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Ovryn Rivera, Rachel Jo

A QUESTION OF CONSCIENCE: THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

City University of New York

Ph.D. 1987

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A QUESTION OF CONSCIENCE: THE EMERGENCE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES

by

RACHEL OVRYN RIVERA

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York.

1987

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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For my father, friend and teacher:

Dr. Robert Ovryn

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Preface

In early December 1983 a group of North Americans in Tucson, Arizona came together in a house in the desert to discuss how to help a family of Salvadoran refugees in Mexico. The family needed assistance in crossing the border into the United States. At this meeting the North Americans learned that the family had fled El Salvador after the father was released from a government prison. Although charged with no crime he had been kept in the prison for over a month during which time he was brutally tortured. Badly beaten, deprived of food and water he had left the prison weighing sixty pounds with his ribs and skull broken. As soon as he had strength to walk he fled El Salvador with his wife, four children and his mother in search of refuge in the United States.

Based on this information and their knowledge of social and political conditions in El Salvador and Mexico the North Americans decided that they would help the family to cross the Sonora desert into the United States. Because the family had not obtained permission from the U.S. government to enter the United States they would have to enter the country clandestinely. If they were caught by border officials they would be locked up in a U.S. detention center where they would be processed for deportation. Their chances of receiving political asylum were very slight. Between 1980 and 1985 the U.S.

Immigration and Naturalization Service had denied over 99.3% of Salvadoran applications. If the Americans were caught they too risked imprisonment for helping "illegal aliens."

In a house near the border the Salvadoran family waited for the North Americans who were going to help them enter the United States. Earlier the family had learned, from church activists in Mexico, that these were "sanctuary activists", North American Christians who were willing to help them enter the United States even though they did not have the documents they needed to come into the country. They were told that these North Americans were willing to help them because they believed that their government was morally and legally wrong in denying Salvadorans and Guatemalans refuge from the persecution and war they faced in their homelands and that as religious people they felt a moral obligation to help these refugees. They were told that a national network of religious people existed designed to help Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees find refuge in the United States and that congregations all over the United States were offering "sanctuary" in their churches and homes to these refugees.

The following week two members of the Tucson group prepared to make the trip. They would enter Mexico together. Three days later they would return with the

family. They bought enough food to avoid making stops along the way. They carried money for gas and expenses in Mexico, water, sleeping bags and American made clothing for the family. Saturday afternoon they left for Mexico in a pickup truck that had been donated to the group by a Quaker couple in Tucson. Late that night they arrived at the house where the family was staying. They were introduced to the family by a local priest. Almost immediately they began to discuss the details of the trip. Each member of the family was asked to remove all traces of their Central American origins. The labels from their clothing were removed and they exchanged any Central American style clothing for North American style garments. Their personal documents and property, including photographs, were left behind and later picked up by a group of North Americans who brought them safely across the border. They were told that it would be wise if they also changed their names. This way, if they got caught family members would not be harmed by affiliation.

The family was told that the trip would be long and hard and that the risks would be high on both sides of the border. The first phase of the trip would be the drive from the house to a location in the desert within walking distance of the border. The second phase would involve walking across the desert to the border fence.

This would be one of the most dangerous parts of the trip because INS planes flew overhead, there was electronic surveillance along the fence and the constant risk of foot patrols by U.S. and Mexican border officials. The children would have to be completely silent. The third phase would involve slipping under the border fence where a second group of North Americans would walk with the family across another stretch of desert to waiting cars. The last phase would be the long drive back to Tucson. This part of the trip was also dangerous because U.S. border officials patrolled all the major roads and highways leading from the border in their attempts to prevent people without U.S. entry documents, whom they identified as "illegal aliens", from entering the country. But if all went well, less than twenty-four hours later they would be having dinner in a church in Tucson, temporarily protected from INS apprehension and detention. The family was told that the members of the church were part of a movement of congregations which had emerged in 1982 as members of the religious community became increasingly committed to supporting, protecting and advocating for the Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugee community. Because these congregations offered sanctuary to refugees in their places of worship the movement had become known as the "sanctuary movement" and the people involved were known as "sanctuary activists."

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Part One

When the church has to break the law in order to provide refuge for homeless people, the struggle for justice has reached a new stage. Now the pastoral has merged with the political, service is prophetic and love is a subversive activity.

Reverend Sid Mohn, Wellington United Church of Christ, Chicago, Illinois, 1982.

Introduction

This book describes the emergence and development of the sanctuary movement. It tells the story of the congregations, denominations, and above all the courageous individuals who were responsible for building and sustaining that movement. It examines and explains how in six years members of the religious community were able to transform what began as an isolated group of socially concerned religious people into a major national movement and social force in American society. It gives voice to Christians and Jews, motivated by belief and commitment, who felt compelled to challenge and resist the policies and actions of their government in order to be faithful to their religion and religious values.

I had the privilege of participating in and observing the sanctuary movement for four years, beginning in 1983. This book is based on those years. Four steady years of work in the sanctuary movement, interviewing members and leaders throughout the United States, reading all of the documents produced by the movement and by the mass media, observing and taping congregations as members debated whether they should join the movement, closely following the government's case against the movement, sitting in on meetings to discuss the range of legal strategies which could be used

defend sanctuary activists, interviewing attorneys involved in their defense, attending religious consultations on sanctuary, conducting interviews with Central Americans in the sanctuary movement in Spanish, taping panel discussions, workshops, public meetings, lectures and informal conversations about the sanctuary movement in both English and Spanish, participating in movement activities, reading letters and internal documents and over two hundred interviews with founders, leaders and members of the sanctuary movement.

The term "sanctuary movement" refers to a movement which formally emerged in the United States in 1982. But the first stirrings of what was to become the U.S. sanctuary movement can be traced to 1980 when North American Christians became aware that refugees from El Salvador seeking asylum in the United States were being detained and deported to their homelands despite widespread persecution and generalized conditions of war. Frustrated and disillusioned with their government's refusal to offer asylum to these refugees, individual North American Christians began to directly assist individual refugees who were detained by the INS. Gradually they became involved in helping those who had not yet been discovered to avoid INS capture, detention and deportation and to publicly address the immorality of their government's decision to deport refugees.

As a coordinated whole the sanctuary movement involved members of the religious community in an elaborate network which functioned to assist undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in crossing the border from Mexico into the United States. Because this network was devoted to clandestinely moving refugees throughout the United States it came to be called the "underground railroad", in memory of the abolitionist network that moved slaves from the South to the North.

In both Mexico and the United States members of the religious community provided Central American refugees with temporary shelter until they could be moved to a church where a congregation had agreed to offer them more permanent refuge. This congregation would provide the refugees with a place to live and a small stipend to cover living expenses. They would also provide them with a base from which to speak to the North American public about their reasons for seeking asylum in the United States.

Even before the formal emergence of the sanctuary movement North American Christians committed to directly helping undocumented Central American refugees find refuge in the United States were aware that their activities were perceived as illegal by their government. Nevertheless, they felt morally compelled to help these refugees. Jim Corbett, a deeply committed Quaker and one

of the founders of the sanctuary movement explained:

Because the U.S. government takes the position that aiding undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees is a felony we have no middleground between collaboration and resistance...For those of us who would be faithful in our allegiance to the Kingdom of God there is also no way to avoid recognition that in this case collaboration with the U.S. government is a betrayal of our faith...Where oppression rules the way of peace necessarily means resistance.

For Jews and Christians the tradition of sanctuary has a long history. At different times and in different places the significance of sanctuary has taken on new meaning. Linguistically sanctuary has always meant "holy place", where people of faith congregation to pray, sing, hear and read the scriptures and worship. Physically the sanctuary is a holy place, set apart from the rest of the world. Sanctuary has also meant "place of refuge and protection." In the Old Testament sanctuaries were places where people were given protection from avengers. Cities of refuge are mentioned frequently and served the purpose of preventing acts of vengeance by offering physical protection to those in need. In Roman Law, Medieval Canon Law and English Common Law the concept of church sanctuary was recognized by the State as a place of refuge for those who would suffer loss of life or due process without it.

Within U.S. history the sanctuary movement has antecedents in the abolitionist movement, the civil rights movement and the peace movement. Like members of the abolitionist movement sanctuary activists were religious activists committed to providing direct assistance to persecuted people. Their significant use of an underground railroad also links the sanctuary movement to the abolitionist movement. Like the civil rights movement the sanctuary movement was highly organized. Activists and leaders made significant use of the religious community, congregational leadership and existing religious organizations to accomplish their goals. Like religious activists in the peace movement sanctuary activists utilized the religious tradition of sanctuary to offer physical protection to those in need. During the Vietnam War draft resisters and AWOL servicemen were given sanctuary in churches throughout the United States. Though these sanctuaries were not respected by the State they symbolized the religious community's moral opposition to the war and punishment of those who refused to serve in that war.

The passions aroused in the debate over the sanctuary movement in the United States suggest that there was more to the movement than simply helping Central American refugees cross the border into the United States to offer

sanctuary to individual refugees. The strategy of offering public sanctuary to people whom the federal government considered to be "illegal aliens" quickly became an effective symbol for articulating a wide range of concerns in the religious community. The movement provided North American Christians with an arena for expressing their moral outrage and disillusionment with their government's domestic and foreign policy decisions. In this way the sanctuary movement was part of a larger political phenomenon known as the "Central America solidarity movement". In many ways the sanctuary movement became the most organized expression of that larger movement. It was the sanctuary movement which brought national attention to the Central American refugee problem within the context of U.S. intervention in the region. Nevertheless, members of the sanctuary movement saw their movement as separate from the solidarity movement and they felt that they were motivated to help refugees for different reasons than members of the solidarity movement. Sanctuary activists consistently explained that in contrast to other activists they were motivated by traditional religious/moral values rather than political reasoning. Yet despite their insistence that the movement was "not political", because the sanctuary movement explicitly addressed government foreign as well as domestic policies, it was consistently

perceived of as pursuing political as well as humanitarian goals, generating much debate and controversy in the religious community, the political arena and the sanctuary movement itself.

Despite the fact that the sanctuary movement was controversial, between 1982 and 1986 congregations all over the United States, from Seattle, Washington to Weston Priory, Vermont, declared their places of worship to be sanctuaries for refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala, challenging the U.S. government to change its domestic refugee policy. These congregations received institutional support from twenty-eight national denominational bodies, including the Presbyterians, Quakers, Mennonites, Methodists, Lutherans, Reformed Jews, Disciples of Christ, United Church of Christ and several Catholic orders. Publically the sanctuary movement led the campaign to protect undocumented refugees from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

By 1986 twenty-two city councils declared their cities to be "sanctuaries" for refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala and the governor of New Mexico declared his whole state a sanctuary. These were not simply symbolic gestures. City officials and public service employees in police departments, hospitals, welfare agencies, departments of motor vehicles and other city offices were

instructed not to inform the INS about Salvadorans and Guatemalans without U.S. entry documents. In 1986 Oakland, California included South Africans in its sanctuary declaration, an indication of the sanctuary movement's capacity and potential to help many refugees populations in the United States.

Throughout the United States members of the sanctuary movement adopted, developed and taught political organizing and protest skills to members of the religious community. They made acceptable the idea of breaking the government's law for higher laws. They brought the theologies of liberation and the preferential option for the poor, both considered to be radical theologies, into congregations which had previously been considered conservative.

The movement also served as the arena for some of the best leaders and scholars in the religious community, Robert McAfee Brown, John Elliot, Marta Benavides, Jim Wallis, Jim Corbett, Gary MacEoin, Felipe Ixcot, John Fife, and hundreds of others who continued to work for social change in Central America, writing, speaking, organizing, researching, traveling and teaching. But more than anything else the sanctuary movement made an impact on the lives of thousands of North Americans. Teaching them, as one member put it, "that risking one's secure

position in society in order to help others whose lives are much more precariously balanced is infinitely more socially valuable and personally satisfying than the immense social and personal costs of protecting that position."

Chapter One

The Foot People

They are called the "foot people". They come across the border of the United States from Mexico, pooling their resources and risking life and limb. Still, the situation they are leaving behind is so intolerable that they find the risk worth taking. Their numbers cannot be calculated accurately, but calculations in early 1984 by relief agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) suggested that 500,000 was a conservative estimate. These are Central American refugees coming from Guatemala and El Salvador, where civil wars are raging. *

Between 1980 and 1986 more than one million Central American refugees fled their homelands in search of refuge from raging civil wars and government repression (2). Almost all were from El Salvador or Guatemala. The majority sought asylum in Mexico and the United States (3). Fleeing political turmoil an exodus of refugees crossed the border between Mexico and the United States in a desperate search for safety and protection. For decades government repression has been an endemic feature of the political scene in Central America and the costs of pervasive violence have been painfully high. Since the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador a tide of blood has flowed from the region. Between 1980-1985 more than 45,000 Salvadorans were killed in the continuing conflict in El Salvador, most of them unarmed civilians. In Guatemala thousands of indigenous

* Melville, Margarita. "Salvadorans and Guatemalans" in Refugees in the United States. Ed. David Hines, Greenwood Press: Connecticut, 1985:

Indians were massacred by the military. Thousands more were forced off their lands and into exile (4).

The decision to leave one's homeland is always difficult. But fleeing under conditions of war and persecution in desperate search of refuge is particularly traumatic. One has to evade detection, sell possessions, accumulate money to make arrangements for illegal crossing of borders and leave family behind (5). Fleeing for refuge and safety one suddenly becomes a "refugee", an "exile". Rare statuses which signify being forced out, homeless. Refugees rarely know where they will end up and they never know when they will be able to go home again. Exiled from Uruguay, Eduardo Galliano, described how fragile is the experience of fleeing one's country in search of refuge:

I lost quite a few things...Due to the rush or to bad luck, no ones knows where they ended up... I left with a few clothes and a handful of papers. I don't complain. With so many people lost, to cry over things is to lack a respect for pain. Gypsy life. Things are next to me but then they disappear I have them by night, I lose them by day... Our entwined bodies change position while we sleep, shifting this way and that..."No, No," you explain thinking you are awake."We are no longer there, We moved to another country while we slept (6).

Because Mexico lies so close to both El Salvador and Guatemala and because of its worldwide reputation as an asylum country, throughout the 1980s thousands of

Salvadorans and Guatemalans sought asylum in Mexico (7). But only a tiny minority who managed to cross the borders of their homelands into Mexico found refuge there. In Mexico refugees were forced to choose between life in the cities where it was almost impossible for them to find work or life in overcrowded, poverty-stricken, fenced-in refugee camps (8).

Life in any refugee camp is terrible, but one of the worst aspects of life in the refugee camps in Central America and Mexico was the lack of security. Human rights groups documented repeated invasions by military forces into refugee camps in Honduras and Mexico. In March 1984, for example, Guatemalan soldiers entered the Pena Rosada refugee camp in Las Margaritas, Mexico. Claiming that they were searching for "subversives" they killed one child and abducted seven adults, six women and one man. In October of that year Guatemalan soldiers were ferried into the El Recuerdo refugee camp where they shot at refugees and pursued them twelve kilometers farther into Mexico. Afterwards the soldiers returned to the camp, robbed its huts and stores and destroyed what little else was in it (9). *

In 1980, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees characterized persons who were leaving or who

 * Guatemalan Refugees in Mexico Americas Watch Committee, September 1984

had left El Salvador and Guatemala beginning in 1979 to be in a "refugee-like-situation" because of generalized conditions of war and persecution in both countries. Both the United Nations 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees stipulate "no forced return" under conditions of war and/or persecution (10). Therefore, people from El Salvador and Guatemala were not to be involuntary returned to their homelands.

Yet beginning in 1980 the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service began to systematically deport Salvadorans and Guatemalans to their homelands, despite the fact that extensive documentation existed which linked deportation to a great likelihood of harm to those returned to El Salvador and Guatemala (11). Categorizing both Salvadorans and Guatemalans as "economic migrants" and "illegal aliens", based on State Department recommendations, the Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted and enforced a policy to apprehend, detain and deport both refugee populations (12). Legal entry into the United States was completely cut off and thousands of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who chose to continue on to the United States with hopes of finding refuge there were forced to endure the nightmare of clandestine entry.

The border between Mexico and the United States is approximately 2,000 miles long. More than 750 miles of barren, abandoned desert in Arizona and California, 800 miles of brush and rushing river in Texas. It is the territory of bandits and "coyotes" (professional smugglers) who prey on migrants and refugees. The desert is filled with an abundance of cacti and brush, vegetation which provide hardly any shelter from the sun. During the summer months when no water is available temperatures can soar to 150* during the day, then become freezing at night.

On both sides the border is patrolled by armed immigration officials hired to prevent people without U.S. entry papers from entering the United States. Checkpoints are positioned on most major roads and highways. Helicopters equipped with searchlights and radar constantly fly overhead. Armed members of the Border Patrol, Mexican and North American, search the area intermittently on horseback or on foot, often accompanied by dogs (13). In 1985 attorneys who worked with refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala reported:

...enforcement priorities (included) the creation of the Border Patrol Tactical Unit or Bortac, an elite squadron equipped with helicopters, infrared night-sensing scopes, high powered rifles, and advanced training in counterinsurgency tactics. Bortac is to be used in "border emergencies" which the INS has failed to define with any precision (14).

The route north to the United States through Central America and Mexico is difficult for undocumented refugees. They travel in constant fear that they will be apprehended and deported to the persecution and war they are fleeing. Even under the best of conditions crossing the border clandestinely is a terrifying ordeal. In order to cross the border from Mexico into the United States most undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans depended upon professional smugglers called "coyotes", people familiar with the border terrain who earn money by clandestinely crossing people over the border. To pay a coyote most Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees had to sell what few possessions they had. Families were often separated, either because they did not have enough money for everyone in the family to cross all at once or because coyotes refused to cross with more than a certain number of people at one time. Those refugees who chose to cross the border on their own were completely dependent upon information supplied by people they met along the way. Undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees who crossed the Mexican/U.S. border with hopes of not being detected by the Border Patrol, with or without the assistance of coyotes, were forced to walk across the desert, cross the river by foot or in tires, crowd into trucks or buses where they hid under boards

or objects, stuffed themselves into the trunks of cars. Those who chose to pay smugglers to assist them were at the mercy of coyotes who routinely abandoned their clients if they sensed that members of the Border Patrol are near, asked for more money in the middle of the journey and sexually abused women and young girls (15).

INS enforcement abuses were commonplace. A wave of assaults was unleashed against undocumented people. Not just at the border, which according to the National Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights has "always been a free firezone" (16), but in undocumented communities throughout the United States. There are still no accurate figures on INS abuses against undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans. By their very nature they cannot be measured. The media uncovered instances regularly but often failed to report them. Witnesses and victims were so terrified of discovery and deportation that they frequently refused to testify because authorities can and did deport witnesses. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that between 1980 and 1986 the INS used excessive force, intimidation, abusive and even fatal tactics when dealing with undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans. People who worked to protect the rights of undocumented people on the border regularly reported an escalation in the number and ferocity of INS

assaults. By 1986 attorneys working to defend the rights of Central American refugees began to refer to the border as "militarized". According to a 1985 report put out by the Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights:

It is an escalation reminiscent of the roundups of Mexican-Americans during the forties and fifties when masses of citizens were deported and the waves of anti-Asian sentiment that have recurred since the 1880s...Official attacks on immigrants rights by conservative forces in the courts, the Congress, the Administration, the state and city legislatures, become even more ominous in this context because they whip up a climate of anti-immigrant hysteria and condone, even if implicitly, the "excesses" of immigration police. The shooting last June (1985) of Mexicans bathing in the Rio Bravo, by self-appointed Texas vigilantes, should be seen in this light (17).

Yet despite these obstacles hundreds of thousands of undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees entered the United States clandestinely between 1980-1986. None had the luxury of resting when they finally arrived. Those who had not yet been discovered lived in constant fear of discovery, detention and deportation. Because the government considered them to be "illegal" undocumented Central American refugees were continually deprived of their civil rights. They were routinely exploited by employers and routinely paid below the minimum wage. They were frequently denied access to health care facilities, including hospitals, and were not eligible to apply for public assistance.

Those who are picked up for "illegal entry" were customarily taken to prisons, jails and detention centers to be "processed". Substantial documentation exists which proves that Salvadorans and Guatemalans were unfairly treated when detained. Uninformed of their rights they were systematically robbed of their right to due process, frequently unable to make phone calls to attorneys or receive visitors, and routinely coerced into signing voluntary departure forms which gave the INS the right to deport them to their homelands without an immigration hearing. The conditions of their detention were never humane. In 1986 the Task Force for the National Day of Justice for Immigrants and Refugees reported that assaults on detainees at the INS Krome Avenue detention center in Florida included:

detainees shackled to beds, fed food that makes them gag, denied toilet paper, showers or mattresses, and forced to sign "voluntary departure forms" through harassment or solitary confinement (18).

Salvadorans and Guatemalans who were fortunate enough to obtain legal council were frequently forced to remain in detention while awaiting processing of their political asylum applications, a process which could take months. Those who applied for asylum had to face the fact that there was more than a 99% chance that their claim would be denied (19). Between 1980 and 1985

more than 35,000 Salvadorans and Guatemalans were deported, averaging a rate of 100 deportations a week.

In addition to its campaign to systematically deny political asylum to Salvadorans and Guatemalans, under the Reagan Administration the Immigration and Naturalization Service substantially increased its efforts to apprehend, detain and deport both groups. In 1985 the INS budget rose by \$75 million, the largest increase in its history (20). That same year the number of people who patrolled the border doubled overall. In Laredo, Texas, for example, the Border Patrol increased tenfold, from 40 to 400 agents. More detention centers were built, increasingly privately owned, operated for profit, and located in remote areas where legal counsel was difficult for detainees to obtain (21). A 1985 ACLU study of the Oakdale detention center which opened in 1986 in Louisiana, designed specifically to detain Central Americans whose immigration hearings were pending, showed that there were five attorneys in the whole town, none of whom were immigration attorneys (22).

In a desperate attempt to survive in the United States, Salvadorans and Guatemalans who were not apprehended by the INS tried to blend into larger communities of the undocumented. In cities like Los Angeles, Dallas, New York, and Washington, D.C. they

lived like a caste without documents; subsisting in a subculture characterized by fear, exploitation and adversity (23). As soon as they could the majority of undocumented refugees sought out ways to send money home to their families in Central America and arranged for transportation for those who had been left behind. Many sought comfort and material support in local churches.

Consequently, beginning in 1980 priests and ministers became increasingly involved in direct ministry with undocumented Central American refugees in the United States. As they learned more about U.S. immigration policy of detention, apprehension and deportation members of the religious community became increasingly involved in providing legal support and bond money to Central American refugees in their communities. One clergyman who worked with undocumented Central American refugees throughout the eighties described how local clergy turned to national church agencies for assistance in this ministry:

Those who are here express their fears and unmet needs. In an appeal for help, in need of shelter, food, clothing legal aid, and medical attention, the refugees turned to the Church for humanitarian assistance. Local churches throughout the U.S. have responded by setting up a number of storefront clinics... By 1981 however, the rate of refugees arriving in the U.S. from Central America especially El Salvador and Guatemala, was so rapid that local churches felt they could no longer continue to shoulder the costs alone. Nor could

they continue their ministry without redoubled advocacy efforts. At the grassroots, ecumenical communities issued a plea for help to national church agencies (24).

By the Fall of 1981 national church agencies, such as the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service and the Church World Service Immigration and Refugee Program, had established programatic responses to Central American refugees. They focused on three areas. First, financial support to local ecumenically-based refugee assistance projects. Second, education of both church and secular audiences regarding the presence of and problems faced by these refugees in the U.S., including the reasons why they had come. Third, advocacy to encourage and enable changes in governmental practice and policy that deprived these refugees of self-respect, legal rights and protection. Reverend Donald Larsen, Director of Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, described why members of the Lutheran Church felt morally committed to protest INS treatment of Central American refugees and directly assist individual Central American refugees: "At the heart of the argument, we believe, is the fundamental moral belief that it is wrong to send people back who are fleeing bombings, civil strife and generalized terror." Based on religious as well as civic values church people, like Reverend Lawson, began insisting that refugee should be

protected:

...They should be protected and must not be sent back involuntarily while such life-threatening conditions persist. The United States has historically proclaimed itself a haven for the oppressed and persecuted and our religious as well as civic beliefs have supported providing that protection. Now is the time to live up to those beliefs (25).

By the Spring of 1981 a debate over the status of Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the United States had emerged. According to the Reagan Administration, State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the United States were "illegal aliens", "economic migrants" seeking economic opportunity in the United States and therefore, not deserving of asylum (26). According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, The Center for Constitutional Rights, National Lawyers Guild, National Center for Immigrants Rights, New York Center for Immigrants Rights, hundreds of immigration attorneys, and a cross-section of the religious community and national church bodies Salvadorans and Guatemalans were "refugees" fleeing war and persecution in their homelands, completely deserving of political asylum and sanctuary in the United States (27).

Chapter Two

The Evolution and Development of the Sanctuary Movement

Although any attempt to date a social movement is risky, I trace the emergence of the sanctuary movement to 1980. In July and October of that year Christian clergy and congregational members in Tucson, Arizona and Berkeley, California gradually became aware of the plight of undocumented Salvadoran refugees in their regions and began to mobilize to support and protect them. Many of these Christians described their earliest experiences with undocumented Central Americans as involving them in a personal crisis of conscience. Central Americans were fleeing life-threatening situations in their homelands, arriving in the United States in record numbers and rather than being met by the U.S. government with hospitality were being deported back to the countries from which they fled.

The needs of these refugees and the dangers they faced when deported quickly became a major concern of the churches in the United States. Members of the religious community became involved in direct ministry with individual Central American refugees and in advocating for their rights. But their efforts to provide legal defense and to advocate for their rights did not stop the deportations. Consequently,

local churches across the U.S. responded by extending sanctuary, physical refuge, to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees.

The geographic proximity of Central America to the United States has always permitted easy access from one country to the other. But the material context within which the sanctuary movement emerged and developed was characterized by an extraordinary flow of undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees into the United States. Due to raging civil war and repression what had been a slow trickle of refugees from El Salvador beginning in the 1960's swelled to flood proportions all along the U.S./Mexican border by 1980. That year Guatemalans also began to enter the United States, via Mexico, in huge numbers. Between 1980 and 1984 more than 500,000 Salvadorans and Guatemalans entered the United States by crossing the border from Mexico into the United States in one of three states - Texas, Arizona, California - the same states in which the sanctuary movement emerged. Their entry did not go unnoticed.

Owners of small businesses, factory managers and farmers in all three border states became aware of an increase in the numbers of Central Americans applying for work. Small low-budget businesses, particularly restaurants which catered to Central American

tastes, began to appear in Latino neighborhoods. Articles describing how many undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans had been apprehended by the INS and under what conditions they were picked up began to appear more frequently in local newspapers. Members of the clergy, particularly in the Catholic Church, observed a great increase in the number of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who attended mass seeking spiritual and material support. Legal workers reported a huge increase in Salvadoran and Guatemalan clients, all of whom were threatened with deportation.

Beginning in 1980 attorneys and members of the religious community began to respond to the legal, material and social needs of undocumented Central Americans. Gradually they formed social networks. Throughout 1980 these networks existed only in areas geographically close to the border. But as the number of undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in the United States increased Salvadorans and Guatemalans began to move from the border states into the interior. By 1981 regions far from the border, like Long Island and Washington, D.C., had become home to large numbers of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. By 1982 small networks of individuals and groups organized to support and protect the rights of undocumented Salvadorans and

Guatemalans and spread throughout the United States. Coalitions to support Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees began to form in Arizona, California, Texas, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Boston, Long Island and New York City. One activist in New York City described the process by which individuals working to help Central American refugees in different parts of the country began to work together:

I'd say we began mobilizing in about the Summer of 1981. By then there were Salvadoran refugees all over the United States. By 1982 it was clear that those of us who worked in the Church on the East Coast needed to start doing something. But we couldn't work alone. We needed to be in contact with folks who worked on the border since they were the first people to see the refugees. And with attorneys who worked in the detention centers close to the border. I mean they were being screwed right and left. Herded straight from the desert into the detention centers. Uninformed of their legal rights. Coerced into signing voluntary departure forms. And those who hadn't been caught lived in constant fear of being caught.

The most immediate organized, formal response to the INS's campaign to apprehend, detain and deport undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in the United States emerged from the legal sector. In the Southwest organizations which existed to defend the legal rights of undocumented people were already in place. Many had mobilized years earlier in response to the huge flow of undocumented Mexicans who crossed the

border in search of work. In the border states attorneys in legal projects like Proyecto Libertad in Texas, El Concilio Manzo Legal Council in Arizona, the Central American Refugee Defense Fund, El Rescate, and the National Center for Immigrants Rights Inc. in California began to respond to the legal needs of undocumented Central Americans refugees as early as 1979. In addition to providing legal counseling both inside and outside of the prisons, jails and detention centers, committed, courageous attorneys and legal workers established bond funds, arranged for translators, produced informational pamphlets in Spanish, attempted to reunite families, familiarized themselves with national and international refugee legislation, lobbied for changes in refugee legislation and policy and consistently fought to improve conditions for Salvadorans and Guatemalans who were detained by the INS in prisons, jails and detention centers. Members of the religious community participated in and helped to fund many of these groups and organizations.

The second group to respond to undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans in Mexico and the United States were members of the religious community, most of whom were ministers and priests. Beginning in 1980 clergy in Mexico and the United States became

aware of the undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugee community as its members showed up to worship in their churches. Increasingly concerned for their welfare, clergy began to organize their congregations to respond to the immediate material and spiritual needs of individual undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees who continually turned to the churches for assistance. Using their congregations and denominations as their base these clergy began to provide direct services, food, shelter, clothing, counseling, temporary work, and social support, to individual Salvadorans and Guatemalans with whom they came into contact through their church work.

Gradually, as the needs of the refugees became greater, members of the religious community expanded the services. They arranged to provide short term shelter for refugees who had been bonded out from the detention centers by rearranging their places of worship or offering the homes of congregational members. They made contacts with people in the community who could provide basic medical care to the refugees. They established bond funds through the contributions of individual donors in the religious community in order to arrange for the release of refugees who had been apprehended and detained by the INS.

Not all of these services fit within the general range of services that members of the religious community had offered to other populations in the past. Establishing bond funds, going into the detention centers to visit with detained refugees and developing the skills necessary to offer practical legal advice to undocumented refugees were new activities for most members of the religious community. But they were within the range of activities which the federal government considers to be legal. Nevertheless, the Immigration Department did not find these activities acceptable. From the moment members of the religious community began going into the detention centers to counsel individual Central Americans members of the immigration department responded with hostility. Forms that were regularly available became unavailable. Detainees were suddenly transferred and nobody knew where. Translators were not available.

For many months members of the religious community involved in helping undocumented refugees were content to remain within this range of activities. But as they came to understand that the INS had established a policy to systematically apprehend, detain and deport all Salvadorans and Guatemalans despite their right to be granted political asylum by the U.S. government as a signator of internationally recognized conventions and

protocols on the status of refugees. After it became clear to them that their legal efforts to help Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees were futile in the face of this policy many clergy and members of their congregations became involved in helping undocumented refugees to enter into and travel through the United States without INS detection. They developed ways to help refugees enter the United States without being caught by the INS. Slowly contacts were made with people willing to help refugees in Mexico enter into and travel throughout the United States and a tighter, smoother network designed to help refugees in Mexico enter the United States began to take form.

When this network became public it was immediately called the "underground railroad" in recognition of the structural similarities it shared with the abolitionist underground railroad designed to help slaves move from the South to the North. But the underground railroads and the people who were responsible for the underground railroads shared more than similarities in organization and structure. Like the abolitionists, members of the sanctuary movement were moved to help Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees find refuge in the United States because they deeply believed that it was their moral imperative to do so.

By 1981 individuals working with undocumented Central American refugees from Arizona, California, Texas, New York and Washington, D.C. began meeting to share information and ideas. In October of that year a group of representatives from projects working to directly assist undocumented refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala met in El Centro, California to work out ways in which they could jointly respond to their needs. They were concerned with legal defense, bond funds, legislative initiatives, producing informational pamphlets in Spanish, educational campaigns, direct social services and advocacy. The group represented a broad range of the legal sector and ecumenical community involved in protecting and supporting the undocumented Central American refugee community in the United States. Participants included representatives from the El Concilio Manzo Legal Project in Tucson, attorneys working with undocumented Central American refugees in San Benito, Texas, staff members of the Center for Immigrants Rights in New York City, attorneys working with undocumented Central American refugees detained in INS facilities in California and clergy and congregational members working in ministry with undocumented Central American refugees. A small number of the participants were involved in helping refugees

in Mexico enter the United States without INS detection.

If nothing else this meeting served to make the participants further aware of the futility of legal efforts to help Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees without U.S. entry papers. Although they were saving some refugees from immediate deportation their efforts did not appear to be influencing the policies of the INS or the Reagan Administration. According to one participant at that meeting:

By consistently responding to the apprehension, detention and deportation of Central Americans our efforts simply served to delay deportation for a chosen few. No matter how consistently we lobbied for change, bonds were being unfairly raised for Salvadorans and Guatemalans, they were being denied work permits while out on bond and they were systematically and consistently being denied political asylum and deported to their homelands where civil wars were raging.

The meeting had a particularly profound effect on the participants who were involved in helping refugees to clandestinely cross the border. After the October meeting many people realized that on its own clandestine support for undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees only served to contribute to the INS and Reagan Administration's determination to cover up the huge numbers of Salvadorans and Guatemalans fleeing from repressive regimes with which the U.S. government was allied. Jim Corbett explained:

In efforts to ransom captured refugees, organizations in Tucson have raised more than 1,000,000 in bond collateral...but we have discovered that as a guiding strategy this is a self-destructive form of collaboration with the government's denial of refugees's basic human rights. We have also developed extensive clandestine evasion services and discovered that in the absence of publically declared sanctuary we are collaborating with the government's efforts to make refugees disappear.

After the October meeting the search for a new response accompanied by new strategies and tactics began. Many of the participants were convinced that one major strategy needed to be developed. That strategy would have three results. First, it would expose U.S. citizens to the subjective and biased elements involved in the INS's decisions to grant asylum to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Second, it would educate the North American public about the Reagan Administration's response to these refugees in the United States. Third, it would protect and support individual Central American refugees in the United States. Members of the ecumenical community were particularly concerned that the strategy involve members of the religious community at the local congregational level. Regarding the response of representatives from the religious community to that meeting Gary McEoin, a scholar and sanctuary activist who lived in Tucson, wrote:

We realized that the increasingly unethical and immoral practices of the INS demanded a corresponding intensification of appropriate counteraction by the faith community.

In trying to understand the emergence and development of the sanctuary movement it is important to understand that the movement did not emerge in response to the abstract question of what could be done to help all Central American refugees. Rather, the movement emerged in response to the concrete question of what could be done to help individual Central American refugees here in our midst. This question, as opposed to the former, requires an immediate response. As members of the religious community began to grapple with the question of how to respond to the plight of individual refugees in their midst they were gradually moved to consider responding to greater numbers of people in the same situation. One leader in the Presbyterian Church, a denomination which extended immense support to the sanctuary movement, explained that the distinction between the two questions was that one could answer the first question abstractly and go on with life as usual. But the second question required immediate attention and action:

An individual or a church may decide that refugees ought to be sent back, and then go on with business as usual. Or they may decide that refugees ought to be given asylum and that it is a shame that they are being sent back and still continue with business as usual... But that same individual or that same church, when confronted with a particular refugee, with an individual whose life or death may depend on one's decision, cannot act so glibly. Indeed, many an individual

and many a church have been drawn into the movement simply by finding a refugee at their doorstep and having to decide that, where as in abstract terms they would perhaps react differently, before this concrete human being they must act in compassion, and offer hospitality and asylum. This was the origin of the sanctuary movement; this was the way many churches and individuals were drawn into it, and this is still the way the movement is growing.

In Arizona the emergence of the sanctuary movement can be traced to July 7, 1980 when twenty-six Salvadorans were found in the Arizona desert west of Tucson after they had been abandoned by the coyote (professional smuggler) they had paid to help them cross the Mexican/U.S. border. After wandering in the desert for days without water, thirteen Salvadorans, mostly women and children, died of heat exhaustion and dehydration. Those who survived were picked up by the INS, charged with "illegal entry" and taken to the jail in the sheriff's office in Tucson. A congregational member of St. Marks Presbyterian Church in Tucson was contacted by the sheriff. Shocked and morally outraged by the government's actions she began to call on the members of her church to help the detained refugees:

I was absolutely shocked. Totally amazed that they had put thirteen completely traumatized, innocent people in jail and on top of that they were processing them for deportation. So I began to call everyone I knew, beginning with my pastor, to figure out what to do with them... Even the sheriff didn't think they belonged in jail... That experience changed my life. Everytime I bring a refugee across the border I remember that day and what could happen to them if they were doing this on their own.

Within days over one hundred local congregational members and clergy came forth to offer help to the detained Salvadorans. Clergy who were members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council, an ecumenical coalition of churches in Tucson involved in community ministry, agreed to coordinate efforts to help the refugees. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Tucson and St. Mark's Presbyterian Church provided enough bond money to release all thirteen refugees, after which time they remained in the care of the Tucson Ecumenical Council. Pro-bono legal defense was offered by local immigration attorneys.

That same week several ministers and priests in the Tucson Ecumenical Council organized a prayer vigil in front of the federal courthouse in Tucson to express their outrage at the government's action and their solidarity with the Salvadoran refugees. That vigil, which continued uninterrupted for six years, became a gathering place for people interested in helping Central American refugees. From then on individual ministers and priests in Tucson began to speak about the plight of undocumented Central American refugees from their pulpits. The Tucson Ecumenical Council's concern for undocumented Central American refugees continued.

Gradually individual Christians in Tucson began

offering shelter in their homes and churches to Salvadorans, some of whom had been bonded out of detention, others who had successfully avoided INS detection. Gary McEoin described that period:

As they (the refugees) arrived, the ministry broadened. Doctors volunteered their services for malnourished children, for victims of torture. People brought food, were soon inviting the refugees to stay in their homes.

In California the movement to offer sanctuary to Central American refugees also began to take form in 1980 when a group of ministers in Berkeley became aware of the growing numbers of undocumented Salvadorans living across the bay in San Francisco. Like undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans throughout the United States they were routinely exploited in the labor market, deprived of their legal rights and lived in constant fear of INS apprehension, detention and deportation.

Like their counterparts in Tucson, ministers and congregational members in Berkeley became increasingly concerned about the welfare of individual Salvadoran refugees in their midst. They also began to talk about their plight from their pulpits and in their communities, arousing the concern of others.

By the Spring of 1980 members of the religious

community in Berkeley began providing individual undocumented Salvadoran refugees with direct social services. As had happened in Tucson members of the religious community in Berkeley organized their responses to the presence of individual undocumented Central American refugees within the context of pre-existing groups in their community. One of these groups was a lectionary group of ministers which met weekly to discuss scripture and issues which would be included in the following Sunday's sermon. Based on their interpretation of the scriptures and the previous experience of some of them in offering sanctuary to AWOL servicemen and draft resisters during the Vietnam war this group mobilized to directly assist undocumented Salvadorans in their midst.

From its inception, the ideas, values and beliefs which framed the way in which members of the sanctuary movement viewed their government's treatment of undocumented Central American refugees were overwhelmingly theological. Clergy and congregational members who became involved in supporting and protecting the rights of undocumented Central American refugees in the United States constantly found support for their actions in the scriptures, in their faith in God, in

their congregations and denominations. As a result the ideas, doctrine, myths and symbols which guided the sanctuary movements emergence and development were consistently theological and biblical in form. Christians in the movement constantly referred to Jesus's special commitment to the poor. Both Christians and Jews in the movement frequently cited passages in the scriptures which emphasized caring for your neighbor and your brother. These ideologies helped members of the sanctuary movement to define the new situation and new problem of undocumented Central American refugees in their midst, identify what issues were involved, decide upon courses of action and identify potential constituencies. According to Reverend W. K. Du Val, Director Presbyterian Church (USA) World Relief:

The response of the church community has been a journey of faith: a journey which extends all the way back to the Old and New Testaments, through the history of the Christian Church around the world and within the church here in our own United States. It is a journey of responding to our brothers and sisters in pain.

Members of the movement consistently described offering sanctuary to undocumented Central American refugees as a consequence of their religious and ethical values. Their actions, symbols and strategies were rooted in traditional religious values. Mary Kay Espinoza,

Catholic layworker and a lifelong resident of Nogales, Arizona whose father was the mayor of that town for fourteen years, was amongst hundreds of Christians living near the border who responded to the immediate needs of Salvadorans and Guatemalans crossing the border from Mexico into the United States. She stands out because in January 1985 she was one of sixteen sanctuary activists indicted and convicted by a federal grand jury in Phoenix on charges of aiding, abetting illegal aliens and conspiracy:

I am a Roman Catholic and I have always been very close to my faith. I attend mass on Sundays, had a religious education. Whenever our community or parish is in need I am able to help, glad to help. I've lived here all my life. Maybe it's the same for other people. The fence between Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Mexico never meant anything to me. We've always worked kind of together. It is very easy to help anyone who is in need on the other side or anywhere for that matter because we've never gotten accustomed to being one city all by itself - just taking care of ourselves. It's pretty much in my family's case that we help those who need help.

In addition to their deeply personal beliefs and values, many of the Christians who became involved in the sanctuary movement were attentive to a theology which emphasized ministry to the poor and the oppressed. The theology, often referred to as the "preferential option of the poor", exerted a tremendous influence over the way in which many members of the religious community perceived and responded to undocumented Central American refugees in their midst.

In early 1982, just a few months previous to the formal emergence of the sanctuary movement, Jim Corbett, who by this time was extensively involved in a network of religious people who assisted refugees in crossing the border without INS detection, began to write letters to fellow Quakers and congregational leaders across the United States encouraging them to become involved in public action to protect and defend Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. The theology of the preferential option for the poor clearly formed the base for one of Corbett's earliest letters in which he urged his fellow Quakers to become involved in ministry with undocumented Central American refugees:

The peoples of Latin America are deciding to go free ...This revitalization of the religious community is now arriving among us in Anglo America. It is not arriving as a new theology or creed or ritual, but in person, as a Central American refugee... As basic ecumenical communities gather to seek, hear, and do what the prophetic faith teaches, the Church is emerging as a people that is formed by service.

The theology of the preferential option for the poor also formed the base for Reverend John Fife's report to the Presbyterian Church at their first consultation on sanctuary:

Clearly a part of what is happening is that the North American church is being evangelized. Clearly the extension of sanctuary is a part of that evangelization. A conversion of the church of North America, experienced by the church which is committed to being with the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized."

With few exceptions the people who became involved in the sanctuary movement were white, middleclass North Americans, members of three faiths - Protestant, Catholic and Jewish, who offered public support and protection to refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala. These were citizens who were dismayed by the consequences of domestic Central American refugee policy in the U.S. that they were determined help refugees in their midst to find refuge despite the U.S. government's interpretation of their activities as illegal.

People who became involved in the sanctuary movement in its earliest stages were committed to an organizing style which resulted in an ecumenical and interfaith grassroots movement which they contained within the religious community. With the exception of lawyers the movement's earliest leaders made the decision to network almost exclusively with the religious community. Members were recruited from local congregations and functioned through local sanctuary committees, task forces and offices located in local churches. These committees, task forces and offices were organized at the local, national and regional levels. Movement activists and leaders

solicited church monies, individual donations, denominational foundation grants, direct mail contributions and held fundraisers in order to finance their activities. By 1986 the movement had three national coordinating bodies: a coordinating network which functioned through the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America, a National Sanctuary Defense Fund which raised money for legal defense and a National Communications Council in which representatives from different regions met to share information and strategies. All three were funded and staffed by members of the religious community.

Throughout the history of the sanctuary movement local congregations served as the social and organizational base for sanctuary activists, providing them with a foundation for mobilization, networking, allegiance, communication, leadership, ideology and concerted, collective action. Sanctuary activists always understood that their ability to link social concerns with social action within the context of the institutional church would have a powerful impact on public opinion and public policy.

The sanctuary movement formally emerged in March 1982 when seven congregations in the United States publicly declared their churches to be "sanctuaries"

for people seeking refuge from persecution, torture and the violence of civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. Previous to their public declaration of support for undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees many congregational members were quietly involved in providing food, bond money and legal advice to undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees who had been apprehended by the INS because they had entered the U.S. without entry papers and were thus being held in INS facilities or were out on bond while with immigration hearings pending. According to Reverend Fife:

Sanctuary began in North America in response to the refugee's need...It began with our congregation and for other people in Tucson with an encounter with refugees who had been smuggled in by a coyote and abandoned in the desert west of Tucson...The churches were asked to help. We know how to do that and we did...It began after that initial encounter with human needs with refugees from El Salvador. Hearing their stories and their plight and understanding in a beginning way what needed to be done, what God was calling us to do. A prayer vigil began to be held every Thursday afternoon...that became a gathering place and a place where ideas were generated and initiatives taken...From there we moved to legal defense. But it became immediately apparent that our legal defense efforts were going to require enormous resources. So we formed one unified ministry in the Tucson area for refugees from Central America, the Tucson Ecumenical Task Council. We worked on legislative agendas, legal aid, fundraising. We even developed corporate strategies around an airline which had a contract with the INS to fly refugees back to El Salvador.

The sanctuary movement involved members of the religious community in an elaborate network which functioned to assist undocumented refugees from Central America in crossing the border from Mexico into the United States. In Mexico and the United States members of the religious community provided the refugees with temporary shelter until they could be moved to a place where a congregation had agreed to offer them more permanent refuge. They were provided with a base from which to speak to the North American public about their reasons for seeking refuge in the United States. This form of public testimony was an integral part of the sanctuary movement and one of its most important strategies. Public testimony was used to inform North Americans about the desperate situation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in their homelands and in the United States.

Despite the government's attempts to stop sanctuary activists from helping Central Americans enter into and live in the United States, the sanctuary movement grew and spread throughout the United States. By June 1986 over 300 congregations had declared their places of worship to be sanctuaries. The movement had been endorsed by governing bodies of almost all the major Protestant denominations, reformed Jewish, and several

Catholic orders. Perhaps the greatest demonstration of the movement's effect on political opinion and public policy was the fact that by 1986 over 22 city councils had declared their cities to be "sanctuaries" for Central Americans. That same year, New Mexico became the first state to declare itself a "sanctuary State" for undocumented Central American refugees.

Between 1982 and 1986 the sanctuary movement grew from a loose network of seven churches to a coordinated social movement involving over three hundred churches. In March 1982 seven congregations declared their churches to be sanctuaries for Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. By the end of the summer ten congregations had joined in declaring their places of worship to be sanctuaries. One year later, in March 1983, thirty-five congregations had declared sanctuary. By 1984 over fifty-nine congregations had signed a covenant of sanctuary through which they expressed their commitment to support, protect and advocate for Central American refugees. By 1986 there were over three hundred sanctuary congregations and tens of thousands of sanctuary activists.

Table I lists the number of sanctuary congregations throughout the United States by denomination and the number of groups which declared sanctuary by the year 1986. Most of the congregations were Protestant but the

movement included a significant number of Catholic congregations and had begun to attract Jewish congregations as well. The sanctuary movement received institutional support from twenty-eight national denominational bodies, including the Presbyterian General Assembly (USA), the American Friends Service Committee (Quaker), governing bodies of the Methodist, Lutheran, Mennonite, Reformed Rabbis, Disciples of Christ, and United Church of Christ and several Catholic orders, including the Maryknolls, Franciscans and Benedictines. The movement had also received official endorsements from twelve universities, twenty-two city councils, and the state of New Mexico.

Table I
Sanctuary Declarations

Catholic	49	Seminaries	1
Friends	50	Episcopal	4
Unitarian	47	Disciples of Christ	3
Presbyterian	29	Jewish	18
United Church of Christ	14	New Jewish Agenda	5
Methodist	12	Other Protestants	30
Mennonite	12	Universities	12
Lutheran	9	City Councils	22
Brethren	7	States	1
Baptist	5	National Bodies	28

* BASTA June 1986:28

Table II lists the number of sanctuary sites by State. By 1986 religious congregations in thirty-four states were involved in providing sanctuary to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Almost one third of the sites were in California, followed by Illinois, Arizona and New York.

Table II

Number of Sanctuary Sites by State

California	106	Virginia	4
Illinois	22	Georgia	3
Arizona	20	Iowa	3
New York	19	Vermont	3
Wisconsin	15	Connecticut	2
Pennsylvania	14	New Jersey	2
Ohio	11	North Carolina	2
Washington	11	Missouri	2
Massachusetts	9	Oklahoma	2
Minnesota	9	Alabama	1
Texas	9	Kansas	1
Colorado	8	Kentucky	1
Oregon	7	Louisiana	1
Washington, D.C.	7	Maine	1
Michigan	6	Nevada	1
Maryland	5	New Hampshire	1
Indiana	4	West Virginia	1

* BASTA June 15, 1986

Total 312

Essentially, members of the sanctuary movement assisted individual refugees in very direct ways. They developed a clandestine network which became known as the underground railroad to assist undocumented refugees in crossing the Mexican/U.S. border and in moving throughout the United States without being discovered by the INS. Members of congregations which declared public sanctuary offered refugees the opportunity to live in their churches, church apartments where refugees could live or offered housing in the homes of members of the congregation. Members of congregations which were unable to offer public support or housing signed covenants which stated that they supported the activities of congregations which had declared sanctuary and contributed to the material needs of refugees.

Throughout the country thousands of congregational members and others donated clothing, food, money, toys, furniture, cribs, diapers, strollers and cars, provided translation services, temporary jobs, housing and worked to reunited families which had been seperated. They also raised bond money and arranged for legal assistance for individual refugees in and out of detention. A much smaller number were involved in making arrangements for relatives of Central Americans living in sanctuary

churches to come to the United States from Central America.

Sanctuary activists were involved in many activities to educate the North American public about the plight of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in the United States. These activities included: public meetings where refugees gave testimony, prayer vigils, public caravans, educational forums and press conferences. Other activities were designed to directly support the Central American refugee community in both the United States and in Central America. Activities included: border witness programs in Texas, witness programs in the refugee camps in Honduras, emergency actions to free prisoners in El Salvador and Guatemala, and a range of direct social services to the refugee community at large, including job banks, health clinics and bail bond funds.

The whole process of joining the sanctuary movement, from deciding to take up the issue of sanctuary as a congregation to offering sanctuary to individual refugees was rarely simple, smooth or tension free. A congregation's decision making pattern varied depending upon the character and history of each particular congregation, the individuals in the

congregation, congregational leadership and denominational affiliation. Quakers for example, needed to approve decisions by unanimous vote. In some congregations the minister was able to take the decision on his own. In others a governing body, such as the Presbyterian Session, needed to approve the decision. In some congregations, such as Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson, the entire membership became highly involved in making the decision and carrying out the churches new ministry with refugees. In others, such as Riverside Church in New York City, only a small number of members participated in the discussion and subsequent movement activities.

Several factors strongly influenced which congregations considered offering sanctuary. Congregations had to have access to financial resources to support one or more Central Americans on a long-term basis. They had to have the support and enthusiasm of their congregational leaders - ministers, priest and rabbis. Denominational enthusiasm, such as that shown by the Quakers, Lutherans and Presbyterians, greatly influenced which congregations were likely to consider declaring sanctuary. Congregational size was also a factor. Congregations had to be big enough, in terms

of membership, to reach outside themselves and be concerned for others. However, it is important to recognize that these factors exert an influence over church activities generally. Clergy consistently have an impact on everything that happens in their congregation, if for no other reason than that they have the power to determine from the pulpit what issues the congregation will be collectively aware of and discussing within a given week. Members of the sanctuary movement were aware of how these factors influenced mobilization of their movement:

Sure you get alot of churches who are interested, but they have to consider alot of factors. After economics you have to look at the particular leader involved. They're following their leader and their making it possible because the leader wants to do it and has got vision and so forth. But they may or may not have the capacity to carry the project through or do anything about it unless they have the membership and the dollars.

Opposition to declaring sanctuary tended to come from four sectors of the congregation: lawyers, who were concerned that offering sanctuary involved the entire congregation and as such implicated them in breaking the law and challenging the State; business people, who though that the churches tax exempt status might be threatened if the congregation became involved in the

sanctuary movement; members of the congregation who were ideologically opposed to helping people from El Salvador and Guatemala, either because they thought they were communists or economic migrants, not bonafide refugees; individual members who felt that the energies and resources of the congregation should be used for other projects and activities.

But after a congregation had decided to offer sanctuary to refugees from Central America most congregations made their decision know to the public. They did so by calling a press conference where a representative, usually a member of the clergy, formally declared the church a "sanctuary for refugees." Congregations did this in order to make the community and the media aware of their opposition to the governments treatment of undocumented refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala. Most congregations also used the opportunity to express their opposition to US military intervention in those countries and in the region generally. If the Central Americans who were to live in the church were present, the congregation always held a welcoming ceremony, to which they invited members of the press, religious and secular community. Many congregations also wrote letters to the INS and State

Department informing them of their intention to shelter undocumented refugees and their reasons for doing so.

Up until 1983 congregations which declared public sanctuary almost always contacted the Tuscon Ecumenical Council, usually by phone, in hopes of networking with Central American refugees to whom they could then offer sanctuary in their church. If this resulted in their being put into contact with Central Americans who wanted to live in their church they often became involved in arranging transportation from border areas in the United States where the refugees were staying to the city in which their church was located.

In 1983 a group called the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America accepted responsibility for coordinating national sanctuary movement activities. After this, congregations contacted the Chicago Religious Task Force in order to be "matched" with refugees to whom they would offer sanctuary in their churches. By 1984 the Chicago Religious Task Force had developed several forms which congregational sanctuary task forces or committees filled out which described exactly what each particular congregation could offer to Central Americans and what they wanted in return. Between 1983 and 1985 so many congregations requested

that the Chicago Religious Task Force match them with Central American refugees who could live in their churches that many of the congregations which contacted the Task Force waited months to be matched with refugees to whom they could offer sanctuary. As a result some congregations lost their momentum and were not as participatory as they might have been. Congregations which entered the movement later benefitted and learned from the experiences of congregations which had participated earlier. By 1985 many congregations bypassed the Chicago Religious Task Force matching system and utilized other networks, such as Salvadoran refugee organizations like CRECE or religiously based social service agencies such as Catholic Social Services, to meet Central Americans to whom they could offer sanctuary.

Once housed in the churches, Central Americans were provided with a platform from which to speak to individuals, groups and members of the media in that church locality. Most Central Americans used these platforms to give what both North and Central Americans came to call "testimony." Testimony referred to the information that Central Americans gave to North Americans as they spoke of the traumatic experiences they had in Central America and Mexico: experiences

which were responsible for their seeking refuge and asylum in the United States and becoming involved in the sanctuary movement. The point of public testimony was to make North Americans aware of why Salvadorans and Guatemalans had left their homelands in search of refuge and were deserving of refugee status and political asylum in the United States.

After March 1982 when the movement formally emerged sanctuary activists made no attempts to hide their activities from the government. In fact they sought to publicize their activities hoping that their actions would call attention to what they considered to be immoral practices of the INS. People who worked on the border in Arizona encouraged members of the media to accompany them on their trips into Mexico and as they crossed the border into the United States with refugees. At the same time members of the movement tried to protect the identities of individual Central and North Americans involved in the underground railroad part of the movement. The routes the movement used, movement contacts and the locations of safehouses were never disclosed. Nor were the identities of Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the movement. When speaking to the public refugees usually covered their faces with bandanas. This was done to protect both their own identities and those of relatives who remained in their homelands who might

might be in jeopardy.

Chapter Three

The Emergence and Development of Social Movements: Classical Collective Behavior and Resource Mobilization Theories

Within the discipline of sociology there has always been a great deal of concern and discussion about social movements. Thus in developing my analysis of the emergence and development of the sanctuary movement I look first to theoretical frameworks which explain the evolution and development of social movements generally. In trying to understand social movements sociologists have focused on the role of discontent (Gurr, 1970), why people are attracted to social movements (Smelser, 1963), recruitment and social networking (Zurcher and Snow, 1980), social movement tactics (Lawson, 1984), problems of participation (Oliver, 1984), interaction between movements and the political environment (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977), consequences of participation (Fendrich, 1977) and under what conditions social movements emerge and develop (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Classical collective behavior theory and resource mobilization theory are the major frameworks within which sociologists have attempted to examine and explain these questions.

Classical Collective Behavior Theory

Until the 1960s classical collective behavior theory dominated the field of social movement research. Classical collective behavior theorists (Blumer, 1946, Turner and Killian, 1957, Lang and Lang, 1961, Smelser, 1963, Davies, 1969, Gurr, 1970) focus on explaining individual participation in social movements. Most often they point to sudden increases in individual grievances generated by the structural strains of rapid social change. Essentially, classical collective behavior theorists assume that movement participation is relatively rare, discontent sporadic and unpredictable, and movement participants nonrational, even irrational. These explanations are based on the assumption that participation in a social movement, like other forms of collective behavior, is relatively spontaneous and unstructured. These theories assume a sharp disjuncture between protest activities and participation as institutionalized actions (Aminzade, 1984). Movement participants are seen as nonrational actors functioning outside of normative constraints, propelled by high levels of strain (Morris, 1981).

For decades the study of social movements was dominated by social theories which viewed popular

protest as a form of social pathology. Classical collective behavior theorists regard social movements, along with crime, suicide, and political violence, as symptoms of the social disorganization introduced by rapid social change (Aminzade, 1984).

Within the classical collective behavior model the rise of social movements and subsequent social movement behavior and participation are traced to periods of instability which result in generalized social and personal apprehension and anxiety brought about by conflicts and subsequent breakdown of norms, leading to groups of people who lack guidelines to follow and reliable social anchors. Participation is linked to dissatisfaction, alienation, disenchantment with prevailing social values, relative deprivation, rising expectations, conflict over norms, and normlessness. Davies (1969), for example, attributes what he calls "violent action" to frustrations which arise due to gaps between rising expectations and gratifications:

...revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short reversal... The frustration that develops when it is intense and widespread in the society, seeks outlets in violent action. (Davies 1969:547)

Davies explicitly relates his analysis to revolutions,

draft riots, student protests, the 'Black Rebellion of the 1960s' and the Nazi seizure of power (Snyder and Tilly, 1972). Feierabend and Feierabend (1966) argue that it is change in the modernization process within any given society affecting political instability and hardship which leads to collective violence. Gurr (1970) proposes a psychological variable, "relative deprivation". Gurr sees relative deprivation as the...

basic precondition for civil strife of any kind... the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form" (Snyder and Tilly, 1977:521).

Classical collective behavior theorists (Smelser, 1963, Gurr, 1970, Turner and Killian, 1972, Davies, 1969) reserve a special place for individual and group discontent. Their assumption is that shared grievances and dislocating personal experiences are important preconditions for social movement emergence. Walsh writes:

The traditional approach to social movements resers a central place for individual and group discontent. While theorists in this camp place varying emphasis on concepts such as status inconsistency, social isolation, relative deprivation or rising expectations as the causes of dislocating or frustrating personal experiences, they have in common the assumption that shared grievances and homogenizing ideologies are important preconditions for the emergence of a social movement (Walsh, 1981).

They portray social movements as extraordinary or deviant occurrences and search to understand the motivational states experienced by individuals that can explain their engaging in the otherwise unexplainable activity of joining social movements. The general conclusion is that the greater their discontent the more likely individuals will be disposed to join social movements. The emphasis is on discovery of variables which are seen as the causes of dislocating or frustrating experiences motivating individual participation in a given social movement. According to Jenkins and Perrow the classical collective behavior model holds in common the following line of argument (cf. Turner and Killian, 1957, 1972, Smelser, 1962, Kornhauser, 1959, Davies, 1962, 1969, Gurr, 1970) social movements arise because of deep and widespread discontent:

... First, there is a social change which makes prevailing social relations in appropriate, producing strain between the new and the old. Strain then generates discontent within some social grouping. When discontent increases rapidly and is widely shared, collective efforts to alleviate discontent will occur. Though there is disagreement about how to formulate the link between strain and discontent e.g. subjective gaps between expectations and satisfactions vs. emotional anxiety induced by anomie, the central thrust is consistent. Fluctuations in the level of discontent account for the rise of movements and major changes in movement participation. In addition the model is based on two fundamental assumptions: (1) that the political

system is pluralistic and thus responsive to all organized groups with grievances and (2) that if movements succeed it is due to the efforts of the participants (social base) with competent leadership. (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977:250-251).

In their now classic discussion of resource mobilization theory McCarthy and Zald (1977) assert that the three most influential approaches to understanding social movement phenomena until the 1970s were those of Gurr (1970), Turner and Killian (1972) and Smelser (1963), all of whom are considered to be classical collective behavior theorists.

They differ in a number of respects. But most important they have in common strong assumptions that shared grievances and generalized beliefs (loose ideologies) ...are important preconditions for the emergence of a social movement in a collectivity. An increase in the extent of intensity of grievance or deprivation and the development of ideology occur prior to the emergence of social movement phenomena... Each, as well, holds that before collective action is possible with a collectivity a generalized belief (or ideological justification) is necessary concerning at least the causes of the discontent and, under certain conditions, the modes of redress. (1977:1214).
Resource Mobilization Theory

In sharp contrast to classical collective behavior theory resource mobilization theorists (Oberschall, 1973, McCarthy and Zald, 1973, Tilly, 1975, Useem and Zald, 1982, Vickers, 1975, Morris 1981, 1984, Walsh, 1981) present a multidimensional model of social movement formation which emphasizes resources, organization, political opportunities, strategies and

leadership, in addition to traditional explanations of discontent. Resource mobilization theorists treat movement participants as rational individuals who join social movements because they expect to receive particular rewards or outcomes by doing so (Oliver, 1984).

Movement strategies are seen as rational, adaptive responses to different lines of action available to movement activists. Goals are seen as emerging from conflicts of interest built into institutionalized power relations. These goals are seen as continually being in the process of being defined and redefined. Success or failure of a movement is attributed largely to the various strategic factors and political processes in which the movement becomes enmeshed (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977). Resource mobilization theory views social movements as a product of social organization, rather than social disorganization, and as an extension of, rather than deviation from, institutionalized actions.

Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the way in which social changes generate movements by altering different group's capacities for collective action based on resources and organization (Aminizade, 1984:)

In contrast to the emphasis on factors which motivate individual attraction and participation in

social movements so characteristic of the collective behavior theorists, resource mobilization theorists focus on the origins of social movement strategies (Walsh, 1981), the extent to which strategies change over time (Barkan, 1979), why innovations occur (Vickers, 1975), why particular options are selected over others (Lawson, 1983), the networks of social relationships that shape the character and development of social movements (Snow and Zurcher, 1980), the success or failure of social movements within the political arena (Jenkins, 1986) and the role of pre-existing institutions and organizational forms in movement emergence and development (Morris, 1981). Attention is focused on specific resources available to a movement or potential movement and the structural conditions which surround, hinder or assist a movement's mobilization and development (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

Resource mobilization theorists reject what they regard as the traditionalist's excessively psychological perspective ...In their polemics against what has been dubbed the "mentalism" of the traditional perspective (Tilly, 1980) resource mobilization theorists turned their attention to organizational factors and social infra-structures for explanations of the emergence of protest movements (Walsh, 1981:).

For resource mobilization theorists organizations, finances, pre-existing networks, strategies, leadership,

institutions and rational participants are seen as crucial resources in collective action. Factors such as the number of participants in a movement, its ability to withstand reprisals, the functional importance of the movement in political and economic spheres, the role of formal and informal organizations, the movement's reaction to responses from authorities and opposition groups, and the capacity of those "managing" the movement to respond to challenges are viewed as critical factors in movement emergence, development and outcome. The focus is on the resources necessary for the initiation and development of social movements (Jenkins, 1983, Walsh, 1981, Morris, 1981, Haines, 1984, Useem and Zald, 1982, Jenkins, 1983, 1986). The main way in which resource mobilization theorists look at the emergence and development of social movements is to study the way in which movement activists utilize critical social movement resources to build and sustain their movement. These very specific resources are seen as necessary to a movement's emergence and development.

According to McCarthy and Zald the search for a new perspective and set of assumptions about social movement emergence was motivated by ambiguous evidence of some of the research on deprivation, relative deprivation and

generalized belief:

We want to move from a strong assumption about the centrality of deprivation and grievances to a weak one, which makes them a component indeed, sometimes a secondary component in the generation of social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1215).

McCarthy and Zald question the theoretical centrality of the close link between frustrations or grievances of movement actors and the decline and growth of social movement activity. In contrast to the earlier emphasis on shared grievances and generalized beliefs by the collective behaviorists (Gurr, 1970, Turner and Killian, 1972, Smelser, 1963) resource mobilization theorists, like McCarthy and Zald, focus detailed attention to the selection of incentives, cost-reducing mechanisms or structures, costs and rewards to individual actors, and the importance of actors and organizations outside of a movement's collectivity. The emphasis is on the interaction between the availability of these resources, the pre-existing structures, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demand. According to McCarthy and Zald the resource mobilization approach:

...examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon

external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements (1977:1213).

Using the example of senior citizens who mobilized to lobby for Medicare benefits to support their argument that the emphasis should be on mobilization processes and not grievances, McCarthy and Zald conclude:

Senior citizens were organized into groups through the efforts of a lobbying group created by AFL-CIO. No doubt the elderly needed money for medical care. However, what is important is that the organization did not develop directly from the grievances but very indirectly through the moves of actors in the political system (1977:1215).

Recent attempts at establishing a resource mobilization model to understand movement emergence and development are provided by Jenkins and Perrow (1977) based on their study of the rise and dramatic success of farm worker insurgents in the 1960's. They compare the unsuccessful attempt to organize farm workers by the National Farm Labor Union from 1946-1952 to the strikingly successful one of the United Farm Workers from 1965-1972. Jenkins and Perrow discuss the relationship between the political environment and the success or failure of insurgent efforts, which they define as "organized attempts to bring about structural change by thrusting new interests into decision-making processes" (1977:249). They conclude that the key reason for the failure of the former and the success of

the latter was the societal response that insurgent demands received.

Like most resource mobilization theorists, Perrow and Jenkins assume that discontent, in this case among farm workers, was relatively constant in both periods. They attribute this discontent not to social dislocation or dysfunction as collective behavior theorists would, but to "established economic relations." They conclude that the critical difference between the former's failure and the latter's success was the nature of the political environments each encountered:

We do not deny the existence of discontent but we question the usefulness of discontent formulations in accounting for either the emergence of insurgent organizations on the level of participation by the social base. What increases, giving rise to insurgency is the amount of social resources available to unorganized but aggrieved groups, making it possible to launch an organized demand for change (Perrow and Jenkins, 1977:250).

Students of social movements not familiar with the farmworkers struggle might find Perrow and Jenkins argument convincing based on the evidence they provide. However, Walsh (1977), who studied farmworkers in rural areas of California in 1974-1975, provides additional information which raises serious questions about Perrow's and Jenkins's conclusions. According to Walsh,

Perrow and Jenkins ignore three critical differences between the National Farmers Labor Union (NFLU) and the United Farm Workers (UFW) which explain their failure and success: (1) the different ethnic composition of the two groups, the former which was white, Southern and fundamentalist, the latter which was Mexican-Catholic, (2) their differential use of strategies and tactics, particularly the UFW's use of a national boycott combined with strikes, and (3) the role of outside resources, particularly the UFW's access to volunteer lawyers and law students.

For Walsh it is precisely Perrow and Jenkins' focus on monocausal explanations which leads to their treatment of the political environment as the determining factor distinguishing the failure of one group and the success of another:

My point is not to deny the importance of the political environment...but only to insist that other factors such as ideology and leadership were crucial in determining its outcome...I am in basic agreement with the authors' argument that environmental factors have been too much neglected in standard social movement literature. My objection is that Jenkins and Perrow go to the other extreme in neglecting important intramovement characteristics and, especially the interaction between a movement and its environment...It is hardly an improvement in sociological eyesight to counter traditional myopia (focusing exclusively on internal movement characteristics) with an equally deficient hyperopia (neglecting such details for the "big picture". (Walsh, 1977:112)

Some resource mobilization theorists (Oberschall 1973, Jenkins and Perrow 1977, McCarthy and Zald 1973) argue that resources and organizations outside of the protest group are crucial in determining the scope and outcomes of collective action for certain groups. In their search to understand the emergence and development of social resources resource mobilization theorists have had to explain the emergence of movements from groups with little access to resources which are perceived as critical in the model. Thus external groups and resources are argued to be especially necessary for movements of the poor, the powerless and the deprived (Perrow and Jenkins, 1977) and the dominated (McCarthy and Zald, 1972).

According to Perrow and Jenkins "for a successful outcome, movements by the powerless require strong and sustained outside support" (1977:251). They argue that when deprived groups do mobilize, it is due to the interjection of external resources, a critical part of the societal response:

Success comes when there is a combination of sustained outside support and disunity and/or tolerance on the part of political elites...Farm worker discontent remained unexpressed in any organized way until out-

side organizers arrived on the scene (Perrow and Jenkins, 1977:251-251).

In many ways this argument is similar to McCarthy and Zald's (1977) explanation of senior citizen mobilization in relation to Medicare benefits - outside resources and organizations are absolutely critical to the mobilization of "deprived" (poor, powerless, dominated) groups. Perrow and Jenkins generalize their findings relative to the farm worker's struggle to other social movements and stress the importance of liberals as outside resources to these movements:

For several of the movements of the 1960s it was the interjection of resources from outside, not sharp increases in discontent, that led to insurgent efforts...sponsors serve as protectors. If the support of the liberal community is necessary for the success of a challenge by a deprived group, then the liberal community is, in effect, able to determine the cutting edge for viable changes that conform to the interests of those groups still excluded from American politics (Perrow and Jenkins, 1977:266).

In an effort to refute the argument that dominated groups must have outside support in order to mobilize successful social movements, Morris (1981, 1984) focuses on the central function that internal organization and pre-existing resources play in the emergence and development of social movements for dominated groups:

My analysis suggests that one-sided emphasis on

spontaneous processes (classical collective behavior) or outside resources (resource mobilization theory) can lead to an unwarranted neglect of internal structure. (Morris, 1981:746)

Although Morris is concerned with social movements which emerge from dominated groups the three propositions he generates based on his study of the role of internal organization and pre-existing resources in the civil rights movement can be applied to the emergence and development of social movements which emerge from groups which are not dominated as well. First, collective action is initiated through pre-existing structures. Second, tactical innovation is a function of well-developed and widespread internal organization. Third, the type of innovation in strategy and tactics which can be rapidly disseminated and sustained is largely determined by the characteristic internal organization of a protest group. Morris writes:

It is becoming commonplace for writers (Hubbard, 1968, Lipsky, 1968, Marx and Useem, 1971, McCarthy and Zald, 1973, Oberschall, 1973) to assert that the civil rights movement was dependent on outside resources: elites courts, Northern white liberals, mass media and the Federal government. The present analysis suggests that this assertion may be premature, especially when the role of internal organization is ignored" (1981:766).

Morris concludes that mass protest is a product of the organizing efforts of activists functioning through a well-developed indigenous base (1984). For Morris this

base includes institutions, organizations, social networks, leaders, money, communication networks, and organized masses.

In an effort to combat traditional collective behavior theory resource mobilization theorists, including Morris, have developed what James Wood and Maurice Jackson (1982) have characterized as a "rational calculation approach" which views social movements,

...as deriving from actors rationally estimating the chances of success by using social movements to attain their goals...These actors are seen to calculate their chances of victory and defeat and act accordingly (Wood and Jackson, 1982:36).
The Indigenous Resources/Values Framework

Recently, sociologists within both the classical collective behavior and resource mobilization schools have begun to criticize resource mobilization theorists for turning their attention almost exclusively to the role of rational calculation, organizational factors and social infra-structures. Walsh (1981) writes:

Theorists working from this perspective are more interested in social movement organizations and in their interactions than in the "hearts and minds" of participants.

Based on his study of grassroots mobilization after the Three Mile Island accident Walsh (1981) concludes

that this particular case study is another in a growing number of instances where suddenly imposed major grievances have been important for explaining grassroots mobilization phenomena. Walsh writes:

Most resource mobilization theorists acknowledge the importance of the perception of grievances by the target collective for the success of any widespread and rapid mobilization process. However, the resource mobilization focus has usually been on social movement organizations developed through moves of political actors outside the aggrieved group rather than directly from the impact of the grievances themselves on the group...resource mobilization theorists have tended to treat discontent as a constant rather than a variable. The sudden perception of major grievances, however, was important in the mobilization of citizen protest over Love Canal (Levine, 1981), in Sevaso, Italy (Whiteside, 1978), and in Santa Barbara (Molotch, 1970). The court ordered busing protests (Useem, 1978 and the anti-Vietnam War mobilization are other examples of grievances leading directly to protest organizing. Such data show that grievances, the structural situation of the aggrieved population, and the mobilization process itself should each be considered variables in the search for a more comprehensive social movement theory. (1981:17-18)

Based on her study of the women's liberation movement Freeman (1979) argues that what is needed is

...a model within which strategic considerations, both planned and spontaneous, leader-directed and grassroots, can be analyzed (1979:770).

According to Killian (1984) resource mobilization theorists have...

placed individual rationality and organizational direction in opposition to spontaneity and emergent structures ...It is being suggested that while spontaneous, unplanned and unforeseen events have a high probability of precipitating social movements they are never sufficient to generate viable structures capable of sustained activities. While never relying on it, planners must be prepared for the unexpected (1984:771,781).

In an effort to deal with the effects of this dichotomy for social movement theory Killian focuses on both Morris's (1981) and McAdam's (1982) research on the civil rights movement. Both Morris and McAdam emphasize the importance of indigenous organizations and pre-existing organizations in the movements emergence. Like other resource mobilization theorists they see movement activists as rational actors working intentionally to achieve their ends. Collective action is seen as being rooted in pre-existing organizational structure of the Black community. While Killian does not disagree that pre-existing organizations and internal organization were critical for the emergence and development of the movement, he questions the lack of attention to spontaneity and emergence (the not pre-established and the novel) as critical explanatory variables in social movement evolution and development:

Although neither spontaneous, impromptu actions nor new movement organization are explicitly ruled out in these analyses, they are ignored or treated as

incidental to social movement development...Hence we conclude that while organization and rational planning are key variables, social movement theory must take into account spontaneity and emergence and the forces which generate them. It must treat as important, not as irrational, the feeling states and the cognitions which sometimes cause individuals to throw caution to the winds and act in face of great or unknown odds (Killian 1977:771, 781).

Klandermans (1984) writes that resource mobilization theorists have "nearly abandoned social-psychological analysis of social movements" (1981:589). While recognizing that resource mobilization theorists view participation in social movements not as a consequence of predisposing psychological traits or states but as the result of rational decision making processes whereby people weigh the costs of benefits of participation. Klandermans argues that social psychology can expand resource mobilization theory in an important way by revealing processes of social movement participation on the individual level. He states:

Identifying the interaction between individuals as the appropriate level of analysis has significant theoretical consequences. It takes into account the psychological truism that people behave in a perceived reality (1981:590).

In order to analyze the important role that participation plays ~~in~~ social movements and the way in which participation changes as a result of mobilization attempts Klandermans applies expectancy-value theory to

movement participation. The theory is a rational-choice theory which assumes that motivation for a certain behavior is a function of the expectation that it will yield certain outcomes and the values of those outcomes. According to Klandermans the framework is useful because it "provides a device for the systematic analysis of the variety of beliefs, expectations and attitudes that are related to participation in a social movement" (1981:591).

Independent of the utility of the theory, what Klandermans is saying is that in order to more fully understand the emergence and development of social movements, resource mobilization theorists need to pay attention to the role of beliefs, expectations and attitudes:

One of the objections to the traditional approach is that it defines participation as tension release, and thus it does not matter in which movement a person participates. In the theory presented in this article it does. Participation is seen as a rational choice in the situation as the person perceives it, and as a way to obtain desired outcomes. In the eyes of the participant, participation is a means of reaching valued goals. (Klandermans, 1984:597).

While recognizing that resource mobilization theory is composed of a wide range of perspectives, Ferree and Miller (1985) assert that variants of the perspective

rely on implicit social-psychological assumptions to explain the formulation of individual and collective interests. According to the authors while some resource mobilization theorists have attempted to deal with the question of participation by focusing on a cost-benefit model (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977) they neglect to deal with critical issues such as how people define what is worth the cost and what is not. Ferree and Miller suggest that resource mobilization theorists look to a Meadian model which suggests that individuals derive their interests through membership in groups, particularly those in which active social interaction occurs:

Social organizations shape individual interests by defining events in different ways as well as by providing a "schedule of preferences", or values, to attach to the events thus defined (Ferree and Miller, 1985:41).

Ferree and Miller also argue that movements and their ideologies must be understood in the material and ideological context of the societies in which they emerge. Ferree and Miller argue that social-psychological components and cognitive structure must be taken into consideration in order to more fully comprehend the emergence and development of social

movements. They write:

By raising the issue of the costs and benefits of participation to individuals, it (resource mobilization theory) has helped social movement theory shed its early emphasis on pathology. However, to discuss participation, resource mobilization models must make some social psychological assumptions. Their assumption of individual economic rationality is inadequate because it underestimates the effects of social organization on individual thought and disregards too much of what we know about cognitive structure and social psychological processes in general (1985:54).

On the basis of the research findings just reviewed this study utilizes what I call an indigenous resources/values framework to describe and analyze the evolution and development of the sanctuary movement. The indigenous resources/values framework draws heavily from resource mobilization theory with its emphasis on resources, organization and rationality and more especially on the emendations of Aldon Morris's work on the civil rights movement which emphasizes the role of pre-existing institutions and leaders and internal organization in the emergence of a social movement. The indigenous resources/values framework is used in relation to a movement which emerged from the religious community although it is not necessarily limited to movements which have a religious community base.

Incorporating the role of values and belief systems into a model which emphasizes resources, internal

organization and pre-existing institutions contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the emergence and development of social movements. It helps better understand movement participation and movement development, including the use of particular strategies and tactics over others, social and organizational networking patterns, reactions to authorities and opposition groups, and the relationship between social movements and the wider society.

The indigenous resources/values framework assumes that pre-existing resources and values are pre-conditions for the emergence of a social movement with a religious community base. While resource mobilization theory has dealt with values as a peripheral variable in movement emergence and development the indigenous resources/values framework gives equal importance to values and resources and stresses the coexistence of values and resources in the emergence of movements with a religious community base. In sharp contrast to classical collective behavior theory the values part of the framework is conceived as logical and rational.

Part Two

Chapter Four

Case Study of the Sanctuary Movement in Tucson, Arizona

Tucson, with a population of 330,507, is the second largest city in Arizona. It lies sixty miles from the Mexican border. Because of its proximity to the border, Tucson has always had a large population of Latinos, the majority of whom are of Mexican origin. However in 1980 Tucson's Central American population began to increase rapidly. Though census figures are not yet available on this population in 1985 local church organizations estimated that there were at least 25,000 Central Americans living within the city limits. The majority of these Central Americans were refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala. Almost all had entered the United States outside of ordinary immigration channels, did not have U.S. entry papers, did not speak English and were employed in marginal sectors of the economy. According to the same church sources the majority regularly attended church where they sought both spiritual and material support.

In many ways Tucson was fertile ground for the emergence of a movement organized to assist undocumented Latinos. In the late sixties and seventies a

considerable amount of organizing was done in the city with the undocumented Mexican population. Organizing around the Hanigan trial*, from 1976-1980, was particularly effective in uniting people from the legal, community, church and political groups in Tucson and Southern Arizona under the heading of the National Coalition on the Hanigan Case. The Coalition included representatives of the Mexican-American community, Mexican and Anglo attorneys from the El Manzo Concilio legal defense project and representatives from a number of churches, both Catholic and Protestant, in Tucson. What was special about the Hanigan case was that it symbolized the vulnerability of undocumented Mexicans in the United States to violence from the Anglo population and the difficulties of their obtaining justice in the American courts.

During the years spent organizing around the Hanigan case members of the Coalition established a network of people throughout the United

* On August 18, 1976 three undocumented Mexican farmworkers were kidnapped, robbed, beaten, branded, and shot by white ranchers in Douglas, Arizona. There followed a police investigation and prosecution which resulted in the summary acquittal of the ranchers, the Hanigans who were accused of being the torturers. Years later because of community pressure the Justice Department agreed to convene a grand jury to probe for possible violations of federal law.

States who were concerned about the rights of the undocumented. Members of this network established bail funds for detained undocumented Mexican workers and their families, set up pro-bono and low cost legal defense teams to protect the rights of undocumented Mexicans, filed class action suits on behalf of the undocumented which would protect their rights and organized in the undocumented Mexican community. They met frequently at regional and national conferences concerned with the rights of the undocumented, in the detention centers and jails where the undocumented were detained and in the Latino communities where the undocumented lived. During this time they shared information, ideas and resources. Thus in 1980 when undocumented Central Americans began to arrive in Tucson, members of the legal and religious community had years of experience working together and organizing around issues which directly effected undocumented people.

The first congregation in Tucson which formally responded to refugees from El Salvador were members of Southside Presbyterian Church. Neither the church nor the congregation fit the stereotype of affluent, white, upwardly mobile Presbyterianism. The tiny adobe church, located in a poor Mexican ghetto, composed of working-class folks - Latinos, mostly of Mexican origin, American Indians, Blacks and Whites.

That the church, which opened over eighty years ago as a Papago Indian mission in what was then called "Papagoville", was largely composed of Latinos and Indians, was tiny and poor, and had a gospel chorus, were not the only characteristics which made the church unusual within the world of Presbyterianism. Its minister, Reverend John Fife, almost always seen in cowboy boots and blue jeans held up by a silver and turquoise Papago belt buckle attached to a wide leather belt, did not fit the stereotype of the Presbyterian minister.

Unlike most Presbyterian ministers, Fife had not spent his life in ministry with relatively affluent white Presbyterians. His first formal ministry was on the Papago Indian Reservation in Ohio, the state where he attended seminary. Later Fife worked with would be juvenile offenders, mostly Indians and Blacks, in Pittsburghs city streets, in what is trade named "urban ministry." He was also a leader in the civil rights movement in that city. In 1972 Fife was offered the opportunity to become pastor of Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson and grabbed it.

Throughout his tenure as Southside's minister Fife was a community activist. He fought hard to help people in his congregation and in the community where the church was located. On the local level he was active in the Tucson Ecumenical Council, particularly with its peace and social justice committees. Years later, when the Council became the organizing base for members of the sanctuary movement, Fife was the Chairperson of the Council's Task Force on Central America. On the national level Fife was active in the Presbyterian General Assembly, sitting on its executive board and chairing its committee on Corporate Responsibility.

Within the context of the sanctuary movement as a whole the sanctuary movement in Tucson, Arizona proved to be the most vital of local sanctuary movement centers across the country. Although activists in other areas, such as South Texas, were involved in offering legal counsel and shelter to undocumented refugees earlier, sanctuary activists in Tucson were responsible for developing the strategy of public sanctuary in the United States. They were also the first activists involved with undocumented Salvadoran refugees to call for the public declaration of sanctuary. Upon making the decision to offer sanctuary, activists in Tucson called for the public participation of congregations

across the country. Further, local activists in Tucson brazenly declared their involvement in and organization of an underground railroad which assisted refugees in clandestinely crossing the border. When the sanctuary movement began to gain popularity, sanctuary activists in Tucson took it upon themselves to formally request that another group, the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America, act as communications coordinator of the public sanctuary movement.

Unlike other local movement centers located on the border and involved in helping refugees cross the border into the United States without INS detection members of the local sanctuary movement in Tucson sought out media attention whenever possible. Proof of the critical role played by the local movement center in Tucson could be found in sanctuary movement leadership, in which Tucson's activists were highly present; national media attention to sanctuary movement activities in Tucson; the political power of the Tucson Ecumenical Council demonstrated by its ability to influence the political arena at the local and national levels.

Mobilization in the Religious Community: Phase I -
Concern for Refugees and the Tucson Ecumenical Council

For members of the religious community in Tucson concern for Salvadoran refugees began during the July fourth weekend when twenty-six Salvadorans, some of who were dead, were discovered in the desert west of Tucson. They had been abandoned by a professional smuggler who had brought them across the border after he had collected his fees. After wandering in the desert for two days without food or water the Salvadorans were so thirsty and so desperate that they drank their own urine. Temperatures had reached up to 150* degrees that week. On July 7th thirteen of the twenty-six refugees, mostly women and children, were discovered alive by INS officials, the others had died of heat exposure and dehydration.

That weekend pastors in the Tucson Ecumenical Council, a coalition of over sixty churches who were involved with social justice issues in Tucson, were contacted by parishoners who had heard that the survivors had been taken to the local jail. The Tucson Ecumenical Council was composed of liberal members of the religious community in Tucson, both Protestant and Catholic, who had a long history of responding to the needs of the undocumented Mexican community. Their reasons for taking a particular interest in the

undocumented Mexican community had much to do with the fact that they were located in a city very close to the Mexican border and had many congregants of Mexican origin in their parishes. Members of the Council had formed an organization called the Tucson Metropolitan Ministries which had been helping the undocumented in Tucson for over twenty years. Members of Tucson Metropolitan Ministries had been actively involved in the National Coalition on the Hanigan Case.

The Tucson Ecumenical Council also had a very active social concerns committee. Many of its members, including Reverend John Fife, had been very active in the civil rights movements. Others, like Reverend Symons, were active in the peace movement. Like most members of the committee, both these ministers attributed their involvement in the Council's social concerns committee to the high value they placed on helping other people.

Members of the social concerns committee and of Tucson Metropolitan Ministries quickly mobilized to assist the survivors. When members of the Council discovered that the refugees were being detained they developed a crash program of medical and emotional aid. Their activities might have ended there had they not discovered that the INS planned to deport the

Salvadorans immediately after they testified against the smuggler who had brought them into the United States and abandoned them in the desert. Within days the Roman Catholic Diocese of Tucson and Saint Mark's Presbyterian Church, both members of the Council, came up with the bond money needed to release the detained Salvadorans. They also arranged for legal counsel. This led to the Salvadorans remaining in Tucson and eventually submitting applications for political asylum. According to Gary MacEoin, scholar, journalist, active member of Saint Mark's Presbyterian Church in Tucson and of the Tucson Ecumenical Council, the government's decision to deport the refugees after they testified played a key role in the Council's decision to stay involved:

It was a traumatic awakening for many, and the trauma was intensified by the bureaucratic response of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The terrified survivors of the desert ordeal were arrested, and preparations began to ship them back to the tender mercies of the regime of institutionalized injustice from which they had fled. The instinctive response was the only one open to the people of faith, a response that in addition resonated with the deepest traditions of the United States. This abomination could not be allowed.

Reverend John Fife, then forty-five years old, a long time civil rights activist, minister of Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson and a member of the Council, described the church's response this way:

The churches were asked to help, we know how to do that and we did. But it was in that initial encounter that discussion, prayers, and the movement began to take place in the Church, in Tucson and in our church.

A few days after the Salvadorans were discovered members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council organized a prayer vigil in solidarity with the refugees and the people of Central America. Reverend Symons, then director of the Council, Reverend John Fife minister of Southside Presbyterian Church, Gary MacEoin, religious scholar and member of St. Mark's Presbyterian Church, Carla Pederson, a parishoner at St. Mark's and an activist in the Democratic Party, Father Ricardo, a priest who was active in the Latino community, and Tim Nonn, then a university student, were instrumental in organizing the vigil. All went on to become leaders in the sanctuary movement in Tucson:

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We chose to organize a vigil because it fit into the spirit of what we were trying to say. That it was morally wrong to imprison refugees and to send them back to their country, that as religious people we had a moral responsibility to do something and that we would call on God to guide us and the religious community to join us. 9

The vigil took place in front of the federal courthouse in Tucson. The assembled crowd carried placards demanding an end to the government's policy of deportation of Central Americans. After that first vigil the Tucson prayer vigil continued uninterrupted for more

than six years, every Thursday at 5 P.M. in front of the federal courthouse. Within a few weeks the prayer vigils became a gathering place for people interested in helping undocumented Central American refugees, a place where ideas were generated and initiatives taken.

Within weeks, attorneys in the El Concilio Manzo Area Council which had a long tradition of representing undocumented Mexicans in the immigration courts, approached members of the Council and asked for their help in servicing the undocumented Central American refugee community. They needed help in dealing with hundreds of Salvadorans who were being detained by the INS and with new INS policies implemented after Reagan's inauguration,, including increased detention and higher bonds for Salvadorans. At this time almost all of the legal assistance available to undocumented Central Americans in Tucson and other border states was being provided by non-profit legal groups which had organized earlier to serve undocumented Mexicans who came to the United States in search of work. These projects were in place in Tucson when the Tucson Ecumenical Council began to develop its ministry with the undocumented Salvadoran refugee community.

Like most North Americans members of the Council and religious community in Tucson who became involved

with undocumented Salvadoran refugees knew very little about El Salvador in July 1980. What little information they had was associated with the assassination of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero only a few months earlier on the 24th of March. But after meeting with the Salvadoran survivors and hearing their testimonies members of the religious community in Tucson were awakened to a shocking reality. Those who were not able to speak to the refugees directly had access to copies of their testimonies which had been translated into English by members of the Council who spoke Spanish. In horrifying detail the testimonies described the persecution and fear the Salvadorans had experienced in their homelands and the journey North. McEoin described that awakening:

Now (the faith community in Tucson) were getting eyewitness accounts from the survivors that challenged all their assumptions and preconceptions; official oppression of people who were simply demanding the elementary rights of free speech, freedom of association, a living wage and a voice in the political system; death squads operating in close collaboration with the government to kill those suspected of seeking to promote peaceful reform; torture and assassination of priests, nuns, Protestant pastors, catechists and other church workers who supported the demands of the poor.

One activist in the sanctuary movement in Tucson recalls the first time that she began to comprehend what was happening to Salvadorans in the United States:

I began to understand that it was not just a question of a few people fleeing for their lives. These refugees were fleeing their country and arriving in the United States by the thousands. Salvadorans and Guatemalans too. Because violence and repression were institutionalized in both countries and they were desperately seeking a way out. And in response to their situation, the INS was rounding them up and shipping them back like cows. Despite the fact that the US government exactly that they were in grave danger of being tortured and killed when they got off the planes... It was totally shocking for me to know that my government was willing to do this.

Mobilization: Phase II - Individual Action

On the 4th of May 1981 Jim Corbett, a fifty-two year old Tucson resident, Quaker and retired rancher, learned that the INS had stopped a friend's pickup truck as he was driving back to Tucson from the border. His friend had picked up a young Salvadoran man he'd seen hitchhiking on the road. When the INS discovered that the Salvadoran man did not have U.S. entry papers they'd arrested him for illegal entry and put him in jail.

Corbett was very familiar with the border terrain and with the INS patrols. He had ranched on both sides of the border, spoke Spanish, and had spent a good deal of time exploring the desert. He was also aware of social and political conditions in El Salvador, including the fact that there were death squads operating there. He also knew that the U.S. government,

through the INS, was deporting Salvadorans without U.S. entry papers. Corbett was concerned that if the young man were deported to El Salvador it could lead to his being tortured, even killed:

We had heard reports of an entire plane load of deportees that had been shot down at the airport in El Salvador in December 1980.

The next day Corbett telephoned the INS and Border Patrol to find out what had happened to the young Salvadoran man. Corbett was told they gave out no information on detainees. Frustrated and annoyed, but determined to get the information, Corbett called a high INS official whom he had heard about in hopes that he would think he was the former mayor of Tucson, whose name was also Jim Corbett. The tactic worked. Corbett requested and was given information on the name and location of a young Salvadoran man intercepted the previous day at the Peck Canyon roadblock. Corbett then called Father Ricardo Elford, a priest whom he knew was involved with a Tucson Ecumenical Council Coalition which had formed after the Salvadoran refugees were discovered in the desert in July 1980. Father Ricardo was able to advise Corbett on how he could visit the young man in detention and the forms he would need in order to have him released on bond with Corbett as his legal representative. Father Elder provided Corbett with

the G-28 form he would need in order to act as the detained Salvadorans legal guardian. He would then be able to retain his release on bond in his custody. G-28 in hand Corbett went to the jail in Nogales, Arizona, interviewed the Salvadoran man and had him sign the form.

In the jail Corbett discovered that seven other Salvadorans, including a one year old baby, had been picked up by the INS the day before. Determined to obtain their release as well Corbett asked the INS for more G-28 forms. The INS staff, whose suspicion had been aroused by Corbett's advocacy on behalf of the Salvadorans, refused to comply. So Corbett left the jail to xerox the one form he had brought with him. In his absence INS officials made a few phone calls and discovered he was not the ex-mayor. When Corbett returned he was informed that the Salvadorans had been moved. He was not told where. Later Corbett reflected on what had happened:

I couldn't believe it really, I was amazed by their actions. They were obviously depriving Central Americans of their most basic civil rights. After that incident I was even more determined to do something about it.

Corbett's visit to the jail made a deep impression on him. All of a sudden he had become aware that the INS was imprisoning men, women and children whose only

crime was not having papers. He'd also learned that the INS did not want U.S. citizens to know about them or to help them by bonding them out. That night Corbett discussed the problem with his wife Pat and with a few friends who were also Quakers and made a decision to do what he could for detained Salvadoran refugees.

Like many members of the religious community in Tucson Corbett was aware that ministers and priests in the Tucson Ecumenical Council had helped the thirteen surviving Salvadoran refugees in July of 1980. Thus after making the decision to help refugees Corbett contacted the Tucson Ecumenical Council and offered to help in whatever way he could.

Within several weeks Corbett was given the opportunity to become directly involved with Salvadoran refugees. An injunction had been brought against the El Centro detention center in California which resulted in several dozen Salvadorans being released on bond. They all needed places to stay while they awaited their asylum hearings and people in the Council began to ask around to see who could offer housing. Jim and Pat Corbett volunteered to house refugees in their tiny two bedroom home and adjacent trailer on the outskirts of the city. MacEoin describes that opportunity this way:

...a paralegal went to a major INS detention center at El Centro, California, four hours distant by road

and nearly as distant from other sources of appropriate legal advice in California. An INS official took the G-28s she was carrying, tore up and tossed them into the trash can. It was a fatal abuse of authority. A court injunction opened up El Centro to the Tucson group and soon Jim Corbett's two-room converted garage was housing twenty or more Salvadorans bonded out from El Centro to await rulings on their claims for political asylum.

Sharing their home with Salvadorans had a profound effect on the Corbetts. After hearing about their experiences with the INS before, during and after being apprehended both Jim and Pat Corbett became convinced that to really help Salvadorans required helping them to evade INS apprehension altogether.

During this period, and in conjunction with his work with detained Salvadorans, Jim Corbett met a priest in Sonora, Mexico across the border from Nogales, Arizona. Because of this priest Corbett was able to get into a prison in Mexico where undocumented Salvadorans were being detained. The priest and members of his parish were involved in bringing food to the detainees on a weekly basis. Disguised as a priest, Corbett accompanied this priest into the prison. There he saw men, women and children, some as young as six and seperated from their parents, being held in detention and processed for deportation. For the first time Corbett began to comprehend that thousands of Salvadorans and Guatemalans were fleeing persecution and war in their homelands and trying to enter the United

States only to be apprehended, detained and processed for deportation.

Corbett returned to the prison many times. He also visited the prisons and detention centers in Arizona and California. From discussions with the detainees Corbett gained new information on how undocumented people entered the United States by crossing the border from Mexico. He learned that they were paying large sums of money to professional smugglers, whom they called "coyotes", and that these coyotes routinely robbed and abandoned their clients, leaving them to be picked up by the Mexican and U.S. Immigration officials. Corbett remembered the twenty-six refugees found in the desert the year before. Outraged that professional smugglers were taking advantage of refugees Corbett took a second decision - he would try to help refugees enter the United States without INS detection. Later, in May 1981, Jim Corbett would write a letter to his fellow Quakers:

Imagine a moonless night and a group of about 15 fugitives who are groping their way through a country that is terrifyingly alien to them. Two carry infants. Three are small children who clutch at their parents hands and try not to cry. The blinding stare of the spotlights suddenly freezes them in place. An amplified voice blares orders. Uniformed men close in. They will be sent back, maybe to be tortured or killed, at the very least to live under the daily threat of being assaulted or killed at the whim of any soldier. It needn't happen that way though, if the people who live where they

are captured would help them, but few of the local people seem to know it's happening. Maybe they don't want to know... I guess I knew without really knowing it. After all those Salvadorans died on the desert last year, ofcourse I knew. But there were so many other concerns to keep me busy and I didn't know I could do anything about it.

Years later many people would attribute Corbett's decision to get involved in transporting refugees across the border to the fact that he was a practicing Quaker. Quakers have a long tradition of service, commitment to social justice and civil disobedience. Many Quakers were involved in the underground railroad developed by abolitionists period in the 1800's. Quakers were at the forefront of the peace movement of the 1960's and the anti-nuclear movement of the 1970's. Corbett's commitment to the Quaker philosophy would influence all his activities in the sanctuary movement. Later Reverend Fife would attribute the emergence of the sanctuary movement to Corbett and to the fact that he was a Quaker:

What happened next began with an individual. Jim Corbett, a Quaker. They are always better then the rest of us, always there first.

After making the decision to try to help refugees cross the border Corbett became involved with an existing network of religious people who had become involved in helping Central American refugees enter the United States. He learned about this network from people working with refugees in the prisons in Mexico.

Mobilization:Phase III - Getting Others Involved

Jim Corbett had been forced to retire from ranching due to bad arthritis. At the time he made the decision to help refugees he was unemployed. Thus, he was able to committ himself to helping refugees on a full-time basis. Corbett was very familiar with the border terrain because of years of ranching and goat herding on both sides of it. Within months he was giving advice and pre-border counseling to refugees who were trying to cross the border without INS detection:

I worked out ways for them to get across, with safe-houses ready for them so they would get off the streets as soon as they did cross. Ways to get them around road blocks and Border Patrol surveillance and into Tucson.

More importantly, Corbett was willing and eager to share that information. Both he and Pat were extremely active members of their Quaker Meeting (congregation) and in the Quaker community in Tucson. After becoming involved in crossing refugees they began to actively engage in informing fellow Quakers about the situation of undocumented refugees in Mexico and the United States. Since beginning to work with undocumented Salvadoran refugees, both Jim and Pat Corbett had been sharing their concern for refugees and information about their

percarious situation with fellow Quakers. Within a few days after his first visit to the prison in Mexico, Corbett wrote a letter to Quakers suggesting that they form a network to help Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees evade capture:

This letter is being written in the hopes that among us we can initiate an integrated response to the needs of Central American refugees... the victims of war and oppression.

Gradually Quakers with whom the Corbetts worshipped in Tucson became involved in helping refugees enter the United States. Corbett continued to write letters to Quakers describing his experiences with these refugees and the conditions by which they left their countries. Because of the information that Corbett provided in these letters Quakers with whom he worshipped began circulating the letters throughout the Quaker community. As Quakers learned about what was happening to the refugees they responded to Corbett's call for involvement. Slowly Quakers throughout the United States offered to help the refugees. In order to distribute Corbett's letters more widely, Corbett and others began using the office space and resources at the American Friends Service Organization (AFSC), a Quaker organization located next door to the Quaker meeting house. They sent letters to fellow Quakers all over the

country. Members of the Meeting (congregation) and members of the staff at the American Friends Service Organization took this task very seriously. Within a few days of Corbett's writing a letter, copies would be xeroxed, envelopes stuffed and addressed and sent all over the country.

In the summer of 1981 Corbett committed himself to informing Quakers all over the United States and in Mexico about the situation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in the United States and to getting them involved. He was also eager to talk to other members of the religious community. The Corbetts began to speak frequently at Quaker events and at meetings of other religious congregations. They committed themselves to disseminating Jim Corbett's letters. They made phone calls to other Quaker meetings. They spoke at congregational and denominational gatherings wherever and whenever possible. Within several months Quakers in the United States and Mexico began to assist Corbett and others in their clandestine and public efforts to help Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees.

Between 1981 and 1986 Jim Corbett extensively utilized the office staff and space of the American Friends Service Committee in Tucson to involve and mobilize Quakers throughout the United States and Mexico

to work with refugees. Later the American Friends Service Organization came to play an important role in the development of the sanctuary movement and the underground railroad in the United States and in Mexico. In a powerfully moving letter to Quakers, dated 6 of July 1981, Corbett spoke of a battle raging in Arizona and the borderlands:

Because the refugees are here, the war against the people of Latin America is being waged here as well. Yet, because the refugees are here among us, the basic communities capable of waging the peace can also emerge here... Lupe (an attorney with the El Concilio Manzo in Tucson) often warns those who volunteer for work with the refugees that part-time involvement is difficult. It's as though a battle were raging here in Arizona and the other borderlands; the problem is not how much to do but how to allocate the little we can do in order to be most effective in reducing casualties. Each week we must turn our backs on refugees who desperately need help but for whom there's just not enough time or money. And there are hundreds of thousands in El Salvador whose agonies far exceeds the sufferings of those reaching the U.S... Please don't take this as a pitch for donations. This issue is much more fundamental and has to do with our sharing life -- it has to do with communion -- rather than with the giving of money. There's no way for us to take our stand with the refugees while retaining the privileges and immunities the war machine provides us... Choosing to serve the poor and the powerless - not just as an intellectual posture or as a charitable gesture, but in spirit and truth - we will soon be stripped of our wealth and position.

Mobilization: Phase III - The Tucson Ecumenical Council on Central America

The experiences that pastors in the Tucson Ecumenical Council had with the thirteen survivors in

July 1980 convinced them that they needed to continue to work with detained Salvadoran refugees. For many members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council, like Reverend John Fife, the experience had jolted them into an awakening about the plight of Salvadoran refugees:

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I learned some incredible stories about El Salvador... In the summer of 1980 I couldn't place El Salvador on the map. I had assumed that people were coming across from Central America for the same reasons that people were coming across our border from Mexico. It was hard in the village, they were poor... But these folks from El Salvador were telling a different set of stories. They were talking about death squads and about torture and about the kind of terrorism and violence that we now know about... And so I started to do my homework after that experience.

After their experiences with these thirteen survivors, members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council made the decision to continue ministering to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Gradually, as they began to understand why they were fleeing their homelands in search of refuge in the North, they became more and more involved in this ministry. As the enormous risks that took to leave their homelands became more apparent, as they began to comprehend what was involved in crossing borders in Central America and in Mexico, and as they realized what their government's response to these refugees was, their commitment to help grew stronger.

Like many members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council Reverend John Fife, pastor of Southside Presbyterian Church, was committed to helping people and was an active member of the religious community. As a member of the Presbyterian General Assembly (USA), the governing body of that denomination, Fife had access to vital social movement skills and resources. He also had considerable community organizing experience from years of working in the civil rights and anti-war movements:

All my experiences, working with civil rights, multi-national corporations and the peace movement during the Vietnam war were a training center for my work with refugees. So when they began to show up in the prisons and detention centers in 1980 I knew how to organize the churches and work in an ecumenical movement in order to deal with a national problem.

By late July members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council had made a formal decision to become involved in ministry with undocumented Central American refugees. This commitment extended to directly helping individual refugees in their midst, not to the refugee population generally. But, they were also determined to struggle to change their government's policy of systematic apprehension, detention and deportation of all undocumented Central Americans.

In July 1981 members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council formally established a task force on Central America. This decision directly reflected growing

concern for undocumented Central American refugees in Tucson's religious community. Many of the Council's most active clergy and members were becoming increasingly committed to helping the refugees. Thus, after several informal discussions and formal meetings, members of the Council decided that a special task force was needed to meet the special needs of the undocumented refugee community.

The Tucson Ecumenical Council Task Force objectives were reflective of the most pressing and immediate needs of the refugee community based on information the members had gathered during the one year they had been working with them. According to Reverend James Symons, once president of the Council, the task force had two objectives:

The first objective of the new task force was to explore the situation in which growing numbers of refugees were being picked up by the Border Patrol and sent to a detention center before being returned to Central America to face torture, harassment or death. The second objective was to provide social services, such as housing, jobs, medical help and legal assistance for the people who had evaded arrest. With the full support of its sixty-some churches, the Tucson Ecumenical Council became an advocate for the Central American refugees.

Ten days after the first official Tucson Ecumenical Council on Central America meeting more than a dozen Council members, including its first chair Reverend

Symons, visited the El Centro detention center in California where many of the Salvadorans and Guatemalans apprehended in the Southwest were detained. After interviewing several detainees, the majority of whom said they wanted to apply for political asylum, members of the Council realized that a tremendous amount of money would be needed to obtain their release. Thus, the newly formed Tucson Ecumenical Council on Central America launched a major fundraising drive. Clergy and parishoners made pitches in their congregations and communities asking for individual donations. Denominational committees were called upon to donate what they could. Congregations were asked to donate monies from their joint funds. Local community activists and their constituents were approached. According to Symons the drive resulted in a great deal of money, much of which was contributed by individual parishoners:

An amazing response in fact. Three quarter of a million dollars was raised, much of it in the form of real estate put up by individuals as collateral.

The Tucson Ecumenical Council on Central America (TECCA) was originally housed in Saint Mark's Presbyterian Church in Tucson. The pastor there had a long history of social activism, much of it within the context of Latin America. Gary MacEoin was also a member

of the church. MacEoin was instrumental in the formation of the TECCA and he played an important role in the evolution and development of the sanctuary movement. The first director of TECCA was Tim Nonn, a young Tucson resident, who was later named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1985-86 grand jury case against the sanctuary movement. Reverend Fife, who served as the Council's first chairperson, described TECCA as "one unified task ministry in the Tucson area for refugees from Central America." Reverend Symons explained the Council's involvement in the sanctuary movement as rooted in the gospel:

It represents that part of the body of Christ which sees the whole world as an arena for God's concern, Where people are hurting is where Christians are called to act.

From its inception the Tucson Ecumenical Council on Central America was funded by a variety of ecumenical and interfaith sources. Funding was used to support a wide range of activities which varied over the years. The task force's earliest tasks were to coordinate social services and raise bond money for detained refugees. In addition, staff and members worked on legislative agendas, fundraising for social services, and public education. Under the direction of Reverend Fife they also developed corporate strategies to

pressure an airline which had contracted with the INS to deport Salvadorans to El Salvador, forcing them to halt their contract with the INS. At one point TECCA raised and expended more than one million dollars for bonds. By May 1985 the budget included expenditures for administration, legal services, social services, advocacy, bail bond project, sanctuary support and loan activity. The total budget for that month was \$6,428.08. The yearly budget that year was \$33,737.05. In 1982 the membership of TECCA organized a committee which was set up to identify key legislative avenues for refugee relief. One member of that group explained that the agenda was broad in scope:

... work involved lobbying not only for progressive refugee legislation but also to reduce aid to the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala and to stop aid to the contras in Nicaragua.

Those members of the religious community who spoke Spanish began to assist attorneys by going into the prisons to inform refugees of their legal rights. They also gathered testimonies and served as translators. Those who did not speak Spanish became involved in other activities: raising bond money, mobilizing clothing, food, shelter, medical and dental care and gathering information about families which had been separated. Everyone became involved in trying to educate themselves

and members of their congregations about political and social conditions in Central America and U.S. immigration policy and practice.

Visits with Salvadorans detained by the INS in prisons and detention centers proved critical in raising the consciousness of members of the religious community in Tucson. Through extensive discussions with detained Salvadorans and Guatemalans, often in the course of taking testimony, North Americans learned about persecution and repression in El Salvador and Guatemala.. Many were completely unaware of these conditions. Within weeks of assisting attorneys and meeting undocumented Salvadorans, members of the religious community also became aware of the great degree to which Salvadorans were being apprehended, detained and deported by the INS, sometimes as many as one thousand a month. They shared this new information with members of their congregations, the Tucson Ecumenical Council and concerned citizens who came seeking information about refugees.

Because of their experiences in the detention centers and prisons ministers, priests and members of their congregations in Tucson also began to comprehend the degree to which the INS was systematically depriving Salvadorans of their rights to due process and legal

council. New information continually reaffirmed their motivation to become involved in ministry with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugee community. According to Peggy Hutchinson, Director of border ministry for the Methodist Church in Tucson, who was in her early thirties and newlywed when she was indicted, convicted and sentenced to five years probation for smuggling illegal aliens, explained how working with attorneys as a translator in the detention centers was critical in motivating her to learn more about the refugee situation and do something to help them:

In the course of translating for North Americans working with refugees in the prisons I began to hear these incredible stories from people who considered themselves very apolitical. What I knew intellectually I began to understand emotionallly...I'd go into the Salvation Army and there would be twenty to twenty-five women and children in this one small place and they'd say, "well we were picked up by the border patrol walking north from Nogales or Sonora or Aguapriata and they told us to sign something but we don't understand what it means and they told us that our husbands have signed it and are on their way back to El Slavador and if we want to be with them we need to sign too." And I'd investigate that, make some phone calls and find out their husbands were in a Tucson jail or Wilmont (the prison). These people had been lied to. And they had no idea of what their rights were and I didn't either. So I began to investigate... As I learned more I knew I had no choice but to get involved.

It was during this intial contact period with Salvadorans that many members of the religious community began to understand, as had Reverend Fife, that there

were differences between the experiences of undocumented Mexicans with whom they were familiar and undocumented Salvadorans and that the costs of each populations being deported were extremely different. One sanctuary activist stated:

After going into the detention centers I began to understand that these people were different from the normal economic migrants coming from Mexico. They had incredible stories about death squads and bodies appearing on the street everyday and escaping for their lives. That's when I began to think of them as refugees, people who were fleeing persecution and for the first time I began to understand the danger of their being deported to El Salvador.

Visits with Salvadorans and Guatemalans also proved critical to the development of the sanctuary movement's underground railroad because in the course of these discussions members of the religious community in Tucson began to learn what routes and contacts Salvadorans had used as they attempted to enter the United States without INS detection. These discussions enabled members of the religious community to develop a wide range of resources which they incorporated into their ongoing work with undocumented Central American refugees.

Mobilization: Stage IV - Networking

In late 1981 Jim Corbett began working to link Quaker concern for undocumented refugees in Mexico with concern amongst members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council on Central America for refugees in and out of detention in the United States. Corbett argued that the Council's frantic efforts to delay deportation through legal defense and bail bond once refugees were caught were futile because the INS had shown a consistent record of denying asylum applications for Salvadorans and Guatemalans. Thus though these efforts bought valuable time for the refugees they did not prevent them from being apprehended, detained, and ultimately deported. Corbett was able to convince several members of the Task Force, including Reverend Fife, that the fundamental need was for undocumented refugees to avoid capture altogether. Corbett argued that this was the only way they could avoid the traumas and dangers of apprehension, detention and deportation.

Corbett worked hard to involve large numbers of people in the religious community in border ministry with refugees in Mexico. He began to write open letters to Quakers, to speak at church meetings of any denomination, to network with individuals in the

Tucson Ecumenical Council on Central America. Gradually, individual Christians began to assist Corbett, and other Quakers on their trips from Tucson to Mexico and back; assisting refugees in crossing the border without INS detection. As more people became involved the network grew in strength and other people took on leadership roles. Gradually, more and more people began to offer to assist in border ministry with refugees, including people from outside the city.

Temporary Shelter in the Churches

In the Fall of 1981 a critical change took place in the small community of people working to help refugees in Tucson. The Corbetts had reached the point where their own home and the homes of all their friends and fellow Quakers had been over-utilized as safehouses. They needed new places where undocumented refugees could stay after they had successfully crossed the border without INS detection. Thus, they were motivated to search out new places where refugees could find temporary refuge in the United States. This is what motivated Jim Corbett to approach Reverend Fife, chairperson of the Tucson Ecumenical Council on Central America and minister of Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson, to ask if he would allow his church to be used

as a temporary refuge for refugees.

Both Jim Corbett and Reverend Fife were fully aware that if Southside Church were to be used as shelter it would mean that members of the congregation would be involving themselves in breaking the law as the government interpreted it. Aiding, abetting and harboring "illegal aliens" were federal crimes, punishable by up to two years in jail and \$5000 fines for each "illegal alien" assisted. It was completely clear that the INS considered Salvadorans and Guatemalans without entry papers or applications for entry status to be illegal aliens.

Nevertheless from the moment the proposal was raised Reverend Fife, who had been working as chairperson of the Council to protect Salvadorans in the United States for over a year, was in favor of using the church as a shelter. But he could not make such a major decision for his congregation. Thus, he brought Corbett's proposal to the Session, governing body of the Presbyterian congregation. That October (1981) the Session argued and deliberated about the repercussions of taking such a bold action. They also prayed and reflected on their moral requirements as Christians in the world. They listened to Jim Corbett and their pastor Reverend Fife, both of whom pressed them to act on their

responsibility as Christians. Jim Corbett stated his position clearly:

For those of us who would be faithful in our allegiance to the Kingdom of God there is no way to avoid recognizing that collaboration with the U.S. government is a betrayal of our faith even if it is loudly protesting collaboration. We can take our stand with the oppressed or we can take our stand with organized oppression... When the government itself sponsors the crucifixion of an entire people and then makes it a felony to shelter those seeking refuge, law abiding protest merely train us to live with atrocity.

For Christians the Kingdom of God represents mans responsibility on earth. This responsibility to God is demonstrated for Christians in Jesus's life on earth. Laid out in the ten commandments and the gospel. Asserted in the New Testament by Jesus on the mount. The Kingdom of God is a place where God's laws and teachings are followed and lived out. Thus, Corbett's statement appealed directly to Christian responsibility on earth.

Nevertheless, many members of the congregation were afraid to break the law. People who live in border states, like Tucson, are very aware of the consequences of helping undocumented people, "illegal aliens". members of the religious community were aware that the INS had harrassed Corbett and others during their visits with detained refugees in the detention centers and prisons. They were also aware that the INS considered

Salvadorans to be "illegal aliens" and that anyone assisting them could be arrested and punished.

Still other members of the congregation felt that the church wasn't physically large enough to handle refugees, even on a temporary basis. There was concern expressed about how the refugees physical presence would interfere with other congregational activities and the childrens school which the church housed. Some members felt that the congregation's energies and finances could be better spent on activities directly related to refugees already in the United States or on other projects. But the majority expressed that they felt it was their Christian responsibility to care for refugees in their midst.

Despite their opinions and feelings about involvement with refugees, all of the members of Southside congregation were fully aware of how committed their minister was to his ministry with Central American refugees. Week after week they had listened to Fife's sermons on helping the poor and the oppressed, the refugee, the persecuted. They were aware of his personal and organizational commitment to the Council, to its new Task Force on Central America and most importantly to the undocumented refugee community. They were also aware that Fife felt strongly that his congregation should be

involved with this community in an ongoing, formal way.

In addition, many Southside parishoners felt a special commitment to the Latino community. More than one third of the congregation parishoners were either Latino, related of Latinos through marriage, or living in Latino neighborhoods in Tucson. Southside Church was located in a poor Latino, mostly Mexican, neighborhood. Thus, in October 1981 Southside Presbyterian Church's Session and congregation agreed to shelter undocumented refugees in their church. Reverend Fife describes his congregation's decision to offer shelter to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in their church as part of a process which involved stages:

Notice that movement which is fairly typical of churches engaged with human needs. From an individual encounter, to prayer and reflection, to acceptable legal ways of trying to deal with the problem. Then to an ecumenical response and then to broad range of strategies which up until that point were all in the category of acceptable legal responses. But once we exhausted all those avenues of acceptable legal redress, all those which we had discovered and organized and poured our energies into...it became obvious that that was not going to solve the problem. What happened next began with an individual. Jim Corbett, a Quaker. They are always better than the rest of us, always there first. He'd looked at all those considerable efforts by the ecumenical community in Tucson and he said, "If you really believe God is calling you to serve refugees than you're operating at the wrong end of the problem. The fundamental need of the refugees is to avoid capture and detention and deportation. And frantic efforts to delay deporation once refugees are caught are futile." So he went on his own to learn from the Church in Mexico. How they were aiding refugees and what the refugees fundamental

needs were. And the answer becomes very simple. The point at which the refugees lives hang most precariously in the balance, where their needs are the greatest, is the point at which they are most vulnerable to being caught. So he began on his own to bring refugees safely across the border. To bring them into his home in Tucson and pretty soon the homes of his friends and relatives. When I first met Jim Corbett he had eighteen Salvadorans and Guatemalans living in his tiny four room house. So he did what is natural in that flow of ministry that we just outlined. He'd already occupied all the homes of the Quakers so he came to me and he said "Can I bring undocumented people to the church to stay?" That was the point at which I had to decide as the minister of the church and our congregation had to decide as a community of faith if we were going to say what was acceptable and what was legal or were we going to join the refugees as unacceptables and as outcasts?

From that day on any Central American refugee could receive temporary shelter in Southside Presbyterian Church. Several members of the congregation and Session agreed to work with Fife and the Tucson Ecumenical Task Force on Central America staff to coordinate refugee related activities and needs. In addition, members of other congregations came forth on an almost daily basis to offer help to the Task Force and the committee. Members of the Session and the committee agreed that it would be most useful to use the two small rooms behind the church sanctuary for housing. These rooms were located away from the school area, were near the bathrooms, had their own entrance and allowed for privacy. They used the church kitchen on the other side, the only kitchen in the church, which was shared with the children's school, for food preparation.

The congregation's coordinating committee to help refugees was informal. But the Ecumenical Task Force provided leadership to the committee and handled the details of daily life for the refugees. In addition, a group which met weekly to help refugees in Mexico constantly provided leadership and resources to refugees living at Southside Church. Most of the financial resources were handled by Council or Task Force staff. Money, clothing, food, medical and dental care and other material resources were consistently donated by a wide range of people in the community, most of whom, but not all, were members of congregations.

Sometimes Central Americans came to stay at Southside in groups of two or four, sometimes in groups of ten or fifteen. Sometimes they stayed overnight, sometimes they stayed for weeks. When the Church could not house any more people other congregations came forward to offer space in their churches and members homes. Several refugees became permanent members of Southside congregation and the sanctuary community. No matter how long they stayed or how many there were, members of Southside congregation and other congregations provided food and clothing to all who passed through. They also arranged for shelter for those who wished to stay in Tucson and assisted people in

moving on to other cities in search of relatives, friends and work.

Mobilization: Stage V- Border Ministry with Undocumented Refugees

Almost simultaneously a second critical change occurred for members of the religious community in Tucson involved in ministry with refugees. In addition to sheltering refugees in Southside Presbyterian Church, many members of the religious community became involved in assisting refugees in crossing the Mexican border. Gradually a tightly knit network of people developed which functioned to assist undocumented refugees evade detection from Mexican and U.S. immigration officials. A small group of people began to meet frequently in churches in Tucson and in peoples homes to discuss the situation for particular undocumented refugees in Mexico who wanted to enter the United States. They would arrange to enter Mexico by car or by foot, meet the undocumented Central Americans in churches and safehouses in Mexico, counsel them on crossing the border, arrange for cars which would meet them on the other side and for safehouses in the United States. They made all these arrangements carefully and privately, telling no one outside of their network about their activities. MacEoin recalls that early period:

As they (the refugees) arrived, the ministry broadened. Doctors volunteered their services for malnourished children, for victims of torture. People brought food, were soon inviting the refugees to stay in their homes. Some joined Corbett in his work on the border. It was all done in utmost secrecy, but the INS soon realized that something unusual was happening and sent a message, indirect but clear: We're not exactly sure what your'e up to, but stop it or we'll indict you.

At this stage in the sanctuary movements development people involved in border ministry with undocumented refugees perceived their activities to be either illegal, as did Reverend Fife and his congregation, or civilly disobedient, as did Corbett and his fellow Quakers. The majority believed that their activities were illegal because the U.S. immigration officials made them believe that their activities were illegal. They harassed them in the detention centers and prisons, frightened them when they worked with refugees out on bond, and threatened them when they worked on the border. Fife describes this period:

We began very quietly, very, very quietly...We extended the hospitality of the church to them, but it was all very secretive because we thought it was illegal. So we went through this very silly phase of passwords and codewords. Secret goings on and strange phonecalls that I could never understand.

The fact that people in Tucson perceived their activities to be illegal or civilly disobedient at this early stage is important to understand because later sanctuary movement activists changed their position,

maintaining that their activities were completely legal. This change was the result of activists being provided with new information from attorneys on both domestic and international refugee legislation which legitimated their actions. So profound was this change that in 1985 the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York City filed a suit on behalf of over twenty declared sanctuary congregations in which they charged the U.S. government with breaking its own Refugee Act of 1980 and International Protocols and Conventions.

Ministers, priests, Quakers, nuns, members of the congregations, Tucson Ecumenical Council and Task Force might have continued to quietly assist undocumented Central Central American refugees to enter the United States without INS detection indefinitely had it not been for the government's decision to stop them. Government harassment began almost as soon as members of Tucson's religious community began mobilizing to help undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Despite their attempts at secrecy and planning, the Border Patrol in Arizona learned of their involvement with undocumented refugees in Mexico and of their sheltering these refugees in churches and homes in the United States and began to send them a very direct message. According to Fife the message was "stop it or we'll

indict you." On May 30, 1981 federal officers briefly imprisoned Corbett and a Salvadoran refugee at the deportation prison in El Centro. INS harassment continued throughout 1981. This was only one of several confrontations between INS officials and members of Tucson's religious community involved in border ministry with undocumented Central American refugees.

Mobilization: Stage VI - The Declaration of Public Sanctuary

In November 1981 a group of people who described themselves as "working together in ministry with Central American refugees" - ministers, priests, nuns, members of Southside Presbyterian Church and other laity - held a meeting to decide how to function in the midst of increasing government harassment. Members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council, the Task Force, Southside Church, Quakers, Methodists and the group that met to help refugees in Mexico were present. Reverend Fife recalls that day:

We met around that in my living room. Several of us sitting around saying either we quit or the indictments would happen. What do we do? Well it was very clear we couldn't quit. But it was very clear we didn't want to be indicted either... In the midst of that kind of desperate crisis we decided that the only other option was to say publically

what we were doing in private and in secret. What we were doing was something like the ancient tradition of sanctuary. Let's call it that and let's publicly declare our church a sanctuary church. Then we reached out. One congregation cannot bear that burden alone.

After that meeting the congregation and Session of Southside Presbyterian Church went through a lengthy, painful process of bible study, prayer, discussion and reflection during the month of December. One month later, in January 1982, they agreed to publically declare their church a sanctuary for Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees fleeing persecution and war in their homelands. They chose the 24th of March, the anniversary of the assassination of Arch Bishop Romero, as the date to make their declaration public.

It is clear that participants at the November meeting, members of the Council's Task Force on Central America, and members of the group working to help refugees in Mexico were motivated to make their activities known to the public and to reach out to other congregations by their fear of being arrested and indicted. But the decision to go public was also the product of a thoughtful and more profound understanding of the limitations and frustrations of clandestine work with undocumented refugees. Many people felt that the secretive nature of the ministry contributed to the Reagan Administration's determination to keep the North

American public ignorant about the reality of the plight of undocumented Central American refugees in the United States and of its policy to deport them. After working with refugees for a year it had become clear to them that clandestine efforts would not change the Immigration department's policy of apprehension, detention and deportation. Thus, members of the religious community in Tucson made the decision to reach out to other congregations in the hopes that they too would declare sanctuary and that their joint action would eventually force the government to change its domestic refugee policy. One Tucson sanctuary activist explained that position:

It was clear to us that the underground was saving a few people, in a few years we could save hundreds. But in the long run we would lose thousands. We needed more support, public support, and it had to come from the religious community.

In need of more support for their decision to declare sanctuary members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council on Central America came up with a list of names of clergy and congregations across the country whom they thought would be receptive to the idea of declaring public sanctuary. The list was generated informally, but it was based on personal contacts and social networks

built through years of social activism in the religious community. Many of the clergypeople and congregations on the list had been active in the civil rights movement, the antiwar movement and the antinuclear movement. Many of the pastors were known to pastors involved in Tucson Ecumenical Council through denominational activities and other religious community networks.

In January 1982 two letters were sent to two-hundred congregations across the United States. One from Tim Nonn, then the director of the Tucson Ecumenical Council Task Force on Central America, on behalf of the the task force. The other from Jim Corbett on behalf of people working with refugees in Mexico. Nonn's letter was straightforward. It stated that Southside Presbyterian Church was planning to declare itself a sanctuary for undocumented refugees on March 24th, the anniversary of Romero's assasination, and that the Council and the congregation were seeking support and active involvement from other congregations and members of the religious community.

Corbett's letter was more elaborate. It explained that a group of Tucsonians were engaged in a new ministry which involved them in bringing undocumented refugees into the United States. Corbett explained that an underground network of people only served to mask the

reality of refugees in the United States and that members of the network urgently needed to make contact with religious fellowships of all denominations throughout the country which would publicly declare their places of worship to be sanctuaries, making their churches available as temporary places of refuge for undocumented refugees. It is important to note that in his letter Corbett made it clear that members of the religious community in Tucson were thinking of sanctuary as a temporary form of shelter and refuge:

Just make your places of worship available as a temporary refuge for fugitive Salvadorans and Guatemalans who will occasionally pass through - and tell both the public and those who prohibit you exactly where you stand... Declarations of sanctuary fuse humanitarian efforts to help refugees with political pressures against the policies that force them to flee their homes.

On March 24, 1982 seven congregations publicly declared their churches to be sanctuaries for Central American refugees. The sanctuary movement was born.

Chapter Five

Case Study of the Sanctuary Movement in New York City

In 1980, census figures indicated that New York City had a population of 7,071,639 people; 60.7% of whom were White, 25.2% of whom were Black, 19.9% of whom were Latino. While these figures illustrate the fact that New York City is home to a large Latino population, predominantly Puerto Rican, Cuban and Dominican, they do not indicate the great number of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who began to enter New York City in 1980. But beginning in 1980 Central Americans increasingly began to settle in the city. By 1982 New York State had the largest concentration of Salvadoran refugees outside of Los Angeles in the United States, at least 100,000, concentrated largely in Brooklyn and on Long Island. The majority had entered the United States outside of ordinary immigration channels, were undocumented, had never presented themselves to the INS, and were employed in marginal sectors of the economy. Figures collected by religious organizations who worked with refugees, such as the Center for Immigrants Rights, suggest that most Salvadorans lived below the poverty line. This fact must be considered alongside the fact that undocumented people do not have access to social services, including health services and public housing.

Riverside Church

Although many other churches were involved in supporting, protecting and assisting Salvadorans and Guatemalans in New York City from 1982 when the sanctuary movement emerged publically to the Summer 1986 when this study was completed Riverside Church was the only sanctuary church in New York City. A few churches offered quiet, private shelter (hospitality) to Salvadorans and Guatemalans and contributed financially to projects like La Clinica Oscar Romero, which offered medical and psychological support to refugees. A small number of congregations in the city were involved in ecumenical coalitions, like the Upper West Side Central American Inter-religious Task force, which lobbied to change refugee legislation in the United States and was dedicated to educating the religious community. But only the congregation of Riverside Church formally declared their church to be a sanctuary and publicly sheltered refugees.

From the day that Riverside Church opened its doors in New York City on October 5, 1930. From its inception the church drew many parishoners and large crowds. At that time most people came to hear Reverend Henry Emerson Fosdick, the congregation's first pastor,

nationally known for his controversial sermons on fundamentalism and social justice. From its inception the congregation was always committed to living by the social gospel. During the Great Depression the church secured jobs for the unemployed, set up a sewing workshop to teach women marketable skills, created a small nursery school to assist parents, tided hungry people over their financial hardship, offered practical, sympathetic counseling and established an arts and crafts program for the discouraged and the jobless. In addition, Reverend Fosdick's pacifist stance brought both him and the congregation further into the national limelight during the Second World War.

Reverend Robert McCracken followed in Reverend Fosdick's steps. For twenty years he followed Fosdick's example of relating the gospel to social as well as individual needs. McCracken continued to call for peace among nations, spoke out in favor of desegregation and against racism and was particularly concerned with urban problems,. In 1954 McCracken warned the congregation

The ever-present danger which confronts the Church is that it may become insipid - standing for nothing in particular, hesitant, halfhearted, its message muffled and uncertain.

In 1968 Reverend Ernest Campbell came to the pulpit. During his tenure more Blacks and Asians entered the congregation and rose to positions of leadership within the church. The congregation became involved in women's issues, the civil rights movement, and the anti-war movement.

In October 1977 Reverend William Sloan Coffin arrived as Riverside's fourth senior minister. Reknowned for his anti-war activities and charismatic Biblically based and socially oriented sermons Coffin drew larger numbers of people to the church. Although Riverside church has always been affiliated with the American Baptist Churches and in 1957 with the United Church of Christ it has consistently been characterized, as an ecumenical rather than a denominational congregation. Its members come from a wide range of denominations. Riverside is also characterized as interracial. Members were proud that minority representation in the congregation and in leadership positions in the eighties were proportional to minority membership.

Throughout its history the church attracted internationally reknowned visiting preachers and laypersons, including Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. who chose to take his stand against the Vietnam war from the Riverside pulpit. Between 1980 and 1986 the church

had a membership of approximately 3000 and consistently attracted dozens of visitors each Sunday. Riverside consistently upheld its reputation as a church committed to peace and social justice. That is why Reverend Sloan Coffin concluded his prayer at the 1980 Fosdick centennial with these words:

We too, must carry on a lover's quarrel with the world, so that when ... we depart this life, we leave behind a little more truth, a little more justice, a little more peace, a little more beauty, than would have been there had we not cared enough about the human race to quarrel with it, not for what it is, but for what it yet might be.

Mobilization: Phase I - The Process of Considering Sanctuary

Although Riverside Church did not formally declare itself a sanctuary church until June, 1984, members of the congregation were aware of the existence of the sanctuary movement and had contemplated declaring public sanctuary as early as February 1982. Reverend William Sloan Coffin, Jr. was one of approximately two hundred people who had been contacted by TECCA in the Winter of 1982 when the Tucson Ecumenical Council sent out its request that congregations show their commitment to Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees by publicly declaring sanctuary with Southside Presbyterian Church on March 24, 1982.

Perhaps Reverend Coffin was selected because of his reputation as a leader in the anti-war movement in the late sixties. But at that time, Reverend Coffin and other members of the congregation felt that precisely because of the church's position as an important local movement center during the anti-war movement, Riverside remained vulnerable to government harassment and infiltration. Without raising the issue with the congregation, they concluded that it would be strategically unwise to formally declare sanctuary at that time. One member of the Riverside sanctuary task force recalled:

Someone had contacted Bill (Coffin) earlier and there had been some internal, behind the scenes, discussion of the idea. But from what I understand Bill felt that the timing was wrong, that the congregation wasn't ready.

Nevertheless, members of Riverside Church began to indicate their support for the Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugee community. This support was consistent with Riverside's long history of social activism and its involvement with and support for refugees generally. In the seventies several Riverside members acted as unofficial hosts to members of the Chilean refugee community when they began to arrive in the U.S. in 1976. Later, many members became involved with Vietnamese

and Laotian refugees. Reverend Sloan Coffin had been outspoken in denouncing the war in Vietnam in the sixties, CIA involvement of the coup in Chile in the seventies and U.S. military intervention in Central America in the eighties.

Beginning in 1976 Riverside consistently allowed members of the Chilean refugee community to hold educational meetings, press conferences, fasts and other types of protest activities in the church building. When members of the Salvadoran refugee community began to request use of the church building beginning in 1981, Riverside staff immediately agreed. Several fasts, press conferences, meetings, slide shows and exhibitions, all organized to protest U.S. intervention in El Salvador and educate the local community of its consequences were held there.

An important and concrete part of Riverside's involvement with Central American refugees can be traced to 1982 when the church sponsored a "huelga de hambre" (hunger strike/fast) to draw attention to atrocities in El Salvador. For ten days members of the Salvadoran undocumented refugee community and two North Americans fasted in the church leaving late at night to sleep elsewhere. The fast drew the attention of the local media and community.

Although the question of sanctuary did not come up at this time, the "huelga" brought members of the congregation into direct contact with members of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugee community and concretely demonstrated Riverside's support for that community. A series of events followed which further cemented Riverside's commitment to and interest in the peoples of Central America, including several trips to Central America by Reverend Sloan Coffin, Cora Weiss, director of the Riverside Disarmament Center, and others. In 1983 members of the Salvadoran refugee community asked the church to sponsor a second fast. The difference this time was that they also asked if they could remain in the church overnight. Members of Riverside's governing body said they could not agree to that. But at that moment the issue of temporary church sanctuary was raised and it stayed in people's minds.

Mobilization:Phase II - Individual Action

In November 1983 Reverend Maryann Lundy, who lived in Wyzata, Minnesota, took a full-time position as Youth Director with the YMCA in New York City. As a member of St. Luke's Presbyterian Church in Minnesota and the wife of its pastor Dick Lundy, Maryann Lundy had been

involved in offering sanctuary to a Salvadoran refugee. Lundy's congregation had become involved with the sanctuary movement when one of its founding members, Art Bell, suggested that they invite Reverend Fife to talk to the congregation about his sanctuary ministry. Bell was a member of the Presbyterian National Committee for Mission Responsibility Through Investments, which John Fife chaired and had heard Reverend Fife speaking about his new ministry with refugees at a Committee meeting.

This led to a series of congregational study groups and Bible studies on Central America and Central American refugees which were related to an option for the poor. Several months later Reverend Fife contacted members of St. Lukes to ask if they could publicly offer sanctuary to a Salvadoran refugee who needed to leave Tucson quickly. Maryann Lundy recalls:

St. Lukes had a theme which started in 1980 when Dick became pastor of global action called "Walking in another's shoes, seeing with another's eyes... This was another step in that theme. The next step was to see refugees as our doorstep. So when Fife called saying, "we have a refugee who we have to move out" the Session met and decided in three hours to take in Rene Hurnado. As my husband said "when an issue becomes a person you respond."

In 1984 Maryann Lundy began to attend Riverside Church when she moved to New York. She quickly became involved in a house church, a group of people who met

and worshipped together on a regular basis, which was made up of people involved in social issues and committed to social activism:

Some of the people in my house church knew about the sanctuary movement and of St Lukes involvement. In particular Don Wilson, Director of Health, Education and Social Justice for the Presbyterian Church (USA). So a group of us began to consider getting Riverside to declare sanctuary. I began to educate Bill Coffin and others but there wasn't that much interest then. I began giving Bill things to read, newspapers clippings, the letter we (St. Lukes) had sent to the government.

Like many Presbyterians the Lundys and Wilsons had quickly become committed to the idea of offering sanctuary to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Beginning in the mid-sixties Presbyterians were involved in peace and antiwar movements. They were concerned with a wide range of peace and social justice issues which were consistently supported by statements from the General Assembly (USA), the denominations governing body.

As a denomination the Presbyterian Church became interested in the sanctuary movement very early. Four of the churches which first declared sanctuary in 1982 were Presbyterian. Moved by the commitment and enthusiasm of Reverend Fife the Presbyterian Church had started an official investigation into sanctuary. Although they questioned its legality it was clear that they supported

the movement and the strategy. According to one Presbyterian minister in New York, a long time peace and social justice activist:

Sanctuary was a great way to give visible form to important values and principles in the Presbyterian Church. It's a perfect vehicle. The family needs to be fed and clothed. They need a place to live and we can mobilize around that and do something about it. It's tangible. Our emphasis has always been on peace. The focus of the sanctuary movement is totally on peace. One way to express it is to receive people who are in danger. Sanctuary is a new form of that movement, a broad church movement for peace.

In the Fall of 1983 several members of Lundy's housechurch, including Don and Marie Wilson and Beverly Thompson Travis, began talking about the question of what issues could result in some commitment people could express by the end of Lent. Both Don Wilson and Thompson Travis were on a subcommittee of the Biblical and theological study committee which was planning a series of programs for Lent. Lundy suggested that they show a film on sanctuary recently completed by the World Council of Churches. She also volunteered to answer questions afterwards based on her experiences with St. Lukes in Minnesota:

Everyone in the group thought it was a wonderful idea. So one morning after the Sunday service we showed the film. We had expected about thirty people to come and were surprised when over one hundred people showed up. The film was 58 minutes so I thought that would mean we'd have about 10 minutes for questions. But people kept asking and asking and I did my best to answer ques-

tions, some of which I fumbled my way through. After almost two hours they still didn't show signs of wanting to leave so I looked towards the back and suggested that we pass around a sheet that people could sign. That sheet generated about thirty names... Those names later became the basis for the sanctuary committee.

After that meeting, members of the Biblical and theological study group and of Riverside's Disarmament Committee met formally to discuss how to mobilize the congregation at Riverside to declare sanctuary. Originally their idea was to try to promote the idea of sanctuary to a small group of people from the congregation first. Later they realized they needed to involve as many members as possible. Marianne Lundy, co-chair of the task force reported:

We originally thought our house church could be the sponsors of the issue but then we realized that it was a major issue and that it had to have wider ownership... We decided, mostly at Don's insistence and he was right, to involve the whole congregation as opposed to just involving the Board and the Deacons in it. Don Wilson and Cora Weiss especially felt that it had to have wide ownership.

A few weeks later that group hosted a supper to which they invited members of the congregation, Board of Deacons, Board of Trustees and the housekeeping staff. Cora Weiss recalls that from the beginning

...the committee was committed to inviting people whom we knew would oppose the idea of declaring sanctuary. We wanted to include them at every stage of the process so that later they wouldn't be able to say that they had been excluded. After the supper we became known as the sanctuary task force.

The group also invited Charlie Clemments, a doctor who had done voluntary service in the liberated zones in El Salvador and was an outspoken opponent of U.S. intervention; Reverend Dick Lundy, Presbyterian minister from Minnesota whose church had declared sanctuary, and Ira Goliman, an attorney and member of the Riverside congregation who was present to answer questions on the legality of the action. Although the meeting went well, Lundy still wasn't sure of the congregations commitment to sanctuary:

I remember thinking that my husband had presented the issue too boldly. ... His assumption was that people at Riverside would be really open and ready for sanctuary. I remember thinking, "oh gosh he doesn't realize how conservative some of these people are." Afterwards we talked alot about that... He stated the issues very clearly...in terms of the risks. I wanted the risks to be softened and he was just real open about what the risks were. In terms of what the liability of the congregation and the minister, we really didn't know at that time. He was just out with it, "well the government looks upon this as breaking the law."... His position was you have to make a decision, a commitment, and stand by that... He was straight out with it... Charlie presented a different manner completely though they were saying the same thing. There were alot of questions. Some officers came and from that we set up the adult education committee chaired by Marie Wilson, set up studies around sanctuary.

Lundy also recalled how interested Reverend Coffin was: Bill (Coffin) asked alot of questions at that time. He was learning about sanctuary... It was really unknown in the East coast at that time... Then we were off and running. We organized the committee into four areas: education, outreach, finance, and communications, I

think.... We formed the committee based on who had signed up the sheet that had been passed around...which included two young lawyers one of whom was Jean K.. Though we lost alot of those original people, they pledged their support.

Mobilization:Phase III - Education

After the dinner the sanctuary task force, as they were now known, began to work to educate the congregation. They organized a series of educationals to be held during the coffee hour after the Sunday worship services, held several public hearings on the issue, and provided members with masses of written material on sanctuary. For several months the sanctuary task force at Riverside hosted a table in the hall outside the church sanctuary after the Sunday worship service. Literature obtained at a low cost from the Chicago Religious Task Force and newspaper clippings xeroxed in people's offices were available for congregational members to take home. Each week different members of the Riverside sanctuary task force were present to answer questions. Sometimes people involved in the sanctuary movement or some aspect of refugee ministry participated. The goal was to educate the congregation on the plight of undocumented refugees in Central America and the United States and on what North American Christians in the sanctuary movement were doing about it.

Because Charlie Clements was in town members of the Biblical and theological study group scheduled him to speak to the congregation about his experiences in El Salvador from the pulpit on three consecutive Sundays.

One of the real pluses was that Charlie Clemments had been scheduled to speak from the pulpit on Sunday. In fact he spoke three Sundays in a row and he moved people so much... That decision (to have him speak) came out of another committee....

Later, Reverend Coffin followed with a sermon on the historical necessity of civil disobedience. Coffin's decision to preach on civil disobedience as a way of demonstrating his support for sanctuary had to do with the fact that by the time Riverside was deliberating over whether to offer sanctuary the sanctuary movement was over two years old. Several activists had been arrested and tried, and movement activists had become more legally sophisticated. Most sanctuary activists were convinced that they were upholding both domestic and international law and that in fact it was the government that was breaking the law. Most believed that any risks or illegal activities involved were related to transporting refugees but not to offering sanctuary. But most people outside of the movement were still focused on the government's interpretation of their activities as illegal or civilly disobedient. This explains why one sanctuary activist at Riverside commented:

Bill has been consistently supportive.... But I remember having really mixed reactions to Coffin's service on civil disobedience. We had said specifically that offering sanctuary was not civil disobedience. It was the government that was breaking the law. I remember coming away from that feeling like, oh God what will we do. Everyone else was so excited that Bill had come to speak publicly on favor of sanctuary but I remember feeling that now we'd have to educate Bill... We felt very strongly that in terms of getting it through Riverside would require getting the lawyers to understand that we were not breaking the law by offering sanctuary.

Mobilization:Phase IV - Debate and Persuasion

From the moment the task force raised the issue of declaring sanctuary at Riverside four sectors of the congregation were opposed to it. Many lawyers in the congregation, several of whom were members of the Board of Trustees, questioned the legality of the action and were against declaring sanctuary because it involved breaking the law. Several business people in the congregation, some of whom were also members of the Board of Trustees, were concerned with potential financial and legal consequences of the action. Both the business people and the lawyers were concerned that the church's tax exempt status would be threatened. In addition, some of the lawyers felt that as members of a congregation involved in "civil disobedience" their professional status might be threatened. In order to

deal with this opposition members of the task force asked the attorneys to form a group to develop alternative legal means of dealing with the refugee problem and changing immigration policy.

Several members of the congregation, most of whom were Eastern European, were opposed to the idea because they felt that Salvadorans and Guatemalans were not refugees and thus did not deserve the congregation's special attention. This sector was largely represented by an Eastern European couple.

Significant opposition to the proposal came from Black members of the congregation who were represented by the Black Christian Caucus, many of whom were on the Board of Deacons. The Caucus questioned declaring sanctuary on several grounds: First, they wanted to know why Haitians had not been included in the sanctuary proposal since they were also refugees, many of whom were detained and were clearly in need of support. Second, they questioned the wisdom of offering help to people outside of Riverside's geographic area when so many people in the community were desperately in need of assistance. Riverside Church is located on the outskirts of Harlem, home to a huge population of very poor, often unemployed people. Most of whom are Black or Latino.

Third, many felt that the exclusion of Haitians from the proposal combined with the desire to help as one member put it, "white people who don't even live in this country," when so many Blacks in the community were in great need of assistance, reflected the racism in the congregation and in the church.

Thus, even before the sanctuary task force formally presented the proposal to the congregation much discussion took place between representatives of these four sectors and members of the task force, including Cora Weiss, Maryann Lundy, Don Wilson and Reverend Coffin. Lundy recalled:

I'm sure that if we had not had anyone who fought the interdynamics of Riverside we wouldn't have gotten anywhere. But Don Wilson brought those issues to the Deacons and the Trustees...Don was the first chair because everyone felt that because he had been a Deacon and longtime respected member of the church it was important to get his visibility. We didn't want anyone to think it was the idea of some left wing cuckoo. I think even then we knew that there were alot of political questions and that we needed both his integrity and his ability to articulate the issues.

But on June 3, 1984, after months of education on the issue, informal discussion and behind the scenes negotiating, the sanctuary task force at Riverside invited members of the congregation, the Board of

Deacons and Trustees, the Black Christian Caucus, and members of the sanctuary movement to a public debate to discuss the sanctuary resolution. Several members of the sanctuary movement, including Jack Elder, Marilyn Chilcote, and three Benedictine Monks from Weston Priory, were present to give short presentations and answer questions. The debate lasted about three hours and was attended by over 250 members of the congregation. At that meeting it was made clear that a week later the congregation would be asked to vote on whether to declare itself a sanctuary church.

At this meeting, the Board of Trustees, Board of Deacons, and Black Christian Caucus presented their positions on the resolution and congregants had the opportunity to ask questions. Representatives of both the Board of Trustees and the Deacons had taken the initiative to meet previously and had voted against the sanctuary resolution. But because Riverside is both a United Church of Christ and a Baptist Church its congregational based polity allowed the congregation to vote on the resolution despite the fact that both the Board of Trustees and the Deacons had voted against it.

From the moment the proposal was formally submitted opposition came from the four sectors of the congregation who had expressed concern from the

beginning. Both the Board of Trustees and the Black Christian Caucus made it clear that they had serious problems with the resolution as it was presented to them. A spokesperson for the Trustees stated that although many members were in favor of legal efforts to protest military intervention and immigration policy vis-a-vis Central America and the Caribbean Basin, including lobbying, congregational education, and public demonstrations a majority had voted against the resolution for the following reason:

The key question for the Board of Trustees as a whole was that lawful means of reaching the same goal have not been actively pursued and that before we put the church in jeopardy of consequences we really cannot foretell we would prefer that as a body we pursue very vigorously all lawful means available to us.

The questions asked by congregants largely reflected the concerns of the Board of Trustees and the Black Christian Caucus. They revolved around the legal risks involved in the decision, how voting in favor of the resolution would effect the church's tax status, the financial commitment offering sanctuary would involve, possible public repercussions of the action, and how wise it was to take on the responsibility of caring for people from a foreign country when right outside the church doors there were so many poor people.

The position of the Black Christian Caucus was clear. Although they endorsed the principle of sanctuary they questioned the necessity of declaring Riverside a sanctuary, the decision to extend sanctuary only to Salvadorans and Guatemalans, and the wisdom of devoting so much energy to problems outside of the community.

The Black Christian Caucus endorses the principle of sanctuary. But we have questions in terms of the resolution as stated. Specifically while we fully understand the urgency of the refugee issue and related military intervention in Central America, we feel it is of vital importance that the U.S. policy and its moves to dominance within the Caribbean Basin and resulting refugee problems should not be and cannot be ignored... Secondly, the other thing that is of concern to us has to do with the process of how things happen or do not happen here at Riverside. We often become involved in what many of us see as the glamour issue of the moment here at Riverside. Where what some will call the more mundane issues are lost. Particularly we believe that Riverside has a very special obligation in terms of this city and to this community ... so that we live up to our total responsibilities, not just those which will bring us the spotlight and the cameras.

Throughout the meeting legal experts, members of congregations which had already declared sanctuary, and key members of the sanctuary movement were available to answer questions. Jack Elder, a sanctuary activist from Texas indicted in March 1983 on charges of transporting illegal aliens in Texas, was present. When asked about his reason for helping refugees Elder responded:

We as a country, through our tax dollars are sponsors of official terrorism in El Salvador. As Christians we have a special duty to help the victims.

Lisa Brogeyada, a lawyer who was then the director of Proyecto Libertad and one of Elder's defense attorneys tried to address congregants fears of committing civil disobedience or breaking the law:

Just as the government has legal tools at their disposal, sanctuary and refugee advocates have legal tools at their disposal which are just as powerful, perhaps more powerful, than those of the government... The Geneva Conventions of 1949, ratified by the United States, extends protection not only to the victims of armed conflict but also to the people who help the victims of armed conflict, which would include sanctuary churches and sanctuary workers.

The Brothers from the Weston Priory mission spoke of how they had first learned about persecution in Guatemala from Benedictine nuns who lived in Mexico. They also spoke of how rewarding their offering sanctuary to a family from Guatemalan had been for them. They also sang several songs they had written about their experiences with the family.

One week later, members of the congregation were given the opportunity to decide on whether the church should declare sanctuary, despite both the Board's and the Deacon's opposition to the proposal. A few days before the congregation met to vote, Cora Weiss

reflected on the process:

It's quite amazing really that the congregation is actually voting on it. In six years the congregation has met only once to vote. That was when the church voted to ask Columbia University to get rid of its trigger reactor. That time 400 members showed up and voted 399 to 1 to do it. We've never called the congregation together since then to vote on an issue that would commit the church to a position.

Mobilization:Phase V - Voting and Formal Decision Making

On June 10, 1984 the congregation met to vote on a resolution which would make Riverside Church a public sanctuary for refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala. Letters had been sent out to the entire membership describing the importance of the decision for Riverside and requesting that they show up to vote. The bylaws of the church stated that at least 100 members needed to be present but the congregation was insisting that many more be present in order to pass the resolution. More than four hundred members and thirty outsiders were present.

The meeting, which was closed to the press, was powerfully emotional and tense. The Chair, a member of the Board of Trustees and the Caucus sat on the stage with the clerk and the parliamentarian. An agenda had

been passed out earlier along with an alternate proposal to the sanctuary task force's proposal which had been written by several congregational members. The Chair called the meeting to order very formally and announced that the meeting had begun. Almost immediately a man grabbed the microphone and demanded, "How do we know who's a member and how do we know if there's a quorum?" The Chair answered that sign up sheets were being passed around but that it was visually clear that there was a quorum. At this point several other voices joined his, arguing that they could not be guaranteed that members of the press or visitors would not vote illegally and demanded to know how a person would be considered a member. Then they demanded that members of the press and visitors be asked to leave. The Chair formally moved to review the agenda.

The agenda had been organized to include five points, each of which the congregation needed to vote upon before they could begin discussing the resolution. These were: a) how the vote would be decided, the congregation voted to accept the two-thirds present system. b) Whether guests and visitors should be present. This was the most heated of the five points, lasting for twenty five minutes. It was clear that people who were against the resolution were also against

outsiders being present. One congregant shouted, "this is a private church issue not for the enjoyment of others. But, senior pastor Reverend Bill Coffin stated, and the members voted, that the debate would be "a valuable learning experience for others considering the issue and that the history of the church was to be open." It was decided however that press would leave after the opening statements were made. Guests were asked to move to one side so that they could be easily identified. Then the congregation voted on how to proceed. They agreed that those in favor and opposed would approach the microphone from opposite sides. That each person would be limited to three minutes and that the debate would not exceed more than one hour, unless extended upon by a two-thirds vote. Then the meeting was called, the resolution was read aloud and statements were presented.

Statements were read by the sanctuary task force, Board of Trustees, Board of Deacons, and Reverend Coffin. One member of the task force called upon the memory of Martin Luther King's call to civil disobedience. The Trustees and Deacons reiterated their decisions to vote against the resolution. Reverend Coffin spoke passionately in favor of sanctuary. He defended its necessity on moral and religious grounds

and also on political grounds. He pointed out that the congregation had a responsibility which went way beyond itself because the whole country was watching Riverside to see how they would act. He also expressed his faith in the congregations ability to, "come together on this issue."

After the statements had been read, members of the congregation who were in favor of sanctuary lined up to approach the open microphone from one side of the room while those against the proposal lined up to approach it from the other side. Over fifty people spoke that day. Several lawyers and businesspeople spoke against the resolution. Two Eastern Europeans, husband and wife, stated that Salvadorans and Guatemalans were terrorists and subversives. Many members of the Black Christian Caucus reiterated their resignation to declare the church a sanctuary for Central Americans only and to focus on an population outside the community. One member stated his reluctance that the refugees would be anti-Christian, but his opposition was not total:

I think this notion of sanctuary is a good one.
All I'm concerned about is our introducing someone
who is anti-Christian...I am strongly in favor of
giving sanctuary to someone who is Christian who
is dedicated and devoted to Christ.

Those who were in favor of the resolution spoke of the genocide being committed in El Salvador and Guatemala. One Latino woman who she was a member of one of the fourteen ruling families in El Salvador and because of this truly understood the necessecity of sanctuary. The majority of those in favor spoke of their special duty as Christians to care for others and to act on their faith. One of the first speakers, an old woman who had been a member of the congregation since 1931, represents this position:

I think our vote should be in the tradition of Jesus who did not hesitate to break the law, in the tradition of those people who sheltered the slaves, and in the tradition of Reverend Fosdick who I heard many times speaking out in a strong voice against things our government was doing, particularly against entry in World War II...Let us vote our conscience, let us vote for what is right, that is our calling.

For many parishoners the most passionate and moving of all the speakers was an old, Black doctor, well known and respected in the congregation, who recalled the time when white, Christian abolitionists helped his family to flee from slavery. He spoke of how he would never be speaking that day if not for those individuals and that movement. In addition to speaking out in favor of sanctuary, he spoke directly to the issue of racism in the congregation and in the society and urged black

members to vote in favor of the resolution. Many members of the task force later stated that his had been the deciding voice for Blacks who had originally opposed the resolution. Maryann Lundy recalled:

I felt that Dr. Jenkins swung the Black vote. I felt the difference in the room. The feeling level just changed when he spoke. I was unsure until he spoke how the Blacks would vote.

After over two hours of heated debate more than two-thirds of the four hundred and fifty members present voted in favor and Riverside declared itself a sanctuary church. The only change made by the sanctuary task force was to include Haitians in the declaration, an addition with which they had no problem. That day, two years and three months after the public emergence of the sanctuary movement, Riverside Church, jointly affiliated with the American Baptist Church and the United Church of Christ, became the first church in New York City to declare itself a public sanctuary for refugees from El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti.

Mobilization: Stage VII - Organization

After the vote Maryann Lundy became co-chair of the sanctuary committee with Don Wilson. Because the congregation decided against financing the sanctuary

project at Riverside the committee was responsible for all costs. Members of the task force explained the financial factors involved. Lundy stated:

We knew that we had denominational support from the UCC and the Baptist Church. We also knew we could get money for speaking engagements. That the endorsers would contribute a little. We'd thought it through well before the vote. We had hoped it would be part of Riverside's budget but that never happened. "We didn't feel it was a very expensive thing. We had data from other churches who had done this. For instance the first year that St Lukes did it it cost \$6500. Living in the church, eating with families often. Rene traveled much more than Ana and Fredrico but people drove him. It had not been expensive. What we did was make a budget on \$13000. when we knew we were going to get a couple. We had a projected budget of between \$10000. and \$13000." "We raised all the money ourselves. We've depended on individuals and all the speaking all of us do. To just put the fifties and hundreds into the pot. Then other groups have put money in from time to time.... We counted on alot of pro-bono work in terms of legal and medical expenses. Some of that came through and some of it didn't.

Another committee member recalled:

It seemed to me that once you do it it's just the community of faith. You do it without having all the answers but once you start ... We documented everything we could and felt we could do it. Then ofcourse the whole thing of working is that the family becomes less and less dependent.

The task force also decided to sponsor a family from Guatemala. Their feeling was that the Guatemalan refugee community was not getting as much attention as was the Salvadoran. Lundy remembers:

Cora (Weiss) felt strongly that Guatemelans had not been well serviced by the sanctuary movement which was true at the time and she felt that given the numbers in the community we should go with Guatemalans.

Thus, the Chicago Religious Task Force, which by this time served as refugee-congregation placement coordinator, was contacted and asked to choose a Guatemalan family:

We worked directly with Lee Holstein (on staff at CRTF) Filled out all the papers and went ahead. The fact that by this time The Chicago Religious Task Force existed was a very good thing for Riverside. At the other end, there was discussion about which refugee family we should have. I know Charlie (Clemments) discussed it with Darlene (Nogorsky (?)). So it was good. Darlene was by then the major voice in who went where. We called there often and asked lots of questions and were in touch with Darlene around transportation.

Several weeks later the Chicago Religious Task Force informed the task force that they could receive a young Guatemalan couple and their infant son. Then the task force made the decision to become involved in arrangements for their transportation from the west to east coast. Lundy, who was chosen to accompany them on their journey, on behalf of the task force, recalls:

Becoming involved in transportation was our idea. We felt it was very important to have someone with them. Bringing a family to New York City we thought would be a horrendous shock and them into Riverside to live in this fortress in a tower would be a shock to

anybody, North American or not. So that was why I went down. The idea was that they would see somebody at the beginning of the journey who would be with them as long as possible and would also be there at the end of the journey to welcome them and that they would not feel so isolated or shocked. That took some working out because Darlene wasn't at all sure about who we were going to send and they had their own systems and styles. But it turned out well... Their concern was whether the person knew enough about the movement that this wasn't just a flip kind of thing. A person who was sensitive and wasn't going to ask a lot of questions they had no business knowing about.

Riverside's public declaration of sanctuary was supported by over one hundred groups in New York's religious and secular community, including representatives from the City Council, Congress, American Baptist Churches of Metropolitan New York, and of course the Presbyterian Church (USA). Paul Morre Jr, Episcopal Bishop of New York, applauded the courage of the church declaring the move, "absolutely vital in our day." Bishop Emerson Moore, auxiliary Bishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York said he hoped the action would make others, "aware of the injustices being perpetrated against the people of Guatemala and Central America. Rabbi Balfour Brickner of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue said the move was, "a spiritually motivated outreach to those in need."

The different statements of support that members of the religious community in New York made at the Riverside declaration in June reflected the different

perceptions that people had about the use, value and hope of sanctuary as a strategy and an action. These statements and others reflected tensions that were developing in relation to the question of "politics".

The different perspectives divided sanctuary activists into three camps: (1) Those who maintained the movement existed to help refugees for religious and moral reasons and were steadfast against "politization" of the movement, (2) Those who wanted to utilize the sanctuary movement to express their political and moral opposition to U.S. military intervention in El Salvador and Guatemala and in the region generally, of which refugees were a consequence, (3) Those who understood the political implications of the movement but sought to avoid labels which described the character and goals of the movement. This third camp believed that to establish sanctuary on a defined platform, such as ending U.S. intervention, would reduce the movement to the level of just another political pressure group. These perspectives and tensions will be addressed in Chapter Seven.

Mobilization: Stage VIII - Refugees

On October 1, 1984, three and a half months after the decision to offer public sanctuary was made by the congregation, the sanctuary task force at Riverside officially, publically offered sanctuary to a young Guatemalan couple and their infant son. They had fled their homeland in search of refuge after government forces had threatened to punish them for their involvement in church community organizing activities. The family had spent three months on the underground railroad before reaching Riverside Church. Speaking through a translator nineteen year old Ana, masked with a bandana, testified:

... the Guatemalan military tried to kidnap me and from that day on I had to run... I have no home and no country.

By the time Ana, Fredrico and their son Carlos came to live at Riverside the public testimony of refugees had become an integral part of the sanctuary movement and played a central role in its overall strategy. In order to inform North Americans about the desperate situation of Salvadorans and Guatemalans in their homelands and in the U.S., refugees "testified". This was part of a refugee's responsibility in the sanctuary

movement. Their task was to communicate to the North American people the atrocities being committed in their countries. Salvadorans and Guatemalans, like Ana and Fredrico, entered the movement knowing that this is expected of them. It was made clear to them before they agreed to be part of the movement and live with a congregation that they would be called upon to speak to North Americans in that congregation's city and that they would be presented to the press. In order to protect themselves and family members who remain in their homelands their names are changed before they meet their new congregation. At the welcoming service for the family Reverend Coffin warned the religious community to realize what the German churches learned too late some forty years ago. It is not enough to resist with confession, we must confess with resistance. Then he spoke on behalf of his congregation:

We are not here to say no to the United States government out of a perverse rebellious instinct. Rather, we are here to say yes to sisters and brothers all over Central America who are asking us to help them stop the carnage. Our government has blood on its hands ... The U.S. is backing a brutal regime in Guatemala. Unless they are stopped they will stain the name of the U.S. in Central America.

Until the Summer of 1986 Riverside remained the only sanctuary church in New York City. The sanctuary

task force operated independently of other congregations in the city. In this way Riverside was quite distinct from other sanctuary churches most of whom worked very closely with other sanctuary churches in their locales. Although many Riverside members belonged to peace and social justice networks in the religious community, the sanctuary task force attracted few members of the congregation and few outsiders otherwise affiliated with Riverside. One member of the task force spoke about the task force's relative isolation in the religious community:

I thought that our interfaith coalition would be stronger. We didn't realize the problems involved in forming a sanctuary coalition in New York City because so many groups form coalitions... But we were trying to organize everything at once and it was crazy....

But a Presbyterian pastor who ministered to a congregation in Brooklyn was not at all surprised that Riverside acted independently of other churches in the city:

Riverside and Coffin have always been lone rangers. That's the way it's always been. They do lots of important things for which we're all grateful, but they do them alone. They don't join coalitions, they don't attend meetings, and they never mention anybody else when they talk to the press.

Although the task force operated independently of other groups in New York City its members were successful in educating people in the city about the

problems of refugees. Despite the fact that the task force had very few members task force meetings were held regularly and monthly. The family which lived there was and members of the committee were frequently asked to speak in congregations and schools throughout the city and at public events. In fact speaking honorariums made up a large percentage of the money the committee used to support Ana, Fredrico and their children. The committee often held public events at the church to which members of the community were invited. Unfortunately few people outside of the committee attended.

The task force was also part of a network of East coast sanctuary churches. Overall the committee was very successful in promoting its position as a sanctuary congregation within the city and the region. This had much to do with the fact that Riverside's permanent staff had accumulated a tremendous amount of experience over the years working with the press. Joan Baccus, director of Riverside's communications office, was extremely committed to the sanctuary movement and to the family. Baccus was extremely successful in getting media coverage for the task force's activities. Almost every major newspaper and magazine mentioned Riverside in their pieces on the sanctuary movement and several articles were devoted exclusively to Riverside.

Chapter Six

A Case Study of the Sanctuary Movement in Berkeley, California

The tradition of using churches as sanctuaries in Berkeley, California can be traced to 1971 when congregations in Berkeley, San Francisco and cities in the Eastcoast declared their churches to be "sanctuaries" for Vietnam War draft resisters, AWOL servicemen and military personnel. The action reflected the religious community's opposition to the Vietnam War and their support for the men who refused to fight in that war. At that time pastors of these congregations were involved in draft counseling and outspoken protest against the Vietnam War, as were many of their parishioners. One example occurred in September 1971 when six enlisted men went AWOL from a Navy ship docked in the port in San Francisco and were given sanctuary in a Roman Catholic church. Several days later the six sailors were arrested by federal agents dressed in civilian clothes who raided the church early in the morning. In November that same year ten congregations in the East Bay declared their churches to be "sanctuaries" for military personnel who refused to serve. That same month the Berkeley City Council voted 6-1 to provide sanctuary to, "any person who is unwilling to

participate in military action." The council banned all city employees from aiding the investigation or arrest of anyone protected by the city's sanctuary decision. By 1972 fifteen congregations in the area, representing many denominations, had declared their places of worship to be sanctuaries. Ten years later many of these same congregations offered hospitality (private refuge) and public sanctuary to undocumented refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala.

The idea of congregations offering hospitality to refugees, in particular, emerged in Berkeley in 1976 when congregations began to sponsor refugees fleeing persecution in Argentina and Chile. That year North and Latin Americans who were part of a Latin American cultural center in Berkeley called La Pena began working closely with international refugee organizations in order to arrange for five hundred refugees living in Argentina to be sponsored by individual U.S. citizens and congregations in the United States. Reverend Bob McKensie, then minister of St John's Presbyterian Church, recalled how his congregation first became involved with refugees from Argentina:

Our congregation heard from Reverend Gus Schultz, and had read in the newspaper, about his chapel having taken into refugee care status a young woman from Argentina. He described one morning at our lectionary group how that all happened and so I inquired about the

process by which that had happened. It turned out that there was a group working out of La Pena which was arranging for the placement of 500 political refugees from Argentina whose freedom had been secured through the OAS and Carter's program on human rights. So this group approached St John's and said, "we have a refugee who needs to come. He's been interviewed by the State Department and would you be willing to take him?"

Reverend McKensie supported the idea of sponsorship immediately. Because he was chairperson of the church's youth group at that time, he raised the idea of sponsorship with that group:

I took it to our youth group. I was the youth advisor and said, "would you like to do this?" and I said my wife and I would stand in support with all of this. So they took it on as a project of their youth group. The refugee arrived. He turned out to be a twenty-four year old young man who had been picked up in a sweep and spent four years in jail. He had been taken by the police to the airport, put on an airplane and arrived thirty hours later in San Francisco. He turned out to be a great part of our congregation. He was a very spirited and hopeful young man. He lived with me and my wife at that time for several months. Then we heard of a second person who needed to be brought out and so the Deacons at St John's decided to do that. All of this sort of prepared the congregation for listening to things that were happening in Latin America.

Both Reverend Bob McKensie and his assistant Reverend Marilyn Chilcote attribute their congregation's decision to sponsor refugees from Central America in the 1980s to the congregations's earlier experiences with refugees from Argentina in the 1970s. Reverend Chilcote, director of the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant office, recalled:

Our congregation had a long history of dealing with third world concerns and with refugees. The minister (McKensie) had been bringing these issues to the pulpit and he had invited people from India, Egypt and South America to be with the congregation. In the '70s the youth group sponsored an Argentinean and through that experience the congregation came to learn about oppression and became concerned with third world issues.... Those experiences prepared the congregation to understand the necessity of their becoming involved in social issues and concerns in the Third world so when we had the opportunity to help refugees from El Salvador we were unquestionably morally committed to the struggle of third world people and to refugees.

But it was not until 1980 that members of the religious community in Berkeley began to pay attention to conditions of political persecution and repression in both El Salvador and Guatemala. In Berkeley, pastors and members of their congregations gradually became aware of what was happening in Central America. Beginning in 1980 priests and nuns became increasingly targeted by government death squads in both countries for their involvement in Christian Base Communities and for calling attention to war and persecution. In March 1980 Arch Bishop Monsignor Oscar Romero was assassinated by government agents in El Salvador after encouraging members of the armed forces to, "stop killing their brothers and sisters." In December 1980, three North American nuns and one layworker were brutally raped, tortured and assassinated by the Salvadoran military. Throughout that year North American pastors and nuns

working in El Salvador and Guatemala were forced to return to the United States as their communities were terrorized and their lives were threatened. When they returned they shared their experiences with members of the religious community, contributing to their awareness of political and social conditions in those countries and their concern for those people. At the same time ministers and priests were becoming increasingly aware of the thousands of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in their area who had crossed the Mexican/U.S. border in search of political asylum in the United States. One minister explained:

We kept seeing Central America in the news. The thing that really made it personal was our contact with priest and nuns who had come back from Central America and with the 60,000-70,000 Salvadorans who had just come flooding into San Francisco and our area. These Salvadorans and Guatemalans were living here, we learned, in real fear that they might be deported back to the awful situations from which they fled. They were living in fear and they were coming to the churches, because they know the church is where you get some help, and asking for protection. It was a natural (thing). One of the pastors (Reverend Gus Schultz) in our Sunday morning group (lectionary group) said, "What about the old idea of sanctuary?" 'cause some churches in the area had given some sanctuary to deserters from the Coral Sea in 1971, back during Vietnam.

**Mobilization: Stage I- The Role of Individual Pastors
and Congregational Members**

In the Fall of 1981 a group of pastors from churches located near the University of California, Berkeley were part of a lectionary group which met every Tuesday

morning to discuss and develop their Sunday sermons. Most of these pastors had a long history of involvement with peace and social justice issues. The presence of Salvadoran refugees in San Francisco had been brought to their attention by religious organizations who worked closely with the refugee population in the city, particularly Catholic Social Services. They were also being informed by pastors who had recently returned from the region and by articles in local and national newspapers. Reverend Marilyn Chilcote was a member of that group:

I remember that we were studying the prophets. That study makes a point of the fact that kings, governments, nations are judged by the way they care for the least among them. It's spelled out very clearly, widows, fatherless, sojourners in your midst. We read the newspapers every morning and they were full of news about El Salvador. There was no way to avoid it.

Reverend McKensie recalls being profoundly affected by a missionary, Father Ron Burk, who was forced to leave Guatemala, after serving there for eleven years, when government death squads threatened to assassinate him along with thirty Guatemalan members of his congregation:

The next step, as I remember it, was having heard that a missionary had recently returned from Guatemala, a Catholic priest by the name of Ron Burk. He came to a group of folks at St. John's and told us about his

having been a pastor of a congregation in Guatemala or eleven years. A congregation made up of indigenous peoples. How over eleven years he had turned over the work of that congregation over to a parish council and that the council had undertaken a number of projects like literacy, trying to get claim to their land, trying to get access to government agencies that were intended to support them, health care and so on. As a consequence, they had begun to experience some harrassment from the military. Then finally one morning they found the body of a young man of their congregation, who Ron described as the chairperson of their evangelism committee, his body badly battered and on his shirt a list of thirty-one names and at the head of the list was Burk's name... He was told by his Bishop and the American Embassy that he must leave the country immediately, that it was a death squad list, and that his life was indeed in danger. So he got out two days later and by the time he was talking to us at St. John's it was five months later and seventeen of the people on the list had already been killed. Well that made a great impression on me so I preached a sermon the next week in which I was talking to the congregation about various aspects of the work in Guatemala and pointed to various members of the congregation who were leaders in our church and then I said so and so and so and so would now all be dead if they were a part of this congregation in Guatemala. So that made a big impression on our congregation. This was in the Fall of 1981.

As these ministers became increasingly aware of conditions in Central America and the problems of refugees in the United States they began to deal with these issues from their pulpits, directly relating what was happening in El Salvador to the gospel. At the same time many members of their congregations were becoming increasingly concerned about doing something to help refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala. Many had been involved in Bible study with their ministers where they payed special attention to their religious responsibility

to the poor and the oppressed. Reverend Chilcote, then an assistant minister at St. John's, recalled:

After Ron Burk spoke several members of the congregation approached me and asked what we could do to help people in Guatemala. He moved many, many people... people in the congregation wanted to do something, not just sit around and feel guilty for what their government was doing in Central America... then Bob (McKensie) gave a sermon which moved folks even more.

Many members of St John's Presbyterian Church had been deeply moved to work with Central Americans after hearing Father Burk and then listening to Reverend McKensie's sermon. Others were moved when they attended a workshop given by Illeen Purcell, a North American Catholic and staff member at Catholic Social Services in San Francisco who was deeply committed to the Salvadoran refugee community. Purcell had spoken about social and political conditions in El Salvador, emphasizing the role of the religious community and the cry of the Church in El Salvador. Others had heard the public testimony of undocumented Salvadoran refugees who lived across the bay in San Francisco. Still others had been part of study groups on liberation theology and were eager to integrate its call of the preferential option for the poor into their own lives.

Mobilization:Phase II - Offering Hospitality to Refugees

Based on these experiences these ministers and members of their congregations became increasingly concerned about Salvadoran refugees. Reverend McKensie recalls the way in which his congregation first became involved with the Salvadoran refugee community, in January 1982.

At that time we had on our Session a young man who had lived overseas in the Phillipines and knew about these ways of governments conducting themselves. He had had a concern about Central America, I don't know where that concern came from, but he brought that concern to the Session. He was chairing our Church and Society committee and he brought to the Session a request that St. John's, in the tradition of having taken in Argentine refugees, commit itself to providing help for refugees from Central America.

McKensie went on to describe how the Session agreed to donate money to support a refugee family.

Not knowing any of the stuff that we now know about their legal status and so forth he suggested to the Session that they committ \$2,000 to the project and it passed.. for a housing and refugee program... Then we learned through Father Moriarty that he had this family, a young woman and her husband and their new baby who had been living in the rectory for some time. He wanted to know if we, as a part of our committment, to take this family to be with us. So we took that through the process, the Session, and they agreed that yes we would be glad to take this family in. That was in January 1982.

Members of the Session, governing body of the congregation, remember the meeting where they met to decide to commit money to housing refugees as being fairly tension free. The meeting did not last very long and by the time it was over members of the Session felt comfortable with the decision to use the church's funds to sponser a Salvadoran family in need. One member recalled that there was very little opposition at the meeting which he attributed to the congregations previous experience helping people from the Third World and the fact that the money was available to be spent on international work:

It was basically easy, very little opposition. One very important previous experience that the congregation had had really helped to create a climate of acceptance and support. In 1978 our Session had voted to support a seminary student from India of great promise. We supported him financially and he preached and served in the liturgy of the church and he taught classes and he was constantly present with us. Some of the money which was raised to support that effort was leftover for the congregation to use for international work. So we had the money available and it had already been committed ahead of time to doing work outside the congregation. When it came to doing the Central American work we asked the Session to committ that money, \$2000. to that work and they did.

Two months later, in January 1982, St John's Church quietly offered shelter (hospitality) to a young Salvadoran couple forced to leave El Salvador after they both received death threats from government forces. The

congregation was able to house the family in the home of the widow of St. Marks Episcopal Church's former rector. She was maintaining a big house and offered the use of several rooms to them. They then used the \$2000 allocated by the Session to pay for the family's other early expenses.

Mobilization:Phase III - From Hospitality to Sanctuary

As a result of St. John's congregation having made that decision and having taken in that family, the lectionary group, of which both Reverends McKensie and Chilcote were members, began to discuss what those actions meant. Members of the lectionary group had met with Father Ron Burk and heard about his experiences in Guatemala. They had received literature about Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero's assassination. In fact, they were quite informed about that event because Father John Quinn, the Archbishop of San Francisco, had attended Romero's funeral and informed the religious community about his experiences in El Salvador. Different experiences moved members of the lectionary group to help Central American refugees. Reverend Chilcote had been very affected by a workshop she had attended as a seminary student, given by Illeen Purcell,

which focused on the recent influx of Salvadoran refugees in the area and the responsibility of the Church in responding to those refugees. She had also known refugees from Chile. Reverend Phil Getchel of St. Mark's Episcopal church had been a missionary in Brazil and was thus familiar with Latin American politics and the social consequences of authoritarian regimes.. Reverend Gus Schultz, whose congregation had offered sanctuary to AWOL servicemen during the Vietnam War, was very influenced by his participation in the anti-war movement. It was Reverend Schultz who raised the possibility of the congregations using the strategy of sanctuary in relation to these new refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala while the group was discussing St. John's actions:

Gus told the story of how his congregation had offered sanctuary in 1971. It was his idea and it was in relation to the previous work that his chapel had done. We even developed a strategy for doing this, this must have been in February 1982. The strategy was that the St. John's Session would vote to offer sanctuary, to declare itself a church offering sanctuary, and that as a result of that we would send out invitations to four other congregations to do likewise. To Lutheran Chapel, Holy Spirit Catholic, St. Marks Episcopal and Trinity Methodist... Marilyn and I took this back to the Church and Society committee, then to the Session. They did meet, did vote, did send the letters and we decided to formally do this as a covenant group on March 24, 1982, two years after the assassination of Oscar Romero's assassination.

Although the lectionary group quickly became committed to the idea of offering sanctuary to refugees in their churches, it was unusual for the lectionary group to take up social action projects. They met to discuss the scriptures and to plan their Sunday sermons. Never before had these ministers used the lectionary group as a base from which to take up social action projects. Their actions were a direct response to St. John's congregation offering hospitality to a Salvadoran family, combined with their increasing awareness of what was happening in Central America and the fact that people from Central America, refugees, were now in their midst and in immediate need of support and protection. They had also gradually come to understand and recognize the special role that members of the religious community had to play in Central America and their special responsibility to the people of Central America:

We were increasingly aware of the consequences of religious action in Central America. Ron Burk's experience and an Episcopal experiment in agriculture in El Salvador. The priest there was trained in Berkeley and two years into the project the army had come in and killed everybody. We were gradually coming to understand that the Church could not be involved and uninvolved at the same time. It was a choice and we chose involvement.

Because the idea to utilize the strategy of public sanctuary had come from the lectionary group, each of

the five ministers in the lectionary group was charged with reviewing the joint sanctuary strategy with their congregations. The joint strategy would involve St. John's publicly declaring sanctuary while the other four congregations entered into a "covenant of sanctuary" with them. This covenant meant that they supported St. John's action and that they too were committed to support, protection and advocacy for refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala.

The process of deciding to offer public sanctuary to refugees as easy for the Session of St. John's Presbyterian Church as the question of deciding to offer quiet support to refugees had been. The question of legality arose frequently during the discussion, as did the question of whether offering sanctuary was the best use of the congregation's energy. Reverend McKensie recalled:

I'm quite sure that at that meeting the question of legality and illegality must have arisen. I'm sure there were some questions and doubts raised. But I'm equally sure that it went through with a strong vote of support.

Within several weeks, each of the four governing congregational bodies had agreed to enter into a covenant of sanctuary with St. John's Presbyterian Church. Over the years these five congregations had worked together and supported each

other in their community based activities. For example, the Lutherans had set up a food bank project which members of St. John's were very active in and supportive of. But the covenant action was the first formal, organized social action that the five congregations were formally involved in. The sanctuary covenant action became an occasion for their drawing together.

Mobilization:Phase V - The Covenant of Sanctuary

All five ministers and their congregations agreed that it would be appropriate to declare public sanctuary on March 24th, the day commemorating the anniversary of Archbishop Romero's assassination. Earlier, Steve Knapp, the chairperson of the Church and Society committee at St. John's, had drafted a letter about his congregations decision to offer hospitality to a refugee family. The ministers decided that they might be able to use this letter as the basis of a document which other congregations could sign supporting their public declaration. They decided to call this document a "covenant of sanctuary". The concept of the covenant has a long tradition for Christians. The strategy of having congregations sign a covenant supporting churches which declared sanctuary proved to be invaluable to the

sanctuary movement in Northern California. It included three essential elements: support, protection, and advocacy.

On March 24th. 1982 the five congregations, St. John's Presbyterian Church, Lutheran Chapel, St. Marks Episcopal Church, Holy Spirit and Trinity Methodist Church, ratified the Covenant of Sanctuary. Two other churches endorsed it and many churches signed the covenant of support:

Steve Knapp, then the chairperson of the Church and Society committee, had drawn up a letter which we sent to the other congregations. That letter was discussed separately in each congregation and became the basis for the sanctuary covenant. Then we planned for the March 24th. event. Gus and I went to San Francisco and met with a Salvadoran who was very active in the refugee community who was living in the rectory at Father Moriarty's place. What we were trying to do was get his support for doing something on March 24th. We put together this project to have three or four, half dozen, Salvadorans come on March 24th. and take up residence at Lutheran Chapel. Then we called a press conference in the morning. Then in the evening a priest from El Salvador. The following Sunday we had an ecumenical mass which lots of people attended.

According to the members of St John's Congregation, they were not aware that members of the religious community in Tucson were engaged in similar kinds of activities and planning to declare public sanctuary until several weeks before they themselves planned to declare public sanctuary. Just weeks before their declaration one of the ministers at St John's, no one

seems to remember who, received a letter from The Tucson Ecumenical Task Force asking that they join in declaring public sanctuary. Reverend Chilcote called Tim Nonn, then the director of the Tucson Ecumenical Task Force on Central America, and they shared information on the religious community's work with Central American refugees. Both Chilcote and Nonn were very excited about what was happening in the other's community and they agreed to include the other in their public declaration.

Mobilization:Phase V- From Covenant to Action

At the time, March 1982, the Berkeley ministers and congregations which signed the covenant of sanctuary viewed the covenant and public declaration of sanctuary as largely symbolic. The idea was to publicly protest their government's treatment of Central American refugees and to offer temporary sanctuary to a few refugees. They had very little idea of what the covenant would require nor were they aware of the movement which was in the process of emerging and of which they were an essential part. Reverend McKensie remembers:

It was a totally symbolic action at that time. But it was also an act of commitment. The formula of support,

advocacy and protection was in place. It was a statement of a covenant among five congregations. It was a defiance of the policy of the INS. By that time we had come to see what the INS policy was. It was also clearly a statement of solidarity with these people. But it was not seen as a full-time, permanent, all-encompassing profound commitment like it is now.

But like congregations in Tucson which declared public sanctuary, sanctuary congregations in Berkeley were inundated with requests for information from the mass media and from groups and individuals in the religious community. They were also approached by members of the Salvadoran refugee community who expected their assistance. Salvadorans in San Francisco requested that they help Salvadoran refugees who were being harassed in the refugee camps in Honduras. This request made sense to members of the congregations because it fit in with the traditional idea of "witness", an essential part of Christian ministry. Within a few months congregations in Berkeley sent members of the religious community to the Salvadoran refugees camps in Honduras. That commitment continued for over six years and was an integral part of the sanctuary movement in Berkeley and San Francisco. Reverend McKensie described the process by which his congregation committed itself to that project:

We learned that the project was a possibility and that Marilyn and Gene Getchel were free and willing to go down to the refugee camps. So I took this to the

Session. Marilyn was a member of our staff and I wanted two things. I wanted them to pony up money for her plane fare and to give her time off to do this without depleting her vacation. It would be a part of the ministry of the church that she would be going there. I remember that there was some equivication around the wisdom of whether this was the best way to express our solidarity. What good would it do for a couple of Anglo women to go down there? We didn't know what the value of doing such a thing would be. But they did authorize her to go and they did see it as a part of the ministry and part of our commitment. So we went. It wasn't a private thing, it was a congregational act.

Mobilization:Phase VI -Social Movement Organization

As they became more involved in activities to help the Salvadoran refugee community the five congregations decided to develop an organizational structure, which they called the Steering Committee, of the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant. They designed a steering committee to include two representatives from each sanctuary congregation which met monthly. Office space was donated, and an office established, at Holy Spirit Church and a part-time staff person was hired. Money to maintain the office and related activities was raised by holding special events and from donations which were actively solicited. The East Bay Sanctuary Covenant Office quickly expanded.

The major factor which distinguished the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant (EBSC) from other local sanctuary movement organizations across the country was that it

was so highly organized and extensively funded. Unlike the loose organizational structures, autonomy, and relatively poor economic status which characterized most local sanctuary movement organizations, the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant developed a highly organized and complex task structure for the control and coordination of the organization and received a Ford Foundation grant for several years which enabled them to hire two full-time coordinators and two part-time staff people.

Although each covenant congregation operated within the context of its own church, covenant community work was coordinated by a steering committee which met regularly and the EBSC office. Each participating covenant church sent two representatives to this Steering Committee. Steering committee officers included a chair, vice-chair, secretary and treasurer, each of whom served a one-year term.

East Bay Sanctuary Covenant churches were defined as, "those congregations or task forces of congregations which have signed the "sanctuary covenant." As a working whole the work of EBSC was divided into six subcommittees, designed to demonstrate the concerns of EBSC and carry out the work of the covenant community. Although it grew and expanded tremendously, this organizational structure remained the same throughout

the history of the East Bay sanctuary movement.

The daily work of the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant community was carried out in the EBSC office located in the basement of Trinity Methodist Church in Berkeley. The office was partly funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation, combined with contributions from the religious and secular community. EBSC also held fundraisers, like the February 1982 Jackson Browne concert, whose profits they shared with the National Sanctuary Defense Fund.

By 1984 the responsibilities of each subcommittee were clearly and specifically delineated. As a working whole, the subcommittees were involved in fundraising, producing a weekly newsletter, outreach to other communities, coordinating witness visits to refugee camps in Honduras, lobbying and advocacy, providing social services, health service referrals, raising money for jail bonds, participating in public caravans from one state to another, and ofcourse, educational outreach. Reverend Chilcote, Director of EBSC explained:

In parts of the country where they don't have a concentration of refugees, public sanctuary is just getting a refugee in a church, giving them a platform, that sort of thing. Here, public sanctuary involves protecting them in all kinds of ways besides just bringing them into a church. So we have to provide direct services. We have to give them jobs and food and clothing so they're not on the streets and getting arrested. We gotta protect these people. Protection is a bigger thing when you've got 60,000....

Further division of each subcommittee and its responsibilities is provided in order to demonstrate how highly organized ESBC was:

1) Finance: composed of three people whose responsibilities include fundraising.

2) Outreach-Publicity-Program: composed of several people including the editor and associate editor of Exodus, the covenant community's newsletter, whose responsibilities included publication of Exodus every month, networking with church and solidarity groups, planning and coordinating the program for the first Sunday of every month, and speaker's committees.

3) International Visitors Program: composed of a coordinator and staff. This subcommittee was set up to coordinate visits to Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras by members of the covenant community. The committee was responsible for setting standards for screening, briefing, participants and maintaining contact with international relief groups and task forces in the camps. Over the course of three years ESBC sent over one hundred fifty visitors to the refugee camps in Honduras.

4) Services to Refugees: responsibilities included acting as liason with Central American Refugee Projects in San Francisco, coordinating work with detainees in

the jail, gathering clothes, furniture, medicines, etc. for refugee community. By 1986 EBSC was able to pay three staff members who worked out of the EBSC office in Berkeley on services to refugees.

5) Executive Committee: composed of chair, vice-chair, secretary, treasurer, and the chairpersons of each subcommittee.

6) Advocacy: monitored events and organized letter-writing campaigns. There was also a phone tree in place for advocacy work.

Within months the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant (EBSC) community grew and spread at a rate unequalled for the sanctuary movement in the rest of the country. By 1986, in addition to having the largest number of sanctuary churches in any one city, thirteen in San Francisco, twenty-eight in Berkeley alone, the cities of Berkeley, San Francisco and Oakland all declared sanctuary. Both the Arch Bishop of San Francisco, Father Quinn, and of El Salvador, Father Rivera y Damas, were active in the sanctuary movement and refugee community in Berkeley and San Francisco. Eventually, the Council expanded and spread throughout Northern California.

With the exception of TEC, the EBSC office had the largest operating budget of all local sanctuary offices in the country. The Salvadorans who were received into

sanctuary, including the first family taken in by St. John's, were extensively involved in giving public testimony throughout Northern California. In addition, the staff worked closely with CRECE, a refugee organization. They sponsored public caravans, operated a job bank and medical referral bank, supervised a bail bond fund, were in touch with dozens of immigration attorneys willing to defend Salvadorans and Guatemalans on a pro-bono or low-cost basis, sponsored hundreds of public sanctuary events designed to inform U.S. citizens about what was happening to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in the United States and in their homelands and were extensively involved with refugees in Central America.

In 1986, the EBSC staff included one full-time paid director, her assistant, three part-time paid coordinators - of the EBSC jail bond, job-placement and health programs and over thirty-five reliable, highly participatory part-time volunteers. Altogether EBSC has an annual budget of over \$135,000. in 1986. In addition, they administered a bond fund.

Volunteers come from both the religious and secular community. Would be volunteers were asked to fill out an elaborate interview form. After which time, they were interviewed. After which, each volunteer went through a

minimum two-hour training with the EBSC director. After this they were able to work in the office. Office tasks were highly organized. Volunteers found their tasks for the day in a booklet marked "volunteers." They marked their hours on a sheet and were often assigned specific tasks dependent upon their skills and resources.

Because the East Bay of California is located relatively far from the border, members of the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant community were limited their activities to public education, advocacy, direct social and legal services with undocumented Central American refugees in the community and in the detention centers, public caravans and their own special ministry of having a religious presence, witness, in the refugees camps in Honduras. The congregations also offered public sanctuary.

As a coordinated whole, the EBSC was not involved in activities on the border which involved crossing refugees. Although some members of EBSC worked with the local movement center in Tucson and other border areas, EBSC members had no formal responsibilities for crossing refugees or in the underground railroad. However, sanctuary activists from the East Bay often chose to become involved in the underground railroad, transporting undocumented refugees after they had arrived in the San Francisco/East Bay area.

Mobilization: Stage VII - Becoming Part of a National
Sanctuary Movement

Despite a tremendous amount of activity in the Berkeley area beginning in 1982, members of the East Bay sanctuary movement say they were not aware that they were part of a national movement until 1983. They attribute this awareness to the arrests of two sanctuary activists in Texas in March and February in 1983. After those arrests sanctuary activists throughout the United States came together to discuss how to handle the fundraising that was going to be necessary for their defense. That Spring a meeting of sanctuary activists representing the locales which were most active, from Tucson, Northern California, Seattle, Chicago, Minnesota, Texas and from the Christic Institute, took place in Tucson, Arizona. At that meeting these representatives set up the foundation for what was to become the National Sanctuary Defense Fund. Later the Christic Institute, which was defending Stacy Merkt at the time, would put up the seed money which would establish the National Sanctuary Defense Fund.

The arrests sparked tremendous interest in the sanctuary movement throughout the United States and sanctuary activists began to get a sense of the potential power of their movement. They also generated what sanctuary activists perceived as the need for

serious national coordination, particularly with regard to a national fund to defend sanctuary activists. A sanctuary activist from the East Bay who attended the sanctuary movement's first national meeting recalls:

The arrests occurred and we heard that Christic Institute was going to raise money in the name of sanctuary which distressed us. We felt that we should be doing that. That the gathering of money and deciding how it should be spent ought to be in the hands of sanctuary, not the Christic Institute. So we met with other people in the sanctuary movement in Tucson. The issue is who's going to raise the money for sanctuary defense. Northern California took the initiative to call together some representatives. It was the first gathering of national leadership...The consequence of that was that we would set up a national sanctuary defense fund... We also knew then that we were part of a national movement."

The 1983 arrests also motivated sanctuary activists to become familiar with legislation which was directly related to their lives and their work. The East Bay Sanctuary Covenant was fortunate in having tremendous legal resources in San Francisco. For example, attorney Karen Parker was involved in studying on international laws, particularly the Geneva Convention, legitimated the activities of sanctuary activists, both in terms of offering public sanctuary and assisting refugees across the border and in moving throughout the United States. Sanctuary activists began to request frequent meetings with attorneys and they began to familiarize themselves

with the law. They also began to perceive their activities as absolutely legal, based on both domestic and international law, and they began to promote this position to the press and in the congregations.

By the Summer of 1986 there were twenty-eight sanctuary congregations in Berkeley, thirteen in San Francisco and more than sixty in Northern California. The city councils in Berkeley, San Francisco and Oakland had declared their cities to be sanctuaries for refugees from Central America. Oakland's sanctuary resolution also included refugees from South Africa and the Caribbean.

In addition to having the greatest number of sanctuary congregations of any region and an extensive organizational base, the East Bay sanctuary movement leadership were extensively involved in the sanctuary movement on the national level. Reverend Gus Schultz was the chairperson of the National Sanctuary Defense Fund, whose headquarters were in San Francisco. Reverend McKensie, Steve Knapp and Illeen Purcell were highly participatory in the National Communications Council. Along with Reverend John Fife and Jim Corbett of Tucson, Reverend Marilyn Chilcote regularly represented the sanctuary movement both in the United States and internationally. All of the leaders of the Berkeley

movement were involved in public debates, including debates with INS officials and members of the State Department.

Further, East Bay sanctuary activists were committed to the Central American refugee community in the United States and in Central America. Throughout the eighties they assisted the refugee community in the United States with a wide range of social services, including a bond fund, and continued their international programs with refugees in Honduras, Mexico and El Salvador. In 1986 leaders of the movement in Berkeley and San Francisco accompanied Salvadorans living as displaced persons within El Salvador back to their land in the war zones of El Salvador. They received extensive media coverage when the Salvadoran government insisted that they leave the country.

Finally, sanctuary activists in the East Bay, and their counterparts in San Francisco, were outspoken opponents not only of INS refugee policy but also of U.S. foreign policy in Central America. They spoke frequently on national television, debated INS and State Department representatives and were actively involved in protesting U.S. military intervention in Central America.

In 1985, Reverend Marilyn Chilcote, director of the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant and a founder of the sanctuary movement in Berkeley, was asked to reflect on the impact of the sanctuary movement on the religious community of which she is a member:

In coming to know the Central Americans in the Bay area who lived in such fear, we've had to ask what happens to them, why did they have to come here, what's happening in Central America. As a biblical people, we've had to use a kind of biblical analysis about what's happening there. We've come to see that the Bible is a book about people, about how they live, about their socio and economic structures, about the responsibility of government to take care of the least among us in our societies. Since we've had to ask those questions about our society and our relationship to Central America, we start to ask a lot of other questions. We start asking about what we're doing in other parts of the world. How the peoples of this world interrelate to each other. How God, in God's system of justice and mercy, evaluates that. So that expands our social consciousness in ways far beyond the relationship between the United States and El Salvador, for instance. It is making the people of faith in the United States reassess their role with respect to their government, moving us into bold faith responses, I think. For the good, I'm convinced, of this country and this planet.

In 1986, Reverend McKensie, one of several coordinators of sanctuary movement activities in San Francisco and a founder of the sanctuary movement in Berkeley, was asked to reflect on the impact of participation in the sanctuary movement on the congregation at Saint John's Presbyterian Church in

Berkeley. Like Reverend Chilcote, he describes the way in which involvement in the sanctuary movement had a radiating effect on participants:

When we first started in 1982, those of us who were most naive, perceived that what we were doing was responding to human need, obvious human need. Ingrid and her family (the first refugees helped by St. John's congregation) were obviously victims of a very harsh policy and everybody in our congregation could see this. But the implications of that are so devastating. You start unfolding the pages and God, it just gets at every issue one can imagine... We are very aware of the political implications of our movement. But on a personal level, for us as individuals, we are even more acutely aware of what we need to do right now with the refugees and in relation to other social issues.

Chapter Seven

Internal Organization

The potential for a national sanctuary movement in the United States was initially established by the geographic spread of the first seven churches which declared public sanctuary in March 1982. Extending from the state of Arizona to the state of California, from the border into the interior, these congregations established the movement's potential to extend throughout the United States. Further, although there were less than ten congregations involved in the March 1982 declaration, their merger established a link between individual congregations throughout the United States and resulted in a semi-coordinated, ecumenical movement. Thus the joint declaration, in and of itself, laid the foundation for what was to become a national movement.

Previous to the formal emergence of the sanctuary movement, Salvadorans and Guatemalans who entered the United States with members of the religious community had been moved throughout the United States in a haphazard, largely spontaneous fashion; to states where they had relatives or friends, areas where they might find work or could melt into an existent Latino community, or to communities where North Americans had

expressed a commitment to help undocumented Central American refugees in the United States. In making the decision to move Central Americans from one place to another, members of the religious community usually consulted with the Salvadorans and Guatemalans involved and made the decision with them, not for them. But because most Salvadorans and Guatemalans who had recently entered the United States had very limited material resources and were not familiar with the United States, many were dependent upon North Americans to make these decisions.

The merger and public sanctuary declaration were not simply symbolic. The geographic spread of the seven churches radically changed the nature of refugee ministry in the religious community. The geographic range of the churches, from the border to the interior, meant that for the first time the possibility existed for Salvadorans and Guatemalans to be moved throughout the country in a coordinated, planned fashion. A group of religious activists who lived near the border, committed to assisting refugees in crossing the border from Mexico into the United States and moving them into the interior was fused with another group of religious activists who lived away from the border and were committed to assisting in transporting these refugees throughout the

United States and offering them sanctuary in their churches. Further, both groups were committed to utilizing the opportunity of transporting refugees and offering public sanctuary to educate the North American public. Their hope was that once in the churches refugees could be provided with a relatively protective base, they could speak to the media and community about the atrocities committed in their homelands.

The testimony of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who lived in sanctuary churches became an integral part of the sanctuary movement. Testimony played a central role in the movement's overall strategy, particularly in relation to its impact on the religious community. In order to inform North Americans about the desperate situation of Salvadorans and Guatemalans in their homelands and in the United States, Central American refugees "testified." This meant that they told their stories to congregations, community groups, members of the press, anyone who was interested in listening. Although not all Central Americans involved in the movement testified, it was generally considered to be a central part of their responsibility when they went to live with a congregation. Salvadorans and Guatemalans entered the sanctuary movement knowing that they would be asked to testify. Their special contribution in the

movement was to communicate to the North American people the atrocities being committed in their countries.

Gradually a three component sanctuary movement strategy developed. Undocumented refugees would be assisted in entering the United States without INS detection. Before entering the United States they would be informed that a network of congregations existed to offer them public sanctuary. Within a short time after they entered the U.S. they would be counseled. Counseling would include in-depth discussion about what it meant to be in the sanctuary movement and what they might do in the movement. After being counseled, Central American refugees who agreed to be part of the movement, would be moved to a congregation which had declared its church a sanctuary for Salvadorans and Guatemalans. Once housed with a congregation, Salvadorans and Guatemalans would work with that congregation's sanctuary task force or committee to educate people in the area about the atrocities being committed in their homelands, ultimately resulting in a flow of refugees into Honduras, Mexico and the United States and the response of the U.S. government to their plight.

Over the years, as more congregations joined the sanctuary movement, the strategy was to vary somewhat. With time members of the religious community became less

dependent upon formal sanctuary movement networks, like the Chicago Religious Task Force, to meet Salvadorans and Guatemalans to whom they could offer sanctuary. Many congregational members learned to network with refugee organizations, such as the Comité de Refugiados Centroamericanos (CRECE) and religious organizations that worked with refugees, such as Catholic Social Services.

Building the Sanctuary Movement: Mobilizing Members of the Religious Community

Although members of the press and the sanctuary movement consistently attributed the emergence of the sanctuary movement to specific individuals, most often Jim Corbett and Reverend John Fife, in fact the emergence of the movement cannot be attributed to any individual in particular. The movement was a product of the religious (ecumenical) community. Corbett, Fife, and others were able to hook into already existing networks in the religious community, in both the United States and Mexico. Both Corbett and Fife used these networks to build and strengthen the underground railroad and sanctuary movement. A brief analysis of the networking patterns of both these individuals are presented in order to demonstrate how these social networks functioned.

Jim Corbett's campaign to bring refugees into the United States without INS detection was not something which he devised or carried out independently of others. His actions were neither spontaneous or unorganized. Corbett's first encounter with detained undocumented refugees in Mexico occurred as a result of his alliance with a Mexican priest, who arranged for him to enter a Mexican prison, where Salvadorans were detained, disguised as a fellow priest. This priest also introduced Corbett to an established groups of Christians, on both sides of the border, who were helping undocumented Central American refugees. After meeting this priest and other members of the religious community, Corbett was able to hook into, and build upon, a network of people who were already involved with border ministry with Central American refugees.

In the United States, Corbett was able to utilize an existing network of Quakers, a community to which he and his wife belonged, who joined in his effort to help undocumented refugees. Corbett first networked with Quakers in his own Meeting (congregation) and later with Quakers throughout the United States and in parts of Mexico. Beginning in 1980 Corbett used the resources of the Quaker American Friends Service (AFSC) office in Tucson, and the office space, to build a network of

Quakers committed to working with Central American refugees. Between 1980 and 1986 he extensively utilized the AFSC mailing list and facilities to write letters to Quakers all over the United States and Mexico, requesting that they become involved in or support border ministry with undocumented refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala. In these letters Corbett suggested that Quakers help refugees to avoid arrest and deportation during the interval between their arrival in the United States and filing their requests for asylum; that Quaker Meetings establish daily checks with Federal authorities to learn of the arrests of Central American refugees; that they find legal counsel and representation for detainees; and that they maintain communication with other groups doing similar work. As individual Quakers and whole Quaker Meetings became involved in these activities, the sanctuary movement grew and spread.

Throughout the history of the sanctuary movement, Jim Corbett worked with members of the Tucson AFSC office to distribute hundreds of documents about Salvadorans and Guatemalans in Central America and Mexico to Quakers in Mexico and the United States. These served as the basis for many people's beginning understanding of the plight of Central American

refugees. By 1986 over 50 Friends Meetings had declared public sanctuary. Hundreds of individual Quakers were involved in the assisting refugees to enter the United States without INS detection; traveling into Mexico, counseling undocumented refugees, donating money, cars and services, and quietly sheltering refugees in their homes.

Reverend John Fife also extensively utilized social networks and personal contacts that he had developed during his twenty year tenure as a Presbyterian minister to build and strengthen the sanctuary movement. As chairperson of the Presbyterian Church's "Committee on Mission Responsibility through Investment" for six years and a member of the Presbyterian General Assembly Council (USA) for eight years, Reverend Fife had status and connections in the Presbyterian community and hierarchy.

From the inception of the public sanctuary movement, Fife worked hard to educate the Presbyterian community and General Assembly (USA) about the plight of Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the United States and continually urged them to become involved in helping Central American refugees. He spoke with people in the General Assembly, with dozens of Presbyterian congregations throughout the United States, and with

fellow Presbyterian ministers. Within months his enthusiasm, commitment, and information about what was happening to Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the United States spread throughout the Presbyterian community in the United States. Many Presbyterians who were interested in what he had to say were ministers who, like Fife, had participated in the civil-rights movement, corporate divestment movement, anti-nuclear movement. Like Fife, they had long histories of working for peace and social justice, in congregational committees and task forces and in the General Assembly. Sanctuary, as a symbol, an idea, a strategy and an action, greatly appealed to them. Many of these ministers, amongst them Reverends Dick and Maryann Lundy, Marilyn Chilcote, Bob McKensie, were responsible for mobilizing their congregations to declare sanctuary. As early as 1982, the 194th. Presbyterian General Assembly (USA) urged:

congregations to actively resist the immoral and illegal policy of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service by declaring their churches to be sanctuaries for refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala."

In 1983, the 195th. Presbyterian General Assembly recommended:

That the Mission Board and Program Agency support through every means possible the efforts of congregations and groups which are providing advocacy for the humanitarian services to asylum seekers...That we renew our commitment as Christians

to provide refuge to those who flee to our nation to escape the threat of death or severe repression... That the General Assembly support congregations who provide sanctuary to asylum seekers as a way of showing Christian compassion for them and stressing the need for change in our government's policies and actions; and that other congregations be challenged to seriously consider taking this stance.

In 1984, the 196th. Presbyterian General Assembly urged:

financial assistance for bond and trial expenses; communication with elected officials, newspapers, radio talk shows, etc. to protest their arrests; holding special services of worship to lift up the plight of Central American refugees and to those who are attempting to help them and assist Presbyterians to participate in public events organized to demonstrate support for those who are being prosecuted for their ministries.

In November 1984, the Presbyterians organized a weekend retreat and consultation on public sanctuary. It was organized by the National Staff PC (USA), Southern California Synod Staff, and representatives of Presbyterian congregations in the United States which had declared sanctuary. It was sponsored and paid for by the Program Agency PC (USA). Over one hundred Presbyterians attended. Also present were Central American refugees, Presbyterian officials, religious scholars and members of the religious press.

By Spring 1986, over 29 Presbyterian congregations had declared sanctuary, the General Assembly (USA) was extremely supportive of the movement and had pledged over \$100,000 to the legal defense fund. All this made Reverend John Fife very proud of his church:

Because the Presbyterian Church saw fit to organize itself, because we have resources like staff people and the General Assembly and Senods and Sessions, the Church has been able to take some leadership in moving the sanctuary movement ahead and responding to the needs of refugees where other denominations have had difficulty in finding ways in which to organize as denominations. They can't move the way we have and I am proud to be part of a Church which has been prepared historically and institutionally to respond to the needs in crisis.

From the inception of the sanctuary movement in March 1982, it was quite clear that the movements survival would depend on hundreds of congregations declaring public sanctuary and extensive support from denominational bodies. Just as Quaker Meetings and Presbyterian congregations were involved in networking and organizing to build the sanctuary movement within their communities, other denominations, and faiths, were organizing in their congregations and communities. Leaders and members of these denominations and faiths mobilized to interest their congregations and denominations in the sanctuary movement. This required that they help and encourage congregational members and denominational leadership to understand the process of becoming a sanctuary congregation. It also meant that they begin to develop ecumenical support for the movement in their communities. Those people who were interested had to be provided with information on the legal consequences of offering sanctuary, the

theological basis of declaring sanctuary, and the actual strategy of offering public sanctuary. Leaders and members, like Reverends John Fife, Marilyn Chilcote, Maryann Lundy, and Henry Atkins, coordinated and facilitated congregational and denominational support and dealt with opposing members in their congregations and denominations.

Denominational support was also encouraged in the religious press. Week after week, throughout the eighties, there were articles in the religious press about the sanctuary movement. Christianity and Crisis, The Christian Science Monitor, The Catholic Agitator, EPICA Press, Sojourner, and newsletters of Clergy and Laity Concerned, Church World Service, the National Council of Churches, Maryknoll, and hundreds of others, consistently reported on the movement. Their coverage was always sympathetic, educational, positive and greatly contributed to their constituencies perception of the movement. At the same time, members of the religious community committed to peace and social justice reproduced and distributed these articles and ordered and distributed thousands of copies of pamphlets from the Chicago Religious Task Force and the Tucson Ecumenical Council.

Coordinating a National Movement: The Chicago
Religious Task Force on Central America

Because the initiative for a joint sanctuary declaration emerged from the Tucson Ecumenical Council, the local movement center in Tucson received extensive local and national media attention. Within days the Tucson Ecumenical Council was bombarded with requests for information on the sanctuary movement. As has been discussed, the Council was put into the awkward position of attempting to coordinate a national movement of congregations and refugees as more and more congregations publically began to declare their churches sanctuaries.

The Tucson Ecumenical Council was never set up to handle enormous numbers of requests for information nor to coordinate a national movement of churches. Moreover, the energies of its staff were increasingly being channelled into the needs of Salvadorans and Guatemalans in Mexico and on the border. The staff desperately needed assistance in coordinating and developing the internal organization of the sanctuary movement. Further, they needed help in developing the movement's image for the media, and others, who were demanding information. They also needed to be relieved of the responsibility of matching Central Americans with congregations who were interested in offering sanctuary to refugees. Further, as more and more congregations

became interested in declaring sanctuary, they demanded information on the legal consequences of their action, the religious tradition of offering sanctuary, and political and social conditions in Central America. Thus, members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council began searching for other groups who could take on these responsibilities.

In the Spring of 1983, the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTF) agreed to become responsible for communications and coordination of churches in the sanctuary movement. According to Reverend Fife:

A group in Chicago called the Chicago Religious Task Force was one of those groups (that kept calling for information) and finally in frustration Dan Dale (on staff at CRTF) called and said, "why don't you send us any information?" I was equally frustrated by refugee needs on the border and I said, "if you want that kind of thing done why don't you do it yourself?" and he said, "that's an interesting idea I'll get back to you." Within a week they did and the Chicago Religious Task Force's willingness to take on the communications end of this ... is one of the keys to the spread and life of the sanctuary movement.

Members of the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America described CRTFCA as an interfaith organization, founded in 1981 to "organize people of all religious persuasions to understand and challenge U.S. foreign policy towards Central America." As an organization, the Chicago Religious Task Force

consistently articulated its objectives and tasks with great clarity. It was described as both a religious and a political organization and members saw no conflict between the two positions. In their national newsletter, BASTA, members of the Task Force stated:

Our task is to inform, educate and activate people on the conditions in Central America, to expose the role of the U.S. government in maintaining corrupt and repressive governments in that area and in promoting policies designed to destabilize the government of Nicaragua. The faith understanding which informs our work could best be described as a theology of solidarity.

Throughout the eighties the task force was housed in the offices of the American Friends Service Committee, in Chicago, Illinois, funded by an ecumenical council of over forty-five churches. In addition, its staff fundraised and regularly applied for grants.

When the Chicago Religious Task Force took on the responsibility of coordinating national sanctuary movement activities it became the first outside group to formally become incorporated into the sanctuary movement. As a religious based Central American solidarity organization CRTF was immediately interested in the sanctuary movement. Upon hearing of Southside Presbyterian Church's request that churches join in their public declaration, CRTF became involved in moving the congregation at Chicago's Wellington Avenue United

Church of Christ, where one of the Task Force's members, Reverend Mike McConnell, was the minister, to declare public sanctuary.

At that time, CRTF members were actively involved in efforts to bring about change in U.S. foreign policy in Central America. But they were a small group, relatively isolated from the larger society with no access to a mass base. This meant that they were unable to disseminate their views to large audiences and potentially effect change on a widescale. Nevertheless, in their pursuit of change the CRTF staff had developed a wide range of social movement resources, including skilled activists, tactical knowledge, media contacts, networks with other social activists, social and personal networks in the religious community and a vision of new possibilities in society. What they lacked was a visible platform and a mass base.

An emerging mass movement like the sanctuary movement provided an ideal setting for a group like the Chicago Religious Task Force, by providing the group with a visible platform and mass base through which it could disseminate information. CRTF found the sanctuary movement to be ideally suited to its goals of "organizing, educating and politicizing people at the base." In a comuniqué to a CRTF subcommittee, Lee

Holstein, a staff member at CRTF, wrote:

We have discovered as a result of this process (by which she meant being involved with Wellington) that sanctuary is an incredible tool for organizing, educating and politicizing people at the base. It is direct action which provides a long-term forum for increasing support for the People's of Central America and opposing U.S. intervention there. It has excited all involved - the organizers, the congregations, the refugees and even the press.

In turn, the sanctuary movement utilized resources and skills provided by the Chicago Religious Task Force in order to develop and strengthen its own internal organization. The Task Force had established itself as an organization before it became involved with the movement. It had office space, a dedicated staff, an equally dedicated group of volunteers, independent funding, media skills, access to local and national networks, a reputation as a reliable organization and a vision. The alliance proved critical for the development of the sanctuary movement from 1983 to 1985.

Different people attribute the formal emergence of the Chicago Religious Task Force into the sanctuary movement to different social networking patterns; but it seems that after the task force's director, Reverend Dan Dale, spoke with Reverend Fife, Jim Corbett called him back on behalf of the Tucson Ecumenical Council to ask if the task force would seriously consider taking on the

responsibility of being the communications and coordination center for the movement. Although CRTF staff were very interested in becoming formally involved with the movement they were unsure if they could handle the responsibility and still have the time and energy to carry out their own agenda. Thus instead of immediately agreeing to do so, they contacted several other groups in the religious community to see if they could take on the responsibility. Although several groups expressed interest in sharing the responsibility no single organization or group volunteered to actually coordinate activities. Therefore, CRTF agreed to become the national communications center and coordinator.

After consulting with other groups, including the Tucson Ecumenical Council, it was decided that national coordination of the sanctuary movement would have at least two components: First, an information center which functioned to deal with inquiries about the movement. Second, coordination of strategies, follow-up, congregations, outreach and on-going communication in the different areas.

Overall, the Chicago Religious Task Force played four major roles in the sanctuary movement. As a communications and coordination center CRTF was a vital link between sanctuary congregations and task forces all

over the country. Within a few months of becoming the official coordinators of the national movement the staff produced a small booklet entitled, "Sanctuary: A Justice Ministry". It outlined the historical and theological basis for sanctuary, described the legal risks involved and provided detailed information on what it meant for a congregation to declare sanctuary and sponsor refugees. The booklet was distributed to thousands of congregations across the United States. For congregations which had declared sanctuary the booklet was a vital educational resource, to be used to further educate congregational members and others. But more importantly, the booklet served to inform new congregations about critical details of the sanctuary movement, well before they took the decision to publically declare sanctuary. The Chicago Religious Task Force continued to publish booklets and its official newsletter, BASTA, throughout the history of the sanctuary movement.

Second, CRTF served as an information clearinghouse on the sanctuary movement for people all over the nation. They produced public documents, staffed telephones, held frequent media interviews, wrote articles, held press conferences, established an extensive newspapers clippings file and provided

legislative updates and information to members of the movement and the media.

Third, Sister Darlene Nicgorski, a nun who had served in Guatemala, was hired by the Chicago Religious Task Force in 1984 and became primarily responsible for carrying out in-depth interviews and counseling sessions with Salvadorans and Guatemalans who might consider going into public sanctuary. These interviews served to inform Central American refugees about the movement and prepared them to go into sanctuary. Counseling sessions also generated information which the Chicago Religious Task Force staff could use to "match" refugees up with congregations. In January 1985, Sister Darlene was one of sixteen sanctuary activists to be indicted by a federal grand jury in Phoenix. Her home and office were ransacked by federal agents who took photos and documents and made a video.

Four, the task force was responsible for developing and implementing the strategy of the public caravan in response to the February 1983 INS arrest of layworker and sanctuary activist Stacey Merkt in Texas. The public caravan proved to be one of the most effective strategies available to sanctuary movement activists.

The Chicago Religious Task Force served as the movement's official clearinghouse and coordinator for

the sanctuary movement for three years, from 1982 until 1985. During that time its staff had an enormous influence over the public's perception of the sanctuary movement. Its staff received calls from all over the nation. They were continually approached by members of the media and asked to characterize the movement and its membership, outline its strategies and goals, estimate its growth and impact and describe its ideological orientation and position. Further, task force staff were continually given the opportunity to influence and direct the internal development of the movement when members of the congregations called the office asking for assistance and information. The staff consistently informed and advised congregational members on a wide variety of issues, ranging from protest strategies to handling problems that came up in their churches.

After 1985, although the Chicago Religious Task Force officially remained the national information clearinghouse, local congregations, national sanctuary organizations and the media relied on it much less. This was due in part to the government's infiltration of the movement in Arizona and Mexico and subsequent indictments, which focused a lot of attention back on the local level. But even before the indictments, sanctuary activists were beginning to perceive members of the task

force as being ideologically at odds with the leadership in Tucson and had begun to take sides with one group or the other. These tensions will be discussed later in this chapter.

Internal Organization and Leadership at Local and National Levels

From its inception the sanctuary movement in the United States was at once a national and local social movement. It was a national movement in that its membership, leadership, strategies and tactics extended throughout the United States and into Mexico. Organizations like the Tucson Ecumenical Council, East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, and the Chicago Religious Task Force were responsible for coordinating activities within their region and for congregations throughout the United States. It was a local movement in that its social and organizational base were in local churches and congregations across the United States and in parts of Mexico. Thus any discussion of internal organization and leadership in the sanctuary movement must focus on both the local and national levels.

On the local level, sanctuary movement activities always fit within the internal structure of the church, congregation and denomination which declared sanctuary.

Each publically declared sanctuary congregation was characterized by a previously established, traditional, official leadership and corresponding internal social structure which supported this leadership. This corresponded to organizational patterns and styles, an established and clearly distinguishable body of members and leaders, differential degrees of power and influence between these members and leaders, access to a wide range of congregational and denominational resources, social networks, including finances, and individuals who shared an organizational history, denominational networks and ideologies. Leaders, leadership styles and supporting organizational patterns differed depending upon many factors, of which denomination may have been the most critical. With the exception of Quaker Meetings and Fellowships, sanctuary movement activities functioned within fairly rigid denominational structures. Any attempt towards the consideration and subsequent declaration of sanctuary occurred within the context of these denominational structures and always required the approval of specific congregational bodies. Congregational discussions and decisions surrounding the issue of sanctuary consistently occurred within the context of a denominational structure, such as involvement of the Board of Trustees and Deacons at

Riverside Church in New York City and of the Session at Southside and St John's Presbyterian Church in Tucson and Berkeley. (*)

In most congregations the idea to form a sanctuary task force or committee was almost always initiated at the local level; either by a minister, as in the case of Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson and St Mark's Church in Berkeley, or an active congregational member, as in the case of Riverside Church in New York City. Much less frequently initiative for the formation of a sanctuary task force and the subsequent decision to declare sanctuary also came from members of the religious community who were organized outside of the congregation which eventually declared sanctuary. A third possibility, initiative for public sanctuary coming

(*) It is important to note that bodies other than congregations did declare public sanctuary. Most notably, the Graduate Student Union at Riverside Campus, Los Angeles and the New Jewish Agenda, in the East Bay, California. However, although they were recognized by the sanctuary movement community and participated in many activities, they were never officially considered to be part of the movement. For example, their names did not appear on the list of declared sanctuaries put out by the Chicago Religious Task Force declaration and they did not house or fiscally sponsor refugees. Beginning in 1985 cities and states also began declaring public sanctuary. However, the form that their declaration took was completely different from public sanctuary within the context of the sanctuary movement.

from someone outside of the congregation and religious community, that is to say from the secular community, rarely occurred. However, in cases where the idea to establish a sanctuary task force and subsequently declare public sanctuary was initiated by an individual or a group outside of the religious community, the ministers in these congregations were supportive of the idea of declaring sanctuary as soon as it was suggested. In these cases, subsequent leadership of the task force and of activities and actions associated with sanctuary were transferred to the minister or interested, active members of the congregation. That is to say, even when the suggestion to declare sanctuary was initiated by a member of the secular community, subsequent sanctuary movement leadership on the local level was transferred to a minister or a member of the congregation.

Independent of who initiated the congregations declaration, public portrayal of the sanctuary movement and/or a sanctuary church, to the media or to congregations considering declaration, always came from a member of the congregation or religious community. In my investigation of over one hundred congregations, almost every single congregation was first introduced to the idea of working with Central Americans and declaring sanctuary by their minister, priest, rabbi or active

congregational member; with the exception of the Benedictine Monks in West Priory, Massachusetts who had served in Mexico. Only one sanctuary task force leader or public speaker, out of the more than 100 congregations I observed, came from the secular community. This, despite the fact that there were individuals present from the secular community who appeared to have the necessary qualifications and contacts for leadership.

For sanctuary activists, membership in the religious community and religiousity were among the most critical and necessary prerequisites for leadership at the local and national levels. Because the sanctuary movement was a product of the religious community and because its social and organizational foundations were in the congregations it was critically important to sanctuary activists that the movement be consistently portrayed as religious. For that to happen, portrayal of the movement had to come from members of the religious community. Like members of other social movements, sanctuary activists wanted their story to be told by insiders. Further, in order to be effective local leadership had to come from within the religious community, precisely because the movement was socially based in the congregations and founded on theological

principles. According to one member of an Eastcoast sanctuary congregation:

I don't think it would have been possible for someone from the secular community to lead our congregation through the process of declaring our church a sanctuary for refugees. We needed a certain kind of spiritual guidance that can only be provided by someone who's really in touch with their faith.

Thus, religious affiliation and status, within the context of congregations and religious denominations, became a critical requirement for people who sought to attain positions of leadership in the sanctuary movement. Almost every single sanctuary movement leader on the local, regional and national level held an important position and high status within the context of their particular congregation and denomination. With few exceptions movement leaders were ministers. Those who were not were either priests, nuns, seminary students, volunteers in mission or highly active members in their religious communities. That religious affiliation was a critical requirement for sanctuary movement leadership is illustrated in the following 1986 job description for position as "office manager" in the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant:

Our Office Manager must be ... able to articulate the aims and religious basis of sanctuary, and be an active participant in the religious community.

The fact that leaders of the sanctuary movement, both locally and nationally, were highly active participants in their religious communities meant that they brought experiences, skills, resources and networks which they had accumulated working in their congregations and denominations to their role as movement leaders. Almost all were able to transform indigenous resources into power resources and marshal them in conflict situations to accomplish their goals within the context of the sanctuary movement. According to one minister and leader of a congregation which had declared sanctuary:

I'm sure that one of the main reasons I was able to convince my congregation to consider the question of becoming a sanctuary church was because I had worked with them on the inner city project. Based on that project I had gained their respect. More importantly, I knew exactly how much money we had in the treasury, where it was going, what people's different interests were, and I had made terrific contacts in the community who I was able to call on to support me when I proposed that we consider sanctuary.

Leaders of the sanctuary movement involved in portraying the movement to the public had to have access to very specific skills and resources. They had to speak eloquently in public, not be committed to a job which required their fulltime attendance or attention, be able to travel freely and frequently, have access to

independent sources of funding, and have a status which legitimated their religious affiliation to the public and contributed to the movement's status. The role of a clergyperson met all these requirements beautifully.

National Sanctuary Movement Leadership

In terms of leadership, the first two years of the public sanctuary movement were relatively free of conflict. The movement was growing at a terrific rate. The Chicago Religious Task Force was coordinating communications and local congregations. Local leaders were occupied with their local congregations. Nationally, leaders were occupied with presenting the movement to U.S. society, largely through the media and public speaking. Although many leaders had participated in other social movements, all were involved in learning what it meant to be in the sanctuary movement particularly.

At this early stage in the movements history the advantages of ecumenicalism, reflected in a wide range of denominational representation were tremendous. Local leaders were able to bring in a wide range of resources and support from their respective congregations and denominations. Ecumenical and

interfaith diversity contributed immensely to the rapid growth of the movement on the local and national levels and produced extensive, unpredicted support for the sanctuary movement in the religious community as a whole.

At the national level one of the most salient characteristics of sanctuary movement organization was that it was consistently ecumenical and interfaith based. National leadership was characterized by a range of leaders who represented over ten different denominations, both Protestant and Catholic. Addressing the Presbyterian Consultation on Public Sanctuary in November 1984 Reverend Fife stated:

It's a movement characterized by its grassroots nature. On Frontline I said it was the most disorganized movement I've ever been part of. We moved from an ecumenical base to an interfaith base. Now Protestant, Catholic and Jewish are involved in sanctuary across the country. ... That understanding of ecumenical diversity is very important to the understanding the sanctuary movement and how it distinguishes itself from other ecumenical efforts. We clearly have a movement that is faith based. Distinguished from other solidarity groups, other political groups, other efforts and organizations across the country by its faith base. Only the congregations can declare sanctuary... Presbyterians, Lutherans, Methodists, Catholics coming together to give sanctuary.

Almost all of the individuals who came to share national leadership of the sanctuary movement in the United States were leaders in their local congregations

or religious organizations prior to their involvement in the sanctuary movement. All were long time, well respected members in their churches and denominations and the religious community as a whole. Within the context of their denominations each had acquired a wide range of experiences, skills and resources, leadership skills, denominational networks, status within their denominations and the religious community. Each had access to sources of financial support and social networks at the local and national levels. Additionally, their high status within the religious community enabled them to attract the attention of the media and legitimated their affiliation with the movement. Resources were even more plentiful for clergy who were the formal heads of their congregations. Organizational affiliations, pre-existing networks, institutional affiliations, ideologies, contacts, financial and organizational resources, denominational status, skills, and participating individuals are critical resources for social movement mobilization. It is the complex combination of these movement resources by individuals which are responsible for facilitating and contributing to a social movements emergence and ongoing development. Although almost all of the individuals who held positions of leadership in the

sanctuary movement were members of the religious community and most were members of the clergy, from its inception the sanctuary movement was characterized by leaders who did not share the same denominational affiliations, networks, styles, organizational bases and frameworks, or religious perspectives. These differences contributed to both solidarity and conflict in the movement

The Impact of Arrests in 1983: New Alliances and Strategies

On February 17, 1983, almost one year after the public emergence of the sanctuary movement, Stacey Merkt, a Christian layworker who worked at Casa Oscar Romero in San Benito, Texas, was stopped by the U.S. Border Patrol between 4:00 and 5:00 A.M. on a back farm road near San Benito. Because she and three other North Americans were traveling with three undocumented Salvadoran refugees, Merkt was charged with transporting "illegal aliens". One month later, Philip Willis-Conger, a staff member of the Tucson Ecumenical Council, was charged with a similar offense. Later the charges against him were dropped, but evidence taken from his knapsack at that time, was used as evidence to begin the governments ten-month undercover investigation and infiltration of the movement in 1984. That same

month, Merkt's co-worker, Jack Elder, director of Casa Romero, was also arrested and charged with transporting illegal aliens.

All three arrests had a profound effect on the development and spread of the sanctuary movement. First and foremost because they attracted national attention. Within days, congregations were mobilizing actions designed to protest the arrests. Sanctuary congregations all over the country immediately committed themselves to raising funds first for Merkt and then for Elder's defense. They held vigils to protest the arrests and press conferences to inform the public of what had happened. Within one month at least ten congregations agreed to declare sanctuary on March 24th. in support of Merkt and Elder's commitment to help Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. One congregational member, whose church became a sanctuary for refugees one month after the arrests, expressed his congregation's reason for declaring sanctuary:

We had been talking about declaring sanctuary but we'd been hemming and hawing about it. We weren't sure that sanctuary was the right place to put our energies. But then Stacey got arrested, then Elder. We had to do something to tell the government we wouldn't allow that and sanctuary was the best way to say that.

Second, the arrests created the need for a sanctuary movement defense team composed of lawyers, legal firms, media people and legal organizations.

Sanctuary activists were put into the position of having to establish new links with a different group of attorneys than the ones they had been working with. The arrests signaled the need for new alliances between the sanctuary movement and the legal profession. Within days of Merkt's arrest a new group of attorneys began working to defend Merkt. Later they would defend Elder and others. Many of these attorneys had years of experience working with social movement activists and had been preparing for the day when members of the sanctuary movement would need their resources. This alliance, between constitutional rights attorneys in the secular community and sanctuary activists, had a profound effect on the way in which sanctuary activists came to interpret their actions, define their movement and relate what they were doing to the society at large. Later the Center for Constitutional Rights would produce a pamphlet in which they stated:

The Center for Constitutional Rights and other organizations were contacted by Jack Elder and his attorneys, Steve Cooper of Minneapolis and Lisa Brodyaga of Brownsville, Texas. The CCR was asked to assist in the defense preparation in connection with the first set of charges against Elder.

Third, the arrests created the need to organize defense funds, both local and national, to pay for all future legal defense costs. Money was needed to pay for

the costs of travel, legal meetings, phonecalls, correspondence, publications, attorneys, duplication, legal documents, filing for government information and all other associated costs of legal defense and public education around the trials.

Immediately after Merkt's arrests the services of the Christic Institute, a religious based legal firm in Washington, D.C., were retained. Because the sanctuary movement and actions of activists were based on specific religious principles, sanctuary activists first sought out and contacted legal groups and attorneys whose philosophies they felt were consonant with their own. However, although they attempted to use attorneys affiliated with the religious community, such as those associated with Christic, most of the individuals and groups with whom they ended up working with, such as the team of attorneys who defended the eleven indictes in 1985-85, were members of the secular community. This was partly a consequence of the fact that right after Merkt's arrest, legal groups like the National Lawyers Guild, Center for Constitutional Rights and Central American Refugee Defense Fund made themselves available to sanctuary activists. The first two groups had long histories of working with social movement activists who challenged the policies of the U.S. government. All

three groups had been preparing for their eventual association with the sanctuary movement.

A small group of these attorneys, amongst them Karen Parker, had been doing research on the relevance of the Geneva Protocols and Conventions to the Salvadoran and Guatemalan community and the activities of sanctuary activists. Thus, they were able to provide activists with new legal information which according to their interpretation of the law, legitimated sanctuary activities. This information was critical because up until the time of Merkt's arrest in February 1983 most sanctuary activists believed that what they were doing was morally correct but illegal or civilly disobedient. This was mainly because their main source of information had been the INS and the State Department, which consistently threatened to arrest them for their activities. This new legal information changed their perception of their activities.

Within weeks of the arrests, the Chicago Religious Task Force produced a handbook prepared by National Lawyers Guild summer interns, entitled "Sanctuary and the Law", which provided activists with new legal information: legal liabilities, refugee rights, INS proceedings, U.S. refugee law, international protocols and conventions. As more information became available,

conferences were held, publications were sent out, and attorneys began to meet with congregations regularly. As more new legal information was disseminated, members of the congregations began to change their perception of their sanctuary movement activities. Instead of seeing their activities as illegal or civilly disobedient, they began to see them as legal. Later in 1985, the Center for Constitutional Rights would bring a suit on behalf of the congregations accusing the government of breaking its own and international laws.

The impact of the linkage between the legal community on the ideological development of the sanctuary movement cannot be overemphasized. New legal information provided by attorneys served to reinforce sanctuary activists belief in the legality of their actions. Sanctuary activists no longer saw themselves as challenging the State by breaking its laws or being civilly disobedient. Rather, they saw themselves as upholding the law, affirming their democratic right to challenge the government to uphold its own laws, forcing the State to live up to its promise of democracy.

Further, the fact that attorneys and members of the sanctuary movement and religious community were able to argue that sanctuary movement activities were legal, contributed immensely to the growth and spread of the

movement. Congregational members felt infinitely more comfortable and secure knowing that there were laws in place which legitimated their assisting refugees in crossing the border and offering them church sanctuary. Within months of the new legal information being disseminated, congregations all over the country began to discuss and consider the possibility of offering sanctuary to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. According to one member of a small congregation on the East coast whose congregation declared sanctuary in the Spring 1984:

There's no question that it was easier for the congregation to accept the idea of sanctuary knowing that there were laws in place which made the action of offering sanctuary legal. I don't think they would have gone through with it otherwise.

The Strategy of the Public Caravan

Stacey Merkts arrest was also critical for the development of what was to become a major strategy in the sanctuary movement -the public caravan. Within weeks of her arrest, the Chicago Religious Task Force organized the movement's first public caravan. The caravan, driven by North Americans, carried a family of Guatemalan Indians from Chicago to Vermont; where they received sanctuary with a group of Benedicton monks. It

was designed to demonstrate people's support for Merkt and their outrage at the government for arresting her and detaining the Salvadorans. Later a caravan traveled from Tucson to Seattle. Then another from Los Angeles to Iowa. Caravans moved all over the country. Each one stopping to meet and talk and stay with North Americans in towns and cities along the route. A 1985 issue of BASTA stated:

...a caravan of 50 cars accompanied a Salvadoran family out of Los Angeles on its first leg of a 1,500 mile journey across the US. The caravan, organized by the Chicago Religious Task Force dramatized the plight of Central American refugees in this country and support of them by local churches defying US law by providing them sanctuary. (*)

That the caravans attracted a great amount of media attention was not accidental. Because congregations were informed well in advance that a caravan would be coming into their communities, they were able to mobilize community support to greet the caravan, organize speaking engagements, alert members of the media and arrange food and shelter for caravan members.

* It is interesting to note the use of Chicago Religious Task Force's language in this press release. I refer to the line, "local churches defying US law by providing them sanctuary." Unlike the rest of the sanctuary movement, in January 1985, CRTF remained committed to the idea that offering sanctuary challenged US law. This difference was one amongst many that caused serious conflicts between CRTF and the Tucson Ecumenical Council.

The caravans proved to have an inspirational effect on North American members of the religious community. After a caravan had passed through an area, one or two congregations would inevitably begin to consider declaring their church a sanctuary. Within months there would be at least one sanctuary church in the area. More people would join in sanctuary movement activities. Within a year of Merkt and Elder's arrests the number of sanctuary churches had doubled, partly due to the strategy of the public caravan. According to one sanctuary activist:

The caravans were an easy way of saying go ahead arrest us all, then you'll really have a fight on your hands...I became involved in the movement because of a caravan, the one that carried Felipe (from Chicago to Vermont). He opened his mouth and I was converted... I've been with the movement ever since.

One of the main reasons that the strategy of the public caravan was so inspirational and effective was because it allowed people to take part in the sanctuary movement without actually declaring sanctuary. Being part of a caravan or sheltering members of a caravan who came through your town was less risky than declaring sanctuary and required much less commitment from an individual or a congregation. Yet like the strategy of public sanctuary, the caravans were designed to bring

North Americans face-to-face with Salvadorans and Guatemalans and challenge the government's policies of deportations and arrests. Like the strategy of offering sanctuary, the public caravans become a powerful and effective symbol for articulating a wide range of concerns and had a profound effect on the lives of North American Christians:

My first direct exposure to the sanctuary movement occurred in June 1984... A Sanctuary caravan arrived that afternoon from Phoenix; a potluck supper and worship service were planned for that evening; the caravan left the following morning on the next leg of its journey. A very young Guatemalan family...who had recently come across the border from Mexico, were being accompanied to a sanctuary church in Seattle. This was not done secretly. The caravans cars carried banners; service open to the public were held at each stop; the young couple gave their testimony that evening and when they talked to journalists after the service. Their story was simple, direct, and utterly sophisticated. After giving thanks to God, the churches, and all who had helped them along the way, Alfredo explained that theirs was just one among "hundreds and hundreds of families who have fled from Guatemalan looking for a safe place to live and to raise our children." ... His uncle and two brothers-in-law were assassinated in 1980 by soldiers dressed in civilian clothes... Four years later...two airplanes arrived to bomb the neighboring hamlet... His two sister, along with his oldest niece, her little brother, another nephew and his youngest niece, who had been born just 17 hours earlier. They were burned alive in their home..."When it was all over, we found my family made into balls of meat and bone. We were unable to recognize anyone. The children were for the most part reduced to ashes."...Alfredo concluded..."There are hundreds of stories like mine. Some we can tell. Others no one can tell because whole families have been exterminated. These are stories that must be heard in churches throughout our country so that our hearts will be touched, our faith awakened to action, and our lives challenged.

Regional and National Sanctuary Movement Bodies

By Fall 1983 the sanctuary movement had spread sufficiently to require regional subdivision. The East Bay Sanctuary Covenant in California was taking on more and more responsibility and tasks in the Northern California region. Riverside Church in New York City, The Episcopal Church in New Jersey and churches in Philadelphia, Washington, D.C. and Boston had joined together to coordinate efforts on the East coast. The Tucson Ecumenical Council and the Tucson refugee support group were increasingly taking on more responsibility for coordinating border activities and responding to the media's need for information about both the underground railroad and the sanctuary movement. In Texas, Stacey Merkt and Jack Elder were increasingly receiving regional and national attention as one, then the other, and then both were arrested on charges of transporting, aiding and abetting illegal aliens. The Chicago Religious Task Force was increasingly becoming responsible for national coordination of congregations that had formally declared their churches sanctuaries, and for refugees interested in the sanctuary movement. But in addition to efforts toward regional coordination and autonomy, it was also clear that the movement was

becoming characterized by ideological tensions which centered around organizational styles. Beginning in 1984 these tensions began to be manifested in questions about whether there should be a national coordinating body for the sanctuary movement as a whole.

Up until 1984 most sanctuary activists, leaders and members both, were comfortable with the fact that there was no formal regional or national movement leadership. Their position was that the movement was, and should remain, organized and controlled at the local level. Most resisted any attempts toward formal national coordination. On the other hand, they recognized that sanctuary movement activities were increasingly being coordinated regionally and nationally. These sentiments were aggravated by the fact that by the Spring of 1984 the sanctuary movement had grown so fast and was so widespread that leaders and members increasingly felt the need for national coordination. This felt need grew stronger as the government increased its harrassment and arrests of sanctuary activists and refugees. The call for national coordination also corresponded to the fact that some local movement centers, in Tucson, Northern California, and Chicago for example, were becoming much more powerful than others; which meant that they were unofficially influencing the direction of the movement.

This meant that they were unofficially exerting an influence on the direction of the movement at the local level.

By late 1984 it became increasingly clear that the different organizational styles and ideological positions of regional and national leaders were beginning to create conflicts for the movement. Quakers in the movement for example, favored horizontal networks of people where no one person or group had power over any other. They did not favor leaders and national organizations and they were in principle opposed to the idea of leaders. The consistent refusal of some Quakers, particularly Jim Corbett, to participate in national bodies or designate leaders consistently frustrated many of their co-activists (16).

Nonetheless, the rapid, unprecedented growth of the sanctuary movement, recognition that certain groups and individuals were exerting a powerful informal influence on the movement, and the government's crackdown on sanctuary activists in 1983 motivated the call for national organization and leadership. Despite some opposition to the formation of national leadership most members of the sanctuary movement were aware of the need to create a national sanctuary defense fund and national channels of communication.

It is important to understand that the call for national leadership came largely from leaders and members who were part of local movement centers located away from the border. In fact, many leaders and members who worked on or near the border in Texas, San Diego, California, and Arizona never called for, and were never comfortable with, the idea of national coordination and or formal movement leadership. When some degree of national leadership was instituted in 1985 these regions refused to allow any coordination of border activities for obvious (security) reasons. However, almost everyone agreed that there was a need to raise large sums of money for legal defense. Thus there was little opposition when it was suggested that a national legal defense fund be created.

The National Sanctuary Defense Fund

The idea for a National Sanctuary Defense Fund (NSDF) emerged at a national gathering of sanctuary activists in the Fall of 1984, almost one year after the arrests of Merkt, Willis-Conger, and Elder. At that meeting, it was agreed that a select group of people should devote their time to raising and coordinating funds for the defense of sanctuary activists and

refugees. At that meeting, a board, representative of geographic regions, was put together. The board was never an elected body. When the federal indictments occurred in January 1985 the Defense Fund went into action. One and half months later on, March 1, 1985, Tom Ambroggi was hired to coordinate the Fund out of its new office in San Francisco, under the auspices of the Franciscan Friars in that city.

The formal mandate of the Defense Fund was to raise and distribute funds for the legal defense of "those sanctuary workers who have been indicted and refugees who have been arrested in conjunction with those indictments." (17) The Fund, which was organized after other local defense funds, such as the Rio Grande Defense Committee in Texas, contributed to local defense funds depending upon local needs. Decisions about who would receive funding were made by regional representatives who put in their requests to the National Fund. Thus decisions about who deserved to be funded were made first by regional leaders and then again by the Fund's board and coordinator.

The National Defense Fund worked in four general areas to raise funds. The first was its "individual contributions" category, which included its extensive direct mail campaign. Many unsolicited contributions

came in during 1985-1986 and local congregations were encouraged to fundraise for the Fund, which they did. Between May 1, 1985 and March 1, 1986, the direct mail campaign involved four million two hundred thousand pieces. The second category was "national and international church bodies." This included denominations and organizations such as the World Council of Churches and World Federation. The third area was "foundations." In 1985-86 Coordinator Ambroggi was in touch with over 45 foundations and sent out many grants. That generated about \$130,000 by March 1986. The fourth area was "benefit events, concerts, dinners and such." The Fund worked with professional organizers to arrange these events.

The Defense Fund also hired a public relations firm, Fenton Communications, to help publicize issues related to the 1985 indictments. The decision to hire a public relations firm was made in June 1985 when it was recognized that national media work was essential around the indictments and the grand jury trial. Fenton Communications was responsible for three things: a backgrounder media tour in New York City and Washington, D.C.; putting together a media packet; and helping with a two-day training of regional media coordinators, at the request of the National Communications Council.

Within a year, the Board of the National Sanctuary Defense Fund were in control of a great deal of money. Between 1985 and 1986 the Fund raised over a half million dollars, \$100,000 alone was pledged by the Presbyterian General Assembly (USA). From the inception of the Defense Fund, an internal (movement) debate emerged over how fund money should be spent. The debate was between those who felt that some of the money should be used to help refugees who were not in the movement, such as the thousands in detention, and those who felt that the money should be used to defend sanctuary activists and refugees in sanctuary. This debate was characteristic of sentiments in the local defense funds as well. The Rio Grande Fund regularly used most of its money to defend undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans in Texas. Thus, many people did not feel comfortable with the decision to spend a great deal of money on hiring a public relations firm, based on their belief that the money could have been spent in other ways.

Although the National Defense Fund was created in order to raise large sums of money for legal defense, its organizational goals went beyond fundraising, and included an educational component. In a major fundraising proposal the second of three stated Defense Fund goals was to, "educate the public about the moral

and legal issues involved in the sanctuary movement." Articulating and carrying out this goal put leaders of the Fund into a very powerful position in the movement. They became involved in defining and interpreting sanctuary movement activities, the trial, the movement's ideological position, its public image, to the media and public.

The National Communications Council

The second national sanctuary movement body formed was the National Communications Council (NCC), designed to facilitate communication amongst regions. The NCC was convened in January 1985 at the consultation on sanctuary held in Tucson, Arizona. The consultation coincided with the national symposium on sanctuary and grand jury indictments against sanctuary activists in Arizona and Mexico. In this climate of tension and increasing apprehension over government harassment, members of the sanctuary movement formally agreed that the time had come to establish formal channels of communication between local sanctuary movement centers and regions. At the consultation it was decided that a coordinating body would be established to facilitate communication, to be called the National Communications

Council. The Communications Council would be composed of North and Central American representatives from regions, roughly divided into twelve regions.

There was much concern among members that another national body would lead to divisions in the movement and at the consultation it was made clear that the NCC would have no decision making power. Yet within several months its members defined the NCC as a body designed to "give the movement some focus and direction". One of the ways in which the NCC worked with the Defense Fund was that its members chose regional media representatives, who were then trained by Fenton Communications, the chairperson and coordinator of the Fund.

Tensions in the Sanctuary Movement

In many ways the local sanctuary movement centers in Tucson under grand jury indictment and on trial in Texas had the most to gain from the formation of national bodies and a national movement which would unquestionably support them. Nonetheless, the local movement center in Tucson clearly stated that many of its members were not comfortable with national bodies and did not want to be part of a national sanctuary movement. Jim Corbett, true to Quaker principles, wrote:

...hierarchical power structures like the National Communications Council and the National Sanctuary Movement subjugate the will of the minority to the will of the majority.

Reverend John Fife, a Presbyterian who felt comfortable with hierarchies and coordinating bodies, stated that he was concerned that:

people making statements and taking directives for the movement organized at the local level just wouldn't work.

Fife was also concerned about the dangers of institutionalizing the sanctuary movement:

We're old enough now to have problems and struggles among ourselves. These ought to be clearly articulated, talked about and used as opportunities to learn. First of all the sanctuary movement is old enough now for people to talk about institutionalizing it...These institutional questions are important. They originated when we had to raise money to provide legal defense for sanctuary workers indicted and captured on the border. That original legal defense effort was very intensive and we needed some national fundraising capabilities. So people came together and we have created within the last three months the National Sanctuary Defense Fund. In anticipation of further arrests which will probably happen on the border those institutional forms are going to have to emerge but there are some very real dangers. Institutions can define, control, organize, establish policy and begin to take on a life of their own. For the needs of the institution and not the needs of the refugees. Institutions can also describe, coordinate, communicate, celebrate diversity and maintain a focus of the movement where it ought to be maintained and that is on the needs of the refugees. What kinds of institutions we're going to develop is going to be a very fascinating question for all of us.

In addition, both Corbett and Fife were concerned that what were becoming obvious ideological differences

between members of the local movement center in Tucson and members of the Chicago Religious Task Force would become very problematic for the movement if there were national bodies who put forth a national sanctuary movement position. Both Corbett and Fife took the position that the sanctuary movement never was a "political" movement with "political goals." Fife liked to call it a "prophetic movement." Whereas, CRTF took the position that sanctuary was a political strategy carried out by members of the religious community to stop US intervention and defend Central Americans.

In the summer of 1985 Jim Corbett, representing the Tucson refugee support group, wrote a series of letters to members of the National Communications Council and Defense Fund. Corbett and others were concerned that decisions made at the Council's April 25-28, 1985 meeting could result in serious problems for the movement. Corbett wrote:

A few days ago, we received a 12-page document, ONGOING STATUS OF THE NATIONAL SANCTUARY COMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL, which was produced by a meeting in San Francisco April 25- 28. The document mixes recommendations concerning the development of communications within the sanctuary network with "National Sanctuary" policy recommendations framed as criteria, endorsements, demands, etc., which seem to pre-suppose the existence or formation in process--maybe of a national body--for generating policies governing sanctuary communities in the United States. The preliminaries to the upcoming Arizona sanctuary trial are revealing that our failure to be timely and

emphatic enough in our statements rejecting misrepresentations in 1984 will weaken the defense of refugee and sanctuary rights in 1985. Any statement or action concerning sanctuary that could be construed to be national can--and probably will--be used by the government and the press to define our position for us... Our position remains that ...we have delegated no policy-making powers over Trsg to any regional or national sanctuary body; we do not wish to be considered members of any body that presumes to exercise such powers, nor will we knowingly send anyone to attend regional or national meetings designed to assert such powers.

another letter continued to address these issues:

The Tucson Ecumenical Task Force on Central America and the Tucson refugee support group have published their opposition to any vertical reorganization of the sanctuary movement. They understood that the San Francisco meeting April 25-28 was to be strictly consultative, its primary aim being to facilitate the development of sanctuary network communications. Instead, the NCC issued a series of policy papers after having constituted itself as the agency of the National Sanctuary Movement made up of "those duly elected representatives of the regions in the National Sanctuary Movement and by the area Sanctuary refugees communities."...The Tucson position on sanctuary has been "that there is no sanctuary movement apart from the covenant people that the Christians among us customarily call 'the Church'. The policies of the NCC and the NSM are matters of faith and practice that must be dealt with by faith communities which already have denominational structures and decision-making procedures. The NCC of the NSM falsifies the sanctuary movement by attempting to reorganize it vertically into a political action association...This is symptomatic of the reorganization of a movement that is defined by its political objectives.

Regarding the formation of a National Defense Fund, members of the local movement center in Tucson had published their views in BASTA as early as September 1984. They were concerned about two issues: First, would

the NSDF "be politicized into the mirror image of the Reagan administration's refugee policy or is it to facilitate legal services that defend everyone's right to protect any genuine refugee from refoulment." This concern was related to a heated debate which began to emerge in the sanctuary movement in late 1984, which was focused on whom exactly sanctuary activists were willing to help? The immediate question was if they were willing to help Nicaraguans who were fleeing their country to escape military conscription. Members of Trsg began to feel increasingly pressured by other sanctuary activists, most of whom lived far away from the border, not to help these Nicaraguans. Thus, they were concerned that the NSDF might articulate a position one way or the other which would serve as a directorate for the movement. The immediate question was:

Will the NSDF fund legal services for sanctuary volunteers who are indicted for helping Nicaraguan deserters or draft evaders reach an INS office that permits affirmative filing?

Second, would the NSDF assume organizing functions for the sanctuary network or would it "reinforce congregation's initiative in the provision of sanctuary services?" This was related to the NSDF taking actions, such as the hiring of a public relations firm, like Fenton Communications, for the sanctuary movement,

distributing statements on the movement, such as the NSDF press packet prepared with Fenton, and making public statements on behalf of sanctuary defendants in its meetings with the media.

It is important to state that problems between members of the movement in Tucson, the Defense Fund, and the Communications Council were eventually resolved. Neither the Fund nor the Council's membership had intended to usurp power or control the movement. However, the conflicts reflected generalized tensions which remained with the movement all its life.

Purpose and Approach: Conflicts Between Religion and Politics

In addition to conflicts which centered around organizational styles and public image, the sanctuary movement had to face serious debates over purpose and approach. Members of the sanctuary movement came to see these debates as the product of two distinct camps. Although the division into two camps was simplistic and never adequately reflected what were in fact very complex differences, members of the movement came to refer to the two camps as the "political/ Chicago camp" in contrast to the "religious/Tucson camp."

In fact, the debates and conflicts were between those who wanted to limit the sanctuary movement to its religious and humanitarian beginnings and those who felt that the movement could not be divorced from the question of U.S. intervention in Central America. Those members of the movement who aligned themselves with what activists referred to as the "political" camp found an ally the Chicago Religious Task Force, which consistently insisted that there need not be a division or conflict between being a religious and political movement. In December 1984 CRTF published the following statement in BASTA, its national newsletter:

...the sanctuary movement is profoundly religious and inevitably political, as was the exodus under the direction of Moses. Moses is not labeled as a purely political leader nor a religious prophet without political purpose. A religious people struggling to cast off the yoke of oppression will inevitably act politically, if not militarily. All social religious activity is inevitably political.

Those in the second camp found an allie in the Tucson refugee support group (Trsg), for whom Jim Corbett became a spokesperson. Trsg not only consistently resisted any attempts to define the movement as "political" but also resisted all attempts to articulate any goals or purpose for the sanctuary movement whatsoever. According to Corbett:

sanctuary exists to care for refugees...

to establish sanctuary on a defined platform, such as ending U.S. intervention, would reduce the movement to the level of just another pressure group.

Those activists who insisted that the sanctuary movement was not political were not simply being strategic, although there is no doubt that the more overtly political the movement the more potentially threatening the movement was to the U.S. government with whom the sanctuary movement, and Corbett particularly, were in trouble. Rather, they believed that the movement and the strategy of offering sanctuary posed an alternative to political power. That it could in Corbett's words, "go beyond politics." Their position is critical to understand because in many ways it reflects the great reluctance and even fear that many sanctuary activists expressed when the movement was defined as or accused of "being political."

For the majority of sanctuary activists there was a great difference between what they were doing and what was "political." Many, like Corbett, viewed politics as a means-ends phenomenon. Political activities were perceived as being organized and carried out in order to achieve previously defined goals. Whereas the sanctuary movement, they insisted, had not emerged or developed in this way. Rather, they contended, members of the religious community responded to undocumented Central

American refugees based on a moral call to respond to what was happening at the moment. These members of the movement consistently insisted that there was no future oriented planning, no ulterior motive, no hidden agenda, no previously defined political platform or goals involved. In Corbett's words, "sanctuary activists make the path as they walk it."

Many sanctuary activists appeared to associate "being political" with being manipulative. For these members, politics was a dirty game, a manipulation, a means-end phenomenon, something polluted in anthropological terms, which they wanted no part of. They associated "politics" with either corrupt American civil politics, of the kind represented by the Daley machine in Chicago, or communism, neither of which they wanted to any part of. In contrast, they thought of their own motivations and actions as pure, clean, unmanipulative, unrelated to any future plans or goals.

That the Chicago Task Force was targeted as the "political" wing of the movement was predictable. CRTF was an organization which was devoted to stopping U.S. intervention in Central America prior to its entry into the sanctuary movement. They defined their goal to:

organize people of all different religious persuasions to understand and challenge US foreign policy towards Central America.

The CRTF became involved in the sanctuary movement precisely because its members felt that the movement could contribute to achieving the groups anti-interventionist goals. Members of CRTF were consistently clear as to why and how they related to the strategy of offering sanctuary and to the sanctuary movement as a whole. Some members of the staff were intolerant of sanctuary activists who refused to engage in strategies which were clearly anti-interventionist and/or define the movement's purpose as anti-interventionist. In an article in the Christian Science Monitor, journalist M. Davidson stated, after interviewing members of CRTF, that the Chicago Religious Task Force, dated October 22, 1985:18-19:

has no use for a church that offers sanctuary and then continues its support (by silence or vote) for U.S. policies in Central America.

That the debate became characterized as between Chicago and Tucson was also predictable. Members of the Tucson Ecumenical Council and Tucson refugee support group had consistently articulated their non-political relationship to the movement and the strategy of sanctuary. In 1984 a series of letters, which directly addressed the two perspectives, were passed back and forth between the two groups. One from Tucson stated:

In addition to making the imprisonment of sanctuary volunteers more likely, CRTF efforts to identify its political platform with the entire sanctuary network undermines our defense of good refugee laws, of international laws governing everyone's right and duty to obstruct the commission of state crimes, and of basic First Amendment liberties.

Nevertheless, and despite the Tucson Ecumenical Council and Tucson refugee support groups insistence that their membership and the movement at large were not involved in political activity, a review of TEC's first letters to congregations all over the country, letters which facilitated the emergence of the public sanctuary movement in the United States, revealed two very specific "political" (goal oriented) agendas which they clearly associated with the strategy of offering sanctuary:

This action (of offering sanctuary) will be undertaken not as an attempt to provide for all the needs of the massive numbers of undocumented Central American refugees in this country, but as an attempt to dramatize the desperate plight of these refugees and challenge the illegal and immoral practices of the INS.

On the other hand, members of what became known as the political/Chicago camp argued that the sanctuary movement could not possibly isolate itself from or transcend politics. According to a statement in the July 1984 issue of BASTA entitled "Political and Legal Position of the Chicago Religious Task Force:

Sanctuary was never merely a protest, it was and is an active resistance aimed at stopping the violence against the people of Central America... Every trial is a political trial. That cannot be changed. What can be changed is who determines the political framework of the trial. The U.S. government wants to shrink the framework of the trial. We seek to widen the framework so that U.S. policy and interpretation of the law is on trial.

Yet despite the fact that there was a split in the movement between "political" and "religious" perspectives, the Chicago Religious Task Force's fear that congregations would offer sanctuary within a vacuum and not take an anti-interventionist position was unnecessary. Despite the fact that most members and leaders of the sanctuary movement rejected definitions of the movement as "political", most members, at both the local and national levels, were consistently involved in protests against domestic refugee policies and intervention in Central America.

The most interesting aspect of the religious/political debate may be that although the religious and political camps were seriously at odds with one another ideologically, in practical terms, that is to say the way in which each position was lived out in terms of action, the conflict did not appear to exist for most members. Despite their consistent insistence that they were not involved in political activities

aimed directly at the political arena and their constant insistence that the movement was not political, most sanctuary activists were very involved in political activities. Many had signed the Pledge of Resistance, a pledge to engage in civilly disobedient activities if the U.S. were to militarily invade Nicaragua. Almost all were actively committed to lobbying efforts aimed at changing U.S. domestic and foreign policies.

At the same time as they criticized what they called, "the CRTF's politicalization of the movement" almost all sanctuary activists, including Corbett and Fife, were consistently involved in protest against U.S. intervention in Central America, aid to the contras in Nicaragua, increased military spending in the region, and U.S. military presence in Honduras. Simultaneously most insisted, like Corbett and Fife, that the sanctuary movement was not a political movement and they were not political people. A sanctuary activist from Northern California put it this way:

To stand by the refugees, to really stand by them, means that we have to fight to create conditions which would allow them to go home. This means protesting U.S. intervention in El Salvador and Guatemala and Honduras. But that doesn't mean the sanctuary movement is political. We're not doing this for political reasons. Our reasons for helping refugees have nothing to do with politics. We have a moral commitment, a commitment to ourselves and to God to help refugees, that goes beyond politics."

Another:

This is definitely not a political movement. We are simply trying to help the victims of a political situation. If that means fighting to change legislation then that's what we have to do. If it means getting Congress to stop funding the military in El Salvador then that's what we have to do. If it means going to a demonstration to stop U.S. intervention in Central America then that's what we have to do. But ours is not a political movement."

Interestingly, although most members of the sanctuary movement worked closely with Central Americans, many of whom were committed to the goal of socialism in their own countries, the movement as a whole and individual sanctuary activists managed to avoid taking a political position vis-a-vis Central America. Many North and Central Americans in the movement did not discuss Central American/U.S. relations (politics) within the context of their sanctuary movement work at all. Ofcourse this does not mean that they did not discuss politics informally. Rather, there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the ruling classes of El Salvador and Guatemala were bad people, greedy people, inhuman people, and both groups seemed content to base their actions within the context of the movement, on their immediate commitment to oppressed Central Americans in their midst and to their struggle against oppression and violence carried out by these "bad" people. A tacit agreement to discuss immediate material conditions in El

Salvador and Guatemala, agree that oppression, injustice, violence and suffering were the result of a ruling class desperately trying to hold onto to its power, and that this could not happen without intensive support from the U.S. government. Tacit agreement that refugees in the sanctuary movement wanted something which was consistently referred to as "a better way of life for the people." How this better way of life would be accomplished was never discussed formally within the context of the sanctuary movement, with the exception of the CRTF which insisted:

To stand in solidarity with the Central American poor struggling for freedom does not necessarily mean sending them guns. Such a way may be beyond our range of expertise and responsibility. But it does mean stopping the flow of U.S. arms that are used to massacre people.

Although the debate was ideological, the consequences of the movement's private and public commitment to one position over the other had important practical implications for the sanctuary movement. Most of the refugees crossed with the underground railroad never went into public sanctuary. They preferred to blend into Latino communities situated throughout the United States, such as those in Los Angeles, New York and Chicago. This raised the question of how sanctuary activists working on the border made decisions about who to cross, given their very limited resources.

In response to exactly this dilemma members of the Chicago Task Force sent a letter to the local sanctuary movement center in Tucson in 1984 in which they stated that they felt the underground railroad should be used almost exclusively for refugees who were willing to go into public sanctuary. The suggestion infuriated members of the sanctuary movement working on the border, particularly in Tucson, who stated in a return letter that their decision and intention was to:

help refugees regardless of the political origins of their persecution or their usefulness in promoting preconceived political purposes.

Another letter stated:

Many of the members (of Trsg) consider the issue of responding to refugee needs regardless of their political usefulness to be integral to the Christian faith, not a matter of tactics.

By 1984 it became clear that tensions were mounting between members of the Chicago Religious Task Force and Tucson Ecumenical Council. In fact, tension between the two groups had been mounting since the winter of 1983 when the CRTF had begun to exert pressure on members of the religious community who worked on the border. The staff at CRTF felt strongly that refugees should be screened very thoroughly and exhibit certain characteristics before being assisted by the sanctuary movement. Within a short time CRTF developed standards

and screening methods for refugees interesting in "going into sanctuary". This led to a great number of problems between CRTF and people working on or near the border with undocumented Central American refugees. Hence the following internal document, written by a member of the Tucson refugee support group, addressed to the staff at CRTF:

...At this point we need to get a better idea of what you intend to do with refugees who flunk out of the sanctuary program.... almost everyone participating can be sure that any involvement with undocumented refugees will defy any kind of neat compartmentalization that excludes the full tangle of associated problems....I'm confident that you don't intend to simply discard those who flunk, but at some point you'll need to decide what else you're willing to do when perspective sanctuary participants fail to meet expectations.

Tensions came to a head in 1984 when CRTF refused to give Jim Corbett a copy of the national sanctuary movement mailing list which he'd requested. Almost everyone agreed that Corbett was one of the sanctuary movement's most active and committed members:

We have decided, at this time, not to give you the sanctuary mailing list because your request doesn't meet our policy criteria.... After much deliberation the decision to withhold the list was reached because we have no guarantee that the 4th criteria that "the requester use the list for strengthening and unifying the sanctuary movement" would be upheld by you. In fact, our conclusion is the opposite... your criticisms have taken the form of attacks and have created enormous, but not unsurmountable, problems.

The denial resulted in Corbett's resignation from the Tucson Ecumenical Task Force's executive board and an ongoing series of letters and discussions and many attempts at dialogue between members of the Chicago Religious Task Force, Tucson Ecumenical Council and Tucson refugee support group. The internal debate reached people outside the two groups through Corbett's ongoing series of letters to fellow Quakers, always addressed "Dear Friends" and through BASTA, the Chicago Religious Task Force sanctuary movement newsletter.

Interestingly, many people, including Corbett, felt that tensions between some members of the Chicago group and some people who worked on the border were representative of tensions and differences of opinion in the movement as a whole. In many ways these tensions were the result of differences between the character of the sanctuary movement at the border and the character and form it took in the interior. In 1984 Corbett wrote:

... The problem is systemic, it is not Chicago. Rather, the CRTF's effort to limit the entire sanctuary system to its highly specialized network role is, regardless of its impracticability, an understandable reaction to the fact that the CRTF is often held responsible (by its own members as well as others) when the transplanted border model of sanctuary loses vitality or fails to fit.

In 1984 part of the debate focused on whether sanctuary activists should help Nicaraguans who didn't want to live under rule of the Sandanistas or serve in

their army. In a 1984 document entitled, "Discussion Guide for Tucson Sanctuary Volunteers" in a section entitled, "Regardless of Political Origins?" volunteers were asked to consider their position vis-a-vis refugees fleeing governments or armed resistance groups involved in fighting U.S. intervention:

If the U.S. government returns Nicaraguan draft evaders to Nicaragua or if it pressures them into joining the contras, are you willing to make border runs to help them evade capture?

But this time, opposition to helping anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans went way beyond the CRTF. At a regional conference on sanctuary held in the summer of 1985, members of the sanctuary movement decided that because the Sandanista government did not persecute its citizens Nicaraguans did not qualify as refugees thus they did not qualify to be helped by the sanctuary movement. One participant put it this way:

I don't feel any moral compulsion to help people who refuse to serve in the Sandanista army. If I had refused to fight for my country when I was called I would have been put in jail immediately. As for the ordinary citizen, there's no evidence that the Sandanistas are persecuting anyone, including the Miskitos I might add.

On the other hand, many members of the religious community who worked on the border in Tucson and Texas continued to assert that they would consider helping

Nicaraguans or any other group of people enter the United States if they were being persecuted in their homelands and unfairly treated by the INS. In 1985 one of the staff members of Casa Oscar Romero was arrested, pleaded guilty, and was convicted for aiding and abetting a Nicaraguan.

Given the serious ideological tensions which permeated the movement beginning in late 1984, perhaps the greatest effect of the grand jury indictments in January 1985 was that they refocused a tremendous amount of attention back on the local sanctuary movement centers, especially the local movement center in Tucson. At the national consultation, which occurred within days of the indictments, it was very clear that any attempts to deal openly with what everyone was calling "the debate between Chicago and Tucson" and with the consequences of that debate, for example, if the movement was going to formally take an anti-interventionist stand.

Although many people asked that the debate be formally called to the floor no one wanted to take responsibility for contributing to the already very tense situation for members of the local movement center in Tucson. One activist from the Midwest later put it this way:

Sure I wanted to raise the issue of how everyone had been dumping on Chicago. Everyone knew that there were private meetings going on between TEC and Chicago anyway. But I just didn't have the heart, maybe the guts, to criticize anyone from Tucson, especially from Trsg.

The debate between the two perspectives softened after the 1985 grand jury indictments. The urgency of rallying support and raising funds for the defense concentrated efforts within the movement at the local level. At first everyone regardless of their differences was occupied with the task of fundraising and then with the much more difficult task of understanding, following and explaining the government's undercover operation, indictments and trial. The fact that such a great deal of money was raised in a short time and that the trial began within a year of the indictments liberated members of local sanctuary movement centers from focusing all their energies on the indictments and trial. Even before the trial had gotten underway, members of the movement were beginning to refocus their energies on activities in their local regions. One leader of a sanctuary task force on the East Coast stated:

Thank God enough money was raised so that we can go on with other things. We have so many expenses in our own church. Food and clothing for the family. --- is having another baby, so we need to start preparing for that. We're constantly in need of money for the phone bills. We also sponser public events at

which we distribute an awful lot of documents. We make calls to Congresspeople all over the country. We even make occasional calls to Central America and we send telegrams.

Although the sanctuary movement developed national organizations designed specifically to coordinate activities, nationally coordination was reverting back to the local regions. Clearly, the decision to work locally and regionally, rather than nationally, was related to the fact that the different leaders and groups could not fully resolve their differences. But more importantly, it became more practical for congregations to operate locally rather than nationally.

The material condition of an increasing number of undocumented Central American refugees entering the United States combined with the government's escalation of its efforts to apprehend, detain, and deport them forced sanctuary activists to intensify local efforts to deal with incoming undocumented refugees as well as those in detention. The escalation of Reagan's war on Central America, increased regional bombing in El Salvador, increased repression in both El Salvador and Guatemala, and increased aid to the contras in Nicaragua and military forces in El Salvador forced them to intensify local efforts to stop U.S. military aid and intervention in Central America.

By 1985 local sanctuary movement activists were increasingly concentrating their efforts on dealing with the social effects of the war on the Central American refugee communities in their areas. Local activities were increasingly made in response to these needs. In addition to sheltering undocumented refugees and declaring public sanctuary, sanctuary activists increasingly attempted to deal with the obvious need for social services in the undocumented refugee community as a whole. At the same time, they increasingly focused their efforts at the local level on activities aimed towards halting U.S. military escalation and military support in Central America, for example, lobbying Congress, Senate and the House. At the same time the governments 1985 grand jury indictments had generated a tremendous amount of new support for the sanctuary movement from both the religious and the secular community, all of whom were shocked by the completely covert nature of the undercover operation.

Additionally, local and regional leaders and their congregations had experienced four years of collective action in the sanctuary movement. They were better organized, much more educated on the issues and laws, better funded, were receiving frequent, supportive media attention, had learned how to attract and utilize the

media, their activities were highly coordinated, and they had received extensive, unconditional support from their religious denominations. Despite their differences leaders and members of the sanctuary movement had learned how to work together and share resources.

The fact that the undocumented Central American refugee community, composed of those undocumented Central American refugees who lived outside of sanctuary, was now highly organized and participating in many local sanctuary movements centers also effected the direction of the movement. Organizations such as the Central American Refugee Committee were increasingly coordinating their efforts with the efforts of local sanctuary movement centers. Each group was learning from the other as they shared their particular resources, experiences, contacts, networks, information, and concerns. By 1986 it had become standard practice for local sanctuary movement centers and undocumented Central American refugee organizations to co-sponsor events, worship services, fundraisers, demonstrations, public caravans, social service and bail bond efforts, and cultural events.

By 1986 it was clear that despite the fact that important ideological conflicts with serious practical implications remained unresolved, leadership of the

sanctuary movement on the national level would continue to be shared. Leaders from the different regions continued to meet regularly and talked frequently on the phone. Resources and information continued to be shared. Regionally and nationally the shared goals of getting more churches to declare public sanctuary, shelter refugees, raise money for legal defense and bond, and protest against military support and intervention in El Salvador and Guatemala and advocate for changes in domestic refugee legislation appeared sufficiently strong to unite leaders on both the local and national levels, despite their ideological differences.

Chapter Eight

Theoretical Overview and Conclusions

My analysis of the emergence and development of the sanctuary movement has been informed by two major sociological theories used to explain and interpret the emergence and development of social movements: classical collective behavior theory and resource mobilization theory. But in addition to these theories, my exploration and explanation of the sanctuary movement takes place within what I have called an "indigenous resources/values framework". In this chapter I review the most important findings of both classical collective behavior and resource mobilization theories and discuss the implications of this study and the indigenous resources/values framework for sociological theory and research on social movements.

Classical collective behavior theorists (Gurr 1970, Turner and Killian 1972, Smelser 1963, Davies 1969) attribute the rise and spread of social movements to sudden increases in individual grievances. Fluctuations in levels of discontent account for the rise of movements and major changes in movement participation. The assumptions are (1) that discontent is sporadic and unpredictable, (2) that movement actors are nonrational, even irrational, (3) movements are relatively

spontaneous and unstructured. Within this model social movements are regarded as symptoms of social disorganization traced to periods of instability which result in generalized social and personal apprehension and anxiety. Lacking guidelines to follow and lacking reliable social anchors people are seen as being susceptible and vulnerable to charismatic forces, as needing to be with others and as searching for stable social anchors.

In sharp contrast to classical collective behavior theorists explanations of social movement evolution and development this study of the sanctuary movement in the United States demonstrates (1) the gradual emergence of grievances as members of the religious community became increasingly aware of the gravity of the problem, (2) the rational character of movement actors, whose responses emerged in reaction to the inadequacies of original and previous responses, (3) the planned, structured character of movement emergence and development rooted in pre-existing social and organizational structures and networks. Rather than being susceptible and vulnerable to leaders these actors actively participated in the emergence and development of their movement. They discussed issues, raised

objections, weighed options and costs, and sometimes went against institutionalized leadership. They were almost constantly involved in the decision making process on the local level and highly participatory on the regional and national levels.

In contrast to classical collective behavior theorists emphasis on the spontaneous, unpredictable character and emergence of grievances, case studies of the emergence of the sanctuary movement in Tucson, New York City and Berkeley demonstrate how members of the religious community gradually came to the realization that they had a moral responsibility to help refugees. The Tucson case study is particularly illustrative. In Tucson members of the religious community originally responded to thirteen refugees apprehended in the desert and placed in a detention center. Morally outraged at the government's decision to imprison people they felt had done nothing wrong, leaders of that community, pastors who had a history of practical activities related to problems with which they were dealing, organized a prayer vigil in front of the federal courthouse. Rather than being spontaneous and irrational, the prayer vigil is the most popular and traditional protest strategy in the religious community.

After the vigil members of the religious community were faced with the practical, concrete problem of what to do about the thirteen imprisoned refugees. There were only two options - they could leave them in the detention center or they could bond them out. Based on their belief that the refugees did not belong in detention, they decided to bond them out. Bonding the refugees out resulted in their having to provide them with legal defense. It also meant that for the first time these individuals had the opportunity to meet and talk with refugees from El Salvador. Deeply moved by these conversations members of the religious community became increasingly committed to helping individual refugees. Each response, each strategic decision was made in response to new information and the utility of the previous one in helping refugees. Jim Corbett's decision to help refugees enter the United States without INS detection was made in relation to his concrete experiences with Salvadoran refugees who were living in his home and only after he had explored many other options, including legal defense. The decision to declare sanctuary publicly and formally was made in reaction to increasing government harassment of people working directly with refugees both inside and outside of the detention centers.

In sharp contrast to classical collective behavior theorist's assumption that movement participants are susceptible and vulnerable to charismatic individuals who seek to be leaders for emotional reasons this study demonstrates how leaders of the sanctuary movement were experienced movement activists, well established, respected, highly productive people who were expected to be involved in community issues and problems. Members of the movement had relatively long histories of working with these leaders within the context of their congregations. Rather than passively accepting their interpretations of events, issues and strategic decisions, these movement participants engaged in long discussions and debates with movement leaders. The case study of Riverside Church is illustrative.

The decision to become involved in the sanctuary movement by declaring Riverside Church a "sanctuary church" was made by members of the Riverside congregation after their minister had decided that the congregation was not ready to take on such an activity. Yet these parishoners convinced their minister to reconsider declaration, activley and systematically engaged in educating fellow parishoners, invited members of the entire congregregation to participate in their

meetings, went against the established leadership of their church (Boards of Trustees and Deacons), negotiated and compromised with one of the most powerful, organized groups in their congregation (Black Christian Caucus), carried out subsequent sanctuary activities independent of their minister and without funding from the congregation and successfully utilized available congregational and denominational resources to build and sustain their activities. The character of these Riverside parishoners participation was consistent with the character of other sanctuary activists all over the country.

Finally, in contrast to classical collective behavior theorists assumption that individuals who attain positions of leadership within social movements have certain "ego needs" which drive them to seek power and/or certain 'charasmatic traits" which enable them to convince other people to follow them almost blindly, this study demonstrates how these leaders were expected to become involved and to lead. These were individuals who had been trained to be leaders and activists and had immediate access to the resources needed to build and sustain a social movement. Most of the leaders in the movement on the local, regional and national levels were

experienced movement activists who had established themselves as leaders in their congregations and denominations based on past behavior and judgements.

Resource mobilization theorists explain the emergence and development of social movements using a multidimensional model of social movement formation which emphasizes resources, organization, political opportunities and leadership in addition to traditional explanations of discontent (Oberschall 1973, McCarthy and Zald 1973, Tilly 1975, Useem and Zald 1982). Individuals are treated as rational actors who join social movements because they expect to receive particular rewards or outcomes by doing so. Movement strategies are seen as rational, responses to different lines of action available to movement activists. Goals are seen as emerging from and continually defined and redefined by conflicts of interest built into institutionalized power relations. Success or failure of a movement is attributed largely to the various strategic factors and political processes in which the movement becomes enmeshed.

This study confirms the resource mobilization view of social movement formation as involving the availability of resources, organizations, political

opportunities and leadership as well as the view that social movements are the products of the organizing efforts of activists functioning through a well-developed indigenous base which includes pre-existing institutions, networks, an organized mass base, leaders, cultural and ideological elements (Morris, 1984).

The organizational structure of the sanctuary movement was based in the religious community. Pre-existing ideologies, social structures, formal movement organizations, social networks, congregations and leaders provided the organizational environment in which the sanctuary movement emerged and spread. Leaders in the sanctuary movement did not arise spontaneously with the emergence of the movement. These were individuals with established histories of leadership not necessarily confined to the context of congregations and denominations. The majority were ministers with years of experience, many within the context of other social movements. This finding confirms research on movement leadership within the resource mobilization model where it was found that leaders were chosen from pre-existing cohorts.

The fact that so many of the sanctuary movement leaders had previously worked together within an

ecumenical organizational setting also contributed to their ability to work together in the new sanctuary movement context. Many leaders knew each other well, having worked together in congregational and denominational committees and other movements. The fact that Reverend Fife had chaired the Presbyterian Church's Committee on Corporate Responsibility greatly contributed to his being able to subsequently organize his denomination and other religious activists to successfully boycott an airline with INS contracts. Beginning in 1981 Corbett successfully utilized pre-existing social and organizational networks of Quakers to build and sustain the underground railroad. The fact that he was able to do so on the basis of the Quaker tradition of civil disobedience and involvement in the abolitionist movement was also a resource.

Individuals who held key positions in denominational organizations, such as the Presbyterian General Assembly or the National Council of Churches, were mobilized and called upon to come forth with financial support, publicity, public statements of support and other critical resources and they consistently responded. Each time the government attacked the sanctuary movement responded by mobilizing

its resources. Beginning in 1980 they came forth with funds, adding up to millions of dollars for bail bonds and legal defense. In July 1980 the Roman Catholic Arch Diocese in Tucson contributed funds to obtain the release of thirteen detained Salvadorans. In February 1983 one of the Archbishops in Texas put up his house as bond collateral to obtain the release of layworker and sanctuary activist Jack Elder. In 1985 the Presbyterian Church pledged one million dollars towards the defense of sixteen indicted sanctuary activists.

Careful rational planning was evident in all of the strategies and tactics developed by activists in the sanctuary movement. According to the resource mobilization model the availability of resources and activists will not crystalize into a protest movement if leaders and activists have not developed strategies and tactics that can be effectively used in confrontations with authorities who will almost certainly challenge the movements goals. Thus, activists must develop strategies and tactics that can be collectively employed by masses of people and which, when employed, are strong enough to greatly impact the social system and the authorities in power. The strategy of the public caravan used to publicly declare the movements opposition to the

arrest of activist Stacey Merkt in February 1983 and to challenge the government to arrest hundreds of other activists committing the same "crime" exemplified both rational planning and successful strategizing on the part of sanctuary movement leaders and activist.

Clearly sanctuary movement leaders and activists were able to generate strategies and tactics and coordinate their masses in an extraordinarily effective manner which heavily impacted on powerful local and federal authorities formally supported the movement by voting to declare their cities and states sanctuaries despite the fact that this formal support moved them into a position of direct confrontation with the federal government, including being threatened in financial terms.

The movements most important strategies - public sanctuary, the underground railroad, refugee testimony and the public caravan - not only generated widespread support which succeeded in disrupting federal government activities but also succeeded in attracting enormous mass media attention which contributed to the movement's critical goal of public education and awareness of the refugee problem. The government's grand jury indictment is an excellent case in point. Instead of halting the

movements underground railroad and public assistance of "illegal aliens" more congregations and denominations came forth to support the movement. Members of the successfully mobilized to make their railroad even more cohesive, effecient and widespread.

According to the indigenous perspective (Morris, 1984) a specific type of protest can develop into a tactical innovation if it corresponds to the resource capability and ideological framework of a movements pre-existing internal organization. Again the strategy of the public caravan serves as an excellent case in point. The idea was to involve activists in committing the same crime. This strategy was a tactical innovation which occurred directly as a result of activists determination to generate widespread, effective disruption within the context of the movements resources. At the same time the strategy was developed leaders of the sanctuary movement were aware that they could count on parishoners across the country to participate in caravans which carried "illegal aliens" across the United States. These were organizational actors with extensive organizational linkages in churches, neighborhoods, schools, clubs and denominations.

The gradual progression by sanctuary activists as a group, from attempts to assert the existence of the problem to creating alternative counter-institutions (responses) to official activities occurred gradually. All sanctuary movement activities, with the exception of legal defense, were facilitated by access to resources indigenous to the religious community within the context of their religious tradition. Most of the finances, including one million dollars pledged by the Presbyterian Church for legal defense, came out of the pockets of congregational members.

The basic premise of this study is that movements are deliberately organized and developed by activists who seize and create opportunities for protest within the context of available resources. Within the context of the sanctuary movement, congregations and denominations provided the resources needed to launch and sustain it. Mass-based institutions, like the congregation and sometimes the whole denomination, provided the sanctuary movement with leaders and groups united in an organized, collective manner. Sanctuary activists and leaders were consistently drawn from these organizations and networks. These congregations and denominations provided activists with the resources

they needed to carry out their goals. In fact, not only did these resources contribute to activists carrying out their goals but they shaped the form of these goals and the strategies designed to achieve them.

Though vastly different both classical collective behavior theory and resource mobilization theory do not sufficiently account for the critical role of well-developed, deeply ingrained values, beliefs and ideas in motivating individuals to become involved in social movements. By concentrating on the irrational (classical collective behavior theory) and the rational (resource mobilization theory) character of social movements neither theory sufficiently explains why people chose to become part of the sanctuary movement. Recent critics of resource mobilization theory (Ferree and Miller 1985, Klandermans 1984, Killian 1977, Walsh 1984) have noted that while its social problem emphasis has produced many fruitful insights into the workings of social institutions and human behavior it has hindered the development of an approach to social movements capable of grasping the dynamic interaction between structural sources of change and purposive human activity. In an unpublished paper on social movement organization Vickers (1986) includes the following comment on resource mobilization theory:

In the legitimate effort to establish certain laws there has been a tendency to reify those laws, to construe them as if they were independent from human action, and to forget that they are only an expression of human behavior.

The Value of the Indigenous Resources/Values
Framework for Social Movement Theory and Research

This study, which employs an indigenous resources/values framework, contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of social movements which have a religious community base. Sanctuary activists were religious activists. People who explained their behavior and activism as being based on the great degree to which they valued helping people in need and helping the poor and the oppressed. In their attempts to explain their reasons for responding to refugees and participating in the sanctuary movement activists consistently emphasized Biblical scriptures and their identity as religious people. Many activists also spoke of their commitment to the theology of the preferential option for the poor. According to many sanctuary activists the theology of the preferential option for the poor was an important component in sanctuary movement emergence. Its influence can be measured by the fact that between 1982 and 1986 every sanctuary movement document contained either some reference to the

theology directly or to the teachings of the theology subsumed under a different name. In BASTA, the national newsletter of the sanctuary movement produced by the Chicago Religious Task Force, the task force stated:

The faith understanding that informs our work could best be described as the theology of solidarity. We believe that God's revelation is discovered amongst the poor and oppressed, and therefore, to make a preferential option for the poor and the oppressed is to discover the God of history.

Sanctuary documents always emphasized acting on moral values and faith, working for the community, self-direction and religious faith. When movement activists were later challenged to broaden their activities and interpretation of their activities they were faced with the problem of explaining activities that had obvious radical political implications in terms of their now original "religious" as opposed to "political" roots and identity.

It is obvious from these research findings that values and religious beliefs played an important role in motivating members of the religious community to extend help to refugees and to participate in the movement. The indigenous resources/values framework recognizes values as an important resource in the emergence and development of a movement with a religious community base.

It is also obvious that the prerequisite value system was not sufficient in and of itself for movement emergence. It was vitally necessary to have in place an existing structure within the religious community which made it possible for intentions and desires to become concrete activities. The indigenous resources - congregational leaders and members, social and organizational networks, churches and meeting houses, mailing lists, xerox machines, previous experiences in other movements, pre-existing organizations and networks served as the building blocks of the sanctuary movement. However, these structures and resources in and of themselves do not sufficiently explain the emergence of the movement. Without the base of religious convictions and values the indigenous resources would have been sterile. Although for some other social movements the resource mobilization model might adequately explain their emergence and development, the sanctuary movement cannot be understood without reference to the indigenous resources/values framework.

Speculations for Future Study

In the course of carrying out this study a number of significant issues emerged which are not directly addressed in this thesis. 1) The question of why particular denominations and not others became actively involved in the sanctuary movement is of particular importance and warrents further investigation. Although this study is attentive to the significant role of Quakers and Presbyterians in the sanctuary movement analysis is limited to the extent to which they participated in the movement.

Why these denominations and their members chose to participate and endorse the movement; what made the problems of Central Americans of particular importance to them; if the strategy of public sanctuary and/or the strategy of transporting refugees was particularly appealing to these denominations begs to be addressed. The most obvious link between extensive Quaker participation in the abolitionist movement and in the sanctuary movement's underground railroad is only one of many issues which could be explored. The question needs to be extended to particular Catholic orders as well. For example, is there something particular to the Sisters of St. Francis order that motivated them to

instruct Sister Darlene Nicgorski to "be a sanctuary worker who aids refugees."

2) Along similar lines, the issue of why specific congregations chose to participate in the sanctuary movement needs to be explored. Again this study merely addresses the degree to which congregations who were members of particular denominations participated in the movement. But the issue of why specific individual congregations became involved in the movement is left unanswered.

Obviously, the case studies provide insight into the issue by tracing the histories of several congregations and congregational leaders in Tucson, New York City and California. For example, the fact that the first congregations in Berkeley to declare public sanctuary utilized the same strategy a decade earlier within the context of the Vietnam War. The fact that some of these churches and their congregational leadership had become involved with refugees from South America is also significant.

But factors such as a congregations geographic proximity to the border, congregational composition and history, activities of local Central American populations, working relationships between local congregations, the role of particular congregations in

the society on both the local and national levels need to be explored in greater detail. For example, it was not by coincidence that Reverend Phillip Wheaton became a leader of the sanctuary movement in Washington, D.C. At the time Reverend Wheaton was the Director of EPICA, a foundation which functioned to interpret events in Central America for the religious community. Further, Wheaton consistently articulated the fact that Christians "had the right and the obligation to become involved in politics in their land as concerned, participatory U.S. citizens.

3) The impact of new theologies, in particular the theologies of the preferential option for the poor and of accompaniment, on members of the sanctuary movement needs to be explored further. This study begins to deal with this relationship by being attentive to the fact that members of the sanctuary movement frequently made reference to these theologies in discussing their participation in the sanctuary movement. But it does explore these theologies substantively nor does it explain why these theologies in particular influenced members of the sanctuary movement.

Although social ministry has always been an area of concern for the churches, motivating a focus on individual and institutional acts of compassion through

food distribution, homeless shelters, hospitals, support groups for families and individuals, counseling, and education, the value of actively advocating for social justice and addressing public issues of economic, foreign and military policies has not been built into a theology as its central component. Thus, as members of the church raise their voices in pursuit of justice an increasingly vocal opposition questions the legitimacy of their dealing with these issues at all. Because contemporary theologies, like the preferential option for the poor and the theology of accompaniment, call Christians to actively commit themselves to the poor and the powerless and because these theologies emphasize that a Christians ultimate allegiance is to God they encourage Christians to transcend the boundaries of nation states and nation laws and open up the possibility for actions of the kind taken in the sanctuary movement. What appears as a simple act of physically offering sanctuary to refugees in fact calls into question the value, necessity and legitimacy of taking a stand on behalf of persecuted and oppressed people and of a congregation's commitment to the poor and the powerless, generating a wide range of questions and issues for each congregation involved.

4) Within this wide range certain questions having to do with the legitimacy of the churches taking a political position vis-a-vis economic, foreign and military policies stand out. The first question raised is: Has the church betrayed its mission by becoming an organ of partisan and sometimes revolutionary politics? The second question raised is: Can the church be faithful to its mission if it does not speak out and address specific public issues in the political arena. Both questions deserve further exploration within the context of the sanctuary movement which brings forth a church which transcends the boundaries of the nation-state, is clearly committed to the poor and the oppressed, and is part of a movement of solidarity between the peoples of Central and North America.

5) Debates over the question of the sanctuary movement's politics were not limited to people outside of the sanctuary movement. Internally a split developed around the goals of the movement and the motivations and intentions of its activists. Discussions about the movements possible "communist" affiliations did not only come from the State Department. In their book "Sanctuary: The New Underground Railroad" members of the Chicago Religious Task Force wrote: "the fear that liberals harbor is that their faith motives, construed

as too political (meaning aligned with Central Americans involved in liberation struggles) will lead to accusations of communism."

The question of why members of the sanctuary movement were unable to resolve internal tensions which arose between members of the movement who saw their activities as "political" and those who saw their activities as purely "humanitarian" deserves attention. This study only touches on the issue by examining how pre-conceptions of what it meant to be "political" influenced members of the sanctuary community. Those members who associated "being political" with either the corruption of the civil machine or with communism and viewed being political with manipulative rather than goal-oriented activity, continually resisted any possibility that the movement was political.

Equally important is the fact that the sanctuary movement occurred during the tenure of the Reagan Administration where being a political activist was viewed quite negatively. That members of the sanctuary movement were aware that labeling themselves, or being labelled, "political activists" might result in the movements losing its legitimacy or in its members being treated harshly by the Administration must be taken into

consideration in any attempts to understand the tensions that arose around this issue.

The fact that the sanctuary movement was a product of the religious community and traditional Judeo-Christian values partially explains its members public disidentification with politics and their insistence that they were committed only to "humanitarian", as opposed to "political", goals. These positions strengthened the movement, contributed to its popularity, and generated institutional support in the religious community at large.

6) The issue of the movements links with traditional values also remains unexplored. Not only with traditional religious values, like helping the poor, and traditional religious strategies, like the strategy of sanctuary, but also the movements concern with upholding democratic values and traditions which its members saw as the property of U.S. tradition and society.

Religious leaders constantly stated publicly that offering sanctuary was a not only a moral obligation, an extension of the religious community's historic role of providing refuge for the persecuted, but a democratic obligation, an extension of being American. Leaders like Riverside's senior pastor Reverend Sloan Coffin and

Southside Presbyterian Church stressed the links between traditionally American values and the sanctuary movement. In a letter to the Editor of the New York Times on January 17, 1985 Reverend Coffin chose the title "To Deny Sanctuary is Un-American."

Recognizing the appeal of the lone ranger and cowboy image to the American public, journalists throughout the United States chose titles for their articles on the sanctuary movement which also emphasized the "Americanness" of its members. Hence a 1985 issue of New Age Journal on Reverend John Fife was titled "The Next American Hero" and several articles on Jim Corbett referred to his being "the lone ranger" behind the sanctuary movement.

7) A separate but equally important issue not addressed in this thesis has to do with a range of questions relating to the participation of Jewish people in the sanctuary movement. By 1985 many Jews and Jewish organizations were interested and involved in the sanctuary movement. Many, like Laurie Zoloth of Congregation Beth Isreal in Berkeley, felt that the sanctuary movement was one way of responding to the Holocaust. According to Rabbi Joseph Weizenbaum "sanctuary is a response to the Holocaust. Since you

can't bring the dead back, you do for the living." It would be interesting to explore if Jews, in direct contrast to Christians, were motivated to become involved in the movement because of their special relationship to the Holocaust.

8) Finally, this study does not in any way explore or deal with gender as an important variable in the emergence and development of the sanctuary movement. However, a number of popular magazine articles have been written which point out that women were particularly active and important in the sanctuary movement. Several leaders of the sanctuary movement also made reference to the special contributions made by women in the movement and a consensus developed within the movement that women should be publicly commended for their participation in the movement. This formal decision in and of itself warrants exploration.

There is no doubt that women actively participated in the sanctuary movement almost from its inception and at all levels after the movement emerged publicly. But overall the sanctuary movement reflected everyday life in the religious community. Therefore it should not be surprising that most of the leaders in the movement were men and that the majority of volunteers and caretakers

were overwhelmingly women. These are the same divisions of labor by gender you would find in church activities generally and would expect to find in church related activities and movements specifically. Nevertheless, the particular role of women in the sanctuary movement remains to be explored and interpreted.

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