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THE IMPACT OF RESOURCE POWER AND SOCIETAL FACTORS ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1973 AND 1985: THE CASE OF ECOWAS

by

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PREFACE

One of the major principles guiding Nigerian foreign policy towards its neighbors at independence in 1960 was commitment to functional cooperation as a means of enhancing continental unity. However, until the outbreak of the civil war in 1967, Nigeria remained aloof from political and economic activities in the West African sub-region.

Nigeria had very limited bilateral or multi-lateral relations with other states in the region, particularly the Francophone states. But in the mid 1970s, at the advent of the oil boom, Nigeria began to show a dramatic increase in foreign policy activities. For this reason, it is important to examine the place of resource availability in Nigeria's foreign policy. Prior to 1973, other than in population terms, Nigeria had little advantage over other West African states. Its huge population of 63 million at independence certainly attracted foreign interest but the very conservative nature of the political leadership at that time did not bring much attention from the great powers. However, following the 1973 oil price increases, the question of the role of resource availability and foreign policy change became important in analyzing Nigerian foreign policy behavior. Nigeria suddenly began to show a dramatic increase in foreign policy activities and one of its most intense

involvements was in the initiation, creation and maintenance of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

This involvement reflected Nigeria's desire to play a leadership role in West Africa. ECOWAS allowed Nigeria to participate in a large number of activities it had not participated in before, especially regional economic and military issues. This study therefore will attempt to determine how the revenues from oil began to change the perception of the Nigerian decision makers as regards their capacity to initiate and maintain ECOWAS. The primary objective is to identify the determinants of Nigerian behavior in terms of their responsiveness to the changing financial conditions. Nigerian decision makers' perception of Nigeria's capabilities constitutes the basis of Nigeria's policy behavior.

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Finally, special and Himalayan thanks to my loved ones especially my dear wife Ifeoma, for her understanding, patience and love which sustained me through the difficult stages of my life. I hope this work will shed some light to a better understanding of the process that led to the initiation and formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS.

History of Nigerian Foreign Policy: Structural Considerations, 1954-1965.

The administrative foundations for decision-making on Nigeria's foreign policy were laid in the fifties and developed in the sixties. The first administrative act relating to the Ministry of External Affairs, was in 1954, when responsibility for external relations, defence, and foreign trade belonged to the federal government. This was not matched, at the time, by the creation of a distinct administrative machinery to coordinate decisions and actions in these areas.[1] What in fact, happened was that the Chief Secretary who headed the domestic civil service incorporated external relations and defence into his schedule, but he lacked the staff, the specialist knowledge and the time to lay a solid foundation for a future Ministry of External Affairs. Similarly, the Financial Secretary of the Federation took on responsibility for external trade. Thus began a practice whereby external economics and foreign trade became primary concerns of economic ministries and departments rather than those of the Ministry of External Affairs. Other federal ministries such as Commerce, Social Services, and Labor also moved into the spheres of foreign affairs without training, preparation, and facilities. Higher Education, Tourism and Industrial Development were made concurrent responsibilities of the federal government and the regional

governments. The regions exploited this constitutional situation, moved forcefully into the field of foreign affairs, and acquired considerable practical, though untutored, experience. All this was long before the establishment of a Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations (later renamed Ministry of External Affairs), and the gradual acquisition by the ministry of the type of knowledge and experience required to operate effectively in the international system. Added to this handicap was the fact that the new ministry remained unguided, at that early stage, by any clear foreign policy, and lacked trained staff. The more disturbing situation was that the Regions were involved in the field of foreign affairs and were encouraged somehow by Britain to be there. The powers over external affairs which Britain transferred to the Nigerian federal government in 1954 excluded the power to direct and regulate relations between the United Kingdom and any of the regions of Nigeria.[2]

The nature of the Foreign Office began to change in 1956. This was when the External Affairs Department was established within the Chief Secretary's Office. This Department handled the welfare of Nigerians abroad; catering to foreign consulates in Nigeria; and prepared Reports for the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

In 1957, this department was transferred to the Prime Minister's Office. It performed essentially the same

functions, and its choices and decisions were purely administrative. Much reliance was placed on British representation of Nigeria abroad. A change effected in 1959 elevated the Department to the status of a semi-autonomous unit and left it at that. Hence, it failed to provide a distinctive outlook and orientation on foreign policy and it was officially claimed that foreign policy could only be formulated after independence in 1960.[3]

Hence, until late 1960, there was no Ministry of Foreign Affairs but an External Affairs Department together with units that performed routine administrative and protocol functions. When finally a Ministry was created, the confusion and muddle noticeable between 1954 and 1960 were not removed. The Prime Minister, who was also the first Foreign Minister (1st October 1960 to 17 July, 1961) was unable, because of his many other duties to devote much time and effort to foreign affairs. He established Nigeria's diplomatic missions abroad, balanced representation between Europe and Africa, and accelerated the recruitment of External Affairs officers. But his Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations suffered neglect, shortage of trained staff, and unsatisfactory internal administrative organization. It could not provide adequately for specialization, research and functional competence.

The training program which the first Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, inherited and retained favored generalists rather than specialists in international relations. It also laid stress on, "on-the-job training," a most inadequate means of preparing people for careers in diplomacy and policy-making in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most outstanding defect was in the critical sphere of coordination and leadership. The Ministries of Trade, Education, Labor and Social Services, Finance, Economic Development and the Regional Governments continued their roles in foreign affairs. Coordination was not effected. For example, there did not exist any organizational device of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations for inter-ministerial, interdepartmental, and federal-regional coordination of programs and overseas activities. Any coordination which was achieved was through the position and role of the Prime Minister as leader of the Cabinet rather than as Foreign Minister.[4]

When Jaja Wachukwu became the Foreign Minister in 1961, he reorganized the Ministry in an extensive manner. The new reforms introduced by him included:

(a). The creation of separate Divisions for Africa and Asia.

(b). The creation of a Research Division.

(c). The creation of an Economic Division and a United International Division.

(d). The establishment of a Language Bureau and a Division

for information.

The Second Phase (1966-85).

One of the useful results of military rule in Nigeria has been the readiness of the military leadership to show an awareness of roles which Nigeria can significantly play in the world, particularly in Africa. This was lacking under Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, despite pressures from his Foreign Office. Perhaps, in part, the professional preparations of the Nigerian military leadership contributed to this awareness. The preparations included extensive training in Ghana and Britain; and international peace-keeping roles in Zaire, India/Pakistan and Tanzania. The growing maturity of the home Foreign Office was equally contributory and should not be left out of analysis. By 1978, the small and inexperienced External Affairs unit of the Chief Secretary's Office of 1956 had acquired twenty-two years of practical experience in foreign affairs. It had helped to articulate a Nigerian foreign policy; it had established diplomatic missions in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America, received and catered to foreign diplomatic, consular and conference missions in Nigeria, and had, under both Prime Minister Balewa and Foreign Minister, Jaja Anucha Nwachukwu, sought to organize itself in ways likely to promote its efficiency and effectiveness.

The experiences of the years of political instability and civil war, covering the period 1966-70, showed the incongruence between the functions and the structures of the Ministry of External Affairs. This was quite apart from the need for a review of the value basis and goals of foreign policy.

In a circular to all Heads of Nigerian Missions and all Directors of Departments in 1972, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs underscored this point when he stressed that:

> there have been wide-ranging discussions and extensive consideration...about the re-organization of the Ministry of External Affairs in order to provide a more effective structure for executing the greatly increased responsibilities and new demands on the Foreign Service and its Headquarters machinery since the Ministry was formally established over twelve years ago.[5]

What then were these increased responsibilities of the Foreign Service, the new demands on its Headquarters machinery, and the structural arrangement introduced in order to achieve effective execution of foreign policy?

The increased responsibilities related to the immense changes which the world international system faced in the period 1965-1975. For example, the post world war military and political alliances of the world were

disintegrating during this period. Both the North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact groups were unable to justify fully their continued existence. A new Europe moving towards economic and political unity emerged. This Europe seemed, at least, to have found peace with itself, to cherish this discovery and to move consciously and carefully to break barriers of politics, trade and culture in order to reemerge as the vital element in the dynamics and processes of the world system.[6] Events in Europe tended to reduce further the role and impact of states as actors in Europe, and to emphasize Europe and its supranational institutions and organizations as the principal actors. It is with this type of change in mind that Nigeria embarked on its foreign policy review and its structural re-organizations.

Besides the NATO and Warsaw Pact which were already weakened by this resurgent Europe, other likely casualties were the Commonwealth and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Britain was definitely incapable of giving to the Commonwealth as much attention as it gave to Europe. The vital question for Nigeria's decision-makers in foreign policy was whether the Commonwealth which was the pivot of Nigeria's foreign policy in the sixties could survive the seventies and eighties.

The new Europe also challenged some of the bases of

the OAU. Twenty out of the forty-one members of the OAU in 1978 were associated with the European Community by treaty. The five North African States of Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt were compelled by geography, defence, economics and politics to place Europe at the center or near enough to the center of their thoughts on foreign policy. The three East African States of Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, and some Commonwealth African States, particularly those in West Africa and Southern Africa, sought either trade agreements or association with Europe. Viewed from this perspective, the OAU was endangered by the new and revived Europe. It was even believed by some that a Euro-African framework devoid of Europe's earlier colonial mentality and economic features, and imbued with a new sense of partnership, co-operation and association could be devised and used.[7]

The actors in the international system were, therefore, changing. Old alliances were proving inconvenient and requiring changes. Old ideological divisions of the world were giving way to increased functional contracts and collaborations. Old balance of power theories were being replaced with new realities and new ideas, such as the idea of deterrence. Europe had risen in the West just as Japan and China rose in the East. The times were, therefore, exciting, unsettled and uncertain. It became imperative that Nigeria's decision-makers needed to grasp and use the underlying essences of the developments to promote radical change,

planning, and rationality.

The new demands on the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) were many. Because of policy decisions emphasizing more involvement in the affairs of Africa and the world, and in direct response to the vast changes in the international political system, more Nigerian diplomatic missions were established. It was, therefore, important to recruit and train the right type of manpower for these missions. The problem was compounded by the loss to the Foreign Service of diplomats from the former Eastern Region during the war, and by the increased demand for high level manpower by both the federal and newly established state civil services within Nigeria. Recruitment and training thus emerged as dominant administrative functions of the late sixties and early seventies.

The impact of crude oil on Nigeria's external economics and international trade has been well known. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) realized that regardless of the roles of the Economic Ministries of the Federal Government, it was a responsibility of the MEA to devise an effective strategy for coping with oil diplomacy because it was expected to build up expert knowledge in this new field of external relations, to train oil diplomats, and to establish a functioning system for coordinating the work of its unit on oil with those of the Ministries of Finance,

Petroleum, Mines and Power. In addition to these, it was realized that the MEA should be able, at any time, to guide Nigerian diplomatic missions as to Nigeria's energy policy, and should receive as well as feed the economic ministries with foreign intelligence on energy and oil diplomacy. A structure was thus required to do these things. The growth of the EEC, the decline of the Commonwealth and the need for economic groupings in Africa reinforced the demands for improving the capacity of the Foreign Office to deal with economic matters.

A reorganization plan for the Ministry of External Affairs was developed in 1971 under Commissioner Arikpo and Permanent Secretary Iyalla, and was aimed at meeting the perceived functional requirements of the ministry. Under the plan, new divisions were added. An Inspectorate service was located outside the principal line agencies of the Ministry and the Research Department was expanded.[8]

History of Nigeria's Foreign Policy: Content.

At independence in 1960, Nigeria was essentially an exporter of agricultural raw materials. It relied exclusively on the West for technological, financial and political support to maintain internal stability and keep development projects afloat. In turn, the country undertook to support Western policies in the African continent and on other international issues. The power elite, created through the

activities of European finance capital and the Western press undertook to convince the leadership and public that the country was destined to lead Africa and the Black world. The country was hailed as the cradle of democracy in Africa. The first Prime Minister was called "the golden voice of Africa" and in their pronouncements and writings the power elite developed this belief which in reality lacked a credible basis. For instance, the first Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that, "our country is the largest single unit in Africa....we are not going to abdicate the position in which God Almighty has placed us... The whole black continent is looking up to this country to liberate it from thralldom."[9]

The basis of this belief has changed over time, population, size, wealth, largest army in Africa, democracy and now oil. But analysts of Nigerian foreign policy have continued to stress the leadership role of the country in Africa. For example, Olajide Aluko declared that "Nigeria cannot readily give up the bid to play a leading role in the Organization of African Unity (OAU)."[10] The Nigerian Government also lent support to such interpretations when in the so called Second Development Plan in 1973, it argued that "the country is fortunate in having the resource potential in men and material and money to lay a solid foundation for a socioeconomic revolution in Africa. The uncompromising objective of rising economic prosperity in Nigeria is the economic independence of the nation and the defeat of neo-

colonialist forces in Africa."[11] Furthermore, in a speech to the nation on October 1, 1973, General Yakubu Gowon, the architect of ECOWAS, emphasized the country's continental responsibility thus:

> Our policy has been one of upholding the dignity of the African, safeguarding his interest and promoting his wellbeing and protecting him from all forms of oppression and exploitation...The support which Nigeria gives for the struggle for human dignity and eradication of all racialism and colonialism in Africa and our determination to pursue these goals will continue to be intensified until the whole of Africa is free from the stain of degradation.[12]

The curious aspect of this over-extended responsibility which the Nigerian power elite seems to have imposed on itself becomes clear when it is realized that the country has remained underdeveloped in all respects. For the Nigerian state, this preoccupation with external issues provides a breathing space and diverts attention from pressing internal issues.

This belief that Nigeria was destined to lead Africa became stronger with the oil boom. Faced with a population of about 100 million, a standing army of about 200,000 and oil production (prior to the glut) in the 1980s of over two million barrels of production per day, there was very little one could do to convince the Nigerian power elite that the country was still poor, underdeveloped and peripheral in the world economy. With the oil boom providing the Nigerian state with huge revenues, the power elite was

able to buy its way into several activities in the international arena creating the impression that some dynamism existed in foreign policy.

But the nature of oil production and marketing on which the state became absolutely dependent for revenues introduced a new and often neglected dimension into the relative power and independence of Nigeria. Though at independence, Nigeria was an exporter of primary products, by 1975 oil had become almost the sole source of foreign exchange earnings (see Table 1). Agriculture was neglected and military expenditure increased tremendously. But the oil sector in Nigeria is dominated by foreign oil companies especially in terms of technology, marketing information, prospecting capacity and ability to withstand the crisis of the international oil market. The danger inherent in this dependence on oil is evidenced in the fact that by the 1980s, the oil bubble burst, leaving Nigeria as poor as ever. The Nigerian state was dependent on the continued cooperation of a handful of workers and oil companies. This situation was very beneficial to the power elites: the oil companies handled all the risks and the state through the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNPC) collected the rent.

Table 1

Nigeria's Oil Economy During Oil Boom.

Oil as a % of:	1970	1973	1974	1975	1976	1978	1979	1980	1983	1984	1985
GDP	10	23	22	18	18	17	24	26	14	17	18
Government current revenues	46	67	81	79	78	68	82	84	69	73	73
Merchandise exports	58	85	93	93	96	89	94	96	96	97	97

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria.

PROFILE OF ECOWAS.

Post-independence economic development in West Africa in the early 1960s indicated striking features of underdevelopment: the predominance of a primary sector, a high concentration of income, sparse diversification in its production system, and an external market far outweighing the internal. Hence, West Africa required some form of reconstruction as a group if political independence was to retain its meaning and value. Economic integration was then conceived as an integral part of this internal politico-economic reconstruction and it was against this background that the Economic Community of West African African States (ECOWAS), was formed on May 28, 1975 to promote economic cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity. The Community's activities began slowly, and its first four years were largely devoted to institutional building and to putting flesh on the bones of the Treaty. The substantive implementation of the Treaty commenced in May 1979, and it obliges Member States to refrain for two-year period from imposing new customs duties or taxes and from increasing existing ones.[13]

The geographical scope of the sixteen countries which are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ranges along the West African coast from Mauritania in the north west to Nigeria in the south east, and includes neighboring land locked states. Other member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire

(used to be called Ivory Coast), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra-Leone and Togo.[14] Non-members of ECOWAS, such as Chad and Cameroon, are also touched upon when appropriate. Statistical data for the region are notoriously poor, a factor which hampers an accurate survey of pertinent facts and presents serious hazards for the development planning process itself.

Countries in the sub region of West Africa are more different than they are similar. The most striking differences can be seen in Nigeria, whose population and Gross National Product (GNP), are roughly equal to those of the other fifteen members of ECOWAS combined. This intraregional inequality has often hampered cooperative virtues and provoked suspicions of Nigeria's intentions within ECOWAS. Reinforcing divisions are further differences, such as the trilingual cultural heritage of Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone influences on countries as well as the numerous currency zones across West Africa. Such a range of cultural, historical, political and economic differences remained a serious obstacle in the search for further cooperation and potential integration.

An additional hazard to development efforts within the sub region is the extreme political instability of many of its member states. According to Claude Welch, West Africa accounts for disproportionately large share of coups d'etat

within the continent, and that these coups have destabilizing and debilitating effects upon the countries and their development goals.[15] Planning in particular becomes problematic because political fluidity detracts from the long term stability desired for the success of these development schemes. Other problems also impede the planning process, such as the paucity of resources, inefficiency, corruption, and the lack of political will. Such a mix of factors led Douglas Rimmer to conclude that development plans in West Africa were ineffectual. At best, therefore, central plans in West Africa have been loose envelopes of ambitions and desire within which the economies have evolved, at worst they have been totally irrelevant.[16]

The intricacy of the economic, political and social dimensions of the West African sub-region has been acknowledged and high lighted by previous researchers. As one study puts it, "the West African sub-region is the most varied in Africa as to the size of countries, degree of economic development, language and economic internal and external links."[17] Plessz, on the other hand, states that "West Africa occupies a very particular position in so far as integration is concerned."[18] While Adebayo Adedeji aptly adds that "a study of integration efforts in West Africa is inevitably a study in frustration."[19] For if Africa as a whole is badly fragmented, West Africa is even more affected than elsewhere on the continent. This is a direct result of the

intense competition for trade and territorial control that took place among the European powers between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries.

West Africa therefore represents the most heterogeneous conglomeration of states in all Africa, and has the largest number of mini-states. The sixteen countries of ECOWAS occupy a geographical area of 6,141,153 square km., and share among themselves a total population of almost 150 million in 1985. They however, vary considerably both in size and population. Cape Verde, the smallest of them, has an area of only 4,033 square km. and a population of less than half a million. The corresponding figures for Niger are 1,267000 square km. and 5.3 million (1985), while Nigeria had a total land area of 923,768 square km. and an estimated population of 90 million, representing nearly 60% of the sub-region's total population.[20]

Nigeria's Policy Towards West Africa.

Four major principles guided Nigeria's policy towards its neighbors at independence in 1960. These were: respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of every African state, equality of all states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and, finally, commitment to functional co-operation as a means of enhancing continental unity. It was in line with these principles that Nigeria joined the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and embraced non-alignment. However, until the

outbreak of the civil war in 1967, despite the above mentioned pronouncements about continentalism, Nigeria remained aloof from political and economic activities in the West African sub-region.

Several reasons have been advanced in an attempt to explain this aloofness by the most populous nation in the region. The argument that the relative economic and military weakness of the other states in the region called for limited attention appears rather weak in face of the reality of socio-economic conditions in Nigeria. Rather, the problems of unity and stability coupled with a preoccupation with economic growth were so enormous as to leave little time for the pro-Western and conservative government that replaced the colonial authority to have time for extensive external affairs. Moreover, unlike post-1973 regimes, resources available to the immediate post-independence government were severely limited in all respects. The limited breathing space available to the government of Tafawa Balewa was spent on dealing with Ghana, preventing the spread of *Nkrumahnism and socialism.*[21]

In the light of this situation, Nigeria had very limited bi- or multi-lateral relations with other states in the region, particularly the Francophone states. Interest began to be shown after the civil war of 1967-70, and this was accelerated by increased oil revenues.The realization of the fact that Nigeria's security could not be totally

divorced from those of other regional states led to a more active interest in West African affairs. This realization came primarily from the support given to the secessionist forces by the Francophone states during the civil war.

One of the manifestations of the country's new foreign policy interest in the region was the initiation and creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The military government was able to win the support or cooperation of other states because it was willing to use oil as foreign policy tool and was prepared to spend oil revenues to achieve its foreign policy objectives. These actions were also made possible by the socioeconomic crisis which the rise in oil prices had created in other regional economies coupled with the desires of other states to take advantage of the benefits which Nigeria was likely to provide as the "core state" in the integration scheme. It is no secret that much is expected from Nigeria in this region.

It is interesting to note that though the dominant power elite that controlled the Nigerian state prior to the civil war had been opposed to integration on the grounds that the country had nothing to gain from the other relatively smaller and poorer states, this perception changed completely after 1970. The impact of the civil war, the realization that the country was not as secure as it had been assumed, the role of France on the side of the secessionist forces and its initiative immediately after the civil war in

Nigeria to create in the sub-region an exclusively Francophone economic community, pushed Nigeria to take immediate action. The general perception was that France was planning to create conditions for the isolation of Nigeria in the sub-region.[22]

Thus, beginning in 1972, Nigeria began making moves to Togo in relation to the formation of an economic community that would embrace all the states in the region for the first time. By May 1973, Nigeria had virtually succeeded in achieving this objective and ECOWAS was born in 1975 embracing all the sixteen states in the region which are: Benin, cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory-Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Togo and Upper-Volta (which is now known as Burkina Fasso).[23] This established for the first time a regional community that cut across colonial, linguistic and cultural barriers, making provision for the harmonization of all economic, social, cultural and ultimately political spheres of activity.

Nigerian Use of Financial Power.

Nigeria's financial power based on oil revenues was a key factor in the successful creation of ECOWAS. If one takes a look at the mechanisms employed by Nigeria to win the support of other states in the region to join ECOWAS, one finds a mixture of bribery and indirect blackmail: bribery in the sense that Nigeria suddenly became very generous to the

Francophone states in financial aid and unsolicited donations; and indirect blackmail in the sense that by bribing and winning the support of some major states in the sub-region, the relatively smaller, landlocked and poorer states had little choice but to join. Even some relatively developed states like Senegal, despite its opposition to ECOWAS and fear of possible domination by Nigeria, had little choice but to join the community. How then did Nigeria bribe these states into joining ECOWAS?

Nigeria virtually purchased its dominant position in the sub-region. Admittedly, countries like the Ivory Coast saw Nigeria as a market for their manufactures while the landlocked states in the region saw ECOWAS as a way to avoid stultifying tariff barriers. The drought- stricken Sahelian states also expected some financial assistance from Nigeria which had joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971. The inability to translate available resources into a credible base that could serve long-term interests meant that Nigeria had no choice but to take the route constantly taken by capital-surplus third world economies- financial contributions. Thus Nigeria took this path to establishing its influence in the region and continent through the hosting of all kinds of meetings. The country also employed soft loans, joint investments and donations.[24]

In pursuit of its aims, Nigeria constructed a

highway linking Idi-Iroko in Nigeria to Port-Novo in the Republic of Benin at a cost of $2.7 million to Nigeria. A $10 million, 25 year interest free loan was also granted to Benin, while Nigeria agreed to take over 30% of the equity and invest $10.8 million in a joint cement project in the Republic of Benin. It also undertook to participate to the tune of $20 million in a joint sugar project in Benin.[25] The flagrant display of wealth between 1972 and 1975 when ECOWAS was formed did not stop there.

Nigeria donated printing machines worth $980,000 to Benin and on foreign trips in the region, Nigerian leaders virtually wrote out checks at every stop. In 1972, on a visit to Guinea, the Nigerian leader donated $500,000 to the ruling party, $250,000 was donated for cultural development in the Republic of Benin and $100,000 was given to a horticultural and nutritional center also in Benin.[26]

Even while electricity was scarce in Nigeria, some West African countries were supplied power. The National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) experienced drastic reduction in power which led to persistent power interruptions to the populace. Even industries reported that 30% of productive capacity was immobilized due to constant power cuts, and still the Nigerian government undertook to supply Niger Republic with electricity from Kainji Dam at a maximum rate of 30,000 Kilowatts.[27]

General Yakubu Gowon, former Nigerian Head of State and the architect of ECOWAS indicated in 1973 that Nigeria's interests were: the development and expansion of its economy, the raising of the standard of living of its population, and the future physical security of its territory. he also stated that, they could be only be effectively secured through joint programs of balanced production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services on a regional basis.[28] In a speech to the Supreme Military Council marking Nigeria's independence anniversary, General Gowon also reiterated the importance of Nigerian leadership in the West African arena when he said that "our wellbeing depends on our economic strength to lead this region of the world."[29]

But realistically, how rich were the Nigerians? Statistics in the annual World Bank's *World Development Report* show that Nigeria's Gross National Product (GNP) was, in 1973, the equivalent of $620 per capita, and had been increasing during 1960-73 at an annual average rate of 3.7 percent. This made Nigeria 56th in the per capita GNP among the 124 countries the report lists.[30] All such figures must be treated with caution. Douglas Rimmer, for example, has estimated that if the real local purchasing power of the Nigerian currency (*naira*), rather than the dollar, was used as the index, the per capita figure could be doubled.[31]

In Black Africa, however, of the major countries

only the Ivory Coast ($940 in per capita GNP, which was at the time increasing at 2.5%) was, in 1973, better off than Nigeria.[32] Among Nigeria's neighbors Cameroon ($500 per capita) alone approached her. Her northern neighbor, Niger ($210) per capita) had a negative growth rate. Benin, to the west ($220 per capita), had a growth rate of only 0.6%. And Chad ($90) had a negative and rapidly falling growth rate.[33] These countries were among the world's poorest. Some African countries with populations of under one million, on the other hand, including Mauritius, the Seychelles, and above all Gabon, had a higher GNP per head than Nigeria. Ghana's GNP however, once far higher than that of Nigeria, had fallen to $400 per head, and Ghana's growth rate was negative and her economy was in ruins. If we look outside Africa, or even to North Africa, the picture is not encouraging. Nigeria's 1973 GNP per head of $620 was well above India's $150; but it was far below the $900 of Tunisia, the $950 of Malaysia, Brazil's $1200 and Singapore's $2900.[34] Clearly, oil was responsible in the 1970s for Nigeria's economic position in Black Africa. However, Nigeria's economic position was not particularly strong in the rest of the world, even in other areas of Africa.

Rationale for the study.

The literature on Nigeria's foreign policy has been reasonably rich and informative on the objectives, direction, substance and pre-occupation of Nigeria's foreign policy but has shown a curious and indefensible neglect of how foreign

policy decisions are made and implemented. Therefore, this study will examine this process with regard to the decision to sponsor and become a member of ECOWAS.

In terms of the literature on Nigeria's foreign policy, one school of thought is represented by Bolaji Akinyemi, Olajide Aluko, Madunagu and Sayre Schatz.[35] They took it to be axiomatic that due to its oil wealth, Nigeria was "powerful" and "influential." They considered Nigeria to be Africa's great power, and advocated an energetic foreign policy in Africa.[36]

Another school of thought represented by Mazi Ray Ofuegbu and Osoba proposed a careful balancing of means with ends rather than a reckless pursuit of grandeur exemplified, in their opinion, by Nigeria's role in the creation of ECOWAS.[37] They claimed that Nigeria was not ready to allocate needed resources from oil to help African states create the economic conditions that would enable them to defend their independence. They based their argument on a consideration of Nigeria's own developmental needs and the extent to which the population could be mobilized and motivated to make the necessary sacrifice for African economic development.[38]

In this debate, however, there has not been a systematic analysis of the role of resource power in the foreign policy behavior of Nigeria. This is the gap that this

study aims to fill. This study then will examine the reasons why Nigerian decision makers perceived that on the basis of its oil revenues, Nigeria should be more active in West Africa. Prior to the oil wealth, Nigerian foreign policy was characterized by fewer regional activities with no visible "resource power" to back her rhetoric. After 1970, Nigeria developed a strong post civil war interest in the region and used increasing oil revenues to push for the creation of ECOWAS in 1975. The study will detail this process of foreign policy participation within a theoretical framework of resource power and perception, discussed in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAME WORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR AND RESEARCH DESIGN.

Some Theories of Foreign Policy Behavior.

There has been an increasing recognition of the need for more complex explanations of foreign policy behavior. Two main schools dominate the debate in the field and seem to monopolize the empirical and conceptual energies of researchers, namely, the psychological-perceptual and bureaucratic-organizational schools of foreign policy decision making.[1] Each of these schools, according to Bahgat Korany, has its own varying applications, formulations, qualifications and emphases. The first framework which is part and parcel of the "behavioral revolution" in political science goes back to the early 1960s by Richard Snyder and his colleagues. In 1954 they offered an outline of categories for the collection and processing of data on foreign policy decision making.[2]

The assumption of Richard Snyder and his colleagues is that "the nation state is going to be the significant unit of action for many years to come" and thus strategies of action and commitment of resources will continue to be decided at the national level. The bureaucratic-

organizational school led by Graham Allison has reacted to the psychological perceptual school by enlarging the arena of decision making to include top bureaucrats, and it has refused to see decision making as a deliberate choice to be made by any individual, even the president or the top decision-maker. State action is not a deliberate choice, rational or otherwise, but an outcome. As Graham Allison has noted, decision making is not a matter of what a given nation did, but rather, "why did it happen?"[3] Also associated with this school is Richard Neustadt, who used this model to examine alliance relations between the United States and Britain; Roger Hilman, I.M. Dester, and Morton A. Halperin, who joined forces with Allison in 1972 to provide a succinct statement of their model.[4]

James Rosenau stated that there can be no real flourishing of theory until the materials of the field are processed, i.e., rendered compatible through the use of the pre-theories of foreign policy, period.[5] He also assumed the task of elaborating a pre-theory that would provide "a basis for comparison in the examination of external behavior of various countries in various situations." Three years after Rosenau's publication, Brecher and his colleagues published a multivariable model of an input-conversion/output-feedback foreign policy system, consisting of fourteen independent variables clustered in five groups (following the example of Harold and Margaret Sprout) embracing the psychological

and operational environments. Rosenau's adherents have used events data as a technique of analysis to describe a country's general behavior pattern at the international level, whereas Brecher and his school have focused more specifically on crisis situations, all the while subjecting such concepts as attitudinal prism, stress, and coping to content analysis. Yet it seems even the study of decisions is fraught with differences in approach and lack of cumulativeness among foreign policy analysts.[6]

The study of national attributes and their relationship to foreign policy is one of the approaches used in foreign policy analysis. Scholars have long assumed that such variables as population, geography, military capabilities and technology levels have an impact on foreign policy. Maurice A. East presented a theoretical framework that included the concept of "capacity to act" as the construct integrating most, if not all, national attributes when related to foreign policy. Capacity to act referred to the amount of resources a nation has and its ability to utilize these resources.[7] Rosenau also generated considerable theoretical interest in national attributes and their influence on foreign policy behavior when he presented his pre-theory of foreign policy. The third variable, called "political accountability," has been considered by some to be an unstable measure, subject to too rapid and frequent change to be a national attribute.[8] While there is no general

consensus on the usefulness of these theories in the analysis of the foreign policy behavior of a nation, the researcher will utilize some aspects of the national attributes theory in the course of this investigation.

Theoretical Propositions.

The theoretical framework for this study will then be based on Maurice East's concept of "capacity to act," a national attribute perspective which refers to the amount of resources a nation has and its ability to utilize them.[9] Within this framework I will also consider the decision makers' perception of their capacity to act and how this affected the nation's foreign policy behavior. In the case of Nigeria, I maintain that Nigeria's decision makers' perception of increased capacity (based on increased oil resources and certain other societal factors) led to the decision to initiate and support ECOWAS.

The theoretical literature on national attributes theory focuses on the concept of "capacity to act," a construct which is central to this study. This theoretical construct refers to the resources available for national use and the ability to utilize these resources in the service of various foreign policy goals and objectives. The attribute framework incorporates other factors besides natural resources such as oil. The ability to use said resources depends on internal societal factors, such as governmental

and bureaucratic organization, societal instability, stress, and level of modernization. These cumulatively may help to determine the ability of decision makers to use these "resources" and also their predisposition to act. It is important to distinguish between the size of the resource base and the regime's ability to manipulate such resources. A regime operating with a relatively small resource base that it controls absolutely will have more freedom of action than a regime in a large society that cannot as easily command the deployment of such resources.[10]

East draws up a model for converting and controlling resources which is dependent upon what he refers to as the level of social organization of the national society.[11] Social organization consists of two dimensions: level of modernization and level of societal stress. The modernization dimension taps the ability of the nation's leadership to allocate and redistribute resources to different national tasks. It is assumed to be positively related to capacity to act. The societal stress dimension includes those persistent problems in the society that the government must deal with, but that are difficult to resolve in the short run. Stress is assumed to be negatively related to capacity to act.[12]

Modernization as a dimension of social organization is broader than economic development and includes much of what Deutsch referred to as social mobilization.[13]

In terms of national attributes, modernization can be tapped by measures of economic development, levels of technology, communication levels of the society, size and efficiency of the bureaucracy, and so forth. In general then, nations with higher levels of modernization will have the potential for greater control over their resources and a greater degree of adaptability in determining where and how these resources will be used. More modernized nations will have a greater capacity to act.

The second dimension, societal stress, has a negative impact on social organization. Examples of the types of measures that might tap this dimension include chronic inflation, substantial unemployment, widespread hunger and disease, persistent and high levels of domestic violence and corruption. Stress is negatively related to social organization (and ultimately to capacity to act) because of two factors. First, according to East, the existence of high levels of social stress means that intrasocietal relationships are not operating effectively and efficiently and, thus, may reduce the nation's capacity to produce goods and services.[14] Secondly, societal stress requires the government to allocate more resources, more time, more attention, more material goods to the management of these societal problems, which decreases the resources available for utilization in foreign affairs.[15] Also, the more time and resources nations commit to these problems, the lower their capacity to act.

East further states that the explanatory logic that relates capacity to act to foreign policy behavior can then be stated as follows: capacity to act is comprised of two separate dimensions, size (resources), and social organization (which includes level of modernization and effects of stress). Both are positively related to capacity to act, although each operates through different mechanisms. Nations ranked high on size (resources) and social organization have a greater capacity to act, and those ranked low have the least capacity to act.

Low size/high social organization nations and high size/low social organization nations have a moderate capacity to act. These differences in capacity to act will be manifested in differences in foreign policy behavior in three ways:

1. Differences in the substantive content of foreign policy behavior.
2. Differences in the style of state craft and the techniques used to pursue foreign policy objectives and
3. Differences in the process by which foreign policy is made.[16]

First, one can expect to find differences in the substantive content of the foreign policies of nations with high and low capacity to act because the very fact of having little capacity to act means that certain types of problems will have higher priority. The lack of capacity to act is due to limited resources or low levels of social organization or both. Under these conditions, it can be reasonably argued

that the foreign policy behavior of such nations will reflect concern for and interest in issues that might have an effect on their already low capacity to act. Issues and problems relating to economic growth and development will be particularly salient. Nations will seek out relationships with those other international actors that are most likely to increase their capacity to act. Examples might include signing trade agreements, joining a cartel, seeking foreign investment, applying for international grants and loans, and the like.[17]

East also argues that a similar type of argument can be made with regard to the style and techniques used in executing a nation's foreign policy. Looking again at nations with a low capacity, he claims one can argue that because of their low capacity to act, they are more likely to utilize techniques of state craft which will be "low cost," that is, those that will consume the fewest resources, whether human or non human.[18] Azar indicated that the best illustration for this is the tendency for smaller nations to utilize international organizations and other multilateral (as opposed to bilateral) settings for carrying out much of their foreign policy activity.[19] International organizations, whether global or regional, offer smaller nations the opportunity to hear and to be heard by many nations at a cost which is less than that necessary to send a delegation on a mission to meet bilaterally with another nation.

East indicated also that the process of foreign policy decision making is also likely to differ in high and low capacity nations. For low capacity nations, he claims one can expect the foreign policy making organization to be smaller and to have a lower degree of internal specialization. These factors can then lead to severe problems and limitations- for example, in monitoring foreign affairs issues. Low capacity nations are not likely to be able to monitor effectively all issues and areas of interest to them, nor will they be able to be represented at the national capitals that they would wish. Therefore, decisions are likely to be made in international bodies. Furthermore, because of the importance of economic issues in low capacity nations, the foreign ministry is likely to play a less prominent role in foreign affairs, often taking a secondary position to the ministries responsible for economic issues such as trade, agriculture, finance and the like.[20]

East indicates also that a nation's ability to utilize its resources is clearly a function of the degree to which the regimes are constrained by various political factors (such as instability, corruption, etc.). Even though a national government may have legal access to and control over a large proportion of a society's total resources, as would be the case in a nation with a highly centralized economy (like Nigeria), such access and control would be of little use in foreign affairs if the regime was paralyzed due

to stalemates and inconsistencies in governing coalitions.[21] D.J. Puchala argues that "one cannot always directly associate a state's [size] with its capacity to act in international politics. What counts most is the immediate availability of resources for the service of foreign policy."[22] He goes on to list industrialization, educational level of the population, and efficiency of societal organization as factors that affect a nation's ability to control and to utilize resources. Similarly, K.W. Deutsch, writing about the problem of inferring a nation's power potential from amount of resources alone, uses the image of a charging elephant to make his point. The animal is capable of smashing down large obstacles but is incapable of threading a needle because it cannot control its behavior sufficiently. He suggests that something similar holds for nations- their power potential is based on both the amount of resources and the ability to control, to convert, and to allocate resources.[23]

The Role of "Perception" in Foreign policy Analysis.

The role of perception is that it provides opportunities and constraints for actual choices and thus establishes the human dynamics of the decision making process itself. The operational environment is the environment within which foreign policy decisions are implemented. According to Richard Snyder, it includes the external setting by using

diplomatic, economic and military instruments. The other part of the operational environment is the internal setting. The internal setting extends to the whole structure of the political system. Two crucially important variables in the internal setting are the state's military and economic capabilities which set limits to what the government can do.[24]

The psychological environment is the decision-makers' cognitive, affective and evaluative perceptions of their operational environment. This is the source of all inputs into the decision making process, since no factors can be considered as affecting the decision process unless they are filtered through the psychological environment of the decision-makers.[25] The psychological environment includes perception of the external and internal environment.

Decision makers act in accordance with their perception of reality, not in response to reality itself.[26] This perceptual approach helps us to find and understand the interest and cognitive patterns of social groups which inform the broader social perspective reflected in policy making.[27] Charles Hermann stated that foreign policy results from the decision makers' perceptions of present or expected problems in the relationship between a nation and its international environment (both human and non human).[28]

It then means that it is their perception of the reality of the environment that must be understood in order to explain the decision and implemented components of foreign policy.[29] The observer may regard the implemented action of decision makers as unwise and it may in fact prove disastrous, but neither the judgment nor the outcome serves to explain why the actors proceeded as they did. Only by transcending our own judgment and adopting the perspective of the actor can we engage in explanatory analysis.[30]

According to Robert Jervis, when one considers the three aspects of decision making (the policy-maker's perceptions of the world and events, the different kinds of decisions made and the various types of decision making systems), it is the first (policy-maker's perceptions) that is very important for the obvious reason that it is the link between the external environment and policy decisions. The real world is the world "perceived"; whether that perception is correct or not, determines the decision makers willingness to act. This distinction between things as they appear and things as they are, raises a key question. Is it the objective environment as such that is important or is it the policy maker's subjective perception of his capacity to act and definition of that environment that are important? Or in

the terminology of Harold and Margaret Sprout, should we focus analysis on the "psycho-milieu," the perceived world, or on the "operational milieu," the world that exists divorced from decision makers' values and beliefs?[31] Clearly, the gap between them can range from very large to nonexistent. The operational milieu presumably limits the number of feasible policies that can be implemented; nevertheless, alternative policies are likely to remain, and the policy makers' perception will be crucial in selecting a particular course of action.

Officials and responsible political and bureaucratic leaders are the key personalities who play the principal roles in policy formation and implementation. Particularly important are the images the nation's chief decision maker and his or her key advisers hold of the external world and of their country's aims, capabilities and role in the international system. The American war in Vietnam illustrated the perception issue poignantly. This war has often been mentioned as an instance of misperception by Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations. This is one aspect of foreign policy behavior that has spotlighted critically the issue of how the principal decision makers of a country view the world beyond their own national boundaries.

Johnson and Nixon were said to be "cold warriors."

Unable to overcome their anti communist crusade, they perceived the world (especially the communist world) through distorted lenses and therefore pursued policies unsuited to the contemporary world. The deficiencies of American foreign policy, epitomized by Vietnam but evident in many other parts of the world, resulted from faulty modes of thought rather than from defects of personality or errors of execution. Correct perceptions of the fragmentation of the communist nations and of the nature of the war in South Vietnam would presumably have resulted in a more accurate assessment of American interests in Vietnam, and that in turn would have precluded the massive intervention of 1965.[32] In another example from the economic sphere, most members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, of which Nigeria is a member), over estimated their potential and capabilities. They flirted with the perception that revenues from oil would automatically generate economic prosperity and sustainable growth. In reality, limited prosperity may have occurred, but long term sustainable growth remains a dream.[33] Nigeria is a classical example.

Not being aware of the inevitable influence of beliefs upon perceptions often has unfortunate consequences.[34] If a decision maker thinks that an event yields self-evident and unambiguous inferences when in fact these inferences are drawn because of his or her preexisting views, he or she will

prematurely exclude alternatives because he or she will conclude that the event provides independent support for his or her beliefs.[35] James Bieri claims that this may partially account for the finding that when people deal with consistent information, those with high cognitive complexity tend to be less confident of their judgment than do people of low complexity.[36] People frequently fail to realize that evidence that is consistent with their view may also be consistent with other opposing views. It is common to find actors believing that strong evidence, if not proof, for their views is supplied by data which they fail to note also supports alternative propositions. Thus, they often fit the evidence that conforms to their views to reality.

According to Robert Merton, because people do not understand the degree to which their inferences are derived from their expectations, they tend to see their interpretations of evidence as "compelling" rather than "plausible."[37] Robert Jervis, writing on the concept of misperception, noted that the most obvious safeguard is for decision makers to take account of the ways in which the processes of perception lead to common errors. He stated that if they know that their belief systems are apt to display irrational consistency, they will be more likely to examine the evidence supporting their beliefs to see if there are hard choices that should be made explicitly.[38] For us, the

question that can be posed is, did Nigerian decision makers' perceive an increased capacity to act because of increased resources? Also did Nigerian decision makers misperceive the effects of "societal stress" and organizational factors that might have constrained their decision to be so proactive in ECOWAS?

From a theoretical point of view, we assume that National attributes affect the choice and formation of a nation's foreign policy goals and objectives through the elite's perception of the nation's capacity to act. National attributes affect a nation's goals and objectives, through purposive human actors who are in turn, political leaders, leading members of a bureaucracy, or component members influential in the government (see Table 2).

East's model of the relationships that are assumed to exist between national attributes and foreign policy behavior is reproduced in Table 2. National attributes affect amount of resources and ability to utilize resources which in turn form capacity to act. Attributes also affect the predisposition to act of national leaders and their choices of foreign policy goals and objectives.

Adaption of East's Model to Nigeria.

East's model can be adapted to fit the Nigerian case study by focusing on two principal aspects, resources

Table 2.



The Relationship of National Attributes to Foreign Policy Behavior. Maurice A. East, 1978: 133.

and social organizational factors. I have opted to include as well the concept of perception, which in some ways incorporates aspects of East's predisposition to act as well as his other factor of "personal characteristics of leaders." I feel that perception plays a very critical role in providing opportunities and constraints for actual choices thus establishing the human dynamics of the decision making process itself.[39]

From East's theoretical analysis of the national attributes perspectives and the theoretical aspects of perception, the following assumptions are made:

1. Limitations on a nation's resources place limitations on its foreign policy activities. In Nigeria's case, both availability of revenues from its major resource, oil and the social organizational factors (modernization and societal stress) must be taken into account in analyzing the decision to initiate ECOWAS.
2. It is how Nigeria's decision makers perceived their environment rather than the objective characteristic of that environment that is important. Therefore, Nigerian perception must be analyzed. The basic assumption here is that Nigeria's decision makers may have overestimated the level of modernization and misperceived or ignored the societal stress factor within the country(specifically, the spread of social instability and lack of economic growth) in making their decisions.

Research Design.

On the basis of the above discussion, the hypothesis that informs our investigation about Nigeria's foreign policy experience can be stated as follows: In deciding to initiate and strongly support ECOWAS, Nigeria's decision-makers were motivated by the increased availability of natural/financial resources (oil), but may have misperceived the balance of social organizational factors (level of modernization and societal stress).

In summary then, the research will incorporate the following:

1. The dependent variable is Nigerian foreign policy, in the form of one particular case, Nigerian contribution to the formation and maintenance of ECOWAS, signifying increased foreign policy activity.
2. The independent variable is the changes in Nigerian oil revenues and social organizational factors from 1973 to 1985.
3. The intervening variable is the perception of Nigeria's increased capabilities, and the perception of the factors leading to the emergence of ECOWAS as a foreign policy objective. East's model is therefore modified as the chart on page 50 indicates.

This is essentially a case study of the role of

Table 3.



*Level of modernization and societal stress.

Modified East Model to suit this research.

capabilities and perception as influences on choice. Therefore, the primary tasks will be:

1. To analyze the changes in Nigerian oil revenues that affected the decision to create ECOWAS in 1975.
2. To analyze the social organizational factors that could have played a role.
3. To identify the major policy makers who influenced the ECOWAS initial decision and were involved in later ECOWAS activities and to try to assess how they perceived the situation.

Methodology.

The data needed for this analysis are as follows;

1.Data on oil revenues (collected from secondary sources and Nigerian government statistics).
2. Data on social organization (secondary sources and personal contacts).
3. Data on perception collected as follows;

   Identification of the Nigerian Authoritative Decision-Makers.

   The decision-makers can be divided into two groups, the Head of State and senior political officers and high-level bureaucrats. The list of bureaucrats will consist of officials on the level of director and above in all agencies that have some responsibility for the formation and implementation of foreign policy. The first step is to identify those persons who took part in top-level foreign policy decision making by virtue of their official

position. This will be done by employing the two-step institutional research approach."[40] The steps refer to the identification of the decision makers by their official positions and, second, to identifying those who were known to have participated in certain foreign policy decisions in order to discover the exact membership of the decision making group in this specific case.

4. Decision-makers' perception of the environment.
I will use a qualitative content analysis of primary and secondary materials to try to reconstruct how the decision was made; what were the key motivations and what goals were to be achieved. The primary source will come from public documents, Nigerian government publications, Ministry of Information publications, Central Bank publications, ECOWAS publications, etc. Public documents can be considered valid sources of data for perceptual variables and have been used with success before for perceptual variables.[41] However, because of the nature of the issues discussed, evidence from oral interviews and written questionnaires, newspaper articles and magazine publications will feature prominently.

By looking at general policy statements of the Nigerian leaders or decision-makers, a checklist of the goals sought by the state can be drawn up. We will also investigate the policy objectives by looking at the actions of the policy

makers. Also a brief discussion of the instruments chosen to achieve these goals will be undertaken.

The next chapter will examine the issue of resource capability, specifically the increases in oil revenues between 1973 and 1985. The year 1985 has been chosen as a cut off date for the decision-making aspect of this study because this was the peak of OPEC activities when revenues from oil dictated Nigerian foreign policy behavior.

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CHAPTER 3

THE IMPACT OF OIL REVENUES.

The maintenance and continuity of ECOWAS required unquestionable leadership, commitment (financial and manpower), and cooperation among the states. Nigerian decision makers seemed to have concluded that these goals were achievable because of the availability of financial resources generated by oil. It is therefore impossible to understand the impact of oil wealth on a major Nigerian foreign policy initiative such as the formation and maintenance of ECOWAS without a detailed analysis of how the revenue generated by oil affected Nigeria's economy.

During the early 1970s, oil became the principal source of Nigerian financial bonanza. It became the "engine" that propelled Nigeria to international recognition. Therefore, one cannot successfully discuss any aspect of Nigerian foreign policy activism without the impact of "oil." This chapter then, will systematically examine how the increase in oil revenues may have created the "climate" that caused Nigerian decision makers to feel confident about foreign ventures like initiation of ECOWAS.

The first part will briefly discuss how oil became important in Nigerian foreign policy. It will also discuss Nigerian membership in the Organization of Petroleum and Exporting Countries (OPEC), since the oil revenues which accrue to the Nigerian government are clearly related to OPEC pricing and production policy and changes in the world oil market. The second part will show how Nigerian decision makers, confident of her oil bonanza, sold oil at concessionary prices to African nations (especially West Africa), future ECOWAS members.

The unstable oil market situation and OPEC's restrictive policy explicitly affected the position of Nigeria's crude oil in the world oil market. The achievement of Nigerian national objectives as perceived by Nigerian decision-makers required the maximization of oil revenues. The reaction of the Nigerian government was not automatic but based on the perception of the opportunities and constraints existing in the global oil market. In this situation, they adjusted to the market conditions in cooperation with foreign oil multinationals at the expense of OPEC.

Nigeria's size, combined with its favorable location and reasonable climate has allowed it to produce a variety of vital resources that are income generating and well in demand. With no part of the country really uninhabitable, those factors combine (at least on paper) to

place Nigeria in a position of potential economic prosperity. With an estimated population of 109 million, Nigeria ranks as the eighth most populous state in the world and by far the most populous one in Africa. Successive Nigerian leaders have perceived population, in conjunction with oil wealth, as an advantageous foreign policy resource. They assume (an assumption which other countries have encouraged, at least until the resurgence of post-apartheid South Africa) that Nigeria should lead Africa and serve as the continent's mouthpiece in the world community. In short, the Nigerian leaders consider that its human and economic resources play critical roles in its foreign relations. This is one reason (in addition to ethnic-religious cleavages) why rapid population growth of 3.3 percent a year has not been accorded the serious attention it deserves. Unchecked growth will double population over the next thirty years and will increase the already severe environmental and food production problems facing the country.[1]

Still a predominantly rural society, Nigeria developed from subsistence farming to cash crop production for export during the colonial era. At independence, agriculture accounted for 70% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with distribution and manufacturing at only 12.5 and 4.6 percent, respectfully. Mining activities at that time contributed just 1% to the GDP. Agriculture's key economic position experienced dramatic change after 1960. Its

contribution to GDP dropped to 53% in 1965, and down to 36% in 1985.[2] Petroleum which in 1960 provided only 42.6%, rose to 97% in 1985. The share of agriculture in export earnings dropped from 81% in 1960 to a mere 5% in 1985.[3]

Oil income increased by 30% during the 1970s, reaching a peak of approximately $25 billion in 1980 (see table 4). Nigerians developed a relatively high taste in consumption; local products, including food, were replaced by expensive imports. Agriculture and other sectors of the economy suffered considerable neglect under the heightened euphoria of oil wealth, which gave Nigeria an inflated sense of influence and prestige in the world. Alhaji Abubarkar, the Senior Economic Adviser to the Commander in Chief of Nigerian Armed Forces, General Gowon underscored the significance of oil in the Nigerian economy:

> Nigeria exhibited a classic and unique case of an oil-dominated economy. In 1975 for instance, oil contributed 96% of total government revenue. Oil is the largest single contributor to the country's Gross Domestic Product and has enabled us (if not even lured us) to pursue ambitious development programmes in the past. Thus when viewed within the context of the development goals and aspirations of about 90 million Nigerians, oil has provided a vital leverage to the Nigerian economy through an unprecedented inflow of foreign exchange and a prolonged period of budgetary ease.[4]

Table 4.

Oil Production and Revenues in Nigeria.

Year	Barrels (Million per Day)	Revenues (Million Naira)
1960	0.017	2.4
1961	0.046	17.0
1965	0.275	29.0
1966	0.420	45.0
1968	1.1	29.6
1970	2.1	176.4
1973	2.3	1,368.0 (billion US $)
1976	2.0	8.9
1979	2.3	-
1980	2.1	23.4
1982	1.3	13.0
1983	1.2	10.1
1984	1.4	11.4
1985	1.4	11.9
1986	1.0	7.1
1989	.7	4.1
1991	.5	3.4
1993	.8	2.6

Source: Nigeria Trade Journal (Lagos) and Petroleum Economist, March 1995.

Nigeria's Membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

In relatively recent times, Nigeria's membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has attracted a great deal of attention. In the process, a lot of information have been published on this "controversial" issue. I say "controversial" if only because the issue of Nigeria's membership in OPEC has always been raised by Nigerians in times of crisis. And predictably, particularly since her membership, Nigeria has witnessed many crisis and, as such, it is not uncommon to find periodic and heated debates about Nigeria's membership of this inter-governmental body.

However, it is necessary to stress that this research seeks to detach itself from this "fire brigade" mentality. Rather we will seek to look at briefly, the factors which inspired Nigeria's membership in OPEC in 1971 and how the revenues generated inspired Nigerian decision makers to initiate and sponsor ECOWAS. But, in the bid to place this discussion in proper perspective, we will start from a relatively familiar turf by carrying out a brief discourse on OPEC itself.

OPEC's origin is largely owed to an inter-hemispheric cooperation between Venezuela on one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other. It was a reactive body which came

into existence in 1960 to stem the monopolistic practices of the oil majors.[5] Hitherto, the oil companies dominated the international oil industry in an unfettered way. They determined the prices of crude oil among themselves and paid to the oil producing countries what has been largely known as *"barkeesh,"* i.e. mere pittance.[6]

In addition, they held concessions over vast tracts of lands in the producing countries such that it was not uncommon to find that such concessions, as in the case of Nigeria, covered the entire territory of the country. But this strangulating hold was not to last.[7] Indeed, from 1945 onwards, a number of forces began to challenge the hegemony of these multinational companies. Such forces include: the rise of the independents, the Soviet oil offensive and the vengeful tactics of the legendary Italian, Enrico Mattei. Indeed, it was the relative success of these forces which enabled the oil producing countries to effect a unilateral reduction of posted prices in 1959. And it was the subsequent refusal of these corporate bodies to heed this warning that directly led to the birth of OPEC in 1960.[8] Ironically, at the time of its formation, OPEC attracted very little attention in the Western media. Indeed, in the first decade of its existence, OPEC was consigned to a peripheral role in the international oil industry. However, this state of benign neglect was soon to change. And the individual who more or

less gave OPEC a new profile was Maummar Gaddafy of Libya. He viewed oil in very straight and political terms. Subsequently, on his accession to power in 1969, he forced the oil companies to effect an upward revision of oil prices. It was an unprecedented action, and its demonstrated effect has been adequately captured by Louis Turner who contended that:

> Once Libya had broken the ice and shown that the international oil industry could be forced to concede prices in the posted prices of oil, it was as though the mystique of the companies which had served them for decades had gone, thus allowing much more timid and conservative regimes to join in an onslaught on the companies which had held them in a state of psychological dependency for so long.[9]

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that OPEC in the seventies had effectively come into its own such that it was widely regarded as a veritable threat to the smug and opulent life-styles of the western world. Incidentally, it was largely in this "radicalized" context that Nigeria was formally accepted into this inter-governmental body as a member.

Nigeria in OPEC.

Although Nigeria formally joined OPEC in 1971, her links with the organization dated back to 1964 when Michael Feyide and Alhaji Musa Daggash represented Nigeria at an OPEC meeting in an observer capacity. Two years later, one Mr.

Okuboyejo led a three-man Nigerian delegation to Algiers where he explored avenues for formal cooperation with the other oil producing countries.[10] Meanwhile, at the behest of the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a four-man delegation was sponsored to the oil producing countries. The ensuing report of the delegation came up with, among other things, the recommendation that Nigeria should join this intergovernmental organization. In this respect, the delegation highlighted the advantages that were to be gained from Nigeria's membership in OPEC. It was pointed out that the accession of Lagos to OPEC would ensure a comprehensive exposure to the progress and developments in the international oil industry and give Nigerians the opportunity to work and understudy the experts in the organization. Finally, the delegation also argued, in its report, that since Nigeria deemed it worthwhile to acquire membership in commodity groupings like the Cocoa Producers' Alliance and the International Tin Council, there is no reason for her not seeking membership of OPEC.[11] This report was accepted by the Federal Government; but it could not be acted upon owing to the pressure of the then civil war from 1967 to 1970.[12]

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that in 1971 Nigeria formally joined this inter-governmental body, thus becoming its eleventh member. OPEC membership then rose to thirteen.

In contrast to countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Nigeria has always advocated for an upward revision of oil prices. This posture is motivated by a number of considerations. In the first place, the quality of her crude has encouraged this attitude. In relative terms, Nigerian crude is light, since it has a sulfur content of 0.075, which makes it one of the best in the world.[13] Another variable which encourages Lagos to demand high oil prices is the relatively low transport costs. The country's oil fields are favorably located with respect to the Western European and North American markets. Consequently, crude oil from Nigeria does not have to go through the Suez Canal. There is, therefore, a shorter haul from Nigerian ports to the main markets of Western Europe and the United States. Meanwhile, the country's huge population constitutes another reason why Nigeria has always opted for optimum prices within OPEC.[14] With an estimated population of about 100 million, her developmental needs are very huge. The gravity of the problem is best appreciated when it is perceived that the population totals in other OPEC countries viz Gabon, Algeria, Ecuador, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates still fell short of the total population of Nigeria. The consequence of this population is a highly absorptive economy which informs Nigeria's constant desire to seek high oil prices. Incidentally, Nigeria is not the only that is so inspired. There are other OPEC countries like Venezuela and Indonesia belonging to this category. Indeed, M.S. Otaiba, using

parameters such as population and developmental needs, has identified two other sub-groupsm within OPEC.[15] According to him, a major feature within OPEC is the uneven distribution of oil reserves and population among its members.[16]

Another major influence on Nigerian policy within OPEC is Saudi Arabia. This stems from the fact that Riyadh is the largest exporter of oil. As a swing producer, Saudi Arabia is the most important OPEC country because of its huge reserves and large crude output. With this dominant hold on the petroleum industry, she is widely perceived as the price leader within OPEC. Consequently, Nigeria and even the other oil producing countries always give serious considerations to Saudi oil policies. Invariably, Riyadh's influence becomes more pronounced in the light of the Islamic links between the two countries. The Saudis themselves are very conscious of these links and on a rather testy occasion during the 70's oil glut, Shekh Yamani, was impelled to remark that "Nigeria's plight is very close to my heart."[17] Incidentally, it was the glut, whose recurrence was much more visible in the eighties, which, among other factors, has shaped Nigeria's behavior in OPEC for the greater part of the years.

Oil at Concessionary Prices for African Nations.

Oil at concessionary prices to African countries has been hotly disputed in Nigeria. There were external pressures - such as the OPEC rules and regulations,

transportation problems - and internal factors, such as the heavy demands on almost all the resources, from crude oil for economic and social development, that were against such a decision. Among the government leaders and officials, there were also divisions. In spite of all these difficulties, however,late in July 1973, the Federal Military Government of General Gowon (the architect of ECOWAS), took the decision to supply oil at reduced rates to African states. Even after this,some members of his government continued to express misgivings about the decision. Some of them even went to the extent of giving the impression that no such decision had ever been made.

The Commissioner for External Affairs, Colonel Joseph Garba, said early in September 1974 - without specifically referring to oil for African countries -Nigeria would sell oil only at prices fixed by OPEC.[18] This kind of statement has tended to strengthen the impression that the decision to sell oil at concessionary prices to African countries was never taken by Nigeria, let alone implemented. Indeed, it was stated latter, that because of complex reasons, the Gowon government was unable to provide oil at reduced rates to African countries.[19] This was simply not true. For the decision to sell oil at reduced prices to African countries was taken, as earlier stated, in July 1973, and the Federal Military Government had since been implementing it through a number of bilateral agreements

through a number of bilateral agreements with some West African countries. Towards the end of 1974, the government signed an agreement with Senegal under which Nigeria was to supply the new Senegalese refinery at Cayal with two-and-a-half million tons of crude a year at special prices.[20] What the government had done had been to confine the implementation of the decision to the countries in West Africa, which was regarded in Lagos as "the special area of concentration" (because of ECOWAS initiative) of Nigerian diplomacy. It has to be remembered that despite Gowon's interst in supplying oil to all African countries and even to other countries under black rule at reduced rates, largely as a result of logistic and political considerations only, some West African countries actually enjoyed this facility during his rule.[21]

At the Ministerial meeting of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) held in Nairobi, the leader of the Nigerian government delegation, Mr. Victor Adegoroye, announced dramatically on 24 February, 1974 that the Federal Military Government had decided to make crude petroleum available to any African country that required it at concessionary rates subject to two conditions. First, such countries had to have their own refineries, and secondly, the crude was not rexported to third countries.[22]

It had been a difficult and controversial decision for the Federal Military Government to make. Although by early 1974 the country was producing an average of 2.3 million barrels of crude oil a day, thus becoming the world's sixth largest oil producer, and although the earnings from oil had shot up from $1 million in 1971 to about $8 billion in 1974, the country remained essentially poor, especially when compared with the developed countries. With a population of about 80 million (1975), the income *per capita* was $90 which was lower than that of African countries such as Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Zambia.[23] Technologically, the country was still very backward. There were vast economic and social projects such as the Universal Primary Education (UPE) requiring government finance. As General Gowon told the British High Commissioner in 1974, "Nigeria is a country is a country in a hurry" to catch up with the developed countries, which needs every dollar that can be realized for internal development.[24] This is one of the main reasons why Nigeria has consistently been one of the hawks within OPEC pressing for higher oil prices. For instance, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the Commissioner for External Affairs, justifying the increase in oil prices, and demanding higher prices still, declared at the United Nations General Assembly in late 1974, that "for every dollar which the producer-country earns, the oil companies earn between seven and ten dollars."[25] Although Dr. Arikpo's claim was denied by the international oil companies,

what is important is what was believed in Lagos.

Although the economy of the country remains essentially underdeveloped, it is much better than most other countries in Black Africa, because of the oil industry boom which began in 1970. Partly as a result of the increase in production from about 0.8 million barrels a day in mid-1970 to 2.3 million barrels a day in 1973, and partly as a result of the phenomenal rises in oil prices, the Nigerian finances became sound. Foreign reserves which amounted to $210 million in December 1969 rose to $2.5 billion in 1973 and to about$4 billion late 1974.[26] The growth rate of the economy during the 1970-74 plan period was an average of over 10% per annum, which was well over the plan target of about 6%.[27]

Although the demands on the economy were heavy, as the proposed $14 billion Five-Year Development Plan (1975-80) showed, the state of the economy was "perceived" healthy enough to make it possible for Nigeria to assist development in the rest of West Africa, where many countries found it difficult to balance their budgets even before the energy crisis, through the supply of crude oil at reduced rates. Moreover, the decision-makers thought that supplying crude to African countries at preferential rates would not place a heavy burden on the country's economy. Arikpo stated that

"after all, less than 3% of Nigeria's crude oil exports would be so affected," using the chart on the next page to justify his assumption (see Table 5).[28]

Even if it could be argued that given time, the percentage of Nigerian crude oil going to other African countries would rise, this could not be substantial for some time to come. Only a few African countries had their own refineries (which was one of the conditions of selling Nigerian crude at subsidized rate). So, the decision-makers perceived that the financial costs to Nigeria would remain small for the foreseeable future. Apart from this, the non-oil sector of the economy was perceived to be doing well, and they thought the country was more or less self-sufficient in food production. Although the value of the export of traditional agricultural products such as cocoa, palm oil, groundnuts, and cotton had not been very encouraging, it nonetheless, rose from $58 million in 1972/73 to $71 million in 1973/74.[29]

The Nigerian leaders then realized that something had to be done to help poorer African states. To add to the pressures from the Arab countries and the OAU were the persistent pressures from the bilateral level. Pressure from this level predated the Yom Kippur War of October, 1973. Following the increases in the posted prices of Nigerian crude oil of early 1972, some countries in West Africa (also

TABLE 5

Summary of Crude Oil Exports, 1974.

Destination	Quantity Exported in Barrels
Bahamas	2,685,996
Belgium	543,428
Canada	361,903
Denmark	456,691
France	8,034,833
Ghana	935,029
Holland	15,402,384
Italy	942,552
Ivory Coast	355,576
Japan	2,758,493
Senegal	246,744
Sierra Leone	121,233
Switzerland	275,052
United kingdom	6,442,740
United States	17,012,429
Uruguay	404,307
Virgin Island	1,389,371
West Germany	2,903,921

Source: *Ministry of Mines and Power. (Lagos, Government Printer).*

Congo and Gabon) asked the federal Military Government to sell oil to them at preferential rates. The pressure from Libya was the most intense, and in spite of that it was one of the most consistent supporters of the Federal cause during the Civil war days. The Nigerian government found it difficult to take any action on supplying oil at reduced rates to Liberia and other West African countries without first studying the implications of such a move. Pressures from these states became more intense following the quadrupling of oil prices between October 1973 and January 1974. The federal Military Government, however, refused to be panicked into taking any decision. As if to add to this pressure on Nigeria, the Late President William Tolbert of Liberia visited some Arab oil producing countries in March 1974, and returned with an assurance that Saudi Arabia would provide his country with all its oil requirements.[30] Later that year, the Foreign minister of Togo, Mr. Joachim Hundele, said in a press statement at the end of the Magadishu summit of the OAU that if the Arab countries could provide loans to the African states hit by the increased oil prices there was no reason why Nigeria could not do so.[31] He added that Nigeria obviously had more in common with the Black African countries than the Arabs had with them.

These were powerful arguments. The Federal Military Government could not ignore the demand of the Togolese Government, because the two governments had signed the treaty

in April 1972 that was to form the nucleus of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). Moreover, apart from the need to help poorer West African states, most of which had been on the Nigerian side during the dark days of the civil war, the Federal Military Government needed the support of all the fourteen other states in the sub-region to launch the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which had been dear to the hearts of the Nigerian leaders. So the Nigerians decided to assist from her own new oil wealth, the West African states hit by the energy crisis.

The overall look at the impact of oil on Nigerian foreign policy behavior could force one to ask: over Nigeria's limited capability, could she embark on an ambitious foreign policy initiative such as the formation and maintenance of ECOWAS? In short, could an extroverted economy sustain an activist diplomacy? The next chapter will focus on Nigerian social organizational factors.

FOOTNOTES.

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24. West Africa. May 26, 1981.

25. Ibid.

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CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS.

As mentioned earlier, East asserts that social organizational factors which include the level of modernization and societal stress have an impact on a nation's capacity to act in foreign policy. Given any level of resources, the nation with the highest level of social organization will be able to convert and control its resources more effectively. This assumption highlights the mechanism underlying the conceptualization of social organization and its relationship to capacity to act.

In this chapter, we will discuss the status of these social organizational factors at the time of the oil boom, to determine if Nigeria was actually ready to embark on such an ambitious foreign policy initiative.

Social Organization.

Social organization consists of two dimensions: level of modernization and level of societal stress. For the developing nations like Nigeria, modernization means to be liberated from economic dependencies. According to John H. Herz, modernization and economic development would also serve to confer on many units that legitimacy which, they lack

because of the absence or weakness of a "national" elite that would integrate them, despite ethnic and similar disparities into a modern nation.[1] The urge to transform backward societies into modern societies and economies began with the European introduction of urbanization, industry, a wage labor force, and an exchange economy in Africa. But the most significant contribution of Western colonialism was the education of the social groups that were determined to lead their shackled nations into freedom and modernize their backward countries. Education, then, was the chief means by which Western political and social thought was diffused to non-Western areas.

The "intelligentsia" thus advanced itself as the group that would lead the people out of the wilderness of servitude, backwardness, and destitution into the paradise of national independence and the prosperity of the welfare state. Whereas in the West, intellectuals have generally been spokespersons for a particular class or interest, allowing the professional politician, the aristocrat, the businessman, or the trade union leader to represent them, in the non-Western area like most African countries, the intelligentsia is the ruling class.[2]

But as intensely aware as the first generation of leaders and their successors were of the underdeveloped

condition of their countries, and as determined as they have been to initiate development, they have faced almost insuperable obstacles to the necessary economic "takeoff" and self-sustaining economic growth. A lack of national cohesion, a far too rapidly growing population, a dearth of capital, and a traditional social structure and values, all have impeded the modernization of their societies, with grave implications for foreign policy.[3]

As pointed out before, in terms of national attributes according to East, modernization can be tapped by measures of economic development, levels of technology, communications level of society, education and efficiency of bureaucracy (and so forth), a phenomenon Deutsch called "social mobilization."[4] Measures that might be regarded as societal stress (East's second dimension) are chronic inflation, severe unemployment, labor unrest, poverty, low income distribution, rural- urban unrest, disease, domestic violence, corruption etc. Bearing in mind the two dimensions East outlined above, we shall now examine selected key aspects of these social organizational factors as it relates to Nigeria, by focusing on:

1. Social modernization issues, specifically education, health and measures of economic growth and development.
2. Societal stress issues, specifically rural and agricultural neglect, labor and political unrest (including unemployment and low income distribution) and corruption.

Social Modernization Issues.

Education.

Primary.

During the 1970s, an increasingly self-confident federal government of General Gowon sought to rapidly modernize Nigeria, using western education as a major tool. This was because educational facilities and standards were poor, and illiteracy rate remained near 50 percent.[5] Revenue from the sale of crude petroleum was to help finance such modernization. Enrollment in western-oriented schools was significantly higher in the South, and some attributed this discrepancy to the south's early embrace of Christianity whose missionaries promoted education. Gowon in a speech to the students of Ahmadu Bello University in the Northern region of Nigeria (predominantly Moslems), promised to "embark on an ambitious educational program to bridge this gap."[6]

Thus the most important channel for equalizing living standards between different parts of the country has been the introduction by Gowon in 1975 of free Universal Primary Education(UPE). This was one of the biggest social revolutions ever attempted in a "poor" country. For Nigeria, the most significant social division has long been that between the educated- in the western sense- and the uneducated (millions are literate in simple Arabic). For the

Western-educated, whatever their family background, there have been luxurious prizes. For peasant farmers or herdsmen, the unskilled laborers, or the urban unemployed, life has been much harder.

Until Universal Primary Education (UPE), some northern states such as Sokoto, had a school enrollment of under 10%. The standard of teaching in primary schools then was disappointing and there was little hope of work or salaried employment for millions who ended their education at the primary schools. But what then was the impact of UPE? Professor Yinde Jide of the University of Ibadan blasted the government take over of all the private primary institutions in the UPE program as shortsighted stating in the long run, the government would not have the required manpower to effectively run these institutions.[7] Others, like the Late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Yorubas (one of the prominent tribes in the South) wanted the government to take this "free' initiative further to university level to help prepare Nigerians for the global competition.[8]

While there is no longer a great divide educationally between north and south, critics charge it will be years before the equalization in primary education works through into secondary, technical and university education. Because of the free UPE program, overcrowding in schools

became epidemic because the government was not prepared for large enrollments. Scarcity and want became the immediate companion of many "empty schools." Recruitment of teachers became linked to a decadent patronage system, where qualification to teach was based on "who has access to local leaders." Discipline became alien and truancy, inadequate supplies and absenteeism became the norm rather than exception. People yearned for the old days where missionary schools instituted law and order coupled with basic excellence.

Secondary Schools.

The secondary or intermediate schools did not fare better. Science laboratories were under funded and children often left schools in the rural areas to go to the cities to search for destiny in the so called "oil boom economy." The "Haves" were able to send their kids to the expensive affluent schools , leaving the rest to rot in a system where accountability was non-existent.

In 1975, the Nigerian Association of Teachers (NAT) issued a report critical of the standard of secondary education, confirming its near demise since the government take over from parochial management in 1973. NAT claimed that of a total of 75 secondary schools studied, only 15 had adequate facilities capable of preparing students for further

education.[9] In fact, they suggested that local parochial communities work in conjunction with government agencies to augment secondary educational standards, especially something as simple as "making text books available to pupils." Meanwhile, government officials claim substantial amount of money was being allocated to secondary education but there was no adequate accountability on how it is spent.[10]

Disgusted with the lack of basic amenities in these institutions, kids eventually turned to armed robbery and drug trafficking, with the intention of hefty profits and eventual migration overseas. In late 1975, the government was shocked when its own survey discovered that 56 percent of secondary school graduates were not adequately prepared for university education.[11]

Most people attributed such secondary school neglect to the influx of "oil money", which created the illusion that lucrative jobs with no significant educational background were available in the major cities. Bishop Kale, the Anglican primate of Nigeria, spoke out against this "neglect" in 1974, calling it "an act of academic genocide."[12] The Bishop warned the government that education should be the top priority of any nation that seeks prosperity. In fact, the Nigerian Association of Teachers (NAT) in collaboration

with the Anglican Diocese of Nigeria pushed for drastic reforms that would restore prestige and integrity to the schools.

University Education

Despite the odds, Nigeria has over twenty universities (and the number is growing), and many other institutions of higher education. Thousands of Nigerian students still go abroad, often on scholarships from home or host governments and most remain there, thus creating a serious shortage of trained people.

One amenity to which wealthy Nigerians have contributed to, is scholarships. A high proportion of the elite have been helped through school and university by many people besides their parents. This was looked on as an investment, since a young man with a university education would be eligible for a good job and could then help his relatives and townsmen through remittances, jobs and other patronage. The problem is two fold. Education is far more common than in the past, and promotion far slower, so today's secondary school leaver or university graduate faces uncertainty over a job and will probably not be in a position to dispense patronage for a long time, if ever. Second, far more parents want their children to get well up the educational system, so they cannot spare money to contribute to the education of other people's children. Most southerners

want to send as many of their children to primary and secondary schools as they can afford; thus, the grouping together of extended families or villages to support their most promising members is probably on the decline. Scholarships from other sources, chiefly the government, are therefore much more important than in the past.

Many University students felt that the main way a government can be "helpful" was to provide financial aid so they could complete their studies in peace. According to Professor Afobi, one has only to see the empty places in universities during the first two weeks of each term as students without scholarships do their best to obtain a term's fees from someone, and appreciate some of the stratagems they use to cut other expenses, to see the importance in their eyes of the state scholarship program.[13] In a 1975 symposium at the university of Lagos a student summed it up: "Nothing has benefitet students. Despite the often-repeated oil wealth of the country from its leaders, students are not given enough loans. If the government could be more permissive, loans should be given to students without sponsors, not only to relatives and close friends of the powers that be."[14] Students prefer outright grants to loans, since they feel that family demands would make it difficult to pay back loans. From the government's point of view, collecting on loans would probably be so politically unpopular as to be extremely difficult to enforce for anyone not in government employment.

Between January 1972 and mid 1975, when the ECOWAS treaty was signed, there were 121 university strikes and class interruptions across the nation.[15] The Secretary-General of the National University Students Association, attributed most of those strikes to Gowon's regime's "nonchalant attitude " to academic matters, especially the government's refusal to increase the ratio of rice subsidy to the university menu.[16] The Minister of Agriculture, Felix Oguma indicated in January 1974 that the government had no choice but to put a high tariff on rice importation to curtail local consumption, thus "every one will be affected including university menu, where serving rice was reduced to once a week from thrice a week.[17]

Another problem that precipitated the unrest was campus over crowding. A panel of university representatives headed by Professor Nwosu of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, recommended that the military government allocate funds for building more campus dormitories. He claimed the situation was affecting their academic performance. In fact, in a direct appeal to General Gowon after he delivered the commencement address at the University of Ibadan in June 1974, the chancellor alluded to such overcrowding in which Gowon promised to look into the matter.[18] Three months later, there was a general strike across the nation to protest lack of action. Ironically, Adebayo Adedeji, another instrumental

figure in the ECOWAS initiative appealed to striking students at the university of Lagos (where he was a visiting professor) to give the government sometime to address the problem.[19] Three weeks later, he was in Togo promising massive financial aid to the Togolese foreign minister if Togo would back Nigeria's ECOWAS initiative. At the same time, the secondary schools (colleges) were faced with out dated text books, dilapidated buildings, inadequate staff and accommodation problems.[20] Philip Asiodu, permanent secretary ministry of Industry was said to have suggested to the members of the Supreme Military Council the creation of a special commission to examine these matters and recommend to the Council its findings. He was quoted as saying that "no nation should play [political football] with the seeds of its future."[21] At this time, most young people just wanted to leave the country and seek their destiny elsewhere, hence the influx of young Nigerians into countries like the United States. Incidentally, Asiodu was one of those who opted for "caution" in the debate over the ECOWAS initiative.

Health.

At the time of the ECOWAS negotiations, almost the same problems that faced education plagued the health industry. In 1972, the World Health Organization reported that while the population of Nigeria was increasing rapidly,

the health care of its populace deteriorated to the point that most communities became breeding grounds for infectious diseases.[22] Though the federal budget of 1973 allocated $700 million dollars (4% of GNP) to health related matters, its priorities became questionable.[23] As usual with funds from oil, the Gowon regime built large and expensive hospitals (with no facilities) in less densely populated areas in Northern Nigeria which are predominantly Hausas (dominant tribe and base of Gowon's political support). Medicine and qualified doctors were scarce and the utilization of these gigantic buildings was minimal. This ill conceived decision by the Supreme Military Council headed by Gowon was seen as a political payoff to the Northerners for their support during the civil war against the Ibos in the South- where most of the diseases erupted due to dense population and intolerable health conditions.

While most of the expatriate medical personnel left in 1972 due to the indigenization policy that calls for 60% of Nigerian ownership, filling the vacuum was not easy. Nigeria initiated a massive program of sending doctors overseas for specialization in which most never came back. In 1973, the Nigerian Medical Association alerted the Gowon regime of a possible over flow of interns with no adequate facility to practice.[24] It was then reported that the regime suggested sending them to other West African countries as a good will gesture instead of augmenting the existing medical

facilities for specialization. All in all, according to Dr. Jimo of the Nigerian Medical Association, while the oil money poured into Nigeria, medical concern took a back seat.[25]

Sanitation and health deteriorated in urban areas because of overcrowding and the absence of public sanitation facilities such as a comprehensive urban sewage system which all Nigerian cities lack. The generalized result, was widespread, appalling filth and endemic disease: during the rainy season flooding, the mixture of raw human waste and surface water became nothing short of a nightmare. According to the International Labor Organization study: "Emptying pails outside the house was still the predominant method of human waste disposal in urban areas.....In 1975, 49% of urban dwellers used the pail system."[26]

The responsibility for this situation rested with the federal government which, during this period allocated 0.4 percent of capital expenditure to sanitation though implementation was much lower still.[27] While Lagos received great coverage in the international press for its sanitation problems, the situation was serious in the more arid regions. In some cities further South, deep burrow pits, once used to mine clay for building material would collect stagnant water which was employed for domestic purposes. One could and still can observe toilet pipes flushing into these pits at one end

simultaneously observing the urban poor bathing and laundering clothing at the other. Water borne diseases- hepatitis, cholera and intestinal disorders - are endemic.[28]

The quality of urban life related to health deteriorated in other ways: the urban water supply was unable to reach its limited capacity because of crowding and breaks in the power supply. Again, according to the International Labor Organization, local clinics (dispensaries) were often closed for lack of drugs and medical amenities.[29] According to the World Health Organization, the Nigerian Infant Mortality Rate increased 35% between 1973 and 1976, when the organization sent a group of experts to discuss the alarming situation with the Nigerian government.[30] All of these developments undermined the quality of health care in the local communities which, prior to the oil boom, had expressed a vitality even under the conditions of material poverty.

Measures of Economic Growth and Development.

Nigerian Limited Growth.

As already stated, Nigeria experienced a great leap in oil revenues when the price almost quadrupled in the six months from November 1973 to April 1974. At the same time, production rose and the government increased its share of the "oil take," so its net oil revenues almost quintupled in nine months. Petroleum became the dominant sector in the economy.

Oil output reached 31.3% of the gross domestic product in 1974-5; the extraction of crude oil created almost half (45.6%) as much value as that generated by the rest of the economy, as measured by standard Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[31] Even this substantially understates the importance of oil output, for much of the value produced elsewhere was directly or indirectly attributable to the expenditure of the oil earnings. For example, in standard national-income accounting, all domestic expenditures of oil revenues contributed to a further increase in GDP. Thus the "Udoji" recommendations of 1974-5 (a government-labor settlement, which mandated salary increases), when implemented almost doubled wage and salary payments in the public sector, caused a big increase in the government- services portion of the GDP.[32] After oil assumed a dominant place in the Nigerian economy, it was no surprise that the annual oil production and government oil revenues continued to grow substantially until 1980, with the exception of a dip in 1981 (see Table 6).

Outside of oil, economic performance was not ebullient. The other-than-oil economy is where one looks in appraising the vitality and strength of Nigerian economic performance. The income from the production of crude oil has been essentially a fortuitous and externally generated windfall, largely dependent upon external expertise, direction and markets. It is the level of output elsewhere in

Table 6.

Nigerian Federal Government Revenues From Crude Petroleum, 1970-85.

	Oil Revenues		Total Current Revenues	
	$ Million	%Increase	$ Million	%Oil
1970	166.4	-	633.2	26.3
1971	510.2	260.6	1,169.0	43.6
1972	764.3	49.8	1,404.8	54.4
1973	1,016.0	32.9	1,695.3	59.9
1974	3,726.7	266.8	4,537.0	82.1
1975	4,271.5	14.3	5,514.7	77.5
1976	5,365.2	26.3	6,765.9	79.3
1977	6,080.6	13.3	8,080.6	75.2
1978	4,654.1	(-23.5)	7,371.1	63.1
1979	8,880.9	180.8	10,913.1	81.4
1980	10,990.2	23.8	15,813.1	69.5
1981	9,825.2	(-10.6)	12,980.3	75.7
1982	6,424.0	(-34.6)	10,204.0	63.0
1983	6,100.2	(-28.1)	10,101.0	60.0
1984	5,939.8	(-21.5)	9,345.2	59.1
1985	5,003.6	(-18.2)	8,875.1	58.2

Source: *Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos: and Federal Republic of Nigeria,. Federal Government Budget in Brief: Fiscal Year, 1986. Lagos, 1986.*

the economy, the GDP excluding crude oil production, that best measures the productive activity of Nigerian workers, traders, and farmers , and it is the level of output of Nigerian enterprises small and large, public and private, with and without foreign ownership that best indicates how well the specifically Nigerian economy is functioning.

In contrast to the steep rise in oil revenues after October 1973, growth in Nigeria's other-than-oil economy has been very limited. In the years of the most vigorous economic achievements, 1973-4 to 1977-8, constant price GDP excluding oil grew at an average annual rate of 7.4% (see Table 7).[33] In essentially the same period, 1973 to 1977, the average yearly increase in government oil revenues was 80.2%, approximately eleven times as great (see Table 7). Extending the dates to cover the time period of this research (1973-85), real GDP excluding oil increased at an average annual rate of 3.7% from 1973 to 1984.[34] In contrast, government oil revenues from 1973 to 1984 rose at an average annual rate of 60.7%. Real GDP excluding oil grew at a rate of less than one- sixteenth that of government oil revenues, a rate not much greater than population growth.[35] Incidentally, many OPEC members found themselves in the same predicament of total dependence on oil and neglect of other avenues.

There have been two broad reasons for Nigeria's limited growth response to the oil bonanza. The first has been a high marginal propensity to spend or transfer money abroad. A large proportion of the increments in Nigerian

Table 7.

Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product Including and Excluding Oil, 1973-1990.

	Gross Domestic Product		G.D.P. Excluding Oil	
	Including oil $ million	Excluding oil $ million	% increase	Index
1973-4	34,850	18,771	-	100
1974-5	37,843	20,251	9.9	108
1975-6	37,172	21,299	7.2	113
1976-7	40,018	23,039	9 .2	123
1977-8	42,052	24,980	8.4	133
1978-9	40,235	23,786	-5.8	127
1979-80	42,034	24,521	7.1	131
1980	42,174	25,259	6.0	135
1981	40,471	25,751	3.9	137
1982	39,815	25,831	3.3	138
1983-85	36,587	24,786	4.2	134
1986-88	32,124	20,941	4.1	122
1989-91	32,345	21,452	6.5	130

Source: *Federal Office Of Statistics, Nigerian Gross Domestic Product and Allied Macro-Aggregates, 1973-91.*

income has been devoted to the purchase of foreign goods or services, or has leaked out of the country in other ways, and this has limited the magnitude of the domestic demand generated by the oil revenues. The second and more important reason has been the inelasticity of domestic supply in the Nigerian economy. The production response to the increases that have occurred in domestic demand has been extremely sluggish and, as a result, most of the rise in demand has been dissipated in inflation.

As a rough indicator of the sluggishness in domestic supply, if oil is excluded during the period 1973-4 to 1981 (see Table 8), GDP shot up at an average annual rate of 18.5% in current 1985 prices, although in constant prices it rose by just 4.1% per annum. Thus, increases in production account for only 22% of the expansion in aggregate demand, while the balance of 78% has been associated with price rises. More than three fourths of the rise in aggregate demand was dissipated in inflation. This suggests a stringent inelasticity of domestic supply, even though the limited supply response cannot be blamed as the sole cause of the inflation.[36]

Declining Economic Growth.

It had been hoped that Nigerian economic growth would accelerate as the oil revenues were used to increase the country's stock of both physical and human capital. The

Table 8

Nigeria's G.D.P. Excluding Oil: 1973-85, At Factor Prices.

	Gross Domestic Product Excluding Oil	
	$ million	% increase
1973-4	9,401	-
1974-5	12,813	36.3
1975-6	17,197	34.2
1976-7	21,212	23.3
1977-8	24,980	17.8
1978-9	26,0992	4.5
1979-80	29,460	12.9
1980	32,546	10.9
1981	35,348	8.6
1982-83	36,148	7.5
1985	33,675	5.6
Average		18.5

Source: *Nigerian Federal Office Of Statistics. 1986.*

declared strategy was "to ensure an all- round expansion in the production capacity of the economy so as to lay a solid foundation for self- sustaining growth and development in the shortest time possible."[37] On the face of it, this was a reasonable expectation: the oil-financed expenditures would surely generate a broad "multiplier" effect in the economy, and thus a significant increase in GDP. First one could look for the strict Keynesian multiplier following from the increase in government expenditures in an economy with underutilized productive capacity. Second, it could be anticipated that the sharp expansion of public investment in human capital, infrastructure, and other physical capacity would:(1) expand productive capacity directly; (2) foster further capacity by increasing private investment and; (3) at the same time, generate incomes, and hence demand for the output of that expanded capacity.

To the contrary, however, economic growth has not only been limited but has also tended to diminish. The decline is seen most clearly when one examines GDP excluding oil at current factor prices.[38] Table 8 on page 90 reveals a pattern of continually diminishing increases in the price GDP excluding oil, except for the plunge in the 1978-9 recession year of the first petro-political cycle.[39] This pattern of dwindling growth also asserts itself, even though imperfectly, in constant-price GDP, as may be seen from Table 8, albeit modified by the petro-political cycle.

The first four yearly increases since the surge in oil revenues (1974-5 to 1977-8) averaged 7.4% per annum: the succeeding five annual increases (1978-1982) averaged 0.7%, i.e., they were less than one-tenth as great. Even if one omits 1978-9, the nadir of a cyclical movement, and considers only the four preceding years (1979-82), the average growth rate was 2.1% less than one third the preceding four year period (see Table 7).[40]

Relationship Between Economic Growth And Oil Revenues.

A close examination of the relationship between Nigeria's economic growth (excluding oil), and the increase in oil revenues, provides further support for what the economist Sayre Schatz calls an "inert" economy. In more precise terms, the relationship parallels that found in the simple Keynesian multiplier in an economy in short-run macro-economic equilibrium.[41] The concept of the multiplier explains how an initial (autonomous) rise in aggregate demand causes increases in income and thus further increases in demand, so that the full growth in national income caused by the initial rise in demand is a multiple of that initial increase. The multiplier indicates that, in the absence of any other favorable impulse, an autonomous rise in aggregate (investment, government, or consumption) to a new level will generate a finite rather than a continuing expansion of the national product. Continuous autonomous increases in demand (e.g. in government spending or investment) are required to

generate continued growth; in their absence, the economy once again becomes stationary.

This was the pattern that the Nigerian economy exhibited. Increases in government spending constituted the autonomous rises in GDP excluding oil. As may be seen from Table 8, the latter pattern of increments closely followed the increases in government expenditures. Broadly speaking, there has been a continuous shrinkage of the increments in government spending and a parallel decline in the price GDP, excluding oil. That is to say, the autonomous increases in government spending have generated corresponding finite and limited rises in GDP, where increments in government expenditure have diminished and then, as in 1981 and 1982, almost stopped altogether. Real economic growth has likewise diminished and then virtually ceased.[42]

Therefore, the dependence of growth upon autonomous increases in demand implies the absence of other impulses; so in the Nigerian economy, the dependence of growth upon increases in oil financed government expenditures also implies a lack of other growth generators. Thus, the other-than-oil economy remained lethargic.

Causes Of The Inert Economy.

In the first place, shortages of capital funds was not a major impediment to private investment and growth in

Nigeria. In fact, according to Schatz, while most Nigerian businessmen maintained that this was a problem, their desire for funds usually constituted a false demand for capital, for most did have commercially viable investment projects to finance. But deficiencies in entrepreneurship constituted a significant impediment in investment strategies and the importance of this factor cannot be understated. The major obstacles lie in the special adversities encountered in the economic environment that make successful business operations in Nigeria considerably more difficult than in a more developed economy.[43]

A second major cause of Nigeria's inelasticity of supply has been an over-valued exchange rate, given the government's limited ability to implement direct measures to deal with the resultant balance of payments deficits. Oil sales brought a great inflow of foreign exchange. This lowered the value of foreign currencies, and imports became artificially cheap compared to domestic products. This in turn, encouraged importation in preference to domestic production of consumer requirements (including foodstuffs), of raw materials and other intermediate goods, and of spare parts. Furthermore, primary-product exports generally sell at world market prices set in terms of the leading world currencies. In such circumstances, the over-valued Nigerian currency lowers the price that Nigerian farmers get from the sale of their primary products on the world market, and this

discourages further output. Thus, Nigerian production, both of goods competing with imports and exports other than oil has been impeded by the over-valuation of the Nigerian currency.[44]

Third, deficiencies in policy formulation and implementation have exhausted resources that could have enhanced Nigeria's productive capacity. Waste, corruption, poor allocation (including the relative neglect of the rural sector), and ineffective implementation continued to limit the development of Nigeria's productive capacity. The great flow of oil revenues beginning late in 1973, brought about a transition to "pirate" capitalism. To a decisive degree, government coffers became the predominant source of economic surplus- i.e., of income above the level needed for living at society's accustomed standard- and in particular of that surplus that can be privately captured in large chunks.

For the most vigorous, capable, resourceful, well-connected, and "lucky" entrepreneurs (including politicians, civil servants and army officers), productive economic activity, namely the creation of real income and wealth, faded in appeal. Access to, and manipulation of the government spending process became the golden gateway to fortune.[45] The use of the state for enrichment is certainly not new. Before independence, the colonial regime was involved in the economy in ways which accorded primacy to

British interests. Thus, the Nigerian political class perceived "government" as a means of serving the interests of those who controlled it. When they got power, they cheerfully and enthusiastically used the state to further their own private interests.

Despite apparent national wealth from oil, little improvement was seen or felt at the personal level. Per capita incomes did not improve, being only $150 in 1975 with an average annual rate of growth of only 1.1% from 1965 to 1975. Efforts to improve the living conditions of the majority of Nigerians were minimal as the average official rate of inflation remained at 10% from 1970 to 1975.[46]

The oil revenues seemed to have provided the means not only for maintaining the viability of the political system but also for ensuring the accumulation of capital. We have also observed that when we move from the largely monetary contribution to the real economic impact-- a completely different picture emerges which shows that notwithstanding the massive increase in oil wealth, the oil industry made a limited impact on the foreign exchange and revenues for the government coffers without adequate concern for the industrial transformation of the economy. The government expenditures and commitments witnessed a large scale of waste and misallocation of resources due to

ineffective management, the very high rates of spending were justified in part on the grounds of great developmental needs and large population base without due regard to the ordering of priorities. But the Nigerian situation clearly underlines the significant fact that there can be "growth" as measured by increase in gross national product, without effective economic development.

Oil wealth then created a mirage for the casual observer in Nigeria. Gigantic buildings, beautiful universities, well -equipped armies, wide tarred roads, a booming business or commercial sector and a big voice in foreign affairs all tended to give the impression that things are going well. Beneath these surfaces, however, were very tense pressures and contradictions arising from the neglect of the vast majority of the people. These were the farmers, artisans, students, women and youth, particularly those in the rural areas. With the creation of modern infrastructures, expansion of the service sector, a booming commercial sector and massive injection of "fast" money into the economy, labor was attracted to the urban centers. Workers were needed for the roads, universities, industries, houses and other institutions being constructed. They were required to work at the docks, offices and hotels. Quick money could be made in the cities during the boom, or at least, that was the belief.

Moreover, the Nigerian state must satisfy not only other rentier states and traders but also the multinational corporations (MNCs). The latter of course struggled to maintain their vantaged position in the economy in order to take advantage of the "oil boom." Bill Freud gave a graphic description of the Nigerian scene in the mid- 1970s, thus;

> As the oil boom gathered momentum, the cities of Nigeria took on the character of gold rush towns. Foreigners flocked to cash in on the bonanza. Greek merchants and Arab doctors, Filipino nurses and Indian school teachers, Italian construction workers and German Lorry salesmen, American bankers and British lecturers jostled one another on the streets all attempting to sell services of good, bad or indifferent quality. Firms reckoned to retrieve their initial investment in two to three years.[47]

The Nigerian state diverted its resources in order to undertake a massive face lift of the urban centers so as to impress those foreigners as well as its own constituents. The bright lights and false image of success attracted rural dwellers to these cities.

Societal Stress Issues.

Rural and Agricultural Neglect.

To understand the impact of societal stress, one has to look at the rural situation in Nigeria, with its food shortages and inequalities during the oil boom era when the ECOWAS initiative was being contemplated. In order to fully

comprehend the impact of the decade-long oil boom on Nigerian society and the distortions it introduced (thereby creating societal stress), one has to look back to the pre- and post-independence periods. This is because the structures, institutions and social forces accentuated and consolidated by the 1973 and subsequent oil windfalls were established in these times.

As mentioned before, at independence in 1960, Nigeria was a major exporter of agricultural products- mainly cocoa, palm produce and groundnuts. Most of these were produced by peasants on individual farms and small holders working in cooperatives.[48] The post-colonial state (like the colonial state) relied on marketing boards to carry out the collection and marketing of the agricultural products at least until their demise in the mid- 1980s. Revenues derived from the export of these primary products was used to sponsor projects mainly in the urban centers and to enhance private capital accumulation. Planning was used as a cover for rationalizing state initiatives in subsidizing capital accumulation by the dominant class. In order to extract surpluses from the peasants with which to subsidize this class, the state's marketing boards through their agents underpaid the producers and invested an insignificant proportion of the surplus in the social environment.[49]

This process of uneven development generated some

unfavorable pressures in the countryside occasionally leading to revolts and migration to the cities. The established class structure in Nigeria did not encourage the initiation of policies that would encourage agricultural development. This, according to Paul Lubbeck, was because there was no planter bourgeoisie as in the Ivory Coast or Kenya.[50] However, after 1973, the Nigerian state found itself receiving substantial revenues from the marketing of oil and thus the dominant class found a new avenue for capital accumulation other than agriculture. The direct impulse of this was the neglect of agriculture and thus the rural areas. This also meant, as East indicated, directing needed resources to remedy this situation. Thus the country had to adapt a dependent food policy like other OPEC states. Where agricultural investment was undertaken at all, it was aimed at displacing the peasant mode of production, and it was large-scale and capital intensive.

How does one then explain the subsequent neglect of agriculture which led to food shortages in Nigeria? The answer to this question must be understood in terms of the discovery of an alternative source of capital accumulation (inevitably oil). It must also be seen in terms of the class position of the custodians of state power. This class position led to the continuous reproduction of a system which concentrated projects in selected urban centers, and saw the

rural areas as places for recharging elite status and showing off wealth acquired in the cities. This class position also explained why oil revenue was not seen as a means of promoting agriculture and forming a dynamic link with industry to promote continued growth and development.

This situation created a particular problem: the youths abandoned the rural areas and migrated to the urban centers, thus abandoning the villages and agriculture to the weak and old. This abandonment of the rural areas and all they represented was in fact encouraged by the neo-colonial educational system which hailed western virtues and presented agriculture as a degrading occupation. The panicky agricultural measures of successive governments, from River Basin Development Authorities to Green Revolution, confused rather than solved the problems created by the manifest contradictions of the neo-colonial economy.

Agricultural output declined precipitously, food was imported with resources from oil to meet the demands of the growing urban population; and large-scale capital- intensive agriculture followed where possible. Since rural migrants needed accommodation, shanty towns for the unemployed and poor emerged in the cities. Farm lands close to these urban centers were used for housing projects for the middle class and real estate speculators displaced other farmers and erected apartments for the "modern" workers with

minimal planning controls. Displaced peasants joined the rush to the urban centers to sell their own labor for wages: the"naira" (Nigerian currency) dream could not be contained. The question that should arise under these conditions should not be why people move from rural to urban areas as people move towards comforts and opportunities under normal conditions. Rather the question should concern attempts by the Nigerian government to divert resources for the formation of ECOWAS, while such societal stress factors lingers.

The second national Development plan was believed to be aimed at a united, strong and self-reliant nation with a dynamic economy, a just society, full of opportunities and democratic polity. Oil was just beginning to play a substantial part in the nation's economy, yet this plan achieved little in terms of its objectives. Excessive concentration of power at the center led to very limited mobilization of the people and increases in oil revenues led to neglect of the agricultural sector. Rural-urban migration increased as conditions of life in the rural areas steadily deteriorated. By the time the third plan was initiated, things had reached alarming proportions: the "new wealth" made Nigeria, like other OPEC states, abandon agriculture and the rural areas, though over 80% of the population still lived there.

This situation of neglect did not prevent one of

the architects of the third plan, 1975-1980, Professor Ojetunji Abayade from arguing that:

> It is the task of planners to plan according to the established political economic structure, otherwise such plans cannot be realistic.[51]

The third plan itself admits the failure of past plans when it states in section 6 that:

> The rural areas in general would also require a new deal in the provision of social services. In almost every state sizable communities still exist without basic amenities, like clean water supply, hospital and health centers, schools and electricity. The absence of such services obviously contributed to the low level of rural productivity and strengthens the pull exerted on rural dwellers of higher urban incomes.[52]

To redress this situation of social stress, Nigeria required a high commitment of human and financial resources. This situation also required not only a rural development strategy but also a comprehensive policy directed at changing social relations of production which are biased against rural producers. These reduced opportunities available to rural people led to panicky and haphazard measures like the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) costing millions of dollars and aimless propaganda.[53] This activity led to the establishment of farm projects, plantations, river basins and state farms. Some of these were simply dropped into villages along with huge machines and operators with minimal inputs from the rural society.[54]

This problem was not with state participation in agriculture. But in a peripheral capitalist economy like Nigeria, taking the place of the peasants means displacing them from the land.[55] The consequence was reinforcement of the drift to urban centers with the long term consequence being the creation of a large army of frustrated, unemployed or underemployed lumpen proletariat.[54] The pressure from this growing urban mass continued to force the government to relocate resources and concentrate services in the urban centers, which further increased the drift. The proletarianisation of the peasants with very limited opportunities was, over time, tantamount to the creation of a time bomb by the bourgeoisie themselves. Because the alienation of the peasants by the state directly militated against the peasants' commitment to the state farms, most of the new centers failed woefully. And as deproletarianisation proceeded with the process of deindustrialisation in the 1980s, so alienation increased.

The failure of farm and other projects forced the Nigerian government to adopt a dependent food policy in a large scale. While food imports did not begin with the oil boom, they took a dramatic upward turn in 1973. While food production increased in Nigeria between 1960 and 1975 by roughly 1.8% per annum, from 1974 food imports began to take

up to 20% of the total budget reaching 32% in 1977.[55] Much of this imported food consisted of basic foodstuffs needed by the urban working class and their dependents- meat, rice, fish, stockfish, flour and wheat.[56] As Bill Freund noted, fish imports reached a value of $500million in 1976 and $1.2Billion in 1977, sugar imports went from $400million to $950million in the same years, maize imports worth $300million in 1976 rose to $600million in the first eight months of 1977, while wheat was imported to the tune of $700million in 1976 and $1.6billion in 1977.[57]

However, the most spectacular increases were in rice. In 1975, Nigeria imported 15million Kilos of rice. In 1976, imports trippled to 45million and in the first nine months of 1977, attained 246 million kilos.[58] American rice undersold the grain and root staples produced by Nigerians to such an extent that it found a ready market even in rural areas.

The government tried to discourage people from rice consumption as a means of holding down on foreign exchange due to imports. Previously, we saw how university students frequently went on strike to protest government reduction in rice consumption on college campuses. It eventually became a type of "status symbol" to have " bags of imported rice in your house.

Most of the food imports came from the United States, growing from $400 million in 1972 to $1.6 billion in 1975. Instead of stimulating internal food production, and having failed to do so through state farms, the government turned to imports to make up for the deficiency.[59] Grain production declined so badly that the marketing boards began to lose revenue. The boards bought 454,000 tonnes of groundnuts in 1972, 270,000 tonnes in 1973, 114,000 in 1974, 178,000 tonnes in 1975, 42,000 tonnes in 1976, 12,000 tonnes in 1977 and just 50 tonnes in 1978.[60] Peasants continued to produce, but either withheld from the market or smuggled their produce across the borders to areas where prices and currencies were more attractive. Others simply used their land to produce food while some were displaced through state policy of land acquisition. There was no doubt that the Nigerian state was able to import food exclusively because it benefited from the world energy crisis as an oil exporter. But given continued increases in urban populations and declining revenues from oil, Nigeria seemed headed towards economic crisis.

The third plan, despite increased revenues, did not alter the status quo. Rather, the prerogative of the state was to mobilize and allocate national surplus or invertible funds in ways that directly and indirectly increase private capital accumulation. This was done in the name of strengthening the private sector which has been dominated

by foreign capital.

There was no doubt that Nigeria had experienced some economic growth and change since independence in certain sectors. GDP increased and so did GNP per capita and foreign reserves until the early 1980s. But these did not really indicate the quality of life and condition of the masses. As long as planning was concerned the masses did not get their fair allocation. This was because planning was employed by the dominant factions to consolidate their positions and enhance capital accumulation. Thus, the third plan failed to negotiate any "new deal" for the rural areas.

As Professor Onimode noted, "the impact of elitist conceptions of planning involving bureaucrats and bourgeois economists alone, coupled with a grossly unequal distribution of any gains of development, has been the inability of Nigeria to mobilize a mass base for planning implementation."[61] He also argued further that, in spite of propaganda anticipating a new deal for the rural areas, planning from the grass roots, etc., the masses of Nigerian peasants, workers, youths, artisans, women and patriotic professionals have never been involved actively in national planning. The consequence of this is that post-colonial capitalist planning has done a lot to Nigerians but very little for them.[62]

Labor and Political Unrest.

The Nigerian state promulgated several decrees specifically directed at controlling labor. Examples include the Trade Dispute Decree No. 7 of 1973 which consolidated the Punitive Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act of 1958 and the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) Degree No. 21 of 1969. Further, the creation of an Industrial Arbitration Panel, a National Industrial Court, the Prohibition of strikes, the imprisonment of union leaders, the proscription of unions (such as the National Union of Bank Employees and the Shell-BP and Allied Workers Union in 1974) and, finally, the banning of certain unionists from trade union activities are all aspects of a general policy of labor control.[63]

Decree No.23 of 1974, the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree was the most far-reaching attempt to control workers. Because the fortunes of the economy had come to rely on "developments in the oil industry", the initiation of regulations to cover all aspects of society was an imperative. The Decree so defined "essential services" to include virtually every human activity in Nigeria. As Tayo Fashoyin observed, this Decree was passed because "the consequences of widespread industrial unrest in the country-particularly in major economic sectors such as petroleum, banking and manufacturing could be disastrous on the economy."[64] Popular thinking began to recognize that everything that concerns oil concerns Nigerian national

interest. So, in particular, the state was not prepared to accommodate any form of protest in the oil sector. While, as a reflection of the triple alliance in this strategic sector, the oil companies initiated and implemented worker domestication policies within the industry- e.g. through the payment of high wages, provision of extensive benefits and sending workers abroad on all kinds of courses- the state responded swiftly to the 1974 strike of Shell-BP workers by proscribing their union. The government declared that this strike has been,

> Calculated not only to obstruct and disrupt the smooth running of the operations of Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria but also to disrupt the economy of the nation.[65]

The state's interest in protecting the oil companies and its own revenues is evident in this statement and other actions. Under the guise of stamping out "racketeering, abuse of office, personality cults, politicization, corruption, conflict of interests and similar malpractices from the trade union movement, since independence and more so since the oil boom, the state has intervened in the activities of trade unions. This culminated in the abolition of all hitherto existing labor centers, the restructuring of all industrial unions into 43, the banning of certain union leaders and the creation of the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC) through Decree No. 21 of 1974. The state allocated one million dollars to this Congress and attempted to impose pro-establishment leaders on it. But the workers

rejected compliant leaders whilst the state rejected activist leaders.[66]

In February 1975, the NLC published the Workers Charter of Demands, a fundamentally populist document which nonetheless reflected the objective problems confronting Nigerian workers. It provided them with an alternative way of perceiving the nature and complex dimension of class struggle in a (semi-) peripheral capitalist society. This Charter called for "structural change" that would lead to "bringing the economy under the ownership and control of the workers and the masses". And it was against the pressures and contradictions deepened by the oil boom and the labor control policies of the state, that the Congress called a general strike in May, 1975. Given intensifying contradictions, the NLC president subsequently observed that "the drift of trade unionists, and other intellectuals into the Marxist camp is due, among other things, to frustration with the way democracy is being practiced and the sight of misery, squalor and want in the midst of plenty."[67]

The inability of federal and state governments to meet their contractual obligations, to pay workers and to keep development projects afloat has heightened the contradictions among the state, labor and capital. Though since the 1975 general strike, reflected in the repressive

June 1976 anti-NLC moves, the state has tried to deprive the Congress of funds, polarize it by sponsoring rural factions and making membership voluntary, there is no reason not to expect increasing militancy, organization and rising class consciousness in the cities. Likewise, in the rural areas, the resistance of peasants, refusal to pay taxes, rejection of prominent politicians by voters, attacks on agents of the state and "invasion" of houses of assembly by market women and school children are all manifestation of discontent.

In fact, the first nine months since the strike settlement in 1975, witnessed 247 officially-registered trade disputes involving 144,866 workers and resulting in the loss of more than one million person days.[68] The NLC then realized that for it to serve as the vanguard organization of the working class, it must develop a political program aimed at influencing state power. Until this occurs it seems, it cannot pursue a radical proletarian cause. It, like Nigerian intellectuals, needs a sense of central contradictions in the (semi-)peripheral political economy and how to mobilize and generalize these.

Finally, the confrontation between labor on the one hand and the state and capital on the other, can be seen to have increased since the early-1970s with the oil boom and subsequent glut. The "arrogance of power" which accompanied

the relative financial independence of the state, has witnessed a deepening of the alliance between it and capital against labor. However, the numerous labor control policies have not prevented industrial unrest, an aspect of societal stress incompatible to economic prosperity. The fluctuation of state revenues, the massive corruption and the gross inefficiency of the system, arising from the instability of the fractional coalitions within the bourgeois class among other reasons - continued to lay bare the fragile and shifting bases of bourgeois power in Nigeria.

One of the major weaknesses of the established radical perspective on the nature of the post-colonial state is the tendency to present the state as (i) a homogeneous actor which is (ii) so powerful that no other social force has ever or can ever challenge it. This is the result of a concentration on the nature of state institutions and functionaries rather than on the social relations and coalitions which underlie them. The fragile and fluctuating alliance between dominant domestic fractions and foreign capital - the erstwhile "triple alliance" - the tenuous relations of indigenous classes to productive activities, the peripheralisation of the social formation in the world division of labor, the content and direction of class struggle and, more importantly, the consciousness, organization and power of non-bourgeois social groups especially women are given limited attention. Yet, it has

made state dorminance so elusive in the semi-periphery.

In an oil economy such as Nigeria's has been, inability to either predict or control conditions in the world market and the domination of the oil industry by foreign capital combine to make dependence on oil revenues a source of insecurity, contradictions and conflict, particularly in times of economic contraction.

Although the Nigerian state has remained to a large extent supreme at the level of political control over the coercive instruments of society, it has lacked the moral and intellectual cohesion and direction which would enable it to impose and sustain its will and world-view on society without the use of force. In other words, the state is fragile in "civil society." The hollowness of its national development plans, the domination of the world-view of the metropolitan bourgeoisie - the prevalence of the "developmentalist" paradigm - the frequent resort to violence to contain popular pressures, the inefficiency of state institutions and the massive wastefulness and corruption of the dominant classes, all these have combined to create conditions of instability and the erosion of hegemony. Hence the call of the Head of state for a social as well as "green revolution" in early 1975 and the mid-1980 transition from War Against Indiscipline to National Orientation Program.[69]

The workers and peasants in Nigeria have historically declined to sanction the dominant social classes in alliance with their international allies to establish, maintain and reproduce their "hegemonic" position in the social formation: that is, the triple alliance remains tenuous. In turn, the bourgeois classes have been incapable of permeating in any systematic fashion the educational, religious, social and cultural aspects of society. Neither have they succeeded in advancing any moral value, taste, culture, custom or principle, that would enable them to integrate other social classes, eliminate or drastically reduce opposition, and reproduce bourgeois domination through popular consent.

Despite control over huge oil revenues, the Nigerian state had then been characterized by fractional and factional coalitions, political confusion and prostitution, corruption and all forms of infantile behavior by government officials. And it is only this superstructural level which the established paradigm recognizes and treats: hence the inadequacy of its findings and explanations: Nigerian culture rather than capitalism. The weakness of the bourgeois class is revealed not only in its continued coexistence with and subordination to foreign capital but also in its inability to regulate and innovate, in part a reflection of contradictory fractional interests. In 1975, the Nigerian government had to hand the national railways to the Indians, the national

airlines to the Dutch, the Nkalagu cement factory to the Swiss and the problem of smuggling also to the Swiss, because it could not manage them itself.[70]

Meanwhile, the class war declared upon the workers and peasants has generated counter strategies of struggle and challenges to state power. These are also direct or indirect precipitate of the misuse of oil wealth and the arrogance of power - reflected in both military and civilian regimes - which accompanied the oil boom. The massacres of students who articulated populist demands in 1975, the proscription of trade unions, the banning of trade union leaders, the massacre of peasants and the promulgation of "primitive" labor laws, have all demonstrated to other social classes the extent to which the Nigerian state was willing to go in order to advance and reproduce itself. In addition, the refusal to adopt a mass-based development strategy, the continued use of colonial institutions to exploit farmers, the politicization of ethnic, religious and regional differences and the victimization of journalists, intellectuals and other professionals, have only culminated in the intensification of challenges to state power in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, the state did not attempt to sell itself to the people. It has continued to repeat past mistakes and to heighten social contradictions. The inability of some state governments to pay workers , did not help to broaden

the level of popular support. Thus, it has been incapable of creating a noble national goal, national spirit or sense of commitment among millions of neglected, unemployed, marginalised and exploited Nigerians.

Ultimately, the most formidable obstacle to the infraction of bourgeois hegemony has been the abject poverty in which the majority of Nigerians lived. This condition of unmet basic human needs has been exacerbated by the unproductiveness, inefficiency, and corruption of the dominant social forces. Volatile and dwindling oil wealth only deepened the crisis of hegemony as austerity measures were adopted in latter years.

Corruption.

Much of the criticism of corruption is necessarily on moral grounds, but it is also possible to examine the effects of corruption on a society from a moral neutral point of view. Many Nigerians assess corruption pragmatically rather than morally. A. R. Zolberg points out that "what it usually called corruption can be viewed, under certain circumstances, as a fairly rational distributive system based on other than rational-legal norms.[71] C. Leys indicates that civil servants forced to live on their pay might seriously disrupt the economy with wage demands, whereas petty corruption is a form of forced taxation.[72] Nye adds that, corruption may help capital formation, supply an incentive

for local entrepreneurs, help to integrate the elite, provide resources for the development of political parties and enable the government to "aggregate enough power to govern."[73] However, there is much waste and the "absence of honesty may destroy the legitimacy of the system." On balance, he concluded that, probably the cost of corruption in less developed countries will exceed its benefits.[74]

The discussion of Nigerian foreign policy behavior or any activity in Nigeria for that matter will not be complete without the mention of corruption, the "cancer" in Nigerian bureaucracy. Since corruption contributes to societal stress, I will mention some aspects of it to help understand the motivation of Nigerian decision makers in terms of dealing with other ECOWAS members. As mentioned earlier, General Gowon channeled millions of dollars to potential West African leaders skeptical about ECOWAS. Some may say it is indicative of Nigeria's way of doing business, while others term it "corruption."

Accusation of corruption have been frequent in Nigeria, both under the civilian and the military regimes. Official corruption is a form of oppression which many people have experienced personally and which is often used when measuring government performance. Defining corruption precisely is at least as difficult as determining its

effects. Action for personal rather than public interest may be so interpreted by those who lose, but not by those who gain from that action. What the man who fails to get the job calls nepotism is praised by the successful candidate as social welfare in the very proper interest of one's family. What is regarded in one country as just "honest graft" is seen in another or by another section of the population in the same country as a heinous offense. Nigerians have been noted for being tolerant of corruption. The former legal Adviser to the government, Chief K. Balogun, in defending the minister of Aviation accused of land deals put the prevailing attitude clearly:

> To say that financial transactions in landed property by many leading citizens of Nigeria have not become a gainful past time is to start deceiving ourselves. All top Nigerians, Parliamentarians, top civil servants, journalists..... indulge in these transactions. When it suits our Parliamentary system and it again suits our purpose, we close our eyes to certain practices, all in the name of the Nigerian way of life. Our journalists must make up their minds which system they are going to uphold in Nigeria: the British Parliamentary conventions or the Nigerian way of life as it exists today, where everybody regards it as fair to make money.[75]

Peter Enahoro, a journalist, put the matter in a slightly different but no less international perspective when he pointed out that westerners usually pay for a favor after it is received, whereas Nigerians pay before getting the favor, indicating that the latter have more trust in their fellow man.[76] It is almost impossible to obtain any genuine

document from Nigerian bureaucrats without bribing the official. The epidemic is so rampant that some top officials in the business sector are calling for direct institutionalization of "Bribery and Corruption" within the nation since it is no longer avoidable.

Ethnic Problems in Nigeria.

Nigeria has at least sixty major ethnic divisions and several hundred ethnic groups, depending on how one counts. While it is possible to put these into a small number of "common traditions" and demonstrate considerable interaction between peoples over several centuries of trade and war, this does little to explain the nature of present boundaries and the way these are used politically or socially.[77] Ethnicity is used by those inside and outside the system (i.e., by both Nigerians and Europeans) as a convenient "tag" for explaining phenomena which are actually much more complex.

Inter-ethnic conflict also breeds on poverty, frustration and insecurity, and people are often made aware of their relative deprivation as social change affects the basis of their daily lives. James O'Connell reported that "there was little friction between the local people and the Ibo while Northern society stayed resolutely traditional."[78] But the colonial powers brought in educated southerners and put them in positions of authority as clerks and policemen.

Local resentment of officialdom, taxes and other innovations was eventually expressed by attacking the strangers. However,O'Connell shows that it was the Ibo traders (of Eastern Nigerian origin) who were especially subject to attack, which led to the Nigerian-Biafra war of 1967-70.[79] The Ibos were in roles which illiterate northerners could most easily fill, and their success in a field which the Hausa regarded as their own was especially challenging. There is seldom friction when strangers are a small minority or occupy a position at the bottom of the social hierarchy. It is when they become sizable and therefore visible that trouble begins. Thus, social change was an important factor; it was not the traditionalism of the northerners which was crucial, but the size and success of the Ibo intrusion, fostered by changed social and economic conditions.

Most of the discussion of ethnicity in Nigeria is in terms of majority groups: Hausa/Fulani in the North, Ibos in the East and the Yorubas in the West. It is well to remember that these make up only about half of the country's population, and that for all their demands for separate states minority groups have been the strongest supporters of national unity. Minority group members have been the strongest supporters in both the army and the police forces; these national services have given them opportunities for advancement available only to majority members at home. However, neither the police nor the army has proved to be a

"melting-pot," which would transform ethnicity into true nationality, since both soldiers and policemen maintain contacts with their communities of origin and are responsive to attitudes of the wider population. Soldiers, especially, demonstrated in 1966 that they shared prevailing ethnic projections and were willing to share in communal violence. Nevertheless, General Gowon, the architect of ECOWAS, instituted the so called "Three Rs"...Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation after the civil war in 1970. Ethnic divisiveness is still a "cancer" within Nigerian community today.

In this chapter, we have discussed the various aspects of social organizational factors, and how it relates to the political economy of Nigeria. From this, we see that Nigeria had so many internal problems, that one could question whether resources should have been spent on ECOWAS. Earlier it was stated that East believes that societal stress requires government to allocate more resources, more time, more attention, more material goods to the management of these societal problems, which decreases the resources available for utilization in foreign affairs.[80] Also according to East model, Nigeria's capacity to act would depend on how "Nigeria" handles the above concerns. In the next chapter, we will discuss how (despite these societal stresses), Nigeria decided to push ahead with the initiation and maintenance of ECOWAS- what there perceptions were and how they tried to achieve these goals despite the odds.

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CHAPTER 5

PERCEPTION OF DECISION MAKERS, RE: ECOWAS INITIATIVE.

As I stated earlier, in addition to East's national attributes perspective model, I will use "perception" as an intervening variable in this study. For when we talk of a state's doing this or that, we are really talking about the decision-makers, the policy decisions they make, and how the decisions are implemented. The state, in short, equals the official policy-makers whose decisions and actions are the policies of the state. The decisions they make are the "outputs" of the domestic political system. By focusing on the decision makers, we emphasize how they see the world. What is important, after all, is not what the international system is really or objectively like, but how the policy-makers subjectively perceive it. For it is on these perceptions that they act or, for that matter, do not act. Reality, in this perspective, does not exist by itself, independent of the policy-makers' definition of the external situation.[1]

In this chapter, I will first identify the main actors who were involved in the ECOWAS decision by the institutional rather than the reputational approach, thereby determining who they are. I will then interpret their views as regards Nigeria's capacity to act using content analysis. In the course of this perceptual analysis, we will also focus on the role of the various domestic interest groups in

influencing the decision makers and the influence of external factors in shaping the perception of Nigeria's decision makers.

Identification of The Main Actors in the ECOWAS Decision.

By the time the ECOWAS initiative was proposed, Nigeria has already had over twenty-five years of military rule since independence in 1960. Any praetorian political order is characterized by the fusion of both legislative and executive power into one. At the time the ECOWAS decision was made, the military was in power headed by General Yakubu Gowon. In the military regime, the highest executive and legislative body was the Supreme Military Council (SMC), now called the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). It is the most important institutional mechanism for policy decision-making and coordination at the highest political level. It is composed of the Head of State, all state governors and high ranking military personnel. But in most instances (like the case of ECOWAS), once a decision is made by the Head of State,it is usually approved by the SMC. Below the SMC or AFRC has always been the Federal Executive Council (FEC), made up of all the appointed political heads of the ministries charged with specific functional management responsibilities and presided over by the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation (see chart on page 127).Using the institutional approach to identify the major elites, I found that members of this

Structure For Decision-Making Policy in the Military Regime.



Source: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. 1990.

Council influential in the ECOWAS decisions were (1) Adebayo Adedeji, the Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, also a close adviser to the Head of State; (2) Philip Asiodu, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industry; (3) Sanni Onyebode, Minister of Labor; (4) Lisa Mbanukwe, Senior Political Adviser to Lagos State Governor; (5) Alhaji Momo Abubarkar, Executive Member of the Council; (6) Shetima Ali Mungono, Nigerian Representative at OPEC, and Adviser to the Head of State.

Since the Federal Executive Council is subordinate to the Armed Forces Ruling Council, it is, more than anything else, an institutional arrangement for coordination of both domestic and foreign affairs. In any case, under Nigeria's military regime, the existence of the FEC complements and strengthens AFRC's capacity and resources for performing the vital and strategic role of policy coordination which has become absolutely essential and necessary for the conduct and management of the nation's foreign policy.[2]

The senior civil servants in the FEC, although subject to the control of military authority, occupy a strong position in the state apparatus. Their function in government enables them to interact with various agencies in the coordination of policy. These top bureaucrats (whose activities will be discussed later in this chapter), take part in a number of commissions and board meetings and act as

chief advisors in the cabinet meetings. The military regimes often refer to these federal bureaucrats as "super permanent secretaries," because they actually implement the affairs of the government. Apart from their strategic location in the state apparatus, their influence is also derived from their relationship with foreign and local capitalists. It is quite common for companies to influence them through bribes, kickbacks into their accounts in the negotiation for government contracts and projects, especially those who have an interest in maintaining extensive relations with the business community. They are also influenced by scholars and journalists.

Gowon's Perceptual Framework

The ECOWAS initiative was personally the result of the confluence of interests between the Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon and Adebayo Adedeji, his commissioner for economic development and a close adviser. For security reasons after the civil war, Gowon made Africa the pivot of Nigeria's foreign policy. A cardinal aspect of this policy was good neighborliness in West Africa. Addressing the Supreme Military Council in Lagos on January 10, 1973, General Gowon said:

> We must establish ourselves as leaders in the move to integrate West Africa economically, whereby no one will dictate our destiny.[3]

This was the direct outcome of the various activities of a number of West African states in favor of "Biafra" and thus against Nigeria's interests during the war. Of these, the recognition of "Biafra" by the Ivory Coast and the French use of Benin and the Cameroun Republics to supply the rebels were the last straw. They revealed, to Gowon, the hollowness of Nigeria's diplomacy and political influence in West Africa and inclined him to see a means towards hegemony in economic integration.[4]

In the same speech to the Supreme Military Council, Gowon reiterated Nigeria's desire to push for such an economic dominance by stating that "Nigeria's fast expanding economy must be viewed as a positive sign towards achieving that goal."[5] Thus he revealed a perception of Nigeria's increased resource capacity.

Nigeria's post civil war affluence, made possible by cash from oil could provide the impetus for such a scheme or so it was believed. As Ibrahim Gambari once noted, "a West African integration scheme would offer "a rational outlet" for external aid to African nations and provide an institutional framework for Nigeria's leadership and the erosion of France's political and economic influence."[6] Gowon bought the popular view that petroleum was a finite quality and the earnings from it must, therefore, be maximized and used to diversify and technologically transform

the economy. But more than that, he also saw the task of diversification and transformation as inextricably bound to the economic fortunes of the West African sub-region as a whole. He put it succinctly when he opined that;

> there was a new Nigeria that recognized its new role in West Africa and realized that,"the gigantic task of economic and political regeneration in which it was then engaged, would be of little avail" unless it was attuned to the requirements of the economy of the rest of Africa, particularly West Africa.[7]

The perception of Nigeria's national interest is as problematic as the definition of the concept of national interest. One may suggest that perception is most relevant to national interest because cognition and evaluation are combined, i.e., not only is the environment perceived in a specific way but it is "simultaneously" assessed normatively. The relevant factor within the psychological environment which produces foreign policy is the decision-makers' perception of the national interest defined in terms of the perceived external (cooperative and security) needs of the state.[8]

The national interest of Nigeria derives from a common historical experience which has been reinforced by the need to promote the unity, stability and development of all Nigerians in a climate of peace in Africa in particular and the world in general. It was not until the speech of January 10, 1973, that General Gowon clearly spelled out what the country's national objective as regards ECOWAS initiative

should be. He categorically stated that:

> ECOWAS will assure the creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in West Africa that will facilitate the defense of independence and territorial integrity of all countries in the area. Also, Nigeria will push for the promotion and defense of justice and respect for human dignity, especially the dignity of the Black man.[9]

Some opponents had taken the position that Nigeria's large market did not need regional expansion before large-scale industrialization could take place. In their view the oil boom, the resultant boost in external reserves and the debt service ratio of under 2% of export earnings were all indicative of the presence of adequate internally generated capital for economic development purposes, but not enough for external grandiose adventure like the ECOWAS initiative. In an open letter to General Gowon, Professor Dina Abubarkar pointed out that Nigeria should utilize its revenues from oil to boost its domestic needs (that is paying more attention to societal stress issues) and support a viable stable economic prosperity, independent of foreign control.[10] General Gowon himself had said in an address to foreign oil executives that "money was no longer Nigeria's problem but how to spend it."[11] In any case, he continued, "if it became necessary, Nigeria could absorb substantial official and private aid without running into debt-service problems."[12] Furthermore, two weeks later, in an address at

the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, he emphatically stated that:

> Nigeria is determined to utilize all available resources for the achievement of the ECOWAS initiative. I strongly believe that Nigeria has the will and the potential to pursue this goal. Nigeria, you are well aware is committed to playing her part maximally to ensure an uninterrupted growth of a future ECOWAS and the attainment of the lofty goals and ideas which will govern this organization. I belief that the organization will have great potentials for the steady economic growth and integration of the sub-region.[13]

In response to the skepticism expressed by some Nigerian newspaper editorials over Nigerian sponsorship of ECOWAS, Gowon reiterated on January 20th, 1973 that "Nigeria cannot turn its back on the initiative simply because of cash."[14] He again reminded them that "it was in Nigeria's national interest to secure a strong West African integrated economy that will be free from western dominance."[15] In fact, he went as far as stating that, with the projected revenues from oil based on anticipated jump in oil prices, Nigeria will be able to sustain her commitments to ECOWAS, including "oil concessions" to its neighbors.[16] But as mentioned in the last chapter; at this particular time (January 1973), Nigerian university students were demonstrating in most of the campuses over the shortage of housing and certain basic amenities. Ten days later, the Minister of Agriculture stated the possibility of eliminating rice from university menu due to "severe cost of importation."[17] Three weeks after the

speech, the World Health Organization issued a warning to Nigerian authorities of a possible cholera epidemic in certain over crowded regions of Southern Nigeria. How then does one explain Gowon's perception of Nigeria's capacity to initiate and sponsor ECOWAS with all these domestic societal stress issues, which East regards as negatively related to capacity to act?

Decision makers act in accordance with their perception of reality, not in response to reality itself, and they often fit the evidence that conforms to their views to reality.[18] Gowon's "belief system and motivation" may have been set on the assumption that Nigeria possesses the potential to sponsor ECOWAS, so any evidence contrary to that "central belief" is either discarded or twisted to fit his "perceived reality and motivation."

Bureaucratic Perceptual Views and Influence.

Adebayo Adedeji.

Representing a major supportive voice from the Federal Executive Council (FEC) is Adedeji. The linkage of Nigeria's economic and political regeneration with the economic health of West Africa was the brainchild of Adebayo Adedeji, the Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction. It is also significant that it was he that Gowon appointed to chair a foreign policy think-thank which

endorsed the idea of Africa as the centerpieceof Nigeria's foreign policy. A brilliant student of economic development and public administration with varied administrative experience, Adedeji was unrepentantly committed to the philosophy of sub-regional integration and was more inclined to rely on the weight of technical economic arguments. He once in a commencement address to the graduating students of the University of Lagos, noted that "sub-regional integration coupled with technological advancement is the precursor to Africa's future and was confident Nigeria possesses the manpower to sustain such an adventure."[19] And as the Director of the Institute of Administration which trained high level public servants, Adedeji had tremendous influence among civil servants and enjoyed Gowon's confidence.

It was Adedeji's ministry that was placed in charge of regional economic matters. This ministry in 1969 had organized a high powered conference on Nigeria's post-war reconstruction which considered, among other things, the possibility that an integrated West African Economic Community with harmonized industrial planning might help stimulate Nigeria's growth and development.[20] Arising from this conference, the Ministry of Economic Development, when it prepared the 1970-74 Development Plan (The Second National Plan, as it is popularly known) recognized the need for a West African Economic Community. Such a community, the Ministry hoped would stimulate the Nigerian manufacturing sector hitherto sluggish in its response to government

incentives. The Ministry did recognize the difficulties which would make it take some time for such a community to become a reality, but it was of the conviction that the community was a necessity and Nigeria was up to the task.[21] Adedeji left no doubt about his conviction of Nigeria's capacity to initiate and sponsor this organization when he stated that, "revenues from oil has made Nigeria an economic giant in West Africa which has the obligation to pull the rest forward."[22] At the same time, Adedeji's response to critics who claim domestic problems were being sacrificed for such an uncertain adventure....."ECOWAS success will trigger domestic productivity which in turn creates prosperity at home."[23] The trust of the pro-integrationist argument (which Adedeji represents) then, was that indigenization and economic integration were inseparable necessities for the transformation of the economy and that long term economic and political gains rather than the short-run costs and sacrifices of integration should be Nigeria's primary consideration.

Bolstering the position of the Economic Development Ministry (which Adedeji heads), was the security perception of the Ministry of Defense and Gowon himself. The recognition of secessionist Biafra by the Ivory Coast (and three other African states), and the pressure exerted on De Gaulle of France by Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast to do the same, and

the use of neighboring countries, such as Benin, as bases for supplies to Biafra- all revealed the depth of security risks across Nigeria's frontiers. The invasion of Guinea in 1970 by "unknown" foreign forces was seen as a portent of possibilities in Nigeria, with the aid and abatement of neighbors. One sure way of reducing the security risks and minimizing external danger was an institutional arrangement which at one and the same time promoted "good neighborliness," reduced the inordinate Francophone dependence of France, and increased Nigeria's (and the sub-region's) bargaining power against Europe. As Gambari stated earlier, "a West African integration scheme would offer a rational outlet for external aid to African neighbors and provide an institutional framework for Nigeria's leadership and the erosion of France's political and economic influence."[24] More later on Adedeji with the business community.

Philip Asiodu

Asiodu (a member of the Federal Executive Council), the "super permanent secretary" of the Ministry of Industry, represented and articulated the position of the anti-integrationists within the Council. In a paper, Planning For Development in Nigeria, presented at the conference on Nigeria's post-war reconstruction and development, Asiodu spiritedly argued against economic integration but supported indigenization (a policy mandating about 60% of all companies be Nigerian owned), a position which Adedeji would find

logically inconsistent. Asiodu did recognize that an integrated West African economic community with harmonized industrial planning could help stimulate Nigeria's economic growth and development, but yet he preferred a purely domestic solution, first by calling on Nigeria to pay attention to "enormous domestic stress problems", like elevating the standard of living of the people and addressing health, unemployment and education issues. His paper criticized the idea that "throwing money at problems without constructive methodology to solve them is the answer, and doubted Nigerian capacity to act on this foreign adventure."[25]

While conceding that major constraints on development were partly questions of state laws, Asiodu, nonetheless, argued that the more important constraint was the tradition of multinationals' near-monopoly resulting in high cost of local production. In addition, there was a limit to which the existing import-substitution strategy could serve as a strong development factor. In his view, the bottlenecks could be removed by better planning accompanied by policies that stimulated internal demand, and by positive laws that gave incentives to indigenous entrepreneurs in partnership with foreign investors. Accordingly, Asiodu urged a focus on "growth industries" such as agro-based and petro chemical industries; on identification of feasible projects for more purposeful private investment, and on the

acquisition of industrial know-how by Nigerians on a massive scale.[26]

Other Bureaucratic Views.

Quite apart from the anti-integrationist position so ably articulated by Asiodu and his Ministry of Industry, there were doubts on the part of the External Affairs Ministry. Bureaucrats there argued that security and the drain on foreign exchange would be enormous.[27] They also feared that under regional integration, Frenchmen and women who had acquired the nationality of Francophone states might serve as spies for France while the concomitant free movement of labor and capital would permit foreign nationals moving out of Nigeria to drain the country's foreign exchange.[28]

Another argument against Nigeria's participation in a West African economic integration scheme centered on the neoclassical theory that integration in developing countries could not yield welfare gains and on the possibility that integration might aggravate economic dependence on Europe.[29] It was argued that Nigeria's intraregional trade, which was at the time insignificant, could not be much improved by integration, because the economies that would be involved were believed to be heavily competitive, rather than complementary.[30] Alhaji Momo Abubarkar, another member of the FEC warned that:

In order to introduce an increasing measure

> of self-sustaining industrial development in the area, the West African region must begin to reduce its chronic dependence on the outside world for the most fundamental of all resources- manpower. The region depends on foreign manpower for the performance of a whole range of activities extending from the conception, formulation and design of industrial projects to the carrying out of plant installations, management and technical operation and sometimes even to plant maintenance and repair.[31]

Lisa Mbakwe, a political adviser to Lagos State Governor- a member of the Supreme Military Council, expressed her reservation on the ECOWAS initiative by stating that:

> If at this stage of our (West African) economic development, we are so dependent on various foreign elements for feasibility studies, execution of projects, imports etc., whom then is ECOWAS going to benefit, if not these same foreign elements?[32]

As far as she was concerned, it seemed that these multinationals would play the same role in ECOWAS that they played in various individual national economies. Moreover she expressed reservation over Nigerian capacity to sponsor this adventure by stating that "we should not forget that by all circumstances the country is still [poor], and should utilize the windfall from oil to tackle the domestic problems."[33]

Sanni Oyebode, the Minister of Labor agreed by adding:

> Who controls the Nigerian economy now? If it is in the interest of the multi-national corporations, the United African Company (UAC) group, Leventis etc., to have ECOWAS, they will promote it. They want of course to extend their markets. If they did not consider that it was in their interest to have these wider groupings obviously, there was nothing our Heads of States could do in so far as they did not themselves control their

economies.[34]

The two contradictory positions within the bureaucracy were reflected in the Second National Development Plan prepared at about that time. On the one hand, the document echoed the anti-integrationists' position by proffering the trade gains of integration without integrating. The better way to expand Nigeria's West African trade was to maintain non-discrimination duties by removing the reverse preferences and the quotas accorded the EEC countries by the majority of the Francophone states. The non-preferential fiscal and customs duties imposed by those states on other West African countries, but not on the EEC states, should also be removed as they effectively shut out the products of the Anglophone neighbors for reasons other than economic in nature. If West African countries could maintain non-discriminatory duties, intra-West African trade in manufactures would be greatly expanded and this would promote more rapid economic growth in the sub-region.

On the other hand, the document recognized the need for a West African Economic Community which all states in the sub-region had accepted in principle as a laudable goal. Adebayo stated that the Nigerian Manufacturing Sector (especially if accompanied by policies that reversed the situation whereby the public sector was an inferior partner), would benefit from the integration. He also stated

that: "In a game dictated by the global strategy of modern international combines that controlled and dominated the national economies, foreign companies would have no choice but to establish repetitive parallel industries in the country of the sub-region."[35] Shetima Ali Mungono, an adviser to the Head of State, also added that, such policies could vitiate the efforts of powerful foreign investors to manipulate, distort and frustrate governmental objectives and priorities. At the same time he added, the attendant "industrial experience and development potential" of the country would "provide the focal point in the active pursuit of West African economic integration."[36]

Given the division within the bureaucracy, it should come as no surprise that the factions resorted to solicitation of support from other groups to literally advance their respective views.

Perceptual Views From The Business Community.

Although the official decision-makers' perception is most important, but their personal approach is usually mediated by the perspectives of competing influential groups. In reality, national objectives are defined by decision-makers in such a way that their private interests have been transformed into "national objectives" through the process of governmental decision-making.[37] It is therefore clear that the term "national" as used in the national interest really

represents only the effective constituency of the decision-makers, that is, the groups to which the foreign policy process is most responsive. Therefore in order to fully determine the sources of decision-makers' perceptions, it is necessary to identify these influential groups and ascertain the nature of their interests and influence. According to Daniel Bell:

> ...the nature of interests implies a selection of values by a group or part of a group over and against others. And this leads to a definition of particular privileges and so on...Certainly, one cannot have a power elite or ruling class without community of interest.[37]

ECOWAS was interested in promoting the interest of Nigerian bourgeoisie, perceived as the cornerstone of the nation's industrialization and development. The expansion and domestication (indigenization) of the inchoate bourgeoisie has always been a goal of the post-colonial Nigerian state. Oluwole Thomas, the managing editor of the New Nigerian Times observed that Nigerian businessmen and women were very enthusiastic and supportive of the indigenization policy of General Gowon and that opposition to the plan by the Trade Unions was insignificant.[38] In post-war Nigeria, this support became more urgent and ECOWAS was perceived by protagonists as a useful instrument.

Nigeria's war economy had produced indigenous "national" and "transnational" emergency contractors and

entrepreneurs on both sides of the conflict and vastly increased the size of the business sector. With the oil bonanza after the war, and particularly after OPEC forced price increases following the Yom Kippur war, the number and size of the "capitalist" further increased. The contradiction between indigenous and non-indigenous capital which had been at the root of Nigerian nationalism resurfaced at a higher level of intensity, especially as the civil war experience clearly demonstrated that non-indigenous economic interests were injurious to Nigeria's political interests.[39]

There was, therefore, a clamorous agitation for indigenization of foreign enterprises operating in Nigeria. But in the absence of adequate indigenous capital and advanced technology (the Nigerian bourgeoisie was still largely deprived and non-autonomous, dependent on external capitalists and their technology), this economic nationalism lacked a realistic basis. To provide such realism as we saw, Adedeji and the Ministry of Economic Development thought if necessary to tie Nigeria's economic development policies to the issue of West African integration, an assertion backed by the Head of State, General Gowon. Addressing a coalition of Nigerian Business Executives at Kano Development Conference in 1971, Adedeji stated that "Nigerians must realize that her economic prosperity is the engine that would pull other West African sluggish economies- if we fail they fail- we succeed they succeed."[40]

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encouraged the private foreign investors to abandon wholesaling, retailing, and small-scale enterprises to private Nigerian business people and to shift, instead, to mining, construction and manufacturing in partnership with various governments of the federation. Existing laws were revamped on income tax relief and guaranteed for the right of repatriation of both capital and profit and against expropriation. The government itself took over the shipping, airways, telecommunications and the banking, insurance and other service sectors with the intention to sell these to Nigerians at a future date when capable entrepreneurs and managers would have emerged. Industrial estates and other infrastructural facilities and loan capital to indigenous entrepreneurs were also provided by government.[42]

Impact of Adedeji's Plea to the Business Community.

West African Regional integration complemented the foregoing policies in so far as one of its objectives was to assist "the agents of socioeconomic activity," as Adedeji calls the bourgeoisie and deriving from this, to develop the Nigerian economy, making it the industrial heart of a West African Common Market.[43] Put another way, West African regional integration was seen as the other side of the indigenization coin; hence, the prominence of the two ideas in the Second (and subsequent) National Development Plans. In an address to the International Conference on Regional Integration, Adedeji stated that, "Nigeria's seriousness in

the initiation of ECOWAS was indicative of the emphasis and allocation of resources earmarked for this project in the National Development Plans.[44] It then seemed that indigenization decrees and the decision to sponsor and become members of ECOWAS was perceived to be paramount to the national interest. For Adedeji, under whose auspices the Second Development Plan was authored, the integration idea seemed to be sine qua non to collective self-reliance which is itself, a main instrument of national self-reliance for which the bourgeoisie were the chief agents. If these agents did not exist, they would have to be created; if they existed, as they were and increasingly so in Nigeria, they were made to perceive West African integration as in their own national interest and were induced to function across national frontiers. To them it seems, domestic problems that constituted societal stress was not an issue and as far as the oil revenues flowed in, Nigeria had the potential. Indeed, Adedeji seemed to have used the existence of these agents of socio-economic activity to function across the national frontier to clinch the argument in favor of sponsorship and membership of ECOWAS in the bureaucratic politics of decision-making in Lagos.[45]

The Influence of Nigerian Chamber of Commerce.

The best organized business community was the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture. The President of the Chamber, Chief Henry

Fajemirokun, was a personal friend of Adebayo Adedeji and, as fate sometimes does to shape interaction in decision making, this friendship was utilized to advantage.[46]
Adedeji used the personal ties not only to clinch the support of the Chamber, but also to induce it to function across national frontiers as a sub-regional interest group that favored ECOWAS. In a speech before the Chambers celebrating its expansion into the southern parts of Nigeria, Adedeji stated that "the dynamism and talent of the Chamber members was a positive access to the future of ECOWAS."[47]

However, the politics of eliciting chamber support was somewhat complicated. This was because of a split within the chamber along indigenous versus expatriate lines. Only about 25% of the chamber's membership was indigenous. Even this had been achieved only because of the enlightened self-interest of the dominant expatriate business interests. These expatriates, it seems, had calculated that to continue to have some say at the planning stages of developmental and other policies, they had to remove the suspicion that the chamber was a powerful lobby for foreign interests. Consequently, they embarked on active recruitment of Nigerian members. Furthermore, they could no longer ignore the increasing number of large Nigerian enterprises brought into being by the war economy, the subsequent oil boom and the governmental aid to indigenous business people. Quite a few of the expatriate firms entered into partnership with

indigenous entrepreneurs and Nigerianized their top management, especially in the area of personnel management. For instance, Unilever's United African Company (UAC), consisting of nine major industrial groups and eleven subsidiaries, went into partnership with Nigerian concerns in seven other major companies.[48]

One result of these changes was that Nigerians soon became "over represented in the chamber's listed leadership," despite the small total number and relatively small financial size of the enterprises they represented. Thus, 17 of the 30 members of the Executive Council in 1969 were Nigerians, some of whom held important posts, among them the presidency: one of the two deputy presidencies and three of the five vice-presidencies. But the leadership of the vital standing committees and trade groups (shipping, imports and exports, industrial, motor and transport, economics and statistics, publications) remained firmly in the hands of the multinationals, leaving the small businessmen and the tourism committees to Nigerians. The indigenous versus expatriate tussle inside the chamber came into the open when several Nigerian business people formed the rival organization of Nigerian Indigenous Businessmen in 1970, although its leadership was drawn from prominent chamber members. The tussle was aggravated by the proposed indigenization announced in the Second Development Plan. The indigenous groups saw themselves as the potential beneficiaries who

would become the new masters, while the expatriate groups came to feel they would be the dispossessed and the vanquished.

Given this situation, Adedeji and Henry Fajemirokun, the President of the Chamber, and a leader of the indigenous business interests utilized their personal friendship to advantage. Fajemirokun simply took a personal decision to throw the chamber's weight behind Adedeji and afterwards secured the acquiescence of the rank and file. In a speech to the annual Chambers dinner, he emphasized that "Nigeria should use its economic strength and vitality to secure the ECOWAS initiative. We, he said, as a nation are blessed with enormous wealth and talent and sponsorship and maintenance of ECOWAS should not be a problem."[49]

As a first class indigenous entrepreneur who owned many industrial and commercial enterprises, including the Nigerian Far East Line and the Nigerian South America Line, it is not unlikely that Fajemirokun had calculated the benefits which he and similar groups could derive from indigenization. And if he played his powerful card as President of the Chamber properly in support of Adedeji's preference for economic integration, he would additionally cement his particularistic ties to Adedeji and other powerful functionaries such as General Gowon, thus ensuring greater political leverage in securing loans from banks and

governmental agencies and in winning lavish governmental contracts.[50]

The proposed indigenization, which initially exercerbated internal chamber struggles, turned out to help the Adedeji-Fajemirokun team in securing the organization's support. For instance, potential gains from indigenization silenced the Nigerian business groups who, in theory, would normally oppose integration. The indigenization policy seemed to preempt or allay their customary fear and reason for opposing integration: that is, that integration might allow foreign companies to penetrate national protective policies such as restrictions on imports and investments, and thus undermine and eventually destroy local entrepreneurs.[51] For one thing, their inability to play the historical role of the capitalist class-the role of initiative, capital formation and increased production- on account of foreign competition could be reversed under indigenization. For another, the indigenous Nigerian groups seemed to calculate that if they supported integration and got in early in working out its details, they might be able to ensure inclusion of a clause in any integration agreement which allow free trade in the common market only for those enterprises that were largely indigenously owned (such, indeed, became the case in the rule of origin clause in the protocols annexed to the ECOWAS treaty). The prospects of displacing foreigners at both the

domestic and the sub-regional levels did arouse the interest of the Nigerian members of the Chamber.

For their part, the expatriates sensed that opposition to integration (especially when their indigenous counterparts supported it) would antagonize the Nigerians even more and perhaps result in more drastic government policies to their detriment. Until the details of indigenization has been worked out, some foresaw that it might be premature to judge the issue. It was seen, for instance, that integration might provide greater opportunities for backward linkages with their parent firms at home and even greater opportunities for large-scale industries since they were only just beginning to enter manufacturing in a big way.

It seemed, then, to be in the political interests of the Chamber as a whole as well as of indigenous and expatriate members, in particular, to support Adedeji's Ministry which appointed the chairman of the Nigerian Planning Board and would be pivotal in working out the details of the evolving policies and their implementation. It was perceived that support might even yield a voice in the deliberations and negotiations for the proposed West African Economic Community. Accordingly, the Chamber threw its support behind Adedeji and thus buttressed the position of the pro-integrationists who carried the day in the bureaucratic politics of Nigeria. Thereafter, the Chamber

embarked on an active campaign to solicit support from its counterparts throughout Francophone and Anglophone West Africa. In December 1973, at the Lome Ministerial Conference on ECOWAS, Adedeji used the activities of the Chamber to clinch his argument with domestic and West African colleagues saying that "the business communities of virtually all the prospective member states view integration as beneficial and support it, the bureaucrats could not be heard opposing it."[52]

The Views of some Academicians and Journalists.

Although they were not directly involved as official decision makers, and it is impossible to determine what impact (if any) their influence played on the final decision, it is imperative for me to mention their diverse opinion on this subject as I encountered them in my extensive research. The anti-integrationist were of the view that Nigeria was unlikely to gain from integration and membership of ECOWAS might be economically counter-productive. Emenike Osakwe, a well known economic professor, an opponent of the integration movement questioned Nigerian financial capability when he said:

> Our resources should be channeled to the domestic decadence of our hinterland. Our primary schools have become dog houses, illiteracy rate have become proportionately unbearable. We must put our house in order before considering the status of the other West African countries.[53]

For one thing, the meager intra-regional trade and the

competitive rather than complementary export goods theoretically made gains from liberalization of trade most unlikely or, at best, marginal. For another, integration would entail a sharing of Nigeria's oil wealth with the regional partners to the advantage of foreign enterprises in those countries. There was, in addition, skepticism that Nigeria, already accounting for about 25% of total African trade with the rest of the world, could by membership in ECOWAS significantly improve its share of this trade or add to its bargaining power in international trade negotiations. In short, for the opponents of ECOWAS, Nigeria should go it alone.

Gbenga Idowu, another leading Nigerian economist wrote that there was no compelling factor that could make ECOWAS a success and that Nigeria would be making a mistake in sponsoring the project. He contended that:

> Domestic economic considerations should be the primary concern of this government. Our shops, streets are full of imported goods, and everyone in governmental authority is acting as if revenues from oil will continue for ever. We must consider the enormous task of supporting the other nations within ECOWAS, some of whose economic viability is non-existent. It seems to me that those advocating such huge financial responsibility have no scintilla of knowledge of the vulnerability of such projects and its political ramifications. "Caution" should be exercised.[54]

Peter Enuhu, a weekly columnist and scholar at the University of Ibadan also stated that:

> For the past two years, the Nigerian government has been involved in promoting "elephant projects" with no economic vitality. Remove vast imports from our economic fluidism and massive starvation will be our immediate companion.[55]

In a contrasting view, Stephen Osuagwu, the Managing Editor of one of Nigeria's leading newspapers opined that:

> Nigeria with its vast resources in manpower will be the engine of this community. Nigeria will become the principal market, whereby other members will buy goods as opposed to from former colonial lords.[56]

In the previous chapter, we saw how Nigeria was heavily dependent on the importation of food just to feed her vast population. It is then ironical how Nigeria hoped to become "the principal market," when she was having a difficult time, feeding herself.

External Factors Shaping Decision-Makers' Perception.

Apart from the expatriate companies and the impact of their activities and their politics, several other external factors influenced the decision to sponsor ECOWAS. On the global plane, there were the several United Nations General Assembly resolutions and Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) independent initiatives, urging African states to regroup into geographical sub-regions for cooperative schemes. Indeed, by 1965, Africa had been divided into four sub-regions for purposes of integration schemes and several meetings of the West African sub-region were subsequently

held. One result of all this was the signing in 1967 of the Articles of Association of a West African Economic Community at Accra. The following year, it was followed by a protocol signed in Monrovia to establish the West African Regional Group committed to the establishment of a common market. Priority studies and a draft treaty were commissioned for the study of an interim council of ministers pending another summit scheduled for Ouadadougou, the Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) capital. Not much happened after this, partly because the life threatening civil war left Nigeria no breathing space for independent/initiatives and partly because "the agents of imperialism and colonialism frustrated the initiatives of others."[57] At the end of the civil war, the very activities of these agents (particularly French activities) which reached their zenith during and immediately after the war, conjointly with political security and economic development concern propelled the Nigerians towards ECOWAS initiative.

There was, too, the demonstration effect to the EEC, an organization being emulated in Latin America and other Third World areas. What is good for Europe, the Nigerians seem to say, should be good for Africa. But even more to the point, the effect and potential effect of the EEC on Nigeria compelled the latter to consider a functional equivalent for Africa. Already, a major market for Nigeria's exports, the EEC countries had the potential to become the

dominant market. The tariff wall of integration, however, posed a serious danger. The danger appeared more ominous when Britain decided that it would join the EEC. That decision, if put into effect would mean not only the loss of extant commonwealth preferences for Nigerian goods in Britain, but also the imposition of EEC tariffs on about 80 percent of its exports as against unrestricted flow of the exports of its Francophone competitors into the enlarged community. One way to stem this danger was to become an associate member of the EEC. Indeed, Nigeria made a *volte face* from its previous opposition to African associate membership and negotiated its own associateship during 1963-66. However, the treaty was never ratified because, Franco-Nigerian relations had reached a low ebb during Nigeria's civil war. France made it unmistakably clear that it would veto Nigeria's membership of the EEC for political reasons and to protect the economic interests of the Francophone states with which it had special neo-colonial relations. It became obvious, then, that there was only one way to EEC. Whether in terms of associate membership (in which Nigeria in any case soon became disinterested), or in terms of mere improved relations with its individual members especially France. That may depend in developing better political and economic cooperation with the Francophone states and organizing them with the Anglophone counterparts as one bargaining unit vis-a-vis the EEC. For this, the resuscitation of the ideas of the Articles of Association of a West African Economic Community appeared

natural and logical. Put differently, Nigeria saw the global environment inextricably linked to the regional, itself already seen as having critical implications for security and economic interests. And the answer to this linkage was to confront it with a domestic-regional linkage of one's own.

The full dramatization of the linkage between the global and the regional environments during and after the civil war culminating in a new French anti-Nigerianism left Nigeria lots to think about being isolated in the region. As already noted, the recognition of "Biafra" by three Francophone states, the French use of bases in another two to supply Biafra and France's veritable recognition *de facto* of the secessionists created security anxieties for post civil war Nigeria. One strategy for allaying that was an institutional framework to keep the Francophone neighbors truly honest and good neighbors. Even for this, good relations with France was obviously essential just as good Francophone relations. But while Nigeria sought to improve these relations, France appeared bent on cultivating a new anti Nigerianism among the Francophone states. Beginning in February, 1971, for instance, President Pompidou of France embarked on a series of African tours during which he urged the Francophone states, in view of the collapse of Biafran secession, to "harmonize their efforts so as to counterbalance the heavy weight of Nigeria" in West Africa. One result was the reconciliation between Senghor and Houphouet-

Boigny, with the former paying an unprecedented visit in December, 1971 to Abidjan where the two leaders affirmed their commitment to the formation of Communauté économique de L'Afrique de l'Ouest, (CEAO), an economic community of seven Francophone states. CEAO, a regeneration of the almost moribund Union Douanière économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (UDEAO), was in reality part of "a complex manueuvre to counter-balance Nigeria's political and economic weight, in particular, to check her attempts to organize a larger economic community" that might jeopardize French neocolonialism.[58]

This new anti-Nigerianism was the last straw. The announcement that CEAO was to be formed quickened the resolution of Nigeria's internal bureaucratic debate over the need for Nigeria's participation in economic integration schemes. It helped, too, to quicken the formation and subsequent pressures exerted by the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce in support of an all West African Economic Community. More importantly, it accelerated Gowon's diplomatic offensive to create a wider community instead. Fortuitously, Niger, Togo and Benin felt that CEAO would not be viable if Nigeria were excluded and generally disapproved of the organization's anti-Nigeria posture. Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) also felt the same way about excluding Anglophone countries in general and Ghana in particular.[59] These countries became Nigeria's main target

in the strategy to form a larger, all West African Economic Community. In the process, Togo became Nigeria's comrade in arms in spearheading the formation of ECOWAS.

With Adedeji and his Ministry committed to the idea of a West African Community, and Gowon concerned with security and a higher political and economic role in West Africa (regardless of social organizational problems), it was almost a forgone conclusion that Gowon would give the green light for Nigeria's sponsorship and membership in what later became the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In Nigeria, to paraphrase Henry Asobie, the political scientist, "when the Head of Government and the relevant ministers agreed, policy is made."[60]

The diplomacy of the process of winning over sub-regional neighbors to form ECOWAS has been touched on briefly in earlier chapter. Essentially, Nigeria tried to overcome the resistance of foot draggers with subtle arm twisting, occasionally with emotional and technical arguments, more often with "spraying diplomacy" (as mentioned earlier) akin to America's "dollar diplomacy." This involved throwing oil money at whatever deemed appropriate by Nigerian decision-makers.

Adebayo Adedeji, the main Nigerian protagonist of ECOWAS (with the blessing of General Gowon), was intimately

involved in the three years of careful planning and intensive diplomatic activities. Indeed, he initiated and directed a number of them, in the process visiting several times every West African country, except Cape Verde. He thus became the sub-region's Kissinger in terms of "shuttle diplomacy."

Summary.

Nigerian capacity to act (following East's model), should depend on social organizational factors (modernization and societal stress issues) as discussed in the previous chapter. In our modified model here, we have tried to look at how Nigerian key decision-makers viewed these characteristics including revenues from oil in their decision to initiate and sponsor ECOWAS. As a result of our extensive research, we can conclude that Nigerian decision makers may have felt that the benefits of entering ECOWAS far exceeded any other alternative. Established in 1975, ECOWAS was envisaged to become the most important international economic instrument for economic cooperation and development in West Africa.

The last and concluding chapter will evaluate the Nigerian foreign policy on ECOWAS, and with the benefit of hindsight, offer a thought for the future.

FOOTNOTES.

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CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSION.

Realism in Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Impact on ECOWAS. Changes in the Global Arena.

Summary of the Analysis of the Impact of Resource Power on Nigerian Foreign Policy.

This study has attempted to determine how the revenues from oil began to change the perception of the Nigerian decision makers as regards their capacity to initiate and maintain ECOWAS. We have seen how the decision makers wrongfully assumed that revenues from oil automatically generated economic growth. Also they recklessly ignored the societal stress factors (aspects of social organization), which East suggested are negatively related to capacity to act in foreign policy. Given any level of resources then, the nation with a high level of social organization, that is, ability to control, convert and allocate resources will have the capacity to act in foreign affairs.[1] East further stated that this assumption then highlights the mechanism underlying the conceptualization of social organization and its relationship to capacity to act.[2]

The achievement of Nigerian national objectives as perceived by Nigerian decision makers required the maximization of oil revenues. Therefore the adverse effect of

the unexpected sharp fall in oil revenues (in the 1980s) on national budgets and development programs led the Nigerian decision makers to adopt policy actions inconsistent to previous assumptions that "money was not the problem, but how to spend it." Philip Asiodu, the former Super Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Industry identified false priorities and misplaced values among others, as some of the failures of the ECOWAS initiative. According to him, the difficulties which Nigeria finds itself in are:

> The necessary price we have to pay for our pathetic planlessness, our lack of vision, avarice, our vanity, our false conception and perception of what constitutes good policy.[3]

Nigerian Problem's Impact on ECOWAS.

ECOWAS remained dormant for over a year and half after the ratification of its treaty. The delay in implementing the treaty was attributable to the following factors:

1. In the desire to obtain the signatures of the member states which eventually adopted the treaty establishing ECOWAS, the summit meeting in Lagos, Nigeria (May, 1975) failed to resolve the most sensitive question, such as the appointment of a Secretary-General and the location of the Secretariat for the organization. This proved to be a very serious mistake. Had these decisions been made then, the new Secretary-General and his staff could have taken the initiative to negotiate the detailed and complex requirements of an economic community, thus pushing the transformation of the ECOWAS treaty into a working document.

Instead, this task was left to the slow and cumbersome machinery of regional multilateral diplomacy. The resulting trade offs slowed the implementation process and did not give ECOWAS the powerful push it needed.

2. Unfortunately for ECOWAS, two of its main Nigerian architects, Dr. Adebayo Adedeji and General Yakubu Gowon, soon found themselves relinquishing their official positions in Nigeria. Dr. Adedeji left for Addis Ababa to become the new Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and General Gowon was removed as head of state and government following a blood-less coup d'etat in Nigeria in August, 1975. The two men who worked very hard to get ECOWAS established, and thereby developed personal and political stakes in its success, left the West African scene and their direct input in the treaty's implementation was missing.

3. Furthermore, the military coup d'etat which overthrew General Gowon directed the energies and attention of new leadership in Nigeria to internal matters, as originally advocated by the anti-integrationist school earlier. The new government had to consolidate itself and deal with the many problems created by the Gowon regime. These included the congestion of Lagos port, measures against corrupt military officers and civil servants in the previous government, the creation of the new states, a decision on whether or not Lagos was to remain the federal capital city, a return to civilian rule, and so forth. ECOWAS was pushed to a low priority in the early months of the regime

which realized that the capacity to implement previous promises seemed limited.

4. The coup in Nigeria did not facilitate easy relations with Togo, whose president, Mr. Eyadema, had worked very closely with General Gowon in bringing about ECOWAS. It was, indeed, felt that President Eyadema had initially wanted to show his displeasure with the overthrow of his friend General Gowon, by granting him asylum in Togo. Although cool heads eventually prevailed in Togo, the Nigerian-Togo Economic Union (designed as an embryo of and example for the West African Economic Community) went into abeyance. So did Togo's enthusiasm for any further spade-work for ECOWAS, a task which it had undertaken jointly with Nigeria before the coup in Lagos.

5. When the Nigerian government under General Mohammed felt confident enough of its domestic acceptability and support to begin playing an active role in African Affairs, Angola was the most urgent foreign policy concern. Nigeria not only recognized the MPLA (People's Movement for Liberation of Angola) party in Angola, but also actively worked to have the Organization of African Unity recognize that liberation movement as the legitimate government of Angola.[4] This position was diametrically opposed to the U.S. policy in Angola, and it was the Nigerian view and efforts that eventually prevailed. General Mohammed was assassinated in an attempted coup in February, 1976. Nonetheless, for several months afterwards, domestic matters, both political and social once again preoccupied the Nigerian leaders and

public, as has been previously advocated by skeptics.

Expulsion of Illegal Aliens from Other ECOWAS Countries.

Nigeria clearly emerged as the core state in ECOWAS. Nigeria accounted for 57.3 percent of the total population of ECOWAS, and 60.5 percent of the region's GNP at the time of inception in 1975. A decade later, by 1985, its proportion of regional population increased slightly, while that of GNP rose significantly to 78 percent (see Table 9). Thus, the magnitude of these figures made Nigeria the core-state and the state around which the integration movement in ECOWAS revolved.[5] Consequently, the policies of such a state, perhaps more than any other in the scheme should have the most profound effect on the course on integration. Therein lies the significance of Nigeria's expulsion of ECOWAS citizens, and the closure of its land borders in the early 1980s.

As one set of measures to enhance intra--regional cooperation, ECOWAS had adopted a protocol on the"Free Movement of Persons and the rights of Residence and Establishment" in 1979. This guaranteed the right of "Community citizens to enter, reside and establish in the territory of member states."[6] According to the program of implementation, every member was required to abolish visa requirements for those "community citizens intending to stay for a maximum of ninety days." As a result of this, and given Nigeria's relatively buoyant economy, many ECOWAS citizens

Table 9.

Country	% of ECOWAS Population & GNP 0 20 40 60 80 100
Togo	* ##
Sierra Leone	* * #####
Senegal	* * #######
Nigeria	********** ##########
Niger	* * ######
Mauritania	* #
Mali	* ####
Liberia	* #
Guinea Bissau	*
Guinea	* * #####
Ghana	* * #######
Gambia	*
Cote d'Ivoire	***** ####
Cape Verde	
Burkina Faso	* ####
Benin	* ####

####Population ******GNP Percentage Distribution, by Country of ECOWAS' GNP and Pop. 1985

Source: Official Journal of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), July, 1991.

moved to and settled in Nigeria. While its economy prospered and its leaders (especially Gowon) determined to finance ECOWAS, Nigeria seemed comfortable with the influx. With the global price of oil dwindling, domestic opposition to the influx heightened. Professor Kola Onabanjo, addressing a regional economic conference in Lagos in June 1981, noted that "the arrogance that had fueled the perception that Nigeria could sustain the problems of ECOWAS member states by throwing money around and opening its borders has come home to face the perpetrators."[7] As unemployment (an important social aspect) increased, ECOWAS citizens considered to be "illegal aliens," came to be identified as the principal cause of the economic chaos and the attendant social problems.[8] Consequently, on 17 January 1983, the federal government ordered a massive deportation of these aliens, totaling about 2 million. In addition, it closed its land borders effectively from January 1984 to January 1986, "much to the indignation and chagrin of neighboring (ECOWAS) countries."[9] This effectively resulted in a crisis of confidence among ECOWAS leaders, a development which culminated in the virtual paralysis of the organization for a long time.[10] In the words of S.K.B. Asante: "This action by the government of Nigeria does strike a blow not only at the spirit of ECOWAS, but also the whole concept of West African unity."[11]

The significance of this incident is threefold.

First, it demonstrated the extent to which the reduction in the economic capabilities of Nigeria (the core-state) diminished its ability to bear the burden of integration, and how this in turn adversely affected the integration process. The experience of ECOWAS during this period suggested that had there existed a prior situation of relative size-power homogeneity in which the burden of integration would have been evenly spread, then the weakening of any one member would not have diminished the capability of the scheme in any significant way. Secondly, and following from this, it seems that had Nigerian decision makers taken into account the internal social organizational factors enumerated in the previous chapters, the realism of "cautious optimism" should have prevailed and misperception of capabilities would have been avoided. Finally, the fact that Nigeria's economy continued its downward spiral, even after the expulsion of the so called illegal immigrants, demonstrated the rational limits of petty nationalism, especially on the part of a core state like Nigeria. The decision to expel community citizens in the 1980s was symptomatic of the nationalistic developmental ideology which has impeded other developments in the scheme, such as trade liberalization. It was inappropriate then, and is even more so now in an era of globalism. ECOWAS lacks the "fragmentation of power" needed to cushion the disintegrative effects arising from the weakening of the capabilities of the core-state (Nigeria). Therefore, in the absence of strategies that reflect

conditions of "after hegemony," its chances for success are minimal. ECOWAS position is fundamentally precarious because it is characterized by the hegemony of an economically, politically unstable core country, a situation which makes it more vulnerable.[12]

As Nigerian decision makers faced economic reality, it became obvious to them that funding ECOWAS would not be attainable and they may have over estimated their financial potential. In fact, Alhaji Shetima Ali Mungono (a former close adviser to President Shagari, and once OPEC Chairman), said that President Shagari once noted that, "Nigeria can no longer afford to be the keeper of its poor ECOWAS neighbors, realism must prevail."[13] The consensus was that ECOWAS must be left to evolve at its own pace as a community it was created to be.

Impact of changes in the Global Arena.

Changes in the international environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s have marginalised Nigeria in global economics and diplomacy, and have shown that Nigeria's apparent influence in the late 1970s and early 1980s was illusory or, at best transitory. Nigeria's dramatic economic decline (combined with OPEC's decline) and its struggles with the Structural Adjustment Program(SAP) have severely undermined whatever capability it possessed to be a player of significance in world politics, even though dependent

linkages with the West, in reality, limited such a role. Other events appear to have undermined further Nigeria's foreign policy performance.

First, the European Community's (EC's) "single market" creation has caused great concern. Nigerian policy-makers are wary that the European market may not be that accessible to them. Nigeria's dilemma is, therefore, how to adapt to future global economic changes, whether globalization or regionalisation, the foundation of which the EC is laying and helping to shape. Second, the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev at the leadership of the former Soviet Union in 1985 heralded new directions in the international political order. Gorbachev's policies of *perestrioka* (economic restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) were designed to correct the distortions in the former Soviet system, but they triggered political and economic change not only within Eastern Europe and the now defunct USSR, but also in the global system generally. Included in this change are the democratic transformation of much of Eastern Europe plus the ending of the cold war, and impact on democratization in Africa.[14]

Third, the 1991 Gulf war generated tremors and confusion about the shape of the new world order, but it also brought together countries of varying levels of economic development, religious, political and ideological

orientations into a broad coalition to fight for a common cause. The oil market eventually stabilized, thus keeping prices low, much to the disappointment of Nigeria. Fourth, the rapid transition to a post-apartheid South Africa heralded the imminent re-emergence of that country into mainstream African political and economic life. South Africa's industrial, commodity and military significance provided greater incentives for western business and investment than any other African state, including Nigeria where political instability has proven to be incompatible with economic prosperity. South Africa's return to the Olympic Games in 1992, combined with the dropping of US trade sanctions and with the successful election that propelled Nelson Mandela to the presidency, are indicators of an inevitable trend that will probably see South Africa emerge as the "champion" of Africa, and become perhaps the continent's only true "middle power."

For Nigeria, perceiving itself to be the aspiring leader of Africa, these developments have significant implications. In the first place, the prospects for improving the lot of impoverished Africa through the drive for New International Economic Order (NIEO) have been virtually eradicated. The demise of the Cold War calls in question non-alignment and the G-77, which gave a central focus to the bargaining of the South vis-à-vis the North. If the non-aligned movement disappeared with the Cold War while the

issues that concern the New International Division of Labor survive, what will be the fate of Nigeria and Africa, especially combined with developments in the EC, Russia and Eastern Europe?[15]

The developing scenario offers several possibilities, all of which point towards further marginalisation. The economic crisis in Africa has found little succor in the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) introduced in over forty countries, and it is clear that in Nigeria, political as well as economic solutions must be applied in view of the multifarious social consequences of adjustment.[16] An integrated European market in the 90s is confronted by a poor Nigerian investment climate and doubtful political stability. Nigeria cannot compete with the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICSs) of Asia, such as South Korea and Taiwan, or with the opening markets of Eastern Europe. The result is that the African-European trade pattern may alter, with dire consequences for externally oriented African economies, strongly dependent on export of raw materials and unable, as yet (and for same time to come), to compete in high technology products.[17] An integrated European market with emphasis on intra-regional development may also lose interest in exogenous investment, and so divert capital away from Nigeria and into less developed EC member-states, such as Portugal and Greece. Besides, it is a matter for speculation what the effect of EC monetary union would be on

non-EC members whose currencies are tied to those of the former metropoles. This issue is of special interest to Nigeria because of the uncertainty faced by the Francophone members of ECOWAS whose currency is tied to the French franc.

The crumbling of the former Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and the subsequent democratic transformations there have created a new romance between West and East. An EC- established European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with headquarters in London and an authorized capital of $12 billion, is devoted to the attainment of East European development, encouraged by the democratisation process and boosted by a reunited Germany. Western attention to Eastern Europe is growing in proportion to its diminishing concern about, and aid allocations to, Africa. But such disinterest and indifference to the plight of Africa have not altered the scope of conditionalities. In fact, the adjustment-linked conditionalities stressed by the International Financial Institutions have been stretched, in the light of developments in Eastern Europe, to include political conditionalities, tying economic assistance to institutionalization of democracy and thereby making Africa's economic crisis, and the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) [especially Nigeria's] introduced to tackle them, ever more problematic. Nor did the Gulf crisis and the crippling condition of the former USSR and Eastern European states help matters. Whereas the former has enhanced African

marginalisation by further diverting the attention of the international community from Africa's problems, the latter has pushed Russia to aim to secure maximum benefits from western countries and to lesson its linkages to the South.

It takes little reflection to see that these issues constitute a major challenge to Nigerian foreign policy in the contemporary world. On the debt front, Nigeria has attempted to use refinancing of short term trade arrears and debt rescheduling and debt conversion programs, but these have so far proved no more curative than the program of privatization and commercialization of enterprises implemented in 1989.[18] The country had also been trying to follow a dutifully planned program for the return to civilian rule. The Babangida military government annulled the 1993 June election that supposedly was won by the Late Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the businessman philanthropist, who died accidentally in detention in summer, 1998. The current military government of General Abdulsalam Abubarkar who succeeded General Sunny Abacha, who also died suddenly in the summer of 1998, has set a target of May, 1999 for a possible hand over to civilians. This civilian government of the Third Republic it is hoped, will create a new atmosphere for solving economic and political problems. It is not clear what the future holds in store. Will Nigeria continue to meet international financial institutions conditionalities or not?

All in all, these factors suggest how much Nigeria slid backwards and became more marginalised in the 1980s and 1990s. Relationships of dependence that formerly would have caused deep protest have been accepted with equanimity, not least in the realm of conditionalities. Faced with the complexities of the international system in the 1990s, it is not surprising that Nigerian policy makers are emphasizing once again the need to revitalize regional groupings with more prudence and prominence in development efforts. This is in contrast to General Gowon's mentality of "Nigeria can solve all problems with her financial resources." Nigeria has continued to give diplomatic support to ECOWAS, endeavoring to fashion a political will for the organization, and providing military support for the "ECOWAS Military Cease fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)" actions in Liberia and in Sierra Leone. But ECOWAS is still struggling with these regional instabilities, and member states are faced with Structural Adjustment conditionalities and political pressures. Regional trade remains stronger in the informal than formal sectors, and under SAP pressures, governments are attempting national rather than regional solutions.

FOOTNOTES.

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9. West Africa. 28 May-3 June, 1990): 883.

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Below is a list of officials and academicians interviewed in the course of this research. Interviews were also conducted with some officials and individuals who preferred to remain anonymous. None of them is responsible for the views presented here. Some may even disagree with me. Nevertheless, my himalayan thanks and appreciation for their respective insights.

NAMES	**DESIGNATIONS**
1. Alhaji Abubarkar.	Senior Economic Adviser to General Gowon.
2. Alhaji Maitema Sule.	Senior Adviser to the Commader in Chief of Nigerian Armed Forces, General Yakubu Gowon. Also former Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations.
3. Alhaji Shetima Ali Mungono.	Former Special Assistant to General Gowon and President Shehu Shagari. Also former Representative of Nigeria at OPEC, later became OPEC President in 1980.
4. Chief Odozie.	The Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria.
5. Professor C. Maido.	Professor of Political Science, University of Lagos.
6. Mr. Ibrahim C. Awuda.	Assistant Secretary to the Federal Government.
7. Mr. Shehu.	Finance Minister to The Federal Military Government.

NAMES	DESIGNATIONS
8. Professor Oyeleke.	Deputy Commissioner of Finance.
9. Dr. Angulu,	Nigerian Consul General in New York.
10. Dr. Okeke.	Managing Director of New Nigerian Bank.
11. Dr. Oladele Olasahore.	Managing Director of First Bank of Nigeria.
12. Professor Albert Offing.	University of Calabar.
13. Dr. Funso Al Haastrup.	Managing Editor, Nigerian Bankers Publication.
14. Mr. J.F.Alabi.	Medium Ranking Officer of The Ministry of Economic Development.
15 Professor Ikenna Ejiofor.	Professor of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Questionnaire.

1. Perception of Impact of Oil Revenue.

(a) What was the Nigerian decision-makers' perception of the revenues derived from oil?

(b) Perception of the Economic condition of other West African countries.

- economic stability/instability.

(c) Perception of political situation and condition in other ECOWAS states.

- stability/instability
- alliance to Western Powers.
- trade capabilities.

2. Interpretation.

(a) Why did the decision-makers consider the revenues from oil adequate enough for this initiative?

(b) What was the impact of the revenues from oil as you saw it on Nigerian policy objectives?

i Internal Needs.

Perception of Nigerian domestic Condition:

- economic
- Political
- Security

ii External Objectives:

- economic

- Political
- Security
- Capabilities

3. Consideration of Alternatives.

(a) Who participated in the final decision to initiate and maintain ECOWAS?

(b) What were the alternative actions advocated as a response to the situation and by whom?

(c) What options were considered by the decision-makers?

(d) What were the arguments for and against those options?

(e) What were the reasons for the choice made?

- Political
- Economic
- public opinion
- External Pressures

(f) How was the final decision made by majority consensus or other means?

4. Evaluation of Chosen Actions

(a) Was there any evaluation of the action?

(b) Who was involved in the evaluation?

(c) How did they consider the impact of the decision to embark on ECOWAS initiative and maintenance in terms of

its effectiveness and cost?

- capabilities
- oil market stability or instability
- Nigerian Foreign Policy Objectives.

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











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