

A Platonic Conception of Language

By

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Abstract

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This dissertation focuses on a Platonic conception of language that parallels the original concept in the dialogues, but more closely matches that held by modern philosophers. The conception of objects is much like that held by Bertrand Russell in his Platonic period. The basic structure of the dissertation includes an introduction that discusses the 'problem of universals' from the dialogues through the modern age. The ontology of language is seen to parallel the positions taken with respect to this issue. A definition of language is also given. Other chapters include an outline of the metaphysics of Plato that stresses the idea of Forms. Not only does the dissertation give a Platonic philosophy of language, but it also analyzes particular linguistic phenomena that are directly affected by this ontology. The phenomenon of predication is discussed, and it is seen to be well accounted for if we assume that certain parts of speech correspond or denote Platonic abstractions. The phenomenon of names is analyzed and seen to be

accounted for in a Platonic manner if we assume that the description theory of names is correct. Descriptions contain Forms. Since there is evidence for both the Millian and descriptivist theories, a conclusion is not reached. Perhaps a mixed theory is correct. The dissertation ends with a brief conclusion.

Acknowledgments

Every project is dependent upon the input of many individuals. This dissertation is no exception. A dissertation should be one of the achievements in life that bears the influence of our formative years as well as the later ones. Philosophy and linguistics has taken every kind of thinking skills and maturity that I can muster.

My first thank you must go to Bob Fiengo. Not many in a linguistics department would be happy to take on such a project, and he did so with a positive attitude. He let me grow without being heavy handed, and he rarely is doctrinaire. This dissertation bears his stamp and influence. I do not always agree with him, but his opinions are always the result of a long, thought out deliberation. Hopefully our relationship doesn't end here.

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- 1) The Divided Line, Page 25

Chapter 1

Introduction

I shall begin this dissertation with a terminological discussion. I have chosen 'A Platonic Conception of Language' as my title. What is the difference in meaning between the expression in my title, the expression 'philosophy of language' and the expression 'philosophy of grammar'?

'Philosophy of language' is a conceptual study of the ideas that underlie the phenomenon of language. It includes topics such as the nature of meaning and reference. My subject falls partially within the scope of this term.

What is 'philosophy of grammar'? Expressions that refer to areas of thought, particularly abstract areas, can be many times elusive and difficult to interpret with little context. Let us give this one a location in the history of thought to begin discussion. The expression 'the philosophy of grammar' was probably first used in academic writing by Otto Jespersen as the title of his 1924 work. On the paperback copy, under the title is written "A study of the living language, emphasizing the ideas that must underlie the science of grammar."¹ This quote relates well the subject of this dissertation with regard to the study of natural language (I will disregard the issues of the study of artificial languages in this dissertation).² However, it is not a perfect fit, because the philosophy of grammar seems to be more focused on the philosophy of science of linguistics.

¹ *The Philosophy of Grammar*. Otto Jespersen, The Norton Library, 1965.

² Let us consider only the time period that begins from the early twentieth century to be included in our subject matter. The study of language as a distinct science didn't truly emerge before this time.

Terms can be slippery, though, and it is not absolutely clear that this term solely conveys the meaning of philosophy of science.

The term ‘conception of language’ is more general, and captures some of the meaning of ‘philosophy of language’ and ‘philosophy of grammar’, while covering also the main emphasis of my dissertation, a conception of language that focuses on grammatical phenomena.

My Platonism is somewhat unique, and differs from the Platonism of the dialogues in ways that will soon become clear. Also, there are aspects of language that are not contained in my Platonist theory that I account for in other ways that are grouped under what I call ‘human language’.

The study of most sciences seems to progress without extensive ontological debate by its key figures. Why has grammar caused such a debate since its infancy? Katz³ has remarked that the Chomskyan revolution was not so much with regard to the discovery of transformations in grammar as it was with regard to a new conceptualist ontology that Chomsky refitted to the grammatical theories of Zellig Harris.

In physics, for instance, the study of mechanics proceeded without much attention to its ontological underpinnings. Linguistics has not been as separable from the study of ontology, because it seems that no one has been in agreement, since its inception, as to what the subject of linguistics should properly be.⁴ This

³ See discussion in *Language and Other Abstract Objects*.

⁴ Some have made the point, though, that the science of linguistics, like mathematics, can advance reasonably without the study of its underpinnings. I am not so sure. This requires more discussion, I believe. I am fairly convinced that linguistics is different from sciences like mathematics though. Observe the fact that formal semantics without an ontology is not formal semantics at all. Without identifying what types of entities are the denotations of words and expressions, we have no idea how to categorize and represent meanings.

dissertation will try to clarify what language is by making an attempt at revealing the essential property of language. The position taken is essentially a Platonist view of language as a universal entity. As a universal, it must have a simple, unique property that it is identified with.

Katz (1981) lays out a Platonist position, but he focuses on the subject of abstraction in language and not on uniqueness. Part of this is due to the emphasis he places on his semantic theory, but partially this can be considered to be a gap in his theory. I will explain why later in the dissertation.

The Problem of Universals---Nominalism

Ontology is the study of the inventory of the basic elements that exist in the universe. The 'problem of universals' is an ontological problem that was raised in Medieval times, but can be traced back to Plato. I will begin my dissertation by discussing the three general ontological positions on the 'problem of universals'. This will enable us to point to what kind of object language is. Some linguists and philosophers have approached the ontological status of language by first taking a position on this issue, and then determining what kind of object language is in light of their position. This is the approach of Willard Van Orman Quine.⁵ Other authors have spent much time investigating language and the human language faculty itself, and have decided that language is a certain type of entity, without making any decisions as to their position on the problem of universals in general. This is the approach of Noam Chomsky. However, Chomsky did find fault with the nominalism of the structuralist linguists. It is just

⁵ See *On What There is*, page 10.

that his criticisms were focused on the inability of the structuralist approach to account for much linguistic phenomena.

The problem of universals relates to an ontological question as to whether or not there exist abstract objects. Abstract objects, for those who acknowledge them are, in Katz (1981)'s⁶ words, "objective, timeless, placeless entities that we discover and learn about". The three positions with respect to this issue are Nominalism, Conceptualism and Platonism.

Nominalism is the metaphysical position that holds that existent beings are all concrete and particular. A recent faithful adherent and representative of this position was Willard Van Orman Quine. According to the nominalist position advocated by Quine, none of the following exist: classes, attributes, propositions, numbers, relations and functions.⁷ Anything which is an abstract object is repudiated.

Quine took all statements of ontology to be true by intuition alone. This means of course that positions in ontology are not given over to proof and evidence: "One's ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which he interprets all experiences, even the most commonplace ones. Judged within some particular conceptual scheme--- and how else is judgement possible?--- an ontological statement goes without saying, standing in need of no separate justification at all."⁸

Quine changed his position with respect to classes at a later point in his career (from what I know, he actually ended his career as a Platonist), but the

⁶ Pg. 181.

⁷ *Word and Object*, pg. 230.

classes that he accepted were not defined through a common attribute. His identity concept for classes is the following 'principle of extensionality': Classes x and y are identical if (and only if) they have the same members.

Quine believed that the general criteria for the existence of an entity arise from what our commonplace language commits us to. Therefore, an existent object will have two criteria for existence: That it can be the value of a variable in a sentence⁹ and that it can be furnished with conditions for identity.¹⁰

Properties, according to Quine, are not able to be furnished with conditions for identity. A property is something like 'redness'. All red objects participate in the abstract property of redness:

The posing of attributes is accompanied by no clue as to the circumstances under which attributes may be said to be the same or different. This is perverse, considering that the very use of terms and the very positing of objects are unrecognizable to begin with except as keyed in with idioms of sameness and difference...

There is no denying the access of power that accrues to our conceptual scheme through the positing of abstract objects. Most of what is gained by posing attributes, however, is gained equally by positing classes. Classes are on a par with attributes on the score of abstractness or universality, and they serve the purposes of attributes so far as mathematics and certainly most of science are concerned; and they enjoy, unlike attributes, a crystal clear identity concept....¹¹

As has been mentioned by Jubien (2004)¹², Quine's conditions seem to emanate from the "intensity of his effort to come to a naturalistically acceptable understanding of language." One could easily see, as Jubien points out, that there is a concept with respect to properties of 'instantiation' that gives the relationship between a property and its abstract source. Once this concept is

⁸ *On What There is*. Pg. 10.

⁹ Quine's semantics was of a logical nature.

¹⁰ See discussion in Strawson's *Entity and Identity*.

¹¹ *Speaking of Objects*. Reprinted in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

¹² See *On Quine's Rejection of Intensional Entities*

developed, we may not have the same relationship between properties and their instantiations as between physical objects, but the relationship can be explained, however. When we do metaphysics, we do not have to commit to entities only on the basis of the overt workings of natural language.

Outside of any other criticisms of nominalism, we should take note of the fact that Quine rejected relations from his ontology altogether. This will be particularly an issue for any linguistic theory, because syntactic theories are theories of language structure. I am not referring to a physical structure with parts that are connected together. I am referring to an abstract structure, which Quine's ban on relations would seem to disallow.

Quine was aware that since he rejected the notion of relation, he would have to develop a special theory to at least describe what the nature of linguistic structure is. Quine was foremost a logician, and was therefore very interested in the structure of logical languages. Concatenation, no matter how one looks at it, must be at least a spatial relation of some kind. However, in Quine (1947)¹³, he fumbles at an attempt to define concatenation without the notion of structure:

Our nominalistic syntax must contain, besides the six shape-predicates, some means of expressing the concatenation of expressions. We shall write "Cxyz" to mean that x and y and z are composed of whole characters of the language, in normal orientation to one another, and contain neither split-off fragments of characters nor anything extraneous, and that the inscription x consists of y followed by z. The characters comprising y and z may be irregularly spaced; furthermore the inscription x will be considered to consist of y followed by z no matter what the spatial interval between y and z, provided that x contains no character that occurs in that interval.

¹³ *Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism*

How does any nominalist deal with relations, besides dismissing them as Quine does? For those nominalists that accept sets¹⁴, they represent a relation as an ordered pair. As Armstrong¹⁵ points out, if I represent a relation between two entities as an ordered pair, the ordered pair represents the relation between the two entities, but it does not seem to *be* the relation. Additionally, the ordering of the ordered pair contributes nothing towards representing the relation. What difference does it make whether we represent the pair of objects as $\langle a, b \rangle$ or $\langle b, a \rangle$? The order is inconsequential. The nominalist who accepts classes seems to represent a relation between two objects as the objects themselves. A relation between two objects is abstract even when we are dealing with a relation between two physical objects. Let us say that the library is next to the supermarket. The 'next to' relation which holds between these two objects is not something you can point at, nor something you can represent by merely assigning to each object a position in an ordered pair.

Conceptualism

Conceptualism is the position in ontology that sanctions abstract objects and universals as creatures of the mind. All reference to abstraction must make reference to the mind.

According to Quine (1951), pg. 14, the modern dispute between conceptualism and realism emerged from a question with regard to whether or not certain mathematical entities should be countenanced. Apparently, since conceptualists believe only in mind-made universals, they only allow for the first

¹⁴ Some nominalists accept classes into their ontology. See Armstrong's *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction*.

order of infinity, whereas realists allow many ascending orders of infinity à la Cantor.

Critics of conceptualism argue that it accounts for the psychology of universals, but it does not answer the basic question about universals. The basic question about universals is what is it about objects that allows us to make generalizations about them. This is the basic metaphysical question.

A response to this criticism is that generalizations can be made about sets of objects because they resemble each other. This, however, is an avoidance of the question. What is it about sets of like objects that licenses generalizations about them? The 'one over many' argument, presented in the next section, is the Platonist's response to this resemblance.

Katz (1981) characterizes Chomsky as a conceptualist. I know of no place where Chomsky takes a position on the 'problem of universals' generally. However, Chomsky takes a position on language as being a creature of the mind. The status of language as a conceptual universal will be discussed in my section on conceptualism in language.

Platonism

Platonism, or Platonic realism, is the position in ontology that there exists a realm beyond the senses where universals exist, that are instantiated in various ways in our physical world. I will be taking a property realist position in this dissertation. A property realist position assumes that this abstract realm is predominately occupied by abstract properties. For instance, the property of redness exists independently, and all red objects in the world instantiate this

¹⁵ *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction*. Pg. 32

property of redness. It should be made clear that Plato himself did not accept only properties as universals. This will become clear when I get to my section on property Platonism. The discussion of Plato in the second chapter of my dissertation accords partially with property Platonism. I felt that it would be important to mention the roots of my theory with respect to Plato himself.

To get a sense of Platonist (Platonic theory in a modern mold) metaphysics, I will give some of the arguments that have been advanced over the years in favor of abstract objects, be they Forms¹⁶ or other entities.¹⁷ I don't wish to completely argue down points now, but to just give a taste of what kinds of objects Platonists argue for.

In his dialogues, Plato called each Form "One over many", because each Form is instantiated by many copies in the physical world. Later on, this phrase became the name of an argument for Platonism.

Let us say that we have three red balls in front of us. Not only do we see that we have three individual rednesses, but there is a resemblance between the rednesses. What accounts for this resemblance between them? Platonists argue that there is a 'property' that they all share.

Philosophers have taken this to be an argument for the fact that properties exist. They have not taken it to be an argument that these properties exist in some specific realm, though. It is possible, according to many philosophers, that this property could exist in our minds (conceptualism) or, according to a position called 'immanent realism', that it could be a property of the objects themselves.

¹⁶ 'Form' is the term used in Plato to denote the abstract reality behind earthly particulars.

Nominalists have disputed this so-called 'One Over Many Argument'. To get it off the ground, Platonists must determine that physical objects possess properties. Nominalists, such as Quine (but not formulated fully until Devitt (1980)) deny that there exists anything such as properties. They hold that in every case where it is asserted that a property exists, in fact it is just the presence of the object itself. Let us say that you have a red object. Scientists give explanations that eventually get to the bottom of why the object is red. There comes a point where the nominalist says that this describes the brute fact of what it means to be red, and it is not a property of redness that the object has. What is meant by a 'brute fact' is that what is conceived as a property by Platonists is in fact just basic to the object. Quine (1948), pg. 10, expressed this position as follows: "That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held that McX is no better off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits under such names as 'redness'." As an aside to this argument, it is true that I have taken properties to be fused to some degree at the level of the object. This makes it somewhat difficult to separate well between properties, but according to this nominalist argument, how are we to distinguish between different features of objects if all the features are phraseable as 'brute facts' about the objects?

As a result of the type of position that they take, nominalists have formulated a criterion of ontological commitment. Our everyday language seems to commit in a way to properties. If we say 'the ball is red', then we seem to be

¹⁷ My discussion derives from the entry "Platonist Metaphysics" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, that is currently online.

committing to the property of redness. Nominalists do not take the predicate seriously. As was said before in this paper, they only commit to existential statements of objects.

The following is a formulated criterion of ontological commitment in the encyclopedia entry¹⁸: “We are ontologically committed by the singular terms in the sentences that we take to be literally true; and we are ontologically committed to the existential quantifiers in the sentences that we take to be literally true; but we are not committed to the predicates in such sentences. Thus, for instance, “a is f” commits us to believing in the object a but not the property of fness; and “a is r-related to b commits us to the objects a and b but not the relation r; and “There is an f” commits us to an object that is f but not to fness.”

Apparently, something like the criterion of ontological commitment just mentioned is accepted by most philosophers nowadays, so the ‘One Over Many’ argument is rejected. In the statement ‘the ball is red’ the existence of the ball is accepted but not the property of redness. However, a related argument called the ‘Singular Term Argument’ is accepted by many. Essentially, the ‘Singular Term Argument’ accepts abstract objects precisely because sentences can be formulated with abstract objects as the subject singular terms.

The first area where Platonists have gained a foothold is in the philosophy of mathematics. The statement ‘three is prime’ is taken as being a literally true statement, and it has an abstract object as its subject. While this is an argument against nominalism, the possibility of conceptualism remains open. Maybe numbers are just ideas in our minds. However, there are good arguments against

conceptualism. Firstly, there are infinite numbers in arithmetic, but there can't be infinite numbers in our heads. Second, statements about very large numbers that no one has ever thought about would be untrue. Third, conceptualism cannot account for mathematical error. If someone thinks that two plus two is five, there would be no way to counter that claim. A related argument is that if everybody on the earth were to die, then there would be no true mathematical statements.

Even though the immanent realist position is not entertained in this dissertation along with the main positions on universals, I will shortly explain why this position, taken by Mill (1843) can not be a position on the philosophy of mathematics. Mill believed that numbers aren't abstract objects. He held that numbers are merely claims about piles of physical objects. If we have two physical objects and we add a third one, we have three physical objects.

One problem with Mill's theory is that in modern set theory, we can talk about a set containing a particular object, a set containing that set, and a set containing that set ad infinitum. There doesn't have to be a physical base for all the many sets that are built around the one object. Another problem with his theory is the sheer size of the infinities involved in set theory. There is just no way of getting a physical basis for these entities.¹⁹

What is left is the nominalist arguments concerning mathematical statements. What can a nominalist say about statements like 'three is prime'? To handle statements like this, many times nominalists will paraphrase the

¹⁸ See section 4 of *Platonism in Metaphysics*.

¹⁹ See Frege's *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, section 84 for a similar discussion with respect to infinite numbers.

statement to show that it is not crucial for our understanding to state it as a singular term.

One view that does this is known as *if-thenism*. According to this view, 'three is prime' can be paraphrased by 'if there were numbers, then three would be prime'. A second view is called *metamathematical formalism*. This view paraphrases 'three is prime' by 'three is prime follows from the axioms of arithmetic'.

The problem with views such as these is that the idea of paraphrase nominalism is that you can paraphrase a metaphysical sounding statement with one that is not metaphysical sounding and retain the same meaning. These paraphrases change the meaning completely. For instance the statement

The average accountant has two children.

Can be paraphrased as

On average, accountants have two children.

without any loss of meaning. When a singular term is involved, however, this does not seem to be the case. To me, this seems to be obvious. When you do a true paraphrase of a statement, you do not change the meaning of lexical items, you change the grammar of the statement. The only case where I know that there is even a similar paraphrase is in the following statements:

The hat has the attribute of redness.

The hat is red.

Another tactic that nominalists can take is called the *fictionalist* view. This view dispenses with the singular term argument by saying that while mathematical

statements have the semantics that commits to abstract objects, they simply aren't true.

This type of account has been dispensed with by nominalists themselves though. Quine and Putnam noticed that mathematical statements are indispensable parts of theories in the natural sciences. As a result of this, if we want to commit to theories in physics or biology or whatever science, we have to commit to a nonfictional account of abstract mathematical objects.

The singular term argument has many more components to it. Arguments are offered for propositions, properties and relations and so forth. I merely wanted to present a small part of the argument in this introduction to get a sense of what abstract objects are and what some possible arguments are for their existence.

Linguistic Types and Tokens

The next step in understanding Platonism with respect to language is a discussion of abstraction with respect to the entities that comprise languages.

To get an idea as to what the nature of linguistic entities are, we must briefly discuss the subject of linguistic types and tokens. Many times, authors look at inscriptions of sentences and physical occurrences of utterances of sentences as tokens of one abstract sentence type. For instance, on the page in the next line are two inscriptions of one sentence type:

The cat is on the mat.

The cat is on the mat.

While there are two tokens of this sentence, there is only one abstract type of this sentence. While we can surely conceive of inscriptions and

utterances in this way, this does not reveal the underlying reality of language.

The fact that inscriptions and utterances are associated with an underlying structure is well known from the work of linguists.

Take, for example, the following sentence:

I love old men and women.

This sentence is associated with two phrase markers, as it is structurally ambiguous:

[I[love[old[men and women]]]]

[I [love[old men][and][women]]]

Token inscriptions do not reveal this ambiguity. Where is this ambiguity revealed? There are only two possibilities that seem to come to mind. Either both possible structures occur somehow in the mind, or they exist in a realm of abstract objects that is beyond the mind, or possibly in both.

The truth of the matter is that inscriptions and utterances do not wear their structural composition on their sleeves at all. One need not turn to cases of structural ambiguity to show this. Every sentence has structure that is not overtly realized. It is just that cases with structural ambiguity are striking in this regard.

So what are linguistic expressions, then?

Nominalism in Language

I will now describe the three basic positions with respect to the ontology of language, nominalism, conceptualism and Platonism. This is based on my general previous discussion of the 'problem of universals'. As I will explain later, these positions are not always mutually exclusive. The nominalist position takes

only the sensible marks of inscriptions or utterances to be language. Zellig Harris was from the school of structuralism in linguistics. “Grammars for this approach are data-cataloguing devices expressing distributional regularities in speech in the form of a segmentation and classification of acoustic signals.”²⁰ The structuralist approach is nominalistic in that it only accepts the raw data of language, physical inscriptions and utterances into its ontology. “...as part of nature...languages can be objectively studied if one considers speech and writing not as expression (sic) of the speaker which has particular, introspectively recognized, meanings to the hearer; but rather as a set of events—sound waves or ink marks.”²¹ Bloomfield also made a statement to the same effect: “Non-linguists (unless they happen to be physicalists) constantly forget that a speaker is making noise, and credit him, instead, with the possession of impalpable ‘ideas’. It remains for linguists to show, in detail, that the speaker has no ‘ideas’, and that the noise is sufficient.”²²

The structuralist linguist viewed the task of the linguist as giving a compact inventory of a corpus of utterances. It was viewed as an empirical task that could not use information or analysis beyond what is overtly given in the data.

As I have mentioned before, the structuralist linguist could not avail herself of any real structure, whether abstract or not. Nominalism can only speak of individual objects. In practice, however, structuralists availed themselves both of structure, as their name suggests, and abstraction as well. Katz mentions that Bloomfield resorted to ordering phonological rules to account for his analysis of a

²⁰ Katz (1981) Page 18.

²¹ Katz. (1981) Pg. 25, quoting Harris.

particular corpus. There is nothing in the data that can license rule ordering on their view. In addition to the linguistic criticisms of Chomsky, we should be critical of structuralism from a philosophical perspective. As mentioned before, the structure in language is a kind of relation. Since structuralism adopts a nominalist ontology, it should reject relations. If it does, then it will have the same problems characterizing syntactic structure as Quine does, or any linguistic structure for that matter.

Conceptualism in Language

Katz (1981) pg. 23 gives a succinct definition for what the conceptualist ontology in linguistics is. "A theory of a particular language is a theory of the mental faculties, states or capacities of its speakers." This definition could take two directions. The mind may be viewed as an independent substance as in Descarte's view of the mind, or as an agglomeration of physical brain states or other parts such as cell assemblies. I will not pursue the first possibility, as it seems to be absent from current debate. A current representative of the second possibility is Noam Chomsky. He holds that the practice of theoretical linguistics is merely a step towards understanding what he refers to as the "mind/brain".

Chomsky holds that grammatical theories explain what the 'competence' or the knowledge of language of an individual is:

...a grammar.... Constitutes a hypothesis concerning the speaker-hearer's knowledge of the language and is to be confirmed or disconfirmed in terms of empirical evidence drawn, ultimately, from investigations of the linguistic intuitions of the language user...the general theory, now regarded as an explanatory theory, is likewise to be understood as a psychological theory that attempts to characterize the innate human

²² Katz. (1981) Pg 25

“language faculty”, and can be tested in terms of its consequences in particular languages.²³

I have said that the positions with regard to the ontology of language correspond to the three positions that hold with respect to the problem of universals. In what way does the conceptualist position on language require any use of mind-made universals? Katz (1981) mentions that the phenomenon of universal grammar is more than just the fact that every language contains common structures. He says that there exists, according to conceptualism, an idea of an abstraction, called ‘language’, that possesses properties that are instantiated in all languages. This idea requires the existence of an abstract object, and therefore at least one conceptual universal.

The notion of a linguistic universal in traditional linguistics is significantly narrower than simply the notion of something common to all languages. Linguistic universals are conceived as having this status in virtue of the nature of language itself and hence as revealing its nature.²⁴

Platonism in Language

The Platonist ontology of language is spelled out in Katz (1981). On his definition, a language is a set of abstract objects, sentences, that exist in a realm independent of the objects that exist in the physical world or the mind. A language is an infinite set of such objects, and is specified by a finite grammar. As a language is infinite, we may only have knowledge of it through its grammar.

Katz offered various arguments over the years for why a Platonist ontology is necessary for language. I am not going to discuss them all here, as I

²³ Katz (1981), Page 54.

²⁴ Ibid. pp. 222-223

do not necessarily agree with all of them. However, I will mention two that I feel are noteworthy, and use them to spell out my own view.

Katz argues that language consists of linguistic types and their linguistic tokens. Linguistic types, as I have already discussed, do not inhabit space or time. They are abstract. Therefore languages, if construed as sets of sentences, are primarily abstract objects. As this is the case, nominalism fails, because it holds that languages are sets of inscriptions or utterances. Conceptualism fails, because languages are considered to be elements of the mind or brain, and the mind and brain are creatures that inhabit space and time.

The other argument of Katz that I am considering has to do with grammars. According to Katz, grammars that linguists formulate are unnecessarily constrained by the conceptualist ontology. The conceptualist ontology can only accept theories of grammar that are compatible with known formulations of human psychology. Katz sees the project of formulating grammars as being unnecessarily constrained by the features of human psychology. He would say that formulating theories of sentence structure that are dependent upon a psychological theory would be equivalent to formulating theories in number theory that are dependent upon the laws of psychology. Linguistics is a study of abstract objects that are a field of study of their own, just like mathematics is its own field and logic is its own field.

Platonism and Necessity

Katz discussed, throughout the latter part of his career, the ingredients that go into a Platonic position. Katz (1981) points out that areas of study that are

used as evidence of the Platonist metaphysical doctrine contain objects that have necessary properties. The area that is often used to exemplify Platonist metaphysics is mathematics.

For example, the relationship between the radius of a circle and its circumference is $2\pi(r)$. No matter what circle we pick, it will have this property. No physical circle precisely has this property. As a matter of fact, we cannot find a perfect circle in nature. The circle that we conceive of is an object²⁵ in an abstract realm that we only perceive with our minds. When we study its properties, we are studying the one abstract circle. The examples of circles that occur in nature or that we draw on the blackboard are only imperfect copies of the actual abstract circle.²⁶

When we come to the study of language, Katz equates sentences to geometrical objects. “We claim that the essential property of natural languages is that their grammatical structure constitute an effable correlation of sentences with senses.”²⁷ It is clear from this quote that Katz accepted the existence of the multiple sentences of a language, abstract objects.

On a Platonist interpretation of Language, the boundaries of languages have nothing to do with the use that we put them to. If we are going to view languages as sets of sentence types, then we are going to run into trouble when we try to draw boundaries around languages.

²⁵ Technically speaking, as I will propose, the only things that exist in the abstract realm are properties of objects. This means that it is the property of circularity that exists in the abstract realm. See later where this conception avoids the problem of ‘the third man’.

²⁶ The abstract circle, according to Ross’ *Plato’s Theory of Ideas*, is an object that is ontologically in between concrete particulars and the Forms. Apparently, sometimes it is called the ‘circle Form’.

²⁷ Katz (1981), Pg. 229.

Katz acknowledges this problem, in a certain way in the following remark²⁸, but does not adequately address the problem.

There is a tendency to think that only the social conception can explain language change. This is not true. Language change can be understood in the Platonist conception as taking place when speakers within a certain line of linguistic development come to have a system of grammatical knowledge so different from the system of their predecessors that these two systems constitute knowledge of two different sets of abstract objects...

Mathematical objects are not specifically adapted to any particular use.

This is different than what is true of the biological world. A bird's beak may be specially adapted to a particular kind of food. This is questionable with respect to the structures that make up language. In order for the mind to process language and in order for it to be a vehicle of thought, one might think that it is specially adapted for such a purpose.

This is not to say that the form of natural language must be determined by the function or meaning of the language, but certain constructions probably only exist in our language because we have a use for them.

Let us say that Katz's position is that a language is defined as the set of all of the sentence types that it contains. A sentence type would be defined as its syntactic structure correlated with its semantic structure. Remember that the language can only be construed in terms of necessary properties. If we examine the syntactic structure by itself, we do not witness any necessary property.^{29 30}

²⁸ Ibid, Pg. 9

²⁹ This may be different for formal semantics, since the semantic structure follows the structure of the syntax.

³⁰ Although controversial, the phenomenon of non-configurational languages could possibly indicate that a language can exist without syntax. It seems that Case might replace it, such as in Warlpiri. This requires more discussion. Some argue that a language like this has a flat syntax. This is obscured by the fact that the

The kind of structure that is part of a sentence type could structure many things. Maybe I could make up some game where the pieces were configured by such a structure. The structure is not unique to language.³¹ Then we might say that we should look to its semantic representation. The semantic representation, à la Katz, accounts for such properties as meaningfulness, synonymy and antonymy, but we are sort of left in the dark as to what basic attributes or properties go into a semantic representation on Katz's theory. The fact that we have a theory that begins to account for those phenomena does not qualify it as a Platonist theory. A Platonist theory must trace back the particular feature of language to its abstract roots. Therefore, I believe that Katz does not adequately supply a necessary property of language. Katz also is pursuing a different agenda. He wants to give a Platonist account of the philosophy of language. I will be giving a partial Platonist account of language itself.

This is not to say that Katz's system of semantic representation would not be useful in a Platonist grammar. It is just that he did not identify what the essential property of language is with respect to semantic properties. What is the common thread that runs through properties like synonymy and antonymy that makes them necessary features of language? We are never told.³²

order of words is not constrained in any way. I am told that the truth conditions are different for the various orders.

³¹ See later in the paper, where I claim that syntax may not need to be unique.

³² In Katz's *Sense Reference and Philosophy*, he proposes that the essential property of language is effability. Effability means that language has at its disposal the means to express any proposition. This seems to me to not be the essence of language. If anything, this is a more peripheral property.

A Platonist Philosophy of Grammar

I have demonstrated that Katz did not adequately formulate a Platonist philosophy of grammar. I will attempt to do so, and also give examples of how to proceed with the analysis of language.

Logical grammarians analyze language by giving the meaning of sentence types in a modified version of some logical language. Much work has been done analyzing English in such a way, and it has been referred to as a Platonist approach. My contention is that if you analyze a particular natural language, then you are going to pick up elements that are conventional and not necessary. The Platonist analysis of language must only contain elements that are relevant to the abstract universal of language that we may term Language (capitalized).

Language in the Platonic sense is an abstraction. Language³³ will only contain those elements that are necessary to the concept of Language. How are we to conceive of individual natural languages then? Individual languages will be formal variants of the abstract language.

A Platonic World

The study of ontology informs us of the basic inventory of things that populate the universe. Before I say what the necessary property of language is, it is necessary to tell what types of entities populate a Platonic world, so that a Platonic view of language will find its natural place.

It is clear that Platonism has undergone some changes to its ontology since the time of the writing of the Republic. In the Republic, the ultimate objects of Being were perfect archetypes of the objects in the visible world. Plato saw all

of the cats, for instance, as imperfect copies of the Cat Form. When Socrates speaks about his famous divided line of existent beings, he puts in the visible side of the line gross physical beings: "Then in the other segment put that of which this first is the likeness—the animals around us, and everything that grows, and the whole class of artifacts."

The Divided Line

Plato gives a metaphor of the division into ranks of the various knowable entities by a divided line in the Republic. He asks us to conceive of a line cut into two unequal segments (See diagram on attached page). The space that is above the horizontal line is for things intellected. The bottom half is for things that are seen. When he refers to things that are seen, he means not only things that are seen, but all things which are known by the senses. Then you take the bottom space and divide it into two regions. One of the segments in the bottom space is meant for all images of visible things, such as shadows and images in water. The other space in the visibles location is meant for the objects that the images are images of.

The top half of the divided line is also cut in half. In the bottom section are what Plato terms hypotheses. If you use some sort of tool or stepping stone to intellect a Form, that tool is termed a hypothesis. Plato gives as an example the drawings of geometers. They use their drawings as starting points for discussion, but do not discuss the entities that these are sensible signs of. For instance, the drawing of a circle is used for determining properties of circles, but the circle itself, the circle that is an abstract entity, is not discussed. The top section of the

³³ 'Language' will only be put in bold this one time.

The Divided Line: The top two sections are in the intelligible realm, the bottom two are in the visible realm.

Forms	Intellection
The Mathematical objects	Thought
Things	Trust
Images	Imagination

intellected section of the divided line is meant to correspond to the Forms themselves. By this figure, we get a notion of the hierarchy of knowable things that exist in the world.

I wish to add another section in the intellected part of the line underneath the forms, for Language. I am going to posit that there is a realm of structures that stands between the objects of this world and the world of Forms. I will discuss the universal of language shortly.³⁴

Property Platonism

Modern Platonism has taken various other shapes, but the kind of metaphysics that I am advocating here is what I would call Property Platonism. In my ontology are exactly the entities that Quine repudiated. My ontology contains attributes, relations and numbers, possibly other things as well. I am going to include language, as will be seen, as another entity that occupies the abstract realm.

I am not going to spell out Platonic metaphysics completely now, but I will explain how attributes participate in our world, to some degree. Let us say that you have a cat. The cat can be viewed as a bundle of properties. The property of 'catness' need not be among the properties which constitute a cat. The cat has a certain color, shape, texture; it is animate etc. Each of these attributes occurs in other objects as well. My coat can be gray, in addition to my blanket and my car.

In an abstract realm, the intelligible realm, gray is an abstract property that has its own existence. Each instantiation of the attribute gray is not its own independent existence. It is only an instantiation of the one abstract attribute. So, all of these instances of gray are merely participants in the abstract Form Gray. The modern version of property Platonism is discussed partially in Russell's *The Problems of Philosophy*.

In contradistinction to the metaphysics in Plato's Republic, I have abstract properties that inhabit the intellected realm. In Plato's metaphysics, there are items, prototypes of the entities that exist in the physical world, that inhabit the realm of the intellectible. I am not going to argue at length here for or against this view of Platonism, but let it suffice to say that when you strip away the properties from an entity, you are left with nothing. This seems to go against the idea of essence and the types of prototype Forms that Plato espoused.

Essentialism

In addition to my position on Platonism, I am going to take a position on the issue of essentialism. Aristotle distinguished between essences and accidents in entities. It is doubtful whether Plato did or not. I am taking the position that he didn't.³⁵ Taking our example of the cat, Aristotle held that there is an underlying logical organization of the cat that is its essence.³⁶ This essence is unique, and distinguishes the cat from other beings. The properties that I have mentioned, such as color, are considered to be accidents that may vary from cat to cat. Aristotle considered a picture of an entity and the entity itself when they

³⁴ For the discussion of the divide line, see the end of book six of The Republic.

³⁵ This should be looked at as a matter of parsimony. Plato didn't develop the idea of essence explicitly.

are called by the same name to only share a homonymous term.³⁷ I am saying that they share a number of properties, and therefore have more in common than Aristotle thinks they do.

I am going to take a position against Aristotle. Essence arises only as the result of the structure of language. When Aristotle says that a picture of an entity and the entity itself have little in common, I think he is wrong. A picture of an entity gives a good representation of what the external qualities of an object are. I will explain how language contains essences at a later point in my discussion.³⁸

Putnam's example is very telling in this regard. He said, what if one day we found out that cats are robots that are controlled from Mars, and that they are not something that we would class together with other animals. The reason that this could be a possibility, no matter how far-fetched the possibility, is that we really only recognize cats by their appearance and the function of their bodily systems, an appearance that we could give by a description of their properties.

It is also interesting to note that most modern biologists do not classify animals in terms of firm genres and species. Apparently, there is no characteristic that doesn't have the ability to mutate over time.

When I ask for the essential attribute of language, I am not asking for the essence of an entity; I am asking for a unique property that language has. Is language reducible to general structures correlated with ideas, or is it a unique universal, or something else?

³⁶ See Aristotle: *The Desire to Understand*, Pp 28-29.

³⁷ See Aristotle: *Categories and De Interpretatione*, pp. 3-5.

³⁸ See the end of my discussion on essentialism and the status of properties.

A particularly relevant and perplexing question is whether or not the ultimate properties in the abstract realm are determined by everyday experience or scientific insight, or both. In most discussions in the philosophical literature, they take the everyday experience of color as an attribute, despite the fact that scientists have determined the underlying reality of light and the composition of colored surfaces in other terms. I am going to make the assumption that our everyday reality is at least one possible view of reality.

A Platonic Universe

To develop a notion of where language fits into a Platonic view of the universe, I will continue to speak about Platonic metaphysics, according to my interpretation.

I have spoken about the divided line in the Republic. Plato's universe is divided into two basic regions, the Intelligible region and the Visible region. The term 'Visible', again, is not meant to isolate the domain of visual experience, but is meant to characterize the domain of all physical experience. According to Plato, the physical world is but a distorted shadow of the world of Forms.

The Platonic Universe is composed essentially of properties and relations, and contains entities constructed out of those properties and relations. Take a familiar object such as a bottle. It has properties of color, size, shape and hardness, amongst other properties. Let us say that the color of the bottle is brown. There is something interesting about its properties. We cannot really separate the color from the other properties of the bottle. All of the properties of

the bottle are fused together. However, we have a sense of their independence as well.

On the intellected side of the universe, all of the properties and relations³⁹ that we perceive in the physical world exist separately. We can intuit them through the intellect only. Let us say that we have the attribute of pinkness. This attribute is intellected only in its abstract form.

I wish to argue that at the level of language, the properties that compose objects and entities in the physical world are somewhere in between the fused state in which they exist in physical objects and the abstract state in which they exist in the world of Forms. They exist in some organized state where they are distinct, but are arranged into the object they participate in. This is the level at which they participate in language. Language, both the Form and particular languages, are an organization of these distinct properties.

So, we end up with a continuum. At the level of the physical object, we have a fused mixture of the properties and relations that are distinct, yet organized at the level of language, and are completely distinct at the level of the Forms.

Language as a Universal

So, after all, what is the universal, Language. Language is the structure that is the organization of the attributes and relations that exist in the abstract realm. The abstract realm contains the set of all attributes and relations in an unorganized way. Language is the particular structure of the attributes that exist

³⁹ See later when I show that only part of the entity of a relation is in the abstract realm and only in the case of certain relations.

in the abstract realm. As such, it has an independent existence, and is a Platonic universal.

I want to propose that the universe is a large bundle of properties. Without language, there are various ways of partitioning the universe into entities. Languages serve the role of partitioning the universe into various entities. This is not to say that we cannot conceive of our own way of partitioning the universe. It is just that language provides a particular version.

Let us take, for example, a rock. The word 'rock' denotes a structure of properties that go into what makes up a rock. It is possible, if we were only to look at attributes, that we could view the rock as merely part of the ground, or various other ways. Maybe we would not individuate particular rocks from each other. However, our language possesses an organized structure that partitions rocks as separate objects. It must be of a certain size and a certain material, amongst additional other properties. This gathering of properties is what goes into being a rock. However, at the level of universals, there may be no such thing as a rock. It is merely the structure of our language that gives us the entities of rocks. So what does our universal of language consist of? Language consists of unorganized structures of properties as subjects and individual properties as predicates. The structure of how they relate together is given by predication, which I will speak about later. The form that language takes, its syntactic form, seems to vary from community to community. While syntactic form is of types, and therefore is a set of abstract entities, the particular form that these sentences take is different from community to community. Therefore, I will not consider

syntactic form to be a universal. Perhaps the fact that correlated with every semantic structure there must be a syntactic form is a universal, but the varying sets of syntactic forms are not.

It should be noted that there is a difference between the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis and what I am saying here. They hold that the elements of a language are *culturally* selected, while I hold that the elements are part of an objective Platonic structure. This does not necessarily mean that their selection will be arbitrary. But, in abstract, all of the possible partitionings exist. Maybe the selection of linguistic communities is what determines the particular instantiations of languages.

A Question

I have defined language as the structure that is the organization of all the attributes and relations that exist in the abstract realm. There is a problem with this definition the way it stands. The way I have defined language makes language coextensive with the universe. If the universe consists of all of the properties and relations that exist, then the organization of all those properties and relations is equivalent to the universe! One might want to remedy this by saying that there is a difference between the organization of the properties and the properties themselves. This however, does not make reference to anything linguistic necessarily, and I want to clearly distinguish between language and the world.

To avoid this problem, we must keep in mind that language is a set of expressions. Therefore, the revised definition of a language is the set of all

expressions of the organization of the attributes and relations that exist in the abstract realm.

So what is included in the universal of language? The universal of language contains all of the sentence types and the grammar of Platonic Language. This includes the possible parameters of variation that can occur in various languages such as English.

What is the relationship between sentence types and sentence tokens. I will give a general answer. Sentence types are the entities that are assigned grammatical structure. A speech token is merely a sound. It only has structure associated with it because a psychogrammar (competence) assigns structure to it in the mind of a speaker or hearer.

A Platonic sentence has a sort of underlying representation that is associated with it, and various conversions add in the material that is necessary for the token or change its Form. For instance, as will be discussed later, there is a lack of tense in Platonic sentences. Therefore, the sentence-type 'the cat run' is converted into a token 'the cat runs' when the verb is in present tense.

Outside of a discussion on essentialism, the remainder of this dissertation focuses on the components of specific phenomena in language, such as predication and names. I hope to demonstrate that a Platonist analysis of language is possible. This will be a partial philosophy of grammar, enough to show that in principle it can be accomplished.

Summary

In summary, the dissertation consists of the following parts:

An Introductory Chapter: The Introductory Chapter contains a discussion, firstly, (not necessarily in order of presentation) of what it means to be a Platonist Philosophy of Grammar. First of all, a philosophy of grammar is the set of general ideas that must underlie the science of grammar. A Platonist Philosophy of Grammar is one where a particular language and its grammar are things that exist out of the realm of time and space. They have an independent, abstract existence. They exist as Platonic universals. Not only do they exist as Platonic Universals, but there is an individual Form that is Language that consists of the underlying pattern that goes into the universal of language in general. Thus, there is a Platonic Form, Language, that has its own grammar, and there are all of the languages that compose the set of the world's languages. My dissertation gives both a Platonic philosophy of grammar and also a partial treatment of what Platonic Language consists of. I feel that Katz did not properly address even the notion of philosophy of grammar. He did not trace back the components of language to their abstract roots.

In the introduction, the Platonist ontology is given in general and also with respect to the particular ontological positions with respect to language.

Arguments are offered with respect to both Platonism in general and also the Platonist position with regard to linguistics. The other two ontological positions, nominalism and conceptualism are given, but rejected.

The property contained by a Form is unique. In the introduction, the unique property that goes into the Form of Language is given. The definition of

Language is the set of all expressions of the organization of the attributes and relations that exist in the abstract realm.

In the second section, an introduction to the Forms is made. The definition of what a Form is is given, and arguments are given to determine that Forms exist. Further, the properties of Forms are discussed.

In the third section, language in the actual text of Plato is discussed. It is noted that the discussions of language are sparse in the text of Plato. The basic principle is laid down that general terms stand for the Form that an object partakes of. Adjectives, common nouns, adverbs and verbs and prepositions are included in the category of general terms.

Part of the third section is a discussion of what constitutes the Platonic Language versus what I call 'human language'. Platonic Language is what is included in the Form of Language. Human language is what the actual spoken language is. Essentially, the Platonic Language contains all of the syntactic and semantic phenomena of Language minus all of the pragmatic phenomena of the speech situation. It also means that all phenomena that are events of the physical world are excluded. What we are left with is a vocabulary of Forms and the various function words that go into a language. It should be mentioned that when I speak about phenomena of the physical world, I am not talking about events that can be described in the vocabulary of Forms alone. For instance, the expression 'the bull is running', can be described in the vocabulary of the Forms itself. The problem is where we run into a referential relationship. If the expression connects to the physical world through reference to some entity, then

the expression is depicting an actual event in the world. That kind of expression is a part of human language and not Platonic Language. Different types of expressions in language and phenomena are presented in this section to tell whether or not they are part of Platonic Language or human language. One example is tense. Tense is something that refers to the situation of utterance or the action involved in an expression, so it is excluded from being in the Platonic Language.

In section four, the topic of proper names is taken up. Proper names are given their own section, because there is a special issue that comes up with respect to Platonism with regard to them. The various positions, Mill, Frege and Katz are first discussed with reference to the fixing of reference of proper names. This dissertation is on the philosophy of grammar. Therefore, I have presented some basic phenomena that are part of a language generally speaking. I do not go into specific formulations of grammars and such, because the philosophy of grammar only deals with general features of language. That is why I discuss such things as pragmatic phenomena, names and predication.

The relevance of the theory of proper names to Platonism is that if names are just Millian tags, then no element of a name belongs to the world of Forms. It is true that the name type is an abstract object, but there is no descriptive content to associate with the world of Forms. This is in contradistinction to the description theory of names. In the description theory of names, the descriptions embody Forms. If the description of 'kitty' includes the color grey, then the Form 'Grey' is embodied in the description.

In the fifth section, three different ideas of predication are presented. Two ideas other than the Platonic view are presented to give contrast. The first view that I give is that of Leibniz. The background of Leibniz's philosophy is given to provide a basis for his view of predication. His view of predication is known as the 'Predicate in Subject Principle'. Basically, according to this principle, a proposition is true if the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject.

Next, I present the view of predication that is given by formal semantics. This view is given in terms of denotation. In the expression 'John walks', the sentence is true just in case the entity denoted by the expression 'John' is in the set of walkers. After I present this view I give arguments against it.

In my dissertation, I offer two different views of Platonic predication. The second view replaces the first view at the end of the dissertation. The conceptualization of predication, therefore, develops in stages. The first view of predication is developed in section five after the formal semantic view is given. This first view of predication runs briefly as follows: A sentence is true if the shadows of properties denoted by the subject partake of the Form that is denoted by the predicate.

Next, a section on the phenomena of relations is given. I give a section on relations, because the phenomenon of relations poses some problems for the view of predication that I have given. Basically, the problem is that the view of predication that I have given allows for two slots, one for the entity denoted by the subject and one for the entity denoted by the predicate. Relations have

another slot for the entity that is related to. Another problem is that we have no relational Forms. A Form is an absolute, independent existence. It cannot have an existence relative to some individual or individuals.

Before I answer the problem of relations, I present Plato's view of relations. I do this through Matthen (1982), Castaneda (1972) and McPherran (1983). Then I present my view. The two principles I present are basically as follows. First of all, you can get the effect of having a relation without relational Forms by saying that entities participate in a Form to relative degrees. Thus, if you have two butterflies, one larger than another, the bigger butterfly participates in the 'Big' Form to a greater degree than the smaller butterfly. The other principle is that when you have a relation, you don't just have one subject, but two. The individuals in question multiply participate in the Form in question.

To finish off the section, I present two more theories of predication, that of Quine and that of Frege.

In the next section, I return to the issue of proper names. I give a few examples of names that, though they look like they have descriptions that underlie them, they are in fact Millian tags. I also deal with the names of God. I conclude that the names of God probably do have a descriptive content. Therefore, I suggest that maybe both Mill and Frege were both partially right, and we have a mixed theory when it comes to names.

The last section of my dissertation deals with an issue called 'the problem of predication'. Essentially, this problem deals with the fact that in a sentence, the subject refers to a Form and the predicate refers to a Form. How do we bind the

two together? How do we avoid the sentence just being a list of names? I present both the problem from my standpoint and from Davidson's standpoint. I have a solution to the problem and Davidson has an unclear solution to it.

My solution, briefly, is that a sentence is not just a list of Forms. My view is that the Form denoted by the predicate causes the property to inhere in the subject. This cause is what binds the predicate to the subject. The problem is, why isn't this cause a third thing in the mix and again we have an infinite regress? I solve this problem by adopting the causal theory of Hume that says there are events which are causes and effects, but there is no particular entity or quality of event that are causes and effects. All we have are two events that are related one to the other. The world is a sequence of events that are in a causal chain. One event follows another. I must say that there are causes and effects because my view of predication relies on it. It is just that there are no individual events or qualities that are termed cause and effect.

Chapter 2

The Theory of Forms

To understand the Platonic theory of language that I am going to propose, I am going to give an introduction to *his* theory of Forms. The theory of Forms plays a major role in my theory. My introduction will be taken from A. Wedberg's article, *The Theory of Ideas*.

The problem that the Theory of Forms is supposed to address is stated in two ways by Wedberg, the semantical problem and the ontological problem. Apparently, Plato deals with the problem in these two ways as well.

The semantical problem is as follows: Let us say that we have a simple sentence such as 'Socrates is human'⁴⁰. The name 'Socrates' refers to the famous philosopher. What does the word 'human' designate? Does it designate an entity in the same way 'Socrates' does? The question can be generalized to any subject-predicate sentence of the same type. If "X is (a) Y" is a significant sentence with the expression X for its subject and the expression Y for its predicate, then does Y designate an entity of some kind?

The ontological problem is a way of viewing the problem using just the entities themselves: John, Mary, Ron and Bob are all humans. Does this mean that there is an entity, humanity, to which they are all related? "In general if A, B, C etc, are all Y, is there then some entity, say Y-ness to which they are all related in an identical fashion?" Wedberg states that both questions are actually identical

⁴⁰ It will be seen later that such a sentence, because it contains a name, is valid only as a sentence in human language, not in Platonic language.

because an affirmative response to the first question implies an affirmative response to the second question.

In The Republic, book X, the issue is stated thus:
We are in the habit of postulating one unique Idea for each
Plurality of objects to which we apply a common name.⁴¹

In the Parmenides the semantical problem is raised concerning the term
“other”:

Must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name,
whether once or repeatedly?

The same thing, of course.

The word ‘distinct’ is the name of something, is it not?

Certainly.

Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to
nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the
name.

Assuredly

Now when we say that the others are distinct from the one, and the one
is distinct from the others, though we use the word ‘distinct’ twice, we
do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to
that nature of which it is the name.⁴²

In the Hippias Major, the ontological problem is discussed:

Then this—I mean justice—is a certain thing?

Certainly.

Then, too, by wisdom the wise are wise and by the Good
all good things are good?

Of course.

And these are real things, since otherwise they would not
do what they do.

To be sure, they are real things.

Then are not all beautiful things beautiful by the
Beautiful?

Yes, by the Beautiful.

Which is a real thing?

Yes, for what alternative is there?⁴³

⁴¹ Republic 596A.

⁴² Parmenides 147D-E

⁴³ Hippias Major 287C-D.

Plato's answer to these questions was that there are entities that correspond to 'humanity' the predicate and the humanity that is shared by the individuals mentioned above. This entity he called an "Idea" or "Form" or "Essence." In addition to the Form for humanity, there are Forms for many predicates⁴⁴. Forms exist such as Beauty, Justice, Whiteness and Similarity.

Wedberg then explains what the relationship is between concrete individuals and the Forms: "It is by participation in the Idea of Y-ness that a thing is Y."

Wedberg says, from sources in the dialogues, that the Forms fall into the following five categories:

(i) Ethical and esthetical Ideas, such as the Idea of the Good, the Idea of the Just, the Idea of the Beautiful;

(ii) Ideas for certain very general notions, such as the Ideas of Sameness and Difference, Being and Not-Being, Likeness and Unlikeness, One and Many.

(iii) Mathematical Ideas, such as the Idea of the Circle, the Idea of the Diameter, the Idea of Two, Three, etc..

(iv) Ideas for natural kinds, such as the Idea of Man, the Idea of Ox, the Idea of Stone.⁴⁵

(v) Ideas for kinds of artifacts, such as the Idea of the Table and that of the couch.^{46 47}

According to Wedberg, Socrates changes his mind in the dialogues as to which classes of entities should be included in the Forms. The relationship

⁴⁴ It should be noted that in my theory subjects as well as predicates partake of the Forms.

⁴⁵ Note that Plato's assumption that natural kinds have Forms does not accord with my 'property Platonism'.

⁴⁶ Please see later in the dissertation for a discussion as to whether artifacts should be included in the Forms.

⁴⁷ I think that the category of event should be added to this list. A storm, for instance, is unified by the fact that all of its components join together to create one entity of event.

between Forms and particulars has been described by Plato as 'one over many'. This implies that for every Form there are particulars that partake of it. There are no empty classes. Despite the implication of the expression 'one over many', why can't there be empty classes? What about the class of unicorns? Maybe Wedberg thought that since Forms are causal entities, they always have particulars that they cause. I am unsure.

Another principle that Wedberg mentions as a result of the 'one over many' statement of Plato is that "An Idea is never one among the objects participating therein." This principle is expressed in the following passage from the Republic, book V:

Well, then, [Socrates asks] take the opposite case: the man whose thought recognizes a beauty in itself, and is able to distinguish that self-beautiful and the things that participate in it, and neither supposes the participants to be it nor it the participants—is his life, in your opinion, a waking or a dream state? He is very much awake, he [Glaucon] replied.⁴⁸

Wedberg wanted to explain further what the character of a Form is. He noticed that a Form seems to bear some similarity to attributes and classes in modern logic.

the class is a collection, a bringing together (Zusammenfassung, says Cantor) of a number of objects, whereas an attribute is a principle according to which such a collection can be established or according to which the objects to be collected are chosen...Plato's usual manner of speaking suggests that he thought of the Ideas as being principles by means of which particulars are brought into collections rather than as being themselves collections. In this respect his Ideas are more akin to our attributes than to our classes...But on the other hand he also speaks of the Idea-species as being a "part" of the Idea-genus. This mode of speaking would seem more appropriate to our classes than to our attributes. We might perhaps say that the Platonic Ideas are something in

⁴⁸ Republic 476C-D.

between what we call attributes and what we call classes but, on the whole, closer to the former than the latter.

Wedberg notes a few of the metaphysical principles of the Forms towards the end of his article. He mentions that the Forms are considered by Plato to be eternal. The following passage expresses this:

The past and the future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; for we say that it [the eternal being] 'was', it 'is', it 'will be', but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly attributed to it, and that 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of becoming in time....⁴⁹

Wedberg assumes from the passage just quoted that Plato probably held that the Ideas do not exist in time.

There is a statement in the Phaedrus that says that the Ideas are relocated in the "region above the heaven."⁵⁰ Wedberg interprets that as meaning that the Ideas do not exist in space.

Another principle that Wedberg mentions is that "Ideas are not compounded out of parts." The following passage expresses this:

Now is not that which is compounded and composite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same way in which it was compounded? And if anything is uncompounded, is not that, if anything, naturally unlikely to be decomposed?... Then is it most probable that things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things which are changing and never the same are the composite things.⁵¹

The theory of language that I am going to present relies on the Theory of Forms. My theory of predication and other theories that I will discuss rely on the

⁴⁹ Timaeus 37E-38A

⁵⁰ Phaedrus 247C

⁵¹ Phaedo 78B-C

theory of Forms. My theory is going to be different from that mentioned in the dialogues and from that theorized by Jerrold Katz. It has a different goal.

Jerrold Katz theorized about a Platonic linguistics that took the same database as a conceptualist linguist would. Katz was therefore working on what I would call a 'human' language. His subject was all of the utterances that humans can possibly make. In the following passage, Katz expresses this claim:

Platonism in linguistics makes two separable claims. The first, and weaker one, is that linguistics is not a psychological science, that its theories are not about states of mind, mental events, or their neurological realizations, but about sentences and languages directly in the way that we ordinarily take linguistics to be about sentences and languages.⁵²

As can be seen, Katz was theorizing about a study of linguistics that would be the same as linguistics is normally conceived of. Plato, when he was discussing language, drew no distinction between spoken language and the Form of language. Here, I am not concentrating on the spoken language. I am focusing on what Plato might have considered a Platonic language. For instance, I am only dealing with sentence types and not tokens.⁵³ My goal is to try to give the constraints on what the Platonic Form of language should be. As this is the case, proper names will not be included in my Platonic language. Linguistic types, the entities that inhabit the Platonic language, exist outside of space and time. This being the case, they have no access to concrete individuals in the physical world. Names, at first blush, refer to specific individuals in the physical world. Therefore, we might think that there is no possibility that names can be included in the Platonic language. I argue, in the sections on names, that

⁵² *Language and Other Abstract Objects* pg. 76

according to the description theory of names, it is possible that they are a part of the Platonic language.

In the introduction to this paper, I gave some reasons for the existence of the Forms. I am going to give some additional reasons for the Forms now. This discussion derives from Nicholas White's book 'Plato on Knowledge and Reality'. "The first consideration is epistemological. It is to the effect that one must suppose that the Forms exist in order to explain how we can know, or at least have grounds for believing, certain things to be true. The claim is that in order for us to know, e.g., that a certain action is just, there must be an entity as Justice whose existence helps to explain how it is that we can know that the action in question is just."⁵⁴

That is the first reason why Forms must exist. I will now give the other two reasons that White gives. "The semantic consideration that is pertinent here is the notion that the existence of an entity such as, for example, Justice can explain, not how it is possible to know something or have reason for believing it, but how it is that certain words make sense or are significant. The idea is that we could not explain, for example, how it is that a singular statement of the form "a is just" makes sense, or can be understood, unless we suppose that there is such a thing as Justice, which somehow confers meaningfulness on the word "just" and thus contributes to the meaningfulness of the whole statement."⁵⁵

"The third, metaphysical, consideration is a view or family of views purporting to use talk of Forms or the like to explain in some general manner how

⁵³ I will briefly discuss some token expressions in the light of a Platonist metaphysics though.

⁵⁴ Page 7

things are, rather than simply how we understand or know about how they are. Consider, for example the view that objects in the world somehow fall out into “natural kinds,” and that certain ways of collecting things together yield genuine groups and others do not, quite independently of the way in which we ourselves happen to classify things. Thus the class of tigers might be thought of as a genuine or natural class or kind, whereas the class of all of the things in Australia might be thought of as somehow artificial or lacking in standing. ...But however the distinction be drawn, it can be claimed that the putative fact that certain things somehow “go together” to form a natural group is to be explained by invoking Forms or similar objects corresponding to such groups.”⁵⁶

The epistemological view appears in the *Euthyphro* 6d-e where “looking to” the Form of Holiness is supposed to tell us what were the particulars of holiness:

...for you said, I think, that it is by one character that unholy things are unholy and holy things are holy....Then teach me what this character is so that I may look to it and, using it as a paradigm, assert to be holy those things which are of the same sort, whether done by you or someone else, and assert not to be holy those things which are not of the same sort.

The semantic consideration appears in the *Parmenides*, where Plato says that if we don’t have the Forms then we “destroy utterly the significance of language” (135b-c).⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Page 7.

⁵⁶ Page 8

⁵⁷ White makes a note at this point that Plato confuses meaning with reference in the dialogues. For instance, White says that Plato assumes that to be usable in discourse, the word ‘Medusa’ must refer to an actual being Medusa. Page 9.

The metaphysical consideration also appears in Plato's writings. The dialogue *The Phaedrus* exhibits the fact that particulars can be fit into natural kinds as a result of the existence of Forms.

With respect to Katz's theory, I believe that we can only apply the semantic argument. The metaphysical argument does not apply because Katz does not distinguish between essential properties and accidental properties. The property of felinity does not occupy a separate place from the property of color. The epistemological argument I believe also doesn't apply. Katz's theory does not deal with real world entities, but rather linguistic entities. Therefore, there is no epistemological issue with respect to entities or their properties.

With respect to property Platonism, the metaphysical argument of positing natural classes only works where a group of entities has a unique property that they share that defines the class. I think that this is the case with most natural classes. Cats most certainly have properties that dogs don't have.

The *Phaedo* is the first place where Plato starts to flesh out his theory of Forms. It should be noted that even the earlier dialogues were an attempt to work out the position. In the earlier dialogues attempts were made to define things such as bravery and piety. The underlying assumption of these discussions was that there exist abstractions or Forms that correspond to these concepts. His idea of Forms was that sensible particulars were somehow imitations or copies of the Forms. Thus came about the idea of self-predication that was to plague Plato's theory later on. The idea of self-predication was that the Form had the

attribute in some perfect way that the particular had. Thus the Cat Form had the attribute of catness in some perfect way that the sensible particular didn't.

The problems that the notion of self-predication caused were discussed in the dialogue *Parmenides*:

I take it that what makes you believe in unitary Forms [or that there is one Form in each case] is something like this: whenever you think 'Here is a plurality of large things', perhaps you think, as you survey them all, that there is one Form which is the same [for them all]; whence you conclude that the Large is one [or that there is one (the) Large].

True.

Then taking the Large itself together with the others, the large things when in turn you survey them all won't there appear once again a one Large in virtue of which they all appear Large?

Evidently.

Then a second Form of Largeness will have turned up, in addition to Largeness itself and its participants; and over all these there will be yet Another, in virtue of which all these will be large; and now you will have On your hands not one Form in each case but an infinite number of them. (Parmenides 132A1-B2)

A formalization of the argument contained in the passage is given in Strang (1971)⁵⁸:

1. Let there be several (a set of) A's; call them Set 1.

(One Over Many Thesis) Given a set of A's, they participate in one and the same F(A).

2. By the One Over Many Thesis, the A's of Set 1 participate in one and the same F(A); call it $F_1(A)$.

3. There is only one F(A). (The Uniqueness Thesis, U for short)

(The Self-Predication Thesis) $F_1(A)$ is an A.

(The Non-Identity Thesis) $F_1(A)$ is not a member of Set 1.

⁵⁸ Page 185

4. By SP and NI The A's of Set 1 together with $F_1(A)$ form a new set of A's; call it Set 2.
5. By OM, the A's of Set 2 participate in one and the same $F(A)$; call it $F_2(A)$
SP $F_2(A)$ is an A.
NI $F_2(A)$ is not a member of Set 2.
6. By NI, $F_2(A)$ is another $F(A)$ [i.e. it is not identical with $F_1(A)$].
7. Moves 4-6 may be repeated again, and indeed indefinitely.
8. Therefore there are an infinite number of $F(A)$'s.
9. Therefore not U.

The offending step in the proof which produces the contradiction is the Self-Predication Thesis. The Self-Predication Thesis is something, however, which the Platonic system can do without. The problem with the Self-Predication Thesis is similar to the problem of self-reference of tokens. We know that a word token cannot refer to itself. The word 'cat' can refer to a particular cat⁵⁹ but it cannot refer to the word 'cat'. This is a property of language that it can only refer to the world and not reflexively, to itself. The problem of self-predication is similar in that a bit of language, the predicate, cannot refer to itself. What you can't do in the use of an expression is have the expression talk about itself.

Another answer to the problem of self-predication emanates from the theory of property Platonism. Since the Form is not an archetype of objects but rather of properties, then we don't have to worry about the Form possessing properties. There is a direct relationship between properties and their physical instances.

Note that the problem of self-predication is not a problem of combining Forms together. A Form can have an attribute. Broadly speaking, there are actually four situations when entities can blend⁶⁰:

- a) There are cases where the things that are doing the blending are not Forms. Such a case is the combining of letters sounds or words.
- b) There are cases where Forms are blending with Forms, but the sentence doesn't give an "object of blending." Thus, there is no grammatical key to what kind of participation is in use. An example of this is "x and y blend." A case where there is an "object of blending" would be "x and y blend with each other."
- c) There are cases of "all pervasiveness" or "running through all the Forms" where the grammar doesn't indicate anything to us. Pelletier thinks that maybe a phrase like "kind x pervades all Forms" is a case of this.
- d) Finally, we have cases of one Form blending with another with an "object of blending."

These are the four possible cases of blending that are listed in the Sophist (249D9-264B8)

Ross (1953), pp. 112-114 gives a discussion on the blending of Forms. He says that we must say that there are certain Forms that can be predicated of other Forms. We must be able to say this, or the Existence Form could not be predicated of all the other Forms. Ross states that it is not the case in blending

⁵⁹ In modern theory, the word 'cat' refers to the property of being a cat.

⁶⁰ See *Parmenides, Plato and the Semantics of Nonbeing* pp. 106-107

that one Form is identified with the other, but rather it is predicated of the other. Some Forms obviously do not blend with each other. Rest and Movement obviously do not blend with each other. Examples of Forms that pervade all of the other Forms are Being, Sameness and Difference.

The Relationship That we Have with the Forms

Now, I am going to discuss the relationship that we have with the Forms. The Forms are perceived by real knowledge as opposed to sensible particulars which are perceived by opinion.⁶¹ The body is considered to be inferior to the soul, and the soul is the part of us which can perceive the Forms. The body acts as a hindrance to the perception of the soul.

Our perceptions are considered to be only dim, flawed copies of the Forms. For instance, take the example of the Form Equals. A sensible particular is both equal to some things and unequal to other things. This is considered to be a defect on the part of the particular because it is not perfectly equal. The Form is considered to be perfectly equals. Therefore, the particular is considered to be a faint copy of the Form. White does admit⁶² that it is paradoxical to say that the Form of the equals is equal when it is not equal to any sensible thing. This can be taken to be an unclarity in Plato.⁶³ What should be noted about equality is that every thing is perfectly equal to itself and nothing else.

There is another thing which is true about Plato's view of sensible objects which White mentions. Plato's view of sensible objects demands that they are

⁶¹ See the Republic 476-480, 506c, 509d-511e.

⁶² Page 67

⁶³ Strictly speaking, equality is only a relation between something and itself. Plato seems to have been confused about this.

describable only with reference to, on one view, other sensible objects, and on another view to Forms. These views are not spelled out in White, so I will not spell them out here.

Another thing which White points out about sensible objects is that they, according to Plato, cannot contain completely contradictory properties. One reason is the following: If Plato's Republic is supposed to be a city that mimics the Forms in terms of Justice, then the city must be able to partake of Justice without partaking of Injustice. Otherwise the city wouldn't satisfy the Platonic definition of a just city. Plato's city is defined by the harmony of its parts that he calls 'justice'.

Another reason that Plato must hold that sensible objects must not solely contain contradictory properties is that Plato himself noted that an object cannot be solely composed of contradictory properties.⁶⁴ He claims that if we do have contradictory properties, then we must have different entities.⁶⁵

White now moves on to the views expressed in *The Republic*. It is in the Republic that the various metaphors for perceiving Forms come into the picture. Such expressions as "looking to," "seeing" and "viewing" come into play.

In contrast with the Forms, sensible objects are "what we habitually heed, but at the same time they are thought to be unilluminably dark to our view, as though our apprehension of them were blocked by a mist which is somehow part of the objects themselves, and through which there is no penetrating."⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Republic 436b, e-437a

⁶⁵ Note that this seems to contradict the ability to participate in the tall Form and the short Form at the same time. See later discussion.

⁶⁶ White, Page 92.

The Forms are considered to be the most knowable, because, for example, “The knowability of the Form of Justice, for example, arises from the fact that it is unqualifiedly just, does not have to be said to be just in this or that aspect or relation, and never in any respect or relation fails to be just. This means, as Plato sees it, that when one judges that the Form of Justice is just, one is never in any danger of having to say that it is also unjust.”

There is a certain science by which people may come into contact with the Forms. I will briefly describe it with a quote from White:

Plato had settled upon a way in which various important disputes could be at least provisionally resolved. One would advance a proposition as a hypothesis, and go about testing it by seeing whether it had any consequences that were obviously absurd. Once this was done, if two people were still in disagreement over the hypothesis, the proponent of it would cast about for a “higher hypothesis” which would entail the original hypothesis, and he would test this new hypothesis in the way in which the original hypothesis had been tested, by examining its consequences. If his interlocutor accepted the higher hypothesis, then the dispute would end and the interlocutor would have to accept the original proposition. If the interlocutor still did not accept the higher hypothesis, then the search would start for a still “higher” hypothesis which the interlocutor might accept and which would be tested in turn. This process would then go on as long as was necessary to produce agreement.⁶⁷

Agreement might never be reached in this way, so Plato expanded the method to ensure that a conclusion would be reached. Higher and higher hypothesis would be entertained until the Form of the Good would be reached. The path downward from the Form of the Good could thus be shown. The assumption was that the structure of knowledge was grounded in the Form of the Good.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ White Page 99.

⁶⁸ Republic 510b6-9, 511b7-c2, 517b8-c1

Before I close this section, I would like to add to my list of properties of Forms. Some of these properties I have already mentioned, but I would like to discuss them further or repeat them.

Firstly, the Forms are abstract. This means that the Forms are out of the physical realm and timeless.⁶⁹

Secondly, the Forms are unique. They are given by the definition

$$A_x A_y A_z [(F \langle x, z \rangle \& F \langle y, z \rangle) \rightarrow x = y].$$

What can a Form be of? It is detached from examples. It doesn't need any instantiation in particulars to exist.

It is indivisible. We may not have the Form Human because a human is a compound of rational and animal. We have no compound Forms.

So, how does my universal of Language conform to the various properties of Forms? Since my Language Form consists of sentence types and the grammar that generates them, the requirement of abstraction is met. My universal of Language is unique. I traced it back to a unique property in the first section.

The fact that a grammar is complex seems to contradict the fact that Forms are indivisible. A possible way out of the problem is to say that the principles that go into a grammar have a unified structure. They all are conditions on what is an acceptable sentence. Therefore, they are not considered to be divisible.

⁶⁹ It should be noted that these properties are derivative of the properties listed in the dialogues, so a source is not available for each case. Some of the sources have already been mentioned.

Essentialism and the Status of Properties

I will now discuss my opposition to the doctrine of essentialism.

Are the properties that I am saying compose objects organized in some particular way? Are there some properties which could be termed essential or accidental? This is a key question with respect to the status of the entities that I am dealing with.

Before I determine whether there are essential properties or not, we must have a definition of what an essential property is. The Aristotelian idea of essence is given by Copi.⁷⁰ He gives two definitions of essence, but I am only going to give the metaphysical one: “A given attribute is essential to an object if its loss would result in the destruction of that object, whereas an attribute is a mere accident if the object would remain identifiably and substantially the same without it.”

The modern statement of essentialism is somewhat different than the Aristotelian view. Klima⁷¹ states that it may be “summarized in the thesis that some common terms are rigid designators...That a common term is taken to be a rigid designator might be reflected in the formal system by stipulating that if an individual is an element of the extension of the corresponding predicate parameter in one possible world, then it is an element of the extension of the same predicate parameter in all other possible worlds in which that individual exists.”

⁷⁰ See his article *Essence and Accident*.

⁷¹ See his *Contemporary “Essentialism” vs. Aristotelian Essentialism*

Plantinga⁷² focuses on the uniqueness of essence in his characterization of it: “E is an essence if and only if there is a world W in which there exists an object x that (1) has E essentially, and (2) is such that there is no world W* in which there exists an object distinct from x that has E.”

Kripke has made some comments on the notion of essentialism in recent years. He framed essentialism with respect to what is known as modality de re. Modality de re is necessity with respect to an entity contained in a proposition as opposed to modality de dicto which ranges over a whole proposition.

Kripke gives two examples in the third lecture of *Naming and Necessity* that he says demonstrate essential properties. The first one is the case of the Queen of England. Kripke reviews an article by someone who says that the fact that the Queen of England is from royal blood is an essential property. Kripke rejects this idea because it relies on the necessity of royalty of the Queen’s family. However, he thinks that the fact that she is the daughter of her parents is an essential property, because it is not possible that she could have been born to other parents.

The second case that he gives is of a particular table that was in the room at the time of his lectures. He wanted to say that the table, just like the queen, could not have come from different origins than it in fact had. It could not have come from a different block of wood or from ice without it having been a different object.

Kripke then goes on to discuss essential properties of natural kinds. He asks about the nature of gold. What if we found out that by some optical illusion

⁷² See *The Nature of Necessity* page 72.

that gold were not really yellow colored but was in fact blue? Would we say that there is no such thing as gold and that we were mistaken? Surely not, for the color of gold is not one of its essential properties. The essential properties of a kind are determined by what science says the kind is. An actually essential property of gold that science has discovered is that it has the atomic number 79.

Kripke also gives an example of a tiger. If there were an animal that had the appearance of a tiger in every way but had an internal structure different from that of known tigers, then we wouldn't say that these *fool's tigers* were in fact actual tigers.

Kripke, against Mill, holds that natural kind terms are rigid designators. He doesn't spell out his reasoning, but I believe that it would be as follows: Any entity that has essential properties has them in every possible world. This means that we have the ability to pick out such an entity in any possible world by essential properties. While such properties are not part of the entity's name, there remains a consistent entity through all worlds. The rigid designator picks out this consistent entity throughout all possible worlds.

There has been skepticism concerning essentialism in modern times. A representative of this skepticism is W.V.O Quine. I share his skepticism. Kripke, in *Naming and Necessity* mentions some of Quine's examples:

What is Quine's famous example? If we consider the number 9, does it have the property of necessary oddness? Has that number got to be odd in all possible worlds? Certainly it's true in all possible worlds, let's say, it couldn't have been otherwise, that nine is odd. Of course, 9 could also be equally well picked out as *the number of planets*. It is not necessary, not true in all possible worlds, that the number of planets is odd. For example if there had been eight planets, the number of planets would not have been odd. And so it's thought: Was it necessary or contingent that Nixon

won the election? (It might seem contingent, unless one has some view of some inexorable processes....) But this is a contingent property of Nixon only relative to our referring to him as 'Nixon' (assuming 'Nixon' doesn't mean 'the man who won the election at such and such a time'). But if we designate Nixon as 'the man who won the election in 1968', then it will be a necessary truth, of course, that the man who won the election in 1968, won the election in 1968. Similarly, whether an object has the same property in all possible worlds depends not just on the object itself, but on how it is described.⁷³

Quine gives the following example in *Word and Object*, page 199.:

Perhaps I can evoke the appropriate sense of bewilderment as follows. Mathematicians may conceivably be said to be necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational. But what of an individual who counts among his eccentricities both mathematics and cycling? Is this concrete individual necessarily rational and contingently two-legged or vice versa? Just insofar as we are talking referentially of the object, with no special bias toward a background grouping of mathematicians as against cyclists or vice versa, there is no semblance of sense in rating some of his attributes as necessary and others as contingent. Some of his attributes count as important and others as unimportant, yes; some as enduring and others as fleeting; but none as necessary or contingent.

My sympathies are with Quine, whereas Kripke's intuition rests with Aristotle. My position is basically that what people refer to as essences are really the part of an object that an individual's culture values most or has the greatest use for. For example, Aristotle defined a human being as a rational animal because he valued the intellect above all else.

What must be admitted to, and I feel what Quine must admit to, is that despite the fact that there aren't essential properties, we still can draw distinctions between different kinds of properties. For instance, if we have a living thing, there is a difference between putting a bullet through it versus bleaching its fur. The difference is that there are properties which are global to the object and

⁷³ *Naming and Necessity* 40-41

ones which are not. Life is a property, if it can be conceived as one, which is global to a living being. This is not to say that it is its essence, just that it is global to it. In some sense, then, we can say that you have and haven't destroyed a life when you kill it. You still have the body, but you have effected the being in a global way.

A global property is one that permeates an object. For instance, I have mentioned Life as a property that permeates living beings. An argument has been raised that blood should not be a global property because of our hair, which is dead tissue. While hair may contain no blood intrinsically, blood is necessary for the growth of hair. After a person dies, the hair does not grow.

It has also been asked that the red color in a shirt permeates the whole shirt. Does this make it a global property? Note that even essentialists don't claim that color is an essential property. What should be added is that a global property will result in destruction of the object if it is altered.

Just as we can speak about the difference between global and non-global properties, we can speak about intrinsic versus non-intrinsic properties. Intrinsic properties are those that affect the body of the object, in any way. Thus if you bleach the fur of a rabbit, you effect an intrinsic property. Non-intrinsic properties are those such as location and the relations that an object has with other entities⁷⁴. The basic idea is that you can still have a notion of object even though you don't have one of essence.

I think that a case can be made that something akin to essence is given by the way that words relate to objects. While it is true that on my theory a subject in

a sentence refers to properties in an unorganized bundle, the only reason that we have a unique word for entities is that they have a property which is unique to them. For instance, we only have a word for cats, because cats have unique properties which distinguish them from other animals and things. Therefore, while I do not admit of essences in the Aristotelian sense, I do say that objects are named because they have properties which distinguish them from other objects.⁷⁵

In conclusion, I am saying that the properties that go into objects are not organized into essence and accident. Therefore, the lists of properties that are denoted by subjects in sentences are not organized in any particular way. I do hold, however, that language itself possesses in some way the notion of essence.

⁷⁴ Location is later discussed in the dissertation as a property which is not an abstract property, however.

⁷⁵ See Russell's view that essences are a linguistic phenomenon in Aune's *Metaphysics The Elements*, page 79.

Chapter 3

Katz's Notion of Proper Names

I will continue, by giving an exposition of the phenomenon of names that highlights Katz's position. The phenomenon of names is important to a discussion of Platonic Language. Before I go into Katz's notion of proper names, I will give a brief introduction to the other positions on proper names. I will use Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* and Gamut's *Logic, Language and Meaning* to explicate the issue. According to Mill, names have a denotation but not a connotation. Names are meaningless tags that are associated with an entity. This is the position that I adopt. Mill gives an example of the name 'Dartmouth'. The location Dartmouth was so named because it lied at the mouth of the river Dart. However, even if the river changed its course so that the location didn't lie at the mouth of the river it could still be called Dartmouth. This shows that the name is just a tag that has no meaning associated with it.

There have been objections that have been raised against the Millian view. Since there are no meanings, the name 'Odysseus' has no meaning. The name 'Socrates' once referred to something but no longer refers to anything. A definite description like 'the president of the United States' can change its reference with each new election, despite the fact that we have the intuition that it has some constant meaning.

Frege added another problem that is very famous. Note the following two expressions:

The morning star is the morning star.

The morning star is the evening star.

The first statement is true as an analytical a priori truth. It is true by its form, $a=a$.

The second statement is true, but not as an analytic a priori truth. It was an empirical discovery. It is of the form $a=b$. If Mill is correct, that all there is to names is a reference, and the names are not part of the content of these statements, then the first statement should be cognitively the same as the second statement. This, however is not the case.

Another problem for Mill's theory are *intensional constructions*. Observe the following statements:

John believes that the president is George Walker Bush.

John believes that the president is George W. Bush.

The two expressions that refer to the president always refer to the same person. However, they can't be freely substituted for each other in these contexts.

Frege solved these puzzles by distinguishing between what he called 'sense' and 'reference'. The 'sense' of a name is the mode of presentation, given by an identifying description, of an entity. Thus, the sense of 'the morning star' is 'the brightest heavenly body in the eastern skies at dawn'. The sense of 'the evening star' is 'the brightest heavenly body in the western skies at sunset.'

Expressions can have a sense without necessarily having a reference. The expression 'the first man on Mars' is such an expression. We don't have a

specific referent for this expression, but we know what property would make it true of some entity.

On Frege's view, sense determines reference. Thus, two expressions with the same sense have the same reference.

Kripke rejected all description theories. He said that we do not need a uniquely identifying description to refer to an entity. He gives the example of the name 'Einstein'. Let us say that the description associated with Einstein was 'the discoverer of the Theory of Relativity'. Not many people can identify the Theory of Relativity, yet reference to Einstein is achieved. Similarly, sometimes people have a false description that they identify the referent with. So, some people might identify Einstein as the creator of the atomic bomb. Even though this description is false, reference is achieved. A false description or a poorly understood one does not prevent reference from occurring. This breaks down the description theory of proper names. Next, I will explain Katz's view of proper names.

As I am a Millian with respect to proper names, I reject not only Frege's view of proper names, but Katz's view as well. Katz held that the counterexamples raised by Kripke to Frege's view were effective. However, Katz held that this refutation applied only to Frege's view, which contained what Katz called 'substantive senses'. To understand what a 'substantive sense' is, we have to understand what a 'thin sense' is on Katz's view.

According to Katz, the thin sense of a proper name 'N' is: the thing which is a bearer of 'N'. This is considered to be the thinnest description of an object,

because it merely describes it as the bearer of a name. The name in the description is mentioned, not used. Any description that gives any further properties of an object is considered to be a 'substantive sense'.

One criticism of Katz is that Katz says in one place in his paper that the thin sense applies to tokens of the name: "The contextually definite thing that is a bearer of 'Nixon' might not have been the self-same contextually definite thing that is a bearer of 'Nixon'." This contradicts later parts of the paper that say that it is the type of the proper name that bears the thin sense.

Outside of this criticism (and another one that I will mention further on), Katz does make some good points. He makes two criticisms against the Millian theory in his article "The End of Millianism" The first argument comes from cases of names without bearers. In the following sentence, we have an intuition that the name 'Santa Claus' has a meaning:

Santa Claus does not exist.

On the Millian view, since there is no bearer of the name, the sentence should be senseless. This does not accord with our intuition. On Katz's view⁷⁶, "the assertion that is made in the literal use of a token of (1a) or (1b) (in application to reality is an assertion about things in the world, to the effect that none of them is the such-and-such thing that is the bearer of 'Santa Claus'."

In addition to the argument from names without bearers, Katz raises an argument from names with multiple bearers. Katz states that most names in natural language have multiple bearers despite the fact that most of their tokens have a unique reference. Classical descriptivists try to reconcile the difference by

saying that proper names are ambiguous between different senses. Katz argues that when we are dealing with proper names, we distinguish between multiple bearers, not multiple senses. He gives an example from the following sentence: Nagel has taught in New York City.

Katz claims that we do not disambiguate the name 'Nagel' by appeal to different senses, but rather we ask the question, is it Thomas referred to or Ernest.

Katz states that Millians also have a problem with multiple bearerhood. Since the only thing that distinguishes one name from the other in the Millian view is the shape or orthography of the name, there is nothing to distinguish tokens of one name type from another. Kripke adopts a view which Katz criticizes. Kripke proposes that we "...adopt a terminology...according to which uses of phonetically the same sounds to name distinct objects count as distinct names." Katz criticizes this proposal on many grounds. One criticism is that it is common usage to say that two people have the same name.

Katz's proposal is that⁷⁷ "On PMT's⁷⁸ separation there is only one proper noun 'John Smith' in English but there are a large (but indefinite) number of tokens of this type in the use of English. These tokens fall into many distinct equivalence classes, such that each member of one class designates (perhaps rigidly) a different John Smith from the John Smith designated by the members of the other classes."

Outside of the criticism that his theory doesn't seem to say much, I reject Katz's notion of thin senses for other reasons as well. Katz states that the sense

⁷⁶ In *Names Without Bearers*

⁷⁷ Ibid.

of a proper name is “the thing which is a bearer of ‘N’.” There are many criticisms which are similar to each other which can be raised against this formulation. The first way of stating the criticism is that the formulation relies upon an infinite regress. The sense of a name relies upon the idea of the bearer relation of a name. However, the idea of a bearer relation of a name is the very thing that is intended to receive a definition. Therefore, the notion of the bearer of the name remains undefined. The same definition repeats itself when we try to define the notion of bearer of the name *ad infinitum*.

The second version of the criticism is that the principle is circular. When we try to understand what the sense of a name is, we are told that it has to do with bearing a name. But the notion of bearing a name is reliant upon the sense of the name to begin with. Therefore, the definition is circular.

Katz, according to the criticisms mentioned, has not given a tenable position that names have a thin sense.

There is an aspect of Platonism that applies to the picture given here. According to my interpretation of the theory of Mill, there are no proper names which are a part of Platonic language. Firstly, it has been noted that Mill was a naturalist. A naturalist only accepts physical entities into their ontology.⁷⁹ So, Mill can hold of no Platonic language. Also, there is no content to a name, on his theory. There is nothing in the name to tie it to the Forms. However, if one holds by a description theory, the description is something which can be related to the Forms, and therefore *can* be a part of the Platonic language. For example, let’s

⁷⁸ Pure Metalinguistic Theory

⁷⁹ See Fred Wilson’s entry on Mill in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

take the example of my cat. She has the property of having gray fur. This means that she partakes of the Forms furry and gray. These are some of the properties that fix the name 'Kitty'⁸⁰ to my cat. Since it is not from the context but from the descriptions that she has the name 'Kitty', the name can be a part of the Platonic language. The name is just an abbreviation of the properties.

⁸⁰ I named my cat generically.

Chapter 4

Language in the Texts of Plato

There is not an abundance of speculation on language in the Platonic dialogues. However, there are a few notable places where he makes comments on language. Every discussion of Platonic Language must begin with the dialogues themselves. The *Cratylus* is actually almost completely about language, but it is about a topic that seems solved according to most modern day linguists. This is the debate over naturalism versus conventionalism in language. I will not comment on that debate, as most linguists have decided on conventionalism, and the topic itself is independent of the ideas that I focus on in this paper.

Plato has a theory of the semantics of language that I will now focus on.

The following passage contains part of Plato's theory:

When you use any word, you use it to stand for something. You can use it once or many times, but in either case you are speaking of the thing whose name it is: however many times you utter the same word you must always mean the same thing. Now "different" is a word that stands for something, so when you utter it, whether once or many times, you are using it to stand for, or naming, just that thing whose name it is. Hence when we say "the others are different from the One" and "the one is different from the others" we used the word "different" twice but nevertheless we always use it to stand for just that character whose name it is. (*Parmenides* 147d-148a; Cornford translation)

In this passage, Plato is remarking on one of his principles of language which I will get to soon. However, we see that Plato holds that a general term stands for the Form that an object partakes of. This is clear from the fact that he holds that the term 'different' always names something, its Form. What should be noticed at this point is that Plato is making his comments about expression tokens. I hold, however, that Plato's principles apply at the level of types. This of course excludes Plato's argument that refers to tokens exclusively.

Bestor(1975) formulates Plato's principle like this:

(T1) All general words (all so-called "universal" terms such as adjectives, common nouns, adverbs, and even possibly verbs and prepositions) are really *proper names*, and proper names of Forms. General words, that is are naming term and their primary designata, their true referents or meanings or bearers, are Forms.⁸¹

It must be noted that I hold that verbs and some prepositions are definitely terms that designate Forms.

The other principle that I mentioned before is an argument that Plato makes in the passage about why he holds that the reference of general terms are Forms. Bestor (1975) formulates the argument as follows:

- (i) For every word that has a clear meaning, there must correspond a thing which is referred to in each and every application of the word.
- (ii) The reference of a word cannot be some individual particular exemplar, however, for there is no such exemplar which is referred to in each and every application of the word ("There are many other things that you will say are beautiful")
- (iii) The referents of words therefore must not be specific particulars themselves but whatever it is that is present to each and every one of them.

⁸¹ It should be noted that Kripke and Putnam have a theory of natural kind terms which is also name-like. This is a theory which holds that the terms pick out the same referents in all possible worlds. However, the Platonic theory holds that natural kind terms pick out a Form, not an individual.

The preceding passage from Plato and the comments that follow it deal with situations where particulars are full exemplars of a Form. In other words, an individual cat is the full exemplar of the cat Form. However, there are passages in Plato where the particular involved only partakes of the Form as a property. For example, if a cat is beautiful, then the cat partakes of the beautiful Form.

The following passage discusses such a case:

As I remember it, after all this had been admitted (that nothing can come into existence other than by participating in the proper essence of each thing, beautiful things in Beauty and two things in Duality for example), and they had agreed that each of the abstract qualities exists and that other things which participate in these get their names from them. (Phaedo 102a-b)

In the following quote, Bestor describes the relationship that holds between general words and particulars.

When a general word applies to anything it is not the proper name of it does so only at second-hand. And even then it only applies to those things which have a sufficiently intimate relation to the named Form, in virtue of that relation and as a means of expressing that relation. Sensibles, for example, are never more than the indirect, derivative designata of general words.

Platonic Language Versus Human Language

The question that now arises is what is the essential difference between Platonic Language versus Human Language. I have already mentioned that Platonic Language does not cover all of the phenomena that normally are considered to be part of language. The Platonic object is supposed to be a more perfect object than the earthly one. The way that this is cashed out is, I say, in terms of the invariance of the meaning of linguistic types relative to contexts. The meanings are not muddled by the vicissitudes of contexts, and are therefore

more pure in some sense. While Plato obviously admits that there are linguistic tokens, these are not part of the abstract language. The abstract language is composed of abstract types.

In the case of Platonic language, it could be suggested that the components that go into the language, both syntactic and semantic, are self-contained and do not rely upon the language user. This means that all pragmatic phenomena will only reside in human language, not Platonic language. The removal of pragmatic phenomena will make the expressions in the Platonic language appear ungrammatical. For example, when tense is removed from a sentence, the sentence appears ungrammatical:

The cat run to the store.

The appearance of ungrammaticality has more to do with our unfamiliarity with Platonic language than anything else. It is very possible that Platonic language would look very different than the way I am going to portray it. My portrayal will be an attempt at capturing what a Platonic language might look like.

What must be understood from the outset is that Platonic language consists of types. Token expressions are of specific expression events and are thus excluded from what is contained in Platonic language. Platonic language consists only of the abstract set of expressions.

The sentence-types that I will deal with are of three kinds⁸². First there are expression types that refer to abstract entities in their subject and predicate:

Beauty is truth.

⁸² Perhaps I shouldn't include a separate type for commands, because there is some question as to whether they have a different type of form from declaratives. The subject in English commands may be covert.

These kinds of sentence-types require no reference to concrete particulars and are thus of no problem in terms of being included in Platonic language. The second kind of type is a 'depictive' type:

The bull is running

These sentence-types are depictive of things that happen in the concrete world.

Why are we allowed these depictive types in Platonic language? Don't they contain expressions which refer to concrete particulars? Sentence-types are abstract, existing out of space and time. They have no access to concrete particulars. Why aren't depictive types part of human language? The answer to this question is that it makes no difference whether we are portraying the abstract or the concrete world. The portrayal is not one where there is a referential relationship between the expressions and concrete particulars. 'The bull is running' does not refer to some specific bull in the physical world which is running. The sentence-type merely gives one the truth conditions under which a token of that type would be true under appropriate conditions.⁸³ The grammar that specifies the sentence-type includes a specification of what the truth conditions would be if the type were tokened. The sentence token is true just in case there exists a bull in the context and that bull is running.

The last kind of type is the type of a question or a command. I am not going to deal with this kind of type here, as it is not included within Platonic language, as will be seen.

⁸³ The question of whether expression types contain truth conditions is a little thorny, however. The problem is that to give truth conditions on the type you must refer to the tokens of the expressions. This may be out of the reach of the type,

I am going to review the phenomena that cannot exist in a Platonic language.

Questions and commands cannot exist in a Platonic language. There are two types of questions. There are questions whose tokens are not the sole use of the linguistic type. The type can be used in a depictive sense as well:

The bull is running?

The bull is running

This kind of question is automatically excluded from Platonic language because it is a token speech event. This expression as a question has no type corresponding to it. My argument is that the force of the question comes from the performance of the token. The second kind of question that I want to deal with is an expression that has the form of a question at the level of the type. A token of such a question is such as:

Is there a bull running?

The type of this sentence has tokens which can only be used as questions⁸⁴.

This kind of question is excluded from Platonic language because it requires a speaker and a hearer for its semantics to be specified. A question is a request for information from the speaker to the hearer. There is no way to understand the force of a question without the notion of a speaker and hearer.

Note that there is another type of question, a wh- question:

Who is it?

⁸⁴ Note that it has been remarked to me that 'Is the bull running' can be used as a warning. It appears to me that that it is true that it can be used as a warning, but the warning is accomplished by means of a question.

Commands are similar to questions. Speakers use the sentence to make a command:

Go to the store!

A command is a direction on the speaker's part for the hearer to comply with it.

Thus, for the semantics of a command to be specified, you need to take into account a speaker and a hearer. They therefore are not something that can exist in a Platonic language.

Note that wh- words that are relative pronouns are not banned from the Platonic language⁸⁵:

The girl know the man who goes to the store.

Reference and truth are elements of sentences that also cannot exist in a Platonic language. The ability to refer, the potential, is something that is built in to expressions even in the Platonic language in terms of truth conditions. However, this is only a potential. For instance, the expression 'Abraham Lincoln' only refers to the actual individual in human language.. With respect to truth, sentences only have the potential to depict situations at the Platonic level. They don't actually apply to situations. The expression 'John likes Mary', for instance, can only have a truth condition in human language, because there is no context in Platonic language. What is meant by 'context' is the situation of utterance, the situation that the speaker is referring to.

It might be said that the removal of reference from Platonic language will strip away all of its semantics. What should be done about this? It should be

⁸⁵ It has been remarked that relative pronouns exist only in some languages. I am unsure if the presence or absence of these elements can be parameterized in the sense of Universal Grammar.

remembered that nouns and predicates in the Platonic language are each connected to an abstract property or Form(s). This means that common nouns will retain a semantic element but proper names won't. For instance, the expression 'cat' is connected to the Forms that specify the properties of cats. 'Abraham Lincoln' cannot participate in Platonic language because its semantics are determined, not by a Form, but by some specific individual that it has no access to.

Exactly how the expression 'the cat' is connected to the Forms is as follows: The Russellian expansion of an expression such as the 'the cat is furry' is as follows: 1) There is some entity x such that x has the property of being a cat; This relationship is between the individual cat and the Forms that specify the properties of cats. 2) there is no other entity y which is distinct from x and has the property of being a cat (In fact there are many cats in this world, so there is a question as to how to interpret this clause when we are dealing with a common noun) 3) the cat has the property of being furry (x has property G). So, the connection between Russell's descriptions and the Forms lies with the first step and the last step in the expansion. The properties that are specified (or underlie) the description correspond to Forms.

The next sort of phenomena that we must deal with are deictic phenomena. Deictic terms refer to something in the situation of utterance and are therefore dependent on the situation of utterance.

Some pronouns are deictic in this sense. For instance:
I want a popsicle.

In this sentence, the interpretation of the sentence is dependent on who the speaker is. It will vary from speaker to speaker. It could refer to me or to you or to some other person. The point of the matter is that the pronoun 'I' refers to the speaker of it. The pronoun 'you' always refers to the addressee of an expression. For this reason, an expression that contains 'I' or 'you' must be spoken in a situation that has people in it to serve as referents. This dependence on speaker and hearer is what excludes these pronouns from being in Platonic language.

The pronoun 'you' will also vary in interpretation from speaker to speaker:

You are a tart!

Sometimes a pronoun is not deictic, but is another occurrence of another expression in a sentence:

The cat likes his mother.

In this case, the pronoun is another occurrence of the expression type that is instantiated by 'John' (See Fiengo and May 1994). Therefore, only deictic uses of pronouns have the condition that they are dependent on context.

Expressions that refer to time sometimes come in the form of tense and sometimes are independent expressions. Whatever form they come in, they must be absent in a Platonic language. Time is something that can only be understood in the situation of utterance of a sentence. Time in an utterance is measured relative to the speakers of the utterance. For instance, in 'John comes to the store' the present tense on 'comes' is specified relative to the time frame of a particular speaker. The time may be 'past' for another individual in a different time frame. This variation of the time frame of the speaker relative to a sentence

is something that is absent in Platonic language. Here are two examples of the different forms of time context that are relevant:

The cat comes to the store.

Now, the men want answers.

Notice how when we remove the tense from the sentence, as in the Platonic expression, the expression appears ungrammatical:

John come to the store.

There are some verbal forms that seem to contain a time element. This would include all forms that have a 'becoming' element.

The plant grow

The fact is that things only grow across regions of time. One way to consider this example is that growth is measured across various stages of the plant's progress. Then we don't have to talk about time in the plant's growth. But if we don't talk about time in the plant's growth, we will never know whether the plant is growing or shrinking. If we just have all the stages of the plant, we cannot tell what direction we are going in without time. Therefore, I propose the following: at the level of the Form, we do not know whether we are growing or shrinking. We merely have all of the plant's stages. We can give a new lexical item to designate this condition. We can call it 'shrow', a combination of the lexical forms 'shrink' and 'grow'. At the level of the Form 'shrow', we only have a set of plant growth stages without any direction of change. When we refer to the plant's growth in human language, we give it a time specification that tells us whether the plant is growing or shrinking.

A similar problem comes up with the verb 'hit'. The verb hit refers to an ordered set of actions: first there is a motion and then there is contact. The situation with 'hit' is even more complicated than it is with 'shrink' and 'grow' , because it is a compound action. The Forms are simple entities that cannot accommodate a complex action. Therefore, I would like to propose that there are two Forms that are involved in the verb 'hit'. One of the Forms is a motion⁸⁶ Form and one of them is a contact Form. The conjunction of these two Forms brings about the lexical item (we shall call it) 'chit' in the Platonic language. In the Platonic language the word 'chit' as with the term 'shrow' doesn't designate an ordered conjunction of the Forms, as there is no time that applies to the Forms. It is only when we speak about human language that we have an order that applies to the motion and the hitting. What we do have when we have two different Forms is two simple discrete elements.

One question that we can ask is the following: If we eliminate time from the realm of types, then how do we order the different stages of an action or a process specified by a verb? Obviously, we can't say that the randomly ordered stages of a plant's growth constitute growing! There are two ways of answering this question. One way of answering it is to make the observation that the successive stages of an action or process are not completely discrete. One stage connects together and blends with the next one. Since this is the case, there is

⁸⁶ One might think that since motion implies successive state changes in an object, that there could be no motion Form. What must be remembered is that the motion Form doesn't itself move. Forms, which require a sharper definition than I have provided in this paper, are more akin to definitions. They are like definitions in that they don't have the property of what they instantiate. This is not to say that a Form is identical with a definition. Another problem is that motion seems to imply time. Unlike the case with 'grow' and 'hit' , I think that we can specify motion without time. It just may be that we won't know the direction of the motion.

an order that results from the interconnection of the stages. We may not know the overall direction of the sequence of stages, but we know the order of the stages.

Another answer is that we might want to include a time element into the Forms after all. As has been mentioned before, the fact that a Form includes time as an element does not necessarily mean that the Form exists in time. The Form might be able to contain time, because Forms are similar to ideas or definitions. Even time itself might be a Form. It defines time but the definition does not exist in time. Note that this discussion is separate from the one about tense. Tense and time itself are two different issues.

How could time be included in a Form? Either there is a general Time Form which blends with other Forms that time applies to . or we could say that time is included as part of the definition that is the Form. Since Forms are simple, we must discuss how definitions relate to them. A definition is typically complex, consisting of a Genus and a differentium, in Aristotle's terms. This discussion should be saved for a paper that deals more with the general aspects of Forms.

As long as we are discussing tense, we should bring in aspect for analysis. Is aspect a feature of time, or something else? Let us take an example: The cat is growing

While aspect seems to have an element of time; the growing takes place across a segment of time, the process seems to not be measured relative to any specific utterers of the sentence. Therefore, we would think that there is no problem in having aspectual forms in Platonic sentences. The basic issue with items going

into Platonic sentences is that they cannot have any element that relies on a speaker and a hearer. The sentences must remain objective. However, the fact is that the whole phenomenon of tense is only specifiable with regard to specific points in time for each utterance. Since this calls for different time specifications for each utterance, aspect must be excluded from Platonic language. Perhaps the habitual aspect, which makes no specific reference to times could be included. The reason that I say that the time referred to by aspectual expressions is specific is because time is part of the physical world, the interaction of objects in the physical world. Therefore, I say that there is no time Form. If there is a time Form, as discussed before, then we might want to say that aspect by itself (without tense) refers to the time Form in some way.

There are also forms of place deixis that cannot exist in a Platonic language. Here is an example using the form 'here'. The form 'here' varies from place to place depending on the place of utterance. Since this is based upon the place of the speaker's utterance, this form cannot exist in a Platonic language: We are going to make our campsite here.

Grice's theory of conversational implicature, which provides overarching maxims that speakers adhere to in conversation, obviously is not adhered to in Platonic language. There are no rules that speakers adhere to in the Platonic realm because there are no speakers.

In linguistic thought, there are two related notions, semantic presupposition and pragmatic presupposition. Stalnaker 1974 defines each of these notions. Here is the definition of semantic presupposition: "A proposition

that P presupposes that Q if and only if Q must be true in order that P have a truth value at all". Here is the definition of pragmatic presupposition: "The distinction between presupposition and assertion should be drawn, not in terms of the content of the propositions expressed, but in terms of the situations in which the statement is made—the attitudes and intentions of the speaker and his audience. Presuppositions, on this account, are something like the background beliefs of the speaker—propositions whose truth he takes for granted, in making his statement."

One might think that since semantic presupposition is a condition on the truth value of sentences, that it would be absent from a Platonic view of language. Just as there is no application of truth conditions in Platonic sentences, so there is no application of a condition on those sentences. However, I would say that just as sentences can carry truth conditions in Platonic language, those sentences can carry conditions on those truth conditions.

Pragmatic presupposition, since it makes use of beliefs of the speaker, is obviously absent from a Platonic view of language.

Now we come to the question of certain linguistic items that might refer to subjective entities or experiences. This may exclude them from the Platonic language..

The first item I will deal with is color terms. In the philosophical literature, color is sometimes known as a 'secondary quality' The following quote gives the distinction between primary and secondary qualities: "...primary qualities are 'solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number', and these are not

powers: rather they are intrinsic properties of things which may be the grounds or bases of powers, and they are ‘modifications of matter in the bodies...’ *Secondary qualities*, however, of which he gives as examples ‘colours, sounds, tastes, etc.’, he does identify with powers: they are ‘nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us, by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts’ (Mackie, 1976 page 12).

It is not so simple that color is a secondary quality, though. All perceptions come through the senses, and so we might want to claim that even shape is somewhat subjective. However, if we accept the view that color is a secondary quality, then color terms must be absent from a Platonic language, because they are dependent on the perceiver. The ‘one over many’ argument mentioned before in the dissertation seems to imply that color is an abstract property. Therefore, it would seem that color terms are not subjective and can be included in the Platonic language.

Similar to color terms are terms of human utility. Words such as ‘knife’, which have a meaning that is specified by human uses and aims, should be absent from Platonic language as well. Terms such as ‘knife’ have a semantic value which is dependent on human utility and aims. Platonic language sees objects as objective entities.

Sentences which contain the word ‘belief’ present a difficulty. Are beliefs subjective to the holder of the belief? Therefore, maybe they should not be included in Platonic language

On the one hand, a belief is something subjective to our perception of a proposition. On the other hand, we seem to be able to report objectively if someone has a belief or not in the same way that we would report on the physical action of an individual. What should be noticed is that we would not understand what the term 'belief' means if we did not have them ourselves. This might rule in favor of the fact that belief is subjective. It should be noted that there is no problem speaking about people in general in Platonic language. The only ban on speaking about people is speaking about specific people. People are an objective part of the universe.

Definite descriptions such as 'the cat' are allowed in the Platonic language as well as indefinite descriptions such as 'a cat'. Despite the fact that we require a set of cats to understand either of these expressions, and that should bring in the concrete world, we can speak in terms of truth conditions here, just like we speak of them with regard to any other sentence. You would think that these expressions require a set of individuals because they pick out a member of a set. However, these expressions might pick out a hypothetical individual from some hypothetical set of individuals. Therefore, truth conditions can be specified for the tokens of the sentence-type.

However, the possible lack of truth conditions on types, as mentioned before, means that we might want to come up with another interpretation of the definite article that requires no truth conditions. In the expression, 'the cat walks', we could interpret the definite article as follows the expression 'the' can be applied to a subject and predicate if the Form denoted by the predicate is

instantiated with the group of Forms that are denoted by the subject general term. Thus, the definite article is a mark of instantiation of Forms. Note that the definite article can be used even where the subject that it is used with is not salient at all. I could be looking at a picture of assorted animals and say 'The giraffe is blue'. This fact makes me think that it is not salience or familiarity that allows the use of the definite article, but rather it is a mark of instantiation of properties together. Note also that, contrary to the way Russell presents it, the definite article does not have to be used with an expression that denotes (Donnellan (1966) says that the term 'denote' is different than the term 'refer' in Russell) a unique object. I can easily say 'the two cats dance. This fact can be accounted for by my theory. The Forms instantiate twice.

If you take the definite article as a pragmatic feature that is used to refer to some salient feature in the context, then obviously it cannot be included in the Platonic language. If you hold by both theories, then only the use of the definite article holds in the Platonic language which helps to refer to instantiations.

It may be argued that on my theory of definite descriptions there is a certain type of truth condition that applies. It may or may not be the case whether the Forms involved are instantiated. Therefore a sentence about the Forms could be false or true. This is really not an issue, because it is only earthly contexts which cannot be related to abstract types. Abstract contexts can be. I am assuming that entities in the abstract world have access to each other. Otherwise I don't see how you could ever have the blending of two Forms.

Another problem is that if types are always talking about the abstract world, how do we ever get the meaning of tokens? Their meaning must derive in some way from types! On my theory of definite descriptions, the use of a token makes the meaning of the type relate to the context. The meaning of a token of a description is that there exists an instantiation in the world that corresponds to the instantiation of the Forms involved. This of course means that token meanings relate to type meanings, but are not identical with them.

Another set of expressions that sometimes are in the Platonic language and sometimes are not are the logical connectives. In any use that requires evaluation with respect to the world, they require reference for the terms in the sentence. This disqualifies them from Platonic language. However, there are uses with abstract terms that do not require reference to the world. Such an expression is 'truth is beauty and beauty is truth'. Such expressions' reference can be evaluated with reference to abstract entities only. Therefore, these types of uses of the logical connectives are contained in the Platonic language.

The last type of expression that I will discuss are the modal expressions of various types. The expressions 'necessarily' and 'possibly' are evaluated with respect to the different worlds that they apply to. On page 136 of Dowty, Wall and Peters (1981), they say that to consider these expressions 'deictic' is sort of trivial since the expressions can apply in arbitrary worlds, I think that this is a mistake with regard to 'necessarily' because the expression that it is used in must apply to all possible worlds. Be that as it may, I think that these expressions are deictic, because we must evaluate their reference with respect to different

worlds. This again brings in the notion of context. Modals such as 'can' and 'must' are allowed in the Platonic language. 'can' can either refer to having a certain ability or to a certain license to do something. 'must' can refer either to obligation or the inevitability of something. There is no reason why these type of expressions cannot be included in the Platonic language. The analysis of these expressions has been taken by some to also include the backing of possible worlds. I do not see why this must be the case.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ See Kratzer's *The Notional Category of Modality*

Chapter 5

Predication

I would like to introduce an idea of predication that accords with my Platonist metaphysics. This dissertation is supposed to be a partial view of what language is. The roots of predication date back to the philosophy of Plato. I will begin by laying out the two other theories of predication, offering critiques of both. One is the theory of Leibniz and one is the theory of the linguistic semanticists.

Predication in Plato

Obviously, any account of Platonism must begin with Plato himself. Plato usually only gives examples of sentences where both the subject and the predicate both denote Forms. An example is 'motion is different than rest'. An exception to this is the example 'Theaetetus flies'. There is a part of the Sophist that J.L. Akrill wrote an article about. His article deals in part with the copular use of 'be'. Predication with the copula is seen as the interweaving of Forms⁸⁸. The Form denoted by the subject is said to partake of the Form denoted by the predicate. We shall see that this 'partaking' is the root idea behind what I shall call my 'Platonic Predicate Principle' where the subject may denote a particular⁸⁹ or a Form.

⁸⁸ As will be seen, Plato holds that predication is an interweaving of two forms; my idea is slightly different because I hold that the partaking relation is between an individual and a form in addition to a Form and a Form.

⁸⁹ In the account of definite descriptions that I gave earlier, I said that types cannot refer to particulars, because they are a part of contexts, which are absent from types. This chapter assumes that subjects can refer to abstract particulars. What I mean is that the subject refers to some particular. I wanted to try to give both workings of the subject in the hope that it would not be confusing. I should say that I intuitively prefer the account given with respect to definite descriptions.

Predication in Leibniz

The broad outline of an idea of predication is contained in Leibniz's philosophy. As Mates⁹⁰ discusses, Leibniz was a nominalist. The flaws of Leibniz's idea serve as a good reference point for the argument for my idea. As a starting point for my discussion, I will outline Leibniz's philosophy. It will be seen that Leibniz's conception of predication is a direct result of his total metaphysical view. My discussion of Leibniz's philosophy derives from Mates' work, *The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language*.

What is striking about Leibniz's philosophy, as presented by Mates, is that a metaphysical view is advanced, without any motivation for such a view. This is a real drawback, and it reduces his philosophy to theory at best. I am not familiar with all of the scattered works of Leibniz, so I cannot say for sure that he didn't motivate his monadology, but from the commentaries that I have been exposed to, no motivation is given.

The totality of existent things, according to Leibniz, consists of an infinite number of individual substances called "monads" or "units." God is one of these monads, only He exists by necessity, and He is responsible for the creation of all of the rest of the monads, the best possible creation.

The monads are simple substances, have no parts, and therefore have neither extension, form nor divisibility. Since monads have no parts, "no monad can be altered or changed in its inner being by any other created thing, since there is no possibility of transposition in it. An example of a monad is a human being. It is hard to see what he means by being simple in the case of a human

being. Humans clearly have parts and it can even be argued that our minds have parts. When he refers to humans as monads, he must be referring to something like a soul, which, I guess can be argued to be indivisible. Leibniz does agree that monads go through changes in states, as he must. Change is an obvious element of the universe. I do not understand how there can be change without the substances being composed of parts, however.

The states of a monad are termed “perceptions”. The tendency to go from state to state is called ‘appetition’. As a monad goes from state to state, it mirrors the state of every other monad in the universe. To get a sense of this mirroring, it is not necessarily the case that a monad portrays all of the other monads. What is meant is that given the state of a particular monad at a particular time, the states of all the other monads can be logically determined. A consequence of this is that the human soul is connected with everything else that goes on in the universe.

Despite the fact that every monad mirrors every other monad, there is no causal connection between them. As his expression goes, “they have no windows.”⁹¹ Mates⁹² gives an analogy of two clocks that are synchronized with one another. One clock strikes when the other shows the hour. The appearance of causal interaction is given because of the correlation, but no such interaction is actually taking place.

Leibniz calls a “soul” monads that have relatively distinct perceptions and memory. Thus, animals and humans are souls.

⁹⁰ See discussion in *The Philosophy of Leibniz* pg. 172.

⁹¹ *Die philosophischen Schriften VI* 607 (L 643).

As I have mentioned, every monad mirrors every other monad in the universe. How does this work with our perception? We do not experience the whole universe simultaneously! Leibniz holds that much of what is going on is in our subconscious. The perception of a physical object is a case in point. When we perceive a physical object, what is happening is we are confusedly perceiving a mass of monads. Subliminally, we perceive all of the monads separately, but since there is an overload of things to perceive, they are all run together in one perception.

The human body and mind are two different substances according to Leibniz. There is a solution to the mind-body problem that emanates from his system. The soul is a series of monad states that consists of thoughts. The body is a separate substance that operates by mechanical laws. The correlation between the two is like any other two monads. They are in harmony and mirror each other. Perhaps the mirroring is more complete between the two, though than any other two monads. This is something that can be said throughout Leibniz's system. When two monads are highly related together, as are body and soul, the mirroring that exists between them is more complete.

As I will discuss in more detail later on, God's position in Leibniz's universe allows him to perceive with absolute clarity everything that is going on in the universe. Man only perceives with obscurity what goes on in the universe. A reflection of this circumstance is a key concept in his system. The "complete individual concept" is God's conception of everything that will happen to a particular substance. For instance, the complete individual concept of a particular

man is everything that did happen, is happening or will happen to that man. All of that man's attributes are considered to be essential to him. Leibniz didn't distinguish between accidents and essences and this poses some problems that I will discuss further on when I discuss necessary and contingent properties of individuals.

Each complete individual concept God created in a way that it was in harmony with the rest of creation. There can be a universe in which there is no sin and there can be a universe in which there is forgiveness of sin, but they cannot coexist in the same universe. Leibniz terms this relation as "compossible." Leibniz has the concept of "possible worlds." Everything strives for existence in Leibniz's universe. If a particular complete individual concept is not compossible with another, then it will exist in another possible world.

The idea of possible worlds is that there are universes that are filled with individuals that God could have possibly created. The concept is obviously more sophisticated than this, but I will leave discussion of it to further on when I need to distinguish between necessary and contingent truths.⁹³

Propositions and Concepts

What underlies Leibniz's logic metaphysics and philosophy of language is the popular view that the role of language is to represent our thoughts about the external world. Parallel to this outlook is what Leibniz terms three "realms": the real world, the region of thought or ideas, and language.

In the final analysis, there is really only one realm, the realm of monads. The first realm, the real world, consists of the monads. Ideas are countenanced

by Leibniz, but they are ultimately reduced to monadic states. The ideas are somehow in God's mind in a way that is not described very well. The realm of language is one of marks and sounds where they are states of individual substances. So, as it turns out, there is only one realm, the realm of monads.

Propositions

The following quote⁹⁴ gives Leibniz's definition of what a proposition is. As will be seen, Leibniz's conception of proposition and subject and predicate will be a reflection of his metaphysics:

A proposition is that which says, as regards two terms or two attributes of things, that one, called the predicate, is contained in the other, called the subject, in such a way that the predicate must apply to everything to which the subject applies. This is said either (1) absolutely or (2) conditionally, that is, as a consequent of another proposition, called the antecedent. Thus every proposition says either that the predicate is contained in the subject or that the consequent is contained in the antecedent.

What must be overlooked is a common confusion in Leibniz's texts between a concept, a term, and the individual itself. A proposition is an idea, but here he talks about the attributes of things.

Leibniz had a conception of attribute that allowed that the attribute could belong to the individual at one time and not another. For example, in 1674 Leibniz had the attribute "in Paris"; in 1670 he didn't have that attribute.

The propositions that are considered most basic by Leibniz are those of the form "A is B," maybe accompanied by the quantifiers "some" "no" or "all". He holds that whatever can be said can be said by sentences of that form. Since he holds that all there is is a set of monads, propositions of the form "A is B" suffice

⁹³ See page 14

to express these simple substances. All one needs to express entities in the universe is a subject term to identify the particular monad at hand and a predicate term to express properties of that monad.

Concepts

In line with standard scholastic doctrine, Leibniz considers that the terms of propositions are concepts. This means that the proposition in the sentence 'A is B' contains concepts represented by A and B.

Signs "represent" concepts and "express" the things that fall under those concepts.

Concepts are said to be simple (primitive) or complex (derivative). The complex ones result from the simple ones by operations termed "negation" and "product formation." The concept Wise Man is the product of the concepts Wise and Man and the concept Nondivisible is the negation of the concept Divisible.

With respect to simple concepts, Leibniz contends that there must exist such concepts:

There must be simple terms, for if we do not conceive of anything per se, we don't conceive of anything at all. It would be as though we should respond to a questioner always using words that he doesn't understand, and , when he asks for an explication of these, by again using others that he doesn't understand, so that if I keep on in this way he won't understand anything.⁹⁵

Product formation is commutative, associative and idempotent. It is not clear whether negation applies only to simple concepts or others as well.

Leibniz remarks that by and large the analysis of complex concepts into their primitive components is not within the power of human beings, but with

⁹⁴ *Die philosophischen Schriften VII 43-44*

respect to the analysis of truths, we have the capacity. He says that many of these propositions can be proved by reduction to indemonstrable primitive truths.

Leibniz speaks of containment among concepts in two different ways. A concept A is contained in a concept B, and B involves A if and only if it is impossible for there to be an object falling under B but not under A. The other criterion is a concept A is contained in a concept B if and only if all the components of A are components of B.

Leibniz explains what he means by “in” and “part”:

We say that an entity is *in* or is an *ingredient* of something, if, when we posit the latter, we must also be understood, by this very fact and immediately, without the necessity of any inference, to have posited the former as well. Thus, when we posit any finite line, we also posit its end points as belonging to it.

An entity which is in something and is also homogeneous to it is called a *part*, and that which it is in is called a *whole*; or a part is a homogeneous ingredient of a whole.⁹⁵

In terms of generality, concepts are different from each other. Under the concept horse, a group of actual and nonactual but possible objects fall. Only nonactual but possible individuals fall under the concept Hippogriff. In each possible world one individual at most will fall under the concept First Man. These concepts do not completely determine an individual however.

The concepts that do completely determine an individual are called “complete individual concepts.” A complete individual concept contains every attribute of every individual that can fall under it.

In the following passage the concept of king is contrasted with the complete individual concept of Alexander the Great:

⁹⁵ *Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Koniglichen offentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover, IV vii B 2 57r.*

Thus the quality of king which belonged to Alexander the Great, if we extract it from its subject, it is not determined enough to define an individual, for it does not include the other qualities of the same subject or everything which the concept of this prince includes. God...in seeing the individual notion or haecceitas of Alexander, sees in it at the same time and the reason for all the predicates which can be truly affirmed of him, for example that he will conquer Darius and Porus, even knowing a priori (and not by experience) what we can only know through history—whether he died a natural death or by poison. Thus when we consider the connection of things, it can be said that there are at all times in the soul of Alexander traces of all that has happened to him and marks of all that will happen to him, and even traces of all that happens in the universe, though it belongs only to God to know them all.⁹⁷

A concept that does not contain everything that will determine an individual is termed by Leibniz the concept of ‘an accident’. The example of the concept king above is such a concept.

The concept of a species “contains only necessary or eternal truths, whereas the concept of an individual contains sub ratione possibilitatis what exists”. An example of this that he gives is the concept of a sphere, which has only those properties essential to spheres, whereas a particular sphere, the one on Archimedes’ tomb, contains the specific properties of size, place time of existence and so on.

⁹⁶ *Mathematische Schriften, VII 19*

⁹⁷ *Die philosophischen Schriften, IV 433*

When Leibniz refers to complete individual concepts, he is referring to God's concepts, not ours.

The Predicate-in-Subject Principle

Now we reach the part of Leibniz's philosophy which is part of the subject of this paper, predication. Leibniz in the following passage says what it is for a proposition to be true⁹⁸:

An affirmation is true if its predicate is in its subject; thus, in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the concept of the predicate is somehow contained in the concept of the subject, in such a way that anyone who understands the two concepts as God understands them would eo ipso perceive that the predicate is in the subject.⁹⁹

Mates¹⁰⁰ comments that Leibniz's principle applies only to simple propositions of the forms 'A is B' and 'Every A is B'. Complex propositions such as conjunctions, disjunctions and conditionals are excluded. So are all negative propositions and all particular affirmative propositions.

The predicate-in-subject principle is an outgrowth of Leibniz's general philosophy. The fact that Leibniz holds that the universe is composed of separate substances that do not causally interact with one another means that each substance can be considered to be a separate subject when conceptualized. The idea of a complete individual concept contributes to this as well. Each substance is self contained. Everything that will ever happen to it is contained in it. As Leibniz states:

⁹⁸ As noted above, Leibniz does not always differentiate between the concept of an entity and the entity itself. Therefore, the 'Predicate in Subject Principle' sometimes refers to concepts and sometimes refers to entities in the world.

⁹⁹ *Opusculum et fragmenta inedita de Leibniz: Extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque royale de Hanovre*, 16-17.

¹⁰⁰ Pg. 84

In saying that the individual concept of Adam involves all that will ever happen to him, I mean nothing else than what all philosophers mean when they say that the predicate is in the subject of a true proposition.¹⁰¹

And further:

In consulting the notion which I have of every true proposition, I find that every predicate, necessary or contingent, past, present or future, is comprised in the notion of the subject, and I ask no more...The proposition in question is of great importance, and deserves to be well established, for it follows that every soul is a world apart, independent of everything else but God; that it is immortal and so to speak incapable of being affected, but that it keeps in its substance traces of all that happens to it. It follows also in what consists the intercourse of substances, and particularly the union of soul and body...Each substance expresses the whole sequence of the universe according to the view or respect which is proper to it, whence it happens that they agree perfectly together.¹⁰²

My Platonic Predicate Principle

The modern formal semantic way to understand a predicate is in terms of denotation. The analysis of the expression “the cat walks” is as follows: The sentence “the cat walks” is true if the entity designated by “the cat” is in the set of entities designated by “walks”, walkers. This is a very unnatural way to understand this expression and I will return to it in a moment.

Apparently, according to Mates, Leibniz intended his predicate in subject principle to have only limited application. He states, “Clearly, this assertion concerns only simple propositions of the forms ‘A is B’ and ‘Every A is B’...”¹⁰¹ I believe that Leibniz holds this position (at least according to Mates) because he holds that the concept of the predicate must be contained in the concept of the subject. This means that the concept of the predicate must fall under the concept

¹⁰¹ *Die philosophischen Schriften, II 43*

¹⁰² *Die philosophischen Schriften, II 46*

of the subject . For instance, in the proposition “Every man is an animal,” the concept of animal somehow falls under the concept of man, because a man is a type of animal. In contradistinction to this, my principle (and the formal semantic principle as well) holds even where the concept of the predicate is not contained in the concept of the subject. For instance, in the proposition “the cat is black,” I hold that my principle holds. In ‘the cat is black’ the concept of blackness is not included in the concept of catness. However, the abstract property of blackness, on my Platonic theory, can be included in the set of properties that the subject denotes.

According to the Platonist Predicate Principle, we can say the following: A subject denotes a set of shadowings¹⁰³ of properties that comprise an individual. A predicate denotes an abstract property, a Form A sentence is true just in case the subject denotes a shadowing of the abstract property denoted by the predicate.

Notice that this way of understanding predicates is much more natural than in the formal semantic treatment. To say that “walks” in “the cat walks” refers to a set of entities is unusual. This expression does not seem to refer to entities, but some sort of property or action. In fact, the authors of *Introduction to Montague Semantics*¹⁰⁴ admit this with respect to the predicate ‘is bald’: “We might digress at this point to admit that from the point of view of a speaker’s understanding of the meanings of predicates, it is not very natural to identify our

¹⁰³ The best that can be done here is to rely on metaphor for the relationship between particular and Form. Plato always used metaphor to explain the relationship. Sometimes he used the metaphor that the particular was a copy or imitation of the Form.

¹⁰⁴ Page 18

understanding of, say, “is bald” with the set of bald persons; there are after all, bald individuals we have never met. Instead, what seems more relevant is our grasp of a certain attribute or characteristic that all these individuals share that distinguishes them from others.” If we pursue the issue further, we see that it is more than unnatural, it makes much less sense. To say that the predicate and the subject denote respectively a property and a set of shadowings of properties is to assign a particular metaphysical explanation to the entities involved. We say that a subject denotes a set of shadowings of properties and that a predicate denotes some individual property. According to the formal semantic treatment, we do not merely provide an explanation of the entities involved, we posit a new set of entities that will represent the predicate. In the case of “walks,” we do not just say that “walks” is a property, we say that it is underwritten by a set of walkers. To me, this leaves the realm of explanation and enters the realm of the positing of new entities.

Two other criticisms concerning the formal semantic treatment are that the expression ‘bald’ refers not only to people who are currently bald, but also those who were so in the past or the future. Reference to individuals only applies to currently existing individuals. Also, the extensional type of semantics used in formal semantics does not separate between the individual and the property. Therefore, an adequate semantics to isolate properties is not available. It might be argued that this is what is given in properties, which give a function between indices and individuals. This, however, still doesn’t isolate properties from individuals. Also, think of the famous argument from the expressions ‘cordate’

and 'renate'. In an extensional semantics, the two terms have the same extension. However, the two expressions clearly have different meanings. It is impossible to denote each property in a purely extensional semantics like formal semantics.

The question might be raised that if we say that the individual denoted by 'the cat' is a walker, he is not always a walker, but only at certain specified times. This can be remedied in the following way: 'the cat' can be seen as denoting a series of sets of shadowings of properties. The sets are distinguished by the different times they apply to. In some sets, 'the cat' denotes the shadowing of the property of walking. In others, he does not. It should be kept in mind that the element of time as regards to a specific individual is something which only applies at the level of the token.

Given this treatment, why don't we have tense on the subject instead of the predicate? I would venture a guess that this would overcomplicate the statement of the subject. Specification of the times that the individual denoted by the subject contains its properties would require a list of all the predicates that apply to the subject. This would also defeat the whole point of having a separate predicate. It would already be explicitly stated in the subject. Instead, we have the tense and aspect indicated separately for each verb as part of the verb itself.

A consequence of this treatment of predicates is that it makes every sentence appear analytic. If the property of the predicate is partaken of by the shadowings of properties denoted by the subject, then the predicate is in some

way telling you nothing new. In a particular sentence such as “The cat meows,” the shadow of the property of meowing is already contained in the subject.

In another sense, though, according to my theory, sentences are not analytic, because the subject denotes just a shadowing of the abstract property denoted by the predicate. It does not contain the property denoted by the predicate. Therefore, the predicate denotes a different entity than the subject does. In this way, my theory is different than a subset theory. To be analytic, the subject would have to denote the actual property that the predicate does. The addition of the predicate shows that the source of the shadowings of properties is an abstract attribute. It should be noted that despite the fact that there is a unique relationship between shadows and Forms, this does not make predicate sentences analytic. If I give you one half of a function, the domain, you can not give me the other half, the range, without directly having knowledge of it.

As I have already said, I hold that descriptions and quantifying expressions do not refer. In a description such as ‘the cat’, how are we to know which properties are being denoted? The list of properties that go into an entity is extremely extensive. How are we to select which properties are being denoted? This is where a Platonic language and the psychological language part ways. The Platonic language consists of an exhaustive set of properties associated with an expression. The psychological language contains only those properties that the individual who knows the language knows to apply.

Possible Worlds and Necessity

In order to discuss a problem that comes up with respect to Leibniz's principle, I will have to take a detour into his philosophy of possible worlds. Leibniz held that the actual world that we exist in is the best of all possible worlds. If it were changed in any way, it would be a change for the worse. This world is only one of infinitely possible worlds that God could have created.

The idea of possible worlds in his philosophy is associated with the difference that holds between necessary and contingent propositions. Statements that are true of all possible worlds are called "necessary" or "eternal" or "metaphysical" truths. Truths which are true of the actual world but not of all possible worlds are termed "contingent" or "factual."

Examples of the first category are the truths of logic, arithmetic and geometry. Examples of the second category are singular statements like 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' or generalizations like "A body tends to continue with the same velocity if nothing impedes."

The problem with the way that Leibniz formulates his philosophy is as follows: If all of the attributes in the predicate are contained in the subject, and if there is no distinction between attributes which are accidental to the subject and those which are essential, then it will turn out that all attributes are necessary attributes of the subject. It will turn out that 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' will be a necessary attribute of Caesar.

According to my view, there is no problem. While it is true that I consider the property denoted by the predicate to be shadowed in the subject, I distinguish

between attributes that are more central to the existence of an object versus those that are less central. Earlier in this paper, I claimed that I was not an essentialist. This would seem to imply that there is no difference between all of the attributes of an object with respect to necessity. While this is true, I still claim that there are attributes that are more central to an object's existence than others. I merely hold that there is no essence. For instance, it is more essential to the existence of a cat that it has blood than that it took a visit to its feeding bowl one morning. According to Leibniz's complete individual concept theory, one attribute is no more crucial than another.

A Few Examples

I have so far presented the Platonist Predicate Principle in a simple fashion. There are certain examples of sentences that pose difficulties for the principle. Let us take the sentence "the cat and the dog met each other". We cannot say that there is a compound subject 'the cat and the dog' that the verb 'met' applies to, because that would mean that the two of them jointly met another entity. The answer, I believe, is that the two individuals contained in the subject each have a property of meeting the other. The cat has a property of having met the dog and the dog has a property of having met the cat.¹⁰⁵ Since we are dealing with abstract properties here, perhaps we should say that the property involved is that x met y .

What are we to do with plural subjects? Let us say that we have the sentence 'the men ate cake'. It will not do to have a mass subject that is the totality of the shadowings of the attributes of all the men. I propose that the

subject in this case is really a set of sets of properties. Each man is a set of properties on their own, and the subject is a set of those sets.

Relational Predicates

An interesting set of phenomena comes up with respect to my theory. The same issue comes up with respect to Leibniz's Predicate in Subject Principle. This issue is broadly discussed in Ishiguro's work, *Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language*. Much of my discussion derives from this work.

If the predicate in subject principle holds, then the properties that occur in the subject must be self contained. An example of a self contained predicate is color. If a cat is blue, then we need no reference to other entities to describe its color. However, what happens when we have a predicate such as 'loves'? This predicate requires reference to another individual besides the subject, the one who is loved. How is my theory and Leibniz's theory supposed to handle this? My theory has an issue with relational predicates because, let us say that you have a predicate like 'loves'. How can we include the lovee in the properties that the subject denotes? Leibniz explained in a number of passages that relations are to be treated as an accident which is in multiple subjects:¹⁰⁶

Relation is an accident which is in multiple subjects; it is what results without any change made in the subjects but supervenes from them; it is the thinkability of objects together when we think of multiple things simultaneously.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ See later for a better analysis of this example.

¹⁰⁶ *Die Leibniz Handschriften der Koniglichen offentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover.*, Page 74.

¹⁰⁷ This language is a partial paraphrase of Ishiguro.

My explanation of relational predicates will follow Leibniz's explanation, partially. First, however, I will examine some other relevant phenomena. Russell questioned Leibniz with two different kinds of propositions. The first is of the type, "There are three men." According to Russell, these "assert plurality of subjects...." And "cannot be regarded as a sum of subject-predicate propositions."¹⁰⁸ As Ishiguro comments, this sentence already has a logical analysis in Leibniz's work.¹⁰⁹ This analysis is "A is m, B is m and C is m , and A, B, C are disparate..."

The other type of proposition that Russell considered to be a problem for Leibniz was relational propositions such as "a is greater than b," "a is a part of b" and "a is between b and c" This type of example will be discussed more later, but Leibniz actually addressed relational propositions. Ishiguro quotes a letter from Leibniz as saying that of a sentence of the form mRl one can take as describing "the accident which philosophers call relation" "either to m or to l. m is the subject of the accident Rl and l is the subject of the accident mR." "Thus propositions of the type "a is greater than b" or "a is a part of b" can at least always be taken as subject-predicate propositions with one subject."

Ishiguro then goes on to ask what makes a predicate relational. As a first stab at a definition, she proposes that a relational proposition is one which cannot be expressed as one that contains no relations. For instance, the relational "John has good health" has the same truth conditions as the non-

¹⁰⁸ *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, page 9.

¹⁰⁹ Couturat page 240.

relational “John is healthy.” This way, the question of whether a proposition is relational or not is not based on surface syntax.

Then Ishiguro brings in examples that are a question as to whether they are relational or not. The first ones she addresses are “perceives,” “is faithful” and “is gregarious.” These predicates contain implicit reference to other particulars. Ishiguro also brings up our characterizations of things as ‘black’, ‘merry’ and ‘thirsty’. To perceive something as black is relational, because what is perceived is of the object. So, even in a sentence such as “a is black” there is an implicit relation involved. The predicate “is merry” is one that depends in some way on outside people or forces to make one merry. Thirst is a relation to an external object, water. These examples are by no means obviously relational. It could be argued that a person is merry even in the absence of external causes. A person could have a merry disposition that never actualizes itself because of circumstance. Thirst could be characterized by the sensations that someone feels when they have been deprived of water.

Ishiguro mentions attempts that Leibniz made to find the true logical form of propositions that seem definitely relational. Leibniz reduced the proposition “Titus is wiser than Caius” to the set of propositions “Titus is wise and as such is superior” and “Caius qua wise is inferior.” The problem is that the terms ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’, which are relational terms, are not eliminated. My theory will have to deal with examples such as this. As it appears, Leibniz left open some examples that need to be addressed.

What needs to be expressed at this point, before I analyze specific sentences, is that for Leibniz, the reduction of relational predicates to monadic predicates is an entailment of the metaphysics that he holds. He holds that subjects must be self contained with relation to their predicates. This means that all relations must be considered as some form of property of the subject. In my theory, I am not committed to the metaphysical point, so it is possible that it is just a linguistic issue for me. The linguistic issue is that, for truth, the subject of a sentence must denote all of the possible shadowings of predicate properties.

Relations in Plato

Relational statements are treated in Plato, but are discussed in a sketchy way. As a result of this, many authors have doubted whether Plato was proposing a treatment of relations at all. I will present those authors that believe that Plato was trying to give an account of relations. The passage that is in question is a passage from the *Phaedo* (102b-102d):

Phaedo: As I recall, when these points had been granted him, and it was agreed that each of the forms was something, and that the other things, partaking of them, took the name of the forms themselves, he next asked: If you say that this is so, then whenever you say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, you mean then, don't you, that both things are in Simmias, tallness and shortness?

I do.

Well anyhow, do you agree that Simmias' overtopping of Socrates isn't expresses in those words according to the truth of the matter? Because it isn't surely, by nature by nature that Simmias overtops him, by virtue that is of his being Simmias but by virtue of the tallness he happens to have. Nor again does he overtop Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because of shortness that Socrates has in relation to his tallness.

True.

Nor again is he overtopped by Phaedo in virtue of Phaedo's being Phaedo, but because of tallness that Phaedo has in relation to Simmias' shortness?

That is so.

So that's how Simmias takes the name of being both short and tall: It's because he's between the two of them, submitting his shortness To the tallness of the one for it to overtop, and presenting to the other His tallness which overtops the latter's shortness.

In Matthen (1982) the author sketches a solution to the problem of relations that fits in with what he believes is the framework laid out by the text in Plato¹¹⁰. I believe that Plato gives more than a framework to answer his question. He gives a complete answer. I will therefore give my version of the answer first.

Plato's question is that if we take some person and we say that they partake of the 'tall' Form because they are taller than someone else, and we also say that they partake of the short form, because they are shorter than someone else, then you are left with a contradiction. The same person is simultaneously both tall and short.

The key to the answer, I believe, is given when Plato says that we are speaking incorrectly. Plato wants to distinguish, I believe, between accidents and essences. With regard to essences, we cannot tolerate contradictory properties. However, with regard to accidents we tolerate contradictory properties, because the physical world only imperfectly shadows or mimics the world of forms. That is why one object looked at in one light can have different properties than when

¹¹⁰ It isn't absolutely clear whether Matthen thinks that the answer is contained in the text of the Phaedo or the text only lays out a framework for the answer.

looked at in a different light. For instance, an object can be both beautiful and ugly.

Matthen introduces his answer with what he feels the problem of relations is. He assumes that every sentence is of subject-predicate form. With the subject-predicate analysis of sentences, we have an individual referred to by the subject and a universal, referred to by the predicate, which applies to the subject if the sentence is true. The problem is that in a relational statement, we have a third thing that is the thing related to. In the sentence 'the cat is taller than the dog' the dog is this third thing. How can we fit this into a framework of subject and predicate that incorporates only an individual and the universal it partakes of? This problem is what Matthen thinks is bothering Plato in the above passage.

Matthen notes that Frege got around the problem by denying its assumptions. "Frege introduced the analysis of sentences in terms of functions and arguments with each name in a sentence denoting an argument for the function denoted by the rest" Thus in 'hydrogen is lighter than carbon-dioxide' hydrogen and carbon-dioxide are arguments for the function denoted by 'is lighter than'.

Matthen then brings up the proposal of H.N. Castaneda. Castaneda holds that all forms are monadic. ..."I take this to imply that all sentences not containing propositional connectives have truth conditions involving exactly as many individuals as forms. In accordance with this, Castaneda takes the Platonic analysis of 'Simmias overtops Socrates' to involve a chain of forms, each

attached to one and only one individual: Tall (Simmiias)-Short(Socrates)...The two forms join to form a chain: the chain is dyadic but each form in it is monadic.”

The reason that Castaneda holds that relational forms are in a chain is because Castaneda holds that in every relation you have two components. For instance, in ‘Simmiias is taller than Socrates’ you have two components in the relation. One component is Simmiias’ participation in tallness and the other is Socrates’ participation in shortness. It takes both sides of the comparison to make the statement true that ‘Simmiias is taller than Socrates’. Castaneda seems to have held that in a relation, you need some basis for the comparison, so you need both sides of the relation.

One point that Castaneda seems to have omitted is that when we speak about tallness and shortness, we have to put it into some frame of reference. A tall turtle is short with respect to a small elephant. Thus we have to qualify our forms with respect to this. We would have ‘tall for a human’ and so forth. This is going to be particularly a problem for Matthen’s theory. He holds that Forms have no relations to anything else, but if we have to qualify ‘for a human’ then forms do have relational properties.

Matthen comments that Castaneda’s view resembles Frege’s. He says that the idea of a monadic predicate is similar to Frege’s idea of having gaps in predicates. A monadic predicate has one gap to fill. The truth is that Castaneda mentions no theory of predication and no theory of predication is suggested by his idea. Matthen seems to have been wrong here. McPherran (1983) makes much the same point.

Matthen criticizes Castaneda in a few ways. Firstly, in the representation of overtopping that Castaneda has, he includes the representation of shortness and the representation of tallness. According to Matthen, Plato wanted to represent tallness by itself.

Matthen also criticizes Castaneda in the following way: ...”he must think that the statement ‘Simmias is tall’ simply attributes a characteristic to Simmias independently of anyone else. Now most of us would want to dissent from such a theory on the grounds that sentences like ‘Simmias is tall’ do not attribute any characteristic to their subjects so much as they say how their subjects’ characteristics compare with those of others.

Lastly, Matthen states that Castaneda cannot deal with identities. The analysis available to Castaneda for identities is ‘Equal (a) – Equal (b)’. Matthen states that this would violate the monadicity requirement on forms that there be a separate form for each individual. Also, this treatment of identities would require that it makes sense to say that an individual partakes of identity by itself. This criticism, that entities do not partake of equality by themselves, also seems to be mistaken, because it is really only in the case that an entity is equal to itself that we say that we have equality.

Matthen then gives his theory of what Plato means in the passage. His view is that Plato focuses in on the relationship between x and F (where x is an individual and F is a form) expressed by the ‘is’ in ‘ x is F ’. He calls this relationship ‘participation’. “Then in x is F with respect to y , Plato takes the modifying clause ‘with respect to y ’ to modify participation. His analysis of the

qualified sentence is x bears to F the relation participation with respect to y If this is correct, Plato's analysis of 'Simmias is taller than Socrates' can be given in two ways: (1) Simmias participates in tallness with respect to Socrates or, (2) Some characteristic present in Simmias participates in tallness with respect to some characteristic present in Socrates.

My basic criticism of Matthen is as follows: If we are going to adopt a subject-predicate analysis for sentences, then it makes no difference if we sneak in a third entity as a qualifier. The fact is that Matthen subverts a subject-predicate analysis. Matthen does this when he sneaks in 'with respect to y '. Is this a part of the subject, the predicate, or something else? It should be part of one or the other, as it expresses part of the relation. An appropriate answer will figure out some way to keep subject-predicate structure intact. My question would be : How can we come up with a theory of one-place predicates that can accommodate relations.

Matthen states that "this [Matthen's] interpretation has three salient features. (1) It gives Plato a theory of relational statements. (2) It involves tallness and only tallness in the analysis of 'taller' statements. (3) It allows tallness to be in a sense monadic—that is tallness has only one participant. However, tallness is a mediated universal: whether something participates in tallness or not does in general depend on other things."

Matthen next wants to show that his theory accords with Plato's Law of Opposites. Plato's Law of Opposites (Republic 436b) states: The same thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect, in relation to the same thing

and at the same time. Matthen wants to understand why the law has qualifications. He answers that this is why he has qualifiers in his theory of relations. Opposite predicates can be predicated of the same individual if the qualifier is different. Thus Simmias can have both the forms tallness and shortness predicated of him depending upon who is in the qualifier.

The next point that Matthen wants to take up concerns another statement in Plato. Matthen wants to know why particulars are considered less intelligible than the forms according to Plato. According to Plato “sensible things are “less real” than the Forms, because they “both are and are not”. Now when Plato says that sensible things are and are not, what he means is that some of them both are and are not F, for at least some values of F. So Matthen goes on to explain that the reason that sensible things are less real and more intelligible than the forms is because the sensible things are true with respect to a qualifier or a number of qualifiers whereas the forms do not need any qualifiers for their intelligibility.

Matthen holds that it is a property of all sensible things to have qualifiers attached to them. Thus it is always the case that they are less intelligible than the Forms.

Matthen now goes on to explain what the second part of his theory means. The second analysis with respect to ‘Simmias is taller than Socrates’ is some characteristic present in Simmias participates in tallness with respect to some characteristic in Socrates.

Before going on with Matthen's explanation, it should be noted that as it stands, it is hard to interpret what Matthen means. If 'with respect to some characteristic in Socrates' modifies 'tallness', then the statement is gibberish. Rather, the statement must be modifying 'participates'. If that is the case, then Matthen must be proposing that there are various degrees that a particular can participate in a Form. This is implied by the fact that it participates in the Form with respect to *y*. This however, is a different theory from what he mentions earlier

Matthen says that he introduces (2) because it is natural to say that a thing is *F* because of some characteristic that makes it satisfy the definition of *F*. For instance, the color of a rose might be the thing that makes the rose beautiful, but this is separate from the circumstance of being beautiful. So there are two separate issues. Matthen says that Plato is very careful to distinguish these two things in the *Phaedo*. "One is inclined sometimes to say that the rose is beautiful because of its color or even to say that its color is its beauty. Plato denies that this is correct. The color is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of beauty. Not all rose-colored things are beautiful and lots of other things are. And it is not because the color satisfies the definition of beauty that the rose is beautiful but because its having that color helps it satisfy that definition."

"Still, if the color makes the rose beautiful it is appropriate to predicate beauty of the color in that context (The qualification 'in that context' is important: to say that Helen has a beautiful complexion is not to say that the color of her skin abstracted from her face is beautiful.) The fact that in a certain context

beauty can be predicated of a color can lead to a certain confusion: the phrase 'the beauty in the rose' can indicate either the characteristic which in that context is beautiful (i.e. the color) or the characteristic which is (identical with) its beauty (i.e. the circumstance that the rose satisfies the definition of beauty)."

Matthen says that this distinction can help us understand when Plato says that: "Simmias takes the name of being both short and tall because he submits his shortness to the tallness of the one to overtop and presents to the other his tallness which overtops the latter's shortness." He says that it might be confusing because the phrases 'his tallness' and 'his shortness' are used. This might lead one to think that two different characteristics of Simmias are being used. Matthen says that he believes that one characteristic of size is being used in both cases with tallness being predicated of one and shortness being predicated of the other. "On the other hand, where Plato insists (102de) ;that both tallness itself and the tallness in us will never abide the approach of shortness he is speaking not of the size but of the circumstance e.g. that Simmias has a size that compares as per the definition of tallness to Socrates' size."

Matthen finishes off his discussion with a piece on equality. We have seen (according to Matthen) that 'a is taller than b' is treated by Plato as attributing tallness to a but with respect to b. Matthen wants to know if equality is treated in the same way, characterizing single objects but with respect to something else. Matthen says that many commentators have adopted this opinion (so have I) but that this opinion is absurd. He says that a consequence of this opinion is that

ideal equals are unqualifiedly so, without being equal to anything. He objects by saying, "What is it for something to be equal but not to anything?"

He says that this is probably a consequence of Plato only holding by unitary subjects. But Matthen states, what would these positions hold about pairs of objects or multiple objects. Surely Plato would have to hold by multiple subjects in such cases. Matthen then brings in Frege, who had no problem with multiple subjects in the case of relations. He wants to say that Plato also had no problem with multiple subjects. Matthen then wants to say that other places in the *Phaedo* deal with the concept of equality with pairs and not a single entity. The following is a quote from the passage in question:

"Well", said he, "how do we feel about the sticks as compared with the real equals we spoke of just now; do the equal sticks seem to us to be as equal as equality itself, or do they fall somewhat short of the essential nature of equality; or nothing short?"

According to Matthen, we see that Plato is discussing pairs of things when he discusses equality.

McPherran (1983) offers a defense of Castaneda (1972) via a criticism of Matthen (1982). I will review his paper. As I have mentioned before, Matthen seems to read Frege into Castaneda's position where it is not there. Matthen claims that since Castaneda describes his predicates as 'monadic', that this involves Frege's idea of gappy predicates. McPherran rightly attacks Matthen as bringing in Frege's idea where it is not indicated. Mcpherran notes that not only does Castaneda not refer to Frege's idea, but he actually opposes it in taking the idea that relations are not polyadically instantiable.

The second criticism that McPherran makes of Matthen is the following: Matthen criticizes Castaneda as composing his chains of shortness also when Plato says that overtopping can only involve tallness. McPherran responds that the requirement of overtopping by tallness alone is satisfied by one of the prongs of the chain.. The form of shortness is not involved in the overtopping of Socrates.

McPherran says that Matthen might respond to this that Plato's requirement is that tallness must be the complete explanation of Simmias overtopping Socrates, and there is no place for shortness. McPherran replies that this can't be what Plato meant because it defies common sense. The natural corollary to something being taller than something else is that something is shorter than something else. McPherran notes that also this is born out by the text at 102c where it is said that Simmias overtops Socrates not only because of the tallness Simmias has but also because of the shortness that Socrates has in respect of his tallness.

McPherran's next point concerns Matthen's following principle which is attributed to Plato: "The same term cannot serve in the explanations both for a subject's possession of a characteristic and for a subject's possession of the opposite of that characteristic." Castaneda uses the form chain Tallness-Shortness to specify both the tallness and the shortness of Simmias. McPherran replies that this principle does not apply to complete explanations of relational facts. It is only meant to apply in a case where we are giving the basic

relationship of participation. For instance, if Simmias is tall by tallness, then he is not short by tallness.

McPherran then summarizes a group of Matthen's criticisms. "(a) If a form like Tallness is monadic, then Castaneda must think the statement 'Simmias is tall' simply attributes a characteristic to Simmias independently of anyone else; but (b) this isn't Plato's view, since (c) Plato holds that the contrast between forms and sensible particulars is that Forms are not relational whereas sensible things are (e.g. Simmias who is in relation to something). Finally (d), Castaneda's theory cannot accommodate the many aspects of certain statements' relationality, such as the respects, times, places, etc, of 'Helen is beautiful'.

McPherran replies that just because forms are monadic ('each Form is instantiated by only one particular in each fact it is involved in') doesn't mean that relational terms are attributed to individuals in relation to no one else. Castaneda realizes that for any particular participating in a form chain, let us say tallness of tallness-shortness, there has to be a particular participating in the correlative of that chain. Something participating in the shortness of tallness-shortness.

"Furthermore, it is his view that any particular which has a relational characteristic (a Form-instantiation factor, or immanent character) such as tallness, only has that characteristic if it is 'towards' its correlative characteristic possessed by another particular. For instance, if Simmias possesses tallness that tallness must be toward something's shortness.

McPherran replies in addition that it is strange that Matthen brings up the point against Castaneda that particulars are relational and Forms are not.

McPherran states that this is exactly the intent of Castaneda's idea that the Forms are monadic. I must step in here to comment. This was not his idea of them being monadic. His idea of being monadic had to do with the fact that 'each form is instantiated by only one particular in each fact it is involved in'.

Matthen's final point is then taken up by McPherran, the analysis according to Castaneda of 'Helen is beautiful' and its many relational aspects. I will quote from McPherran for the various analyses:

- a. 'Helen is beautiful'. As Matthen speculates, Castaneda can account for this by asserting that Helen participates in the Beautiful and has her beauty towards 'average' women who participate in the Ugly. What then, he asks, about the 'many other roots of the statement's relationality as Plato sees it: respects, times, places, etc'. For these, consider the following:
- b. 'Helen is more beautiful than Xanthippe' [aspectual]. Analysis: Helen possesses beauty towards Xanthippe's ugliness.
- c. 'Helen has beautiful hair, but her nose is ugly' [aspectual] Analysis: Helen's hair possesses beauty towards average women's hair which possesses ugliness, her nose possesses ugliness towards average women's noses possessing beauty.
- d. 'Helen is more beautiful (at t_1) than she used to be (at t_0) [time]. Analysis: Helen at t_1 possesses beauty₅₇, a beauty₅₇ towards (across time) the ugliness₅₇ which was possessed by Helen at t_0 .

This mode of analysis seems capable of dealing with any further sort of relation - including places – aspectual or otherwise.

Matthen's last objection to Castaneda involved statements of the form 'a is equal to b' and 'a and b are equals'. This is essentially the same as a question that Gallup had against Castaneda. "Castaneda's response to Gallup was to claim that such statements are to be accounted for in this manner: a participates in Form F_1 , b participates in Form F_2 , and the chained Form-pair F_1 - F_2 is the Form-pair called 'Equality itself'". For McPherran, this is a clear answer to Matthen's question.

Next, McPherran gives his criticism of Matthen's view itself. He starts off by saying that Plato in the text never had two views of participation, one for ordinary cases and one for relations. McPherran says that this is too sophisticated a formulation for Plato when Plato was not even sure how to characterize participation itself.

Then, McPherran makes three points, the first I understand, the next two I don't. The first point is that Matthen violates his own condition, because if you involve a relation to another object, y, then you involve something besides the form tallness in the description of the relation. Matthen only allows the form tallness itself.

The rest of McPherran's criticism I do not understand, and I refer you to his paper for it.

My Theory of Relations

Before going on with my theory of relations, I just want to make one more comment with respect to Matthen's theory of relations. Matthen wanted to say that Forms do not participate in relations at all. They are so to speak above

everything. This does not seem to be completely the case, because we have sentences that show participation of Forms in relations. First, we have a sentence that shows a relation between Forms: 'virtue impedes sinfulness'. Then we have a relation between a particular and a Form: 'Theaetatus sits'.

Just as a reminder, I am going to explain the basic structure of predication again. In a sentence you have a subject and a predicate. The subject denotes an individual and the predicate denotes a Form. Predication takes place when the individual denoted by the subject partakes of the Form denoted by the predicate. So, for example, in 'Mary is thin', the individual Mary if the sentence is true, partakes of the thin Form. It might also be claimed that there are subjects which denote Forms, such as 'Virtue is good'.

In sum, there are two problems that a theory of relations must address. First of all there is the problem that there are no relational Forms. This was seen to be a problem with Castaneda's interpretation of relations. In his chain theory, there was no comparison holding between the elements in the Form chain. This is a difficult problem to get around. Also, there is a problem with restricting relations to subject and predicate form. There seems to be three elements in a relation: The subject, the predicate and the thing the relation is being made to.

The problems fall away with the following theory of relations. There are various types of participation relation. The first type occurs in the sentence 'This butterfly is bigger than that butterfly'. The problem is that, let's say that both butterflies are smaller than the average butterfly. Then how can the bigger butterfly participate in the big Form. It is not big for a butterfly. The answer is that

both butterflies participate in the big Form to a relative degree. In a complimentary way, both butterflies participate in the small Form to a different degree. The bigger butterfly participates to a greater degree than the smaller butterfly. This means of course that individuals can participate in Forms to differing degrees. So, this type of participation is a participation of relative degree. The sentence 'the butterfly is big' is ambiguous between a reading where the butterfly is big for its kind and a reading where it is bigger than some specific butterfly. On the reading where it is big for its kind, we say that the butterfly partakes of the big-for-a-butterfly Form¹¹¹. I have already discussed the other possibility.

I have mentioned that there is a problem with my subject-predicate analysis. There is only a position for a single subject and a predicate in my analysis. In a relation, there is a third element. The argument that is in relation with the subject. To avoid this problem we can say that, underlyingly, there is a complex subject which is the ordered pair <this butterfly, that butterfly>. We get rid of the problem by saying that they are really one complex subject. Both elements of the subject partake in the Big Form to a different degree.

There is another type of participation relation that is exemplified by the sentence 'John loves Mary'. This is a relation that is explained by the individual denoted by the subject participating in the Loves Form from a different angle than the individual denoted by the object. There is an ordered pair participating in the loves Form. One could say that the subject participates in the Love Form from

¹¹¹ Note that this working of the participation relation will change in the next section. There is a requirement that Forms don't bifurcate into a double Form, one that shares both bigness and butterfly.

the angle of an agent and the object participates in the Love Form from the angle of a patient.

Platonic Propositions

It is now time to give an adequate formalism for what I will call 'Platonic propositions'. So far, I have identified three distinct parts to a Platonic proposition. There is the subject, which is an individual or individuals, the partaking relation and a Form. The individual denoted by the subject partakes of the Form. There is an ordering that the subject undergoes that is a part of the participation relation. To give an adequate formalization, I wish to rework the butterfly example. When the butterfly is big for the average butterfly we don't want Forms to bifurcate. It is enough to compare the butterfly with the average butterfly. So we have the following formalism $\langle \text{this butterfly, the average butterfly} \rangle \alpha \langle \uparrow, \downarrow \rangle \text{Big}$. The order that they are in is the participation order. The arrows mean the relative participations in the Big Form. Where the butterfly is big relative to all other objects we have $\text{This butterfly} \alpha \text{Big}$.

I should mention that there is a case where the application of size terms doesn't come out quite as expected. This is where the butterfly is slightly larger than average. The butterfly would in this case come out as small despite the fact that it is technically in the category of big butterflies.

Quine's Version of Predication

I am now going to present another few theories of predication to contrast with the theory of predication that I have presented. In Quine's version of predication, the difference between what he calls general and singular terms is

important. A singular term purports to refer to just one object. So 'Pegasus' is a singular term. 'natural satellite of the earth' is a general term in that it does not purport to refer to just one object.

"Predication joins a general term and a singular term to form a sentence that is true or false according as the general term is true or false of the object, if any to which the singular term refers."¹¹² Quine is saying that the predicate does not play a referential role. The predicate is a bit of language that is either true of the object denoted by the subject or is false of that object. I take issue with this version of predication advanced by Quine. He is saying that a syntactic form can be true of an individual. I say that only an entity or feature of the external world can be true or false of another individual in the external world. It is sort of ridiculous that we would consider a syntactic form to be true of an individual in the external world. Quine is clearly trying to avoid the existence of properties or Forms. That is the natural assumption that correlates with what the predicate denotes. That is why he holds that the predicate denotes nothing. He is a true nominalist in *Word and Object*.

Quine considers substantives, adjectives and verbs to be merely variant terms of the general term. The predication Fa is realized as 'a is an F', 'a is F' and 'a F's'. It is illustrated by 'Mama is a woman', 'Mama is big' and 'Mama sings'. Quine says that the verb may be looked upon as the fundamental form, because it enters predication without the apparatus of 'is' or 'is an'. "The copula 'is' or 'is an' can accordingly be explained simply as a prefix serving to convert a general term from adjectival or substantival form to verbal form for predicative

position. 'Sings', 'is singing' and 'is a singer' thus all emerge as verbs and interchangeable ones apart from some subtleties of English idiom. Conversely 'ing' and '-er' are suffixes serving to convert a general term from verbal form to adjectival or substantival form, to suit various positions other than predicative; and 'thing' and '-ish' are suffixes for converting adjectives into substantives and vice versa.

Adjectives in English bear a formal resemblance to mass substantives in that we cannot apply 'an' to them, nor the plural ending. Adjectives that are cumulative in reference even double as mass substantives—as when we say 'Red is a color' or 'Add a little more red'. In such cases English agrees with us in making light of the distinction between substantive and adjective. But in general we must note which substantive it is that an adjective does not need to be distinguished from. The substantives to be thus equated to 'red', 'wooden' and 'spherical' are 'red', 'wood' and 'sphere', not 'redness', 'woodenness', and 'sphericity'. These latter are quite another matter: abstract singular terms. In general a faithful substantival rendering of a term, if not the briefest can be got from the adjective by appending 'thing' or 'stuff'."

Quine says that mass terms behave sometimes occurring before 'is' like a singular term and sometimes after 'is' like a general term. Examples showing mass terms after 'is' are 'That puddle is water', 'The white part is sugar' and 'The rest of the cargo is furniture'. A mass term in predicate position may be viewed as a general term which is true of each portion of the stuff in question. In 'Water is fluid' or 'Water flows' the mass term is much more like a singular term.

Similarly the mass substantive 'red' may be conceived in subject position as a singular term naming the scattered totality of red substance.

Frege's View of Predication

The second view of predication that I am going to take up is Frege's.¹¹³ Frege considers predication to be where we have a name and a 'concept word' or predicate. "Corresponding to the name is the object for which it stands and corresponding to the 'concept word' is the concept for which it stands, and this concept itself is a function mapping objects onto values."¹¹⁴ Just like the function designated by '()+3' maps the number 2 onto the number 5, so the concept for which '() is wise' stands maps the man Socrates onto that which is designated by the sentence 'Socrates is wise'. What is designated by the sentence? A truth-value. Thus, concepts are functions mapping arguments onto truth-values.

Frege denied the Platonic view of predication. In the sentence, 'Socrates is wise', the Platonic view holds that there is a Wisdom Form. Frege holds that 'Wisdom' is the name of a Form, not the concept name of the predicate 'wise'. Concepts are essentially predicative. Predicates, unlike proper names, are essentially incomplete. "A predicate must be written with an indication of the gaps to be filled, not as a matter of convention, but because a predicate is not itself a quotable bit of a sentence, as a proper name is, but a pattern exhibited by the sentences which contain it."¹¹⁵

¹¹³ This discussion is derived from Frege: A Critical Introduction pp. 32-34.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

Another interesting case that comes up with respect to my theory is the sentence ‘the men are heavy.’ On one reading, this means that each man is heavy independently. This would receive the analysis that I have already given of the plural and a standard predicate. On the reading that we are talking collectively about the men, I would propose the following: The men is represented by a set of all of the shadowings of the properties of the men collectively.

Leibniz and Nominalism

Leibniz’s metaphysics is clearly nominalistic. He also describes himself as a nominalist:

Up to now I see no other way of avoiding these difficulties than by considering abstracta not as real things [res] but as abbreviated ways of talking [compendia loquendi]—so that when I use the name heat it is not required that I should be making mention of some vague subject but rather that I should be saying that something is hot—and to that extent I am a nominalist, at least provisionally... There is no need to raise the issue whether there are various realities in a substance that are the fundamentals of its various predicates (though, indeed, if it is raised, adjudication is difficult). It suffices to posit only substances as real things [res] and to assert truths about these. Geometricians too do not use definitions of abstracta but reduce them to concreta; thus Euclid does not use his own definition of ratio but rather that in which he states when two quantities are said to have the same, greater or lesser ratio.

The arguments against nominalism I have already mentioned earlier in the paper in the section on metaphysics. Suffice it to say, however, that the nominalist position is really a difficult one. If all individuals are particular and concrete, then it is difficult to understand what a set of them is. If all individuals are particular, then there is no basis for a comparison between them. If every cat

is a separate substance, then it is hard to understand how to define one or generalize across the class. Every cat should be a unique thing.

Another problem with Leibniz's nominalism is that predicates come out as being timeless entities. If we say 'John is wise', then the property of being wise might change over time, but the changes over time occur in the subject John. The predicate is a timeless property. In fact, we could not conceptualize the predicate changing over time, because we wouldn't have the subject to tell us when the property applied. Therefore, this is an argument against any nominalistic position that has a predicate in subject principle. Predicates are timeless properties. This is a violation of nominalist metaphysics, which holds that all existent beings are particular and time bound. There are no abstract entities in nominalism.

Katz's Notion of Containment

I will now discuss Katz's notion of analyticity. Katz's notion of containment is contained within his idea of analyticity. This idea was developed and refined over the course of a number of papers and a book. I will present the earlier version, as it is more appealing to common sense. The discussion will be derived from *Analyticity and Contradiction in Natural Language*. This article presents the semantic framework that Katz's ideas of analyticity lie within. I will present this framework to facilitate comprehension.

A semantic theory must account for the fact that a speaker can understand and produce any of the infinite sentences of their language. Because the sentences are infinite, the speaker must have knowledge of a set of recursive

rules that are able to generate any sentence in the language. Also, the speaker must understand the elementary components of the language. She must understand the lexical items in the language and the mode of composition that puts them together.

There are two components to a semantic theory according to Katz. First, there is a dictionary which has the meaning for every lexical item in the language. Next, there is a set of what he calls “projection rules.” “These use information supplied by the dictionary for the lexical items in a sentence and information about the sentence’s syntactic structure supplied by the grammar of the language in order to assign the sentence a semantic interpretation.”

The syntactic structure is input to the semantic interpretation. A semantic theory takes each discrete output of the grammatical component and operates on them. What a semantic theory must account for are different things that the speaker has knowledge of. The speaker is able to distinguish between semantically acceptable and semantically anomalous sentences. She has knowledge of ambiguities and so on.

To characterize a semantic theory of a language, Katz says that we only need to define the notions of *dictionary entry*, *semantic interpretation*, and *projection rule*.

I will let Katz speak for himself to define what a dictionary entry is:

In the majority of cases, a dictionary entry consists of a finite number of sequences of symbols, each sequence consisting of an initial subsequence of syntactic markers, followed by a subsequence of “semantic markers”, then optionally, one distinguisher and finally a “selection restriction”. Dictionary entries can be represented in the form of tree diagrams...where each sequence in the entry for a lexical item

appears as a distinct path rooted at that lexical item. Semantic markers are represented enclosed within parentheses, the distinguishers are represented within brackets, and the selection restrictions are represented within angles. Each complete path, each sequence, represents a distinct sense of the lexical item in whose entry it appears.

The sharing of a semantic marker indicates a semantic similarity. For instance, Katz says that the dictionary entries for bachelor, uncle, man and lion contain the semantic marker 'male' and are therefore similar in that respect. A distinguisher distinguishes between a lexical item and another which is close to it in meaning. Thus, in the tree for 'bachelor', we have distinguishers for a knight who is serving under the standard of another and one having the academic degree conferred for completing the first four years of college.

A semantic ambiguity occurs in a lexical item if its entry contains at least two paths. A necessary but not sufficient condition for sentential ambiguity is ambiguity in a lexical item¹¹⁶. Katz gives the example "he likes to wear a light suit in the summer". The lexical ambiguity is that of the word 'light' here. The lexical ambiguity is not sufficient for sentential ambiguity, as can be seen from the sentence "the stuff is light enough to carry"

One last component of a dictionary entry is something called a *selection restriction*. A selection restriction comes at the end of a path and determines the conditions under which a lexical item may be combined with another lexical item. "Thus, for example, the selection restriction affixed to the path of a modifier determines the applicability of that path of the modifier to a sense of a head. Instances of modifier-head relations are: adjective-noun modification, adverb-verb modification, adverb-adjective modification."

Projection rules are the rules that determine the sense of particular lexical items and combine them into higher constituents based upon their selection restrictions. The projection rules are complicated and I will not go into them here.

The paper that I am discussing wishes to give an account of analyticity which will satisfy Quine's objections to the notion. Katz first quotes another paper, *The Structure of a Semantic Theory*, to define his notion of analyticity:

The limiting case [of modification] where the addition to the compound of semantic material from the modifier is zero, is of considerable theoretical interest. The compound *unmarried bachelor* is a case in point. The erasure clause in (R1)...tells us to delete from the path of the modifier any semantic material already represented in the path of the head. Thus in forming the compound *unmarried bachelor* all the semantic information in the path of the modifier *unmarried* will be deleted so that the derived path for *unmarried bachelor* will contain no more than the semantic material which comes from the path for *bachelor*. The failure of the modifier to add semantic information would appear to account for the intuition that such expressions as *unmarried bachelor* are redundant and that, correspondingly such statements as "bachelors are unmarried" are "empty", "tautological", "vacuous", "uninformative". Thus, we have a new explanation of the analyticity of a classical type of analytic truth.

Katz then gives a formal definition of analyticity as follows: "...analyticity is the predicative vacuity that results from the failure of the path associated with the predicate to contribute semantic elements to the path associated with the subject when these paths are amalgamated to produce a reading for the sentence."

Unlike my theory, where the inclusion of shadowings of the predicate in the shadowings of the subject is not only the condition for analyticity, but is the mechanism of predication, Katz only reserves it for analyticity. Why is this the case? Katz holds that meaning in language is purely a truth of language. He holds that analyticity is a linguistic relation. His theory of semantic markers is a

¹¹⁶ I am not sure what this says about ambiguities like 'every person speaks one language'.

truth of grammar and is purely language internal. To hold that predication is purely a result of the predicate being included in the subject, one must hold that there is a relationship between language and that which is external to language, the properties that make up entities. This is why my theory is not compatible with Katz's theory.

The Relevance to Platonism and The Appropriate Formalism

What needs to be said at this point clearly is what relevance the Platonic Predicate Principle has to Platonism. The Platonic Predicate Principle relies on the fact that entities are made up of instances of shadowings of abstract properties. The subject in a sentence is made up of a set of instances of shadowings of abstract properties and the predicate is one or more of an abstract property or properties. The type of Platonism that I espouse is one where entities are made up of these instances of shadowings of abstract properties.

What is also the case is that I arrived at three different views of time with respect to predication. According to the linguistic semantic view of predication, predicates vary across time and a predicate applies at a certain time if a subject falls under it. This view of predication I rejected for various reasons.

The second view of time with respect to predication is where we have the Platonic Predicate Principle. The subject is composed of a set of sets of shadowings of properties that apply at various times. According to this view, the predicate is timeless. This accords with a Platonist view of properties where they are out of space and time.

There is a third possibility that accords with the Platonic Predicate Principle that I want to rule out. This would be where both the predicate and the subject vary across time. I can rule out this possibility easily, because this would amount to double predication. We would have a situation where the predicate would fall under the subject and the subject would fall under the predicate. In this case there would be a double predication and we would have some indication that it is double. Since we do not, we can rule this possibility out. This also is ruled out by the fact that the predicate is timeless.

What is the appropriate formalism for the mechanism of predication? First we have the subject. It is made up of a set of shadowings of properties. To list all of the properties that the subject has would be nearly impossible. I will only list a few. Let's say that you have the sentence 'The dog walks'. The description 'the dog' contains a subject that has some of the following shadowings of properties: {x is white, x is furry, x walks} the reason that I use the scheme 'x is' or 'x has' is that I need to distinguish between the abstract property and shadowings of that property. 'x is' denotes a token of an abstract property, not the property itself.

The abstract property of the predicate is {walks}. The fact that {walks} is partaken of by the set of properties that the subject has yields truth for the proposition 'the dog walks'.

There is another type of participation relation that is exemplified by the sentence 'the dog loves the cat'. This is a relation that is explained by the individual denoted by the subject participating in the loves Form from a different angle than the individual denoted by the object. There is an ordered pair

participating in the loves Form. One could say that the subject participates in the loves Form from the angle of an agent and the object participates in the loves Form from the angle of a patient.¹¹⁷

Predication and Montague Grammar

What should be noticed is that the predicate in subject principle has been used before in Montague Grammar. However, the principle is in no way crucial to Montague Grammar, as it is not used consistently throughout his treatment and treatments that came along later that use his style. His treatment can be said to be a mixed treatment of both subject in predicate and predicate in subject principles.

A couple of quotes from textbooks on Montague Grammar will indicate the mixed treatment. In Dowty, Wall and Peters (1981) they mention the following subject-in predicate principle:

We can now see how the truth value of a sentence formed from a name and a one-place predicate is to be determined. A sentence like $M(j)$ Should be true if and only if the individual denoted by the name j (John Mitchell in this case) is a member of the set of individuals denoted by the predicate M (the set of individuals that have moustaches).¹¹⁸

In another text, Gamut gives a treatment of predicate in subject predication: "For proper names can also be viewed as referring to sets of properties. Sentence (8), John walks, can be interpreted as asserting that the property of walking belongs to the set of John's properties."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ This might explain the example of 'The cat and the dog met each other' mentioned earlier.

¹¹⁸ Page 19

¹¹⁹ Volume 2, Page 162

Apparently, the use of predicate in subject predication is not crucial to Montague's treatment, so it will not be necessary to pursue the issue further.

What does need to be noted also is that there is a difference between Leibniz's treatment and that of Montague. Montague gave a uniform treatment of quantifiers, descriptions and proper names as noun phrases that denote sets of properties. According to Leibniz, proper names might denote sets of properties, but descriptions and quantifiers might not denote. They might merely quantify certain kinds of expressions. This is in accordance with the view of philosophers following Russell.

How do Names Refer

It is necessary to give an account of how names refer now that I have said that they are referring expressions¹²⁰. First of all, there is an issue of Platonism that comes up with respect to names. If we were to say that all there was to a name was a relationship of denotation with respect to the bearer, that a name denotes the bearer on an instance of the use of a token of the name, then we would not do justice to what it means to bear a name. It would be a new event of naming every time the name is used. The reality of naming is that there is a name type that has an ongoing relationship with the bearer. Tokens of the name are used when a speaker wants to refer to the bearer. It is true that I have said elsewhere that names might possibly not be a part of the Platonic language. Therefore, name types would seem not to exist. Maybe we could say, then, according to this position, that the ongoing relationship of the name to the bearer

is a memory of name tokens in the mind of people that know the person or thing in question.

Not only with respect to names is it the case that tokens refer, but it is the case that tokens refer with respect to all referring expressions. The type of an expression is what we say is grammatical or ungrammatical. Only types have grammatical structure. Tokens do not bear the grammatical structure. This is why we end up with ambiguities. There is no such thing as an ambiguous grammatical type. A type is a singular structure.

The theory that I am going to be using to explain how reference with names works is the Causal Theory of Names. This theory is due to Kripke (1980). The basic idea of a causal theory of reference is that terms refer to something because they are causally connected to it in a certain way, a way that doesn't require speakers to have identifying knowledge of the referent. There are two basic parts to a causal theory of names: How were people first able to use a particular sound to designate a particular individual. This is a theory of reference fixing. Secondly, how does the name pass from speaker to speaker. For this we require a theory of reference borrowing

Devitt (1987) gives a concise statement of these two parts of the theory:

The basic idea of the causal theory of grounding is as follows. The name is used ostensively at a formal or informal dubbing. This dubbing is in the presence of the object that will from then on be the bearer of the name. The event is perceived by the dubber and probably others. As a result of this causal action, a witness to the dubbing, if of suitable linguistic sophistication, will gain an ability to use the name to designate the object. Any use of the name exercising that ability designates the object in virtue

¹²⁰ Note that names only refer in what I call 'human language'. In the Form of Language, Platonist Language, there is no such thing as reference at all, besides the relationship between language and Forms. Therefore, this section is dealing with the semantics of tokens.

of the use's causal link to the object: ostension of the object prompted the thoughts which led to the use of the name. ...

The basic idea of the causal theory of reference borrowing is as follows. People not at the dubbing acquire the semantic ability from those at the dubbing. This acquisition is also a causal, indeed perceptual process. The name is used in conversation. Hearers of the conversation, if of suitable linguistic sophistication, can gain the ability to use the name to designate the object. The exercise of that ability will designate that object in virtue of a causal chain linking the object, those at its dubbing, and the user, through the conversation... We identify the sense of a name with the type of causal chain linking uses of the name to its bearer. The aspects of reality we have to call on to explain reference are all we need for sense. The reference of a name is determined by the appropriate causal chains and, in virtue of that, by its sense.

A Few Examples of Types of Predication

I will now give a few examples of predicates that challenge my view of predication to show that they fit in neatly with my view. The first of these predications is 'Jack is extinct'. This predication has the form of what I would call a Plato's beard predicate, though not exactly. Since 'extinct' is a term that is used in connection with a species, I will use the expression 'Jack doesn't exist anymore' instead. The old Plato's beard riddle¹²¹ concerns sentences like 'John doesn't exist'. The reasoning behind the riddle is that you must admit to John's existence, or otherwise we would not be able to talk of him. In other words, the expression 'John' must have a reference.

In my view, we must somehow capture Jack and not capture Jack in our predication at the same time. The problem with representing this predicate in my theory is that being extinct or not existing is not an attribute of a subject. If anything, it is the absence of attributes.

¹²¹ See, *On What There is*, by W.V.O. Quine for discussion of the riddle.

What at first seems difficult is solved by taking a look at an example. Remember that tense is partially handled in my system as successive time slices of the subject. Different sets of attributes are denoted by the subject at different times depending on the predicates that apply at a particular time. Let us say that we have a set of attributes at time t and a lack of attributes from $t+1$ onward (However, the abstract Jack still exists). This would represent 'Jack is extinct'. It would do so because we would have his attributes at one time and then not from further on. How, may it be that we still have Jack's presence? What is advantageous to my theory is that from the abstract side of things, Jack's attributes still exist. It is just that they are not instantiated. Thus, in some sense Jack exists, and we can say that Jack doesn't exist at the same time.

What should be noticed at this point is that I have added another feature to my ontology. The Platonist ontology normally consists of Forms and particulars only. Forms are instantiated as particulars. With the addition of abstract entities such as abstract persons, I have added abstract complexes of Forms in addition to the Forms themselves. This gives a three tiered system instead of Plato's two tiered system. I have abstract Forms, complexes of those Forms, and instantiations or concretizations of those complexes.

My ontology might be compared with Meinong's, who tried to give an object in connection with every denoting phrase. There is, however, a big difference between my ontology and Meinong's, because I do not admit objects that violate the law of contradiction into my ontology. Russell discussed such

objects that violate the law of contradiction, such as the round square in *On Denoting*.

A problem that comes up with respect to my answer about the sentence 'Jack doesn't exist anymore' is that I haven't made it accord with the Platonic predicate principle. I have treated it as a loss of attributes. The answer to this is that it can be stated in the negative. It can be stated that Jack doesn't have the attributes that made him Jack anymore. This preserves the Platonic predicate principle. What I am saying is that this expression is not a true predicate. It is a gap in predicates in a certain time slice of the subject.

It remains to treat some other predicates that are difficult to understand given the Platonic predicate principle. Let us take 'Jack is an American'. The attribute of being an American is in fact a disjunction of attributes. Either one can be born in America, marry someone who is American, or become naturalized through the process of becoming a citizen.

The next predicate I will treat is 'Jack is a unicorn'. This statement means that Jack has all the properties of being a unicorn and is false because there is no such thing as a unicorn.

'Jack is the teacher' informs us, if true, that the entity referred to by 'the teacher' has all of the properties that Jack does. It is an identity statement.

'Jack is in the next room' is difficult because the property of being in the next room is not an intrinsic property of Jack. However, we can divide between

primary and secondary properties of Jack. Being in the next room can be a secondary property of Jack.¹²²

‘Jack is running’ involves issues of tense and aspect, and I dealt with that earlier.

¹²²See earlier when I say that location is not an abstract property.

Chapter 6

Names with Dubious Meaning and Names of God

It has already been said that there is an issue with regard to Platonism with respect to the positions on names of Frege and Mill. According to the position that descriptions underlie names, the description is associated with a Form. According to the Millian position, it is only the name type that has an abstract existence, but there is no description that is associated with a Form. According to Mill himself, there are only name tokens, since he is not a Platonic philosopher.

In English, at least Old English, many times a name would indicate the profession of an individual. Thus we have the names 'Cooper', which means a barrel maker, or 'Carpenter' that means a carpenter.

In Biblical Hebrew, the Old Testament, the name 'Moses' is associated with the dubbing by the daughter of Pharoah 'because I drew him out of the water'. The name itself means 'drawn out'.

This type of naming seems to occur in other natural languages as well. Perhaps it occurred more frequently in Biblical Hebrew than in other languages. In Japanese and Chinese, I am told that it is very common to name a child one of these types of names. Thus, a Japanese parent may name their child 'First Son'.

While these names seem to have some kind of meaning associated with them, they are descriptions that do not seem to designate their bearers. The description 'drawn' was not a significant description because it describes only one insignificant event in Moses' life. A significant event would be 'the leader of

the Jewish people'. You cannot have a significant description that is given at birth, as the child has not lived long enough to be given a significant description. The reason that I am concerned with significant descriptions is that only these are usually unique. The fact of being drawn out of the Nile river could be common to many children.

The truth is that the daughter of Pharoah's description is not a sense in the way of Fregean senses, because it can be falsified while Moses still bears the name 'Moses'. It might have been false that Moses was drawn out of the Nile River and yet he still retains the name of Moses. This indicates that 'Moses' is a Millian name.

There is another type of name in the Bible that might have more of a chance of being a description that would designate its bearer. Sometimes mothers named their children with a name of God in it. This was meant to give the child a Godly character. This could be referred to as a *hopeful description*. Since the parent could not know the character of the child at birth, this description is not considered a description that would pick out its bearer.

There is another consideration, though. Even if the aforementioned names are not descriptions that pick out their bearers, they might be adjectives instead of names that are used in what we might call a paronymous usage. Even if this is the case, since the names do not have descriptions that designate their bearers, the meaning of the name does not pick out a Form.

The next issue comes up with respect to names of God in the Bible and in English. The question with respect to both the Bible and English is whether

names of God have a descriptive content to them at all or whether they just name the deity in the Millian sense. In English, my feeling is that the name God is just a Millian tag. I feel that it is just a name for the deity. Notice that it can be used with descriptive expressions without becoming tautologous. Thus we have the expression 'God Almighty'. If the expression 'God' had descriptions underlying it, it would be repetitive and tautologous to append 'Almighty' to it. It should be mentioned that this is not so simple. The name God translates into other languages into different expressions than 'God'. Thus, in French, 'God' translates into 'Dieu'. The fact that there is a different translation into other languages might suggest that the expression 'God' is not just a Millian tag. Perhaps there are descriptions that underlie the expression after all.

It should be noted that there are languages which have a similar sounding name for God as English. In German the name for God is 'Gott'. The Latin name for a god, 'Deus', is similar to the French term. What might be happening here is that really the name is a Millian tag that was invented in different cultures and transmitted to other cultures which are related to them. This is not so surprising, because the concept of God is common to many cultures. This is contrasted with people's names, where we usually don't completely change the sound, because the name is not universal to all cultures initially.

Some reject the notion that two languages contain the same word when they are phonologically different. My advisor holds that the phonological difference (in this case, /got/ versus /gad/) is enough to make the two words in the separate languages distinct. They also remark that the current community of

speakers doesn't know the history of terms (many don't), and therefore they would have no knowledge that the names have something in common. I hold by this last point, because I feel that the only people who the comparison is relevant to are the people that originally modeled the name on the other culture's name. I see no other way that people could learn whether or not the two forms are related and are therefore a direct translation.

In the Bible, there are names of God of all sorts. One of these names is YKVK. It is a composite of the verbs 'Hayah, Hoveh veyiyeh' which means did exist, exists and will exist. When I say that there are names of God in the Bible, it is because there are actual names of God in the Bible. However, Maimonides explains in *The Guide For the Perplexed* that there is no way to name God himself. He explains that when God is named in the Bible, it is only in the figurative sense. What is meant by 'the figurative sense' is that the expression is somehow metaphorical. Maimonides claim is that the Bible only speaks in the language of men. In actuality, Maimonides claim is that the names of God in the Bible only refer to the *actions* of God in this world. Science describes the system that God created the world to run by. Some names refer to God's system and some refer to his direct actions.

In the Bible, names of God's actions take the form of attributes. Thus we have the name 'Shadai' that means something like all inclusive. As with regular Hebrew names, there is an issue as to whether they are paronymous uses of speech or whether they are names. There is a further question, if they are names, whether they are Millian tags or whether they are Fregean descriptions.

Since they adequately describe God's actions, maybe they really are Fregean descriptions, just explicit Fregean descriptions. There is some evidence that they are names. In Exodus 33, there is a descriptions given of the attributes of God's actions. It runs as follows: "God, God Almighty Merciful and Gracious, Long Suffering and Great in Kindness and True." This list is given in a context where Moses is asking for a list of descriptions that describe the attributes of God's actions. Since this list describes the attributes of God's actions, the remainder of the expressions used to describe God's actions are probably names. If, as said before, that these names probably are descriptions of God's actions, I don't know what that would do to the Millian theory of names. One more piece of evidence that they are descriptive names is that there are so many of them. It would be unusual to have so many different names if they all were tags.

There are also some good arguments besides that Biblical names and Biblical names of God's actions are not paronymous. First of all, we do not see anywhere that adjectives can be used as the subject of a sentence. It is true that the term 'red' can be used as the subject of a sentence, but that is only in its use as a noun. Also, under normal circumstances, an adjective can be modified by adverbs like 'very'. These terms cannot be modified in any way.¹²³

Since the Biblical names for God's actions might be descriptions in the Fregean sense, maybe we could say that the theory of names is a mixed one. In the case of the Biblical names of God's actions we could say that a description theory applies. However, with names like 'Bob' or 'Ron', a Millian theory applies. I

see no reason why this could not be the case, but some do not like the idea of a mixed theory.

It has been mentioned that there seems to be evidence that the English name 'God' has descriptive content. While societies that have multiple deities will name people after them, such as 'Venus', no one would ever name their child 'God'. This would seem to indicate that while it is possible to have Millian tags such as 'Venus', the word 'God' has descriptive content that cannot be stripped from it. This is fairly powerful evidence.

There are cases in other cultures where we have religious language where you seem to have descriptive names as well. In Japanese, we have two phenomena with respect to the emperor that seem to indicate this. Number one, the emperor was and is still called 'The Son of Heaven'. Number two, in the emperor's presence, one is not allowed to call him by his first given name. I am told that most Japanese do not even know what his first given name is. Before 1945, when the emperor announced on the radio that he was not divine, the Japanese devised a way to refer to him that would not refer to him directly. They would refer in different ways to the space around him.

The question is with respect to the emperors' names whether when he was assumed to be divine his names had a descriptive meaning and now that he is not considered to be divine his names are just arbitrary tags. Since his names are actual descriptions, it is hard to say that his names are just arbitrary tags. It would seem that the name 'Son of Heaven' in some way retains its original

¹²³ It should be mentioned that those who hold the paronymous view hold that adjectives can be subjects. I don't think that this accords well with most semantic theories and it doesn't seem to be too productive. I

meaning. This would seem to be the case for the names that refer to the space around him as well.

Some make the point that when descriptions are used as names, it is just a Millian tag. He further says that an expression cannot semantically be a description and a name at the same time. He gives the example of Bruce Springsteen's nickname, 'The Boss'. A description is used despite the fact that the meaning of the description does not apply. I am not so sure about this, though. The expression 'The Boss' could be being used metaphorically, to describe his musical prowess. One fact from language usage that would seem to support this position is that when we write names, even if they are descriptions, we put quotes around it. This would seem to imply that the name is a sound, not a semantically significant unit.

With respect to the emperors' names, there is another possibility which does not seem as paradoxical, however. Maybe we could say that the original name was under a false description and now that we know that he is not divine, there are descriptions that underlie the names that are more appropriate. This solution does seem to have a problem with it, however. We can still not remove the fact that the descriptive names mean what they do as descriptions. 'The Son of God' means The Son of God!

A few questions came up with one of my advisors regarding descriptive names. As usual, these names pose a problem for any Millian theory of proper names. In Christianity, we have the names 'The Father', 'The Son' and 'The Holy Ghost'. Many Christians assume that these names designate three individuals

that are at the same time one individual. I am told that not all Christians accept this formulation as it ends up in a contradiction that the deity is simultaneously three beings and one being.

One way out of the contradiction that serves to show what the linguistic meaning of the names is as well is that these names don't refer to three separate beings but rather refer to different attributes of one being. In this case there would be different descriptions that underlie each possibly. The fatherly attribute, the sonly attribute and the ghostly attribute.

In English, we capitalize the name for God that refers to the divine deity and we put into lowercase the first letter of the word 'god' polytheistic uses. We also sometimes in slang refer to an individual as a god if they excel extremely in some activity or attribute. It is interesting that in Biblical Hebrew, the polytheistic use is the same as one of the descriptive names of God, Elohim. I should note that the Biblical translation of 'God' is sometimes 'YKVK' and sometimes Elohim. 'YKVK' is a composite of the terms 'Hayah' 'Hoveh' veYihyeh' which means always existing. 'Elohim' is a descriptive name that means encompassing all powers. We don't have to worry about the status of the word 'god' as a name, because it is probably a common noun. We can modify it with the words 'a' and 'the' or with an adjective such as 'brave'. It is interesting to note that whereas the modification of a proper name with an adjective is somewhat unusual usage such as 'Big John', the modification of the Deity's name with an adjective is commonplace such as 'Almighty God'. It has been suggested to me

that this might be a complex name in which case I would have to amend my use of 'God Almighty' as a description above.

Another interesting use of a descriptive name is when people use the expression 'the bible' to refer to authoritative works by a particular author. This would seem to have a descriptive content because it does not refer just to a physical book but the property of a work as being authoritative.

It is interesting to note that the expression 'the president of the United States' has at least three usages. One is as a description. We can say that 'this president of the United States is different than 'that president of the United States'. It is also sometimes used as a name. We can say 'The president of the United States without signaling the fact that we are referring to the current president of the United States. The third usage is the office of the president of the United States. This usage is in the following statement 'the president of the United States is the hardest office to hold.'

In conclusion, if names are meaningless tags, as Mill holds, then the Forms have no relationship to the names. On the descriptivist theory, names have a bearing on the descriptions associated with the name. Names such as those that refer to God's actions in Biblical Hebrew might be names that require a descriptivist theory.

Chapter 7

The Problem of Predication

For the final section of my dissertation, I am going to discuss the next logical step in the progression of my thought. So far, I have discussed the type of predication that Plato espoused and applied it to relations. However, in the history of philosophy, there has been some doubt as to whether this account of predication is satisfactory.

Various forms of infinite regress were a problem with Plato's basic philosophy of Forms. One famous problem was known as the problem of the 'third man'. The 'third man' problem comes up on the assumption that particulars resemble the Forms they partake of. Let us say that we have the Form of a circle and a particular circle. If the particular circle resembles the Form of a circle, then they must have something in common. This something in common is the property of circularity. But if they share the property of circularity, then that property must be another Form. This leads to an infinite regress. Apparently, there were a number of such infinite regresses that came up with regard to Plato's philosophy.

One such regress is termed by Davidson 'the problem of predication'. This is also known as the problem of 'the unity of the proposition'. Let us take two examples : Let us say that we have the sentences 'Theaetetus sits' and 'motion differs from rest'. Under the Platonist interpretation, 'Theaetetus sits' is analyzed as saying the individual partaking of the sitting Form. Theaetetus partakes of the property of sitting if it is true. However, there is a problem. The word 'sits'

designates the sitting Form and 'Theaetetus' designates the individual. Where is the element that links these two elements? It isn't just a list, but why not? Why isn't participation just the name of another Form. The same problem occurs with 'motion differs from rest'. The word 'differs' designates the difference Form. But what relates the difference Form to motion and rest? If we stick in an invisible verb, we just end up with an infinite regress. The problem here is that the elements of a sentence according to Plato are entities, and as such they cannot be related together. This is the problem of predication.¹²⁴

An Answer to The Problem

Despite the fact that the problem of predication has not been answered for hundreds of years, I am going to pose a solution to it¹²⁵. The only solution that avoided the infinite regress was Frege's, but he was left with residual problems. Davidson remarks that even Frege's view of concepts sees them as entities, and we are left with the problem of relating entities to entities.¹²⁶ The solution will lie within the relationship between Forms and individuals. I am going to go back to the original text of Plato to show what that relationship is. The allegories of the Sun and the Cave in the Republic show in a metaphorical way what the relationship is.

¹²⁴ I think that one of the ways that Davidson states the problem is flawed. He says that if the relation of instantiation is a member of every proposition, then the relation will not connect the subject and predicate. I think that being an instantiation is not a separate relation, but is part of the definition of the entity denoted by the subject. The proper way of looking at the situation is if either we consider every sentence to have a hidden copula or if we don't posit any invisible entities.

¹²⁵ Davidson thinks that Tarski's theory of truth is an unrecognized answer to the problem. He thinks that the concept of predicates being true of subjects unifies the proposition. He, however, is not so clear as to how this happens. He thinks that any theory that says that predicates denote objects of any sort will automatically fall prey to the problem.

¹²⁶ Davidson is not that clear here and more discussion is required. See page 156.

I will derive my discussion of the allegories of the Sun and the Cave from Cross and Woosley's *Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary*. In Plato's *Republic*, he gives a proposal as to how a state should be composed. The rulers of the state are people called 'guardians'. The guardians require a very high level of philosophical knowledge. The highest form of knowledge that the guardians require is the Form of the Good. The Good is 'the end of all human endeavor and something about which the Guardians of the state cannot be left in the dark'. When they asked Plato what he thinks the Good is, he said that an answer would be beyond the scope of the present inquiry, but that he would speak about the offspring of the Good and what is compared to it.

Plato goes on to make the distinction between the many good things and the Form of Goodness. The Forms are objects of thought but not of sight. The many good things are objects of sight and not thought. The metaphor of the sun is as follows: "Just as, then, in the visible world the Sun is the cause of light which enables visible things to be seen and of sight which enables the eye to see, though it itself is neither light nor sight, so in the intelligible world the Form of the Good is the cause of truth, which enables the Forms to be known, and of knowledge, which enables the mind to know, though it itself is neither truth nor knowledge. Further, just as the sun not only enables visible objects to be seen, but causes the processes of generation and growth, though it itself is not such a process, so the Good not only enables the objects of knowledge to be known, but is the cause of their being and reality, though it itself is not being, but surpasses even being in dignity and power."

The metaphor of the sun thus provides an explanation of the relationship between the Form of the Good and the other Forms. This relationship is meant to be a causal one, just like the sun shines on objects causing them to grow. This is the first step in the chain of entities that ends with Forms relating to particulars.

The next step is the allegory of the Cave. The allegory of the Cave deals with the human condition as a lack of knowledge and the possible enlightenment that can come from a release from this condition. The allegory is of a cave that has a long steep passage that eventually opens to daylight, but because of the length and steepness of the passage, no daylight enters the cave. At the lower end of the cave are men who are chained so that they cannot see what's behind them and they face the end wall of the cave. They have been chained like this from childhood and they know no other condition. Behind the prisoners a fire is burning and between the prisoners and the fire there is a wall that is like the screen at a puppet show. Behind the wall there are men who are speaking and carrying statues of men and animals that cast shadows on the wall that the prisoners face. The prisoners assume that the sounds are made by the shadows, since that is all they have access to.

The allegory is a comparison to our situation. We believe that the world of particulars is the real world, when in fact it is only a shadow of the real world of Forms.

Plato then goes on to a description of the release of a prisoner. First he is released from the chains and forced to turn around and face the objects that cast the shadows on the wall. He is confused and believes the objects to be less real

than the shadows on the wall. Next, he is taken to view the sunlight at the opening of the cave. At first he finds it easier to look at the shadows that are cast in the outside world. Eventually, he can look at regular objects in the outside world.

What is important in this allegory for my purposes is the portrayal of the relationship between the world of Forms and the physical world. This relationship is seen as that between an entity and its shadow. How are we to describe such a relationship? It would seem that we could describe it as a relation between a cause and its effect. A Form causes the existence of all the particulars that fall under it.

We can now begin to answer the problem of predication mentioned at the beginning of this section. Remember that the problem was that a sentence turned out to be just a list of elements. Participation turned out to be an entity just like the individual and the Form that it is said to participate in. With the description given in the Cave allegory, we can see that participation is not in fact a third element. The Form *causes* the property to inhere in the individual. Let us take an example. Let us take the sentence 'the cat is thin'. The thin Form causes the thinness of the cat. There is no third element which is the relation between the Cat and the Thin Form. There is just the Cat and the Thin Form. So what is the entity of participation? There is no entity of participation. Participation is just a shorthand way of expressing that the Form causes a certain property to inhere in the individual.

There is a place in the Platonic literature that explicitly talks about Forms as causes. It is at 100 c-d in the *Phaedo*: “I no longer learn about, and cannot understand...these other subtle ‘causes’, but if anyone tells me that anything is beautiful, as having a bright color or a special shape or anything of that sort, I dismiss the other ‘reasons’—all the others confuse me—and purely and simply and perhaps naively keep to this, that the only thing that makes it beautiful is the presence of, or its participation in—or whatever the relationship may be—that ‘Beautiful [the Form of Beauty].’ I do not now insist upon any particular relationship, but only that all beautiful things are beautiful simply because of the Beautiful.”

However, my analysis of predication depends upon cause not being a relation. Is it really not a relation? Is there not a connection between the two entities when A causes B? The truth of the matter is that there does not have to be.

Hume’s analysis of causation is instructive at this point. I will quote from a synopsis of Hume’s view now from Grayling’s *Philosophy 1* a guide through the subject.

Prior to Hume, philosophers assumed that when one thing caused another, this was because the cause possessed some kind of power which necessitated the occurrence of the effect. Moreover, they took it that we can know about these necessitating links a priori, in the sense that we can infer a priori that the effect will necessarily follow the cause, even if we have never had previous experience of their cooccurrence.

Hume argued against this account of causation. He pointed out that when we observe one event causing another (for example the impact of one billiard ball causing another to move), we never see any necessitating link. All we see is the initial event (the first ball’s impact), and then the subsequent event (the second ball’s

motion), but never any third thing which might link them together. In addition, Hume argued that there is no a priori knowledge of the kind which such necessitating links will provide. People who have never observed billiard-balls cannot possibly tell, on the first occasion they see a moving ball approaching a stationary one, that the impact will make the stationary one move, rather than explode, or turn into a leprechaun.

Hume's own account of the link between a cause and its effect is simply that events like the cause are always followed by events like the effect. In Hume's view, there is nothing in a particular cause-effect sequence, Other than that the first event occurs, and the second occurs after it. The link is simply that this sequence is an instance of a general pattern In which, to use Hume's terminology, events like the cause are 'constantly conjoined' with events like the effect.

We see from Hume's account of causation that there need not be any link between causes and effects. This means straightforwardly that cause and effect is not a relation. All we have is sequences of effects that occur one after the other. There is no third thing that connects a cause to its effect.

I am not saying that I adopt the part of the theory that Hume espouses that any effect could come after any cause. I am merely saying that there is no observable connection between cause and effect, so two things are true. Firstly, that there is no intervening entity between causes and effects and that also there is no separate power that is contained in the cause which helps produce the effect.

The Problem of Predication in Davidson

Now that I have introduced the problem of predication and its solution from my viewpoint, I am going to give a working of it from the standpoint of Donald Davidson's *Truth and Predication*. Davidson begins by noting that it has been an open question since the time of Plato about the semantic role of the copula. This and other questions about predication have been around since the time of Plato.

However, no one has come up with a satisfactory answer, or at least has not noticed that one has been around that answers the question.

The question of predication is a central one, because without it we don't understand how any sentence works. The question is not only a semantic one, but also a metaphysical one. The metaphysical one is how is a substance related to its attributes. There is also a question from the standpoint of the philosophy of mind; how do we describe the nature of judgement.

Plato is the one responsible for introducing the problem of predication. He asked the problem from a metaphysical point of view by asking how particulars are related to universals. A parallel question exists in semantics: How are names or other singular terms related to predicates? Apparently, Plato discusses both questions. He doesn't often distinguish between them. Aristotle and others carried on the discussion through the middle ages. In recent times, it has been dealt with as a problem in the philosophy of language. Davidson deals with it also as a problem in semantics, because the problem is more easily stated as such.

"The Socratic dialogues like *Euthyphro*, *Charmides*, *Laches* and *Greater Hippias* ask what it is that "makes" a man, or one of his actions, pious, courageous, wise, or virtuous."¹²⁷ We don't understand what the question is until we find out what Socrates rejects as an answer. He will not accept a list of brave acts as an answer, since we don't know what the brave acts have in common. What is behind all of these brave acts, what Socrates is looking for, is the Form or idea that unites them all. This commits Socrates to a dual ontology of both particulars and universals. In the earlier mentioned dialogues, the duality is not

explicitly mentioned. The idea of the Forms is brought up in other dialogues and developed. Two problems of predication were brought up in the later dialogues. The first problem is how the Forms are related to their instantiations. The other is how the Forms are related to one another.

In one dialogue Plato says that the Forms are not perceived by the senses, but are rather perceived by the mind. That they are “imperishable; that they are indivisible; that they are superior to material objects; that they are norms by which we judge material things (particulars are valued to the extent that they partake of the Forms); that they have a certain creative power (the form of wisdom “makes” Socrates wise). Material objects participate in, resemble, copy, or are modeled by the forms.”¹²⁸ That the Forms are the archetypes of particulars is made clear in the Republic. The following quote is a comparison between couches that are made by artisans and the Couch Form.¹²⁹

“Then, if he doesn’t make what *is* he wouldn’t make the being but something that is like the being, but is not being. And if someone were to assert that the work of the producer of couches or of any manual artisan is completely being, he would run the risk of saying what’s not true.”

What Plato is saying is that the Form of couch is the only one that has true being, and is the archetype for the other many individual couches.

Then Davidson mentions the problem of the Third Man that I discussed before with the example of the circle. Davidson says that the problem of avoiding one infinite regress or another could be said to be the problem of predication.

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¹²⁸ Page 78-79

¹²⁹ Republic 597a.

Another problem came about because of Plato's view that the Forms are models which constitute a norm for institutions, material particulars and ways of behaving. "The more like a form one of these entities is, the more valuable it is."¹³⁰ Later, Plato abandoned the idea that the particulars resemble the Forms and the view that the forms are norms. In the *Parmenides*, Parmenides suggests to Socrates that when he grows up he will admit forms of all kinds of objects. "This admission becomes necessary as Plato evolves the method of collection and division in the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*. The method of division, which means specifying the species that fall under a genus, the sub-species that fall under a species, and so on down to the infima species, often creates categories of evil or worthless particulars." "In the *Philebus*, for example, pleasures are divided into those of a positive value and those that should be excluded from the good life."¹³¹ Another example is provided by the various categories into which sophists are placed. "Taking art as the genus, the Stranger in the *Sophist* first distinguishes acquisitive and productive arts. The acquisitive arts then divide into those that acquire by exchange and those that acquire by capture. The arts that acquire by exchange then subdivide into no less than three categories, in each of which the sophist may be found: merchants, retailers, and salesmen of information. But the sophist also falls into the class of hunters, for he is a hunter of rich young men. After adding the category of those who practice eristic, the

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¹³¹ Page 80

Stranger points out that the sophist appears in so many guises that he really should be called an imitator who creates the illusion of truth and wisdom.”¹³²

Davidson then gives a short discussion of the problem as to how it is possible to think or say a proposition that is untrue. This he adds to the discussion of sophists who are known for giving fallacious arguments. Let us say that we have two different sentences, one true and one false. ‘John sits’ is the true sentence and ‘John flies’ is the false one. Even though ‘John flies’ is false, it still has a meaning. These sentences are composed of two parts. They are composed of a name and a verb. Because each component of ‘John flies’ is understandable on its own, the sentence as a whole has a meaning.

Building on the observation that a sentence must have a name and a verb, the name corresponds to some object in the world, and the verb corresponds to some Form or another.

Then Davidson tries to introduce the problem of predication. He gives the example of the relationship of two Forms. The example is ‘Motion is not Rest’. Plato here distinguishes the ‘is’ of existence from the ‘is’ of identity. This sentence tells us that the two Forms, both of which exist, are not identical. The problem is that Plato takes Sameness and Difference to be Forms. If these are Forms, then we have no verb (He does not mean a verb form, but the connection between subject and predicate). The same situation exists by ‘John sits’ and ‘John flies’. If the verbs refer to Forms, then we have no verb at all. Even if we assume that every sentence has a copula, the copula will just refer to another

¹³² Page 80

Form (or something else in other theories) and won't provide the connection needed.

The next step in recognizing the problem of predication is that when we analyze 'John sits' we don't have just two entities, but three. We have the name, 'John' and the verb 'sits', but we also have the relation of instantiation between the name and the verb. The problem is that taken together these elements make up a list, and the name and the verb have nothing to relate them. If we bring in a fourth element, then we have to relate the fourth element and so we have an infinite regress.

Davidson next says that we can pose the problem in a different way by looking at the function of a proposition. The function of a proposition is to bear a truth value. Let us return to our sentence 'John sits'. To bear a truth value, we have to assign the property of sitting to John. The proposition is true if the property applies to John and false if it doesn't. The little verb 'has' occurs in place of the relation of instantiation invisibly. We end up with the regress, as the relation of instantiation occurs here as an entity.

Davidson next goes on to mention a few of Aristotle's objections to the concept of the Forms. Aristotle had a problem with reconciling the fact that the Forms were indivisible and the fact that they could mix or blend. "Aristotle's objections seem to have depended, at least in part, on the assumption that each form was one and indivisible, and therefore could not be "subdivided" as was required by the method of division or by some ways at arriving at a definition."¹³³

¹³³ Page 88

The next objection is that the Forms should not be totally separate from their instances. "This is apparent from the fact that Aristotle says the forms are too much like their instances, or just too much like material objects generally."¹³⁴ Plato once said that the Forms are superior to material objects because they are unchanging. Aristotle replied to this that longevity is a property of some material beings. An example of the stars is one that shows that there are physical beings that last forever. This example might be disqualified nowadays, because stars die.

Aristotle agreed with Plato that universals exist. Where he differed from Plato "was in holding that although universals are not identical with the things of which they are properties, they exist only by virtue of the existence of the things of which they are properties. If universals existed independently, they would take their place alongside the things that instantiate them. Separate existence is just what would make universals like other particulars and thus no longer universal."¹³⁵

Davidson believes that Aristotle is confused here. If we can refer to universals, then that makes them particular. But then universals must at the same time be particulars yet distinct from particulars. Also, there are many universals that have no instantiation. This could not be the case if universals depend on particulars.

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¹³⁵ Page 90

Frege has a discussion that parallels this point. I will be using Weiner's *Frege explained: From Arithmetic to Analytic Philosophy* to explicate the issue¹³⁶.

In Frege, the sentence is composed of an object-name and a concept-name. As I have discussed before, the concept-name denotes an unsaturated function. The object completes the predicate. Just like in Plato, you have the universal, you have the concept in Frege. Frege clarified the idea of concept and object in an article of the same name. By reviewing the argument, we can see more clearly what the idea of concept and object are.

Benno Kerry published a paper in which he questioned the notion that there is a basic distinction between concepts and objects. Kerry said this because of the following sentence:

The concept *horse* is a concept easily attained.

'The concept horse' refers to an object that falls under that which is denoted by 'easily attained'. But surely, the concept *horse* is a concept. But according to Frege, nothing can be a concept and an object. And that's what Frege denied in 'Concept and Object'. When we examine the notions of Frege's object and concept, it is important that we don't assume that the ideas of these things are the same as our everyday conception of these things. Let us keep that in mind.

Frege denies that what occurs here is a concept. He holds that it is an object. "A concept is predicative; that is, it is the meaning of a grammatical predicate. As we saw earlier, a concept is a kind of function; it is unsaturated or incomplete. An object, in contrast, cannot be the meaning of (what is designated by) a grammatical predicate—although it can be the meaning of part of a

¹³⁶ Discussion begins on page 103.

grammatical predicate.” A simple way of telling object expressions from concept expressions is that object expressions that contain articles contain definite articles whereas concept expressions that contain articles contain indefinite articles. Thus, in Weiner’s sentence

The morning star is a planet.

the concept a planet is predicated of the object the morning star.

However, Weiner objects that ‘the morning star’ designates the same thing as ‘Venus’. If the ‘morning star’ is an object expression, so should be ‘Venus’.

However, in the sentence,

The morning star is Venus.

It appears that ‘Venus’ is being predicated of ‘the morning star’. This can be answered by noticing that the ‘is’ is used in two different ways in the sentences just mentioned. In the first, it is used as a copula. In the second, it is used as the ‘is’ of identity. The sentence states that the morning star is identical to Venus. Both expressions are object expressions.

Weiner now turns back to the sentence used at the beginning of the section, ‘the concept horse is a concept easily obtained’. ‘The concept horse’ is an object, because it starts with a definite article. Let us see if ‘the concept horse’ can be used as a grammatical predicate. In the sentence,

Venus is the concept horse.

‘the concept horse’ appears to occupy the grammatical position that a predicate would. However, its role in the sentence is one of identity. Therefore, ‘the concept horse’ is an object expression, not a concept expression.

Next, Weiner tries to show that maybe ‘the concept horse’ can be predicated of an object by predicating a similar expression with the same designation but a different grammatical role from ‘the concept horse’. Since the two expressions designate the same thing, Weiner wants to say that they are equivalent. The expression in question is ‘a horse’. In the sentence, Venus is a horse.

The word ‘is’ is a copula. Weiner notices, though that for Frege, if the two expressions designate the same thing, they must be intersubstitutable in inferences. We should be able to infer

A horse is a concept easily attained.

From

The concept horse is a concept easily attained.

But the first sentence is a sentence about horses in general or some specific horse. This is not the case with the second sentence.

Frege admits that it is strange to say that the concept horse is not a concept. It seems to be almost a contradiction. To appreciate this fully, we must recognize that the predicates, ‘is a predicate’ and ‘is a function’ cannot be used without contradiction. Frege gets around this problem by stating that he hasn’t given a definition of concept and object, but is merely giving hints and metaphors at their understanding.

Davidson then gives a synopsis of Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione*. Aristotle focuses on sentences which can have a truth value. “A sentence, he says, is a significant spoken sound some part of which is significant separately, that is, it

must contain parts which are independently meaningful, though the parts alone cannot be used to affirm something. If a sentence or statement is to have a truth value or serve to make a statement, it must contain a name and a verb....In the *Categories* Aristotle provides a list of predicate types. These comprise the category of substance (man, horse), of quantity (four cubits long), of quality (white, grammatical), of relation (double, half, larger), of location (in the Lyceum, in the Agora), of time (yesterday, last year), of posture (lying down, sitting), of dress (shod, in armor), of action (cutting, burning), and of affection (being cut, being burned).”¹³⁷

Davidson notes that Aristotle calls verbs names. But clearly verbs cannot be names in the same sense that subject expressions are names without erasing the distinction between names and verbs altogether. Davidson thinks that the reason may in part be that Aristotle wants to consider verbs as significant parts of speech. However, Davidson thinks that Aristotle has something more in mind. “At the end of Chapter 3 of *De Interpretatione* he explains that when a verb is uttered by itself, or even with a copula it does not necessarily entail the existence of a universal.” The predicate only refers to something that has that property. “So verbs are not names in the same way subject expressions are; it is only if some substance instantiates the universal that the verb refers to something, that is, becomes a name.”¹³⁸

Aristotle realized the problem of predication according to Davidson. Plato held that the universal was separate from the particulars that participate in them.

¹³⁷ Page 90-91

¹³⁸ Page 92

This gives rise to the regress mentioned above. Aristotle held that the universal was not separable from the particular. In this way, the sentence describes one entity. 'John sits' refers to one entity of John sitting.

To finish up, Davidson gives his solution to the problem from Tarski. I have already explained that it is not so clear in an earlier note.

Conclusion

The conclusions reached in my dissertation are the following: With respect to the philosophy of language, a Platonist framework seems like the most reasonable option. The syntax of a language may not be a unique Form, but the semantic properties of languages can be explained with reference to the Forms.

With respect to the analysis of language itself, the phenomenon of predication is explained if we assume that some expressions refer to Forms. The phenomenon of names can also be explained in this way, but more evidence is needed to determine if this is the case.

The problem of predication is a thorny one, but the view of Forms as causes seems to be helpful in answering the question.

More work is necessary to address other phenomena in language to complete the picture given here. However, the samples provided here give a good idea as to what constitutes appropriate linguistic analysis on the Platonic view.

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