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City University of New York PH.D. 1983

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Gender Tracking In A County Democratic Party Organization: An Issue In Social Stratification

by

Eileen G. Moran

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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Abstract

Gender Tracking In A County Democratic Party Organization:
An Issue In Social Stratification

by

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Adviser: Professor Cynthia Fuchs Epstein

While inequality appears to be a universal feature of complex societies, the emergence and persistence of specific types of structured inequality needs to be accounted for sociologically. The persistence of patriarchy and its accomodation to capitalist and industrial development produces and reproduces a sexual division of labor in most social settings.

Feminist claims have politicized the status of women and, therebye, undercut the broad cultural support for sexual stratification. This study focuses on a County Democratic Party as an organization in which women systematically receive lower rewards than their male colleagues. It differs from other studies in the field in that its analytical focus is on attempts by the dominant group to maintain their privileges, rather than on attempts by outsiders to gain power.

In this case study the methodology of participant observation was used to examine the mechanisms through which women were excluded from participation which was "non=traditional" and were tracked into stereotypical roles with this County Democratic Party.

This is a study of the development of a feminist coalition within a county Democratic Party organization. The reactions to the coalition by those in power made visible a simple but previously hidden fact; male dominance within this Party existed as a part of the mundane routines of the organization. It is an attempt to show how the coalition set about challenging existing definitions of gender appropriate behavior and also identifying the processes by which the Party creates and sustains gender tracking. This is a case study of a power system and its mechanisms for perpetuating that power.

In both clubs and campaigns gender shapes recruitment, task assignments and sponsorship of these Democratic Party activists. The few women who surmount these obstacles find that the Party's male leadership redefines the political activity and interest of women to conform to stereotypes of gender-appropriate behavior. Women who compete with men for power find that sexual harassment and slander are used as exclusionary mechanisms. Although women who are upwardly mobile are predominantly single and childless, they , nevertheless, find that assumptions about family obligations are used to thwart their mobility.

In the past those few women who were upwardly mobile in party politics had strong familial orientations; in that way they were representative of the female population at large. Clearly, then, the mobility of single career women, during a peak of Party insurgency, raises a number of questions about the future mobility of women in party politics. Is such mobility likely to continue while family burdens remain unevenly distributed? How can the cohort of credentialed

career-oriented women entering party politics now get ahead without the major advantages enjoyed by the last political generation? These include self-conscious supports of feminist networks to provide both practical, systemic supports and the consciousness raising required to challenge the assumptions of a patriarchal society.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade feminists have politicized the status of American women, calling our attention to institutionalized sex discrimination. Following this tradition, this study focuses on the political party as an organization in which women systematically receive lower rewards than their male colleagues. Because of its democratic ideology, and its dependence on the electorate, the political party is especially vulnerable to charges of discrimination and exclusivity. Women's potential political resources are considerable. Their numbers and history of voluntary work in reform movements can render them a formidable interest group.

Until recently, the broad cultural supports for a sexual division of labor in almost all social settings obscured the restrictions women experienced. Only feminist analyses emphasized the political component of interaction between men and women. These analyses indicated that the structure of male dominance and interactive patterns were linked. The production and reproduction of dominance occurred through the mutual reinforcement of structural and interactive constraints on insurgency or change. Prescriptions of appropriate gender behavior curtailed women's opportunities and reinforced their lower status. Feminist analyses deliberately called attention to, and politicized, interactive patterns which had been previously taken for granted (Schutz, 1967, Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Men and women had been unconsciously collaborating to re-create gender inequality. The feminists called upom women, and male sympathisers, to withdraw such support, in their daily interaction. Simultaneously, they called for recognition and recruitment of women to positions, once held only by men. Feminists believed that these initial steps would enhance women's opportunities both within the Party and beyond.

This dissertation will document and analyze the structures and operations of a County Democratic Party that support male dominance. The differential treatment of politically active women within the Party, once considered part of the natural order, is now being redefined as sexist. At the same time, the feminist movement has sought political power as a resource to improve the opportunities of women in this and other institutions. The feminist movement stimulates both new recruits and long-time activists to expect more from the Party, both in attentiveness to women's issues and in providing career opportunities.

In this case study, the focus is on the processes within a County Democratic Party Organization which exclude or track women's participation. Political parties are required to be accessible to the public in order to maintain their legitimacy and electoral appeal. The national Democratic Party's commitment to the disadvantaged encouraged feminist Democrats to use their County Democratic Party to promote feminist interests. These new recruits to party activity, young women with feminist commitments, challenged the limits the Party imposed on its women activists.

Exclusionary mechanisms of this County Organization are viewed from the perspective of these feminists who sought support for feminist issues and political careers within the Party. The mechanisms supporting sexual stratification within the Party became visible because of the feminists' attempts at equal participation with male colleagues. It is not germane to this study whether those actions which limited women's participation were intended to exclude or not. The behavior, whether protective, paternalistic, or discriminatory, functioned to exclude.

Not all women in the Party are feminists. Non-feminist women, whose conventional behavior as Party workers supports sexual stratification, are not the focal point of this study. However, the impact of the feminists upon this group is of great interest, as is the impact of the non-feminist activists on the feminists.

The contributions to be made by this study include both the description and documentation of exclusionary processes, themselves, and the analysis of gender tracking may suggest how ascriptive criteria operate in stratification systems, generally.

THEORY

Although the existence of structured inequality has been clearly documented in the literature, the actual processes through which exclusivity develops and is maintained within social organizations remains problematic. Often the focus is on the excluded group itself, rather than upon those who exercise real control. It is my hypothesis that dominance by any particular group is maintained, at least in part, by routine, everyday practices by the dominant group itself which function to exclude "outsiders."

To test this hypothesis, this study will document and analyze the social mechanisms, structures and processes through which one County Democratic Organization has blocked and limited participation by women in the Party.

I will make use of an eclectic theoretical approach drawing on structuralist, interactionist and feminist perspectives since to focus on any one exclusively obscures the dynamic relationship between social structure and the interaction which occurs within its limits. By so doing I hope to avoid the standard pitfall of reifying analytical distinctions which are intended only to highlight one or another aspect of social reality. The synthesis of theoretical perspectives facilitates the analysis of the processes which exclude or track women's political participation. It emphasizes the adaptibility of organizations in a changing environment. And it has made it possible for me to assess the relationship between interaction and structure without apriori notions of isolating or discovering an independent variable.

Although this is a case study focusing on the processes which limit women's participation in one County Democratic Party, the social patterns being analyzed are, none the less, of general sociological interest. The historically ubiquitous curtailment of women's political power and activity has rendered the techniques of exclusion virtually invisible. One contribution of this study will be to "take away the veils" and bring to light these mechanisms of control. But this is a study not only of exclusion, but of burgeoning awareness of exclusion. During an era in which reform and egalitarianism are often expressed ideals, the processes through which differential treatment loses legitimacy and becomes redefined as exclusion or discrimination are of interest to students of social change.

Interactionist

Although structures emerge from individuals interacting, most of us encounter the social world as already established. Structures appear supra-human. They precede us, and are expected to outlive us. Existing social arrangements are "taken for granted," perceived as immutable. Ideology reinforces their stability by legitimating these arrangements as inevitable, just, or moral. For Berger and Luckmann (1967), the structure is continuously re-created through interaction, through daily conversation. Its stability is dependent upon the fact that people are not conscious of the creative role they play in constructing the social world. Conformity is reinforced by habit, by not imagining or considering alternatives. However, it is important to note that non-conformity is punished, often in proportion to its perceived threat to the established order.

Usually it is only in new situations or in crises that older patterns are discarded and new ones tried. For example, a considerable degree of social change often develops around new technology without people consciously accepting or rejecting it.

The power of individuals or groups to act intentionally to promote or resist change depends on their leverage. Creating or re-creating the social world is a group enterprise, although the power involved in the process is unevenly distributed. The perception of the "binding quality of everyday life" may be an accurate assessment for some (Schutz, 1967). Ironically, even corporate and government executives who are perceived as important decision makers, depict themselves as powerless, responding to external forces beyond their control. They are more conscious of the limits imposed upon them in operating in a complex system than of the real power they have.

The heterogenity of complex industrial society, and the experience of change within one's lifetime, can have a relativizing effect on popular consciousness. Alternatives become imaginable. The political movements of the last two decades have posed counter definitions of the American reality. The re-emergence of feminist claims is rooted in women's participation in social movements and the growing contradictions in their status. Women's salaried employment was once seen as a hiatus between school and family obligations, while the growing pattern is that full time home-making is a hiatus in a lifetime of salaried employment. Women then begin to re-define the differentiation which they experience in the labor market as unfair, discriminatory.

Organizational structures within a given culture are by definition inter-dependent and interactive. It follows that sexual stratification can only exist within well-established, accepted organizations when it is supported by the larger culture. This insight is a requisite for understanding how exclusionary mechanisms operate within a County Democratic Party. The existence and consequences of these structural patterns have been documented and analyzed by social scientists (Chesler, 1971; Epstein, 1973; Jaquette, 1974; Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1973; Lorber, 1973; Kantor, 1977, Millet, 1969 and Oppenheimer, 1970). Many of these works address the impact of familial roles on women's participation in other social institutions, including the assumption that such participation is fundamentally in conflict with familial roles. Feminists who recognize the presence of such conflict challenge assumptions about its inevitability.

The unequal power of participants stamps most social interaction. Recent feminist analyses have highlighted the power differential in the interaction between men and women, emphasizing the "politics" of personal life. The limits upon women's social participation emerge from the cycle of mutual reinforcement between structural constraints and interactive patterns, which prescribe appropriate behavior by gender. This analytical focus stresses the links between the macro and the micro levels of the social world.

Thus, women's prospects for ascendency in the Democratic Party cannot be accounted for without analyzing their position in the societal stratification system. A brief examination of the consequences for women of the concentration of power and of institutionalized sexism in most social organizations illustrates the liabilities with which women enter party politics.

Gender Inequality and Stratification

While inequality appears to be a universal feature of complex societies, the emergence and persistence of any specific type of structured inequality (Heller, 1967) needs to be accounted for sociologically. In this case study of a County Democratic Party Organization, the focus is on the processes operating to exclude women from the leadership and to track their party participation into the lower positions within the organizations.

Within any organization the structure, action, and interaction are inter-dependent. Historical precedent is insufficient to account for the persistence of sexual stratification in most organizations. A specific historical situation may determine inherited disadvantages; but the impact these have or continue to have, on a group's life chances depends on the presence of interactive and structural supports. In this study, constraints on women's social participation are viewed as a stratification issue.

Until the recent emergence of feminist claims, women's place in society was rarely examined. When women were the focus of analyses it was almost exclusively their roles in the family that were of interest. Acker states that "sex has rarely been analyzed as a factor in stratification processes and structures although it is probably one of the most obvious bases of economic, political and social inequalities" (Acker, 1973, p. 174). Thus, while sexual inequality has been prevalent, it has not always been obvious. The women's movement made sexual inequality visible and, simultaneously, challenged its legitimacy.

Stratification systems have been analyzed in terms of the factors which either caused them or maintained them. For analytical purposes they have been conceptualized as static, as a photo captures a moving object to permit examination. With the exception of revolutionary transitions, very little work has been done on the relationship between social movements and stratification.

The effect of intentional political activity by interest groups on both the perception and maintenance of structured inequality is crucial to any kind of stratification analysis, to an understanding of how inequality is changed or preserved. These activities have, however, not been analyzed.

Stratification theory ought to account for both the patterning of structured inequality and for how such patterns are changed.

Structural analyses do not explain social change adequately, nor the potential impact of organized interest groups. Social change has most frequently been conceptualized as the anonymous, somewhat deterministic, interplay of social forces. Change has been explained as the unanticipated consequence of innovations in technology, or the result of developing ideologies. Most often it is conceptualized as a gradual, accumulative process.

The intentional activity of individuals and groups, which fail or succeed, is one way of addressing the gaps in prediction in social science. Structured settings can produce a supportive environment for any activity, (e.g., labor organizing) but they can not determine such activity. Structural conditions may be a prerequisite for certain types of political activity but in and of themselves they are insufficient to account for the emergence of such activity.

How is it that women's standing in the stratification system has been so little examined? Women's social inequality has not been entirely unnoticed but it has never been recognized as relevant to stratification analyses. Several factors combined to obscure the relationship between sexual inequality and the overall stratification of society. The major factors were:

1. The ubiquity of a sexual division of labor;
2. the prevalence and persistence of patriarchy and its adaptability to changes in production processes;
3. the focus on the development of industrial capitalism and its consequences for stratification;
4. the choice of conceptual tools used to address the social changes associated with capitalism.

These factors were mutually reinforcing. The reification of evolutionary analyses obscured how much of the pre-industrial stratification system could be incorporated within industrial society. The ubiquity of sexual differentiation and the analytical tools used to describe production changes contributed to the misunderstanding of patriarchy, and its persistence in industrial society. Presumptions that male dominance was "natural" made it unproblematic in both pre-industrial and industrial society.

As social scientists we are vulnerable to the limits of our own discipline and historical period. Most of us experience the social world as given, as does the "man in the street." The contradictions which are visible, and which we question, are socially determined. As women gain reproductive control and higher education, they stimulate questions about

traditional roles. The ommission of sex and gender as stratification factors demonstrates the limits which domain assumptions impose (Gouldner, 1967, p. 31).

The presumed "naturalness" of male dominance and its institutionalization as patriarchy facilitated its being overlooked in stratification analyses. As societies changed, attention was drawn to the variations in social organization. Those aspects of society which were constant were less visible. The ubiquity of male dominance in spite of the diverse forms it took, lent credibility to its "naturalness" or inevitability. The fact that patriarchal norms were hegemonically supported encouraged theorists to take this aspect of society for granted. Since patriarchy was not recognized as a socially constructed inequity, stratification analyses need not account for it. Theorists could, therefore, draw distinctions between societies which were differentiated and those which were stratified.

For social scientists who have been overwhelmingly male, written history and the fragmantary anthropological data available seemed to confirm the universality of age and sex differentiation: that is of assigning tasks by age and sex. Its ubiquity contributed to the perception of age and sex differentiation as inevitable. It was interpreted as "natural," that is, rooted in biology and psychology.

The seeming necessity of a division of labor based on age and sex, with a concommitant neglect of its significance in ranking systems, obscured its relevence to stratification analyses. Patriarchal values were normative when the early theorists addressed these issues and drew distinctions between societies which were differentiatied from those which

were stratified. Differences among adult men were relatively obvious, and were likely to be perceived as ranking indices. In contrast, the differences between men and women, and adults and children were more readily perceived as "natural" or biologically determined.

Given this acceptance of patriarchal values, societies with a "simple" division of labor, based on age and sex were characterized as "differentiated" rather than "stratified." Differentiation did not automatically imply a ranking system, but stratification did. Societies with subsistence economies and a simple division of labor were characterized as egalitarian.

Ortner and Rosaldo and Lamphere (Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1973) dispute these early depictions of egalitarianism and agree that "although the degree and expression of female subordination vary greatly, sexual asymmetry is presently a universal fact of human social life" (Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1973, p. 9).

Subtle differences in consumption, such as reserving special parts of animals for hunters or honored members of the group were not addressed as indices of inequality. Also, differences in power or prestige between men and women were not always recognized as evidence of structured inequality.

Because stratification theorists focused almost exclusively on economic inequality, and because of the persistence of patriarchy, the inequality of women and children was relatively invisible to Western ethnographers and social scientists. Differences based on gender were characterized as qualitative with the implication that these differences were not the bases for ranking men and women in relation to one another. Stratification was most often associated with a material surplus and a more complex division of labor.

It was the re-emergence of feminist claims in the late nineteen sixties which highlighted aspects of social reality previously unnoticed or considered insignificant to theorists of structured inequality.

The modifications which Rosaldo and Lamphere make (1973) regarding the perception of gender equality in "primitive societies" emerged because theorists looked at existing data with a new perspective rather than because "new data" were discovered. As Gouldner indicates the greatest contributions in science were more often a new way of looking at phenomena rather than the "discovery" of "new facts" (1975, p. 425).

The impact of capitalism has understandably riveted the attention of stratification theorists. Sociology emerged in response to the social changes associated with industrialization, and theorists focused on the consequences this process had for the rise and fall of specific classes and groups.

The economic inequality associated with capitalism was most salient and led theorists to focus on how these changes effected other social institutions. They correctly portrayed economic forces as dominant. The emphasis on economic inequality obscured both the presence of other inequities and the degree to which these were adaptable to changes in the organization and ownership of the means of production.

Marx and Engels recognized women's dual roles as producers and reproducers but believed their exploitation was a consequence of private property. By viewing the family as superstructure they misunderstood patriarchy and its adaptability to changes in the means and ownership of production (Engels, 1891; Eisenstein, 1978). Women's liberation was

expected to occur as childcare and household services were re-organized and communalized. Their unstated assumption of a unilinear model of development supported their faith that all the economic tasks once performed in the household would become industrialized.

Marx thought the power of economic change was sufficient to force accommodations from other social institutions. In Eisenstein's socialist feminist analysis "women's oppression is rooted in more than her class position (her exploitation), and that one must address as well her position within patriarchy--both structurally and ideologically" and subsequently she contends "that patriarchy precedes capitalism through the existence of the sexual ordering of society which derives from ideological and political interpretations of biological differences...men have chosen to interpret and politically use the fact that women are the reproducers of humanity" (Eisenstein, 197 , p. 11).

Marx assumed that the sexual division of labor was rooted in the differing biological roles in reproduction with the implication that gender roles were quasi-natural. These differences and the existence of a surplus, which could be privately owned, was the origin of women's exploitation. Marx conceptualized a setting in which all work was valuable and appreciated. His focus on the power of economic relations to shape other institutions precluded the existence of sexual inequality without material inequality, that is private property, which was unevenly distributed. Eisenstein criticizes Marx and Engels for not developing their insight that the division of labor in the family, preceded the historical development of capitalism and for reducing the family in subsequent analyses to superstructure (Eisenstein, 1977). While the absence of a material surplus

reduces the degree of difference between men and women, it does not eliminate the possibility of their having different power or status even in a communal tribe.

The absence of private property in socialist societies does not necessarily eliminate male privilege, automatically. Patriarchy persists because it often has other institutional bases of support which are not eliminated with the change in ownership of the means of production. Patriarchy can coexist with a wide range of production systems. Denitch addresses the tendency of patriarchy to reassert itself even after revolutionary change in Yugoslavia.[2]

Unlike Marx, Weber conceptualized power, status and economic resources as potentially independent determiners of stratification systems. He agreed with Marx that under capitalism economic resources were dominant and determined access to power and status. Yet, a group's specific historical situation determined its ability to survive broad social changes with some of its leverage intact.[3]

Though he recognized the pull of capitalism and bureaucracy to fundamentally alter society, Weber allowed for some variation. Interest groups had different resources and acted to secure their position in transitional periods. Their tactics succeeded or failed, because of, or in spite of their intentional activity. Those with power had a better opportunity to survive major social changes than those less fortunate.

Weber's analysis recognized the possibility that essentially non-economic factors (values, ideas), might influence the economic structure. Non-material and material factors combined in a process of mutual influence and reinforcement. In some historical circumstances (feudalism) the

power structure determined the economic structure. Weber's major work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, focused on the affinity between a set of religious values and the emergence of capitalism. He focused on the possibility that ideas, embodied in cultural values, impacted on economic organizations. Conversely the ascendency of the capitalist class reinforced capitalist values and ideas, because the newly dominant group had the power to shape the institutionalization of their values, for example in the making and enforcement of the law.

Patriarchy as a component of the pre-industrial political economy had broad institutional support in popular culture as well as in law, religion, and the family. As capitalism emerged, patriarchy as a system of power, persisted because it was adaptable to economic change.

Sexual stratification is analagous to racial and ethnic inequality which persists in spite of egalitarian ideology and level of economic development.

For Despres (Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Gulana, 1967), the ethnic stratification of the colonial political economy was replicated in the developing society, in spite of the fact that both ethnic groups expressed rhetorical commitment to "socialism" as a means of national development.

In these very different examples, the common element is the persistence of a form of structured inequality in spite of dramatic, at times revolutionary, changes in the economic and/or political structure. The structured inequality of a specific society often persists in spite of economic transitions. The institutional supports for inequality are

often sustained throughout a period of transition, for example a privileged group's access to education provides a resource for weathering technological change.

This analysis does not imply that the structured inequality of race or sex is independent of the economy. Rather, it shows that the unequal distribution of social resources (education, power) is frequently reproduced even in transitions, because unequal access to these resources, are themselves the institutional supports which preserve structured inequality.

Early analyses of the processes of industrial capital predicted the erosion of other forms of inequality as differences based on class became dominant. Instead, societies which moved to industrialized found that the racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual inequality which were integral components of the pre-capitalist stratification system were institutionalized within the industrial economy; for example, South Africa's aparteid system. This tendency has abated in societies which have undergone revolutions and eliminated a specific group or its privileges (e.g., expropriating land or other property).

The patriarchy of Western pre-industrial society has both adapted to capitalism, and, eventually, supported it. Industrial capitalism transformed the family's structure but male dominance was preserved.

Eisenstein's work on the synthesis of capitalism and patriarchy views patriarchy as a system of male dominance which was joined to capitalism and the two became mutally dependent. In its beginnings capitalism's free labor had the potential for challenging patriarchal

prerogatives including the patriarch's control of the labor of other family members (Eisenstein, 1977).

The ideology of individuality and "free labor," which were supportive of capitalist development undercut some of the control men had over their wives and children. In fact, some elements of male dominance were gradually eroded, such as a father's control over the choice of his children's spouses. Even the cultural remnant of a man asking a father's permission to marry his daughter has diminished. Where it remains it is often perceived as a polite formality. But those patriarchal forms which were supportive of the expansion of industrialization, not just of capitalism, have not only been preserved but strengthened. The paid labor force of late industrial society was more rigidly segmented by sex-gender than the agricultural family. The farm family's division of labor was necessarily less rigid to allow for illness, seasonal needs, family membership. Childcare was automatically more shared because of the presence of several related adults and siblings in the extended family and the incorporation of children into the family's labor pool. The very substantial limits of women's participation were also very explicit.

In contrast, the present division in the U.S. paid labor force confines women by tracking them into lower paid work under the assumption that their primary commitment is to housework and childcare. Women's socialization and the absence of structural supports for alternatives (such as childcare) legitimates their tracking because their lower achievement is taken as proof of disinterest or lack of ambition, in a society with an ideology of individual achievement in spite of handicaps.

FEMINIST ANALYSIS AND THE FAMILY

Eisenstein's use of the dialectic method emphasizes the mutual dependence of capitalism and patriarchy which has developed over time. It continues to be a process.

Capitalist expansion supported a nuclear family with a single breadwinner, on whom other family members were economically dependent. Both the emerging bourgeoisie and the working class of early capitalism held institutionally supported patriarchal beliefs, originally expressed differently in these two classes.

In time, the patriarchal form which became culturally acceptable was the male dominance of the bourgeoisie. Women and children were characterized as weak and in need of protection. The cultural ideal was for the bougeoisie to have a household staff which the "lady of the house" managed.

As industrialization reduced the availability of domestic servants to the middle class wives took up the slack. The middle class patriarch in accord with cultural ideology, perceived himself as the protector and supporter of wife and children and his wife as a "lady of leisure." This image, based in ideology, of the middle class mother negated the very real work which household maintainence and childcare involved. Recent feminist analyses addressed the growing contradictions between the images of women and their real lives.

The conflicts and accommodations between capitalism and patriarchy occurred in a process of mutual influence. The emerging bourgeoisie were themselves patriarchs within their own households who expected to

control the lives of other family members. Patriarchal values were widely supported structurally, so capitalist change was mediated to minimize its disruption of patriarchal prerogatives.

With industrialization, market production moved outside the home, but the inequality of the family was preserved, duplicated in the "free labor" market. The labor of women and children was cheaper, regardless of the task performed (Oakley, 1976, p. 15). In some instances, families worked as a team, with the wages paid to the male head.

The social costs associated with capitalist production stimulated resistence by labor and reform movements. Both wanted to curtail the labor of women and children in factories. "Protective" legislation was sought and eventually won.

With different motives, both social reformers and trade unionists were committed to getting married women and children out of factory labor and reducing women's and children's role in the paid labor force.

Anti-capitalist sentiment was couched in patriarchal terms. That is, it was said that women and children needed to be, or ought to be protected from the most difficult or most unhealthful work. This interest was alternately phrased as the interest of society in protecting the human species or humanitarian consideration for those who are weak. For women eligible for factory work, the danger to their breeding potential was salient. It is important to realize that it was not agreed that women's exploitation was to be avoided because of their intrinsic worth as individuals. Such an argument could prove equally effective against the exploitation of men. The motive for displacing

women and children from factory labor came as much from the need of organized labor to eliminate competition as the bourgeosie's wish to "protect" women and children as the source of the future's labor force.

Patriarchal values supported the family as a unit through which other family members were linked to the larger society. The norm of pre-capitalist society recognized the senior male as the family's head, legally entitled to negotiate the interests of the family. The male vote itself was an indicator that women and children's interests were presumably protected through the patriarch, that is the male head of the family. The inequality of women and children, within the family was irrelevent to stratification analyses. But the status of family members was not identical. While the family's status and income did influence the life chances of all of its members it do so in varying degrees.

As dependents, women were able to enjoy family assets in terms of their level of consumption. However, in the paid labor force, they were not treated individually in terms of personal characteristics or acquired skills, but ascriptively. Their sex determined their life chances, more than their skills or ambition.

The family, and women's place within it, is relevent to stratification because of the ways it links to the production process, making it part of the econimic structure. The services performed primarily by women inside the household reproduce the labor force, generationally and on a daily basis. Because the family was taken as

the unit of stratification alaysis, rather than the individuals within it, women's inequality within the household and within the paid labor force was obscured (Acker, 1978).

Generally, stratification analyses have neglected or misinterpreted the economic role of the family in industrial society. "The economic structure was the total ensemble of social relations entered into in the social production of existence. That this conception of economic structure must include the family would have been perfectly clear in any analysis of pre-capitalist society" (Zaretsky, 1976, p. 25). Zaretsky maintains that the relationship persists under capitalism but is obscured by the physical separation of the workers' residence from the production site. The economy gets narrowly defined as the production of marketable commodities and the management of that process. The expansion of the commodity market increasingly limits the woman at home to service work. Her productive activity is confined to the needs for domestic consumption. However, the labor of homemakers facilitates the participation of men and children at work and school.

The physical separation of commodity production from the rest of production necessary to sustain life muted the interdependence between market production outside the household and the subsistence and maintenance activities which continued to be performed within the household, under the auspices of the family. These other forms of production, of work, which continued to be performed within the family increasingly became defined as "women's work." These included reproduction, child rearing, cleaning, food production and preparation and the purchasing of

commodities or services needed to maintain the well being of family members. In the early industrial periods, the household's consumption depended on the direct production which continued to be performed within the household; for example animal husbandry, gardening, making clothes and securing fuel. As industrialization continuously expanded, women became primarily service workers, negotiating with the commodity market for products which the family consumed.

Oakley's analysis reconstructed the ways in which the family, continuously adapted (Oakley, 1976) its production to the demands of industrialization. She emphasized the adaptations women made in their work. Women were forced to accommodate their work to the industrialization process. The family continued to perform economic functions, but went from primary production for its own and market consumption to maintainence services. In the late industrial period, the family produced less and less for its own consumption, but became the service worker and consumption unit.

As industrialization expanded, less labor was needed per unit of production. The pre-industrial production team, the family, provided surplus labor if all members were available to the factory. The separation of market production from maintainence activities, within a patriarchal culture, kept women in the home and responsible for child rearing and housekeeping. The limited availability of reproductive control and the cultural support for large families tended to make housewife-mother roles a woman's career. The physical separation of tasks which occured within a capitalist society, were assigned primarily

by gender. This meant that women's work was less valuable, regardless of its substantive content. In the paid labor force, for example, teachers and nurses received lower rewards than unskilled laborers.

In the wage market, women become a skilled but undemanding workforce (Oppenheimer, 1970). As professionals, they are drawn into low paying service positions. The discrimination which women experience as wage earners is directly associated with cultural assumptions about "their place," and their low commitment to paid work. Blau and Duncan (1967) analyse the male occupational structure and conclude it is an open, achievement system, for the most part, with the exception of the discrimination against blacks. Women's participation in the paid labor force is considered insignificant, and then, the tracking they experience need not be accounted for.

However, the differential structuring of opportunities by ascriptive criteria seriously undercuts the depiction of the United States as an open society. As women are added to the list of peoples being barred, it precludes interpreting these systematic inequities as a "minority" problem.

Oppenheimer can show that the steady increase in women's labor force participation reflects a basic shift in the labor market. Since 1940, there has been a growing demand for female labor, that is a rising demand for clerical skills and employee traits sex typed female in this society. Female labor is defined as skilled, cheap, with personality traits stereotyped as appropriate or associated with feminine gender traits (e.g., supportiveness, deference) (Oppenheimer, 1970).

Since theorists accepted the segmenting of the social world into private and public spheres, segmenting the labor force by gender was not perceived as a stratification problem. The relationship of the economic structure and the family, including the limits imposed on women's wage earning by family obligations went unchallenged till the re-emergence of feminist claims.

The assumption that women would only be in the paid labor force briefly discouraged them from persuing professional training. When they had such training, their jobs were still low paying on the assumption that it was an extension of charitable work or that they were not supporting other family members. The conventional wisdom was that few women needed to work.

Gender socialization drew women into service work. The low payment has less to do with service being intrinsically less valued, but rather that jobs dominated by women received lower rewards.

Patriarchal values operated primarily to legitimate differential rewards for male and female workers. Routinely, the "exceptional" woman, single, professionally trained, childless, or heads of house, were all subject to the same differential rewards based on gender rather than on their circumstances or skills. Far too little attention has been paid to the effects these mechanisms had on reproducing gender differences.

In sum, women's place in the economy, in the production process, was negated once production was narrowly defined as turning out marketable commodities. Women's production, processing, and service delivery which physically came out of the household were not perceived as

economic contributions. Significantly identical services exchanged for cash were accepted as part of the economic structure.

Conceptual Limitations

Socialization

In Western industrial societies, patriarchal culture socialized women to accept all but financial responsibility for the family, and to give it priority over other interests. This "freed" men enabling as well as pressuring them to concentrate on their careers or jobs.

From infancy on gender differentiation is intrinsic to the socialization process, serving as a social control, to maintain sexual inequality. Because socialization was conceptualized primarily as an early childhood process, parents, especially mothers, were held responsible for their children's adult success. It was the transmitters of cultural norms who were perceived as powerful, rather than the institutions which rewarded the structured differential socialization.

Socialization arguments are therefore insufficient to account for low achievements by women or any other group, because they fail to consider how structural constraints shape socialization processes. Anticipatory socialization which reinforces gender stereotypes, reflects some awareness

of discriminatory patterns, and is itself a gatekeeping device. Additionally, subsequent socialization can reinforce or erode gender differentiation, as can the opening of opportunities.

Public and Private

Similarly, the analytical separation of the social world into public and private spheres inhibited a critical analysis of the family's economic role in industrial and post-industrial society. In "Marriage and the Social Construction of Reality," Berger argues that in advanced industrial society the family is merely a consumption unit, therefore a private institution (Berger, 1970). Flexibility and freedom are possible due to its separation from the productive process. He fails to note the tie between production and reproduction, generationally and on a daily basis in terms of the maintainence operations required in every day life. Women's work, at home, and its relationship to production is barely visible. Thus, Berger depicts the family's function as providing an escape from the impersonal bureaucracies of the public sector. His male, and middle class bias, is unexamined. If the family is a place of leisure for the breadwinner, it is a workplace for the housewife. Full-time homemakers would hardly characterize their negotiating with super-markets, utilities, banks or department stores as escapes from bureaucratic control. Many men and women spend much of their time which is not in the paid labor force, in household maintainence and childcare, since they cannot afford to delegate these tasks.

Too, the family as the unit of analysis in stratification hierarchies, rather than the individuals within it, suppresses the issue of women's

lower status. To assume that a women's position is identical to, or determined by her male relatives, is not only inaccurate, but distorting. It ignores the inequality inside the family and the consequences it has for women in the paid labor force. It also fails to account for the growing number of women living outside a nuclear family with a male breadwinner.

And what of biology as an explanation of women's position? Even today, sexual differentiation, unlike race and ethnicity, was perceived as inevitable, naturally based in reproductive roles. Not until feminist critiques separated sex and gender analytically, was reproduction seen separately from parenting.

Just as the ascendency of science challenged assumptions about biological differences between ethnic or racial groups, presently social science questions the relevence as well as the substantive biological differences between male and female.

An eclectic theoretical perspective is used to examine the relevence of gender in the overall stratification systems of industrialized societies. This approach emphasizes the limitations of earlier analyses. The reification of evolutionary models of development which predicted the erosion of ascriptive criteria in determining stratification seems overly simplistic. Presently, there are numerous examples of the persistence of the relevence of ascription in both industrialized and developing stratification systems (Enloe, 1973).

Feminist analyses examined the failure of theorists to address gender inequality as a component of stratification due to the focus on

Industrialization processes, the persistence of patriarchy, and the choice of conceptual schemes used to analyse the development of industrial capital.

METHODOLOGY

This case study utilizes participant observation to examine exclusionary mechanisms operating with a County Democratic organization.

Since World War II party organizations have steadily adapted the technological innovations characteristic of business organizations. For example, computerized mailing lists and computer analysis of voting behavior have replaced the traditional "captain system" in which the party captain solicited votes personally and relied upon his knowledge of neighborhood events to influence political outcomes. Telephone solicitations by party volunteers have also become very widely used.

In this transition, women become a majority of the party's labor force, mostly as volunteers.[5] As in the paid labor force, party organization is characterized by sexual segmentation even though their staffs are made up of both paid and volunteer workers. Thus the institutionalized exclusion and tracking women experience are not peculiar to the Democratic Party. Rather, the patterns supporting sexual stratification in the Party parellel those operating in the paid labor force and in the culture generally.

Several qualities peculiar to political parties make them ideal for observing exclusionary tactics. They are semi-public organizations with ideological commitments to democratic openess. This makes them more

accessible to both participation and scrutiny. Their legitimacy depends on maintaining a public image of accessibility and commitment to self governence through democratic processes. However, unlike other organizations, maintaining ascendency is a legitimate goal for party leaders. As long as party participants observe the "rules of the game" regarding conflict, blocking others' ascendency is expected and legitimate. Holding power and withholding it from others is normative.

I used participant observation to examine the processes through which male dominance is maintained in this kind of organizational setting. From September of 1970 through 1979 I was a participant observer in a variety of County Democratic Party Organizations. During this period I held positions in which I was privy to diverse, sometimes conflicting, circles within the Organization. I was a member of two Reform clubs, a club's executive committee, the managing staff of assembly district, borough, and city-wide campaign organizations of both Regular and Reform factions, and the County Women's Political Caucus. I attended Democratic fundraising affairs and the Reform factions' caucuses on the borough and city-wide level.

Through these activities I had access to both the public (frontstage) behavior of professional politicans at club and community meetings and their "behind the scenes" decision making as Party leaders. I observed directly the decision making and strategizing of club and campaign organizations including the inter-organizational relationships of club and campaign operations.[6]

The meetings of party leaders not available to me were accessible through the reports of feminist participants whom I interviewed (legislators, district leaders, the staff of elected officials).

During this period I was an insider in both County Democratic Party and feminist networks. Through these circles I was in the stream of information of the party leadership. Throughout these activities I maintained field notes, which were available to me for re-evaluation for the purposes of this investigation. The re-reading of material exposed data which had not always been apparent during the activity. In addition to note taking at meetings, my data included notes of interviews, telephone reports of activists, and printed materials from club and campaign organizations, such as membership lists. Some materials, such as the record of candidacy or delegate sponsorship were available as part of the general Election Board's report.

To address gatekeeping this research focuses its analysis on the emergence and organization of an interest group, feminists, who attempt to gain power. They come to re-define impediments to their participation as sex discrimination. These women describe and function around exclusionary mechanisms which occur on the interactional level, or rather are observable on the interactional level. Patterns once invisible, and taken for granted, are challenged by feminists as exclusionary. This questioning of party patterns, itself, erodes their legitimacy.

The significance of focusing on a group of feminist activists is two-fold. Their counter definition of party procedures highlights the exclusionary component of standard operating procedures. Additionally,

they shift the focus of attention from the behavior of those being excluded to the behavior of those incumbents attempting to maintain their position. The women's open discussion of the party's sexism, illustrates how a group reinterprets or defines the behaviors of others. Without the group, the individual woman might not label her shoddy treatment as discriminatory. Certainly male Democrats might not perceive the patterns as exclusionary, but it is important to take the interpretation of those who perceive themselves as victims of discrimination and are acting according to their definition of the situation.[8] The dispartiy between the perceptions of the various participants is itself significant to this research since they have impact on the organization's policy.

The selective recruitment of party activists draws those who are attuned to the Party's rules of the game regarding exclusivity. Most of the women who are recruited into party volunteer work are not feminist. Although these non-feminist women will not be the focal point of this study, their reactions to feminist strategies and tactics are invaluable in demonstrating that such strategies violate taken for granted reality. Despite the fact that feminist party workers are fewer in numbers they are the more significant group to observe because they form a network and because they develop strategy. They are an interest group lobbying inside the party and women's groups to increase their power, both in the County Democratic Party and the society at large.

This study will include only those who were active in the Network for at least three years since 1972. These women entered party politics

during a peak of insurgency, and were chosen for study because they combine commitments to feminist causes with party activity, within either the Reform or Regular faction of the Democratic Party. Their collaboration in the feminist network made them more influential than other women activists who owe primary allegiance to a specific male leader or club. The Network has recruited women from both the Reform and Regular factions.

The feminists deliberately confront "taken for granted" social patterns which are perceived by them as maintaining sexual inequality. Through this process, feminists politicize daily interaction and personal life as an intentional tactic of social change. Simultaneously, they organize to change the structure directly.

This encourages non-feminist women to confront patterns defined as sexist. As a support for social change, it is a deliberate tactic of exposing the links between structure and interaction. This strategy makes explicit the ways that interactive patterns reinforce a sexual division of labor. It develops a critical perspective towards the existing knowledge and history by uncovering the ways in which male definitions were assumed, and what questions this habit of assumption precluded.

This removing of the veils, and making the connections between structural and interactional levels is more than a strategy. It is also closely alligned to the interests of critical sociology.[9]

The study of organizations has too often emphasized the formal goal structure of an organization, or its public policy. In political parties incumbents need to maintain legal openess or its appearance,

while consciously limiting the opportunities of insurgents. Consequently, differentiating frontstage and backstage behavior is more important conceptually, since it emphasizes the audience as a shaper of behavior (Goffman, 1959). The backstage tactics to exclude are normative. Insiders never mistake democratic rhetoric as a serious invitation to public participation in party decisions. Career politicians speak one way to the public and another to colleagues. In the study of organizations, policy which cannot be admitted publically needs to be discerned. Feminists are crucial to the uncovering and reporting of such backstage party procedures. The feminists, both by their very presence and by their strategies, focus our attention on the processes through which exclusionary mechanisms are shaped.

While social science has considerable data on the consequences of discriminatory patterns, the process itself has been relatively unexplored. "Hard data," that is quantitative data, is best suited to documenting the existence of discrimination.

By contrast, data on the process is more difficult, time consuming and expensive to gather, and certainly less manipulable mathematically. One can establish the presence of ideology in a culture but how is it's impact measured? Yet understanding the tactics incumbents use to maintain their ascendency are as essential as recording the consequenses of their ascendency for them as well as for those excluded.

Unfortunately in social science the predisposition was to rely on technology to guarantee objectivity. Herein the pre-selection of what

aspect of the social world to examine is unquestioned. Since Blau and Duncan for example, accepted the cultural assumptions about women their selectivity allowed them to omit women from their occupational analysis (1967). This selectivy even ignored a basic tenet of methodology, that the atypical case or cases can be extremely useful in examing the typical. This study attempts to make full use of that insight.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Defining Political Activity

In the Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Gouldner argues that "The most basic changes in any science commonly derive not so much from the invention of new research techniques, but rather from new ways of looking at data that may have long existed. ...The most basic changes are in theory and in conceptual schemes, especially those that embody new background assumptions." (Gouldner, 1970, p. 34) Nowhere is this more clear than in the current analyses of women's position in contemporary society and, as will be shown in this study, of women in political parties.

Women as Apolitical

A narrow conceptualization of "politics" inhibits the recognition of American women's political participation. While in principal, politics is defined as the study of power and power relationships, in practice, political science research has focused on political philosophy, government, the elections process, and the legal prescriptions which bind and support government institutions.

This focus has very effectively excluded an analysis of the contribution of women, since women did not have the vote until very recently. Thus they were excluded by law and custom from the only kind of participation deemed worthy of investigation.

In contrast, sociology including recent feminist analyses, view power and politics as a component of social relations generally (Schermerhorn, 1968; Weber, 1946; Simmel, 1967; Millet, 1969 and Acker, 1973).

The characterization of women as apolitical by mainstream political science emanates from their too narrow definition of politics as the

behavior inside political parties and government. Women's political activity in reform movements is noted by historians (O'Neill, 1969; Parker, 1972).

The narrow conceptualization excludes women's interests. Suffrage as a topic is not included in the first thirty years of the Political Science Association (Shanley and Schuck, p. 635). Carroll shows that "feminist scholarship has not yet had a major impact on the discipline of political science. The academic work currently being done on women appears to be shaped more by traditional concepts of the discipline than by the challenges suggested by the impact of the women's movement in the early seventies" (Carroll, 1979, p. 305). Also, except for a few special issues, the American Political Science Review has been "barren of articles focusing on women.." (IBID). Jaquette (1974) criticizes the description of sex differences in political behavior and male colleaques who conclude that women will have access to power as they come round to men's pragmatic "realpolitick" orientation. She notes how little either party does which reflects women's interests. Additionally "realpolitick" is a perspective which comes with participation. Male reformers initiate their political activity as idealists, too (Wilson, 1962). Additionally, as women's behavior looks more like men's the response of political activists is often to suspect their affectional choice rather than to include them now that they're "one of the boys." Does not the need to be "one of the boys," itself reflect gender tracking or discrimination?

In American culture politics meant government and elections. Before the franchise, this institutional arena was closed to women. Additionally,

party politics was deemed corrupt and corrupting, and therefore an inappropriate activity for "ladies." Men on the other hand, were permitted to withdraw after dinner, for brandy, cigars, and to talk politics.

Politics was portrayed as predominantly exchange relations more suited to business interests, that is male interests, than women's interest. The political participation which grew out of ideological or moral commitments, was not considered as political.

The women themselves collaborate to define their reform activities as civic or charitable work. Predominantly middle class ladies they accepted the popular notions of politics and preferred to interpret their activities as an extension of such traditional roles as nursing the sick or caring for the indigent.

Women were believed to be more moral than men. Indeed, even the feminists argued for women's suffrage on the grounds that women would bring moral considerations and judgment into politics. Like suffrage, the other reform movements often had a distinctive religious and moral tone. One's Christian duty was appealed to.

In Everyone Was Brave, O'Neill (1969) surmises that the feminist and other reform movements reinforced one another. He distinguishes social feminists from feminists. The former gives priority to a particular cause, while the latter puts women's rights first (IBID). In his view both groups fail because they accept a too narrow view and do not ask how the women's status and the social ills they work against are tied together.

Without an integrated focus, their class position and religious background exert a conservative influence on the reform activists, in-

hibiting adaptation of a theoretical explanation that ties the position of women to the social ills of a capitalist economy. Also, the women themselves and the causes they championed depended on the approval of the men of their class for financial and other support. The feminists lose their impact when they narrow their goal to suffrage, forming a moderate, broadly based, pragmatic organization, which appeals to racism and nativism to gain allies. Without a theoretical understanding of their society and their place in it both groups fail to develop a long term strategy.

Therefore, party leaders did not find it necessary to attend to women after they won the franchise except in symbolic ways. Neither major party appealed to women as an interest group in a way that was at all comparable to their courting of other new blocks of voters.

Thus, in spite of their considerable work in reform movements, women were believed to be apolitical. In part, they collaborated in defining their activity as civic and charitable. Their interests in cultural and educational improvements, the care of the poor and the sick, had a distinctive moral tone. Women's participation was seen as an extension of religious duty. The recruitment of volunteers often went through a network of churches and church sponsored organizations. Yet the impact of these activities could hardly be more political, considering the issues they addressed, such as abolition, civil rights, contraception, feminism, pacifism, labor organizing, and finally even party reform. Political parties, once considered irredeemable, become the object of reform.

If women were portrayed as less political than men, it was due to this limited notion of politics, as contracts of interests. Politics was thought to be confined to the rational calculation of self interest, and on strategies for maximizing them with government contacts. The emotional and moral ferver which both male and female reformers devoted to their causes was perceived as antithetical to the realpolitick of compromise and exchange. Even after winning the franchise women activists "seemed to prefer" issue and reform politics to party participation. The party was deemed corrupt and corrupting, reducing politics to exchange. Were women activists' perception of the Party inaccurate? How much were women's preferences determined by Party gatekeeping?

Women activists in these reform movements were for the most part privileged economically and educationally. However, women who were active in the labor movement, either as workers or relatives of workers, represented more broadly based interests.

Women's participation in these movements was clearly political, given their impact on American society and on the political party system. Although women were significant supporters of these causes, few realized the impact they would have, particularly on the party system. For example the demand for social services, emanating from settlement houses, and the institution of civil service to replace patronage appointments for filling government posts cut deeply into the party's raison de'etre.

In summary, while American women have been intermittently active in political movements over the last century, they are perceived as apolitical. Women collaborated in conceiving their participation in reform movements as an extension of religious or civic commitment, obscuring the political nature and consequences of their work (Parker, 1972). "Good works" were traditionally appropriate for women while more direct politics was not. The socialization of girls and women shaped their interests, including their empathy for the weak. As women were believed more noble and pure than men, this ideology selectively directed their political action to periodic reform movements on behalf of the weak or exploited.

Unfortunately, the over emphasis of material constraints masked the compelling quality of ideological factors while inhibiting our understanding of how material and ideological factors were linked. The absence of the women's franchise, itself, as a material factor, both reflected the belief in the inappropriateness of women being politically active and precluded specific types of political participation.

After winning the franchise, women continued to prefer lobbying for reforms over party politics which seemed tainted and too self interested for them. When they engaged in party work it was as seasonal participants in campaigns for candidates with specific issue commitments. The vote did not alter the education and socialization of girls. A political clubhouse remained off bounds to women, just as bars and poolrooms were.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Domain Assumption

Party Openess

With a few recent exceptions (Jaquette, 1974) the American party system is conceptualized as an open one. Explanations of women's absence are attributed to factors outside the party system. These analyses focus on personality traits interpreted as liabilities (Constanini and Craick), socialization away from political interests and roles (Jennings and Thomas, 1968), and role conflict (Stoper, 1977) between domestic and political (or career) responsibilities. The patterns supporting exclusivity are then located in the general culture and through socialization internalized by the women. The inconsistencies which these data point to are noted (contrary to my expectations...), but not persued. Significantly, the same explanations are used to account first for women's lack of participation and then as the evidence of their activism grows beyond dispute, it accounts for their presence at the grassroots but absence at the top.

The language itself betrays the bias; "women participate less at elite levels" (Constantini and Craick, 1977; Carroll, 1979). The implication is that elite positions are open to women but they choose not to seek them. Yet, Lee shows that women are confined to women's auxiliaries or low level party work, and that they expect hostility from male colleagues if they seek candidacies (Lee, 1977). In spite of their larger contribution as party workers, women are not sponsored for candidacy or other political careers. Reporting that women run less as if it were by choice implies that to be ambitious and talented is all that is needed to receive nominations. There is very little reference

to the recruitment process itself. Yet, both male and female candidates report that receiving sponsorship depends on having a cadre of colleagues willing to both suggest candidacy and provide support (Currey, 1977; King, 1977). One study reports that twice as many men as women held elected or appointed offices, but does not raise questions of how nominations or appointments are made (Jennings and Thomas, 1968).

The data upon which these analyses are made is itself very selective. It relies on surveys of convention delegates and elected officials. Which women get to be delegates? Although the peace candidacies in the Democratic Convention of 1968 and 1972 brought many new recruits including women to those conventions, very little attention is paid to the atypical character of these delegates. Does not the participation in these partisan campaigns by many women; younger, educated, professionals, undercut the notion of their preference for other forms of political participation? When partisan politics is open they participate.

Very little of the analysis of women's participation address club politics, unless the interviewee offers the information. Are not the convention delegates, as the party's loyal cadre, less likely to be critical? In urban political organizations, party leaders who are not elected have enormous impact on the party's policy of recruitment and sponsorship.

The data on women's participation is flawed because for the most part it is secondary analysis of voting behavior, candidate demography and interviews of delegates. Since the focus is not women's participation, the analysts are limited to the gender differences they can tease out of the computer.

Socialization

Socialization into the "feminine" role develops traits in girls and women which are presumed not conducive to exercising power. The continuous decline in male-famale differences in voter turnout indicates that socialization is a continuous process and is affected by cultural changes in women's role. Very few men or women are political activists (Burrell, 1977), and women's activity sometimes exceeds that of men (Gruberg, 1968; Constanini and Craick, 1977). So, while women are socialized or expected not to be interested in politics, some women do develop and pursue this interest.

Socialization in Party Organizations

The socialization which may inhibit women's party activity is more likely the socialization of party colleagues who perceive the club or its leadership, as a male sanctuary. The women who do attempt to participate are subject to a barage of gatekeeping devices (Lynn and Flora, 1977).

Several authors report data that seem to indicate that it is the secondary socialization within party circles which shapes the attitudes of activists regarding male and female party participation. Some examples are: that the gender differences are slight at the mass level but increase with partisan activities, that registered voters support women in politics more than party committeewomen do (Wells and Simell, 1974).

Some data proving boy's to be more "political" than girls emerges from poor methodology. As long as one's results fit popular belief

they are not questioned. For example, male behavior, in general is identified as political: boy's preference for war pictures is used as an index of political interest (Carroll, 1979). The assumption that gender roles are formed in childhood and are significant determiners of political interest is undercut by (Orum, Cohen and Grasmuck, 1974) who find that situational factors combine with socialization to determine that male-female differences.

The impact of the feminist movement of the last decade show how secondary socialization can reverse earlier cultural tracking. The dramatic change in public opinion regarding women's holding political offices as well as the dramatic increase in women candidates once some of the prohibitions are removed also undercut early socialization arguments. Besides, as Epstein points out, even when the majority of women seemed politically disinterested, or at least not interested in party activities, there was a group of women activists who clearly were interested who were still not promoted by their party leaders (1978).

That bright women are seen as masculine is a consequence of sexism (Gittens and Presage, 1977). In describing the differences in appearances of male and female candidates, women are older, or dress to appear sober and gray as if to de-emphasize their sexuality, which can be a disadvantage, while male candidates, can increase their appeal by being sexually attractive.

If politics is stereotyped as "properly" a male activity then women who are interested in politics and political careers are somehow suspect. Very little work has been done which examines how challenging gender

identity can be an effective gatekeeping device even though Kohlberg indicated that gender identity is a fundamental component of personal identity (Kohlberg, 1966).

Role Conflict

Women's double burden as domestics and workers/politicians is frequently used to account for their absence as elected officials in spite of their considerable commitment to party activism. Studies confirm that women are older when they initiate candidacy, that they continued to have more household responsibility than male colleagues, and are unlikely to have minor children (Stoper, 1977; Gehlen, 1977).

However, the focus on candidacy as the index of professional commitment obscures the absence of party sponsorship of women (who are the grassroots labor force) into party leadership. Women receive neither nominations nor patronage.

How realistic can the notion be that role conflict is a self imposed liability, given the fact that women who are deeply involved in party politics have already made a fulltime commitment to the party?

However, most of these are liabilities working women experience generally, and are themselves a consequence of the existence of sexual stratification. Even when female political activists have resolved their role conflict, the liability seems to remain in the form of assumptions by the male leadership that women ought not to be political leaders and housewives/mothers simultaneously. Women with young children managed to spend enormous time in running and sitting on school boards.

If school board positions were not the track for political mobility no one minded that young mothers sought and held these positions (Epstein, 1978).

Structurally, politics can be blended with housewife-mother roles more easily than other careers especially on the local level. For example, one works physically in one's own community, much of the political work can be performed in one's own home, and by telephone, the periods of intense political activity are seasonal, the time away from home is predominantly at night or weekends, when spouses or babysitters could be available for childcare. Much of the role conflict originates with political leaders' assumptions about when wives are not available or ought not to be available. Again, most of the role conflict is one of too many responsibilities with too little time to meet them.

Although the ranks of single professional women have grown, the political parties are not sponsoring single women who have considerable time to spend on politics. Nor are women sponsored on local levels where financial limits and other responsibilities are less of a handicap than in offices where campaigning requires not only travel but enormous financial resources. Do male leaders save these local seats to provide career ladders for men they anticipate will go further?

Summary

Women's substantial participation in campaigns, in civic, and social reforms demonstrates their political interest and commitment. Given women's considerable participation in the Party's grassroots, their absence in the leadership indicates gatekeeping more than gender socialization, role conflict, apoliticalness, or aversion to power. The literature on women's political participation is fundamentally flawed. As long as the assumption of the party's openess went unchallenged, the socialization, personality, and femininity arguments are not questioned. As long as one had a plausible cause, other possibilities need not be investigated. Again, the preference of male dominated political science for survey data on elite party participants itself supports conservative bias into the examination of women's position in party politics.

PARTY STRUCTURE

The structure of a political party must accommodate itself to processes of social change which effect both its relationship to its constituency and the distribution of power within its organizations. Party organizations which do not adapt to changes in the external environment or demands for change from within its ranks, disappear. A brief survey of the Democratic Party's organizational tensions and the major social processes having impact on it will be outlined. These processes are inter related; changes in the larger society effect the mobility chances of factions within the party, differentially.

The party is shaped by internal conflicts and by its external environment. Four factors which have had substantial impact on the national Democratic Party and its local organization are:

First: the federal system of government;

Second: the continuous expansion of the Federal bureaucracy, initiated in the depression of the thirties;

Third: immigration and urbanization as correlates of industrialization;

Fourth: the periodic surges of social movements, and their impact on the institutionalization of internal party reform.

The Federal Structure

As propertied gentlemen, the American post revolutionary elite feared the excesses of both a monarchy and an unrestrained, but empowered mass. They deliberately designed the federal system to structurally "check and balance" the concentration of power. The

jurisdiction of the national government was limited and divided by branches and function into the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. An indirect electoral system limited the impact of any populist surge. Congressional representatives were elected indirectly by the state legislature and the electoral college, respectively. The founding fathers considered the organized interests of parties or factions distasteful and dangerous to individual freedom. The federal division of power was intended to thwart the development of factions and to limit their power should they emerge.

The federal system preserved the power of the states. Initially, the role of government was limited and the services and regulations it managed were focused at the state level: law and order, public works, and later schools. The national government's responsibilities included defense, currency, postal services and foreign affairs. As a further restraint on the masses, local state power was reinforced by allowing each state to determine who was eligible to vote, and what conditions that person had to meet.

As interest groups developed into political parties, they influenced the electoral process. Yet, parties were not recognized by the legal structure and although an extension of the governing apparatus, they were free of regulation. Parties were self governing, establishing the rules and customs which bound them. Legally peripheral to the elections process, they were permitted to operate an exclusively, and perhaps as privately, as social clubs.

As interest groups organized, the state's role as employer, contractor, and regulator; encouraged political parties to organize along state lines. Under the federal system, even congressional districts followed state lines, superceding population size as a determinant. Even states with a small population were entitled to two Senators and one Representative. The state's budget became critical to the maintainence of the party's organization, and the significance of state boundaries for all public offices reinforced the tendency for political parties to develop as state organizations.

Since national party unity across state lines was only required quadrennially, the state party became responsible for keeping the party organization, intact during the "off season," between elections. The patronage and political favors focused at the state level increased the autonomy of the state party. In large areas, sometimes whole states, only one party was seriously operating. Entrenched county incumbents, free of serious competition, could drive a hard bargain with national or state candidates soliciting support.

Instead of a cohesive two party system, the national party was a loose coalition of 48 (50) state organizations (Mills, 1956, p.254). The heterogeneity of their constituencies and the quadrennial presidential election produced only a loose bond. Given the limited role of the national government only limited patronage was feasible. The principal interest of Congress or state party organizations was to see that local interests were not hurt by national interests. Party unity within or across state boundaries was more dependent on interest than ideology, on each getting its share of the spoils.

The depression of the thirties with its widespread unemployment and business failures, destroyed the economic base of state and local governments, thereby undercutting the support of the party organization. The United States faced a crisis of faith in both business and government. The solution of the Democrats, under Roosevelt, deficit spending by the government, was a dramatic break with the past. The economic crisis made experiments more feasible since established procedures had failed.

Since the depression, the federal government has steadily grown as agencies swelled and new ones were spawned. In this process the budget exploded. As spending shifted to the national level, power shifted also, and with it the attention of the Democratic Party. Consequently, local party organizations were faced with complicated compliance regulations to be eligible for federal funding for projects, encouraging the recruitment of some professional experts.

National lobbying networks, including the congressional caucuses, within and peripheral to local governments, solicited funds for cities, roads, welfare, housing, healthcare, minorities, and consumer protection. With the quadrennial convention, the coalitions formed within Congress, along party and regional lines, provided an informal national network. Nationally known Democrats were sought after, as celebrities, for personal appearances and fundraising.

Drawn by the growing federal budget, local party and public officials became more interested in Congress and the federal bureaucracies. For a recent example, the N.Y.C. fiscal crisis (1974-1980) drew the governor, the mayor, and the city's and state's congressional members into a lobbying network on behalf of the city.

Should a member of Congress be unsupportive on a bill thought critical to the city/state, her/his county leader might be asked to apply pressure. This situation is most likely when the interests, or philosophical disposition, of the district, conflicts with the interests of the state or city.

In 1974 the national Democratic Party shifted to a bi-annual convention. This signified a recognition of both its expanded national business and the increased impact of Federal policy on the voters. Equally important, party professionals were distressed by the increased access of amateurs (Wilson 1962) at presidential nominations' conventions and their penchant for placing ideology ahead of party maintainence and electoral success. The bi-annual meeting, without the glamour and media buildup associated with the nominating process, drew party professionals, from both reform and regular factions.

The bi-annual convention permited party professionals to institutionalize mechanisms, surely more open than formerly, but amenable to their control. The more frequent meeting was initially promoted by refomers and liberals interested in developing platforms. The nominating convetion, with its focus on the presidential candidacy, had neither the time nor the inclination, to focus on party positions, making the platform a mere formality, which was ignored. In the aftermath of Vietnam, it was thought that a party more responsive to rapid changes in the national mood, not only was more democratic, but had a better chance at the polls. The more representative climate pleased the reformers and the electoral advantage pleased the regulars. The

regulars supported the bi-annual meeting after realizing how presidential politics swelled the convention with delegates, strongly committed to an issue or candidate who would not compromise on it. The experience of the Democrats in 1968 and 1972, proved how costly this pattern was.

Ascendency of the Urban Party

The urbanization and immigration associated with industrialization made the Democratic Party ascendent in industrial cities. The urban Democratic Party built its organization on serving the immigrant population, facilitating their naturalization to increase the party's base vote. The constituency of the working class poor was solidly Democratic and relatively undemanding of the party leadership. Democratic leaders were not held accountable beyond the delivery of crisis relief, and mediating the unintelligible routines of government (e.g., filling out and filing alien registration forms required of non-citizen, foreign born). The practical absence of competition between parties and the ability of incumbents to block insurgency facilitated corruption and unresponsiveness.

Since the depression the power of the Democratic Party was split between the solid south and the urban machines. The Southern state parties and the Urban Democratic organizations shared a few structural traits. Both had no serious challenge from Republicans. Both represented populations with blocks of unregistered voters: blacks in the South, and immigrants in the city. They varied considerably

in their willingness to include these people. Still, the population not so well served could not demand accountability, without being registered voters, able to threaten incumbents with insurgency. The leadership in both types of Democratic organizations agreed not to scrutinize one another's policy. Within the national conventions both enjoyed a decided advantage over smaller delegations and those who faced electoral competition. The power of these two large factions, prevented the other groups within the Party, from scrutinizing their tactics. At the nominating conventions, traditional restraints prevented an examination of the internal operation of state or county organizations, so each chose processes as open or as exclusive as it wished, or as its constituency tolerated.

The power of the two major factions was rooted in the system of calculating the delegation size each county was entitled to. The state was assigned a number of delegates based on population. The number assigned each Congressional district was based on a ratio of the population and the per centage voting in the Democratic column in the last election. Strategically, this system gave the largest Democratic strongholds the most input on the nominations decision, since their support was essential to any nominee. An unanticipated consequence was that a large population of unregistered voters did not diminish one's delegation if they were still counted by the census, and what voters there were were concentrated in your party. While Southern Democrats may have deliberately blocked blacks from voting the difficulty of the naturalization process was an advantage to entrenched urban Democrats and could have been eliminated if they

saw it as a priority. They had an interest in keeping the electorate small and fortuitously avoided a nativist backlash. Political organizations, once established, had little incentive to expand the electorate since control of a small organization required less work.

The ranks of voters in New York were kept low by requiring them to re-register annually. This served the party with only the most highly motivated participating, and incidentially swelling the ranks of patronage employees needed to work on registration. In a promising election year, either party could mount a massive registration drive to capture a national or state office.

County Democratic Organization

The County Democratic Organization is presently in transition, weakened by the institutionalization of insurgency and by the population and business exodus from the city to suburban communities.

In its prime, the County Democratic Party was stable and powerful. Its strength was rooted in its control of the county's Democratic nominations, its influence at state and national nominating conventions, and the abundance of patronage. In exchange for support in the nominations process elected officials gratefully returned jobs and projects back to "County."

County Democratic clubs mark their boundaries by assembly districts, the smallest unit from which a state representative and the important party officials, the district leaders, are chosen. Assembly districts include 55 to 65 election districts of 400 to 1,000 enrolled voters.

In a labor intensive operation, patronage employees, as election district captains, had face to face contact with their neighbors and could "deliver" their votes. These captains, provided grassroots contact between the Democratic club and the voter, dispensing favors, information, and some social services, in the name of the club or its male leader. The tithe that jobholders and public contractors paid back to the club supported the organization and paid for the services delivered. It often made district and county leaders rich as well as powerful.

Generally, the ability of the county leader to broker the county's vote at conventions brought the county party both patronage and government favors. For the local organization the ability to dispense favors and jobs secured the labor of party workers and generous business donations. Businesses were grateful for the Deomcratic club's facilitating licensing or getting zoning variances.

The pro-labor platform of the Democratic Party after the depression secured the loyalty of County voters for several decades. In New York State, district leaders and assembly members were elected every two years. In most of this county, Democrats had safe seats. The November election became a mere formality. However to appear on the ballot, to be the party's nominee, required collecting petition signatures from enrolled Democrats, living in the District. District leaders, rarely facing opposition, filed their petitions, and succeeded themselves. Without opposition, the Primary election was eliminated. Candidates for public office had to file petitions, and run in the General Election. Serious opposition to the regular Democratic candidates was rare. The assembly district club collected

signatures, not only for its own district, but for the county's slate of endorsed Democratic candidates. The collection of qualifying signatures was one of the services that county offered to prospective candidates.

The power of the County organization was rooted in its population size, and almost exclusively Democratic electorate. When New York City boasted a population of 8 million, almost half resided in this county. At state and national conventions, sometimes the city's five county leaders pooled their votes to increase their leverage in the nominations' process, striking a better bargain for the city's Democratic organizations. Their motives were crassly materialistic; a presidential victory which swept the upstate areas, could supply federal patronage, and a chance for additional state patronage.

A candidate for national, state, or city office needed the support of New York City's county organizations to get the nomination, and the victory in a general election. Those running city wide were more dependent on these clubs for the technical requirements of petition gathering, than on the elections operation of the club in November. Then, county leaders might each have a favorite son he wished to be mayor. In state wide races how heavily the solidly Democratic electorate voted was believed to be determined by how hard the assembly district clubs worked.

Ironically, while the federal system divided power, the absolute control of county leaders locally imposed a discipline on the party's clubs, otherwise likely to be fraught with rivalries. The strict

hierarchy, with clear lines of authority, prevented the development of factional disputes, as public officials competed for higher offices as vacancies occured. Mobility was based on loyalty, seniority, and skill. Working class men could rise in this system through public office or through the party's patronage system, and personal favoritism. The decline of the county's control increased both the competition within the party over nominations, and the role which personal wealth had in securing them. Internal party reform diminished the opportunities the party can offer, and altered them in the direction of bureaucratic rationality. Consequently, those with some professional expertise became the recipients of the party's favors. These patterns reflected the structural shifts in the society which had impact on party organizations.

Reform

The federal financing of highways and suburban housing facilitated the decline in the city's population. Technological change in communications, relieved businesses of the need to be located in central cities. The urban party seemed not to anticipate the negative impact on the city, and on itself, of suburban growth.

A major factor in the decline of urban machine politics has been the reforms stimulated by the excesses and corruption of that system. Once their power was clearly established, county and district leaders not facing any competition did not have to be accountable to their constituency. They tended to become arrogant and irresponsible,

considering the party machinery their personal property to be used as they wished. This climate encouraged corruption. Periodically, reform movements attacked the "machine" after a scandal was exposed. The first reforms developed outside the party but destroyed the party's base, by establishing civil service tests as a more efficient method to fill government jobs and open competitive bidding for public contracts. Additionally, good government activists supported reformers or independent and third party candidates to cut into the Democrat's constituency. Later, reforms were more directly focused on the party's internal processes, including the nominations process.

While some changes weakened the party system in general, and the urban machine in particular, the reform party faction of the party was best able to survive these changes.

The city's population has declined and changed. The newer city residents, non-whites, singles, educated professionals, are closer in philosophy and style to the reformers. The city's more educated, more Americanized, younger population, including the children of the old Democratic constituency, are more demanding of political leadership. They applaud the American muckraking tradition. Thus, the County Democratic organization has far less clout; and what power it has is shared with reformers.

Social movements addressed political issues with moral and ideological overtones: racial and sexual inequality, war, poverty, corruption, and social justice. Political parties, with their pragmatic concern for survival, attempted to avoid these issues which were considered "too hot to handle." It was only after social movement activity aroused the public that the party was forced to deal with them.

National

Inside the national Democratic Party, a coalition emerged on the left calling for democratizing internal party procedures of the organization and for support of liberal issues, especially racial justice (Commonweal, 1975). Who participated in this faction?

Factions expanded and declined with the specific issues being addressed and the hopes the participants had of being able to capitalize on them. Insurgents were gaining modest reforms in the national and state party conventions, because some Democrats were embarassed by the party's racism or the arrogance of dominant county leaders. Additionally, ambitious men, seeking nominations preferred not to defer to the party's "Kingpins," nor begin their post owing them. If the power of the bosses was divided, some prospective candidates had a better chance for ascendency. The excesses of machine politicians were potentially costly to the careers of public officials associated with them.

Additionally, party activists had mixed commitments to issues and to self interest. The control exercised by Leaders from Democratic strongholds, excluded other Democrats from the nominations process. Delegates from other areas (rural, small cities, or bi-partisan areas) backed insurgents who would alter the process to include them. The unit rule which enabled state delegations to vote in a bloc made smaller delegations disposable. Candidates secured the nominations (or the issue) without them. More liberal party professionals, drawn into politics during the "New Deal," supported coalitions for civil rights and civil liberties.

The reform movement inside the New York State Party developed in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The reformers were angered by the Democrats failure to push for black civil rights and by the arrogance and incompetence of party bosses. The entrenched leadership was criticised for its corruption, its inefficiency, its incapacity to lead the Party on issues. The ranks of the reformers included the young, college educated, professionals, academics, and old "New Dealers." The ascendency of reformers, was linked to a specific issue and candidate (Stevenson 1956, 1960, U.S. Wagner, 1961, N.Y.C.).

Frequently the social movements outside the Democratic Party fostered the factionalism within it. In 1964, for example, with Johnson's nomination assured, the civil rights advocates formed a coalition and challenged the seating of the Mississippi delegation, since its selection process excluded blacks (Commonweal, 1/3/75). Lyndon Johnson was furious that this friction should occur tainting his nomination. While not endangered, the informal rules of the game disapproved of the move by party liberals. The tactic was considered distasteful, and disloyal, washing the organizations laundry in public. The Party had always preferred to settle these disagreements, if it had to, backstage, as it always had done. Traditionally, the convention ignored state or local delegate selection processes. Johnson, as a Southerner, and a supporter of civil rights, took it personally. He believed his support of blacks had already weakened his appeal to Southern leaders.

The dispute was resolved by seating the Mississippi delegation but with a warning that new rules (for 1968) would require stricter

adherence at subsequent conventions. The largely symbolic victory for blacks served as a warning to other states that their selections process could also be subject to challenge.

The rulings assumed that if the selections process were sufficiently open the delegations would become representative of the state' population. Also, the autonomy of state or county organizations would be modified to comply with the perceived national interest of the Party. This precedent undercut the informal code of not questioning other Party organizations. The liberals who raised the issue of black representation were party professionals who accepted these compromises seeing changes within the Party as a long term struggle. The Party's mainstream supported the inclusion of blacks in principal and in practicality. While, in the South, victory was assured, even if black voters were excluded, in Northern cities, black voters were often the margin of state victory, for the Democrats, and had the potential for playing a similar role in close presidential races.

Regulars defined reformers as amateurs, newcomers who were transient to party organizations (Wilson, 1966). Their participation tended to be seasonal, around specific "burning" issues. Yet, the liberalization of party procedures, along lines supported by reformers, gave them a stake in the party. While there were still large numbers of Democrats who were temporarily active, a core of reformers became as professional as the regulars, making a full time commitment to politics. Their seasonal interest declined dramatically as they became incumbents and part of the rule making process.

The kind of victory feasible at national conventions, was far more difficult to accomplish, at state or county meetings. Here County Leaders exercised greater control, relatively free of media attention. As national coalitions of insurgents, within the Party, modestly altered the rules of the game, they struck at the heart of the remaining power of the regular, entrenched party organizations: nominations.

The anti-war movement begun in 1965, addressed itself to the national Democratic conventions of both 1968 and 1972, through peace candidacies. In 1968, in addition to the direct confrontation over the nomination, factional disputes permeated credentials challenges, platform hearings, and rules committee hearings.

The moral outrage which surrounded the issue of the Vietnam War, made the petty, bureaucratic, politicking of the convention, seem ridiculously corrupt. After the primaries, McCarthy (1968) called for an open convention, appealing to the average delegate, to rise above the exclusivity and partiality characteristic of party proceedings. Credentials' challenges became a major component of McCarthy's strategy, not to win the nomination, clearly impossible, but to get an accommodation on Vietnam policy. The leadership of McCarthy's campaign, and the peace delegation, were not entirely new to national conventions. Many came from the reform and liberal factions of the Party. However, conviction and anger over Vietnam, and the pacifist constituency they organized and got to the convention, believed that business as usual was morally despicable, under the circumstances.

After the euphoria of Johnson's stepping down, pacifists failed to win either the nomination or even modest revisions in Vietnam policy. They did successfully challenge the legitimacy of the nominations process from the primaries and caucuses to the mechanics of the convention itself. They exposed the power of the incumbents to use committee assignments, seating arrangements, and even microphones to their political advantage. Daley seated the peace delegations in the back of the hall with defective mikes (Mailer, 1968). They had great difficulty being recognized by the chair. This pettiness seemed highly unprofessional given the relative powerlessness of the peace coalition.

For Party regulars, committed to Johnson-Humphrey, the peace coalition was more powerful, and threatening to the national ticket, than they had expected. The prospects for Humphrey in November were dismal after the Daley sanctioned violence, and Johnson's support still dependent on Humphrey's not publically altering his position on the war. As a consequence of Johnson's strength at the 1964 convention, his supporters had majorities on all the significant convention committees (1968). The merits of any case were less important than which clique supported it. The compromises gotton were not sufficient to soothe the pacifists who left the convention outraged. The party lost in 1968, proving that the professionals could not win with such wide divisions.

This coalition did get two reform commissions passed, through the efforts of moderates hoping to bind the Party's wounds, and avoid such bloodletting at later meetings. The McGovern commission was to

reform the delegate selections process, insuring representativeness, and the O'Hara commission had responsibility for assuring fair play by the 1972 convention machinery (Commonweal, 1/3/75).

The McGovern and O'Hara commissions quickly ran out of money and survived through personal loans taken by supporters, McGovern among them (New Republic 2/7/70 p. 9). The loans kept the staffs working until additional money was raised. McGovern's efforts reflected his interests and his values, inextricably mixed. The Democratic national committee accepted the recommendations of both committees to be implemented at the 1972 convention.

McGovern's familarity with the new rules gave him a decided advantage in the 1972 primaries. His pacifism recruited volunteers, not usually found in party politics. Women were one of the groups with high levels of participation on McGovern's behalf.

In 1972, McGovern came to the convention with almost enough votes to be the nominee. Following McCarthy's example, his campaign used credentials challenges, on behalf of women and non-whites, tactically. So did his opposition, Humphrey. While the campaign leadership had ideological commitments as well as strategic ones, to the participation of minorities, and the implementing of reforms, the securing of the nominations took priority. California was permitted to use the unit rule, once more (1972).

McGovern approached Humphrey before the California primary and suggested that instead of implementing the winner take all rule, they agree to split the delegates in the spirit of the new rules, proportional to the vote. Humphrey refused, but when he lost

California, he challenged McGovern's delegation on that very point. This strategic change caused McGovern to join in unseating Daley, to make up what he could lose in the California delegation. THE "ABM" coalition were amazed at the discipline and "ruthlessness" of McGovern's campaign.

McGovern sacrificed allies to get the nomination. When Humphrey joined the ABM (Anyone But McGovern) movement, it forced the campaign to sacrifice the women in the South Carolina challenge, and to join blacks in an attempt to unseat Daley's delegation.

This time, the more conservative elements sat out the November election. The absence of Daley's organization and of the financial backing of labor were insurmountable. The mudslinging of fellow Democrats in the primary doomed McGovern's candidacy.

Ultimately, the reform movements did have impact on party rules opening the process to public participation and scrutiny. These changes, at the national level, had reprecussions on the state and county Democratic organizations.

New York

Until 1968, the New York State Democratic Party had a mixed delegate selection process. Its Primary Election served only as a recommendation to the convention of Democratic leaders. At least half of the state's delegation to the convention were selected "at large" by the state leaders to assure that those who controlled the Party's elections machinery were involved in the selection process. The state delegation was not bound to allocate votes to successful candidates proportionate to their electoral victory.

In 1968 McCarthy won a substantial number of congressional districts in New York but the state leadership chose not to give him the number of delegates which reflected the proportion of the Primary vote he had won. The attention of the media, Reformers, and pacifists, damaged the legitimacy of the state's procedures, exposing the structural advantages which incumbents designed into the Primary mechanism. To obstruct insurgency, and maximize the incumbents' control of delegate selection, only the delegates' names, differing in each congressional district, appeared on the ballot, rather than the name of the candidate to whom the delegates were pledged. The incumbent leadership preferred to go to the national convention with an uncommitted slate, to increase its leverage. At subsequent conventions the New York Democrats would have far fewer "at large" slots. In 1976, the delegates were bound to vote as instructed by the electorate for at least two ballots.

These shifts nationally meant that McGovern (1968) and Carter (1976) had the nomination sewed up after the primaries. This decreased the likelihood of going beyond a second ballot and changed the role of the "nominating" convention.

In New York, the peace insurgency won some reforms begun a decade earlier. In the 1950's reform Democratic clubs in the city's center began contesting the Regulars in party primaries. In outlying areas, pockets of Reformers were weak until the insurgency of the anti-war movement. Earlier they had supported reform mayors (Wagner 1961, Lindsay, 1965-1969). By the early 1960's, Reformers had control of the city center. Their power grew with their support of successful

mayors. One of the tactics of Reform officials was to reduce the patronage controlled by Regular county leaders, by increasing the power and patronage of the mayor's office. Wagner used this tactic in his second term, when backed by Reformers (in his first 1957 term he won as a Regular). Lindsay used it in both terms. If one got into City Hall without the county leaders, you shut off their patronage. Successful insurgents deliberately weakened adversaries to deter their mounting campaigns against you. You altered the governmental structure to the degree possible to maintain your tenure in office.

Two tactics of reform-insurgents were to increase the number of enrolled voters, and the Primary turnout. In New York City, instituting permanent registration (as long as the voter voted every two years), was applauded by Reformers. Permanent registration cut clerical costs and was characterized as more democratic because it facilitated participation. It also facilitated insurgency by increasing the rolls of new voters not committed to the regular incumbent organization. The increased rolls were believed a resource for future primaries. A large list of registered voters was a potential resource for insurgents.

Reformers epitimized the values of bureaucratic rationality and efficiency, highly valued in modern society. It was an asset to their ascendency because of its appeal to a middle class electorate. Lindsay's administration was appalled to discover that their plans for urban renewal of "slums" and "commercial" areas were resisted by working class ethnics who perferred to keep their neighborhoods free of the city's improvements. Lindsay failed to realize the chauvinism of his pro-

fessionally trained aides until neighborhoods organized to prevent such improvements. The administration was unaware of the ethnic and class bias implicit in its plans for the city.

This County Regular Organization gave priority to personal loyalty over issues or efficiency. In this County, two assembly districts, both middle class professional enclaves, had the strongest Reform clubs. Their constituents were the least comfortable with the Regulars' focus on personal problem solving and patronizing style. The nucleus of these reform clubs was often a neighborhood, which fielded a campaign for a progressive candidate for national, state or citywide office. At first, they were not engaged in local issues but were surprised at how well they did. The Regulars were reputed to be unbeatable. The Reformers' success encouraged them to challenge the local district's incumbents.

In challenging them, the Reformers were supported by community activists who had trouble with the Regulars. Often, Regulars perceived all community activists as potential adversaries, projecting their own motives on other activists. Consequently, they were uncooperative with community groups, consciously obstructing their projects. As community groups recognized the impediments the local Regular Organization put in their path, they were willing to forego their neutrality and support the Reformers, who were more responsive to their interests. The accountability demanded by both Party Reformers and community activists increased the public participation in the process, and with it the insurgents' chances.

Democratic Party As An Organization

Comparable to other complex organizations the Democratic Party must negotiate the conflicts emerging from the diverse and sometimes competitive interests of its participants, and the conflicts amongst its several goals. Winning required the Democrats to coordinate their ideology, a platform responsive to public opinion, and candidates, who represented both. Increasingly, campaigns were personal operations of the candidates. They depended on both paid and volunteer labor, and a cadre of political operatives with technical expertise in mounting campaigns. In the off-season between elections, the Party organization needed to maintain itself.

Maintainence operations included rewarding its technical experts with prestige and/or jobs, remaining credible to its constituency, and continuously raising volunteers and money. The ebbing of the County Leader's control increased the personal and factional in-fighting, threatening party unity, and electoral success. In this County, the institutionalization of Reform-Regular conflict has permeated all party business from the selection of delegates to county judicial conventions to choosing a presidential nominee. The prolonged conflict destroyed the hierarchy, once common to this urban Democratic party. Instead the access routes to public office have multiplied, increasing intra-party conflict. Career ladders were possible without either the Reform or Regular faction. Wealthy candidates mounted independent campaigns and proteges of these independent officials were sponsored into politics without the Party.

Unlike organizations with clear hierarchic authority, and a salaried labor force, the Democratic Party depended on both volunteer and paid workers. The paid staff included elected officials, their staff and other patronage appointees whose jobs depended on election results. The volunteers may be moved by issue commitments, party loyalty, or prestige.

The conflict between those with a career interest in politics and those with issue commitments was common. The seasonal participation more common to volunteers with issue interests, limited the confrontation between them and party Regulars. Reformers tended to be ideological and irregular participants. Over time a core of the Reform faction developed career interests in the Party. They began to calculate their short and long term interests, as they expected the struggle to persist. They accepted some of the rules of the game, particularly the compromises they helped formulate. They become optimistic that their strength at the polls was growing so that success was inevitable. Their activism increased their commitment to the process itself. The federal system itself worked against the control of any faction, and the classic urban machine seemed a temporary response to a specific set of circumstances. Now, there was an increase in personal political bases rather than the party clubs.

The ideology of participatory democracy which the party embraced in an amorphous way constrained the organization to be responsive to the public. Because of its dependence on voters and on volunteers, the Party was more accountable than private organizations, or even

government agencies. Other organization were more likely to be judged on effectiveness not on process (Wilson, 1966). To recruit votes and volunteers required an image of integrity. Often the trust was in a specific candidate rather than the Democratic Party as an organization.

CHAPTER THREE

FEMINIST NETWORK IN A COUNTY DEMOCRATIC PARTY

FEMINIST NETWORK

This study asserts that gender tracking exists in the County Democratic Party and that an analysis of the experience of Democratic Feminists is crucial to discovering how such tracking is patterned and supported. One of the hypotheses of this work is that structured inequality is maintained simultaneously by structural and interactive constraints. The focus is on a group of Democratic Feminists and the patterns of the County Democratic Party (CDP) which they perceive as gatekeeping mechanisms, that is devices which exclude them or limit their participation.

In this chapter the Feminist Network will be described as it developed over eight years (1972-1979).[1] Its development is best viewed as a process which highlights the interaction between macro-level social movements and people's daily lives.

The women's movement specifically labeled interactive patterns prescribed appropriate by gender as exclusionary mechanisms. Personal life was politicized, and interaction on the micro-level became a significant political arena for feminists.

The women's movement stimulated the development of a number of women's organizations and caucuses which were directly or indirectly political. These groups presumed that political women had common interests which could be advanced through their collaboration. Historically, women's political experience had been as seasonal activists who were intensely involved during crises. They worked in social reform movements, labor strikes, and later, electoral campaigns.[2] After the crises, or upon attaining their goals, these groups disbanded or were considerably reduced in size. The core of those groups which perseverd rarely had women participants.

Unlike male counterparts, women were seldom if ever, recruited into the leadership circles formed after these political crises abated. In spite of women's proven abilities in the grassroots of such groups, they were not drawn in to serve in the leadership. The predominance of men in such circles indicated that men's talents were recognized and they were asked to participate; they were recruited.

The women's movement stimulated an assortment of women's political groups and the media's recognition of women's political interests. The women's movement addressed the widespread changes in women's lives, especially their increased participation in the paid labor force, and, their greater reproductive control. Feminists politicized women's differential treatment and defined it discriminatory.

The County Feminist Network, which is the subject of this study, emerged out of the links amongst local feminists active in Democratic Party circles. Its development grew out of the bond fostered by the feminist climate in the larger society and the cooperation of these women in local political causes.

Between 1972 and 1979 a group of women entered County Democratic Party politics with mixed commitments as reformers, pacifists, community activists, and feminists. In response to the County Democratic Party's treatment of them, as women, they changed their priorities. They became ardent feminists, and formed coalitions by networking.

First: As part of a large pacifist insurgency they viewed the CDP's procedures critically, consciously examining the patterns the Party developed to block insurgency.

Second: They entered politics expecting women's issues and candidacies to be supported. By challenging the customs which limited women's participation, they made these visible. Other activists had taken these for granted (Schutz, 1967) which both reinforced and obscured these patterns.

Third: Numbers were significant. In a cohort of insurgents, with considerable support for feminist claims, they resisted the CDP's attempt to socialize them into accepting the organization's procedures. As an established group with specific political commitments, the Party Organization had difficulty absorbing them without significantly altering its "modus operandi." Male Reformers were more easily assimilated because their principal disagreement with the CDP was insurgency, itself. Once they were no longer insurgents, they began to think as incumbents, which facilitated their relations with the Regular CDP. In contrast, the CDP's sexism, itself, solidified the network of women insurgents, further limiting the Party's co-opting of them. Sustained as outsiders, they had less to lose, which facilitated their increased feminist commitment.

Process and Structure

During this study this County Feminist Network was shaped by the issues and candidates it supported, the organizations from which its associates linked-up, and the absence of feminist support within

County Democratic circles. The organizations, which brought these feminists together, included both official Democratic Party channels[3] and groups peripheral to the County Democratic Party which has impact on the Party Organization. The county chapters of the Women's Political Caucus and the National Organization for Women encouraged and supported women candidates, particularly as independents. Also women who were members of NOW and the WPC, were also participants in local Reform or Regular Democratic clubs. These diverse political organizations provided structural supports for the network. In the process of these feminists "doing politics" the network emerged.

For example, the early recruits supported abortion rights, which shaped their political action, their subsequent recruitment of associates and their coalitions with pro-choice groups.

Goals

Generally, the Network supported women's (later feminist) ascendency in the Democratic Party and the extension of women's legal rights and access to services. These feminist activists also responded to the political opposition which aimed at curtailing abortion rights or instituting policies to limit women to traditional domestic roles.

Character of the Leadership

The network's leadership was fluid which permitted different groups within it to initiate activity. For example, action to protect medicaid abortion funding was led by CARASA while electioneering for feminist candidates was led by the political operatives with campaign experience. Individuals with specific feminist projects (Displaced Homemakers) also tapped the network for support.

An organization's influence within this network depended on the regularity and longevity of its operation. Another factor was whether the organization was formally mandated to engage in partisan politics. Groups which were officially neutral participated only through the informal contacts made by its membership as individuals, not as representatives of the group. An organization's impact on this network depended on its persistence, its frequency of meeting, and on its ability to be partisan.

Problems

Feminists needed to differentiate feminist women candidates from women candidates. This created sticky issues because, at first, feminists were confident that electing women automatically enhanced feminist goals. In highlighting women's interest, as women, they overlooked the interests which divided them.

The experience feminists gained in county politics changed their political commitments. They moved from identifying themselves principally as women (as in women's group, women's caucus, etc.) to defining themselves explicitly as feminists. During this period, the network had to respond to shifts in the general political environment as well as to the anti-feminist backlash. This feminist network had three overlapping social bases which reinforced the ties amongst its activists.

Permanent

Those organizations which operated continuously in county Democratic circles provided the network's stability. They included Democratic clubs with feminists in their leadership, the community offices maintained by elected feminists, the County Women's Political Caucus, and NOW's legislative and political committees. Most met at least monthly. Political intelligence circulated through these assorted groups.

Temporary

The temporary coalitions formed by feminists at conventions and in electoral and lobbying campaigns reinforced their bonds and provided state and city wide contacts. The women's movement stimulated women's caucuses to address the particular interests of women as elected officials, government employees, party activists, etc. Within these groups, some activists focused on lobbying, some on electoral campaigns. Most learned to "network" amongst the groups.

LOBBYING

The longevity of the lobbying groups varied considerably depending on their tasks. Some only lasted through a specific convention. Some groups with very specific goals dissolved when the goals were reached. For example, a task force to reform legislation for regulating the prosecution of rape, disbanded when the law was reformed.[4]

Other lobbying organizations had specific goals (childcare funding, abortion rights) which could not be permanently secured. These groups responded to legislative calendars, particularly budget processes, and were seasonally activated. Other organizations, like NOW had broad legislative agendas. As one goal was realized, they proceeded to the next. Frequently they lobbied on several issues simultaneously. (In one legislative season, NOW lobbied for abortion rights, displaced homemakers, childcare, divorce reform).

Some issue lobbyists began as task forces but found themselves involved in a more protracted struggle. Abortion rights were secured in 1970 in New York State, and the Supreme Court decision of January 22, 1973, made pro-choice advocates over-confident. As Right to Life groups emerged and shifted the debate to public funding of abortion, the pro-choice activists had to re-organize again. In response, pro-choice groups lobbied continuously to prevent encroachments.

As abortion rights were increasingly challenged in the legislatures rather than the courts, pro-choice advocates got involved in

electoral activities. They responded to the Right to Life groups targeting abortion supporters for defeat. Inadvertently, the failure to secure abortion rights, forced these groups to persevere. This feminist network has been extended by the collaboration of legislative and lobbying staff in election activity. Volunteer lobbyists often had difficulty making the transition from pressuring legislators to active support of those committeed to their issues.

Elections

Campaigns were also seasonal operations. Feminists were recruited with or without the formal endorsement of the organizations which brought them into contact with the campaigns. Without the endorsement, participants were free to identify with the campaign, reinforcing the bonds amongst campaign volunteers. With the formal endorsement of an organization, the campaign had access to organizational resources as well as volunteers.

Friendship and Collegiality

Through their participation in Democratic Party and women's organizations these feminists formed collegial and friendship ties which strengthened the network. They supported one another personally and politically. They shared political information, job referrals, fundraising contacts and techniques, consciousness raising and links to other feminists.

The feminists who remained active in county Democratic circles sought one another out assuming they were mutually interested in supporting feminist candidates and issues. During this study, they discovered more subtle forms of gender tracking in both Reform and Regular factions. Informally, these feminists supported one another in confronting exclusionary mechanisms such as sexual harrassment, men taking credit for women's contributions and the invisibility of the women's work. This circle of women, emerged as a feminist caucus in response to these constraints, normatively imposed on women activists in county party circles.

These three social bases of the network were mutually reinforcing. The temporary groups, lobbying and elections campaigns, drew feminists into the more stable, permanent groups such as Democratic clubs, or Women's Political Caucus. The friendship circles which emerged supplied further support for this network and placed these women in frequent contact with one another regardless of the political season.

Consciousness raising occurred informally and unexpectedly within these several circles of women activists in permanent and temporary organizations and in social circles (Merton, 1968; Kadushin, 1968).

Between 1972 and 1979 this network dramatically altered its political commitments. From 1972 through 1975, these Democratic Feminists exchanged personal and political support but their contact occurred mainly within Democratic Party circles. The women's groups linked other feminists, indirectly to the Party organization. Friendships developed from this political activity.

The feminist participation in once exclusively male political circles established the need for women's caucuses and groups, because of the discomfort feminists experienced within these groups.

The CDP's failure to support the ERA (November, 1975) symbolized the persistence of the feminists' marginality in spite of their equal participation along side male colleagues. As a result, the feminists increased their distance to the CDP Regular and Reform circles explicitly placing priority on their mutual interests. These feminists were angry because they thought the discomfort they had experienced within the Democratic circles was an initiation. They saw themselves educating one another and male colleagues. If nothing changed after four years of considerable commitment to the Party, they had best review their position.

The feminists increasingly withdrew from recalcitrant Party circles and channeled their energies in support of feminist candidates and issues. They preserved their contacts with male colleagues who were supportive. Their new alignment was only possible because of the experience gained and contacts made in the early seventies within Democratic clubs and campaigns. After November of 1975, they had less of a presence within clubs per se, and began making wider connections beyond the county circles.

Below, I will review these two stages in the network's development focusing on their political activity in groups and campaigns and their interpersonal support of their political careers.

Process

In New York, Reform Democrats were empathetic to feminists claims as ideologically in harmony with their support of other "minorities." They combined their political commitments to peace and to the representation of "minorities" including youth and women, to strengthen McGovern's candidacy.

Feminists linked to the network were active in four reform clubs, and were clustered somewhat around the three Reform women candidates. As Reformers, they were committed to incremental changes and were optimistic about their ability to influence the Party to support women, as it had men. These districts were contiguous, or overlapping because the population most supportive of insurgency and or feminism had some common traits.

The strong Reform districts were found in cosmopolitan neighborhoods with a high concentration of single and professional residents. Some feminist activists found campaigns intrinsically exciting and increased their commitment to reform the Democratic Party. They began to coalesce as a group within the Reform clubs and around a few women candidates.

Extra Effort

The feminists' experience in these campaigns indicated how peripheral they were even in insurgent political networks. Their marginality persisted even when they were well integrated into these campaigns, as campaign staff and volunteers. Volunteer campaigns tended to be the most egalitarian. Still, women's interests had to be identified.

Two feminists were candidates in 1972 in overlapping districts. Boles was running for State Senate and Foley for the Democratic leadership. Boles' district included substantial pieces of three assembly districts, including Foley's (15 AD) and her home district (25th). Foley was part of an assembly-wide slate in the 15th, and her campaign was integrated with that of the male assembly and leadership candidates. This Reform campaign had completely integrated its efforts on behalf of Reform state senate candidates and McGovern's presidential race with its assembly-wide slate. In contrast, Boles relied heavily on women friends and colleagues, while her home assembly club (25th) focused almost exclusively on the presidential race. Lyden, who had staff responsibilities in both campaigns, was most active in the 15th AD, where she lived. At a 15th AD campaign meeting she complained of the 25th AD's neglect of Boles' race. Her experience of the 15th AD's integrated effort for the whole slate, sensitized her to the absence of such support for Boles. Lyden urged colleagues in the Foley race to push harder for Boles and to inform her of the community affairs schedule because Boles' club was unreliable regarding local matters. Although Lyden perceived the neglect as subtly "sexist," the 25th AD was considered eccentric.

So, even in Reform campaigns where men professed ideological support for women's rights, the women had to take extra steps to secure such support. For the most part, male candidates received this cooperation without extra effort. The 15th AD gave more help, and had a closer tie to the other male state senate candidate. In

part, his race was taken more seriously because most of his district had no Reform club, which placed a heavier burden on the 15th AD. The existence of the 25th AD Reform club made it the logical mainstay for Boles.

While participating in political networks did not guarantee support, the feminists learned what campaigns had to offer or withhold. Without such knowledge, they were unable to discern "differential treatment."

The impact of gender on the distribution of responsibility within the campaign was demonstrated by another incident within the 15th AD assembly race. In New York State, the legislature repealed its abortion restrictions. The Republican incumbent, opposed by Flynn (15th Democratic nominee), had voted to maintain the bans on legal abortions.

In 1972, the Coalition For A Free Choice (CFFC) raised money and volunteers to support pro-choice candidates. Flynn claimed to be personally opposed to abortion. However, he saw it as a matter of individual conscience, and opposed the legislature taking any position on it. His discomfort with a clear pro-choice position was apparent in his procrastination over writing or approving a pro-choice position for his campaign. By supporting no legislative restrictions on abortion, he was eligible for CFFC support. In this campaign, the women staff assumed responsibility for the campaign's abortion platform. How this occurred, was significant as it established a pattern which made women accountable for "women's" issues and relieved the ordinary Democratic Party circles of this burden.

The dual tendency of the CDP's neglect of feminist claims and the women's accepting of responsibility for them, kept feminists on the perimeter of the party. In providing a need for feminist caucusing, the Party's neglect also provided an alternate political base for women. Another subtle consequence was that men in these circles felt comfortable letting "the girls do their thing;" so then, not opposing them is perceived by the men as tantamount to support.

Given the Republican incumbent's record, the Coalition For a Free Choice was interested in the Democratic insurgent's race. Practically, CFFC did not insist that candidates openly declare support for abortion rights, but respond honestly, if asked. The CFFC's financial support automatically became public as campaigns filed financial reports before Election Day.

Abortion had recently been thrust into public view by feminists and by the dramatic repeal of abortion restrictions (New York, 1970). Many were just beginning to grapple with it as a campaign issue. Those with feminist or civil libertarian commitments advocated free choice while the majority of campaign activists were ambivalent. For many volunteers, the controversy, and the need to respond for the campaign, provoked a painful examination of their own views.

Strategically, Flynn was in a tight spot, running against a Republican-Conservative in a heterogenuous district. His volunteer staff were young, mostly single students and young adults, and half were women. They leaned towards a pro-choice position. Foley, the District Leader considered a pro-choice position, non-negotiable.

Before the primary she made it a condition of her being on the slate. Her strong commitment, and the staff's support, exerted considerable pressure on Flynn.

The issue was not divisive amongst campaign staff. The men and women were equally suportive or ambivalent about it, treating abortion rights as a necessary, but lesser evil, than illegal abortions. Men in the campaign deferred to women on this issue, considering the women's views more relevant. The men supported pro-choice as an extension of individual rights, and to prevent the greater hazard associated with illegal abortions. The women were more deeply involved and more influenced by the militant feminist position: that control of reproduction, however secured, was critical to other opportunities for women.

The Campaign Manager and the Elections Day Coordinator both men, were anxious to have the Coalition's financial support. They encouraged the campaign staff, particularly the women thought to be close to Flynn, to press him, informally, for a position. A female coordinator, Whelan, was asked to draft a position and get the candidate's approval of it. Whelan was chosen because of her friendship with Flynn, but also because it seemed presumptuous to assign a man to write it. The man who wrote the other campaign pieces seemed inappropriate.

Whelan solicited the input of most campaign staff, but relied heavily on the opinions of the feminist women. Even in this well integrated campaign, women were encouraged to assume responsibility for abortion as an issue, and were simultaneously drawn to it.

The men in this campaign felt restrained to comment on abortion documenting their awareness of institutionalized sexism. They were reluctant to expose themselves to feminist criticism. Their reluctance itself acknowledged an acceptance that some knowledge of the social world was gender determined.

> For example, whenever a constituent called and inquired about the candidate's abortion position one of the male coordinators asked one of the women to respond. He believed the women were more convincing on the issue. Since most callers were anti-abortion, the coordinators discussed how a pro-abortion position was more acceptable coming from a woman. Also, the campaign staff discussed how the female leader received less resistence from constituents about abortion than her male running mates.

To a degree the women's movement legitmated women's position for choice, and simultaneously defined abortion as a women's issue, rather than a public issue. For the clique of feminists in this campaign, it set a precedent for segmenting women's interests from general interests.

In this process, abortion is not defined as a public issue, and of general interest. Rather, women's lesser power, and perception as the "other" (de Beauvoir, 1953) defines issues with special impact on them, more narrowly, that is as "special interests." In contrast, occupational safety regulations, which disproportionately effect segments of the male labor force still are considered social issues of public concern. So, in this society manual laborers in potentially hazardous work, regardless of numbers are bona fide public participants. Our language supports this conceptualization, since man is used generically to include huMANity. The term, woman, signifies a delimited population.

In accepting responsibility for abortion as a campaign issue the feminists helped to segment "women's" issues. In part, their assuming responsibility was a consequence of feminist strategy which mistrusted male collaborators, particularly regarding reproduction. It also illustrated the constraints of cultural hegemony (Gramsci 1971) even on those struggling against it.

By accepting responsibility for women's interests feminists reinforced existing patterns which separated women's interests from public interests, worthy of universal support. As women's interests got defined as special interests, the precedent was there for the special interest group, women, to take care of their (sic) own special interests.

Within the courts, pro-choice strategy appealed to both rights of privacy and "minority" rights. The majority ought not to impose its morality on a minority who did not share its views. Both the protection of an individual's right to privacy and of minority rights had legal precedents, safely established.

Pro-choice advocates were a numerical minority in this society and they did not anticipate that legalizing abortion would so quickly legitimate it.

Since abortions have been legal, public opinion has shifted on the issue, and now a majority supported some abortion rights. Still, abortion delt with sexuality and reproduction, traditionally family matters, traditionally private matters, which the legal tradition supported as an individual's private business.

The pro-choice coalition also inadvertently sustained abortion as a non-public issue by pragmatically permitting elected officials to keep their pro-choice record a secret. Pro-choice advocates believed that they would lose a public debate on the issue. Consequently, candidates usually chose not to advertise their stand for abortion rights.

Oddly enough, anti-abortion lobbyists appealed to the "individual rights" of the fetus to equal protection under the law. They made abortion a public issue by treating it as a criminal offense; and by their strategy which demanded that political officials make their positions known. Pro-abortion lobbyists accepted quiet support and made no such demands on elected officials.

Still, in both incidents, feminists inside Reform campaigns took primary responsibility for protecting women's interests (re: abortion or the Senatorial candidate). The feminists collaborated and pragmatically acted on their interests. They showed their acceptance of their interest not being considered of general interest and reflected their "knowledge of taken for granted" reality (Schutz 1967) that help was not to be expected. At this early point of their activity within the party circles, the neglect of Boles was considered sexist; but not particularly deliberate.

These feminists felt obliged to raise the consciousness of their male colleagues. While they expected support from male colleagues they felt it was their responsibility to uncover sexist patterns. So, the feminists took the initiative on "women's interests" and the responsibility for explaining sexist patterns to others.

Therefore, Lyden believed that simply alerting the 15th AD campaign staff of Boles' neglect by her home club was sufficient remedy given the good will within the 15th AD.

Similarly, the feminists assumed responsibility for securing and maintaining abortion rights because it fit their strategy. There was still an air of "we're all in this together" amongst these men and women campaign staff. Male colleagues were not held strictly accountable because feminists were still doscovering traces of sexism in their own behavior.

Later, the feminists found that most male colleagues did not support them in confronting sexual harrassment or in establishing themselves as serious political actors. Both the Party and male colleagues failed to back women's causes. As the feminists continued to cooperate this absence of support became politicized.

The unreliability of the CDP kept feminists on the periphery of the organization. Instead of addressing their interests within the existing framework of the Party, they were obliged to form ad hoc groups and caucuses with issue lobbyists. This pattern of segmenting women's interests forced feminists in this County to develop their own political apparatus.

The CDP's disregard for the ERA Campaign symbolized the persistence of institutionalized sexism which encouraged the feminists to increase their distance to the official party.

These early incidents were significant because they laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of the county feminist network.

The ties amongst the feminists active in the 1972 Reform campaigns were strengthened by their collaboration in an unsuccessful mayoralty race. The candidate (Boland) had led in the repeal of anti-abortion laws in New York State, which made him an attractive candidate to Reform feminists. The Supreme Court Decision (January 22, 1973) seemed to negate the need for legislative lobbying so the pro-choice lobbyists were not involved in the campaign. The major flaw of the campaign was its staff's assumption that issue groups (pro-choice, tenants) would supply the campaign's labor force.

Within county Reform circles, Boland's supporters were recruited through the incumbent mayor's network, a clique of Reform activists from the 11th, 15th, and 25th assembly districts, part of Lindsay's network in this county. All three districts included parts of Boles' state senate seat in 1972. In 1973 this Lindsay circle supported the pro-choice mayoralty candidate in this county. Boland was endorsed by the city Reform caucus (NDC) and three Reform Assemblymen helped spur his efforts amongst fellow Reformers.

In the borough campaign headquarters six of the staff from the 15th AD held responsibility in the mayoralty in addition to one staff member from Boles' senate race. Five of the seven staff for the borough office were women. The male campaign manager had considerable problems with the women when he referred to the office's productivity and "manpower." The office manager insisted that "manpower" was inappropriate since women did the major share of the work. He was also reminded that he was addressing volunteers, not the employees of General Motors.

While these feminists pounced on such verbal sexism, they were committed to working in politics with men and women. They considered the consciousness raising theirs and their colleagues, an extension of their political work. The borough coordinator misunderstood this.

This incident reflected a problem feminists had working with men who interpreted criticism of sexist patterns as personally hostile. It encouraged feminists to work within more compatible but less mainstream political networks. The difficulty for feminists within the CDP circles was tolerable if their presence helped erode sexism. Otherwise they might just as well do their political work in more comfortable surroundings.

During this period (March 1972 to November 1974), the feminist participation within Reform circles complimented their feminist political activity but the pattern was affirmed for women to assume responsibility for "women's interests" for example in Krupsak's candidacy and in reforming rape prosecution.

The County's feminists worked together to reform the prosecution process for rape, which in New York State required a witness, other than the victim. Senator Boles and the leader (15th AD) Foley, collaborated. Boles sponsored the legislation in Albany while Foley gathered supportive evidence and testimony in New York City. Their cooperation demonstrated the use of Democratic incumbency and community groups to lobby for legislative changes. In this effort they received support from feminists, anti-rape task forces, the County Women's Political Cacus, as well as their district Reform clubs.

Feminism Supercedes Factionalism

In 1972, Foley and Boles had been elected as Reformers. In 1974 these feminists supported one another across factional lines. Foley had just alligned with the Regulars. Boles alienated Reform support because she refused to endorse the 15th AD Reform candidate opposing Foley. Boles' neutrality was significant because a substantial piece of her district was controlled by the 15th AD Reform club.

Foley also received support from the 11th AD Reformers which preserved some of her Reform credentials. The cooperation among the reform-feminists from the 11th, 15th, and 25th AD assembly districts within both women's organizations and Reform circles tightened their bond. These pockets of Reform support of Foley were reinforced by friendship ties between 11th AD and 15th AD activists and their collaboration on several projects between 1972 and 1974. Intra-party factionalism was less important than the mutual support of the feminists. Foley was well suported by male Reformers from the 11th AD too. She had been a community and party activist over the last two years while her opposition within the 15th AD Reform club came from Flynn who had been relatively inactive after his defeat in 1972.

A County Congresswoman was also re-elected but she chose not to participate in this feminist network or identify strongly with feminist issues.[5]

James, a Reform feminist from the 13th AD won the female leadership but her running mates (for assembly and male leader) lost.

All three elected feminists supported Maryann Krupsack for Lt. Governor in both the Primary and the General Election, and drew upon their personal political networks on Krupsak's behalf. Foley and Boles attended a city wide fundraiser and persuaded others to attend. At the state leaders' convention Foley lobbied for Krupsak's endorsement amongst the County's district leaders. James ran with Krupsak in the 13th AD and lobbied for her candidacy within Reform County circles.

The elections process, particularly the Primary kept both the public officials and their core supporters active. Either they themselves faced serious challenges, or they sought to influence the outcome of other races. Those who found they enjoyed politics and campaigns were committing themselves to political careers. These feminists active in Democratic clubs and campaigns were very aware of the limits imposed on them as women, but were optimistic about their ability to cope with it.

Networking

In the early development of this feminist network, ties among the feminists were fortuitous, stemming from their overlapping membership in Democratic clubs, community groups, and women's organizations.

Shea, an activist from the 15th AD campaign, had been involved in a school strike several years earlier. She became close friends with other parent activists. These parents later formed the leadership of the 11th AD, with one of their group elected to the Assembly. Since Shea made friends in both circles she linked these two political groups, informally. Activists from both groups were at her children's Bar Mitzvah.

Foley and James had both worked as daycare administrators and had lobbied for daycare funding before they became Reform club

activists. Later, as district leaders (1974) they collaborated to strengthen and expand the women's caucus among leaders. The three elected women (Boles, Foley and James) were also active in the County Women's Political Caucus (CWPC). Each of the elected feminists drew feminists from their districts into the CWPC.

During 1973, women's caucuses developed and expanded among district leaders, legislators, convention delegates and government employees. These women's groups which emerged within Democratic party and governmental circles were fostered by the strength of insurgency in New York and the feminist movement.

These coalitions included the County Women's Political Caucus and the ad hoc groups of elected officials and convention delegates engaged with short term goals. These groups assumed that women had common interests in political careers and in feminist issues and that these did not conflict. The euphoria encouraged by the women's movement muted the political differences among them. The earliest projects of the women's movement (consciousness raising, equal wages, media portrayals, and eliminating rape) appealed to many women and did not fit into traditional political labels.

The ad hoc coalitions with specific feminist goals for a legislative session or convention offered similar supports to women on a state wide basis as it addressed women's issues within these arenas. The women's caucus at a convention facilitated the like-minded feminists finding one another, since they were frequently only a small minority amongst women delegates. Most delegates were hand picked by the county or district leader and in strong clubs his choices were elected.

The CWPC was affiliated with a National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC). Officially it was non-partisan but in this county its participants were overwhelmingly Democratic. Those not tied directly to the Democatic Party were either further left or issue lobbyists, rather than Republicans.

In its formation the CWPC stressed issue lobbying and the trading of practical, "how to" information.

During 1973 the CWPC met monthly, had guest speakers on political topics, did consciousness raising, announced women's issues in need of lobbying in the state legislature or Congress, distributed information on women candidates and gave them a speaking forum from which they solicited volunteers. Additionally the caucus participated in state and national caucuses, which drew its most active members into broader feminist networks. The caucus uncritically encouraged women's candidacies but explicitly ruled against making endorsements. Naively, the caucus avoided the problem of two men as competitors, and assumed that women candidates supported "women's issues." Those whose primary political experience had been campaigns were extremely critical. A no-endorsement policy surrendered a major avenue of influence in the candidate selection process. The CWPC removed itself from an arena of politics, the differentiation amongst several Democratic hopefuls, in which it could have considerable power. The early days of the caucus stressed encouraging women to participate in politics at all levels and to lobby on issues which it perceived as non-controversial, such as reforming rape prosecution. The caucus never anticipated that its agenda conflicted with that of other political

actors. Although the caucus encouraged women's candidacies it viewed the women who ran somewhat ambivalently, as if their career interests exploited the CWPC.

The caucus was most critical of women candidates who sought support but had no record of their own in support of feminist issues or candidates. Without explicit goals, other than consciousness raising and political education, the CWPC had difficulty maintaining itself. The functions it did serve, were also being addressed by other women's groups (NOW). Although the caucus scheduled monthly meetings they were held somewhat erratically after the first eighteen months. Informally, the caucus did put women interested in politics in contact with one another. The central branches of the WPC, state and national, held conventions and published newsletters which kept these political women in contact with wider networks.

Friendship Collegiality

With the campaigns there was a heightened solidarity amongst the women activists with an especially tight bond amongst the militant feminists. The women's movement fostered sisterhood. Feminists reached out to other women in situations where previously they had perceived one another as strangers (club meetings, parties). Women struck up conversations with one another without the benefit of formal introductions.

Feminists within these circles shared insights and self discoveries, and collaborated to raise consciousnesses, their own and their colleagues. For some, the women's movement had already stimulated a resocialization process (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

As experiences were examined critically from a feminist perspective, women began to redefine themselves as feminists who confronted sex discrimination. In small groups, women very deliberately reviewed the patterns of their daily lives. The women's new awareness sparked more spontaneous reviews of on-going interaction. Women changed their behavior to confront the limits imposed by expectations based on gender. Inside the campaigns, the feminists scrutinized the campaign and its personnel for sexist patterns, especially regarding language and differential treatment of women candidates.

The feminists in the campaign (15th AD) connected as they shared these revelations. Their solidarity was an additional boost to an already high morale in this campaign. In carrying out the daily business of the campaign they had an extra tie to one another which made the campaign mean more to them. Most of the campaign activists were single men and women in their twenties. Before the re-emergence of feminism, parties and meetings served the latent function of singles social events. With the feminist resurgence, women sought one another out for conversation at fundraisers and meetings. The women's interest in one another reduced the amount of male-female flirtation, which shifted the ambiance of these gatherings.

Friendship circles developed within the several reform districts particularly amongst the campaign staff who had spent a great deal of time together. The Reform conventions placed these activists, from the several Reform clubs in contact with one another at its county and state meetings. The several sets of feminists from Reform clubs (25th, 15th, 11th, 13th) also had their ties strengthened by the CWPC.

These men and women formed social sets to maintain bonds developed during the campaign. In the 11th assembly district the set included a group of Jewish married couples, in their early thirties, who participated in politics as couples. In both the 25th and the 15th districts most campaign activists were single. In the 15th, the two staff who were married had spouses who were not involved in campaign activities. Most of these activists were in their twenties.

Activists kept in contact with one another as the political circles became friendship circles. Both the men and the women found that their closest same sex friends were drawn from the several sets of political activists. These ties were reinforced because the activists were recruited from the neighborhood. They shared its facilities: schools, laundromats, movies, restaurants, and bars as well as the civic and political groups.

The several sets of women friends formed from these political circles discussed their personal and political interests as they re-evaluated them from a feminist perspective. They discussed MS magazine articles as its first issues were published. The network's beginnings were in both the friendship and ideological bonds of the feminist activists. Those who remained active in Democratic Party circles maintained the friendships rooted in political activity. Other activists who drifted away from political involvement developed or maintained other friendship circles.

These feminists helped one another deal with the institutionalized sexism they were discovering in party and governmental circles. During this early stage in the network's development, these feminists had few political resources to exchange besides mutual support, contacts, and information. The dominant theme of the support which they exchanged was coping with sexual harrassment, marginality, or visibility. Feminists were helping one another deal with sexism, as individual actors. While they were aware of the politics involved, they were naive about how pervasive and persistent the Party's sexism was. They expected that the sexism they experienced would fade as women were no longer exceptional in leadership positions. The sexism was viewed as an educational problem, men had to get used to having women around in all political circles. They did not realize that the sexism itself was a deterrent to recruits and maintained them as peripheral Party actors.

Informally the CWPC was a morale boost to those participating in male dominated party circles. Here the feminist Deomcrats could complain about the more subtle forms of sexism they uncovered in the Party's routines.

On a personal level, Foley and her circle of supporters were extremely uncomfortable with the sexist patterns within the 15th AD Regular club. The women in her circle spoke several times each week in both suporting one another and planning their strategy. They were unable to get the full support of the men from their circle which contributed to their isolation.

This atmosphere facilitated the feminists increasingly preferring County wide ties to one another over participation at the club level. Many dropped away from the club politics and selectively chose campaigns they considered worth doing.

The 11th AD's leadership was predominantly couples. The men and women shared feminist commitments which made it more comfortable for women activists. When this club alligned itself with the Regulars, the assemblyman was dominant. His more liberal stance was shared by most club members. The club absorbed, or rather the Reformers dominated the more chauvinist Regular faction.

Before the county wide race for the ERA (November, 1975), these feminists were indirectly linked to one another through their clubs, their elected officials, the CWPC, and overlapping friendship and political ties. As the elected feminists drew upon their networks for the ERA, its volunteers had more direct communication with one another, which produced additional bonds among feminists.

ERA Campaign

In New York State, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was a referendum in November 1975. The County Democratic Party endorsed its passage, but neither Reform nor Regular faction worked on it. Most of the Regular district leaders were lukewarm at best. The Reform clubs philosophically supported it but were already jockeying around the presidential nominations process.

The county's ERA elections campaign was carried by this feminist network and limited to the resources it could muster. The Reform

clubs (the 25th AD: Boles and the 13th AD: James) and two Regular clubs (15th AD: Foley and the 11th AD) worked for the ERA along with several clubs in Black districts. All of these clubs had feminists active in their leadership.

James, Foley, and Boles had additional responsibilities in the county's ERA campaign. Boles was on the state elections committee. She spoke for the amendment's passage around the city. Foley and James, as district leaders, pressed the County Leader and other leaders to support the ERA in their districts.

Foley drew her women friends into the County race and asked one of her male colleagues for a statistical analysis. She left the other male colleagues to work within the district for the whole slate. Few men worked in the borough wide race for ERA in spite of their verbal support. Male colleagues who openly emphathized with the feminists and agreed that the CDP was remiss, did not believe it was their fight. Essentially, even men supporting the amendment limited their role to cheerleading, offering women only encouragement not their labor, their financial support, or their access to other political resources.

Although the League of Women Voters was formally non-partisan, the two county ERA coordinators were League members, and they recruited other League members to the campaign. Their presence, symbolized the perception of ERA as a non-controversial, non-partisan issue. The Democratic Party professionals knew better the pulse of the borough.

During the Fall of 1975, the County Women's Political Caucus had not been operating. The borough coordinators recruited volunteers

for ERA by using the mailing lists of the CWPC, the National Organization for Women (NOW), the networks of elected feminists, and assorted other women's groups.

Feminists co-operated across factional lines to support the ERA referendum. The absence of the Democratic County's support drew the feminists together with an increased awareness of their marginality. This shift in consciousness marked a turning point within this network of Democratic feminists.

Process

Between 1972 and November, 1975, the feminists encountered sexual harrassment and invisibility of their political work within Party circles. These experiences occurred in personal inter-action with other Party activists. It was annoying but perceived as trivial, comparable to the hazing of newcomers. The feminists believed these patterns would be temporary.

While the focus on "invisibility" and "harrassment" as gatekeeping devices is examined later in this work, a few examples here will illustrate the linkages between these mechanisms.

> The County Leader visits an assembly club, during a campaign, and remarks that the breast sizes of the female leader and the campaign manager are considerable assets to the club. He simultaneously discounts their political contribution and emphasizes their sexuality. There is an additional implication that their position of authority is more sympbolic than real.
>
> A male club member paws any unescorted women who come within reach. This behavior is ignored by the club's leadership and by male colleagues. What is the message to women who choose to be activists without the benefit of male protection?

> A graphics artist, who had recently separated from her spouse, offers to help in a campaign and is told that her sexual favors would sure boost the morale of male activists.

The feminists invisibility as political actors and high visibility as females, often operated as two sides of a coin. For feminists the ERA campaign and their post-mortem analysis of it, highlighted the links between their personal experience and the Party's systematic exclusion of them and their interests.

As most county clubs failed to support the ERA, these feminists realized how peripheral their interests were to the Democratic organization. The feminists linked the personal harrassment they experienced to the Party's decisive failure to use its machinery for the ERA referendum. Feminists active in Democratic cirices found their Party loyalty markedly reduced, perceiving themselves as adversaries of the party's leadership. Although these women began to distance themselves from the Party, the advantages gained from their Democratic Party participation was an asset in developing the network's resources.

As formal organizations which met monthly, and mailed its newsletters and agendas, the clubs provided a base which other Democratic officials took seriously. The club was a vehicle of communication, including the rumors of who was retiring or how district lines were to be changed. This kind of data helped the feminists in planning their political careers. Initially the feminists did use the club's apparatus and expertise to support modest feminist goals. Their

early goals, representation at conventions, inclusion in party platforms, as symbolic recognition of their presence, were more attainable than sharing power. Still, the feminists with elections' expertise learned the mechanics through their participation in their clubs. As club activists they had in contact with the networks of various Democratic candidates. The feminists were included in this process particularly within segments of the Reform circles.

These Democratic feminists had developed expertise, and contacts through their political work which suported their network. They remained attached to clubs which independently aided feminist causes while distancing themselves from most of the CDP.

In the post-mortem of the ERA campaign, feminists discussed the need for a caucus which could field an elections operation or lobby as the need arose. The core of supporters for the idea were those who were disappointed and critical of the CWPC's neutrality.

Four women from the ERA campaign met for dinner to explore the possibilities. Three had worked in several of the 15th AD campaigns together, one woman came from the ERA campaign.

In discussing the groups commitment, they split over Affirmative Action, two were adamant supporters, while two had reservations about it.

In the absence of a specific tasks they split ideologically. They all agreed that they wanted the Democratic Party accountable to

feminist goals. They expected caucus members to give priority to feminist rather than party loyalty. The problem was defining the feminism which would receive such support. They differed on strategy which reflected their class and ideological differences.

Foley and Pitt believed that jobs were crucial, and assumed that employment equality gave women the resources to solve other problems. They strongly supported Affirmative Action as a technique for removing job discrimination particularly in high paying union crafts. Whelan and Moore defined feminism more broadly. Their working class backgrounds made them less willing to oppose working class men and women who could be allies in seeking broader changes they considered essential to feminist goals. If feminism did not change the family and educational institutions, equality in employment would provide career opportunities for elite women with professional credentials. Even these women would then continue to face the problem of role conflict between job and family. If the only solution for them was to pay to replace themselves at home the status quo was reinforced.

They believed that working class men shared some of the liabilities experienced by women, and imposed by cultural values. (For example, self denigration, sub-cultural limits on ambition, group loyality vs. individual achievement through competition.) The major advantage working class men had over women was that their jobs were unionized and paid better. Pragmatically, they disapproved of a tactic which

was very unpopular and contradicted gains unions had struggled for (e.g., seniority). The meeting ended with these four agreeing to think more about their differences. In the interim, they considered reviving the old CWPC with a policy of endorsement.

This incident showed how class filtered one's definition of feminism and acceptable strategies for its achievement. Previously, the network succeeded because philosophical agreement did not have to be reached, apriori. Instead, both selective recruitment and self selection brought specific people into specific electoral or lobbying campaigns. While full agreement was impossible, in many cases it was unnecessary. The feminist issues which were being addressed within the party and legislative process (childcare, reproductive freedom) did have wide consensus.

The feminists agreed on short term goals and specific programs. Their problem was the one highlighted by O'Neill in Everyone WAS Brave (O'Neill, 1969). The focus on short term, pragmatic solutions to problems, precluded the feminists developing a long term strategy based on a theoretical understanding of the sources of their liabilities.

Still, this group of feminists remained committed to establishing a caucus. They believed they could work out their disagreements. Between 1976 and 1979 they operated loosely through the caucus. In 1979, they formed Feminists First.

Feminists First

The feminists who had experience in Democratic clubs valued the continuity which these organizations provided. They were very aware of continuity as a political resource in formally initiating a caucus (Feminists First). In January, 1979, they sought to provide a degree of structure and regularity with minimal organizational overhead.

Earlier, the network operated informally and only served those who had direct access to one of its circles or perhaps those once removed. The maximum benefit of its networking went to the small number of feminists in close contact to the elected feminists or leaders of voluntary groups. An individual within any one of these circles was frequently not aware of the resources available to other circles.

This network consisted of several circles of activists each linked to one of the elected feminists or one of the voluntary feminist groups. These several circles regularly collaborated on feminist issues. The interpersonal supports were more often exchanged within one of these circles. Leadership within the network varied with the issue being addressed.

The leaders within these several circles, elected officials, their staff, heads of voluntary groups, had contacts with one another. Having formal meetings was an attempt to expand the network's accessibility and allow for some long term planning.

As an informal operation, the network relied heavily on individual initiative, on a small group deliberately trying to share experience

and contacts. By organizing, they expected to expand their ranks, and increase their power to lobby and elect feminists and enhance their career networking for one another. By formalizing their group, these feminists wanted to provide a planning mechanism for the caucus.

Beginnings

The shift in the network's structure was carried out with a degree of secrecy and exclusivity.

In the beginning of the year, Foley, James and their close circle of supporters began to "talk up" the idea of an ongoing feminist caucus, among their colleagues.

The six feminists most involved in setting up the caucuses all had had elections experience. They met in twos and threes, and had telephone discussions, to decide how to get underway. They made decisions about procedures by consensus. One of the first decisions was whom to include.

Those approached were told that the criteria for inclusion was a willingness to give priority to feminist goals over attachment to either Democratic Party faction. The initiators of the group avoided defining the "feminist" commitment which had to be deferred to. Their earlier experience was that it provoked splits within the group in attempts to find philosophical agreement. These pragmatic feminists were conscious of how wasteful that was, since most of the specific issues which encouraged political participation were more easily agreed to. Additionally, formulating a platform drained the limited resources of the caucus, which could be better spent in practical action.

The first mailing list of the caucus included feminists who expressed interest when the initiators had informally discussed the idea of the caucus with friends or colleagues. They were recruited from campaigns, work, community groups, lobbying, and women's organizations. In effect, each of the initiators were including feminists from their own circles and asking these women to invite interested colleagues. Most on the list had face to face contact with one of the initiators.

The leaders chose not to advertise a public meeting but preferred to recruit within their personal networks. In part, they wanted a group within which they could speak freely, especially as they worked out their procedures. These feminists were aware that the caucus existence and its agenda conflicted with the CDP organization. For example, they planned to recruit and endorse feminist candidates to oppose recalcitrant incumbents. Those in this group who worked within CDP circles, wanted to avoid the risk of someone maliciously or indiscretely bringing tales of the caucus back to the County Leadership. They chose women whom they considered strong feminists, unlikely to compromise on feminist issues and sophisticated about the risks of political gossip. Those whose activism was outside county Democratic circles were welcome (feminist or community groups). Even if they were inexperienced or naive, without mixed contacts or loyalties, the risk was markedly diminished.

In two cases women were excluded because their ties to one or the other party faction was considered problematic. There was no clear sense of their feminist commitment, just that they were women active

in local politics. These feminists were more comfortable recruiting women whose feminist commitment was apparent either because they knew them well enough or because they had met them in some feminist political activity. The advantage recruiting those with a history of feminist political action was that these women were the most likely candidates for future activities.

Demography

This network which had specific political interests in common shared some demographic traits as well. Of the sixty six women invited to the caucus, just under 70 percent were between 28 and 42 years old. Of those for whom marital status was known (N56/85%) forty four percent were married, or living with men in stable relationships. In the single group, twelve percent had been married once while twenty-nine percent had never been married. This was a significant factor given the age groups with the most participation in the caucus. This network of feminists were more likely to be single or non-parents than their age peers in the larger society. Just under forty-four pefcent of this caucus had no children.

This list of network members supported the depiction of these women as age cohorts for whom the feminist movement, peaking when they were in their twenties, had major impact. Networks or social circles formed primarily as interest groups did not need homogenity to operate. Interests were expected to over-ride other differences. Yet this network was fairly homogenuous, even though it came together, primarily as a political interest group. No doubt, the homogenity

facilitated trust amongst the associates of the network. Their common interest as feminists emerged from some common political experiences and commitments, and the absence of those commitments in other political circles. Over one third of this group worked in government or in service programs dependent on government grants.

The group met irregularly, but continuously, which facilitated its lobbying efforts. Meetings served to remind these feminists to pursue political goals even through the off-season. James' presence in the legislature brought first hand news to the caucus. For those attending these gatherings, more of the network's activists had direct access to one another rather than remaining dependent on third party contacts.

Between 1976 and 1979, the feminists' collaboration made the inception of Feminists First possible (June 1979).

Mutual Support

In 1976, New York State held two primaries: one in April for presidential convention delegates and the other in September for legislative offices. James, the reform leader from the 13th AD decided to run for the assembly (September). Since Foley had already been re-elected leader of the 15th AD (April), she encouraged the feminists in her circle to help elect James to the assembly. Bryce, a man from Foley's circle who had helped in the ERA effort, offered to work for Boles, whose safe senate seat had been redrawn, and she now expected a tough Primary.

Whelan and Moore went into the James race, as consultants, the first week of August. They pressed the campaign staff to set up a canvassing and pulling operation, and advised the campaign on literature, scheduling and primary day operations. Since both Whelan and Foley had patronage jobs through the 15th AD Regular club, their role in the 13th AD Reform race had to be kept secret.

Whelan and Moore's work in other campaigns provided electoral expertise and access to other political resources. These two feminists had worked almost every Primary and Election Day since 1972. Frequently they supervised Election Day operations as a favor to male colleagues who simultaneously managed several campaigns. In exchange, these colleagues shared their political resources. These reciprocal favors were quite commonly the foundation of political bonds.

From her contacts in the Presidential Primary (April, 1976) Whelan borrowed an up to date Prime Voters List for James' assembly district, normally a considerable expense to any campaign. Another male colleague, Bryce, contributed both his statistical and strategic advice. He was available to Whelan and Moore out of friendship and colleagiality.

Unfortunately, the feminists failed to re-direct the campaign from literature distribution to canvassing and James lost by a narrow margin. The network's operation remained significant. Feminists again gave priority to other feminists, at some risk, across factional lines.

In 1978, Moore managed James' successful bid for the assembly and expanded her base in the 13th AD. Moore gave more responsibility to volunteers who had only been peripheral participants in earlier campaigns. She also recruited the most active volunteers from the county-wide races the year before. In those three 1977 races, she or James had had staff responsibilities which made volunteer lists accessible to them. Those who were supportive but lived too far from James's district to use in the field campaign were asked to contribute money and work Primary Day. One of the network's feminists had been a long time supporter of James, a member of her 13th AD club, and active in the National Organization for Women's Political and Legal Committee. She pressed the committee and expedited James' endorsement. An early endorsement gave the campaign access to the NOW membership list within the district, and enabled the campaign to print the endorsement in its literature.

Again, Moore's contacts provided an updated version of the Prime Voters' List, free. Both Moore and James had contacts within the Regular organization from which they received information relevent to her race.

County-wide Races

The groundwork for these feminists' participation in the 1977 Primaries was initiated at the end of 1976. All through the Fall of 1976, the resurrection of the County Women's Political Caucus was discussed.

The ERA campaign activists had re-convened the caucus and were determined to participate in the upcoming Democratic Primaries. Practically, they recognized how much an elections campaign would expand their contacts within the borough.

In January, political feminists met to re-establish the County Women's Political Caucus but with an explicit commitment to endorsing feminists. Those who had supported the CWPC's neutrality had either dropped out of politics or had changed their view after the ERA referendum.

Foley wrote a statement of purpose which committed the caucus to feminist, rather than women candidates.[6] She encouraged endorsing male candidates with feminist credentials, as a mechanism for maximizing the caucus' leverage. Several women at the meeting were mistrustful of male candidates lending lip service and little else to women's causes. Several leading feminists were exploring running in the upcoming city-wide races which sparked the enthusiasm of those at the meeting.

Additionally, they discussed the desirability of affiliating with the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC). They did not share the National's non-partisan view (including both Republican and Democratic Members) nor relish paying dues to the national organization, which seemed steep. A practical issue was whether any county caucus was already operating.

A rumor was circulating that Bellamy had held off announcing until Abzug made a decision. Finally, Bellamy's advisers convinced her that Abzug did not have a problem of name recognition, but that she did, and could not afford to wait.

When the CWPC met in February, Bellamy, the state senator, had already announced for the city council presidency and Abzug was waiting for a draft for the mayorality. Some feminists at the meeting had already attended a fundraiser for Bellamy. Initially, the debate centered on which of these two candidates to support with work as well as an endorsement. The focus was on the merits to women with the respective positions being sought. The candidates were both considered highly qualified. Presumably, two women, even running for different offices, pulled away from one another, implying that only a limited amount of money or volunteers was available for women candidates.

James challenged the assumption. They were not direct competitors. No one considered an all male slate imbalanced. She suggested endorsing both and caucus members could select which race they preferred to work in, or work both together. Since Abzug was still undeclared, they might as well begin working for the city council presidency. James had committed herself to Abzug, but expected to work hard for both candidates in her home district. The caucus members began working for Bellamy (field notes 2/77).

Most of the feminist caucus was involed in Bellamy's race because she announced first, and had fewer financial resources. She was more dependent on voluntary support. Unfortunately, in spite of James' warning, Abzug's strategists wrote off the county because it was the incumbents strength.

In the 1977 Primaries, James and Moore became county coordinators in the mayoralty and city council president's campaigns, respectively.

In the Reform New Democratic Coalition (NDC) one needed a sixty percent majority to be endorsed. Moore was responsible for lining up Reform votes for Bellamy for the Reform caucus while James did the same for Abzug. Abzug was favored by Reformers while Bellamy was perceived a dark horse (three of the four candidates in her race had Reform credentials). Bella got the margin. James was especially skilled at sliding votes for Bellamy, from Abzug delegates who had no preference in the city council race, or whose candidate had dropped out in the early votes. James had an excellent reputation as a Reformer, and was adept at this kind of politics. Bellamy just fell short of the .60 (getting 59), but left the NDC convention having established her credibility.

The feminists in this county succeeded in denying liberal-reform attempts to cast the female candidates, for different positions, as competitors.

In this county, the friendly cooperation between Moore and James, as borough coordinators, blocked the divisive splits between the two women candidates occurring in other Democratic circles. Neither used that negative pitch in appealing to NDC delegates, or subsequently in their campaigns. James helped Bellamy in Reform circles where Moore's friendship and political links to Foley, the Regular were a liability. The Reformers from Foley's district (15th AD), who themselves had patronage from the incumbent city council president, lobbied against Bellamy due to her "Regular ties." They failed to mention that their own patronage was at stake. (Bellamy's Regular ties was her remaining neutral when Foley was opposed by a Reformer, and her collaboration with Foley on a number of feminist issues.)

When Bellamy's 25th AD club tried to block Abzug's renting a headquarters in the area, Moore established that this was not initiated by the campaign, but got the central campaign to stop the Reform club. Bellamy strategists understood that they might get votes from some who would not vote for Abzug, and then, feeling guilty would vote for the "other woman." However, they refused to exploit this strategically.

Resources

The borough wide Bellamy race highlighted the network's ability to use its expanded resources, to support a feminist candidacy.[7] In this vein, one Reformer who ran successfully for judge in the 1977 Primaries, received some help as her volunteers and Bellamy's carried palm cards for both candidates.

The county's effort for Bellamy drew heavily on the network. The same clubs supported Bellamy as had supported the ERA with one addition. The only exception was Foley's regular club because the male leader insisted on supporting the incumbent. Foley's persistence forced the club to allow captain's choice, making palm cards available for both city council candidates. While several other Reform clubs had endorsed Bellamy in the borough, their elections operation was either unreallable or non-existent. Moore relied on volunteers recruited directly for Bellamy, those from CWPC, and her own political circles. In the run-off Primary, the same few clubs worked even though their local candidates were no longer running.

The 11th AD shared their headquarters, including phones, with the borough campaign and supplied a member's home for election day. Foley was managing a well financed borough race and managed to coordinate her candidates' interest in the borough with Bellamy's to some degree. Whelan's contacts with the borough's Board of Elections, facilitated Moore getting any information and materials, she needed.

For the November election, James managed the campaign of the Liberal Party candidate for city council at large. The candidate was gay, which was public knowledge. Moore helped James out on election day and recruited some of the borough's Bellamy volunteers to help the council at large candidate. For the feminists, it was a principled race to support. The candidate was clearly more qualified than any of his opponents, but his sexual preferance was a liability. Moore and James' role in the campaign for a gay candidate also widened the network and was a step towards forming coalitions to replace the attachment once supplied through Regular and Reform clubs.

At this point the most active members of this feminist network were those whose major political involvement had been campaigns. The strength of the "right to life" lobbyists both disturbed them and showed that electoral campaigns, by themselves, were inadequate safeguards to reproductive freedom. These feminists sought to affiliate with lobbying groups, particularly pro-choice groups, to increase their impact and remain continuously active as a caucus. They were concerned about the seasonality of campaigns, especially as they reduced their activity in Democratic clubs. They knew that the Party and professional operatives kept in touch with their campaign staff through socials

and fundraisers. The anti-feminist backlash provided more political work than the network could respond to. They did not need an artificial device to maintain their political activity.

Whelan's new job /local ombudsman (sic)/put her in touch with most city agencies. Among these contacts was Kelly who was active in a pro-choice lobby, Committee for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse (CARASA). As they got acquainted in their working relationship they established that they were both political feminists. They both recognized that Whelan's "insider" information could be useful in CARASA's lobbying. In January 1978, Whelan, James, Moore, Kelly, Foley, and Carey met to discuss how to preserve medicaid funding for abortion. Kelly had lists of state legislators who had not supported medicaid funding. Most of CARASA's membership was committed to not engaging in partisan politics. However, they had no difficulty collaborating with Party activists to support CARASA's lobbying. As the women reviewed the recalcitrant legislators, the support became obvious. The Democratic Party activists categorized the legislators to target their lobbying pressure. For example, legislators for whom abortion was a matter of conscience, those for whom constituent pressure was significant, those whom the feminists or male colleagues, had personal contact and influence. Tactically, this group set up a telephone chain which could be activated immediately.

Since CARASA's activists already monitored the legislature, Kelly took responsibility for alerting these feminists, when the medicaid issues were brought to the floor.

When medicaid funding was threatened in the Spring of 1978, Moore was managing James' assembly race. The feminists with Democratic Party contacts pressed them. James' opponent was one of the recalcitrant. Moore had James' supporters from the district call the assemblyman's office to lobby for medicaid funding. For the first time, he voted pro-choice.

After their meeting in January 1978, Kelly kept in contact with Moore to periodically alert these Democratic Feminists of encroachments on abortion rights. However, Kelly sought other types of advice as well. The Assembly Leader who had been strongly pro-choice faced a tough primary. He solicited the help of pro-choice lobbyists, including CARASA. CARASA's members had qualms about participanting in party politics. Kelly wanted to check out how they could maintain good relations if the Leader was returned to the Assembly, with the minimum of direct involvement.

Moore supplied the insiders' information. The Leader's record was good and somewhat more to the Left than his opposition. If he were defeated, his successor was just as strongly committed to pro-choice and perhaps slightly better on most women's issues. If CARASA chose to have individuals help in the campaign, they should do so as visibly as possible. Moore suggested they offer to phone their own members and perhaps other pro-choice voters in the incumbent Leader's district. They could phone from the campaign or elsewhere, or promise to do so. Whether they actually did or not probably could not be determined. Moore's advice was purely on how to remain in the good graces of the Leader, if he were re-elected. Significantly, Moore had learned from

her party work how to separate substantive support from its appearance. Essentially Moore was sanctioning Kelly exploiting the Party connection without having to deliver anything. A shift was occuring within which the feminists accepted two codes of behavior, one for outsiders and one for insiders. Moore would have been highly critical of James being treated in that way.

Still, the Network's resources were increased through the occupational mobility of its members and because they had access to additional resources through male colleagues who were sympathetic or who "owed" them.

Between 1975 and the spring of 1977, Whelan worked for an agency responsible for delivering city services. In the Spring she was promoted, appointed to a similar position. She had more responsibility and more salary. Her new position placed her in contact with a broader city network and on a higher level within its hierarchy. An unanticipated consequence of both Whelan's and Foley's jobs was the other feminists, city and state wide, with whom they established working relationships.

Personal

The network's participants supported one another as individuals as complimentary to their collegial political roles.

Foley and Whelan had become close friends in part as a consequence of their long political discussions of the liabilities for women inherent in the 15th AD regular club. Whelan babysat for Foley's child so she could attend club or community meetings associated with

her leadership position. Whelan was the most frequent supporter but the other women in Foley's circle did not differentiate between personal and political help. Babysitting was as much political support as was leafletting or attending meetings. The men in her circle restricted their aid to operating within the political or community arena in her behalf. Significantly, the men were unaware of the services which the women performed behind the scenes and which facilitated the woman officials functioning. Single women in this feminist network relied on one another for services often performed by spouses or parents. In some cases the friend who was adviser was perceived as having dropped out of politics.[8]

In another incident, Whelan met a woman whose son was active in the Democtatic club. Mrs. Giles had just begun college and was a political science major who needed an internship with an elected official. Her Professor recommended her to Assemblymember Flynn. In conversations, Whelan recognized that Giles had feminist leanings. Whelan suggested she might prefer Boles' office, especially since Flynn's colleagues saw him as idealistic but unproductive. An internship with a lackluster legislator, something of an outsider, could be dull and the least informative.

Whelan and Foley used contacts to put Giles in Boles' office. Giles had to push her teacher to get the Boles placement accepted, since he was a friend of Flynn's. The women running Boles' office had no difficulty using women in non-traditional positions which broadened Giles' experience. As part of her assignment she performed a wide variety of tasks. Giles later helped in Boles' county campaign after her assignment had ended.

In a similar vein, a feminist working as an economic developer found that her professional and city government circles overlapped. Most development plans required approval by city agencies. A political contact, which this planner had made through a third person, through her community work, orally guaranteed the approval and thereby expedited the process. Once accomplished, the woman found that her boss did not credit her with the achievement. She was not invited to participate in subsequent project meetings which her contact had made possible. Effectively, she was cut out of the project.

Over drinks with another feminist, who had been the third party liaison she complained about the turn of events. In conversation, they realized that if she had the power to open doors, she had the power to close them. After the liaison had informed the city representative, she was less than cooperative until the feminist planner was back, visibly, on the project. The representative asked to work with her since they had already established rapport.

In this incident, the woman recognized that her boss had not deliberately excluded her. Rather, in spite of her professional status a female assistant easily slipped into the stereotypical secretary slot. Women had to consciously resist the existing pattern, to operate as professionals.

Within both examples of network exchanges these feminists demonstrated their capacity to be pragmatic and tough. The planner's experience showed the network's usefulness in government circles had begun to include career women with only friendship ties to the political party activists. Their broad conception of political issues

enabled the feminists to approach businesswomen who faced comparable gatekeeping mechanisms. These contacts with businesswomen was a step towards this feminist network resembling male political circles where businessmen were regularly included as a fundraising source. The businessmen well understood how political ties aided their business.

These feminists reviewed their personal lives in ways similar to their examination of paid employment. Both before and after her successful assembly race Moore and James discussed how James could negotiate her family and political obligations. James was ambivalent about expecting her spouse and children to do more household tasks. They considered the principals at stake as well as very practical techniques to reduce the pressure on her.

Frequently, the several friendship circles within this network discussed in twos or threes, the difficulties feminists encountered around romantic relationships and family. The single women began to use the group to consider the possibilities of their maintaining career activity, even as parents, and as single parents.

CONCLUSIONS:

The development and operation of the Feminist Network had contradictory effects on its participants in this County Democratic Party. It called attention to, and politicized the differential threatment of women in the Party. The Network supported feminists,

heightened their awareness of discriminatory patterns and enabled them to confront and withstand the Party's gender tracking. It also increased their discomfort with CDP patterns and eventually led to their withdrawal from sectors of the Party. The alternative political association, the Network, made this a feasible strategy.

The Network drew the feminists into closer cooperation and facilitated the loosening of their ties to recalcitrant Party clubs. Just as the feminists distinguished between feminist and non-feminist women as part of their political education and growth, they also differentiated between other Party activists. They became increasingly careful and pragmatic in their choices of allies and in making coalitions. These developments support findings from other research which indicates that amateur political orientations decline with length of participation in party politics (Wilson, 1962). My findings indicate that level of participation may be even more significant than previously believed.

The absence of substantive support for women's issues or careers by the CDP or even sympathetic male colleagues constituted a major difficulty feminists had working within organizations where their interests were defined separately. How can feminists work with men who are uncomfortable at having gender tracking raised as an issue? Some used humor to make their point, but lightly.

Again, the more the feminists are perceived and threated as peripheral participants, the more distant and exclusionary they themselves become. It is more comfortable for them, as it is for others, to work with those who share their worldview. This con-

tinuous negotiation of two different social worlds is tiring and reduces efficiency. However, it may be a strategical error for feminists to allow this isolation, which is equivalent to their collaborating to define their concerns as "other."

Strategy

The fact that the feminists easily collaborated on short term specific goals but could not agree on longer range, broader goals indicates how fragile network ties can be. Such ties depend on the selective participation of associates which varies from issue to issue. For these Network participants, feminist commitments did not erase the influence of class, ethnic or other social traits which influence political decision-making.

The fact that they had difficulty reaching agreement on abstract goals underscores the dilemma of the nineteenth century feminists as posed by O'Neill (1969). It represents a major barrier to the development and implementation of effective strategy and tactics. Thus existing structural patterns as well as a lack of structural supports for women strengthen male exclusionary mechanisms.

Marginality

The Network emerged out of feminists' need for support within the CDP if they were to remain active. As did the women's organizations of the early seventies, they came together along county lines. The discomfort they experienced was a consequence of their marginality in the CDP. It seems unlikely that as individuals they could have re-

mained both feminists and Democrats in that setting. Pressure to succumb to the party's socialization would have made the conflicting statuses extremely uncomfortable for them as individuals. The Network provided a feminist support group for these activists which facilitated their remaining active in the CDP. In addition, as a group they collaborated to redefine "female Democrat," thus creating a new social reality in the interactive process. Women who still found the CDP circles too unpalatable, and left them, could continue their political work through the Network. This strengthened the political base of those still in the Party.

These feminist Democrats were involved with a variety of women's organizations and caucuses as well as with Democratic campaigns. Through these groups they were drawn into city and state networks of feminists in government. Their job mobility, as candidates or staff members of candidates, further enhanced their contacts within Democratic and government circles. The discomfort they experienced in local clubs and campaigns encouraged them to make alternative ties to more progressive segments of the Democratic Party. Ironically the very recalcitrance and parochialism of the district clubs and specific segments of its leadership encouraged the feminists up and out. Those interested in building political careers as candidates or operatives increasingly saw that their work and issue commitments were best served by supporting candidates with feminist leanings or commitments. Once elected, these officials could and did provide access to the CDP's resources. Significantly, in spite of very

explicit gender tracking, political women have alternate mobility routes available to them which are less available to women building careers in business. The decline of the Party system, its factionalism, and the tendency for elected officials to recruit their own "teams," multiplied these opportunities.

Demography

Feminists active in this Network are atypical, both of women in their age group, and most especially of women active in County Democratic clubs. They are disporportionately single and childless in comparison to women in their age cohort in the society generally. These factors, and the fact that they are younger than other women in the Regular clubs, contributed to their marginality. Their demographic profile is similar to that of women in the setting of Reform clubs, which drew a higher proportion of younger, educated, professional women, who are also more likely to be single and childless.

The Regular Party leaders were uncomfortable with Reformers, and even more so with the feminists. These men expected women over twenty-one to be married, and not to be interested in politics. The feminists' interest in political leadership was problematic for the male leadership.

Although studies show that single persons have more time for political activity, these feminists' willingness to spend time on politics did not make them more welcome in the Regular Party clubs. The Reformers wanted women workers around, preferably in a supportive role, as a labor source, without policy making power.

Clubs and Campaigns as Apprenticeship

As critical as the Network members became of the CDP, their activity inside these circles was essential to their development as professional politicians. As volunteers, they learned the organizational skills required in campaigns and political circles generally -- or realized they already had these skills.

As insiders in clubs, campaign and government networks, they learned what resources the Party actually controlled. Their disappointment over the ERA came because they knew what the Party leadership chose to withhold. Also, in Party circles, they had received information generally useful to their own careers and those of colleagues.

The pressure they exerted and the explicit criticism they made regarding the treatment of women in the Party, did increase access to Party positions by women. The feminists found that some male Democratic colleagues supported them. Some began to notice women's differential treatment once it was raised. This more positive response tended to come from the rank and file who responded both to their interaction with the feminists and the effects of the women's movement in the society generally. Some older women as well were very supportive of younger women's candidacies or club leadership.

Although the Network broadened its political base, and was less in need of Party clubs for access, these club and campaign circles provided a starting place for the feminists. This was where they learned how deeply they were interested in politics. Their contacts with supportive elements at both county and higher levels contributed significantly to their access to some party resources.

Leadership

The Network's leadership did vary with the issues addressed. The feminist Democrats most closely associated with elected feminists usually had the most influence. The feminists with campaign experience initiated activity and had access to information which precipitated activity. To the degree that they saw their feminist and career interest fostered by the Network, they had more incentive to invest time and effort. They also used the Network more. The CDP organization, including the offices of elected officials, clubs and campaigns, provided an organizational base which met more regularly than women's or feminists' voluntary groups. Feminists who persued political careers as candidates or appointees, found that their social bonds reinforced these political links. The most active in party circles, found more and more of their social contacts were political links.

CHAPTER FOUR

DIVISION OF LABOR BY GENDER

Almost all modern organizations segment their labor force by gender, allocating assignments to men and women differentially (Oppenheimer, 1970; Kessler-Harris, 1973). The gender stereotypes concerning which types of work are appropriate for men and women often takes precedence over skills and training. Women with college degrees are routinely tracked into secretarial slots while their male counterparts enter training as junior executives.

Beliefs about appropriateness of tasks thwarts women's attempts to work in other capacities. Those rare women who hold positions commonly held by men have difficulty performing the tasks associated with the job because they are treated as "marginal men" (sic) (Stonequist, 1937; Githens and Prestage, 1977). People, especially men, respond to women's ascribed status, sex, rather than their official positions in the organizational hierarchy. Expectations based on gender stereotypes limit the performance of women.

> "People who have authority without system power are powerless." (Kanter, 1977, p. 186).
>
> "The problem with women was that, first, there were doubts about how far they could go in the corporation, and second, a widespread belief that women could only be individual 'movers' i.e. even if they moved, they could not take anyone else with them." (Kanter, 1977, p. 200).

Kanter's analysis of the structural limits on women's mobility in corporations frequently constrains their political party participation, too. Women who are public or party officials cannot rely on the party's resources to back them up. As a result, women in authority must do more to get compliance, often in "stereotypically feminine ways." That is, she must either play the shrew or the charmer (Kanter, 1977). Kanter rightfully calls attention to these roles being determined by access to organizational power. As supervisors, women are disproportionately found in positions without power which reaffirms negative stereotypes about women as bosses.

On another level, stereotypes indicate that women work for love and praise, not for money and power (Kanter, 1977, p. 86-86). This makes the acquisition of substantive rewards more difficult for women. Their demands for power or financial rewards are met with more praise and appreciation, which is thought to be what they "really" want. In the political literature, women's party activity is presumed to be motivated by love of party (Costantini and Craik, 1977, p. 237) or public service (Kirkpatrick, 1974) and women are thought to be content with symbolic rewards (Jennings and Thomas, 1968, p. 491).

Gender is a pervasive, though not exclusive, determinant of the division of labor in American culture. It is not surprising, then, that this division of labor is replicated in political party organizations. The general turmoil over what roles women should play, have played or will play, is repeated in the County Democratic Party. In this chapter, the consequences for women of gender assignments in these county clubs and campaigns will be described and analyzed.

The CDP's sexual division of labor is supported by the persistence of patriarchy, which shapes the segmentation of the paid labor force and is in turn replicated in the division of labor and power within the party organization. These supports are mutually reinforcing, limiting the political participation of both elite and grassroots women activists.

In this County Democratic Party, most women are confined to the lowest levels of the organization. As Party leaders, women find their authority challenged and their performances misinterpreted. Gender filters their colleagues' perceptions of women's party activities.

Women's experience within this CDP indicates that gatekeeping mechanisms are more deeply entrenched and more subtle than earlier analyses implied. The social science literature describes an open, merit system operating in both the paid labor force and in political parties. Presumably, women who follow the "rules of the game", securing credentials for example, will receive rewards similar to those received by male colleagues. Analysts appear to believe that bureaucratization assures the neutrality of the system.

Unfortunately, patriarchy inhibits the possibility that the behavior of men and women will be similar and even precludes recognition of behavior which is in fact identical.

As Party organizations increasingly adopt bureaucratic principles, women activists are routed in similar ways. Women's clerical skills and their presumed tolerance for repetitive, dull work tracks them into the lowest positions in party clubs and campaigns. The fact that they are "good with people" causes women to be assigned to grassroots contact with voters while the same talent in men results in their being placed in supervisory and public relations work. Thus the same skills are differentially perceived in female activists and are differentially evaluated and rewarded.

Women's opportunities vary with the kinds of political organizations in which they participate: Reform or Regular clubs or campaigns. The size and financial health of the campaign is a factor in opportunity. Still, certain patterns persist which, in varying degrees, structure the participation of women activists.

A major part of women's party activity is confined to elections. In campaigns women are recruited to the grassroots volunteer force, after the hierarchy is established. Gruberg (1968) recognizes that because women enter campaigns late, and because they do not "take" responsibility, the

possibility of being rewarded is low. He implies that if women's political behavior mirrored that of men it would be rewarded. This research indicates that regardless of the amount of work women do in party organizations. they are not visible to the male leadership as potential career politicians. The ease with which women managers recruit women into campaign hierarchies undermines assumptions that women are either not interested in politics or are not sufficiently motivated to accept responsibility. Rather, it suggests that more women accept responsibility when it is offered than men imagine.

Even when the behavior of women and men is identical gender expectations act to intervene so that their behavior is perceived as different. These expectations act as a "gender filter" and operate for both men and women.

The issue of women's visibility inside party circles is a subtle one. Male leaders recognize "women's work" at least enough to assign women to these tasks, but fail to see those whose organizational skills or party commitment warrant sponsorship. Mobility is limited to the female district leader who sometimes serves as the crew chief for the larger group of women volunteers. In a comparable pattern, male executives do not see the potential of competent secretaries.

Organizationally the Party is not recruiting its best for sponsorship. Talented women in the Party are rarely recruited into elite circles just as women in the paid labor force work on the lowest organizational levels with fewer chances for recognition and mobility than their male colleagues. However, women's expectations are changing. As more women work both at home and in the paid labor force, volunteers are more scarce and expect more for their voluntary work.

In this County Democratic Party, clubs and campaigns varied in the extent to which they provided access to women participants. While almost

all party organizations depended on a large female labor force for election work, they varied in their acceptance of women's presence within the clubhouse, physically, or within responsible positions within the club or campaign hierarchy. High risk campaigns, heavily dependent on volunteer labor, provided the most access to women.

The insurgencies of the early seventies drew women into elite Party circles as elected officials and campaign experts. Yet, in this County Democratic Party women's prospects either as leaders or as rank and file are dynamically linked. Both have difficulty receiving recognition for their work. Both find that as team members the contributions and skills of women are often overlooked or are credited to male colleagues.

Even when women activists are recognized as competent, they need to be very explicit about the rewards they expect in return for Party service. Women in elite positions in party organizations find that they must take extra steps to enforce their authority, especially in their relations with male subordinates.

Elite women had the most difficulty within CDP circles where their presence was "abnormal", such as within the County leadership, or the exclusively male clubs. Still, their presence as elected officials enhanced the access of women in the grassroots of these clubs. While the handful of elite women did open up recalcitrant sectors of the CDP to women, much of their own energy was absorbed raising consciousnesses within these circles, which limited their own mobility.

In party organizations which have successfully contained the participation of women activists, elite women face more sexual innuendo and harassment. This process heightens their visibility as females and undermines their roles as professional politicians. Sexual innuendo and sexual harassment are effective tactics against women competitors because

they often discourage the participation of other women and undermine the credibility of those who persist.

In contrast, clubs or campaign operations with women sprinkled throughout the organization provide opportunities for both elite and rank and file women. In these settings the most blatant forms of sexual innuendo and harassment are considerably reduced. The women in the leadership have a grassroots base which reaffirms them as professional politicians. For the rank and file, their political interest is taken seriously, and sponsorship to political careers is possible.

Below I will describe the sexual division of labor in this County Democratic Party within the County leadership, within Reform and Regular clubs and within campaigns.

COUNTY DEMOCRATIC PARTY HIERARCHY

Each of the two party factions described in this study was organized hierarchically, which meant that club leaders and elected officials were brought together at the county level. Within both Reform and Regular factions the leadership was overwhelmingly male. They differed in the degree to which women's participation was both welcome and rewarded. Women had far more access to the Reform leadership, provided that they selectively participated in those local clubs which rewarded them. Substantial differences existed amongst Reform clubs in terms of their recruitment and sponsorship of women into the leadership. In contrast, the Regular leadership reinforced a sexist division of labor on the county level. Regular women who were within the leadership circles of their clubs still had great difficulty getting their status recognized by the county leadership.

REGULAR COUNTY LEADERSHIP

When women were enfranchised, the New York State Democratic Party chose to pair party positions so that a man and a woman held each office. Consequently, women's chances for power declined as they were limited to symbolic partnership. Women inside the Party were recruited for adjunct positions, (co-leader, co-chair, co-coordinator) where only the form of equality was supported, not its substance (Gruberg, 1968, p. 62). The paired-positions became a co-optive measure in which women were recruited to the work of the Democratic Party but received minimal rewards. Generally, guaranteed proportional representation by age, gender, or ethnicity produce symbolic representation rather than real power (Denitch, 1977).

While Reformers gave priority to winning public office the Regulars considered the party office of the district leaders more important. The male district leader was the club's link to the county organization and its resources. Each club reflected the class and ethnicity of its constituency and membership but patterns supporting the dominance of the male district leader permeated the organization. Within the Regular clubs, the nuances accounted for by class and ethnic differences were not germane to the issue of women's participation.

The Regular faction, as I use the term, included those clubs and officials who were recognized by the County leader and had a cooperative relationship with him.

COUNTY LEADER

The County Leader is elected by the district leaders and tradition supports his serving for life or until retirement. He is usually a male district leader from one of the more powerful of the county's clubs.

The Incumbent County Leader used his power to sustain the patriarchal patterns of the organization. When he spoke of "his" leaders, he almost always meant the male district leaders. The possessive tense symbolized their relationship to him. Although consensus was sought, male leaders were expected to defer to "County" just as female "co-leaders" were expected to defer to their male counterparts. The titles linguistically confirmed the adjunct status of the women. Men were the "leaders" and women were the "co-leaders," only the feminists politicized the use of the term co-leader for women district leaders.

While party loyalty and tradition were significant social controls, the County Leader had enormous discretion in dispensing party rewards or disciplining recalcitrant clubs or officials. "County" punished some Democrats and ignored identical transgressions by others.

When "County" was displeased with a person, he refused that person's calls or attempts to see him. Again the language was revealing. "County" designated the person of the county leader or the County Party Organization. The Leader and the county organization were treated as synonymns.

When an elected official met with "County" s/he did not leave until s/he was officially dismissed. Respect and deference were patterned into his relations with district leaders and other county Democratic officials.

To maintain his eroding power base, "County" needed to negotiate with successful insurgents. When elected Reformers were approached, contact was made through third parties who acted as boundary personnel, between the two faction. Using mediators, the Leader was protected from the potential embarrassment of being turned down. "County" carefully avoided situations in which the limits of his power were apparent.

> One Reform leader routinely received messages from County but always through a third Party. The third party reported "He (meaning the County Leader) likes you, he really considers you his leader, (or candidate, or legislator, whichever was appropriate at the time). If you need anything, let him know." The message always ended with the opening that she should call the Leader and he would surely be 'in' for her call. (Interview, June, 1978)

The County Leader wanted his leaders to vote with him unanimously at state conventions to maximize his power negotiating with hopeful nominees. A leader who did not vote with "County" was expected to notify the County Leader to avoid his being embarrassed or surprised. He released leaders depending on how many votes a particular candidate or issue needed.

> One feminist leader reported the following. "When Maryann (Krupsak) spoke to our delegation, lots of people were impressed and wanted to go with her. In the discussion, County had already promised the slate to Cuomo to balance the ticket with an Italian. I said that if they were really interested in ticket balancing, they would go with Maryann, the only woman in a slate of four candidates. I was right, Maryann won and County missed an opportunity to back a winner." (Interview, 1974)

The Regular leaders from this county voted for Cuomo because they were unwilling to risk reprisals or the label of independence or disloyalty. The women were especially unwilling to vote independently of either their male leader or "County." Independence in female leaders was considered troublesome and reflected negatively on the male leader. While both men and women leaders obeyed "County," men, especially lawyers, were better rewarded for their compliance. In dispensing patronage men were placed in positions of authority while women were tracked into low paying clerical work. Lawyers were given positions as counsel to a government office or a share of the county's court patronage as an income supplement. Even within this highly authoritarian relationship between "County" and the male leaders, a standard of respect marked their interaction which was not present in "County's" dealings with female leaders.

Although district leaders had equal voting power at conventions, irrespective of gender women were not equals within their clubs or in their relations with the County Leader. The male leader was the undisputed head of the club. The County organization's power to dispense patronage, eliminate governmental red tape, or make nominations flowed from County through the male district leader. This role, that is his relationship with the County Leader, secured him the loyalty and labor of the club membership. Recognition by the County Leader was essential to the functioning of the male leader. "County" frequently continued to channel rewards through a male leader who was defeated in an election to maintain the presence of the Regular organization in the district. This policy was based on the hope of regaining the seat but was an area where the County Leader exercised considerable discretion.

Female leaders never received this support from County. An outline of County policies emphasizes the male and female district leaderships as two separate, unequal statuses, in spite of their formal equality within state party rules. Nomination procedures provide examples. Female leaders were not included in meetings to choose County nominees or discuss Party business. Usually when a larger seat was vacated the County Leader discussed the recruitment of a nominee with the male leaders whose districts overlapped the boundaries of the vacated seat. Traditionally, the male district leader controlled the nominations within his district for the assembly and for the leadership.

If a male leader had a good relationship with the female leader she was made aware of the meetings with the County Leader and sometimes invited. In that case she was kept informed to be a more efficient team player, which facilitated her role as assistant. Regular clubs recruited women who accepted this division of labor.

Access to information was critical to holding and exercising power. The inclusion of the female leader was not by right but by the willingness of her co-leader to draw her in. Even in that case she was not invited to all-male meetings, which included breakfasts, lunches or late night snacks at which the County Leader discussed party business with his leaders.

Significantly, the County Leader was more respectful of Reform female leaders whom he saw as independent politicians who had won an election in which they had campaigned as heavily as the men who were their "co-leaders." The Reform leader who made an alliance with the Regulars insisted on being included in the discussions involving nominations in her district (Interview, 1978).

Female leaders did not remain as unofficial leaders after a defeat at the polls. In fact, deposed male leaders held more power than re-elected female leaders. Female leaders, even those with long tenure had little or no input into the replacement of the male leader in their own district. The absence of support at the county level checked the female leaders who had seniority after the male leader retired or was promoted. Instead of the replacement being nominated at the club, County was free to step in and assume the right to nominate. In the absence of a male leader, County had more jurisdiction than the incumbent female leader, even within her district.

Female leaders had no control of a club's financial resources including the most mundane Election Day expense money. The importance of Election Day expense money was highlighted by a successful female Reform leader's experience.

> After a primary victory, Foley dropped by the County office to pick up the money for Election Day expenses supplied by the County Organization. Normally, insurgents were not included in the dispensing of Organization funds, but this club had a chance to unseat a Republican incumbent. When she arrived, the County Leader was not in the office. The woman responsible for the allocation of the funds to district leaders was reluctant to give the money to a woman. She called all over for permission to give the district's Election money

> to its female leader. The clerk, in the absence of her boss, was afraid to ignore custom, saying she would give Foley the money when she came back with the male leader. The Reformer, a feminist, created a fuss and refused to leave without the money. (Interview, 1972).

This incident demonstrated the Regular's practical definition of the leadership as two separate and unequal positions. Money was given to leaders, male, not co-leaders, female. The Reformer got the money but not without a fight. Since the County Organization had no great loyalty to the Reformers, it was even more significant that his status,(the male Reform leader) was protected. If County protected the status of its adversaries, what did it do for its allies?

Female leaders had little influence in dispensing patronage and what they had was exercised through the male leader. To receive a job through a specific club was to receive it through the club's male leader. Contracts successfully completed, or patronage dispensed, were credited to the male leader because the County Leader dealt with the club or recognized it through its male leadership. The paired leadership confirmed the status of the male leader and defined the female leader as his assistant.

Assignments In the Club: Male And Female Leaders

The inequality between the male and female district leaders was structured into the County Democratic Party (CDP) hierarchy. From the onset, male and female leaders were differentially recruited, assigned tasks, and rewarded.

Inside the Regular club, the responsibilities of the male and female district leaders were differentiated by gender. In Regular clubs, the male leader controlled the club's resources, namely, nominations, patronage, and service contracts. The female leader's assignments complimented those of the male leader, in which she did the detail work which came out

of the clubs commitments, and the work generated by organizational maintenance, (supplies, fundraising). Usually a small clique of the most active club members emerged as the leadership. The female leader was a member of this group while the male leader was its head.

The female leaders reqponsibilities included: fulfilling contracts and community services which constituents brought in; maintaining the club's office supplies and refreshments; campaigning and smoothing over conflicts between club activists and attending community meetings. Female leaders often took responsibility for refreshments for parties or for organizing formal dinners.

Both men and women were involved in the cleaning up of the club after such affairs. Women, including the leader, donned aprons and men rolled up shirtsleeves. The male leader, however, rarely engaged in such physical labor.

While both men and women performed many of the tasks cited, their performances were given different interpretations. Men did organizational maintenance and were considered loyal, commited Democrats, worthy of sponsorship. Women performing in a similar way were seen as typically providing assistance to the men with whom they worked. Their labor as "co-leader" was in fact comparable to the work and support expected from secretaries or wives.

Significantly, the political science literature portrays women as the builders of their own mobility traps because they confine themselves to "expressive tasks, housekeeping chores of the party, 'intra-party orientations'" (Constantini and Craik, 1977, p. 239). To describe this phenomena they use the analogy of the family where "dad" orients to instrumental tasks and "mom" towards expressive ones. Each is unaware that the

choices of conceptual schemes are themselves constructing the reality, rather than describing it. In this frame, the most powerful county and district leaders would be characterized as blocking their political mobility because of their intra-party focus!

Ironically, a feminist district leader who focused on Inter-Party matters, extending support to liberal candidates and issues, found her position in the club eroded. The club's workforce was less interested in a good community record than in the more tangible patronage possibilities coming through the County Organization. While she focused on issues and candidates, the male leader focused on party business which built up his image as the provider.

Successful teams of male-female leaders had a long association within which they both developed loyalty to one another and to the club. In those cases the women's power was limited to influence exercised through the male leader. Powerful women leaders were those who come from strong clubs, that is clubs with access to substantial patronage with a strong male leader. If these women influenced the strategy of the club or the dispensing of rewards, their ideas were attributed to the male leader. Then, women had influence if they were willing to forego recognition. Kanter found this pattern of choosing social invisibility common amongst older women executives who were negotiating their token status (Kanter, 1977, 0. 220-221).

Club members and the female leader were expected to defer to the male leader, even if he bolted from the county leadership. When two leaders disagreed on the endorsement of an issue or candidate, the male leader's preference was implemented by the club.

The male leader's power was confirmed by his control of patronage and influence on nominations. The rituals surrounding his performance as

leader stressed the patriarchal format of the organization, including its language. "Patronage" favors were supplied by the "father."

Twice a week he held office hours at the club. Here he heard, and, theoretically, solved the complaints and problems of constituents. The weakness of this system emerged from dispensing services to the rather limited constituency of the friends and relatives of club members. Long term incumbents served an ever-narrowing constituency. In these cases, commitment to the patriarchal style worked against meeting the needs of community organizations, which were of increased political significance.

The club provided a back office equipped with better furnishings, a phone and air conditioning in which the leader could interview constituents in private. The manifest function was to protect the privacy of the constituent (Merton, 1967, p. 117). However, the back room also provided the leader's clique a conference space beyong the eyes and ears of the membership, that is, a backstage (Goffman, 1959, p. 112). Typically, the complaints involved the expedition of government services, such as getting an invalid parent into a nursing home. The format implied that the personal contact with the male leader was essential to solving one's complaint. Even when the service sought was completely beyond the influence of the leader, this was rarely admitted. The constituent left believing that if the problem was not solved, the leader chose not to exercise influence. This pattern encouraged dependency on the patriarch, and exaggerated his power.

For example, district leaders could not longer relieve a person of jury duty. They could only postpone it, which the citizen can do for himself/herself by filling out a form. Typically, the leader did not inform the constituent but accepted the jury notice and filed for a postponement.

Complaints from individuals or community organizations were referred to as contracts, implying some exchange was expected. Contracts sought by businesses, a zoning variance for example, were most likely made outside the club. Female leaders were rarely trusted with information about contracts benefiting businesses because the expected return was often financial support for the club.

The favors which the club delivered through the network of political appointees were dependent on the follow-up work of club activists, but were credited to the male leader. Because of his role in supplying patronage jobs to club workers, the services they did for the club's constituents were perceived as the male leader's contracts. Some administrators only talked to district leaders, refusing to respond to underlings. Good form required subordinates to call in the leader's name.

The male leader's status was reinforced by the deference he received. Club members lined up to speak to him at the club and at social gatherings. Members formally greeted the leader (male) as you did the host at a house party, indicating his proprietary rights in the club. Activists competed to be included in the inner circle, symbolized by free access to the back room.

Both leaders were expected to appear at the club's office hours twice weekly, and to attend community meetings. Sometimes, they split the community meetings to increase the club's representation. The women sometimes found themselves assigned to organizations on the presumption of gender related interests, such as school boards, parents associations, or senior citizen organizations. Increasingly, the responsibility was shaped by the groups' ethnicity, class, or geographic location, with each leader attending the meetings where s/he was most effective.

PATRONAGE OF FEMALE LEADERS

The patronage seen as the exclusive domain of the female leader was the recruitment of Election Inspectors to work on resistration and supervise the polls for Election and Primary Days. A patronage base in harder times, these slots were increasingly difficult to fill. The increase in the numbers of working women made these jobs, which lasted only three to five days per year, less desirable than they had been formerly. This modest income once provided housewives with a supplement to their family's income, conveniently available before the holidays. Now it paid less than the minimum wage.[1] The Electicn Inspectors were part of the grassroots workforce, usually activated by the district captains. Customarily women, they were the spouses and neighbors of the captains. Their considerable turnover diminished their usefulness as a political base. Although the leader was responsible, she relied heavily on the captains to recommend and recruit Inspectors. The high turnover made filling the posts more difficult. The Regular club continued to treat the positions as patronage while the Inspectors perceived themselves as civil servants doing the party a favor.

The Inspectors with a long involvement with the club were the most likely to voluntarily help at the club or electioneer among their neighbors. Some took the positions as a favor to the leader, which reduced the hassle of recruitment.

Clearly the female leader's power was not enhanced by this ability to dispense patronage. Rather, she was assigned one of the headaches of Election Day.

REGULAR CLUBS: DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG GRASSROOTS PARTICIPANTS

Only a handful of the most active women attended the Regular club's monthly meetings.[2] Since almost all decision-making went on backstage,

by the leadership clique, the meeting served as a forum to make club or community announcements, and a social tie to maintain the club's organization in the off-season, between elections. A slightly better turnout was likely if a prospective candidate or a public official was invited as a guest speaker.

In addition to its monthly meetings, Regular clubs kept office hours two evenings a week when the male leader heard constituents' complaints. By their twice weekly attendence, club captains had the opportunity to show deference and loyalty. They also had a chance for informal socializing with their fellow captains, as well as a place to hang out, and perhaps play cards. Few women appeared at these informal sessions, preserving the club as something of a "male sanctuary." The women came when there was work to be done, such as getting out a mailing or decorating for a fundraiser. Since few captains were women, a mailing directed to captains produced mostly men at a meeting. The few women who were election district captains, were the widows or relatives of captains. When a huge work project was undertaken, however, these women were drawn in.

In spite of the availability of women members for these projects, their low visibility and their infrequent informal socializing, hurt them. Unless a project was going on which guaranteed the presence of a number of other women, women appeared uncomfortable at the club. Effusive flattery and more direct sexual harassment, more common on the slow nights at the club, reinforced the image of the club as an inappropriate place for women except under special circumstances. Thus, women were made to feel unwelcome at "normal" activities of the club, but were drawn in when a larger labor force was needed.

In the Regular clubs, loyalty was far more important than competence. The men who came out, once or twice weekly, when there was nothing to be

done, demonstrated their attachment to the club and loyalty to the male leader. When the club had rewards to offer, these men in regular attendence were more likely to know about them, as well as more likely to receive them.

Those women who worked as Elections Inspectors, or who worked on special projects, remained peripheral. Ironically, these organizational patterns discouraged the more competent activists. As more women worked outside the home, and fulfilled responsibilities for household and child-care, few could manage leisurely "hanging out" at Democratic clubs. Besides, activists had community groups competing for their volunteer time.

Significantly, leisurely "hanging out" at the club, in lieu of social activity, may have shown personal loyalty to the club or leader but cannot be interpreted as interest in politics.

In addition, the tendency for trust to be based on homogeniety continued to be a barrier to women, even if they were regular and frequent attenders of the club's functions. The same paths that provided mobility for men were not automatically viable alternatives for women.

Women were acceptable participants if their party work seemed motivated by party loyalty or support of men's careers. In this setting their activity had low visibility, since their competent performance as assistants was accepted but unnoticed as the initiation of a political career.

Women who sought sponsorship were highly visible and subject to punishment, including sexual harassment for expressing political interest deemed inappropriate. It was not just the presence of women, but their attempts to act politically which were limited.

> The women Reformers who participated in the Regular Club were subject to consistent sexual harassment so that only the most politically interested remained (Interviews, 1974-1976).

It is significant that the political literature assumes an open system and accounts for differential participation by women in terms of their psychology and role conflict rather than gatekeeping mechanisms (Jaquette, 1974; Carroll, 1979).

REGULAR ASSEMBLY DISTRICT CAMPAIGNS

Temporary, high risk campaign organizations provide the most opportunity for women seeking political careers. Far fewer opportunities exist in Regular assembly district campaigns in which the club structure, or the male leader, dominates the campaign operation. Hence, the description of these Regular campaigns is included with the description of the club's division of labor.

In this County, women had the least opportunity in clubs which still utilized the system of captains and Elections Inspectors. The Regular club shaped the campaign organization under the captain system. Each election district captain, typically male, worked with two election inspectors, typically female. This team supplied the grassroots work of the organization, such as collecting qualifying signatures to place candidates on the ballot. In exchange for this, the Elections Inspector had a patronage appointment of up to five days work per year, and the captain usually had a full-time patronage job and recognition at the club. Generally, accountability for the grassroots effort rested in the amounts of party work performed. Some captains signed the sheets, swearing that they had witnessed them. Besides being illegal, this practice made the inspectors' contribution invisible. The women recruited, usually the spouses or neighbors of the captain, collaborated in building his reputation at the club, since his job security was theoretically dependent on it. Usually a neighbor did it as a personal favor, since they had little interest in the club and its procedures. The process favored the recruitment of women not interested in party politics.

With declining patronage, the Regular club had difficulty replacing those who retired, died or moved. The children of Party activists had somewhat better credentials than their parents and were less in need of patronage. Consequently, one captain became responsible for three to five election districts in which elections were held in the same physical location. He became more dependent on the inspectors to help him cover this larger area, especially for petition signatures. The club often supplemented this labor shortage by hiring children to distribute literature and handbills in front of the polls. Some voters' loyalty was developed because of their children's employment. Since captains were given Election Day expense money, this was a nice supplement to those working five districts. (Election Day expense money ranged from twenty to thirty-five dollars per election district, depending on how much importance the local club placed on the race.1

Although the Regulars were more dependent on them, the inspectors' perceived their party activity as seasonal and peripheral. They were not weekly visitors to the club, or typical attenders at the monthly meetings. Given women's participation in other voluntary organizations, their low profile in County Democratic clubs stemmed from the continued barriers to women's presence in these "male sanctuaries." The almost equal ratio of men and women in Reform clubs challenged the notion that women had no interest in politics per se. The use of the Regular club as a social hangout for men did constrain women's participation. The patterns which kept women as peripheral participants, and as less visible participants, since their activity was outside the club physically, legitimated their being unrewarded by the male dominated leadership.

In the traditional captain system of campaigning, then, women's participation remained seasonal and invisible.

As Margolis indicated, women's contribution to the party was greater than men's but far less visible. The women made phone calls and did clerical work from home which maintained the organization and the contact amongst its members. She noted that men did less but their work was more visible, and in part they consciously acted to make it known to others (Margolis, February, 1979).

While a district captain's contribution to the party was removed physically from the club an individual's achievement was recorded by election returns. Yet, even when women's work was recognized, presumptions about the motives behind their participation discouraged sponsorship.

REFORM COUNTY LEADERSHIP

On the county level, Reformers had a loose coalition, based primarily on disdain for the Regular County Organization. In the early seventies, Reform-independent candidates were ascendant because of their strong liason with the anti-war movement. The Reform faction had few substantive resources to motivate or discipline its membership. After 1974 the Reform faction continuously lost members and cohesiveness. It had neither issues nor resources to unify participants. Its leadership was increasingly limited to a small circle of elected officials, their staff, and leaders from the clubs managing to persevere. In New York City the Reformers had the most success when they took clear, controversial positions, usually somewhat to the left of the Regular organization. Increasingly, the independet candidates within the county with Reform status were more conservative on issues than the Regulars.

By the mid-seventies, women within the county's Reform leadership were usually the elected officials and their female staff, with fewer women recruited on the club level, except as partners or activist husbands. As a

caucus the Reform coalition in this county was conspicuously absent in any of the feminist causes (ERA, abortion rights).

REFORM CLUBS: DIVISION OF LABOR

In this county, Reform clubs had a younger, more educated membership and more women participants. The anti-Vietnam war forces made Reform clubs, committed to Peace candidacies, ascendent. The stronger Reform clubs were found in the cosmopolitan neighborhoods, with a high concentration of single and professional residents. In these areas the constituency was more informed politically and there were a variety of community organizations which could support insurgencies. In the more middle class districts, the Reform ascendency was built upon the ambitions of assembly candidates who made coalitions with peace activists and city-wide insurgents (e.g., Lindsay, 1969). These clubs had fewer women activists than the more cosmopolitan areas. During the Peace Movement, a county and city-wide association of Reform clubs was organized, to increase their leverage. These coalitions persisted but with far less unanimity than they enjoyed during the Vietnam War when the peace issue produced solidarity.

A Reform club's hierarchy included its officers, executive board and general membership. The executive board was usually five or ten percent of the club's membership. The structure of these clubs was similar since many came together with a view towards their cooperation. Certain patterns were prerequisites to their participation in the county and city-wide Reform Coalition; that is voting on the coalition's endorsements.[3]

Until the re-emergence of the women's movement, Reform women were seldom found in the club hierarchy, as officers or board members, with the exception of the secretarial posts. Male dominance was most pronounced in clubs exclu-

sively committed to a local male candidate or incumbent. The combined impact of the women's movement and the Peace candidacies brought more women into party politics and increased their visibility. In a County Reform club in a cosmopolitan neighborhood it became stylish to increase the percentage of women officers and board members. When two women ran for club president, each was seen not as an individual but as a representative of a clique. This was a fair appraisal, since the clique that each was associated with represented alternative directions for the club. Unfortunately, each was believed to be controlled by one of the male leaders in the clique, in one case a spouse, in the other, a romantic interest.

While unattached women may be believed to be independent, those with romantic attachments were assumed to be pawns of their lovers, rather than acting in their own behalf.

Both factions electioneered backstage in this club presidential race. Criticism of either candidate was always phrased in terms of each woman's romantic tie. "Jane, (or Jill) is good, or OK, but I don't trust Peter, or Dick".

"Peter's out to control the club, and this is just another step in that direction."

"Dick is really off the wall, and he'll have the club involved in all the radical left causes."

There were innumerable variations of these themes, depending on which faction one alligned with, or one's neutrality. Sigificantly, neither woman was taken seriously. Her individual abilities were not addressed; the most salient trait of each was her romantic attachment. The subsequent sexual harassment was an improvement to the degree that the woman herself was a target and recognized as a bona fide competitor for power.

Women's activities were assumed to be in the interests of the men they were associated with. Yet both cliques "sponsored" women candidates, since it was believed to have some electoral advantages in the existing climate of the club. In addition to the sexism apparent in the incident cited, it illustrated the leaderships' perception of the membership to be unqualified to evaluate candidates on their credentials and to be easily manipulated.

A married woman who was very active in this club's campaigns was elected to the Executive Board. A male Board member approached her, flirtatiously, but somewhat curiously. He implied that she must be available since she must be having marital difficulties, given the time she freed up for politics. Her spouse was not a political activist so her presence was a mystery. Political interest was not considered as an explanation. On the other hand, men whose wives were not interested in politics went unchallenged.

The man who questioned the presence of the woman on the Board participated in the club with his wife and children. Women were more easily accepted as part of an activist couple.

Unattached women were acceptable participants because they did not have men or home lives competing for their time. This implies that politics is not intrinsically interesting to women, and that it is a substitute until they take on traditional roles. Then, Reform men were most comfortable with women participants who were part of an activist couple, or who were unattached and, therefore, available.

These incidents occurred in a cosmopolital Reform club, the most open to women. Yet, in these incidents, women's romantic ties were pre-

sumed to dominate their lives. Their political motives were perceived by others to be secondary, reifying their image as "apolitical." In a patterned way, women's political participation was reevaluated to conform to stereotypes.

The persistence of such evaluations of women's performance may be one of the reasons that they must participate longer than male peers before being sponsored (Bullock and Keys, 1977, p. 217). Age may also be a factor. The strength of traditional stereotypes about what women want inhibits the the acceptance of young women as seriously committed to political careers. More likely they are perceived as sexually threatening.

A County Committee meeting of the 15 AD shows women as the scapegoats of factional rivalries.

> After a successful Primary, this cosmopolitan Reform club had won about one third of the county committee seats. At the County Committee meeting, the women from the Regular organization taunted the Reform women with: "go on home to your kids" (interview, 1972).

This was an interesting attack because it came from an older married woman with grown children and was leveled at young women, most of whom were single. It indicated that the traditional place for women, home with the children, ought to preclude political activity. It showed women inflicting upon other women the values of male dominance. Clearly, the ties to one's faction overrode any women's solidarity.

Determined women did advance political careers from the more progressive, cosmopolital Reform clubs, but they confronted persistent, albeit, more subtle forms of resistence. Opportunity was even less available in other County Reform clubs.

In one club, an incumbent assemblyman was considering a Congressional race. The club's executive board had three young men anxious to replace him

and an older man who wanted to use the club as a base for a judgeship. Women were only tokens on the executive board. The number of would-be candidates was highly significant, in such a small club.

The men complained that women activists, who were critical of the club's policy, did not work hard enough to be taken seriously. Women, who had been recruited as an extension of peace activities, were understandably discouraged by the club's leadership which continuously sought deals with the Regulars, regardless of issues. When the deals did not materialize they expected to inspire the membership into a frenzy of beating "them," i.e., the Regulars.

Why get worked up for an election which might not occur? The men worked with the expectation of rewards: having their political careers sponsored. They assumed the women should work without rewards and uncritically, out of personal loyalty or community service. However, the opportunism displayed by the club's leadership undermined the loyalty of volunteers and even of pragmatic community activists.

Women were not sponsored for careers or rewarded by this club. The incumbent assemblyman led the club and manipulated the Executive Board in his interests. Independence was not encouraged. Backstage, he and his hand-picked clique decided the strategy of the club. After a campaign, a woman was invited to participate because of her valuable campaign experience. Her experience was gotten outside this district. While no women were being drawn into this circle from the local club, a handful (3-5) of young men were being brought along, apprenticed. Women who had made substantial contributions of time were not included.

Two particular women had worked many hours for the club. One had run its fundraising dinner several times. While she was elected to the Board, she was not included in the inner circle. The assemblyman hand-picked a majority of the Board, to assure it acted in his interests. Those not in his clique were ignored, because he held informal meetings, and telephoned to establish consensus before the Board meeting. As one of its few women activists, she was not even considered for the district leadership.

The other woman was the club's leading petition gatherer. She often was responsible for gathering 200 signatures, ten times what was expected of others. She was praised for her efforts but her work enhanced the reputation of her husband, who talked endlessly at meetings. Her work encouraged the leadership to tolerate him. She was appreciated, verbally, because she expected nothing in return. No one suggested that those doing well should be given more power in the club. This woman was not on the Executive Board, but her husband was. He was also included in the assemblyman's clique.

The leadership in this club viewed women as a source of labor on the grassroots level, but did not offer any other opportunities to them, either to use the club in community interests or to have access to decision-making within it. Since young men were continuously recruited, it was not an issue of the leadership's being closed. Women were presumed to have different motives than men for engaging in party politics (Jennings and Thomas, 1968). The leaders leaned on the women for campaign work, but did not include them in the decision-making.

The turnover of women recruited through issue or community politics was high because the club's callous manipulation of these commitments undermined its credibility. In part, the men believed the women were too idealistic. In the absence of patronage rewards, this Reform club had to take community

services seriously, and deliver them, and share power with those willing to invest time in the club's maintenance.

WOMEN IN CAMPAIGNS

This section examines the limits imposed on women who were in the leadership of campaign organizations. Election Campaigns were significant avenues of mobility for those who chose to be professional politicians, either as candidates or as the political operatives who staff campaigns and the legislative or executive offices of successful candidates. Once elected, a public official often hired aides from her/his campaign. In an upset victory, the staff's reputation was so enhanced that they were often recruited by other ambitious public officials.

Opportunities for women in campaigns in this County exceeded those in either Reform or Regular Democratic Clubs. While a division of labor, based on gender was frequent, it was not automatic. Opportunities were directly and positively correlated with risk.

Men were frequently the leaders even in voluntary organizations in which women were an overwhelming majority of the membership. As volunteers, women sought status and achievement (Gold, 1971, pp. 539-540) and were encouraged to do charitable works. There were strong cultural supports for men to be in charge and men often had financial control of charitable and civic organizations. This pattern was replicated in political campaigns. Even as women became the majority of volunteers, this participation did not lead to positions in the campaign leadership.

In part, some women may have deferred greater responsibility to men in campaigns because the rewards in politics favored men almost exclusively.

However, in campaigns most people were recruited to leadership positions through the encouragement of friends and colleagues. Until recently women were rarely the beneficiaries of such sponsorship and support. The question may be not why have women deferred, but why have they not been asked as have male activists who have shown even less commitment.

As campaign staff, women politicos were disproportionately located in insurgent campaigns with limited budgets. Comparable to male Reformers, they had fewer opportunities as paid staff because these campaigns were overwhelmingly volunteer efforts, particularly on the county and local level. However, successful insurgents did provide patronage appointments which sponsored women into political careers.

Even as campaign leaders, women had difficulty receiving recognition and rewards for their work, and in getting compliance from male subordinates. Competitors used sexual innuendo, flirtation, and other harassment to undermine their performance as political operatives. As team members, the women were remembered, if at all, as the assistants of their male colleagues.

All campaigns produced mountains of clerical work, sex typed "female" in the paid labor force (Oppenheimer, 1969, p. 133). Even women who had taken on staff responsibilities had to resist being drafted into "female" work categories in emergencies. Emergencies occurred on the hour in campaigns. For example, in staffing telephones for canvassing, or teams of door to door canvassers, women received a better response. People were less afraid of a stranger calling or visiting if it were a woman. If a male canvasser needed a female partner, or a phone was still available, there were pressures for the woman supervisor to fill in and either forego supervisory responsibilities or to double up and do both tasks.

Obstacles remained even for those women who accepted responsibility and had campaign experience.

CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT

Campaign managing has been stereotyped as a male job because it usually has been filled by men, as have most supervisory positions. The aspect of the manager's role which has been charicatured was the single-minded, ruthless, focus on winning. The portrayal of the tough negotiator, or smooth con-man depicted campaigns as contests of egoes in which one cleverly outsmarted opponents.

This macho style has been overdrawn and was not in tune with the diverse skills needed by managers. The manager's image of protecting the candidate's interests, running interference for her/him so that potential supporters were mad at the manager and not at the candidate, implied an unemotional, detached attitude for the manager. This coolness was considered a male trait in this society. Yet secretaries who took blame or criticism to cover for their bosses were not characterized as tough and unemotional. Again, the same behavior is differentially perceived according to the actor's gender.

Herein presuppositions about an actor's gender and status affects the interpretation made of her/his role performance. He's tough and can take it; she's passive and powerless.

Campaigns only provided opportunities to those who accepted responsibility.

To assume responsibility in a campaign one had to be involved early. Long before any candidate announced, s/he had been meeting with a clique of supporters who became the campaign staff.

Staff did not volunteer but were drafted. Participation in these inner circles was by invitation only, and usually limited to those who already had campaign experience. The best managers continuously recruited the more able and committed volunteers to take staff responsibility. In volunteer campaigns, responsible positions were open longer, due to both turnover and expansion as the campaign got underway.

In the larger, well financed campaigns, recruitment for highly paid staff in the upper echelons of the campaign once went through a male network.

In this county, women began to hold campaign positions (1972 through 1974) which gave them entree to state and city political networks. The insurgency of the early seventies brought in and trained new political operatives, including a cohort of young single women. Feminism made their campaign experience and skills both salient and visible.

One of the peculiarities of American politics is that members of the same Party or faction competed for funding and volunteers. The personal campaign operation and the multi-candidate primary have accentuated these patterns.

The frequent analogy made in campaigns comparing them to competitive sports exaggerated the need to be a tough competitor and neglected the necessary cooperation amongst one's allies. Women had ample opportunity to be supportive team players but rarely had the opportunity to set the strategy for winning. The dominance of men in the campaign manager's role led to the stress on out-maneuvering both allies and opponents rather than cooperation to achieve mutual goals. Yet successful campaign managers, both men and women, either had or developed diplomatic and administrative skills. These were directed toward supporting the candidate and towards

motivating the campaign's labor force of volunteers or paid employees. This pattern was in sharp contrast to the manager's image as tough and ruthless, or as the slick con artist. Both male and female managers had to motivate people with minimal organizational rewards, so the campaign was dependent on their inter-personal and administrative skills.

Women brought specific skills to managing such as the ability to say "no" without a subordinate feeling subjugated, an asset in volunteer efforts where people were free to leave.

There is conflicting evidence here. Successful women supervisors may need to develop special skills to get compliance from subordinates (Kanter, 1977). Still, some men may find women in any position of authority oppressive, which gets back to the differential perception of women's behavior. Hence the joke, "men are ruthless, when they control empires and command them at whim, women are ruthless when they put you on hold." (Meyerson, 1976).

The best campaign managers, male or female, have combined the ability to bargain on the campaign's behalf and the personal relations skills to motivate others working in the campaign. This enables them to implement policy with a minimum of confrontation, which those accustomed to more aggressive leadership might perceive as weakness. This makes implementation of policy more time consuming. Clearly, differing leadership styles had both strengths and liabilities, and the effectiveness of these alternatives depended on the campaign's resources, especially its personnel.

The tactics both men and women used in campaign managment support Kanter's analysis that these are accounted for by structural setting rather than gender. Both men and women relied on charm and persuasion to recruit and motivate volunteers.

Single Candidacies

In this County, the number of candidates who were single increased. The time commitment needed to foster a political career was more easily made by single people. Feminist values, such as equalization of parenting, made family responsibilities a legitimate excuse for men to refuse a candidacy.

In a pattern similar to that of wives of corporate executives, politician's wives were expected to offer advice, support and time to attend the numerous political functions to advance their spouses's career.

As more women and single men ran for office, women had more chances to manage. Recently in this country, single candidates have chosen managers of the opposite sex. The manager has doubled as an escort at essentially political functions, where knowledge of political mores was useful. It warded off rumors of homosexuality, or unwelcome advances. In this context, rumors of romance between a manager and a candidate were not problematic, if both were unmarried.

For a single male candidate, a female manager subtly symbolized his commitment to women in positions of authority. Credentials establishing some degree of women's advocacy were an asset to male candidates.

For female candidates choosing a male manager offset an atmosphere of feminist exclusivity. When a female candidate and her manager attended a koffee klatch, the manager was asked if it were an "all women campaign", implying either radical feminist commitment or homosexuality. Such assumptions were not routinely assigned to male candidates and managers.

In several boroughwide and assembly wide campaigns, women active in the feminist network were managers. They reported a variety of difficulties associated with the exercise of their authority.

Compliance

All but one of the women managers had difficulty getting compliance from male staff in the campaigns. In both local and county wide races these women confronted attempts to ignore their official position. One of the tactics used to skirt their authority was to treat the title as symbolic and then ignore it. The men acted autonomously or addressed the candidate directly or a man they believed was "really" in charge.

> In the Democratic Primary for the County Councilmatic race, the literature writer ignored the manager and sent his material to the printer without having it approved. In going over her head the writer placed the manager in an awkward position. If she recalled and changed the material, it could cost the campaign both time and money if the printer had already begun on the unuseable draft. If she let it go, it encouraged others to subvert her authority. This manager called the writer in and held up printing until she saw and approved the material. She made it clear that since the responsibility was hers, and she was accountable, she would not tolerate his autonomy. The candidate's family had considerable leverage in County circles and some men came to the campaign from this network. They had problems being supervised by a woman (Interview, 1977).

Campaigns were more fluid organizations because of their temporary task. The incident cited occurred early in the campaign, and illustrated how power was negotiated interactively either in harmony or in conflict with the "official" assignment of tasks and responsibilities. To exercise power, one must not only be entitled but must recognize and confront attempts to encroach upon one's area of responsibility. Even in the incident cited, the manager risked being portrayed as petty if she called attention to

such details. Again, she was set up in a no win situation, where her behavior was liable to be perceived as weak or overbearing.

This incident exposed the seam which linked interaction to structure which was most visible at the beginnings of an organizational relationship, for example, the actual start of the organization or the replacement of a supervisor. Campaigns were settings within which compliance was least affected by the ability to reward or punish. This woman manager had her authority challenged, immediately, with a presumption that it was not "real," whereas male managers were deemed competent until they demonstrated otherwise. As a woman in authority, her marginality led to her having to prove herself. She was "tested" almost immediately.

The woman manager who had no difficulty from male staff and volunteers was of interest because it represented a deviation from the pattern. She managed a third party candidate in which the top two candidates were elected.

In this borough wide councilmatic race, the fact that two candidates won guaranteed some minority party representation. The Democratic candidate was the automatic winner, and the contest was between the Republican and Liberal Party nominees. The Liberal Party candidate was highly qualified and personally endorsed by the Democratic nominee. His weaknesses were the low budget of the Liberals, its place on the ballot (fourth), and the candidate's open homosexuality. As manager, James recruited other women to work on Election Day, including Moore. The women were treated as professionals with none of the undercutting common in campaigns, expecially the discomfort men seemed to have when women were in authority. The feminists were delighted with the absence of tension, interactionally, which they had come to consider "normal," that was typical, in campaign organizations (General Election, November, 1977).

Several factors accounted for this climate. The personal style of both the candidate and the manager contributed to a friendly easy-going atmosphere. The majority of the campaign workers were gay men who were political neophytes. They naturally looked to James' experience. Their homosexuality eliminated one aspect of sexual politics which typically complicated male-female interaction. James' work was doubly appreciated because her association with this campaign was risky to her future candidacy. The feminists and the gay men collaborated easily because of their joint stake in legitimacy created by competence rather than the sex status or sexual preference of a candidate determining opportunities. Pragmatically, they all knew the candidate's homosexuality would be costly at the polls, but they worked together because it ought not to matter.

An additional bonus was the fact that a "good cause" with a slim chance of victory brought out issue volunteers rather than those seeking patronage.

In one mayoralty race a woman was the "office manager", essentially responsible for coordinating the borough campaign, while an assemblyman had the official title of Borough Campaign Manager. Since the assembly was in session, the "manager" was not available, practically. Additionally, he had a poor relationship with some other public officials whose efforts he needed to coordinate.

The office manager, Brock, took up the slack. She did the work without the status. She was not named the borough manager, ostensibly because she needed to be with her young daughter at night. By contrast, the central campaign staff, predominantly male, were often less available than

she. Yet they had titles within the campaign hierarchy. Men still had titles even if only available by phone. The most unavailable male operatives often had the best reputations and juggled commitments to several campaigns at once.

As office manager, Brock had difficulty working with the staff of the central campaign. The staff had a number of the incumbent mayor's appointees, anxiously seeking a new sponsor, and a rivalry existed between those in the "downtown" office versus those working in the "hinterland." When Brock called the central staff, a receptionist screened her call, a response to hearing a woman's voice.

In spite of her considerable campaign experience, as a woman she was treated as a receptionist. The sexism within the campaign blocked recognition of her political skills. Without the title she was left with the responsibility for the borough wide operation without access to the campaign's resources.

Brock focused directly on the goals of the organization, recruiting volunteers and materials to field the borough campaign. In the central office, the "boys" busily competed for recognition, just in case the candidate succeeded.

Regular assembly campaigns provide the least opportunity for women as managers because the club just shifts to a campaign operation, leaving its patriarchal patterns intact.

Foley's coalition with the Regulars drew a cohort of Reformers into the 15 AD Regular club (1974). Upon first entering the Regular club, this circle of friends were sensitive to supporting one another, perceiving themselves to be outsiders. They established consensus before any joint meetings to publically demonstrate their solidarity. As Reformers, their

solidarity overrode issues of authority among them. They had not expected patronage rewards for their political activity, so differentiating individual contributions was unnecessary.

In 1975, Jones was to manage the judicial delegate race for the Regulars because two years earlier she had won that race for the Reformers and because other members of her cohort claimed to have personal commitments which precluded their acceptance of heavy campaign responsibilities.

Running a Regular campaign with money and the captain system required a definite manager but few middle levels of responsibility. As manager, Jones' authority was challenged both by the Regular captains and the men from her own clique. At campaign meetings she had to maintain her authority over ED captains old enough to be her father, while one or another of them persisted in flirting with her.

She discussed strategies for dealing with this sexual harassment with her feminist friends who were active in politics. While she expected to struggle with the captains and negotiate the competing egoes on the delegate slate, she was very annoyed that her male friends did not support her. Jones assumed they were still a team, taking turns as leaders, demonstrating their versatility. When given less demanding tasks, these men balked at not having anything "important enough to do."

After the election, Jones got together with the two men and one other woman from the Reform clique to discuss it. Jones perceived it as sexism, as did the other woman involved in the campaign. Her male peers worked very well with her as an equal or when she supported their authority. The two men adamantly denied any issue of sexism. Rather, the work was beneath their skills, and they were not asked nicely enough to do the low level of work. Jones and Moore reminded them that when the men managed,

the women in the clique had worked on the lowest level tasks without complaint. The men took the compliance for granted as proof of their good managerial skills and ability to work with "people." Jones explained that while she knew she had to "stroke" the club's captains, all older men, she was angry that it was expected by her friends. In her view, friendship and group solidarity should have guaranteed their compliance, bored or not (Interview, 1975).

Clearly, the men and women involved defined the situation differently and acted on those definitions. Jones assumed the team cooperation initiated in the Reform campaigns was still operative. The men assumed that the compliance they enjoyed was not so artificially constructed, but was simply what they deserved. As long as the social world seemed to work, they took it for granted (Schutz, 1967). The men assumed that when these women alternated between supervisory and menial tasks that their acceptance came for either not minding menial work and/or their own (male) skill as managers. The men's assumption was certainly supported by gender stereotypes that women had special skills for menial tasks and that they made difficult bosses. The men did expect Jones to do more to gain their confidence and compliance than was necessary when the situation was reversed.

The team rapport began to disintegrate as the structural setting changed. Unlike the Reform club, the Regulars had rewards to dispense. There was now an incentive for the men to shine as individuals. While the men from the clique expected to be sponsored by the Regulars, the women were skeptical. They were uncomfortable with the chauvinism they encountered. So the men had an interest in distinguishing themselves individually and the women had an interest in holding the clique together and bargaining as a group. The women involved found that this incident distanced them from

the Democratic organization, just as it drew men in. The women increased their commitment to feminist causes within the Party as they recognized the difficulty of communicating with even the men they knew well and considered friends.

Earlier Jones had found that one of these men, Joyce, had been having lengthy discussions with her on the strategy and options of the club which he would then repeat to the male leader, implying the ideas were his own. As members of a team this was annoying but tolerable. When it was clearly every man (sic) for himself, she resolved to treat the ex-Reform men the same as she treated the Regulars, that is with great discretion, since she now perceived them to be untrustworthy. She became more guarded in her conversations with them.

Jones' experience was comparable to Brock's. Both women, as managers, focused very directly on the manifest goal of the campaign, and paid less attention to colleagues' individual agendas. Once the prospects of patronage rewards were likely, the men were quicker to adapt to emphasizing their individual work, sometimes even to the detriment of the campaign.

MANAGING REFORM ASSEMBLY RACE

Through the feminist network, two women were recruited, Whelan and Moore, to advise and co-manage a Reform women's race; James was running for the assembly. James' spouse had been managing her campaign. His strategy was to recruit a narrow circle of volunteers who put many hours into the campaign. The whole operation limited the contact with the voter to literature distribution at subways, supermarkets and under doors. The race was expected to be close. A statistician encouraged the campaign to switch to

a canvassing operation, as the only possibility for winning. The women operatives had expertise in supervising such a canvassing and pulling operation (calling or visiting on election day to guarantee that your supporters did indeed vote).

Between 1974 and 1976 More and Whelan had been brought in as outside experts by male colleagues to "run Election Day" and had had no problems of compliance. Their male colleagues defined them as experts and they worked as such.

In this operation for James' assembly candidacy they had been referred through the Feminist Network. In James' Reform campaign they were somewhat suspect as "Regulars". More importantly, coming through this feminist tie did not give them the credibility as operatives that the referral of male colleagues did. Also, these feminists had been recruited by the candidate after the operation had been going on for a time. Her spouse-manager successfully resisted turning the campaign over to them. In their other experiences as consultants, the campaigns involved had actively sought their help.

The husband-manager could not adapt to a new strategy. The group he recruited avoided the personal contact needed to recruit other volunteers or personal contact with the voter. Those selected and trained by the husband were very uncomfortable asking volunteers for help. His personal biases set the tone of the campaign. At meetings they all agreed and then just passively did not do what was agreed to. James lost narrowly as predicted by the statistician.

Two years later, when the candidate ran again, Moore successfully managed the campaign; James was elected to the Assembly. Moore had continuous difficulty with the husband, who took on too much responsibility. However,

Moore gave him only those tasks with which the campaign could afford to be late and focused herself upon the canvassing and pulling operation.

DIVISION OF LABOR: OTHER CAMPAIGN TASKS

In addition to campaign managing, gender tracking has imposed limits on women working in other campaign roles in this county. Women were included in the workforce of political campaigns without being rewarded or visible. As volunteers, they had access to jobs which were usually assigned to men in the paid labor force. In campaigns, as volunteers, women had the autonomy and responsibility normatively reserved for men in the paid labor force. Their ability to use this work experience for career mobility varied.

REFORM ASSEMBLY RACE

Teams

In a 1972 campaign, teams of coordinators had responsibility for specific geographic sections of the district. Of the seven areas, the coordinators included one woman and one man working alone. The five teams were two men and two women, each covering an area and three teams of men and women. Initially, in three of the four male-female teams the women were perceived as the clerical assistants of the men involved. As two of the four men dropped out, the women's abilities were recognized. Had the men even been moderately active, the women would have remained invisible.

In another team the woman had been involved in the earlier race as a high school student. Now, at eighteen, she was a college sophomore. Maher's youth helped affirm her role as assistant, even though she competently handled all aspects of the job. As a young woman, she was perceived by the volunteers as a kid, working against her having the authority usually associated with her responsibility. Some volunteers had to be spoken to by her

co-coordinator. She was seen as his helper, and in many cases this shaped the way they worked when they were both present. When each of them was there alone, they did all the tasks normally divided between them.

The experience of women coordinators in this race highlighted the problem of women receiving adequate recognition for their efforts. Solidarity and morale were high in this group, which facilitated their working together and sharing whatever rewards there were; praise and the "high" of a win at the polls.

Male-Female Competition

Competition developed in this race over the position of "McGovern Coordinator" for the assembly district. The McGovern campaign offered the position to the campaign manager, who did not have time for it. The county coordinator for McGovern suggested he choose someone to attend meetings and keep canvassing statistics for McGovern. He chose Jones, a woman who had rapport with the McGovern staff, having smoothed over several fights between the two campaigns during the summer registration drive.

She was unemployed, and could use the fifty dollars per week stipend. Mac also wanted the position, or its title, and argued that his economics degree entitled him to it. He had a fulltime job driving a cab. He claimed that he successfully supervised the summer registration drive, so he deserved it. The assembly campaign staff was annoyed that he took credit for the registration drive which they perceived as a joint effort. The other coordinators recruited their volunteers and participated themselves. His responsibility was keeping count, and getting enough forms from the Board of Elections. Besides, he had had serious fights with the McGovern campaign staff, and was therefore a poor choice. Jones was chosen by the manager,

and the other staff considered her more qualified so she became the McGovern coordinator. The disappointed coordinator, Mac, circulated rumors that she got the position for dispensing sexual services to the manager. From this point on Mac was a destructive force in the campaign.

This incident pointed to the use of sexual innuendo as a weapon against women competitors. It also pointed to the limits of team spirit. Mac saw the MacGovern position as a step towards a government appointment because it placed its incumbent in a larger network. Yet, the tactic of innuendo was used even when on very objective criteria the woman was a better choice. She had more time and a good rapport with the McGovern staff as well as with fellow coordinators. Mac was peripheral at best. He worked out of a separate headquarters and was personally disliked by fellow coordinators.

By using such gossip against Jones he called attention to her one deficit, she was a woman. He did not even perceive her credentials, other than her lack of a degree. It was her sex that made her choice seem inappropriate to him, and he considered her sex as her only advantage over him. He chose not to ask why she was supported universally by the other coordinators, men and women. It was the first campaign for both Jones and Mac. They both were area coordinators and had approximately similar experience.

After Mac lost this appointment to Jones he began to sabotage the Fall campaign effort. He cut back his own efforts and gossipped to club members and volunteers that other staff were dumping McGovern. Maher was sent in to assist him. Sending any other coordinator would demonstrate the manager's lack of confidence in Mac and none of the canvassers were available. It was too close to Election Day to risk a disruption. Maher was sent to salvage the efforts of the volunteers without appearing to upstage Mac.

Maher's age and sex supported her acceptance as an assistant. She operated inconspicuously to salvage what she could by enthusiastically supporting volunteers. Her presence made it difficult for Mac to undercut the other campaign staff to his volunteers.

Again, without explicit attention being drawn to it, a woman's competent performance was unobtrusive, even when her inconspicuousness was being used. She salvaged the organization's objectives, threatened by a resentful man. She simultaneously protected his public image while maintaining her own invisibility. Her efforts were recognized by the campaign staff.

In 1976 the Reformers and the Regulars collaborated on presidential delegate slates in some districts. In one, a group (three men and a woman) met to draw up the delegate slate and plan the campaign. The only Reformer, Peters, began jokingly citing each's contribution when Whelan had suggested a tactic for fundraising. Peters recognized each of the men's skills with exaggeration and then said to Whelan, "and you can jump out of the cake." This joke indicated his discomfort with her as a political operative and peer. He preferred to treat her as a woman and, more pointedly, as a sex object. The other two men let the remark go. Whelan was angry and annoyed that her two allies missed the boat and allowed her to be put "in her place."

Peters was more at ease in the meeting once he successfully called attention to Whelan as the outsider rather than himself. Had she commented on his sexism, it would reinforce the solidarity of the men along lines of "these feminists can't take a joke". Of course it is unclear how consciously the Reformer exercised this tactic. But by making a sexist joke he emphasized his solidarity with the men and in turn de-emphasized their factional differences.

Significantly, some men were quick to attack such sexist remarks when their interests were alligned with the reputation of the woman as a credible

political actor, as for example when Jones competed with Mac for McGovern coordinator. If they did not always label it sexism, they still acted to defend their factional or clique interests from being undercut.

SUMMARY: GENDER AS A DETERMINANT OF THE CDP'S DIVISION OF LABOR

This chapter examined the limits imposed on women activists in the County Democratic Party. It differentiated between the experiences of those women whose political participation was confined by the party's structural constraints, and a smaller group of feminists who moved into positions which were once male sanctuaries within the CDP. The structural limits imposed on women by the Party handicapped both types of female activists.

The segmentation of the paid labor force is reflected in the division of labor in Party organizations. In both Regular and Reform factions female volunteers are recruited for the lower level of work of the organization.

Gender Filters

Gender expectations or assumptions filter perceptions of women's activities and the quality of their performance in CDP circles, just as they do in other social settings. This fact has several important consequences for women. First, as noted above, the same skills are seen and evaluated differently, leading to different rewards. Second, it supports this differential reward system which guarantees a supply of essential but low-level workers. Promoting a woman from the clerical level only means she must be replaced with another woman, since no man wants the job. Third, the gender expectation that women will volunteer time without receiving rewards leads to the structural reality that those women who remain active frequently

do so without advancement or rewards.

Visibility

Recognition of ability and achievement in the CDP was dependent on recognition by the CDP hierarchy. There have been changes and women's talents are more appreciated than they were in the past. Significantly, the opportunity to demonstrate these skills frequently was confined to feminists' campaigns and staffs, and, as noted above, to high risk campaigns generally. These skilled women were considered very unusual, while the male leadership continued to overlook the women in their own organizations.

Teams

In both regular and Reform circles, active women tended to be paired with active men, that is in teams. However, the Party rewarded the male partner in these activist couples while the female partner's contribution was rarely visible. Women who sought political careers found that they needed to avoid working in such teams or had to take very explicit steps to get recognition.

This assertiveness by women was sometimes offensive in and of itself to men. One strategy to avoid this problem was for one woman to call attention to the contributions of other women. Men in politics, in contrast, are free to push their own career interests.

The Party hierarchy itself includes this "coupling" element, mandating that leadership be shared by a male leader with a female "co-leader". The Regular faction's hierarchy empowers the male leadership and reduces the female co-leader to symbolic inclusion. She either serves as his assistant or is perceived to do so by others; her functions are thought to be similar to secretarial responsibilities.

While the work done by women was the least visible in such teams of male and female partner, their contribution as part of larger groups was also problematic. The higher the morale and commitment of the group to a campaign operation, the stronger the inhibitions to individual recognition. The group's consensus confirmed worth within the organization. But the cultural patterns operated in these settings to recognize the male activists and designate them for political mobility. A woman who was friendly with other campaign participants is inhibited by group loyalty from singling herself out to claim credit.

Contributions by women were usually recognized when they were singly responsible for a discrete component of the campaign operation.

Elite Participation

In spite of the lack of structural supports, some women did in fact achieve important leadership positions. Even this group, however, was not immune to the general constraints imposed upon women activists. They, too, faced impediments to their work within the CDP. Many were feminists who were indirectly linked to the Network. Advancements by these women were achieved largely in high-risk, indepent campaigns with limited resources, i.e., those to which men were less attracted.

Women who had campaign responsibilities were less likely than men to have the titles associated with that responsibility, which made compliance with their directives more difficult to secure. Their problems were further compounded by the fact that, as managers of volunteer efforts, personnel had to be recruited and motivated entirely through the manager's personal skills. In larger, better funded campaigns, recruitment and cooperation were facilitated by both paid salaries and the hope of future patronage.

Compliance

Women often found it difficult to carry out their responsibilities because men responded to their sexual status. For example, some men found any criticism from a woman problematic, which created conflict for women supervisors. In other circumstances, the inability to accept supervision is usually seen as a problem of the supervised person. In this case, women supervisors had to invent ways of achieving their goals without allowing the interaction to slip into patterns based on gender, in which male subordinares had leverage. This handicapped their performances and made their work more time consuming.

As managers and campaign consultants, women had to "prove" themselves; they constantly found themselves being tested.

Kanter indicates that management styles are more determined by power than gender. (1977, p.202). More women than men are in relatively powerless managerial positions, which encourages stereotypes of oppresive women bosses.

Women's efficiency as managers requires versatility, but women were not as free to be assertive or direct: this was interpreted as "harsh" when coming from them. The difficulties women managers experienced limited their political options. They found themselves drawn to the campaigns of independent women with feminist credentials and away from recalcitrent segments of the CDP.

Sexual Harassment

Single women suffered blatant sexual harassment in Regular circles , and more subtly in Reform clubs, which discouraged their participation. Single women were most able to remain active in clubs with a high proportion of single activists.

The women in leadership positions within clubs and campaigns received more sexual harassment than non-leaders, which indicated men's discomfort not only with women's presence but with their seeking leadership within the CDP. Women whose husbands were CDP activists were protected from this gatekeeping tactic since their presumed motive of participating with or for husbands' careers was acceptable. Women who were married or single but who were active in political circles without escorts were also subject to sexual harassment. Most male colleagues did not try to prevent such harassment unless it was interpreted as an attack on the faction. Only when male interests were challenged by the attack against a woman were men supportive.

The experience of women activists in the CDP elite highlights the persistence of barriers to their participation. These gatekeeping devices tend to inhibit and track women's Party activity rather than to preclude it. As more women work in the paid labor force and increase their educational and occupational attainments they are far less likely to accept unrewarding volunteer work. Again, since the division of labor in society shapes the Party's processes, changes in the larger society will impact on the Party.

CHAPTER FIVE

SPONSORSHIP

Women have steadily increased their participation in Democratic Party clubs and campaigns. In this County, their sponsorship into political careers as elected officials and as government appointees has not been commensurate with this activity. Rather, feminists active within the CDP or in peripheral political groups, stimulated women's interest in political careers. Both factions of the CDP were slow to respond to the feminist insurgents being drawn into the Party as an extension of their feminist and anti-war activities.

In 1972 only one woman held public office in this County. In 1972, two insurgent women, thought to be sacrificial lambs, were surprisingly victorious as part of the anti-war coalition. In six years, (1978) this County had elected two women to the assembly, one to the state senate, three to the city council, and two to the Congress. Two of these seats were held by minority women, one was held by a Republican. The remainder were insurgents who relied heavily on volunteers and received very minimal support from fellow Reform insurgents.

While the feminist wave established women's credibility with the voters, it was less effective in broadening the CDP's allocation of its resources. As elected officials these women were less able than their male colleagues to sponsor their supporters into full-time political careers. Their staff appointments were limited to those mandated by their offices. As insurgents without strong club support, they remained heavily dependent on volunteers, which threatened their incumbency and limited their future mobility. Just as these elected officials were ascendent without traditional political bases, they needed to develop campaign operations which could function to replace club supports.

The selective recruitment of women into Party politics produces three types of activists: those not particularly political but who work seasonally out of personal loyalty; those not interested in party politics who participate seasonally for specific issues; and those very committed to politics who would or do work as full-time politicians.

The women seeking political careers through the Party's patronage system have difficulty gaining access. The mechanisms which limit their participation in Regular clubs indirectly impedes their access to patronage the Regulars can influence. Again, the tendency is to place women into low-level clerical work with few if any opportunities for mobility.

However, the CDP is itself in transition and the power of the most patriarchal faction is declining. The modest success women have achieved within this County continues to draw independent women into Party politics. Even the modest budgets of pro-choice and women's organizations provide career opportunities on the periphery of politics and government.

Any party needs a labor force to conduct its business. The party has a variety of rewards it can offer its supporters. These include power within the organization, party honors, patronage appointments, and nominations. The rewards motivate activists and link them to the County Democratic Party (CDP). The organization's resources are allocated differentially, according to the services performed for the Party and by whom.

The County Democratic Party used its resources narrowly to recruit and reward its workforce. Most of the work was done by those receiving rather modest benefits. Their participation must be understood as an extension of voluntary work, motivated by party or familial loyalty, sociability or by the excitement of elections.

Participants from the Reform and Regular factions expected different rewards for their Party activity. Regular activists expected patronage or personal favors and jobholders were the core staff of the Regular faction. Refermers had limited access to patronage so they relied on praise, or concern about issues or community interests to motivate workers.[1] As a result, Reform clubs had greater difficulty maintaining themselves between elections and were subject to more accountability. Disenchanted activists left.

Reform activists expected to participate in club decisions, to share in the club's power in exchange for their volunteer time. Between 1968 and 1972, County Refermers had some commitment to feminist and liberal issues and a feminist presence was very pronounced in the peak of insurgency around the anti-war movement. The Reform forces diminished considerably after the war, and with it the Reformers' feminist presence. The priority given to factionalism, and opportunistic ascendency of male candidates, rather than issues, placed feminists and others with issue convictions outside Reform circles. Their participation was limited to the two Reform clubs whose leadership was open to women. These clubs had maintained some credibility regarding issues.

The women who remained active in other Reform circles were usually part of an activist couple, with the husband more politically involved, or visible. The women supported their husbands' interests. This pattern closely approached the Regulars' style where wives served primarily as adjuncts to husbands. In a few instances, women without such attachments gave priority to factionalism over feminist issues.

These women were decidedly less feminist, or less independent, since they did not use their club activity to press for support of women's issues.

Since 1974, Reform insurgencies were increasingly built on candidates markedly more conservative and less feminist than their Regular adversaries.

While women were mobile in insurgent campaigns, they were subject to similar constraints as their Regular counterparts in most Reform clubs. The Reformers' moral crusade against the "machine," when it was convenient, facilitated accepting and expecting women to work without reward or influence. Power within the club was one way of recognizing campaign efforts but in all but two Reform clubs power stayed with the men regardless of the women's participation. In part, men aspiring to public office refused to risk having independent women in leadership. They believed women would restrict their ability to be pragmatic. (Epstein, 1981) This was certainly true if the pragmatic issues were abortion or ERA where those with feminist interests would inhibit the Reformer's ability to compromise under public pressure. Issue support was critical to the Reform club's ability to maintain credibility, and, in turn, its capacity to recruit volunteers.

NOMINATIONS WITHIN THE ASSEMBLY DISTRICT

In both factions women and men were differentially rewarded. Both Reformers and Regulars sought club nominations, and both factions disproportionately bestowed nominations and endorsements on men.

The value of a club's nomination or endorsement was positively associated with the control a club had in a specific district. In some districts, the nomination was equivalent to election. Usually the club's jurisdiction matched the assembly district. Those running in larger districts within the County sought the endorsement of both the relevent assembly clubs and factional support. One approached the County Leader of the Regular

faction, or the county caucus of the Reformers, to gain factional support for the primary. Some city- and state-wide candidates sought Regular and Reform support simultaneously.

ASSEMBLY NOMINATIONS

Again, in this study, the focus was on those County Assembly districts with a white male leadership.

The assembly endorsement was an index of club sponsorship towards a career as an elected official. As the smallest legislative office the Assembly was a typical first step for those who sought careers as elected officials. While the Assembly race had been an initial career step for men, it has not been as accessible to women.

Between 1970 and 1978, five bi-annual Assembly elections occured. If all sixteen districts had primaries every two years, there would have been eighty contests. There were twenty-two, averaging out to slightly better than twenty-five percent. In all of the County's uncontested districts, white men were incumbents. Typically, primaries were most likely when an incumbent died, retired, moved up, or was indicted. Atypically, in 1970, (and 1972) the contests between incumbents and insurgents were fueled by the anti-war movement. The 1968 McCarthy race solidified the alliance with Reform clubs. Reformers, in a loose city-wide coalition, brought anti-war volunteers into Reform campaigns.

The three County primaries in 1970 ended with one victory and two run-offs which in turn resulted in two victories and one loss by Reformers. In 1972, in four assembly primaries, Reformers won all four. The four successful Assembly insurgents were men with active Reform club support. In these races with 17 candidates, none were women.

The insurgent's success in 1970 and 1972 encouraged additional candidacies because the incumbents' vulnerability became apparent.

Candidates supported by an active Reform or Regular club were favored over those who ran as independents. During this eight year period, fifty-two candidates sought twenty-one nominations. Thirteen ran without club support as independents. Of the 52 candidates, only eight were women, just 15%. Yet, six of the thirteen independents were women, almost half of that group (46%). An analysis of these eight candidacies indicated even less support for women than it seemed.

No Reform clubs sponsored women to the Assembly. As Reform-independents, women's candicacies emerged in districts without active Reform clubs. In contrast, men who sought assembly nominations joined or built clubs and had no compunction about directing these clubs almost exclusively to their candidacies.

In six of the eight female Assembly candidacies, (or 75% of the cases), women emerged as independent insurgents who challenged the organizational incumbents under the most adverse circumstances. These women were recruited from community activities or issue politics. They expected no rewards and were drafted into candidacies when no one else wanted to take the risk. The women Assembly candidates, who were Reformers without club support, were extremely high risks. Only one was successful and that was her second attempt in the same district.

The only two women to receive club support were Regulars in districts where the Reform opponents were strongly favored. Only one of the Regular women had even a slim chance of winning. She ran against a Reform incumbent seeking a third term. Two years earlier the club sponsored a male candidate, who was only marginally active in the club, and lost very badly. The prognosis

for the woman was thought to be worse. Ironically, she came within 200 votes of winning the Primary, due to a fortuitous rainstorm and the fact that the 15 A.D. committed all its resources to the effort to unseat its Reform rival. For ambitious women who considered candidacy, they accepted sponsorship when it was offered in spite of the improbability of a win. They believed it would not be offered again.

The recruitment pattern in this County supported their conviction. Even in this race, the male district leader printed his name larger on giveaway pens and placed himself ahead of the Assembly candidate on slate literature, even though the ballot order places Assembly before Party offices.

In the second case, an appointed female leader, ran against a Reform woman who had won the leadership in 1974, and came close to unseating the twenty-year incumbent in 1976. This was the Reformer's third race within the district and she was favored to win even without an active club's support. The appointed leader had very low name recognition, since it was her first campaign.

In 1976, on behalf of the male incumbent, this Regular club spent heavily and drew support from all over the County. In 1978 the female leader, without the incumbents' advantages, had only a nominal campaign fielded for her. The club's resources were spent on the gubernatorial aspirations of its male State Senator.

The only successful female assembly candidate (1978) won without an active club but with an independent base. She ran twice before winning the seat.[2] Of the six successful male insurgents, with Reform club sponsorship, two won in their first attempt, two in their second and two in their third try. To some degree a candidate's seriousness was gauged by his/her willingness to run consecutively for the same seat.

None of the five female Reformers ran for the Assembly before 1976 in spite of women's substantial activity in Reform circles since 1968. Even then, of the two who ran in 1976, one was clearly a sacrificial lamb. The other potential Reform winner received minimal support from the Reform caucus. Significantly, two male Reform incumbents received any support the Reform caucus could generate in spite of the considerable support they already had from the Assembly leadership and unions.

Unlike their male counterparts, female Reformers characterized their races less dramatically. They recognized and publically spoke to the inherent limits on the power of their office. In contrast the men, even the incumbents, portrayed themselves as fighting the good fight, a la David and Goliath or Christians vs. Lions. These emotional portrayals stimulated their volunteer support in Reform clubs.

Of the five women who ran in 1978, in both the 13th and the 17th A.D.'s, two women opposed one another.

Most clubs had male activists who were perrennial candidates who made their interests known to their clubs. Women waited to be drafted, and then ran once.

The aspiring male candidate postured continuously, and ran repeatedly. For example, in the Regular faction, men sought sponsorship dressed in suits and ties, and greeted club members with cheerful chatter about family and health. Those who were lawyers found that court patronage facilitated scheduling time for community and club activities. Herein, the CDP groomed candidates by providing the kinds of patronage which both aided and signified their future candidacy. In Reform circles, dress was a less reliable predictor. Instead, potential candidates sought club offices, Reform caucus assignments as delegates, and community activities which kept candidates in view and the club membership active. Neighborhood work was designed to

fit the candidates' future credentials, for example, tenants organizing, or handling constituent complaints.

With one exception (24th A.D.), women who have been assembly candidates in this County viewed running as a temporary shift in their political and community participation. These women did not choose issues because they facilitated candidacy. They perceived running as seasonal, and in the off-season were less calculating of their ascendency.

OTHER NOMINATIONS

In this County women were elected to other offices. As Reform insurgents, women won both a Congressional and State Senate seat in 1972 and a City Council seat in 1977. In the County-wide judicial races (1977) the two women candidates came in first and second in a field of nine in spite of very different support bases. These victories proved women could win difficult races.

Between 1972 and 1978, only one woman had lost in these larger districts. James' City Council race (1973) had been a symbolic protest on behalf of tenants rights. Even then she made a good showing. Women succeeded in larger districts because the impact of club sponsorship was reduced on this level. Male candidates for a variety of offices were recruited from clubs and joined clubs to deliberately mount races. Between 1970-1978, men had monopolized the club route to candidacy, and thereby access to the Assembly.

It was after the successes of 1977 that Regular clubs sponsored women to the Assembly (1978) and to judgeships (1979). In these larger districts, everyone fielded an independent race and had to coordinate community and Democratic club support. Women did better because their

credentials as community and issue activists went further. The men with club support were often limited to one faction or the other, and possibly one club, if other clubs were also fielding favorite sons. The women elected to public office as Reform - Independents between 1972 and 1977 had put their own political organizations together. They relied on community, feminist and Reform support.

In 1972, the McGovern campaign swept in insurgents, including the two women who ran in large, very high risk districts. Five of six Assembly districts from which their districts were drawn had strong field operations, with the Reform faction fielding slates of candidates. In three or four-way contests, a lone female candidate stood out which reduced her recognition problem. She was not confused with her opponents. This advantage was a factor both for Krupsak (1974) and Bellamy (1977). Both fielded campaigns with very modest resources and against several male candidates who could be confused for one another (e.g., two liberals from the same base).

The feminists in the County network were recruited as volunteers who were not planning on political careers but found themselves engaged in the political process. The fortuitous joining of feminist claims with other insurgent interests enabled them to view the barriers to their participation critically and provided a support group to encourage a professional commitment to politics. Even these feminists found that they had to be very explicit about their wanting party sponsorship, or risk the assumption by others that they were not interested. The ability of male politicians to overlook the contribution of female activists, facilitated these men keeping competent workers, rather than sponsoring their mobility.

In the CDP, stereotypes about the motives of women inhibited even ambitious women from stating their career goals; instead, they verbalized altruistic motives for their activities. While all potential candidates were encouraged to publicly employ such rhetoric, backstage, among fellow politicians, men were permitted to state their interests openly. Women were not, which inhibited their seeking sponsorship directly.

In effect, women were pressured to undercut their own seriousness as politicians. Believing in their own altruism enabled them to step aside if an equally qualified man sought the same position. Selectivity encouraged women, even feminists, to take the "no win" seats. As insurgents, they limited themselves to the toppling of the more powerful incumbents, in a "good cause." All four of the feminists elected in this County won this type of race. Even those feminists who complained of the strain for gender to override other criteria, found their task performances inhibited by expectations of gender roles. Even when they consciously confronted such behavior patterns, the mechanisms they used to cope with their situations reinforced gender differentiation, for example, the prohibitions against women being explicitly ambitious.

DECISION MAKING

An example from the 15 A.D. illustrates several patterns which influence the sponsorship of women by their clubs. Seniority was important in both factions.

Most clubs had several potential candidates, almost always men. Women accepted or sought sponsorship only when no one else wanted it. In 1974, the ex-Reform leader initiated an Assembly race, but she dropped out because of inadequate financing. Seniority operated, so that as openings occurred she had to disclaim interest until other club members

were considered. Her demonstrated vote-getting ability in the leadership races preserved her "seniority rights," but somewhat conditionally.

In 1978, as rumors of the Republican Senator's retirement circulated, she considered a race for his seat. Three Regular clubs had input into the choice of a candidate. A man from the adjacent club had no reservations about running, even though the Reformers had won the last three State Senate primaries. The female (15 A.D.) leader would only run if the incumbent State Senator retired. Her decision was sound, pragmatically, since the Republican incumbent had defeated his Democratic challengers in 1972, 1974 and 1976.

The man successfully pressed the three clubs for an endorsement, before the retirement was confirmed. As a "Reformer turned Regular" she had the best chance of winning in both Primary and General Elections, but her hesitation undercut her candidacy. Political leaders felt more comfortable with someone who was "hungry to run." Also, the literature indicates that candidates decide to run most often because a cohort of friends or colleagues encourage them to do so. The idea is usually not initiated by the candidate.

The eager Regular lost even the Primary. Although the women had "seniority," as a woman she was in a double bind. She perceived that it would have been disloyal to her club to announce early and then back out, and unfair to the man for her to be willing to run under any circumstances. Competitive women were perceived negatively and were frequently passed over because they were disliked. Aggression, ambition and competition were positively evaluated in men. Less aggressive women, or cautious ones, were viewed as insufficiently interested, or ambivalent. (Epstein, 1981, p. 267) Women who understood the process tried to manipulate a draft. This leader would have preferred a draft.

While her political friends were strongly urging her to announce her candidacy, her male co-leader was far less supportive; and it was he who, to a large extent, controlled the clubs resources. Her ambivalence was directly related to her "insider's" knowledge that because she was a woman the Regulars would not produce for her.

When the incumbent's retirement was confirmed, her co-leader was reluctant to switch. Additionally, the female Assembly candidate refused to support her for the State Senate, because she claimed it would drain off too much energy from her own race. The leader would not run if she had to fight within her club.

District Council 37, a large union representing city workers, was endorsing the Republican. Without the union's financial support or the enthusiastic support of her club, she considered the race to be too much of a long shot.

FEMINISTS OPEN THE PROCESS TO WOMEN

Clubs with feminists active in the leadership sponsored more women because the feminists explicitly recognized the constributions of other women and made them visible to male colleagues. In spite of the feminists discomfort within these clubs, their presence and their criticism of the sexism within the club facilitated participation by other women.

The sponsorship of women in one club demonstrated the importance of a feminist presence in making the party's resources accessible to women. This presence facilitated the career mobility particularly of non-feminist women. It was extremely difficult for feminists to remain active in either Regular or Reform factions. Clubs were not uniformly feminist or anti-

feminist, but any group with strong issue commitments were potentially insurgent. Feminists' loyalty to either faction within the CDP organization was qualified, conditional. Unlike ethnic minorities, support of feminist issues had not been institutionalized within the Party beyond its symbolic presence in Democratic platforms.

A feminist leader, who had entered politics as a Reformer, drifted into the leadership candidacy. Her marginality limited her own career but her feminism opened the club to other women. During her tenure as leader, two women have been sponsored to judgeships in addition to the Assembly sponsorship. Her presence made other women activists visible to the leadership. The other female leaders recruited and socialized into support for the existing system did not facilitate career mobility for themselves or for other women. The atypical experience in the 15 A.D. where within three years three women have been sponsored, verified the importance of even a token feminist in opening the process to other women.

In Regular clubs, few women other than the female leader were included in the inner circle. This pattern supported a tendency in women to view one another as competitors.

The County Leader failed to support women for city or state-wide office. Understandably, women with strong Reform credentials had two handicaps. Nevertheless, the County Leader, and some Regular clubs, endorsed Reform Independent men (Samuels, Lindsay). When the County Leader was supporting a New York City Jewish man (Samuels) for Governor, the failure to support Krupsak was problematic. She was a Regular, who brought religious, ethnic, gender and regional balance to the ticket. She won with very few resources. Her success in this statewide race marked a turning point for the viability

of women as candidates. In spite of this success, it was not until the sweep of a citywide office, a Councilmatic seat, and two County Judgeships (1977) that the County Regular organization realized the potential advantage of sponsoring women. While the Regular faction was not more progressive than the Reform group, they were quicker to adapt to changes in the tastes of the electorate.

In 1978, three Regular clubs put up women in Assembly contests. All were high risk races, and in two out of the three the women were considered sacrificial lambs. Still, one was elected and one came within two hundred votes of winning.

Career Mobility

To be upwardly mobile in politics, one must continually build alliances which expand one's political base. Male leaders of County party or union organizations refrained from dealing with elected women seeking higher offices. They presumed that the idealism of women precluded their making bargains. (Epstein, 1981). They saw women either as losers or as untrustworthy. Women who were excluded from such contracts had rather limited political mobility, since they had so few political resources to draw upon to begin with. Up until now, wealthy daughters did not take the route of wealthy sons whose fortunes allowed them to seek state wide offices without much organizational support.

The failure of the Party to sponsor women meant that those who did succeed were insurgents. What differentiated male and female insurgents was the CDP's willingness to deal with male Reformers after a few years of observing them and calculating their power. In contrast, the leadership has more difficulty approaching elected women with a "deal."

PARTY POSITIONS: THE DISTRICT LEADERSHIP

Recruitment

Male leaders rarely faced competition from within their clubs; they either served for life or until they were promoted to a judgeship or the legislature. Before leaving the office, the male leader chose a replacement from his club's leadership, usually someone he had groomed for the position. Men competed within the club to become the Leader's protege. The choice was made by the incumbent in consultation with the County Leader to assure that the new district leader was acceptable.

The unimportance of the female leadership to the Regular organization was demonstrated by the recruitment pattern. Women were recruited to the leadership at the discretion of the male leader. He chose someone who was loyal to him, who was content with the honor or limited patronage involved. Typically, she was a relative, or a long-time club activist. While men actively pursued the district leadership, the women were recruited as their assistants. The male district leaders avoided appointing women who were considered independent or ambitious. Regular male leaders were most comfortable with women who were sufficiently organized to competently administer club tasks but who were not competitive with the male leader for the control of the club. It was preferable to him that her work be interpreted as an extension of his. Many incumbent female leaders were recruited to the Regular organization when the club did not face insurgencies, so no campaigning was required. They lent their name, accepting the post with the understanding that their involvement would not be very time consuming.

In ethnically diverse communities, the female leadership became a way of symbolically representing an ethnic faction in the club without surrendering or sharing power. The recruitment of the female leader was comparable to that of a vice presidential candidate: used to expand a political base, but the incumbent holds an honorary rather than a powerful position. Besides, female district leaders did not have the right of succession.

Recently, male leaders have chosen women community activists as female leaders in order to expand their own political bases. They risked recruiting a candidate with an independent political base. So far, none of these activists have sought higher office. For those clubs which expected primary challenges, a female leader with a community base became strategically important. One female leader who had voted independently was replaced after one term.

How the male leader left the office determined the position of the female incumbent. If he were promoted or retired, her seniority was preserved, provided she had a long tenure as "co-leader."

While the new male leader may wish to appoint a "co-leader," it was difficult to replace a female leader who wished to remain. The new leader usually had a good relationship with the leadership, since they probably had worked together in the club for several years. The power bestowed on the male leadership, and its absence in the female post, meant that even if they disagreed, she could make no difference. He could continue with or without her. If the male leader lost an election, the County Leader continued to recognize the club through him or a county replacement. Female leaders who lost were not replaced, which confirms their adjunct status.

ELECTIONS

Since the female leader served as an adjunct and received lower rewards from the Party, less was demanded of her, in terms of political campaigning, fundraising, or work in the club.

The low priority of the female leadership in the Regular organization was exemplified by the campaigns they ran, and the Election results. Although the leadership was described as a team effort, the male candidate was emphasized and the female candidate was "also running." The campaign strategy determined the tasks set out for the candidates, but whatever the tasks, (shaking hands at subways, visiting block parties, attending community meetings) the male candidate was expected to campaign more heavily. The female leader's race was secondary, even when she was encouraged to campaign with the male leader. The recruitment of community activists for female leader did not alter the Regulars' strategy. They expected the male leader's victory to carry the rest of the ticket. Practically, the County Leader dispensed favors through the male leader, which encouraged placing stress on his race.

In the Regulars' leadership races, male candidates usually ran ahead of female candidates. The higher vote indicated the heavier emphasis placed on it, and his position on the ballot.

Statistically, the number of votes cast dropped off for each successive office. Local and party offices were always at the bottom of the ballot. Male leadership candidates appeared ahead of the female candidates on the ballot and expected to benefit slightly by their position. But the gap between male and female candidates was too great to be explained by ballot position alone. The recognition of the advantage of ballot

position in other races led to a change in Election Law; the names must now be rotated to eliminate the advantage of ballot position. It did not apply to the leadership because the male and female slots were treated as separate offices. Still, if the positions were equal legally, both had the same voting rights at conventions, there was no reason why the male leadership always appeared first on the ballot, since one's place was determined in descending order, by office.

REFORM LEADERSHIP RACES

The disparity between the two Regular leaders plurality did not exist for Reform leadership candidates who ran as a team and deliberately emphasized the two positions equally. In contrast to the Regulars, they stressed the equality of the positions. Both were leaders, and only co-leaders in relation to one another.

Reform clubs sought the leadership to influence the internal mechanisms of the Party, to undercut the Regulars' opposition, and to build a local political organization.

In Reform races the total votes received by the male and female leadership candidates were very close. Even when the totals were similar the female insurgent won by a greater per centage, or had a higher plurality than the male candidate. Fewer of the Regulars' supporters bothered to vote for the female leader which confirmed the Regulars lower commitment to it. If only one Reform candidate won, it was the woman, since the Regulars fielded a weaker campaign for the female leadership.

Recruitment in Reform Faction

Two patterns of recruitment for female leaders occurred, depending on the openness of the club to participation by women.

In clubs accessible to independent women, women were sponsored who wanted to win enough to campaign seriously.

When the insurgent female candidates were recruited independently, they were qualitatively different from their Regular counterparts. They were serious about politics, and had career interests.

Four of the five insurgent women leaders recruited independently have sought legislative office in subsequent elections (two fielded assembly campaigns in 1980). Their motives differed from those of women recruited in both Regular and Reform circles who saw the leadership as a favor to the Party or a male incumbent. Instead, they used the leadership as a first step in a career ladder.

Within the Reform movement in thes county, women were also drawn into a district leadership, through male sponsorship, in which they were used to support men's careers. The Vietnam insurgency brought insurgent assembly members (male) into the legislature with very weak political bases, consisting mainly of a network of friends and relatives. When they sought the leadership, it was considered a step towards guarding the incumbent assembly menber's seat, and not seen as a worthwhile end in itself. In two cases, incumbents ran their wives for female district leader, assuming that the name familiarity was advantageous. In another instance, a Reform State Senatorial candidate sensed the potential criticism of his wife's running, so she ran under her maiden name. Two of these wives had only been activists as an aid or support to the political career interests of their spouses. The third had little or no political involvement before her candidacy. The recruitment of their wives by these reform Assemblymen had varying motives. For the Senatorial candidate, there was no club base

to speak of, since he had split from a strong Reform club which had coalesced with the Regulars. He recruited his wife because there was no one else.

The wife who had not previously been politically involved came from the club which had a history of discouraging women activists and of intermittently attempting to deal with the Regulars. The incumbent assembly member perferred to have his wife, whom he controlled, run; he could have her step down if he secured a Congressional endorsement. Explicitly, he sought a pawn or pawns. He also chose the male leadership candidate, a close friend, who had also been inactive in Reform politics but who was amenable to doing a favor for a friend.

In the third case, the assemblyman was highly ideological and very patriarchal in his personal style. He trusted very few of his colleagues and had a difficult time recruiting independent women into his campaign. Of the three wives who ran, only his wife won. While his charismatic and idealistic style drew many student aides and volunteers, familiarity with his operation caused high turnover, which left him dependent upon his wife's candidacy.

Opportunities for independent women were greater in County Reform clubs where participation was tied to promotion in the club organization. Still, a pattern of recruiting women through male sponsorship, where the women's interest was subordinated to the interest of the men, was common in both the Regular and Reform factions. It cannot be assumed that the Reform faction sponsored women, or that women active within it were independently motivated political actors.

SPONSORSHIP OF POLITICAL OPERATIVES

In addition to the party's sponsorship of candidates, the CDP provided career ladders to those who sought politics as a profession. Through patronage appointments, the party recruited and promoted those whose skills and contributions were useful to the organization. The CDP tried to select the most talented campaign workers since electoral success determined its strength. Patronage jobholders were the core of the CDP's labor force responsible for the maintainence of the organization as the staff of elected officials, or government agencies, who expedited government processes for the party faithful. These activists were the mainstay of the Party's district clubs.

A broad range of patronage existed, from high salaried and high status commissioners to mundane clerical and unskilled labor positions. These full-time appointments reflected the CDP's hierarchy. The best patronage went to those expected to take responsibility inside the organization and the more mundane positions supplied the seasonal workforce expected to attend fundraisers and be available for the big elections push. Nepotism interfered with the party's ability to recruit the best talent available. Close familial ties to party leaders precluded the need for some to contribute anything besides money to the Party.

In this county, gender and expectations of appropriate gender roles incluenced the distribution of appointments and interfered with the ability of the CDP to recruit the best talent available to it.

There were several sources of patronage because of the divisions between Federal, State and local government. The Reform faction's patronage was limited to the staff of Reform elected officials. The County Regular

organization controlled the major share of political appointments. The reciprocity between those elected through the efforts of the Regular clubs encouraged the funneling of patronage through the district leaders in those clubs.

Patronage recommendations were subject to the discretion of the County Leader and "his" district leaders. Bright men, credentialed or not, were sponsored into government jobs with career ladders in exchange for assuming campaign or club responsibilities. Women were rarely sponsored regardless of their contribution to the Party. This CDP recruited housewives whose family commitments encouraged involvement, whether salaried or volunteer, to be temporary. The party's network relied heavily on the family, wives and children of the male patronage jobholder.

Regular party women were recruited through male relatives and friends and worked in clubs in support of the men since so few of the party's rewards were offered directly to women. These women were recruited and socialized to accept gender tracking in the dispensation of patronage. The most skilled female activists were offered the "best" of the clerical pool.

Career sponsorship was used to reward and motivate people to undertake substantial campaign work or the maintainence work of the district clubs. For the most part, the Regular clubs recruited men to take these responsibilities.

The Party rewarded men with both the opportunity to exercise power and substantial patronage. The economic or political rewards were rarely available to women. The prohibitions on women supervising men precluded their having the responsibility within a club or campaign which demonstrated their abilities. In this County, male leaders typically assumed it was inappropriate for women to supervise men. They assumed the men found it objectionable and that was sufficient reason to deny women the opportunity.

The Regular Democratic Organization had difficulty recruiting and keeping women with higher education. Unlike their male peers, the Party did not offer educated women power, managerial appointments or nominations. Politically ambitious women did not stay. This selectivity meant that women participated to benefit male relatives, friends or as an extension of community work.

LEADERSHIP'S PATRONAGE

The District Leadership of the Party was an unsalaried, but very time consuming position. To compensate for their efforts, the county organization found patronage jobs for those leaders who wanted them. Men who were lawyers served as District Leaders hoping to exchange their tenure for a judgeship without having to donate huge sums to the Party's coffers. Lawyers were also favored with a share in the rather substantial court patronage which "County" dispensed. Men without professional credentials worked in the Party because they were better compensated, or more secure, than in the private sector or within civil service jobs. Others sought nominations.

The male leadership assumed women were not motivated by ambition at, least not ambition for their own political careers. The leadership had trouble taking even the few female lawyers seriously, let alone less credentialed women.

The club's selectivity and socialization drew women participants who accepted the gender tracking. The women's response was to either limit their commitment to the club or leave it. Both occurred.

Women leaders expected and got far less for their party service. As patronage jobholders, they were tracked into the lower paying clerical positions, hardly better than the positions available in the private sector.

In a circular pattern, women's lower rewards mitigated their ties to the club and willingness to spend time in its behalf, which legitimized their receiving less reward. But even exceptionally active, competent women received low rewards. The Female leader from the County Leader's home club received the same patronage as a Republican man. Female leaders received honorary recognition or their work benefited a male relative. Frequently, a spouse, who was a lawyer, was made a judge because of his wife's tenure as a district leader. Her labor accrued a benefit directly to her spouse, and only indirectly to herself (interview, 1976). In some cases, the female leader joined the club with the intention of advancing a husband's career.

The patronage appointments to governmental agencies were subject to the gender stereotyping of jobs which operated in the society generally. In practice, women were appointed to clerical - secretarial positions, while men were appointed to higher paying supervisory office positions or unskilled and skilled manual labor.

Sexuality As Symbol

What kept the Regulars from promoting talented women to the degree that it promoted men? In some circles, sponsoring women is interpreted as an admission of a love affair. Some men were unwilling to subject their reputations or a female protege's to slander.[3] Conversely, others preferred the assumption of sexual intimacy to that of collegial sponsorship. The collegial tie with women was received more negatively by peers than an affair, since it implied support of "women's lib".

The County leadership perceived feminity and political interest, particularly career interest, as contradictory. Their traditional attitudes

around sex roles precluded sponsorship which interfered with familial obligations. Yet, in Regular clubs the handful of women in the leadership had already resolved the competing demands on their time. Either they were active as a couple, had older children, could afford childcare or had other alternatives. The club did not refuse the hours of labor those women managed to put into the club. Clearly, the time itself was less of a problem than the professional sponsorship. Whereas women were becoming acceptable candidates, sponsorship as political operatives was more problematic.

Single female activists were not sponsored either. Their political participation was expected to be terminated with marriage. In Wilson's account of the Manhattan Reformers' conversation with an old time boss who asked "What's a nice girl like you doing in politics", the inference was clearly that such participation was inappropriate or that corruption was politically inevitable (Wilson, 1962). In County circles, that attitude persisted. The young and/or single women whom the club captains liked were encouraged paternalistically to find a nice man. The implication was that, once married, they would drop out of politics. Either they were expected to lose interest or be forbidden by husbands to participate. Consequently, single political women were seen, unflatteringly, as frustrated old maids.

One example was a woman with a controlling personality, single, who was extremely difficult to work with. Yet the club exploited her willingness to take responsibility to the exclusion of others, while the members clucked that she was to be pitied. Their portrayal supported outrageous hostility on her part. After all, all she had was the club. This was

accentuated when she appeared at a formal political dinner in a white gown, which club members attributed to her desire to be "really" a bride (15 AD dinner, 1978).

Married women who had such personalities were obviously "not getting enough," but were also curable. Sex was the answer to women's disagreeableness. In a different setting, a male leader displayed his lack of understanding of the feminists, and their political activism. One woman explained how parents saw in the two leading political women in the County a role model for their children or themselves (i.e., bright, successful, ethical). She did not list the attributes. The male leader's response was "Is that what they wanted for their daughters, to be single?", obviously incredulous (strategy, December, 1979). Also, regardless of these women's status, their most salient and negative characteristic to him was their being single.

Comparable to other organizational patterns, men in politics rarely promoted their female assistants "up and out." This policy was reinforced in politics, where personal loyalty superceded other virtues. Party and Public officials had cliques whose careers depended on their leaders' mobility. Still, men were promoted out with the idea of extending one's domain by sending out competent representatives. Kanter cites this pattern in a large private organization (1977). While it was only appropriate for a younger man, an apprentice, to be an assistant without losing face; women were not subject to negative evaluation for remaining assistants or secretaries. Men and women were punished for inappropriate gender behavior and the sexual content of the punishment was significant. Men who remained "juniors" too long were likely to have their capability challenged; it was seen as "unmanly" to be willing to remain subordinate to another man.

In contrast, women who were upwardly mobile, or ambitious to that end, were perceived unwomanly or unfeminine. Much of the description of competition for power was crudely depicted in sexual slang. As shown above, women interested in power were perceived to be sublimating sexual drives.

Insurgent candidates were far more likely to have had women activists in the leadership of their campaigns. The Reformers' greater dependence on volunteers made women more welcome in both clubs and campaigns. When insurgents won they appointed women to their staff in both secretarial and administrative slots.

In Lindsay's mayoralty, his innovation was to appoint a substantial number of women to supervisory positions. Many of these women remained active and formed a core of powerful women in the central city. Lindsay's former aide, Kretchmer, was noted for his sponsorship of women operatives, many of whom were responsible for Krupsak's success, even with very modest resources (1974).

In this County, the ascendency of women operatives was still in its early stages. Reformers have been far less consistent in their support of women than their central city counterparts. Women fared best in those insurgent city or state victories where substantial patronage was part of the "win."

In this County, the small group of elected women had a higher proportion of female staff which reflected the participation of women in their campaigns. A comparable pattern for elected men was to draw on an ethnically homogenuous group which reflected the composition of their network and campaign. For example, Carey's Irish Catholic male network, which developed as his Congressional election network, had to be considerably expanded and deliberately diversifies when he ran for Governor.

The campaigns of women candidates were portrayed as exclusive, no matter how diverse its female staff were in terms of class and ethnicity. Why men chose not to participate was not asked.

SUMMARY: WOMEN'S SPONSORSHIP AS OPERATIVES

The patronage system reinforced a sexual division of labor within the CDP. The labelling and assigning of tasks by gender limited the kinds of participation women did within Democratic clubs and campaigns. The lower rewards typically received by women further limited their commitment to the party and their willingness to assume responsibility. The temporary and sporadic nature of women's activity handicapped their pursuit of political careers. They were left out of the political networks which operated throughout the year. In contrast, after they demonstrated political or organizational skills in club or electoral activity, men were invited into these backstage networks.

Rather than through the Regular County organization, women received their patronage, which could be considered the initiation of career sponsorship, largely through their participation in successful insurgencies and networking. Their efforts in these campaigns established their skills and their interest in political careers. However, city and state-wide insurgencies and the increasing number of women's candidacies did not provide a consistent organizational base for the recruitment and sponsorship of women into political careers.

The emergence of conservative and pointedly non-feminist women candidates further reduced the potential for women's candidacies to provide entry positions for women into politics. As conservative women candidates are sponsored by male political leaders, their network and recruitment of staff would tend to be those recommended by these male leaders.

Opportunities for women, outside candidacy itself, were more dependent on the cultural changes in the society generally, which would no longer pose political interest and feminity as contradictory. This process will be facilitated as women move into careers which are enhanced by political ties. Power has shifted, and is shifting from Reform and Regular district clubs to semi-independent political bases formed around candidacies and elected officials. The decentralization of power and patronage offers more opportunity to women.

Summary: Sponsorship

The CDP's resources and rewards were differentially allocated and gender was certainly significant in the Party's use of its resources and distribution of rewards. Both Reform and Regular factions sponsored women far less than men. This chapter looked at assumptions about gender, male-female work teams and the presence of feminists in both the Reform and Regular clubs.

Assumptions about women, their motives, and their interests shaped their treatment within the CDP. Because women were believed to be uninterested in politics and primarily active in support of spouses (boyfriends), or as civic minded volunteers, they received few rewards for their participation. These beliefs both socialized those women who were activists, and also selectively recruited women into the Party who accepted these traditional values. These beliefs functions as a self fulfilling prophecy.

Gender appropriate behavior frequently blocked women's political mobility. Women were expected to serve when asked, but not to be ambitious, to fight or to demand sponsorship. Indeed, those Regular female leaders who complained were punished. Male colleagues, in contrast, were able to seek CDP support aggressively. The interactive style which was acceptable

for women facilitated defining them as ambivalent, uninterested, or uncommitted. Consequently, it facilitated recruiting them as sacrificial lambs and otherwise overlooking them. Thus, women who followed gender appropriate role performances inadvertently collaborated in handicapping themselves.

Couples as Party Activists

In both Reform and Regular factions married women were usually seen as the supporters of spouses, rather than as individual actors. Recognition and rewards went directly to husbands, and only indirectly to wives. The CDP's differential treatment of spouses, and of colleagues of male-female teams, made women's contribution in Party organizations less visible. This patterning of male-female work teams duplicated the hierarchic relationship of the patriarchal family. Male colleagues were uncomfortable with women Party activists who participated without spouses. The only way in which women were acceptable in politics was with men, but the women who were active in this way were bound by traditional interpretations of their behavior, regardless of their own interest in Party politics. Those who were most interested in politics accepted the restrictions as the price of participation.

Feminist Presence

The CDP's sponsorship of women's issues, or of women into political careers, varied. A feminist presence in a district club did increase the opportunities for women, especially non-feminist women. Feminist success in the larger culture and on the state and national levels of the Democratic

Party, made it possible for women to seek sponsorship and, ironically, to escape being labeled a "libber". Still, women were sponsored only from those clubs where feminists had been active for several years. The general cultural climate was a necessary but insufficient condition for receiving sponsorship.

Reform

Although Reform clubs gave only minimal support or access to women, their structures were more open than were the Regular clubs. They had at least ideological commitments to democratic process, and participation by the general membership was structurally supported by the clubs' by-laws. Single women interested in political careers could receive some support in a few county reform clubs. However, the County Reform caucus had been unresponsive to both women's issues and candidacies in the past, limiting their support to verbal endorsements. Reform women were well-educated volunteers who participated as an extension of civic duty. The selective recruitment patterns produced a female membership which did not expect or demand sponsorship. The Reformers failure to mobilize its limited resources on behalf of women candidates meant that those who sought public office needed to develop their own alternate political base, through community or feminist activities.

Regular

The Regular faction was generally less supportive of women than the Reform. It had substantial rewards at its disposal but the hierarchy itself, the institutionalization of the county leader's relations to the male leaders, defined the female leadership as irrelevent.

While the CDP failed to support ERA, the Regular leadership in the legislature responded to lobbyists for abortion rights. The legislative leadership did fight to preserve medicaid funding of abortion rights, and did not perceive this as a "women's issue" in the narrow sense.

In addition, the county leader and several clubs sponsored women candidates after 1977. Once the Regular leaders recognized the credibility of women candidates with voters, the women began to receive some sponsorship from the County organization. However, the internal operations of most County clubs continued to limit the possibility of female candidates emerging from its rank and file membership.

The patronage system reinforced a sexual division of labor within the CDP. The lower rewards typically received by women limited their commitment to the party and their willingness to assume responsibility. Women's temporary and sporadic activity handicapped their pursuit of political careers. They were excluded from the political networks which operated throughout the year. Men, in contrast, after demonstrating political skills or organizational skills in club or electoral activity, were invited into these backstage networks.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

This study examines exclusion and tracking by gender in a county Democratic political party as a stratification issue. The prospects of women inside the Democratic Party are inextricably linked to their standing in the paid and unpaid labor force and in the society generally. Gender inequality is supported by social patterns within the larger culture such as the segmentation of the paid labor force, the unequal division of responsibilities within the family, and the persistence of patriarchy in general, which supports a sexual division of labor both at home and at work. The major focus of this analysis has been on those interactive patterns within a County Democratic Party which support, and those which challenge, gender inequality.

The exclusion of women from the leadership of political parties, and of private and government organizations as well, was once hegemonically supported. Feminists challenged the tracking of women participants which occurred in most organizations, and labeled it discriminatory. Feminist critics undermined the legitimacy of those patterns which limited women's participation.

As quasi-public organizations, the legitimacy of political parties depends on their appearing to be accessible to public participation. Democratic party organizations provide multiple routes to political careers, some more and some less open to women. But like corporations and government itself, political parties and clubs now face both legal and public relations problems for failing to open their career ladders to women.

Since the County Democratic Organization which I studied could no longer overtly preclude women's participation, a variety of tactics were used to covertly discourage it, and to withhold Party resources and re-

wards from women participants. The penalties imposed on women who seek Party support must be seen as gatekeeping mechanisms. By attempting to participate as equals with male colleagues, feminists highlight the patterns supporting gender inequality.

In this County Democratic Party, women seeking political careers have handicaps imposed by both general patriarchal values and those specific to this party organization and its leadership.

Generally, the low-paying positions women occupy in the labor force precludes their having access to the financial and professional contacts which foster political careers. It simultaneously encourages women to view home and family responsibilities as their "real work" or to give that work priority because someone must do it. Work, school and community activities are considered secondary in importance.

As Epstein (1981) points out, even professional women feel obliged to take more responsibility for marriage and family. Marriage and family are still culturally supported as "women's work".

These patterns support the selective recruitment of women who are good government reformers, issue partisans, or loyal to a specific candidate, a relative or a friend. These activists do not enter party politics expecting to build careers.

The few women for whom career opportunities emerge, experience ambivalence (Epstein, 1981). These women worry much more than male colleagues about being co-opted. Indeed, women public officials are expected to be purer (Epstein, 1981, p. 272) which undermines their ability to make coalitions they need to advance their careers. Again, the double standard operates: women "sell out", while men are "pragmatic", "tough", "bargainers".

Family responsibilities, or perhaps more importantly, the assumtions male colleagues make about the primacy of familial responsibilities, place an additional burden on women activists. Family, a liability for women, is an asset for men, who frequently have the services of a "political wife."

From the perspective of the male leadership, both the unequal distribution of family responsibilities and the beliefs about women's inherent conflicts over work and family roles, reduce the pool of politically interested and available women whom they are willing to sponsor.

But politically interested and available women do emerge, in spite of these barriers to their participation and, more significantly, barriers to their sponsorship into political careers.

The demographic profile of women candidates seems to verify the belief that familial responsibilities make women late entries into Party leadership circles.

Atypically, four of the seven elected women in this County were young and single. All were successful as high-risk insurgents. Late entry may reflect the bias of the leadership in offering sponsorship, as well as unequal parenting patterns.

Feminists in the CDP network without family obligations, had time at their disposal and were interested in party politics but still experienced constraints on their party participation. Young, single women were sexually harrassed. Male colleagues questioned the sexual orientation of women who made unseemly power bids; and women candidates were required to present an image that was sober and gray (Currey, 1977), that is, asexual.

Patriarchal values made the sexuality of young, single, women their most salient trait. Their political interests or skills were muted. Consequently, the sponsorship of young single women was more likely to be interpreted as a romantic liason rather than as a mentor-protege relationship. This was enough to ward off some mentors.

Presumably, the older married woman, whose sexuality is muted, can have a collegial tie to male politicians, where a comparable relation with a young single woman is perceived as troublesome.

The belief that participation by women is inappropriate, whether or not the women involved have resolved or avoid the "role conflicts" of unequal family responsibilities, indicates that "role conflict" arguments are an ideological rationalization among men which discourages the ascendency of women. In fact, local candidacies and party leadership are more easily integrated with household-parental responsibilities than are other careers. No party leaders refuse to accept the substantial time commitments of women volunteers. Only their promotion is deemed inappropriate.

Role conflict is only one explanation which has been suggested to account for women's lack of success in politics. Organizational demands for homogeneity is another.

Bureaucratic legitimacy, it is believed, mandates the use of "objective criteria" in organizational recruitment. Yet, as Kanter has documented, upper management's preference for homogeneity within its leadership serves as a shortcut to establishing trust. (1977, p. 68).

The perception of women as "other" (deBeauvoir, 1970) is routinely and broadly supported. Yet this "otherness" does not prevent women from being trusted as team players when they are subordinates. It is only when she

is upwardly mobile that a woman becomes highly visible, and her difference noted. Her male colleagues collaborate to confirm their common bond, as men, and to affirm her "otherness". Significantly, women's otherness is made visible when they compete for positions once monopolized by men.

Homogeneity facilitates trust and communication because cultural and, more importantly, subcultural meanings and interests are shared. But homogeneity can be based on a number of social parameters: race, age, ethnicity, religion, gender or organizational experience.

Gender is salient because feminist claims simultaneously challenge the legitimacy of male dominance within political parties and encourage women to seek careers in politics, as in other arenas.

The political component of the trend toward homogeneity has not been discussed. Groups who politicized the existence of institutional discrimination have always been suspect. Some groups have only been upwardly mobile since social protest movements exposed discriminatory practices and forced legislative reform to limit institutionalized exclusion. The visibility of ascriptive differences has been heightened by the political pressure generated by these social movements. The presence of a political constituency could qualitatively alter the response the homogeneous insiders give to a heterogeneous newcomer.

Structural constraints on the mobility of women in private corporations operates in much the same ways as in political parties, as noted above. But unlike corporations, parties openly value trust and loyalty more than competence. Even so, the party's dependence on a heterogeneous constituency and its inability to completely control entry precludes the homogeneity of its leadership. Rather, the political model of incumbents

versus insurgents is more useful. Scarce rewards prompts competitors to limit the pool of eligibles by whatever tactics are available.

As more women are active in party politics, they inevitably produce a qualitative change in the way Party business is conducted. The long-term trend is for the definition of "professional politician" to expand to include women.

Interestingly, the feminists in the network studied also find themselves drawn to homogeneous circles of other feminist democrats. Since support of feminist issues is at least a public commitment of both state and national Party organizations, it complements rather than blocks their participation in wider political circles. As a result, women's power at the polls has been clearly established. The Political Action Committees of the National Organization for Women and various pro-choice lobbyists provide some alternative political careers for feminists. Additionally, elected officials who seek endorsements or funds from such women's groups need feminists in their campaign who can speak effectively to feminist groups.

The power of the most patriarchal segments of the CDP is declining. More and more club and campaign organizations include women in their leadership, just as legislative staffs have more women in non-secretarial slots. Fewer CDP circles remain male sanctuaries, but those that do still control most of the County Party's resources.

Party sponsorship in the form of nominations or political appointments still favor men, but more subtly than before. For example, in this County the better paid political appointments are disproportionately held by men. Again, with the exception of a few judgeships, all of the women elected

in this County won as insurgents. Neither their initial success nor their subsequent mobility was supported by the County Party's resources. While their incumbency is often not challenged, neither is it aided.

The heterogeneity of the CDP provides access to women seeking political careers because of the variety of entry levels; that is, clubs, campaigns, legislative offices, and the more politically connected community groups.

The operation of the feminist network continues to support women activists in the CDP. The career mobility of those alligned with the network enhances their ability to aid one another as well as to sponsor new women into CDP circles.

But even the Democratic feminists' success has been very modest, and was only possible because they entered party politics as part of a larger cohort of insurgents. These facts raise serious questions about the prognosis for women who want political careers in the future. Can the impact of feminists on the party be sustained? Can their political base, the network, continue to be used both to recruit women interested in politics and to support women within other Party circles?

In spite of the hardships experienced by the first women elected in this County, their success makes them role models to other women interested in politics.

Women now entering party politics come more deliberately seeking political careers. Many of them start with credentials, such as law or political science degrees, which affirms their seriousness about politics.

Without structural supports to alleviate or eliminate the double load of work and family carried by women, the Party's sponsorship of women into political careers will continue to be severely curtailed. This will reinforce sexual segmentation of the Party's labor force, with women serving

as volunteers or as low paid seasonal employees. Women will confront considerable obstacles and competition for the more desirable nominations and appointments, because of assumptions by male colleagues about their family commitments. Their tracking within Party and government will be perceived as a reflection of their individual choices, rather than structural limitations.

Unlike the earlier cohort of feminists activated in the seventies, recent graduates of professional schools are unlikely to have a feminist support group to politicize the unfairness of expecting women to meet both career and family obligations.

The first claims of feminists were relatively well received. But their ability to be full participants in American institutions depends on a restructuring of familial responsibilities, and a reorganization of work in organizations. The continued support for segmenting the social world into private versus public spheres, family versus work, makes it increasingly likely that women will be "free to choose" careers or family. Then women without family obligations or supports may pursue political and other careers. The harder economic times, and the rhetoric of reverse discrimination will make structural accomodations, such as day care, far less likely.

The feminist's ability to successfully wrest power, albeit limited power, from the CDP was made possible only because of outside support. Feminist organizations throughout the county, and the feminist movement itself, combined to provide an extended political base upon which the network was able to draw. The next cohort of women, even those now receiving law degrees and MBAs, will have a less promising future. The changing

economy will only intensify competition and, therefore, gatekeeping. Their simple presence in elite political circles, as in the professions, verifies claims of "openness". Yet even these privileged professional women remain "marginal men" if family responsibilities remain "women's work".

FOOTNOTES

Chapter One

[1]Gramsci, A., 1971. Patriarchy enjoyed hegemony since both economic and cultural orders supported male dominance There was consensus that such dominance was appropriate. Significantly, what is hegemonically supported goes unquestioned.

[2]Denitch, Bogdan, pp. 44-45. "...the Partisan generation of women has maintained its position, but their gains have not carried over into younger groups to the same extent...Normalization also means privatization and depoliticization of broad layers of the population.

[3]Weber, Max. "Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany", from From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. Gerth, H.H. and C. Wright Mills.

[4]A sexual division of labor in the farm family is modified by seasonal demands, and the sex of the children and other family members.

[5]Party organizations recruited more women volunteers as their tasks became clerical and phone work: work which was sex-typed "female" in the paid labor force.

[6]These inter-organizational relations include the links between campaign operations in support of a slate, the links between clubs, and the relations between factions as they work out the "rules of the game."

[7]In American Pluralism, William Newman calls attention to the fact that a sociology of the majority group is essential to understanding the maintainence of prejudice and discrimination.

[8]Blumer, Herber, p. 41. "One should sedulously seek participants in the sphere of life who are acute observers and who are well informed. One such person is worth a hundred others who are merely unobservant participants."

[9]Berger, Peter. "Sociology As A Form of Consciousness" develops the role of the sociologist to be critical of what others do not see or take for granted, and develops the structural conditions which facilitate such critical awareness.

Chapter Three

[1]This network was comparable to Kadushin's concept of social circles, as the "informal connections in large social systems." Kadushin, P. 685, American Sociological Review, 1968.

[2]O'Neill, 1979; Gruberg, 1978; Meltzer, 1967; Parker, 1972.

[3]The party channels included the Democratic clubs of both factions, the campaign organizations, the offices of elected officials, conventions, and Democratic Party fundraisers.

[4]Rape task forces which treated victims and did preventive education continued these activities but after the legislation was reformed their collaboration with party professionals declined markedly.

[5]The independent congresswoman was seen as attempting to use the caucus without supporting its goals. None of her political credentials supported women's interests or other women or feminist candidates.

[6]These circles had contacts with one another weekly or bi-monthly. The leaders within each circle had contact through work, through the reform caucus, and through the county women's political caucus.

[7]Her well-financed borough-wide field campaign supported the councilmatic race by using the borough's phone banks to pull voters in areas expected to be good for both candidates.

[8]A few feminists were continuously active as supporters and advisers of elected feminists but had sharply limited their public political participation.

Chapter Four

[1]Election Inspectors worked from 6:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m., when the polls closed. By the time they completed tallying, it way be 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. For this day's work they earned $37.50 for up to 15 hours.

[2]Unless the club had a guest speaker, few women came to the meetings, since nothing happened other than that the male leader of club president made a few announcements. Food was served for work parties or before Elections' meetings to draw a crowd for work. When work was needed a work party notice was sent, which included all the Inspectors, who may not be club members. Many more women showed up for these work parties.

[3]Reform clubs that wanted to participate in County or City-wide caucuses were mandated to employ democratic processes, i.e., have the general membership vote to select delegates and made endorsements. This was not universally practiced but the clubs did formally have this policy in its by-laws as a condition of participating in these caucuses.

[4]At first, the clique of Reformers who joined the Regulars explicitly agreed to take turns accepting campaign responsibilities so all had the opportunity to demonstrate their skills and no one was designated the "leader."

Chapter Five

[1]Feminists and pacifists entered party politics with strong issue interests in contrast to community activists who wanted practical services such as trees planted, or removal of alternate parking.

[2]In 1974 James won the district leadership and then ran twice for the Assembly in 1976 and 1978.

[3]Epstein points to "allegations of sexual impropriety" and "sexual jokes and innuendoes" as gatekeeping mechanisms. Epstein, p. 138, Epstein and Coser, 1981.

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