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THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL AGAINST POVERTY: THE
POLITICAL DYNAMICS AFFECTING ITS POVERTY POLICY
DETERMINATIONS.

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THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL AGAINST POVERTY: THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS
AFFECTING ITS POVERTY POLICY DETERMINATIONS

by

MARTIN HOCHBAUM

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Chapter I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In 1964, the United States Congress approved Public Law 88-452, popularly known as the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA). A vital provision of this Act was Section 202 (a)(3) of Title II which stipulated that the Federal government would pay up to 90 per cent of the cost of community action programs that were "developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the area and members of the groups served."¹

While there are many studies examining the passage of the EOA, and a variety of evaluative and critical studies of the war against poverty and its various component programs, very little is known about the political dynamics and the decisional processes in those local government and representative bodies responsible for implementing the EOA at the local² level. This study examines selected implementation issues requiring action by New York City's Council Against Poverty (CAP). In describing and analyzing the actions taken by the Council, the study attempts to identify

1. Although this study concentrates on a specific time period, it must be read in light of more recent developments. The contemporary status of the poverty program differs considerably from the 1968-69 period here examined. On the national scene, many programs originally supervised by the Office of Economic Opportunity (such as Head Start) are now located in other Federal agencies, funding for community action has not kept pace with inflation and the very future of the Federal government's support for community action is uncertain. In New York City, the City Administration is now contributing a larger percentage of funds that it did in the earlier period, many of the City's civil rights groups have a declining interest in it, and the sense of excitement, experimentation and hope that once pervaded the program's operations is mostly gone. Hopefully, this study will make clear some of the reasons contributing to this decline.

2. Two of the few comprehensive studies of the local implementation of the EOA are Louis A. Zurcher's, *POVERTY WARRIORS* (Austin: University of Texas, 1970), which examines the poverty program in Topeka, Kansas and Ralph M. Kramer's *PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), which studies the poverty program in four California cities.

the key actors involved and the underlying forces that shaped the action milieu. We will then be able to delineate the decisional processes that were involved and make observations about the nature and character of the poverty program and its relationship to the larger political processes in New York City.

We will examine the full terrain of Council decision-making by identifying the actors and determining their roles in the process. In examining the CAP's policy formulation and implementation, we will seek to identify the components which led to specific Council actions. To do so, several key questions must be answered. We are interested in determining, for example, whether this process was of a dynamic or nondynamic nature. Also, did the Council react to recommendations or was it an initiator? If the former, to whose recommendations did it react and did this lead to a redefinition of Council power as the power to veto recommendations? What was the role of the Council's administrative arm, the Community Development Agency (CDA), in policy formulation? Was it, for example,

Numerous sources however discuss the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act. See for example, John Bibby and Roger Davidson, *ON CAPITOL HILL* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967: Chapter 7; Richard Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy: Antipoverty and the Community Action Program," in Allan Sindler, ed., *AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), pp. 128-179; John C. Donovan, *THE POLITICS OF POVERTY* (New York: Pegasus, 1967); Sar Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1967); Daniel P. Moynihan, *MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING* (New York: Free Press, 1969), Chapters 1-5; and Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of OEO," in James Sundquist, ed., *ON FIGHTING POVERTY* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. 34-51.

This study is not directly concerned with the genesis of the Council's power. It should remain clear to the reader that broad spectrum decisions, in terms of policy priorities and funding, originate in Washington. The dynamics entering into such action is of great interest to students of decision-making and policy formulation and, as such, merit further study. The pressures entering into such decisions, while closely related to our interests, constitute a distinct phenomenon. As we can not hope to do it justice by parenthetical allusion, we shall confine our analysis to the implementation of specifics in New York City's program.

limited to its formal role of carrying "out the policy decisions of the Council Against Poverty?"¹ Similarly, what role did Council committees,² which were an integral part of that body, play in policy formulation? Did they go beyond the formal description that holds that they are limited to making recommendations" to the Council?"³ Did this specialization of labor (committee system) lead to the parent body's approval of recommendations made?⁴ If so, why?

As the national agency charged with implementing the EOA we must determine the role of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in Council policy formulation and implementation. Did it cause certain actions to be placed on the Council's agenda where these were necessitated by the national guidelines or requirements of the Act? Did it set the constraints that constituted the legitimate class of decisions that the Council could make, or did it attempt to play a more direct role in the Council's policy actions?

1. See, Council Against Poverty, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL AGAINST POVERTY (New York: CAP, 1967), p. 5; Human Resources Administration, BASIC FACTS (New York: HRA, rev. September, 1969), p. 9; Community Development Agency, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY (New York: HRA, 1969), p. 7; and Commissioner Major R. Owens, "Statement by Major R. Owens," Special Committee To Make An In-Depth Study of the Human Resources Administration, March 3, 1969, p. 2.

2. To discuss the role of the Council's committees in decision-making is not to suggest that they are not part of the Council. We are merely seeking to make their role clear.

3. New York City Council Against Poverty, CHAPTER AND BY-LAWS, Article IV, Section 4.

4. For a discussion of what is called the "law of anticipated reaction," see, Carl J. Friedrich, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY (New York: Ginn and Co., 1950), p. 49. This is also reviewed by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, POWER AND POVERTY (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 25-26, and by Terry Clark, "The Concept of Power: Some Overemphasized and Underrecognized Dimensions - An Examination With Special Reference to the Local Community," in Charles M. Bonjean, et al., editors, COMMUNITY POLITICS (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 26-27.

Another series of questions are suggested by the nature of the Council's membership. How was the Council's policy formulation affected by the fact that it met relatively infrequently and consisted of people for whom Council membership was a part-time responsibility (included are the public officials whose positions are full time but who are necessarily limited in the amount of time they spend on Council affairs)?¹ Did all of the time consuming tasks that Council members were called upon to perform² affect that body's policy formulation? If so, how?

We must in addition determine the significance of our findings for the broader questions that concern us. These include the applicability of decision-making theory to the decisional processes delineated herein, the importance of, ethnic factors on decision-making in the urban political setting, and the implications of a new type of representative body in urban decision-making.

The literature of decision theory and practice (which includes non-decision-making) and community power studies are reviewed in Chapter IV. This will be done in order to critique this literature as well as to determine whether or not it provides basic concepts that may be used to key our analysis and interpretation of New York City's poverty decision-making. An important component of our review of the community power studies will be the determination of the applicability of our findings to the pluralist or elitist schools of community decision-making.

1. According to Stephen Thernstrom, bodies of this nature are better "equipped to endorse than to decide." See, *POVERTY, PLANNING AND POLITICS IN THE NEW BOSTON: THE ORIGIN OF THE ABCD* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 299.

2. Council members are reimbursed for expenses. Community representatives receive a small stipend of \$50.00 per month.

Our results must also be related to the question of the importance of ethnic factors on decision-making in an urban setting. Here, several questions come to mind. We must determine whether or not it is as true today as it was a decade ago that the most important fact about New York City's ethnic groups is that they are interest groups.¹ Also, how has the poverty program affected the Puerto Rican and Black groups that are most closely associated with it? What has been the poverty program's effect on the white ethnic groups in this City? Was the California experience of one author, that one of the most pervasive features of the community action program was its ethnic character, borne out in New York City?² Is it correct to state that the poverty program exacerbated ethnic conflicts?³ Perhaps most important, did any groups in New York benefit politically from the poverty program?

A third area that must be looked into concerns the implications of a new type of decision-making body, as exemplified by the CAP, for urban decision-making. The Council's mixture of political actors - community corporation representatives, representatives of social organizations and public officials - was unique with respect to other representational bodies. Does its experience teach us anything regarding the usefulness of such a mix of actors? Clearly, we must attempt to determine whether or not the poverty program should continue to operate with the Council-corporation structure that is presently in existence or whether that

1. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *BEYOND THE MELTING POT* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963), p. 17.

2. Ralph M. Kramer, *PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), esp. pp. 247-255.

3. Daniel P. Moynihan, *MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS* (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 139.

structure should be discontinued or modified. More generally, what does the Council's experience tell us regarding changes that should be made in local government? For example, does it lend any weight to either side in the centralization-decentralization controversy? Do bodies such as the Council make any difference or did the poverty program have no more than an absolutely minimal effect on city government.¹

Methodology

The remainder of this Chapter discusses the reasons for concentrating on the New York City poverty program, the formal definition of a Council decision, and our broader concern with the policy formulation process. We then review how and why the Council actions presented in Chapter III were chosen. This is followed by a review of the advantages of using case studies and the method of, as well as problems involved in, gathering data.

Reasons for Concentrating on New York City's Poverty Program

The justification for concentrating on New York City's poverty program rests on the following considerations:

- 1) New York City's program is the largest in the nation in terms of the key indicators of monies spent and the number of people classified as poor. During the 1968-1969 period in which the Council actions examined in this study were made, over \$70,000,000 was spent in poverty funds. Additionally, nearly two million people were classified as poor, many of them living in some of the nation's severest examples of inner city slums.
- 2) In spite of the fact that New York City's program is so large, there is a paucity of knowledge regarding the policy formulation role of the Council.

1. PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR, esp. pp. 233-237, takes the latter position.

3) This City has a diverse ethnic mix that at times has become highly polarized. By studying its poverty program, we will be able to examine the interactions of several ethnic groups in one arena.

4) New York City has experimented with several citizen participation modes of which the poverty program is one example. The question of political and administrative decentralization, furthermore, is a lively political issue. In 1972, at the request of Governor Rockefeller, the New York State Legislature established the State Charter Revision Commission for New York City. The Commission's mandate included recommending reforms in the City's government that would make it responsive to the needs of its constituents and encouraging citizen participation.¹

5) The author had access to Council members, employees of the CDA and other participants in New York City's poverty program. Many of these people were willing to make available whatever sources were requested.

Council Decisions

Within the context of the Council, a decision is the outcome of a Council vote at which fifty per cent plus one of those voting on a resolution brought up at a meeting attended by a quorum agree on a formal expression of Council opinion. Article II, Section 4 of the Council's CHARTER AND BY-LAWS specifies that,

one-half of the members ... shall be necessary to constitute a quorum for the transaction of business ... a majority of those present shall be necessary and sufficient to take action.

1. State Charter Revision Commission for New York City, REVISING THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER: INTRODUCTORY REPORT (New York: State Charter Revision Commission, 1973), p. 9.

A major experiment in command decentralization is operating under the auspices of the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Government and the New York City Council. See, Mayor John V. Lindsay, PEOPLE FOR THE DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES IN NEW YORK CITY COMMUNITIES (New York: Office of the Mayor, December, 1971).

Our concern however extends beyond this formal definition of a Council decision. By studying selected policy actions of the Council and the policy formulation processes that led to them, we are interested in elucidating the decisional elements that lie behind Council determinations. These include identifying the participants in the process and gaining an understanding of the forces that resulted in the adoption of a particular resolution. In doing so we will gain a rich understanding of the complexity and total dynamics of the Council's policy-making role in the community action phase of New York City's anti-poverty program.

Choosing Council Actions for Analysis

Council actions affecting representation were chosen for intensive examination for several reasons. The community action and maximum feasible participation provisions of the EOA were unquestionably its most significant and innovative features. They led to the establishment of both the CAP and the community corporations, governed by boards of directors, which managed community action programs within their neighborhoods. To study Council actions having a major impact on the membership of these boards, as well as on the Council, is thus to examine a crucial component of the poverty program. Actions affecting representation were also chosen because questions of representation have long been of interest in political science. This interest has grown among students of contemporary political science because of the provisions in the Economic Opportunity and Demonstration Cities Acts providing for the participation of the target population. The currency of the questions of decentralization of government and community control, especially in New York City and other large urban areas, further contribute to this interest.

The actions affecting representation analyzed here were taken from a list of eighty actions, SUMMARY MAJOR DECISIONS OF THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL AGAINST POVERTY, November 7, 1968 to August 7, 1969, that were compiled by the Council Staff Director.¹ [their emphasis] The selection of representation decisions proceeded as follows. The eighty decisions were placed in decision-areas or categories. These were developed by taking the first decision and determining its center of concern. This concern was then made a decision-area or category. The same process was then repeated with the remaining decisions until a total of sixteen separate types were developed. All decisions were then received a second time, with the aim of placing each of them in one of the categories. The categories, number of decisions in each of them and an example of a decision in each category are presented in the following Table.

TABLE I

Decision Categories and Examples

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of Decisions</u>	<u>Example of Decision</u>
Representation	5	March 13, 1969. Members of the Board of Directors of the South Jamaica Community Corporation were declared ineligible for re-election.
Community Corporations	7	November 7, 1968. The Staten Island Community Corporation's Plan was approved.
Financing	3	March 13, 1969. The Board of Estimate and City Council were asked to approve the Manpower Career Development Agency's \$30,000,000 capital budget.

1. The "vital statistics" for the period in which the decisions were made are as follows: during the nine months in which the Council made these eighty decisions, five of which are examined here, it met twenty-four times. The number of decision-categories is sixteen and the average number of decisions per category is 5. The average number of decisions per meeting is four because no decisions were made in three meetings: April 24 and June 19, 1969 because of the lack of a quorum and April 10, 1969 because of the failure to adopt the agenda.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of Decisions</u>	<u>Example of Decision</u>
Allocations	20	February 27, 1969. The 1968-69 General Harlem package was approved.
Summer Programs	6	January 9, 1969. Guidelines for summer programs for the summer of 1969 were adopted.
Elections	5	August 7, 1969. Elections for the Board of Directors of the Hunts Point Community Corporations were mandated for September 27, 1968.
Headstart	4	November 21, 1968. The summer Headstart application, which would serve 4110 children, was approved for submission to the Office of Economic Opportunity.
Employment, Training, and Manpower	8	January 23, 1969. The New York Training Institute was designated as the Council's primary training instrument.
Council Appeals	2	March 13, 1969. The Council reaffirmed its year-round appeals procedure.
Policy-Action Statements*	11	December 19, 1968. The Council voted against endorsing a plan for a comprehensive health planning agency for New York City and stated that it preferred a public agency.
Boundaries	2	May 22, 1969. The Brownsville poverty area was expanded due to an earlier oversight.
Model Cities	2	June 12, 1969. The Council's Model Cities Committee was expanded.
By-Laws	2	November 21, 1968. The By-Laws were adopted.
Delegate Agencies	1	August 7, 1969. The structure of Harlem's Youth Development Agency was approved.
Senior Citizens	1	March 27, 1969. Research and demonstration projects under contract to the National Council for Senior Citizens were approved.
Investigations	1	January 23, 1969. The Council stated it would fully cooperate with any studies of the poverty program.

* These statements are not specifically or substantively related to Council actions or proceedings.

The major advantage of this list is that it was fairly current during the 1969-71 period of investigation. This was important because many of the key people on the Council during the period in which these decisions were made were then still active in the poverty program and available for interviewing. At the same time, the further back one goes, the more likely it is that memories begin to fade, especially when seeking to present a comprehensive study. Also the record-keeping during the period in which the decisions were made is a great improvement over the system followed in the previous years. Not only are the records comprehensive, but they have rarely been misplaced. Lastly, while not able to attend Executive Sessions of the CAP, the writer was able to attend most open meetings during the period discussed.

This is not to say that a study of what were current decisions is without difficulties. The obvious disadvantage is that the decision-making participants were still active Council members, and as such they may have hesitated to discuss these at all or simply answer in vague generalities. This study sought to overcome this by guaranteeing respondents anonymity and by seeking to interview as many of the participants as was possible. The latter hopefully led to a more comprehensive study while the former sought to put respondents at ease so that their answers would be frank. Many people, however, gave the writer permission to quote them directly. Usually, the further away one's then current interests were from the poverty program, the more likely this would occur. Thus, members of the Wagner Administration were nearly unanimous in allowing direct quotation. On the other hand, some Council and CDA employees prefaced their remarks with, "If you mention this to anyone, I'll deny ever speaking to you." One individual even went to the extent of

frequently peering into the hallway in order to see if anyone was listening. As often as not, the "secrets" produced by these sources were common knowledge.

The list of Council actions to be examined, in an abbreviated and chronological order, is as follows:

1. December 12, 1968. The Council could be petitioned by groups lacking representation.
2. January 9, 1969. The Corporation Plan for the Crown Heights area was amended.
3. March 6, 1969. Recognition was withdrawn from the Jamaica Corporation's Board of Directors and elections for a new Board were to be held in South Jamaica.
4. March 13, 1969. The Jamaica Panel was given permission to expand.
5. March 13, 1969. Current members of the Board of Directors of the Jamaica Corporation were declared not eligible for re-election.

The first two were respectively concerned with the question of providing redress to groups which felt they lacked the representation to which they were entitled, and the physical makeup of the Board of Directors handling poverty affairs in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn. Numbers 3-5 are essentially part of the same Council action, one of the most important ever made, the withdrawal of recognition from the Jamaica Corporation's Board of Directors. All decisions were made during the period, spring 1968 through summer 1969, when Edwin Greenidge was Council Chairman.¹

1. As is apparent from this review of the focus of each of the five cases, the sample was such that none of them had any programmatic substance. While our major focus is these five cases, references will be made to other policy actions and policy determinations.

Case Studies

Case studies are used in this analysis because they enable us to go beyond the mere identification of participants and actually demonstrate the systemic nature of the interactive processes that occurred.¹ As was noted above, while our focus is on the Council Against Poverty as the principle policy-making body, the case studies and general observations that follow will enable us to see the whole picture of the operations of New York City's poverty program.²

For purposes of continuity and organization, we will begin each case study by discussing the background to the Council action and then examine the specific action taken. The last part of each case study will note the implementation of the Council's policy determination.

In this study, a case or case study is an examination of a particular Council action, the object of which is explaining why it occurred.³ The explanation is made by treating decision-makers and their environment as principle interacting variables.

1. Bernard E. Brown, "The Case Method in Comparative Politics," in James B. Christoph and Bernard E. Brown, *CASES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 4.

2. We will be aided in gaining this understanding by studying in the next Chapter the structure and organization of the City's poverty program as related to the total political setting.

3. There is no universally accepted definition of a case study. Paul Furfey, *THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY* (New York: Cooper Square, 1969), p. 316, defines a "case study of an individual ... as a systematic gathering of enough information about a particular person to permit one to understand how he functions as a unit of society." Harold Stein, *PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT: A CASE BOOK* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), p. xxvii, defines a public administration case as "a narrative of the events that constitute or lead to a decision or group of related decisions by a public administrator or group of public administrators."

The use of the case study as a distinct method is fairly new, although the early doctor and lawyer employed it.¹ Harvard's Graduate School of Business Administration began its now famous case approach in 1919 and within a generation, it was adopted by its School of Public Administration. In 1950 Bailey published his comprehensive study of the Full Employment Act,² CONGRESS MAKES A LAW.

Since Bailey's study, there have been many other case studies. Many are similar to his in that they are concerned with a single event or outcome.³ Some, however, examine or test a specific hypothesis in a series of cases. Thus, Herbert Kaufman, in the winter 1958 edition of the PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW urged that a number of cases examine a particular problem.⁴ This study follows his advice and focuses several case studies on a specific area - Council actions dealing with questions of representation. This is done because it is believed that while a single case study has the major advantage of allowing study in greater depth, it also has a major defect: generalizations based on but one case are weak.⁵ Another advantage is that a series of cases examining one question should help point out the complexity of the Council's policy-making.

1. THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY, p. 317; PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, p. xx.

2. Stephen K. Bailey, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW (New York: Vintage, 1950).

3. Bernard Cohen, THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND FOREIGN POLICY (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Glenn Paige, THE KOREAN DECISION: (New York: Free Press, 1968).

4. "The Next Step in Case Studies," pp. 52-59.

5. Dean Pruitt and Richard Snyder, THEORY AND RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES OF WAR (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 8, and p. 57.

Data Gathering

Determining what instruments will be used to gather data is an important part of every study.¹ As our concern here centered on five Council actions, the first approach was to study them and the minutes of the meetings in which they were made. However, the minutes of Council meetings frequently consisted of bare outlines of what was discussed. Inevitably, it was necessary to heavily supplement the written record with interviews for, as Stephen Bailey observed, written records are like icebergs and "unless live sources are used in a study of ... legislative² policy-making, a meaningful analysis is virtually impossible." Besides interviews and minutes, it was necessary to become familiar with Council procedures. This required a reading of federal and state laws, New York City Executive Orders and various memoranda issued by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Also, the CITY RECORD, COUNCIL BY-LAWS and procedures and similar instruments of the Human Resources Administration (HRA) and CDA. Lastly, books, articles, and the NEW YORK TIMES and HERALD TRIBUNE were reviewed.

For the period 1964-65 (Wagner's last two years as Mayor), interviews were vital because little "hard data" was available in the form of meeting records, etc. The Municipal Reference Center, HRA and private sources were unable to supply minutes for pre-1967 meetings of the CAP or its predecessors. Minutes for a few meetings of the Mayor's Committee on Expanded Employment Opportunity and Training were available at the Municipal Reference Center. These were too incomplete to be of much use. It is

1. Bernard Phillips, SOCIAL RESEARCH: STRATEGY AND TACTICS (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 73-75.

2. CONGRESS MAKES A LAW, p. x.

believed, after noting that CAP minutes during Lindsay's first year were also brief, that the lack of these sources were not harmful, especially in that many of the key administration officials were amenable to interviews which were usually quite informative.

As sources of information, interviews have two fundamental advantages over written records. Statements for public consumption may be misleading, either because they fail to be entirely accurate or omit certain facts. An interview which guarantees anonymity can hopefully overcome this difficulty. Secondly, it is easier to get at the information sought because the interviewer frames his questions with this information in mind.¹

Interviews were usually arranged by telephone calls. Certain people, however, were especially helpful in arranging appointments and in putting respondents at ease regarding the nature and possible uses of this research. In some cases, the latter was necessary because the poverty program has been the subject of numerous investigations and any stranger asking questions is regarded as an "official." At the conclusion of an interview, the respondent was asked to name one or two people who might be of further assistance. They were called and advised that the writer

1. THEORY AND RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES OF WAR, p. 7.

Interviews were used in this study instead of questionnaires because it was believed that they provided several distinct advantages. As Raymond Gordon, *INTERVIEWING* (Homewood: Dorsey, 1969), pp. 52-54, observed, an "interview allows greater control over the interview situation." It allowed the interviewer to determine via probes and questions what approach to use in order to get at the information in which he was interested, to explain the meaning of unclear questions and to detect and rectify inconsistency in a respondent's answers. Lastly, interviews avoided the possibility of a questionnaire being answered by a respondent's assistant. On the Council this would most likely have occurred when dealing with public officials. Note that according to John Wahlke, *et al.*, *THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM* (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 449, it was likely that a representative in a state legislature would answer questionnaires himself because of a lack of staff.

was preparing a dissertation at the City University of New York and that the last person spoken to suggested that he or she might be of some assistance. With few exceptions, appointments sought were easily made.

The more than forty interviews conducted averaged approximately forty-five minutes, ranging from twenty-five minutes to ninety minutes in length. Most sources were interviewed only once. The setting for the interviews varied considerably and included community corporations, offices, restaurants, the street, private offices (including those within the HRA, CAP, and CDA), the library and the YM-YWHA.

Chapter Summary

In summary, it was noted that we seek to explore and explain the Council's decision-making dynamics. This will be done by focusing on actions taken in New York City's poverty program. This examination will be used to elucidate the meaning and significance of ethnic factors in contemporary urban government; and in addition, the CAP and its related bodies will be looked at with respect to the emergence of new kinds of representational bodies on the local scene. A review of relevant literature in decision-making theory and practice and community power studies will be undertaken and findings of relevance will be applied for analytical and interpretative purposes to the material of this study. At the same time, such literature will be critiqued with respect to the findings that emerge from this study. Also discussed in this Chapter was the methodology that will be used to achieve these goals.

CHAPTER II: SETTING THE STAGE -- THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM IN NEW YORK CITY

This Chapter examines the development and changes in New York City's poverty program in 1964-68 under the Administrations of Mayor Wagner and Lindsay. This will enable us to do the following:

1) examine the role played by the Mayor in the poverty arena and compare the behavior of two Mayors - one a Democrat and the other a Republican reformer¹ - with respect to the poverty program;

2) help us understand the organization of the poverty program and thus contribute to setting the stage for the case studies that follow;

3) although not a principle purpose with regard to the primary thrust of this study, a review of this period also offers a significant piece of urban history, which is illustrative of the larger political scene in New York City, about which we have no systematic record.

While we are uncertain how the organization of New York City's poverty program would have evolved without the political relationships found in this City, it is our thesis that what ultimately emerged, and is crucial to this study, was a function of a deliberate political tactic adopted by Mayor Lindsay. As a Republican-reform Mayor, Lindsay believed that his political career would benefit most from maximizing community participation. By doing so he hoped to gain adherents among those lower class groups which did not back his 1965 campaign for Mayor. Lindsay's view on maximizing community participation coincided with the climate of the Federal program which was amenable to the enhancement of the citizen participation element.

1. On August 11, 1971, Mayor Lindsay became a Democrat. See, Richard Reeves, NEW YORK TIMES, August 12, 1971.

Mayor Wagner on the other hand sought to minimize community participation. He believed that the best way to ensure the success of the poverty program, as well as of himself, was by having City Hall maintain control.

Mayor Wagner and Minimum Feasible Participation

Mayor Wagner, as he and other top Administration officials confirmed, was seriously considering making poverty a major issue even before President Johnson's declaration.¹ In mid-October 1963 he stated, "We must mount an all out war against poverty as well as discrimination and disadvantage."² The first week of January he further hinted that a poverty message was coming when he said that he had been thinking for many months about developing a poverty program and appointing a poverty coordinator.³ Finally, six days after the President's announcement, the Mayor presented his "Poverty and Unemployment," message to the City Council.⁴ In it he referred to the status of the poor as the "central and most important question of our time."⁵ He called for a counter attack on poverty which emphasized a public works program and would mobilize the City's public and private resources. Direct aid from Washington was demanded and the Mayor stated that New York City must serve as an advance guard in an alliance

1. Interviews with Robert Wagner and Maxwell Lehman on November 7, 1969 and with Julius C.C. Edelstein on October 31, 1969.

2. Unsigned, HERALD TRIBUNE, October 14, 1963.

3. Edward Silberfarb, HERALD TRIBUNE, January 8, 1964.

4. "Poverty and Unemployment," An Address to the New York City Council by Mayor Robert F. Wagner, MAYOR'S PRESS RELEASES, January 8, 1964.

5. He subsequently referred to the problem of poverty as "the supreme challenge of my responsibility as Mayor." MAYOR'S PRESS RELEASES, April 21, 1964. In an interview he hailed the Federal legislation as a "breakthrough for you got Congress to commit the Federal government to these programs."

with the Federal and State governments.¹

Early Organization

In the same speech in which he announced the attack on poverty. Wagner called upon the Mayor's Council on Expanded Employment Opportunity and Training (hereafter MCEEOT) to "serve as the nucleus of a General Staff for this undertaking."² Established the previous June, Council functions included combating discrimination in employment, the establishment of new City programs in manpower training and economic development and the strengthening and coordination of existing programs. The Council was now assigned the task of formulating and implementing antipoverty measures.³ In fact, its major interest was in jobs and job training. Excluding its Chairman, Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Calvin E. Gross, statutory members were all close Wagner appointees.

The Mayor's Poverty Council was chaired by the Mayor and included representatives of more than thirty City agencies. The key members, all of whom (excluding Screvane) also sat on MCEEOT were Vice-Chairman James Dumpson, Planning Coordinator Julius C. C. Edelstein and the Executive Officer or Coordinator of Operating Paul Screvane. Council functions according to Mayor Wagner were the approval of plans, allocation of funds,⁴ and coordination of programs. Edelstein added that its major emphasis⁵ was coordinating the City's efforts on behalf of the poor. The Council

1. The following day the NEW YORK TIMES credited Edelstein with developing the ideas presented by the Mayor. On the 16th, a TIMES Editorial called the idea of Federal-city aid without state intervention "unabashedly political."

2. "Poverty and Unemployment," p. 7.

3. Robert Wagner, Interview, November 7, 1969.

4. Robert Wagner, Interview, November 7, 1969.

5. Julius C. C. Edelstein, Interview, October 31, 1969.

had five permanent committees, each chaired by a City Commissioner, concerned with different aspects of the City's poverty program.

Dimensions of Poverty

In late March 1964 the City Administrator released a study, "Dimensions of Poverty in New York City."¹ Based on 1960 census data, it divided the City's poor into 320,000 single people and 389,000 families.² Certain characteristics of the poor presented in this Report are worth noting. Whites made up 85 per cent of the City's population and a bare majority of 52.1 per cent of the poor. For nonwhites the percentages are 14.7 per cent and 24.2 per cent, and for Puerto Ricans, 7.9 per cent and 18.8 per cent. Perhaps most important as a forerunner of the Community Corporation concept was the finding that poverty was concentrated in 16 of the City's neighborhoods. These neighborhoods contained less than 30 per cent of the City's population, but 73 per cent of its nonwhites and Puerto Ricans; also, over 70 per cent of recipients of Aid to Dependent Children, 54 per cent of juvenile offenders, 64.6 per cent of venereal disease victims in people under twenty-one and an infant mortality rate of more than one-third higher than the rest of the City. While the study made clear that poor people within them were not uniformly stricken, it was clear to the Report's authors that any antipoverty effort would have to concentrate most heavily on these neighborhoods.³

1. Office of the City Administrator, March 23, 1964, Mimeo., eight pages.

2. According to the 1970 census, New York City's poor consisted of 266,000 single people and 899,000 families.

3. Attention is increasingly being focused on the fact that many of the poor live outside of the boundaries of poverty areas. On February 7, 1973, in announcing a grant to help impoverished Jews, Mayor Lindsay noted that many of them lived beyond the boundaries of poverty areas. See, unsigned, NEW YORK TIMES, February 8, 1973.

Organizational Changes

Three months after the publication of the aforementioned, the MCEEOT¹ was abolished and replaced with the Mayor's Council Against Poverty. The motivation for this change was essentially a result of the strong pressures that were put on the City by the philanthropic agencies for "a piece of the action."² The new Council was thus an attempt to bring these groups into the system.

The Mayor's CAP was charged with the planning and formulation of policies, the coordination of programs, and to serve in general as the Mayor's Cabinet in the City's antipoverty efforts. Once more, its membership would be limited to high ranking Mayoral appointees including all members of the predecessor MCEEOT.

Part II of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 114 established a Poverty Operations Board to serve as the operating area of the Mayor's CAP. Under the Mayor's direction it was charged with supervising the allocation of all poverty funds and neighborhood projects, negotiations of contracts, negotiation with the Federal government for grants, and "the promotion and stimulation of neighborhood Councils and groups." The importance of the Board, both to the Mayor and New York City's poverty program is indicated by the fact that his appointments consisted of his closest and most reliable political associates. These included Screvane, Edelstein and Dumpson.

Attitudes and Values of Mayor Wagner and Other Actions

Thus far, besides the proliferation of organizations the significant fact about New York City's poverty program is that the Mayor always

1. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 114, June 30, 1964.

2. This was confirmed in all interviews with high ranking Administration officials.

appointed close political associates to key positions in order to enable him to control the program and make sure it pursued the goals he wanted using the procedures he wanted. Before moving on to the final organizational change of the Wagner Administration, it will prove worthwhile to first review the attitudes and values of key Administration members regarding such questions as how much the poor would be allowed to participate in the community action program and whether it should seek to redress their lack of economic power, political power or both.¹

Mayor Wagner believed that the City government should control the poverty program. Accordingly, he observed that "the local community is necessarily the base and foundation of any successful undertaking to combat poverty ... these must have the prime responsibility for planning the strategy ... and for coordinating the attack," and he disapproved "of the interposition of the authority of the state governments in these undertakings," but rather favored more direct Federal aid to the cities. Furthermore, he urged that the local government unit function as a channel through which projects were proposed and passed on to OEO for their consideration.²

When asked in an interview whether the purpose of community action was to rectify the poor's lack of political or economic power, the Mayor

1. The phrase "allowed to participate" is intentional because at that time the poor had virtually nothing to say regarding the program's development.

2. "Testimony of Mayor Robert F. Wagner of New York City on Behalf of the U. S. Conference of Mayors and the American Municipal Association before the Hearings Committee of the Democratic National Convention," August 21, 1964, Mimeo., 5 pages.

unhesitatingly stated that the program was, "Never thought to give the poor political power." According to him, "you could not allow local people using government monies to control the program. You need government control for often local people set themselves up as leaders without having been elected."¹

While he disapproved of citizen control, he did agree to include the poor as members of the CAP, here referring to the New York City CAP and not the Mayor's CAP, and the Community Progress Centers (hereafter CPC). The people would choose most CPC officials with the CAP establishing some "minimum" qualifications. The problem however was that the Administration did not remain in office long enough to implement its plan.²

Mobilization for Youth

The Mayor's view that City Hall should maintain control was probably reinforced by his experience with Mobilization for Youth, a program on New York's Lower East Side which had some success in organizing residents to take action to solve their problems.³ In doing so, MFY came into conflict with several local groups which were quite satisfied with the existing social order.⁴

The first of these were some local public school principals who protested to both the Mayor and President Johnson that MFY workers, in their encouragement of Puerto Rican protests over the lack of school books,

1. Robert Wagner, Interview, November 7, 1969.

2. Robert Wagner, Interview, November 7, 1969.

3. Herbert Krosney, BEYOND WELFARE (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1966), p. 21.

4. Boston's Mayor complained that he did not believe that the function of that City's community action program was to stir up dissent. See, Stephen Thernstrom, POVERTY, PLANNING AND POLITICS IN THE NEW BOSTON (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 112.

were becoming political agitators and undermining and hampering their efforts to correct the problem. The February 1964 public school boycott further alienated school leaders for their neighborhood had one of the City's highest percentages of absences. Other groups MFY came into conflict with were the police, landlords who were angered by their frequent initiation of rent strikes, welfare officials (the poor were provided with lawyers to contest welfare proceedings), and the Catholic Church which appears to have objected to the group's social militancy.¹ Additionally, MFY was allegedly linked to the Congress of Racial Equality which had deposited dead rats on the Mayor's doorstep. Mr. Wagner, obviously disturbed at the incident,² held MFY responsible.

The reason for citing the MFY incident is that it demonstrated that through the vehicle of community action, a political group without power could challenge one with power. This was interpreted by City Administration leaders to mean that there was something to fear in an independent community action program that was controlled by the neighborhoods and aimed at upsetting the existing distribution of power which was favorable to them. Demands for more services were troublesome enough, but new organizations antagonizing established interests would only direct more pressure from both sides on the Mayor and his sides.³

Another problem with an independent community action program was

1. Peter Marris and Martin Rein, *DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL REFORM* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 67-69.

2. Robert Wagner, Interview, November 7, 1969. Also, Kenneth Clark and Jeannette Hopkins, *A RELEVANT WAR AGAINST POVERTY* (New York City: MARC, 1968), pp. 216-219.

3. J. David Greenstone and Paul Peterson, "Reformers, Machines and the War on Poverty," in James Q. Wilson, ed., *CITY POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY* (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 275-276.

that the demands of Blacks and Puerto Ricans were frequently made against other ethnic groups (Jewish landlords and teachers) which traditionally backed the Democrats. Such a conflict, in which the Mayor was asked to pick a side, might well affect the size of his vote by alienating members of one group without significantly increasing his plurality among the members of the opposing group.¹ Lastly, the conflict between community control which represented conflict and government control which represented "jobs and money, the historic cement of organizational politics" was undoubtedly clear.²

Views of Other Actors

The Mayor's views were shared by another key Administration member, Paul Screvane. In mid-February 1964 Wagner placed him in charge of the City's poverty program. Screvane too believed that the poor would receive the greatest economic benefits if the City retained control. He was against independent programs for they fragmented the City's efforts and got "bogged down in debates, and other things."³ By seeking centralization, he was apparently interested in building up a following in poverty areas which would help elect him Mayor.⁴

1. Stephen David, "Leadership of the Poor in the Poverty Program," in Robert Connery, ed., URBAN RIOTS: VIOLENCE AND CHANGE (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1968), p. 89.

2. William Haddad, "Mr. Shriver and the Savage War on Poverty," HARPER'S MAGAZINE, vol. 230-231 (Dec., 1965), pp. 43-50.

3. Woody Klein, HERALD TRIBUNE, March 3, 1965.

4. That Wagner and Screvane were strong advocates of City control is not surprising. They were aware of the fact that the Democratic Party was divided and that party organization was declining. Wagner himself, as Ed Costikyan observed in BEHIND CLOSED DOORS (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1966). Furthermore, campaigns were increasingly expensive and the political party was progressively unable to provide its workers with material incentives. A City Hall controlled poverty program was thus an excellent opportunity to maintain and indeed enhance their control over the New York Democratic Party.

Former Welfare Commissioner James Dumpson differed with some of these observations. He believed that under Wagner, "Community action was aimed at redistributing power - it sought to find channels to get people to participate in decisions affecting their lives." The Mayor however, "wished to hold on to the ultimate responsibility."

The issue of how much the poverty program should be used as a vehicle for the reallocation of political power, or as a means of bringing about political action, was not only a concern at City Hall. Control over the poverty program could have a significant impact on the power relationship between City Hall and the Statehouse. Other actors and sets of actors, each with their own interests were also concerned.

The Republican Governor of New York State, Nelson Rockefeller was not pleased with the development of New York City's program. In general he opposed it on the grounds that it would provide the Democrats with a very powerful political base. From the very beginning, when he created a State OEO, he stressed the fact that the basic problem was "the creation of more jobs through an accelerated rate of economic growth under our free enterprise system.¹ In May of 1965 he sought a partial restoration of the Governor's veto of OEO grants to community action agencies (as provided in the EOA)² after it was erased by Congressman Powell's Committee. According to Paul Screvane, he continuously "sought to have funds funneled through the State government."³

Congressman Powell was also displeased with the City's program. He complained that the interference of local government in the operation of

1. Clayton Knowles, NEW YORK TIMES, December 10, 1964.

2. Unsigned, NEW YORK TIMES, May 21, 1965.

3. Paul Screvane, Interview, November 25, 1969.

various projects was unauthorized and that cities could not force community programs to conduct their operations through City agencies and departments.¹ The Harlem Democrat sought to minimize municipal interference because he claimed to fear that local governments would take advantage of the program's patronage potential and consequently endanger future Congressional approval. He ostensibly wished to avoid such situations as occurred in the summer of 1965 when 3,380 out of 8,600 summer Post Office jobs which were to be distributed to the poor were used instead as patronage (the word "ostensibly" is used because a perusal of HARYOU payroll revealed the names of many Powell followers).² In numerous instances he criticized the City's program for not allowing the maximum feasible participation of the poor. Much of this criticism becomes clearer when one considers that Powell had his own political stakes in the poverty program and these included his control of HARYOU which meant that he had to keep the Mayor away from that program.

Because of a fear of Wagner's control, Governor Rockefeller wanted the program controlled by the state. City control would have meant Democratic control of the potentially lush patronage opportunities which could have been used to strengthen New York City's Democratic Party. State control however was synonymous with Republican control and would have provided patronage opportunities which could have been used to build up New York City's Republican Party. Congressman Powell, who at the time was feuding with Wagner, was also not interested in having the Mayor expand his control over the poverty program and concomitantly the Democratic Party. He sought control by the community, which in the Harlem

1. Clayton Knowles, NEW YORK TIMES, September 25, 1964.

2. Alfonso Navarez and Barry Gottehrer, HERALD TRIBUNE, May 13, 1965.

area he represented would have meant himself and his allies.

Criticism of New York City's Poverty Program

By April of 1965 New York City's poverty program was a frequent target of criticism, most of which was aimed at the City's domination.¹ In March, Dr. Eugene Callender, Chairman of the Board of HARYOU-ACT criticized City domination, stating that the "same forces that have perpetuated poverty in New York City for decades are now administering the poverty program."² A month later, Congressman Powell called this City's program "a monolithic program that is directly contrary to the present act" and is a "great fiesta of political patronage." In that same report, OEO officials³ complained that City officials had not yet involved the poor. The late Manhattan Congressman, William Pitts Ryan, who was interested in diminishing Wagner's political strength and maximizing his own position as a reform Democrat, advocated the direct delivery of Federal community action funds to the agencies involved without going through the City.⁴

At the same time, the leaders of 250 community groups recommended that the policy-making board should be made up of one-third poor people, one-third representatives of community action projects and one-third representatives of public organizations and voluntary agencies.⁵ By late May, OEO claimed that it could not review the City's application for aid

1. Barry Gottehrer, HERALD TRIBUNE, April 16, 1965.

2. Tim Hutchins, HERALD TRIBUNE, March 23, 1965.

3. Cabell Philips, NEW YORK TIMES, April 25, 1965. Ralph M. Kramer, PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 2, asserts that this was also the case in San Francisco.

4. Special to the New York Times, NEW YORK TIMES, May 1, 1965.

5. Barrett McGurn, HERALD TRIBUNE, May 9, 1965.

unless thirty-two representatives of the poor were placed on the Council¹ within sixty days.

Reorganization

Thus Mayor Wagner was under the pressure of community groups, the OEO, and such Congressmen as Powell, Lindsay and Ryan (backed by the reform movement which Wagner was anxious not to antagonize), to revise New York City's program to provide for at least a modicum of participation for the poor. Reacting to these pressures, Paul Screvane stated on May 11th that while the original idea in New York City's program was rapid decision-making, the point had been reached when the broadest consensus² was needed. Two weeks later, on May 24, 1965 Mayor Wagner issued EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 141 which replaced the Mayor's CAP and the Poverty Operations Board with the New York City Council Against Poverty, the Anti-Poverty Operations Board and the Economic Opportunity Corporation. The first purpose of the new bodies dealt with increasing the participation of the poor in the planning and development of the City's antipoverty strategy.

Under the new formula for participation of the target population, the community committee of each of the City's eight (ultimately sixteen) CPCs would choose two Council members to represent them on the CAP chaired by a respected Harlem physician and community activist, Dr. Arthur C. Logan. The rest of the membership would include "City Government agency heads and officials, representatives of labor, industry, business groups, religious groups, voluntary and social welfare agencies, neighborhood and ethnic groups."³ However, as each CPC was limited to but two represen-

1. Marshall Peck, HERALD TRIBUNE, May 29, 1965.

2. Fred Powledge, NEW YORK TIMES, May 12, 1965.

3. Andrew Glass, HERALD TRIBUNE, May 13, 1965.

tatives or a maximum of thirty-two out of a CAP membership which could not exceed one hundred, it was clear that the representatives of the target population could easily become diluted in the larger body.

The Council possessed ultimate policy-making powers over New York's program. It was charged with the development of guidelines for all poverty programs, establishing guidelines for the operations and functions of the EOC (discussed below, pp.), and reviewed all applications¹ to OEO for grants.

In operational terms, CAP's responsibility for reviewing applications to OEO for grants was hardly geared to enforce impartiality. It meant that Council members were often asked to review applications submitted by their own agencies and were susceptible to the trading of votes. Furthermore, there was no clear differentiation of responsibility between the CAP and the APOB. While CAP was charged with policy-making, the APOB was responsible for the supervision and allocation of funds and had much² to say regarding the supervision and coordination of programs. The Council, lacking an independent staff, relied on the EOC staff under the direction of a Wagner appointee, Mrs. Anne Roberts. Additionally, two-thirds of the Council membership was appointed by the Mayor to nonstatutory terms (presumably the Mayor also possessed removal powers) which hardly made for independence from City Hall. Also, according to what one author refers to as an "uncited legal memo" on the subject, the Mayor³ possessed the power to veto Council actions. Lastly, as Paul Screvane

1. Section 1, paragraph E, subparagraphs 1-5.

2. "Mr. Shriver and the Savage War on Poverty."

3. Arthur Schiff, "Comments on the Structure of the New York City Anti-Poverty Program," December 1965, mimeo, p. 10. Schiff was the Assistant Director of Columbia University's Mobilization for Youth project.

pointed out, "The Council was too large and ponderous to get anything
1
done.

Most decisions were made by the Council's eighteen-member Executive
2
Committee, which was empowered to act on its behalf between meetings.
It advised the Council concerning the actions it should take in matters
involving planning, applications, and program renewals and changes. The
Committee's membership was equally divided among the three major groups
on the Council: City officials, social agency representatives, and the
representatives of the target population. According to more than one
source, the APOB provided direction to both the CAP and its Executive Com-
mittee, although the professional opinion of the social agency represen-
3
tatives was usually important regarding specific program proposals.

Section two of this order renamed the POB and the APOB and modified
its functions. It was given the responsibility of coordinating, super-
vising, planning and operating City poverty efforts, eliminating dupli-

1. Paul Screvane, Interview, November 25, 1969.

2. "Comments on the Structure of the New York City Anti-Poverty Program,"
p. 12. Also, Stephen M. David, "Welfare, the Community Action Contro-
versy," in Jewel Bullush and Stephen M. David, eds., RACE AND POLITICS IN
NEW YORK CITY (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 35.

The City's private agencies played an interesting role in New York's
poverty program. Dedicated to helping the needy, they naturally wanted
to participate in a new and large-scale undertaking in their field. Un-
der Wagner they gained a strong voice on the various policy-making organ-
izations by exerting pressure on City Hall through the direct access of
such eminent trustees as Cardinal Spellman. Additionally, as the general
public had a great deal of regard for these "nonpolitical agencies,"
they could also seek concessions by threatening to take their case to the
media.

Helping the poor was not the only reason these agencies sought a voice
in the poverty program. As leading social welfare organizations they un-
doubtedly wished to maintain their position of eminence. Also, the new
programs were going to operate with millions of dollars of new funds and
represented a potentially substantial increase in the number and types of
programs which could be undertaken. Then too, these agencies were in ac-
cordance with accepted social welfare doctrine.

cation and relating Mayoral agencies to non-Mayoral ones such as the Board of Election. It also was charged with the task of maintaining liaison with neighborhood groups, voluntary agencies, and the Council. Most significant was its supervision of the allocation and spending of poverty funds, and the negotiation of contracts. The Board's membership, all City officials, was pretty much the same as the old one.¹

Although the chief policy-making agency in the poverty program was the CAP, the APOB was an independent municipal agency which made decisions without consulting anyone other than the Mayor, who appointed all members and presumably could dismiss them. Other than a general commitment to the goals of the Federal program, the APOB failed to specify any guidelines for its decision-making or for the public and private agencies with which it dealt. As a coordinator of City programs, it left much to be desired because it lacked any explicit goals. Instead, it handled requests for funding on the individual basis.²

In practice, it was the APOB which played the key role in the City's community action program (to a considerable extent APOB control would³ negate even the limited representation given the poor on the CAP). Screvane went so far as to say that the APOB had a staff (EOC) and "all funds and unlimited power." It was responsible for allocating funds and for the coordination of programs in which the City was the sole contributor (some organizations, because of their inability to qualify or in

1. "Comments on the Structure of the New York City Anti-Poverty Program," pp. 3-5.

2. Maxwell Lehman, Interview, November 7, 1969 and Paul Screvane, Interview, November 25, 1969.

3. For the story of the veto and change in name, see Maurice Carroll, HERALD TRIBUNE, July 2, 1965.

in order to avoid "red tape," sought City aid) and for a contribution of matching funds, which could be withheld, in programs financed by the OEO.

No particular rationale appeared to exist to determine whether a particular program would be funded by the City or passed on to the OEO. Schieff believed, on the basis of the key roles played by Edelstein and Screvane in the MFY crisis and their concomitant importance on the APOB, that programs aimed at services received a higher priority than those aimed at organizing the poor.¹

Section III of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 141 created a public corporation, the Economic Opportunity Corporation (EOC) to serve as the operational and administrative arm of the CAP. As both Deputy Mayor Lehman and Council President Screvane explained, the corporate device was aimed at relieving the members of individual liability and avoiding red tape. Funds could be appropriated to circumvent civil service so that personnel² lacked the required educational or other criteria could be hired.

Governor Rockefeller was not pleased with the new system. He vetoed the Economic Opportunity Corporation (which was renamed the Economic Opportunity Committee).³ On other occasions he threatened to withhold the approval needed to establish six CPCs in poverty neighborhoods. He feared that they would fall under the domination of City Hall which was empowered to approve their administrators and he was also critical of the fact that four of them were to be established in neighborhoods in which

1. "Comments on the Structure of the New York City Anti-Poverty Program," pp. 3-5.

2. Maxwell Lehman, Interview, November 7, 1969 and Paul Screvane, Interview, November 25, 1969.

3. For the story of the veto and change in name, see Maurice Carroll, HERALD TRIBUNE, July 2, 1965.

the same services were already provided by local groups. Thus the CPCs would have bypassed "self-developed groups and duplicate many existing ongoing services." On the 26th of June the Governor's top antipoverty side stated that he had not threatened to veto the Centers but was seeking "administrative clarification."¹

In spite of the Governor's veto of the Corporation, the use of a corporate analogy is helpful in comprehending the distinctions between the CAP on the one hand and the EOC and APOB on the other. If one were to consider New York City's poverty program as a corporation, then the CAP might be conceived of as the policy-making Board of Directors and the EOC would be the Corporation's officers, responsible for carrying out policy. In fact, the APOB was the Board of Directors and it was this body which controlled two-thirds of the seats on the EOC or implementing body which provided both the latter and the CAP with direction. (As a result of membership overlap it was often difficult to separate the APOB from the EOC. The EOC had stationery, used at its direction, with APOB or EOC letterheads.) The functions of CAP was to legitimate the City's program by providing the poor and other representatives with a voice. It was largely a body of shareholders casting votes on questions with which they were usually unfamiliar.

The EOC was responsible for screening and approving requests for Federal antipoverty funds (its chairman had to sign both the original application for aid and the approved contracts). The Committee's seventeen members included the eleven member APOB, four representatives to reflect the interests of the target population and two to represent private agencies. It was charged with providing technical assistance to agencies,

1. Robert Wagner, Interview, November 7, 1969.

functioning as the employing and reimbursing agency, supervising the allocation of funds, auditing programs and reviewing on a technical basis all grant applications before they were forwarded to the CAP.

According to Wagner, the reason for the existence of the EOC was because voluntary participants performed part-time duties and, therefore the need for full-time personnel (EOC) to perform the day-to-day tasks (all APOB members also had other duties). Hopefully, either the supervisors of the EOC would have familiarized themselves with existing problems or else have had people working for them who were trustworthy.¹ Obviously the Administration felt the EOC to be important enough to require City control of two-thirds of its seats.

Basic Means of Citizen Participation

The basic means of citizen participation was to be the sixteen Community Progress Centers which were to govern the poverty programs in the City's poor communities. Each of the proposed centers was to be located in the area it was to serve and each was to have a paid staff of close to one hundred about half of whom were to be blockworkers. This meant the addition of approximately 1500 people to the City's payroll, with half of them living, working and voting in the City's poor communities.

Clearly the patronage potential in the aforementioned was enormous. At a time when civil service had considerably reduced the Mayor's patronage, a new program was suggested which would involve the appointing of hundreds of workers lacking civil service status. The political potential in this program became obvious if one envisioned the substitution of the words precinct captain for blockworker and clubhouse for CPC (while the City could not appoint the CPC's executive directors, it was empowered

1. Robert Wagner, Interview, November 7, 1969.

to veto local suggestions and hence was guaranteed of advance consultation and negotiation).

The community committee which was to determine policy for the CPC was to be chosen by area residents at a local convention. The means usually employed was the calling together of all community social welfare organizations, having these choose a committee and empowering the latter to make the additional appointments that were often necessary in order to make sure that one-third of the committee was poor and lived within the community. This system satisfied very few: in one area it led to control by a few well organized groups in a second to ethnic strife, and in general, it prevented unaffiliated groups from participating.

Thus, by the end of 1965 the poverty program was ostensibly in the hands of three agencies, the APOB, EOC and the CAP. As have seen however, the Mayor and a few close political associates dominated the program by occupying key positions on each of these agencies. Thus each of the eleven APOB members was a non-elected high ranking City official and was appointed by the Mayor (this excluded the City Council President). The membership of the EOC consisted of the APOB plus six others, four of whom were to reflect the interests of the target population. Finally, the CAP included the APOB plus representatives of labor, industry, business, social welfare and religious groups as well as two individuals who represented each CPC (in effect, the Community Progress Centers would have little power because fiscal and employment matters would be controlled by the EOC). CPC representatives however could not total more than one-third of the CAP. Two very close Wagner associates occupied important positions in each agency. Thus Screvane was Chairman of both the APOB and EOC and CAP Vice-Chairman, while Executive Assistant Edelstein was a

member of the CAP and Executive Secretary of the EOC and the APOB.

Mayor Lindsay and Maximum Feasible Participation

Throughout the 1965 campaign, Congressman Lindsay criticized the City's poverty program. The thrust of his attack was that the Administration and not the poor controlled the program and that the "concepts of self-help and involvement of the poor ... the touchstones of the whole program" were thus ignored. He promised, if elected, to destroy the EOC, transfer its functions to the CAP and increase representation of the poor on the latter body.¹ Furthermore, he denounced the City's program as a "structural monstrosity ... designed to keep clubhouse politicians in control."² In an October debate he claimed that City Hall did not understand what Congress meant when it spoke of "control for the poor."³ His last pre-election poverty comments concluded with a familiar theme - "the greatest failure of the city's poverty program has been its consistent failure to involve the poor."⁴

These quotations demonstrate that John Lindsay was committed to changing both the structure of, and participation of the poor in, this City's poverty program. We shall see, that as was the case with Mayor Wagner, Lindsay's views derived from his political motivations (although they differed from the former Mayor's because of different political sources of electoral strength). These motivations however were congruent with his concern for "good government."

1. Terry Smith, HERALD TRIBUNE, August 6, 1965.

2. Terry Smith, HERALD TRIBUNE, August 6, 1965.

Screvane countered that Lindsay "discovered poverty the same way Cortez discovered Mexico - in order to exploit rather than assist."

3. Paul Weissman, HERALD TRIBUNE, October 22, 1965.

4. Unsigned, HERALD TRIBUNE, October 24, 1965.

Political Considerations

In CITY POLITICS, Banfield and Wilson observed that middle and lower-middle income groups such as the Italian and Irish, were frequently opposed to low income Puerto Ricans and Negroes and high income Jews and Protestants.¹ In the late sixties, Mayor Lindsay's upper-middle and upper-class Republican supporters would not be threatened by his support for Negroes and Puerto Ricans. By meeting the demands of these minorities, including placing many on the HRA payroll, the Mayor was unlikely to lose Irish and Italian voters for these had little interest in a Protestant, Republican-reform Mayor, especially one who sought the establishment of a Civilian Review Board.

The Mayor was interested in creating a new political base that would be useful for his future career. By gaining adherents among those lower class groups which displayed little favor for him during his campaign, he might be able to overcome his lack of an organizational political base.² As we shall see, Mr. Lindsay believed that appointments bring a "Mayor some kind of a following."³ Black and Puerto Rican appointments, as well as a restructuring of the poverty program which appeared to take it out of politics, would also reinforce his backing among the reformers, civic associations and the TIMES, all of which were instrumental in his election and were committed to both integration and increasing the political power

1. Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, CITY POLITICS (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1963), pp. 35-36.

2. Daniel Bell and Virginia Held, "The Community Revolution," in THE PUBLIC INTEREST, no. 16, Summer 1969, p. 154.

3. Theodore Lowi, AT THE PLEASURE OF THE MAYOR (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 6-7.

¹
of the poor.

Good Government

At the same time that the Mayor was interested in enhancing his personal position in New York politics, he also possessed many of the traits associated with "good government."² John Lindsay was then able to rally support from all political parties for his reelection campaign. As he observed in his book, JOURNEY INTO POLITICS, mayors could not "afford the luxury of dialectic about Republicans and Democrats."³ Politics to him was "not a competitive struggle among political units, but a cooperative search for the communal interests."⁴ The Mayor was interested in efficiency, organization and the establishment of administratively correct agencies (or rather superagencies). All of these traits represented the contemporary shift from the smoke filled room to a middle class orientation.⁵

The Mayor's "middle class Yankee-Protestant belief that government is merely a matter of honest, impartial and efficient pursuit of the interests of the community as a whole ... leads ... to a conception of government as 'administration.'"⁶ In 1966 he believed that a primary source

1. "Reformers, Machines and the War on Poverty," pp. 284-85.

2. CITY POLITICS, pp. 239-246.

3. Dodd, Mead and Co., 1967, p. 137.

4. Edward Banfield, editor, URBAN GOVERNMENT (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 210.

His views have apparently changed. More recently he stated, "You can't ever separate government operations from the political process. ... political considerations have some influence on all major issues." See, Murray Schumach, NEW YORK TIMES, February 11, 1973.

5. URBAN GOVERNMENT, p. 209.

6. URBAN GOVERNMENT, p. 210.

of New York's trouble was the structure of its government and that if this were reformed New York could be governed economically and efficiently.¹ "This business" Lindsay contended, "of trying to get the separate parts of the Administration working at maximum efficiency leads to all kinds of resistance."^{2,3}

Poverty Task Force

The first week in December 1965, the Mayor-elect appointed a non-governmental task force to evaluate and recommend changes in the City's poverty program. Members included such respected names of the academic, human resources and business fields as Daniel P. Moynihan, Michael Sviridoff, and Thomas Watson. Public hearings were held in poverty areas in order to determine the reaction of the target population to existing programs and the Committee was expected to report to the Mayor by the 31st of December.⁴

The report was never presented. The appointment of this group was perhaps the Mayor-elect's first post-election attempt to gain political mileage out of the poverty program. As one Committee member, Professor Alex Rosen, who at the time was the Dean of New York University's School of Social Work, observed, "We had no input, but just received complaints. In effect we were taking a beating for the City. Many of us began to feel that we were being used for the Task Force as a political ploy to

1. JOURNEY INTO POLITICS, p. 140.

2. Nat Hentoff, A POLITICAL LIFE: THE EDUCATION OF JOHN V. LINDSAY (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 141.

3. Mayor's Task Force on Reorganization of New York City's Government, REPORT AND PROPOSED LOCAL LAW (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1966), proposed that all municipal departments be placed in the administration's congruent with the City's major problem areas.

4. Thomas Ronan, NEW YORK TIMES, December 7, 1965.

to legitimate what Sviridoff wanted."¹

Sviridoff Report

Early in January 1966, the Lindsay Administration announced the appointment of Connecticut labor leader and Director of New Haven's poverty program, Mitchell Sviridoff, to examine New York's human resources policies in order to "come up with recommendations for improved techniques and administrative arrangements to attack the causes of poverty, expand the range of opportunity and release new productive energies."² Conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Public Administration, it was common knowledge that Sviridoff's study would propose the establishment of a Human Resources Administration and that he would be its first head.³

Sviridoff's study presented four major goals:

1. meaningful employment for all;
2. job related education;
3. the participation of residents of target areas in the development and operation of local programs;
4. the coordination of public assistance and other social service programs.⁴

In order to reach these goals, a merger of the City's efforts to aid its poor was recommended. The Human Resources Administration was to be responsible for taking over existing organizations and their programs and establishing new ones. Its organization would reflect four

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1. Dean Alex Rosen, INTERVIEW, November 18, 1969.
 2. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, p. 5.
 3. Ronald Sullivan, NEW YORK TIMES, January 6, 1966.
 4. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, p. 8.

major functional areas: manpower and employment, social services and public assistance, education and community development. In all of these, "serious and sustained efforts should be made to achieve full resident participation."¹

In manpower and employment, a Department of Manpower and Career Development would be created to provide job training and placement services paying particular attention to the City's poor neighborhoods. Regarding social services and public assistance, the Youth Board and Welfare Departments would be placed in the HRA. Hopefully, the solution to problems would be simplified by the comprehensive approach that could occur within a human resources framework. In the field of education, an Office of Education Liaison would "develop a closer working relationship between the City administration and the Boards of Education and Higher Education."²

The City's community development program the report noted was hazardous and lacked coordination.³ In order to get away from this and to increase participation of the poor, it made a number of proposals. The CAP would be revised in size so that it would have special roots among the poor.⁴ It would however continue to set goals and priorities and thus function as the City's top community action policy-making body. In the City's poor neighborhoods community corporations would be established and the maximum participation of the area residents would be

1. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, p. 18.

2. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, p. 9. In 1969, the Office of Education Liaison was abolished following a City Council recommendation.

3. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, p. 13.

4. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, p. 8.

established and the maximum participation of the area residents would be encouraged. Lastly, a Department of Community Development would serve as an administrative unit and provide assistance to the Council¹ Against Poverty and community corporations.

More specifically, the SVIRIDOFF REPORT recommended that the CAP should have the following functions: examine resident participation in the poverty program, review applications for aid, pass an annual program budget, resolve corporate disputes, and evaluate the progress of community action programs. Funds would come primarily from the Federal government under Title II (for which the proposed Department of Community Development's Commissioner would consult with the Federal OEO to establish a guideline figure) and the City government (the APOB would be abolished). CAP would allocate half of its money to community corporations on the basis of need. The latter would then choose from among various local proposals, "subject to review by the CAP in the light of overall program goals." The other half would be used for general programs such as legal services or narcotics prevention. Besides community corporations, voluntary agencies, neighborhood groups and City agencies² could apply to CAP for funding.

The Council would consist of twenty-four representatives, twelve appointed by the Mayor and twelve representing the community corporations. The Mayor's appointments would include both the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The twelve community seats would be apportioned as follows: each Borough would have one, while seven communities in Brooklyn, Bronx, and Manhattan would select the remaining few. Because it was

1. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, p. 18.

2. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, pp. 8-11.

anticipated that it would take a few months to establish the community corporations, representatives of the existing community committees could¹ choose the first twelve representatives.

Each community corporation's governing board, which would hopefully become an influential community spokesman, would be responsible for local policy-making. Its method of selection would be determined by the community, which could rely on the technical assistance of the proposed Department of Community Development, and approved by the CAP. In general, it was recommended that the board consist of between fifteen and thirty members who were broadly representative of the community (including the poor). They could be elected directly, chosen at a convention of social welfare organizations, or appointed. The latter would hopefully only be used to complete or balance a board's membership.

The Community Development Department was to "be responsible for the operations of the community action program." More specifically, it was to provide technical assistance to the CAP and corporations, strengthen HRA's field operations and carry out other community development tasks chosen by the superagency. The Department's Commissioner would be in charge of all community development operations and was responsible for activating all of the City's community action resources. He would also be a liaison with the State and Federal Offices of Economic Opportunity² and would report directly to the HEA Administrator.

Sviridoff recognized that his proposals were not a panacea³ for the "biggest and most complicated problem affecting" New York City. He

1. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, pp. 18-19.

2. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, vol. 11, pp. 35-51.

3. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, p. 10.

believed however that a comprehensive program which would bring together diverse programs would be a more effective and more efficient approach to helping the City's poor.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 28

On August 15, 1966, the Office of the Mayor issued EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 28, "Creation of the Human Resources Administration." With some modifications, this was intended to enact Sviridoff's recommendations. By "grouping the various agencies of the City having relation to the development of the human resources," the Mayor hoped to avoid waste and duplication, get better planning and coordination, provide concerted leadership, making existing programs increasingly effective, and enhance the conditions for the initiation of new programs.

With these goals in mind, Section 1 created an HRA headed by an Administrator who was charged with developing a Program Planning Budget System, advising the Mayor regarding educational matters, and was to

plan, initiate, conduct, supervise, coordinate, review, and evaluate City programs and activities in the Attack on Poverty, including the areas of community action and development, manpower and career development, social and youth services and public assistance.

The Department of Welfare, Youth Board and NYC Commission for the Foster Care of Children were placed in the HRA as was the Department of Community Development.

1. Although it does not affect the substance of this thesis, it should be noted that since 1966 the HRA has been substantially reorganized. On January 30, 1973, HRA Administrator Jule M. Sugarman announced that as a result of the latest reorganization HRA now consisted of five Departments, each headed by a Deputy Administrator; Management Services, Employment, Income Maintenance and Community Development. See, Unsigned, NEW YORK TIMES, January 31, 1973.

During the period in which the actions examined in this study were made, HRA was criticized for being a "loosely aligned confederation," whose components were "virtual dutchies." See respectively, City Council of New York, FINAL REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO MAKE AN IN-DEPTH STUDY

Much of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 28 was concerned with creating and outlining the structure and functions of the major concern of this study, the Council Against Poverty. The previous Council was abolished and replaced with one consisting of twenty-eight (Sviridoff had recommended twenty-four) members, each serving two year terms. Fourteen of these would represent "residents of the areas and members of groups served." By mid-September, these would be appointed by the governing bodies of the local program in each of the fourteen poverty areas. The other fourteen, all appointed by the Mayor would be representatives "of public and private educational and social services agencies, labor, business religious and minority groups." From these fourteen, the Mayor could appoint¹ two members to serve as Chairman and Vice-Chairman.

By providing fourteen seats in the residence of poverty areas and a like number in other interested groups, the Mayor went far beyond the recommendations of the OEO whose COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM GUIDE suggested that "representatives of the poor should comprise approximately

OF HRA (New York: City Council, July 24, 1969), p. 6, and Francis X. Clines, NEW YORK TIMES, July 25, 1969. Some of this lack of unity may have resulted from the fact that the Mayor alone was empowered to hire or fire commissioners. While it is probably safe to assume that he consulted with the HRA Administrator before taking such actions, the latter's influence depended upon his influence with the Mayor.

HRA's Central Staff, which lacked operational responsibilities, provided the constituent agencies with a variety of services and some coordination. These were reviewed for the period covered in this study in HRA 1969-70 BUDGET REQUEST published on January 12, 1969. To cite several examples, the Office of Centralized Management provided payroll, fiscal and personnel services. The Public Affairs Office coordinated press and public information services. Legal and contractual affairs were handled by the General Counsel. Other components of HRA Central in 1970, the functions of which were apparent in their titles, included, the Office of Program Review, Office of Program Development and the Community Relations Office.

1. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 28, Section 3, paragraphs a, c, and d.

one-third of the policy-making body for local community action agencies."¹
 Indeed, he went even further than these numbers indicate because some of his noncommunity ties and were interested in strengthening the positions of the local community in the City's poverty program.

In effect, as Table 2 demonstrates, the community representatives and their allies held a majority of the newly appointed Council seats. While their original representation was thirteen out of twenty-five seats or fifty-two per cent, they could also count on the backing of MFY and the two minority groups seats. Thus, community seats and other CAP members who were strongly community oriented occupied sixteen of the twenty-five seats (sixty-four per cent).

Table 2.

Council Members Under Executive Order No. 28*

Government Representatives	Community Representatives	Other Groups Representatives
New York City - 0	Brooklyn - 5	Education - 1
New York State - 0	Bronx - 3	Social Services - 6
	Manhattan - 3	Labor - 1
	Queens - 2	Business - 1
	Staten Island - 0	MFY - 1
		Minority Groups - 2
Totals	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>

*Data gathered from Jack Kifner, NEW YORK TIMES, September 15, 1966.

Six CAP functions were outlined in Section III, paragraph b: it would determine goals and priorities, help create community corporations as the basic means of citizen participation, review and approve or deny applications for aid for the corporations and other agencies (including

1. Washington, 1965, vol. 1, p. 18

those denied funds by the corporations), adopt an annual budget which would specify how much money was allocated to each area, request and receive from OEO Title II funds, and require the Administrator to provide estimates of the cost of the antipoverty program.

Editorials in the NEW YORK TIMES were pleased with both the SVIRIDOFF REPORT which was lauded on June 27, and the creation of the HRA which was envisioned as "eliminating much of the overlapping and plan-¹lessness. The City Council however did not look too favorably on its creation. At one point, Queens Councilman Sadowsky, who was Chairman of the Codes Committee which was considering the bill for the establishment of HRA, warned the Mayor that his appointment of high salaried executives prior to receiving City Council approval might endanger his legis-²lation. Seven years later, the HRA still has not received the Council's approval.

July 1966 through July 1968

In the two years following the issuance of EXECUTIVE ORDER 28, the CAP was very active. Plenary meetings were held at least semi-monthly, and often more frequently. Out of these sessions numerous budgets were adopted, community corporations were established, and applications for aid were approved and denied. Among other Council actions in this period, it approved the community corporation concept presented in the SVIRIDOFF REPORT, agreed that each community's financial allocation would be based on its percentage of the City's poverty, approved an appeals procedure from community corporation elections to the Council, and agreed that

1. Editorial, NEW YORK TIMES, September 20, 1966.

2. Clayton Knowles, NEW YORK TIMES, December 27, 1966.

1

community corporations could become prime contractors. It also established numerous committees and the practice of having these review matters before bringing them before the Council.

During this period both the Mayor and NEW YORK TIMES agreed that the City's poverty program was of much value. Thus, in late August 1967, Mayor Lindsay praised the CAP stating that it was successful in getting the programs to the people, improving administration and coordinating with job training and placement programs.² His interest in participation of the poor was praised in a NEW YORK TIMES Editorial on April 12, 1968 which stated that by deliberately including the poor in City government programs, particularly in poverty and on the urban action task forces, the Mayor helped limit the rioting which occurred in the aftermath of Martin Luther King's death.

The Green Amendment

A later change in the organization of New York City's poverty program was the result of Federal legislation. When Congressional hearings began in 1967 to extend the existing Act, it became clear that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction both with the way that the poverty program as well as with its results. Changes were definitely in store, the only question being their extent.

To a large extent, the new Act, "the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967," was influenced by Rep. Edith Green (D., Ore.), the second ranking member of the House Education and Labor Committee and no friend of an independent poverty program. Perhaps the best indication of her influence was that the new Act was referred to as the Green Amendment.

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, October 27, 1966, December 1, 1966, March 9, 1967 and March 21, 1968.

2. John Kifner, NEW YORK TIMES, August 27, 1967.

Congresswoman Green believed that "those who spend public money ... should and must be accountable to their fellow citizens through the democratic process ... locally elected commanders will be responsible for local successes and local failures."¹ Her Amendment required that one-third of the seats of the governing boards of community action agencies be allocated to "public officials including the chief elected official," and limited both the size of the board and length of term of its members.²

Executive Order No. 84

New York City EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 84, effective July 1, 1968 had as its only purpose compliance with the Green Amendment. It was an amendment to EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 28n and stipulated the exact same six functions cited in NO. 28, in some cases using the identical wording of the earlier ORDER. The most important part of it was Section C which increased the Council's size from 35 (as new community corporations were recognized they were given a seat on the CAP) none of whom were City officials, to 51, including 17 elected and appointed City officials.³ More specifically, 25 seats were to be held by "representatives of the poor Nine by members of business, industry, labor, religious welfare or other major groups ... Seventeen ... by public officials." Paragraph d increased the terms of CAP members who were not public officials to three consecutive years but no more than a total of six years.

1. U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 90th Congress, 1st Session, November 7, 1967, vol. 113, Part 23, p. 31416.

2. Public Law 90-222, Section 211, paragraphs b and d (1).

3. Community Development Agency, Community Development in New York City (New York City: Community Development Agency), 1969, p. 8.

Public officials however could serve unlimited terms.¹

In reorganizing the CAP the Mayor used what discretion he possessed to provide extra representation for the City's largely Black and Puerto Rican poor. Thus, while the Federal legislation required that one-third of the CAP consist of public officials, it also required that at least one-third of the members represent the poor. The Mayor could appoint a larger percentage of the CAP from the poor, and this he did, allocating one-half of Council seats to representatives of the poor.

Mayor Lindsay and the 1969 Election

In effect, by providing extra representation to the poor, and by encouraging Black and Puerto Rican participation, the Mayor was seeking minority backing. That he was at least moderately successful is clear. Thus, although we are getting somewhat ahead of our chronological development, and although the different line-up of candidates and different configuration of issues does not allow too much to be inferred from a comparison of voting results in the 1965 and 1969 elections, a review of them does offer some potentially interesting conclusions.

In 1969 Mayor Lindsay doubled his vote among the City's Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Obviously this may not be attributed solely to the poverty program. His Democratic opponent was clearly unattractive to minority group members. Nevertheless, after recalling the numerous pro-Lindsay posters in both private offices and in the lobby of the CDA-CAP shared building, it appears that Lindsay's poverty strategy did pay off² with an increase in his total of minority group votes received in 1969.

1. All of these changes were mandated by PL 90-222, Section 211, paragraphs b and d (1).

2. David Rosenbaum, NEW YORK TIMES, March 27, 1969.

Table 3

Black and Puerto Rican Voting in two Mayoral Elections (in percentages).*

Candidate	Black Vote		Puerto Rican Vote	
	1965	1969	1965	1969
Beame	60		68	
Lindsay	40	80	32 (under)	63
Procaccino		13		26
Marchi	—	<u>7</u>	—	<u>11</u>
	100	100	approx. 100	100

*Figures appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES of November 4, 1965 and November 9, 1969. Earlier figures compiled by Oliver Quayle Associates; 1969 data compiled by Richard Scammon, former Director of the U. S. Census Bureau.

Summary

In summary, this Chapter reviewed the development of the Citywide poverty structure from its inception under Mayor Wagner through the beginning of the period that is the principal concern of this study. This review's purpose was to contribute to both understanding the background from which the Council emerged, and to unravel the complex tangle of events that marked this period. It was also observed that Mayor Wagner sought to minimize maximum feasible participation and to maximize government control. As the City's Puerto Ricans and Blacks were already committed to him, he believed that maximum feasible participation would

The Mayor's 1971 switch from the Republican to the Democratic Party occurred for several reasons. In 1969 he lost the Republican Primary to State Senator John Marchi. Opportunity for upward movement in that Party was blocked by a Republican Governor and a first term Republican President. As the Democratic Mayor of the nation's largest City he would have an opportunity at getting his Party's nomination for either Governor or the Presidency. Lastly, it is probable that Mr. Lindsay believed that the Democratic Party offered the best hope for ending what he perceived of as the regressive national policies of the Nixon Administration.

lead to an antagonizing of other groups that were similarly committed to him. Mayor Lindsay however, by providing for maximum community participation, had an opportunity to stimulate the pro-Lindsay political participation of the Black and Puerto Rican minorities which had not favored him in his 1965 campaign.¹

We also saw that by the fall of 1968, New York City's poverty program was a complex arrangement involving multiple and intersecting sets of representative bodies and a major executive agency to operate and manage programs and projects in the communities directly or through a supervisory process. Community corporations, which were to serve as the basic instrument of community action and resident participation in the City's 26 poverty areas were created or being created. The Community Development Agency was established as a major constituent unit of HRA to implement Citywide poverty policy. Overall policy-making was to be made by an unpaid 51 member Council Against Poverty.

1. The concluding Chapter examines some of the ramifications of this increased Black and Puerto Rican participation.

CHAPTER III. EXAMINATION OF THREE COUNCIL/ACTIONS

A. Introduction and Case Studies

Council Meetings

Physical Layout and Members

During the period of this study, the CAP usually met biweekly at the Brotherhood in Action building at 41st Street and Seventh Avenue, or in a conference room in the HRA complex at 200 Church Street. Both of these chambers discouraged mass participation because their seating capacities were respectively limited to a maximum of seventy-five and fifty.¹ Additionally, the use of the former site further limited discussion because those premises frequently had to be vacated before 11 P. M.

Meetings were generally called to order in an informal manner by the Council Chairman who sat at the far end of a rectangular shaped series of tables. To his right was CDA Commissioner Major Owens and on his left was the ?Council Staff Director, Raleigh Davenport. All three were Black.²

The above setting seldom varied during the period examined, although a visiting commissioner, such as Cyril Tyson of the Manpower and Career Development Agency (MCDA) usually sat alongside the Chairman. The appearance of Council members was probably as varied as any such group in the nation. There were men and women, Blacks, Puerto Ricans and white, with ages ranging from the late twenties through the mid-sixties. Some were dressed in mod clothes, others in the severe garb of the Hasidic rabbi. Clergymen were present, including priests, ministers and a nun.

1. On one occasion, when over two hundred angry people showed up to protest funding cuts (an anger that increased when told that they could not enter the meeting room), a potentially dangerous situation was averted when the meeting was moved into an auditorium large enough to seat everyone.

2. Thus far, all four Council Chairmen have been Black. The first of the two CDA Commissioners was white.

Attendance

After noting the meeting's physical layout, perhaps the first fact one becomes aware of is the paucity of members present. With a total of fifty-one members, it was difficult to get thirty of them (four more¹ than a quorum) to attend a meeting. On numerous occasions meetings lacked quorums or were delayed for up to three hours. In fact, few began on time for many Council members worked a full day and thus could not arrive at meetings until 7 or 8 P.M. even without stopping for dinner. Recognizing this, the Council provided a buffet style dinner for members who were able to use the time before meetings to eat, relax, review the evening's agenda, and discuss current issues.

The attendance record for a twenty-five month period, beginning June 1967 and ending with the last June meeting in 1969, revealed that perhaps fifteen per cent of Council meetings failed to convene as a result of the lack of a quorum of one-half of the membership (others were undoubtedly² cancelled when it became apparent that a quorum would not be present). Thus quorums were lacking on June 13, July 6, August 31 and December 28,

1. With 51 members, the Council is sufficiently small so that it may be worthwhile to investigate the relevance to the events examined of small group research. While the potential for doing so will be reviewed in Chapter IV, at this point it is important to realize that although the terms small group and primary group are frequently used interchangeably, they are not necessarily synonymous.

In the classic study by Charles H. Cooley, *SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS* (New York: Scribner's, 1909), pp. 23-24, primary groups were defined as "those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation." He further noted that these groups involve "the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which 'we' is the natural expression." While such groups are usually small, Michael S. Olmsted, *THE SMALL GROUP* (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 22-24, has observed that all small groups are not primary. Thus, while a group of fifteen volunteers operating in an ad hoc experimental setting is small, it is unlikely to possess the sense of "we" discussed above.

2. This period was chosen because of the availability of the records.

1
1967; January 18, 1968, and February 27, April 24, and June 19, 1969.

On other occasions, meetings began as unofficial discussions without
2
quorums and were convened when a quorum was present.

Perhaps the highest percentage of members at a meeting was on April
18, 1968 when Mayor Lindsay and Administrator Ginsberg attended a Gracie
3
Mansion meeting. Thirty-three of thirty-five members of the pre-Green
Amendment expansion were drawn to the meeting by the attraction of the
4
guests and the location. More typical was the preceding April 18th and
the following April 25th at which twenty-two and twenty-six members were
5
present.

In fairness to Council members it should be made clear that at times
meetings were hastily called and Council members did not receive notifica-
tion of them until shortly before they were to begin. At the same time,
members also attended meetings of Council committees as well as those of
6
community corporations and other groups. It became physically grueling to
attend all of these, especially if at the same time one had both family
and work responsibilities. At least one CDA staff member believed that

1. See, COUNCIL MINUTES for these dates.

2. See for example, COUNCIL MINUTES, May 16, 1968 and May 18, 1969.

3. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, April 18, 1969.

4. On July 1, 1968, when the Green Amendment became effective, the Council was expanded to fifty-one members, seventeen of whom were New York City officials.

5. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, April 11, and April 25, 1968.

6. During busy periods, it was not unusual to spend three nights a week on Council matters. This was common in most community action agencies. See, for example, Louis A. Zurcher, POVERTY WARRIORS (Austin University of Texas, 1970), p. 167, where it is noted that this was also the case in Topeka, Kansas.

meeting attendance was low because members felt that their power to bring about change was limited and they did not have a financial incentive to attend meetings that often lasted for up to six hours.

On the basis of their attendance, it appears that most public officials had relatively little interest in Council matters.¹ As in San Francisco, where Kramer (PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR, p. 60), noted the higher absenteeism of government officials, this too was the case in New York City. One elected official advised this writer that he had appointed an alternate to attend meetings and since she became ill, he had not had a representative at a meeting "in months." This lack of interest may be explained by any one or combination of the following: as full time government employees they viewed their Council work as part of their jobs and therefore were not as dedicated as community representatives; they were often white in a body dominated by minorities; their supervisors may have advised them to play a minimal role; and, often the alternate could not attend a meeting and simply appointed a largely uninterested but available subordinate, one who could not vote, to attend in his place.

While the CAP has not taken any action against absent members, its BY-LAWS do provide for such eventualities. Article II, Section 6 required Council members to advise the Council Chairman regarding absences. The latter was empowered to report to the Council any member who had three unexcused absences and to ask that body to recommend action. Section 5 provided that after a special meeting the Council could recommend to the Mayor that an individual member be suspended or expelled "for conduct prejudicial to the" Council's interests (presumably, this included excessive absences).

1. A strong exception to this was the Mayor's Alternate, Mr. Lewis Feldstein.

The Agenda, Reports, Discussion and Voting

The first action of each Council meeting was the review and approval of the proposed agenda. This was usually drafted by the Chairman with the advice of the Staff Director, CDA Commissioner and committee chairmen who were interested in presenting reports. It was usually placed in an information folder which each Council member received upon entering a Council meeting. While changes were made prior to approval, these were usually of an insignificant nature. Typical of these was a proposal to bring an item from far down the agenda to the beginning in order to allow someone who had to attend another meeting that same night to leave early or to shorten the wait of visitors who were interested in a specific agenda item.¹

Following the agenda's approval, the Chairman then moved to the first order of business - The Commissioner's Report. Commissioner Owens would then spend approximately fifteen minutes summarizing how he had followed up Council resolutions since the last meeting and reminding members that certain programs had to be approved in the immediate future because of OEO deadlines. This was followed by a period of questioning which at times became hostile. When this was concluded, the next agenda item -² usually a committee report - was presented.

Council debate and discussion varied greatly from question to ques-

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, May 8, 1969, p. 4.

2. Briefly speaking, the Council had twelve committees which reviewed policy for all of the City's poverty areas in such fields as education, manpower, and legal services. Additionally, there were twenty-six panels, one for each poverty area. Any issue relating to that particular area, ranging from the creation of a community corporation to approving a summer program was first examined in the area's panel. The functions of committees and panels are more extensively examined below, in the section entitled, "The Role of Committees and Panels."

tion. Usually the shortest discussion followed a panel's favorable report regarding a community corporation's budget. However, when the panel and community representative were at odds, one could expect long and loud protests by the latter and his allies.

All Council members did not participate equally in discussions. Those who dominated any particular discussion were usually the chairman of a committee presenting a report or the community representative from an area whose program was being reviewed. Some members, such as the Council Chairman, and several community representatives stood out as being informed, articulate and willing to speak.

Council debate followed parliamentary rules of procedure. In choosing speakers, the Chairman recognized them in the order in which their hands were raised. Direct questioning by Council members was not permitted: instead, all questions had to be addressed to the Chairman. If he was unable or unwilling to answer, he would request the relevant information from a staff member or allow a Council member to address the body.

The Council's voting was relatively simple. The only voting procedure used was a show of hands, and these were usually tallied by the Council Chairman. Only the names of abstainers, and there were relatively few of these, were recorded in the meeting's minutes.

The Community Corporations and the CAP

The establishment of community corporations in each of the City's poverty areas was one of the principal recommendations of the SVIRIDOFF
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REPORT. It is clear that they were to be subordinate to the CAP because

1. Because of the need to narrow the focus of this study in order to make it manageable, we were not able to explore the perceptions the board of directors of community corporations had of the role (s) of their representatives on the Council.

Section 3 (b) of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 28 empowered the Council to recognize and presumably to withdraw recognition from a community corporation. Additionally, the Council was to determine each corporation's annual allocation, had to approve their programs and budgets, and was to establish priorities for the City's poverty program.

Corporation Recognition

The recognition by the Council of a community corporation involved a series of steps. After a community was designated a poverty area by the CAP, this was publicized by CDA staff members. Following a series of public meetings, the area residents elected a planning committee. The latter, with the assistance of CDA, was responsible for the drawing up of a plan for the establishment of a community corporation. Plans usually contained such information as the area's boundaries, population data, the size of the board of directors, the frequency of elections and voting requirements. Also to be noted is that they discussed the corporation's goals in such fields as economic development, manpower and education and contained a statement that, "The relationship between the Corporation Board and Central Staff must ... be based on a clear understanding of the distinction between policy matters and administrative or operational matters."

When the planning committee completed a draft of its work, it held a series of public meetings in the community. Ultimately the plan was reviewed by a Council committee and the full Council. Following the latter's approval, residents of the community elected a board of directors.

Index of Poverty

Once a community was designated a poverty area by the Council it was assigned an index of poverty which determined its annual allocation. This

1. Crown Heights Community Committee, CROWN HEIGHTS MASTER PLAN (New York City: Crown Heights Community Committee, 1968), Section IV, p. 7.

index was a community's percentage of the poverty existing within all of the City's poverty areas, as measured by such factors as its welfare and juvenile delinquency rates. For example, the East New York section, with an index of 3.5 was entitled to receive 3.5 per cent of funds allocated by the CAP to community corporations for year-round community action programs.¹ The advantages of this formula were that it allocated money on the basis of need and not "noise" and it enabled corporations to plan for the coming year because they could anticipate the approximate aid they would receive.²

CAP Guidelines

When a community corporation's board of directors was informed of its allocation for the coming fiscal year, it was required to draw up a budget that conformed to Council guidelines. In Program Year 1969/70 these stipulated that twenty per cent of a corporation's budget was to be used for education action, fifteen per cent for manpower, fifteen per cent for housing, and ten per cent for economic development. The remaining forty per cent was unprogrammed and could be spent by the corporation for other programs.³ Naturally, the above figures were minimums and the corporation could choose to use its unprogrammed funds to exceed them.

In 1969 the CAP mandated that each community corporation decentralize its operations and provide for the operation of as many programs as possible by delegate agencies. For example, on the Lower East Side there were twenty delegate agencies directly operating programs. The nature of the

1. Funds for summer programs were allocated on the same basis.

2. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL AGAINST POVERTY, 1966-67, p. 3.

3. Community Development Agency, VERSATILE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, 1969/70 (New York City: Community Development Agency, 1969), p. 13.

programs varied, but they had to conform to the guidelines cited in the previous paragraph. Informally, the community corporation, which was required to approve delegate agency programs before passing them on to the Council for review, was also obliged to pay heed to such local factors as ethnic diversity. On the Lower East Side this means that a Chinese dominated delegate agency was to be funded as well as the more frequent Puerto Rican and Black ones. Once a delegate agency was funded, it frequently became "locked in" and was fairly certain of being refunded the next year.¹

Community Corporation Organization

The basic organization of community corporations was approximately the same throughout the City. The board of directors was the legal representative of the corporation and was charged with carrying out the goals described in its Master Plan, as well as those announced by the CAP. It employed the staff, held all property, had fiscal responsibility, and determined corporation policy. "Once policies are established, it is the task of professionals to see that they are carried out."² The senior staff employed by a corporation usually consisted of an executive director, deputy director, and assistant directors in such fields as manpower, community development, and planning and research. Besides their operating responsibilities, staff was to maintain contact with other HRA agencies such as MCDA and the Youth Services Agency. Each corporation also had a number of specialists in such areas as housing, education and economic development. Lastly, there was a public information specialist

1. Community corporations usually operated some programs on their own.

2. South Jamaica Community Committee, SOUTH JAMAICA MASTER PLAN (New York City: South Jamaica Community Committee, 1968), p. 22.

Who was responsible for disseminating information about the corporation's activities in the area it served.

With this background, we may now turn to the case studies.

Case Study 1: Revising the Crown Heights Community Corporation Plan

Mr. Charles Rodriguez stated that he merely wanted to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that the Crown Heights Community Corporation Plan should be amended since the community felt that one-half of the elected members of the Board should be poor. The present plan stipulated at "least one-third," He moved that the Crown Heights Corporation Plan be amended to read "one-half of the elected members must be poor, according to the Council's poverty index." It was seconded by Rabbi Neumann.¹

The above quotation is nearly the entire CAP transcript of the first action to be examined, the January 9, 1969 revision of the Crown Heights Community Corporation Plan. At that meeting, the Council agreed by a 25 to 0 vote, to revise part of the representation clause in the Crown Heights Plan so that one-half of the elected members (instead of one-third) had to be poor.

This study is an examination of how and why this action was taken. We shall see that the determination was essentially a function of the neighborhood's ethnic pattern. What was involved was a deep seated suspicion harbored by the affected Black and Jewish groups towards each other. These feelings were exacerbated by the poverty program which brought competition over material rewards such as jobs and psychological ones such as social status and recognition. The dynamics of this CAP action give support to Daniel P. Moynihan's observations, that

In a city such as New York, where the poor are not so exclusively Negro, the potential for ethnic conflict for control over the CAP's especially within the framework of the election of poor representatives, provided plentiful opportunities for ethnic conflict.²

While the cause of the conflict that had to be addressed by Council

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, January 9, 1969, p. 5.

2. Daniel P. Moynihan, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 139.

action was the Black-Jewish hostility in the community, the specific content of the Council resolution was worked out informally in a Council Panel by the Panel Chairman and the Crown Heights Area Delegate. In doing so, they had to consider the Council's earlier approval of a resolution which stipulated that one-third of the members of a Community Corporation's Board of Directors had to consist, not of representatives of the poor as the OEO guideline specified, but of the poor. The latter was a minimal guideline which the Crown Heights Panel could, and in this case did, exceed. Once the Crown Heights Panel agreed to its recommendation, it placed it before the Council where it was unanimously approved.

Background of the Crown Heights Representation Action

Hasidic-Black Relations in Crown Heights

One of the most widely reported events in the last decade in Crown Heights was the May 1964 organization of a volunteer group to provide sundown to sunrise safety patrols. Organized by a Hasidic Rabbi, Samuel Schrage, the two hundred member Maccabees of the community used radio-equipped cars to provide escorts to late workers and to serve as a crime deterrent.

To some members of the community however, the patrol represented undesired vigilante action. Many Negro leaders denounced it as a blatantly racial act and the official police response was cool (unofficially many policemen appeared pleased). Some negative attitudes towards the Maccabees changed after the rape-murder of a local school teacher, and the change of the patrol's name to the Citizen's Community Patrol. Indeed, it managed to attract three score non-Jewish volunteers who were urgently needed for the Jewish Sabbath¹ when neither travel nor manning the telephone center were permitted.

1. Special note should be made of the unique nature of the Hasidic

The 1964 formation of the Maccabees is cited here for two reasons, both related to the 1969 Council action that is the focus of this case. On the one hand it demonstrated the organizational ability of the Hasidim who were able to bring together 200 of their members under Rabbi Schrage. At the same time it showed that while Jews and Blacks lived close to one another, intergroup tension was still alive (as we shall see, this tension would shortly be extended to the poverty arena¹). In fact, although both groups lived in Crown Heights there was little intermingling. The Hasidim were and remain highly concentrated within a sixty block area bound by Empire Boulevard in the south, Eastern Parkway in the north and Rogers and Utica Avenues in the west and east.² The two groups do rub shoulders in some shops and stores, but conversation is rarely involved. Entertaining is one another's home is rare (the Hasidim may only eat in a Kosher home³) and Hasidic children "never enter a public playground unsupervised since these are considered Negro territory."⁴

community. As a group, it is highly integrated internally, and its members are very religious and homogeneous with respect to the rest of New York City's Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Furthermore, their leaders are articulate and have established lines of communication with public officials.

1. On this point, that physical proximity alone does not breakdown intergroup antagonisms, see, J.A. Neprash, "Minority Group Contacts and Social Distance," in *PHYLON*, vol. 14, pp. 207-212; also, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *BEYOND THE MELTING POT* (Cambridge: MIT PRESS, 1963), esp. p. 71, where the authors observe that Jewish-Negro tension is common because the former is just ahead of the latter and frequently owns his shops and homes.

2. Michael Cohn, *CROWN HEIGHTS AND WILLIAMSBURG: A COMPARISON OF TWO HASIDIC COMMUNITIES IN BROOKLYN* (Brooklyn: Brooklyn Children's Museum, 1964), p. 3.

3. Socializing with non-Hasids is regarded as a threat for it may bring assimilation. See, Solomon Poll, *HASIDIC COMMUNITY OF WILLIAMSBURG* (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 35.

4. *CROWN HEIGHTS AND WILLIAMSBURG*, p. 11. Relations between Blacks and Jews in the winter of 1968-69 were weakened by the United Federation of

Determining the Boundaries of the Crown Heights Poverty Area

When New York's poverty program was getting off the ground, the mostly residential Crown Heights community was not one of the fourteen neighborhoods originally designated a poverty area. In early March 1967, as part of a package deal involving eleven communities it was given this designation.¹ Following this, it was necessary to establish a Planning Committee that would draw up a plan for the creation of a Community Corporation. Before this body could take any action, the neighborhood's boundaries had to be settled.

One of the most difficult questions the Council has wrestled with was determining the boundaries of the City's poverty areas. According to the Council's ANNUAL REPORT 1966-67, "The exact boundaries of each poverty area were a continued source of friction and they had to be worked out block by block."² There were frequent disputes because the size of the poverty population within a district determined the amount of funds which would be allocated to that district. The latter was a result of the Council's 1966 acceptance of a recommendation by the Program and Geographic Priorities Committee.

That a major principle governing allocation of funds be that allocations to communities be in proportion to that community's percentage of the total /City/ population living under conditions of poverty according to the best indices that can be secured ³

Teachers strike of the previous fall which was viewed by many as a Black-Jewish confrontation.

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 1, 1967, p. 5.
2. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL AGAINST POVERTY 1966-67, p. 5.
3. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, December 1, 1966, p. 3.

Another reason that boundaries were important is that only people and groups living within the poverty area were eligible to receive funds and services from the local Community Corporation.¹

In determining boundaries the Council relied on the CDA to gather and organize dates provided by the City Administrator's Office, Youth Board, Department of City Planning and Department of Welfare. In Crown Heights, the Council was forced to work around Eastern Parkway which for all practical purposes served as a boundary separating the Orthodox and Hasidic Jews from the Blacks and Puerto Ricans.

That Eastern Parkway was in the center of Crown Heights was accepted by all ethnic groups. The problem was really one of determining how far north and south these boundaries extended. In the former direction is Bedford-Stuyvesant and the further north the boundary was extended, the more Black people would be included in the poverty area; conversely, moving it to the south, as the map demonstrates, would include more Jews.²

The boundaries of the poverty area were established at a Council meeting on May 11, 1967. To the north, east, and west are the contiguous poverty areas of South Brooklyn, Fort Greene, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and Brownsville. To the south, beneath Clarkson Avenue, the rest of Brooklyn, with the exception of Coney Island, consists of largely white middle class neighborhoods. Within this area there were 165,268 people according to 1965 statistical data.³ This population had a poverty index of 2.6

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, NEW YORK CITY POVERTY AREA MAPS (New York: CAP, 1967), p. 2.

2. CROWN HEIGHTS AND WILLIAMSBURG, p. 4. There the author states that the Hasids are moving south as a result of the influx of Negroes.

3. NEW YORK CITY POVERTY AREA MAPS, p. 12. The Puerto Rican population had little to say regarding the area's poverty program because of their small size and lack of organization.

which ranked it fifteenth out of the City's poverty areas and meant it¹ was eligible for 2.6 per cent of available funds.

Table 4

Population of Crown Heights in 1965*

	Negro	White	Puerto Rican	Total
Population	68,266	78, 857	18,145	165,268
Per cent of total	41.31	47.71	10.98	

*Source: CDA, COMMUNITY CORPORATION ELECTION MASTER PLAN (NYC:CDA, March 27, 1969), p. 41.

Corporation Elections

Running for a seat on the Board of Directors of a Community Corporation as large as Crown Heights presented a number of significant political consequences for the aspiring candidate. On the one hand it meant that the votes of the poor in one end of the district might have been cancelled by those of their better organized and more likely to participate middle-class neighbors. Also, it was more difficult for a poor unknown candidate to get elected in an at-large election than for a local lawyer or businessman who might have already gotten an area-wide following. Lastly, those who had more free time and ability to campaign across the district probably had a better chance of being elected.

In order to combat these disadvantages, the CAP made it official policy to divide each poverty area into a minimum of four election dis-

1. Monies allocated according to a community's poverty index are called versatile funds. Programs such as Headstart were administered on a city-wide basis and did not fall within this category. Versatile funds usually amounted to more than half of the City's poverty budget.

In spite of the fair share formula, Crown Heights has continuously received less than its fair share, while other areas, such as Central Harlem, received double their share. While the fair share ostensibly solved this problem, it was never totally adhered to. The reason for this is that the older overfunded areas managed to prevent any severe cuts in their allocations, rationalizing this position, as CDA employee observed, by the statement that such cuts would eliminate "too many jobs in one fell swoop."

tricts. The candidate for a seat on the local board of planning committee was required to live in the district he sought to represent and only district residents were eligible to vote for him. In determining these district boundaries, the aim was to find geographically compact areas with some sense of neighborhood, separated wherever possible by a natural boundary. In Crown Heights the basic natural boundary used was Eastern Parkway. The area was divided into six election districts, each to elect four members to the Planning Committee and subsequently to the Community Corporation's Board of Directors. Districts I, II, and III, were all south of Eastern Parkway and heavily Jewish. The others were north of the Parkway and heavily Negro.

Crown Heights Planning Committee

On October 30, 1967 the six election districts elected a 24 member Planning Committee to draft a Corporation Plan. The Black population north of the Parkway turned out in small numbers yet managed to capture eleven of twelve seats in their three districts. In Districts I, II, and III, the Hasidic community easily won all twelve seats, in spite of the fact that by official estimate a couple of thousand Jewish voters were turned away from the polling sites by overcrowding and a Jewish-Black¹ confrontation.

In casting their ballots, voters in Crown Heights as elsewhere often did not know what candidates stood for because little individual electioneering took place. Under these circumstances, they often voted on an ethnic basis for "Ethnicity may ... simplify choice ... especially in² a nonpartisan election." This is reinforced by the fact that political

1. Crown Heights Planning Committee Memo from Frank Espada to George Nicolau, CDA Commissioner, November 11, 1967.

2. Edgar Litt, ETHNIC POLITICS IN AMERICA (Glenview: Scott Foresman,

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discussion generally occurs within a homogeneous group. Also, when dealing with a cohesive group such as the Hasids, a member may correctly feel that a fellow Hasid, that is one who shares the same religious and secular beliefs would best represent his interests (in this case such voting was facilitated by the fact that Jewish candidates could frequently be identified by their clearly Jewish names). Conversely, the Blacks in Crown Heights were unorganized and lacked a tradition of communal solidarity.² It was consequently more difficult to get them to vote.

The newly elected Crown Heights Planning Committee proceeded to draw up a Corporation Plan using the Council's GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMATION OF COMMUNITY CORPORATIONS approved at an April 6, 1967 Council meeting. These GUIDELINES included specifications regarding election requirements, the minimum number of public meetings which had to be held and the need for representatives of districts to live in the areas they represent. The latter was to be significant in the action discussed here, as were paragraphs C and E of Section 1 of these GUIDELINES. The former empowered the Council Chairman to review the area's Corporation Plan. Paragraph E stipulated that the Panel had three options regarding a submitted Corporation Plan: acceptance, rejection or modification. Additionally, the full Council had to act on the Panel's recommendation within a month.

1970), pp. 20-21. For a discussion of why ethnic politics persists, see Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, vol. 61, 1967, pp. 717-726.

1. Bernard Berelson, et al. VOTING (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 105.

2. The turnout for the Planning Committee vote was 4,805 which ranked it fifth in the City in terms of its percentage (4.9%) of turnout.

Council Action

Racial and Ethnic Balance Plan

The Crown Heights Corporation Plan was reviewed by the CDA and the Crown Heights Panel, and approved by the Council on November 7, 1968.¹ It followed the Council's "Plan for Ensuring Racial and Ethnic Balance on the Boards of Directors of Community Corporations." The latter resulted from a Black-Puerto Rican conflict in the Hunts Point section of the Bronx. In 1965 the former gained control of the area's poverty program in spite of the fact that the population was 65% Puerto Rican, 30% Black and 5% white. Puerto Rican protests were largely ignored by the Economic Opportunity Committee. When an election for the new Community Corporation was held in October 1967, the Puerto Ricans were organized and gained control of 21 of the 24 elected seats. The final Board makeup, including appointments,² was 31 Puerto Ricans, 2 Blacks and 3 whites.

Black residents of the Hunts Point community complained to the Council about their underrepresentation. The Puerto Ricans answered that in 1965, when the situation was reversed, nothing was done. Additionally, they reminded the Council that at a Council meeting on December 8, 1966, it rejected ethnic quotas for the Boards of Directors of Community Corporations.³ The Black dominated CAP ignored the Puerto Rican claims and on January 18, 1968 ordered the addition of thirteen Blacks to the Corporation's Board in order to bring about racial balance. The Puerto Ricans

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, November 7, 1968, p. 5.

2. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, January 18, 1968, p. 4.

3. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, December 8, 1966, p. 5.

claimed discrimination in that their area alone was being asked to take steps to see that each of the community's ethnic groups was represented on the local Board according to that group's percentage of the area's population.¹ Ultimately they received the backing of Herman Badillo, who was the Borough President of the Bronx, Mayor John V. Lindsay and OEO. The Mayor observed that if the "Council insisted upon exercising this right ² to balance Boards it should be applied citywide." OEO Regional Director Josephine Nieves³ advised the CDA that her agency held a similar view.

Under the above pressures the Council passed the "Plan for Ensuring Racial and Ethnic Balance on the Boards of Directors of Community Corporations." They provided that two-thirds of a Community Corporation's Board of Directors would be elected and one-third would be selected. The appointed members were to be used to balance the Board's ethnic membership so that the percentage of each ethnic group's Board membership was the same as its percentage of the neighborhood's population. Furthermore, it specified that at least one-third of the elected and selected members of the Board must be poor. This went beyond the Office of Economic Opportunity requirements stated in COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 81, Part C, Paragraph 3, which held that one-third of such Boards must consist of representatives of the poor.

Apportioning Seats in Crown Heights

Returning to Crown Heights, as there were twenty-four elected and twelve selected members on the Board, the Council regulation meant that

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, January 18, 1968, pp. 4-6.

2. Peter Kihss, NEW YORK TIMES, January 26, 1968.

3. Peter Kihss, NEW YORK TIMES, February 5, 1968; also, letter from Regional OEO Director Josephine Nieves to CDA Commissioner George Nicolau.

eight elected members and four selected ones would have to be poor. For a number of reasons the difficulty in the Crown Heights situation was determining which eight of the elected members had to come from the target population.

As mentioned above, Crown Heights was divided into six election districts. To have required that eight or one-third of the elected members belonged to the target population ostensibly meant that each of the election districts would have had to elect one poor Board member and two of them would have had to elect two. This was a result of Section 1, paragraph G of GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMATION OF COMMUNITY CORPORATION which prohibited at-large elections. Various solutions were discussed and rejected. Thus to redraw election district boundaries so as to have eight districts instead of six would have been a massive technical task requiring months of work. It would also have been difficult from a political perspective, for it would have meant reopening the question of which areas would be Jewish and which Negro.¹ Also, the elections for the Corporation's Board of Directors, tentatively scheduled the next month, would have had to be postponed for at least sixty days. Increasing the size of the Board's elected members to thirty-six (or decreasing it to eighteen), ostensibly appeared to be a solution. In the first instance, if one-third or twelve of the thirty-six elected members were to be poor, it would have required two Board members from each Jewish and Black district to be poor. But, as one-third of the Board had to be selected, it would have also meant an expansion of the Board to fifty-four (thirty-six elected and eighteen selected). It would have been difficult to gain acceptance for this figure for the control of those in office would have

1. Mr. Joseph Neumann, Interview, January 28, 1970.

been diluted by a fifty per cent increase in membership. Additionally, such an increase might have made the Board too large to operate effectively. More matters would have had to be strictly regulated. Conversely, if the number of elected members were decreased from twenty-four to eighteen, some of those on the Planning Committee would have lost their seats.

Overriding the difficulties discussed in the preceding paragraph was the Jewish-Negro hostility discussed on pp. 2-3. In attempting to place eight poor candidates in the six election districts it was necessary to avoid a solution which could be interpreted by one group as appearing to favor the other.

Some help to the problem was found in Section II, paragraph A of the GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMATION OF COMMUNITY CORPORATIONS. There it was stated that of prime interest in drawing up a Corporation Charter was that it be tailored to the community. It should take into account the concentration of the poor, ethnicity, existing organizations and neighborhood and geographical divisions. In this case it meant that while the GUIDELINES specified that at least one-third of the Corporation's elected members be poor, it was just that, a guideline establishing a minimum of one-third. If the Crown Heights Planning Committee and CAP agreed, then that area's Corporation could have provided that one-half, two-thirds or even all of the elected members of the Board were required to be poor.

The Crown Heights Panel

According to the Crown Heights Panel Chairman, Charles Rodríguez, and the Crown Heights area representative, Rabbi Joseph Neumann, who sat on the Panel as a resource person but could not participate in its deliberations, the idea for a solution was first brought up at a Panel meeting

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by Mr. Rodriguez. He suggested that the problem could be solved by increasing the "at least one-third" to one-half. In that way, each of the six districts would have been required to elect two Board members who were poor. Thus, the Board's size would still consist of twenty-four elected members and twelve selected members and both sides would be treated equally.

Once the Panel agreed to this, Mr. Rodriguez proposed that one-half of the twelve selected members also be poor. Rabbi Neumann objected to this figure because it would have meant that one-half of the entire Board, far above Council requirements, be poor. His feeling was that only one-sixth of the selected members should be poor. The two agreed to the compromise figure of one-third.²

Throughout the Panel meeting, most members were fairly silent. They did not propose any alternatives but agreed to the proposals presented by the Chairman and Rabbi Neumann. No formal vote was taken on these matters but rather a consensus prevailed. Mr. Rodriguez believed that his meetings³ were highly informal and operated through a "feeling of consensus." In backing the Chairman, Rabbi Neumann did not have the approval of his Planning Committee. However, when he later presented to them the changes proposed by the Crown Heights Panel, they readily agreed to them.⁴ Thus did the Panel agree that twelve of the twenty-four elected members and four of the twelve selected ones were to come from the target population.

1. Being a Puerto Rican, Mr. Rodriguez was able to mediate conflicts between Jews and Blacks without incurring charges of favoring his own people.

2. This was confirmed in interviews with Mr. Neumann and Mr. Rodriguez.

3. Mr. Charles Rodriguez, Interview, February 3, 1970.

4. Mr. Joseph Neumann, Interview, January 28, 1970.

Council Approval

Just before the January 9, 1969 Council meeting, Rodriguez and Neumann met and agreed that the former would introduce the resolution and the latter would second it. They did not expect any opposition from the Council because the resolution was a noncontroversial one which applied to but one community, and because the Council had an established tradition of agreeing to Panel recommendations, especially where the community representative¹ agreed with them. And thus it was.

Role of the Community Development Agency

One other factor needs to be examined, the role of CDA. This Agency's field staff was broken down into ten District Offices, each providing assistance to two or three community corporations. They were responsible for making sure that programs within their jurisdictions were "executed within the policies and guidelines that are set forth for them."² Their significance was further indicated by the fact that they were at the center of a communications network in that all CDA communications to local groups were³ routed through them.

In spite of the above, there was no mention of CDA's role in this Council action. No reference was heretofore made since its role was of a general nature. It was neither specifically involved, nor was it a participant in the formal decisional structure as it operated for this Council action. Earlier, however, it provided the technical assistance needed to

1. Mr. Rodriguez believed that the Council's committees shared certain values with the parent body and hence the Council nearly always backed committee recommendations. Interview, February 3, 1970.

2. New York City Community Development Agency, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL (New York City: Community Development Agency, 1969), p. 1.

3. PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL, p. 3.

set up the Crown Heights Planning Committee; it alerted residents to the existence of the poverty program in the neighborhood; and it conducted meetings. Furthermore, it aided in the drawing up of the Planning Committee's Corporation Plan which was approved by the Council on November 7, 1968, helped determine the boundaries of the area's six election districts, and gathered statistical data regarding the neighborhood's ethnic makeup.

Having aided in all of the above, CDA was still charged with providing "technical assistance in the ... modification of plans." ¹ The reason it did not provide such assistance in this instance is that it was not called upon to do so. The issue of how to place eight poor members of the Crown Heights Community Corporation's Board of Directors in six election districts came up at a Panel meeting and was settled there. At that meeting no members of the CDA staff were present. Had the Crown Heights Panel failed to reach agreement, then it was possible that the CDA staff would have been consulted. However, as this was not the case, then the latter did not occur.

Elements Involved in the Council's Determination

Several components of Council policy-making, all of which will be further examined below, stand out in this study. This case demonstrated the importance of a Council Panel, its Chairman, an area delegate, and an informal process of decision-making. The resolution which the Council approved was drawn up by the Crown Heights Panel Chairman and the Crown Heights Area Delegate who assumed the backing of his Planning Committee. The Panel never formally voted on the issue before it, rather a "feeling of consensus prevailed."

1. GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMATION OF COMMUNITY CORPORATIONS, Section 1, paragraph F.

The Council unanimously approved the Panel's recommendation with no¹ discussion. The recommendation however conformed to earlier Council guidelines regarding the makeup of the Boards of Directors of Community Corporations as presented in the Council's "Plan for Ensuring Racial and Ethnic Balance on the Boards of Directors of Community Corporations." This document stipulated that a minimum of one-third of each Board had to be, not representatives of the poor as the broad OEO memoranda insisted,² but the poor. Thus the Crown Heights Panel could not expect the Council to approve a recommendation that did not meet the Council's minimum requirements. It could recommend, as occurred here, that a Corporation's Board of Directors consist of more than the minimum number of poor members required by the Council.

Implementation

So it was that on February 18, 1969, the voters of Crown Heights turned out to elect twenty-four members to their Community Corporation's Board of Directors. Eleven Jews, ten Blacks, one Puerto Rican and two³ Catholics were elected, half of whom were poor. For the next two months, the elected members demanded that those members who were to be appointed to the Crown Heights Board be members of their respective ethnic groups. Finally, at a June 10, 1969 Corporation meeting, it was agreed that the Board would be balanced by the selection of four Blacks, two Puerto Ricans,

1. This case was an example of what Truman was discussing when he observed that, "Even where virtual unanimity prevails in the legislature, the process of reconciling conflicting interests must have taken place - though perhaps at an earlier stage.... When this happens the legislature /read Council Against Poverty/ merely registers the decision. See, David Truman, THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 392.

2. Office of Economic Opportunity, COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 81, Part C (Washington: Office of Economic Opportunity, February 18, 1968).

3. American Arbitration Association Letter to Council Chairman, March 15, 1969.

and four Jews. Four of them, one Black, one Puerto Rican, and two Jews¹ were poor. Thus, both parts of the resolution introduced by Mr. Rodriguez and seconded by Rabbi Neumann and unanimously approved by the Council on January 6, 1969 were implemented: one-half of the elected members, and one-third or more of the appointed members of the Crown Heights Corporation's Board of Directors were poor.

Table 5

Crown Heights Corporation's Board of Directors*

Elected Members

District Number	Poor	Non-Poor	Ethnic Background
I		x	Jewish
		x	Jewish
	x		Jewish
	x		Jewish
II		x	Jewish
	x		Jewish
	x		Negro
		x	Puerto Rican
III		x	Jewish
		x	Jewish
	x		Jewish
	x		Jewish
IV	x		Negro
		x	Negro
	x		Negro
		x	Negro
V	x		Negro
	x		Negro
		x	Negro
		x	Negro

1. Letter, "Appointments to the Crown Heights Community Corporation Board," to Raleigh Davenport, Council Staff Director, from Isaih Brunson, Community Organizer, Community Development Agency.

* American Arbitration Association Letter to Council Chairman, dated 15 March 1969.

District Number	Poor	Non-Poor	Ethnic Background
VI		x	Jewish
		x	Catholic
	x		Catholic
	<u>x</u>		<u>Negro</u>
	12	<u>12</u>	11 Jewish
			10 Negro
			2 Catholic
			1 Puerto Rican

Appointed Members*

Poor	Non-Poor	Ethnic Background
	x	Jewish
	x	Jewish
x		Jewish
x		Jewish
x		Negro
	x	Negro
	x	Negro
	x	<u>Negro</u>
	x	Puerto Rican
<u>x</u>	<u>x</u>	<u>Puerto Rican</u>
4	6	4 Jewish
		4 Negro
		2 Puerto Rican

Totals:** 24 elected: 11 Jewish, 10 Negro, 2 Catholics, 1 Puerto Rican
 10 selected: 4 Jewish, 4 Negro, XXXXXX 2 Puerto Rican
 15 Jewish 14 Negro 2 Catholics 3 Puerto Rican

* Letter to Raleigh Davenport, Council Staff Director, from Isaiah Brunson, CDA.

** These totals exclude two youth representatives and consequently total 34 and not 36.

Case Study 2: The Council's Adoption of a Petition Procedure

This case study examines the Council's adoption of a procedure which groups of the poor that believed they were underrepresented on the Council could use to seek increased representation.¹ What we shall see, is that this Council action, the specifics of which were drafted by the Council Staff Director and the By-Laws Committee, was a response to a demand by Regional OEO. We shall also see that, with one minor exception, both the drafting and adoption of this procedure were marked by an essential lack of disagreement among Council members.

Background of the Petition Procedure Action

Congress and OEO

Amendments to the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, and OEO memoranda are of fundamental importance to this case for they made necessary the Council action. When the poverty program was first approved by Congress in August 1964, the original legislation provided that community action programs would be run by groups which were broadly representative of the poor. The following Congress approved an Amendment to the EOA, Public Law 89-794. Title II, Part A,

Required OEO to establish procedures for special groups such as minority groups, the elderly and the rural poor to petition for increased representation on community action boards if they felt their current representation was not adequate.²

COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 57. "Revised Requirements for Representation

1. The procedure, adopted on December 12, 1968, is reproduced in the Appendix.

2. According to OEO's, DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office), December, 1965), these groups had a much higher incidence of poverty than the rest of the population. Thus, fifty per cent of nonwhites and but twenty per cent of whites, twenty-seven per cent of rural inhabitants and but fifteen per cent of urban dwellers, and twenty-five per cent of the aged but poor.

of the Poor on the Governing Bodies of Overall Community Action Agencies," issued by OEO on January 11, 1967, was designed to implement this Amendment. It mandated that, "Each CAA shall establish procedures which provide a fair hearing for any representative group of the poor, ... which may feel itself inadequately represented on the CAA's governing body...." Furthermore, when such a petition was received by a community action agency, both the receipt as well as the action taken were to be promptly reported to the Regional Office of Economic Opportunity. Recognizing that such a petition would be useless if the community action agency was at its maximum size, the MEMO further stipulated that each community action agency had to provide in its By-Laws, "for expansion or review of its makeup ... in the event of approval of such a petition."¹

These petition requirements were never complied with by New York City's Council Against Poverty. Some members were against instituting such a procedure because they believed that it would force the Council to become heavily "engaged in appeals and requests on the part of the community to see that they are treated fairly."² Also, according to one source, some Blacks objected to such a procedure because they feared that it would increase the influence of the Council's Puerto Rican membership. Another possible explanation was that at times Council action was expedited by the need to meet a deadline. In this case however, there was no such coercive timetable.

When Congress met in 1967 to amend the EOA, there was considerable criticism of the poverty program's deficiencies. Public Law 90-222,

1. The Council's 1967 By-Laws never contained such a provision.

2. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 14, 1968, p. 2.

passed December 23, 1967 mandated changes in board membership and standards. Section 211, paragraph b of "Community Action Agencies and Boards" limited each board to a membership of fifty-one. One-third of these were to be public officials, at least one-third were to represent the poor, and the remainder were to represent labor, business, industry, religious and welfare groups. More important for this case however, was paragraph d (2) which stated that the OEO Director,

shall require community action agencies to establish procedures under which community agencies and representative groups of the poor which feel themselves inadequately represented on the community action board or governing board may petition for adequate representation.

COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 81 was designed in part to implement the last¹ quotation. It required the By-Laws of community action agencies to establish "procedures for implementing Section 211 (d) (2) and adjusting² and realigning board membership in any case where a petition is granted." As its predecessor, COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 57, it too specified that petitioners must have an opportunity to present their petitions and receive an answer in writing and that frivolous petitions could be prevented by requiring that petitions contain a minimum number of signatures. The MEMO specifically mentioned such potentially unrepresented groups as the elderly, minorities, migrants and the rural poor. Furthermore, it was noted that disregarding these standards could lead to a total or partial³ loss of funding under Title II.

1. The subject of this MEMO was, "The Organization of Community Action Agency Boards and Committees under the 1967 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act."

2. COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 81, Part C, Paragraph 5.

3. COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 81, Part C, Paragraph 5.

The By-Laws Committee and the Council's Review

In New York City, the Council's By-Laws Committee, chaired by Mr. Dennis Gardner, was responsible for revising the Council's BY-LAWS. As part of the general revisions in the BY-LAWS, it was to draft a "Petition Procedure." However, several factors delayed the Committee's completion of its work. These included the summer months when vacation made it difficult to schedule meetings, and the fact that revising the BY-LAWS was a lengthy and complicated task.¹ Consequently, OEO granted the Council a number of postponements regarding the submission of the proposed BY-LAWS. By September 1968 however, the OEO deadline for their submission was November 1, 1968. In order to meet this deadline, the Council agreed at its October 10, 1968 meeting to submit to OEO the draft of the revised BY-LAWS presented to it by the By-Laws Committee "until such time as the final document is completed."²

Black-Puerto Rican Dispute

The reason the BY-LAWS were regarded as incomplete resulted from a conflict between Committee Chairman Gardner who believed they were complete and a dissenting member of his Committee. The dissenter, Mr. Peter Lugo of the Hunts Point community was not present at a Committee meeting the previous week when it was agreed, without taking a formal vote, that the revised BY-LAWS would be submitted to OEO.³

Such contradiction of a Committee Chairman by one of its members

1. The drafting of a procedure through which unrepresented groups would seek the representation which they were numerically entitled to was but a small part of the total revisions of the BY-LAWS.

2. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, October 10, 1968, p. 17.

3. Mr. Dennis Gardner, Interview, March 11, 1970.

was uncommon. It occurred according to Mr. Lugo because, "Mr. Gardner is¹ a Black and I'm a Puerto Rican and we always disagree." This statement is placed in better context when one considers that Lugo was Chairman of the Hunts Point Community Corporation during the Black-Puerto Rican confrontation discussed in the last case and believed that the Blacks controlled New York City's poverty program to the disadvantage of the Puerto Ricans.²

Before this conflict between the two Committee members became more than a minor irritation, Council Chairman Greenidge managed to resolve their differences by suggesting to the Council that it submit the BY-LAWS³ presented "until such time as the final document is completed." Such action by Mr. Greenidge, which was readily agreed to by the rest of the Council, earned him widespread approval among fellow Council members. Currently Deputy Administrator of the Housing Development Administration, he did not attempt to dictate Council policy and usually provided information only when it was specifically requested of him. Greenidge ran meetings in a quiet manner always seeking to develop a consensus. As one respected Puerto Rican leader observed, "He was polished and knew how to⁴ deal with people."

1. Mr. Peter Lugo, Interview, March 4, 1970.

2. Committee Chairman Gardner avoided answering questions regarding a Black-Puerto Rican split. The importance of ethnic factors in the poverty program is examined in the conclusion.

3. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, October 10, 1968, p. 17.

4. The role of the Council Chairman in the Council's action is discussed below, in a separate section entitled "The Role of the Council Chairman."

The Council Approves the BY-LAWS and OEO Rejects Them

Six weeks later, at the November 21, 1968 meeting of the Council, what was viewed as the final draft of the BY-LAWS was approved. Present at that meeting was a representative from Regional OEO. In discussing the BY-LAWS, he mentioned that the Council's Executive Committee could act on behalf of the Council between meetings, but that such actions must be reported and approved at the next Council meeting.¹ Of more interest to this study however, he did not say anything regarding the need to institute a specific appeals procedure.

Once the Council approved the BY-LAWS, they were submitted to Regional OEO by Staff Director Davenport.² Shortly after the November 21st Council meeting (the exact date can not be determined because of the lack of access to the communication), Regional OEO advised the Council that the submitted BY-LAWS were incomplete and required the addition of other provisions. Article II, Section 7 of the BY-LAWS stated, "CAP shall adopt procedures regarding petitions for membership on the Council by community agencies and representative groups of the poor which feel themselves to be inadequately represented on the Council." OEO's objection to this was that "The procedures for implementation of the petition provisions for groups which feel themselves inadequately represented on the Council must be spelled out."³ In asking for a specific procedure, OEO

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, November 21, 1968, pp. 5-6.

2. Attached to the Council is a small staff of six people supervised by the Council Staff Director. The duties of this group are of a general secretariat nature, including the setting up of committee and Council meetings, insuring that quorums are present, typing minutes, and communications with other agencies. Its relationship with CDA is reviewed below, pp. 11-13, in the section on CDA's role in the Council's actions.

3. This was quoted from a letter to Council members, "OEO's RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCLUSION IN COUNCIL AGAINST POVERTY BY-LAWS."

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allowed the details to be determined by the local board.

In making this demand, Regional OEO was asking the Council to comply with the 1967 Amendments as well as COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 81. It was carrying out what former Deputy Regional Director Frank Ferro once referred to as its

responsibility for ensuring that our grantees are in compliance with the laws, with policies, with administrative guidelines, with formal accountability, composition of boards, representation on boards....2

The "Petition Procedure"

When Davenport received the communication from Regional OEO, he contacted the Chairman of the By-Laws Committee. Over the next two weeks, Mr. Davenport, who as a full time Council employee was expected to help the committees meet their responsibilities, spent much time drafting a procedure to satisfy OEO's demand. He was especially influential in doing so because he was able to devote much time to it and because as a lawyer he was familiar with drawing up documents of a legal nature.

The "Petition Procedure" was essentially written by Davenport in consultation with Committee Chairman Gardner. It was presented by them to the By-Laws Committee which approved it after a brief discussion, without taking a formal vote. It provided that any group of one thousand or more people who shared a factor which was germane to the problem of poverty and which was either unrepresented or inadequately represented by the representations of the poor on the Council, could request that the Council be

1. The reader will recall that in Chapter 1, p. 2, it was noted that we must determine whether OEO's involvement in the actions of the Council Against Poverty consisted of the establishment of guidelines which were to be followed by the latter or whether it at times played a more direct role in the Council's action.

2. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, May 23, 1968, p. 20.

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expanded to include them. Upon receiving this petition, the Council was required to appoint a committee to determine the validity of the claim and the committee was to report to the Council within one month.

The implementation of a petition which contained a valid claim was a difficult task. Once the Council agreed that a claim was valid, it had to request that the Mayor appoint additional Council members so as to represent the affected group. The number of these additional representatives should be such,

so that the proportion of people having the above described common characteristics /of poverty/ among the representatives of the poor on the Council Against Poverty approximates the proportion of people having this characteristic among the total poverty population.²

Thus, to use the example of the elderly, if twenty per cent of the poor people in New York City were elderly, then presumably twenty per cent or one-fifth of the twenty-six representatives of the poor on the Council should consist of people who were representatives of the elderly poor.

The problem with this procedure was that the Mayor could not increase the Council's size to provide representation for unrepresented groups because the 1967 Amendments limited its membership to the fifty-one members it already had. Of these, the Amendments specified that seventeen were to be public officials, at least one-third were to be representatives of the poor (in New York City it was broadened by the Mayor to one-half) and eight seats were allocated to social agencies. It appeared that the seats needed for the unrepresented groups could only have come from those held by social agencies. This was because it was nowhere specified how many

1. COMMUNICATION ACTION MEMO 81 suggested that in order to prevent frivolous petitions, fifty or one hundred signatures might be required. See, Bart C, Paragraph 5.

2. Appendix 1, Section 6, Paragraph A.

seats these agencies should have and their allocation could have been decreased without too much trouble because this bloc was probably the weakest on the Council because of their small numbers and the fact that they were frequently viewed as "establishment organizations" in an anti-establishment body.

Council Action

At a meeting on December 12th, where the Council unanimously approved the "Petition Procedure," each Council member received an envelope containing the meeting's agenda, OEO's requests for inclusion in the BY-LAWS, and a copy of the "Petition Procedure." The latter had earlier been reviewed by the Council Chairman and Commissioner Owens both of whom believed that it would satisfy OEO. Some Council members read both the requests and the "Petition Procedure." However, none of them asked any questions regarding potential implementation problems.¹

Elements in the Council's Determination

In summary, the Council Against Poverty, responding to a request by OEO, formally adopted a procedure which provided a method by which groups which felt themselves unrepresented or inadequately represented on the Council could seek the representation to which they believed they were entitled. The drafting of the procedure was accomplished by the Staff Director in consultation with the By-Laws Committee. Both the Council Chairman and the CDA Commissioner reviewed it before it was presented to

1. Clearly, Owens and Davenport should have made manifest the difficulties in implementing this procedure. While it is only in the realm of speculation, their failure to do so may have resulted from their belief that the procedure lacked significance because it was unlikely that it would be used. This view is reinforced by the fact that the major group it could have been applied to, the aged, was largely unorganized and unable to make use of the petition procedure. For an interpretation that severely limits the applicability of this procedure, see, p. 12.

Chairman and the CDA Commissioner reviewed it before it was presented to the Council. The proposed "Petition Procedure" was approved by Council members who viewed it as a noncontroversial matter and without inquiry accepted it as what was necessary to comply with OEO's request.

There are similarities and differences in the processes leading to Council action in this case and the last one. In both of them the Council unanimously approved without debate recommendations presented to it.¹ Another similarity between the two is that in neither instance did the CDA initiate the item or press it on the Council as a significant need with regard to CDA's operational role. Also, in both cases the Chairman of the relevant Committee played a larger role than the members of his Committee.

There are however important differences in the decisional dynamics for these Council actions. In this case OEO was more directly involved. It demanded that the Council adopt a petition procedure, the specifics of which were to be determined by the Council. Also, in the former case the Council Staff Director played no role, while in this one he was active in drafting the "Petition Procedure" and putting it in final form. Lastly, the substance of this case was such that it potentially enhanced the Council's role as an appeals board.

The Council's Appellate Function

The last statement, that this action potentially enhanced the Council's role as an appeals board needs to be further examined. Since the beginning of the poverty program, community action agencies have on

1. It should be observed that had Owens noted the difficulties in implementing the petition procedure, the noncontroversial nature of the resolution before the Council would have been diminished. It is likely that this would have led to both debate as well as a decreased chance of passage.

occasion functioned as appellate bodies. This was especially common in the larger cities where a citywide council coordinated policy for the neighborhood agencies. Generally the former had the power to review and affirm, reverse or modify many of the actions taken by the neighborhood agencies. For example, they were empowered to approve budgets and plans but lacked power over the specific people hired to carry these out.

In New York City, the appellate function was specifically written into EXECUTIVE ORDERS 28 and 84 which respectively created the Council and re-¹structured its membership. Section 3 of each of these provided that appeals from community corporations or delegate agencies whose application for funds were rejected would be heard by the Council. Indeed, but nine months after the issuance of EXECUTIVE ORDER 28, the Council adopted, on June 13, and June 22, 1967, procedures for appealing respectively, denials² of year-long and summer programs. The Council also sat as a judicial body resolving disputes arising out of elections held by community corporations. It agreed to listen to such appeals at a March 9, 1967 meeting and believed this power implicit in Section III, paragraph 2 of both EXECUTIVE ORDERS which specified that the Council could create and recognize community corporations. Furthermore, these review functions were stipulated³ in the CHARTER AND BY-LAWS approved on November 21, 1968.

One factor which these different appeals had in common was that they were all concerned with appealing to the Council situations existing

1. EXECUTIVE ORDER 28 created the Human Resources Administration including the Council Against Poverty. EXECUTIVE ORDER 84 modified the makeup of the Council.

2. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, June 13 and June 27, 1967.

3. See, Section 1, paragraphs b and d.

within one of the poverty areas. The representation petition procedure action reviewed here was a widening of this appellate function in that appeals could now be made by groups other than those which claimed they lacked representation on their community corporations.¹ From then on there was a formal procedure which could be used by groups which believed they lacked representation on the Council Against Poverty.

Council Implementation

While this Council adopted policy, which was one of our original sample of Council actions, appeared to be very important, it has thus far had no impact on representation² (this lends credence to the view that Owens and Davenport did not believe that it would be significant). Unrepresented groups were unaware of it or failed to make use of it because of their lack of organization or internal problems. Furthermore, according to one source, the previous Council Chairman believed that although there were such groups as the aged that lacked specific representation, they were indirectly represented on the Council through their community representatives. He therefore did not perceive the need for any special representation.

1. Council Chairman Greenidge once stated that it was Council policy "to review any request by a community group that questions representation on the boards of community corporations." See, Peter Kihss, NEW YORK TIMES, January 26, 1968.

2. This will be elaborated on in Chapter IV in our discussion of non-decision-making.

Case Study 3: The Withdrawal of Recognition From the Board of Directors of the South Jamaica Community Corporation

The withdrawal of recognition from the Board of Directors of the South Jamaica Community Corporation was one of the most important actions ever taken by the Council Against Poverty. As we shall see, what was basically involved here was an intra-Board struggle for control of the Corporation. The Board's leadership viewed this as an internal matter that should be settled without outside interference. The Council Against Poverty however was convinced by Commissioner Owens and Council Chairman Greenidge that it was necessary to take action because the failure to do so would ultimately threaten the stability of New York City's poverty program. In essence, this case went to the heart of a basic question of decentralization: how much power should a citywide body have in order to ameliorate community conflict and tension in a decentralized system?

As indicated, this case represented one of the Council's most important actions. More than one Council member believed that it demonstrated an important use of that body's power because it served as an example to community corporations that they could not with impunity challenge the power and authority of the Council and the Community Development Agency for these bodies were willing to take all necessary steps to ensure compliance with their mandates. Indeed, the action taken established a¹ precedent which would later be used in a similar situation.

1. Months later, acting on the South Jamaica precedent, the Council withdrew recognition from the Board of Directors of the South Bronx Community Corporation without raising much of a controversy, See, New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, October 23, 1969, p. 7. Four years later, in a matter involving electoral irregularities, recognition was withdrawn from the Brownsville Community Corporation. See, Unsigned, NEW YORK TIMES, September 16, 1973.

This action will be examined in greater detail than the other cases. This is done because of the need to review the intra-Board struggle that led to the action discussed here, and the fact that what was involved here was a configuration of related actions that taken together resulted in a significant policy determination. On March 6, 1969, as part of a lengthy resolution, the CAP agreed to call for new elections for the Jamaica Community Corporation's Board of Directors and to take that Corporation under emergency guidance unless it met certain "special conditions"¹ within five days. At the next Council meeting, when it was clear that the "special conditions" had not been complied with, the Council agreed to two other actions that were peripheral to the major one that withdrew recognition: it barred members of the Jamaica Community Corporation's Board of Directors from seeking reelection for one year and it increased the size of the Council's South Jamaica Panel which had to additionally function as that Corporation's Board of Directors.²

Before turning to these actions, we will first review the operations³ of the South Jamaica Community Corporation. It will be shown that the summary suspension of Executive Director Sharpe was the result of an intra-Board struggle for support of the area's poverty program.

1. See, below, p. 25, for the "special conditions." Disputes between board members and executive directors were not unique to New York City. Ralph Kramer, PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 37-41, observed that in a California City the firing of an executive director by the local board ultimately led to the resignation of both.

2. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 13, 1965, p. 15.

3. Much of what follows came from private sources that were not open to the public. These were as diverse as interviews with participants, the personal file of a City Commissioner, and copies of memoranda, telegrams, and cancelled checks. Because of the confidence in which these sources were made available, some of them are not cited.

Background to the Withdrawal of Recognition

At the time the matter discussed in this case was on the Council's agenda, the South Jamaica poverty area contained over 140,000 residents. Of the twenty-six poverty areas, its poverty index of 3.3 ranked it twelfth in the City. It was however by far the worst in the generally better off Borough of Queens.

Early Problems

When New York's poverty problem began under Mayor Wagner, each neighborhood's program was to be run by a locally elected community committee. In Jamaica, the Community Committee was elected in December 1965. From the beginning, relations between this body and the Executive Director were strained. For example, the Community Committee refused to allow him to hire Assistant Directors until August 1966. Matters came to a head one month later when the Director was discharged on the grounds that he never got the program started, that he kept poor personnel attendance records and that he "unwittingly allowed the fiscal officer to misappropriate over \$700.00 worth of funds."

In the fall of 1966, the Community Committee chose one of their own membership, W. Eugene Sharpe, as Executive Director. Mr. Sharpe was an attorney who had extensive experience in community affairs. He was held in such high esteem by the Executive Directors of the City's Community Corporations that they elected him Chairman of the Association of Community Corporation Executive Directors.

The Community Committee, as well as the Corporation that succeeded it in October 1967, did, however, acquire a reputation as being among the worst functioning in this City. Meetings occurred irregularly, staff reports were presented at similar intervals and such basic responsibilities of Boards of Directors as establishing policy and goals, as well

as developing programs were virtually ignored. It chose instead to concentrate on dominating the hiring and firing of personnel and meddling in routine administrative affairs. For example, a Personnel Committee was responsible for interviewing and hiring all employees above the level of blockworker. All others could technically be hired by the Executive Director, but he in fact needed the approval of this Committee.¹

The result of these practices was that staff selection was often based on political factors which had nothing to do with the ability needed to carry out the specific job for which the individual was hired. Thus the workers did not "pull together," but instead were encouraged to seek to advance their own interests. When one of them received a politically motivated promotion, there was an inevitable decline in the morale of his better qualified coworkers. Staff, especially at the middle management level, was thus unable to come up with effective programs.

The Corporation was also criticized for being dominated by clergymen, for possessing a middle class orientation and for being too closely allied with the local branch of the NAACP. The dominance by clergy was not surprising, for these, including the Board Chairman, played a significant role in making up the slate for the original Community Committee. The middle class criticism was based on the fact that too few of the Corporation's personnel were members of the target population and little real attempt was made to reach these people. Additionally, documents related to this case indicate that the original Community Committee virtually ignored the poor and consisted instead of people active in "civic, political and church affairs." The criticism that the Jamaica Board was an adjunct of the local NAACP was based on the fact that

1. Community Development Agency, "Summary of Major Findings," (New York City: Community Development Agency, 1969), pp. 60-61.

Executive Director Sharpe was President of that body, and three members of the Corporation's Executive Board, as well as several other Corporation employees were also members of the NAACP's Executive Board.¹

Internal Struggle for Control

By late fall - early winter 1969, the Jamaica Corporation's Board of Directors was in the midst of an internal struggle for control of the community's poverty program. To the winner would go the traditional rewards of such conflicts: jobs, program orientation, and the distribution of poverty grants. The loser would be banished, as Ed Flynn once suggested in another context, to "poverty Coventry."²

One faction on the Board consisted of Board Chairman Dr. C. O. Simpkins, Vice-Chairman Dr. Canute Bernard, CAP Delegate Coley Davis, and Mr. David Smith. These sought increased control of the community's poverty program and wanted the Executive Director to be more responsive to their demands. They resented the power of a second faction which included, besides Sharpe, Mr. Paul Gibson, the Reverend Donald Ming and Area Assemblyman Guy Brewer.

Such conflicts, even within a virtually all Black Board were not unusual. What was unique in this case was the intensity of feelings and the destructiveness. On April 24, 1969, Rev. Ming's church and Assemblyman Brewer's office were firebombed.³ One month later, a member of the

1. The employment of poverty workers who were closely affiliated with a local civil rights organization was common. In San Francisco, over one-half of the community organizers hired by the local community action agency were members of the Congress of Racial Equality. See, PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR, p. 39.

2. Ed Flynn, YOU'RE THE BOSS (NEW York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 22.

3. Sidney Zion, NEW YORK TIMES, April 25, 1969.

other faction, CAP Delegate Davis was arrested and charged with these
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crimes.

The battle for control of the Jamaica Corporation reached a peak in late January 1969 when the Executive Director was suspended. This action ultimately resulted in the Council's withdrawing recognition from the Jamaica Community Corporation's Board of Directors. Although the latter did not occur until seven weeks after Sharpe's suspension, when the Board refused to meet certain conditions established by the Council, the process leading to it began with his suspension. Throughout this period CDA Commissioner Owens and Council Chairman Greenidge were actively involved in attempting to resolve the conflict. Without their active stands, this Council action would probably not have been taken.

Sharpe's Suspension and Due Process

The Chairman of the South Jamaica Board suspended Sharpe because of his failure to follow the Chairman's order to cease to consolidate
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several departments in the Jamaica headquarters. While the reason given for the suspension was insubordination, the actual reason brings us back to the intra-Board conflict. The faction headed by Dr. Simpkins
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wanted someone "running the Corporation who was their guy." It was also felt that if they could get rid of opposition leader Sharpe, then it would be clear to the whole Corporation that they were in control.

1. Unsigned, NEW YORK TIMES, May 27, 1969.

2. Telegram: From Board Chairman Dr. C.O. Simpkins, to W. Eugene Sharpe. This stated that Sharpe was relieving pending a full hearing of the Board.

3. On February 4, 1969, Simpkins resigned as Board Chairman. He charged Commissioner Owens with "arbitrary, dictatorial, and illegal interference." The following day, Dr. Canute Bernard succeeded him.

On the 8th of February, Owens and Greenidge, neither of whom had a direct Council mandate, met with the Jamaica Board in an attempt to persuade them to reconsider their decision.¹ Most of this meeting was devoted to discussing the "due process" procedure to be followed by the Corporation in its relationship with its staff. Both sides were friendly at the meeting's conclusion and it was agreed that the Board would meet in one week in order to attempt to resolve the problem.

Since "due process" was an important issue in the outcome of this case, its meaning must be explored. When a Corporation came up with a program it wished to fund, it initiated a process which ultimately led to a contract signed by the Corporation and CDA.² The CDA - Jamaica Corporation contract had expired on December 31, 1968. At that time it was extended to February 28, 1969. The classes in this contract appeared in all such contracts. The distinctiveness of each were such factors as grant number, amounts of monies involved, and signers. Part II, paragraph g of the contract was relevant to our concern. It stated that the contractor agreed that the employment of personnel "shall be in accordance with the pertinent regulations and policies of OEO, the CAP and the HRA." That this applied to the Corporation's Executive Director was specifically stated. Furthermore, the Corporation was to establish its own personnel policy procedure. Failure to do so, according to a

1. According to the Council's BY-LAWS, the Chairman, in Article V, Section 2, is empowered to "promote the interests and concern of the Council." Presumably this allowed him to investigate and seek information. Constitutionally, he could not act on behalf of the Council unless given a specific mandate to do so. The Council's Executive Committee was empowered to act on behalf of the Council when it was not in session. However, according to Article IV, Section 2, such actions were to be ratified by the membership at the following Council meeting.

2. Community Development Agency, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL (New York City: Community Development Agency, 1969), pp. 70-73.

Council Personnel Policy Resolution meant that the Corporation would be guided by Council and CDA Procedures.

According to Part 1 of the contract, Corporation personnel policy was to adhere to guidelines established by OEO. Part C 5 of COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 23A was the relevant guideline. It stated in part,

Employee Grievances. Employee grievances shall be given prompt and fair consideration. Grantees and delegate agencies shall make provision for review of personnel actions by the governing body or a committee appointed by the governing body in any case in which there is a claim of unfair treatment or of dismissal without cause.

Furthermore, according to a March memo from the Director of Regional OEO, the grantee agency could exercise "considerable discretion" as to the specific manner in which it required itself "and its delegate agencies, to accord employees due process in the resolution of their grievances."¹

The interpretation of MEMO 23A was that due process was to be followed in employer-employee relations. These were to conform to the generally accepted ideas of fairness. For example, before dismissing or suspending an employee, he was entitled to a hearing, was to be presented with written charges, and given an opportunity to refute these. None of this occurred in Sharpe's case. Furthermore, "The length of his suspension was not stated, nor whether it was with or without pay." Also, the Jamaica Corporation's Constitution did not empower the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally suspend the Executive Director. To the contrary, Article VIII, Section 6 specified that only the Board could take this action. With this background, the other elements in this case may now be considered.

1. Memo: To Paul Zuber, Esq., from Josephine Nieves, March 29, 1969.

Council Action

The Council's and The Jamaica Board's Meetings

At a February 13, 1969 Council meeting, Commissioner Owens presented Council members with their first formal knowledge that a problem existed in South Jamaica and advised the Council what steps were being taken to correct.¹ The adjective formal is used because we do not mean to imply that this was the first time Council members heard about the developing controversy. Many of them had received information about it from the CDA staff or fellow Council members. For example, David Billings, Chairman of the Council's South Jamaica Panel was kept informed by both Commissioner Owens and CDA Chairman Greenidge.

The Jamaica Corporation's Board met on the 15th of February and refused to follow any actions suggested by CDA. It neither presented Sharpe with written charges nor established a timetable for resolving the dispute. In a 16-15 vote, it agreed to suspend Sharpe retroactive to January 23rd and to approve all actions taken by Simpkins and Bernard. It stated that charges against Sharpe were "insubordination, increasing his salary without permission, and failure to inform the Board of the Jamaica Community Corporation of fiscal matters." In a confused meeting, a motion was made to lift his suspension. Four vote counters were present and two of these felt that the motion was approved by a vote of thirteen for and eleven against. The other two vote counters felt that the motion failed by a vote of twelve for and thirteen against. Chairman Bernard, certainly not one of Sharpe's friends, ruled that the motion had not been passed and denied demands for a recount.

1. Memo: To Dr. Canute Bernard, Acting Chairman: from, Commissioner Owens.

At this same meeting, matters were further complicated by the suspension of seven workers, including four senior staff members, who in a demonstration of sympathy for Sharpe walked off their jobs. Once more the Board's actions did not follow the dictates of due process. (On February 20th, Commissioner Owens notified Acting Chairman Bernard that the workers were to be allowed to return to work. Furthermore, his letter stated that staff members could not be penalized for actions taken during "the period of the illegal suspension of the Executive Director from January 23rd to February 15, 1969.)^{1.}

The Commissioner's Orders

Four days after the Jamaica Board's meeting, reacting to the lack of action, Commissioner Owens sent Acting Board Chairman Dr. Canute Bernard a letter commanding that his body follow a due process schedule, established by the Community Development Agency, to resolve the Sharpe problem by February 27th. By the 20th of February, the Board's Personnel Committee was required to present Sharpe with written charges. He then had four days to answer these and within two days of his defense, a copy of it was to be presented to each Board member. The following day the Board was to allow Sharpe to defend himself at a Board meeting, after which the Board would deliberate and take a secret vote. The end of the letter stipulated that this procedure was "mandated under power granted the Commissioner of CDA as stated in the contract with CDA."^{2.}

The Board of Directors of the South Jamaica Community Corporation totally ignored the Community Development Agency's timetable for

1. Memo: To Dr. Canute Bernard, Acting Chairman; from Commissioner Owens.

2. SPECIAL BULLETIN, "Problems of the Jamaica Community Corporation," February 26, 1969, p. 2.

resolution of the "Sharpe problem" claiming that it was an internal matter subject to the jurisdiction of the Board alone. Realizing that the Board was not about to follow recommendations, Commissioner Owens stated on the 26th of February, that,

Despite all of ... [the Community Development Agency's] attempts to achieve a reasonable solution, as of February 25, 1969, the Board is still not close to a solution of the problem which started on January 23, 1969.¹

Effective the 26th of February he therefore ordered that,

1) The Corporation's Board implement the requirements stipulated in the aforementioned letters of February 19th (regarding a timetable for resolving the Sharpe situation) and February 20th (regarding the reinstatement of the seven suspended workers);

2) All Corporation employees were to be paid on time and none could be penalized "for actions taken during the period of the illegal suspension."

3) All Corporation staff, excluding the Acting Executive Director, were to return to the position held prior to the suspension of Sharpe, and only payroll vouchers for those pre-suspension titles would be honored;

4) The Fiscal Department of the Human Resources Administration was to withhold all funds allocated to the Jamaica Corporation until Commissioner Owens reviewed the extent to which his requirements were met;

5) Lastly, the Board was requested to attend a meeting with the Commissioner the following Saturday (March 1st) "for a final² conference before receivership proceedings are initiated."

1. "Problems of the Jamaica Community Corporation," pp. 2-3.

2. Unsigned, NEW YORK TIMES, February 28, 1969.

The conflict was escalating.

The following day, the Acting Board Chairman of the Jamaica Community Corporation reacted in a predictable manner to the Commissioner's action. He stated that Sharpe had been dismissed for ignoring the complaints and criticism of area residents who the poverty program was supposed to serve and for attempting to usurp the Board's authority. It was also claimed by Dr. Bernard that Commissioner Owens was taking sides in an internal struggle and was "trying to bludgeon us into submission."¹

The last quotation was important for it indicated a freezing or hardening of positions. Thus the Commissioner was angry because he viewed the Jamaica Board as deliberately ignoring his directives and of being in violation of their Corporate contractual obligations. With his City-wide outlook, he believed that the failure to act in this situation would encourage similar future actions with their attendant disruption of local poverty programs. At the same time, the Board believed its position to be correct and viewed the controversy as a local one² that should be settled within the community. Lastly, the Board's stubbornness may have also resulted from the desire to use the controversy³ as a test case to determine how much power it possessed.

1. As in other organizational contexts, there was a conflict between the central unit and its component parts. The community corporations in general complained that the CDA was too powerful. Workers in the community at times portrayed the CDA as an antagonist. "The Final Report of the Special Committee to Make an In-Depth Study of HRA," heard testimony, pages 31 and 34, that CDA was "autocratic" and unaware of conditions in the neighborhoods. This however was a two way street for many CDA employees believed that the corporations were not performing adequately and that there was need for a greater amount of review of their operations.

2. Council Chairman David Billings, Interview, April 22, 1970.

3. Article III, Section 7 of the Council's BY-LAWS stipulated that every fourth Council meeting was to be held in "poverty areas throughout the city, on a rotating basis, where time will be set aside for persons from the public to speak to the Council."

Commissioner Owens Reports to the Council

The same day as Dr. Bernard's negative reaction, the CAP met in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn. Commissioner Owens brought the Council up-to-date on the situation in the Jamaica area. He stipulated that "CDA is not concerned with the final decision of the Board but must¹ insist that due process is followed by the Corporation." His agency, he explained, had not acted more quickly only because of the hope that the Board would realize that its actions were illegal and would hence² take corrective measures.

The Commissioner made it plain why the Jamaica Corporation could not be allowed to continue on its own course. To do so he felt would place its own program as well as the others in the City, in jeopardy. What he was really worried about he said was protecting the interests of this as well as the other community corporations and planning committees,³ and guaranteeing the entire structure of community participation. To allow the Jamaica Board to go on ignoring the "contract of the Council and CDA ... would be opening a pandora's box."⁴ Thereafter, he feared, other contracts would be broken for the parties involved, recalling the Sharpe incident, might believe that they could follow any

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, February 27, 1969, pp. 1-2.

2. "Problems of the South Jamaica Community Corporation."

3. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, February 27, 1969, p. 2.

4. By announcing that he was asking the Human Resources Administration to determine the actions required to place the Jamaica Corporation in receivership, Commissioner Owens may have been attempting to lead credibility to his threat. See, Thomas Schelling, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 6, where the author maintained that in order for a threat to be effective, it must be credible.

course of action with impunity. It was hoped that intervention at this juncture by the CDA and the Council would prevent such occurrences.

The Commissioner further advised Council members that he had invited the Jamaica Board to meet with him on March 1st and that it was his hope that the situation could be resolved at that meeting by getting the Board to comply with his Agency's orders. Possibly as a threat to the Jamaica Board, he announced that he was asking the Legal Department of HRA to determine what action was required to put the Corporation in receivership. He urged all Council members to think seriously about this, for it would be the first time a Corporation was placed in receivership.¹ Before the discussion concluded, the Council Delegate from Jamaica, Coley Davis, stated that Sharpe was guilty of unspecified actions which would lead to a criminal action being filed against him.

Last Attempts at Reconciliation

On Saturday, March 1st, a few members of the Jamaica Community Corporation's Board of Directors - many stayed away on the advice of Dr. Bernard - met with Commissioner Owens and other CDA personnel. The Board members maintained that the Sharpe question was an internal one over which the Commissioner's Agency lacked jurisdiction. Owens once more advised the Board that they had failed to follow either the due process procedure or directives issued by his Agency in the last month. He furthermore reminded them that the extension of their contract had expired the previous day and it would not be renewed unless they agreed to allow the Council's Jamaica Panel to resolve their personnel problems.

1. Memo: "Statement to Members of the Board of the Jamaica Community Corporation," to Dr. Canute Bernard, Acting Chairman; from, Commissioner Owens, March 3, 1969, p. 1.

On the face of it this appeared to have been a reasonable offer of reconciliation which would ostensibly have given victory to neither the Corporation's Board nor CDA. Instead, the Jamaica Corporation would be asked to surrender its authority over personnel matters to the Council Against Poverty's South Jamaica Panel. In what was an attempt to maintain the integrity of both the Community Corporation as well as acquire its acquiescence, it would be allowed to retain all other powers.

For a number of reasons however the Jamaica Corporation refused to agree to this offer. It was felt that the Panel was not an objective third party since its Chairman, David Billings, had a closed and personal relationship with Commissioner Owens. Additionally, many members of the Board by then perceived the conflict as a test of both themselves and the community they represented against the illegal exercise of power by the Community Development Agency. As discussed above, they perceived themselves as engaged in the struggle of the field unit against the centralized bureaucracy. This viewpoint, reinforced by the fact that their counsel advised them that their position was legally secure, led to a solidification of their beliefs into a nonnegotiable stance. The Community Development Agency was to make one more attempt at solving the problem before asking the Council to vote on the question of receivership.

The Commissioner's last attempt at resolving the problem before requesting receivership was made at a March 4th meeting of the Jamaica Board. Attending with him were Council Chairman Greenidge plus legal and other staff members. They presented the Board with a candid memo which accused it of not understanding "its legal role and function as a Community Corporation Board," and therefore not being able "to act responsibly."¹

1. "Statement to Members of the Board of the Jamaica Community Corporation," p. 1.

Because of this and the intra-Board conflict, the Community Development Agency deemed "it necessary to impose limits of operation on the Board."¹ It once more demanded that for a limited period of time, the Agency and the Jamaica Panel have the final word on all personnel matters including suspension, promotion and grievances. Additionally, only Commissioner Owens would be allowed to issue checks and those employees suspended February 15th were to return to their former positions with full pay. The Sharpe case was to be investigated by the Human Resources Administration's Office of Review which would make a recommendation to the Panel. Pending the outcome, Sharpe would be reassigned to another program, but would be paid by Jamaica Corporation funds.² In an ominous conclusion, the memo declared that "these measures will be temporary and are preferable to the more drastic measures which the Community Development Agency, if pressed, will take."³

Predictably, the Jamaica Board refused to consider the "special conditions" and still maintained that it was an internal matter. Furthermore, on the advice of their attorney Paul Zuber, they did not believe that the Community Development Agency could remove them for as an incorporated body under New York State law, it was felt that only the Supreme Court, State Attorney-General or they themselves possessed such power.⁴ Indeed, according to the Commissioner's statement at the February 27th

1. "Statement to Members of the Board of the Jamaica Community Corporation," pp. 2.-4.

2. "Statement to Members of the Board of the Jamaica Community Corporation," p. 5.

3. Peter Kihss, NEW YORK TIMES, March 17, 1969.

4. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, February 27, 1969, p. 2.

Council meeting, Zuber advised the Board that it needn't submit the¹ written charges against Sharpe demanded by his Agency.

Chairman Greenidge however had earlier countered Zuber's position when he said that although the Corporation possessed certain rights as an incorporated body, in using funds coming from the Office of Economic² Opportunity and the Council, its rights are circumscribed. The only reason that a Community Corporation functions as a coordinating body for the poverty program in its area is because it has been so designated and certified by the Council. Furthermore, by contract between the Board and the Community Development Agency, the Commissioner of the latter may terminate³ the contract of any illegally operating agency.

With this latest rebuff, Commissioner Owens felt that he had no recourse other than to carry out the "drastic measures" threatened. To this end, his agency moved to take over the Jamaica Community Corporation. HRA Legal was asked to prepare a resolution which would establish the Jamaica Panel as the recognized body for the coordination of the area's poverty program. HRA Fiscal was to determine the Corporation's obligations, especially in the area of payments owed to Corporation staff members. A procedure was to be developed to determine which employees were to be paid. However, those hired in place of Sharpe and the others were felt to have been hired illegally, and hence would

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, February 27, 1969, p. 3.

2. Memo: Council Actions on February 27, 1969. To: CDA Staff, from Staff Director Davenport.

3. Memo: "Jamaica Community Corporation and Related Problems," to all Departments, from Commissioner Owens.

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not be reimbursed.

To summarize, in the midst of a battle for control of the Jamaica Community Corporation, its Executive Director was suspending. In taking this action, the Board of Directors failed to provide him with a written set of charges and to give him an opportunity to defend himself against these. On numerous occasions Commissioner Owens met and corresponded with the Corporation's Board in order to get that body to follow due process requirements. In all of these efforts he was rebuffed. In his March 4th memo to the Jamaica Board, the Commissioner's language was so strong that it was clear that he would not hesitate to take the action threatened. This was the situation on the eve of the Council's March 6th meeting.

It should be clear that the key to action in this case has thus far been Commissioner Owens backed by Council Chairman Greenidge. It was the former who initiated the charges of failing to follow due process, established the timetable for solving the problem, decided that the Jamaica contract would not be renewed, and summoned the Board to the March 1st meeting. While Owens was backed in his actions by Greenidge, neither had a formal Council mandate. Rather, they acted on their own, aware of the fact that the Chairman of the relevant Council Panel backed them. The latter, David Billings, felt that the Jamaica Board's failure to provide Sharpe with due process, especially in light of the repeated requests to do so, was a usurpation of Council power. He further believed that the Council's failure to act in this case was an implicit approval of a double standard whereby some rules were enforced while others were

1. David Billings, Interview, April 22, 1970.

¹
ignored. In the two instances where Owens proposed to give some decision-making power to another body, the March 1st and 4th offers to the Jamaica Board to have the Jamaica Panel solve the personnel problems, Owens would be dealing with a Committee chaired by someone who agreed with him. Once the matter went before the Council, Owen's influence declined while Greenidge's increased.

The Council Withdraws Recognition

If one may judge by the low attendance of Council members at the March 6th meeting (twenty-seven or but one more than a quorum) nothing very important was to be discussed that evening. Following a discussion of funding problems, the Commissioner reviewed what was referred to as ² "the pressing situation existing in South Jamaica." Everything he said was backed by Chairman Greenidge. The only opposition came from Jamaica Delegate Coley Davis. The latter claimed that the Commissioner, in presenting the Board with five days to resolve the problem of Sharpe and the other seven was unfair and arbitrary, and that the former Executive Director failed to formally request a hearing by the Board or its Person-³nel Committee to answer the charges lodged against him. He also stated that the whole affair was before the New York State Supreme Court and ⁴ that his Board would abide by the Court's decision.

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 6, 1969, p. 3.

2. The reference to the five day period was the timetable which began on February 20th and had not been complied with by the 25th. See, SPECIAL BULLETIN, "Problems of the Jamaica Community Corporation," p. 2.

3. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 6, 1969, pp. 13-14.

4. Memo: from HRA General Counsel's Office, March 10, 1969, p. 3.

The Council ignored the Jamaica Delegate's remarks and began instead to discuss the thirteen paragraph receivership resolution prepared by HRA's Legal Office at the request of Commissioner Owens. Previous to drafting this resolution, Regional OEO was contacted to make sure that the Council possessed the authority to withdraw recognition, call for new elections, and directly operate the poverty program in South Jamaica. The answer was that it did as long as elections were held within six months. It was also noted that these actions could be appealed by the South Jamaica Board in order to determine if they were "arbitrary and capricious."¹

The Council's resolution, after noting the problems in South Jamaica and Council's power to act, declared,

That the Council hereby directs that new elections are to be arranged and held in the South Jamaica community;

That the Community Development Agency ... shall advise the Regional Office of Economic Opportunity, that, acting with the Council it desires a component change to show the Council Against Poverty as the administering agency for South Jamaica;

That CAP may delegate its administrative functions in South Jamaica to the South Jamaica Panel of CAP, subject to the ultimate control and responsibilities of CAP.¹

In short, the Council was to become the administering agency for the South Jamaica Community Corporation. Contrary to what was then popular opinion, the Council did not place the Corporation in receivership. Indeed, in a series of memos the Legal Office of the Human Resources Administration expressed the opinion that "any color of ousting the Board

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 6, 1969, pp. 15-17.

2. The representatives of political offices and of social organizations were not as directly affected by the proposed ruling.

should be avoided." However, the Council was empowered to recognize a corporation and this was interpreted to mean that it could also withdraw recognition. The latter was the course followed. Furthermore, the CAP was empowered to delegate its administrative functions to the Council's South Jamaica Panel. Also, the Community Development Agency was given a general grant of power to take whatever steps were required to carry on the poverty program in Jamaica. In a show of lack of faith in the Jamaica Board it was also stipulated that elections for a new Board were to be held as rapidly as possible.

In discussing the withdrawal of recognition with Council members who were representatives of the City's poverty areas and members of their respective Boards of Directors, it becomes clear that some of these were reluctant to take such action on the grounds that it would establish a harmful precedent. The reasoning behind this was simple: if the Council assumed the administration of the Jamaica poverty program, what was to prevent it from taking similar action in the future against their respective communities?¹ Why establish a precedent which could be invoked to their own detriment if the Corporation they represented disagreed with the Council? Would it not be best to find an alternative way to settle the dispute? This question, which really concerns the influence of a Council member's constituency on his voting, is reviewed below.

Because of the aforementioned, Chairman Greenidge had a great deal of difficulty in persuading some community representatives to back the resolution. Mr. Greenidge's relations with Council members was a personal and individual one. In an interview he emphasized, and other verified, the fact that relations with him were based on confidence and

1. Edwin Greenidge, Interview, April 23, 1970.

trust. He acknowledged the fact that many community representatives found the pending action distasteful, but he personally appealed to them both before and during the Council meeting to back it. He advised them that as far as he and the Commissioner were concerned, whether or not W. Eugene Sharpe kept his job was unimportant. If the Jamaica Corporation wished he related, it could present Sharpe with written charges, give him a hearing and then fire him. The real issue was due process.¹

All Council members were not willing to back the resolution to withdraw recognition. Harding Bowman of East New York sought to table the issue. He felt then, as he did earlier in a dispute arising out of the makeup of the Hunts Point Board of Directors, that the Council "cannot get involved in the private operation of a corporation."² His motion was soundly defeated by a vote of two in favor, thirteen opposed and no recorded abstentions. A second motion, introduced by the Central Harlem Area Delegate was then approved in the unusually close Council vote of eight in favor, five opposed, and one recorded abstention. This resolution placed on the floor for discussion the truth of the charge that due process was denied both Sharpe and eight other Jamaica Corporation employees.³

This however was precisely the type of question, one dealing with the validity or substance of the charges, that Owens and Greenidge

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, January 18, 1968, p. 5.

2. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 6, 1969, p. 14.

3. The time consuming discussion on the merits of the suspension was now to be overlooked. This may have resulted from the confusion and lateness of the hour, or the Chairman's conscious choice to avoid a drawn out discussion.

wished to avoid. To review this question would mean that the Council would have to involve itself in lengthy debate and fact finding. This would lead to a delay (it was then nearly midnight) in consideration of their resolution and a possible postponement to another meeting for it would most likely become necessary to hear statements from such participants as Dr. Bernard, Mr. Sharpe and others.

Before discussion on the merits was allowed to get under way, the Council Chairman recognized Rabbi Bernard Weinberger of Williamsburg.¹ Rabbi Weinberger moved that Commissioner Owens wait fifteen days before withdrawing recognition. This was seconded by Mr. Coley Davis, the South Jamaica Delegate, who naturally backed such a move over the immediate withdrawal of recognition, as was a motion by Peter Lugo that the Commissioner's Resolution be passed as it stood. Fearing that his motion would be defeated and that Lugo's would pass, Rabbi Weinberger sought to preserve a delaying period by amending Lugo's motion. This amendment stipulated that if the Jamaica Community Corporation's Board of Directors accepted certain "special conditions" presented to it by the Community Development Agency in a March 3rd memo, then the resolution which would withdraw recognition would not be implemented. The conditions stated that a thirty day contract extension would be prepared. However, the Jamaica Board was requested to reassign staff (excluding Sharpe) with full pay, cooperate with an investigation by the Office of Review of all aspects of the Jamaica Corporation's activities, pay Sharpe's salary for the period in which he would be temporarily reassigned, agree that only the Commissioner or his designee may authorize expenditures, and allow the Jamaica Panel and the Community Development Agency to

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 6, 1969, p. 18.

temporarily have the final word on all staff matters.

If the Jamaica Board refused to agree to abide by these conditions within five days, as Mr. Lugo apparently felt would be the case, then the Commissioner's Resolution would take effect immediately and recognition would be withdrawn. If they did agree, hopefully all existing problems would be settled by the end of the month and another contract would be concluded. Mr. Lugo accepted Rabbi Weinberger's amendment. The Rabbi's original motion seeking a fifteen day delay was dead. At 2 A. M. the Chairman called the question: ten members backed the resolution by the special conditions, none opposed and there were four abstentions.¹

It is interesting to note the few ballots cast on each of the four motions voted on at this meeting. The yes, no, or abstentions totaled fourteen on three of the motions and fifteen on the fourth. On the summer appeals procedure discussion which directly preceded the South Jamaica question, twenty votes were cast. This means that close to one-half of the twenty-seven Council members originally recorded as present did not vote. Two factors may explain this. First, and this was verified in conversations with some Council members, it became difficult to vote on the motions made because they were complex, numerous, rapidly changing and introduced at a very late hour. Probably more significant is the fact that it was not unusual for a Council member to arrive at a meeting, have his attendance recorded and leave shortly thereafter. The longer a meeting went on the fewer the members who remained until adjournment. To expect a nonsalaried Council member to remain at

¹1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 6, 1969, p. 12.

a meeting beyond a reasonable time of approximately 11 P.M. was placing a tremendous burden on that individual. This was especially so if he or she had to begin work at 9 A.M. the following morning. As discussion of the South Jamaica question did not begin until approximately 10 P.M. and clearly would last more than a few hours, some members certainly left. For those who remained, the meeting lasted until after 2 A.M. This meant that if they were required to begin work at 9 A.M. that morning they could not expect more than a couple of hours of sleep.

In approving the withdrawal of recognition resolution, the Council was threatening the Board only if it refused to agree to the special conditions. The Council's action was thus dependent on the Board's: if the latter agreed to accept the special conditions, then the Council was obligated to resolve the personnel problem within a month; if it refused, then withdrawal of recognition would follow. Furthermore, by conducting this meeting in public and publicizing the special conditions, then the Council would have to withdraw recognition. To do otherwise, would very likely destroy its credibility among the Community Corporations.

The Jamaica Board met on March 10th and predictably refused to go along with the conditions. The vote was 14:8 with seven abstentions and twelve absences. The majority of voting members backed their Chairman who advised them that their position was legitimate. To accept the special conditions was viewed as capitulation and might be interpreted as implying that the position maintained thus far was fraudulent. It also appears possible that there was some doubt that the Council had the authority to take the threatened action and indeed that the latter would be carried out, for the Commissioner's directives had thus far been ignored with impunity. According to the wording of the Council

resolution, recognition of the Board was automatically withdrawn.

Two Other Council Resolutions

Withdrawing recognition was the most important of a series of Council resolutions growing out of the Jamaica controversy (it has already been observed that the March 6th resolution also mandated the holding of elections for a new Board of Directors). Two other actions, both considered logical outcomes of the withdrawal of recognition, were made at the March 13th Council meeting. At that time it was decided that members of the Board of Directors would not be eligible to run for seats on the new Board and that the size of the Jamaica Panel would be expanded.

When discussion on the Jamaica question began at the March 14th meeting, it was reported that the Jamaica Board had failed to comply with the Council's conditions and was therefore placed under emergency guidance. Following this, David Billings, Chairman of the Jamaica Panel, introduced a motion that would have barred members of the Jamaica Board from seeking reelection for a period of one year. The reason for this motion was that it was feared that if the old Board's members were allowed to run for reelection, the two factions involved would have dominated the election. Billings' motion was seconded by the Brownsville representative and passed unanimously.

Billings' resolution did not originate with him, but came instead from Lloyd Terry, Assistant Commissioner of the Community Development Agency. In a memo which he sent on March 5th to the Jamaica Panel, it was suggested that an election be held in Jamaica for a new Board of Directors. "The present officers of the Board could not participate¹ in the election as candidates." This however was broadened by a member

1. Memo: To South Jamaica Panel; from Lloyd Terry, Assistant Commissioner, March 5, 1969, p. 3.

of the Jamaica Panel the evening before the March 13th Council meeting. In the belief that that area's antipoverty efforts would benefit from a new Board of Directors, as well as a reaction against the Jamaica Board's intransigence, panel member Ted Gross, Harry Gottherer's alternate, stipulated that all members of the Board should be ineligible for reelection for a period of one year. As was already observed, the Council readily approved this recommendation.

The other relevant Council action at this meeting was the expansion of the size of the Jamaica Panel. As Panel Chairman Billings observed in an interview, the Panel had to be expanded because of the extra work load for which it would be responsible. Thus besides the traditional responsibilities of all Council Panels, it had the added one of functioning as the Board of Directors for the Jamaica Community Corporation. This meant that more people were needed to carry out the extra work load.¹ Indeed, Panel Chairman Billings went so far as to request that the Council Chairman select only "genuinely interested and active people² to be members on the South Jamaica Panel. As in the other cases examined, excluding the withdrawal resolution, the question was called after minimum discussion and passed unanimously.³

Elements in the Council's Determination

In summary, this case began when an intra-Board struggle led to the dismissal of Executive Director Sharpe. Had the latter failed to protest his dismissal, then the proceedings reviewed here would never have

1. David Billings, Interview, April 22, 1970

2. New York City Council Against Poverty, COUNCIL MINUTES, March 12, 1970, p. 15.

3. The actual size of the expanded Panel was not determined at this meeting.

occurred. Once he sought redress, Sharpe fell into the background and Commissioner Owens and Chairman Greenidge became the major actors. Both were very active in negotiating with the Jamaica Corporation's Board of Directors to have them reconsider Sharpe's dismissal. Once it became clear that this would not be done, the scene shifted to the Council where Greenidge persuaded the membership to back the action he and the Commissioner sought - the withdrawal of recognition. Indeed, the major difference between the Council's withdrawal of recognition and the actions reviewed in the last two case studies was the activist role played by the Council Chairman and the CDA Commissioner.

In effect, what we saw in this case was the influential role particular actors had in shaping Council determinations. More specifically, we saw the close relationship of administration to policy-making as the CDA Commissioner, who was charged with supervising the activities of the administrative and operational arm of the Council, managed to convince the Council that action was needed to support his objectives. We also saw the importance that leadership (Owens again, but especially Greenidge) had in influencing Council determinations. The involvement of the CDA Commissioner and the Council Chairman in the Council's actions will be further explored below.

The Council's role in the major action was unusual. It was the only one of the five cases examined in this study in which the Council conducted a lengthy discussion and debate and in which it amended a resolution as originally presented to it. In this case it amended the Commissioner's resolution so that the Jamaica Board was given a last opportunity to mend its ways. That the Council could take such action was implicitly acknowledged by Owens and Greenidge. They did not attempt to force their motion on the Council. Over a period of weeks

they informed the membership of developments in Jamaica and advised them that serious action was a distinct possibility. In the peripheral actions, the Council, as in the previous ones examined, approved resolutions introduced by a committee or panel chairman. In both cases there was no reason to believe that the Council would not approve the resolutions introduced, given the fact that recognition had been withdrawn from the South Jamaica Board but two days before the meeting at which these resolutions were introduced.

In the two previous case studies, Council committees were found to exert a strong influence, similar to the relationship found between most committees and legislative bodies, in the Council's policy determinations. What was the role of the Jamaica Panel in this case? In the action which withdrew recognition, it was kept abreast of events by the Commissioner and Council Chairman, but did not otherwise play an important role. The South Jamaica Panel did play an important role in gaining the Council's approval to expand the size of the Jamaica Panel. Once its Chairman introduced the Panel's resolution to the Council, it was rapidly and unanimously approved. In the other peripheral action, the one which barred members from seeking reelection for a period of one year, the Panel also played an important role. In that instance however, the Panel simply modified a proposal given to it by Assistant Commissioner Terry. In both of these instances, the trust which the Council usually exhibited for its panels was evident. Once Chairman Billings introduced these proposals, they were approved unanimously with little discussion.

In the major Council action, the Central Staff of the Human Resources Administration functioned as a provider of services. Its Legal Office prepared the resolutions withdrawing recognition, its Public

Affairs Office drafted and disseminated news releases regarding the controversy and its Fiscal Office was asked to examine the financial status of the Jamaica Corporation. According to the highest CDA Sources, HRA Administrator Mitchell Ginsberg was kept informed of the situation. However, these same sources stated that he did not attempt to influence the action taken and was not present at the Council's March 6th meeting.

The Office of Economic Opportunity's participation in this Council action was similar to that seen in the last two cases. It had earlier established a broad guideline for the handling of major grievances, the interpretation of which was left with community action agencies. From Commissioner Owens' perspective, this guideline mandated following a due process procedure in corporation-employee relations. It appears however that this guideline was sufficiently vague so that this interpretation might have been an attempt to legitimate the action sought.

Implementation

On March 26, 1969, Sharpe wrote the Council Staff Director requesting an opportunity to appear before the Jamaica Panel in order to discuss the validity of his dismissal. HRA's Legal Office objected to holding such a hearing because it was believed that the Jamaica Panel was not an objective body for it "has already executed the policy of the full Council which acted as it did because of its earlier expressed view that Sharpe's dismissal was a violation of due process." The Panel ignored this opinion and held its hearings on April 2nd. It found that Sharpe was denied due process and directed that he "be returned to his original employment as executive director."

1. Memo "Regarding W. Eugene Sharpe Hearing," to Administrator Ginsberg, Commissioner Owens, Chairman Greenidge; from Bruce Wright, March 31, 1969, p. 1.

At approximately the same time as Sharpe's hearing, members of the Jamaica Corporation's Board of Directors, accompanied by counsel, met with the Regional Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. At that meeting they denounced the Council's action. Their charge: in withdrawing recognition, the Council had failed to follow due process.¹

In the fall of 1972 it appeared that the Community Corporation in the Jamaica area was operating without any deep conflicts. Briefly, the situation was as follows: an election for a new Board was held on May 24, 1969, in which members of the old Board were allowed to seek reelection. The latter, which contradicted one of the Council actions discussed here, occurred in part because the Legal Office of HRA considered barring Board members from the election unconstitutional in that it "would be a violation of the due process and abridgement of the privileges and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution."² Considering this memo, and also attempting to bring the South Jamaica community together after two firebombings, Commissioner Owens, in late 1969, wrote an "open letter" to the South Jamaica community in which he notified area residents that allow old Board members to seek reelection. And thus it was.

One of the first acts of the new Board of Directors was to change the Corporation's name to the South East Queens Community Corporation. In March, 1970, ten months after his suspension, Sharpe resigned his position as Executive Director and returned to private business.

1. Letter to Paul Zuber, from Josephine Nieves, March 29, 1969.

2. Memo: "Regarding W. Eugene Sharpe Hearing," p. 3.

B. Summary of Findings Regarding Roles of Participants in Council Actions

Through a detailed case exposition of three key Council actions we have illustrated the kinds of issues and problems with which the Council as a policy-making body was concerned. Also illustrated was the unique role of the Council as a Citywide policy-making body in New York City's community action program and its relation to the larger thrust of HRA. Finally we identified the involved institutional and individual actors and their roles in the actions formally enacted by the Council in the cases reviewed.

Actor roles will now be further investigated and analyzed. This will be done to more fully explicate the Council's decisional processes and to further describe the place and meaning of the Council in the developing local political dynamics as engendered and exemplified by the anti-poverty programs in New York City.

1. The Role of Committees

This section seeks to demonstrate that committees played a central role in the Council's actions. This resulted from the expertise of their members, the prevailing system of reciprocity which meant that their recommendations were seldom modified or reversed by the parent body, and the fact that they anticipated the reaction of the Council and hence did not make recommendations that the latter was unlikely to accept.¹

Introduction

Committees developed because of the need for a division of labor and specialization of function. If the entire Council was to have thoroughly examined each issue on its agenda, it would have soon found its operations strangled by a mass of details that would have required it to meet on a daily basis. This becomes especially clear when one considers that Council members, although handling but approximately 200 resolutions each year, were unsalaried and had sources of financial maintenance that were found in non-Council activities. Working at full time jobs they did not have the time needed to become knowledgeable in all questions that came before the Council. The system of representation thus contributed to the need for a committee system for it would have otherwise been impossible to complete the Council's work. Indeed, one of the first actions of the post-Green Amendment Council, occurred on July 11, 1968 when it was decided to continue the existing committees² and panels.

1. By now it should be clear that the Council was similar to other local policy-making bodies, except that its jurisdiction, as determined by Congress and OEO, was more defined or limited. We will now see that the relationship of committees to the Council was also similar to that existing between committees and other local policy-making bodies.

2. COUNCIL MINUTES, July 11, 1968, p. 7.

The Council had two major types of committees related to the two types of resolutions it passed: those related to individual poverty areas and those concerned with matters of policy for the entire City. The former were called panels and there was one for each designated poverty area. Any issue related to that particular area, including questions arising out of the application of policy in that area, was reviewed by the area panel before being brought to the Council.¹ For example, in the cases examined, the South Jamaica Panel was carrying out its responsibility to examine any problems arising in a poverty area, while the Crown Heights Panel was fulfilling its duty in the area of elections and the establishment of community corporations. Besides panels, there were fourteen Council committees such as the By-Laws Committee. These "recommended general policies and guidelines for adoption by the Council" in such functional areas as health, education, and legal services.²

The official version of the role of committees and panels did not give them any policy-making power. Article IV, Section 4 of the BY-LAWS stipulated that, "The power of all committees and panels shall be limited to making recommendations to the Council." For example, in January, 1969, Commissioner Owens recommended and Council Chairman Greenidge agreed that before the Council reviewed a proposal, it "should go to the proper committee and come back to the Council with recommendations."³ Furthermore, at a May 1968 training session for new Council members, Staff Director Davenport referred to committees as not

1. BY-LAWS, Article IV, Section 5.

2. BY-LAWS, Article IV, Section 6.

3. COUNCIL MINUTES, January 23, 1969, p. 3.

possessing "the final authority,"¹ and said that "Panels shall not set policy."² Also, according to the BY-LAWS the only committee that was empowered to act for the Council between meetings was the Executive Committee. However, Article IV, Section 4 further stated that the actions of the latter were to be ratified by the Council at its next regular meeting."

Once committees and panels were established they began to play an important role in the decisional process. Their importance was acknowledged by both Council and staff members. To sample but a few observations, the Crown Heights Area Delegate observed that the Council's "power is in committees and panels."³ The Council Staff Director referred to them as "quite important because that is where the real difficult work ... is done."⁴ Also, a middle management Community Development Agency employee reported that "Much CAP power lies in Committees." Furthermore, in discussing his tenure as Council Chairman, Ed Greenidge stated that he stressed their importance and insisted that no matter would be brought before the Council before it was reviewed by the relevant committee or panel. In spite of the fact that he was frequently familiar with a committee report or recommendation, he always insisted that these be presented to the Council by the committee chairman and that all questions be addressed to the latter.⁵

1. COUNCIL MINUTES, May 23, 1968, p. 24.

2. COUNCIL MINUTES, May 23, 1968, p. 29.

3. Rabbi Neumann, Interview, January 28, 1970.

4. COUNCIL MINUTES, May 23, 1968, p. 23.

5. Council Chairman Greenidge, Interview, April 23, 1970.

Functions of Committees and Panels

Development of Expertise

The functions of committees and panels were not limited to those cited thus far. Several of them were important in spite of the fact that they were mentioned in neither the BY-LAWS nor the EXECUTIVE ORDERS affecting the Council. At the same time that the committee system made the work of the Council more manageable, it gave the individual member of the Council an opportunity to develop some expertise in two or three substantive areas and a similar number of poverty communities. This was important to Council members for with it they begin to comprehend for example that the budget for the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn was to include, besides grants to Negro and Puerto Rican organizations, monies¹ to the local YMHA and certain yeshivas. To have remained unaware of such details, a situation which would have been much more likely if the Council were to consider all questions without using committees, could have easily led to disruptions of the poverty programs in the city's poor areas. It would have meant that nearly all Council actions were based on the recommendations of its professional staff for each member's knowledge would have been extremely general. With a committee system there were usually a few Council members, those on the relevant committee or panel, who were familiar and knowledgeable regarding a specific neighborhood or program area and were able to discuss and even challenge any speakers including professional staff members.

Related to the development of expertise is that as a result of their committee work, committee members became better informed regarding

1. The Executive Director of the Williamsburg YM-YWHA was a former chairman of the Williamsburg Community Corporation.

the complexity of the work in which they were engaged. This made some of them less militant advocates of partisan positions and led to the working out of compromises. Thus, it will be recalled that in the Crown Heights study, Rabbi Neumann suggested that sixteen per cent of the appointed Board members should be appointed Board members should be poor, while Mr. Rodriguez believed that the figure should be fifty per cent. They agreed to the figure of thirty-three per cent. Also, in working together Puerto Ricans, Blacks, and whites received a close and concentrated view of the needs and aspirations of representatives of other ethnic groups as well as those of other poverty areas. Again, in some cases this had something of a levelling effect in the positions taken¹ by Council members.

Accommodation of Interests

A second function of the committee system, one which was seldom mentioned and which might have been impossible if sensitive issues were thrashed out in public, was to alleviate conflicts by accommodating various interests. This was especially significant regarding a controversial question where there were many community residents present. Under such circumstances it became difficult to conduct negotiations for both parties to a disagreement might not compromise their positions for fear of invoking the wrath of their constituents. A committee or panel stood a better chance of gaining the confidence of both sides, promoting candor and managing to work out a compromise. Thus, a panel

1. It should be noted that some Council members continued to believe that the legitimate needs of their groups were blocked by members of a second group. The reader will recall that in the Petition Procedure study, Mr. Peter Lugo observed that he and his fellow Committee member, Mr. Dennis Gardner, always disagreed because Mr. Gardner was Black and Mr. Lugo was a Puerto Rican.

meeting concerning the make-up of the Hunts Point Corporation was able to reach a temporary agreement between the predominantly Puerto Rican Corporation and the all-Black Interested Citizens of Hunts Point to add sixteen blacks to the Corporation's Board of Directors.¹ At an open meeting, one that would have been attended by scores of irate community residents, this type of agreement would have been more difficult, if at all possible, to conclude.

The "accommodation of interests" function was clearly seen in the Crown Heights study. In that situation an agreement had to be worked out to resolve what was on a Citywide basis, certainly no more than a minor irritation. In the Crown Heights neighborhood however, the issue of apportioning eight representatives of the poor in six districts² touched on the very sensitive area of Black-Jewish relations. By resolving it in the Panel, chaired by Mr. Rodriguez, a potential conflict which might have harmed that area's delicately, i.e. -- proportional ethnic representation, balanced poverty program may have been averted. The Panel was able to come up with a solution amenable to all parties. To attempt to reach agreement before an open Council meeting, where members might have felt obliged to demonstrate that they were protecting the interests of their respective ethnic groups, which have been a much more difficult task.

Legitimation of CDA's Position

Another function of committees and panels was to legitimate the Community Development Agency's position. Just as the Council at times approved recommendations made by committees and panels, the latter at

1. COUNCIL MINUTES, March 14, 1968, pp. 5-6.

2. On the subject of recent Black-Jewish problems in Crown Heights, see, John Durnton, NEW YORK TIMES, December 10, 1972.

times endorsed CDA recommendations. The committees and panels at times functioned as transmission belts, legitimating and passing on to the Council recommendations made by the professional staff. Thus, in the COUNCIL MINUTES for March 6, 1969, there were numerous references to panels recommending that the Council accept a CDA approved budget. Each time the Council went along with the panel's recommendations.

In the cases presented in this study, committee endorsement of CDA recommendations occurred once, while on a second occasion such a recommendation was amended. In withdrawing recognition from the Board of Directors of the South Jamaica Community Corporation the former occurred. There the South Jamaica Panel endorsed the Commissioner's resolution. In prohibiting all members of that Board from seeking reelection, the Panel amended a CDA proposal that would have only barred officers of the Board. This action may be attributed to both the South Jamaica Panel's reaction against what was viewed as a prolonged intransigence of the Jamaica Board, as well as the belief that that area's antipoverty efforts would have benefitted from a new Board of Directors.

Specialized Roles of Panels

Panels played certain specialized roles which committees did not. They acted as a community corporation's board of directors where the Council had withdrawn recognition from said Board. This occurred in the Jamaica case and seven months later when recognition was withdrawn from the Board of Directors of the South Bronx Community Corporation.¹ Another function limited to panels was the review of appeals from applicants that were either denied funding or suffered a substantial decrease

1. COUNCIL MINUTES, October 23, 1969, p. 11.

in funds allocated by community corporations. These applicants had the right to present their position to the relevant panel. In a sense, the panel functioned as a court of appeals which heard the testimony of a rejected applicant who was seeking to have a wrong corrected. The panel's recommendation was then presented to the Council.

The Council and Committee Recommendations

The importance of the committees to the Council's actions derived from the fact that the parent body infrequently modified or reversed their recommendations. For example, in this study, four committee recommendations were completely accepted by the Council and the fifth, which was a prelude to the withdrawal of recognition, was amended. The exception was made on the floor of the Council after a prolonged debate (which itself was an indication of the action's significance). Some Council members were wary of accepting a recommendation which ultimately could have been used against their boards of directors. The Council's action was a compromise which provided the South Jamaica Board with a last opportunity to adopt the Council's position.

That Council members believed that the Council should accept the recommendations of its committees was borne out by an examination of COUNCIL MINUTES. East New York Delegate Harding Bowman stated that the Council should always accept the recommendations presented by its panels.¹ Similarly, Council member Frances Brown was upset when the Council questioned his panel's report.² Lastly, a Council member stated that if a committee report was unanimous, it should be accepted by the Council.³

1. COUNCIL MINUTES, January 18, 1968, p. 5.

2. COUNCIL MINUTES, March 14, 1968, p. 8.

3. COUNCIL MINUTES, March 21, 1968, p. 4.

This is not to suggest that all Council members believed that committees should have total power over matters within their domain. At one Council meeting it was suggested that in order to expedite matters panels should be given full authority to review and approve summer packages. A number of Council members criticized this proposal. The Williamsburg Area Delegate felt that "there should be some overview." Similarly, the representatives of the Lower West Side and the Community Council felt respectively that "groups should be allowed to appeal to the Council," and "too much authority would be delegated to panels."¹

Reciprocity

There are two explanations for the frequency with which committee recommendations were approved by the Council. Firstly, there was an informal and tacit agreement among virtually all Council members to approve committee recommendations. As Council members developed some expertise in their specific realms, it became difficult for their non-expert fellow Council members to challenge them in their areas of specialization. This was in part a result of the system of representation which meant that a Council member had little time to thoroughly research an issue and seek information with which to challenge a committee's members. At the same time, the questioning of the validity of a committee's recommendation meant that one's own reports and recommendations would be questioned and criticized. In order to avoid the latter, an unwritten system of reciprocity was maintained.

Anticipated Reaction

The second major reason why committee recommendations were so frequently enacted by the Council resulted from what may be referred to

1. COUNCIL MINUTES, March 16, 1968, p. 12.

anticipated reaction. Members of committees realized that the Council had the power to veto their recommendations and hence avoided making any that were unlikely to receive approval. The importance of the veto power was not found in the number of times it was used, rather in its potential use. It prevented committees from making recommendations that were unlikely to be heeded. Thus the Crown Heights Panel would not recommend that six of the twenty-four elected members of the Crown Heights Corporation's Board of Directors be poor for to have done or would have violated a Council guideline that mandated that a minimum of eight or one-third of the elected members be poor. The Crown Heights Panel would not make such a recommendation because it would have been vetoed by the Council. Furthermore, committees were made aware that the Council possessed a potential veto power which had to be considered because it was used every so often.

Modification or Reversal of Committee Recommendations

At times the recommendations of committees were modified or reversed. This usually occurred when the committee that presented a recommendation lacked cohesion. For example, one of the Council members noted on page 10, did not say that all recommendations should be approved, but only those made by unanimous committees. Similarly, in the case studies examined in this study, the Council unanimously approved without debate those recommendations made by cohesive committees. Where a committee was split, such as occurred regarding the original motion made by the Chairman of the By-Laws Committee in the Petition Procedure study, the motion offered was not approved.

Another factor which contributed to bringing about modification in a committee's position was the controversial nature of an issue. In

the withdrawal of recognition case, modification of the Commissioner's motion (which was previously accepted without change by the South Jamaica Panel), was not a result of the lack of unity in the relevant Panel. Another factor was present, the controversial nature of the proposed resolution. To have accepted this motion meant approving a precedent which might have been utilized in the future. To say the least, the representatives of community corporations on the Council did not find this a pleasant thought.

Similarly, in other instances where the Council modified or reversed a panel it was involved in a controversial case. In October 1969, it withdrew recognition from the Board of Directors of the South Bronx Community Corporation after the South Bronx Panel recommended that such action should not be taken.¹ In another example, the Council postponed the Bedford-Stuyvesant Corporation election in the winter of 1968-69 in spite of the fact that the Bedford-Stuyvesant Panel's recommendation was that they be held. In doing so, the Council was aware that many vocal members of that community believed that the elections should be postponed because of such alleged irregularities as the lack of adequate publicity.²

Committees and Their Effect on Council Members

The importance of committees in the Council's decisional process had an important effect on the individual Council member's role in that process. It made his role a dynamic one. He was a far more significant actor in Council actions which were first reviewed in those

1. COUNCIL MINUTES, October 23, 1969, p. 23.

2. Bedford Stuyvesant Panel, "Report on Bedford Stuyvesant Elections," December 12, 1968.

committees of which he was a member. Under these circumstances he was frequently but one of five or six Council members who drew up a recommendation which was usually approved by the Council. More often however the individual Council member was not a member of the relevant committee that made a recommendation to the Council. In those cases, he had far less influence on the Council's actions because he had relatively little information regarding the question under review, little time to thoroughly examine it, and possessed but one of the twenty-five or thirty votes that were cast on that issue. For example, Charles Rodriguez of the Crown Heights Panel had a significant impact on the Council's revision of the Crown Heights Corporation Plan. But on the other actions received in this study, his impact was negligible.

At this point, it should be noted that our case studies demonstrated that all committee members were not normally involved in their committee's deliberations. The active participants in a committee's work usually consisted of a few figures, one of them being the committee chairman.

Committee Appointments

Appointment of Members

According to Article IV, Section 1 of the Council's BY-LAWS, the Council could have both closed and open committees. The former, as well as all panels, were limited to Council members. Open committees could include non-Council members. All of these were to "reflect the general composition of the Council," which had 26 community representatives (51%), 17 public officials (33%), and eight representatives of social agencies (17%). As nearly all committees had ten members, five of them (50%) were community representatives, three (30%) were public officials,

¹
terests. Wherever possible, and this was most often the case, they sought to agree to the latter. For example, Rabbi Neumann related that he was interested in, requested and received appointments to the Model Cities Committee (he was a Brooklyn realtor) and the Williamsburgh Panel (he was a Hasidic Jew and many of them lived in that area).² However, it appeared that Chairman Billings had somewhat less flexibility in making appointments than his predecessor because of the ratio criteria previously mentioned and the standardization of committee size at ten members. These provisions were not as ironclad during the tenure of McCall or Greenidge.

Appointment of Chairman

The most important committee appointments made by the Council Chairman³ was to the position of committee chairman. These posts did not carry specific terms of office but could be held until the expiration of the term of the Council Chairman of the committee chairman.

Committee and panel chairmen were usually appointed on the same basis as regular appointments - available positions and the interest of the potential committee chairman. Because committees and panels were so important to the Council, the Council Chairman's perception of the individual's desire and ability to perform the added work demanded of committee chairmen was also taken into consideration. This led to a situation where some Council members chaired two committees, while others chaired none. The Council's 41 panels and committees were chaired

1. Interviews held respectively on April 22 and 23, 1970.

2. Rabbi Neumann, Interview, January 28, 1970.

3. The Chairmen of the Committees cited in footnote 22, were elected and not appointed by the Council Chairman.

by 25 Council members. Twenty-nine of them chaired a single committee or panel, six chaired one of each, and sixteen chaired neither.

An unmentioned factor which at times was significant in appointing panel chairmen was the ethnic cleavage in the community with which the panel was concerned. In areas where conflict was found, the Council Chairman at times appointed a member of a "neutral group" as panel chairman. A white man chaired the Hunts Point Panel in an area beset by Black-Puerto Rican tension, a Puerto Rican chaired the Crown Heights Panel which was concerned with a program involving a Black-Jewish conflict and a Black man chaired the Williamsburg Panel where the predominant conflict was between Puerto Ricans and Jews.

Chairman's Prerogatives

Formal Prerogatives

In general, the formal prerogatives of the committee chairmen included presenting reports to the Council and presiding over and scheduling meetings. The latter was for the most part a routine affair that consisted of a 13 step procedure which placed most responsibility (including time, place, and presence of a quorum) in the hands of the Staff Director's Office. The initiative for meetings came from the committee chairmen, the Council Chairman, or the chairman of the board of directors of a community corporation. The latter at times advised a committee or panel chairman that his board wished to have something reviewed by said committee or panel for ultimate Council approval. The only stipulation about calling committee or panel meetings, one which was at times violated, was that they were not to be held less than six days preceding¹ the Council meeting at which the committee's report was to be presented.

1. New York City Council Against Poverty, COMMITTEES AND PANELS (New York City: Council Against Poverty, 1969), p. 9.

The committee chairman was also charged with presiding over committee meetings. The typical committee meeting seldom attracted more than two-thirds of its members. For example, at a May 1, 1969 Council meeting, ten panels presented reports for summer programs. The average number of Council members present at each panel meeting was a bare quorum of between five and six. This meant that the chairman needed the backing of but two other panel members in order to have his point of view accepted.

Committee and panel meetings usually operated with a minimum of rules. There was no strict control of discussion by the chairman and all members who wished to speak were given an opportunity to do so. At the end of discussion on a particular subject the chairman usually presented his impression of the committee's view. Many committees and panels did not take a formal vote on the chairman's "impression", but considered it adopted unless there were objections. For example, Chairman Charles Rodriguez observed in the Crown Heights case that the new apportioning plan was never voted on; rather, a "feeling of consensus" prevailed.¹ Similarly, Council member Frank Torres once observed that the lack of objection at a Council meeting was "interpreted as concurrence."²

Informal Prerogatives

The advantages which the committee chairman possessed, in comparison with other committee members were not specified in any Council document. As Chairman he usually began and concluded discussion at committee meetings.

1. Charles Rodriguez, Interview, February 3, 1970.

2. COUNCIL MINUTES, March 14, 1968, p. 7.

The potential significance of opening discussion was that the chairman had an opportunity to submit his own ideas. This meant that other Council members had to react to these proposals before submitting their own. The significance of ending discussion was that in summarizing the group's view, he probably had some leeway which allowed him to lean towards the position he advocated.

Perhaps the most significant power of committee chairman was an outgrowth of their presentation of reports to the Council. Its importance may be found in the fact that it allowed the chairman to direct the discussion on his report for questions about it were usually addressed to him. Related to this was the fact that the committee chairman was usually best informed about the committee's work. This meant that other Council members, including the Council Chairman, sought and respected his opinion or statements about matters arising from his committee's concern.

An important aspect of the power found in presenting reports to the Council depended on the chairman's personality. When speaking, he often included homespun remarks about his ghetto upbringing or the fact that although he was not well educated he would still make an attempt to use such college words as "input" and "output."¹ Also, he was attentive when other members spoke and quite skillful at exploiting opportunities which might serve to the advantage of his committee. Thus, at a January 23, 1969 Council meeting, he tried to get the prestige of the Council Chairman behind his committee's report by requesting that Council Chairman Greenidge present it because he had attended the committee's meeting and was familiar with the subject matter. Other

1. Personal notes, Council meeting, June 6, 1969.

Council members failed to pay attention at meetings, even where the activities of their committees were being discussed, and appeared at times to be uninterested in the Council.¹

Summary

In this section it was concluded that committees played an important role in the Council's actions. This was attributed to the expertise of their members, the system of reciprocity, and the anticipation of the Council's reaction to their recommendations which meant that they were unlikely to make any that the Council was unlikely to accept. The development of committees and panels was attributed to the system of representation which made necessary a division of labor and specialization of function. We saw, furthermore, that but a few figures on each committee participated in the deliberations.

This section also examined the functions of committees. Among its findings were that they: provided an opportunity for members to develop some expertise; they frequently were able to settle sensitive issues in a quiet manner; and that they served to legitimate recommendations made by CDA. Panels were also found to function as a community corporation's board of directors when the Council had withdrawn recognition from said board. The appointing of committee members was explored as were the powers of their chairmen. Appointments, it was found, were usually made on the basis of vacancies, individual interest and as a means of satisfying ethnic representation needs. When appointing committee chairmen, the individual's desire and ability to perform the added duties of that post were taken into consideration.

1. A leading member of the City Council felt that the latter was too often the case.

In brief, the committee system contributed to make it possible for the Council to function despite such handicaps as a part-time membership that consisted mostly of nonexperts. It brought various actors, frequently with diverse points of view into the system and by minimizing conflict, helped the body maintain its equilibrium in the midst of forces¹ that had high potential for producing conflict.

1. The Council's ability to function as a policy-making body would have been seriously impaired had it frequently rejected committee and panel recommendations. To have fully discussed most of the questions before it, including various suggested alternative courses of action, would have exacerbated conflict between members and groups. More important from our perspective, it would have required daily meetings which one could not realistically expect from an unsalaried part-time body.

2. The Role of the Community Development Agency

As the principal presenter of the alternatives to which the Council responded, CDA played an important role in the Council's decisional process. This is not to suggest that it did so in every Council action. Rather, its role varied in form and style from one action to another. In three of those reviewed here, the Crown Heights and the Petition Procedure cases and the increases in the size of the South Jamaica Panel, CDA was not directly involved. However, both the withdrawal of recognition and the barring of members of the South Jamaica Board from seeking reelection were first proposed to the Council by CDA. As we shall see, CDA also played an important role in a group of actions not found in our sample, those concerning the program budgets of community corporations.

What is being suggested is that CDA's involvement in the Council's deliberations was far more significant than was indicated by official documents or statements. For example, an HRA publication, BASIC FACTS, observed that CDA supported "the Council by providing the staff to carry out policies."¹ Or, according to the testimony by Commissioner Owens before the City Council Special Committee, CDA was "the administrative arm of the Council."²

In spite of these quotations, it is maintained that CDA was more than the Council's "administrative arm." While it is acknowledged that the Council alone was ultimately empowered to take action and could override staff recommendations, CDA's role in the Council's actions was

1. (New York City: Human Resources Administration, revised, September 1969), p. 9.

2. Statement by Major R. Owens, Commissioner, CDA, Before the City Council Special Committee, March 3, 1969, p. 2.

important in that it proposed the alternatives on which the Council acted. This resulted from the part-time nature of Council membership and the fact that CDA contained hundreds of full time employees who were able to gather and digest large amounts of information and possessed both¹ the time and expertise needed to formulate recommendations.

CDA's Leadership

The CDA Commissioner was appointed by the Mayor following the recommendations of the Council's Personnel Committee. According to Section 1 of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 84, the Council had "the right to reasonable advance notice of and an opportunity to make recommendations to the Mayor concerning the selection of the Commissioner."² The Council's power in this area was of a negative nature. If it strongly disliked a candidate backed by the Mayor, it could probably have exerted sufficient influence to have his name withdrawn. It did not appear to have enough influence to force the Mayor to accept a candidate he disliked but who was favored by the Council.

The Deputy Commissioner during the time of this study, Felix Cosme, was a Puerto Rican and a former Executive Director of the Williamsburg

1. Brendan Sexton observed that, "Board memberships ... were often only ceremonial The professionals who run institutions almost always 'consult with the board,' but consultations as often as not occurs at meetings for which professionals draw up agendas and write reports on which boards act" See, "Realistic Vistas for the Poor," in WORK, YOUTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT, by Melvin Herman, et al. (New York: Crowell, 1968), p. 563. Similarly, Richard Boone, as quoted in "The Bureaucracy: Antipoverty and the Community Action Program," p. 138, believed that "real power belonged to bureaucracies rather than governing boards."

2. Although the Commissioner was expected to serve the Council and the Mayor (during the period of this study there was no example of a major policy disagreement between the latter), only the latter was empowered to appoint or remove him. However, had the Council lost confidence in the Commissioner and suggested his removal, it appears that the Mayor would have had to pay rather close attention to their recommendations.

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Community Corporation. He was appointed by the Mayor and backed for his position by the Council's Personnel Committee, Administrator Ginsberg, and Commissioner Owens. Each was undoubtedly aware of the need to appoint a Puerto Rican to a top level CDA post.

Besides the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, CDA's top staff consisted of three Assistant Commissioners, two in Program Operations and one in Program Planning and Budget. The qualifications for these posts, according to CDA's PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL, p. 4, were as "determined by the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner." The actual appointment was made by the former in consultation with the Administrator and the Mayor. Additionally, the Council's Personnel Committee also consulted with the Commissioner although its approval was largely of a pro forma nature. For example, an Assistant Commissioner was appointed in the fall of 1970, through an "administrative oversight," without Council consultation. The Council was only made aware of the appointment several weeks after it was made.

Commissioner Owens

During the period of this study, CDA was directed by Commissioner Major R. Owens. A former Brooklyn Librarian, Owens became active in civil rights affairs in that Borough approximately ten years ago. By the mid-sixties, he was head of Bedford-Stuyvesant CORE, a rent strike leader and had run an unsuccessful campaign for the City Council. In 1966 he was appointed Executive Director of the Brownsville Community

1. Mr. Cosme's replacement in the fall of 1970 was also a Puerto Rican. Both Council and CDA sources have often stated that as Blacks and Puerto Ricans were the two major clientele groups of the poverty program, and as the former were more preponderant and better organized, then the Commissioner's post will be reserved for a Black and the Deputy Commissioner's post for a Puerto Rican.

Corporation. Within a short period of time he was directing what was acknowledged as one of the City's finest programs. In 1968, following the resignation of CDA Commissioner George Nicolau, Owens, in spite of the opposition of some militant Blacks,¹ was appointed Commissioner.

Commissioner Owens acquired a reputation for working long hours. He was very highly regarded by both his subordinates and Council members. His one fault, according to several of his subordinates, was that he found it difficult to delegate authority and responsibility and consequently became too frequently involved in matters which should have been handled by his subordinates. These colleagues did not regard such activities as snooping, but simply a desire on his part to keep abreast of all matters and provide whatever assistance he could. Members of the Council acknowledged his influence in policy-making when they stated that they respected his opinion and at times adopted it as their own. One Bronx Delegate went so far as to state that, "The CAP depends on whatever picture the CDA Commissioner paints."

In an interview Owens stated that he believed that CDA was influential in the Council's policy-making because it provided the information on which Council actions were based. He did not however feel that this role was unique to the Community Development Agency - Council Against Poverty relationship, rather that it was found in the relationship between any legislative body and its professional staff. What it came down to he suggested was that CDA made recommendations which the Council acted on.

1. According to an article by Peter Kihss in the NEW YORK TIMES of March 13, 1968, Owens was favored by the HRA Administrator. A middle-management CDA source added that the outgoing Commissioner had recommended Owens for the Commissionership because he had both experience and expertise.

CDA and the Funding Cycle

With this background, we now turn to an examination of CDA's role in the funding cycle. This review is undertaken in order to demonstrate its dominance in that process and to enable us to see the extensive staff employed by the Agency.

Program Operations and the District Office

Program Operations was responsible for two major functions: they were to provide technical assistance to the City's grantees and ensure that the latter's programs were "executed within the policies and guidelines that are set forth for them."¹ More specifically, they provided technical assistance to develop programs and budgets, train personnel, monitor elections, enhance managerial effectiveness, provide aid in the education field and determine whether or not a corporation was complying with Council and OEO guidelines.

Since New York City is so large, Program Operations was divided into Program Operations 1 and 11, each supervised by an Assistant Commissioner. The former covered the fourteen poverty areas in Brooklyn and Queens, while the other Division covered the twelve in Manhattan, Bronx, and Staten Island. The 1965 estimated population within the poverty areas of Brooklyn and Queens was approximately 1,666,000 people, while the Manhattan, Bronx and Staten Island areas were inhabited by approximately 1,787,000 people. Nineteen per cent of these people were Puerto Rican,² thirty-four per cent were Black and forty-seven per cent were white.

1. PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL, p. 1.

2. COMMUNITY CORPORATION ELECTION MASTER PLAN, pp. 36-40.

The field work for each of the two Program Operations Divisions was carried out by one of its five District Offices. The PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL stated that,

The District Office staff must have complete knowledge of Federal, State and City grant requirements and procedures, budgets and fiscal operations and procedures, specific legal requirements applicable to Education Action programs, and complete recording and reporting mandates. The staff must know the C.D.A./H.R.A. divisions and agencies available for ready resource. They must understand the functions of these departments and the vital role they play in the funding process. Without this knowledge, service and compliance might easily become reversed in importance, and the grass roots agency might spend the program year struggling to meet official mandates instead of offering optimum services to the community.¹

In fact, a reoccurring complaint of community corporations was that CDA was less interested in providing services than in determining their compliance with various guidelines.

Each District Office was staffed by eight employees charged with the dual responsibilities of providing assistance and monitoring the compliance with the operations of two or three operations. Their significance was further indicated by the fact that they were located at the center of a communications network: all CDA - poverty area communications were routed through them.²

One must understand that just as the community representatives on the Council provided that body and its panels with input from the field, so too did the CDA gather information from the field through its District Offices. In a sense, CDA's information input from its District Offices functioned as a counterbalance to the community input to the

1. PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL, p. 68.

2. PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL, p. 3.

Council. It provided the Agency with its own system of intelligence gathering so that it was not necessary to rely exclusively on that provided by community corporations or Council members.

Program Activities Cycle

The program activities carried out by the Program Operations Divisions "may be thought of in terms of an eight step annual cycle."¹ This cycle is reviewed here in order to demonstrate CDA's constant presence in the funding process and to demonstrate both the complexity of this process as well as the inputs of such other participants as HRA and OEO. While these stages are presented in a chronological order, it should be clear that this is somewhat of an artificial separation used in order to make clear the overall process. In fact, more than one of these stages may have been operating at the same time.

In the first of these steps, CDA aided the Council in the determination of Citywide priorities. In Program Year 1969/70 for example, the Council decided that community corporations that received an annual appropriation of from \$1,101,000-\$3,000,000 were to spend twenty per cent of their funds for educational programs, fifteen per cent for housing, ten per cent for manpower, and fifteen per cent for economic development.² Once these priorities were established, the District Offices provided the corporations with technical assistance in drawing up their budgets. The proposed budgets were then submitted to CDA where they underwent further review in order to attempt to determine for

1. PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL, p. 4.

2. See, VERSATILE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, p. 13. Corporations receiving appropriations beneath the minimum or above the maximum were required to spend different percentages of their funds for these four programs.

example whether or not the sponsoring board had a membership of the minimum size, containing at least the minimum number of poor people.¹ Also, did the proposed program conform to the Citywide priorities established by the Council.

Once CDA completed its review, it then made a recommendation to the relevant Council panel. At a meeting of the latter, usually attended by six or seven Council members, two or three members of the CDA staff were also present. The panel was technically empowered to recommend that the Council reject, modify, or approve a package. Following the presentation by staff, the panel chairman asked the area delegate to present his view of the proposed program package. As the corporation had been working closely with CDA in putting the package together, it was not surprising to find that the area delegates went along with CDA's recommendations. It was similarly not surprising to find that the panel usually recommended that the Council approve whatever was presented to it by the CDA. For example, COUNCIL MINUTES for May 1, 1969, pp. 9-13, stated that the Long Island City, South Bronx, Corona-Elmhurst, Coney Island, Sunset Park and Bronx River Panels recommended that the Council approve program packages presented by CDA. Similarly, COUNCIL MINUTES for the May 8, 1969 meeting, pp. 9-24, specified that four panels recommended adoption of CDA recommendations regarding summer programs for these areas. As has frequently been observed, panel and committee recommendations were usually approved by the Council.

Steps four and five in the program cycle followed the Council's approval of a panel's recommendation. These involved CDA's submission of applications requesting Federal and City monies and approval for

1. VERSATILE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, pp. 14-15.

the release of these. A Council approved package was submitted to the
Regional and New York State Offices of Economic Opportunity.¹ Once
Regional OEO approved the various corporation packages, a sample of
approximately ten per cent was further examined by the Washington Of-
fice.² Before funding could occur, the Governor's approval was required.³

Following the approval of the requests for grants, CDA prepared a
line by line budget for the funding period. Contracts were then prepared
by HRA's Legal Office and forwarded to the Corporation Counsel.⁴ Once
the latter approved them, they were signed by the CDA Commissioner and

1. As part of its relationship with other levels of government, as well as with other bureaucracies within the City, CDA served at times, as a mediator between them and the community corporations. For example, in its review of budgets proposed by community corporations, REGIONAL OEO might raise questions regarding program emphasis. Or, the Comptroller had questions regarding the procedures to be used for fiscal accountability. Through informal meetings and telephone conversations, CDA sought to iron out differences such as these. In doing so, it contributed towards the maintenance of a state of equilibrium among the participants.

2. POVERTY WARRIORS, p. 44, noted that the Topeka Community Action Agency's "most tangible evidence for efficiency was the technically correct and successful preparation and implementation of OEO community action proposals.

3. According to Section 242 of the 1967 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act, the Governor had thirty days to veto a local submission to OEO. However, the OEO Director was empowered to override any veto.

4. It will be recalled that one of the original purposes for establishing the Human Resources Administration was to coordinate the City's social welfare efforts and that HRA was criticized for failing to bring about this unity. CDA did have a good working relationship with other HRA units. For example, each year it worked with the Youth Services Agency in apportioning and distributing positions in the Neighborhood Youth Corps. In helping the Council determine its policies and programs in the employment field, CDA worked with the Manpower & Career Development Agency (MCDA). Furthermore, these two agencies worked together in placing MCDA offices in community corporations. At the same time, it should be recalled that in Chapter 1, one of the examples of a Council action that was in our original sample, was the Council's request to the NYC Council and NYC Board of Estimate to approve MCDA's capital budget request.

distributed to the Comptroller, HRA's Legal and Fiscal Departments, community corporations and delegate agencies. The next step, the establishment and reimbursement of revolving funds was handled by HRA Central. Ultimately, an advance was paid to the corporation and delegate agencies to allow them to begin functioning. They were required to submit vouchers, and summarized documentation of expenses for continual reimbursement.

The last step in CDA's program activities cycle was the monitoring, evaluation and technical support of ongoing programs. Once a contract was signed, CDA was responsible for reviewing the grantee's program, determining its effectiveness, and aiding it with whatever assistance it could provide. The failure on the part of the grantee to comply with any clauses of the contract could "lead to termination of the contract, withholding of funds or change in the scope of services and the budget."¹

Implications of the Program Activities Cycle

This review demonstrated CDA's constant presence and the minimum presence of the Council in the funding process. It is not being argued that this was right or wrong. The body here charged with making policy, the CAP, was a part-time one. Of necessity, the full time CDA, through its recommendations, had a strong impact on the Council's actions. As the City Council Special Committee Report noted, the "CDA dominates the submission and approval processes of the program and budgets."²

The heavy dependence of part-time legislators on their staffs (even more than full time ones) was noted by Mayor Robert Wagner. According

1. "Statement by Major R. Owens," Commissioner, CDA, Before the City Council Special Committee, p. 7.

2. "City Council Special Committee Report," p. 18.

to him, the members of infrequently meeting voluntary bodies such as the Council may have been able to familiarize themselves with some problems, but they were of necessity heavily dependent on their full time staff for the gathering of information and the presentation of recommendations.¹ In this case, it was the more than three hundred members of the CDA staff who were responsible for gathering large amounts of accurate, current and relevant information and presenting it to the Council. The staff's importance was enhanced by the fact that there was an element of trust between them and many Council members. As one public official observed, "You had to have confidence in the staff. It was good and always produced decent recommendations whenever these were requested."² Furthermore, in presenting information to committees, CDA was expected to come up with proposals which would be acted on by the Council.

The official view however was that the staff did not make recommendations. Rather, it was to present information and speak only when called upon. Thus Commissioner Owens observed at a Council meeting that "as a matter of procedure staff makes presentations to the panel and it makes recommendations as a result." He informed staff that they "were only present for backup information and asked them to refrain from speaking out at meetings. If a panel needs information, they will call upon staff."³

Staff's role was especially significant at the committee and panel stage for the recommendations of these bodies were the subject matter

1. Robert F. Wagner, Interview, February 3, 1969.

2. Charles Rodriguez, Interview, February 3, 1970.

3. COUNCIL MINUTES, May 1, 1969, p. 8.

of most Council sessions and were virtually always enacted without amendments. This occurred for example in four of the five actions examined in detail in this study. In guiding committee and panel work, staff, therefore, had an excellent opportunity to influence Council policy. The result was that just as the Council acted on committee and panel recommendations, a principal function of committees and panels was to act on CDA proposals.

This is not to suggest that committees and CDA never disagreed, rather that they seldom did. One of the reasons for their disagreement stemmed from their use of different criteria in evaluating a program package. CDA's review was based on technical criteria: would a program provide assistance to a sufficiently large number of people? Had similar programs worked in the past? Some panel members, especially those representing poverty areas, were more interested in seeing that the wishes of the corporation (as the voice of the community) were heeded. For example, were the community's interests being followed or were they¹ shunted aside in order to comply with CDA's technical criteria?

The Council's Checks on CDA

Council members did have some checks on CDA deriving from their alternative, although limited sources of information. Thus area delegates had administrative experience with various programs and procedures and hence knowledge regarding how these had worked or not worked in the past. Also, area delegates had the facilities of their community corporations, public officials had their own staffs and the Council had its staff under the Staff Director. All of these could be used to

1. Obviously the corporation also presented the community's view in its discussion with CDA.

gather information. More specifically, the Model Cities Secretary and the Health Services Representative possessed expertise and information in their respective fields. Also, the delegate from a particular area was familiar with that area and could make use of this familiarity when the Council or relevant panel discussed programs or problems in his neighborhood. Additionally, over a period of time some committee and panel members gained expertise in their specializations. Under these circumstances, staff recommendations were not provided to individuals who reviewed them in a vacuum. The Council member who was concerned and alert was not required to totally rely on CDA recommendations.

The attitude of committee and panel chairmen towards the use of staff also may have acted as a check on CDA's influence. Some chairmen simply objected to becoming too dependent on professional staff. They

1. It is worthwhile to attempt to determine why CDA played a role in some Council actions and not in others. That is, why was it active in the budgetary process and the withdrawal of recognition cases, while it lacked significant input in the actions increasing the size of the South Jamaica Panel as well as in the Crown Heights and Petition Procedure cases.

Turning to CDA's extensive involvement in the budgetary process first, it is noted that this process was a lengthy, complicated and detailed task. Neither the Council nor the panels possessed the time needed to become involved in all of the stages. Also, as the working out of corporation budgets was an annual affair, it was both possible and necessary to establish a formal procedure which provided for CDA input. It was much easier for the Agency to become involved in a reoccurring process than in nonreoccurring ones such as the Crown Heights case.

The question of withdrawing recognition from the South Jamaica Board was politically important. As a unit of HRA, CDA brought a citywide perspective to most questions and represented the prevailing political posture. It became an active participant in this Council action because from the Commissioner's perspective what was involved was nothing less than the future of the City's poverty program. To have failed to take action in that situation would have meant that the South Jamaica Community Corporation was able to contravene Citywide guidelines. This would have made CDA's work virtually impossible and endangered the entire structure of New York City's poverty program.

believed that staff was only to provide information on request and was not to make recommendations. In this vein, the reader will recall that in the Crown Heights case Panel Chairman Rodriguez did not consult with the staff until after his Panel decided what recommendations it was going to make. In general, this was the exception rather than the rule. Council members were usually heavily dependent on CDA for information¹ regarding most Council activities.

The Council Staff Director and CDA

The Council Staff Director was also an alternative source of information for Council members. His relationship with CDA was a complicated one. According to Article VI, Section 2 of the BY-LAWS, the Staff Director was a liaison between the Council Chairman and the CDA Commissioner but was formally subordinate to the Council Chairman.

The placing of the Staff Director under the Council Chairman resulted from the fact that when the Council was getting started it was believed that its operations required its own secretariat. Thus the Staff Director's Office was given numerous duties of a secretarial nature. These included handling correspondence, scheduling Council meetings, preparing and distributing COUNCIL MINUTES, and informing affected persons and communities of Council actions. Furthermore, the Staff Director's Office functioned as a liaison between community corporations and the Council, aided in drawing up the agenda for Council meetings and edited the COUNCIL BULLETIN. The Staff Director was also

1. It should be noted that by setting alternatives, the staff expedited the Council's work. This was because it freed time pressed Council members from having to determine Council alternatives. At the same time it made stalemate less likely because Council members were not as likely to have a vested interest in staff recommendations as would have been the case if their own proposals were being considered.

the Council's parliamentarian and represented the Council Chairman at Council meetings.

The importance of the Staff Director to the Council's operations did not result solely from the functions cited in the last paragraph. He was also important because he was frequently called upon by Council members to interpret OEO memoranda and to help the Council comply with the latter's standards (this in essence was what he was doing when he helped the By-Laws Committee draft the Petition Procedure). He was able to play this role as a result of several factors. Firstly, as Staff Director he was in constant communication with all Council members and hence familiar to them. Also, he kept abreast of all developments in the poverty arena and was always available to answer all inquiries. Related to this is that as a lawyer he possessed the legal knowledge that was at times necessary to interpret official documents. Lastly, some Council members preferred calling on him instead of CDA because they more readily perceived him as a Council employee.

We do not mean to imply that the Staff Director operated independent of the CDA Commissioner. While the latter believed that the Staff Director's Office should have been a department within CDA, he grudgingly accepted its status as subordinate to the Council Chairman as stated in the BY-LAWS.¹ Mr. Davenport however was aware of the conflict in his Office's status and careful to avoid appearing to trespass in CDA's bailiwick.² Thus he frequently consulted with the CDA Commissioner

1. Commissioner Owens, Interview, April 24, 1970.

2. While it is only in the realm of speculation, it appears probable that the potential for conflict between the Commissioner and the Staff Director was somewhat ameliorated by the fact that Owens and the Council Chairman had a close working relationship. This made it even more likely that the Commissioner was informed of the Staff Director's activities.

and other CDA officials. For example, in the Petition Procedure study, he submitted a draft of his work to the Commissioner before it was submitted to the Council. Other areas in which such consultation occurred included the interpretation of OEO guidelines, establishing program priorities, reviewing developments in the City's poverty areas, and¹ making up the Council's agenda.

Summary

This section reviewed CDA's involvement in the Council's deliberations (paying special attention to the funding cycle) and its relationship with the Staff Director. After noting that the Council alone was empowered to decide in those areas in which it was authoritatively competent, it was observed that CDA's importance in the Council's deliberations stemmed from the fact that the Council acted on its recommendations or alternatives. CDA was able to play this role because of its large full time staff that gathered and reviewed information, as well as the fact that the Council consisted of infrequently meeting part-timers who were dependent on their staff to present them with alternatives. We also observed that the Council had some means of checking the influence of CDA including alternative sources of information and the fact that some committee chairmen chose to minimize their dependence on the Agency.

1. The community corporation's relationship with the constituent units of HRA largely consisted of their providing neighborhood residents with information regarding the programs operated by these units and referring these residents to the relevant programs. For example, they did this with MCDA, YSA, NYC and even with the Department of Social Services.

In reviewing the relationship between CDA and the Staff Director, it was noted that although the Staff Director was formally subordinate to the Council Chairman, he was cognizant of the fact that the CDA Commissioner believed that the Staff Director's Office should have been a department within CDA. In order to avoid any conflict with CDA, the Staff Director was therefore careful to consult with its officers and avoided trespassing in its bailiwick.

3. The Role of the Office of Economic Opportunity

In keeping with its emphasis on local initiative, OEO's involvement in the Council's deliberations consisted of establishing the parameters within which it could or could not take action.¹ These parameters were set forth in guidelines or memoranda with which community action agencies interested in receiving funds had to comply.² At times OEO went beyond issuing guidelines and directed that a community action agency take a specific action. Even in the latter instance however, in keeping with its emphasis on local initiative, flexibility with regard to details was usually given to the local community action agency.³

OEO's Involvement in the Cases

Establishment of Guidelines

To review the five cases, OEO's grantee in New York City, the CAP, was delegated the task of implementing OEO guidelines. It will be recalled that in the Crown Heights study the Council approved the recommendation by the Crown Heights Panel that one-half of the elected members of the Board of Directors of the Crown Heights Corporation be poor. This went beyond the Council minimum of one-third which in turn went beyond the OEO guideline. The latter, COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO NO. 81, p. 12, stipulated that one-third of the members of each board had to consist, not of the poor, but of representatives of the poor.⁴

1. We do not mean to imply that OEO should have been involved in each Council action. What we are attempting to do is describe the role that it played.

2. OEO has seven Regional Offices located throughout the nation. Since 1965, national guidelines have been passed on to community action agencies through these offices.

3. The Nixon Administration's proposed elimination of OEO is discussed in the conclusion.

4. According to Sar Levitan, THE GREAT SOCIETY'S POOR LAW (Baltimore:

In the withdrawal of recognition case, OEO's involvement was similar to the last cases although it differed from it in that OEO was involved both before the issue emerged as well as after the Council took action. Before action was taken, on August 26, 1966, OEO issued COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO 23A. Part C5 stated that grantees were to provide for the review of cases where there was "a claim of unfair treatment or of dismissal without cause," by either the governing body or its personnel committee. The determination of how to implement this broad guideline¹ was to be made on the local level.

Commissioner Owens interpreted Part C5 to back Sharpe's claim that he was entitled to due process before dismissal. He was not forced to invoke this OEO MEMO but did so in order to legitimate the action he sought. Before recognition was withdrawn, Regional OEO affirmed that the Council could take this action as long as elections for a new Board were held within six months. It also noted that the Jamaica Board could appeal to OEO in order to determine whether the action taken was "fair² or arbitrary and capricious."

One week after this action was taken, OEO Regional Director Nieves met with several Directors of the South Jamaica Community Corporation and their counsel to discuss the controversy. She refused to comply with their request that OEO "intervene immediately to prevent the CAP

John Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 113, this guideline could "be observed without having a single low income person on the CAA board.

1. According to OEO's Regional Director, "considerable discretion rests with each grantee agency as to the specific manner in which it requires ... according employees due process in the resolution of their grievances." See, "Letter to Paul Zuber from Josephine Nieves," March 3, 1969, p. 2.

2. "Memo from General Counsel's Office," March 10, 1969.

from implementing its March 6th resolution." Instead, she observed that local initiative was encouraged in all areas including personnel policies and that as OEO did not have a direct relationship with the Corporation, it would only hear an appeal from the latter after it had first appealed to the Council. Additionally, OEO implicitly acknowledged the Council's power to withdraw recognition when it said that an appeal would only be heard on the grounds that the Council's action was arbitrary, reached by unfair procedures or would have an adverse effect on the community's program. In conclusion, she recommended a negotiated settlement the advantages of which "are too obvious to require elaboration.¹

Turning to the peripheral actions, in expanding the size of the South Jamaica Panel, OEO's involvement was again limited. The sole OEO regulation regarding committees and panels was that they had to reflect the composition of the parent body.² Thus, the membership of a panel could be expanded, as South Jamaica Panel Chairman Billings wished, as long as it kept within this guideline.

In the peripheral action which prohibited members of the Board of Directors from seeking reelection, three weeks before the Council approved this action, Regional OEO acknowledged that it could withdraw recognition and call for new elections.³ However, it never commented on the question of barring board members from seeking reelection. Rather, as a former Metropolitan Director of the Northeastern Regional Office observed, "In this case the OEO sought to avoid getting involved."

1. "Letter to Paul Zuber from Josephine Nieves," March 31, 1969, p. 4.

2. COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO, Part D, paragraph 5.

3. "Memo from General Counsel's Office, March 10, 1969.

Directing that Action be Taken

OEO's role in the Petition Procedure study was an example of its directing that a community action agency take a formal action to bring its organization or local policies in line with OEO guidelines, although variation in details with respect to the local action were allowed. In this case we saw that OEO directed that the Council establish a procedure by which groups which were unrepresented or inadequately represented on the Council could rectify their status. However, the specifications regarding a petition procedure were of such a general nature, as found in COMMUNITY ACTION MEMO NO. 81, p. 15, that the enactment of virtually any petition procedure was allowed.

Why OEO Seldom Directed the Council to Take Specific Actions

Although OEO's involvement in the cases discussed was seldom direct, that it was potentially a strong influence with which community action agencies had to deal was clear. It was for example empowered to withdraw their recognition (and funds). Thus, in the summer of 1967, Syracuse's Crusade for Opportunity, which had the misfortune of both antagonizing powerful elements in the community and engaging in what appeared to be some fiscal irregularities, became the first community action agency placed in trusteeship.¹ At other times, a threat to take such action brought about compliance on the part of a recalcitrant community action agency. This was the case in San Francisco, where OEO stated that it would withhold over \$2,000,000 from the Economic Opportunity Council until it "agreed to comply with the national employment² policy.

1. MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, pp. 132-135.

2. PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR, p. 61.

Situations such as those cited in the last paragraph were rare. During the period covered by this study, no examples were found of OEO's threatening to withhold funds from New York City in order to gain compliance with OEO guidelines. Commissioner Owens felt that OEO infrequently ordered the Council to take a specific action because the Council did not go off half-cocked. Instead, it was aware of its responsibility¹ to operate within OEO guidelines.

However, OEO's infrequent direction to the Council to take specific actions went beyond the last statement. For a number of reasons it usually followed a policy of minimizing Federal standards and encouraging local initiative. From a purely practical point of view it was originally thought to be very difficult to come up with detailed standards to govern community action programs in such different areas as Harlem, rural Mississippi, and a West Virginia mining town. Additionally, some members of Congress and city hall leaders would have strongly objected to Federal domination. Also, as John G. Wofford observed, "planning itself was seen as a form of action," for it would lead to a mobilization² of resources. Additionally, there was some "confidence in the ability of individual communities to organize and carry out antipoverty programs³ tailored to local needs and priorities."

One must also consider the dynamics of the OEO-Council relationship as contributing towards the little direct involvement of OEO. OEO

1. Commissioner Owens, Interview, April 24, 1970.

2. See, John Wofford, "The Politics of Local Responsibility," in ON FIGHTING POVERTY, edited by James Sundquist (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 76.

3. "The Politics of Local Responsibility," p. 75.

officials believed that they had little opportunity to become directly involved in New York City's poverty program. According to an OEO Assistant Administrator, the Agency possessed more influence in areas where its expertise was in greater demand. At the same time, this same official stated that because New York City had a large Congressional delegation, many OEO officials believed that they should avoid actions that might lead to antagonizing any of its members. Because of this, it is likely that in the event of a disagreement between OEO on the one hand and the Council, CDA and the Mayor on the other, that OEO would have backed off. Thus, in spite of the fact that the Council was technically subordinate to OEO the realities of their relationship minimized the likelihood of OEO's directing the Council to take specific actions.

How Much Federal Regulation?

This review of OEO's role tells us something about how much it should regulate local programs. As the major purposes of the Economic Opportunity Act included encouraging local initiative and the "maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served," for OEO to have attempted to dominate local policy-making would have been contrary to the very legislation with which it was created. At the same time it was clear that occasions would arise when it would be necessary for the intercession of the local body. Basically, there were two types of occasions when this was necessary: in order to enforce national standards and in order to settle local disputes.

The Enforcement of National Standards

Little more need be said on this function. That some regulation was needed in order to ensure that community action agencies complied with the purposes of the EOA was clear. As was frequently mentioned,

OEO was charged with enforcing national standards through its issuance of guidelines. In this study, the best example of its performing this function was in the Petition Procedure case.

The Settlement of Local Disputes

In spite of OEO's desire to avoid interfering in local disputes, at times it was impossible to do so since it was in a very real sense viewed by community groups or factions as a superior body which was empowered to reverse disagreeable local actions. For example, we saw that following the withdrawal of recognition, OEO Regional Director Nieves met with several members of the South Jamaica Board to consider their appeal to "immediately prevent the CAP from implementing its March 6th resolution." While the Council's action was not changed by this appeal, the fact that the Board had an opportunity to present its case before a presumably third party may be viewed as contributing to its growing acceptance of the Council's action. This was so since in making its appeal the Board was at least able to "blow off some steam" and to feel that it had done all that was possible to battle its adversary - the Council Against Poverty. Court cases and appeals to Washington, while considered, were simply too expensive for those who could no longer draw¹ on the resources of the Corporation.

1. While there is no comprehensive study of the role of the Regional Offices in local policy-making, at least one observer believes that when it comes to local disputes they back the position of those in power. Clark and Hopkins quoted an official of Crusade for Opportunity in Syracuse who claimed that "OEO's real policy ... was to have no standard stance and to react simply to whoever" was in control. See, Kenneth B. Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A RELEVANT WAR AGAINST POVERTY (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 158.

The function "of blowing off steam" is not to be lightly dismissed. In functioning as a body to which local disagreements could be appealed, OEO contributed towards the maintenance of a system of equilibrium among the participants in the poverty arena. It encouraged those involved to become more accepting of actions with which they disagreed and hence helped ameliorate local tensions.

Essentially what is being suggested is that while some Federal regulation was necessary, it had to be minimized in order to maximize the role of local community action agencies. Moreover, from a pragmatic perspective to have sought to maximize OEO's influence on community action agencies would have required an expansion of OEO's staff and represented a distinct thrust in the community action program away from local initiation and implementation of programs. The latter would have undoubtedly incurred the wrath of many local officials as well as minority group leaders.

Summary

In summary, this section reviewed OEO's involvement in the Council's actions and the reasons for the infrequent times it directed the Council to take specific actions. Also examined was the need for Federal regulation and OEO's role in contributing to the maintenance of a system of equilibrium among the participants in the poverty arena.

4. The Role of the Council Chairman

Another participant in the Council's actions whose role will be examined is the Council Chairman. Such an examination is believed necessary because in the course of this study it has become apparent that the Chairman played an important role in the Council's deliberations.

Choosing the Chairman

Following nomination in a special Nominating Committee, the Chairman was chosen in a secret ballot by a majority of the Council. The BY-LAWS stipulated that if no candidate received a majority of the vote, then a run-off was to be held between the two top candidates.¹ According to EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 28, "After consultation with the members of the Council, the Mayor shall designate two of the members to be Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively."² Thus before taking office the newly elected Chairman was required to receive the approval of the Mayor.

The Mayor's power to appoint the Council Chairman was of a technical nature. Although he had but one vote on the Council, it would appear that he could have influenced the other City officials on that body, especially the eight he appointed. However, he was undoubtedly aware of the fact that any attempt by him to dictate the appointment of the Council Chairman would have given rise to the accusation that he was bringing politics into the poverty program and would most likely have led to strong opposition by the 26 community representatives on the Council. As Chairman Billings observed, the "Mayor appoints, but he doesn't have anything to say regarding the election."³

1. Article 1, Section 1.

2. Section 3, paragraph c.

3. David Billings, Interview, April 22, 1970.

Some Council members however believed that the Mayor should not even possess the technical power of designating the Chairman. Ed Greenidge, who was Chairman from spring 1968 through the summer of 1969, was one such individual. When he was elected Chairman, he refused to submit his name to the Mayor for his approval. Consequently, he was legally not Chairman, but Acting Chairman. This had no effect on his powers.

The Chairman's Role

The leadership of the Council Chairman in the period studied affected the direction of the Council and helped it to function smoothly. This was basically accomplished by the Chairman's active involvement in some Council actions, his mediation of disagreements and his encouragement of the functioning of committees.

Active Involvement

A review of the five Council actions indicates that the only one in which the Chairman was constantly involved was the withdrawal of recognition. In the others, those marked by a high degree of agreement among Council members, the Chairman's role consisted of drawing up the agenda, recognizing speakers and tallying votes.

Greenidge's role in the withdrawal of recognition may be divided into two parts. In the first, he and Owens were actively involved in negotiations aimed at convincing the South Jamaica Community Corporation's Board to reconsider the firing of Sharpe and follow due process. In doing so, Greenidge did not originally have a Council mandate but acted on his own initiative.

The second part of his role in this action involved his persuading Council members to back the resolution withdrawing recognition. According to him, this was one of his most difficult times as Council

Chairman. He related that many members did not like the idea of withdrawing recognition and he had to work very hard to persuade them to back it. He advised them that he was not interested in Sharpe's fate, only in due process. The former Chairman believed that he was able to get the approval of Council members only because he had developed personal relations with them.¹ The members responded to his urgings to approve the resolutions withdrawing recognition because over a period of time they had grown to respect him and placed great trust in his point of view. Also, according to one source, some Council members who did not agree with the resolution but who admired Greenidge, simply abstained. There is some doubt that the Council would have approved the resolution had someone else been Chairman.

Mediating Disagreements

Council Chairman Greenidge was also involved in mediating disagreements among Council members. The reader will recall that in the Petition Procedure study, a conflict was developing on the floor of the Council between two members of the By-Laws Committee. The Chairman of the latter felt that the BY-LAWS were complete and should be submitted to OEO while a second member of the Committee felt that they were incomplete and therefore not ready for submission. Before their difference of opinion could go too far, Greenidge suggested and the Council agreed, that the BY-LAWS should be submitted until such time as the final document is complete.² He was able to work out this simple compromise because he was respected by Council members. When they disagreed among themselves, they were willing to accept a solution he recommended.

1. Ed Greenidge, Interview, April 23, 1970

2. COUNCIL MINUTES, October 10, 1968, p. 17.

It was observed in the last paragraph that Greenidge was able to work out a compromise because the members respected him. This was a mutual relationship. As Council Chairman, he treated each Council member the same, whether he was a very devoted Council member or one who had little interest in Council affairs. Greenidge was always fair in recognizing Council members in the order in which their hands appeared in the air and in allotting time to speakers with divergent outlooks. He did not attempt to monopolize debate, but usually spoke only when information was requested of him. The Chairman was able to gain the confidence of the members so that when he asked them to back his position, they agreed to do so.

The generally laudatory approval of the Chairman was upheld by observations offered from a variety of sources. A representative from the Bronx Borough President's office praised Greenidge as helping to defuse conflicts and getting such information to members by allowing people with divergent opinions to present these to the Council. A Bronx Area Representative felt that Greenidge was tactful, "polished and knew how to deal with people." Another Area Representative was of the opinion that Greenidge respected Council members and they in turn respected him. Indeed, in a score of interviews with both Council members and CDA employees, there was but one criticism of Greenidge: he had too¹ little time to spend on Council affairs.

1. Some Council members believed that the reason that the Black-Puerto Rican conflict boiled over in September, 1970, was because Greenidge's successor, David Billings, "Has a long way to go before he can be as successful as his predecessor." It was felt that he was unable to mediate between these two groups. He was criticized by some Council members for seeking to dominate discussion, failing to inspire confidence in himself, and for his mod attire which was believed to be too flamboyant for the head of the City's poverty program. See, Francis Clines, NEW YORK TIMES, September 11, 1970.

The Council Chairman and Committees

Mr. Greenidge's leadership style was even influential in those Council actions in which he was not directly involved. This was the case because by helping create an atmosphere of professionalism, he encouraged the Council to move on with its work and prevented it from bogging down into a body in which the various groups present engaged in long and heated exchanges of accusations. This was also the case because some of the importance of committees in the Council's deliberations resulted from his seeking to have them play such a role. He insisted that all matters were first to be considered by the appropriate committee before being considered by the Council. Moreover, he helped encourage the interest of committee chairmen in Council matters by insisting that they dominate the discussion before the Council on those matters which were first heard in their committees. This made them feel as though they played an important role on that body.

Summary

In summary, we have seen that the Council Chairman played an important role in that body's deliberations. He affected the direction of the Council by mediating disagreements which otherwise may have led to serious impairment of its ability to operate, and by his active participation in the Council's withdrawal of recognition from the South Jamaica Board, helped establish the supremacy of the Council over the community corporations. Furthermore, under his leadership, committees were encouraged to play an important role in the Council and the Council's affairs were in general handled in a professional manner. All of this helped the Council to function smoothly without unnecessary breakdowns or roadblocks.

5. Area Delegates and Their Constituents

Representational Roles

The relationship between the area delegates, who comprise by far the largest group of Council members, and their constituents is a complex

¹ one. While they speak of two major representational roles, trustee and delegate, in practice the latter prevails.

Turning to the delegate role first, the area delegate may feel that he represents either his corporation or the poverty area.² The Council Chairman held the latter belief. At a March 27, 1969 meeting, he told the Council that area delegates do not "sit on the Council representing the corporation but a poverty area."³ Echoing this viewpoint, the East New York Delegate said at a noisy meeting that he would do whatever the people wished him to do. If they, and not the East New York Board of Directors,⁴ wanted him to resign, then he would do so.

The problem with this orientation is that the residents of poverty areas are unorganized and rarely attend meetings. Getting them to turn out for a corporation election is a herculean task. This makes it

1. As a representational body, the Council supplements the overall system of representation in New York City.¹ This includes such traditionally elected bodies as the Borough Presidents, City Councilmen, State Assemblymen and State Senators, as well as more recently established elected bodies such as the Community School Boards, and Model Cities Policy Committees. There are also appointed bodies such as the Community Boards (appointed by the Borough Presidents) and Urban Action Task Forces (appointed by the Mayor).

2. In her discussion of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles, Marshall states that community representatives represent the poor in their districts. She qualifies this somewhat by stating that several community representatives believed the problems of the poor were the same throughout the area and therefore felt that they represented the interests of all of the poor. See, *THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION IN POVERTY*, pp. 52-53.

3. COUNCIL MINUTES, March 27, 1969, p. 18.

4. Personal notes, Council meeting, April 10, 1969.

difficult for an area delegate to ascertain the views of the residents of
the area he represents.¹

Other area delegates who are perceived as having a delegate orientation however believe that they represent their corporations of board of directors.² Thus the Bedford-Stuyvesant Delegate felt that he should receive information more quickly so as to be "able to reflect the community corporation's feeling to the Council."³ Similarly, the Hunts Point Delegate spoke of receiving instructions from his Board to resign from the Council pending the outcome of a question regarding the area's allocation.⁴

An example of the trustee orientation was found in the Crown Heights study where we saw that the Crown Heights Delegate agreed to an apportioning formula for his area without consulting either his Community Committee (predecessor of the Board of Directors) or other area residents. According to him, he presumed the backing of his Community Committee. Similarly, a member of the Board of Directors of the Williamsburg Community Corporation complained that their Council Delegate neither came to their Board meetings for advice nor provided reports to them regarding Council activities. It was angrily related that he acted totally on his own.

Despite these findings of the existence of two major variations regarding the representational role of the area delegates, in practice most

1. In *THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION IN POVERTY*, pp. 53-54, Marshall observes that it was impossible for community representatives to determine the position of their constituents on the issues they faced.

2. Melvin B. Moguloff, *CITIZEN PARTICIPATION* (Washington: The Urban Institute, 1970), p. 162, notes that in a California city, "representatives of the poor in the CAA were selected by local area councils and were occasionally told how to vote by those Councils."

3. COUNCIL MINUTES, March 4, 1968, p. 3.

4. COUNCIL MINUTES, March 27, 1969, p. 7.

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are forced to adopt the trustee orientation. This results from the fact that frequently they do not receive knowledge of an evening's agenda, and the detailed information that goes with it, until shortly before a Council meeting. In fact, the area delegate's inability to solicit his board's view on specific questions before the Council was in a sense institutionalized. This is the case because even if an area delegate received information on the first of the month regarding a meeting on the 7th or 8th, his board of directors, which meets less frequently than the Council, may not have a meeting scheduled until the 15th or 20th. Hence, he is not able to seek the board's advice although he may informally solicit the views of some members.

As a result of the belief that other Council members would pay closer attention to the views expressed by area delegates if they believed that the latter did in fact speak for their boards of directors, it is viewed as unfortunate that most area delegates are forced to adopt a trustee orientation. Furthermore, as cited on the last page, the fact that some members of a corporation's board did not feel that their area delegate was concerned with their position on issues before the Council, has led to some tension between them. Other than to recommend that an area delegate be considered an officer of a corporation's board of directors, and hence make it easier for him to regularly consult with other board leaders, it is difficult to suggest a method of institutionalizing closer board-area delegate cooperation on questions before the Council.

1. This was not the case in San Francisco. Without citing specific evidence, PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR, p. 208, tells us that community representatives to the community action agency were "quite conscious of their delegate status."

Constituency and Voting

Determining whether or not Council members vote on motions on the basis of the interests of their constituencies is difficult to answer because most motions before the Council are unanimously approved as well as the fact that the Council does not take roll-call votes but simply tabulates the total number of ayes, nays and abstentions.¹

However, the March 6th withdrawal of recognition resolution was not unanimously approved and is therefore an opportunity to determine in a limited manner whether or not constituency influences voting. Because such an investigation is hampered by the lack of roll-call votes, we are forced in our investigation of this question to use aggregate data or voting totals on the various motions before the Council.

The basic issue at the March 6th Council meeting was whether or not recognition should be withdrawn from the South Jamaica Board. Approval of such action would potentially weaken the boards of directors of all community corporations for it would mean the establishment of a precedent which could be used against them in the future. One would thus suspect that area delegates, who were also members of their boards of directors, would be hostile towards this motion because once a precedent was established, similar action might be taken against their Boards when they were involved in a dispute with the Council. If the Council, however, failed to take any action, especially after the dispute had escalated so, it could be interpreted by the corporations as weakness and might encourage them to ignore the Council whenever it suited their purposes. This in turn might endanger the Council's role as the top policy-maker for the City's poverty program and could ultimately lead to chaos. Public

1. Rarely are the names of abstainers recorded.

officials and representatives of private organizations, not having the narrow constituency of the area delegate, would be expected to be more concerned with the latter and on that basis would back the resolution withdrawing recognition.

Of the twenty-seven Council members at the meeting, seventeen were area delegates. There were two opportunities for them to prevent withdrawal of recognition: they could have backed the East New York Representative's motion to table the Commissioner's resolution and thus effectively killed it, or they could have voted against the compromise resolution which established the special conditions. It is obvious from the results, the tabling motion was defeated by a vote of 2:13 and the second motion was approved by a vote of 10:4, that they failed to follow either course. This was essentially a result of the great trust and respect they had for Council Chairman Greenidge who believed that the occasion required firm action on the part of the Council.

The above situation lends credence to the view that in that situation area delegates were more influenced by their high regard for the Council Chairman, who was a former area delegate, than by the potential effect this resolution could have on the independence of their community corporations. Some Council members, who were more conscious of their role as area delegates, at first balked at the resolution and only agreed to it after it was amended to provide for a last attempt at reconciliation. In fact, the latter was a meaningless gesture in that it was obvious that the South Jamaica Community Corporation was not in a reconciliatory mood; however, the fact that a delay was provided helped convince some recalcitrant area delegates to back the resolution. The conclusion one must draw, nevertheless, is that had the independence of

their corporations been of basic concern to the area delegates, then they would have prevented passage of the amended resolution which could have been cited later as a precedent in Council-corporation disputes involving their own corporations.

While it is obviously difficult to draw any definitive conclusion regarding the relationship between a Council member's seat and his voting, on the basis of but one resolution, it may, however, be concluded that on an issue of immense potential significance for their community corporations area delegates failed to vote their constituency.¹ One can not draw even such a limited conclusion regarding the other Council members. Of the eight representatives of private organizations on the Council, but one was present at the May 6th meeting. Regarding the eight of seventeen public officials or their representatives who were present at this meeting, interviews indicate that while none of these were against the resolution, some of them left before the voting began, while others were not eligible to vote because they were not official alternates but subordinates who were able to attend the meeting. It is, however, probable that those who backed the resolution may have done so either because they had a citywide outlook or because of their respect for the Council Chairman's opinion.

1. Other observers have come to the same conclusion. In Trenton, New Jersey and New Haven, Connecticut, the bylaws of the community action agency specified that the board members serve as individuals. It was felt that if a member represented a constituency, he would have to consult with it before voting and hence delay action. See, Gregory Farrell, "View from the City: Community Action in Trenton," in ON FIGHTING POVERTY, pp. 133-34. Similarly, Howard Hallman's COMMUNITY CONTROL, p. 177, notes that most board members are not responsible or accountable to any organized constituency.

Chapter Summary

In this Chapter five Council actions were examined which illustrated the kinds of issues and problems with which that body was concerned. Through these studies it was found that participants in the Council's actions included OEO, CDA, the Council Chairman, the Staff Director and various committees and panels. We also saw that the roles played by these participants varied in each action and that no single participant played an important role in each of them.

Having completed the case studies, a detailed examination of the roles played by the major actors was then undertaken. It was shown that the importance of committees and panels in the decisional process derived from their drawing up recommendations on which the Council acted, and that this made it possible for the Council to function despite such handicaps as a part-time membership that consisted most of nonexperts. We also saw that CDA, because of its large full time staff which gathered and reviewed information, also presented the Council (at times through the committees and panels) with recommendations or alternatives. The Staff Director's importance to the Council's decisional process derived from his being called upon by Council members to interpret OEO memoranda and to help the Council to comply with the latter.

While the full time staff of necessity played an important role in the actions taken by the part time Council, it should be clear that those actions were not merely rubber stamps of staff recommendations. The Council alone was empowered to decide in those areas in which it was authoritatively competent. Furthermore, Council members had some means of checking CDA's influence, including alternative sources of information and the fact that some committee chairman choose to minimize their dependence on the

Agency.

The roles of the Council Chairman and OEO in the Council's deliberations were also reviewed. We saw that the former mediated disagreements which otherwise could have led to the impairment of the Council's ability to operate and was actively involved in the South Jamaica case in order to demonstrate the Council's supremacy over the community corporation (and hence help maintain the stability of the City's poverty program). OEO's involvement in the Council's deliberations stemmed from its issuance of broad guidelines which established the parameters within which the Council could or could not take action (although at times it did direct the Council to take a specific action). Lastly, the Mayor's participation in the day-to-day operations of the Council was noticeable by his absence. While he was represented on the Council, he played a low key role in a body which spent less than one per cent of the City's expense budget and on which, in EXECUTIVE ORDERS 28 and 84, he sought to encourage strong community representation and participation.

While all of this demonstrated the Council's policy-making dynamics, it is important to note that the various actors, with the exception of OEO, all realized that the Council alone was responsible for approving, reversing or modifying the recommendations presented to it. Hence they were careful to take into consideration existing Council policy and guidelines in order to see that their recommendations adhered to them.

The case studies also served as an illustration of the process of institution building. Through a complex process involving interweaving with the established political system (represented on the Council by the public officials), the Council was able to establish itself as the major agency in determining the City's poverty policy.

Indeed, the Council became an integral part of the City's political system responsible for taking action in the poverty arena. In doing so, the process by which policy was made and implemented was institutionalized and the participation of actors was regulated (note the South Jamaica example) and their behavior was organized. Thus, within the guidelines established by OEO, structures and procedures were developed for numerous areas including dividing up funds and providing for their expenditure, establishing community corporations, and encouraging the participation of the poor. These and procedures in other areas brought institutional stability to what had previously been a chaotic and constantly changing system.

We also saw that the Council functioned as an institutionalized forum for exchanging views among people in different cultural, political and economic positions. Prior to its establishment, such exchanges only took place on an ad hoc basis.

The following Chapter is a survey of the relevant decision-making literature as well as an attempt to apply it to the findings of this study. We are interested in determining whether our findings are supported by or related to the relevant literature. At the same time, we must attempt to determine whether these findings offer any basis for a critique of the literature.

CHAPTER IV: A SURVEY AND APPLICATION OF DECISION-MAKING LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES THAT WILL BE APPLIED TO OUR FINDINGS

Through three case studies, we have examined Council actions, delineating the genesis and the process leading to their outcomes. At this point, we must consider two basic questions. Although the decision-making literature in political science was not specifically referred to in our cases, does it support our findings? That is, are there any basic theories that help explain the how and what of the findings of this study?¹ Second, do our materials afford any basis for a critique of that literature?

1. The period following World War II witnessed an enormous growth in decision-making studies. In 1958, Paul Wasserman and Fred Silander published a 96 page annotated review of the decision-making literature that was published between 1945 and 1957. See, *DECISION-MAKING: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY* (Ithaca: Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University, 1958). Six years later, they published, *DECISION-MAKING: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, SUPPLEMENT, 1958-1963* (Ithaca: Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University, 1964). In spite of the fact that the 1964 SUPPLEMENT covered a period that was not even half the size covered by the original BIBLIOGRAPHY, it was more than sixty per cent larger. It seems safe to conclude that a more current updating would exhibit even more dramatic growth.

While a comprehensive review of the decision-making literature would be desirable, it is felt that such a review is beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, as James A. Robinson and R. Roger Majak observe in, "The Theory of Decision-Making," in James C. Charlesworth, editor, *CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 176, a comprehensive review of the literature is unnecessary because much of it has been discussed by others. These authors examine the decision-making literature from the perspective of outcome and process. James A. Robinson and Richard C. Snyder review the literature in terms of the decision situation, participants and organization. See, their, "Decision-Making in International Politics," in Herbert Kelman, editor, *INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 435-463. Decision-making in psychology and economics is reviewed by Ward Edwards, "The Theory of Decision Making," *PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN*, 51 (1954), pp. 380-417. Herbert Simon, "Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science," *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW*, 49 (1959), 253-287, reviews some of the same literature as Edwards, but is also concerned with the boundaries between psychology and economics. The economic decision-making literature is also reviewed in Jacob Marshak's "Decision-Making: Economic Aspects," *INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES*, 4 (1968), pp. 42-53.

The theoretical literature most relevant to our study is both general decision theory and those studies focusing on decision-making in the community context.¹ In selecting works for consideration, we have largely limited ourselves to those which have received wide acceptance and use by the academic community and are most frequently discussed by scholars whose concerns would cause them to be interested in the two aforementioned bodies of literature. As this examination of the literature is of a selective nature, numerous sources not covered in the text will be referred to in the footnotes.

According to James C. Robinson, the two roots of political decision-making are the theory of games and public administration. As the latter is "the more influential strain in political decision-making," our review begins with public administration theory.²

General Decision Theory

Harold Lasswell

A descriptive model of the decision-making process is Harold Lasswell's, THE DECISION PROCESS: SEVEN CATEGORIES OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS.³ In describing the decision process Lasswell identifies seven categories or steps of analysis applicable to every decision.⁴ There

1. A similar dichotomy of the decision-making literature is made by Richard Snyder, et al., FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 9-11, where the authors discuss decision theory in general and foreign policy decision-making.

2. James C. Robinson, "Decision-Making: Political Aspects," INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 4 (1968), pp. 55-62.

3. College Park: Bureau of Governmental Research, 1956.

4. Lasswell was not the only scholar concerned with outlining a number of stages in the decision-making process. In FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING, esp. p. 91, Snyder and his colleagues discuss a sequence of activities called predecisional, choice and implementation.

are 1) intelligence (gathering information), 2) recommendation (proposing alternatives), 3) prescription (the selection of one alternative), 4) invocation, 5) application of the selected alternative, and ultimately, (6) appraisal (assessment of the rules enacted and 7) termination (renewal, revision or repeal).

One can apply Lasswell's typology to observe the specialized structures that exist to perform each function. For example, in the enactment of a piece of legislation by the United States Congress, one might associate the press with the intelligence function, the President with promoting alternatives, and the Congress with prescription. The Attorney-General would be concerned with invocation, and the courts with application. Appraisal could be conducted by a Congressional committee, while termination would be the function of the full Congress.

While the DECISION PROCESS provides an important organizing device, it does little to explain the "what" and "how" of occurrences described in this study. Thus it fails to explain the Council's choice of actions¹ in some situation and not in others, and does not consider the fact

Glendon Schubert, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING (New York: Scott Foresman, 1965), Chapter 4, identifies the six stages of judicial policy-making as initiation, accommodation, persuasion, decision, implementation, and recommendation. Also, Bertram Gross, ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR MANAGING (New York: Free Press, 1968), Chapter 21, notes that decision-making consists of the three interrelated phases of defining problems, choosing courses of action, and justifying the choice. Lastly, Edward V. Schneier, POLICY-MAKING IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. xii, observes that the six stages of policy-making are formulation, articulation, mobilization, codification, application, and redefinition.

1. William J. Gore and J.W. Dyson, editors, THE MAKING OF DECISIONS (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 2, observe that "the number of decisions attempted in relation to the number of decisional opportunities is exceedingly small." They then ask, "Why do decisions appear in one instance and not in another?" Moreover, Lasswell's presentation does not concern itself with what Snyder, FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING, p. 92, calls "the occasion for decision." That is, under what circumstances did it become necessary to make a decision?

that that body could operate with limited information or depend on its¹ staff or committee for information. For example, the Council did not know how the South Jamaica Community Corporation's Board of Directors would react to its being given a last opportunity to comply with the basic tenets of due process. Furthermore, it does not tell us anything regarding which of the stages in the decision-making process were most important to the action taken. Lastly, the stages outlined do not contribute to our understanding of the relationship between such actors as the Council and OEO or the Council and its committees.

Herbert Simon

IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, Herbert Simon, criticized both existing research in administration and the so-called proverbs of administration (e.g., specialization of task increases efficiency), as superficial and² unrealistic. He was interested in developing a general theory of administration, which included "principles of organization that would³ ensure correct decision-making." Heretofore neglected decision theory⁴ was believed by him to be at the heart of any theory of administration.

1. According to Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, XIX (Spring 1959), pp. 79-88, Lasswell's rational model fails to consider the fact that the decision-making process may operate with both intellectual and informational limitations. It is not being suggested that Lasswell ruled this out, just that it was not discussed by him.

2. See, Herbert Simon, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (New York: Macmillan, 1961), esp. p. 38.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, p. 1.

4. In "Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Sciences," AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 49 (1959), 253-283, Simon examined developments in economics and along the boundaries between economics and psychology. The implications of computers for American business are discussed by him in THE NEW SCIENCE OF MANAGEMENT (New York: Harper and Row, 1960).

In making decisions, Professor Simon postulated a concept of bounded rationality. He sought,

to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kind of environment to which such organisms exist.¹

Simon postulated an administrative man, quite different from his cousin, economic man. The latter knew all the alternatives and their consequences, assigned a value to each, and was able to rank order them to select the best (optional) one available. Administration man is viewed² as incapable of complex judgments and choices. Instead, he satisfies or chooses a course of action that is satisfactory or appears to meet minimal standards. His choices are made without consideration of all³ alternatives (an impossible task, since knowledge is never complete). He perceives a simplified version of the real world and uses "relatively simple rules of thumb that do not make impossible demands upon⁴ his capacity for thought."

While some of Simon's points regarding administrative man - such as the latter's limited access to information and his making choices without considering all alternatives - are applicable to the Council, his

1. Herbert Simon, *MODELS OF MAN* (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 241.

2. According to Ward Edwards, "Economic man is assumed to know not only what all the courses of action open to him are, but also what the outcome of any action will be." See, "The Theory of Decision-Making," p. 381. This essay reviews the decision-making literature in psychology and economics.

3. Martin Shubik, "Approaches to the Study of Decision-Making Relevant to the Firm," *THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN BUSINESS*, 34 (April, 1961), 101-118, also notes the impossibility of considering all alternatives.

4. *ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR*, p. xxvi.

work does not entirely support our findings.¹ For example, his description of decision-makers as satisficers does not consider the importance of ethnic factors in the decision-making process. Thus, in the Petition Procedure case, a member of the Council (Peter Lugo) stated that he did not back the position proposed by By-Laws Committee Chairman Gardner because they disagreed on most matters since he (Lugo) was a Puerto Rican while Mr. Gardner was Black.² Also, a decision-maker acts in a political environment. In the Crown Heights study we saw that Rabbi Neumann and Crown Heights Panel Chairman Rodriguez compromised over the number of poor people who were to be appointed to the Crown Heights Board.³

1. It is interesting to note that the only empirical examination of administrative man as a satisficer was in an industrial rather than a governmental arena. See, Richard M. Cyert, Herbert Simon, and D. Trow, "Observation of a Business Decision," JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 29 (1965), 237-48. Furthermore, as Robinson and Majak observe, generalizing from "nonpolitical decision behavior to political decision behavior (and vice-versa)" must be done with caution. See, "A Theory of Decision-Making," p. 178. Similarly, Robert C. Wood and V.V. Almedinger, 1400 GOVERNMENTS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), argue that public and private decisions are different and thus one can not apply to the former, findings from the latter. Also, Eugene J. Meehan, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT (Homewood: Dorsey, 1967), p. 288, feels that, "conceptualizations that prove useful to the economist are not prima facie useful in the study of politics." But, Anthony Downs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 27-28, accepts the self-interest axiom of economic man and applies it to politics. Francis Bator, THE QUEST OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING: PUBLIC NEEDS AND PRIVATE WANTS (New York: Harper, 1960), and Alfred Kuhn, THE STUDY OF SOCIETY: A UNIFIED APPROACH (Homewood: R.D. Irwin, 1963), both equate public and private decisions.

2. See, Chapter III, Case Study 2.

3. A more familiar example of the political environment occurs in situations where a public official must take a course of action that an acknowledged political leader has requested him to take. In other words, the individual decision-maker is not free to examine every potential decision in a vacuum. The individual's ability to satisfice may be constrained by political factors.

Simon's work also fails to consider the fact that a Council member may interact with other Council members and that as a result of these interactions certain recognized leaders emerged (Commissioner Owens¹ or Council Chairman Greenidge) whose opinions were highly regarded. Hence the latter may exert a strong influence on the individual Council member's outlook. For example, some chose to follow Council Chairman Greenidge's recommendation to withdraw recognition in spite of the fact that doing so probably went against the interests of their constituents. They did so because over a period of many months Greenidge built up his personal relations with them and they had a high regard for his² views.

Richard Snyder

Turning to another approach that focuses attention on the actors, Snyder and his associates felt that scholars incorrectly viewed the

1. Sidney Verba, SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 144 maintains that a group's leaders are responsible for the performance of "external and internal tasks - those directly connected with the goal-oriented activities of the group, and those associated with the maintenance of the internal structure of the group and the satisfaction of the needs of the individual members."

2. Simon's description of decision-makers as satisficers does not enhance our ability to make predictions. According to Herbert McCloskey, "Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics," in, Richard Snyder, et al., FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING (New York: Free Press, 1962), good theory needs to specify the conditions under which the relevant variables will evoke the predicted response. This is lacking in ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR. Furthermore, if one satisfices (uses relatively simple rules of thumb that are not intellectually taxing), one is susceptible to adopting easy solutions to complex problems. Under such circumstances, a domino theory easily takes hold or the important latent functions discussed by Robert Merton, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), may be overlooked. On the basis of the latter, it would appear that to say that administrative man satisfices, is to make a descriptive and not a normative statement.

state as the prime actor in international affairs and believed that¹ its actions depended on objective world conditions. According to James Rosenau, Professor Snyder believed that scholars,

tended to search for the goals and sources of a state's behavior in geographic, historical, political and technological circumstances, and these circumstances seemed so unmistakable that the state was considered to be subservient to them.²

Instead, Snyder felt that the only way one could explain why a particular decision was made, was by adopting the perception of the relevant decision-makers or actors. His work focused attention on those who acted in the name of the state. Actions taken or not taken depended on the individual's perception or "definition of the situation." A situation is defined within an organizational context (decision unit) which influences the behavior of the decision-makers. Within this decision unit, the major determinants of action are spheres of competence (norms and rules of behavior), communication and information, and motivation.

While the work of Snyder and his colleagues is valued for focusing attention on the long overlooked decision-makers, it must be borne in mind that his basic concern was decision-making by the state and not by bodies such as CAP which have a different set of actors who operate³ in a very different environment. Hence, this study does not readily

1. Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics," in FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING.

2. James N. Rosenau, "Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis," in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS, p. 196.

3. It is nevertheless included here because it is part of "the more influential strain in political decision-making," cited by James Robinson on page 1.

fit the framework established in FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING. For example, in analyzing decisions, Snyder's framework required the consideration of such external factors as other states, and their minerals and weaponry (to cite but two examples). Council actions are made by a more limited set of actors, and while numerous factors enter into them, the actual number is less than in the foreign policy field.

Furthermore, the work of Snyder and his colleagues gives us no way of determining whether the major determinants of action he discusses are of different or the same importance to decisions made, whether or not they are related to one another and how scholars could make such a determination.¹ Also, Snyder makes no distinction between the decision-makers "definition of the situation" and the actual situation.² Thus Owens and Greenidge believed that if they failed to act in the South Jamaica situation the Council would have been irreparably harmed, while several members of the South Jamaica Community Corporation's Board of Directors believed that they were fighting against the centralized power of the Council and CDA. Both of these views were somewhat extreme.³

1. On this point, see, James Rosenau, "Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis," pp. 192-195.

2. Harold and Margart Sprout argue that it is possible for decision-makers to perceive only part of conditions existing in the real world. Such selective perception is referred to by them as the psychological environment. The operational environment describes conditions existing in the real world. See, their, "Environmental Factors in the Study of World Politics," JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1 (December, 1957), 309-328. Stanley Hoffman, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," WORLD POLITICS, XI, 3 (April 1959), 361-382, adds that decision-makers are not necessarily conscious of all of their moves.

3. Herbert McClosky, "Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics," has noted that there is a risk that researchers will omit problems that do not easily fit into the framework that

David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom

Braybrooke and Lindblom's, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS, is a criticism of the rational approach to decision-making.¹ The authors argue that previous analyses of decision-making paid too much attention to the synoptic method which consists of considering all alternatives and their consequences, placing a value on each and choosing the alternative whose consequences are deemed most desirable. They object to this on the grounds that 1) it would require a hopeless amount of computation because it is impossible to present the total number of alternatives and their respective consequences, and to place a value on each; 2) the preceding uncertainty will lead to a postponement of choosing until added information is available; 3) it fails to come to grips with the fact that decision-makers, with their own interests and different views as to what alternatives exist and the possible consequences of each must in some way agree to one choice.²

In place of the synoptic methods, the authors recommend a strategy called disjoined incrementalism, which they feel is used by most decision-makers. This is a flexible strategy which calls for making small changes (and thus enhances the possibility of knowing what the

Snyder outlined and that it will take years to complete a single application of it. Indeed, the only study to employ Snyder's work is still Glenn D. Paige's, THE KOREAN DECISION, June 24-30, 1950 (New York: Free Press, 1968).

1. David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A STRATEGY OF DECISION, POLICY EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS (New York: Free Press, 1963).

2. The synoptic method may ostensibly be used under certain circumstances. The exact position of a plane leaving New York and its goal (Chicago) may be known. The authors would argue that the problem with this example is that the plane may take any one of various routes to reach Chicago. Each of these could have different consequences in terms of fuel used, length of time and turbulence encountered.

consequences are) and adjusting ends to means. Computational difficulties are minimized by not attempting to consider all possible alternatives and their consequences and by using only readily available information. By using this method, the job of the decision-maker is considerably eased.

While this writer agrees with Braybrooke and Lindblom that too much attention is paid to the synoptic method, nevertheless their strategy of decision-making leaves much to be desired.¹ One is never quite sure whether disjointed incrementalism is how the Council agrees to a position or how it should do so. Additionally, a series of discrete actions when taken together, as occurred in the South Jamaica situation, may well add up to a major policy formulation. Also, if one pays too close attention to this approach, the roles played by those active in earlier stages of the decision-making process (which could have been important to the ultimate outcome) may be overlooked. For example, to limit analysis of the South Jamaica case to the last stage involving action by the Council may result in failure to see the contribution made by Commissioner Owens in the earlier stages. Additionally, even disjointed incrementalism is subject to errors. The reader will recall that the Council's barring all members of the South Jamaica Board from the election was later reversed. Lastly, while disjointed incrementalism calls for making small changes, the withdrawal of recognition from the South

1. Braybrooke and Lindblom are too complacent about the inadequacies of the synoptic method. Instead of extolling the virtues of disjointed incrementalism, and criticizing the synoptic approach, in the long run their work might be more productive if they paid more attention to improving the latter, perhaps by designing a better information system.

Jamaica Corporation's Board of Directors was certainly not a minor¹ one.

William Riker

William Riker's, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS takes us from the public administration to the second root of political decision-making, the theory of games.² Riker's work is heavily indebted to John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR.³ Because Riker believes that it is through coalition that groups which make authoritative decisions are formed, he seeks to construct⁴ "a theory of coalitions that will be useful in studying politics."

The foundation of Riker's theory, which is developed with the minimal use of symbolic language, rests on the Von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of n-person, zero-sum-games. Basic to it are three principles which he feels may be applied to both national and international problems. The size principle, based on the principle of maximization of pay-offs, contends that the members of a coalition will move towards the minimal size needed to win; the strategy principle examines the conditions governing the growth of coalitions (that is, who will align with whom, and under what circumstances); and the disequilibrium principle contends that at times, disequilibrium will be promoted by the optimal coalitions elimination of some players.

1. On pp. 78-79 of A STRATEGY OF DECISION we are told that disjointed incrementalism may not be applied to revolutionary and utopian decisions.

2. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

3. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3rd edit., 1953. An excellent summary of the literature in this field is still R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa's GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (New York: Wiley, 1957).

4. THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS, p. viii.

Riker's work does not support our findings. Instead of coalitions which seek to maximize payoffs by moving towards the minimal size coalition needed to win, we saw that four of the five actions were approved¹ by unanimous votes. Neither Riker's strategy nor equilibrium principles are applicable to our case studies in that there were no alignments to speak of and there were no attempts to eliminate any of the actors. Also, the withdrawal of recognition was not a pure conflict² situation. Both the Council and the South Jamaica Board presumably had a common interest, later maintaining poverty program services to the residents of the South Jamaica area. Lastly, actors may not be as rational (interested in winning) as is assumed by Riker. For example, when Peter Lugo opposed a course of action suggested by Dennis Gardner in the Petition Procedure study, his only interest was in obstructing a recommendation by a member of an ethnic group which he was hostile towards because he believed that that group had benefited from the poverty program at the expense of his group.

Summary

In summary, we have seen that the decision-making studies of such scholars as Lasswell, Simon and Snyder provide limited support for our findings. We also critiqued the decision-making literature with respect

1. James Barber, *POWER IN COMMITTEES* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966), pp. 108-110, concludes that "the larger the proportion of agreement a member receives, the less importance he attaches to the membership, the less willing he is to return, and the less he tends to refer to the group rather than himself."

2. Thomas Schelling, *THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), argued two years before the publication of Riker's work, that the use of game theory should be reoriented from zero-sum (pure conflict) to non-zero-sum (mixed motive) games in which adversaries have, besides a common conflict, a common interest.

to our findings, while at the same time making use of critical reviews of this literature. At this point the literature of nondecision-making will be examined in order to determine whether or not it lends any support to our findings.

Nondecision-making

Few social scientists have as yet addressed themselves to the study of nondecision making. By far the best known proponents of its usefulness are Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz. Their major ideas are found in two well known articles, "Two Faces of Power," and "Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework," as well as their book, POWER AND
1
POVERTY.

1. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," AMERICAN SCIENCE REVIEW 56 (1962) 947-52; "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 57 (1963) 641-51; and POWER AND POVERTY (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Also, see, Shin'ya Ono, "The Limits of Bourgeois Pluralism," in Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, editors, APOLITICAL POLITICS (New York: Crowell, 1967), pp. 99-123.

Robert Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 62 (1968) 451-60 criticizes nondecision-making because it "does not admit of empirical proof or disproof." Raymond Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 65 (1971) 1063-80 agrees with Merelman. He also feels that the concept of nondecision contains unrealistic assumptions about political life (the belief that most people have a major interest in political activity), and that the data that may be gathered does not lead to realistic conclusions regarding the location of power. But, Frederick Frey, "Comment: On Decisions and Nondecisions in the Study of Power," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 65 (1971) 1081-1101 believes that the work of Bachrach and Baratz is important and workable but that it requires refinement "beyond their/valuable start."

Our feeling is that while it may be difficult to make use empirically of nondecision-making, it can be done. The way to do so, the use of inference, is suggested by Bachrach and Baratz. They note, POWER AND POVERTY, p. 41, "that it is both feasible and necessary to deduce from detailed observation of the situation why persons act as they do." Also, Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, SMALL TOWN IN MASS SOCIETY (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 321, "infer that the

Bachrach and Baratz contend "that there are two faces of power,¹ neither of which the sociologists see." The former, according to the authors, incorrectly assume that a power structure exists, that it remains stable over time and that one's power reputation is the same as his actual power. More correctly, "the pluralists concentrate their² attention, not upon the sources of power, but its exercise." They do so by studying important decisions, identifying the participants and their respective roles, and analyzing the outcomes.

While the pluralist's approach is regarded as an improvement over the sociologists, they are still critical of it on two grounds. First, they believe that it omits the possibility that power may be exercised by limiting decisions to particular issues of areas. Second, they are critical of it because it does not provide objective criteria for determining whether a decision is an important or unimportant one.

Turning to the former criticism first, Bachrach and Baratz accept as valid Schattschneider's statement that "all forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others...."³ They believe that there is a predominant set of values and procedures that work to the benefit of some and the detriment of others. In a key passage, we are told that this is sustained by nondecision-making, which

same processes described for Springdale occurred and are occurring at various levels and localities in America at large."

1. POWER AND POVERTY, p. 4.

2. POWER AND POVERTY, p. 6.

3. E. E. Schattschneider, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Co., 1960), p. 71.

is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges ... can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making area; or failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing state of the policy process.¹

Nondecision-making may take several forms, ranging from the very obvious or direct to the indirect. The most obvious way of keeping demands for change out of the political process are the use of force (the beating of early union organizers comes to mind), or the threat of sanctions.² Invoking a norm or bias of the political system (its socialism) is a more indirect way of killing a potential demand. Demands for change may also be killed by procedural delays, such as referring them to committee examination. The latter, Bachrach and Baratz note, is especially relevant with the poor who "have difficulty withstanding delay." The most indirect form of nondecision-making consists of reinforcing the mobilization of bias to block challenges to the manner in which values are allocated. One may do so, for example, by creating additional barriers (rules and procedures) to process demands for change.

To fail to consider Bachrach and Baratz's observations is to omit the possibility that an individual or group, through nondecision-making, is able to prevent the redressing of grievances held by other actors in the political arena. In other words, an examination of nondecision-making may be more important to a study concerned with

1. POWER AND POVERTY, p. 44.

2. It is important to note that the authors consider both positive and negative sanctions. The former is a threat to deprive the initiator of a harmful demand of something he values, while the latter would take the form of a reward (cooptation).

determining who governs than one such as Dahl's that is concerned with examining several decisions and the roles of the participants in¹ them.

For a number of reasons, however, nondecisions are difficult to identify. Nondecision-makers may be unaware of what they have done, or, if aware, may attempt to conceal their actions. Additionally, those who are adversely affected by nondecision-making will either be preoccupied with their loss, or fail to comprehend it.

According to Bachrach and Baratz, we begin to identify nondecisions by examining decision-making. This will produce the names of participants as well as their roles in decision-making. Additionally, it will provide information regarding the existing mobilization of bias and² knowledge as to who is short-changed by the latter.

A second major criticism of pluralism by Bachrach and Baratz to that while it discusses the need to examine "a fair sample of cases involving key political decisions," it fails to provide any objective criteria that may be used to identify such decisions. Just as the elitists presuppose the existence of an elite, the pluralists presuppose the existence of key political decisions. Dahl's examination of public education and political party nominations are not felt to be key decisions because many of the notables reside in the suburbs and

1. See, Robert Dahl, WHO GOVERNS? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). Dahl is partially aware of the potential significance of nondecision-making. See, POWER AND POVERTY, footnote 12, p. 9.

2. POWER AND POVERTY p. 9, distinguishes between overt grievances which are issues within the political system and covert ones which while visible to the investigator, have not yet entered the political system.

hence are uninterested in these issue areas. Additionally, even those notables who reside in New Haven usually send their children to private schools.¹

Determining the relative importance of issues requires awareness of both the mobilization of bias and the nondecision-making process. Obviously, to become aware of both, one must examine key decisions. The authors assert that the way out of this dilemma is to begin by studying decisions which appear to involve key issues. These will provide clues regarding the prevailing mobilization of bias. Ultimately, only when exploring nondecision-making would one know whether a specific issue was important.

Nondecision-making in New York City's Poverty Program

Having followed Bachrach and Baratz's advice and identified the key participants and their roles in the Council's actions, we will now attempt to determine whether certain questions that were of importance in New York City's poverty program were or were not on the Council's agenda, and if not, why this was the case. This will be done by applying the nondecision-making framework to what was observed in our case studies as well as by taking into consideration other aspects of New York City's poverty program. We shall see that as a result of nondecision-making, certain areas of decision-making were neglected by the Council. More specifically, it shall be shown that there is a mobilization of bias, supported by nondecision-making, that benefits the City's Black and

1. This is not to say that New Haven's notables are powerless. It is merely to suggest that such a conclusion is not supported by examining decisions in which they may have little interest.

Puerto Ricans and focuses little attention on the rest of the City's¹ poor. Within the poverty arena, these groups are "opponents of change [which] have in varying degrees a stake in the maintenance of the prevailing policy and are either active or potential supporters of ongoing programs."²

This is not to imply that Black or Puerto Ricans are not in need of the assistance they receive from the poverty program. It is clear that these groups have both larger numbers and a larger percentage of poor people than do other ethnic groups in New York City. It is also clear that the social and economic positions of these groups in American society has suffered and continues to suffer because of overt and covert discrimination. At the same time, it is also clear that New

1. Contrary to the frequent charge made by some of New York City's Puerto Rican, they are not excluded from significant participation in New York City's poverty program. The latter was the case when the poverty program was first established. It was mostly a result of Black groups being better organized, submitting their applications for grants before other groups, and the frequent treating of application on a first come, first served basis. However, as Puerto Ricans became increasingly aware of the potential benefits of the poverty program they began to organize and seek poverty funds. Other factors that contributed to a reversal of the earlier situation was the establishment of "fair share" allocations and the beginning of such specifically Puerto Rican programs as Aspira. In spite of these, some Puerto Ricans continued to protest as though it was still 1965. For a discussion of the persistence of once established viewpoints, see, Kenneth Boulding, *THE IMAGE* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

2. *POWER AND POVERTY*, p. 56.

Many of the examples that follow concentrate on the Jewish poor. This is because of the author's work with the American Jewish Congress, and the fact that there is much more research on this group than on any other white poor in New York City. This is not to suggest that what is being discussed does not apply to other groups. To a varying extent it applies to Italians, Poles, Greeks, Irish, Chinese, etc. However, these groups represent smaller numbers, and lack both the awareness of the situation that is found in the Jewish community as well as the means to articulate demands for change.

York City has large numbers of poor whites whose existence is either not acknowledged or is only perfunctorily acknowledged by those¹ charged with administering the poverty program.

The "Office of Economic Opportunity Report" provides the percentage of Black and Puerto Rican clientele served by the twenty-two community corporations for which it gathered data.² Eleven of them (50 per cent) served a majority of Blacks, seven of them (32 per cent) a majority of Puerto Ricans and each of them had an overwhelming majority of Puerto Rican and Black clients. The average percentage of Puerto Ricans and Blacks served by these community corporations was 91 per cent, with the³ median percentage being 95.

The racial and ethnic breakdown of those employed by the poverty program was also overwhelmingly Black and Puerto Rican. In 1969, 50.7 per cent of those employed in the poverty program were Black and 26.8⁴ per cent were Puerto Rican. This approximate figure was confirmed in visits to several community corporations. According to the Executive

1. The estimated 1965 population in poverty areas, according to "Community Corporation Election Master Plan," p. 36, was 3,453,457. Whites made up 46.57 per cent, nonwhites 34.43, and Puerto Ricans 19 per cent. The 1964 report by Deputy Mayor-City Administrator Maxwell Lehman, "Dimensions of Poverty in New York City," observed that 52 per cent of New York City's poor (based on 1960 census data) were white. With the increased growth of Blacks and Puerto Ricans since that time and with the decline in the number of whites, the white percentage of the poor has declined. Nevertheless, it should be clear that there are still large numbers of impoverished whites in New York City.

2. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, September 21, 1971, House of Representatives, p. E 10144.

3. The 91 per cent figure (which means that less than nine per cent of those served are white) is truly startling when one considers that using 1960 census data, 52 per cent of the poor were white.

4. Nat Hentoff, A POLITICAL LIFE, (New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 330-31.

Director of the Lower East Side Community Corporation, one-sixth of¹ that corporation's employees were neither Black nor Puerto Rican. Similarly, the Executive Director of the East New York Community Corporation noted that out of that corporation's 48 employees, 38 were Black, six² Puerto Rican and four white. In visits to half a dozen other corporations, the outstanding exception to an overwhelmingly Black and Puerto Rican staff was the Crown Heights Community Corporation. There, nearly³ one-half of the employees were white.

While the City's newest minorities have been receiving the preponderance of jobs and services provided by the poverty program, it is not yet clear whether there has also been a mobilization of bias, sustained by nondecision-making, that works to their benefit. In their discussion of the various forms of nondecision-making Bachrach and Baratz included positive and negative threats of sanction, invoking of norms, procedural delays, failing to implement decisions and the use of force. In the pages that follow, we will find examples of most of these in New York City's program.

Decision Implementation

According to Bachrach and Baratz, nondecision-making included maiming or destroying demands for change in the "decision-implementing

1. Roland Cintron, Interview, July 28, 1971. As that corporation's boundaries include Chinatown, many of the one-sixth are Chinese.

2. Harding Bowman, Interview, July 30, 1971.

3. Although a racial and ethnic breakdown of employees in the Community Development Agency was not available, on the basis of numerous observations it appears that approximately one-fifth are white.

state of the policy process."¹ The reader will recall that the Council Against Poverty approved a "Plan for Ensuring Racial and Ethnic Balance on the Boards of Directors of Community Corporations." This specified that two-thirds of a community corporation's board of directors would be elected and the remaining one-third would be selected. The latter were to be members of groups that were unrepresented or underrepresented on the local board.

The OEO Report, "Memorandum of Inspection Division of Office of Economic Opportunity," gave the number of Jews on the boards of directors of community corporations in New York City. In example after example, there were no Jewish board members. For example, while Jews in the Rockaways made up 72 per cent of that area's poor population, there was not a single Jew on the corporation's board of directors. While the Rockaway situation would appear to lend itself to an application of the "Racial and Ethnic Balance Plan," no changes have been made in the Board of Directors. Indeed, the only time this procedure was applied was in cases involving Black and Puerto Rican underrepresentation; HRA Administrator Sugarman refused to even consider attempting² to implement this plan in the case of Jews.

Another demand for change that has been killed in the "decision-implementing stage of the policy process" concerns the petition procedure discussed in Chapter III. In the nearly three years of its existence, this procedure has never been used to provide representation for an unrepresented group. Indeed, when representatives of the aged

1. POWER AND POVERTY, p. 44.

2. Meeting, Jule Sugarman, November 2, 1971.

met with the Council Chairman to request Council representation for the aged, they were told by him that this was unnecessary in that their area representatives would look out for their interests.

Invoking a Norm

One of the commonest factors which limited the participation of the white poor in New York City's poverty program was the incorrect, but frequently voiced belief that the poverty program was created to serve the needs of the Black poor (at times, Puerto Ricans were also included).¹ On several occasions, a member of the Council or a CDA employee voiced some variations of the following: "You know that the purpose of the Economic Opportunity Act was to help poor Blacks and Puerto Ricans." Related to this was the statement by a high ranking HRA official who after acknowledging the existence of many poor whites argued that the problems of poor Blacks were more severe and therefore merited primary attention.

The aforementioned hindered demands for change in the poverty program's allocation of benefits in two ways: first, many whites would not even think of proposing increased participation by their groups in the poverty program because they too accepted the belief that it was established to serve the City's newest minorities; second, those who sought changes in the distribution of benefits were told to accept the existing system because the poverty program was not established to serve poor whites.

1. That this belief is also found outside of New York is clear. Ralph Kramer, PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 248, observes that in Oakland and San Francisco, the poverty program, according to an "informal understanding between some officials and ethnic spokesmen ... was to be a 'Negro program'."

The latter is what Bachrach and Baratz discussed when they said that demands for change may be killed by invoking a norm. In this case, the relevant norm was the belief that the poverty program was established to serve the City's newest minorities. Therefore, other groups were to refrain from actions that would change this situation.

Threat of Sanction

Another barrier to change was the threat of sanctions. According to high-ranking members of the poverty bureaucracy a race war would be the outcome of efforts to bring about changes that would reduce the benefits received by Blacks. In order to avoid such a conflict, it was necessary to refrain from measures that would lead to changes in the existing distribution of benefits.

Bachrach and Baratz further noted that the threat of sanctions included both positive (cooptation) and negative sanctions.¹ Several examples of the former were found in New York City's program. In the midst of charges that the poverty program discriminated against poor Jews, a pilot program, the Hasidic Corporation for Urban Concern was approved. This program was controlled by a vocal group of Jews who exhibited considerable dissatisfaction with the existing administration of the poverty program. It became an overnight success in that this group's dissatisfaction is no longer heard. In another use of positive sanctions, the Human Resources Administration gave verbal approval (after but one week) to a \$1,400,000 program submitted by the Jewish Association of Services for the Aged. When a longer version of the same proposal was submitted in April 1971, before the interest in Jewish

1. POWER AND POVERTY, p. 44.

poverty, it was found to be unfundable. Additionally, this author has attended meetings where a government representative has literally asked what it would take to satisfy the Jewish community. Lastly, several of the critics of the lack of services available to poor Jews were offered appointments within the Human Resources Administration.

Violation of the Established Rules

Another form of nondecision-making that has limited the participation of the white poor is the administrative organization of the poverty program which only provides benefits in defined poverty areas. Many poor whites - including Italians living west of the Concourse in the Bronx and Jews in the East Flatbush section of Brooklyn - live outside of these areas. Demands to have the poverty program service the poor throughout the City rather than in specific areas are countered with the statement that it is administratively proper to place resources in areas of concentrated poverty. (As Bachrach and Baratz observe in their discussion of invoking a norm as an example of nondecision-making, "a demand for change may be denied legitimacy by being branded ... in violation of an established rule or procedure."¹)

Threat of Sanctions (Again)

Furthermore, we are told that to spread resources throughout the City would mean that each corporation's allocation would have to be decreased. This in turn would result in Black and Puerto Rican rioting. The latter is another example of the use of threat as a form of nondecision-making. Another example is the Council's response to reallocate some poverty funds to Citywide programs that would serve the poor

1. POWER AND POVERTY, p. 45.

living outside of poverty areas. These were not even seriously discussed by the Council on the ground that to do so would increase tensions between Blacks and whites.

Procedure Tactics

Lastly, in spite of periodic urgings by the Jewish community, the Council Against Poverty allowed community corporations to hold elections on the Jewish sabbath if they chose to do so. Most did. However, in 1972 the New York State Legislature and the New York City Council passed bills prohibiting such elections.¹ In effect, the latter is an example of decision-making nullifying the effects of nondecision-making.

Summary

In summary, we have seen the importance of examining not only decision-making, but also of looking for evidence of nondecision-making. In the last few pages we reviewed several examples of the latter in New York City's poverty program. These included the use of positive and negative sanctions, invoking a norm and the failure to implement the "Racial and Ethnic Balance Plan."

While some of the illustrations referred to appear to be more relevant to the internal dynamics of the community corporations rather than the Council, the point is that they were not confronted by the Council. That is, as a result of nondecision-making, they did not even appear on the Council's agenda.

Our investigation of nondecision-making thus added a new dimension to our understanding of the determinants affecting the Council's

1. Francis Clines, NEW YORK TIMES, March 28, 1972.

¹
deliberations. On the basis of this investigation, we see that non-decision-making in the poverty program was successful in limiting the distribution of benefits. By following Bachrach and Baratz's advice and inferring intent from behavior, we are led to believe that most members of the Council were uninterested in extending benefits to the white poor. When we juxtapose this with President Nixon's proposal to eliminate the community action program, the statement by the United States Commission on Civil Rights concerning the need to distribute antipoverty monies according to need becomes almost prophetic. The Commission noted that while the result of this recommendation could mean that "all concerned will have to share an already small pie," the failure to do so may lead to "no pie."²

COMMUNITY POWER LITERATURE

In relating the literature of general decision theory to our findings, the work of Bachrach and Baratz was found to be especially helpful in explaining why the Council failed to take action in certain areas. The community power literature will now be related to the findings of this study. In doing so we are especially interested in determining whether this literature supports or contradicts our findings.

1. POWER AND POVERTY p. 41

While the conclusions in the text appear to follow from our application of nondecision-making, it is felt that researchers must be very careful before reaching such conclusions. For example, it would be much more difficult to conclude that nondecision-making was present if all one had to go on was but a single example. In this study, this was not a problem because we saw several examples of a pattern of nondecision-making.

2. Unsigned, NEW YORK TIMES, February 27, 1972.

The Elitist School

Robert and Helen Lynd

The community power literature is basically divided into the elitist¹ and pluralist schools. Turning to the former first, MIDDLETOWN² and MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, by Robert and Helen Lynd have been characterized as "The Oldest still standing landmark among American community studies."³ Each is a social, political and economic analysis of Muncie, Indiana, the former for the period 1885-1925, and the latter for the following decade.

While both studies found power concentrated in the hands of a few people, perhaps the most significant change observed in the second period was that power was increasingly centralized in the hands of one family of industrialists. That family's pervasive influence in all of Middletown's affairs led the Lynds to conclude that private business is the dominant institution and that it is dominated by "an upper class, consisting of wealthy local manufacturers, bankers, the local managers of one or two of the national corporations with units in Middletown and a few well to do dependents of the above."⁴ It is this group that uses politicians to accomplish such goals as keeping taxes low, maintaining an open-shop town, and other policies that enable the members

1. Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, MIDDLETOWN (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1929).

2. Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1937).

3. Nelson W. Polsby, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p.

4. MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, pp. 458-459.

of the elite to enhance their ability to make money.¹

However, the conclusion that political and other leaders are subordinate to an economic elite that rules in its own interest fails to take into consideration the numerous instances (reported by the Lynds themselves), where this was not the case. If political leaders are subordinate to the economic elite, then how does one explain the failure of Middletown's City Council to appropriate money for a sewage project backed by the City's economic elite and opposed by the representatives of the working class,² or the failure of a business backed candidate who was "badly defeated by the machine in the primary."³ Similarly, the attempt at unionization was defeated more by the lack of interest on the part of workers and incompetent union organizers than by the efforts of the economic elite.⁴ As a result of the combination of these factors, one may conclude that while the economic elite participates in Middletown's affairs, it was not as dominant as was suggested by the Lynds.

The two decades following the publication of MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION⁵ witnessed the publication of a series of other community studies.

1. MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, p. 89. COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY, p. 24, observes that discussing the economic elite's dominance in areas it considers important is difficult to criticize because any instance in which the elite is found to be less than dominant may be discarded by saying that it was not important to them.

2. MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, pp. 121-22.

3. MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, p. 320.

4. MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, pp. 32-33.

5. See for example, August B. Hollingshead, ELMTOWN'S YOUTH (New York: Wiley, 1949) and William L. Warner, et al., DEMOCRACY IN JONESVILLE (New York: Harper, 1949).

The conclusions of these were similar to the Lynd's work in that they suggested the existence of a local elite. In general, these works may be criticized, as is done by Nelson Polsby, in that the data presented do not necessarily require one to conclude that an elite exists.¹ To the contrary, the data may be used to support the contention that a pluralistic form of decision-making prevails.

Floyd Hunter

Perhaps, the most famous stratification study on a local level is Floyd Hunter's, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS.² In this work, Hunter concludes that the power structure of Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia) consists of four tiers. In descending order of significance these are 1) the owners and top executives of large businesses; 2) vice-presidents of the above and top ranking public officials and lawyers; 3) lower public officials and civic and mass media leaders; 4) professionals such as ministers, teachers and accountants.³

Hunter believes that the city's policy makers were almost exclusively members of the first tier (at times the second tier was included). Acting in an informal manner, they made the basic decisions implemented by members of the lower tiers, including political leaders. The decisions made were "in the interests of the political and economic status quo."⁴ Those who were disadvantaged by such policies were dismissed by

1. COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY, pp. 24-42.

2. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1953. Hunter is also the author of TOP LEADERSHIP U.S.A. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959).

3. COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE, Chapter 4, especially p. 109.

4. COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE, p. 258.

Hunter as "inarticulate," by which he presumably meant they lacked any means of redress.

There are numerous critiques of COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE by eminent social scientists. Herbert Kaufman notes that by asking people to identify the community's top leaders Hunter presumes that the "existence of the elite has been established."¹ Wolfinger criticizes Hunter's method of reputational analysis because it does not provide a way to assess the relative power of top ranking leaders, and assumes both that the distribution of power is static and that the researcher and the individual he is interviewing have the same definition of power.² Long believes that "Much of what occurs seems to just happen with accidental trends being cumulative over time and producing results intended by nobody."³ Simpson observes that we should seek to determine who benefits from governmental action or the lack of action.⁴ Dahl notes among other objections to the elitists, that because some individuals are recognized as being leaders, does not mean that they function as a ruling group.⁵

1. Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, 14 (summer, 1954), 205-212.

2. Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 25 (October, 1960), 636-644.

3. Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 64 (November, 1958), 251-261.

4. Richard L. Simpson, "The Concept of Power: A Sociologist's Perspective," in Charles Bonjean, et al., eds., COMMUNITY POLITICS: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 36-39.

5. Robert Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 52 (June, 1958), 463-469.

In spite of what may be summarized as strong deficiencies, Hunter's work had a significant impact on the study of community power. Sometimes wholly, and at other times with changes, his method of reputational analysis was used to study community power in various cities. In spite of these, the authors found decision-making dominated by an¹ elite.

Pluralism

By the late 1950s there was an increasing disaffection with the work² of Hunter and other scholars who modeled their work on his. Increasing numbers of social scientists began to inquire if Hunter's results about³ community leadership were in part a consequence of his method. Using a different method of analysis, many of them began to reach conclusions that differed strongly from those found by Hunter and his followers. Increasingly, a pluralistic view of decision-making began to appear in the literature.

Robert Dahl

Robert Dahl is the social scientist most closely associated with the pluralist school. The question, in which he is interested, as he

1. See for example, Delbert C. Miller, "Industry and Community Power Structure," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 23 (February, 1958), 9-15, where the author finds that "Businessmen ... exert a predominant influence in community decision making." Also, Robert O. Schulze, "The Role of Economic Dominants in Community Power Structure," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 23 (February, 1958), 3-9, who concludes that the "political and civic life of Cibola ... [is controlled by] a group of middle-class business and professional men."

2. Jewel Bellush and Stephen David, RACE AND POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 3. observe that "up to that time sociologists ... held a monopoly of the" study of community power.

3. COMMUNITY POLITICS, p. 160.

succinctly states it on the opening page of his book, is "who actually¹ governs?"

Dahl sought to answer this question by examining decisions made in New Haven in the areas of public education, urban redevelopment, and political nominations. He chose these areas because they were felt to involve a great many participants and interests. In each of them Dahl sought, not to demonstrate that a single group dominated, but to identify the participants and describe their role in decision-making. Information was gathered, not by reputational analysis, but by participant observation, interviews and the examination of newspapers and public² documents.

On the basis of his investigation, Dahl concluded that decisions in New Haven were made by an executive-centered coalition. Decisions in each area were made by different participants, with the Mayor active in all of them. Overall, New Haven's political system was felt to be pluralistic because influence in the system was shared by various coalitions. This differed from earlier periods in that city's history in which first patricians and then entrepreneurs dominated. This movement, according to Dahl, was from a system of cumulative inequalities to one³ of dispersed inequalities.

1. WHO GOVERNS?, p. 1.

2. Charles Bonjean and David Olson, "Community Leadership: Directions of Research," in COMMUNITY POLITICS, pp. 163-73, note that restructuring decisions is an extremely time consuming task. The ~~rap~~ppore needed to have one's questions answered in a candid manner usually requires a period of time in which one must establish oneself among respondents as a legitimate investigator.

3. WHO GOVERNS, p. 85.

Dahl's work may be criticized on a number of grounds. Determining which decisions to examine is one of its difficulties. Polsby argues that "those which are generally agreed to be significant," should¹ be studied. However, if an investigator decides to examine only major decisions, then he must establish objective criteria which will enable² him to separate major from nonmajor decisions. Surely Dahl and his followers would not expect community residents to make this determination, for to do so would in effect be to rely on reputational analysis. At the same time, it is perhaps possible that the investigator should not ignore minor decisions because in the long run the sum of the latter³ may prove to be significant.

Dahl's approach also fails to pay adequate attention to possible anticipated reactions. For example, in discussing the redevelopment issue, Dahl concludes that the Citizens Action Commission lacked influence. He bases this conclusion on the ground that it neither initiated nor vetoed any proposals. Bachrach and Baratz observe however that the same data may be used to support a different conclusion. According to them, the business-dominated Citizens Action Commission may have been so powerful that actions that it was unlikely to back were

1. Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: the Pluralist Alternative," JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 22 (August, 1969), 474-84. Just as the elitist presumes the existence of a power structure, so does Polsby here assume the existence of readily recognizable significant decisions.

2. "The Two Faces of Power."

3. The significance of such decisions is not presented here as a definition statement, but as one that at least merits further investigation.

not suggested by any of the participants in the urban redevelopment arena.¹ It was for this reason that it neither initiated nor vetoed any proposals.²

Like Dahl's work, other community studies suggested that leaders varied from issue area to issue area, with public officials crossing over or participating in more than one of these. Among such studies were Banfield in Chicago,³ Martin and his colleagues in Syracuse,⁴ Wildavsky⁵ in Oberlin and Sayre and Kaufman in New York City.⁶

Sayre and Kaufman

According to Sayre and Kaufman, decisions are made in particular arenas or centers of decision-making.⁷ At the nucleus of a center of decision-making is a core group that is formally charged with discharging

1. "The Two Faces of Power," p. 951. Mayor Lee, whom Hunter refers to as "the businessman mayor," might have knowingly or unknowingly represented the interests of the Citizens Action Commission. See, Floyd Hunter, "A Review of WHO GOVERNS?," ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 6 (1962), 517-19.

2. To continue with the discussion of the redevelopment arena, Fred Powlage's, MODEL CITY (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), concludes that that City's redevelopment program operated in the traditional manner. That is, the Black residents of the community had very little to say about decisions that destroyed their homes and forced them to relocate.

3. Edward Banfield, POLITICAL INFLUENCE (New York: Free Press, 1961).

4. Roscoe Martin, et al., DECISIONS IN SYRACE (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961).

5. "Leadership in a Small Town," in THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY POWER, edited by Willis D. Hawley and Frederick M. Wirt (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp, 115-124.

6. Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert H. Kaufman, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960).

7. Theodore Lowi refers to these decisions centers as "arenas of powers," and states that each has its own power structure. See, Theodore Lowi, AT THE PLEASURE OF THE MAYOR (New York: Free Press, 1964), Chapters 6-7, and 9.

certain governmental functions. The core group is surrounded by satellite groups that are interested in influencing it. Decisions are the result of interaction and compromise both within the core and between the core and its satellites. Indeed, Sayre and Kaufman believes that bargaining is so important in decision-making in New York City that "Every program and policy represents a compromise among the interested¹ political participants."

Among the many participants in the decision-making process are party leaders, public officials, bureaucracies, nongovernmental groups, and officials of higher levels of government. These participants function within a set of rules determined by federal, state and city laws. Because the rules help determine which groups will be rewarded, they are important to all of the contestants. In order to benefit their own interests, many of the latter seek changes in the rules or in their² interpretations.

In "each of the city's decision centers," decisions are ordinarily "formulated and carried out without much calculated³ consideration of the decisions emanating from other decision centers." This leads to a situation in which there is little citywide integration of the decisions made by the various centers. It is however noted that some factors tend to integrate the system. These include, overlapping membership which means that members of one decision center participate in other centers, the fact that a core group in one system may turn up as

1. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, p. 714.

2. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, Chapter 4.

3. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, p. 714.

a satellite in a second and the Mayor's office, overhead agencies, civic groups and the press, all of which have broad perspectives.¹

In spite of the presence of integrating factors,

The city government is accurately visualized as a series of semiautonomous little worlds, each of which brings forth official programs and policies through the interaction of its own inhabitants.²

Indeed,

most ... decisions are shaped by a small percentage of the city's population ... because only the participants directly concerned have the time, energy, skill, and motivation to do much about them.³

Community Power and New York City's Poverty Program

Having reviewed the leading community decision-making studies, we will now relate them to our findings as well as other events in the poverty arena.⁴ It is felt that pluralism (especially the work of Sayre and Kaufman) tends to uphold the findings of this study in that both found numerous centers of decision-making without any individual or

... ..

1. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, pp. 714-716.

2. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, pp. 715-716.

COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY, p. 124, notes that "different small groups normally make decisions on different community problems."

3. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, p. 715.

4. POWER AND POVERTY, p. 3.

We do not attempt here to apply the work of Bachrach and Baratz to the whole field of decision-making in New York City. While this is a worthwhile task, to do so would require an examination of numerous centers of decision-making outside of the poverty arena. As such, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

On pages 19-27, we demonstrated how nondecision-making limited white participation in the poverty program. During the period examined by this study, New York differed from such cities as Baltimore (see, POWER AND POVERTY) which through nondecision-making limited the entrance and participation of minority group members in the political system. Under

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group dominating the entire system. However, we disagree with the pluralists' claim concerning the responsiveness of local governments to their constituents, and believe that racial and ethnic factors are more important in community decision-making than they acknowledge.

Within the context of this study, the Council Against Poverty is a body that is made up of functionally specialized officials who "constitute the core group for decisions in ... /a/ functional area of governmental action."² As is the case in other centers of decision-making in New York City the core group is surrounded by satellites. The satellites surrounding the Council include community corporations, delegate agencies, racial and ethnic groups, the Community Development Agency and the Office of Economic Opportunity. It is important to note, as we saw in our case studies, that the degree of participation of each satellite varies considerably from action to action. For example, a delegate agency may only seek to influence those Council actions where its vital interests, such as its annual allocation, are involved. In situations not related to these interests, it may not be involved.

the leadership of Mayor John V. Lindsay, to quote HRA Administrator Mitchell Ginsberg, "the idea of community people participating in affairs that directly concern them," was encouraged (see, JOHN V. LINDSAY: A POLITICAL LIFE, p. 236). In general, in spite of Mayor Lindsay's frequent irritation at delays brought on by community participation, he believed in the need to work with and not in behalf of the affected City residents.

1. See for example, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY and WHO GOVERNS?

2. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, p. 711; also, see, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY, AT THE PLEASURE OF THE MAYOR, Chapters 6-7, and WHO GOVERNS? The latter, p. 169 observes that "Perhaps the most striking characteristic of influence in New Haven is the extent to which it is specialized; ... /those/ influential in one sector ... tend not to be influential in" other sectors. /their emphasis./

Council actions resulted from negotiation and compromises between the interested parties.¹ In our case studies we saw compromises over the number of members of the Crown Heights Board who were to be poor, the timing of the withdrawal of recognition; and in the petition procedure case, the Council agreed to a compromise suggested by the Chairman in order to iron out the differences between Council members.² These compromises all took place within the core group, i.e., the Council Against Poverty. Compromises were also reached between the core group and its satellites. For example, the Council negotiated with OEO regarding the establishment of the Racial and Ethnic Balance Plan.

It is significant that most Council actions were made by a small part of the City's population, but more importantly by a small number of those who were active in New York City's political system. These few dominated policy-making in the poverty arena because "only the participants directly concerned have the time, energy, skill, and motivation to do much about" shaping decisions.³

For these reasons there was limited coordination of the various decisions centers in New York City. Hence, the Council Against Poverty

1. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, p. 714, notes that "Every program and policy represents a compromise among the interested political participants."

2. In POWER IN COMMITTEES, p. 110, it is noted that the committees reviewed went through both controversies and compromises. The result, as was the case with the Council, was that "by the time the group gets down to making a final decision, the conclusion is almost always" unanimous.

3. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, p. 715, Similarly, WHO GOVERNS?, p. 115, notes that "the direct influence of the electorate on the key decisions involving redevelopment has been negligible compared with the direct influence of a few leaders. In origin, conception and execution it is not too much to say that urban redevelopment has been the direct product of a small handful of leaders." [their emphasis]

was able to move in a direction to which other decision centers were opposed. For example, on December 18, 1968, COUNCIL MINUTES show that that body voted against the Health and Hospital Planning Council's recommendation that a comprehensive health agency be established. Or, Urban Action Task Forces duplicated some of the referral work of community corporations and delegate agencies. Also, the Council failed to act on many of the recommendations made by the City Council's Special Committee Report. Lastly, while Mayor Lindsay called upon the poverty program to concentrate a major part of its efforts on jobs, the call was largely¹ unheeded.

One other factor discussed by Sayre and Kaufman needs to be reviewed. According to them the contestants for the City's prizes "seek the rewards of political action not only within the established political framework but also by altering the ... framework in ways which will im-²prove their chances of success. That this was demonstrated in the poverty is clear. Thus we saw Puerto Ricans and Blacks disagreeing over³ the Racial and Ethnic Balance Plan; Jewish groups seeking the treatment

1. Richard Reeves, NEW YORK TIMES, December 28, 1967.

We do not mean to suggest that there are no forces that coordinate the Council with the City's other centers of decision-making. Some coordination was in a sense built in by the presence on the Council of public officials who spend most of their time as leaders in other functionally specialized centers of decision-making. A more general type of coordination resulted from the presence of the press and civic organizations interested in good government and from overhead agencies and those with a citywide outlook such as the Director of the Budget Bureau and the Mayor.

2. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, p. 105.

3. COMMUNITY CORPORATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY, pp. 20-22.

of poverty wherever it was found instead of just in poverty areas be-
cause many poor Jews lived outside of such areas;¹ and, the conflict
over the meaning of due process in the South Jamaica case, which would
lead, if the Commissioner's interpretation was followed, to a rein-
statement of the dismissed Executive Director.²

Responsiveness of Local Government

In spite of our agreement with the pluralist view concerning the
existence of multiple centers of decision-making, we do not totally con-
cur with their perception of the political system. Their claim re-
garding the responsiveness of local governments to their constituents
is believed to be exaggerated. For example, Sayre and Kaufman state
that New York City residents "have learned that governmental decisions...
are responsive to the demands upon the decision centers."³ This is not
an isolated view. According to Bellush and David, the pluralists be-
lieve that "no significant groups are left out of the system."⁴

When Sayre and Kaufman tell us that the decisions made by the va-
rious arenas or centers of decision-making are responsive to the demands
placed upon them, they are implying the presence of several factors
that may not exist. More specifically, they are suggesting that a group
exists that is aware of what it wishes to seek from government, has
knowledge regarding to whom it should communicate its demands, possesses

1. Murray Schumach, NEW YORK TIMES, November 4, 1973.

2. Chapter III, Case Study 3.

3. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, p. 721.

4. RACE AND POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY, p. 6. At this citation the
authors present citations from such leading exponents of pluralism
as Dahl, Polsby and Sayre and Kaufman and demonstrate how each of them
agrees with this point of view.

some basic organization that will enable it to communicate these demands, and perhaps most important, that the relevant decision-makers are available to listen and act upon their demands.

The absence of any one of the aforementioned factors, may lead, to rephrase Bellush and David, to a significant group being "left out of the system." For example, while it was theoretically possible for the white poor to get on the Council agenda, the fact that people in this group were unaware of their common status and lacked any organizational means to seek changes meant that from a practical point of view their status would not be reviewed by the Council. More importantly, the Council appears to have been uninterested in either acknowledging or responding to the needs of this segment of the population.

Another disagreement with the pluralists derives from their contention that decisions are the result of negotiation and compromise among the interested parties. In the discussion previous (see supra, p. 37), illustrations were cited which demonstrated that this was occasionally the case. In the application of the nondecision-making analysis to this study however there was no discernible compromise of any significance. There, we saw that many of the white poor were unaware of their exclusion from the poverty program (according to Bachrach and Baratz, "those who were adversely affected may not understand the process by which this occurred"), that the Council was uninterested in seeking them out, and that therefore there could not be any negotiation between them and the Council which might lead to a compromise (indeed, as long as the level of funding for community action programs did not increase, there was a fear that increased white participation in the poverty program could only be accomplished by decreasing Black and Puerto Rican

participation).¹ In other words, negotiation and compromise may take place between those groups involved in decision-making, but not all groups were involved.²

This leads us to another criticism of pluralism. While the pluralists are believed to be correct in stating that nearly "every citizen in the community has access to unused political resources," they are wrong in asserting that the failure to use political resources results from the fact that one has not been aroused enough.³ A particular group may simply lack the political expertise necessary to make use of its potential resources. Furthermore, in a situation involving nondecision-making, the lack of awareness regarding how one was adversely affected, and not one's apathy, may prevent him from becoming aroused and tapping his "unused political resources."⁴

Importance of Racial and Ethnic Factors

Besides the belief that the system is not as open as the pluralists contend, it is also believed that racial and ethnic factors are more

1. POWER AND POVERTY, p. 47.

2. Within the context of EE Schattschneider's, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE, Chapter 1, the City's Jewish community, as a result of its organization, was able to widen the scope of their conflict with the poverty program. They did so by informing the Mayor directly and indirectly of their desire to have the existing system reformed.

3. WHO GOVERNS?, p. 309.

4. It should be noted that what occurs in one decision-making arena may have consequences for other arenas. Thus, part of the reason that so many Jews adopted a hard line attitude against building the Forst Hills housing project may have resulted from their belief that Jews were already being asked to make room for minority groups through the affirmative action program and had been excluded from the poverty program. The question then became, why should the Jewish community again be expected to move aside so that minority group members could benefit. The answer, at least to some, was that it should not.

important to decision-making than they note and that too many political scientists have inaccurately perceived the melting pot mythology.¹ As Glazer and Moynihan observe, "The point about the melting pot is that it did not happen."² More specifically, AT THE PLEASURE OF THE MAYOR observes that, "Decisions on nominations and appointments in New York City have always been weighted heavily with ethnic and religious considerations."³

In 1960 Sayre and Kaufman observed that more than 750,000 nonwhites lived in New York City.⁴ Since then, this figure has more than doubled⁵ and now totals close to 1.7 million. As a result of this very large

1. What appears to be the greater presence of the ethnic factor in the poverty arena, as distinct from the studies of the pluralists, is a result of several factors. In part it may be attributed to the failure on the part of some of the pluralists to draw the proper conclusions from some of their observations. For example, in WHO GOVERNS?, pp. 51 and 63, Dahl notes that ethnic politics is on the decline in New Haven and that its practitioners have been pushed aside by the new problems of city life. He fails to consider the metal houses controversy (see, pp. 192-97) as a conflict between the lower middle class Italian and Jewish residents and the need for low cost housing for Blacks, and does not even mention, as Allan R. Talbot did, that redevelopment was seen by "Many, if not most, of the residents of Wooster Square ... as a means of removing Negroes." See, Allan R. Talbot, THE MAYOR'S GAME: RICHARD LEE OF NEW HAVEN AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 137. Also, see, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, where the authors make passing reference to the need to "balance" different ethnic groups. For example, on pages 526, 539-40, and 683-84, they refer respectively to the need to balance the board of education, court nominations and the citywide ticket. However, they do not examine any specific clashes where forces are aligned on a racial or ethnic basis.

2. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963), p. 2.

3. AT THE PLEASURE OF THE MAYOR, p. 34.

4. GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY, p. 26.

5. Edward C. Burks, NEW YORK TIMES, March 5, 1972, notes that this City's Black population now totals 1,668,000 and its Puerto Rican population is 946,000.

increase in the size of the minority population, one which has occurred in most urban centers, minority group members now have a greater "presence" in urban areas than they did but a decade ago.

That minority group members, especially Black and Spanish-speaking individuals, now make up an increased percentage of New York City's population does not thereby explain the more frequent presence of the ethnic factor in the decision-making arena. The last decade began "the current surge of ethnic consciousness."¹ This led to a belief among many Blacks (one which soon spread to other groups), "that they shared a common fate in the political arena."² This belief in a common fate was manifested in several areas including the poverty arena.³

Winner Take All System

With their larger numbers and developing group consciousness, Black urban dwellers became more militant advocates of their group needs and sought an increased share of available benefits. They were aided in this effort in the poverty arena because of its decentralization into specific communities. The latter, combined with a winner take all election system at times served to promote intergroup conflict. This resulted from the fact that whichever ethnic group gained a majority of the seats on the board of directors of a community corporation exerted strong control over that agency's programs, policies and jobs.

1. Alan A. Altschuler, COMMUNITY CONTROL (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 96.

2. RACE AND POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY, p. 117.

3. For a discussion of the education and police arenas, see, Marilyn Gittell, "Education: The Decentralization-Community Control Controversy," in RACE AND POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY, and Edward T. Rogowsky, et al., "Police: The Civilian Review Board Controversy," in RACE AND POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY.

This system could not cause ethnic conflicts in areas such as Harlem where all of the poor were members of the same ethnic group. We do not mean to suggest that there were no factions in such areas, just that all of the factions were Black. In areas where more than one ethnic group lived however, ethnic conflicts were bound to occur. According to Moynihan, in such situations, "the potential for ethnic conflict for control over the CAPs, especially within the framework of the selection of poor representatives, provided plentiful opportunities for ethnic hostility."¹

What frequently happened in such situations is that one group, usually Black, was better organized when the poverty program was just beginning; consequently, it received more than its fair share of representation on the local board of directors. A second ethnic group belatedly recognized this, and as was observed by Luis Flores, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Lower East Side Community Corporation, was awakened and sought to rectify the imbalance. This was the root of most of the earlier conflicts. Unfortunately, this process established a background of mistrust that has frequently continued after the earlier imbalance was corrected.

Intergroup Conflicts

One can easily cite numerous examples of intergroup conflict in the poverty arena. In Chapter III, we saw the conflict between Blacks² and Hasidic Jews in Crown Heights. Also, "An antipoverty clash

1. Daniel P. Moynihan, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 138.

2. More than two years later, a NEW YORK TIMES article noted that "The most abrasive issue between the two communities [Blacks and Jews] has been the administration of \$575,000 in antipoverty funds by the Crown Heights Community Corporation." Jonathan Kandell, NEW YORK TIMES, January 9, 1972.

involving a competition for power between Puerto Ricans and Negroes ... has largely immobilized the \$1 million-a-year South Bronx antipoverty ¹ In Morrisania, the poverty program has led to "considerable animosity between Puerto Ricans and blacks."² In nearby Hunts Point, we find a similar Black-Puerto Rican conflict over control of that area's community corporation.³ Additionally, in the Tremont area, 76 per cent of those who participated in or benefited from that area's poverty program indicated the existence of ethnic group antagonism.⁴ These and other conflicts led New York City Congressman Herman Badillo to state that New York City's poverty program "incubates violence between Blacks and Puerto Ricans."⁵

1. This quotation is from an unsigned NEW YORK TIMES article of October 23, 1969. Over two years later, on January 3, 1972, C. Gerald Fraser noted in that newspaper that a Black-Puerto Rican battle for control delayed "The implementation of community control of the Martin Luther King Health Center in the South Bronx"

2. Murray Schumach, NEW YORK TIMES, April 4, 1971.

3. Nathan Glazer, "Race Relations: New York City in 1969," in Lyle C. Fitch and Ann Marie Hauck Walsh, eds., AGENDA FOR A CITY (New York: IPA, 1970), p. 518.

4. Kenneth J. Pollinger and Annette Pollinger, COMMUNITY ACTION AND THE POOR (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 167.

5. Murray Schumach, NEW YORK TIMES, April 4, 1971.

This City's experience with intergroup conflicts was consistent with the national one. For example, according to PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR, pp. 42-43, in San Francisco's Mission District, "Major struggles ensued, centered around employment of staff and the selection of programs, as the board members sought to protect or advance their personal or ethnic interests." Speaking with a national perspective, an OEO project officer noted that "there were ... battles between blacks and Spanish-speaking people in Los Angeles, Denver, Chicago, San Francisco," and New York City. See, C. Gerald Fraser, NEW YORK TIMES, January 2, 1972.

While examples of intergroup tension in the community corporations were numerous, they were less readily observable on the Council. The only example of such tension in our case studies occurred between the Puerto Rican Delegate from the Hunts Point Corporation and the Black Delegate from the Morrisania Community Corporation. The reason for the lower frequency of these occurrences on the Council was that on the corporation level intergroup conflicts were more directly concerned with the control of jobs and funds. On the Council however, because of the system of "fair share" allocations, much of the controversy regarding the disbursement of funds to the corporation was largely taken out of the arena of political conflict.

In spite of the latter, it is still interesting to note those corporations that were overfunded (received more than their fair share) by the Council. By far the two most heavily overfunded corporations were Bedford-Stuyvesant (86 per cent Black) and Central Harlem (96 per cent Black). These corporations were respectively funded at 151 per cent and 218 per cent above their fair share level.¹

Another reason for the lower frequency of ethnic tensions exhibited in the Council's deliberations was a function of the fact that it was not as decentralized as the community corporations. It was a city-wide body that was responsible for coordinating the New York's entire poverty program; furthermore, nearly one-half of its membership consisted of public officials and representatives of private groups who had a broader constituency than those Council members who represented community corporations. In effect, they were less likely to represent the interests of one particular ethnic or racial group.

1. VERSATILE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, 1969/70, p. 12.

Ameliorating Intergroup Tension

At the risk of sounding contradictory, it is important to note that the effects of the poverty program on intergroup relations were not all negative. While it is true that the competition it created exacerbated ethnic tensions, in some cases, such as in Crown Heights, these tensions preceded the poverty program and were simply extended to a new arena. The community corporations moreover, and to a lesser degree the Council, operated as forums where various ethnic groups could actually confront one another and present their conflicting points of view. Prior to the poverty program there was no systematic opportunity for such interaction - especially for it to occur within the framework of an authoritative conflict resolution process. The result was that despite group differences and despite meetings that were at times tense and involved shouted charges and countercharges, the poverty program did represent an institutionalized process in which it was necessary for various groups to work together. Furthermore, tensions were reduced by such compromises as occurred in the Crown Heights and other cases. One may therefore make a case that a representative forum that was perceived as existing to serve the needs of the poor and minorities, did through its operations provide a mechanism to reduce intergroup tensions that might otherwise have been more explosive.

Future Research Concerns

Our review of the literature and our attempt at testing it against the political process we studied demonstrate that we have no general body of decision theory applicable to all authoritative policy formulation processes. Decision theory and political process studies, as exhibited in the community power and decision-making studies, demonstrate

that the conclusions and theories appear to be dependent upon the functions of the particular system or subsystem studied. Where theories or models have been deduced or adduced on the basis of synthesizing findings from a variety of studies and disciplines, they are generally¹ not applicable to specific systems or subsystems.

In spite of the large number of community power and decision-making studies, one result of this study is that it is obvious that there are areas in need of further research. Community power studies need to pay² more attention to comparative research. Too many of them are limited by their examination of but one community. The narrow scope of these undertakings makes it difficult to use their results as a basis for generalizing about community power. An orientation towards comparative research, including comparing both decision-making in a number of communities, and the manner in which a number of decisions were made in one community, would greatly enhance our ability to make generalizations.

There is also a need to develop and verify propositions that would tell us what conditions are conducive to a pluralistic or elitist system of decision-making. Such propositions have largely been overlooked in this field, perhaps because scholars have devoted much of their

1. One of the few attempts to be more systematic in the use of controlled comparative data, is Terry Clark's, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities." Here he demonstrates high correlations with respect to many variables which produce a given kind of decision system profile. However, this may only hold true over a short range of time. Thus, while Clark's focus was cities in the early 1960s, it would be interesting to note whether or not the same correlations were found a decade or two before or after that period.

2. The need for more comparative research is referred to as "the chief problem in this field" by John Walton, "Substance and Artifact: The Current Status of Research on Community Power Structure," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 71 (January, 1966), 430-438.

efforts to fighting over questions of method and the interpretation of findings.¹ There have however been some beginnings along these lines² and these will be expanded.

Furthermore, some work should attempt to determine how values are distributed under different systems of decision-making. Are the masses in New Haven living a better life than their counterparts in Regional City" Do elites always make decisions in their own interests? In other words, why not go beyond asking the question who governs and attempt to determine in whose interests decisions are made.

Lastly, while intellectual debate is obviously beneficial to the growth of knowledge, some scholars have defended the results of their studies with less than an open mind. As Peter Rossi observes,

Each author has his own town, defending it from the erroneous and somewhat heretical conceptualization of othes much the same way a feudal lord defends the integrity of the local patron saint against the false counter-claims of nearby realms.³

Turning from community power studies to decision theory, attempts must be made to determine which of Lasswell's seven stages are most important in producing decision outcomes. For example, do those actors who dominate one of the stages have a larger role in influencing the decision outcome? If so, which stage? Additionally, scholars must investigate why decisions appear in one instance and not in another. They must also attempt to determine whether or not certain types of "occasion

1. Nelson Polsby, Community: The Study of Community Power," in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, pp. 161-162.

2. See for example, Terry N. Clark, "Power and Community Structure: Who Governs, Where and When?" in COMMUNITY POLITICS, pp. 177-84.

3. Peter H. Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 4 (November, 1960), p. 391.

for decision," to use Snyder's term, such as routine, lead to less centralized decision-making than do other types such as uncertainty or risk.

The relationship between personality and decision-making should also be investigated. Are individuals with one personality type more likely to encourage extensive debate than individuals with another type of personality? If so, what are the implications of this for policy-makers? Related to this is the connection between psychological and organizational factors. While a number of studies have investigated the influence of one or the other, too little attention has been devoted to the examination of personality types operating within certain organizational settings.

Lastly, more scholarly efforts should be devoted to nondecision-making. In this work we saw that the work of Bachrach and Baratz added a new dimension to our understanding of the determinants affecting the Council's actions. Similarly, efforts to apply their work in other areas should be encouraged. It is important to note that these efforts need not be limited to local politics but could be extended to include the national and international arenas. Furthermore, the results of such efforts should be placed in a comparative framework so that social scientists might for example attempt to determine why a decision was made in one community and not in a second.

The possibility of using the literature on small group interaction as a framework for focusing on the events reviewed in this study should be explored. This would offer a unique opportunity to determine the relevance of this literature to a group of actors of different ethnic, political, economic and social backgrounds. While we will not here

attempt an in-depth examination of the applicability of this framework, some of the relevant literature as well as specific questions such an¹ approach would seek to answer will be reviewed.

The literature on small groups derives mainly from psychology and² sociology. In psychology, Kurt Lewin and his students were a major influence on the development of the study of small groups. Lewin was concerned on an experimental and theoretical basis with social influence. He believed that social behavior was lawful and that these laws could be³ found in the psychological and social forces which caused behavior. In sociology, Homans was interested in "bringing out the formal relationships that lie within the apparent confusion of everyday behavior," and William F. Whyte employed anthropological techniques in demonstrating

1. While the usefulness of exploring the small group approach in gaining a comprehensive understanding of the events examined is recognized, a thorough application of research in this field is beyond the scope of this study. It would be impossible to assume that due justice to this literature could be accomplished by tangential references. Indeed, it is hoped that one of the heuristic contributions of this study will be to spur further research along the lines suggested.

Furthermore, it will be recalled that one of the aims of this study was to determine the applicability of decision-making theory to the events observed. Although we found that much of this literature was of limited applicability, it is felt that this is an important conclusion that rests on its own merits. Parenthetically speaking, we add the observation by Hubert M. Blalock, SOCIAL STATISTICS (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 121, that "a researcher is usually interested in setting up a hypothesis which he really would like to reject."

2. An important distinction between the writings of members of these disciplines is that sociologists were interested in examining the behavior of members of real groups while psychologists emphasized experimentally created laboratory groups.

3. See, Dorwin Cartwright, editor, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEORETICAL PAPERS BY KURT LEWIN (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

that "Corherville" had its own social structure and that this structure¹ did not "mesh with the structure of the society around it."

Robert F. Bales believed that while groups differed in their cul-² tures, they all confronted a similar set of problems. He turned atten- tion away from the effect of the group on people and situations to the effects these variables had on the group. According to Bales, if a group was to reach its goal (such as a decision), the behavior of the mem- bers must display certain characteristics. For example, the individual member of the group must develop a certain distribution of liking or at least respecting other members.

Turning to the political realm, James D. Barber observed that the small group approach to the study of political phenomena has developed³ along several lines. Scholars such as Richard Fenno have found certain propositions and concepts which they extracted from this research useful⁴ in analyzing their data. Others, such as Harold Guetzkow, have ob- served public officials in controlled decision-making and role playing situations in order to gain a better understanding of the decision-making⁵ process.

1. George C. Homans, *THE HUMAN GROUP* (New York: Harcourt, 1950, p. 453 and William F. Whyte, *STREET CORNER SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF AN ITALIAN SLUM* (Chicago) University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 273.

2. Robert F. Bales, *INTERACTION PROCESS ANALYSIS: A METHOD FOR THE STUDY OF SMALL GROUPS* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1950).

3. *POWER IN COMMITTEES.*

4. Richard Fenno, *THE POWER OF THE PURSE* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

5. Harold Guetzkow, *et al.*, *SIMULATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

The major theoretical study on the importance of small group research in gaining an understanding of political phenomena in Sidney Verba's, *SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP*. Verba emphasized the importance of face-to-face groups in the political process. He believed that primary groups are the "locus of most political decision-making; they are important transmission points in political communications, and they exercise a major influence on the political beliefs and attitudes of their membes.¹

With 51 members the Council's size lends itself to an investigation of the relevance of research on small groups to the events examined in this study. Such an examination would be concerned with specific questions regarding the relationship between the Council's leaders and followers as well as questions pertaining to each of these subgroups. For example, the effect on both leaders and followers of the Council's size and the emotional and political attachments of its members would have to be considered. Also to be considered would be the effect of the economic, political, social and ethnic background of Council members.

Regarding leadership, sample questions would include determining how leadership arose and how the leaders maintained the respect and loyalty of the membership. Were there important differences between the behavior of the leaders and the Council members and how were the latter affected by the former? Also, did the Council have two types of leaders - i.e., those concerned with maintaining a proper atmosphere for the group's interactions and those concerned with managing the group's responsibilities - or did the same leaders handle both needs?

1. *SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR*, p. 4.

Regarding the Council's members, attempts should be made to determine the pressures to conform to the group's norms and how nonconformists were treated. Additionally, were there any informal groups operating on the Council, and if so, why? Did the group support any behavior or attitudes that contradicted either the leader's views or the larger political system? Lastly, how were Council members affected by the leadership and what the effect of participating in decision-making on the nature of the decisions made and their degree of acceptability?¹

Summary

This Chapter has reviewed the decision-making literature in order to find its relevance to the Council actions presented in this study.

1. While small group research is one alternative approach to examining the events reviewed in this study, other approaches might also prove useful. For example, one could take a policy perspective that would begin by clarifying the Council's goals and then go on to determine whether or not they were accomplished. (In her critique of proposals to reorganize New York City's Government, Annmarie H. Walsh, "What Price Decentralization in New York," in CITY ALMANAC, vol 7, No. 1, June 1972, observed that few such proposals state "their aims in anything but vague and sweeping terms.") This approach would also consider the unanticipated effects of the Council's operations.

In terms of political science literature, this approach could focus on the research in public administration on decentralization-centralization and the literature in urban politics and sociology. In the former case we could examine such questions as the meaning of centralization and decentralization, the definition of neighborhood and which system is most efficacious in improving neighborhood services. Also, does a decentralized system expedite action, facilitate coordination among related functions and redistribute power more widely among different groups.

In the urban politics and sociology literature we could focus on research concerning the poor and minority groups. For example, given what we know about the poor, minority groups and ghetto politics, what would we have expected to happen in the poverty program and how did this differ from what occurred? Also, why was it possible for Blacks and Puerto Ricans to get such a head start in the poverty program (see, below, Chapter V, footnote)? Lastly, did the poverty program seek to accomplish a real or symbolic redistribution of benefits (Murray Edelman, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 6-7, discusses what are referred to as condensation symbols which evoke emotions.

Although this literature was not specifically referred to in our case studies, we sought to determine whether it would help explain what we found in these studies.

In applying this literature it must be emphasized that we focused on but one subsystem of New York City's political system and that this subsystem represented but a small fraction of the total number of policy issues dealt with, actors involved in, and monies expended by that political system. Nevertheless, it was still logical and defensible to apply the various decision-making schema to our findings. This was because the subsystem examined had a potential constituency that was larger than the population of perhaps twenty of our states and distributed an amount of funds that was larger than the budgets of many local governments.

In the attempt to apply, for analytic and interpretative purposes the conclusions and models found in this literature, we saw that in general its applicability to policy formulation and decisional processes by the New York City Council Against Poverty was quite limited. The major exception to this was the literature of nondecision-making. The latter enabled us to see that those charged with formulating antipoverty policy in New York City failed to pay more than a minimum amount of attention to the needs of the white poor. Indeed, the Council and the whole structure and politics of the poverty program in New York City were exemplary of this lack of interest in the needs of poor whites. Our own findings, based on the case studies of the Council in action, and observations about the poverty program politics in New York City, did lead us to take issue with some of the conclusions and theoretical constructs in the decision-making literature.

Subsequently the literature on community decision-making was compared and contracted with our findings. Here we saw that the pluralist writings, especially Sayre and Kaufman, had relevance for explaining our findings. Of special pertinence was their concept of multiple centers of decision-making or arenas of power.

At the same time, we noted several important areas in which the pluralist writings did not support our findings. Contrary to their statements concerning the "responsiveness of the system," we did not find the poverty structure in New York City responsive to the needs of all of the poor. As previously mentioned, white participation in this program was extremely limited.

Another area in which the pluralist writings and our results fail to coincide concerns the importance of racial and ethnic factors in urban decision-making. The pluralists either fail to mention or lightly pass over this phenomena. To the contrary, our study indicates that this factor was very important, especially on the community level, in determining which groups would control the poverty program and the jobs, funds and program orientation that went with such control. However, lest the reader conclude that in the area of intergroup relations the poverty program served solely to exacerbate intergroup tensions, it must be mentioned that without the ?Council Against Poverty these tensions would have been considerably more pronounced than they were. In this arena the Council was able to moderate intergroup disputes by providing an orderly process for the division of what on a Citywide level was not an excessive amount of funds. It also provided an institutionalized forum wherein conflicts were modulated, ameliorated or resolved.

Also reviewed in this Chapter were future research concerns.

These included research in both community power and general decision theory.

The last Chapter will summarize the findings of this study, discuss the Council's accomplishments, suggest recommendations aimed at improving its operations and speculate regarding the future of the poverty program.

CHAPTER V: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This Chapter will summarize the findings of this study in terms of the objectives stated in the opening Chapter.¹ We will also examine the implications of what was observed for larger developments in both New York City as well as elsewhere. For example, one question that must be addressed is has our research provided any cues or clues for the decentralization thrust that is apparent in New York City?²

A review of the five Council actions indicates that the decision-making process was of a dynamic nature.³ A participant who played an important role in one action did not necessarily play such a role in a second one. Thus, for example, in the Crown Heights study the

1. It is important to note the conditional nature of our conclusions. The case studies do not conclusively prove that the participants cited were influential in all of the Council's actions. This disclaimer is required since this study was concerned with a specific time period in the life of the Council and only examined actions that dealt with representation. The decision-making process may have differed in the pre-Green Amendment Council. Also, evidence suggests that OEO, because of the National Emphasis Programs, had a more important role in certain substantive actions. Lastly, the departure of the Council Staff Director omits an important actor from the decision-making scene.

2. We will answer such questions by drawing on both our findings and our general knowledge of the community action program.

3. According to Theodore M. Mills, *THE SOCIOLOGY OF SMALL GROUPS* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 8, observers of the interactions occurring in small groups need not always be outside the group. To the contrary, "groups have been composed of persons who simultaneously act as participants and observers, who interact and exchange their observations and interpretation.

Crown Heights Panel, especially its Chairman and the Crown Heights Area Delegate were found to be important actors while both CDA and OEO played indirect roles. In the Petition Procedure case however, OEO initiated the action by calling for a specific procedure. Once it did, it allowed the details of the procedure to be determined locally. The actual drafting of it was accomplished by the Council Staff Director and the By-Laws Committee.

A different constellation of actors, especially the Council Chairman and the CDA Commissioner, were visible active participants in the withdrawal of recognition case.¹ In the action which increased the size of the South Jamaica Panel, the key participant was Panel Chairman Billings, while the barring of members of the South Jamaica Community Corporation from seeking reelection was initiated by a CDA Assistant Commissioner (although it was amended by the South Jamaica Panel to include all Board members).

Besides being dynamic, the Council's decision-making was complex. Thus the committees and CDA played a visible role in most actions by presenting recommendations. For example, in four of the five actions, the Council unanimously approved a recommendation made by one of these bodies.² CDA's role was an outgrowth of the large staff, time and

1. James Barber noted that one of the differences between passive and active chairmen is that the former work "to define issues." See, POWER IN COMMITTEES (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 93.

2. In her study of the community action agency in Greater Los Angeles, Marshall noted that "only 28 per cent of the votes taken during a six month period had any abstentions or nos." See, Dale Marshall, THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION IN POVERTY (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 18.

information which the Agency possessed, as well as the fact that Council members, because of the limited time they had for Council duties, were of necessity forced to rely upon its information and recommendations. For example, in both withdrawing recognition from the South Jamaica Board and barring members from seeking reelection, CDA had a direct and influential role. These actions were respectively modifications of proposals made by the Commissioner and the Assistant Co Commissioner. It is also important to realize that CDA played an important role in the budgetary process. As the City Council Special Committee observed, "CDA dominates the submission and approval process of the programs and budgets."¹

Since the committees were the bodies that usually made recommendations to the Council, their role was more visible than CDA's. With the exception of the case in which the Council played an amending role, in the others it approved recommendations presented by committees. The importance of the latter resulted from several factors. Once again, Council members had relatively little time to devote to Council matters. At the same time, committee members were usually knowledgeable in the subject matter of their committees. Beyond this, there was a strong bond between the Council and the committees. Committee members were after all Council members. Additionally, there was an informal system of reciprocity so that members of the Council usually went along with the recommendations made by committees they were not members of and presumed that the recommendations made by their committees would be similarly approved.

1. City Council of New York, FINAL REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO MAKE AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF HRA (New York: City Council, July 24, 1969), p. 18.

The role played by committees meant that the importance of the Council member varied from action to action. He had more potential influence on actions which were sent to the Council by committees of which he was a member than those handled in committees to which he did not belong.

In spite of the fact that the Council usually approved the recommendations presented to it, it may not be concluded either that there was no opposition to these recommendations or that they were simply legitimated by the Council. Opposition was at times present, although in an earlier (committee) stage of the decision-making process.¹ For example, while there was no opposition to the recommendation presented to the Council by the Chairman of the Crown Heights Panel, we saw that that recommendation was the result of a compromise made in the Crown Heights Panel. It appears likely that had it not been made there, the very same question would have come up on the floor of the Council.

Regarding the fact that the Council ostensibly appears to be a legitimator of recommendations, it can and has amended or reversed recommendations presented to it by committees or CDA. For example, it amended a CDA recommendation to withdraw recognition and overruled a recommendation presented to it by the South Bronx Panel in a similar dispute.² The amending and overruling of recommendations is believed to be important because it makes it quite clear that the Council was the authoritative body with respect to the poverty program in New York City within the constraints established by OEO.

1. Theodore A. Caplow, "A Theory of Coalition in the Triad," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY REVIEW, XXI: 489-493, applies the conflict model to a small group.

2. COUNCIL MINUTES, October 23, 1969, p. 7.

The importance of the veto power is not found in the number of times used, rather in the fact that the committees and CDA were aware of its potential use. This leads to a redefinition of Council power. Since the former bodies were aware that their recommendations could be overruled, they were prevented from making any that could be referred to as "excessive." In other words, the knowledge that their recommendations had to receive the approval of the Council prevented them from making any that were unlikely to receive that approval. For example, the Crown Heights Panel would not recommend to the Council that it approve a Corporation Plan for that area which stipulated that one-quarter of the Board of Directors must be poor. To have done so would have violated the Council's guideline that a minimum of one-third of the members of a Board of Directors must be poor, and would not have received the Council's approval. Thus we see that the Council's decision-making is far more complex than it ostensibly appears to be.

OEO's participation in decision-making was marked by its desire to avoid getting involved in specific actions. Instead, it established broad parameters (which encouraged local initiative), within which the Council could act. In the Petition Procedure study, the one case in which it initiated the establishment of an explicit procedure, its guidelines were general and the specifics of the procedure were to be determined by the Council. Similarly, in the action which withdrew recognition, it also sought to encourage local initiative, this time by avoiding involvement. In the other three actions studied, the Council was operating within general OEO guidelines which encouraged local initiative.

In reviewing the relevant decision-making literature, we saw that there was no general body of decision theory applicable to all authoritative policy formulation or policy implementation processes. Our examination of general decision theory and community studies demonstrates that their conclusions and theories were dependent on the functions of the particular system or subsystem studied. Where theories or models were deduced on the basis of synthesizing findings from a variety of studies and disciplines, they were not applicable to specific systems or subsystems.

Most of the general decision-making literature was seen to be of limited relevance in enabling us to understand what occurred. The major exception to this was the nondecision-making work of Bachrach and Baratz. By applying the latter to the Council's actions, we saw that the distribution of benefits by and large failed to consider the needs of the white poor. This was accomplished by such means as failing to implement certain decisions such as the Council's Racial and Ethnic Balance Plan.

In reviewing the community decision-making literature, we saw that these studies differed in their conclusions as to "who actually governs."¹ A continuum of the best known studies would run from Dahl's pluralism to Hunter's elitism. While our study adds credence to the pluralist view of a fragmented system consisting of multiple centers of decision-making, it is not felt that local government was as responsive to its constituents as they contend and we believe that ethnic factors

1. Charles Bonjean and David Olson, "Community Leadership: Directions of Research," in Charles Bonjean, et al., editors, COMMUNITY POLITICS (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 172.

are more important to community decision-making than their studies indicate.¹

In addition to the above questions, this study also examined the implications of our findings for ethnic politics. It was seen that the ethnic factor was more important in this study than the writings of the pluralists seemed to indicate (which we attributed in part to the oversight of the latter) and that one of the most important features of the poverty program was its ethnic character.² The latter resulted from several factors including an enhanced group consciousness among members of minority groups. Also important was the winner-take-all system of election and the economic and psychological rewards

1. It is clear that Black and Puerto Rican groups were originally better able to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the poverty program. The explanation for this probably lies in the characteristics which these groups have in common. That is, not only were many Blacks and Puerto Ricans poor, they also shared a common sense of ethnic identification.

What is being suggested is that in the United States, class characteristics alone may not function as an effective means of organizing the poor. This difficulty has been noted in several studies. Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *THE AMERICAN VOTER* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 335-336, observed that "social class per se rarely becomes formalized as an organization. There is no official class leadership and no official class policy." Judson L. James, *AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES IN TRANSITION* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 138, noted that in America social stratification is "perceived only indirectly or obscurely by most people." One of the results of this lack of class consciousness among the poor is that New York City never witnessed the development of an effective coalition of poor people.

2. That this situation was not endemic to New York City, but was reproduced in other cities, is clear. For example, Ralph M. Kramer, *PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969) especially pp. 247-255, discusses the importance of ethnic factors in San Francisco's poverty program.

that went with electoral success.¹

At the same time it was observed that conflicts brought on by the poverty program were more likely to occur within the corporations than on the Council, and that the latter contributed to moderating ethnic conflicts by establishing an orderly process for the disbursement of limited appropriations.² It was found too, that the conflicts brought on by the poverty program were not as destructive to intergroup relations as they ostensibly appear to be.³ It was noted that the seeds of intergroup conflict often preceded the poverty program and were simply extended to it. Also, the poverty program brought together in a forum groups which previously lacked a regular system of communicating with one another. While the atmosphere in this forum was at times tense, through the institutionalized conflict resolution process it provided, there were opened avenues of communication, individuals and groups were

1. Daniel P. Moynihan, *MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING* (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 139, observes that the winner-take-all system exacerbated group conflict.

2. It must be understood that the poverty program did reveal the existence of ethnic tensions and in some cases served to exacerbate them. Furthermore, at times these conflicts spilled over into other arenas. Indeed, the 1965-72 period in New York City witnessed major intergroup conflicts in the police, public education and housing arenas. Thus, according to Jewel Bellush and Stephen David, *RACE AND POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 15, "in the 1960's ... racial controversies had a high, rather than low, visibility, ...

3. In his overview of research on group behavior, Morton Deutsch observes that "People prefer to associate and interact with others who are similar rather than dissimilar to themselves." See, Morton Deutsch, "Groups: Group Behavior," in *INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), Vol. VI, pp. 265-276.

provided an opportunity to let off steam, and at times compromises were produced which lessened the potential for intergroup conflict.

We also saw that this study had heuristic value. It pointed out future research concerns in both community power and general decision theory.

CONCLUSIONS

Accomplishments

A question of basic importance to this study is what has the Council Against Poverty accomplished? In our view it has become another decision-making center, one which "was created outside the existing institutional structure with influence over some limited social resources."¹ Its virtue is not that it has overnight transformed the status of the City's poor from have-nots to haves.² Only an enormous Federal redistribution of resources could have accomplished this end.³ The Council may however be credited with two categories of accomplishments: those directly deriving from its mandate as stated in EXECUTIVE ORDERS 28 and 84, and those which are more difficult to assess because they are of an indirect

1. PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR, p. 260.

2. It should be clear that what is ostensibly a simple task, discussing accomplishments, is actually a difficult one. This is so because there are no acceptable criteria of evaluation. For example, there are no accurate measures for determining the number of people who are no longer poor as a result of the poverty program. Also, how does one measure the fact that the Department of Social Services is less insensitive to the needs of the clients they serve.

3. Many observers have commented to the effect that the early publicity surrounding the poverty program was deceptive in that it implied an enormous Federal commitment. See, for example, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, p. 100.

nature and will in part be more clearly observable in the years to come.
come.

Before turning to these accomplishments it is important to note that what is reviewed here are specific accomplishments of the Council as well as more general ones of the community action program. The relevance of the latter to the Council is that in New York City the Council was generally recognized as the body responsible for making the entire community action program work. Had its operations been marred by an inability to act, then the entire community action program would have suffered.

Direct Accomplishments

The establishment of the Council at the outset of the Lindsay Administration brought reasonable order to what had previously been a chaotic organizational structure. This institution, which has survived without breakdown for over seven years, has achieved legitimacy and an authoritative status.

The Council's major success deriving from its official mandate is that it has approved hundreds of resolutions each year concerned with such varied topics as aiding in the establishment and recognition of community corporations, determining their boundaries, establishing goals for programs, and approving summer and year-round program budgets for community corporations and their 242 delegate agencies. In carrying out its mandate, the Council also enforced compliance with OEO guidelines and has approved plans regarding the makeup and elections of boards of directors of community corporations.

The Council has also aided in the establishment and operation of

such direct services as family planning, economic development and summer employment for needy youth (through the Neighborhood Youth Corps). While some would argue that these services were little more than referrals, in a City such as New York, where perhaps half a dozen departments may potentially be involved in rehousing a family on public assistance, such a service is undoubtedly useful.¹

Other Accomplishments

Perhaps more important in the long run than the above is that through the Council implemented community action program a contribution was made towards keeping the peace in the City's poverty areas.² This occurred because residents of poverty areas (especially minority group members) were often made to feel that they were part of the system. Each of the accomplishments that follow is thus valued for its intrinsic worth as well as its contribution towards "keeping the

1. It may well be that the items handled by the CAP were dealt with and resolved in better fashion and with greater output than they would have been in the City Council where without the CAP structure and related organizations they might very well have had to be considered. The City Council, which was not as representative of the interests concerned as was the CAP, would have probably produced even more conflict and ethnic tensions. This would have resulted from the lack of mitigating forces at work in the CAP where the conflicts were those of relatively equal partners. Furthermore, the CAP's leadership and staff were in general trusted by members of that body and the communities they served. The leadership of the City Council did not have the same rapport with the City's poverty neighborhoods.

2. According to Earl Rabb, the poverty program became "symbolic proof to the embattled community that they could get 'in'." See, "Which War, Which Poverty?" THE PUBLIC INTEREST, No. 3 (spring, 1966), p. 50. PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR, p. 257, notes that according to an OEO study in none of the 32 riots in the summer of 1967 did buildings housing poverty programs suffer burning or destruction. See, "OEO and the Riots - A Summary," in OEO NEWS SUMMARY OF THE WAR ON POVERTY, vols. 2-26 (September 11, 1967), pp. 1-2.

the paece." In some cases, data is available to support our contention regarding some of these achievements. Where it is not, we have drawn upon the general literature concerning the community action program.

In implementing the Council's resolutions, New York City's poverty program provided employment opportunities for over 14,000 people,¹ four-fifths of them community residents, usually minority group members who were often "excluded ... or handicapped in the race for getting ahead."² The new positions were of a professional and nonprofessional nature, and often provided their holders with their first opportunities for economic and social mobility.

These employment opportunities should not be looked upon simply as jobs. That is important, but so is another consequence, one that is frequently overlooked. The jobs provided an excellant opportunity to acquire administrative and other skills that are readily transferable to other fields. Sar Levitan was very much correct when he stated that "A major achievement of CAA's was that they offered young Negroes and representatives of other minority groups the opportunity to develop administrative and executive capabilities."³ Furthermore, minority group

1. Community Development Agency, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY (New York, Human Resources Administration, 1969), p. 4.

2. Robert Merton, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), p. 78.

3. Sar Levitan, THE GREAT SOCIETY'S POOR LAW (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1969), p.116.

employees in this area frequently view themselves as serving the interests of the minority community, interests which in the past were often overlooked.

While New York City's Government has generally provided minority group members with opportunities for employment, the poverty program is rather unique in that many of the higher level jobs in the field are held by Blacks and Puerto Ricans. For example, all three Council Chairmen have been Black, and the top five CDA positions during the time of this study were occupied by three Blacks and two Puerto Ricans. These same groups also dominated the administrative positions in neighborhood programs.

In making such top-level appointments as CDA Commissioner, it should be understood that to Blacks and Puerto Ricans the appointment was both a "recognition of their worth and a means of making increases in real power."¹ As a "recognition of their worth" the appointment may have had the significant although subtle consequence of defusing some of the potential for violence found in some ghettos by ameliorating the alienation of some residents. Thus, the appointment of a Black or Puerto Rican, which was usually well publicized in such ethnic oriented newspapers as EL DIARIO ~~AND~~ the AMSTERDAM NEWS, was a recognition of more than a group's worth. It was also a statement of the individual's potential. As such, it served to combat his alienation and reinforced his faith in the system by demonstrating that members of his group, including himself,

1. Theodore Lowi, AT THE PLEASURE OF THE MAYOR (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 7. Lowi observes, p. 199, that once a particular ethnic group becomes associated with the leadership of a specific agency, "future appointing authorities have difficulty avoiding" the appointment of a member of said group. On p. 5, he notes that an appointment to a key post is "one of the Mayor's handiest mechanisms for coopting support."

had an opportunity to move up to the City's highest positions.

As mentioned above, the Council contributed to lessening ethnic tensions by providing an orderly means for dividing up the limited available funds. It also did so by creating community corporations which functioned as arenas where ethnic groups could regularly communicate with one another. It is important to note here that while inter-group conflict was often present in the poverty program, this conflict frequently preceded the poverty program and was simply extended to it.

The poverty program has also served the poor in New York City by making the institutions that serve them increasingly sensitive to their needs. It has at times functioned as the voice of the poor, representing them before insensitive welfare, education, police and housing officials.¹ No longer are these officials able to ignore with impunity complaints of their constituents regarding such factors as delayed checks, brutality or housing violations.

Another achievement, one that is rather difficult to assess, is that minority group members gained access to and learned how to place demands upon key public officials. As Commissioner Owens stated, "I am committed to train the poor and socially alienated to make use of the regular channels of government."² Even if the poverty program was immediately abolished, these skilled community leaders would still be around making demands for their constituents.

Related to the above is the belief that at least some representatives of the poor came to realize that some members of "the establish-

1. Herbert Krosney, BEYOND WELFARE (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 247.

2. Unsigned, NEW YORK POST, February 13, 1971.

ment" genuinely supported the interests of the poor. Furthermore, the participation of indigenous people undoubtedly made them aware of the interrelatedness and complexity of the problems of the poor, and the difficulties that City officials had in dealing with them.

Besides minority group members gaining access to public officials, the latter also gained access to the former,¹ A channel of communication between government representatives and the City's ghettos was established. For some public officials it was probably the first time that they encountered "minority persons as peers."² This could lead to a better understanding by them of the problems of these groups and consequently in the policies of the offices they represent.

Another achievement of the Council administered poverty program is that it provided people with an opportunity to take part in decisions which affected their lives.³ In overseeing the establishment of community corporations and delegate agencies, the Council opened the way for participation by thousands of people, including many who were indigent. Thus approximately one-half of the 6500 members of local boards in New York City, a figure which was well above the Office of

1. Louis Zurcher, *POVERTY WARRIORS* (Austin: University of Texas, 1970), p. 378, notes that the Economic Opportunity Board opened "lines of communication."

2. *BEYOND WELFARE*, p. 249.

3. That individuals have the right to participate in decisions affecting themselves is consistent with the American ethos and exists independent of one's view regarding the effect of the participation. For example, according to Alan Altshuler, *COMMUNITY CONTROL* (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 71, "Americans from the start have placed /high value/ on citizen participation."

Economic Opportunity requirement, were poor.¹ Additionally, tens of thousands of others in New York and other cities participated in other ways, ranging from working as volunteers to voting in elections for local boards.² Given the absence of very direct incentives, as well as the fact that many of those who voted in elections or served on local boards had no tradition of such participation, this was not a minor accomplishment.

Although there is no hard data available, it is not unreasonable to conclude that in many cases, the opportunity to participate contributed to combating the alienation that so often accompanies being poor.³ In doing so, the individual's dissatisfaction with the system may be reduced. Thus Altshuler believes that, "Those most involved in organized protest

1. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY. Mayor Lindsay observed that the poverty program functioned as an escape valve for frustrated Negroes seeking political power. See, Richard Reeves, NEW YORK TIMES, February 25, 1968.

2. The total number of votes cast for the boards of directors of community corporations was over 60,000. See, Community Development Agency, COMMUNITY CORPORATION ELECTION MASTER PLAN (New York: CDA, 1969), pp. 31-32.

3. Many authors have mentioned the barriers preventing the poor from participating in the poverty program. Frances Piven argues that (among other factors) the hostility of established groups, and the lack of verbal skills serve as barriers to participation by the poor. See, Frances Piven, "Resident Participation in Poverty Programs: An Overview," in George A. Brager and Francis Purcell, eds., COMMUNITY ACTION AGAINST POVERTY (New Haven: College and University Press, 1967), pp. 151-160.

According to Francis X. Clines, NEW YORK TIMES, October 1, 1969, the median turnout in New York City's poverty elections was 4.5 per cent. In reviewing such figures it is necessary to maintain a proper perspective. Corporation elections are relatively new, receive little publicity and are not tied to other elections. Local school budget elections in financially better off areas often bring out low percentages of the eligible population. See, for example, Robert E. Agger and Marshall N. Goldstein, WHO WILL RULE THE SCHOOLS (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1971), esp. p. 156.

and political activity have been among the least to riot."¹ As a middle-aged woman on public assistance, who was a volunteer worker with young people in South Brooklyn stated in answer to the question, "What does the poverty program mean to you?", "It shows that the City cares for us. [Blacks] It is an opportunity for us [Blacks] to get ahead."²

The poverty program provided an opportunity for many people to acquire political sophistication and skills which will enable them to participate in the larger political arena. What we are saying is that many people who received their first taste of politics in the poverty arena now have the experience, knowledge, desire and background needed to participate in other areas of New York City's political life.³

Such increased political involvement by minority group members could potentially yield two positive results. The increased political visibility of minority group members tells the ghetto resident that members of his group, including himself or his family, are able to get ahead in the system. At the same time it may help bring about the end of the underrepresentation of minority group members in a whole range of elected offices.⁴ This is because the poverty program

1. See, COMMUNITY CONTROL, p. 206. Similarly, Haggstrom argues that participation in meaningful decision-making can combat the alienation of the poor. See, Warren Haggstrom, "The Power of the Poor," in Frank Reissman, et al., MENTAL HEALTH (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 205-23.

2. Personal notes, Council meeting, March 27, 1969.

3. MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, p. 129, suggests that the poverty program helped activate and establish Black leadership.

4. As of yet, few successful candidates for such positions as City Councilman received their initial experience in the poverty arena. One exception is Ramon Velez. See, John Darnton, NEW YORK TIMES, July 16, 1973.

contributed to the development of a leadership core among the previously politically weak and underrepresented.¹ While the significance of the latter is still in the realm of speculation, we believe, as Moynihan observes, that,

Tammany at its best (or worst) would have envied the political apprenticeship provided the neighborhood coordinator of the antipoverty program.²

Indeed, some have argued that in several poverty areas jobs were controlled by local officials and used by them as patronage.³

More immediately, the effect of the poverty program on other political arenas in New York City has been minimal. At this point we are unaware of important changes in City policy that have resulted from the efforts of the Council Against Poverty or the community corporations. While in theory neither the community corporations nor the Council may engage in direct political activity, educational efforts have been undertaken aimed at informing residents regarding issues in elections as well as how to register to vote. The extent to which these efforts took place varied considerably however from area to area.

One must view the increased political participation brought on by the

1. An important area of further research suggested by this study is an empirical examination of the extent to which the community action program served as a training ground for political leaders. At the same time, attempts should be made to determine the extent to which jobs in the poverty program served to provide residents with training which was useful in enabling them to move into other jobs in the private sector and traditional City departments or serve as paraprofessionals in schools or hospitals.

2. MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, p. 129.

3. See, Murray Schumacher, NEW YORK TIMES, March 27, 1971.

poverty program as an important step in achieving the long range goal of having all groups participate in the political arena to the fullest extent possible is probably correct. The poverty program's contribution to this goal is dual: it has been responsible for increased participation and helped create (because of its innovative nature) a momentum for resident participation in other areas which will also contribute towards raising the level of minority group participation.

The increase in minority participation is leading to a more significant handle on and exercise of political power by minority groups in New York City and elsewhere. While this process does not occur, without friction, it is viewed as a positive development for the danger of preventing its occurrence means more tension, alienation and destruction. Indeed, in the future attempts of minorities to gain control of many of the nation's cities, the poverty program may be viewed as the place where they received their initial impetus.

Decentralization

The basic question which we must address on decentralization is what are the implications of this study for a system of neighborhood government? That is, does the experience of the Council and the community corporations offer any suggestions that may be applied to such a system?

What becomes clear on the basis of this study is not that a particular form of decentralization is desirable, but that any restructuring of New York City's government which is aimed at initiating a form of neighborhood government must come to grips with certain fundamental factors. While it is somewhat difficult to generalize on the basis of this study to a broad system of neighborhood government because the poverty program was not

concerned with the whole City but rather with the poor who resided in defined areas, certain lessons are apparent. Before turning to these, it will first prove useful to review some relevant information regarding the poverty program.

The poverty program established a limited form of decentralization in that community corporations were given specific control over the spending of resources (the amount of which was determined by a Council established formula) directly or by one of their delegate agencies.¹ While the original goal was to have the community corporations coordinate services in a particular area, in point of fact this never effectively materialized.² Thus the years following the establishment of the community corporations witnessed the establishment of such separate structures as school boards, model cities, policy committees and urban action task forces.

The reasons for the failure of the community corporations to become neighborhood coordinators are varied. Local elections were frequently controversial and the elected boards were often charged by various groups as being unrepresentative.³ Somewhat related to this is that the poverty program in general and the community corporations in particular, frequently received adverse publicity resulting from fiscal irregularities.⁴ Both of these reasons, according to one source, gave "the program a bad

1. The formula was the fair share plan.

2. SVIRIDOFF REPORT, p. 15.

3. Murray Schumach, NEW YORK TIMES, March 27, 1971.

4. See for example, Clayton Knowles, NEW YORK TIMES, June 17, 1970 and Walter Rugaber, NEW YORK TIMES, February 20, 1969.

name."¹

One must also consider the fact that the community corporations did not cover the entire City and included less than forty per cent of its inhabitants. Thus if one sought an instrument of community participation for the entire City, the community corporations were handicapped from the start because of their geographical limitations. Lastly, some government officials in New York City, such as the Borough Presidents, had nothing to gain from an expansion of the role of community corporations. They had no appointments to these bodies, while the community boards provided them with an established community participation instrument whose membership they appointed.²

On the basis of this study, several implications for neighborhood government are clear. Firstly, the present system under which there are numerous boards and committees does allow for the participation of many different voices in the community. This in turn means that in most communities there are many opportunities to relieve local pressures. At the same time, this system also provided an opportunity for citizen-participants to become involved on a part-time basis while at the same time allowing them to become specialists in one particular area of concern. While some have criticized the current system of numerous districts lacking in coterminality as illogical, in the absence of clear evidence that coterminous districts will make the

1. James A. Krauskopf, "New York City's Anti-Poverty Program," CITY ALMANAC, December, 1972, p. 9.

2. "New York City's Anti-Poverty Program," p. 9.

delivery of services more effective, this system may not be as in need of reform as is sometimes argued.¹

Nevertheless, there is a significant thrust for a system of de-neighborhood government. In this study we saw that decentralization helped create an atmosphere in which intergroup tensions were easily able to surface. Broadly speaking, one result of the latter was that it helped prevent the formation of a Citywide coalition of the poor. Instead, the opportunity for such a movement was lost as various racial and ethnic groups competed with one another for available funds.

Because of the latter it is believed that where neighborhood governments do not cover a homogeneous population, they will lead to the surfacing of intergroup tensions. In order to make sure that the members of various racial and ethnic groups in a community are represented on the neighborhood board, it will probably be necessary to follow the experience of the community corporations and elect a percentage of the members while appointing the remainder. At the same time, the boundaries of districts will be drawn in all likelihood around homogeneous populations. This will encourage increased separation of different groups for where whites or others are in a minority in such districts, many of them will seek to move.²

In electing members to local boards it is important to secure as large a turnout of voters as is possible. The failure to do so makes

1. State Charter Revision Commission for New York City, REVISING THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER: INTRODUCTORY REPORT (New York: State Charter Revision Commission, 1972), p. 23, notes that it is undertaking a study of the "Feasibility of coterminous election districts."

2. Walter G. Farr, et al., DECENTRALIZING CITY GOVERNMENT (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 33.

elections susceptible to control by a relatively small percentage of voters, in some cases little more than the friends and relatives of board members and employees. Hence, it may be worthwhile to cease attempting to insulate community elections by holding them on special days and perhaps hold them during the regular election cycle. If the plethora of existing boards are to continue, it may be worthwhile to hold all community elections on the same day.

The members of local boards should be chosen in districts rather than in at-large elections. There are several reasons for taking this position. Obviously in a City with a population the size of New York's, a neighborhood will contain a minimum of 50,000-100,000 people. Hence, electing representatives in smaller districts will help ensure that each particular neighborhood in a district will be represented on the governing board. Additionally, it will make likely a more balanced representation in heterogeneous areas. Lastly, this system will prevent the domination of neighborhood governments by several well known individuals such as a handful of local businessmen.

The allocation of resources to the neighborhood districts will have to be determined by a strict formula similar to the Council's fair share formula. This does not mean that all districts will receive the same amount of funds. To the contrary, different amounts will be allocated depending upon local needs. However, unless an allocation formula is agreed upon at the outset of a citywide decentralization plan, the competition among districts for resources will in all likelihood doom any decentralization plan before it gets off the ground.

In this study we saw that the programs implemented by the community corporations varied considerably from area to area. While some corporations, especially in the early days, were concerned with recreation programs, others have developed and implemented complicated programs in housing development. For example, in 1972, 1823 units of new and 2303 units of rehabilitated housing were occupied as a result of efforts initiated by community corporations to provide housing for their communities.¹

From this it is clear that even under a decentralized system, there will be a need for central government supervision. For example, the Bureau of the Budget may be charged with monitoring the programs being implemented by neighborhood governments.

Personnel tenure, selection and advancement must also be governed by citywide rules. This does not mean to imply that existing civil service regulations should be retained. Rather, they should be revised so as to make them more flexible (one suggestion that will probably be considered is to provide a bonus to neighborhood residents). However, in order to prevent the development of a large scale patronage system that would include the appointment of unqualified personnel and the termination of employment of those viewed as dissenters, personnel practices will have to be governed by Citywide regulations. At the same time, this would be an important selling point that would help secure the backing of the powerful municipal unions.

One other implication should be mentioned, the fact that decentralization brings to the surface the problem of linkage between community

1. "Testimony of James E. Greenidge, Chairman, Council Against Poverty," before the sub-Committee on Employment, Poverty and Migratory Labor of the U.S. Senate, mimeo., May 7, 1973.

spokesmen and the downtown administrative apparatus.¹ Thus a decentralized system will in all likelihood create independent community voices.' Under a system of neighborhood governments, the Mayor may "no longer be able to speak as effectively for the City."² However, as the Mayor must seek financial assistance from higher levels of government, under whatever system is ultimately adopted it is important that he be viewed as the City's spokesman. This could prove especially significant in situations in which the Mayor's political party differs from the Governor's or President's.

One last comment, many of the numerous local boards found under the current system will very likely become foes of a more general system of neighborhood government if the thrust for major change moves out of the study stage and into the action stage. The reason for this is that such a system will lead to uncertainty regarding their future control over policy, program orientation and jobs. Hence, a conscious attempt to secure the backing of these boards will have to be made.

In summary, we have seen that decentralization does allow more people to participate in the political system (including those interests which were previously unrepresented or minimally represented) and distributes power more widely among different groups. Also, at times decentralization allows conflicts to be settled locally. While some may view the latter negatively in that it may fail to consider Citywide needs, it does at times yield expeditious settlements, encourages local people

1. In effect, another problem of linkage between the community and top public officials was that the latter infrequently attended Council meetings but were represented at them by their alternates.

2. DECENTRALIZING CITY GOVERNMENT, p. 33.

to participate in neighborhood matters and is conducive to the development of indigenous talents. Furthermore, decentralization provides minority group members with new and important opportunities to gain jobs, skills, social rewards, and power and hence encourages their entrance into the mainstream of American life.¹ All of this contributes to a decrease in their underrepresentation in all areas of political life and helps legitimate the system in their eyes.

At the same time, we feel that a word of caution is in order. Decentralization is not a panacea for all of the problems facing urban America. Moreover, it can be expected to introduce new problems that could "well vitiate its beneficial effects."² Any decentralization proposal must come to grips with these problems. The failure to do so may lead to impressive structural changes that have a limited capacity to produce benefits for urban residents.³

Recommendations

Several recommendations are presented here in the belief that in order to ensure that maximum feasible participation occurs, Council members should represent all of the poor and engage in broad discussions and present diverse views on matters before that body. These recommenda-

1. It should be clear that it may require a long time before a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of the decentralized community action program can be completed. This is not to suggest that more immediate evaluations may not be made. Rather, it is being suggested that it may take years before one can adequately determine such ramifications of decentralization as its effects on the development of political leadership.

2. DECENTRALIZING CITY GOVERNMENT, p. 37.

3. While some of these problems were reviewed here, a more comprehensive examination of them may be found in COMMUNITY CONTROL AND DECENTRALIZING CITY GOVERNMENT.

tions contain certain assumptions. One is that funding for the community action program will continue.¹ A second is that the basic structure of the City's poverty program, including the CAP, community corporations, and delegate agencies will remain basically unchanged under the new Mayor.² Third, the State Charter Revision Commission for New York City will not come up with a comprehensive decentralization plan that will, among other things, substitute a new structure for the CAP and the community corporations. Additionally, it is to be noted that these recommendations are interrelated and none by itself will have a major impact on the Council's operations.³ Taken together, however, they will help meet the goals outlined above.

The first recommendation concerns the need to get rid of some of the "deadwood" on the Council.⁴ This is best exemplified by the high rate of absenteeism. Thus the average attendance at the four meetings in which the actions examined in this study were made, was twenty-nine members or fifty-six per cent of the total. This means that an average of twenty-two members or forty-four per cent of the membership were absent from each meeting.

1. See below, Epilogue.

2. Interestingly enough, during the course of the 1973 Mayoral campaign, none of the candidates for Mayor made any references to the poverty program.

3. The recommendations of the State Charter Revision Commission for New York City must be approved by New York City's voters.

4. Since 1972, the post of Council Chairman has been a full time position paying an annual salary of \$25,000.

While perfect or near perfect attendance is an unrealistic expectation in such a body, it is hard to see how members who attend so infrequently can perform any useful functions. Article 11, Section 6 of the BY-LAWS specifies that members absent "from three consecutive meetings without satisfactory explanation," should be expelled.¹ Continued absence should lead to expulsion, perhaps accompanied by some publicity. For example, in the case of an area delegate, a news release should be sent to a neighborhood newspaper.² This might serve as a negative inducement to attend meetings. It is felt however that the threat of expulsion would be enough to get the Council member involved to either resign or attend meetings on a more regular basis.

A second recommendation in the area of attendance only applies to City officials. It is recognized that extraordinary demands are placed on their time in terms of political meetings, speaking engagements and problems that must be handled on an emergency basis. It is recommended that City officials and not their alternates attend a minimum of four meetings a year. This would give each Council member greater access to City officials and might lead to an increase in the attendance of both representatives of private organizations and community representatives because of an opportunity to receive a kind of status reward by mingling with key public officials.

1. In effect this may be interpreted to mean that a member may miss two out of every three consecutive meetings without a satisfactory explanation.

2. A problem related to absenteeism is that some Council members leave shortly after their attendance is taken. There is no viable solution to this problem other than perhaps having the secretary note in the COUNCIL MINUTES the time members leave meetings.

In order to get increased discussion and closer examination and analysis by the Council, it will be necessary to increase the length of Council meetings. But Council meetings are already too long. The reader will recall that the Council decision withdrawing recognition was voted on at 2A.M. This means that Council members were voting on a very important issue when they were probably physically exhausted from a sevenhour work day and a Council meeting of approximately the same length.

The only way to have adequate time for discussion and debate is to increase the number of Council meetings. This sounds rather contradictory if attendance is already low. However, if a satisfactory financial incentive was made available to non-City officials, they might well find the time to attend the extra meetings. Additionally, one must recall that there are dedicated members who would likely welcome extra meetings.

The possibility of a more thorough examination by Council members of the various questions before it would be enhanced if Council members had a better opportunity to become familiar with events that are discussed at Council meetings. It is therefore recommended that the tentative agenda for a meeting, plus all supporting documents and reports, must be in the hands of Council members at least a week before a meeting. This should give them enough time to become familiar with an evening's proceedings. It is further recommended that the night of a meeting, the tentative agenda be approved, as is presently the case, by a majority vote. Other items, that is those not listed on the tentative agenda, would require the approval of a two-thirds vote.

The next recommendation is concerned more directly with the executive

directors of the community corporation. This is undoubtedly the key position on the community level and requires executive, administrative and political skills. The executive director must be able to appease the various factions on the board of directors because his tenure, in a very real sense, depends on their continued approval. In the South Jamaica case, we saw that an intraBoard dispute led to the dismissal of the executive director. Ultimately, this was discussed at three Council meetings and literally thousands of man hours were spent trying to come up with a solution to this problem.

The implementation of a simple recommendation would make ~~unlikely~~ the repetition of affairs of this nature. When hired, the executive director should be given a contract stipulating the specific period of time for which the corporation agrees to purchase his services. Any alleged violation of this contract could then be remedied in the courts. There would be no need for the Council to get involved in any more South Jamaica type situations.

In spite of the fact that it does not appear likely that the Council will undergo any drastic membership changes in the immediate future, a word on the training of Council members is in order. The little training that Council members receive is provided by the full time staff. This training, is "aimed at transforming the community representatives into the staff's image of good board members."¹ Perhaps Council members, especially inexperienced community representatives, would be better off if they were trained by an outside organization. This training should go beyond such basic information as the determination of area allocations and include an understanding of the role

1. THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION IN POVERTY, p. 129.

staff plays in policy-making, as well as strategies that may be followed in gaining influence.

Turning to the election of members of the boards of directors of community corporations, in the last Chapter it was observed that as a result of nondecision-making the white poor were frequently underrepresented on these boards. Hence we believe that some adjustment must be made in the election system. One method which we feel could prove useful is the adoption of a system of proportional representation as suggested by George H. Hallett of the Citizen's Union.¹ It is felt that under this system every minority within a community would be more likely to elect its fair share of representatives to a corporation's board of directors. To those who feel that proportional representation would institutionalize bloc voting, it is clear that this is now informally the case in most areas where more than one ethnic group is located. While this suggestion would add whites to boards of directors of community corporations, it might also lessen the Black-Puerto Rican rivalries that peak during election periods.

A second suggestion in this area is to implement the Council's Racial and Ethnic Balance Plan. Perhaps the best way to do so is to have the Mayor revise the Executive Order establishing the structure of the Council so that the Council Chairman would annually be expected to present a report to the Mayor on how the Racial and Ethnic Balance Plan was implemented in the last year. We believe that the mandating of such publicity would encourage efforts to implement this Plan.

1. George H. Hallett, "Memorandum on Proportional Representation for Community Corporation Elections," March 29, 1968, mimeo.

Another suggestion concerns the date chosen for elections of Boards of Directors of Community Corporations. In the last Chapter we saw that recent legislation mandated that elections be held on weekdays. In 1972, these were conducted in the summer. We believe that this was a poor choice because the summer is a period of tension in poverty areas and because poverty elections frequently exacerbate intergroup conflict. It is therefore suggested that future elections be held sometime in the early spring when tensions are lower, the weather is nice and there is no conflict with other elections.

The boundaries of community corporations should be ~~wid~~ drawn. For example, in the Borough of Queens there are more people on public assistance outside of poverty areas than within them.¹ It is therefore necessary to revise corporation boundaries taking into consideration the most current available data.

Lastly, from a programmatic perspective, it is clear that both the community corporations and the Council have found it difficult to eliminate programs that were marked by a low level of performance. The reason for this is that various groups within the community had a vested interest in the continued refunding of specific programs. Thus for the corporation or the Council to have attempted to eliminate a program was to initiate a community struggle. It is therefore recommended that the Council make a serious effort to implement the suggestions made by outside evaluators regarding program renewal or discontinuance. Such evaluations could naturally be appealed to the Council.

1. Abraham C. Burstein, NEW YORK CITY COMMUNITY CORPORATION AREAS (New York: Human Resources Administration, 1972), p. 24.

In conclusion, we believe that just as many members of the white community need to become sensitized to the needs of the Black community, so too do many whites and Blacks need to become sensitized to the needs of the white poor. Instead, what occurred in the poverty program is that many whites and Blacks usually defined the latter as legitimate participants. Had it been clear that the poverty program was aimed at helping all of the poor, then it is possible that it would have gotten the political and financial support needed to become a war on poverty. Hopefully, such mistakes will not be repeated.

Epilogue

President Nixon's proposed budget for fiscal 1974, if implemented, would reverse the Federal government's impetus towards an emerging, although still limited, pattern of federalism that established a new mixture of actors in a new decision-making environment. We refer here to the fact that the Federal system, as a result of the community participation provisions in the Economic Opportunity Act and the Demonstration Cities Act has been expanding from what one scholar called a three partner system to a four partner system which includes the local community.¹ However, the proposed budget would end Federal funding for both the community action and the model cities programs.

The Nixon Administration's dissatisfaction with OEO is clear. It transferred Job Corps to the Department of Labor, merged Vista with the Peace Corps and is placing Legal Services in a public corporation

1. Roscoe Martin, *THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM* (New York: Atherton, 1965), p. 175.

Additionally, as a NEW YORK TIMES editorial of September 27, 1971 noted, in the three previous years OEO has had three directors, each "less visible than his predecessor." It has since had two more.

The current status of future Federal funding of the community action program is as follows: while the Nixon Administration's proposed budget for fiscal 1974 calls for dismantling OEO and eliminating funding for community action, on April 11, 1973, a United States District Court Judge called the efforts to dismantle OEO "illegal" and ordered their curtailment.¹ More recently, the House approved an authorization for fiscal 1974 with the Senate due to act shortly. It is believed that the President would not impound or veto funds appropriated for community action because of his unwillingness to further exacerbate tensions with Congress during the Watergate investigation.

If the foregoing review of the budget question is correct, then one might expect the continued operation of the poverty program as another arena of decision-making. In the event that it is incorrect, it is believed that the poverty program will continue to operate in large cities, although on a smaller level, as it is funded out of local funds.

1. See, Bill Kovach; NEW YORK TIMES, April 12, 1973

APPENDIX 1

PROCEDURE WHEREBY REPRESENTATIVE GROUPS OF THE POOR WHICH FEEL THEMSELVES INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON THE COUNCIL AGAINST POVERTY MAY PETITION FOR ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION

1. Any group consisting of 1,000 persons or more which feels itself inadequately represented on the Council Against Poverty may present to the Council Against Poverty a statement that it wishes the Council Against Poverty to be expanded by the addition of persons represented in the group.

2. This statement shall be addressed to the Council Against Poverty, 100 Church St., New York, New York.

3. ,This statement shall specify:

- a) The identity of the group presenting the statement.
- b) That the group has adopted the statement.
- c) That it has authorized presentation of the Statement to the Council Against Poverty.
- d) That the group has 1,000 or mote members.
- e) That its members are predominantly poor persons.
- f) That the members have a common characteristic germane to the problems of poverty and found among many other poor persons (including but not limited to age or ethnic characteristics).
- g) That the characteristic which this group has in common is either totally absent or inadequately present among the members of the Council Against Poverty who are representatives of the poor.

This statement must be supported by affidavits and appropriate statistical data from reliable sources.

4. At the next regular meeting after receipt of this statement the Council Against Poverty shall constitute a committee to evaluate the accuracy of the statement. The committee shall be instructed to make a recommendation for action to the Council Against Poverty at its second regular monthly meeting after receipt of the statement.

5. The evaluation committee report shall be on the agenda of said meeting of the Council, Against Poverty which shall act upon the recommendations of the committee. Failure of the Council Against Poverty to act at this meeting shall be deemed acceptance of the statement.

6. a) ACCEPTANCE

Upon acceptance by the Council Against Poverty a recommendation shall be made to the Mayor of the City of New York to appoint sufficient additional members to the Council Against Poverty so that the proportion of people having the above described common characteristic among the representatives of the poor on the Council Against Poverty approximates the proportion of people having this characteristics among the total poverty population.

b) REJECTION

Upon rejection by the Council Against Poverty a letter shall be written to the petitioning group informing it of the rejection. A copy of this letter, the committee report and the statement shall be sent to the Regional Office of Economic Opportunity.

APPENDIX 11

TABLE OF INTERVIEWS*

Frank Arricale, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity

Richard Aurelio, Deputy Mayor, New York City

Joel Barkan, Assistant Administrator, Region 11 (Northeast), Office of Economic Opportunity

David Billings, Chairman, Council Against Poverty

Harding Bowman, Member, Council Against Poverty

Carol Capezzi, Special Assistant to the Commissioner of the Community Development Agency

Roland Cintron, Member, Council Against Poverty

Eldon Clingan, Member, Council Against Poverty

Felix Cosmey, Deputy Commissioner, Community Development Agency

James Dumpson, Commissioner of Welfare

Julius C.C. Edelstein, Executive Assistant to Mayor Robert F. Wagner

Lewis Feldstein, Member, Council Against Poverty

Dennis Gardner, Member, Council Against Poverty

Vaughn Gearan, Director of Legal Services, Region 11, Office of Economic Opportunity

Sholem B. Gorodetsky, Member, Council Against Poverty

Edwin Greenidge, Chairman, Council Against Poverty

Micho

Michael Hazen, Community Development Agency Staff

Joseph Holdamph, Program Planning Department, Community Development Agency

Farrell Jones, Deputy Administrator, Human Resources Administration

Maxwell Lehman, Deputy Mayor-City Administrator, New York City

*Many of those listed were interviewed on more than one occasion. In two cases the interviews were not of a formal nature but were small meetings in which the author participated.

Sol Levy, Chairman, Williamsburg Community Corporation

Peter Lugo, Member, Council Against Poverty

James McCarthy, Civil Rights Investigator, Office of Economic Opportunity

Alice McFadden, Private Sectors Liaison Officer, Office of Economic Opportunity

Joseph Neumann, Member, Council Against Poverty

Carmelo Negron, Member, Council Against Poverty

Major Owens, Commissioner, Community Development Agency

Cleo Pearson, Executive Director, Tremont Community Corporation

Froilo Rivera, Member, Lower East Side Community Corporation

Charles Rodriguez, Member, Council Against Poverty

Alex Rosen, Dean, New York University School of Social Work

Jerry Schatz, Director of Personnel Training, Community Development Agency

Paul Screvane, President, City Council of New York

Herb Singer, Member, Council Against Poverty

Jule Sugarman, Member, Council Against Poverty

Celia Vice, Member, Williamsburg Community Corporation

Wanda Watson, District Officer, Community Development Agency

Bernard Weinberger, Member, Community Development Agency

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