbia Pictures Industries and its subsidiaries produce and distribute on a worldwide basis theatrical motion pictures, television series and features, and phonograph records. They also produce television commercials and operate television stations both in the United States and abroad. It has about 30 percent interest in two television stations in the British Virgin Islands and the Netherlands Antilles.

The Columbia Pictures Division arranges with independent companies for the production of most of the films it distributes. Columbia generally reserves for itself worldwide distribution rights, and is entitled to the gross receipts and net profits after adjustment with the other parties. Agreements with independent producers generally provide that each picture's story, cast, director and budget must be approved by both Columbia and the independent producer. As a result, Columbia is involved in all stages of the production process and must consent to each significant commitment made by outside producers.

Overseas, Columbia's productions are not necessarily designed to serve only the needs and tastes of the countries where it is

made. The company's international operation develops local productions having the potential for exploitation in other territories, thus leading to films that have international rather than local interest. As with other film companies, Columbia's foreign operations are subject to fluctuation in currency exchange rates and regulations as well as to quotas and other restrictions imposed by foreign governments upon the importation and exhibition of American programs or theatrical films. Since Columbia is owned by the Coca-Cola Corporation, it can arrange favorable terms for the transfer of foreign assets because of the enormous financial strength of the parent corporation overseas.

Columbia maintains an international distribution chain in more than 50 countries. Most often, it releases films through local, independently-owned distribution companies. In some countries, it shares facilities with Warner or Fox. Columbia's television distribution, in recent years, has been the number two supplier of American network programming. Like feature films, several series, which are licensed in virtually every foreign country, are available for international syndication.

To carry out foreign activities, Columbia has subsidiaries incorporated in Australia, Belgium, West Germany, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan, New Zealand, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Panama and Canada. In a dozen other countries, Columbia has film distribution offices, some of which are shared with other American motion picture companies.

Paramount Pictures

Paramount pictures is a subsidiary of Gulf & Western (G+W), which is one of the largest international conglomerates in United States. G+W's activities are organized in eight major operating groups: manufacturing, consumer and agricultural products, natural resources, apparel products, paper and building materials, automotive replacement parts, financial services and leisure-time.

G+W's leisure-time operations center mainly on Paramount Pictures, which produces and distributes motion pictures and televisions series. Other leisure-time activities include book publishing through Simon & Schuster, music publishing, production and distribution of educational films, manufacture and distribution of coin operated amusement devices, real estate development and foreign theater operation. Each of Paramount and Universal holds a 49% ownership of Cinema International Corporation (CIC), which owns theaters in England, France, South Africa, and Egypt.

The most important aspect of Paramount's business is the financing and production of feature films. When Paramount finances all or part of a film produced by an outsider, it customarily retains a percentage of the proceeds from distribution as a means of recouping its investment, and it also generally obtains an ownership interest in the picture or enters into a profit-sharing plan with the producer. Paramount has about 3,000 features in its television library available to overseas markets.

Like other American film companies, production and financial decisions involving foreign subsidiaries are made in the United

States, thereby suggesting that the destiny of film industries abroad is not entirely under local control. This is particularly true of Paramount, as it is clear that its activities are thoroughly integrated into the corporate decision-making process of its parent company, the Gulf & Western Industries.

United Artists (UA)

Another major Hollywood-based company that has become a small part of a large conglomerate is United Artists Corporation (UA). It was acquired in 1967 by Transamerica Corporation, which is one of the five largest diversified financial corporations in the United States. It engages in such business activities as property, life, health and disability insurance, pension and mutual funds, investment advice, consumer lending, real estate, mortgage banking, moving and storage, air travel, auto rental, information processing, radio televisions broadcasting, film processing, motion picture financing and distribution.

As Transamerica's entertainment subsidiary, United Artists contributes about 15 percent of the total of its parent company. In addition to obtaining distribution rights to certain films, United Artists distributes for theatrical release feature films produced by independent producers, though financed wholly or partially by UA. The Company also distributes these pictures to televisions, merely by phasing out its series business.

The foreign production policy of United Artists is similar to that of other American companies. It generally looks at the

world-wide market potential for a proposed film--in addition to its possibilities for the country in which it is made. Although foreign managers may recommend policy, ultimate decisions are made in the United States.

Walt Disney Productions

The production and distribution of theatrical and television films is overshadowed by the company's principal business, the operation of its amusement parks. The firm's other activities include music and records, character merchandising, publications and educational media material. Disney's motion pictures are distributed in more than 125 countries. Outside the United States, they are handled by other organizations. But Disney wholly owns subsidiaries for all distribution in France, Japan and the United Kingdom. According to the company, it takes from five to seven years to market a feature film throughout the world. Disney's television programs are broadcast regularly throughout the world too. Some programs, originally broadcast in the United States, have been reedited for distribution for overseas.

To summarize, it can be stated that such giant American corporations as MCA, Twentieth Century-Fox, Columbia Pictures, Paramount Pictures, United Artists, and Walt Disney not only have the capacity to produce programs for developing countries but also to distribute these programs through the network of their subsidiaries and branches.

Transfer of Values and Practices of Television

When a broadcasting system is imported into a developing country, the relevant practices, values and professional norms are also imported with the medium. This transplantation of values, practices and norms may pose problems for the importing societies. One example of the transfer of American values is the common practice of continuous broadcasting in many developing countries. Since there is a tendency to judge the maturity and effectiveness of the system by its broadcasting hours, many developing countries strive for more broadcasting hours in their services from the very beginning. In the process, they ignore or underestimate several important considerations: the amount of money it costs to produce a locally made program; the talent it takes to do so, and the infra-structure in the visual arts of theater, graphics, and film (Katz 1973). Soon enough, they find that the easiest way to fill the airtime is by importing programs from abroad, particularly from the United States, because it is the major source of low-cost programs.

Values reflecting the style and content of programs are also important. The audience rating system of the United States is a good example. It is crucial in identifying the comparative success of programs by stations and networks in America. This system was exported to Britain through its commercial television and has been exported to other countries as well. The "never ending" series and soap operas are responses to the rating systems (Boyd-Barrett 1973). They offer a formula for securing maximum audience over a long

period of time on the strength of a single major idea, and continuing the idea as long as the audience accepts it. As a result, producers are reluctant to undertake new ventures that reflect new ideas and imagination. Once the audience gets used to programs like sentimental soap operas over a long period of time, they may tend to reject some other programs which have greater intellectual and artistic merit. The Latin American "telenovela," which corresponds to Western "series," is a good example of local programs made following the Western format. Tunstall (1977) argues:

> . . . any search for cheap programming to build audience loyalty could scarcely fail to arrive at the solution of a series drama with a tiny cast and minimum studio set. The key point about the telenovela is that it originates from a need to fill time cheaply--and this in turn arises from transporting multichannel all-day commercial television from a rich country to a much poorer one.[10]

At the end of the 1950s and up to the mid-1960s, the powerful and rich industrialized Western nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and a few others began to provide the developing countries with television hardware as well as programs. As a result, the values and practices of television of the exporting countries were transported uncritically to the receiving countries. For instance, RCA provided the equipment for the Egyptian and Syrian televisions during the 1960s. RCA also provided American program advisors in each of the two stations to advise on the importing of program material (Nordenstreng 1977).

The dependence of the less developed countries on the aid provided by major industrialized countries seems not to be limited to the introduction stage but continues with every stage of the

medium's development. Most of the French-speaking African countries have used the French Office de Cooperation Radiophonique (OCORA) not only to set up their radio and television stations but also to train their staff and assist in administration. Even today, this influence is as predominant as it had been during the 1960s and early 1970s. Organizations similar to OCORA also exist in other Western countries, such as Thomson Television International (TTI) and Televisions International Enterprises (TIE) in the United Kingdom, and Radio Television International (RTV) and NBC International in the United States. These companies offer packages to television stations in various areas of the world and continue their services on a long-term basis.

Foreign Programs and Indigenous Art

Television reflects popular culture and delivers immediate consummatory pleasure with very little effort on the part of the public (McCormack 1969). Television programs not only reflect the aspirations, values and fantasies of the middle class (Wilensky 1964) but also offer participation and escapism for the pent-up working class in modern society (Gans 1974; Katz and Foulks 1962). They are mass-produced and mass-packaged by modern communication institutions for mass consumption. Neither elite nor folk culture would be a match for television in a market test (McCormack 1969; Rosenberg and White 1957).[11]

Due to a constant inflow of foreign cultural material and messages, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish clearly the

indigenous origin of popular culture from the foreign import (Lee 1977). Traditional culture and art may not suit the logic of modern television programming. Modern media demand performance on an arbitrary cue, in tune with an entirely different rhythm. The wrenching of traditional art from the event that gives it meaning, such as festivals, may drain it out of authenticity and significance (Head 1977). Furthermore, as Katz and Wedell (1977) observe in the case of Thailand:

> The earliest days of Thai television contained a much higher proportion of indigenous creativity and of televised materials based on traditional art forms such as shadow play, the dance theater, puppeteering and so on. The decline in the proportion of these original productions in Thailand and elsewhere followed the increase in the number of hours of broadcasting,the easy importation of foreign films serials, and invention of the videotape recorder, as well as, just exhaustion. The fact is that Thailand has several classical dramatic forms that have not yet found their place in television; the national theater is the last preserve of the dance-drama, for example. Instead Thailand is importing gory Japanese thrillers at a very high rate vying with that of the importation of American series.[12]

Modern television appears to have helped revive some traditional forms of arts, such as the Peking Opera in Taiwan and mau lum (song and story) in Thailand, but this has yet to be exploited extensively.

It has been argued that the "sleek" foreign made television programs take away opportunities that could be accorded to local producers and performers (Katz 1973). Local programs are produced under severe budgetary constraints, with equipment hardly capable of creating the necessary effects. The average budget of an American production is well over a million dollars and has at its disposal

state-of-the-art technological gadgets. As a result, American programs are likely to be, at least visually, more attractive to the viewers.

More importantly, as Lee (1977) observes, the "native" television is modeled on the "metropolitan" styles and is involved in a wholesale borrowing of Western assumptions. In most Third World countries where the market economy is weak, conditions for talent training and development are not as competitive as those in the Western countries. Local performers are often compared unfavorably with polished western "superstars." There is genuine pressure on local talent by the arbitrary importation of a "world standard" of technical excellence which may be at variance with local cultural values and needs.

NOTES

1. Thomas McPhail, Electronic Colonialism: The Future of International Broadcasting and Communication (London: Sage, 1981).

2. Bruce Smith, International Communication and Political Opinion: A Guide to the Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).

3. Ibid.

4. Thomas Guback, "Film as International Business," Journal of Communication 24:1 (1974):237.

5. McPhail, Electronic Colonialism, p. 37.

6. Guback, "Film as International Business."

7. Most of the information contained in this part of the discussion was acquired from the K-10 forms submitted by these companies to the Securities Exchange Commission.

8. The FCC rule in question prohibits national television networks from engaging in the domestic distribution of television programs for non-network exhibition, or foreign distribution of such programs except where they are the sole producers of them.

9. Annual Report (Warner Communications, 1984), p. 3.

10. Jeremy Tunstall, The Media are American: Anglo-American Media in the World (New York, Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 68.

11. Bernard Rosenberg and David White, eds., Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America (New York: The Free Press, 1957).

12. Elihu Katz and E. G. Wedell, Broadcasting in Third World: Promise and Performance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 133.

CHAPTER IV

AREA STUDIES: BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA, AND THAILAND

Introduction

Broadcasting in most Third World countries typically represents governmental monopoly under direct government supervision. In the past, there were some exceptions; but today, the trend is toward direct government operation and ownership of radio and television. The organizational patterns for these media are more uniform throughout the Third World countries than in the Western societies.

The reasons for government ownership and control are twofold. First, the cost of establishing a radio or television system is much higher than the cost of setting up a newspaper. As a result, the private ownership of a broadcasting station is often beyond the capability of private persons in developing countries; second, this high cost encourages the pooling of resources and thus leads to a monopoly. Moreover, since these media reach rural areas and transcend conventional literary barriers, the government has a much greater interest in controlling them or at least in keeping them out of hostile hands. Anyone with a printing press has the technical capability for reaching the literate audience. Such access is seen by the government as a political threat but the threat is not as great as it would be if radio or television broadcasting is left to a private control. These media, which have the potential for

reaching a vast audience in the country, and many more outside it, are regarded by the governments as too important to be left to private interests. In most instances, there has been very little argument against this basic claim of the government.[1]

This trend toward greater government control over all media, common in most Third World countries, has affected a newer medium like television more because it has no tradition of freedom to uphold. Furthermore, television was introduced at a time when press diversity and freedom were declining and military regimes were on the rise in many Third World countries.

Individual countries had different experiences with radio and television because of unique local factors that influenced these media. Many of these countries acquired radio when they were under colonial rule. The colonial administrators placed broadcasting under government control from the beginning, so that it could be used as an instrument of colonial rule. When the colonial rulers departed, they turned broadcasting facilities over to the newly-independent governments. The latter were content to maintain them as official institutions with a view to strengthening their power bases. Other reasons for government control of the broadcasting media include such factors as scarcity of broadcasting frequencies and inadequacy of trained personnel, which the government can handle better in these countries.

Government ownership and operation derive also from the belief that government is best suited to formulate broadcast policies and manage the system well. Depending on which motivation is dominant,

program philosophies range from a dictatorial effort to provide only a limited access to ideas and entertainment to more benevolent attempts to provide a relatively wider range of informational and entertainment programs. In most cases, there is a general lack of concern for the size, nature and interests of the audience. Most of these systems rarely survey the listening or viewing preferences of the audience. Programs are not shaped to fit the precise needs or desires of the audience, but are designed by the intentions of broadcast personnel and government officials who decide what the public should have (Smith 1977). Occasionally, viewer and listener mail provides some flavor of the public reaction but it is not a determining factor in program decisions.

Against the background of this general picture of the broadcasting system in Third World countries, a descriptive account of television in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand is presented below.

BANGLADESH

Introduction

There are several special features one must take into consideration before undertaking any discussion concerning broadcasting in Bangladesh. Critical to any such discussion is an awareness of the natural disasters that continually ravage this country and the region.[2]

Bangladesh is a very small country with an area of 55,000

square miles. The country is situated in one of the largest and most heavily watered deltas of the world. It comprises alluvial plains with marginal hills in the east and southeast. Its monsoon climate gives Bangladesh an average rainfall of 100 inches. The region's vast network of rivers undergoes extensive periodic flooding every year. Nearly 30 to 50 percent of the land of Bangladesh is inundated by flood waters, yet the country experiences a lack of water in the dry months of November to April following the monsoon, and naturally needs both flood control and irrigation facilities--a tremendous task for a developing country. The country is subject to severe storms, cyclones, and tornados, especially in the delta area because of its funnel shape.

To a greater extent than usual, people in most areas of Bangladesh are concerned about the unpredictable nature of their weather and an increasing inability to control their rivers. On the average, annual floods are experienced over a third of the cultivated area of Bangladesh during seven months of the year (approximately April through October), and almost every fourth or fifth year--usually in August or September--the floods ravage more than half of the land. The last very big floods occurred in 1970 and 1988, at about the same time that a series of cyclones devastated the southern coast with a heavy loss of life. The death toll estimates varied from nearly a million to 100,000. Cyclones and floods are now commonly described within Bangladesh as the two greatest natural calamities of this century.

Perhaps nowhere in the world does so much water flow into such

a small land area in such a short space of time as in Bangladesh. Much of the water and snow that falls in the Himalayas, and in the Kumaun, Nepal, Bhutan, and Assam Hills, finds its way into the rivers that flow into Bangladesh. These rivers are then fed by the annual rainfall. It has been estimated that the water that flows into Bangladesh would be sufficient to cover every inch of the country to a depth of 34 feet every year if the water were dispersed equally over the entire area.[3]

Population

Many of Asia's problems are carried to their extremes in Bangladesh. Paramount among them is a heavy and rapidly increasing population. Bangladesh is the world's eighth most populous country, with a population which is now over 89 million,[4] and rising rapidly. Already for its size, Bangladesh is the most densely populated country in the world.

The average density of population in the rural area is 1,300 persons per square mile of cultivated land. While the whole of Bangladesh is densely populated, there are five especially overcrowded districts--Dacca, Comilla, Chittagong, Noakhali and Faridpur--where according to the 1961 census there were 2700 persons per square mile of cultivated land. These districts, which comprise approximately 35 percent of the country's total population, are also the food deficit areas. From 1960 to 1965 roughly 50 percent of their grain consumption was imported from outside.[5]

In fact, increasing population has been the country's most

serious problem for quite some time now. The table below shows the evolution of population in the area of the subcontinent of India that now forms Bangladesh.

The population has roughly tripled since 1881 and roughly doubled since 1931. Crude death rates fell from about 50 per thousand at the beginning of the present century to less than 20 per thousand in 1968. Crude birth rates declined in the present century from about 60 per thousand to less than 50 per thousand. Neither birth nor death rate figures are very accurate[6] but they point to a natural rate of increase of about 30 per thousand.

There also are other factors that work to make the problems even worse. Family planning measures have not been very successful in Bangladesh.[7] Almost every aspect of society in village life is against population planning. Lack of education, superstition and religious views contribute to this reaction toward family planning. Besides, since men are the only earning members of a family, a desire for sons--and thus increased income--often leads to several children.[8]

It is obvious that with a population of only 10 million people, life in Bangladesh could be very pleasant. But with the population already over 89 million, projections are that by the year 2000 the population will reach 130 million in a country the size of the state of Wisconsin.

Economic Resources

Bangladesh has limited natural resources, and it has virtually

TABLE 3

THE EVOLUTION OF POPULATION IN BANGLADESH

Year	Population (in millions)
1881	24
1891	27
1901	29
1911	32
1921	33
1931	36
1941	--*
1951	42
1961	51
1974	77
1975	80
1980	93
1990	121
2000	150

* not available

no industrial base.[9] The principal resources of Bangladesh are its magnificent, if uncontrolled rivers, its fertile deltaic land, and its untapped reserves of natural gas. But it has no known quantities of minerals, iron ore, coal, petroleum (expectations of finding off-shore oil still remains unfulfilled), or any of the other numerous resources that enrich many of the developing countries. The economy of Bangladesh is, therefore, an agricultural peasant economy, with 90 percent of the population living in rural areas and more than 70 percent of the population engaged in agriculture. During the period when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, agriculture generated about 60 percent of the gross national product and over 90 percent of that agricultural territory is now included in Bangladesh.[10]

Under these circumstances, it is little wonder that the economy of Bangladesh has been forged in the classic colonial pattern with agricultural produce being exported in return for the products of industry. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the British developed and established control over the indigo, jute and tea that was grown in East Bengal (the area that is now Bangladesh) and shipped these products either to Calcutta or to England for processing. This meant that in many ways British Indian agents--centered either in Calcutta or London--controlled the destiny of the people of East Bengal and such control increasingly led to feelings of exploitation on the part of the East Bengalis. This prompted their joining Pakistan in 1947, only to find that they had merely substituted one colonialism for another.

The country is mainly a land of small farmers, most of whom own less than the country's average of a little more than three acres per farm. Moreover, most of these tiny farms consist of many small, discontinuous plots. Many of the people engaged in agriculture are cultivators who own their farms, but more commonly they rent or sharecrop someone else's land. However, nearly 20 percent of those employed in agriculture in 1960 were landless laborers, and it is likely that their number has greatly expanded.

Industry has never gained a foothold in the area. To aggravate the situation further, much of the development effort in the private industrial sector in East Pakistan was undertaken by West Pakistani businessmen. So, development in this sector only enriched the non-Bengalis. Even then, the manufacturing industry in Bangladesh contributes about only 10 percent to the nation's gross domestic product. The contribution of the large-scale manufacturing sector is about 6 percent, while the remainder is made up of small scale and cottage industries.[11]

The Bengali Social Structure

As stated earlier, about 90 percent of Bangladesh's population lives in the rural areas and is involved in various spheres of agricultural production, which provides over 55 percent of the gross national product.[12] The peasants in Bangladesh constitute more than 70 percent of the total self-employed population of the country, and represent the largest detachment of laborers. A large portion of them (not less than 18 percent--about 1.4 million

families) are landless agricultural workers. As for the landowners, predominant among them are poor peasants (51 percent of all the property owners) with an allotment of up to 2.5 acres. As a rule, they are engaged in subsistence or semi-subsistence farming and often not having even draft animals. Almost half of the poor peasants (over 4.5 million families) have parcels of land of less than one acre, and are actually agricultural workers with an allotment.[13]

As such, the rural upper class are numerically small. There are only 190,000 families who own parcels of land ranging from 12 to 25 acres in size, and 20,000 families who own from 25 to 50 acres. They constitute 3 percent of all the property owners and own about 1 percent of the agricultural land in the country.[14]

A special place in the social structure of the country is occupied by a relatively small group of landowners (4,000 families) with allotments of from 50 to 150 acres. They have appeared relatively recently in the 1960s and consist of businessmen and prominent officials, local and foreign, who have invested their savings in the land holdings, the ceiling of which was raised from 83 to 150 acres by the government of M. Ayub Khan in 1959. As a rule, they have not been working and are not working on their own farm, but lease or sublease the land to local farmers. Along with all wealthy farmers in the rural areas, right up to 1971, this group of major landholders was the principal social support of the Pakistani ruling circles in the rural areas of East Pakistan. One of the aims pursued by the Bangladesh government was to weaken the

position of this special group. This was achieved by the passage of a bill on February 20, 1972, that lowered the ceiling for rural ownership from 150 to 33 acres.[15]

Next in number after the peasants is the detachment of Bangladesh laborers, the so-called independent workers in the non-agricultural section of the economy. Socially, they are extremely non-homogenous. About 500,000 are small-scale to very small scale merchants, and about one million of them are artisans. A considerable number of the latter are connected with small scale trade structures of the economy and live in deep poverty.

The Bangladesh working class, numbering about 600,000 people, include about 100,000 plantation workers and almost 100,000 transport workers. The largest detachment of the working class numerically are the textile workers (239,000 people in 1970).[16]

An important role in the political life of Bangladesh is played by the intelligentsia, with a size of 300,000 people. A large number of them (about 70 percent) are employed workers in state institutions and private firms, as well as teachers in the elementary schools, receiving low wages. The Bangladesh intelligentsia is primarily "first generation intelligentsia," coming from the well-to-do or relatively well-provided strata of society--the bourgeoisie, landowners, prosperous peasants and village merchants, the top artisans, petty bourgeois and priests of religious order.[17]

The number of Bangladeshi bourgeoisie is relatively small and is made up of only a few tens of thousands of families. More than

half of them (not less than 60 percent) work primarily, if not exclusively, in the sphere of distribution--such as export-import business. In 1971, the Bengal bourgeoisie had about 900 qualified industrial enterprises out of the 3,130 existing in the country. There are about 100 transport firms, a large number of construction firms, and a few other types of firms in the country. In general, these were minor and medium sized-enterprises with assets of up to 2.5 million takas. By the time the strata of upper Bengal bourgeois had been marked out, about 40 large Bengal associations or groups were active, with assets of more than 25 million takas each.[18]

Until 1971, the basic position in the non-agricultural sector of the Bangladesh economy was occupied by the non-Bengali bourgeoisie, represented chiefly by Muslim businessmen, who, after 1974, had moved to East Bengal from India or West Pakistan. After the formation of independent Bangladesh, the government took under state control all of the enterprises with a capital of more than 1.5 million takas which belonged to the non-Bengalis who had abandoned the country during the period of political crisis. The decision also was made to sell non-Bengali abandoned enterprises worth less than 1.5 million to private Bengali capital. But not all the non-Bengali enterprises were taken over by the state or sold to the Bengalis. State control was not extended to enterprises which belonged to the dealers from the merchant Muslim sects of Khojas and Bohras who numbered several thousand families.[19] Thus the strata of wealthy non-Bengali bourgeoisie in Bangladesh remained strong through its capital experience and international finance and

business connections.

According to data published by the Bangladesh press, and official announcements, there is an apparent trend to form a so-called "bureaucratic bourgeoisie," considerably extended since the nationalization of approximately 260 large industrial enterprises.[20]

An important feature of Bangladesh is the great linguistic and ethnic (national) homogeneity of the population--almost 98 percent of the people are Bengalis. The principal ethnic minority of the country, the so-called Biharis, are immigrants from various states in Northern India. There are also other ethnic minorities including Chakmas, Santals, Khasis, Garos, and Hajongs. In general, these are poor peasants. There are very few tradesmen and entrepreneurs or teachers and other persons performing intellectual work among them. So, it appears, an overwhelming majority of the economically active population (no less than 80 percent) is involved in the traditional subsistence and small-scale commercial structures of the economy. As far as the private-capitalist and state capitalist structures are concerned, although they have already become the leaders in the economic system of the country, for the time being only a negligible part of the population is linked with them.[21]

Bengali Political Culture

To say that Bengali Muslims possess a relatively short political tradition is not too broad a statement. It is true that in the delta lands of eastern Bengal, the native inhabitants were

peacefully converted to the faith of their Muslim rulers during the first three centuries after the Afghan-Turkish conquerors entered Bengal at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Yet Bengali Muslims never possessed much political power until very recently. The political power in Bengal rested with the non-Bengali Muslim rulers.[22]

In fact, it was not until the beginning of the present century that a native Bengali Muslim middle class emerged to claim a leadership among the Muslims. This is clear from the fact that the native Bengali Muslims had no voice in the establishment of the Muslim League, although one of its original objectives was the defense of the 1906 partition of Bengal which would have made the Muslims of Bengal a political force, and which was annulled by the British in 1911. The 1906 Partition of Bengal provided the Bengali Muslims the first opportunity to enter into the political life of the country. However, it was not until 1937 that Bengali Muslims played any substantive role in the country's politics.[23] The Muslim League, which is credited with the creation of Pakistan, did not exist in Bengal until 1936, when Indian Muslims felt their interests were no longer being served by the Indian National Congress Party.

The growth of a Muslim middle class in Bengal, as such, has been the key to the political power of the Bengali Muslims. The Pakistan movement was a movement of the Muslim middle class against the Hindu middle class, and the Bangladesh movement was essentially a movement of the Bengali middle class against the power elite of

West Pakistan.[24]

During the first decade following the 1947 independence, Bengali participation in the national power elite of Pakistan was limited. Although the Bengalis had nearly 50 percent representation in the central government, they had very meager representation in the military (5 percent), civil bureaucracy (30 percent) and entrepreneurial elite (10 percent). This imbalance was due largely to historical factors. Before partition, East Bengal was an underdeveloped hinterland of West Bengal. Bengali Muslims were generally poor peasants. At the time of Partition, only one of the 133 Muslim Indian Civil Service/Indian Political Service officers who opted for Pakistan was Bengali Muslim.[25] Thus, the power structure that Pakistan inherited had no effective Bengali participation and the policy pursued by the national elite in the early years--a policy of one state, one government, one economy, one language, and one culture--tended to perpetuate their imbalance and was a significant factor in the growth of Bengali alienation in the first decade of Pakistan's existence.

The second decade of East Bengal's existence as a part of Pakistan was not much different. Though a "vernacular elite" grew very rapidly during the period,[26] differences between the two parts of Pakistan only widened, the real power still eluding the new Bengali middle class. Only after the creation of an independent Bangladesh in 1971, could Bengali Muslims be said to have gained the real political power in their own hands. Only then were they able to guide their own destiny. The struggle for power among the

Bengali elite that ensued after Bangladesh was created, the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, and the subsequent military coups d'etat only indicated the short political tradition of the Bengali Muslims.

A Quarter-Century of Union With Pakistan

It should be clear by now that any discussion concerning the social-political-economic and almost any other aspects of Bangladesh cannot escape reference to the country's past association with Pakistan. In fact, this association contributed to a great extent toward the country's development.

As it appears, the union with West Pakistan was unhappy politically and economically. Bengali economists saw the association with West Pakistan as a time of economic exploitation, in fact as a second colonial era.[27] In this respect, it is better documented than most. There can be little doubt that in the early years of Pakistan the financial resources of East Pakistan were diverted to the development of West Pakistan. This was possible because of the integrated nature of the two economies. East and West Pakistan were separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. The impact of economic development in one region could not be felt in the other region. Besides, the central government exerted overall economic control, and the regional governments had very little say in the formation of economic policy. There was virtually no room for independent action by the East Pakistan government. There was a common external tariff on imports from other countries, but trade

between the two wings of the country was regarded as internal trade and no fiscal restraints were imposed upon it, although the quantity of goods that could be moved depend upon the availability of transport, and to some extent, on government regulation. The use of a common currency was combined with freedom to move money from one wing to another. Earnings of West Pakistani businessmen in East Pakistan could be re-invested in West Pakistan and the proceeds of the exports of jute diverted to the development of other parts of Pakistan.[28]

To aggravate the situation further, much of the development effort carried out in the private industrial sector in East Pakistan was undertaken by West Pakistani businessmen. Development there enriched non-Bengalis because:

> . . .in a modern economy an influx of foreign capital may be welcomed together with the expertise it brings. The rewards to capital may be low compared with the wages paid out in respect of the employment created. But in a poor underdeveloped country the share of wages is often much smaller than in countries with a large supply of capital and in conditions of near monopoly and protection, much of the advantage of development may go to capitalists and with the opportunity further to expand their empire by reinvestment, or to send capital away abroad.[29]

After independence in 1972, for the second time in twenty-five years the people of East Bengal were faced with the necessity of adjusting their economy to a new economic order,the result of which is still not certain. Their search for new markets for products previously sent to Pakistan continues. They have had to develop new sources of supply at a time when the machinery of government was being established and new institutions were being built up. In

short, if East Pakistan was considered economically underdeveloped prior to 1971, it became more so after being Bangladesh.[30]

The imbalance was equally disheartening in other spheres of national life as well. In fact, regional and kinship ties strengthened the bond between the top bureaucracy and big business in East Pakistan, from which the Bengali Muslims were virtually barred. Moreover, law and order and the security and defense of this wing of Pakistan, were almost entirely in the hands of West Pakistanis. The subservient position of the Bengali Muslims in the economic structure of East Pakistan was thus reinforced.

As such, the starting point from which Bangladesh attempted its economic development was not promising. The cyclones, the floods, the droughts in recent years have made this task even more difficult.

Television in Bangladesh

Television was introduced in 1964 when Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan. For a poor country like Bangladesh, television is still considered a luxury (Dutta 1980). Yet Bangladesh has nine television stations serving more than 24 cities and has both black and white as well as color transmissions.[31]

The first television was started in Dacca as a pilot project in late 1964 on an experimental basis for a period of three months, and operated initially for three hours daily, six days a week. By the late 1960s, the Dacca station was feeding a newly established satellite station at the port city of Chittagong about 200 miles

away. Seven additional telecast stations, each with a viewing range of some 50 miles, have since been inaugurated in different cities. By 1970, these stations could reach 16 cities and towns and over half the population (Dutta 1980). Weekly telecasts in the early 1970s totaled about 35 hours, the bulk of which was in Bengali (Mujahid 1977).

Television was fully nationalized by the new government in 1971. By 1975, a new center was operational in Rampura with new equipment, multiple studios and a large auditorium. The plan called for one of the largest televisions stations in south Asia (Mujaheed 1977).

Organizational Structure

Bangladesh Television is operated by Bangladesh Television Corporation, with controlling interest held by the government. It is managed by a board of directors, the members of which are directly under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and is directly controlled by the government including day-to-day activities. Almost all program materials, including the advertising commercials, are subject to censorship and governed by standard guidelines.

A significant source of revenue is a yearly license fee collected from owners of receiving sets. Advertising revenue is covered by standardized rates which are relatively low. A written code bars commercials not in "good taste" and the management takes care of it. However, these two sources of revenue are inadequate to

meet operational costs, so the government provides funds for development and operating expenses.

Programming

Programming generally consists of news as well as cultural and light entertainment materials, such as songs, music, drama, and imported serials. Programs from the United States and a few from the Great Britain are important shows on Bangladesh TV. Frequently, addresses to the nation are made by the President of the country or his ministers on television. Using celebrities or popular speakers to propagate the government viewpoint is not uncommon. This is especially likely during governmental crises or in the event of anti-government demonstrations and strikes.[32]

The high cost allows only those in the upper-middle and high income groups to afford television sets. Bangladesh is now producing some televisions sets but it still depends heavily on imports. All color sets are imported and are very expensive. Television ownership is limited to cities where there is access to electricity. Community viewing has been attempted several times but has yet to succeed.[33]

Program Description

Bangladesh utilizes two channels: Channel 9 and Channel 6. Daily airtime for Channel 9 is 5:35 hours every evening starting at 6:00 PM plus another 5:35 hours on Saturday mornings starting at 8:00 AM. The airtime of Channel 6 is only two hours starting at 8:00 PM. The time schedule is almost unvarying except for some

special occasions such as religious festivals. Table 4 describes the program composition of both channels of Bangladesh television.

Among different categories of local programming, entertainment is predominant. This category includes drama, song and music and locally-produced serials. During the period of this study, Channel 9 broadcast 46.10 hours (51 percent) and Channel 6 broadcast 16.55 hours (61 percent) of entertainment program. There is significantly less emphasis on educational and children's programs. During the two-week period of the study, Channel 9 devoted only 4.7 percent of its time for children's programs, while there was no such programs on Channel 6. Channel 9 devoted 3.30 hours (3.9 percent) to educational programs while Channel 6 devoted less than an hour (3 percent) to this category.

News and documentary are moderately emphasized on Channel 9 (21:10 hours or 23 percent) and minimally included on Channel 6 (1:14 hours or 6.5 percent). Religious programs took up a significant proportion of the time on both channels. Programs on both channels start with readings from the Koran, accompanied by readings from the Geeta, the Tripitak and the Bible. Commentary on Koranic verses is a standard feature on both channels. During the period of study, Channel 9 devoted a little over six hours (6.7 percent) and Channel 6 devoted 4:40 hours (16.6 percent) to religious programs.

All foreign programs are entertainment shows, including serials, and adventure dramas. The most common American serials shown during the period of study are Knight Riders, Different

TABLE 4

TELEVISION PROGRAMS BY CATEGORIES DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD: PERCENTAGE OF BROADCAST TIME IN BANGLADESH

	Channel 9		Channel 6	
Categories	Time[a]	Percent	Time	Percent
News and Documentary	21:10	23.5	2:50	5.5
Entertainment	46:10	51.0	16:55	61.0
Sports and Games	9:10	10.0	2:45	10.0
Educational	3:30	3.9	0:50	3.0
Children's	4:15	4.7	0	0
Others	6:05	6.7	4:40	16.6

[a]in hours and minutes.

Strokes, M*A*S*H*, Phoenix-Five, Trapper John, M.D., The Waltons, Dallas, Fall Guys, CHIPS, Bewitched, Hart to Hart, and Dynasty.

Among the imported programs from the United States, Bangladesh devoted 18:45 hours (80 percent) to the category of series/ entertainment and about six hours (24 percent) to cartoons as children's program. Neither of the channels showed any educational/ documentary or sports programs imported from the United States.

As Table 5 indicates, Channel 9 broadcast 18:50 hours of foreign programs during the period of study, which constituted slightly more than 21 percent of its airtime, whereas Channel 6 broadcast 7:25 hours, covering more than 27 per cent of its airtime.

Of the total 27 hours of foreign programs, 24:50 hours (93 percent) are U.S.-made programs. Table 6 provides the breakdown of both the U.S. and foreign programs during the period of the study.

SRI LANKA

Introduction

Sri Lanka is situated in the Indian Ocean just southeast of India.[34] It is an independent republic within the Commonwealth of Nations. The pear-shaped island state is 140 mile across its widest point and 270 miles long. About four-fifth of the island is flat and gently rolling. The south and central areas are predominantly mountainous. Sri Lanka has a generally uniform subtropical climate; the average lowland temperature is moderate but humidity is high. Rainfall, largely carried by monsoons, is adequate for agriculture,

TABLE 5

FOREIGN TELEVISION PROGRAMS DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD: PERCENTAGE OF BROADCAST TIME IN BANGLADESH

	Channel 9		Channel 6	
Date	Time[a]	Percent	Time	Percent
June				
3	1:25	25.4	:25	21.0
4	1:00	18.0	0	0
12	:55	18.0	:25	21.0
13	1:25	23.6	1:20	66.7
14	3:00	28.0	:50	41.6
15	1:30	26.7	:50	41.6
16	1:25	25.4	:50	41.6
17	1:25	25.4	:50	21.0
18	1:00	18.0	0	0
19	0	0	:25	21.0
22	1:30	27.0	:55	45.8
23	1:25	24.4	:50	41.6
24	1:45	26.6	:25	21.0
25	1:00	18.0	0	0
Total	18:50	21.6	7:25	27.4

[a]in hours and minutes.

TABLE 6

FOREIGN AND U.S. TELEVISION PROGRAMS DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD IN BANGLADESH: PERCENTAGE OF U.S. PROGRAMS' AIRTIME RELATIVE TO TOTAL FOREIGN PROGRAMS' AIRTIME

Date	Total Foreign Time[a]	U.S. Time	Percent of U.S. Time
June			
3	1:50	1:50	100
4	1:00	1:00	100
12	1:20	1:20	100
14	3:55	3:55	100
15	2:20	2:20	100
16	2:15	1:25	63
17	1:50	1:50	100
18	1:30	1:30	100
19	:25	:25	100
22	2:25	2:25	100
23	2:15	1:25	63
24	2:10	2:10	100
25	1:00	1:00	100
TOTAL	27:00	24:50	93

[a]in hours and minutes.

except in the north. The country's economy is agricultural, the emphasis being on export crops. Tea, rubber and coconut constitute the main exports of the country.[35]

Sri Lanka leads the world in the production of amorphous graphite, its principal mineral industry. Also mined are precious and semiprecious gems, mineral sands and limestones. Substantial deposits of iron ore have not yet been exploited. The island's swift rivers have considerable hydro-electric potential, which is being developed. Industry is centered chiefly around the processing of agricultural products, especially the cash crops--tea, rubber and coconut. A great variety of consumer goods are also manufactured. Although coastal lagoons provide many sheltered harbors, only south Sri Lanka lies on the main world shipping routes, through the port of Colombo.

Sri Lanka's population grew rapidly after 1950. Soon after the year 2000, the island may have to support 20 million people in an area half the size of North Carolina. The pressure of population on the natural resources already is severe.[36]

Another major problem concerns relations between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil people. Perceiving their status in Sri Lanka as second class citizenship, many Tamils seek the creation of their own independent state on the island, and some groups have resorted to violence in pursuit of that goal.[37]

Approximately 74% of the people are Sinhalese. They claim descent from the island's original settlers, who came many centuries ago from northern India. They occupy most of the island with the

exception of the dry northern Jaffua area and sections of the east coast. Their language is Sinhalese, an Indo-European tongue derived from Sanskrit. About 93% of the Sinhalese are Buddhists; the rest are Christians and Moslems.[38]

About 18% of the people are Tamils, who in Tuva can be considered as two separate population groups. The smaller group, the "Indian Tamils," are mainly laborers who migrated from southern India to Sri Lanka after 1830.[39] The "Sri Lankan Tamils" are concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the island. They trace their descent to early invaders who fought the Sinhalese for centuries but lived more or less harmoniously after the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries--until 1958, when trouble over discrimination against the Tamils by the dominant Sinhalese became acute.[40]

The Tamils speak a Dravidian language, difficult in alphabet. Vocabulary and grammar are taken from Sinhalese. Most Tamils are Hindus, about 10% of them are Christians. The Indian Tamils, who do most of the hard work on the plantations are mainly illiterate and an insecure minority.[41] The Sri Lankan Tamils, prominent in the professions and business, have long had to accept a minority position among the strongly nationalistic and politically more powerful Sinhalese.[42]

Th "nors, with other Muslims, forming about 7% of the population, are descendants of Arab merchants who took over the spice trade after the eighth century and held it for 800 years. They intermarried freely and formed Muslim communities.[43] They are

concentrated along the east coast, and many are shop keepers and traders in the cities. They speak Tamil.

Other small communities include the Burghers, who claim to be descendants of Dutch and other European employees of the Dutch East India company who intermarried with Sinhalese. They consider themselves European in culture and background and speak English and generally keep apart from other groups. Most are Christians.[44]

The economy is based primarily on agriculture--or more precisely, on three basic agricultural commodities: tea, rubber and coconuts.[45] Half of all cultivated land and a quarter of the labor force are involved in the production and distribution of these products, but the prices of these commodities on the world market have fluctuated since the 1950s. As a result, the country's income fell off dangerously at times and no longer could cover the cost of importing necessary food products. The situation was all the more serious because of Sri Lanka's continued rapid growth in population.[46]

Sri Lanka's economy was further weakened by government policies that tend to discourage foreign investments and dangerously deplete foreign-exchange reserves. High government consumer subsidies on rice and other foods became an explosive political issue, because the drain of these subsidies on the national budget was threatening the government with bankruptcy. Payments deficits, inflation, and external debt created additional pressures on the economy.[47]

In order to restore the economy, the government fostered

increased production of tea, rubber and coconuts; began to improve rice farming and to introduce other cereals, and set about establishing new industries. Nevertheless, unemployment continued to create unrest, prices rose, and essential goods became scarce.[48] Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils are strongly family-centered. Both tend to be conservative, though in the cities radical elements have developed.

Education

Sir Lanka has one of the highest literacy rates in the developing world. Estimates of adult literacy range from 85% upward.

Education, to many ambitious families, spells the possibility of government service for their sons and good marriages for their daughters. They will make almost any sacrifice to get their children through high school at least and, if possible, through a university and into the professions.[49]

Education was emphasized by the British rulers. In 1943, five years before independence, free education from kindergarten to university was provided by law. All but a few private schools, holding out against what they feared might be unacceptable government influence, joined the free education plan, which meant grants for equipment, maintenance and teachers' salaries.[50]

School attendance in Sri Lanka is compulsory for children between the ages 5 and 14. The rapid growth in population has outstripped school facilities, and the number of children of school

age actually attending schools falls about 25% short of the ideal of universal education.[51]

The British system put great emphasis on academic subjects and made little provision for practical training. The result is that too many high school graduates are prepared for clerical positions, of which there are not enough available, and too few are trained as technicians, for which there is an urgent need.[52]

The standard of education has suffered in Sri Lanka because of the language conflict, which almost tore the country apart during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The bitter quarrel over the language issue between the Sinhalese and the Tamils grew out of the declaration in 1956 that Sinhalese would, in the future, be the only official language and the medium of instruction in all government and assisted schools. With the election of a coalition led by the United National party in 1965, tensions eased because of concessions made to the Tamils, including permission to use the Tamil language in certain schools.[53]

Although the use of English, now only a second language, has diminished considerably, the University of Sri Lanka, the largest university in the country, has continued to employ it as its principal medium of instruction. Some courses, however, are taught in Sinhalese, much against the wishes of the non-Sinhalese minorities, who prefer English.[54]

Labor troubles, fluctuations in world market prices of the island's three main exports, population pressure, conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, radical insurgencies, and political

ineptitude all plagued the nation after independence.[55] The conservative UNP, which sought to unite the country's ethnic and religious groups, was defeated in 1956 by a coalition led by the more liberal but avowedly Sinhalese and Buddhist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SKFO) under Solomon Bandaranaike.

By making Sinhalese the sole official language (in place of English) and by lending state support to Buddhism, the new government provoked the Tamils to violent confrontations as early as 1958. In 1960, Srimavo Bandaranaike became prime minister after the assassination of her husband. As Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike outlawed the Federal Party of the Tamils. Certain Western business facilities were nationalized and the country became involved in disputes with the United States and Great Britain over compensation. The radical politics of Mrs. Bandaranaike aroused opposition and she lost power in 1965 election. However, she returned to power in 1970 after a landslide victory. She launched social programs, including rice subsidies and free hospitalization, but failed to satisfy the extreme left, which attempted to overthrow the government in an armed rebellion in 1971. The rebellion was quelled after heavy fighting. Mrs. Bandaranaike was ousted in the 1977 elections by the UNP. A presidential form of government was installed in 1978 to restore stability.

After 1983, extremist groups, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elain, became increasingly active and powerful, employing terrorism and guerilla warfare to bring about an independent Tamil state on the island. Reprisals by the army against Tamil civilians

thought to be supporting the guerrillas inflamed the situation.

India considered the rise of bases on its soil by Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka but, uneasy about separatism in its own state of Tamil Nadu, evinced mounting concern for a negotiated settlement of Sri Lanka's communal problems. In 1986, the two countries implemented an agreement originally made in 1964 by which nearly 600,000 stateless Indian Tamils were recognized as citizens of India and close to 500,000 as nationals of Sri Lanka. Finally President Jaywardine and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed a privately negotiated accord providing for greater political autonomy in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka and recognition of Tamil as one of the official languages of the country. The agreement also called for a cease fire, surrender of arms by the guerrillas, and a general amnesty, while guaranteeing Indian military assistance, if requested, to enforce the settlement. However, both Tamil militants and Sinhalese nationalists reject the peace solution. Despite the arrival of a duly summoned Indian peacekeeping force, full implementation of the historic agreement became highly doubtful.

Television in Sri Lanka

Although a proposal to introduce television service was approved as early as 1959, the government was reluctant to introduce the system. It was thought that the nation was not yet prepared for such an expensive medium. Even in 1966, when the West German government offered a gift of television equipment worth $1.3 million, Sri Lanka decided, instead, to use the funds to expand the

country's medium wave radio transmission system (Guanaratne 1977).

However, immediately after the overthrow of Mrs. Bandaranaike's government, Sri Lanka introduced television in 1980. Sri Lanka is the newest Asian country to have a television system. Among all Asian countries, only Nepal and Bhutan still do not have television. Sri Lanka television is a state monopoly, organized under the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation. It has two channels: Rupavahini and ITN. Both channels air programs in Sinhalese, Tamil and English. None of the programs are dubbed or subtitled.

From the very beginning, advertising was an important source of revenue for the system. It is still important today. Although not as commercialized as in Western countries, most programs, including the news, are sponsored by both foreign and domestic companies and organizations. Advertising rates are flexible and large companies are always given preference by the stations since they are steady customers of the commercial airtime.

However, advertising revenue is not enough to offset the total cost of operating the system. A yearly nominal license fee from set owners is another source of income. But a substantial amount of money is provided by the government to run the service.

So far, television service is limited to large cities such as Colombo, Jaffna and Trinciomale, which are the main centers of commerce and industry. The majority of the sets are concentrated in and around Colombo only. There are about 85,000 sets in operation.[56] Broadcasting is limited to black and white only, but the government is studying the feasibility of introducing color

telecasting in near future.

Sri Lanka does not yet manufacture any television sets. Several manufacturers, such as Philips and National Electronic Corporation (NEC), are in the process of establishing their facilities to assemble both black and white as well as color sets in Sri Lanka.

Although there was a proposal in 1979 to connect Sri Lanka's earth satellite to the Indian Ocean Satellite of the Intelsat Consortium, the plan has not materialized because of recent bitter political relationships with India, related to the Tamil separatist movement in the north of the island. However, considering the small size of the country and scarcity of foreign exchange resources, some experts still consider this cooperation with India as feasible and worthwhile (Guanaratne 1977). However, in view of recent political riots and unrest, the government is less likely to enter a joint venture with India and lose control of its monopoly over television broadcasting.

Program Description

Sri Lanka has two television channels: Rupavahini and ITN. Both are operated by the government and the programming on both channels is remarkably similar. The airtime in Rupavahini is an average of six and a half hours per evening starting at 5:30 PM and closing at 10:35 PM, with an extended broadcasting time of an hour on Wednesdays and Saturdays. Similarly ITN starts its program at 6:00 PM and closes at 10:50 PM. There is no broadcast on Sundays on

either channel.

Both channels broadcast in English, Sinhalese and Tamil. Since English is spoken by most of the urban upper and middle class people, who are the primary audience of Sri Lankan television, English language programs predominate. Locally produced programs are simple talk shows, music, dance and song programs. Elaborate dramatic productions are rare. Most of the dramatic programs are imported. Americans serials and British comedies are the predominant dramatic programs on both channels. "Prime-time" fare is comprised of these type of programs. On both channels, a large amount of time is devoted to foreign programs.

As Table 7 indicates, during the period of study, Rupavahini devoted 28:45 hours (37.7 percent) and ITN devoted 46:05 hours (84 percent) time to foreign programs. More than half of them (53.2 percent) are American programs (see Table 8). Other imported programs are from Great Britain, a few are from Canada and one is from the Federal Republic of Germany. Most common American programs are Starsky and Hutch, Charlie's Angels, Bionic Woman, Battleship Gallactica, and I Love Lucy. Other non-entertainment American programs that are common in both channels are Sesame Street, Electric Company and Focus on Wild Life.

Locally produced entertainment programs are markedly less prominent on either channel. It should be noted that Sri Lankan television is still in the developing stage. However, during the period of study, Rupavahini devoted 4:24 hours (5.6 percent) and ITN gave 8:50 hours (15 percent) to locally-produced programs. These

TABLE 7

FOREIGN TELEVISION PROGRAMS DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD: PERCENTAGE OF BROADCAST TIME IN SRI LANKA

	Rupavahini		ITN	
Date	Time[a]	Percent	Time	Percent
June				
1	2:55	57.4	3:90	43.4
2	2:50	53.0	4:30	93.0
4	2:20	27.0	3:00	43.4
6	:55	15.3	2:30	66.7
7	1:50	33.8	3:00	80.0
8	2:05	41.0	3:30	82.0
9	3:00	56.2	4:05	84.5
11	2:05	41.0	3:05	71.0
13	:25	6.5	2:30	59.0
14	2:00	37.3	3:30	93.3
15	1:15	24.6	2:45	73.3
16	2:30	46.8	4:35	95.0
18	2:05	36.2	3:05	71.0
19	2:30	49.0	3:00	80.0
TOTAL	28:45	37.7	46:05	84.0

[a]in hours and minutes.

TABLE 8

FOREIGN AND U.S. TELEVISION PROGRAMS DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD IN SRI LANKA: PERCENTAGE OF U.S. PROGRAMS' AIRTIME RELATIVE TO TOTAL FOREIGN PROGRAMS' AIRTIME

Date	Total Foreign Time[a]	U.S. Time	Percent of U S. Time
June			
1	5:55	1:30	25.3
2	7:20	6:15	85.0
4	5:20	4:20	81.0
6	3:25	1:25	42.0
7	4:50	1:20	27.6
8	5:35	1:30	27.0
9	7:07	5:45	81.0
11	5:10	3:30	67.8
13	2:55	1:55	66.0
14	5:30	2:30	51.5
15	4:00	1:30	37.5
16	7:05	4:30	63.5
18	5:10	3:40	71.0
19	5:30	1:00	18.2
TOTAL	74:50	40:40	53.2

[a]in hours and minutes.

programs consist of song, music and dance, both in Sinhalese and in Tamil.

Entertainment programs are predominant on both channels. During the period of this study Rupavahini devoted 24:25 hours (31.3 percent) and ITN devoted 28:55 hours (52.7 percent) to such category (see Table 9). Rupavahini showed more news and documentary programs (12:35 hours or 16 percent) than did ITN (5:50 hours or 10.6 percent). Rupavahini leads in other categories too. It devoted more time than ITN to such shows as children's programs, educational programs and games and sports.

As for foreign programs, both Rupavahini and ITN devoted a total of 28:30 hours (70 percent) to series and entertainment programs, 2:10 hours (5.3 percent) to educational/documentary, 8:30 hours (20.3 percent) to children's program and only 1:30 hours (3.7 percent) to sports and games.

Sri Lankan television devoted 56 percent of its time to foreign programming and 30.3 percent (in relation total airtime) to American programs. Of the total 74:50 hours of foreign program during the period of the study, 40:40 hours (53.2 percent) were American programs. Table 8 provides the breakdown of both the U.S. and foreign programs.

THAILAND

Introduction

Occupying a central position on the Southeast Asian peninsula, Thailand is bordered by Burma on the west and northwest, by Laos on

TABLE 9

TELEVISION PROGRAMS BY CATEGORIES DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD: PERCENTAGE OF BROADCAST TIME IN SRI LANKA

	Rupavahini		ITN	
Categories	Time[a]	Percent	Time	Percent
News and Documentary	12:35	16.0	5:50	10.6
Entertainment	24:25	31.3	28:55	52.7
Sports and Games	10:45	13.8	9:30	17.3
Educational	12:50	16.4	3:35	6.5
Children's Program	13:45	17.65	5:30	10.0
Others	3:40	4.7	1:30	2.7

[a]in hours and minutes.

the north and east, by Campuchia on the southeast, and by the Gulf of Siam and Malaysia on the south.[57] The heart of the country, the fertile and thickly populated central plain, is virtually one vast rice growing plain, entirely flat and rarely more that a few feet above sea level. The north is mountainous and stretches along the boundary of Burma on the west. There are extensive forests on the sparsely populated north. Most of the northeast is cut off from the rest of the country by highlands and mountains. It is a hilly, dry and generally poor region.

People and Culture

Except in the border mountain areas and in the extreme south, the population of Thailand is largely homogenous. The Thai people are racially Mongoloid.[58] They speak the Thai language, use the same script, are socially integrated and are committed to a common Buddhist faith. The Lao of the Mekong Lowlands are also culturally and ethnically Thai, and non-Buddhist Thai-speaking tribal groups extend northward through the mountains of Laos and across the border of China.

Ethnic Minorities

The one large minority people in Thailand are the Chinese, who comprise approximately 10% of the country's total population. They concentrate in centers of trade and industry, such as Bangkok, where they dominate the world of business. Thailand's next-largest minority are Malay, Thai-speaking Muslims, who are mainly fisherman and rice cultivators, living in the southern provinces bordering

Malaysia. There are also some tribal people--the Lisel, Luwa, Shan and Kaven, who are usually slash and barn cultivators, shifting their residence in accordance with the cycle of land utilization.[59]

Most of Thailand's 100,000 Vietnamese are well established in the country. Of the several hundred thousand Khmer, a large proportion entered Thailand from Campuchia after 1975 and face an uncertain future as refugees or legal immigrants.[60]

Social System

Thai society is loosely structured without strict class lines. The family is the basic social unit. Marriage continues to be arranged by parents, although those based on personal choice are increasing.

Most Thai live in villages. These socially integrated communities respect the influence of elders and customary patron-client relationships, which function informally as agencies of social control.[61] Government activities, by comparison, constitute an unwelcome intrusion.

Local trade and craftsmanship are in the hands of the Thai ethnic group, but the distant marketing of produce supplies is handled by itinerant Chinese traders. Thai farmers work their plots of land individually, but pool their labor at harvest time. Urban Thai men tend to aspire to civil-service jobs or to police or army service rather than business careers. Generally speaking, it is the Thai women who engage in business. They manage bazaar stalls and sometimes perform manual labor in construction projects, up to the

level of carpenter and bricklayer. Educated middle-class women operate real estate agencies and substantial business ventures in the cities--functions that otherwise fall to resident Chinese.[62] A person's status can be enhanced by educational accomplishment. Overseas study and degrees have carried a high premium since the 20th century. Foreign-trained professional men and private engineers usually hold some state jobs although they derive their principal income from business or personal services.[63]

Adjustment to Change

There is a growing cultural lag between village Thailand and Bangkok, a modern city of more than 5.5 million people. Thailand's long experience with modernization sponsored by its own kings, rather than imposed by foreigners, contributed to its capacity for tolerating and rationalizing paradoxical situations.[64] Reverence for royalty and the insistence that power is exercised in the king's name, plus the inertia of the vast civil-service structure, respect for status, and persistence of Thai identity as distinct from that of resident aliens, are all important factors contributing to the stability and unity of Thai society. Moreover, the country has been spared the devastation of warfare and consequent social dislocation in moderation.[65] vitality of the Buddhist faith also does much to bridge social gaps, such as those prevailing between city and country side.[66]

The genius of the Thai social system is that it can encompass contradictory factors within the framework of an expanding economy

and culture. Economic depression, involvement in war, or the eventual pressure of excess population could disrupt the adjustment process, as could an abuse of power and privilege at the center.[67]

Economy

Despite escalating prices for petroleum imports in the 1970s, the Thai economy has continued to perform well. Foreign debt increased rapidly to almost $20 billion by the early 1980s, but debt service, less than 10% of export earnings, constituted no service burden.

The main impetus to economic growth continued to be the expanding export trade in agricultural products. Cultivated land has increased rapidly through improved irrigation, extended double cropping, and mostly--perhaps excessively--through forest clearing.[68]

A major problem remains: the marked inequalities in income and living standards among the regions and, above all, between urban middle class in Bangkok and the provinces generally. Because peripheral regions contains substantial population that are not lowland Thai, ethnic and linguistic differences accentuate economic inequalities in promoting political unrest.[69]

Foreign-exchange earnings from tourism rival those of many leading exports. Bangkok has long been a major tourist center, and new hotel construction proliferated with the Vietnam war. Patlaya, on the gulf, has developed as a Western-Style resort, but lack of facilities for visitors hampers the growth of many attractive

places.[70]

Siam, the ancient Thailand, commenced a relationship with the West in 1511, when the Portuguese traders and missionaries began to arrive. Adroit diplomacy during this time enabled Siam to remain independent of European colonialization.[71] Siam was the only country in South and Southeast Asia able to do so. In the early seventeenth century, the Dutch and British broke the Portuguese monopoly. Siam became, as far as Europe was concerned, the most consequential kingdom in Southeast Asia, and the brilliance of its court under King Narai (1657-1688) was proverbial.[72] The French launched a bid for dominance in Siam that provoked an anti-foreign coup d'etat in 1688 and Siam was closed to most foreigners for over a century. In the nineteenth century, the authority of Bangkok was at last established over all of Siam and the relations with the West were resumed. Siam signed commercial treaties with Great Britain in 1826 and with the United States in 1833. The independence of the kingdom was threatened, however, when Great Britain extended her sway to Malaya and Burma, and France carved out an empire in Indo-China. By opening their ports to European traders, by bringing in Western advisors and by playing off British against French interests, the Siamese managed to stay free.[73]

Siam became a constitutional monarchy in 1932 when a bloodless coup d'etat forced King Rama VII to grant a constitution. In 1934, the country's name became Thailand. Thailand signed a technical and economic aid agreement with the United States and sent troops in support of the United Nations action in Korea.[74] Thailand has

received huge military grants from the United States and has become increasingly apprehensive over its proximity to Communist China. It remained consistently pro-Western with respect to an international outlook.[75]

With Western aid, the country's economy in 1960s continued to boom. It expanded at a rate of 7.5 percent per year. Thailand strongly supported the American policy in South Vietnam, providing bases for the U.S. troops and airfields for strikes against North Vietnam. Thousands of Thai soldiers fought in support of South Vietnam.[76]

The nation's foreign policy was closely geared to the American presence in Southeast Asia and its economy became increasingly dependent upon the United States military spending and subsidies. Economic reversals came in 1970 when the international demand for rice dropped substantially and the prices of tin and rubber fell.[77] In addition, the security of the country appeared threatened by the spread of the Vietnam war into Cambodia and Laos and by growing insurgencies, chiefly Communist-led, in several areas within Thailand itself. Those economic and security problems prompted a series of military coups.[78] In 1973, the military regime was toppled after a week of student demonstrations and violence in Bangkok. King Bhumibal appointed Thailand's first civil premier in twenty years. After a few years, the military took over the government in 1976 but it resigned in 1980 in the face of opposition over soaring inflation, oil price hikes, labor unrest and growing crime, while clashes with Laos and Cambodia have continued to pour

thousands of refugees in Thailand.[79]

Television in Thailand

Thailand was the first nation after Japan to introduce television in Asia. It began broadcasting in June 1955 under the auspices of the government. From the very beginning, television has been a commercial medium and most of its programs have been sponsored by local and foreign advertisers.[80] Initially, the revenues from advertising were insufficient for some provincial stations to continue operations. As a result, the government had to provide large subsidies to the stations from time to time.[81]

During the past few years, the Thai television industry has enjoyed a substantial increase in popularity as a medium for advertising. From 1960 to 1975, advertising revenues earned by the industry multiplied by more than 17 times. Nonetheless, as advertising revenues increased, the number of station also increased, and revenues were shared among the stations in operation.[82]

Thailand does not yet produce television sets on a large scale. Some are assembled in the country, but most are imported. Since 1955, the number of television sets imported annually has steadily increased. In 1975, 22,550 sets were imported. In 1974, there were about 684,700 sets in use.[83] Today the number in use seems to be a million, although no reliable statistics are available.[84]

Most stations today aim at earning a profit from advertising

revenues. Commercial stations even allow the sponsors to have control over programming. Television, therefore, has become one of the major marketing tools for consumer products and services in urban areas. It has been argued that television has largely been responsible for bringing about consumerism.[85] Although all television stations are affiliated with the government in some form or other, yet they are highly competitive because they are fed by the advertiser's budget. Because of this competition, advertisers enjoy great bargaining power over them. In this way, the advertisers' role in influencing the programming is considerable.

Television reception in Thailand does not extend beyond the major urban areas. In the southern part of the country, there are a few or no television sets in rural areas. In the northern part, approximately 2 percent of the rural households own television sets, and in the central plain, about 7 percent of the rural households have televisions. It is primarily used in Bangkok and other large cities.[86]

The regional distribution of television sets is as follows: 50 percent in Bangkok, 30 percent in the central region and the rest of the sets are found in smaller towns throughout the nation.[87]

Organizational Structure

The Thai Television Company Limited was initiated by a legislation in 1953 and began broadcasting in 1955. The Public Relations Department and nine other government agencies are share-holders of the company. The Public Relations Department holds 55

percent of the total shares while the rest are divided among agencies such as Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, Thai Tobacco Monopoly, Thai Sugar Organization, Liquor Factory and the State Lottery Bureau. The Royal Thai Army also runs a color television station since 1967. A second color station was established in 1973. The station is partially owned by the Public Relations Department but operated by a private commercial enterprise, the Bangkok Entertainment Company. Although operated by a private company, most programs are subjected to government censorship prior to broadcasting. The original missions of these stations are different from each other. For example, the Public Relations Department's station was intended to bridge the gap between the government and the people. The Army station aimed at linking the army with the public and giving instructions to it officers. The other companies seek to make profits.

Programming

The early days of television in Thailand were marked by an interest in using the medium for presenting traditional arts, such as puppet theaters and folk plays. The United States Information Agency (USIA) in Bangkok used to provide some film for the new television channel, but the bulk of the programming was local (Katz and Wedell 1977). But in 1956, Thailand started importing programs from the United States. Gradually, as the proportion of imported foreign films and serials increased, the number of local programs decreased (Scalden 1977). Although Thailand has several classical

dramatic forms, they have yet to find their place in television. Instead, Thailand is importing light entertainment shows from the United States and gory Japanese and Chinese thrillers and "Kung-fu" movies on a regular basis.

Program Description

Thailand utilizes four channels: 3, 5, 7 and 9. Program time is quite similar in all channels. During weekdays, airtime starts at 4:00 p.m. on Channels 3, 5, and 7. Channel 9 starts its program at 3:25 p.m. Programming ends at 11:30 on all channels. There is an hour and a half intermission, from 6:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. on all channels except Channel 9. Programs before the scheduled intermission are predominantly children's programs, and programs of special interest to women, such as cooking and housekeeping.

The second half consists mainly of entertainment programs, both of local and foreign origin. Thailand broadcasts a number of locally produced serials modeled on the pattern of popular American serials such as Dynasty or CHIPS. However, American programs such as Knight Rider, Eight is Enough, Hart to Hart, Six Brides for Six Brothers, Dallas, Dynasty are part of the regular program schedule of Thai television.

Entertainment is predominant in all channels. During the two-week period of the study, Channels 3, 5, 7, and 9 devoted 79:00 hours (68 percent), 81:15 hours (70 percent), 50:05 hours (42 percent) and 43:25 hours (38 percent), respectively, to programs in this category (see Table 10). Although Thailand produces a large

TABLE 10

TELEVISION PROGRAMS BY CATEGORIES DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD: PERCENTAGE OF BROADCAST TIME IN THAILAND

	Channel 3		Channel 5	
Categories	Time[a]	Percent	Time	Percent
News and Documentary	10:30	9.0	9:40	8.3
Entertainment	79:00	68.0	81:15	70.0
Sports and Games	0	0	5:40	5.0
Educational	6:20	5.5	2:20	2.0
Children's	15:30	13.4	12:05	10.4
Others	4:40	4.0	5:00	4.3

	Channel 7		Channel 9	
Categories	Time[a]	Percent	Time	Percent
News and Documentary	35:00	30.0	9:40	8.5
Entertainment	50:05	42.6	43:25	38.0
Sports and Games	13:00	11.0	8:00	7.0
Educational	8:45	7.5	21:15	18.4
Children's	10:40	9.0	28:30	25.0
Others	0	0	3:30	3.0

[a]in hours and minutes.

number of programs, such as drama, music and dance shows, entertainment programs are predominantly imported from other countries. Besides the United States, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan are the major exporters of such shows to Thailand. Among the four channels, Channel 9 used the least amount of time in entertainment programs. It utilized 21:15 hours (18.3 percent) for educational programs and 28:30 hours (25 percent) for children's programs, which are highest among all the stations. It also showed the least number of imported programs (Table 11). Channel 5 devoted most of its airtime to entertainment programs (70 percent) and the least amount of time (2 percent) to educational programs. During the period of the study, Channel 5 showed no programs in the sports and games category, and Channel 5 showed just a few. It devoted 5:40 hours (5 percent) for sports and games. Channel 3 also devoted the least amount of time for educational programs: 6:20 hours (5.5 percent).

Channel 7 used 35 hours (35 percent) for news and documentary while Channels 5 and 9 showed the least amount of programs in thiscategory: 9:40 hours (8.5 percent) each followed by Channel 3 with 10:30 hours (9 percent). Most documentary programs are of local origin; a few of them are imported and are shown on all the channels.

Sports and games were not common fare on Thai television. Channel 7 engaged only 13 hours (11 percent), which is the highest. Other channels devoted much less time, with Channel 3 showing none. Live broadcast of boxing was the only sports program broadcast during the period of study.

TABLE 11

FOREIGN TELEVISION PROGRAMS DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD: PERCENTAGE OF BROADCAST TIME IN THAILAND

	Channel 3		Channel 5		Channel 7		Channel 9	
Date	Time[a]	Percent	Time	Percent	Time	Percent	Time	Percent
June								
3	12:20	70.0	3:30	24.0	3:30	22.0	2:40	16.7
4	4:00	66.7	2:05	35.0	1:50	30.5	1:20	15.0
5	4:00	66.7	1:30	25.0	2:20	39.0	2:05	27.8
6	3:55	60.3	1:30	25.0	2:50	47.2	2:30	38.5
8	3:55	60.3	1:00	15.4	2:00	30.8	1:45	19.5
10	8:35	59.2	2:00	14.0	4:35	31.6	3:40	24.5
11	4:00	61.5	1:00	15.4	2:30	38.5	1:00	11.0
12	3:55	60.3	1:30	25.0	2:50	47.2	2:40	29.7
13	3:25	52.5	1:30	25.0	3:50	59.0	2:20	26.0
14	3:55	60.3	1:25	21.8	2:50	47.2	1:25	15.7
15	3:55	60.3	1:00	15.4	2:00	30.8	2:15	25.0
17	8:25	57.0	2:00	13.8	3:30	22.0	2:40	26.7
18	4:00	61.5	1:00	15.4	2:20	36.0	1:10	13.0
Total	73:45	60.5	23:00	20.2	42.55	37.3	35:30	24.4

[a]in hours and minutes.

During this period, all the channels devoted a total of 174:10 hours of foreign programs including 63:05 hours (35.5 percent) of American programming (Table 12). The majority of the foreign programs are from Japan and Hong Kong. Japanese cartoons and Chinese Kung-Fu movies are most common and apparently popular fare on Thai television.

Channel 3 devoted most of its time to foreign program--73:45 hours (60.5 percent) and Channel 5 devoted the least amount of time, 23:00 hours (20 percent) (see Table 11). This does not mean that Channel 5 showed more programs of educational and children's interest. Instead, it showed more locally produced drama, serials, dance and music programs, including a few programs on traditional and classical drama and song.

It is clear, therefore, that while all stations in Thailand relied heavily upon foreign programs for their broadcasting schedule, they did not offer even a modest range of choice to the viewing public. Programs are remarkably alike on all channels whether foreign or local. The programs are heavily entertainment-oriented and conditioned by the materials imported from the other countries.

TABLE 12

FOREIGN AND U.S. TELEVISION PROGRAMS DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD IN THAILAND: PERCENTAGE OF U.S. PROGRAMS' AIRTIME RELATIVE TO TOTAL FOREIGN PROGRAMS' AIRTIME

Date	Total Foreign Time[a]	U.S. Time	Percent of U.S. Time
June			
3	20:00	8:50	44.2
4	9:00	2:00	21.6
5	9:55	2:55	29.4
6	10:45	3:40	34.0
8	8:40	5:35	64.4
9	23:25	9:40	41.3
10	18:50	7:30	39.8
11	8:30	2:00	23.5
12	10:55	2:55	26.7
13	11:05	3:40	33.0
14	9:35	2:00	21.0
15	9:10	4:30	49.0
17	16:35	7:30	45.2
18	8:30	2:00	23.5
Total	174:10	63:05	35.5

[a]in hours and minutes.

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CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

Import of Television Programs

This chapter is divided into three sections, each devoted to one of the three dimensions of "media imperialism" as operationalized in earlier chapters. The first section deals with the findings on the research proposition involving import of television programs, as outlined in Chapter II.

> American television programming accounts for a major share of total broadcasting time.

Contrary to the popular notion that most Third World countries utilize more than half of their broadcasting time for American programs, the empirical evidence demonstrates that such a notion is not well founded (see Table 13). This finding is consistent with Tunstall (1977) and Nordenstreng (1977) who argued that most of the developing nations devote less than 35% of their broadcasting time to the American programs. Tunstall (1977) compiled a table of 59 nations--of which 16 countries allocated more than 50% of their time to American made programs. Table 13 reveals that Bangladesh devoted 20.3 percent, Sri Lanka 30.3 per cent and Thailand 36 percent of their total airtime to American programs. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka also received a few programs from other sources such as the United Kingdom and Canada, while Thailand acquired a great bulk of foreign programs from Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

TABLE 13

FOREIGN AND U.S. TELEVISION PROGRAMS DURING THE TWO-WEEK STUDY PERIOD IN THE THREE COUNTRIES: PERCENTAGE OF U.S. PROGRAMS' AND TOTAL FOREIGN PROGRAMS' AIRTIME RELATIVE TO TOTAL AIRTIME

		Total Foreign		U.S.	
	Total Air-time[a]	Time	Percent of Total Airtime	Time	Percent of Total Airtime
Bangladesh	118:20	27:00	22.9	24:40	20.3
Sri Lanka	132:50	74:50	56.0	40:40	30.3
Thailand	463:50	175:00	37.8	63:50	36.0

[a]in hours and minutes.

It may be inferred that the reason for fewer foreign programs than expected is the culturally dissimilar content of these programs relative to the importing countries. The content of the imported programs is often alien to the values and imagery of the importing country. When programs from the United States are imported by the developing countries, the gap in values and imagery may be unbridgeable. Although these programs attract a large audience--mostly young educated urbanites--the older audience sometimes finds the programs offensive, especially with regard to the relationship between men and women, and the emphasis on sex and violence in these materials. In most developing countries, watching television is a family affair, where all family members--often including members of the extended family--gather in front of the television set to watch the evening programs. In this viewing arrangement, the audience prefers "family entertainment" which can be enjoyed by most of the members of the family regardless of status, age and relationships.

It is this consideration that caused many countries to increase their own television production. In the case of Thailand, the weak cultural link with the Chinese and the Japanese has been exploited successfully with regard to television programs. Although this cultural link in other spheres of life is very weak and almost non-existent, television provides an attractive alternative to exploit the cultural link as a commercial venture.

Thus it appears that empirical evidence does not support the postulate stated in research proposition 1.

> Within a group of less developed countries, economically more disadvantaged ones allocate a greater percent of total broadcasting time to American programs.

We have already indicated in Chapter II that economic resources and other demographic characteristics of individual countries are related to the conditions determining the one-way-flow of television programs. In addition, it is a fact that economically-advanced countries are self-supporting in televisions programs and the poorer nations are not. Thus, the latter are more reliant on foreign made programs, particularly American serials and adventure series (Nordenstreng 1977). The number of imported programs from the United States does not vary significantly from one country to another. However, Bangladesh, the poorest of the three, imports the least number of American programs, while Thailand, with the highest economic development among the three, imports the largest number of American programs (see Table 13). Thus, the empirical evidence does not support research proposition 2.

> The degree of consumption of American television programs within a group of Third World countries may vary with the rate of literacy, level of urbanization, number of radio and television receivers in operation, and newspaper circulation.

As indicated in Table 14, Bangladesh has a literacy rate of 29 percent. The percentage of people living in urban areas is only 10.6. It has 76 radio sets, 2.9 television receivers, and 37 issues of newspaper for every 1000 population. Sri Lanka and Thailand have a much higher rate of literacy (82 and 81 percent, respectively), but the percentage of urban population varies significantly, with

TABLE 14

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES IN THE THREE COUNTRIES: THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO PERCENTAGE OF U.S. PROGRAMS' AIRTIME RELATIVE TO TOTAL AIRTIME

	SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES					
	Rate of Literacy	Urban Population	Radio	TV	Newspaper	U.S. PROGRAMS
			per 1,000 population	per 1,000 population	per 1,000 population	Relative to Total Airtime
Country	%	%	N	N	N	%
Bangladesh	29	10.6	76	2.9	37	20.3
Sri Lanka	82	22.4	58	3.3	49	30.3
Thailand	81	1.32	131	49.0	21	36.0

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from the Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations, 1983.

22.4 percent in Sri Lanka and 13.2 percent in Thailand. Sri Lanka has 58 radio sets, 3.3 television sets and 49 newspaper per 1000 people, while Thailand has 131 radio sets, 49 television sets and only 21 newspaper copies per 1000 people. Although these numbers vary significantly, the rate of import of American programs does not vary to a considerable degree. Thus, based on the data in Table 14, it is difficult to find justification for research proposition 3.

> Programs imported by the Third World countries tend to be entertainment oriented.
>
> The imported programs are generally targeted to predominantly urban and affluent audiences in the Third World countries.

Almost all American programs on Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand television consist of typical American television fare: light comedy, such as Eight is Enough, Three is Company, Happy Days, Different Strokes, and action adventure, such as Knight Rider, Charlie's Angels, Bring'em Back Alive. Katz noted at a 1973 symposium that imported television programs in the developing countries were treated rather casually. Whatever attention is given to programming is given to domestically-produced programs. The main concern of the purchaser of the foreign programs is to fill airtime. Thus, the obvious and only solution is to buy never-ending series based on the formula of the American model. Just by looking at the program schedule of any of these countries, it becomes apparent that these programs are used as fillers to fill airtime.

Katz (1973) also believes that there is a tendency to measure the maturity of a nation's broadcasting in terms of its number of

broadcasting hours. So, without considering whether they are capable of providing resources, such as money, talent, materials and supporting facilities to produce the shows, television stations start their programming. To compete with other stations, they increase their broadcast hours and realize that the only way they can fill the time is by showing more and more foreign programs (Katz 1977). A typical Saturday program schedule of Thai television shows that during the 14 hours of broadcasting, only 2:40 hours were devoted to studio programs; the rest to imported programs (see Table 15). This picture is not uncommon. Similarly, a typical Saturday program of Sri Lankan television, as depicted in Appendix VI indicates that out of 4:50 hours of broadcasting time, only 20 minutes have been spent for local programs; the rest are filled with foreign programs. It is even surprising to see that competing channels also present the same fare. For example, Appendices V and VI indicate that at 9:30 p.m., viewers of ITN were watching Starsky & Hutch (prog. 10/13), while at the same time slot, Rupavahini, the other channel, showed another segment (23/26) of the same show. In some cases, the audience has o choice at all. On the following evening, at 9:45 p.m. and 9:5J p.m. both ITN and Rupavahini respectively were showing the same segment of Charlie's Angels. This is an ideal example of how competition leads to sameness.

Bangladesh television provides an interesting picture. It decided to cut back on imported programs significantly since 1975. Although Bangladesh TV has been in operation since 1965, its proportion of imported program is the lowest among the countries

TABLE 15

THE PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN PROGRAMS' AIRTIME RELATIVE TO TOTAL AIRTIME AND BILATERAL TRADE INDEXES IN THE THREE COUNTRIES

	Export to U.S.	Import from U.S.	Percentage of U.S. Program Airtime Relative to Total Airtime
Bangladesh	10	8	20.3
Sri Lanka	14	11	30.3
Thailand	13	13	36.0

under study. It has cut back broadcast time significantly to reduce imported programs. It is producing a good number of programs using its own resources and talents. Bangladesh television can be used as an example of how local talent, organization and materials can produce attractive television schedules with less reliance on imported materials.

Occasionally, however, Bangladesh television has failed to maintain this diversity. There are some imported programs on the second channel--reruns of American serials, which usually take away a major portion of the airtime. It is hard to justify the existence of another channel to broadcast programs only for two hours if they are not dissimilar in quality and content and if they are not targeted toward a different audience group.

Research proposition 5 deals with the urban audience as the focus of programming. There are several reasons for such an initiative. First, electricity as an energy source is mainly available in cities and large towns. Second, broadcast signals are restricted to urban areas and do not cover most of the villages. Third, although there are a few rich people who could afford TV sets, they lack political leverage to influence decisions of the government and thus are secluded from the areas covered by the TV signal or supply of electricity. These arguments hold true in varying degrees for all three countries under investigation. In these countries, television is still considered a luxury item for the higher income people. It is ironic that these countries have invested millions of dollars in the state-of-the-art production and

transmission equipment without any comparable effort to ensure reception by the general public.

The case of Bangladesh is worth noting in this regard. Bangladesh acquired its state-of-the-art color broadcasting equipment in 1978 and immediately started broadcasting programs in color. Although Bangladesh manufactures and assembles some black and white receivers, it has no facility to produce color sets. Even after the color broadcasting started, color television sets remained unavailable to the public. Gradually, color sets were marketed, in spite of their exorbitantly high prices. The price of the sets reflects a government tax of about 300 percent. As a result, a modest quality small set sells at a price equivalent of US$800 in Bangladesh, which is about five or six times higher than that of a comparable set in Europe or North America. In a nation with very low per capita income even in urban areas, such a price is prohibitive. However, black and white television sets are popular and are affordable to middle class people in these countries.

Both Bangladesh and Thailand are now beginning to assemble television receivers from components, bringing down the cost of the black and white receivers to the levels equivalent to those in the developed countries. But progress is slow, and it is unlikely that a realistic low-cost solution will be found in the near future. However, until a solution is found, importation of sets and their cost will remain major factors contributing to further disparity among the population of these countries.

As electrification has rarely penetrated the rural areas of

these countries it is extremely difficult to operate television receivers even where a signal is available. The performance and reliability of television sets are also very important. Television sets are fragile and delicate compared to radio sets. High humidity and moisture and fluctuations of local electrical supply, which impair performance and damage sets, are very common in many poorer countries. In addition, there are limited facilities available for the repair and maintenance of sets. If a set malfunctions, it becomes virtually useless. These problems highlight the difficulties that ensue when complex technology is imported ready-made without ensuring an adequate supporting infra-structure in the receiving societies.

Multiplicity of languages is another problem faced by many nations where different languages are spoken by the people of different regions. Thailand and Sri Lanka are cases in point. Differences of language and culture makes it difficult to produce programs for all linguistic groups. It thus deprives some groups from sharing this popular source of information and entertainment. In sum, in all these countries, possession of a set tends to be a privilege of the urban elites. Even when programs reach outside towns, the audience is often culturally disadvantaged because the television content may be alien to the viewer's background. Thus, in this case, the findings support both research propositions 4 and 5.

> Within a group of less developed countries, the import of American programs is proportional to total American imports. Therefore, those import more American commodities tend to that import more American television programs.

Peter Golding (1976) observed that the flow of television programs is related to the overall economic structures within and between nations. He states that:

> The flow of TV materials is not just parallel activity with trade routes, but actually a part of the trade routes, and intimately connected with them, so that these two sets of activities--the flow of cultural material and the flow of other commodities--are not just a metaphor to each other; they are actually part of the same phenomenon.[1]

The same point of view is clearly presented by Schiller (1977) and Smythe (1977). Nordenstreng (1977) calls this situation a "material condition." According to this explanation, television programs or any other cultural material, such as film, magazine, and music are seen as commodities--or "as means of producing audiences for commercial purposes" (Smythe 1977). However, Nordenstreng also argued that this overall rule only holds for those countries which are governed by a free market economy and that the program policy would not follow similar commercial principles in the socialist countries. Globally speaking, this overall picture applies not only to television materials but to all cultural materials.

Table 15 illustrates the importation of television program in relation to bilateral trade of the three countries. Of the foreign programs, Bangladesh imports 20.3 percent, Sri Lanka imports 30.3 percent and Thailand imports only 36 percent from the United States. These figures suggest that there is no correspondence between

economic ties and the importation of television program materials. Economic ties between Thailand and the United States are much closer than those of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka with the United States, yet Thai television imports much fewer programs from the United States than the other two countries.

A number of points deserve further attention here. First, the comparative low media dependency of Bangladesh on foreign material (23 percent) can be understood in the context of a complex of cultural factors, such as religion and moral premises. The proportion of Western programs is low, partly because of "excess" of sex in many of the programs, which may offend the conservative morality of the public as well as of the government. Bangladesh devoted substantial amount of time to schedule religious programs. Like most Moslem countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Bangladesh television begins and ends its program offerings with elaborate religious rituals--such as readings from the Koran, interpretation of Koranic verses, religious songs and hymns. It also has programs for other religious groups, such as the Hindus, the Buddhists and Christians.

Cultural pride and nationalistic attitudes are also some of the reasons for the relatively low inflow of Western or American programs. After years of subjugation by colonial rule, and later on, exploitation by the Pakistani regime, Bangladesh nationalism is quite fervent in all spheres of public life, particularly among the educated middle class. This sentiment probably explains the low dependence on foreign programs of Bangladesh television.

In the case of Sri Lanka, where the television system is quite recent, foreign programming dominates the screen. One reason for this could be that Sri Lanka, with limited facilities, is not yet capable of producing a large number of programs. Following years of socialism under Mrs. Sirimavo Bandernaike, the country has recently returned to a government that encourages closer economic and cultural ties with the United States. Such facts may have contributed to Sri Lanka's dependence on the United States.

Yet another consideration may be the existence of two large ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, who have been at odds for many years and are presently engaged in armed conflict. It is difficult for Sri Lanka to gear programs that may cater to the demands of either of the diverse groups. It is easier for stations to choose to avoid the controversy as well as expenses by showing low-cost American programs.

Thailand, on the other hand, imports the least amount of programs from the United States. It derives a significant amount of them from Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Hong Kong and Taiwan are moving towards regional programming subcenters.[2] Taiwan alone exports about 2,600 hours of television program per year (Lee 1978). The exports consist of series and variety shows produced in order to capture large audience beyond their geographical boundary. Hong Kong is also another important producer of action-filled, violent Kung-Fu movies and television series. These movies and serials are not only popular in southeast Asian countries but also in many Western countries, including the United States.

As noted by Katz (1977), an American series is an ideal solution to the problem of filling airtime at relatively low cost, since it is cheap to acquire and the supply is abundant. American producers and exporters are able to provide programs at relatively modest prices since domestic payments have already covered basic production costs. Unlike books, records, or movies for theatrical showing, where multiple copies are needed, just a single copy of a television program is required for showing on a national network. Renting one copy of a videotape costs very little. It is also very convenient for these countries to purchase programs from American offices stationed at close proximity, and the station managers do not have to shop around for programs. As a result, the countries may buy programs which are easily available. It is not surprising that series like Knight Rider, Dallas or Dynasty are common fare in all the channels of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thai television.

From the above discussion, it follows that bilateral trade with the United States has little bearing on the import of American television program. Also, with regard to the relationship of American program import and other socio-economic variables, such as rate of literacy, rate of urbanization, number of radio and television sets and newspaper circulation, findings do not show a consistent relationship.

The next section will deal with the second dimension of "media imperialism" theory.

Transfer of Values and Practices of Television

As outlined in Chapter 3, an important aspect of "media imperialism" theory involves the transfer of values and practices of television. This means that the importing country receives not only the technology but also the values and practices associated with it. Tunstall (1977) asserts that such an argument has a broad strength and an obvious weakness. He cites examples of countries which received technology from the United States together with American media consequences and other countries which imported not the technology but the programming only. This study demonstrates that importation of technology does not go hand-in-hand with transfer of values and practices. Bangladesh acquired television from Japan; Sri Lanka derived it from the West Germany and Thailand from the United States. Yet none of these countries seems to follow the broadcasting norms and patterns of any of the exporting countries. None of the exporting country's television is either operated or controlled by the government. They are free enterprise, as in the United States, or monopolies under government charters as in NHK in Japan or ZDF in West Germany. In the case Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand, the system is owned by the government. All personnel are state employees implementing government policies. And financing comes from the government treasury. Government ownership and operation derive from the belief that government is best suited to manage and operate broadcasting for a fear of the consequences if ideas inimical to government were permitted to broadcast. Depending

on which motivation is dominant, program philosophies range from a dictatorial effort to provide only a limited access to ideas and entertainment and to more benevolent attempts toward providing the informational and relaxation programming that people may desire.

Secondly, both in Japan and West Germany, a non-commercial dual system is the standard operation where one channel caters to the needs of the mass audience and the other is devoted to programs of educational and public service nature. BBC is the pioneer of this system. But the system of the countries under study is an odd mixture of different systems of the world. Although advertising is carried on all stations, commercial broadcasting as conducted in the United States does not exist. Advertising does bring some revenues to help cover broadcasting budgets, but usually the government has to provide the bulk of the expenses of the system's operation. It is not surprising that advertising prices are as negotiable as any buyer-seller relationship in Thailand. Rates are kept secret so that a client may have control of certain time slots. Heavy time buyers who reserve yearly amounts of time are sometimes not charged at all. The average cost per one-minute slot of Bangkok television stations is $125 (Scalden in Lent 1977). In Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the income from receiver license fees covers only a fraction of the cost to operate the stations.

Another aspect of broadcasting in the Third World countries is censorship. Censorship is common in all three countries studied. Censorship is exercised to control programs and other materials prejudicial to the government and to promote appropriate social

values as perceived by the authority.

Competition in broadcasting networks as a special feature of American television did not influence any of the country's systems, even in Thailand, which received its system from the United States. This is partly due to the philosophy of government control, as discussed earlier. In addition, it may also be due to the fact that the private sector in these countries is not developed enough to sponsor such undertaking of large capital investment necessary for establishing a broadcasting station.

Access to television by various social groups, which is possible in Western television, is conspicuous by its absence in these countries. However, groups or individuals supported by the government have easy access to television. Television, like any other medium, has been used by many authoritarian governments to divert public attention from their own problems and the problems of these societies. It has been used as an instrument of propaganda by the regimes in power. These governments are more concerned with the role of media in terms of preserving their power than with the positive role of media in terms of national development.

From the above discussions, it becomes evident that transfer of values and practices, as postulated in the "media imperialism" theory, is not supported in these countries.

Television and Indigenous Culture and Art

Culture and Communication

The role of communication may be regarded as that of a major

carrier of culture. The media of communication are cultural instruments which serve to promote or influence attitudes, to motivate, to foster the spread of behavioral patterns, and to bring about social integration.[3] They play, or should play, a major role in implementing cultural policies and in helping to democratize culture. For millions of people, they are the principal means of access to culture and to all forms of creative expression.

Although a great body of cultural expression maintains its traditional and interpersonal forms, it is also true that in the modern world the mass media supply the cultural fare and shape the cultural experience of many millions of people.[4] For coming generations, they are creating a new culture; it is not easy to define its character, still less to judge its value. Masterpieces of creativity, both from the past and from the present, have been introduced to new audiences on a national as well as international scale. Entertainment in various forms has been made far more readily available and undoubtedly responds to human needs and demands. But a great deal of this entertainment is so banal and stereotyped that it dulls instead of stimulating the imagination. Commercial and advertising interests as well as the sterile conformism of culture approved by bureaucrats carry threats of a levelling, impoverishment and hollowness of cultural life.[5] Nor are these the only contradictions, individual creativity has sometimes been aroused by new opportunities, and sometimes replaced by the initiative and passivity of the specter. The cultural identity of ethnic groups and minorities has sometimes been

confirmed by taking advantage of fresh avenues of expression, but has often been overwhelmed by external influence. For good or for evil, the mass media have vast responsibility, because they do not merely transmit and disseminate culture but also "select or originate its content."[6]

Mass communication and mass culture are phenomena of the present century.[7] Their development can be defined, from an economic stand point, as the application to the cultural sphere of the changes brought about by the industrial revolution. The outcome being the large-scale production followed by distribution through appropriate techniques and institutions, of a constant flow of messages and stimuli. Mass culture is certainly not the same thing as popular culture, which often has to fight a difficult battle against cultural forms generated by a dominant minority and disseminated on a mass scale.[8] Still, the concept of mass culture is not without ambiguity. It may have overtones of approval when we think of its general acceptability, or a pejorative ring when we deplore its shallowness. It is not easy to say whether a given cultural product is a part of "mass culture" or not: should more attention be paid to its origins or to present-day forms of dissemination? An old ballad, surely, does not become a piece of mass culture because it is heard on transistor radios.[9]

Another danger that has assumed considerable proportions is that of cultural domination, which takes the form of dependence on imported models reflecting alien life-styles and values. A free exchange must be an equal exchange based on mutual respect. To

secure this, it will often be necessary to protect and strengthen the threatened culture, develop communication at a local level, and open up alternative forms of communication as an antidote to the pressure of this large-scale medium. It should be stressed, too, that the problem does not arise solely in the relationship between one nation and another. Often, it takes its sharpest form and presents the most pressing dangers within nations whose population includes cultural minorities.[10]

Communication and Technology

Technological progress in general--and more particularly the increasing use of communication and information technology--is now sufficiently well advanced for it to be possible to forecast trends, define prospects, and identify likely risks and stumbling-blocks. Science and technology are constantly making advances which may one day facilitate breaking down barriers between individuals and nations. That trend is, without doubt, irreversible. But the consequences which can now be foreseen are not necessarily beneficial.[11]

To be sure, in all industrialized countries, and in a growing number of developing countries, interest is focused on the extraordinary new opportunities being opened up by technological innovations in this field. However, these opportunities are not yet, for political and economic reasons, within the reach of everyone. Many scientific discoveries and technological innovations were initiated and are controlled by a small number of countries and

by a few transnational firms. This many continue for a long-time to come. It is, therefore, difficult to determine how these technological developments can be of greatest benefit to all nations and, within each community.[12]

The new technologies have ambiguous consequences since they bring with them the risk of making the existing communications systems more rigid and exaggerating their faults and dysfunctions. In setting up ever more powerful, homogenous and centralized networks, there is a danger of accentuating the centralization of the public or institutional sources of information, of strengthening inequalities and imbalances, and of increasing the sense of irresponsibility and powerlessness both in individuals and in communities.[13] The multiplication of radio-broadcasting channels, made available by direct broadcast satellite, could bring about a diversification of objectives and audiences; however, by intensifying competition, it may lead to the "standardization of content and, at the international level, accentuate cultural dependence by increasing the use of imported programmes" (Compton 1964).[14] Again, as distance becomes an increasingly irrelevant factor in transmission costs, the inequalities between developed and developing countries can diminish; but they maybe intensified as a result of the concentration of their resources in the hands of a minority.

When talking of Third World cultures, even at the risk of oversimplification, one must at least try to define those characteristics that distinguish them from the industrial

culture.[15] The most fundamental characteristic of the majority of Third World cultures is that they are based on small holding subsistence agriculture. Nearly 70 percent of Third World populations live on small farming. It is not agriculture, per se, that determines the quality of the cultures, but its scale. There is a fundamental difference between modern, large-scale surplus agriculture and traditional small-holding subsistence agriculture. The former is a concomitant of industrial and urban cultures, while the latter characterizes village culture.[16]

A small-holding subsistence agriculture, by its very nature, does not guarantee surpluses on a scale sufficient to provide the farmer with the necessary purchasing power required for changing the pattern of his life on any significant scale. So, in economic terms, dependence on subsistence agriculture causes stagnation and perpetuates poverty.[17]

Being poor, and generally not having access to resources besides muscle power, the farmer tends to depend on the goodwill and active help of the community. So, communities tend to be strong. Lacking sanction in statutory law of "contract," these community values derive their strength from a sense of tradition which is celebrated and preserved by myth, ritual and religion.

It would be an exaggeration to claim that the transformations effected within Third World cultures, thus far, have principally been the product of communication technologies. A whole range of other influences over the past two or three hundred years have helped to bring about radical changes. They have been mostly of a

political, religious, economic and commercial character. In order to place the role of modern communication technologies in perspective, it will help if we first briefly identify some of these influences.[18]

Beyond contention, the most potent and durable of these influences was the European colonial enterprise. It was the penetration of Third World societies by the colonial powers, between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, that served as the permanent conduit through which the transforming influences flowed in the succeeding centuries. Colonialism was the seminal influence. In order to understand the range and complexity of that influence one has to remember that it was itself a response to an inner imperative that had been working within European societies from about the sixteenth century. This imperative was essentially economic rather than political. Around the sixteenth century, European societies located along the western seaboard of that continent felt the impulse to accumulate wealth.[19] The impulse launched them out on voyages of discovery and commerce. The colonial enterprise itself was the political expression of this fundamental drive for commerce and wealth.

Along with the establishment of political hegemony and the spread of commerce, the deep hinterlands of these societies (i.e., the rural areas), which had preserved certain lifestyles and patterns of social and economic organization for untold centuries, were expropriated. Roads and railways were laid through these lands. The dispossessed villagers were forced into overcrowded

hamlets without adequate agricultural lands for cultivation. An entire rural culture, that had been based on the ownership and cultivation of land, was thereby put under great strain and progressively eroded.[20]

Next to the physical arrival of the colonizing powers in the Third World territories, the most potent factor in undermining and transforming their cultures was the missionary enterprise. According to Jayaweera (1983):

> The missionaries came ostensibly to carry out the great commission given them by Jesus Christ to "go ye forth to all the nations." But they brought with them more than the Gospel. They seemed to have been imbued with the conviction that the cultures from which they came represented the Kingdom already have come, and that their obligation to announce the Good News of Salvation in Jesus included the right to recommend their own cultures, customs and life-styles for adoption by those whom they saved in practice. Salvation in Christ came to be inseparable from captivity to an alien culture.[21]

Perhaps next in importance to the missionary enterprise and its educational institutions was the advent of mass media and their role in overhauling Third World cultures. The penetration of these cultures by mass media exposed them directly to unfiltered cultural influences from abroad. Earlier, the local cultures had been insulated up to a point, both by space and time. Cultural influences from abroad had to travel over vast distances, by road or sea, and for many months and years before they touched the villages. In between they were subjected to a series of modifications and adaptations, so that when they did impinge on the local cultures their impact had been already blunted.

Furthermore, these earlier foreign cultural influences did not

touch the masses straight away. They had first worked through very exclusive small groups, who came into contact with missionaries, planters, administrators and the like. It took several decades before influences brought to bear on these elites developed a mass impact.

Not so with mass media. They telescoped both space and time, reduced filtration to a minimum, leapt over barriers of illiteracy and poverty, and enabled whole societies to achieve--at the psychic level--the mobility they could not achieve at the physical. What the roads, railways, schools and missionaries had built was to funnel influences from outside into the villages. But the villages and local cultures continued to remain passive. At worst, they merely absorbed and internalized these influences after modifying or adapting them. But the rural people never really broke out of their villages. They could not travel far, not only because transport was still limited and would not carry them beyond the townships, but also because they could not even afford the bus ride. Now, with the advent of mass media, even as they remained physically at home, farmers could travel in their minds to the ends of the earth and recreate for themselves at a psychic level a complex, external reality, the existence of which had been hardly known to them earlier.[22]

These psychic excursions proved to be highly destabilizing for the local cultures. At a purely consumer level, the villagers came to be conscious of the existence of goods, commodities and life styles which seemed a far cry from what they had been used to for

centuries. This awareness set in motion expectations which, failing to achieve fulfillment, turned invariably into dissatisfaction. This, in turn, exerted pressure on socio-cultural forces which had been under strain for decades. In a short time, political upheaval followed, and with it, inevitably, the suppression of civil liberties, the dismantling of democratic structures and the imposition of repressive regimes.[23]

Quite obviously, it will not be valid to suggest that incidence of repressive regimes in the Third World is due primarily to the destabilizing effects of mass media. But it will not be out of place to argue that the prima facie co-relation between the incidence of social instability and the emergence of repressive regimes on the one hand, and the exposure to consumer-oriented mass media on the other, is sufficient to warrant serious study.

The cumulative product of all these influences on Third World societies was the emergence of a strong middle class and a developed urban sector.[24] A middle class developed naturally out of the penetration into the rural sector of modernization efforts, such as roads, schools, plantations, bureaucracy and commerce. The foreign powers could not afford to bring with them all cadres they needed to run their colonial dependencies, so they developed local elites for the purpose. Their role in transforming local cultures was enormous. At least up to the middle decades of this century, these middle class elites set the norms (in values, styles of dress, language, etc.) for the rest of the local society. They were the opinion leaders and change agents. They went to foreign

universities and returned with the "correct" values. They lent currency to the values of the foreigners which, because they were palpably alien, could not find acceptance with the local masses. It was the local middle classes that consolidated and legitimized the colonial influences which, for over two centuries, had been steadily eroding the base of the local cultures.[25]

It is necessary to acknowledge the various factors that contributed, over the centuries, to the erosion of Third World cultures, in order not to attribute to the new communication technologies a role that would be disproportionate to their real significance. By the time television, the communication satellite and video cassettes arrived on the scene, traditional cultures the world over had been wearing away for centuries. The question arises: what is there in the contemporary situation that justifies even looking into the role of television and other new communication technologies as significant factors in cultural transformation? If, as it is argued, Third World cultures had, in any case, been falling apart, what could provide the new technologies with an opportunity to serve as another great solvent of Third World cultures?

Renaissance in the Third World

Just prior to the arrival of the new technologies on the cultural scene, that is, between the 1940s and the 1960s, a strange and paradoxical development had begun to characterize Third World societies. The self-same influences that had for decades been helping to wear down the local cultures had quite unexpectedly

produced an opposite reaction. The mission schools that had inculcated in their proteges (deliberately or otherwise) a sense of shame in their local cultures were found to have produced a whole generation of dedicated young people who were filled with a resolve not only to discover and re-establish their lost heritage, but to expunge from their history, as far as possible, all evidence of foreign cultural influence. Foreign languages were dethroned from the status of official language. Imported sartorial styles were ceremoniously discarded. Mission schools were taken over and foreign missionaries were asked to leave. State support was lavished on efforts to rehabilitate ancient arts and crafts. There was a surge of interest in and a frantic search for historical roots. The importation of foreign cultural material was either curtailed or stopped. All these expressions were developed as a countervailing force against foreign influences and were supposed to usher in a renaissance of local cultures, which would, in turn, return these societies to their unspoiled, pre-colonial purity.[26]

In India, Mahatma Gandhi and his followers hoped to rediscover and restore the real India of the villages, symbolized by the Charka (spinning wheel) and the Khaddar (home-spun cloth). In China, Mao Tse Tung sought to build a new China based on a revitalized and resurrected rural economy. And in a number of other Third World countries that emerged as independent nations shortly after World War II, national leaders sought to rekindle the dying embers of their national cultures. Bandernaike of Sri Lanka, Nkrumah of Ghana, U Nu of Burma, Sukarno of Indonesia, Tunku Abdur Rahman of

Malaysia, Kenyatta of Kenya, Nasser of Egypt--they all were driven by an intense desire to reverse the flow of foreign culture into their societies and to restore the identity and integrity of their own cultures. This development contradicted the forces that had been working for change within these societies, in some cases for over three centuries. Almost without exception, these leaders were either direct products of missionary schools or had derived their political values from the Western thinkers. Notwithstanding, it looked as if, after centuries of exposure to erosion and denudation, the local cultures were on the threshold of a new lease of life, and the restoration of lost glories.

This cultural renaissance within Third World societies was unfortunately to be short-lived.[27] It petered out within three decades. Two factors served to ensure that this would happen: first, economic stagnation and increasing poverty at home; second, economic expansion and technological innovation within the industrialized countries. In Third World countries, economic growth did not keep pace with population increase and, worse, it was not distributed evenly. The result was increasing deprivation among the vast mass of the people, deepening of social instability and regular political upheavals accompanied by increasing repression. The cumulative result over a period of three decades was a growing disillusionment among the local people with economic models that had been recommended them by their leaders. In the majority of cases, these models were based on a closed, controlled economy, with the state bearing the larger share of the burden of investment and

exercising control from its "commanding heights." By the mid-1960s, this model had either collapsed--as in Indonesia, Egypt and Chile--or been voluntarily abandoned by the people through the democratic process--as in Sri Lanka--or had virtually ground to a halt--as in Tanzania.[28]

The failure of this economic model, together with deepening poverty, helped to turn people's minds away from "culture," a preoccupation that had provided the impetus for Third World nationalism for several decades. At the beginning of the 1970s, the eradication of poverty had replaced cultural regeneration as the rallying call for Third World societies.

George Gerbner headed a research team at the University of Pennsylvania which very thoroughly analyzed television content in preparation for a report later submitted to the Congress. They explored the number of violent incidents per hour and the length of these scenes to analyze their possible effects on people's attitudes. They concluded that the more a person is exposed to television, the more likely the person's perceptions of social realities will match those represented on TV:

> the more time one spends 'living' in the world of television, the more likely one is to report perceptions of social reality which can be traced to [or are congruent with] television's most persistent representations of life and society.[29]

Since the content analysis was made on situation comedies, dramatic series and made-for-TV movies, the very kinds of programs that are mostly exported to other countries, the conclusions of the research team have an important bearing on the questions considered here.

While it is difficult to establish beyond all doubt the relation between television viewing and violence and fear, it has been a burning question to the American people and the government. Following the completion of the research project, which took three years and cost a million dollars, the U.S. Surgeon General presented the results to Congress in 1972.[30] The networks were criticized for continually relying on violence in their "action-adventure" series. It is estimated that violence in the United States has been increasing at six to ten times the rate of the population increase. A number of media sociologists warn against hasty conclusions, which put more blame for such an increase on television's influence than on that of any other media, in motivating human behavior.[31] But it is not at all clear which comes first: whether it is the exhibition of violence on the small screen or violence in a given society, which is simply mirrored on television. In this respect, interesting comparative studies have been made between violence as it is presented on Eastern European networks and that presented on the American networks. It was found that in Eastern European countries, the violence shown is mainly "collective," of a group, and connected with political events, whereas in the United States the violence is that of individuals dealing with a threat to themselves, or using violence to achieve a personal goal they have set for themselves. The conclusion is that television, therefore, simply reflects the individualistic approach of American culture and political, social concerns of the Eastern European countries.[32] Although this may be an equally valid hypothesis, it does not negate

serious consideration alternative research findings, however difficult it may be to draw unequivocal conclusions from them.

Television and Indigenous Culture and Art

In a heterogenous society, where there are many languages, religions, customs and traditions, cultural unity is unlikely to occur. As a matter of fact, only a few nations in the world today have been able to create a unified culture (Tunstall 1977). Even in an ethnically homogenous society of the Third World, there may be multiplicity of cultures. The existence of large differences between urban and rural areas and very uneven and unequal levels of development between urban and rural areas are a major hindrance in developing cultural unity. Although these societies are rich in traditional cultural resources, their appeal is not uniform among people of different levels. Many traditional cultures are not even appropriate for the time and age of today. Tunstall (1977) writes:

> Traditional culture is (also) typically archaic, does not fit with contemporary notions of justice and equality, and depends upon religious beliefs which have long been in decline. Many traditional cultures are primarily carried by a small elite of scholars and priests, who often used languages which few other people understood . . . Many others (cultures) ascribed a fixed subservient positions to women, the young and the occupationally less favoured.[33]

Besides, the folk cultures of the rural people are neglected by the urban elites because they may be lacking in sophistication. In a simple word, it is "vulgar." Consequently, because of their access to resources, upper class urbanites often become active consumers of imported popular culture. In contrast, rural dwellers, "short of

food, land, literacy, income, life expectancy, birth control devices and so on," remain the main consumers of folk culture.

It is difficult to prove or disprove that television hinders the growth of traditional art and culture. Some evidence suggests that television helps to revive some traditional folk theaters of Thailand (Katz and Wedell 1977). Mau lum (song and story), a traditional folk theater of Thailand, was revitalized primarily by television during the early days of the medium of the country. Lee (1977) suggests that the Peking Opera, a classical art form, was revamped by television. The new medium gave the art a contemporary interpretation and made it accessible to a wider audience. In recent years, Bangladesh television is experimenting with Jatra, one of the world's earliest theatrical art forms which had been threatened to extinction by the tremendous social changes (Elahi 1978). Television has emerged as an ideal medium to guarantee the survival of Jatra for many years to come. Similarly, other folk arts are gradually becoming regular fare on Bangladesh television.

Contrary to the wide spread assumption that American programs are the most popular fare on television in Third World countries, Katz and Wedell (1977) demonstrated that locally-made dramas are the most popular programs. Thus they maintain that:

> . . . certain homemade programs--especially the homemade soap opera -almost always outdraw them (American action-adventure thrillers) in popularity, technical sophistication notwithstanding. Thus, Iran's most popular program is colorful Morad Barghi's discourse to his family; the story of a moralizing taxi driver, his clients and his comrades is one of Senegal's leading program.[34]

Similarly, Scalden (1977) observed that even when pitted against

American programs, such as Wagon Train, or the British show, The Avengers, the Thai dramas attract larger audiences. He also observed that during September 1971 and 1972 and March 1973, the most popular shows were always Thai, and in all three instances "at least 60% or 70% of the top ten TV programs" were Thai.[35]

It is true that television is also responsible for injecting "alien" values into the indigenous culture. There are arguments that in societies like those of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand, where television is available only to a few who are educated, urban and from the upper levels of the social strata, foreign programs can "alienate" them from the rest of the society. However, it is hard to believe that a few hours of foreign culture can change a segment of the population so easily. If they alienate themselves, there are probably other factors which may help to explain such alienation even better.

These factors may mainly be economic in nature. To be precise, in a developing society, the gap between the rich and poor, the urban and the rural, the have and the have-nots, has always been great--long before the introduction of television. The ways of life, values and tastes of such groups have always been different. Television has little effect on such group differences, especially when the medium serves the upper or middle classes almost exclusively.[36] It may, however, have some reinforcing effect.

NOTES

1. Peter Golding, "Media Role in National Development: Critique of a Theoretical Orthodoxy," Journal of Communication, 24:3 (1974):9.

2. Taiwan was rated by UNESCO in 1970 as the world leader in movie attendance per capita. Chinese movies and television programs are exported overseas--mostly to overseas Chinese population in the USA, Western Europe and other Southeast Asian countries (Lee 1978).

3. Alan Lice, Communication and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971).

4. Ibid.

5. Kaarle Nordenstrung and Tapio Varis, "The Non-homogeneity of National State and The International Flow of Communication," in Communication: Technology and Social Policy, George Gerbner, et al. (eds.) (New York, Wiley, 1973).

6. Susan Crean, Who's Afraid of Canadian Culture? (Ontario: General, 1976).

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Alex J. Murray and Mary C. Gerace, "Canadian Attitudes Toward the U.S. Presence," Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (1972):

12. Ibid.

13. Crean, Who's Afraid of Canadian Culture.

14. Neil Compton, "Television and Canadian Culture," Commentary 38 (1964):6.

15. Richard Adler and Douglas Carter (eds.), Television as a Cultural Form (New York: Praeger, 1976).

16. Neville Jayaweera, "New Technologies and Third World Cultures," Culture, 36 (1983):

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 87.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. J. E. Goldthorpe. The Sociology of the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

27. Jayaweera, Culture.

28. J. D. Halloran, "Mass Communications in Society: The Need of Research," Educational Broadcasting Review, 4 (1970):

29. G. Gerbner, M. Morgan, and N. Signorelli, "The Demonstration of Power: Violence Profile No. 20," Journal of Communication, 19:3 (1979):117-195.

30. Ibid.

31. H. Kumata, "A Decade of Teaching by Television," in The Impact of Educational Television W. Schramm (ed.) (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 71.

32. Ibid.

33. Jeremy Tunstall, The Media Are American: Anglo-American Media in the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 209.

34. Elihu Katz and E. G. Wedell, Broadcasting in Third World: Promise and Performance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 116.

35. John A. Lent, ed., Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978).

36. Colin Hoskins, Rolf Mirus and William Rosenbloom, "U.S. Television Programs in the International Market," Journal of Communication 39:2 (1989):13.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The central purpose of this study was to assess the validity of the "media imperialism" theory in the Third World. Three countries were selected for this investigation: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

The "media imperialism" theory is operationalized in terms of three dimensions: American television program flow, transfer of values and practices of television, and the influence of foreign programs on indigenous art and culture.

Six research propositions were examined under the dimension "American television program flow" as follows:

1. American television programming accounts for a large share of total broadcasting time in the developing countries.

2. Within a group of less developed countries, economically more disadvantaged ones allocate a greater percent of total broadcasting time to American programs.

3. The degree of consumption of American programs within a group of the Third World countries may vary with the rate of literacy, level of urbanization, number of radio and television receivers in operations and newspaper circulation.

4. Programs imported by the Third World countries are likely to be entertainment oriented.

5. The imported programs are likely to be targeted to the predominantly urban and affluent audience in the Third World countries.

6. Within a group of less developed countries, the import of American programs is proportional to total American imports. Therefore, those who import more American commodities tend to import more American television programs.

On the question of American television programs accounting for a larger share of total broadcasting time in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand, empirical evidence did not substantiate the postulation. The evidence did not provide support for the belief that more economically disadvantaged nations allocate a greater percent of their total air time to American programs. Demographic variables, such as rates of literacy, urbanization, and access to radio, television and newspapers, do not account for consumption of American programs in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand. This study provides strong quantitative support for the fact that imported programs are entertainment-oriented and are targeted to an urban and more affluent audience.

The second dimension of "media imperialism" theory was operationalized in terms of technological values and practices associated with television broadcasting. This study showed that due to: (a) government ownership of television systems, (b) homogenization of programs, (c) government censorship, (d) lack of competition among the stations, and finally, (e) restricted access to television by the local social groups among the recipient countries, this dimension of the "media imperialism" theory--viz, technological values and practices are transferred to the recipient countries from the donor countries--could not be substantiated

The third dimension of "media imperialism" theory was operationalized in terms of how imported programs influence the local culture. Due to a lack of available data or audience survey, the study was based mainly on qualitative analysis. The author

argued that imported programs have minimal impact on local culture for the following reasons: First, only a very small segment of the audience is exposed to American television programs; second, the imported programs are usually in English, presenting a barrier for the majority of the local audience; third, the religious beliefs and social customs of these countries hinder acceptance of the cultural norms of the imported programs.

Thus, based on three case studies, this author believes that "media imperialism" theory needs to be reexamined both in terms of its assumption, content and the process.

Although many Third World leaders as well as several Western scholars and communication experts have accused American media in general and American television in particular of promoting "media imperialism," by no empirical study has been conducted to verify it. Television is new in these countries, and it has not yet established itself as a stable institution. As a result, relevant information is sketchy and unreliable. Even a uniform program pattern is lacking and program schedule is subject to constant change. These problems stand in the way of any serious investigation in this area.

However, arguments for and against the concept of "media imperialism" are many, and most of the authors of these arguments have relied more on consequential evidence and intuition rather than on verifiable data. The present study can claim to be the first serious attempt to verify the "media imperialism" thesis in terms of empirical data. Although Nordenstreng (1977) and Nordenstreng and Varis (1978) undertook similar studies, they attempted was only to

compile a world-wide television program inventory. This study, on the other hand, though limited to one geographical area, was able to focus on the imported programs of these countries and their relationship with several socio-economic and demographic variables.

Findings similar to this study may not be obtained if the study is duplicated in another geographical area where conditions are dissimilar. Television, like any other mass medium, is conditioned by a multitude of socio-economic and political factors. There is substantial evidence to prove that American programs, in certain situations, are responsible for changing attitudes, behaviors and taste for clothes and food among many Latin Americans (Burnett and Muller 1977; Lee 1978). The impact of American television programs on the people of the Latin American countries can be explained in the context of their close geographical proximity and their political, cultural and economic dependence on the United States. Latin America has traditionally been a large importer of consumer goods, military hardware, and a significant amount of cultural products from the United States. This relationship has been strengthened by the presence of American business and industry all over Latin America. In many of these nations, American industries and businesses expert substantial control over the other spheres of life--such as government, politics, communication and transportation. Many television and radio stations in this region have been established by the Americans and almost all of them depend heavily upon funds and advertising provided by American businesses and industries. Wells (1975) cited

examples of how the advertising industry in Latin and Central America is controlled directly by American companies on Madison Avenue.

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand are not dependent on the United States like the Latin American nations. Geographical distance and cultural dissimilarity are contributing factors for their not being totally dependent on the United States. However, this study provides a generalized pattern on the import of American programs in many Third World countries of Asia and Africa, where social conditions are similar to those of the three countries studied.

Television was introduced with the explicit goal of communicating with the rural population for political integration, socio-economic modernization and cultural unity. But till now this sector of the audience has hardly reached through television in these countries. Television has become, as Katz and Wedell (1977) have rightly pointed out a "jewel for the tired and spent bourgeoisie," siphoning off funds from the much more mass-oriented medium of radio.[1]

They argued that "the aim of television is to promote cultural and national development and national building" (Katz and Wedell 1977). The tradition of mass media, including television in the West and particularly in the United States, was essentially pure and simple entertainment. But the role of mass media in the developing countries involved educating and informing the public, with a little emphasis on bringing about large scale positive change (Krippendorff

1979). In developing nations, as Rogers (1969) states, "much of the content of all media . . . [should be] informational, educational and propagandistic in nature, designed to inform or persuade people about various kinds of modernization."[2] This goal, however, has never been emphasized. As a result, television has largely become a luxury medium for the educated urban elites (Spain et al. 1977).

This failure has been, to a large extent, due to the lack of planning and insensitivity of the governments of these countries (Lee 1977; Lent 1980). Television and other mass media have been used by many authoritarian governments to divert public attention from their own problems and problems of their own societies. They have also been used as instruments of propaganda by the regimes in power. These governments are more concerned with the role of media in terms of preserving their power than with the positive role of media in terms of national development.

Pool (in Pye 1963) put some key policy questions to the governments of the developing nations. They are: (1) the amount of scarce resources to be invested in the media; (2) public vs. private control of the media; (3) the balance of freedom and control and of uniformity and diversity; and (4) the cultural level at which to aim the media output. But the governments failed to deal with these questions.[3] It is very important for these nations to be practical and realistic about the problems of media in their countries and to take steps which are appropriate for the purposes of national development.

In all countries where television is in operation, it has come

to stay. The approach or format of television may change,but it will not lose its importance, in spite of financial or cultural constraints. The necessity of television in most of these nations may be questioned, but governments have persuaded themselves that this type of mass media is necessary for modernization. They wanted to open the windows of the world to their people and to stimulate cultural and political understanding between and among nations,thus projecting a sense of urgent commitment to national development. But there is little indication that persons at policy-making levels in broadcasting are aware of the need for a change of direction. They are more concerned with the acquiring of better and more advanced equipment and more program time than to meet national needs. As a result, they fail to exploit the resources of the existing system. Without ensuring conditions for the operation of the medium at a high level of efficiency, they continuously demand additional installations without considering the requisite supportive systems, such as training and development of talent, artists, designers, technicians, operators, researchers and specialists.

Increased airtime is not a sign of the efficiency of the station or the executives who determine programming. Efficiency and maturity should be measured in relation to how well airtime is used to foster the developmental needs of the country. Chinese television can be cited as an ideal example of how a relatively brief and short airtime schedule can effectively be used for the purpose of mass mobilization, which is consistent with the socialist

ideology of China. Smythe (1973) reports:

> Shanghai may be taken as typical of the television program fare. It totals about 2 1/2 hours per day, six days a week in evenings. News takes 30 minutes, literature and art take 60 minutes, documentaries take 50 minutes, children's program take 15 minutes. Some evenings are devoted, apart from news, to full-length presentations of revolutionary opera, ballet . . . Peking and Kwangchow had the most (airtime)--about 3 hours/day, six times a week, Wuhan broadcast four times a week for 3 hours each time. Nanking broadcasts Wednesday and Saturday for a total of 2 to 3 hours. . . After watching many hours of Revolutionary Opera,. . . I can report that it is very colorful, dramatic, tautly staged, well choreographed, and extremely popular with the Chinese audiences.[4]

Smythe also observed that television receivers in china are almost all owned by factories and communes and are used by groups of 25 to 100 viewers. Many other nations, notably, India, Indonesia, and Tanzania, attempted such a viewing policy on a large scale, but have not successfully implemented it.

None of the countries in this study lacks experts and specialists who can conduct research and suggest policies suited to the needs of their own society. There has been a tendency for many Third World governments to view academicians with suspicion. This is particularly true when the government is not rooted on a firm democratic base. Universities and colleges have often been regarded as the bases of radicals, because many political and social movements grew from the campuses. It is natural, therefore, that in a society where the majority of the people are not well educated and are far from the seat of power, students become active supporters of social and political justice. They strive to bring about changes in society. As a result, authoritarian governments may avoid the intellectuals and academicians of their own countries.

In these countries, where broadcasting is generally controlled by the government, it is operated by the civil servants (Katz and Wedell 1977). Consequently, broadcasting is considered to be like any other area of government services, under its direct surveillance. J.F. Scotton (in Head 1974) pointed out, when he surveyed the broadcasting systems of Africa:

> It makes little difference to them (broadcasting personnel) whether they are in broadcasting or in the Public Works Department and they will have no hesitation about transferring at any time for a slightly higher salary. These are men and women meant for civil service careers and can never look on broadcasting as a profession.[5]

It has also been found that, in many developing countries, broadcasting is very top heavy with professional bureaucrats at the top of each sector, who are more concerned about technicalities than the actual content of the program. Like other bureaucrats, they would rather follow the rules instead of experimenting or introducing new content or segments in the schedules unless they are specifically told to do so by their superiors. In most cases, these government functionaries are simply unaware of the art and science of broadcasting. In Bangladesh and Thailand, many top positions are held by military officers, usually from the Signal Corps. Other bureaucrats who are knowledgeable through experience or in-service training, are reluctant to take chances. The delicately-balanced political situation in many such countries accentuates the reluctance of bureaucrats to take chances which may cost them their jobs. Having lost such a job, there is a very slim chance of being employed in a new situation where previous skills and experience

will count. There is an urgent need for executives and administrators to be trained and to be recognized for their roles as mass communicators in the interest of national development and cultural integrity. Overseas training with some international broadcasting or communication emphasis is helpful. But it often happens that senior managers are quite willing to send bright young men to be trained but are most reluctant, on their turn, to allow them to practice what they have learned. At the same time, once trained in a prosperous country, where financial and technical resources are abundant, they return home discouraged by the gap between the amplitude of resources in their place of training, and the poverty or resources available on their job. Having, as they see it, no hope of achieving the standard set during their training, they often give up altogether and do not even try to apply their experience in the context of limitations of resources at their disposal.

Limitations and Future Directions

Researchers dealing with Third World countries, such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand, are always confronted with the paucity of research-relevant, empirical data. Especially in a field such as mass media, which is yet to be developed as a full-fledged discipline in these countries, researchers are always faced with innumerable difficulties in generating and collecting data. None of these countries collect data on the users of media products. No baseline data on audience characteristics and preferred programming

satisfaction are available for evaluation and comparison. Collecting data, particularly in this field, is very difficult for individual researchers because it involves layers of bureaucratic clearances in addition to an enormous financial commitment. Moreover, as the rights of the people are limited by the regime, specially with regard to freedom of speech, the only source of information is government publications. One difficulty with such a source of information is that the government may inflate or deflate the figures according to its whims. To counter these limitations, data from international agencies are used in conjunction with government publications.

The propositions explored in this study could not be quantified and operationalized in terms of hypotheses due to the unfeasibilty of administering a design aimed at quantitative analysis. Therefore, future studies could be directed in the pursuit of gathering primary data through field and observational studies.

Besides, given the small sample of three countries in this study, no correlational analysis could be carried out. As such, this study remained descriptive and qualitative. However, this author believes that a quantitative study, involving media imperialism theory, is quite feasible. A micro study, involving 30 or more Third World countries selected from various geographical areas of the world, may be undertaken in order to do a meaningful multivariate analysis of media imperialism theory. This author believes that the assumptions and dimensions of media imperialism

theory could be quantitatively operationalized and measured in terms of interval and ratio scales. Once that is done, it will be possible to design structural equation models depicting the underlying cause and effect relationship between the parameters of media imperialism and the anticipated outcomes.

Although this study finds very little support for "media imperialism" theory, it does not follow that the theory does not apply to other countries. Future studies should be undertaken in other Third World countries to validate and generalize the findings of this dissertation.

NOTES

1. John A. Lent, ed., Topics in Third World Mass Communication (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1979), p. 17.

2. Everett Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969), p. iii.

3. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," in Handbook of Communication, Pool and Schramm, eds. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), p. 88.

4. Dallas Smythe, "Reality Audience for International Broadcasting," Journal of Broadcasting 15:1 (1971):110.

5. J. F. Scotton, in Broadcasting in Africa, Sydney H. Head, ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), p. 181.

APPENDIX I

TELEVISION PROGRAM SCHEDULE: THAILAND

SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1985

Thailand: CHANNEL 3

08.00 Housewives' Program
08.30 That's Incredible
09.00 World of Robinson
09.30 Satellite News
09.40 Speak Out
10.20 Poom Jai Thai Tham
10.50 Weekend Theater
"MASADA" Part III - This series continued from last week. Starring: Peter O'Toole, Peter Strauss, Barbara Carrera, David Warner, and Anthony Quayle. And the last series will be continued tomorrow.
12.50 Thai Film
15.00 Today F.B.I.
"Bank Job" - After Ben becomes a captive witness to a bank robbery, he and his team go undercover to crack those responsible for a wild series of holdups.
16.00 Children's World
17.30 A Moment for Learning
17.35 Chinese Series: THE CONDOR HEROES
18.30 Intermission
20.00 Local and Satellite News
20.45 Tou Told Us
20.55 A Word a Day
21.00 Drama: SIX BROTHERS FOR SIX BROTHERS
21.30 Drama: TORN BETWEEN TWO LOVERS
22.00 Chinese Series: GOOD MORNING MOTHER-IN-LAW
23.00 Chicago's Story
"DUTTON'S LAW" Part II - This conclusion continued from yesterday.

Thailand: CHANNEL 5

08.00	Tank Sngob program
08.30	Satellite News Summary
09.00	Japanese Cartoon: KAIBUTSU KUN
09.30	Wildlife Film
10.00	Children's Program: MU BAAN DEK
10.30	Comedy Show
11.00	Saturday Meeting
12.00	Drama: TIM MUEY THAI
12.30	HAPPY DAYS
13.00	See You on Saturday
14.30	Saturday Get-Together
15.00	Japanese Series: SEITO SHOKUN
16.00	Thai Classical Dance
17.00	Housewives's Program
17.30	Sport World
18.30	Intermission
20.00	Local and Satellite News
20.45	Documentary
21.15	Touring the World
21.45	News
21.50	Personality in Focus
22.15	Thai Feature Film

Thailand: CHANNEL 7

08.00	Thai Series: SI YOD KUMARN
09.00	Singer World: Feast or Famine
10.00	Japanese Series: Charivam Space Guardian
11.00	Thai Feature Film
13.00	British Soccer Championship The match between England and Wales
14.00	Live telecast of Thai boxing from Lumpini Stadium
16.00	World of Sports
16.30	Sat Star
17.30	Wonderful World of Disney
18.30	Intermission
20.00	Local and Satellite News
20.55	Cartoon
21.00	Thai Series: Wild Cat
22.00	Chinese Series: Bitter Conflict
23.00	Variety Show

Thailand: CHANNEL 9

07.40	Morning News
08.00	Great Space Coaster
08.30	Japanese Cartoon: Gold Lightan
09.00	Japanese Cartoon: Yatterman
09.30	Japanese Cartoon: Asari Chan
10.00	Japanese Cartoon: Parman
10.30	Japanese Cartoon: Jungle Blacky
11.00	Entertainment program
12.00	Sao Sanuk
13.00	Entertainment program
14.30	KON DEN KON DANG
16.30	Musical Show
17.30	Entertainment Program
17.50	Japanese Cartoon
18.01	Japanese Cartoon: Tamagaon
18.30	Sukhothai Thammathiraj
20.00	Local and Satellite News
20.40	Japanese Cartoon: Doraemon
20.50	Kwamu Kue Prateep
21.50	Film Series: JOE'S WORLD
21.50	Merry King's Raffle

APPENDIX II

TELEVISION PROGRAM SCHEDULE: SRI LANKA

SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1985

Sri Lanka: RUPAVAHINI

PM 5.30 Pigeon Street - Programme 7/13 - "A Cold Day" - Animated cartoon series.

5.45 Play house - "The witching hour" - educational series.

6.10 "Rural health workers" - a documentary from the International Development Research Centre, Canada.

6.35 Future Attractions

6.55 News - Tamil

7.15 "Hiru dutu siyapath" - Musical feature to mark 5th anniversary of Gam Udawa.

7.45 Dad's Army - "A brush with the law" - Comedy Series.

8.15 News - Sinhala

8.35 Javanika - "La Hiru Dahasak" - Prog. 5/11 teledrama

9.05 "Swara Ranga" - Oriental musical program.

9.30 News - English

9.50 Starsky & Hutch (Final Programme) - detective series. Starring David Soul, Paul Michael Glaser & Bernie Hamilton.

10.30 World News

10.35 Starsky & Hutch (contd.)

10.50 Close down

Sri Lanka: ITN

PM	6.00	Programme parade
	6.01	Sesame Street - Prog. 27
	7.00	Your home garden - a programme produced in association with department of agriculture.
	7.15	Cartoon film
	7.30	Flambards - Prog. 3/13 - "ENTRY TO A NEW WORLD" - Adventure series. Starring Christine McKenna, Alan Parnaby, Edward Judd.
	8.30	Cilla's World - Musical Programme
	9.00	Dance fever - Prog. 10/16 - A programmed of competition dancing
	9.30	News - English
	9.44	Programme parade
	9.45	Starsky & Hutch - Prog. 8/3 - Detective series, Starring David Soul.
	10.50	Close down.

APPENDIX III

TELEVISION PROGRAM SCHEDULE: BANGLADESH

SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1985

Bangladesh: CHANNEL 9

9.00	Opening announcement, Al-Quran and programme summary
9.15	News in Bangla
9.25	Cartoon film: Hans Christian Anderson
9.25	TV coaching
10.10	Rum Zhum
10.40	Film show: You asked for it
11.05	Bhandul
11.35	Film show: THE FALL GUY
12.25	Sports Programmed
2.30	Close down
6.00	Opening announcement, Al-Quran and programme summary
6.15	Local news
6.20	Reading from the Tripitaka
6.25	Desher gan
6.35	Amra Natun
7.05	Film show: BEWITCHED
7.35	Tagore's song
7.55	Today's programme
8.00	News at Eight
8.30	Bishwa Parikrama
9.00	Jadi Kichu Mane Na Karen
10.00	News at Ten
10.20	Sunday's Programme
10.25	Film Show: DALLAS
11.20	The News
11.30	Tomorrow's programme. Verses from the Holy Quran, National Flag and National Anthem.

Bangladesh: CHANNEL 9

6.00	Opening announcement
	Al-Quran and programme summary
6.15	Film show: CHIPS
7.05	Magazine programme
7.55	Tomorrow's programme
8.00	Close down

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