Diaspora Movements, Social Networks, and Civil Wars: The Irish-American (Dis)connection and the Northern Ireland Troubles

by
Danielle A. Zach

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

	Susan L. Woodward
_____	_____
Date	Chair of Examining Committee
	Joe Rollins
_____	_____
Date	Executive Officer

Susan L. Woodward

Mehdi Bozorgmehr

Thomas G. Weiss

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

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Armed insurgents often seek material and other forms of support from communities beyond the borders of contested states. Situating long-distance, grassroots financing of rebel groups as a form of social movement, this dissertation examines patterns of transnational radicalism among diasporic populations with regard to "homeland" civil wars. The study is conducted within a dynamic, multilevel framework that analyzes: (1) the nested political opportunity context (i.e., domestic, international, and transnational) within which militants must mobilize for "the cause"; (2) the availability of potential resources, especially socio-organizational ones; and (3) the strategic capacity (skill and social capital endowments) of movement leaders. It devotes significant attention to social network properties and mechanisms that facilitate collective action.

More specifically, the dissertation investigates patterns of Irish-American support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army's campaign in the 1970s and 1980s. It asks why financing for the republican movement was very modest (although significant) given the vast size of Irish America, and in comparison to other "groups" with respect to their "homeland" wars. This dissertation argues that coordinated suppression among a triad of governments with robust state capacity (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland) created legal risks and costs to supporters and limited the movement's reachability beyond tightly-knit

communities. At the same time, these Irish "urban villages" were dissipating as a result of exclusionary US immigration policy, an economic boom in the Republic of Ireland, and upward social mobility in the United States. Socioeconomic integration coupled with few new immigrants led to the disintegration of moral economies, occupational desegregation, spatial dispersion, and an emaciated organizational infrastructure.

Yet how the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid)—the main republican fundraising arm in the United States—endured for the three-decades-long conflict in the face of these countervailing challenges from above and below presents a second puzzle. The study argues that the leadership's network-building strategies explain the organization's resilience. While Noraid actively cultivated interpersonal ties among the Irish in the United States and across the Atlantic, movement leaders pursued three strategies at the organizational level that would prove crucial to Noraid's longevity (centralization, co-optation of existing communal institutions, and brokerage, especially with building trades unions).

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Abbreviations

AAI	Australian Aid for Ireland
ACIF	American Congress for Irish Freedom
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
AOH	Ancient Order of Hibernians
BBC	British Broadcasting Company
BIS	British Information Services
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIRA	Continuity IRA
CnG	Clan na Gael
DMs	diasporic movements
FARA	Foreign Agents Registration Act
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO	Foreign Commonwealth Office (UK)
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
FOIPA	Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts
FOIF	Friends of Irish Freedom
FTO	foreign terrorist organization
GAA	Gaelic Athletic Association
HMP	Her Majesty's Prison (UK)
IAUC	Irish American Unity Conference
IBA	International Broadcasting Authority
ILA	International Longshoremen's Association
INC	Irish National Caucus
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IPLO	Irish Peoples' Liberation Organization
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRB	Irish Republican Brotherhood
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
MABSTOA	Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority
MI5	Security Service (UK)
MI6	Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
NAIF	National Association for Irish Freedom
NAIJ	National Association for Irish Justice
NI	Northern Ireland
NICRA	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NIIS	Northern Ireland Information Service
NIO	Northern Ireland Office
Noraid	Irish Northern Aid Committee (aka INA and INAC)
NORC	National Opinion Research Center
NYT	*New York Times*
OIRA	Official Irish Republican Army (aka the Officials)
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army (aka the Provos)

PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
POS	political opportunity structure
PSF	Provisional Sinn Féin
ROI	Republic of Ireland
RSF	Republican Sinn Féin
RTÉ	Radio Teilifis Érieann
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SCS	special category status
SCSA	standard consolidated statistical area
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
SEIU	Service Employees International Union
SMOs	social movement organizations
SMSA	standard metropolitan statistical area
SNA	social network analysis
TDMs	transformative diasporic movements
TWU	Transport Workers Union
UBCJ	United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
UDA	Ulster Defence Association
UDR	Ulster Defence Regiment
UFF	Ulster Freedom Fighters
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
US DOC	United States Department of Commerce
US DOJ	United States Department of Justice
US DOS	United States Department of State
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force

Introduction

Diasporic populations wielding power in conflict-ridden homelands have long attracted media attention in Western countries. During the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the US media cast a negative spotlight on the Irish-American connection[1] with violence in Northern Ireland, with such headlines as "Helping the Old Country Kill"[2] and "Irish Troubles, American Money."[3] As the Irish Republican Army (IRA) laid down its weapons in the late 1990s, journalists publicized another "Bronx Connection"[4]: Albanian-American links to what one journalist dubbed "a Balkan Version of the IRA"[5]—namely, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was waging a secessionist campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the German press reported on the Kurdish migrant community's support of armed separatists in Turkey.

Since 9/11, public scrutiny of diasporic communities appears to have intensified. Just days after the terrorist attacks on US soil, the BBC featured a series of articles calling for a renewed crackdown on capital flows from Irish Americans to republican militants. The US-based Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid), which had been a thorn in the side of the British government for three decades, was singled out for special attention in such articles as "Rich

[1] Angus Deming with Stephan Lesher and Richard Manning, "The American Connection," *Newsweek*, December 1, 1975, 52.
[2] "Northern Ireland; Helping the Old Country Kill," *The Economist*, January 10, 1976, 52.
[3] T.K. Jones, "Irish Troubles, American Money; Right Here in the Bronx, Aid and Comfort to the IRA," *Washington Post*, March 22, 1987, C5.
[4] Jim Dwyer, "The Bronx Connection," *Daily News*, February 7, 1999.
[5] Eske Wright, "A Balkan Version of the IRA?" *Newstatesman*, April 9, 1999, available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/199904090011.

Friends in New York"[6] and "America pressed over UK terrorism," which carried the Northern Ireland secretary's blunt message before his fellow Tories in October 2001:

> We must prevail on our friends abroad, including the United States, to treat terrorist threats to this country exactly as we are treating terrorist threats to theirs. Any organisation supporting those who continue to hold illegal arms must be denounced . . . every opportunity to raise money . . . must be closed off—and that includes Noraid.[7]

More current media headlines have called attention to Somali exile youth leading "double lives" in London's suburbs and even disappearing from their homes in the US Midwest to join militias in Mogadishu.[8] And in May 2009, following the Sri Lankan government's declaration of victory in its twenty-five-year war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Tamil diaspora—a well-known source of funding for the Tigers—captured public attention in Toronto with mass protests and the burning down of a Sinhalese Buddhist temple, prompting one commentator to quip, "Civil wars never end, they just move to Canada."[9]

In reporting on armed conflicts, diasporic populations can occasionally find themselves cast favorably, particularly when they have powerful allies. Such was the case in July 2012 when major newspapers publicized US secretary of state Hillary Clinton's praise of Syrian

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[6] Jonathan Duffy, "Rich Friends in New York," *BBC News*, September 26, 2001, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1563119.stm; and "Call for Noraid Crackdown," *BBC News*, September 25, 2001, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/1562217.stm.

[7] Northern Ireland Secretary Quentin Davies quoted in: "America Pressed over UK Terrorism," *BBC News*, October 10, 2001, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk_politics/2001/conferences_2001/conservatives/1591204.stm.

[8] Samanthi Dissanayake, "Exile Youth Lead 'Double Lives,'" *BBC News*, December 10, 2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7760992.stm; and Andrea Elliott, "A Call to Jihad, Answered in America," *New York Times*, July 11, 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/12somalis.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

[9] Olivia Ward, "Civil Wars Never End, They Just Move to Canada," *Toronto Star*, May 23, 2009, available at: http://www.thestar.com/article/638391. On Sri Lankans and other groups in the United Kingdom, see "Exiles Wielding Power from the UK," *BBC News*, December 4, 2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7742638.stm.

Americans[10] for their acting as "a link between the international community and opposition activists on the ground," helping to advise the US government in its efforts to further "a transition" in Damascus, and in collecting funds and humanitarian assistance for the victims of violence[11] in the escalating clash between Bashar al-Assad's troops and insurgents—whom the embattled regime and its ally Iran conveniently referred to as "terrorists."[12]

When close allies disagree on who deserves the "terrorist" label, the portrayal of diasporas in the mainstream media can be ambiguous. In August 2012, for example, Hezbollah fundraising among European Lebanese garnered public attention owing to the contention caused between the United States and European Union (EU) over the latter's refusal to blacklist the Shiite militant group. While perceived as a resistance movement within the Muslim world and as a terrorist outfit by the United States and Israel, explained one news report, the lack of consensus among EU members means that long-distance supporters of Hezbollah can continue to fundraise for various purposes with few restrictions in Europe.[13]

Along with Western publics, the role of diasporas in armed conflict has increasingly captured the attention of policy analysts and academics over the past decade. Although an emerging body of literature suggests that such communities can be a boon to their homelands, playing a role as peacemakers and propelling post-conflict reconstruction forward in war-torn

[10] Although portrayed in reports as a homogenous group, Syrian Americans are a diverse population, including Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds, among other ethnicities, with various religious affiliations and degrees of loyalty/opposition to Assad's regime.

[11] Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Remarks at Second Annual Global Diaspora Forum," Washington, DC, July 25, 2012, available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/195479.htm (accessed August 1, 2012).

[12] In an interesting twist in reporting on the unfolding civil war and international politics, a *New York Times* article subtitled "Allied by History, Related by Marriage" tied Russia's continued support for the embattled dictatorship not just to Moscow's material interests but also to the presence of an "unusual diaspora" in Syria: the estimated 20,000 Russian women who are the wives of the elite, a byproduct of the Soviet–Syrian cold war alliance. Ellen Barry, "Russians and Syrians, Allied by History, Related by Marriage," *New York Times*, July 1, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/world/middleeast/for-russia-syrian-ties-complicated-by-marriage.html?pagewanted=all.

[13] Nicholas Kulish, "Despite Alarm by U.S., Europe Lets Hezbollah Operate Openly," *New York Times*, August 15, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/world/europe/hezbollah-banned-in-us-operates-in-europes-public-eye.html?pagewanted=all.

countries,[14] analysts have heavily focused on what has been called the "dark side" of diaspora politics, emphasizing their role in fomenting ethnic nationalism, irredentism, domestic armed conflict, and international instability.[15] More often than not, diasporas have been depicted as fanatics who irrationally and recklessly impose their own "frustrations and fantasies" on homeland politics.[16]

Parsing these transnational actors as either "peacemakers" or "peace-wreckers," policy specialists have sought to understand how they are stakeholders in civil wars in order to develop strategies that minimize their role as "spoilers"[17] and maximize their potential to contribute to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Yet it has been recognized that these Manichean categories mask the internal complexity of such communities and their politics. Moreover, diasporic populations can hardly be called "peace-wreckers," for example, when there is no peace to wreck or when "peace" is not merely defined as the absence of violence.[18]

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[14] See, for example, Fergal Cochrane, "Irish America, the end of the IRA's Armed Struggle and the Utility of 'Soft Power,'" *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007): 215–31; Fergal Cochrane, Bahar Baser, and Ashok Swain, "Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 8 (2009): 681–704; Gregory Kent, "Diaspora Power: Network Contributions to Peacebuilding and the Transformation of War Economies," paper presented at the Transforming War Economies Seminar, Plymouth, UK, June 16–18, 2005, available at: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/twe/papers/Kent,_Greg_-_Diaspora_contribution_to_peacebuilding.pdf (accessed August 1, 2012).

[15] Eva Kristine Østergaard-Nielsen, "Diasporas and Conflict Resolution: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?" Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Brief, March 2006, 8, available at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-nielsen_diaspora_conflict_resolution.pdf (accessed October 9, 2012). Smith and Stares's edited volume, as its title suggests, explores both their potential for both peacemaking and "peace-wrecking." Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds., *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers?* (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2007).

[16] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).

[17] Yossi Shain and Ravinatha P. Aryasinha, "Spoilers or Catalysts? The Role of Diasporas in Peace Processes," in *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2006). These authors do not adopt Stephen Stedman's definition of spoilers as those who use violence to undermine attempts to establish peace in conflict zones. See Stephen Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 5–53. Shain and Aryasinha use the term simply to refer to extreme levels of hostility toward peace negotiations or settlement.

[18] Skrbiš made this observation with respect to the Croatian diaspora. Zlatko Skrbiš, "The Mobilized Croatian Diaspora: Its Role in Homeland Politics and War," in *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers?* ed. Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2007), 218–39. Smith highlights this finding of his work in her introduction to the edited volume, "Diasporas in International Conflict," 10, 12. This perspective was also

Diasporic Financing as Collective Action

The civil wars literature has recognized diasporic populations as potentially crucial nonstate actors in conflict contexts and identifies their principal role as financial. From a rationalist perspective, diasporic support for belligerents is seemingly a conundrum: why expend scarce resources funding war in a territory with diminished instrumental value? Even more perplexing are cases in which support is channeled to armed actors whom the host state opposes, and/or are seeking independent statehood for the homeland, given that only a few internationally recognized states have been born from separatist conflicts over the past five decades.[19] The rationalist puzzle of potentially costly, risky, and ineffectual behavior has generated a bias toward arguments that invoke emotional motives as explanations for activism.

Descriptive accounts of particular cases often spotlight high-profile individuals who appear fervently committed to "the cause." Yet most contributors likely have mixed motives for providing support that may include such oft-cited emotions as guilt, sympathy, and hatred, but also such self-interested motives as social status, approval, and reputation. Explaining behavior solely from assumed motives, moreover, ignores mobilization processes and fundamentally cannot explain variation within and between ethnic populations in their propensity to engage in collective action from afar.

Conceived of in this way, understanding patterns of long-distance support for armed insurgents would require investigation into the conditions under which core activists must

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well captured in a 1974 news snippet in the pro-Provisional IRA newspaper *Irish People*: "There is nobody on this earth who detests violence and wants peace more than the members of Irish Northern Aid. But it must be peace with dignity, equality, and justice." Jim Sheehan, "Boston News," *Irish People*, May 4, 1974, 18.

[19] Shain and Aryasinha, "Spoilers or Catalysts?" 124. These are: Bangladesh (1971), Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), Eritrea (1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), and East Timor (2002). In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence. As of July 2012, only 91 out of 193 UN member states have formally recognized the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state. In July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was created after two decades of civil war in Sudan and can also be included on this list.

mobilize for the cause. That is, strategic action must be situated within the broader macro-political context (international relations; host country foreign policy, domestic political institutions, and state capacity; belligerent government strategies vis-à-vis the insurgent movement within its territorial jurisdiction and beyond; and those of the "homeland" government should one exist). This relational, institutional, and policy configuration establishes the parameters for collective action (i.e., opportunities and constraints). Government actors, for example, can deprive diasporic activists of crucial resources such as legitimacy and public voice and create considerable risks and potential costs for movement involvement. On the other hand, as the example above regarding Syrian Americans illustrates, they may aid such transnational activism.

While the macro-context can help explain variation among "groups" and change over time, it inevitably cannot explain within-group variation. This requires attention to the availability of communal resources that are vital to a movement. Edwards and McCarthy would even "expect the spatial distribution of movement mobilization to correlate more strongly with resource availability than with the spatial distribution of injustice or grievance."[20] More specifically, they hypothesize, "the presence of social-organizational resources in a particular locale should increase the overall likelihood of movement mobilization in that setting."[21] Such a prediction is consistent with very firmly established findings of social movements scholarship: mobilization often happens through interpersonal networks and existing communal organizational infrastructure (e.g., parishes, neighborhoods, fraternal associations, workplaces; what Knoke has referred to as "naturally occurring solidarity structures" and Feld has labeled

[20] Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 119.
[21] Ibid., 127.

"social foci" [22]). Thus, in addition to the "opportunity set," analysis of the resources potentially available to activists, including ethnic-based networks and organizations, is essential to understanding patterns of support within and between diasporic movements. The following chapter gives a more extensive analysis of the mechanisms inherent in networks, and especially cohesive ethnic networks (what Tilly would call a "catnet"[23]), that render them a potentially rich resource for militant activists. The availability of such resources, however, is not necessarily stable. Demographic trends, for example, may impact resource availability over time.[24]

These levels of analysis must be complemented by a third—individual agency. The extent to which diasporic militants can tap available resources and generate new ones[25] is contingent on the strategic capacity of movement leaders, which is not only a matter of skill endowment but also of their prominence within communal networks.[26] Prominence is not only a matter of how many connections one has but also of to whom one is tied. It is the social network analysis equivalent of social capital: "advantage created by a person's location in a structure of

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[22] David Knoke with Nancy Wisely, "Social Movements," in *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective*, by Knoke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 68; Scott Feld, "The Focused Organization of Social Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 86 (1981): 1025.

[23] Tilly defined these as "a set of individuals comprising both a category and a network." Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 63.

[24] Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 119.

[25] Edwards and McCarthy note five types of resources: moral (e.g., legitimacy, solidarity; sympathy); cultural (e.g., collective identities, music, newspapers, films); socio-organizational (e.g., social networks, organizations); human (e.g., labor, skills, experience, expertise); material (e.g., money, property, equipment). They examine four mechanisms of resource access: aggregation; self-production (e.g., network-building, selling products with movement significance); co-optation/appropriation (borrow resources/surreptitious exploitation); patronage.

[26] On strategic capacity see, Marshall Ganz, "Why David Sometimes Wins: Strategic Capacity in Social Movements," in *The Psychology of Leadership: New Perspectives and Research*, ed. David Messick and Roderick M. Kramer (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005), 209–238, and his more recent work, *Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Prominence is a network measure. It entails a measure not only of the number of ties an actor has within a network (i.e., how connected s/he is), but also to whom an actor is tied and how. Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

relationships."[27] Ceteris paribus, one would expect higher levels of mobilization in a locale where a militant activist was prominent than not.

Thus, the complex set of constraints and opportunities that diasporic militants confront, the potential resources available, and their leaders' strategic capacity are crucial to explaining patterns of mobilization. An analysis that combines the macro-level context, network structures, and micro-dynamics includes:

- *Nested political opportunity structures (domestic, international, and transnational)*: These parameters can change over time, as a result of exogenous events (e.g., the end of the cold war, 9/11) or endogenous attempts by challengers to change them. Relevant questions include: What is the broad international context in which an insurgency takes place? How does that shape "host" state foreign policy? What is the relationship between "host," belligerent, and in cases where one exists, the "home" state? In short, what does the dyadic or triadic relationship among government actors look like? At the domestic level, how robust is the capacity of relevant states to help or hinder insurgent connections across borders? Do "host" state political institutions and laws enable or constrain mobilization? If there is a "homeland" state, what is its relationship toward the insurgency and diasporic actors?
- *Organizational infrastructure and interpersonal networks*: How sizable is the co-ethnic population? What proportion of that population are first- and second-generation immigrants? Are populations geographically concentrated in the "host" state? Are they occupationally clustered in ethnic economies or niches? How saturated are they with religious, cultural, and social institutions that facilitate collective action?

[27] Ronald S. Burt, *Brokerage & Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4.

- *Strategic capacity*: How prominent are militant activists within ethnic-based organizational networks? What strategies do they adopt to recruit members/supporters and acquire/generate resources? Are they tied to powerful brokers? How do they manage internal and/or external competitors (i.e., moderates)?

A Puzzle Within a Puzzle

A 1971 article in the *Observer* (London) titled "Irish Mafia" highlighted the presence of 40 million Irish ethnics in the United States, most of whom it claimed "harbor[ed] bitter memories of the English."[28] The article's undercurrent was that these American Irish posed a security threat to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, as they undoubtedly would generously fill the coffers of the Irish Northern Aid Committee, which was established in 1970 to aid the Provisional Irish Republican Army's campaign against British rule in the North of Ireland, principally by providing aid to the families of IRA prisoners.

Such reports, however, proved alarmist; overall Noraid's declared sums (and even official estimates) of its income and remittances to Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s were paltry relative to the size of the Irish Catholic population in the United States, an estimated 15 to 20 million. As one analyst described, diasporic militants "enlisted but a sliver of Irish America in consistent support. Given the size and resources of Irish America, NORAID's membership and the amount of its contributions were even in its best days tiny."[29] Although the financing was significant given that the population of Northern Ireland was only about 1.5 million, the figures also paled in comparison to the income generated by other diasporic populations for

[28] "Irish Mafia," *Observer* (London), October 17, 1971.
[29] Timothy J. Meagher, *The Columbia Guide to Irish American History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 212.

insurgent efforts elsewhere. IRA historian J. Bowyer Bell once quipped, "The Zionists could raise more in New York over a weekend than NORAID managed in a generation."[30] A more apt comparison, however, is the estimated 800,000-strong Tamil diaspora, which reportedly funded about 20 percent of the LTTE's $300 million annual budget. Canadian Tamils alone allegedly contributed between $10 and $12 million annually to the Tigers.[31] Similarly, Kosovar Albanians in United States, mostly the 200,000 in New York but also significantly those in Dallas and Detroit, contributed as much as $11 million to the KLA's Homeland Calling fund to finance its war against Serbia within about two years,[32] while simultaneously contributing to the Fund for the Republic of Kosovo (aka the Three Percent Fund) that financed a parallel state apparatus.[33] Estimates of overall contributions to the KLA range from $75 million to $100 million, while the Three Percent Fund, very little which was funneled to the KLA, garnered anywhere from $260 million to $500 million. As one KLA commander noted, "Money was not a problem."[34]

Why was Noraid only able to enlist a "sliver" of a vast Irish America into supporting its efforts to aid the cause of Irish unification? This dissertation argues that coordinated state suppression among the triad of relevant government actors with robust state capacity created high barriers to collective action. Government policy on both sides of the Atlantic increased

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[30] Bell, *The IRA, 1968–2000: Analysis of a Secret Army* (London: Routledge, 2000), 188.

[31] See Rüdiger Falksohn and Padma Rao, "Tamil Tigers Exploit Exiles Abroad to Fund Insurgency," *Der Spiegel* (Germany), February 14, 2008, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,535316,00.html.; Human Rights Watch, *Funding the Final War*; International Crisis Group, "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE," Crisis Group Asia Report No. 186, September 23, 2010, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186%20The%20Sri%20Lankan%20Tamil%20Diaspora%20after%20the%20LTTE.ashx. For an analysis, see Radke's work on this topic. She finds that the Tamil Tigers, like a state bureaucracy, essentially were able to routinize and enforce compliance with their demands for financial support.

[32] Perritt estimates the figures as follows: Dallas, US$4 million; Detroit, $1.8 million; Alaska $400,000–500,000; Chicago, $500,000; and New York, the remainder of the $11 million total from the United States. Most of the funding came from Switzerland, about $50 million, and an additional $10 to 12 million from Germany. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 92.

[33] See Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 252.

[34] Perritt, Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 88–9.

legal risk and social costs to supporters of Noraid and limited the movement's reachability[35] beyond tightly-knit communities.

H1: ↑ suppression → ↑ cost and risk (disincentives) and ↓ reachability → ↓ mobilization

At the same time these communities were dissipating as a result of government immigration policy and upward social mobility, which reduced the economic interdependence of co-ethnics and spatially dispersed them, thus diminishing the organizational infrastructure and interpersonal networks that facilitate ethnic collective action.

H2: ↑ upward social mobility in host society economy → ↓ availability of intra-communal resources

Yet how Noraid endured for the duration of the three-decades-long conflict in the face of these countervailing challenges from above and below presents a second puzzle. This study argues that the leadership's network-building strategies both at the interpersonal and organizational levels explain the organization's resilience. While Noraid actively cultivated interpersonal ties among the Irish on both sides of the Atlantic, its leaders pursued three strategies at the organizational level that would prove crucial to its longevity (centralization, co-optation of existing communal institutions, and brokerage).

Most crucially, Noraid's leadership brokered relationships with local union bosses in major American cities where the Irish still predominated if not in rank and file at least in leadership. Union leaders not only had the resources to provide support to Noraid, but they also had institutional mechanisms to sanction and reward their rank and file to follow their political directives. At the same time, a number of local branches, especially in the building trades in

[35]As Hanneman and Riddle explain, "an actor is 'reachable' by another if there exists any set of connections by which we can trace from the source to the target actor." Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle, *Introduction to Social Network Methods*, online textbook, Chapter 7.

major US cities, were under government pressure to end nepotistic and patronage practices[36] that resulted in a preponderance of white ethnics, which facilitated collective action by enhancing intra-group solidarity.

This strategy was possible because Noraid's leaders were prominent within their local communities.

H3: ↑ network centrality of radicals → ↑ resource access

"Diaspora": Contested Meaning

It is necessary to define "diaspora" at the outset especially given that its meaning is so vague and contested. Indeed, there is a substantial body of scholarship preoccupied with addressing the definitional conundrum.[37] Scholars disagree on a number of different dimensions such as impetus for migration; real or symbolic desire for return;[38] duration of settlement; and

[36] As Knoke explains, "kinship settings seem to be the bedrock on which all patron-client systems are erected. Clientelistic relationships are constructed on the basis of social exchange, reinforced by trust and feelings of ascriptive solidarity. The extension of kin intimacy to a larger circle of friends and acquaintances allows a social order of unconditional mutual obligations that could not be sustained only by exchanging economic and power resources. Thus, patron-client systems combine strong emotional, particularistic ties with simultaneous but unequal exchanges of different types of resources. Clients exchange personal loyalty, deference, and awe for the protection, understanding, and material benefits provided by their patrons." David Knoke, *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 142.

[37] William Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Mythos of Homeland and Return," *Diaspora* 1 (1991): 83–99; James Clifford, "Diasporas," *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (1994): 302–38; Kachig Tölölyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment," *Diaspora* 5 (1996): 3–36; Robin Cohen, *Global diasporas: An introduction* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998); Kim D. Butler, "Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse," *Diaspora* 10, no. 2 (2001): 189–219; Östen Wahlbeck, "The Concept of Diaspora as an Analytical Tool in the Study of Refugee Communities," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28, no. 2 (2002): 221–38; Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora: At Home Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Rogers Brubaker, "The 'diaspora' diaspora," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005): 1–19; Martin Sökefeld, "Mobilizing in transnational space: a social movement approach to the formation of diaspora," *Global Networks* 6, no. 3 (2006): 265-84.

[38] Clifford argues that large segments of the Jewish diaspora—often considered the paradigmatic case—would not even meet this criterion. Clifford, "Diasporas," 305. See also Stanley J. Tambiah, "Transnational Movements, Diaspora, and Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus* 129 (Winter 2000): 169. In his discussion of the Armenian diaspora, Panossian contends that "the myth of return to the homeland loses its meaning in many cases . . . and is no longer an operative concept with any deep emotional resonance, if any appeal at all." Razmik Panossian, *The*

extent of spatial dispersion. They have developed typologies[39] and drawn up lists, sometimes rather lengthy ones, of necessary criteria[40] in an attempt to bring analytical leverage to a concept that Brubaker argues has become "stretched to the point of uselessness."[41]

There is a loose consensus, however, that the concept at a minimum denotes dispersion in space, homeland orientation, and boundary maintenance with the host society, although scholars differ in their interpretation of these elements.[42] This dissertation draws partly on Sheffer's definition:

> a social-political formation . . . whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries. Members of such entities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homelands and with individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host countries. . . .[43]

"Diaspora" shares a semantic field with a range of other social categories—including refugees, multiple generations of immigrants, guest workers, and political exiles[44]—that are often fluid and partly depend on self-identification as well as host-country policies.[45] At the core of this definition, however, is *permanent settlement* outside of the homeland, which is at odds with those who view diasporic existence as transient. As Sheffer explains, outmigration from the homeland in large groups and settlement in distant countries are key defining elements of

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Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 314.

[39] See, for example, Cohen's categories of victim, labor, trade, imperial, and deterritorialized; and Sheffer's historical, modern, and incipient classification. Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, 2nd edn. (New York: Routledge, 2008); and Sheffer, *Diaspora*.

[40] See, for example, Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies"; and Cohen, *Global Diasporas*. The criteria are largely based on the Jewish case.

[41] Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora," 3.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Sheffer, *Diaspora*, 9–10.

[44] Kachig Tölölyan, "The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface," *Diaspora* 1, no. 1 (1991): 3–7.

[45] Sheffer, *Diaspora*.

diasporas.[46] Thus, analytically distinct from the concept of diaspora are transborder minorities, who are physically separated from co-ethnics because territorial borders have shifted.

In accordance with Brubaker's conceptual critique, diasporas are not viewed as bounded "groups." Their actual size is impossible to quantify, not only due to continuous migration, but also because individuals themselves shift categories in practice. As Brubaker makes clear, common ancestry is a poor proxy for membership. Those who consistently adopt a diasporic stance often constitute only a small minority of the putative group.[47] Sheffer and others refer to these individuals as "core" members: organizing elites and activists intensely involved in diasporic affairs. By contrast, "marginal" or "passive" members are not regularly active but are likely to be available for mobilization when leaders call upon them.[48] Sheffer describes them as those who "maintain their ethnic communal identity but do not identify as such."[49] Along with Shain and Barth, he identifies a third layer, consisting of a "dormant" or "silent" pool of potential constituents. These individuals are uninvolved in diasporic affairs but in times of crisis may identify with the diaspora and be mobilized by leaders and organizations.[50]

Anny Bakalian's work on "symbolic ethnicity" among Armenians in the United States clearly illustrates the relevance of Brubaker's critique of ancestry as a proxy for diaspora. She explains: "A small core of highly active men and women, overwhelming from the first and second generations, make up the 'Armenian-American Community.' . . . The community is

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[46] Ibid., 88.
[47] Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora."
[48] Sheffer, *Diaspora*; Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 57 (Summer 2003): 452.
[49] Sheffer, *Diaspora*, 100.
[50] Ibid.; Shain and Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," 452–3. Such a perspective is akin to how layers of social movements are typically conceived: "Whereas most participants are only peripherally involved, there is always a small, committed core—the cadre—who make decisions and whose lives revolve around the movement." Knoke with Wisely, "Social Movements," 79.

unable to attract the attention, let alone retain the participation, of the vast majority of people of Armenian descent."[51]

It is helpful then, as Brubaker suggests, to think of diaspora as a category of practice that "is used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties."[52] As he and Adamson[53] articulate, "diasporas" should be viewed as outcomes of mobilization by political entrepreneurs engaging in strategic identity construction and seeking to reify the "imagined community."[54] Reification, Brubaker explains, is a social process that "is central to the *practice* of politicized ethnicity." In conceptualizing diaspora in this way, analysts can avoid the pitfall of doubly reifying a key part of what should be explained.[55] Rather than taking diaspora as fixed and given, he suggests, the extent and circumstances under which those claimed as members actively adopt a diasporic stance should be studied empirically.[56]

Aiming to counter essentialist approaches to the study of diaspora, Sökefeld similarly argues that diasporas are not a "natural" consequence of migration. Rather, they should be defined as "imagined transnational communities," whereby "sentiments of belonging, attachment to a home and ideas of a place of origin do not constitute the 'substance' from which diasporas . . . are made but the codes in terms of which 'a' diaspora is imagined."[57] According to this perspective, diaspora signifies a transnational dispersed collectivity with discourses of shared identity. Fundamental questions are how people are mobilized for such an identity, and how

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[51] Anny Bakalian, *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 8–9.
[52] Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora," 12.
[53] Fiona B. Adamson, "Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements," paper presented at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 26–29, 2008.
[54] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 2nd edn. (London: Verso, 1991).
[55] Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora," 10.
[56] Ibid., 13.
[57] Sökefeld, "Mobilizing in Transnational Space," 267.

they are made to assume it—which may be fruitfully pursued through a social movements approach.[58] Indeed, analysts often presuppose deep emotional attachments, solidarity, organization, and political mobilization—staple features of a social movements perspective—by including them as *defining* features of diaspora thereby limiting the explanatory power of their arguments about the role of such populations in armed conflict.

Ethnic identity is also an elusive concept. Fearon and Laitin's conceptual work is helpful in clarifying its meaning: a social category "defined mainly by descent rules of group membership and content typically composed of cultural attributes, such as religion, language, customs, values, and shared historical myths." As they explain, a constructivist perspective recognizes that the *content* of social categories can change over time and so can the *boundaries* between them (e.g., Croat versus Yugoslav). On the issue of violence in Northern Ireland, they note, while the social *content* of the categories "Protestant" and "Catholic" have become so similar that there are virtually no cultural differences that separate the two populations, the *boundaries* between the two groups are "long-standing and unquestioned."[59]

Group-making Back There and Here

A constructivist lens thus brings into sharp focus that individuals can hold and mobilize along multiple identities, that perceptions of ethnic group membership are "situational," and that identifications can shift based on the context, which in the case of migrant populations may be a

[58] Ibid.

[59] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Identity," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 848–849, 858. On identities in Northern Ireland, they draw on John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). As Mulholland notes, "The Catholics in Ulster feel Irish, and Protestants feel British, and that both countenance violence to vindicate their identities, is not peculiar. . . . Being so alike—in language, appearance, and broad culture—they cling tenaciously to what marks them out." Marc Mulholland, *The Longest War: Northern Ireland's Troubled History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), v–vi.

product of both host country conditions and homeland politics.[60] During the 1960s and 1970s, for example, Sikhs in Canada and elsewhere mobilized as part of a broader Indian diaspora to aid India in its wars with Pakistan. During this time, the Canadian government did not recognize "Sikh" as a distinct category, which illustrates the role that the state can play in constructing "groups." It was not until the Indian government's 1984 attack on the Golden Temple[61] (Operation Blue Star) that Sikhs abroad began collectively mobilizing in support of carving out an independent Khalistan.[62] Another illustration is Blumi's analysis of Albanian "invisibleness" in Western Europe in the postwar period. Her interviews reveal how Kosovar Albanians, recognized by Western European host states as Yugoslavs, adopted a "Yugoslav" identity "in order to reinforce a sense of self-pride as well as economic security" in adverse conditions.[63]

Immigration studies have explored the relationship between host environments and ethnic solidarity,[64] while sociologists have long recognized the role that threat and conflict can play in increasing intra-group cohesion.[65] This section discusses the role of violence in group-making across borders and more briefly the role economic competition within borders, a topic that is

[60] A helpful illustration is Horowitz's discussion of Sikh identity. "Sikhism," he explains, "is an offshoot of Hinduism, but the Sikhs in the Punjab have increasingly acted as if they were a separate descent group. Some decades ago, Sikh leaders attempted, with some success, to sever the traditional ties of Sikhs to Hindus. They apparently believed that by ending the long history of religious interchange, conversion, and intermarriage, they would put the Sikhs on a more solid—because more ascriptive—political foundation." Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 2nd edn. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 56.

[61] The Golden Temple, located in the Punjab region of India near its border with Pakistan, is the center of Sikh worship.

[62] Darshan Singh Tatla, *The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999).

[63] Isa Blumi, "Defining Social Spaces By Way of Deletion: The Untold Story of Albanian Migration in the Postwar Period," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 29, no. 6 (2003): 957.

[64] For example, Alejandro Portes, "Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration: A Conceptual Overview," in *The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship*, ed. Alejandro Portes (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995). This issue is discussed in further in the following chapter.

[65] Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, trans. and ed. Kurt Wolff (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, [1922] 1955); Louis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).

more thoroughly addressed in the following chapter's discussion of immigrant adaptation and networks.

"Groupness" and Violence

The civil wars literature has provided rich insight into the variability of ethnic "groupness,"[66] and how *intra*-ethnic processes may actually condition and foster *inter*-ethnic violence.[67] Brubaker and Laitin identify four mechanisms, which can be collapsed into two: in-group power struggles and in-group policing.[68]

In competitive electoral settings, elites can engage in "ethnic outbidding," a process whereby communally based political entrepreneurs politicize ethnic divisions and outbid moderates on ethnic issues for votes. The spiral of extreme bidding that ensues leads to the disappearance of brokerage institutions and ultimately the breakdown of democratic procedures, often accompanied by violence.[69] Among diasporic leaderships, analysts have noted the practice of discrediting internal rivals as a primary tactic for factions to shore up power among constituents and gain or maintain control of institutions.[70] In his in-depth study of Balkan diasporas, Hockenos notes that "mudslinging was a form of combat practiced unintermittently"

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[66] Although Brubaker focuses his discussion on ethnic groups, his critique of "groupism" is applicable to other social categories such as class.

[67] Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," in *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 98.

[68] These are: in-group policing (sanctioning); incumbent/challenger power struggles; ethnic-outbidding; and symbolic and material rewards. I have collapsed the first and fourth and the second and third mechanisms.

[69] Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1972), 82–6. Drawing on the case of India, Chandra argues that ethnic outbidding occurs in specific institutional contexts. See Kanchan Chandra, "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 2 (2005): 235–52. In the case of Yugoslavia, Gagnon contends that elites actually engaged in a strategy of ethnic underbidding and sought to demobilize populations via violence, particularly targeting ethnically mixed communities. Votes were secured through gerrymandering and limiting the political opposition rather than mobilization. V.P. Gagnon, Jr., *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

[70] Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 72.

on the radical right. Ultranationalists, he explains, frequently attacked more moderate elements, often through vicious name-calling and accusations of collaboration with the Yugoslav secret service or a rival ethnicity.[71] In the Irish case, IRA sympathizers lambasted prominent Irish-American politicians as "lapsed Irishmen,"[72] "British lackeys" and, with the added dimension of class antagonism, "lace curtain Irish."[73] Diasporas, as Hockenos writes, tend "to charge their rivals in the movement of betrayal and 'going soft.'"[74]

Ethnic outbidding in the homeland, moreover, may generate a feedback loop in the diaspora. The more polarized the homeland becomes as a result of elite in-fighting, the more credible the appeals of diasporic radicals and thus the more resources they can mobilize to support their nationalist allies back home. Moderates may be sidelined in existing institutions for seeming "soft" on ethnic issues. Alternatively, in organizations with mixed memberships, ethnic "others" may be expelled or marginalized.

In-group incumbents and challengers may also not only dramatize external threats to the group but actually provoke violence in order to delegitimize their internal opponents and/or generate popular support at home and among diasporic communities. Brubaker describes the KLA's provocation of brutal regime reprisals as a successful "group-making" strategy.[75] It led to defections from Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo among Kosovar Albanians abroad, leading Hockenos to argue that the KLA thus "reshuffled the deck in the Albanian diaspora."[76]

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[71] Ibid., 72, 248.
[72] Sean McManus, *My American Struggle for Justice in Northern Ireland* (Cork, Ireland: The Collins Press, 2011), 180.
[73] Andrew J. Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict 1968–1995* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 134.
[74] Ibid., 235–6.
[75] Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora," 14.
[76] Hockenos, *Homeland Calling*, 249.

Violence, Gagnon explains, constructs "ethnic groups" in "hard" terms and generates images of solidarity. Moreover, it silences contention, as those who can credibly appeal to existential threats can shut down opponents by claiming that such action is in the interests of survival. He contends that when elites are unable to "play the ethnic card" as a means of mobilizing the population, they are forced to use violence as a strategy "to impose a very specific meaning and interest on ethnic identity." Serbian and Croatian elites, he argues, used violence to change what it meant "to identify as Serb [and] Croat and to impose an equivalence between ethnic identity and political position."[77] Similarly Mulholland finds that when the longstanding sectarian divide between "Catholics who felt Irish and Protestants who felt British" was challenged by political reform efforts in the North of Ireland during the 1960s, the Protestant Ulster Volunteer Force sought to provoke violence to reinforce communal identities, a strategy he notes worked as expected.[78] And writing on the upsurge in support for the Provisional IRA among Philadelphia's Irish, one journalist succinctly asserted: "Nothing pulls people together like war."[79]

From this perspective, group crystallization and polarization result *from* rather than cause violence.[80] But why do publics sometimes follow? Fearon and Laitin contend that observers tend to assume that popular involvement in violence is motivated by underlying ethnic hatreds and fear. Brass, Kalyvas, and others, however, have shown how violence in civil wars may have more to do with local agendas than with communal antipathies. Thus, elites are not the only

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[77] Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War*, 28 and xviii. Mobilization, Gagnon explains, requires elites to tap into relational senses of identity and self or into environmental factors that do so (8). Serbian and Croatian elites used violence to destroy these social realities and "impose their own political preferences on populations who had very different values and preferences" (149). This is why the worst violence occurred in the country's most ethnically mixed and tolerant regions (28).

[78] Mulholland, *The Longest War*, 67–71.

[79] Mike Mallowe, "My Life & Times With the IRA," *Philadelphia Magazine* 64, no. 3 (March 1973): 105.

[80] Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora," 14.

strategic actors. Strategic action also takes place "on the ground," Fearon and Laitin explain, and "social identities are produced and reproduced through the everyday actions of ordinary folk."[81]

This points to a second mechanism involved in boundary-strengthening, group-making projects—in-group policing, which involves "the formal and informal administration of sanctions, even violent sanctions, within a group so as to enforce a certain line of action vis-à-vis outsiders."[82] This can also be done positively with rewards that encourage particular behaviors.

Drawing on Barth's seminal work,[83] Fearon and Laitin contend that assimilation can threaten group boundaries. In such contexts, those with a vested interest in maintaining such boundaries provoke violence as a strategy to reinforce them and to prevent "defection."[84] Militants have also used physical coercion directly against co-ethnics as a sanctioning mechanism for generating intra-group support for their agendas. While not widespread among diasporic communities, there are instances of murder,[85] beatings and gang attacks, public threats, and intimidation through door-to-door campaigns to ensure compliance.[86] LTTE representatives, for example, used such tactics in Canada.[87]

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[81] Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction," 855; Paul R. Brass, *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[82] Brubaker and Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," 99.

[83] Fredrik Barth, "Introduction," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, ed. Fredrik Barth (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 1–38.

[84] They also argue that marginal members of a group may use violence as a strategy to gain greater acceptance within the group. Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction," 857.

[85] In Germany, for example, members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) not only attacked Turkish businesses and cultural associations but also targeted other Kurds. Several were convicted of murdering members of the Association for Kurdish Workers for Kurdistan (KOMKAR). Alynna Lyon and Emek Uçarer, "Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict: Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK," in *International Migration and the Globalization of Ethnic Politics*, ed. Ray Koslowski (New York: Routledge, 2005), 72.

[86] For a discussion of intimidation tactics used by Kosovar-Albanian radicals, see Hockenos, *Homeland Calling*, 254.

[87] Human Rights Watch offers an in-depth discussion of coercive LTTE tactics ranging from violence to intimidation to extortion to extract resources from the diaspora. Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Funding the "Final War": LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora* (New York: HRW, 2006), available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/ltte0306/ltte0306webwcover.pdf (accessed October 14, 2012).

Positive and negative incentives may also be exercised through the distribution of material benefits. Within diasporic communities, this partly takes place through the fusion of ethnonationalist agendas with welfare organizations and the ethnic economy. Probably the predominant mode of administering sanctions and rewards, as Radtke[88] and others have noted, is through the assignment of shame and honor, as illustrated by the common practice of posting donor lists in community organizations.

"Groupness" and Economic Competition

The previous section discussed the relationship between political competition, violence, and "groupness," while this one focuses on economic competition, violence and protest, and "group" crystallization. Barth's work on ethnic groups and boundaries contended that ethnic relations become unstable when the resource environments (niches) that groups occupy overlap, which increases competition between them and encourages attempts to exclude competitors that often entail violence. Essentially, when two or more populations try to draw on the same limited resources, competitive processes emerge and activate ethnic boundaries.

Also building on Barth's findings, Olzak's well-known study of ethnic and racial conflict and protest in major American cities from the late nineteenth through early twentieth centuries finds that it is not poverty, inequality, or segregation that explains instances of ethnic/racial events but rather the "desegregation of labor markets that intensifies ethnic competition, which in turn raises the rate of ethnic collective action."[89] Competition, she explains, can result from economic contraction or increased prosperity among the disadvantaged in the occupational

[88] Katrin Radtke, "Engaging the Diaspora: The Dynamics of Diaspora Mobilization in Civil Wars," paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, Calif., March 22–25, 2006.
[89] Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 3. For her discussion of Barth and how his argument relates to her work, see p. 27.

hierarchy who then challenge groups directly above them. Instances of ethnic conflict and protest, in turn, heighten the salience of ethnic boundaries, she contends, as "urban confrontations of all kinds increasingly come to be seen as racially motivated by the press, by local authorities, and by residents."[90] Such a process leads to a spiraling of ethnic confrontation.

Conclusion

Diasporic financing for armed insurgents has come to be seen as a significant transnational dimension of civil wars. As Olzak has noted, "[W]e know that ethnic solidarity does not invariably cause ethnic collective action." Her caution in distinguishing the two concepts, similarly applies to "diasporas," which are often conceptualized in such a way so that behavioral outcomes are definitional elements, which thus generates tautological arguments.

While ethnic populations settled afar in Western democratic host countries do not confront comparable levels of risk in aiding insurgents as their actual or perceived kin caught in the cross-hairs of armed conflict at "home," militant leaders confront a set of opportunities and constraints that can ease or exacerbate collective action problems. These populations themselves also continuously undergo processes of group-making and -unmaking in relation to political events and economic processes in their homelands, and in relation to other "groups" in the host society and government policy.

Structure of the Chapters

Chapter 1, "Tapping the Diaspora: Passions, Interests, and Mobilization Dynamics," establishes the theoretical framework of the dissertation. It examines the current literature on

[90] Ibid., 215.

diasporas in civil wars, fleshing out key debates and insights that scholars have brought to bear on understanding the role of diasporic populations in relation to "homeland" armed conflicts. It also identifies two significant shortfalls: over-aggregation bias and inattention to social network theory and methods. It then explains the relevance of relational approaches to the study of social movements, immigrant adaptation, and diasporic politics.

Chapter 2, "Research Design," explains the methodology of the study. It revisits the conceptually contested concept of diaspora and defines other key conceptual building blocks. The chapter also clarifies the phenomenon under examination, labeling it a "diasporic movement"—a subtype of social movement—which is distinct from ethnic lobbies, which are a subtype of interest group. It then fleshes out generalizable hypotheses and turns to the issue of case methods and selection, justifying the choice of Irish-American militant activism vis-à-vis the Northern Ireland conflict in the 1970s and 1980s as the central focus of the study. The research design then lays out the quantitative analysis that supplements the qualitative methodology, and concludes with a discussion of data collection sources.

Chapters 3 through 7 are devoted to examining Irish-American support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army during the Troubles, focusing on the first two decades of the conflict: from 1970—when the Irish Northern Aid Committee formed in the United States to support the dependents of incarcerated IRA members—through 1989, when Noraid split due to factional infighting over strategy to advance the cause of an all-Ireland republic.

More specifically, Chapter 3, "The Lace Curtin Divide Over Ulster: 'Fat Cats,' the Working Class, and America's Disinterested Irish," examines the historical development of the republican movement in the United States from the nineteenth century onward. The chapter not only provides the necessary historical background to understanding Irish-American involvement

in Northern Ireland's Troubles (1968–1998), but also constitutes an historical comparison of three periods of Irish America's role in supporting IRA campaigns: 1919–1921; 1956–1962; 1969–1998. It identifies an uneven pattern of nationalist mobilization in the United States in the twentieth century: massive, virtually none, and very modest, which shows that diasporic mobilization is by no means automatic with the onset of an insurgent campaign. Rather its emergence, intensity, and duration are historically contingent on a combination of factors, including levels of political mobilization in the homeland, levels of state violence within a contested territory, and insurgent transnational strategy. The chapter then analyzes Noraid's emergence, the organization's financial health, and geographic base, which was mostly confined to the last of the "urban villages"[91] remaining in major US cities. It concludes by noting the general apathy of Irish ethnics in the United States about the North of Ireland and asks what explains the "disconnection"? The following two chapters address that question.

Chapter 4, "Polluting the Insurgent Sea: Coordinated State Suppression of the Republican Movement in the United States," examines in detail the macro-context of collective action. Extending Mao's metaphor of an insurgent sea of support to include populations dispersed across borders, it develops the concept of *ancillary zones* of domestic armed conflict, specifying three ideal types which vary according to the opportunity available to diasporic militants to mobilize a support base in a "host" society: transnationalized (akin to insurgent-dominated zones in contested states); re-territorialized (akin to state-controlled areas); and contested (mixed, where both sides vie for support).

As a theater of the Ulster war, the United States was a contested ancillary zone. Despite a hostile executive branch, US domestic institutions and law allowed Noraid to operate as a legal

[91] "Urban villagers" is a term coined by Herbert J. Gans in his work, *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962).

organization. The analysis focuses on the coordinated state suppression of the Irish Republican movement in the United States, which increased risk and limited information and its ability to reach potential supporters. More specifically it examines: (1) the British government's criminalization strategy, propaganda machinery and tactics, and political efforts to win American hearts and minds (or at least acquiescence); (2) the US government's "special" relationship with the belligerent government, especially in the larger context of the cold war, which meant that it would police its territorial jurisdiction to suppress radicalism; (3) the Irish government's anti-insurgent stance, which truncated networks connecting the "homeland" with potential recruits in the "host" country and deprived insurgent sympathizers of an important source of legitimacy. Coordinated suppression by three robust state apparatuses (i.e., the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Republic of Ireland) set the context for the type of support network that could feasibly emerge (i.e., closed rather than open).

Chapter 5, "America's Diffuse Irish Sea," argues that the social mobility of Irish ethnics rendered the vast majority of them "unreachable" by republican activists given the adverse political context discussed in Chapter 4. Dispersion—spatially, occupationally, and socially—weakened the communal organizational infrastructure, a process that was compounded by the 1965 US Immigration and Nationality Act curtailing the flow of migrants from Europe. Disconnected from activists and linked into countervailing social networks that exposed them to cost and risk for supporting "terrorism," middle-class suburbanites shied away from association with an armed group overwhelmingly portrayed in mainstream media as a bunch of depraved criminals.

Chapter 6, "The Transnational 'Villagers,' Republican Patriarchs, and Union Chieftains," explains how Noraid survived given the countervailing forces from above and below. It had to

mobilize at the local level, through interpersonal connections and organizations (i.e., through informal and Irish-American organizational networks). Noraid strategically not only drew on the last bastions of Irish community in urban neighborhoods, its various branches also fostered intra-communal ties through events that celebrated Irish identity construed as working-class, Catholic, and Gaelic. At the same time, Noraid's very purpose of helping families in need tapped into and reinforced communal norms of mutual self-help—i.e., the moral economy. It even created personal ties between Irish Americans and nationalist individuals and families in the North through various tactics.

While these were crucial in weaving webs of individual connectivity, at a structural level it engaged in three strategies with network implications: centralization, co-optation, and brokerage. Among these, brokerage with leaders of union locals, largely in the building trades but also transport, was key to Noraid's support base. These men not only had material resources and organizational skills, but they also had informal mechanisms to ensure the compliance of their rank and file.

The Conclusion pulls together the various findings of the study and develops a future research agenda. It ends with a brief update on the current situation in Northern Ireland and an assessment of the state of republican organizations in the United States. It quite safely predicts that that loose construct called "Irish America"—absent massive state repression in Ulster—will remain largely apathetic to political developments (or lack thereof) in that still fragile territory, which is a decade and a half into the peace process established by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

CHAPTER 1

Tapping the "Diaspora":

Passions, Interests, and Mobilization Dynamics

> The ethnic bond is perhaps irrational and emotional. It can be described, even analyzed, but not explained rationally. Theories lag behind the conceptual tools necessary to deal with group passions, the symbols that move them and the intensity of attachments which cut across borders and nations. —Darshan Singh Tatla[92]

> [Some Irish Americans are] victims of propaganda and a hereditary emotionalism. It's all so innocent for these people to give away their dollars for Ireland. They haven't experienced the misery of Ulster. . . . There is a certain glamour for them in buying a raffle ticket to win a trinket made by a man in a British prison, a man they see as a hero but we might call a terrorist. —Bernard Falk[93]

> Not all Kosovar Albanians in Switzerland were dedicated to supporting the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army]. . . . Many elected to spend their money on BMWs, nice apartments, and Prada accessories, rather than generously contributing to the KLA funds. —Henry H. Perritt, Jr.[94]

The theoretical review of this chapter weighs heavily on contemporary diasporic movements with nationalist territorial claims. Diasporic transnational political activism is certainly not a "new" phenomenon. Irish-American support for movements in Ireland, for example, dates at least as far back as the early nineteenth century.[95] Nor is it only relevant to ethnically framed civil wars. Diasporic populations can and have been engaged in armed conflicts in which communal identity is not the principal macro-cleavage in the homeland. During El Salvador's civil war, for example, exiles "organized a highly structured and integrated movement" in the United States that, according to Gosse, was "synchronized with the strategic

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[92] Darshan Singh Tatla, *The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), 206.

[93] Bernard Falk, "American-Irish Aid," BBC TV, September 15, 1976. Transcript available in The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1840, 444269, p. 6.

[94] Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2008), 91.

[95] See Wilson, who names Daniel O'Connell as the first Irish leader to establish the diaspora as "an important source of funding." He notes: "In the late 1820s, Friends of Ireland organizations and Hibernian Relief Societies were formed in the US to aid his campaign for Catholic Emancipation." Andrew J. Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict 1968–1995* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 4.

priorities, and even specific tactical needs," of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Articulating social justice and human rights claims, they not only mobilized intra-communal support but also created robust linkages with extra-communal organizations and groups, including churches and universities.[96]

The dearth of analysis regarding their role in ideologically framed conflicts is perhaps rooted in the historical milieu of both scholarship and of particular civil wars themselves. As Wimmer and Schiller assert, before the end of the cold war "methodological nationalism" inhibited scholars from appreciating and theorizing about transnational ties among migrants. They argue that analysts have been able to examine diasporic identities and transnational political activism because they have "changed the lens through which [they] perceive the world."[97]

Moreover, in the case of US-based communities, the collapse of the bipolar system affected Washington's stance toward diasporic involvement in homeland politics. During the cold war, Shain explains, the US government silenced diaspora opponents of its right-wing regime allies.[98] Thus, the seeming ubiquitousness of diasporic involvement in ethnically framed armed conflicts may stem from favorable political opportunities that emerged with the end of the cold war. These opportunities not only pertain to host-country policies toward transnational political activism among migrant communities within their borders but also to the increased

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[96] Van Gosse, "'El Salvador Is Spanish For Vietnam': The Politics of Solidarity and the New Immigrant Left, 1955–1993," in *The Immigrant Left*, ed. Paul Buhle and Dan Georgakas (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996), 320. Gosse notes that what was remarkable about Central American activism was its focus on organizing North Americans as an "'external front' of the internal war of liberation" rather than building fraternal networks in their own communities, action, he describes, as "typical of the old immigrant Left" (303).

[97] Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology," *International Migration Review* 37, no. 3 (2003): 596.

[98] Yossi Shain, "Ethnic Diasporas in U.S. Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 5 (1994–5): 828.

incentives for both state challengers and incumbents to seek resources from diasporic populations given the decline in external patronage from Western states.[99]

Despite the recent upsurge of analyses of diasporas and civil wars, however, there are very few theoretically driven studies. Most comparative analyses are typically introductory chapters in edited volumes comprised of single country cases.[100] This study aims to fill the gap by constructing a generalizable argument grounded in social network theory and analysis. In doing so, it both draws from and aims to contribute to multiple literatures, including the civil wars literature, which has recently focused on the transnational political and economic dimensions of armed conflict; international relations scholarship, particularly its concern with the role of nonstate actors in world politics and their dual role as domestic and transnational agents; and social movements theory, which has provided rich insights into the network dynamics of political mobilization. It also draws on the economic sociology literature on immigration, social capital, and ethnic economies; and political sociology, particularly its concern with societal cleavages, social mobility, and political radicalism. This theoretical framework thus intertwines salient themes in both political science and sociology: globalization, transnationalism, migration, the nation-state, citizenship, ethnic nationalism and identity politics, and violence.

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[99] Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," in *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 90.

[100] See, for example, Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds. *Diasporas in Conflict: Peacemakers or Peace Wreckers?* Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007); and Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The New European Diasporas: National Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000). Two important exceptions are Griffiths's study on Kurdish and Somali refugees; and Radtke's work on the Tamil and Eritrean diasporas. David J. Griffiths, *Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London: New Identities in the Diaspora*. London: Ashgate, 2002). Katrin Radtke, *Mobilisierung der Diaspora: Die moralische Ökonomie der Bügerkriege in Sri Lanka and Eritrea* (Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag GmbH, 2009), and "Engaging the Diaspora: The Dynamics of Diaspora Mobilization in Civil Wars," paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, Calif., March 22–25, 2006.

Diasporas and Armed Conflict

Benedict Anderson has argued that the defining feature of the past half-century is a double movement. Alongside the centripetal forces of global capitalism and advances in telecommunications technology, the ethnicization of political life in postindustrial states and diasporic involvement in homeland politics—what he terms long-distance nationalism—challenge the nation-state from below. As Anderson describes, the long-distance nationalist can send money and arms, generate and disseminate war propaganda, and organize the war effort safely from afar. Essentially, physical security, access to resources, and democratic institutions within advanced capitalist states reduce the costs of supporting belligerents—or even warmongering.[101]

Scholars and policy analysts have noted the significance of diasporas in such disparate war zones as Chechnya;[102] Croatia/former Yugoslavia;[103] Darfur;[104] El Salvador;[105] Ethiopia/Eritrea;[106] Lebanon;[107] Israel/Palestine;[108] Nagorno-Karabakh;[109] Kosovo;[110]

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[101] Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (London: Verso, 1998), 73.

[102] Maria Koinova, "Diasporas and Intra-State Conflict: Causal Mechanisms and the Cases of the Albanian, Armenian and Chechen Diasporas," paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, Calif., March 22–25, 2006.

[103] Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).

[104] Cindy Horst, "The Role of Diasporas in Civil War," Transnational Facets of civil War Workshop, PRIO, March 16, 2007.

[105] Van Gosse, "'The North American Front': Central American Solidarity in the Reagan Era," in *Reshaping the U.S. Left: Popular Struggles in the 1980's, Volume III of The Year Left*, ed. Michael Sprinker and Mike Davis (New York: Verso, 1988), 1–43; Gosse, "'El Salvador Is Spanish For Vietnam.'"

[106] Terrence Lyons, "Diasporas and Homeland Conflict," in *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*, ed. Miles Kahler and Barbara F. Walter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 111–32; Radtke, "Engaging the Diaspora," and Katrin Radtke, "From Gifts to Taxes: The Mobilization of Tamil and Eritrean Diaspora in Intrastate Warfare," Working Papers Micropolitics, no. 2, Humboldt University, 2005.

[107] Elizabeth Picard, "Trafficking, Rents, and Diaspora in the Lebanese War," in *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Greed, and Creed*, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 23–51.

[108] Yossi Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," *SAIS Review* 22, no. 2 (2002): 115–44; Gabriel Sheffer, "The Jewish Diaspora in the Arab–Palestinian–Israeli Conflict," in *Diasporas in Conflict: Peacemakers or Peace Wreckers?* ed. Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2007), 65–89.

Kurdistan/Turkey;[111] Northern Ireland;[112] the Punjab;[113] Somalia;[114] and Sri Lanka.[115] Case-study research offers robust empirical evidence that diasporas can be crucial in escalating and sustaining conflict or in maintaining "frozen" ones.[116] Their role is seen as especially important when alternative sources for financing war (such as a powerful state patron or natural resources) are absent.

The literature identifies financing as the key mechanism of *direct* influence. Money more easily crosses borders than weapons,[117] and contributing monetarily does not entail the high risks of participating as a combatant or in arms smuggling operations. While a committed few engage in such activities, financing can be mobilized at the mass level.

Seeking to quantitatively test the relationship between diasporic financing and armed conflict across cases, Collier and Hoeffler's widely cited *Greed and Grievance in Civil War* finds a positive relationship between diaspora size (a proxy for financing) and the recurrence of

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[109] Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States," *World Politics* 53, no. 4 (2001): 524–52; Yossi Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict."
[110] Hockenos, *Homeland Calling*.
[111] Eva Kristine Østergaard-Nielsen, *Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany* (London: Routledge, 2003); Alynna Lyon and Emek Uçarer, "Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict: Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK," in *International Migration and the Globalization of Ethnic Politics*, ed. Ray Koslowski (New York: Routledge, 2005), 62–82.
[112] Michael Hanagan, "Irish Transnational Social Movements, Migrants, and the State System," in *Globalization and Resistance: The Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements*, ed. Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston (London: Roman & Littlefield, 2002), 53–73; Brian Hanley, "The Politics of NORAID," *Irish Political Studies* 19, no. 1 (2004): 1–17; Jack Holland, *The American Connection: U.S. Guns, Money, and Influence in Northern Ireland* (Boulder, Colo.: Robert Rinehart Publishers, 1999); and Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*.
[113] Tatla, *The Sikh Diaspora*; Badisha Biswas, "Nationalism by Proxy: A Comparison of Social Movements Among Diaspora Sikhs and Hindus," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 19 (2004): 269–95.
[114] Horst, "The Role of Diasporas in Civil War."
[115] Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Funding the "Final War": LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora* (New York: HRW, 2006), available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ltte0306webwcover.pdf; Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 2001); Radtke, "Engaging the Diaspora," and "From Gifts to Taxes"; Sarah Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora," *Review of International Studies* 30 (2004): 405–26.
[116] King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War."
[117] Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support*, 59.

civil war.[118] Indeed, they assert that diasporic financing exhibits by far the strongest effect on the risk of recurrent conflict, and that the actual risk of relapse is six times higher in societies with the largest US-based diasporas.[119] A Rand report even speculates that diasporas have become the main financers of insurgencies since the end of the cold war.[120] While extortion occurs, Radtke's study finds that armed belligerents rely principally on donations and other "voluntary" contributions rather than on protection money.[121] Such contributions can be collected through door-to-door campaigns, fund-raising events, festivals, and telethons, as membership dues in associations or clubs, "taxes," or even as deposits in bank accounts such as the well-known Homeland Calling for Kosovo. They can also be sent home as remittances with an explicit political purpose.[122]

Insurgent organizations have not been the only beneficiaries of financing. The Jewish diaspora, for example, annually sends substantial sums of money to Israel,[123] and case-study research has shown how such financial leverage can hinder conflict resolution by tilting electoral politics toward right-wing actors.[124] The Croatian diaspora was crucial in bringing ultra-nationalist Franjo Tudjman to power through campaign financing and subsequently funded and

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[118] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–94; and "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2355 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000).

[119] Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War" (2000), 26. Scholars have criticized Collier and Hoeffler's methodology. Sambanis, for example, argues that correlation alone tells us very little and that diaspora size is poorly measured and may be endogenous to prolonged conflicts, thus calling into question the direction of causality. See Nicholas Sambanis, "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War," *Defence and Peace Economics* 13, no. 3 (2002): 215–43. The endogeneity problem is addressed in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds., *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, vols. 1 and 2 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005).

[120] Byman et al., *Trends in Outside* Support, 3.

[121] Radtke, "Engaging the Diaspora."

[122] Remittances to kin in war zones as well as diaspora funding of humanitarian organizations operating in conflict areas may unintentionally and unknowingly benefit armed belligerents. The discussion here focuses on purposeful financial support.

[123] Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora: At Home Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 188.

[124] Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict."

channeled arms to the Croatian army.[125] In addition to exerting electoral influence, the Armenian diaspora financially sustains Nagorno-Karabakh's existence independent of Azerbaijan.[126] In the case of Eritrea, the government's border war with Ethiopia was financed by the diaspora,[127] which earlier played a crucial role in the eventual success of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in carving out an independent state from Ethiopia.[128]

While funding can be channeled directly to armed actors, diasporans may also contribute to political lobbies in their host countries.[129] The extensive literature on ethnic lobbies in the United States has illuminated the impact of such actors on the foreign policymaking process.[130] The role of the robust Jewish and Armenian lobbies in securing US aid for their homeland states is well known.

Explaining Support

This section reviews the burgeoning literature on diasporas and civil wars. It situates studies into three key approaches to explaining diasporic militant activism: motives (emotions and interests); social movements; and immigrant adaptation.

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[125] Hockenos, *Homeland Calling*, 84–9.
[126] King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War," 542.
[127] Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, *Diasporas, Remittances and Africa South of the Sahara: A Strategic Assessment*, ISS Monograph no. 112 (March 2005), available at: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No112/Contents.htm (accessed August 8, 2012).
[128] Nadje Al-Ali, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser, "Refugees and Transnationalism: The Experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 4 (2001): 615–34.
[129] Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict."
[130] See, for example, Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); Thomas Ambrosio, ed., *Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002); David M. Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul, *Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2008).

Passions and Interests

Analysts tend to be biased toward explanations that stress noninstrumental motives for providing support. Collier and Hoeffler's claim that diasporas finance rebellion because they preserve their own hatreds is illustrative.[131] Others have asserted that genuine sympathy and guilt for having left the homeland are key motivating factors.[132] These arguments are reminiscent of the now defunct collective behavior paradigm, which invoked emotions, such as frustration and anger, as explanations for protest.[133]

Often at the heart of emotive-based arguments is a distinction between forced and voluntary migrant groups. Lyons views "conflict-generated" diasporas[134]—elsewhere labeled "victim" diasporas[135]—as likely to perpetuate war because traumatic displacement elevates the symbolic importance of a territorially defined homeland as part of the group identity. Emotional attachments, he argues, cause them to categorically oppose peace negotiations that entail power-sharing arrangements or that challenge the homeland's territorial integrity.[136]

This dichotomy, however, is too simplistic. Diasporas are heterogeneous configurations, layered with multiple waves of migrants. At the micro-level, individual motives for migration are often complex and mixed, bringing into question the validity of the sharp distinction between

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131 Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War" (2004), 575.

132 Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support*.

133 On the classical collective behavior tradition, see Steven M. Buechler, "The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown Theories of Collective Action," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007): 47–66. The paradigm is defined by the assumption that behavior is triggered by strain or breakdown of normal social routines and that such behavior is marked by spontaneity and emotionality. Such behavior was often framed as irrational, disruptive, and dangerous (49). McAdam, Beuchler notes, critiqued the paradigm as assuming a "mechanistic and linear relationship between macrolevel strain and microlevel behavior." Fundamentally, it ignores how "individual mental states are translated into genuinely collective phenomena" (53). Note that the collective behavior paradigm is distinct from social movements and collective action, as Jasper notes. James M. Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions In and Around Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 3 (1998): 397.

134 Lyons, "Diasporas and Homeland Conflict."

135 Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).

136 Lyons, "Diasporas and Homeland Conflict."

"forced" (i.e., refugees) and "voluntary" (i.e., laborers) migrants.[137] Indeed, Harpviken's rich study of outmigration from war-torn Afghanistan finds that there are very few cases of indisputably forced migration.[138] Moreover, as Portes and Bach explain, flows that may have begun for political reasons may devolve into de facto economic migration, while seemingly economic movements may have direct political roots.[139]

Furthermore, homeland orientation toward countries in conflict cannot simply be deduced from the ostensible motivation for migration. Østergaard-Nielsen, for example, reveals in her case studies of Turks and Kurds in Western Europe that economic migrants may become politically mobilized, while refugees may decide to be politically inactive.[140] Similarly, research among Tamils finds that asylum seekers are not necessarily more politically radical and supportive of the LTTE than economic migrants, as many political refugees are disillusioned by the war at home.[141]

The tendency to consider refugees as necessarily supportive of a particular belligerent, moreover, takes no account of their experience in war zones prior to flight. A key finding of the civil wars literature is that insurgents in ethnically framed conflicts tend to primarily commit violence against their own people in order to ensure compliance with the war effort[142] and that

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137 Al-Ali, Black, and Koser, "Refugees and Transnationalism."
138 Kristian Berg Harpviken, *Networks in Transition: Wartime Migration in Afghanistan* (Oslo: University of Oslo Press, 2006), 35.
139 Alejandro Portes and Robert Bach, *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 74.
140 Eva Kristine Østergaard-Nielsen, "Transnational Practices and the Receiving State: Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands," *Global Networks* 1, no. 3 (2001): 261–81.
141 Wolfram Zunzer, "Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transformation," Occasional Paper 26 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, September 2004), 9.
142 Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 78.

forced recruitment and coerced collaboration are widespread in ideological and ethnic civil wars alike.[143]

Alternatively, democratic host country systems can provide space for labor migrants to acquire new views about their homeland and for political mobilization. In their attempt to explain the mechanisms by which migrants abroad can contribute to conflict onset, Miller and Ritter contend that they can identify "rights gaps" between their "host" countries and countries of origin and communicate them to their kin at home.[144] Thus some migrants who arrived abroad in search of economic opportunities (or as children or to join family members) can become political refugees from afar.[145]

The "traumatic displacement" argument cannot explain mobilization among labor-migrant communities with respect to their war-torn homelands,[146] nor variation *between* communities that are lumped together in the "conflict-generated" category. Migration for whatever reason can be a traumatic experience. Even if it is simply assumed that this category is conceptually useful, and that these migrant populations are more aggrieved than others based on their historical development, it cannot explain variation in levels of mobilization *within* such communities across space and time. For example, the US-based Irish diaspora—which one analyst classifies as a "clear case" of a "conflict-generated" diaspora as an explanation for its

[143] Ibid., 10; and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Wars: A Valid Distinction? Research Note," *World Politics* 54, no. 1 (2001): 99–118.
[144] Gina Lei Miller and Emily Hencken Ritter, "Bad Blood? Migrant Networks and the Onset of Civil War," May 31, 2012, available at: http://bama.ua.edu/~eritter/diasporas.pdf (accessed August 9, 2012).
[145] Eva Kristine Østergaard-Nielsen, "Diasporas and Conflict Resolution: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?" Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Brief, March 2006, 8, available at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-nielsen_diaspora_conflict_resolution.pdf (accessed October 14, 2012).
[146] The Sikhs in Canada and Britain vis-à-vis the Punjab is one example.

support for the IRA during the Troubles[147]—gave *virtually no assistance* to the armed group during its Border Campaign between 1956 and 1962.[148]

The argument lacks explanatory power precisely because it fails to identify the mechanisms by which grievance becomes translated into collective action—a key concern of civil wars and social movements scholarship alike. Emotions indeed matter, but how they matter is a question that is left unanswered. As Gagnon argues, "Every group has collective memories of injustices and grievances. The relevant question is what meaning is attributed to those memories; which memories are foregrounded . . . when do memories become instrumentalized to justify violence; and who undertakes such instrumentalization, and to what purpose?"[149]

Social movements theorists Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, for example, argue that it is important to study how political activists strategically use emotions to mobilize participants. They also explain how emotions can alter the costs and benefits of participation and information processing and how moral emotions such as shame and pride may lie behind recruitment into activism.[150] Essentially, "emotions can be strategically used by activists *and* be the basis for strategic thought."[151] Such a perspective challenges the perception of emotions as irrational and understands them as socially constructed and thus variable. Distinguishing between reactive emotions (e.g., anger, outrage), which are transitory, and more stable affective ones (e.g., hatred, love, loyalty, trust), Jasper explains that both types enter into social movements at every stage and further contends that emotions contribute to the causal force of a number of established

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147 Lyons, "Diasporas and Homeland Conflict."
148 Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 16.
149 V.P. Gagnon, Jr., *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), xvi.
150 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, "Emotional Dimensions of Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 425.
151 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, "Introduction: Why Emotions Matter," in *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 9.

concepts and mechanisms advanced within social movements scholarship.[152] The "strength" of an identity, argue Goodwin et al., comes from its emotional side.[153]

In sharp contrast, Kenny emphasizes the instrumental nature of identity.[154] He finds that diasporic involvement with the homeland has less to do with ongoing emotional attachments (or levels of assimilation) and more to do with strategic choice. He contends, political actors can select from a variety of plausible identities and choose among them based on their perception of which one best advances their personal interests.[155] He finds that "diasporan nationalism" is "strategically adopted by particular groups within the immigrant community as a means of generating support for their own local goals."[156] Kenny, however, overstates the extent to which individuals can strategically shift identities.[157]

Through the theoretical lenses of constructivism and liberalism, international relations theorists Shain and Barth focus on the interrelationship between identity and interests in shaping attitudes toward war and conflict resolution.[158] They highlight the role that war can play in sustaining ethnic identity, especially in assimilating environments, as collective participation in a war effort generates cohesion. In this sense, identity is an interest in and of itself. Ongoing conflicts, moreover, may be intimately linked to other interests: they may elevate the political

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[152] James M. Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements, *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 3 (1998): 397–424.

[153] Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, "Introduction: Why Emotions Matter," 9.

[154] John Kenny, "Mobilizing Diasporas in Nationalist Conflicts," paper presented at Laboratory in Comparative Ethnic Processes, Duke University, April 20–23, 2000. Available at: http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/licep/1/kenny/kenny.pdf (accessed August 8, 2012).

[155] Ibid., 1–2.

[156] Ibid., 1.

[157] Laitin's study of political cleavages in Yorubaland demonstrates the limitations of a purely instrumentalist approach to understanding why certain identities come to serve as the basis for political action. Rational choice cannot explain his puzzle: why do Yorubas continue to politically mobilize around their ancestral cities rather than along religious lines, given that religious identification has become an important indicator of social status while ancestral city identification has declined as a source of social cleavage? David D. Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Religious Cleavages in Yorubaland," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 285–316.

[158] Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 57 (Summer 2003): 449–79.

and social status of diasporas in host countries, as well as the prestige, funding, and membership of their established organizations.[159] Thus diasporas will likely oppose peace negotiations when armed conflict fosters their identities and other interests.

This perspective aligns with Goodwin et al.'s critique of the false dualism between emotions and identity, on the one hand, and rationality, cognition, or instrumentality, on the other.[160] Wood's analysis of insurgent collective action in El Salvador, for example, very clearly breaks down this dichotomy, showing how the assertion of agency against a repressive regime was a source of pride and pleasure for participants. What she calls "emotional in-process benefits," alongside material benefits such as access to land, impelled the insurgency.[161]

Social Movements–grounded Analyses

An alternative approach to studying diasporas and homeland armed conflicts draws on the findings of social movements scholarship.[162] Sökefeld has argued that the study of diasporas should take inspiration from this social science field, which is fundamentally concerned with how people get mobilized for collective action.[163] Mobilization, as Klandermans explains, is the process that links the demand-side of collective political action (aggrieved populations) with its supply-side (opportunities created by organizers).[164]

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159 Yossi Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," *SAIS Review* 22, no. 2 (2002): 129; Shain and Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory."
160 Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, "Introduction: Why Emotions Matter," 14.
161 Elisabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
162 See, for example, Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks"; Biswas, "Nationalism by Proxy"; Lyon and Uçarer, "Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict"; Martin Sökefeld, "Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora," *Global Networks* 6, no. 3 (2006): 265–84; Smith and Stares, ed., *Diasporas in Conflict*.
163 Sökefeld, "Mobilizing in Transnational Space," 268.
164 Bert Klandermans, "The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 360–79.

In their seminal volume, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald identify three crucial sets of variables in social movements theory, which have begun to appear in the literature on diasporas and civil war: political opportunity structures (POS)—"*the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system*"; mobilizing structures—"*collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action*"; and framing processes—"*strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.*"[165] These correspond to the three main social movements paradigms: (1) the political process model, which emphasizes the role of formal and informal political institutions,[166] configurations of power among actors, and the dynamics within interaction contexts;[167] (2) resource mobilization theory, which is concerned with formal organizations and actor interests and goals while dismissing issues of emotion, frustration, and strain and downplaying grievances;[168] and (3) cultural approaches, which emphasize norms, beliefs, symbols, and identities.[169]

Wayland, for example, draws on social movements theory to address the puzzle of the Tamil insurgency's longevity despite an unfavorable domestic political opportunity structure in Sri Lanka. The answer, she argues, lies in expanding the concept of POS to include transnational factors, particularly the openness of political systems in migrant-receiving states and the

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[165] Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), quotes on pages 3, 3, and 6.

[166] Kriesi argues that the structural political context includes not only formal political institutions such as the degree of openness of a political system (measured in terms of centralization and separation of power) and electoral and party systems, but also cultural models (prevailing strategies about how to deal with challengers, discursive opportunity structures); political cleavages; and the international system. Hanspeter Kriesi, "Political Context and Opportunity," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 69–73.

[167] Ibid., 69.

[168] Buechler, "The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown," 53.

[169] Rhys H. Williams, "The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities, and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 94.

presence of co-ethnics living in the diaspora. Democratic host countries, she explains, facilitate organization and the accumulation of resources, which diasporas then channel to separatists in the homeland through "transnational ethnic networks."[170] Sometimes such political systems may foster the emergence of distinctive ethnic identities and afford challengers the opportunity to organize secessionist movements among diasporic communities.[171] According to Wayland, 9/11 and the ensuing war on terrorism marked a shift in what she terms the "transnational opportunity structure," as states cracked down on diasporic financial flows to the LTTE and other armed groups.[172]

It is apparent from her case study that "exit weakens the home state's ability to cage and penetrate its population,"[173] while affording opportunities to homeland insurgents to access resources in other territories. A lucrative source of financing and arms from afar can adversely affect the possibility of a "mutually hurting stalemate"[174] and conflict resolution, a view is consistent with the findings of the civil wars literature. Wayland's analysis, however, does not offer much insight into which host country political institutions actually facilitate diasporic transnationalism. Indeed, the evidence, as Østergaard-Nielsen notes, is contradictory.[175] In her

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[170] Wayland,"Ethnonationalist Networks." Wayland adapts this term from Keck and Sikkink's notion of "transnational advocacy networks," which differ from other types of networks that transcend borders by "the centrality of principled ideas motivating their formation." Margaret E. Keck and Katherine Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), quote at 1.

[171] Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks," 417. She notes that the Kashmiri Liberation Front was formed first in the United Kingdom and cites: Patricia Ellis and Zafar Khan, "The Kashmiri Diaspora: Influences in Kashmir," in *New Approaches to Migration? Communities and the Transformation of Home*, ed. Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (London: Routledge, 2002), 169–85.

[172] Canada, which has the largest Tamil community of any advanced industrialized country, however, did not designate the LTTE and its main front organization, the World Tamil Movement, as terrorist organizations until April 2006 and June 2008, respectively.

[173] Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald, "Transnationalism in Question," *American Journal of Sociology* 109, no. 5 (2004): 1177–95.

[174] I. William Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*, ed. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000); and "Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts," in *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*, ed. Zartman (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 3–29.

[175] Østergaard-Nielsen, *Transnational Politics*, 771.

comparative study of Turks and Kurds in the Netherlands and Germany,[176] she finds that more inclusive systems—those that grant immigrant populations "more rights and access to relevant gatekeepers (trade unions, political parties or NGOs)"—actually encourage *immigrant politics*[177] and discourage *homeland politics*.[178]

This finding is confirmed in Koopmans's analysis of migrant claims-making. His sophisticated cross-local and cross-national comparative study[179] reveals that citizenship and integration regimes matter in the extent to which migrant populations are proactive in their host societies on issues of immigrant and ethnic relations as opposed to homeland politics. The higher the barriers to full equal rights, he contends, the more likely migrants will be involved in homeland politics.

POS analyses have grounded claims that appeared in the early literature on "immigrant transnationalism," particularly that such practices were territorially "unbounded."[180] The state's policing of its borders, regulation of membership in the national collectivity, and security interests condition political mobilization across borders.[181] Host country security concerns and policies can render activism more or less *risky*—a point that Wayland alludes to in her discussion of 9/11—which affects collective action. But as critiques of POS-focused analyses have asserted

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[176] Østergaard-Nielsen, "Transnational Practices and the Receiving State: Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands," *Global Networks* 1, no. 3 (2001): 261–81. Germany is a prime example of an exclusivist system that long denied immigrant populations of full rights. In 2005, an immigration reform bill was passed that sought to promote political integration among the countries migrant populations.

[177] She defines these as activities focused on bettering the situation of migrants and refugees in the receiving country (e.g., political, economic, and social rights).

[178] She defines these as activities pertaining to the homeland.

[179] Koopmans gathers and analyzes data from 16 German regions and cities and then compares the findings to cities and regions in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. He finds that while the local context matters national-level differences are more robust in explaining variation in migrant claims-making. Ruud Koopmans, "Migrant Mobilisation and Political Opportunities: Variation Among German Cities and a Comparison within the United Kingdom and the Netherlands," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 3 (2004): 449-70.

[180] Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994).

[181] Waldinger and Fitzgerald, "Transnationalism in Question."

generally: the macro context matters, but actual movement development "clearly depends on a series of more specific dynamics operating at the micro level."[182]

In her comparative analysis of diaspora Sikhs and Hindus, Biswas critiques POS-focused studies and looks to elite strategic choice of mobilizing venues, alongside other tactics, to explain variation in success at generating constituent support for nationalist movements given similar external opportunities. Her main finding is that while Sikh elites in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States relied almost exclusively on the *gurdwaras* (temples) to mobilize support for the Khalistan movement, the leadership of the Hindutva movement actively sought to forge links between different kinds of diaspora institutions. In addition to relying on a strategy of "brokerage,"[183] the latter also framed the movement to appeal to a diverse audience and thus was more successful in garnering widespread and sustained support.[184]

Fair takes Biswas's analysis a step further and underscores the importance of the historical development of diasporas in explaining differences in mobilization strategies and capacity. In the case of the Sikhs, the institutions through which elites in Canada and the United Kingdom chose to garner support for the insurgency existed before the onset of violence in the Punjab and therefore had to be "politicized and mobilized in the service of a Sikh state." Moreover, the *gurdwaras*—"the most important forum[s] for political organization among various Sikh factions"—are local institutions that reflect political divisions in the homeland. [185] By contrast, because a significant portion of the Tamil diaspora emerged from the conflict itself,

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[182] Doug McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism," *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 127.

[183] Brokerage is a network concept developed by Ronald Burt. It refers to a bridge between otherwise disconnected entities. See Burt's, *Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[184] Biswas recognizes the issue of comparability, noting "The Khalistan movement is a separatist struggle, while Hindutva is directly linked to the Indian government." She does not, however, explore the implications of the distinction in shaping elite strategy and mobilization outcomes. Biswas, "Nationalism by Proxy," quote at 274.

[185] C. Christine Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11 (2005): 147 and 132, respectively.

diaspora institutions came into being specifically designed to aid the insurgency. The LTTE was able to construct a global financial infrastructure by tapping into a variety of social institutions in the diaspora. Essentially, the Tigers were able to both mobilize and routinize support from abroad.

In their discussion of Kurdish diasporic support for separatism, Lyon and Uçarer, construct a model that intertwines all three major social movement approaches (political process, resource mobilization, and culture). They highlight three crucial variables for mobilization: politicized identity, organizational resources, and a favorable political opportunity structure (i.e., a democratic host country and initial government acquiescence to Kurdish mobilization). They note the role that cultural organizations played in forming and maintaining a politicized ethnic identity and providing resources. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), they explain, organized a "thick net" of Kurdish workers' organizations, cultural groups, recreational clubs, and migrants' associations from which they drew activists and funding.[186]

The existing literature on diasporas and civil war that draws from social movements theory has illuminated the usefulness of applying the concepts and findings of theorists concerned with collective mobilization. Yet the constituents whom leaders and activists draw support from are studied as aggregate entities. Essentially, what Klandermans and Oegema call "mobilization potential"—the reservoir of people that a social movement can draw from[187]—is assumed to consist of all co-ethnics. An important finding of their study is that while certain prior attitudes will preclude segments of a population from participation in any instance of activism, the "latitude of acceptance" (i.e., those with attitudinal affinity) is much larger than the number of persons who actually take part—even in instances of low cost/risk activism such as

[186] Lyon and Uçarer, "Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict," 72.
[187] Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema, "Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements," *American Sociological Review* 52, no. 4 (1987): 519.

attending a peace demonstration.[188] Collective action must involve not only ethnic attachment but, as Hunt and Benford explain more generally, also "identification with a collectivity that includes a sense of mutuality and solidarity."[189] Analytically however, solidarity not only has an ideational component (identification with the collectivity), according to Moody and White, but also a relational one (connections among members).[190]

Socioeconomic Approaches

Despite the importance that immigration scholars and others have attached to host-country conditions in explaining transnational political activism,[191] few scholars studying diasporas and civil wars actually analyze socioeconomic relationships within diasporic communities and the extent of integration within the host country economy. Griffiths's study of Kurdish and Somali refugees in London identifies the presence of an ethnic economy as an important variable in explaining variation among these two communities in their capacity to organize politically and advance their interests vis-à-vis the host society.[192] And similar to Lyon and Uçarer, he notes the role that welfare organizations play in promoting a politicized Kurdish identity and the goal of Kurdish independence.[193]

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[188] Doug McAdam, "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer," *American Journal of Sociology* 92 (1986): 64–90.
[189] Scott A. Hunt and Robert D. Benford, "Collective Identity Solidarity, and Commitment," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 434.
[190] James Moody and Douglas R. White, "Structural Cohesion and Embeddedness: A Hierarchical Concept of Social Groups," *American Sociological Review* 68, no. 1 (2003): 104.
[191] See, for example, Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller, "Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants," *American Journal of Sociology* 108, no. 6 (2003): 1211–48.
[192] David J. Griffiths, "Fragmentation and Consolidation: The Contrasting Cases of the Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13, no. 3 (2000): 281–302, and *Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London: New Identities and the Diaspora* (London: Ashgate, 2002).
[193] Griffiths, *Somali and Kurdish Refugees*, 177.

Hall and Kostić's survey of Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, and Yugoslavs in Sweden quantitatively analyzes the relationship between structural integration and homeland attitudes concerning war and conflict resolution.[194] Their survey results show that structural integration[195] does have a robust and positive effect on reconciliatory attitudes.[196] Drawing on the findings of health psychology and social work, they contend that structural integration "empowers diasporas with the positive attitudes and confidence necessary in order to deal with the past and envision a common future with other groups."[197] Employment and other forms of structural integration, they explain, generate a higher "sense of coherence"—defined as individual feelings that one's life situation is comprehensible, manageable, and meaningful—which allows them to deal with homeland experiences in a more constructive, reconciliatory manner.[198] They thus directly challenge arguments about the peace-wrecking role of "conflict-generated" diasporas resulting from simmering hatreds and emotional territorial attachments.

Radtke's work on financing is one of the most theoretically rich, empirically grounded studies on the role of diasporas in civil wars. Drawing on Weber, she distinguishes types of financing of political bodies along two dimensions—intermittent/permanent and voluntary/compulsory—and identifies four ways armed groups generate diasporic financial support: donations, entrepreneurship, taxes, and protection money. Her research among Tamils in Toronto and Eritreans in Frankfurt reveals that in order to generate income from the first three types, armed groups in contested states must link up to "the moral economy of the diaspora"—an

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[194] Jonathan Hall and Roland Kostić, "Integration for Peace?" Paper presented at the 50th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, February 15–18, 2008.
[195] They measure structural integration according to language skills, citizenship, education, dependence on welfare, and employment.
[196] Social integration, they contend, also has a significant positive effect but is spurious when other variables are controlled for. They measure social integration as contact with native Swedes, importance of Swedish norms and values, internalization of Swedish identity (10).
[197] Hall and Kostić, "Integration for Peace?" 6.
[198] Ibid., 6–7, fn. 14.

informal economic system of gifts and obligations that involves subtle forms of social control. These solidarity networks serve to reduce economic insecurity in adverse conditions. By contrast, protection money relies on coercion and is "the exception rather than the rule,"[199] a finding consistent with Perritt's assertion that "little evidence exists that the KLA raised money through extortion" among the diaspora in Switzerland and elsewhere.[200]

Methodological Shortfalls

There appear to be two general methodological problems in the existing literature. First, there is a bias toward over-aggregation, despite the widespread recognition that populations are stratified along such lines as class, caste, and legal status. In addition to heterogeneity at the mass level, "parochial factional struggles for power and honour,"[201] "personal fiefdom-building,"[202] and "factional in-fighting"[203] are rife among certain leaderships. As movement actors engage in the "us" and "them" boundary construction that is so crucial to the formation of collective identities, factions vie to acquire or maintain legitimate "us" standing.[204] Thus, along with the potential significance of cleavages, elite competition entailing struggles to control institutions and economic resources; to recruit loyal constituencies; and to attract cultural producers to a certain vision of diasporic identity, with specific political commitments[205] needs more rigorous investigation.

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[199] Radtke, "Engaging the Diaspora," quote at 16; and Radtke, "From Gifts to Taxes."
[200] Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 93.
[201] Pnina Werbner, "Diasporic Political Imaginaries: A Sphere of Freedom or a Sphere of Illusions?" *Communal/Plural: Journal of Transnational & Crosscultural Studies* 6, no. 1 (1998): 12.
[202] Gregory Kent, "Diaspora Power: Network Contributions to Peacebuilding and the Transformation of War Economies," Transforming War Economies Seminar, Plymouth, June 16–18, 2005, 7.
[203] Biswas, "Nationalism by Proxy," 281.
[204] Hunt and Benford, "Collective Identity Solidarity, and Commitment," 442, 444.
[205] Kachig Tölölyan, "Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation," *Diaspora* 9 (2000): 109.

The second problem is inattention to social network analysis (SNA). Scholars have identified the formation of networks as a staple activity of diaspora communities that is critical to their survival,[206] yet they have not seriously analyzed and investigated this key aspect of social movements literature. Networks link group members; enforce compliance with group norms through monitoring and sanctioning; channel information and material resources; and are a critical means for coordinating activities and generating political mobilization. SNA is also helpful in illuminating distributions of power (influence and domination) among sets of actors by analyzing network locations.[207] Network theorist Knoke, for example, finds that voting behavior is significantly shaped by an individual's social network through the mechanisms of persuasion[208] and selection.[209]

Networks in Social Movements and Migration

Social movement theorists have used SNA to explain participation in demonstrations and armed insurgencies,[210] while sociologists have explored the role of networks in migration.[211]

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[206] Sheffer, *Diaspora*, 82.

[207] David Knoke, *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9.

[208] Knoke explains that persuasion "operates by providing information intended to alter an actor's perception of the connection between an action and its consequences. . . . For persuasion efforts to be effective, the target of influence must believe the information to be credible and/or the source to be trustworthy. Impersonal media may carry less weight than personal contacts with others to whom one has intense emotional and instrumental connections." He notes, moreover, that "the consequence of successful mutual persuasion is social cohesion and solidarity." David Knoke, "Networks of Political Action: Toward Theory Construction," *Social Forces* 68 (1990): 1042–3.

[209] This refers to the homophily principle, a generic network process whereby egos tend to "choose as their alters persons who resemble themselves in social and attitudinal characteristics." Ibid., 1043.

[210] David Knoke, *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Chapter 3, "Social Movements," written with Nancy Wisely, 68.

[211] Douglas S. Massey, "The Social Organisation of Mexican Migration to the United States," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 487 (1986):102-13; Douglas S. Massey, Rafael Alarcon, Jorge Durand, and Humberto Gonzalez, *Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, J. Edward Taylor, "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal," *Population and Development Review* 19, no. 3 (1993): 431–66; Douglas Massey, Luin Goldring, and Jorge Durand, "Continuities in Transnational Migration: An Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities," *The American Journal*

This section summarizes the key findings of scholarship within these two fields, which underpin the network argument advanced in this dissertation.

Networks in Collective Action

Olson's seminal work identified the inherent dilemma of collective action—the free-rider problem—and its solution—selective incentives.[212] However, as Klandermans explains, "The problem with Olson's logic is that indeed it provides an explanation for why people *do not* participate, but fares poorly in explaining why people *do* participate." A key criticism of Olson's model is that it assumes that actors make decisions in isolation and thus does not take into account that individuals are interdependent.[213] Rational choice scholars concerned with collective action of course have addressed this issue in their game theoretic models, which, as Gould explains, "are intrinsically about the interdependence of individual actions"[214]: ego strategically acts based on alter's intentions or actions. Because it takes preferences as fixed, however, the rationalist perspective cannot account for the deeper role of social interactions—that is, how they create and sustain a structure of meanings that shape individual perceptions and preferences.[215]

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of Sociology 99, no. 6 (1994): 1492–1533; Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor, *Worlds in Motion: International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[212] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[213] Klandermans, "The Demand and Supply of Participation," 363.

[214] Roger V. Gould, "Why Do Networks Matter? Rationalist and Structuralist Interpretations," in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 240.

[215] Florence Passy, "Social Networks Matter. But How?" in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 26. Gould also argues that rational choice models of collective action cannot explain the emergence of cooperation. The iterated social dilemma can only explain its persistence provided people start out cooperating and retaliate when others defect. Ibid., 246.

In their efforts to explain individual participation in collective action, social movements scholars have pointed to the importance of embeddedness, or network integration. Actors who are integrated in dense clusters or multiplex relations of social networks," note Moody and White, "face different sets of resources and constraints than those who are not embedded."[216] Indeed, research has provided robust evidence that prior social ties not only operate as the basis of recruitment[217] but also impact levels of participation. Actors may not only be tied directly through interpersonal linkages but also indirectly by joint involvement in the same political or social activities/organizations.[218] As McAdam's Freedom Summer study has shown, strong attitudinal support for the project alone was insufficient to ensure involvement.[219] While identification with the values of the campaign acted as a "push," integration into activist networks served as the structural "pull." The number of organizational and interpersonal ties that measured integration into activist networks explained variation among those applicants who participated in the campaign and those who ultimately withdrew.[220] Fernandez and McAdam have shown that not only is the number of ties relevant, but also demonstrated that ties to more prominent actors in the network can affect participation.[221] And together with Paulsen, McAdam also demonstrates that linkages to people who support an individual's strong identification to a particular identity are especially important. This explains why movement studies often find that

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[216] Moody and White, "Structural Cohesion and Embeddedness," 105.
[217] Mario Diani, "Introduction: Social Movements, Contentious Actions, and Social Networks 'From Metaphor to Substance?'" in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action,* ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 7.
[218] Ibid.
[219] Doug McAdam, "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer," *American Journal of Sociology* 92 (1986): 64–90; and "Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism," *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 141.
[220] McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts," 151.
[221] Roberto M. Fernandez and Doug McAdam, "Social Networks and Social Movements: Multiorganizational Fields and Recruitment to Mississippi Freedom Summer," *Sociological Forum* 3 (1988): 441–60.

"strong" ties such as friendship and kinship play a key role in mobilization.[222] A considerable body of research on participation in civil wars has even found that "combatants are usually motivated to fight *not* by ideology or hate or fear but by peer pressure and processes involving their comrades, respect for leaders, concern for their own reputation with both, and an urge to contribute to their success of the group—in short, what is known as 'primary group cohesion.'"[223]

Recognizing that individuals can be exposed to conflicting behavioral pressures, Snow et al. contend that not only do interpersonal ties with movement members strongly influence patterns of recruitment, but also that weak social ties to countervailing networks increase availability for participation.[224] Similarly della Porta's in-depth study of Italian left-wing terrorist organizations found that members experienced a strengthening of friendship ties inside the political network while external ties diminished, a process that led to isolation from the outside world and in turn reinforced loyalty to the group and enhanced participation.[225] These findings support hypotheses that Knoke advanced in his research on the relationship between ego-centric networks[226] and political attitudes and behavior:

> When the opinions and actions of ego's alters are consistent (homogenous), ego faces overwhelming social pressures to adopt the same preferences. When the alters' orientations are divided, ego's preferences are likely to be influenced by those with

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[222] Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, "Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism," *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1993): 640–67. According to Wellman and Wortley, three criteria constitute a strong tie: "perception of close intimacy; voluntary interaction between ego and alter . . . and interaction between ego and alter in multiple social contexts." Barry Wellman and Scot Wortley, "Different Strokes from Different Folks: Community Ties and Social Support," *American Journal of Sociology* 96, no. 3 (1990): 558–88. Quoted in Harpviken, *Networks in Transition*.

[223] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 46.

[224] David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, "Social Networks and Social Movements: A Micro-Structural Approach to Differential Recruitment," *American Sociological Review* 45, no. 5 (1980): 794.

[225] Donatella della Porta, "Recruitment Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations: Italian Left-wing Terrorism," in *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures*, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1988), 163.

[226] As Knoke succinctly defines it: "an 'ego-centric network' consists of a focal individual ('ego') and a set of others ('alters') to whom ego is directly connected by ties of varying intensity." David Knoke, "Networks of Political Action: Toward Theory Construction," *Social Forces* 68 (1990): 1043.

> whom he or she is more closely tied than by alters with whom ego has weaker links. When the opposing preferences of alters are evenly balanced in intensity and strength of ties to ego, these conflicting social cues cannot be easily reconciled. Ego is most likely to take a middling position, to vacillate, to delay a decision, or to remain uncommitted. If indecision is psychologically painful, ego may . . . change his or her network by dropping some alters and picking up new ones.[227]

Moving beyond individual-level analysis, Gould's seminal study of the Paris Commune uprising uncovered the role of network structure and multiplexity (overlapping ties). Using formal social network modeling, he empirically demonstrates how battalions that were organized on the basis of neighborhood were more effective during the insurgency, as ties among neighbors enhanced solidarity. He also shows how resistance levels in neighborhoods were interdependent based on the presence of formal organizational linkages among them. His study thus demonstrates how formal organizational and informal social networks interact.[228]

Another firmly established finding of social movements scholarship is that existing social settings are often the sites of movement emergence.[229] McCarthy, for example, identifies everyday life social locations such as family units, friendship networks, voluntary groups, and workplaces.[230] And studies have found that mobilization often occurs through "bloc recruitment"[231] of significant groups of members of existing organizations.[232]

As McAdam has pointed out, these collective settings provide established "structures of solidarity incentives"—that is, interpersonal rewards—that solve or mitigate the effects of the free-rider problem. Insurgents, he explains, can appropriate solidarity incentives by equating

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[227] Ibid.
[228] Roger V. Gould, "Multiple Networks and the Paris Commune, 1871," *American Sociological Review* 56 (December 1991): 716–29.
[229] Diani, "Introduction: Social Movements," 7.
[230] McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 141.
[231] Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973).
[232] Mario Diani, "Networks and Participation," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 341.

movement participation with group membership.[233] Della Porta's research on members of clandestine organizations found that "a widespread motive for joining was the desire to show solidarity with a network of friends who all participated in small legal political groups."[234]

Feld refers to entities around which the joint activities of individuals are organized as foci (e.g., voluntary associations, workspaces, and families). According to Feld's focus theory, these structures have implications for properties of interpersonal networks such as transitivity, bridging, and density.[235] He contends that the personal networks of individuals who draw associates from the same focus or from "constraining"[236] or "compatible"[237] foci are highly dense. At the structural level, these factors produce close-knit network clusters. Higher levels of network density, as Portes explains, increase the effective development of normative expectations and the enforcement of group norms.[238]

While early network studies were concerned with the relevance of social ties for recruitment, recent scholarship has more focused on explaining how social networks actually facilitate collective action. Kitts's critical review identifies three primary mechanisms found in the literature: identity, information, and exchange. Social relations can enhance group solidarity and cultivate a sense of shared identity. Social networks also serve as conduits of information,

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[233] McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts," 136.
[234] della Porta, "Recruitment Processes," 161.
[235] Transitivity is "the tendency for two individuals who are bot tied to a third to also be tied to each other"; bridges are "ties between two individuals who do not share ties to other individuals"; "density" is "the extent to which the associations of a particular individual are ties to each other." Scott Feld, "The Focused Organization of Social Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 86 (1981): 1022–4.
[236] Constraining foci, Feld asserts, "lead a pair of individuals to devote time and energy to participating in joint activities associated with that focus." Ibid., 1025.
[237] Foci are compatible when they involve similar types of activities and interactions. Ibid.
[238] Alejandro Portes, "Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration: A Conceptual Overview," in *The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship*, ed. Alejandro Portes (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 5–10.

and social ties provide recruitment opportunity.[239] Meanwhile, scholars relying on an instrumental model of social action find that informal social exchanges such as approval or criticism can motivate participation in collective action. Studies have empirically demonstrated that rewards and punishments can indeed predict participation.[240] As McAdam explains, nonparticipation can exact such significant social costs that people may be compelled to engage in forms of activism.[241]

Passy also identifies three functions of social networks: socialization, structural connection, and decision shaping. The first function is to enable individuals "to define and redefine their interpretive frames, facilitate the process of identity-building and identity-strengthening, and create or solidify political consciousness."[242] In this sense, networks create the predisposition to participate in a particular social movement. Meaningful embeddedness in formal or informal networks, she explains, fosters the creation of a salient identity that serves as an important cultural resource for active involvement. By contrast, those with major countervailing linkages will have competing identities. The second is that social ties connect individuals who are disposed to participate with the opportunity to engage in concrete action; strong ties are especially crucial in contexts of high risk activism, which require high levels of trust to bypass the costs of commitment, as della Porta's study reveals.[243] Thirdly, networks shape individual preferences and perceptions regarding such issues as risk and individual and

[239] James Kitts, "Mobilizing in Black Boxes: Social Networks and SMO Participation," *Mobilization* 5 (2000): 241–57.
[240] See, for example, della Porta, "Recruitment Processes."
[241] McAdam, "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism."
[242] Passy, "Social Networks Matter," 24.
[243] della Porta, "Recruitment Processes."

collective effectiveness.[244] Through these mechanisms, Passy argues, social networks theoretically link structural, agent-centric, and culturalist social movement approaches.

Networks and Immigration Processes

While social movements scholars have found networks crucial to mobilization, immigration scholars have found that networks are often at the core of the migration process because they reduce its costs and risks. There is strong empirical evidence that social ties influence not only the decision to migrate but also the choice of destination.[245] As Tilly asserts, networks are the effective units of migration.[246] Networked-migration, moreover, is not limited to labor flows, as Harpviken demonstrates in his study of collective flight from violence.[247]

In addition to explaining migratory patterns, social networks have also become a key means of explaining adaptation after arrival in host country societies as well as the extent of assimilation of subsequent generations. Ethnic-based social networks serve as channels of capital, jobs, security, and other resources and are particularly crucial for survival and sometimes betterment in adverse conditions, especially for those who lack financial resources and the skills education to compete in the host economy.

A companion concept is social capital, which Portes defines as the ability of individuals to garner scarce resources through membership in networks.[248] Portes and Sensenbrenner identify four sources of social capital: moral obligation, bounded solidarity (norms of mutual support), reciprocity exchanges, and enforceable trust (rewards and sanctions linked to group

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[244] Passy, "Social Networks Matter," 25–6.
[245] Harpviken, *Networks in Transition*.
[246] Charles Tilly, "Transplanted Networks," in *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics*, ed. Virginia Yans-McLaughlin (New York: Oxford, 1990), 84.
[247] Harpviken, *Networks in Transition*.
[248] Portes, "Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration," 12.

membership). Within ethnic communities, bounded solidarity is a function of the extent of host state receptiveness, prejudice faced in the receiving society, and difficulty of return. Enforceable trust is dependent on the community's monitoring capacity, which is heavily influenced by network attributes. Unlike moral obligation and bounded solidarity, enforceable trust and reciprocity exchanges are instrumental in character.[249]

Citing the negative side of social capital, these authors assert that benefits are acquired at a cost: fierce social control and isolation from the outside world.[250] Cohesive enclave communities strongly reinforce group identification through norms and sanctions, while ethnically grounded institutional affiliations and activities shape self-perceptions, understandings of collective histories, and relations with "outsiders."[251]

Radtke provides evidence that armed belligerents are successful at mobilizing financing from diasporic communities when they connect to the diaspora's "moral economy."[252] The key mechanism that generates support, she argues, is a feeling of moral commitment toward armed groups.[253] Moral commitment, however, is a function of economic interdependence, as individuals are socialized within the networks in which they are embedded. Moreover, action may be instrumentally motivated in that one's status or reputation as influenced by adherence to community norms has material consequences in terms of access to resources.

Indeed, Bonacich and Modell's study *The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity* argued that small business owners who rely on gains from ethnicity have material incentive to actively maintain ethnic solidarity. By participating in multiple ethnic associations and regularly meeting

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[249]Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action," *American Journal of Sociology* 98, no. 6 (1993): 1323–6.
[250] Ibid., 1340.
[251] Tilly, "Transplanted Networks," 91.
[252] James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976).
[253] Radtke, "Engaging the Diaspora," 6.

with community members, entrepreneurs aim to demonstrate their trustworthiness.[254] These authors were pioneers of the concept of ethnic economies, which lies at the heart of numerous studies of immigrant adaptation.

Ethnic Economies

The literature distinguishes between three types of ethnic economies: ethnic-ownership economies; ethnic enclave economies; and ethnic-controlled economies.[255] According to Light and Gold, ethnic-ownership economies are comprised of the self-employed, employers, co-ethnic employees, and unpaid family workers. What distinguishes enclave economies is that firms are territorially clustered, exhibit vertical and horizontal integration, have a substantial number of co-ethnic employees. While every group has an ethnic economy, only few have established enclave economies.[256] In contrast to both ethnic-ownership and enclave economies, which are grounded in legal ownership of businesses, ethnic-controlled economies are niches in the mainstream economy where co-ethnic employees control hiring, pay, and labor conditions in the workplace.[257] As Light and Gold explain, their *de facto* control results from clustering, numerical preponderance, organization, or government policy, and allows co-ethnics to secure more and better jobs than they would otherwise.[258]

These authors have illuminated the symbiotic relationship between ethnic economies and ethnic communities. While the former provide jobs, training, and social welfare, the latter are a

[254] Edna Bonacich and John Modell, *The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 22.
[255] Ivan Light and Steven J. Gold, *Ethnic Economies* (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 2000).
[256] Light and Gold, *Ethnic Economies*, 9
[257] Ibid., 22
[258] Ibid., 25

source of labor, loan funds, and consumers.[259] Ethnic economies rely on group cohesion and in turn reinforce this cohesion.[260]

Cross-Pressures and Economic Mobility

Lipset's seminal article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," which argued that enclave communities were conducive to political extremism, is a helpful starting point in exploring the relationship between ethnic economies and politics. While the social structure may "naturally" isolate individuals or groups from contact with differing views (e.g., segregated laborers), what he calls "parties of integration"—fascists and communists, as well as non-totalitarian groupings such as Catholics and socialists—purposefully seek to isolate their followers by creating networks within which followers can live their entire lives.[261] Lipset argued that extremism was the tendency whenever an individual belonged to a variety of groups predisposing toward the same political choice.[262] Allen's rich empirical study of the Nazi seizure of power in a small German town revealed the crucial role of deep social segmentation along class lines in political radicalization—even the taverns, he noted, were socially and politically segregated.[263]

By contrast, individuals under cross-pressures—that is, those exposed to heterogeneous political stimuli, through friendships, associational affiliations, and exposure to multiple informational sources—tend to be less receptive to extremism. Lipset's cross-pressures are the equivalent of variegated social networks, which expose individuals to countervailing influences.

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[259] Ibid., 167.
[260] Antoine Pécoud, "Thinking and Rethinking Ethnic Economies," *Diaspora* 9, no. 3 (2009): 439–62.
[261] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *The American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 69–105.
[262] Ibid., 96–7.
[263] William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town 1922–1945* (Danbury, Conn.: Franklin Watts, 1984).

Lipset argued that economic mobility was the vehicle through which individuals could become exposed to cross-pressures and thus acquire more moderate political views.[264] Analysts of social class and networks have indeed found that middle-class groups tend to have a higher proportion of weak ties than working-class groups. Milroy and Milroy asserted, "In British and American society, at least, close-knit, territorially based, kin-oriented networks are located most clearly in the lowest classes. . . ."[265]

Ethnic-controlled economies and more broadly ethnic niches are cases of occupational segregation. By contrast, "strong" ethnic communities, according to Portes, are not only large in numbers but also have a diverse occupational structure that includes entrepreneurs and professionals. Hence, they cut across class cleavages. At their most developed, enclave communities are urban, economically diversified, and "institutionally complete," allowing individuals to conduct their lives entirely within the community's confines.[266]

In their research on Chinese immigrants in Toronto, Fong and Oooka empirically demonstrate that migrants who participate in the ethnic economy have significantly lower participation rates in social activities in the host society.[267] Meanwhile, Griffiths suggests that the ethnic economy not only shields Kurdish migrants in London against the vagaries of the wider labor market, but in conjunction with the nationalist project, it also reinforces communal self-sufficiency and insularity. Kurdish associations, he contends, have successfully intertwined political mobilization with welfare support and provision.[268]

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[264] Lipset, "Some Social Requisites," 96, 83
[265] Lesley Milroy and James Milroy, "Social Network and Social Class: Toward an Integrated Sociolinguistic Model," *Language in Society* 21 (1992): 17.
[266] Portes, "Economic Sociology," 28.
[267] Eric Fong and Emi Ooka, "The Social Consequences of Participating in the Ethnic Economy," *International Migration Review* 36, no. 1 (2002): 125–46.
[268] Griffiths, "Fragmentation and Consolidation," 294, 297.

Elites within ethnic economies have been noted to play significant roles in founding communal organizations, even churches.[269] As Pécoud describes, ethnic entrepreneurs provide opportunity and assistance and often become political leaders.[270] In general, the political power of co-ethnic elites is inversely proportional to the social and economic options available to the rank and file.[271]

Cross-Pressures and Ethnic Violence

Drawing on Lipset, Rabushka and Shepsle[272] develop a theory of instability in countries with politically salient cultural cleavages. Taking "primordial attachments to communal groups as a source of political preferences," they then theorize about strategic behavior in the plural society.[273] "Communal politicians," they argue, ultimately undermine moderates by promising their constituents more for less on ethnic issues, leading to polarization, democratic breakdown, and oftentimes violence. Although they do not develop a formal explanation, Rabushka and Shepsle speculate that ethnic cleavages become politically salient because of the machinations of political entrepreneurs who manipulate "natural" social cleavages for political gain.[274]

Varshney's rich empirical work on patterns of violence in India seeks to uncover the conditions under which such entrepreneurs are successful in cleaving society along ethnic lines. Existing approaches, he contends, overstate the power of long-standing hatreds, political elites

[269] Light and Gold, *Ethnic Economies.*
[270] Pécoud, "Thinking and Rethinking," 449.
[271] Light and Gold, *Ethnic Economies*, 173.
[272] Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (New York: Pearson Longman, [1972] 2009).
[273] James D. Fearon, "Foreword," in Ibid., v. "Plural" societies, as opposed to "pluralistic" societies, are those with cultural diversity; politically organized cultural communities; and the salience of ethnic identity. Ibid., 62.
[274] Ibid., 59–61.

and institutions, and master narratives.[275] Civil society, he argues, is the key missing variable in the existing literature on ethnic cleavages and violence. Varshney distinguishes two types of civic networks: associational engagement and everyday forms of engagement. Interethnic networks of both types are agents of peace because they build bridges and manage tensions, he argues, although the former are more so than the latter because associations can serve interests that are not the object of quotidian interactions.[276] Moreover, interethnic mass-based associations, such as trade unions, are more robust agents of peace than elite-based organizations.[277] By contrast, intra-ethnic networks render ethnically mixed communities prone to violence. His key hypothesis is that the more associational networks cross cut ethnic boundaries, the more difficult it is for politicians to polarize communities, even when it is in their interest to do so. Two mechanisms inhibit a polarizing strategy among local politicians: inter-communal communication and shared interests.

Chandra's critique of Varshney, however, asserts that the heavy lifting in the theory is not inter-communal associations but rather economic interdependence. A more convincing hypothesis that can be extracted from Varshney's data, she contends, is that where Hindus and Muslims are interdependent in the local economy, they cooperate with each other to stymie a polarizing strategy by local political entrepreneurs and prevent violence to avoid economic losses on both sides.[278]

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[275] Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict in Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002), 39.
[276] Ibid., 375.
[277] Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict in Civic Life*, 49.
[278] Kanchan Chandra, "Civic Life or Economic Interdependence," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 39, no. 1 (2001): 115.

Conclusion: Tying it All Together

Starting from the assumption that an armed insurgency exists and its leadership has a core group of diasporic allies, the question to answer is under what conditions can they build a viable support base in a given "host" territory? To answer this question, the parameters of (i.e., the macro-context) and potential resources available for collective action must be examined. While the former requires an analysis of nested opportunity structures (international relations, "host" domestic political institutions, state capacity to suppress transnationalism), a network approach to political activism and immigrant adaptation points the way forward to understanding the micro-dynamics of mobilization. This chapter detailed how networks facilitate collective action: socialization to identify with a collective; as channels of information and opportunity (i.e., structural-connection); and mechanisms to levy sanctions/rewards.

At the same time, owing to the risks associated with migration and the imperatives of adaptation, ethnic communities produce and reproduce formal and informal institutions that facilitate collective action—though their robustness will vary over time and from community to community depending on their historical development, including the extent of structural integration within the host country. Upward mobility within the broader host country economy—that is, beyond the ethnic economy—diminishes the likelihood of supporting armed insurgents, most especially under conditions where there is some risk and potential cost for involvement. The economically mobile are less dependent on interpersonal networks for various forms of assistance, much more likely to be linked into countervailing networks, have less access to locally constructed information from affected co-ethnic communities, and are less vulnerable to in-group policing.

CHAPTER 2

Research Design

> The development of diasporic sensibilities within nationally specific ethnic identities is an ideal subject for comparative inquiry. —Kevin Kenny[279]
>
> While historians have long paid lip-service to the notion that ethnic groups contained within themselves multiple sub-groups, they have rarely acted upon this knowledge. —Hasia R. Diner[280]

This chapter sets forth the research design of the dissertation in detail. In doing so, it addresses tasks that are essential for systematic, theory-oriented case study research: specification of the research objective; specification of hypotheses and variables; case selection; and formulation of data requirements.[281]

Research Objective

The dissertation seeks to explain patterns of diasporic mobilization for homeland war efforts. More specifically, the research seeks to identify the conditions under which diasporic radicals are more or less likely to mobilize a support base in a "host" country for a homeland insurgency, and explain variation in levels of support within a given ethnic population. The study examined these questions through the lens of Irish America and the Northern Ireland conflict between 1970 and 1990 to generate generalizable hypotheses for future testing. The study is simultaneously theoretical and empirical, but it is a theory-building, rather than theory-testing, endeavor.

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[279] Kevin Kenny, "Diaspora and Comparison: The Global Irish as a Case Study," *The Journal of American History* 90, no. 1 (June 2003): 137–8.
[280] Hasia R. Diner, Book Review, *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 15, no. 1 (1992): 152.
[281] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).

Often cited as a prime example of diasporic radicalism, historians have argued that Irish-American support for the Provisional IRA was not widespread and in fact often exaggerated—a finding that in-depth investigation in this study strongly supports. Why did mobilization remain so limited among the very sizable Irish ancestry population in the United States and compared to other "groups" with respect to conflicts in their homelands?

Before presenting the argument advanced in this dissertation, this section first lays out key concepts in order to make clear the phenomenon under investigation. The Introduction already discussed the elusive concepts "diaspora" and "ethnic identity"; however, further clarification of concepts is necessary given that the conceptual language of the literature on this topic is often nebulous and contested.

This state of conceptual development perhaps stems in part from the challenges of mapping a transnational phenomenon onto a territorially demarcated political terrain, of reconciling how a phenomenon that transcends state borders is simultaneously confined by them. Wimmer and Glick Schiller have noted the limitations imposed by what they term "methodological nationalism" for studies concerning migration.[282] Although the very study of long-distance nationalism challenges the "container model" of nation/state/society, social science discourse still imposes limitations on how we talk about dispersed imagined communities. Such terms as "host state," for example, essentially fail to capture the potentially complex relationship between migrants and their descendants and countries of settlement as well as local social realities.

[282] Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: The Nation-state, Migration and the Social Sciences," *Global Networks* 2, no. 4 (2002): 301–34.

A second reason may lie in the literature's general lack of theoretical sophistication, which Koinova, Radtke, Hall and Kostić, and recent others have noted and sought to address.[283] Concepts, as Sartori has explained in his seminal 1970 article, are not only "fact-finding containers" but also elements of a theoretical framework.[284] Thus, systematic data collection and theory building necessarily entail conceptual precision.

Concepts

The research focuses specifically on what can be called *diasporic movements* (DMs), which are considered a subtype of social movement. *Social movements,* as Snow et al. define them, are "collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are part."[285] Thus, according to this definition, social movements entail some degree of sustained collective action and mainly engage in non-institutional activities, such as demonstrations and sit-ins. Their duration greatly varies from case to case, with some lasting for short periods of time while others may span decades, "alternating between periods of heightened activism and dormancy."[286]

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[283] Maria Koinova, "Diasporas and Intra-State Conflict: Causal Mechanisms and the Cases of the Albanian, Armenian and Chechen Diasporas," paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, Calif., March 22–25, 2006; Katrin Radtke, *Mobilisierung der Diaspora: Die moralische Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege in Sri Lanka und Eritrea* (Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag GmbH, 2009) and "Engaging the Diaspora: The Dynamics of Diaspora Mobilization in Civil Wars," paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, Calif., March 22–25, 2006; Jonathan Hall and Roland Kostić, "Integration for Peace?" Paper presented at the 50th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, February 15–18, 2008.
[284] Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review 64*, no. 4 (1970): 1033–53.
[285] David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, "Mapping the Terrain," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 11.
[286] Ibid., 10–11.

Diasporic signifies that the core of a movement is comprised of an ethnic community whose goal is to affect political change in a faraway territory conceived of as the "homeland" (or potentially a political system where some part of the broader transnation is settled). Temporally, diasporic movements may precede or arise as a reaction to contentious political action unfolding afar. *Homeland* is an emotionally laden concept that refers to a *revered* real or imagined place of origin, the territorial boundaries of which are often fluid in the collective imagination. Diasporic politics, which is sometimes referred to as *homeland politics*, is thus distinct from what is termed *immigrant politics*, the focus of which is bettering the situation of migrant communities in the country of settlement (e.g., expanded political, economic, and social rights).[287]

In contrast to social movements, *interest groups* mainly rely on institutionalized means to pursue their collective objectives and are typically considered legitimate actors in the political arena.[288] Voter mobilization, campaign financing, and advocacy work are typically among their strategic repertoires. Ethnic lobbies—such as the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee and the Armenian Assembly of America—are a subtype of interest group. These groups vary in their membership base; some are elite organizations while others are mass-based entities.[289] Americans for a New Irish Agenda, for example, which played a critical role in the peace negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, was a small but wealthy interest group, headed by high-ranking political figures and Irish-American business elites, whose involvement in the Ulster conflict may have been motivated by lucrative investment

[287] Eva Kristine Østergaard-Nielsen, "Transnational Practices and the Receiving State: Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands," *Global Networks* 1, no. 3 (2001): 261–281.
[288] Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, "Mapping the Terrain," 7.
[289] David M. Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul, *Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 12.

opportunities in Northern Ireland.[290] While ethnic lobbies are often grassroots based, some rely principally on patronage from a few resource-rich individuals or government grants to fund their activities. Within the American Jewish community, for example, about 6 percent of donors contribute 80 percent of organizational funds, while the Armenian Assembly of America has received millions of dollars from the federal government.[291]

An extensive literature already exists on ethnic lobbies (although it focuses almost exclusively on organizations in the United States). Factors often identified as crucial to their success in exerting policy influence include: the compatibility of group objectives and host-country national security interests, electoral clout based on population size and dispersion, organizational strength, and the permeability of and access to the government.[292] Generally, Paul and Paul assert, groups that seek to protect existing policies are more influential than those that seek to change the status quo.[293]

Social movement actors and interest groups can form alliances to press their joint interests and thus can be closely connected; and over time social movements may become institutionalized and evolve into interest groups.[294] Although some overlap exists, they are distinct forms of collective action and are treated as such here (see Figure 2.1). As Snow et al. explain, their "differential positioning [in relation to the polity or state] is sufficiently important to produce different sets of strategic and tactical behaviors, and thus different kinds of

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[290] Yossi Shain and Ravinatha P. Aryasinha, "Spoilers or Catalysts? The Role of Diasporas in Peace Processes," in *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), 117.
[291] Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora: At Home Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 188. Paul and Paul, *Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 12.
[292] Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 3 (1999): 341–61.
[293] Paul and Paul, *Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 14–5.
[294] Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, "Mapping the Terrain," 8.

collectivities."[295] Moreover, as Ansell notes, "Many social movement organizations . . . have only a very limited demarcation from informal social networks." Bureaucratization and professionalization, however, "may draw increasingly sharp boundaries between organizations and their environments. These boundaries increase the autonomy of organizations from their social contexts."[296]

Figure 2.1: Social Movements and Interest Groups



Moving down Sartori's ladder of abstraction,[297] diasporic movements can be broken down into further subtypes based on their aims: *reformist diasporic movements*, *defensive diasporic movements*, and *transformative diasporic movements*. Reformist diasporic movements seek *change within* the existing system (e.g., expanded civil, socioeconomic, and cultural rights). An example is Irish-American mobilization in support of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Defensive DMs aim to *preserve* the existing homeland political order. Serbian-American activism in support of Belgrade during Kosovar-Albanian

[295] Ibid.
[296] Christopher Ansell, "Community Embeddedness and Collaborative Governance in the San Francisco Bay Area Environmental Movement," in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 127.
[297] Sartori, "Concept Misformation."

secessionism is an illustration. Transformative movements seek *change of* the system—that is, they seek to subvert the homeland political order through regime change, separatism, or revolution, although movement activists may differ in their strategies (see Figure 2.2). Diasporic *radicals* are those who support the use of violence to attain political goals. By definition, they are allies of armed groups; in some instances, such actors may even have been crucial in their very constitution (e.g., members of the Swiss-based Popular Movement for Kosovo [LPK] were indispensable in the KLA's emergence). *Moderates* seek transformative change via non-violent means. Chapter 1 has mentioned quite a few examples transformative diasporic movements (TDMs), which are the focus of the study.

Figure 2.2: Diasporic Movement Typology



TDMs can be further differentiated according to the ideological basis of their claims-making (e.g., ethno-nationalist; Marxist; Islamist; liberal-democratic). This study focuses on ethno-nationalist TDMs: movements that voice claims for territorial sovereignty based on real or presumed histories of ethnic victimization.[298] Yet sometimes TDMs can articulate multiple

[298] This definition is a combination of Olzak's definitions of *ethnic and racial social movements* and *nationalist movements*. Susan Olzak, "Ethnic and Nationalist Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 666–93. In her dissertation on the Sikh diaspora and the Punjab conflict, Gunawardena develops the concept Separatist Diasporan

bases of claims-making, which may vary over time and among different actors engaged in the same movement, as the case which is the focus of this study will show.

More specifically, the dissertation aims to explain patterns of support for radical activists in such movements. *Mobilization*, as Olzak explains, is the harnessing of resources (including loyalty, organizations, and material resources) to reach some collective goal.[299] A movement's *mobilization potential* is defined as "the people in a society who could be mobilized by a social movement." It consists of those with positive attitudes toward the goals of a movement and willingness to become engaged.[300]

The concept *armed conflict* refers to organized violent contests for control of the state apparatus, separatist conflicts, or irredentist wars. In relevant contexts, this term is used interchangeably with civil war. Borrowing from Kalyvas, *civil war* is defined as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities."[301] The armed contestation of sovereignty lies at the core of this definition, distinguishing it from rebellions, violent protests, and riots. *Belligerents* are organized armed actors in the homeland conflict, who may be conventional armies, paramilitary forces, or rebel groups.

Movement *activism* can entail a wide range of activities that vary according to levels of commitment and risk: participating as a combatant in an armed conflict, undertaking arms

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Movement (SDM). She defines this concept as: "a coalition of groups comprising of minority coethnics of migrant origin that: 1. sustains a strong attachment to their homeland; 2. maintains numerous networks among coethnics in other countries, 3. seeks to carve out a separate homeland out of territory that forms part of an existing state because of real or imagined feelings of persecution; 4. is organized and engages in lobbying and other strategies to attain its political objectives; 5. is linked to the separatist struggle at home; AND 6. contains members, who although sharing the broader ethnic label, also possess other affiliations that vary, e.g., caste, class, sect, origin (urban/rural) etc." Therese Suhashini Gunawardena, *Contesting Khalistan: The Sikh Diaspora and the Politics of Separatism*, Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 2001, quote at 43.

[299] Olzak, "Ethnic and Nationalist Social Movements," 688.

[300] Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema, "Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements," *American Sociological Review* 52 (August 1987): 519.

[301] Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17.

smuggling, organizing demonstrations and fundraising events, disseminating propaganda, and participation in protests. The dissertation does not seek to explain participation in combat or gun-running schemes—which are extremely high risk activities that are undertaken by only a select number of individuals[302]—nor the occasional donation or short-term involvement. Rather *activists* are those who are devoted to the cause and expend considerable time organizing and fundraising. *Supporters* are those who give sustained moral and financial support to armed groups and/or their proxies, even if only by attending fundraising events.

Specification of Hypotheses

The research aimed to explain levels of collective action for a specific sub-class of social movement—ethno-nationalist TDMs. Three key hypotheses are advanced in this dissertation. The first pertains to the conditions under which mobilization is more or less likely, that is the macro-political context; the second corresponds to the intra-communal resources potentially available to militants (social foci; networks); and the last refers to strategic capacity (ability to tap those resources for the cause).

H1: The greater the levels of state suppression, the less likely diasporic radicals will be able to mobilize an insurgent support base. Suppression generates barriers to mobilization by decreasing attitudinal affinity with a movement, decreasing movement reachability to mass audiences, and increasing social cost and legal risk, thus creating disincentives for movement participation. Indicators of government suppression in democratic host countries include surveillance, infiltration, censorship, propaganda, criminalization, and public denouncements.

[302] The members of the Kosovo Liberation Army's so-called Atlantic Brigade, for example, totaled about one hundred Albanian Americans. In the case of the Croatian diaspora, Hockenos asserts that probably no more than one thousand Croat émigrés from across the world enlisted in Croat militias fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that in terms of soldiers, diaspora volunteers "added little to the Croat armies." Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 92.

The key indicators of mobilization are fundraising levels and assessments made in government documents of militant organizational health.

↑ suppression (IV) → ↓ mobilization (DV)

H2: The more upwardly social mobile an ethnic population in the host society, the less potential resources available to militants to mobilize grassroots support for a homeland war effort afar. Upward social mobility weakens ethnic-based organizations and interpersonal networks, which facilitate collective action through their inherent socialization, structural connection, and exchange mechanisms. Socioeconomic integration in the host society "disembeds" individuals from ethnic-based networks that reinforce communal identities and norms and alter costs and benefits of particular behavior through monitoring and the distribution of rewards and sanctions. Upward social mobility is measured by levels of class of worker,[303] occupational segregation, income, education, and suburbanization over time and relative to the dominant native-born group.[304] Organizational memberships in non-movement communal organizations are used as a proxy for the dependent variable.

↑ upward social mobility (IV) → ↓ availability of intra-communal resources (DV)

H3: The more central radicals are within communal networks, the more likely they will be able to centralize control and harness resources from non-movement organizations. Centrality is a measure of influence within a set of social relationships. Number of organizational affiliations and leadership role of movement leaders in non-movement organizations are indicators. Resource access is measured by number and type of non-movement organizations that financially contribute to public fundraisers for the cause.

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[303] "Class of worker" is a classification scheme used by the US Census Bureau. It categorizes workers as follows: federal government workers; state government workers; local government workers; private wage and salary workers; self-employed workers; or unpaid family workers.

[304] These measures are based on information gathered in the US census. Some of these indicators may not be relevant in all contexts.

↑ network centrality of radicals (IV) → ↑ resource access to non-movement organizations (DV)

Research Methods

The research entailed one main case and comparison with other already well-researched cases to develop a typology of macro-contexts (varying by foreign policy, domestic political institutions, and state capacity) that condition the possibilities for collective action in a particular "host" country. Chapter 4 engages in cross-case comparison to show how "nested political opportunity structures" enable or constrain collective action—that is, how they impact mobilization potential. Given that the main focus of the dissertation is on micro-mobilization processes, more rigorous typological theorizing and testing is left for a future extension of this project.

The study also engages in within-case comparison to explain variation in *intra-communal* mobilization patterns, longitudinally and spatially. Two within-case methods are employed: congruence testing and process tracing. As George and Bennett explain, these provide a viable alternative to controlled comparison.[305] In the former, the researcher aims to establish whether the hypothesized relationship between the independent and dependent variables are congruent in the outcome of a case. However, while consistency between a theory's predictions and case outcomes provides support for a causal interpretation, they note, safeguards must be employed to confront the possibility of spurious causation. Process-tracing, which seeks to identify the causal chain connecting the independent and dependent variables, thus provides a helpful complement

[305] Ibid., 179.

to the congruence method. By examining a range of evidence, the researcher aims to find whether the causal process is, indeed, evident.

Case Selection

Irish America and the armed conflict in the North of Ireland, during which more than 3,600 people were killed and 40,000 injured, was selected as the main case study. As Kieran McEvoy notes, for a population of only 1.5 million, the scale of the Northern Ireland conflict is comparable to the civil wars in Sri Lanka, Cyprus, and Lebanon.[306]

There were a number of theoretical and pragmatic reasons why this case was chosen. Beginning with the latter, first and foremost was feasibility. It is an historical case, and while not resolved, the main protagonists are about a decade and a half into implementing a peace agreement. Research on current, active support (direct and indirect) for armed groups abroad, many of which the United States and other Western governments consider "foreign terrorist organizations" (FTOs), would have posed grave risks to informants (See Appendix). Although splinter groups of the Irish Republican Army, including the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA, are listed as FTOs, the main armed group studied here, the Provisional IRA, was not. Moreover, it is unlikely that an adequate sample of informants could even have been generated, especially given the increased government surveillance of such groups in the wake of Al Qaeda's attacks on US soil on September 11, 2001, and the concomitant enforcement of penalties for providing material support to designated entities. In short, unlike many armed groups included in THE Appendix that are proscribed in the United States and elsewhere and thus carry severe penalties for individuals and groups who materially support them, the main militant organization in this

[306] Kieran McEvoy, *Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland: Resistance, Management, and Release* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9.

case—the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid)—was a legal organization and remained so in 2012.

Second, rich data were available on relevant organizations and on the Irish-American population. Because Noraid was forced to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which subjects organizations to government scrutiny, reports exist on its finances, however suspect, as well as its other activities. Because Noraid, along with other Irish-American organizations, was subject to surveillance by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), there is a large volume of US government documentation, including reports from infiltrators and informers. Executive Order 13256 (1995) regarding access to information requires the automatic declassification of records after 25 years. The conflict onset of this case was long enough ago to allow for a significant bulk of these documents to be available through the Freedom of Information Act. Similarly, the British government carefully monitored American fundraising for the IRA and, through its National Archives, also has available declassified documents produced by embassy and other government entities from that period.

Reliable figures on immigrant/ethnic populations can be difficult to obtain, because of census/sample classification schema, and/or host country policy about aggregating data on such populations. The US Census Bureau collected and aggregated data on the Irish foreign stock (i.e., the foreign-born and the native-born of foreign or mixed parentage) in its decennial census in the decades leading up to the start of the Troubles until 1970. Beginning with the 1980 census, the bureau gathered data on the Irish ancestry population. US Census data provided information on key demographic variables that made it possible to disaggregate Irish America, socioeconomically and geographically. The historically large size of the Irish population in the United States, moreover, makes it amenable to meaningful statistical analyses.

In addition to the abundance of government records on Irish-American organizations and population, there were also accessible archives containing organizational ephemera from relevant Irish institutions, including Noraid, and newspapers, including what was essentially Noraid's paper, the *Irish People*.

Irish-American diasporic mobilization during the Troubles was an ideal case for this study for theoretical reasons as well. The United States had a vast Irish ancestry population[307] that was layered with multiple waves of migrants, thus allowing for examination of internal heterogeneity. Moreover, the Troubles lasted for approximately three decades, which allowed for the examination of change over time. The case, moreover, could be disaggregated in two ways that made for meaningful comparison. First, Noraid had a central office, but also had units spread through the country, thus making disaggregation possible, as the units became cases within a case. Secondly, the conflict in the North can also be seen as part of an extension of the War of Independence earlier in the century and the subsequent failed Border Campaign of the 1950s. The twentieth century thus witnessed not one but multiple armed campaigns (1919–1922; 1956–1962; 1969–1998) by various incarnations of the IRA that received varying levels of Irish-American support which enabled historical comparison.

Social Network Analysis

In addition to case study methods, the dissertation drew on social network analysis (SNA). As Wasserman and Faust explain, SNA is a distinct research perspective that "is based on an assumption of the importance of relationships among interacting units. . . . Relations defined by

[307] According to census data from 1980, there were 10,337,353 individuals who reported Irish as a *single* ancestry (the figures are much higher for those who reported multiple ancestries), but only 6,338 who reported "Northern Irelander" as a single ancestry.

linkages among units are a fundamental component of network theories."[308] The following, they further elaborate, are central principles that distinguish SNA from other research approaches:

- "Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than independent, autonomous units
- Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for transfer or "flow" of resources (either material or nonmaterial)
- Network models focusing on individuals view the network structural environment as providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action"[309]

Moreover, structures are operationalized in terms of networks of linkages among units.[310] Units can be individuals, organizations, neighborhoods, or more aggregated entities such as states. Relational ties among pairs of actors include: friendship, kinship, transfers of material resources, shared association or affiliation, and formal relations (e.g., authority). Network data sets can contain two types of variables: structural variables, which measure ties between a pair of actors, and composition variables, which are measures of actor attributes.

This study gathered data on three types of networks. The first is ego-centric networks, which "consists of a focal actor, termed *ego*, [and] a set of alters who have ties to ego, and measurements on the ties among these actors."[311] As Wasserman and Faust note, ego-nets are often used to study social support and how personal relationships affect individual well-being.[312] They are also useful in studying recruitment into social movement organizations. The second is organizational networks. The third is affiliation networks, which is a special type of two-mode

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[308] Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4.
[309] Ibid., 4.
[310] Ibid., 6.
[311] Ibid., 42.
[312] Ibid.

network[313] containing one set of actors and one set of events, in this case individuals and the voluntary organizations to which the actors belong.[314]

Data Collection

Data gathering, including network data, entailed conducting semi-structured interviews and the mining of community newspapers, archival records, historical accounts, memoirs, and biographies. Quantitative data were garnered from the Sutton Index of Deaths made available online in the University of Ulster's Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) Database; government documents; and US Census Bureau data.

Semi-structured Interviews

Social movements scholars often rely on semi-structured interviews to gain insight into the construction of collective and individual identities and how they relate to political activism; the context of movement participants' motivations, beliefs, and attitudes; relevant mobilizing structures; elite strategies; and recruitment processes.[315]

Interviewees were grouped into three categories: community leaders in various Irish-American organizations, most especially the Irish Northern Aid Committee; rank-and-file members of these organizations; and party leaders and activists in Ireland.

Using a snowball approach, the first order participants were recruited by attending public events by key Irish-American organizations. Between April 2011 and May 2012, I attended

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[313] As Wasserman and Faust explain, the term "mode" refers "to a distinct set of entities on which the structural variables are measured." Networks containing two sets of actors are two mode networks. Ibid., 29.
[314] Ibid., 30.
[315] Kathleen M. Blee and Verta Taylor, "Semi-structured Interviewing in Social Movement Research," in *Methods of Social Movement Research*, ed. Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 97–117.

twenty events, mostly in New York State but also in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, DC, and one in Dublin. The organizations sponsoring these events included: the Irish Northern Aid Committee (jointly with Clan na Gael), Cumann na Saoirse Náisiúnta, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, the *Irish Echo*, the Brehon Law Society, Catholic Viva House, the Irish Center, Friends of Sinn Féin, and Republican Sinn Féin. The types of events ranged from celebrations, commemorations, and fundraisers to book launches and conventions. In total, I conducted more than forty interviews, not including numerous casual conversations.

Interview questions aimed to generate data on social ties at the interpersonal and organizational levels. For leaders, the interview questions sought to ascertain the extent of inter-organizational linkages, relevant actors and their roles within the network and, in relevant instances, information concerning recruitment and fundraising, target audiences for propaganda, and impediments to mobilization. For rank and file members, questions aimed to generate information about family history, homeland attitudes, levels of activism during the conflict and forms of activism or support, personal networks, organizational ties, and socioeconomic status.

Government Documents

This project entailed examination of US Department of Justice files on a number of relevant Irish-American organizations: the Irish Northern Aid Committee, Clan na Gael, the Irish National Caucus, and the Irish Republican Clubs. Quantitative data on levels of financial support were drawn from FARA files, which provide the amounts of money channeled to Noraid's central office in New York from its branches scattered across the country for seven six-month periods of the conflict (Feb.–Jul. 1977; Aug.–Jan. 1978; Feb.–Jul. 1978; Aug.–Jul. 1979; Feb.–Jul. 1980; Aug. 1980–Jan. 1981; Feb.–Jul. 1981). While government officials firmly

believe that the figures are inaccurate given that they were self-reported, they do provide a partial picture of where the most mobilized communities were geographically located and conversely where radicals lacked any presence, findings that were supported with other sources of documentation, including British government files, and in interviews.

Nongovernmental Archival Records

New York University's Archives of Irish America contained a number of valuable collections on Irish-American organizations, political activists, and newspapers, including the *Irish People*. The paper was a crucial data source for identifying key individuals involved in the movement, fundraising activities, and supporters, including local businesses. A very important source of information was Noraid's annual dinner journal. I reviewed a decade's worth of these books, beginning with the first in 1973 through 1983, which gave a list of table patrons, ad patrons, and a snapshot of Noraid's organizational sources of support, including the particular union locals and their leadership, over the course of the conflict. Essentially the dinner journals were a rich source of data on discerning the Noraid leadership's level of access to non-movement resources.

Conclusion

This chapter has laid the conceptual foundations of the empirical chapters that follow. Along with defining key concepts and the main hypotheses, it specified the research methods and data collection sources that figure in the next four chapters. The study now turns to Irish America and its support of the Provisional Republican movement in the North of Ireland.

CHAPTER 3

The Lace Curtain Divide Over Ulster: "Fat Cats," the Working Class, and America's Disinterested Irish

> Irish America was not a standing army ready for action; it was a few sergeants trying to drill a platoon of sleepy volunteers. —Dermot Quinn[316]
>
> [N]ot the politicians, the wealthy Irish-Americans, nor the Catholic Church found the prospect of associating with NORAID [the Irish Northern Aid Committee] worth the opprobrium it would have earned them. —Michael McKinley[317]
>
> [M]ost of the educated middle-class [Irish] . . . have long since turned their backs on Noraid, whose appeal is basically to the working-class and trade unionists. —Barry White[318]

This chapter first provides the necessary historical backdrop to understanding militant mobilization within Irish America during the civil war in the North of Ireland (1969–1998). It begins with a discussion of the emergence of the Irish as an ethnic group in the United States during the nineteenth century, followed by trends regarding militant nationalist mobilization in the first half of the twentieth century. The historical comparison of Irish-American support during three armed campaigns in Ireland during the twentieth century reveals significant variation in levels of mobilization. While the War of Independence (1919–1920 fomented a large-scale movement, the Border Campaign (1956–1962) in the North attracted virtually no support, while the Provisional IRA's 30-year campaign on the whole received very modest

316 Dermott Quinn, *The Irish in New Jersey: Four Centuries of American Life* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 193.
317 Michael McKinley, "Lavish Generosity: The American Dimension of International Support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army 1986–1983," *Conflict Quarterly* (Spring 1987): 28.
318 Barry White, "The American Connection. Those Dollars from America. Who Gives Them? Who Gets Them?" *Belfast Telegraph*, September 9, 1978.

support, although significant enough to have an impact on the cycle of violence in Northern Ireland.[319]

As this latter campaign is the focus of the study, the chapter's emphasis is on the first two decades of the Ulster conflict, beginning with the emergence of the Northern Ireland civil rights movement and the Irish-American response to it, which is situated within a context of contentious race relations in the United States. It then discusses the ultimate collapse of the civil rights movement and emergence of the Provisional IRA in the North and what amounted to the republican movement's fundraising arm in the United States—the Irish Northern Aid Committee.

It asks how widespread was Noraid's support among Irish ethnics in the United States. Drawing on government documents, it finds that even according to official estimates, its income was miniscule relative to the number of individuals claiming single Irish ancestry in the United States and to other "groups" supporting self-determination campaigns elsewhere in the world. It also finds that while visible acts of oppression by the British government led to fundraising spikes, Noraid's regular financial support base remained geographically confined largely to urban neighborhoods in a handful of major cities.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the Irish-American "disconnection," which raises the question of why the movement enlisted but a "sliver" of Irish America into supporting the republican movement.

[319] The proper noun "Northern Ireland" is considered illegitimate by the republican movement. I first realized this during a conversation with Rita O'Hare, US representative of Sinn Féin. Similarly, during Republican Sinn Féin's *ard fheis* (annual conference) in November 2011 in Dublin, Ireland, a speaker raised the issue of the term's usage. Calling the six counties that are currently under the territorial jurisdiction of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland "Northern Ireland" is considered to accept or acquiesce in the partition of the island. Irish republicans prefer "six counties" and "the North of Ireland." I also use these terms within the text, along with Ulster, which tends to be favored by unionists, who support the territory's status as part of the United Kingdom.

Historical Background

The transnational dimensions of Irish nationalist mobilization have a long, uneven history. Indeed, Irish nationalists tapped the vast immigrant population in the United States to support their opposition to British rule in Ireland as early as the nineteenth century, when the Emerald Isle was transformed into what one scholar aptly called an "emigrant nursery."[320] While state officials and the landed elite portrayed emigration as opportunistic—and indeed encouraged it in the interests of "modernization"—Irish nationalists attributed the hemorrhaging of some 5.5 million of Ireland's "surplus" population during that century alone to its imperialist neighbor's long misrule. Unlike France where peasants "were transformed into Frenchmen . . . in other words into French *citizens*," explains Mac Laughlin, "the rural poor in Ireland were, more often than not, proletarianised into the core areas of the international, not the national, economy."[321]

While emigration and Irish nationalism have longer histories, it was during this period of mass migration across the Atlantic, from the mid-nineteenth through mid-twentieth centuries, that these phenomena became intricately intertwined. Key historical elements of nineteenth-century nationalist discourse included England's mass confiscation of land from Gaelic clans and the importation of settlers from England, Scotland, and Wales during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, principally in the northern province of Ulster but also Munster in the South. Such demographic reshuffling created a sizable, concentrated community in the North that would identify as British, an ethno-religious construction institutionalized in the Orange

[320] Jim Mac Laughlin, *Ireland: The Emigrant Nursery and the World Economy* (Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 1994).
[321] Ibid., 21.

Order[322]—an exclusively Protestant fraternal organization loyal to the British monarchy. Along with the Crown's "plantation" policy, nationalist narratives invoked the discriminatory penal laws—which excluded Irish Catholics from public office and certain professions and curtailed their land ownership.[323] Interwoven through these twin legacies of the so-called Protestant Ascendancy was another historical marker that nationalists used to denounce Ireland's union with Britain,[324] namely, the Great Famine of 1845–1852, which claimed the lives of nearly one million and prompted the emigration of another million within less than a decade.[325]

Peasants into Irishmen

The famine produced a large influx of Irish Catholics to the United States—indeed more so than the past century and a half of Protestant emigration from Ireland combined. Concentrating in America's urban centers on the East Coast, migrants came from different areas of Ireland, and traditional rivalries and village quarrels endured. "Patterns of affiliation were local and regional," explains Kenny, "with workers from one part of Ireland banding together against those from another. . . . They fought each other . . . in a desperate struggle for access to employment."[326] These immigrants generally lacked a coherent Irish ethnic identity. Their

[322] Although on the decline over the past few decades, the Orange Order remains influential in the politics of Northern Ireland even today. In 2011, it was estimated that the organization had a 40,000-strong membership, with about half of the current members of the Northern Ireland Assembly in its ranks. As the authors of *Loyal to the Core?* explain, the order represents an extended family to many of its members, while joining is usually driven by family reasons. For further discussion of the Orange Order and its conceptualization of British identity, see James W. McAuley, Jonathan Tonge, Andrew Mycock, *Loyal to the Core? Orangeism and Britishness in Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2011).

[323] These policies also discriminated against Presbyterians.

[324] Richard English, *Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland* (London: Macmillan, 2006), 168.

[325] This large influx of Irish Catholics, explains Lee, "exceeded in a single decade the entire Protestant immigration of the previous century and a half, estimated at three-quarter of a million." J.J. Lee, "Introduction: Interpreting Irish America," in *Making the Irish American: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States*, ed. J.J. Lee and Marion Casey (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 18.

[326] Kevin Kenny, "Race, Violence, and Anti-Irish Sentiment in the Nineteenth Century," in *Making the Irish American: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States*, ed. J.J. Lee and Marion Casey (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 373.

religious practices varied across the spectrum of paganism to Catholicism, and devotion to the cause of a sovereign Irish state was hardly prevalent among new arrivals. Loyalties, Light explains, "were located in family, clan, town or home county."[327]

Belchem similarly finds:

> The initial mechanics of chain migration preserved old subethnic allegiances, functioning along lines of clan, county and regional affiliations. In the "paddy camps" . . . workplace loyalties to specific foremen were based upon clan/family/regional ties simply transferred across the briny ocean. . . . Faction fighting was, indeed, transmitted with undiminished vigour. . . . [T]he intimidatory tactics of the agrarian secret societies [were adapted] to defend territory and jobs in urban-industrial America. . . . Such fierce rivalries notwithstanding, [immigrants] were perceived by resident Americans as one in the same, Irish.[328]

This massive demographic shift in Irish migrant stock during the nineteenth century would decisively alter collective communal identity within Irish America. In the context of US nativism, writes Hanagan, "immigrants acquired a keener sense of a common Catholicism and Irishness than they had at home."[329] With these impoverished immigrants depicted as uncivilized brutes among the mainstream[330]—the Protestant Irish distanced themselves from newly arrived Catholics.[331] As Lee explains, "Whatever chance there still was of Catholics and Protestants from Ireland being able to identify with the common name of Irishman after the 1840s,[332] and that had [already] shrunk under the twin pressures of the evangelical revival [in the

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[327] Dale B. Light, "The Role of Irish-American Organisations in Assimilation and Community Formation," *Irish Studies* 4 (1985): 113.

[328]John Belchem, "Ethnicity and Labour History: With Special Reference to Irish Migration," in *Class and Other Identities: Gender, Religion and Ethnicity in the Writing of European Labour History*, ed. Lex Heerma van Voss and Marcel Van der Linden (Oxford: Berghahan Books, 2002), 91–2.

[329]Michael Hanagan, "Irish Transnational Social Movements, Migrants, and the State System," in *Globalization and Resistance: The Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements*, ed. Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston (London: Roman & Littlefield, 2002), 61–2.

[330]Andrew M. Greeley, *The Irish Americans: The Rise to Money & Power* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 5.

[331] Thomas N. Brown, *Irish-American Nationalism, 1870-1890*, 2nd edn. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1980), 23.

[332] The Know Nothings, an anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic political movement in the United States, emerged during the 1840s. It was comprised of middle-class Anglo-Saxon Protestant males. In Ireland, the Young Irelanders launched a failed insurrection in 1848.

United States][333] and Catholic Emancipation[334] in Ireland, the Famine effectively buried at a mass level."[335] It was during this period, argues Brown, that "the battle lines were drawn: Irish Catholic against Anglo-American Protestant."[336]

This split was mirrored in opposing framings of the famine. While evangelicals portrayed it as "a grand providential plan" that targeted Catholics, Irish nationalists on both sides of the Atlantic attributed mass emigration to British imperialism and deemed the famine, in particular, England's solution to the Irish Question. Contemporarily also known as the Great Hunger—*an Gorta Mór*—the Great Calamity, and the Great Starvation, this humanitarian catastrophe was interpreted as a direct consequence of the British government's response to the potato blight—at best seen as callously inadequate and, at worst, "genocidal."[337]

Uneven Patterns of Nationalist Mobilization

The causes of Irish emigration were henceforth Anglicized and its solutions nationalized, explains Mac Laughlin.[338] These included both reform initiatives advocating Ireland's autonomy within its union with the United Kingdom[339] as well as violent rebellion that sought the creation

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[333] This period of US history is known as the Second Great Awakening, which began at the dawn of the nineteenth century and was in full swing by the 1820s. On this period, see for example, Barry Hankins, *The Second Great Awakening and the Transcendentalists* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2004).

[334] The Catholic Emancipation of the 1820s entailed the repeal of the penal laws and the inclusion of Catholics in governance, including the right to vote, own land, hold senior government positions, and sit in parliament. The campaign for Catholic rights had been led by Daniel O'Connell, who successfully fomented a mass movement. Indeed, as English describes, O'Connell's Catholic Association, which led the campaign, was the "first truly popular, mass-democratic organization in the history of the modern world." Hundreds of thousands were involved in this "effective mass movement of communal nationalist struggle." O'Connell, he explains, proffered a rhetorically inclusive nationalism, but "in practice he tended to identify Irish nationalism with Catholic interests, community, organization and identity." English, *Irish Freedom*, quotes at 128, 129, 137.

[335] Lee, "Introduction: Interpreting Irish America," 22.

[336] Brown, *Irish-American Nationalism*, 23.

[337] According to English, "the Irish nationalist political elite failed to offer an adequately coherent opposition to government policy." English, *Irish Freedom*, 169.

[338] Mac Laughlin, *Ireland*, 134.

[339] The Kingdom of Ireland joined the Kingdom of Great Britain in 1801, though the Acts of Union passed in 1800 in both the British parliament and the Irish parliament—which notably excluded Roman Catholics from serving as

of an independent republic. While these dual trends had appeared earlier, the famine was a decisive turning point in the historical relationship between Irish nationalism and emigration: it trans-nationalized the movement's potential mass base by virtue of the scale of migration it induced; and it embedded Catholicism, the Celtic "race," and Gaelic culture into nationalist imaginings from US shores.[340]

Masses of predominantly Catholic Irish emigrants continued cross the Atlantic well into the late nineteenth century. In post-famine Ireland, Miller explains, emigration was a societal imperative, "in reality less a choice than a vital necessity both to secure the livelihoods of nearly all who left and most who stayed." Essentially it was a safety valve "to ensure the relative stability of a fundamentally 'sick' society [that] offered its lower classes and most of its young people 'equal opportunities' only for aimless poverty at home or menial labour and slum tenements abroad."[341]

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members of parliament. Until 1922, when the Irish Free State came into existence after the War of Independence, this political entity was known as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. In 1927, the name was officially changed to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

[340] Irish nationalism, according to historian Richard English, was born in the 1790s. Key figures in the United Irishmen movement were Protestant nationalists such as Theobald Wolfe Tone. They were heavily influenced by the American and French revolutions and inspired by republicanism and the drive for popular sovereignty. English also asserts: "It is also important to note that the term 'republican' possessed for the United Irishmen a set of meanings which would have been entirely lost on most modern republicans in, for example, the late-twentieth-century IRA. The United Irish movement drew heavily on classical republicanism, or civic humanism. . . . This was very much the politics of the Enlightenment Era." They attempted to transcend religious divisions, which were seen as a tool of English dominance. Tone would become "the great prototype on which all later would-be revolutionaries instinctively modeled themselves. . . . A much later generation of radicals in the 1960s celebrated Tone in their (similarly) vain attempt to undo Irish sectarian division: as in the 1790s, however, the sought-after transcendence of sectarianism was lost amid often sectarian conflict as the northern troubles arose in the late twentieth century." English, *Irish Freedom*, 99, 103.

[341] Kirby A. Miller, *Exiles and Emigrants: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 362.

Table 3.1 Net Emigration from Ireland, 1850–1900

1850s	800,000
1860s	697,000
1870s	502,000
1880s	597,000
1890s	396,000

Source: Table drawn from Paul Sweeney, *The Celtic Tiger: Ireland's Continuing Economic Miracle Explained* (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1999), Table 2.2, 37.

The indigenous propertied class actually promoted emigration to consolidate land holdings for commercial farming and later to foster export-led agricultural development, and ultimately sovereignty from Britain. "Whole sections of the rural poor," explains Mac Laughlin, "were considered redundant to the nation-building project as Irish nation-builders and entrepreneurs staked their clam to self-determination on a vehement disavowal of the Irish as an impoverished and 'barbarous' race." Emigrants, however, were expected to contribute to "nation-building Ireland" from US shores by financially supporting their family members who were left behind.[342]

While America's Irish had already begun funding political initiatives in Ireland during the 1820s,[343] it was only in the wake of the potato famine that physical-force (i.e., radical) nationalism gained any ground on US soil and was institutionalized in such organizations as the oath-bound Fenian Brotherhood[344] in 1858 and later the Clan na Gael in 1867. Formed in New York to bridge strategic divisions within the Brotherhood, the Clan became "the . . . most durable

[342] Mac Laughlin, "Emigration and Construction of Nationalist Hegemony in Ireland," 26.
[343] According to Wilson, Daniel O'Connell's Catholic Emancipation campaign of the 1820s was financially supported by the diaspora. Andrew J. Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict 1968–1995* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 4.
[344] The Fenian Brotherhood was the companion organization to the Ireland-based Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), which by conservative estimates had some 54,000 members in the late 1860s. Its role was to provide the IRB with "money, arms, and skilled military leadership." Hanagan, "Irish Transnational Social Movements," 58.

revolutionary organization in the history of Irish America."[345] Within the first decade of its existence, it had a membership of 10,000, and within two, it comprised an astounding 40,000, especially remarkable given that the organization was cloaked in secrecy and that joining was possible only by recommendation of existing members.[346]

But as in Ireland, the militant nationalist movement in the United States was largely isolated from mainstream society—although its discourse was refracted through the American master-narrative of republicanism.[347] At the elite level, the Catholic Church hierarchy denounced the Fenians not only in Ireland but also in the United States. So staunch was the Church's opposition that Pope Pius IX actually excommunicated them, as an enemy of both the Church and state alike.[348] Irish-American politicians joined religious officials in condemning violence, while middle-class Irish ethnics generally perceived radicalism as a threat to respectable status within the dominant Protestant bourgeois culture.

Revolutionary nationalists thus sought to recruit support from among the immigrant working class; in late nineteenth-century Philadelphia, for example, more than 75 percent of Clan na Gael's membership was drawn from the ranks of unskilled labor.[349] Urban-industrial locations "unleavened by the substantial presence of either the church or an Irish-American bourgeoisie,"[350] according to Miller, were a particularly fertile source of recruitment for militants as they confronted little local opposition. He writes:

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[345] Michael F. Funchion, "Clan na Gael," in *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, ed. Funchion (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 75.
[346] Marie Veronica Tarpey, *The Role of Joseph McGarrity in the Struggle for Irish Independence* (New York: Arno Press, 1976), 51–2.
[347] Belchem, "Ethnicity and Labour History."
[348] Seán McManus, *My American Struggle for Justice in Northern Ireland* (Cork, Ireland: The Collins Press, 2011), 32.
[349] Light, "The Role of Irish-American Organisations," 130, 133.
[350] Ibid.

> There is no doubt that the bonds forged in steel mills, pit crews, and working-class neighborhoods among Irish-American laborers heightened ethnic as well as class consciousness, facilitated their mobilization in nationalist movements, and inclined them to more extreme forms of nationalism which reflected not only a social radicalism derived from contemporary labor agitations but also a proletarian culture of masculinity which exalted physical force as a means of redressing or revenging both personal and communal injuries.[351]

Succeeding waves of immigrants not only swelled the ranks of an organized nationalist movement from US shores, but their individual personal contacts at home served as the connective tissue tying it closely together with Ireland.[352] What emerged by the late nineteenth century was a "persistent . . . web of nationalist sympathy and activity,"[353] transnationally connecting America and the Emerald Isle.[354] Indeed, the Ireland-based Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) maintained links across the Atlantic for nearly seven decades, a relationship that was institutionalized in an interlocking revolutionary directorate with Clan na Gael.[355]

In collaboration with its American counterparts, it fomented mass mobilization in the early twentieth century around revolutionary republicanism. Success came only after the failure

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[351] Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles*, 505.

[352] Hanagan, "Irish Transnational Social Movements," 64.

[353] Dennis J. Clark, *Irish Blood: Northern Ireland and the American Conscience* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977), 4.

[354] This web also included England and Australia. In 1867, for example, the US Clan na Gael assisted the Australian IRB in rescuing six Fenian convicts sentenced to life imprisonment in Australia (58). According to Hanagan, however, "Irish nationalism had an American heart." He identifies three reasons: "First, unlike the other major countries of Irish emigration [i.e., Australia, Canada, Scotland, and New Zealand], the United States was an independent republic that, by means of violence, had thrown off successfully the British yoke. Irish-American nationalists appealed to the United States' revolutionary republican tradition to legitimate their own goals. Second, the country's independence and its growth as a powerful new nation between 1850 and 1870 brought the country into increased conflict with Britain. For statesman involved in confrontations with Britain, the new Irish-Catholic immigrants were a constituency worth cultivating. Third, Irish nationalism also flourished . . . because the high tide of Irish immigration . . . occurred during . . . a critical period of U.S. state formation, the period of the Civil War and its aftermath. The crisis provided real opportunities for Irish nationalists who were sought as soldiers to fight in Union armies and as voters" (61). As he further explains, "Lincoln's government allowed Fenian organizers . . . to establish Fenian circles within the Union army" (62). Moreover, the Catholic Church in the United States "tolerated" the Fenians, and some clergy actually publicly supported the Brotherhood (63). Hanagan, "Irish Transnational Social Movements."

[355] Tarpey, *The Role of Joseph McGarrity*.

of constitutional nationalists to secure autonomy through the Home Rule Movement,[356] the formation of the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and executions and wholesale arrests of rebels in the wake of the failed 1916 Easter Rising by the Irish Volunteers—which would afterward reorganize as the Irish Republican Army.[357]

As Greeley asserts, "Even the most respectability-obsessed Irish Americans . . . grudgingly admit[ted] that it was time for Ireland to be free."[358] Widespread support in the United States was reflected in membership numbers in nationalist organizations, some of which had hundreds of thousands of members,[359] as well as the considerable sums of money channeled into the self-determination campaign. Between 1919 and 1921, militants alone drummed up more than $5 million to directly support the IRA's campaign to secure the existence of the unilaterally declared Irish Republic of 1919, while nationalist groups of various political stripes combined mobilized upward of $10 million to finance Ireland's War of Independence.[360]

The 1922 Anglo-Irish Treaty abolished the Irish Republic and divided Ireland; prompted a short-lived civil war between IRA factions over its terms; and ultimately led to the execution and exile of anti-treaty forces. Diasporic nationalism diminished despite the island's partition into a 26 county, self-governing dominion of the British Commonwealth in the South (known as

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[356] The Home Rule Movement emerged in the late 1860s in the wake of the failed repeal movement launched earlier in the century, which sought to undo the incorporation of Ireland into the United Kingdom of Great Britain. Home Rule essentially sought the autonomy of Irish parliament in the island's domestic affairs within its union with Britain. For further detail, see, for example, Alan O'Day, *Irish Home Rule, 1867–1921* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1998).

[357] Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations,* xvii.

[358] Greeley, *The Irish Americans*, 103.

[359] The Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF), formed with the backing of Clan na Gael, for example, had some 250,000 members at its peak, according to Wilson, while the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic (AARIR) recruited almost 750,000 members. Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 12–13. Hanagan estimates that FOIF had a 275,000-strong membership in 1919, while the AARIR, formed by a rival faction of the Clan, had over 700,000. Hanagan, "Irish Transnational Social Movements," 99.

[360] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict,* 12–13.

the Free State) and enduring British rule in six of historic Ulster's nine counties[361] in the North (Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, and Tyrone).[362] In 1949, the former declared its full sovereignty and renamed itself the Republic of Ireland, while the latter's Protestant majority remained firmly wedded to the North's union with Britain.

As Holland remarks, by the mid-twentieth century "no Irish wolfhound's bark could be heard from the suburbs of middle-class America to disturb the British and their dependent Northern Ireland state."[363] With the exception of a few gunrunning schemes, Irish America played virtually no role in the reconstituted IRA's Border Campaign (aka Operation Harvest) between 1956 and 1962[364] and showed little reaction to internment on both sides of the border. Clan na Gael,[365] the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) in New York,[366] headed by IRA veteran Michael Flannery, and the labor unions were exceptions—particularly the Transport Workers Union (TWU),[367] founded and led by IRA veterans Mike Quill[368] and Gerald O'Reilly, among

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[361] Prior to the Norman invasion of Ireland in the twelfth century, Ireland was divided into provinces (Ulster in the North, Munster in the South, Connaught in the East, and Leinster in the West). Ulster contained nine counties; the partition excluded Donegal, Monaghan, and Cavan ostensibly to create a loyalist majority that would elect to remain within the United Kingdom rather than join the Free State.

[362] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 16.

[363] Jack Holland, *The American Connection: U.S. Guns, Money, and Influence in Northern Ireland* (Boulder, Colo.: Robert Rinehart Publishers, 1999), 26.

[364] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 16.

[365] According to Freeman's findings, anti-treaty IRA exiles who had fled to the United States in the wake of the civil war came to constitute the core of the Clan na Gael in New York, which had previously been an organization of mostly Irish Americans. By the 1930s, he argues, the Clan was no longer a mass organization. See Joshua B. Freeman, *In Transit: The Transport Workers Union in New York City, 1933–66* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 34.

[366] Michael Flannery in his memoirs noted that during this period he was elected president of the GAA in New York and that during his term the association "continued to help by passing resolutions and promoting field days to raise money to help the fight in Ireland." Dermot O'Reilly, *Accepting the Challenge: The Memoirs of Michael Flannery* (Dublin: Irish Freedom Press, 2001), 131. Flannery was a veteran of the Irish Civil War and had spent two years in prison and conducted a twenty-five-day hunger strike.

[367] The TWU was also active in the black civil rights movement in the United States and encouraged the integration of local unions in the South. In the 1950s, it had a membership of about 100,000. It was heavily concentrated in New York, with Local 100 the largest unit of the TWU. See: http://dlib.nyu.edu/findingaids/ead/tamwag/twu.xml.

[368] Quill also gave money to George Harrison, who supplied arms for both the Border Campaign and later to the Provisional IRA. See, Fenian Graves, "George Harrison, 1915–2004," available at: http://www.irishfreedom.net/Fenian%20graves/Harrison,%20G/George%20Harrison.htm (accessed July 4, 2011).

others. The TWU, according to Holland, was one of the largest donors to the US-based IRA Prisoners' Aid Committee.[369]

Any financing that had been coming from the United States, however, had "dried up" by the end of 1960, recalled the campaign's director of operations.[370] Reflecting on the IRA's rout by early 1962, Flannery, who would later co-found Noraid, asserted that "the reason the late 1950s I.R.A. campaign failed was for the want of money."[371] The minimal aid from US shores was a reflection of the IRA's failure to mobilize support on either side of the border. As English asserts, "the overriding problem for this army was that, while they claimed to act for the Irish people, the Irish people seemed not to be interested in their doing so."[372] Mary Sheils Baggarly described growing up in a Catholic ghetto of Derry during that time:

> There wasn't a lot of people who were politically involved back then; there was very little political involvement. Always on Easter Sunday my father would have at the top of the Bogside, he'd always give a speech. . . . . And we'd always wear the Easter lily [symbolic of the 1916 Easter Rising]; and there would only be a handful of people there, and I remember one time saying "Daddy, why do you bother, why do you bother? There was hardly anyone there." And I always remember him saying, "Where there is a flicker there is a flame."[373]

The lessons of the Border Campaign were not lost on the IRA, which in its secret journal *An tÓglach* (*The Volunteer*) explained its failure as a result of the people not seeing "the connection between the fight in the North and the idea of improving the Irish social condition"; a lack of sufficient resources, effective publicity, and an efficient propaganda machine; and a

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[369] Holland, *The American Connection*, 75. According to the *Irish People*, the committee was officially formed in 1953 and dissolved in 1963. Among its members was Frank Durkan, who would represent Irish republicans in court battles in the United States as a lawyer with O'Dwyer and Bernstein. "Fourth Annual Testimonial Dinner," *Irish People*, December 20, 1975, 11

[370] Barry Flynn, *Soldiers of Folly: The IRA Border Campaign 1956–1962* (Cork, Ireland: The Collins Press, 2010), 196.

[371] "Bergen County I.N.A.C. Gives Check," *The Advocate*, April 15, 1972.

[372] Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 74–6, quote at 76. Margie Bernard, *Daughter of Derry: The Story of Brigid Sheils Makowski* (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 45.

[373] Interview with Mary Sheils Baggarly, Upper Marlboro, Md., March 19, 2012.

"dwindling of public support both North and South making it virtually impossible for men to operate on Guerrilla lines."[374]

This perspective extended to the diaspora. By the end of failed 1950s campaign, Clan na Gael was "a dormant, organisation devoted to celebrating past events"; "neither it nor the IRA had ever been at a lower ebb,"[375] explained Brigid Makowski who joined the organization in 1962. Cathal Goulding, then chief of staff of the IRA, toured the United States the following year, stopping first in Philadelphia to pay homage to the famed Irish Brigade on the one-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg. A November 1963 article reported the IRA's launch of a new organizational drive, quoting Goulding saying outright that he was there "to organize Irish societies and the Clan na Gael to aid in the fight to free Ireland."

The *Irish World* also reported that the Clan was experiencing an upsurge in membership in the Philadelphia area and beyond. Indeed, its membership in the so-called City of Brotherly Love alone increased 200 percent in 1963, according to newspaper sources. The *Irish World* speculated that the activism of the American Committee for the Release of Irish Political Prisoners was largely responsible for the increase in the Clan's ranks there and in other cities, such as Baltimore.[376] Makowski recalled that in 1966, she and other Philadelphia members travelled to nearby cities to help establish Clan na Gael camps. She noted success in Baltimore, Washington, DC, Scranton, PA, and Brunswick, NJ.[377]

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[374] Quoted in Bob Purdie, *Politics in the Streets: The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1990), chapter 3 available online on the CAIN website: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/purdie.htm.

[375] Bernard, *Daughter of Derry*, 46.

[376] See US DOJ, FBI, declassified documents contained in New York University's Archives of Irish America, Sean Prendiville Collection, AIA 005, box 1, folder 11 (Clan na Gael c. 97-4883-1-17). In particular see, US DOJ, FBI, Report of [name redacted], "Clan na Gael," bureau file no.: 97-4883; April 23, 1964, pp. 9, 11, which quotes Cathal Goulding in an article titled "IRA to Recruit U.S. Supporters," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 12, 1963; and cites two articles from *Irish World*, a weekly newspaper printed in New York: "Clan na Gael: New Strength," quoted above, and "Clan na Gael to Hold National Conference in Philadelphia," November 23, 1963.

[377] Margie Bernard, *Daughter of Derry: The Story of Brigid Sheils Makowski* (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 52.

FBI memos, however, document only sporadic, small-scale activities among the Clan in Philadelphia and virtually none in New York City, another historic Clan bastion.[378] These findings coincide with Flannery's claim that by the mid-1960s the republican movement in Ireland and the United States alike "was in the doldrums."[379]

From Marching for Civil Rights to Financing Armalites and Alleviating Familial Plight

The onset of the Troubles in Northern Ireland in 1968 revived a weak activist pulse within Irish America as a whole.[380] A motley of civil rights organizations—spanning the political spectrum and divided on specific issues such as the Vietnam War and racial equality[381]—sprouted up and subsequently receded and/or collapsed in tandem with the civil rights movement in the six counties,[382] which had agitated for reform to end decades of social discrimination against Catholics and their exclusion from political power.[383] The focal grievance that initially galvanized protest was unequal allocation in public housing, which was allotted

[378] US DOJ, FBI, To: Director, FBI; From: SAC, New York; "Clan na Gael"; September 30, 1964; file no.: 97-4883, document available at NYU's Archives of Irish America, Sean Prendiville Collection, AIA 005, box 1, folder 11 (Clan na Gael c. 97-4883-1-17); see also folder 12 (Clan na Gael, c. 97-4883-18-40).
[379] O'Reilly, *Accepting the Challenge*, 141.
[380] This section title is an adaptation of Niall Ó Dochartaigh's pithy book title *From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles* (Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 1997). As Bell explains, the Armalite was an AR-18 assault rifle, which was a standard IRA weapon and served as a symbol of the armed struggle. J. Bowyer Bell, *The IRA: 1968–2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army* (London: Routledge, 2000), 183.
[381] For a discussion of civil rights organizations and political divisions among them, see Brian Dooley, *Black and Green: The Fight for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland and Black America* (London: Pluto press, 1998); Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*; Niall Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up With the Splits Here": Irish American Responses to the Outbreak of Conflict in Northern Ireland, 1968–1974," *Irish Political Studies* 10 (1995): 138–60; Gregory M. Maney, "Transnational Mobilization and Civil Rights in Northern Ireland," *Social Problems* 47, no. 2 (2000): 153–79.
[382] For an extensive discussion of the transnational connections between US-based Irish civil rights organizations and those in Northern Ireland, see Maney, "Transnational Mobilization and Civil Rights."
[383] Ó Dochartaigh, *From Civil Rights to Armalites*, 10.

through elected local councils—an issue that was deeply political as it was intertwined with disenfranchisement and gerrymandering to ensure Protestant dominance.

As a 1969 government-commissioned report titled *Disturbances in Northern Ireland*, known informally as the Cameron report, explained:

> Northern Ireland has a population of about one-and-a-half million people and of these about two-thirds may be described as Protestant and one third as Roman Catholic. Not only has the Government of Northern Ireland since it was established been a Unionist (and therefore Protestant) Government, but at the local level Councils have tended to reflect the particular religious majority in their areas, except that in certain areas, notably in certain of those in which disorders occurred, namely Dungannon, Armagh and in particular Londonderry, the arrangement of ward boundaries for local government purposes has produced in the local authority a permanent Unionist majority which bears little or no resemblance to the relative numerical strength of Unionists and non-Unionists in the area. . . . . [W]e have to record that there is very good reason to believe the allegation that these arrangements were deliberately made, and maintained, with the consequence that the Unionists used and have continued to use the electoral majority thus created to favour Protestant or Unionist supporters in making public appointments—particularly those of senior officials—and in manipulating housing allocations for political and sectarian ends.
>
> It further asserted:
>
> It would be simple to regard the religious division of the population as coinciding historically and accurately with the divisions between the Unionist party, mainly if not in fact exclusively Protestant, and the various Nationalist groups mainly but not exclusively Roman Catholic. This generalisation however would be far too broad and would be misleading if accepted as a complete and safe guide to the causes of the unhappy divisions within the State. No doubt, religion is a deeply divisive force, but in addition there is the conflict of political loyalties which sometimes transcends the religious cleavage in the population. There is division also in the segregation of race, real or imagined as it may be.[384]

The civil rights campaign, headed by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) which was formed in 1967, did not raise the issue of partition.[385] It was a mainstream social movement that drew on a broad swath of the Catholic population, despite its partial roots

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[384] See Commission Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland, *Northern Ireland Disturbances* (Belfast: UK government, 1969), chapter 1, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cameron.htm. Henceforth, this publication is cited as the Cameron report, after the commission's chair Lord Cameron.

[385] Ó Dochartaigh, *From Civil Rights to Armalites*.

in revolutionary circles that aimed to mobilize and unite the working class in opposition to the regime.[386] As the Cameron report concluded: "They are not, as organisations, concerned with altering the constitutional structure of Northern Ireland." And although the movement had been infiltrated by "left-wing extremists," according to the report, "their activities and influence were condemned and opposed by many of the movement's leaders and supporters."[387] Modeling itself off of civil rights groups in the United States, NICRA adopted a strategy of nonviolence and called upon protestors not only to refrain from violent activity but also to police their own ranks.[388]

By this time, the increasingly Marxist leadership of the defunct IRA had shifted away from militarism toward a nonviolent, political strategy that sought to erect an all-Ireland democratic socialist republic. Dublin IRA headquarters even encouraged local IRA units in the North to participate in civil rights marches.[389] As Purdie notes, however, the IRA's involvement in the civil rights movement did not eliminate its commitment to armed force.[390]

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[386] According to Richard English's historical account, the civil rights campaign was the outgrowth of republican efforts to foment agitation and mobilize Northern Protestants to join Catholics in bringing down the Stormont regime. Particularly crucial in mobilizing activism were the Wolfe Tone Societies, which sought to foster republicanism throughout Ireland. These societies sprung from committees that had been established to celebrate the bicentennial of the birth of Wolfe Tone, the Protestant leader of the United Irishmen and the failed rising of 1798. The IRA at this time was leftist; it sought to generate a working-class movement from below and opposed sectarianism. However, as English describes, "Far from uniting with their fellow Catholic workers, Protestants in the north . . . proved more likely to join paramilitary organizations determined to kill them." By the late 1960s, the civil rights movement evolved into a mass movement that leftist republicans no longer could control, and the majority of those who supported it advocated for reform not revolution. English writes, "The IRA may have helped create the civil rights movement, but they did not control or run it once it was established." Ultimately, they would "unleash a conflict with battle lines different from those they had anticipated." The 1960s IRA, he asserts, "failed to appreciate the deep, tangled roots of sectarian division (attributing it simply to ruling-class manipulation)." English, *Armed Struggle*, quotes at 92, 93. See also Purdie, *Politics in the Streets*, chapter 4.

[387] See Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland, *Northern Ireland Disturbances*, chapter 1.

[388] Interview with Thomas Hughes (who was present at the 1972 civil rights march in the Bogside area of Derry at which 14 unarmed civilians were killed by British paratroopers), Bay Ridge, Brooklyn, July 7, 2011.

[389] Robert W. White, *Ruairí Ó Brádaigh: The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 138–9.

[390] Purdie, *Politics in the Streets*, 127–30.

The Civil Rights Campaign and Irish-American Mobilization

The Northern Ireland civil rights movement's strategic and discursive similarities with the black civil rights campaign alienated many members of established Irish-American organizations.[391] As Maney explains, the Irish by this time had long constituted part of the US ethnic/racial elite and were unreceptive to parallels drawn between the status and grievances of Catholics in Ulster and African Americans.[392] Moreover, in "older working-class urban areas, such as South Boston, a racially informed ethno-nationalist identity forged over a century of preservation for group advancement and competition fueled opposition" to African Americans and other groups.[393] Generally, "groups upholding the distributive status quo in one domestic issue arena are not likely to support redistribution in others," he asserts, "particularly during heightened periods of polarization."[394]

And the 1960s in various parts of the United States could be precisely characterized as such. US urban centers that were once Irish bastions—including Chicago, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia—were marked by tense relations between African Americans and working-class ethnics—"a conflict between the racial have-nots and ethnics who [had] a little and [were] afraid of losing even that."[395] The black civil rights movement's calls for economic justice, and the federal government's response with job training programs and affirmative action laws, were

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391 Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 33. See also Dooley, *Black and Green*.

392 These parallels were not novel. For an historical treatment, see David Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London: Verso, 1991); and Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (London: Routledge, 1996).

393 Maney, "Transnational Mobilization and Civil Rights," 165. Meagher points out that owing to real or perceived group loss of status in Ireland, the Irish in the United States jealously guarded their status vis-à-vis blacks in the American racial hierarchy. He notes, however, that Irish Americans were not just fixated on blacks but that they "battled almost every group when moved to do so." Timothy J. Meagher, "The Fireman on the Stairs: Communal Loyalties in the Making of Irish America," in *Making the Irish American: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States*, ed. J.J. Lee and Marion Casey (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 635.

394 Maney, "Transnational Mobilization and Civil Rights," 156. After noting that there were collection cans in bars all over New York City for the civil rights campaign in the North, one interviewee shared this story: "A Queens bar owner was asked to make a donation to the civil rights cause," and his response was "'I'm not for civil rights in this country, why would I be for them back home?'" Conversation with Liam Murphy, Yonkers, NY, June 18, 2011.

395 Stephen Steinberg, *The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 220.

particularly seen as threatening by skilled trade unions, which maintained a tight labor supply through nepotistic apprenticeship and hiring hall practices.

The building trades, which historically had a strong Irish presence, in particular, had the worst record of racial exclusion.[396] They resisted government reforms and generally defended the status quo and white male privilege.[397] In response to protests that began in "majority-white, heavily working-class" Philadelphia in 1963,[398] which had a ripple effect through other Northern cities, the federal government in 1969 implemented the so-called Philadelphia Plan, which targeted for affirmative action "several nearly all-white trades—the ironworkers, plumbers and pipe fitters, steam fitters, sheet metal workers, electrical workers, roofers, and elevator construction workers."[399] In Philadelphia, "economics and culture—interests and identity—powerfully combined to keep the building trades overwhelmingly white." Many of them had recruited through family connections (e.g., the electrical workers, plumbers, plasterers and cement masons), while the larger unions (such as the sheet metal workers Local 6 and the ironworkers Local 401) drew "members from ethnic associations, Catholic parishes, and neighborhood social networks. . . . Friendship and kin networks were nearly an insurmountable barrier for black workers."[400] As Sugrue explains, "Exclusive hiring practices reinforced the ties

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[396] Jill Quadagno, "Social Movements and State Transformation: Labor Unions and Racial Conflict in the War on Poverty," *American Sociological Review* 57, no. 5 (1992): 622. In Cleveland, for example, only 13 of 7,000 construction union members were black (624).

[397] Marion Crain and Ken Matheny, "Labor's Identity Crisis," *California Law Review* 89, no. 6 (2001): 1782. See also "Civil Rights: Not Racism, but Nepotism," *Time*, August 9, 1963.

[398] Thomas J. Sugrue, "Affirmative Action from Below: Civil Rights, the Building Trades, and the Politics of Racial Equality in the Urban North, 1945–1969," *The Journal of American History* 90, no.1 (2004): 160. The Kennedy administration considered Philadelphia, along with Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles, a "danger spot" because of the level of segregation in the trade unions. The Philadelphia riots of 1963 along with unrest elsewhere prompted Executive Order 11114, which prohibited discrimination against minorities in government-contracted construction projects (164).

[399] Ibid., 146.

[400] Ibid., 157–8.

of ethnicity and community."[401] It was these unions that would become essential to the republican movement in the 1970s and beyond.

Mickey Whelan, a former member of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America Local 608, explained, "Traditionally in construction you have what you hold, and you protect what you have for your sons and your family." New York City construction, he elaborated, developed along ethnic lines: the local on the Upper East Side was Jewish; on the Lower East Side, it was Italian; and on the West Side (Local 608), it was Irish. "The Irish Americans seemed racist," but the antagonism, he asserted, "didn't necessarily stem from racism, but having to protect our own selves and our own jobs."[402]

There were, of course, some unions that were more progressive. The Irish-dominated Transport Workers Union, which honored Martin Luther King at its national convention in 1961, for example, fought for integration in transport at the local level, while thousands of TWU members marched in support of civil rights.[403] However, African Americans and other minority workers continued to be underrepresented in higher paying positions and in the leadership of some of the local TWU branches.

In a broader context of deindustrialization, urban decline, and pervasive racial discrimination, widespread urban rioting erupted across major American cities between 1964 and 1971 mostly by black youth protesting unemployment, housing discrimination, and repressive police practices, among other grievances. Thus, by the time the Northern Ireland civil rights movement emerged in full force in the late 1960s, elements of the US civil rights movement had radicalized and the Black Power movement—which emphasized not integration but autonomy,

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[401] Ibid., 158.

[402] Interview with Mickey Whelan, Dublin, November 12, 2011.

[403] The TWU has a longer history of civil rights activism. In the 1940s, the union staged a boycott in New York and battled the Philadelphia Transport Company for the promotion of minority workers. See: http://www.twu.org/international/our_history#civil_rights (accessed July 20, 2011).

group solidarity, and black nationalism—gained ground, particularly in urban ghettos. Philadelphia Clan na Gael member and Derry-born Brigid Sheils Makowski noted, "the formation of NICRA received a mixed response from Clann-na-Gael members, who equated civil rights with 'Black Power' in the US with which they wanted no association."[404]

According to Maney, frame misalignment across the Atlantic is a key reason that US-based organizations actually undermined the civil rights campaign in Northern Ireland.[405] Irish civil rights leader Bernadette Devlin vociferously advocated solidarity with oppressed blacks and socialists during her US speaking tour in 1969,[406] but her open confrontation with conservative Irish America on social and racial issues was nothing short of divisive.[407] She explained, "I deliberately made a comparison between Ulster's Catholics and America's blacks . . . no doubt I lost a lot of potential contributions by doing this."[408] Her relationship with the Black Panthers had surely alienated much of her American support base. In November 1969, the AOH New Jersey State Board president actually released a statement warning Irish Americans "to be careful with whom they associate their efforts to aid the suffering in Ulster," particularly Bernadette Devlin owing to her affiliations with radical revolutionary socialist groups.[409] However, there were a number of Irish-born interviewees that found the comparison between the Irish in the North and black Americans to be a very meaningful and apt comparison. Indeed, one noted that she supported the mail drives of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) during that time.[410]

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[404] Quoted in Dooley, *Black and Green*, 79. See also her memoir: Bernard, *Daughter of Derry*.
[405] Maney, "Transnational Mobilization and Civil Rights."
[406] For a discussion of Devlin's impact on Irish America, see Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 31–8.
[407] Dooley, *Black and Green*, 91.
[408] Quoted in Ibid., 88.
[409] Eugene J. Byrne, AOH State Board president, November 2, 1969, available in New York University's Archives of Irish America, Records of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, AIA 046, box 5, folder 4.
[410] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, NY, December 13, 2011.

While NICRA activists such as Devlin pursued Catholic inclusion and equality in "non- or even anti-sectarian terms,"[411] drawing explicit links to the goals and framings of the black civil rights movement, some of their American counterparts, such as the American Congress for Irish Freedom (ACIF), emphasized the issue of unification.

The ACIF

The New York-based ACIF, founded in February 1967 without any stimulus from abroad, promoted civil rights in Northern Ireland, but its broader goal was a thirty-two county Ireland. "The overall concept of the ACIF," explained a former key leader, "was a unified Ireland; [civil rights were] like going in through the back door."[412] Civil rights were thus seen as a means to unification, for "it was only a unified Ireland that could ensure civil rights in the North." In correspondence with the Spanish ambassador in Washington, ACIF founder James Heaney outright asserted: "Our ultimate objective is the expulsion of Britain from Northern Ireland. The present civil rights movement is merely one step in that direction. . . . Those supporting the British government in Belfast are actually Englishmen who were planted in Ireland 300 years ago. They're neither Irish in blood or outlook."[413]

Alongside Heaney, a key individual behind the formation of the organization was Vincent Conlon, an IRA veteran of the Border Campaign from Armagh and a prominent member of the Clan na Gael in Philadelphia, who would later be indicted on gunrunning charges. Attending the organization's initial public call for support were some 50–60 individuals, mostly Irish born. Among them were the old guard republicans, including Flannery and Liam Kelly.

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411 English, *Armed Struggle*, 94. English offers a discussion of the birth of the civil rights movement and the role of the IRA in fostering its emergence.
412 Insert interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.
413 Quoted in Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 25.

By contrast, the Irish Americans attending were significantly fewer in number and, according to one interviewee, "were well-dressed and [appeared to be] university educated."[414]

One former leader estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 individuals had been somehow actively involved, and about 20 chapters, with the most active ones in Irish neighborhoods such as Sunnyside in Queens and Olney in Philadelphia, as well as those in Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco. The ACIF monthly newsletter, the *Irish American Reporter*, claimed in 1968 that the organization had a membership from "all walks of life"—from attorneys and professors to bus drivers and clergymen. Although some professionals did join, "a lot of people were more or less business people—[we were] bar owners . . . plumbers . . . Irish-born entrepreneurs."[415] This was apparent in the first concert souvenir journal produced by the New York City chapter in which nearly all of the advertisements belonged to small businesses or independent contractors, most prominently operating in the Bronx and Yonkers, Long Island City, Sunnyside, and Woodside, and Manhattan.[416] Yet through the organization, as one former member noted, "recent exiles and long-time New World residents go to know each other through working together and a free exchange of ideas on how best to re-energize the Cause of Irish Freedom."[417]

According to Liam Murphy, civil rights were emphasized because they were a "hot button issue that could draw attention."[418] By publicizing the pervasive discrimination against Catholics in jobs and housing and their ill treatment by the Northern Ireland security forces—or

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[414] Interviews with Liam Murphy, New York, NY, June 23, 2011, and Yonkers, NY, July 13, 2011.
[415] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011. There were also chapters in Buffalo (NY), Jersey City (NJ), Providence (RI), Dayton (OH), Cleveland (OH), Birmingham (Ala.), Detroit (MI), Syracuse (NY), Springfield (Mass.), New Haven (Conn.), and Charlotte (NC). *Irish American Reporter*, November 1968.
[416] American Congress for Irish Freedom, New York Chapter, "Statement," Souvenir Journal First Annual Concert, November 30, 1969, 2. Made available through the US DOJ, FBI, FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[417] Email correspondence from Liam Murphy, November 4, 2012.
[418] Interview with Liam Murphy (former ACIF board member), Yonkers, NY, July 13, 2011.

as the ACIF's publication put it, exposing "the facts of life in OCCUPIED IRELAND"—the organization sought to shame the British government and create pressure from within the United States "to induce our government to apply pressure on Britain to give up her police state in Ulster."[419] The group's big publicity opportunity came with Heaney's appearance on the Alan Burke show in 1968/9. As one ACIF leader described,

> We in the ACIF had a tremendous break [on the] Alan Burke show; it was generally considered a show for crackpots, nuts, people getting involved in crazy things . . . but it was entertaining. . . . We got a chance to go on for a half hour. Heaney was the main guest. We had one or two loyalist supporters speak. Alan Burke took our side, more or less. It set off a firestorm in Northern Ireland to such an extent that the British government sent out John Taylor to debate with Heaney. That put the ACIF more or less on page 1. [It] became well known in New York and elsewhere. It riled up the unionists to such an extent. What happened was people who were never interested before became part of the fray and most anger became directed against us. Controversy swelled.[420]

Essentially, the ACIF was more nationalist than civil rights oriented, and by late 1969 the group abandoned any pretense of a reform agenda. During a New York chapter event, Heaney outright declared that the organization was at war with Britain and asserted, "We in the A.C.I.F. believe in one man, one vote, one job, one house, and, above all, one nation."[421]

As Dooley explains, "When nationalism replaced civil rights as the paramount political issue in Northern Ireland . . . it became easier for Irish-Americans to duck the contradiction of opposing civil rights in the US while supporting them in Northern Ireland."[422] Recalling the heckling of Devlin during her fundraising speaking tour, another interviewee explained, among "the allies of the civil rights movement was not Irish America, which was seen as conservative.

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[419] *Irish American Reporter* (published by the ACIF), November 1968, 3. The editorial office of the publication was located in Buffalo. Caps in the original.
[420] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011. Liam Murphy and Brigid Brannigan, two other ACIF activists, also mentioned the importance of the organization's appearance on the Alan Burke show.
[421] American Congress for Irish Freedom, New York Chapter, "Statement," *Souvenir Journal First Annual Concert*, November 30, 1969, 2. Made available through the US DOJ, FBI, FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[422] Dooley, *Black and Green*, 92.

Its allies were the New Left; the Clan na Gael and the [Ancient Order of] Hibernians [AOH] were seen as backward looking."[423] Indeed, Devlin herself noted that her visit to the United States in 1969 "goes down in history for screwing the Hibernian agenda."[424] In the words of one long-time AOH member: "Devlin was a brilliant speaker; she was a spell binder. She had the whole country in her hands. But then when Mayor Lindsey gave her the key to the city, she gave it to the Black Panthers . . . in the eyes of Irish Americans she was divisive. They were more conservative, not on Irish freedom but on other issues. These 'shocking' events didn't help the cause; but hurt it in the long run."[425]

The Boomerang: Mutually Reinforcing Radicalization across the Atlantic

The specter of unification with the South, however, played on the worst of loyalist fears of reforming the regime, the political and economic institutions of which were structured to ensure Protestant dominance. A radical right wing had already surfaced in 1966—when the reincarnated Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) declared war on the defunct IRA and killed Catholic civilians. That same year the militant fundamentalist Reverend Ian Paisley formed the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee—a self-proclaimed "united society of Protestant patriots"—which had its own military arm, the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV). These loyalist paramilitary groups emerged in response to the IRA's perceived revival on the 1916 Easter Rising's fiftieth anniversary and in a context of Catholic agitation and government reform initiatives that aimed to quell minority grievances, which unfolded during a period of economic stagnation in the North. With religious conservatives couching the civil rights campaign as a

[423] Brendan Talton (pseudonym), New York, NY, March 30, 2011.
[424] Quoted in Dooley, *Black and Green*, 125.
[425] Interview with Phil Gallagher, AOH leader in Connecticut, September 7, 2011.

conspiracy by the Vatican and Dublin to unify Ireland,[426] discourse directly challenging the partition, as well as socialist republican rhetoric from the movement's radical fringe, was manipulated by hardline unionists to stoke fear and foment a violent backlash by the state and mobs. As Jack McKinney of the *Philadelphia Daily News* explained, "With pro-government newspapers inciting the false fears that the IRA was just employing a new form of trickery to achieve its ultimate goal of getting the British out of Northern Ireland, the ugly forces of reaction began to heat up."[427]

Repression of civil rights activism by the predominantly Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and its auxiliary force, the B-Specials, fueled the outbreak of riots in Derry and Belfast and would seal the civil rights movement's fate. RUC brutality along with loyalist paramilitary and mob attacks against Catholics prompted the reactivation of republican military structures as local defense groups in early 1969[428] and quickly thereafter the resort to politics by other means. As one republican activist explained, "the shift toward armed struggle happened because the civil rights movement didn't have the answers to state repression . . . to the tanks, the bullets. It was our abdication of political responsibility that enabled the IRA to resurrect itself." Indeed, prior to the state's violent backlash, he noted, "the IRA were seen as anachronistic. The young and hip wanted to be associated with the civil rights movement." It

[426] See Richard L. Jordan, "The 'Prophet' of Interposition: The Reverend Ian Paisley and American Segregation," *New Hibernia Review* 15, no. 2 (2011): 40–63. Jordan discusses Paisley's relationship with American militant fundamentalists.
[427] Jack McKinney, "Gandhi Tactics in Ireland; Irish Did Try Non-Violence, But it Failed," *The Philadelphia Daily News.*
[428] Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up," 138–9. According to Dillon, between April and August 1969 the IRA began to exert its influence within NICRA and money had been channeled to the IRA for the purchase of weapons to defend Catholic areas. Martin Dillon, *The Dirty War* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 6.

was only after the repression escalated that the young Irish working-class flocked to the IRA, which had to turn recruits away because there were too many and too few weapons available.[429]

Mobilizing the American Front

Without military resources to wage war, the reconstituted IRA looked to Irish America for guns, money, and political support.[430] As militancy gained ground in the North, "Irish Republicans began to set up their own support groups in the United States, separate from the civil rights support groups and acting as their rivals."[431] As Ó Dochartaigh explains, they activated a dense republican network that was closely linked to the movement in Ireland through strong personal ties.[432] More specifically, it was intimately connected to the leadership of Sean Óglaigh na h'Éireann (the old IRA veterans' association), the IRA Benevolent Society,[433] and remnants of the Clan na Gael.

US-based groups mirrored divisions within the IRA itself, which split into the Official (Marxist) and Provisional (national socialist) camps in 1969 over strategy, with the former

[429] Interview with Brendan Talton (pseudonym), former Australian Aid for Ireland leader, New York, NY, March 30, 2011.
[430] Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, *The Provisional IRA* (London: Heinemann 1987), 233.
[431] Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up With the Splits Here," 143.
[432] Ibid., 147.
[433] Liam Murphy provided a detailed explanation of the differences between the two old IRA veteran organizations: "Anyone who fought in the War for Independence (aka 'First Defence of the Republic' or 'Black and Tan War'—regardless of what, if anything they might have done in the Irish Civil War—was eligible for membership of Sean Oglaigh na hÉireann; such eligibility/membership also conferred with it eligibility both for the 'Black and Tan' Medal, and for a pension from the Dublin government. They observed the commemoration of the 1916 Easter Rising on the liturgical Easter (Roman calendar). The 'IRA Veterans,' on the other hand, were those who had participated in the 'Second Defence of the Republic' (Irish Civil War) on the Republican side. Their Easter commemoration was on the calendar observance of Easter Monday 1916. Nearly all Civil War Republicans were also veterans of the 'Tan War.' By definition some men could be members of both, but Free Staters in the Civil War, who had also participated in the War for Independence, could belong only to Sean Oglaigh na hÉireann." At the same time, "purists" such as Michael Flannery, Murphy further explained, would not join Sean Oglaigh na hÉireann, seeing it as tainted by association with Dublin. Flannery, however, was always an honored guest at that organization's annual Easter Breakfast. Email correspondence with Liam Murphy, June 3, 2012.

favoring social agitation and the latter, military force.[434] Revolutionary republicans from both factions sent their representatives to the United States to garner support. As the North became increasingly polarized and violence escalated, Britain deployed its army to restore order in mid-1969,[435] but troops were quickly perceived by the Catholic minority in the six counties, and those already politically mobilized abroad, as collaborating with repressive state security forces and the loyalist paramilitaries, rather than as a neutral peacekeeping force. A radical diasporic movement concomitantly emerged in support of the IRA.

The well-known representatives for the Provisional IRA, or the "Provos," were Seán Keenan, who served as the public face of the armed group, and Dáithí Ó Conaill—Provisional Army Council member and director of publicity—described by one interviewee as "the real man behind the scene making things happen."[436] Support groups associated with the Provos—first the Clan-na-Gael–backed Irish Action Committee (itself the outcome of a left-right split within the ACIF), which had a web of contacts in the unions, county societies, Ancient Order of Hibernians, and the Gaelic Athletic Association,[437] and later the Irish Northern Aid

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[434] Factional splits within the IRA between the Belfast IRA and Dublin headquarters resulted in the emergence of two wings: the Provisionals and the Officials. The Provisionals took their name from the symbolic Provisional Government of the Irish Republic that was created during the 1916 Easter Rising, while the Officials assumed their name from the fact that they remained in possession of the official office on Gardiner Street in Dublin (email correspondence from Liam Murphy, October 20, 2012). The former was a guerrilla organization that was ideologically socialist and nationalist while the latter touted Marxist ideology and peaceful revolution. As Clark explains, "At the root of the matter was the fact that the North of Ireland men thought self-defense should have greater priority than the Dublin IRA's preoccupation with social goals and agitation." Clark, *Irish Blood*, 18. One analyst described the Provisional-Official split as essentially between "men-of-the-gun and socialist-theoreticians." John McCarthy, Northern Ireland: Irish-American Responses," *The Recorder* 2 (Winter 1986): 46. For an historical account of the split, see Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 89–105. For a detailed discussion of inter-organizational disputes among US-based groups, see Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up."

[435] The normal peacetime presence of British troops in Northern Ireland was about 5,000.

[436] Interview with Liam Murphy, New York, NY, June 23, 2011. According to Murphy, Ó Conaill stayed with his uncle in the Bronx, who was an official in the Local 32 BJ, a property services workers' union that represented porters, maintenance workers, and window cleaners, among others. Murphy described himself as a teacher by day and Ó Conaill's driver by night.

[437] Michael Flannery headed the Irish Action Committee, which had split off from the ACIF over its strong anti-communist views. Clan na Gael members controlled the organization. See Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up," 144, 146.

Committee[438]—would capitalize on the politicization and mobilization of Irish ethnics, albeit very limited, by civil rights groups, especially the ACIF, which collapsed in 1970.[439] Internal bickering over American issues, especially related to the Vietnam War, "brought it down," according to one senior member.[440] ACIF leaders, including Thomas Enright, Martin Lyons, and Robert McCann, would have a hand in the very formation of Noraid that same year.[441] And when word came out that "interested parties should form into Irish Northern Aid . . . most answered the call," he explained, "because that was official from Ireland. The rank and file of ACIF, they all went for this."[442] Longtime activist Brigid Brannigan recalled, "Noraid just suddenly sprouted, just like the resistance movement in Ireland sprouted so rapidly . . . like a phoenix out of the ashes. . . . It seems like one week we were the Congress [ACIF] . . . and then suddenly there was Noraid."[443]

Similarly, the Irish American Action Committee (AIAC) was dissolved and its activities were subsumed by Noraid. "One of the principal reasons for the discontinuance of the AIAC," noted an FBI report,

> was the resolve on the part of its leadership to put a definite end to the confusion that had come about, partly by design on the part of some members of the National Association for Irish Justice (NAIJ), between the identity of the AIAC and a number of organizations established by the NAIJ as affiliates bearing names which included in the title a similar-

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[438] Noraid trustee and head Michael Flannery was a member of fraternal organizations associated with his home county, Tipperary, held positions in the GAA, was a member of the AOH and the Pioneer Association, and was national president of the Clan na Gael. Indeed, Flannery recounted in court testimony that he came to the United States to organize for the republican movement. O'Reilly, *Accepting the Challenge*, 164–5, 171.

[439] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 48. According to Wilson, the leader of the ACIF, James Heaney who was a Protestant with family roots in Derry, estimated that the organization had a core of 3,000 members by 1969 and a few thousand sympathizers and 25 chapters (30).

[440] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.

[441] Liam Murphy described Thomas Enright as a "driving force" behind the ACIF; Wilson, who interviewed Enright, identifies him as ACIF treasurer. Robert McCann is described as ACIF chapter head in Yonkers. Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, quotes at 30 and 28. A copy of the New York City chapter's 1969 journal lists Martin Lyons as chapter president. According to Murphy, these men were present at a 1970 meeting convened in the apartment of Jack McCarthy regarding Noraid's formation. Michael Flannery was also a member of the ACIF.

[442] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.

[443] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.

> appearing name. . . . Because of ideological differences between the leaders of the AIAC, and some of the leaders of the NAIJ and its . . . affiliates, leaders of the AIAC felt this confusion should be abolished, and so dropped all activity under the name of the AIAC.[444]

In sharp contrast to the ACIF and its predecessors, the National Association for Irish Justice (NAIJ) was leftist and ideologically aligned with the Official IRA (OIRA). It had actually been NICRA's official branch in the United States, until it collapsed in 1970.[445] Its members from New York formed the National Association for Irish Freedom (NAIF), which in September 1972 claimed to have 2,000 active members and 50,000 supporters.[446] As a US government report explained: "The NAIF appears to be an organization that grew out of the defunct National Association for Irish Justice . . . which lost the support of many of its original sympathizers as NAIJ became discredited among a large portion of the Irish American Community."[447] NAIJ's involvement, as one editorial asserted, with "the trials and tribulations of International Socialism, YAWF [Youth Against War and Fascism], the Greek Colonels [*sic*], [and] the Black Panthers, ad nauseum," was a mistake that led to its failure to gain support among Irish ethnics.[448] According to Mary Cotter, a member of NAIJ's executive, however, it was not its leftist politics and ties to left-wing movements that led to its demise but rather intra-communal rivalry:

> NAIJ was a broad-based organization [that] could have survived, should have survived but for one thing. From its earlier beginning NAIJ was attacked. Attacked by the very people who should have welcomed it as Irishmen who had kept the spark alive in New York over the past fifty years. Here was an opportunity to "pass the torch" to a new

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444 US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC)," New York, NY, March 22, 1971; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
445 The NAIJ was founded in New York in April 1969 and had 31 branches. It presented "the Irish struggle as part of a worldwide, anti-imperialist, Marxist revolution." Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 31, 9.
446 "Irish Group Questions Nixon's Views," *Irish People*, September 2, 1972, 18.
447 US DOJ, FBI, Report of Henry C. Ruda, New York, "Irish Republican Clubs, United States of America and Canada," September 15, 1972, bureau file no.: 97-5339, 4.
448 P.J. Guinian, "Republican Clubs," *Irish-American Review*, February 20, 1972, 4.

> generation eager to receive it; instead they chose to attack and try to destroy what they saw narrowly as a threat to themselves. And so, NAIJ was attacked—attacked because we were not born in 1916 or '21, attacked because some of us were born here in New York instead of Tipperary, or Cork, or Galway. . . . Self-righteousness and petty jealousies have always been the curse of Irish politics.[449]

In mid-1971, the Irish Republican Clubs (IRC) of the United States and Canada was formed to represent the Official republican movement, with Cotter as the national chair of the group's organizing committee.[450] In October, the IRC issued a statement at the behest of Official Sinn Féin—the Official IRA's political arm—asserting that only Clan na Gael, the Irish Veterans' Association, and the IRC had the authority to speak on behalf of the Officials. It further disclaimed any association with either NAIF or Noraid, although it noted its willingness "to cooperate with any group sincerely interested in cooperating with [it]."[451] However, the bitter rivalry continued, as Official supporters charged Noraid of being "green fascists," who "make use of simple nationalistic, emotional appeals,"[452] while Noraid described members of the latter as "raving communist agitator[s] intent on deceiving Irish Americans."[453] Noraid issued its own statement accusing Official IRA chief of staff Cathal Goulding not only of disseminating black propaganda in Ireland and the United States but also of collaborating with British forces.[454] Despite sharing the common goal for a unified Ireland and some joint protest activity, the

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[449] Mary Cotter, "Letters to the Editor," *Irish-American Review*, March 6, 1971, 4. The year 1916 has tremendous significance in the history of Irish republicanism. It was the year of the Easter Rising by the Irish Volunteer Army against the British, which failed but regrouped in 1919 as the Irish Republican Army. The IRA successfully waged war against the British army, leading the UK government to relinquish control over 26 of Ireland's counties in the South. Here she is referring to IRA veterans.

[450] "Irish Republican Clubs," *The Advocate*, June 19, 1971, 16.

[451] "Irish Republican Clubs U.S.A. & Canada," *The Advocate*, October 23, 1971, 16.

[452] Jan Matthews, "Letter to the Editor," *Irish-American Review*, March 13, 1971, 4.

[453] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 46.

[454] US DOJ, FBI, "Documents Pertinent to Inspection of Records of Registrant," Appendix A, GHQ, "Oglaigh na h'Eireann (Irish Republican Army)," file no.: NY 97-2700.

ideological divide was gaping—even more so in the United States than in Ulster,[455] where Provos and Officials engaged in armed clashes. Although hardly on the same scale, there were threats of violence and actual fist fights between members of Noraid and leftist groups in New York.[456]

Meanwhile Unionist Party officials sent a "Truth Squad" to the United States to undermine civil rights activism on behalf of the North, and Paisley actively promoted the Unionist stance during a US tour in late 1969. They later launched their most "scathing attacks" against Noraid and its supporters, whom they described as "plastic Irishmen" who "dip obligingly into their pockets when collection boxes are rattled in front of them" to finance the murder of Ulster Protestants and British soldiers.[457] Loyalists, however, largely relied on the British government, especially the British Information Services (BIS), to articulate their position to American audiences.[458] Indeed, the monthly publication of the *Orange Order* asserted: "It is true that . . . the whole running has been made by the 'shanty Irish' [i.e., Irish Catholics] in information and propaganda about Ulster. The Scotch-Irish, an older and more honorable influence on the US, have been particularly muted."[459]

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[455] See comment by Patrick McParland in Jack Deacy, "The New York Brigade," *New York Magazine*, March 13, 1972, 42. This point was also brought up in an interview with the president of Republican Sinn Féin, Des Dalton, who noted that the Provisional IRA leadership was committed to socialism. New York, NY, May 2, 2011.

[456] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 47. An FBI memo dated July 17, 1970, reveals that NAIJ was told that their presence at a Noraid sponsored demonstration was unwelcome. *The Irish-American News Review* printed an article on July 18, 1970, in which NAIJ claimed that Noraid organizers "physically mishandled" two members of their executive committee and threatened one of their "young girls" with violence. However, the extent of antagonism between Noraid and the IRC may have also varied by city or even neighborhood.

[457] Quoted in Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 57.

[458] Clark, *Irish Blood*, 37–8.

[459] Quoted in Andrew J. Wilson, "Ulster Unionists in America, 1972–1985," *New Hibernia Review* 11, no. 1 (2007): 57. During the eighteenth century, the Scotch-Irish in Ulster had a triple identity: "Scottish in religion, local dialect, and specific culture; Irish by birth, polity, and local associations; and British by ultimate political allegiance and aspects of their wider culture (educated speech, legal and commercial procedures, etc.). Their national and ethnic identities were thus scarcely fixed, and they themselves were divided about these." David Noel Doyle, "Scots Irish or Scotch-Irish," in *Making the Irish American: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States*, ed. J.J. Lee and Marion Casey (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 152. In the United States, Fallows explains, the term "Scotch-Irish" came to identify Protestant Irish as a separate, and largely acceptable, ethnic group which

After the "Truth Squad" initiative, two small support groups emerged as the Troubles began in New York and Los Angeles (with about a hundred members each) that organized media appearances and receptions for Unionist politicians. Unionists, however, "had little constituency from which they could draw support," explains Wilson. Having long fully assimilated into mainstream American society at least since the 1830s, the descendants of Ulster Protestant immigrants, who earlier constituted a distinct Scotch-Irish community in the United States, "showed little or no interest in the politics of their ancestral homeland."[460] In 1974, the *Washington Post* reported that "the U.S. Justice Department knows of no Protestant-Irish relief groups operating in the United States."[461] Similarly in Canada, another choice destination for Ulster Protestants, support was not overwhelming. In 1972, UDA leaders Tommy Herron and Billy Hull went on a publicity tour in Canada to establish links with Ulster Protestant émigrés to supply arms and weapons.[462] Over the course of three and a half years, the Canadian Ulster Defense Association had raised a mere $30,000 by early 1976.[463] Within just a few years of the conflict's outbreak, "the Unionist 'network' [was] reduced to a few individuals mostly operating in isolation."[464] According to news reports, there were gunrunning schemes out of Canada, England, and Scotland, but the key source of Protestant paramilitary arms and funds was "home grown" in Ulster, where "'free and voluntary contributions' [were] squeezed out of Protestant families throughout Belfast."[465] Thus, no defensive diasporic movement emerged in the United

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merged more quickly into American life." In an anti-Catholic America, it was Irish Catholics who had not only to struggle "for survival but also for respectability in an overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon Protestant country," she contends. Marjorie R. Fallows, *Irish Americans: Identity and Assimilation* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), 6.

460 Wilson, "Ulster Unionists in America," 50.

461 Jim Landers, "Running Guns to Ulster," *Washington Post*, September 8, 1974.

462 Henry McDonald and Jim Cusack, *UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror* (Dublin: Penguin, 2004), 39.

463 Bernard Weinraub, "Arms Smuggling is Said to Aid Protestants Less than the I.R.A.," *New York Times*, February 5, 1976.

464 Wilson, "Ulster Unionists in America, 50.

465 Landers, "Running Guns to Ulster," B3.

States or elsewhere to raise funds or counter republican sympathizers. Essentially the latter task would be left to government officials on both sides of the Atlantic.

By the early 1970s, Noraid eclipsed both civil rights organizations and Official backers, as the Provos had done in Ulster. A July 1970 article in the *Irish Echo* asserted that many Irish-American organizations were supporting the newly formed Noraid.[466] Just as the framing of the civil rights movement as parallel to the African-American struggle in the United States failed to resonate widely, Official IRA ideology and calls for international solidarity with the oppressed repelled mainstream Irish ethnics. An FBI report noted, "This wing of the IRA [the Official], and the NICRA, have . . . exhibited a tolerance for left-wing support that is not shared by other elements of the Irish and Irish-American communities that seek a solution to Ireland's current problems."[467] One journalist bluntly asserted: "The typical IRA supporter in America is a single issue, working class Catholic, politically conservative and viscerally anti-black in outlook, who has nothing in common with radical politics."[468] Another FBI document noted that a source advised: "support for the INAC [Irish Northern Aid Committee] seems to come from more moderate and /or conservative elements within the Irish-American community in [New York City]. The INAC does not seem to attract, and certainly does not welcome, any support from individuals aligned with the 'New Left' or with various radical, left-wing youth elements."[469]

"Activists in New York were anti-British," explained one US-born interviewee who was raised in Ireland; they had "a Brits out policy. The people were for Ireland. Especially in the

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[466] "I.R.A. Veterans Give $1,500 check to Aid Committee," *Irish Echo*, July 11, 1970, 16. According to the article, the funds came from Sean Óglaigh na h'Éireann, the Donegal Association, the United Ireland Committee, and 22 individuals.
[467] US DOJ, FBI, New York, NY, April 27, 1971; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[468] Leonard Doyle, "Sinn Fein Pins Hopes on Noraid for New Blood," *The Independent* (London), January 23, 1989.
[469] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC) Internal Security—Ireland," New York, NY, January 14, 1971; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.

carpenters union—where you made good money—socialism had died out."[470] Similarly, Frances Duffy, a Noraid member in Upper Darby, a suburb of Philadelphia, explained: "People in Noraid did not go for leftist politics. . . . The Irish had no time for anything that smacked of communism. They thought it was anti-Church and identified it with the repression of the Church in Eastern European countries [by the Soviet Union]. They didn't make the distinction between communism and socialism."[471] Neither she nor any of the other interviewees in the Philadelphia area, New York, or Boston could recall there being much support for the Officials.

Indeed, in Irish-American circles left-wing connections were a serious liability.[472] Sinn Féin leader Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, during his trip to the United States in 1973 was said to have been told by a brash Irish-American Texan, "Sonny, I hope you're not trying to set up some God-damn Castro operation over there."[473] Provo supporters seeking to garner American public sympathy and influence US government policy were keenly aware of the danger of red-baiting, making clear that any association with Marxist elements was tantamount to "political suicide."[474] "We have no place for them in an Irish struggle," according to the Irish National Caucus (INC) leadership, "because they deter from Irish nationalism."[475]

The IRC, which had its national headquarters in Woodside (Queens), NY,[476] attempted to form bridges with like-minded groups such as left-wing student associations, black radicals, and anti-war organizations. However, unlike the US-based Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), for example, which a decade later would successfully build a robust

[470] Interview with Mickey Whelan, Dublin, November 12, 2011.
[471] Interview with Frances Duffy, Noraid activist, Upper Darby, Penn., August 14, 2011.
[472] Holland, *The American Connection*, 50.
[473] Interview with Des Dalton, president of Republican Sinn Féin, New York, NY, May 2, 2011.
[474] NYU Archives of Irish America, Irish Republicanism Collection, AIA 022, box 2, folder 5, Letter from Sean W. Walsh IV regarding the goals and purpose of the Irish National Caucus.
[475] NYU Archives of Irish America, Irish Republicanism Collection, AIA 022, box 2, folder 5, Irish National Caucus, "Statement of Purpose."
[476] FBI memos note that the IRC listed its address as being located in Woodside but was, according to postal boundaries, located in Flushing.

network that encompassed an array of actors to directly or indirectly support the FMLN's guerilla campaign,[477] the IRC was also ineffective at drumming up support extra-communally. An internal FBI report dated 1973 noted: "The IRC are reportedly having financial difficulties and have not found it easy or successful, as had been hoped, in the collection of funds."[478] On the same token, noted a State Department document, Officials "do not try as hard as they might in [the] U.S. because their ideology makes it embarrassing for them to ask help of 'reactionary capitalists.'"[479] Official supporters in the United States would remain marginal throughout the conflict,[480] especially after the Official IRA declared an end to its armed campaign in May 1972.

The Irish Northern Aid Committee

By the early 1970s, Noraid emerged as the most active and robust militant Irish-American group, and its branches essentially came to constitute the "backbone" of the republican movement in the United States.[481] Formed in April 1970, the organization was the outcome of a

[477] The civil war in El Salvador—unlike Ulster in which both sides would demonstrate "reciprocal restraint," as Kalyvas described—was one of "spectacular carnage." Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). And certainly, as Gosse explains, "there was far more space . . . for suggesting that the FMLN/FDR [Frente Democrático Revolucionario] *should* win, given that the alternative appeared to be those . . . whom Carter's ambassador to El Salvador had labeled 'pathological killers.'" However, the scale of violence in and of itself cannot explain the organization's success at countering US propaganda of the Cuban-Soviet threat at the height of the cold war and mobilizing widespread extra-communal support among diverse actors, most especially churches. Indeed, CISPES emerged as "the largest, most effective single Central America group in the US." Rather, interpersonal networks developed between US missionaries and activists and organizations in El Salvador during what Gosse described as "an ecclesiastical accompaniment to the Alliance for Progress" were crucial. "America's churches and laity," he explains, were "the one national constituency whose moral basis for opposing intervention could disarm anti-Communism and deflect red-baiters." Van Gosse, "'The North American Front': Central American Solidarity in the Reagan Era," in *Reshaping the U.S. Left: Popular Struggles in the 1980's, Volume III of The Year Left*, ed. Michael Sprinker and Mike Davis, (New York: Verso, 1988), quotes at 26, 16, and 27, respectively.

[478] Quoted in US DOJ, FBI, Report of Henry C. Ruda, "Irish Republican Clubs, United States of America and Canada," January 26, 1973, New York, New York, p. 16. Office file no.: 105-113426; bureau file no.: 97-5329; FOIPA request: 1146084-000.

[479] United States Department of State (DOS), case no. 201102285, June 27, 2011, document F3.

[480] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*.

[481] Clark, *Irish Blood*, 40.

Clan na Gael decision to support the emerging Provisional IRA.[482] Sean Óglaigh na h'Éireann (the US-based old IRA veterans' association, among whom were anti-treaty exiles), according to republican activist Liam Murphy, also threw its weight behind the Provos, voting 16 to 1 to support them.[483]

Thirteen men attended an initial founding meeting hosted at the apartment of IRA veteran and labor leader Jack McCarthy of the Cement and Concrete Workers' Union. Along with two Provisional representatives and McCarthy were: Connie Buckley, Thomas Enright, Peter Finnegan, Michael Flannery, Matthew Higgins, Martin Lyons, John McGowan, Robert McCann, Patrick McParland, and Liam Murphy.[484] Notably, all except for one of these men were Irish-born. "Different people had different functions," Murphy noted, but "the big ones were [the veterans] from the Black and Tan War":[485] Flannery, who headed the IRA Benevolent Society, Inc., and McCarthy, McGowan, and Higgins—who were leaders of Sean Óglaigh na h'Éireann. While led by the so-called Veteran Four from a Bronx storefront, Noraid's designated trustees were none other than senior Northern IRA figures Dáithí Ó Conaill, Seán Keenan, and Joe Cahill.[486] Indeed, in the organization's governing by-laws, Article III noted that its executive council was appointed by its sponsors in Ireland (listed as Joe Clarke and Des Ferguson).

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[482] Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up," 149.

[483] Interview with Liam Murphy, Yonkers, NY, July 13, 2011.

[484] Ibid. All but one of these men were Irish-born: McCarthy (b. Cork); Buckley (b. Cork); Enright (b. Dublin); Finnegan (b. Cavan); Flannery (b. Tipperary); Higgins (b. Scotland [from Donegal]); Lyons (b. Galway); McGowan (b. Clare); McCann (b. Belfast); McParland (b. Belfast); and Murphy (b. US).

[485] Ibid. The Black and Tan War is another term used for the Irish War of Independence. It refers to the uniforms worn by the Royal Irish Constabulary forces that fought against the Irish Republican Army. They were notorious for their brutality against the civilian population.

[486] Originally IRA veteran and Northern Command leader Jimmy Steele (Belfast) was the third trustee; Cahill took his place after he died in August 1970. In 1975, the sponsors were: Joe Clarke (Dublin) and Des Ferguson (Dublin); and the trustees were: Joe Cahill (Belfast) and Sean Keenan (Derry).

In the early years of the Troubles, the stated aims of the organization were: "to provide financial assistance to local defence committees, who maintain the defense patrols that protect innocent people from the violence of British imperialism"; "to alleviate the hardships of people who have lost their jobs, and those who cannot take up employment or collect welfare benefits because of fear of arrest or being shot by sectarian extremists"; "to assist persons who have lost their homes"; "to provide assistance for persons imprisoned for defending their homes against attacks"; and "to provide funds for defensive measures including first aid services."[487] Noraid thus initially "more or less openly canvassed for funds for arms," explains Hanley, aiming to supply both financial and practical assistance to nationalists in the North.[488] In July 1971, the Provisional IRA's chief of staff issued a public statement to "make clear that the Irish Northern Aid Committee . . . is the only organization authorized by the Irish Republican Army Council to collect funds for the Republican Movement. . . . All contributions to [Noraid] will be acknowledge[d] by the Irish Republican Army Council."[489] And outright on its information and donation solicitation forms, Noraid proclaimed itself to be "the only organization in America that supports the Provisional I.R.A."

Officially, Noraid channeled money through the Irish Northern Aid Committee Belfast and later An Cumann Cabhrach—described as a "principal organisation" of the republican movement[490]—which transmitted money to the Green Cross to assist families of IRA

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[487] "Irish Northern Aid Committee Appoints Representatives in New York Area," *Irish World* (New York), May 2, 1970.
[488] Brian Hanley, "The Politics of NORAID," *Irish Political Studies* 19, no. 1 (2004): 2
[489] "General Headquarters Irish Republican Army Ireland Army Council Statement," *Irish World*, July 31, 1971.
[490] Internal UK government memos note that in the Provisional Sinn Féin Booklet Ruairí Ó Brádaigh listed the organization as one of the republican movement's five "principal organisations." The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666, C442497, Confidential draft letter; To: J. Davidson of the British Embassy in Washington, DC; From: M. Hodge of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in London; "Northern Ireland: Public Line on Fund-raising."

prisoners.[491] In its early years, it also sent tons of clothes across the Atlantic for needy families in the North,[492] as the violence had forced approximately 8,180 families to evacuate their homes in the Greater Belfast area between 1969 and 1973—an estimated 80 percent of whom were Catholic.[493]

According to British intelligence, the organization was "by far the largest overseas contributor to the republican movement," providing an estimated two-thirds of expenditures on prisoner dependents.[494] The focus on prisoner support, as one interviewee explained, was a way to "tap into the traditional politics of the IRA." It was "maximum possible buy in, with minimal political opposition"—a way to maintain legality and "broaden the circle" of support by appealing to communal norms of mutual assistance. He offered this personal vignette: "My gran [who lived in Belfast] hated the IRA; it got her three boys thrown in jail and her daughter killed. But she would support prisoners' dependents . . . because they were sons and daughters of the community."[495] Cathleen O'Brien, whose parents headed the Suffolk County, NY, chapter of Noraid, similarly noted that the organization was formed with the intention of being "palatable to the American public."[496]

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[491] Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up," 149. An article published in *An Phoblacht/Republican News* explained that the Green Cross had emerged in Belfast in 1973. It centralized existing loosely coordinated groups operating in nationalist ghettos in Belfast called Prisoners' Dependents Fund committees, which had formed as a response to the onset of Britain's internment campaign in August 1971. In 1979, there were 23 locally based branches in Belfast. The organization was primarily based in Belfast, although it operated in other locations, including Portadown, Loughgiel, Armagh City (County Armagh), all of County Down, and Strabane (County Tyrone). The article described the impact as follows: "To the imprisoned man or woman the knowledge that an organization exists to help their families is a tremendous comfort and softens the blow of imprisonment. To the deprived dependent its existence is a morale booster." "Green Cross 73," *An Phoblacht/Republican News*, November 24, 1979.

[492] By April 1972, the organization had shipped seventy-four tons of clothes to Ireland, the distribution of which was overseen by the Irish Red Cross. P. Keegan, "I.N.A.C. of Bergen County, N.J. Presents Check for Distressed People in North," *Irish World*, April 4, 1972, 9.

[493] Marc Mulholland, *The Longest War: Northern Ireland's Troubled History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 76.

[494] Holland, *The American Connection*, 61.

[495] Interview with Brendan Talton (pseudonym), New York, NY, March 30, 2011.

[496] Interview with Cathleen O'Brien, Riverdale, NY, July 12, 2011.

However, as Ó Dochartaigh explains, US-based Irish republicans also established secret committees to channel money and guns directly to the Provisional IRA. Although these were separate from Noraid, many of those who participated were also active in Noraid.[497] Gunrunning convictions in US courts would provide evidence of this overlap.[498] By 1984, at least 10 Noraid officials or members had been charged with illegally running arms. Flannery himself would admit in court testimony that he had, indeed, separately collected money for the IRA.[499] As one Noraid leader explained, "We were charitable totally for prisoners and their families. And anything other that people did, we did outside. We stepped out and turned the hat around. . . ."[500] Former Noraid executive member Michael Cummings similarly noted, "Many members of INA [Irish Northern Aid], AOH [and] IAUC [Irish American Unity Conference] did give to the IRA visitors but it was a separate process and schedule. Most of the INA money went to support the prisoners' families."[501]

Although in 1971 Noraid registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)—which subjects organizations to government scrutiny of their expenditures, remittances, income, and activities—as a legal non-profit organization providing support to the families of IRA prisoners, Irish, British, and US officials were convinced that it was merely an IRA front.[502] After a long legal battle, which included Noraid filing a $1 million countersuit

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[497] Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up," 149.

[498] Among these are: Daniel Cahalane (head of Delaware County, Penn., unit); Neil Byrne (Noraid member in Philadelphia); Frank Grady (founder and chairman of the Yonkers, NY, unit); Joseph Myles (executive officer); James O'Gara (official in New York). Michael Flannery as well as four other Noraid members, along with notorious gunrunner George Harrison, were arrested on gunrunning charges but were acquitted. For a detailed account, see Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*; and Holland, *The American Connection*.

[499] O'Reilly, *Accepting the Challenge*, 174.

[500] Unattributable interview, 2011.

[501] Email correspondence with Michael Cummings, April 24, 2012.

[502] Flannery himself in court testimony maintained that "not one penny" of Noraid collections went to the IRA, although he did separately collect money for the IRA. In the wake of the Hunger Strikes, he stated, "Everybody I met seemed to be giving me money, and exclusively for the IRA." O'Reilly, *Accepting the Challenge*, 174–5, quote at 175.

against the US government for harassment in 1977, a US court ruled in 1981 that Noraid had to register with the armed group as its foreign principal. Noraid would henceforth file its FARA reports as a foreign agent of the IRA but only with the caveat that it had been forced to do so. It eventually did not cooperate.

Given that the organization had given an enormous amount of discretionary spending power to their allies across the Atlantic, however, even some leadership figures were not certain of how its remittances were spent. In the words of one interviewee: "We didn't know where it went. And we didn't care where it went."[503] This point echoed a comment by Noraid publicity director Patrick McParland in 1972: "We're 3,000 miles away from the situation and it is up to the people back home to do what they see fit with the money."[504] And again, it was reinforced by a former Noraid chairman of the Washington, DC, unit: "We collect money for Republican prisoners, and, personally, I don't care what they do with it after that."[505]

Noting that only about 20 percent of IRA financing came from the United States, it asserted: "American money is important because the USA is a ready source of weapons." British officials estimated that about $100,000 a year never left United States but was instead used to purchase arms.[506] Security agencies were never able to prove that the organization's funds were used to purchase arms, although US weapons certainly made their way across the Atlantic. Between 1972 and 1974, noted one British document, 85 percent of weapons recovered from the Provisional IRA were of American origin, although this figure declined to 50 percent by 1975.[507] By the mid-1980s, more than 1,400 weapons had been seized by authorities in the Republic of

[503] Unattributable interview, 2011.
[504] Kathleen Teltsch, "In Bronx Storefront Campaign Outpost for the I.R.A.," *New York Times*, July 30, 1972.
[505] Peter Almond, "American Partisans of IRA Now Openly Part of Struggle," *Washington Times*, August 12, 1985.
[506] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269, Confidential, "PIRA Fund Raising and Gun Running in the United States," [Contingency Briefing for the New Secretary of State], Brief no.: S22, Division 4 (L), August 27, 1976, 1.
[507] Ibid., 1.

Ireland, according to the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, while the RUC estimated that three out of four traceable guns used in IRA killings were American-made weapons.[508]

As Holland contends, whether or not Noraid actually used funds to purchase weapons or directly funneled money to IRA coffers is largely academic: money is fungible—resources spent to support the dependents of IRA prisoners freed up funds to be used for weapons and other supplies.[509] Thus, in addition to being compatible with staple mutual self-help practices in the immigrant community and more "palatable" to American audiences, prisoner support was also militarily strategic as it "lift[ed] the burden of the IRA to support prisoners."[510] And in the words of Michael Flannery, soldiers relieved of financial worries regarding their dependents made them "better fighters."[511] As one Noraid activist in the Washington, DC, area explained:

> It was a big help to the movement to have us taking care. Imagine the worry. We had all different arrangements. We turned money over to New York for big events. Most money went to Derry some to Belfast. There were people here who had family living in Derry; we would send over money when someone was going; we couldn't send checks. We were putting milk and bread on the families' tables. It went to an organization in Derry to help whichever family needed it. I have letters from some of the wives thanking me. If the families suffered, it would put pressure on the prisoners; if you wanted to drop out [of the IRA] you could get out of prison.[512]

"Noraid undoubtedly contributed to IRA arms-buying in the US," explain Bishop and Mallie. However, most contributions were actually given "by sympathisers with no direct

[508] American 'Charity' and the Irish War: For Guns or Butter?" *Chicago Tribune*, December 2, 1984, 25.
[509] Holland, *The American Connection*, 60.
[510] Interview with Brendan Talton (pseudonym), March 30, 2011, New York, NY.
[511] A.J. McIlroy, "Row Brews Over IRA Man's Funds Campaign in U.S.," *Daily Telegraph*, August 14, 1979.
[512] Conversation with Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), June 22, 2011.

connection to any of the pro-republican organizations. This became inevitable once it became clear that Noraid . . . had been thoroughly infiltrated by US security agencies."[513]

The Fundraising Machine

"The organization," wrote Flannery in his memoirs, "got off to a flying start both socially and financially."[514] In January 1972, Noraid's information and donation solicitation sheet, listed 36 US branches,[515] although correspondence with an interested participant in October 1971 asserted that the organization had 49 chapters in the United States and Canada.[516] In the wake of Bloody Sunday on January 30, 1972, when British soldiers killed 13 unarmed civilians during a NICRA protest in Derry, Flannery claimed that the organization had over a hundred chapters and a membership of 80,000.[517] In September 1972, the Bronx-based pro-IRA newspaper the *Irish People* noted that 80 units with some 70,000 members channeled money to the Bronx headquarters, which then sent it to officers in the IRA's Provisional wing.[518] Accepted estimates from 1972 range from 70 to 80 chapters and 7,000–10,000 members.[519] In February 1973, an FBI report had estimated that the organization had about 63 chapters. In Noraid's first official statement on its membership figures in 1976, it proclaimed only 54 chapters and 2,055 members, presumably its active core.[520]

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[513] Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 235. They also assert that the Irish National Caucus, which from its inception in 1974 until the late 1970s served as a pro-IRA lobbying arm in the United States, had also been infiltrated. INC head Sean McManus also mentions the issue of government surveillance in his autobiography, *My American Struggle*.
[514] O'Reilly, *Accepting the Challenge*, 143.
[515] Catalogued in FBI files on January 20, 1972, FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[516] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee," bureau file no.: 97-5299, February 28, 1973, New York, NY.
[517] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 70.
[518] Frank Greve, "Holyoke, Mass. Speaks Out: The Exiled Children of Brian Boru Carrying on the Fight for Ireland," *Irish People*, September 2, 1972.
[519] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 70.
[520] Ibid., 70 and 139.

Another indicator of the organization's scope of consistent support was the actual distribution of the *Irish People*, which was launched in July 1972 by Sister St. Hugh literally right next store to Noraid's main office, which provided staff support. By the mid-1970s, the paper had encountered significant financial troubles. With the republican leadership in Ireland fearing that the paper's folding would constitute a sign of weakness in support,[521] Noraid kept it afloat financially, and its members served as staff editors, contributors, and distributors, and even shared office space with the paper during 1975–76. During that time, the *Irish People* had a weekly press run of about 9,000, a distribution of about 6,400, but only a total of approximately 3,500 direct subscriptions.[522]

There was some revival in the early 1980s. The Hunger Strike of 1981—during which 10 men no older than 30 years-old starved to death inside Her Majesty's Prison (HMP) Maze (aka the H-Blocs) in protest of conditions and their denial of political status—swelled Noraid coffers. Noting that support was on the rise, a 1981 *Wall Street Journal* article reported: "Donations are pouring into its treasury, new recruits are signing up, and it has added 10 new chapters for a total of 90 nationwide."[523] In 1984, there were a reported 102 chapters nationwide with 5,000 active members.[524] On the eve of Noraid's split in 1989, the organization was estimated to have retained its level of active membership along with approximately 30,000 supporters on the

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[521] See Liam Ó Murchadha, available at: http://www.irishfreedom.net/Cultural/Special%20Events/MFlannery/M.%20Flannery%20.htm.

[522] In 1984, the US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the US Attorney General, ruling that *The Irish People*, Inc., was controlled by the Irish Northern Aid Committee and thus had to register as a foreign agent under FARA. In 1986, the *Irish People* won an appeal of that decision, maintaining its independence of Noraid. The judgment in favor of the *Irish People* found that Noraid did not retain financial control over the paper or editorial decisions. Although the Attorney General (AG) had shown that Noraid financially sustained it through advertising and that an overlap of personnel existed, including the dual role of Martin Galvin as both publicity director of Noraid and editor of the *Irish People*, the AG did not present any evidence that Noraid exercised formal control over the paper.

[523] Stanley Penn, "Ulster Pipeline: How U.S. Catholics Help their Brethren in Northern Ireland," *Wall Street Journal*, October 12, 1981.

[524] Jack Anderson, "Friends of Irish Under Fire," *Chronicle*, March 21, 1984.

periphery.[525] The following year, an FBI source estimated that there were only 38 active chapters,[526] although another document listed 57.[527] At the end of 1990, there were a mere 600 paid members on file in Noraid's central office—a figure the organization estimated was about 10 percent of its strength.[528]

Longitudinal Trends in Fundraising

Noraid's early appeals "to the Irish Conscience" of "Erin's exiled children in America" were modest: $5 donations "to support the . . . downtrodden Irish people . . . fighting for their very existence in British-occupied Ireland." A typical fundraiser, often entailing dinner and music, would require just a few dollars for admission, while individual donations to Noraid's central office were generally modest, with typical (reported) donations ranging from $5 to $25 and occasional heftier sums of $50 or $100. Hence, as one Noraid leader remarked: "They used to call us, 'The men of twenty dollars.' That's the way it was. We could never get the big money; we tried."[529]

Although existing figures are hardly accurate, Noraid's fundraising spiked in 1972. In the words of one Philadelphia activist, "After Bloody Sunday . . . that's when the money really started coming in."[530] Thereafter, its support base considerably declined over the 1970s with some revival in the following decade. Based on an interview with Martin Galvin—who assumed the helm of Noraid in the mid-1980s—Bishop and Mallie contend that "Noraid was sending

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[525] Leonard Doyle, "Sinn Fein Pins Hopes on Noraid for New Blood Money," *Independent*, January 23, 1989.
[526] US DOJ, FBI, Memorandum; From: SA [name redacted], To: DADIC (199F-1564); Subject: "Irish Northern Aid Committee, aka Noraid"; January 20, 1990, file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.
[527] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), also known as Noraid," New York, NY, February 20, 1990, file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.
[528] Irish Northern Aid Committee, Political Action Department, Gerry Coleman, National Director, "Political Action Report 1990."
[529] Interview with Gerry Coleman, Jersey City, NJ, June 13, 2011.
[530] Interview with Jimmy McPaul, Philadelphia, October 8, 2011.

$600,000 to Ireland in the first years of the conflict but in the mid-seventies this figure dipped to $160,000. During the Hunger Strike of 1981, the figure leapt to $800,000 but afterwards fell back to $300,000."[531] Noraid figures of its remittances and expenses as provided to the US Department of Justice as required under FARA depict the same trend (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). In the second half of 1988, for example, Noraid reported about $166,000 in total receipts and remitted $62,500.[532]

Noraid's figures, however, only give a partial picture of the monetary support mobilized for the movement. Aside from issues of siphoning and underreporting, they obviously do not take into account sums raised through parallel efforts (i.e., by Noraid members who had "turned their hats") explicitly for arms and other supplies. As an FBI report noted, "Noraid routinely function[ed] with two sets of accounting books."[533] They also do not include sums raised by individual chapters—which operated largely autonomously from headquarters in New York—that circumvented the central office.[534] And they also exclude what one longtime activist called "private parties," at which an activist would host a prominent IRA figure, a former prisoner, or a republican fugitive, and a select number of guests would be invited to attend a gathering for a considerable sum.[535]

Noraid rank and file also worked jointly with other organizations—not always with the blessing of the leadership—forming ad hoc committees for specific purposes, such as the legal defense of men accused of involvement in gunrunning from the United States, which also tended

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[531] Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 235.
[532] US DOJ, "Supplemental Statement," file no.: 199F-NY-C269194-2, p. 11. Noraid's expenses amounted to about $170, 500.
[533] US DOJ, FBI, Teletype, routine, New York (199F-1564), December 18, 1989, p. 10; file no.:199F-NY-C269194.
[534] Three interviewees from separate state chapters noted that not all money had been channeled through the central office but was carried over in cash to relatives.
[535] Interview with Cathleen O'Brien, Riverdale, NY, July 12, 2011. KLA fundraisers in the United States used the same technique. According to Perritt, they would bring out KLA fighters or survivors of Serb attacks to generate sympathy and contributions with their personal stories. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2008), 95.

to include monetary support for their dependents. The Dallas Forth Worth Five Defense Fund, the Philadelphia Defense Fund, and the Irish-American Defense Fund (IADF) were among such initiatives. The legal fees of these men alone amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Money spent battling the US government inevitably detracted from channeling money abroad.[536] However, according to Frances Duffy—whose late husband had been charged and acquitted of conspiracy to illegally export arms to Northern Ireland—such committees could draw in support from a broader base than Noraid because these men were often known to their communities.[537]

At a New York fundraising event at Gaelic Park in August 1972, for example, the Dallas Defense Fund raised over $10,000 in admission charges alone.[538] According to gunrunner George Harrison's records, the IADF garnered about $265,000 from its inception in May 1982 through December 1983 for the legal aid of 24 men on trial, including Flannery and Harrison himself.[539]

And Noraid was not the only organization sending money. As one article noted,

> It is as the IRA's secret fund-raising body—some also allege gun-running as one of its functions—that Clan na Gael is really significant. While Noraid attracted all the public notice and vitriol during the years of the Provisional IRA's campaign . . . Clan na Gael remained invisible to the public eye. And while Noraid's funds went largely to the families of IRA prisoners, those from Clan na Gael are believed to have gone straight into the IRA's war chest.[540]

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[536] Indeed, a report of an August 1972 Mid-Manhattan unit meeting noted that there was "heated" discussion around "the preoccupation of the IRA in the U.S. with the detention of the so-called 'Dallas 5.'… It was pointed out that this effort might undermine the effectiveness of the campaign in support of the Long Kesh prisoners. [Yet the] incident is considered a very basic threat to the IRA movement as it threatens the source of the M-16 rifle[s] and bazookas." "Meeting of the Mid-Manhattan Chapter of the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Provisional IRA), August 24, 1972. US DOJ, FBI, file no.: NY 105-109381, received August 30, 1972. Author not provided. It seems that the report was written by a government infiltrator and/or informant.

[537] Interview with Frances Duffy, Upper Darby, Penn., August 15, 2011.

[538] "N.Y. Goes Wild for Texas 5 at Gaelic Park: Nixon Accused of Pandering to the British," *Irish People*, August 19, 1972, 1.

[539] New York University's Archives of Irish America, George Harrison Papers, AIA 009.

[540] Ed Moloney, "Clan na Gael Split a Worry for Sinn Féin," *Sunday Tribune*, October 4, 1998, available at: http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/mal10-41.htm (accessed March 10, 2012).

"Clan na-Gael flew under the radar of the federal government and funneled huge sums to the IRA from the U.S. from their various 'Camps,'" explained Michael Cummings.[541] These sums are, of course, impossible to know. In addition, the Freedom For All Ireland (FFAI) Committee of the Ancient Order of Hibernians raised money for charities benefiting prisoners and other causes to further the unification of Ireland via its annual Christmas appeal.

Figure 3.1



Source: Figures drawn from FARA reports for all full years available. Figures were reported for six-month periods (February to July; August to January). The chart above includes the combined figures for Noraid's remittances and disbursements (including administrative expenses) as an estimate of its income given that it did not report its income for all years. Data for 1981–1983 regarding remittances and disbursements is either incomplete or non-existent. In the first half of 1981, Noraid reported approximately $250,000 in receipts, which means that there was likely a spike in income that year (see Figure 3.2).

[541] Email correspondence with Michael Cummings, April 24, 2012.

Figure 3.2



Source: These figures represent all February through July reports available under FARA, which happen to be more numerous than the available years of the August through January cycles. Doubling these figures as an estimate for the year, however, would be highly inaccurate, given that the organization's annual testimonial dinner was held in the early part of the year and thus its receipts were typically greater from February to July.

Fundraising Trends and Violence in Northern Ireland

The decline in funding over the 1970s, as depicted in the above figures, occurred in tandem with a decline in violence in the North (See Figure 3.3). Noraid propaganda focused attention on the indiscriminate nature of British, RUC, and loyalist paramilitary abuses, painting a picture of a community under attack and, indeed, being terrorized and driven out of their homes.[542] Mob attacks and the burning out of Catholic neighborhoods, the flight of as many as 8,000 refugees from Belfast across the border to the Republic of Ireland, and Bloody Sunday were among the early events that were the brushstrokes of this portrait.

Noraid was also persistent in couching the conflict as an anti-colonial struggle against Britain, a framing that gained traction with the British government's suspension of the Northern

[542] Between July and the end of October 1969, an estimated 1,820 families, the vast majority of whom were Catholic and constituting 5.3 percent of Catholic households in Belfast, "were forced out of their homes as loyalists attempted to ethnically cleanse parts of west and north Belfast." See Brendan O'Duffy, *British-Irish Relations and Northern Ireland: From Violent Politics to Conflict Regulation* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 75.

Ireland parliament (Stormont) and the imposition of direct rule over Ulster in March 1972.[543] This frame coincided in its targeting of British security forces and avoidance of "any operations which had obviously sectarian overtones."[544] It vociferously countered the portrayal of the Troubles as a sectarian war between Catholics and Protestants, a framing, it argued, that was propagated by Britain and the American "Anglophile press" to encourage noninvolvement by the United States.[545]

Indeed, the struggle was often compared to the American War of Independence, and its historical roots were traced back to the Society of United Irishmen, a revolutionary group inspired by the American and French Revolutions that emerged in Ireland at the end of the eighteenth century. The role of America's Irish in the Union Army during the US Civil War, especially the Irish Brigade, was also intertwined in appeals for support grounded in the principle of reciprocity—the Irish helped the Americans, the Americans should help us.

Yet the actual dynamics of violence on the ground from the mid-1970s onward seemingly challenged Noraid's liberation struggle framing. And while the republican movement may not have couched the conflict in sectarian terms, the ethno-religious dimension was starkly apparent in material published in loyalist newspapers, such as Paisley's *Protestant Telegraph* and *U.D.A.*

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[543] The British government suspended the Northern Ireland parliament (Stormont) and assumed direct control over Northern Ireland in March 1972. The territory was administered by the Northern Ireland Office headed by the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. Direct rule was abolished in 2007.

[544] Eamon Collins with Mick McGovern, *Killing Rage* (London: Granta Publications, 1997), 295. As they note, "The IRA–regardless of public utterances dismissing condemnations of their behaviour from church and community leaders—tried to act in a way that would avoid severe censure from within the nationalist community; they knew they were operating within a sophisticated set of informal restrictions on their behaviour, no less powerful for being largely unspoken" (295).

[545] M. Gearoid Baréid, Liam O'Murchadha, Robert McCann, and Des Ferguson, *The Irish Question* (New York: Irish Northern Aid Committee, 1975), 28.

News, the Ulster Defence Association's (UDA) publication. The anti-Catholic commentary was virulent and the discourse de-humanizing.[546]

Figure 3.3



Source: Data for this chart were drawn from the Sutton Death Index files compiled by Michael Sutton on the University of Ulster's CAIN website concerning Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland.

[546] An early issues of *UDA News*, for example, contained such terms as "vermin," "Bogside parasites," and "scum" in reference to republican supporters among the Catholic minority. *Official UDA News*, vol. 1, no. 6, June 15, 1972; vol. 1, no. 12, August 9, 1972. Commentary regarding media censorship in latter volume, for example, asserted: "The I.R.A. and their supporters are winning the propaganda war; don't let them. They are scum and must not be permitted by our apathy and civilized outlook to win anything," p. 2. These issues are available at the National Library of Ireland (Dublin).

Figure 3.4



Source: The data for this chart were drawn from the Sutton Death Index files compiled by Michael Sutton on the CAIN website. The category "civilians" here includes not only those coded as civilians (civ) but also entries coded as civilian political activists (CivPA), off-duty prison officers (POs), and f1ormer RUC (x-RUC), former Ulster Defence Regiment (x-UDR), former prison officers (x-POs), and former paramilitary members (x-INLA, x-IRA, x-OIRA, x-UDA, x-UVF). The bulk of "civilians," however, were those coded as "civilians" in the database.

Not only was there an absolute decline in violence overall from the peak year in 1972—the year of Bloody Sunday and the abrogation of the Stormont regime—but civilian deaths began to far outstrip combatant fatalities from 1974 through 1976 (See Figure 3.4). Moreover, the number of Catholic civilian deaths caused by British security forces steeply declined, at the same time that the IRA's bombing campaign intensified in the North and in English cities from mid-1972 to mid-1974. On Bloody Friday, July 21, 1972, the IRA unleashed 22 bombs across Belfast. According to Wilson, the immediate media backlash against the IRA, "prompted Noraid officials to contact Seán MacStiofáin [Provisional IRA chief of staff] and tell him that the IRA bombing campaign was severely affecting republican fund raising and destroying its image in

America."[547] The IRA attempted to counter its portrayal as a bunch of depraved lunatics, claiming that British officials ignored bomb warnings to damage the IRA's image.

With the exception of 1973, loyalist paramilitary violence against Catholic civilians—by such groups as the UVF and the UDA and its Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)—remained high through 1976, but then precipitously dropped off (see Figure 3.5). A member of the Ulster Defence Association's inner council explained that during the mid-1970s the organization had shifted away from random sectarian killings to an exclusive focus on the IRA since indiscriminate violence "drove ordinary, decent Catholics behind the IRA for protection."[548] Others contend that the de-escalation of violence was the result of British demilitarization policy, alleging not only collusion with the loyalist paramilitaries but also Military Intelligence and Special Branch infiltration of them.[549] In 1977 and 1978, republican forces (mainly comprised then of the Provisional IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army [INLA], a splinter group of the Official IRA) were actually responsible for more Catholic civilian fatalities than loyalist paramilitaries, most of which were seemingly inadvertent, although some were targeted assassinations of alleged informers. In the late 1980s, the trend would reverse with the loyalist paramilitaries committing more civilian fatalities, although at a much lower rate than in the early 1970s.

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[547] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 82.
[548] Quote from Sammy Duddy, a member of the UDA inner council, quoted in "UDA Sets its Sights Only on Extremist Groups," *Guardian* (London), August 15, 1979.
[549] This argument assumes not only significant degrees of collusion between British security forces and the loyalist paramilitaries, but also heavy infiltration of their ranks by Military Intelligence and Special Branch. Essentially it contends that the British government was able to "turn off" loyalist violence and did so as part of its policy of its demilitarization of the conflict from 1976 onward. See Relatives for Justice, *Collusion* (Belfast: Relatives for Justice, 2002), 9.

Figure 3.5



Source: The data for this chart were drawn from the Sutton Death Index files compiled by Michael Sutton on the CAIN website. "Summary organization" is a composite category; "British Security Forces" include the British Army, the RUC, and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR); "Loyalist Paramilitaries" include the UFF, UDA, UVF, and the Red Hand Commandos. The category "civilians" here includes not only those coded as civilians (civ) but also entries coded as civilian political activists (CivPA), off-duty prison officers (POs), and former RUC (x-RUC), former Ulster Defence Regiment (x-UDR), former prison officers (x-POs), and former paramilitary members (x-INLA, x-IRA, x-OIRA, x-UDA, x-UVF). The bulk of "civilians," however, were those coded as "civilians" in the database.

Thus, what was perceived as indiscriminate human rights violations and violence against a distinct community initially bolstered the position of militants vis-à-vis both reformists and moderates. The introduction of internment in 1971, which during its peak rounded up 1,874 Catholics most of whom had no ties to the IRA and a mere 107 Protestant/loyalists,[550] coupled with brutality,[551] also galvanized support behind the IRA. As the London *Sunday Times* reported,

[550] See Martin Melaugh, "Internment – Summary of Main Events," CAIN Web Service, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/intern/sum.htm (accessed March 10, 2012).

[551] Amnesty International in 1971 concluded that the ill-treatment of internees by British security forces did amount to brutality and therefore was in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In 1972, Lord Gardiner's *Minority Report* found the following five interrogation measures used on internees to be immoral and illegal under UK domestic law: wall-standing, hooding, noise, food and water deprivation, and sleep deprivation. Similarly the European Commission on Human Rights in 1976 also determined that these five interrogation techniques—which had been developed in British counterinsurgency operations in such places as Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus—did indeed constitute torture while other police practices were inhuman and degrading. Two years later, in 1978, the European Court of Human Rights determined these techniques did not constitute torture but were inhuman

the jailed in "the cages" of Long Kesh prison "keep resentment high in the tightly-knit areas where their families and friends live: they give the Provisional IRA an invaluable instrument for drumming up support, NOT LEAST FINANCIAL SUPPORT IN AMERICA; and they are therefore influential, out of all proportion to their numbers."[552] Internment was terminated in December 1975, although the so-called Diplock courts (trial without jury) would remain until 2007.[553] As Wilson asserted, "less committed members, who had joined in the emotional wave created by internment and Bloody Sunday, withdrew their support" over the course of the decade.[554]

The emergence of a peace movement in 1976 and the IRA's response to it also contributed to the deflation of peripheral support in mid-decade. Prompted by the death of three children, who had been killed in a car crash involving an IRA volunteer who had been shot to death while fleeing the British Army, the Peace People movement mobilized thousands on the streets to protest violence.

The tragedy, explained Brendan Talton, "was manipulated by everyone for their own purposes." He elaborated: the loyalists howled for blood; the IRA lionized Danny Lennon—the

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and degrading, and thus in breach of the European Convention. For further discussion see, Laura K. Donahue, *Counter-terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom, 1922–2000* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001), 117–23.

[552] "Irish Unity and Ulster Justice," quoted in the *Irish People*, October 7, 1972, 16, caps in original.

[553] The courts were named after Lord William Diplock, who headed a commission of inquiry that issued a final report in 1972 recommending that trial by jury be suspended and that a single judge preside over paramilitary cases. The justification was to counter jury intimidation. However, as Donahue asserts, only limited information was gathered during the commission's proceedings and "no evidence regarding actual cases of intimidation was produced." It also made recommendations regarding evidence and the onus of proof. Donahue, *Counter-terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom*, 126. The government ultimately incorporated many of the commission's recommendations into an emergency statue, while a number of measures of the Special Powers Act in place from 1922–1944 were reintroduced. The 1973 Emergency Provisions Act also extended powers regarding: arrest, detention, and internment; closing of licensed premises; blocking of roads and use of vehicles in specified areas; entry, search, and seizure; taking possession of land or property suspected to be used in the commission of terrorist acts; and prohibiting meetings, assemblies, and processions, among other measures. See Donahue, *Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom*, 117–55; for analysis of how these measures evolved and the new measures implemented between 1973 and 1996, see 156–206.

[554] Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*, 75.

dead volunteer—and attacked the movement to try to counter British propaganda and limit loss; and the Northern Ireland Office and mainstream media denounced the IRA, painting its combatants as heinous monsters while conveniently ignoring the question of why the British Army was shooting on a busy civilian thoroughfare.[555] In October 1976, the movement's leaders, Betty Williams and Máiread Corrigan, filmed an appeal on the Public Broadcasting System in the United States asking Americans to cease funding the IRA. They also were interviewed for the December 1976 issue of *Ms. Magazine*, in which they reportedly condemned violence on all sides.[556]

Although enthusiasm for the peace movement quickly waned among Northern Ireland's ghettos,[557] the movement's leaders continued to receive international attention and recognition. In mid-1977, a republican activist had noted in correspondence, "We have the peace people . . . here [in Washington, DC] almost constantly."[558] And at the end of that year Williams and Corrigan received the Nobel Prize. The movement ultimately unraveled, as its leaders could offer little more than a simplistic appeal for both sides to lay down their weapons.

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555 Interview with Brendan Talton (pseudonym), New York, NY, March 24, 2011.

556 "Peace leaders beaten," *Times-Herald* (Newport News, Va.), October 11, 1976, 30. According to the AP report, the two women were punched and kicked by an angry mob of Roman Catholics in Belfast. It also reported that the Bishop of Londonderry accused the IRA of a "smear campaign" against the movement, by charging that peace activists only focused on denouncing IRA violence and not loyalist paramilitaries or British security forces. According to a column by Jane O'Reilly, the television interview had to be moved from Buffalo to New Orleans as a result of hostility from republican sympathizers who claimed Williams and Corrigan were tools of the British government. "'Dying for Peace Isn't a Bad Death,'" *Washington Star*, November 15, 1976, D-2.

557 "The Press and the Peace People," in *The British Media and Ireland,* ed. Campaign for Free Speech on Ireland (London: Information on Ireland, nd), 44. According to historian Tim Pat Coogan, part of the reason for the peace movement's demise was that it gave the appearance of being solely anti-IRA rather than anti-violence in all its forms more broadly. He argues the Northern Ireland Office used the movement as a smokescreen for political inertia. See Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 401.

558 Private correspondence, Letter to Reverend Piaras O'Duill, sender name and signature unavailable on copy, June 13, 1977.

By the end of the 1970s, "the IRA was believed to have been badly depleted by arrests, deaths and infiltration by the security forces."[559] A February 1979 *Washington Post* article reported that "the Irish Republican Army outlaws and their Protestant counterparts [were] rapidly losing support" among Ulster's "weary and heartsick" populace while the IRA's "financial support in the United States [was] drying up."[560] By the end of 1979, the *Baltimore Sun* asserted that only a "small, hard-core minority" within the Irish-American community was supporting the republican movement. Officials estimated that the proportion of support that Noraid provided for the IRA's campaign dropped from 70 percent to 25 percent in 1975.[561] Flannery would attribute this decrease to economic depression in the building trades, rather than waning support in the wake of public attacks on Noraid by prominent politicians, civilian fatalities and casualties by IRA bombings, or donor fatigue. "One reason for the leveling off," he argued, "was the lack of building work in New York. That is bad for the Irish tradesmen. Most of them are now on welfare."[562]

Rather than diasporic financial support, news reports contended that the bulk of the IRA's resources were coming from bank robberies in the Republic of Ireland and extortion rackets in the North.[563] The Provisional IRA, of course, denied communal exploitation. In the words of one commander: "If we fuck with the community, we're lost. If we alienate or piss off people, they won't help us. . . . They won't trust us. And without the community behind us, it's all over.

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[559] Leonard Downie, Jr., "As Death Toll Climbs, Security Forces Are Increased," *Washington Post*, August 29, 1979.
[560] Jack Anderson, "Ulster Turning Away Form Terror," *Washington Post*, February 1, 1979.
[561] Ernest B. Furguson, "Americans who aid Ulster called 'real' Irish enemies," *Baltimore Sun,* November 19, 1979.
[562] White, "The American Connection."
[563] "Aid to IRA Falls as U.S. Support Groups Split," *Washington Star,* September 7, 1979, A-5.

We're dead."[564] Given the extent to which personal ties, especially kin relations, were crucial to the flow of information within the network, this argument would naturally extend to the diaspora.

And the leadership was, indeed, aware of the danger of alienating the diaspora, as for example with bombings of targets that caused the deaths of ordinary civilians.[565] According to the British and Irish governments, the IRA's bombing in Brighton, England, which nearly killed Thatcher and her cabinet, was a strategy to "solidify American backing by proving that it [could] attack Britain and reduce indiscriminate bombings. Attacks on military and government targets reinforce[d] the belief of Noraid members that the IRA [was] fighting a 'legitimate' war."[566]

It was the Hunger Strike of 1981, however, that would proverbially reshuffle the deck by refocusing attention on human rights abuses by security forces in the North, this time from within the prisons. The successive deaths of ten inmates from starvation—a powerful symbolic weapon of the weak in Irish culture—in protest of Britain's withdrawal of political prisoner status of the IRA and INLA, and the Thatcher government's refusal to change the basic terms of their incarceration,[567] was a victory for the cause that led to a spike in financial support as well as protest activity in the United States and elsewhere. As one New York City activist noted, "The hunger strikes attracted a lot of outsiders, people from all walks of life became interested."[568] Similarly Jimmy McPaul in Philadelphia noted that the money "slowed up to a

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[564] Quoted in Rory Nugent, "Inside the IRA," *Spin* 10, no. 5 (1994): 74.
[565] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 82.
[566] "American 'Charity' and the Irish war: For Guns or Butter?" *Chicago Tribune*, December 2, 1984, 25.
[567] The five demands of the prisoners were: (1) the right not to wear a prison uniform; (2) the right not to perform prison work; (3) the right to free association and to organize education and recreational activities; (4) the right to one visit, letter, and parcel per week; and (5) the restoration of remission lost through protest. The Hunger Strike had been preceded by the Blanket Protest (1976–1981), in which prisoners chose to remain naked wrapped in a blanket rather than wear a prison uniform, and the No Wash Protest (1978–1981), in which the blanketed prisoners refused to leave their cells to use the shower or lavatory because of attacks by prison guards.
[568] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.

trickle until the Hunger Strike. Without the Hunger Strike, it would have fell apart. Most people got tired. After the Hunger Strike you saw people out there that you'd never seen before."[569]

Indeed, a survey of 73 newspapers around the world showed opinion shifting toward the IRA in the wake of the death of the first hunger striker, Bobby Sands, who had been elected MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone while refusing food.[570] This pattern shows that the ability of Noraid to reach a wider support base depended largely on repressive British strategies—a reality that the UK government was aware of according to official documents—and the movement's effectiveness in publicizing them.[571] In the words of Mary Sheils Baggarly: "The same theory that held true for the support of Northern Aid is what I said to you, 'The best recruiter for the IRA was the British government.' The best support network for us was what the British government actions were. . . . We would get more money in the mail, more checks. . . .[572]

The Geographic Dimensions of Noraid Fundraising

In terms of its finances, Noraid was organizationally constructed as star-shaped network with money channeled from the units to the central office, which would then transmit it abroad. Clustered units in particular areas (i.e., the major cities such as New York and Philadelphia) tended to exhibit relatively high degrees of cooperation, facilitated in part by a regional

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[569] Interview with Jimmy McPaul, Philadelphia, October 8, 2011.

[570] "Two Killed in Violence in Ulster," *Boston Globe*, June 1, 1981, 10, pertinent quote found at: http://www.nyu.edu/library/bobst/research/aia/exhibits/0501_hunger/ampress/media02.htm

[571] One British government document noted: "Just as the funds have declined in response to events in Northern Ireland, so they might very well go up again if we had, for example, another "Bloody Sunday" — indeed the Patrick Kerr case could be exploited to some extent by NORAID." The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666 C44297, "Fund-raising in the USA," To: Mr Marshall; From: R G. Jones, November 21, 1977, 1–2. This point was reiterated in another document: "We should of course always remember that a single bad incident like 'Bloody Sunday' can increase the fund quickly and substantially." The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666, C442497, Foreign Commonwealth Office, London; To: J. Davidson, British Embassy, Washington; From: M. Hodge, Republic of Ireland Department, FCO; May 19, 1977, 4.

[572] Interview with Mary Sheils Baggarly, former head of the Washington, DC, unit, March 19, 2012.

coordinator. Figure 3.10 depicts the contributing units to the central office, the recorded amount of their contributions given in the FARA reports, and their geographic locations.

With national headquarters located in the Bronx, New York was the hub of the support network. It is unsurprising that Noraid emerged in New York City: the metropolitan area had the largest number of Irish-born by far (Boston was second with about one-quarter of the Irish-born population of New York). In early 1972, New York State contained about one-third of the 36 units listed on its information sheet. New York City alone would have at least nine chapters spread throughout the boroughs, along with a few scattered in the suburbs (Rockland, Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties) and upstate. In early 1972, Pennsylvania had eight units, with four in the Philadelphia area along with the Irish Center and Clan na Gael listed on an information sheet as supportive organizations;[573] mid-decade FARA reports show regular income only from three. Farther north, Massachusetts had at least five. To the west, Chicago itself claimed three chapters and a central board, and still farther west California had nine units.

Between February 1977 and January 1978—the first year that Noraid submitted a detailed FARA report—the New York units generated the most funding ($25,300), particularly those in the Bronx, Manhattan, and Queens. Pennsylvania ($19,900)—particularly from the Philadelphia (Mayfair and Olney) and Delaware County chapters—followed closely, with the next biggest contributions coming from Chicago chapters ($19,600). The following year, the Pennsylvania ($25,000), Illinois ($24,000), and New York ($16,000) chapters again ranked among the top three. In 1980, New York ($30,200) and Pennsylvania ($26,600) remained in the

[573] Sheet catalogued in US DOJ, FBI, files on March 23, 1972. The Philadelphia area committees were listed as follows: Northeast, Philadelphia; Olney, Philadelphia; Upper Darby; and Rosemont. FOIPA request: 1146079-001.

top three, while California ($21,300) replaced Illinois as a top contributor, [574] with the bulk of donations coming from the San Francisco chapter.

Figure 3.6



Figure 3.7



[574] An FBI report noted that around 1982 there was dissention among one of Chicago's three units and the Central Board, headed by Alex Murphy, a close friend of the gunrunner George Harrison. The unit, under the leadership of Owen McNamee, broke away. It started organizing activities that conflicted with board sponsored events and ceased channeling its fundraising revenue to it, although it claimed to be "sending it to the right place." See US DOJ, FBI, To: Director, FBI; From: SAC, Chicago; August 13, 1987; file no.: CG 199F-368 in 199F-NY-C269194, FOIPA request: 1146079-001. In 1985, another FBI report noted that in Chicago "the INA is being viewed by some people as a supporter of the IRA and, therefore, viewed as terrorists. This has resulted in some withdrawing of support." To: Director, FBI; From: SAC Cleveland; "Irish Northern Aid Committee," April 25, 1985.

Figure 3.8



Source: US Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) Files, Irish Northern Aid Committee, Registration no. 2239, available on-line at: http://www.fara.gov/.

While states with the most numerous populations claiming sole Irish ancestry contributed the most, population size was not a clear determinant of funding, at least according to FARA reports. With a similar Irish ancestry population size, Pennsylvania outstripped Massachusetts and California, even in some years rivaling New York, which not only had a substantially larger single ancestry Irish population but also a much larger foreign-born Irish population and was the organizational hub.

Figure 3.9



Source: Chart compiled with information from FARA reports and 1980 US Census Data.

More accurately, particular cities were more lucrative than others. According to data in Noraid's FARA reports, the most lucrative earners at the unit level outside of New York City were Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. All five cities were among those with a Clan na Gael presence.[575]

The data suggest that Philadelphia may have been the most lucrative fundraiser of them all for Noraid's central office (See Figure 3.10), although is quite possible that other areas experienced more leakage with money either directly going to the families in affected areas in

[575] US DOJ, FBI, Report of [name redacted]; bureau file no: 97-4883, "Clan na Gael," April 23, 1964, pp. 9, 11. The other Clan centers in the United States that sent a representative to the 1963 convention attended by IRA chief of staff Cathal Goulding were Scranton and Providence. FBI reports note that a Clan camp had been set up in Baltimore in 1963 and in just two years looked like it was "becoming one of the leading clan centers in the United States." US Government, Memorandum, To: Director, FBI; From SAC, New York; "Clan na Gael," April 19, 1965, file no.: 97-4883-30. FBI files available at New York University's Archives of Irish America, AIA 005, box 1, folder 11.

the North or for other purposes. Anecdotal evidence supports the strength of Philadelphia. In late 1978, when Noraid's coffers seemed to be dwindling, a British government document described Noraid as "influential in Philadelphia politics." "Hard-core IRA supporters," it noted, were "entrenched in Philadelphia politics, an area which we must regard as a lost cause." The "silver lining," according to British officials, was that "they do not seem to have much impact statewide."[576] Similarly, journalist Mike Mallowe reported in 1978 that "ATF agents consider[ed] this city second only to New York for the intensity of Noraid operations."[577] Former AOH president Joe Roche noted: "Philly was the leader; Philadelphians were born fighters; the mix of immigrants and closeness of the neighborhoods, and they were well organized. The Irish ambassador [once] asked me: 'What are we to do about the problem in Philadelphia?' I asked: 'What problem?'"[578]

[576] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666, letter written by J. Davidson of the British Embassy to D. E. Richards Esq in Philadelphia, March 3, 1978.
[577] Mike Mallowe, "The Rising of the Moon," *Philadelphia Magazine* (March 1978): 130.
[578] Conversation with Joe Roche, Baltimore, Md., June 14, 2011.

Figure 3.10: Noraid Organizational Network, Contributing Units, 1977–1980



Source: Data for this figure were generated from FARA reports from 1977 to 1980. While the exact figures are highly questionable, they do provide a picture of the most financially lucrative units and the actual units that sent money to the central office. Unit size is calculated from the individual unit donations recorded in the files.

Conclusion: The American (Dis)connection

Despite popular stories of the intimate and extensive Irish-American "connection" with the Provisional IRA,[579] most Irish ethnics remained largely apathetic to political developments in the North of Ireland. To the extent that Irish Americans were engaged at all, they weighed in on the side of constitutional nationalists[580]—not the Provos, who waged their guerilla campaign on the streets of Belfast, Derry, London, and other urban areas. Militant activism essentially remained confined to working-class communities, which will be explored further in Chapter 6.

After some initial success in mobilizing broader support in the early 1970s in the wake of massacres of Catholics, British internment policy in Ulster, and evidence of torture among internees,[581] militant republicanism went into a steep decline by the end of the decade. Grassroots support, however, had not been displaced by moderate elements. Indeed, constitutional nationalists and the Irish government "did not conjure up popular support in the Irish-American neighbourhoods but rather, gained influence with the people who represented those areas in Congress." "Irish-American political connections with Ireland," writes Ó Dochartaigh, moved on to an elite level.[582] John Hume, head of the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), stated that he focused his efforts on "talking to influential American politicians."[583]

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[579] This title is adapted from Holland's *The American Connection*.

[580] Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*, x.

[581] The upsurge of support is unsurprising. As Kalyvas notes, insurgent organizations themselves tend to receive more recruits in the wake of indiscriminate violence against civilians (as well as in the wake of successful insurgent engagements) (127). Indiscriminate violence, he notes, is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. It generates resentment, anger, and a desire for revenge (154). Indiscriminate violence tends to be used by incumbents, particularly when information is lacking. Insurgents, however, also resort to it in areas where their presence is limited (149). "When insurgents know that they are unlikely to have an advantage in control, they may adopt a strategy of indiscriminate terrorism—as suggested by the [case] of Northern Ireland" (206). Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence.*

[582] Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up," 156.

[583] Quoted in Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*, 114.

The republican movement's failure to "control the Irish Diaspora" was a "great unexpected defeat," explains Bell.[584] Events such as Bloody Sunday in 1972 and the Hunger Strikes of 1981 served as focal points of mobilization among broader swaths of Irish Americans, as reflected in Noraid's FARA reports on its income shown above.[585] However, once media attention and emotional fervor waned, general interest in the conflict and political developments in Northern Ireland receded.[586] Northern Ireland militants and constitutionalists alike failed to convert large numbers of Irish ethnics into diasporic nationalists of whatever political stripe. This was not a problem for the latter, as its funding base was drawn from the Irish-American elite.

The following two chapters explain why Noraid's fundraising remained limited relative to the size of Irish America, which was put into perspective by former US ambassador to Ireland William V. Shannon: "fewer than one-half of one percent of . . . Irish Americans ha[d] contributed to the IRA's American Front group" over a decade and a half.[587] A number of countervailing forces existed against widespread radicalization among Irish ethnics in the United States that neither Tiger front organizations in Canada nor Kosovar KLA supporters in the Bronx, for example, confronted simultaneously. These forces are fleshed out in the next two chapters.

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[584] Bell, *The IRA*, 195.
[585] Holland, *The American Connection*; Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*.
[586] Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*.
[587] William V. Shannon, "Stealing N.Y. St. Patrick's Parade," *Boston Globe*, February, 22, 1984.

CHAPTER 4

Polluting the Insurgent Sea:

Coordinated State Suppression of the Irish Republican

Movement in the United States

> The United States government was not only being deployed to protect the United Kingdom's flank in this war. . . . America was now fighting its own citizens to persecute the prisoners of this little war. —Mike Cummings, Noraid Publicity Director[588]

> The State Department uses the term "terrorist" the way it used "communist" in the 50's. —Noraid[589]

> [T]here would be informers everywhere—FBI, British government, Irish government. . . . —Father Sean McManus, INC Executive Director[590]

> The greatest weapon the British have for oppressing Catholics in Northern Ireland is the Irish Embassy in Washington. —Father Sean McManus, INC Executive Director[591]

> Despite British and Irish government condemnations, US Justice Department harassment, media distortion and indifference, attacks from the Irish press both in Ireland and America . . . a generally apathetic Irish community [in the United States] . . . we managed to [still] send more money back to Ireland. . . . —Paul Murray, Noraid Chairman[592]

The previous chapter illustrated in detail how the Irish Republican Army's infrastructure—or sea of support as Mao's metaphor goes[593]—extended across the Atlantic to US shores, where a vast pool of Irish Americans could potentially be tapped to provide material

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588 Mike Cummings, Irish Northern Aid Committee [INAC] National Director of Publications, "America's Irish War," not dated.

589 Irish Northern Aid Committee, "Visa Denial," date unreadable.

590 Sean McManus, *My American Struggle for Justice in Northern Ireland* (Cork, Ireland: The Collins Press, 2011), 77.

591 Ibid., 195. Quote from an Irish National Caucus press release titled: "Irish Embassy Cover-up on Anti-Catholic Discrimination," Washington, DC, November 4, 1983.

592 "The Yearly Message from INAC Chairman, Paul Murray," Irish Northern Aid Committee's Newsletter, First Quarter, 1992.

593 Mao Tse-tung, Chinese revolutionary leader and one of the twentieth century's foremost strategists of armed insurgency, likened the guerrilla to a fish and the people to the sea in which he must swim: "The guerilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea." Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffin, 2nd revised edn. (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2000 [1961]), 41. The original work was written in 1937.

resources, refuge for former prisoners and fugitives (aka "men on the run"), political pressure, and moral support.[594] It also concluded with a puzzle: Why was overall support for the republican movement in the United States limited relative to the size of Irish America and in comparison with other "groups" vis-à-vis their homeland conflicts? This chapter argues that government policy on both sides of the Atlantic limited the capacity of republican activists to mobilize widespread support. It thus establishes the broad parameters of collective action and problematizes the assumption that co-ethnics abroad, unlike their brethren at home caught in the cross-hairs of war, freely support insurgents without substantial risk or cost.

This chapter begins by situating the United States as a theater of (as opposed to an actor in) the Ulster war. It then analyzes the domestic and intergovernmental policies of London, Washington, and Dublin, identifying their efforts to stifle the flow of funds across the Atlantic. It starts with an examination of Britain's criminalization and propaganda campaigns, both of which extended beyond its borders. Second, it examines the US government's policing of its own territorial jurisdiction to suppress Noraid fundraising, as well as the public dissuasion campaign undertaken by prominent Irish-American politicians at the encouragement of London and Dublin.[595] These policies directly targeted both the movement's inner core and support base in the United States. Finally, it focuses on the Irish government's anti-insurgent stance both at

[594] The British government saw Noraid fundraising as a significant "morale booster." As one document stated, "American funds and political lobbying help the [Provisional IRA] to see themselves as an internationally recognized movement rather than a purely local terrorist group." Moral support was a crucial part of Noraid's efforts. Its members provided direct support by regularly writing letters to prisoners and even traveling to the North to visit them and their families. Noraid also sent contingents to participate in parades and commemoration events. The organization, according to one Derry-born activist, was well known within the local community.

[595] John Hume, a prominent member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern Ireland, also played a crucial role in convincing Irish-American politicians to publicly condemn the IRA and its supporters. The SDLP was a constitutional nationalist party that sought Irish unification through peaceful means. For a detailed account, and an overall excellent history on the US role in the Troubles, see Andrew J. Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict 1968–1995* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995).

home and abroad; indeed, Noraid supporters would accuse the Republic of Ireland (ROI) of attempting to liquidate nationalism.[596]

Table 4.1: Coordinated State Suppression

Tactics	UK	US	ROI
Policing	Coordination with FBI and other US government agencies; collaboration with ROI police; spies/informants	FBI surveillance and infiltration of Noraid; cooperation with UK and ROI governments	Border patrol; coordination with British security and US State Department
Propaganda/information control	Army Public Relations Office; Northern Ireland Information Service; British Information Services; media courting; IRA and Sinn Féin media bans	Visa denials; moral opprobrium by influential politicians, especially Irish-American Congressmen	Public denunciations by government officials and politicians; media censorship
Law	Criminalization of IRA (denial of political status)	Grand jury investigations; extradition; FARA registration and compliance	Offenses Against the State Acts; extradition

The chapter then concludes with an analysis of the adverse implications of these policies for the mobilization potential of Irish America to financially aid the republican movement. By increasing the risk of involvement and social costs of association, and simultaneously decreasing the movement's reachability, coordinated state suppression by three robust state apparatuses would ultimately leave only small pockets in a vast Irish-American sea where republicans could thrive.

Battles for the People Beyond Borders

Perhaps a hangover of "methodological nationalism,"[597] we lack an adequate conceptual toolkit to analyze the dynamics of civil war beyond the confines of borders where violence

[596] Gerry Foley, "Lynch Moves to Liquidate Irish Nationalism," *Irish People*, December 23, 1972, 3.

unfolds. By definition civil wars are bloody conflicts between parties subject to a common authority within the boundaries of a sovereign entity.[598] Yet as ample empirical evidence has made apparent, crucial battles can be fought on foreign soil to mobilize (or suppress) geographically dispersed "imagined communities"—that is, those populations "outside the state but inside the people." These non-military campaigns can be critical to the dynamics of armed conflict when they affect the capacity of one side or another to wage war. Whether insurgent allies or a belligerent state predominates in what essentially are *ancillary zones* of armed conflict, however, depends not on military capability but in large part on "host" country foreign policy, state capacity, and political institutions.[599]

An *ancillary zone* is a prime area for challenging incumbent authority from afar when the "host" country affords maximal opportunity for insurgents and their diasporic allies to mobilize mass support and build an organizational infrastructure to routinize it. As an ideal type, a trans-nationalized ancillary zone is akin to rebel-controlled areas where a violently contested state is weak or virtually nonexistent. As rebels often do in their territorial strongholds,[600] their diasporic allies may even adopt state-like behavior, imposing "taxes" (and less frequently even extracting protection money) within local communities.[601] To return to Mao's metaphor,

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[597] Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology," *International Migration Review* 37, no. 3 (2003): 576–610.
[598] Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17.
[599] The following chapter analyzes intra-communal variables: ethnic population size and geographic dispersion in the "host" country; upward social mobility; and communal organizational infrastructure.
[600] See Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 219. Even in the North of Ireland, where insurgents confronted a web of security forces, including the British military, armed groups were able to exercise some control within their respective communities. As one head of a charity organization in Northern Ireland explained: "In many parts of Belfast you just can't separate the paramilitaries off like that from what we would possibly call the rest of the community. There is always the danger of the paramilitaries taking over vast portions of public life." Determining whether a charity has inadvertently become a "front" organization for an armed group is thus "a very grey area." Michael Bromley, "How Much Money are the Paramilitaries Getting from Peace Funds?" *Belfast Telegraph*, August 20, 1976.
[601] Radtke's work on the Tamil and Eritrean diasporas shows how insurgent organizations may adopt state-like behavior as they attempt to routinize support among diasporic populations. Katrin Radtke, "Engaging the Diaspora:

insurgent representatives can more or less freely swim, and ordinary folks incur virtually no risk in financially contributing to their cause. Indeed, they may incur penalties for not regularly donating when solicited to do so. Prior to Ottawa's official listing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a "terrorist" organization in 2006, Canadian territory, for example, approximated this type of environment for the Tigers and its financial support arm, the World Tamil Movement, which was subsequently proscribed in 2008.[602]

At the opposite end of the spectrum are ancillary zones where "host" countries actively repress "homeland" radicalism in their borders, rendering such territories unviable support bases. Although diasporic radicals are beyond the jurisdiction of the contested state, the "host" country acts as its proxy by imposing grave risks to even peripheral supporters of a "homeland" insurgency. Communities in such areas are essentially "re-territorialized" and akin to populations under state control in actual war zones. Basque diaspora sympathizers of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), for example, confronted such a context in authoritarian Argentina under successive pro-Franco regimes during the cold war. Alongside the high risks of activism, there was a pervasive revulsion for a movement portrayed by the Argentine government as communist and hence atheist in a staunchly Catholic country. Political involvement thus "took refuge in more private forums" among those with deeply held ideological conviction.[603]

The Dynamics of Diaspora Mobilization in Civil Wars," paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, Calif., March 22–25, 2006.

[602] In addition to its liberal domestic law, Canada also had a liberal asylum policy and generous social benefits, which made it an attractive destination for Tamils fleeing war-torn Sri Lanka. Some contend that Canadian and European Union measures to restrict the financial support from the diaspora were "devastating" to the LTTE and contributed to its defeat by the Sri Lankan Army in 2009. The United States had already declared the Tigers a terrorist organization in 1997, and in 2001 upgraded it to a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group. See Niel A. Smith, "Understanding Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers," *JFQ* 59, no. 4 (2010), available at: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_40-44_Smith.pdf.

[603] For an extensive analysis of the Basque diaspora, see Gloria Pilar Totoricagüena, *Basque Diaspora: Migration and Transnational Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada, 2005), quote at 198.

Ancillary zones that fall in between these extremes are *contested* spaces, either because the "host" state lacks the capacity to effectively stifle diasporic mobilization, or because domestic law and institutions restrain governmental efforts to eliminate it within its jurisdiction. Within this conceptual framework, the United States can be viewed as a contested ancillary zone of the Ulster civil war. As one analyst described, America was "the most important arena of propaganda warfare" for both republicans and the British government.[604] The Ulster Volunteer Force even went so far as to consider US territory a potential theater of violence, as captured during an interview for an educational film targeting American audiences:

> If anyone in any part of the world gives support to the IRA that's going to cost lives in this country, then we're going to take action against them. Your country [the United States] is one in particular in which this will happen. . . . Militarily we will attack those groups like Noraid who more than any other organization has supported them. . . . Noraid is a very, very dangerous organization. . . . It supplies money, weapons and safe havens to IRA men on the run. No one can expect to give such help with impunity.

In response to the interviewer's question of how the organization knew who was in Noraid, a UVF representative produced "a thick sheaf of papers" containing the membership lists of a number of Irish-American organizations—the Derry Society of Philadelphia, the Irish-American Club, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, the Irish Social and Cultural Society, Anglo-Celtic Cultural Society, among others. The names and addresses ostensibly constituted a potential UVF hit list. While the armed group claimed to have executed Noraid members who filtered money into Ulster for weapons, evidence of such action has not surfaced.[605]

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[604] David Miller, *Don't Mention the War: Northern Ireland, Propaganda and the Media* (London: Pluto Press, 1994), 160.
[605] Sally Belfrage, *Living in War: A Belfast Year* (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1987), 237.

On the whole, loyalist organizations lacked any significant presence or influence in the American theater.[606] US-based battles were waged between the republican movement and state actors—principally the UK and American governments, with assistance from the Republic of Ireland. And they were fought not with Armalites, SLRs, or plastic bullets[607] but generally with non-lethal weapons such as street protests, sit-ins, stories, and memorials, on the one hand, and secret agents, lawyers, and the mass media, on the other. Given the demands of irregular war—civilian support and intelligence—how these weapons were wielded may have been just as decisive in the conflict's outcome.

Ulster's American Zone

Owing to its vast pool of Irish ethnics—an estimated 10.3 million Americans of sole Irish ancestry according to the 1980 census[608]—US territory was the key external theater of the conflict in the North of Ireland. When the Provisional IRA emerged in 1970, Irish republican activists and sympathizers had the advantage of pre-existing nationalist organizations, some dating back to the nineteenth century, including the dormant Clan na Gael whose sole purpose was to materially support the IRA. There was also a bevy of other fraternal societies and cultural

[606] Chapter 3 discusses this issue. In the wake of the Hunger Strikes, unionists launched Operation USA to counteract republican publicity. The Irish National Caucus was successful in getting leading members of Congress to pressure the US State Department to withdraw Ian Paisley's US visa in 1983. Noraid demonstrated at public appearances made by other unionist leaders, and the campaign ultimately collapsed. Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 197–8.

[607] The Armalite, a US-made rifle, was commonly used by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, while the British Army used self-loading rifles (SLRs). Security forces also used weapons that fired rubber bullets and later plastic bullets, which were intended to be non-lethal. In the wake of accidental deaths, both types of bullets were a source of controversy and the latter remained so in 2011. See, for example, Mark Thompson, "Plastic Bullets Should Never be an Option—History has Shown," *The Guardian* (London), December 21, 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/21/plastic-bullets-policing-north-ireland.

[608] Another 30 million people listed Irish among multiple ancestries in that census. According to Akeson, studies from the 1970s and 1980s show that a little over half of Americans who identified their primary ethnic group as Irish were Protestant. About 70 percent of Catholic Irish Americans resided in the Northeast and North-Central United States, while Protestants tended to live in the rural South. Moreover, in the 1970s about 41 percent of Irish Catholics were fourth generation in the United States, compared to 83 percent of Irish Protestants. Donald Akeson, "The Irish in North America: Catholic or Protestant?" *The Irish Review* 11 (Winter 1991-2): 17–22.

clubs that could potentially be co-opted to serve the cause. In addition to an organizational infrastructure, albeit emaciated owing to migration and assimilation patterns discussed in the next chapter, there was historical experience with mass mobilization around the territorial independence of Ireland, which meant that strategies and tactics were available for insurgent supporters to draw on.[609]

Yet violence in the North unfolded in the context of the cold war, which brought the US and UK governments into a close alliance, indeed cemented their "special relationship." The East-West rivalry, moreover, imbued Northern Ireland with strategic significance. As Sloan explains, "Northern Ireland was perceived as being important with respect to ensuring the security of the United Kingdom from the threat of physical invasion."[610] The spate of international hijackings in the 1970s and 1980s created yet more favorable political conditions for the United Kingdom to institutionalize deeper counterterrorist cooperation with the US government, culminating in extradition treaties that would render US territory "unsafe haven" for republican fugitives.[611] Both governments attacked the IRA and Noraid in multiple public arenas—in Congress, in the courts, in the media—to curb American funding for the republican campaign, while the Departments of State and Justice, in collaboration with British officials, waged covert operations to target the diaspora's radical core and Noraid's broader membership.

US institutions and law, however, left some room for republican activists to contest the policies and tactics of a firmly pro-British cold war executive.[612] In the literature on "political

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[609] The organizational infrastructure—its components, geography, and historical development—will be discussed in the next chapter.

[610] Geoffrey R. Sloan, *The Geopolitics of Anglo-Irish Relations in the Twentieth Century* (London: Leicester University Press, 1997), 260.

[611] Karen McElrath, *Unsafe Haven: The United States, The IRA and Political Prisoners* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

[612] However, as a 1976 British Embassy memo asserted: "I fear that one of our problems is that although official Administration policy is entirely correct, there are some pockets of Irish American sympathizers in the State Department whom it would be very difficult to educate into the realities of the current situation." The National

opportunity sets," the United States, a federal system with far-reaching separation of powers, is the classic example of a "weak state": multiple access points and constraints on the state's capacity to act.[613] Noraid also clearly benefited from liberal domestic laws that allowed it to operate legally as a registered agent of the Provisional IRA—despite the fact that the State Department deemed the armed group a "terrorist" organization. It was not until 1996 that Congress enacted legislation—namely, the Antiterrorism and the Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)—that established considerable legal risk for any US citizen, resident, or organization to "knowingly provide funds or other forms of material support to groups designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the Secretary of State."[614] However, by the time AEDPA was implemented—nearly three decades into the Troubles—the Provisional IRA had declared an "unequivocal" ceasefire and Sinn Féin was engaged in peace talks with British parties.[615] The armed group was thus never listed as an FTO (although its splinter groups—the Continuity IRA [CIRA] and the Real IRA [RIRA]—were designated as FTOs and remained so in 2012).

Thus, for the duration of the conflict, the government faced legal limits on suppressing Noraid. Court battles over the organization's compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA),[616] gunrunning trials involving its leaders and rank-and-file members,[617] and

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Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269; "John Hume"; To: M. Hodge, Republic of Ireland, FCO; From: Jonathan Davidson, British Embassy, Washington, DC; October 27, 1976.

[613] Hanspeter Kriesi, "Political Context and Opportunity," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007): 70–1.

[614] Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft, *Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy*, vol. 2 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2008), 859. The authors argue that the legislation was motivated in part by "the realization that terrorist groups were increasingly turning to front charities and companies instead of state sponsors for their funding" (859). However, domestic bombings on US soil were the immediate impetus—at the World Trade Center in 1993 and in Oklahoma City in 1995.

[615] The first FTO list was released in October 1997.

[616] As the US Department of Justice webpage explains: "FARA is a disclosure statute that requires persons acting as agents of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and disbursements in support of those activities. Disclosure of the required information facilitates evaluation by the government and the American people of the statements and activities of such persons in light of their function as foreign agents. The FARA Registration Unit of the Counterespionage Section (CES) in the National Security Division (NSD) is responsible for the administration

extradition cases[618] did not always end in the government's favor, although Noraid's legal woes would drain time and money away from the cause and reinforce the organization's consistent and strong media image as a terrorist front group rather than a humanitarian organization.[619]

US political institutions also allowed for some degree of popular influence over foreign policy via Congress.[620] While Noraid itself focused on fundraising, its members and supporters often "turned their hats" and worked through and with less militant organizations sympathetic to the cause of a unified Ireland—such as the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), the Irish National Caucus, and the Irish American Unity Conference (IAUC). Noraid had some Congressional allies, who organized as the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs in 1977 with the assistance of the AOH and the Caucus. Among its members were House Representatives Mario Biaggi (D-NY [the Bronx]), Benjamin Gilman (R-NY [Rockland County]), Hamilton Fish (R-NY [Upstate counties]), and Lester Wolff (D-NY [Nassau and

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and enforcement of the Act." Available at: http://www.fara.gov/. The US government succeeded in having Noraid register in 1971, and in 1981 Noraid was forced to declare the IRA as its foreign principal. The government engaged in lengthy legal battles to force the organization to comply with FARA reporting requirements. The court decision connecting Noraid to the *Irish People* newspaper, which subjected the latter to FARA, however, was overturned in 1984. See Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 117 and 227.

[617] The most well-known case was the acquittal of Michael Flannery, Thomas Falvey, Danny Gormley, George Harrison, and Pat Mullin in 1981. Their attorney was Frank Durkan, nephew of the staunch Irish-born republican Paul O'Dwyer. O'Dwyer's firm served as Noraid's legal counsel. The defense argued that the five men did, indeed, seek to export arms but believed that they were working in collaboration with the CIA to provide weapons to the IRA. See Shana Alexander, "The Patriot Game," *New York Magazine*, November 22, 1982, 58.

[618] The extradition denials included Desmond Mackin, Peter McMullen, William (Liam) Quinn, and James Barr. Mackin was ultimately deported to the South; McMullen was extradited after a second request from Britain came just after 1986 Supplementary Treaty was in place; and Quinn was also extradited after a US appeal. For case details see, McElrath, *Unsafe Haven*, 45–64.

[619] One British document noted that gunrunning prosecutions by US authorities and "the accompanying harassment and bad publicity this ha[d] inevitably caused" was one explanation for the decline in Noraid's remittances to Northern Ireland during the 1970s. The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666 C44297; "Fund-raising in the USA"; To: Mr Marshall; From: R G. Jones; November 21, 1977, 2.

[620] In the 1970s, Congress implemented institutional reforms partly in response to the unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the anti-war movement that it spawned. These reforms allowed it to become more active on foreign policy issues. As Paul and Paul note, "these reforms weakened the power of committee chairs, relaxed jurisdictional boundaries of committees, and allowed individual members of Congress greater ability to shape legislation by offering floor amendments." It also increased its capacity to conduct research. Such reforms allowed individual members of Congress much greater opportunities "to become foreign policy entrepreneurs, even if they do not sit on the relevant standing committees or possess seniority." Analysts of ethnic lobbies attribute these changes to the increased influence of such groups in the foreign policymaking process. See David M. Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul, *Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 6.

Queens Counties], who lent the nationalist cause legitimacy at the local level. Along with the MacBride Principles,[621] the State Department ban on the sale of US weapons to Northern Ireland's police force (the RUC) in 1979—which was implemented under Congressional pressure—was one of their more visible and important successes.[622] Declassified Belfast documents, however, provide evidence that the ban was circumvented, allegedly with the Reagan administration's acquiescence.[623] For the most part, activist groups that challenged the status quo in the North of Ireland during the cold war fought a losing battle against their robust state opponents.

Triad of Suppression

As the armed conflict evolved from 1970 onward, a governmental triad formed to suppress the movement from US shores—that is, to proverbially pollute America's Irish sea for pro-republican activism. The UK, US, and Irish governments not only had the will and capacity to stifle mass mobilization within and across borders, but all three countries had democratic

[621] The MacBride principles were a set of anti-discrimination principles for American firms operating in the North of Ireland. The code of conduct consisted of nine principles for fair employment that would end discrimination of Catholics in employment. At the outset, the MacBride initiative's opponents included John Hume (SDLP), the Catholic Bishop of Belfast, Aer Lingus, and the Irish government, according to Irish National Caucus leader Father Sean McManus. For a detailed discussion of the role of the Irish National Caucus in the MacBride campaign, see McManus, *My American Struggle*, 187–251.

[622] Congressman Mario Biaggi's Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs is said to have generated pressure on the State Department to institute the ban owing to the RUC's human rights record. In a Letter to the Editor, he explained: "It was my amendment to the fiscal 1980 State Department appropriations which led to the decision by the State Department to suspend further sales or shipments of United States arms to the R.U.C. pending a full review of our policy. . . . On May 16 I was joined by 17 of my House colleagues in a letter to Secretary of State Muskie reaffirming our support of the suspension." Mario Biaggi, "Letter: On Arms Sales to Britain. No Guns for Violating Irish Rights," *New York Times*, June 7, 1980.

[623] Sam McBride, "RUC Secretly Received US Guns and Spy Gear," *Belfast Newsletter*, January 3, 2012, available at: http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/local/ruc_secretly_received_us_guns_and_spy_gear_1_3382386. McManus also raises the issue of the role of the Catholic Church hierarchy, noting that he urged Archbishop Hickey of Washington and Bishop Thomas Kelly, then secretary-general of the US Catholic Conference, to advocate that Reagan continue the ban on US weapons to the RUC, which they refused to do. "Dealing with these people," wrote McManus, "was like dealing with the British Embassy." McManus, *My American Struggle*, 227–8.

legitimacy, which aided their efforts in swaying public opinion firmly against the republican movement.

The following sections examine the configuration of state policies and tactics on both sides of the Atlantic that hampered Noraid's ability to generate widespread support from Irish America to aid in the IRA's campaign, directly and indirectly. Standard techniques used by security forces and intelligence agencies in irregular wars, such as informants, surveillance, undercover work, infiltration, propaganda, and media manipulation, were applied in this case.[624] Law enforcement tactics directly targeted the IRA and Noraid while propaganda and moral shaming aimed starve them of popular support, financial or otherwise. This mix of coercion and persuasion would prove effective.

Shutting off the Tap: Britain's Battle for Irish-American Acquiescence

Britain's army brought to the North a fundamental lesson from its counterinsurgency campaigns in the Third World, which was eloquently captured in Brigadier Frank Kitson's oft-quoted axiom "wars of subversion and counter subversion are fought, in the last resort, in the minds of the people."[625] This staple of twentieth-century counterinsurgency doctrine translated in practice, as Alderson explains, to "a focus on the means by which public opinion could be shaped and on the need for intelligence obtained from the population."[626]

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[624] Maurice Punch, *State Violence, Collusion and the Troubles: Counter Insurgency, Government Deviance and Northern Ireland* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 119.

[625] Frank Kitson's work on this topic is considered seminal in shaping counterinsurgency doctrine in the twentieth century. As a member of the British Army, Kitson served in both the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya and the guerrilla war in Malaya. He was stationed in Northern Ireland in 1971. Kitson was ultimately made commander-in-chief of UK land forces and achieved the rank of general. *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971).

[626] Alexander Alderson, "Britain," in *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*, ed. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (London: Taylor and Francis, 2010), 35.

The relevant population in this case, however, extended far beyond the locus of violence, given large-scale outmigration and settlement among the Irish from the nineteenth century onward. Although diasporic Irish as far flung as Australia and New Zealand could and did provide various forms of support to the IRA, it was Irish Americans who most preoccupied British authorities, owing to their sheer numbers, proximity, and ready access to weaponry.[627] While concerned from the outset about the "American connection," British efforts to "shut off the tap" began in earnest in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday in 1972, when contributions to Noraid significantly increased (See Figure 3.1). The government pursued a multilayered approach to undermine support for insurgents within the United Kingdom's borders and beyond: the criminalization of IRA combatants; information distribution, control, and acquisition; and security coordination, internally[628] and with the United States and the Republic of Ireland.

From Militarization to Criminalization: Depoliticizing the IRA at Home and Abroad

Criminalization policy began full force in Northern Ireland in March 1976 when the British government revoked special category status (SCS) for republican forces, which had been granted in the wake of an IRA hunger strike in 1972. Unlike SCS, which treated them as *de facto* prisoners of war, the new policy sought to delegitimize the IRA by treating its members as ordinary criminals rather than combatants, as terrorists rather than insurgents confronting a specified enemy—the British Army. Special category status was also revoked for the loyalist

[627] The British government noted lax US gun laws as a reason why American money was so important. It noted: "There is no problem about purchasing arms in the US and any attempt to tighten gun laws would be a highly sensitive political issue in that country." The National Archives (UK), CJ 4/1830, 444269; Confidential; "PIRA Fund Raising and Gun Running in the United States," [Contingency Briefing for the New Secretary of State]; Brief no. S22; Division 4 (L); August 27, 1976, 1-2.

[628] According to a former British Army officer, the intelligence community in Northern Ireland suffered from "little or no coordination, due mainly to the intense distrust between the varying agencies." Internal squabbles and lack of centralized coordination, he contends, led to inefficiencies in intelligence gathering. Martin Ingram and Greg Harkin, *Stakeknife: Britain's Secret Agents in Ireland* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 31.

paramilitaries. These were also proscribed entities with the notable exception of the Ulster Defence Association—the public face of the Ulster Freedom Fighters—which was allowed to operate as a legal organization for two decades.[629]

Another rationale behind the policy was to downscale the role of the British Army—which by 1972 had a standing force-strength of about 27,000[630]—by placing Northern Ireland security forces—the RUC and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR)[631]—on the front lines, thereby further "internalizing" (or "Ulsterizing") the conflict and bolstering the image of Britain as a neutral actor between two warring communities—at least for international audiences. As Gormally and his co-authors assert: "on ideological grounds from the government's perspective the notion of criminalization was more sophisticated [than internment and SCS] in terms of the battle for legitimacy."

The policy was implemented three months after the official end of internment (aka Operation Demetrius) in December 1975. Internment was ultimately deemed "an unmitigated disaster" both politically, in terms of the fall out, and militarily, in terms of its failure to meet objectives—that is, to capture key IRA members and acquire information about the organization through interrogation. Instead, the British Army disproportionately targeted Catholics, who had little or no association with the IRA. Over a four-year period beginning in 1971, 1,874

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[629] The UDA and its military arm, the UFF, were formed in 1971. McDonald and Cusack described the relationship between the two wings as: "UDA by Day, UFF by Night." The UFF was outlawed in 1973, but the UDA remained legal until 1992. Legal status gave obvious advantages to loyalist militants, including a public voice in the media and elsewhere. In 1988, however, the Thatcher government banned it, along with Sinn Féin, from being broadcast on BBC. The ban lasted until 1994.

[630] Over the total 38-year military operation, 300,000 British soldiers had been deployed to Northern Ireland. Ralf Sotscheck, "End of a Dark Chapter: British Military Leaves Northern Ireland," *Der Spiegel*, July 31, 2007.

[631] The UDR was formed in 1970 as a regiment of the British Army. Its troops were recruited from the local community and were overwhelmingly Protestant. Notably because the UDA remained a legal organization, there was cross membership between the two security forces. Critics allege two types of collusion between British security forces and the UDA/UFF. One is of "a disparate nature involving low ranking members of the RUC and part-time members of the locally recruited British army regiments often acting on their own initiative in an ad-hoc manner supplying information and weapons to loyalists." The second type is "structured collusion," a policy of the "highest echelons" of the UK government. See Relatives for Justice, *Collusion* (Belfast: Relatives for Justice Press, 2002), 2.

Catholic/nationalists (versus 107 Protestant/loyalists) had been interned. In conjunction with mass house searches/raids—almost 75,000 in 1973 alone—heavy handed military tactics inflamed grievance among the minority community and within the diaspora.[632]

Criminalization policy was physically manifested in what came to be known as the H-blocks (i.e., HMP Maze). Specifically constructed to house those convicted as ordinary criminals following the end of SCS,[633] their design sharply contrasted with the "Cages" of Long Kesh Prison,[634] where prisoners were divided along organizational lines into self-governing communities. As Feldman elaborates, "This social structure replicated and intensified the paramilitary social structure on the outside."[635] While republicans and loyalists remained separated, the cellular plan of the H-blocks sought to eliminate communal life on the inside. As Lloyd explains, Maze was "designed to isolate and individuate as *criminal* paramilitary actors who understood their operations as political."[636] With the new policy, moreover, extensive police powers became "normalized" as part of the criminal justice system, as insurgents were treated as terrorists rather than political actors.[637]

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[632] Brian Gormally, Kieran McEvoy, and David Wall, "Criminal Justice in a Divided Society," *Crime and Justice* 17 (1993): 77–9. The annual number of house searches increased from 17,262 in 1971 to 74, 556 in 1973. See O'Duffy, *British-Irish Relations*, 94.

[633] Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 269.

[634] Prisoners were initially housed in Nissen huts at the Royal Air Force Station of Long Kesh in the town of Maze, which became Long Kesh Detention Center. The H-blocks were constructed there to house non-SCS prisoners.

[635] Allen Feldman, *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 296. He notes that republican organizations engaged in extensive education and training in the setting of Long Kesh, where military command and rank were maintained by the prisoners.

[636] David Lloyd, *Irish Culture and Colonial Modernity 1800–2000: The Transformation of Oral Space* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 111.

[637] Gormally, McEvoy, and Wall, "Criminal Justice in a Divided Society," 79. The authors also detail the police brutality that was part of this policy.

Extradition

As early as 1972, before the full application of criminalization policy in the North, the United States and United Kingdom negotiated an extradition treaty, which the US Senate ratified in 1976 and came into force in 1977. The 1972 US-UK Extradition Treaty did include a political exception clause barring the extradition of those accused of political offenses—as was customary in international law. Successful cases made by Provisional IRA fugitives in US courts to avoid extradition led the British government (jointly with the US State Department) to pressure Congress for a revamped Anglo-American extradition treaty in the mid-1980s.

The 1986 Supplementary Treaty excluded violent offenses from the political exception clause, thus "effectively negat[ing] the POE [political offense exception] by stripping the political character away from an entire schedule of offenses that are normally associated with political revolution." The treaty amounted to an extension of British policy across the Atlantic. Henceforth, IRA "terrorists" accused of violent offenses in the United Kingdom could no longer avoid prosecution in British courts by fleeing to the United States.[638] As McElrath explains:

> modifications to the US-UK extradition treaty in 1986 reflected the most substantial change ever to US extradition law. . . . The Supplementary Treaty was passed in the decade during which the special relationship between the United States and Britain was at its strongest ever. The alliance between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher resulted in a significant change in United States extradition policy, thereby ending a long history of providing refuge for Irish political offenders.[639]

[638] Kathleen A. Basso, "The 1985 U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty: A Superfluous Effort?" *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 12, no. 1 (1989): 301–33, quote at 313. According to Basso, the United States had 90 treaties in place with other countries that contained the POE. The US-UK Supplementary Treaty was the first to attempt to narrow the scope of the clause. The Senate, however, included safeguards that covered cases where the accused could show that the request for extradition intended to punish an individual on account of his or her political opinions and instances where the accused would be prejudiced at trial because of his or her political opinions.

[639] McElrath, *Unsafe Haven*, 51.

Lobbying efforts by the Irish National Caucus, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and even the International Longshoremen's Union[640] to stymie the treaty were to no avail. Their attempts were complicated by the fact that in 1984, after nearly a decade of fending off British pressure, the Republic of Ireland extradited its first Irish republican back to the United Kingdom, thereby ending its 60-year policy of recognizing IRA offenses in the North as political.[641] As the *Washington Post* reported, "the new accord and the campaign against it provide further proof that the Irish-English battle is often fought on American soil."[642] The treaty was heralded by then secretary of state George Schultz as "a significant step to improve law enforcement cooperation and counter international terrorism" between the two close allies.[643]

The case of Joseph Doherty, who would spend almost a decade in a Manhattan correctional facility battling extradition and deportation to the North, mobilized Noraid and other Irish-American groups to protest the agreement's implementation. Doherty successfully opposed extradition in US courts and was granted deportation to the Republic, but the US government appealed the rulings and ultimately won on the deportation case. Despite support from 132 members of Congress, Doherty was "de facto extradited." As McElrath concludes, "Doherty's case suggested that the executive branch would go to great lengths, including the violation of the separation of powers clause in the US constitution, in order to exclude persons from the US, all for the sake of foreign relations." "History has suggested," she further argues, "that deportation

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[640] Under the leadership of Teddy Gleason, the International Longshoreman's Union was a significant supporter of Noraid as well as of the Irish National Caucus. Gleason served on Noraid's honorary annual testimonial dinner committee, and the union bought pages in the annual testimonial dinner books in show of support. Gleason also served on the executive of the Irish National Caucus.

[641] McElrath, *Unsafe Haven*, 63. Dominic McGlinchey was the first republican to be extradited since 1922.

[642] Lionel Barber, "Irish Republican Lobby Is Fighting Revised Anglo-U.S. Extradition Pact," *Washington Post*, September 23, 1985, A11. The treaty was passed in July 1986. Lynch points to the quid pro quo involved, with the Thatcher government supporting Reagan's bombing of Libya on charges of international terrorism. Timothy J. Lynch, *Turf War: The Clinton Administration and Northern Ireland* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 19.

[643] Quoted in Basso, "The 1985 U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty," 313.

has been used to target persons in absence of '. . . other mechanisms of repression. . . .'"[644] Irish historian Tim Pat Coogan similarly concluded: "British diplomacy succeeded in making the American court an arm of its counter-insurgency effort in Ireland."[645]

The Information Game: Framing, Blocking, Infiltrating, Informing

Britain's de-politicization of the IRA would enhance its other policy track—information distribution (public relations, propaganda, and censorship), which aimed to delegitimize and isolate the armed group, and intelligence gathering (by infiltrators and informers), which sought to undermine it from within. Given the prime importance of civilian support and intelligence in irregular wars,[646] the British government built a robust infrastructure to garner both. Various British agencies within the UK military and civil service—operating in the North, in England, in the Republic, and in the United States—were tasked with information distribution, control, and acquisition.[647]

The Propaganda Machinery

Alongside its military operations, public relations (PR) were an integral part of the British Army's counterinsurgency campaign from the outset. In September 1971, an Information Policy Unit (IPU) was established within the Army's Public Relations Office at Lisburn barracks in the

[644] McElrath, *Unsafe Haven*, 54–5.
[645] Tim Pat Coogan, "Foreword," in *Unsafe Haven*, xii.
[646] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*. See his discussions of civilian support on 91–104; and information, 174–6.
[647] According to Martin Ingram (pseudonym), an intelligence officer stationed in the North during the 1980s, the intelligence community consisted of the RUC Special Branch (intelligence in Northern Ireland), three British Army undercover units, and MI5. Ingram and Harkin, *Stakeknife*, 31. The authors argue that intelligence operations extended into the Republic of Ireland, where members of the Garda Síochána (the Republic of Ireland police force) also worked for British intelligence (111–2). They also argue that "despite what the politicians said publicly, on-the-ground cooperation between the security forces of both states was virtually non-existent, whatever happened at higher levels. In reality, for the FRU [Force Research Unit] the only source of information for the British on southern activity was that supplied by agents" (112). They also note that "many FRU operations took place in the Republic" (112).

wake of the growth and effectiveness of the IRA. According to Foot and others, its function was not standard PR but rather psychological warfare, entailing the production and distribution of propaganda and disinformation. British domestic and international intelligence agencies, MI5 (the Security Service) and MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service), also worked with the unit.[648] The Ministry of Defence, explained one former army intelligence officer, employed "people whose only role in life [was] to make sure that information released to the media [was] controlled."[649] In the late 1970s, however, as the government's Ulsterization-criminalization campaign was underway, the Army shifted much of its PR responsibilities to the RUC,[650] and the IPU was disbanded.

Within the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), the civil service apparatus governing the North under direct rule from Westminster, there was also the Northern Ireland Information Service (NIIS), the press and PR department with staff offices in Belfast and London.[651] In New York, Oliver Beckmann Inc. acted on its behalf.[652]

Along with the Army's information offices, according to Miller, NIIS was "a major source of political news on Northern Ireland."[653] One of its key tasks was shaping international opinion through the distribution of official information, which was embedded within a

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[648] Paul Foot, "Colin Wallace and the Propaganda War," in *War and Words: The Northern Ireland Media Reader*, ed. Bill Rolston and David Miller (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1996), 158–90; Duncan Campbell, "Still Dark in Paranoia Gulch," in *War and Words*, 191–6. See also "Britain's Propaganda War During the Troubles," presented by Mike Thompson, BBC Radio 4, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8577087.stm.

[649] Ingram and Harkin, *Stakeknife*, 8. Ingram explains that FRU was a British Army Intelligence Corps unit that recruited, developed, and controlled the Army's "'human intelligence assets' in Britain's secret war on the IRA." According to Ingram, FRU did not have a RUC officer commanding operations, and the relationship between the FRU and the RUC Special Branch (the primary intelligence unit in the six counties) "was frosty" (30).

[650] Liz Curtis, *Ireland: The Propaganda War: The British Media and the 'Battle for Hearts and Minds'* (London: Pluto Press, 1984), 253.

[651] David Miller, "The Northern Ireland Information Service and the Media: Aims, Strategy, Tactics," in *Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power*, ed. John Eldridge (London: Routledge, 1993), 63–91.

[652] Presumably this was a public relations firm. The National Archives (UK), CJ 4/1830, 444269, "Visit to Northern Ireland by Mr. P. L. O'Keeffe, CVO"; To: D. Gilliland (NIO); From: M. Hodge, Republic of Ireland Department; August 2, 1976; reference no. WLU 026/1.

[653] Miller, "The Northern Ireland Information Service," 74.

framework of assumptions: Northern Ireland was a legitimate entity; violence was caused by extremists; the IRA was a terrorist group (i.e., it lacked political motivation); and the British Army was a neutral actor in a conflict between two historically antagonistic communities.[654] By framing the Ulster war as a result of ancient hatreds, and the perpetrators of violence as criminals, the British government attempted to isolate it from serious political debate. And in this effort it was largely successful, at least until the 1981 Hunger Strike in Maze Prison.

With the war's causes portrayed as irrational and the perpetrators of violence as ordinary criminals, it then followed that its solution could not be political. Before American audiences, the answer to the North's woes was economic: first and foremost, the cessation of funding for the IRA from US shores; and secondarily, investment for the Northern Ireland economy. The government's position was captured in the statements of MP Don Concorran, the minister of state for Northern Ireland, during an industrial promotion tour in 1977: "The flow of blood money is not wanted. What is needed is investment for jobs." The government's efforts to "advance the Northern Ireland economy," he argued, were "greatly hindered by the activities of the terrorist who believes there is a never-ending flood of dollars from across the Atlantic to sustain him in his evil work." "With more and more men at work," Concorran continued, "the 'godfathers' who intimidate and knee-cap and arrange a bullet in the back would have fewer and fewer to exploit for their foul deeds."[655]

With the United States considered a lucrative material pipeline for the IRA—combined with the potential political pressure that Irish Americans could collectively exert if moved to do

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654 Miller, "The Northern Ireland Information Service and the Media," 225–6.

655 The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269, Statement by Don Conannon, MP, minister of state for Northern Ireland in New York, March 21, 1977. British Information Services, Policy and Reference Division, "Northern Ireland Minister Asks Americans to Help, Says Investment, Not Money for Arms, is What is Needed," March 21, 1977. The Northern Ireland Department of Commerce maintained an office in New York called the Northern Ireland Industrial Development Office.

so—US officials, opinion-makers, and the American public at large were the main focus of British overseas information efforts. One NIIS officer explained: "The prime target as far as we were concerned were American journalists. . . . If you could influence the media then you could influence the senators, Congress and eventually perhaps the White House."[656]

Major US newspapers were key targets, although NIIS had some success in reaching the Irish-American media. A letter addressed to the head of the Information Service in Belfast, for example, noted how the *Irish Echo*—described as "the most useful market we could want, as the IRISH ECHO is the paper of choice of those we might expect to be the heaviest contributors to NORAID"—reproduced one of its press releases almost word for word.[657]

On US soil, the British Embassy in Washington and consulate offices throughout the United States made a concerted effort to "make clear to the US Administration and to American opinion generally the serious consequences caused by those giving any kind of support to the terrorists in Northern Ireland." High-level officials visiting the United States also publicly chastised the IRA and support groups. In December 1975, Prime Minister Wilson denounced Noraid fundraising before the Association of American Correspondents, asserting that the organization's supporters were financing "murders and maiming."[658] High-level ministerial initiatives, however, were generally not pursued "because it [was] felt that too much exposure on this subject could prove counter productive." The task of undercutting American support was mainly placed in the hands of a less publicly visible organization: the New York-based British Information Services—dubbed "the British Misinformation Service" by opponents.

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[656] Quoted in Miller, "The Northern Ireland Information Office and the Media," 94.
[657] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269; Letter; To: T.M. Roberts Esq., Head, Departmental Information Services, Stormont Castle, Belfast; From: Elspeth Flynn; April 5, 1977.
[658] Quoted in Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 111.

By the mid-1970s, BIS had nearly a one-hundred strong staff and an annual budget of approximately $1.5 million dollars.[659] A confidential British document asserted that BIS "regard efforts to deter fund-raising as one of their most important tasks and undertake every opportunity to explain the realities of the situation to the American audience," which was described elsewhere as "a delicate operation" because "Irish/Americans are inherently suspicious of the UK point of view."[660] The memo noted that although the Irish government frequently pointed this out and argued that it would be better "to leave it to them to deal with the Irish-Americans,"[661] the British government doubted its capacity. As one document made clear, "They do not have an information machine remotely comparable to ours."[662]

Linked by satellite to a Central Information Office in London, BIS fed information "directly through special lines into 10 radio networks." "These 10 networks," explained one information officer, "in turn service[d] no less than 6,000 of the 9,000 radio stations in the country," which meant that the agency could put British policies "right at the top of the news."[663] According to Dumbrell, BIS's "most successful activity was the production of 'news spots' for American television," designed to undercut any sympathetic treatment of the IRA in the US media.[664] It also had its own printing press so that the agency could mail material to all major American newspapers.[665]

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659 John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2001), 202.
660 The National Archives (UK), CJ 4/1830, 444269; Confidential, "PIRA Fund Raising and Gun Running in the United States," [Contingency Briefing for the New Secretary of State], Brief no. S22, Division 4 (L), August 27, 1976, 2.
661 The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666 C4422497; "IRA Fundraising in the USA," para. 8, nd.
662 The National Archives (UK), CJ 4/1410, 444269; "Ireland," To: GW Harding Esq., CVO, Republic of Ireland Department, FCO; From: RM Russell, British Embassy, Washington DC; February 11, 1976.
663 Quoted in Liz Curtis, *Ireland and the Propaganda War: The British Media and the "Battle for Hearts and Minds"* (London: Pluto Press, 1984), 260.
664 Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, 202.
665 Curtis, *Ireland and the Propaganda War*, 260.

Among the most visible targets of British information officers and politicians, according to Miller, were the editorial boards of major American newspapers and business people.[666] BIS head Patrick Nixon stated, "We keep in very close touch with the editorial writers and foreign editors of all the leading papers. Our job is to know the opinion-formers and brief them on British policy."[667]

A 1977 memo on the US media outlined a few general guidelines:

> . . . rebuttal may not always be the best method of ensuring fair media coverage; over the past two years we have successfully chosen other techniques. In the background note [,] ministers can be told (not for quotation) that these have included private representations to editorial boards, such as that made to *The New York Times* . . . as well as stimulating the media to use material critical of terrorism. There are some 10,000 newspapers and radio and TV stations in the US: the information services concentrate their effort on the most influential of these.

At the same time, it explained:

> The hard core of the minority that indulge in misrepresentation are local Irish-American magazines and papers totally committed to one side. Rebuttals in such fora merely provide them with further excuses to repeat their misrepresentations and give them an unwarranted legitimacy in American eyes. Nor do we engage in public debate with IRA propagandists. But where misleading items appear in reputable media—whether in letters to the editor, articles or interviews, we react when it can be effective.

The memo further noted, that "a measure of our success is the continued attacks on the British Information Services by spokesman of extremist Irish/American organisations who accuse us of having misled the American public at large."[668] Another measure it used to gauge its effectiveness was Noraid's declared remittances to Northern Ireland, which steadily fell from

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[666] Miller, "The Northern Ireland Information Service and the Media," 225–6.

[667] Quoted in Curtis, *Ireland and the Propaganda War*, 260–1.

[668] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269, Confidential; To: Priority FCO, and to Priority BIS New York, Dublin and NIO Belfast; From: Ramsbotham; January 24, 1977. The draft submission Notes to Supplementaries to the Parliamentary Question from Mr. Diggs-Davison states that the ambassador in Washington "took up with the Board of the New York Times an article on Máire Drumm's funeral which struck him as unduly sympathetic to the Provisionals' cause. Although we should not want to prejudice the Ambassador's position by saying so publicly, his representations did in fact lead to the New York Times' taking confidential action to prevent any recurrence." Draft Submission, From: Mr. Wallis, The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269.

$440,000 in 1974 to $110,000 in 1978. According to a confidential document, "The money has been falling off recently and we believe that this is due to some extent to British propaganda efforts, but the most important factor has probably been the realization by Irish Americans of the nature of the Northern Ireland problem."[669] Another document explained the substantial decrease as a result of "[i]ncreasingly sympathetic and objective reporting and comment in the US press—the result of steady work by the British Information Services and by visiting British and Irish Ministers."[670] In a 1976 brief, officials similarly explained: "Our efforts are directed to weaning away the more moderate Irish/Americans and the recorded decline in money transmitted to Northern Ireland by NORAID is taken to be an indication of the success of our efforts. Our tactics are under continuous review in order to ensure that they remain effective."[671]

Scholars and analysts also found the government's PR/propaganda machine to be highly effective. By the early 1970s, according to historian Dennis Clark:

> it was clear . . . that English versions of the conflict in the North would get heavy coverage [in the United States]. The press officers of the British army and a broad range of government officials and propaganda specialists ground out news releases, situation reports, interpretive stories, gave background interviews, and plied the wire services and foreign press . . . with the English side of the issue. Conscious distortion was, of course, a normal government news management technique.[672]

Reporting on and in the North

In both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland alike, broadcasting companies were under the supervision of government-appointed bodies—the BBC Board of Governors and

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669 The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269; Confidential fax, "American Fund-raising – Mr John Hume"; To: Ms Elliott; From: DA Hill; September 22, 1976.
670 The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666 C44297; "Fund-raising in the USA," To: Mr Marshall; From: R G. Jones, November 21, 1977, 2.
671 The National Archives (UK), CJ 4/1830, 444269; Confidential, "PIRA Fund Raising and Gun Running in the United States," [Contingency Briefing for the New Secretary of State], Brief no. S22, Division 4 (L), August 27, 1976, 2.
672 Dennis J. Clark, *Irish Blood: Northern Ireland and the American Conscience* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977), 35.

the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), and the Radio Teilifis Érieann (RTÉ) Authority, respectively. Neither government exercised direct control, according to Curtis, but they did have "the legal power to stop the broadcasters transmitting either specific programmes or any specified class of material." Although the British government "stopped short of using its censorship powers, while the Irish government went ahead,"[673] she explains, the BBC adopted a policy of self-censorship, through what became known as the "reference upwards system."

In 1971, in the wake of a barrage of attack from politicians, the BBC established rules to minimize political flak. These gave BBC management "an unprecedented degree of control over programming decisions." Curtis further notes that a similar system was developed in ITV, as the Independent Television Authority (ITA), the forerunner of the IBA, exercised tight control over programs made on the North. In both cases, top management's approval at all stages of production was required on all programs relating to Ireland. Both the BBC and ITV, moreover, had rules that essentially amounted to a ban on interviews with "republican extremists." BBC staff were forbidden from interviewing IRA members without direct permission from the director-general, a policy that was extended to include Sinn Féin in 1979, when the BBC revamped its rules to apply to "terrorist organisations" and "individuals who are deemed by the [Director of News and Current Affairs] to be closely associated with a terrorist organization."[674]

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, relations between the government and broadcasters became more contentious. Curtis listed at least 40 television programs on Northern Ireland that were banned, censored, or delayed between 1970 and 1983.[675] In 1988, the Thatcher government went as far as to impose an outright ban on the broadcasting of words spoken by

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673 Curtis, *Ireland and the Propaganda War*, 189.
674 Liz Curtis, "The Reference Upwards System," in *War and Words: The Northern Ireland Media Reader* (Belfast: Beyond the Pale, 1994), 93.
675 Curtis, *Ireland: The Propaganda War*, 279–90.

representatives (or in support) of 11 Irish organizations, including the loyalist paramilitaries. The target, however, was Sinn Féin, which was a legal political party. According to Danny Morrison, the party's publicity director, "the ban as far as we were concerned was a weapon of war used by the government."[676] The ban lasted until the IRA's ceasefire in 1994.

At the same time, republican media was suppressed. The Belfast-based *Republican News*, which was launched in June 1970, had to be clandestinely produced and printed. According to Curtis, the internment swoops beginning in 1971, which led to the arrest of some of the paper's editorial board, seriously hampered the paper's production and distribution capabilities. It was not until 1975 that the paper's office began "to be a focus for the press and for foreign support groups" and effectively began to "convey their version of incidents immediately to the press." As part of its criminalization campaign, British authorities in turn launched a series of raids on the paper in 1977–8.

As Curtis explains, republicans could never have matched the resources at the disposal of the Northern Ireland Office, RUC, and Army press offices. Similarly Jo Thomas described, "In the battle for hearts and minds, the I.R.A. . . . ha[d] no press operation, and Sinn Fein . . . ha[d] a clumsy one"; they were "absurdly portrayed by government officials having been adept at propaganda."[677] And "even if they could," she continued, "the ties between the [British] media and the authorities [were] too strong."[678] Similarly in the United States during this period, republican supporters conducted media relations on an ad hoc, voluntary basis, and their

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[676] Francis Welch, "The 'Broadcast Ban' on Sinn Fein," April 5, 2005, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4409447.stm (accessed February 25, 2012). The absurdity of this policy was clear when Gerry Adams, elected member of British Parliament and president of Sinn Féin, could not be heard speaking about the Northern Ireland conflict on television but on other issues such as agriculture.
[677] Jo Thomas, "Bloody Ireland," *Columbia Journalism Review* (May/June 1988): 35
[678] Curtis, *Ireland: The Propaganda War*, 273-4.

resources paled in comparison to those at BIS's disposal. Hence, one Noraid activist's comparison of his publicity work as akin to David fighting Goliath.[679]

Critics and analysts also noted the lack of foreign journalists on the ground in the North. "Everything is terribly out of context," argued psychologist Rona Fields in the early years of the Troubles. "Most of the American press people do not stay on the scene. They come in to 'cover' a particular extraordinary act of violence. They don't know local people and can't communicate with them."[680] According to Holland, among major US newspapers, only the *Christian Science Monitor* had a full-time Irish correspondent before the 1990s. "Northern Ireland was usually the responsibility of the London Office," he explained, "while reporting the day-to-day violence generally became the responsibility of the wire services."[681]

Holland pithily observed: "If the U.S. courts provided an opportunity to challenge certain assumptions about Northern Ireland, the U.S. press usually did not."[682] Mainstream print media interchangeably referred to the Provisional IRA as Marxists, communists, terrorists, widow-makers, thugs, and mafia, and with specific regard to its American supporters—romantics, who were "delusional," "misguided," and "naïve." In general, US coverage on Northern Ireland was framed on the "sectarian-war thesis": the antagonists were "two fanatical religious armies" driven by irrational hatred, while the British government was a neutral force merely attempting to prevent "Irishmen from killing Irishmen." He goes on to argue that by excluding the republican view from its terms of reference, the US press "lacked not only explanatory power but reliability."[683] Holland further contends: "one thing is clear: the acceptance in the [US] press of

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[679] Conversation with Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), New York, NY, September 21, 2011.
[680] "British Government Drugging Irish People," *Irish People*, March 17, 1973, 6.
[681] Holland, *The American Connection*, 196–7.
[682] Ibid., 196.
[683] Ibid., 198.

the British government's consensus on Northern Ireland . . . provided a worrying example of how in democratic societies a free press can be used to stifle controversial matters."[684]

There were, of course, some columnists who deviated from the official package of assumptions about the conflict, notably Jack McKinney (*Philadelphia Daily News*), Pete Hamill (New York *Daily News* and *Village Voice*), and Jimmy Breslin (New York *Daily News*). Holland describes them as "sentimental tough guys," who simply appealed to an "Arcadian view of Ireland as a Garden of Eden spoiled only by the serpent England" rather than produced any complex analysis for mainstream consumption.[685] Describing McKinney and his impact in Philadelphia, Mallowe asserted: "McKinney wrote his ass off and [particular] . . . stories were inflammatory enough and persuasive enough to make the city . . . declare war on the British Empire."[686] British officials also point to frustration with a *Boston Globe* correspondent, who was described as "a thorn in our flesh for many years and in spite of discreet protests on our part to the *Globe* management at various times he continued to remain one of their regular correspondents. . . ."[687]

Major US news outlets did begin to send reporters on assignments to Northern Ireland during the 1981 Hunger Strikes, which ultimately led to the successive starvation of ten IRA and INLA prisoners in HMP Maze between March and August 1981 in protest of British criminalization policy. While reports and editorials continued to condemn the IRA, they also launched harsh criticisms against the British government, which hitherto had generally escaped

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[684] Holland, *The American Connection*, 235.
[685] Ibid., 227.
[686] Mike Mallowe, "My Life & Times with the IRA," *Philadelphia Magazine* 64, no. 3 (March 1973): 102–14. McKinney was also involved in the Northern Ireland civil rights movement in Philadelphia and was a friend of former IRA volunteer and Clan na Gael leader Vincent Conlon. See Bob Lydon, "Letters: The life & times of Jack McKinney," *Philadelphia Daily News*, August 19, 2002, available at: http://articles.philly.com/2002-08-19/news/25336612_1_irish-pub-irish-patriot-devlin.
[687] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269; Letter from the British Consulate General Boston; "Mr John Hume"; To: DK Middleton, The Northern Ireland Office, County Down; From: Barbara Eachus, information officer; October 26, 1976.

criticism for its role in the violence. Two media analysts contended that this period marked a break from the mainstream media's sole reliance on British sources for information. Accordingly, BIS, with the assistance of senior British officials and politicians, attempted to counteract critical coverage.[688] Notes from a 1983 Irish American Unity Conference meeting claimed that the "Brits fear" of Irish Americans was reflected in the addition of 15 information officers and one trip per month to the United States by British officials "to propagandize their point of view."[689]

By the early 1990s, with the activism surrounding the Hunger Strikes wound down, there was a perceived return to the status quo. A letter from Noraid activists in New York addressed to Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams stated: "It is no longer 1981 when Irish American interest in membership and support for Noraid peaked for a short period. That is not the case now. Adverse publicity has been a real problem."[690] And as one internal Noraid memo described: "It is difficult if not impossible under the British/Irish/US administration's propaganda barrage here to successfully justify the Republican point of view in the truth-vacuum we are in."[691]

Noraid Propaganda and Counterattacks

Activists in the United States described facing an uphill battle in terms of getting the republican point of view into the mainstream. "We were up against a very professional, well-financed opposition," asserted one Noraid activist. And "the propaganda campaign," he further

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[688] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 181–8.
[689] "Irish American Unity Conference, July 15–17, 1983, Chicago. Ill., notes," New York University, Archives of Irish America, Irish Republicanism Collection, AIA 022, box 2, folder 1.
[690] Letter from Jeannie and Charlie McLoughlin, to Gerry Adams, May 30, 1989. Available at the Archives of Irish America, Frank Durkan Collection, AIA 008, box 7, folder 29.
[691] Irish Northern Aid Committee, "Re: 'northern' Ireland TELETYPE," from Gerry Coleman, to Regional Coordinators, Unit Chairpersons, political action coordinators, and members of the executive, February 1, 1992, obtained from US Government FOIPA request: 1146079-0001.

explained, "was as important as the military and the political." [692] One editorial in the very first volume of the *Irish People* went as far as to argue that the British government's "greatest single weapon against the people's resistance movement has been propaganda."[693]

Another Noraid activist noted:

> So you had a lot of Irish here believing not only what the Catholic Church said, the American press got most of their information through the British Information [Services] and that's what they printed. We had meetings, like the *Washington Post*, with different newsmen, and the one meeting, we had one meeting at the *Washington Post*, the guy told us, "Any information we want regarding about what's happening in Northern Ireland we'll get from the British government." So when you're fighting that . . . we left the meeting there we were thinking what do you do?[694]

Republican activists attempted to counteract one-sided coverage by channeling major newspapers information from republican sources in Ireland. One interviewee described how a single copy of a weekly news report produced by the underground Irish Republican Information Service was physically passed through a network of supporters across the Atlantic to reach him in the United States from Dublin. He would then make photocopies of news articles and distribute them to major papers in hopes that they would be picked up—or at least some of the information would make its way into reporting on the conflict.[695]

Republican supporters also launched scathing attacks against mainstream news media. One of their key targets was the *New York Times*. Writing in 1972, in the wake of Bloody Sunday, Séan Cronin quipped, "The *New York Times*' views on Ireland are predictable—indeed as predictable as the British Information Service."[696] And in 1981, Noraid published a lengthy tirade on the *New York Times*, titled *A Decade of Deceit*, accusing the paper of an "anti-Irish" bias in its reporting of events in the North of Ireland, distorting the conflict as "sectarian"

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[692] Conversation with Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), Washington, DC, November 29, 2011.
[693] "British Mistakes?" *Irish People*, August 26, 1972, 7.
[694] Interview with Mary Sheils Baggarly, Upper Marlboro, Md., March 19, 2012.
[695] Conversation with Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), Washington, DC, November 29, 2011.
[696] Séan Cronin, "The Irish Americans Resent O'Malley's Arrogant Speech," *Irish People*, December 26, 1972, 2.

between Catholics and Protestants, and even printing untrue stories to defame the IRA. Essentially it accused the *New York Times* of acting as mouthpiece for BIS.

This view, moreover, was not confined to the republican fringe. Jo Thomas, former *New York Times* assistant national editor and foreign correspondent in London, wrote a revealing criticism of American coverage in an article titled "Bloody Ireland," which was published in the *Columbia Journalism Review* in 1988. While briefings were offered at 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Commonwealth Office, she explains, the press officers at the Northern Ireland Office would sometimes arrange a correspondent's entire itinerary but often did "something more subtle and effective":

> they set the terms in which the situation is discussed, which is usually one of law and order, terrorism and counterterrorism, or religious sectarian battles in which both sides are inaccurately portrayed as equally bigoted, equally powerful, and equally unreasonable. . . . If you see Northern Ireland in these terms, as a cauldron of violence, religious bigotry, and terrorism—and many American journalists seem to—then it makes sense to rely on the "guidance" of British and Irish officials in trying to grasp the situation. The British and Irish know the place, and they are "reasonable". . . . [I]t's also very tempting to seek out and write about "peacemakers," as American correspondents so often do, even if these well-meaning souls have no constituency and no prospect of righting the terrible wrongs which exist. . . . In trying to describe a foreign political landscape, language is everything. . . .

She describes the very purpose of the British government's massive public relations campaign as an effort to "strip the I.R.A. of the popular support it has to have in order to survive." Language, she writes, "is an essential ingredient of the government's 'criminalization policy.'"[697] This point was reinforced by the *Daily News*' Chuck Stone, who quipped that "outlawed" was so consistently attached to any reference of the armed group that it came to appear as if its formal name was "the outlawed IRA."[698]

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[697] Thomas, "Bloody Ireland," 35.

[698] Quoted in Irish Northern Aid Committee, *The Year of the Irish Hunger Strike: An American Tribute* (New York: Noraid, n.d.), 111.

Noraid also took on its own "political education" campaign as one of its core tasks. The *Irish People* became the key print source of republican news in the United States, although the bulk of its readership remained confined to New York. Noraid members contributed articles and individual units paid for advertising space, while news from Ireland was drawn from articles published in the underground *Republican News/An Phoblacht*. This material, however, had to be translated into "American,"—that is, sanitized of socialist discourse—before being republished for consumption on the US side of the Atlantic. The *Irish People*, although *de jure* a separate entity, was virtually Noraid's newspaper, with shared staff volunteers and distributors. By the mid-1970s, the paper failed to generate enough income to sustain itself, and Noraid had to step in to keep it financially afloat; it became one of its most hefty expenses. Noraid's efforts were aided by other sympathetic organizations such as American Irish Political Education Committee and the Irish National Caucus, which had their own newsletters that publicized British brutality and other forms of injustice.

Local media was perhaps one of the few viable channels open to publicizing the republican perspective. Indeed, Northern Ireland militants, according to Philadelphia journalist Mike Mallowe, consciously developed a strategy that targeted local media to "neutralize the pro-British news stories that the U.S. journalism establishment habitually printed."[699]

The other key channel was on-the-ground accounts from people in the North passed through interpersonal channels, or by republican figures on tour. Describing his motivation to become active in the early years of the conflict, one core activist noted:

> the stream of letters coming [from family and friends in Northern Ireland] was our connection and motivation. The pull was not what was in the papers. The British Army had a PR secretary in Belfast that would send information to London. There were no

[699] Mike Mallowe, "The Rising of the Moon," *Philadelphia Magazine* (March 1978): 126.

> journalists based in Belfast at that time. Only a small number of people knew what was really happening, from people they knew pleading for help.[700]

As the conflict endured, activists also developed "a plan to concentrate on a city-by-city campaign aimed at propagandizing strictly local connections between the Irish struggle and whatever American community happened to be the target area."[701] "The model entailed," Mallowe further explained, "portraying a local personality as a victim of British brutality in the North . . . play on local sympathy and local indignation to offset the horror stories that AP [Associated Press] and UPI [United Press International] carried depicting the IRA as a bunch of psychotic thugs."[702]

This approach was strategic, as by this time, prominent republican figures were barred from entering the United States, although they continued to do so illegally. Their status, however, meant that they had to remain underground in "safe houses" within the tightest knit Irish-American communities to escape detection by US authorities. During the late 1980s, the FBI found that the movement's "directing of convicted PIRA members to the United States on fund raising functions . . . appear[ed] to be on the increase."[703]

Visa Denials

The US State Department, encouraged by the British government, not only blocked the entry of known IRA leaders and former prisoners but also Provisional Sinn Féin (PSF) officials,

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[700] Discussion with Noraid activist Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), Baltimore, Md., June 15, 2011. In her extensive research on the Basque diaspora in Argentina, Totoricagüena similarly finds that information coming from family and friends in Basque territory during the Franco era often contradicted what was in the national media, which tended to be pro-Franco. "Personal contacts affected Basque identity in each community," she notes. Totoricagüena, *Basque Diaspora*, 279.

[701] Mike Mallowe, "The Rising of the Moon," *Philadelphia Magazine* (March 1978):126.

[702] Ibid., 126.

[703] US DOJ, FBI, Teletype, Subject [redacted], Preliminary Investigation Initiated November 3, 1989, expires March 2, 1990; To: Director FBI; From: New York (199F-NY-188059); November 6, 1989.

who headed a legal political party. According to a record of conversation between US and UK officials, "The most effective way to get the message across to Americans that contributions were not for charitable purposes but for terrorism, in HMG's [Her Majesty's Government's] view, was the visa stop-list" provided to US authorities. "This kept out potential fund-raisers and gun-runners," it explained. Also alerting British authorities whenever a person on the stop-list applied for a visa was another measure discussed.[704] The visa denial policy was indeed an effective impediment.[705]

In 1978, the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs brought before the Committee on the Judiciary a fact-finding report it produced with the Irish National Caucus, which found that the State Department "may have acted unfairly and unjustifiably in denying non-immigrant visas to certain Irish nationals. . . . Considerably more effort should be made to differentiate between political activity and terrorist activity which now appears to be regarded as synonymous."[706] One of the Caucus's main lobbying campaigns was opposing the visa denials of republican figures,[707] and Noraid also attacked the issue as form of "British censorship."[708] It was not until 1987, however, that a member of Provisional Sinn Féin's leadership was allowed to enter the United States in over a decade, while the party's president, Gerry Adams, would not be granted a visa until 1994—and only through a tremendous lobbying campaign of the first post–cold war US administration. According to the head of Americans for a New Irish Agenda,

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[704] The National Archives (UK), CJ 4/1410, 444269, "Record of Conversation Between the Deputy Under-Secretary of State and the United States Ambassador Held at the Foreign Commonwealth Office on Friday, 7 November 1975 at 11 am," November 17, 1975.
[705] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 227. Wilson notes, "Prominent republicans admitted that the visa denial policy seriously impeded their activities and effectively undermined the presentation of Sinn Féin's position in America."
[706] Robert White, *Ruairí Ó' Brádaigh: The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 261.
[707] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 133.
[708] "INA Newsletter," no. 1, April/May 1989.

Clinton's decision to grant Adams a visa "overturned a 50-year hegemony over Irish policy that the British government had exercised through the State Department."[709]

Infiltration and Informers

The British government also engaged in intelligence gathering on the ground through infiltration and informers. As Dillon remarks, along with black propaganda, "it is the agent, double agent or informer who [was] the vital tool or pawn" in what he calls the "dirty" side of the conflict.[710] Just as RUC and other intelligence agencies spread their net wide in the North, where "almost everyone from the nationalist community who could be a source of information was viewed as potential informer material," this activity extended to the United States and was aided by the FBI.[711]

The history of this covert side of the Troubles is less well-documented, as much information likely remains classified. One of the few publicized cases is that of Denis Donaldson, who was an IRA member and later influential Sinn Féin leader. In the late 1980s, he was sent by the party to restructure Noraid and even worked in its central office. Donaldson was also a paid British spy.[712] According to one senior republican source, "There were known agent provocateurs in the ranks of Irish Northern Aid at the time and we figured we knew who they were"; however, "the notion that Donaldson was one never crossed our mind."[713] In the late

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[709] Quoted in Cited in Adrian Guelke, "The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1996): 533.
[710] Martin Dillon, *The Dirty War* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), xxi.
[711] Kevin Toolis, *Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within the IRA's Soul* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 212.
[712] Séan O'Driscoll, "US Republicans Find Their Struggle was Run by an Informer," *Irish Times*, December 24, 2005. Available at: http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/irish_times/arts2005/dec24_US_republicans_find_struggle_run_by_informer__SODriscoll.php. Donaldson was ultimately murdered by the Real IRA in 2006 in County Donegal.
[713] Quoted in Niall O'Dowd, "The Soldier, The Spy, the U.S. Connection," *Irish Voice*, December 21, 2005, available at: http://www.irishabroad.com/news/irishinamerica/news/the-soldier-the-spy-dec2105.asp.

1990s, Noraid's splinter group, Cumann na Saoirse Náisiúnta, was also infiltrated, by American spy David Rupert who worked with both the FBI and MI5.[714]

The US Government's Policing

While British intelligence agencies reconfigured "Orwell's nightmare into everyday reality" in the North,[715] and BIS waged its propaganda campaign, the US government undertook policing in its territorial jurisdiction. It had an ad hoc interagency committee to coordinate action in relation to IRA/PSF fundraising, which was under the chairmanship of the Department of Justice.[716] The US government also collaborated with British and Irish authorities. The FBI had a legal attaché, "legat," in London, the role of which was to act as a liaison with British law enforcement and security agencies.

US officials worked directly with British authorities on cracking down on the flow of weapons and money. In the mid-1970s, for example, a team of Customs officials visited the United Kingdom to "make contacts to enable them to investigate the illegal export of arms and the export of cash . . . from the United States." [717] RUC and the Department of Justice also cooperated on the "Philadelphia Five" gunrunning trial, which ended with two Noraid members (Neil Byrne and Dan Cahalane) convicted of 19 counts of illegal export of arms and

[714] Michael McKevitt Justice Campaign, "Omagh, David Rupert, and MI-5 & FBI Collusion," available at: http://www.michaelmckevitt.com/omagh-david-rupert-mi5-fbi-collusion.htm (accessed April 27, 2012); Liz Walsh, "Spy Rupert Tells Tale of Intrigue, Terror and Semex-stuffed Toys," *Irish Independent*, June 29, 2003, available at: http://www.irishfreedomcommittee.com/NEWS/rupert/062903_irindep_intrigue.htm.
[715] Rory Nugent, "Inside the IRA," *Spin* 10, no. 5 (1994): 66.
[716] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1840 ;"NORAID"; To: M. Hodge, Republic of Ireland Department, FCO; From: J. Davidson, British Embassy, Washington, DC; July 20, 1976.
[717] Patrick Farrelly, "Sinn Fein Urges Noraid Changes," *Irish Voice*, January 21, 1989, 35.

ammunition.[718] By the late 1980s, "cooperation between the U.S. authorities and the British and Irish security forces [had] made shipments of arms from the U.S. very risky."[719]

Shutting the pipeline on funding was more difficult, because Noraid was a legal organization and its fundraising activities were permissible under US law. The US government attempted to debilitate Noraid with legal battles and kept the UK government apprised of the organization's financial reports. Although US cooperation was deemed "invaluable," British documents reveal ambivalence about the Justice Department's effectiveness.[720]

Targeting the Core: Surveillance and Infiltration

As early as 1970, according to Wilson, the FBI established a comprehensive surveillance and infiltration operation of Irish republican groups.[721] However, the group's leadership was initially described as "moderate" and "conservative" that is vis-à-vis leftists, and NY office FBI memos did not deem that the organization was involved in subversive activities or activities inimical to US national security. The case was thus placed in a "pending inactive status."[722]

By 1972, this had changed when the FBI suspected it to be an agent of the Provisional IRA. The so-called Irish problem came to be considered not only as serious but also "a source of embarrassment" to the US government.[723] The agency subsequently afforded Noraid fundraising "prompt and continuous investigation."[724] Government documents reveal the FBI's

[718] The National Archives (UK), CJ 4/1830, 444269; Confidential, "PIRA Fund Raising and Gun Running in the United States," [Contingency Briefing for the New Secretary of State], Brief no. S22, Division 4 (L), August 27, 1976, 2.
[719] Ibid.
[720] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666, C442494.
[721] Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*, 80.
[722] US DOJ, FBI, United States Government, Memorandum; To: Director, FBI; From: SAC, New York; Subject: Irish Northern Aid Committee; January 14, 1971, 2; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[723] Quoted in Holland, *The American Connection*, 39.
[724] US DOJ, FBI, Airtel, Subject: Irish Northern Aid Committee Registration Act; To: SAC, New York; From: Acting Director, FBI; June 21, 1972; file no.: 97- NY-2700; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.

presence at protest events, combing through of Irish community media, and visits to Noraid's Bronx headquarters and other chapters, as well as a cadre of agents and informants with bureau offices from New York to California monitoring the organization's activities.

Such was the weight that the US government brought to bear on the organization, that it received public attention. "The Justice Department," wrote one journalist, "used an arsenal of weapons, usually reserved for Cosa Nostra—wire taps, undercover agents, 24-hour surveillance, grand jury intimidation and the crack anti-gunrunning treasury agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms—to relentlessly break the back of Noraid."[725] Similarly, on the *Congressional Record* in December 1975, Congressman Mario Biaggi asserted that not only did Ulster politicians and the British government set up Irish Northern Aid as a "straw man" "in order to disparage its efforts and discourage those who participate by making it a fearful undertaking," but also that there was "many an American of Irish origin here and many an Irish national here who have been harassed by our federal government."[726]

In 1978, Noraid attempted to sue the US government for "knowing and unabated illegal harassment," including visits to its offices and the homes of Noraid officials, wiretaps and bugging, the "use of infiltrators and informants," opening of mail, burglary, and photography of private affairs.[727] As Noraid executive vice-chairman Richard Lawlor explained: "There was always that concern that we would have a mole, [were] being followed, [and had our] phones

[725] Mallowe, "The Rising of the Moon,"129.
[726] Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 94th Congress, First Session, Vol. 121, no. 178, December 4, 1975.
[727] Lawrence M. O'Rourke, "U.S. Probers Deny Harassing Irish Group," *The Bulletin*, November 12, 1978, made available through The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666, C442497.

tapped."[728] Another former chapter chairman noted: "We always understood that someone was planted in our unit."[729]

Similarly the Irish National Caucus was under surveillance. Its executive head, Father Sean McManus, explained, "I was totally conscious that there would be informers everywhere—FBI, British government, Irish government, etc."[730] In correspondence with the FBI dated February 1975, the Caucus stated:

> [W]e are well aware of FBI, Treasury and CIA survelliance [*sic*] of law-abiding Americans. . . . We also know of British agents in the United States. . . . Why is it such close survelliance [*sic*] is given [to] Irish-Americans who are engaging solely in legal activity? Too many Irish-Americans have been unduly harassed by the FBI, Treasury and other federal investigatory agencies. . . . Employment of many Irish-Americans has been jeopardized by the FBI and in a few known incidents people have been dismissed.[731]

In addition to surveillance and infiltration, another tactic was the use of the grand jury system to investigate gunrunning schemes. The men who became known as the Fort Worth Five—Ken Tierney, Pascal Morahan, Matthias Reilly, Tom Laffey, and Danny Crawford—would spend over a year in a Texas jail cell for their refusal to testify before the grand jury.[732] As Tierney explained, "The grand jury investigation was about looking for informers, which is what the British did. The judge thought that us married men would be the first to break because we had families and would feel overwhelmed by the hardship imposed on us by being in jail."[733]

However, Irish Northern Aid would mobilize support for these men and their families; indeed, one recounted how Matt Higgins of the central office brought over a bag of cash

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[728] Interview with Richard Lawlor, Hartford, Conn., December 1, 2011.
[729] Conversation with Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), Washington, DC, November 2011.
[730] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 77.
[731] US DOJ, FBI, Letter, To: Mr. Clarence Kelly, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; From: Irish National Caucus (author name redacted); February 13, 1975; FOIPA request: 1146145-000.
[732] All of these men were from counties in and around New York City, which made their year-long stay in a Texas jail an extraordinary hardship, especially for those who had dependents.
[733] Interview with Ken Tierney, Bronx, NY, June 7, 2011.

collected in Irish bars to pay for their eventual bail. Meanwhile, lawyers affiliated with the American Committee for Ulster Justice (ACUJ) would vociferously speak out against the US government for harassing Noraid, and they provided their legal services for their defense.[734] While this particular strategy appeared to backfire, as it reinforced the wave of mobilization in the early years, overall US government polices generated serious pressure on the organization.

Longtime Noraid member Brigid Brannigan noted that it created a sense that there was "danger lurking," that you could be arrested.[735] A number of interviewees noted that the fear of harassment and potential job loss deterred individuals who may have been sympathetic from becoming involved. One third-generation Irish American and long-time member of the Armagh County Association explained that she did not become involved with Noraid because "they [i.e., the government] would watch you," especially being from the North.[736] One interviewee even noted that he would avoid Irish bars in his community, as they were often under surveillance.

Department of Justice investigations and arrests also appeared to have resulted in the dissolution of some less cohesive chapters. FBI memos reveal that the agency's investigation of Noraid was believed to have led to attrition in the Bergen County, NJ, chapter, and even the collapse of others.[737] Moreover, chapters that existed in the early 1970s such as in Bucks County and Rosemont, PA, Central Connecticut, Hamden CT, and as far flung as Reno and Las Vegas, NV,[738] do not appear in the organization's mid-1970s FARA reports as contributors to the central office in the Bronx.

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[734] Michael F. Funchion, "American Committee for Ulster Justice (ACUJ)," in *Irish American Voluntary Organizations* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 31–4.
[735] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.
[736] Conversation with a long-time Armagh Association member, New York, NY, September 1, 2012.
[737] Holland, *The American Connection*, 38–9, 41. Holland mentions one in New Jersey (place not specified) and Portland, Oregon.
[738] These Nevada chapters were reported as formed in July 1972. See Kathleen Teltsch, "In a Bronx Storefront Office, a Campaign Outpost for the I.R.A.," *New York Times*, July 30, 1972.

By 1978, the British Embassy itself described the climate in the United States as "fairly hostile" to IRA supporters.[739] Then Noraid co-director Matt Higgins explained the impact, "All this heavy breathing down our necks has discouraged a few of the weaker brethren around the country."[740]

Targeting the Outer Circles: FARA and Moral Opprobrium

While law enforcement tactics were used against Noraid's inner circles, persuasion or rather dissuasion aimed to constrict its support base. Two key mechanisms were used to dissuade supporters: the Foreign Agents Registration Act and public denouncements by prominent Irish-American politicians.

FARA

The very goal of forcing Noraid to register as an agent of the IRA under FARA was to discourage Irish Americans from associating with a "terrorist front" organization.[741] However, according to British documents, the Department of Justice had long been split on the issue of how to proceed with Noraid: on the one hand, there were those who advocated shutting down the organization and, on the other, those who blocked any legal action. The move to have it register was "a compromise between these two points of view." According to inside information, the matter "had not been submitted particularly high within the Department of Justice, let alone for wider political clearance within the new [Carter] Administration."[742] Nevertheless, the British

[739] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666; letter, To: D.E. Richards Esq in Philadelphia; From: J. Davidson of the British Embassy, March 3, 1978.
[740] *Irish Echo*, February 18, 1978.
[741] Holland, *The American Connection*, 47.
[742] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1840, 444269, Confidential letter titled "NORAID," To: M. Hodge, Republic of Ireland Department, FCO; From: J. Davidson, British Embassy, Washington, DC; March 3, 1977.

government perceived that forcing Noraid to register would "help to deter the innocent—though not the already committed—from contributing funds."[743] "Many of the contributions that they received," it argued, "have been from people who might be much less willing to contribute if their names were to be banded about publicly."[744] The requirements it foresaw would also put "administrative obstacles in the path of their fund-raising."[745]

In 1981, the US government successfully won a lengthy legal battle to have Noraid register as a foreign agent of the Provisional IRA. By 1983, the FBI believed that "because of the pressure placed on NORAID by the US Justice Department to register as an agent of PIRA that the organization may fold in name only."[746] Noraid survived.

Moral Opprobrium by Big Irish-Catholic Politicians

The British and Irish governments also courted the support of Catholic Irish-American politicians to speak out against the IRA and Noraid. Internal British memos note that officials were "convinced that one of the most productive ways of tackling the flow of American funds and arms to PIRA is to get prominent Irish Americans to speak out against it."[747] The memos show active courting of Senator Edward Kennedy, although an awareness about Congressional election cycles and his Irish constituency. Although it was ambivalent about the Department of

[743] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1840 444269, letter titled "US Action Against 'Noraid,'" To: Michael Hodge Esq., Republic of Ireland Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; From: NR Varney, Northern Ireland Office, March 7, 1977.
[744] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1840 444269, confidential letter titled "NORAID," From: J. Davidson, British Embassy, Washington, DC; To: M. Hodge, Republic of Ireland Department, FCO; March 3, 1977.
[745] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1840 444269, "Draft Minute [sic]," To: Mr. Varney; From: David Hill; March 4, 1977, p.2.
[746] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee, Full Field Investigation authorized 11/22/83," To: Director, FBI; From: ADIC, New York; April 19, 1984, 2; file no.: NY199F-1564.
[747] The National Archives (UK), CJ 4/1410, 444269, draft letter, "Senator Kennedy: Ireland," To: J.Q. Greenstock, Esq., British Embassy, Washington, DC, n.d.

Justice's effectiveness to stifle fundraising,[748] the British government believed that the moral persuasion of the so-called Four Horsemen (i.e., Ted Kennedy, Tip O'Neill, Hugh Carey, and Daniel Moynihan) was effective. The Carter administration similarly made clear its continuance of "noninvolvement" policy to the American public. This meant that the US government would not interfere in what London considered an "internal" matter. An April 1978 internal memo states that the drop in fundraising figures during the latter half of 1977 is "a probable result of the various anti-fund-raising utterances of Kennedy, Carter et al since March 1977."[749]

In a May 1979 internal memo, it was asserted that American politicians have since 1977 "used their influence effectively to curb Irish American support . . . for PIRA." "It seems surprising that NORAID'S 1978 receipts were so very little higher than the previous year's record low figure" in light of the publicity surrounding police brutality in the H-Blocks. "This probably is thanks to the moderating influence of people like O'Neill and Kennedy . . . who continue to speak out firmly against any kind of support for the men of violence."[750] In late 1979, Ireland's prime minister Jack Lynch similarly recognized the role of Irish-American politicians in reducing support in the United States and publicly thanked them for "closing the information gap."[751]

According to one activist in the New York area: "We were making tremendous in roads with individual congressmen. [Then] Carey, O'Neill, Moynihan, Kennedy changed course. They had more or less counteracted [it]; they had a huge influence on counteracting anything the Irish

[748] In a May 1979, an internal memo from the US British Embassy in Washington noted, "It will be interesting to see if the Department of Justice do take steps against NORAID branches in the Mid West as suggested. I would be surprised if effective action is in fact taken—the DOJ do not seem to have found a way in the past to curb NORAID fundraising elsewhere in the country." The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666, C442497.
[749] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666, Hendy, April 28, 1978.
[750] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666, C442497, quoted in Hendy, May 15, 1979.
[751] Ernest B. Furgeson, "Americans Who Aid Ulster Called 'Real' Irish Enemies," *Baltimore Sun*, November 19, 1979.

were doing here."[752] Richard Lawlor, Hartford chapter leader and Noraid executive member, asserted, "The Irish government convinced the Big Four to issue condemnations against people like us, against Irish Northern Aid, against anyone who would support the republican movement. It had a huge effect on those upwardly mobile people. They didn't know anything about anything so these people must be right, they thought, and we [Noraid] must be wrong."[753]

From Boston to New York, to Philadelphia and Baltimore, Noraid interviewees expressed how the negative public perception of Irish Northern Aid affected their social lives. Lily Lafferty, daughter of two devout activists in the Boston area, recalled: "Friends of mine always were surprised that my parents were involved in this; sometimes it was better not to mention it. 'My God,' they would say, 'your parents could get picked up!' As if they were living on the edge."[754] Recalling being taunted as the "Irish bomb thrower," one interviewee had noted that during his teenage years he had actually "lost every childhood friend I had because of the moral shame of being associated with Noraid."[755] Similarly, Queens activist Olive McKeon relayed how neighbors and friends who once visited her house stopped coming by as she became further involved with the republican cause.[756]

Dublin's Posture

Dublin played a crucial role in stifling diasporic radicalism both by policies it pursued within its borders and its US initiatives. Although the junior partner of the United States and United Kingdom, its role was nonetheless critical in hampering mobilization from US shores for

[752] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.
[753] Interview with Richard Lawlor, Hartford, Conn., December 1, 2011.
[754] Interview with Lily Lafferty (pseudonym), Quincy, Mass., August 9, 2011.
[755] Conversation with Billy Guerin, New York, NY, September 21, 2011.
[756] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, NY, December 13, 2011.

at least two reasons: It stifled the growth of republican militancy in its own borders, which meant that the kinship and friendship ties that are so crucial in mobilizing support for any movement would not be activated in the service of the republican cause. This was especially effective because most Irish ethnics in the United States had roots in the South of Ireland, where the IRA was criminalized and Provisional Sinn Féin was banned from communicating on television and radio. Second, as the "homeland" government,[757] its vociferous anti-IRA stance had a significant delegitimizing effect on the movement, especially among Irish-Americans who had no direct or indirect ties to the Catholic ghettos in the North of Ireland.

The Home Front

The South, despite its very origins in revolutionary bloodshed, was inhospitable terrain for the IRA and its offspring. This was in part a product of Anglo-Irish relations, which were highly asymmetrical[758] as a result of the Republic's trade dependence on its neighbor. The Republic was vulnerable to political pressure from the United Kingdom to suppress any threat to the partition from within the 26 counties of Ireland under its jurisdiction.

The Offenses Against the State Act, which granted the government the power of internment against criminal organizations, was introduced in 1939 in the wake of an IRA

[757] "Homeland" country is from the perspective of republicans—not unionists, of course, who perceive themselves as British. Not only did Provisional IRA/Sinn Féin not recognize Northern Ireland as a legitimate part of the United Kingdom, but this wing of the movement also did not recognize the legitimacy of the Republic of Ireland, which was referred to as "the Free State." From 1970, when it emerged from a split in the republican movement, Provisional Sinn Féin pursued an abstentionist policy of sitting neither in the British nor Irish parliaments until 1986. Under the leadership of Gerry Adams, it decided to contest elections and sit in the Dáil Éireann (the Republic's parliament), thus further advancing the "Armalite and ballot box strategy" that began during the Hunger Strikes in 1981 when Provisional Sinn Féin first participated in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections.

[758] O'Duffy describes how the British-Irish relationship became more symmetrical as a result of their joint entry into the European Economic Community, which decreased the Republic's economic dependence on the United Kingdom. The Republic's own economic boom in the 1990s also contributed. In addition to the shift from asymmetry to symmetry, O'Duffy describes a shift from contested sovereignty vis-à-vis Northern Ireland to one of pooled sovereignty. See his *British-Irish Relations and Northern Ireland*, 114.

bombing campaign in Britain, and the organization was quickly thereafter declared unlawful and suppressed. The Gardaí Síochána (the Irish police) and the RUC cooperated in the border areas to suppress IRA activities and in routine criminal matters.

At the same time, domestic politics also weighed against militant republicanism. The dominant party, Fianna Fáil (the 1926 offspring of Sinn Féin) adopted a rhetorical republican doctrine as "a buffer against criticism from radical republicanism and was aimed at delegitimizing the IRA."[759] Its focus on the injustice of partition was a means to "counter the apparent threat that republicanism itself posed to the very existence of the [26-county] state." Portraying itself as the representative of the Irish nation—imagined as Catholic and Gaelic and constitutionally declared to encompass the whole island of Ireland in 1937—the party pursued pragmatic policies that contradicted its rhetorical commitment to unification. With small gaps, Fianna Fáil was in power for most of the twentieth century, including at the onset of the Troubles in 1968.

With the outbreak of violence in 1968, the party was forced to directly confront its internal contradiction between ideology and practice. When refugees came streaming over the border in 1969, Taoiseach Jack Lynch publicly declared that he would "not stand idly by." Although units were deployed to the border to assist victims, the Irish Army lacked the military capability to even restore order in the North's Catholic ghettos.[760] As one interviewee put it, "the relative military capacity of Ireland and the UK was like a mouse and an elephant."[761] Members in Lynch's cabinet secretly attempted to arm the emerging Provisional IRA, which was put to an end when the efforts were discovered and made public in 1970. In 1971, Ireland's

[759] Catherine O'Donnell, *Fianna Fáil, Irish Republicanism and the Northern Ireland Troubles* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007).
[760] Anthony Craig, *Crisis of Confidence: Anglo-Irish Relations in the Early Troubles, 1966–1974* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2010).
[761] Phone interview with Phil Gallagher, Connecticut AOH leader, September 7, 2011.

foreign minister spoke before the UN General Assembly, outright declaring that Northern Ireland was an illegitimate state and requesting an international peacekeeping force.[762]

Although Fianna Fáil framed the Troubles as an inevitable outcome of the partition and advocated unification, the party denounced the IRA and suppressed it. Certainly the Republic felt pressure from London, but the IRA also constituted a security threat to the Republic itself for the armed group neither recognized Northern Ireland nor the Republic as legitimate states. The IRA's end goal was to not only to end the partition but also to create an all-Ireland democratic socialist republic—which meant taking down the Dublin regime also.

Between 1971 and 1972, Lynch's policies increasingly aligned with the British government. In October 1971, Lynch invoked Section 31 of the Broadcasting Authority Act (1960) and issued a directive that banned the Provisional and Official IRA from being broadcast on Irish radio or television. "As early as 1972," asserted a British government document, "the Irish and the UK governments had seen eye to eye on the problem."[763] According to Craig, while "security cooperation [with the British government] concerning republican groups had been politically impossible for the Lynch government, the very ferocity of the IRA's campaign had done something to change this." Following the Bloody Friday attacks in 1972, the administration declared to British officials, "On measures to defeat the IRA, there was no lack of political will to cooperate."[764] Lynch also amended the Offences Against the State Act to facilitate non-jury courts, which were introduced in May 1972, to convict IRA suspects.[765]

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[762] Craig, *Crisis of Confidence*.
[763] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269; Telegram no. 1217, "My Telegram no. 1197: Irish Foreign Minister's Visit," To: Priority FCO; From: Ramsbotham; March 18, 1977.
[764] Craig, *Crisis of Confidence*, 130.
[765] Ibid., 141. By the end of 1972, Seán MacStiofáin (chief of staff of the IRA), Ruairí Ó'Brádaigh (president of Sinn Fein), and Martin McGuiness (an IRA commander in Derry) were imprisoned in the South.

One February 1973 editorial published in the *Irish People*, titled "The South: A One Party State?" from a contributor is Dublin, described the information situation as follows:

> In the first place, the entire media in Ireland are firmly biased against republicans. RTE is the most notable of these – it refuses air time to republicans and presents their statements in only the most condensed and garbled form. Of the three Dublin national papers, *The Irish Independent* refuses to carry any republican material as a matter of policy, *The Irish Press* is of course partisan by its very nature being an organ of the government party, and *The Irish Times*, while being the most liberal of the three, has a strong traditional bias against the republican movement.
> ….
> In addition to these disabilities, Sinn Fein . . . has suffered government harassment and restriction in the last year. Its offices were closed down by government order . . . and recently many of its leaders have been jailed including its president, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, and the editor of its newspaper *An Phoblacht*. . . ."[766]

After Fine na Gael and the Labour Party ousted Fianna Fáil in 1973—the year violence spilled across the border with the UVF's Dublin and Monaghan bombings (initially blamed on the IRA) that resulted in 33 deaths[767]—the Irish government imposed an even stricter ban by extending it to include Sinn Féin in 1976. Conor Cruise O'Brien, during his tenure as minister of posts and telegraphs, even supported censorship in Irish newspapers.[768] Subsequently the restrictions imposed under Section 31 were renewed continually with "suffocating effects."[769] It was not repealed until 1994. Mickey Whelan, who was deeply involved in organizing the H-bloc Committees during the Hunger Strikes, explained:

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[766] Jack Maloney, "The South – A One Party Fascist State?" *Irish People*, February 24, 1973, 5, 8.

[767] As recently 2003 and again in 2007, there was a probe into whether British security forces colluded with the two loyalist paramilitaries who were responsible for the bombings. The so-called Barron report asserted: "A finding that members of the security forces in Northern Ireland could have been involved in the bombings is neither fanciful nor absurd, given the number of instances in which similar illegal activity has been proven. However, the material assessed by the Inquiry is insufficient to suggest that senior members of the security forces in Northern Ireland were in any way involved in the bombings. The loyalist groups who carried out the bombings in Dublin were capable of doing so without help from any section of the security forces in Northern Ireland, though this does not rule out the involvement of individual RUC, UDR or British Army members." *Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings*, October 29, 2003, 286–7, available in the *Interim Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings*, Joint Committee of Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights, Houses of the Oireachtas, Republic of Ireland, December 2003, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/dublin/barron03.pdf (accessed September 12, 2012).

[768] Curtis, *Ireland and the Propaganda War*, 193.

[769] Ibid., 194.

> Everyone in Ireland knew about Noraid because of the paper reports of the money that was being raised by "misguided Americans." There was consistent criticism of Noraid. Under Section 31, journalists could not interview members of the IRA or Sinn Féin; they couldn't even play republican songs on the radio. . . . The RTÉ was state run television and radio. People could get BBC, and in the 1970s there were a lot of pirate stations, but they were concerned with playing rock music, and mostly aimed at city audiences. . . . That's why it was such a tight network; it was hard to get the word out. They only had *An Phoblacht*, and you could only get the paper if there was an activist in the community selling that paper. There was no independent reporting. Other than that there was word of mouth or commemorations held by the National Graves' Association. . . . That was how tight it was, the control of the news and events by the government.[770]

Deeper cooperation between the Republic and the United Kingdom was cemented in 1985 in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, in which both governments agreed to jointly suppress terrorism and enhance cooperation in policing the border. The Extradition Act was passed soon after in 1987, although the Irish government began extraditing fugitives back to the North in 1984. By 1990, "Overt co-operation between the security authorities of the United Kingdom and Ireland has become a common place fact of political life."[771] Eammon McCann, journalist and Derry social activist, would go as far as to argue that "[t]he record shows that Fianna Fail in government . . . consistently collaborated with the British intelligence services in their Irish adventures and covered up their criminal activities."[772]

Between the Irish government's suppression of the IRA, which included internment on its side of the border, its public denouncements, and its ban on the IRA as well as Sinn Féin from having a public voice on RTÉ, the IRA would have difficulty mobilizing support from the 26 counties. Former editor of *An Phoblacht*, Sinn Fein's official newspaper and later the party's publicity director, Rita O'Hare, rhetorically asked, "Can you imagine being a publicity director and not being able to get on TV?" Beyond radio and television, the censorship also affected the

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[770] Interview with Mickey Whelan, Dublin, November 12, 2011.
[771] Eunan O'Halpin, "Anglo-Irish Security Co-operation: A Dublin Perspective," *Conflict Quarterly* (Fall 1990): 5.
[772] Eammon McCann, "Spy Game: British Espionage, Cover Ups and Collusion — 30 Years of a Tangled Web," June 5, 2003, available at: http://www.hotpress.com/archive/2662220.html.

print media, she noted. The reverberations of Dublin's censorship policy would extend thousands of miles beyond. "There would have been more Irish Americans informed if there wasn't the degree of censorship that there was in the South," explained O'Hare.[773]

At the same time, asserted Noraid leader Richard Lawlor, "the [American] press would try to bring out someone who was born in Ireland but was wholly ignorant of the situation to speak out against what we were doing. And so consumers would think that because this person has an Irish accent they must know what was going on. Anyone who stepped off the boat from Ireland, someone from the South."[774]

Sinn Féin attempted to counter through its Irish Republican Information Service, which was produced underground in Dublin in various locations. Its function was to act as the equivalent of the international wire services, channeling information to distributors and press contacts abroad.

Dublin's posture would effectively cut off a vast network of potential militant ties between the "homeland" and the United States, especially given that most post-independence migrants had come from the South.

Cavan-born Hugh Lunney explained:

> People who lived further South [of the border] had little or no conception of what it was like [in the North]. I went to a wedding years ago, and there were other boys that went and some of them were from Cork or Kerry. And I brought them up to the border, and we crossed the border. They had no sense of what it was like; they had to cross the border and to be interrogated by the British.[775]

[773] Conversation with Rita O'Hare, *An Phoblacht* editor 1985–1991, Sinn Féin publicity director, 1990–1998; and current Sinn Féin representative to the United States; New York, NY, November 2, 2011.
[774] Interview with Richard Lawlor, Hartford, Conn., December 1, 2011.
[775] Interview with Hugh Lunney, New York, NY, December 5, 2011.

As one Ireland-born activist noted: "People from the South were in oblivion. It was not an aspect of their daily lives in Ireland . . . . They didn't want to know about it."[776]

The US Front

On the US front, Irish politicians began discouraging American audiences from supporting the IRA as early as 1972, the conflict's peak year of civilian fatalities. Irish minister of justice Desmond O'Malley, heckled as the "minister of injustice" by US opponents, warned Irish-American audiences that "the money you are asked to contribute at door-to-door collections, at dances and dinners and other social functions for relief in the North is, in fact, being used [to finance the IRA campaign]."[777] In 1975, Garret FitzGerald, Ireland's foreign minister, publicly criticized the "delusion" of Noraid's supporters.[778] The following year Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave issued a statement on St. Patrick's Day before both houses of Congress denouncing organizations "nominally engaged in relief" who provide money to help "kill and maim Irish men and women."[779]

By the late 1970s, prominent figures from all of the major political parties—including, Fianna Fáil's Lynch (derided as "Union Jack" by Noraid opponents); FitzGerald, leader of Fine Gael; and Frank Cluskey, leader of the Irish Labour Party—had categorically expressed their opposition to the financing of the IRA before American audiences. Lynch at a reception in New York noted that "Any lobby or organisation which has or has had association with violence of the fanatics on one side or the other cannot help the Irish on the road to unity. It can only . . .

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[776] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, September 14, 2011.
[777] "O'Malley Condemns IRA Support Here," *Irish Echo*, November 4, 1972, 2. Quoted in US DOJ, FBI, Report of Henry C. Ruda, "Irish Republican Clubs, United States of America and Canada," January 26, 1973, New York, New York, p. 12; Office file no.: 105-113426; bureau file no.: 97-5329; made available through FOIPA request: 1146084-000. He was speaking before the Emerald Association of Long Island.
[778] Frederic B. Hill, "Irish Official Assails U.S. Fund-raising for IRA," *Baltimore Sun*, March 4, 1975, 4.
[779] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 120.

divide both the Irish in Ireland and the Irish in America."[780] Fitzgerald outright stated: "the entire spectrum of political opinion in the Republic, and the leadership of the SDLP [Social Democratic and Labour Party] in Northern Ireland, are united in asking Irish Americans who would like to support Irish unity by agreement to reject Noraid . . . and the Irish National Caucus." Cluskey similarly asserted: "These organisations thus stand condemned by the entire spectrum of Irish political leadership."[781]

As Miller noted, it was not only the content of messages disseminated to the public, but also the messenger that mattered for what he called Britain's psychological-warfare campaign.[782] As early as 1973, the British Information Services noted before the House of Commons Expenditure Committee: "Some of the most effective material . . . comes from Dublin . . . particularly on such matters as denouncing the support given in the USA to the IRA in way of funds."[783] Internal British government memos noted that Irish officials were "probably right in claiming that statements by leading Republic of Ireland politicians . . . are the single most effective publicity we can have."[784]

The Irish Embassy in Washington, DC, was also highly active on the political front. A November 1976 memo recounts a meeting between the British and Irish embassies:

> [W]e talked about Congress, fund-raising and publicity, the staple diet of subjects here, as far as Ireland is concerned. On Congress, Lillis agreed that the Congressmen "with such well known Irish names" as Wolff and Biaggi, who cultivated the Irish issue for constituency reasons, were a menace. The Irish Embassy was determined to continue their efforts to block any moves towards official Congressional hearings on Ireland. . . .

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[780] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/2666, C442497, FCO Comment on NI, July 1978. Lynch statement, New York, May 1978.
[781] Ibid. Fitzgerald statement, New York, June 14, 1978; Cluskey statement, Washington, DC, June 14, 1978.
[782] Miller notes that even academics were valuable distributors of British information, noting that sometimes entire passages of briefing documents were printed verbatim in scholarly work. See his chapter, "The Northern Ireland Information Service," 86–7.
[783] Quoted in Miller, "The Northern Ireland Information Service," 86.
[784] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1410, 444269; letter titled "Ireland"; To: GW Harding Esq., Republic of Ireland Department, FCO; From: RM Russell, British Embassy; February 11, 1976.

It also noted that "the Irish Embassy have been working on [Senator Moynihan] for some time and thought that they had made some impression." It further asserted:

> the Irish Embassy here are realistic about the need for us to maintain our own publicity effort. They are, however, concerned that there should not be seen to be collusion or too close collaboration between us. They are very conscious of the problems involved in their relations with the Irish community here and this lies behind their wish that we should not ourselves quote from statements from Irish ministers. . . . [B]ut as you know, statements by Irish Ministers are in fact amongst the best ammunition we can use here. . . . [I]t is generally encouraging to find the Irish Embassy's views to be close to our own, so that we are both pulling in the same direction, even if we cannot be seen to be coordinating our efforts too closely.[785]

This was one issue that activists from various Irish nationalist organizations could actually agree on with the UK government. McManus, for example, bluntly asserted in a 1983 press release, "The greatest weapon the British have for oppressing Catholics in Northern Ireland is the Irish Embassy in Washington."[786] Similarly Joseph Roche, former national president of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, stated: "I was naïve like a lot of Irish Americans in thinking that we could depend on the Irish government. There was nothing further from the truth . . . . the role of the Irish government was to neutralize Irish Americans, scatter [them], and feed them false hope; to ostracize them; to demonize [allies]. . . . The Irish government did the British government's bidding."[787] One activist noted: "It definitely dampened support. [People thought] if the Irish government is not behind it, 'Why should I be?'"[788]

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[785] The National Archives (UK), CJ4/1830, 444269; British Embassy LHM; To: GW Harding, Republic of Ireland Department, FCO; From: RM Russell; November 5, 1976.
[786] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 195.
[787] Conversation with Joe Roche, Baltimore, Md., June 14, 2011.
[788] Interview with Jimmy McPaul, Philadelphia, October 8, 2011.

Republican supporters would argue that Dublin sought to maintain the status quo, as "change would bring about a re-alignment of Irish Parties and [the main parties] would disappear—with all the booty and pensions, etc."[789]

Conclusion: A Polluted Sea

Irish militant activists thus confronted opposition from three robust state apparatuses that cooperated to suppress the IRA and its US-based support network. Combined their policies would limit the production and flow of republican propaganda. In social movement terminology, it constrained the ability of the armed group and its American allies be effective at generating "consensus mobilization"—sympathy for the cause.[790] Government policy also increased the risk not only of joining Noraid but also being associated with it. One dedicated Noraid member from Philadelphia explained: "There were a lot of supporters who said, "Keep my name out."[791] Another noted: "People were fearful; yes, indeed."[792]

This chapter analyzed the nested opportunity contexts within which Noraid and the republican movement more broadly operated within in order to explain why support for militants in the United States during the Troubles was very limited relative to the vast numbers of ethnic Irish. According to a 1992 survey of 200 Irish-American organizations—which excluded Noraid and the Irish National Caucus—a mere 7 percent of their leaders thought that Irish America should assist the IRA.[793] The following chapter disaggregates that loose construction called "Irish America" to understand the challenges that Noraid faced from below, which compounded

[789] Letter to Timothy Leland, Managing Editor of *Boston Globe* from James C. Heaney, dated January 28, 1982.
[790] Bert Klandermans, "The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 370.
[791] Interview with Jimmy McPaul, Philadelphia, October 8, 2011.
[792] Interview with Gerard Walsh (pseudonym), Philadelphia area, October 29, 2011.
[793] Cited in Guelke, "The United States, Irish Americans," 532.

the risk and potential costs imposed from above and near information monopoly of anti-republican forces. Together these would impose formidable barriers to collective action and thus impede large-scale mobilization.

CHAPTER 5

America's Diffuse Irish Sea

> [The IRA is] like any guerrilla organisation, unless you have the water in which to swim you can't survive. —John Kelly[794]

> [T]here should have been thousands of Americans, both Irish and supporters, marching for Irish unity. But sometimes we lose touch with our antecedents. Our cousins' pain across the ocean seems remote. Even worse, we accept our adversary's version of the truth. —Chuck Stone[795]

> [T]he Catholic Irish have "made it." . . . Acculturation, Americanization, homogenization have melted them into the middle class. . . . Irish America, the "urban pioneers," has abandoned the cities. It has forsaken its allegiance to . . . the labor movement. . . . The cause of social justice in America has lost its Gaelic accent. —L.A. O'Donnell[796]

> Too many Irish white-collar workers and college graduates have little time or interest in the Ulster civil war or the health of the IRA. They're too busy trying to make money. . . . They are Americans first and Irishmen only as an afterthought. —Mike Mallowe[797]

The concerted governmental efforts of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Republic of Ireland to stifle mobilization on both sides of the Atlantic generated risk, monopolized information available to mass audiences, and created potential social costs for even ancillary participation in the republican movement on US soil. Within this inhospitable context, the mainstream general public—to the extent that it could even be reached—would remain largely unsympathetic to movement appeals, despite Noraid's strategic use of American symbols and analogies with US colonial history and human rights discourse. Noraid's "mobilization potential" was thus largely confined to Irish America—and in actuality only limited pockets of

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[794] Quoted in a Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) interview with IRA volunteer John Kelly in response to a question on why the IRA's 1950s campaign failed. See "Behind the Mask: The IRA & Sinn Fein," PBS, available online at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/kelly.html.

[795] Chuck Stone, quoted from the *Philadelphia Daily News*, in Irish Northern Aid Committee, *Irish American Tribute: The Year of the Irish Hunger Strike* (New York: Irish Northern Aid Committee, n.d.), 111.

[796] L.A. O'Donnell, *Irish Voice and Organized Labor in America: A Biographical Study* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997), 214–5.

[797] Mike Mallowe, "My Life & Times With the IRA," *Philadelphia Magazine* 64, no. 3 (1973): 108.

that vast sea. Why was Noraid able to enlist but a tiny fraction of America's Irish into activism and even less onerous forms of participation such as sustained financial contributions? This chapter argues that the networks and organizations through which republican militants had historically mobilized material support intra-communally were dissipating as a result of upward social mobility and mass population movements in postwar America along with decreased immigration to the United States stemming from a combination of Congressional quotas and positive economic trends within Ireland itself. Thus, while the movement was suppressed from above, it was simultaneously confronted with demographic changes among America's Irish that limited the scope of its reach within that enormous population—about 40 million, about half of whom were Catholic. Ethnic networks in themselves contain mechanisms that facilitate collective action—what one scholar labeled identity, information, and exchange mechanisms.[798] In a context of robust state suppression which created strong disincentives legally, socially, and even materially, dense intra-communal ties became even more necessary to bypass the cost and risks associated with participation and thus to mobilize support.

While the previous chapter examined the domestic and international polices of relevant government actors, this chapter analyzes intra-communal dynamics that stifled large-scale mobilization of Irish ethnics in the United States, especially under adverse conditions. It begins by sketching emigration patterns from Ireland during the few decades preceding the Troubles and during the conflict, which were influenced by a combination of factors: the international economy, world war, policy decisions by the Irish government, and US immigration law. As this first section shows, the numbers of foreign-born in the United States from both the Republic and the six counties in the North had precipitously declined by the outbreak of the conflict, which

[798] James Kitts, "Mobilizing in Black Boxes: Social Networks and SMO Participation," *Mobilization* 5 (2000): 241–57.

meant that immediate kinship ties to the island were dwindling by virtue of the decreased flow and ultimate break in chain migration after the early 1960s. For a movement that depended on locally constructed information about conditions in the North to be passed through interpersonal channels, the shrinking and aging of the foreign-born population meant that there were ever smaller numbers of brokers with direct connections to Ulster (See Map 5.1).

The chapter then describes socioeconomic trends among Irish America broadly, and examines the consequences of widespread social mobility: a decrease of occupational clustering in the civil service and skilled trades; the dissipation of Irish neighborhoods with suburbanization; and depletion in the ranks of fraternal institutions that functioned as mutual aid associations as well as other cultural organizations. With the aging and death of IRA veterans from the War of Independence, combined with the absence of mass political mobilization across the Atlantic since Ireland's partition, the militant organizational infrastructure was emaciated at the outbreak of the Troubles, although there had been some resurgence of Clan na Gael in the early 1960s owing to IRA chief of staff Cathal Goulding's efforts to revive the organization. Similarly, the broader network of cultural and social institutions that fostered collective identity and interpersonal connections on both sides of the Atlantic was in decline.

A network approach to social movements establishes the importance of everyday life "foci" for mobilizing supporters. Yet structural integration and spatial dispersion meant the uncoupling of typical overlapping affiliations in the urban neighborhood: parish, workplace, and cultural associations that formed the basis of communal solidarity. The Irish middle class would find themselves in thoroughly intermixed suburban towns and in jobs where co-ethnics were not preponderant. Although some branches of the AOH migrated with their members, they would also have greater chances of encountering associations that did not have predominantly Irish

memberships (e.g., the country club, the parent-teacher association). Thus, their social networks would be more variegated, loosening, if not obliterating, constraints of moral obligation and reciprocity. At the same time, those who were sympathetic to the republican movement were more vulnerable to social and economic costs that could be levied for supporting "terrorists."

Irish Emigration Patterns in the Twentieth Century

Breaking the trend of a half century of decline, net emigration from Ireland increased during the 1920s in the aftermath of the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921) and subsequent civil war between IRA factions over the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1922–1923), which partitioned Ireland. According to Delaney, emigration was low in the early years of the Free State, but increased in response to the incremental tightening of immigration quotas in the United States over the course of the 1920s, prompting an outflow of over 30,000 annually in mid-decade (See Table 5.1).[799]

Opponents of the incumbent Cumann na nGaedheal administration blamed the party's commitment to an economic policy based on export agriculture as the cause for continued mass outflow. "Unemployment and unnatural emigration still are rampant as if we were not free," asserted one critic. "And now that we are free we cannot blame England."[800] The depopulation of Ireland, moreover, was considered a threat to the very existence of the nation. As IRA veteran and treaty opponent Seán Lemass stated: "Unless [the] drain on the country's vitality is arrested the days of the Irish nation are numbered."[801]

[799] Enda Delaney, "State, Politics and Demography: The Case of Irish Emigration 1921–1971," *Irish Political Studies* 13, no. 1 (1998): 25–49.
[800] Quoted from Ibid., 27.
[801] Lemass quoted in Ibid., 27–8. Lemass's written statement is believed to be dated sometime around 1929–1930.

Table 5.1: Net Emigration from Ireland, 1850-1990

1850s	800,000
1860s	697,000
1870s	502,000
1880s	597,000
1890s	396,000
1900s	262,000
1910s	116,000
1920s	136,000
1930s	101,000
1940s	250,000
1950s	409,000
1960s	135,000
1970s	-104,000
1980s	208,000
1990s	-20,000

Note: The figures are for all Ireland until 1924; thereafter they are only for the Republic of Ireland. The negative figures of the 1970s and 1990s show negative emigration during those decades.

Source: Table drawn from Paul Sweeney, *The Celtic Tiger: Ireland's Continuing Economic Miracle Explained* (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1999), Table 2.2, 37.

Regrouping under Fianna Fáil, defeated anti-treaty republicans led by Éamon de Valera assumed the helm of the Free State in 1932. Along with efforts to establish full political sovereignty from Britain, the party broke with the conservatism of its predecessor and implemented a nationalist economic program based on self-sufficiency through import substitution. A new constitution was passed in 1937, which renamed the state Éire, and declared the national territory to encompass all 32 counties of Ireland (that is, not just the 26 counties in the South but also the six counties that constituted Northern Ireland [NI]) (Article 2) and the Irish nation's "firm will" to unite the island (Article 3). It also included a series of socioeconomic principles as a guide for parliament (Article 45), which sought to generate employment and stem outmigration. According to the constitution's Directive Principles of Social Policy: the state

shall promote a social order in which "justice and charity" informed "all the institutions of the national life"; direct policy to secure the right of each citizen to an adequate means of livelihood; and regulate the free market and private property in the interest of the common good. Article 2 also declared that "the Irish Nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad." [802]

While emigration from Ireland decreased during the following decade, the decline was not due to positive economic trends owing to state policy, but the worldwide Great Depression of the 1930s. With the outbreak of World War II (WWII), it resumed in substantial numbers, as Éire's mass unemployed crossed the Irish Sea to fill gaps in Britain's wartime economy.[803] Behind the scenes the Irish government facilitated the outflow, which continued into the postwar period. By the late 1940s, an estimated 30,000 annually left what in 1949 was renamed the Republic of Ireland.[804] This figure increased to an average of 50,000 a year during the 1950s.[805]

The upsurge was prompted by economic depression in the Republic, as agriculture and agriculture-sustained industries continued to form the basis of national policy, thus stalling economic diversification and perpetuating labor surplus. While the advanced industrial economies were expanding and growing in the 1950s, the Republic had yet to economically "modernize." A significant proportion of the population, two-fifths (approximately 1.5 million

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[802] Constitution of Ireland, enacted on July 1, 1937, available on line at: http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/publications/297.pdf. The constitution also established the Irish language as the country's official language with English as its second official language. Considered offensive and threatening to Unionists, Articles 2 and 3, regarding the "Irish Nation" (as opposed to the "Irish State") were amended in 1998 as a consequence of the Good Friday Agreement. The amended text removed references to the Irish nation in territorial terms and instead construed it as community with a shared identity.

[803] Enda Delaney estimates that about 100,000 went to Britain during WWII. Delaney, "State, Politics and Demography," 25.

[804] Ibid., 36.

[805] Note that only net emigration (outgoing minus incoming) figures are available and thus the outflow is larger than depicted in Table 5.1.

people), still lived outside of towns and villages recognized by the census authority, while 43 percent of gainfully employed males worked in agriculture.[806]

In parts of the North, too, the population remained largely rural: in the early 1960s, 69 percent of the population of Fermanagh, Tyrone, and Derry lived in rural areas.[807] However, at the time of partition, the North had an industrial base, particularly in shipbuilding and linen, sectors that were in decline in the postwar era. As a peripheral area with high unemployment within an advanced industrialized country, the territory benefited from fiscal transfers from the UK Exchequer, although public service provision still lagged behind the rest of the country.[808] While net emigration rates from Éire and Northern Ireland Catholics were close between 1937–1951 (6.9 per 1,000 per annum and 6.5, respectively), Northern Ireland did not experience mass outflow like the Republic during 1950s, although the Catholic rate of net emigration (10.8 per 1,000 per annum) was about double that for Protestants (4.6 percent) during that decade.[809]

Rooted in "rural fundamentalism," nationalist economic policy in the Republic nurtured the family farm as the country's basic unit of production. As Mac Laughlin explains, "rural fundamentalism was by no means narrowly economic in its logic," as it reflected the hegemonic status of the rural bourgeoisie and small farmers, as well as of the Catholic Church, which had been accorded a "special position" in the 1937 constitution.[810] While the modern Irish economy

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[806] T.W. Freeman, *Ireland: A General and Regional Geography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 130–2. Figures are from 1961.
[807] Freeman, *Ireland*, 484.
[808] Kieran Anthony Kennedy, Thomas Giblin, and Deirdre McHugh, *The Economic Development of Ireland in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1988), 100, 113.
[809] Bronwen Walter with Breda Gray, Linda Almeida Dowling, and Sarah Morgan, *A Study of the Existing Sources of Information and Analysis about Irish Emigrants and Irish Communities Abroad*, August 2002, available at: http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/taskforcestudy.pdf
[810] This article was removed in 1972.

had its roots in the class structure of nineteenth-century post-famine Ireland, he argues, it "owed its morality and political outlook to Catholic social teaching."[811]

In his examination of party politics in Ireland, Sacks illuminates the pragmatics behind Fianna Fáil's rural fundamentalism—the party depended on the peasant vote for its electoral edge. He explains: "Rural population loss posed a double threat, for not only would it erode the [party's] constituencies in the countryside but it would also threaten the survival of the traditional Irish [peasant], who [was seen as] the repository of much of the national heritage."[812] Thus, the vision of a "Gaelic Ireland gnawed at as little as possible by the worm of civilization and especially the British, in which there would be no rich and no poor, but many small farmers and small industries"[813] was in part a product of the party's heavy dependence on the rural vote in the "backward" west—"the heartland of Irish language and culture."[814]

Yet the economic turmoil of the 1950s hit the northwest region the hardest. This was an area that historically had been "congested" in terms of population density and contained some of the poorest districts on the island.[815] Between 1956 and 1961, the following counties, in descending order, had the highest rates of emigration: Leitrim, Donegal, Monaghan, Mayo, Wicklow, Cavan, Sligo, Longford, Roscommon, and Clare.[816] Of these, Donegal, Cavan, and Monaghan were three of historic Ulster's nine counties (the other six formed Northern Ireland), while Leitrim was a border county, geographically contiguous with Sligo, Roscommon, and

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[811] Jim Mac Laughlin, "The New Vanishing Irish: Social Characteristics of 'New Wave' Irish Emigration," in *Location and Dislocation in Contemporary Irish Society*, ed. Jim Mac Laughlin (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 138.
[812] Paul Martin Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia: An Irish Political Machine* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976), 3.
[813] Quote from E. Rumf, as cited in Ibid.
[814] Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia*, 3.
[815] In the 1890s, the counties that constituted "Congested Ireland" were: Donegal, Leitrim, Roscommon, Sligo, Mayo, Galway, Kerry, and Cork. Mac Laughlin, "Emigration and the Construction of Nationalist Hegemony," 17.
[816] Irish Centre for Migration Studies, available at: http://migration.ucc.ie/oralarchive/Context/numbers_emigrating.htm

Longford. These counties along with Mayo were part of the Connaught (See Map 5.1), a region, along with west Munster, where anti-treaty forces in the Irish civil war had been strongest.[817] As Freeman's geographical survey also notes, these counties—particularly, Donegal, Mayo, and Galway—were among those areas that maintained a substantial Irish-speaking population into the 1960s.[818]

Map 5.1: Historic Provinces of Ireland and Partitioned Ulster

Source: http://family.devinetime.co.nz/irish_influence.aspx

[817] Kerby A. Miller, *Emigration and Exile: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 453.

[818] Freeman also notes that other significant areas where Irish was spoken in 1961 include: Clare, Kerry, and west Cork in Munster (also in western Ireland). In the late nineteenth century and into the 1930s, these counties also contained some of the "Congested Districts." County Waterford also contained a district with a few hundred Irish speakers. Freeman, *Ireland*, 122, 165–70.

Unlike earlier waves, however, those joining "the emigrant trails out of Ireland" in search of work gravitated to Britain, not the United States where some 4 million had already settled between 1846 and 1925.[819] Of the estimated half a million who left the Republic during the 1950s, fewer than 60,000 landed on US shores (See Table 5.2).

Table 5.2: Irish Immigration to the United States, 1820–1975

Period	Number	Percentage of Total Incoming Immigrants to the United States
1820-1830	54,338	35.8
1831-1840	207,381	34.6
1841-1850	780,719	45.6
1851-1860	914,119	35.2
1861-1870	435,778	18.8
1871-1880	436,871	15.5
1881-1890	655,482	12.5
1891-1900	388,416	10.5
1901-1910	339,065	3.9
1911-1920	146,181	2.5
1921-1930	220,591	5.4
1931-1940	13,167	2.5
1941-1950	26,967	2.6
1951-1960	57,332	2.3
1961-1970	37,461	1.1
1971-1975	6,559	>1
Total	**4,720,427**	

Source: Table drawn from Patrick Blessing, "The Irish," in *Harvard Encyclopedia of Ethnic Groups*, ed. Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Table 1, 528. Data are drawn from the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), *Annual Report*, 1975 (Washington, DC: INS, 1976), 62–4.

[819] Jim Mac Laughlin, "Emigration and the Construction of Nationalist Hegemony in Ireland: The Historical background to 'New Wave' Irish Emigration," in *Location and Dislocation in Contemporary Irish Society*, ed. Jim Mac Laughlin (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1997), 26.

In the 1960s, Dublin abandoned protectionism and courted foreign investment in an effort to reverse stagnation and curtail mass emigration.[820] Aided by favorable international economic conditions, the decade was marked by unprecedented growth and industrial expansion along with a substantial reduction in outmigration; indeed, the net outflow was the lowest recorded since 1871 when the first reliable figures appeared.[821] The net emigration rate among Northern Ireland Catholics (6.9 per 1,000 per annum) actually exceeded the Republic's rate (4.8) during the 1960s.[822] Between 1961 and 1966, however, there was still considerable net population loss from the Connaught (most prominently Leitrim) and the Ulster counties of the Republic (especially Donegal), although the rates decreased over the next half decade.[823] While the shift away from agriculture toward industrial development diversified the economy and boosted employment in the Republic, a substantial proportion of the country's workforce would come to depend on employment in foreign-owned firms.[824]

As Ireland sought accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), moreover, attitudes toward nationalism began to shift. As Mac Laughlin asserts, the government's "modernization through globalization" project devalued rural fundamentalism and nationality as the basis of Irish identity.[825] In what he calls "post-nationalist" Ireland, the new cadre of Irish political leaders framed emigration as a purely voluntary search for economic opportunity in labor markets abroad countering the nationalist narrative of exile. With the de-politicization and individualization of the process, the departing emigrant was no longer constructed as child torn

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[820] Sweeney, *The Celtic Tiger*, 40.
[821] Freeman, *Ireland*, 123.
[822] Walter, Gray, Dowling, and Morgan, *A Study of the Existing Sources*. The net emigration rate for non-Catholics was 2.8 per 1,000 per annum.
[823] Freeman, *Ireland*, 125.
[824] Mac Laughlin asserts that by the 1970s, about one-third of the labor force was employed by foreign-owned firms. Mac Laughlin, "Social Characteristics," 142.
[825] Jim Mac Laughlin, "The Devaluation of 'Nation' as 'Home' and the Depoliticisation of Recent Irish Emigration," in *Location and Dislocation in Contemporary Irish Society: Emigration and Irish Identities*, ed. Jim Mac Laughlin (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1997), 181.

from poor mother Erin by an unjust social and political order,[826] but rather *homo economicus* responding to the pushes and pulls of the global economy.[827]

The 1970s represented the first decade of positive net migration in Ireland's modern history; less than 7,000 arrived in the United States during the first half of that decade. In 1973, the country joined the EEC along with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In the Republic, explains one analyst, nationalism had "come to be seen as an embarrassment . . . [,] a primitive disgrace to the island as a whole at a time when we [were] trying . . . to polish up our image as a modern European state. . . ."[828] Hand in hand with the Republic's global economic integration from the 1960s onward, nationalism, Mac Laughlin explains, was increasingly perceived as a "contaminated" ideology, tainted by association with working-class politics and political violence in the North.[829] By the mid-1970s, reunification was seen in the Republic "more as a problem than a purpose, while the secular deity of nationalism [had] been superseded by the more mundane concerns of economic growth."[830]

In addition to the retarding effects on emigration resulting from Ireland's economic boom and accession to the EEC, changes in US immigration law in 1965 restricted migration from Western Europe. Between 1961 and 1975, only about 45,000 new arrivals from the Republic landed on US shores.[831] And while the North experienced an upsurge in emigration with the escalation of violence in the 1970s, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand were likely the main

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[826] The Proclamation of the Irish Republic of 1916, the foremost republican document, for example, refers to Ireland's "exiled children in America," who support "her" as "she strikes for her freedom." For a critique of the "Mother Ireland" construction, see Mac Laughlin, "The Historical Background," 22–4.
[827] Mac Laughlin, "The Devaluation of 'Nation' as 'Home,'" 181.
[828] Mary Holland quoted in Ibid.
[829] Mac Laughlin, "The Devaluation of 'Nation,'" 181–2.
[830] Sack, *The Donegal Mafia*, 37.
[831] Patrick Blessing, "The Irish," in *Harvard Encyclopedia of Ethnic Groups*, ed. Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 544.

recipients of that outflow.[832] With death rates exceeding incoming migrants, the entire twentieth century was marked by a continuous decline in the numbers of Ireland- and NI-born immigrants in the US population, as Table 5.3 depicts.

Table 5.3: Population of Ireland- and Northern Ireland–born in the United States, 1920–2000

Decade	Ireland	Northern Ireland
1920	1,037,234	(N/A)
1930	744,810	178,832
1960	338,722	68,162
1970	251,375	40,837
1980	197,817	19,831
1990	169,827	16,531
2000	156,474	13,177

Note: After 1920, Ireland in the table refers to the various incarnations of the South: the Free State, Éire, and the Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland did not exist in 1920, which is why there are no data for 1920.

Source: Data drawn from Campell Gibson and Kay Jung, *Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850-2000*, Working Paper no. 81 (Washington, DC: US Census Bureau, February 2006), table 4, available at: http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps0081.pdf.

At the onset of the Northern Ireland conflict in 1968, there were only about 250,000 Ireland-born in the United States and an additional 41,000 from the North. Between 1970 and 1980 alone, the Ireland-born population decreased by a fifth while the NI-born population halved. By 1980, Ireland had dropped out of the top ten countries of origin of the foreign-born population in the United States.[833]

[832] Walter, Gray, Dowling, and Morgan, *A Study of the Existing Sources*, http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/taskforcestudy.pdf. For data on net migration from Northern Ireland from 1973 through 2010 see, http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/Documents/RaISe/Publications/2012/general/3112.pdf. Reliable statistics on destinations are not available.

[833] US DOC, Bureau of the Census, *Profile of the Foreign-born Population: 2000* (Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, 2000), Table 3.1, available at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-206.pdf.

Table 5.4: Population of Ireland- and Northern Ireland–born in the United States by Period of Immigration, 1980

Decade	Ireland	Northern Ireland
Before 1950	113,445	8,643
1950-1959	41,111	4,251
1960-1964	18,606	2,177
1965-1969	10,133	1,724
1970-1974	7,179	1,387
1975-1980	7,343	1,649
Total	197,817	19,831

Source: Figures are drawn from US Department of Commerce (DOC), Bureau of the Census, "Detailed Population Characteristics United States Summary, Section A: United States," *Census of Population 1980* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), PC80-1-D1-A, Table 254. The census uses the term "Ireland" to refer to immigrants who came from Ireland before independence and from the South thereafter.

There were another 1.2 million US-born of foreign or mixed parentage from Ireland, down from 3.1 million fifty years earlier. The median age of that population was 55 years old in 1970, slightly less than the foreign-born which was almost 62.[834]

According to the 1980 census,[835] about 40 million Americans claimed some Irish descent (an estimated half of whom were Protestant); however, only about one quarter of them claimed Irish their sole descent (10.3 million). Based on National Opinion Research Center (NORC) data, which unlike the census includes religion as a variable, Greeley calculated that a mere 4 percent of Irish Catholics were foreign born whereas 25 percent were native born of immigrant parents, and 71 percent were third or fourth generation. He estimated with "reasonable

[834] US DOC, Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports, "Nativity and Parentage," *US Census of Population 1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1965), Final Report, PC (2)-1A; Subject Reports, "National Origin and Language," *US Census of Population 1970* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973).
[835] The 1980 census is the first to have asked the question about ancestry. It was novel in that it collected information about ethnicity "regardless of the number of generations removed from their country of origin." In the past, such information was limited to questions about country of birth and that of one's parents. Thus ethnicity was identified only for the foreign-born and persons of foreign or mixed parentage (Ancestry of the Population by State: 1980 [PC80-S1-10]), p. 1, available at: http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/pc80-s1-10/pc80-s1-10.pdf. In this census, an additional 6,300 listed "Northern Ireland" singular descent. It is impossible from the census to discern the meaning of the category as "Scotch-Irish" or as simply being from Northern Ireland.

certainty" that only 7 percent of American Irish were either post-1925 immigrants or descendants of this cohort.[836]

With the industrial downturn in the Republic's economy in the early 1980s, and worldwide recession, a new wave of Irish emigration began. Between 1981 and 1986, approximately 14,000 left annually, a figure that climbed to over 50,000 in the latter half of the decade, when unemployment reached 18 percent. Generally young, Irish flocked to urban centers on the East Coast. An estimated 135,000 arrived in the United States over the course of the decade, about 20,000 of which went to Boston and anywhere between 40,000 and 100,000 to New York City.[837] Unlike earlier waves, the new arrivals were mostly undocumented, and thus could not permanently settle and integrate into American society as so many of their predecessors had done. According to the 1980 census, about 80 percent of the foreign-born population from Ireland had become US citizens, while 66 percent of the much smaller NI-born population had naturalized.[838]

Corcoran, in her work on "Clandestine Destinies," even goes so far as to suggest describing the process not as emigration but "relocation," given that many within this cohort perceived of themselves as "transients rather than settlers."[839] One interviewee who had arrived in New York City during that wave mentioned that he knew very few new arrivals who had planned to permanently settle in the United States. "Many thought they would stay for just six months to a year," he explained.[840]

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836 Greeley, *The Rise of the Irish Americans*, 72.
837 Mac Laughlin, "Social Characteristics," 143–4.
838 Calculations based on figures provided in US DOC, Bureau of the Census, "Detailed Population Characteristics, United States Summary: Section A: United States," *Census of Population 1980* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, March 1984), PC80-1-D1-A, Table 254.
839 Mary P. Corcoran, "Clandestine Destinies: The Informal Sector and Irish Immigrant Incorporation," in *Location and Dislocation in Contemporary Irish Society: Emigration and Irish Identities*, ed. Jim MacLaughlin (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1997), 136.
840 Interview with Mickey Whelan, Dublin, Ireland, November 12, 2011.

Social Mobility

The numbers of Ireland- and NI-born and US-born of mixed or foreign parentage were not only in decline in the United States but the socioeconomic status of Irish America had also considerably shifted by the eve of the Troubles. This section first examines the historical development of the Irish male labor force in the United States, which was not only tied to political and economic forces in the United States but also to social unrest in Ireland which was persistent throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The US labor movement and nationalist/republican political activism on both sides of the Atlantic were mutually reinforcing. The development of specific niches where the Irish concentrated—the building trades and civil service—however, were very much a product of urban politics. The Irish escape from what Eire calls a "blue-collar cul-de-sac" was tied to structural changes in the American economy along with the disintegration of big-city patronage machines in the postwar era. The section concludes with evidence of well-established general trends of Irish upward mobility within American society.

From Common Laborers to Labor "Aristocrats"[841]

The estimated four million mostly impoverished Irish Catholics who migrated from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth centuries concentrated in America's industrial centers where unskilled labor was in high demand. An estimated 72 percent of the nineteenth-century wave settled in seven urban US states—New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Massachusetts[842]—where they were vastly employed as common laborers (e.g.,

[841] In a non-Marxist sense, labor aristocrats refer to the leadership of the AFL who excluded unskilled workers and practiced business unionism. It is also used to refer to skilled craftsmen who secured average median wages significantly above those of unskilled laborers.
[842] Holland, *The American Connection*, 10.

longshoremen, teamsters, canal and railroad builders, pipe layers, street pavers).[843] Anti-Catholic nativism had excluded them from the skilled crafts, which were dominated by Anglo-Saxon Protestants, the Welsh, the Scottish, and Ulster Protestants. Unskilled Irish laborers sporadically formed organizations for collective economic protection, typically "based upon neighborhood, parish, fire company." According to O'Donnell, these arrangements resembled "rural bodies of men formed to resist oppression in the old country."[844]

With rapid industrialization and urban expansion underway in American cities, Irish laborers developed skills in "bricklaying, ironwork, and most of the trades associated with building." By the latter half of the nineteenth century, Irishmen "worked disproportionately in the highly skilled, heavily unionized, and better paid trades." They not only moved into the skilled trades, but in some cities such as Philadelphia they also established themselves as building contractors. Owing to "ethnic and religious discrimination," explains Clark, "the overwhelmingly Catholic Irish [were] impelled to construct an entire parallel network of churches, schools, and welfare institutions in the major cities, and the necessary building work provided a continuing source of construction operations by . . . Irish contractors."[845] By 1870, notes Montgomery, at least 17 percent of all contractors identified by the census were born in Ireland, making them three times as numerous as the Germans or English in the business. Clark argues that their preponderance as contractors led to the emergence of "the archetypal urban

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[843] Females tended to be concentrated in domestic service. As Blaine McKliney asserted, "after 1850 domestic servants and the Irish became virtually synonymous," particularly in the urban Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and parts of the Midwest. According to Lynch-Brennan, "This repute was so extensive that the American public came to use the name Bridget, or Biddy, as a generic soubriquet for Irish servants. . . ." Quotes from Margaret Lynch-Brennan, "Ubiquitous Bridget: Irish Immigrant Women in Domestic Service in America, 1840–1930," in *Making the Irish America: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States*, ed. J.J. Lee and Marion Casey (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 333.

[844] O'Donnell, *Irish Voice*, 203.

[845] Dennis Clark, *The Irish in Philadelphia: Ten Generations of Urban Experience* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973), 136–7.

figure, the contractor-boss—the building developer with strong political ties and influence."[846] At the same time, contractor preference for co-ethnic laborers reinforced their numbers as "brick masons, stone cutters, plumbers, steam fitters and boilermakers," as well "electricians, elevator riggers, and structural iron workers," where their preponderance was more marked. [847]

By the latter decades of the nineteenth century, Catholics of Irish descent were at the forefront of labor organizing in the building trades and industrial sectors such as mining. P.J. McGuire, for example, almost single-handedly built the Brotherhood of Carpenters, which was a crucial building block of a larger project—the creation of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1886. By the turn of the twentieth century, they held almost half of the presidencies of AFL unions,[848] and achieved occupational parity with the native-born white population.[849] According to Doyle, "Numerically, Irish Americans dominated few trades (except plumbers and steam fitters), politically they dominated a majority of the unions of organized trades."[850]

O'Donnell attributes their prominence in union leadership not only to their sheer numbers in the labor force, but also to their English language skills and high literacy levels,[851] coupled with the "politically aroused atmosphere" of nineteenth-century Ireland from which the peasant masses were emigrating. The Catholic Emancipation of the 1820s and the Repeal movement of the 1830s,[852] which sought to repeal Ireland's status as a constituent territory of the United

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[846] Ibid., 136.
[847] David Montgomery, "The Irish and the American Labor Movement," in *America and Ireland, 1776–1976: The American Identity and the Irish Connection*, ed. David Noel Doyle and Owen Dudley Edwards (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), 211.
[848] L.A. O'Donnell, *Irish Voice and Organized Labor in America: A Biographical Study* (Westport, Conn.: Westport Press, 1997).
[849] Kevin Kenny, "Labor and Labor Organizations," in *Making the Irish American: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 360.
[850] David Doyle quoted in Montgomery, "The Irish and the American Labor Movement," 207.
[851] By the mid-1900s, about 75 percent of all Irish immigrants arriving in the United States could read and write in English. By 1910, this figure reached 97 percent. O'Donnell, *Irish Voice*, 205.
[852] Clark's historical analysis of the Irish in Philadelphia notes that the Repeal Association had an active branch in that city. Clark, *The Irish in Philadelphia*, 18.

Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, were followed by the failed Young Irelander Rebellion in 1848, which sought independence; the Home Rule movement of the 1870s through 1910s, which sought greater autonomy through constitutional politics; and the Land League movement of the 1880s, which sought to end to landlord rent rackets and facilitate land ownership by tenant farmers in Ireland; as well as labor union organizing in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

As Lee has noted, even rural Ireland was historically highly politicized: "It accordingly contributed to the leadership and mass composition of [the island's] national political movements. . . ."[853] Irish nationalism and republicanism were intertwined with the very rise of the labor union movement in the United States. As Boyd notes of Ireland-born labor leaders:

> Many of the Irishmen who went to Britain and to the USA during the nineteenth century had gained much political experience before they left their own country. . . . Those who left Ireland after the Famine were either Fenians [republicans] or became Fenians abroad. Wherever they went[,] these Irishmen found employment as industrial workers, and so their energy for politics found a natural outlet in trade unionism and in socialist parties as well as in émigré societies whose main objective was to end British rule in Ireland.[854]

This cross-fertilization between labor and political movements in Ireland, and across the Atlantic, extended across generations and into the twentieth century. The head of the Knights of Labor, American-born Terrance Powderly, was a member of Clan na Gael and raised funds for the Land League movement, which mobilized support in the churches, clubs, and saloons of Philadelphia. At the same time, Land League branches—which numbered 2,500 in the United States[855]—offered support to striking longshoremen on New York docks led by Cork-born nationalists Jeremiah Murphy, John McNamara, and P.J. O'Sullivan. Montgomery explains that evidence exists "in city after city" of overlap between leading union activists and Clan

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[853] J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912–1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 73.
[854] Andrew Boyd, *The Rise of the Irish Trade Unions: 1729–1970* (Tralee, Ireland: Anvil Books, 1972), 55.
[855] William V. Shannon, *The American Irish: A Social and Political Portrait*, 2nd edn. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1989), 134.

membership, and these personal connections embedded "the causes of nationalism and land reform deeply within the American labor movement."[856]

In the early twentieth century, the relationship between labor and nationalist organizations was institutionalized within the AFL. John Fitzpatrick, president of the Chicago Federation of Labor, was a member of the Friends of Irish Freedom, which raised funds for the dependents of prisoners who fought in the Easter Rising of 1916, and later joined the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic. He headed a bureau within the AFL that was established after the labor organization passed a resolution in support of Ireland's self-determination at its annual convention in 1920. This bureau communicated with central labor councils across the United States, encouraging them to form committees and support the emergent Irish Republic in its war against Britain. In California, the committee was headed by P.H. McCarthy, who was president of the Building Trades Council in San Francisco.[857] The mass movement surrounding Irish independence coincided with an "unprecedented scale" of labor activism, and unsurprisingly, notes Brundage:

> some historians have found in these years an intertwining of the social and national questions reminiscent of the Land League era. While the main Irish American nationalist organizations remained under socially moderate leadership, a significant minority of Irish American workers embraced radically democratic and sometimes even socialist, perspectives on the independence struggle.[858]

In later decades, IRA veterans Mike Quill and Gerald O'Reilly were members of Clan na Gael and founding members of the Transport Workers Union (TWU) in New York in the 1930s.[859] Quill attributed the TWU's emergence to "hardcore Irish revolutionaries, whose

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[856] Montgomery, *The Irish and the American Labor Movement*, 213-4, 217.
[857] O'Donnell, *Irish Voice*, 155.
[858] David Brundage, "Recent Directions in the History of Irish American Nationalism," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 28, no. 4 (2009): 83–4.
[859] O'Donnell notes that the founders were inspired by Irish labor organizers James Connelly and Jim Larkin, who were co-founders of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union in Dublin and were ideologically socialist.

devotion to the nationalist cause had been tested in guerilla warfare."[860] O'Reilly explained how the TWU's emergence was intertwined with the infrastructure of militant republicanism in the United States: "Each Clan member was assigned the task of organizing his or her own shop, or depot, or barn." The TWU was also grounded in the Irish Worker's Club. According to O'Reilly, the AOH and the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick—which unlike the Clan were "respectable" Irish-American organizations—"did not want to involve themselves in a controversial area of labor."[861] The TWU would later be a key organization in Noraid's network in New York City, as would a number of other long-time AFL unions.

While the Irish-born such as Quill and O'Reilly could be found in left-wing circles, the leadership of the AFL was generally conservative in accordance with the Catholic Church's opposition to socialism. From the outset, the organization was inscribed with an ideological opposition to radical social unionism.[862] As Fantasia and Stepan-Norris describe, the AFL was "heavily bureaucratic" and grounded in an ideology of pragmatism.[863]

Contrary to the exclusivist craft unions of the AFL,[864] the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which was founded in 1938, was more socially inclusive and organized unskilled and semi-skilled workers along industry lines. While Philip Murphy of the United Mine Workers, who succeeded John Lewis as CIO president in 1940, was a devout Roman

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[860] Quoted in O'Donnell, *Irish Voice*, 187.
[861] Gerald O'Reilly, *The Birth and Growth of the Transport Workers Union: The Story of How a Dedicated Few Realized Their Dreams and Built a Powerful Union* (Enterprise, Ala. The Printing Press, 1988), 6.
[862] Connelly vigorously opposed the craft approach of the AFL and espoused industrial unionism.
[863] Rick Fantasia and Judith Stepan-Norris, "The Labor Union Movement in Motion," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 562.
[864] According to Beck and others, the AFL was antagonistic to blacks and other nonwhite workers, who were denied union protection and access to apprenticeships. This discrimination, he explains, was not only a result of racism but also hostility to the use of blacks to break labor strikes and the AFL's aversion to unskilled labor organizing. E.M. Beck, "Labor Unionism and Racial Income Inequality: A Time–Series Analysis of the Post–World War II Period," *American Journal of Sociology* 85, no. 4 (1980): 791–814.

Catholic and staunchly anti-communist,[865] many CIO leaders were drawn from various left-wing parties and movements. In a context of counter-mobilization of capital against labor in the late 1940s and McCarthyism, however, the union was purged of radicals, causing a shift from "social movement unionism that embodied a frontal challenge to American capitalism" to bureaucratic unionism, and thereby paving the way for its merger with the AFL in 1955.[866]

In the mid-1950s, Bronx-born George Meany, a staunch conservative Irish Catholic and plumber by trade, would be the first to assume leadership of the merged AFL-CIO. At the onset of his tenure, nearly 35 percent of the country's workers were unionized. By its end in 1979, membership dropped to 19 percent,[867] and it continued to decline for the rest of the century,[868] concurrently as "Irish-American identity . . . became much more diffuse."[869] Even the building trades unions, which were more buffered from the effects of deindustrialization and capital flight than industrial unions, experienced a decrease in union density from the 1960s onward.[870] Kenny argues, "Irish-American influence in the U.S. labor movement reached its height in the mid-twentieth century, just as that movement as a whole was reaching its own peak."[871]

Although Irish males had already been moving out of the workforce's blue-collar ranks, into the 1970s and 1980s Irishmen remained at the helm of some influential unions—the International Longshoremen's Association; Transport Workers Union; California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO; Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers International Union, among others—not to mention the various locals in the major urban centers where the Irish historically had a large

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[865] O'Donnell, *Irish Voice*, 183.
[866] Fantasia and Stepan-Norris, "The Labor Union Movement," 564.
[867] Jay P. Dolan, *The Irish Americans: A History* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008), 295.
[868] Data drawn from Union Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS (Current Population Survey), by Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, 2012, available at: http://www.unionstats.com/.
[869] Kenny, "Labor and Labor Organizations," 363.
[870] Mark Elrich and Jeffery Grabelsky, "Standing at a Crossroads: The Building Trades in the Twenty-first Century," Articles and Chapters, Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) Collection, Cornell University, September 1, 2005.
[871] Kenny, "Labor and Organization," 363.

presence. It is these local unions of various building trades, along with transport, that would emerge as the most significant institutionalized source of material support for the Provisional republican movement.

The Rise and Fall of the Celtic Machines

The concentration of Irish males in the building trades was historically reinforced by the infamous Irish-controlled political machines, which had emerged as "a major urban political institution in the late nineteenth century" and endured in some cities well into the twentieth.[872] As Cochran asserts: "No other ethnic group's history is more closely tied to urban machine politics in the United States than the Irish. They were major players in almost every city that had both a machine and a sizable Irish population. . . . Irish use and abuse of urban machines is legendary."[873] This kind of politics, he explains, was made possible by American federalism, "which devolved significant amounts of power down to the state and local governments."[874] Their longevity would depend on a complex combination of factors, such as alliances between mayors and state and federal actors, white middle-class appeasement, and counter-mobilization among other ethnic groups for the spoils of patronage.

From New York and Jersey City, to Buffalo, Albany and Boston, Pittsburg, Chicago, Kansas City, and San Francisco, the Democratic Celtic machines were "rooted in the institutional life of working-class ethnic neighborhoods."[875] They were "parochial in the full sense of the

[872] Steven P. Eire, *Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840–1985* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 2. As early as 1890, he notes, half of the country's largest twenty cities were machine-controlled.
[873] David Carroll Cochran, "Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability: The Case of Irish Americans," *Political Science Quarterly* 110, no. 4 (1995–96): 598.
[874] Ibid., 599.
[875] Republican machines by contrast relied on "the Yankee middle-class vote" and thus had "little incentive to incorporate working-class immigrant groups and reward them with costly welfare services." Eire, *Rainbow's End*, 3.

word." [876] Irish bosses doled out patronage in the form of public employment and private sector jobs (via public works contracts especially in the building trades), services, and business licenses.[877] As Eire explains, their specialty was "padding blue-collar payrolls in the police, fire, and public works departments." In 1900, Irish males were more than four times likely to be employed as a policeman or fireman than the rest of the white male workforce.[878] In New York City during the 1930s, for example, the Irish constituted "22 percent of workers at Consolidated Edison . . . 70 percent of the Transport Workers Union, 50 percent of the police department, and 75 percent of the fire department."[879]

At the same time, Eire notes, the machines "deliberately limited while-collar job opportunities" because they were more expensive to create and did not have the same vote yield.[880] Essentially, "the machine's job growth strategy created much more blue-collar public employment for the Irish at a time when the cities were moving from a manufacturing to a service economy and when the greatest increases in private sector employment occurred in the white-collar ranks."[881] Thus, while they politically assimilated the Irish, economically they channeled them into a blue-collar cul-de-sac, "encouraging long tenure in poorly paid bureaucratic positions" thus delaying the emergence of an Irish middle-class.[882]

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[876] George Reedy quoted in Cochran, "Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability," 599.
[877] Irish-controlled political machines did not emerge in all cities with high numbers of Irish immigrants. As Eire explains, "A large Irish voting bloc was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for building Irish machines." In eight Irish cities, Irish-led Democratic machines emerged: New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Pittsburg, Jersey City, and Albany. However, Philadelphia had a non-Irish controlled Republican machine, while Boston, "the most Irish of the big cities, never rose above factional ward politics." Thus, there is significant variation across cities as well as within cities over time. Eire, *Rainbow's End*, 19.
[878] Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, *From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America* (New York: Russell Sage, 1988), 124. To a lesser extent, they were also more likely to be miners, boatmen, and plumbers and gas and steamfitters.
[879] Linda Dowling Almeida, *Irish Immigrants in New York City, 1945–1995* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 36.
[880] Eire, *Rainbow's End,* 59.
[881] Ibid., 244.
[882] Ibid., 242.

Although they "reached levels of skilled craftsmen, foremen, police and fire officers, trainmen, [and] civil service jobs in local government,"[883] rarely did the Irish occupy managerial or professional jobs, although the judicial and legal departments were "a prime source of white-collar patronage for Irish lawyers." Because the Irish were crowded into the public sector's middling ranks, "the Irish were solidly lower-middle rather than middle class. By channeling so much economic energy into the public sector, the Irish forsook opportunities in the private sector, save for industries such as construction that depended on political connections."[884]

Eire describes the mutual self-interest underpinning the alliance between labor unions and the Irish big-city machines, which he calls an "ethnic political and labor aristocracy":

> Bosses could do much for local unions. Sympathetic judges and police hampered the ability of capital to break strikes and boycotts. The construction industry . . . valued public works projects. Union officials appointed to public works boards ensured that these projects bore the union label. Unions could do much for the bosses. Tacit alliances co-opted organized labor and its vote, thereby weakening labor party challenges. . . .[885]

Irish affluence, Eire notes, only came in the postwar period with the decline of the big-city Irish machines.[886] While they showed resilience in some cities such as Chicago, Albany, and Pittsburg,[887] overall "the postwar era would prove to be an Indian summer for the aging Irish machines," as cities were confronted with demographic shifts, a shrinking revenue base, civil service reform pressures, militancy among public sector unions, and federal legislation

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[883] O'Donnell, *Irish Voice*, 205.
[884] Eire, *Rainbow's End*, 90.
[885] Ibid., 252.
[886] For a discussion of the impact of the Depression and New Deal policies on their longevity, see Eire, *Rainbow's End*. The machines that survived into the postwar period (in Albany, Chicago, and Pittsburgh) did so only by "shifting from working-class to middle-class policies [such as homeowner services] for white ethnics" (15).
[887] Eire notes that the Albany and Chicago machines reached their peak in the 1960s and lasted until the 1980s. Ibid., 142. For many, Richard J. Daley of Chicago was "the true 'last hurrah,'" of the big-city Irish political bosses. Lawrence McCaffrey, *The Irish Catholic Diaspora in America* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997 [1976]), 174. *The Last Hurrah* is the title of a novel written by Edward O'Connor. The plot involves an old-machine boss running for city mayor one more time; he ultimately loses the election. The story depicts overall changing urban politics in the postwar era and the end of the big-city machines that ruled major American cities.

concerning job discrimination, labor protection, and welfare policy. They did endure, however, on a sub-city level in New York, while in Boston and Philadelphia in the 1960s and 1970s Democratic mayors were able to create personal machines.[888] "Only with lessened job dependence on the machine in the prosperous post–World War II era were the third- and fourth generation Irish able to move rapidly into business and the professions," argues Eire.[889]

Off Step Ladders and Up Professional Ladders

Census data from 1950 show that "males of Irish descent had moved impressively into white-collar ranks,"[890] mostly as accountants, clergy, and lawyers as well as clerical workers.[891] Table 5.5 shows the disparity between the occupational distributions of first- and second-generation Irish males in 1960.[892]

[888] Eire, *Rainbow's End*, 175–6. In Philadelphia a Republican machine had ruled, with the Irish receiving benefits but not dominating it.
[889] Ibid., 243.
[890] Blessing, "The Irish," 541.
[891] Hutchinson's analysis of the 1950 census shows that second-generation males were disproportionately in accounting, law, and religious professions. See E.P. Hutchinson, *Immigrants and their Children, 1850 to 1950* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956), Table 41a, p. 228.
[892] First generation refers to individuals born in Ireland. Second generation refers to US-born individuals of mixed or foreign parentage from Ireland. Combined in the census, these two groups are referred to as the "foreign stock."

Table 5.5: Occupational Distribution of First- and Second-generation Irish Males and Percentage Change, 1960

Occupation	First Generation	Second Generation	Percent Difference
Professionals	6.5	13.3	6.8
Managers	7.4	12.7	5.3
Clerks	9.5	14.2	4.7
Sales workers	3.6	7.8	4.2
Craftsmen	23	18.6	-4.4
Operatives	18.1	14.6	-3.5
Service Workers	18.2	10.4	-7.8
Farm Laborers	0.5	0.4	-0.1
Laborers	10.2	4.3	-5.9

Source: Table based on figures drawn from US DOC, Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports, "Nativity and Parentage," *US Census of Population 1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1965), PC(2)-1A, Table 11.

It should be noted, however, that disparities existed, among US regions and even cities within the same region. Calculations based on census data from 1960 reveal that about 23.9 percent of second-generation Irish males in the Northeast were in the professional and managerial ranks, compared to 32.7 in the West.[893] Meanwhile, Blessing's analysis of first-generation Irish males in 1970 found that "1 in 4 Irishmen in Los Angeles were in the professional ranks compared with 1 in 18 in New York," leading him to conclude that "the likelihood of encountering a white-collar Irishman generally increased with movement to the west."[894] While on the face of it, the data seem to support the findings of Thernstrom, Clark, and others that rigid social stratification and limited economic opportunity posed significant challenges to upward mobility in the Northeast, particularly New England, further investigation

[893] Calculations are based on figures provided in US DOC, Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports, "Nativity and Parentage," *US Census of Population 1960* (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1965), PC(2)-1A, Table 11.
[894] Blessing, "The Irish," 541.

is needed to establish the extent to which social mobility varied according to region and even cities within the same region.[895]

By 1970, an estimated 17.5 percent of second-generation Irish males in the United States were professionals; 15.1 percent managers; 20.8 percent clerks and sales workers; and the remainder in blue-collar jobs (See Table 5.6).[896] Meanwhile Table 5.7 shows movement among second-generation Irish male workers out of the government sector and into the private sector, while other second-generation male groups were moving out of self-employment, where the Irish historically did not have a large presence.

Table 5.6: Occupational Distribution of Second-generation Irish Males, 1950, 1960, 1970

Occupation	Second Generation, 1950	Second Generation, 1960	Second Generation, 1970
Professionals	9.5	13.3	17.5
Managers	11.6	12.7	15.1
Clerks	13	14.2	8.3
Sales workers	7.5	7.8	12.5
Craftsmen	19.3	18.6	17.5
Operatives	16.5	14.6	11.9
Service Workers	11	10.4	12.3
Farm Laborers	0.9	0.4	0.3
Laborers	5.9	4.3	3.7

Source: Data for 1950 were drawn from Patrick Blessing, "The Irish," in *Harvard Encyclopedia of Ethnic Groups*, ed. Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 541. The figures for 1960 and 1970 were calculated from figures drawn from US DOC, Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports, "Nativity and Parentage," *US Census of Population 1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1965), PC(2)-1A, Table 11; and US DOC, Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports, "National Origin and Language," *Census of*

[895] Stephan Thernstrom, *The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973); Clark, *The Irish in Philadelphia*. In his summary of the findings of the literature on regional disparities in upward mobility among the Irish, Lee calls for further systematic investigation. See J.J. Lee, "Introduction," *Making the Irish American: The History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 12.

[896] For a discussion of the general trend in structural mobility among European immigrant groups see, Richard Alba and Victor Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

Population 1970 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 1973), PC(2)-1A, Table 13. Percentages are less than 100 because categories were eliminated for consistency.

5.7: Class of Worker, Second-generation, Employed Irish Males and All Other Second-Generation Employed Males, by Age Group, in Percentages, 1970

Second-generation Group	Irish	Other	Irish	Other	Irish	Other
Class of Worker	**16 to 24**		**24 to 44**		**Average**	
Private wage and salary	82.6	85.7	72.3	74.8	77.5	80.3
Federal government	4.7	2.7	5.1	4.8	4.9	3.8
State government	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.3
Local government	8.1	5.4	14.6	7.7	11.4	6.6
Self-employed	1.2	2.2	4.9	9.4	3.1	5.8
Unpaid family workers	0.2	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4

Source: Calculations based on figures provided in US DOC, Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports, "National Origin and Language," *Census of Population 1970* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 1973), PC(2)-1A, Table 14.

Among all second-generation families in 1969, median income was $11,356; 6.2 percent fell below the poverty line. The median income for second-generation Irish families was $11,776, while the percentage below the poverty line was lower than the average at 5.1. Among the foreign-born Irish, too, the average family income at $10,112 was higher than the average median for second-generation families at $9,026, while 7.0 percent of families fell below the poverty level compared to 11.0 percent among all second-generation families.[897] Yet national-level figures mask significant variation among metropolitan areas. In New York City, for example, the income of second-generation Irish families was actually 14 percent above white native families of native parentage, while in Boston it was only 2 percent higher than that group.[898]

[897] Calculations based on figures provided in US DOC, Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports, "National Origin and Language," *Census of Population 1970* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 1973), PC(2)-1A, Table 14.
[898] Morton Winsberg, "The Suburbanization of the Irish in Boston, Chicago and New York," *Eire Ireland* 21 (Fall 1986): 98.

Educational disparities were apparent between the first and second-generation Irish in a given year, and among different second-generation age groups. Table 5.8 shows differences between first- and second-generation Irish in the United States in 1960. Measured in terms of median school years completed, the foreign-born figure was 8.6 years, while the second generation was 11.5; among 25 to 34 year-olds only, however, the median was 12.6.

Table 5.8: Educational Attainment of First- and Second-generation Irish, in Percentages, 1960

Level and Years	First Generation	Second Generation
Elementary		
Less than 5	6.9	2.4
5 to 7	20.3	9.7
8 years	36.5	19.4
Percent subtotal	**63.7**	**31.5**
High School		
1 to 3	13.1	22
4 years	16.1	28.3
Percent subtotal	**29.2**	**50.3**
College		
1 to 3	4	9.9
4 years or more	3.2	8.2
Percent subtotal	**7.2**	**18.1**

Source: US DOC, Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports, "Nativity and Parentage," *US Census of Population 1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1965), PC(2)-1A, Table 10. Table based on individuals who were 14 years and older.

As Greeley notes, "By the 1970s, in terms of educational achievement and per capita income, Irish Catholics ranked as the second most privileged of the United States' ethnic

98. There were significant disparities among the foreign-born Irish in those cities as well: in New York, the income of Irish immigrant families was 7 percent below native whites, while in Boston it was 20 percent below that group.

communities."[899] Only second to the Jewish population, he described them as "the richest and best-educated white Gentile group in America."[900] In terms of occupational prestige—measured on a scale of 0 to 100—the Irish Catholic score was 44, less than Jewish attainment at 48 but above the national average at 40.[901] His analysis of NORC data found that Irish Catholics fall behind British Protestants in terms of occupational prestige but only among those who attended college.[902]

"The Irish have made it in America," noted one commentator; "they have become well integrated indeed almost become the establishment, especially in the political and corporate . . . worlds."[903] The reality was captured by the launch of *Irish America* magazine in the mid-1980s. In contrast to ethnic newspapers concerned with Gaelic sport and communal events, *Irish America* focused on political and business leaders in the United States, generating annual lists of names honoring corporate success such as the Wall Street 50, Business 100, and Stars of the South. According to one organization's estimate, in the 1980s 45 percent of Fortune 500 companies in the United States were headed by a person with an Irish surname.[904]

For some Irish Catholic academics, however, Irish mobility was bitter-sweet. American sociologist Andrew Greeley, for example, wrote "An Epitaph for the Irish" in the early 1970s, in which he wrote: "The Irish . . . finally proved to the WASPs [White Anglo-Saxon Protestants] that they could become respectable." The price, he lamented, of having been "tamed" was that

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899 Andrew M. Greeley, *The American Catholic: A Social Portrait* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), 104.
900 Ibid., 65
901 Andrew Greeley, "The American Achievement," in *America and Ireland, 1776-1976: The American Identity and the Irish Connection*, ed. David Noel Doyle and Owen Dudley Edwards (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), 234.
902 Greeley, *The American Catholic*, 63–5, quote at 65.
903 McCarthy, "Northern Ireland," 44.
904 Irish American Unity Conference, July 15–17, 1983, Chicago, Ill., notes, New York University, Archives of Irish America, Irish Republicanism Collection, AIA 022, box 2, folder 1.

"they [were] no longer Irish."[905] Others, such as Lawrence McCaffrey, softly criticized the country club for having replaced the neighborhood parish as the hub of Irish Catholic life in middle-class suburbs and upscale urban areas.[906] Both would later moderate their conclusions about the demise of Irish America.

Resistance to the Waning of Green Power

As other ethnic groups and minorities mobilized and challenged Irish urban dominance in the postwar period, gaining electoral as well as bureaucratic power in the big cities, Irish ethnics mounted an organized response to their waning influence in the civil service. At the same time, the better-paid skilled trade unions maintained exclusivist practices and high barriers to entry, making them near impenetrable by minority workers who lacked the personal connections necessary to secure jobs and apprenticeships.

Emerald Societies

The formation of Emerald Societies from the 1950s onward was a collective attempt to counteract the diminishing dominance of the Irish in public bureaucracies and utilities. These associations were divided along occupational lines (e.g., fire, police, sanitation, transit, corrections, communications) and engaged in "a multitude of social, cultural, charitable, and nationalist activities."[907] In the 1960s, they would expand beyond New York City to its suburbs and New Jersey and subsequently beyond the metropolitan area, although the Emerald Society

[905] Andrew M. Greeley, *That Most Distressful Nation: The Taming of the American Irish* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972).
[906] McCaffrey, *The Irish Catholic Diaspora*, 194.
[907] Frank Cull, "Emerald Societies," in *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, ed. Michael F. Funchion (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 99–101, quote at 99.

movement would remain heavily concentrated in New York.[908] By the early 1980s, there were some forty Emerald Societies in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut with a combined membership of more than 40,000. One quarter of that figure was comprised of the New York City police and fire departments' combined membership alone.[909] Even at the national level in 1980, US-born Irish males were still disproportionately concentrated in police, fire, and other protective services.[910] The Emerald Society of the Manhattan Bus and Surface Transit Authority (MABSTOA), which attracted Irish males arriving in the 1950s and early 1960s, had a robust membership of approximately 1,000.[911] These associations were affiliated under the umbrella organization, the Grand Council of United Emerald Societies, based in New York.[912]

Unions

At the same time that unions were facing global economic pressures, they also were under domestic political pressure since the 1960s to open their doors to blacks and other minorities. In 1970, *Time* published an article on the lack of progress in integrating trade unions: "The building unionists have kept the door closed to most of the blacks who would like to join," it asserted. Of the 1.3 million construction workers in the United States, it reported, only a little

[908] In the 1970s, Emerald Societies were established in Boston (Police 1971); Rockland County, NY (1972); Philadelphia (Police and Fire, 1973); Chicago (1975); and New Haven, CT (1979). By 1983, there were some forty Emerald Societies in the tri-state area alone with a membership of over 40,000. For a listing of these see Cull (1983). See also Patrick O'Brien, "History of Emerald Societies in America," Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Emerald Society, available at: http://www.impdemeralds.org/history2.html (accessed April 8, 2011).
[909] According to Cull, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) society had a membership of about 6,000, while the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) was about 4,000-strong. Cull, "Emerald Societies," 99.
[910] See Liberson and Waters, *From Many Strands*, 124.
[911] Cull, "Emerald Societies," 99.
[912] According to the United Grand Council of Emerald Societies' website, there are currently only 23 affiliated organizations, with a combined membership of about 10,000. See http://www.grandcouncilofemeralds.org/ (accessed November 22, 2011).

over 100,000 were black, mostly confined to the lowest paying jobs.[913] In some cities, such as Philadelphia, resistance to the integration of unions sparked violence.[914]

Two decades later, New York City's Commission on Human Rights noted that minorities (and women) still remained severely underrepresented in the skilled construction trades, which into the 1980s continued to be an avenue of social mobility for those without higher education.[915] The report concluded that personal connections were still the main avenue for gaining union membership. It asserted:

> [In] 1963, the Commission concluded after extensive hearings that the construction unions were largely Irish or Italian. Union entry and work opportunities were simply a matter of being sponsored by a family member or a personal acquaintance. . . . The standard procedure for obtaining work in most trades [continues to be] through an informal grapevine.[916]

One interviewee, who was a member of the now dissolved Local 608 of the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners during the 1980s, estimated that that the local had about 3,000–4,000 members, about 60 percent who were Irish-born, 35 percent Irish American, and 5 percent other. He elaborated on how construction is "tribal":

> My father was a carpenter, and he knew someone who worked in the Local 608. At that time, all of the officers were Irish born. . . . In the 1980s for an Irish guy coming from Ireland to get in, it depended on who you knew. My Dad knew [one of the leaders], so he said [to him], "I have a young fellow coming over, and I need to hook him up with a job." In the trade unions in America, you get into a union and they get you a job. . . . [T]he apprenticeship school, it was very tight, and it was destined to keep carpenters' sons in the business, within the circle of protection of the union. Around that time, the federal government warned about the ethnic breakdown. New York was a concern about minority representation. . . . Jobs were given based on where [workers] were from or their personal networks. If you were from a particular county [in Ireland], it would be

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913 "Labor: The Philadelphia Problem," *Time*, August 17, 1970.

914 Quadagno, "Social Movements and State Transformation."

915 Elrich and Grabelsky argue that in 1983 disparity in median wages among the skilled trades was 20 percent above unskilled workers. By 1999, however, the wage differential was a mere 3 percent. Elrich and Grabelsky, "Standing at a Crossroads," ILR Collection, Cornell University, September 1, 2005.

916 New York City Commission on Human Rights, "Executive Summary," *Building Barriers: Discrimination in New York City's Construction Trades*, December 1993, available at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/pdf/building_barriers-discrimination_in_new_york_citys_construction_trades-executive_summary_opd.pdf (accessed January 13, 2013).

> more likely for you to work in a job where the boss was from that particular county. It was indirect connection by county or direct [personal] connection. . . . . I watch out for [my fellow union members], and I watch out for the [business agent], and I watch out for [my county].

He also explained how construction workers are protectionists: "Our organizing concentrated on protecting work, jobs, protecting a particular site for you and your son."[917]

Waning Irish dominance in the civil service sector and the unions alike owing to government policy and generalized upward mobility led to reactive solidarity, both organized, as with the Emerald Societies, and spontaneous, as the violence in Philadelphia demonstrates.

The "New" Irish

Despite overall higher levels of education, Mac Laughlin contends that the wave that arrived in the 1980s was quite similar in social and occupational profile and geographic destinations as the post-WWII wave of immigrants. The rural poor and working class constituted a significant proportion of this cohort.[918] And similar to their predecessors, the majority of males, at least in New York City, would be absorbed into the construction sector, where they worked for subcontracting firms owned by established members in the Irish community. Structure Tone Construction, for example, was flagged in FBI documents as a source of employment for illegal Irish immigrants (and financial contributions to "numerous PIRA and NORAID individuals").[919]

However, as Corcoran's field research in New York City's construction sector found, "While the fact of their Irishness often helped to get them hired," it also exposed them to potential exploitation. Those with contacts could potentially garner membership on false

[917] Interview, Mickey Whelan, Dublin, November 12, 2011.
[918] Mac Laughlin, "The New Vanishing Irish," 140.
[919] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), also known as NORAID," New York, NY, March 22, 1990; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194; FOIPA request: 1146079-001.

premises in a local construction union, which provided greater job security and benefits but did not guarantee work.[920]

Another niche where they found work was the service sector, particularly in Irish-owned bars and restaurants. In 1986, staunch Irish republican and artist Brian Mór O'Baoigill mapped a few hundred of such ethnic proprietorships spanning Inwood, the Bronx, and Yonkers—areas containing some of the few enduring Irish neighborhoods.

Geographic Dispersion

Concomitant with their upward mobility, the geography of the Irish was also changing in the latter half of the twentieth century. On a regional level, the foreign-born remained heavily within the Northeast, although between 1970 and 1980 there was a significant population decline of 27.2 percent of its Ireland-born population, while the North Central region lost 21 percent of its foreign-born Irish population. Only the American South gained; the 12.8 percent increase likely reflects retiree settlement in more favorable climate.[921] Although the numbers of Ireland-born living in the Northeast declined in absolute terms, the region still contained 64.4 of the foreign-born from Ireland in 1980 (127,300). The change among the Northern Ireland-born population in the region was even more drastic, an absolute decline of 65.6 percent, although it too continued to have the largest percentage of NI-born at 42.9 (8,500).

[920] Mary P. Corcoran, "Clandestine Destinies: The Informal Sector and Irish Immigrant Incorporation," in *Location and Dislocation in Contemporary Irish Society: Emigration and Irish Identities*, ed. Jim Mac Laughlin (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1997), 243.
[921] Walter, *A Study of the Existing Sources*, 52.

Table 5.9: Ireland-born Persons in the United States by Region, 1970, 1980

US Region	1970	Percent	1980	Percent	Population Change
Northeast	174,797	69.5	127,273	64.3	-27.2
North Central	35,214	14.0	27,825	14.1	-21
South	15,168	6.0	17,105	8.6	12.8
West	26,196	10.4	25,614	12.9	-2.2
US Total	251,375	100	197,817	100	

Source: US DOC, Bureau of the Census, "General Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population, Untied States Summary," *US Census of Population 1980* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1983), PC80-1-C1, Table 79.

When analyzed in terms of the much broader population claiming sole Irish ancestry on the US Census (10.3 million), however, the geographic distribution is more evenly dispersed across the country, with the most living in the South (34.8 percent), followed by the Northeast (30.4 percent), North Central (21.0 percent), and the West (13.9 percent).[922] This category captures the more sizable Irish Protestant population in the United States, which Greeley notes was disproportionately Southern and rural than its Catholic counterpart.[923] At the state level, the most populous states with individuals reporting Irish as a single category were, in descending order: New York, California, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, Illinois, and New Jersey.

While regional shifts among the foreign-born were mostly a consequence of death and aging in a context of few new arrivals, at the city-level there was mass movement out of the central cities to the suburbs. In 1970, the largest cities with Irish-born immigrants were: New York (75,400); Chicago (14,700); Boston (12, 900); and Philadelphia (8,000). In all of these cities, they accounted for less than 1 percent of the total population (except for Boston at 2 percent). [924] Essentially by 1970, except for these enclaves "the Irish were no longer a major

[922] Ibid., 54, Table 2B.4. Figures based on the 1980 US census.
[923] Greeley, *Ethnicity, Denomination and Inequality*, 78, n.15.
[924] Blessing, "The Irish," 528.

presence in urban areas."[925] Table 5.10 provides a comparison of the Irish-born population in major US cities in 1920 and 1970.

Table 5.10: Ireland-born Persons in US Cities with Historically Large Irish Populations, 1920 and 1970

City	1920	1970
New York	203,450	75,382
Philadelphia	64,590	8,076
Boston	57,011	12,894
Chicago	56,786	14,709
San Francisco	18,257	4,808
Pittsburgh	13,989	1,316
St. Louis	9,244	522
Jersey City	12,451	1,944
Providence	11,900	1,042
Cleveland	9,478	1,548
Total	**457,156**	**122,241**
Total Irish-born in the United States	**1,037,234**	**292,212**

Source: Patrick Blessing, "The Irish," in *Harvard Encyclopedia of Ethnic Groups*, ed. Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Table 3, 531.

If those with at least one Ireland-born parent are included, population estimates for 1970 are as follows: New York (200,000); Boston (120,000); Chicago and Philadelphia (70,000 each); and Los Angeles and San Francisco (28,000 each).[926] Table 5.11 shows the figures for the foreign-born by standard consolidated statistical areas (SCSAs) in 1980 by wave of immigration. Aside from the overall low figures, what stands out is that pre-1950 immigrants remained the overwhelming majority in each area.

[925] Ibid., 542.
[926] Clark, *Irish Blood*, 34.

Table 5.11: Distribution in Standard Consolidated Statistical Areas (SCSAs) by Wave of Immigration, 1980

SCSAs	TOTAL	1975-1980	1970-1974	1965-1969	1960-1964	1950-1959	Before 1950
New York-Newark-Jersey City							
Ireland	73,232	1,750	2,504	3,374	7,328	15,105	4,3171
NI	4,087	178	226	233	498	925	2,027
Total	77,319						
NI percent of total	**5.3**						
Boston-Lawrence-Lowell							
Ireland	19,270	491	631	1,045	1,450	3,456	12,197
NI	752	76	63	55	64	134	360
Total	20,022	567	694	1,100	1,514	3,590	12,557
NI percent of total	**3.8**						
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha							
Ireland	15,008	675	622	596	1,406	4,032	7,677
NI	843	59	96	106	67	198	317
Total	15,851						
NI percent of total	**5.3**						
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trenton							
Ireland	10,008	224	263	363	779	1,602	6,777
NI	1,189	33	33	80	103	219	721
Total	11,197						
NI percent of total	**10.6**						
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim							
Ireland	8,008	435	312	739	1,304	2,237	2,281
NI	1,889	117	145	209	418	463	537
Total	9,897						
NI percent of total	**19.1**						
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose							
Ireland	7,820	488	329	386	1,082	2,108	3,427
NI	828	27	62	70	158	273	238
Total	8,648						
NI percent of total	**9.6**						

Source: US DOC, Bureau of the Census, "Detailed Population Characteristics United States Summary, Section C: Standard Consolidated Statistical Areas," *1980 Census of Population* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), PDC80-1-D1-C.

Table 5.12: Single-ancestry Irish in Select Urbanized Areas of 50,000 or More, 1980

Urban Areas 50,000 or More	State	Single-ancestry Irish Population	Percent of Total Population
Albany-Schenectady-Troy	NY	43,370	8.8
Atlantic City	NJ	10,618	7.3
Baltimore	MD	69,844	4.0
Binghamton	NY	11,634	7.2
Boston	**MA**	**403,432**	**15.1**
Bridgeport	CT	25,515	6.2
Brockton	**MA**	**23,345**	**13.1**
Buffalo	NY	51,746	5.2
Chicago	CT	284,544	4.2
Cincinnati	OH	53,923	4.8
Cleveland	OH	62,829	3.5
Columbus	OH	35,439	4.3
Dayton	OH	25,428	4.3
Detroit	MI	110,213	2.9
Hartford	CT	32,957	6.5
Indianapolis	IN	37,341	4.5
Kansas City	MO	50,068	4.6
Lawrence-Haverhill	MA	19,127	9.0
Los Angeles	CA	247,115	2.6
Lowell	**MA**	**19,881**	**12.6**
Milwaukee	WI	26,209	2.2
Minneapolis-St. Paul	MN	50,549	2.8
New Haven	CT	25,645	7.0
New York, NY - Northeastern NJ	NY	910,858	5.8
Oklahoma City	OK	32,336	4.8
Omaha	NB	24,422	4.8
Peoria	IL	11,291	4.3
Philadelphia-NJ	PA	336,225	8.2
Phoenix	AZ	56,281	4.0
Pittsburgh	PA	83,659	4.6
Portland	OR	35,635	3.5
Poughkeepsie	NY	10,283	7.5
Providence	RI	59,946	7.5
Rochester	NY	28,148	4.6
Sacramento	CA	28,136	3.5
St Louis	MO	79,725	4.3
Salt Lake	UT	10,832	1.6
San Antonio	TX	21,803	2.3
San Bernardino	CA	21,433	3.0

Urban Areas 50,000 or More	State	Single-ancestry Irish Population	Percent of Total Population
San Diego	CA	62,331	3.7
San Francisco-Oakland	CA	120,456	3.8
San Jose	CA	37,012	3.0
Scranton-Wilkes Barre	PA	38,411	9.4
Seattle	WA	45,471	3.3
Spakane	WA	10,723	4.0
Springfield-Holyoke	MA	39,082	7.7
Syracuse	NY	26,326	6.9
Stamford	CT	12,214	6.7
Tacoma	WA	11,881	3.0
Tampa	FL	23,123	4.4
Toledo	OH	15,552	3.2
Trenton	NJ	11,528	4.4
Tucson	AZ	16,119	3.6
Tulsa	OK	17,250	3.9
Waterbury	CT	11,386	7.1
Washington, DC-MD-VA	DC	114,986	4.2
Wichita	KS	12,358	4.0
Wilmington	DE	27,553	6.8
Worcester	**MA**	**276,124**	**11.0**
Youngstown-Warren	OH	15,074	3.9

Note: All of the cities listed in the table have at least a single-ancestry Irish population of at least 10,000. Southern cities were not included in the selection.

Source: US DOC, Bureau of the Census, "General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary," *Census of Population 1980* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), PC80-1-C1, Table 250.

The 1980 census reveals that in all urbanized areas of 50,000 or more, not a single one outside of Massachusetts had a single-ancestry[927] Irish population that constituted at least 10 percent of the total population. Only Albany, Philadelphia, and Wilkes-Barre, PA, would meet a lower threshold of 8 percent (Table 5.12). Among towns/townships with populations of 50,000

[927] The ancestry question on the 1980 census allows for individuals to include more than one ancestry in their response. "Single" refers to those who listed "Irish" as their only ancestry. "Mixed" refers to individuals who listed Irish along with another ancestry group or groups (e.g., "Irish-German-Italian").

or more with substantial single Irish ancestry populations, only two met the 10 percent threshold (See Table 5.13).

Table 5.13: Single-ancestry Irish Population in Select Towns/Townships of 50,000 or More, 1980

Towns/townships 50,000 or more	State	Single-ancestry Irish Population	Percentage of Population
Babylon	NY	15,331	7.5
Bronx	NY	56,673	4.8
Brookhaven	NY	26,428	7.2
Brooklyn	NY	74,180	3.3
Hempstead	NY	61,950	8.4
Huntington	NY	14,505	7.2
Islip	NY	27,028	9.0
Manhattan	NY	51,603	3.6
North Hempstead	NY	16,660	7.6
Oyster Bay	NY	28,229	9.2
Queens	NY	106,982	5.7
Smithtown	NY	9,840	8.4
Staten Island	NY	28,163	8.0
Upper Darby	**PA**	**16,809**	**20.0**
Waymouth Town	**MA**	**11,673**	**21.0**

Note: Towns/townships included have at least a 10,000 (rounded) single-ancestry Irish population.

Source: US DOC, Bureau of the Census, "General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary," *Census of Population 1980* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), PC80-1-C1, Table 250a.

Patterns of suburbanization among the Irish population reflect general trends among the old European immigrant populations. Upward social mobility, along with federal housing programs and other incentives, during the postwar period led to mass suburban flight among white ethnics, as black populations were growing in Northern cities. Indeed, between 1950 and 1960 suburbs grew by almost 50 percent while the population of central cities gained only 11

percent, mostly because of the expansion of city limits.[928] Such movements created sharp disparities between the suburbs and central cities, as the people moving out tended to have "more money, higher occupational status, larger families, and more education than those left in the cities."[929] Blacks remained largely segregated from the suburban ring.[930]

Table 5.14: Percentage of Irish Population within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), Urban and Rural, Foreign-stock 1960, and Foreign-born 1980

Area	1960	1980
Urban	*95.7*	*95.8*
Central Cities	60.8	49.4
Not in Central Cities	34.9	46.5
Rural	*4.3*	*4.2*

Note: The 1980 census did not ask a question on parental nativity, and hence it does not contain data on the second generation. The data in the table for 1960 show levels of suburbanization for the foreign-stock, which includes both first and second generation, while the column for 1980 shows only the foreign-born from Ireland. The bias, however, is in the opposite direction, and thus the table underestimates levels of suburbanization in 1980. The calculations in this table cannot account for any boundary shifts between central cities and their suburbs over that 20-year period.

Source: Calculations for 1960 were based on data drawn from US DOC, Bureau of the Census, "General Characteristics of the Population," Volume 1, Part 1, United States Summary, *US Census of Population 1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), Table 101; US DOC, Bureau of the Census, "General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary," *US Census of Population 1980* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), PC80-1-C1, Table 110.

[928] Dennis R. Judd, *The Politics of American Cities* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 159. Judd notes that the increase in the central cities was largely due to the annexation of territory. Without annexation, the cities would have only grown by 1.5 percent.
[929] Ibid., 160.
[930] Ibid., 243, Table 8-2. His figures for the urban black population show, for example: New York central city grew 13.7 to 30.8; suburban ring, 4.4 to 6.0; Philadelphia central city, 18.3 to 34.4; suburban ring, 6.6 to 7.1; Boston central city 12.3 to 18.2; suburban ring, .08 to 1.6; Baltimore central city, 23.8 to 47.0; suburban ring, 10.2 to 6.2.

The single-ancestry Irish population—which as a category includes multiple generations—within SMSAs was less urbanized. Among the 81 percent single-ancestry Irish who were urban, almost 60 percent were not in central cities.[931]

Among the single and mixed Irish ancestry population in the New York Metropolitan area, what Alba et al. describe as a "critical test case" for white ethnic neighborhood survival, about 73 percent of this population was suburbanized.[932] By contrast, Hispanics and nonwhites constituted about a quarter of the suburban population. At the same time, in the suburbs the Irish measure on the index of dissimilarity[933] was well below the accepted threshold of modest segregation, indicating thorough residential intermixing. However, the 27 percent Irish ancestry population remaining within the central cities did meet that threshold, meaning that the Irish were modestly segregated. The number of Irish neighborhoods which they find in both the central cities and suburbs, moreover, dropped from 23 to 16 between 1980 and 1990.[934]

These findings coincide with a number of other qualitative and quantitative studies that find that from the 1960s onward, Irish urban enclaves were shrinking and aging. Almeida argues that in New York City the Irish population had declined by 30 percent during that period, with the most significant drops in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx.[935] Meanwhile, in Philadelphia, Clark asserts that the old Irish working-class districts had become part of the black

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[931] Calculations based on figures provided in US DOC, Bureau of the Census, "General Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population, United States Summary," *Census of Population 1980* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1983), PC 80-1-C1, Table 76.

[932] Richard D. Alba, John R. Logan, and Kyle Crowder, "White Ethnic Neighborhoods and Assimilation: The Greater New York Region, 1980–1990," *Social Forces* 75, no. 3 (1997): 890.

[933] The index of dissimilarity is the extent of evenness of "the overall residential distribution of one population when compared against the baseline formed by another." In Alba et al.'s study, the residential distribution of the Irish ancestry group is compared to all other non-Hispanic whites who are not Irish. The benchmark value of .3 percent is generally considered the threshold of modest segregation; a value below that threshold indications a non-segregated population. Ibid., 891.

[934] The population size residing in these neighborhoods was a mere fraction as a proportion of the total group, less than six percent in both the central cities and suburbs—a figure significantly less than the Italians at about 20 percent. Their data, of course, cannot account for the significant number of illegal Irish who found their way to New York City during that period, who tended to settle in traditional Irish neighborhoods in the Bronx and Queens.

[935] Almeida, *Irish Immigrants in New York City*, 56.

ghetto, as the Irish "dispersed into outlying neighborhoods and the suburbs."[936] While Gamm's comparative analysis among Boston's Jews and Catholics in their respective strongholds revealed that the latter were more "rooted" owing to the territorial coupling of the Catholic parish and neighborhood, in Roxbury and Dorchester the Irish population declined significantly in the 1960s and 1970s.[937] The Irish of South Boston would become notorious for violently resisting the integration of black children from Roxbury into the neighborhood's public schools in the mid-1970s. Suburban exodus also unfolded further west in Chicago, although the Irish did maintain a strong presence on the far southwest side of the city into the 1980s.[938]

Winsberg's 1986 comparative study of suburbanization among the Irish in Boston, Chicago, and New York revealed marked change from 1950 to 1980 in all three cities.

Table 5.15: Percentage of Foreign-born Ireland Living Inside/Outside Central Cities of Select Metropolitan Areas, 1950, 1970, 1980

	1950		1970		1980	
	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside
Boston	78	22	67	33	60	40
Chicago	90	10	76	24	58	42
New York	84	16	77	23	64	36

Source: Table drawn from Morton Winsberg, "The Suburbanization of the Irish in Boston, Chicago and New York," *Eire Ireland* 21 (Fall 1986): 94.

He concluded:

> Irish assimilation is well advanced. Old Irish neighborhoods in Boston, Chicago, and New York survive today, although they are much reduced in area and population from years past. Not only have improved economic conditions among the Irish and their

[936] Dennis Clark, *Irish Blood: Northern Ireland and the American Conscience* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977), 43.
[937] Gerald Gamm, *Urban Exodus: Why the Jews Left Boston and the Catholics Stayed* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
[938] Winsberg, "The Suburbanization of the Irish," 95.

> descendants brought about this reduction in ethnicity, but the arrival of a huge new wave of immigrants to the cities of the nation, primarily composed of blacks and Hispanics, precipitated the breakup of Irish neighborhoods and the movement of their residents elsewhere within the central city or to the suburbs.[939]

Table 5.16: Percentages of Black and Hispanic Population in the Central Cities of Selected Metropolitan Areas, 1950 and 1980

	1950	1980	Percent Change
Boston	3	17	14
Chicago	10	47	37
New York	14	55	41

Source: Table drawn from Morton Winsberg, "The Suburbanization of the Irish in Boston, Chicago and New York," *Eire Ireland* 21 (Fall 1986): 95.

"As the Irish neighborhoods dispersed, the old ethnic ties became difficult to maintain," noted Clark of Philadelphia's Irish.[940] Cavan-born, Manhattan pub owner Hugh Lunney, who remained very active in Irish affairs despite his move to Yonkers from the Bronx, explained how social life differed:

> When we lived in the Bronx, our children were very young, you'd sit on the stoop and the neighbors would come over and talk. And then you each go back to your homes, and you'd meet them in parks. Now I live on a street with one-family houses. You wind up waving to people, but don't talk to them one on one. You might meet them in a coffee shop and talk, but otherwise it's just waving.[941]

Another Irishman who moved from Queens to Long Island similarly noted:

> [There was] more camaraderie in closer space. First of all the Irish went to the same church [and] were in various societies; there were more Irish bars where people drank. An awful lot of reliance on your own kind; and talking to people from your own country,

[939] Ibid., 91.
[940] Clark, *The Irish in Philadelphia*, 161.
[941] Interview with Hugh Lunney, New York, NY, December 5, 2011.

> from your own county. And the GAA sports. Out here [on Long Island] every town has their own St. Pat's parade.

There was some population infusion owing to the wave of illegal immigrants arriving in the 1980s. While they moved into traditional Irish neighborhoods, at least in New York according to Almeida, "They tended not to socialize or mix with the older migrants or Irish Americans," and did not move in with families, as had the earlier generation of immigrants, but lived with their peers.[942] For the so-called new Irish "the extended family and social relationships of the 1950s were virtually nonexistent. The advanced age and anemia of the immigrant community into which [they] migrated was complicated by the second significant difference: the legal status of the new immigrants," which meant that they were "weary of anyone who was not a member of their immediate peer group."[943] Having grown up in a Europeanizing Ireland, moreover, their attachment to nationalism was far more diminished than earlier waves who were socialized in a less modernized Ireland.

The Decline of Irish-American Organizations

Upward mobility and the dissipation of Irish Catholic neighborhoods in urban centers on the East Coast and elsewhere, coupled with the trickle of immigration in the 1960s and 1970s, led to a decline in the ranks of established Irish-American institutions. Historically, Irish organizations facilitated the birth of an Irish consciousness among a diverse population of immigrants. As Light explains, "they established standards of behavior and belief that defined and set members of the ethnic community off from the larger population; and they promulgated specific goals and programs that gave direction to [the development] of a sense of ethnic

[942] Almeida, *Irish Immigrants in New York City*, 81.
[943] Ibid., 104.

solidarity."[944] These organizations also provided their members with direct forms of practical assistance, such as sick and death benefits, and offered opportunities for interaction that facilitated the creation of interpersonal networks that could be tapped into for social support.

One emigrant explained the logic of joining Irish-American organizations upon arrival to New York:

> I was a member of the Waterford County Association and the GAA [Gaelic Athletic Association]. . . . You used all your ties . . . . [T]o help people [come] out, you have to be involved. You have to have as many connections as possible; it's a ripple effect. For the people following behind you, you had to join as many organizations as possible to broaden your network. . . . The first port of call [for help] was someone from your own town; if they couldn't help you, then you widened your circle to people in your county, and lastly to anyone who could help you at all.[945]

Historians have attributed this communal solidarity to moral economies formed in response to economic scarcity in Ireland, risks associated with migration and poverty, and Catholicism.[946] O'Dowd's investigation of cooperative labor in rural areas, for example, showed that mutual self-help practices persisted in Ireland well into the twentieth century. She identifies various forms of such labor, including: charity labor (neighbors helped those who were sick, elderly, or poor); exchange arrangements (based on reciprocity); and group labor (which was often accompanied by celebratory festivities after work was completed).[947]

Yet like the militant republican organizations discussed in Chapter 3, fraternal organizations such as the AOH and county associations had also dwindled in membership.[948]

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[944] Dale B. Light, "The Role of Irish-American Organisations in Assimilation and Community Formation," *Irish Studies* 4 (1985): 114.
[945] Interview with Mickey Whelan, Dublin, November 12, 2011.
[946] Timothy J. Meagher, "The Fireman on the Stairs: Communal Loyalties in the Making of Irish America," in *Making the Irish American: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 617.
[947] Anne O'Dowd, *Meitheal* (Dublin: Comhairle Bhéaloideas Eireann, 1981).
[948] Andrew J. Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict, 1968–1995* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 16.

Fraternal Organizations

Fraternal organizations have a long history in the United States and were born to aid immigrants and "celebrate the bonds of Irish identity."[949] The most prominent among these was the Ancient Order of Hibernians, with its US origins in the mid-nineteenth century. The requirements for joining the AOH were not only Irish nativity or descent but also Catholicism.

As a mutual aid organization, local AOH divisions were crucial in facilitating the adaptation Irish immigrants landing on US shores, a role it played well into the twentieth century. One Ulster-born immigrant who arrived in the 1960s explained: "I joined the AOH to get in front of the employment line." "That's where I met all of my transit worker friends who introduced me to transportation and eventually [helped me] secure a job with [MABSTOA]." He further explained that joining the AOH "was the thing to do at the time. It was a stepping stone to finding ourselves a better future. It was a way to make connections with the sanitation department, fire and police."[950]

In some instances the relationship between a workplace and an AOH division was mutually reinforcing. AOH Division 9, for example, located at the time in Inwood, the northern most neighborhood in Manhattan, was actually known as the "bus men's division." With a sizable 360-strong membership, John Dunleavy recalled how one bus dispatcher kept its ranks solid by giving new MABSTOA recruits an application to join the AOH when they arrived at his garage on 129th Street.[951] The division even assisted newly arrived Irish immigrants in preparing for the MABSTOA exam after it was introduced in the mid-1960s in response to minority grievances. It also helped MABSTOA workers who were members with promotional exam preparation.

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[949] Marjorie R. Fallows, *Irish Americans: Identity and Assimilation* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), 53.
[950] Interview with Seamus Naughton (pseudonym), Yonkers, June 29, 2011.
[951] Interview with John Dunleavy, TWU and AOH Division 9 member, New York, NY, October 21, 2011.

The organization, however, was in overall decline. By the onset of the Northern Ireland conflict, it had a membership of about 15,000–20,000 nation-wide with about an equal number in the Ladies' Auxiliary—down from 175,000 combined earlier in the twentieth century.[952] Given its role in assisting immigrants, the bulk of the organization's divisions were in the Northeast—Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania—and also Ohio. With the aging of the first- and second-generations in the postwar era, branches emerged in places where people tended to retire: Florida, Texas, North Carolina, Georgia.[953]

AOH historian John Ridge asserted that in the postwar era for many AOH members "the only thing Irish they had was a surname," and by the late 1960s, many Hibernian divisions existed "only on paper." The organization, he explained, "was not a living, breathing organization; it was just a shell."[954] As then AOH president Seamus Boyle noted of the organization in Philadelphia, "In the 1970s, it was almost extinct. Most of the Irish organizations were very small."[955] Indeed, when he took the helm of Division 39, it had only 10 active members.[956]

In the mid-1980s, the AOH had about 18,700 members across 27 states. New York had the most with 6,450, while others such as Alabama and West Virginia had fewer than 20.

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[952] Michael F. Funchion, "Ancient Order of Hibernians in America," in *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, ed. Funchion Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 60–1.
[953] Interview with AOH historian Phil Gallagher, September 7, 2011.
[954] Telephone interview with historian John Ridge, vice president of the NY Irish History Roundtable, November 18, 2011.
[955] Interview with then AOH president Seamus Boyle, Pleasantville, NY, July 13, 2011.
[956] Boyle biography in the Delaware Valley Irish Northern Aid Committee, 2nd annual testimonial dinner journal.

In addition to New York, the largest memberships were in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Ohio, and New Jersey. These six states comprised about 80 percent of the membership.[957]

County Associations

The various county associations had a presence in New York as early as the mid-nineteenth century, which had "the largest cluster of county societies." According to New York University's exhibition of the county associations titled "The Fifth Province" denoting the diaspora as the mythic addition to the historic four provinces of Ireland: "The guiding principles of Christian charity and the old Irish rural tradition of the *meitheal* (helping one's neighbors) made benevolence, fraternalism, and mutualism the bedrock of these American organizations."[958] The county associations provided sick and death benefits to their members and also "found jobs for the jobless, donated money to charities on both sides of the Atlantic . . . and perhaps most important of all, they sponsored a range of social activities."

In the early twentieth century, they cohered under the United Irish Counties Association of New York, while their associated football and hurling clubs joined the New York Gaelic Athletic Association, an affiliate of the GAA in Ireland.[959] In 1950, the umbrella organization had 34 affiliates (associations representing each of the 32 counties of Ireland plus the Dalcassian Social and Athletic Club and the Irish American Club of Nassau, Suffolk and Queens) and also

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[957] "Compiled from the National Secretary's Records – Thomas D. McNabb, 1986," New York University's Archives of Irish America, Records of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, AIA 046, box 1, folder 11. Interestingly, California's membership at 305 was only slightly more than Maryland's at 267.

[958] See New York University's Glucksman House, The Fifth Province: County Societies in Irish America, available at: http://www.nyu.edu/as/irelandhouse/fifthprovince/lookingout.php (accessed September 13, 2012).

[959] Michael F. Funchion, "United Irish Counties Association of New York (UICA)," in Irish American Voluntary Organizations, ed. Michael F. Funchion (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), 266.

had a Welfare and Employment Bureau, which assisted members in finding employment, missing relatives, social service agencies, educational programs, and Irish clubs and activities.[960]

By the early 1980s, membership in the county associations had been shrinking as the Irish population suburbanized across the New York Metropolitan area; Ridge estimated that there were 5,000 members, about 40 percent of whom were American born. He noted, however, that "the pool of potential American-born members is limited by the fact that many are not interested in joining what had been mainly immigrant organizations and by the fact that many live in the suburbs."[961]

Cultural Organizations

Two other organizations were also key institutions among Irish-American communities—the Gaelic Athletic Association and the Gaelic League. Like the AOH, the GAA had a counterpart organization in Ireland, which historically served as a basis for IRA recruitment in Ireland under British rule. Founded in the late nineteenth century, the organization was formed to preserve Gaelic sports and help preserve Irish identity. As Darby explains, the organization served as "an important cultural mechanism for building and articulating an affinity for Ireland and the nationalist agenda."[962]

In the 1970s, GAA clubs, organized on the basis of the 32 Irish counties, were largely comprised of Irish-born men. In New York, the Irish-dominated civil service sectors also formed football clubs. The NYPD, FDNY, MABSTOA, and Con Edison each had their own team.

Gaelic Park in the Bronx, which was the venue for GAA games, was a central part of the Irish community in New York City. As a *New York Times* article from 1970 explains, Gaelic

[960] Ibid., 268.
[961] Ibid., 269.
[962] Paul Darby, "Playing for Ireland in Foreign Fields: The Gaelic Athletic Association and Irish Nationalism in America," *Irish Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (2010): 69–89.

Park had a long "tradition of fund raising and charity events [that] helped defray the cost of wakes, hospital stays, sports teams and political campaigns. New York's Transport Workers Union met for years in the park's banquet hall, and Mr. O'Donnell [who for decades held the lease to the park] counted powerful [TWU] union leaders like Michael J. Quill, John E. Lawe and Daniel Gilmartin as friends."[963]

The GAA's annual testimonial dinner journal "Highlights of 1972" ominously began, "Let's face it, the past year was not so good. . . . The 1965 Immigration Law has virtually shut off the infusion of young players to the local championships." It concluded by portending that John O'Donnell faced another difficult year following his 1972 term.[964] For decades to come, lack of rejuvenation would a present problem for GAA teams in New York and elsewhere in the country.

The Catholic Church

The Irish played a crucial role in the Church's maturation in the United States during the nineteenth century, and in turn, as Almeida explains, "The Church played an important role in the maintenance of [ethnic] identity."[965] "The cornerstone of Irish Catholic religious life in the United States was the parish,"[966] and it was the parish that defined boundaries of Irish-American neighborhoods.

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[963] Tim Golden, "At Gaelic Park, the Contest for Control is Off the Field," *New York Times*, October 12, 1990, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/12/nyregion/at-gaelic-park-the-contest-for-control-is-off-the-field.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.

[964] Gaelic Athletic Association of Greater New York, Thirty-Ninth Annual Banquet, February 3, 1972, New York, NY. Available at New York University's Archives of Irish America, Gaelic Athletic Association of New York Records, AIA 025.

[965] Almeida, *Irish Immigrants in New York City*, 88.

[966] Blessing, "The Irish," 534.

At the same time bishops, nuns, and priests performed a vital role in aiding the social adjustment of newcomers and as "cultural brokers, mediating contacts between the impoverished Irish masses and the host society."[967] They also assisted in the establishment of charitable organizations and institutions such as schools and hospitals.

Yet after Vatican II (1962–1965), the decline of Church power and authority coupled with "the dissolution of the neighborhood parishes as ethnics left for the suburbs" were, according to some historians, responsible for "the loss of Irish identity." As Almeida argues, when Vatican II and its changes in regulation were "combined with the migration to the less ethnically dense suburbs, Irish Catholics . . . both in the city and outer communities . . . felt the loss of some common identity." Between 1968 and 1975, according to Greeley, church attendance experienced the sharpest decline. In Ireland, moreover, "the change in the Church coincided with a social and economic awakening that replaced the spiritual with the material."[968]

Irish-American Institutions and the "New" Irish

The infrastructure was not replenished by the influx of the 1980s. As Almeida finds, the New Irish avoided the county associations. Indeed, a survey on this cohort in New York City revealed that only 13 percent of them had attended "Irish or county organizations."[969]

Two crucial factors combined to make the new wave an infertile source of replenishment: the broken links of chain migration and socialization in a modernizing and Europeanizing Ireland that devalued nationalism and actively suppressed the IRA and Sinn Féin. One individual who had arrived in 1984 explained how he had been politically conscious and active in Ireland on human rights issues in Central America and South Africa but ignorant of the conflict in the

[967] Ibid.
[968] Almeida, *Irish Immigrants in New York City*, 98–100.
[969] Ibid., 113.

North. He stated: "I was not as conscious or aware [of the six counties] as I was about the rise of the Sandinistas or El Salvador."[970]

The reality of their illegal residence, moreover, meant that they were inclined to stay hidden from the mainstream. Given that their stay was precarious, it was conceived more as a temporary "relocation" than resettlement. By the 1980s, the so-called American wake—an Irish social ritual akin to a living wake for those "departing" to the United States—had been dead for at least a half century.[971]

Noraid and the Upwardly Mobile

Militant leaders in the United States, many of whom were Irish-born, were weary of largely assimilated, upwardly mobile Irish Americans. As Hanley explains, Noraid perceived these "respectable Irish" as so overly concerned with gaining acceptance in "an American Anglophile society" that they betrayed their heritage and their struggling kin in Northern Ireland.[972] Prominent Irish Catholic politicians, Ted Kennedy, Tip O'Neill, Daniel Moynihan, and Hugh Carey, were especially singled-out for condemnation.

A clear illustration of what Noraid supporters considered "Lace Curtains and Hypocrisy"[973] was the honoring of Mrs. Nixon by the prestigious American Irish Historical Society in 1972, which by then "had become essentially a club for a few hundred New York business and professional men." The society's "tendency toward social elitism cut it off from the

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[970] Phone conversation with Brendan Fay, March 21, 2012.

[971] For a detailed discussion of the American wake, see Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles*. Miller notes that this was a Catholic peasant tradition common in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It not only lamented emigration, but in traditional villages also "the inexorable disintegration of old communities and the decline of traditional ways of life" (560). The practice endured in the Connaught, west Munster, and parts of Ulster into the early twentieth century. He notes that with the "routinization of emigration and westward advance of Anglicization" the custom came into disuse (557).

[972] Hanley, "The Politics of NORAID," 8.

[973] Clark, *Irish Blood*, 36. Headline of editorial noted in Clark.

largely proletarian fraternal and athletic associations," notes Griffin, while its "avowedly ecumenical and nonpolitical character isolated it from the self-consciously 'Irish' element in the United States."[974] In a context in which the Nixon administration was seen by Noraid as "pandering to the British"[975] and selectively "persecuting" Irish Americans through FBI arrests and grand jury intimidation, the honoring of Mrs. Nixon was deemed "a slap in the face" to the supporters of Irish unification.[976]

The Irish Society in Philadelphia was also more "business and professional," in the words of one interviewee. By contrast, he explained, Noraid members "were more like the working class, union men, blue collar. A lot of the Irish Society were lawyers, judges, you know things like that, the big wheels in there were anyway."[977]

Similarly, of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, Liam O'Murchadha wrote: "The well to do often found their way into the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, while the less well-off were served by the Ancient order of Hibernians and the neighborhood saloons and pubs."[978] Noraid activist Frances Duffy described the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick as an elite organization, with doctors and lawyers. "They were the St. Patrick's Day Irish," she asserted. And "the St. Patrick's Day Committee," she noted, "was very conservative, with judges and lawyers." [979]

As government condemnation of IRA support groups was intensifying in the United States, the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick invited SDLP moderate John Hume to speak in March 1977. He told the audience, "Irishmen today required the same wisdom as had inspired those

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[974] William D. Griffin, "American Irish Historical Society," in *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, ed. Michael F. Funchion (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 42.
[975] "N.Y. Goes Wild for Texas 5 at Gaelic Park: Nixon Accused of Pandering to British," *Irish People*, August 19, 1972, 1.
[976] See Frank Durkan, "The Same of the American Irish Historical Society," *Irish People*, September 16, 1972. 14. Noraid, as well as the NAIF and the IRC, organized a picket to protest the honor on October 5, 1972.
[977] Interview with Seamus Boyle, Pleasantville, NY, July 13, 2011.
[978] Commentary by Liam O'Murchada, *Irish People*, May 26, 1973, 17.
[979] Interview with Frances Duffy, Upper Darby, Penn., August 15, 2011.

who left Ireland two centuries ago to build the republic of the USA" castigating "nationalist exclusivism" on both sides. He explained to his audience: "The present over-emotional and fanciful make-believe was very different from the original true ideal of Irish Republicanism."[980]

In the mid-1970s an elite network comprised of Irish-American politicians and businessmen, US government agencies, and Northern Ireland moderates emerged which staunchly denounced the IRA and its supporters as "terrorists" and advocated a political solution to the conflict. The Ireland Fund was founded in 1976, and its board of directors included distinguished businessmen and professionals.[981] It funded development projects and other reconciliation initiatives in Northern Ireland. Its financing came mainly from "the wealthy and famous, business leaders and politicians," not from Irish bars and clubs but lavish affairs.[982] As Noraid director and spokesman Matthew Higgins[983] remarked: "The Ireland Fund is not a competitor because it's not money that would have come to us in the first place. They're what you might call fat cats—or lace curtain Irish." [984]

Conclusion: The Dispersed Dispersed

The aggregate "group" level analysis of this chapter addressed the puzzle of why republicans and their US allies were relatively unsuccessful in mobilizing mass support from

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[980] Quoted from "Hume tells Americans of 'Sterile Exclusivism' in North," *Irish Times*, March 18, 1977.
[981] Michael F. Funchion, "Ireland Fund," in *Irish American Voluntary Organizations* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 147.
[982] Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*, 121.
[983] Higgins hailed from of County Donegal and was an IRA veteran. He was the chairman of Noraid and in his seventies when he assumed directorship of Noraid after McGowan died in 1974. See Mary Vespa, "Matt Higgins Collects Dollars for Irish Widows He Says—but Does the Money Go for I.R.A. Guns?" *People*, March 22, 1976, available at: http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20066275,00.html.
[984] Quoted in Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*, 121. According to Shannon, this term was in common usage by the 1890s. It referred not only to upwardly mobile Irish Americans, whose prosperity was symbolized by lace curtains hanging in their windows, but also those with drive to gain acceptance into middle-class Protestant society. Shannon, *The American Irish*, 142.

Irish America in a context of coordinated state suppression that relied on mechanisms that averted backlash—information, shaming, and policing. While the movement's ability to appeal to mass publics was constrained by government policy, upward mobility among Irish America as a "group" was dissolving the intra-communal connections that could bypass the adverse conditions imposed from above. Structural integration diminished the need to rely on ethnic networks for economic security, while suburbanization dispersed the Irish and thus decreased their proximity to co-ethnics in their daily living experiences.

That dispersion had two consequences. Perceptions of the conflict would be shaped by mainstream media, which was biased against republicans, rather than personal contacts with politicized co-ethnics. Most of those who identified their ancestry as Irish lacked the direct and even indirect ties through which information and appeals flowed to help nationalist families in the North's Catholic ghettos. That lack of connection to the movement, moreover, generated distrust about its goals. Phil Gallagher, a former high school teacher from a lower-middle/middle-class town in Connecticut described: "

> For another reason, I didn't join [because] I was fearful of communist influence. They [the PIRA] were also involved with Libya. It bothered me. I was concerned that they would set up a communist Ireland; many of those supporting the cause didn't think it was possible; they just focused on unity in Ireland. As a history teacher, I think of the Russian revolutions. Any revolution can have influence or power. Most people don't like violence. They don't want to be bothered. . . . I didn't like the left-wing tinge of Sinn Féin. I was puzzled by it. I didn't know enough about its goals, who it made up of. I feared being taken advantage of.[985]

Second, owing to processes of assimilation—i.e., of the Irish becoming "white"[986]—and relative affluence, they were integrated into networks that did not reward pro-republican activism but rather would levy social and even economic costs for being affiliated with "terrorists." "It was very much a working-class movement," noted Lawlor, "because people of greater economic

[985] Interview with AOH historian Phil Gallagher, September 7, 2011.
[986] Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

means were scared off and felt they had a little more something to loose. They would be stigmatized and loose business. There was no economic benefit of being on the right side."[987] Mary Sheils Baggarly of Washington, DC, noted: "You had businesses in the area that would give money. . . . Some would do it anonymously, they would didn't want to cut off their customers [;] maybe their customers didn't support Northern Aid, and they didn't want to lose business."[988] One Philadelphia area Noraid member similarly asserted, "There were wealthy businessmen who gave money, but they did so silently. They didn't want to be identified with Noraid or the movement because it was bad for business."[989]

Olive McKeon, activist in Queens, asserted: "I would say the Irish-American middle class was less interested in the cause. If you get something, you want to keep it. They didn't want their names associated with violence. That's the response you got from people who only heard what the IRA were doing but not the British."[990] Similarly, Matthias Reilly noted: "There was an element of the older Irish who did not believe in upsetting the apple cart. They called Noraid vagabonds." Yet another activist noted: "If you lived in New Jersey in a small town, it takes a lot of courage. People with affluence would be afraid of getting their name in the papers, in a magazine. In my business, I lost about two customers when I appeared in the paper."[991]

Social networks "to a large extent determine whether someone becomes a target of mobilization attempts."[992] At the same time, those integrated into diverse social networks were

[987] Interview with Richard Lawlor, Hartford, Conn., December 1, 2011.
[988] Interview with Mary Sheils Baggarly, Washington, DC, March 19, 2012.
[989] Interview with Connell McCrea, Philadelphia, August 15, 2011.
[990] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, NY, December 13, 2011.
[991] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.
[992] Bert Klandermans, "The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 371.

less vulnerable to intra-communal dynamics that exacted both moral and instrumental costs for non-participation. It is these dynamics that are the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

The Transnational "Villagers," the Republican Patriarchs, and Union Chieftains

> The neighborhood . . . generates tremendous loyalty. . . . You feel a certain obligation toward [your neighbors] and they toward you. It is easy to see in this mutuality of obligation a continuation in the urban environment of the old peasant loyalties of village and clan. —Andrew M. Greeley[993]

> [M]ost of the Irish working in transit were "county people" from the poorer counties of southern and western Ireland. . . . In many cases they were but a few years removed from the peasantry and retained social, political, and psychological traits there formed. —Joshua Freeman[994]

> Historically, nepotism and patronage have been endemic to the construction industry. —New York City Commission on Human Rights[995]

> The cause of Ireland is the cause of labor; and the cause of labor is the cause of Ireland. —Gerry Adams[996]

Given the countervailing forces confronting Noraid from above (government suppression) and from below (communal dispersion), how did Noraid survive for the IRA's three-decades-long armed insurgency and manage to send remittances back to Ireland to support prisoners' dependents? This chapter argues that the leadership and activist core engaged in network-building strategies at both the interpersonal and organizational levels that increased the organization's longevity in the face of highly adverse circumstances.

At the interpersonal level, they not only drew upon waning communal ties to mobilize support but also actively cultivated them through a persistent stream of fundraising events that

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[993] Andrew M. Greeley, *The American Catholic: A Social Portrait* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), 228–9.
[994] Joshua B. Freeman, *In Transit: The Transport Workers Union in New York City, 1933–66* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 31.
[995] New York City Commission on Human Rights, "Executive Summary," *Building Barriers: Discrimination in New York City's Construction Trades*, December 1993, available at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/pdf/building_barriers-discrimination_in_new_york_citys_construction_trades-executive_summary_opd.pdf (accessed January 13, 2013).
[996] Gerry Adams, speech at the *Irish Echo* Labor 50 Awards, New York, NY, September 21, 2011.

celebrated Irish nationalist identity through dance, food, music, and sport.[997] Social life in the dissipating Irish neighborhoods was thus politicized, which generated positive incentives to support the cause, including intimate friendships, and disincentives not to contribute, such as shaming or exclusion. Essentially, the events served as social foci from which a closed network was built and maintained.[998] At the same time, Noraid created opportunities for direct personal connections between Americans and republican prisoners and their families through a number of initiatives. By personalizing the conflict, Noraid sought to convert them, too, into "transnational villagers" imbued with a sense of moral obligation to help those who had become their friends, spouses, or even imagined kin in the North's Catholic ghettos.

At the organizational level, the movement leadership on both sides of the Atlantic actively sought to centralize efforts in the United States, discouraging competition, although it was not wholly successful at eliminating drainage from its resource pool. Two additional strategies were pursued: co-optation and brokerage.[999] Noraid activists co-opted various elements of established Irish-American institutions, particularly branches of the Ancient Order of

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[997] The very founding of the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) in Ireland during the 1880s was intimately linked to the revolutionary Irish Republican Brotherhood, which according to historians envisioned sports teams as a preliminary form of training for insurgent warfare. The association emerged during a period of Gaelic cultural revival and nationalism in Ireland that sought to reverse the decline of Irish football and hurling as well as the Irish language. See Richard English, *Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland* (London: Macmillan, 2006), 259. On the GAA in the United States, see Patrick Hennessy, "The Gaelic Athletic Association," in *Irish American Voluntary Associations*, ed. Michael F. Funchion (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 127; Paul Darby, "Playing for Ireland in Foreign Fields: The Gaelic Athletic Association and Irish Nationalism in America," *Irish Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (2010): 69–89.

[998] Chapter 1 discussed Feld's definition of social foci. Burt also draws on Feld to discuss the emergence of clusters of dense connection. As he explains, "A social focus is anything that brings people together in an activity with the result (intended or unintended) of facilitating relationships among the people." As he and Feld note, events—including membership in the same union, church, or voluntary organization—create what is known as a "'homophily bias' in networks, which means that relations are more likely between people who share socially significant attributes. . . ." See Ronald S. Burt, *Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 12; and Scott Feld, "The Focused Organization of Social Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 86 (1981): 1015–35.

[999] Cooptation refers to "the transparent, permitted borrowing of resources that have already been aggregated by [non-movement] groups." By contrast, appropriation refers to surreptitious exploitation, such as infiltration. Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 134. Brokerage is simply the tying together of unconnected nodes within a network.

Hibernians and county societies. The leadership also brokered relationships with unions that were Irish-dominated at least in leadership, especially in the building trades. While some rank-and-file union members joined Noraid units, the Noraid leadership strategically honored Irish union leaders at events and included them as committee members for big fundraising efforts and was thereby able to benefit from patronage dynamics within the unions.[1000] These men not only had financial resources at their disposal but also informal institutional mechanisms that gave incentive for rank and file and their colleagues to display their loyalty to them by supporting Noraid.

These network-building strategies at the organizational level—centralization, co-optation, and brokerage—were successful overall because Noraid's leaders in New York and elsewhere were not only directly tied to the republican movement in Ireland, but they were also *prominent* within their respective Irish-American communities because they had been "joiners." They tended to have multiple organizational affiliations and held leadership posts that positioned them to exert their influence. Lacking in favorable structural opportunities to mobilize broad-based support in cold war America and in material resources, they were rich in social capital—defined by Burt and others as advantage from one's structural position within a network.[1001]

Yet as movements are not static, this chapter discusses changes within Noraid in the late 1980s that resulted from the emergence of a new leadership in Sinn Féin and a prioritization of the ballot box above the Armalite for achieving unification.[1002] Noraid expanded its activities

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[1000] In this sense, patronage and brokerage are tied together. "The relationship is one between a social and economic superior who extends favours, often of a material kind, to a poorer person who gives service and esteem to the patron." It is thus "an asymmetrical, quasi-moral relationship between a person (the patron) who directly provides protection and assistance (patronage) and/or who influences persons who can provide these services (brokerage) to persons (clients)." Quoted in David Morgan, "Cultural Work and Friendship Work: The Case of 'Bloomsbury,'" *Media, Culture and Society* 4 (1982): 19.

[1001] Burt, *Brokerage and Closure*, 4.

[1002] The Armalite is an automatic assault rifle that was used by the IRA and became a symbol of its armed struggle. The ballot box and Armalite strategy was articulated first by Danny Morrison at Sinn Féin's 1981 *ard fheis* (annual

beyond fundraising for prisoners' dependents in the North to lobbying and educational campaigns that were more attuned to Sinn Féin's political strategy. The split that ensued in Noraid over strategic priorities would essentially push aside the old guard—those with deep ties to the waning Irish communities from within which the organization had drawn its loyal base of support. As Sinn Féin mainstreamed into the political arena and shed its stigma as the public voice of a terrorist organization, however, the old communal ties became less necessary as a more broad class of Irish Americans joined the bandwagon, particularly after 1994 when President Clinton granted Gerry Adams a visa. However, the party continued to rely on American labor leaders for financial support.[1003]

The chapter concludes with a discussion of Noraid's marginalization as Friends of Sinn Féin emerged as the party's fundraising organization, while Clan na Gael became the key channel through which cash was sent across the Atlantic to support the armed struggle. Before examining Noraid's strategies and ultimate split in the late 1980s, the chapter first analyzes the provincial dimensions of this radicalized transnational movement. It then examines both the movement's core membership and wider support base in the United States.

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conference), when he said: "Who here really believes that we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object, if with a paper ballot in this hand, and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?" Quoted in Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 224–5.

[1003] The party continues to do so. On the committee of Friends of Sinn Féin's St. Patrick's Day luncheon in March 2012 were such prominent union leaders as Richard Trumka, president of the AFL-CIO and former United Mine Workers of America union president; John Sweeney, former president of the AFL-CIO and former president of the Service Employees International Union Local 32B-J; Gerald McEntee, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees union; Jimmy Hoffa, general president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters; Terry O'Sullivan, president of the Laborers' International Union of North America; Robert Scardelletti, president of the Transport and Communications Union; James Williams, president of the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades; Joseph Nigro, general president of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association; Walter Wise, general president of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, and Reinforcing Ironworkers. At the same time Gerry Adams was also a featured guest speaker at the Labor 50 celebrations in New York in 2011 and 2012.

A Provincial Transnational Movement

The republican movement in the United States was paradoxically transnational and provincial. Despite Provisional Sinn Féin's socialist bent and calls for international solidarity with oppressed peoples, Noraid itself did not pursue bridging tactics with its counterparts similarly engaged from afar in armed conflicts elsewhere in the world.[1004] In the backdrop of the cold war, this no doubt was a pragmatic strategy to avoid red-baiting and alienating its primary constituent base—ordinary Catholic Irish-Americans who tended to be socially conservative. However, as Chapter 3 discussed, it also reflected its leadership's aversion to left-wing ideologies, and thus lack of compatibility with Marxist-inspired movements of the day.[1005] One former Clan na Gael member described the ethos of the old guard as "anti-political, pro-military, conservative, pro-Catholic Church."[1006]

Even Noraid's intra-diasporic linkages across borders were frail at best. It had a handful branches in Canada, though not seemingly very active.[1007] There was an overt display of solidarity from Australian Green Cross in Noraid's first testimonial dinner journal in 1973, but no available evidence of any connection between the two organizations thereafter.[1008] Noraid activist Gerry Coleman could not recall any association with Australian Aid for Ireland (AAI),

[1004] Interestingly the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Philadelphia branch did place an advertisement in the Delaware Valley Noraid dinner journal in 1983. And there were actors who were crucial in the republican arms network, particularly George Harrison, who were activists for various left-wing causes, including the FMLN in El Salvador. Harrison, however, was not typical either of the leadership or rank and file of militant Irish organizations in the United States.

[1005] Former IRA chief of staff and then president of Provisional Sinn Fein, Ruairí Ó'Brádaigh, noted that in 1970 one un-named Noraid leader said to him during his speaking tour, "Look here sonny. Don't mention that goddamn word socialism while you are here." Robert W. White, *Ruairí Ó'Brádaigh: The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 179.

[1006] Margie Bernard, *Daughter of Derry: The Story of Brigid Sheils Makowski* (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 52.

[1007] According to FARA reports, only the Vancouver branch contributed funds to the central office.

[1008] Irish Northern Aid Committee, First Annual Testimonial Dinner Journal, 1973.

Noraid's counterpart Down Under, although US government files noted a visit by Noraid leader Martin Galvin to Australia for an AAI event in the mid-1980s.[1009]

At the same time the genealogy of Irish republicanism is intertwined with the historical development of the United States. Irish republicans trace their roots to the United Irishmen whose emergence in the late eighteenth century was inspired by the American and French Revolutions. Propaganda frequently drew a parallel between the Irish struggle for independence and the American Revolution in particular—the successful model of throwing off the British yoke[1010]—and called attention to the role of Irish immigrants in the American Civil War in defense of the union. Drawing parallels between US and Irish colonial history and emphasizing the loyalty of Irish ethnics to America, however, was not merely a pragmatic strategy aiming to legitimize the armed struggle to the US public; it was also a means through which a hybridized identity was negotiated and construed as compatible with participation in Noraid. Indeed, while the goal of the republican movement in Ireland was not merely to end divided sovereignty, but construct a united democratic socialist republic, Noraid's focus was always much more truncated—get England out of Ireland.

The sometimes intimate connection between Irish and American identities among those involved in the republican movement was made starkly apparent in a 1982 article titled "The Patriot Game," which covered the gunrunning trial involving Noraid leader Michael Flannery and four other co-defendants. Its opening paragraphs stated: "The prosecutor called the defendants terrorists. . . . The five men . . . said they were not terrorists but patriots—Irish

[1009] Paper by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in conjunction with the Northern Ireland Office, October 1986, in US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), Irish Northern Aid (Noraid)," November 3, 1986, file no.: 199F-1564-670 in 119F-NY-C269194; FOIPA request: 1146079-001.

[1010] This framing was not new. During the Irish War of Independence, fliers of the American Commission on Irish Independence seeking financial help for the Irish Republic asserted: "Ireland assisted Washington in his hour of need. Ireland helped win liberty for America. Ireland gave her flesh and blood to America on every battle field." See Kevin Kenny, "American-Irish Nationalism," in *Making the Irish American: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 296.

patriots and patriotic Americans as well. They had served this nation in World War II, Korea, Vietnam. But they would never turn their backs on the land of their birth." Portraying the imagery that "the ghosts of America's Founding Fathers stood beside them in the dock," Flannery rhetorically questioned, "Would this country be a republic if George Washington hadn't *fought* for freedom?" And when these men were ultimately acquitted, "the courtroom became a churning sea of waving American flags," the article noted, as the defendants exclaimed, "Up the I.R.A.!"[1011]

In light of US government conscription policy, which did not end until 1975, it was not uncommon for men in the ranks of Noraid or other Irish organizations to have served in the US armed forces, which was a vehicle for naturalization for the foreign-born. Despite a hostile US government policy toward the republican movement, a number of interviewees who were born in Ireland emphasized being American as an integral part of their identity. Others did not need to vocalize the connection, as it was apparent in the symbols displayed in their homes. In the living room of one dedicated activist, for example, the Irish tricolor was displayed side by side with the US flag that had been bestowed on her deceased veteran husband—who had also been incarcerated in federal prison for conspiracy to ship weapons to the IRA in 1983.

For those outside the Noraid fold, however, being a member of Noraid and being "American" presented a puzzling contradiction. As one interviewee described, "I was intrigued how some of the folks who were vocal Noraid activists could be mainstream in American society," like "a dual personality." "There was this one gentleman whom I knew was a key person in Noraid and head of [a] fireman's union in [Connecticut]."[1012]

[1011] Shana Alexander, "The Patriot Game," *New York Magazine*, November 22, 1982, 58.
[1012] Interview with Phil Gallagher, AOH leader in Connecticut, September 7, 2011.

Embedded within these national identities of varying degrees of hybridity were subnational ones based on the historical geography of Ireland, which was divided into 32 counties. Key facets of Irish America's organizational infrastructure, particularly the county associations and the Gaelic Athletic Association teams, cultivated such allegiances. It was common for individuals to identify themselves not only by the county from which they or their family had hailed, but also their local parish in Ireland. While US county geography was not a significant marker of identity, the parish often defined the boundaries of urban American neighborhoods, which was a source of identification.[1013]

It was in these social spaces, what Herbert Gans called the "urban villages,"[1014] that Noraid was able to mobilize regular financial support for prisoners' dependents, perceived by some as sons and daughters of the community and thus a moral obligation to aid, and others a necessary cost to bear for the war effort. Stigmatized among the mainstream public, Noraid and its various branches throughout the United States would be confined to mobilizing support in communities where trust could mitigate risk; personal connections channeled locally constructed knowledge from Catholic ghettos in the North and the border counties, thus challenging the overwhelmingly pro-British bias of mainstream media; and where the social costs of supporting "terrorists" could be converted into solidarity benefits and sanctions for non-participation could be imposed.

[1013] Linda Dowling Almeida, *Irish Immigrants in New York City, 1945–1995* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 88–9.
[1014] Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962).

Circles of Trust: The Core and its Resource Base

Collective action studies have illuminated how risk can affect movement participation, both in terms of the willingness of potential recruits to engage in activism of varying levels of commitment as well as whom social movement organizations target for recruitment. It is unsurprising that Noraid chapters screened their potential members and recruited largely through personal contacts, although some units such as those in Bergen County, NJ, and Hartford, CT, placed ads for membership in the *Irish People*.[1015] Indeed, Noraid's constitution stated that "Prospective members should be proposed and seconded by members of the Committee in good standing,"[1016] which one interviewee explained was a security measure. An FBI source, describing Chicago's lucrative Southside unit, headed by Alex Murphy, detailed:

> The largest and strongest unit of the three [in Chicago] is the south side unit. Those who attend the meetings are known to Alex Murphy. If someone who is not known to Murphy attends a meeting, Murphy checks on the person's background and family. Murphy gives membership cards only to those who have earned his trust.[1017]

Gerry Coleman, Noraid executive member since 1989, confirmed:

> At that time [in the early 1980s], and this was true, you couldn't join Noraid. You couldn't pick a phone up and say, 'I'd like to come to a meeting.' It was so secretive, people told me: 'It's nice, but you can't join it.' It literally was like that. . . . It was mostly people who knew each other, because they had to trust each other.[1018]

[1015] See Volumes 1 and 2 of the *Irish People*.
[1016] Irish Northern Aid Committee, "Organizational Instructions for the Formation of Chapters, Governing By-Laws," Article II, in FBI NY file 97-2700, 88.
[1017] Murphy was also the head of Chicago's central board. He was also a good friend of prominent PIRA figure Joe Cahill. US DOJ, FBI, To: Director, FBI; From: SAC, Chicago; August 13, 1987; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[1018] Interview with Gerry Coleman, Jersey City, NJ, June 14, 2011.

Jimmy McPaul of the Olney chapter in Philadelphia, who noted that membership cards in his unit had been dispensed with once "things got rough," similarly asserted: "Someone would have to vouch for you if you were to join Noraid."[1019]

Speaking of his experience in Noraid's Australian counterpart, Brendan Talton explained the movement as "circles of trust:"

> There were people on the fringe, there for event[s], the food, the beer, they didn't give a shit about AAI. Those at the outer circle were there for just that reason. Then there were people who would never do more than attend those functions, but did so to make a statement, to give some contribution by being present. . . . At the highest level were deep connections. [Indeed,] you could not become a member of the leadership unless you had some level of endorsement from back there. You had to be trusted. And there were people within the organization . . . you knew them by their families and what they had done. . . . Diaspora communities tend to be . . . tight. Even within the leadership group, there were circles within circles.[1020]

The Core: "It was a Family Thing"

Noraid's initial membership was comprised almost exclusively of Irish-born republicans.[1021] Many interviewees, however, recalled a substantial Irish-American membership in their respective areas. One Philadelphia leader noted, "If we didn't have Irish Americans, we'd be done."[1022] Similarly in Queens, NY, Boston, and Connecticut, chapter activists noted a substantial Irish-American presence, including "a number of people who had no lived experience of a relative in Ireland."[1023]

The activist core was comprised of those who were linked to the republican movement in Ireland—the old IRA veterans from the War of Independence and the failed 1950s Border Campaign, immediately surrounded by those with kin relations and friendships in the North's

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[1019] Interview with Jimmy McPaul, Philadelphia, October 8, 2011.
[1020] Interview with Brendan Talton (pseudonym), New York, NY, March 2011.
[1021] Brian Hanley, "The Politics of NORAID," *Irish Political Studies* 19, no. 1 (2004): 3; English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 117.
[1022] Interview with Gerard Walsh (pseudonym), Philadelphia area, October 29, 2011.
[1023] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.

nationalist communities where the IRA had popular support and/or those with a republican family lineage. The inner executive committee of Noraid was exclusively made up of Irish-born men, noted Cathleen O'Brien, whose identities were kept a secret. There was an unspoken sense that they could not totally trust Irish Americans, she explained. Chapter chairmen were also almost always Irish-born. Her father, who headed the Suffolk County chapter, was an early exception because Michael Flannery knew her grandparents and could verify the family background.[1024]

Those with personal connections to the North comprised the activist cadre. In the words of one Derry-born activist based in the Washington, DC, area:

> [the US media] made it sound like [the IRA] landed from another planet. The IRA was my nephew who was killed, my neighbor next door, the fellow up the street, the fellow that I liked, the girl I went to school with, that was the IRA—they were all your neighbors. And they wouldn't have existed, they wouldn't have been there, if they didn't have the support of the people.[1025]

Of the Philadelphia Irish, Clark concluded: the republican network in the 1970s was "not an Aer Lingus tour crowd. It was more like an overseas extension of [Belfast's] Falls Road ghetto."[1026]

As Chapter 5 detailed, however, those born in the six counties of Northern Ireland constituted a small proportion of the overall Ireland-born population in major Irish population centers in the United States.[1027] Of the major East Coast standard consolidated statistical areas (SCSAs), only Philadelphia had an NI-born population of more than 10 percent of the total (See Table 5.11), which was about a third less than Boston's and about seven-and-a-half times less

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[1024] Interview with Cathleen O'Brien, Riverdale, NY, July 12, 2011.
[1025] Interview with Mary Sheils Baggarly, Baltimore, Md., March 19, 2012.
[1026] Dennis J. Clark, *Irish Blood: Northern Ireland and the American Conscience* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977), 31. The Falls Road was a largely working-class Catholic community in Belfast that became a bastion of militant nationalist support after attacks by loyalist militias and the British Army's deployment to the area. During the Troubles, some of the worst violence of the conflict occurred in this area.
[1027] In New York it was about 5.3 and in Boston only approximately 3.8. Both the San Francisco and Los Angeles SCSAs also had a larger proportion of immigrants from Northern Ireland, about 9.6 and 19.1 percent, respectively.

than New York's foreign-born population from Ireland.[1028] As one Noraid activist from Armagh described of the Bronx chapter: "There was a strong nucleus. . . . There were a number of counties represented [but] very few from the North. I was the token Northerner very often."[1029]

In addition to those with direct ties to the North were the Irish-born who came from traditional republican families in the 26 counties. Olive McKeon, who grew up on a very small farm in the border county of Leitrim, recalled a lot of talk of politics at home as she recounted:

> My mother was a member of Cumann na mBan, the women's equivalent of Sinn Féin. . . . [H]er mother died when she was 11 years old; and the grandmother, the mom's mom, lived with them. [T]he Black and Tans came to Ireland. My mother's maiden name was Maguire, and the Maguire house was considered a safe house for rebels. And after her mom died, someone reported that there were rebels at the house, and the Black and Tans came and searched the house. They didn't find anybody, but they were sure they were there [and] that they just didn't find them. So as a result, they took my great-grandmother, they took pliers and took all the nails off her fingers. She died three days later. And that story resonated, to this day resonates with me. I can't imagine what that must have been like for somebody 11 years old to see it happen and the poor human being it happened to. So I guess it was inbred in me to have resentment towards what the British did.[1030]

One Noraid activist in New York City noted that generally, "People from the South were in oblivion. . . . They didn't want to know" about what was happening in the North; except "if there

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[1028] This figure is an underestimation of those from Ulster. Immigrants from Donegal also had an organized presence in the city but they are included with figures from the Republic of Ireland.

[1029] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.

[1030] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, New York, December 13, 2011. The Black and Tans were a paramilitary unit deployed to suppress the Irish Republic Army during the War of Independence. They are notorious for use of indiscriminant violence, which historians argue was extremely counterproductive as it encouraged support for the IRA. Such a view is in accordance with Stathis N. Kalyvas's general argument about the undermining effects of indiscriminate violence civil war. See his *Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). As Hopkinson notes, "The Black and Tans have become the most well-known symbol for perfidious Albion in Irish communities world-wide." Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence* (Toronto: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002), xvii. Note in 2006, there was outcry in the Irish-American community over the commercial use of "Black and Tan" as a name of a Ben and Jerry's Ice-cream flavor. See "Ireland's War of Independence: The Chilling Story of the Black and Tans," *The Guardian* (London), April 21, 2006, available at: "http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/irelands-war-of-independence-the-chilling-story-of-the-black-and-tans-475005.html (accessed September 19, 2012). Almost a century since the war's end in March 2012, Nike also incurred backlash from Irish Americans for naming a pair of sneakers "Black and Tans." See Rosa Prince, "Nike Apologises over 'Insensitive' 'Black and Tan' Sneakers," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, March 14, 2012, available at: http://www.smh.com.au/executive-style/style/nike-apologises-over-insensitive-black-and-tan-sneakers-20120314-1uz16.html (accessed September 19, 2012).

was a republican tinge in the family, then you'd get an interest, if there was a familial connection."[1031] Similarly, Mary Sheils Baggarly, a leader in Noraid's Washington, DC, chapter, explained:

> You had the republican faction, you had a people that were republican minded that was handed down from their people. . . . And then you had your Irish that just didn't care: "We're alright, we're over here, we're doing okay; it's not happening in the South of Ireland; so don't bother us; we don't want to know it.[1032]

Additionally, there was both activism and financial support from Americans with lineages that traced back to members of the old IRA, Cumann na mBhan—the women's paramilitary auxiliary to the Irish Volunteers that also canvassed for Sinn Féin in the aftermath of the failed 1916 Easter Rising—or both. Baggarly noted, "Any Irish-American support we got, you can be assured that there was some republicanism in that family, that they had it handed down. . . ."[1033]

One Noraid member in the Capital District (Albany) Noraid unit and executive committee member noted not only the significance of direct connections between the Noraid leadership and the republican movement in Ireland for fundraising efforts, but also of Americans with long-standing republican roots:

> . . . most of the money was raised within the "American shamrock," Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago with San Francisco being a part of the tail or stem of the shamrock. The reason for success of [Noraid] units was often related to the leadership. Many of the local leaders were native Irish with connections to IRA elements.

He further clarified:

> It is important to distinguish between [Noraid's] work raising money for the families of what we termed political prisoners and those collections that were independently conducted for IRA emissaries raising money for "gear." Although many [Noraid] members were frequently key to this funding, I remember funds for the IRA "visitors"

[1031] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.
[1032] Interview with Mary Sheils Baggarly, Upper Marlboro, Md., March 19, 2012.
[1033] Ibid.

> coming from contacts that went back 60–70 years from 2nd and 3rd generation Irish Americans whose parents or grandparents were involved in the [1916] Rebellion period or otherwise.[1034]

At its very core, noted another interviewee, "it was a family thing. Trust is why the MI5 [British Military Intelligence] couldn't infiltrate."[1035]

Among the Noraid rank and file, kin relationships were not uncommon—spouses, siblings, parents and children, and even more distant relations. In fact, for some activism was a family event. Jeannie and Charles McLoughlin of Suffolk County were among a number of married couples who, along with their daughter Cathleen, shared chapter membership and jointly participated in organizing.[1036] Olive McKeon, who was a member of the Flushing, Queens, unit with her husband, noted that her children were very supportive. "My daughter," she recalled, "was down with the stroller protesting outside of the British consulate during the Hunger Strikes almost every weekend."[1037] In the Boston area, one activist's daughter noted that she did not feel the need to formally join Noraid, as she frequented dinner dances and protests with her parents.[1038] In the Bronx, NY, where most of the chapter's membership comprised of couples, there were also the Gormley brothers who were activists of varying levels (including Donal who stood trial with Flannery on gunrunning charges), while in Philadelphia the Higgins brothers were joint members. In Baltimore, an uncle and nephew were both part of the unit leadership.

[1034] Email correspondence with Michael Cummings, former Noraid executive member, April 24, 2012. Acronym INA (short for Irish Northern Aid Committee) was replaced in these quotes with Noraid for consistency and to reduce confusion.
[1035] Liam Murphy, New York, NY, June 23, 2011.
[1036] Interview with Cathleen O'Brien, Riverdale, NY, July 12, 2011.
[1037] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, NY, December 13, 2011.
[1038] Interview with Lily Lafferty (pseudonym), Quincy, Mass., August 9, 2011.

Outer Circles

While the IRA veterans, those connected to the nationalist ghettos in the North, and those from republican families who were "weaned on militant politics"[1039] comprised the heart of the radical movement, ancillary support came from the Irish-born from elsewhere who, according to Clark, "react[ed] to the social pressure of those who were."[1040] McCarthy identifies two broad groups of supporters who were integral to the republican movement: Irish who were involved in the building trades or owners of small businesses, especially restaurants and bars, who had "never been to the North or anywhere near it";[1041] and "second- or third-generation Irish-Americans anxious for an ethnic badge of identity." The anxiety of this latter group, he argues, was rooted in the entrance of other ethnic groups into "the employment or residential turf earlier dominated by the Irish," a claim that coincides with Ó Dochartaigh's description of its bastions as neighborhoods "in conflict with black Americans over resources."[1042] "Enthusiasm for what they see as the 'Irish' cause," he further asserts, "is a mechanism whereby they can achieve and assert a sense of solidarity. . . . This is most apparent in the Emerald Societies of various public services [e.g., the New York City Police Department] and public utilities."[1043]

As long-time Noraid executive board member Gerry Coleman described: "That's who we were, we were transit workers, and cops, and school teachers maybe."[1044] Similarly Frank Walsh explained: "We didn't get [many] lawyers or CEOs; we had bus drivers, plumbers, bartenders." He also noted that the organization had the cooperation of the police, firefighters, and other city

[1039] McCarthy, "Northern Ireland," 50.
[1040] Clark, *Irish Blood*, 31.
[1041] McCarthy, "Northern Ireland," 50.
[1042] Niall Ó Dochartaigh, "Sure, It's Hard to Keep Up With the Splits Here": Irish American Responses to the Outbreak of Conflict in Northern Ireland, 1968–1974," *Irish Political Studies* 10 (1995): 150.
[1043] McCarthy, "Northern Ireland," 51.
[1044] Interview with Gerry Coleman, Jersey City, NJ, June 14, 2011.

workers; and also those who performed maintenance work in big buildings.[1045] Unofficially, explained O'Brien, New York City police and firemen were supportive,[1046] and sometimes purchased ad pages in the annual dinner journals. Occasionally their Emerald Societies and pipe bands would make very public displays of solidarity on both sides of the Atlantic, even in the face of condemnation from superiors and politicians.[1047]

In Philadelphia, the social composition was the same. As one interviewee noted: "[T]here were not a lot of doctors, lawyers, or professionals. Just poor, hardworking people, some of whom had their own successful businesses such as bar owners. For the 'lace-curtain Irish,' Noraid would be beneath them." He further elaborated, "We had plenty of cops that would come to our affairs; they wouldn't be members, but they would attend events. The unions and the small businesses, they were the big ones." [1048] Another Philadelphia activist asserted: "The Emerald Society were supporters but not members. They wouldn't be members because the organization was classified as terrorist." "The police had to watch what they were doing,"[1049] Noraid Mayfair Unit activist Seamus Boyle explained, as likely did other government workers.[1050]

Joe McHugh, a former police officer who helped run dinner banquets in Boston and Lynn, Mass., similarly noted that unions would buy tables, especially the carpenters' unions, and

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[1045] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.
[1046] Interview with Cathleen O'Brien, Riverdale, NY, July 12, 2011.
[1047] In the 1980s, for example, the NYPD Emerald Society pipe band marched at hunger strike commemorations in the Republic of Ireland. "New York Police Band Members March with IRA Supporters," *Associated Press*, August 31, 1985.
[1048] Interview with Gerard Walsh (pseudonym), Philadelphia area, October 29, 2011.
[1049] Interview with then AOH president Seamus Boyle, Pleasantville, NY, July 13, 2011.
[1050] Olive McKeon noted that when her son came up for an appointment in the fire department, individuals wrote letters in opposition to it because she and her husband had been in jail on various charges surrounding gunrunning. Olive was placed in jail from March to May 1980 for her refusal to testify before a grand jury about her husband's involvement. Similarly, Frances Duffy's son, who was a member of the police department, was questioned regarding his parents' activism. Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, NY, December 13, 2011; and Frances Duffy, Upper Darby, Penn., August 15, 2011.

support also came from bar and café owners, construction companies, and restaurant employees.[1051] Essentially, those embedded in the local ethnic economy—whether as small business owners or members of Irish-dominated unions, with some support from the disappearing Irish civil service niches—constituted the support base of Irish Northern Aid.

As one interviewee noted, participation in Noraid was about "economics and personal proximity." He explained, "If you're from Waterford [in the South] and you do not have a direct connection to [the conflict], the national question is [likely] not a question for you. . . . In the US, [whether it was] depended on one's proximity to what was occurring [in the North] or other people in the community" who had been affected by the violence. Economic prosperity and generational assimilation, he contended, would make people less likely to find common cause with the movement.[1052] Such processes diversified interpersonal networks thus weakening communal identification and norms.

Weaving Personal Ties That Bind: From Social Events to Cultivated Direct Connections

From the outset, Noraid appealed to the Irish community for support through traditional means. It appealed to donors indirectly through solicitations in ethnic newspapers, but more key was its organization of social events such as dinners, dances, raffles, card games, concerts, boat rides, and picnics, which were advertised in the *Irish People*. Noraid tapped directly into Irish communal social life and in turn fostered it. As Frances Duffy noted in Philadelphia, "Noraid brought Irish culture back with the dances and the socials. It got people together."[1053]

[1051] Interview with Joe McHugh, Noraid Lynn unit leader, Swampscott, Mass., August 9, 2011.
[1052] Interview with Josh Jacobs, member of Cumann na Saoirse Náisiúnta, New York, NY, September 17, 2011.
[1053] Interview with Frances Duffy, Upper Darby, Penn., August 15, 2011.

Bronx unit member Brigid Brannigan and bar owner described both the frequency of events and the reciprocity mechanism among the units: "Weekend after weekend, Saturday and Sunday, for many, many, many years we just went to fundraisers. Weekend after weekend for years, because of course if you belonged to the Bronx chapter and Manhattan supported you then you needed to go to O'Lunney's [which hosted Manhattan chapter events]; if you went there, then you needed to go to Queens."[1054] One Queens activist similarly noted: "There were few weekends in those years that there wasn't something." She recalled attending events throughout New York City's boroughs and in Nassau County, and "they'd come to us. It was the same people every weekend!"[1055] Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington, DC, area activists described the same fundraising mode through social events. Mayfair unit member Seamus Boyle explained, "[P]eople in Philadelphia stuck together. We would always check with others' organizations if you were running a function, fundraiser. We supported each other's fundraisers. You were guaranteed a crowd no matter what you ran. . . . When you needed mobilization you got it. . . ."[1056]

The cost of entry was typically just a few dollars—"a cheap night out" in the words of one organizer. Yet they were lucrative because the cost of throwing such events was not borne by Noraid alone but rather dispersed among members of the community, including by bar owners who opened up their pubs as venues and sometimes donated food and liquor, and Irish musicians, who played without much or even any financial remuneration at dances and benefit concerts. Sometimes a bar's patrons were unexpectedly roped into being supporters, as Brannigan explained:

[1054] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.
[1055] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, NY, December 13, 2011.
[1056] Interview with Seamus Boyle, Pleasantville, NY, July 13, 2011.

> [M]ost Bronx bars, I don't remember exceptions, but most bars were very supportive and would allow us to go around with the can like the Salvation Army . . . or have a night where people would pay at the door coming in . . . . That's how we did a lot of fundraising, just ask for permission and then set up a table at the door. So rather than go in for free like you would expect to at your corner place . . . we'd say, "We're having a Noraid fundraiser tonight." . . . People would invariably just pull out their money.[1057]

The events also provided an opportunity for Noraid to sell merchandise, such as the record *Ireland Calling*, T-shirts, bumperstickers, plaques, and buttons. These were also peddled at Irish fairs and other cultural events—sometimes not openly as Noraid in hostile venues. Washington, DC, activist Patrick Kierny described: "We started the Irish Cultural Society because Noraid was so demonized that we couldn't get into Irish festivals."[1058]

It was not just the monetary income that benefited the organization, but rather the sense of solidarity and social connections that these events fostered. These were sometimes intimate, as some interviewees recounted marriages and friendships that were created. While they generated positive social incentives to support the cause, they reinforced the perception of the conflict as an age-old communal struggle.

Trans-Atlantic Connections

While intracommunal connections were cultivated through events in the old urban neighborhoods, Noraid also wove ties across the Atlantic. One means of generating a connection was through objects. Republican supporters, for example, would send leather kits and other materials to prisoners in Long Kesh and elsewhere so that they could make items such as wallets and painted handkerchiefs, and send them back across the Altantic to be raffled as prizes or

[1057] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.
[1058] Conversation with Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), New York, NY, September 21, 2011.

auctioned off at Noraid events.[1059] Wooden harps were another cherished craft that came out of the prisons. The material items then constituted a symbolic link between prisoners and those who were far removed from the violence. Yet Noraid went farther with generating trans-Atlantic connections.

The prisoner writing campaign was a staple Noraid activity. Prison and cell information about Irish republican prisoners, the "IPOW List" (Irish Prisoners of War), was ciruclated in the *Irish People* and elsewhere, and rank and file were encouraged to correspond with prisoners,[1060] especially on holidays such as Christmas or for birthdays, the dates of which were included on lists. From the persepctive on the other side of the Atlantic, Malachy McAllister, who served seven years in HMP Maze, recalls that the "writing back and forth was a morale boost" for the men.[1061]

In the early 1980s, as Noraid began to actively garner support from American-born Irish who had weak or no ties to either side of the border, it strategically fostered relationships among them and republican families in the North so as to personalize the human dimensions of the conflict. In 1983, it launched an annual tour in which participants would meet and stay with the families of prisoners in the North. The tour itself was promoted as "a chance to see first-hand what life was like for the Irish in British occupied Ireland."[1062]

[1059] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.

[1060] The AOH's Freedom for All Ireland Committee (FFAI) also encouraged letter writing and circulated a prisoners list. A letter dated October 20, 1980, by FFAI national chairman Martin Higgins was circulated and encouraged members to send Christmas cards to their "brothers and sisters in jail in Northern Ireland" who are "prisoners of war, fighting for human rights and the reunification of Ireland."

[1061] Interview with Mallachy McAllister, Long Island City, NY, June 20, 2012.

[1062] Interview with Richard Lawlor, Hartford, Conn., December 1, 2011.

During the 1985 tour, an FBI source reported that some of the Americans had themselves been "hassled" by the police.[1063] Long-time Noraid vice chairman Richard Lawlor vividly recalled the experiences as much more severe:

> Martin Galvin started the tour in 1983. I headed the tour in 1984, '85, and '86. Martin had been banned from the North. In 1984, we had three busloads of people. We were hosted by people everywhere we went. We were there for 10 days. It was a life changing experience for people. Sean Downes had been murdered right in front of me [at an anti-interment rally in North Belfast where Galvin was speaking]. . . . During that time, we had helped to bury an IRA volunteer in Newry, Brendan Waters. . . . [We] formed a human barrier around the casket. . . . The RUC would try to break through our protective circle to remove the beret and gloves from the corpse. Bullets were fired at us that day. I was standing right next to Martin. There were bullets flying. . . . We had people injured. I took a delegation to the American consulate in Belfast who couldn't give a damn about us, provided no comfort, no support.[1064]

As Coleman explained, the tour "was part of the agenda to bring it home a little bit. And the only way to do it was to bring Americans over. They weren't Noraid people per se. They just wanted to go."[1065] Some were members of more mainstream Irish organizations such as the Ancient Order of Hibernians or the Irish American Unity Conference (IAUC), while others had no affiliation with any communal organization.[1066]

Lawlor described the participants as "average everyday working people": "People who went on the trip," he explained, "were average . . . cops, firemen, office workers, teachers, real middle-class people—but not upper middle-class people—the regular backbone of America. The majority were of Irish heritage; there were a few who weren't Irish at all."[1067] An FBI informant

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[1063] US DOJ, FBI, "NORAID Delegation to Northern Ireland," Detroit, MI, September 12, 1985; file no.: 199F-DE-1970; FOIPA request: 1146079-001.
[1064] Interview with Richard Lawlor, executive vice-chairman of Noraid and long-time Hartford Chapter member, Hartford, Conn., December 1, 2011.
[1065] Interview with Gerry Coleman, Jersey City, NJ, June 14, 2011.
[1066] "Belfast March Tour," *Irish People*, April 15, 1989, 14.
[1067] Interview with Richard Lawlor, Hartford, Conn., December 1, 2011.

reported that of the approximately 115 participants on the 1985 tour, most came from New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, California, and possibly Illinois.[1068]

Lawlor further elaborated:

> The camaraderie was fantastic. Girls met their husbands; lifelong friendships were developed; people kept in contact over the years. It was a morale boost for all of us; it created bonds with people in the North. The idea was that after people came home they would be a lot more motivated. It wasn't calculated, but the trip itself would produce that outcome. . . . We [also] wanted the Brits to know that we were watching, and the Unionists to know, too, that they couldn't run roughshod over them [i.e., the nationalist community].[1069]

Martin Galvin, former publicity director of Noraid, similarly remarked: "That was the idea. People would see things on the ground first hand and build a personal attachment, and they would come back and be more active."[1070]

One US-born woman of mixed descent, for example, had been an active member of the Ladies' Ancient Order of Hibernians (LAOH) in Lynn, Mass., when she applied go on her first Noraid tour in 1985, which she had heard about through word-of-mouth in AOH circles. Kathleen Savage described:

> I had to feel what they were feeling, see the suffering. The family in Newry that put me up with them, their son had brain damage from a brutal beating by the British Army. . . . To hear and see in person. . . . I heard stories and said, "This isn't made up." I had a cousin who said that it was all propaganda, that they set it up, the Noraid tours. How could they set that up?

Upon her return, Savage actually subsequently joined the organization as an active member and wholeheartedly engaged in the prisoner correspondence campaign, writing as many as 30 letters per month to republican inmates. She keeps a box of her cherished photos and

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[1068] US DOJ, FBI, "NORAID Delegation to Northern Ireland," Detroit, MI; September 12, 1985; file no.: 199F-DE-1970; FOIPA request: 1146079-001.
[1069] Interview with Richard Lawlor, Hartford, Conn., December 1, 2011.
[1070] Conversation with former Noraid leader Martin Galvin, AOH FFAI Annual Appeal, McGuiness-Fitzsimmons AOH Division # 14, Rockville Center, NY, January 22, 2012.

letters, a testament to the relationships that she had built with families in the North since her first tour some 25 years ago. Savage described becoming embedded in an interpersonal network of friendship and even kin-like ties. Discussing her relationship with the Dillon family, for example, she noted: "I loved them, and they loved me like a daughter. And I would visit their son [Séamus] in [HMP] Maghaberry" before he was released from prison in the early 1990s. She sorrowfully recounted his murder in 1999 by the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) in retaliation for INLA's killing of loyalist paramilitary leader Billy Wright, aka "King Rat," which she was informed about from another family with whom she had become close.[1071]

An advertisement in the *Irish People* explained, "One of the major benefits of the tour . . . stems from tour members being housed with local families. . . . These arrangements have afforded tour members an opportunity to see the six counties from the perspective of ordinary nationalist people. Such arrangements have led to the formation of lasting friendships."[1072] By contrast, an FBI source described the trips as manipulative, asserting that hosts were "thoroughly coached" in what to say to lodgers in a "standardized pro-PIRA/PSF rhetoric." It was believed that the tour organizers were effective at instilling a "pro-PIRA/anti-Brit attitude" among the participants.[1073] The trips were thus considered a major "propaganda and indoctrination vehicle."[1074] The FBI also saw the tours as a means for participants to make "contacts with PIRA and PSF individuals who have in turn traveled to the US and made contact with them."[1075]

[1071] Interview with Kathleen Savage, Lynn, Mass., August 8, 2011.
[1072] "Belfast March Tour," *Irish People*, April 15, 1989, 14.
[1073] The 1989 tour had 62 participants, only 11 of which were Noraid members. US DOJ, FBI, "1989 Noraid, Belfast, Northern Ireland Tour, August 5–14, 1989," September 12, 1989; New York, NY; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194; and US DOJ, FBI, "Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)," To: Director FBI; From: ADIC New York (199F-41); September 12, 1989; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[1074] US DOJ, FBI, "Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)"; To: Director, FBI, From: ADIC, New York; July 31, 1990; file no.: 199F-DE-1790; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[1075] US DOJ, FBI, Memorandum; To: Director of the FBI; From: ADIC New York (199F-41); June 2, 1989; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194, Section 16; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.

Noraid activists also worked on other initiatives such as the children's exchange programs, which also were a proactive method to create personal ties between Americans and Northern Ireland.

In the Philadelphia area, Frances Duffy explained:

> The children's programs brought children out; people are still friends with the kids and their parents and the chaperones to the kids. Project Children was hesitant to have political parents on both sides. . . . People here were very accepting of the program. Lots of people wanted to have the kids, and they were not the average people who came to the dances.[1076]

In response to Project Children's exclusion of political prisoners' children, the Irish Political Prisoners Children's Holiday was formed in 1983. Coleman recalled:

> I worked for this children's fund, the Political Prisoners' Children's Fund, [which] took kids from Belfast, Derry, and Tyrone and brought them to America. It was really done for the parents, because it was usually a mother, and the father in jail. But it could be the mother in jail. And it gave them a little bit of a break. And it exposed people to these kids, and it exposed the kids to us. But I think it was more to influence Americans with these kids.[1077]

The Republican Patriarchs, They Were Joiners

While the militant republican leadership in the United States faced countervailing forces in their efforts to forge a movement—government suppression and communal dissipation—they had a distinct advantage at the onset of the Troubles: they had been joiners of communal and other organizations, typical among the immigrant Irish interviewees. They not only had been joiners, they had also held leadership positions within Irish-American organizations that were deeply connected to Irish communities. Former US ambassador to Ireland William V. Shannon once remarked: "It is these shrunken organizations, some of them virtually defunct, that the IRA

[1076] Interview with Frances Duffy, Upper Darby, Penn., August 15, 2011.
[1077] Interview with Gerry Coleman, Jersey City, NJ, July 13, 2011.

hardliners . . . captured."[1078] At the same time, Noraid's leaders in New York were advanced in age and thus retired from their jobs, allowing them to devote their energies full-time to organizing, which was a boon to the movement.

Communal connectedness is not uncommon among social movement leaders generally. As Morris and Staggenborn note, "social movement leaders often have prior lives that are deeply embedded in community institutions."[1079] Figure 6.1 depicts the organizational affiliations of the Veteran Four (Michael Flannery, Jack McCarthy, John McGowan, and Matt Higgins), along with two other honorees at Noraid's first testimonial dinner in 1973. The bipartite graph reveals the direct and indirect ties among the leadership, as well as how organizations were tied together through the memberships of these individuals.[1080] Michael Flannery alone has nine affiliations with key communal institutions, in six of which he is the sole connection between the Noraid central office and them, making him the most prominent actor within the network.[1081] Jack McCarthy is a "cut point" in the graph, or a broker, with a key Irish-dominated building trades union, which proved to be a robust source of support for Noraid, especially in its early years (See Table 6.1).[1082]

[1078] William V. Shannon, "Stealing N.Y. St. Patrick's parade," *Boston Globe*, February 22, 1984.

[1079] Aldon D. Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Leadership in Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 184.

[1080] A bipartite graph is one in which there are two sets of nodes. In this case, individuals (the red circles) and organizations (the blue squares) are represented. The edges, or ties, represent membership in a particular organization.

[1081] Prominence is a network concept that can be measured. It refers to the location of an actor embedded in a network; a prominent actor is one who is "extensively involved in relationships with other actors" (i.e., one who has many ties). Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 172. There are two measures of prominence: centrality and prestige. Centrality is simply the number of ties that an actor has in a network, while prestige measures the number of ties an actor receives in a directed graph (i.e., one that measures the direction of the ties). The ties presented below are not between individuals directly but between individuals and organizations and contain no actual directed measures.

[1082] Jack McGowan died in 1974; Matthew Higgins replaced him as the third official US representative. When Higgins died in 1979, John McElhone took his place. Jack McCarthy died in 1984; Flannery died in 1994.

Figure 6.1: Organizational Affiliations of Noraid's Testimonial Dinner Honorees, 1973



Note: The red nodes are the individuals whom Noraid honored at its first annual testimonial dinner in 1973. The so-called Veteran Four, the organization's central office leadership in New York, were all included. In addition, two key leaders in the Irish community in New York City were also among the honorees: the president of the GAA and lease-holder of Gaelic Park stadium, John "Kerry" O'Donnell, and the president of the TWU Local 100, Daniel Gilmartin. Affiliations were drawn from the biographies included in the 1973 Testimonial Dinner journal as well as other sources. Their affiliations are likely incomplete and thus the connections between them.

Strategic Centralization, Co-optation, and Brokerage

This section examines three strategies at the organizational level that explain Noraid's survival in highly adverse circumstances. First, the republican leadership on both sides of the Atlantic actively sought to centralize fundraising for the cause by minimizing competition with rivals for resources and leakage through personalized channels;[1083] second, activists co-opted, and sometimes even appropriated, the resources of existing Irish-American institutions; and third, it developed brokerage relationships with individuals who were "connected" and tapped into patronage systems, particularly in the unions.

Forestalling Competition and Centralizing Fundraising Efforts

The republican leadership in the United States, like other diasporic leaderships, faced internal competition with rival groups for support, the effective management of which was crucial to the organization's longevity.[1084] As Chapter 3 detailed, Noraid initially had to compete with civil rights organizations and later the Irish Republican Clubs, the support arm of the Official IRA. Noraid prevailed and became the hegemonic militant organization in the United States in the early 1970s—a victory that was aided by generalized American antipathy to the Marxist bent of the IRC and the Provisional IRA's dominance of the armed movement in the North, from which Noraid derived its legitimacy.

Yet the leadership had to actively maintain this position. Brannigan recalled:

> The old timers were dead set on keeping everything very organized. We couldn't, for example, in the Bronx chapter of Noraid, under Jack McCarthy and Flannery, and John

[1083] A social movement encompasses more than one organization, although one particular organization may be at the center of many activities.

[1084] According to one analyst, intense competition among the Sikh separatist leadership led to the demise of the Khalistan movement in Canada and England. Given that there were as many as a dozen different military outfits operating in the Punjab, unlike the Tamil Tigers, which was the sole armed insurgent force on the ground in Sri Lanka, it is unsurprising that internal competition was rampant. See Tatla, *The Sikh Diaspora*.

> McGowan [and] Matt Higgins . . . under that group, we couldn't even send out a letter from the Bronx chapter of Noraid, everything had to be filtered; things were very controlled; they wanted to have an image. They were definitely very much within the Catholic Church. They were as fearful as anything of the Left as any outsiders. . . . They were very controlling. . . . In as much they were able to control it after a certain length of time, authorization to set up chapters, everything, Noraid was very controlled and very organized. . . .[1085]

According to FBI memos, the organization "looked down upon and tried to discourage attempts by other Irish American organizations to raise funds for Irish Nationalists in Ireland."[1086] Personal initiatives were also frowned upon, as the Noraid central office did not want competing efforts. "Noraid had some problems with people going off on their own from time to time," noted Brannigan, who further recounted:

> The Veteran Four would have seen anything outside of their control as competitors. . . . They were very challenging to work with . . . . This is an example of something that Noraid was very unhappy about actually. This young man, I went to school with him. He was involved in, he was an active volunteer at the time, and he suffered an injury. And people from home, neighbors and friends of his, he had lost an arm, and friends and neighbors of him asked those of us from the parish who were here [in the United States] to try and raise money. . . . They wanted to get an orthotic and so . . . we were asked to raise money because he was on the run and now he's missing part of his right arm. . . . And we felt the need to do just as we were asked for our neighbor. But Noraid . . . would have none of it. And so this was one event that became a problem.[1087]

The Irish National Caucus: From Companion to Competitor

Organizational competitors posed a formidable challenge. Founded in February 1974, the Irish National Caucus was initially established as an umbrella organization and pro-republican lobbying arm within the US political arena and thus had a clear division of labor with

[1085] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.
[1086] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee, Full Field Investigation authorized 11/22/83," From: ADIC, New York; To: Director, FBI; April 19, 1984; file no.: NY199F-1564.
[1087] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.

Noraid. Flannery was "always opposed to the formation of the Irish National Caucus [INC],"[1088] according to Father Sean McManus, national coordinator of the organization. An alternative account of the organization's formation suggests, however, that Flannery was assured that "a lobby would not take away from the INA [Irish Northern Aid (Noraid)]," and that Noraid and Caucus leaders agreed to work together in early 1974.[1089] In September 1974, AOH president Jack Keane called a meeting of various organizations to endorse the Caucus, present at which were Noraid leaders Flannery and Brendan McCusker, along with activists Bob McCann, Brigid Brannigan, and Cathy Myers.[1090]

As Thompson asserts, "due to the scarcity of active republicans interested in northern issues,"[1091] there was overlapping membership between the two organizations among rank and file. Patrick Kierney, who had been a member of both organizations, explained, "We turned our hats. At some events we were the Caucus, and others Noraid, depending on the audience."[1092] Meanwhile, Olive McKeon, who noted that she helped McManus organize dinner dances, explained that in New York City "it was people who were Northern Aid people that supported the Irish National Caucus."[1093]

The membership overlap was encouraged by the fact that the Caucus adopted the same organizational structure as Noraid—a central office (eventually located in Washington, DC) and

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[1088] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 82. In an April 2011, the "Fenian Notes" column of *Saoirse* by Peadar Mac Fhínín challenged McManus's account stating that McManus had the backing of Sinn Féin president Ruairí Ó Brádaigh as well as Flannery (14).
[1089] Peadar Mac Fhínín, "Republican Roots of the Irish National Caucus," *Saoirse*, April 2011, 15.
[1090] Statement by Sean W. Walsh, IV, September 27, 1974, and "Persons in Attendance at the AOH Meeting on Northern Ireland and Unity," New York University's Archives of Irish America, Irish Republicanism Collection, AIA 022, box 2, folder 8.
[1091] Joseph E. Thompson, *American Policy and Northern Ireland: A Saga of Peacebuilding* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 55.
[1092] Conversation with Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), June 2011.
[1093] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, NY, December 13, 2011. Irish National Caucus, Testimonial Dinner Dance Journal, November 24, 1978. Along with McKeon, the other two chairmen of its first dinner dance (Gabriel Kennedy and Jim O'Gara) had also been long-time Noraid activists.

outlying chapters spread across the United Sates. It had a presence in the Baltimore/Washington, DC, area, where McManus was located from 1972–1975, before his subsequent appointment in Boston, which lasted until late 1978. While some chapters grew out of Noraid units, elsewhere AOH divisions were crucial. Bob Bateman, former INC director, noted that the Caucus was very strong in Massachusetts, where Hibernian divisions were its life blood there,[1094] particularly in Lawrence and Lowell.[1095]

One former Noraid leader asserted that the Caucus "was not popular in Philadelphia,"[1096] which evidence suggests was Noraid's most lucrative support base. In some places, the emergence of an active branch was strategically forestalled by Noraid members. According to Lawlor, the Caucus did not have a significant presence in Connecticut because some early heads of the Hartford Noraid unit held the charter for a chapter and made sure that nothing was done with it.[1097]

At the leadership level, the two organizations also had overlap in its early years, from 1974 until 1977. Noraid's chairman, Brendan McCusker, was a member of the Board of Governors, and McManus was on Noraid's annual testimonial dinner honorary committee from 1973–1977 and acted as a guest speaker at various Noraid events.[1098] At the 1976 Noraid Annual Testimonial Dinner, the committee also included Fred Burns O'Brien, INC executive vice president, Sean Walsh, INC national director, and Bishop Thomas J. Drury, member of the Board of Governors. Meanwhile, INC Board of Governors included other regular Noraid

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[1094] Interview with Bob Bateman, New York, NY, August 31, 2011.

[1095] Three influential figures in bringing the AOH on board with the Caucus were from Massachusetts. Bob Bateman, David Burke, and Fred Burns O'Brien were in Division 8 in Lawrence, Mass.; Patrick Burke of Division 8 was also a member of the INC Board of Governors. One account notes that Bateman set up a series of meetings in Massachusetts for Caucus leaders to pitch the organization's mission to the membership, and there was a positive reception in Boston, Lawrence, and Lynn. Peadar Mca Fhínín, "Fenian Notes," *Saoirse*, July 2011.

[1096] Interview with Gerard Walsh (pseudonym), Philadelphia area, October 29, 2011.

[1097] Interview with Richard Lawlor, current Noraid executive board member and long-time Hartford chapter member, Hartford, Conn., December 1, 2011.

[1098] Noraid Annual Testimonial Dinner Journals, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977.

honorary committee members such as union leaders Teddy Gleason and Phil Brennan.[1099] The relationship was mutually beneficial in that McManus, as a Catholic priest from the North (County Fermanagh),[1100] bestowed moral legitimacy on the cause at the same time that the Catholic Church on both sides of the Atlantic denounced it, while Noraid had deep contacts with the Irish-American community, which McManus lacked as he had just arrived in the United States in October 1972.

In 1977, McManus, who had been referred to as "the Provos chaplain,"[1101] publicly veered away from supporting armed struggle as the means to achieve Irish unification, undoubtedly a necessary strategy to make headway with Congress. In September of the following year, the Provisional IRA had declared one Caucus leader persona non grata.[1102] Two months later, the Caucus held its first annual testimonial dinner dance in Queens, the dinner journal of which asserted, "The Caucus has resolutely refused to be dictated to by any group in Ireland."[1103]

According to one former Noraid activist:

> I remember McManus coming. He broached the idea of a liaison. He turned around and formed his own organization, with dinners and fundraising. People organizing and fundraising that drained the best talents Noraid had. . . . Mike [Flannery] took exception to this. He was able to drain off quite a lot of support and fundraising. He drained Noraid's talents; people could organize a dinner . . . and pack the place. There were 8 to 9 tables of union membership alone. People were sending McManus money by themselves; there is no way of tabulating.[1104]

[1099] Noraid Annual Testimonial Dinner Journal, 1976.

[1100] McManus, according to his memoir, was relocated to the United States for his criticism of the Northern Ireland establishment. His brother Patrick was an IRA volunteer who had been killed in the 1950s Border Campaign, and his brother Peter was Unity MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone in the early 1970s. In addition to being a priest, these familial connections undoubtedly further bolstered his credibility among Noraid's support base.

[1101] Ad for Bronx Unit Noraid Dance featuring Sean McManus as guest speaker, *Irish People*, April 14, 1973.

[1102] This person was Fred Burns O'Brien. McManus, *My American Struggle*, 134.

[1103] Irish National Caucus, Testimonial Dinner Dance Journal, November 24, 1978.

[1104] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.

The following year, an article in *An Phoblacht* explaining Provisional Sinn Féin's hardline during the Caucus-organized peace forum asserted: "It should be remembered that the INC has attempted to milk support and finances away from those genuinely concerned not just about human rights but our national freedom—those in Irish Northern Aid."[1105] In October 1980, the *Irish People* published an editorial that, according to McManus, "was dictated by the Republican Movement, which declared, 'the Caucus is an anathema to the Republican Movement in Ireland.'"[1106]

McManus and colleagues were not only accused of poaching supporters, including by upstaging Noraid with their own fundraising dinners, but also of sabotage and collaborating with the CIA.[1107] In addition to spreading rumors, McManus claims that the republican movement in Ireland also gave Noraid leaders "specific instructions . . . to oppose and obstruct the Caucus in every possible way." "Many Irish Northern Aid members were privately disgusted about the attacks," he asserted in his memoir. "They would admit to me that the IRA had sent orders that Irish Northern Aid were to infiltrate, disrupt and destroy Caucus chapters throughout the country—just as the British and Irish Embassies were trying to do."[1108] Wilson contends that Caucus chapters in New Jersey, Illinois, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania had memberships that opposed the INC's more moderate line and broke away to form new organizations in 1979.[1109]

A September 1979 article in the *Washington Star* claimed that the split between the INC and Noraid had a negative effect on fundraising for the movement. It asserted: "Irish officials,

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[1105] Reprinted article, titled "The Republican View of the National Caucus" in an unknown source, from *An Phoblacht*/*Republican News*, September 1, 1979. The article noted that the reason why Sinn Féin refused to engage in peace talks with loyalists was because participation would "positively helps the Brits in projecting their role as a 'peace-keeping force' instead of an occupation force."
[1106] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 156.
[1107] See "Split Threatens National Caucus," *Hibernia*, August 8, 1978.
[1108] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 157, 156.
[1109] Wilson, *Irish America*, 150. He cites the *Irish People*, August 18, 1979, as his source.

who seek to keep a lid on the Irish-American community's support for the IRA, say the decline in funds is the result of a split between the Irish National Caucus . . . and the Irish Northern Aid Committee."[1110] With the Caucus operating on a platform defined in opposition to Noraid—i.e., a nonviolent organization with "NO FOREIGN PRINCIPAL"[1111]—and mimicking Noraid's annual dinner, the organization became a competitor for scarce resources.

Co-optation/Appropriation

Co-optation/appropriation is a mechanism of resource access in social movements. Edwards and McCarthy define it as the exploitation "of existing forms of social organization that were not formed for explicit movement purposes." They differentiate between co-optation, defined as "the transparent, permitted borrowing of resources," and appropriation, which entails exploiting them surreptitiously.[1112] Noraid activists would use both approaches.

Noraid's primary purpose of generating financial support for prisoners' dependents was wholly compatible with the charitable activities that were typical of Irish associations, especially fundraising for vulnerable populations and families in need of assistance, including among their own memberships. For example, as retired Mount Vernon police officer Tony Gormley explained of the Emerald Society: "When someone gets hurt, they take care of their own and step up to the plate and run benefits and get them on their feet."[1113]

[1110] "Aid to IRA Falls as U.S. Support Groups Split," *Washington Star*, September 7, 1979, A-5.
[1111] Irish National Caucus, Testimonial Dinner Dance Journal, November 24, 1978. Caps in original.
[1112] Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 125–35. They note four mechanisms for resource access: aggregation; self-production (e.g., building networks); co-optation/appropriation; and patronage.
[1113] Interview with Tony Gormley, former Noraid Bronx unit chairman, Yonkers, NY, October 6, 2011.

Co-opting the resources—organizational, financial, human, moral—of existing Irish social, cultural, and economic organizations was thus a viable strategy.[1114] As Hanley notes, "From its inception, Noraid relied very heavily for support on existing Irish institutions. . . ."[1115] One activist estimated that in the Philadelphia area: "About 70 percent of Noraid's membership had belonged to something."[1116] Yet there is evidence that Noraid members also joined organizations to align other groups with their efforts. An FBI report asserted, "[Noraid] has gotten its members and supporters in places of leadership in several organizations so their influence is . . . greater than their membership size would indicate."[1117]

AOH and the County Societies

The Ancient Order of Hibernians, as the largest and highly structured national organization, was perhaps the most pivotal in the long term. In addition to its mutual aid and charity functions discussed in the previous chapter, the active promotion of an end to Ireland's partition, an initiative titled Freedom For All Ireland, was an integral mandate of the organization. Yet there were deep political divisions within the organization and disputes over priorities among the AOH's programmatic priorities, of which FFAI was one among others that also included an anti-abortion campaign and immigration reform.[1118]

[1114] Edwards and McCarthy note five types of resources: moral (e.g., solidarity, legitimacy); cultural (e.g., newspapers, music, film, knowledge of how to run events, technical or strategic know how); social-organizational resources (e.g., social networks, organizations); human resources (e.g., labor; skill; expertise); material resources (e.g., money, property, office space). Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 125–35.

[1115] Brian Hanley, "The Politics of NORAID," *Irish Political Studies* 19, no. 1 (2004): 4.

[1116] Interview with Jimmy McPaul, Philadelphia, October 8, 2011.

[1117] US DOJ, FBI, report on Irish Northern Aid Committee, July 26, 1985, FOIPA no. 1146079-001 : . The original text used INAC, short for Irish Northern Aid Committee, which was replaced here with Noraid for consistency and to reduce confusion.

[1118] Interview with Phil Gallagher, September 7, 2011.

At the national level, the nature and intensity of the AOH's activism vis-à-vis the Northern Ireland conflict was not consistent. Long-time Hibernian Phil Gallagher noted, "The tone of [the *Hibernian*] *Digest* [the AOH's paper] on the issue changed depending on the editor and militancy of the national presidency."[1119] Under Edward Fay, president from 1970–1974, it "was only nominally involved in the Northern Ireland issue."[1120]

The republican movement on both sides of the Atlantic strategized to steer the organization at the highest level of leadership. Liam Murphy noted that he never joined Noraid and that his job was essentially to bring the republican movement program to the AOH as a Hibernian. He recalled a meeting convened by Flannery with Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, former IRA chief of staff and then president of Sinn Féin, at Cornyn's Steak House in the Bronx, during Fay's term:

> I was asked my opinion about the AOH. Fay issued some stupid press release about the situation in Northern Ireland. . . . [I was told], "you will help steer it in a different direction; you will become the assistant editor of the *National Hibernian Digest*. This man from Boston, Dave Burke, will make it happen." . . . All Fay knew was what the Dublin government had told him.[1121]

Fay, he further noted, had a "colossal ego. We convinced him that Dave Burke and I would make him look like a hero if we took over the newspaper," which they did in 1973. He also mentioned that he always received information from Seán Ó Brádaigh, Sinn Féin's publicity director, which would find its way into the paper. AOH stalwarts Burke and Murphy would also urge McManus, who was then involved with Noraid, to "'convert' the AOH" leadership in 1974, efforts that aided Jack Keane's successful bid for the presidency.[1122] As former AOH president Joe Roche (1982–1984) explains, "Jack Keane was the first to light a fire under the AOH. He lit

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[1119] Ibid.
[1120] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 82.
[1121] Interview with Liam Murphy, New York, NY, June 23, 2011.
[1122] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 82.

a fire under me. . . . He galvanized the AOH."[1123] Jack Keane would be honored by Noraid at its 1976 testimonial dinner, at which McManus was guest speaker, as would Roche six years later.[1124]

In the wake AOH's 1978 convention in Ireland, Fay convened a press conference asserting: "We want it to be known that . . . AOH is a non-political organization. We are against violence—but a few people at the top may have their own views. . . . There are some political opportunists in AOH." The *Irish Echo* reported that he was "adamant that the AOH must be freed from the image of an IRA support organization." [1125]

Gallagher explained why: "At the 1972 convention in Dublin, the Irish government was very welcoming to the Hibernians; [they] rolled out the red carpet. It was a plush affair. . . . Then the leadership changed with Jack Keane in '74. In the '78 convention held in Kerry, the AOH was persona non grata, given Keane's activism. Some members of the secret branch were there. In the eyes of the Irish government, the AOH were supporters of the IRA."[1126]

Gallagher further explained that because the "AOH was an existing network; the advantage was that it's like a feudal society; the strength is in the local-level divisions."[1127] Thus, it was at the local level that the AOH had the most impact on Noraid. As their funding enthusiasm for FFAI initiative varied,[1128] so too did the divisions' support for Noraid.

[1123] Conversation with Joe Roche, Baltimore, Md., June 14, 2011.

[1124] McManus explains his role in inspiring Keane to "make sure the AOH would be intensely involved." At the 1974 convention, McManus would be made deputy national chaplain of the organization, while Jack Keane would be placed on the executive board of the Irish National Caucus along with such Hibernians as Liam Murphy, David Burke, and Thomas McNabb (AOH president 1978–1980). McManus, *My American Struggle*, 82.

[1125] "AOH Needs Overhaul Says Ex-President," *Irish Echo*, July 15, 1978, 1.

[1126] Interview with Phil Gallagher, September 7, 2011.

[1127] Ibid.

[1128] Mike Cummings elaborated: "The structure of the AOH was such that local Divisions were very autonomous and contributions to the Freedom For All Ireland campaign varied considerably." He further noted that because a portion of the basic membership fee automatically went to the national board that "there was always a corpus of funds for the National Board to distribute regardless of the fundraising enthusiasm of various Divisions across the country." Email correspondence with Michael Cummings, April 24, 2012.

Noraid branches thus varied considerably in their success in coopting/appropriating AOH resources. Local AOH divisions in such urban neighborhoods in Inwood and Astoria, for example, would sponsor social events on Noraid's behalf and turn over their proceeds.[1129] Other divisions, however, were not so helpful or even sympathetic. In New Jersey, Quinn contends that there was a "canyon of difference" between Noraid and the Ancient Order of Hibernians. The former was attractive to the 'New Irish': second- and third-generation immigrants who preferred political engagement to bourgeois assimilation. . . . The latter attracted the 'Old Irish': integrated, socially consequential, conservative Catholics."[1130] Meanwhile, in Connecticut, Gallagher estimated that there was very little cross-membership between his division and Noraid.[1131]

"A fundamental fact was that where you had an active AOH you always had an active [Noraid unit] and to a lesser extent an [Irish American Unity Conference branch]," asserted Mike Cummings, former Noraid executive member. "[Noraid] units in my memory never grew up without an AOH unit to build upon."[1132] "Most of the founding and other members were either Hibernians (or in NYC, Philadelphia, and Boston and Chicago also Clan na Gael). . . ."[1133]

Cathleen O'Brien notes that in the Suffolk County, NY, Noraid unit, co-founded by her father and Mike Flannery, for example, "nearly all were members of the AOH." "It was a strong

[1129] Interview with John Dunleavy, who noted that AOH Division 9 in New York had held fundraising events in support of Noraid, New York, NY, October 21, 2011. Padraig Pearse Division 3's activities noted in an *Irish Echo* advertisement, April 15, 1972, 15.
[1130] Dermot Quinn, *The Irish in New Jersey: Four Centuries of American Life* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 198.
[1131] When asked if the LAOH was helpful in organizing for Noraid, activists McKeon (Flushing, Queens), Baggarly (Washington, DC), and Savage (Lynn, Mass.) all explained that their respective branches were not helpful in their organizing efforts.
[1132] Email correspondence with Michael Cummings, April 24, 2012. The brackets substitute Noraid for the abbreviation INA, and IAUC for its spelled out name.
[1133] Email correspondence with Michael Cummings, May 1, 2012.

group" with "many couples," she noted, "they were friends originally from the Hibernians; and nearly everyone was involved in the church."[1134]

Yet Brigid Brannigan, whose activism in the Bronx dates back to the civil rights movement and the American Congress for Irish Freedom, explained the causal process in the reverse:

> For example, the Ancient order of Hibernians, a number of people joined who were involved with Noraid, or who were [just] interested in Irish freedom, had the idea to join the Ancient Order of Hibernians and bring that organization—by joining it—they brought that organization into being a support group.

She further noted:

> That was a strategy, certainly. I don't know that that was any particularly planned strategy. But that just people had that idea and came together, joined AOH, and then the AOH became a strong ancillary organization to Noraid. . . . My memory of it was that there were groups that filled up in the ranks with people who were strongly in support of Irish freedom at the time, and those groups came out at different fundraisers . . . and would buy tickets as a group and support things. It was networking; all networking.[1135]

Similarly, as Roche described, Noraid members "joined with us because we had a network. The AOH had divisions from Maine to California. They didn't have the network we had"; only individual cells. They "joined the AOH and converted them."[1136]

One Noraid head in New York estimated that as much as 30 percent of Noraid's membership in the 1980s was comprised of AOH members.[1137] Roche estimated the figure at 40 percent.[1138] Boyle noted of Philadelphia, "Some of them [initial members of Noraid] were AOH, some of them later joined AOH. . . . I think by the time I left Northern Aid most people belonged

[1134] Interview with Cathleen O'Brien, Riverdale, NY, July 12, 2011.
[1135] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.
[1136] Conversation with Joe Roche, Baltimore, Md., June 14, 2011.
[1137] Interview with Gerry Coleman, Jersey City, NJ, June 14, 2011.
[1138] Conversation with Joe Roche, Baltimore, Md., June 14, 2011.

to both. There was an awful lot of cross membership. I still have a lot of friends that were in Northern Aid that are members of my division and other divisions in the city."[1139]

Yet in the Bronx, noted an early president of that borough chapter, "A lot of Noraid's membership did not come from the AOH; it was not the main source."[1140] Rather than the AOH divisions, historian John Ridge explained, "The Irish county associations were more inclined to supply the cadre for the republican movement."[1141] There was a very strong association with funding republican activity from the United States at least since the early twentieth century. And while the leaders of Noraid, such as Michael Flannery, were AOH members, "they were not primarily AOH people. They spent more time working with the county societies."[1142] Unlike the AOH, which in the post–WW II period became mostly American-born, immigrants coming to the United States would more likely find themselves joining the county societies, explained Ridge, where they had friends and neighbors from their home counties and co-members shared the same accent. In many areas, the AOH had become middle class.[1143]

The county societies, which like the AOH were also segregated by sex, although they mostly integrated by the mid-1980s,[1144] were politically divided on the republican movement. In New York, the Leitrim Association "as a whole were very supportive and generous," noted one long-time member.[1145] When asked which of the county associations from the South would tend to be more supportive of Noraid, former United Irish Counties Association leader, Joe McManus

[1139] Interview with Seamus Boyle, Pleasantville, NY, July 13, 2011.
[1140] Interview with Tony Gormley, Yonkers, NY, October 6, 2011.
[1141] Interview with John Ridge, vice-president of local history, the New York Irish History Roundtable, November 18, 2011.
[1142] Interview with John Ridge, November 18, 2011.
[1143] Ibid.
[1144] In 2011, the Kerrymen's Association finally agreed to allow women to join.
[1145] Interview with Tony Gormley, Yonkers, NY, October 6, 2011.

mentioned: Leitrim, Mayo, and Sligo in the west (Connaught), and Cork, Kerry, and Tipperary in the southwest (Munster) (See Map 5.1).[1146]

In Philadelphia, the Ulster societies of Donegal, Derry, and Tyrone had overlap with Noraid or had members that would support it, as well as the Mayo society. As one Philadelphia activist noted: "Everyone in the Tyrone society was in Noraid."[1147] Another noted that a lot of the Donegal society membership was also in Noraid,[1148] while Frances Duffy singled out the Derry Society. She noted that generally the societies were not active but supportive.[1149]

Yet when asked how supportive the county societies were as organizations in New York, Brannigan asserted:

> Very little support. Again there were a couple of exceptions. . . . I might think Cork and Leitrim . . . . The counties would . . . have a lot of debate over handing over any amount of money, even making a donation, it always became a controversy as to how the money was being spent and why. . . . It was political, it was entirely a question of "Do we support them? . . . [T]hey're not like our fathers were, the IRA in the old days was a decent organization; these people are a bunch of terrorists." So it came down to that kind of judgment, it came down to a Free State kind of mentality, "We're fine without the six counties; we really don't need them." There were harsh decisions made by people who did not want to support [the movement]; they truly saw the IRA as the enemy of Ireland.[1150]

A review of Noraid's annual testimonial dinner journals from the 1970s and early 1980s reveals that only the Cork, Donegal, and Tipperary associations were fairly regular table patrons at the dinners and purchased ads. Unsurprisingly these were headed by the central office leadership. Less support in the form of ads came from Clare and some of the Ulster counties (Derry, Tyrone, and Monaghan). Other societies seemed to be inclined to take out an ad page if someone from their county was being honored at that year's particular dinner.

[1146] Interview with Joe McManus, Long Island City, NY, June 20, 2012.
[1147] Interview with Connell McCrea, Philadelphia, August 15, 2011.
[1148] Interview with Jimmy McPaul, Philadelphia, October 8, 2011.
[1149] Interview with Frances Duffy, Upper Darby, Penn., August 15, 2011.
[1150] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.

Local Parishes

The extent to which resources could be drawn from the Church and its network of parishes was also highly variable. The Church hierarchy was steadfastly opposed to the insurgency in the North. In the words of Olive McKeon, "They were anti-IRA, and there's no question about it!" However, she also noted that at the parish level, there was considerable variation in the way that pastors reacted to her chapter's efforts to mobilize support. According to McKeon, "there were some parishes that allowed us to sell hundreds of raffle tickets," elsewhere officials threatened to call the police. She recalled, one time it actually happened, but "when the cops arrived they bought raffle tickets!" "It didn't mean that people in that parish didn't support us," she explained. "It just meant that the pastor of the parish 'didn't want to be involved,' so that was it."[1151] Wilson explains, "Although church leaders were careful not to endorse republicanism, a number of priests openly sympathized with the IRA and allowed Noraid to use parish buildings for fund-raising events."[1152]

A report of the meeting of the Mid-Manhattan Noraid chapter dated August 1972 noted that special efforts were being made to "influence" members of the Roman Catholic clergy to support Noraid's fundraising activities and that the program had had some success. It noted that priests had agreed to urge contribution to collections outside of church following mass.[1153] As Cummings explained: "At the height of the civil rights marches and in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday [in 1972], the AOH was given permission by the Catholic Bishops to collect outside churches for the many displaced families in the North."[1154]

[1151] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, NY, December 13, 2011.
[1152] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 66.
[1153] US DOJ, FBI, "Meeting of the Mid-Manhattan Chapter of the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Provisional IRA)"; August 24, 1972; file no.: NY 105-109381. Author not provided. It seems that the report was written by a government infiltrator and/or informant.
[1154] Email correspondence with Michael Cummings, April 24, 2012.

Thereafter, however, the Church and the local parishes generally were not a helpful source of recruitment or support. Union leader Seamus Boyle of Philadelphia explained: "They [the local parish] didn't get up and preach against it, but if you asked them for something like, whatever it was, prayers, they would never pray for the people in the Troubles of Northern Ireland. You had the odd priest that would . . . 'the rebel priest,' as we would say . . . but other than [that] . . . no we never went through the church to try to [mobilize] . . . we found it better to stay away." Indeed, Belfast-born Thomas Hughes recalls even having been chased away.[1155]

Political efforts were also not welcomed. McManus, outspoken critic of the Catholic Church hierarchy's political noninvolvement in Northern Ireland, attempted to persuade the US Catholic Bishops' Conference to request that the Reagan White House continue the US weapons ban on Northern Ireland's police force at the same time that it was going to do so regarding the ban on El Salvador's military. He noted the response as follows: "In the case of El Salvador, we have been encouraged to take what action we have taken by the local hierarchy. We have not, at this time, received such encouragement from the Irish hierarchy on the subject you have brought to our attention. . . ."[1156]

Workplaces: The Case of the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority

The garages and depots of the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA) are a prime example of how a workspace was put into the service of the cause. The company was heavily Irish at the onset of the Troubles as hiring had long been done on the basis of personal connections. Among its Irish workforce, about 55 percent were US-born and

[1155] Interview with Thomas Hughes, Brooklyn, NY, July 7, 2011.
[1156] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 227.

45 percent were born in Ireland, estimated former supervisor John Dunleavy. As a closed shop, its employees were required to join TWU Local 100, which itself "was an Irish-born union."

Dunleavy asserted that "a lot of individual transport workers were members or supporters of Noraid."[1157] One retired MABSTOA bus driver recounted that "when situations arose, MABSTOA workers would convene meetings in the local garages."[1158] Although Dunleavy did not recall any formal organizing in the depots, he did recall that leaflets were left on lunch tables advertising events.[1159]

Roscommon-born Pascal Morahan, who lived in the Bronx and noted that he had not felt pressured to join Noraid or any other political organization, asserted:

> Noraid basically had to do with the TWU. I think most of those people in the TWU seemed to be affiliated more with that [than the carpenters' union Local 53]. . . . It was easier for them because they it was more of them thinking the same way. You did have a lot of Irish in the TWU. The leader of it was an Irishman, and there were hundreds of Irish bus drivers. Whereas . . . they did agree, it was like one voice there, because it was all agreed to. Whereas in my union [Local 53] it was more diverse; it might not have been accepted. You had English in my local. We were a more diverse union. . . . It was much easier for them because, like I said, you had one voice there, and they all stick together.[1160]

Noraid sympathizers who were dispatchers within MABSTOA, such as Dunleavy and Leitrim-born Frank Beirne, who also headed the AOH New York County Board, were centrally placed within the transit sector, as they had contact with hundreds of employees among whom they could potentially garner loyalty. They had a very distinct organizational advantage, including that some of the nine bus depots were located in Irish neighborhoods in the Bronx and Manhattan, and that the drivers themselves came into contact with clientele on a regular basis. Morahan explained:

[1157] Interview with John Dunleavy, TWU Local 100 and AOH Division 9 leader, New York, NY, October 21, 2011.
[1158] Interview with Seamus Naughton (pseudonym), Bronx, NY, June 29, 2011.
[1159] Interview with John Dunleavy, New York, NY, October 21, 2011.
[1160] Interview with Pascal Morahan, Nanuet, NY, July 20, 2011.

> It was easier for those people to organize and get something because they were in the city and so forth. . . . [They] had more time because of their shifts, because of the way they worked and different things. They were more equipped. If they wanted to they could have stopped the city . . . with a transit strike, not show up to work. They didn't do that.[1161]

Brokerage

Noraid also relied on patronage from powerful Irish leaders, typically local ones, and in turn honored them at testimonial dinners. As one letter addressed to Gerry Adams described of one Noraid leader in New York: "Pat [O'Connell] has special talent in [fundraising] due to his ability to establish a personal relationship with people in various fields i.e. – union leaders, restaurateurs and leading representatives in industry."[1162] Of critical importance in this regard were union leaders. Figure 6.2 reveals the 1973 honorees and honorary committee affiliations. The figure shows how embedded these individuals (all men this year) were in Irish organizations overall and also which union leaders were brokers in the network. They would play that role not only in New York City, but also in Philadelphia, Boston, and San Francisco.

[1161] Interview with Pascal Morahan, Nanuet, NY, July 20, 2011.

[1162] Letter from Jeannie and Charlie McLoughlin, to Gerry Adams, May 30, 1989. Available at the Archives of Irish America, Frank Durkan Papers, AIA 008, box 7, folder 29.

Figure 6.2: 1973 Noraid Dinner Affiliations



Source: Data constructed from Noraid's 1973 Annual Testimonial Dinner Journal and other sources. The red nodes represent the dinner honorees and honorary committee members and while the blue squares represent the organizations. The arrows indicate that a person is affiliated with particular organization. It is likely that the figure underestimates the connections between individuals as all of the affiliations for each participant are not known. Noraid's leaders are placed at the center of the graph.

GAA and Gaelic Park

John Kerry O'Donnell, president of the New York GAA in the early 1970s and long-time lease holder of the MTA-administered stadium Gaelic Park in the Bronx, sponsored field days to benefit Noraid.[1163] Interviewees differed in their perceptions of the role of the GAA as a basis for support. One interviewee explained that the GAA was seen to be infiltrated by informers.[1164] Another saw them as fundraising fronts for republicans.[1165] At a minimum, the GAA brought their team players, supporters, and spectators together on a regular basis around distinctively Irish sporting events.

Rather than the GAA, it was O'Donnell himself, as the manager of Gaelic Park, where the GAA played its games and was a meeting ground for events, who was crucial. Along with Noraid's central office leaders, he was honored at Noraid's first testimonial dinner in 1973. Thereafter, he was consistently an honorary committee member of Northern Aid's annual testimonial dinners.

Brigid Brannigan noted:

> I don't remember any affiliation of any nature [with the GAA] except Gaelic Park. The owner of Gaelic Park would allow us to have fundraisers. . . . We had some big fundraisers there for sure and raised a lot of money there. [O'Donnell] did let us collect outside on a Sunday afternoon. We would have people with the boxes collecting money, he did allow that. . . . There might have been individual [GAA] players but not as teams.[1166]

A cursory review of the dinner journals shows that the GAA would sometimes contribute as would individual county football teams, particularly Leitrim and Donegal, but the support was neither robust nor consistent.

[1163] "Northern Aid Games April 9," *Irish Echo*, April 1, 1972, 22. O'Donnell was also twice previously GAA president.
[1164] Conversation with NYC pub owner Dave McIlroy (pseudonym), July 30, 2011.
[1165] Interview with AOH historian John Ridge, November 18, 2011.
[1166] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.

Union Leaders

The crucial network brokers were union leaders, who had both the organization skills and resources to mobilize. There was also the historic connection of Irish nationalism and union activism, as discussed in Chapter 5, from which Noraid could draw upon. This connection was articulated in July 1970 in Provisional Sinn Féin's newspaper *An Phoblacht*—which was initially promoted as Noraid's newspaper and available at Noraid's Bronx office. It stated, "The present power position of the trade union movement in U.S. society," it stated, "is due in no small part due to the part played by former I.R.A. men."[1167]

Noraid testimonial dinner books provide evidence of the intimate connection between Noraid and unions, especially at the local level, in areas where the Irish had historically dominated, such as construction, long shoring, teamstering, utilities, and transit.[1168] As Hanley found, "Trade unions with large Irish memberships or with an Irish leadership such as the New York Transport Workers Union, the Longshoremen . . . and the various construction unions were all early financial contributors to the organization."[1169] Bronx and later Manhattan activist Brigid Brannigan noted:

> Labor unions I believe were strong. . . . I think again there was a handful of people in the labor unions who definitely gave both financial support and they did come out at times, the word went out and they would come out to demonstrations in groups and came to fundraisers in large groups. . . . And they were also excellent with getting fellas who would come on the run and need jobs. Labor was very good, trade unions, certain people in involved . . . we had a network who could put young fellas to work.[1170]

[1167] Sean Collins, "New York Veterans Back Irish Freedom," *An Phoblacht*, July 1970, 6. Below the article was an informational piece written by Noraid publicity committee chairman, P.J. McParland titled "U.S. Appeal for Northern Aid." On p. 7, the paper acknowledged receipt of payment for Noraid's subscription.
[1168] Freeman, *In Transit*, 30–1.
[1169] Hanley, "The Politics of NORAID," 4.
[1170] Interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.

The first Noraid testimonial dinner journal of 1973 indicates that the initial support base of the organization in New York City relied on the Cement and Concrete Workers' Union, especially Local 18A of which Noraid head Jack McCarthy was the former business agent; the Transport Workers Union, particularly Local 100, under the leadership of Sligo-born Daniel Gilmartin, who was honored that year, and John Lawe who was honored the next. The honorary committee members for 1973 also included leaders in the following building trades, service, and transport unions: Cement and Concrete Workers' Union 18A; Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 32BJ, representing porters and maintenance workers, as well as bus drivers among others; the International TWU; the International Longshoremen's Association; the Metallic Lathers' Union Local 46; and the Mason Tenders' Union Local 33. In the early 1980s, leaders in the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local 608, known as the "Irish Local," and the Operating Engineers Local 30 were also among the honorary dinner committees. Some of these men also had vertical linkages to city and state union councils and even the national AFL-CIO leadership, which meant that their reach was beyond their individual unions.

When a powerful union leader was honored at a dinner, support from his particular union tended to increase, as rank and file filled up tables (See Table 6.1) and journal ads were purchased.

Table 6.1: Affiliations of Union Leader Honorees and Table Patrons at Noraid Annual Testimonial Dinners, 1973–1983

Union Honoree Affiliation	TWU; Cement Local 18A (NYC)	TWU	Intl. ILA (DC)	Intl. Metal Lathers (ML) (DC)	Mason Tenders Local 33 (NYC); SEIU 32BJ (NYC)	Philadelphia Building Trades Council; ML Local 46 (NYC)	Operating Engineers Local 542 (Philadelphia); ML Local 46	Teamsters Local 115(Philadelphia); UBCJA Local 608 (NYC)	ILA 799 (Boston); Teamsters Local 115	n/a
Table Patron	**1973**	**1974**	**1975**	**1976**	**1977**	**1978**	**1979**	**1980**	**1981**	**1983**
Cement and Concrete Workers Union Local 18A	**12**	6	3	2	2	3	3	2	3	0
ILA	0	0	**1**	3	0	1	1	1	0	0
John McCullough (Philadelphia Building Trades Council)	0	0	0	0	0	**12**	0	2	0	0
Mason Tenders Local 33	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Metal Lathers' International Union	0	0	**1**	**1**	0	0	0	0	0	0
Metal Lathers' Union Local 46	2	1	**1**	**1**	1	2	1	0	0	0
Plumber's Union Local 2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Plumber's Union Local 690, Philadelphia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
SEIU 2 (Window Washers)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
SEIU 32B&J	1	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Teamsters Local 115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**5**	1	0
Teamsters Local 500	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
TWU	**5**	**10**	6	4	3	1	1	1	1	1
UBCJA Local 608	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	**8**	1	1

Source: Table constructed from Noraid dinner journals. Data may not be wholly accurate owing to the fact that the patron lists sometimes listed the tables in names of individuals who were members of the union but not identified as such and thus could not be properly coded.

Philadelphia

Union activism, however, was not just confined to New York. One staunch former Noraid activist in the area noted: "The unions were heavily Irish at that time. The roofers, the teamsters, the plumbers, and the sheet metal workers; the building trades were consistent, including the carpenters with Seamus Boyle, and concrete workers—John Dougherty's local."[1171] As Boyle remarked: "Philadelphia [was] a very Irish town as far as labor goes."[1172]

Journalist Mike Mallowe described the scene at the cabbage and potato dinner in 1973 as follows, "The whole array of building trades in Philadelphia was represented, from painters to operating engineers." Hosted by the roofers' union boss John McCullough, a message was delivered from Northern Aid headquarters in the Bronx announcing that "McCullough's people alone had kicked in more than all the Irish in New York" that year.[1173] According to available, although questionable, FARA records from 1977 to 1981, it was the Philadelphia units that were the biggest earners. Indeed, one Philadelphia leader noted that the central office even joked, "What do you have a machine making money over there?"[1174] Noraid's annual testimonial dinner journals confirm Philadelphia's strength. Of any area outside of New York City, the City of Brotherly Love by far sent the most people for the dinner, even rivaling the New York City units.

McCullough, who was also vice president of the Building Trades Council in Philadelphia with over 60,000 members in 30 trades, was a crucial broker within the Philadelphia network.

[1171] Interview with Gerard Walsh (pseudonym), Philadelphia area, October 29, 2011.
[1172] Interview with Seamus Boyle, Pleasantville, NY, July 13, 2011.
[1173] Mike Mallowe, "My Life & Times With the IRA," *Philadelphia Magazine* 64, no. 3 (March 1973): 105.
[1174] Interview with Gerard Walsh (pseudonym), Philadelphia area, October 29, 2011.

As Armagh-born Seamus Boyle, who began his career working for one of the most successful and politically influential Irish building contractors in Philadelphia, Matthew McCloskey,[1175] and would later become the business agent for Regional Council of Carpenters of Philadelphia and a leader in Carpenters' Union Local 122, explained:

> The unions were very, very involved. . . . Without the unions we would not have been able to pull off what we did. We had the financial support from the unions, the bodies. Really there were people there like John McCullough; if we told John that we need five hundred people tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock, he'd have 600. And it wasn't through intimidation. He'd tell the guys "Be there," and they'd do it. If the boss asked you to do something, you just did it. Then you knew if you were hurting for a job or something like that he'd remember that. That kid came out last Sunday and protested, and he'd tried to help him out. That was with all of us. I guess it was bred into us.[1176]

As Boyle further noted, "John McCullough was a legend. He was a real legend. He was very connected [to all the unions]. And very well respected. . . . He was a pivotal person in organizing the unions."[1177] McCullough was honored by Noraid in New York in 1978 and would even be posthumously honored in journal ad pages for years after his death in 1980 by the Delaware Valley units.[1178] Taken together, the ads show just how powerful McCullough's brokerage role was for Noraid. Figure 6.3 reveals the array of local unions, construction businesses, bars, and other firms that he was personally connected to along with Irish organizations in the Philadelphia area that included the Philadelphia's Emerald Society, comprised mostly of police and firemen, and the well-heeled Irish Society.

[1175] McCloskey was a close friend of John F. Kennedy, who appointed him ambassador to Ireland during his presidency. He was also a big fundraiser for the Democratic Party and served as treasurer for the Democratic National Committee. See Dennis Clark, *The Irish in Philadelphia: Ten Generations of Urban Experience* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), 159–61.

[1176] Interview with Seamus Boyle, Pleasantville, NY, July 13, 2011.

[1177] Ibid.

[1178] John McCullough was assassinated in 1980 by the mafia.



Figure 6.3: Roofers' Union Local 30 Boss John McCullough Noraid Dinner Journal Callouts

Source: Noraid 1978 Annual Testimonial Dinner Journal; Noraid Delaware Valley, PA, First (1982), Second (1983), and Third (1984) Annual Testimonial Dinner Journals. Ad pages that listed all of the honorees for that particular dinner in their callouts were not included.

Micro-dynamics and Network Mechanisms

This section returns to the network mechanisms discussed in Chapter 1—socialization, information, reachability, and exchange. Chapter 4, which focused on coordinated state suppression of the republican movement from the United States, United Kingdom, and Republic of Ireland, gave the contextual reasons as to why social networks were especially crucial to this movement: trust could by-pass risk, locally constructed information from nationalist communities in the North could flow, opportunities for recruitment existed, and social relations altered incentives.

Identity/Socialization

Networks are important to movements, analysts have noted, in part because they socialize individuals and thus render them more or less likely to engage in a movement. As Passy notes, prior embeddedness in "formal or informal networks close to [an] issue helps individuals create a salient identity, which facilitates the emergence of a political consciousness related to specific political issues." Essentially, social networks create a predisposition to participate. She argues, moreover, that the stronger the socialization experience and identification, the more intensely involved an individual will tend to become.[1179]

The Irish case provides evidence that supports this hypothesis. By far, those within the activist core, whether born in the Republic of Ireland or in an immigrant receiving country, had grown up in a republican-minded family. Some of those in the latter category even explicitly used such terms as "brainwashed," "infected," and "pre-programmed" to explain their initial predisposition to become involved.

[1179] Florence Passy, "Social Networks Matter. But How?" in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action,* ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30.

Such identities were maintained because they tended to be joiners of organizations: as Roman Catholics they registered in their local parishes, which defined the boundaries of neighborhoods; as immigrants they became members of fraternal and other associations that helped ease adjustment to life in the United States; and as nationalists they involved themselves in either explicitly republican clubs and societies and/or organizations that revered and actively nurtured fading elements of Irish culture (e.g., the Gaelic language, Gaelic football and hurling, step-dancing, pipe bands). By embedding their children in such a network, by enrolling them in parochial school and distinctively Irish activities, for example, they reproduced socialization within the family and the family as the primary unit around which social life was organized in the neighborhoods.

Cathleen O'Brien, both of whose parents were American-born, for example, noted that although her family had moved to Suffolk County, Long Island, they remained "totally immersed in Irish culture." Her father was in a pipe band and a member of the AOH; her mother was in the LAOH; and both were active in the Church and Holy Name Society. She was enrolled in Irish step-dancing classes.[1180] Similarly, Joe Roche who grew up in Pittsburgh and whose maternal grandfather was Irish-born noted, "My mother had us sign up for the AOH. All my brothers and my father were members. It was necessary that I join at about age 21–22."[1181]

While such embeddedness created the predisposition to become a Noraid activist, being known to one's community established trust, which became particularly crucial as the three relevant governments increasingly converged on a policy of suppression, including through infiltration. At the same time, families and friends buffered individuals from the public opprobrium that came with supporting Noraid. "In our family," noted one second-generation

[1180] Interview with Cathleen O'Brien, Riverdale, NY, July 12, 2011.
[1181] Conversation with Joe Roche, Baltimore, Md., June 14, 2011.

interviewee in Boston, "shaming didn't have an effect on us; the cause was considered to have a whole lot of value. We identified with Irish heroes, 'the history of suffering consequences' of political action. Irish songs are about emigration, tragedy and nostalgia."[1182]

Of course the predisposition alone does not explain *how* individuals did in fact join and/or why those without salient identities engaged less rigorously, by for example attending Noraid social events or simply purchasing ads in dinner journals.

Information

Networks channel information among actors. The denser they are, according to Burt, the more "redundant" the information, which in the case of Noraid would actually be positive given how antagonistic mainstream sources of information were to the republican movement.[1183] At the same time, studies suggest that information that comes from close relations also tends to be considered much more credible than impersonal media. "The personal obligations, loyalties, affections, and trust that people have within their social networks," explains Knoke, "exert powerful persuasive influences that neither radio nor newspapers can match." [1184]

In making a case for local-level analysis, Ó Dochartaigh explained that violent conflict "is intimately bound up with the particular place or 'space' in which it occurs." People experience conflict "through personal and family connections," and these networks form "part of a web of local knowledge."[1185] Given that in this case "webs of knowledge" extended across borders, it is unsurprising that those with direct connections through family and indirect ones through friends received information about the conflict that differed from mainstream media and

[1182] Interview with Lily Lafferty (pseudonym), Quincy, Mass., August 9, 2011.
[1183] Burt, *Brokerage and Closure*
[1184] David Knoke, "Networks of Political Action: Toward Theory Construction," *Social Forces* 68 (1990): 1047.
[1185] Niall Ó Dochartaigh, *From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles* (Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 1997), quotes at 4 and 2.

consequently constructed alternative understandings about the conflict. New York City activist Brigid Brannigan from Armagh noted:

> As active as our network was here, we had just as active a network coming from Ireland. There was a flow of information. I suppose it was certainly on a daily basis. For example, in my own family, I come from an area where I had friends, family, and neighbors who were arrested, so we kept in constant contact . . . daily contact.

Similarly Derry-born Mary Sheils Baggarly, who lived in Washington, DC, explained:

> Things were starting to heat up in Ireland. I guess that's when my Irish Republicanism upbringing kicked in. . . . I would call a neighbor of my mother's who had a phone, and that's where I would get a lot of my information from. . . . And you would hear on the news here about what was going on. But what they were reporting in the news here and what I was hearing from Ireland was two different stories.[1186]

One US-born activist in that same area noted:

> Washington, DC, was close to Derry because there were people from there. There were quite a few families. They would come here, and we would get the latest information. We'd meet at someone's house. They had on the spot (as close as it could be in those days) information. . . . There were some Belfast connections; but the strongest connections were to Derry.[1187]

Similarly, activist from Queens Olive McKeon noted: "I heard about what was happening in Northern Ireland through friends, people who had come here from the North."[1188]

When asked why Irish America was not more supportive of the republican movement, Manhattan bar-owner Hugh Lunney responded:

> Lack of knowledge and information, and also British propaganda, disinformation. So many people in America whose parents were involved in the movement going back generations, but they lost touch with the problem in Ireland and a lot of them think the problem has been solved. And you talk about people in America, but I could talk about people in Ireland. I met someone from Limerick years ago and started talking about the

[1186] Interview with Mary Sheils Baggarly, Upper Marlboro, Md., March 19, 2012.
[1187] Conversation with Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), June 22, 2011.
[1188] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, NY, December 13, 2001.

> North, and she said, "The North has nothing to do with us." They were so disconnected. And I blame the government in the South, also.[1189]

O'Brien noted that knowledge about what was happening on the ground was available "if you had friends or family ties in the North; if you were from the South, you didn't know. There was a major news blackout in the North."[1190] Chapter 4 covered this dimension of the conflict in detail, noting the Republic of Ireland's censorship of the media, how US reporters rarely covered stories on the North from the North and, with the assistance of British Information Services, American media was overwhelmingly biased in its reporting. In such a context, interpersonal networks were even more crucial for information flow from the North's Catholic ghettos.

One tactic Noraid used to bolster access to local information was to bring out Provo speakers disguised with false identities for private "house parties." Activists would send invitations to a limited trusted group, and the proverbial hat would be passed around for an expected minimum contribution as they heard first-hand what was happening on the ground.[1191] Tony Gormley, activist from the Bronx, noted: "when you get something first hand of how people were treated—scooped up off the street; family members in prison or harassed; assassinations with the blessing of the British government, RUC, and B-Specials—[it generates] a lot of sympathy."[1192]

At an organizational level, membership in a particular county society, most obviously those representing the six counties in the North, provided social space for information. One

[1189] Interview with Hugh Lunney, New York, NY, December 5, 2011.
[1190] Interview with Cathleen O'Brien, Riverdale, NY, July 12, 2011.
[1191] Ibid.
[1192] Interview with Tony Gormley, Yonkers, NY, October 6, 2011.

American-born man from in Philadelphia who lacked any familial connections across the Atlantic noted: "Through the Tyrone society, I knew people who had experienced violence."[1193]

Sympathetic bars were also crucial information hubs. Bars served as "the principal social center for many working-class Irish Americans and recent immigrants," explains Wilson. "These bars provided not only a familiar social outlet but a way in which information about accommodation and employment could be obtained by Irish immigrants." [1194] Yet they were also a source of information about political activities. One bar owner explained how people would gather at the pub and share information about the conflict. Pubs also sold copies of the *Irish People*, which reported on events from a republican perspective and carried information about events within the community. Yet they had another informational dimension: they were what one owner described as a place for "vetting" people. With considerable contacts, the bar owners could confirm the identities of people, which was critical for an organization that was subject to government infiltration.[1195]

Reachability

In network analysis terminology, "an actor is 'reachable' by another if there exists any set of connections by which we can trace from the source to the target actor."[1196] This amounts to opportunity, what Passy termed the structural-connection function of networks.[1197] Social movements scholarship has robustly established the important role of friendships in

[1193] Interview with Connell McCrea, Philadelphia, August 15, 2011. He also noted that he initially got his information from newspapers, singling out Jack McKinney as a source. Notably McKinney was a friend of IRA Border Campaign veteran Vincent Conlon and very sympathetic to the cause.
[1194] Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*, 44, n. 70.
[1195] Conversation with Desmond McIlroy (pseudonym), New York, NY, July 30, 2011.
[1196] Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle, *Introduction to Social Network Methods*, online textbook, Chapter 7.
[1197] Passy, "Networks Matter," 24.

recruitment.[1198] Given that for most of the conflict Noraid largely recruited through personal contacts, it is hardly surprising that this was the case with a number of interviewees.

As one former Philadelphia leader explained, "Danny Cahalane requested me to join Noraid. He did a lot of work on my house for no charge. We all helped one another, more or less, in those days. I knew Danny from the Irish affairs; and we became very, very good friends."[1199] Another Noraid activist from that area noted, "I joined Noraid after the Hunger Strikes in 1981. The reason I joined was because I met Mike Duffy, who did the writers' campaign to help prisoners. . . . I had been to a few Noraid meetings before then, which I heard about in the community, the Tyrone Society and elsewhere. . . . I would show up at the protests and pickets. I met Duffy at the Noraid picnic on Father's Day."[1200] Irish-born construction worker Tom Egan who was married to a woman from County Armagh, noted, "when a friend asked me[,] I joined Bronx I.N.A. [Irish Northern Aid]."[1201]

Yet even spatial proximity to an activist was enough to pull some into activism. Armagh-born Brannigan, who could not precisely recall how she became involved, noted that she had been living in the Kingsbridge section of the Bronx, which was then still a heavily Irish neighborhood, and came into contact with republican activists, such as bus driver Tom Duffy.

[1198] There are, however, two different approaches to understanding the mechanism. Gould argues that structuralist and rationalist approaches explain this outcome with different mechanisms. For the structuralist, networks enable or constrain behavior by establishing "obligations, expectations, entitlements, and influences." By contrast the rationalists, who take the individual as the unit of analysis, contend the mechanism rests on the expectation of future interaction and amounts to a reward for continued cooperation (in this case friendship). In the rationalist approach, he contends, it is "only by exploring the deeper character of activism and its connection to the type of social tie we call friendship that it becomes possible to talk convincingly about the credibility of sanctions in the recruitment of friends" (255). Drawing on Durkheim, he explains that activism "alters the value of social relationships among activists. To friends hovering on the brink of joining an activist cause, this promised shift in value presents a positive inducement; and the prospect that new contacts will readily provide replacements for friends left at the brink furnishes a negative one" (254). Roger Gould, "Why do Networks Matter?" in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 233–57.

[1199] Interview with Gerard Walsh (pseudonym), Philadelphia area, October 29, 2011.

[1200] Interview with Connell McCrea, Philadelphia, August 15, 2011.

[1201] Biographic information on Tomas MacAodagain (Thomas Egan) provided in the Irish Northern Aid Committee's 1981 Annual Testimonial Dinner Journal.

Some Irish-born bus drivers whose route extended into Westchester County could also reach the upwardly mobile Irish who suburbanized. Ken Tierney, for example, recalled having joined Irish Freedom News at the encouragement of Duffy, whom he met on his commute.[1202]

By contrast, when asked why he did not join the organization, one long-time AOH member from Long Island stated: "I probably didn't know about Noraid as such. I just didn't have any real contacts."[1203] And although Gallagher had other reasons for not supporting Noraid, when asked why he did not join, he replied, "No one asked me to."[1204]

The Bars

As Clark notes, "Taverns and bars were invaluable places for reaching potential members. The Irish saloonkeeper had played a historic role in the political and nationalist organizing of the past, and his function was just as valid in the 1970s as it had been in the nineteenth century."[1205] Similarly, as Wilson explains, Irish bars were a "focal point of Noraid activities . . . Noraid volunteers held regular collections among the clientele and received substantial donations from the bar owners themselves." Consequently, they were "prime recruiting and fund-raising sources for Noraid." [1206]

[1202] Interview with Ken Tierney, Bronx, NY, June 7, 2011. "Folklore" has it that Tom Duffy would play an Irish radio program on the bus and would pull over the bus to call into the radio station to comment on the program from a payphone. Interview with Liam Murphy, Yonkers, NY, July 13, 2011; interview with Brigid Brannigan, North Bergen, NJ, December 8, 2011.
[1203] Interview with AOH member Tim Myles, New York, NY, July 30, 2011.
[1204] Interview with Phil Gallagher, September 7, 2011.
[1205] Clark, *Irish Blood*, 36.
[1206] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 44.

Moral and Instrumental Rewards/Sanctions

Networks establish a set of preferences that shape individual choices about whether or not to contribute to the cause. They create a set of moral, social, and material incentives and disincentives that influence decision-making.

Invoking communal norms of moral obligation to assist one's brethren in need was integral in solicitation tactics, as captured by flyers that read: "Appeal to the Irish Conscience to Help Our People in their Hour of Need," and "Shame the Irish family that doesn't have a member there." Father Sean McManus asserted, "I made them feel guilty that they were ignoring their homeland and told them they were aiding British oppression in Ireland by their silence. Soon there was an active chapter of Irish Northern Aid in Baltimore and Washington."[1207] Within MABSTOA, for example, one interviewee noted that there was a sense that "if you didn't join Noraid, you weren't a good Irishman."[1208]

The distribution of honor and shame, as Radtke had noted were apparent in the Tamil and Eritrean cases, was the mechanism by which compliance was enforced. Fundraising dinners, particularly Noraid's annual testimonial dinner which honored influential supporters and sometimes rank and file members, provided not only social incentives to contribute, but also were a forum for doling out shame and honor within the community. The souvenier dinner journal, moreover, printed ads of local businesses and words of support from individuals and organizations, of varying cost depending on the size and page color. One activist noted that there was a sense that when solicited, you "had to give an ad to Noraid or you'd be in trouble."[1209] Precisely how, he did not elaborate, although by their very nature, the journals were a public display of who purchased an ad page, how substantial a payment was made for the page, and

[1207] McManus, *My American Struggle*, 68.
[1208] Interview with Seamus Naughton (pseudonym), Bronx, NY, June 29, 2011.
[1209] Interview with Joe McManus, Long Island City, NY, June 20, 2012.

who purchased tables for the dance. This information was, thus, a means to gauge which individuals, families, and organizations deserved honor or approval as supporters.

Because the journals encouraged people to patronize the businesses—such as pubs, construction firms, independent contractors, Irish import shops—that took out ad pages, they also had an instrumental purpose. One Philadelphia area Noraid member asserted, "Some bar owners were supportive. They made it [became successful] because they had an Irish name. The ones with working-class clientele were more likely to be supportive."[1210] Of the Queens area, McKeon noted that some Irish pub owners would not sell copies of the *Irish People*, which was a clear indication of support, because she or he did not want not to alienate clientele, but would buy ad space in the annual testimonial dinner journal. In this way, she explained, the owner would be able to appeal to clientele that supported Noraid while not alienating those who did not, as those who did not support Noraid would not likely ever see the journal book.[1211]

Unions that were dominated by the Irish not only provided an organizational structure to recruit supporters, but they also had innate mechanisms to police their members broadly and particular followings within. The power structure of the unions also fostered constituency building. As Whelan explained:

> Union bosses filled up tables at events as a show of their prestige within the union. I would go to the lads and say, "So and so needs your support for the dinner." Now this was the boss who had assigned them their jobs. Since the boss was responsible for getting them jobs, it was unsaid that they should go and buy tickets.

He further elaborated on the process:

> The executive board would receive a letter [about providing support to Noraid]; then the membership would vote on it. Maybe they would pay for one table. But then they would have to go to the membership to get more tables paid for. Then a leader would get people to organize tables for him. There was constant politics. If [a leader] couldn't fill three

[1210] Interview with Connell McCrea, Philadelphia, August 15, 2011.
[1211] Interview with Olive McKeon, Auburndale, Queens, December 13, 2011.

> tables, he would be seen as weak [within the union]. You had to protect yourself by doing the best you could to protect [the business agent]. You were tied to [him] because he gave you your jobs. So I would go to [his] supporters and say, "Buy a ticket for the Noraid dance because [the boss] needs your support on this." And they would go buy tickets for the event.

Union bosses could even compel other forms of activism as illustrated above with the example regarding roofer's union leader John McCullough and protest participation of rank and file.

Strategic Shift

From the 1980s onward, it was second- and third-generation Irish Americans whom Noraid actively courted for membership. The Hunger Strikes were particularly galvanizing for the younger generation. As Jane Enright, who became involved in Noraid in her twenties, explained:

> I think what motived me more than the Irish family connection was because I sort of came of age at the time of the 1981 Hunger Strikes, and that's what really got me to get more educated about what was happening over there. Because those boys, at that time, they were about my age. . . . I was a single parent. I was also trying to get through university, and was working multiple part time jobs. And I couldn't imagine dying for something other than maybe your child. That's what sort of smacked me in the face in the beginning. And that's when I started to educate myself about what was going on over there.[1212]

Coleman, whose grandparents were Irish-born and similarly got involved in Noraid in the wake of the Hunger Strikes, estimates that by the 1990s the majority of Noraid's membership was American born: "it became 70 percent Irish-American and 30 percent Irish-born because people died and people left, too." And they brought us in," namely, younger Irish Americans. This shift would result from a change within Provisional Sinn Féin's leadership, with Gerry

[1212] Interview with Jane Enright, chairwoman of Cumann na Saoirse Náisíunta, Yonkers, NY, July 18, 2011.

Adams of the Northern IRA assuming the helm from 50s Border Campaigner Ruairí Ó Brádaigh after the 1983 Sinn Féin Ard Fhéis.

By the late 1980s, Noraid split from factional infighting over its mainstreaming into the US domestic arena. One faction sought to add lobbying and publicity as staple activities, while "traditionalists" opposed shifting the organization's focus away from sending funds to prisoner dependents in the North and thus financing the armed struggle.[1213] With the Provisional Sinn Féin leadership ending the decades-long policy of abstentionism from the Irish parliament—which led Dáithí Ó Conaill and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh to split and form Republican Sinn Féin (RSF)—traditionalists such as Flannery left and formed Cumann na Saoirse Náisíunta (National Irish Freedom Committee),[1214] which ideologically supported RSF—the political face of the newly formed Continuity IRA (CIRA). As Des Dalton, Ó Brádaigh's successor as president of RSF explained, "Republican SF split off from Provisional SF in protest of [the latter's] recognition of the Free State. In 1986, it breached the SF, which sets out the primary object of SF as the reestablishment of the All Ireland socialist republic of 1916."[1215]

The further Adams mainstreamed into the political arena, the further attrition Noraid suffered. In 1989, the year CIRA was first publicly acknowledged, Noraid split again, with the formation of Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF). However, unlike the 1986 split, the 1989 split was a result of a power struggle between Provisional Sinn Féin—which was attempting to assert more control over the organization—and some of the old guard leadership who had long been

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[1213] Wilson, *Irish Americans and the Ulster Conflict*, 277.

[1214] According to one senior member of the organization, those present at the founding of the organization were: Michael Flannery, George Harrison, Joe Stynes, Michael Skeahan, and Liam Murphy. Email correspondence with Liam Murphy, October 20, 2012.

[1215] Interview with Des Dalton, president of Republican Sinn Féin, May 2, 2011, New York, NY.

autonomous in their activities. Coleman referred to the chapters as "fiefdoms" that were jealously guarded by incumbent leaders.[1216]

Declassified government documents reveal information from a source noting the dissatisfaction of the Provisional Sinn Féin/Provisional IRA (PSF/PIRA) leadership with the fundraising efforts of Noraid leaders,[1217] although it was also believed that the attempts to assert control were also due to too many information leaks to US authorities.[1218] A report on the state of Noraid's affairs conducted by representatives sent from PSF was scathing in its review, characterizing the organization as "ghettoized" and unprofessional.[1219]

In early 1989, PSF sent over a representative to take the helm of Noraid, ensuing in a power struggle. As one article reported: "In previous splits in the Republican movement, dating back to the foundation of Sinn Fein, the hardliners had usually won out. Sinn Fein first sent to the U.S. party official Brian MacDonald, who based himself in the Irish Northern Aid office in upper Manhattan to try and prevent any split."[1220] However, according to government documents, MacDonald assumed an "antagonistic leadership role in Noraid. His activities, while sanctioned by PSF in Ireland . . . caused great dissention in Noraid. Source reported that the dissatisfaction with McDonald [*sic*] by these individuals [former longstanding Noraid leaders] is to such a degree that they no longer participate in Noraid activities or fund raising." The old guard allegedly reached out to Joe Cahill, but "the age and health of the 'godfather,' had

[1216] Interview with Gerry Coleman, Jersey City, NJ, July 13, 2011.
[1217] USDOJ, FBI, Memorandum; To: DADIC (199F-5716); From: Special Agent (SA) [name redacted]; April 17, 1989; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.
[1218] USDOJ, FBI; [subject redacted]; To: DADIC (199F-New); From SA [name redacted]; September 12, 1988; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.
[1219] "Noraid at the Crossroads," *Irish Voice*, October 14, 1989.
[1220] Niall O'Dowd, "The Soldier, The Spy, the U.S. Connection," *Irish Voice*, December 21, 2005, available at: http://www.irishabroad.com/news/irishinamerica/news/the-soldier-the-spy-dec2105.asp.

weakened his position in PSF/PIRA."[1221] Subsequently, PSF sent Denis Donaldson—who was later found out to be a British spy—as "the man charged with ensuring that the Provisional Sinn Féin grip on American support was maintained."

Men such as Jim Maunsell in Boston and Gerard Walsh[1222] in Philadelphia perceived themselves as being pushed aside. One long-time New York City activist explained: "There was a house cleaning from the top. There was going to be a change in strategy and anyone that was unwilling to change was more or less dropped. There were new faces; you were no longer welcome. You were sort of ostracized. The new way of doing things seemed to have caught on and more money came available for this."[1223]

By the end of the year, a number of staunch, long-time Noraid supporters launched a public attack in the *Irish Echo*. Joining Flannery in defecting from Noraid were Pat O'Connell, national president who had actually set up another Noraid office before resigning; Maunsell, national chairman; four other members of the Noraid executive; scattered unit and regional heads; and a core group of the Suffolk County unit, which was under the long-time leadership of unit co-founder Charles McLaughlin. The public defection through a paid advertisement claimed that the newly constituted executive of Noraid was violating its founding principles as a result of a December 1988 meeting in Dublin between PSF and Noraid leaders, which had shifted the organization from its role as a "humanitarian organization" to pursuing politics.[1224]

[1221] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), also known as (aka) Noraid," July 5, 1989; New York, NY; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.

[1222] Interview with Gerard Walsh (pseudonym), Philadelphia area, October 29, 2011.

[1223] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, September 14, 2011.

[1224] "Attention All Irish Northern Aid Supporters," *Irish Echo*, October 7, 1989. The other defectors among the leadership were: Pat Mullin (national executive); Barney Mulligan (national executive); Dan McCormick (national executive, San Francisco); Mary McCormick (national executive, San Francisco); Frank O'Neill (chairman, central board Chicago); Dan McCormick, Jr. (West Coast regional chairman); Charlie Steele (chairman Lowell, Mass.); Charlie McLaughlin (chairman Suffolk unit); Mary Devlin (former chair Manhattan unit); John Boyle (chairman Connecticut unit); Rita O'Neill (founder Westchester/Putnam unit); John Hurley (chairman Boston unit); Kathleen Montague (former secretary national office); and Mary Shanahan (chair, national merchandising/distribution).

Yet the departure of O'Connell and Maunsell did not lead to great gains in support for RSF. As one article explained, the group around these two heads was "not particularly sympathetic to them [RSF]. Many of them were motivated by personal loyalty to O'Connell and Maunsell, rather than any coherent differences with Belfast."[1225] And as Murphy notes, the majority of Noraid members stayed on board because they were "habituated" to supporting it and it was "a social thing as well."[1226]

In 1989, Noraid launched its newsletter as "a forum for internal information as well as discussion." The goal was to make Noraid members aware of the national office's activities so that local units could bring themselves into line with its initiatives. The organization also announced the establishment of fundraising targets for each unit in an attempt to gain control over finances as well as accountability from each unit, which was to submit receipts to the central office detailing the money raised after events.[1227] It also attempted to regularize the stream of funds by implementing across the board membership dues and voluntary pledges from individuals and businesses.

The Noraid executive chairman's report by Paul Murray, the first Irish American to hold the position, made it clear that the organization was moving in a direction of more centralization and professionalization to "modernize" and appeal to more Americans. Regional and state chairs were appointed "lobbying coordinators" to create contacts with elected officials and human rights groups.[1228] In 1991, the organization even launched a Political Activists School in Belfast to train Noraid members to be at the forefront of the political and media struggle, while operation

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[1225] "Noraid at the Crossroads," *Irish Voice*, October 14, 1989.
[1226] Interview with Liam Murphy, New York, NY, June 23, 2011.
[1227] "INA Newsletter," no. 1, April/May 1989. On the letterhead the trustees were listed as: Michael Flannery (New York), Barney McTeague (Philadelphia), James Maunsell (Boston), Alex Murphy (Chicago), and Dan McCormick (San Francisco).
[1228] "INA Newsletter," no. 1, April/May 1989.

Lifeline had been established to provide a consistent stream of cash to An Cumann Cabhrach. It also implemented a formal annual dues program, which was interestingly called Homefront, a title that caused confusion as most members thought of Ireland as "home."[1229] The following year, a clear hierarchical structure had been put into place and a Political Action Department was in the works—a decision undertaken with the movement leadership on the other side of the Atlantic to create more formal structures within the organization. In an effort to create accountability to headquarters, the national executive even began to consider evaluation criteria for unit performance in terms of both fundraising and political action.[1230]

In tandem with the changing agenda of Sinn Féin, Noraid's tours took on a new dimension. Educational workshops that entailed "in-depth analysis and discussion of the current conflict and approaches to peace" were incorporated into the program.[1231]

The feud between Noraid and FOIF, as Wilson explains, was intense and virulent, entailing "wild accusations and rabid personal attacks." The former accused FOIF of cooperating with the federal authorities to undermine the liberation struggle, while the latter accused Noraid activists of working as FBI informants.[1232] And within what remained of Noraid, noted an FBI report, "Efforts [were] made by younger NORAID members to obtain control over NORAID from the old-line leaders. . . . The old-line leaders that they are trying to oust [were]: Ed Brady, Bob McCann, and Alex Murphy [in] Chicago."[1233]

That same October 1990 report also noted:

[1229] Irish Northern Aid Committee; Re: Regional Units; To: Regional Coordinators; From: Gerry Coleman, January 30, 1992.
[1230] Irish Northern Aid Committee, "Re: 'northern' Ireland TELETYPE," To: Regional Coordinators, Unit Chairpersons, political action coordinators, and members of the executive; From: Gerry Coleman; February 1, 1992, obtained from FOIPA request: 1146079-0001.
[1231] "Belfast March Tour," *Irish People*, April 15, 1989, 14.
[1232] Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict*, 47.
[1233] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), aka NORAID, Clan na Gael (CnG); Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF)," New York, NY, October 22, 1990," FOIPA no.: 1146099-000.

> FOIF continues to increase in popularity and fundraising capabilities in the New York and Boston areas. This is attributed to former NORAID leaders Patrick O'Connell and James Maunsell's leadership. Following their departure from NORAID they both maintained a loyal following and were in a position to take many former NORAID members into FOIF. Many of these people were large money donators and successful fund-raisers.

Noraid thus began to court "younger Irish Americans and Irish immigrants by conducting fundraisers targeted at the younger individuals," the "new target membership." According to an FBI report, there was "a marked increase in attendance at Noraid functions by individuals younger than the previous Noraid supporters." The FBI's New York Office found that "there was a reduction in attendance at Noraid's functions," seemingly caused by factionalism.[1234] It also asserted that financial support "decreased drastically" as a result of the rift within Noraid.[1235] An FBI report asserted that the organization was "in extreme financial distress."[1236] According to a government source in late 1990, "NORAID's position within PSF continue[d] to diminish because of the lack of funds being provided by NORAID to PSF/An Cumann Cabhrach (ACC)."[1237]

In Boston and New York, particularly, FOIF increased in popularity, as key members who were successful fundraisers in those areas defected from Noraid.[1238] A 1991 FBI document noted that FOIF "continue[d] to overshadow INAC's [the Irish Northern Aid Committee's] activities and fund raising capabilities."[1239]

[1234] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), also known as (aka) Noraid," New York, NY, July 5, 1989; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.
[1235] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), also known as (aka) Noraid," New York, October 24, 1989; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.
[1236] Ibid.
[1237] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), aka NORAID; Clan na Gael (CnG); Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF)," New York, NY, October 22, 1990; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.
[1238] Ibid.
[1239] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC)," October 28, 1991; file no.: NY 199F-1564.

Meanwhile, FOIF and the Clan na Gael remained "politically aligned and support[ed] each other against NORAID."[1240] As early as 1988, according to FBI source information, a PIRA associate from Belfast traveled to the United States to try to unify republican groups, particularly Noraid and Clan na Gael. However, it did not appear that the attempted alignment was accomplished nor in the latter half of the year even progressing well. "Both organizations," the document explained, "continue[d] to maintain their autonomy, as far as fund-raising functions." The report further noted that "While it is well known that PIRA/PSF will accept funds from any source, the various Republican support groups in the United States tend to overlap, and in some cases, negate each other's actions and cut into monies collected by one group or another."[1241] According to another FBI report on Clan na Gael, there was dissension in the New York leadership.[1242] The organization, however, continued to be a consistent and reliable source of PIRA funds, especially in County Tyrone. A report speculated that it may have increased its fundraising capabilities, as members left Noraid in the wake of the split and joined Clan na Gael.[1243] By 1990, the primarily Irish-born Clan na Gael was believed to have surpassed Noraid in raising funds in the United States.[1244]

The Irish American Fenian Society of New Jersey also withdrew its support of Noraid. And in 1991, an FBI informant reported that the Noraid testimonial dinner failed to get sold out;

[1240] Ibid., 2

[1241] US DOJ, FBI, "International Terrorism – Provisional Irish Republican Army," February 21, 1989, New York, NY; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194, p. 4-6.

[1242] US DOJ, FBI, Memorandum; To: DADIC (199F-5252); From: SA [redacted]; Subject "Clan na Gael; IT-PIRA"; January 17, 1989; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.

[1243] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), aka NORAID; Clan na Gael (CnG); Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF)," New York, NY, October 22, 1990; file no.: 199F-NY-C269194.

[1244] US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC), aka NORAID, Clan na Gael (CnG); Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF)," New York, NY, October 22, 1990. FOIPA no.: 1146099-000.

Clan na Gael failed to pay for two tables; that the support of the unions was much lower for that year's event; and that the AOH was "conspicuously absent."[1245]

On the political front, Noraid was confronted not only with criticism from within that the organization should maintain its traditional focus, but also from other Irish interest groups that perceived Noraid's reputation would get in the way of the "respectable political world." In developing its strategy for political action, it bluntly asserted that it lacked the necessary resources "to infiltrate the mainstream political consciousness of the nation." To this end, it advocated high impact campaigns and even suggested that units should operate under a new name "if it helps to add credibility or distance from local negativeness." [1246]

With the staged implementation of the 1998 Good Friday Peace Agreement, including such milestones as police integration and arms decommissioning, membership attrition continued. As Dalton explained, "Due to events in Ireland over past 10–20 years . . . people withdrew from Noraid. [In doing so] they made huge sacrifices, including friendships. Someone who left had mentioned that they had lost a whole network of friends when they left Noraid. It was deeply personal."[1247] One former Noraid member from San Francisco explained that he remained a member of Noraid much longer than most other current members of Cumann na Saoırse Náısıúnta because that affiliation had become deeply embedded as part of his identity; it was only with the decommissioning of arms—that "were so hard fought to get"— that prompted him to defect.[1248]

[1245] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee, also known as (aka) Noraid; IT – PIRA," New York, NY, February 7, 1991; file no.: 199F-DE-1790; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[1246] Irish Northern Aid Committee, Political Action Department, Gerry Coleman, National Director, "Political Action Report 1990."
[1247] Interview with Des Dalton, president of Republican Sinn Féin, New York, NY, May 2, 2011.
[1248] Conversation with Josh Jacobs, New York, NY, April 30, 2011.

With Noraid fundraising capability diminished by the rift, the FBI believed in late 1989 that a new organization was being established—Friends of Sinn Féin. And three years later, it believed that the United Irish Appeal was launched in upstate New York as an appendage of Noraid. By creating an offshoot that was distanced from the negative image of Noraid's Manhattan headquarters, the goal was to attract wealthier and more powerful Irish Americans.[1249] It was there, it anticipated, that Noraid's "real business" would be conducted. [1250]

According to an *Irish Voice* article, Dennis Donaldson, who was later found to be a British spy, returned to the US in the face of major dissension in the wake of the IRA's 1994 ceasefire. "Indeed Donaldson, by everyone's account, did a good job," it asserted, "of steadying the Sinn Fein ship in America and smoothing the path to the formation of the new organization, Friends of Sinn Fein."[1251] In 1995, Sinn Féin formed Friends of Sinn Féin, which is not a membership organization but the party's fundraising vehicle in the United States and in other countries. With dinner plates that have cost as high as $1,000, the target constituency was not the same segment of Irish America from which Noraid traditionally drew its funding.

In the wake of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, a *New York Observer* article covered a gathering at O'Lunney's, a known republican bar in Manhattan, of long-time activists who were opposed to the peace process. It reported:

> They say that Mr. Adams, president of Sinn Féin—the political party with ties to the I.R.A.—has abandoned them, preferring quiet tête-à-têtes in the White House to rallies in the working-class Irish bars of the Bronx and Queens. Held in equal contempt are the New York business leaders—led by Mutual of America chairman Bill Flynn and billionaire philanthropist Chuck Feeney—who escorted Mr. Adams into the corridors of power. They are referred to derisively as "cease-fire soldiers" who wouldn't dirty their

[1249] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid United Irish Appeal, International Terrorism Northern Ireland," New York, NY, January 9, 1995; file no.: 199F-LO-12260; FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[1250] US DOJ, FBI, "Irish Northern Aid Committee, aka Noraid, International Terrorism – Provisional Irish Republican Army, New York, NY, July 7, 1992; file no.: 199F-DE-1790: FOIPA no.: 1146079-001.
[1251] http://www.irishabroad.com/news/irishinamerica/news/the-soldier-the-spy-dec2105.asp.

> hands with Irish matters during the Troubles but who now play auctioneer to the sale of republican principles.[1252]

One activist in the Boston area expressed, "With the Friends of Sinn Fein, we felt like we were being pushed aside."[1253] Another former Noraid activist similarly noted:

> Getting Adams the visa [to visit the United States in 1994] was like us taking a cyanide pill. It shows the hidden support that we had no way of calculating. . . . Then that's when you saw a lot of support. Word went out to the colleges, unions, lawyers' guilds. It was done. People normally hidden in the shadows all came out. I probably wouldn't know anyone at a $500 a person Friends of Sinn Féin dinner.[1254]

Another flatly asserted, "Noraid was left to wither on the vine."[1255] Brendan Talton similarly noted that Sinn Féin came to "see Noraid as a liability" rather than an asset.[1256] "For all practical purposes," explained Patrick Kierney, "Noraid died with the Good Friday Agreement."[1257] He further asserted: "We didn't abandon Noraid; Noraid left us."

Conclusion: The Life and Decay of Noraid

Considering the countervailing forces discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the very longevity of Noraid is a puzzle. This chapter argued that Noraid engaged in network-building strategies at both the interpersonal and organizational levels that sustained the organization despite the triad of government suppression limiting its capacity to mobilize beyond the narrow confines of Irish communities that were themselves dissolving due to government policy and upward social mobility.

[1252] Eamon Lynch, "City's Irish Exiles Aren't Thrilled," *New York Observer*, May 11, 1998.
[1253] Interview with Kathleen Savage, Lynn, Mass., August 8, 2011.
[1254] Interview with Frank Walsh (pseudonym), Long Island, NY, September 14, 2011.
[1255] Interview with Liam Murphy, New York, NY, June 23, 2011.
[1256] Brendan Talton (pseudonym), New York, NY, March 25, 2011.
[1257] Conversation with Patrick Kierney (pseudonym), June 8, 2011.

Noraid leaders were relatively successful at mobilizing grassroots support in dissipating "urban villages" because they had deep communal ties to organizations that could be coopted and had enough clout to broker relationships with influential local actors with access to crucial resources. Local union leaders, in particular, were crucial to this strategy, as they wielded power within patronage networks endemic in the building-trades unions. While Noraid faded as its fundraisers in local pubs and parish halls were overshadowed by lavish events, Friends of Sinn Féin continued to rely on financial contributions from Irish labor leaders, although it moved beyond local union bosses to the national leadership of the AFL-CIO, including within the Building Trades Department, and that of powerful unions within it, including among others, the teamsters, laborers, sheet metal workers, ironworkers, bricklayers, and civil service workers.

Conclusion

The study aimed to advance conceptual clarification on a topic of study that is fraught with ambiguity, challenged by the discursive hangover of container models of nation/state/society, and thus far been under-theorized. Its primary goal was to generate hypotheses that form the elements of a theory by culling conceptual and explanatory building blocks from social movements, civil wars, international relations, and immigration scholarship as well as social network analysis.

The starting point was to dispense with common assumptions that have essentially become definitional elements of diasporas, which mean that phenomena requiring explanation are taken as a given. Instead of static aggregate collectivities, they were conceptualized as fluid constructions, undergoing continuous processes of group-making and -unmaking driven by political and social dynamics within a putative homeland and in countries of settlement (and potentially among other elements of the imagined trans-nation, although this area has not received much attention).

Both the civil wars literature and immigration studies have identified key processes involved in the construction and maintenance of social boundaries, such as violence, economic competition, internal communal policing, and social pressure, and their dissolution—upward social mobility in host countries, and the concomitant decline of ethnic economies and mutual aid institutions, being the classic example. Chapter 1 drew on a variety of examples spanning such populations as Croats and Kosovar Albanians to Kurds, Sikhs, and Somalis—situated in various contexts—from Canada and Western Europe to the Balkans and India—to illustrate these processes. Chapters 3 and 5 examined these in detail with regard to the Irish population in the

United States over the span of a century, tracing the effects of armed campaigns and nationalist political movements in Ireland, ethnic/racial violence and economic competition in the United States, labor movements on both sides of the Atlantic, the rise and fall of political machines in American cities, and upward social mobility in the construction of Irish America.

The second step was to situate diasporic financing for armed groups abroad as a form of collective action that is contingent on the opportunities and constraints of a multi-level context (or nested political opportunity structure) that is not necessarily static. Advancing this argument, Chapter 4 sought to conceptually de-territorialize civil wars by extending Mao's proverbial sea of insurgent support to potentially include not only populations within contested borders, but also those "inside the people but outside the state."[1258] Such "host" territories were conceived of as ancillary zones of a conflict that varied in their utility as a support base for armed groups based on the configuration of host foreign policy, political institutions, and state capacity. The chapter laid out a tripartite typology: transnationalized zones (akin to insurgent-dominated zones in contested states) at one end of the spectrum; re-territorialized zones (akin to state-controlled areas) at the other end; and contested zones (mixed, where both sides vie for support).

As the Irish case illustrated, the "host" state is potentially not the only relevant government actor in ancillary zones. Belligerent governments can exert influence not just by the policies that they adopt within their own territorial jurisdictions and indirectly by influencing host state policy but also directly on the ground, as so aptly illustrated by the United Kingdom's efforts to suppress American support for the IRA. When such entities exist, the policy and capacity of "homeland" states are also relevant. While the Republic of Ireland deprived the republican movement of legitimacy and effectively stifled mobilization within its borders and

[1258] Yossi Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," *SAIS Review* 22, no. 2 (2002): 115–144.

transnationally, in other cases home states have promoted "long-distance nationalism" by actively encouraging support for armed actors or passively if they simply are unable to repress them within their jurisdiction.

In making a case for qualitative fieldwork into the dynamics of collective action, however, McAdam has asserted that "the real action in social movements takes place at some level intermediate between the macro and micro," that is, in the existing associational groups or social networks of relevant populations.[1259] By focusing on these socio-organizational resources, and the effects of demographic change on their availability to diasporic radicals, this study has sought to give attention to this level.

More ambitiously, it has endeavored to theoretically and empirically connect all three levels. The Irish case illustrated how coordinated state suppression forced the republican movement to pursue a localized approach—that is, to mobilize "transnational villagers." Suppression thus elevated the importance of ethnic organizations and networks, for it was only within social spaces where trust could bypass risk, information could circulate from nationalist communities in the North, and the potential social costs of association with "the outlawed IRA" could be converted into solidary incentives that Noraid could survive. Yet the last of the Irish urban ghettos were disappearing, while their attendant organizational infrastructure was on the decline. These processes were a result of upward social mobility within mainstream American society, a trend compounded by too few new arrivals given US immigration restrictions from Europe in 1965 and the economic boom in Ireland during the 1970s. At the same time, the wave of the 1980s, the so-called New Irish, were an illegal transient population, who had been

[1259] Doug McAdam, "Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements," in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 284–5.

socialized in a Europeanizing Ireland and owing to their status and social distance from Irish Americans did not generally join communal institutions.

That the Irish Northern Aid Committee survived given these dual challenges from above and below was quite remarkable. This study argued that the explanation lies in the network-building strategies of Noraid's leadership, which were effective owing to their personal connections to the IRA leadership across the Atlantic (and hence legitimacy) and their prominence within their local communities. Noraid's leaders had long been joiners and held leadership positions within an array of communal associations and organizations. Simply stated, they were well connected, and the most lucrative ties of all were to the local Irish union bosses who not only had material and organizational resources but also were linked into informal patronage systems that gave them the capacity to reward and sanction their rank and file to participate in fundraising events.

A Future Research Agenda

This project is a first step in a larger project in developing a theory and testing the hypotheses advanced in the dissertation. Such an endeavor would involve both new cases for further theorizing about nested political opportunity structures and ancillary zones, in-group cleavages, and network mechanisms. Yet the utility of the Irish case has certainly not been exhausted. A more systematic disaggregation of the Irish case would be a potentially fruitful way to establish the extent to which social mobility (and attendant indicators thereof) is statistically significant in explaining patterns of mobilization. As George and Bennett note, "it is

valid to develop a theory from a case and then test the theory against additional evidence from the case that was not used to derive the theory."[1260]

A disaggregated Noraid leaves a number of outstanding questions for further research: Do high levels of mobilization indeed negatively correlate with levels of upward social mobility (e.g., income, education, occupational distribution) at the county level? Answering this question would require a more rigorous measure of mobilization, perhaps a composite index of various forms of support, and disaggregated census data. Did a Noraid unit fail to emerge in a place where it could be expected to have been established? Were there places that Noraid branches underperformed? Which units collapsed or were impaired given government suppression, and how were their social contexts and leadership different from those that survived and even thrived?

The next phase of research would also seek to more rigorously engage in social network analysis, which is a quantitative methodology. Actor prominence scores can be quantified, as can network density and connectivity among other staple variables. In this regard, this study has only scratched the surface of what can be done with the available data and network software technology.

Concluding Thoughts

This study has also sought to contribute to the historical record about the conflict in the North of Ireland, and more specifically on Irish America's (dis)connection to the Troubles. By mining multiple sources, aggregating existing data, and creating new forms of data, it made advances toward that goal.

[1260] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 112.

At the same time, Northern Ireland remains a fragile territory. Ninety-nine "peace walls" still stand in Belfast.[1261] In the Catholic areas, republican memorials are still maintained with fresh flowers, while in the largely Protestant section murals remain such as that of the UDA's Stephen McKeag, who earned the name Top Gun for his assassinations of mostly ordinary Catholic civilians, and that of William of Orange, which memorializes his defeat of Catholic King James II in the Battle of Boyne of 1690, which "secured British dominion in Ireland for more than 200 years."[1262]

Although it has been more than a decade since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), media reports as recent as 2012 have noted violent incidents occurring in the North. In July, the Ardoyne nationalist neighborhood in Belfast witnessed rioting by Catholic youths during the Orange Order's annual parade celebrating King William III's victory.[1263] Two months later, the endemic problem of rioting over the tribal ritual of parading flared up once again, although this time organized by loyalist paramilitaries in response to a republican parade.[1264]

While the Provisional IRA decommissioned its weapons in 2005, dissident armed groups remain. Indeed, yet another armed faction, simply calling itself the IRA, surfaced in 2012 alongside the Continuity IRA and the so-called Real IRA (designated as terrorist groups by the United States), by claiming responsibility for the murder of a 25-year-old Catholic police officer in the county of Omagh. The Real IRA's Easter statement that year portended further killing, leading some to suggest that although Northern Ireland had come a long way since the GFA it

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[1261] Sean O'Hagan, "Belfast, Divided in the Name of Peace," *Observer* (London), January 21, 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jan/22/peace-walls-troubles-belfast-feature (accessed September 18, 2012).
[1262] John F. Burns, "Political Rifts Reappear in Northern Ireland Riots," *New York Times*, July 13, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/14/world/europe/14ireland.html (accessed September 18, 2012).
[1263] Ibid.
[1264] "Belfast Riots," *Irish Times*, September 7, 2012, available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2012/0907/1224323695985.html (accessed September 21, 2012).

still had far to go. And in July 2012, on the heels of the historic handshake between Queen Elizabeth and Martin McGuiness, first deputy minister of Northern Ireland and former IRA leader, came a statement delivered by motley dissident factions, which excluded the Continuity IRA and its political arm Republican Sinn Féin, asserting that they had formed a united command structure. A *Guardian* report portended:

> The overwhelming majority of nationalists in Northern Ireland vote for and support Sinn Féin in its peaceful strategy to achieve Irish unity; election results over more than a decade bear this out. . . . Nonetheless in parts of the province left behind by the peace process the soil is toxic enough for the teeth of a terrorist Hydra to create a new army of the malcontent.[1265]

In the United States, a *Wall Street Journal* article ominously reported the previous year that dissident republicans were "trying to emerge from the shadows by raising funds in the U.S."—"a traditional bastion for hard-line Irish Republicanism," "a fertile IRA funding-raising target."[1266] If the American connection of past decades was exaggerated, any foreshadowing of potential support for militants is even more so now. Absent mass atrocities against Irish Catholics, it is highly unlikely that the modest support of the 1970s and 1980s could be matched on US soil. There are a number of reasons that lead to this prediction.

First is that since 1996 support organizations of designated FTOs are outlawed. Thus, even providing financial support to such organizations is illegal and carries grave risks. Noraid of the 1980s, which had an organization deemed a terrorist group (i.e., the PIRA) by the State Department as its foreign principal, could simply not exist as a legal entity under current US domestic law. Thus the opportunity context is even far more inhospitable than it was in Noraid's heyday.

[1265] Henry McDonald, "How Republican Dissidents Delivered Their Statement of Unity," *The Guardian* (London), July 26, 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/26/republican-dissidents-statement-real-ira.
[1266] Alistair MacDonald, "An Old Threat in Ireland Tries to Raise U.S. Profile," *Wall Street Journal*, May 5, 2011, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704322804576303083716808452.html.

At the communal level, the old republican patriarchs from the War of Independence are all dead, and with no membership so are their veteran organizations. Meanwhile, Irish America's immigrant population is far fewer than the already severely depleted immigrant population of the 1980s, and personal connections are by far to people in the Republic of Ireland, which over the past half-century has become modernized, Europeanized, Americanized, and globalized. Observing from the turnout at AOH and other functions over the past year, the median age of attendees is probably at least 60. Meanwhile the Clan na Gael is largely defunct,[1267] while Noraid exists as a mere skeleton of its former self.[1268]

For the few who remain somewhat politically active within Irish America on the Ulster conflict there is one simple solution to the North's woes: "ENGLAND GET OUT OF IRELAND," as a banner stated at the co-sponsored Clan na Gael and Noraid dinner commemorating the 30th anniversary of the 1981 Hunger Strikes. Despite all the bluster of the speeches that night before a crowd of some 700 guests, the underlying message was loudly clear: Sinn Féin and the peace process have furthered the goal of a united Ireland and remain legitimate.

Given the small showing that turned out for the 2011 annual testimonial dinner of Cumann na Saoirse Náisíunta (National Irish Freedom Committee)—the break-away organization from Noraid that considers the GFA to be a failed agreement packaged "in frilly English lace to impress the gullible and provide cover for the latest batch of traitors and power

[1267] Writing nearly three decades ago, Funchion had described the organization as "anemic." He asserted: "The members of the Clan are old men, and when they die the Clan will probably die with them. Michael F. Funchion, Clan na Gael," in *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, ed. Michael F. Funchion (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 92.
[1268] Sean O'Driscoll, "Noraid Set to Restructure," *Irish Voice*, January 17, 2006.

hungry political predators"[1269]— it was starkly obvious that support for militancy in the United States, as in Ireland on both sides of the border, has dwindled to almost nil since the peak years of violence in the North nearly four decades ago. This small group of militants who refuse to recognize either the North or South as legitimate governments and is ideologically aligned with Republican Sinn Féin, considered the political arm of the Continuity IRA, has endured despite FBI monitoring and infiltration. Some of the elder members of this intimately connected group were once at the forefront of mobilizing modest, yet significant, support from Irish America for the Provisional IRA's campaign for a united, sovereign Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s. For them, the war has not ended. The remaining "dragon's teeth,"[1270] however, are too very few to pose any challenge to the status quo in the North.

[1269] Cumann na Saoirse Náisíunta, "Good Friday Agreement Position Paper," available at: http://www.irishfreedom.net/NIFC/Position%20papers/GFA.htm (accessed October 14, 2012).

[1270] In Greek mythology, the planted teeth of the slayed dragon guarding the water spring of Ares, the god of war, spring from the ground into ferocious warriors. The myths of Cadmus and Jason in which the dragon's teeth feature illustrate how actions can have undesirable consequences, in this case the harvesting of violence. Historian A.M Sullivan used this metaphor to describe mass mobilization around revolutionary republicanism in the early twentieth century: "Famine clearances have sown dragon's teeth from the Hudson to the Mississippi." A.M. Sullivan quoted in Thomas N. Brown, "The Origins of and Character of Irish-American Nationalism," in *Irish Nationalism and the American Contribution*, ed. Lawrence John McCaffrey (New York: Arno Press, 1976), 328.

Appendix

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the United States, Canada, and the European Union

US Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

- Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
- Abu Sayyaf Group
- Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
- Al-Shabaab
- Ansar al-Islam
- Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
- Asbat al-Ansar
- Aum Shinrikyo
- Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
- Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
- Continuity Irish Republican Army
- Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
- HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
- Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
- Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
- Hizballah (Party of God)
- Islamic Jihad Group
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
- Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
- Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)
- Kahane Chai (Kach)
- Kata'ib Hizballah
- Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)
- Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
- Lashkar i Jhangvi
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
- Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
- Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
- National Liberation Army (ELN)

- Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)
- PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
- Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)
- al-Qa'ida
- al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GSPC)
- Real IRA
- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
- Revolutionary Organization 17 November
- Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
- Revolutionary Struggle
- Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
- United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

Source: US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," January 19, 2010, available at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. According to this document, "FTO designations play a critical role in [the U.S. government's] fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business." As FTOs are considered to be either threats to U.S. nationals or national security, the document notes that "it is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide 'material support or resources' to a designated FTO." Among the stated effects of the designation is the curbing of terrorism financing, in part through deterring donations and contributions to named organizations.

Canada's "Listed Entities"

- Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
- Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
- Al Jihad (AJ)
- Al Qaida
- Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (AAMB)
- Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (AGAI)
- Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI)
- Ansar al-Islam (AI)
- Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
- Asbat Al-Ansar ("The League of Partisans")
- Aum Shinrikyo

- Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)
- Babbar Khalsa (BK)
- Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)
- Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
- Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
- Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
- Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
- Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya) ("Islamic Resistance Movement")
- Harakat ul-Mudjahidin (HuM)
- Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
- Hizballah
- International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
- Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
- Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
- Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI)
- Kahane Chai (KACH)
- Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)
- Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
- Mujahedin e Khalq (MEK)
- Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
- Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
- Sendero Luminoso (SL)
- Vanguards of Conquest (VOC)
- World Tamil Movement (WTM)

Source: Public Safety Canada, "Listed entities," January 13, 2010, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx.

European Union Groups and Entities

- Abu Nidal Organisation – AN (a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary Council, a.k.a. Arab Revolutionary Brigades, a.k.a. Blacssk September, a.k.a. Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims)
- Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade
- Al Aqsa e.V.
- Al-Takfir and al-Hijra
- *Cooperativa Artigiana Fuoco ed Affini – Occasionalmente Spettacolare (Artisans' Cooperative Fire and Similar – Occasionally Spectacular)

- *Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo (Armed Units for Communism)
- Aum Shinrikyo (a.k.a. AUM, a.k.a. Aum Supreme Truth, a.k.a. Aleph)
- Babbar Khalsa
- *Cellula Contro Capitale, Carcere i suoi Carcerieri e le sue Celle (CCCCC, Cell Against Capital, Prison, Prison Warders and Prison Cells)
- Communist Party of the Philippines, including New People's Army – NPA, Philippines, linked to SISON, Jose Maria (a.k.a Armando Liwanag, a.k.a Joma, who plays a leading role in the Communist Party of the Philippines, including NPA)
- *Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
- *EPANASTATIKOS AGONAS (Revolutionary Struggle)
- *'Euskadi Ta Askatasuna'/'Tierra Vasca y Libertad' – (ETA, Basque Fatherland and Liberty); the following organisations are part of the terrorist group ETA: K.a.s., Xaki, Ekin, Jarrai Haika Segi, Gestoras proamnistía, Askatasuna, Batasuna (a.k.a. Herri Batasuna, a.k.a. Euskal Herritarrok), Acción Nacionalista Vasca/Euskal Abertzale Ekintza (ANV/EAE), Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas/Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista (PCTV/EHAK))
- Gama'a al Islamiyya (a.k.a. Al Gama'a al Islamiyya) (Islamic Group – IG)
- İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi – IBDA C (Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front)
- *Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre – G.R.A.P.O. (Antifascist Resistance Groups First of October)
- Hamas, including Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem
- Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
- Hofstadgroep
- Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
- International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
- *Solidarietà Internazionale (International Solidarity)
- Kahane Chai (a.k.a. Kach)
- Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF)
- Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), (a.k.a. KADEK, a.k.a. KONGRA-GEL)
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
- *Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
- Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)
- *Orange Volunteers (OV)
- Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General – Command (a.k.a. PFLP – General Command)
- *Real IRA
- *Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Comunista Combattente (Red Brigades for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party)
- *Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
- Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

- *Epanastatiki Pirines (Revolutionary Nuclei)
- *Dekati Evdomi Noemvri' (Revolutionary Organisation 17 November)
- Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP/C) (a.k.a. Devrimci Sol [Revolutionary Left'], a.k.a. Dev Sol [Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party])
- Sendero Luminoso (SL, Shining Path)
- Stichting Al Aqsa (a.k.a. Stichting Al Aqsa Nederland, a.k.a. Al Aqsa Nederland)
- Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK) (a.k.a. Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, a.k.a. Kurdistan Freedom Hawks)
- *Brigata XX Luglio (Twentieth of July Brigade)
- *Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
- Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, United Self Defence Forces/Group of Colombia)
- *Federazione Anarchica Informale (FAI, Unofficial Anarchist Federation)

*Indicates a European Union–based organization.

Source: Council Common Position 2009/67/CFSP, January 26, 2009, *Official Journal of the European Union*, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:023:0037:0042:EN:PDF (accessed February 16, 2010).

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