DANTE'S TRANSMUTATION OF CLASSICAL FRIENDSHIP

By

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation proposes a study of friendship in Dante's *Commedia*, understood as a synthesis of the classical and Christian notions of the subject. It is argued that friendship constitutes a handmaiden to Dante's journey toward complete happiness and perfection. To the extent that it bridges the distance between the human and the divine, friendship in Dante is to be understood as a relationship that transcends humanity to reach divinity. Dante's friendship with Virgil and Beatrice will be studied parallel to the interplay between the human and the divine, flesh and spirit, philosophy and theology.

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. By exploring the ideas of various philosophers and scholars, the first chapter serves as a general introduction to the topic of friendship. It will become clear that the meaning of friendship has altered through history and within particular socio-political and socio-cultural realities.

Chapter two focuses on the Classical notion of friendship. Particular attention will be given to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Cicero's *De Amicitia*. It will become clear that, while providing a lucid and comprehensive understanding of classical friendship, Aristotle's analysis of friendship in the *Nicomchean Ethics* is much broader

than our modern English understanding of the term. *Philia* encompasses a wide spectrum of associations to include relationships of a personal, political, social, and religious nature. The common ground for the various types of unions is man's natural desire, as a socio-political animal, to connect with others of the same species. The chapter explores Aristotle's classification of friendships, corresponding to three motivations: utility, pleasure, virtue. Since people are pleasant or useful incidentally and since only the good are good for and in themselves, friendship grounded on virtue alone is of the highest order (*NE*, 8.3, 1156 b6-11). [1] An exposition of Cicero's ideas on the subject will follow my analysis of Aristotelian friendship.

Chapter three studies the Christian notion of friendship. The ideas of St. Augustine, Boethius, and St. Thomas Aquinas will be explored. Friendship in this chapter is studied in relation to the love of God, to *caritas*. It is also understood in relation to man's ultimate perfection and happiness. Human friendship is seen as a preparation and prefiguration of the spiritual happiness that is to be found in Heaven.

Chapter four studies friendship in *Inferno* 2 in relation to discourse, change, and movement. More particularly, the changes that occur in *Inferno* 2 are examined in relation to Dante's friendship with Virgil and Beatrice. The words of friends are understood in relation to the Word of God. By means of compassion and discourse characters in this canto are moved first internally (emotionally), and then externally (physically). Virgil and Beatrice are understood as active friends: they are participants in

[1] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1985), 8.3 1156 b6-11, pp. 212-213.

Dante's journey toward perfection. They do not merely wish him good, rather through their words and deeds they become integral parts of his good.

Chapter five finally explores Dante's transmutation of classical friendship. It proposes an understanding of friendship from a lower to a higher form, parallel to the disappearance of Virgil and the appearance of Beatrice at the summit of Purgatory. A close reading of pertinent passages in *Purgatorio* 30 and *Purgatorio* 31 presents friendship as a relationship that transcends human boundaries. Friendship is explored in relation to the interplay between human reason and divine grace. Virgil guides, instructs, and prepares Dante for divine grace, but it is Beatrice who takes him to the experience of divinity. Singleton notes well that, "Virgil's guidance in the *Comedy* is that of *praeparatio ad gratiam*,"[2] and Beatrice is "*lumen gratiae*." [3] It is precisely in relation to *praeparatio ad gratiam* and to *lumen gratiae* that Dante's friendship with Virgil and Beatrice is to be understood.

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[2] Charles S. Singleton, *Dante Studies 2: Journey to Beatrice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 46.
[3] Singleton, *Journey to Beatrice,* p. 42.

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As this journey comes to an end, what remains is to acknowledge friends, teachers, and colleagues who have in their own special way contributed to the completion of this study. I am especially grateful to Paul Oppenheimer, my advisor, for his guidance, support, and for the care with which he read and commented on each chapter. His many helpful suggestions and incisive comments helped to enrich many aspects of this study. I am grateful also to Robert Hollander, a teacher, scholar, and friend, who in the spirit of true friendship has continued to inspire, guide, and encourage me along the way, always with my best interests at heart. The value of his suggestions and Dante scholarship are inestimable. For this study I have used Robert and Jean Hollander's translation of the *Inferno*, *Purgatorio*, and *Paradiso*. In addition, Robert Hollander's commentary at the end of each canto has proved invaluable. I am deeply indebted to William Coleman, who directed this study at its beginning stages. His intellectual expertise and valuable criticism helped to clarify and refine many points. I thank Paolo Fasoli who graciously accepted my invitation to read the manuscript. While any errors are to be attributed to me alone, this study is the result in large part of the intellectual guidance, generosity, and encouragement of these mentors.

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friends, who taught me valuable lessons about friendship and virtue, and reinforced my love of learning.

I am grateful to my family, and in particular to my late father, Antonino Modesto, whose loving memory has served as a source of unwavering strength throughout this journey. It is unfortunate that I began fully to appreciate the greatness of his spirit rather late in the day. The depth of his love of my son was an extension and confirmation of his love for me. Finally, I must thank my most precious and constant friend, Antonio Alexander, *un buon figlio, un migliore amico*.

DEDICA

A mio figlio
e
in memoria di mio padre

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

DANTE'S TRANSMUTATION OF CLASSICAL FRIENDSHIP

> After that the next topic to discuss is friendship; for it is a virtue, or involves virtue, and besides is most necessary for our life. For no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods.
> (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.1 1155 a1-5)

While the topic at hand is friendship, this dissertation is not meant to be a comprehensive study of the history of friendship; rather, it addresses a more focused area of inquiry. Its aim is to offer an examination of the nature of friendship in the *Commedia*, interpreting it as a dialectical synthesis of the classical notion grounded in human reason and virtue, and the Christian medieval notion grounded as it is in the love of God. In this manner, friendship in the *poema sacro* is understood in relation to the interplay between reason and faith, philosophy and theology, the human and the divine. It will be shown that classical friendship, a relationship grounded in man *qua* man, in human reason and virtue, serves both as a point of origin and deviation for Dante. Its purpose is to offer a concept of friendship that is compatible with, but not reducible to the classical notion of the subject. To the extent that it concerns man's dual end, the secular and the spiritual, friendship in the *Commedia* bridges the human and the divine. Far from being an addendum, friendship constitutes an integral part of Dante's journey: a handmaiden to his spiritual perfection and complete happiness. Particular attention will thus be given to Virgil and Beatrice as two benevolent and compassionate friends. Their union will be studied as a parallel to the relationship between secular and spiritual happiness, flesh and spirit, philosophy and theology.

The ancients viewed friendship as a noble subject, one worthy of the highest respect and serious consideration. Friendship thus acquired a special significance and was understood to have powerfully ethical dimensions. In its intrinsic link to man's highest good, friendship became a bridge that led beyond particularity into universality. In the *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle defines *philia* as a virtue, a relationship intrinsically linked to man's ultimate happiness and perfection.[1] Friendship is seen as the highest external good.[2] That friendship is necessary for human life,[3] and that no one would willingly choose a life without friends,[4] are claims that perhaps remain difficult to refute. In Plato's *Lysis,* Socrates praises friendship above all other virtues telling, Menexenus of his long-lasting desire for the companionship:

> Now it happens that since I was a boy I've desired a certain possession, just as others desire other things. For one desires to acquire horses, another dogs, another gold, and another honors. Now me, I'm of a gentle disposition regarding these things, but when it comes to the acquisition of friends I'm quite passionately in love; and I would like to have a good friend rather than the best quail or cock to be found among humans, and indeed, by Zeus, for my part, rather than a horse or a dog. And I suppose, by the Dog, that I would much rather acquire a companion than the gold of Darius, and rather than Darius himself--that's the kind of lover of companions I am.[5]

The desire to seek the comfort and assistance from others of the same species was understood by the ancients as a natural and distinctively human attribute.[6] While other

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[1] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1985), 8.1 1155 a 1-2, p. 207: "After that the next topic to discuss is friendship; for it is a virtue, or it involves virtue, and besides it is most necessary for our lives."
[2] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b10, p. 257: "for having friends seems to be the greatest external good."
[3] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a3, p. 207: "and besides is most necessary for our life."
[4] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a5, p. 207: "For no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all other goods."
[5] Plato, Lysis, trans. David Bolotin (London: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp.30-31.
[6] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a20-22, p. 208: "Members of the same race, and human beings most of all, have a natural friendship for each other; that is why we praise friends of humanity. And in our travels we can see how every human being is akin and beloved to a human being."

species may seek the comfort of their own kind, man's passionate resort to his own is unique in its frequent reliance upon reason. Human friendship seems alone to aim at the highest possible end of moral perfection. For both Plato and Aristotle, all forms of association, including the several types of friendship, acquire significance and are to be understood within and in relation to that most encompassing of human associations, the *polis*. As a social and political being, man's friendships seem to presuppose a natural union with others within a particular kind of socio-political reality.[7] Konstan observes well that "the Greeks and Romans were sociable peoples, and to be deprived of human company was normally perceived as the extreme of suffering."[8] For the ancients friendship was thus linked to the active life.[9] The Latin *amicitia,* for example, also implied the notion of being active together. [10] While noting how Horace identifies himself as Maecenas's companion not merely in the private life but also in the professional and political realms, David Armstrong observes "indeed, there is hardly such a thing to the ancient mind, whether Greek or Roman, as friendship separate from the idea of acting together in the world." [11] In an attempt to contrast the attitudes of the ancients with a present-day general apathy toward politics, H. H. Joachim draws attention to their depth of commitment to the political life of the state:

> Citizenship--the being a member of the polis--meant far more to Plato and Aristotle than it means to us. The whole of the man was, so to say, absorbed in the association: his interests all found their fulfillment in his civic life--his duties all had their basis in his civic position.[12]

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[7] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b17-19, p. 257: "For no one would choose to have all other goods and yet be alone, since a human being is political, tending by nature to live together with others."
[8] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 16.
[9] David Armstrong, *Horace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 41.
[10] Armstrong, p. 41
[11] Armstrong, p. 41.
[12] H. H. Joachim, *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 250.

Friendship, like justice, therefore belonged within the political community: "For in every community there seems to be some sort of justice, and some type of friendship also….The proverb 'What friends have in common' is correct, since friendship involves community."[13] Following in Aristotle's footsteps, centuries later Montaigne hails friendship as the highest reward of a perfect society and contrasts it to the less noble and less perfect unions grounded in pleasure, power, or gain. As opposed to these less perfect unions, the intrinsic value of friendship is to be found in no source other than itself:

> And Aristotle says that good lawgivers have paid more attention to friendship than to justice. Of a perfect society friendship is the peak. For, generally speaking, all those relationships that are created and fostered by pleasure and profit, by public or private interest, are so much the less fine and noble, and so much the less *friendship*, in so far as they mix some cause, or aim, or advantage with friendship, other than friendship itself.[14]

The truth perhaps is that friendship, whether as topic or experience, remains as significant today as ever. In place of disparity, it brings accord; in place of chaos, order; of many, it creates one. Cicero notes that for Empedocles all things in the universe are either united by friendship or disbanded by discord.[15]

Despite its numerous benefits, both in private and public, friendship seems to remain an enigma, with its definition and worth shaped within specific historical, social, and political realities. Like other types of social constructs, the language of friendship to a great extent mirrors the socio-political and socio-cultural reality within which it takes shape. Often cultural differences translate to hermeneutic discrepancies and confusion

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[13] Aristotle, *NE* 8.9 1159 b26-32, p. 224.
[14] Michel de Montaigne, "On Friendship" in *Essays*, trans. J. M. Cohen (New York: Penguin Classics, 1983), p. 92.

regarding language and sense. Hermeneutical discrepancy between the Greek and Latin terminology for friendship and our modern terminology adds to the confusion regarding correspondence.[16] The fact that cultures are not homogeneous and that definitions of friendship have evolved over time, adds to the complexity. Despite certain confusions regarding terms used to describe it, a core idea of friendship, dating from the ancient world and running through the Middle Ages, has somehow managed to transcend the existing discrepancies. As David Konstan notes, despite its complexities, the concept of friendship in some essential ways remains continuous.[17] A common ground for all forms of friendship is man's natural tendency, as a socio-political animal, to form bonds with others of the same species.[18]

Despite cultural and hermeneutic discrepancies, this dissertation will assume an essential core of friendship, one worthwhile investigating. Such a core is here understood as a personal, mutual,[19] active,[20] and loving relationship that is grounded in reason, virtue, and excellence of character, rather than in external goods.[21] Unlike contractual relations, friendship is to be understood as a union that is essentially acquired and not imposed.

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[15] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, trans. William A. Falconer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), vii. 24, p. 134: "Agrigentum quidem doctum quondam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam."
[16] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 10
[17] Konstan, p. 11
[18] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b17-19, p. 257.
[19] Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155 b31-34, p. 210: "Love of a soulless thing is not called friendship, since there is no mutual loving….For friendship is said to be reciprocated goodwill."
[20] Aristotle, *NE* 9.7 1168 a20, p. 252: "Moreover, loving is like production, while being loved is like being acted on; and [the benefactor's] love and friendliness is the result of his greater activity." Cf. 9.9 1169 b30-34, p. 258: "Being happy, then, is found in living and being active….The activity of the good person is excellent, and [hence] pleasant in itself, as we said in the beginning." Cf. 8.9 1170 a5-10, p. 259: "But the solitary person's life is hard, since it is not easy for him to be continuously active by himself; but in relation to others and in their company it is easier, and hence his activity will be more continuous."
[21] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3, 1156 b6-9, p. 212: "But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are good, and they are good in

Friendship is a relationship grounded in voluntary and rational choice, [22] rather than in obligatory reciprocity, political factions, economic alliance, familial, ethnic, or national ties. Acquired relationships, to be sure, may not always result from personal decisions. As Konstan observes, there are instances when one meets people by accident, feels some attraction, and through time develops a friendship with them.[23] In such instances the friendship is grounded in incidental circumstances. Arranged marriages may, for good reasons, be seen as imposed relationships. Nonetheless, these individuals may grow to love each other and become friends. Beyond these examples, friendship is here understood as an intimate union that results from a free, rational, and ethical choice.

It is important to note that friendship also acquires significance in relation to its opposite, enmity. Above all friendship is ineluctably joined with the rational, moral, virtuous, and harmonious. By contrast, enmity is linked to the irrational, chaotic, desolation, pride, and evil. For St. Aquinas evil results from a defect in the way one shares in the supreme good.[24] If enmity leads to civil conflict, friendship brings concord.[25] At the centre of enmity there is malevolence, indifference, hatred, pain, and helplessness.[26] At the centre of the experience of friendship there is love, benevolence,

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themselves." Cf. 8.8 1159 b5, p. 223: "Equality and similarity, and above all the similarity of those who are similar in being virtuous, is friendship."

[22] Aristotle, *NE* 8.5 1158 a30, p. 217: "reciprocal loving requires decision, and decision comes from a state

[23] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 1.

[24] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1975), Vol. 34, 2a2ae.23-33), p. 189: "It is always some evil that causes our neighbour's tears. Now evil always means some defect in the way a creature shares in the supreme good, and accordingly, charity makes us share our neighbour's sorrow to the degree that his sharing in the divine good is blocked."

[25] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a21-25, p. 208: "Moreover, friendship would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would seem to be more concerned about it than about justice. For concord would seem to be more similar to friendship and they aim at concord above all, while they try above all to expel civil conflict, which is enmity."

[26] See Paul Oppenheimer, *Evil and the Demonic* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 5: "One is aware, in other words, of dealing with a special world when dealing with evil. It is a world of pain in which the tyranny of passion and an obsession colours with fresh with fresh ghastly hues everything and

compassion, cooperation, happiness, and humility. That friendship is grounded in humility is a lesson taught by Christ. The Incarnation of Christ is a prime example of friendship grounded in humility. By means of humility the Word became flesh. By contrast, Satan rejected the Word because of pride. Precisely because of his pride Satan became an enemy of God, *e contra 'l suo fattore alzo` le ciglia* (*Inf.* 34, 35).[27] It is right that Satan, who rejected the Word, is forever condemned to silence in a place marked by its distance from Him, in ice.[28] It may be argued that as the epitome of evil, Satan is a parody of the Love that is at the center of Christian friendship. In an enlightening study on the subject of evil, Paul Oppenheimer notes the relation between Satan's speechlessness and his pride.[29] The relation between Satan's pride and his speechlessness may be understood parallel to the relation between humility and the Word, and more particularly, to the relation between Christian friendship and the Word. The point that bears noting is that in the *Commedia* friendship and the harmony it bears are evoked by a reference to the enmity and chaos that afflict and disrupt the city.[30] Mazzotta observes that enmity is what destroys the

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everyone." Oppenheimer offers a comprehensive study of evil in all its possible forms and in association with criminality, pain, malevolence, desolation, confusion, chaos, and the irrational.

[27] Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), p. 628: "and raised his brow in scorn of his creator." Satan's pride made him an enemy to God. See Hollander's note to verse 35 and also his note to verses 4-7. See also Paul Oppenheimer, *Evil and the Demonic*, p. 47 and p. 151.

[28] See Joan Ferrante, "The Relation of Speech to Sin in the *Inferno*," *Dante Studies* 87 (1969), pp. 33-46. Ferrante proposes an understanding of Satan as a parody of the flame of the Holy Spirit: "Lucifer, who emits no sound but sends forth a silent and freezing wind of hate, a parody perhaps of the love inspiring tongues of flame brought to the Apostles by the Holy Spirit" (p. 38). Cf. Paul Oppenheimer, *Evil and the Demonic*, p. 47: "Readers of Dante will be reminded of the frozen region at the bottom of the *Inferno*, where Satan stands, titanic and forever immobile, in the icy swamp of Cocytus, with his six wings beating around his body a great chilly blast that freezes him in yet more tightly." See also Dino S. Cervigni, "Dante's Lucifer: The Denial of the Word," *Lectura Dantis 3* (Fall, 1988) cf. Lecture given at The University of Virginia (April 29, 1980).

[29] Paul Oppenheimer, *Evil and the Demonic*, p. 151.

[30] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 119-120: "But by referring to the enmity within the city, Dante also historicizes the concept of friendship and makes it the meataphor of unity and the means by which the pristine harmony of the city can be restored."

garden, and that it continues to pose a threat to the safety of its inhabitants. [31] Friendship can restore order, stability, and harmony can be restored in the city. [32]

It is puzzling that despite its importance, friendship has not until recently been seen as a topic of interest to scholars. One wonders why even today there exist relatively few comprehensive studies of classical friendship.[33] It is fair to note that the major bulk of work on friendship examines it from a philosophical point of view, and along these lines Aristotle's *Ethics* receives most attention.[34] Among classical studies the most crucial are to be found in Plato's *Lysis,* in Books VIII and IX of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics,* and in Cicero's *De Amicitia*. Decent modern surveys also exist, but none of them

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[31] Giuseppe Mazzotta,*Dante Poet of the Desert,* p. 120: "Enmity is precisely what destroys the garden: the *locus amoenus of Purgatorio* VII, the valley where the great rulers of the world are gathered, shelters the pilgrims from from the imminent dark and its dangers….The enemy is the snake which comes but is exorcised by the arrival of two angels sent by Mary. The implication is that the Arcadian place is a precarious shelter threatened by enmity, in which the fall from Eden is typologically reenacted."

[32] Mazzotta, p. 120: "Dante also historicizes the concept of friendship and makes it the metaphor of unity and the means by which the pristine harmony of the city can be restored."

[33] See J. Derrida's *Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London and New York: Verso, 1997). Derrida's discussion of the topic acquires significance within an anti-genealogy that questions the conventional genealogy within which the concept of friendship developed and emerged. His vision of a new friendship may be understood in relation to Nietzsche's remark in *Human All Too Human*: "Perhaps to each of us there will come the more joyful hour when we exclaim: 'Friends, there are no friends!' thus said the dying sage; 'Foes, there are no foes! Say I, the living fool." *Human All Too Human*, trans. R. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 149, 1, 376 (Nietzsche quoted by Derrida).

[34] For a thorough analysis of Aristotelian friendship see, H. H. Joachim's *Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics* (1951). A valuable collection of essays on Aristotelian friendship is to be found in *Essays On Aristotle's Ethics* (1980), ed. Amelie O. Rorty. Also see John M. Cooper's *Aristotle on Friendship* (1977) and Price's *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (1989). For recent studies on Aristotelian friendship see Michael, Pakaluk's "Friendship and Comparison of Goods" in *Phronesis* 37 (1992) and Suzanne Stern-Gillet's *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship* (1995). Stern-Gillet observes that, while focusing on virtue, Aristotelian friendship is the loving and personal union between individuals rather than the love of an abstract quality. Aristide Tessitore's *Reading Aristotle's Ethics* (1996) offers a clear and insightful interpretation of Aristotle's ideas on friendship in light of Aristotle's ethical system. For a study of the relation between friendship and self-love in Aristotle see, W. F. P. Hardie in *Aristotle's Ethical Theory (*1968), Anthony Kenny in *Aristotle On the Perfect Life* (1992), and Hardie's, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (1968). For a discussion on the *Virtuous Friends,* see C. D. Reeve in *Practices of Reason Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics* (1992). An insightful study of friendship in Plato and Aristotle is *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* by A. W. Price (1980). A classic study on the interplay between love and friendship in Plato and in Aristotle is Gregory Vlastos's, "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato" in *Platonic Studies* (1973). A clear and concise study of Plato's *Lysis* is to be found in D. Bolatin's, *Plato's Dialogue on Friendship* (1979). For a comprehensive study of friendship in the *De Amicitia* see *Cicero: Laelius On Friendship and the Dream of Scipio*, ed. J. G. Powell (1990).

in English with the exception of David Konstan's *Friendship in the Classical World* (1997). An Italian survey is to be found in Pizzolato's *L'idea di amicizia nel mondo antico classico e cristiano* (1993), which explores the theme of friendship in classical antiquity up to the ancient Hebrew, and Christian period. A survey in French is J. Fraisse's *Philia: La notion d'amitie' dans la philosophie antique* (1974), which represents the philosophical study of friendship from ancient to modern times. Fitzgerald's *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship* (1996), though not a survey, presents a collection of studies on friendship in ancient authors. When it comes to an understanding of the relationship between the classical and Christian tradition, there are a number of good studies available. [35]

An illuminating study on friendship is David Konstan's *Friendship in the Classical World*. Konstan's study is to my knowledge the only history of friendship in classical antiquity in English. Its value is inestimable. Konstan sets out to examine the entire scope of friendship, tracing its development from ancient Greek and Rome into the

[35] See Harry V. Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism* (1952). Also worth reading is J. Bobik "Aquinas on *communicatio*, the foundation of friendship and *caritas,"* (1986) in *Modern Schoolman* 64: 1-18; E. Cassidy, "The recovery of the classical ideal of friendship in Augustine's portrayal of *caritas,*" in *The Relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity,* ed. T. Finan (1992). For a well written and clear interpretations of Dante's notion of love and of the difference between the pagan and the Christian notion of love, see: "Platonic Eros and Christian Agape," in *Downside Review,* 79 (1961), Kenelm Foster, "Dante's Idea of Love" in *From Time To Eternity*, ed. by Thomas G. Bergin (1967). For the notion of beauty in relation to love see Mazzeo, "Dante and The Phaedrus Tradition of Poetic Inspiration" in his *Structure and Thought in The Paradiso* (1958). Mazzeo explores the relation between the Platonic notion of beauty and the Christian notions of ultimate beauty and love. The relation between reason and Revelation is explored by Etienne Gilson in *Reason and Revelation in The Middle Ages* (1938). For general studies on Dante and philosophy see Simon Gilson, "Dante and the Science of 'Perspective': A Reappraisal," in *Dante Studies* 115 (1997); *Medieval Optics and Theories of Light in the World of Dante* (2000); "Medieval Lore and Dante's *Commedia,*" in *Dante Studies* 119 (2001); "Medieval Science in Dante's *Commedia*: Past Approaches and Future Directions," in *Reading Medieval Studies* 27 (2001); "Rimaneggiamenti danteschi di Aristotele: gravitas e levitas nella *Commedia*," in *Le culture di Dante.Atti del quarto Seminario internazionale,* ed. by Michelangelo Picone et al. (2004); Etienne Gilson's *Dante The Philosopher* (1948). For the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian influences on Dante also see Joseph Mazzeo, "Light Metaphysics in the Works of Dante" in *Dante in America* (1983), ed. A. B. Giamatti.

Holy Roman Empire (or from the eighth century BC up to the fourth and fifth century AD). His study remains enlightening and innovative in the challenge that it poses to a conventional conception of classical friendship as a relation essentially devoid of the emotive element: it is a union grounded in political and economic alliances and in obligatory reciprocity. The author provides ample evidence to support his thesis that for the most part classical friendship denotes a personal union grounded in affection and altruism, or one that exists separate from ties of kinship, citizenship, and other ascribed unions.[36] In contrast to popular opinion, Konstan argues that as a noun *philos* is to be understood and restricted to indicating a personal friend. [37] He rejects the views of scholars such as Paul Millett,[38] Malcom Heath,[39] and Simon Goldhill,[40] who too readily equate the wide range of relationships encompassed by the Greek term *philia* with political obligation and duty. The insistence on reciprocity seems to contribute to the common misunderstanding of classical friendship as a union grounded in political obligation, economic transactions, and personal advantage. Konstan argues against the

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[36] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 6: "Friendship in the classical world is understood centrally as a personal relationship predicated on affection and generosity rather than on obligatory reciprocity, challenges prevailing assumption about the nature of social relations in antiquity."

[37] Konstan, p. 9. Konstan observes that the different range of meanings of the terms *philos* and *philia* have added to the confusion over the meaning of the concrete noun, by misleading thinkers to assume that its use is as encompassing and broad as that of *philia*. Scholars have erroneously assumed that there is no Greek word equivalent to the English word "friend." Nonetheless, Konstan is well aware of the wide range of meanings encompassed by the abstract noun *philia*, and that "there is no single Greek term quite equivalent to "friendship."

[38] Paul Millett, *Learning and Borrowing in Ancient Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 113: "It is true that from the viewpoint of comparative sociology, to say nothing of our own experience, the all inclusive quality of Greek friendship is anomalous."

[39] Malcolm Heath, *The Poetics of Greek Tragedy* (California: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 73-74. According to Heath friendship in classical Greece: "is not, at root, a subjective bond of affection and emotional warmth, but the entirely objective bond of reciprocal obligation; one's *philos* [friend] is the man one is obliged to help, and on whom one can or ought to be able to rely for help when oneself is in need." (Heath quoted by David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 2.)

[40] Simon D. Goldhill, *Reading Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 82: "The appellation or categorization of *philos* is used to mark not just affection but overridingly a series of complex obligations, duties and claims." (Goldhill quoted by D. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 2).

dominant conception of ancient friendship as a union devoid of a personal and emotive aspect. He understands ancient friendship as a relation embracing the affectionate personal.[41] In doing so he refutes a strictly political interpretation of Roman friendship, offered by such scholars as Ronald Syme [42] and Peter Brunt.[43] These scholars posit *amicitia* as a relationship devoid of the emotional: they reduce it to political factions and social alliances. That there may be personal advantages to friendship is obvious. But such an advantage in no way diminishes friendship to a utilitarian and calculated union grounded in self-interest and obligation.[44] The truth is that one of the necessary conditions for classical friendship is disinterested love: "To a friend, however, it is said, you must wish goods for his own sake."[45] Aristotle's ideas of friendship will be examined in greater detail in chapter one.

Throughout this study, the terms used for "friend" will be: *philos* (Greek), *amicus* (Latin), and *amico* (Italian). The terms for friendship will be: *philia* (Greek), *amicitia* (Latin), and (*amicizia*) Italian. It is worth noting that the Latin word for friendship, *amicitia*, is most often restricted to the distinct relationship between *amici*, rather than

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[41] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 5: "It is now apparent that one strand of the argument developed in this book, according to which friendship in the classical world is understood centrally as a personal relationship predicated on affection and generosity rather than on obligatory reciprocity, challenges prevailing assumptions about the nature of social relations in antiquity. Rather than conceiving of Greek and Roman friendship as seamlessly embedded in economic and other functions, I am claiming for it a relative autonomy comparable to the status it presumably enjoys in modern life."

[42] Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 157: "Roman political factions were welded together, less by unity of principle than by mutual interest and by mutual services (*officia*), either between social equals as an alliance, or from superior to inferior, in a traditional and almost feudal form of clientship: on a favourable estimate the bond was called *amicitia*, otherwise *factio*." (Syme quoted by David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 3).

[43] Peter Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 352. David Konstan notes that Brunt cites Wilhelm Kroll for the notion that "*amicus* means in the everyday language of [Cicero's] time no more than a political follower." (Brunt quoted by David Konstan); cf. Wilhem Kroll, 1933, p. 55; cf. Powell, 1995; cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 3.

[44] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 13.

[45] Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155b31, p. 210.

embracing the wide range of meanings indicated by the Greek word *philia*.[46] As Konstan observes, the Latin term that corresponds to *philia* in the sense of love in general is *amor*.[47] A common theme running through these chapters is an understanding of friendship as a union grounded in compassion, altruistic love, commitment, and self-sacrifice. Another theme is the set of relations between friendship and virtue, friendship and happiness, and friendship and perfection. The conflict between self-love and the love of another individual, altruism and egoism, will be addressed as well.

Within the scope of the study on friendship here proposed, key issues need also to be addressed. What is the precise nature of classical friendship, and how does it relate to human virtue, reason, happiness, and perfection? What is the nature of Christian friendship, and how does it relate to divine grace, *caritas*, Wisdom, and revelation? What are the relations between classical and Christian friendship? Is friendship a relation between a select few similar in virtue, or it is a union of opposites? Is it a union grounded in similarity, in difference, or both? Does it involve deficiency or abundance? In other words, is it a relation between good people, who selflessly give of themselves from a surplus of moral goodness, or is it a relation between good people and those having a moral, material, psychological, emotional, or intellectual deficiency? Is it a union involving equality or inequality? Why do we become friends with some people and not with others? And finally, what is the nature and function of friendship in the *Commedia*?

The importance of the study to follow thus perhaps lies, first, in its offering a new interpretation of friendship in Dante as a synthesis of the ideas of classical and Christian friendship, and second, in its proposing a novel understanding of his journey toward God

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[46] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 122.

as a movement intrinsically linked to friendship. This dissertation proposes to investigate the role of friendship in the *poema sacro* in relation to Dante's ascent to ultimate perfection and complete happiness. My research indicates that vast as it is, little in Dante scholarship deals with friendship of any kind, and nothing that corresponds to the claims to be elaborated in the chapters that follow. In consulting the *Enciclopedia dantesca* edited by Umberto Bosco and others (1970-78) and *The Dartmouth Dante Project* (1322-1983), it may be suggested, one comes across various entries for "friendship," "*amicizia*," and "*amicitia*," but no entry that addresses topics important to this dissertation.[48]

It may even be argued that the *Commedia* is itself a gift of friendship. As Dante asserts in his Letter to Cangrande, one intention of the *Commedia* is "to remove those living this life from the state of misery and to lead them to the state of happiness."[49] Dante's journey becomes a universal journey through an act of friendship. The first two of its 14, 233 lines places his poem within the interplay between the particular and the universal, between the "I" and the "you": *Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita / mi*

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[47] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 122.

[48] See *The Dartmouth Dante Project* (1322-1983). In the search box one comes across 426 entries for "amicizia," 145 entries for "amicitia," and 65 entries for "friendship." No entry seems to address the particular interests and concerns of this dissertation.

[49] Dante, Alighieri, *Letter to Can Grande della Scala*. cf. Rachel Jacoff and William Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, ed. Robert Hollander, Anthony L. Pellegrini, Aldo D. Scaglione, Joan M. Ferrante (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), p. 1 (Dante quoted by Jacoff and Stephany). While drawing a parallel between Augustine's *Confessions* and the *Commedia*, both products of conversion, the authors refer to Dante's intent in the Christian poem, as stated in the Letter to Cangrande, to relieve men from their misery and to lead them to happiness. Whether Dante wrote the whole Epistle is still much disputed. Mazzoni argues for the authenticity of the entire *Epistle*, an argument which Jacoff and Stephany find convincing. Robert Hollander also defends the authenticity of the *Epistle*. See "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)," *Lectura Dantis Newberryana* (1990), p. 98. For a comprehensive discussion of the controversy see Manlio Pastore Stocchi's *voce* on "Epistole" in *ED* and Padoan's discussion in "La 'mirabile visione' di Dante e l'Epistola a Cangrande," in *Il pio Enea*, pp. 30-63. For more recent arguments against the authenticity of the Epistle see Peter Dronke, *Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and Henry A. Kelly, "Dating the Accessus Section of the Pseudo-Dantean *Epistle to Cangrande*," *Lectura Dantis [Virginiana] 2* (1988): 93-102. cf. Jacoff and Stephany, note 75, pp. 122-123), *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II* (1989). For an attack on all these, see Robert Hollander, *Dante's Epistle to Cangrande* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

ritrovai per una selva oscura [50](*Inf.* 1-2). It is precisely by means of friendship that the distance between the particular and the universal, the "I" and "you," is bridged. Man is not an isolated being. He arrives at truth by means of his interaction with others. Along these lines, Simone De Beauvoir has argued that "if it is true that every project emanates from subjectivity, it is also true that this subjective movement establishes by itself by a surpassing of subjectivity. Man can find a justification of his own existence only in the existence of other men. Now, he needs such a justification; there is no escaping it."[51] As will be proposed below, Dante's "surpassing of subjectivity"[52] occurs by means of his acts of friendship, first with Virgil and then with Beatrice. In his embrace of their friendship Dante's "subjective movement"[53] toward spiritual perfection becomes "a surpassing of subjectivity."[54]

The chapters will focus on those parts of the *Commedia* in which Dante's transmutation of the ideas of classical friendship is most evident: on *Inferno* II, *Purgatorio* XXX, and *Purgatorio* XXXI. I plan to argue that Dante's transmutation of classical friendship is not a case of a mere transference, from the secular to the spiritual realm, but that it involves a shift in focus, from the particular and finite to the universal and eternal, from the human to the divine. While the focus in classical friendship is on man *qua* man, the focus in Christian friendship is on man's relation with God. Along these lines as well, Dante' union with Beatrice will be considered in relation to the love of God. Once a woman of flesh and blood, Beatrice becomes for the poet the bridge between

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[50] Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), p. 2: "Midway in the journey of our life / I came to myself in a dark wood." See Robert Hollander's notes to verses 1-2, p. 12.
[51] Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (New York: Citadel Press, 1948), p. 72.
[52] Simone de Beauvoir, p. 72.

man and God, between the finite and the infinite, between the particular and universal truth. Ultimately, Dante learns to love Beatrice not merely for herself, according to a classical notion of friendship, but for the sake of his love of God. That man should reach ultimate happiness by means of his union with a woman will be shown to be revolutionary, as inconceivable for the poets and thinkers of antiquity as for Dante's contemporaries.

The role assigned to Beatrice in terms of Dante's redemption will also be seen as elevating friendship to new heights. It is Beatrice, both as woman and friend, who leads Dante to God. Through friendship man learns to love another not merely for and in himself, but in and through his love of God. It is worth noting that Dante does not hesitate to embrace the friendship of a woman, understanding and valuing it as a union of equals. The introduction of Beatrice marks a revolutionary modification of both the classical and Christian ideas of friendship. For those who may wish to object by pointing to the Christian cult of Mary, it may be replied that as the mother of God, she belongs in a different category of relationships altogether than does Beatrice, an ordinary woman of flesh and blood whose experiences are also ordinary. That Dante's ultimate perfection and happiness is attained by means of his friendship with Beatrice, a woman, is thus unusual if conceivable from a Christian point of view. Through Beatrice friendship itself is transported to a wholly different level, higher level. Not only does Dante learn to love another through his love of God, but he also learns to love God through of his love of Beatrice.

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[53] Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity,* p. 72
[54] Simone de Beauvoir, p. 72.

Ultimately, friendship, as it is developed by Dante is to be understood as a union that overcomes duality and opposition, life and death, the particular and the universal. With Dante friendship is no longer the disinterested union grounded in human reason and virtue of the ancients, nor is it the Christian union grounded in divine love. Friendship as understood by Dante is both of these, and more: it is a disinterested union grounded both in human virtue and in divine grace, in philosophy and in theology, in particular and in universal truth. It is through his friendship, first with Virgil and then with Beatrice, that he transcends his human self to reach God. In this sense, friendship may be understood as an activity that aims to transcend humanity to join divinity, while encompassing both.

The argument is made that in the classical notion of friendship Dante finds the seeds for his own notion of friendship. By means of human reason and virtue man experiences earthly perfection and happiness. By means of divine grace and revelation man experiences spiritual perfection and happiness. One does not interfere with the other. Nonetheless, autonomy does not exclude cooperation. Like St. Thomas before him, Dante accepts a distinction between faith and reason, without interpreting it according to an Averroistic concept of opposition.[55] Human reason alone cannot lead man to ultimate perfection, for that role belongs to revelation. With respect to the relations between theology and reason, Giovanni Gentile observes that, in Dante theology reaches man through the assistance of reason, but since it remains limited, reason leads man only to a certain point, after which faith must take over. [56] Gentile makes reference to particular points of the journey, such as in *Purgatorio* VI and *Purgatorio* XV, in which Virgil

[55] Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1938), p. 78

openly admits to his own limitations with regard to certain issues, pointing out that Beatrice alone can provide answers to all his questions.[57] While Virgil points to Beatrice as one who is more knowledgeable than himself, she looks to Virgil for help. As Gentile notes, Beatrice does not meet Dante in the dark wood, she implores the assistance of Virgil. Because of his imperfection, Dante is unable to experience blessedness directly without assistance of human virtue and reason. In other words, in all of her blessedness, Beatrice cannot reach Dante directly, she needs the assistance of Virgil. For Gentile, Virgil's intervention is to be understood as a "thomistic rationality,"[58] a place where theology is to a certain extent subjected to reason.[59] Without dissenting from Gentile's interpretation, it will here be proposed that Dante's transmutation of classical friendship be placed within the positions adopted by Virgil and Beatrice, or as between the secular and the spiritual, the human and the divine.

By means of an exposition of Aristotle's and Cicero's ideas in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *De Amicitia* respectively, the second chapter, *Classical Friendship*, attempts to arrive at an understanding of the nature of classical friendship. The discussion here limits itself to Aristotle and Cicero, since, as is maintained, both philosophers had a singular

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[56] See Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante* (Firenze: Sansoni Editore, 1965), p. 31: "La Teologia, dunque, non giunge all'uomo, non lo salva, se non per mezzo della ragione. Ma la ragione ha limiti invalicabili, oltre i quail occorre la fede, e quindi l'insegnamento teologico."

[57] Gentile, p. 31: "Abbiamo ricordato quei versi fondamentali del c. VI del *Purgatorio*, in cui Virgilio esplicitamente rimanda le soluzioni definitive di certi problemi razionali a Beatrice. Altrove (*Purg*. XV, 76-78) dice pure apertamente, che *la* sua *ragion non disfama* e che solo Beatrice puo` togliere ogni *brama*. Altra volta accenna alla relazione che…la filosofia ha con la teologia….Il compimento dell'opera di Virgilio e` all'entrata nel Paradiso terrestre dove egli si congeda da Dante in questi termini."

[58] Gentile, p. 30.

[59] Gentile, p.30: "Beatrice non puo` correre essa incontro a Dante sulla piaggia deserta; e fa capo a Virgilio, alla ragione. E questa non e` piu` trascendenza, ma vero e proprio razionalismo: quell razionalismo tomistico che riesce in certo modo a sottomettere la teologia alla ragione.Questo accade, avvertiva Tommaso, propter defectum intellectus nostri; qui Beatrice direbbe che ha bisogno, essa, la Beatrice, di Virgilio, pel difetto di Dante; ma certo e`, che senza Virgilio ella non sarebbe Beatrice, perche` non beerebbe Dante, ne` potrebbe beare nessuno."

and profound impact on the formation of Dante's philosophical thought. It may thus be seen that within the ideas of Aristotle and Cicero Dante discovers the seeds of his own understanding of friendship. In considering Aristotle's influence on twelfth-century Europe, especially in philosophy and theology, chapter two explores how and in what form Aristotle's thought reached Dante, chiefly by tracing its arrival, transmission, and prominence in the west. By these means it is hoped that sufficient evidence of Dante's direct knowledge of Aristotle, *via* Latin translations from the Arabic and as influenced by Thomistic Aristotelianism, will be provided.

In contrast to earlier Christian thinkers who aimed at reconciling Aristotle with Augustine, and stressing the Platonic elements in both, the proponents of the new Aristotelianism known as Orthodox Aristotelianism worked to reconcile the pagan-Greek rational world-view with their Christian faith.[60] It will be argued that it is precisely within the context of this new type of Aristotelianism that Dante's ideas of friendship are to be understood as leading into a relationship that attempts to reconcile opposition with duality; a relationship that aims to fulfill man's dual end, the secular and the spiritual. While taking into consideration important Aristotelian and Ciceronian influences, this exploration is not intended to diminish the richness of Dante's originality. It is simply a fact that Dante refuses to adhere to a single position, and that he is both a critic and a follower of Aristotle and Cicero. The evidence shows that indeed Dante tailors his authorities to suit his plan, using their ideas so that they elaborate his vision.

In an attempt to comprehend classical friendship, chapter two thus examines Aristotle's three types of friendship as it is discussed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and as it

corresponds to his three classifications of motivation, those of utility, pleasure, and virtue.[61] Aristotle argues that since people are pleasant or useful coincidentally, and since only the good are good for and in themselves, friendship grounded in virtue alone is of the highest order, the other two are incomplete and coincidental. [62] What unites friends of the type that he has in mind is emotion and not a mental state, so that each wishes the other the sort of benevolence that only the friend can provide him with: pleasure or utility.[63] Aristotle thus defines a complete friendship as the union between good people, while a friend is to be understood as one who loves his friend because of himself.[64] Bad people cannot enjoy a complete friendship, for bad people find no enjoyment in one another without profit.[65] Aristotle concludes that only among good people is friendship experienced in its full and best form,[66] and only primary friendship is all inclusive, since it encompasses the other two types, even as the good are also useful and pleasurable to each other.[67]

It will be seen that while offering a lucid and comprehensive understanding of classical friendship, Aristotle's notion of friendship in Books VIII and IX of the *Nicomchean Ethics*, and in Book VII of the *Eudemian Ethics,* like the ancient Greek notion of *philia*, is broader than the modern English usage of the term implies. The English word "friendship" is far more restricted in its meanings, and does not offer an accurate rendition of the Greek term *philia*. Unlike *philia,* a term encompassing a wide

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[60] "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph R. Strayer (New York: Scribners, 1982-89), 13 vols., p. 462
[61] Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155 b20, p. 209.
[62] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3. 1156 b6- 30, pp. 212-213; 8.4. 1157 a20-35, p. 215.
[63] Aristotle, *NE* 8.4. 1157 a5-25, pp.214-215.
[64] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3. 1156 b6-10, pp. 212-213.
[65] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3. 1156 a11-20, p. 211; 8.4. 1157 a15-35, pp. 214- 215.
[66] Aristotle, *NE* 8.4. 1157 a30, p. 215.

spectrum of associations, including relationships of a personal, political, social, and religious nature, the English word "friendship" denotes a mutual and loving bond existing outside of familial, political, or religious affiliations, or a relationship free of impositions and obligations. For the sake of clarity the second chapter goes on to describe the Aristotelian distinction between erotic love and friendship. Friendship is defined as a virtue and a state of mind, and since it is grounded in reason it remains an option. By contrast, love is an emotion that refuses choice. The contrast between love and friendship is of concern to Plato and Aristotle. In Plato's *Phaedrus*, Phaedrus observes:

> A lover more often than not wants to possess you before he has come to know your character or become familiar with your general personality, and that makes it uncertain whether he will still want to be your friend when his desires have waned, whereas in the other case, the fact that the pair were already friends before the affair took place makes it probable that instead of friendship diminishing as a result of favors received, these favors will abide as a memory and promise of more to come.[68]

Constancy in friendship, a union grounded in character and thereby a state of mind, is to be contrasted with the instability of love, a union grounded in passion and desire, thereby an emotion. A bit later in this dialogue it is Socrates who defines love in relation to the desire for pleasure and the enjoyment of beauty:

> It is plain to everyone that love is some sort of desire….When irrational desire, pursuing the enjoyment of beauty, has gained the mastery over judgment that prompts to right conduct, and has acquired from other desires, akin to it, fresh strength to strain toward bodily beauty, that very strength provides it with its name-it is the strong passion called love. [69]

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[67] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3. 1156 b20-24, p. 213.
[68] See Plato, Phaedrus, trans. R. Hackforth in *The Collected Dialogues,* ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 233a1-8, p. 481.
[69] Plato, *Phaedrus,* 237e1-238c2-7, pp. 485-486.

If the guiding principle in love is passion, the guiding principle in friendship is reason. Friendship is a virtue, and it is a state that has roots in the best part of us, in reason.[70] In taking stock of the similarity between love and friendship in their mutual desire for physical proximity, Aristotle also observes that in love the desire for physical proximity and intimacy is guided by sensation rather than by reason: "Love (*eros*) seems to resemble friendship; for the lover desires a life together, although not in the most proper way but according to sensation [or perception, termed *aesthesis*]."[71] Moreover, while friendship originates in goodwill, love originates in the pleasure of perception: "In fact goodwill would seem to originate friendship in the way that pleasure coming through sight originates in erotic passion."[72] Centuries later, in comparing friendship to love, Montaigne finds that his ideas on the subject are remarkably like those of the ancients. In his readings of Plato and Aristotle, Montaigne seeks to contrast the reckless abandonment of the passion that is love to the more temperate and constant state that is friendship:

> But it is a reckless and fickle flame, wavering and changeable, a feverish fire prone to flare up and die down, which only catches us in one corner. In friendship there is a general and universal warmth, temperate, moreover, and uniform, a constant and settled warmth, all gentleness and smoothness, with no roughness or sting about it. What is more, in sexual love there is only a frantic desire for what eludes us….Friendship, on the other hand, is enjoyed even as it is desired; it is bred, nourished, and increased only by enjoyment, since it is a spiritual thing and the soul is purified by its practice.[73]

The interplay between love and friendship is indeed too significant to ignore. Friendship is linked to virtue, to the rational, the good, and the human. By contrast, love is linked to

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[70] Aristotle, *N*E 8.1. 1155 a1-3. p. 207; 8.1. 1158 a30, p. 217.
[71] Aristotle, *NE* 7.12.1245 a24-6.
[72] Aristotle, *NE* 9.5.1167 a3-5, p. 248.
[73] Michel de Montaigne, "On Friendship," in *Essays*, p. 94.

physical beauty, to passion, and to the sublime.[74] In taking stock of Plato's and Aristotle's understanding of love and friendship, friendship is to be placed within the realm of ethics and love within the realm of aesthetics. A friend is loved for his virtuous character, for his moral goodness, while a lover is loved for his aesthetic beauty.[75] Beauty changes, while moral excellence remains constant. It is within the context of ethics and virtue that Aristotelian friendship is studied in the next chapter.

The understanding of friendship in relation to ethics extends to the classical understanding of a friend as another self. In reflecting on his friendship with Maecenas as the most valued treasure in life, for instance, as that which most sustains him, Horace refers to him as his other half:

> Your friendship is the thing my life most glories in. It is what most sustains me. Ah, if some unexpected event should happen one day, and carry you off who are the half of what I am, what would the other half do, going on living, neither as dear as it used to be, nor able to be by itself? That fatal day would be the ruin of us both.[76]

Horace cannot envision a life without Maecenas, his "other half."[77] The understanding of a friend as another self is not limited to the Greeks or to the ancients: it is a notion that

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[74] See Allan Bloom, *Shakespeare on Love and Friendship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 13-14: "It is comparable on all these counts only to friendship of the higher kind described by Aristotle. Friendship, however, is a much calmer thing and can give a better account of itself inasmuch as one chooses a friend for his proved virtue. Friendship is a consequence of deliberate choice, whereas love is a kind of possession that requires so much faith, accompanied by a spectacular apprehension of the beautiful. A friend is good, while a beloved is beautiful. The beautiful has it all over the good in attractiveness. The appeal of the good is rational, that of the beautiful is passionate. Friendship is human, while love is divine."

[75] See John Keats, " Ode on a Grecian Urn." Keats means something quite different by beauty. It is the sensuous ideal of beauty forever imprinted in the urn, untouched by the passage of time and the uncertainty of human passion, that Keats seems to admire and love. For an intelligent study on this ode see Earl R. Wasserman, "Ode on a Grecian Urn," in *The Finer Tone: Keat's Major Poems* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1953, 1967), pp. 11-63. For a more contemporary study on the poem Wasserman himself refers to Brook Thomas's "A New Historical Approach to Keat's 'Ode on a Grecian Urn,'" (p. 2032).

[76] Horace, *Odes*, trans. David Ferry (New York: The Noonday Press, 1997), ii.17, p. 145.

[77] Horace, *Odes*, ii. 17, p. 145.

seems to have transcended time and place. Montaigne speaks of the blending of two souls into one:

> Everything being in effect common between them--will, thoughts, opinions, goods, wives, children, honour, and life--and their agreement being that of one soul in two bodies, according to Aristotle's very proper definition, they can neither lend nor give one another anything….For this perfect friendship of which I speak is indivisible. Each gives himself so absolutely to his friend that he has nothing to dispose of elsewhere….But that friendship which possesses the soul and rules over it with complete sovereignty cannot possibly be divided in two.[78]

In pondering the great loss of his dear friend Montaigne exclaims, "I had grown so accustomed to be his second self in everything that now I seem to be no more than half a man." [79] To be sure, a friend is a sort of image of oneself.[80] By means of friendship, the duality and opposition between the self and the other are bridged, and one learns to know and love another as a mirror of oneself. Individuals who are alike in moral goodness are drawn to each other. In this sense, a friend is an extension of oneself. By looking into the eyes of a friend one sees a reflection of oneself. It is within the context of the understanding of a friendship as a moral and intellectual relation that, the subject of friendship is explored.

The analysis of Aristotelian friendship is followed by a study of Cicero's treatment of friendship in his *De Amicitia*. Mutual ideas are explored. Cicero's influence on Dante is considered in light of Gilson's remark, "For here at any rate in the *De Amicitia*, the men of the twelfth century found much they felt to borrow; either as it stood

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[78] Michel de Montaigne, "Friendship," in *Essays*, trans. J. M. Cohen (New York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 99-101.
[79] Michel de Montaigne, "Friendship," in *Essays*, p. 103.
[80] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, trans. William A. Falconer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), vii. 23, p. 132: "Verum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui."

or adapted to their need."[81] In the *Convivio* it is Dante himself who insists on Cicero's philosophical influence. He cites Cicero's *De Amicitia* along with Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* as valuable guides and manuals of instruction both on love and philosophy. [82] It would be erroneous to interpret Cicero's ideas on friendship in the *De Amicitia* as merely derivative from Aristotle, but equally erroneous to overlook their similarities. Both philosophers understand complete friendship as a disinterested relationship, the union of good people similar in virtues, who wish each other well for each other's sake. Both share the belief that friends love each other for themselves, not coincidentally. Furthermore, both understand complete friendship as a union ineluctably grounded in virtue.[83] Friends are willing to sacrifice their own lives for each other.[84] Ultimately, both Aristotle and Cicero hold friendship in the highest regard. Friendship supplies all denied by life: in it the poor find wealth, the needy and disconsolate solace, and the weak strength. Friendship is understood by both as the offspring of plentitude and affluence, not of need and deficiency. The truth is that only those who are good and sufficient in themselves can love others for themselves. Their accord in matters of friendship is never clearer than in their mutual understanding of the friend as "another

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[81] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Theory of St. Bernard* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 8.
[82] Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, ed. Giorgio Inglese (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 1999), p. 121
[83] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1. 1155 a1-4, p. 207: "After that the next topic to discuss is friendship; for it is a virtue, or involves virtue, and besides is most necessary to our life."cf. Cicero, *De Amicitia*, vi.20-21, p. 130: "sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest." Cf. Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xxii.83, p. 190: "Virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiourum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea quae summa sunt pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret." Cf. Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xxvii. 100, p. 206: "Virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat. In ea est enim convenientia rerumm, in ea stabilitas, in ea Constantia." Cf. Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xxvii. 104, p. 210: "vos autem hortor ut ita virtutem locetis (sine qua amicitia esse non potest) ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis."
[84] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8. 1169 a20, p. 256: "Besides, it is true that, as they say, the excellent person labours for his friends and for his native country, and will die for them." Cf. Cicero, *De* Amicitia, vi.22-vii.23.

self." This claim of *allos autos* is found in both the *Ethics* [85] and in the *Magna Moralia*.[86] Similarly, for Cicero a friend is another self, *alter idem*. [87] The argument will be made that Aquinas's use of the expression *alter ipse* in his interpretation of Aristotle's *allos autos*, must be placed and understood within a Christian context of "another self" in God. A Christian friend is not merely another self, he is another self in God. In this manner, a friend is to be loved for God.

Following the discussion on classical friendship, chapter three, *Christian Friendship*, attempts to explain how classical friendship was transformed by Christian writers. To this end, it studies the ideas of Christian writers who acted as bridges between Aristotle and Cicero, on the one hand, and Dante, on the other. The ideas of Boethius, St. Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas will be explored and related to Dante's notion of friendship. It will be shown that Dante seems to draw on the classical idea of friendship with its association with human virtue, and on Christian friendship understood as *caritas*, the mutual love of man and God. As Konstan accurately observes, "Christians outdid the classical tradition in recognizing the possibility of friendship between mortals and God or angels."[88] Aristotle rejected the possibility of friendship between man and god because of the degree of inequality between the two.[89] By contrast, in embracing

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[85] Aristotle, *NE* 1161 b28-29, 1166 a32, 1169 b6-7, 1170 b6-7. cf. Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics,* 1245 a34-35.
[86] Aristotle, *Magna Moralia.* 1213 a23-24.
[87] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xxi. 80, p. 188: "verus amicus numquam reperietur: est enim is qui est tamquam alter idem."
[88] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 167.
[89] Aristotle, *NE* 8.7 1158b33-36, p. 221; cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 168; cf. Erik Peterson, "Der Gottesfreund: Beitrage zur Geschichte eines religiosen Terminus," *Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte* 42 (1923). Konstan observes that, in this article, Peterson argues that two contrasting views existed in classical antiquity, one which accepted the possibility of friendship between man and god, while the other, represented by Aristotle, rejected it. For Peterson the two divergent views find resolution in the works of the early Christian thinkers; cf. J. F. Dodek, "Friendship with God," in *the New Catholic*

inequality Christianity also embraces a friendship between man and God. In an attempt to ingratiate himself with Can Grande della Scala, Dante alludes to friendship between superiors and inferiors, between man and God:

> And if our attention be directed to true friendship for its own sake, shall we not find that the friends of illustrious and mighty princes have many a time been men obscure in condition but of distinguished virtue? Why not? Since even the friendship of God and man is in no wise impeded by the disparity between them. But if any man consider this assertion unseemly, let him hearken to the Holy Spirit when it declares that certain men have been partakers of its friendship.[90]

Friendship between superiors and inferiors finds equality in reciprocity, "Therefore, since it is a doctrine of ethics that friendship is equalized and preserved by reciprocity, it is my wish to preserve due reciprocity in making a return for the bounty more than once conferred upon me."[91] In an effort to reciprocate the good he has received from Can Grande, Dante dedicates the *Paradiso* to his patron.

As Konstan observes, the notion of friendship with God has roots in the Bible.[92] In the Old Testament when Moses asks for the forgiveness of his people, he is described as "a friend to God" (Exodus 33:11; Genesis 18:17, Wisdom 7:27).[93] When Abraham argues for the lives of the residents of Sodom and Gomorrah, he is called God's friend (Is 41:8, Js 2:23). At the last supper Jesus called his Apostles his friends: "Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you" (Jn 15: 14). Jesus identifies self-sacrifice as the greatest sign of friendship: "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his

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Encyclopedia, vol. 6: 207-208 (1967): cf. J. Moltamann, "Open friendship: Aristotelian and Christian concepts of friendship," in Rouner (1994): 20-42.

[90] Dante, *Epistle to Cangrande*, in *Critical Essays on Dante*, ed. Giuseppe Mazzotta (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1991), pp. 3-4.

[91] Dante, *Epistle to Cangrande*, p. 4.

[92] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 167.

[93] Konstan, pp. 167-168.

life for his friends" (Jn 15:13). By means of self-sacrifice Christ proclaimed friendship grounded in a spiritual community.

In the early Church monastic ideas of brotherhood and universal love begin to replace the classical notion of friendship as a personal relationship grounded in the mutual love of human virtue. The ideas about Christian friendship were in fact shaped and influenced by theological principles and by the Monastic life.[94] Saint Ambrose, for example, understood friendship as a spiritual bond of brotherhood grounded in faith. Often when discussing the topic he would be addressing priests (*On the Duties of Ministers*, 3.22.128).[95] With the rise of spiritual communities, the cloisters, monasteries, and seminaries, more emphasis was placed on a universal sense of charity and spiritual brotherhood, and less on the individual and personal relationship.[96] In this manner, the classical notion of friendship was gradually transformed from a particular union between individuals to a broader faithful community of Christ. At the same time, the traditional vocabulary associated with friendship also begins to alter. The term *caritas* begins to permeate the language of friendship and gradually displaces *amicitia*.[97] In the fourth century, for example, Paulinus of Nola for the most part reserves the term *caritas* for friendships grounded in Christ and *amicitia* for unions strictly grounded in human

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[94] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 149: "When the church fathers wrote about friendship, they were as often concerned with relations among monks, priests, or other devotees who lived together in religious communities as with forms of familiarity among lay people." Cf. B. P. McGuire, *Friendship and Community: The Monastic Experience*, 1988: 17-20; 38-40.

[95] Saint Ambrose, *On the Duties of Ministers*, 3.22.128: "Open your bosom to your friend, so that he may be faithful to you and that you may derive from him pleasure in your life. 'For a faithful friend is the medicine of life, and the blessing of immortality' [Eccl. 6:16]." Cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (1997), p. 150. (Ambrose quoted by Konstan).

[96] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 153.

[97] Konstan, p. 173.

affection. [98] Konstan notes that even St. Jerome, Augustine, and Basil of Caesarea, who adopt the classical terminology of friendship, commonly substitute *caritas* or *agape* for *amicitia* or *philia*.[99] He also observes that often in the writings of Venantius Fortunatus the language of *amor* becomes interchangeable with that of *amicitia*, and the distinction between love and friendship becomes less marked than it was for the ancients.[100] In contrast to classical friendship, a union grounded in the love of man *qua* man, Christian friendship is grounded in the love of God. Unlike classical friendship which emphasizes a certain degree of equality, Christian friendship seems more willing to embrace inequality regarding moral goodness.[101] It is a union less grounded in personal merit than in divine grace.

Christianity rejects the classical conception of friendship, which at best was grounded in moral excellence and personal merit, but it allows for the possibility of friendship between man and God.[102] This notion may seem less puzzling and paradoxical if one considers that human virtues are imperfect and limited. For Augustine, virtues that

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[98] See Paulinus, *Ep.* 13.2. While writing to Pammachius, Paulinus contrasts spiritual friendship, a union grounded in Christ, with secular friendship, a union grounded in man: "Therefore in the truth in which we stand in Christ, receive my spirit as it is expressed to you in this letter, and do not measure our friendship by time. For it is not as a secular friendship, which is often begotten more in hope than in faith, but rather that spiritual kind, which is produced by God as its source and is joined in a brotherhood of souls. Consequently, it does not develop toward love by daily familiarity nor does it depend on anticipation of proof but, as is worthy of a daughter of truth, it is born at once stable and great, because it arises out of fullness through Christ." (Paulinus quoted by D. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 157); cf. P. Fabre, *Saint Paulin de Nole et l'amitie' chretienne* (1949), pp. 142-8; cf. H. Petre', *Caritas*: *Etude sur le vocabulaire latin de la charite' chretienne* (1948), pp. 30-98; cf. C. White, *Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century* (1992), pp. 158-159. According to Konstan, Fabre affirms that Paulinus never uses *amicitia* to refer to friendship grounded in Christ. By contrast, White argues that despite the common association of Christian with friendship *caritas* Paulinus, "does occasionally use *amicus* without implying that he is talking to a non-Christian," and that in the eleventh epistle he uses *amicitia* as he discusses his friendship with Sulpicius Severus (White quoted by Konstan).

[99] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 161.

[100] Konstan, p. 173; cf. B. J. Rogers, "The Poems of Venantius Fortunatus: A Translation and Commentary " (New Brunswick: Diss. Rutgers University, 1970), p. 43; J. W. George, *Venantius Fortunatus: A Latin Poet in Merovingian Gaul* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 144, pp. 173-4.

[101] Konstan, p. 22.

are not referred to God are incomplete and deceptive.[103] Consequently Augustine notes, "He truly loves a friend who loves God in his friend, either because He is in him, or so that He be in him." [104] Since God's love is taken to be above human affection, secular friendship as an end in itself is less than perfect: "the friendship of this world is the enmity of God" (James, *Ep*. 4:4).[105]

Chapter four, *The Canto of Compassion: Friendship in Inferno* II, examines the role of friendship and compassion in relation to Dante's journey. Dante's union with Virgil is understood as a union resembling classical friendship. Similar to classical friendship, the poet's relation with Virgil is a loving and disinterested union grounded in reason, in the love of virtue and of the virtuous character. Dante loves and admires Virgil for his magnanimous spirit, for his moral integrity, and for his poetic skill (*Inf*. 1, 85-87). Dante gains benefits from their friendship: Virgil leads him to moral perfection and to Beatrice, to divine grace. Nonetheless, friendship between Dante and Virgil is primarily grounded in character, in human virtue and reason, rather than in incidental attributes. To be sure, their friendship is not static: it develops and grows through time. Dante learns to trust Virgil completely, and willingly places himself under his care. Virgil does everything within his powers to lead Dante out of the dark wood and on the path toward salvation. By means of his noble speech, through compassion and guidance, Virgil awakens in Dante a renewed desire to begin the journey: *Tu m'hai con disiderio il cor*

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[102] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 22.
[103] St. Augustine, *City of God*, 19.25; cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 160.
[104] St. Augustine, *Sermons*. 361.1, cit. M. A. McNamara, *Friendship in Saint Augustine* (1958): 206; cf. *On the Trinity* 9.7.13; *On Christian Doctrine* 1.22.20. cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 172. (Augustine quoted by Konstan)
[105] See David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 165.

disposto/ si` al venir con le parole tue,/ ch'i` son tornato nel primo proposto [106] (*Inf.* 2. 136-138). Through Virgil, Dante overcomes alienation and loneliness (*Inf.* 2, 3).[107] The restorative power of friendship is never more evident than at the end of *Inferno* II when, having found a *pars animae* in Virgil, Dante unconditionally surrenders himself to Virgil, *Or va, ch'un sol volere e` d'ambedue* [108] (*Inf.* 2. 139).

Chapter four also explores the interplay between friendship and change, friendship and action, friendship and discourse. The premise to be argued here is that the changes and movement in *Inferno* II are initiated through the intercession, the love, compassion, and discourse of friends. Compassion, an essential attribute of friendship, moves Mary, Lucy, Beatrice, and Virgil internally (emotionally) and externally (physically). Compassion for Dante moves the three blessed ladies to orchestrate and facilitate his spiritual journey back home to the Father. Mary moves Lucy, who then moves Beatrice. Beatrice's compassion for Dante leads her to seek Virgil. It will be shown how the word of friends leads to activity. Along these lines, Virgil and Beatrice are seen as benevolent and active friends: they do not merely wish Dante well: they participate in the attainment of his well-being, or goodness, and are essential to it. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that their senses of their relations with Dante are very different.

Chapter five, *Friendship in Purgatorio* XXX, *Purgatorio* XXXI, examines the transmutation of classical friendship in relation to the disappearance of Virgil and the appearance of Beatrice at the summit of *Purgatory*. It is suggested that the transition from Virgil to Beatrice in *Purgatory* XXX parallels the transition from a lower to a

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[106] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 136-138: "Your words have made my heart/ so eager for the journey / that I've returned to my first intent ./ Set out then, for one will prompts us both."
[107] Dante, *Inferno* II, 3: "e io sol uno"

higher type of friendship. It is argued that with the disappearance of Virgil and the appearance of Beatrice at the top of *Purgatory*, classical friendship is transmuted to a higher and more perfect form: a union that transcends humanity to encompasses divinity. The argument is made that the awakening of Dante to God occurs through Beatrice, who arrives both as divine grace and as a friend in Christ. In her dual nature, in her humanity and in her divinity, Beatrice teaches Dante how to love her in God. With the return of Beatrice in the poem, friendship manifests itself as a spiritual union that acquires significance in relation to God.[109]

Dante's friendship with Virgil, though finite and imperfect, is understood as preparation for Beatrice, or for divine grace. In turn, Dante's friendship with Beatrice is understood as the epitome of Christian friendship. Singleton's remarks are pertinent: "Virgil's guidance in the *Comedy* is that of '*praeparatio ad gratiam*' while Beatrice is '*lumen gratiae*.'" [110] In the garden, Dante's journey under Virgil's guidance comes to an end even as a new journey begins under the instruction of Beatrice. Mazzotta interprets this section of the poem as a "Pauline *rite de passage*,"[111] noting that:

> In the garden the pilgrim's journey under Virgil's guidance ends and the new journey led by Beatrice starts; moreover, this is the place where the Pauline *rite de passage* from the condition of the old man occurs and, at the same time, it appears as a veritable garden of love where the fall of man took place.[112]

Without disputing Mazzotta's interpretation, it may be suggested that the pilgrim's rite of passage from a lower to a higher and more enlightened self parallels a passage from

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[108] Dante, *Inferno* II, 139: "Set out then, for one will prompts us both."
[109] Charles Singleton, *Dante Studies* 2*: Journey to Beatrice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 33.

[110] Singleton, *Journey to Beatrice,* p.53.

finite and imperfect friendship (human friendship with Virgil), to a more complete and perfect friendship (spiritual friendship with Beatrice). Dante's passage to his higher self occurs through the compassion and benevolence of Beatrice, a friend in Christ. In her own love for God she intervenes on his behalf. With the disappearance of Virgil and the appearance of Beatrice as grace, in *Purgatorio* XXX, friendship acquires its proper significance in the realm of Augustinian theology.[113] In the end, friendship in Dante is to be understood in relation to the Word that has become flesh. It is to be understood in relation to the words of Christ in John 15.

> Greater love has no one than this, than to lay down one's life for his friends. You are my friends if you do whatever I command you. No longer do I call you servants, for a servant does not know what his master is doing; but I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you. (John 15: 13-15)

Friendship reveals a loving bond among those united in one purpose, of love of God.

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[111] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert*, p. 114
[112] Mazzotta, p. 114.
[113] Mazzotta, p. 114.

CHAPTER TWO

CLASSICAL FRIENDSHIP: ARISTOTLE AND CICERO

> *E misimi a leggere quello non conosciuto da molti libro di Boezio, nel quale, cattivo e discacciato, consolato s'avea. E udendo ancora che Tullio scritto avea un altro libro, nel quale, trattando de l'Amistade, avea toccate parole de la consolazione di Lelio, uomo eccellentissimo, ne la morte di Scipione amico suo, misimi a leggere* quello….E *si` come essere suole che l'uomo va cercando argento e fuori de la `ntenzione truova oro, lo quale occulta cagione presenta, non forse sanza divino imperio; io, che cercava di consolarme, trovai non solamente a le mie lagrime rimedio, ma vocabuli d'autori e di scienze e di libri.* (*Convivio*, II, XII, 3-5)

For centuries, except for the Latin translation of the *Categories* and *On Interpretation* with commentaries by Boethius (c. 480-c. 525), Aristotle was virtually unknown in the West. [1] Boethius' translation of the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* (c. 480-c.525), were well known in northern Europe from the ninth century forward. These works formed what became known as the Old Logic (*logica vetus*). [2] They became the basis for the dialectical movement in theology which culminated at Paris with Peter Abelard (1079-1142).[3] Aristotelian categories were used as a means of understanding problems of universals, the Eucharist, and the Trinity.[4] In the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries Latin translations from the Arabic of Aristotle appear primarily in Spain and Sicily.[5] While only portions of Aristotle's texts were known in the early Middle Ages, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a great deal more reached the universities of Europe and subsequently exercised

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[1] John A. Scott, "Aristotle," *The Dante Encyclopedia*, ed. Richard Lansing (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000), p. 61.
[2] Scott, "Aristotle," *The Dante Encyclopedia*, p. 61.
[3] William A. Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph R. Strayer (New York: Scribner, 1982-89), 13 vols., p. 460.

an extensive influence on the fields of philosophy and theology. [6] The high point of this influence is attained from 1250 to 1350.[7] This rediscovery of Aristotle in the West thus occurs within a time span of about one hundred years (1200-1300), which also marks a turning point in European history.[8] By 1265, in other words, about fifty-five of Aristotle's works had already been translated into Latin.[9] Even those critical of the secular limitations of Aristotelianism eventually ended up adopting his doctrines and terminology.

After 1230, with the Latin commentaries of Avveroes a new kind of Aristotelianism appeared.[10] In contrast to earlier Christian thinkers who aimed at reconciling Aristotle with Augustine, stressing Platonic elements in both, the proponents of this new Aristotelianism worked to reconcile the pagan Greek rational world view with Christian faith.[11] Its foremost representatives were the two Dominicans, Albertus Magnus (1200-1280) and his student Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).[12] Albert and Thomas were the leading interpreters of Aristotle,[13] both were instrumental in the

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[4] William A. Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, p. 460.
[5] Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, p.461.
[6] Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, pp. 460-461: "The full influence of Aristotelian thought was not felt, however, until the remaining works were available in Latin. This eventuated in the mid twelfth century through the efforts of James of Venice (d. after 1142), who travels to Constantinople and translated the *Posterior Analytics, Physics, On the Soul, Metaphysics,* and minor works from the Greek….A better translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* was made about 1240 by Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1168-1253), along with *On the Heavens*. The entire Latin corpus was completed in the third quarter of the century by William of Moerbeke (ca. 1215-1286)."
[7] Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, p. 456.
[8] Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, p. 461.
[9] John A. Scott, "Aristotle," *The Dante Encyclopedia*, p. 61. In Toledo, Michael Scoto (c. 1220-1235) does a partial translation of the *Metaphysics* from an Arabic text.
[10] William A. Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, p. 462.
[11] Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, p. 462.
[12] Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, p. 462.
[13] John A. Scott, "Aristotle," *The Dante Encyclopedia*, p. 62.

diffusion of Aristotle in the West,[14] and both were influencial for Dante, particularly Albert.[15] Like Albert, Thomas professes adherence to Aristotelian thought, but unlike his predecessor, he ends by adopting, and at times even molding, Aristotelian ideas to force them to conform to Christian doctrine. Influenced by Albert, Aquinas recognized the importance of both reason and faith in relation to the entire body of knowledge, human and divine.[16] Accordingly, man's understanding of the material world also yields a knowledge of God as the creator of all creation. Notwithstanding its importance in relation to truth, however, natural reason is limited, particularly concerning religious mysteries. Concerning religious truth, natural reason requires the assistance of divine Revelation. Rather than rejecting Aristotelian philosophy, Thomas molds it so that it becomes a handmaiden to theology. [17] Both the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the *Summa theologiae* present an interpretation of Aristotelian thought as concurring with Christian truths.[18]

Dante's thought was shaped within the intellectual fervor of Thomistic Aristotelianism, with the synthesis of faith and reason, flesh and spirit. Like Aquinas, Dante values the importance of human reason and philosophy in relation to divine Wisdom. Given the intellectual fervor of his time, his understanding of Aristotle was influenced by the various sources and interpretations from Albert, Aquinas, and Avveros. Particularly important to Dante were the commentaries of St. Thomas on Aristotle and the

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[14] Maria C. De Matteis, "Aristotele," *Enciclopedia Dantesca*, dir. Umberto Bosco; ed. Giorgio Petrocchi (Roma: Istituto Dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970-78), 6 vols., p. 372
[15] John A. Scott, "Aristotle," *The Dante Encyclopedia*, p. 62.
[16] Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1966), pp. 73-78.
[17] William A. Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, p. 462.
[18] Wallace, "Aristotle in the Middle Ages" *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, p. 462.

Summa contra Gentiles as primary sources.[19] He was well acquainted with the Scriptures and the Latin writers: Seneca, Orosius, and Boethius.[20] Dante was familiar with the Arabian commentaries on the works of the Greek philosopher, most likely through the references of others.[21] His familiarity with the Greek philosopher arrived through the Arabian commentators and indirectly through the references in works such as St. Augustine's *Confessions,* the *De Meteoris*, the *De Coelo et Mundo*, and other works by Albert Magnus, and *De Regimine Principium* of Egido Colonna.[22] Which of Aristotle's works did Dante know? In his own works he makes specific references to the *Ethics*, *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, *De anima*, *De Meteoris, De caelo et mundo*, *De sensu et sensato, De generatione et corruptione*, *De iuventute et senectute*, *De animalibus*, *Organon*, *Rhetoric*, and *Politics*.[23] For the *Nicomachean* Ethics, Dante most likely consulted Robert Grosseteste's translation from the Greek and the *Compendium Alexandrium*, also known as the *Liber Ethicorum*, a digest compiled by Brunetto Latini in his *Tresor* (2.1-39).[24]

It is also worth noting that by Dante's time the Franciscan schools of Santa Croce and the convent of Santa Maria Novella were dominant forces in Florentine intellectual circles. Between the end of 1291 and 1295 Dante had fully immersed himself in the study of philosophy taught by the Franciscans at Santa Croce and by the Dominicans at Santa

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[19] Michele Barbi, *Life of Dante*, trans. Paul G. Ruggiers (Berkley: University of California Press , 1966), p. 45.
[20] Barbi, p. 45.
[21] Barbi, p. 45.
[22] Barbi, p. 45: "He is, of course, a follower of Aristotelian philosophy, and he never tires of calling Aristotle the 'teacher and leader of human reason,' the philosopher 'most worthy of faith and obedience,' and of asserting that 'where the divine opinion of Aristotle opens its mouth, the opinion of all other men should be disregarded.'"
[23] John A. Scott, "Aristotle," *The Dante Encyclopedia*, ed. Richard Lansing, p. 64.
[24] Scott, "Aristotle," *The Dante Encyclopedia*, p. 64.

Maria Novella.[25] By the time the *Convivio* was written he was familiar with the teachings of the religious schools. Indeed, his knowledge of Aristotle and Cicero can be traced to these religious schools. In the second *tractate* of the *Convivio* he asserts that shortly after 1290, in an attempt to console himself for the loss of Beatrice, he began to devote himself to the study of philosophy.[26] He read Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* and Cicero's *De Amicitia,* and in these works he found much more than mere consolation.[27] He began to frequent the religious school where philosophy was taught and within thirty months his new love of her erased all prior thoughts of his first love:

> *E imaginava lei fatta come una donna* gentile….*E da questo imaginare cominciai ad andare la` dov'ella si dimostrava veracemente, cioe` ne le scuole de li religiosie a le disputazioni de li filosofanti . Si che in picciol tempo, forse di trenta mesi, cominciai tanto a sentire de la sua dolcezza, che lo suo amore cacciava e distruggeva ogni altro pensiero*.[28]

Dante imagined philosophy in the allegorical figure of a noble and beautiful lady, the daughter of God.[29]

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[25] John A. Scott, "Aristotle," *The Dante Encyclopedia*, ed. Richard Lansing, p. 63.

[26] Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, ed. Giorgio Inglese (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 1993), II xii 1-2, pp. 120-121: "Come per me fu perduto lo primo diletto de la mia anima, de la quale fatta e` menzione di sopra, io rimasi di tanta tristizia punto, che conforto non mi valea alcuno. Tuttavia, dopo alquanto tempo, la mia mente, che si argomentava di sanare, provide, poi che ne' 'l mio ne' l'altrui consolare valea, ritornare al modo che alcuno sconsolato avea tenuto a consolarsi."

[27] Dante, *Convivio*, II xii 3-5, p. 121: "e misimi a leggere quello non conosciuto da molti libro di Boezio, nel quale, cattivo e discacciato, consolato s'avea. E udendo ancora che Tullio scritto avea un altro libro, nel quale, trattando de l'Amistade, avea toccate parole de la consolazione di Lelio, uomo eccellentissimo, ne la morte di Scipione amico suo, misimi a leggere quello….E si` come essere suole che l'uomo va cercando argento e fuori de la `ntenzione truova oro, lo quale occulta cagione presenta, non forse sanza divino imperio; io, che cercava di consolarme, trovai non solamente a le mie lagrime rimedio, ma vocabuli d'autori e di scienze e di libri; li quail considerando, giudicava bene che la filosofia, che era donna di questi autori, di queste scienze e di questi libri, fosse soma cosa." While seeking consolation "argento" for the loss of his beloved, in the works of these two thinkers Dante finds a greater reward, philosophy, "oro."

[28] Dante, *Convivio*, II xii 6-8, pp. 121-122: "And I perceived her as a gentle lady….And from this perception, I began to frequent the schools of the disputations of those who teach philosophy, so that, in a short time, perhaps thirty months, I began to be so keenly aware of her sweetness that the love of her drove way and destroyed every other thought."

[29] Dante, *Convivio*, II xii 9, p. 122: "E perche`, si` come detto e`, questa donna fu figlia di Dio, regina di tutto, nobilissima e bellissima Filosofia."

The *Convivio* abounds with direct references to Aristotle and Cicero. In the first *tractate*, while tracing the origin of his friendship with the Italian vernacular, Dante makes reference to both philosophers.[30] Dante defines friendship as a natural union grounded in the love of the good and on similarity, a union that grows through time and with the sharing of activities. He then traces his definition of friendship directly to Aristotle and Cicero, linking the ideas of one philosopher to that of the other.[31] In addition to the references to Aristotle and Cicero, while discussing the causes of his friendship with the vernacular, Dante makes an implicit reference to Aquinas through the example of the union between father and son as two who are most alike.[32] All facts point to a knowledge of Aristotle *via* Latin translations from the Arabic, as influenced by Thomistic Aristotelianism, and a direct knowledge of Cicero in the original Latin. Given that *De Amicitia* was a work well known to twelfth century thinkers, Dante's direct knowledge of Cicero's treatise on friendship should not surprise. As Etienne Gilson observes, "For here at any rate in the *De Amicitia,* the men of the twelfth century found much they felt to borrow; either as it stood or adapted for their need."[33]

If influences from Aristotle and Cicero are easily ascertained, what about influences from Plato and specifically from the *Lysis,* his dialogue on friendship? Vossler

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[30] Dante, *Convivio*, I xii 3, p. 75.

[31] Dante, *Convivio*, I xii 3, pp. 75-76: "Dico che, si' come vedere si puo' che scrive Tullio in quello De Amicitia, non discordano da la sentenza del Filosofo aperta ne l'ottavo e nel nono de l'Etica, naturalmente la prossimitade e la bontade sono cagioni d'amore generative; lo benificio, lo studio e la consuetudine sono cagioni d'amore accrescitive. E tutte queste cagioni ch'io porto al mio volgare, si` come brievemente io mostrero`."

[32] Dante, *Convivio*, I xii 4-6, p. 76: "Tanto e` la cosa piu` prossima quanto, di tutte le cose del suo genere, altrui e` piu`unita: onde di tutti li uomini lo figlio e` piu` prossimo al padre….Per che, se la prossimitade e` seme d'amista`, come detto e` di sopra, manifesto e` ch'ella e` de le cagioni stata de l'amore ch'io porto a la mia loquela, che e` a me prossima piu` che l'altre." Here Dante echoes Thomas Aquinas, *Comm. Eth.* VIII, lect.12. "Filius est quodammodo pars patris ab eo separata. Unde haec amicitia propinquissima est dilectioni qua quis amat sipsum, a quo omnis amicitia derivatur."

insists that while Dante had no direct knowledge of Plato, indirectly he was also Plato's student.[34] Apart from the Latin translation of the *Timaeus,* Dante's knowledge of the Greek philosopher is obtained indirectly through Aristotle, Cicero, St. Augustine, Albert the Great, and Aquinas.[35] Most likely Dante was not aware of this. Indirect influences from the *Lysis* arrived through Aristotle himself.[36] In the *Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics,* Aristotle demonstrates a thorough knowledge of Plato's *Lysis*. H. H. Joachim and A. W. Price suggest that the *Lysis* served as a point of departure for Aristotle.[37] Joachim traces Aristotle's formulation of the three types of friendship to Plato's *Lysis*: "Aristotle formulates his own theory of the types of friendship by starting from (and rendering more precise) popular views, and particularly the views of Plato's *Lysis.*"[38] Similarly, A. W. Price argues that Aristotle possessed a detailed and complete familiarity with Plato's *Lysis*, and takes it as a point of origin for his *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Eudamian Ethics*.[39] While citing specific passages in Aristotle that either concur with or diverge from Plato's ideas*,* Price notes that the *Lysis* serves as the groundwork for Aristotelian friendship: "the *Lysis* provides, or confirms, many of the commonplaces that form the background to his

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[33] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Tradition of S. Bernard,* trans. A.H.C. Downes (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1995), p. 10.

[34] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, trans. William C. Lawton (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1929), vol. 1, p. 185: "Plato, of whom he had only a second-hand knowledge, is much closer to him than Aristotle, whose *Nicomachean Ethics* he memorized almost as thoroughly as the *Aeneid* of his beloved Virgil." Contrary to Vossler's opinion, it must be affirmed that Dante was closer to Aristotle than to Plato.

[35] Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1965), p. 9: "Delle opere aristoteliche e psuedo-aristoteliche vi ricorrono a ogni passo citazioni che provano o vogliono provare come l'Autore le avesse studiate: l'Etica a Nicomaco, la Politica (che in realta' pare non conoscesse ancora direttamente), la Metafisica, la Fisica, il De coelo et mundo, il De generatione et corruptione, il De animalibus, il De anima, il De sensu et sensibili, la Rhetorica, il De juventute et senectute e il De causis. Di Platone, oltre la traduzione del Timeo, gia' ricordata, egli conosce, ma indirettamente, e rammenta talune dottrine, di cui attinge la notizia in S. Tommaso, in S. Agostino o in Cicerone; e altra volta dallo stesso Aristotele o da Alberto Magno."

[36] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), p. 1.

[37] H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 246.

own discussion."[40] While failing to present a clear and affirmative definition of friendship, by raising crucial questions and setting the tone, the *Lysis* provides a valuable background for future discussions on friendship.[41] Price observes: "Despite its failure to define or to explain friendship, the *Lysis* succeeds in setting the scene for a genuine understanding; as Plato no doubt intended, it therefore constitutes a limited achievement under the guise of a fiasco."[42]

The most immediate issue raised in the *Lysis*, one that is addressed by Aristotle himself, is whether friendship is a union arising from need and deficiency, or a union grounded on one's love of another's goodness.[43] It seems that Socrates simultaneously accepts and rejects this higher type of union. At first he seems to adhere to the Homeric view that friendship is a union among likes, and thus concludes that only among good men can friendship so much as exist. Soon after he argues that the good are self-

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[38] H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 246; cf. Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155 b17.
[39] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, p. 1.
[40] Price, p. 9: "On behalf of the theme that like loves like (214a6; EE 7.I. I235a7, cf. NE 8.1. 1155a34); On the attraction of opposite both again have natural philosophy in mind (215e5-9; NE 1155b1-6, EE 1235a13-16); the theme that only good men can be friends (214b6-7, d5-e1, 215a4-5; EE 1234b26-7, 1235a31-3, cf. NE 1155b11-12); This is linked to the love of the like to the like by being supported by a claim that bad men not only wrong one another (214b8-c3; EE 123b24-5, 7.2.1236b13-14), but are not similar even to themselves (214c7-d3; NE 9.4, EE 7.6); it is opposed by the thought that the good are self-sufficient (215a6-c1; NE 9.9. 1169b3-8, EE 7.12.1244b1-15). Plato's failure in the Lysis to define friendship in relation to the various uses of philos (212a8-213c9) inspires Aristotle's success (already quoted): 'A man becomes a friend whenever being loved he loves in return' (EE 7.2. 1236a14-15, cf. NE 8.2. 1155b27-8). Plato assumes a close connection between philos in the senses of 'friend' and of 'dear'; indeed, he fails to distinguish them, and so, to our eyes, wambles in and out of discussion of friendship in a way that threatens to dissolve the topic. Aristotle keeps the senses apart, but does not discard Plato's attention to things, as well as persons, that are dear. Indeed, he grounds, and classifies, kinds of friendship by reference to different categories of things that are loved: just *as inanimate* objects can be loved as being good, pleasant, or useful, so can men (EE 7.2. 1236a10-14); just as the good, pleasant, and useful differ in kind, so do lovings and friendships (NE 8.3. 1156a6-8). Hence both Plato and Aristotle view friendship against the general background of the structure of human desire. Aristotle's more developed analogue to Plato's 'first dear' (219d1) came earlier (NE 1.2. 1094a18-22, EE 1.8. 1218b9-12); but for him the problem about how the good man can need friends reduces to the question how friends can contribute to his own final good or *eudaimonia* (cf. NE 9.9. 1169b3-4, EE 7.12. 1244b5) " (p. 9).
[41] Price, p. 14.
[42] Price, p. 14.
[43] David Bolatin, *Plato's Dialogue on Friendship* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), p.11.

sufficient, and thus they neither desire nor need anything or anyone and are incapable of friendship. [44] While the reader is therefore left to wonder about the precise nature of friendship, in a manner that is true to the Socratic method, the *Lysis* leaves us to seek our own definition.[45]

That the ideas explored in Plato's *Lysis* reached Dante indirectly, *via* his knowledge of Aristotle, is evidenced by the numerous direct references to the pagan philosopher. Giovanni Gentile observes that, Dante possessed a thorough knowledge of nearly all current philosophical and scientific trends.[46] Given his command of a wide body of knowledge, his creative complexity and intellectual depth, tracing Dante's philosophical thought to one particular source is probably impossible, at least in many instances. Instead, it may be more fruitful to consider the general intellectual and cultural ambiance within which he worked, keeping in mind a predominant influence of Aristotelianism. While the issue of originality and influence is crucial, one should not make light of Dante's imaginative power to establish connections among the various threads of knowledge or, to use Auerbach's expression, to synthesize traditional trends of ideas and to invent links where previously there were none:

> Thus the question of whether Dante was an original philosopher is poorly formulated. He was original in the same sense as most scholastic thinkers, whose significance resides less in any freeborn thought than in their striving for a systematic synthesis of differential bodies of traditional thought. Just as Thomas Aquinas sought to combine Aristotelianism with the Christian Platonism of Augustine, so Dante tried to reconcile the Thomistic system with the mystical ideology of the *cor gentile.*[47]

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[44] David Bolatin, *Plato's Dialogue on Friendship,* p. 11.
[45] Bolatin, p. 12.
[46] Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante*, p. 9: "L'Autore si mostra, infatti esperto conoscitore di quasi tutte le fonti del sapere filosofico e scientifico correnti sul finire del sec. XIII e al cominciare del XIV per l'Europa."
[47] Erich Auerbach, *Dante Poet of the Secular World,* trans. Ralph Manheim (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 71. According to the ideology of the *cor gentile*, love is intrinsically linked to the

Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with Auerbach's claims, what can be ascertained is Dante's unique capacity to assimilate past and current ideas, at times even opposing ones, giving them an innovative spin and thereby making them his own. Notwithstanding his creative genius, crucial influences from Aristotle, Cicero, St. Thomas, and others are scattered throughout the body of his work.

All the evidence available points to the fact that like most of his contemporaries, Dante thus held Aristotle in high regard. Numerous references to and compliments bestowed upon Aristotle throughout the body of his work confirm his direct acquaintance with the philosopher, [48] and Dante hails him as the one philosopher who, more than any other, upholds truth as the loftiest of friends.[49] He admires Aristotle for having perfected moral philosophy [50] and for having posited the attainment of earthly happiness by means of virtue, *il preceptor morum*,[51] *cuncta moralia dogmatizans*.[52] Aristotle is deemed worthy of the highest trust, faith, and obedience.[53] His authority deemed worthy of the highest respect.[54] Moreover, Dante refers to the Greek philosopher as *maestro e duca*

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gentle heart, or to one possessing a noble character. Such a person is capable of both loving and of being loved.

[48]Maria C. De Matteis, "Aristotele," *Enciclopedia Dantesca,* dir. Umberto Bosco; ed. Giorgio Petrocchi (Roma: Istituto Dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970-78), vol. 2, pp. 372-373. See Dante's *Convivio* for a comprehensive list of Dante's references to Aristotle: "mio maestro" (*Cv* I ix 9; cfr *Ep* XI ii); "maestro de li filosofi" (*Cv* IV viii 15); "maestro e duca 'de la ragione umana" (*Cv* VI vi 8; cfr. II 16); "maestro de la nostra vita" (*Cv* IV xxiii 8); *Inf*. 4; "maestro di color che sanno" (*Inf.* IV, 131).

[48] Dante, *Convivio*, IV ii 16, pp. 224-225; III xiv 8, 9, p. 202.

[49] Dante, *Convivio*, IV vi 15, 16, p. 241.

[50] Dante, *Convivio*, IV vi 15, 16, p. 241.

[51] Dante, *Monarchia*, III I, 3

[52] Dante, *Epistola,* XI ii

[53] Dante, *Convivio*, IV vi 5, 6, 8, p. 239: "Onde, quand'io provi che Aristotile e` dignissimo di fede e d'obedienza, manifesto e`che le sue parole sono somma e altissima autoritade. Che Aristotile sia dignissimo di fede e d'obedienza cosi` provare si puo`….Questi e` Aristotile; dunque esso e` dignissimo di fede e d'obedienza" (p. 239).

[54] Dante, *Convivio*, IV vi 17, p. 242: "che l'autoritade del filosofo sommo, di cui s'intende, sia piena di tutto vigore."

della ragione umana,[55] as the *glorioso filosofo al quale la natura piu` aperse li suoi segreti*.[56]

Vossler recognizes Aristotelian influence in the *Commedia* regarding the overall plan, terminology, scholastic division, virtue and sin. Nonetheless, he believes that Dante "never took seriously the doctrine that makes of action the source of happiness and the condition of virtue."[57] Accurate as Vossler may be in his observations, he fails to consider the value that Dante places on action guided by reason in relation to earthly happiness. Vossler does not consider the interplay between reason and theology, earthly happiness and celestial bliss. Like St. Thomas before him, Dante accepts the distinction between faith and reason, without interpreting it in Averroistic opposition.[58] Reason alone cannot lead man to ultimate perfection, for that role belongs to revelation. Nonetheless, as Giovanni Gentile observes, reason does not hinder theology, it aids it.[59] Despite its limitations, reason is the means by means of which theology reaches man and saves him.[60] In the dark wood Beatrice does not meet Dante directly, she implores the assistance of Virgil. While it is true that complete happiness in Dante occurs by means of

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[55] Dante, Convivio, IV vi 8, p. 239: "teacher and lord of human reason."
[56] Dante, *Convivio*, III 3: "The glorious philosopher to whom more than any other nature revealed its secrets. "
[57] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture*: *an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, vol. 1, p. 185: "From Aristotle he indeed took over the general plan, the terminology, the scholastic division, the concepts of virtue and sins, but hardly one vital and fundemental thought. He never took seriously either the doctrine that makes of action the source of happiness and the condition of virtue, or the doctrine of the moral neutrality of the sensuous nature. If it were otherwise, how could he ever have insisted that moral purification comes through vision instead of through experience, through instruction and not through toil, through penance and not through discipline?"
[58] Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1938), p. 78.
[59] Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante*, pp. 30-31.
[60] Gentile, p. 31: "La teologia, dunque, non giunge all'uomo, non lo salva, se non per mezzo della ragione. Ma la ragione ha limiti invalicabili, oltre i quali occorre la fede, e quindi l'insegnamento teologico." In an effort to validate his claim Gentile refers to *Purgatorio* VI, where Virgil looks to Beatrice for solutions to particular problems that he himself is unable to resolve. Also, in *Purg*. XV, 76-78 Virgil openly admits that his reason "non disfama" and that Dante should look to Beatrice as one who can satisfy "ogni brama."

vision, it is equally true that earthly happiness is attained by means of human reason and virtue. In embracing Aristotelian philosophy, Dante embraces earthly happiness as a preparation and a prefiguration for celestial happiness. This dissertation argues that it is precisely because Dante embraces Aristotelian philosophy, grounded as it is in human reason, that he can begin with classical friendship as a point of departure for his own understanding of friendship.

In the *Commedia,* the importance assigned to Aristotle is further evidenced by his privileged position in Limbo, amongst the ancient philosophers. Confronted with such greatness Dante is physically forced to look up and raise his brow: " *Poi ch'innalzai un poco piu` le ciglia,/ vidi `l maestro di color che sanno/ seder tra filosofica famiglia./ Tutti lo miran, tutti onor li fanno.*"(*Inf.* 4, 130-33) [61] The truth is that the honor bestowed upon Aristotle equals the honor bestowed upon philosophy. Gentile observes the symbolic richness of the scene: light standing for human reason, the seven doors for the seven liberal arts, and the green meadow representing all knowledge available to man through the use of his reason.[62] While noticing their privileged position, *ch'orrevol gente possedea quell loco* [63] (*Inf.* 4, 72), Dante asks Virgil, "*O tu ch'onori scienzia e arte,/ questi chi son c'hanno cotanta onranza, / che dal modo de li altri li diparte?* [64] (*Inf.* 4, 73-75). Virgil answers that their fame on earth gains them preference in Heaven, *L'onrata nominanza/*

[61] Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), IV, 130-133: "When I raised my eyes a little higher,/ I saw the master of those who know,/ sitting among his philosophic kindred./ Eyes trained on him, all show him honor."
[62] Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante*, pp. 13-14.
[63] Dante, *Inferno*, IV, 72: "an honorable company was gathered there."
[64] Dante, *Inferno,* IV, 73-74: "O you who honor art and knowledge,/ why are these so honored they are set/ apart from the condition of the rest?"

che di lor suona su` ne la tua vita,/ grazia acquista in ciel che si` li avanza [65] (*Inf.* 4, 76-78). The intellectual wisdom that was the cause of *l'onrata nominanza*[66] (*Inf.* 4, 76) on earth is the cause for their privileged position among the dead. Intellectual wisdom is honored in the world of the living and in the world of the dead.

Just as honor is bestowed upon Aristotle in Limbo on account of his wisdom, honor is also bestowed upon Virgil by *la bella scola*[67] (*Inf.* 4, 94). In a sense, philosophy in the *Commedia* is represented through the figures of Virgil. Homer, Horace, Ovid, and Lucan. They welcome back their fellow poet with words denoting the greatest kind of admiration and honor: *Onorate l'altissimo poeta; / l'ombra sua torna, ch'era dipartite* [68] (*Inf.* 4, 80-81). Gentile interestingly argues that in choosing Virgil as guide and master, Dante intends to vest himself in a poetry that is capable of leading its prospective readers to the attainment of Aristotelian knowledge, that is, to philosophy in general.[69] Gentile's analysis is particularly significant, for it brings to the foreground the close relation between philosophy and divine Wisdom, between earthly happiness and heavenly happiness. The interplay between philosophy and revelation, human reason and divine Wisdom is central to a study of friendship in the *Commedia*. If one is to accept what Gentile here proposes, friendship in Dante is to be understood within the context of a synthesis of reason and Revelation, philosophy and theology, a synthesis of man's two ends, earthly happiness and heavenly bliss. This is a theory that will be further examined

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[65] Dante, *Inferno*, IV, 76-78: "Their honorable fame, which echoes in your life above,/ gains favor in Heaven, which thus advances them."
[66] Dante, *Inferno*, IV, 76: "Their honorable fame. "
[67] Dante, *Inferno*, IV, 94: "the fair school. "
[68] Dante, *Inferno*, IV, 80-81: "Honor the loftiest of poets!"
[69] Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante*, p. 14.

in the chapters that follow. For now a discussion of classical friendship, as presented first by Aristotle and then by Cicero, is appropriate.

Books VIII and IX of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* present a lucid and comprehensive treatise on the topic of friendship. David Konstan observes: "As a window onto Greek ideas of friendship, this material is invaluable, but it has also been the cause of misunderstanding."[70] It is both odd and unfortunate that these two books have received little attention from scholars and philosophers.[71] At the center of Aristotle's discussion of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* stands his ethical theory, As John Cooper observes, it is here that Aristotle directly addresses the notion of active benevolence toward others, merely for their own well-being.[72] Aristotle's theory of friendship is to be understood in relation to his ethical theory. And his ethical theory must be understood in light of his theory of friendship.[73] Friendship is directed towards the attainment of man's highest good, the acquisition of which results in happiness. To the extent that man's highest good consists in the perfection of his character as a rational and moral being, Aristotelian friendship may be said to stand at the core of man's perfection and general well-being.

Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship in Books VIII and IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics* with the assertion that first, it is a virtue, or more precisely, that it is

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[70] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p.67.
[71] John M. Cooper, "Aristotle on Friendship," *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 301-340.
[72] Cooper, p. 203: "It should be clear why Aristotle's theory of friendship must be considered a cardinal element in his ethical theory as a whole. For it is only here that he directly expresses himself on the nature, and importance to a flourishing human life, of taking an interest in other persons, merely as such and for their own sake."
[73] Cooper, p. 303.

with (*meta*) a virtue;[74] that second, it is necessary for a morally good life and for the life of the *polis*;[75] and last, that no one would choose a life without friends even if it were possible for him to have all other good things.[76] As a political animal, it is in man's nature to form ties with others of the same species. No one in his or her right mind would choose a life without friends.[77] Friendship is natural (*phusei*) among members of the same species[78] and it creates concord (*homonia*) among citizens.[79] For all of these reasons friendship is both necessary and noble.[80] Everyone needs friends, rich, poor, young, and old. The wealthy need friends to share their prosperity and to help them guard it, the poor need friends with whom to share their misfortune, the young need friends for guidance, and the old need friends to take care of them.[81]

After having established its worth, Aristotle goes on to discuss the essential attributes of friendship and the necessary conditions for its proper development. He accepts the popular understanding of friendship as reciprocal benevolence grounded in one of the three objects of love, but adds to it the element of awareness, or recognition.[82] It is not enough that friends reciprocate benevolence, they must also become aware of the

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[74] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a
1-4, p. 207.
[75] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a22-28, p. 208.
[76] Aristotle, *NE* 9.1 1169 b17-19, p. 257: "For no one would choose to have [other] goods and yet be alone, since a human being is political, tending by nature to live together with others."
[77] It is worth noting that in his understanding of man as a socio-political being, Aristotle does not take into consideration the figure of the misanthrope whose antisocial behaviour would drive him to reject friendship.
[78] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a20-23, p. 208: "Members of the same race, and human beings most of all, have a natural friendship for each other; that is why we praise friends of humanity. And in our travels we can see how every human being is akin and beloved to a human being. "
[79] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a23-26, p. 208: "Moreover, friendship would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would seem to be more concerned about it than about justice. For concord would seem to be similar to friendship and they aim at concord above all, while they try above all to expel civil conflict, which is enmity."
[80] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a28-31, p. 208.
[81] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a12-17, p. 208.
[82] H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle*, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 246.

reciprocated goodwill.[83] Reciprocity of goodwill and a mutual recognition of the moral goodness are essential attributes of friendship. In order that reciprocity and mutual recognition of goodwill can be ascertained, friends must share in activities and spend time together. [84] In other words, it is important that friends spend time together since with prolonged absence friendship may be destroyed.[85] Since it is natural to escape that which is a source of pain and seek that which provides pleasure,[86] it is quite natural for man to desire the company of those friends that are source of both pleasure and comfort for him.[87] Friendship grounded in virtue is friendship essentially and not incidentally, hence the pleasure aspect in this type of union is intrinsic to the relationship and not accidental.[88] The pleasure element in character friendship is derived from the love and admiration of the good and virtuous character.

It is worth noting that the Greek word *philia* encompasses a wide spectrum of associations, to include bonds of a familial type, relationships outside the family, as well as those of a political, social, and religious nature. Aristotle's study of friendship takes into account the bond between friends (*philoi),* the familial bond between child and parent and between siblings, as well as the bond among citizens. The union among fellow citizens (*politai*)*,* creates a political association (*politike` philia*)*,* whereas that between comrades (*hetairike philia),* creates a comradely affection.[89] All of these associations ultimately acquire significance within and in relation to the political

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[83] Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155 b32-35, p. 210.
[84] Aristotle, *NE* 8.5 1157 b19-22, pp. 216-217.
[85] Aristotle, *NE* 8.5 1157 b10-12, p. 216.
[86] Aristotle, *NE* 8.5 1157 b16-17, p. 216.
[87] Aristotle, *NE* 8.5 1157 b22-24, p. 217.
[88] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 b8-10, pp. 212-213; 8.3 1156 a11, p. 211; 8.3 1156 b10, p. 213; 8.4 1157 b3, p. 216.
[89] Aristotle, *NE* 8.11, 1161 a 25-30, p. 228.

association that is the *polis*.[90] All of them are grounded in a common purpose, which stems from communal interest, familial ties, the common rearing of siblings, or the love of a good and virtuous character: "All *philia,* then is in partnership (*koinonia*), as has been said."[91] The common ground for this broad range of relationships is man's desire as a political and social animal to connect, or unite with others of the same species.[92]

Since the word *philia* encompasses a wide range of relationships*,* scholars have erroneously concluded that there is no Greek equivalent for the present-day personal notion of friendship. Contrary to common belief, as Konstan notes, Aristotle distinguishes between the *philia* that takes into account a wide range of relationships and the *philia* corresponding to friendship proper.[93] Aristotle uses the noun *philos* to refer to a friend in the more general sense, but reserves the term *philoi* for the unique bond between friends proper.[94] For example, when speaking of the bond between parent and child Aristotle does not use *philoi.*[95] And while he applies the verb *philein,* to love, to the more broad and abstract *philia,* he also draws a distinction between the more encompassing *philia* and *philia* proper, the distinct union between *philoi*.[96] Konstan thus argues that Aristotle does in fact give serious consideration to friendship proper, the affectionate and disinterested union between friends, *philoi*.[97] One distinguishing factor may be that while other types

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[90] Aristotle, *NE* 8.9 1159 b25-1160 a-35, p. 224; 8.11 1161 a35-1161 b1-10, p. 229.
[91] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 67.
[92] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a20-23, p.208.
[93] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 68: "Chief among the errors is the widespread supposition that Aristotle has no notion comparable to that of friendship in English, since for him *philia* covers so wide a range of relations as to be effectively a different concept. Indeed, it is. But one type of *philia* corresponds closely to friendship, namely, the affection that obtains between *philoi* or friends."
[94] Konstan, p. 68.
[95] Konstan, p. 68.
[96] Konstan, p. 68.
[97] Konstan, p. 68.

of relationships may involve love, they may not necessitate requital, a prerequisite for *philia* proper. [98]

While the desire for complete friendship is most natural to humans, its enjoyment is unique and uncommon.[99] Not only are good people scarce, often there is no time for people to truly get to know and trust each other. Since only the very few are truly good, primary friendship is a union for the very few rather than for the many. Moreover, it is infinitely more difficult to be good and selflessly loving and devoted toward many people simultaneously, since this requires excessive time and self-commitment. On the contrary, it is easier to please many if the friendship is based on utility and pleasure, since the majority of people do not aspire to a higher type of relationship. [100]

According to Aristotle, friendship does not belong to inanimate existence, rather it belongs to rational beings capable of mutual goodwill. [101] While it is possible to love soulless objects, reciprocal loving is a result of a conscious decision, which in turn is a consequence of a state and not of feeling. Love is an essential part of friendship, but they are not one and the same thing: love is a feeling while friendship is a state. Perfect friendship does not originate from transitory feelings, rather it is the result of a rational decision to love the good present in the other.[102] The highest form of friendship is a state; it is a union of hearts as well as of minds, a bond grounded on reason and virtue. Complete friendship is the child of an enlightened human reason and clear vision. It is a foreign phenomenon to the irrational beast lacking self-awareness and rational thought,

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[98] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World,* p. 69.
[99] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 b25-30, p. 213.
[100] Aristotle, *NE* 8.6. 1158 a11-15, p. 218.
[101] Aristotle, *NE* 8.2. 1156 b27-30, p. 210.
[102] Aristotle, *NE* 8.6. 1158 a30-35, p. 217.

the beast whose actions are dictated by the instinctual predisposition toward self-preservation. Those lacking in reason also lack the ability to consider the good of others; hence, brutes are necessarily antisocial, their only goal and primary concern being the satisfaction of primary needs and desires, at least as they perceive them. Lacking in reason these have no room for moral concern or moral dilemma; they themselves lack moral virtue and are incapable of recognizing it in others. Complete friendship is thus the companion of rational thought, self-consciousness, and moral rectitude. It is the nemesis of the irrational, of passion and disorder.

Central to Aristotle's discussion of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is his classification of friendship according to three types, depending on the object of love: the pleasant, the useful, and the good.[103] Joachim argues that in formulating three types of friendship grounded in three objects of love, Aristotle adheres to the same popular view that is expounded in Plato's *Lysis.*[104] According to a widespread belief, the object of love can be pleasant, useful, or good; hence, some unions are grounded in pleasure, others in interest or advantage, and others still, in a person's moral goodness. In support of this popular notion Aristotle notes that, "now since these causes differ in species, so do the types of loving and types of friendship. Hence friendship has three species, corresponding to the three objects of love."[105] The three types of friendships are further classified as complete and incomplete. Friendships based on utility and pleasure are incomplete since they are grounded in coincidental qualities, while friendships grounded in virtue are complete since they are grounded in essential attributes. Aristotle defines complete

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[103] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 a6-1156 b30, pp. 211-213.
[104] H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle*, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, p.246.
[105] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3. 1156a 3-5, p. 211.

friendship as, "the friendship of those who are good and alike in virtue."[106] Accordingly, only good people can be friends to each other because of the friend himself.[107] These friends love each other for their own sake, or for their virtuous character which is constant, thus their friendship is enduring.[108] Since grounded in character, complete friendship is inclusive and permanent. These friends love each other for their whole character, and the good in each is understood and valued in relation to the good in the other. What unites these friends is a decision and as Aristotle explains, a decision comes from a state.[109] A primary friendship is a union of good people. Primary friendship alone is encompassing since it also incorporates the other two types. Good men are also pleasurable and useful. Aristotle's conclusion is that only among the good or virtuous is friendship experienced in its fullest, *malista,* and best, *ariste,* form.[110] Complete friendship is a union of equality of those who are similar in virtue.[111]

In contrast to virtue friendship, which is constant since it is grounded in character, friendships grounded in utility and pleasure are unstable and finite since they are grounded in mutable realities such as advantage and pleasure.[112] These friends are coincidental since "the beloved is loved not in so far as he is who he is, but in so far as he provides some good or pleasure."[113] Often these unions are capricious since subjugated to the whims of fortune and external conditions. These friends love each other for the pleasure or advantage they gain from the relationship. The relationship will last so long as

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[106] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 b6-8, p. 212.
[107] Aristotle, *NE* 8.4 1157 a20, p. 215
[108] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 b 6-10, pp. 212-213.
[109] Aristotle, *NE* 8.5 1158 a30, p. 217.
[110] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3.1156 b22-24, p. 213.
[111] Aristotle, *NE* 8.8.1159 b4-5, p. 223
[112] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3. 1156 a19-20, p. 211; 8.4 1157 b5, p. 216.
[113] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3. 1156 a16-19, p. 211.

each friend provides some good for the other, and will dissolve as soon as the one stops being useful or pleasant to the other.[114] There are palpable elements of exploitation and superficiality in these types of unions. Each friend treats the other as a means to his own end rather than as an end in itself. Joachim succinctly identifies the business-like nature of these types of friendship: "There is something sordid, mercantile, vulgar-some trace of a definite bargain-in this type, which is the most common type of friendship."[115] These are friendship only to the extent that they resemble the primary type. Joachim observes that they are friendship by similarity or by analogy, "The other two forms of friendship are forms of friendship by analogy."[116] Friendship for pleasure and for utility resemble complete friendship since good people are also pleasant and useful to one another. [117] Because they focus on incidental properties rather than on the whole person, friendships of this sort are not inclusive and they are subject to dissolution.

Of the two incomplete forms, it is pleasure friendship that most resembles complete friendship.[118] Pleasure friends tend to want to spend time with one another and derive pleasure from one another's company. To the extent that their union is less mercantile and more humane, they seem to come closer to ideal friendship. Also while the worth of the useful friend stands outside of himself, that of the pleasant is intrinsic. It would seem that of the two it is pleasure friendship that is less incidental. Friendship grounded in utility arises from difference, since we normally seek that which we lack and

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[114] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3. 1156 a20, p. 211.
[115] H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics*, p. 248.
[116] Joachim, p. 247.
[117] Aristotle, *NE* 8.4 1157 a1-4, p. 214.
[118] Aristotle, *NE* 8.6 1158 a20, p. 218.

repay with some other thing.[119] These friends seek each other coincidentally and not in themselves.[120] Each does not love the other for who he is, but for what the other could provide, so that the relationship is easily dissolved as soon as the profit or the pleasure disappears.[121] For all of these reasons it must be concluded that only the friendship of good people is friendship in the primary and most complete sense, the others are friendship by analogy.[122]

It is worth noting that although virtue is a prerequisite of complete friendship, it is not a sufficient condition. While it is possible to be virtuous and yet lack friendship, it is impossible to have friendship in the absence of virtue. This leads Aristotle to the conclusion that friendship might be even more desirable and rarer than moral virtue: it is capable of providing a greater happiness. Virtuous people may still experience unhappiness due to a lack of friendship, while friends are happy in their union and they are never lacking in virtue. Although virtue ought to be sought and praised for itself, it is always more rewarding and enjoyable when it is mutually shared among friends. As friends mutually recognize and appreciate each other's virtuous character, virtue itself ceases to exist as an abstract concept and is rendered a living reality. In applying one's virtue for the well-being of a friend, one becomes a good for that friend. In this manner, potential good becomes an active and actual good. And in the mutual extension the particular good, the particular good of the individual friend becomes part of a greater

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[119] Aristotle, *NE* 8.8 1159 b13-15, p. 223: "The friendship that seems to arise most from contraries is friendship for utility…for we aim at whatever we find we lack, and give something else in return."
[120] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1159 b20-21, p. 224: "Presumably, however, contrary seeks contrary coincidentally, not in itself, and desire is for the intermediate."
[121] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 a20, p. 211; 1156 b10, p. 213.
[122] Aristotle, *NE* 8.4 1157 a31, p. 215: "On this view, the friendship of good people in so far as they are good is friendship in the primary way, and to the full extent; and the others are friendship by similarity."

and more encompassing general good. In this manner, friendship leads to the discovery of a universal good that exists to a lesser degree in the particular good of each friend.

The question arises whether friendship changes or ceases to exist under certain conditions? There is no doubt that Aristotle envisions circumstances when friendship may change, diminish, or dissipate. He concludes that indeed life's misfortunes can become obstacles to both friendship and happiness. Even in character friendship, it is possible that the pain, suffering, and unfavorable conditions push the elderly and those ill of health to withdraw from others' company. The happiness that is derived from friendship is thus to a certain degree contingent upon external and uncontrollable forces. Aristotle insists that when a good person becomes incurably vicious a friend can no longer love him, since the ground for the original bond no longer exists.[123] It is impossible to love that which is bad: "What is bad is not lovable, and must not be loved; for we ought neither to love what is bad nor to become similar to a bad person, and we have said that similar is friend to similar."[124] On the other hand, if there is a slim possibility that a friend may be steered toward the right path one must do everything possible to rescue his character from corruption.[125] In the event that one friend remains the same while the other becomes more virtuous and excels the morally, Aristotle believes that the better person has a moral obligation to dissolve the friendship. The gap between the things that each approves and finds agreeable is so great that it would be impossible to continue the friendship.[126] Nonetheless, the dissolution of the friendship by the better person should not result in the mistreatment of the other as though he had

[123] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3 1165 b15-30, p. 244.
[124] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3 1165 b13-15, p. 244.
[125] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3 1165 b17-20, p. 244.

never been a friend. In other words, some recognition and respect should be reserved for past friendship, unless the disbandment is due to extreme lack of virtue.[127] Since perfect friendship is grounded in character, major changes in character would seem to result in the mutation or total disintegration of the relationship. Of course, while it is possible for complete friendship to disintegrate, it is more common to witness the disintegration of utility and pleasure friendship. It is logical that these less perfect type of unions dissolve as soon as they cease to be pleasant or useful.[128] Since passion, self-interest, and instability is of their nature, these unions are short lived as compared to those grounded in character.

In an attempt to shed light on Aristotelian friendship, Price addresses the distinction between *praxis,* action which has intrinsic value, and production, *poiesis,* which has only instrumental value.[129] It would seem that of the three types of Aristotelian friendship, virtue friendship alone belongs to *praxis,* while pleasure and utility friendship fall under the category of *poiesis.* Virtue friendship is the union of good men who love each other for their intrinsic value, each loving the other *qua* himself. By contrast, pleasure and utility friends love each other *qua* production, *qua* the instrumental good.

It should be observed at this point that many commentators view Aristotle's notion of virtue friendship as a paradox. When discussing virtue friendship Aristotle envisions a complete friendship, or a union of good men.[130] But if virtue is the

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[126] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3 1165 b21-30, p. 244.
[127] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3 1165 b31-35, p. 244.
[128] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3 1165 a1-4, p. 243.
[129] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, p. 119.
[130] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3 1156 b7-8, pp. 212-213.

determining factor in character friendship, then why are we not attracted to all those possessing such moral attribute? One does not become friends with all virtuous individuals, however excellent their character may be. Moreover, in loving a friend for his virtue does one love the abstract attribute, or the individual himself? And does the importance placed on virtue diminish the role of individuality in character friendship? Susazze Stern-Gillet argues that to a certain degree Aristotle takes into account the importance of individuality, but that on the whole individuality is not at the forefront of his discussion:

> Though Aristotle's insistence on the individuated character of moral virtue allows him somehow to account for the uniqueness of the friend, the equation between selfhood, reason, and goodness nevertheless pushes such uniqueness off the center of his analysis of primary friendship.[131]

By contrast, Konstan argues that the object of love in Aristotle is the individual.[132] Accordingly, one does not merely love virtue, rather one loves the virtuous friend on account of his virtue. [133] That the object of love is the individual bearer of each quality can be deduced from Aristotle's own definition of complete friendship: "But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are good, and they are good in themselves."[134] It would seem that for Aristotle complete friendship is a relationship concerning people rather than abstract qualities. The good person loves the virtue present in his friend, but in so far as that virtue is related to the essence of who he is as a particular individual.

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[131] Suzanne Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 73.
[132] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 76.
[133] Konstan, p. 76.
[134] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 b6-9, pp. 212-213.

After categorizing the lovable as either good, pleasant, or useful, Aristotle goes on to consider the requirement of reciprocity in friendship. Unable to reciprocate love, a soulless thing is incapable of friendship: "Love for a soulless thing is not called friendship, since there is no mutual loving, and you do not wish good to it….To a friend, however, it is said, you must wish goods for his own sake….For friendship is said to be reciprocated goodwill."[135] An abstract quality can neither reciprocate love nor become aware of the mutual love. Aristotle concludes, friendship is an activity that requires reciprocated goodwill and an awareness of the reciprocated goodwill.[136] While it is possible to love a soulless object, it is not possible to establish friendship with it. [137] Aristotle's claim must be understood in relation to the distinction he makes between love and friendship: love is a feeling while friendship is a state. Friendship is the result of a conscious and rational choice. One freely and consciously enters into a union with another as a result of a rational decision to love the other for himself, for his virtuous character:

> Loving would seem to be a feeling, but friendship a state. For loving occurs no less towards soulless things, but reciprocal loving requires decision, and decision comes from a state; and what makes [good people] wish good to the beloved for his own sake is their state, not their feeling.[138]

Moreover, while friendship requires reciprocity, love does not. One may envision situations when someone or something is loved even though he or it is unaware of the love or does reciprocate it. Abstract qualities are capable neither to reciprocate love nor to reason. From all that has been said it would seem that the object of love in complete

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[135] Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155 b30-35, p. 210.
[136] Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155 b31-35, p. 210.
[137] Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155 b28-30, p. 210.

friendship is the individual and not the abstract quality. Since good people are good in themselves and not coincidentally, it follows that each loves the other for his individual self.[139] On the other hand, when a friend is loved for the sake of utility or pleasure, he or she is loved coincidentally. These friends love one another for the sake of gain and interest.[140] They love each other not for themselves, but for their riches, fame, or power: "And so those who love for utility or pleasure are fond of a friend because of what is good or pleasant for themselves, not in so far as the beloved is who he is, but in so far as he is useful or pleasant."[141] Utility and pleasure friends thus are not true friends, for they love one another instrumentally and not intrinsically.[142] The object of love in these type of unions would seem to be the abstract quality. These individuals love neither themselves nor their friends. [143]

Another point of contention among commentators of Aristotle is the relationship between self-love and friendship, altruism and egoism. In Aristotle the relation between self-love and friendship, as that between virtue and friendship, is to be understood within his theory of ethics and within his understanding of human nature. Some interpret the component of self-love in Aristotelian friendship as a sign of an egoistic view of human nature. Others see it for what it is, an extension of man's love for another. Before exploring these opposing views, it seems right to examine Aristotle's own ideas on the interplay between self-love and friendship. According to Aristotle, the same features that are to be found in friendship proper are also to be found in self-love:

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[138] Aristotle, *NE* 8.5 1157 b30-35, p. 217.
[139] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 a5-15, p. 211.
[140]Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 a11-15, p. 211.
[141] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 a15, p. 211.
[142] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 a10-20, p. 211; 8.8. 1159 b20, p. 224.

> The defining features of friendship that are found in friendships to one's neighbours would seem to be derived from features of friendship toward oneself….Each of these features is found in the decent person's relation to himself, and it is found in other people in so far as they suppose they are decent. As we have said, virtue and excellent person would seem to be the standard in each case.[144]

Both in self-love and in one's love of another the union is grounded in virtue, in reason and in rational thinking. A good person does good to himself and wishes to exist for the rational part of himself. Likewise, he wishes and does good to his friend and desires that he live for the best part of himself, or his reason. The virtuous person who is satisfied with his own deeds and finds pleasure in spending time with himself also admires his friend and finds it pleasant to spend time with him chiefly for his virtuous character. A good person finds it pleasant to spend time with himself since his memories of what he has done are agreeable, his expectations for the future are good, and both are pleasant.[145] Since the relationship to the self precedes all other relationships, man's relations with others mimics his relationship to himself. The good person thus has the same features to himself as does his friend: "The decent person, then, has these features in relation to himself, and is related to his friend as he is to himself, since the friend is another himself."[146] It seems that the standard both in self-love and in friendship is virtue. [147] The decent person loves himself for his own sake, for his virtuous and rational parts.[148] Likewise, he loves his friend for his sake, for the friend's virtuous character.[149] By contrast, the base person does not love himself, nor is he friendly toward himself because

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[143] Aristotle, *NE* 8.4 1157 a15, p. 214.
[144] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a1-10, p. 245.
[145] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a20-25, p. 246.
[146] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a30-32, p. 246.
[147] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a12-13, p. 245.
[148] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a15-20, p. 245; 9.8 1168 b4-7, p. 253; 9.8 1169 a4-5, p. 255.
[149] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1168 b1-4, p. 253.

there is nothing lovable or admirable about him.[150] Since there is nothing good within him to admire or respect, the base person is incapable of seeking the good for himself and for his friend. Being incapable of truly loving himself, he is incapable of experiencing loving and friendly feelings toward others.[151] Friends feel and act most benevolent toward each other when in agreement about the good. Good men lack internal contradictions: they are of one mind.[152] The decent person, thus, is related to himself as he is to his friend.[153] He has the same features in relationship to himself and to his friend.[154]

D. Konstan notes well that Aristotle's discussion of self-love serves to determine whether the same attributes that apply to love of others also apply to love of self.[155] Konstan argues that there is no real evidence that friendship for others comes from a love of self, except perhaps in the opening remarks on self-love where Aristotle states that signs of friendliness toward others and the attributes of *philia* derive from those toward oneself.[156] This is to say that those attributes attractive to others are the same as the attributes for which we like ourselves.[157] Similarly, Susanne Stern Gillet argues that rather than being an expression of selfish egoism, the Aristotelian notion of self-love constitutes an ideal of moral excellence. Accordingly, self-love does not conflict with altruistic feelings toward one's friends, but lays the groundwork for friendship proper.

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[150] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 b26-27, p. 247.
[151] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 b1-25, pp. 246-247.
[152] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a14-18, p. 245.
[153] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a31, p. 246.
[154] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a30, p. 246.
[155] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 77.
[156] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a1-2, p. 245.
[157] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, pp. 77-78.

Stern-Gillet's observes well that for Aristotle self-love is unattainable by men who are not virtuous:

> In the *Nichomachean Ethics* self-love constitutes a *sine qua non* for the achievement of primary friendship with other virtuous individuals…self love is inaccessible to those who are not virtuous. In Aristotle's moral philosophy virtue and genuine self-love cannot but be concomitant.[158]

Stern-Gillet thus defends the compatibility of self-love and friendship in Aristotle. A moral person loves both himself and his friend for the best parts, for the rational parts. The good man's love of self may even drive him to sacrifice himself for the sake of his friend.[159] It must be argued that once understood in relation to his ethical and moral theory, Aristotelian friendship is as an extension of man's self-love, a sign of his altruistic nature.

According to D. Ross, the theory of self-love is a means by which Aristotle attempts to overcome the duality between egoism and altruism: "Aristotle's theory here is an attempt to break down the antithesis between egoism and altruism by showing that the egoism of a good man has just the same characteristics as altruism."[160] The good person loves himself and his friend intrinsically, for who he is, for his *nous.* Ross posits a good and a bad self-love in Aristotle: "There is a good self-love as well as a bad one."[161] Accordingly, to love oneself for the rational part and for the good part is to love oneself in a good way, while to love oneself for the irrational, passionate, and inconstant part is to love oneself in a bad way. In this way Ross interprets Aristotle's theory of self-love as a sign of altruism rather than egoism. Ross recalls that in Aristotle's *Ethics* reason is the

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[158] Suzanne Stern- Gillet, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship*, p. 80; pp.84-85.
[159] Stern-Gillet, p. 101.
[160] David Ross, *Aristotle* (London: Methuen Press, 1968), p.231.

element with which the good man most identifies, the most authoritative part with which he most associates: "In this section of the *Ethics* Aristotle's intellectualism becomes more and more apparent. Reason is represented as the most authoritative element in man, that which is most truly himself, that which the good man in acts of self-sacrifice is gratifying."[162] Since grounded in reason rather than in passion, self-love in the good man is to be understood in relation to altruism. Ross's remarks at first seem to conflict with his earlier interpretation of reciprocity in Aristotelian friendship as a sign of an egoistic view: "Traces of an egoistic view are present even in the account of friendship, as they should be, for friendship is not mere benevolence but demands a return."[163] It would seem that in equating reciprocity with egoism Ross ignores key points of consideration. First, the "return" that complete friendship demands is offered freely, rather than being imposed; second, the "return" is the result of an altruistic and loving concern for the well-being of the friend. In other words, the element of reciprocity in character friendship is not the mere exchange of goods similar to that which occurs in business transactions or political associations. In such instances reciprocity most likely arises from self-interest, egoism, a sense of duty, or obligation. By contrast, reciprocity and the mutual recognition of goodwill in character friendship is grounded in altruism and in one's selfless love of another. Fortunately, Ross understands that in Aristotle loving is more important than being loved, and that the good man wishes good things to his friend for his friend's own sake, rather than for his own well-being.[164] In the final analysis, Ross comprehends that the essence of Aristotelian friendship is altruism. He understands that the treatment of

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[161] David Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 232.
[162] Ross, p. 232.
[163] Ross, p. 230.

friends as "other selves" signals man's ability to place the well-being of another before his own.[165]

Anthony Kenny provides his own twist to Ross's theory of a good self-love and a bad self-love. Kenny traces self-love in Aristotle to the good man's love of self as opposed to the bad man's love of self: "a good man should love himself (that will be the good for himself and for others) and a bad man should not love himself (that will be bad for himself and for others)."[166] His use of the word "should" may create a level of ambivalence that is absent in Aristotle's discussion. Indubitably, for Aristotle a good man loves himself and a bad one does not. Kenny recognizes the link between self-love and self-sacrifice in Aristotle. The good man is willing to sacrifice all else, even life itself, for the sake of his friend and country.[167] In a sense, self-sacrifice is the epitome of self-love. A good man loves goodness to the extent that he is willing to sacrifice his own life for its sake. At the end of his discussion Kenny seems to diverge from Aristotle's theory of self-love considerably. As a point of departure he takes Aristotle's claim in the *Ethics* that a happy man's ultimate goal is his own supreme good.[168] From this he turns his attention to Aristotle's claim that the happy man needs friends.[169] He proceeds to point out the conflict and discrepancy between the two claims. Kenny argues, if the happy man needs friends so as to bring about their well-being and not his own, then his ultimate goal cannot be his own good.[170] If, instead, the happy man needs friends so as to bring about his own self-knowledge and gratification, then his friendship is not altruistic, it is not a

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[164] David Ross, *Aristotle,* p. 230. cf. *NE* 1159 a27, 1155 b31.
[165] Ross, p. 231. cf. *NE* 1161 b28, 1166 a32, 1169 b6, 1170 b6, 1161 b18.
[166] Anthony Kenny, *Aristotle on the Perfect Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p.53.
[167] Kenny, p. 53. cf. *NE* 1169a 18ff.
[168] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1168 b10, p. 257.

disinterested love of their own good.[171] In his own defense Aristotle would most likely argue that in bringing about the well-being of his friends the happy man is bringing about both the good of his friends as well as his own good. He would also point out that it is easier to observe the actions of virtuous friends than one's own.[172] Since it is easier to study the behavior and character of others, and since a friend is a mirror of oneself, in loving his friend for his true self, for his *nous,* the good man learns to know and love himself best.[173] Furthermore, since having friends is the greatest good, it would be absurd for the happy man to possess all other goods except friendship.[174] In benefiting his friends, the happy man is also fulfilling his ultimate goal, the fulfillment of his own supreme good.[175] It would be absurd to deprive the happy person of friends since as a political being man is naturally drawn to the company of others.[176] Friendship encourages virtue as well as shared conversation and thought, the mark of human life.[177] Thinking is of the essence of human life. Man is alive most all in so far as he is thinking, hence, to desire life is to desire thinking. And if one a perceives, one is aware that he is perceiving, which is the same as perceiving that one exists.[178] For Aristotle the happy life then is a life that promotes the sharing of intellectual discussion and pursuit of knowledge together with friends.[179] The solitary life is not conducive to continuous activity and

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[169] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b1-20, pp. 257-58; 1170 b19, p. 261.
[170] Anthony Kenny, *Aristotle on the Perfect Life*, p. 54.
[171] Kenny, p. 54.
[172] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b23-35-1170 a1-4, p. 258.
[173] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b25, p. 258.
[174] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b10, 20, pp. 257-58.
[175] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b11-15, p. 257.
[176] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b16-22, p. 257.
[177] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1170 a11, p. 259.
[178] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1170 a30, p. 260.
[179] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1170 b8--10, pp. 260-261.

pleasant experiences.[180] Friendship encourages virtue through shared activity and conversation and thought, the mark of human life.[181] Aristotle thus concludes: "Anyone who is to be happy, then, must have excellent friends."[182]

Hardie notes that since Aristotle's virtuous man is not hedonistic, his self-love cannot be egoistic. Aristotle's virtuous man possesses nobility of spirit and his self- love is of the highest sort.[183] Hardie thus proposes an understanding of the theory of self-love in light of Aristotle's ability to comprehend human nature in all of its variety, strengths, and weaknesses in a realistic manner. Aristotle's theory of self-love is consistent with self-sacrifice.[184] The excellent person is willing to sacrifice money, honors, as well as his own life for the sake of his friends and country, and in so doing he awards himself what is finest and best.

It must be argued that, Aristotle's theory of self-love acquires significance in relation to his notion of the friend as another self. For Aristotle a friend is indeed ever another self (*allos* or *heteros autos*). [185] The attributes that characterize friendship derive from the attributes of friendship as expressed to oneself.[186] A friend wishes and does good for his friend's sake and in complete accord makes the same choices.[187] A friend spends time with his friend, sharing in his suffering and joys.[188] The good man lives in complete accord with himself, wishing and doing good for the sake the best part of

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[180] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1170 a5-10, p. 259.
[181] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1170 a11, p. 259; 9.9 1170 b9-14, pp. 260-261.
[182] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1170 b18, p. 261.
[183] W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 328.
[184] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1169 a18-35, p. 256.
[185] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4. 1166 a30, p.246; 9.9 1170 b5, p. 260; *EE* 7.12. 1245 a30
[186] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a1-30, pp. 245-246.
[187] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a14, p. 245.
[188] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a15, p. 245.

himself, his thinking self, for his *nous.* [189] Since the good man relates to himself in the same way as he relates to his friend, the friend may be seen as an extension of oneself. Aristotle concludes: "The excellent person is related to his friend in the same way as he is related to himself, since a friend is another himself."[190] A friend is alike to oneself in goodness.

From all that has been said, it would seem that complete friendship is grounded in similarity and not in difference. For Aristotle, "similar is a friend to similar"[191] and similarity is friendship.[192] The good are drawn toward the good. A W. Price gets to the heart of the matter as he identifies an ethical conception of the self central to Aristotle's account of friendship.[193] It is in the understanding of oneself as an ethical being that the notion of a friend as another self acquires significance. In loving a friend for his own sake[194] and in himself, [195] one loves him for his character.[196] Price observes well that in complete friendship one's concern for the whole welfare of his friend must be understood within the realm of morality. Once the welfare of the friend is understood independently of morality, the door is opened to an egoistic view of human nature. In such instance there is the possibility that one is willing to sacrifice another.[197] Price refers to Nietzsche, who envisions the possibility that loving another as myself may also permit me to sacrifice him as I would sacrifice myself:

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[189] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a15-19, p. 245; 9.8 1168 b30-35, p. 253.
[190] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1170 b6, p. 260.
[191] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3. 1165 b15, p 244; *EE* 7.1. 1235 a6
[192] Aristotle, *NE* 8.8. 1159 b4, p. 223
[193] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, p. 105.
[194] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 b10, p. 213.
[195] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 b9-10, pp. 212-23; 8.4. 1157 a20, p. 215.
[196] Aristotle, *NE* 8.4. 1156 b10, p. 213 .
[197] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, pp. 111-112.

> May we not at least treat our neighbour as we treat ourselves?….Supposing we acted in the sense of self-sacrifice, what would forbid us to sacrifice our neighbour as well?-just as the state and as princes have done hitherto, when they sacrificed one citizen to another 'for the sake of the general interest', as they put it.[198]

Nietzsche envisions instances in which the interest of the individual has been sacrificed against his wishes for the welfare of some common good. One may argue that in such instances self-sacrifice is not grounded one's feelings of benevolence toward another individual, in which case such sacrifices do not belong to friendship proper. Price distinguishes between two kinds of "other sacrifice," taking only the second as belonging to friendship proper.[199] I n the first type, the interest of the other is sacrificed either against his will or against his knowledge.[200] Here the moral advantage belongs to me and the material disadvantage belongs to you.[201] In the second type, instead of sacrificing my interest I allow you willingly to sacrifice your interest. The moral advantage here is shared by both: you partake in the moral advantage by means of your material sacrifice and I by means of a moral sacrifice.[202] It is this second type of self-sacrifice that comes closest to the Aristotelian notion of self-sacrifice: "It is also possible, however, to sacrifice actions to his friend, since it may be finer to be responsible for his friend's doing the action than to do it himself." [203] By providing you with the opportunity to choose to sacrifice your own interests, I provide you with the possibility of becoming noble and achieving perfection.

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[198] Price, p.111, cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, trans. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 146 (Nietzsche quoted by Price).
[199] Price, p. 112
[200] Price, p. 112
[201] Price, p. 112
[202] Price, p. 112
[203] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8. 1169 a32-4, p. 256.

It may be observed that the Aristotelian notion of self-sacrifice is grounded in the desire for moral goodness. Nietzsche's ideas of self-sacrifice seem to address other types of goods than the moral: political, social, or economic. Self-sacrifice may serve a humanitarian, social, or political purpose, yet it may not be grounded in *philia*. For Aristotle, it is natural that one should want to share all types of benefits, moral and material alike, with one's friends. It is also natural that the good man who is willing to die for another "does indeed choose something great and fine for himself."[204] Permitting my friend to sacrifice himself is not a form of exploitation, since it brings him moral benefit by providing him with the opportunity to act in a fine and noble manner.[205]

As I should be concerned for the welfare of my friend in the same way as I would be concerned for my own welfare, so I should not want to sacrifice him for my own interest without bringing benefit to him.[206] The Aristotelian conception of the friend as another self is thus foreign to the modern understanding of the self. In an effort to emphasize the distance between the ancient and the modern conception of the self, Price refers to Proust's understanding of man as an isolated being:

> Despite the illusion of which we would like to be the dupes and with which, out of love, friendship, politeness, human respect, or duty, we dupe one another, we exist alone. Man is the creature who cannot exit from himself, who only knows his fellows in himself, and, in saying the contrary, lies.[207]

Proust's view of the self is a clear testament to just how far modern age has distanced itself from the ancients' conception of the self. While focusing on the uniqueness of the

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[204] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8.1169 a26, p. 256.
[205] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, p. 113.
[206] Price, p. 114.

individual, Proust seems to expound a rather negative notion of self. Price observes that, Proust imagines man being forever doomed in a whirlwind of chaos and alienation.[208] This negative and alienated conception of the self drastically differs from the ancient Greek understanding of man as a political and social being. Aristotle, as all the ancients, had no conception of an isolated self. Man was understood in relation to the civic life, to the socio-political community, to the life of the *polis*: he was a political animal.

H. H. Joachim notes well that, being a citizen was far more important to Plato and Aristotle than it may be to many of us.[209] For the ancients a man's life seems most often to have acquired meaning in relation to the life of the *polis*, which encompassed within itself the various and best forms of human nature.[210] To Aristotle it would have seemed senseless to think of man as an isolated being, for his essence and his good were to be fully comprehended and realized only in relation to the other citizens, or within a community. Within the various types of political associations there were the various types of friendship; friendship, such as justice, is found in the political community. [211] Ultimately, friendship was understood in relation to the most encompassing association of all, that of the *polis.* The Aristotelian conception of man as a political animal justifies the need for friendship. As a political animal, man achieves happiness in relation to others. Solitude cannot be conducive to happiness: "For no one would choose to have all [other] goods and yet be alone, since a human being is political, tending by nature to live together

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[207] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle,* p.114. cf. M. Proust, *A la recherché du temps perdu, ed. P. Clarac and A. Ferre'* 3 vols. (Paris, 1954), iii. 450.
[208] Price, p.114. cf. F. Nietzche, *Daybreak*, p. 491.
[209] H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics*, pp. 250-251.
[210] Joachim, pp. 250-251.
[211] Aristotle, *NE* 8.9 1160 a31, p. 226; 8.12 1162 a33, p. 232.

with others….Hence the happy person will need friends."[212] No one would prefer other goods and be without friends.

Another component of Aristotelian friendship is proximity. To be sure, it is important that friends live together. Living together, however, is much more than the mere sharing of physical space and the sharing of food and drink, as animals might be expected to do. From the point of view of friendship, living together consists in the sharing of ideas and thoughts through discourse: "the sharing of words and thought."[213] Beasts merely share food and drink; men share thoughts and deeds. Friends become united in thought and action. The relation of friendship is built on free speech and open discourse. By means of open discourse friends as active and rational beings arrive at a mutual knowledge of themselves, of each other, and of the universe. Living together entails cooperation and learning. The sharing of thoughts and action in friendship leads to the betterment and improvement of each friend: it encourages development and growth.[214] Friendship is thus to be understood as an activity that leads to wisdom and moral perfection. It is a moral and intellectual union. Through the mutual sharing of thoughts, words, and deeds, friends of similar character improve themselves and each other. Since a friend is more directly visible to me than my own self, it follows that in observing my friend I discover my own perfection: "We are able to observe our neighbours more than ourselves, and to observe their actions more than our own. [215] Moreover, it is in the fulfillment of my friend's moral perfection that my own perfection is to be found. There is no doubt that friendship simultaneously leads to the betterment

[212] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b16-22, pp. 257-58.
[213] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9. 1170 b11-12, p. 261.
[214] Aristotle, *NE* 9.12 1172 a10-14, p. 266; 9.9 1170 a11-12, p. 259; 10.9 1180 a31-2, p. 294.

and improvement of each friend and of society. To the extent that each friend is a conscious and active being who exists, acts, and reacts within a particular socio-political reality, he is involved in a dynamic and reciprocal relation with his friends and with the world around him.

Cooper interprets man's ability to recognize himself in his friend as an instinctual human capacity, a sort of intuition. He argues that, since friends know "intuitively" [216] that they are alike in character, each could come to know his own character by studying that of his friend.[217] In his argument Cooper seems to overlook that friendships may alter and change, particularly under various pressures. He does not seem to consider the role and importance of time in these types of relationships. By contrast, Price notes the importance of "cooperation" in Aristotelian friendship.[218] It is through the cooperation and the sharing of activities that a friend's actions become one's own.[219] Cooper observes that the compatibility of character is tested over time and by means of shared thoughts and actions: "through long experience both of the other person and of oneself."[220] Through cooperation, through the exchange of thoughts and deeds, friends get to know each other and themselves. The true test of friendship seems to lie in cooperation and in open communication, rather than in intuition. Of course, one may envision situations in which a refusal to cooperate might be a sign of friendship: when a friend requires another friend to brings harm to one's country, or to another individual.

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[215] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9. 1169 b34, p. 258.
[216] John Cooper, "Aristotle on Friendship," *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, p.322.
[217] Cooper, p. 322
[218] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, p. 123.
[219] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b30, p. 258; 1170 a3, p. 258.
[220] John Cooper, "Aristotle on Friendship," *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, p. 323.

Any sort of self-awareness that does not aim to reach beyond itself, at best, leads to a limited comprehension of truth. The moment an individual recognizes himself in relation to another, is the moment he transcends himself. There is no doubt that friendship, as understood by Aristotle, is a movement away from particularity into universality. In an effort better to comprehend Aristotelian friendship as an activity grounded in reason and reciprocity, Hegel's remarks on self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* may prove useful. He posits the relationship between two rational beings as a double movement between two independent consciousnesses:

> Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the *other* do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one side would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both.[221]

The action has a double movement because the one party becomes aware of itself in relation to the other, and because the action of the one is simultaneously the action of the other: "Thus the action has a double significance not only because it is directed against itself as well as against the other, but also because it is indivisibly the action of one as well as the other."[222] The action is simultaneously directed toward itself and toward the other. Each recognizes itself as self and other, and both recognize themselves recognizing each other.[223] In his interpretation of Hegel, Solomon notes how man's sense of self derives from his own perception of himself as much as from the perceptions that others have of him: "each person finds himself 'in each other;' that is, a person is

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[221] G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 182.
[222] Hegel, p. 183.
[223] Hegel, p. 184.

identified not by his opinions of himself alone but by the opinions of others, and the reflection of one's own opinions by them, and so on." [224] In other words, my sense of self, my identity, is to some extent established and defined not merely in relation to myself, but in relation to another who resembles me in goodness. For Hegel self-consciousness that does not transcend itself is negation,[225] while self-consciousness directed toward another is understood as mediation and recognition.[226] Friends learn to truly know and define themselves in relation to each other. In confrontation with the other, the self comes to know and love itself. In my awareness of my friend's virtue I come to know and love my own virtue. The relation between friends is active and reciprocal. Each friend acts upon the other and the other reacts to that initial action. Friendship thus is to be understood as an activity by means of which each friend becomes a source of the other's consciousness, knowledge, and love. By means of discourse and shared activity each friend changes and transforms the other, and both arrive at a common understanding of the truth.

It is worth noting that this understanding of friendship as a reciprocal activity that aims to transcend subjectivity is not limited to the ancients. It is a conception that has managed to transcend historical, cultural, and socio-political barriers. In Book I of Machiavelli's *The Art of War*, Fabrizio tells Ruccelai: "I would give you my opinion, were I not concerned that I might offend you. And yet I do not believe I would be

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[224] Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 449-450.
[225] G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of* Spirit, p. 167.
[226] Hegel, p. 186

offending you, because when one converses with friends one simply discusses, one is not finding fault." [227] And then a bit later:

> I will be happy to tell you what I know about anything you ask, and will leave you to judge whether it is true or not. I will be grateful for your questions, because I wish to learn as much from you in what you ask as you will from me in what I answer. For often a wise questioner leads one to consider many things and to realize many others, things that would never have been realized had the question no been asked.[228]

The relationship that is friendship is to be understood precisely within this interplay between the self and the other, or between the "I" and the "you." By means of discourse, by asking and answering, friends arrive at a common understanding of truth.[229] In this manner, the distance between the "I" and the "you" is surpassed. Friendship thus is the means by which the conflict of opposed wills is resolved. Along these lines Simone De Beauvoir's observation may prove useful: "I concern others and they concern me. There we have an irreducible truth. The me-others relationship is as indissoluble as the subject-object relationship….To will oneself free is also to will others free. This will is not an abstract formula. It points out to each person concrete action to be achieved." [230] Yet, my union with another is grounded in the recognition of him as something free and different from myself. In other words, to love a friend is to love his otherness.[231] Through a free and rational interaction, each friend fulfills his subjective existence in relation to the

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[227] Niccolo` Macchiavelli, "*Arte della guerra*," in *The Essential Writings of Macchiavelli*, ed. Peter Constantine (New York: The Modern Library, 2007), p. 94.

[228] Machiavelli, p. 95.

[229] Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (New York: Citadel Press, 1948), p. 71: "One can reveal the world only on a basis revealed by other men. No project can be defined except by its interference with other projects. To make being 'be' is to communicate with others by means of being."

[230] Simone de Beauvoir, pp. 72-3.

[231] Simone de Beauvoir, p. 67: "It is only as something strange, forbidden, as something free, that the other is revealed as an other. And to love him genuinely is to love him in his otherness and in that freedom by

subjective existence of another: "Thus we see that no existence can be validly fulfilled if it is limited to itself. It appeals to the existence of others." [232] In that mutual and subjective movement from the self to the other, from the "I" to the "you" subjectivity is surpassed. [233]

In his analysis of Aristotelian friendship, Price notes that it is through my interaction with another that I become aware of myself as a thinking person with a particular character.[234] By means of my interaction with my friends I obtain self-knowledge.[235] By means of cooperation, living together, and the sharing of ideas and activities, friends are simultaneously moved inwardly toward themselves and outwardly toward each other. In this double movement of two independent self-consciousnesses, each sees the other acting as it does and each does what it expects of the other. [236] Each friend is worked upon and is influenced by the other.[237] The identity of one is influenced by the identity of another. Aristotelian friendship is thus to be understood as a becoming, an activity that leads to the actualization and perfection of the self in relation to another. It is a process by means of which duality is resolved in activity, in cooperation, and in knowledge.

All of this may suggest that there should no longer be serious doubts concerning the compatibility of self-love and friendship. Surprisingly, many view the notion of self-love in friendship as an unnatural and negative instinct.[238] Aristotle is well aware of the

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which he escapes. Love is then renunciation of all possession, of all confusion. One renounces being in order that there may be that being which one is not."
[232] Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, p. 67.
[233] Simone de Beauvoir, p. 72.
[234] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, p. 122.
[235] Price, p. 122.
[236] G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of* Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, p. 182
[237] Yoshihisa Yamamoto, "Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of Friendship: Selfness and Otherness," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (November, 2008).
[238] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1168 a28-30, p. 253.

stigma attached to those who love themselves most, as self-lovers. [239] He explains that the negative application of the term is derived from the most common type of self-love, which is base since grounded in passion and in the non-rational part of man.[240] In an attempt to clarify matters further, Aristotle returns to the distinction between base and decent people and identifies the self with the thinking part, the *nous.* The base person does everything for his own sake, but for the worst part of himself, his passions. By contrast, the decent person always acts for the sake of what is good and for the welfare of his friend, even at the expense of his own good.[241] Aristotle then proceeds to distinguish this bad form of self-love from a good form of self-love. Bad self-love is grounded in a false and therefore distorted view of oneself, the non-rational part. These self-lovers seek to gratify their appetites and their actions are dictated primarily by their passion.[242] By contrast, good self-love rests on a correct notion and essence of oneself, the rational part. He who loves himself for the most controlling and best part loves himself most of all.[243] Moreover, he who loves himself for the best part of himself loves his friend for that very same reason. Aristotle concludes: "The decent person, then, has each of these features in relation to himself, and is related to his friend as he is to himself, since the friend is another himself." [244] The decent person's love of self is thus consistent with friendship: he loves his friend for the same reason that he loves himself, for the sake of the good. Both the love of self and the love of another require virtue. The base person's love of himself is inconsistent with friendship, for he loves things which are harmful to himself

[239] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1168 a28-30, p. 253.
[240] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1168 b5, p. 253; 1168 b16-24, p. 254.
[241] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1168 b31-35, p. 255.
[242] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1168 b16-24, p. 254.
[243] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1168 b28-35, p. 255; 1169 a1-7, p. 255.

and to his friends.[245] Since a friend is another self [246] and since "similar is friend to similar,"[247] it would seem that friendship is a union grounded in similarity. [248]

In the same way that self-love and virtue are essential components of primary friendship, goodwill and active benevolence are essential attributes of friendship. While an essential aspect of goodwill is well wishing the friend's good, it alone does not equal to friendship. It is certainly possible to wish goodwill toward someone unknown to us, even in cases when the person is unaware of our goodwill. In addition to mutual goodwill, it is necessary that friends are aware of their goodwill. Aristotle goes on to clarify the distinction between love and goodwill. In contrast to love, goodwill lacks intensity, desire, and it may also lack familiarity.[249] While goodwill is a necessary attribute of friendship, it does not necessarily presuppose friendship. It is possible to desire good toward one who is not a friend. There are cases when one may wish goodwill to a stranger or to a mere acquaintance. Aristotle defines goodwill as inactive friendship, a relationship than can be transformed into friendship with shared experience and with the passage of time.[250] Friendship is thus equated with activity. Benevolence requires more than merely wishing a friend his good. It requires that one does all that is humanly possible in order to bring about the good of another. In this way a friend becomes an active participant in the actualization of his friend's potential good. In this sense friendship is to be understood as an activity by means of which man's potential good is

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[244] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a30-34, p. 246.
[245] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 b8-10, p. 247.
[246] Aristotle, *NE* 9.4 1166 a32, p. 246; 9.9 1170 b6, p. 260.
[247] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3 1165 b15, p. 244.
[248] Aristotle, *NE* 8.8 1159 b3-5, p. 223.
[249] Aristotle, *NE* 9.5 1166 b30-35, p. 248.
[250] Aristotle, *NE* 9.5 1167 a11, p. 248.

transformed into his actual good. Friendship is an the activity that leads to happiness. [251] And since the actions of virtuous men are good and their activity is of the highest sort, it follows that their happiness is most perfect.

Along these lines, Aristotelian friendship should to be understood in relation to ethics and to the philosophic life. It is worthwhile noting that, for Aristotle, friendship consists in living together and sharing in discussion and thought, which is the mark of the philosophic life.[252] Price notes the close relation between Aristotelian friendship and philosophy: "Aristotle's ideal friendship, at once rich in its philosophic content and pregnant in its practical implications, represents his moral philosophy at its best and most distinctive."[253] In an effort to reach beyond particularity and arrive at universal truth, philosophy aims at the transcendence of self-consciousness. Jaffa also remarks on the interplay between friendship and the philosophic life: "this is the mark of the true work of a philosophic life. "[254] He observes that, like philosophy, friendship is the means by which man's particular self-consciousness transcends itself.[255] Through intellectual wisdom man learns to love himself in relation to universal truth. Similarly, through friendship man learns to know and love himself not as an isolated entity, but in relation to others within a community. In the same way that the philosophic life, the perfection of wisdom, is the highest internal good, friendship, the perfection of self-love, is the highest external and internal good.

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[251] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9 1169 b30, p. 258.
[252] Aristotle, *NE* 9.12 1171 b35-1172 a14, pp. 265-266: "…what friends find most choiceworthy is living together. For friendship is a community, and we are related to our friend as we are related to ourselves….But the friendship of decent people is decent, and increases the more often they meet. And they seem to become still better from their activities and their mutual correction. For each moulds the other in what they approve of, so that you will learn what is noble from noble people."
[253] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, p. 130
[254] Harrry V. Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 126

Beyond these considerations, there remains a study of Cicero's notion of friendship in the *De Amicitia*. Unlike Greek, Latin has a specific word for friendship, *amicitia.* Although the word *amicitia* may encompass some of the wider sense of the Greek *philia,* for the most part it denotes a personal bond between friends (*amici*), rather than love in general.[256] Against popular belief, Konstan notes that *amicitia* did not designate party relationship.[257] *Amicitia* was also used to designate personal and sentimental relationships. Konstan explains that the Latin word corresponding to *philia* in the broader sense is *amor*, while the verb *amare* is equivalent to the Greek verb *philein*.[258] According to Konstan the common misconception of Roman *amicitia* as a union devoid of personal intimacy and emotion may be a reaction to the various Roman political factions and alliances that were grounded in private favor and known as *amici.*[259] The Roman preoccupation with reciprocity may be another reason for this misconception.[260] As Konstan observes, the term *gratia* refers to the payback that is due for a service (*officium* or *beneficium*) received and to the moral sense of gratitude, debt, and obligation imposed on the beneficiary.[261] This sense of moral obligation especially prelevant among friends, paralleled the more pragmatic reciprocity among political alliances.[262] Thus the assumption that all *amicitia* is devoid of emotional and personal ties. It may be useful to draw a distinction between the reciprocity of political alliance

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[255] Harry V. Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, p. 133.
[256] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 122.
[257] C. Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1949), p. 8: "the good old word for party relationships." cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 123 (Taylor quoted by Konstan).
[258] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 123.
[259] Konstan, p. 123
[260] Konstan, p. 123.
[261] Konstan, p. 123.
[262] Konstan, p. 135.

and the reciprocity of friendship. The reciprocity of political alliance seems to be grounded in the demand for recompense (*gratia*) and in the desire for profit. By contrast, the reciprocity of personal friendship is grounded in generosity and altruistic love.[263] Konstan refers to Brunt who challenges the common assumption that *amicitia* implied political alliance and that, "if a Roman called a man *amicus,* it meant that he was a political ally."[264] Brunt argues that in fact, "complex personal relationships could cut across political discords"[265] To be sure, often close personal bonds among individuals survived political disagreements.[266] Brunt refers to the various passages in Cicero's writings in which *amicitia* is not restricted to a connection founded solely on mutual services and common interests, still less to membership of the same faction.[267] In an attempt to strengthen his argument, Brunt notes that the Latin word for friendship (*amicitia*) derives from the verb to love (*amare*).[268] Cicero himself establishes the close relation between love and friendship: *Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam*.[269] Brunt determines that, "The range of *amicitia* is vast…it covers every degree of genuinely or overtly amicable relation."[270] An understanding of *amicitia* as a union that transcends political affiliations to encompass

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[263] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, trans. William A. Falconer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), ix. 31, p. 142: "sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus."

[264] Peter Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 352. cf . David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 123 (Brunt quoted by Konstan).

[265] Brunt, p. 367. cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 123 (Brunt quoted by Konstan).

[266] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 123.

[267] Peter Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, p. 356. cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, pp. 123-124.

[268] Brunt, p. 354. cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 124. See Cicero's *De Amicitia* XXVI and *Partitiones oratoriae* 88 for the relation between *amor* and *amicitia*.

[269] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* trans. William A. Falconer, XXVII, p. 207: "For it is love (*amor*), from which the word 'friendship' (*amicitia*) is derived, that leads to the establishing of goodwill."

personal ties between *amici* will henceforth be assumed. Of course, during the political instability that leads up to and follows Caesar's assassination, Cicero associates friendship with matters of honor and loyalty to the state.[271] But even during such unstable times when he is most aware of the interplay between friendship and politics, Cicero never reduces friendship to a union grounded in mere utilitarianism. This truth is evident in his most serious and complete meditation on friendship, the *De Amicitia* (44-43 BC), a work that coincides with the assassination of Julius Caesar and the outbreak of civil war (44-43 BC). [272]

I limit my discussion of *amicitia* to the term defined by Cicero's discourse on friendship, the *De Amicitia*, for it is here that Dante finds the seeds for his own understanding of friendship.[273] The goal Cicero sets for himself is to write on the topic of friendship: *sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia*.[274] The fictional frame that he creates for his work is as follows: a few days after the sudden death of Scipio Minor (129 B.C.), Laelius and his two sons-in-law, Quintus Mucius Scaevola and Gaius Fannius, discuss the topic of friendship. It is a dialogue that Cicero, while still a young man, had heard around the year 90 B.C. from the elder Roman lawyer Scaevola, his mentor and instructor in Roman law. The unexpected death of Scipio Africanus provides the opportunity for Laelius to remember his friend's noble character and to

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[270] Peter Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, p. 381. cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 124.

[271] Cicero, *De off*. 3.43-6; Cicero, *Letter to Cn. Pompeius Magnus;* David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 131; P. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, p. 381.

[272] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 130.

[273] Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, II xii 3, p. 121: "e misimi a leggere quello non conosciuto libro di Boezio, nel quale, cattivo e discacciato, consolato s'avea. E udendo ancora che Tullio scritto avea un altro libro, nel quale, trattando de l'Amistade, avea toccate parole de la consolazione di Lelio, uomo eccellentissimo, ne la morte di Scipione amico suo, misimi a leggere quello."

reflect on the merits of friendship. Laelius considers himself most fortunate to have known Scipio both in private and public.[275]

Critics differ over the Greek influences and sources for the composition of the *De Amicitia*. For Diogenes Laertius and Aulus Gellius the primary Greek influence is Theophrastus' treatise *On Philia*.[276] There is no doubt that, Aristotelian influences permeate the *De Amicitia*. Whatever its sources and influences, the *De Amicitia* is unique in its own right. It abounds in originality of thought, style, and form, presenting a clear and comprehensive study of friendship. Fritz-Arthur Steinmetz, who insists that Cicero's primary source for his treatise on friendship was the Stoic Panaetius, recognizes that the discussion of violence against the state (*De Amicitia*, 36-44) is unique.[277] A discourse on friendship is seen as a most noble endeavor, one that should be reserved for the most skilled philosophers.[278] Laelius urges Scaevola and Gaius Fannius to value friendship above all other good things, for it is a natural human experience and it is indispensable for man's happiness in troubled times as well as during fortunate moments.[279]

Similar to Aristotelian friendship, Ciceronian friendship is grounded in virtue: *sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest*.[280] Friendship exists among good men, who are loyal, just, generous, and who are

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[274] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, i. 5, p. 113: "in this book I have written as a most affectionate friend to a friend on the subject of friendship."
[275] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, iv. 14-16, p. 122, p. 124.
[276] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 132.
[277] Konstan, p. 131. Konstan notes that, for Fritz-Arthur Steinmetz the inspiration for Cicero's discussion on violence against the state derives from contemporary circumstances and from his communication with Gaius Matius, a partisan of Cicero.
[278] Cicero, *De* Amicitia, v. 17, p. 127.
[279] Cicero, *De* Amicitia, v. 17, p. 127.
[280] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, vi. 21, p. 130: "but this very virtue is the parent and preserver of friendship and without virtue friendship cannot exist at all."

ruled by their passions.[281] Their actions are dictated neither by passions nor whims, but by what their nature dictates as good. In Cicero, as in Aristotle, friendship is linked to his system of ethics: *Virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat*.[282] One way in which friendship can thus be distinguished from other types of relationships is to determine whether it marks the union between good and morally upright men. Complete friendship is desired for itself. It is a union grounded in virtue and it arises from an altruistic desire to give of oneself selflessly and completely: *Virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea quae summa sunt pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret.*[283] Accordingly, friends value and seek each other's company because they love and admire their virtuous character. Friendship among good men is stable and constant since grounded in character. Friendship that is grounded in virtue will outlive even death: *Mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque vivet; virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae exstincta non est*.[284] Scipio still lives in the memory of Laelius, his friend. It was his virtue that Laelius loved most of all. By contrast, friendship grounded in pleasure, profit, or power, is unstable and short lived since it relies on changing realities. These unions collapse as soon as the advantage, power or pleasure is removed: *Nam si utilitas conglutinaret amicitias, eadem commutata*

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[281] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, v. 19, p. 128.
[282] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xxvii. 100, p. 207: "Virtue, my dear Gaius Fannius, and you, my dear Quintus Mucius, Virtue, I say, both creates the bond of friendship and preserves it."
[283] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xxii. 83, p. 191: "Friendship was given to us by nature as the handmaid of virtue, not as a comrade of vice; because virtue cannot attain her highest aims unattended, but only in union and fellowship with another."
[284] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xxvii. 102, p. 209: "For me, indeed, though he was suddenly snatched away, Scipio still lives and will always live; for it was his virtue that caused my love and that is not dead."

dissolveret; sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt.[285]

The question arises whether friendship is a union of similarity or difference. Nature is such that it attracts and desires that which is like itself. For Cicero, as for Aristotle, good men are necessarily attracted to other good men in a spirit of mutual goodwill and affection.[286] Each friend seeks to unite with another in a bond that is both good and natural. Complete in themselves, virtuous men seek each other from a natural desire to love and to give of themselves. Advantage and material gain are foreign to complete friendship, a union grounded in virtue. [287] Laelius hopes that his sons-in-law value virtue without which friendship could not exist: *Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem; vos autem hortor ut ita virtutem locetis* (*sine qua amicitia esse non potest*) *ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis*.[288] Since virtue is the parent of friendship, in valuing virtue one will also value friendship above all other goods.

Apart from virtue, another essential attribute of Ciceronian friendship is goodwill. While other types of relationships may exist in the absence of goodwill, friendship cannot.[289] If goodwill is removed from friendship the very nature of friendship

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[285] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* ix. 32, p. 145: "For on the assumption that advantage is the cement of friendships, if advantage were removed friendship would fall apart; but since nature is unchangeable, therefore real friendships are eternal."

[286] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* xiii. 50, p. 161: "Quid? Si illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse quod ad se rem ullam tam illiciat et tam trahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo, concedetur profecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant asciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura. Nihil est enim appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura" (p. 161).

[287] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* xiv. 51, p. 163.

[288] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xxvii. 104, p. 211: "This is all that I had to say about friendship; but I exhort you both so to esteem virtue (without which friendship cannot exist), excepting virtue, you will think nothing more excellent than friendship."

[289] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, v. 20, p. 128: "Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet."

is altered.[290] Moreover, in contrast to other types of natural human relationships, friendship always unites two, or, at most, a few people.[291] Cicero echoes Aristotle in his claim that good men are few, and since time is needed to grow familiar with each other, friendship of good people is rare.[292] Cicero further echoes Aristotle in the belief that while it is difficult to feel affection and goodwill toward a multitude of people, it is more difficult to establish close contact with a great number and be in accord with them about crucial matters both of a secular and the spiritual nature.

These preliminary remarks concerning the attributes and conditions of friendship lead Laelius to his definition of friendship: *Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio, qua quidem haud scio an excepta sapentia nil quicquam melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum.*[293] Here again, one hears echoes of Aristotle's ideas on friendship. Aristotle and Cicero stress the importance of goodwill and virtue in relation to friendship. Both philosophers note the innumerable advantages of friendship, during fortunate and unfortunate times. Both value friendship as the highest form of good. All other forms of the good, riches, power, good health, and sensual pleasure, are unstable and short lived. Friendship alone remains stable since it is grounded in the virtuous character. While all other goods are devoted to a single end, riches to wealth, public position to power, health

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[290] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, v. 20, p. 128.
[291] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* v. 20, p. 128.
[292] Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156 b25, p. 123: "These kinds of friendships are likely to be rare, since such people are few. Moreover, they need time to grow accustomed to each other; for, as the proverb says, they cannot know each other before they have shared the traditional peck of salt, and they cannot accept each other or be friends until each appears lovable to the other and gains the other's confidence." Aristotle here envisions friendship involving good people.
[293] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, vi. 20, p. 130: "For friendship is nothing other than an accord in all things, human and divine, conjoined with mutual goodwill and affection, and I am inclined to think that, with the exception of wisdom, no better thing has been given to man by the immortal gods."

to the freedom of physical pain, and pleasures to sensual gratification, friendship alone encompasses a multitude of ends. Cicero concludes that a life without friends is a life not worth living:

> *Principio qui potest esse vita vitalis, ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescit? Quid dulcius quam habere quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? Qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui illis aeque ac tu ipse gauderet*? [294]

Friendship must be valued for itself. It alleviates the most painful calamity and enriches the most rewarding experience. Friendship provides all that is denied to us by life itself. With friendship the poor find wealth, the needy find solace, and the weak find strength. Friends are good men similar in virtue, loving and treasuring each other for their character. A friend places the well-being and interest of his friend before and above his own. He revels in the friend's success and shares in his misfortune as if it were his own. Similar in virtue, friends share similar values regarding important matters. In this sense, a friend is a reflection of oneself. The bond between friends is such that death itself cannot destroy it, for a friend though absent or deceased lives in the loving memory and sweet recollection of his friend. [295] Because of its crucial role in the private and public realm, friendship may be understood as a primary good in the universe. Order and stability are often accepted as the necessary components of a civilized and cultured society, and both are established by means of friendship. Single households and entire cities are quick to surrender and even crumble under the duress of conflict: *Quod si*

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[294] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* vi. 22, p. 131: "In the first place, how can life be what Ennius calls "the life worth living," if it does not repose on the goodwill of a friend?….For friendship adds a brighter radiance to prosperity and lessens the burden of adversity by dividing and sharing it."
[295] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* vii. 23, p. 133.

exemeris ex rerum natura benevolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri quidem cultus permanebit.[296] Friendship establishes stability and brings accord within households, cities, and the universe.

After having reflected upon the various benefits of friendship, Laelius begins to reflect on whether it arises from need and weakness or from plentitude and strength. Do friends seek each other from some form of deficiency or weakness, so that each takes from the other what he lacks while providing that which the other needs? [297] Do they seek each other from a surplus of good and from a natural desire to share and give of themselves? [298] He concludes that the desire for friendship arises from man's natural inclination to unite himself in a loving bond with his friend, rather than from a self-centered concern for profit: *Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura*.[299] In addition to this natural desire to love, friendship is grounded in man's desire for virtue. Both animals and humans have a natural impulse to provide for and protect their offspring.[300] However, man's natural impulse to love virtue inspires him to seek the company of others similar to himself: *Nihil est enim virtute amabilius, nihil quod magis alliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter*

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[296] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* vii. 23, p. 135:"But if you should take the bond of goodwill out of the universe no house or city could stand, nor would even the tillage of the fields abide.…For what house is so strong, or what state so enduring that it cannot be utterly overthrown by animosities and division?"
[297] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, vii. 26, p. 136.
[298] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, vii. 26, p. 138.
[299] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* viii. 26-27, p. 139: "Wherefore it seems to me that friendship springs rather from nature than from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford."
[300] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, viii. 27, p. 139.

virtutem et probitatem etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus.[301] In instances where man's natural instinct to love the good is received with mutual affection, goodwill, and recognition, the bond is strengthened and flourishes into friendship.[302]

Cicero considers the conditions or circumstances under which friendship may change, or cease to exist. It is his belief that a friendship which continues till the end of life is truly a rare occurrence.[303] Often, friendship ceases to exist when the relationship ceases to be mutually advantageous or when the friends no longer share similar political viewpoints.[304] It may be the case that a friend's character changes as a result of adversity, tribulations, and old age.[305] In such an instance the friendship may also vanish.[306] In considering the circumstances under which friends have both the right and the obligation to dissolve their relationship, Laelius is unequivocal. When a friend implores one to commit dishonorable deeds and particularly those against the state, then one is obliged to sever ties of friendship.[307] Under no circumstance should one commit an unjust or evil deed on behalf of a friend, particularly if the deed is directed against the Republic: *ut ne quis concessum putet amicum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi*.[308] According to Cicero, one has the moral obligation to withdraw from friends who are

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[301] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* viii, 28, p. 139: "For there is nothing more lovable than virtue, nothing that more allures us to affection, since on account of their virtue and uprightness we feel a sort of affection even for those whom we have never seen."
[302] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* ix. 29, p. 141.
[303] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, ix. 33, p. 144
[304] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, ix. 33, p. 144.
[305] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* ix. 33, p. 144.
[306] Cicero, *De Amicitia,* ix. 33, p. 145.
[307] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xii, 40, p. 151: "Haec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpis nec faciamus rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae."
[308] Cicero, *Da Amicitia*, xii. 43, p. 154: "so that no one may think it permissible to follow even a friend when waging war against his country."

plotting against the Republic.[309] A friend must dare to give advice with frankness, and if the occasion demands it even with sternness.[310] Having the friend's well-being in mind, one should do for a friend and ask of him only what is honorable.[311] Committing an immoral deed in the name of friendship means forsaking the friendship. In committing a dishonorable deed one is forsaking the virtue upon which the friendship itself was founded. Since the friendship was grounded in virtue, it is difficult to maintain the friendship once the virtue has been forsaken.[312] In such instances one would be asking the friend to dismiss the very foundation upon which the friendship was built.

This idea that one ought not to expect anything bad from friends can be traced to Aristotle.[313] The element of patriotism in friendship, however, is unique to Cicero. In considering those circumstances that may alter friendship Cicero, as Aristotle,[314] identifies change in character, change in interest, change in fortune, old age, illness as situations that may alter or destroy friendship. Unlike Aristotle, however, Cicero adds disagreement over political sides and disloyalty to the republic.[315] Konstan observes well: "The most telling indication, however of Cicero's concern with patriotism is the vigor with which he denies that loyalty to friends can ever justify rebelling against the state."[316] Konstan notes that, Laelius is shocked that Gaius Blossius Cumanus would have been willing even to set fire to the Capitol upon the request of his friend Tiberius

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[309] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xii. 42, p. 154.
[310] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xii. 42, p. 154.
[311] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xiii. 44, p. 154: "Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem dum rogemur."
[312] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xi. 38, p. 148.
[313] Aristotle, *NE* 8.8, 1159 b5, p. 223: "They neither request nor provide assistance that requires base actions, but, you might even say, prevent this."
[314] Aristotle, *NE* 9.3. 1165 b13-22, p. 244.
[315] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 131. cf. Cicero, *De Amicitia* 21.77.
[316] Konstan, p. 131.

Gracchus: "Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris." [317] As Konstan observes, if one is to account for Cicero's politicized definition of friendship, one is to look at the civil and political turmoil of his time, civil wars and tyrranicide.[318] For Cicero, one of the most serious crimes is a crime against one's own country. No one should plead defense of evil deeds against the Republic on account of friendship.[319] For Cicero, loyalty toward one's friend is never an excuse for waging war against one's country (*contra patriam*).[320] Of course, Cicero lived in the midst of political turmoil and social disorder. He could not rule out the possibility that friends would demand dishonorable deeds from each other. [321]

From a study of the *De Amicitia* it becomes clear that in many ways Cicero's understanding of friendship echoes that of Aristotle. For both, friendship is a unique bond grounded in goodwill, virtue and reason. It is a union by means of which man reaches happiness, actualization and perfection of himself. Both understand friendship as a union among men alike in virtue, men who love each other in themselves and who love each other for their essential qualities. For both, friendship is to be understood in relation to the morally upright character and the rational life. Life without friends is understood as a life not worth living. The failure to rush to a friend's assistance, particularly in times of need, is interpreted by both as the absence of goodwill. Finally, both interpret friendship as an activity that leads to the moral and rational life.

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[317] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xi. 37, p. 148. For Cicero there is no justification for sinning on behalf of a friend. Since one's virtue was the reason for the friendship, it is difficult to maintain the friendship once the virtue has been abandoned the virtue. cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 131.

[318] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World,* p. 132.

[319] Cicero, *De* Amicitia, xii. 40, p. 151.

[320] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 132, cf. *De Amicitia* 11.36.

Notwithstanding these similarities, there are major points of divergence between the two worth noting. Perhaps the most crucial difference is Cicero's emphasis on the relationship between friendship and patriotism. Another difference is what Karl Vossler views as a difference regarding their respective notion of righteousness and justice. Vossler points out that while Aristotle and Cicero both link justice to the political and social community, Cicero adds a personal and metaphysical aspect to Aristotle's political interpretation:

> It was Cicero who gave to the political and social ideal of righteousness of Aristotle a personal, metaphysical, and essentially Stoical foundation. This is, as it seems to me, the most valuable contribution made by Cicero, and is contained in his concept of duty (*officium*).[322]

Clearly, for both Aristotle and Cicero the righteous man is the good citizen who extends himself toward his neighbor, coming to his assistance with affection and self-less benevolence. By comparison, however, Cicero's conception of justice seems more encompassing, for it extends outside of the political community to embrace even the non-citizen and slave:

> So Cicero's conception of justice includes more than the modern one, but it also embraces more than Aristotle's definition. The latter insists on justice only within the political community. Toward those who stand outside of it, gods and slaves, there can, strictly speaking, be no injustice. Cicero, on the other hand, expressly demands justice not only for his enemies, and, in a certain sense, for the gods, but even for the slaves. [323]

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[321] Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World,* p. 133, cf. Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xii. 40, p. 150: "Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae. Deflexit iam aliquantulum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum."
[322] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: An Introduction to Dante and His Times*, vol. 1, p. 203.
[323] Vossler, pp. 203-204.

It is precisely in this connection between justice and the ethical good that Cicero comes a step closer to the Christian notion of justice with its purely ethical interpretation. And in this personal understanding of justice that Cicero comes a step closer to the Christian notion of friendship, understood as a form of brotherly affection and as *caritas*:

> Let us not forget that even toward the humblest members of human society, justice must be observed. It is a sound principle that they are to be regarded as hirelings; that is, we are to require their service, and must also give them due recompense. [324]

According to Vossler, with the assistance of Cicero, the Aristotelian concept of justice finds fulfillment and completion in Dante:

> Dante completed, with the aid of Cicero, the Aristotelian conception of justice. From Aristotle he accepts the division of all acts of injustice into two classes: those which are committed in passion (*incontinenza*) and those inspired by malice (*malizia)*….When he further assumes, as we recalled above, that human violence and even to some extent human deceit, may offend not only our fellow men but also God, Nature, and our own reason--he then comes much closer to Cicero's conception of justice than to Aristotle's.[325]

Accordingly, in his morality Dante is indebted to Cicero for having "distinguished what is ethically *good* from that which is politically *profitable* by inserting between them legal right as the *political good*." [326] Whether it be the Aristotelian justice, understood in relation to the political good and well-being of the community, or the more encompassing metaphysical Ciceronian justice, the truth is that a common ground for both is the relationship between justice and morality, morality and friendship. The ideal of moral excellence is what links justice to friendship. A friend is a just person, someone who lives according to the norms of the moral life. A friend does not deceive nor bring harm

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[324] Cicero. *De* Officiis, trans. William A. Falconer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), I, XIII, 41 (Cicero quoted by David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, 1997).
[325] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, p. 204.

neither to himself nor to another. While it is true that one can imagine cases where the presence of justice does not result in friendship, it is never the case that friendship proper precludes justice. Where there is friendship there is also justice, in this manner friendship can become the means by which justice is actualized.

When Aristotle discusses friendship in relation to the morally good life, he is linking friendship to justice as it relates to the *polis.* Friendship is a unifying force within the political community that is the *polis*. Cicero also links friendship to justice and to the morally good life, but unlike Aristotle he extends it outside of the *polis*. He envisions a more encompassing and perhaps even a more universal notion of justice, one that would extend friendship to one's enemy, to a non-citizen, or to slave.[327] As with Aristotle, Cicero's notion of justice bears great weight on his notion of friendship. But for Cicero friendship is possible even among the humblest members of human society. Cicero's influence on the Christian notion of friendship would seem to lie in his extension of justice and benevolence toward all men. It must be argued that, Ciceronian friendship bridges distances of rank. This notion is conveyed by Laelius as he asserts that a superior friend must be a peer to one's inferior:

> *Sed maximum est in amicitia superiorem parem esse inferiori. Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis*.[328]

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[326] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, p. 203.
[327] Cicero, *De Officiis,* trans. William A. Falconer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), i, xiii, 41.
[328] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xix. 69, p. 178: "But it is of the utmost importance in friendship that superior and inferior should stand on equality. For oftentimes a certain pre-eminence does exist, as was that of Scipio in what I may call 'our set.' But he never affected any superiority over Philius, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or over his other friends of a lower rank." cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 135.

The superior friend should put himself on the same level as the inferior, [329]and at times even lower himself in order to lift up their inferior: *Quam ob rem, ut ei, qui superiores sunt, submittere se debent in amicitia, sic quodam modo inferiores extollere*.[330] In the same way that the superior friend places himself on the level of his inferior, the inferior should not be upset if the superior friend surpasses him in intellect, fortune, or position.[331] Konstan observes that in the *De Amicitia* Cicero tells stories of princes who even after their true identity had been revealed, continued to show *caritas* toward the shepherds who had raised them as their own.[332] What is refreshingly new in Ciceronian friendship is the desire to transcend political barriers and social distances through the extension of generosity (*humanitas*) and fraternal affection, even to the most unfortunate and alienated members of society.

It may be worth noting that Cicero's notion of justice, an entity intrinsically linked to ethical morality and independent from practical and political concerns, extends to his notion of nobility. For Cicero, as for Boethius and the Stoics, nobility is to be found neither in possessions nor in birth, rather it resides in inner worth of the soul.[333] As Aristotle and Cicero, Boethius understands nobility to reside neither in lineage nor in material possession.[334] Boethius diverges from both Aristotle and Cicero, however, not in the definition of nobility, but in its source. He traces the originating source of nobility

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[329] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xx. 71, p. 180.
[330] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, xx. 72, p. 181: "As, therefore, in friendship, those who are superior should lower themselves, so, in a measure, should they lift up their inferiors."
[331] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 20.71, p. 180: "Ut igitur ei, qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari." cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classsical World*, p. 135.
[332] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 19.70. cf. David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 135.
[333] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, p. 200.
[334] Vossler, p. 200.

to God and not to man. [335] For Boethius that which is good and noble in man, his soul, is linked to its source, God. Accordingly, it is no longer sufficient to love a friend in and for himself. While virtue and nobility reside in a man's soul, the origin of both resides outside of man: in God. And God lies at the center of Christian friendship. The classical understanding of friendship as a union grounded in virtue and character, is transformed to a union grounded in the love of Christ. Man no longer loves his friend for in himself, rather he loves him for his love of God. Friendship transcends the limits of human reason and virtue to embrace divine Wisdom and divine Love, understood as *caritas.*

Vossler believes that it is from the Stoics, from Cicero, from Seneca, and from Boethius, "that Dante borrows the weapon with which to oppose the human, all too human, value set on riches, noble birth, and good fortune."[336] According to Vossler, Dante perceived a "natural bridge"[337] between the classical notion of virtue and Christian morality.[338] If Vossler is correct in his assertion, it follows that Dante would also perceive a natural link between classical friendship and Christian friendship. This point will be explored further in the chapters that follow. A discussion of Christian friendship in relation to *caritas* is now appropriate.

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[335] Boethius, *Consolation of* Philosophy, trans. V.E. Watts (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 23.
[336] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: An Introduction to Dante and His Times*, p. 200. cf. *Convivio*, IV, 12; *Paradoxa*, I, 6; *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, Book II, Metr. II; *Inferno,* VII, 64-66. Vossler refers to *Convivio*, IV, 12. where Dante translates from Cicero's *Paradoxa*, I, 6. Vossler points out that in the same passage Dante also appeals to the authority of Seneca and Boethius. The underlying message in all of the passages seems to be one and the same, namely, man's thirst for happiness cannot be quenched through the possession of material wealth and political power.
[337] Vossler, p. 201.
[338] Vossler, pp. 200-201: "He seems actually to have formed the conviction that a natural bridge united this antique virtue with Christian morality: 'Be not a miser nor a spendthrift; be the master of gold, and let not thyself be mastered by it'-these, he believes, are the principles on which the best men of antiquity nourished a Christian life."

CHAPTER THREE

CHRISTIAN FRIENDSHIP

> **…**beatus qui amat te, et amicum in te, et inimicum propter te. solus enim nullum carum amittit, cui omnes in illo cari, qui non amittitur.
> (St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, IX)

Following the earlier discussion of classical friendship, it remains to be shown how classical friendship was transformed in the work of Christian writers. With this goal in mind, what follows is a discussion of Christian writers who acted as bridges between Aristotle and Cicero, on the one hand, and Dante, on the other. The ideas of Boethius, St. Augustine, and St. Aquinas will be explored and related to Dante's notion of friendship. In the same way that in the classical notion of virtue Dante finds the foundation of Christian morality,[1] in the classical notion of friendship he finds the foundation of his own theory of friendship.

It is in any case convenient to begin with Anicius Boethius, the Roman philosopher who occupies a central position at the crossroads between the classical and medieval worlds. As V. E. Watts maintains, Boethius belonged to an era in which ancient classical culture had become integrated into Christianity, but was still in many ways a distinct phenomenon, not completely immersed in it.[2] The historical importance of Boethius is great: the spread and survival of Aristotle in the West was in large part due to Boethius' translation of Aristotle's logic, his own commentaries on it and others of

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[1] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, trans. William C. Lawton (New York: Hartcourt Brace, 1929), vol. 1, p. 204.
[2] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. V. E. Watts (London: Penguin Books, 1969), Introduction, p. 30.

Aristotle's works. In his application of Aristotelian logic and methods to theological questions Boethius may be seen as a precursor of Scholasticism.[3] C. S. Lewis refers to Boethius as "the divine popularizer,"[4] while Helen Wadell views the *Consolation* as "the book of most serene and kindly wisdom that the Middle Ages knew."[5]

That the *Consolation* inspired writers, translators, and commentators of the Middle Ages is a well established fact.[6] Richard Morris notes well that it was Boethius who perhaps more than any other philosopher influenced Medieval writers: "No philosopher was so bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of Middle-Age writers as Boethius. Take up what writer you will, and you find not only the sentiments, but the very words of the distinguished old Roman."[7] Boethius more than any other thinker provided the Medieval philosopher and theologian with a comprehensive world view.[8] V. E. Watts attributes the popularity of the *Consolation* to its broad philosophical nature and to Boethius' attempt to escape a strict and formal philosophical inquiry.[9] Scholars such as Bruno of Corvey and John of Salisbury have seen the *Consolation* as the fruit of a pagan world-view, while others choose to focus on Christian influences. A philosophical protreptic toward God,[10] the *Consolation* is unique in its attempt to synthesize pagan

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[3] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, p. 13.
[4] C. S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 46.
[5] Helen Waddell, *The Wandering Scholars* (London: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 26.
[6] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, p. 7.
[7] *Chaucer's Translation of Boethius de Consolatione Philosophiae*, ed. R. Morris (Early English Text Society, Extra Series V, 1868), p. 2.
[8] W. P. Ker, *The Dark Ages* (London: Heinemann, 1923), pp. 107 ff.
[9] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, p. 8.
[10] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. P. G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Introduction, xxxi: "Thus the *Consolation* is consolation in the wider sense of philosophical protreptic or exhortation—not in the Aristotelian sense of a protreptic to philosophy to satisfy that intellectual curiosity by which 'all men by nature desire to know', but 'a protrepic towards God', a philosophical exhortation with a specifically religious message." For the Aristotelian idea that all men by nature desire knowledge, see the initial remark of the *Metaphysics.* For an understanding of the *Consolation* as a 'Protreptic towards God,' see E. K. Rand, HSCP (1904), 8. For this section of his Introduction P.G. Walsh gives homage to

structure and Christian context. Whether one chooses to focus on pagan or Christian influences in the *Consolation*, the fact remains that in the presence of death Boethius turns to reason rather than faith for assistance. It is to philosophy, rather than divine grace, that Boethius entrusts his salvation. While true good and happiness is found in God alone, the ascent to God occurs through philosophy. Perhaps it is precisely in his attempt to reach God by means of philosophy that Boethius is drawn both close to and away from Christianity. In his reverence for God and philosophy, faith and reason, and in the distinction he poses between these last two, Boethius is both a defender of pagan culture and a precursor of Christianity. While the basic scheme of the *Consolation* has been seen as Platonic, with comparisons made to the ascent of the soul in the allegory of the Cave in the seventh book of the *Republic,*[11] the soul's ascent to God and the doctrine of recollection are indicative of Christian influences. For instance, it is not far-fetched to draw an analogy between the doctrine of recollection in Book III, understood as the inward turning of the soul to its inner light, and the Christian belief of the soul's natural desire to reunite itself with its source of origin, that is God. Men may have a natural desire for the good, but while the pagan understands the good in relation to reason and virtue, the Christian understands it in relation to God. Ultimately, whether pagan or Christian, it is a moral error that leads man away from the good.[12] The notion that a moral error leads man astray along the wrong path is a crucial theme in Dante's

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Anna Crabbe's essay, 'Literary Design in the *De consolatione philosophiae*', in Boethius, ed. Gibson, ch. 10.

[11] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Introduction, p. 22

[12] Boethius, *The Consolation,* Book III, 2, p. 79: "For the desire for true good is planted by nature in the minds of men, only error leads them astray toward false goods."

Commedia. Both Boethius and Dante are initially sidetracked and their minds clouded by false goods.

That Dante had first-hand knowledge of Boethius is a fact that he himself establishes in the *Convivio.* He asserts that after the death of Beatrice Boethius' *Consolation* along with Cicero's *De Amicitia* were sources of comfort and inspiration for him as he took up the study of philosophy: *E misimi a leggere quello non conosciuto da molti libro di Boezio, nel quale, cattivo e discacciato, consolato s'avea…*[13] The *Commedia* abounds with echoes from Boethius. Virgil's discourse on the nature of Fortune in *Inferno* VII, for instance, is reminiscent of the first two chapters of Book 2 of the *Consolation*. The Lady Philosophy explains to Boethius that while men who suffer tend to blame Fortune for their misfortune, the truth is that they bring misfortune upon themselves by loving false goods: fallible and fleeting things. In *Inferno* VII, Dante echoes and accepts Philosophy's message as mere facts of life.[14] In the *Convivio* (IV.xi.6-8), Fortune is presented in negative light: she acts randomly and distributes goods among men according to her whim. By contrast, in the *Commedia* Fortune is presented in favorable light, she is provident (*Inf.* 7, 86).[15] She turns her "wheel" in bliss (*Inf.* 7, 96).[16]

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[13] Dante Alighieri, Convivio, ed. Giorgio Inglese (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 1999), Bk. II, XII, 3, 5, p. 121. Dante asserts a direct acquaintance with Boethius' *Consolation of Philossophy* and Cicero's *De Amicitia* : "I set myself to read that book by Boethius, in which he consoled himself about his anxiety and punishment. And then, hearing that Cicero had written another book dealing with 'Friendship', in which he had reported words of consolation of the excellent Laelius at the death of Scipio, I set myself to read that too…so I who sought to console myself found out not only a remedy for my tears but also the words of author, sciences and books " (p. 121).

[14] For Dante's ideas on Fortune see Vincenzo Cioffari, *The Conception of Fortune and Fate in the Works of Dante* (Cambridge: Dante Society of Cambridge, 1940), Gianluigi Toja, "La Fortuna," *Studi Danteschi* 42 (1965), pp. 247-60.

[15] Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), VII, 86: "questa provede, giudica, e persegue." See Hollander's note to verses 62-96.

[16] Dante, *Inferno*, VII, 96: "volve sua spera e beata si gode." See Hollander's note to verses 62-96.

That Dante held Boethius in high regard is also made clear by Boethius' privileged position among the twelve lights in the heaven of the Sun and is referred to: *l'anima santa che `l mondo fallace / fa manifesto a chi di lei ben ode* [17] (*Par.* 10,125). It has not gone unnoticed that the *Paradiso* ends with an echo of Boethius' *caelo imeritans amor--l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle*.[18] The entire journey could be understood in relation to Boethius' theory of the soul's ascent homewards to God.[19] A resemblance in scheme is evident in both works, with the gradual ascent of the soul from darkness to light, from false good to supreme good, from misery to complete happiness. In both cases vision and love descend from on high in the figure of a woman, and it leads man to perfection and happiness. The soul turns inwardly to witness the inward light that is a reflection of the true light, God. [20] Philosophy and Beatrice both descend from on high and lead Boethius and Dante respectively to truth.

If the importance placed on philosophy in Boethius' *Consolation* mirrors pagan thought, the emphasis on love mirrors Christian dogma. In its exaltation of love as the ultimate moving force in the universe the *Consolation* represents Christian ideology. Needless to say, the exposition of love in the *Consolation* is also crucial to the idea of friendship. In Book II, while singing its praises, Philosophy links friendship to love. Love strengthens the bond of friendship and bridges the gap between the human and the

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[17] Dante Alighieri, *Paradiso*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Doubleday, 2007), X, 125, p. 238: "the holy soul who makes plain / the world's deceit to one who listens well."
[18] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Introduction, p. 8; cf. *Cons.* II poem 8 l. 29; cf. *Par.* XXXIII, 145.
[19] Boethius, Introduction, p. 8
[20] Boethius, Book III, 2, p. 80: "In spite of a clouded memory, the mind seeks its own good, though like a drunkard it cannot find the path home" cf. Dante, *Inferno*, I, 1-3 "Midway in the journey of our life/I came to myself in a dark wood,/for the straight way was lost."

divine. "Love who rules the sky" [21] promotes peace and unity among nations; it joins people in marriage and solidifies friendship.[22] Love establishes order and unity in the universe. Boethius's notion of love as the original cause of all things, and as that phenomenon to which all creation wishes to return, [23] is the seed of Dante's ideas on love. In his presentation of love as the ultimate moving force of the universe, Dante seems to echo Boethius. This influence is evident in the first and last lines of the *Paradiso*: *La gloria di colui che tutto move* [24] (*Par*. 1, 1) and *l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle* [25] (*Par*. 33, 145). For both Boethius and Dante ascent occurs because of the love, compassion, and friendship of a lady of sublime beauty and worth. But while lady Philosophy is an allegorical figure, Beatrice is a blessed lady, once a woman of flesh and blood, thus at once human and divine. Notwithstanding this difference, it is love that moves both ladies from on high to bring healing and assistance to their respective friend.[26] Both ladies act from selfless love. Each descends so that her friend may ascend to God. Each delivers her friend out of his state of "amnesia"[27] and guides him toward true vision and light. Both ladies are moved to compassion for the friend's suffering and

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[21] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Book II, 8, p. 77

[22] Boethius, Book II, 8, p. 77: "If Love relaxed the reins/All things that now keep peace/ Would wage continual war/The fabric to destroy/which motions beautiful./Love, too, holds peoples joined/By sacred bond of treaty,/And weaves the holy knot/ Of marriage's pure love./ Love promulgates the laws/ For friendship's faithful bond./ O happy race of men/ If Love who rules the sky/ Could rule your hearts as well!"

[23] Boethius, Book IV, poem 6, p. 142: "This is the love of which all things partake,/The end of good their chosen goal and close:/ No other way can they expect to last,/ Unless with love for love repaid they turn/And seek again the cause that gave them birth."

[24] Dante Alighieri, *Paradiso*, I, 1: "The glory of Him who moves all things."

[25] Dante, *Paradiso*, XXXIII, 145: "Love that moves the sun and the other stars."

[26] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Book I, 2, p. 38: "But it is time for healing, not lamenting."

[27] Boethius, Book I, 2, p. 38: "It is nothing serious only a touch of amnesia that he is suffering, the common disease of deluded minds. He has forgotten for a while who he is, but he will soon remember once he has recognized me. To make it easier for him I will wipe a little of the blinding cloud of worldly concern from his eyes."

come to share in it, thereby lessening the burden.[28] It is out of love that philosophy chides Boethius and that Beatrice chides Dante for having abandoned the right path toward God for the sake of false goods.[29]

While similarities and influences between the *Consolation* and the *Commedia* abound, the differences are equally if not more significant. Boethius chooses reason over faith: the ascent of the soul to God occurs directly by means of philosophy. He relies on the compassion of Lady Philosophy for his consolation rather than that of his fellow men. To the extent that it is grounded in a love of secular wisdom and of moral goodness, Boethius's friendship with lady Philosophy resembles *philia*. According to V. E. Watts, Boethius' thought closely adheres to the ancients whose doctrines he respected and upheld: "Boethius had not undergone the inner conversion of a Sidonius or an Ennodius: the ancient learning still preserved its hold upon him unimpaired."[30] In contrast to Boethius, the medieval Christian thinker turns to faith, belief and trust in God. The same importance that is assigned to philosophy in the *Consolation* is assigned to grace in the *Commedia*. In the *Commedia* ascent is a gift of grace achieved by means of revelation. Moreover, while Boethius' experience of divinity is direct, Dante experiences divinity

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[28] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy,* Book I, 3, p. 39: "Why, my child, should I desert you? Why should I not share your labour and the burden you have saddled with because of the hatred of my name?" cf. Dante, *Inferno* 2. 61-6, p. 28: "l'amico mio, e non de la ventura,/ne la diserta piaggia e` impedito/si` nel cammin, che volt'e` per paura;/e temo che non sia gia` si`smarrito,/ch'io mi sia tardi al soccorso levata,/per quell ch'i' ho di lui nel cielo udito." (Dante translated by G. Petrocchi)

[29] Boethius, Book I, 2, p. 38: "You are the man, are you not, who was brought up on the milk of my learning and fed on my own food until you reached maturity? I gave you arms to protect you and keep your strength unimpaired, but you threw them away." cf. Dante, *Purgatorio*, 33. 125-137, p. 750: "di mia seconda etade e mutai vita,/questi si tolse a me, e diesi altrui./Quando di carne a spirto era salita,/e bellezza e virtu` cresciuta m'era,/fu' io a lui men cara e men gradita;/e volse i passi suoi per via non vera,/imagini di ben seguendo false,/che nulla promession rendono intera./ Ne' l'impetrare ispirazion mi valse,/con le quali e in sogno e altrimenti/lo rivocai: si` poco a lui ne calse!/Tanto giu` cadde, che tutti argomenti/a la salute sua eran gia` corti,/fuor che mostrarli le perdute genti " (p. 750). (Dante translated by G. Petrocchi)

[30] Boethius, Introduction, p. 30.

through the mediation of friends such as Virgil and Beatrice. Except at the end, when he has earned the right to a direct, painful experience of it.

In light of these similarities and differences between Boethius and Dante, it may be pertinent to ask what precisely were Boethius ideas on friendship and how they influenced Dante's thought. It is well known that as in Plato and Aristotle, Boethius distinguishes those unions grounded in extrinsic attributes, such as power, wealth, and pleasure, from that union grounded in the intrinsic moral worth of a person: "And as for friendship, the purest kind is counted as a mark not of good fortune, but of moral worth, but all other friendship is cultivated for the sake of power and pleasure"[31] (*Consolation*, Book III, 2). Also as with Plato and Aristotle, Boethius understands that in most cases friendship is grounded in man's desire for mutable goods, in the desire for power, riches, and pleasure. While all men have a natural desire for happiness, most are side-tracked by their attraction to false goods.[32] Since power, riches, and pleasure are mere shadows of the true good, it is impossible to find perfect happiness in them.[33] Like his pagan predecessors, Boethius posits perfect friendship in relation to virtue and moral worth,[34] with the exception that he traces it back to the source of all good, God himself. Boethius takes the pagan and Stoics' emphasis on virtue back to its source of origin, God.[35] He diverges from their conception of virtue not in definition but in source. Like Aristotle and Cicero, he takes nobility and moral excellence to reside neither in lineage nor in

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[31] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy,* Book III, 2, p. 80.
[32] Boethius, Book III, 8, p. 91, 93.
[33] Boethius, Book III, 9, p. 96: "So that it is impossible to find happiness among these things which are thought to confer each of the desired states individually…Clearly, therefore, these things offer man only shadows of the true good, or imperfect blessings, and cannot confer true and perfect good."
[34] Boethius, Book III, 2, p. 80: "And as for friendship, the purest kind is counted as a mark not of good fortune, but of moral worth, but all other friendship is cultivated for the sake of power or pleasure."

possession, but unlike them he looks to God rather than to man for the source of both nobility and virtue.[36] While virtue and nobility are seen to reside in man's soul, the origin of both lies outside of himself; it lies with God. Since God is the source of all creation and since reason shows us that he is perfect good, true good and ultimate happiness reside in God.[37]

If happiness equals divinity, man's happiness is to be found in divinity.[38] While God is divine, man becomes divine by means of his proximity and participation in divinity.[39] Of course, while Boethius participates in divinity through philosophy, Dante participates in divinity through faith, grace, and revelation. In contrast to Boethius, whose philosophizing leads him to straight to God, Dante's experience of divinity is achieved through friends such as Virgil and Beatrice. If in the *Convivio* man's experience of divinity is posited in the secular world attainable through moral excellence, in the *Commedia* the experience of divinity transcends humanity and is attainable through divine grace.[40] While philosophy aids man in his journey toward God, it cannot on its own take man to God, for that is the work of grace and revelation. If friendship with Lady Philosophy in the *Consolation* and in the *Convivio* leads to the perfection of man's

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[35] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Book III, 10, p. 102: "While only God is so by nature, as many as you like may become so by participation."
[36] Boethius, Introduction, p. 8
[37] Boethius, Book III, 10, pp. 99-101: "It is the universal understanding of the human mind that God, the author of all things, is good…Reason shows that God is so good that we are convinced that His goodness is perfect. Otherwise he couldn't be the author of creation…it must be admitted that the supreme God is to the highest degree filled with supreme and perfect goodness. But we have agreed that perfect good is true happiness; so that it follows that true happiness is to be found in the supreme God…So that we have to agree that God is the essence of happiness."
[38] Boethius, Book III, 10, p. 102: "Since it is through the possession of happiness that people become happy, and since happiness is in fact divinity, it is clear that it is through the possession of divinity that they become happy."
[39] Boethius, Book III, 10, p. 102: "Each happy individual is therefore divine. While only God is so by nature, as many as you like may become so by participation."

character, friendship with Beatrice in the *Commedia* leads to the perfection of his soul. The *Convivio* adheres to Aristotle's definition of happiness in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: *Felicitade e` operazione secondo virtude in vita perfetta*." [41] In the *Commedia* complete happiness is related to man's spiritual perfection and is experienced in the heavens through the beatific vision of God. For Dante happiness that is grounded in earthly goods is limited and finite. The perfection of the Christian soul lies in a sanctifying grace that is attained with the aid of the divine virtues. Through grace, with the assistance of faith, hope, and charity, man rises above his human self and attains perfection: "Faith, hope, and charity transcend the human virtues, for they are virtues of a man insofar as he is made a sharer in divine grace."[42] In a manner similar to the ideas of classical friendship described earlier, Christian friendship aims to move beyond narrow particularity to reach perfection in universality. The difference is that in Christian friendship the movement beyond particularity is a movement beyond humanity and into divinity.

It is proper that a consideration of the classical literature of friendship take into account St. Augustine's *Confessions*, and especially its fourth book, in which a comprehensive study of friendship is enunciated. Undoubtedly, Augustine had an overwhelming impact on Christian attitudes toward friendship. As Peter Brown notes: "No thinker in the Early Church was so preoccupied with the nature of human friendship."[43] In an effort better to comprehend Augustine's influence on Dante's

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[40] Steven Botterill, *Dante and the Mystical Tradition Bernard of Clairvaux in the Commedia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 231.

[41] Dante, *Convivio*, IV, xvii, 8, p. 287: "E queste sono quelle che fanno l'uomo beato, o vero felice, ne la loro operazione, si` come dice lo Filosofo nel primo de l'*Etica* quando difinisce la Felicitade, dicendo che 'Felicitade e' operazione secondo virtude in vita perfetta'.'' Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* I, 9, 1099 b10-30.

[42] Thomas, Aquinas. *Summa Theologiae,* Ia, II ae, 58, 3 ad 3.

[43] Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. 41

thought, particular attention must be given to the ideas found in the fourth book of the *Confessions*. Crucial to Augustine's notion of friendship is the belief that God is the creator of all things and the source of all good, as a result of which all things must be loved in God. Augustine's notion of friendship is directly linked to the belief that God is the supreme good, ultimate truth and love. In Book IV of his *Confessions*, Augustine defines friendship as the union of two souls in a common goal in search of perfection and wisdom: a union of two hearts in the Holy Spirit, who is God. Since God is true love, a friend must be loved in God "and he who abides in love abides in God."[44] According to Augustine, friendship is a good and noble thing, but the love of a friend for his own sake is a perverse kind of love that is destined to failure. Since all earthly beings are transient and since God alone is immutable, friendship that is not grounded in the love of God is finite and incomplete.

Augustine's recollection of his childhood friend and of their union brings to mind the idea of classical friendship. This was a union grounded in their common interests [45] and in a friendship that was sweeter above all else in life. [46] When he loses his friend to an untimely death, Augustine is overcome by inconsolable grief and begins to hold his very existence in disdain.[47] That which once was the cause of much merriment is now the source of much suffering. Faced with this great loss, his only recourse is inconsolable

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[44] Letter quoted in Adele Fiske, "St. Augustine: Stages of Friendship," in *Friends and Friendship in The Monastic Tradition* (Cuernavaca: Centro Intercultural De Documentacion, 1970), 2-3.
[45] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. W. Watts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), IV, IV, p. 158: "cocta fervore parilium studiorum."
[46] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, IV, p. 158: "amicitia mea, suavi mihi super omnes suavitates illius vitae meae."
[47] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, IV, p. 160: "Quo dolore contenebratum est cor meum, et quid quid aspiciebam mors erat. et erat mihi patria supplicium, et paterna domus mira infelicitas."

despair [48] that leads to a desire and fear of death.[49] A part of himself dies with the death of his friend, for they were one soul in two bodies. [50] In referring to his friend as his other half, [51] Augustine follows in the tradition of classical friendship with the understanding of a friend as a mirror of oneself.[52]

After his conversion, Augustine regards this same friendship from an entirely new and an enlightened prospective. He comes to the conclusion that his friend was not a friend in the true sense of the word [53] (*Confessions*, IV, IV). Through faith Augustine arrives at the realization that there is no friendship in the absence of God. He comes to understand that to place one's happiness in the hands of an imperfect and finite being is a foolish blunder. [54] (*Confessions*, IV, VII). Augustine now regards his past grief as the result of his own fallacious reasoning. Mistakenly he had relied on the transient world for his happiness. [55] (*Confessions*, IV, VI). He now knows that a friend who is loved through God can never be lost, for God is eternal.[56] (*Confessions*, IV, IX). Friendship is a noble and good thing, provided that the friends love one another in God. [57] (*Confessions*,

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[48] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, p. IV, IV, 160: "Solus fletus erat dulcis mihi et successerat amico meo in deliciis animi mei."
[49] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, IV, p. 164: "et taedium vivendi erat in me gravissimum et moriendi metus."
[50] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, IV, p. 166: "animam illius unam fuisse animam in duobus corporibus."
[51] St. Augustine, *Confessions,* IV, IV, p. 166: "dimidium animae suae."
[52] Aristotle, *NE* 9.9. 1170b 5-8, p. 260: "The excellent person is related to his friend in the same way as he is related to himself, since a friend is another himself."
[53] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, IV, p. 156: "sed nondum erat sic amicus, quamquam ne tum quidem sic, uti est vera amicitia, quia non est vera, nisi cum eam tu agglutinas inter haerentes sibi caritate diffusa in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis."
[54] St. Augustine, *Confessions,* IV, VII, p. 166: "O dementiam nescientem diligere hominess humaniter! O stultum hominem immoderate humana patientem! Quod ego tunc eram."
[55] St. Augustine, *Confessions,* IV, VI, p. 164: "miser eram, et miser est omnis animus vinctus amicitia rerum mortalium, et dilaniatur, cum eas amittit, et tunc sentit miseriam, qua miser est et antequam amittat eas."
[56] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, IX, p. 172: "beatus qui amat te, et amicum in te, et inimicum propter te. Solus enim nullum carum amittit, cui omnes in illo cari, qui non amittitur…te nemo amittit, nisi qui dimittit."
[57] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, XII, p. 178: "si placent animae, in deo amentur, quia et ipsae mutabiles sunt et illo fixae stabiliuntur: alioquin irent et perirent."

IV, XII). God alone is immutable, and he alone deserves to be loved as an end. Moreover, since the source of the good that is loved in the friend is God, to love one's friend in himself is a misplaced love [58] (*Confessions*, IV, XII). Augustine's misery stemmed from having mistaken the source of good as man rather than God [59] (*Confessions*, IV, XV). Through faith he comes to understand that all good originates in God and returns to God, and that in loving the good in the other person one loves God. Since earthly virtues are mutable and unreliable, an attempt to trace the origin of virtue and the good in man rather than in God is a faulty decision that opens the door to vices. [60] Christians become ever so sceptical of the classical conception of friendship grounded in virtue. For Augustine, human virtues are deceptive and unreliable (*City of God* 19.25).

Although friendship is a good to be enjoyed for its own sake, it is finite and imperfect unless it looks and moves toward God.[61] Only in *caritas* can a friend be truly loved.[62] *Caritas* universalizes love, directing it to a community of individuals united in faith and solidarity in Christ: "In him therefore let them be loved; and draw unto him along with thee as many souls as though canst" [63] (*Confessions*, IV, IV). *Caritas* affords a hierarchy and accumulation of vision, grounded in humility. [64] This is the humility of Christ who died on the cross for the sake of humanity. It is also the humility of man, who accepts his own limitations in the face of ultimate truth. *Caritas* was manifested in its

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[58] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, XII, p. 180: "bonum, quod amatis, ab illo est: sed quantum est ad illum, bonum est et suave…quia iniuste amatur deserto illo quidquid ab illo est."
[59] St. Augustine, *Confessions,* IV, XV, p. 190: "non enim noveram neque didiceram…nec ipsam mentem nostram summum atque inconmutabile bonum."
[60] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 160; cf. Augustine, *City of God* 19.25. For the implicit contrast between civic virtue and Christian piety in Augustine see *Ep*. 86.1.
[61] Karl Jaspers, *Plato and Augustine,* trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Hartcourt Brace, 1957), p. 97.
[62] Jaspers, p. 96.
[63] St. Augustine, Confessions, IV, IV, p. 181: "in illo ergo amentur, et rape ad eum tecum quas potes."

most profound form by Christ himself who descended so that man could ascend to the Father.

The ascent of the soul home to God, or away from the transient to the intransient, is one of the major themes running throughout the *Confessions*. [65] (*Confessions,* I, I). In Book 13, 9 of the *Confessions* Augustine presents love as a weight that pulls the soul upward toward its resting place, *pondus amoris*.[66] He uses the metaphor of a flame whose weight pulls upward: if earthly concerns are weights pulling downward, away from God, love is a flame that pulls upward, toward Him. In contrast to the Aristotelian theory of *generatio,* or the proper activity of the soul's virtues toward perfection through reason, the movement of the Christian's soul toward perfection is achieved beyond the visible world, by means of grace and with the aid of the theological virtues.[67] Looking up toward God, Christian friendship is a union grounded in *caritas,* in the love of God. While man's final goal is the experience of supreme happiness and spiritual perfection in the heavens, his union with others will support and guide him on this journey. Reason by itself cannot lead man to ultimate truth. Ultimately, supreme truth cannot be attained solely by means of reason: assistance from faith and divine revelation are also necessary. [68] While most men seek friendship as a path toward happiness, not all men share the same definition of friendship and happiness. For Augustine all moral issues,

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[64] Marguerite Mills Chiarenza, "The Imageless Vision and Dante's '*Paradiso*,'" in *Dante*, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1986), p 86-87.
[65] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, I, I, p. 2: "tu excitas, ut laudare te delectet, quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te."
[66] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 163-164.
[67] F.C. Copleston, *Aquinas* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959), pp. 216-217.
[68] Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1966), pp. 16-17.

including friendship, rest on faith.[69] By contrast, in Aristotle and in Cicero friendship is a matter of reason rather than faith. For them trust in friendship is grounded in things seen and not in things unseen.[70] For Aristotle and for Cicero friendship is strengthened by shared activity in the secular world.

Throughout the fourth century, more and more one notes a distinction being drawn between Christian friendship and the classical notion of friendship, with a preference given to the term *caritas* to denote Christian affection.[71] St. Jerome, Augustine, and Basil use *caritas* and *agape* for the traditional *amicitia* and *philia.* They more and more understand friendship as a union of brotherhood grounded in man's faith in Christ.[72] In the late fourth century, in an effort to draw such a distinction, Paulinus of Nola applies the term *caritas* when speaking of the union among Christians, and reserves *amicitia* mostly for relationships of a strictly secular nature. Konstan notes that, even when using *amicitia* to denote Christian friendship, Paulinus goes to great lengths to differentiate it from its classical predecessor.[73] In a letter written to Pammachius, Paulinus defines Christian friendship as a "brotherhood of souls."[74] He further defines Christian friendship in relation to Christ and exalts its merits of divine origin and eternal nature. Unlike classical friendship, Christian friendship defies time limits. It introduces a new type of union, one grounded less on reason, personal merit, and moral excellence than on charity and divine grace.[75] If classical friendship is a union grounded in human

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[69] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, p. 237. cf. St. Augustine, *De fide rerum quae non videntur,* 1-2.
[70] Vossler, p. 237. cf. Augustine, Sermon 43, ad. Int. "faith is belief in what you do not yet see."
[71] David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 157.
[72] Konstan, pp. 156-157.
[73] Konstan, pp. 157-158.
[74] Konstan, p. 158. cf. Paulinus. *Ep.* 13.2.
[75] Konstan, p.160.

virtue and moral excellence, Christian friendship is a union grounded in *caritas.* It was St. Augustine who first attempted to provide a systematic account of the term c*aritas*, understood as the third and most important of the three theological virtues.

It is proper that a discussion on Christian friendship take in consideration the ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas. All the evidence points to Dante's direct knowledge of Aquinas. P. Wicksteed notes that Dante was already studying Aquinas'a works at the time of the *Vita Nuova*, around A.D. 1292.[76] In all probability Dante studied Aristotle with the aid of St. Thomas's commentaries. [77] Both in the *Convivio*[78] and in the *Monarchia*,[79] Dante quotes from the *Contra Gentiles*, even referring to Aquinas's work by name.[80] The fourth book of the *Convivio* addresses the nature of true nobility. And in his commentary Dante requests that the poem be cited by the first words of the *tornata*, *Contra gli erranti*, and then explains that the name is "chosen after the example of the good friar Thomas Aquino, who gave the name 'Against the Gentiles' to a book of which he made to the confusion of all those who depart from our faith." [81] Given the extent of Aquinas's influence on Dante, what is to the point here is an analysis of Aquinas's understanding of friendship as *caritas*.

Like Augustine, however, St. Thomas Aquinas understands *caritas* as the essence of spiritual perfection.[82] Accordingly, St. Thomas insists that "charity is not a virtue

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[76] Philip H. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1913), p. 124.
[77] Wicksteed, pp. 124-125.
[78] Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*. While echoing Aristotle, the beginning of the *Convivio* also echoes the *Contra Gentiles,* I, 4. Dante argues that by their very nature all men desire to know. Through the use of his reason man reaches both perfection and happiness. Cf. P. H. Wicksteed, p. 130.
[79] Dante, *De Monarchia*, ii. 4: 5
[80] Philip H. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas*, p. 125.
[81] Dante, *Convivio*. Cf. Philip H. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas*, p. 127.
[82] See "Charity," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert C. Broderick (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1976), p. 108 cf. *Summa Theologica* 2a 2ae, q. 184, a3: "Essentially the perfection of the

insofar as he is a man but rather insofar as he is divinized and made a son of God.[83] The question arises whether *caritas* is a friendship? In the *Summa Theologiae*, Thomas identifies friendship with *caritas*. He does not equivocate on this point, *caritas* is not simply love, it is friendship. [84] In an attempt to clarify and strengthen his argument, he forsees and addresses possible objections to his claims. The first point he addresses is the importance of dwelling together in friendship. Since, as Aristotle asserts, nothing so marks friendship as dwelling together, and since man's charity is directed toward God and the angels who do not dwell among men, it would seem that *caritas* is not friendship.[85] The second point Aquinas addresses is the attribute of reciprocity in friendship. According to Aristotle there is no friendship without reciprocal goodwill, but since *caritas* requires us to love even our enemies, it would seem that *caritas* is not friendship.[86] The third point addressed concerns Aristotle's three kinds of friendship: for utility, for pleasure, for worth. According to Aquinas charity is none of these: charity is not useful, nor is it pleasurable.[87] Charity is not Aristotle's complete friendship, for that is restricted to the virtuous, whereas charity is directed to the wicked also. [88] Therefore, it would seem that charity is not friendship.[89] After playing devil's advocate, Aquinas sets out to prove that in fact *caritas* is friendship. In doing so he turns to the words of Christ,

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Christian life consists in charity, first and foremost in the love of God, then in the love of neighbor." (Aquinas quoted in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*).

[83] See "Love," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia for School and Home* (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1965), p. 494. (Aquinas quoted in *The Catholic Encyclopedia for School and Home*).

[84] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, trans. R. J. Batten (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1975), 2a2ae. 25, 3, p. 86: "Sed caritas non est simplex amor, sed habet rationem amicitiae, ut supra dictum est."

[85] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23.1, p. 4.

[86] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23.1, p. 4.

[87] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23, 1, p. 6.

[88] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23, 1, p. 6.

[89] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23, 1, p. 6.

No longer will I call you servants but my friends,[90] and argues that they can only be explained as charity, which therefore is friendship.[91]

Concerning the importance of reciprocity in Aristotelian friendship, [92] Aquinas notes that Aristotle's reciprocal goodwill is grounded in fellowship or in something that friends share or have in common.[93] In *caritas* the sharing of man with God occurs through the sharing of His Son. Man's friendship with God is grounded in this sharing of Christ.[94] The love that is grounded in this type of fellowship is *caritas*, understood as a friendship between man and God.[95] Of man's double life, secular and spiritual, his friendship with God and the angels belongs to the life of the spirit.[96] Though impefect in this life, man's friendship with God will become perfect in heaven. [97] It follows then that *caritas* is imperfect in our present state, but that it will reach perfection in heaven.[98] Aquinas further notes that friendship extends to another in two ways: when a person is loved in himself and when he is he is loved because of someone else.[99] In the first

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[90] *John* 15, 15 (Quoted by St. ThomasAquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae. 23, 1)
[91] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae. 23, 1, p. 6: "Sed Contra est quod *Joan.* Dicitur, *Jam non dicam vos servos, sed amicos meos.* Sed hoc non dicebatur eis nisi ratione caritatis. Ergo caritas est amicitia."
[92] Aristotle, *NE* 8.2, 35, p. 210.
[93] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae. 23.1, p. 6.
[94] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23.1, p. 6: "Cum igitur sit aliqua comunicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem comunicat, super hac comunicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. De qua quidem comunicatione dicitur I *Cor*., *Fides Deus per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii ejus*."
[95] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23,1, p. 6: "Amor autem super hac communicatione fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum."
[96] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23.2, p. 8: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est hominis vita. Una quidem exterior secundum naturam sensibilem et corporalem, et secundum hanc vitam non est nobis communicatio vel conversatio cum Deo et angelis. Alia autem est vita hominis spiritualis secundum mentem, et secundum hanc vitam est nobis conversatio et cum Deo et cum angelis"
[97] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23, 2, p. 8: "in praesenti quidem statu imperfecte, unde dicitur *Phillipp*., *Nostra conversatio in coelis est*."
[98] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23, 2, p. 8: "Et ideo hic est caritas imperfecta, sed perficietur in patria."
[99] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23, 2, p. 8: "Ad secundum dicendum quod amicitia se extendit ad aliquem duplicitur. Uno modo respectu suipsius, et sic amicitia nunquam est nisi ad amicum. Alio modo se extendit ad aliquem respectu alterius personae, sicut si aliquis habet amicitiam ad aliquem hominem, ratione ejus diligit omnes ad illum hominem pertinentes, sive filios sive servos sive qualiter-cumque ei attinentes."

instance friendhip is grounded in the love of the friend himself, whereas in the second it is grounded in the love of another person. The friendship of charity extends to our enemies, who are loved for the sake of loving God: *caritas, quae maxime est amicitia honesti, se extendit ad peccatores quos ex caritate diligimus propter Deum*.[100] From all that has been said it would seem that *caritas* is indeed friendship. But is *caritas* a friendship in the Aristotelian sense? To be sure, *caritas* is friendship, but it is also the greatest of the theological virtues which have no place in Aristotle's philosophy.[101] For this reason and because Aristotelian friendship is a strictly human relationship, *caritas* is not friendship in the Aristotelian sense.

Is *caritas* a virtue? And is it a virtue in the Aristotelian sense of the word? While in the *Ethics* Aristotle defines moral virtue *according to right reason*,[102] for Aquinas *caritas* is a virtue because it extends to God and because it joins man to Him.[103] In an attempt to strengthen his argument Aquinas refers to Augustine who asserts that: *caritas est virtus quae, cum nostra rectissima affectio est, conjungit nos Deo, qua eum diligimus*.[104] Without refuting Aristotle's claim that friendship is *a virtue or with a virtue*,[105] Aquinas distinguishes the moral virtue that extends to other persons from the virtue that is charity, which is grounded in divine goodness. [106] It would seem that charity

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[100] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae. 23, 2, p. 8: "charity, which above all is friendship, reaches out to sinners whom we love for God's sake."
[101] Harry V. Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 134.
[102] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* 2.2, 1103 b31, p. 35; 2.6, 1107 a1, p. 44.
[103] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* 2a2ae. 23, 3, p. 16: "Unde sicut virtus moralis definitur per hoc quod est *secundum rationem rectam*, ut patet in *Ethic*., ita etiam attingere Deum constituit rationem virtutis, sicut etiam supra dictum est de fide et spe. Unde cum caritas attingit Deum quia conjungit nos Deo, ut patet per auctoritatem Augustini inductam, consequens est caritatem esse virtutem."
[104] St. Augustine, *De Moribus Ecclesiasticis* I, II. PL 32, 1319 (St. Augustine quoted by St. Thomas). Cf St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae. 23, 3, p. 14.
[105] Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155 a3.
[106] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae. 23, 3, p. 16: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus non negat amicitiam esse virtutem, sed dicit quod est *virtus vel cum virtute*. Posset enim dici

is a special kind of virtue since its proper object of love is divine goodness, which is the final object of man's beatitude.[107]

Of all the virtues *caritas* is the greatest and most encompassing since its object is the ultimate end of human life, eternal happiness.[108] *Caritas* is a friendship between man and God, but it includes friendship towards one's neighbour. [109] Aquinas returns to the words of St. John: *This commandment we have from God that he who loves God should love his brother also*.[110] While encompassing both the human and the divine, charity remains a single virtue for the primary object of love is one, God.[111] It is for the sake of God that we love our neighbours. [112] Charity, thus, extends mutually and in one act to the love of God and to the love of our neighbour. [113] In friendship man loves two things: his friend himself whom he wishes good things and the good itself which he wishes his friend.[114] Charity would seem to belong to the second category.[115] Man loves and forms

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quod est virtus moralis circa operationes quae sunt ad alium, sub alia tamen ratione quam justitia….Nec est simile de caritate, quae non fundatur principaliter super virtute humana, sed super bonitate divina."

[107] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae. 23, 4, p. 18: "proprium autem objectum amoris est bonum….Bonum autem divinum, in quantum est beatitudinis objectum, habet specialem rationem boni. Et ideo amor caritatis, qui est amor hujus boni, est specialis amor. Unde et caritas est specialis virtus."

[108] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23. 5, p. 20: "Et ideo, quia caritas habet pro objecto ultimum finem humanae vitae, scilicet beatitudinem aeternam, ideo extendit se ad actus totius humanae vitae per modum imperii, non quasi immediate eliciens omnes actus virtutum."

[109] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23, 5, p. 20: "Praeterea, sub caritate includitur amicitia ad proximum….Dicendum quod caritas, sicut dictum est, est quaedam amicitia hominis ad Deum."

[110] I *John* 4, 21 (St. John quoted by St. Thomas). Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae. 25, 1, p. 82.

[111] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23, 6, p. 22: "Est etiam et una comunicatio beatitudinis aeternae super quam haec amicitia fundatur. Unde relinquitur quod caritas est simpliciter una virtus, non distincta in plures species."

[112] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 23, 6, p. 22: "Hoc autem non est verum, sed Deus est principale objectum caritatis, proximum autem ex caritate diligitur propter Deum."

[113] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 25, 1, p. 82: "Ratio autem diligendi proximum Deus est: hoc enim debemus in proximo diligere ut in Deo sit. Unde manifestum est quod idem specie actus est quo diligitur Deus, et quo diligitur proximus. Et propter hoc habitus caritatis non solum se extendit ad dilectionem Dei, sed etiam ad dilectionem proximi."

[114] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae. 25, 3, p. 86: "Per amicitiam autem amatur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ipse amicus ad quem amicitiam habemus et cui bona volumus. Alio modo, sicut bonum quod amico volumus."

[115] Aquinas, *S. T.* 2a2ae. 25, 3, p. 86: "Et hoc modo caritas per caritatem amatur, et non primo, quia caritas est illud bonum quod optamus omnibus quos ex caritate diligimus."

friendships with both God and with his neighbour, but his love for them also includes a love of charity itself, God.[116]

C*aritas* originates and culminates in God himself, *Deus caritas est*: God is love. It is the love that God bestows upon humanity in the figure of Christ. Since God himself is ultimate love and perfect good, and since He essentially is complete in Himself, in loving man He seeks only man's greatest good.[117] That which is unique in Christian friendship is the possibility of a relationship between man and God. In its flight toward divinity, Christian friendship transcends the particular and embraces the universal. In man's beatific vision of God, the particular and the universal co-exist as one. It must be argued that, Christian friendship is a union that aims to transcend duality: it aims to resolve the opposition between the human and the divine, the finite and the infinite. It is worth noting that while looking upward toward God, *caritas* simultaneously looks downward toward man. Christian friendship simultaneously encompasses the love of God and the love of one's neighbor. Christ calls man to love God with all his heart, and he also calls him to love his neighbor as he loves himself: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"[118] (Matthew 29:39).

Self-love is both just and necessary, and it is the basis for the love of one's fellow men. It is impossible for man truly to love God and not to love himself and his fellow men.[119] In his study of Augustine's notion of *caritas*, Etienne Gilson observes well that,

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[116] St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* 2a2ae. 25, 3, p. 86: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus et proximus sunt illi ad quos amicitiam habemus. Sed in illorum dilectione includitur dilectio caritatis; diligimus enim proximum et Deum inquantum hoc amamus, ut nos et proximus Deum diligamus, quod est caritatem habere."
[117] John J. Sullivan, "Love," *The Catholic Encyclopedia for School and Home* (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1965), p. 491.
[118] Sullivan, "Love," *The Catholic Encyclopedia for School and Home*, p. 496.
[119] Karl Jaspers, *Plato and Augustine*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Hartcourt Brace, 1957), p. 96.

there exists no real contradiction between loving another and loving oneself: "To love another as oneself cannot be a contradiction because love tends to unity and there can be no division within something which is one."[120] Man is not forbidden to love his friend so long as he does not love him in the way he loves God, without restrictions. It is wrong to love one's friend as if he were the highest good.[121] God alone is the highest good and He alone deserves to be loved without reservation.[122] Friendships that are not grounded in *caritas* are coincidental unions, for the beloved is not loved in so far as who he essentially is; he is not loved in relation to God.

While God alone is the supreme good and the object of perfect love, *caritas* is mutually the love of God and the love of man. It includes the love of self and the love of one's neighbor. For Aquinas, as for Augustine, there are two kinds of self-love. One is a well-ordered love of self whereby man guided by reason and faith seeks his true good. The other type is a misguided love of self, whereby man is guided by his emotions instead of his reason and by the love of God. This second type of self-love seeks to gratify sensual appetites, or the desire for power or pleasure without concern for one's true good.[123] This Christian notion of a well-guided and a misguided self-love echoes the Aristotelian notion of bad self-love and good self-love. For Aristotle, bad self-love seeks to gratify the passionate part of his soul: man desires false goods such as power, pleasure, money. By contrast, good self-love seeks to gratify the rational part of the soul,

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[120] Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine*, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 138.
[121] John J. Sullivan, "Love," *The Catholic Encyclopedia for School and Home*, p. 495.
[122] Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine*, p. 139.
[123] John J. Sullivan, "Love," *The Catholic Encyclopedia for School and Home*, p. 495.

and desires a good that is constant, virtue.[124] Guided by his reason, the good person will do whatever is best for both himself and others. By contrast, he who is guided and ruled by his passions will bring harm to himself and others.[125] *Caritas*, thus, is a well-guided love: the love of self for the love of God.

Although ultimate perfection and happiness lie in man's beatific vision of God, human friendship is to be understood as a preparation and prefiguration for perfect bliss.[126] Through his union with his fellow men, one learns to know and love oneself and others in God. The love I have for my fellow men, it is believed, will prepare and guide me toward the ultimate object of love, God.[127] Man also seeks man for the sake of reaching God. Though man's ultimate object of love and final end is God Himself, *caritas* embraces the entire Christian community.[128] God commands us to love him and love each other, it is assumed, as he has loved us. He commands that we love each other in *caritas*.[129] C*aritas* is thus at once the love of man and God, the love of all humanity, even enemies. It is thought that Christ, while knowing that Judas will betray him, does

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[124] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1168b 19-23, p. 254: "Those who are greedy for these goods gratify their appetites and in general their feelings and non-rational part of the soul; and since this is the character of the many, the application of the term self-love is derived from the most frequent kind of self-love, which is base. This type of self-lover, then, is justifiably reproached." cf., 9.8 1168 b29-1169 a5, p. 255: "At any rate he awards himself what is finest and best of all, and gratifies the most controlling part of himself, obeying it in everything….Moreover, his voluntary actions seem above all to be those involving reason….Hence he most of all is a self-lover. "

[125] Aristotle, *NE* 9.8. 1169 a11-14, p. 256.

[126] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 119: "Friendship, to be sure, is an essentially earthbound value, but Ambrose, in a deliberate attempt to Christianize this most pagan human bond, speaks of friendship as a foretaste of the harmony of Heaven and a veritable experience of the Garden of Eden on earth." Cf. St. Ambrose, *PL* 16, cols. 73-4; and cols. 178-84.

[127] Karl Jaspers, *Plato and Augustine*, p. 98.

[128] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* 2-2. 23.1

[129] See "Love," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia for School and Home* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 498.

not stop loving him and allows him to receive communion.[130] By means of his own example, through his descent and ascent, Christ teaches the ultimate lesson about *caritas* as the path away from death toward spiritual life and perfect vision. It is precisely in relation to descent and ascent that Christian friendship acquires a unique significance. In the *Confessions* Augustine calls on believers to accept Christ's descent as an invitation to ascent: "Will ye not now after that life is descended down to you, will not you ascend up to it and live?"[131] By means of his death Christ called his followers to new life: "Anyone who loves me will be true to my word, and my Father will love him; we will come to Him and make our dwelling place with Him "[132] (Jn. 14: 23). Though it may, in some respects parallel Cicero's notion of *amicitia*, Christian friendship is grounded in the Scriptures.[133]

For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, the essence of friendship is abundance and similitude, rather than deficiency and difference. Imperfect unions are grounded in deficiency: one enters into a relationship with others to receive from them what one lacks. But in complete friendship man enters into a relationship with others who are alike himself in goodness, that he may share and communicate with them the abundance of his goodness:

> In the love of concupiscence, we draw to us what is extraneous for us, for we love other things by the love in so far as they are useful of delectable for us. But in the love of friendship, it is otherwise. For we draw ourselves

[130] Walter Farrell, *A Companion to the Summa* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), p. 234.
[131] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 188: "numquid et post descensum vitae non vultis ascendere et vivere?"
[132] Robert C. Broderick, *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Inc., 1976), p. 108.
[133] The scriptures encourage believers to seek the "friendship of God" (Wis. 7:14); God is believed to be the most perfect friend (Prv. 27:10); Jesus teaches that the greatest act of friendship is to sacrifice one's life for another (cf. Jn. 15:13:23). The scriptures also presents charity as the greatest of the three theological virtues and as the greatest commandment (Mt. 22: 34-40). Charity is at once the love of God , the love of ourselves, and our neighbors for the love of God (cf. 1 Cor. 13: 8-13). For St. Thomas Aquinas man's perfection is to be found in charity: "Essentially the perfection of the Christian life consists in charity, first and foremost in the love of God, then in the love of neighbor" (S.T. Iia Iiae, q. 184, a3) (Aquinas quoted in Robert C. Broderick, *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1976), p. 108.

> to that which is outside of us. Since to whom we love by that love, we behave ourselves just as to ourselves and communicate ourselves to them in a certain manner. Therefore, in the love of friendship, similitude is the cause of love, for we do not love someone in this way unless we are one with him, and similitude is a kind of unity. [134]

For Aquinas the goodness in man has origin in divine goodness and in divine abundance. God created the universe from an abundance of goodness.[135] Man, in varying degree, shares in His divine goodness and is a representation of His goodness. Man participates in divine goodness and by nature desires to communicate his goodness to others.[136] Friendship, thus, is the union of good men who are alike in goodness. In friendship one wishes good things for his friend as one does for oneself. A friend thus become another self, *alter ipse*.[137] Moreover, friendship is a mutual relationship.[138] The relation between friends is dynamic and reciprocal. By means of discourse and shared activities, each friend changes the other. Moreover, each friend becomes similar to the other by

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[134] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Super loannem*, c. 15, 1.4. cf. Yoshihisa Yamamoto, "Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of Amicitia: Unio and Communicatio," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (November, 2008) (Aquinas quoted by Yamamoto).

[135] Aquinas, *S. T.* I, q.47, a.1: "God brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them. And because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another." Cf. Yoshihisa Yamamoto, "Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of Amicitia: Unio and Communicatio," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (November, 2008) (Aquinas quoted by Yamamoto).

[136] Aquinas, *S. T.* I, q.106, a.4: "Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to thers; for it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfection to others as far as possible." Cf. Yoshihisa Yamamoto, "Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of Amicitia: Unio and Communicatio," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (November, 2008). (Aquinas quoted by Yamamoto).

[137] Aquinas, *S. T.* Ia-2ae, q.28, a1, p. 90: "Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum: unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse *alter ipse*: et Augustinus dicit, *Bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae*."

[138] Aquinas, *S. T.* Ia.2ae, q.28, a2, p. 94: "Potest autem et tertio modo mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur."

being acted upon.[139] Thus, the identity of one friend is influenced by the identity of another.[140] As an indepent and rational being, man is capable of establishing mutual relationships with others without losing his own individuality.

In Aquinas one finds a close link between existence and action. By the very fact that something exists, it is active: *ex hoc ipso quod aliquid in actu est, activum est*.[141] In this manner, friendship is to be understood as an active relationship: a union that bridges the distance between the self and the other. Man establishes his individuality not in isolation, but by means of being in an active relation with others. In other words, man establishes himself as an individual in relation to others who are different from himself. One man (*unum*) establishs himself as something different (*aliud quid*) in an active relationship and in communication with someone else. [142] As an independent and rational being, man is capable of establishing mutual relationships with others without losing his own individuality. The relation between friends is dynamic and reciprocal. By means of discourse and shared activities, each friend changes the other and each becomes the source of the other's knowledge and love.

Before proceeding to a discussion of friendship in *Inferno* 2, it is appropriate, if not essential, to understand the basic distinction between classical and Christian

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[139] Yoshihisa Yamamoto, "Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of Amicitia: Unio and Communicatio," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (November, 2008).

[140] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia-2ae, q.28, a2, p. 94: "In amore vero amicitiae amans est in amato inquantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere, secundum Philosophum."

[141] Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, c.43 cf. Yoshihisa Yamamoto, "Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of Amicitia: Unio and Communicatio," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Association* (November, 2008) (Aquinas quoted by Yamamoto)

[142] Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q.1, a1: "A thing is said to be *aliquid* (something) as *aliud quid* (something other). Then, as a being is said to be as long as it is indivisible in itself, so it is said to be aliquid as long as it is separate from other things." Cf. Yoshihisa Yamamoto, "Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of Amicitia: Unio

friendship and establish the relationship between each. A fundamental difference between the two lies in the object of love, and in the movement implied by that love, either of ascent toward God (*caritas)* or of descent toward man (*philia*) (*amicitia*). For ancients and Christians alike, friendship is an activity that leads to happiness and perfection. While not all men love the same good and not all men seek perfect "goodness," [143] in so far as all men have a natural inclination toward happiness and perfection all men strive toward what they perceive to be their good. Disagreement arises in relation to the particular doctrine of happiness and knowledge, which is closely connected to the notion of being. This difference can be accounted for by man's propensity to alter the meaning of happiness at various points in history. While happiness seems to be sought by all men, it seems, its definition shifts, so that it means different things to different people at different historical times. Singleton observes: "happiness is that which all desire as something for its own sake, the final goal of all striving. Yet, while this is true, while all agree that happiness is that object, there are many differing conceptions of what happiness actually is."[144] In an attempt to strengthen his point, Singleton refers to Virgil's discussion of happiness in the *Commedia*: *Quel dolce pome che per tanti rami / cercando va la cura de' mortali, / oggi porra` in pace le tue fami.* [145] (Purg. 27, 115-117). Virgil point to man's natural thirst for happiness, a thirst that manifests itself on different planes. The discrepancy in the notion of happiness and being

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and Communicatio," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (November, 2008) (Aquinas quoted by Yamamoto)

[143]Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.2 1155 b20-8.3 1157 a35, pp.209-214.

[144] Charles S. Singleton, *Journey to Beatrice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 102-103.

[145] Dante, Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), XXVII, 115-117: "That sweet fruit which mortals, with great effort,/ seek on so many different boughs/shall today give peace to all your cravings."

further parallels a discrepancy in man's definition of friendship. While the Christian conceives of happiness as a transcendent reality, the pagan conceives of it as part of the secular world. For both the object of love is the good, but while the pagan places the essential good in man himself, the Christian envisions it to reside in God. And while classical and Christian friendship both arise from a surplus and an abundance of a good, rather than from deficiency, for a Christian God alone is ultimate Good. Accordingly, God neither lacks nor needs anything, thus he creates and loves from abundance rather than lack or deficiency.

In contrast to the Platonic theory of being, Aristotle conceives of a universe that is existentially independent of a god.[146] As such, he is concerned with what things are and how they become what they are; thus his theory of becoming. In contrast to Aristotle, Aquinas concerns himself with why things exist at all; thus his theory of existence.[147] While adopting much of Aristotelian philosophy, Aquinas transforms Aristotle's notion of being. For Aristotle truth is to be found in the essence of things while for Aquinas it is found in the existence (*esse*) of things.[148] While Aristotle understands being primarily as form and potentiality, Thomas understands it as existence that must be traced back to its source or creator. This discrepancy in the notion of being was to have major consequences on their doctrines of happiness, the good, knowledge of the universe, and in on their notion of friendship. Aquinas approaches friendship, as he does all other issues, from a human vantage point. He, however, views all things in light of their causal

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[146] F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959), p. 62.
[147] Copleston, p. 62.
[148] Armand A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1982), p. 185; cf. *Sent*., I, 19, 5, I; vol. I, p. 486: "Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum"

relation to God.[149] What is innovative in Aquinas's views is that he incorporates Aristotelian virtue and elevates it from the realms of natural ethics and philosophy to the realms of spiritual truth and theology. He begins with the Aristotelian notion of happiness in the here and now and ends with Christian happiness found in the beatific vision of God in the heavens.[150] Likewise, he begins with earthly virtues, ultimately arriving at the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.[151] Since God alone is complete goodness, complete happiness resides only in Him. Aquinas believes that human reason can reinforce faith, but it cannot on its own merits arrive at ultimate truth.[152] He further believes that if man is ever to attain complete happiness, it must be through revelation and grace.[153] Accordingly, for Aquinas friendship acquires significance in relation to man's complete happiness: in relation to divinity. The goodness found in the visible world, though finite and imperfect, is an anticipation of the supreme good found in the heavenly sphere.[154] In this manner, friendship is understood as a foretaste of the heavenly bliss that man so desires. In creating man God instilled in him a natural desire to return to it.[155] The love of God is *caritas*, the highest of the theological virtues. The more man partakes of *caritas*, the greater his chances for experiencing complete happiness. Both Thomas and Dante see charity as preparation for spiritual perfection.[156]

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[149] Armand A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy*, p. 190.
[150] F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959), p. 179, p. 193.
[151] Copleston, *Aquinas*, p. 193.
[152] Armand A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1982), p. 189.
[153] Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy*, p. 180.
[154] Philip H. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1913), pp. 115-116.
[155] Wicksteed, pp. 115-116; cf., *Summa Contra Gentiles,* III, 19, 20.
[156] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture*, p. 49.

It must be argued that, the relation between classical friendship and Christian friendship parallels the interplay between reason and faith, philosophy and theology. If classical friendship is a union grounded in human reason and virtue, Christian friendship is a union grounded in *caritas,* in divine Wisdom, and in the gratuitous gift of the Word Incarnate. Christian friends are united spiritually in Christ.[157] While reason and revelation are distinct means of arriving at the truth, both acquire significance in relation to the one truth.[158] Reason is to be valued as it reinforces faith, but there is no reason without faith. While God's presence is all around us, it is by means of revelation that man can know God in his essence. It follows that revelation is the supreme source of truth. Augustine also believed, however, that while reason alone can never yield complete truth, there is no faith without reason.[159]

Following Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy, for Aquinas the quest for truth begins in the material world. Since man is part of the secular world, by necessity all knowledge begins in sense perception.[160] In his search for truth Aquinas ascends from the material to the transcendent. As a finite being living in the sensible world, man necessarily deduces the existence of God from the world around him and not the other way around. [161] By means of philosophy man comes to the realization that the world is existentially related to the creator, God, and that all things are related to him causally. Through reason and philosophy man arrives at the realization that empirical reality is causally dependent upon a transcendent reality and that all things are causally related to

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[157] Karl Jaspers, *Plato and Augustine*, p. 98.
[158] Jaspers, p. 77.
[159] Jaspers, p. 79.
[160] Philip H. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas*, p. 155

the creator. [162] Unlike other thirteenth-century thinkers, such as St. Albert the Great and St. Bonaventura who drew a distinct line between reason and faith, Aquinas seeks to resolve the opposition between the two. He places each within its proper context and order, thereby creating a synthesis of both.[163] Etienne Gilson observes well that, "the historical significance of St. Thomas Aquinas rests with the fact that he was the first medieval thinker to go to the root of the difficulty."[164] The root of the difficulty that Gilson here refers to is the duality between faith and reason. For Aquinas the relation between faith and reason is one of coexistence and harmony rather than of opposition. While both are distinct types of knowledge aiming at distinct truths, their distinction does not translate to a conflict.[165] Aquinas insists that while certain truths are accessible to human reason, truths of revelation are not.[166] Man cannot by means of his natural reason alone attain to a direct knowledge of God. The third book of the *Contra Gentiles* attempts to show that complete beatitude is unattainable to man solely by means of his human faculties.[167] While the highest form of vision belongs to revelation, still for Aquinas man's complete beatitude is to be found in the beatific vision of God, [168] and in the direct knowledge of his essence.[169] While truths of revelation are inaccessible to reason, however, they are not necessarily opposed to it.[170] Religious truths are inaccessible to philosophy, but philosophy can be useful in shedding light on religious

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[161] Etienne Gilson, *Methodical* Realism, trans. Philip Trower (Front Royal: Christendom Press, 1990), p. 72.
[162] F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas*, pp. 109-110, p. 137.
[163] Copleston, p. 64.
[164] Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1966), p. 69.
[165] Gilson, p. 73.
[166] Philip H. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas*, p. 98. cf. *Contra Gentiles*, ii. 38.
[167] Wicksteed, p. 132.
[168] Wicksteed, p. 132.
[169] F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas*, p. 179.

truths.[171] Along these lines, Vossler poses a reasonable question: if reason can rise to faith then why the need of revelation?[172] From Aquinas's perspective the answer is that revelation leads to a more complete and direct knowledge of God. Nonetheless, Aquinas stands firm on the harmonious relation between reason and revelation, philosophy and theology.[173] Vossler notes that for Aquinas man holds a central position in the universe, serving as a bridge between material and spiritual reality:

> Since Thomas's philosophy fixes man's place between beast and angel, matter and God, as the most important middle link, and finds in the soul of the individual the iron ring that holds together the terraced structure of the universe…and, in short, sets man and his reason in the center of all things. [174]

If man is truly the "middle link"[175] between matter and God, human friendship would seem to be a necessary first-step toward divinity. One's love of one's fellow men inspires and encourages one to love God, thereby promoting one's spiritual perfection and happiness.[176] In this manner Christian friendship is universalized. It is not the love of an individual merely his own sake, rather it is the love of an individual for the love of God.

After having explored friendship in Christian writers who influenced Dante's thought, we may proceed to a study of Dante's friendship in *Inferno* 2, interpreting it as a synthesis of classical and Christian notions of the subject.

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[170] Philip H. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas*, p. 100. cf. *Contra Gentiles*, i. 7.
[171] F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas*, p. 193.
[172] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture an Introduction to Dante and His* Times, vo. 1, p. 122.
[173] F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas*, p. 193.
[174] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, p. 124.
[175] Vossler, p. 124.
[176] Karl Jaspers, *Plato and* Augustine, p. 98.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CANTO OF COMPASSION: FRIENDSHIP IN *INFERNO* II

What is here to the point is to study the changes that occur in *Inferno* 2 with respect to Dante's union with Virgil and Beatrice, understood as distinct types of friendship. What is proposed is an understanding of friendship in Dante as a dialectical synthesis of classical, humanistic premises, grounded in human reason and virtue, and Christian premises, grounded in divine grace and *caritas*. In this manner, friendship will here be explored in relation to such categories as reason and theology, philosophy and revelation, distance and proximity. Moreover, friendship in *Inferno* 2 acquires significance in relation to activity and change, distance and proximity, isolation and inclusion. The salvific power of friendship is reflected in the changes and discourse that transpire in the course of the canto.

Inferno 2 brings to the foreground the importance of friendship in the wayfarer's journey. The canto begins in fear, uncertainty, isolation, and through the experience of friendship it ends in hope, affirmation, and inclusion. *Inferno* 2 thus celebrates the interplay between friendship and spiritual happiness. To a great extent this is the canto of compassion and friendship. The reader learns how to respond to the sufferings of a friend with an altruistic love and compassion that bespeaks of true friendship. With its emphasis on compassion, love, self-sacrifice. Discourse, and change, the second canto celebrates friendship as an activity that leads away from misery into happiness. It is an act of friendship that draws Dante out of his spiritual misery to experience eternal

happiness.[1] Along these lines, friendship will be viewed as a handmaiden to spiritual happiness and perfection. In an attempt to place Dante's thought within the context of a synthesis of classical and Christian philosophy, it will be useful to recall Vossler's words: "On these two pillars, completeness of the individual and independence of reason, on this double foundation of character and intelligence, raised by twelve centuries of philosophic labours, the mighty personality of Alighieri rears itself." [2] It is within the rich philosophical background of classical and Christian thought that Dante's own ideas grow and develop. His ideas of friendship emerge, in other words, from the synthesis of reason and revelation, theology and philosophy. As Francesco De Sanctis notes, "Dante's theology does not conflict with his philosophy but completes it; Beatrice is not in contrast with Virgil but above him." [3] It is precisely in relation to such a synthesis that his union with Virgil and Beatrice takes on new and illuminating meanings.

For Dante, as for Aquinas, man's happiness begins in the here and now, though in its complete form it may be said to be found in the Hereafter. For both the path toward

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[1] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 119: "Paulinus of Nola is even more explicit in stating that friendship is the means of raising oneself to God. Within this perspective one can understand, for instance, why it should be the act of friendship which brings the pilgrim out of his spiritual entanglement in *Inferno* 1." Cf. Paulinus of Nola, *Epistola* xi, 6, *CSEL* xxix, 64; see also *Epistola* xxiv, 9, *CSEL* xxix, 209. See also Aelred of Rievaulx, *De spiritali amicitia*, ed. Jean Dubois (Paris: Bayaert, 1948), ii, 671D-673A.

[2] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture*: *an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, trans. William C. Lawton (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1929), vol. 1, p. 123.

[3] Francesco De Sanctis, "The Subject the Divine Comedy," *Critical Essays on Dante*, ed. Giuseppe Mazzotta (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1991), p. 77-78. De Sanctis focuses on the interplay between religion and philosophy in Dante. Both are necessary for the fullfillment man's two ends, heavenly happiness and earthly happiness: "His mind submitted to the authority of the *Ethics* as to the Bible, to Aristotle as to St. Thomas; he believed implicitly that the great philosophers of antiquity agreed with the teaching of religion, and that they were wrong not because they saw wrongly, but because they did not see everything…he maintained that spirit and matter were endowed each with its own life, without interference with the other; and from this he inferred in independence of the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal….Both are organs of God on earth, 'two suns'[*Purgatory*, Xvi, 106] who guide humanity, one in the ways of God, the other in the ways of the world, one to heavenly and the other to earthly happiness."

happiness and the good are a progressive upward movement.[4] Christian friendship, a virtue grounded in ultimate good and the love of God, is a progressive movement toward eternal happiness. Dante's movement toward ultimate happiness and the good must therefore be examined in relation to his union with Virgil and Beatrice, two benevolent and active friends. By means of their assistance, guidance, and compassion, Virgil and Beatrice lead Dante away from perdition and steer him toward the path of salvation. They do not merely wish Dante good: they become integral parts of his goodness. Beatrice descends into Limbo to enlist Virgil's assistance so that Dante may ascend to heaven. Virgil leaves Limbo and arrives in the dark wood so as to lead him toward the right path. Divine love is the ultimate moving force, but it is mitigated through the intercession of benevolent friends. Compassion moves Virgil to action, *nel primo punto che di te mi dolve* (*Inf*. 2, 50-51). And, compassion moves Beatrice to act on Dante's behalf, *Oh pietosa colei che mi soccorse!* (*Inf*. 2. 133). The journey toward perfection and happiness occurs by means of a hierarchy of friends whose active compassion initiates and facilitates Dante's movement toward a higher degree of vision. By means of his union with each friend, Dante's will and intellect are corrected and perfected. Far from being a mere appendix, friendship in the *Commedia* constitutes an integral part of the journey toward redemption. Ultimately, Dante's journey is possible due to the compassion, love, and intercession of friends. Friendship in Inferno 2 is here studied, therefore, in relation to compassion, discourse, and movement. It will become clear how by means of the discourse between friends characters are moved to compassion and to action.

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[4] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: an Introduction to Dante and His Times*, vol. 1, p. 145.

My discussion of Inferno 2 centers on three key moments in the canto. The first is to be found at the beginning, when feeling alone despite Virgil's presence, Dante refers to himself as *e io sol uno* [5] (*Inf*. 2, 3). The second passage is located at the point when speaking to Virgil in Limbo, Beatrice refers to Dante as *l'amico mio e non de la ventura* [6] (*Inf*. 2, 61). The third passage appears as Beatrice terms love the force behind her descent to Limbo, as with her speech, *Amor mi mosse che mi fa parlare* [7] (*Inf*. 2, 72). Each of these pivotal passages presents Dante's spiritual journey as a progression from isolation and loneliness toward inclusion and friendship. Each places his journey within a context of friendship and each stresses the role of Beatrice and Virgil as true friends to Dante. Indeed the first also places Dante outside of friendship, at least from his vantage point. The second passage sees Dante's identity defined in relation to someone other than himself, or in relation to Beatrice. In the third passage the relationship of love and friendship is implicitly established.

In a real sense the movement of the *Commedia* begins with Inferno 2.[8] It is here that both Dante and the reader learn about events that predate and foreshadow this starting point. It is here too that the journey is placed under an umbrella of divine compassion and *caritas,* and here that the interplay between Virgil and Beatrice is established in relation to Dante's salvation. Traditionally, to be sure, *Inferno* 1 has been viewed as the preface to the entire Commedia, while Inferno 2 is understood as a

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[5] Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), II, 3: "and I, alone."
[6] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 61: "my friend, who is no friend of Fortune"
[7] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 72: "The love that moved me makes me speak."
[8] Siro A. Chimenz, "Il Canto II Dell'Inferno," *Letture Dantesche*, ed. Giovanni Getto (Firenze: Sansoni, 1963), p. 27: "…insieme col primo costituisce, diro` col Tommaseo, <<la macchina del poema>>, l'impostazione allegorica del mistico viaggio."

prologue to the first canticle.[9] This distinction is emphasized by the invocation's position in the second canto rather than in the first, as is the case with the other two canticles.[10] Notwithstanding this categorization, as many commentators have noted, structural similarities between the first two cantos create a sense of continuity and unity. Some of the events in *Inferno* 2 echo those in *Inferno* 1. For instance, the last verse of the second canto, *intrai per lo cammino alto e silvestro*, echoes the beginning of the first canto, *cammin* (1), *selva* (2), *intrai* (10) and *alto* (16).[11] Commentators note that, in these first two cantos, there is also a chiastic parallel of the movement from fear to hope and from hope to fear.[12] At the beginning of each canto the pilgrim's progress is impeded. At the

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[9] Antonino Pagliaro, *Ulisse* (Messina-Florence: G. D'Anna, 1967), p. 17. cf. Mazzoni, "Il canto II dell'*Inferno*," in *Saggio per un nuovo commento alla 'Divina Commedia.' Inferno, Canti* I-III. (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967), p. 151. In his commentary to *Inferno* II, Mazzoni notes a distinction between the first two cantos, "Questo canto, secondo una formula invalsa, e` il 'prologo al cielo' dell'opera… ; ma e` pur anche- sul piano strutturale- il prologo alla prima cantica (come il precedente lo era a tutta l'opera)" (Mazzoni quoted by Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, p. 95); Silvio Pasquazi, " Il Prologo in Cielo,"*Critica letteraria,* 2 (Roma: Bonacci, 1974), p. 163. Pasquazi refers to *Inferno* I as a "proemio" to the *Commedia* and to *Inferno* II as "prologo" to the *Inferno*; John Freccero, "Infernal Irony: The Gates of Hell," *MLN*, 99. iv (1984), p. 772-773. Freccero considers the first two cantos as a unit, "Until we come to the entrance of Hell, things seem to exist in a double focus, suffused with moral and allegorical intent so that their substantiality seems totally compromised" (Freccero quoted by Jacoff and Stephany, p. 95); "Dante's Prologue Scene," in *Dante Studies*, 84 (1966), p 1-25. According to Freccero "mimetic fiction" begins in *Inferno* III; Charles S. Singleton, *Dante Studies* 1: *Elements of Structure* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 7-13; Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2) in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana* Vol. 2 (1990), p. 97. Arguing against common opinion Hollander observes: "In this respect the separateness of the first two cantos from one another is underlined, since invocations occur in each of the first cantos of the succeeding *cantiche*. At the same time, their structural similarity tends to make them a unit." On this point Hollander agrees with the argument presented by E. H. Wilkins, "The Prologue of the *Divine Comedy*," *Annual Report of the Dante Society* (1920), 1-7. Based on the characteristics of the prologues in the *Epistle to Cangrande* (*Epist*. XIII.43-48), Wilkins argues that *Inferno* I and *Inferno* II form a unit as a prologue to the entire poem and to the *Inferno*.

[10] Robert Hollander, "The Canto of the Word," in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana*, ed. Paolo Cherchi and Antonio C. Mastrobuono (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), vol. 2, p. 97.

[11] Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)" *Lectura Dantis Newberryana*, p. 97. Hollander notes the similarity between the last verse of the second canto and the beginning of the first canto and a parallel of the three segments of speech divided by similes; Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany "The Canto of the Word," in *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II (1989). Jacoff and Stephan note a reversal of patterns: the first canto is set at dawn, and Dante is impeded by the three beasts; the second set at dusk and he is impeded by his own fears and doubts (p. 2).

[12] Richard H. Lansing, *From Image to* Idea: *A Study of the Simile in Dante's* "*Commedia* " (Ravenna: Longo, 1977), pp. 128-31. The author present a discussion of the change from fear to hope and hope to fear in the two pairs of similes of the first two cantos; see Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno*

beginning of *Inferno* 1 Dante is impeded by external obstacles, the three beasts, while at the beginning of the second his own fears and doubts stand in the way. In both cases Virgil becomes a source of comfort, security, and strength. Scholars observe that, notwithstanding a similarity between their last verses, clear contrasts between them can also be described. At the end of the first canto Dante's lack of initiative and enthusiasm is implied in the verse *Allor si mosse, e io li tenni dietro* [13] (*Inf.* 1, 136), while his own will at the end of the second canto is affirmed with the word *intrai* [14] (*Inf.* 2, 142). It is worth noting that it is Virgil who at the end of each canto transforms his fears and doubts into courage and resolution.

The extensive use of dialogue and the lack of explicit action have led some scholars to label Inferno 2 as the "canto of stasis."[15] This interpretation has provoked objections among scholars who point to the major changes and movements taking place in it. Reflecting upon the important inward changes that occur in Dante, in his union with others and the world around him, Jacoff and Stephany observe that:

> The changes that occur between the beginning and the end of Canto II--changes in Dante's spiritual state, in his relationship to Virgil, to nature, and to himself-are so great that rather than being a

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2)," *Lectura Dantis Newberryana* (1990). See Hollander's note 9, p. 118. For a discussion of the parallel endings of *Inferno* 1 and *Inferno* 2 see Francesco Mazzoni, "Il canto II dell' *Inferno*," in *Saggio per un nuovo commento alla "Divina Commedia." Inferno, Canti I-III*. (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967), p. 157.

[13] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 136: "Then he set out and I came on behind him."

[14] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 142. Cf. Siro A. Chimenz, "Il Canto II dell'Inferno, *Letture Dantesche*, ed. Giovanni Getto (Firenze: Sansoni, 1963), p. 40: "Allor si mosse, e io gli tenni retro, ci rappresenta Dante dietro Virgilio, senza entusiasmo, senza convizione.…La chiusa di questo pare, come dicevo identica: e poi che mosso fue, Entrai per lo cammino alto e silvestro. Quell'intrai; al principio del verso, dice la risolutezza con cui si mette in cammino, anche se il cammino e` arduo e selvoso."

[15] For a summary of Ballerini's article on *Inferno* 2 see *Year's Work in Modern Language Studies* (1965), p. 306; Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, "The Canto of The Word," in *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II (1989), p. 4. Jacoff and Stephany juxtopose Ballerini's interpretation of *Inferno* 2 as the "canto of stasis" with the canto's extensive use of dialogue and motion.

> canto of stasis, Canto II must in fact be characterized as a canto of motion. [16]

While *Inferno* 1 has been called the "canto of fear," [17] *Inferno* 2 has also been called the "canto of the word."[18] Hollander notes that the word *parola* in *Inferno* 2 (it is in fact used more often here than in any other canto, at lines 43, 67, 111, 135, 137) and *parlare* (which appears three times, at lines 72, 113, 126) parallel the use of the word *paura* in *Inferno* 1, which comes up five times. [19] While having no difficulties with accepting *Inferno* 2 as the "canto of the word,"[20] this chapter proposes an understanding of the second canto as " the canto of compassion and friendship." It will be seen that the changes and movement [21] are initiated by means of the discourse of friends.[22]

While commentators note the relationship of discourse and motion, discourse and compassion, love and motion,[23] they fail to appraise the relationship of friendship and compassion, friendship and discourse, friendship and motion, love and friendship.

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[16] Rachel Jacoff and William Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, ed. Robert Hollander, Aldo D. Scaglione, Joan M. Ferrante (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), p. 4

[17] Francesco Mazzoni, "Il canto II dell' *Inferno,"* in *Saggio per un nuovo commento alla "Divina Commedia." Inferno, Canti* I-III (Firenze: Sansoni , 1967), p. 49. cf. Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)," *Lectura Dantis Newberryana,* vol 2, p. 96.

[18] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)" in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana*, ed. Paolo Cherchi and Antonio C. Mastrobuono (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 2 vols., p. 96.

[19] Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)" in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana,* pp. 96-97. Hollander observes that 118 of its 142 verses (83 percent) in *Inferno* 2 are spoken and only one other canto in *Inferno* (the eleventh canto) has a higher percentage of discourse, 106 of its 115 (92 percent).

[20] Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)" in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana*, p. 96.

[21] For a comprehensive list of words associated with motion see Rachel Jacoff and William A Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II (1989), p. 97.

[22] The diction of *Inferno* 2 is dominated by expressions associated with compassion and friendship (la pietate 5, m'aiutate 7, mi guidi 10, virtu` 11, mi fidi 12, salvazione 30, di te mi dolve 51, l'amico mio, e non de la ventura 61, temo che non sia gia` smarrito 64, al soccorso levata 65, l'aiuta si` ch'i ne sia consolata 69, amor mi mosse, che mi fa parlare 72, m'aggrada il tuo comandamento 79, non ti guardi 82, non temo di venir qua entro 87, miseria non mi tange 92, si compiange 94, ha bisogno…di te 98-99, io a te lo raccomando 99, nimica di ciascun crudele 100, soccorri 104, t'amo` tanto 104, la pieta del suo pianto 106, lagrimando 116, venni a te 118, ti levai 119, ti tolse 120, curan 125, tanto ben ti promette 126, pietosa 133, mi soccorse 133, un sol volere e` d'ambedue 139).

[23] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2) in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana*, pp. 95-114. Hollander points to the link between language and motion, language and compassion, emotional and

According to Jacoff and Stephany the relationship between language and motion in *Inferno* 2 establishes the potential role of poetry in the poem.[24] While their observation may be valid, it does not take into account the potential role of friendship. On a closer examination one realizes that both discourse and motion are grounded in the compassion of friends. While establishing the potential role of poetry through the relationship between language and motion, *Inferno* 2 also establishes the role of friendship in relation to spiritual salvation. Movement is linked to the Logos, which in turn is linked to *caritas*. It is precisely in relation to the Logos that the words of friends find significance.

Virgil and Beatrice travel great distances to ensure Dante's safety and well-being. Distance makes their friendship more palpable and real. Virgil leaves Limbo to arrive at the *selva oscur*a. [25] (*Inf.* 1, 2) He leads Dante to safety: *E venni a te cosi` com'ella volse*: */ d'innanzi a quella fiera ti levai / che del bel monte il corto andar ti tolse* [26] (*Inf.* 2, 118-120). As R. Jacoff and W. Stephany note, Virgil's motivation is grounded in loving compassion, *di te mi dolve* [27] (*Inf.* 2, 51). Similarly, Beatrice's motivation is grounded in concern and compassion for Dante. She descends from Heaven to Limbo and enlists Virgil's assistance so that Dante may be saved (*Inf.* 2, 69).[28] Through the intercession of both friends great distances are bridged and proximity toward God attained. A close reading of *Inferno* 2 shows that in fact characters are moved and change initiated through

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physical movement; cf. Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Inferno* II in *Lectura Dantis Americana*, (1989), p. 6. The authors note the relation between love and motion.

[24] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 4 and p. 8.

[25] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 2: "dark wood"

[26] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 118-120: "And so I came to you just as she wished. / I saved you from the beast denying you / the short way to the mountain of delight."

[27] Dant, *Inferno* II, 51: "I felt compassion for you" cf. Rachel Jachoff and William A. Stephany, "Inferno II," in *Lectura Dantis Americana* (1989), see p. 9.

the intercession and discourse of both Virgil and Beatrice, two benevolent friends: By means of Beatrice's speech, which is *soave e piana* [29] (*Inf.* 2, 56), and by means of Virgil's *parola ornata* [30] (*Inf.* 2, 67) Dante is moved from *stasis* to action. By recounting his encounter with Beatrice in Limbo, Virgil moves Dante both internally--*Tu m'hai con disiderio il cor disposto / si` al venir con le parole tue, / ch'i` son tornato nel primo proposto* [31] (*Inf.* 2, 136-138)--and externally: *e poi che mosso fue, / intrai per lo cammino alto e silvestro* [32] (*Inf.* 2, 141-142). While discourse is indeed an expression, or articulation of movement, it is also the basis of friendship. Ultimately it is through the compassion and the discourse of friends that Dante's spirit is rejuvenated (*Inf.* 2, 37-42) and he is moved to action (*Inf.* 2, 136-138).

The Aristotelian definition of friendship as an activity that promotes happiness[33] leads to an understanding of Dante's journey as an activity and progression toward complete happiness. The events that transpire in *Inferno* 2 place Dante's voyage toward perfection and happiness within the realm of friendship. Notwithstanding their lengthy speeches, Virgil and Beatrice are not passive observers so much as they are active participants. It may be useful, therefore, to recall Singleton's application of Aristotle's theory of becoming, *generatio*, to his study of Dante's experience of happiness at the top

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[28] Dante, *Inferno* II, 69: "l'aiuta si` ch'i' ne sia consolata." See Amilcare A. Iannucci, "Beatrice in Limbo: A Metaphoric Harrowing of Hell." *Dante Studies* 97, (1979), pp. 23-45. According to Iannucci, Beatrice brings to mind Christ harrowing Hell.
[29] Dante, *Inferno*, II. 56: "Gentle and clear."
[30] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 67: "polished words."
[31] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 136-138: "Your words have made my heart / so eager for the journey / that I've returned to my first intent."
[32] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 141-142: "…and when he moved ahead / I entered on the deep and savage way."
[33] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing , 1985), See 9.9 1169 b2-70 b19, p. 257.

on the mountain in *Purgatorio* 30. [34] Singleton makes reference to both the *Convivio* and the *Monarchia* as proof that Dante was familiar and in agreement with the great Philosopher's definition of happiness as "operation according to perfect virtue," the inner activity of the soul's virtues by means of which man achieves his own perfection. According to Aristotle, happiness is to be sought and valued for its own sake, and it is to be obtained from the pursuit of knowledge. Since creation desires its own perfection above all else, all men strive after happiness. Like Aristotle, Dante also believes that happiness is to be sought for its own sake and that all creation ultimately desires its perfection. However, the Aristotelian parallel of happiness and knowledge represented in the *Convivio* is superseded, in the Epistle and in the *Commedia*, by the Boethian subordination of secular knowledge to the source of ultimate truth and happiness, or God. In contrast to Aristotle, Dante locates ultimate perfection and happiness in Heaven. His own voyage toward happiness is necessarily an ascent toward God. For both Dante and Aristotle friendship is an activity that leads to happiness and perfection. However, since the Christian poet locates perfection and happiness in God, for him friendship is a bridge between man and God.

At the opening of *Inferno* 2 friendship is indirectly evoked through Dante's isolation and loneliness. Despite Virgil's presence, Dante describes himself as being alone, *e io sol uno*[35] (*Inf.* 2, 3), a phrase which permits the reader to feel the magnitude and depth of Dante's loneliness. His isolation and desolation are magnified through a preoccupation and an obsessive concern with his personal I, (*io*)-a pronoun used five

[34] Charles Singleton, *Dante Studies Journey to Beatrice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 101-105.
[35] Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, II, 3: "and I, alone"

times in the span of four lines.[36] It is most appropriate that the entrance to Hell, a place marked by its distance from God and the total absence of His light, should be found in isolation and at night. The somber and heavy tone established by the nocturnal setting supports and intensifies loneliness, loss of hope and faith.[37] Here it is useful to recall Mazzoni's understanding of the canto's nocturnal setting as a sign of Dante's distance from God.[38] In distancing himself from God, Dante has also distanced himself from the community of God and from his fellow men. Vulnerable, insecure, alone, and about to enter the abyss of Hell, only an act of friendship, to be sure, can restore Dante from this spiritual chaos.

Commentators have read the verse *e io sol uno*[39] (*Inf.* 2, 3) in various ways. Some find in it an affirmation for an allegorical interpretation of Virgil as Reason,[40] while others hear classical literary echoes.[41] Against Buti's allegorical interpretation and

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[36] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II, p. 8.

[37] Siro A. Chimenz, "Il Canto II dell'*Inferno*," *Letture Dantesche*, ed. Giovanni Getto (Firenze: Sansoni, 1963), pp. 28-29: "Quel tramoto si rileva come paesaggio spirituale: e` tramonto di fede e speranza; e` il riflesso dello stato d'animo del poeta, che <<sol uno>> sulla terra si accinge a una impresa, sotto ogni aspetto, spaventosa come una Guerra."

[38] Francesco Mazzoni, "Il canto II dell'*Inferno,*" in *Saggio per un nuovo commento alla* "*Divina Commedia*." *Inferno*, *Canti I-III*. (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967), pp. 166-170. cf. Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, "The Canto of the Word," in *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II (1989). See p. 95. Jacoff and Stephany note that, Mazzoni discusses the symbolic significance of the canto's nocturnal setting in relation to Dante's distance from God.

[39] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 3: "and I, alone."

[40] Buti (1385): "si deve intendere che Virgilio non era con Dante se non quanto alla lettera, per seguitamento che Dante seguiva la sua poesia, et allegoricamente s'intende la ragione umana…che non era altro che Dante" (Buti quoted by Robert Hollander) cf. Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)" in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana* (1990). Pointing to Buti's interpretation of the verse, Hollander rejects the common interpretation of Virgil in the *Commedia* as an allegory of Reason: "This misleading notion—that Virgil exists in the *Commedia* entirely (or even mainly) as an internalized rational capacity of the protagonist—lies at the heart of one of the most persistent basic misreadings of the text confronting students of the poem " (See Hollander's note 2, p. 117).

[41] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)" in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana*, p. 101: "In this particular it should be clear that Dante intended to be understood as being "alone" morally, despite Virgil's presence. Only *he* will or can experience Hell in a fully meaningful way, as his salvation is not yet achieved (despite the many promises offered throughout the poem of its likelihood). He is in *via*." See also Robert Hollander, "Le opere di Virgilio nella *Commedia* di Dante," in *Dante e la "bella scola" della poesia*: *Autorita` e sfida poetica*, ed. A. A. Iannucci (Ravenna: Longo, 1993), p. 256. Hollander looks to

calling attention to Virgil's historical identity, Hollander understands the line in a moral sense: despite Virgil's presence, Dante is morally alone.[42] The notion that Dante is morally alone, since he alone can change, may amount to a valid excursus, though it may diminish the power of Virgil and of his friendship. While it may well be the case that change ultimately lies with Dante himself, the power of Virgil's discourse and his friendship cannot not be overlooked. It is Virgil who, through his discourse, draws Dante out of his *stasis* and isolation and instills hope and courage. In contrast to Buti's allegorical reading and Hollander's moral reading of the line, it must be argued here that at the beginning of *Inferno* 2 Dante stands alone because of his own wrong choices. His isolation is a direct consequence of his own actions, his errors, and his pride.

The claim that at the beginning of *Inferno* 2 Dante is alone because, lacking in faith, Virgil cannot provide moral support, seems to overlook a few important points. First, it does not seem to take into consideration that in choosing Virgil as his guide Dante confirms, to a certain extent, Virgil's moral authority. This reading also seems to ignore the fact that while fallible in spiritual matters, Virgil is the epitome of moral excellence and earthly perfection. While it is true that Virgil can rise no further than the Earthly Paradise, it is also true that he sets Dante on the path to Beatrice, thus taking him closer to spiritual perfection. Having lived before the advent of Christ, Virgil is also free of moral blame, although he seems at times not to think so. As one of the honorable and virtuous pagans in limbo, he is free of sin. This fact is established by Virgil himself when in speaking about the virtuous pagans he refers to them as those who did not sin, *ch'ei*

Virgil's *Aeneid* as a point of reference for Dante, who thought Aeneas to have been alone despite the presence of the Sibyl: "quando esso Enea sostenette solo con Sibilla a intrare ne lo Inferno" (*Convivio* 4. 26-9).

non peccaro[43] (*Inferno* 4, 34). Later, while discussing the moral virtues, Virgil again refers to the pagans as those without sin: *sanza vizio / connober l'altre e seguir tutte quante* [44](*Purg.* 7, 35-36). As Auerbach observes, Virgil is chosen both for his poetic mastery and his moral excellence, his *iustitia* and *pietas*:

> He was destined to be a guide, for not only was he a master of eloquent discourse and lofty wisdom but also possessed the qualities that fit a man for guidance and leadership, the qualities that characterize his hero Aeneas and Rome in general: *iustitia* and *pietas*. For Dante the historical Virgil embodied this fullness of earthly perfection and was therefore able of guiding him to the very threshold of insight into the divine and eternal perfection. The historic Virgil was for him a *figura* of the poet-prophet-guide, now fulfilled in the other world.[45]

As the epitome of human *iustitia* and *pietas*, therefore, Virgil is more than qualified to offer moral support. If at the beginning of *Inferno* 2 Dante is morally alone, Virgil ought not to assume the blame for Dante's transgressions. He freely alienated himself from God and from the spiritual community of God. Dante feels alone because he does not yet comprehend the power of *caritas*. He does not yet understand that his journey is a gift of divine grace and *caritas* rather than a reward for good behavior. Dante cannot fathom that despite his transgressions he is still very much loved and protected by Beatrice, a friend in Christ, by Lucy and Mary.

Feeling alone and assailed by fears, Dante hesitates and questions his own abilities and merit in the light of his challenge: *Poeta che mi guidi, / guarda la mia virtu` s'ell' e` possente, / prima ch'a l'alto passo tu mi fidi* [46] (*Inf.* 2, 10-12). While at the end of the

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[42] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)" in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana*, p. 101.
[43] Dante, *Inferno*, IV, 34: "they did not sin."
[44] Dante, *Inferno*, VII, 35-36: "yet, blameless, / knew the others and followed every one."
[45] Erich Auerbach, "Figural Art" in *Dante*, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1986), p. 27.
[46] Dante, *Inferno*, X, 10-12: "Poet, you who guide me, / consider if my powers will suffice / before you trust me to this arduous passage."

first canto he had confidently accepted the challenge set before him--*Allor si mosse, e io li tenni dietro*[47] (*Inf.* 1, 136)--at the beginning of the second he regresses, fearing that this undertaking might lead to madness: *temo che la venuta non sia folle* [48] (*Inf.* 2, 35). In comparison to both Aeneas and St. Paul he does not deem himself worthy of so great an undertaking: *Ma io, perche' venirvi? O chi `l concede? / Io non Enea, io non Paulo sono; / me degno a cio` ne' io ne' altri 'l crede* [49] (*Inf.* 2, 31-32). Considering the political importance of Aeneas' voyage and Paul's spiritual one it is not surprising that their voyage should receive divine sanction.[50] Dante does not understand why he himself should be granted the same privilege. In the first canto, assailed by fear at the sight of the beasts, he had too readily accepted the challenge. Now, after some thinking, he is struck by the oddness of the whole thing and is assailed by doubts and fears.[51] He still does not

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[47] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 136: "Then he set out and I came on behind him."
[48] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 35: "I fear it may be madness."
[49] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 31-32: "But why should I go there? Who allows it? / I am not Aeneas, nor am I Paul. / Neither I nor any think me fit for this."
[50] Dante is to be seen as the "new Aeneas" and the "new Paul." See Rachel Jacoff and William Stephany, "Pilgrim and Poet," *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II (1989), pp. 57-72. The authors provide a thorough discussion on this subject; Joseph A. Mazzeo, "Dante and the Pauline Modes of Vision," in *Structure and Thought in the Paradiso* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 101-102. In light of the Aeneas and Paul parallel Mazzeo claims that, "the great parallel to St. Paul in the tradition of mystical thought was not Aeneas but Moses and that Dante creates a new typology and parallelism of his own. The two consummate seers are not the *Doctor Judaeorum* and the *Doctor gentium* but the *pater Romanorum* and the *Doctor gentium*" (Mazzeo quoted by Jacoff and Stephany in note 17, p. 113); Francesco, Mazzoni, "Il canto II dell' *Inferno*," in *Saggio per un nuovo commento alla* "*Divina Commedia.*" *Inferno, Canti I-III*. (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967). According to Mazzoni the parallel of Aeneas and Paul is created "col preciso scopo di affiancare all'esperienza tutta naturale di Enea quella soprannaturale del *Vas d'elezione*; ponendo cosi`, fin dall'inizio dell'opera, due termini di conforto ben precisi, che valessero a indicare non solo il senso della duplice esperienza che Dante vive nella *Commedia,* ma anche precedenti, le fonti ideali (e le sole riconosciute esplicitamente) cui il poeta si richiamava." (p. 230) (Mazzoni quoted by Jacoff and Stephany in note 18, p. 114). Following Pascoli's footsteps, Mazzoni suggests that in the *Inferno* and the *Purgatorio* Dante is like Aeneas, but in the *Paradiso* he is like Paul, (p. 232) cf. See Jacoff's and Stephany's note 18, p. 114). For a rather recent study of the presence of Paul in Dante's works see Giuseppe Di Scipio, *The Presence of Pauline Thought in the Works of Dante*. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995).
[51] Siro A. Chimenz, "Il Canto II dell'Inferno," *Letture Dantesche*, p. 27: "Dante, incalzato dalle fiere, si e` aggrappato a Virgilio apparsogli insperatamente, e ne ha, senza troppo rifletterci, accettato subito la proposta del viaggio oltremondano. Ma poi, quetata un po' la paura, pensa alla stranezza di un tal viaggio, dubita, teme, s'impunta, adduce le sue ragioni."

understand that like Aeneas his own journey has received divine sanction, but that unlike Aeneas the culmination of his own journey will be the beatific vision of God. Jacoff and Stephany note that, in a state of moral confusion Dante cannot comprehend the sense of his own words. Trusting in Virgil's wisdom he asks the Roman poet to interpret the true meaning of his words: *Se' savio; intendi me' ch'i' non ragiono* [52] (*Inf.* 2, 36). Virgil who is *savio* interprets Dante's words as a sign of cowardice rather than humility.[53] He interprets Dante's *non essere degno* [54] (*Inf.* 2, 33) as cowardice: *S'i' ho ben la parola tua intesa, / … l'anima tua e` da viltade offesa* [55] (*Inf.* 2, 43-45). Hollander, Jacoff, and Stephany observe well that, in unveiling the true sense of Dante's words, Virgil also teaches Dante how to interpret the true meaning of the words he hears.[56] In looking for a logical explanation as to why he should be granted this honor, Dante betrays his inability to comprehend the power of *caritas*. By exposing the cowardice behind the apparent humility, Virgil teaches Dante that *caritas* is as a gratuitous gift of divine grace less grounded in merit than on need. Virgil assures Dante that he is not alone and that in he is loved and supported by benevolent friends. In other words, Dante is made to understand that his journey is not a reward for good behavior but that it is a gift of love, a gift of grace and *caritas*. It is worth noting that it is Virgil, the pagan poet who has seen Christ,[57] who teaches Dante about *caritas*.

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[52] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 36: "You are wise, / you understand what I cannot express."
[53] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II, p. 8.
[54] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 33: "not fit"
[55] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 43-45: "If I have rightly understood your words, / …your spirit is assailed by cowardice"
[56] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II, p. 9.
[57] Dante, *Inferno*, IV, 52-54: "Io era nuovo in questo stato, / quando ci vidi venire un possente, / con segno di vittoria coronato." In 34 A.D., about fifty-three years after his death, Virgil witnessed a "mighty one" (Christ) during the harrowing of Hell. See R. Hollander's note 52-54.

In an attempt to find explanations for Dante's change of heart at the opening of *Inferno* 2, Rachel Jacoff and William Stephany look to Virgil for an answer. They argue that at the end of the first canto Virgil had responded to Dante's individual crisis inappropriately, by providing a universal solution in the prophecy of the Veltro.[58] According to the authors Virgil implies but never makes clear the connection between the prophecy of the Veltro and Dante's individual journey. If Jacoff and Stephany are correct in their interpretation, then how does one make sense of Dante's resolution at the end of the first canto to proceed with the journey? (*Inf.* 1, 133-136). Even if the authors are correct in their thinking that at the beginning of *Inferno* 2 Dante still does not understand the significance the journey has for him, why blame Virgil? One needs to recall that toward the end of *Inferno* 1 Virgil does tell Dante that for his own sake it is best that he follow him, *Ond'io per lo tuo me` penso e discerno / che tu mi segui* [59] (*Inf.* 1, 112-113). Moreover, Dante's response to Virgil at the end of the first canto indicates that he in fact understood the particular and personal significance of the journey, *a cio` ch'io fugga questo male e peggio, che tu mi meni la` dov'or dicesti, / si` ch'io veggia la porta di san Pietro / e color cui tu fai cotanto mesti./ Allor si mosse, e io li tenni dietro* [60] (*Inf.* 1, 132-136). Dante seems to have understood what is at stake for himself: to escape his present precarious situation (*male*) and his future damnation (*worse*). Blaming Virgil for Dante's change of heart places the blame where it does not belong. For a more plausible

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[58] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II* , p. 3: "Virgil responds to what is imagined as a personal crisis by invoking a "public" and universal solution in his prophecy of the Veltro. However one reads this prophecy, it is clear that Virgil is talking about the salvation of "umile Italia" and not the pilgrim alone, understood as particular man in a specific moral crisis. "

[59] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 112-113: "Therefore, for your sake, I think it wise / you follow me"

[60] Dante, *Inferno,* I, 132-136: "so that I may escape this harm and worse, / lead me to the realms you've just described / that I may see Saint Peter's gate / and those you tell me are so sorrowful. / Then he set out and I came on behind him."

explanation one again needs to look at Dante himself. He is unable to view his particular journey in relation to a universal significance because of his error: his sinful state. It is Dante and not Virgil who through his own actions has distanced himself from God and from his fellow men to the point of feeling *sol uno*[61] (*Inf.* 2, 3). Another important point to remember is that in *Inferno* 1, and still at the beginning of *Inferno* 2, Dante erroneously believes that salvation can be reached by means of poetic perfection and human wisdom.[62] In other words, at the beginning of *Inferno* 2 Dante still sees Virgil primarily as the poet from whom he learned his own poetic style, *Poeta che mi guidi* [63](*Inf.* 2, 10). As scholars note, Dante errs in believing that the love of poetry he shares with Virgil will get him out of this spiritual mess and that secular knowledge is the path to redemption.[64] Virgil himself makes it clear that the literary path is no longer sufficient. In *Inferno* 1 in response to Dante's fears, Virgil explains that to escape the imminent danger a different path must be taken [65] (*Inf.* 1, 91-93). Virgil implicitly evokes Beatrice with, *anima fia a cio` piu` di me degna* [66] (*Inf.* 1, 122). Fortunately, by the end of the second canto Dante will have learned to view Virgil both as poet as messenger of divine grace, *tu duca, tu*

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[61] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 3, p. 24: "I, alone"
[62] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, "Pilgrim and Poet," *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 72-73: "In the address to Virgil in the beginning of Canto II, Dante seems still to be thinking of poetry as he had when he appealed for Virgil's aid in Canto I….His praise of Virgil as the sole source of his own honor as a poet shows in retrospect how imperfectly he understands at the poem's beginning what he will come to learn during its course: the true nature of honor and of poetry, as well as the transformed role Virgil will come to play in his life and in his writing. One of the main objectives of Virgil's speech in *Inferno* II is to correct this misperception: Virgil did not come to rescue Dante as a reward for philological study or because his literary influence can somehow "justify" Dante, but as an instrument of divine grace."
[63] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 10: "Poet, you who guide me"
[64] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, "Pilgrim and Poet," *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 73: "When Dante calls Virgil "poeta che mi guidi" at the beginning of *Inferno* II, he is still thinking of secular poetry and knowledge as the path to salvation."
[65] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 91-93: "A te convien tener altro viaggio, / rispuose, poi che lagrimar mi vide, / se vuo' campar d'esto loco selvaggio." [It is another path that you must follow, / he answered, when he saw me weeping, / if you would flee this wild and savage place.]
[66] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 122, p. 10: "you'll find a soul more fit to lead than I."

segnore, tu maestro [67] (*Inf.* 2, 140). While the term *maestro* still points to Virgil's previous role as poet and literary teacher, *duca* and *segnore* allude to his nobility of character, his sense of integrity, and overall moral excellence. By the end of *Inferno* 2 Dante will have learned to view Virgil as a personal and virtuous friend who will lead him from spiritual peril to moral rectitude. At the end of the canto Dante learns to view his will as one with Virgil: *Or va, ch'un sol volere e` d'ambedue* [68] (*Inf.* 2, 139). In *Inferno* 2, as Jacoff and Stephany note, Dante begins to learn about the limits of poetry.[69] Notwithstanding the immense value of human wisdom, spiritual perfection is obtained by means of divine grace. By the end of *Inferno* 2, Dante will have learned that salvation is attained through the cooperation of grace and wisdom, theology and philosophy. More importantly, by the end of the second canto Dante will have learned to view Virgil's compassion and friendship in relation to the compassion and friendship of Beatrice, *O pietosa colei che mi* soccorse! / *e te cortese ch'ubidisti tosto / a le vere parole che ti porse!* [70] (*Inf.* 2, 133-135). He will have learned to understand Virgil's *cortesia* in relation to Beatrice's *pieta`*.

The way Virgil draws Dante out of his paralysis to embrace the challenge set before him is by relaying a story of compassion and *caritas*. He relays the story Beatrice told him in Limbo (*Inf.* 2, 49-126). Mary, who is *donna gentile* [71] (*Inf.* 2, 94), feels compassion for Dante and moves Lucy to compassion and action. In her compassion for Dante and by means of her discourse, Lucy moves Beatrice to compassion who then

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[67] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 140, p. 32: "You are my leader, you my lord and master."
[68] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 139, p. 32: "Set out then, for one will prompts us both."
[69] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stepahny, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II, p. 72.
[70] Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, II, 133-135: "O how compassionate was she to help me, / how courteous were you, so ready to obey / the truthful words she spoke to you!"

descends to Limbo and by means of her own discourse moves Virgil to compassion and action: *nel primo punto che di te mi dolve* (*Inf.* 2, 51).[72] Lucy is dismayed by Beatrice's seeming lack of compassion for Dante: *loda di Dio vera, / che' non soccorri quei che t'amo` tanto, / ch'usci` per te de la volgare schiera?* [73] (*Inf.* 2, 103-105). In retrospect Lucy's harsh tone is justified and merited. Why is Beatrice indifferent to the suffering of her friend? Why is she not rushing to his rescue at a time when he most needs her help? Does she not hear his anguished cry and does she not see the imminent danger facing him? (*Inf.* 2, 106-108). By means of rational discourse Lucy moves Beatrice to compassion and action. No sooner had she finished speaking that Beatrice rushes to Dante's rescue. Eager to deliver Dante from danger and lead him toward his good, Beatrice descends from her heavenly seat to seek Virgil's assistance in Limbo (*Inf.* 2, 109-114). This story of compassion that begins with Mary and ends with Virgil, as told in *Inferno* 2, serves to underscore the harmonious balance between human compassion and the divine compassion, virtue and grace. It is Mary, a gracious heavenly lady (*Inf.* 2, 94), who initiates the process of compassion that begins in the heavens and ends on earth. It is Lucy's appeal to Beatrice's dual nature, to her divinity and her humanity that moves Beatrice to compassion and action (*Inf.* 2, 103-105). Jacoff and Stephany note that, Lucy's words serve the dual purpose of recalling the earthly Beatrice of the *Vita Nuova* and preparing for her advent in *Purgatorio* 30.[74] When Lucy concludes by stating that

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[71] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 94, p. 30: "a gracious lady"
[72] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 51: when first I felt compassion for you."
[73] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 103-105: "Beatrice, true praise of God, / why do you not help the one who loved you so / that for your sake he left the vulgar herd?"
[74] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 38. According to Jacoff and Stephany, Lucy's words recall the earthly Beatrice of the *Vita Nuova* and the heavenly Beatrice who reappears to Dante in *Purgatorio* 30: "Her cameo appearance in Canto II serves a double purpose: it both recalls the youthful Beatrice of the *Vita Nuova* and anticipates the transfigured Beatrice who will guide

Beatrice had led Dante to leave *la volgare schiera*, she recalls the *Vita Nuova*. This was a time when Dante turned away from a more conventional love poetry to what he names the *dolce stil novo* [75] (*Purg.* 24, 57), a poetry that celebrates Beatrice in her higher and Christological significance.[76] In turn Beatrice descends to Limbo and appeals to Virgil's secular nature, to his moral excellence, his nobility of character (*cortese*),[77] and to his poetic speech (*con la tua parola ornata*).[78] She trusts that through the power of his discourse Virgil will bring Dante to safety: *Or movi, e con la tua parola ornata / e con cio` c'ha mestieri al suo campare,/ l'aiuta si` ch'i' ne sia consolata* [79] (*Inf.* 2, 67-69). Scholars note the apparent rhetorical emptiness in this line. As one of the blessed Beatrice has no need for consolation. Chimenz reads the line as a testament of her dual nature; she is divine yet capable of the most refined human emotions. [80] To be sure, the tone of compassion and benevolence is meant to impress. One is touched by the depth of Beatrice's love for Dante, by the human pathos. Beatrice appeals to Virgil's compassion. She begins her speech with a sort of *captatio benevolentiae* in the hope that he in turn will show benevolence to Dante. Her plea to Virgil begins with a complement to be then

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from *Purgatorio* XXX on. Lucy suggests an earlier narrative prehistory by reminding Beatrice (and the reader) of 'quei che t'amo` tanto, / ch'usci` per te de la volgare schiera'; such a statement grants Beatrice a reality outside the poem and assumes a narrative continuity with the *Vita Nuova*."

[75] Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), XXIV, 57: "the sweet new style" cf. see Robert Hollander's note to verses 55-63. In an attempt to understand what Dante means by the phrase "dolce stil novo," Hollander provides "a series of hypotheses" that outline key points.

[76] See Francesco Mazzoni, *Saggio di un nuovo commento alla "Divina Commedia" : "Inferno—Canti I-III*, pp. 289-93); Robert Hollander, "Dante's dolce stil novo' and the *Comedy,*" in *Dante: mito e poesia. Atti del secondo Seminario dantesco internazionale,* ed. M. Picone and T. Crivelli (Florence: Cesati, 1999), pp. 263-81.

[77] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 58: "corteous"

[78] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 67: "with your polished speech"

[79] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 67-69: "Set out, and with your polished words / and whatever else is needed for his safety, / go to his aid, that I may be consoled."

followed by a promise to praise him to God once she returns in heaven. Beatrice concludes her discourse in the same way she had begun, by complimenting Virgil. And finally, she cries. As it will be observed later, Beatrice's tears are a vivid sign of a human form of compassion, and of friendship.[81] By means of her discourse and her tears, she moves Virgil to compassion. Virgil responds by eagerly coming to the rescue, *tanto m'aggrada il tuo comandamento, / che l'ubidir, se gia` fosse, m'e` tardi; / piu` non t'e` uo' ch'aprirmi il tuo talento* [82] (*Inf.* 2, 79-81). It is worth noting that, while Virgil's discourse instills courage and hope, ultimately it is the assurance of divine compassion and Beatrice's love and friendship that revives Dante's spirit, *Tu m'hai con disiderio il cor disposto / si` al venir con le parole tue, / ch'i' son tornato nel primo proposto* [83] (*Inf.* 2, 136-138). This news of compassion and love brings new hope and Dante is able to overcome his fears and doubts and to embrace Virgil and Beatrice as true friends. Their faith in him instills faith in himself; he begins to believe in his own capacities and to regain strength to move forth.

Scholars note the difference in motivation between the first and second canto. According to Pasquazi, fear pushes Dante to follow Virgil at the end of *Inferno* 1, while

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[80] Siro A. Chimenz, "Il Canto II Dell'Inferno," *Letture Dantesche*, ed. Giovanni Getto, p. 35: "E` una beata che parla, e non ha bisogno di consolazione; ma, se la sua condizione e` di beata, il tono della sua parola e` patetico e umano."

[81] Robert Hollander, *Allegory in Dante's Commedia* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1969), pp.91-92. Hollander notes the Virgilian echo in Beatrice's tears. Like Beatrice,Venus also sheds tears of mercy in *Aeneid* I: "et lacrimis oculos suffusa nitentis" (I, 228) [her bright eyes dimmed and tearful]. Jacoff and Stephany (1989, p. 41) note the Biblical resonance in her tears--the salvation oracle of Jeremiah where the prophet describes Rachel' s intervention on behalf of the Jews on their way to exile to Babylon.

[82] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 79-81: "so pleased am I at your command that my consent, / were it already given, would be given late. You have but to make your desire known."

[83] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 136-138: "Your words have made my heart / so eager for the journey / that I've returned to my first intent."

in *Inferno* 2 the motive is more positive.[84] It may be suggested here that what Pasquazi terms *una vocazione positiva* [85] when referring to Dante's positive outlook at the end of *Inferno* 2, may be the fruit of friendship. The love, compassion, and support of both Beatrice and Virgil, their friendship, are causes for Dante's positive outlook at the end of the second canto. The assurance of friendship gives new hope for success. Friendship transforms fears, doubts, and isolation (*Inf.* 2, 3) to eagerness and desire for action (*Inf.* 2, 136-138). An important function of the story told by Beatrice in Limbo is to revive Dante's spirit in new strength and hope. Another function of the story is still to place Dante's journey under the umbrella of friendship. Still another function is to link Virgil's friendship and compassion to those of Beatrice. She moves Virgil to compassion for Dante. Without her intervention Virgil cannot intervene.

Beatrice's story introduces the interplay between divinity and humanity, between Mary and Beatrice, Beatrice and Virgil, between the discourse of friends and the Logos. In the *Commedia* Beatrice is the beloved young lady of the *Vita Nuova* and she is also *donna beata e bella* [86] (*Inf.* 2, 53), who is *loda di* Dio *vera* [87](*Inf.* 2, 103). The shedding of her tears at the end of her speech is another sign of her human nature, her passion and compassion.[88] Her role as friend must be understood in relation to her dual nature, both

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[84] Silvio Pasquazi. "Il Prologo in Cielo," *Critica letteraria,* 2 (1974), 163-164: "Ma quando, riflettendo, gli vengono alla mente le figure di Enea e di Paolo, egli mostra di aver compreso, o almeno di aver virtualmente intuito che quell viaggio non e` soltanto un *fuggir quell male e peggio*, bensi` e` anche, e soprattutto, una vocazione positiva" (Pasquazi quoted by Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany (1989), pp. 95-96.

[85] Pasquazi, "Il Prologo in Cielo," *Critica letteraria*, 2 (1974), pp. 163-164.

[86] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 53: "lady…so blessed and so fair"

[87] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 103: "true praise of God"

[88] Siro A. Chimenz, "Il Canto II dell'*Inferno*," *Letture Dantesche*, p. 39: "Ma l'ultima parola e` una lagrima che trema nei suoi occhi e li fa ancor piu` lucenti: una lagrima tutta umana, e soltanto umana, e di donna e di amante, ultimo sigillo di commozione impresso nell'animo di Virgilio."

human and divine. She is the Beatrice of the *Vita Nuova* who loved Dante as a woman of flesh and blood, but she is also the blessed Beatrice who now loves him in her divinity.

That Beatrice is a friend to Dante is a fact that she herself asserts. In her plea to Virgil, she describes Dante as her friend rather than a friend of Fortune: *l'amico mio, e non de la ventura, / ne la diserta piaggia e` impedito* [89] (*Inf.* 2, 61-62). Beatrice's famous declaration of friendship in *Inferno* 2 has stirred no fewer than seven interpretations.[90] In an enlightening study of *Inferno* 2, Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany provide a rather thorough overview of the interpretive history of the line.[91] While studying the line in relation to friendship and in an effort to place it within a history of literary interpretation, a summary of the authors' overview is here provided. The more obvious and literal interpretation of the line is that Dante is a friend of Beatrice although he is a victim or an enemy of fortune. This interpretation, as noted by Jacoff and Stephany, dates back to Jacopo della Lana, Boccaccio, and l'Anonimo Fiorentino.[92] As the authors note, a common argument against this interpretation is that in 1300, the fictive time of the *Commedia,* Dante was in fact blessed with good fortune.[93] One of the major contributions that Jacoff and Stephany make is to expose the faultiness of this argument by pointing out the Boethian resonance in Dante's line. The authors call attention to the similarity between Beatrice's words and those of lady Philosophy in her

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[89] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 61-62: "my friend, who is no friend of Fortune, / is so hindered on his way upon the desert slope."
[90] Francesco Mazzoni, "Il Canto II dell'*Inferno*," in *Saggio per un nuovo commento alla "Divina Commedia." Inferno, Canti* I-III (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967), pp. 256-277.
[91] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, pp. 44 – 46.
[92] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II, p. 44. Jacoff and Stephany observe that Boccaccio interprets Beatrice's line as an attempt to enlist Virgil's assistance by appealing to his sense of compassion through a display of her own loyalty and compassion.
[93] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 44.

discussion of fortune and friendship in the *Consolation of Philosophy*.[94] In the beginning of Book II of the *Consolation*, lady Philosophy warns Boethius against the deceptions of Fortune and of her friendship: *Intellego multiformes illius prodigii fucos et eo usque cum his quos eludere nititur blandissimam familiaritatem, dum intolerabili dolore confundat quos insperata reliquerit* [95] (*The Consolation of Philosophy*, II, i). Philosophy teaches Boethius a lesson about the paradoxical nature of good and bad fortune: good fortune deceives while bad fortune, through the constancy of her fickleness, instructs about the fragility of happiness. Philosophy concludes, *Nunc et amissas opes querere; quod pretiosissimum diuitiarum genus est amicos inuenisti*"[96] (*The Consolation Of Philosohy*, II, viii). In losing what appeared to be his good fortune, wealth, power, and riches, Boethius found the most valuable asset, that is true friendship. The love of friends is a constant through fortunate times and unfortunate times. During unfortunate times false friends disappear while true friends remain faithful in their love. While emphasizing the Boethian resonance in Dante's line, Jacoff and Stephany argue that in 1300 what then appeared to be Dante's good fortune in reality was his bad fortune.[97] Deceived by false goods, Dante had turned away from Beatrice. She, on the other hand, as a true and committed friend, remained loyal in her love for Dante. The depth of her love and

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[94] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 86.
[95] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. V. E. Watts (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 54: "I know the many disguises of that monster, Fortune, and the extent to which she seduces with friendship th very people she is striving to cheat, until she overwhelms them with unbearable grief at the suddenness of her desertion."
[96] Boethius, *The Consolation*, p. 77: "So you are weeping over lost riches when you have really found the most precious of all riches—friends who are true friends."
[97] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 86: "In his self-deception, he attributed what he thought was his good fortune to the conquest of Beatrice in his affections by her rival Philosophy, and yet through it all, *Inferno* II asserts, Beatrice's love remains unbroken….What one might have taken to have been his good fortune proves only that at that time, despite appearances, he was not in reality Fortune's friend."

devotion is asserted by Beatrice herself in *Purgatorio* 30, as part of her explanation to the angels for her harshness toward Dante (*Purg.* 30, 126-139). She explains that notwithstanding Dante's transgressions, after her death she continued to guide and inspire him: *questi si tolse a me, e diessi altrui /…e volse i passi suoi per via non vera, / imagini di ben seguendo false…Ne' l'impetrare ispirazion mi valse, / con le quali e in sogno e altrimenti / lo rivocai: si` poco a lui ne calse!…/ Per questo visitai l'uscio d'I morti…*[98] (*Purg.* 30, 126-139). Beatrice had good cause to turn her back on Dante, yet she remained steadfast in her love for him.

A second interpretation of this passage, one adopted by l'Ottimo, Guido da Pisa, Buti and by most sixteenth-century commentators, understands Dante's line as a reference to his love of Beatrice in her role as Theology or Revelation.[99] Still a third reading, one promoted by Benvenuto, understands the line to mean that Dante is the true friend of Beatrice, whose love is not subject to the whims of fortune.[100] In 1943, Mario Casella understood the line as a sign of Dante's disinterested love of Beatrice, not dissimilar to his love of the Beatrice in the *Vita Nuova*.[101] Sharing in Benedetto Croce's hostility toward any allegorical interpretation of poetry [102] and favoring Casella's reading,

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[98] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 126-139: "he took himself from me / and gave himself to others….He set his steps upon an untrue way, / pursuing those false images of good…useless the inspiration I sought and won for him, / as both with dreams and other means / I called him back, so little did he heed them."

[99] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 44. According to Jacoff and Stephany, Landino interprets the line to mean that Dante loves "dottrina" as an end, rather than as a means to gain earthly goods.

[100] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 45.

[101] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 45. Jacoff and Stephany refer to Casella's invocation to Abelard and Saint Augustine for the sake of emphasizing the contrast between true friends whose love is disinterested and false friends whose love is subject to fortune, "amici fortunae."

[102] Benedetto Croce, *La poesia di Dante* (Bari: Laterza, 1921), pp. 13: "L'allegoria non e`…se non una sorte di criptografia….Nella poesia e nella storia della poesia le spiegazioni delle allegorie sono affatto inutili, e in quanto inutili, dannose. Nella poesia l'allegoria non ha mai luogo." (Croce quoted by Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany in *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II* (1989), pp. 45-46).

Mazzoni argues that all allegory is *forzatura interpretativa che nuoce alla poesia*.[103] He rejects all allegorical interpretation of Beatrice.[104] In favor of the literal sense, Mazzoni understands the line to mean that as a friend to Beatrice, Dante is not a friend to Fortune but not that he is a victim of Fortune.[105] Both Casella and Mazzoni note that Dante loves Beatrice with a kind of selfless love that bespeaks complete friendship. Mazzotta interprets, *l'amico mio*, *e non de la ventura* [106] (*Inf.* 2, 61) as preparation and prefiguration for their union in the Garden of Eden.[107] Whatever interpretation one may favor, it seems sensible not to ignore the Boethian echo. Echoing the words of Lady Philosophy in Book II of the *Consolation*, the contrast between friendship and Fortune in Beatrice's line parallels the contrast between true and false friendship. A union grounded in selfless love and virtue, true friendship is constant through good times and bad times. By contrast, grounded in extrinsic and mutable attributes, false friendship alters in times of bad fortune.

The meaning of *amico mio e non de la ventura* [108] (*Inf.* 2, 61) has been closely associated with another much-disputed tercet, *O donna di virtu`, sola per cui / l'umana*

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[103] Francesco Mazzoni, "Canto II dell' *Inferno,*" *Saggi per unnuovo commento alla* "*Divina Commedia*" *Canti* I-III, p. 277.
[104] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 45. Jacoff and Stephany note that, while Padoan (1976) rejects Casella's interpretation seeing it as a big mess, "un grosso pasticcio," many recent scholars, including Mazzoni, accept Casella's argument as sound. The authors continue to note that Mazzoni's acceptance of Casella's reading coincides with Domenico De Robertis' reading of the *Vita Nuova*, with its reference to the double theme of disinterested love and the poetry of praise. This reading seems to work well with the literary tradition that opposes the allegorical interpretation of Beatrice, a position which Mazzoni defends: "noi fermamente crediamo di dover rispingere ogni allegorizzazione astratta del personaggio di Beatrice, come di quello di Virgilio" (1967). (Mazzoni quoted by Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, p. 45).
[105] Francesco Mazzoni, "Il canto II dell'*Inferno,*" *Saggio per un commento alla "Divina Commedia." Inferno, Canti* I-III, pp. 256-268.
[106] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 61: "my friend, who is no friend of Fortune"
[107] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante, Poet of the Desert* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 119
[108] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 61: "my friend, who is no friend of Fortune"

spezie eccede ogne contento / di quell ciel c'ha minor li cerchi sui [109] (*Inf.* 2, 76-78*).* Moore, Singleton, Jacoff, and Stephany all note the Boethian resonance in Beatrice's verse and in Virgil's response: Beatrice's line echoes Book II and Virgil's line echoes Book I of the *Consolation.*[110] According to Michele Barbi, Virgil was addressing *virtu`* rather than Beatrice.[111] For Barbi, Beatrice is Dante's beloved of the *Vita Nuova* and thus cannot also be allegory.[112] Jacoff and Stephany note that in favoring Barbi's interpretation, Giorgio Petrocchi removed the comma after *virtu`* so that the focus is on *virtu`* rather than on Beatrice. [113] Anxious to defend Beatrice's historical identity, Mazzoni agrees with Barbi's reading of the verse.[114] By contrast, viewing the literal reading of Beatrice as too limiting, Singleton firmly rejects Barbi's interpretation of the line.[115] Establishing a close link between Beatrice's words and Virgil's response to them, Singleton reads the line from Virgil's perspective:

> Indeed, may we not see that Virgil's 'point of view' or perspective is respected by Beatrice herself, when in speaking to him she refers to the man to be rescued as 'amico mio e non de la ventura?'…It is a language, a

[109] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 76-78: "O lady of such virtue that by it alone / the human race surpasses all that lies / within the smallest compass of the heavens."
[110] Rachel and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 46.
[111] Michele Barbi, "Ancora sul testo della *Divina Commedia*," *Studi Danteschi* 18 (1934): 5-57.
[112] For a recent study of the allegorical interpretation of Beatrice see Bruno Porcelli, "Beatrice nei commenti danteschi del Landino e del Vellutello " [1994], in his *Nuovi studi su Dante e Boccaccio con analisi della* "*Nencia*" (Pisa: Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 1997), pp. 57-78. See Robert Hollander's note to *Inf.* 2, 53-54, p. 39. Hollander refers to the presentation of Beatrice in the *Vita Nuova* (ca. 1293) as a mortal woman, whose significance is linked with the Trinity and with Christ.
[113] Rachel and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, pp. 43-44. The authors note the omission of the comma in all subsequent Italian editions, except that of Mattalia, stressing *virtu`* as the means by which the human race surpasses all.
[114] Francesco Mazzoni, *Saggio di un nuovo commento alla* "*Divina Commedia*": "*Inferno*" *–Canti* I-III, pp. 276-77.
[115] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 44. According to Jacoff and Stephany, Singleton's argument against Barbi's reading fell on deaf ears among Italian scholars. The authors believe that Maria Chiavacci Leonardi is the first Italian to consider Singleton's argument as solid. While Chiavacci focuses on Virgil's praise of Beatrice as a personification of Revelation, Singleton focuses on Virgil's limited perspective. cf., Anna Maria Chiavacci Leonardi, "Questioni di punteggiatura in due celebri attacchi danteschi (*Inf.* II, 76-78 e X, 67-69)," in *Lettere italiane,* 36, n. I (Genn.-Marzo 1984), p. 7.

> way of phrasing, which a Virgil could understand. In this way, Beatrice is already telling Virgil who she is. [116]

According to Singleton, Virgil understands Beatrice in the only way he can, as an allegory in relation to the *donna gentile* in the *Convivio*.[117] This is not the case for Mazzoni. Intent on upholding the historical interpretation, Mazzoni overlooks the Boethian resonance in both lines claiming that, *il riscontro boeziano addotto da E. Moore non vincola quanto all'interpretazione*.[118] According to Mazzoni, Dante is not a friend to Fortune not that he is a victim of Fortune.[119] The sense is that Beatrice establishes Dante as her friend in the true spiritual sense though he is not friendly to Fortune. For Siro Chimenz, *O donna di virtu* echoes the *regina delle virtudi* of the *Vita Nuova*, a reference to Beatrice's human virtues. Accordingly, as a virtuous pagan Virgil is here bestowing upon Beatrice the highest compliment he is capable of giving.[120]

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[116] Charles S. Singleton, "Virgil Recognizes Beatrice," *ARDS*, 74 (1956), pp. 29-38. cf. Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II, p. 46.

[117] Singleton, pp. 29-38. cf. Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, "Tre Donne Benedette," *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II, p. 44; also see Jacoff and Stephany, note 58, p. 107. The authors note the similarity between Singleton's reading of the lines and Biagioli's reading , from Virgil's perspective: "figura il Poeta nella bellissima sua Beatrice quella stessa donna, che fu di Boezio consolatrice. Ella e` dunque simbolo della Filosofia." (quoted by Jacoff and Stephany, p. 107); see Jacoff and Stephany, note 55, p. 107. According to Jacoff and Stephany, Chiavacci Leonardi's understanding of the line is that Virgil praises Beatrice as a personification of Revelation whose truth surpasses all secular wisdom. They refer to Singleton who differs from Chiavacci by emphasizing the limits of Virgil's perspective and conclude that, "in the *Commedia*, the capacity for the 'umana specie' to transcend its limits must be conceptualized in theological rather than philosophical terms, given the problematic of original sin (see *Paradiso* VII, 28-30)."

[118] Francesco Mazzoni, "Il canto II dell'*Inferno*," *Saggio per un nuovo commento alla "Divina Commedia.*" *Inferno, Canti* I-III, p. 278 (Mazzoni quoted by Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany (1989), p. 46). Jacoff and Stephany note that Mazzoni ignores that the Boethian echoes in Virgil's response were noticed before Moore, by Pietro di Dante himself.

[119] For a full consideration of this verse see Francesco Mazzoni, *Saggio di un nuovo commento alla* "*Divina Commedia.*" *Inferno*, *Canti* I-III, pp. 256-68.

[120] Siro A. Chimenz, "Il Canto II Dell'Inferno," *Letture Dantesche*, p. 35: "Ora, Virgilio e` un pagano che aveva esaltato appunto l'umana virtu`: chiamando in questo senso Beatrice <<signora della virtu`>>, egli le fa la piu` alta lode che da parte sua potesse farsi."

Commentators who hear the Boethian resonance in Beatrice's line go on to read it in relation to Virgil's response: "Once we think of Boethius we begin to see that the line 'amico mio e non de la ventura' cannot be understood apart from Virgil's response to it, his apostrophe to Beatrice 'donna di virtu`, sola per cui."[121] In noting the close relation between Beatrice's words and Virgil's response, Singleton, More, Jacoff, and Stephany all seem to take into account the implied relation between Philosophy and Revelation, poetics and Theology. Of the various interpretations offered, the more encompassing seems to be that which recognizes Beatrice in her dual nature, both as an historical and an allegorical figure.[122] In the *Commedia*, Beatrice exists simultaneously in her dual nature: historical and Christological.[123] Scholars are quick to point out her resemblance to Christ. According to Almicare Iannucci, Beatrice's descent in Limbo to ensure Dante's safety echoes Christ's harrowing of Hell, and indicates that she should be understood as a *figura Christi*.[124] Beatrice is *loda di Dio vera* [125] (*Inf*. 2, 103) and *donna beata e bella* [126](*Inf*. 2, 53), but she is also the beloved in the *Vita Nuova*, who has traveled great distances for the sake of her friend's well-being. Beatrice's human compassion is

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[121] Rachel Jacoff and William A Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 46.
[122] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 46: "For us, Beatrice as 'donna di virtu`' recalls both the Beatrice of the *Vita Nuova,* 'regina de le vertudi' (X, 2) and the Boethian 'magistra virtutum,' Lady Philosophy, who is said to supplant Beatrice in the *Convivio.* The Beatrice of *Inferno* II subsumes both these figures in her new poetic incarnation " (p. 46). The earliest commentators tended to ignore Beatrice's historical identity. Her historical identity is first noted in Boccaccio and in Pietro di Dante's third redaction. Modern commentators such as Hollander, Jacoff, and Stephany seem to favor the historical identification of Beatrice.
[123] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II,* p. 40, pp. 46-47. The authors interpret Beatrice's descent into Limbo as a sort of "condescension" of the Word: "Beatrice's descent, like Christ's descent into Limbo, is a type of the "condescension" of the Word." Later in the same chapter they note that while different in crucial details in their argument against Barbi's historical interpretation, both Singleton and Chiavacci Leonardi recognize and accept Beatrice's dual nature, as historical and allegorical figure.
[124] Amilcare Iannucci, "Beatrice in Limbo: A Metaphoric Harrowing of Hell," *DS,* 97 (1979), 23-45.
[125] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 103: "true praise of God."
[126] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 53: "so blessed and so fair"

explicitly evoked through her tears for Dante: *Poscia che m'ebbe ragionato questo, / li occhi lucenti lagrimando volse* [127] (*Inf.* 2, 115-116). From Boccaccio's day to the present, commentators have recognized in Beatrice's tears a distinct sign of her humanity.[128] It must be added, however, that while evoking Beatrice's humanity, her tears also evoke her compassion as a friend. These are the tears of a friend who suffers because her friend is suffering. As Chimenz notes, Beatrice's tears must be understood in relation to what follows, Virgil's response to them. He responds by eagerly coming to Dante's rescue. The eagerness and urgency with which Virgil responds to Beatrice's tears is a reflection of his own compassion for Dante (*Inf.* 2, 51), but also of his respect for Beatrice: *tanto m'aggrada il tuo comandamento, / che l'ubidir, se gia` fosse, m'e` tardi* (*Inf.* 2, 79-80).[129] In other words, his compassion is directly related to her compassion: *per che mi fece del venir piu` presto* [130] (*Inf.* 2, 117). It must thus be argued that, Virgil's

[127] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 115-116: "After she had said these things to me, / she turned away her eyes, now bright with tears."

[128] Admiring Beatrice's humanity Boccaccio observes: "E in questo lagrimare ancore piu` d'affezione si dimostra, dimostrandosi ancora uno atto d'amante, e massimamente di donna, le quali com'hanno pregato d'alcuna cosa la quale disiderino, incontanente lagrimano, mostrando in quello il disiderio suo essere ardentissimo" (p. 125). (Boccaccio quoted by Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany (1989), note 46, pp. 105-106). Jacoff and Stephany note that, Padoan praises Boccaccio's admiring gloss "as an indication of Boccaccio's sensitivity to the 'umanita` viva di Beatrice, solitamente ridotta dai commentatori trecenteschi a fredda e statica allegoria.' " The same positive gloss of the lines is found in subsequent commentators who recognize and praise Beatrice's humanity. Momigliano notes: "Questo particolare costituisce l'ultima perfezione del motivo principale del canto: una fugace luce di lacrime in cui si tradisce appena l'umanita` dell'anima beata che si allontana. Su questi occhi lucenti si chiude la visione; ma il resto del canto ne rimane tutto ravviato e commosso" (Momigliano quoted by Mazzoni, p. 287 and by Jacoff and Stephany, p. 106, see note 47). See Siro A. Chimenz, "*Inferno-Canto* II," *Letture Dantesche* (1964), p. 39. While noting the beauty of the human pathos in the lines, Chimens relates her tears to what follows, Virgil's speedy flight to Dante's rescue: "Ma l'ultima parola e` una lagrima che trema nei suoi occhi e li fa ancor piu` lucenti: una lagrima tutta umana, e soltanto umana, e di donna e di amante, ultimo sigillo di commozione impresso nell'animo di Virgilio….Quello che segue e` come il frutto raccolto da queste lagrime di Beatrice, il loro riflesso sentimentale " (p. 39).

[129] Dante, *Inferno*, 2, 79-80: "so pleased am I at your command that my consent, / were it already given, would be given late."

[130] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 117: "making me more eager to set out."

friendship, while incomplete and finite, is to be understood in relation to Beatrice's friendship.

In defending Beatrice's dual nature, Singleton exposes the limitations of Barbi's literal reading and interprets it as a type of "heresy."[131] While recognizing the Boethian resonance in both lines, hardly anyone today would see Beatrice as mere allegory. In her dual nature, human and divine, secular and spiritual, Beatrice embodies key attributes of both classical and Christian friendship, human *virtu`* and Christian *caritas*, moral excellence and spiritual perfection. It must be argued that, in the way that moral excellence prepares and prefigures spiritual perfection, Dante's friendship with Virgil prepares and prefigures his friendship with Beatrice. In her love and compassion, Beatrice is a *pars animae*, while in her divinity and love of God she reflects perfect love and divine grace. Through Beatrice, Dante learns to love himself and his fellow men in God. Through her example he learns about the miracle of *caritas*. Beatrice is the epitome of *caritas*: she loves Dante unconditionally, in God. If Lady Philosophy presides in the *Convivio*, it is Beatrice who presides in the *Commedia*. As Hollander notes, the reintroduction of Beatrice in *Inferno* 2 reestablishes her power once and for all.[132]

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[131] Charles S. Singleton, "Virgil Recognizes Beatrice," *ARDS*, 74 (1956), p. 34: "To see her so. To 'read' Beatrice so in the poem, has proved to be something of a major difficulty with the modern reader, and by modern I mean post-Renaissance….It amounts, actually, to a reader's heresy (if we may conceive of such a thing, and with all due allowance made) not unlike one of the well-known heresies that denied one or the other of Christ's two natures " (Singleton quoted by Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany (1989), p. 47); Jacoff and Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II* (1989), p. 29. Jacoff and Stephany argue that the elevation of Mary prepares the way for Beatrice's Christological analogy. For them Singleton underestimates the importance of Mary: "Mary's own role is, of course, an imitation of Christ's salvific mediation for all mankind, but the emphatic feminization of the process of mediation at the poem's opening predisposes the reader to accept the extraordinary claims Dante will later make of Beatrice" (p. 29). For a discussion of the importance of the role of Mary see Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300)*, Vol. III of *The Christian Tradition, A History of the Development of Doctrine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 158-174. cf. Jacoff and Stephany, note 19, p. 102.

[132] Robert Hollander, *Dante* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 121. Hollander here takes up an old debate among Dantisti. Should the *Commedia* be understood as an admission that the ideas proposed in

At first Virgil is surprised that Beatrice is not concerned with her personal safety (*Inf.* 2, 82-84) and she does not fear Hell. His surprise is a testimony to his own inexperience and limitations in matters of religion.[133] Lacking in faith, Virgil does not know about the power of *caritas* and does not understand that Beatrice is acting out of a disinterested love for Dante. Virgil does not know that the blessed neither fear evil nor can they be harmed by it.[134] Beatrice explains that, as a blessed soul, she is not touchable by the sufferings of Hell. [135] She does not fear Hell since she cannot be harmed by its evil, *Da che tu vuo'saver cotanto a dentro, / dirotti brievemente,' mi rispuose, / perch' i' non temo di venir qua entro / Temer si dee di sole quelle cose / c'hanno potenza di fare altrui male; / de l'altre no, che' non son paurose* [136] (*Inf.* 2, 85-90). As a true friend, Beatrice is not concerned for her own safety: her only concern is for Dante. Her only fear is that Dante is so lost in self-deception that it might be too late for his salvation: *e temo che non sia gia` si` smarrito, / ch'io mi sia tardi al soccorso levata* [137] (*Inf.* 2, 64-65). Reminding the reader of the ability of the blessed to see things through divine knowledge of all time, Jacoff and Stephany point an inconsistency of Beatrice's fear for Dante: she

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the *Convivio* were to be revised: "The reinstallation of Beatrice as his lady here, at the outset, at least suggests that the enterprise of *Convivio* with its representation that the Lady Philosophy has superseded Beatrice as the object of his affection and reverence), is *ipso facto* to be regarded with caution" (p. 121).

[133] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)," *Lectura Newberryana*, p. 108. Hollander observes: "The question he poses is indeed an awkward one, emphasizing once again Virgil's inadequacy in matters of faith."

[134] Christopher J. Ryan, "Virgil's Wisdom in the *Divina Commedia*." *Medievalia et Humanistica* 11 (1982), pp. 269-77. Ryan notes other limitations of Virgil's understanding in the *Commedia*; Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)," *Lectura Newberryana* (1990), p. 108.

[135] Francesco Mazzoni, "Il Canto II dell'*Inferno*," *Saggio per un nuovo commento alla "Divina Commedia*." *Inferno, Canti* I-III, p. 282. According to Mazzoni the allusion to Aristotle's *Ethics* III.ix.349 has been noted since Boccaccio. cf., Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II* (1989), p. 9.

[136] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 85-90: " 'Since you are so eager to know more," / she answered, "I shall be brief in telling you / why I am not afraid to enter here. / We should fear those things alone / that have the power to harm. / Nothing else is frightening."

[137] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 64-65: "I fear he has gone so far astray / that I arose too late to help him."

knows that he will be saved. [138] While the narrative may betray a certain rhetorical emptiness behind Beatrice's promise of praise, the tone is meant to portray the depth of her love and compassion for Dante. Her fear and concern for Dante's safety moves her to speak and act on his behalf. Beatrice's fear for Dante's safety parallels Dante's fear for his own safety at the beginning of *Inferno* 2. Her fear is grounded in her love and concern for Dante. It arises from a well-guided love and from her altruistic love of another: it is all embracing. By contrast, Dante's fear for himself is grounded in a misguided love of self: it is limiting and self-destructive. To forget oneself in order to embrace another has a liberating effect: it may open one to unknown possibilities and options. By contrast, fear for one's own safety may paralyze.[139]

It may seem surprising that, while being compassionate toward Dante, Beatrice is unmoved by Virgil's suffering: *I' son fatta da Dio, sua merce', tale, / che la vostra miseria non mi tange, / ne' fiamma d'esto 'ncendio non m'assale*[140] (*Inf.* 2, 91-93). As Hollander observes, her indifference toward Virgil emphasizes the distance between them, one is in heaven and the other in hell. [141] According to Christian dogma the damned do not merit compassion. The blessed reserve concern only for the living, for whom there is still hope of salvation. It is willed in the heavens, *duro giudicio*, (96) that they not be offered compassion.[142] Virgil knows that fact. He knows that he was *ribellante a la sua legge*[143] *(Inf.* 1, 125), and for that reason is forever denied the gift of

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[138] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 16.
[139] Rachel Jacoff and William Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 10: "…fear for one's own security can be debilitating, but acceptance of the concern for the other is empowering."
[140] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 91-93: "I am made such by God's grace / that your affliction does not touch, / nor can these fires assail me."
[141] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)," *Lectura Newberryana Volume II*, p. 190.
[142] Hollander, p. 109.
[143] Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, I, 125: "A rebel to His law"

caritas. How very fortunate is Dante that even after his transgressions he should be blessed with the gifts of grace and *caritas*. How unfortunate is our virtuous and magnanimous pagan poet who is forever denied these same gifts. Why does Dante not recognize and appreciate his good fortune? Why does he still hesitate and think himself alone when in fact he has the support of devoted and loving friends? Virgil gives voice to his sense of frustration with a series of interrogatives: [144] *Dunque: che e`? perche', perche' restai, / perche' tanta vilta' nel cor allette, / perche` ardire e franchezza non hai, / poscia che tai tre donne benedette / curan di te ne la corte di cielo, / e 'l mio parlar tanto ben ti promette* [145] (*Inf.* 2, 121-126). Why should Dante still linger and doubt when three heavenly ladies desire his well-being, and the words of both Virgil and Beatrice promise so much good?[146] Virgil soon discovers that his words have revived Dante's spirit. In the same way that Virgil was moved to compassion and action by Beatrice's *dir soave e piana* [147] (*Inf.* 2, 56-57), Dante is moved to his *primo proposto* [148] (*Inf.* 2, 138) by Virgil's *vere parole*[149] (*Inf.* 2, 173). The transformation of Dante's spirit is vividly represented: *Quali fioretti dal notturno gelo/ chinati e chiusi, poi che `l sol li `mbianca,/si drizzan tutti aperti in loro stelo,/ tal mi fec'io di mia virtude stanca,/ e tanto buono ardire*

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[144] Giovanni Fallani, "Canto II," *Lectura Dantis Scaligera* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1967), p. 44. Fallani notes the repetitive use of the word *perche`* (four times within the span of three lines).
[145] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 121-126: "What then? Why, why do you delay? / Why do you let such cowardice rule your heart? / Why are you not more spirited and sure, / when three such blessed ladies / care for you in Heaven's court / and my words promise so much good?"
[146] Silvio Pasquazi, "Il canto II dell'*Inferno*," in "*Inferno*": *Letture degli anni 1973*-76, ed. S. Zennaro (Rome: Bonacci, 1977), p. 40; Raffaele Giglio, "Il prologo alla *Divina Commedia,*" *Critica letteraria.* (1973), pp. 156-57. For a discussion of the importance of Lucy see Pasquazi, pp. 40-60 and Jacoff and Stephany, pp. 29-38. See Hollander's note 13 in "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)" in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana* (1990), p. 118).
[147] Dante, Inferno, II, 56-57: "Gentle and clear"
[148] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 138: "that I've returned to my first intent."
[149] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 173: "Your words"

al cor mi corse,/ ch'i cominciai come persona franca [150] (*Inf.* 2, 127-132). In the same manner that little flowers after the morning dew stand erect in response to the sun's rays, so is Dante's spirit fortified and rejuvenated by means of Virgil's discourse, which unveils poetic and divine truth. Previously frozen by personal fears and doubts, Dante's spirit is revitalized with courage and strength. His isolated self, *e io sol uno* [151](*Inf.* 2, 3) unites to become one with Virgil, *Or va, ch'un sol voler e' d'ambedue*: *tu duca, tu segnore e tu maestro* [152] (*Inf.* 2, 139-140). At the end of *Inferno* 2 the two poets proceed as one and their wills are committed to one mission. The image of the two proceeding as one echoes classical friendship with its presentation of a friend as another self and as a mirror of oneself. The positive ending, *e poi che mosso fue, / intrai per lo cammino alto e silvestro* [153] (*Inf.* 2, 141-142), echoes the end of Canto 1 with Virgil leading the way and Dante following, *Allor si mosse, e io li tenni dietro* [154](*Inf.* 1, 136). By means of discourse, Virgil dissipates fears, rebuilds courage, and moves Dante to action. Virgil rescues Dante from external impediments (the dark wood and the three beasts in *Inferno* 1) and internal impediments (personal doubts and fears in *Inferno* 2). By means of discourse and compassion Virgil, the pagan friend, moves Dante both inwardly and outwardly.

Jacoff and Stephany note that while at the end of Canto 1 Dante has become a follower of Virgil, at the end of Canto 2 his own will has been re-emphasized with the

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[150] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 127-132: "As little flowers, bent and closed/with chill of night, when the sun/lights them, stand all open on their stems,/such, in my failing strength, did I become./And so much courage poured into my heart/that I began, as one made resolute."
[151] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 3: "and I, alone"
[152] Dante, *Inferno,* II, 139-140: "Set out then, for one will prompts us both./You are my leader, you my lord and master."
[153] Dante, *Inferno,* II, 141-142: "and when he moved ahead / I entered on the deep and savage way."
[154] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 136: "Then he set out and I came on behind him."

emphatic "intrai."[155] While this fact is significant, one must also recall that in the first canto (*Inf.* 1, 30) and again at the beginning of the second (*Inf.* 2, 10), Dante is to be seen still thinking of Virgil primarily as a poet. By the end of the second canto, however, his perception of Virgil has changed. He has now begun to see Virgil both as poet and as a messenger of divine grace. To be sure, throughout the *Commedia* Virgil remains the master of poetry from whom Dante has taken his poetic style. On the other hand, he is also a messenger of divine truth. If in the past Virgil has led Dante to poetic perfection, he has now arrived to lead him to spiritual perfection. To be sure, the importance of Virgil is inestimable. The importance of Virgil becomes ever so clear in the Statius episode.[156] It was Virgil who through his example and by means of the fourth Eclogue taught Statius how to be a poet and a Christian: *Per te poeta fui, per te cristiano*[157] (*Purg*. 22, 73). Whether Statius's conversion is the poet's fictional creation or not, the episode is meant to emphasize Virgil's salvific power. [158] Statius's fictional conversion is a parallel for Dante's real conversion. [159]

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[155] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 96, see note 9.
[156] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, "Pilgrim and Poet," *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 73.
[157] Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), XX, 73, p. 488: " Through you I was a poet, through you a Christian."
[158] On the continuing dispute concerning Statius's Christianity see Giorgio Brugnoli, "Statius Christianus," *Italianistica* 17 (1988): 9-15; Riccardo Scrivano, "Stazio personaggio, poeta e cristiano," *Quaderni d'italianistica* 13 (1992): 175-97; Andreas Heil, *Alma Aeneis*: *Studien zur Vergil-und Statiusrezeption Dante Alighieris* , Inauguraldissertation zur erlangung der Doktorwurde der Philosophischen Fakultat der Ruprecht-Karl-Universitat Heidelberg, 2001; Giorgio Padoan, "Il mito di Teseo e il cristianesimo di Stazio," *Lettere Italiane* II (1959): 432-57; Alessandro Ronconi, "L'incontro di Stazio e Virgilio," *Cultura e scuola* 13-14 (1965): 566-71. As a response to Padoan's discussion, Ronconi insists that the conversion of Statius is fiction; Giorgio Padoan, "Il Canto XXI del *Purgatorio*," *Nuove lettere dantesche,* vol. IV (Florence: Le Monnier, 1970), pp. 327-54.
[159] Giorgio Padoan, "*Purgatorio* XXI," *Nuove letture danteschi,* Vol. III. (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1970), p. 354: "Il poeta e` riuscito a far vivere intensamente la commozione di Stazio di fronte a Virgilio, perche` si potrebbe quasi affermare che dietro Stazio e` Dante stesso che parla. Anche Dante, come Stazio, puo` dire di Virgilio: 'per te poeta fui, per te cristiano,' perche` la *Commedia* da` una illuminante rilettura dell'*Eneide* in chiave escatologica" (Padoan quoted by Jacoff and Stephany); cf. Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana*: *Inferno II* (1989), pp. 117-118, see note 44: "See Stephany's conclusion: 'Dante's *Commedia* is his attempt to do with his own writing what Statius had failed to do and

The point needs to be made that while his union with Virgil resembles classical friendship, in the *Commedia* Dante neither quotes Aristotle nor Cicero in describing his relationship with the pagan poet. The relationship between Virgil and Dante is a noble and steady union grounded in human wisdom and virtue, in character and moral excellence. It is a union that looks to moral rectitude. Virgil is described as *magnanimo* [160] (*Inf*. 2, 44), an essential attribute of classical friendship. From their first encounter in *Inferno* 1 one senses great solidarity grounded in common interest, in their love of poetry and in their inclination toward the good: *O de li altri poeti onore e lume…Tu se` lo mio maestro e `l mio autore*. [161] (*Inf.* 1, 82-85). Dante holds Virgil in the highest regard as the poet who more than any other influenced his poetic style: *tu se' solo colui da cui io tolsi / lo bello stilo che m'ha fatto onore* [162] (*Inf.* 1, 86-87). It was his deep love and admiration for Virgil that pushed him to seek out the *Aeneid*, *che m'ha fatto cercar lo tuo volume* [163] (*Inf.* 1, 84). Both Moore and Whitfield observe that Dante takes much from Virgil in his construction of Hell, particularly from *Aeneid* VI. [164] Notwithstanding the numerous Virgilian echoes, in the *Commedia* Virgil is much more than a source of poetic inspiration: he is an active participant in search of Dante's good. He gives of himself for the sake of Dante's salvation. As Mazzotta observes, "Virgil gratuitously shows himself forth to rescue the wayfarer from his despair."[165] While it is

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what Virgil had accomplished, albeit unintentionally, with his. It is Dante's response to his own conversion' (1983, p. 162)."

[160] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 44: "great soul." In the next verse Virgil's magnanimity is contrated with Dante's cowardice, "l'anima tua e` da viltade offesa" ["your spirit is assailed by cowardice"].

[161] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 82-85: "O glory and light of all other poets….You are my teacher and my author."

[162] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 86-87: "You are the one from whom alone I took / the noble style that has brought me honor."

[163] Dante, *Inferno,* I, 84: "that made me delve so deep into your volume."

[164] J. H. Whitfield, *Dante and Virgil* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949), p. 70.

[165] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert*, p. 152.

true that Virgil is sent by Beatrice, it is also true that he willingly and graciously accepts the challenge: *tanto m'aggrada il tuo comandamento, / che l'ubidir, se gia` fosse, m'e` tardi; / piu` non t'e` uo' ch'aprirmi il tuo talento* [166] (*Inf.* 2, 79-81).

Dante's first spoken words to Virgil are a call to friendship, a supplicating plea for mercy: "*Miserere di me"* [167] (*Inf.* 1, 65). Full of fear and lost, after the way up the slope was impeded by the three beasts, Dante has been driven by the she-wolf back to the dark wood. Through the use of the word *miserere*, Dante underscores the close link between classical and Christian thought. Hollander points to the dual reference of *Miserere*: the biblical reference pointing to the first word of Psalm 50, and the classical reference pointing to Aeneas' words to his mother Venus, *sis felix nostrumque leves, quaecumque, laborem.*[168] Dante would expect Virgil, the author of the *Aeneid*, to recognize and respond to *Miserere* [169] (*Inf.* 1.65). With its dual reference, *miserere* [170] (*Inf.* 1.65) places Dante's journey under an umbrella of classical and Christian friendship. In the second canto Dante will find out that Virgil's *misericordia* is linked to the *misericordia* of Beatrice, and ultimately to the *misericordia* of Mary: "*nel primo punto che di te mi dolve*"[171] (*Inf.* 2, 51). Virgil, the Roman poet, becomes a messenger of divine compassion, an emissary of a higher truth. E. R. Curtius discusses the union of Dante and Virgil as an awakening:

> The 'awakening' to Aristotle in the thirteenth century was the work of generations and took place in the cool light of intellectual research. The

[166] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 79-81: "so pleased am I at your command that my consent, / were it already given, would be given late. / You have but make your desire known."
[167] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 65: "Have mercy on me."
[168] Dante, *Inferno*, p.18 cf. *Aeneid* I. 327-330: " Be though gracious, whoe'er thou art, and lighten this our burden."
[169] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 65: "Have mercy"
[170] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 65: "Have mercy"
[171] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 51: "when first I felt compassion for you."

> awakening of Virgil by Dante is an arc of flame which leaps from one great soul to another. The tradition of the European spirit knows no situation of such affecting loftiness, tenderness, fruitfulness. It is the meeting of two great Latins.[172]

It must be argued that, Dante's friendship with Virgil is a union that leads to a mutual "awakening." [173] Virgil is awakened by means of the explicit references of the *Aeneid* in the Christian poem. By means of Virgil's compassion, guidance, and discourse, Dante's spirit is awakened to a higher good.

Dante's choice of Virgil as guide in a Christian poem has perplexed scholars. Most Dantisti, uncomfortable with Dante's choice, have attempted to escape the dilemma by explaining Virgil as a general symbol of human reason or as the reason in each individual. Since the time of Emperor Constantine, a strictly Christian interpretation has been offered, making reference to Virgil's fourth Eclogue as a prophetic foretelling of the coming of Christ. While Dante would allow that one interpretation of Virgil could be allegorical, it would be a mistake to follow early commentators who evaded the so called "scandal"[174] of having a pagan guide in a Christian poem by personifying him as reason. A number of scholars, Robert Hollander among them, dissent from the traditional allegorical interpretation of Virgil as a prophetic Christian figure.[175] In favor of an

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[172] Ernest R. Curtius, *European Literature in the Middle* Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper Press, 1963), p. 358.
[173] Curtius, p. 358.
[174] Robert Hollander, *Dante a Life in Works* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), p.115
[175] Robert Hollander refers to the *Monarchia* I, xi, I, where Dante's understanding of Virgil's virgin does not point to the blessed Mary, but to Aestrea, Justice. Hollander also points to those passages in the *Commedia* where Virgil behaves in ways that betray his fallibility as a pagan, such as in *Inferno* 21, when tricked by Malacoda he misinterprets his evil agenda; Peter Dronke, *Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 3. According to P. Dronke early allegorical interpretations were grounded in fear for Dante's reputation and in order to escape accusations of blasphemy: "The early commentators on the *Commedia*, however, speak again and again of Dante's feigning—at times probably in order to shield the poet and his poem from accusations of hubris, indeed of blasphemy " (p. 3).

historical interpretation, Hollander reminds the reader that it is precisely Virgil's historical reputation as master of the tragic style and author of the Roman epic poem that earns him the imminent role as guide, mentor and teacher in Dante's poem: "He is first and foremost the historical Virgilio, most importantly the author of the *Aeneid*, which is what Dante knows best about him, and 'signifies' as does many a personage in the *Commedia*, along 'figural' principles." [176] Virgil identifies himself as the pagan Roman poet of the Aeneid. (*Inf.* 1, 67-75). Dante recognizes him as the great poet from whom he learned his own poetic style (*Inf.* 1, 82-87). As a virtuous pagan, Virgil's friendship with Dante is grounded in virtue and wisdom. Nonetheless, because he is a pagan his virtue and friendship are limited and imperfect. Dante loves Virgil for his moral excellence, for his noble character, and for his poetic mastery, *lungo studio e 'l grande amore / che m'ha fatto cercar lo tuo volume* [177] (*Inf.* 1, 83-84). Notwithstanding the importance of Virgil for Dante, it is Beatrice who teaches Dante how to love another in God. Having lived prior the advent of Christ, he is not privy to faith nor to the gift of *caritas*.

An important passage, perhaps the most important, in *Inferno* 2 occurs in the exact center, the twenty-fourth of the forty-seven *terzine*.[178] With its insistence on love as the primary force of movement, this *terzina* establishes the relation between love and motion. The *terzina* also establishes the close link between love and friendship, placing the entire journey within the context of *caritas*. While noticing the relationship between love and

[176] Robert Hollander, *Dante a Life in Works*, p. 116.
[177] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 83-84: "long study and great love avail / that made me delve so deep into your volume."
[178] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 5. The authors point to the centrality of this *terzina* and to the relation of words to motion.

motion,[179] compassion and motion,[180] commentators overlook the relationship between *amor* and *amicitia*. Love moved Beatrice to compassion, love moved her to action, and love makes her speak: *amor mi mosse, che mi fa parlare*[181] (*Inf.* 2, 72). By referencing love as the ultimate force of her compassion, her movement and her speech, Beatrice is indirectly referencing the relationship between a*mor* and *amicitia.*[182] Both *amor* and *amicitia* lead Beatrice to active goodwill. Her love for Dante cannot be separated from her compassion and friendship. The full significance of the line *amor mi mosse, che mi fa parlare* [183] (*Inf.* 2, 72) is grasped once understood in relation to *l'amico mio*, *e non de la ventura.* [184](*Inf.* 2, 61). Her love for Dante moves her to act and speak on his behalf. Her love moves her to compassion and to action. She is his friend because she loves him, truly. Love moves her internally and then externally to promote Dante's good. This referencing of *amor* in this *terzina*, thus, is an indirect referencing of *amicitia*, and more particularly to *caritas*. Beatrice loves Dante in her love for God. She is a friend in God. In this sense her friendship must be understood as *caritas*. It originates in divinity, *Donna e` gentil nel ciel che si compiange / di questo 'mpendimento ov'io ti mando, / si*

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[179] Robert Hollander, *Studies in Dante* (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1980), p. 82. Hollander notes that the close relation of love, discourse, and motion in *Inferno* 2 is also stressed in *Purgatorio* 24, 52-54: "I' mi son un che, quando Amor mi spira, noto, e a quell modo ch'e` ditta dentro vo significando." Hollander further points to the "theological" sense of these verses. "*Amore*" and "*spira*" iconographically understood in relation to Holy Spirit, and Dante's role understood as inspired poet, as *poeta theologus* and *scriba dei*

[180] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, "The Canto of the Word," in *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II, p. 6: "These lines are the 'kernel of the canto and, in a sense, of the poem: the relationship between love and motion which is explicit here is played out repeatedly throughout the canto and will be recalled in cosmic terms in the poem's concluding line, when the pilgrim's desire and will are at one with 'l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle' (*Paradiso* XXXIII, 145)…compassion leads to motion, which leads to words."

[181] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 72: "The love that moved me and makes me speak."

[182] Cicero, *De Amicitia*, trans. William A. Falconer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), viii. 26-28, p. 139: "For it is love (*amor*), from which the word "friendship" (*amicitia*) is derived, that leads to the establishing of goodwill."

[183] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 72: "The love that moved me and makes me speak."

[184] Dante *Inferno*, II, 61: "my friend, who is no friend of fortune."

che duro giudicio la` su` frange [185] (*Inf.* 2, 94-96), and it returns to divinity, *vegno de lo loco ove tornar disio*; *amor mi mosse, che mi fa parlare* [186] (*Inf.* 2, 71). That *amor* acquires significance in relation to *amicitia*, and more specifically in relation to *caritas*, becomes ever more clear in the sphere of Venus. A good case in point in *Paradiso* 8. 55-57 is Charles Martel as he recognizes Dante's love for him while still on earth, *Assai m'amasti, e avesti ben onde; / che s'io fossi giu` stato, io ti mostrava / di mio amor piu` oltre che le fronde*[187] (*Par*. 8, 55-57). The repeated use of *amore* and *amare* in the sphere of Venus at first makes us think of Veneral love (of Dido at the very beginning of the canto), only, once we reflect, to be seen to be equal to Christian friendship.[188]

The twenty fourth *terzina* of *Purgatorio* further establishes the role of Virgil and Beatrice in a hierarchical order. Love moves Beatrice to compassion and action and she in turn moves Virgil. While witnessing Beatrice's *caritas*, Virgil himself is moved both internally and externally, first to compassion and then physically toward Dante: *Poscia che m'ebbe ragionato questo*, / *li occhi lucenti lagrimando volse*, / *per che mi fece del venir piu` presto. E venni a te cosi` com'ella volse: / d'innanzi a quella fiera ti levai / che*

[185] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 94-96: "There is a gracious lady in Heaven so moved / by pity at his peril, she breaks stern judgment / there above and lets me send you to him."
[186] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 71: "I come from where I most desire to return"
[187] Dante, *Paradiso*, VIII, 55-57: "You loved me well, and with good reason. / Had I remained below, to you I would have shown / much more than the mere fronds of my affection."
[188] On this point see Robert Hollander's note to *Par.* 8, 55-57. I cite partially from Hollander's note: "…his use of the verb *amare* and the noun *amore* in this tercet, spoken by Charles in Venus, shows how the poet has reconceptualized the nature of love from Dido's kind to spiritual friendship (see note to *Inf.* II.61)." See Lino Pertile, "Quale amore va in Paradiso?" in "*Le donne, I cavalieri, l'arme, gli amori*": *Pema e romanzo: la narrativa lunga in Italia,* ed Francesco Bruni (Venice: Marsilio, 2001), p. 60. Hollander notes that Pertile is not alone in objecting that Charles is not present as a lover. For the relationship between Charles and Venus see Patrick Boyde, *Perception and passion in Dante's* "*Comedy*" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 285: "Perhaps we are meant to infer that the rays of Venus may dispose a 'gentle heart to disinterested friendship, as well as to *luxuria.*" (Boyde quoted by Hollander). Hollander also points to Benvenuto da Imola who presents Charles as a "son of Venus."

del bel monte il corto andar ti tolse[189] (*Inf.* 2, 115-120). *Inferno* 2 establishes Beatrice's authority over Virgil. It establishes their role as friends in a hierarchical order. It is Beatrice that descends from on high and moves Virgil. Without Beatrice's intervention Virgil would not have been drawn into the action of the poem in the first place, nor would he have known about Dante's perilous state. In *Inferno* 10, 100-108, the reader is informed that the damned are not privy to events that transpire on earth. It is simply a fact that Virgil would not have known about Dante's perilous state. It is Beatrice and not Virgil who initiates movement and action in the poem (*Inf.* 2, 40-51). His response to Beatrice's request for assistance is testimony to her greatness and her power: " *e donna mi chiamo' beata e bella, / tal che di comandare io la richiesi* [190] (*Inf.* 2, 53-54). Virgil responds with an immediacy that bespeaks deep respect and admiration: *tanto m'aggrada il tuo comandamento, che l'ubidir, se gia` fosse, m'e` tardi; / piu` non t'e` uo' ch'aprirmi il tuo talento* [191] (*Inf.* 2, 79-81).

The hierarchical relation between Virgil and Beatrice is echoed in Virgil's reference to Beatrice as, *anima fia cio` piu` di me degna* [192] (*Inf.* 1, 122). According to Hollander, in *Inferno* 2 Dante begins the unpleasant but necessary process of downgrading Virgil's authority for the sake of affirming a higher truth.[193] While

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[189] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 115-120: "After she had said these things to me, / she turned away her eyes, now bright with tears, / making me more eager to set out. / And so I came to you just as she wished. / I saved you from the beast denying you / the short way to the mountain of delight."
[190] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 53-54: "when a lady called me, so blessed and so fair / that I implored her to command me."
[191] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 79-81: "so pleased am I at your command that my consent, / were it already given, would be given late. / You have but to make your desire known."
[192] Dante, *Inferno* I, 122: "a soul more fit to lead than I"
[193] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)," *Lectura Dantis Newberryana*, p. 114: "It is my contention that, beginning with the second canto, Dante sets out the task of downgrading the authority of Virgil overtly, if with delicacy. The phrase "Tu dici…" (13) is thus the first clear sign, one that requires only good sense to recognize that Dante has begun to distance himself from his own so very remarkable resuscitation of Virgil. He has come not only to praise Virgil, but to bury him. As unfair as this element in

emphasizing his own unworthiness, Virgil is simultaneously affirming the worthiness of Beatrice. This discrepancy in their authority parallels a discrepancy between philosophy and theology, human reason and divine Wisdom.[194] Vested in Christian truth, Beatrice is a worthier, more perfect friend; she loves Dante through God. Lacking faith, Virgil is a virtuous but fallible friend. He loves Dante for himself, rather than through God. In Virgil's reference to Beatrice, Hollander hears the resonance of John the Baptist's reference to Christ in John 1:27 [195] Notwithstanding the importance of his role as mediator and messenger of grace, Virgil cannot speak the Word directly. Virgil's discourse is limited and imperfect. His discourse conveys a limited and imperfect truth. According to Hollander, even at his first introduction in the poem Virgil is presented as one who failed to speak the Word. [196] Accordingly, *chi per lungo silenzio parea fioco*[197] (*Inf.* 1, 63) emphasizes Virgil's inability to speak the Word. If Virgil's initial silence emphasizes his distance from the Word, it may also indirectly emphasize the power of *caritas* in the face of such distance. It is an act of friendship, more particularly of *caritas*

Dante's treatment of Virgil may seem to us, a clearer perception reveals its necessity in this poem which is striving to convince us of its accord with a higher truth than Virgil had managed to come to know."

[194] Robin Kirkpatrick, *The Divine Comedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 50: "The theme of this canto is the inadequacy of heroic and rational modes of conduct in the light of Christian humility and Christian faith" (Kirkpatrick quoted by Jacoff and Stepany, "Inferno II" in *Lectura Dantis Americana* (1989), p. 117, see note 44).

[195] On the relation between Virgil and John the Baptist see Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)," *Lectura Dantis Newberryana* (1990), p. 114. In Virgil's line Hollander hears the resonance of John's reference to Jesus: " 'Ipse est qui post me venturus set, qui ante me factus est; cuius ego non sum dignus ut solvam eius corrigiam calceamenti." ("He it is , who coming after me, who was made before me, whose shoe's latche I am not worthy to unloose.") (John quoted and translated by Robert Hollander). See also Andre' Pezard, *Dante sous la pluie de feu*. (Paris: Vrin,1950), p. 343; Bruno Porcelli, " 'Chi per lungo silenzio parea fioco' e il valore della parola nella *Commedia*," *Ausonia* 19, no. 5 (1964): pp. 34-36; Robert Hollander, *Allegory in Dante's* "*Commedia*" (1969), pp. 261-263; Robert Hollander, *Studies in* Dante (1980), pp. 86-87, 193n; and Robert Hollander, *Il Virgilio* dantesco (Florence: Olschki, 1983), pp. 69-77.

[196] Robert Hollander, *Il Virgilio dantesco: tragedia nella* "*Commedia*" (Florence: Olschki, 1983), pp. 69-70. For further clarification of the same line Hollander points to Giorgio Brugnoli's article on *Inf.* 1. 63 in *Letteratura comparata: problemi e metodo: Studi in onore di Ettore Paratore* (Bologna: Patron, 1981), 3:1169-82.

[197] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 63: "faint in the wide silence."

that bridges the distance between Dante and the Word.[198] It is also worth noting that, despite Virgil's distance from the Word, by means of his relation with Beatrice he leads Dante a step closer to the Word. While Virgil's silence represents his inability to speak the Word, as Hollander suggests, it also represents his ability to confirm its truth.

If *Inferno* 2 begins the process of undermining Virgil's authority, as Hollander also asserts, it likewise begins to reassert the authority of Beatrice, previously undermined in the *Convivio* by the *donna gentile*.[199] Virgil's subordinate role is clearly to be understood in relation to Beatrice's authority. As Beatrice gains more authority, Virgil begins to lose some of his. Virgil is *savio* [200](*Inf.* 2, 36), yet in Dante's poem he is put in Hell. By contrast, Beatrice is *loda di Dio vera* [201] (*Inf.* 2, 103) and resides among the blessed in Heaven. As mentioned above, it is Beatrice who begins the action in the poem and not Virgil. Beatrice moves Virgil to compassion and action and not the other way around. As Hollander observes: "for all her humility and modesty, it is Beatrice who is distinctly in charge: 'I' son Beatrice che ti faccio andare' (70)." [202] Virgil is more than happy to accept her authority and obey her orders (*Inf.* 2, 79-81).

The distinction between Beatrice and Virgil as friends is further reflected in their linguistic style. For the most part Beatrice's language is immersed in divinity and mirrors religious truth. By contrast, Virgil's language is immersed in poetic rhetoric and mirrors

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[198] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra* in *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, trans. Thomas Common (New York: Random House), p. 72: "In divining and keeping silence shall the friend be a master."
[199] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 84: "*Inferno* II begins the process of restablishing Beatrice's primacy in Dante's poetic life and of reconceptualizing the opposition between Beatrice and the *donna gentile*."
[200] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 36: "wise"
[201] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 103: "true praise of God"
[202] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)" *Lectura Newberryana*, p. 107.

secular truth. Virgil refers to Beatrice's speech as *soave e piana* [203] (*Inf.* 2, 56), while she in turn refers to his as *parola ornata* [204] (*Inf.* 2, 67). Commentators relate the two adjectives *piana* and *ornata* to the medieval distinction of rhetorical styles, between the plain (*umile*) and ornate or high *(alto*).[205] Hollander notes that Benvenuto da Imola (1373) was the first to place the stylistic distinction between Virgil and Beatrice within a religious context: "divine speech is sweet and humble, not elevated and proud, as is that of Virgil and the poets." [206] Benvenuto notes that the stylistic distinction between *soave e piana* and *parola ornata* establishes the distances between divine and human language.[207] Accordingly, Beatrice's speech reflects the humble style adopted in the *Commedia*, while

[203] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 56: "Gentle and clear."
[204] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 67: "polished words." See also Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the* Desert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 157. Mazzotta explains that the phrase is "a rhetorical commonplace in the esthetic treatises of the twelfth century" and that it refers "to the order and design of the poetic text" cf. *Commentum super sex libros* Eneidos, p. 2: "Ex hoc opere ex ornatu verborum et figura orationis…quaedam habetur delectatio." (quoted by Giuseppe Mazzotta in note 19, p. 157). Bernardus Silvestris makes reference to the *Aeneid*'s "ornatu verborum" to point to the "quaedam delectatio."
[205] See Hollander's note to *Inf.* 2, 56-57, p. 40; Robert Hollander, "The "canto of the Word' (*Inferno*2)," *Lectura Newberryana*, p. 107. According to Hollander the distinction between "piana" and "ornate" brings to mind "the medieval categorizations of rhetorical styles, between the plain (*umile*) and the ornate (*alto*)" (p. 107). See also Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert* (1979), p. 158. According to Mazzotta, Beatrice's language "exhibits rhetorical lures through the extended *captatio benevolentiae*" (p. 158). See also Jacoff and Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II* (1989), p. 99, note 27). According to Hollander, Jacoff, and Stephany, Beatrice's speech echoes the words spoken by Aeneas to Dido in his pledge of praise in *Aeneid* I, 605ff.: "semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt" (I, 609) [ever your name and praise and honor shall last], a pledge which, as the authors note, is ironic (Aeneas' words quoted by Jacoff and Stephany).
[206] See Robert Hollander's note to *Inf.* 2. 56-57. cf. Erich Auerbach, "*Sermo humilis,*" in *Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages,* trans. R. Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 65-66; Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante, Poet of the Desert* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.157-58; Robert Hollander, *Studies in Dante* (Ravenna: Longo, 1980), pp. 217-18; Robert Hollander, *Il Virgilio dantesco* (Firenze: Olschi, 1983), p. 153; Robert Hollander, "Dante's Pagan Past: Notes on *Inferno* XVIII," *SIR*, 5, 1985, pp. 30-31.
[207] Benvenuto da Imola, ed. *Inferno*, p. 63: "Et dicit: et ista Domina *Soave e piana*, et bene dicit, quia sermo divinus est suavis et planus, non altus et superbus, sicut sermo Virg. Et poetarum, *cominciommi a dire con angelica voce*" (Benvenuto quoted by Auerbach and by Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet Of The Desert*, p. 158, see note 20).

Virgil's speech reflects the high style adopted in the *Aeneid*.[208] Virgil's speech stands in opposition to her speech.

It must be argued that, this antithesis in stylistic styles mirrors a distinction in their character and role. By means of a distinct speaking style, a particular type of speech, each friend leads Dante to a different level of truth.[209] Virgil's elevated speech is the language of humans, which may be prone to human pride, and as Mazzotta observes, to duplicity.[210] Although Virgil does not intend to deceive, his speech is fallible, as fallible as his understanding of the truth. [211] It is worth recalling that one important way in which friends change and influence each other is by means of discourse. If Virgil's discourse is fallible one can only conclude that his friendship is as fallible. By contrast, Beatrice's speech is *soave e piana* [212](*Inf.* 2, 56) and she speaks *con angelica voce* [213] (*Inf.* 2, 57). Her humble and sweet speech is the language of God, it mirrors divine truth and is infallible. At the end of *Inferno* 2, Dante refers to their compassion in such a way that betrays an awareness of a distinction in role. By describing Beatrice as *pietosa* [214] (*Inf.* 2, 133) and her words as *vere parole* [215] (*Inf.* 2, 135), Dante underscores her spiritual

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[208] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' (*Inferno* 2)," *Lectura Dantis Newberryana* Vol II, p. 107.
[209] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, "The Canto of the Word," *Lectura Americana Inferno II*, p. 17. The authors relate Virgil's "parola ornata" to the more encompassing question of language with its ability to represent truth or falsehood: "The question of the "parola ornata" is ultimately a question about literary language and its potential for both truth and falsehood, part of the poem's ongoing interrogation of the relationship between rhetoric and truth."
[210] See Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert*, p. 159: "But Dante knew well that there is a gap between the language of God and the language of men: for the language of men is prone to duplicity." And yet, it is to the language of men that Beatrice appeals to when she inlists Virgil's assistance.
[211] See Robert Hollander, "Dante's Pagan Past: Notes on *Inferno* XVIII," *SIR*, 5 (1985). Hollander argues that the later use of "parola ornata" in retrospect undercuts the positive sense of the phrase as used about Virgil in *Inferno*2.
[212] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 56: "Gentle and clear"
[213] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 57: "an angel's voice"
[214] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 133: "compassionate"
[215] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 135: "truthful words" Beatrice's "vere parole" are a contrast to Virgil's "parola ornata"

significance. In turn, by describing Virgil as *cortese* [216] (*Inf.* 2 134), Dante emphasizes his noble character and moral excellence. In her first address to Virgil, Beatrice also refers to him as *cortese* [217] (*Inf.* 2, 58). Virgil in turn addressed her as *donna di virtu`* [218](*Inf.* 2, 76). The Italian word *cortese* conveys a sense of generosity and nobility of character reminiscent of the courtly love tradition. Virgil is *cortese* because he has a noble and morally upright character. He is *cortese* because of his human virtue. By contrast, Beatrice is *virtuosa* because of her spiritual excellence, her faith, her charity, and her temperance. The contrast between *cortese* and *virtuosa* emphasizes the contrast between Virgil and Beatrice as friends. In the same way that *anima cortese* [219] (*Inf.* 2, 58) is referencing Virgil's nobility and moral excellence, *parlare onesto* [220] (*Inf.* 2, 113) is referencing his moral integrity and decorum. [221] By contrast, in her spiritual excellence and in her blessedness, friendship with Beatrice is grounded in divinity. The interplay between Beatrice's humble (*umile*) speech and Virgil's ornate (*alto*) speech parallels the interplay between classical and Christian thought, classical friendship and Christian friendship. The distinction in their linguistic style mirrors a distinction in character and role. Virgil is a virtuous and noble friend in the classical sense. And in her love for God and in her divinity, Beatrice is a friend in Christ.

While establishing a hierarchical order between Beatrice and Virgil, *Inferno* 2 also establishes their collaborative effort. Their collaborative effort parallels the interplay

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[216] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 134: "courteous"
[217] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 58: "courteous"
[218] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 76: "O lady of such virtue"
[219] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 58: "courteous spirit"
[220] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 113: "noble speech"
[221] See also Hollander's note to *Inf.* 2, 114, p. 43. Hollander understands "onest speech" as a reference to Virgil's moral greatness, to his nobility. He notes that the same observation is found in Sinclair's translation.

between human reason and theology, human virtue and *grace*. Dante learns to understand the compassion and mission of Virgil in relation to the compassion and mission of Beatrice. Without Beatrice's intervention Virgil would not be present in the story. And without Virgil's involvement Beatrice would not be reached. At the precise moment when Beatrice identifies herself to Virgil by name, *I'son Beatrice che ti faccio andare* [222] (*Inf.* 2, 70) and Virgil recognizes her, *O donna di virtu` sola per cui / l'umana spezie eccede ogni contento / di quell ciel c'ha minor li cerchi sui* [223] (*Inf.* 2, 76-78), their relationship is characterized both in a hierarchal order and as a cooperative union. Each fulfills a specific function and both work together toward the achievement of one mission, Dante's perfection and happiness. The role of each is distinct, but each needs the other. Precisely because "ethics is the very foundation of a life with God," [224] Virgil is the foundation for Beatrice. The moral life promoted by the virtuous pagan is a necessary precondition for spiritual perfection and heavenly bliss. [225] While not being privy to faith, Virgil recognizes the necessity of faith. Rather than standing in opposition, Virgil and Beatrice complement each other. In Dante's gradual ascent toward perfection and happiness each friend plays a particular role. Each friend lends a particular form of vision, each leads to a particular type of perfection and happiness.

The changes and movement that transpire in *Inferno* 2 have been studied in direct relation to the compassion and intercession of Virgil and Beatrice as two benevolent and distinct friends. More generally, an attempt has been made to show that *Inferno* 2 begins

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[222] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 70: "I who bid you go am Beatrice."
[223] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 76-78: "O lady of such virtue that by it alone / the human race surpasses all that lies / within the smallest compass of the heavens."
[224] Christopher Ryan, "The Theology of Dante" *The Cambridge Companion To Dante*, ed. Rachel Jacoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 141.

the process of unlearning to be "bound fast in the friendship of mortal things." [226] Dante's friendship with Virgil has been seen as a preparation and prefiguration for his union with Beatrice in the Garden of Eden (*Purg.* 30, 11-19). It has in fact been argued that as a pagan friend Virgil leads Dante to the experience of earthly happiness, but cannot lead him to transcendence. It remains to be shown in the next chapter that the harmonious balance between humanity and divinity introduced in *Inferno* 2, reaches an apotheosis in *Purgatorio* 30, with the disappearance of Virgil and appearance of Beatrice. It may then become clear how the transition from Virgil to Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30 marks Dante's transmutation of classical friendship.

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[225] Christopher Ryan, "The Theology of Dante," *The Cambridge Companion to Dante*, p. 144.

[226] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, IV, VI, p. 164: "miser eram, et miser est omnis animus vinctus amicitia rerum mortalium, et dilaniatur, cum eas amittit, et tunc sentit miseriam, qua miser est et antequam amittat eas."

CHAPTER FIVE

FRIENDSHIP IN *PURGATORIO* XXX AND *PURGATORIO* XXXI

Trasumanar significar *per verba*
non si poria; pero' l'esemplo basti
a cui esperienza grazia serba.
(*Paradiso* I, 70-72)

Friendship in relation to Dante's spiritual movement toward God [1] now remains to be considered, as does the idea of friendship in relation to the transition from flesh to spirit, humanity to divinity, philosophy to theology. Friendship is here to be understood in relation to knowing and loving, and more particularly in relation to the happiness found at the summit of the Earthly Paradise. It will be shown how the interplay between humanity and divinity introduced in *Inferno* 2 reaches an apotheosis in *Purgatorio* 30.[2] Dante's transmutation of classical friendship is understood parallel to his experience of *trasumanar* [3] (*Par.* 1, 70), the movement away from humanity toward divinity. *Trasumanar* [4] (*Par.* 1, 70) is a verb devised by Dante to signify a crossing over the human

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[1] Kenelm Foster, O.P., "*The Mind in Love*: *Dante's Philosophy,*" in *Dante*, ed. John Freccero (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 43: "What we enter, as readers of the *Comedy*, is the continuous spiritual movement of a mind seeking God."

[2] Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia della letteratura italiana*, ed. Benedetto Croce (Bari: Giuseppe Laterza, 1965), vol. 1, p. 217: " Quest'apoteosi di Beatrice, questo primo apparire della sua donna, ancora velata fra tanta Gloria, scioglie l'immaginazione dalla rigidita' de' simboli e de' riti, e le da' le libere ali dell'arte. Il drama si fa umano; spuntano le immagini e i sentimenti….L'apparire di Beatrice e` lo sparire di Virgilio. Qui l'astrattezza del simbolo e` superata. Ti senti innanzi ad un'anima d'uomo. "

[3] Dante Alighieri, *Paradiso*, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Doubleday, 2007), I, 70, p. 6: "To soar beyond the human."

[4] Dante, *Paradiso*, I, 70: "To soar beyond the human." cf. Steven Botterill, *Dante and the Mystical Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 231 Botterill traces the scholarly tradition of the term *trasumanar*, from medieval to modern times. Among those listed are: Jacopo della Lana (1320's), Pietro Alighieri, Francesco da Buti, Benvenuto da Imola, Scartazzini, Poletto, Casini, Chimenz, Sapegno, Bosco Reggio, Jacopo della Lana (1320's) and Pietro Alighieri. Notwithstanding differences in interpretation, all seem to draw a relationship between *trasumanar* and contemplation while emphasizing the element of human fallibility. Scartazzini understands *trasumanar* as transcendence from humanity to

into the divine, the passing beyond humanity to join divinity. The term implies a process of change and transformation, an upward movement toward illumination and perfection. At the same time as it signifies movement from one state to another, *trasumanar* [5] (*Par.* 1, 70) presumes the existence of both states. It will be seen how at the summit of Purgatory both the human and the divine are represented in the figures of Virgil and Beatrice. In the end, therefore, what needs to be taken up here is Dante's transmutation of classical friendship in relation to the shift in focus from Virgil to Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30. Dante's friendship with Virgil, along the lines of a union resembling those of classical friendship, is understood as a preparation for and prefiguration of his friendship with Beatrice. As will be proposed, Dante's transmutation of classical friendship is parallel to the journey from philosophy to revelation, reason to faith, earthly happiness to celestial bliss. An argument will be made that the return of Beatrice at the summit of Purgatory introduces a new, and more perfect type of friendship, a union grounded in the love of God. Beatrice's return at the summit of Purgatory can, as will also be shown, be interpreted as a completion and a fulfillment of Dante's friendship with Virgil. Similarly, Beatrice's return in the *Commedia* will be seen as a completion and

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divinity: "Trasumanar: divenire piu' che umano, passare dall'umano al divino." Similarly, Poletto interprets *trasumanar* as a passing beyond humanity without which the beatific vision of God would be impossible: "passare al di la' dell'umano, senza di che non e' possible vedere Iddio." Casini also understands *trasumanar* as a passing from the human state to the divine state: ''il passaggio dallo stato umano allo stato divino.'' Chimenez understands it as a means of assuming a superior and divine nature: " divenire di natura superiore all'umana." Sapegno understands *trasumanar* as a rising beyond human limitations: 'innalzarsi verso i limiti dell'umano.' For Bosco and Reggio *trasumanar* signifies a traveling beyond the limits of human nature: ''oltrepassare i limiti della natura umana.'' According to Botterill, Benvenuto da Imola is the medieval commentator who provides "the fullest and most learned explication of word and concept alike." Benvenuto interprets *trasumanar* within the hermetic tradition while adding a "Neoplatonic twist to the contemplation." All the while Benvenuto places *trasumanar* within the boundaries of a Christian mystical tradition, understanding it as a way, through grace, for man to become transhumanized in this world. (All quotes by Steven Botterill)

[5] Dante, *Paradiso*, I, 70: "To soar beyond the human."

fulfillment of the role of Lady Philosophy in the *Convivio*. It will be proposed that just as theology reigns above but not in contradiction to philosophy and reason, so does Beatrice preside above but not in contradiction to Virgil. The return of Beatrice in the *Commedia* thus echoes Christ's incarnation. Through Christ's incarnation, through his humanity and divinity, reason was fulfilled in revelation and morality in faith.[6] Similarly, with Beatrice's return at the summit of Mount Purgatory reason is fulfilled in divine Grace, philosophy in theology, morality in faith, sensual love in *caritas*.

Any study of Dante's transmutation of classical friendship would in fact not be complete without considering Dante's friendship with Lady Philosophy in the *Convivio,* a work that in many ways supports Aristotle's notion of friendship as defined in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. A consideration of Dante's friendship with Lady Philosophy reveals the extent to which Dante's ideas on friendship grew and were transformed from what they were in that earlier work to what they became in the *Commedia*. Dante's friendship with Lady Philosophy thus serves as a point of reference for his friendship with Beatrice in the *Commedia*. Previously it has been shown that by Dante's time Aristotelian ideas and terminology, particularly from the *De Anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, had permeated works of the Arabs, St. Albert, and St. Thomas Aquinas. [7] Scholars have good reasons to believe that Dante had read Aristotle's *Ethics* with the assistance of St. Thomas' commentary.[8] What Dante seemed to have appreciated in

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[6] Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia della letteratura italiana*, ed. Benedetto Croce, vol. 1, p. 151: "La ragione andava a tentoni e menava all'errore….Era necessaria una redenzione soprannaturale. Dio si fece uomo e redense l'umanita' offrendosi vittima espiatoria per lei." Cf. *Paradiso*, VII, 25.

[7] Kenelm Foster, "The Mind in Love: Dante's Philosophy," in *Dante*, ed. John Freccero (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 45

[8] Peter Dronke, *Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 91. See Dronke's note 19 where he points out that Maria Corti in *La Felicita` mentale* (Turin, 1983),

Thomas' commentary on the *Ethics* is his sense of ordering, a concept which directs all things toward God. As Dronke observes, Dante focuses on Thomas' notions that "ethics orders us towards the other forms of knowledge," [9] and that "to know the order of one thing in relation to another is the specific act of reason."[10] Accordingly, ethics aids man's ascent toward God.

In celebrating the virtue of Lady Philosophy in the *Convivio* Dante seems to celebrate Aristotelian friendship. He echoes Aristotle's classification of friendship according to three types: utility, pleasure, and virtue, or *per onestade*.[11] The difference among the three types lies in the object of love and in the efficient cause. For Dante as for Aristotle friendship that is grounded in accidental attributes such as pleasure and utility is incomplete and imperfect. [12] In the same way that perfect friendship is grounded in the love of virtue, *per onestade*, philosophy is grounded in the love of truth and of the

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pp. 110ff "has given good reasons for believing that Dante also worked with one of Albert's two commentaries on the *Ethics*, the so-called *Super Ethica* " (p. 141).

[9] Dante, *Convivio*, ed. Giorgio Inglese (Milano:Rizzoli, 1999), II, xiv, 14, p. 134; cf. Thomas, *Ethic*. II I, 245, ed. R.M. Spiazzi, *In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio* (Turin-Rome 1964), p. 69; cf. Peter Dronke, *Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions* (1986), p. 141. See Dronke's note 20.

[10] Dante, *Convivio*, IV viii, I, p. 247; cf. Thomas, *Ethic*. I I, I, ibid. p. 3. cf. Peter Dronke, *Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions (*1986), p. 141. See Dronke's note 21.

[11] Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, III, xi, 7-8, p. 190: "E [`n] la `ntenzione d'Aristotile, ne l'ottavo de l'Etica, quelli si dice amico la cui amista` non e` celata a la persona amata e a cui la persona amata e` anche amica, si` che la benivolenza sia da ogni parte; e questo co[nvien]e essere o per utilitade, o per diletto, o per onestade" (p. 190). cf., Aristotle, *Ethics*, trans.Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1985), Book viii, 1156 a 3-1156 b30, pp. 211-213. Aristotle classifies friendship into three types, corresponding to three objects of love: friendship for utility, friendship for pleasure, and friendship for virtue. Of these three, only friendship grounded in the love of virtue is considered to be the most perfect and complete. Friendship grounded in the love of utility and pleasure is incomplete since it is grounded in accidental attributes. According to Aristotle the lesser types of friendship are "coincidental, since the beloved is loved not in so far as he is who he is, but in so far as he provides some good or pleasure " (p. 213).

[12] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xi, 9, p. 190: "E si` come l'amista` per diletto fatta, o per utilitade, non e` vera amista`, ma per accidente—si` come l'Etica ne dimostra—cosi` la filosofia per diletto o per utilitade non e` vera filosofia, ma per accidente."

rational life [13] The object of love and efficient cause in perfect friendship is virtue, and its form is a desire for that virtue. Similarly, the object of love in philosophy is knowledge, its form a love of the intellect, and its efficient cause truth. [14] Just as the end of friendhip is the happiness resulting from a life lived together and ordered according to reason, so also is the end of philosophy the happiness resulting from a contemplation of truth.[15]

In the previous chapters, above, it has been shown how Aristotle's notion of *generatio* left its definitive mark on Christian theology, and that it influenced a wide spectrum of thinkers, from such early theologians as Philippe le Chancelier (1230), to Albertus Magnus and Aquinas, to Guido Guinizelli and Dante himself. These Christians found a useful explanation for divine grace in the Aristotelian theory of *generatio*.[16] In the *Convivio* Dante interprets Aristotle's process of *generatio* as a movement from matter into form.[17] In both the Aristotelian and in the Christian senses *generatio* is movement toward perfection. For Aquinas, *generatio est motus ad formam.*[18] According to the Christian interpretation of *generatio*, man's natural desire for happiness and perfection

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[13] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xi, 11-12, p. 191: "…per che, si` come l'amista` per onestade fatta e` vera e perfetta e perpetua, cosi` la filosofia e` vera e perfetta, che e` generata per onestade solamente, sanza altro rispetto, e per bontade de l'anima amica, che e` per diritto appetito e per diritta ragione."

[14] Dante, *Convivio,* III, xi, 13, pp. 191-192: "E si` come la vera amistade, astratta de l'animo, solo in se' considerata, ha per subietto la conoscenza de l'operazione buona, e per forma l'appetito di quella, cosi` la filosofia, fuori d'anima, in se' considerata, ha per subietto lo'ntendere, e per forma uno quasi divino amore a lo 'ntelletto. E si` come de la vera amistade e` cagione efficiente la vertude, cosi` de la filosofia e` cagione efficiente la veritade."

[15] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xi, 14-15, p. 192: "e si` come fine de l'amistade vera e` la buona dilezione, che procede dal convivere secondo l'umanitade propriamente, cioe` secondo ragione (si` come pare sentire Aristotile nel nono de l'Etica), cosi` il fine de la filosofia e` quella eccellentissima dilezione che non pate alcuna intermissione o vero difetto, cioe` vera felicitade, che per contemlazione de la veritade s'acquista."

[16] Charles S. Singleton. *Dante Studies 2 Journey to Beatrice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 45.

[17] Dante, Alighieri. *Convivio*, II, i, 10, p. 85.

[18] Thomas Aquinas, opusc. 27, *De Principis Naturae ad Fratrem Silvestrum*: "Generatio est motus ad formam"; and *passim*in other works.

requires that he move beyond humanity to unite with God, who is his original source for being. Since matter cannot move on its own and relies on some outside force for its motion, both the cause and object of man's movement toward perfection and happiness lie outside himself. Through Grace, God moves man toward Him.

As in Aristotle's *Ethics,* friendship in the *Convivio* is understood as analogous to man's desire both for truth and happiness. For Aristotle, any man who is to be happy must have friends. [19] The link between friendship and happiness underscores a mutual concern for the morally virtuous life.[20] In the *Convivio*, Dante cites Aristotle's definition of happiness as *operazione secondo virtude in vita perfetta*.[21] Aristotle's understanding of happiness rests on the principle that all men desire their own perfection above all

[19] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1985), Book IX, 1169b 20, p. pp. 257-258: "Surely it is also absurd to make the blessed person solitary. For no one would choose to have all [other] goods and yet be alone….This will also be true, then, of the happy person; for he has the natural goods, and clearly it is better to spend his days with decent friends than with strangers of just any character. Hence the happy person will need friends." A bit later, in Book ix, 1170b, 15, p. 261, Aristotle concludes that in order to be happy man needs friends: "Anyone who is to be happy, then, must have excellent friends."

[20] Aristotle, *NE* Book VIII, 1156 b, 5, p. 212. According to Aristotle perfect friendship is grounded in the love of virtue. A true friend loves his friend for who he is essentially, for the good present in him: "But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are good, and they are good in themselves." Accordingly, friendship among good people only is perfect friendship. See Book viii, 1157 b25, p. 217: "It is the friendship of good people that is friendship most of all, as we have often said. " Friendship encourages virtue. See Book ix, 1170 a10, p. 259: "Further, good people's life together allows the cultivation of virtue, as Theognis says." In considering the relationship between friendship and happiness, Aristotle concludes that in the absence of friendship happiness is impossible: "Surely it is also absurd to make the blessed person solitary. For no one would choose to have all [other] goods and yet be alone, since a human being is political, tending by nature to live together with others. This will also be true, then, of the happy person; for he has the natural goods, and clearly it is better to spend his days with decent friends than with strangers of just any character. Hence the happy person will need friends." Since happiness is an activity, and since it is easier to be active in the company of others, friendship promotes both activity and happiness. In Book ix, 1169 b30-1170 a5, pp. 258-259, Aristotle concludes: "For we have said at the beginning that happiness is a kind of activity….But the solitary person's life is hard, since it is not easy for him to be continuously active all by himself; but in relation to others and in their company it is easier, and hence his activity will be more continuous. It is also pleasant in itself, as it must be in the blessedly happy person's case " (pp. 258-259).

[21] Dante, *Convivio*, IV, xvii, 8, p. 287: "si` come dice lo Filosofo nel primo de l'*Etica* quando diffinisce la felicitade, dicendo che, 'Felicitade e` operazione secondo virtude in vita perfetta. "

things and that perfection lies in operation according to perfect virtue. [22] True happiness is an activity of the soul that results in complete virtue. [23] As Singleton notes, operation is an activity and more specifically inner activity of the soul. Consequently, happiness as an activity is the product of *agere* rather than of *facere*.[24] While all men may naturally desire happiness as the ultimate goal of their actions, disagreement arises regarding the meaning of happiness.[25] For both Dante and Aristotle happiness is the inner movement of the soul toward its own good and its own perfection. In Aristotelian terms Dante's journey toward happiness and perfection is *generatio*, it is a movement or a becoming, from potentiality to actuality, from matter to form.[26] There is no doubt that for Aristotle *agere* and *generatio* concern man *qua* man in his earthly existence. Accordingly,

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[22] Dante, *Convivio*, I, i, 1-2, p. 41: "Si` come dice lo Filosofo nel principio de la Prima Filosofia, tutti li uomini naturalmente desiderano di sapere. La ragione di che puote essere, ed e`, che ciascuna cosa, da providenza di propria natura impinta, e` inclinabile a la sua propria perfezione; onde, accio` che la scienza e` ultima perfezione de la nostra anima, ne la quale sta la nostra ultima felicitade, tutti naturalmente al suo desiderio semo subietti." See also Thomas Aquinas, *Comm. Metaph*., Proem.: "Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hominis perfectionem, quae est eius beatitudo" (St. Aquinas quoted by Charles Singleton, "Goal at the Summit," in *Journey to Beatrice* (1958), p.118, see note 5).

[23] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1098b 30, p. 20: "First, our account agrees with those who say happiness is virtue [in general] or some [particular] virtue; for activity expressing virtue is proper to virtue." See also Book I, 1099 b25, p. 29: "from our account [of happiness]. For we have said it is a certain sort of activity of the soul expressing virtue,[and hence not a product of fortune]." See also Book I, 1102 a5, p. 29: "Since happiness is an activity of the soul expressing complete virtue, we must examine virtue; for that will perhaps also be a way to study happiness better."

[24] Singleton, *Dante Studies* 2 *Journey to Beatrice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 23: "Evidently, happiness, on such a definition, is something which can fit very well into a pattern of moral allegory, since such allegory is always in terms of *agere,* of action or movement in the soul." See also Singleton's note 4 (p. 117). According to Singleton the distinction in these two types of activity is crucial for an understanding of the moral allegory of the poem as *agere.* Singleton notes how Aquinas often refers to this same distinction made by Aristotle. cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol*. I-II, q. 3, a. I, ad 3: "Sicut dicitur in IX Metaph., duplex est action. Una quae procedit ab operante in exterioram materiam, sicut ucere et secare. Et talis operatio non potest esse beatitudo, nam talis operatio non est action et perfectio agentis sed magis patientis, ut ibidem dicitur. Alia est action manens in ipso agente, ut sentire, intelligere et velle, et huiusmodi action est perfectio et actus agentis. Et talis operatio potest esse beatitudo." (Aquinas quoted by Charles Singleton, p. 117, note 4).

[25] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1095a 20, p. 5: "most people virtually agree [about what the good is], since both the many and the cultivated call it happiness, and suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy. But they disagree about what happiness is, and the many do not give the same answer as the wise." See also Book I, 1097 b20: "Happiness, then, is apparently something complete and self-sufficient, since it is the end of the things pursued in action."

[26] Charles Singleton, *Dante Studies: Journey to Beatrice*, pp. 101-105.

happiness is attained through the subservience of man's lower powers to his reason, the result of which is that he becomes all he possibly can in this life. Both Aristotle and Dante recognize the importance of philosophy and friendship in facilitating and promoting man's movement toward perfection and happiness, or toward his moral good. One crucial difference seems to be that for Dante, as for Aquinas, *agere* and *generatio* begin with man *qua* man, but in its most perfect and complete form it resides in the Hereafter. Dante's journey toward perfection and happiness, like his journey toward perfect friendship, is thus by necessity an ascent toward divinity.[27] For Aristotle happiness is an activity grounded in secular reason and wisdom, for Dante it is an activity grounded in divine Wisdom and Love.

In the third book of the *Convivio*, while extolling lady Philosophy, Dante draws an analogy between friendship and philosophy. [28] In the same manner as a friend must be loved for virtue rather than for utility or pleasure, so must philosophy be loved for itself, for the love of truth.[29] This analogy is crucial, for it presents friendship in relation to the activities of knowing and loving. The *Convivio* treats *si` d'amor come di vertu`*[30] (*Conv* I, I, 14). Knowing and loving both are at the center of friendship. The natural bond of

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[27] Karl Vossler, *Medieval Culture: An Introduction to Dante and His Times*, trans. William C. Lawton (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1929), p. 145.

[28] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xi, 13-15, pp. 191-192. Dante draws an analogy between true friendship and philosophy. If the efficient cause of true friendship is virtue, the efficient cause of philosophy is truth. And if the end of true friendship is the joy in living the rational life in proximity of friends, the end of philosophy is the happiness attained in the perception of truth: "E si`come la vera amistade, astratta de l'animo, solo in se' cosiderata, ha per subietto la conoscenza de l'operazione buona, e per forma l'appetito di quella, cosi` la filosofia, fuori d'anima, in se' considerate, ha per subietto lo 'ntendere, e per forma uno quasi divino amore a lo 'ntelletto. E si` come de la vera amistade e` cagione efficiente la vertude, cosi` la filosofia e` cagione efficiente la veritade; e si` come fine de l'amistade vera e` la buona dilezione, che procede dal convivere secondo l'umanitade propriamente, cioe` secondo ragione (si` come pare sentire Aristotile nel nono de l'Etica), cosi` fine de la filosofia e` quella eccellentissima dilezione che non pate alcuna intermissione o vero difetto, cioe` vera felicitade, che per contemplazione de la veritade s'acquista " (pp. 191-192).

[29] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xi, 7-11, p. 191.

[30] Dante, *Convivio*, I, I, 14, p. 44: "both of love and of virtue"

human love moves man to compassion in the knowledge of a friend's suffering. [31] While the efficient cause of friendship is the love of a friend's virtuous character, the efficient cause of philosophy is the love of truth.[32] In the former the object of love is virtue, while in the latter it is truth. The uniting force in both instances is love. Love strengthens the bond of friendship, for it is the spiritual union of man's soul with the object of love. [33] In his love of truth the knower unites and becomes one with what he knows.[34] The lover becomes one with what he loves.[35] In both cases happiness is experienced as a result of both knowing and loving and as a consequence of living the virtuous and rational life. A friend unites and becomes one in spirit with his virtuous friend that he knows and loves.

In the *Commedia* the relationship between knowing and loving acquires particular significance in *Paradiso* 10 as Beatrice and Dante move together into the sphere of the Sun. The link between knowledge and love is exemplified in the presentation of God's three persons in one: the Father (Power), the Son (Wisdom), and the Holy Spirit (Love) [36] (*Par*. 30, 1-6). The link is further represented by the circle of twelve lights, or twelve

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[31] Dante, *Convivio*, I, I, 8-9, pp. 42-43: "Ma pero`che ciascuno uomo a ciascuno uomo naturalmente e` amico, e ciascuno amico si duole del difetto di colui ch'elli ama, coloro che a cosi` alta mensa sono cibati non sanza misericordia sono inver di quelli che in bestiale pastura veggiono erba e ghiande gire mangiando. E accio` che misericordia e` madre di benificio, sempre liberalmente coloro che sanno porgono de la loro buona ricchezza a li veri poveri, e sono fonte vivo, de la cui acqua si rifrigera la naturale sete che di sopra e` nominata."

[32] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xi, 13-15, pp. 191-192.

[33] Dante, *Convivio*, III, ii, 3-4, p. 149: "Amore, veramente pigliando e sottilmente considerando, non e` altro che unimento spirituale de l'anima e de la cosa amata; nel quale unimento di propia sua natura l'anima corre tosto e tardi, secondo che e` libera o impedita."

[34] Peter Dronke, *Dante and Medieval Latin Tradition*, p. 82: "The activities of knowing and loving become one together in contemplation. In medieval Aristotelian terms, the knower becomes one with what he knows, even as the lover becomes one with what he loves."

[35] Dronke, p. 82.

[36] Dante, *Paradiso*, p. 230. See Hollander's note to *Par.* 30, 1-6 (p. 240). Cf. Peter Dronke, "The First Circle in the Solar Heaven," in *Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 82: "The relations between knowledge and love are made manifest in *Paradiso* X: they are exemplified within the godhead, in the ordering of the heavens, in Dante and Beatrice, in a host of images drawn from earthly phenomena, and—most comprehensively – in a circle of twelve lights: twelve radiant, fiery souls that show their power to know and love inseparably."

bright souls who encircle Beatrice and Dante [37] (*Par*. 30, 64-69). It remains to be shown, as it will be, below, that Beatrice's eyes and smile are manifestations of divine Wisdom. For now it may suffice that through his friendship with Beatrice, Dante partakes in a celestial *convivium* where *lo pane degli angeli* is served. [38] In the *Commedia* the "bread" is no longer the intellectual food that was shared in the *Convivio* (*Conv.* I, i. 7).[39] The intellectual "bread" that sustains man on earth cannot entirely satisfy his hunger for ultimate truth [40] (*Par.* 2, 10-12). Through his union with Beatrice he begins to taste the food that simultaneously satiates and causes more hunger (*Purg*. 31, 127-129).[41] He is induced into tasting the Bread of Life.

Looking back at the *Convivio* from the prospective of the *Commedia*, one notices that Dante's transmutation of classical friendship parallels the journey from philosophy to revelation, from human reason to divine grace, from earthly happiness to celestial bliss. Dante's friendship with Lady Philosophy in the *Convivio* is a preparation and a prefiguration of the return of Beatrice in the *Commedia*. Philosophy and morality encourage and prepare man's ascent toward God; they teach man how to distinguish good from evil, right from wrong. Human reason and philosophy are means by which man

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[37] See Hollander's note to *Par*. 30, 64-69, p. 244. Cf. Peter Dronke, "The First Circle in the Solar Heaven," in *Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions* (1986), p. 82.

[38] Dante, *Convivio*, p. 42: "the bread of the angels." Cf. Peter Dronke, "The First Circle in the Solar Heaven," in *Dante and Medieval Latin* Traditions (1986), p. 89. See Dronke's note 7, p. 144. Dronke draws attention to Bruno Nardi, *Nel Mondo di Dante* (Rome, 1944), pp. 47-53. See also Dronke, *Saggi e note di critica dantesca* (Milan—Naples, 1966), pp. 386-90. Cf. K. Lange, 'Geistliche Speise,' *Zeitschrift fur deutsches Altertum* XCV (1966), 81-122.

[39] Dante, *Convivio*, I, I, 7, p. 42: "Oh beati quelli pochi che seggiono a quella mensa dove lo pane de li angeli si manuca! E miseri quelli che con le pecore hanno comune cibo!"

[40] Dante, *Paradiso*, II, 10-12: "Voi altri pochi che drizzaste il collo / per tempo al pan de li angeli, del quale / vivesi qui ma non sen vien satollo." I cite from Hollander's note to verse 12, p. 47: "Christians on earth will never be able to attain angelic understanding of the doctrine that nourishes them; for that they must await their afterlife in Paradise."

[41] Dante, *Paradiso*, XXXI, 127-129: "Mentre che piena di stupore e lieta / l'anima mia gustava di quel cibo / che, saziando de se', di se' asseta." See Hollander's note to verse 11.

reaches secular truth, moral goodness, and earthly happiness (*Conv*. IV, 22).[42] According to Francesco De Sanctis, the study of philosophy is both a duty and a path toward the good and morality.[43] Morality is the path toward self-knowledge, *La morale e` il <<Nosce te ipsum>>*, *la conoscenza di se stesso*.[44] Through philosophy and morality man is made happy in this life. Though incomplete and imperfect, earthly happiness prefigures perfect happiness in the heavens. It must be argued that in the *Commedia* Lady Philosophy finds completion and fulfillment in Beatrice. Both in the *Convivio* and in the *Commedia* Dante treats of *amore* and *virtu`,* the difference between them seeming to lie in the object of love and in the direction of the movement toward that object. In the *Commedia* one notes an ascent toward divine Love and Wisdom, attainable through Grace with help from the theological virtues. In the *Convivio* the journey leads to secular truth by means of philosophy, man's natural reason with the assistance of the cardinal virtues. It is in relation to ascent and descent that Dante's friendship with Beatrice and Lady Philosophy must be understood.

In the *Convivio* Dante tells his readers that his friendship with Lady Philosophy is grounded in love and in his need of consolation. [45] In an effort to console himself for the death of Beatrice he immersed himself in the study of philosophy, and more particularly

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[42] Dante, *Convivio*, IV, xxii, 1-18, pp. 300-305.
[43] Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia della letteratura italiana*, ed. Benedetto Croce (Bari: Laterza, 1965), 1 vols., p. 150: "Lo studio della filosofia e` percio` un dovere: e` via al bene, alla moralita`."
[44] De Sanctis, *Storia della letteratura italiana*, p. 151.
[45] On this see Erich Auerbach, *Studi su Dante*, trans. Maria Luisa De Pieri Bonino (Milano: Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1966), p. 64. Auerbach observes that Dante turns to philosophy out of need, a need that originates in the heart. According to Auerbach, in his philosophy Dante synthesizes the doctrine of St. Thomas with that of the *dolce stil novo.* I cite from Auerbach: "Il suo filosofare e` nato da un bisogno del cuore, in esso trovo` confermato cio` che presentava da tempo; la sua aspirazione all'unita` universale vi trovo` alimento, e subito egli comincio` a ricercare una completa concordanza fra cio` che portava in se' con le conoscenze ora acquisite…e come Tommaso cercava di unire le dottrine peripatetiche con quelle cristiano-platonico-agostiniane, cosi' Dante voleva unire il sistema tomistico con la mistica ideologica del 'cor gentile' " (p. 64).

in the study of Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* and Cicero's *De Amicitia*.[46] He begins to attend the religious schools where philosophy is taught.[47] Like a man who goes looking for silver but finds gold instead, in the works of these authors he finds much more than just a source of consolation.[48] The love and virtue of the noble lady was of such power that within a period of thirty months all thoughts of his previous love dissipated.[49]

The debate over the *donna gentile* as the object of Dante's affection in the *Convivio* and in the *Vita Nuova* has been a topic of interest among *dantisti.*[50] It centers around a discrepancy between the description of the *donna gentile* in the two works and Dante's conflicting attitude toward her. Should the reader accept Dante's claim that the *donna gentile* in the *Convivio* is one and the same lady as she is in the *Vita Nuova* and that she is always an allegory of philosophy? Some scholars have interpreted the return of Beatrice in the *Commedia* as Dante's admission of having committed a blunder in the

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[46] Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, II, XII, 1-3, pp. 120-121: "io rimasi di tanta tristizia punto, che conforto non mi valeva alcuno. Tuttavia, dopo alquanto tempo, la mia mente, che si argomentava di sanare, provide, poi che ne' l mio ne' l'altrui consolare valea, ritornare al modo che alcuno sconsolato avea tenuto a consolarsi; e misimi a leggere quello non conosciuto da molti libro di Boezio, nel quale, cattivo e discacciato, consolato s'avea. E udendo ancora che Tullio scritto avea un altro libro, nel quale, trattando de l'Amistade, avea toccate parole de la consolazione di Lelio, uomo eccellentissimo, ne la morte di Scipione amico suo, misimi a leggere quello."

[47] Dante, *Convivio*, II, xii, 7, pp. 121-122: "E da questo imaginare cominciai ad andare la` dov'ella si dimostrava veracemente, cioe` ne le scuole de li religiosi e a le disputazioni de li filosofanti."

[48] Dante, *Convivio*, II, xii, 5, p. 121: "E si` come essere suole che l'uomo va cercando argento e fuori de la ' ntenzione truova oro, lo quale occulta cagione presenta, non forse sanza divino imperio; io, che cercava di consolarme, trovai non solamente a le mie lagrie rimedio, ma vocabuli d'autori e di scienze e di libri; li quail considerando, giudica bene che la filosofia, che era donna di questi autori, di queste scienze e di questi libri, fosse soma cosa." Dante begins to love Philosophy as a good in itself, rather than a source of consolation.

[49] Dante, *Convivio*, II, xii, 7, p. 122: "Si` che in picciol tempo, forse di trenta mesi, cominciai tanto a sentire de la sua dolcezza, che lo suo amore cacciava e distruggeva ogni altro pensiero. Per che io, sentendomi levare dal pensiero del primo amore a la virtu` di questo, quasi maravigliandomi apersi la bocca nel parlare de la proposta canzone."

[50] For a discussion of the problem of the *donna gentile* and the relation between the real lady and the symbol, see Francesco Mazzoni, *Il canto XXXI del Purgatorio*, in *Lectura Dantis Scaligera* (Firenze: Le

Convivio. If the *donna gentile* is always an allegory of philosophy, in *Purgatorio* 30 and 31 she is presented as a real woman. How does one account for the apparent contradiction and how does one justify Beatrice's accusations directed against Dante in *Purg*. 30, 124-126? [51] On the other hand, if the *donna gentile* in the *Vita Nuova* is indeed a real lady then Dante's love for Beatrice is questionable, his friendship with her less than perfect, and the scolding merited that he receives from her in *Purgatorio* 30, 124-126. This is a problem that holds crucial ramifications for the *Commedia,* and more particularly for *Purgatorio* 30 and *Purgatorio* 31.

In an enlightening study of the question surrounding the *donna gentile*, Shaw criticizes Michele Barbi's explanation, as presented in his introduction to the *Convivio*.[52] Referring to Barbi's theory as "the orthodox theory," [53] Shaw explains that for Barbi the *Vita Nuova* and the *Convivio* are two very different types of work, with different sets of ideas, each belonging to different periods in Dante's life.[54] Accordingly, the allegorical poems beginning with *Voi che intendendo* are inspired by a love of knowledge and are dedicated to the *donna gentile*, or Lady Philosophy, whereas the earlier poems in the *Vita Nuova* are inspired by sensual love and are dedicated to Beatrice.[55] Barbi understands the motive behind Dante's pretense: to protect his reputation, dismiss accusations of fickleness in matters of love (*Convivio,* III, i, ii) and of succumbing to passion (C*onvivio,*

Monnier, 1965), pp. 5-98. For a study of the same problem see: Gilson, Nardi, Barbi, Casella, Auerbach, Singleton, and Hollander, op. cit. and below.

[51] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 124-126: "Si` tosto come in su la soglia fui / di mia seconda etade e mutai vita, / questi si tolse a me, e diesi altrui." Beatrice rebukes Dante for having given himself to others shortly after her death.

[52] Dante*, Il Convivio*, ed. G. Busnelli and G. Vandelli (Firenze: F. Le Monnier, 1934, 1937), 2 vols.

[53] James E. Shaw, *The Lady* "*Philosophy*" *in the Convivio* (Cambridge: Dante Society of Cambridge, 1938), p.1.

[54] Shaw, p. 1.

[55] Shaw, p. 1.

I, ii, 16). Nonetheless, for Barbi, no matter how improbable Dante's claim may seem, the reader has no other choice but to accept it. The reason for this, he would say, is that Dante himself tells us that the *donna gentile* is none other than philosophy and that the meanings of his allegorical poems are fictitious, or *fittizzia*. [56]

Dante is asking the reader to believe that the *donna gentile* in the *Vita Nuova* was not a real lady, and that she was none other than philosophy, the daughter of the emperor of the universe.[57] Since this was not true in the *Vita Nuova,* the reader has every right to question Dante's assertion. In an attempt to lend credence to this claim, he refers to the description of the *donna gentile* in the *Vita Nuova* as *fittizia*, fictitious.[58] Remembering Dante's claims in this part of the *Convivio*, Barbi argues against the possibility of any sort of historical truth in the poet's allegorical poems and refers for contrast to *Convivio* II, i, where the literal and allegorical senses are distinguished. [59] In another contrast, for Shaw, when Dante uses *bella menzogna* he does so in the conventional manner,

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[56] Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, ed. G. Busnelli e G. Vandelli (Firenze: Felice Le Monnier, 1934, 1937), 2 vols., xxxv-xxxvi. In his introductory remarks Michele barbi states: "At any rate what is cannot be denied: our duty is only to explain it. Dante's assertion in the *Convivio* about his second love leaves no ground for uncertainty; no matter what critics persist in saying, whatever is imagined in the letter of the various poems about a love for a real woman is now for him poetical invention, it is 'favola,' it is 'bella menzogna,' it is 'parola fittizia'; and when he comes to expound the 'sentenza vera' of his canzoni, he declares definitely that the lady of whom he became enamoured 'after the first love' is no other than 'the most beautiful and most dignified daughter of the Emperor of the Universe, whom Pythagoras called Philosophy' (*Conv*. II, xv, 12) " (xxxv-xxxvi). Barbi quoted by Shaw in *The Lady* "Philosophy" *In The Convivio* (1938), p. 7.

[57] Dante, *Convivio*, ed. Giorgio Inglese (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 1999), II, xv, 12, p. 138: "E cosi`, in fine di questo secondo trattato, dico e affermo che la donna, di cu'io innamorai appresso lo primo amore, fu la bellissima e onestissima figlia de lo Imperadore de lo universo, a la quale Pittagora pose nome Filosofia."

[58] Dante, *Convivio*, II, xii, 8, 10, p. 122.

[59] Michele Barbi in *Il Convivio,* ed. G. Busnelli e G. Vandelli, xxx, n. I:"It is thought by some that in Dante's view there can be no allegory without the foundation of a literal narrative that is true, and that even in the *Convivio* he does not deny the reality of the 'donna pietosa.' But the truth is that he declares definitely that the literal sense is nothing but a 'bella menzogna,' a 'favola' invented to conceal a truth." Barbi quoted by Shaw in *The Lady* "Philosophy" *In The Convivio* (1938), p. 8). Shaw reminds both Barbi and the reader of the distinction Dante draws between the allegory of the theologians and allegory of the poets and of his assertion that he is here using the allegory of the poets.

corresponding to Horace's *fictum Carmen*. [60] Shaw argues that by definition all words in poetry are *fittizie* and *fictio rhetorica*, regardless of whether they refer to an allegorical or non allegorical poem or whether their content be truthful or not.[61]

Regardless of one's opinion regarding the *donna gentile*, the fact remains that while identifying Lady Philosophy with the *donna gentile* of the *Vita Nuova* and in asking the reader to believe that she is Philosophy, Dante does not resolve the inherent inconsistencies between the two stories. Robert Hollander observes that it is rather improbable that the lady at the window is "Philosophy," particularly as Dante has previously asserted that in the *Convivio* he does not intend to contravene the *Vita* Nuova, but to lend it support.[62] Addressing the discrepancy in the physical descriptions, Hollander points to the poem *Amor che ne la mente*, in which the physical aspect of the lady posesses such power that she, like Beatrice, causes Dante to sigh. [63] The two accounts present a discrepancy between the physical description of the *donna gentile* and Dante's attitude toward her. While in the *Vita Nuova* the *donna gentile* is defeated by the memory of Beatrice, in the *Convivio* Lady Philosophy is triumphant. Barbi recognizes

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[60] James E. Shaw, *The Lady* "*Philosophy*" *in the Convivio*, p. 17

[61] Shaw, p.17.

[62] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, pp. 77-78 cf. Dante, *Convivio*, ed. Giorgio Inglese (1999), I, i, 16, p. 44: "non intendo pero` a quella in parte alcuna derogare, ma maggiormente giovare per questa quella."

[63] Hollander, p. 80: "That the lady of 'Amor che ne la mente' was almost certainly not Lady Philosophy when Dante first wrote the poem is underscored by its description of her physical attractiveness (vv. 33-36), so great that, like Beatrice, she draws forth sighs from her beholder." Hollander points out that while the commentary attempts to make the two ladies identical, in the text of the two poems one notes the differences. Hollander observes how in the prose Dante attempts to cover up this embarrassing discrepancy by linking her body to the miraculous nature of God: "The prose disposes of this physical encumbrance with understandable tact and celebrity, insisting that her body is under the sign of the soul, a soul which 'riceva miracolosamente la graziosa bontade di Dio' (miraculously receives the gracious goodness of God—III, vi, 12)."

those contradictions,[64] yet encourages the reader to accept as truth Dante's claim that she is always Philosophy. In trying to account for the difference in Dante's attitude toward the this lady, Barbi draws attention to *Conv*. II, ii, 3, in which Dante claims that love grows and is strengthened by time. With this passage in mind Barbi concludes that in the *Vita Nuova* Beatrice triumphs because in its newness Dante's affection for philosophy is insufficient to defeat the power of his first love.[65] The reader is to believe that in the *Convivio*, Dante recognizes that philosophy in no way contradicts the memory of Beatrice and that he finally gives himself wholeheartedly to this lady. Finding this explanation hard to believe, Shaw points out that in the *Vita Nuova*, in the commentary to the sonnets, Dante affirms that the sonnets are not allegorical and that the *Donna Gentile* is a real woman rather than a symbol.[66]

To his list of discrepancies Shaw adds yet another, a chronological contradiction between the two stories.[67] In the *Convivio* II, ii, I, the date given for the lady's first appearance of this lady is August 1293, while in the *Vita Nuova* her appearance occurs

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[64] Dante, *Convivio*, ed. G. Busnelli and G. Vandelli, cit. p. xxxvi: In the introduction remarks Barbi notes the contradiction: "una dissonanza, e diciam pure una vera contraddizione" (Barbi quoted by Shaw in *The Lady* "*Philosophy*" *in the Convivio* (1938), p. 2).

[65] Dante, *Convivio,* ed. G. Busnelli and G. Vandelli, cit. p. xxxviii: "Se nella Vita Nuova l'amore di Beatrice trionfa, il lettore dovrebbe pensare che la` dell'amore per la filosofia (secondo l'interpretazione del *Convivio*, s'intende bene) e` appena narrato il principio, e nei primi contrasti fra due passioni vittorie e sconfitte s'alternano." cf. Dante, *Convivio*, ed. Giorgio Inglese (1999), II, ii, 3, pp. 87-88: "Ma pero` che non subitamente nasce amore e fassi grande e viene perfetto, ma vuole tempo alcuno e nutrimento di pensieri, massimamente la` dove sono pensieri contrari che lo mpediscano, convenne, prima che questo nuovo amore fosse perfetto, molta battaglia intra lo pensiero del suo nutrimento e quello che li era contraro, lo quale per quella gloriosa Beatrice tenea ancora la rocca de la mia mente." (pp. 87-88).

[66] James E. Shaw, *The Lady* "*Philosophy*" *in The Convivio*, p. 3. cf. *Convivio* II, xii-xv.

[67] Shaw, pp. 3-4. According to Shaw the chronological discrepancy is dismissed by Barbi as unimportant: "This chronological discrepancy is barely mentioned by Barbi and dismissed by him as nothing to boggle over, since the date and other time indications in the *Convivio* are adopted by the poet for purposes that do not concern the *Vita Nuova*, and are part of his attempt, and failure, to transform a brief affection for a veritable woman into an enduring love for philosophy " (pp. 3-4). cf. Michele Barbi, ed. cit. p. xxxviii.

shortly after the anniversary of the death of Beatrice, in June, 1291.[68] For all these reasons Shaw finds Dante's claim too improbable to accept. He does not deny that in the *Convivio* Dante, now a mature man, devotes his attention to a higher cause, the noble love of knowledge. In any case, Shaw believes that this very same love might have been present in the *Vita Nuova*, perhaps in a less perfect form, as a love grounded in passion. He reminds both Barbi and the reader that what Dante says is that the *donna gentile* is philosophy, and not that she is "nothing but" philosophy.[69] According to Shaw, the *donna gentile* could simultaneously be a symbol and a real lady, and that in the little book she is both Philosophy and the real lady. He argues that since Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30 reminds Dante of the *donna gentile*, and since Beatrice herself is a woman as well as a symbol, the other lady is likewise both a real lady and a symbol. [70] Shaw observes that if the orthodox theory is correct, then not only is the *Vita Nuova* contradicted in the *Convivio*, but also the *Convivio* is contradicted in *Purgatorio* 30 and in *Purgatorio* 31.[71]

There is little doubt that the appearance of Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30 announces her triumphal return in the life and work of Dante.[72] The question that remains to be answered is whether to interpret Beatrice's return in the *Commedia* as a correction of erroneous ideas presented in the *Convivio*.[73] Robert Hollander notes that readers are so thrilled by Beatrice's return in Dante's work, if not his life, that they fail to recognize that

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[68] James E. Shaw, *The Lady* "*Philosophy*" *in The Convivio*, pp. 2-3.
[69] Shaw, p. 7.
[70] Shaw, p. 20.
[71] Shaw, p. 20: "If the theory is correct, then not only does Dante contradict the *Vita Nuova,* in the *Convivio,* but he also contradicts the *Convivio* in the *Purgatorio*.... Now if, in the Convivio, he means to persuade his readers that the Donna Gentile was only a symbol for Philosophy even in the Vita Nuova, in Purgatorio XXX, and XXXI, on the contrary, she is declared to have been a real woman."
[72] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 113.

this "is a sort of rifacimento of *Convivio*," [74] or an attempt to counter and modify ideas earlier expressed in the *Convivio*.[75] Accordingly, readers fail to recognize that in the *Commedia* Dante is also "countering or modifying particular ideas or attitudes expressed [there]." [76] While this may certainly be true, one must keep in mind that "countering or modifiying,"[77] ideas expressed earlier may not necessarily point to a contradiction or an opposition. Perhaps, more than a "*rifacimento* of *Convivio*," [78] Beatrice's triumphant return in the *Commedia* signals *un adempimento* (a fulfillment), *un completare* (a completion). As Hollander himself observes, if Lady Philosophy herself is absent in the *Commedia*, she is represented by the ancient philosophers in Limbo and by Virgil, Marco Lombardo, and Thomas Aquinas.[79]

What is here maintained is that the return of Beatrice in the *Commedia* is in fact less a contradiction than a completion and a fulfillment of Dante's friendship with Lady Philosophy in the *Convivio*. Dante's friendship with Lady Philosophy in the *Convivio*, a union grounded in natural reason, in the love of secular truth, finds fulfillment and completion in his reunion with Beatrice at the summit of Purgatory. Understood as *caritas,* Dante's friendship with Beatrice is a union grounded in divine Wisdom and in divine Love. Through the incarnation of Christ, reason is fulfilled in faith, love in grace,

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[73] For an excellent study and a comprehensive source of the bibliographical material on this topic see Francesco Mazzoni, "*Purgatorio* Canto XXXI," in *Lectura Dantis Scaligera* (Florence: F. Le Monnier, 1965), pp. 5-98.
[74] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 121.
[75] Hollander, p. 121.
[76] Hollander, p. 121.
[77] Hollander, p. 121.
[78] Hollander, p. 121.
[79] Hollander, p. 122.

philosophy in revelation, and classical friendship in *caritas*. [80] Similarly, with the appearance of Beatrice at the summitt of Purgatory, philosophy is fulfilled in faith and Grace. This is not to say that Dante ever stops loving philosophy or thinks of her as unimportant.[81] Philosophy both prefigures and leads to ultimate Wisdom. Francesco De Sanctis captures the essence of Dante's position: "Dante's theology does not conflict with his philosophy but completes it; Beatrice is not in contrast with Virgil but above him." [82] Beatrice does not conflict with Virgil, though above him, just as she does not conflict with Lady Philosophy, though above her.

Through philosophy and reason man reaches secular truth and earthly happiness, which are less perfect and less complete than divine truth, and the eternal happiness granted through revelation and Grace. In the *Convivio* the limitations of philosophy are clearly set forth. Man is limited in his body and imagination, and the perfection and happiness he attains to are both imperfect and limited.[83] By living a moral and virtuous life in accordance with reason, man experiences a happiness which at best is incomplete. Dante draws a distinction between the natural life, which is imperfect and finite and the

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[80] Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia Della Letteratura Italiana*, p. 151: "Mediante questo sacrificio, la ragione e` stata avvalorata dalla fede, l'amore avvalorato dalla grazia, la filosofia e` stata compiuta dalla teologia, la rivelazione. "

[81] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 122: "This does not make philosophizing unnecessary but makes it relatively less valuable. In the *Comedy*, David and Aquinas both know more that is essential than Aristotle does, but Aristotle can aid us in the effort to know as they know."

[82] Francesco De Sanctis, "The Subject the Divine Comedy," *Critical Essays on Dante*, pp. 77-78. De Sanctis emphasizes Dante's belief in the full cooperation, coexistence, and independence of religion and philosophy. Both are necessary for the fullfillment man's two ends, heavenly happiness and earthly happiness: "His mind submitted to the authority of the *Ethics* as to the Bible, to Aristotle as to St. Thomas; he believed implicitly that the great philosophers of antiquity agreed with the teaching of religion, and that they were wrong not because they saw wrongly, but because they did not see everything…he maintained that spirit and matter were endowed each with its own life, without interference with the other; and from this he inferred in independence of the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal….Both are organs of God on earth, 'two suns'[*Purgatory*, XVI, 106] who guide humanity, one in the ways of God, the other in the ways of the world, one to heavenly and the other to earthly happiness" (pp. 77-78).

supernatural, which is eternal.[84] Each leads man to a distinct form of happiness and to a particular type of vision. Philosophy leads to finite happiness and a limited vision. Perfect happiness and perfect vision belong to the supernatural life, when man experiences the beatific vision of God. Friendship with Beatrice leads Dante into a perfect vision, divine Wisdom and into divine Love as the ultimate origin of all things. Beatrice knows who she loves, and loves who she knows in God.[85] According to Kenelm Foster, Beatrice is "essentially … the same ideal wisdom whom we met in the *Convivio*." [86] The secular wisdom present in the *Convivio* is transmuted into divine Wisdom in the *Commedia*. Like Aristotle, Dante is of the opinion that by its very nature man's mind seeks to attain truth because in it lies its perfection, *`l vero e` lo bene de lo intelletto.*[87] While divine Wisdom is above secular wisdom, philosophy is important and necessary.[88] Philosophy can help man to know God and Dante never forgets this. Even in the *Commedia* where philosophy is not directly present, she is represented by Virgil, by the ancient philosophers of Limbo, by Boethius, and the virtuous pagans.[89]

Eager to note the discrepancies surrounding the *donna gentile*, often scholars overlook the importance of philosophy in relation to salvation. In the *Convivio*, Lady Philosophy is *la bellissima e onestissima figlia de lo Imperadore de lo universo, a la*

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[83] Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, III, xv, 6-10; cf. III, iv, 9 and *Paradiso* IV, 40-42; cf. Kenelm Foster, *The Mind in Love*:*Dante's Philosophy* in *Dante A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. John Freccero (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 47.
[84] Dante, *Convivio*, IV, xvii, 9-12; IV, xxii, 10-18; *Mon*. III, xvi, 7; *Purgatorio* III, 34-39, *Paradiso* II, 10-2, IV, 40-2. cf. Kenelm Foster, *The Mind in Love*: *Dante's Philosophy* in *Dante A Collection of Critical Essay,* ed. John Freccero (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 47.
[85] Kenneth Foster, "The Mind In Love: Dante's Philosophy," *in Dante A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. John Freccero (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 52: "In fact, she is the perfection of knowledge and love; she loves all she knows and knows all she loves."
[86] Foster, p. 52.
[87] Dante, *Convivio*, II, xiii, 6, p. 124: "truth is the good of the intellect."
[88] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life In Works*, p. 122: "In the *Comedy*, David and Aquinas both know more that is essential than Aristotle does but Aristotle can aid us in the effort to know as they know."

quale Pittagora pose nome Filosofia. [90] In the *Commedia* she is a handmaid of theology.[91] In her physical aspect she is linked both to faith and spiritual salvation, *la nostra fede e` aiutata*. [92] Her physical beauty mirrors the beauty of her soul, which in turn reflects divine goodness, *riceva miracolosamente la graziosa bontade di Dio*. [93] Similar to the miraculous body of Christ, her own body is linked to man's salvation. [94] The beauty reflected in her eyes and smile echo the divine the beauty reflected in the eyes and smile of Beatrice.[95] Like Beatrice, Lady Philosophy is intrinsically linked to Paradise.[96] Her beauty mirrors divine beauty and light; it mirrors God's greatness.[97] By looking into the eyes and at her smile, which are the demonstrations and persuasions of *Sapienza*, Dante experiences both perfection and happiness.[98] That her physical aspect is

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[89] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life In Works*, p. 122.
[90] Dante, *Convivio*, II, xv, 12, p. 138: "The most beautiful and most dignified daughter of the emperor of the Universe whom Pythagoras called Philosophy."
[91] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life In Works*, p. 122. For Hollander the fact that in the *Commedia* philosophy is presented as a handmaid of theology is a sign that "Dante corrects the central problem left by the *Convivio*, which presents philosophy as his only lady."
[92] Dante, *Convivio*, III, vii, 16, p. 175: "Secondamente narro come ella e` utile a tutte le genti, dicendo che l'aspetto suo aiuta la nostra fede, la quale piu` che tutte l'altre cose e` utile a tutta l'umana generazione, si` come quella per la quale campiamo da etternale morte e acquistiamo etternale vita. E la nostra fede aiuta…manifesto e` che questa donna, col suo mirabile aspetto, la nostra fede aiuta."
[93] Dante, *Convivio*, III, vii, 16, p. 175.
[94] Dante, *Convivio*, III, vii, 16, p. 175: "E la nostra fede aiuta; pero` che, con cio` sia cosa che principalissimo fondamento de la fede nostra siano miracoli fatti per Colui che fu crucifisso—lo quale creo` la nostra ragione, e volle che fosse minore del suo potere—e fatti poi nel nome suo per li Santi suoi; e molti siano si` ostinati che di quelli miracoli per alcuna nebbia siano dubbiosi, e non possano credere miracolo alcuno sanza visibilmente avere di cio` esperienza; e questa donna sia una cosa visibilmente miraculosa, de la quale li occhi de li uomini cotidianamente possono esperienza avere, [e]d a noi faccia possibili li altri; manifesto e` che questa donna, col suo mirabile aspetto, la nostra fede aiuta." cf. Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works* (2001), p. 80.
[95] Dante, *Convivio*, III, viii, 10-11, pp. 177-178: "Dimostrasi ne li occhi tanto manifesta, che conoscer si puo` la sua presente passione, chi bene la` mira….Dimostrasi ne la bocca, quasi come colore dopo vetro. E che e` ridere se non una corruscazione de la dilettazione de l'anima, cioe` uno lume apparente di fuori secondo sta dentro? "
[96] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 81.
[97] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xv, 5, p. 205: "Dunque si vede come ne l'aspetto di costei de le cose di Paradiso appaiono. E pero` si legge nel libro allegato di Sapienza, di lei parlando: <<Essa e` candore de la etterna luce e specchio sanza macula de la maesta` di Dio>>."
[98] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xv, 2-5, pp. 204-205: "E quisi conviene sapere che li occhi de la sapienza sono le due dimostrazioni, con le quail si vede la veritade certissimamente; e lo suo riso sono le sue persuasioni, ne le quail si dimostra la luce interiore de la sapienza sotto alcuno velamento; e in queste due cose si sente

linked to the moral virtues [99] and to moral philosophy [100] emphasizes the importance of philosophy and ethics in relation to man's salvation. That her physical aspect is linked to faith and salvation underscores the interplay between philosophy and theology, morality and spiritual salvation, earthly happiness and heavenly felicity. More important, that her physical beauty mirrors heavenly beauty underscores the relation between man's two ends, earthly happiness and celestial bliss. It is precisely in relation to man's two ends that friendship in *Purgatorio* 30 needs to be studied.

The encounter between Dante and Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30 is a central *episode* in the *Commedia*. [101] The canto holds a central position in the poem both numerically and thematically.[102] All that has transpired thus far has been a preparation for the triumphant return of Beatrice.[103] *Purgatorio* 30 marks a definitive moment in Dante's journey toward ultimate perfection and happiness. In *Purgatorio* 30 the figures of Beatrice and Virgil are presented in a symmetrical relationship with one another. As De Sanctis notes

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quell piacere altissimo de beatitudine, lo quale e` Massimo bene in Paradiso….E in questo sguardo solamente l'umana perfezione s'acquista, cioe` la perfezione de la ragione, de la quale, si` come di principalissima parte, tutta la nostra essenza depende….E pero` si dice nel libro di Sapienza: <<Chi gitta via la sapienza e la dottrina e` infelice>>, che e` privazione de l'essere felice…e felice e` essere contendo, secondo la sentenza del Filosofo."

[99] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xv, 11, p. 207: "Dove e` da sapere che la moralitade e` bellezza de la Filosofia…cosi` la bellezza de la sapienza, che e` corpo di Filosofia, come detto e`, resulta da l'ordine de le virtudi morali, che fanno quella piacere sensibilmente."

[100] Dante, *Convivio*, III, xv, 14, p. 258: "E pero` dico che, a fuggire questo, si guardi in costei, cioe` cola` dov'ella e` essemplo d'umilta`, cioe` in quella parte di se` [che] morale filosofia si chiama."

[101] Bruno Panvini, "*Sul Primo Incontro Di Dante Con Beatrice Nel Paradiso Terrestre (Purgatorio* XXX *e* XXXI*)*," in *Filologia romanza*, (Torino: Loescher—Chiantore ,1960), vol. 5, p. 258: "Pertando a me sembra che l'episodio del primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso terrestre sia l'episodio centrale e cardinale del poema sacro."

[102] Edoardo Sanguineti, "Il Canto XXX del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche* (Firenze: Sansoni Editore, 1963), p. 1289: "il canto XXX del *Purgatorio* si pone come intermedio tra I primi 63 canti della *Commedia* e i restanti 36, e` quasi algebricamente la sua concreta centralita` strutturale (63 canti virgiliani, di contro a 36 canti sacri di Beatrice)."

[103] Bruno Panvini , "*Sul Primo Incontro Di Dante Con Beatrice Nel Paradiso Terrestre (Purgatorio,* XXX *e* XXXI*)*," in *Filologia romanza*, vol. 5, p. 256: "L'incontro di Dante con Beatrice rappresenta il momento decisivo del viaggio del pellegrino di Dio, determinante delle sue future vicende. Tutto quanto gli e` prima

and other scholars have agreed, the life of this canto is found in the appearance of Beatrice and in the disappearance of Virgil.[104] Dante's instruction under the guidance Virgil ends and guidance under the tutelage of Beatrice beginns.[105] Beatrice's return permits Dante to resume and strengthen his personal friendship with her.[106] In addition, he begins to understand his own salvation as a gift of Grace.[107] The transition from Virgil to Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30 marks the transition from one state to another, from the natural to the supernatural, from matter to form, from flesh to spirit.[108] As Singleton notes, to move with Virgil is to move within the confines of human nature, while to move

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avvenuto e` stato preordinato per quest'incontro; tutte le precedenti vicende sono la preparazione di questo momento supremo, che lo hanno portato e ferrato per una giusta e suprema decisione della sua volonta`."

[104] Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia Della Letteratura Italiana*, ed. Benedetto Croce, p. 217: "L'apparire di Beatrice e` lo scomparire di Virgilio. Qui l'astrattezza del simbolo e` superata. Ti senti innanzi ad un'anima d'uomo. Quella donna e` la sua Beatrice, l'amore della sua prima giovinezza; e Virgilio e` il dolcissimo padre che sparisce, quando piu' ne aveva bisogno, quando era proprio come un fantolino in paura che si volge alla mamma; e si volge, e non lo vede piu', e lo chiama tre volte per nome nella mente sbigottita. Il mistero liturgico si trasforma in un dramma moderno." Cf. Edoardo Sanguineti, "Il Canto XXX Del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche* (1964), p. 1294: "quella che additavamo come la centrale dialettica delle figure di Virgilio e di Beatrice; che' la vita del canto si riassume appunto nella presenza di questa e nella assenza (assenza da codesta stessa presenza implicata e imposta) di quello, nel drammaticamente violento apparire della donna e nel drammaticamente violento disparire del maestro (le sue simmetriche occasioni del <<pianger>> del poeta)."

[105] Edoardo Sanguineti, "Il Canto XXX Del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche*, p. 1289: "che' qui agisce, in effetti, il rovesciamento prospettico che l'alunno di Virgilio fara` il devoto di Beatrice…il poema ritrova, in un certo modo, nuova inaugurazione, ritrova almeno, in termini reali, l'avvio alla sua maggiore vicenda."

[106] Giorgio Petrocchi, *L'Ultima Dea* (Roma: Bonacci Editore, 1977), p. 135: "La serie delle esperienze morali e degli atti esteriori…si svolge attraverso trapassi analoghi dell'*iter* purificatorio e del lento riprendesi dei rapporti umani tra la donna e il poeta, diremmo d'un normalizzarsi di questi rapporti sullo *standard* d'un'amicizia riconquistata e ormai indistruttibile perche' celestiale, nutrita dai carismi straordinari acquisiti nell'*altro viaggio*."

[107] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio*, XXX e XXXI)," in *Filologia romanza*, vol. 5, p. 256: "onde l'incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso terrestre rappresenta simbolicamente l'incontro dll'anima umana con la Grazia divina, vale a dire il momento supremo dell'anima umana, quando essa deve riconoscere e accettare la Grazia come l'esclusivo e indispensabile fattore di tutti i propri meriti terreni, della propria salvazione e della propria possibile futura beatitudine."

[108] Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia della Letteratura Italiana*, ed. Benedetto Croce, p. 207: "Questo processo di carne a spirito e` il purgatorio, dove la forma diviene pittura, estasi, sogno, simbolo. Il simbolonon e` piu' forma, ma puro spirito, lavoro intellettuale. Sotto la figura ci e` la nuova e vera realta', pronta a svilupparsene e comparire essa direttamente."

with Beatrice is to move beyond the human.[109] With the disappearance of Virgil and the appearance of Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30 a strictly human mode of comprehension is replaced with a higher and more perfect form of vision. The disappearance of Virgil marks the loss of a familiar world, the world of human experience as Dante knows it, while the appearance of Beatrice marks Dante's initiation into the non-familiar and transient. The transition from Virgil to Beatrice at the summitt of Purgatory marks the transition from friendship in the classical sense to the epitome of Christian friendship.

According to Giuseppe Mazzotta the transition from Virgil to Beatrice at the summit of Purgatory is to be interpreted as a "Pauline rite de passage." [110] Accordingly, the Garden of Eden signals Dante's transition from Dante's old sinful self to his purged more perfect self. And the return of Beatrice in the garden signals the end of an old journey and the beginning of a new journey. Scholars have interpreted Beatrice as a symbol of theology, faith, Christ, Sapientia, and Grace. [111] Bruno Panvini understands Beatrice primarily as a symbol of Grace and of revelation, in the sense that revelation is

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[109] Charles Singleton, *Dante Studies* 2 *Journey to Beatrice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 269: "To come to Beatrice and to move with her is to move beyond the human. To move with Virgil means to move within the proportion of man's nature, as Thomas Aquinas liked to express it. To journey with Virgil is to journey by that natural light which may not extend beyond such confines."

[110] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert*, p. 114: "in the garden the pilgrim's journey under Virgil's guidance ends and the new journey led by Beatrice starts; moreover, this is the place where the Pauline *rite de passage* from the condition of the old man occurs and, at the same time, it appears as a veritable garden of love where the fall of man took place."

[111] Charles Singleton, "The Goal at the Summit," in *Journey to Beatrice*, p. 107: "In which case we have again the familiar sequence: justice as the disposition or preparation for what then follows, be it Christ, or Sapientia, or Contemplation, or Light of Grace. Beatrice, in fact, can mean more names than one in the allegory of the poem." For a contemporary study of the allegorical interpretation of Beatrice see Bruno Porcelli, "Beatrice nei commenti danteschi del Landino e del Vellutello," in *Nuovi studi su Dante e Boccaccio con analisi della 'Nencia'* (Pisa: Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 1997), pp. 57-78. See also Robert Hollander's note to *Inf.* 2, 53-54, p. 39. Hollander notes that in the *Vita Nuova* (1293), the meaning of Beatrice is linked with the Trinity, and more particularly with Christ.

an act of Grace.[112] As a gift of Grace, Dante's friendship with Beatrice is the means by which he is made to participate in divinity.[113] Dante's transcendence, his participation in divinity is a gratuitous gift of friendship and Grace, it is *caritas*.[114] Dante's salvation, thus, is less grounded in merit than in *caritas*. His salvation is a gift of divine Love delivered through divine grace and through the compassion of friends. It is precisely in relation to both Grace and to *caritas* that Dante's friendship with Beatrice acquires significance as a union grounded in the highest form of virtue and in the mutual love of man and God.

With the return of Beatrice at the summit of Purgatory friendship is transmuted to a higher level: it is made to encompass divinity. The transition from Virgil to Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30 signals a transition from finite and inmperfect type of friendship to the most perfect type, a union that leads to God. At the summit of Purgatory, Dante's friendship with Virgil, a union grounded in natural reason and the cardinal virtues, disappears to make room for one grounded in divine Wisdom and divine Love. Through his union with Beatrice, Dante is introduced to a higher way of knowing and loving. She

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[112] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio*, XXX e XXXI), in *Filologia romanza*, vol. 5, p. 257: "Beatrice e` stata vista soprattutto come simbolo della teologia, o della fede, o, meglio, della rivelazione. A me sembra invece che la funzione di Beatrice intendendola come il simbolo delaa grazia operante e santificante e della rivelazione insieme, in quanto anche la rivelazione e` un atto della Grazia."

[113] Panvini, p. 257: "…che Dante voglia dire che solo esclusivamente mediante la Grazia, signora (*donna*) delle virtu`, l'umana specie puo` vincere d'eccellenza e trascendere ogni altra cosa terrena, in quanto e` esclusivamente la Grazia che rende l'uomo partecipe della Divinita`." cf. S. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae,* tomus II, Pars prima secundae, Quaesto CX, Articulus 1, pag. 561 dell'ed. Marietti, Torino-Roma 1948: "…est dilectio (Dei) specialis, secundum quam trahit naturam rationalem supra conditionem naturae, ad participationem divini boni." *Op. cit.,* tom. Cit., quaestio CXI, Art. 1, pag. 565: "…gratia…per quam ipse homo Deo congiungitur…vocatur gratia gratum faciens" (St. Thomas quoted by Bruno Panvini).

[114] Panvini,, p. 258: "Come per Tommaso, anche per Dante la Grazia e` un dono dell'amore divino, il qualegiunge all'uomo in un modo inaspettato e non richiesto."

teaches him how to know and love all of creation in relation to God. In the *Commedia* Virgil is the ancient Roman poet who guides and leads through natural reason.[115]

Notwithstanding the importance of Virgil, Dante's friendship with the pagan poet is imperfect and limited. While rejecting a strictly allegorical interpretation of Virgil as reason, the importance of reason in relation to the pagan poet and to the type of friend he is cannot be ignored. Even the best of classical friendship is, from the vantage point of a Christian, misguided and lost. At best Dante's friendship with Virgil is a misguided type of friendship, for the the object of love in their union is man *qua* man. Virgil leads Dante to a knowledge of earthly things and to perfection of his secular nature which is finite. The authority of Virgil in the *Commedia* is fallible and on various occasions undermined. According to Robert Hollander Dante begins to undermine the authority of Virgil way back in the second canto of the *Inferno*.[116] For Hollander, Virgil's fallibility highlights the distance between the two poets. [117] Virgil himself is aware of his own limitations. In the first canto of the *Inferno* for example, while describing Beatrice as *anima…piu` di me degna* [118] (*Inf.* 1, 122) Virgil places Beatrice above himself in order of importance,

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[115] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio*, XXX e XXXI)," in *Filologia romanza*, vol. 5, p. 258: "E pertanto Virgilio e` si` il simbolo della retta ragione mossa dalla Grazia, ma e` anche e pur sempre il Virgilio storico, l'immortale poeta di Roma, che Dante ha amorosamente studiato e ammirato."

[116] Robert Hollander, "The 'Canto of the Word' *(Inferno 2)*," in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana*, p. 114: "It is my contention that, beginning with the second canto, Dante sets about the task of downgrading the authority of Virgil overtly, if with delicacy."

[117] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 117: "if Virgil is allowed an honorable afterlife in Dante's pages, his standing is nonetheless frequently undercut in ways that point up the distance from him of even his greatest admirer."

[118] Dante, *Inferno*, I, 122, p. 10: "a soul more fit to lead than I."cf. Robert Hollander, "*The* '*Canto of the Word*' *(Inferno 2)*," in *Lectura Dantis Newberryana* (1990), p. 114. Hollander notes an echo of John 1:27 in Dante's line: "So far as I have been able to ascertain, no one has heard the echo of John 1:27 in that verse: 'Ipse est qui post me venturus est, qui ante me factus est: cuius ego *non sum dignus* ut solvam eius corrigiam calceamenti' ('He it is, who coming after me, who was made before me, whose shoes's latched I am not worthy to unloose' ; italics added)" (p. 114). It is worth noting, as Hollander notes, the insistence with which Virgil harps on his own unworthiness.

seeing her as a worthier friend and guide. In the *Inferno* and in the *Purgatorio* the reader is periodically reminded of the fallibility of Virgil.[119] The reader and the pilgrim are being prepared for the eventual disappearance of Virgil and the appearance of Beatrice. In *Purgatorio* 18 after having presented a philosophical analysis of love and while promoting the primacy of reason in love, Virgil confesses his own limitations concerning good and bad choices in matters of love. He instructs Dante to look to Beatrice for issues of faith, as he himself lacks such knowledge. In *Purgatorio* 6, while discussing the value of prayers Virgil directs Dante's attention to Beatrice who will come at the top of the mountain smiling and happy: *Veramente a cosi` alto sospetto / non ti fermar, se quella nol ti dice / che lume fia tra `l vero e lo `ntelletto / Non so se `ntendi: io dico di Beatrice; / tu la vedrai di sopra, in su la vetta / di questo monte, ridere e felice* [120] (*Purg.* 6, 43-48). In those instances when Virgil's limitations are underscored, Beatrice's powers are magnified. As Giovanni Gentile observes, Beatrice smiles and not Virgil because it is she and not he who is ultimate wisdom; she is the light between the truth and intellect.[121] One might add that Beatrice smiles and not Virgil because she alone is a friend in Christ.

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[119] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 118. Hollander notes several example of Virgil's fallibility in *Inferno*: "he is denied entrance to the city of Dis by the rebellious forces that guard it (VIII); he gives a confused and Empedoclean explanation of the Crucifixion (XII, 37-45); he offers several incorrect interpretations of the wicked intentions of the *Malebranche* and subsequently experiences annoyance at having been tricked by them (XXI-XXIII). In *Purgatorio*, Virgil is chastised by Cato, along with the saved souls who lent their ears and hearts to Casella's song (II and III); we find him indirectly but unmistakably compared to the loser in the simile that opens the sixth canto, in which Dante is like a winner in a game of dice; we observe the difficulty he has in understanding how Statius, who is accounted as a Christian by none but Dante, could have been saved (XXII)" (p. 118). According to Hollander these examples are presented to make his readers understand that, "as a Christian poet he had not 'gone over to the other side' in his veneration of Virgil " (p. 118).

[120] Dante, *Purgatorio*, VI, 43-48, p. 120: "But do not let these doubts beset you / with high questions before you hear from her / who shall be light between the truth and intellect-- / I don't know if you understand: I speak of Beatrice. / You shall see her above, upon the summit / of this mountain, smiling and in bliss." cf. Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante* (1965), p. 27.

[121] Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante*, p. 27: "Beatrice ride; Virgilio no. Beatrice ride perche' essa e` lume tra il vero e l'intelletto, e` la vera scienza."

The fallibility of Virgil's authority in matters of faith underscores his limitations both as guide and friend.[122] Finite and imperfect, friendship with Virgil eventually must come to an end. Reason without Grace cannot lead to salvation. De Sanctis notes that after the fall man became enslaved by his passions and reason alone became insufficient for his salvation.[123] Through reason Virgil leads Dante to a limited knowledge of the truth and to a limited vision. It is Beatrice who arrives as Grace who will lead Dante to revealed truth and perfect vision. This fact is made clear by Virgil himself, *Quanto ragion qui vede, / dir ti poss'io; da indi in la` t'aspetta / pur a Beatrice, ch'e` opra di fede* [124] (*Purg*. 18, 46-48). Traveling through Hell and Purgatory the natural light of reason sufficed. Beatrice rather than Virgil will lead Dante to perfect vision and complete happiness.[125] Virgil recognizes his own limitations and calls to the authority of power, *E se la mia ragion non ti disfama, / vedrai Beatrice, ed ella pienamente / ti torra` questa e*

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[122] For instances when Virgil's authority is fallible see: *Purg.* 6, 43-48; *Purg.* 15, 76-78; *Purg.* 18, 46-48; *Purg.* 27, 128-149.

[123] Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia della letteratura italiana*, p. 151: "L'umanita' per il peccato d'ordine cadde in servitu' dei sensi (del male o del peccato), e la ragione e l'amore non furono piu' sufficienti a salvarla."

[124] Dante Aligheri, *Purgatorio*, XVIII, 46-48, p. 390: "As far as reason may see in this, / I can tell you. To go farther you must look / to Beatrice, for it depends on faith alone." cf. Giovanni Gentile, *Studi Su Dante* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1965), p. 28. According to Gentile's interpretation, Virgil is to be understood as reason and philosophy and Beatrice as faith: "Beatrice, insomma, e` la fede e Virgilio e` la ragione; quella la teologia e questo la filosofia" (p. 28). Gentile refers to other definitions of Beatrice in the *Commedia: Inf.* X, 131: *quella, il cui bell'occhio tutto vede; Par.* XV, 54: *colei ch'all'alto volo mi vesti' le piume*; Par. XVIII, 4: *quella donna ch'a Dio mi menava;* Par. XXVIII, 3: *quella che imparadisa la mia* mente; Par. XXX, 75: *il sole degli occhi* miei. In all of the above passages Beatrice is defined in relation to ultimate light and heavenly vision. While recognizing that Virgil leads through the light of natural reason and Beatrice through the light of Grace, it is both erroneous and limiting to understand Virgil and Beatrice as mere symbols of reason and faith respectively. First and foremost the identity of Virgil in the *Commedia* is historical, he is the ancient Roman poet from whom Dante took his own poetic style. Beatrice, on the other hand, must be understood in her dual natue: the Florentine girl with whom Dante fell in love and as the blessed lady who descends from Heaven for the sake of her friend's salvation.

[125] See Dante, *Paradiso*, IV, 118-132; V, 1-9: "S'io ti fiammeggio nel caldo d'amore / di la` dal modo che `n terra si vede, / si` che del viso tuo vinco il valore, / non ti maravigliar, che' cio` procede / da perfetto veder, che, come apprende, cosi` nel bene appreso move il piede. / Io veggio ben si` come gia` resplende / ne l'intelletto tuo l'etterna luce, / che, vista, sola e sempre amore accende."

ciascun' altra brama[126] (*Purg*. 15, 76-78). As Dante is about to cross from the natural to the supernatural, reason no longer suffices and the light of Grace becomes necessary.[127]

That in the *Commedia* Virgil's authority is fallible is not a reflection of his importance. Dante never stops loving Virgil just as he never stops loving Lady Philosophy. Notwithstanding his limitations, Dante's friendship with Virgil is indispensible. The virtuous and magnanimous pagan leads Dante to moral rectitude, making him better disposed to choose right over wrong, good over evil (*Purg*. 30, 51).[128] Similar to St. Thomas, Dante recognizes the importance and use of secular truth in relation to Truth, to the knowledge of God.[129] Dante's friendship with Virgil precedes, but it does not conflict with his friendship with Beatrice. Similarly, philosophy and reason precede, but they do contradict theology and divine Wisdom. And human virtues precede Grace and the theological virtues without contradiction. [130] This fact is confirmed by the cardinal virtues themselves, "*Noi siam qui ninfe e nel ciel siamo stelle: / pria che Beatrice discendesse al mondo, / fummo ordinate a lei per sue ancelle* [131](*Purg.* 31, 106-108). The cardinal virtues on earth lead man to moral rectitude, which precedes

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[126] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XV, 76-78: "And if my words do not requite your hunger, / you shall see Beatrice. She will deliver you / entirely from this and every other craving."

[127] Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia della letteratura italiana*, p. 147: "L'anima nell'inferno e nel purgatorio, non essendo uscita ancora dal terreno, ha a guida il lume naturale, la ragione o la filosofia; ma la ragione e` insufficiente senza la grazia di Dio." (p. 147).

[128] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 51, p. 668: "Virgilio a cui per mia salute die' mi"

[129] Michele Barbi, *Problemi di critica dantesca; seconda serie* 1920/1937 (Firenze: Sansoni, 1975), p. 69: "Dante segue San Tommaso nel valutare l'importanza degli studi profani e l'utilita` di essi anche in rapporto con una piu` vera e profonda conoscenza di Dio. Questo e` il pensiero animatore del *Convivio*, e non subisce cambiamento nella *Divina Commedia* " (p. 69). Cf., *Convivio*, III, xiv, 2-15.

[130] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio*, XXX e XXXI), in Filologia romanza, vol. 5, p. 257: "Invero le virtu` cardinali sono le precorritrici della Grazia, quelle che sostengono nel bene l'uomo non ancora infuso della Grazia e lo preparano ad essa; esse erano le sole virtu` dell'umanita` prima della Redenzione, in quanto prima di allora l'uomo in genere non poteva fruire della Grazia per l'impedimento del peccato originale. Dopo la Redenzione, superata la barriera che divideva l'uomo da Dio, la Grazia e` stata restituita all'uomo e in primo modo mediante la rivelazione evangelica."

celestial perfection. By means of his own powers, through human reason and virtue, Virgil independently guides and leads Dante to moral rectitude. Virgil leads Dante to the perfection of his secular nature and to the experience of the happiness that man is capable of attaining by means of his human virtue.[132] More than this Virgil cannot do, further than than this point he cannot go, e *se` venuto in parte / dov'io per me piu` oltre non discerno* [133] (*Purg*. 27, 128-129). Virgil's fallibility is a prerequisite for Beatrice's return. In Dante man's salvation is an act both of humanity and divinity; both Virgil and Beatrice are necessary.

As Panvini notes, Dante completes and fulfills Aquinas' doctrine in positing man's salvation the work of both Grace and human reason. [134] While recognizing the importance of Grace, Dante also recognizes the importance of man's reason in relation to his salvation. For Dante there is no conflict between pagan thought versus Christian thought, earthly life versus the hereafter, humility versus strength. The first is completed and fulfilled in the latter. The return of Beatrice in the *Commedia* is a completion and fulfillment of Dante's friendship with Virgil. That Dante held classical friendship in the utmost regard as a union grounded in the highest part of man, his reason, is evidenced by

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[131] Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 106-108: "Here we are nymphs and in heaven we are stars. / Before Beatrice descended to the world / we were ordained to serve her as her handmaidens."

[132] Michele Barbi, *Problemi di critica dantesca seconda serie* 1920/1937, p. 73: "e la separazione delle due autorita` e del loro compito e dominio e`, ripeto, fondamento, nel Poema, d'ogni invenzione…il 'savio gentil che tutto seppe' guida D. con piena indipendenza> Beatrice ha rimesso a lui pienamente la scelta dei mezzi: 'l'aiuta s` chi` ne sia consolata;' ed egli sa di suo la via per cui condurlo e la meta: il paradiso terrestre, cioe` lo stato di vita unamente perfetto, quella felicita` che l'uomo e` in grado di conseguire in questo mondo col suo mezzo della propria virtu`."

[133] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXVII, 128-129, p. 606: "and now come to a place / in which, unaided, I can see no farther."

[134] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio,* XXX e XXXI)," in *Filologia romanza*, vol. 5, p. 261: "Dante, perfezionando S. Tommaso, pur ritenendo con l'Aquinate che la salvazione umana sia un atto della grazia divina, vuole anche che sia un merito della retta volonta` dell'uomo, una conquista della verita` divina che l'uomo attua con l'ausilio della *Gratia gratum faciens,* la quale fa *ut anima ad gloriam perveniat*."

his choice of Virgil as both guide and friend. The importance of Virgil in relation to Dante's salvation in a sense parallels the importance given to philosophy and morality in relation to spiritual salvation.[135] To the extent that it leads Dante to moral rectitude and earthly perfection, friendship Virgil is preparation and prefiguration for a more perfect type of friendship with Beatrice. In the words of St. Ambrose, Dante's union with Virgil is "a foretaste of the harmony of Heaven." [136]

For C. T. Davis in the *Commedia* Virgil assumes a new role, that of being, "a bridge between the two Romes." [137] Along these lines, Virgil bridges the distance between classical and Christian thought. From Hell up to the summit of Mount Purgatory, the pagan poet remains a loving friend in a Christian poem. Throughout all the perils and challenges facing Dante, he guides, supports, and sustains him with self-less love and compassionate benevolence. Virgil takes Dante to moral rectitude, but he also takes him to Beatrice. He takes Dante to the very threshold of his *trasumanar*. Once his will is *libero, dritto e sano* [138](*Purg*. 27, 140), Dante is then ready to cross from humanity to divinity. [139] Virgil has vested Dante with of the highest form of authority,

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[135] Michele Barbi, *Problemi di critica dantesca*: *seconda serie* 1920/1937, pp. 75-76: "In D. si osserva sempre – nella *Commedia* come nelle altre opere, e in cio` che sappiamo della sua vita – un perfetto equilibrio delle facolta` morali ed intellettuali, che lo fa rifuggire instintivamente da ogni esagerazione, ed in virtu` del quale egli e` sempre disposto ad apprezzare quel che pur v'e` di buono nell'uomo e nelle sue cose, anche come bene in se`. Per questo il poeta non spregia l'umano sapere, ma lo ricerca con sete insaziabile."

[136] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert*, p. 119.

[137] Charles T. Davis, *Dante and the Idea of Rome* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 137. cf. Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert* (1979), p. 150.

[138] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXVII, 140: "Your will is free, upright, and sound."

[139] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio*, XXX e XXXI)," in *Filologia romanza*, vol. 5, p. 260: "Virgilio, cioe` la retta ragione mossa dalla Grazia, gli e` sempre a fianco fino a che la complessa esperienza del male e della purificazione lo ha portato alla quasi perfezione della sua natura umana, alla liberta` spirituale, alla possibilita`, cioe`, di rettamente giudicare e risolversi." As Panvini observes, the complete perfection of Dante's human nature is achieved only after he is babptized in the waters of Lethe to be reborn in Christ.

per ch'io sovra te corono e mitrio [140] (*Purg.* 27, 142). Dante now is in complete control of his will and can rule himself morally. As Dante is ready to leave the natural world for the supernatural, Virgil disappears to make room for Beatrice who will lead him to divinity.[141]

Mazzotta interprets Dante's movement through Purgatory as a dual baptism, first as preparation to grace, and then in the Garden with the descent of Beatrice as the direct experience of grace.[142] If one is to follow Hollander's suggested schema: through Virgil, Dante's will is first corrected (*Inf.* 1-34) and then perfected (*Purg*. 1-29); through Beatrice, his intellect is corrected (*Purg*. 30-*Par*. 30); through Bernard, his intellect is perfected (*Par*. 30-end).[143] Virgil has restored Dante's will to newfound health (*Purg*.

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[140] Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, XXVII, 142: "over yourself I crown and miter you." See Robert Hollander's note to verse 142. Hollander observes well that, Virgil is metaphorically crowning Dante with the authority to rule himself morally. Now Dante is in command of his own will. See also Michelangelo Picone, "*Purgatorio* XXVII: passaggio rituale e *translatio* poetica," *Medioevo romanzo* 12 (1987), pp. 400-401. According to Hollander, Picone understands the crown and miter as allegories for the laurel of the modern poet and the Christian truth that completes and fulfills Virgil's pagan wisdom. Hollander also points to Remo Fasani, "Canto XXVII," in *Lectura Dantis Turicensis: Purgatorio,* ed. Georges Guntert and Michelangelo Picone (Florence: Cesati, 2001), p. 432. Fasani points out that while modern criticism has understood the two terms as synonyms, as far back as Ottimo (1333) and Francesco da Buti (1385) they were understood as separate. See also Theophil Spoerri, "Il Canto XXXI Del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche*, ed. Giovanni Getto (Firenze: Sansoni, 1964), p. 1302: "Quindi Virgilio lo ha insignito delle piu` alte corone (<< per ch'io sovra te corono e mitrio>>)."

[141] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo inconto di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio*, XXX e XXXI)," in *Filologia romanza*, vol. 5, p. 260: "A questo punto, quando Dante sta` per lasciare alle spalle il regno del contingente e del transitorio per quello del reale e dell'eterno, Virgilio, cioe` la *Gratia gratis data*, scompare per far posto alla *Gratia gratum faciens*, cioe` a Beatrice, lasciando Dante solo arbitro di se stesso e del suo futuro destino." Cf. Robert Hollander's note to vv. 49-51. Hollander notes an echo of Orpheus's three-verse farewell to Euridice in Dante's three-verse farewell to Virgil. He notes that few twentieth-century commentators have heard the echo in Dante's lines. See also Robert Hollander, *Il Virgilio dantesco: tragedia nella "Commedia"* (1983), pp. 132-34. According to Hollander a few centuries earlier Bernardino Daniello (1568) heard this very same echo.

[142] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert*, p. 122. Mazzotta applies the two types of baptisms administered to Christians (baptism as a preparation to grace, and baptism as the descent of grace) to the moral structure of the *Commedia*, particularly analogous to Dante's movement through *Purgatory* as preparation and in the Garden as the arrival of grace itself in the figure of Beatrice.

[143] See Robert Hollander's note to *Purg*. 27, 139-141, p. 616. According to Hollader, Virgil "gives over the instructional task that has been his since *Inferno* I, presiding over the correction and perfection of Dante's will." See also Robert Hollander, "The Invocation of the *Commedia*," *Yearbook of Italian Studies* 3 (1976): 235-40.

27, 140), [144] but more than this he cannot do (*Purg*. 30, 139).[145] Virgil is well aware of his limitations and turns to Beatrice's authority (*Purg.* 6, 43-48).[146] He prepares Dante for divine grace, but it is through Beatrice that he can experience grace directly, *E se la mia ragione non ti disfama, / vedrai Beatrice, ed ella pienamente / ti torra` questa e ciascun' altra brama* [147](*Purg*. 15, 76-78). If Dante's union with Virgil leads to moral rectitude and earthly wisdom,[148] his union with Beatrice leads to divine Wisdom and eternal bliss.[149]

For Sanguineti the appearance of Beatrice and the disappearance of Virgil in *Purgatorio* 30 signifies the succumbing of morality to faith and of the moral life to the religious life.[150] In Dante, however, there is no perceivable conflict between ethics and theology; the second is a fulfillment and a completion of the first. Similarly, there is no conflict between Virgil and Beatrice as friends. Sanguineti observes well that the moral life is in some way comprised in the religious life.[151] Dante's spiritual process is also an

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[144] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXVII, 140: "libero, dritto e sano e` tuo arbitrio"
[145] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 139: "Non aspettar mio dir piu` ne' mio cenno "
[146] Dante, *Purgatorio*, VI, 43-48: "Veramente a cosi` alto sospetto / non ti fermar, se quella nol ti dice / che lume fia tra 'l vero e lo 'ntelletto. / Non so se 'ntendi: io dico di Beatrice; / tu la vedrai di sopra, in su la vetta / di questo monte, ridere e felice."
[147] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XV, 76-78: "And if my words do not require your hunger, / you shall see Beatrice. She will deliver you / entirely from this and every other craving."
[148] Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante*, p. 26: "La condizione del *sapiens* spinoziano e` quella di Virgilio nella *Commedia*, perche' Virgilio e` il saggio dantesco; e` la condizione degli spiriti del Limbo."
[149] Gentile, p. 27: "Che se Virgilio e` il *sapiens* spinoziano, Beatrice e` quell'altra sapienza, quell'altra via, che secondo Dante si puo` trovare veramente all'eterna pace."
[150] Edoardo Sanguinetti, "Il Canto XXX del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche*, p. 1295: "Il canto XXX del *Purgatorio* esprime il concreto emergere della vita religiosa dinanzi alla coscienza del poeta (in figura di Beatrice, <<regalmente…proterva>>), dinanzi alla sua vita morale (in figura di Virgilio, <<dolcissiomo padre>>), e il necessario cedere di questa a quella."
[151] Sanguinetti, "Il Canto XXX del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche*, p. 1295: "Che questa vita morale sia pero` immediatamente, in qualche modo, compresa e assunta nella vita religiosa stessa, che essa sia, in ogni modo, giustificata, nella nuova dimensione di esperienza (<<Virgilio a cui per mia salute die` mi>>; e confermera` solennemente Beatrice: <<colui che l'ha qua su condotto>>), e` conclusione che appartiene alla sicurezza di fede, tutta medioevale ancora, che e` propria del poeta."

ethical process; absolute wisdom does not exclude ethics, rather it encompasses it.[152] Virgil to whom Dante has entrusted the health of his soul, *Virgilio a cui per mia salute die` mi* [153] (*Purg.* 30, 51), prepares and leads Dante to revealed truth, *colui che l'ha qua su condotto*.[154] (*Purg*. 30, 140). In the *Commedia* Virgil is simultaneously the ancient Roman poet and the messenger of Christ who guides and leads through natural reason.[155]

Beatrice is the beautiful Florentine young lady with whom Dante fell in love and the blessed lady who leads him to God. On earth she had guided and sustained him through her countenance and youthful eyes (*Purg.* 30, 121-123).[156] In the afterlife she continued to inspire and guide him through dreams other means (*Purg*. 30, 133-135).[157] Notwithstanding her trasfiguration and her association with Sapienza and Grace, Beatrice never ceases to be the particular friend and the beautiful gentle lady with whom Dante fell in love in Florence. She looks exactly the same and wears the same colors she wore the first time Dante set eyes on her.[158] Their friendship was and still is extremely personal.[159]

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[152] Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante*, p. 25: "Anche per Dante il processo teorico dello spirito e` processo etico, e l'emendazione dell'intelletto, che trae dall'errore a Dio, libera dai dolori della vita, elevando alla vera e sola felicita` compartita dalla visione dell'assoluta verita`. La *Commedia* potrebbe dirsi un'*Ethica* sovrannaturale, come l'*Ethica* potrebbe a sua volta dirsi una *Commedia* naturalistica."

[153] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 51: "Virgil, to whom I gavemyself for my salvation."

[154] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 140: "to the one who has conducted him thus far " Cf. See Edoardo Sanguinetti, "Il Canto XXX del Purgatorio, " in *Letture Dantesche* (1964), p. 1296: "E Virgilio ottiene precisamente il suo luogo e il suo significato: egli sara` colui che riconduce il poeta dalla colpa alla sua vocazione originaria."

[155] Erich Auerbach, *Studi su Dante*, trans. Maria Luisa De Pieri Bonino (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1966), p. 81: "Virgilio , l'annunciatore di Cristo e il cantore dell'impero romano, divento` la sua guida, il sesto libro fu per lui verita` autentico-poetica."

[156] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 121-123: "Alcun tempo il sostenni col mio volto: / mostrando li occhi giovanetti a lui, / meco il menava in dritta parte volto." See Hollander's note to vv. 118-123. As a friend should, for a long time (a period of about sixteen years, 1274-1290) Beatrice attempted to guide Dante to God, despite his sinful disposition.

[157] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 133-135: "Ne' l'impetrare ispirazion mi valse, / con le quali e in sogno e altrimenti / lo rivocai: si` poco a lui ne calse!" See Hollander's note to verse 134, p. 686.

[158] Theophil Spoerri, "Il Canto XXXI del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche,* ed. Giovanni Getto (Firenze: Sansoni, 1964), p. 1302: "La donna amata indossa vesti che hanno I medesemi colori di un tempo, del tempo in cui Dante la vide, fanciulla di nove anni, per la prima volta."

Similarly, notwithstanding his association with reason and philosophy, Virgil still is the particular and historical ancient Roman poet from whom Dante took his own poetic style.[160] As Auerbach notes, what distinguishes the *Commedia* from other journeys in the hereafter is the preservation and continuation of the totality of the human figure with all of its particular and historical attributes.[161] That Virgil becomes a messanger of Christ does not diminish his personal and historical significance. It would seem that in the *Commedia* Dante's personal affections are transmuted to a universal level,[162] without ever loosing their human pathos. For instance, even before he can actually see Beatrice, Dante is overcome with the overwhelming power her presence. (*Purg.* 30, 34-39).[163]

The truth is that both Virgil and Beatrice are necessary for Dante's salvation. The appearance of Beatrice and disapppearance of Virgil at the summit of Purgatory does not present opposition between the two, rather it signifies a fulfillment and completion of Dante's moral perfection. The authority of each friend is independent, yet both act in cooperative effort for the sake of Dante's wellbeing. The interplay between Virgil and

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[159] Erich Auerbach, *Studi su Dante*, p. 56: "Per quanto evanescenti e appena sfiorate, la vita e la passione terrena di Beatrice esistono; noi sentiamo il profumo della sua persona umana, che era giovane e meravigliosa; aveva sofferto ed era morta; assistiamo al suo incielarsi, e nella trasfigurazione dell'aldila` vediamo mantenuta e potenziata la sua contingente figura terrena." Auerbach continues to observe, "Beatrice non cessa mai cio` che era al principio, e cioe` una creatura particolare e un'esperienza contingente e personalissima." (p. 90).

[160] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 114-121.

[161] Erich Auerbach, *Studi su Dante*, p. 81: "L'aver conservato e definitivamente fissato l'unita` della figura umana nell'aldila` e` quello che distingue fondamentalmente la *Commedia* da tutte le precedenti visioni dell'oltretomba."

[162] Auerbach, pp. 90-91: "sono le forze dell'incanto dei sensi che vengono messi al servizio della redenzione, e` Amore in persona che guida in alto l'uomo alla vista di Dio; nella sorte eterna il fenomeno non e` distinto dall'idea, ma e` contenuto e trasformato in essa."

[163] Dante*, Purgatorio*, XXX, 34-39: "E lo spirito mio, che gia` cotanto / tempo era stato ch'a la sua presenza / non era di stupor, tremando, affranto, / sanza de li occhi aver piu` conoscenza, / per occulta virtu` che da lei mosse, / d'antico amor senti` la gran possanza." See Hollander's note to vv. 34-36, 39. As Hollander notes, Beatrice looks exactly like the Florentine woman with whom he fell in love, though she now loves him only in Christ. This truth will be emphasized in *Purg.* 32, 7-9. See also Theophil Spoerri, "Il Canto XXXI Del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche* (1964), p. 1302: "Alla vista di lei, Dante prova una

Beatrice parallells the synthesis of philosophy and theology, reason and faith, love and grace, the natural and the supernatural. Following in the footsteps of St. Thomas Aquinas, Dante recognizes the importance and the limitations of philosophy and natural reason in relation to man's ultimate perfection and happiness. In the absence of Grace man's natural powers are insufficient for a direct experience of perfect good and perfect truth.[164] Friendship with Virgil leads Dante to the perfection of his secular nature, but it is Beatrice who through *caritas* leads Dante back to God. Grounded in Sapienza, Beatrice's friendship is a gift of divine Grace. For Dante as for Thomas, divine Grace is the means by which man returns to God. [165] By the same token, Grace operates through reason. Beatrice cannot reach Dante directly in his corruptible nature, she needs the assistance of Virgil (*Inf*. 2, 67-69). [166] Gentile interprets Beatrice's reliance on Virgil as a

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commozione profondissima. Egli, tremando, quasi si sente, <<affranto>>, mancare. Senza ancora chiaramente vederla, per una misteriosa virtu` che da lei emana, sente la grande potenza dell'antico amore."

[164] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio*, XXX e XXXI)," in *Filologia romanza*, vol. 5, p. 258: "Ma Dante ci mostra il fallimento del proprio tentativo, in quanto da buon tomista ritiene che l'uomo non possa con le sole sue forze liberarsi dal male e conseguire il sommo bene, perche` a cio` e` indispensabile l'intervento della Grazia." cf. St. Thomas Aquinas., *Op. cit*., tom. Cit., Pars cit., Quaestio CIX, Art. 7, pag. 553: "requiritur auxilium gratiae ad hoc quod homo a peccato resurgat, et quantum ad abituale donum, et quantum ad interiorem Dei motionem"; Quaestio cit., Art. 2, pag. 547; 'natura humana indiget auxilio divino ad faciendum vel volendum quodcumque bonum"; Quaestio cit., Art. 5, pag. 551: "…sine gratia homo non potest mereri vitam aeternam" (St. Thomas quoted by Bruno Panvini). Panvini notes that as a personification of Grace, Beatrice moves Dante through Virgil, the personification of reason: "in quanto Beatrice, personificazione della Grazia, agisce su Dante per mezzo di Virgilio, personificazione della retta ragione." Along these lines, Virgil and Beatrice are to be understood in relation to man's two ends, earthly and celestial happiness.

[165] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Op. cit*., tom. cit., Quaestio IX, Art. 6, pagg. 55-56: "Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia animae rationalis, quae a solo deo causatur per creationem….Secundo vero ex hoc patet, quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum. Unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum….Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum." (St. Thomas quoted in Bruno Panvini) cf. Bruno Panvini, "Sul Primo Incontro Di Dante Con Beatrice Nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio* XXX e XXXI)," in *Filologia romanza* (1954), p. 259: "In sostanza, cosi` per S. Tommaso come per Dante, la Grazia puo` considerarsi l'atto con cui Dio riconduce a Se` le creature muovendo la loro volonta` e determinando I loro pensieri e le loro azioni."

[166] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 67-69: "Or movi, e con la tua parola ornata / e con cio` c'ha mestieri al suo campare, l'aiuta si` ch'i' ne sia consolata."

subjugation of theology to reason.[167] Perhaps more than a subjugation on should learn to think of their relationship as a cooperative effort between two whose primary concern is the well-being and safety of their mutual friend.

The seriousness with which Dante treats philosophy in both the *Convivio* and in the *Commedia* [168] is equal to the seriousness with which he treats Virgil in relation to his own salvation and in relation to Beatrice. As Hollander observes, even in the *Commedia* where Philosophy is not assigned a specific part, she is represented by the ancient philosophers in Limbo and by the philosophic discourse of Virgil, Marco Lombardo, and Thomas Aquinas.[169] In the Christian poem, philosophy is never indispensible. Michele Barbi notes that the importance with which Dante treats philosophy in the *Convivio* does not change in the *Commedia*. Barbi directs attention to the privileged position assigned to the ancient philosophers.[170] He continues to observe that in the *Paradiso* Aristotle holds his place next to Moses and St. John the Evangelist among those who show Dante the necessity to love God.[171] While all this is true, it should not be forgotten that the *Commedia* presents the limitations of philosophy in relation to divine Wisdom and

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[167] Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante*, pp. 30-31. That Beatrice needs the assistance of Virgil for Gentile is a sign of the subjugation of theology to reason. "Beatrice non puo` correre essa incontro a Dante sulle spiaggia deserta; e fa capo a Virgilio, alla ragione….E questa non e` piu` trascendenza, ma vero e proprio razionalismo: quel razionalismo tomistico che riesce in certo modo a sottomettere la teologia alla ragione. Questo accade, avvertiva Tommaso, *propter defectum intellectus nostri*; qui Beatrice direbbe che ha bisogno, essa, la beatrice, di Virgilio, pel difetto di Dante; ma certo e`, che senza Virgilio ella non sarebbe beatrice, perche' non beerebbe Dante, ne potrebbe beare nessuno" (pp. 30-31). That Beatrice seeks out Virgil's aid perhaps denotes cooperation rather than subjugation.

[168] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 122: "This does not make philosophizing unnecessary but makes it relatively less valuable."

[169] Hollander, *Dante*, p. 122.

[170] Michele Barbi, *Problemi di critica dantesca*: *seconda serie 1920 / 1937*, p. 69: "Dante segue San Tommaso nel valutare l'importanza degli studi profani e l'utilita` di essi anche in rapporto con una piu` vera e profana conoscenza di Dio. Questo e` il pensiero Animatore del *Convivio*, e non subisce cambiamento nella Divina Commedia."

[171] Barbi, p. 69: "Menti privilegiate come quelle d'Aristotile e di Platone ecc. non furono della natura formate senza il concorso della Grazia: per questo la fama ch'e` rimasta di loro nel mondo fa degni quei

celestial happiness. Ultimately, philosophy cannot by its own powers lead man directly to divine truth; this is under the jurisdiction of perfect vision. And perfect vision is under the jurisdiction of Beatrice as divine Grace. For Barbi it is precisely because Dante feels so confident about his faith and is willing to recognize the limits of reason that he feels an urgency to reach for truths that are inaccessible to the human mind.[172] While this may be a valid point, it is crucial to remember that it is Beatrice and not Virgil who takes Dante to those truths that are inaccessible to the human mind. As the epitome of classical friendship, Dante's union with Virgil at best is incomplete and finite. By means of natural reason Virgil leads Dante to the perfection of his earthly nature and to earthly happiness in the earthly Paradise. As Virgil himself makes clear, further than this point he cannot not go. (*Purg.* 27, 128-129).[173]

For many the top of the mountain is Eden itself, a place where Dante experiences the happiness that was first enjoyed by Adam and Eve before the fall.[174] For Francesco De Sanctis the earthly paradise is an idyllic world reminiscent of the golden age, a place where man can live in peace while enjoying the joys of friendship.[175] It is a place where Dante's soul becomes free of sin and of the weight of the flesh; it is a return to

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filosofi antichi d'una speciale distinzione pur fra I dannati; e nel *Paradiso* il Poeta pone Aristotle, accanto a Mose` e a san Giovanni Evangelista, fra coloro che gli mostrarono la necessita` di amare Dio."

[172] Barbi, *Problemi di critica dantesca: seconda serie 1920 / 1937*, pp. 71-72: "Appunto perche` egli sente bene salda la sua fede ed e` disposto a riconoscere i limiti della ragione, prova—ora come al tempo del *Convivio*—l'impulso ad indagare, con speranza di merito piu` che con timore di peccato, anche le verita` inaccessibili all'intelletto umano: *fides quaerens intellectum*." cf. *Studi danteschi*, XVII, p. 22.

[173] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXVII, 128-129: "e se' venuto in parte / dov'io per me piu` oltre non discerno."

[174] Charles S. Singleton, *Dante Studies* 2: *Journey to Beatrice*, pp. 101-102: "Then, at the summit where Beatrice comes to this man, speaking to him at first so sternly, her words again point to the same *other* meaning of the mountain…here at the top of the mountain is found nothing less than Eden itself, where our first parents lived so briefly in perfect happiness….Happiness must surely be the allegorical meaning of this summit, the goal of this mountain climb."

[175] Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia della letteratura italiana*, p. 208: "Ne nasce un mondo idillico, che ricorda l'eta` d'oro, dove tutto e` pace e affetto, e dove tutto si manifestano con effusione le pure gioie dell'arte, I dolci sentimenti dell'amicicia."

innocence.[176] Virgil himself understands the goal at the top of the mountain to be happiness. In *Purgatorio* 27 while encouraging Dante to continue the struggle up the hill, he represents the goal as a tree of many branches: *Quel dolce pome che per tanti rami / cercando va la cura de' mortali, / oggi porra` in pace le tue fami* [177] (*Purg*. 27, 115-117). The branches symbolize the various meanings attached to happiness. If the goal at the summit of the mountain is indeed happiness, one wonders about the type of happiness found there. [178] While happiness may be attained along different paths and while the life of reason is the happiest in this life, perfect happiness is not to be found in this life.[179] It would seem that at the summit of the mountain Dante regains that happiness enjoyed by Adam and Eve before the fall. [180] Friendship with Virgil leads Dante to the life of reason and earthly happiness, but it is Beatrice who leads to ultimate perfection and happiness. .

That the goal at the top of the mountain is happiness is first confirmed by Virgil (*Purg*. 27, 115-117),[181] and then again by Beatrice: *Guardaci ben, ben son, ben son Beatrice! / Come degnasti d'accedere al monte? / Non sapei tu che qui e` l'uom felice?*

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[176] De Sanctis, *Storia della Letteratura Italiana*, p. 114: "nel Purgatorio si sale sino al paradiso terrestre; immagina terrena del paradiso, dove l'anima e` monda del peccato o della carne e rifatta bella e innocente….Il purgatorio e` il centro di questo mistero o commedia dell'anima; e` qua che il nodo si scioglie."

[177] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXVII, 115-117: "That sweet fruit which mortals, with great effort, / seek on many different boughs / shall today give peace to all our cravings." Cf. Charles Singleton, *Dante Studies* 2 *Jurney to Beatrice* (1967), p. 102. Singleton interprets Virgil's promise of "that sweet fruit" as the promise of happiness to be attained at the summit of the mountain.

[178] Charles S. Singleton, *Dante Studies* 2: *Journey to Beatrice*, p. 102: "here at the top of the mountain is found nothing less than Eden itself, where our first parents lived so briefly in perfect happiness, so that the affirmation 'man is happy here' takes on thereby a deeper meaning. Man was happy here, and now there is a return to this place. Happiness must surely be the allegorical meaning of this summit, the goal of this climb."

[179] Singleton, pp. 104-105.

[180] Singleton, p. 115. Singleton notes that, at the summit of the mountain Dante regains the Earthly Paradise and that moral innocence which was the inner state of Adam before the Fall.

[181] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXVII, 115-117: "Quel dolce pome che per tanti rami / cercando va la cura de' mortali, / oggi porra` in pace le tue fami."

(*Purg*. 30, 73).[182] As Beatrice herself makes clear, the happiness that Dante finds at the summit of Purgatory is to be understood in relation to herself as true good. Hollander observes that the triple use of the word *ben* echoes the triple use of "Virgil" (*Purg*. 30, 49-51) [183] uttered by Dante and of the triple use of the word "weep" uttered by Beatrice (*Purg*. 30, 56-57).[184] This echo reinforces Beatrice's earlier point, Dante should not weep for the disappearance of Virgil, for in loosing Virgil he has gained a greater good. While the Italian word *ben* means "really," it also implies the sense of its root, "good."[185] Beatrice, a greater good since a friend in Christ, has returned to lead Dante toward complete happiness. As Singleton notes, Beatrice's very name signifies happiness, "The journey to the summit means journey to Beatrice….Here at the summit 'man is happy', as Beatrice says. She might also have said that man is happy when he attains her, as her very name signifies: Beatrice, bearer of beatitude." [186] Dante is happy when he attains to Beatrice because the gift she bears is beatitude.

As witnessed earlier, the distinction between Virgil and Beatrice as friends can be better understood once placed in relation to man's two ends.[187] The interplay between

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[182] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 73: "Look over here! I am, I truly am Beatrice. / How did you dare approach the mountain? / Do you not know that man here lives in joy?"

[183] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 49-51: "Ma Virgilio n'avea lasciati scemi / di se', Virgilio dolcissimo patre, Virgilio a cui per mia salute die' mi." See Hollander's note to vv. 49-51. Here Hollander observes that Dante's triple farewell to Virgil echoes Orpheus's three-verse farewell to Eurydice. Hollander notes that Bernardino Daniello (1568) heard the same echo.

[184] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 56-57: "non pianger anco, non piangere ancora; che' pianger ti convien per altra spada." See Hollander's note to vv. 56-57. Hollander observes that the thrice-uterance of the word pianger by Beatrice echoes the thrice-utterance of Virgil's name by Dante in vv. 49-51

[185] See Hollander's note to *Purg*. 30, 73-75, p. 683. According to Hollander, Tommaseo was the first to note this echo: "That Beatrice speaks the word *ben* (here meaning 'really,' but also carrying its root sense, 'good' or 'well') three times in order to echo the triple iteration of 'Virgil' (vv. 49-51) and of 'weep' (vv. 56-57) was first noted by Tommaseo (1837)."

[186] Charles S. Singleton, *Dante Studies 2 Journey To Beatrice* p. 116.

[187] Michele Barbi, *Problemi di critica dantesca: seconda serie 1920 /1937* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1975), p. 72: "Il presupposto che la ragione e` sufficiente a raggiungere la conoscenza di certe verita` indipendentemente dalla rivelazione induce D. a pensare e a dimostrare – e non tanto nel *Convivio* quanto nella *Monarchia* e

Virgil and Beatrice in the *Commedia* is to be understood in relation to the interplay between man's natural end and his supernatural end.[188] Bruno Panvini visualizes Virgil's relationship to Beatrice as, *gratia* gratis *data, per quam unus homo cooperatur alteri ad hoc quod ad Deum reducatur.* [189] Beatrice is the Grace by means of which Dante through the intervention of Virgil is called back home to God. Dante's friendship with Virgil and Beatrice must be understood within the context of those things which belong to faith and those which belongs to reason.[190] In the *Monarchia* man's first goal is presented as earthly happiness (*beatitudo hujus vitae*) attained in Eden by means of philosophy (*per philosophica documenta*). This first goal entails proper operation according to the moral and intellectual virtues. Man's second goal is presented as spiritual happiness (*beatitudo vitae aeternae*) and it is located in the heavenly paradise. The second goal is attained by means of revelation and the Scripture (*per documenta spiritualia*) and it entails the proper operation according to the theological truths. [191] The

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nella *Commedia* – che come duplice e` il fine dell'uomo, uno per la vita terrena e uno per la vita eterna, cosi` al raggiungimento del primo sia mezzo sufficiente la ragione, a quello del secondo occorra la fede. La ragione viene in tal modo ad essere considerata, per quanto attiene alla vita terrena, indipendente dalla fede." In contrast to Pietrobono, who believes that Dante's insistance on the independence of reason is exclusive to the *Convivio*, Barbi notes how the independence of reason is a concept that he becomes more passionate about as time progresses and is represented in his later works including in the *Commedia*: "la ragione si muove di per se` ed opera secondo le proprie forze. Questo concetto non e`, come pensa il Pietrobono, proprio esclusivamente del *Convivio*, ne` viene ad essere temperato o sconfessato nelle opere piu` tarde: anzi Dante se ne persuade sempre piu` quanto piu` sente il bisogno di trovare una base per sostenere l'indipendenza del potere imperiale dal potere religioso " (p. 72).

[188] Michele Barbi, *Problemi di critica dantesca: seconda serie 1920 / 1937*, p. 66: "Accanto a Beatrice da` luogo a Virgilio, che rappresenta la ragione e la filosofia, ed e` guida alla felicita` terrena. Anche nella *Commedia*, come gia` nel Convivio, appar dunque chiaro com'egli tenga in gran conto tanto la verita` rivelata quanto la scienza umana, e come miri costantemente a conciliare l'una con l'altra, armonizzando insieme il fine celeste col fine terreno della vita."

[189] S. Thomas Aquinas., *Op. cit*., tom. Cit., Quaestio CXI, Art. 1, pag. 566, "gratia gratis data, per quam unus homo cooperatur alteri ad hoc quod ad Deum reducatur "cf. Bruno Panvini, "Sul Primo Incontro Di Dante Con Beatrice Nel Paradiso Terrestre," in *Filologia romanza* (S. Thomas quoted by Bruno Panvini)

[190] Michele Barbi, *Problemi di critica dantesca: seconda serie 1920 / 1937*, p. 71: "Che Dante non abbia anche nella *Commedia* sentito vivamente,al pari di tanti altri pensatori cristiani, in contrasto fra cio` che insegna la fede e cio` che soltanto appare credibile alla ragione, nessuno potrebbe asserirlo."

[191] *Monarchia* III, 16, 7 cf., Charles Singleton, *Dante Studies 2 Journey to Beatrice*, p. 265.

Monarchia argues for a complete independence of the two goals. The first goal is not subjugated to the second, and the attainment of the first is not a precondition for the fulfillment of the second.[192] If Dante's friendship with Virgil leads to the fulfillment of the first goal, friendship with the Beatrice leads to a fulfillment of the second. Grounded in natural reason, Dante's union with Virgil leads to moral rectitude, to the correction and perfection of his will. [193] The authority of Virgil is independent from that of Beatrice. As Michele Barbi observes, while seeking Virgil's assistance Beatrice leaves him free to choose the means by which he will guide Dante out of danger.[194] Independently of Beatrice, Virgil guides and leads Dante to earthly perfection and happiness.

In the *Commedia* Virgil and Beatrice belong to a hiearchy of friends that lead to the hiearchy of vision and light professed by Singleton. Applying St. Thomas' formulation of the three types of vision, Singleton interprets the transition from Virgil to Beatrice at the summitt of Purgatory and the transition from Beatrice to St. Bernard at the summit of *Paradiso* as a transition of lights in a hiearchical order from lowest to highest.[195] As *lumen gratiae* Beatrice is the path to perfect vision and truth. [196] As

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[192] Charles Singleton, *Dante Studies* 2: *Journey to Beatrice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 266.

[193] Singleton, p. 32: "Virgil as guide can and does represent a first movement toward God by the natural light, even though 'contemplation of invisible things' is not a significant or prominent part of that movement. Virgil…guides toward a condition of justice at the summit of the mountain."

[194] Michele Barbi, *Problemi di critica dantesca: seconda serie 1920 / 1937*, p. 73: "ad ogni modo il 'savio gentil che tutto seppe' guida D. con piena indipendenza. Beatrice ha rimesso a lui pienamente la scelta dei mezzi…ed egli sa di suo la via per cui condurlo e la meta."

[195] Charles Singleton, *Dante Studies 2: Journey to Beatrice*, p. 16: "The wayfarer completes a journey to God, moving first with Virgil, then with Beatrice, and finally with Bernard…Beatrice as guide is higher than Virgil, and Bernard higher than Beatrice…the lower leads to the higher, Virgil to Beatrice at the summit of the mountain of Purgatory, Beatrice to Bernard at the last summit where God is seen in His essence. The pattern of it emerges through the figures of the three guides, through an occasional and reiterated reference to their nature and function. The guides are 'lights' (Virgil or Beatrice) or one of them may precide over the area of a third and last light (Bernard) ….The change of guides is the clear signal of a

lumen naturale Virgil is the path to finite vision and truth. [197] Dante's friendship with Virgil is a union grounded in the natural light of the intellect and in contemplation according to natural reason and perfect virtue. It is perfect friendship as defined by Aristotle in the *Ethics*.[198] Friendship with Virgil is an activity that leads to operation according to perfect virtue. It leads to the virtuous life, a life lived in accordance with reason. On the other hand, Beatrice as the light of Grace leads Dante to perfect vision and divine love.[199] Friendship with Beatrice is grounded in divine Wisdom and it is a gift of Grace. It is an activity that leads to operation according to divine Wisdom and Grace. It is the means by which Dante is raised to light of God while still in this life, *in via*. Friendship with Beatrice is the epitome of Christian friendship, it is *caritas*. Beatrice

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change of 'lights'….To pass from Virgil's guidance to that of Beatrice means, when measured on the familiar pattern, to pass from journey by the first of the three lights to journey by the second" (p. 16). cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In Isaiam Prophetam*, ch. I: "…sciendum quod non quaelibet visio intellectualis est visio prophetalis: est enim quaedam visio quam sufficit lumen naturale intellectus, sicut est contemplatio invisibilium per principia rationis: et in hac contemplatione ponebant philosophi summam felicitatem hominis. Est iterum quaedam contemplatio ad quam elevatur homo per lumen fidei sufficiens, sicut sanctorum in via. Est etiam quaedam beatorum in patria ad quam elevatur intellectus per lumen gloriae, videns Deum per essentiam, inquantum est objectum beatitudinis; et hoc plene et perfecte non est nisi in patria, sed quandoque ad ipsam raptim elevatur aliquis etiam existens in hac mortali vita, sicut fruit in rapto Pauli" (Aquinas' quote by Charles Singleton, note 1, p. 34). "There is [I] a kind of vision for which the natural light of intellect suffices, such as the contemplation of invisible things according to the principles of reason; and the philosophers placed the highest happiness of man in this contemplation; [2] there is yet another kind of contemplation to which man is raised by the light of faith, as are the saints in this life [*in via*]; and [3] there is that contemplation of the blessed in Heaven [*in patria*] to which the intellect is uplifted by the light of glory, seeing God in his essence, as the object of beatitude—and this contemplation is not full and perfect except in Heaven; yet sometimes one is uplifted to this contemplation by rapture even while still in this mortal life, as was Paul when in rapture [II Cor. 12.2: "I know a man…whether in the body or outside the body, I know not, God knows, rapt even to the third heaven"]. (Translation by Charles Singleton, p. 15).

[196] Charles Singleton, *Journey to Beatrice*, p. 31. For Singleton, Beatrice "is *lumen gratiae,* and the vision by such a light does indeed serve to kindle the kind of love which is 'true' because its other name is charity " (p. 31).

[197] Singleton, p. 33: "Virgil, then, when urged by Beatrice to rescue the wayfarer from his struggle…takes on a function as guide which, allegorically, is that very light itself: *lumen naturale*."

[198] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, pp. 212-213, 8.3.1156 b6-30.

[199] Charles Singleton, *Dante Studies 2: Journey to Beatrice*, p. 31: "She is *lumen gratie*, and vision by such a light does indeed serve to kindle the kind of love which is 'true' because its other name is charity."

takes Dante where Virgil cannot go, beyond the human to experience divinity, *trasumanar*.

For Singleton movement with Virgil is an *umanar* and movement with Beatrice is a *trasumanar*. [200] Friendship with Virgil is a union grounded within the limitations and powers of human nature, therefore it is an *umanar*. By contrast, friendship with Beatrice is a union by means of which Dante moves beyond humanity to divinity, it is a *trasumanar*. Friendship with Beatrice leads away from *gravitas* and *visio corporalia* toward *visio spiritualia*.[201] Newman observes well that, "Purgatory mediates between the shadowed corporeality of Hell and the lucid incorporeality of Heaven." [202] In Purgatory Dante begins to see celestial Light, but his vision is not yet ready and perfected to be able to look upon it directly.[203] He still requires a media or mirror through which the brilliance of that Light may be reflected.[204] The eyes of Beatrice become that media and mirror. By fixing his eyes into her eyes, Dante is transformed as Glauco is metamorphosed into a god of the sea.[205] However, before he can undergo such a transfomation Dante must first admit to wrongdoing, he must confess.

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[200] Charles Singleton, *Journey to Beatrice*, p. 33.

[201] Francis X. Newman, "St. Augustine's Three Visions and the Structure of the 'Commedia' " in *Dante*, ed., Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1986), p. 72: "The passage from Hell to Purgatory is an entry into the light and thereby into a realm which calls for a different kind of vision. The culminating action of *Purgatorio* is not a vision of *corporalia*, but of *spiritualia,* in Augustine's sense of the term." Newman studies Dante's journey toward salvation as a hierarchical progression toward light. He suggests that the progression through the three canticles be studied in relation to the Augustinian schema of three visions. With the appearance of Beatrice in *Purgatory,* Dante leaves behind the *gravitas* of the sinner*,* the *pondus* of evil, and the *visio corporalis* of Hell to be introduced to a *visio spiritualis*.

[202] Newman, p. 75.

[203] Newman, p. 75.

[204] Newman, p. 75: "Purgatory is the realm in which the pilgrim begins to see the heavenly Light, but his eyes are not yet ready to look upon it directly. He still requires media to shield him from its full brilliance. In Paradise Dante will see God face to face; here in Purgatory he still sees *per speculum in aenigmate*: through a glass and in a sign." Accordingly, Beatrice is the sign and the glass.

[205] Dante, *Paradiso*, p. 6: "Beatrice tutta ne l'etterne rote / fissa con li occhi stava; e io in lei / le luci fissi, di la` su` rimote. / Nel suo aspetto tal dentro mi fei, / qual si fe' Glauco nel gustar de l'erba / che 'l fe'

Beatrice demands a confession: *di`, di` se questo e` vero; a tanta accusa / tua confession conviene esser congiunta* [206] (*Purg*. 31, 5-6). Frozen by fear and overwhelmed with confusion, Dante admits to wrongdoing with a feeble, *si`* [207] (Purg, 31, 14), and then gives in to tears and sighs [208] (*Purg*. 31, 13-21). He gives a full confession: *Piangendo dissi*: *'Le presenti cose / col falso lor piacere volser miei passi, / tosto che 'l vostro viso si nascoste* [209] (*Purg*. 31, 34-36). Dante's transgressions would seem to consist in having loved earthly and false goods. Beatrice reinforces the requirement of purgation, *Alto fato di Dio sarebbe rotto, / se Lete` si passasse e tal vivanda / fosse gustata sanza alcuno scotto / di pentimento che lagrime spanda* [210] (*Pug*. 30, 142-145). Confession forces Dante to recognize his own fallibility in relation to a higher Truth and Good. Theophil Spoerri notes that confession lies at the very center of Purgatory and the entire *Commedia*.[211] Before Dante can know and love himself as God knows and loves him, he

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consorto in mar de li altri dei." By fixing his own eyes into the eyes of Beatrice Dante is transformed as Glauco is metamorphosed into a god of the sea upon eating a magic herb. Through Beatrice, Dante experiences *trasumanar*, he passes beyond human limitations and approaches divinity. See Hollander's notes to vv. 64-66, 67-72, 68, and 70-72, pp. 23-24.

[206] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 5-6: "say if this is true. To such an accusation / your confession must be joined." As Hollander notes in his commentary to verses 5-6, Beatrice demands that Dante confesses with reference to the list of accusations she directed against him in *Purg*. 30, 124-132.

[207] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 14: "yes"

[208] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 13-21: "Confusione e paura insieme miste / mi pinsero un tal 'si' fuor de la bocca, / al quale intender fuor mestier le viste /… / si` scoppia' io sottesso grave carco, / fuori sgorgando lagrime e sospiri, / e la voce allento` per lo suo varco."

[209] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 34-36. Dante confesses and identifies his trangressions as having loved false goods. He is rather vague in identifying the precise nature of these pleasures. See Hollander's note to *Purg*. 31, 34-36. I cite partially from Hollander's note, p. 703: "It does seem clear that they are presented in so vague and encompassing a way as to allow two primary interpretations, that is, both carnal and intellectual divagations from the love he owed God, awakened in him by Beatrice."

[210] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 142-145: "Broken would be the high decree of God / should Lethe be crossed and its sustenance / be tasted without payment of some fee: / his penitence that shows itself in tears." See Hollander's note to vv. 142-145.

[211] Theophil Spoerri, "Il Canto XXXI del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche*, pp. 1301-1302: "La confessione di Dante e` il nucleo vero del *Purgatorio*, anzi il nucleo ed il centro di tutta la *Commedia*."

must first humble himself before Beatrice and admit to any wrongdoing. [212] Confession is a necessary first step to salvation, for it leads to self-awareness and self-knowledge.[213] Self-knowledge in turn lead to humility, a precondition for salvation.[214] As Etienne Gilson observes, "the end of humility is compassion."[215] And compassion is the offspring of *caritas*. In recognizing the ugliness of his sin and rejecting it as ultimate evil, Dante learns to recognize the beauty of Grace as ultimate good. [216] Confession is a personal form communication between man and God. By exposing himself Dante escapes the limitations and restrictions of his subjective and personal "I" and embraces the "you" and the "Thou."[217] Through confession the distance between Dante and God is bridged and the duality between flesh and spirit, natural and supernatural is resolved.

His personal humiliation unites Dante to the humiliation of Christ on the cross and to the humiliation of all men. To truly know oneself is to know others and to feel

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[212] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard*, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Sheed and Weed, 1955), pp. 72-73.
[213] George Holmes. *Dante* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), p.74.
[214] Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, "On the Canticle of Canticles," in *On the Love of God and Other Selected Writings*, ed. Msgr. Charles J. Dollen (New York: Alba House, 1996), p. 66: "No one can be saved without that self-knowledge that leads to humility, the mother of salvation."
[215] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard*, p. 77.
[216] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio,* XXX e XXXI)," in *Filologia romanza,* vol. 5, p. 265: "Ma a che la *poenitentia* sia piena occorre ancora che l'uomo, paragonando la bruttura del peccato alla bellezza infinita della Grazia, giunga anche a detestare il peccato come il sommo male, come la causa della privazione del sommo bene, affinche` piu` non incorra in esso." Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Op cit*., tom. cit., quaestio CXII, Art. 5. pag. 585: "…opportet quod mens humana, dum iustificatur, per motum liberi arbitrii recedat a peccato et accedat ad iustitiam….Oportet igitur quod in iustificatione impii sit motus liberi arbitrii duplex: unus quo desiderium tendat in Dei iustitiam; et alius quo detestetur peccatum." Cfr. Also *Op*. cit., tom. cit., Quaestio cit., Art. 6 e tom. IV, Pars III, Quaestio LXXXVI, Art. 6, pag. 612. (Aquinas quoted by Panvini)
[217] Theophil Spoerri, "Il Canto XXXI del Purgatorio," in *Letture Dantesche*, p. 1301: "La confessione e` la forma di comunicazione attuale, personale, della conoscenza. E` del pari il legame della comunita`, un uscire dalle barriere dell'io, un aprirsi per gli altri. La purificazione penetra sin nella zona piu` intima, piu` occulta dell'anima. L'uomo diviene limpido e trasparente a se medesimo e agli altri….Ciascuno parla del proprio errore. Nessuno si cela dinanzi all'altro." Spoerri notes that, Dante's poetry has the unique ability to overcome the subjective and personal "I" of the poet to encompass the universal "you," p. 1310: "Percio` questa poesia non e` come molta altra poesia: soggettiva—un mero accadimento interno dell'anima, nell'io esclusivo del poeta; ma oggettiva: rivelazione, dialogo, impetuoso passaggio dalle proiezioni dell' <<io>> alla realta` dell'incontro col <<tu >>" (p. 1301).

compassion for their misery.[218] Humility is the offspring of *caritas.* Once he has renounced his personal will and that personal "I" [219](*Inf.* 2, 3), he then can embrace the common will. [220] The brutal honesty which permits Dante to know himself as God knows him and judge himself as God judges him, permits him to unite his particular will with the will of God.[221] Friendship with Beatrice forces Dante to know himself in relation to all men as images of God. Through Beatrice, Dante begins to know and love others in relation to God and to love Him in his essence.[222] Singleton notes that in her dual nature, both human and divine, Beatrice comes as Christ came in the flesh, as Christ will come on Judgement Day, and as Christ presently comes everyday. [223] From fixing his eyes on Beatrice (*Par.* 1. 65-66)[224] Dante proceeds then to fix his eyes on God.

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[218] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard*, pp. 73-74: "My history is also my history; my state is also your state. When a man knows himself miserable, guilty, under condemnation and deserving to be so, then he knows also by that very fact that all men are in the same condition. To know the truth concerning oneself is therefore to know the truth concerning one's neighbour, and it is indispensable to know it, not this time to pass judgement, as we have to do in our own case, but that we may have compassion."

[219] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 3, p. 24: "e io sol uno." See the second chapter of this dissertation for a consideration of the significance of this line for the topic of friendship. Also see Hollander's note to verse 3 on p. 34. See also Robert Hollander, *Electronic Bulletin of the Dante Society of America*, p. 30.

[220] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard*, p. 75.

[221] Bruno Panvini, "Sul primo incontro di Dante con Beatrice nel Paradiso Terrestre (*Purgatorio,* XXX e XXXI)," in *Filologia romanza*, vol. 5, p. 263: "E nel pentimento si risolve il contrasto fra la libera volonta` dell'uomo e la libera volonta` di Dio."

[222] Charles S. Singleton, *Dante Studies* 2: *Journey to Beatrice*, pp. 26-27.

[223] Singleton, pp. 79-81. Singleton interprets the return of Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30 as an analogy for the coming of Christ, an advent, and more specifically, as three advents of Christ: "But, until we came across the pattern of it in Bernard and again in Thomas, we had not thought to look upon the advent of Beatrice for the resemblance which it might reveal to *three* advents of Christ….Now, we do see, being aware of the pattern. Beatrice comes as Christ *came*; the signs of that are unmistakable. Beatrice comes as Christ *shall* come—in glory, to judge…Beatrice comes as Christ *comes…in mentem*….Beatrice's other names in this advent in the present are the same as Christ's other names when His advent is *now*: Wisdom and Grace " (pp. 79-81). Singleton observes that, since Grace comes as light, the advent of Beatrice is an advent of Light cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Opusc. 53, *De Humanitate Jesu Christi*: "Grace is caused in men by the presence of the Divinty, even as light in the air by the presence of the sun; whence it is said in Ezachiel 43 that 'the glory of the God of Israel came forth out of the East…and the earth shined with His glory " (Aquinas quoted by Singleton, p. 82).

[224] Dante, *Paradiso*, I, 65-66: "fissa con li occhi stava; e io in lei / le luci fissi, di la` su` rimote." See Hollander's note to vv. 64-66, As Hollander explains, it is presumed that Dante and Beatrice have passed the sphere of fire that circles the earth below the sphere of the Moon. Through Beatrice's eyes Dante's eyes are guided toward the heavenly spheres.

These very same eyes moved Virgil to compassion (*Inf*. 2, 116-117),[225] now move Dante toward divininity (Purg. 31, 119-123).[226] Through the vision of Beatrice, Dante experiences *trasumanar*.

In his interpretation of the term *trasumanar*, Jacopo della Lana notes the importance of Beatrice in relation to Dante's transcendence. Through Beatrice's vision Dante is transmuted, he becomes better able and disposed to contemplate divinity: "*Or qui` vuole mostrare Dante come per la visione di Beatrice ello trasumano`, cioe` che ello divento` piu` abile e disposto a contemplare che non puo` dare la spezia di sua natura umana.*"[227] Dante's friendship with Beatrice permits him to move beyond humanity and to become more disposed to contemplate divinity. For Botterill the role played by Beatrice in relation to Dante's transformation is even more significant than that which Jacopo envisions. On fixing his gaze into Beatrice's eyes Dante does not merely become more disposed to contemplate divinity. Through the divine splendor reflected in Beatrice's eyes (*Par*. 1. 65-6) [228] Dante actually partakes of divinity and becomes god-

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[225] Dante, *Inferno*, II, 116-117: "li occhi lucenti lagrimando volse, / per che mi fece del venir piu` presto." For possible influencial sources of Beatrice's tears see Hollander's note to verse 116, p. 43. See also Robert Hollander, *Allegory in Dante's "Commedia"* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1969), pp. 91-92. According to Hollander, Beatrice's tears are reminiscent of Venus's who weeps for her burned son in *Aeneid* I.228. Also see Rachel Jacoff, "The Tears of Beatrice," *Dante Studies* 100 (1982), p. 3. Here Deatrice's tears are to be understood in relation to Rachel's tears for the loss of her children (Jeremiah 31:15).

[226] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXI, 119-123: "…strinsemi li occhi a li occhi rilucenti, / che pur sopra `l grifone stavan saldi./ Come in lo specchio il sol, non altrimenti / la doppia fiera dentro vi raggiava, / or con altri, or con altri reggimenti."

[227] Steven Botterill, *Dante and the Mystical Tradition*, p. cf. Jacopo della Lana, *La 'Commedia' di Dante degli Alligherii col "Commento" di Jacopo della Lana Bolognese*, ed. Luciano Scarabelli, III (Bologna, 1866).

[228] Dante, *Paradiso*, I, 65-66: "fissa con li occhi stava; e io in lei / le luci fissi, di la` su` rimote." See Hollander's note to vv. 64-66. In fixing his gaze on Beatrize, Dante is transmuted from the earthly sphere to the heavenly spheres.

like.[229] In contrast to Jacopo, Francesco da Buti notes the importance of change and grace (*per grazia*) in relation to Dante's "*trasumanar*."[230]

It should be observed that in order to experience *trasumanar* there must also be *umanar*. In Dante the point of departure is man, whose natural reason leads him to the very threshold of revealed truth.[231] Beatrice takes Dante to experience perfect vision and heavenly bliss, but it is Virgil who takes him to Beatrice. The point of departure in Dante's journey toward divinity is humanity. Though imperfect and incomplete, Dante's friendship with Virgil is necessary, it is the first-step toward a long journey toward illumination and Truth. Without the assistance of Virgil, Dante would never have reached Beatrice. [232] Dante's last words to Virgil in the poem emphasize the importance of Virgil for his salvation, *Virgilio a cui per mia salute die' mi*.[233] (*Purg*. 30, 51) While it is

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[229] Steven Botterill, *Dante and the Mystical Tradition*, p. 231. According to Botterill, Jacopo della Lana undermines the element of change in "*trasumanar.*"

[230] See Francesco da Buti in Steven Botterill, *Dante and the Mystical* Tradition, p. 231. Botterill notes that, Buti conceives of contemplation as an activity of this world and understands *trasumanar* as a consequence of grace: "trasumanar, cioe' passare dall'umanita' a piu' alto grado, che non puo' essere se none Iddio: impero' che nulla natura e' piu' nobile dell'umana se non la divina…se' come li santi omini che sono nel mondo si trasumano per grazia, stando in vita contemplativa, che sono quanto a l'anima risplendenti come e' lo Sole nel cospetto di Dio" (Buti quoted by Botterill). Focusing on the importance of change in *trasumanar*, Buti draws attention to the Glaucus' episode: " E questo esemplo ae indutto l'autore, a dimostrare com'elli fu trasformato, secondo l'anima, dell'umanita' alla divinita." In the same way that after eating a magic herb Glaucus the fisherman is transformed into a god and throws himself in the sea, by gazing at Beatrice Dante is also transformed. The analogy underscores the miraculous nature of Dante's transformation. It should be noted that in Dante's case the transformation occurs by means of a lady who is both human and divine. Through Beatrice, Dante transcends humanity and joins divinity. (Buti quoted by Steven Botterill, p. 231).

[231] Erich Auerbach, *Studi su Dante*, p. 85: "Egli comincia con l'uomo smarrito, in aiuto del quale viene mandata la ragione – non Aristotole ma Virgilio – ed essa lo conduce alla verita` rivelata che gli fa vedere Dio" (p. 85).

[232] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 120: "For Dante, Virgil is the most welcome of sources, the most needed of poetic guides. It is simply impossible to imagine a *Comedy* without him. And no one before Dante, and perhaps very few after, ever loved Virgil as he did."

[233] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 51: "Virgil, to whom I gave myself for my salvation." See Robert Hollander, *Allegory in Dante's "Commedia"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 261. I cite here from Hollander, "At Dante's beginnings we do well to have in mind his endings, and vice versa. It is Beatrice, the figure of Christ, who brings Dante to salvation; it is Virgil who brings Dante to Beatrice. Dante does not (and did not in the *Vita Nuova*) use the word *salute* lightly. His last words to Virgil give him the highest

Beatrice who sends Virgil to Dante, it is Virgil who takes Dante to Beatrice (*Purgatorio* 30). Dante's friendship with Beatrice is grounded in both humanity and divinity. It it is a union by means of which Dante's flesh is transmuted into spirit.

Instead of consoling Dante for the loss of Virgil (*Purg*. 30, 49-51), [234] as one would expect, Beatrice calls Dante by name and tells him to save his tears for a more serious cause, *Dante, perche' Virgilio se ne vada, / non pianger anco, non piangere ancora; / che' pianger ti conven per altra spada* [235](*Purg.* 30, 55-57). Dante's self-nomination in the poem coincides with his conversion. [236] This is the first and only time in the poem where Dante names himself and shortly there-after deems it necessary to defend his self-nomination (*Purg.* 30, 62-63). [237] Why the necessity to name himself at

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function anyone less than Christ can perform, and that is to bring another to Christ " (p. 261). See also Hollander's note to *Par.* 31, 79-81.

[234] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 49-51. See Robert Hollander's note to lines 43-48. Hollander draws attention to the reversal of roles between Virgil and Beatrice. He also juxtoposes Virgil's feminine demeanor (his motherly and nurturing role) with Beatrice's masculine demeanor (her fatherly role). While this might be a valid interpretation, it is worth noting that while the use of the word *mamma* emphasizes Virgil's nurturing role, there are various occasions when Virgil fulfills a fatherly role. In *Purg*. 30, 44, for instance, in addressing the pagan poet Dante says "Virgil, sweetest of fathers" (50). The truth perhaps is that in providing wisdom, guidance, protection and discipline, Virgil fulfills a fatherly role, while in providing care, comfort, and encouragement he seems to fulfill a nurturing and motherly role.

[235] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 55-57: "Dante, because Virgil has departed, / do not weep, do not weep yet- / there is another sword to make you weep." See Hollander's note to *Purg.* XXX, 55, p. 681. For Hollander this moment is "the climax of the poem. Everything before it leads here….And, once Dante is named, his new mission begins to take form, first as Beatrice has him cleanse himself of his past crimes and misdemeanors. (His 'vacation' in the garden of Eden is over) " (p. 681). Also see Hollander's note to *Purg*. 30, 63.

[236] See Robert Hollander's notes to *Purgatorio* XXX, 63, pp. 682-683. Hollander notes that, Dante's self-nomination echoes the *Convivio* (I.ii.12-14) and Virgil's only self-nomination in *Georgic* (IV.563, "Vergilium"). Also see Trifon Gabriele's commentary, *Annotazioni nel Dante fatte con M. Trifon Gabriele in Bassano*., ed. Lino Pertile (Bologna: Commissione per i testi di lingua, 1993), {1525-27}).

[237] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 62-63: "quando mi volsi al suon del nome mio, / che di necessita` qui si registra" cf. John Freccero, *Dante The Poetics of Conversion*, (1986), p.2. One notes an echo of *Convivio* (I. ii.12-14) where Dante gives two possible reasons why an author would name himself: first, as in Boethius's *Consolatio,* to defend oneself against infamy or harm, second, as in Augustine's *Confessions,* in order to instruct others cf. Hollander, Robert, *Il Virgilio dantesco: tragedia nella "Commedia"* (1983), p. 133.

this precise moment in the poem, the first and only time in the body of his poem? [238] The justification given in *Purgatorio* 30, 63 echoes that of the *Convivio* (I.ii.12-14) [239] where Dante gives two reasons for an author's self-nomination: first, as in Boethius's *Consolation*, to defend oneself against infamy; second, as in Augustine's *Confessions*, for the purpose of instruction.[240] For Robert Hollander this is "the climax of the poem,"[241] and he regards all prior action as a preparation leading up to this point. Dante's self-nomination is a sign that a new phase in the journey has commenced. In calling out his name, Beatrice appeals to the new Dante, who after confession (*Purg.* 31, 31-36) will emerge from the waters of Lethe purified and reborn in Christ. The calling out of Dante's name is a sign that he is soon to become a friend in Christ. Beatrice next demands that Dante recognize her for the true good that she is, *Guardaci ben! Ben son*, *ben son Beatrice* [242] (*Purg.* 30, 73). She demands that he recognize her for who she truly is, or that he now see clearly the meaning of her name. The meaning of her name must be

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[238] Robert Hollander, *Il Virgilio dantesco: tragedia nella* "*Commedia*," p. 133.

[239] Dante, *Convivio*, I, II, 12-16, pp. 48-49: "…per necessarie cagioni due sono piu` manifeste. L'una e` quando sanza ragionare di se' grande infamia o pericolo non si puo` cessare….E questa necessitate mosse Boezio di se medesimo a parlare…L'altra e` quando, per ragionare di se', grandissima utilitade ne segue altrui per via dottrina; e questa ragione mosse Agustino ne le sue Confessioni a parlare di se', che' per lo processo de la sua vita…ne diede esemlo e dottrina….Movemi timore d'infamia, e movemi desiderio di dottrina dare, la quale altri veramente dare non puo`…"

[240] See Robert Hollander's note to *Purg*. XXX, 63, p. 682. According to Hollander in *Il Virgilio dantesco: tragedia nella* "*Commedia*" (1983. I, p. 133, n. 24), he failed to note "that his self-nomination echoed the only self-nomination found in the extended works of Virgil, indeed in the very *Georgic* (IV. 563. "Vergilium") that Dante had cited a few lines earlier (vv. 525-527 at *Purg.* XXX. 40-51)." Hollander points to Trifon Gabriele's commentary as an "earlier commentator who had made the same discovery… where he says that, in naming himself, Dante wished to imitate Virgil's self-nomination ("volendo imitar Virgilio…*illo Vergilium me tempore*")." In the *Commedia* the fear of infamy as one of the two justifications for his self-nomination takes us back to the problem of his friendship with Lady Philosophy versus his friendship with Beatrice. Dante's self-nomination would seem to be another attempt to defend himself against accusations of infamy, of betrayal, and of fickleness in matters of love. In calling out his name, Beatrice confirms the solidarity of their friendship, a union grounded in divine Wisdom and love. It is worth noting that the idea of the late-naming in an epic or romance of the protagonist or hero is by no means unique. In Chretien's *Perceval*, the hero discovers his name, or who he actually is, only rather late, for instance, and in Wolfram's *Parzival* the same technique is adopted to an illustration of the impact of the hero's destiny.

understood in relation to God, who is pure name, or Logos. Beatrice then continues to judge and to rebuke Dante for having directed his attention to others after her death, *di mia seconda etade e mutai vita, / questi si tolse a me, e diessi altrui* [243] (*Purg*. 30, 125-126). She continues to rebuke him for having set himself on the wrong path, and for having followed false images of the good, *e volse I passi suoi per via non vera, / imagini di ben seguendo false* [244] (*Purg.* 30, 130-132).

In the Garden of Eden all details surrounding Beatrice's arrival confirm the fact that she is a friend in Christ. She arrives on a sacred chariot surrounded by one hundred ministers and messengers of God who welcome her arrival (*Purg*. 30, 16-18),[245] by tossing flowers up into the air [246] singing: *Benedictus qui venis!…Manibus,* oh, *date lilia plenis!* [247] (*Purg.* 30, 19-21). That the meaning of Beatrice is involved in Christ is also

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[241] See Robert Hollander's notes to *Purg.* 30, 55, p. 681.

[242] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 73: "Look over here! I am, I truly am Beatrice."

[243] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 125-126: " when I changed lives, he took himself from me / and gave himself to others." See Hollander's note to verses 124-126. As Dante reports in the *Vita Nuova* (chapters XXXV-XXXIX), after the death of Beatrice he devoted himself to at least one other lady (as Hollander notes, *altrui* can be either singular or plural in Dante). In the *Convivio,* this other lady is presented as an allegory of Philosophy, Lady Philosophy. Also see Hollander's note to *Purg*. 33, 85-90.

[244] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 130-132: "He set his steps upon an untrue way, / pursuing those false images of the good."

[245] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 16-18: "cotali in su la divina basterna / si levar cento, *ad vocem tanti senis,* / ministri e messagger di vita etterna." As the saved souls will arise on Judgement Day, one hundred angels rise up ready to welcome Beatrice, who soon will enter the scene. See Hollander's note to verse 16-18. Hollander notes a connection between this scene and the scene in *Vita Nuova* XXIII.7, where Dante imagines the death of Beatrice and sees a group of angels escorting Beatrice up to heaven upon a cloud singing "Osanna in altissimi." According to Hollander, Charles Singleton in *Commedia, Elements of Structure* (1954), was perhaps the first to make this connection. In both scenes "Hosanna" associates Beatrice with Christ's triumphant as he enters Jerusalem. I cite partially from Hollander's note: "'Hosanna' associates her with Christ's triumphal entry into Jerusalem: in the *Vita Nuova,* the New Jerusalem that is life eternal in the Empyrean; here, a triumphant descent to earth modeled on Christ's return in judgement." The association between Beatrice's entrance with Christ's entry into Jerusalem and with Christ's return on Judgement day serve to confirm and defend the position affirmed in this dissertation, that is, Beatrice is a friend in Christ. Through Beatrice friendship is transmuted to from flesh to spirit.

[246] Dante, Purgatorio XXX, 20: "e fior gittando e di sopra e dintorno." See Hollander's note to v. 20. He notes a tradition among commentators, since the time of Daniello (1568), to associate this line with the scattering of palms as Jesus entered on Palm Sunday.

[247] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 19-21: "Tutti dicean: 'Benedictus qui venis!' / e fior gittando e di sopra e ditorno, / '*Manibus*, oh, *date lilia plenis*!' " See Hollander's notes to vv. 19, 21. As Hollander observes in

made plain by her apparel. She is a crowned with an olive branch (*Purg*. 30, 31),[248] associating her with wisdom. She wears the colors white, green, and red, associating her the theological virtues (*Purg*. 30, 31-33). [249] In her dual nature, both human and divine, Beatrice descends as Christ descended so that Dante the man may ascent to God. For this reason she is the ideal bridge between Dante and God.[250] Mirrored in her eyes is the dual nature of the Word Incarnate,[251] *Come in lo specchio il sol, non altrimenti / la doppia fiera dentro vi raggiava, / or con altri, or con altri reggimenti* [252] (*Purg*. 31, 121-123).

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his note to verse 19, it is rather surprising that in the clause "Blessed are you who come" Dante gives the masculine ending of the adjective instead of the femminine that would seem to be a more appropriate description of Beatrice. Since the femminine rendering "benedicta" would interfere neither with rhyme nor meter, Hollander concludes: "It seems clear that the poet wants his reader to realize that her meaning, her eventual identity, is totally involved in Christ. And thus she comes as Christ, not as herself." "Benedictus qui venis" is derived from the scene of Christ's entry into Jerusalem described in Mark 11:9-10: "And they that went before, and they that followed, cried, saying, 'Hosanna; Blessed be the kingdom of our father David, that comes in the name of the Lord: Hosanna in the highest' *(Hosanna in excelsis).*" (St. Mark quoted by Hollander) Hollander observes that " While Mathew (31:9) and John (12:13) also report the "Hosanna" and the blessedness of him who comes in fulfillment of the prophesy in Zechariah 9:9, only Mark has the words almost exactly as Dante has them in this passage and in *Vita Nuova* XXIII.7." See Hollander's note to vv. 16-18 and also to v. 21, where he notes the Virgilian echo (*Aen.* VI.883): "Give lilies with full hands." Also see Robert Hollander, "Dante's Use of the Fiftieth Psalm," in *Dante Studies* 91 (1973), p. 146;

[248] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 31: "sovra candido vel cinta d'uliva."

[249] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 31-33: "sovra candido vel cinta d'uliva / donna m'apparve, sotto verde manto / vestita di color di fiamma viva." See Hollander's note to vv. 31-33. The olive branch crown associates Beatrice with wisdom: the olive is associated with the goddess of wisdom, Minerva. The colors she wears link her to faith (white), hope (green), and charity (red), the three theological virtues. It is rather interesting that in her apparel Beatrice at once is associated with the classical and with Christian world. The olive branch, the classical symbol of Minerva, acquires a higher level of significance through the colors Beatrice wears, symbols of the three theological virtues. Beatrice is associated with a wisdom that is more perfect and more complete than the wisdom of Minerva.

[250] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno II*, p. 42: "Beatrice is seen from the very beginning of the poem as *mediatrix* both in the Christological and in the ecclesiological sense….The duality of Beatrice's role, at once courtly and erotic, maternal and mediatory, necessitates the conflation of stilnovistic language and biblical resonance…the duality is there in her appearance at the top of the mountain of Purgatory."

[251] Giorgio Petrocchi, *L'Ultima Dea* (Roma: Bonacci Editore, 1977), p. 130: "…in quanto negli occhi di Beatrice si rispecchiano le due nature dell'unico Verbo."

[252] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 121-123: "Even as the sun in a mirror, not otherwise / the twofold beast shone forth in them, / now with the one, now with its other nature " (p. 700). Traditionally the griffin is understood as Christ. See Hollander's note to *Purg*. 31, 123, p. 708. Hollander explains that beginning with Venturi (1732), commentators have understood *reggimenti* as synonymous to *atteggiamento*, to mean bearing or self-presentation. Hollander points to Daniello (1569 [118-123]), who understood the word to mean that the griffin behaved " 'now as man, now as God.' "

Recognizing the old passion that had ignited his soul, Dante turns to Virgil uttering a line that echoes Dido's words, "Agnosco veteris vestigial flammae" *Aeneid* (IV, 23), *conosco I segni de l'antica fiamma* [253] (*Purg*. 30, 48). Dido's love for Aeneas, though, was misguided, grounded in passion. In declaring her love for Aeneas, Dido breaks her vows to her dead husband Siccheaus. Dante recognizes the human Beatrice with whom he fell in love. He recognizes Beatrice's humanity, but he soon must learn to recognize her divinity. Beatrice's maidens, the four cardinal virtues of Prudence, courage, Justice and Temperance, encourage Dante to recognize Beatrice in her dual nature. They direct Dante's gaze into her mirroring eyes (*Purg*. 31, 115-117). [254] The very eyes whose love had sustained him while on earth continue to sustain him through the divine splendor mirrored in them (*Purgatorio* 31*,* 118-123).[255] By gazing into her eyes Dante learns a new way of knowing a higher truth.[256] By gazing into her eyes Dante is raised above his human self. He undergoes a transformation and becomes god-like. [257] If Virgil guides through the light of the intellect, Beatrice guides through the light of

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[253] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 48: "I know the signs of the ancient flame."

[254] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 115-117: "Disser: 'Fa che le viste non risparmi; / posto t'avem dinanzi a li smeraldi / ond'Amor gia` ti trasse le sue armi." I cite here from Hollander's note to *Purg*. 31, 115-117, p. 708: "The four virtues prepare Dante to do something that will become, very quickly, the standard way of learning for the protagonist in this new Beatricean realm of the poem: gaze into her mirroring eyes."

[255] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 118-123: "Mille disiri piu` che fiamma caldi / strinsermi li occhi a li occhi rilucenti, / che pur sopra `l grifone stavan saldi. / Come in lo specchio il sol, non altrimenti / la doppia fiera dentro vi raggiava, / or con altri, or con altri reggimenti." In his note to verse 123, Hollander observes that the modern Italian sense of the word *reggimenti* (regiments, goverments, regimes) seems to support those who argue against the traditional understanding of the griffin as Christ. Hollander continues to point out that beginning with Venturi (1732), commentators have understood the word to mean *atteggiamento* (as bearing), while Daniello (1568 [118-123]) had understood the word to mean that the griffin acted "now as man, now as God." (Daniello quoted by Hollander)

[256] Charles S. Singleton, "The Three Lights," in *Journey to Beatrice*, p. 31: "Beatrice's eyes do in fact become the symbol of seeing by a new kind of light (new, following upon Virgil's guidance) is clearly marked." For Singleton Beatrice is *lumen gratiae*.

[257] Singleton, *Journey to Beatrice*, p. 28: "Dante, gazing upon Beatrice and ready to begin his upward flight with her, is as Glaucus was when he tasted of the grass. He too, like Glaucus, suddenly desires another element…and suffers a sea-change to a higher, god-like nature." Also see Robert Hollander's note to verse 123.

Grace.[258] Beatrice is eternal light and revealed Truth.[259] With the return of Beatrice at the summit of Purgatory friendship is perfected and transmuted to encompass divine Truth.

That Beatrice is a friend in Christ is something that becomes even clearer as the poem progresses. Through the intercession of the the three theological virtues, Faith Hope and Charity, Dante is made to witness a sight miraculous in nature. These three bring Dante to witness Beatrice and the gryphon exchanging glances. Mirrored in the eyes of Beatrice is the dual nature of the gryphon, who represents Christ in his dual nature, human and divine [260] (*Purg*. 31, 79-81). Beatrice's eyes are manifestations of divine truth and of the dual nature of the Word incarnate.[261] Faced with such an extraordinary and miraculous vision, Dante concludes that his earlier intuition back in the *Vita Nuova* regarding Beatrice's divine nature (Chapter. 42) had indeed been correct. That Beatrice is a friend in Christ becomes ever so evident, *Sotto 'l suo velo e oltre la rivera / vincer pariemi piu` se' stessa antica, / vincer che l'altre qui, quand'ella c'era* [262] (*Purg*. 31, 82-84). The divine beauty mirrored in her eyes at once satiates Dante and

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[258] Singleton, *Journey to Beatrice*, p. 30: "Thus, man's nature may be raised above its own natural proportion and powers to a dignity that is *transhuman*. Beatrice is in fact the *lumen gratiae* by which this takes place, and the grace in question can be none other than that here defined by Thomas….Virgil as guide can and does represent the first movement toward God by the natural light, even though 'contemplation of invisible things' is not a significant or prominent part of that movement."

[259] Giorgio Petrocchi, *L'Ultima Dea*, p. 130: "L'accusatrice dei canti XXX e XXXI diventera`, sul finale di questo secondo canto del processo alla giovinezza del poeta, *isplendor di viva luce etterna*, riverbero e rivelazione di dio Verita` somma, trasfigurata."

[260] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 79-81: "e le mie luci, ancor poco sicure, / vider Beatrice volta in su la fiera / ch'e` sola una persona in due nature." See Hollander's note to verse 81. Hollander points out that, the phrase "one person in two natures" makes it difficult to argue that the griffin is not a symbol of Christ. cf. *Purg*. 118-123, p. 700. See also Peter Armour, *Dante's Griffin and the History of the World: A Study of the Earthly Paradise ("Purgatorio XXIX-XXXIII)* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). P. Armour does not think that the griffin is not a symbol of Christ.

[261] Giorgio Petrocchi, *L'Ultima Dea*, p. 130: "in quanto negli occhi di Beatrice si rispecchiano le due nature dell'unico Verbo."

leaves him craving for more (*Purg*. 31, 128-129).[263] The four cardinal virtues escort Dante to witness the beauty of her eyes, but it is the theological virtues who must sharpen Dante's vision for that miraculous sight (*Purg*. 31, 109-111).[264]

If Virgil oversees the correction of Dante's will in *Inferno* and *Purgatorio,* Beatrice oversees the correction of his intellect in the first nine heavenly spheres, after which Bernard takes over to oversee the perfection of Dante's intellect in the Empyrean.[265] Upon the restoration of his soul's health (*Par.* 31, 89), Beatrice relinquishes her role to St. Bernard and then resumes her place next to Rachel (XXXII, 8-9). Beatrice has taken Dante up to divine vision and spiritual salvation, teaching him how to love her in God. In his newfound ability to love others in God, he is finally able to understand Beatrice in her divinity. Rachel Jacoff and William Stephany refuse to pigeonhole Beatrice either as mere allegory or mere historical figure.[266] Beatrice is the beautiful girl that Dante fell in love with in Florence, but she is also the blessed lady whose beauty mirrors divine beauty. That Dante's final address to her takes the form of a

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[262] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 82-84: "Even beneath her veil, even beyond the stream, / she seemed to surpass her former self in beauty / more than she had on earth surpassed all others."

[263] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 128-129: "l'anima mia gustava di quel cibo / che, saziando di se', di se' asseta." See Hollander's note to vv. 128-129. Scartazzini is perhaps the first commentator to have found the likely influential source of this passage in Ecclesiasticus 24:29: "He who eats of me will hunger again, who drinks of me will thirst again." The speaker is Wisddom, the second person of the Holy Trinity according to Christian faith. Hollander also notes that while Scartazzini's claim is shared by a number of twentieth century commentators, they neither credit nor acknowledge him. That the speaker is Wisdom strenghtens the association between Beatrice and Christ as Sapience. This is an association also favored by Charles Singleton in *Dante studies 2: Journeyto Beatrice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 122-34.

[264] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, 109-111: "Merrenti a li occhi suoi; ma nel giocondo / lume ch'e` dentro aguzzeranno I tuoi / le tre di la`, che miran piu` profondo " (p. 698). See Hollander's note to vv. 109-111, p. 708.

[265] Robert, Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 124.

[266] Rachel Jacoff and William A. Stephany, *Lectura Dantis Americana Inferno* II, p. 43: "Beatrice is not reducible to a univocal allegorical correlative, as most of the early commentators tried to make her; but neither is she merely, as Mazzoni puts it, the Beatrice *storica*, 'ben viva al cuore di Dante' (p. 284). By thinking of the multiplicity of typological roles she plays, depending on the context in which she is

prayer (*Par*. 31, 91)[267] is a sign that he has learned the lesson she has come to teach, namely to know and love her in Christ.[268] He prays that she will keep intact in him his new-found knowledge once he returns to earth and not be drawn to earthly goods (*Par*. 31, 78-90). At the moment when Dante fully knows and loves Beatrice in Christ, friendship is transmuted to a higher form. Only when Beatrice is with God in heaven does Dante stop addressing her with the more distant *voi* and begin to address her with the familiar *tu* [269] (*Par*. 31, 85). The uttering of the familiar *tu* is an indication that Dante has learned to see Beatrice as a friend in Christ. He has learned to recognize her in her dual nature, in her humanity and divinity. In learning how to know and love Beatrice in the right way, Dante learns how to know and love God. Through a clearer vision, Dante now sees and loves Beatrice in God.[270] Divine love is the universal force that unites all creation into the One.

According to Mazzotta, the return of Beatrice in *Purgatorio* 30 places Dante's poem within the grace of Augustinian theology. [271] In Book XIII of his *Confessions*, St.

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described, we can see that Dante's complex portrait of Beatrice includes a variety of consonant or congruent aspects all of which must all be taken into account."

[267] Dante, *Paradiso*, XXXI, 91: "Cosi` orai"

[268] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 126.

[269] Dante, *Paradiso*, XXXI, 85: "Tu m'hai di servo tratto a libertate." See Hollander's note to verses 79-90. Hollander notes that the first commentator to have noticed Dante's switch from *voi* to *tu* was Grabher (Hollander's note to vv. 70-93). Porena also notes the switch, but in terms of ending the distance between the two, though it remains a distance since she is a Saint. Chimenez (Hollander's note to vv. 79-84), Giacalone (Hollander's note to vv. 79-84), Bosco/Reggio (note to vv. 82-84) support Porena's interpretation. Singleton (see note to verse 80) understands the use of the *tu* as a sign that Beatrice the guide has resumed her individuality. Cf. Robert Hollander, *A Life in Works*. (2001), pp. 126-27. Hollander observes that, as in the *Vita Nuova, Beatrice* is adressed with the familiar *tu* only when she is united with God in heaven "where and when there are no human hierarchies."

[270] Dante, *Convivio*, III, ii, 8-9, p. 151: "E pero` che ne le bontadi de la natura si mostra divina, vene che naturalmente l'anima umana con quelle per via spirituale si nisce, tanto piu` tosto e piu` forte quanto quelle piu` appaiono perfette; lo quale apparimento e` fatto secondo che la conoscenza de l'anima e` chiara o impedita. E questo unire e` quello che noi dicemo amore, per lo quale si puo` conoscere quale e` dentro l'anima, vegendo di fuori di quello che ama."

[271] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante, Poet of the Desert*, p. 187: "As Virgil disappears, the poem actually seems to take on what might be called an Augustinian literary form….Cantos XXX and XXXI enact precisely a

Augustine presents his doctrine of love as *pondus amoris* through the metahorical use of stone and fire. The Augustinian image of spiritual love is that of a fire that ignites the soul with its heat and carries it upward to its final resting place. [272] Love is a a force that uplifts man's soul to the heights of its own place.[273] The upward movement of fire symbolizes the soul's spiritual ascent to God, while the downward movement of a stone symbolizes its descent away from God. Beatrice descends as sanctifying Grace so that Dante's soul may ascend to God. Beatrice's love is a fire that ignites and uplifts Dante's soul to eternal perfection and complete bliss. Echoing Dido's words, Dante himself refers to Beatrice's love as an ancient flame: *conosco I segni de l'antica fiamma* [274] (*Purg* 30, 48). The difference is that Dido's love for Aeneas is misguided, for it is grounded in passion. With their dual reference, Virgilian and Augustinian, Dante's words reinforce the interplay between ancient and Christian thought. More particularly, the echo of Dido's words illuminates the contrast between sensual and spiritual love.

In the Earthly Paradise, when Dante gazes at Beatrice, the angels rebuke him for being, *Troppo fiso* [275] (*Purg*. 32, 9). The angels sense that Dante still appreciates Beatrice as the young woman he loved in Florence, rather than the blessed lady who orchestrated

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confessional experience. The pilgrim voices his contrition and goes into a brief recapitulation of his past from the 'vita nuova' (*Purgatorio* XXX, 115) to the new encounter with Beatrice."

[272] St. Augustine, *Confessions,* trans. Warner, XIII, viii p. 232: "Our rest is our place. Love lifts us up to it, and your good spirit raises our lowness from the gates of death. In your good will is our peace. A body tends to go of its own weight to its own place, not necessarily downward toward the bottom, but to its own place! Fire tends to rise upward; a stone falls downward. Things are moved by their own weights and they go toward their proper places….Put them back in order and they will be at rest. My weight is my love; wherever I am carried, it is my love that carries me there. By your gift we are set on fire and are carried upward…we are red hot with your fire and we go; for we are going upward toward the peace of Jerusalem"

[273] Giuseppe Mazzotta, *Dante Poet of the Desert*, pp. 163-169. Mazzotta applies Augustine's theory of love in the *Confessions* to the moral structure of the *Inferno*.

[274] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 48: "I know the signs of the ancient flame."

[275] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXII, 9: "Too fixed!"

his salvation. As Robert Hollander notes in his commentary to this verse, Dante's dilemma is as old as Plato's *Phaedrus*. [276] How does one see and love physical beauty only as a reflection of a higher beauty? According to Joseph Mazzeo while having no direct knowledge of the *Phaedrus*, Dante adopted the *Phaedrus'* notion of salvation, love, and poetic inspiration in great details.[277] A difference is that while for Plato the goal is truth, for Dante it is God.[278] For both Dante and Plato, the beauty of the beloved is a means by which the soul ascends to spiritual beauty. In Dante, however, the beloved is transformed and assumes a higher significance and even greater beauty in death.[279] Beatrice's love for Dante does not end with her death: it intensifies. Dante's friendship with Beatrice aquires importance in relation to distance. After her death, he is forced to understand her in relation to the life of the spirit, or in relation to divine Truth and Beauty. Friendship with Beatrice has withstood the test of time. While still alive she sustained Dante with her countenance (*Purg*. 30, 121),[280] guiding him with her youthful

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[276] I cite from Robert Hollander's commentary to *Purg*. 32. 1-3, p. 726: "Dante would seem to be looking back in time, seeing Beatrice now, in 1300, as she was in Florence in 1290 (the year in which she died). That his eyes are so 'fixed' will be noted by the theological virtues at verse 9—and not with approval." See also Hollander's note to *Purg.* 32. 9: "How can Dante love Beatrice too much? Only if he does not love her in God. And that, we should realize, is why he is rebuked here by the theological virtues (not the least of them being Charity), who understand that his gaze is fixed on the image of the young woman he loved and lost rather than on the saved soul who has made his journey possible. See Hollander's note to Purg. XXX. 58: "The problem is as old as Plato's *Phaedrus*. How do we love physical beauty in such a way as to see it as only the manifestation of a higher beauty (in Dante, of the *etterno piacer* [*Purg*. XXIX. 32]? See Mazzeo's "Dante and the *Phaedrus* Tradition of Poetic Inspiration" (Mazz. 1958.I, pp. 1-24). The virtues intercede because they sense that Dante is caught up in carnal appreciation of a spiritual entity " (p. 726).

[277] Joseph A. Mazzeo, *Structure and Thought in the Paradiso* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 2. Dante had no direct knowledge of Plato's *Phaedrus*, but as both Etienne Gilson and Joseph Mazzeo assert, although Plato was absent in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, platonism was present everywhere in the fathers of the Church, in Cicero, in the Arab philosophers, and in Aristotle.

[278] Joseph A. Mazzeo, *Structure and Thought in the Paradiso*, p. 7: "The *philokalos* as well as the *philosophos* reach the supreme reality which Plato calls the plain of truth (*to pedion aletheias*) and which Dante calls God."

[279] Mazzeo, p. 132.

[280] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 121: "Alcun tempo il sostenni col mio volto." See Hollander's note to vv. 118-123, p. 686. Beatrice's friendship never altered. She remained constant and loyal in her love. Hollander

eyes (*Purg*. 30, 122),[281] steering him in the right direction (*Purg.* 30, 123).[282] After her death she has continued to guide and inspire him by means of dreams and in other ways (*Purg.* 30, 134-135).[283] When Dante sank deeply in sin, so that all her attempts to save him fell short (*Purg.* 30, 136-137),[284] she descend into Limbo to seek Virgil's assistance (*Purg*. 30, 139-141). [285] Beatrice has remained a constant and loving friend in good and in bad times. Even when Dante turned his back on her (*Purg.* 30, 127-132), [286] she remained firm in her friendship. Friendship such as is seen in the *Purgatorio*, and then in its perfected form in *Paradiso*, is a union that overcomes distance, absence, and even death.

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observes that Beatrice words takes us back to the narrative of the *Vita Nuova*, when for a period of sixteen years (1274-1290) she attempted to guide Dante to God.

[281] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 122: "mostrando li occhi giovanetti a lui." See Hollander's note to vv. 118-123, p. 686.

[282] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 123: "meco il menava in dritta parte volto." See Hollander's note to vv. 118-123, p. 686.

[283] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 134-135: "con le quali e in sogno e altrimenti / lo rivocai: si` poco a lui ne calse!" See Hollander's note to verse 134, pp. 686-687. The Siren in *Purgatorio* XIX. 7-32 is an example of the type of negative dream Beatrice asked God to send Dante about his affection for the *donna gentile*. Regarding the "inspirations" Beatrice was granted in order to divert his attention back to her even after her death, Hollander points to Scartazzini (1900) who "offers a simple and compelling hypothesis." The gist of the argument is that while asleep, God sends Dante dreams of the unworthiness and baseness of his love for the *donna gentile*, while awake He sends positive images of Beatrice.

[284] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 136-137: "Tanto giu` cadde, che tutti argomenti / a la salute sua eran gia` corti."

[285] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 139-141: "Per questo visitai l'uscio d'I morti, / e a colui che l'ha qua su` condotto, / li preghi miei, piangendo, furon porti." See Hollander's note to vv. 139-141. Hollander observes well that, Beatrice who sought out Virgil's help does not mention his name, but refers to him as "colui" (the one who). At the summit of the mountain, it is Dante's name that Beatrice calls out and not Virgil's. Perhaps as one who is condemned to eternal damnation, Virgil cannot be reffered to by name. Virgil is not a member of the community of Christ. One cannot help but feel empathy for Virgil, who as Hollander points out, "has done the Christians sixty-four cantos' worth of service, guiding their great poet to his redemption and vision" and now is most likely headed once again resume his place in Limbo. Virgil's name will be heard twice more (*Par.* XVII.19 and XXVI.118) and never again from Breatrice who uses it only once in verse 55, to chide Dante for his tears when Virgil disappears.

[286] Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXX, 127-132: "Si tosto come in su la soglia fui / di mia seconda etade e mutai vita, / questi si tolse a me, e diessi altrui / e volse I passi suoi per via non vera, / imagini di ben seguendo false, / che nulla promession rendono intera."

For Mazzeo, the return of Beatrice in the *Commedia* marks a sort of remaking of the *Phaedrus'* doctrine of beauty and love.[287] Beatrice, a concrete and beautiful individual, initiates the upward flight toward universal love and beauty. [288] The dilemma facing Dante in the Earthly Paradise is how to appreciate and love Beatrice in God. To love her beauty truly is to know and love it in relation to God. Dante already knows how to love Beatrice in her humanity, but at the top of the mountain he must now learn to love her in her divinity. In *Purgatorio* 32. 9, Dante regresses to the old, sexual and personal, way of looking at Beatrice.[289] The old way is even more limiting than the best of classical friendship, which, at its best, is at least not sinful, just misguided. Dante must learn to appreciate Beatrice's physical beauty as a manifestation of divine beauty. Love is a light that illuminates and pulls the soul upward toward perfect truth and perfect light, or God.[290] As Dante moves with Beatrice, beauty and light intensify until he is brought face to face with supreme beauty and eternal light, or God.[291] Friendship between Beatrice and Dante is therefore not a static union: it changes and is transmuted from the personal into the universal and spiritual. [292] Through her beauty Beatrice intices Dante to

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[287] Joseph A. Mazzeo, *Structure and Thought in the Paradiso*, p. 128.
[288] Mazzeo, p. 128.
[289] See Robert Hollander's commentary on Par. 33. 98 and *Purg.* 32.9. In *Purg.* 32. 9, Dante is rebuked by the angels for looking at Beatrice "troppo fiso!" (too fixed),or for appreciating her in a carnal sense. Instead, in Paradiso 33.98 Dante's mind is "fissa" (fixed) on God and rightly so since, as Hollander explains, fixed contemplation of God is the eternal condition of the blessed in heaven cf. St. Bernard, *On The Love of God and Other Selected Writings*. Ed., Msgr. Charles J. Dollen (New York: Alba House, 1996), p. 35: "In the presence of God he will lay aside all the cares of self and the flesh and be wholly absorbed in the glory of God, alone."
[290] Joseph A. Mazzeo, *Structure and Thought in the Paradiso*, p. 7: "For Dante, the spirit of love matures the soul and illumines truth. Thus when, in the sphere of Mercury, Dante is puzzled about the Redemption, Beatrice speaks to him as follows: This decree, brother, lies buried from the eyes of everyone whose mind is not matured in the flame of love."
[291] Mazzeo, p. 13.
[292] Mazzeo, p. 113. Mazzeo observes that in their notion of love, Dante and Plato unite the personal and particular love with the transcendent love that encorporates it. Accordingly, the relationship between Dante

climb the ladder toward pure Light and Beauty. For St. Bearnard as for Dante, sensible beauty initiates a nostalgic desire for eternal beauty.[293]

True friendship, as is seen in *Purgatorio* and then in its perfected form in *Paradiso*, is loving one another in Christ. It is a union that strives for eternity. Regardless of how noble it may be, friendship which is not transcended and becomes an end in itself is doomed to failure. God commands that we love our neighbour as ourselves for the love of Him. Through the Incarnation of the Word, friendship acquires spiritual significance in relation to God. From loving a friend men pass to loving God. The uniqueness of Christian friendship consists precisely in the union of the particular and the universal, the personal and the spiritual, the human and the divine. By loving another individual in God, man ascends to God. The beauty of Beatrice is a reminder of the beauty Dante had once seen and has now forgotten.[294] Beatrice is the: *amanza del primo amante* [295] (*Par*. 4, 118). Her love for Dante cannot be separated from her love for God. She loves Dante simultaneously in a personal and in a universal sense. As complete union, friendship with Beatrice is *caritas,* it is the mutual love of man and God. As Etienne Gilson notes, *caritas* "…is the will common to man and God."[296] By renouncing his personal will, Dante, the particular man, joins and becomes one with universal truth. [297]

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and Beatrice from the *Vita Nuova* to the *Commedia* exibits this movement from the particular and temporal to the eternal.

[293] St. Bernard, *Sermones in canticum canticorum, Sermo* XXV; *P. L.*, 183: cols. 901D-902A cf. Joseph A. Mazzeo, *Structure and Thought in the Paradiso* (1958), p. 81.

[294] Joseph A. Mazzeo, *Structure and Thought in the Paradiso*, p. 135.

[295] Dante, *Paradiso*, IV, 118: "beloved of the first Lover"

[296] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard*, p. 73.

[297] Gilson, p. 75.

Friendship requires humility, it requires that man recognizes and loves himself and others always in communion with God. And where there is humility there is also compassion.[298] Firmly grounded in charity, Christian friendship comprises both the love of man and of God. One of its most striking aspect of Christian friendship is this sense of inclusiveness. While classical friendship is grounded in the love of human virtue,[299] Christian friendship is grounded in divine grace and charity, the highest form of love that was bestowed upon man through the Incarnation of Christ.[300] Through charity man is united with the Word incarnate. Charity alone directs the soul to God, for it alone renders the soul disinterested.[301] Dante's friendship with Beatrice converts and directs his soul from a love of self to a spiritual love of others and of God. When all is said and done, Christian friendship is essentially the offspring of both *benevolentia* and *caritas*.[302] It should be noted that *benevolentia* and *caritas* are grounded in divine love.[303] The close association between love and friendship takes this discussion to St. Bernard and to his definition of love.

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[298] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard,* p. 77. Gilson calls to mind Jesus as the most complete example of humility and compassion: "For we have but to call Jesus to mind and we behold the perfect image of humility, and understand that the end of humility is compassion " (p. 77).

[299] Gilson, p. 9.

[300] Ernesto Livorni, "Charity," in *The Dante Encyclopedia*, ed. Richard Lansing (Brandeis University: Garland Publishing, 2000), p. 156.

[301] St. Bernard of Clairvaux, "Letter to Guy, the Carthusian Prior (12)," in *On The Love of God and Other Writings*, p. 112: "…neither can turn the soul to God; only charity can do this because it alone can render a soul disinterested."

[302] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard*, pp. 8-13. Gilson notes the influence of Cicero on the Cistercian theology. More particularly, he focuses on Cicero's doctrine of disinterested friendship grounded in the love of virtue and on the identification of friendship with *benevolentia*, as wishing the good of the friend for himself (*De Amicitia*, Cap. VI). Gilson also observes the influence of Cicero on St. Bernard, particularly in Bernard's "fructus ejus, usus ejus,"echoing Cicero's doctrine that the fruit of friendship lies in the love and good-will we have toward our friend: "…sic amicitiam, non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis ejus fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus" (*De Amicitia*, Cap. IX). Cf. Cicero, *De Amicitia,* Cap. XIV. Gilson observes notes a resemblance between Cicero's "Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in co, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus…" (*De Amicitia*, Cap. XXV) and the *unitas spiritus* that is essential to the mystics. (Cicero and St. Bernard quoted by Gilson)

[303] Gilson, p. 10.

Although his presence in the *Commedia* is rather brief (*Par*. 31, 58- *Par*. 33, 50), St. Bernard assumes a crucial position in the poem, perhaps the highest among Dante's guides.[304] The representation of St. Bernard as a tender old man [305] (*Par*. 31, 61-63) may not seem as confusing [306] if one recalls the classical association between old age and wisdom and the Christian association between tenderness and *caritas*. The absence of specific citations of the works of Bernard in the *Commedia* is not a reflection his importance. As Steven Botterill observes, "the simple fact of his presence in so exalted a position may be the most telling evidence we have for Dante's high estimation of him."[307] Just as Virgil disappeares leaving Dante under the tutelage of Beatrice (*Purg*. 30, 43-54), so she will disappear, leaving Dante under the tutelage of Bernard (*Par*. 31, 55-58).[308]

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[304] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, pp. 127-129. Hollander notes well that, as a Christian Saint, the role of St. Bernard as guide in a fourteenth-century Christian poem would seem more plausible than that of Virgil or Beatrice. Hollander continues to observe: "If the schema for Dante's growth as protagonist proposed earlier (correction and then perfection of the will followed by correction and then perfection of the intellect) does indeed correspond to the intentions of Dante the writer, then Bernard occupies the most elevated and crucial position among Dante's several guides." Bernard disappears after his last smile in *Paradiso* 33, 50.

[305] Dante, *Paradiso*, XXXI, 61-63: "Diffuso era per li occhi e per le gene / di benigna letizia, in atto pio / quale a tenero padre si convene." See Hollander's note to verse 63, where he refers to Bernard as "Dante's last 'father' in the poem."

[306] See Robert Hollander's note to *Par.* 31, 59. According to Bosco/Reggio (comm. to *Par*. XXXII.40-75), in choosing to describe St. Bernard as an old man (*sene*) Dante is contradicting a ground rule of *Paradiso*, that is, that all souls are, in their perfection, of the age of Christ in his last year on earth, thirty-three. According to Hollander, Bosco/Reggio explain Dante's violation of the norm as artistic freedom, Bernard as an old man being more believable than a young one. Hollander also cites Carroll (comm. to *Par*. XXXII. 1-48), who discusses the babes seated in the lower half of the Rose: "Further, as we saw in the case of Bernard himself, Dante appears to ignore the doctrine of Aquinas that in the Resurrection the saints will rise at the age of thirty. Bernard, himself an old man, draws his attention to the child faces and voices of the lower ranks (*Par.* XXXII.46-48)…" (Carroll quoted by Hollander). St. Bernard's age should also be understood in relation to those same atributes traditionally associated with old age: superior wisdom, knowledge, experience, and good judgement. After all, of the three guides it is St. Bernard who takes Dante directly to the experience of divine Truth.

[307] Steven Botterill, "St. Bernard," *The Dante Encyclopedia*, ed. Richard Lansing, p. 100.

[308] See Hollander's note to *Par.* 31, 55-58 on p. 778. One should note the similarity between this scene and the scene in *Purg.* 30, 43-54, when Dante turns back to speak to Virgil only to realize that he has disappeared. In addition to the similarities between the two scenes, Hollander also notes the differences in length and tone. This scene being much briefer and less tragic than the earlier one. In *Purg.* 30, 43-54 Virgil disappears never to be seen again. By contrast, in *Par.* 31, 55-58 Beatrice disappears to then reappear in the Rose (see verse 71, p. 766), "e vidi lei che si facea corona."

Under the guidance of St. Bernard, Dante is prepared for the experience of the universal order of things in God, in His essence, and in the Trinity.[309] If Beatrice teaches Dante to love God for Himself, it is Bernard who takes Dante into experiencing the final stage of loving God, or seeing himself in Him.[310] Through St. Bernard, Dante experiences the highest degree of love.

For St. Bernard there are four levels, or degrees, of love: in the first man loves himself for himself; in the second, man begins to love God out of need, because he realizes that he needs divine assistance to escape suffering and misery; in the third, man loves God for Himself; in the fourth, man loves himself only for God's sake.[311] As a way of explaining the fourth and final stage of loving God, when man sees himself in God, St.

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[309] Robert Hollander, *Dante A Life in Works*, p. 127. I here cite from Hollander's discussion on the importance of St. Bernard for Dante: "Under his tutelage Dante is prepared for the culminating visions that occupy the final ninety-one verses of the *Comedy*, for seeing first the universal relations of all things in God, then God as and in Himself, and finally the principle of the Trinity " (p. 127). Why did Dante choose Bernard as his guide for the concluding part of his journey? Perhaps because he recognized Bernard as an important figure in mystical theology? For this view Hollander points to Etienne Gilson, *Dante et la philosophie*, pp. 278-79. Gilson's view finds support in Manselli and others. Modern commentaries tend to attribute Dante's choice to Bernard's devotion to the Virgin Mary. For this view see Auguste Valensin, *Le christianisme de Dante* (Paris: Aubier, 1954), pp. 132-35 and to Botterill. Other critics believe that Dante acquired an indirect knowledge of St. Bernard from the Franciscans (as Bonaventure and others) and other mystical thinkers (as Joachim of Flora). For this view Hollander once again points to Manselli, *ED*, I, pp. 601-5. See Hollander's note to verse 164. The most recent studies on Bernard's importance for Dante are to be found in "Dante e la tradizione mistica: San Bernardo di Clairvaux" in *Atti del Seminario dantesco internazionale I*, pp. 147-278, by Steven Botterill, Francesco Mazzoni, and Lino Pertile. See also Giorgio Petrocchi, 'Dante e san Bernardo,' in *L'ultima dea* (Rome: Bonacci, 1977), pp. 137-55; S. Botterill, *Dante and the Mystical Tradition*: *Bernard of Clairvaux in the 'Commedia'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[310] See Robert Hollander, "The Invocations of the *Commedia*," in *Yearbook of Italian Studies* 3 (1976): 235-40 cf. See Robert Hollander's note to *Purgatorio* 27, 139-141 and his note to *Paradiso* 33, 127-132.

[311] St. Bernard of Clairvaux, "On the Love of God," in *On the Love of God and Other Selected Writings*, ed. Msgr. Charles J. Dollen (New York: Alba House, 1996), pp. 34-35: "First, therefore, man loves himself for his own sake; for, he is flesh and he can have no taste for anything except in relation to himself. And when he sees that he cannot subsist of himself, he begins to seek God through faith as something, as it were, necessary for him (cf. Heb 11.6) and to love Him. Thus he loves God according to the second degree, but for his own sake, not for Himself…and thus by tasting how sweet the Lord is (cf. Ps 34:9), he passes to the third degree so that he loves God now, not for his own sake but for Himself…and I know not if the fourth degree is attained, in its perfection, by any man in this life so that, indeed, a man loves himself only for the sake of God. But it will be so, beyond a doubt, when the good and faithful servant has been brought into the joy of his lord (cf. Mt 25:31) and 'inebriated with the plenty of God's house' (Ps 36:9)" (pp. 34-35).

Bernard quotes from Philippians 2:7.[312] In *Paradiso* 33 Dante also makes reference to Philippians 2:7, *mi parve pinta de la nostra effige* (*Par*. 33, 131).[313] The fact that in *Paradiso* 33 Dante resorts to the same Pauline passage confirms the supposition that Dante was acquainted with and inspired by St. Bernard's thought.

In the same way that Dante's *trasumanar* takes into account *umanar*, the starting-point of Bernard's four degrees of love is the love of self. [314] Even in the fourth degree where man loves himself for the sake of God, his human nature and individual identity will remain, but transfigured into a higher form. [315] Since man is not pure spirit, it is natural that he would first love his earthly self. In Bernard's degrees of love man never

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[312] St. Bernard of Clairvaux, "On the Canticle of Canticles," in *On the Love of God and Other Selected Works*, p. 51: "As to the way in which our Redemption was accomplished, God's emptying of Self, there are also three points which I commend to your attention. For that emptying out was not a simple matter or limited. 'He emptied Himself,' even to the extent of becoming flesh, of enduring death, even 'the death on the cross' (Ph 2:7-8) " (p. 51).

[313] Dante, *Paradiso*, XXXIII, 131: "to be painted with our likeness" cf. See Robert Hollander's note to *Paradiso* 33, 127-132 (p. 841). I cite partially from his note: "It took centuries until a commentator (Scartazzini [comm. to verse 131]) realized that this image contained a reference to St. Paul (Philippians 2:7), 'but made himself nothing, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men.' This is currently a fairly widespread perception, but the only other writer in the DDP to observe it is Grandgent (comm. to verse 131) " (p. 841). Also see Hollander's note to *Paradiso* 33, 131 (p. 841) here summarized. For an echo in *Paradiso* 131 of the fourth mode of loving God in St. Bernard's *De diligendo Deo*, see Robert Hollander, "The Invocation of the *Commedia*," in *Yearbook of Italian Studies* 3 (1976), p. 35. Hollander observes that St. Bearnard, in *De diligendo Deo* (*Sancti Bernardi Opera*, ed. J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochais, Vol. III [Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963], p. 142), makes reference to the same Pauline passage in a similar context, describing the highest form of mystical love, loving oneself in God. For Bernard's four modes of love and their possible influence to the stages in the *Commedia* see Hollander's note to *Purgatorio* 27, 139-141. According to Hollander this suggestion was first made by Donald J. Mathison, a student at Princeton, in 1968. For more recent discussions that agree with the above see Francesco Mazzoni, "San Bernardo e la visione poetica della *Divina Commedia*," in *Seminario Dantesco Internazionale*: *Atti del primo convegno tenutosi al Chauncey Conference Center, Princeton*, *21-23 ottobre 1994*, ed. Z. G. Baranski (Florence: Le Lettere, 1997), p. 176, as well as Christian Moevs, *The Metaphysics of Dante's "Comedy"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 81. Also see Edmund G. Gardner, *Dante and the Mystics.* (London: Dent, 1913), p. 118, for the link between the *De diligendo Deo* X. 27-28 and Dante's spiritual preparation for the final vision of God.

[314] Etienne Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard*, p. 86. cf. St. Bernard, "Letter To Guy, the Carthusian Prior (12)," in *On The Love of God and Other Selected Writings*, ed. Msgr. Charles J. Dollen (1966), p. 25: "The substance, indeed, will remain, but in another form, another glory, another power. Man's human nature and jindividual identy will remain, transfigured."

[315] St. Bernard of Clairvaux, "On the Love of God," in *On the Love of God and Other Selected Writings*, p. 25: "The substance, indeed, will remain, but in another form, another glory, another power. Man's human nature and individual identity will remain, transfigured."

stops loving himself; rather he learns how to love himself for God. The important thing is that the channeling of love in the proper direction cannot occur without the help of Grace. Ultimately, love's fourth degree is a gift of divine grace and charity. [316] As John says, "God is charity" (1 Jn 4:8).[317] St. Bernard himself notes, however, "charity is the mother of friendship…it alone can render a soul disinterested."[318] Charity alone is powerful enough to direct the soul from a misguided love to the love of of God.[319] In the end, therefore, Dante's salvation is essentially a gratuitous gift of Christian friendship, understood as *caritas*. His transmutation of classical friendship parallels his ascent from *umanar*, with Virgil, into *trasumanar*, with Beatrice.[320]

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[316] St, Bernard of Clairvaux, "On the Love of God," in *On the Love of God and Other Selected Works*, p. 26: "…let the soul hope to apprehend the fourth degree of love, or, rather, to be apprehended in it (cf. Ph 3:12-13), for in truth, it is within the power of God to give it to whomsoever He wishes, not for human diligence to procure by its own efforts."

[317] St. Bernard, "On the Love of God," in *On the Love of God and Other Works,* p. 31: "Therefore charity is rightly called both God and the gift of God. And so charity gives charity, the substantial gives what is the accident." Cf. St. Bernard of Clairvaux, "Letter To Guy, the Carthusian Prior (12), in *On the Love of God and Other Selected Writings,* pp. 112-113: "…but I say that charity is the Divine Substance itself. There is nothing new or strange about this, for St. John himself has said, 'God is love' (1 Jn 4:8). It follows that love (charity) can be correctly said to be both God and the gift of God; that charity gives charity; the substance of charity, the quality of charity."

[318] St. Bernard, "Letter to Guy, the Carthusian Prior (12)," in *On the Love of God and Other Selected Writings*, pp. 111-112: "Charity knocks confidently on the door of a friend, knowing that charity is the mother of friendship and will not be repulsed… it alone can render a soul disinterested."

[319] St. Bernard, "On the Canticle of Canticles," in *On the Love of God and Other Works*, p. 30: "…for it is charity alone which is strong enough to convert a soul from love of self and of the world and direct it to God."

[320] St. Bernard, "Letter to Guy, the Carthusian Prior (12)," in *On the Love of God and Other Selected Writings*, p. 114: "Because we are flesh and blood born of the desire of the flesh, our desire or love must start in the flesh, and it will then, if properly directed, progress under grace by certain stages until it is fulfilled in the spirit for 'that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual' (1 Cor 15:46). We must first bear the image which is earthly and afterwards that which is heavenly."

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