

A PARADOX OF PEACEBUILDING AID: INSTITUTIONALIZED EXCLUSION
AND VIOLENCE IN POST-CONFLICT STATES

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,

The City University of New York

2009

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
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Abstract

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EXCLUSION AND VIOLENCE IN POST-CONFLICT STATES

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Exclusion and violence persist in post-conflict states, despite external assistance to the demilitarization of politics, which the literature emphasizes as the primary goal of aid. Through a field-based study of Tajikistan and a survey of an additional three cases (Cambodia, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone), this dissertation finds that aid focuses on economic liberalization in the initial stage of post-war transition. Such an organization of aid empowers a particular group of elites who have privileged access to state assets at the time of civil war settlement, and establishes institutional frameworks that will consolidate the economic control of the incumbent regime elites. As the incumbent regime elites seek to remove wartime commanders and opposition leaders from the state apparatus, thereby nullifying power-sharing and other provisions of peace agreements, violence tends to be instigated by increasingly repressive governments or those facing exclusion from sources of livelihood. Aid thus institutionalizes exclusion and sustains patterns of violence along civil war divisions, rather than transforming existing political and economic structures.

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I n t r o d u c t i o n

Exclusion and violence persist in post-conflict states, despite international peacebuilding assistance to promote “the absence of armed conflict and modicum of participatory politics” (Call and Cousens 2007:3). Since the 1990s, mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved from ceasefire monitoring to multifaceted support for the implementation of peace agreements, including, *inter alia*, post-war elections; constitutional reforms; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; and repatriation and resettlement of displaced populations. In addition, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, Fund, and Support Office were established in 2006 to coordinate external assistance and marshal resources for post-war recovery. Bilateral donors have also promulgated a range of strategies to promote civilian security and democratic decision-making in post-conflict states, including the reform of security agencies, establishment of rule of law, and community-based reconciliation and development.

Yet the following anecdotal evidence demonstrates repeated failures of external assistance in resolving insecurity and facilitating inclusive decision-making after civil wars. In Timor-Leste, where the United Nations spent more than \$2 billion in peacekeeping from 1999 to 2002, the dismissal of 600 soldiers in 2006 resulted in a

mob-like rampage and prompted another multilateral military operation. Haiti experienced a renewed insurgency in 2004, after a series of UN missions had attempted to re-establish law and order from 1994 to 2001. In El Salvador, more people were killed in the first four years of peace than during a decade of civil war, despite the signing of the peace accord in 1990 and the deployment of peacekeeping forces in 1991, as murder rates doubled from 1992 to 1994 (Hume 2004).

Furthermore, in a number of post-conflict states, a small group of regime elites has established a monopolistic control of economic assets and an increasingly repressive state apparatus. Income inequality has increased after the end of civil wars in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Tajikistan.¹ A recent quantitative study finds that multidimensional peacekeeping operations with extensive civilian, police, and military mandates, which are also essentially peacebuilding strategies, have had little, no, or negative effect on democratization (Fortna 2006). In Cambodia, Guatemala, and Tajikistan, opposition leaders have been persecuted through a coup, targeted assassinations, and criminal prosecutions initiated by incumbent governments respectively. Charles Call and Susan Cook also argue that 13 out of 18 countries that

¹ Income inequality, measured by the Gini Index, has shifted as follows (higher number indicates larger inequality): Cambodia - from 40.39 (1997) to 41.71 (2004); El Salvador - from 49.86 (1995) to 52.36 (2002); Mozambique - from 39.61 (1997) to 47.29 (2002); Tajikistan - from 31.52 (1999) to 32.64 (2003). Data for post-war years were not available in Angola, Haiti, Guatemala, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. Source: World Development Indicators (www.worldbank.org).

experienced United Nations peacekeeping missions between 1988 and 2002 have some form of an authoritarian regime today (2003:233-34).²

One way to explain these empirical findings is that post-war violence tends to be waged by the incumbent regimes, which tend to be exclusionary, or by groups alienated from the state structures. This is a puzzling outcome of peace implementation, because power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and other provisions of peace agreements would have precluded power consolidation by a particular group. Furthermore, the persistence of post-war exclusion and violence suggests that international assistance to the demilitarization of politics has led to an opposite outcome.

To explore the causes of post-war exclusion and violence, this dissertation focuses on the effect of post-conflict aid on the internal elite bargaining process and institutional frameworks that emerge from it, especially as it relates to the distribution and redistribution of resources. This emphasis is in conformity with the literature on state formation and regime change, which argues that the success of political and economic

² These 13 countries are Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Tajikistan. Four countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique and Namibia) were considered electoral democracies, and only one (Croatia) was considered a liberal democracy. Their regime classifications are based on Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," and Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," both in *Journal of Democracy* 13, 2 (April 2002). Nicholas Sambanis and Michael Doyle also argue that only 35 percent of post-conflict states have achieved the minimum standard of political openness. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000).

reorganization hinges on state capacities to manage the allocation of income (Ayoob 1995, Reno 1999, Rubin 2002). Conversely, the patronage-based appropriations of public funds and assets is said to lead to the decay of the state and civil wars. Violence then becomes an instrument for armed groups and individuals to gain control of economic and natural resources. To transform these patterns of civil war violence and resource extraction, it would be of particular importance to reform and strengthen the structure of public administration and finance in the aftermath of the civil war. Aid is likely to play a significant role in this process, as post-war reforms are often designed, funded, and implemented with external assistance.

This dissertation will examine whether post-war exclusion and violence is a pattern deriving from the way in which external actors have implemented post-conflict assistance or a unique challenge in particular circumstances. For analysis of post-conflict aid and its consequences, this dissertation combines field-based research in Tajikistan with a survey of three additional cases: Cambodia, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone. Chapter 1 discusses the relevant theoretical framework, the main argument, and research methodology, including the rationale of case selection. Chapter 2 presents data on aid flows to post-conflict states. They demonstrate that donors prioritize economic liberalization, rather than peace implementation, in post-conflict states. Chapters 3 and 4 analyze how such an organization of aid affects power relations among groups competing for access to resources in post-conflict states, based on a case study of

Tajikistan. These two chapters also present evidence of how donor policies allow a formation of institutional frameworks that exacerbate post-war exclusion and violence. Chapter 5, based on a survey of aid flows to Cambodia, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone, shows that despite different local circumstances, donors adopted nearly identical approaches to their involvement in Tajikistan, and these led to similar outcomes of post-war transition: exclusion and violence institutionalized in the process of peacebuilding with international assistance.

Chapter 1

THEORIES, PUZZLES, AND RESEARCH ON POST-WAR TRANSITION

Exploring the impact of external involvement on post-war transition, this dissertation argues that aid, as currently designed and implemented, facilitates the establishment of political structures that privilege a small group of incumbent elites and exclude the majority of populations from decision-making, which in turn explains two distinct patterns of violence: state-led repression and local resistance against exclusion. The influx of aid after the end of civil wars, which constitutes the bulk of income in many post-conflict states, should change the dynamics of local power realignment:

The decisions about whom to finance, whom to establish an aid relationship with, and whose preferences to consult have direct influence on the peace process and the success of implementing the provisions of a peace agreement (Woodward 2002:206).

However, the extent and way in which aid has shaped the outcome of post-war transition remain unclear. Some argue that a large-scale foreign presence “intruding” in domestic politics is detrimental to conflict transformation because it monopolizes “political space for indigenous actors to build home-grown institutions,” thereby

removing incentives for warlords to democratize (Fortna 2006:31). Others propose that aid is allocated in such a way that fails to “give concentrated attention and resources to state institutions during the critical five-year period when the state is still weak and its authority contested” (Barnett 2006:9). This failure of state building, some argue, is due to donors’ preoccupation with the establishment of a liberal-democratic kind of state, not the degree of a state’s ability to manage public administration and finance (Fukuyama 2004, Paris 2004, 1997). Pressed to adopt a minimalist state model, governments in many aid-dependent countries no longer distribute resources. Instead, it is international donors and their implementing organizations that undertake the task. Post-conflict aid can thus be characterized by “liberalization,” “NGOization” (subcontracting arrangements by aid agencies), and “informalization” which is also related to liberalization in that ad hoc, privately managed arrangements take precedence over formalized regulation by public authorities (Gould 2005).

Yet if aid prohibits local institution building or tends to bypass the state, why have post-war regimes been able to recentralize power and establish bureaucratic-administrative structures that consolidate their exclusive access to resources? In many post-conflict states, indicators for inclusive decision-making and effective economic policy planning and execution have declined during post-war transition (Table 1.1).³ It remains unclear

³ Indicators from Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005* (2006). Accountability is defined as the extent of citizen participation in government selection, freedom of expression and association, and free

why international assistance promoting the liberal-market state model has failed and resulted in the opposite outcome of its intended effect: post-war exclusion and violence. To explore this puzzle, this chapter will begin with a review of the relevant literature, including theories on civil war settlement, peacebuilding, state formation, the political economy of armed conflict, and regime change, followed by the main argument and research methodology. It concludes with an introduction of the peace process in Tajikistan, which highlights the distinct nature of post-war exclusion and violence and the existing literature's inadequacy in explaining it.

media. Political stability is based on the likelihood of unconstitutional or violent government overthrow. Government effectiveness is measured by the quality of civil services and their policy formulation and implementation. Regulatory quality is defined as the government ability to regulate private sector development. Rule of law is (1) the extent to which state agents abide by rules, (2) the quality of contract enforcement, the police, the courts, and (3) the likelihood of crime and violence. Control of corruption is the extent of the government control over private gain and "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

Table 1.1: Indicators of institutional capacities in post-conflict states

Cases	Transition period ⁴	Governance Indicators: rank 1-100 (higher values indicate better ratings)					
		Accountability	Political Stability	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Corruption Control
Afghanistan	2002	2.9	0.5	7.7	0.0	0.0	1.0
	2005	11.6	2.4	9.1	5.4	1.4	2.5
Angola	2000	10.1	1.4	1.4	3.4	3.4	2.0
	2005	16.9	23.1	17.7	8.9	8.2	10.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2003	41.5	18.4	25.8	19.7	17.3	36.8
	2005	43.5	24.5	33.5	31.7	30.4	46.3
Cambodia	1996	25.5	10.4	27.1	32.4	15.8	14.6
	2005	23.7	31.1	18.7	27.7	11.1	8.9
CAR	2000	29	39.6	11.5	21.7	26.9	8.8
	2005	17.9	16.5	3.3	9.4	7.7	11.3
Croatia	1996	31.3	44.8	48.1	43.6	32.1	33.7
	2005	61.4	58.0	67.5	65.3	53.6	59.1
DRC	2000	1.4	0.0	1.0	1.5	0.5	1.5
	2005	1.9	0.0	1.4	4.4	1.0	2.0
El Salvador	1996	39.9	34.4	34.8	77.0	34.0	22.9
	2005	52.7	40.1	45.9	57.4	44.0	44.3
Haiti	2000	24.2	18.9	2.4	11.3	2.9	9.8
	2004	9.2	5.2	1.0	8.4	2.4	2.9
Guatemala	1996	34.8	19.3	48.3	77.3	21.6	24.5
	2005	35.7	21.7	29.7	46.5	14.5	17.7
Liberia	1998	18.8	9.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	1.0
	2003	6.8	0.5	1.0	5.4	2.4	8.3
Mozambique	1996	41.8	28.3	34.3	13.2	6.2	31.7
	2005	44.4	47.2	44.0	28.2	31.4	31.0
Namibia	1996	62.0	63.7	67.1	45.6	64.6	83.4
	2005	57.5	62.7	58.4	56.4	53.1	58.6
Rwanda	1996	6.3	8.0	5.7	12.3	48.8	N/A
	2005	10.6	12.7	12.9	23.8	15.9	24.1
Somalia	1996	0.0	2.8	0.0	0.5	1.4	0.5
	2005	1.9	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Sierra Leone	2000	12.1	6.6	5.3	12.8	17.8	21.1
	2005	34.8	30.7	9.6	17.8	12.1	17.2
Tajikistan	2002	15.9	15.1	8.1	8.4	6.3	9.3
	2005	15.9	9.4	12.4	15.8	16.9	11.8
Timor-Leste	2002	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2005	51.2	26.9	14.8	14.4	36.7	25.6

⁴ Without comprehensive data, I used the year closest to the end of peacekeeping missions in Angola (1999), El Salvador (1995), Guatemala (1997), Liberia (1996 for the 1993-1996 UN Observer Mission), Mozambique (1994), Somalia (1995), and Tajikistan (1997) as the beginning of a “post-war” transition period. When conflicts resumed, I used the year in which new missions were launched as the end of the transition period (e.g. 2003 in Liberia and 2004 in Haiti). For historical cases, such as Cambodia (1993) and Namibia (1989), I used the earliest data available: 1996. For ongoing missions, I used the mission’s start year (2000 for Afghanistan, and 1999 for DRC and Sierra Leone).

Theoretical Framework

Significant progress has been made in understanding war economies and violence, including the role of aid as a contributing factor to the outbreak and escalation of armed conflict. The literature, however, has not addressed the political economy of post-war transition. “There has been no systematic analysis on the contribution of economic factors to the success or failure in the implementation of peace agreements” (Woodward 2002:183). Instead, the literature on civil war settlement focuses on the merits and demerits of various power-sharing arrangements. Similarly, the literature on peacebuilding proposes a range of organizational reforms that external actors can support to demilitarize post-war politics, but post-war exclusion and violence can persist both despite and in the absence of these political frameworks. Alternatively, theories of state formation and regime change argue that institutional frameworks depend on the specific patterns of interaction among various elite groups, and that aid can influence both economic structures and the political process.

Civil War Settlement

As Roy Licklider states, one of the main characteristics of civil war, as opposed to those of international war, is that “belligerents have to live in the same political unit after the

war” and that the political system has to be re-created if there is “multiple sovereignty,” in which certain populations take orders from non-state entities (1995:682). To establish political frameworks that can reconcile warring parties and reorganize domestic political authority, the literature on civil war settlement has proposed various power-sharing mechanisms, including ethnic partitions, consociational elite pacts, and federalism. Donald Rothchild called these mechanisms a “formal group-based security-building system,” because their basic premise is first and foremost the resolution of security dilemmas among groups involved in conflict (2002:120).

Ethnic-partition solutions are based on the assumption that physical control and self-governance by ethnically homogenous groups is the only sustainable solution to resolve security issues in disputed territories (1996, 1998). Similarly, the consociational model of power-sharing assumes that ethnic identity should be the basis of participation in decision-making and allocates proportional quotas for legislative, executive, and administrative appointments among various groups (Lijphart 1969, Sisk 1996). Others have argued that group identity is not a pre-determined, primordial basis of individual associations but develops in the context of crisis, as the lack of state-provided protection may turn people to seek support from representatives of their ethnic groups. These scholars propose that territorial or functional federalism can overcome insecurity by enhancing group autonomy. In federalist structures, competitive relationships between the central government and regions are also considered to allow more efficient delivery

of social services and prevent the state from establishing and abusing the monopoly of power in the long run (Lake and Rothchild 1998).⁵

However, these formulas have been criticized by those who argue that “to consolidate these ethnic identities through institutions which build on group differences....would be, at best, an unnecessary perpetuation of competing identities, and at worst, a folly inviting instability” (O'Sullivan 1996:5). Nicholas Sambanis demonstrates empirically that ethnic partition neither prevents the recurrence of war nor resolves the insecurity of minority groups residing in partitioned territories (2000). Pure partitions are also unlikely and can cause large-scale violence, as was the case in the India-Pakistan partition of 1947. It has been also suggested that federalist autonomy can reinforce separate identities among sizable groups, incite ethno-nationalist discourse, and enhance the capacities of local political institutions to rebel against the central government (Brubaker 1996, Cornell 2002, Stewart and O'Sullivan 1998). The delegation of law enforcement authority to autonomous groups can exacerbate security fears and reinforce self-help armament at the local level. Neither does decentralization redress inter-group and intra-group disparity of income distribution, particularly in the context of diminished state capacities or uneven development exacerbated by civil wars.

⁵ This characterization of the state departs from their earlier work in “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict” (1996) in which Rothchild and Lake argued that ethnic conflict arises from emerging anarchy, caused by the state’s loss of ability to provide credible protection or arbitrate group conflict, which exacerbates the intra-group strategic dilemmas.

Moreover, ethnic partitions, federalism, and consociation are largely static models, which render them unable to readjust electoral representation in the aftermath of major social change, such as large-scale demographic shifts or population movements (Licklider 1998).

These power-sharing models are also based on a narrow and formal definition of democracy—electoral contestation—which does not necessarily guarantee inclusiveness, especially when the right to participate in decision-making is predetermined on the basis of ethnic or other group identity (e.g., 25 percent of parliamentary representation no matter how votes are cast). Given these challenges, power-sharing arrangements may be understood simply as “agreement during the negotiations on power-sharing” which “creates the possibility that the parties may be able to use this arrangement as an initiating point for an iterative bargaining process that can lead to new institutions during the subsequent political consolidation period” (Rothchild 2005:260). Post-conflict exclusion and violence could be shaped by the institutional frameworks that emerge from this process of iterative internal bargaining. Yet neither the scholars who propose the group-based power-sharing formulas nor their critics have explained whether and how post-war institutional frameworks have transformed the nature and level of violence and exclusion in post-conflict states.

Peacebuilding

Similar to the literature on civil war settlement, the literature on peacebuilding has proposed a range of organizational frameworks, primarily for security restoration. According to George Downs and Stephen Stedman, the success of peace implementation should be measured by the containment and termination of large-scale violence “on a self-enforcing basis so that the implementers can go home without fear of the war rekindling” (2002:51). In this context, Terrence Lyons argues that the success of peace implementation depends on whether armed groups can be transformed into political parties, for which international assistance should focus on building electoral institutions that facilitate the de-militarization of politics (2002). Charles Call and William Stanley advocate the reform of security agencies, such as the police, to protect civilians who often face new threats after peace agreements are signed, because conflicts undermine the justice sector and civil war settlements often reduce the number of security personnel (2002:419).

Yet as was the case in Angola, Haiti, Liberia, and Timor-Leste, peace processes have collapsed despite a cessation of fighting, new elections, and the establishment of an interim government through large-scale international assistance, resulting in the resumption of civil wars or new patterns of large-scale conflict. Furthermore, the nature of post-war exclusion and violence may diverge from wartime patterns of exclusion and

violence, involving different sets of actors, policies, and mechanisms. For instance, incidents of post-war exclusion and violence are often caused by governments that adopted an “integrated” state model, which is supposed to facilitate participatory decision-making, based on its unitary and non-communal political framework, such as majoritarian or proportional representation (Rothchild 2002).

These shortcomings in the analysis of both civil war settlement and peacebuilding suggest the fallacy of a statist approach, which considers the state as a set of unitary bureaucratic organizations autonomous from underlying social and economic conditions. Instead, “peace is profoundly social. It is maintained by enduring social arrangements that allocate resources and which include the state” (“New Thinking on State Formation and Peacebuilding” 2004:1-2).⁶

Yet the literature on peacebuilding fails to explore underlying conditions that form the basis of institutional capacities. For instance, the peacebuilding literature suggests a post-war transition is more likely to succeed when there is (1) a short non-identity conflict, (2) a smaller number of warring parties, (3) local (primarily economic) capacities for change, (4) a peace agreement signed by all parties, and (5) international

⁶ The report further argues: “This does not mean, however, that “decentralization” in the form of federalism or devolution guarantees a more effective or accountable state. These goals may require reform of the center rather than decentralization, especially in aid-dependent states.” “New Thinking on State Formation and Peacebuilding” (paper presented at the New Thinking on State Formation and Peacebuilding, Century Association, New York City, December 17 2004), 1-2.

assistance (Cousens, et al. 2002, Walter 1997). Many of these local conditions are not static variables, however. Economic capacities can shift over time to the benefit or detriment of peacebuilding. Elizabeth Wood (2000) argues that in El Salvador, change from a labor-intensive agrarian economy to remittance-based commercial and financial development resulted in the recapture of the state by oligarchs, which hampered opportunities for political liberalization, after sustained insurgency had created economic incentives for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Similarly, the nature and level of international commitment can fluctuate. Bruce Jones (2001) argues that in Rwanda, disconnects between external actors mediating the conflict and those assisting in the implementation of the peace agreement gave an opportunity for oligarchic elites to solidify their opposition to the peace process, which they feared would undermine their economic and political privileges. Moreover, according to the literature on state formation and civil war, international aid can exacerbate state weakness and escalate the causes of armed conflict, rather than resolve them. The following section will discuss this proposition.

State Formation and Civil War

The literature on state formation and the political economy of civil wars suggests that conflicts are not necessarily the result of a breakdown or collapse of the state, but rather derive from a competition over exclusionary uses of economic resources. Modern state

structures in Western Europe, Charles Tilly argues, emerged from centuries of warfare involving extensive extraction of resources—military and economic—by warlords seeking to conquer or eliminate other domestic authorities (1985). In contrast, these resources required for the formation of unitary state apparatus were provided externally in countries colonized by those Western powers (Mamdani 1996, Young 1994). Rather than cultivating domestic sources of income, aid allowed local leadership to establish private control of internal and external resources and redistribute public goods based on kinship favors. Behind the façade of state sovereignty and infrastructure, rulers of these “shadow states” or “rentier states” were able to institute a patrimonial form of domination relying on external assistance, instead of reaching out to broader constituencies within their societies (Reno 1999, Rubin 2002).

Such a clientelistic use of state resources tends to result in chronic economic crises, however. Furthermore, the “small government paradigm” pursued by Western donors promoting structural adjustment programs has undermined state capacities to provide social services by further reducing the public sector expenditures (Vandemoortele 2004). The resultant decline of living standards has triggered a rebellion or armed takeover of economic assets, especially in developing countries (Bratton and Walle 1997). In particular, the control of natural resources, such as oil, gold, diamonds, and other mineral deposits, has led to the deliberate use of violence to loot and recruit

combatants.⁷ These economic functions of armed conflict are related to globalization, as the liberalization of trade and investment has also diminished state capacities to regulate the economy, making it possible for commodities acquired through civil war violence to reach the international market (Ballentine 2004). In this context of direct and coercive transfer of income, even international humanitarian aid becomes part of the supplies that sustain war economies (Keen 1996).

Local power structures operating in such a situation of permanent emergency are “inherently authoritarian, violent, and disaster-producing,” which enables the survival of elites garnering profit from violence, while depleting public resources and destroying social and economic infrastructure (Duffield 1994:55). Those benefiting from war economies will have few incentives to support the establishment of an effective and legitimate government (Berdal and Malone 2000, Duffield 2001). As Charles King notes, the informal networks of power and profit accumulation developed in the course of civil wars can replicate themselves in state-like institutions in post-conflict states which “keep existing states weak, populations poor, and full-scale war a constant possibility, even as they enrich the key players who extol the virtues of peace” (2001:528). These informal power networks can undermine the efficiency and

⁷ Recent quantitative and qualitative studies suggest that (1) oil exports are linked to the onset of conflict and (2) lootable commodities are correlated with the duration of conflict, but (3) agricultural commodities seem to be uncorrelated with civil wars and (4) primary commodities are not robustly associated with the onset of civil wars. Michael L. Ross, "What Do We Know About National Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004).

performance of states by posing parallel and competing power outside formal-legal state control and distributing resources through family and personal networks (Grzymala-Busse 2004, Lauth 2000, North 1990).⁸ For instance, when formal institutions are weak and informal patronage networks form the basis of elite selection, decision-making tends to be “autocratic” if elites are chosen through formal processes, such as elections, or “personalistic”, if elites compete primarily through informal networks (Grzymala-Busse and Luong 2002).

If formal state institutions fail to protect equal citizenship through the accountable and equitable distribution and redistribution of income, states no longer have adequate “coercive capacity, infrastructural power, and unconditional legitimacy,” which Mohammed Ayoob argues as requisite for establishing a legitimate political order (1995:54). Yet international aid to post-conflict states often fails to strengthen formal state institutions. Donors often continue or reinstate structural adjustment policies in post-conflict states, reducing their public sector expenditures, despite the need for

⁸ Formal institutions can be conceptualized as officially codified and enforced rules, while informal institutions represent “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels.” Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, *Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda* (The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 2003 [cited July 28 2004]); available from <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/heg02/heg02.pdf>. A transformation of such informal institutions, according to these theories, is contingent upon individual interests responding to formal institutional change. For instance, the resilience of traditional village chieftaincy in South Africa can be explained by the strategic and interactive agency of chiefs utilizing opportunities in the context of democratic transition, choosing to serve as the mediators of communal disputes as well as collaborators of state agents in facilitating elections. J. Michael Williams, "Leading from Behind: Democratic Consolidation and the Chieftaincy in South Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, no. 1 (2004).

immediate resumption of social service delivery to war-affected populations. Barnett Rubin argues:

The dominant models of assistance delivery...ignore and indeed often undermine the fundamental strategic goal of economic assistance to state-building: strengthening sustainable state capacity to mobilize resources to deliver services, which requires the growth of licit economic activity, which in turn requires public services such as security, rule of law, fiscal and monetary management, and education. The mobilization of resources, finally, requires that the state develop both legitimacy (partly through service delivery) and capacity (2005:100).

The literature on state formation and civil wars thus suggests the following. First, the economic structures of the state, particularly the way in which public income is generated and reallocated, have political consequences, because state offices and assets may be distributed to sustain a predatory regime. Second, international aid contributes to the establishment of such a regime and the further erosion of state capacities to provide public goods and services in the context of the liberal-market global economy. Third, aid can therefore become one of the causes of armed conflict and part of war economies. It is hence critical that international aid to post-conflict states be conceived in a way that prevents exclusion and violence and yet it appears that post-conflict aid

repeats the same mistake of failing to strengthen formal state institutions responsible for the distribution and redistribution of resources.

Regime Change

Similar to the literature on state formation and civil wars, theories on state and democracy highlight the political implications of economic structures. The statistical analysis of democratic transitions indicates that the sustainability of democracy, though not its origin, correlates positively with a higher level of economic development (Przeworski 1991). Conversely, economic crises can erode the specific configuration of the class-based alliance on which regime stability may have rested (Haggard and Kaufman 1997). The literature therefore suggests that economic elites also play an important role in shaping particular economic and political structures. Peter Evans (1995) argues that rapid industrial development in East Asia was made possible by the way in which socioeconomic elites were recruited into governments through long-term career rewards, which created “embedded autonomy” or institutionalized opportunities for the state to develop corporate coherence in relation to those elites on the planning and execution of economic policies. As discussed in the literature on weak states, elites in predatory states do not have such organized and mutually transformative relations with the state but rather seek to capture it for personal gains.

The literature further argues that in a situation of political or economic transition, the configuration of power balance between the government and other elite groups will have a path-dependent effect on the outcome of reforms, because the patterns of their interaction will be institutionalized and reproduced as enduring legacies (Beissinger 2002, Collier and Collier 1991, Stark and Bruszt 1998). Adam Przeworski argues that a transition tends to be most successful when the power balance between the incumbent government and the opposition is relatively equal (1991). Michael McFaul, on the other hand, argues that a symmetry of power leads to partial reforms or partial dictatorships, thereby resulting in instability, while successful reforms occur when the opposition is stronger than the incumbent (2002).

In the context of a transition to the market economy, the most common obstacle to institutional change is arguably the former state managers or local officials who gained most from the initial stage of economic reforms (Hellman 1998). Because their profits were based on special privileges and market distortions, these elites tend to seek to block subsequent economic reforms that could increase competition. The simultaneous transition of the polity and the economy thus allows the early winners of the reform process to prevent further change that could undermine their exclusive privileges—economic and political—which they acquired through informal access to state assets. In the Soviet case, the loser of the transition—the poor—have consequently become more reliant on clan politics and ancestral cults to cope with the extinction of the official

collective safety net provided by the Soviet state, which the literature on new economic institutionalism has argued could further undermine the process and outcome of formal institutional change (Humphrey 1998).

The literature on democratic transition also underscores the role of aid in establishing a particular type of economic production and a political process to sustain it. Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Falleto (1973) argue that the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America were built to sustain an alliance between local elites (government, the army, and landed oligarchy) and foreign investors, both interested in maintaining internal order and an economy dependent on foreign investment. Peter Uvin (1996) argues that aid to accelerate macroeconomic growth in Rwanda reinforced an autocratic and exclusionary power structure dominated by the minority group. In this context of pervasive inequality, international assistance to the introduction of electoral rule can create the situation of “delegative” democracy, in which intermittent elections can co-exist with informal, permanent, and pervasive clientelism (Diamond 2002, O'Donnell 1994, 1996). Instead of forging an alliance against the government, opposition leaders will be fragmented, as the structure creates disincentive to challenge the regime, or co-opted into the administration through bureaucratic appointments, which would further sustain a patronage-based rule (Geddes 1999, Takougang 2003). Consequently, electoral democracy could become part of a personalistic power struggle, as “most of the opposition parties have as their single most important objective the capture of the

presidency” (Mbaku 2002:152).

The literature on regime change thus offers several theoretical possibilities for the analysis of post-war transition. First, incumbent regime elites, who are in power at the time of civil war settlement, will be in a position to benefit exclusively from the early stage of transition and prevent further institutional change. Second, aid could also affect the configuration of power at the time of civil war settlement by providing resources in a way that would benefit a particular group of people. As such, the patterns of aid allocation could play a decisive role in facilitating the conversion of political and economic capital in the process of simultaneous post-war transition to the market economy and electoral democracy. Third, the literature suggests that institutional change requires a transformation of both formal and informal institutions controlling the distribution and redistribution of resources in the context of war economies. As Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe argue, “the Western-style paradigm of state building, which is preoccupied with forming a national executive, legislature, and judiciary, confronts resilient traditional structures, socially legitimate power-holders, abusive worlds out to win, or coping mechanisms communities rely on under conflict conditions” (2004:289). The allocation of aid, if provided in a way that weakens the capacities of the state to distribute and redistribute resources, could strengthen the power of those informal networks of power and further undermine the process and result of institutional change.

Argument

Why do post-war exclusion and violence persist in the face of international assistance seeking to resolve it? The literature on civil war settlement is insufficient to explain this empirical puzzle, as post-war exclusion and violence continue despite and in the absence of political arrangements that the literature proposed to reconcile warring parties. Alternatively, the literature on state formation, civil war, and regime change argues that the success of political and economic reforms hinges on the state's ability to provide equitable distribution and redistribution of resources.

The literature also suggests that aid can compromise such a capacity of the state, because the inflow of external resources would reduce incentives for the recipient countries' rulers to construct mutually interactive state-society relations, which leads to the establishment of a patronage-based administration of state assets and prerogatives. In particular, aid based on structural adjustment policies, which include the reduction of public sector expenditures, has been criticized as contributing to the decline of state capacities to (re)allocate income for service delivery. In this context of economic disparity, violence would become a means of access to scarce resources, while electoral democracy sustains exclusionary regimes, rather than promoting inclusive development, as opposition parties would be co-opted into submission and cooperation with the government.

Nevertheless, empirical evidence indicates that international aid continues to prioritize economic liberalization in the initial stage of post-war transition (Pugh 2002). As donors seek to reduce the size of the public sector, aid also tends to bypass the state with weak administrative capacities (UN 2004). In Afghanistan, only \$1.6 billion out of \$8.4 billion in aid allocated during the Bonn Process between late 2001 and 2004 was disbursed through the government (Jalali 2006). Instead, donors have assumed the responsibility to deliver social services themselves, thereby supplanting the role of the state in relation to its citizens. Similarly, “the Tajik state has almost completely outsourced the provision of material public goods to international donors” (Zürcher and Gosztanyi 2004:23). Moreover, contrary to the conventional argument that the demilitarization of politics is the first priority for post-war transition, the level of donor funding for this task appears to be much smaller than for economic restructuring. In many instances, the disarmament and demobilization of combatants does not start until a year or even a few years after the signing of peace agreements. Chapter 2 discusses these patterns of aid allocation in more detail.

Based on the field-based study of Tajikistan and a survey of an additional three cases, Cambodia, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone, this dissertation argues that the organization of aid prioritizing economic liberalization in the initial stage of post-war transition contributes to power consolidation by the incumbent regime. As the literature on

transition states and economies argues, the outcome of institutional change is shaped by the balance of power between the government and opposition groups. The incumbent regimes are often in a position to manipulate their privileged access to state resources and shift the course of political and economic reforms to safeguard their exclusive access to those assets. I propose that at the time of post-war restructuring, the arrival of aid changes local power relations in favor of the incumbent government. External assistance to economic liberalization would benefit those regime elites in power exclusively, because it makes it possible for them to utilize their formal and informal relations to the state and establish bureaucratic-legal arrangements that allow their monopolistic control of the trade, economy, and market.

Moreover, the donor preference of a small market-based state model would limit the government capacity to maintain power-sharing with the opposition within the bureaucratic apparatus, while the reduction of public expenditures, combined with the lack of external assistance to DDR, could incite discontent among armed groups. The incumbent regime may seek to co-opt these forces by providing economic incentives, such as territorial control of resources (e.g., land) or appointments to managerial positions in state-affiliated enterprises. Yet once the regime elites establish exclusive control of the state and economy through the donor-assisted reform process, they would be able to revoke those wealth-sharing arrangements and dismiss wartime commanders and opposition leaders from positions of power. The regime elites may also resort to a

more coercive action, including criminal prosecutions or larger-scale military action against these wartime rivals, in order to cement their monopoly of power, resources, and violence. Post-war restoration of security would not be a result of successful demilitarization of politics, but owe to a selective distribution and redistribution of resources to armed groups by incumbent regime elites. Moreover, post-war violence at the national level would be the continuation of civil war politics by other means, mainly involving the state repression of wartime opposition leaders and commanders who could pose challenges to the consolidation of power by the incumbent regime.

I further propose that the donor-driven delivery of aid, in particular as it relates to public services, fails to create a system of accountability. Increasingly, donors fund “parallel nongovernmental public service wholesaling organizations that use other NGOs to extend services to citizens” (USAID 2006:14). The donor financing and delivery of social services removes the incentives for the government to improve its performance in service of the local populations, rather than establishing a mechanism in which the state collects taxable income and provides public goods. Consequently, those incumbent regime elites benefiting from a post-war process of macroeconomic reforms would find little incentive or obligation to redistribute resources, while donors seek to establish *ad hoc* mechanisms of service delivery directly with recipient communities.⁹ The post-war

⁹ Although community-based service delivery is expected to increase local participation in developmental decision-making, empirical evidence shows that this approach rather reinforces existing hierarchies of power at the local level, which tend to be exclusionary and autocratic.

regime elites may form a strategic alliance with leaders of these local entities and devise institutional frameworks that preserve the status of their communal authority in exchange for clientelistic allegiance to the regime. These particular patterns of interaction between the state and societal elites should exacerbate political polarization and competition over scarce resources, reinforcing exclusionary structures in the center and at the local levels, which will also trigger the proliferation of local violence over access to productive assets.

I argue that this realignment of power is a distinctively post-war process because the power basis of regime elites would have been nominal during the war, contested by other armed groups. During a civil war, at least several competing groups would exist, controlling various aspects of the state (e.g., military, administration, or particular regions) and resources associated with them. A post-war regime is likely to reflect the strength of these wartime groups, and the government would be pressed to appoint opposition leaders into public offices, as agreed upon during peace negotiations. Institutional frameworks that emerge from this process of transition (hence not transformation in and of itself) would define the scope of post-war power relations. “The lines of division that led to conflict escalation normally survive the peace process:

“Kin-based or religious organizations are increasingly providing refuge from state inadequacies, but these groups tend to be pre-liberal or illiberal and to subscribe to undemocratic values...these groups themselves are inherently exclusionary and often chauvinistic.” Nancy Bermeo, "What the Democratization Literature Says--or Doesn't Say--About Postwar Democratization," *Global Governance* 9, no. 2 (2003): 246.

if war is a continuation of politics by other means, peace is generally the resumption of the same politics, often by the same pre-war means” (Smith 2004:27).

Yet as Tajikistan and other case study countries show, those who won on the battlefields are not necessarily the ones benefiting from post-conflict institutions; on the contrary, many of them have been in fact jailed, killed, or forced into early retirement. This dissertation thus seeks to “process trace” the path-dependent effect of post-conflict aid on the outcome of peace implementation, identifying which of the groups are privileged by external involvement and what are the intended and unintended consequences of the donor-client relations on for post-war exclusion and violence (Brady and Collier 2004).¹⁰

Methodology

This dissertation is based on a diverse cross-case analysis, combining a field-based study of post-war Tajikistan and a survey of three additional cases, Cambodia, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone. Tajikistan illustrates the deficiencies of the peacebuilding literature in addressing post-war exclusion and violence. Short of reverting to large-scale warfare, the post-war transition process in Tajikistan has nevertheless resulted in the incumbent regime consolidating its exclusive basis of power, instead of upholding

¹⁰ Brady and Collier define process tracing as analysis of processes of change that seeks to uncover causal mechanisms and causal sequences.

the 1997 peace accord, and dismissing or jailing the opposition leaders who signed the agreement and subsequently contributed to post-war security restoration. Income inequality has increased since the end of the war, and unemployed youth and women, especially in rural areas, have been recruited as carriers of the drugs trafficked through the area. Yet there have been few accounts of why this situation has evolved, whether and how post-war exclusion and violence are related to the civil war, and to what extent external assistance shaped this particular outcome of post-war transition in Tajikistan.

To explore the result of peacebuilding aid further, this dissertation has also undertaken a survey of the three additional cases. For research that involves a relatively small number of cases, such as this, the problem of selection bias is acute. The ethnographic accounts of a few cases, albeit insightful, can “suffer from sampling problems and are not systematic enough to allow for the rigorous testing of theoretically formulated hypotheses” (Kalyvas 2006:19). In order to offset the constraints of the selection bias, the four cases were chosen to present a wide spectrum of factors that could affect the outcome of post-war transitions, including the nature and duration of civil war, paths to war settlement, level of economic development, and the extent of international assistance. Diversity in these local conditions would also help to capture the full range of donor engagement in post-conflict states, while the selection of the cases from a list of recently completed peacekeeping missions would maintain the minimum level of comparability. These variables are also considered as the indicators of transition in the

peacebuilding literature: peace implementation is more likely to be successful with a short duration of the conflict, sustained and inclusive peace negotiation, some level of economic capacities, and international peacekeeping assistance (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Walter and Snyder 1999).

Conceptualization

Post-conflict is a relative concept. Violence may have subsided to a smaller scale than the civil war period but could continue at a lower level. This study will equate post-conflict with the signing of a peace agreement, and countries such as Somalia are excluded from the analysis and its conclusions because there was no peace (agreement) to keep at the time of peacekeeping deployment. This distinction prevents the problem of endogeneity, where the values of the explanatory variables (donor policies) will be constrained by those of the dependent variables (post-war exclusion and violence), limiting the validity of causal inferences (King, et al. 1994). In addition, this study conceptualize the interim period of five years after the conclusion of the peace agreement as a critical juncture of post-war transition (Collier and Collier 1991). First, the increase of international assistance after the conclusion of civil wars usually peaks in the third or fourth year of post-war transition and declines thereafter. Aid is thus expected to have the most significant impact on the recipient post-conflict states during that period. Second, although there is no accepted standard period for post-conflict

transition, considering that almost 40 percent of peace agreements collapse within five to eight years, those interim years are likely to provide a path-dependent context in which institutional frameworks emerge and define the nature and level of post-war exclusion and violence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

In this study, violence is conceptualized as a response to exclusion, rather than random, irrational, and devoid of purposes. As Kalyvas argues, “violence is a means, not an end; a resource, not the final product”(2002:3). Although not circumscribed to post-war contexts, existing literature emphasizes relationships among violence, livelihood opportunities (constraints relating to access to resources), and changing forms of governance (Moser and Rodgers 2005, Popkin 1979, Scott 1976). Rui Figueriredo and Barry Weingast (1999) also highlight resource and political dimensions of violence, arguing that violence is instigated by leaders who, insecure of their control of power or fearful of losing their exclusive wealth and access to resources, manipulate the underlying uncertainty of inter-group relationships, or ethnification of politics. Given the economic dimensions of civil war violence, post-war violence is likely to be intertwined with exclusion.

The concept of exclusion can be multidimensional, involving economic, social, political, and cultural aspects of disadvantage and deprivation. For several reasons, this dissertation focuses on economic dimensions of exclusion. First, inclusion and

exclusion in the distribution of economic resources would relate closely to political behavior, as people usually comply with those who can provide and guarantee sources of livelihood. Second, the provisions of resources, to be inclusive, must be treated as public goods, which require the mobilization and centralization of resources and relations of government accountability that arise from the interests of citizens as taxpayers. Conversely, the lack of state capacities to ensure the equitable reallocation of income is closely related to the deterioration of security, because competition over sources of income lead to the privatization of violence as a means of gaining access to the increasingly scarce resources. Post-war reforms of state institutions, which are often designed, financed, and implemented with international assistance, would therefore need to transform these exclusionary and violent structures of power and economies in order to address the root causes of conflict.

The explanatory variable—the organization of aid to post-conflict states—involves a range of sectors, including security, political, socio-economic, and justice. In conformity with the literature on state formation, civil wars, and regime change that emphasizes the importance of institutional capacities for the generation, administration, and reallocation of taxable income, I focus on donor engagement with institutions for the distribution and redistribution of resources. This would involve international assistance to public administration and finance, as well as service delivery through non-state communal groups often defined by kinship, geographical proximity, and hereditary

social hierarchies. In particular, this dissertation focuses on official development assistance, not humanitarian aid, because the primary purpose of the latter is not to promote post-conflict development but to provide immediate and short-term relief for war-affected populations and therefore its primary focus is not the performance of local and national institutions. This emphasis on development assistance also helps investigate “potentially negative effects of aid on state institutions, a topic which has received relatively little attention” by addressing, among others, the reduction or aid substitution of tax shares within revenue mobilization and expenditures, which could fundamentally alter the relationship between government elites and citizens (Moss, et al. 2006:1).

Case Selection

Tajikistan is one of the cases for which literature on peacebuilding does not explain the outcome of post-war transition. Its civil war between the government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) was relatively brief and concentrated in southern and eastern parts of the country. The multi-track peace process, assisted by the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and regional powers (such as Russia and Iran), led to the signing of a series of protocols and the final peace accord in 1997 by both parties, including an agreement to establish 30 percent quotas for UTO representation at all levels of government. By the time the peace agreement was

signed, fighting between UTO and the incumbent regime assisted by a pro-government militia Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT) had reached the situation of a mutually hurting stalemate, in which neither side could expect a decisive battlefield victory. Security restoration and maintenance was further assisted by the deployment of a Russian-led regional and a UN peacekeeping operation.¹¹ The level of international aid was stable, without exceeding the capacity of local institutions to absorb it (Levin and Dollar 2005:18). These local conditions are conducive, according to the literature, to a successful implementation of peace agreements.

Yet the power-sharing agreement was never fully implemented. President Emomali Rakhmon, incumbent since 1992, won flawed elections in 1994, 1996, 1999, and 2006, and succeeded in amending the constitution in 1994, 1999, and 2003 to allow him to stay in power until 2020. Rakhmon's government has rigorously persecuted its wartime rivals, including those who collaborated with the government for post-war security restoration, which continues to date. Former opposition leaders and presidential allies deemed capable of challenging Rakhmon have been dismissed and imprisoned. Although the economy has rebounded since the 1990s, with the annual GDP growth of 9 percent in 2000-2003, much of the development is a reflection of increasing cotton

¹¹ CIS peacekeeping deployed in 1993—mainly for border management—was withdrawn in 2000. The UN Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT) also left in 2000, completing its original 1993 mandate to explore a political settlement to the conflict, and its expanded 1997 mandate to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement. UNMOT was replaced by the UN Peacebuilding Office in Tajikistan (UNTOP), which finished its mission in 2007.

prices dominated by a “cotton mafia” coalition of individuals from Kulyab, Hissor, and Sogd (Olimova 2004:91). Despite continued donor assistance to the liberalization of the economy, major economic assets, such as the Tajik Aluminum Smelter (TADAZ), remain state enterprises and provide lucrative sources of export revenue for the regime elites (Crisis Group 2003:6). Social and economic indicators have not improved, despite the end of the civil war, “largely due to the existing institutional norms and power structures that determine the degree of people’s access to information, networks, and command over economic resources” (Babajanian 2004:7). The per capita income decreased from \$1,050 in 1990 to \$480 in 1992, and further down to \$150 in 2002. In 1990, the monthly salary for teachers was \$100 and a pension was \$70; their rates in 2005 were \$7 and \$2 respectively.

A survey of three additional cases will demonstrate that this outcome—exclusion and violence caused by the post-war regime—is not particularly unique to Tajikistan but a common phenomenon in post-conflict states. In Cambodia, the post-war coalition government collapsed when one of the parties—incumbent since 1979—resorted to a coup in 1997, and subsequent elections have been marred by assassinations and harassments of opposition leaders. In Guatemala, a pro-government militia formed during the civil war has been revived by the former dictator who oversaw the junta regime of the 1980s, and leaders of indigenous, human rights, and labor groups have been victimized by extra-judicial killings and lynching. In Sierra Leone, former

combatants, many of them unemployed youth, have clashed with the police forces.

All these cases provide variation in the size and context of international assistance. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in 1979 after the Khmer Rouge destruction officially ended with diplomatic negotiations leading to a peace agreement in 1991, followed by multidimensional complex peacekeeping operations. Guatemala suffered from two decades of a class-based conflict, which was resolved by one of the most inclusive and human rights-oriented dialogue and peace agreements, assisted by a UN human rights verification mission. In Sierra Leone, a so-called resource war (mainly involving diamonds) over two decades ended with third party interventions and one of the largest-scale multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations in history.

Considering such a diversity of local conditions in these cases, have donors tailored aid policies to address different needs and circumstances? Was there discussion of, or any effort to implement, alternative approaches to peacebuilding, especially as it relates to the distribution of resources that formed an underlying cause of these conflicts, and did it result in different outcomes? To address these questions, the case study of Tajikistan and a survey of three additional cases sought to identify the patterns of post-conflict aid provision by major donors, including international financial institutions, selected bilateral agencies, and peacekeeping and other missions deployed by the United Nations for the first five years after the signing of peace agreements. This analysis of aid flows

is based on donor reports and statistics, findings from aid coordination and tracking mechanisms established by various national and international organizations, and other secondary sources, with a view to investigating the financial allocation of aid and its emphasis. The purpose of this review is to uncover which of the sectors and institutions are prioritized by donors, rather than accepting without scrutiny their stated goals of post-conflict engagement.

To further explore the effect of the aid organization on the development of post-war political and economic structures, patterns of inclusion or exclusion in access to resources, and the nature and level of violence, the outcome of post-war transition in Cambodia, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone was assessed based on qualitative and quantitative research available. References included databases that indicate the level of political openness (e.g., Polity VI), the control of the economy by particular individuals (e.g. the Transparency International Corruption Index), exclusion of and violence against particular groups (e.g., the Minority at Risk datasets), and other social and economic indicators (e.g., the Human Development Index and reports).

To map out in detail the way in which aid shapes post-war institutional frameworks and how the configuration of power embedded in those structures determines the nature and level of post-war exclusion and violence, this dissertation undertook the field-based study of Tajikistan from 2005 to 2007, involving archival research and structured

interviews in Dushanbe, Garm, Kurgan-Tube, Sharitus, and Sogd. In Tajikistan, official data on its state and economic structures are neither accurate nor readily available. There is no central depository keeping records of government reshuffles, management structures of state and private enterprises, or any other information that could indicate who is included and excluded from the post-war state apparatus and economy, either within the government or the UN and other regional and bilateral donor organizations. Similarly, there is a dearth of reliable data on post-war violence. For instance, minor crimes tend to be underreported to the police, reflecting the general lack of public confidence in judicial mechanisms, while law enforcement agencies often report a higher number of arrests in order to display their effectiveness.

To gauge the extent of post-war exclusion and violence, this dissertation refers mainly to the appointments and dismissals of top leadership within the cabinet and state enterprises, and major incidents of violence from 1997 to 2003, both of which were reconstructed from news articles, interviews, and biographies compiled by local and foreign researchers on an *ad hoc* basis. The narrative of leadership change in key state institutions indicates the composition of post-war elites, as well as the level of their control of resources, because state and economic structures in Tajikistan remain highly centralized and it requires association with the state to obtain access to main sources of income, including cotton and aluminum trade. Furthermore, as the president reserves the right to appoint and dismiss government officials at the national and local levels, the

chronology of cabinet reshuffles would indicate the evolution of his power and relations with other influential players and groups. Major incidents of violence include assassinations of public officials, confrontations between state security agencies and armed individuals and groups, riots or other disturbances involving civilian casualties or injuries or large-scale government interventions. Other types of structural and direct violence by the state against particular individuals or groups, such as arrest, trial, and imprisonment of wartime commanders and opposition leaders without due process, would be included as major incidents of violence, especially when those actions are committed in violation of amnesty and other provisions of peace agreements.

Given the lack of systematic documentation in Tajikistan, the compilation of the list of senior government officials and violent incidents was based on the secondary sources and crosschecked through targeted interviews with a carefully selected group of government officials, scholars, journalists, and local and international staff of UN and other international organizations and embassies. Interviewees were selected from UN agencies, international financial institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and regional and bilateral organizations, including the OSCE and US Agency for International Development (USAID). Additional interviews were conducted with senior officials from government agencies responsible for financial and economic management and law enforcement, including the state committee on property, the agency for financial control,

the ministry of interior, the tax police, and the prosecutor-general's office. Representatives of local research and media institutions were also interviewed to solicit alternative views. Interviewees were carefully selected based on their institutional affiliation, rank, and professional background (i.e., previous employments). These interviewees will be identified only with their institutional affiliation to protect their identity.

Tajikistan

The following section provides an overview of the civil war, peace process, and outcome of peace implementation in Tajikistan. Tajikistan is a small landlocked country, more than 90 percent of it covered by mountains. Roughly the size of Wisconsin, it shares borders with Afghanistan to the south, Uzbekistan to the west, Kyrgyzstan to the north and China to the east. The territory is divided into the region of republican jurisdiction, which includes the capital city of Dushanbe, Sogd (formerly Leninabad) in the north with its regional capital of Khujand, Khatlon (which used to be separate provinces of Kurgan-Tube and Kulyab) in the south and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in the southeast with the regional capital of Khorog. Formerly part of the Persian Empire, Tajikistan was incorporated into the USSR in 1929 after the failed *basmachi* movement, a region-wide grassroots revolt in 1916-1923 against the expansion of Russia's influence in the region.

Background to the Civil War

Fifteen years after the outbreak of the five-year civil war from 1992 to 1997 that took the lives of 50,000-100,000 people and forced another 1.2 million people (out of a total population of 6 million at the time) to flee their homes, “the study of the Tajik civil war is still at a rudimentary stage,” says Shirin Akiner (2007:16). Those who represented the two parties in conflict at the negotiating table from 1994 to 1997—the government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO)—concede that even to them it is not clear why the war started.¹² Some, such as Rashid Abdullo, argue that the war was about different and incompatible visions for a new state after the independence from the Soviet Union. Shirin Akiner argues that the receding Soviet economy by the 1980s, unable to maintain the same level of budgetary transfers, investment, and development in Tajikistan, led to the underlying causes of the conflict, including youth unemployment, corruption (by which she means distribution of scarce resources along ethnic-regional affiliations), and Islamic resurgence (2005). Others argue that the outbreak of the conflict in 1991 was triggered by competition for power between the Garmis and the Pamiris, groups excluded from the government in Dushanbe, against the communist establishment

¹² Interviews with Talbak Nazarov, former foreign minister, and Abdunabi Sattorzoda, former deputy chair of the Democratic Party and deputy foreign minister, in Dushanbe, April 2007.

represented by the Leninabadis and the Kulyabis (Roy 2003, Rubin 1998).¹³ During the Soviet era, the Leninabadis provided all the first secretaries of the Communist Party from 1937 to 1992, while the Kulyabis occupied the post of prime minister. In contrast, the Garmis had no real national power, except for the honorary position of speaker of the Supreme Soviet, and the Pamiris were mainly represented in the security apparatus, including the KGB (Roy 2005).¹⁴

This characterization of the civil war in Tajikistan as an ethno-regional conflict, however, can be “misleading” (Akiner 2007:19). The opposition forces included an array of groups, including the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) whose main constituencies came from Garm, the secular and Western-leaning Democratic Party, *Lali Badakhshan* in pursuit of greater autonomy for the Badakhshan region, and *Rastokhez*, an intellectual restoration movement of Persian cultural heritage. In addition, many secular intellectuals joined the Islamic-democrat opposition, while the Pamiris were split between those who supported the government and others who joined *Lali Badakhshan*.

¹³ Shortly after Tajikistan was incorporated into the USSR, Moscow replaced the Garmis and the Pamiris occupying national government posts with those from Leninabad (later Sogd), an industrial northern region considered more russified and closely connected to Uzbekistan commercially and culturally.

¹⁴ The Pamiris, who have separate linguistic and religious backgrounds from the Tajiks, are said to have had “an instinctive animosity towards the black market networks which had been developed, under the cover of the Party, by provincial officials in Kulyab, in the south of the Republic—a region entirely overlooked by Soviet industrial investment.” Stephane A. Dudoignon, “Political Parties and Forces in Tajikistan, 1989-1993,” in *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence*, ed. Mohammad-Reza Djalili, Federic Grare, and Shirin Akiner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 57.

Moreover, the conflict in Tajikistan began not as an inter-regional power struggle but in the context of post-Soviet democratization after the 1991 independence.

Escalation of Conflict, 1992-1993

When Tajikistan declared independence from the Soviet Union in September 1991, Rakhmon Nabiev, a former Communist Party first secretary, assumed the presidency of the new republic. Nabiev was from Leninabad (later renamed Sogd), as his predecessors had been since the 1930s, but his continued hold on power was contested by newly formed opposition parties immediately after the 1991 independence. Opposition demonstrators soon gathered in Dushanbe, calling for the resignation of Nabiev, as well as the speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Safarali Kenjaev, and other Communist Party officials. Nabiev briefly stepped down from power in October but won 58 percent of votes in the first multi-party elections held in November and assumed the second presidency. In February 1992, US Secretary of State James Baker visited Tajikistan and met with Nabiev but not with any opposition parties, during which he is rumored to have promised US support if Nabiev cracked down on the Islamic and Iranian-inspired opposition parties (Akiner 2007). In March, another round of demonstrations led by Lali Badakhshan began, soon joined by other opposition groups.

The opposition demonstrations, drawing estimated 100,000-300,000 protesters over a

period of 52 days, met with counter-demonstrations by the regime supporters, mostly from Kulyab. In April, 13 gangs calling themselves Youths of Dushanbe City declared a war on Nabiev, and in return Nabiev created the Kulyabi-dominated National Guard, answerable only to him, under the command of Sangak Safarov, a convicted criminal who had spent 23 years in jail on various charges, including murder (Atkin 1994, Brown 1997). Armed with 1,700 machine guns supplied by Nabiev, the National Guard clashed violently with the opposition demonstrators on 5 May, prompting an intervention of Dushanbe-based Russian army's 201st Motorized Rifle Division to restore order. On 11 May, the Nabiev government agreed to form the Government of National Unity (GNU) and to allocate one-third of ministerial posts to the opposition leaders, mostly from Garm and Badakhshan. Kenjaev was replaced by Akbarsho Iskandarov, deputy chair of the Supreme Soviet from GBAO. In addition, Davlat Usmon from the IRP was appointed deputy prime minister.

Once the opposition demonstrators finally left Dushanbe, however, the Leninabadis threatened to secede from Tajikistan and the Kulyabis challenged the legitimacy of the new government. Armed clashes soon ensued in Kurgan-Tube and by June 1992, escalated into a full-scale warfare among opposition supporters, self-organized vigilante groups, informal militias, including former members of Nabiev's National Guard, and police forces who deserted their stations with arms to join paramilitary formations. In September, Kenjaev created in Hissor a pro-government militia, the Popular Front of

Tajikistan (PFT). In October, the PFT joined forces with Safarov's militia based in Kulyab, which was composed of remnants of the former National Guard, and Safarov became the commander of the PFT. These militia groups unleashed violence Olivier Roy called "a savage war: massacres, rape, torture, looting and summary executions" (2005:140).¹⁵

Interventions of regional powers also escalated the conflict. In August-September 1992, some 600-650 soldiers of General Abdul Rashid Dostum (ethnic Uzbek) in Afghanistan came to aid Sangak Safarov, while a roughly equal number of Tajik-Afghans (including Ahmed Shah Massoud) fought on the side of the opposition (Nourzhanov 2005). Between May and November 1992 alone, approximately 50,000 people—mostly civilians—were killed and 100,000 fled to Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, in addition to 600,000 internally displaced, including a sizable group of some 30,000 ethnic Uzbeks, while property and infrastructure damage was estimated to reach \$7 billion (Kamoludin and Barnes 2001).

In Dushanbe, Nabiev barely controlled the situation. On 31 August 1992, opposition demonstrators seized the presidential palace. Nabiev was apprehended on 7 September by the Youths of Dushanbe City at the Dushanbe airport, apparently en route to a safe

¹⁵ In addition, "in the areas of heaviest fighting, whole villages were razed in a calculated and targeted manner. What was not destroyed was stolen." UNHCR, "Unhcr Report on Tajikistan: January 1993-March 1996," UNHCR,1996),15..

heaven in Leninabad, and was forced to resign. Akbarsho Iskandarov assumed the acting presidency, along with Abdumalik Abdullajanov, from Leninabad, as prime minister. Russia's 201st Motorized Rifle Division remained non-committal until the fall of 1992, when Moscow decided to back the PFT, ignoring Iskandarov's call to send the troops or arm him with weapons in order to pacify the situation in Kurgan-Tube (Neuman and Solodovnik 1995). Russian forces took positions to guard key government infrastructures, while Uzbekistan trained, equipped, and provided air support to the PFT. In September, Mahmud Khudoiberdiev, a half-Uzbek deputy military commissioner in Kurgan-Tube, joined the fray on the side of the government and began marching into Dushanbe with four tanks procured (or stolen) from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. The PFT-allied forces reached Dushanbe in October and launched an offensive.

To resolve the escalating crisis, Iskandarov called for the dissolution of the GNU and a new session of the parliament. On 16-18 November, the Supreme Soviet met in Khujand, capital of Leninabad (late renamed Sogd), which reflected the growing influence of the Leninabadi-Hissor-Kulyab forces. A visible presence of PFT commanders, including Safarov himself, at the meeting prevented many opposition leaders from attending out of safety concerns. It was then decided to (a) abolish the institution of presidency, as the post-independence creation of the office was considered to have triggered the conflict, (b) select Emomali Rakhmon, a 40-year-old former farm

director from Kulyab as chair of the Supreme Soviet and head of state, and (c) accept Nabiev's resignation and appoint Abdumalik Abdullojonov as prime minister. In addition, Kurgan-Tube and Kulyab were combined into a single province of Khatlon.¹⁶ On 10 December, the PFT entered Dushanbe, forcing the opposition forces to retreat to the Tajik-Afghan border. Having captured the state, "the Kulyabis methodically set about plundering official positions and sources of wealth for the benefit of their faction, and had no interest whatever in running the state" (Roy 2005:141).

New Government and the Peace Process, 1993-1997

Although Rakhmon was considered a compromise candidate, once in power, his government began to crack down on the opposition groups immediately. PFT commanders launched punitive reprisals against the Pamiris and the Garmis, driving at least 90,000 of them to exile in Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch called the terror campaign ethnic cleansing, which prompted the appointment of the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy in April 1993 to seek a ceasefire and a political solution to the conflict. In June 1993, the Supreme Court of Tajikistan formally banned opposition

¹⁶ The Uzbek populations in Kurgan-Tube were left under the command of ethnic-Uzbek commanders (e.g., Kudoiberdiev). The concentration of Uzbek populations in Khatlon is still high. Uzbeks constitute 38 percent of populations in Shartuz District, 51 percent in Qabodin District, 39 percent in Jilikul District and 35 percent in Pyanji District, according to an interview with the OSCE Center, Shartuz, in March 2007.

parties and brought criminal charges against their leaders, who in return regrouped under the banner of United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in December.

With the retreat of the opposition, the nature of the conflict shifted to a guerrilla war. The opposition forces destroyed bridges and roads to mountain passes, thereby preventing the government from establishing control, especially in Badakhshan, and launched hit-and-run operations on the Russian and Tajik forces along the Afghan-Tajik border. In August 1993, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping forces were deployed, with contingents from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Russia supplied most of its ground forces and air support that dropped almost 80 tons of bombs a day around the opposition's hideouts in eastern and southeastern parts of the country during the summer of 1993 (Cooper 2003). It failed to wipe out the opposition, however, and resulted in heavy casualties among the Russian soldiers from opposition counterattacks.

The first round of talks between the Tajik government and UTO took place in 1994 in Moscow. The opposition proposed the creation of a Commission on National Reconciliation for a period of two years until the new constitution was drafted and presidential and parliamentary elections were held. The level of commitment by the government to the peace process was minimal, however. Neither did opposition leaders act in concert with each other; many of them were in Moscow, Tehran, and Afghanistan

and maintained their own spheres of influence over separate networks of fighters. According to the report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council in September 1995:

The Government still lacked the political will either to implement, or seriously to contemplate implementation of, the necessary confidence-building measures. For its part, the opposition has continued its armed struggle through border infiltrations and acts of terrorism and sabotage inside the country (S/1994/893:3).

Rakhmon was declared winner of the November 1994 presidential election (58 percent of votes) in which the opposition candidates were barred from running; the government delayed the registration of the main contender, Abdumalik Abdullajanov (who still managed to win 40 percent of votes); and the UN refused to observe the process. The 1994 Constitution also banned political parties based on religion (targeting the IRP), restored the institution of the presidency, and granted the president discretionary power to appoint and dismiss government officials at all levels. Parliamentary elections were held in February-March 1995 without opposition participation or international observation. By 1995, the civil war in Tajikistan had reached a state of a mutually hurting stalemate. The Russian-Tajik forces failed to penetrate into Badakhshan, despite repeated attempts; UTO, aware that a decisive victory was unlikely, focused on

expanding its military presence in Badakhshan and around Garm and Tavildara in the eastern Rasht and Karategin Valleys to extract favorable terms from negotiations with Rakhmon.

Peace Accord and its Aftermath

Concerned with the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and possibility of region-wide instability, Russia and Iran exerted pressures on the Tajik government and UTO respectively to reach a negotiated settlement of the civil war in Tajikistan. Through multi-track peace dialogues, with the UN mediating official negotiations, the government and the UTO signed the General Agreement on Peace and National Accord on 26 June 1997.¹⁷ The Accord provided 30 percent quotas for the UTO to be represented at all levels of government branches. A 26-member Commission on National Reconciliation was established, composed of an equal number of government and UTO representatives and chaired by the UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri, to monitor the implementation of agreements, oversee the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of UTO fighters, and continue dialogue between the signatory parties before parliamentary elections were to be held in 1998.

¹⁷ The parallel and informal Inter-Tajik Dialogue was organized based on the framework of the Dartmouth Conference, a dialogue between the Americans and the Russians during the Cold War era (1960-1981). For more background, see <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/tajikistan/inter-tajik-dialogue.php>.

However, delays and painstaking negotiations on the quota appointments ensued. In October 1997, Rakhmon unilaterally sent a letter to the opposition groups with a list of 14 top governmental positions for which they should send nominations, including two deputy prime ministers, five ministers, and seven chairs of government committees, and it was not until February 1998 that the first group of UTO members joined the government. Akbar Turajonzoda assumed his position as first deputy prime minister on 10 March; five more UTO members joined the government in early August and additional appointments were made in November. Yet the agreement on UTO control of one of the “power” ministries (interior, security, foreign affairs, and defense) was not resolved until the summer of 1999 (Smith 1999).¹⁸ Rakhmon was extremely reluctant to appoint Mirzo Zioyev, UTO’s commander-in-chief, to either of those security agencies, which were ultimately occupied by the Kulyabis, and Zioyev was finally appointed to the committee on emergency situations, which was then elevated to cabinet rank.

In the end, the power-sharing agreement was neither fully implemented nor sustained. The Protocol on Political Issues, if fully implemented, would have provided the UTO with no less than 2,000 administrative posts across the country (Kabiri 2002:55). In total, only 54 UTO representatives were appointed to various posts within the executive

¹⁸ Before the signing of the 1997 peace accord, there was a tacit agreement that UTO’s commander in chief, Mirzo Zioyev, would be appointed to defense minister and IRP’s deputy chair Khoji Akbar Tursonzoda would become prime minister.

branch. In May 1998, the parliament adopted a draft legislation that banned any political party based on religion, although the 1997 peace accord had legalized the IRP. Faced with national and international criticism, including an IMF warning to suspend its credit, the parliament passed a modified version that prohibited political parties from receiving support from religious institutions, but the government continued to ban three of the four parties suspended in 1993—*Rastokhez*, *Lali Badakhshan*, the IRP—and a faction of the Democratic Party. Due to the disagreement over the role of political Islam, the Commission on National Reconciliation could not reach an agreement on proposals for the constitutional reform until March 1999 and consequently, the parliamentary elections initially scheduled for June 1998 were delayed. It was originally envisioned that parliamentary elections precede the presidential race, but Rakhmon—whose term was to expire in 1999—chose to proceed with the latter as scheduled. The opposition threatened to boycott the November 1999 election when the government refused to allow the opposition equal access to the media, and the possibility of renewed conflict was averted only after a last-minute meeting between Rakhmon and Nuri. Rakhmon won 97 percent of votes, while the only contender, IRP's Davlat Usmon, was listed on the ballot only days before the voting. Usmon's son was kidnapped the day before the voting. In addition, during the campaign period, Tolib Boboev from the banned opposition Party of Popular Unity was killed by masked gunmen in January, and Safarali Kenjaev, widely believed to have been planning to run for the November presidential race, was shot and killed by unidentified gunmen outside

his home in Dushanbe.¹⁹ In February-March 2000, the first post-war parliamentary elections were finally convened for the 63-member Lower House and the 33-member Upper House amid reports of irregularities and campaign fraud,²⁰ and resulted in the victory of the incumbent: Rakhmon's Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), which won 65 percent of votes against 7 percent for the IRP (Freedom House 2002). With the conclusion of the elections, the CNR officially ended its work in March 2000.

In 2001, UTO appointees in the executive branch began to be dismissed. Similarly, top-level former opposition commanders, who had been appointed to senior government positions through the power-sharing agreement, began to be prosecuted on a variety of charges. Rakhmon reportedly said that "it would be naïve to expect the victor to share the spoils, even with former supporters and allies" (Akbarzadeh 2001:30). In 2003, the government proposed 56 amendments to the Constitution, including further extension of presidential terms to the maximum of two seven-year terms, making it possible for Rakhmon to stay in power until 2020. The UN and OSCE declined to observe the

¹⁹ Two other candidates, Saifiddin Turaev from the Party of Justice and Sultan Kuvvatov from the Democratic Party, were denied registration on the grounds that they allegedly failed to gather the signatures of 5 percent of the electorate to secure a nomination. The candidates claimed that authorities in various parts of the country had obstructed their efforts to collect sufficient signatures. Freedom House, "Nations in Transit: Tajikistan," (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2000), 376.

²⁰ According to unpublished UN reports on human rights, these violations included high rates of proxy voting in more than 68 percent of precincts and voting without proper identification in 67 percent of precincts. Interviews with UNTOP in Dushanbe, January 2007.

referendum that the government claimed led to 96 percent of voter turnout and 93 percent approval of the amendment.²¹

Conclusion

This brief overview of the Tajik peace process confirms the failure of peace implementation, in spite of favorable local conditions identified by the peacebuilding literature. The 1997 power-sharing agreement was discarded and the participation of opposition parties in post-war elections was curtailed, when the government decided to limit the level of competition. In such a situation, elections can legitimize and institutionalize the power of the incumbent ruling party, however fraudulently conducted. The UN Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT), its successor Peacebuilding Office in Tajikistan (UNTOP), or any other donors appeared to have little influence in this process, rather than promoting the demilitarization of politics as emphasized in the literature.

²¹ Though the UN did not monitor the 2003 constitutional referendum, the UN Peacebuilding Office (UNTOP) received reports that strong pressures were exerted on local authorities to inflate voter turnout and ballot. Political parties' representatives were excluded from 2,802 local precinct electoral commissions. There are reports that in some districts, people were allowed to vote repeatedly or for entire families, enterprises, or housing blocks. The police forces were utilized to deliver late voters to polling stations. Some referred to the process of the referendum as akin to the Tajik system of cotton harvest: the government expects 100% positive results. The government claimed 96 percent voter turnout. The Democratic Party and the IRP members in Isfara contested the reported rate of voter participation (DP estimated that the turnout was as low as 10-15 percent). Interviews with UNTOP, January 2007.

To account for the gap between the literature and outcome of post-war transition in Tajikistan, and the patterns of post-war exclusion and violence, this dissertation focuses on the effect of aid on post-war power realignment and institutional frameworks that emerge from the process of iterative bargaining and are likely to shape the patterns of post-war exclusion and violence. In subsequent chapters, this dissertation presents empirical evidence to demonstrate that aid allocation in the initial stage of peace implementation was disproportionately skewed towards measures to promote economic liberalization, which are known to undermine state capacities to redistribute resources and to provide incumbent regime elites with privileged access to state resources. These patterns of aid allocation would strengthen particular kinds of actors and institutions, shifting post-war power balance in favor of the incumbent regime and allowing its elites to consolidate monopolistic command of the economy, develop a state apparatus at the national and local levels, and get rid of their wartime rivals. The lack of opportunities for economic and political advancement in this structure of power also leads to local-level violence, which the literature on weak states and civil wars identifies as one of the root causes of conflict. This dissertation thus argues that international aid based on economic adjustment, not transformation of civil war violence and economies, has contributed to the institutionalization of post-war exclusion and violence.

Chapter 2

OVERVIEW OF AID ALLOCATION IN POST-CONFLICT STATES

This chapter focuses on the analysis of aid flows to post-conflict states. The main purpose of this exercise is to identify patterns of external involvement in post-war transition, because to what extent, where, and to whom donors allocate resources are tangible indicators of their priorities. Yet never before has donor funding for post-conflict states been studied comprehensively and systematically. Fifteen years since the term peacebuilding first appeared in the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, the total or sector-specific amount of aid provided for peacebuilding remains unknown. Instead, peacebuilding has come to represent “a virtual laundry list of activities” undertaken by a range of actors: the United Nations, multilateral and regional financial institutions, bilateral donors, and civil society groups (Call 2005:iv).

This chapter begins with discussion on challenges to studying post-conflict aid, followed by a review of statistics and reports from major donors, including the World Bank, the UN agencies, the US government, and some of European countries. Notwithstanding the lack of accurate data on donor funding, a few distinct tendencies can be observed from these publications, including the types of country and sector that these donors are inclined to support. The third section further explores the organization

of aid through a comparative case study of Sierra Leone, an aid “darling” country, which receives more aid than would be anticipated at its level of development, and Tajikistan, an “orphan,” which receives less than half the aid per capita of Sierra Leone (Levin and Dollar 2005).²² As such, these two countries can be considered the “most-different cases” in terms of aid volume: if a similar pattern of external resource allocation can be identified between the two, it would form a strong basis for generalization on the substance of post-conflict aid (King, et al. 1994, Seawright and Gerring 2008).

Measuring International Post-Conflict Aid

Data on aid flows to post-conflict states remain fragmented and inconsistent. This is due in part to the lack of a clear definition of the concept (what constitutes peacebuilding) or a consensus on its goals (what constitutes successful peacebuilding) and strategies (what it takes to achieve those goals). Some advocate that the primary aim of peacebuilding is security restoration, while others emphasize the need to address

²² According to the Organization for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD) statistics, between 1999 and 2003, Sierra Leone received more than double the total net ODA per capita (\$48.4) on average than Tajikistan (\$23.5), with a 278 percent increase over the same period, as opposed to 15 percent for Tajikistan. Moreover, the annual budget of the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) increased from \$260 million in 1999 to more than \$600 million in years 2001-2003, where as the UN Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT) operated with the annual budget of \$10 million from 1994 to 1999.

the root causes of conflict through political and economic development.²³ Such an absence of conceptual clarity is linked to the lack of coherent demarcation of countries receiving external assistance to deal with various consequences of civil wars. There is no definitive list of post-conflict states at any given moment. Instead, donors have established several categories of weak states based on overlapping but slightly different sets of indicators, including fragile states, difficult partnership countries, and low-income countries under stress, within which some but not all countries recovering from armed conflicts are included.

In 2005, the first Fragile States Strategy was published by USAID but without quantitative definition of the concept, and a further effort to develop an approach to fragile states came to a halt in 2006, when the Bush Administration introduced new categories of countries considered important to receive US assistance.²⁴ For the definition of difficult partnership countries (the OECD now call them fragile states), the OECD measures the quality of government policies and institutions by the World

²³ Those who prefer the security-centric prioritization criticize the latter as holding the role of external actors to an unreasonable standard and failing to discriminate between catastrophic failures and flawed success of peacebuilding. George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluating Issues in Peace Implementation," in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Donald Rothchild Elizabeth Cousens, Stephen Stedman (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2002).

²⁴ The new categories proposed by the Bush Administration include rebuilding states (12 countries emerging from conflict), developing states (66 countries which would include fragile states), sustained partnerships states (43 countries with strategic relations to the US), transforming states (23 countries eligible or on the threshold of the Millennium Challenge Account eligibility), and restrictive states (11 of the so-called rogue states).

Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and the level of poverty by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) International Development Statistics Database, the World Bank's Statistical Information Management and Analysis Database, and UN Millennium Indicators Database. For the World Bank's grants for post-conflict states, the Post-Conflict Performance Indicators are used to measure the same set of institutional capacities as CPIA, and in addition, indicators for the level of security and progress made on DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), reconciliation, and repatriation of displaced populations. The CPIA also determined eligibility for the World Bank's Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) initiative, which supports countries at the bottom of the CPIA performance spectrum, including both post-conflict and non-conflict countries.²⁵

The CPIA being used to define the level of institutional capacities in weak states is based on the aid approach of international financial institutions, which favors structural adjustment policies, and does not take into consideration political environments. The CPIA consist of 16 indicators, including for economic management (e.g., fiscal and inflation control), structural development (e.g., financial, private sector, and market development), social inclusion (e.g., gender, welfare, poverty, public services), and public sector management (e.g., property management, revenue mobilization, public

²⁵ As of 2007, countries at the bottom quartile of the CPIA and eligible for LICUS support included Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Comoros, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Togo, and Zimbabwe.

expenditures, and anti-corruption). Meanwhile, “CPIA does not measure the reach of service provision and administrative control across geographical territory” (World Bank 2005:7). These characteristics of the CPIA can be problematic in post-conflict environments, because one of the critical tasks for the transformation of wartime economies and violence is to reform and strengthen service delivery and administrative capacities of public institutions, according to the literature on civil wars. A representative of USAID notes: “CPIA were never developed to consider the needs of conflict and post-conflict countries, or fragile states in general.”²⁶ Moreover, despite the prominent role of the CPIA in the classification of weak states, its rating has never been disclosed in full detail. Due to the mounting pressures to make the CPIA process transparent, the World Bank agreed in 2005 to publicize the performance of the borrowers but only relative to one another. It is suspected that the current CPIA methodology is “largely based on staff judgment rather than clear, objective measurable indicators” (Bretton Woods Project 2004:1).

The overlapping and yet inconsistent categories of weak states, none of which focus on post-conflict states, mean that there is no coherent set of post-conflict aid recipients to conduct empirical research on aid flows. In addition, donors have established multiple mechanisms to deliver aid, which also makes it more difficult to track it. In Timor-Leste, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) administered the Trust

²⁶ Interview with the Office of Conflict Management, Washington D.C., October 2006.

Fund for East Timor, while the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) managed the Consolidated Fund for East Timor and different UN agencies and bilateral donors also financed and implement their own projects (Schiavo-Campo 2003). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, donors established thematic trust funds, in addition to three parallel aid administration systems for each nationality, and therefore three de facto separate budget systems and cash management accounts. Moreover, the donors maintained multiple databases in Bosnia-Herzegovina, some of which were set up by multilateral and regional organizations; other ad hoc tracking mechanisms were also established at donor pledging conferences, while national authorities monitored aid flows through their own mechanisms. “Such discrepancies, and the lack of uniform reporting guidelines, make it nearly impossible to determine the exact amount of aid currently implemented” (Hetrick, et al. 2000:329).

To compensate for the lack of qualitative and quantitative definition of peacebuilding and data on countries receiving peacebuilding aid, a few studies have attempted to document post-conflict aid flows through the ad-hoc selection of cases, such as project titles to estimate the intent of peacebuilding and its sector focus (Barnett 2006, Smith 2004). Other analyses on peacebuilding rely on questionnaires distributed among aid agencies, which are based on the voluntary participation of respondents, and as such, only reflect the views of those willing to provide information. While mindful of these challenges, including bias in case selection and the absence of independently verifiable

data, the analysis of aid flows in the next section draws on reports and evaluations published by largest-scale agencies, with a particular focus on the destination and sector-specific allocation of post-conflict aid. These reports do not provide a global, comprehensive picture of aid flows, but still indicate a few particular patterns of donor involvement in post-conflict states, namely its short duration, preference for middle-income countries, and emphasis on economic liberalization.

Patterns of Aid Allocation in Post-Conflict States

External actors are often said to have increased their post-conflict assistance (Caplan 2002, Gurr and Marshall 2003). UNDP, which has the largest field presence within the UN system, reports that 83 of its 135 country offices undertake activities related to crisis prevention and recovery (UNDP 2007). In 2000, UNDP established the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund, which was budgeted \$248 million in 2005. The total allocation of UNDP budgets (inclusive of project funding) for peacebuilding increased from \$658 million in 2004 to \$1 billion in 2005, comprising approximately 13-15 percent of its annual budget (UN 2006). The World Bank's funding for post-conflict assistance has also increased. It established the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) in 1997 to administer mainly small-scale grants for community-based social reconstruction, the total disbursement of which in 2005 was \$7 million. In addition, the Bank funds post-conflict countries through the LICUS Trust Fund, which has

approximately \$25 million in budget, mainly for policy planning, technical assistance, and the delivery of social services (2005). In total, 38 post-conflict countries received approximately \$3.8 billion from the World Bank in 2005 (Hassan 2004).²⁷

Similarly, bilateral donor organizations have added separate budget lines for conflict-related assistance. Canada was the first donor to establish the Peacebuilding Fund, at the Canadian International Development Agency, with the budget of CAD 10 million in 1996. In April 2001, the UK government established two Conflict Prevention Pools, one for a global coverage and one specifically for Africa, consolidating the existing budgets and activities within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the Department for International Development (DFID). The Pools' combined budget for 2006-8 was £74 million per year, the equivalent of \$126 million. In 2002, Norway launched the transition budget line under the auspices of the minister of international development (with the initial budget of approximately \$65 million) and established a unit for Peace and Reconciliation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In

²⁷ This amount includes the International Development Association (IDA) allocation of \$2.581 billion (29 percent of the total IDA commitments) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) allocation of \$1.217 billion (11 percent of the total IBRD commitments). The IDA provides long-term interest-free grants and credits to the least developed countries, while IBRD serves middle-income countries with capital investment and advisory services. The IBRD raises most of its funds on the world's financial markets, but IDA is funded largely by contributions from the World Bank's member countries. Additional IDA funds come from IBRD's income and from borrowers' repayments of earlier IDA credits. Post-conflict states can receive the maximum 40 percent of IDA allocation in grants, which is 20 percent higher than the average ratio of grants to loans.

January 2004, the Netherlands established the Dutch Stability Funds (with the initial budget of €64 million or \$80 million).

Despite the establishment of these funding mechanisms, the level of post-conflict aid has increased only for specific countries, while the majority of war-torn societies continue to receive a negligible amount of international assistance. UNDP estimates that about 71 percent of all resources allocated to peacebuilding in 2004-2005 went to six countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Liberia, and Haiti (UN 2006:19). Sixty-three percent of UNDP's Trust Fund for Conflict Prevent and Recovery in 2005 was allocated to Asia, mostly for the tsunami response. The Trust Fund allocation for Africa was only 19 percent (\$42 million) of the total budget, the majority of which was allocated to DDR in Liberia (\$25 million). Expenditures for the Arab states were a mere 9 percent (\$20.4 million), more than half of it dedicated to Iraq (\$11 million).

Similarly, one half of the entire US budget for 52 countries considered "fragile" has been devoted to three countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Patrick and Brown 2006).²⁸ Of \$27.5 billion US foreign aid in 2005, more than one third was allocated to

²⁸ *Fragile States* may be defined as low or low-middle income countries failing in core state functions, including security, service delivery, and government legitimacy. According to the methodology developed by the Brookings Institution and the Center for Global Development, security is measured by the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, service delivery is measured

Iraq (\$10.2 billion). US assistance to Africa grew modestly from \$3.5 billion in 2004 to \$4.1 billion in 2005; the majority of it was for increased food aid to Ethiopia and mediation support in Sudan. Out of \$1.1 billion USAID budget requests in 2006 for conflict and post-conflict states, only \$18.9 million was given to a group of protracted conflicts, including Angola, Burundi, DRC, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, while the rest of the 98 percent is divided among Afghanistan, Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza, Liberia, Haiti, and Sudan (USAID 2006).²⁹

Overall, official development assistance continues to reward countries with stronger economies and institutional capacities to manage public administration and finance. Countries characterized by the OECD as difficult partnership countries because of their low income and weak institutions receive approximately 43 percent less in total aid than the amount predicted by their level of population, poverty, and policy and institutional capacities (Levin and Dollar 2005). The World Bank's resource allocations in 2003-2005 were nearly five times higher for the best-performing governments, measured by their income level and the quality of government policies for economic management, than for those in the poorest-performing countries (Alexander 2005). However, given the economic focus of indicators used to determine the institutional capacities of aid-

by the Human Development Index, and government legitimacy is measured by the World Bank Institute's Governance Matters IV database.

²⁹ These figures are from USAID: Congressional Budget Justification FY 2006, Statement of the Administrator (www.usaid.gov; accessed on August 8, 2006).

seeking countries, most notably the CPIA, the preferential allocation of donor resources to higher-performing economies is not surprising. The nature of the CPIA could also suggest that aid may prioritize macroeconomic reforms, rather than reflect the specific needs of post-conflict environments.

These patterns of resource allocation, in terms of the destination of aid and type of countries donors are inclined to support, suggest that despite the overall increase of external funding for post-conflict states, those most affected by protracted civil wars tend to receive the least amount of aid. Moreover, aid to post-conflict states tends to be unsustainable (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Kang and Meernik 2004). Although post-conflict difficult partnership countries receive approximately 30 percent more in aid per capita than non-post-conflict difficult partnership countries, it decreases quickly after the initial few years of transition. Similarly, the duration of the World Bank's exceptional grants for post-conflict states extends only to three years, plus two years of phase down, before a transition to the regular process which requires more rigorous selection criteria and performance review (World Bank 2004).

This frontloading tendency of post-conflict aid allocation is particularly problematic to institution building, which is a long-term process and requires sustained engagement. Furthermore, the overall pattern of aid allocation poses a perplexing dilemma to post-conflict institution building: post-conflict states do not receive sufficient funding

because of their weak institutions, but donors do not provide adequate assistance to institution building. Yet unless these post-conflict states establish effective institutions within a few years of post-war transition, they may become “aid orphans” (OECD 2005:26). To explore this puzzle further, the following section will investigate how major donors allocate their resources by sector, focusing on their thematic emphasis.

Aid Allocation by Major Donors

Increasingly, international assistance to peacebuilding has been extended to a range of sectors, including security, political, economic, judicial, social, and environmental reforms to address the root causes of conflict. In conformity with the literature on peacebuilding, UN entities identify that they have developed some expertise in the demilitarization of post-war politics, with specific reference to DDR, mine clearance, and electoral assistance, according to a survey conducted in 2006 (Table 2.1).³⁰ This perception may be due in part to the evolution of peacekeeping operations, which are increasingly mandated to carry out these tasks. Yet peacekeeping expenditures have not increased to meet the growing demands of complex multidimensional operations. When

³⁰ The survey used a broad definition of peacebuilding, consist of four categories: (1) security: SSR, DDR, mine action; (2) justice and reconciliation: transitional justice, judiciary, corrections, human rights; (3) social and economic well-being: protection of vulnerable groups, food, health, and education, community rebuilding, gender, infrastructure, employment, economic growth and development; (4) governance and participation: mediation support, constitution and transitional governance, public administration, local governance, aid coordination, financial transparency and accountability, elections, political parties, civil society, media. Indicators to measure the level of commitment and capacity to implement peacebuilding were inconsistent and indirect, such as the number of projects and a percentage of staff time dedicated to peacebuilding-related activities.

recalculated to the dollar value in 2004, peacekeeping expenditures declined from \$4 billion in 1994 to \$1.1 billion in 1997, and grew back to \$2.9 billion in 2000 and \$4.8 billion in 2005, which indicates that the more extensive the mandate is, the thinner the budget for each component will be (Renner 2005). For instance, of the budget of \$1.08 billion for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2006-2007, only \$12.7 million are available for DDR from UNMIS assessed contributions (the total amount of resources available for DDR in Sudan was \$42 million).

Table 2.1: Existing Peacebuilding Capacities within the UN System

Level of expertise	Security	Justice	Social-Economic	Governance
Substantive capacity and coordination	DDR; mine action; law enforcement	Human rights		Elections
Some capacities	Corrections	Transitional justice; judicial and legal reform	Gender; protection of vulnerable groups	Good offices and mediation
Some capacities but not relevant for peacebuilding			Basic needs; infrastructure; employment; economic development	Public administration; local governance
Little capacity	Security sector governance; defense			Constitution-making

Source: UN (2006)

For DDR, there are three major sources of funding: national, multilateral assistance, and

bilateral contributions. None of these multilateral or bilateral sources maintains a centralized DDR database, but a recent study estimates the total cost of the DDR processes as follows: \$184 million in Angola for the period of 2002-2006; \$44 million in Cambodia for the period of 1999-2005; \$100 million in Sierra Leone for the period of 1996-2004 (Ball and Hendrickson 2005). The largest and most common funding mechanisms for DDR are trust funds managed by either UNDP (e.g., Afghanistan and Liberia) or the World Bank (e.g., Great Lakes region, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone). In 2005, 40 percent of UNDP's Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery expenditures was devoted to the DDR and small arms component, which mainly involve community-based integration of former combatants through small-scaled interventions, such as micro credit and training assistance (UNDP 2005). The World Bank administers ad hoc trust funds for specific DDR processes, although neither UNDP nor the World Bank are involved in the military-related aspects of DDR processes, namely disarmament, which in peacekeeping contexts is covered by assessed contributions. Assessed contributions play a bridging role by meeting the short-term requirements until those trust funds or bilateral funding are established to provide voluntary financing for the bulk of DDR financing, particularly for reintegration initiatives (UN 2007).

The UN has also assisted post-war democratization through the reform of political institutions. Electoral assistance is one of the main substantive civilian functions in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the costs of which are covered by assessed

contributions for each mission. Outside peacekeeping frameworks, the primary sources of funding for electoral assistance are the United Nations Trust Fund for Electoral Observation, which was as of 2007 close to depletion, and the UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund, which had about \$19 million as of 2006. Economic and security institution building seems to be one of the weakest areas of UN assistance, although the reform of public administration and finance is closely related to the political framework of the post-war government and its stability, as the control of resources is one of the critical requirements for the transformation of wartime economies and violence. Bilateral aid appears to follow the same trend: “despite the rhetoric and the ambitious goals outlined in various US government documents and declarations, efforts to strengthen civilian capacity to lead on the fragile states agenda have remained chronically under-funded and under-staffed” (Cammack, et al. 2006:xi).

The World Bank publications claim that its post-conflict assistance encompasses a wide range of activities, including community-based development, DDR, de-mining, public sector reform, governance (mostly anti-corruption), and the rule of law (World Bank 2004:29). The locus of the Bank’s objective, however, remains macroeconomic stability and infrastructure rehabilitation: “most of the Bank’s lending to post-conflict countries has...been in rebuilding physical infrastructure such as roads and buildings carried out under the Bank’s guidelines for emergency lending” (Hassan 2004:7).

Similarly, the US allocates a large sum of money to infrastructure rehabilitation.³¹ In Iraq, the main US funding mechanism for the civilian aspects of post-conflict assistance is the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, established by the US Congress in November 2003 with the budget of \$18.4 billion, which is mostly disbursed in contracts to US private firms. US aid to Afghanistan nearly doubled from \$778 million in 2004 to \$1.5 billion in 2005; 41 percent of non-security aid to Afghanistan in 2004 was spent on infrastructure rehabilitation and 17 percent on economic governance, including privatization (US Government Accounting Office 2005). Only 4 percent of non-security assistance was allocated to democratic assistance. Meanwhile, US assistance to fragile states is increasingly absorbed by HIV/AIDS-related initiatives: funding requested for the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative in 2007 amounted to more than half of the total bilateral US foreign aid to the fragile states.

The World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) mainly supports community-based development through small-scale grants ranging from USD\$25,000 to \$4 million. From 1997 to 2004, PCF funding was concentrated among eight high profile countries (Afghanistan, Burundi, DRC, East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Somalia, Sudan), which received over a half of funds awarded to the total of 34 countries during that period.

³¹ A study of post-conflict reconstruction in El Salvador suggests that donors may prefer infrastructure development (61% of total funding for El Salvador in 1993-1996) because it is considered politically neutral. The host government tends to discourage aid that would empower opposition groups, such as the security sector reform. Herman Rosa and Michael Foley, "El Salvador," in *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery*, ed. Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

The World Bank's lending for Community-Based Development (CBD) or Community-Driven Development (CDD) increased from \$325 million in 1996 to \$2 billion in 2003, and the share of projects with a CBD/CDD component has grown from 2 percent in 1989 to 25 percent in 2003 (Mansuri and Rao 2003:2). Community-based development is also one of the top priorities for UNDP. Of \$155 million that UNDP spent for conflict prevention and recovery in the years 1997-2000, 43 percent was allocated to community-based socioeconomic recovery (UNDP 2000).³² From 1997 to 1999, the total resources committed by UNDP to local governance and decentralization increased by 81 percent over the preceding five years (UNDP 2000). The majority of UNDP expenditures for crisis prevention and recovery activities, which reached \$386 million in 2005, was also dedicated to social and economic recovery from civil wars and natural disasters, as well as mine action in Afghanistan and Sudan (UNDP 2006).

According to an OECD-commissioned paper, donor support to the community-based delivery of social services, is part of a wider strategy for public sector reform, which has gone through three different stages (OECD 2002). The first wave of structural adjustment programs, carried out throughout the 1980s and continuing to date, had a negative impact on institution building, as it sought to reduce the size of the public sector, and the small government paradigm limited public investment necessary to

³² The remainder was divided in the following manner: 25 percent for disaster mitigation and response, 11 percent for peace processes, 8 percent for mine action, 7 percent for institutional support, and 3 percent for aid coordination.

generate social services. The second wave focusing on technical assistance to the civil sector reform in the 1990s led in many instances to piecemeal and fragmented capacity-building strategies, failing to have any perceptible impact on service delivery (Berry, et al. 2004).³³ As a result, “there is no evidence of genuine and consolidated capacity to strengthen state and local capacities” (UN 2006:21). The third and current wave focuses on service delivery, often through non-state actors:

Effective transitions within fragile states will often require exceptional institutional arrangements to fill temporary gaps in capacity or accountability, drawing on the potential for supplemental oversight, delivery capacity, or technical assistance within the private sector and civil society or international partners. Along with efforts to strengthen capacity and accountability at the central level, strengthening local or community capacity for service delivery is often a critical element of a state-building—and peace-building—strategy in fragile states (World Bank 2005:4-6).

In this approach, donors organize community organizations as “independent and parallel providers of social services”(USAID 2006:14). Yet “the ad hoc parallel arrangements

³³ Another evaluation of the World Bank’s Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) also notes that “technical assistance does not have discernable effect” and “appears to be a waste,” unless government commitment to reforms translates into a measurable increase (by at least 0.5 point increase of the Country Policy Indicator). Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier, "Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds," (Oxford: Center for the Study of African Economics, Department of Economics, Oxford University,2004),14.

set up to implement Bank projects have hindered the long-run enhancement of local government capacity” (World Bank 2005:xiv). Rather than strengthening public sector capacity, government institutions have often been alienated by the practitioners of community-based development, who fear that “government involvement would result in elite capture and the exclusion of vulnerable groups” (Peabody, et al. 2004:14). As a result, state officials do not feel obliged to maintain assets established or repaired with donor support they did not benefit from (World Bank 2002:21). Community-based development has thus lowered the cost for the government to deliver social services, while the recipient communities have increasingly become responsible for the task. The World Bank’s evaluations also find that community-based development is not a cost-effective option, a majority (more than 75 percent) of which consists of small and scattered subprojects and requires considerable donor supervision.

According to an evaluation of the *Utstein* group (Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK), none of these four countries has “what any of the research teams was prepared to characterize without reservation as ‘a policy’ on peace-building” (Smith 2004:42). The Norwegian funding for peacebuilding tends to be larger in the area of security and socio-economic development than the other two categories. The Netherlands supports a larger number of projects on political development, but the average cost of projects is the highest in the social-economic sector. Meanwhile, no common understanding of peacebuilding as a method, concept, or approach was

identified among German (development cooperation) institutions or individual actors. The UK, on the other hand, emphasizes security. Fifty-one percent of funds from the UK's Conflict Prevention Pools have been allocated to security sector reform, followed by 27 percent for preventive action, 7 percent for law and justice, and 6 percent for governance.³⁴ The evaluation of peacebuilding assistance by the U4 countries thus concludes: "alongside the lack of national peacebuilding policy or strategy, most peacebuilding projects lack strategic connection to a broader strategy for the country in which it was being implemented" (Smith 2004:42-43).

These donor reports and data, as well as indicators used by donors to determine aid eligibility, indicate that external actors tend to prioritize the following post-conflict activities: economic liberalization, DDR, infrastructure rehabilitation, and community-based development. In contrast, institution building, including the reform of public administration and finance structures, appears to be one of the weakest areas of their involvement in post-conflict states. These observations, however, are not based on comprehensive and independently verifiable data. In addition, this overview does not indicate country-specific patterns of aid, and whether external actors prioritize those sectors listed above in all post-conflict environments or a specific issue is considered

³⁴ An evaluation for the Pools, however, argues that the security focus may contradict the Pools' policy goal, which is to pursue "direct" contributions to conflict prevention, reduction, and management: "many direct conflict prevention measures require intervention in political affairs of a target country." Greg Austine and Malcolm Chalmers, "Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Portfolio Review," (London: Department for International Development, 2004), 24-25.

more important under certain circumstances, depending on the context of post-war transition. To address these challenges, the next section analyzes the organization of aid to Tajikistan and Sierra Leone, focusing in particular on resource allocation for economic liberalization, DDR, infrastructure rehabilitation, community-based development, and institution building to analyze if these sectors are in fact prioritized or neglected by international assistance.

Post-Conflict Aid in Tajikistan

The Tajik civil war, albeit brief (1992-1997), had weakened the central control of the economy and given opportunities for armed elements within the government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) to benefit from narcotic trafficking and arms trade. Eventually, the camp that controlled more resources, and hence could buy more weapons from Russia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran than the other side, would have won the war.

Two issues over which the factions constantly realign is the profitable narcotic traffic from Afghanistan and control of the little that is economically viable in Tajikistan—which amounts to cotton and aluminum production. Control of the few good roads in the country is another realm for competing interests, which block relief convoys at will (Open Society Institute 1998:3).


Donor engagement in Tajikistan began in 1996 against this background, when both the IMF and the World Bank began providing \$22 million and \$50 million respectively for economic restructuring.³⁵

The total amount of aid delivered to Tajikistan since 1996 remains unclear. It was not until 2003 that the UN system in Tajikistan established the Aid Coordination Unit, although four donor conferences had been convened by then (in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2001). Even for the disbursement of \$900 million pledged at the fifth Consultative Group Meeting held in Dushanbe in May 2003, “officials at the World Bank office in Dushanbe could not confirm what was actually delivered in financial assistance,” although it was likely “significantly less than the amount pledged”(ReliefWeb 2003). For aid delivered in the years 1996-2003, the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for humanitarian emergencies is the only mechanism from which the level and scope of funding for UN agencies in Tajikistan can be gauged. It suggests that from 1999 to 2004, food security constituted 68 percent of the total aid. Although UN agencies in Tajikistan are gradually moving away from humanitarian aid, food security was still the largest component of external assistance as of 2004, totaling \$28.5 million raised through the CAP (Figure 2.2). A local researcher analyzes the continued focus of aid on food security as follows: “though the economy in Tajikistan has recovered to the pre-

³⁵ Tajikistan became a member of the World Bank in June 1993 and a liaison Bank office was established in October 1996, followed by a full-fledged country office in December 1998.

war level, the government wants to maintain the ‘poor country’ status and continue receiving grants and humanitarian aid, rather than technical assistance. Meanwhile, large-scale donor funding for poverty reduction and infrastructure development has not benefited the public, because these facilities are not efficiently managed by the government.”³⁶

Figure 2.2: Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Tajikistan, 1994-2003



Source: ReliefWeb

³⁶ Interview in Dushanbe, January 2007.

Economic Liberalization

In line with the general trend observed in the previous section, international aid to Tajikistan focused on economic stabilization and liberalization from the early stage of its post-war transition. During the initial period of peacebuilding in Tajikistan, donors pledged most of their resources to assist the government with balance-of-payments and budgetary support. On 31 October 1996, in anticipation of the peace negotiations yet to be concluded, \$185 million was pledged at the first Consultative Group Meeting in Tokyo, mainly for balance-of-payments support, technical assistance, and economic investment. The majority of this amount was not delivered, however, because of the deterioration of the security situation (IMF 1998).³⁷

External assistance did not reflect the context in which the government and the opposition groups had been engaged in a violent war. Ambassador Grant Smith, a chief US representative in Tajikistan at the time, summarizes the role of international aid at the end of the 1990s:

³⁷ Many donors also suspended relief and development operations after the kidnapping of foreign aid workers in 1997. One of the aid workers, a French citizen, was killed when, after failing to force the captors out of the basement with tear gas and 10 tons of hydrant water, the government rescue operation tossed hand grenades into the building. Open Society Institute, "Chapter Two: Fragile Peace," Open Society Institute, 1998), 5. After this incident, the European Commission imposed a 4-year moratorium on its technical assistance to Tajikistan.

...the international community has few resources with which to persuade the government and the UTO and their component parts of the benefit of peace. The World Bank and the IMF, to their credit, mobilized themselves quickly following signing of the peace accords to provide post-conflict assistance in late 1997/early 1998... However, these credits had two disadvantages: they flowed to or through the government, and they did not include post-conflict related performance criteria tied to disbursement. This constituted an important one-shot reward to the government, but the UTO benefited only as the government disbursed the money to it or its areas and the government only had an incentive to perform to get follow-on assistance. Fine tuning was not possible. Also, those bilateral donors who came forward—principally the United States—preferred to deliver their peace process support assistance directly rather than through the special fund established by the UN. Thus, not only was the total far short of that needed for a full demobilization and reintegration arrangement, but it was delivered through a variety of bilateral and multilateral channels...there was no significant aid package or carrot available in the short term which encouraged UTO field commanders to implement the accords” (1999:247).

After the signing of the peace agreement in June 1997, the second Consultative Group Meeting was held in Vienna in November 1997, resulting in the renewed pledge of \$95 million for humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction. Yet commitments

directly related to the implementation of the General Peace Agreement amounted to only \$39 million, including \$3 million for political reconciliation and democratization, \$19 million for DDR, \$10 million for repatriation of refugees and the internally displaced (Open Society Institute 1998). The third Consultative Group meeting of May 1998 in Paris resulted in the pledge of \$220 million for 1998-1999, 58 percent of which was allocated for balance-of-payments support, followed by 34 percent for investments and 8 percent for technical assistance (UN 1998).

In total, almost 90 percent of aid from 1996 to 1998 (some \$454 million) was provided by multilateral agencies, and in particular, international financial institutions (IFIs). The majority of funding from the IFIs has concentrated on macroeconomic stability and liberalization. The IMF provided stand-by loans of \$15 million in 1996 and a structural adjustment credit of \$78 million in 1998 and \$65 million in 2002 on the conditions that the government pursues, among others, the reduction of fiscal deficit, privatization, and liberalization of the agricultural sector and the trading system. The World Bank provided \$140 million in the years 1996-1998, including \$50 million for the privatization of state farms and enterprises, \$10 million for budget support, \$12 million for community-based development and NGO support, and \$53.5 million for structural adjustment. By 2003, the World Bank's financial commitments totaled \$322 million. In addition, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) approved five projects equivalent to \$17 million in 1998, mainly for the privatization of small and


medium scale enterprises and infrastructure rehabilitation. By 2005, EBRD's investment reached 11 projects totaling nearly €49 million, 53 percent of which was for developing the private sector and infrastructure. Since granting it membership in 1998, ADB's assistance to Tajikistan reached \$372 million in loans by the end of 2007. Of those loans, the largest expenditures (\$193.9 million) were given to infrastructure (energy and transport) development projects, followed by agricultural reform and natural disaster risk mitigation measures (\$122.7 million), social, education, and health sectors (\$35 million), and governance (\$28 million), which involved customs modernization and microfinance development (ADB 2007). In comparison, UNDP, the largest UN entity in Tajikistan as of 2007, managed approximately 10 percent of the total ODA to Tajikistan, according to aid tracking by the UN. Moreover, UNDP's reliance on earmarked funding from other sources has led to some donors viewing UNDP as "just another subcontractor" or even a competition to NGOs they fund (Pillay 2006:32).

Infrastructure Development

By 2003, the emphasis of international aid shifted from macroeconomic reform to infrastructure development, with China providing more than \$600 million for construction of power transmission lines and a tunnel (Figure 2.3). This trend corresponds to the increased reliance of the Tajik government on donor funding for

capital investment. In Tajikistan, overall government spending fell from 67 percent of GDP in 1992 to 14 percent in 2000, due in large part to the IMF-recommended reduction of public expenditures, and although it has since recovered to 20 percent of GDP in 2003, it is mainly because of increased donor funding of public investment.

Figure 2.3: ODA flows to Tajikistan, 2003-2006



Source: UN Aid Coordination Unit, Tajikistan

Capital expenditures on public assets in Tajikistan, including infrastructure development and maintenance, are financed by the externally funded and off-budget Public Investment Program (PIP) and the Centralized State Investment Program (CSIP) financed by the government source and reflected in the budget. In 2003, public capital expenditures were estimated at 7.1 percent of GDP, a sharp increase from 4.2 percent in 2000, which was due mainly to the increasing share of the PIP.

In prioritizing the allocation of internal and external resources for public investment, both the government and donors continue to emphasize infrastructure over social sectors and service delivery. For instance, PIP allocates 45 percent of its resources to transport and energy sectors and only 11 percent to social sectors, while the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), adopted in 2004 as a common development framework for the government and donors, calls for 42 percent of resource allocation to social sectors and 26 percent to the transport and energy sector. CSIP allocates one third of its budget for the construction of government buildings, which together with the transport and energy sectors accounted for 70 percent of domestic capital expenditures in the years 1999-2003. Primary education was the only social sector in the list of the top five recipients of resources allocated from the CSIP from 1999 to 2000; since then, social sectors have not been represented in the list of government priorities under the CSIP (World Bank 2005:45).

Despite donor assistance to economic liberalization and infrastructure development, living conditions have not improved, especially in rural areas. Although an overall increase of official development assistance grew from \$124 million in 2000 to \$240 million in 2004, the inequality of consumption expenditures, measured by the Gini Index, increased from 0.33 in 1999 to 0.35 in 2003. A World Bank report concludes:

Despite the robust growth and reduction in extreme poverty, the standard of living for many has not materially improved and there is ample evidence that the delivery of public services in social sectors and infrastructure is still deteriorating. Enrollment in basic education declined throughout the 1990s to about 88 percent of the school-age population in 2000 compared to 94 percent in 1989 and it appears that this trend is continuing. Health expenditures declined steeply in the 1990s, from around 5-6 percent of GDP to about 1 percent GDP in 2002, or below US\$2 per capita—among the lowest levels of spending in the world. The sharp decline in spending by the government has shifted the burden of health spending on to households, leading many households to delay accessing medical care. Access to transport, telecommunications, and safe water, particularly by the poor, has also declined (World Bank 2005:ii).

To eradicate poverty, donors have relied on community-based delivery of social services by setting up semi-autonomous institutions to participate in the design and implementation of rural development (World Bank 2002:10). Empirical research shows, however, that community-based intervention in and of itself promotes neither democracy nor poverty reduction, which will be discussed below.

Community-Based Development

Donor support to community-based development in Tajikistan began during the civil war. One of the first projects carried out by UNDP was the Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Development (RRD) program. With start-up funding of \$2 million in 1996, the RRD program mainly focused on small-scale and area-specific rehabilitation of agricultural land in Kulyab, Garm, and Shaartuz, which eventually spread to 187 sub-projects with approximately \$87,200 in funding for each. The RRD program evolved into the Communities Program in 2004, currently with a \$3 million budget to support 110 neighborhood-based self-governments (*jamoats*) through small-scaled grants for micro credit or infrastructure development. *Jamoats* are the former Soviet collectives reorganized into local self-government institutions, each including a varying number of *kolkhoz*, *sovkhos*, and villages. According to the 1994 Law on Local Self-Government in Towns and Villages, *jamoats* are the lowest level of official statehood, although they do not have official functions financed by budget allocations or rights to own or manage properties.³⁸

³⁸ Heads of *jamoats* are selected by a chair of *hukumat* (regional branches of the central government) with a nominal approval of *jamoat* councils, consist of *mahalla* or other village representatives. The appointments and dismissals of *hukumat*, on the other hand, rest with the president, subject to confirmation by local legislatures, though presidential nominations are rarely contradicted because a chair of a *hukumat* also serves as a chair of the local assembly.

The World Bank, the ADB, and the UNDP have also created user associations for the rural infrastructure development that they funded; USAID was the main donor for NGO-led community development, including Mercy Corps and the Aga Khan Foundation's Mountains Societies Development and Support Program (MSDSP). USAID particularly sought to encourage village-level groups, such as *avlods* (patriarchal extended families) and *mahalla* (neighborhood associations), to be involved in rehabilitation of municipal infrastructure, such as small-scale canals, drainage pipes, and schools. The cooperation of *mahalla* leaders and *aksakal* (respected elders) was considered especially important in enhancing the legitimacy of these projects, as is *ashar*, collective voluntary labor that donors often require as the community contribution towards the project costs in order to foster local ownership.

These solidarity networks based on kinship and neighborhood associations (the two forms of relationships became interlinked over time, as people often married with those residing close to them) had gone through a complex transformation after the introduction of the Soviet distribution systems. The *avlod* system continued to exist as a parallel system of social organization, and *mahalla*, though "reincarnated in the *kolkhoz* where they organized some service provision, local infrastructure maintenance, and resolved community disputes," also resisted full state capture (Abdullaev 2004, Freizer

2005:4).³⁹ Post-Soviet independence and the outbreak of the civil war brought these informal mechanisms of self-help into the forefront of collective identity and survival: “At the local level, the struggle focused on land and resources between regionally-defined groups, with little choice but to rely on these solidarity clans for self-defense in circumstances of institutional collapse” (Lynch 2001:55).⁴⁰

Post-war donor assistance to community-based development resulted in empowering local elites, not the poor, because one of the challenges of relying on pre-existing local solidarity networks is the limited participation of marginalized groups who find it difficult to voice and have their views taken into account by local elites (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005, Swiss Cooperation Office 2004).⁴¹ The MSDSP program in the Rasht

³⁹ For instance, even today, a decision by a community member to become a labor migrant must be approved by the *avlod* elders. The *avlod* then raises money to help with travel, arrange to ensure that the family members of the migrant are taken care of, and facilitates support networks through which migrant workers find jobs, accommodation, resident permits, and cash in host countries. Babken Babajanian, "Poverty and Social Exclusion in Tajikistan," World Bank, 2004), 17.

⁴⁰ A survey in Tajikistan also shows that, due to the withdrawal of the state, wealth and livelihood opportunities are now “linked to membership in small, localist patriarchal clans, which was identified by village or neighborhood of origin and family ties....Localist clans controlled access to employment in industrial and political bureaucracies and distributed the benefits to a narrow group.” Elizabeth Gomart, "Between Civil War and Land Reform: Among the Poorest of the Poor in Tajikistan," in *When Things Fall Apart: Quantitative Studies of Poverty in the Former Soviet Union*, ed. Nora Dudwick, et al. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003), 63.

⁴¹ The World Bank-commissioned report also recognizes: “building on what exists may enhance the legitimacy of community councils and the returns of project investments...[but] the inclusion and active participation of marginalized groups may prove difficult.” Arne Strand et al., "Community Driven Development in Contexts of Conflict," (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2003), 6.

Valley observed that the richest families benefited most from community-based development by diversifying and expanding their sources of income. The poorest families became dependent on remittances, as “there has been little change in the number of job opportunities and no real decrease in unemployment” (Aga Khan Foundation 2004).

Institution Building

Donors have increasingly acknowledged that for an accountable, transparent, and equitable distribution and redistribution of resources, community-based delivery of social services is not sufficient, and external assistance should be dedicated to reform and strengthen national institutions. As the World Bank’s report argues:

Many communities are characterized by serious power imbalances, which place severe constraints on community-based development. Where the poor are heavily dependent on vertical links with local elites, it is difficult to form the horizontal associations necessary for organizing collective action for the common good. Moreover, there is real danger of “local capture” of development programs, with local elites thwarting efforts at collective action or monopolizing their benefits. In such settings, higher levels of government may actually be better motivated to help the disadvantaged than local agencies influenced by

local vested interests (Gupta, et al. 2003:2).

Yet in Tajikistan, donors provided few resources for post-conflict institution building, as evident from the way in which aid was pledged during the Consultative Group Meetings in 1996, 1997, and 1998. Moreover, international assistance to economic liberalization in post-war Tajikistan has further undermined the capacities of the public sector to deliver social services by forcing the government to reduce overall budgetary expenditures.

Management of service delivery in Tajikistan is plagued by the consequences of the across the board staff cuts imposed by the IMF in recent years, which have significantly reduced the ability of ministries to effectively coordinate service delivery. A number of successive cuts of 5 percent in overall staff numbers annually have been imposed in order to reduce the public sector wage bill. However, these cuts have been introduced without any underlying reform plans, which mean that they have mostly been implemented in a mechanical fashion, by reducing staff numbers by 5 percent in each individual institution funded from the budget. [...] Across the board cuts act as a substitute for reform and therefore they not only freeze existing systems into place, preventing organizational and structural changes, but also dilute already limited staff capacities in priority areas, and reduces coordination capacities at the central

level of administration (World Bank 2005:88).

Despite the donor attempts to put in place a small and efficient administrative apparatus conducive to market-based economic management, highly centralized bureaucratic structures have not changed in post-war Tajikistan. Officially, social services are to be provided by district (*rayon*) *hukumat*, local branches of the central government, while regional (*oblast*) branches of the government assume a supervisory role. However, few resources are made available at the *rayon* level for service delivery. Sixty-five percent of the total government budget is allocated for the republican expenditures, and local government expenditures, comprising only about 25 percent of the total budget or 4 percent of GDP, are shared among 4 *oblasts* and 59 *rayons*. Another 10 percent of the national budget goes to the Social Protection Fund, an extra-budgetary item established in 1996 and managed by the ministry of labor and social protection, but it reaches only about 10 percent of the population and gives out on average less than \$3 per month. While social services—education, health and housing services—account for about 70 percent of total local government expenditures, the bulk of these expenditures is absorbed by salaries, wages, and benefits of government employees, rather than the cost of procuring and delivering goods and services for the public (World Bank 2005).

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

One of the striking features of post-conflict aid in Tajikistan is the lack of funding for DDR, although the successful reform of the economy should have been contingent upon security. Although the annual budget of the UN Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT) increased from approximately \$8 million in 1994 (with about 40 military observers) to \$15 million in 1997 (for 120 military observers), its mandate remained the investigation of ceasefire violations, DDR monitoring, and diplomatic engagement, while DDR was carried out by the Commission of National Reconciliation (CNR). The CNR was responsible for making assembly areas habitable in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where 6,238 opposition fighters, of the estimated total number of 7,000 former UTO combatants, disarmed and received medical examination in the course of two months.⁴²

Compared to the level of funding for economic liberalization and infrastructure development, donor assistance to DDR in Tajikistan was negligible. The World Bank provided a grant of \$165,000 in March 1998 to support the CNR in the design and preparation of the reintegration program, but most of this funding went to government institutions, such as ministries of labor, transportation, and agriculture, and did not

⁴² To encourage weapons collection, the government offered amnesty in 1994 (which continued until 2003) for voluntary surrender of firearms held by individuals, and in 2000, Rakhmon issued a presidential decree to ban the public possession of weapons by all except the security services. 2,199 weapons were surrendered in the process of DDR.

benefit demobilized soldiers directly (Smith 1999). UNMOT had some \$2 million in its budget for blankets and 60 days of food at assembly areas, and the World Food Program provided food rations for 2,500 soldiers in January-March 1998 and again in January-February 1999.

Aside from donor provision of basic supplies in assembly areas, “there was no DDR expert in the Karategin Valley as of 1997 and the demobilization of UTO fighters was carried out without disarmament or long-term plans for reintegration,” according to an international observer.⁴³ In 1998, the World Bank earmarked a credit of \$10 million for the Karategin Valley, but a majority of the credit (51 percent) was spent on the repair of transport infrastructure through the ministry of transportation, and the rest was divided between NGO-led community-based development (23 percent) and studies (20 percent) for further agricultural and power sector rehabilitation (World Bank 1997). The World Bank project did not include activities related to disarmament or demobilization, nor was it conceived as a mechanism to facilitate post-war reconciliation. For instance, the World Bank released a \$50 million credit for structural adjustment only 10 days after four UN peacekeepers were murdered in the Karategin Valley in July 1998.

⁴³ Interview with an international consultant in Dushanbe, March 2007. Furthermore, without independent monitoring and record keeping, “the number of arms held in stores fluctuated from day to day as weapons were removed and carried by fighters in public.” John Heathershaw et al., “Small Arms Control in Central Asia,” (London: International Alert, 2004), 17.

In 1999, two years after the signing of the peace accord, UNDP amended its ongoing Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Development program to create short-term employment opportunities in the Rasht Valley. Each project, for the budget of \$17,000, employed an average of 17 former combatants for three to six months to lead community-based infrastructure rehabilitation at the average salary of \$50 a month, which was a substantially higher amount of money than the average salaries for armed forces. Yet this program did not result in the long-term revival of the local economy, and the majority of those former combatants migrated to Dushanbe or Russia at the end of the program (UNDP 2004). Concerned that the unemployment of UTO fighters could lead to instability, the UN Peacebuilding Office in Tajikistan (UNTOP) proposed the establishment of a vocational training center in 2000, to which the Japanese government contributed \$700,000. Some 256 former combatants of a total of 6,238 disarmed opposition fighters attended the Center in 2000-2001. Yet these projects were essentially not DDR programs but part of community-based development (Kannangara, et al. 2004).

Similarly, international involvement in the reform of the security sector is almost nonexistent. The EU funds a border management project through UNDP, and the US provides some support for border management (US aid is approximately \$50-60 million a year, about \$10 million each for democracy, socio-economic reforms, community-

based development, and law enforcement).⁴⁴ As a result, “even more than in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, there is a remarkable lack of oversight of the security forces” in Tajikistan (Crisis Group 2002:14). The ministries of interior and security, the general prosecutor’s office, and the national drug control agency all have the power to initiate and conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases, which focus on the extraction of confession rather than evidence collection and analysis and often involve torture. Any information regarding police activities is classified as a state secret and is closed to the public, but foreign experts estimate the MOI staff to be as large as 28,000.

The patterns of aid allocation in post-war Tajikistan can be summarized as follows: emphasis on macroeconomic stability and liberalization, distribution of small-scale funds for community-based development, and lack of support to institution building and DDR. Furthermore, the overall amount of aid was relatively small, especially for direct assistance to the implementation of the peace agreement. UNMOT expenditures were only \$50 million in total. In contrast, the total cost of international involvement in Sierra Leone amounted to around \$3.5 billion by 2002, including a peacekeeping budget that reached \$600 million a year at the height of its operation (2001-2002). Donors

⁴⁴ Although the realignment of US foreign policies after September 11, 2001 appears to have led to a shift towards security-centric assistance, it was slow in following up on promises as of 2002. The Tajik border guards had yet to see the \$8 million promised by the US government. “Apparently, the only aid that has reached the division was a shipment of 60 pairs of binoculars—scanty, indeed for the force of 5,000.” Mieka Erley, “Us Military Involvement in Central Asia: The “Price of Freedom”?” *Give & Take: A Journal on Civil Society in Eurasia* 5, no. 2 & 3 (2002): 10.

were also engaged in a wider range of activities, including the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The following section explores how aid is organized in Sierra Leone and whether it follows a similar pattern to that of Tajikistan.

Post-Conflict Aid to Sierra Leone

The conflict in Sierra Leone was a much more protracted process than in Tajikistan, which began with the incursion of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Liberia in March 1999. Composed of no more than several hundred combatants supported by then President of Liberia Charles Taylor, the RUF rebelled against the one-party government of the All People's Congress (APC) in power since 1978. Throughout the 1980s, the APC leader Siaka Stevens and his close associates, including a small group of Lebanese merchants, had monopolized control of private enterprises and government import-export licensing, taking advantage of the donor-supported introduction of neo-liberal policies. In this structure of inequality, the RUF drew new recruits from urban revolutionary students, city dwellers, labor migrants, and village youth who were also marginalized in the hierarchical system of paramount chieftaincy (Lord 2000). In the ensuing decade of the conflict, more than 50,000 people are estimated to have perished and two-thirds of the population was forced to leave their homes.

The Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) was slow and ineffective in launching counter-

insurgency operations. To defend communities from the RUF, some local leaders, such as Chief Hinga Normal of Bo, began to organize civil defense forces (CDF) made up of professional hunters also known as *kamajors*.⁴⁵ With intimate knowledge of local terrains, CDF launched guerrilla warfare to “deny the RUF free movement through the ‘jungle’” (Richards, et al. 2004:14). The APC government also contracted Executive Outcomes, a South African private security firm, to protect state infrastructures from RUF attacks in exchange for the cash and diamond-mining concessions. In February 1996, the APC government gave in the mounting internal and external pressures to end one-party rule and hold elections with the assistance of donors. Paramount chiefs in the south and the east voted in favor of the Sierra Leonean People’s Party (SLPP), which in return promised support for the *kamajors* (Keen 2005). The elections led to the victory of SLPP candidate Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who then signed a peace agreement with RUF leader Foday Sankoh in Abidjan in November 1996.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Although the CDF is often associated with the Mende tradition, the original hunter-militias were from the north, numbering one or two per village or collection of villages. They were believed to have commanded secret knowledge and protective medicine relating to hunting in the forest, although “during the twenty years preceding the civil war urban hunting societies composed primarily of youth often became embroiled in partisan thuggery, and with the unfolding of the war, they inevitably also lost their link to local codes of accountability.” Mariane Ferne and Danny Hoffman, “Hunter Militias and the International Human Rights Discourse in Sierra Leone and Beyond,” *Africa Today* 50, no. 4 (2004): 75. The first recruits of the CDF were mainly from Bo and Kenema, but a larger number of the initiated came from among displaced farmers driven into Bo and Kenema by RUF.

⁴⁶ Kabbah had been a long-term employee of UNDP (former UN Resident Representative in Tanzania) who had close ties to the UNDP office in Sierra Leone. “Given these links, it is not surprising to learn that the UNDP office in Freetown was commonly referred to as Kabbah’s ‘campaign office’ during the 1996 elections.” Toby Porter, “The Interaction between Political

The peace process did not last long. In May 1997, junior military officers staged a coup, forcing Kabbah to flee and seek exile in Guinea, and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC suspended the constitution, banned all political parties, and called for the return of Sankoh from Nigeria, where he had been arrested two months earlier, “in a move that only serves to confirm suspicions of collusion between soldiers and the RUF” (Conciliation Resources 2000). The UN imposed sanctions on the AFRC government in October 1997, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed 15,000-strong forces led by Nigeria under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In February 1998, ECOMOG drove the RUF out of Freetown and Kabbah returned in March. However, rebel forces remained in control of the Northern Province, diamond fields in Kono, and areas along the Liberian border. In January 1999, the RUF marched to Freetown with the cooperation of the AFRC. The battles for Freetown and its environs lasted more than six weeks and killed over 6,000 people. Under pressure from Nigeria, the US, and the UK, a new round of peace negotiations began in Lomé, Togo in May 1999, and resulted in the Lomé Peace Accord.

In February 2000, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of UNAMSIL but in May, the RUF attacked the UNAMSIL compound and detained more than 500

and Humanitarian Action in Sierra Leone, 1995 to 2002," (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2003), 13.

peacekeeping personnel. A battalion of British paratroopers was dispatched to secure the airport in Freetown to allow UN reinforcement, and Foday Sankoh was arrested and handed over to the British. In August 2000, a group of ex-army forces known as the West Side Boys captured eleven members of the Irish UNAMSIL regiment, who were freed after a British raid in September. After these incidents, UNAMSIL was expanded from 6,000 to 17,500 military personnel. By 2005, security was largely restored and UNAMSIL withdrew in December 2006.

Economic Stability and Liberalization

Although the amount of post-conflict aid to Sierra Leone was much larger than that to Tajikistan, it was not sufficient to address its post-conflict needs. For instance, the November 2002 donor meeting held in Paris led to the pledge of \$650 million for 2002-2006, but these contributions did not amount to half of the estimated cost required for Sierra Leone's post-war reconstruction, which, prior to the conference, the World Bank anticipated to be about \$523 million for 2001 and \$279 million for 2002 alone. The World Bank, the largest donor at the time, could finance only about 13 percent of the total financing requirements for 2001 and 23 percent for 2002 (World Bank 2000). The IMF, following the 2001 loan of \$169 million to support the reduction of the budget deficit and privatization (e.g. the petroleum sector) and provided \$42 million in 2004 and \$20 million in 2005 for balance-of-payments support, which accounted for 17 percent and 6 percent of the total donor assistance in 2004 and 2005 respectively (Table

2.5).

Table 2.4: Top donors to Sierra Leone in 1989-2005

	Top 10 Donors/ODA	1984-98 \$M	1999-2003 \$M	2004-05 \$M	Total \$M
1	World Bank	157.95	216.27	90.64	582.71
2	European Commission	134.71	109.94	150.29	473.03
3	United Kingdom	60.83	245.82	121.52	446.97
4	United States	55.19	180.63	51.01	329.83
5	Italy	19.08	31.12	25.64	227.34
6	African Development Fund	84.33	39.42	50.29	206.29
7	Germany	39.04	48.15	18.01	176.61
8	Netherlands	14.71	85.27	16.74	122.13
9	UNHCR	5.96	53.49	23.64	91.11
10	Norway	14.75	40.03	9.33	74.03

Source: OECD/DAC

In Sierra Leone, as was the case in Tajikistan, donors focused on macroeconomic reforms from the initial stage of post-war transition. In anticipation of the 1996 Abidjan Accord process, the first donor roundtable conference was convened in September 1996 in Geneva, during which donors pledged \$212 million to assist in DDR and finance a trust fund that would help transform the RUF into a political party. However, the pledge was far short of the \$1.2 billion that the UN assessment estimated to be the total cost of reconstruction, and the pledge of \$212 million was targeted mainly towards short-term economic recovery measures, such as quick impact projects (Sierra Leone News Archive 1996). Meanwhile, the IMF had approved a three-year loan totaling \$151 million for the period of 1994-1997 to support structural economic reforms, including


privatization and public sector downsizing. In comparison, expenditures of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) from July 1998 to June 1999 were merely \$12.9 million.

Other donors have also provided budgetary support, as well as infrastructure development.⁴⁷ The World Bank's support to Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2007 was largely concentrated on economic recovery and infrastructure development (Figure 2.6). The European Commission (EC), Sierra Leone's biggest donor in terms of direct support to the government, allocated 42 percent of its total aid in the period of 2004-2005 to infrastructure projects, mainly for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of roads, followed by 32 percent of its aid allocation to budgetary support and capacity building for the Ministry of Finance. Direct budget support was also high on the aid agenda for the UK, the largest bilateral donor to Sierra Leone. Approximately one-third of DFID allocation in 2003-2007, which totaled £91 million, was for direct budget support. Similarly, over 50 percent of support from the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 2004-2005 was allocated to budgetary support; in contrast, AfDB support to governance

⁴⁷ China has been the second largest bilateral donor since 2004, although its aid is not reflected in the OECD/DAC statistics and is very difficult to monetize because the individual projects and programs are not defined within a project document framework with budgets and implementation structure. According to data from the Aid Coordination Office of the Sierra Leonean government, Chinese aid in 2004-2005 focused on infrastructure development and in-kind contribution, such as equipment donation to the ministries of foreign affairs and agriculture; the construction of stadiums in Freetown and Bo; renovation of the parliament; hydroelectric power plant financing; private sector development; and investment in state-owned enterprises.

constituted only 2.8 percent of its aid. The UN agencies altogether accounted for 15 percent of the total aid (about \$49 million) in 2005.

Figure 2.5: World Bank assistance to Sierra Leone, 1999-2007



Source: World Bank

Institution Building

While donors continued to provide budgetary and infrastructure support to the Sierra Leonean state, some of those donors also insisted on the downsizing of state institutions. As one of the quantitative performance criteria for the government to receive loans, the IMF recommended the reduction of the government wage bill from 8.4 percent of GDP in 2002 to 7 percent in 2005. As a result, the salary scale of civil servants is close to or below the poverty threshold, and those poorly paid civil servants engage in

embezzlement of aid and state budgets (Hanlon 2004). The Corruption Index issued by Transparency International ranked Sierra Leone 142nd of 163 countries in 2006, a decrease from the 126th among the 158 countries in 2005 and 114th among the 145 countries in 2004. In 2006, DFID suspended its assistance to Sierra Leone's anti-corruption commission when the commissioner was dismissed by the SLPP government after bringing charges against senior government officials.⁴⁸

Despite post-war economic growth at the rate of 6-7 percent per annum, Sierra Leone remains heavily dependent on external aid. In 2004, aid constituted \$360 million, or 34 percent of GDP, and debt was estimated at \$1.6 million or 205 percent of GDP. Many normal state functions have been carried out by large and well-funded international NGOs:

Rather than the government collecting maximum revenues, using them to pay for basic services, and then developing a plan to seek specific, targeted assistance where funds are insufficient, it is outside actors (donors, INGOs or UN) that set policy and perform other state functions. Such swapping of

⁴⁸ Commissioner Val Collier and his deputy, Andy Felton (a British national), were accused by the government of causing the death of Gloria Newman-Smart, former head of customs and immigration that the ACC investigated for corruption; of discourtesy to the president and the parliament that Collier allegedly described as corrupt; of traveling without government permission; and of paying journalists to write negatively about the government, among other things. Crisis Group, "Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity," (Dakar/Brussels: Crisis Group, 2007),

responsibilities means that the state does not build meaningful capacities. Its institutions are focused on finding new sources of donor revenue, rather than managing money at hand in a way that would develop autonomy and self-sufficiency” (Crisis Group 2004:5-6).

Civil society groups in Sierra Leone therefore argue that donors reinstated the state without an efficient and accountable public sector to manage the influx of aid.⁴⁹ Aid dependency resulted in the drain of skilled personnel from the Sierra Leonean public sector to donor agencies and international NGOs. Meanwhile, UN de facto administration of security became “a kind of parallel neo-colonial state,” which also hindered the legitimacy of the Sierra Leonean government, as the overwhelming presence of the UN illuminated the weakness of the latter (Kaldor and Vincent 2007:19). For instance, UNAMSIL’s operational costs were almost three times as large as the annual expenditures of the government (Table 2.7).

Table 2.6: Aid to Government Expenditures in Sierra Leone

	2002 (\$ Million)	2003 (\$ Million)	2004 (\$ Million)
ODA total	353	303	360
UNAMSIL	617	603	449
GoSL expenditures	240	256	338
Gross National Income	936	1010	1080

Source: Malan and Meek (2003:118)

⁴⁹ Interviews in Freetown and Bo, November 2004.

The peacekeeping expenditures in Sierra Leone were mostly absorbed by payments for troop-contributing countries and the maintenance of the mission, rather than benefiting local institutions directly. Although one of the main goals of UNAMSIL was the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, DDR in Sierra Leone suffered from financial bottlenecks and delays, as was the case in Tajikistan, despite the larger-scale peacekeeping budget in the former.

DDR

Similar to Tajikistan, DDR processes in Sierra Leone were chronically under-funded and much smaller-scale than that of economic reforms. Although donors began to discuss DDR assistance before the signing of the 1996 Abidjan Accord, DDR started only after the Kabbah government was reinstated in March 1998. A DDR program was formally re-established in July 1998, when it was decided that funding for the disarmament of an estimated 45,000 combatants from the RUF, the AFRC, CDF, and the Sierra Leone Army was to be administered by the World Bank through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MTDF). However, due to continued insecurity, only about 3,200 of mostly AFRC combatants were disarmed by the end of 1998, and the DDR process was interrupted again by the deterioration of the security situation and a rebel attack on Freetown in January 1999.

Despite the signing of the Lomé Accords in July 1999, DDR continued to suffer from funding shortage.⁵⁰ Although the MTDF had raised and disbursed about \$6 million by 2001, the DDR program still faced a shortfall of \$31.5 million in 2001-2002, which owed in part to the voluntary nature of contributions to DDR, rather than treating it as part of the regular budget for peacekeeping operations financed through the assessed contributions (Kings College 2004).

The United Nations and the World Bank have experienced persistent difficulties in fully funding many of the key post-conflict activities, even those that have always been identified as critical to peacebuilding. Most seriously, the DDR programme has always struggled to attract the funds it needed, a situation aggravated by the fact that the final number of ex-combatants presenting themselves for DDR was more than twice the figure estimated at the start of the programme. Such parsimony towards peacebuilding activities appears highly incoherent, in view of the high sum invested in UNAMSIL which has an annual budget of between \$650 million and \$700 million. Given this, it seems extraordinary that the DDR programme which has, since 1995, been identified as a post-conflict activity of primary importance, regularly falters every six months for lack of modest contributions (Porter 2003:49).

⁵⁰ From October 1999 to April 2000, 18,898 combatants were disarmed but the process was interrupted by the resumption of hostilities in May 2000. A low-key disarmament continued sporadically, which brought about the disarmament of 2,600 combatants, until a ceasefire was signed in Abuja on 10 November 2000 and an agreement was reached on 2 May 2001 between the government and the RUF to resume the disarmament.

The shortfall of funding was particularly problematic to the reintegration component of the DDR. It was not until December 2002, almost one year after the completion of disarmament and demobilization that a reintegration program for 56,700 former combatants began. By 31 January 2004, 51,122 former combatants received some assistance in vocational training, education, agriculture, and job replacement, and some 2,800 who could not participate in the reintegration program were given a one-time payment package equivalent to \$150.

On the other hand, unlike Tajikistan, Sierra Leone received sustained funding for the reform of security agencies, including the military, from the UK. From 1999 to 2001, the UK undertook a series of induction training programs for members of the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) under the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), at an estimated cost of \$32 million. From June 2000 through September 2001, some 600 British troops trained 8,500 SLA soldiers, and 360 British military personnel remained after the end of the training program to continue advising and directing military operations, including the staffing of key positions within the Sierra Leonean Defense Headquarters. They also helped administer a program to train up to 3,000 ex-RUF and CDF combatants selected to join the new SLA. Security was also the sole focus of the £26.3 million spent by DFID's Africa Conflict Prevention Pool for Sierra Leone: £22.5 million was allocated to the security sector reform and £3.7 million

for the reintegration of ex-combatants through community-based reintegration and reconciliation. In November 2002, the Sierra Leone and UK governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding, confirming a ten-year partnership arrangement on the UK assistance to Sierra Leone.

Community-Based Development

As security was gradually restored with the deployment of UNAMSIL, donors and the Sierra Leonean government started exploring the structure of post-war local governance. Since the colonial period, paramount chiefs had been the main provider of social services at the local level, for which they were granted fixed salaries, tax authority, the power to enact by-laws and mobilize voluntary labor, and chiefdom administration composed of a clerk, a bailiff, customary court functionaries, and chiefdom police.⁵¹ The land tenure system in Sierra Leone was also governed by paramount chiefs. The 1972 amendment to the Protectorate Land Ordinance of 1927 effectively left it to the chiefdom councils to determine the criteria of native status, which confer chiefdom citizenship, as achieving native status means gaining rights to land, residence, legal protection, and political representation. People who reside outside their chiefdom of birth—traders, migrant laborers, and displaced people—are classified as non-natives,

⁵¹ The main role of the chiefdom police, the size of which ranges from two to 25, is to arrest or seize property in default of obedience or tax payment.

Sierra Leonean nationality notwithstanding (Archibald and Richards 2002). Land in the chiefdom is reserved for natives, while non-natives are required to take out a lease. Customary laws administered by chiefdom courts also reflected the hierarchical nature of chieftain authorities: women, the poor, and migrants have to pay fees for the courts. There was no upward mobility within the chiefdom structure, as paramount chiefs are selected by an electoral college of councilors, each representing 20 taxpayers, and since those who could afford to pay tax were limited in number, the position of paramount chief has been circulated only among those wealthy ruling families.

Therefore, as organs of local government, the chieftaincy was “neither representative nor efficient” (Abraham 1993:86). Consultations held by UNDP and DFID separately in 1999 highlighted a variety of grievances against the system of paramount chieftaincy, including (a) discrimination against women, the youth, and migrants, (b) the limited scope of participation in the selection of chiefs, (c) mismanagement of resources, including aid, by chiefs and (d) the lack of accountability (UNDP 1999).⁵² Despite these shortcomings, chiefdom administrations were reinstated in 2000 with the support of DFID. An evaluation of the DFID program argues: “fear of the consequence of a post-war power governance vacuum in rural areas prompted DFID to design a

⁵² Anthropological work suggests that chiefdom structures emerged as a self defense mechanism against the British arrival in the mid-19th century. Subsequently, the British formalized the chieftaincy system with the 1938 Native Administration Act, modeled after the British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria. Paul Richards, Khadija Bah, and James Vincent, "The Social Assessment Study: Community-Driven Development and Social Capital in Post-War Sierra Leone," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004),

programme for restoring paramount chiefs. This was enthusiastically supported by the SLPP government, which was keen to re-establish political control over the countryside” (Fanthorpe 2003:59). The youth were mobilized to rebuild houses for chiefs, and elections were held between December 2002 and February 2003 to fill 63 offices of paramount chiefs vacated during the civil war. A number of covert manipulations, including cabinet ministers openly supporting a particular candidate, were reported during the elections, and tax receipts—the basis of eligibility to serve as chiefdom councilors—were often given to only those who supported particular candidates (Campaign for Good Governance 2003).

Yet soon after the 2002-2003 chiefdom elections, donors recognized the lack of confidence among aid agencies and local populations in the ability of chiefdom authorities to manage the allocation of aid transparently and accountably, and decided to support the creation of local councils (Thomson 2007). A nation-wide consultation organized in 2003 to canvas public opinion on the structure of local government resulted in three main recommendations in relation to the establishment of the local councils, including (a) election of candidates on a non-party basis, (b) no reserved seats for paramount chiefs and (c) a quota for women. Yet all of these were rejected by those voting for the Local Governance Act—predominantly males, chiefs and government officials—in March 2004 (Nickson 2004). The Act instead provided that councilors include elected members and those nominated by paramount chiefs. Among twelve

councilors in town and district councils, chiefs can select between one and three. Councilors are to consult with a ward committee, which includes all councilors, paramount chiefs and up to ten residents (five of whom must be women) to promote the development of the locality “with such resources and capacity as it can mobilize from the central government and its agencies, national and international organizations, and the private sector (Local Governance Act 2004).

However, the local councils do not have independent sources of income to finance community-based development: the councils have to apply for grants from the central government. In deciding the financial authority of the local councils, international financial institutions argued that the powers of the local councils should be limited to the administration of central government transfers, rather than being responsible for the collection and reallocation of local taxes (UNDP 2004). The Sierra Leonean government also resisted pressure from some donors to fix a proportion of central government revenue for transfer to the local councils (Fanthorpe 2005). In the end, a grant system, including block grants for local investment and tied grants to finance primary health, waste management, agricultural services, and water supply, was established.⁵³ As the local councils rely on the central government and donor for resources, their independent sources of income as a percentage of their total revenues is only 18 percent, at the meager per capita rate of \$0.29 (World Bank 2007). The 2004

⁵³ In the transition period of 2004-2008, only service specific grants have been and will be available to the Local Councils.

Local Government Act provides that local taxes and mining revenues collected locally should be shared between chiefdom authorities and the local councils. Many of the councils have raised the rate of local tax at a flat annual amount from Le 500 (20 US cents) to Le 5,000 and the proportion of revenue sharing between councils and chiefdom administration varies from 40/60 to 50/50 respectively, with the responsibility of collection falling on the chiefs.

These financial arrangements resemble those of the failed pre-war arrangement for local governance, whereby the local councils (then called district councils) drew the main sources of income from the local taxes collected by and shared with chiefs and grants from the central authority.⁵⁴ The membership of the pre-war district councils was also dominated by chiefs, as all paramount chiefs were ex-officio members of the councils and other members were nominated by the tribal authority (Abraham 1993). Due to the lack of independent authorities for financial management, the quality and quantity of social services delivered by the district councils were affected negatively by the decline of government revenues and/or local tax payments withheld or delayed by the chiefs. Resultant failures to deliver social services led to the suspension of the councils in 1962, resumption in 1966, another suspension in 1967, and final abolishment in 1972. The collapse of the local governance system coincided with the centralization of the state

⁵⁴ The district councils extracted a portion of its revenues from local tax collected by chiefs at the rate of 44 percent, and assumed some of the chiefdom functions, mainly the provision of primary education and health care.

under the Siaka Steven's APC government, and subsequently, the capacities of chiefdom authorities to deliver social services declined as public expenditures dwindled. The re-establishment of the failed financial structures for the post-war local councils demonstrates the donor tendency to restore, rather than transform, institutions responsible for the distribution and redistribution of resources without addressing their deficiencies that became part of the war economy.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the allocation of aid to identify patterns of donor engagement in post-conflict states. The findings of the global overview of aid flows and the case studies of Tajikistan and Sierra Leone point out stark contrasts between the perceptions of post-conflict priorities and the reality of aid allocation. Contrary to the emphasis of the peacebuilding literature on the demilitarization of politics and the self-assessment within the UN system that its level of assistance to DDR has increased, the case studies suggest that DDR tends to be under-funded and limited to food assistance or small projects called community-based development to facilitate the reintegration of combatants.

Instead, the bulk of post-conflict funding is allocated to measures for promoting macroeconomic stability and reform, including budget support, privatization, and

infrastructure development. The centrality of the CPIA as an indicator of institutional capacities of aid-seeking countries also suggests that donors tend to prioritize institutions that are conducive to market-oriented economic growth, because the CPIA rewards such policies as low tariffs, reduction of public sector expenditures, and low regulation on business. In contrast, the reform and strengthening of public administration and finance appears to be one of the weakest areas of international involvement. This observation is confirmed by the World Bank's own evaluations of its general approaches to post-conflict states: "the Bank has not been able to use leverage (conditionality, delayed program/project funding, overall level of funding) in support of the implementation of important reforms, particularly in governance and public sector management and in sound economic policies" (Hassan 2004:6). Moreover, "there has been no comprehensive analysis of public sector reform and capacity building in post-conflict settings" (World Bank 2004:33).

Donor emphasis on economic liberalization, especially at the critical juncture of post-war transition, will have path-dependent implications for institutional frameworks of post-war states. First, as the case studies highlight, these economic liberalization measures do not necessarily strengthen the capacities of public administration, which are in return required for sustained aid allocation. Second, the market-oriented international assistance to institution building in post-conflict states suggests that the main function of multidimensional peacekeeping operations remains a temporary

suspension of armed conflict through external provision of security, not the implementation of peace agreements, because the latter tends to require the reform of state institutions in order to redistribute power and resources. Third, while reducing public sector expenditures, donors have financed service delivery by communal groups. Community-based development, however, has promoted neither poverty reduction nor local democracy, but rather restored and reinforced existing hierarchies of social relations. This outcome has not only empowered local elites who have formal and informal ties to the incumbent regime, including *mahalla* leaders who are also managers of government-run institutions in Tajikistan and paramount chiefs supporting the SLPP government. It has also led to the same power structure through which combatants were mobilized to participate in the civil war in Tajikistan and from which the youth and other under-privileged individuals in Sierra Leone sought to escape.

These case studies underscore that donors tend to adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach to post-conflict aid, whereby focusing on economic liberalization, assuming responsibility for service delivery, and neglecting DDR, regardless of variant local conditions. However, requirements for economic reforms, disarmament, and local governance would have been different between Tajikistan, with its state and economy maintaining a semblance of centralized structures after the 5-year civil war, and Sierra Leone, in which the IFI assistance to liberalize the economy since the 1980s continued despite a decade-long civil war. The identical pattern of aid is particularly noticeable in the initial stage

of post-war transition before donors develop a country-specific aid framework, although both Tajik and Sierra Leone cases demonstrate that aid agencies continue to prioritize measures for economic growth after the adoption of poverty reduction strategies (e.g., Tajikistan in 2000 and Sierra Leone in 2001).

The evolution of donor assistance to local governance in Sierra Leone, whereby donors (the UK in particular) switched their support from the restoration of paramount chieftaincy to the establishment of the local councils, suggests that aid organizations could identify problems and adjust their policies. Yet as highlighted by the decision on fiscal arrangements for the local councils, diverging views among donors could create new institutions without addressing the central issue of capacity and accountability for the distribution of resources: who is responsible for service delivery, how it is financed, and to what extent the process can be inclusive and participatory.

These consequences of aid present a major disconnect between the current peacebuilding practice and the literature on civil war settlement and regime change, as the latter emphasizes that the reform and development of public institutions responsible for the (re)allocation of income is essential to the transformation of war economies and violence. In the next two chapters, this dissertation further explores the effect of these funding patterns on local power structures, including the outcome of macroeconomic reforms, DDR, and institution building.

Chapter 3

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN TAJIKISTAN

Based on the patterns of aid allocation discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter analyses several empirical puzzles concerning the case study of Tajikistan. First, although external assistance has prioritized economic liberalization, the public finance structures in Tajikistan have not only remained highly centralized, but have also been gradually brought under the personal control of Emomali Rakhmon, incumbent since 1992. Second, despite the lack of international assistance to DDR, Rakhmon was able to recentralize security under his command. On these particular developments, the literature on Central Asia has argued that the post-war power structures in Tajikistan can be explained by the following: the authoritarian tendencies of post-Soviet regimes; clan politics privileging Rakhmon and his associates from Dangara; and the role of warlord politics undermining the establishment of an effective and accountable state. Yet these theories do not explain how external support to the macroeconomic reforms failed to achieve the transformation of war economies, or why the government was able to restore security without implementing power-sharing and other provisions of the 1997 General Peace Accord. Empirical evidence recounted in this chapter will also show a discontinuity of post-Soviet elite composition; Rakhmon's alliance with particular individuals from Dangara and non-Dangara groups; and the contribution of warlords to

the stability of the Rakhmon regime.

In order to contextualize the impact of post-conflict aid to Tajikistan, this chapter discusses the evolution of war economies and violence from the outbreak of the conflict in 1991 to its resolution in 1997, and describes how the arrival of aid in 1996 changed the course of interaction between Rakhmon and other elites prior to the 1997 peace agreement. It also discusses the re-centralization of violence and economic control by Rakhmon and his close associates after 1997, despite the lack of DDR and donor assistance to economic liberalization, details of which—how aid contributed directly to institutional consolidation of power by those post-war oligarchs—will be discussed in the next chapter.

Specifically, this chapter begins with the analysis of events from 1991 to 1996, during which new state managers emerged from the armed takeover of the state. This section also presents evidence on how the power of these new state managers was continuously challenged by armed groups, including factions within the pro-government militia, Tajik Popular Front (PFT), and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which highlights the limited control of the incumbent regime. The second part of this chapter discusses the beginning of power consolidation by a particular group within the winning coalition of the civil war in 1996-1997, especially in the area of macroeconomic control, and the role of international aid in this process. Thirdly, this chapter analyzes the failure of

power-sharing arrangements with UTO promised in the 1997 peace accord, despite international engagement through the UN Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and its successor mission, the UN Peacebuilding Office in Tajikistan (UNTOP). The last section discusses the last puzzle: why some of the former UTO commanders, who were appointed to government posts after the civil war, assisted in the consolidation of Rakhmon's security control by leading armed campaigns against those who remained outside government control, despite the aforementioned collapse of the power-sharing arrangement included in the 1997 peace agreement.

Emergence of New State Managers

This section analyses power dynamics before and during post-war transition, which demonstrates that external assistance affected not only a balance of power between the government and opposition forces but the implementation of a peace agreement signed between them by empowering a particular group of elites within the government.

Shift from a Soviet to Wartime Government

Many argue that post-war power structures in Tajikistan resemble other authoritarian ones of post-Soviet Central Asian states. In Tajikistan, however, the civil war changed the composition of elites at various levels. In the center, those who ascended to power

after the outbreak of the conflict have forced the Soviet-era officials out of decision-making structures.

In December 1992, the short-lived coalition government, which mainly consisted of opposition groups from Garm and Badakhshan, was ousted by the Kulyabi-based PFT supported financially and logistically by the Leninabadi Soviet officials, including Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullajanov.⁵⁵ Yet soon after the formation of the new government in 1992, Rakhmon set out to disband the Leninabadi influence. In August 1993, Rakhmon attempted to deploy Kulyabi-dominated police forces to Leninabad (renamed to Sogd), but Sogd Governor Abdujalil Hamidov prevented this move by blowing up the only bridge connecting Dushanbe and the north. In December 1993, Rakhmon dismissed Abdullajanov, together with Governor Hamidov and Mayor of Sogd's capital Khujand (Abdullajanov's brother). Abdullajanov ran against and lost to Rakhmon in the 1994 presidential race, after which he was accused of embezzlement and barred from holding public office and standing in future elections. Abdullajanov left Tajikistan and formed the National Revival Movement in Moscow in 1995 with two other former Leninabadi prime ministers, Jamshed Karimov and Abdujalil Samadov, and demanded to be included in peace negotiations with the UTO. This so-called Third

⁵⁵ According to a retired senior diplomat, Abdullajanov also engineered Uzbekistan's support for the Kulyabi forces. His motive for backing the PFT, according to the diplomat, may have been the protection of his own economic assets, including cotton farms.

Force, which was neither part of the government nor UTO, found some support in the latter but not from Rakhmon or international organizations assisting in mediation.⁵⁶

If Abdullajanov had stayed in power, he would have been in a position to influence the post-Soviet economic restructuring. Having served as the minister of grain products before the fall of the Soviet Union (Governor Hamidov was also in the grain business and his relative), Abdullajanov had extensive overseas contacts and political-economic capital, especially during the food shortage after the outbreak of the conflict. He also took advantage of privatization that began at the end of the Soviet era and owned several firms by the time of independence, for which he acquired export licenses and credits from the state. Perceived as a formidable challenger to Rakhmon, Abdullajanov and his associates were removed from power thoroughly. After the dismissal of Abdullajanov, Rakhmon also fired the heads of the KGB (later renamed ministry of security), the ministry of the interior, and the prosecutor-general in Sogd, as well as 13 out of 16

⁵⁶ According to a UN official, “the mandate of the United Nations was to mediate the two warring sides—the government and UTO—so as to achieve a settlement that would end the war...A proliferation of negotiating parties was not justified and could have delayed the restoration of peace.” Vladimir Goryayev, "Architecture of International Involvement in the Tajik Peace Process," in *Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kamoludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes (Conciliation Resources, 2001), 37. Another senior diplomat argues: “the exclusion of the Abdullajanov group and the Uzbeks from the peace process would not necessarily have been serious if the government and CNR had been able to agree to early, open parliamentary elections... However, this opportunity did not happen. Not only were the elections delayed, but when they occurred, they were managed in a way that probably reduced representation by both these groups.” Grant Smith, "Tajikistan: Implementing the Peace Accords," (University of Peace, 2002), 13.

district chiefs seen as sympathetic to Abdullajanov (Gretsky 1995). The influx of Kulyabis to fill these posts provoked large demonstrations in Khujand in May 1996, and “the wave of arrests that followed these demonstrators specifically targeted known friends and supporters of Abdullajanov” (Akbarzadeh 2001).

Elite change also took place at the local level, as the victorious group assumed control of the *kolkhoz* (collective farms) and *sovkhos* (state farms).⁵⁷ During the Soviet era, the collectivization of land since the 1930s had led to the transfer of the Uzbeks and the Kulyabis from eastern Khatlon to work on the *kolkhoz* in Kurgan-Tube. Moscow also moved tens of thousands of Tajiks from Garm to Kurgan-Tube after the 1948 earthquake in the Rasht Valley. These migrations typically involved the relocation of entire villages, and as a result, Kurgan-Tube and the rest of Western Khatlon became a patchwork of generally mono-ethnic groupings. Upon arrival in the south, the Garmi settlers gained dominant positions in the local economy, which created resource-based antagonism along ethno-regional identities (Roy 1997:138). When political tension escalated in 1991, these local dynamics were exported to the capital, as farmers were mobilized by various factions and transported from the *kolkhoz* in buses and tractors to participate in demonstrations. Olivier Roy thus calls the conflict in Tajikistan “the war of the *kolkhoz*” (2005:140). Similarly, Barnett Rubin argues that “the clans that went to

⁵⁷ A local observer characterizes the *kolkhoz* as a basis of “collective identity and social safety net, on the one hand, and feudalistic social and economic structures that provided income for the rich while making the rest slaves, on the other.” Interview in Dushanbe in December 2006.

war in Tajikistan...were solidarity groups or parallel power networks organized around the administrative and economic assets of the Soviet state” (1998:148). In particular, *avlod* structures (extended patriarchic family structures) within *kolkhoz* were the main force behind violent mobilization, the ultimate goal of which was “to exterminate the rival *avloids* to the root, hence atrocities against women and children from the enemy groups” (Matveeva 2006:11).

It was therefore not an accident that fighting began in Kurgan-Tube where the Garmis and the Kulyabis attacked each other’s *kolkhoz*. For instance, PFT commander Faizali Saidov (an ethnic Uzbek) was a leader of a small self-defense unit for a *sovkhov* near Kurgan-Tube. With the victory of the PFT, many of the farms came under the Kulyabi management. A large number of the Garmis abandoned land and fled, while others were demoted to agricultural workers on *kolkhoz* now belonging to the Kulyabi.⁵⁸ When those internally displaced populations returned to their properties after the war, “many houses were not occupied by their legal owners, as those powerful enough had claimed the spoils of the war [...] Exacerbating this problem was the fact that the government has settled many Kulyabis in Western Khatlon” (UNHCR 1996:16).

⁵⁸ An NGO worker in Tavildara recalls: “during the Soviet time, this whole village had migrated to the south. In 1992, they all came back to Tavildara to seek refuge and this area became overcrowded. When fighting moved north, they fled to Afghanistan with the opposition forces and came back only after the conflict.” Interview with a Mercy Corps staff member in Dushanbe, December 2006. He adds that these villagers, because of little aid from the government, are now going back to the south to look for jobs.

Intra-Clan Dynamics within the Wartime Government

The civil war not only changed the representation of particular ethno-regional groups in national decision-making and local resource management structures, but also led to the emergence of a new elite group altogether, as Rakhmon sought to undermine the influence of PFT commanders who helped his ascendance to power. In April 1993, PFT commanders Sangak Safarov and Faizali Saidov were killed by their own bodyguards, reportedly in a quarrel with each other. “There are reasons to believe, however, that the whole accident was planned in Dushanbe and that the Kulyabi commanders were liquidated by the very same people whom they had put in power” (Nourzhanov 2005:118). Rakhmon has since appointed many from his hometown of Dangara, Kulyab, to national and local administrative posts that oversee law enforcement, customs, taxation, and business enterprise development. As such, it is often said the 1997 peace accords---facilitated by international organizations and regional powers---formalized and bolstered “an openly clan-based regime” of Emomali Rakhmon (Asadullaev 2001, Collins 2004:225).

However, according to Muriel Atkin, clans in Tajikistan lack the primordial character of homogenous or common ancestry; instead, they should be considered as “patron-client networks linked to extended families,” which do not encompass all inhabitants of a

particular territory but alliances with individuals from other provinces (1997:292). For example, despite the so-called Kulyabi-zation of the post-war regime, Kulyab remains one of the poorest regions in the country without public investment in basic services and utilities.⁵⁹ As discussed in the following section, the patterns of elite circulation since the end of the war also illuminate the intensity of intra-group rivalries, indicating that individual ties to Rakhmon could override ethno-regional affiliations. Contrary to the popular notion of a clan-based regime formation, this process of elite bargaining in Tajikistan underscores inter-clan dynamics and individual-based alliance between Rakhmon and other groups.

Kulyabis

It is often said that the most prominent challenger to Rakhmon is Mahmadsaid Ubaidolloyev, mayor of Dushanbe. From the Farkhor district of Kulyab, he was deputy chair of the cabinet of ministers from 1992 to 1994 and first deputy prime minister in 1995, but was removed in 1996 when several PFT commanders of non-Kulyab origin revolted to protest the Kulabi-zation of the post-war government. Yet soon after,

⁵⁹ In February 2002, the visit of Prime Minister Akil Akilov to Kulyab met with angry local populations complaining about the government's failure to address their social and economic conditions (women participating in the protest threw stones at the motorcade). According to a UN analysis, their discontent was not directed at Akilov per se (he is from Sogd) but at Rakhmon who is from the area, and was fueled by visible signs of wealth among those Kulyabi elites that settled in Dushanbe after the war and had land and properties in Kulyab confiscated for their personal use through quasi-legal measures. As of winter 2007, the city center of Kulyab still did not have a constant power supply.

Rakhmon reappointed him mayor of the capital city and chair of the National Assembly. Ubaidolloyev is said to be a hard liner, uncompromising toward opposition parties, and has criticized Rakhmon as too weak at times. According to one account, “the Ministry of National Security supports the Mayor of Dushanbe, the Ministry of Defense supports Rakhmon, and the Ministry of the Interior is divided” (Crisis Group 2001:4).⁶⁰ Often described as the second most powerful person in the country, Ubaidolloyev amassed personal wealth from real estate developments in Dushanbe, many of which are registered under the names of his brothers and relatives. A Western embassy estimates that his family controls advertisement and almost all the procurement enterprises supplying construction materials in Dushanbe, as well as most of the hotels and buildings (in which diplomatic missions and international organizations are housed). The source estimates that he is worth \$500 million.

Leninabadis

The downfall of Abdullajanov did not mean the end of Leninabadi representation in the government. Shortly before the presidential election in November 1994, Governor Hamidov switched sides to ally with Rakhmon. As a result, he was reinstated to the

⁶⁰ In February 2000, a bomb exploded in the car carrying Ubaidulloyev and deputy minister of security Shamshullo Jabirov, killing the latter. Two brothers involved in the UTO (Daud and Sherali Nazriev) were indicted for the assassination attempt in February 2001, sentenced to death in May, and executed in June, despite requests of clemency and further investigations made by the UN Human Rights Committee, High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, and EU Human Rights Ambassador Gerard Stoudmann.

governorship until Rakhmon appointed Kasim Kasimov to the post in 1998. Hamidov (an ethnic Uzbek) then moved to Uzbekistan, but when he returned to Tajikistan to attend his sister's funeral in 2000, he was arrested and charged with the attempted assassination of Rakhmon in Khujand in 1997.⁶¹ He was sentenced to 15 years in jail, while all other alleged co-conspirators of the assassination attempt were sentenced to death, including Abdullajanov's brother Abdulkhafiz. Abdulkhafiz was executed in November 1998 while his clemency petition was still pending. In the meantime, Rakhmon has consistently appointed a few Leninabadis to prominent, albeit often technical or ceremonial, positions. These examples include Akil Akilov, minister of construction in 1993, deputy prime minister from 1994 to 1996, and prime minister since 1999; and Colonel Azimov Amirkul, deputy minister of internal affairs from 1992 to 1994, state advisor on defense, law, and order from 1994 to 1995, general prosecutor from 1995 to 1996, and secretary of the security council since 1996.

⁶¹ This assassination attempt took place at a peak of anti-Rakhmon sentiment in Khujand, which also manifested in a prison riot in May 1997. The riot grew out of a protest within the prison against the deterioration of living conditions, but the immediate catalyst came when inmates learned that some would be transferred to Khatlon, where prison conditions are known to be worse. The Khujand prison itself was built to hold 300 inmates, but at the time of the riot, it held 800. According to Human Rights Watch, the government obstructed an investigation into the prison incident and covered up the true number of inmate deaths, which was officially reported at 24, but is believed to number between 100 and 150.

Hissori-Uzbeks

The Rakhmon government also sought to diminish the power of the Hissori faction of the PFT. Despite the Hissor contribution as an architect of the PFT, Rakhmon announced in 1993 an intent to form armed forces exclusively with Kulyabi personnel (Gretsky 1995). In addition, except for appointments of Jamoliddin Mansurov to mayor of Dushanbe (later replaced by Ubaidolloyev) and Ibodullo Boimatov to mayor of Tursunzoda, “the Uzbek elements of the PFT coalition were not integrated into the ruling mafias that grabbed and redistributed to their supporters Tajikistan's dwindling economic resources” (Rubin 1996).

In contrast to PFT commanders of Hissori origin, several civilians have maintained influential positions, including Murodali Alimardonov and Hakim Soliev. Alimardonov was president of Agroprombank in 1993, the largest commercial bank in Tajikistan specializing in agricultural financing, and appointed in 1996 to the chair of the National bank where he remains to date. Hakim Soliev is also a key player and architect of Tajikistan's financial and economic frameworks, having served as minister of trade and property (1994-2001), minister of finance (2002-2006), and chair of the tax committee (2006 to date).

Power Struggle within the Winning Coalition of the Civil War (1992-1997)

While Rakhmon sought to establish the basis of his power within the winning coalition of the war, particularly against the Leninabadi officials from the Soviet era and the Hissori faction of the PFT, his control of the state was unstable throughout the civil war period. PFT influence remained strong in the security sector, with its commanders and combatants integrated into the ministries of defense (MOD), interior (MOI), and the Tajik border forces (TBF). These wartime commanders also occupied land, properties, and state-owned enterprises by force, emerging as new economic elites. Moreover, as the civil war continued, narcotic trafficking through Tajikistan shifted from the opium trade through the Badakhshan region to the heroin trade that routed through Khatlon, generating an estimated \$100 million a year, according to an interview with UN officials in the region. This war economy provided a lucrative source of income to PFT commanders, which Rakhmon and his associates sought to take over.

Limited Central Control

During the civil war period, commanders of the PFT and other pro-government armed groups took physical control of productive assets, occupying by force Tursunzoda Aluminum Smelter (TADAZ) and agricultural land in Kurgan-Tube. TADAZ, Tajikistan's largest industrial facility, was under de facto control of Ibodullo Boimatov,

an ethnic Uzbek commander of the PFT-Hissor faction, in his capacity as mayor of Tursunzoda. In May 1994, Boimatov shot a director of TADAZ over a contractual dispute, an incident soon followed by fighting between his soldiers and government forces outside Dushanbe. At the request of the government, Russian tanks moved into Tursunzoda to guard the plant and Boimatov fled to Uzbekistan, but returned in February 1996 to seize Tursunzoda. Boimatov's revolt in 1996 was joined by Khudoiberdiev, half-Uzbek former deputy military commissioner in Kurgan-Tube and head of a ministry of defense brigade in Kurgan-Tube after the war. Khudoiberdiev contributed his well-trained and equipped 2,000 mostly Uzbek fighters and an additional 5,000 reserves in Kurgan-Tube.

Together, Boimatov and Khudoiberdiev demanded the dismissal of Kulyabi officials, including Ubaidolloyev, Sherali Hairullaev (minister of defense from 1995), and Izatullo Khayoyev (chief of presidential administration), as well as the partition of the Khatlon Oblast into its original state of two separate provinces, Kurgan-Tube and Kulyab. Kurgan-Tube is a multi-ethnic agriculturally fertile part of Khatlon, with sizable Uzbek populations, while Kulyab has been an underdeveloped eastern half of Khatlon, from where Rakhmon and his family hail. Rakhmon agreed to release Ubaidolloyev and Khayoyev from their positions, appointed Boimatov as trade envoy with special responsibilities on cotton and aluminum products and Khudoiberdiev to first deputy of the presidential guard, but there was no progress made on the commission

set up to proceed with the reorganization of Khatlon.

In August 1997, Khudoiberdiev mobilized his forces again to gain more autonomy in his control of Kurgan-Tube, where he instituted a separate system of law and order, taxation, and conscription from Dushanbe, and Hissor. The revolt was joined by another senior PFT commander, Yakub Salimov, who was minister of interior from 1992 to 1994.⁶² The 1997 revolt by Boimatov, Khudoiberdiev, and Salimov was put down by other Kulyabi commanders, including Ghaffor Mirzoyev, former PFT commander and then head of the presidential guard, Sukhrob Kasimov, Head of MOI's rapid deployment brigade, and Sulton Kuvvatov, head of the tax committee.⁶³ Yakub Salimov fled to Saudi Arabia and then Moscow, where he was arrested in February

⁶² Rakhmon dismissed Salimov in 1995, reportedly concerned with the extent of Salimov's influence within the police force, but reinstated him as the chair of the customs committee in 1996. Salimov even saved Rakhmon's life in Khujand when a grenade was thrown at the latter, after which Rakhmon reportedly said, "seven generations of Rakhmon will remember the deeds of Yakub Salimov." Interview with an embassy staff member, Dushanbe, March 2007.

⁶³ Kasimov was not a prominent member of the PFT; he was commander of special forces of Dushanbe police from 1992 to 1994 but was promoted by Rakhmon in part to "keep Mirzoyev under control." Kirill Nourzhanov, "Saviours of the Nation or Robber Barons? Warlord Politics in Tajikistan," *Central Asian Survey* 24, no. 2 (2005): 120. Kasimov was in fact dismissed in 2005, a year after Mirzoyev himself was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. Kuvvatov was also dismissed in 1998. In 2002, the parliamentary seat Kuvvatov had won in 1995 and in 2000 was revoked, and he then founded the *Tarrakiyot* (democratic) Party, but the government has refused to register it. In 2005, the ministry of security instituted criminal charges against Kuvvatov for insulting Rakhmon and inciting ethnic hatred. Kuvvatov died in March 2007 while in detention by the ministry of security.

2004, extradited to Tajikistan, and sentenced to 15 years in jail.⁶⁴ Khudoiberdiev retreated to Uzbekistan, and the “government troops then turned on the ethnic Uzbeks in the local population to punish them for presumably supporting this commander” (Open Society Institute 1998:4). Khudoiberdiev invaded Sogd in November 1998, succeeding in occupying Khujand in six hours, but on the following day, he was repelled by a coalition of government reinforcements and UTO commanders, resulting in more than 300 deaths and 600 wounded, including civilians.⁶⁵

These shifting alliances and splits within the victorious group of the civil war suggest that the level of access to resources such as land, state-owned enterprises, and drug trafficking was an integral component of post-war power realignment at the national and local levels.

⁶⁴ According to a UN source, this arrest evoked strong reaction from his supporters, including bomb explosions at the office of the prosecutor general in Dushanbe and at the home of the KGB chief in Isfara, followed by demonstrations (two people were killed in confrontations with the police) in 2004. A UN human rights report also notes that many community leaders in Kurgan-Tube signed a letter of support for Salimov but they were later dismissed from their jobs.

⁶⁵ Theories as to his motives for the 1998 incursion include: (a) secession of Sogd and its integration into Uzbekistan, (2) natural resources (he is rumored to have stolen 6 kg of uranium from a factory there) and (3) instigation of political dissent against Rakhmon (it is widely believed that Abdullajanov was involved in this operation). Khudoiberdiev demanded Abdullajanov be given airtime on TV, along with 40 percent of the shares in government appointments for Hissoris. Khudoiberdiev is rumored to have been involved in the mass killing of civilians in Andijan in May 2005.

The ability to convert administrative potential into financial capital... has created new motivations for empowerment of regionalism. An increase in the number of “their people” in the governmental structures means an increase of access to the privatization pie by ruling ethno-regional groups (Olimova 2004:96).

While these competitions culminated in several armed clashes in 1996-1997, the Rakhmon government also began macroeconomic reforms in 1996 with the support of the IFIs. Taking advantage of this externally assisted opportunity to reorganize the government apparatus for financial and economic management, Rakhmon and his close associates sought to establish institutional frameworks that could undermine the de facto influence of PFT commanders over the economy.

From War Economy to Centralized Economy (1992-1996)

By the time of independence from the Soviet Union, Tajikistan was undergoing an early stage of privatization. In 1991, the Nabiev government launched the privatization of 1,276 state-owned enterprises out of some 9,000 existing at the time. The parliament passed several laws on finance, investment, and property ownership, and established the national bank of Tajikistan (NBT) to take over the former Soviet state bank Gosbank. The state property committee, established in October 1991, was given responsibilities

for the privatization of national properties, while local governments were in charge of privatizing municipal properties. Despite the escalation of the civil war, 846 out of the 1,276 authorized enterprises of all sizes were privatized by October 1993, although more than 600 of which were small-scale enterprises.⁶⁶

Upon assuming power in 1992, the Rakhmon government restored central control over trade and finance. It reversed price liberalization measures adopted in 1991 and reinstated price control on basic foods and export goods through a range of administrative guidance issued by the ministry of finance. Similarly, the government restored “a de facto export monopoly” on trade, by setting production targets by the ministry of trade and the ministry of economy (World Bank 1994:72). Earnings from exports had to be surrendered to the state at the rate of 100 percent for cotton and aluminum, and 30 percent for the rest, which was later increased to 70 percent (Iwasaki 2002). In addition, all exports were handled by six so-called general contractors, who received the privilege of issuing licenses required for all exports (to themselves and other exporters) and quotas set for trade. These contractors were ministry of trade, ministry of industry, *Tajikmatlubot* (consumers union for agricultural crops), *Glavkhlopkoprom* (state committee on cotton industry), the organization for trade and industry, and TADAZ. The financial sector was also highly centralized. Among 13

⁶⁶ In most instances, labor collectives managing shops, restaurants, and other retail entities gained the ownership of these properties by leasing them first and earning money to purchase shares, but the distribution of shares within the collectives was never equal between managers and workers or old and new employees.

banks operating in Tajikistan as of 1994, three of them—Agroprombank, Orienbank and Tajikbankbusiness—controlled 96 percent of lending (World Bank 1994). Most of these banks were partially owned by the state, such as the state property committee, the ministry of finance, and the national bank of Tajikistan, and credit allocation remained subject to a variety of government controls to support existing state enterprises and priority sectors.

The centralized control of trade, however, did not increase tax revenue from exports. Although the cotton and aluminum sectors accounted for 80 percent of total exports, their proceeds contributed only 4.7 percent of GDP to the public revenues. *Glavkhlopkoprom* and TADAZ were exempt from all republican taxes, except for taxes that would calculate tax bases according to production targets, not the value of actual transactions. In addition, presidential decrees often forced these agencies to transfer portions of export proceeds to other ministries or state owned enterprises, rather than reallocating them through the national budget process (IMF 1998:27).

PFT commanders controlled many of these major economic and financial institutions, including TADAZ and half of the general contractor positions, until 1996. The list of agency heads as of 1994 (Box 3.1) indicates (1) the significant level of PFT control in the cotton and aluminum sectors, (2) the role of a few presidential associates in setting economic and privatization policies and (3) the remaining power of Abdumalik

Abdullajanov and elites from Sogd. This outcome of government-led economic reforms from 1992 to 1996 indicates that no semblance of accountability and transparency existed over the distribution and redistribution of resources in Tajikistan.

Box 3.1: Heads of Economic Agencies in Tajikistan (1994)

- State Property Committee: Matlub Davlatov from Kulyab (Rakhmon's cousin)
- Tajkmatlubot: Habib Narzulloev from Kulyab and former PFT field commander (arrested in Moscow in 2006 on the Tajik government's request but yet to be extradited due to the lack of evidence against him)
- TADAZ: Mikhail Sinani (who was shot by Ibod Boimatov in 1994)
- Glavkhlopkoprom: Ghulom Boyakov from Kulyab and former PFT field commander; deputy Hikmat Odinayev also a PFT commander
- National bank: Qayum Kayumiddinov (transferred to Sonibkabank after failing to account for \$175 million missing from the NBT account)
- Agroprombank: Murodali Alimardonov from Hissor
- Tajikbankbusiness: Abdumalik Abdullojonov from Sogd and former Prime Minister (1992-1994)
- Ministry of Trade: Hakim Soliev from Hissor, former Chair of State Committee on Trade and Contracts (1992-1994)
- Ministry of Finance: Normat Yunusov, later deputy of Tajikprombank
- Ministry of Economy: Izatullo Khayoyev from Kulyab, former Chair of the Council of Ministers (1986-1990) and Prime Minister (1991-1992)
- Ministry of Industry: Shavkat Umarov from Sogd

Yet the arrival of aid in 1996 from the IFIs did not reflect the unregulated state of economic management: it set out to de-regulate and privatize state-owned enterprises, many of which were already controlled by wartime elites, thereby legalizing their ownership of these assets. International assistance also helped curtail the power of the PFT commanders and establish a monopolistic command of the economy by Rakhmon

and his close associates.

International assistance in 1996

In 1996, the very first international aid of \$5.5 million came from the World Bank to privatize small and medium-sized enterprises, restructure state and collective farms, and reform the banking sector. This project, entitled Institution Building Technical Assistance (IBTA-1), was followed by an additional \$50 million credit to facilitate trade liberalization and farm restructuring.⁶⁷ Recommended by the World Bank and the IMF, the Tajik government introduced foreign exchange auctions, liberalized grain and bread prices, removed trade license requirements, and abolished the obligation to turn over foreign currency earnings to the government. These macroeconomic initiatives, however, soon led to budget deficits. Although the market-based foreign exchange system improved credit control and a reduction of subsidies dropped inflation rates from 200 percent in 1995 to 40 percent in 1996, these policies also resulted in the decline of the money supply and overall budget deficits (Azimov 1997). The government reallocated the \$50 million credit from the World Bank to finance the shortfalls in the

⁶⁷ Of \$5.5 million, \$1.5 million was spent on salaries, study tours, and office equipment for consultants fielded to the state property committee for 9 months, in addition to \$224,000 for another set of consultants carrying out public information campaigns, about \$700,000 for other consultants to identify legal and technical frameworks for land reform, and approximately \$2 million for multiple sets of consultants to propose legal, accounting, and auditing and payment reforms in the banking system. In total, more than \$3 million of the project expenditures were spent on consultants.

national budget, while the declining exports of cotton and aluminum offset additional financial assistance from the World Bank (\$9.98 million in 1997 as a budgetary supplement) and the IMF (World Bank 2003).

Immediately, the government reinstated central control over trade and finance. By the end of 1996, the government had abandoned foreign exchange auctions in favor of administrative allocation by the NBT, and trade restrictions were imposed in the form of export taxes and protectionist import duties (IMF 1998). In October 1996, the import tariff was substantially increased from a range of 2 to 5 percent to 5 to 25 percent, followed by a further increase in June 1997 to the maximum rate of 50 percent.

The restoration of the highly centralized economy was not simply a response to the budget crises caused by the donor-recommended reforms, but reflected a conscious effort on the part of the Rakhmon government to maintain personal control over income-generating industries. For instance, Rakhmon shifted the responsibility for monitoring export and import contracts from the ministry of the economy to a newly created Tajik commodity and material exchange board under the state committee for contracts and trade in February 1996, a few months before the World Bank project began. The exchange board was given sweeping power, forcing all exporters to submit trade contracts and obtain government permission prior to shipment. Hakim Soliev, Rakhmon's economic advisor from Hissor, was appointed to chair the state committee

on trade and contracts. Similarly, Rakhmon replaced PFT commander Sulton Kuvvatov with Khol Masharov, originally from Kulyab and former chair of Leninski district, as chair of the tax committee in 1996.⁶⁸

In addition, with donor support, the Rakhmon government established in 1996 a new framework for cotton financing with a substantial role of the national bank of Tajikistan (NBT) and its chair, Murodali Alimardonov, who was previously the president of Agroprombank.⁶⁹ When donors began assisting in the restructuring of cotton farms in 1996, the government had no means of financing cotton cultivation and it was agreed that Paul Reinhart, SA, a Swiss cotton-trading firm, would provide \$138 million in loans against a sovereign guarantee of repayment. The money was channeled through Credit Suisse Boston to the NBT with a 10 percent interest rate, from the NBT to AgroInvest (AgroPromBank renamed) with 12 percent interest rate, and from AgroInvest to a group of local loan brokers. These brokers, called futures companies, made their own arrangements with farms, and provided in-kind crop financing, such as seeds, fertilizers, and fuel, in exchange for advance contracts to receive a fixed amount of cotton at predetermined gins. Once the raw cotton was processed, farms were credited against the cost of inputs; otherwise the shortfall would be treated as debt and accrue interest.

⁶⁸ Masharov was then able to take advantage of the privatization component of the 1996 reform and gained the ownership of a bazaar, cotton farms, and a ginnery in the Leninsky district.

⁶⁹ The relationship between Alimardonov and Rakhmon is one based on personal loyalty by the former. Alimardonov turned his private home in Varzob into a palace (dacha) and presented it to Rakhmon, one of the five the president now owns.

Without any guidelines or oversight by the NBT or AgroInvest, the monopoly of credit distribution allowed futurists to charge interest rates as high as 14 to 30 percent and distort the prices of inputs by 10 to 25 percent, according to conservative estimates (Ashurov 2002).

The privatization component of the 1996 reforms also led to the personal control of economic assets by a small group of elites. The World Bank contracted the CARANA Corporation (USA), and with its assistance, the government prepared a system to issue vouchers in exchange for people's savings that had been frozen in state bank accounts. Yet the privatization of state enterprises and infrastructures was planned "in secrecy," as Stephane Dudoignon argues, without the participation of political parties or other constituencies (2004:133-34). Although this round of privatization in 1996 increased the rate of private ownership of state enterprises from less than 8 percent prior to 1996 to 30 percent by the end of September 1997, this was essentially an insiders' game.⁷⁰ Many people were unaware of the plan, could not afford vouchers, or were unable to purchase them because they were refugees at the time due to the ongoing civil war. According to one poll, 74 percent of citizens did not participate in the privatization program (Freedom House 1998). According to a senior staff member of the State Property Committee:

⁷⁰ Interview with an embassy staff member, March 2007. Chief of Glavkhlopkoprom's international department also gained a ginnery, registered under Dushanbe Mayor Ubaidulloev's brother.

To meet the deadlines set by the World Bank, a property as small as a car was “privatized.” For example, a driver of a government agency would buy a car that he drives for \$100 and claims it as “privatized.” He could then resell the car at a higher price, like \$1,100, as someone in my family did. These deals were usually done within government agencies, as the government did not want to involve outsiders.⁷¹

Many profitable properties were sold quietly, without advertising or open auctions, or their prices were grossly distorted after the state property committee intervened. For instance, according to a former staff member of the CARANA Corporation, a small shop to be auctioned for \$800 in Penjikent was priced at \$2,000 after the State Property Committee made a “special calculation of the asset.”⁷²

This has resulted in state enterprises largely being sold off to government officials, their relatives, other elements of newly emerging elite, and to leaders of armed factions, who have gained wealth through drug trafficking, operating road checkpoints, and other illicit activities. Many privatization auctions were reportedly rigged, and insider groups have intimidated potential buyers of

⁷¹ Interview in Dushanbe, March 2007.

⁷² Interview in Dushanbe, February 2007.

shares. The World Bank notes that the process of valuation of state enterprises is inefficient and lacks transparency (Freedom House 1998).

From this process of privatization, PFT commanders acquired apartments, cotton farms, shopping centers, and restaurants, many of which they had already controlled by forcefully occupying after the breakout of the conflict. For instance, the head of the presidential guard, Gaffor Mirzoyev, owned a meat-processing factory, over 30 apartments in Dushanbe, a small Olimp Bank, and a casino called *Jomi Jamshed* in Dushanbe. Qurbon Cholov, PFT commander integrated into the Tajik border forces, reportedly owned hotels and restaurants in areas between Dushanbe and Kulyab. Another Cholov brother is said to have purchased a ginnery with credit from the NBT and a brick factory in Kulyab.

Though lucrative, these were mainly small and medium enterprises. In the meantime, the recentralization of trade and agricultural financing in 1996 created an institutional framework to establish *de jure* authority of Rakhmon and his associates against that of the PFT. The 1997 revolt of Boimatov and Khudoiberdiev, despite their successful uprising the previous year that removed Kulyabi officials from the government and gained them lucrative appointments in the government, should be considered in light of the increasing concentration of Rakhmon's control over the economy. After the 1996 revolt, Boimatov was appointed as a trade envoy with special assignments on cotton and

aluminum, but any trade contracts would have required the approval of the exchange board. Similarly, although Khudoiberdiev controlled cotton land in Kurgan-Tube, the production of cotton became dependent upon the capital channeled through the NBT.

Meanwhile, social indicators continued to decline. GDP per capita decreased from \$550 in 1991 to \$177 in 1998; between 1990 and 2003, the monthly pension decreased by 18 times to \$4 and the average teacher's salary decreased by 11 times to \$12 (Sharq 2005). Given the increasingly competitive access to resources, the post-war reform of public administration and finance would have been critical for not only the success of power-sharing with the UTO, but for stability and development in Tajikistan. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, international post-conflict aid that began in 1998 after the signing of the peace agreements followed a similar path to that of 1996. The first structural adjustment credits from the World Bank and IMF for \$53 million and \$78 million respectively focused on macroeconomic reforms.

Limited Power-sharing with the UTO: 1997-1999

The 1997 peace accord—and in particular, the 30 percent quota for UTO representation in all forms of government, including state enterprises—was supposed to reverse the state-centric control of the economy and establish an inclusive distribution of power and resources. Based on the quota agreement, 54 UTO members were appointed to

government structures, including 5 ministers, 7 chairs of committees, 13 deputy ministers, and 15 chairs of local governments (box 3.2).

Box 3.2: UTO Appointments, 1998-1999

- First deputy prime minister: Akbar Turajonzoda, deputy chair of IRP⁷³ (removed in 2005)
- Deputy prime minister: Zokir Vazirov, former minister of education during the Government of National Unity (demoted to minister of labor and social Affairs in 2004 and dismissed in 2006)⁷⁴
- Minister of emergency situations: Mirzo Zioyev (dismissed in 2006)
- Minister of economy and foreign economic relations: Dalvat Usmon, vice prime minister during the Government of National Unity (dismissed in 2000)
- Minister of industry: Zayd Saidov (dismissed in 2005)
- Minister of labor and employment: Khudoiberdi Holiqnazarov, minister of external relations during the Government of National Unity in 1992 (dismissed in 2001)
- Minister of agriculture: Shodi Kabirov (demoted in 2001 to deputy chair of Khatlon)
- Minister of health: Asomiddin Latifov
- First deputy minister of interior: Habib Sanginov (assassinated in 2001)
- First deputy minister of defense: Ghairat Adhamov
- First deputy minister of nature protection: Alikhon Latifi (dismissed in 2001; his father, Otakhon Latifi—deputy prime minister in 1988-1991 and founder of an opposition party *Rakhtohez*—was assassinated in 1998).
- First deputy minister of social protection: Khaknazar Goibnazarov
- First deputy minister of culture: Mirzomhammad Mirzohodjiev, a member of the CNR and the IRP (dismissed in 2001)
- First deputy minister of communication: Sherali Nadjmiddinov
- First deputy minister of transport and roads: Abdurakhmon Nazarov
- First deputy chair of tax committee: Assliddin Sohibnazarov, deputy chair of the Democratic Party (dismissed in 2001)
- Chair of Tajikcommunservice/state enterprise Tajikgas: Mahmadrusi Iskandarov, head of the Democratic Party (arrested in 2004 and sentenced to 23 years in prison)

⁷³ He was dismissed from the IRP after endorsing Rakhmon in the 1999 presidential elections.

⁷⁴ Many observers argue that Zokir Vazirov, Zayd Saidov, and Khudoiberdi Holiqnazarov were not UTO members but appointed based on the quota as opposition representatives, due in part to the lack of professionals within the UTO camp.

- Chair of customs committee: Rahim Karimov (transferred to deputy head of national drug agency in 1999 and dismissed in 2005)
- Chair of committee on oil and gas: Salamsho Muhabbatov (transferred to a national tourism company in 2003)
- Chair of committee of state control for safe work in mining industry: Ayub Aliev
- Chair of state association Tajikmyasomolprom (meat and milk products): Dovudkhoja Islamov
- Deputy chair of committee on border control: Khakim Kalandarov
- Deputy chair of committee on the precious metals: Sarabek Murodov
- Deputy chair of committee on ensuring social property: Saza Sarkorov
- Deputy chair of state sport committee: Sayid Makhmudov
- Deputy director of drug control agency: Rakhim Karimov
- Deputy director of state statistics committee: Eshon Tohirov
- Head of office of cartography and geodesy: Qurbonali Sultonov
- Chair of Amonatbank: Imomadi Mirzoyev

As this list shows, power-sharing was mainly done in the executive branch, rather than the judicial or legislative branches. As the first group of UTO appointees was sworn into the government from 1998 to 1999, the power-sharing agreement was soon discarded by all concerned. In the protocol signed by Rakhmon and Nuri on 5 November 1999 on the eve of the contested presidential race, calling for the full implementation of the peace accord, there was no explicit reference to the quota. This “already signaled a de-linking of progress in the peace process from the issue of appointments,” according to a UN analyst, who further argues:

There was a lack of professionals within the UTO to fill the quota. Perhaps the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) made a strategic decision to focus on the

parliamentary elections scheduled in 2000. There was an informal deal, though, between the government and the UTO around 1998, promising lucrative positions for the top-level commanders and politicians, but not for all. Those in the rank and file of UTO gave up on the quota thinking that their positions were secured, but subsequent strengthening of the presidential power in the centralized Tajik administrative system and clannish personnel policy reminiscent of past animosities led to the further erosion of the 30 percent quota.⁷⁵

Similarly, the amnesty agreement was never fully implemented. Although the parliament adopted an amnesty law in 1997, the implementation of this law continued to be problematic long after the peace accords were declared complete.⁷⁶ Article 4 of the amnesty law excludes a wide range of crimes, including terrorism, banditry, smuggling, large-scale embezzlement of public funds, premeditated murder, sexual assault, and narcotics crimes, which left open the possibility of future prosecution of UTO members. Moreover, opposition fighters had to confess to crimes and sign testimonies with the

⁷⁵ Interview in Dushanbe, January 2007.

⁷⁶ Ten years after the signing of the peace accord, the issue of amnesty is still unresolved. In March 2007, former Deputy Prime Minister Akbar Turajonzoda publicly called for the government to delete all files on the UTO, but the reaction from government officials has been discouraging. As a UN official put it, “there is a willingness from the opposition side to engage in dialogue with the government, but it is uncertain whether the government is willing to listen.” In June 2007 the 10th anniversary of the peace accord, Rakhmon announced amnesty for minor offenders, mainly women.

MOI. In May 1999, the parliament approved an additional law granting amnesty to over 5,000 UTO fighters who had registered at various assembly areas, but this provision did not end continued harassments by authorities against former UTO members. In 2002, MOI established a special department to investigate crimes related to the civil war. No data are available on the number or nature of the cases the unit has on file, but according to UN internal sources, this unit has six investigators working under deputy interior minister. Several opposition leaders, including Nuri, complained that the special unit in the MOI could serve as a tool for blackmail and other political manipulation. According to an opposition representative, no international organizations—UNTOP or OSCE—have filed a protest against the establishment of such a mechanism: “instead of putting political pressures on the government to comply with democratic or human rights standards, these international organizations act as if they were NGOs, concerned mainly with fundraising and project implementation of their own.”⁷⁷ As of 2003, according to the chief of the MOI unit in Rasht, only 40 out of 740 former UTO combatants in the area were employed (some under his command) and two-thirds of the rest had left for Russia, not only in search of employment but also for fear of prosecution for crimes committed during the civil war.

⁷⁷ Interview with an opposition leader, Dushanbe, March 2007.

Security Restoration from 1999 to 2001

The lack of UTO integration into the government did not mean that Rakhmon was in control of security. Throughout the 1990s, the incumbent regime had to rely on an unstable alliance and the loyalty of individual commanders of both PFT and UTO origin. The Tajik government at the time was “splintered,” according to one account, whereby “the ‘power ministries’—defense, interior, and intelligence—are run by men who won them as rewards for fighting on the government side. Each has his private army, which destabilizes the regions to the east and the south” (Open Society Institute 1998:3).⁷⁸ Even as late as 1999, the government was said to “control only 20 percent of the country, and in some areas, only during the day” (Freedom House 1999:581). Rakhmon at that time was called, as one of the observers put it, “the President of Rudaki Avenue,” a 6-kilometer boulevard in central Dushanbe.

Neither the president nor the leader of the UTO had firm control over his field commanders. The governmental ‘field commanders’ were originally heads of the Popular Front’s essentially private armies during the civil war. [...] They often exerted influence in particular areas, profiting from economic activity in those areas, including narcotics trafficking. The opposition field commanders, if

⁷⁸ A representative of a UN agency recalls that inter-agency delegations to Tavildara with high-ranking government officials always required the escort of Mirzo Ziyoiev until 2001.

anything, more firmly controlled the area in which they had been fighting. They had sometimes-tenuous links to the opposition leaders, which prior to the peace accords were located in Afghanistan or Iran, physically separated from their field commanders. Some of them also benefited from the narcotics trade, which originated in Afghanistan (Smith 2002:10).

Against these elements in the armed forces, Rakhmon sought to maintain a delicate balance of power and authority through strategic appointments of a few individuals rotating around the ministry of security, the ministry of interior, and the prosecutor-general's office. Although the 1997 peace accord called for a restructuring of security agencies, no significant progress was ever made. As a long-time UN law enforcement observer noted, "the Tajik security structures were essentially the same from 1992 to 2006."⁷⁹ Instead, opposition field commanders were offered positions as heads of security entities into which their troops could be integrated. These included:

- Mirzohoja Akhmadov, deputy commander of MOI unit against organized crime in Rasht Valley (the unit was abolished in 2002)
- Tolib Ayambekov, head of MOI battalion in Khorog

⁷⁹ Interview, Dushanbe, January 2007.

- Nazarali Ermahmadov, commander of a battalion within the ministry of emergency situations (arrested and charged for the murder of Habib Sanginov in 2001)
- Shokh Iskandarov, head of the Tajik border forces in Jirgatal
- Kholbash Kholbashev, head of a unit within the Tajik border forces
- Hakim Kalandarov, deputy head of the Tajik border forces
- Namoz Kourbonaliyev, chief of the republican reception unit in the ministry of defense (arrested in 2002 and sentenced to 25 years in prison)
- Boqir Mamaboherov, head of Tajik border force battalion in Murghab (arrested in 2006)
- Mansur Muaqqalov, employed in the ministry of defense (killed after hostage taking along with Rahim Sanginov in 2001)
- Makhmadruzi Saidov, head of MOI in Nurobod

Because of the way in which UTO (and PFT) elements were incorporated into the government structures, post-war power structures in Tajikistan are frequently characterized as an outcome of warlord politics (Nourzhanov 2005). “The overall balance of political power has largely been tilted in favor of the pseudo-warlord commanders, and thus the government has been forced to integrate them into the military and the administrations [...] the Tajikistani state has been fundamentally too weak to overpower the warlords” (Lezhnev 2005:66). Many prominent and powerful

commanders were considered “untouchable,” and some of the UTO-controlled areas were not accessible to the government or the UN even after the signing of the peace agreement in 1997 (Matveeva 2006:27).⁸⁰

Yet the role of warlords in the Tajik peacebuilding process is more complex than a zero-sum power struggle between them and the government, or a challenge posed by them against the government’s authority, legitimacy, and control. When the civil war ended, the Tajik government was considerably fragmented and fragile, but many influential warlords of the PFT and UTO were complicit in Rakhmon’s power consolidation in the 1990s. When some of them became too powerful or posed armed threats to the government, other warlords came to clash with them, as was the case with the fall of several PFT warlords, including Salimov and Khudoiberdiev. Similarly, UTO warlords who took positions within government structures after the civil war participated in military campaigns to quell their former comrades who did not end up in government. In the next section, I present some examples of government-warlord cooperation.

⁸⁰ These locations included Tavildara (home of the minister of emergency situations Mirzo Zioyev), Darband (controlled by Mullo Abdullo), and the Leninsky District, an outskirt of Dushanbe controlled by Rakhmon “Hitler” Sanginov.

IMU and UTO, Tavildara, 1999-2001

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) led by Juma Namangani was a UTO ally during the civil war. The IMU maintained bases and multi-ethnic forces (including Uzbek, Tajik, and Chechen fighters) in Tajikistan after the 1997 peace accords, especially in Tavildara and a part of GBAO, and in 1999, the IMU launched incursions from its base near Tavildara into Batken, Kyrgyzstan and again in 2000 into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. These attacks revealed strong links among the IMU, Taliban, and several UTO commanders. Namangani and his 240 fighters were trained in Afghanistan, and according to a UN source, former UTO commander Abdullo Rakhimov (widely known as Mullo Abdullo) admitted participating in the Batken operation in August-September 1999, though allegedly on the orders of a certain former field commander occupying a high-ranking government position in Tajikistan. Eribek Ibrohimov (nicknamed Shaikh) and his subordinates from Tojikobod were spotted in Batken with Namangani in 1999; Al Alauddin Mansur, who had accepted an appointment as deputy commander of the ministry of interior battalion in Garm, also participated in those operations. Moreover, on the eve of IMU incursions into Kyrgyzstan in 1999, trucks belonging to the ministry of emergency situations were used to transport Uzbek fighters to the Kyrgyz border, with an additional two trucks of weapons for Namangani, according to UN internal sources. Minister of emergency situations Zioyev denied the IMU presence in Tavildara and bitterly complained about

the lack of recognition for his contribution to the government's major armed campaign in 1997.⁸¹

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan pressured Rakhmon to eliminate the IMU bases in Tajikistan and threatened that they would send their own troops to do so if he did not cooperate. At that point, the Tajik government had no control over the Karategin Valley and no capacity to liquidate the IMU with its own forces. Not only were those bases located in inaccessible mountain passages, but also a military action by the government

⁸¹ Rizvon Sodirov was once a UTO commander but was expelled in December 1994 after unilaterally executing some of his soldiers. He joined government forces in 1996 but unable to recruit enough fighters, moved to northern Afghanistan. Rakhmon reportedly gave his militia carte blanche as long as they fought against the UTO near the border. For instance, his brother Bakhrom Sodirov took 23 members of the ceasefire monitoring committee (set up after the ceasefire agreement signed in Tehran in 1994) hostage in 1996 to pressure the UTO into releasing two of their fighters, but the government did nothing to penalize him. In January 1997, Bakhrom again took 17 hostages in Obigarm (between Dushanbe and Garm), but this time it included five UNMOT staff, one representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, four UNHCR staff, and even Minister of Security Saidamir Zukhurov, who was sent by Rakhmon to negotiate the release of the others. Bakhrom demanded the return of his brother Rizvon from northern Afghanistan and with the assistance of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Rizvon visited Bakhrom's camp. Rizvon was to leave Tajikistan after the release of hostages, but he stayed and further demanded the transfer of his fighters, 40 of them each carrying two weapons, from Afghanistan. The government gave in again. As those fighters were assembled for transport to Tajikistan, a fight broke out between the Sodirov group and Massoud's forces over the disarmament of the former (the Tajik government sought to transfer them separately), in which seven of Rizvon's fighters were killed. UTO commanders, including Mirzo Ziyoiev and Davlat Usmon, reportedly urged the government to take strong action against the Rizvon brothers and offered to participate in such a campaign. After all hostages were released in mid-February, the Presidential Guard and UTO forces attacked the Sodirov group but to no decisive effect. In April 1997, the government-UTO joint forces attacked the Rizvon brothers' camp again, and Bakhrom was arrested and jailed. In October 1997, Rizvon Sodirov kidnapped two French aid workers, as well as two relatives of Gaffor Mirzoyev and two sons of the official Mufti (Islamic cleric), but he was killed by the government-UTO forces. One of the French hostages was also killed in the crossfire. Bakhrom was sentenced to death and executed in 1998.

would have risked alienating the UTO members, especially those from Garm, who would have hardly remained indifferent to a war against their former allies.⁸² Rakhmon had no option but to negotiate with Namangani and his fighters, estimated to be between 200 and 500, about voluntary departure from Tajikistan. On 16 December 2000, the government dispatched a secret commission to Tavildara. The team was composed of former UTO commanders integrated into government structures, including the minister of emergency situations Mirzo Zioyev and his civil war era deputies, Gayrat Adhamov (appointed to first deputy minister of defense) and Hakim Kalandarov (appointed to first deputy commander of the Tajik border forces), and first deputy minister of interior Habib Sanginov. The commission failed to persuade Namangani, and instead faced the threat of military confrontation, which would have given the IMU the advantage of winter weather conditions.

The tension with the IMU escalated again in early 2001, after Namangani took hostage some 30 members of the ministry of interior (MOI) special task force. On 3 January 2001, according to a UN source, a secret meeting was held in the presidential palace, attended by the heads of all the law enforcement agencies. On 4 January, former UTO commanders, including Mirzo Zioyev, Mahmadrusi Iskandarov (head of the Democratic

⁸² In November, Namangani held a meeting with former UTO commanders from the Karategin Valley, urging them not to interfere with the movement of IMU fighters. Implicit collaboration between Namangani and the former UTO members can be also assumed by the release of five Uzbek fighters, captured after their return from Kyrgyzstan by Shoh Iskandarov, the former UTO commander and the Tajik Border Force commander in Jirgatal.

Party), Salamsho Muhabbatov (head of state committee on oil and gas), Shoh Iskandarov (Mahmadruzi's nephew and commander of Tajik border forces in Jirgatal), and Habib Sanginov departed for Tavildara, together with some 700 former UTO fighters. This move, according to the UN analysis, was more of a gesture of solidarity with Rakhmon, as it was unlikely that they could launch any significant military action against Namangani, but an attempt to reduce pressures from Rakhmon and to demonstrate their solidarity with the government.⁸³ In January 2001, the IMU decided to pull out of Tajikistan and left for Afghanistan.⁸⁴ On 17 January, the government commission sent to Tavildara confirmed the evacuation of some 250 IMU fighters by two army helicopters (supplied by the Russians), although it was estimated that some 300 fighters remained in Tajikistan.

Mullo Abdullo, Darband, 2000

On 3 June 2000, Saimudin "Sergey" Davlatov was assassinated with his driver and assistant on a road between Konsomolabad and Garm, close to the location where four

⁸³ A few weeks later, in mid-January, at a meeting chaired by Rakhmon, Ubaidolloyev insisted that unless military action was taken against Namangani, Uzbekistan would cut gas and electricity supplies as punitive measures, whereas Mirzo Ziyoiev and defense minister Hairullaev maintained a cautious approach towards Namangani.

⁸⁴ According to an unclassified and reliable source, this decision to pull the IMU out of Tajikistan was received on Namangani's satellite phone, which indicated IMU connections to the Taliban, Al Qaeda or other movements with a regional and global reach.

UNMOT staff were killed in July 1998. Davlatov, a former UTO fighter appointed chair of the Garm district based on the quota, was collaborating with aid agencies to create employment in the region. His plan to rebuild an old coalmine to finance construction and heating of public buildings may have collided with the commercial interests of other people, such as Mullo Abdullo or another former commander based in Jafr, north of Garm, according to a UN analysis. The incident was followed by a wave of retaliation that ended up killing 11 people, all of whom were former UTO fighters (including Mullo Abdullo's brother; Abdullo claimed that the head of the MOI in Darband was responsible for his brother's death). A few weeks later, the government sent a commission composed of former UTO commanders from the Karategin Valley to investigate the incident and to convince the remaining former combatants roaming the area to join the security agencies.

Mullo Abdullo responded by establishing four checkpoints in Darband and requested that a special battalion be created under his command. In September, after months of caution and deliberation, the government initiated military action against Mullo Abdullo, led mainly by former UTO commanders. About a dozen of his fighters were killed, though Mullo Abdullo himself and 50 to 60 of his combatants escaped and hid in the mountains. Thirty-seven of these fighters eventually surrendered, reportedly under an agreement of amnesty and integration into the ministry of defense in Kofarnikhon under the command of a former UTO officer (some of them were later arrested in

August 2001). Mullo Abdullo himself is reported to have fled to Afghanistan where he joined the Taliban forces (Hall 2002). He was rumored to have died in Afghanistan but, according to a UN source, he returned to Tajikistan in 2007.

Rakhmon Sanginov, Dushanbe, 2001

In April 2001, first deputy minister of interior Habib Sanginov was assassinated in the midst of internal reorganization of the police forces. Habib Sanginov was from Garm, a member of the Commission on National Reconciliation, and was appointed deputy minister of interior in 1998 based on the quota agreement. Sanginov reportedly feared for his life after dismissing from the Khatlon police 40 percent of those recruited during the civil war. Showered by machine gunfire on his way home from the ministry, Sanginov, his driver, and two bodyguards all died, and the professional manner of the incident prompted a fear among UTO commanders that it was orchestrated by the government and that they, too, would be soon eliminated. They complained to Mirzo Zioyev, minister of emergency situations, that Sanginov was one of the early targets, for he did not have military forces behind him.

After Sanginov's assassination, security situations in Kofarnikhon deteriorated rapidly, as he was the only person who could negotiate with armed elements outside state control in the area, according to a UN analysis. On 23 April, a shooting took place in

Turkobod, near Kofarnikhon, killing a man. The following day, two police officers were beaten and another three (from Kulyab) were apprehended by a group of villagers. A former UTO commander integrated into the ministry of defense (MOD) was dispatched to investigate these incidents, only to be surrounded by an angry crowd, 70 strong, complaining that the government instigated these acts of violence. The following day, a residence of another former UTO fighter was fired upon and four children died. Meanwhile, the government claimed that Sanginov's assassination was carried out by UTO members holding a grudge against him for implementing government policies dutifully and owing debts from drug trafficking. In May, the government arrested nine suspects, seven of them former UTO fighters, including a battalion commander of the ministry of emergency situations (MES) who allegedly decided to take revenge for Sanginov's collaboration with the government. To others, Sanginov allegedly owed over \$1 million for 74 kg of heroin.

Regardless of the truth behind Sanginov's assassination, the series of violent incidents that followed indicates that, until 2001, the security situation in Tajikistan was still dependent on individual commanders and their control of certain localities. On 8 June 2001, Rakhmon Sanginov (nicknamed Hitler) took five MOI and two MOD officers hostage, demanding that the government stop arresting former UTO fighters in violation of the amnesty law (one of his men reportedly died in police custody). Another former UTO commander, Mansur Muaqqalov, a Lieutenant Colonel in the MOD, also

complained that his officers had been repeatedly harassed by other law enforcement agencies (Asia Plus, 19 June 2001). Rakhmon “Hitler” Sanginov had been offered a position in the MOD after the civil war but was soon dismissed, at which point he formed a renegade group of ex-combatants together with Muaqqalov in the eastern outskirts of Dushanbe, in the Leninsky district. According to the government, their groups are responsible for some 400 criminal acts and more than 270 killings from 1996 to 1998, but a UN source also says that he was renting land in the area to provide employment for people from the Kofarnikhon and Leninsky districts.

“Hitler” Sanginov and Muaqqalov claimed that some 60 former UTO members were killed in the first half of 2001 and that law enforcement agencies often demanded \$2,000-\$3,000 in bribes for their release. Sanginov presented a list of UTO fighters apprehended by the government in violation of the amnesty law and demanded their release. This action was followed by another hostage crisis on 13 June in Darvaz involving two German citizens and one American citizen working for the German Agro Action. The perpetrator, another former UTO field commander Hassan Saidmakhmadov, was chief of the MES department in Tavildara and a relative of the MES officer arrested in connection with the assassination of Habib Sanginov. On 21 June, upon the release of all hostages, the government initiated a military action to eliminate Rakhmon Sanginov and Mansur Muaqqalov. This operation caused 56 casualties, including civilians. Sanginov’s brother was killed but Sanginov and 125

fighters escaped to the Romit Valley the day before the operation and joined Mullo Abdullo.⁸⁵

Conclusion

These armed incidents from 1999 to 2001 and the evolution of government response indicate the gradual and incremental consolidation of security control by Rakhmon. As the first part of this chapter demonstrated, intra- and inter-group dynamics within the post-war government, including the Hissori faction's revolts with Kulyabi participation, also suggest that the post-Soviet state managers did not possess a monopoly of violence long after the government-allied forces captured Dushanbe in 1992. Yet by 2001, Rakhmon was able to thwart major threats to his regime, without international assistance to DDR or security sector reform (SSR). The opposition forces contributed to this process, despite the government's failure to fulfill the 30 percent quota or amnesty commitments.

Some analysts argue that this process of security restoration in Tajikistan can be explained by the "incentives" associated with the integration of UTO commanders into the post-war state structure, such as the offer of government positions and economic

⁸⁵ In total, 82 persons were brought to court for belonging to Sanginov's and Muaqqalov's groups, but according to an advocacy group of defenders, some of those arrested were under the command of Muaqqalov's MOD unit at the time and simply followed orders as part of the regular military service.

assets (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007). Luigi de Martino argues: “In the Karategin Valley, there was a trade off made between UTO commanders and power ministries. For the former, integration promised economic benefits.”⁸⁶ “ These guys are cutting deals every day: who’s going to get this business, who’s going to get that project” (Open Society Institute 1998:4). Privatization that resumed in 1998 with the assistance of the IFIs also allowed some of these UTO commanders to acquire small and medium-sized assets.⁸⁷ “The promotion of former military and political leaders into government positions has, therefore, provided the dominant civil war actors with an easy means of enriching themselves, while also giving them a stake in the survival (if not the proper functioning) of government institutions” (Torjesen 2006:14).

The nature of command and control on the two sides meant that when the peace accords were signed, the field commanders were not forced to choose between supporting those agreements and continuing their criminal activities. In practice, they could do both. In the short term, this provided an incentive for them to support the accords; however, it also laid the foundation for future problems.

Not only were there the mafia-type turf battles between warlords, but as the

⁸⁶ Interview in Dushanbe, March 2007.

⁸⁷ For instance, deputy prime minister Akbar Turajonzoda acquired control over the import of wheat from Kazakhstan, as well as a ginnery and a shopping center in Vakhdat, Khatlon, and two apartments in Dushanbe. Shoh Iskandarov, via his post-war assignment as a commander of the Tajik border forces in Jirgatal, reportedly controlled narcotics trade from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and to Kyrgyzstan, as well as much of the potato trade in Jirgatal. Minister of emergency situations Mirzo Zioyev is also said to have been involved in drug trafficking. IRP leader Nuri owned a textile factory.

profits from criminal activity grew, it [the economic co-optation of warlords] loomed even larger in the economy and politics of the country (Smith 2002:11).

This is, however, only a part of the story. First, as the first part of this chapter demonstrated, international aid had contributed to the early phase of Rakhmon's power consolidation against his own allies, the PFT, which precipitated the conclusion of the civil war and subsequent recentralization of violence through the co-optation of the opposition forces. Starting with donor-assisted macroeconomic reforms in 1996, the Rakhmon regime was able to access large-scale economic assets, which were previously controlled by PFT commanders. Rakhmon also took advantage of the 1996 reforms to take control of public administration and finance from PFT commanders.

Second, while the economic incentives of government integration satisfied some of the UTO commanders and their immediate subordinates who joined the post-war government, there were not enough official positions and economic resources to go around for everyone. Further, these co-optation arrangements were soon abandoned by the Rakhmon regime. As soon as the DDR process was announced complete in 1999 by the CNR, the government began to disband UTO units incorporated into security agencies. In November 2000, a MES battalion in Khorog, entirely recruited from UTO fighters, was disbanded. In 2001, news that the government also planned to dissolve the MOI battalion in Garm led to a rumor of unrest, which prompted the government to

revise the decision and instead downsize the battalion into a smaller special operations detachment under the command of the same UTO leadership. The lack of international assistance to DDR and SSR not only failed to remedy this collapse of opposition integration into security agencies but also exacerbated the shortage of economic opportunities for the majority of UTO combatants, who in the end had to desert their home bases and migrate to Dushanbe or Russia for seasonal labor work.

In sum, the power basis of the Rakhmon regime was strengthened because of the way that aid was organized. The early process of economic reforms, on which donor assistance was concentrated, benefited Rakhmon and his associates exclusively, as the literature on post-Soviet transitions would have anticipated. In other words, the conversion and consolidation of political and economic capital, which remained implausible throughout the civil war period, resumed at the end of the civil war with international assistance. Throughout the 1990s, almost every sector of the economy was dominated by large state-owned enterprises receiving hefty subsidies from the government, and prices for most commodities in the domestic market or for trade were effectively set by them. The question of who would control these properties and the profits emanating from them was of fundamental concern to every commander and politician involved in the civil war and its settlement. Internationally assisted economic reforms in 1996 made it possible for Rakhmon and his close allies to take control of these productive areas from PFT commanders. The next chapter presents further

evidence on which international aid was directly responsible for Rakhmon's power consolidation and institutional basis to sustain it.

Chapter 4

IMPACT OF AID ON POST-WAR INSTITUTIONS IN TAJIKISTAN

This chapter analyzes the direct impact of aid on the formation of post-war institutional frameworks, from which the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) representatives were excluded. As discussed in the previous chapter, the beginning of aid from international financial institutions in 1996 helped strengthen the institutional basis of power for the Rakhmon regime against its wartime allies, the pro-government Popular Tajik Front (PFT) militia commanders, before the war's end in 1997. This chapter further analyzes links between donor support to economic reforms after the signing of the 1997 peace accord and their political consequences in relation to peace implementation and power sharing with the UTO. Specifically, this chapter discusses in detail how aid in 2000-2001 led to the exclusion of UTO representatives who had participated in the post-war government.

Aid during this period contributed to the establishment of post-war financial and economic structures, both public and private, that would be controlled by the Rakhmon regime, which not only prevented reconciliation with the opposition but also undermined inclusive and equitable resource distribution considered necessary for sustainable peace.

Aid and Exclusion: 2000-2001

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, there was little external support to implement the power-sharing arrangement promised in the 1997 peace accord. Neither the UN Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT) nor the UN Peacebuilding Office in Tajikistan (UNTOP) took punitive action when the government failed to implement the 30 percent quota for UTO representation at all levels of the state or began to reverse the initial post-war appointments of UTO members. From 1999 to 2001, three prominent UTO members were dismissed from government posts. Davlat Usmon was dismissed from the post of minister of economy in 2000, a year after he ran against Rakhmon in the 1999 presidential election. Fayziddin Imomov, one of the UTO delegates to the Commission on National Reconciliation established by the 1997 peace agreement, was dismissed as chair of the Qomsangir district, Khatlon, in 2001. Another UTO appointee, Shodi Kadirov, was also dismissed from the post of agriculture minister in 2001. UNTOP noted these personnel changes in its regular reports to the UN Headquarters but included no recommendations for further action. Neither did the UNHQ issue any specific instructions, “because it was not UNTOP’s mandate to intervene in policy decisions of the host country.”⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Interview with UNTOP staff, Dushanbe, November 2006.

Not only did external actors fail to prevent the dissolution of the power-sharing agreement, but the reversals of UTO appointments during this period were also a direct result of donor-funded institutional reform. In 1999, the World Bank approved a \$6.7 million for Institution Building Technical Assistance project (IBTA-2), prepared in concurrence with a \$50 million structural adjustment credit (SAC-2), to assist in the reform of public administration, budget management, and large-scale state enterprises.⁸⁹ A presidential task force for public administration reform (PTFPAR) was established to coordinate the public sector component of the reform, and the ministry of finance (MOF) and the state property committee were designated to implement budget reform and privatization respectively. Foreign consulting firms were contracted, and between 1999 and 2004, these consultants submitted a number of proposals for the restructuring of government agencies, including the ministries of economy and external economic relations, social protection, labor and employment, agriculture, communications, transport and roads, education, and health.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ The IMF provided an additional \$65 million to assist in the reform of the banking sector through this project. The project budget consisted of \$2.3 million for public administration reform, including \$1.5 million for consultants to review and propose organizational structures, including civil service management, \$2.5 million for consultancy, study tours, and training to develop new budget management systems and \$1.2 million to assist in the privatization of large-scale enterprises. Almost 90 percent of the budget went to the three consulting firms (\$5 out of \$6.7 million). When Davlat Usmon, the UTO-appointed minister of industry and a member of the presidential task force for public administration (PTFPAR), complained about the bulk of the credit going to foreign companies at one of the PTFPAR meetings, the task force stopped meeting on a regular basis, according to a former IBTA-2 project staff member.

⁹⁰ These contractors were SMEC Consultative Company (Australia) for public administration reform, the Baring Point Group company (US) for budget reform, and the CARANA corporation (US) for privatization and private sector development.

Based on these recommendations, several ministries and committees were reorganized and downsized in 2001-2002. Many quota-based UTO appointees, as well as some of the PFT commanders, were dismissed in this process. For instance, the ministry of labor and employment and the ministry of social security were combined into the ministry of labor and social security in 2001, and the UTO-appointed minister of labor and employment, Khudoiberdi Holiqnazarov, was dismissed. These decisions came as a surprise to the World Bank, as they were made “without warning and consultation with the consultants” (World Bank 2006:7). Furthermore, the Rakhmon government combined the tax committee and the customs committee into the ministry of state revenues and tax collection in 2002, thereby dismissing two UTO appointees—chair of customs committee Mirzokhodja Nizomov and his deputy Assliddin Sohibnazarov. For the newly created ministry of state revenues and tax collection, Rakhmon appointed his long-serving technocrat, Ghulomjon Boboyev, who was formerly state advisor on economic policy (1990-1996) and first deputy minister of finance (1996-2001).

Similarly, the ministry of economy and foreign economic relations was replaced by the ministry of economy and trade in 2001, into which several organizations, including the committee for special supplies (procurement office for law enforcement agencies), were absorbed. As a result, Hikmat Odinayev, former PFT commander and deputy head of

*Glavkhlopkopro*m (state committee on cotton production), lost his post as chair of the committee. Another close ally of Rakhmon, Hakim Soliev, was appointed to head the new ministry of economy and trade, moving from the state committee on trade and contracts (one of the six general contractors discussed in Chapter 3) where he served from 1996 to 2001. According to a UN analysis, by this reorganization Rakhmon successfully removed Hikmat Odinayev of PFT and others “who became politically useless, harmful, or dangerous to him. Although the decision was formally taken within the framework of the gradual implementation of the IMF, WB, and ADB sponsored program to reorganize government structures; in fact, the main aim was to further strengthen his presidential power.”⁹¹

Donors sought to justify these reorganizations on the grounds that 23 percent of government budgets were absorbed by the administrative costs of overlapping agencies. Meanwhile, the salary scale for each civil servant remained low, which was considered as one of the causes of corruption in the public sector (World Bank 2005:93).⁹² In addition, through this reform process, additional agencies were also established, some with extensive power to monitor corporate and individual economic activities and assets, and headed by Rakhmon’s close allies. For instance, the agency for financial

⁹¹ Interview in Dushanbe, January 2007.

⁹² The actual number of civil servants, however, remains unknown. The ministry of finance reports that the total number of officials is 17,322, but this is contested by other institutions and does not cover those whose wages are paid from the Social Protection Fund.

control (AFC) was established in 2001, reporting directly to the president, with an all-encompassing authority over the administration of national and local budgets, including: budget and off-budget state funds; internal and foreign debts; loans and grants; and humanitarian aid received by the government. The AFC also had a monitoring and investigative capacity towards the use of state property and enterprises of all kinds. As such, the creation of the AFC gave Rakhmon comprehensive control of both state and private finances at all levels. Matlub Davlatov, Rakhmon's relative and chair of the state property committee (responsible for privatization of national properties) from 1994 to 2001, became the chair of the AFC. Rakhmon also appointed Sherali Gulov, his nephew-in-law and former chair of Dangara district (Rakhmon's hometown) in Kulyab to succeed Davlatov as chair of the state property committee.

All of these appointments and dismissals have been made by the office of presidential administration, and in particular, the state advisor on personnel policy, who monitors and tracks some 800 officials at the top level and an additional 5,000 middle management staff (World Bank 2005:94). Presidential control over personnel decisions extends from political appointments, administrative appointments, and state-owned enterprises to chairs of local branches of the central government (*hukumat*). In addition, the presidential power to appoint one-quarter of the Upper House members (and the fact that *hukumat* chairs constitute the majority of the Upper House) gives Rakhmon virtual control of the legislative bodies, as he also controls the Lower House as the head of the

ruling party in the Lower House. Consequently, although the constitution provides that the parliament should have the exclusive authority to enact legislation, it is the team of presidential advisors who are the nucleus of policymaking, “frequently setting policy by decree and bypassing the legislature to impose new legislation” (Freedom House 2002:368).

Rakhmon introduced the system of presidential advisors in 1996; as of 2007, it consisted of five state advisors, eight senior advisors, and twelve advisors, divided in five groups, dealing with economic policy, legal issues, international affairs, social affairs, and personnel policy. An evaluation of the World Bank’s involvement in Tajikistan summarizes the situation:

Although economic management is assigned to the Cabinet of Ministers, the Presidential Administration exerts significant influence on policy setting and is the decisive body on key issues. All sub-national appointments are made by political appointees of the President and even the lowest level of local bodies are administrative units of the central government. As a result, the policy making and implementing structures continue to be highly centralized (World Bank 2005:1).

By rotating these advisors between presidential administration and key state agencies,

Rakhmon maintains control of public administration and finance. For instance, Izatullo Khayoyev, head of presidential administration from 1994 to 1996, was formerly minister of economy (1992-1994).⁹³ Khumdin Sharipov, who succeeded Khayoyev in 1996, became minister of interior from 1998 to 2006. Sharipov was replaced in 1997 by Mahmadvazar Salikhov, former general prosecutor (1992-1994) and deputy minister of interior (1994-1996). Salikhov then became chair of the constitutional court from 2000 to 2003, when Rakhmon succeeded in amending the constitution to extend presidential terms for another 12 years in 2003. Subsequently, Salikhov returned to the post of head of presidential administration from 2003 to 2005, and became minister of interior in 2006. As of 2007, the head of presidential administration was Amirsho Miraliyev, former state advisor on personnel policy from 1996 to 2001 and governor of Khatlon from 2001 to 2005.

While Rakhmon has continued to rotate these officials within key state institutions at his discretion, donor involvement in the public sector reform had no significant impact on Rakhmon's command of presidential administration or his authority to appoint and dismiss state officials. On the contrary, through personnel control, Rakhmon was also able to undermine external efforts for the reform of public administration and finance. For instance, under the World Bank-financed institution-building project (IBTA 2), the

⁹³ As discussed in Chapter 3, Khayoyev resigned in 1996 when Khudoiberdiev, an Uzbek army commander, revolted against Rakhmon and demanded resignation of Kulyabi officials, including Khayoyev.

ministry of finance was to develop and implement medium-term budget and expenditures frameworks, which was one of the preconditions for the release of the structural adjustment credit.⁹⁴ However, after the IBTA-2 credit was approved by the World Bank in 2000, Rakhmon replaced Ambarhof Muzafarov, minister of finance since 1996 from Garm, by Safarali Najmuddinov of Dangara. Once appointed, Najmuddinov sent proposals prepared by consultants for budget and expenditure reforms back to the World Bank, arguing that the fact that those reviews were done was a proof that the conditionality for the release of funds had been met (Saidov 2004). “The new minister of finance, who was appointed after the IBTA-2 credit was signed, did not want to take over responsibilities of the ministry of economy and trade” (Enterplan Limited 2005:47). In its own evaluation of the IBTA-2 project, the World Bank notes that “the change of management at the ministry of finance played a significant role in this regard and it is not clear what could be done ex-post” (World Bank 2006:20).

Several former staff members involved in the IBTA-2 project recall that these bureaucratic impediments to the public sector reform came directly from Rakhmon’s

⁹⁴ In Tajikistan, regional, municipal, and district *hukumats* implement central government policies and edicts, while relevant ministries also make policy decisions, “resulting in general administrative inefficiencies.” Alijon Boymatov, “Economic Relations between Centre and Regions: The Case of Sughd Province,” in *Tajikistan at a Crossroad: The Politics of Decentralization*, ed. Luigi De Martino (Geneva: Cimera, 2004), 79. To streamline responsibilities related to public finance under the ministry of finance, the World Bank included the completion of budgetary reforms to give line ministries opportunities to identify and develop sector-specific priorities.

long-time advisors, including: Murodali Alimardonov, chair of the national bank of Tajikistan; Hakim Soliev, minister of economy and trade; and Matlub Davlatov, Rakhmon's relative and new head of the AFC.⁹⁵ By the time the reform initiative began in 2001-2002, the main counterpart in the government for the reform, state advisor on economic affairs Gulomjon Boboyev (from Sogd), had been replaced by Fayzulo Kholboboyev from Kulyab. As a result,

[...] combined with mixed quality of outputs from consultants, insufficient coordination by and commitment of PFTPAR, and inadequate Bank supervision, the result was that project resources were spent without any major outputs and there was little and no capacity building. No reorganizations of government structures were undertaken based on the consultant recommendations financed by the project. However, in line with the division of labor agreed between the Bank, Asian Development Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), some new ministries were created but these were largely unrelated to IBTA II recommendations (World Bank 2006:7).

⁹⁵ Though SPC is the main agency responsible for privatization, its longtime chair (1994-2001) Matlub Davlatov, who is Rakhmon's cousin (though some say uncle), is reportedly opposed to economic reforms and has complained about donor involvement in privatization, saying "what would foreigners know?" Interview with an embassy staff member in Dushanbe, February 2007.

In summary, donor-funded reforms in 2001 provided the opportunity for the Rakhmon regime to decrease the UTO representation in the post-war government, to continue with the removal of PFT elements that began in 1996, and consolidate Rakhmon's personal control of public administration and finance. The presidential authority of appointment and dismissal would have given Rakhmon power to launch such a state restructuring earlier, on his own initiative. Instead, Rakhmon took advantage of donor assistance to legitimize bold bureaucratic reorganizations to remove UTO and PFT elements from the post-war government, while avoiding implementing those reforms recommended by donors. Through these reform processes, moreover, the control of industries for the two most important export items—cotton and aluminum—became more exclusive and monopolistic, leading to further decline of UTO and remaining PFT influence, especially in the areas of economic and financial management. I briefly discuss the outcome of donor-proposed changes in the cotton, energy, and aluminum sectors below.

Consolidation of Oligarchic Economic Control

With donor assistance, Rakhmon and his associates established personal control over the main sectors of the economy, including cotton financing (constituting 14 percent of GDP), cotton trade (11 percent of GDP), and aluminum export (40-60 percent of GDP). The cotton sector in Tajikistan generates two-thirds of the gross value of agricultural production and 18 percent of total export earnings. Cotton cultivation is concentrated in

Khatlon and Sogd, where 7 percent of Tajikistan's arable land and 65 percent of its population are located, but these two provinces account for 75 percent of the poor and 72 percent of the extremely poor.⁹⁶ During the civil war, commanders and district authorities grabbed cotton farms by force and used profits from cotton production to buy properties made available through privatization that began in 1996. For instance, when the ginnery was privatized in 1996 with assistance of international financial institutions, some commanders arrived at gins with machine guns and "bought" these properties by rewriting deeds with no or nominal fees, an OSCE observer recalls.⁹⁷ Ghulom Boyakov, former PFT commander and head of *Glavkhlopkoprom* (state committee for cotton production), obtained a gin in the Farhor district, and so did Hikmat Odinayev of PFT, Boyakov's deputy at *Glavkhlopkoprom* and head of the state committee for special supplies at the time. Mirzo Ziroyev, former UTO commander and minister of emergency situations after the 1997 peace accord, also owns a gin in Pyanj, GBAO.

To reform the agricultural sector, the World Bank provided a \$50 million credit line in 1996 and another \$20 million credit line in 1998 to eliminate state farms.⁹⁸ With donor

⁹⁶ During the Soviet time, more than 90 percent of arable land was divided among 668 *sovkhoz* and *kolkhoz*, and less than 10 percent of the land was allocated to private household plots, although household farming accounted for 30 percent of the value of agricultural production.

⁹⁷ Interview in Kurgan-Tube, March 2007.

⁹⁸ Under this project, ten pilot farms were privatized, eight of them cotton farms (yet less than 5 percent of cotton land), and turned into some 5,800 individual farms. The budget consists of \$4.8 million for land mapping, survey and registration and public information for ten pilot farms, \$4.7 million for the pilot farms to purchase agricultural goods, \$3.5 million for drought

assistance, 73 percent of 668 existing *sovkhos* and *kolkhos* were privatized by 2004. This land reform, however, did not privatize the ownership of agricultural farms but merely transferred collective land tenure rights to a group of farmers working on the land, “which has resulted in no significant increase in individual farmers’ authority compared to Soviet times” (World Bank 2004:ii). To meet donors’ land reform targets, the government often converted *kolkhos* and *sovkhos* into large collective *dekhan* (peasant) farms, in which the former farm managers were “elected” as new managers while farm administration remained the same as in the Soviet period (Porteous 2003:6). Although there are some individual *dekhan* farms (constituting 10 percent of agricultural land), the application process to gain these individual farms is cumbersome and only those who know the laws, have personal connections with the local authorities, and can afford the official—and unofficial—costs of the bureaucratic process tend to gain the ownership of these farms.

Moreover, independent *dekhan* farms are also increasingly supplanted by the association of *dekhan* farms, a group of independent *dekhan* farms under a single management that still operate like a *kolkhos*, organizing the workers in brigades and cultivating the land collectively. In most of *dekhan* farms, farmers are required to grow cotton under a government production plan. Although there is no legal basis that requires *dekhan*

mitigation (component added in 2000), \$7.4 million for project management and \$8.5 million to rehabilitate irrigation infrastructure. The rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure, the largest expenditures under this project, adopted the community-based development model by creating water user associations, which was discussed in the previous chapter.

farms to produce cotton, local *hukumat* often insist on cotton production occupying 60-80 percent of the land. Those who grow other crops in defiance face state harassment, including the bulldozing of their harvests by *hukumat* or repeated tax audits (Crisis Group 2005:7).

Furthermore, the donor-funded land reform led to the rapid accumulation of debts by the *dekhan* farms. During the Soviet era, debts from crop shortfalls were owed to the republican government (or ultimately to Moscow). At the time of land reform in 1996, the amount of debt in the cotton sector was estimated to be \$125 million, approximately half of Tajikistan's annual government budget. Because the Tajik government had no means to absorb it, this debt was transferred and redistributed among the newly created *dekhan* farms, at an average rate of \$1,000 per hectare. In Kurgan-Tube, the amount of debt transferred ranged from \$450 to \$1,800 per hectare.⁹⁹ The World Bank report of the farmland project notes that:

In the last few years, farm workers who pushed for privatization have been threatened by debt obligations, which they have been told, they would have to assume along with the land use rights. Scaling up effective land privatization in the cotton areas is constrained by a complex net of vested interests that see land privatization as a threat to their current stronghold (World Bank 2006:6).

⁹⁹ Interview with a farmers association in Kurgan-Tube, March 2007.

Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, donors and the Tajik government established a system of financing cotton production, whereby a credit from a Swiss investor was channeled through the national bank of Tajikistan (NBT) and AgroInvest to a group of local investors called futurists, who had exclusive contracts with farms to provide oil, seeds, and other agricultural inputs. When cotton ginneries were privatized through the World Bank's credits in 1998 and 2001, the futurists also gained control of cotton ginning facilities. For instance, when *Glavkhlopkoprom* was liquidated in 1999 under the terms of the World Bank's structural adjustment credit, the futurists gained direct control over five of the privatized gins and the majority of shares in 15 others. These futurists and their gin factories operate as a cartel: cotton farms are effectively divided among gins located in the area and farmers cannot switch gins based on their performance.¹⁰⁰ The overpricing, poor quality, and delayed delivery of inputs by futurists and slow processing of cotton by ginneries have all contributed to the further accumulation of debt, in addition to debt inherited from the Soviet time as the result of the 1996 reform.¹⁰¹ By 2004, the amount of total debt reached \$65 million, and farmers

¹⁰⁰ This is mostly because the tax code—yet to be reformed—assigns hukumat responsibilities for collecting revenues from ginning in their jurisdictions. World Bank, "Tajikistan: Welfare Implications of Cotton Farmland Privatization," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 12.

¹⁰¹ Raw cotton needs to be processed within three months (after which it absorbs moisture which damages its quality), but it takes six months to process cotton in Tajikistan, partly due to the unavailability of better equipment and partly because of gin owners intentionally slowing the process. As a result, farmers who managed to submit the pre-agreed-upon amount of cotton by the end of the season did not receive credit in time for the new season and thus incurred new debt; those who did not would accumulate double the debt and interest.

began to abandon land, unable to repay the debt. The debts to the futurists are inflated, however: a recent study finds that the overpricing of inputs, underpayment for cotton products, and overcharging of interest by futurists led to overstatement of debt by \$3.76 million for 2002-2005 alone, which is overwhelming for *dekhan* farmers who, on average, earn less than \$1 per day (Center for International Studies and Cooperation 2006).

Who are those futurists and to what extent do they control the market? As of 2007, 74 percent of cotton processing is controlled by five firms— Somoni 21st, Khima, Oim Kamozod, Tamer, and Khujand Cotton Invest—out of some 10 ginneries that exist.¹⁰² The two largest futurists/ginneries are Somoni 21st and Khima, with Somoni 21st occupying about 20 percent of the cotton market, according to a donor representative.¹⁰³ Khima is co-owned by Izatullo Khayoyev, former prime minister (1991-1992), minister of economy (1992-1994), and head of presidential administration (1995-1996), and Murodali Alimardonov, chair of the NBT and former president of AgroInvest, the largest commercial bank in Tajikistan. The company is named after their combined initials and managed by Alimardonov's son.¹⁰⁴ Somoni 21st is owned by Rakhmon's

¹⁰² Interview with an expert consulting a donor organization in Dushanbe, February 2007.

¹⁰³ Interview in Dushanbe, March 2007.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with a representative of international financial institutions in Dushanbe, March 2007.

brother-in-law, Hasan Saduloev, who also owns the Orion Bank, the second largest commercial bank in Tajikistan. Before the civil war, Saduloev worked as an attendant at a gas station, but became one of the wealthiest in the country through a marriage into Rakhmon's family, owning some 13 ventures, including five cotton mills, several factories, and at least three food-processing companies since the end of the civil war (Najibullah 2008). When *Glavkhloprom* was restructured in 1999 and its wholesale functions were given to the national exchange board, Saduloev was appointed to chair of the board (then head of *Glavkhlopokoprom*, Ghulom Boyakov of PFT, was transferred to chair of the Farhor District, Kulyab). Saduloev made a fortune during his tenure at the exchange board, and in June 2003, when Rakhmon declared "financial amnesty" to encourage the declaration and registration of assets without penalties for their origins, Saduloev disclosed an estimated \$3 million in assets and bought 50 percent of the shares in the Orion Bank.¹⁰⁵ After Saduloev left for the Orion Bank, Rakhmon's son-in-law Zohir Soliev was appointed to chair of the exchange board.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with a western embassy staff member in Dushanbe March 2007. Although there are almost no public and written accounts of the financial amnesty, according to a senior staff member of the tax committee, it was granted by a presidential decree with a view to legalizing money made illegally for the duration of one year (some say it was extended for another year). This tax committee official estimates that only 20 percent of illegal capital was registered, due to the lack of confidence in the banking system ("only those who had negotiated with banks and obtained the guarantee that their assets would not be seized upon registration came forward. Others kept money overseas"). Interview in Dushanbe, April 2007.

Cotton Financing

The monopoly of cotton financing and processing is also closely related to the structure of the financial sector. According to an estimate by an international expert in 2007, there were 10 foreign investors from Europe, North America, Russia, and Kazakhstan providing about 60-65 percent of the sources for cotton financing. Domestic lending to cotton financing, constituting the other 35 percent, increased from 7 percent of GDP in 1999 to 12 percent in 2001 (IMF 2003). The largest domestic lenders to the cotton sector are the Orion Bank, owned by Hasan Saduloev, and AgroInvest. Among the eight largest shareholders of AgroInvest, the longtime chair of the NBT, Murodali Alimardonov is the single largest investor, controlling 16.2 percent of its shares (Balke, et al. 2006:25).¹⁰⁶

Donors have provided technical and financial assistance to these large banks (e.g., a \$4 million credit by the EBRD to Orion Bank and IMF assistance to Orion Bank, Tajiksoderotbank, AgroInvest, and Amonatbank). Yet similar to the cotton sector, aid to the financial sector has resulted in the concentration of capital, rather than

¹⁰⁶ Due to debts accumulating in the cotton industry, AgroInvest was reorganized in 2003 between two separate entities, AgroInvest and the non-bank joint-stock company, Kredit-Invest. The restructured and recapitalized AgroInvest is still the largest bank in the country, with assets of \$70 million accounting for 38 percent of all assets; Kredit-Invest is exempt from prudential requirements applicable to other banks and has a large, mainly non-performing loan portfolio of some \$60 million.

diversification, due in part to donors' preference to remove licenses from non-performing banks. In 1994, Agroprombank (later AgroInvest) was four times larger than the second largest bank, Tajikbankbusiness, and most dependent on the government, receiving 14 percent of its deposits from the NBT. Tajkibankbusiness was owned at the time by Abdumalik Abdullajanov, former prime minister from Sogd, who challenged Rakhmon in the 1994 presidential elections. Orion Bank then financed industry and construction mainly, while Tajvnesheconombank served Tajikistan's external debt under the auspices of the ministry of finance and the savings bank (Amonatbank) remains state-owned and individual deposits are guaranteed by the state. In 1997, five of 28 banks operating in Tajikistan—AgroInvest, Orion, Tajikbankbusiness, Tajvnesheconombank, and the savings bank—controlled 90 percent of total credit available. In April 1999, Tajikbankbusiness was liquidated, officially due to the violation of banking regulations, and the number of commercial banks was reduced to 17. The other four major banks still controlled 75 percent of the credit.

Although the number of banks was further reduced to 14 in 2003, AgroInvest, Orion, Tajiksoderotbank (former Tajvnesheconombank, privatized in 2001) and the savings bank continued to control 85 percent of total assets.¹⁰⁷ AgroInvest alone accounted for 45 percent of capital. Orion Bank expanded its share when Hasan Saduloev became the

¹⁰⁷ Some local analysts familiar with the banking sector suggest that Alimardonov also owns 50 percent of Tajiksoderotbank (and some 30 percent is owned by Tojiddin Pilov, one of the futurists and former trade representative to Belarus.

owner, acquiring the account for TADAZ from Tajikprombank.¹⁰⁸ In total, assets held by Tajikistan's financial sector constitute about 20 percent of GDP, the majority of which is controlled by Hasan Saduloev (Rakhmon's brother-in-law), Murodali Alimardonov (long-serving chair of the NBT), and a few other individuals close to them.

A former staff member of the World Bank project for the reform of public administration (IBTA-2) argues:

In a way, priorities for international financial institutions—macroeconomic stability and economic liberalization—were in alignment with those of oligarchs who are interested in personal control of domestic assets, and that led to the partial success of these reforms. For example, the conditionality set by the World Bank focused on the removal of government functions in the economy. The privatization and sales of ginnery was particularly important. I saw Alimardonov (chair of the NBT) calling friends and families himself, urging them to buy those properties so that the government can meet the deadlines and

¹⁰⁸ Tajikprombank was originally established in 1995 as a “pocket bank for TADAZ,” according to a local analyst of an international financial institution, and is owned by former deputy minister of finance Jamshed Ziyaev and his family: “Mr. Ziyaev is also a chairman of the bank's management and has good personal relations with NBT and its chairman.” Dan Balke, Daniz Tuna, and Katharina Schachtner, “The Financial Sector in Tajikistan,” (Berlin: LFS Financial Systems GmbH, 2006), 31..

targets set by the conditionality.¹⁰⁹ When auction and tender targets were not met because those friends of Alimardonov did not have enough capital, the NBT even provided credit out of the SAC-2 funds for them to buy those assets. At the end of the day, they now control major industrial assets because of donor programs.¹¹⁰

In contrast to those regime oligarchs involved in cotton financing, former commanders who once owned cotton farms and ginneries have been pushed out of the market, as they do not have the level of access to the financial capital that the owners of Khima and Somoni 21st do. In Khatlon, former commanders who remain involved in the cotton sector occupy only a small fraction of the industry, some 100-150 hectares each in the mountain areas, and most of them have official duties within the government and hence links to the regime elites.¹¹¹ A local observer notes: “many commanders had acquired legal titles to cotton farmland during the civil war and the early phase of privatization by

¹⁰⁹ For instance, the second structural adjustment credit (SAC-2) provided that 280 medium and large enterprises and 30 state and collective farms, should be privatized within two months, but without suggesting pricing or stock mechanisms. Interview with a staff of international financial institutions, Dushanbe, March 2007.

¹¹⁰ Similarly, a senior staff at the Tax Committee recalls: “because of the tight deadlines, hukumat organized fake ‘open’ auctions for assets whose values ranged from \$280 to \$350,000. Ministers called their friends to sell properties under market price. The government knew about the World Bank policies and tried to stop privatization while some made a lot of money through these fake auctions and commissions.” Interview in Dushanbe, March 2007.

¹¹¹ Interview with a local journalist, Kurgan-Tube, March 2007.

putting their names on the paper, but only those who have relations to the government have survived.”¹¹²

Energy and Aluminum

International aid has also failed to reform the energy and aluminum sectors, over which Rakhmon continues to exert personal control. While Rakhmon’s relatives have been appointed to head the state property committee since 1994, which oversees the privatization of state-owned enterprises, some of the largest and most profitable assets are yet to be privatized, and remain controlled directly by the president, as in the case of the Tursunzoda aluminum smelter plant (TADAZ). In addition, line ministries, such as ministries of energy and transport, are responsible for managing enterprises, such as Barqi Tojik (Tajik Energy), Tajik Air, and Tajik Railways. These enterprises have been operating with little accountability to the public. For instance, although Tajikistan is the world’s third-largest producer of hydroelectric power, behind the US and Russia, TADAZ consumes about 40 percent of the country's electricity production, and as a result, Tajikistan has the lowest usage rates of electricity among the former Soviet countries, enough for only a few hours of electricity per day in the winter. The energy shortage in turn has shut down much of the country's industry. Meanwhile, the

¹¹² Interview with a local agricultural center in Kulyab, March 2007.

estimated quasi-fiscal deficit in the energy sector reached about 23 percent of GDP in 2003, most of which lies in electricity, amounting to 20 percent of GDP.

TADAZ

TADAZ is the largest enterprise in Tajikistan and the third largest aluminum smelter in the world, contributing to 40-60 percent of the country's total exports.¹¹³ During the civil war, PFT commander Ibod Boimatov occupied TADAZ by force, and when he revolted against Rakhmon in 1996, another PFT commander Gaffor Mirzoyev (later head of the presidential guards) protected the plant. Assets of TADAZ have been treated as state secrets, and it remains difficult to get accurate data on its financial position. According to a senior staff member at the state property committee, TADAZ generated \$1.15 billion or 30 percent of GDP per year in the period of 1992-1997, and will generate \$3 billion in 2007.¹¹⁴ Almost all aluminum products produced in Tajikistan are exported, but TADAZ's contribution to the budget appears to be much lower than its estimated export values (Table 4.1).

¹¹³ Though Tajikistan does not have native aluminum ore and raw materials for the plant have to be imported, it was built there in 1975 because of access to cheap electric power.

¹¹⁴ Interview in Dushanbe, March 2007.

Table 4.1: The share of aluminum export earnings to the government revenues

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total government revenue/GDP (%)	13.6	15.2	16.7	17.3	17.9
Contribution of aluminum and cotton export to government revenues* (%)	3.3	2.5	1.9	1.9	1.9
Total export (\$million)	788	652	699	798	913
Aluminum export	424	398	398	430	593

*disaggregated data on aluminum not available. Source: IMF

In addition to those discrepancies between official data and estimated value of aluminum export, TADAZ imports raw materials from, and exports final products to, a single group of companies, whose ownership is unknown to the public, as they are incorporated overseas under exclusive contractual agreements (World Bank 2005:87). TADAZ's official deficit from transactions with these unidentified partners had reached \$529 million as of 2000. The World Bank's structural adjustment programs (both SAC-1 and SAC-2) included an audit of TADAZ in accordance with international standards, but the firm initially contracted by the Bank in 2000 was rejected by TADAZ before the completion of a final report. Reportedly, the main area of disagreement between the firm and TADAZ was the requirement for disclosures of transactions with those unidentified third parties. TADAZ appointed another firm, which the Bank did not consider qualified, to complete audits for 2000 and 2001. In 2002, on an exceptional basis, the Bank reviewed the firm and its field work on TADAZ, and still concluded that

this firm was not acceptable to the Bank (World Bank 2004:27). In the end, the duration of the second structural credit (SAC-2) was extended three times because of the disputed TADAZ audit. According to the 2000 audit (unpublished) and some other pricing estimates, the discrepancy between its profit and tax contribution could be \$40-45 million in 2002 alone.

Although TADAZ is a state-owned company and its assets constitute national property, TADAZ is “not governed by a board of directors or any other type of executive committee. Instead, it is under the sole command of its director, who reports only to the Tajik president at monthly meetings” (World Bank 2004:26). The president’s direct control over TADAZ has led many observers, including western embassy staff, to speculate that his personal wealth has reached as much as \$1 billion.¹¹⁵

In 2005, TADAZ’s longtime director Abduqodir Ermatov (appointed to deputy minister of energy earlier that year) fled the country after failing to account for \$100 million, together with Avaz Nazarov, a Tajik national who had led one of the exclusive trading companies dealing with TADAZ. Rakhmon and TADAZ (later renamed Talco) sued

¹¹⁵ This estimate includes the value of five presidential palaces (estimated \$5 million each) and presidential salaries of \$36,000 a month (increased from \$25,000 a month in 2006) and assets of Rakhmon’s extended families, including those under Hasan Saduloev (Somon 21st, Orion Bank, a gin factory in Panj, and the Regar cable factory for TADAZ) and by Rakhmon’s daughter Tahmina (Sitara supermarket---sold to the Orima chain---a luxury apartment complex in Dushanbe with unit prices at \$500,000), a ginnery in Jomi, a winery in Shahrinav, and several other shops.

Nazarov and his London-based Ansol group of companies in the British High Court, and Nazarov counter-sued, charging that TADAZ had defrauded his group in favor of giving TADAZ contracts to Russian Aluminum (Rusal).¹¹⁶ In April 2008, a British law firm representing the plaintiff—Rakhmon—disclosed that the 3-year case has cost the Tajik government the total of \$120 million, equivalent to 5.2% of Tajikistan's GDP and one third of the total loan amount it currently receives from the World Bank. Meanwhile, the IMF announced in March 2008 that the Tajik government and the NBT had defaulted on their IMF loan agreements, as a result of which at least \$79 million went missing from a loan for poverty reduction. In addition, the ADB and other multilateral lenders to Tajikistan have reportedly opened separate investigations, looking for \$500 million in loans intended to revitalize the cotton sector.

Documents submitted to the London High Court for the Nazarov case indicate that in the period of 2006-2007, TADAZ's gross profit was \$136 million, of which \$99 million was allocated to an offshore company called CDH, one of the exclusive TADAZ traders registered in the British Virgin Islands. In contrast, TADAZ received only \$17 million from the gross profit and after tax and other commercial expenses, most of which are born by TADAZ, "TADAZ makes a net profit of \$1.8 million on a business which actually generated \$96 million in profits" (Helmer 2008). CDH is

¹¹⁶ Rusal is led by Oleg Deripaska, currently the richest person in Russia according to an April 2008 Forbes magazine report, with a total asset of \$28.6 billion.

reportedly owned by Hasan Saduloev, and in June 2008, he was ordered by the High Court judge to appear in court and testify by October (Najibullah 2008).

Energy

In 2001, also as part of the structural adjustment program (SAC-2), the government divested Tajikcommuneservice, a conglomerate of utility services then headed by a quota appointee, Mahmadrusi Iskandarov, former UTO commander and head of the Democratic Party. Iskandarov was reappointed to chair of Tajik Gas (unitary state enterprise that handles natural and liquidated gas). For other units born out of Tajikcommuneservice, a former UTO commander and quota appointee for chair of state committee on oil and gas since 1998, Salamsho Muhabbatov, was reappointed to head Tojinkeftgas (gas and oil company) and Rustam Namatov, another UTO commander, was appointed to head Tojikangisht (a coal extraction company). The coal-mining industry was overseen by the ministry of industry, headed then by another UTO appointee, Zayd Saidov.

Yet these UTO representatives in the energy sector did not survive long, either, because:

Whatever little progress had been made toward improved corporate governance was reversed in 2003, when the Government decided to reabsorb the electricity,

gas, coal, and oil companies into MOE (ministry of energy) and to abolish the boards of the companies. Instead, a single board chaired by the minister of energy and consisting of the minister's five deputies and the head of the trade unions runs all the companies (Asian Development Bank 2004:8).

With the re-centralization of gas, coal, and oil companies into the ministry of energy, all UTO appointees to these facilities were sacked and Jurabek Nurahmatov from Rakhmon's hometown Dangara and then the head of Barqi Tojik became the minister of energy. It was not until March 2006 that Barqi Tojik was separated again from the ministry of energy, at which point another Kulyabi, Sharifkhon Samiyev (former chair of the Firdavsi district), was appointed to head Barqi Tojik. At the same time, in 2006, the ministries of energy and industry were combined into a single entity and Zayd Saidov of UTO was dismissed from the post of minister of industry. Instead, Sherali Gulov, former chair of Dangara district and head of the state property committee since 2001 (and Rakhmon's kin) became the minister of energy and industry.

As these examples of government restructuring from 2001 to 2006 demonstrate, the post-war regime of Emomali Rakhmon manipulated donor conditionality and managed to replace UTO appointees with those close to Rakhmon. The World Bank recognizes that "many 'reorganizations' were superficial and did not result in splitting up the policy planning and the economic/production activities, which were considered to be the

cornerstone of the administrative reform. In a few cases the reverse happened, e.g., the electricity company Barqi-Tajik was combined with the ministry of energy” (World Bank 2006:7). Faced with the lack of commitment from the government, the World Bank nonetheless failed to maximize the advantage of its resources. For instance, the World Bank’s institution building assistance in 2001 (IBTA-2) was to be a companion and prerequisite for a structural adjustment credit (SAC-2), which had made the government endorse public sector reform in the first place. Yet the commencement of SAC-2 was delayed for two years because of the extension of SAC-1 in May 1999 with an additional credit to alleviate the impact of the Russian financial crisis. As the second installment of SAC-1 did not complete until December 1999, the approval of SAC 2 initially scheduled for 1999 in tandem with IBTA-2 was not granted until May 2001. Taking advantage of the delay of SAC-2, the government refused to accept the first round of proposals made by IBTA-2 consultants in 2000, arguing that those reforms should be considered during the implementation of SAC-2 and not before (World Bank 2006:6). The World Bank agreed with this revised approach and as a result lost the advantage of linking SAC-2 conditionality with the completion of public administration and finance reform under IBTA-2.

The Bank Board approved SAC-2 two years after approving IBTA 1, despite the fact that the latter’s implementation had already provided ample evidence of government of Tajikistan’s indifference towards reforms. The Bank could have

used SAC-2 to promote government compliance with IBTA-2 conditions and this would have also rendered fulfillment of SAC-2 conditions more meaningful. This evaluator (an independent firm contracted by the World Bank) could not explain how it could be possible for the government to behave that way and for the Bank to condone it (Enterplan Limited 2005:48-49).

Neither did other international organizations, including the UNTOP or the OSCE, raise objections to the dismissal of UTO representatives that resulted from this process of economic restructuring, or make efforts to address those political consequences of economic reforms, which not only undermined power-sharing with the UTO but established institutional frameworks that strengthened Rakhmon's monopolistic ownership of the state and economy.¹¹⁷ The Representative of the Secretary-General in Tajikistan in 2007 argued: "it was not our mandate to be involved in economic reforms. It was for UNDP and the World Bank."¹¹⁸ As a result, external actors did not combine their political and economic resources to prevent or remedy the failure of institutional reforms promised in the peace accord.

¹¹⁷ Interviews with UNTOP and OSCE staff members, January-March 2007.

¹¹⁸ Interview in Dushanbe, February 2007.

Post-War Violence

As discussed in Chapter 3, post-war incidents of violence from 1997 to 2001 involved mainly armed clashes between government-affiliated forces and opposition elements that did not integrate into the post-war government apparatus or assassinations of high-ranking officials. After 2001, coinciding with the institutional consolidation of power by Rakhmon and his associates, the nature of post-war violence shifted towards unilateral action by the government against UTO appointees. Rakhmon also intensified internal reorganization of security agencies in 2002 to remove both UTO and PFT elements from the armed forces. In 2002, Rakhmon appointed Major General AbduRakhmon Azimov, former first deputy prime minister, as chair of the state committee for border protection (former Tajik border forces), reportedly to tighten control over several PFT commanders, such as Qurbon Cholov and Shamolov.¹¹⁹ Upon assuming the post, Azimov fired 150 officers, including Shamolov and Cholov in January 2002. Shamolov was then sent to China as military attaché. In January 2003, Cholov's brother Sulaymon, formerly deputy chair of Dushanbe's customs committee, was convicted of extortion, kidnapping, marrying a minor, and polygamy, and was sentenced to six years in prison.

¹¹⁹ Interview with UNTOP staff, February 2007.

The persecution of wartime commanders reached the highest ranks by the end of 2003. In November 2003, Rakhmon fired Mahmadrusi Iskandarov, head of the Democratic Party and former UTO field commander from Tajikobod, from his position as chair of Tajik Gas, a state owned enterprise, for incompetence and nepotism.¹²⁰ Having led the government-UTO coalition forces against post-war threats posed by the IMU, Mullo Abdullo, and Rakhmon Snaginov, Iskandarov's contribution to the maintenance of peace had been indispensable. According to a UN source, "virtually no security crisis in Garm was resolved without his active cooperation."¹²¹ The source also argues that Iskandarov was the most vocal opponent to personnel changes in 2001, when a number of UTO representatives serving within the 30 percent quota were dismissed, and he became soon after subject to various forms of harassment by the government.¹²² After dismissal from Tajik Gas, Iskandarov left for Tojikobod with another former UTO commander Salamsho Muhabbatov. Iskandarov then reportedly met with other UTO commanders, including his nephew Shoh Iskandarov, who had been fired from his post as commanding officer of the Tajik border forces in Jirgatal shortly before, as well as former PFT commanders, such as Qurbon Cholov and Saidsho Shamolov.

¹²⁰ Iskandarov was initially appointed to chair of the state committee on emergency situations in 1998, but when Rakhmon decided to appoint Mirzo Zioyev minister of emergency situations rather than making him minister of defense, Iskandarov was reappointed to chair of Tajikcomuneservice (1998-2001), a part of which became the Tajik Gas.

¹²¹ Interview in Dushanbe, January 2007.

¹²² For instance, in January 2003, he was apprehended in Dushanbe, released the same day, but detained the following day, only to be released shortly thereafter.

In April 2004, Iskandarov met with Rakhmon in Dushanbe and during their seven-hour meeting reportedly warned him about widespread resentment among opposition groups. Iskandarov presented Rakhmon with a list of 103 former UTO field commanders who he claimed were jailed in violation of the 1997 amnesty agreement. In May, UNTOP visited the Rasht Valley and confirmed that many of the former UTO commanders and combatants lacked access to international aid, were excluded from job creation programs administered by the district government, and were subjected to harassments by local law enforcement agencies throughout the area, many of which were headed by recent arrivals from Kulyab. Pressed by the UNTOP request, the government completed the investigation of those on Iskandarov's list in October, and eight of them were released.¹²³

UNTOP involvement did not resolve the status of UTO commanders and combatants, however. In August 2004, several former UTO combatants attacked the ministry of interior (MOI) post in Tojikobod, in protest of persistent harassment by local police officials in the Rasht Valley and the additional arrest of two former UTO members for the 1996 murder of district administrator in Jirgital. In response, the MOI department for combating organized crime undertook a special operation led by former UTO field commander Akhmadov—a common Rakhmon formula of quelling UTO with UTO—

¹²³ Forty-two were apparently never charged or detained and the rest were apparently arrested for crimes committed after the Amnesty Law or not covered by it. Interview with UNTOP, March 2007.

and arrested Eribek “Shaikh” Ibrohimov and his associates on charges of hooliganism and illegal use and possession of weapons. Shortly after, another operation was launched in the Hoyt district against another two former opposition commanders, Ahmadbek Kholmatov and Ahmadbek Safarov. They fled with 40 to 60 men to hide in the Rasht Valley and the MOI had to call for reinforcements from Dushanbe.

After the dismissal of Iskandarov in November 2003, Rakhmon made another bold move in January 2004 and sacked Ghaffor Mirzoyev, head of the presidential guards since 1995. However, a rumor of uprising by the presidential guards surfaced; Mirzoyev reportedly organized a secret meeting in Dushanbe with former senior UTO and PFT commanders, including Mahmadrusi Iskandarov, Shoh Iskandarov, Salamsho Muhabbatov, Qurbon Cholov, and Saidsho Shamolov, according to UN and embassy sources. Rakhmon back peddled and in a reconciliatory gesture appointed Mirzoyev to head the national drug agency. This arrangement did not last long, however. In August, Mirzoyev was arrested again and sentenced to life imprisonment at a closed trial. After his arrest, the casino he owned in Dushanbe, *Jomi Jamshed*, and another shop in Kulyab, *Kooperator*, were transferred from the company registered under his brother’s name to the state property committee for “being privatized illegally” and for “invalid” ownership (“Asia Plus” 2005). Another brother of his was also arrested and sentenced to 12 years in prison for polygamy, forced detention, lynching, and illegal possession of weapons in Kulyab.

An analyst in a western embassy who previously worked with the UN peacekeeping mission in Tajikistan observes that “the prosecution of UTO-related individuals has been coercive and systematic, mainly carried out by the government, while PFT commanders have been dismissed quietly or charged with economic crimes, such as corruption charges.”¹²⁴ In December 2004, Iskandarov was detained in Moscow at the request of the Tajik government but Moscow refused to extradite him to Tajikistan and freed him on 3 April. Iskandarov disappeared on 15 April until the Tajik government announced on 26 April that he was being held in a former KGB detention facility in Dushanbe. He was tried and sentenced in October 2005 to 23 years in jail, and fined some \$470,000 for corruption, committing terrorist acts, and illegal possession of weapons.

As was the case with Ziroyev and Iskandarov, corruption charges have become a weapon of the government in prosecuting its political and economic rivals (Marat 2006:107). A longtime UN observer summarizes relationships between economic crimes and the prosecution of wartime commanders as follows:

Many of the senior commanders were appointed to lucrative positions where they made a lot of money quickly, some of them from drug trafficking and

¹²⁴ Interview in Dushanbe, February 2007.

others from corruption. If you look at the list of appointments in 1998-1999, many of them had positions related to customs or security agencies that controlled borders and known drug routes. Their easy access to resources, however, gave a pretext for subsequent arrests for economic crimes.

In pursuing corruption charges against wartime opposition leaders and commanders, the government utilized some of the economic agencies established by the recommendations of donors. For instance, based on advice from the IMF, the government created the tax police in 1996 to enforce tax collections from the 200 largest taxpayers. As noted by many observers, including those with international financial institutions, the largest asset owners and taxpayers at the time were field commanders and political leaders who acquired assets as part of the economic incentives of the peace agreement, and with whom the civil tax administration could not deal. According to a senior staff member of the tax police who spent more than a decade in the KGB, the tax police investigated 5,000 cases of tax evasion a year on average but “it is impossible to go after the untouchable groups” who have connections to the highest level authorities. The tax police operated an independent body until it was absorbed into the ministry of state revenues and tax collections in 2002, since when it has often been used for political reasons. For instance, according to an embassy observer, every time the former UTO leader Akbar Turajonzoda (appointed to first prime minister in 1997 but dismissed in 2005) criticized government policy, the tax police was sent to check the ginnery he

owns in Kofarnikhon.¹²⁵

While the tax police investigate mostly individuals who own small-scale and public enterprises, the role of the agency for financial control (AFC), established at the World Bank's recommendation in 2001, is more secretive and high profile. AFC reports directly to the president, and cases the agency investigates are discussed only with the president and the ministry of security (former KGB), according to a senior AFC staff member. The organization was first created as a small unit within the ministry of finance, with 250 accountants and lawyers, but when it became an independent agency as a result of the World Bank's assistance to institution building (IBTA-2) in 2001, the staff increased to 500 with an additional 150 operatives on contract. Once the AFC completes an initial investigation, cases are sent to the president's office, where only a small percentage of cases are approved for further investigation and prosecution, amounting to about 10 percent of funds recovered to the national budget, according to the senior AFC staff member.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Interview in Dushanbe, January 2007.

¹²⁶ On these functions of the AFC, a senior staff member of the state property committee argues: "There are 70,000 state organizations, including schools and hospitals, which receive budget allocations from the ministry of finance and other departments. AFC investigates not these sources of money or how they are allocated—such as \$100 million a year for celebrations!—but where the money ends up. When they spot a problem there, they come to investigate and ask for bribes. The system is designed to corrupt people and make money for some of them." Interview in Dushanbe, April 2007.

Taking advantage of their control of the state and its institutions, Rakhmon and his advisers persecuted their wartime rivals, including the PFT and UTO commanders and leaders, through military campaigns or legal proceedings. Although the reported crimes rates are relatively low in Tajikistan, they do not include acts of violence committed by the state, especially against wartime commanders and politicians, nor do they include economic crimes prosecuted by other agencies, such as the AFC and the tax police.

As the formal economy is controlled by a small group of elites, larger segments of the population continue to rely on coping mechanisms, such as barter trade. As of 2007, ten years since the end of the civil war, the informal shadow economy still occupied 60 percent of the officially reported GDP (Olimov 2007).¹²⁷ The Tajik government estimates that the number of labor migrations to Russia and other Central Asian states has reached 600,000 by 2007, many of whom have fallen victim to forced labor, and more than 1,000 women trafficked to the Middle East and Central Asian states in 2000 alone (IOM 2001). In addition, Tajikistan has become “the most popular transit country for Afghan opiates in Central Asia,” as a result of nearly a 2,000-fold increase in registered seizures of raw opium from 1991 to 2001 and an increase in heroin seizures

¹²⁷ According to one account, even members of the Tajik parliament and government remain heavily involved in the shadow economy. “It is difficult to separate the country's major criminals and businessmen from politicians as both domains greatly overlap. Under Rakhmon's leadership, virtually all public positions are distributed according to the financial capabilities of prospective candidates. [...] As a result, now only candidates affiliated with the president are allowed to participate in the political and economic processes.” Erica Marat, “Criminal State of Play-an Examination of State-Crime Relations in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,” *Jane's Intelligence* (2007).

from 60 kg in 1997 to 4,039 kg in 2001 ("Eurasian Narcotics Country Factsheet: Tajikistan" 2004).

Violence as a result of exclusionary economic structures is difficult to quantify. The statistics from the ministry of interior show that the number of serious crimes, such as murder, appears to have decreased since the late 1990s, but the data do not capture the extent of violence related to land and property disputes, except for a twofold increase in the unspecified category of "disturbance" from 1998 to 2005 (Table 4.2). There have been other signs of increased economic violence, however, which in many instances has been perpetrated by the same state institutions as those used for political violence, but with intent of controlling access to resources, rather than for persecution of individuals deemed to pose threats against Rakhmon's power. A UNDP-commissioned survey finds that crimes related to corruption in Tajikistan have increased in the post-Soviet period, especially in the customs service, the tax police, traffic police, courts, the prosecutor's office, and other agencies involved in the distribution of property and resources, such as energy (Strategic Research Centre 2006). These organizations considered corrupt are the ones undertaking overzealous tax inspections, which has hindered the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. According to this survey, 95 percent of small and medium-sized businesses were inspected by tax authorities on average of 16 times a year in 2002, and 98 percent of the respondents openly declared making unofficial payments to the authorities during the inspection

process (International Financial Corporation 2003).

Table 4.2: Number of arrests in Tajikistan from 1998 to 2006

Types of crime	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Total	13,161	14,413	14,455	14,117	12,754	11,150	11,037	12,074	10,183
Murder	433	357	283	233	180	164	178	124	167
Attempted murder	58	58	40	35	32	36	36	33	39
Rape	51	60	65	83	74	96	83	54	50
Attempted rape	10	8	11	18	9	30	28	18	14
Armed robbery	748	706	603	236	240	150	114	62	76
Robbery	248	268	304	286	287	167	213	221	174
Theft	4555	5845	5401	5127	4755	3583	3334	3558	2894
Hooliganism (disturbance)	451	435	475	490	653	659	902	968	826
Drug-related	979	1646	1922	1922	1087	877	754	620	539

Source: Ministry of Interior, Tajikistan (unpublished)

The lack of opportunities for political participation and economic advancement is one of the underlying causes of the growing sympathy towards underground Islamic movements such as Hizb-ut Tahrir (HuT), especially among women and youth. Although HuT has not called for violent regime change as other Islamic groups have, focusing instead on advocacy for the equitable distribution and redistribution of resources, the Tajik government has arrested hundreds of alleged HuT supporters throughout the country. Whether it is true that HuT is building wider constituencies or that these arrests have been fabricated in part by a government seeking to prevent any signs of political mobilization, it is a fact state-led violence has extended from the

prosecution of wartime elites to the crackdown of any signs of dissidence.

Conclusion

As underscored throughout this study, post-conflict aid privileges macro-economic liberalization over priorities for the implementation of peace agreements. This is especially the case in the early stage of post-war transition, which shapes the subsequent process of iterative elite bargaining among the government, opposition parties, and other groups in society. Such an organization of aid allows a particular group of elites, who have formal and informal access to state resources, to put in place bureaucratic structures that safeguard their exclusive access to economic assets, thereby undermining power-sharing and other provisions of peace agreements intended to promote post-war redistribution of resources. Furthermore, these regime elites manipulate the post-war institutional frameworks, some of which were established as a direct result of international assistance, to persecute their wartime rivals, including former field commanders and opposition leaders.

As a list of major wartime commanders and their post-war affiliations underscores (Annex 2), the winner of peacebuilding in Tajikistan is a small group of civilians revolving around Rakhmon, not commanders. Through corruption charges and cabinet reshuffles, most of the wartime commanders and opposition leaders have been removed.

Post-war aid in 2001-2002 contributed directly to Rakhmon's power consolidation by establishing an administrative apparatus through which the regime elites monopolized the ownership of productive assets, repulsed UTO representatives from their posts, and eventually persecuted those who helped restore security and recentralize the control of violence by the state. Furthermore, some of the economic institutions put in place at the recommendation of donors have been subsequently used by the regime to prosecute UTO elites on account of corruption and other charges unrelated to the civil war. This explains how the government was able to remove from power and even persecute UTO and PFT commanders who had helped the Rakhmon regime survive the threats against his regime discussed in Chapter 3.

This is a story that many local and foreign observers of Tajikistan are aware of but which has never been documented in detail. Never has the link between the failures of donor-assisted economic reforms, on the one hand, and the collapse of power-sharing and subsequent exclusion and violence against wartime oppositions, on the other, been explored. Analysis on peacebuilding in Tajikistan has been, and remains, fragmented, focusing on one or another particular area: security, political-electoral processes, poverty eradication, decentralization, and so forth.

At the national level, the political economy of peacebuilding in Tajikistan is closely related to the political economy of war: "much of the dynamics of the war in the later

stage was not about policy but rather access to resources” (Crisis Group 2003:1). Power- and wealth-sharing was a major concern of the parties negotiating the 1997 peace agreement, and the post-war distribution of resources would have been critical to the sustainability of the negotiated settlement of the conflict. Instead of facilitating the reallocation of state assets, the donor-funded structural adjustment process in post-war Tajikistan institutionalized the exclusive control of economic and financial management by Rakhmon and his associates at the expense of forfeiting the quota-based appointments of opposition representatives promised in the peace agreement.

For local-level dynamics of post-war transition, the recent research on Tajikistan argues that there can be parallel processes of peacebuilding at national and local levels (Heathershaw 2007), because grassroots democratization can be promoted through solidarity networks (Freizer 2005). Yet as aid has failed to transform the distribution of resources in the center, donor support to community-based development without reform of public administration and finance can revive patrimonial hierarchies of power at the community level, which in turn reinforce autocracy at the national level. First, community-based development risks constraining individual access to resources and social services within particular ethno-territorial associations and thereby reinforces regional identity. Second, the atomization of communities or “social cellularization,” whereby issues and interests tend to be conceived in terms that are local and highly contained and cannot be articulated at supra-local levels of the polity, would contribute

to preserving the autocratic forms of power (Shue 1994):

Rural development based on kinship affiliation can often preclude development of cross-regional or wider social networks between different groups of people. While providing protection, kinship ties can also suppress individual choice and freedom: instances of disagreements between representatives of different avlods have been observed, as they sometimes prefer to promote their narrow interests at the expense of community wide goals (Babajanian 2004:18).

Furthermore, when donor-funded service delivery is not integrated into national budgetary processes, aid is often viewed as private goods to be allocated. In such a circumstance, the legislature can become “the place to press for favors and patronage, rather than for policy outcomes, and this will once again tend to reinforce the patrimonial elements in the local political economy” (Moss, et al. 2006:16).¹²⁸ In Tajikistan, coupled with the unilateral selection of government officials by the presidential administration with little accountability and transparency in the selection process, community-based development had diminished government responsibility for service delivery and distracted public activism from official governance processes in

¹²⁸ Consequently, “instead of protecting the public interest, favoritism may dominate policy, resulting in narrow rather than broad-based reconstruction....despite its virtues, multi-party politics can degenerate into ‘money politics.’” Tony Addison, "Africa's Recovery from Conflict: Making Peace Work for the Poor," (Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research,2003),3.

which the public puts claims on government bodies and their performance.¹²⁹ While communal groups look to donors for the source of funding for service delivery, local government officials will be bound only by the obligation to repay the president and seek his continued favors, rather than responding to the needs of their constituencies.

These political consequences of donor assistance to community-based development also prevent aggregation of public action against the oligarchic base of power and emergence of alternative political forces, which undermines the prospects of democratization from within. According to a public opinion survey held in Dushanbe in 1999, 43 percent of the respondents consider that solutions to poverty reduction and the development of the market economy lie in the restoration of order, even if it is connected with restrictions in terms of human rights (Olimov and Olimova 2004). Marginalized groups have found few alternatives in the current post-war power structures in Tajikistan. Particularly in the Rasht Valley, a former opposition stronghold where nearly 50 percent of the male population has migrated to Russia for seasonal labor, the youth often speak of having an “uncle”—an influential person in the extended *avlod* family—as the only way to gain access to higher education, employment, and other professional and social opportunities.¹³⁰ This phenomenon is strikingly similar to the situation Shirin Akiner offers as a prelude to the civil war. Thus, international assistance to Tajikistan has not

¹²⁹ Without government funding for community development and service delivery, leaders of groups organized by donors (e.g. USAID) spend their unpaid volunteer time visiting aid organizations to find additional or continued funding. Interviews in Garm, August 2005.

¹³⁰ Interview in Garm, August 2005.

only failed to resolve the underlying cause of the conflict but instituted exclusion and violence along wartime divisions both at national and local levels under the banner of peacebuilding.

Chapter 5

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POST-WAR EXCLUSION AND VIOLENCE

The previous two chapters on Tajikistan demonstrated political consequences of economic reforms, presenting evidence of post-war exclusion and violence instigated by the incumbent regime elites, whose institutional basis of power was established and consolidated through the externally funded structural adjustment processes. To explore the applicability and relevance of this causal argument, this chapter presents a diverse case study of aid and its relation to post-war exclusion and violence in Cambodia, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone, which builds on the earlier analysis of aid flows in Chapter 2. These cases differ considerably in terms of the level of peacekeeping and donor engagement, economic capacities within the country, and the nature of the civil war and path to its settlement, all of which are identified in the peacebuilding literature as indicators for post-war transition. If the patterns of aid allocation are nonetheless similar among these cases, it can be assumed that there is a standard pattern of international post-conflict involvement, implicit or explicit, with an independent effect on post-conflict power relations and institutional setups, regardless of those local conditions considered pertinent to the outcome of peace implementation.

Cambodia

An estimated 1.7 million Cambodians died in the mere three years of the Khmer Rouge's reign (1975-1978), largely due to forced migration and labor, torture, execution, and starvation. The Khmer Rouge regime ended when Vietnam invaded and installed its puppet regime in 1979. Oppositions in exile and the Khmer Rouge continued diplomatic and guerrilla resistance until Vietnamese forces withdrew in 1985, leaving Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge member, and his Cambodian People's Party (CPP) in charge. The Paris Peace Accord, signed in 1991, led to a temporary reconciliation between Hun Sen's CPP and the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh. In 1992, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was launched with the authorized strength of approximately 16,000 and a broad mandate, including mine clearance, the repatriation of refugees, DDR, electoral preparations, and economic recovery. Donors also provided some \$5 billion since the first donor conference held in June 1992 in Tokyo.¹³¹

¹³¹ The conference also established the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia composed of multilateral and bilateral donors. Provided with technical and administrative support by UNTAC and UNDP, the Committee met annually until 1995, when it was replaced by the Consultative Group led by the World Bank and the government of Cambodia, in a shift from post-conflict rehabilitation to development assistance.

Although the Paris Accord did not include a specific provision for power-sharing, external actors nevertheless facilitated an elite pact when the 1993 elections, boycotted by the Khmer Rouge, led to a victory of the FUNCINPEC (45 percent of votes) against the CPP (38 percent of votes). UNTAC was unprepared for the defeat of the CPP and was concerned with its repercussions, given the lack of FUNCINPEC capacity and experience to govern and the contrasting domination of the CPP in the army and bureaucratic apparatus, which Hun Sen was not likely to relinquish without a fight (Roberts 1999).

The Paris peace agreement left in power the Vietnamese-installed and supported government of Hun Sen. None of the major donors supported the Hun Sen government. All the major powers and donors (perhaps including Moscow), hoped that the elections scheduled for 1993 would bring to power a different government led by the erstwhile opposition to Hun Sen and had little incentive to rush in aid in the meantime (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005:13).

UNTAC therefore facilitated a post-electoral power-sharing arrangement between the two parties, which Michael Doyle characterized as a “shotgun marriage” between FUNCINPEC and the CPP, whereby two co-prime ministership (Ranariddh as the first prime minister and Hun Sen as the second prime minister) and equal representation of the two parties within each ministry were established (2001:21). FUNCINPEC

supporters were integrated into the state apparatus, but the CPP refused to share power with the FUNCINPEC at the local level, where provincial governors appointed by Hun Sen maintained control over access to local resources (Roberts 2003).

1992-1996: Aid arrives while government reduces public expenditures

With the total budget of \$1.6 billion, UNTAC was one of the largest peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, and as a transitional authority superseding the government, was mandated to undertake an array of state-building activities, including the organization of the 1993 elections, constitutional reform, and civil society development. UNTAC, however, has been criticized for failing to demobilize the armed groups and strengthen the Cambodian state and economy (Doyle 1998). Instead, international financial institutions provided aid for the reform of the Cambodian public sector. Large-scale donors from 1992 to 1995 included the World Bank (\$75 million), the Asian Development Bank (\$67 million), and the IMF (\$52 million). These international financial institutions focused on economic liberalization and infrastructure development. The first disbursement of funds made available by multilateral agencies was an Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan of \$65 million in 1993 for the balance-of-payments and infrastructure support.¹³² The IMF assisted in the adoption of a privatization law in

¹³² ADB assistance to Cambodia in 1992-2002 included \$675 million for 26 loans, mostly in the transport sector, technical assistance, and advisory assistance in 10 different sectors, managed through “a loose program structure with piecemeal resource allocation to some priority sectors,

1994, followed by the second annual loan of \$41 million in 1995 for a structural adjustment program, through which the number of civil service employees was to be reduced by 10 percent by the end of 1996 and by an additional 10 percent by the end of 1997. The World Bank provided a total of \$268 million in 1992-2000, including \$63 million credit for infrastructure rehabilitation, \$40 million for balance-of-payment and budgetary support, and \$17 million technical assistance to enhance the government's economic management capacities. The main goals of the World Bank's assistance strategy in 1995 included economic growth (at 7.5 percent of GDP), increase of tax revenues from logging and other sources, reduction of civil service and defense expenditures, private sector development, rehabilitation of rubber plantation and rice production, and infrastructure development.

The arrival of post-conflict aid coincided with the budget cuts by the government. By 1989, the Vietnamese-supported CPP government was faced with the decline of financial transfers from the former Soviet Union, on which it was highly dependent (the tax share of GDP was only 3 percent). At the same time, the de-collectivization of agriculture and industry that began in the 1980s was resulting in a loss of budget contributions from state enterprises (Irvin 1993). To control deficits, the government

such as finance.” ADB, "Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia," (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2004), vi.

cut budgets for capital and social spending, including infrastructure, health, and education.

Where the government cut budgetary commitments, the donors stepped in. EU funding focused on rural development, basic health infrastructure, de-mining, and the resettlement and repatriation of refugees through the Cambodian Resettlement and Rehabilitation Project (CARERE) in partnership with UNDP and UNHCR. Japanese funding was devoted mostly to rehabilitation of infrastructure, social services (health and education), and rural and agricultural development. US assistance shifted from infrastructure development and electoral support to health, education, and governance (e.g., anti-corruption, decentralization, human rights education), “primarily delivered through contracts and grants to private voluntary organizations or international organizations—a pattern that continues to this day” (USAID 2007). In 1994, only 42 percent of public service expenditures were financed by the government’s own revenue sources, and the ratio further declined to 34 percent in 1996 (World Bank 1999:vii). In 1995, aid also financed 85 percent of all public investment and 46 percent of the total government budget, but its strong “urban-returnee relief bias” led to the expansion of the service sector and high rates of consumer imports and growing inequality (Doyle 2001:98). In 1996, government expenditures for education were only 1 percent of GDP and for health, 0.5 percent.

While donors continued to finance the delivery of social services, international financial institutions pressured the government to downsize the civil service, which further reduced the ability of the state to provide for its citizens further. Donors also recommended the reduction of military expenditures, which was unrealistic, given the continued insurgency of the Khmer Rouge along the Thai border. In 1996, defense expenditures still comprised 48 percent of government revenues. Moreover, the donor policy contradicted the UNTAC-facilitated power-sharing arrangement between the CPP and the FUNCINPEC, as this agreement required the creation of bureaucratic posts in the government. Donor insistence on the reduction of public sector personnel and expenditures became increasingly untenable, as the parties—especially FUNCINPEC—struggled to continue allocating administrative jobs as a source of patronage support to its constituencies. By the end of 1996, Ranariddh began to seek an alliance with the Khmer Rouge, which could have shifted the fragile power balance within the coalition.

In July 1997, Hun Sen resorted to a preemptive coup and ousted Ranariddh. The elections in July 1998, held in the midst of a systematic campaign of intimidation, torture, and summary executions, resulted in months of political deadlock and protest over their outcome. When it was suspected that the CPP would not achieve a majority in the legislature, the CPP-dominated national election commission altered the electoral formula to ensure a parliamentary majority for their benefactors. A new coalition established after the elections selected Hun Sen as prime minister and Prince Ranariddh

as president of the National Assembly. No attempts were made by international organizations to intervene and stop the collapse of the 1993 power-sharing arrangement; UNTAC was long gone, having withdrawn in November 1993, and the UN and donors had shifted their focus to post-conflict development.

Only after Hun Sen regained a firm control over the 160,000-strong armed forces after the coup did the DDR process start. In 2000, a pilot program funded by the World Bank and other donors (with a total contribution of \$2.25 million) began to demobilize soldiers by offering a one-time payment of \$1,200. This cash payment resulted in a surge of military enrollment, as local commanders accepted \$50-100 in bribes to add names to the list of army personnel and immediately discharge them upon the payment of \$1,200 (Crisis Group 2000:21). Similar to Tajikistan, therefore, the DDR process in Cambodia began late and with limited external assistance (\$18 million from the World Bank in 1998), compared to the level of donor support to macroeconomic reforms, to which hundreds of millions were provided in the first three years of post-war transition.

1997 onward: state bypassing

Aid allocation to Cambodia decreased from \$518 million in 1996 to \$375 million in the aftermath of the 1997 coup, as some donors (most notably the US) suspended aid (Peou and Yamada 2000). Nevertheless, the total amount of aid—\$2.6 billion—was still

higher than government expenditures of \$2.1 billion over the period of 1996-2001. Donors nevertheless avoided direct contribution of their resources to the government. “The current development strategy of the World Bank is to bypass the state,” with multilateral and bilateral donors contracting their project implementations to international and local NGOs (Doyle 2001:99). Hun Sen, for his part, seemed suspicious of the intentions of major donors and did not solicit aid actively, instead preferring a cautious approach with which he could control the post-war reconstruction process.

Bypassing the state, however, also meant the lack of external involvement in the reform of the state. Some analysts thus argue: “More worrying than the sheer volume of external assistance is the fact that the bulk of it is not reflected in the government’s budget or disbursed through the National Treasury. Such off-budget arrangements undermine the integrity of the national budgetary system and raise concerns about resource use excessively reflecting donor priorities or being allocated in uncoordinated ways that exacerbate inter-ministerial competition” (Smoke and Taliercio 2006:16). Even the World Bank evaluation in 1999 recognized:

The current situation is such that much donor assistance bypasses the budget and involves direct funding of project contractors. This has resulted in a fractionalized public sector effort with little central organization and control and

with a number of adverse side effects such as: (i) the absence of strong government ownership of many projects; (ii) piecemeal efforts by aid agencies toward sectoral issues and institution building; (iii) weak coordination among donor programs; (iv) a proliferation of different procurement, disbursement, auditing, and progress monitoring activities among agencies; and (v) the creation of special project units, staffed by expatriates or by nationals with "topped up" salaries, with adverse impacts on institution building (1999:xiv).

While the World Bank, ADB, IMF, and UNDP among others have provided technical assistance to public sector reform, these donors often gave conflicting advice to the Cambodian counterparts. Their “bickering about the ‘best’ structures allows the RGC to maintain its patronage approach and ignore the resulting damage to revenue generation and public expenditure management” (Smoke and Taliercio 2006:46). An evaluation of ADB assistance argues that most of the initiatives related to institution building and capacity development were ineffective, being ad hoc and focused on improving individual technical skills, rather than resource allocation and management for effective functioning of institutions as a whole (ADB 2004).¹³³

¹³³ The World Bank’s evaluation also recognizes that “the donors’ first role is to provide well-coordinated technical assistance and training to strengthen the line ministry’s capacity in a more systematic and programmed manner. Ad hoc approaches to capacity building would make the proposed budget reforms more difficult to implement.” World Bank, "Cambodia Country Assistance Evaluation," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank,2000),xiv.

Frustrated by the lack of progress in the public sector reform and political deadlock leading to and resulting from the 1997 coup, donors made community-based service delivery a priority in the 1990s. The CPP government also saw in the establishment of commune councils “possibilities for further consolidating its grip on power by extending its influence at the grassroots in the communes” (Blunt and Turner 2005:77). In 1996, UNDP and the UN Capital Development Fund through the Local Development Program (LDP) launched the Cambodia Resettlement and Reintegration Project (CARERE) and its follow-up initiative *Seila* project (Khmer for foundation stone) to establish a decentralized process of planning, financing, and delivering public services through local development committees.¹³⁴ Though widely considered a model of service delivery when state institutions remain weak, an evaluation of this approach argues: “LDP has limitations, cannot substitute for national development programs. In addition, LDPs entail tradeoffs between institutional development and infrastructure delivery. There is also a bias towards local public goods – this may not be an appropriate channel

¹³⁴ Analysts suggest a number of factors that contributed to the attractiveness of this program. “First, the RGC remained weak and in disarray well into the 1990s. The UN's success in brokering elections (and perhaps its decision not to challenge Hun Sen’s bid to stay in power despite the 1993 election results) gave it credibility to effectively bypass the RGC in developing experimental sub-national institutions and processes under CARERE/Seila. Second, some key ministries and the provincial governors must have seen opportunities in CARERE/Seila for improving their influence, access to resources, and capacity, so they were happy to cooperate. Third, the LDF started in Northwest provinces that benefited from the return of Cambodians who were educated in the ways of international donors during years spent in refugee camps at the Thai border. These areas also experienced a proliferation of NGOs generously funded by post-1993 international contributions and skilled in community organization and local service delivery. Initially, many of these NGOs viewed Seila as unwelcome competition, but they learned over time to benefit from and integrate themselves into the Seila system.” Paul Smoke and Robert Taliencio, "The Evolutionary Role of Public Finance in Post-Conflict State Building in Cambodia," (Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2006).

for private goods or more strategic public goods. Bias towards one-time capital investments versus recurrent budget items also exists” (UNDP 2002:7).

Post-war exclusion

Similar to the post-war process in Tajikistan, donor assistance to Cambodia undermined reconciliation between the CPP and the FUNCINPEC. While the UNTAC-facilitated power-sharing arrangement required the expansion of the bureaucracy to incorporate FUNCINPEC supporters in the CPP-dominated state administration, donor focus on macro-economic reforms included the reduction of the public sector from the early stage of post-war transition. The increased competition over government posts subsequently led to FUNCINPEC seeking an alliance with the Khmer Rouge, which Hun Sen prevented by resorting to the coup in 1997.

Donor emphasis on economic liberalization in Cambodia also resulted in the centralization of economic management by the CPP and incumbent prime minister Hun Sen, especially in the timber industry. Similar to Tajikistan, Cambodia had been undergoing a gradual transition to a market economy by the end of the civil war, with the private sector increasingly involved in its timber industry. As donor assistance to privatization began after the formation of the coalition government in 1993, “the two co-prime ministers recruited foreign companies to capture the forestry rent on their behalf

through forest concessions—covering all available productive forests by 1997—and export contracts” (Le Billon 2000: 792). As donors insisted on the reduction of the defense budget, the coalition government decided in July 1994 to finance military campaigns against the Khmer Rouge through timber exports and put the ministry of defense in charge of logging. The use of timber exports for counter-insurgency essentially gave exclusive authority to the two prime ministers to approve any export license requested by the ministry (Talbot 1998). As a result, “official forest revenue, originally forecast at US\$50 to \$100 million per year, averaged less than US\$10 million due to pervasive evasion of royalty payments... timber exports have been used to finance a ‘parallel military budget’ and have served as a lucrative source of rents for high-level officials” (Smoke and Taliercio 2006:36).

Since the 1997 coup, Cambodia’s timber industry has been run by a network of alliances and companies that rely on the support of Hun Sen and his close associates, as well as government institutions occupied by those elites, in a manner that resembles Rakhmon’s control of the cotton sector in Tajikistan. According to a report by the NGO Global Witness, the largest logging firm in Cambodia, Seng Keang Company, is led by Dy Chouch, the first cousin of Hun Sen; Dy’s ex-wife Seng Keang; and their business partner Khun Thong, who is the brother-in-law of minister of agriculture, forestry and fisheries Chan Sarun and father-in-law of director general of the forest administration Ty Sokhun (2007). One of the factories operated by this firm alone produces the

estimated profit of \$13 million annually. A USAID-commissioned assessment summarizes the political economy of post-war Cambodia:

Following the Paris Accord, Cambodia's former Communist leaders embraced a hybrid system of predatory market economics and authoritarian control [...] As in other ex-socialist states, political and economic "reforms" of the early transition phase gave way to a wholesale process of state capture. One manifestation was spontaneous privatizations, as the dominant political class assumed de facto control of much of the country's patrimony. Through shady deals, state-owned enterprises have been taken over by politicians or their cronies. These practices continue through granting of concessions in forestry and other sectors. Since the 1980s, 20-30 percent of the country's land, the main source of wealth, has passed into the hands of less than one percent of the population (Calavan, et al. 2004:2)

Concerned with the lack of transparent forest management, the IMF froze a \$20 million loan to Cambodia in 1996 and another \$20 million loan in 1997. In 2003, although the Cambodian government did not meet the prerequisite condition to improve forest management, the World Bank released the final \$15 million of its structural adjustment credit, arguing that the Hun Sen government cancelled some timber concessions made after the 1998 elections and had not granted new ones outside the legal framework.

According to the Global Witness analysis, however, those terminated were “controlled by companies which were bankrupt or had the wrong political affiliations,” and senior government officials continued to reallocate timber concessions and dispense an array of legally dubious documents to facilitate logging operations (Davis 2004). Applying the commodity management model of a well-regulated market economy in the context of post-war power divisions and contests, donors paradoxically validated an exclusionary system of resource access by legalizing the selected individuals’ control of the timber industry while denying community members access to the forest area (Le Billon 2000). The post-war government in Cambodia also delayed the donor-recommended rehabilitation and privatization of rubber plantations, so that their production and exports were left in the control of provisional governors who smuggled as much as one-third of the total rubber exports (World Bank 2000:5). Hence, in a similar manner to the outcome of donor involvement in Tajikistan’s cotton sector, external assistance to the reform of the logging industry in Cambodia has failed to generate revenues for the national budget or contribute to poverty reduction, while it has enabled Hun Sen and his allies to monopolize benefits arising from timber exports.

In Cambodia, as well as in Tajikistan, post-war governments “managed its rhetoric in a way that ensures that donor interests are endorsed so as to ensure the flow of financial and technical assistance necessary to satisfy its own political agenda” (Blunt and Turner 2005:85). Philippe Le Billon summarizes the impact of aid on the political economy of

the Cambodian post-war power structures:

the priorities of international policies and development programme—such as controls on public spending, government down-sizing, and multi-million dollar studies by foreign consultants—also unintentionally promoted the creation of parallel budgets funded by forest exploitation and covering military expenses, infrastructure (re) construction, and complementing civil service salaries (2000; 787).

Post-war violence

With the incumbent regime's exclusive control of public administration and finance, violence in post-conflict Cambodia has often been committed by state agents, such as the police, to suppress political dissent. In the 2000 report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for human rights in Cambodia listed a series of violent incidents that took place after the signing of the peace accord, which mainly involved attacks against members of opposition parties, the media, as well as selected government officials. Such incidents included a grenade attack against the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party congress in September 1995, the assassination of an official working with the economic crimes department of the ministry of interior in 1996, a grenade attack against a legal demonstration in Phnom

Penh in March 1997 which killed more than 14 people, a grenade attack on the office of *Koh Santhepheap* newspaper in October 1997 and a subsequent attempt on the life of its editor, and 24 cases of murders involving members of the opposition parties prior to the July 1998 elections. These cases, in the total number of 178 from 1995 to 2004, were submitted to the Government but no proper investigation took place and police and government authorities concluded that these were acts of ‘robberies’, ‘personal disputes’ or “revenge” (Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia 2005:15). During the campaign for the election of local commune councils in February 2002 in which the CPP won a landslide victory (1,600 councils out of 1,621), at least 20 opposition candidates and activists were reportedly killed by the CPP government (Jagan 2002).

In addition to political violence against opposition parties, data from police records and newspapers also suggest an increase in crimes related to property or economic conflict. The statistics from the Cambodian Ministry of Interior confirm the increase of crime rates since the end of the civil war, especially in the areas of theft and disputes resulting in death or injury (Table 5.1). These figures do not include acts of violence committed by the state agencies, although violence has been “used by the state and legal companies to enforce the legalization (of the timber industry), which compounded the loss of access to forests by local communities, already impoverished by land mines and the depletion of timber resources” (Le Billion, 2000: 801). Reports by the UN and the

Global Witness in July 2007 documented that Cambodian and foreign-owned logging firms contracted by the Government, to which “senior government ministers secretly awarded between 30 and 40 logging concessions...giving away 39 per cent of Cambodia’s land area” had resorted to a range of coercive measures to occupy and control the forests (UN 2008:14). Such acts of violence included illegal and forceful appropriations of public property; intimidation, detention, and illegal confinement of residents and destruction of private property in the area; organized crime, including trafficking of women and children from the area; and extortion from employees of the forest administration. “Victims of this illicit economy, whether through the appropriation of their property, intimidation, or illegal detentions, have no redress. The beneficiaries are a relatively small group of tycoons with political, business or familial ties to senior officials. There is widespread use of police and army” (ibid).

These patterns of economic violence at the local level are thus directly related to the exclusionary structure of the timber industry controlled by the Hun Sen regime. A review of homicide rates in the 1990s analyzes the nature of lethal violence in post-war Cambodia as follows:

Political and economic adversity drove the homicide rate to 11.6 per 100,000 in 1998 similar to levels reached during 1993 the year of the first national elections. Usually homicides were between males and commonly arose from robbery,

disputes, and quarrels with most deaths resulting from gunfire. Extra-judicial death arising from police or “mob” actions accounted for high rates of suspect/offender death and contributed significantly to the homicide rate. Rates of violent crime were higher in rural areas but Phnom Penh experienced higher levels of property crime than the provinces (Broadhurst 2002:2).

Table 5.1: Crimes recorded by the Ministry of Interior, Cambodia

Cases	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Murder	429	599	303	397	542	317	793	581
Armed robbery	1414	1613	905	832	1345	887	1822	1396
Grenade	40	157	79	27	54	46	68	42
Rape	106	43	39	84	122	46	130	165
Kidnap	9	93	133	24	44	23	130	91
Poisons	14	47	42	23	24	21	0	20
Patrimony	8	6	20	12	6	n/a	n/a	n/a
Theft	1420	792	835	896	1471	868	1871	1789
Assault/disputes	515	267	353	423	1050	445	1114	1058
Fraud/pick-pocket	23	117	163	214	233	97	244	248
Possession of illegal weapons	136	514	235	310	79	n/a	n/a	n/a
Other offences			20		668	208	950	641
All crimes reported	4114	4248	3031	3260	5638	2958	7122	6031
Rates	45.2	44.7	30.9	32.6	59.6	27.9	65.8	53.8

Source: Broadhurst (2002)

Guatemala

In contrast to aid to post-war Cambodia and Tajikistan, the Guatemalan case represents

conscious donor efforts to include the issue of resource redistribution as part of the peace process. The 36-year conflict in Guatemala, which claimed more than 200,000 lives, was shaped by deep class and racial divisions between the poor indigenous Maya Indians and the relatively prosperous Latino population. The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) insurgency composed of Mayan peasant groups, labor unions, and communist sympathizers emerged after the CIA-organized overthrow of a democratically elected, socialist-leaning government in 1954, followed by a series of junta regimes taking over power. The URNG waged guerrilla warfare against the government forces and pro-government right-wing groups of self-appointed vigilantes, including those organized by Efraín Ríos Montt who ascended to power in 1982 after a coup and who subsequently dissolved the Congress, suspended political parties, cancelled elections, and formed local civilian defense patrols (PACs).

In 1983, Montt was deposed and an unstable transition to civilian rule ensued, including the governments of Vencio Cerezo in 1985, Jorge Serrano Elías in 1990, Ramiro de León as an interim president in 1993, and Alvaro Arzú in 1996. The de León government signed the Framework Accord with URNG in January 1994. The Accord established the assembly of civil service through which civil society groups were allowed to present substantive recommendations to the official negotiation process between the government of de León (and later Arzú) and the URNG. A resultant series of peace accords, signed between 1994 and 1996, were comprehensive in their coverage

of political, economic, social, and cultural issues, so that the exclusion and inequalities underpinning the conflict would be redressed. The peace accord also stipulated that various military institutions be put under civilian control, which would have required the amendment of the 1985 constitution, which assigned responsibilities to the armed forces for both external and internal security.

Public finance as a part of peace process

One of the unique aspects of the peace process in Guatemala was the range of institutional reforms—political, economic, social, and cultural—addressed in the peace agreements. These reform agendas also included the restructuring of public finance to extend social services to the poor indigenous communities, the lack of which was one of the root causes of the insurgency and exacerbated by neo-liberal economic policies during the civil war period.

The roots of the problem run wider than political and institutional legacies. [...]

The market-oriented economic policies adopted throughout the region to cope with the economic downturn of the 1980s provided few means of addressing the deterioration of the material welfare of major sectors of the population and a concomitant increase in social inequality. At the same time, the limitations imposed on redirecting (much less increasing) public expenditures and

improving the state's bureaucratic capacity constitute a major brake on a thoroughgoing reform and expansion of its public security institutions (Kincaid 2000:53) .

Another major difference between the Cambodian and Tajik cases and the Guatemalan peace process was the commitment of national resources in the latter to implement provisions of the peace agreements. When the peace negotiations were concluded in Guatemala, the government estimated the cost of peace implementation to be around \$2.6 billion, which included funds for provision of education, health, and social security to the indigenous population (\$1.2 billion), democratization (\$693 million), agriculture, land, and rural development (\$351.8 million), and reintegration of refugees and ex-combatants (\$330 million). While donors were expected to cover 70 percent of these costs, the government was held responsible by the socio-economic accord of May 1996 for increasing the tax ratio from 9.75 percent of GDP, which was one of the lowest in Latin America, to 12 percent of GDP. Public expenditures for education, health, and housing were also to be raised by 50 percent of the 1995 level by 2000.

The agreement did not provide details for tax reform, however. Guatemalan oligarchs, particularly those represented by the coordinating committee of farming, commercial, industrial and financial associations and the national farmers' and ranchers' council, resisted the establishment of proportional tax rates. While the government was still

negotiating a fiscal pact with those lobbying groups and the business community, the international financial institutions proposed an increase of the value-added tax (VAT), which was favored by economic elites because it is born by all consumers equally, unlike proportional tax rates based on income level (IMF 2001). In 2000, the Guatemalan Congress adopted the increase of VAT, but without measures to tax the wealthy economic elites, the tax collection rate never reached the 12% target (it increased up to 11 percent in 2002 but declined thereafter). Similarly, public expenditure has increased only modestly from 9.4 percent of GDP in 1996 to 13.8 percent in 1999, and fell to 12 percent in 2004.

While the international financial institutions adopted policies aligned with the interest of the country's economic elites, the leverage of other donors, including the UN, and the URNG to press for compliance with peace implementation was "modest at best" (Rodas-Martini 2006:36-37). The UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was established with two mandates: a civilian component to observe the implementation of human rights accords (1994-2004) and a peacekeeping component to observe the DDR process (January-May 1997). The day-to-day operation of MINUGUA had "little impact on the government's decisions. The mission operated in a climate of nationalism verging on xenophobia [...] in reaction MINUGUA maintained a low profile [...] A survey commissioned by MINUGUA in

1998 found that few Guatemalans understood the mission's mandate or valued the UN's presence" (Peceny and Stanley 2001:176).

Similarly, by 2000, the URNG was already a shadow of the force it had been in the 1980s, and its roughly 1,500 to 3,000 members, mostly little-trained peasants, were no match for the 46,000 armed forces. DDR of the URNG was carried out under a tight deadline—60 days (March-May 1997) — monitored by 155 unarmed MINUGUA observers. In contrast, the size of PACs (pro-government paramilitary groups created by Montt) was estimated to be 393,132 as of 1996. Taking advantage of this disparity between the strength of the URNG and PACs, the army refused to accommodate URNG supporters in government and military structures (Burgeman 2000). For instance, only 14% of the police force is composed of the indigenous people, although 43% of the country's population is indigenous.

Social-economic focus of aid attempted

The estimated amount of post-conflict aid to Guatemala varies from an average annual disbursement of \$200 million for 1997-2003 (Rodas-Martini 2006) to \$250 million for 1996-2006 (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005) and \$600 million in 1996-2002 (Azpuru, et al. 2004). The first post-conflict donor meeting for Guatemala was held in Brussels in January 1997, chaired by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and resulted

in the aid pledge of \$1.9 billion for 1997-2000. In addition, expenditures for the peacekeeping component of MINUGUA (January-May 1997) were about \$4.5 million and its human rights work cost approximately \$20 million annually for 1994-2004.

Many observers agree that donors learned a lesson from post-war reconstruction in Nicaragua and El Salvador, namely that distributional inequalities need to be remedied in order to address the root causes of the conflict and prevent further aggravation of the existing socioeconomic divisions. The World Bank and the IMF participated in peace negotiations to harmonize the economic and political aspects of peace implementation. Departing from the civil war period during which adjustment loans for finance, trade development, and agriculture were proposed (on a condition that the government increase tax revenues and public expenditures), the World Bank's country assistance strategy for Guatemala in 1995 recommended lending for education, community development, roads, financial management, and agricultural services. The 1998 strategy also continued to propose lending for rural infrastructure, market development, land administration, urban neighborhood development, and reconstruction of war-torn areas.

However, when it came to the implementation of post-war assistance, donors continued to focus on macro-economic growth, following the traditional model of liberalization (Table 5.2). In the immediate post-war period of 1997-2002, sectors such as infrastructure, the financial sector, business development, and public training received

40 percent of total aid, in contrast to 25 percent for social investment, health, housing, human rights, and land issues, and only 15 percent for agriculture (Rodas-Martini 2006:26). Approximately 40 percent of the IADB loans during this period (\$485 million in total) were allocated to the energy and transportation sectors, while only 30 percent were provided for health, urban development, service delivery combined, and 17 percent for the reform of public finance (World Bank 2002). An evaluation of IADB assistance to Guatemala shows that although the share of social sector loans against the total amount increased from 12 percent in years 1993-1995 to 48 percent in years 1996-1999 (and decreased to 24 percent in years 2000-2003), spending for governance (mainly judicial reforms) remained an average of 4.2 percent (Inter-American Development Bank 2004:13).

In contrast to these large-scale loans for infrastructure, enterprise, and economic development, the “first major commitment to the Guatemalan peace process” from donors was a community-based development program called DECOPAZ (Programme of Community Development for Peace), approved in October 1996 with the budget of approximately \$50 million in total (Plant 1998:24). Similar to other community-based development initiatives, DECOPAZ sought to build rural infrastructure, encourage community participation in development projects, and create local sources of income. However, the program had “problems of institutionalizing” the initiative, because “the program favored municipal agencies that, due to a lack of coordination with indigenous

communities and organizations, made access difficult for the communities and created mistrust” (Inter-American Development Bank 2005:11). Among bilateral and multilateral donors, UNDP was one of few agencies closely involved in peacebuilding assistance, spending approximately \$110 million from January 1998 to April 2000 for repatriation, resettlement, reintegration of refugees and former combatants and for the work of the Commission on Historical Clarification. Yet well over 95 percent of UNDP resources were delivered through “a proliferation of distinct projects (over 100), which, in turn, has at times complicated the administration of resources” (UNDP 2001:3).

Table 5.2: International Assistance to Guatemala 1996-2001

Sector	Total (\$million)	% of total
Infrastructure	982.3	35.1
Enterprise development	335.1	12.0
Economic development	297.5	10.6
Rural development	229	8.2
Education	170	6.1
Agriculture	128	4.6
Health	125	4.5
Public sector reform	114	4.1
Peace accords implementation	106.29	3.8
Environment	88.4	3.2
Democracy	66.9	2.4
Resettlement of the displaced populations	65.2	2.3
Emergency humanitarian assistance	48.2	1.7
Civil society development	19.5	0.7
Gender and women	14.1	0.5
Culture	5	0.2
Indigenous populations	2.9	0.1
Food security	2.2	0.1

Source: Azpuru (2004)

Post-war exclusion

Providing large-scale loans for economic growth and infrastructure development would have been conducive to peace implementation if it had facilitated the decline of income gap between the rich and the poor, which characterized the Guatemalan civil war.

However, to date, less than one percent of agricultural producers still control 75 percent of the land in Guatemala (Minority at Risk Project 2004). Traditional exports—such as sugar, beef, and rubber—are controlled by some 20–50 families, while small-scale landholders, who constitute 87 percent of farmers but own only 15 percent of land, have effectively been excluded from export-oriented agricultural sectors, such as sugar, with limited access to credit and marketing infrastructure (UNDP 2005). Since agriculture has been the primary occupation of these indigenous persons, according to the World Bank’s 1995 economic assessment in Guatemala, land reform and agricultural assistance would have made direct contribution to poverty eradication in the underprivileged communities.

Unfortunately, the Bank has done little sector work on agriculture in Guatemala, missing the chance to influence policies for the rural sector, where most of Guatemala's poor, illiterate, and indigenous people live. Although some Bank loans have supported development in rural areas and project preparation work

has analytical content and policy advice, the Bank has known too little about the country's agricultural markets (products, inputs, rural labor, and rural support services) and lacks an explicit strategy to deal with agriculture (World Bank 2002:17).

In contrast to the Tajik and Cambodian cases, the Guatemalan peace agreements did not include power-sharing arrangements. Instead, structural changes to address political, economic, and social inequalities within the Guatemalan state and society were envisaged through comprehensive institutional reforms, including tax increase. As the Guatemalan economic elites managed to prevent an increase of their tax share, endorsing instead the donor-recommended VAT, other reforms promised in the series of peace accords signed between 1994 and 1996 have also been stalled. The Guatemalan Congress did not approve a set of constitutional reforms to implement those peace agreements until 1997. In the interim period, no elections took place, giving no opportunity to incorporate URNG in the post-war government or increase indigenous representation in the legislature. By the time that the constitutional reforms were finally submitted for public referendum in May 1999, the congressional package of fifty constitutional reforms faced extreme controversy, particularly concerning the rights of the indigenous populations.

The reform package had included the most significant provisions of the accords, such as the restriction of the army's power, the establishment of accountability mechanisms in the executive system, and the promotion of indigenous rights. Although pre-referendum polls had indicated that the constitutional amendment was likely to be approved, reform opponents waged a last minute, well-financed campaign using anti-Mayan rhetoric,¹³⁵ and subsequently succeeded in defeating the constitutional reforms. The civil society and indigenous groups that had fought for reforms during the peace process had now lost the momentum for change; only 18.5 percent of the eligible electorate voted, and 55 percent voted against constitutional reforms.

Shortly after the referendum, the first legislative and presidential elections were held in November 1999, and the extreme right and one of the most vocal opponents to peace negotiations won a majority in Parliament (its leader won the presidential runoff on 26 December 1999). The Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), led by former dictator and current National Assembly member Ríos Montt, has made significant gains in legislative balloting since the mid-1990s and currently holds a majority of seats in the Congress. Montt supporters in the Congress have effectively stymied efforts by the executive branch to follow through on many of the issues outlined in the 1996 peace

¹³⁵ The anti-Mayan language included “reforms would ‘Balkanize’ Guatemala” and “everyone will be forced to learn obscure indigenous languages” and “the legal system will be replaced by traditional indigenous law.” Susana Jones, “Guatemala peace endangered,” *Christian Science Monitor* (12 July 1999).

accord (e.g., land reform) and have effectively sought to protect former military leaders from prosecution for both past crimes and current illegal activities. While multiple political parties operate within Guatemala, institutional opportunities to access the political process remain limited for those who live in poverty. While constitutional law permits universal suffrage, the voting rights of indigenous people are limited by exclusionary social practices such as lack of transportation and elections scheduled during harvest season.

Post-war violence

The homicide rate in post-war Guatemala increased 64 percent from 3,230 cases in 2001 to 5,308 in 2005 and there were more killings per day in 2007 than there were during the civil war (UN 2007). While incidents of post-war violence appear to be concentrated in urban areas, perpetrated by police or gangs, observers note similarity between methods used by state agents during the civil war and characteristics of many violent incidents since the end of the conflict, such as signs of torture and mutilation of bodies that are displayed in public areas (Agner 2008). In February 2007, UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions Philip Alston reported that “the state bears direct responsibility” for the prevalence of violence, given the lack of its political will to end impunity, including the killings of women, the execution of selected

individuals by elements within the police and military, and gang and crime-related violence (UN 2007:2).

Frequently, violence is also committed by criminal groups outside the formal government apparatus but still linked to state institutions, such as the police and customs authorities, many of which have been formed by former military personnel who were forced to retire after the end of the civil war. Moreover, paramilitary PACs have been reactivated by Montt-led FRG, which is said to have resulted in the rise of death threats, abduction, and harassment of indigenous leaders in 2002 and 2003 (USAID 2002). These organized crime syndicates, which are heavily involved in the drug trade, use political violence and intimidation against judges, politicians, human rights workers, church officials, journalists, and moderate elements within the armed forces: there clandestine groups with alleged ties to the military especially targeted former URNG members after the end of the civil war (Minority at Risk Project 2004). According to the Amnesty International, there were 29 killings during the 2003 elections at least 50 during the 2007 elections of candidates from opposition parties, and from 2000 to 2006, at least 64 human rights defenders were murdered.

Highlighting that only 1 percent of violent crimes are prosecuted by the state, another analyst stresses the nature of post-war violence as a means to consolidate an

exclusionary state in the continuum of wartime divisions:

The very notion of a *postwar* era can have the effect of deflecting attention from the existence of subtler forms of violence and persistent linkages of violence to politics and the state. [...] the tendency to blame gangs play into the resurgence of right-wing political activity and the rise to power of former military leaders responsible for “old” violence. This link is vividly seen in widespread support for a politics of the “iron fist” or “strong hand” (*mano fura*) and platforms centered on militarization” (Peter Benson, et al. 2008:39).

State agents, including the army and the police, also perpetrate violence to exclude indigenous populations from access to economic resources. Throughout 1997 and 1998, the government forcibly evicted indigenous populations from land, often using the police forces (Robinson 2000). The loss of access to land left many in the rural areas vulnerable to poverty, unemployment, and recruitment into criminal groups, which was exacerbated by pressures from the World Bank and the IMF on the government to reduce social service expenditures and lift price controls on basic commodities, such as fuel, as part of structural adjustment and economic liberalization policies (Green 2003). Thus, donor-supported economic restructuring and continued structural inequality, which was also linked to state power and the state’s control of coercive force, led to the

reemergence of “militarized-state-capitalism” that existed before the signing of the peace agreements in Guatemala (Smith 1990:36).

In Guatemala, despite the donor awareness that the redistribution of resources was essential to the implementation of peace agreements, post-war aid followed the similar pattern to that of Cambodia and Tajikistan, focusing on macro-economic growth. The outcome was continued marginalization of the indigenous peoples—the loser of the post-war transition process, not the civil war itself—and their persecution by the state and its affiliated agents, while a small group of elites associated with the post-war regime benefited from donor-funded economic reforms. This was strikingly similar to patterns of post-war exclusion and violence in Cambodia and Tajikistan, whereby aid facilitated the consolidation of power by a selected group of incumbent ruling elites, who used their control of public administration and finance to oppress their wartime opponents. To explore the consequence of post-war aid further, the following section builds on the analysis in Chapter 2 of aid to Sierra Leone, which also highlighted donor emphasis on macro-economic liberalization.

Sierra Leone

A reform of public administration and finance was critical for peacebuilding in Sierra Leone as well, since RUF combatants joined the rebellion to gain access to food, education, and employment—the basic needs local and national institutions had failed to provide (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004, Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004). Similar to the Guatemalan case, the international financial institutions continued to provide aid for economic liberalization during the civil war in Sierra Leone, which had little to do with conflict resolution or poverty reduction. This emphasis on macro-economic growth continued after the peace process in 1996 and 2001, while DDR suffered from funding shortage. In addition, donors restored the paramount chieftaincy and local government structures that existed before the outbreak of the war, thereby failing to transform institutional frameworks that led to or exacerbated the conflict. An international analyst on West Africa commented in 2006: “none of the causes of the war have been addressed in Sierra Leone, whether it is corruption in the government, the paramount chieftaincy, or youth unemployment.”¹³⁶ Service delivery also continued to rely on external funding.

The logic of the political class seemed to have been that the international community should be responsible for the welfare of the average Sierra Leonean,

¹³⁶ Interview, New York City, March 2006.

while government leaders, business groups and their supporters helped themselves to the country's rich resources. Patrimonialism was never threatened by such arrangements. Indeed, they strengthened it, as chief patrons of rulers passed on the burdens of national and social provisioning and development to foreign aid agencies (Bangura 2004:28).

Similar to the other three cases, external funding for post-war recovery in Sierra Leone was characterized by two opposing trends: aid agencies assuming state responsibilities for service delivery because of the weak government, while the donor-recommended reduction of public expenditures further reduced state capacity to provide for its citizens. This tendency had a negative impact on power-sharing arrangements in Sierra Leone, as was the case in Cambodia and Tajikistan. After the election of the first Kabbah government in February 1996, the IMF announced the approval of \$132 million in loans to commence a structural adjustment program, including the reduction of government expenditure, especially for the military. To meet the goal, the Kabbah government announced a significant reduction of subsidies for the army that numbered roughly 14,000 at the time (Gberie 2004, Keen 2005). This decision, coupled with DDR arrangements included in the November 1996 Abidjan accord, triggered resentment within the army. The army especially feared loss of power against the 37,000-strong civil defense forces (CDF), which the Kabbah government had relied on as counter-insurgency forces, with its leader Chief Sam Hinga Norman appointed to deputy defense

minister in 1996. To reduce defense expenditures, the government also decided to cancel its contract with Executive Outcomes, a South African security firm, which reportedly cost \$20 million a year. The departure of Executive Outcomes in February 1997 left the country with no third party security guarantees while the government and the RUF were still negotiating the deployment of a multilateral peacekeeping force. Three months later, a group of junior army officers resorted to a coup ousting the Kabbah government, and invited RUF's Sankoh to join the new government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

This preemptive coup reversing the outcome of the 1996 elections and Abidjan accord is similar to the 1997 coup by Hun Sen in Cambodia, which led to the collapse of the political framework established by the 1993 elections. Both were triggered by structural adjustment policies, particularly the downsizing of the public sector, which changed precarious power relations in the initial period of post-war transition following the signing of peace agreements, when key actors—the government, the armed forces, and the rebel group—scrutinized their chances of maintaining power and access to resources.

After three years of renewed fighting, the government and the RUF signed the Lomé accord of 1999, which included power-sharing, amnesty, and other concessions to the RUF. The rebels were in a position of relative strength, unlike the Abidjan accord of

1996 signed against the backdrop of RUF defeats to Executive Outcomes and the CDF. In Lomé, the RUF-AFRC alliance demanded at least half of the cabinet posts in a four-year transitional government, recognition of AFRC-RUF control over certain areas of the country, participation in a new army, the creation of an independent peacekeeping force, and the unconditional release of Sankoh.¹³⁷ The final settlement included four ministerial and four deputy ministerial positions for AFRC-RUF representatives in a 16-member cabinet, Sankoh's appointment as chair of the commission for the management of strategic mineral resources, national reconstruction, and development and the unspecified "status of vice president," and a blanket amnesty for RUF and AFRC leadership (except for international crimes).

A few years later, this power-sharing agreement in the Lomé accord also collapsed. To obstruct the participation of the RUF in a transitional government, donors pushed for elections to be held in 2002, which had been scheduled to take place in 2001 but postponed due to insecurity. By advocating early elections, donors intended to ensure the victory of Kabbah and speed up their own exit from Sierra Leone (Hanlon 2004:3).

¹³⁷ Specifically, the AFRC-RUF group demanded that the cabinet be expanded to 20 posts, 11 of which should be occupied by RUF-AFRC representatives, including the positions of vice president, ministers of defense and finance, and six top diplomatic posts, including ambassador to the US, deputy high commissioner to the UK, high commissioner to Nigeria, and ambassador to Liberia. Furthermore, they demanded 11 public offices, including the governorship of the Bank of Sierra Leone and the head of the port authority, one of three resident ministers (for the north), mayor of Freetown, and head of post-war reconstruction commission. The government rejected these proposals and offered four ministerial posts (two full and two deputies) in a 16-member cabinet, which would include justice, defense, foreign affairs or finance, and the chairs of some of the committees.

Meanwhile, with donor backing, the SLPP government backpedaled from its commitment to power-sharing with the RUF, giving the latter ministries of trade and industry and of energy and power, instead of finance, foreign affairs, or justice ministries as agreed. Furthermore, for the allocation of semi-public appointments (such as the head of the port authority), “the real bone of contention,” “the government claimed that it had decided to privatize the para-statal and it was unnecessary to make fresh appointments to their boards,” which was in conformity with the structural adjustment program that resumed in 2001 (Bright 2000:38). RUF representation in the government practically ended when the group attacked UNAMSIL in November 2001 and Foday Sankoh was subsequently arrested by the British. The RUF won only 2.2 percent of votes and no seats in the 2002 elections.¹³⁸

After the 2002 elections, some of the key wartime leaders were indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which was financed almost entirely from donor sources. In July 2003, the Court charged RUF’s Foday Sankoh, Sam “Mosquito” Bockaire, and Issa Sessay (although Sessay was a lead negotiator for the Lomé accord and considered as a moderate), AFRC leader John Paul Koroma, CDF founder Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, and Charles Taylor of Liberia with crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law. The arrest and indictment of Chief Norman, who was deputy defense minister from 1998 to 2002 and minister of interior

¹³⁸ In 2007, RUF-Party merged with the ACP and officially ceased to exist.

from 2002 to 2004, infuriated the CDF combatants, as they perceived the court action to be a reflection of the SLPP government intent to remove the wartime ally. Special security measures were put in place for Norman's detention, which was kept secret, and his initial court appearance was done in a closed session, unusual for international tribunals seeking transparency and accountability. Chief Norman died in 2007 while imprisoned. Foday Sankoh also died in 2003 while awaiting a trial.

Without the need to continue sharing power with the RUF or relying on alliance with the CDF, the SLPP government was able to consolidate its exclusive hold on power and access to resources. After the 2002 elections, Kabbah moved from a government of national unity to an exclusively SLPP government, with vice presidency and ministerial positions of finance, mines, transport and communication, agriculture, and local governance occupied by SLPP members from the southeast region (John 2007). In addition to the increasingly exclusive nature of the government, the downsizing of the civil service as a result of the structural adjustment program exacerbated the perception of growing corruption within the government, as low-paid public officials were susceptible to rent-seeking opportunities (Crisis Group 2007). The public sense of alienation from access to resources contributed to the downfall of the SLPP government and return of the APC to power in the 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections. While APC leader Earnest Bai Koroma was sworn in as the new president, violence against SLPP associates erupted in Freetown and Kono. APC supporters and the mob

looted and razed houses of the former SLPP cabinet members, as well as those of known SLPP supporters, including paramount chiefs and members of Kabbah's ethnic Mandingo group.

Post-war exclusion and violence

Electoral democracy in post-war Sierra Leone led to political polarization rather than inclusive decision-making, as the outcome of 2002 and 2007 elections demonstrated, because winning the votes meant exclusive access to state resources. Donor support to economic liberalization did not change this “winner-takes-all” structure of power and resource allocation. Instead, the resumption of the structural adjustment program further reduced the capacity of the state to redistribute income, which had already been impeded by two decades of one-party rule and a subsequent decade of civil war. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, donors and the post-war SLPP government formally delegated the responsibility of service delivery to community-based institutions, without changing the mechanism of financing local development, which relies on fiscal transfer from the center. As a result, conflicts related to access to resources also shifted to the local level.

When demobilized combatants returned to their communities, tensions increased between them and chiefdom authorities over control of economic assets, because “the

most pressing political issues for many people were how to secure basic rights to land, living space, and legal protection” (Fanthorpoe 2001a). Access to land continues to be governed by chiefdom authorities: “while land is abundant, rural elders in many areas maintain strict control over land allocation (as well as over the labor and marriage decisions of rural young men), which deters youth from farming” (World Bank 2007:S7.2).¹³⁹ The 2005 Land Policy reaffirms the role of chiefs, giving them authority to negotiate with private investors and reinforcing the requirement for landowners and tenants to adhere to customary law and practice (Unruh and Turray 2006).

In addition, chiefs control the distribution of profits from diamond extraction and trade. The diamond industry in Sierra Leone has a potential of generating \$400 million a year, although official earnings from diamond exports remain at the level of \$140 million as of 2005, due in large part to rampant illegal mining and smuggling (Even-Zohar 2003, Smillie, et al. 2003). The government earns 3 percent of the total value of all diamonds exported, which is then redistributed in the following way: Consolidated National Revenue Fund (0.75 percent), the government’s Gold and Diamond Office operational costs (0.75 percent), Mining Community Development Fund (0.75 percent), independent valuator fees (0.40 percent); and Mines Monitoring Fund (0.35 percent).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Although many chiefdoms have youth committees, their members are appointed and not selected by and among themselves, and half of them are over 35 while a tenth are over 50.

¹⁴⁰ About 100 Mines Monitors have been recruited by the Ministry of Mineral Resources to combat illicit diamond mining and smuggling and patrol diamond areas, particularly in Kono.

The Mining Community Development Fund, established in 2001, distributes the revenues among the chiefdoms in the areas proportionately to the number of mining licenses held in each territory. By the end of 2004, 54 out of total 152 chiefdoms benefited from the total of \$1.9 million paid by the government ("Diamond Industry Annual Review" 2006). However, the money has been "mismanaged or embezzled by chiefs who were displaced during the war and have little attachment to their people" (Malan and Meek 2003:130).

As the system of paramount chieftaincy has been reinstated with donor support, those who have been marginalized in the local hierarchy of power continue to face exclusion. For instance, youth unemployment remains as high as 80 percent. As of 2007, only 3 percent of the youth were employed in the public sector and 2 percent in the formal nonagricultural private sector. These youth and demobilized combatants are neither able to find employment nor willing to submit to the rule of the chiefs:

In a way, the war involved a process of forced urbanization—many young people were forced to leave their villages and many are now reluctant to return, even though unemployment is high in towns. In the villages, where bride prices are very high, many youths are often virtual slaves as they have to work for several years for the parents of a girl they may want to marry. Lack of access to land (in rural areas) and to mineral resources (diamond, gold, etc) because of

very high registration and licensing procedures and costs, and difficulty of obtaining information, compounds the marginalization of youth (Kaldor and Vincent 2007:13).

Many of these former combatants have formed or joined self-policing groups for vigilante justice. Formal and informal law enforcement groups in Sierra Leone range from mine monitors, beach police, and traffic wardens that are part of the state to police local partnership board, professional associations, customary courts, security firms, and peace monitors approved by the state, and youth groups and mobs that remain outside state control (Baker 2005).¹⁴¹ The last category—the informal youth groups—includes the Movement of Concerned Kono Youths (MOCKY) and the Biker Rental Associations (BRA). MOCKY was formed in 1999 with some 5,000 members, reportedly to consolidate ethnic Kono control over the diamond-mining area, and periodically resorted to violent intimidations to evict non-Konos from the district. In December 2001, dispute over mining in Kono led to clashes between former RUF rebels and MOCKY, which left at least 13 dead, most of whom former RUF combatants hacked to death with machetes (Human Rights Watch 2003). Organized horizontally

¹⁴¹ Beach police are operated by the national tourist board to provide some security along the Lumely beach, with ten uniformed wardens on two daytime shifts. A group of 34 Traffic Wardens, created by the road transport authority, operates in Freetown. Local policing partnership boards were initiated by the SLLP to promote community policing. Work-based associations, usually of artisans, patrol and regulate markets and vendors. Commercial security firms (currently about 30 licensed) employ guards (ex-soldiers or retired police), primarily in Freetown and the large mines.

and nationally, the BRA consists mostly of the poor and illiterate; they pay 25,000 leones (\$8-9) to join the association and they receive an identity card and maintenance support (Kaldor and Vincent 2007). Most of them cannot afford motorcycles on their own nor have licenses, renting them instead on a weekly basis from wealthy residents—often police officers and members of the town council—to give transportation services for 1,000 leones (30 cents) per ride. The police, aware of these shortcomings, have established roadblocks for spot-checking and often extorted money from the riders (Search for Common Ground 2006). The BRA, 3,000-strong as of 2007, have had confrontations with various state agents, including the police, the road transport authority, the customs office (as many motorcycles have been smuggled from Guinea), and taxi drivers and passengers.

Conclusion

The pattern of post-war exclusion and violence in Cambodia, Guatemala, Tajikistan, and Sierra Leone highlights a common challenge that has not been addressed in the literature on peacebuilding: violence perpetrated not by armed groups that Stephen Stedman called spoilers (e.g. the Khmer Rouge) but by increasingly exclusionary post-war regimes (Stedman 1997).¹⁴² These incumbent elites succeeded in circumventing power-

¹⁴² Stedman defined spoilers as "leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it," using rebel groups in Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique as examples.

sharing and other provisions of the peace agreements and alienating their wartime opponents and allies to consolidate their hold of power. Yet how did those governments gain monopolistic control of power, resources, and the use of force? In all four cases, incumbent regimes at the time of civil war settlement were sufficiently weak against their opponents as to agree to a range of concessions they made in final peace agreements. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, donor preference for economic liberalization and community-based service delivery, as well as the lack of international support to DDR should have made it difficult for the post-war governments to centralize their hold on resources and violence. To explore this puzzle, this chapter analyzed consequences of these characteristics of aid, focusing in particular on their impact on post-war elite bargaining and institutional frameworks reflecting the shifting power relations.

In Cambodia, the environment in which post-conflict aid was conceived is strikingly similar to that of Tajikistan. When the civil war ended, the governments in Cambodia and Tajikistan were both going through the transition to a market economy and faced with the decline of public revenues, including fiscal transfers from the Soviet Union and state-owned enterprises. The negotiated settlement of civil wars in Tajikistan and Cambodia both involved power-sharing agreements, as well as economic incentives associated with those arrangements, for the opposition forces to be integrated into the state. Instead of assisting in the implementation of peace agreements, donors in both

countries largely focused on balance-of-payments and budgetary support, infrastructure development, and privatization, while their preference for the small government model collided with the post-war need to absorb and share power with the opposition forces in the coalition government formed after the signing of the peace agreement.

Moreover, in both instances, donor involvement in the reform of major industries helped the incumbent regime elites to consolidate exclusive control of those productive areas, as the governments established institutions and mechanisms to monopolize profits emanating from those resources. However, donors failed to use their influence to demand that the government implement economic reforms and often approved the disbursement of funds, regardless of the lack of progress and clear violations of the terms of aid provision by the governments. In Cambodia, the freezing of an IMF loan in protest at the government's failure to manage revenues from illegal logging was a rare and well-publicized exception, but the example was not followed by other international financial institutions and funding from donors soon resumed. In Tajikistan, the World Bank released its structural adjustment credit, despite the government failure to meet requirements for the reform of public administration and finance. In addition, donors' fragmented approach to the public sector reform, whereby they took over the delivery of social services that the governments abandoned to undertake a donor-favored transition to the market economy, undermined the basis of sustainable economic growth that economic liberalization sought to achieve. The World Bank evaluation of aid in

Cambodia argues that while the high level of donor financing for public expenditures contributed to economic growth on the narrow basis of construction and service sectors, “macroeconomic stability and growth were not sustainable because they were structurally unbalanced and dependent on foreign financing” (World Bank 2000:14).

Donors could have adopted different strategies in Guatemala. Guatemala had a larger economy at the end of its 36-year civil war, with GDP per capital of \$1,705 in 1997, as opposed to Tajikistan’s \$154 at the end of its 5-year civil war in 1997, Sierra Leone’s \$700 after 10 years of fighting in 2000, and Cambodia’s \$606 in 1991 when its 15-year civil war ended. Guatemala’s peace process was more inclusive, with the formal participation of civil society groups in the negotiation resulting in 13 agreements on a range of issues, including human rights, constitutional and electoral reforms, socio-economic and agrarian situation, and rights of indigenous peoples. There was no major spoiler threatening the peace process (i.e., the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, unsundered commanders in Tajikistan, and the RUF in Sierra Leone) in Guatemala, which rendered the post-war DDR process significantly easier and shorter than the other cases. Moreover, unlike Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Sierra Leone, which had a one-party system for most of their civil war periods, Guatemala already was a functioning market economy and electoral democracy by the time its peace process began. Throughout the civil war period in Guatemala, the international financial institutions and bilateral donors (e.g., the US) provided economic aid to develop transnational banking and

export-oriented agricultural export sectors.

Given these local conditions, donors could have toned down their focus on economic liberalization and focused instead on the reduction of income inequality in post-war Guatemala. Although the international financial institutions were more conscious of the need to integrate poverty reduction measures into their post-war assistance to Guatemala, they nevertheless reverted to traditional growth models. The neo-liberal economic model pursued in the aftermath of the civil war helped consolidate the position of the Guatemalan economic elites, while precluding redistributive measures that could have ameliorated the civil war divisions. Specifically, when the Guatemalan oligarchs succeeded in delaying public finance reforms promised in the peace accord, donors proposed alternative measures that could increase tax income in the short term but would not resolve the income gap. As a result of the donor-suggested introduction of VAT, “the poor and popular classes are thus being asked to finance, through austerity, an accord whose purpose, from the transnational elites’ perspective, is to stabilize the country so that a neo-liberal order can be constructed” (Robinson 2000:102).

In Cambodia, Guatemala, and Tajikistan, those individuals within the ruling party who control the economy also have developed personal command of post-war security forces. As defense budgets had to be trimmed down under the structural adjustment

program, these post-war regimes maintained their influence on the military by providing economic incentives. Frequently, assets privatized through the donor-funded reform process were redistributed by the regime elites to the leadership of armed forces and militia affiliated with the governments. This led to increased competition over resources between the signatories of the peace accord—the government and the opposition—and resulted in the alienation of the opposition leaders from power and access to resources. Moreover, these economic dimensions of post-war transition often triggered coercive transfer of assets, including land, as the regime used the security forces to secure their grip on productive assets.

While donors preferred reduction in public sector expenditures, they also encouraged communal organizations to assume primary role for service delivery, further decreasing the scope and capacity of the state. This was the case in all four cases, regardless of their wartime state and social structures. For instance, donors in Sierra Leone restored and distributed aid through what they viewed as the traditional authority of paramount chieftaincy, in a similar manner that donors in Tajikistan relied on *mahalla* to lead community-based development, although chieftdom authorities have had tax-based income since the colonial period and *mahalla* were informal self-help village associations. Civil wars had also transformed relationships between chieftdom and *mahalla* authorities and their constituencies. In Sierra Leone, those who joined the RUF sought to destroy the institutions of chieftaincy, driving many chiefs into exile. In

Tajikistan, both the government and the opposition forces mobilized combatants through extended family networks within *mahalla* structures, but as fighting continued, many *mahalla* organizations disintegrated because of violence and population displacement.

When donors reinstated and channeled aid through the chiefdom and *mahalla* authorities after the end of civil wars, those who had historically faced exclusion in these local power structures and thus had been susceptible to civil war mobilization (e.g. the youth and the poor) were once again marginalized. Alienated from economic and political advancement within their own communities, these former combatants and unemployed youth have found refuge in informal vigilante groups in Sierra Leone or underground associations, such as Hizb ut-Tahir, in Tajikistan. Members of these organizations have been targeted by state authorities, accused of being threats to public order.

In both Sierra Leone and Tajikistan, youth unemployment is considered to have been one of the root causes of conflict. Yet post-conflict aid to Tajikistan did not include a particular focus on youth empowerment, and as reviewed in Chapter 2, employment generation initiatives encompassed in DDR programs were short-term and ad hoc. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, donor support to youth employment programs has been short-term and supply-driven, focusing disproportionately on training (World Bank

2007). As the local patterns of post-war violence and exclusion in Sierra Leone and Tajikistan suggest, however, the marginalization of the youth is not merely a technical issue but part of a wider structural challenge related to the disproportionate distribution of resources at the national and local levels. At the center, donor-assisted reforms based on structural adjustment policies escalated the contest among wartime elites over access to state and private (or privatized) assets, and eventual monopolization of those resources by a particular group of elites associated with the regime in power. Aid to community-based service delivery left responsibility for the redistribution of income, including donor funds, in the hands of tribal authority. The outcome of post-conflict aid thus increased exclusion of and violence against those who were not part of either power structure, including the wartime commanders and opposition leaders disposed by the post-war regime, or former combatants, the youth, and the poor.

C o n c l u s i o n

As the overview of aid in Chapter 2 highlights, the concept of peacebuilding has become an integral part of policy goals and discourse for external actors involved in post-conflict assistance. However, findings of the aid analysis and the case studies from Chapter 3 to Chapter 5 demonstrate that the design and implementation of aid, especially by large-scale providers, has not yet reflected specific requirements for peace implementation, such as the facilitation of power-sharing and wealth-sharing arrangements. Contrary to the stated goals of peacebuilding, donors allocated fewer resources to DDR, elections, institution building, and other critical elements of peace implementation than for macro-economic reforms. They continued to focus on economic liberalization, regardless of divergent local conditions, including the nature of conflict, path to its conclusion, size of peacekeeping operations, level of post-conflict aid, and wartime state and economic structures. Furthermore, in all of the four cases studied, the international financial institutions began post-conflict aid immediately after, or even before, the conclusion of peace negotiations. Compared to this, external assistance to DDR and other aspects of peace implementation, such as elections, occurred much later in the process of post-war transition, at least a few years after the signing of peace accords.

Yet despite its macro-economic focus, post-conflict aid has failed to transform the

structure of wartime economies. It is critical to reform the ways in which revenues are generated and administered in order for peacebuilding to succeed. This was especially so given the role of timber in financing the Khmer Rouge insurgency; inequality in income and land ownership as the basis of civil war divisions in Guatemala; wartime commanders competing for cotton and aluminum resources in Tajikistan; and a rebellion fought by unemployed youth and funded by diamonds in Sierra Leone. Instead of helping to redistribute these resources, the current organization of aid allowed the incumbent regime elites to institutionalize their privileged access to these assets, because they were able to manipulate the donor-funded economic reforms and consolidate their personal and monopolistic control of public administration and finance before international assistance for the implementation of the peace agreement began.

The lack of external assistance to key aspects of peace implementation, such as power-sharing, exacerbated the concentration of wealth and power by the regime incumbents. From institution-building perspectives, multilateral peacekeeping operations have made little contribution to sustain post-war reforms. The main role of peacekeepers in Cambodia, Guatemala, Tajikistan, and Sierra Leone was to provide third party security guarantees through the presence of foreign troops in the interim period. Although these missions helped maintain a transitional political framework for the duration of their mandate by assisting in transitional administration, constitutional reforms to allow multi-party elections, and electoral process, few investments were made to maintain the

outcome of post-war democratization, as was clearly the case in Cambodia and Tajikistan. On the other hand, the DDR process assisted by peacekeepers reduced the possibility of organized rebellion against the post-war regime, whereby the incumbent elites were able to dismantle the opposition forces and elements within the army or militia that they previously had to rely on for survival but become burdensome to support. In essence, external actors may focus on the ending of armed conflict, by putting pressures on warring parties to sign a peace agreement or deploying a peacekeeping mission, but seem less interested in the outcome of the agreement they helped facilitate.

Neither has UN peacebuilding engagement found a way to facilitate power- and wealth-sharing in post-conflict states. Instead, international organizations tend to align with the incumbent regime by way of acknowledging and respecting the national ownership of the peacebuilding process. For instance, when the Kabbah government developed a Peace Consolidation Strategy in 2006 with a successor mission of UNAMSIL, the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), UNIOSIL allowed the government to remove all references critical of the SLPP, including corruption within the government and tension between the SLPP and the ACP.¹⁴³ Then-vice president Solomon Brewa

¹⁴³ The Peace Consolidation Strategy, covering the period between UNAMISIL withdrawal and the 2007 elections, was to be submitted to the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The General Assembly and the Security Council would decide a country that can be included on the PBC's agenda. In June 2006, Burundi and Sierra Leone were selected to be the first countries on the PBC agenda, through a referral from the Security Council, which meant that peacebuilding

(later SLPP's presidential candidate who lost in the 2007 elections) argued: "donors should validate the institutions that came out of civil war."¹⁴⁴ Against these government interventions, the UN has thus far failed to maintain sufficient influence, especially after peacekeeping forces withdraw. In Sierra Leone, the government was able to stall the drafting of the Peace Consolidation Strategy, when the Secretary-General issued a report critical of the government to the Security Council. UNIOSIL sought to keep the government engaged by promising financial support from the Peacebuilding Fund, totaling \$35 million.

This problem of political engagement with post-war regimes is a recurrent challenge for UN peacebuilding assistance. The UN Peacebuilding Office in Tajikistan (UNTOP) was similarly confronted by the government becoming increasingly indifferent to UN advise and support. While UNTOP continued to carry out a limited level of police, human rights, and media training from 2000 to 2007, its political influence diminished, particularly after the 2003 amendment of the Constitution which allowed the extension of Rakhmon's tenure until 2020. In June 2007, UNTOP hosted the 10th year commemoration of the end of the Tajik civil war, but UNTOP was not able to engage

strategies and activities in Sierra Leone would be under the scrutiny of the PBC, while receiving financial support from the Peacebuilding Fund. As of February 2008, the Peacebuilding Fund had total funds of \$236 million committed by donors, \$35 million of which has been allocated to Sierra Leone.

¹⁴⁴ Conference on Peace Consolidation in Sierra Leone, July 30-July 1, 2006, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

opposition leaders or decide the agenda and participants of the ceremony without the prior approval of the government. Peacebuilding practitioners, including the Peacebuilding Commission, are yet to identify strategies to respond to these setbacks.

Meanwhile, the growth-oriented aid from the international financial institutions undermined post-war power-sharing arrangements by reducing the size of the public sector. In Cambodia and Sierra Leone, although the power-sharing scheme had been established with international mediation support, subsequent donor pressures to reduce government expenditures diminished the scope for maintaining a delicate power balance between the signatories of the peace accord and resulted in a coup. In Tajikistan, donor-funded public sector reforms allowed the post-war government to engineer a series of cabinet reshuffles, and the majority of opposition leaders who had been appointed to official posts through the quota agreement were dismissed in this process. In Guatemala, where peace agreements aimed to transform the fundamental structure of the state and economy through sweeping institutional reforms, aid undermined the transition process by proposing tax reforms that failed to redress income inequality. Once the regime elites established an exclusive control of public administration, they were no longer required to count on the opposition compliance in order to maintain the regime stability.

Furthermore, the oligarchic control of the economy and institutions by the small group

of regime elites made it possible to recentralize violence under their personal command. Former commanders, both government-affiliated and from opposition forces, were co-opted by the regime elites and subsequently removed from power coercively when they were perceived as posing threats to post-war order and power structures. The use of violence by the regime elites included the persecution of their wartime rivals and allies through clandestine networks of pro-government militia (Guatemala), state-led criminal proceedings (Tajikistan), and a coup d'état (Cambodia). Even in Sierra Leone, where donors were involved in the post-war security sector reform, state agencies target unemployed former combatants, who find meager sources of income from the informal economy. In other cases, such as Tajikistan, the causal effect of aid on post-war violence is more direct, as the regime elites have used those state institutions established at the recommendation of donors, including the tax police and the state agency for financial control, to investigate and prosecute wartime opposition leaders and commanders. Consequently, many of the former opposition forces are subjected to multi-layered violence—forcible coercion by state agencies and structural discrimination leading to poverty—across all four cases.

Another form of violence observed in post-war Cambodia, Guatemala, and Tajikistan and Sierra Leone was of economic nature related to exclusion from access to resources. Especially at the local level, economic violence may be committed by the same state agencies that are instrumental to the perpetration of political violence, but with the

primary motive of controlling sources of income, rather than persecution of wartime elites. Nevertheless, economic violence is closely linked to the exclusive structure of post-war states and economies. For instance, examples of economic violence include the forceful eviction of farmers by local government agents from cotton fields in Tajikistan, forests in Cambodia, or land in Guatemala, and confrontations between the police and youth groups over the management of motorbike licenses or revenues from diamond extraction. Yet regardless of its form, political or economic, those who have been rendered vulnerable by post-war violence were not the losers of the civil war. Peasants were at the peace table in Guatemala; Tajik farmers in Khatlon won the management of cotton farms from Uzbek and other groups; the youth in Sierra Leone constituted the majority of the RUF troops, and the Cambodians were able to remove the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese influence from their polity and economy. Post-war exclusion and violence were institutionalized in the process of a particular kind of institutional reforms designed, financed, and implemented with aid, which empowered a particular group of elites within incumbent regimes at the expense of power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and other promises of peace.

Interviews with selected aid agencies, as well as their evaluation reports, indicate that donors are aware of these unintended consequences of aid and the one-size-fits-all approach. Several representatives of the international financial institutions noted that the main hindrance to their economic assistance is the failure of the United Nations and

the diplomatic community to transform the post-war political structures. At the same time, these donor representatives emphasize that growth-oriented aid, including large-scale expenditures for infrastructure development, could be justified because improved transportation, communication, and utility services would have a far-reaching impact on poverty reduction, with little awareness on the political consequences of such aid policies. External involvement nevertheless continues to be divided among specific sectors, including political, security, economic growth, and poverty eradication, each focusing on technical goals without any mechanisms to identify, analyze, and respond to the realignment of post-war power relations. For instance, despite the political consequences of economic reforms, the United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions have rarely taken into account the implications of donor-supported economic reforms. To bridge this gap, the World Bank and the United Nations are in the process of developing a framework for partnership in crisis and post-crisis situations since 2007 (The World Bank and UN Development Group 2008). However, in its draft form, the partnership framework focuses on the process of the inter-agency collaboration, such as the establishment of consultative mechanisms, rather than the substance of their enhanced cooperation to prevent or deal with civil wars.

These shortcomings of the aid approach appears to be a result of bureaucratic tendencies to follow existing aid approaches, rather than designing and implementing aid policies that address particular needs intrinsic to post-war states. The World Bank-

commissioned report on its post-conflict funding concludes: “there is no consensus within the Bank or among its potential partners on what kind of action is most effective and on the most appropriate role for the Bank” (Bahson and Cutura 2004:ix). The lack of integrated strategy for external engagement, especially at the onset of post-war transition, has a long-term impact detrimental to peacebuilding. For instance, in Tajikistan, donors appear to have lost their influence over government performance by 2001, when the regime in power began to complete the institutional consolidation of its power, but this was not the case in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. As many local observers noted, the government was once eager to align with donors not only to receive external resources that could reduce illicit and wartime sources of income (e.g., the narcotics trade), but also to gain international and national legitimacy. The opportunity for optimal structural change can thus be brief and must be seized.

This dissertation contributes to the peacebuilding literature by highlighting the nature of post-war violence, plurality of internal and external actors involved in post-war transition and impact of their interaction. While research on post-conflict states has referred to the prevalence of gang or youth violence, as was the case in Guatemala and Sierra Leone, there has been a lack of conceptualization and analysis on political violence in the aftermath of civil wars, although state-led violence is a common phenomenon in post-conflict environments. This dissertation also underscored the multiplicity of actors involved, ranging from pro-government and opposition

commanders, regime elites, and communal groups at the local level to the international financial institutions, bilateral donors, and peacekeeping missions. Through the global overview and case studies on aid and its effect on internal dynamics, it identified the major actors driving aid agendas in post-conflict states, namely the international financial institutions and regime elites, as well as the focus and sequencing of aid distribution that prioritize macroeconomic reforms over particular challenges to peace implementation, such as power-sharing and DDR.

In post-war Cambodia, Guatemala, Tajikistan, and Sierra Leone, post-conflict aid has created a particular form of patronage politics. International aid, as currently conceived, not only led to government outsourcing of the public investment to external actors, but it also allowed the post-war regime to monopolize its control of state prerogatives, including means to control violence, while failing to redistribute resources more equally. These elites owe their neo-patrimonial basis of power to institutional frameworks designed and financed by donors. In the meantime, donors continue to provide budgetary support and funding for service delivery, rather than collectively and consistently demanding accountability on the allocation of aid and domestic taxable resources. This peculiar pattern of patron-client interaction demonstrates that neither donors nor the regime elites are held liable for the failure of peace implementation or the welfare of people in post-conflict states.

The influx of external resources (political, military, and economic) changes power dynamics within post-war states and shapes the patterns of state building by creating outside sources of finance, which influences internal patterns of capital accumulation and reallocation. The kind of state that emerges in the aftermath of civil war depends on how resources are distributed and whether capacities of state institutions are developed for the durable extraction of domestic resources. These economic aspects of peacebuilding are also significant because the simultaneous transition of polity and economy can result in the conversion of political and economic capital and the consolidation of power by a particular group of elites associated with the government. Exclusion from access to resources is also intimately linked to post-war violence, often waged by the regime elites against wartime commanders and opposition forces in order to consolidate their hold on power and economic assets. These are distinctly post-war phenomena, as peace agreements promised a different outcome. As both the literature and empirical evidence demonstrates, armed groups participate in civil wars to take control of the state or parts of its territory in order to access certain resources. In Cambodia, Guatemala, Tajikistan, and Sierra Leone, the incumbent regimes were relatively weak, politically if not militarily, when they signed peace accords with the opposition parties. These agreements provided mechanisms to incorporate opposition forces and their demands in post-war government structures. Yet time and again, power-sharing agreements have collapsed; incumbent regime elites maximizing profits from post-war economic liberalization have blocked further reforms that would have

regulated the management of resources; and post-war regime elites have manipulated their control of the state apparatus to intimidate, remove, and persecute their wartime rivals.

Only in the process of externally assisted post-conflict peacebuilding were the incumbent regime elites able to establish and consolidate an exclusive control of economic assets. Once secure in power, the regime elites removed or prosecuted their former coalition partners through institutions they now controlled, some of which had been established with donor assistance. This is how the incumbent regimes have been able to restore security, without sufficient international assistance to the demilitarization of politics, and disregard power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and other arrangements promised in peace agreements to facilitate reconciliation with opposition groups. If a war is a continuation of politics by other means, peace will also be a continuation of the same politics. Aid helped institutionalize post-war exclusion and violence, while proclaiming its contribution to peacebuilding.

Appendix A: Security Sector Appointments in Tajikistan (1994-2006)¹⁴⁵

Ministry of defense

Minister

- Alexander Shishlyannikov (1993-1995), an ethnic Russian (an interim appointment agreed upon among Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan)
- Sherali Khairullayev (1996-), from Kulyab. Former deputy interior minister (1988-1995)

Deputy Minister

- Ghairat Adhamov (1999-2001) from Pyanj, UTO appointment.

Ministry of Security

- Saidamir Zuhurov (1992-1994, 1997-1999), from Khatlon. Former head of KGB in Khatlon. Reappointed to minister of interior (1995-1996), deputy prime minister (1999-2006) and chair of central administrative board on protection of the state secrets (2006-)
- Saidanvar Kamolov (1995-1997), from Kulyab. Former head of investigation department in the KGB (1986-1992)/ministry of security (1992-1994). Reappointed to head of the state committee on border protection (1997-2002).

¹⁴⁵ Ministerial level only, though I included deputy appointments insofar as they concerned UTO members.

- Khairiddin Abdurakhimov (1999-2006), former head of the Khatlon division of the ministry of security (1996-1999). Reappointed to the chair of the state committee on national security (2006-)

Ministry of Interior

Minister

- Yakub Salimov (1992-1994), from Kulyab. PFT commander. Sentenced to 15-year imprisonment in 2004.
- Saidamir Zukhurov (1995), from Kulyab. See above.
- Khumdin Sharipov (1996-2006), from Kulyab. Former chair of the constitutional court (1995) and head of presidential administration (1996).
- Mahmadvazar Salikhov (2006-), from Kulyab. Former prosecutor general (1992-1995), deputy minister of interior (1995-1997), head of presidential administration (1997-2000), chair of the constitutional court (2000-2003), chair of the justice council (2004-2006) and head of presidential administration (2003-2005).

Deputy Minister

- Amirkul Azimov (1992-1994), from Sogd. Reappointed to prosecutor general (1995-1996), state advisor on defense, law and order (1994) and secretary of national security council (1995-2006)

- Mahmadnazar Salikhov (1995-1997), from Kulyab (see above).
- Habib Sanginov (1998-2001), from Garm. UTO appointment. Assassinated in 2001.

Drug Control Agency

Director

- Rustam Nazarov (1996-2003), from Dushanbe. Former deputy head of the Police (1995)
- Ghaffor Mirzoyev (2004), from Kulyab. PFT commander and former head of presidential guard (1995-2003) and chair of the Olympic committee (2001-2004). Arrested in 2004 and sentenced to life imprisonment.
- Rustam Nazarov (2004-)

Deputy Director

- Abdurahim Karimov (1999-2005), from Kulyab. UTO appointment. Former chair of the customs committee (1998-1999).

National Guard (former Presidential Guard)

- Ghaffor Mirzoyev (1995-2003), Kulyab, PFT. See above.
- Rajabali Rakhmonaliev (2004-), from Dangara/Kulyab (Rakhmon's nephew), PFT. Former commander of air force battalion (1997-1999).

Ministry of Justice

- Shavkat Ismoilov (1993-2001), from Dushanbe. Former dean of legal faculty of the Tajik State University.

- Khalifabobo Homidov (Jan 2001-2006), from Sogd. Former head of department of culture in the office of the president.
- Bakhtier Khudoyarov (2006-), from Dushanbe, former deputy justice minister (1992-2000), senior presidential advisor on legal affairs (2000-2004), and deputy chair of the department of constitutional guarantees of citizens under the president's office

Prosecutor General

- Mahmadnazar Salikhov (1992-1995), from Kulyab. See above.
- Amirkul Azimov (1995-1996), from Sogd. See above.
- Salomiddin Sharopov (1996-2000), from Sogd, former prosecutor of Dushanbe (1984-1994) and transport prosecutor (1994-1996).
- Bobojon Bobokhonov (2000-), former First Deputy Prosecutor.

Tajik Border Forces/State Committee on Border Protection

Head

- Saidanvar Kamolov (1997-2002), from Kulyab. See above.
- AbduRakhmon Azimov (2002-2005), from Kulyab. Former head of the ministry of security in Khatlon and deputy prime minister (with specific responsibilities on law and order)
- Saidamir Zuhurov (2005-), from Khatlon. See above.

Deputy Head

- Hakim Kalandarov (1999-2002), from Pyanji/GBAO. UTO appointment.

Reappointed to a chief of training unit within the Committee.

- Mirzohoja Nizomov (2002-2006), from Garm. UTO appointment. Former chair of the customs committee (1999-2001)

Appendix B: List of Former Commanders in Tajikistan

Opposition

- Ghairat Adhamov, from Pyanji. GBAO. First engaged in fighting in Khatlon and fled to Afghanistan, where he was based until the end of the civil war. Appointed to the first deputy minister of defense (1999-to date) based on the quota. Last opposition field commander remaining in the government.
- Gairat Ahkmed from GBAO. Integrated into the traffic police in Dushanbe within the ministry of interior with a rank of major.
- Sayriddin Akbarov, fought under the command of Ahmadbek Safarov in Hoit and Jirgital during the civil war. Opened a village organization for farmers after the war but arrested in 2004 for crimes committed during the war, which led to uprising in Hoit. He escaped and joined Iskandarov, but eventually surrendered.
- Mirzohodja “Belgie” Akhmadov (named after his home village in Garm). Appointed to deputy commander of the ministry of interior (MOI) against organized crime in Rasht, with 30-40 former UTO fighters. Still chief of local police in Garm.
- Alaudin Mansur, Garm. Integrated into the MOI battalion in Garm as deputy to Mirzohoja Akhmadov.
- Tolib Ayambekov from GBAO. Led a group of fighters in Khorog after the assassination of his elder
- brother, Alisha Gorbun, by unknown suspects. Appointed to head of MOI battalion

in Khorog.

- Sobirijon Begijonov, originally from Hoit/Garm but resettled in Khatlon during the Soviet era. Commander under Shoh Iskandarov, responsible for procurement in Kurgan-Tube (allegedly made a fortune from it during the civil war). Appointed to the Chair of hukumat in Jabborrasulov District in Sogd in 1999. Assassinated in 2001.
- Ishon Daroz from Kofarnikhon. Appointed to a head of MOI subdivision along with 20-30 subordinates. Married to Himazoda's daughter.
- Shakhobiddin Darveshev "Eshoni Junaid" from GBAO. In 1994, he attacked and destroyed the Russian border post in Darvoz.
- Ne'mat Darvoz from GBAO. Appointed to a post in the ministry of emergency situations (MOES).
- Alovudin "Ali" Davlatov from Garm. He became a head of a farm.
- Nazarali Ermahmadov from Garm. Served under the command of Mizonhodja Akhmadov. Appointed to Commander of a MOES battalion in 1999-2002 but arrested and charged for the murder of Habib Sanginov.
- Abdmaek Holmatov from GBAO.
- Yoribek "Shaikh" Ibrogimov from Tojikobod. Appointed to a head of a sovhoz, while his fighters were relocated to Dushanbe in 2000 and integrated into MOES (later disbanded). He was detained in a MOI operation for combating organized

crime in Rasht Valley in 2003 and sentenced to 23 years in prison in 2004.

- Fayziddin Imomov. A member of CNR and appointed to chair of Qumsangir District, Khatlon, but dismissed in 2001. Afterwards he established a private construction firm.
- Mahmadrusi Iskandarov from Tojikobod, chair of the Democratic Party, appointed to director of Tajikcommuneservice in 1999 and Tajikgas in 2001. Dismissed in 2003 and detained in Moscow in 2004. Extradited to Tajikistan in 2005 and sentenced to 23-year imprisonment.
- Shokh Iskandarov (nephew of Mamadrui). Appointed to the Tajik border forces in Jirgatal but dismissed, reappointed to the chief of the mine action unit within the state committee on border protection.
- “Johangir”, another relative of Mahmadrusi Iskandarov, from Tajikobod. Appointed to a head of a *kolkhoz*, while his fighters were assigned to the Tajik border forces in Sogd in 2000.
- Shodi Kabirov from Garm. Appointed to minister of agriculture in 1998 in accordance with the quota but in 2001 demoted to deputy chair of Khatlon region.
- Abdurahim Karimov from Kulyab. Left for Afghanistan in 1992 but came back and attacked the Russian formation in Moskovosky in 1993, destroyed its border troops (which some argue led to the deployment of the CIS peacekeeping in Tajikistan). Appointed to chair of customs committee in 1998 and reappointed to deputy head of drug control agency in 1999-2005.

- Kholbash Kholbashev from Khorog. He was a MOI officer before the civil war and became a commander of self-defense forces in GBAO in 1993. Appointed to a head of a Tajik border force unit but his fighters were later moved to Sogd.
- Kholiknazarov Khudoberdi from Khorog. Minister of external relations during the Government of National Unity. Appointed to minister of labor and employment in 1998, a UTO quota appointment. Removed in 2001 when the minister was restructured and merged into the ministry of labor and social security.
- Hakim Kalandarov from Pyanji. He was Deputy to Mirzo Ziroyev in Afghanistan during 1992-1995. Appointed to deputy head of the state committee on border protection in 1999 and said to have controlled a significant portion of border trades. Reappointed in 2002 to head a training division within the border protection committee.
- Namoz Kourbonaliyev. Appointed to chief of the republican reception unit in the ministry of defense. Charged in 2002 along with 20 others for murder, hostage taking and robbery in 1994-2001, including the 1994 assassination of ex-chief of Tajik state TV and sentenced to 25-year imprisonment.
- Boqir Mamaboherov from GBAO. Appointed to the head of Tajik border forces battalion in Murghab but dismissed after a physical fight with GBAO governor at the time. An attempt to arrest him led to demonstrations against the governor and a damage to the MOI office (the standoff continued for a while (July-Nov 2006)).
- Majnun Majnonov from GBAO. Killed during the civil war.

- Mirzomuhammad Mirzohodiyev from GBAO. Chief of the council of GBAO self-defense forces during the civil war. A member of the CNR and appointed to first deputy minister of culture (representing IRP) but removed in 2001.
- Salamsho Muqabbatov from GBAO. During the war, he was the chair of Jihad Council in GBAO but dismissed from the Council when joined the GBAO self-defense forces. After the war, he was appointed to Head of Committee on oil and gas (1998-2001), director general of Tojinkeftgas (gas and oil) in 2001 but removed in 2002. Reappointed to chair of the “Sayoh” tourism company in 2004.
- Mansur Muakkalov. Appointed to lieutenant colonel in the ministry of defense but killed after hostage taking along with Rahim Sanginov in 2001.
- Rustam Namatov. Appointed to director general of Tojikangisht (coal extracting state enterprise) in 2001.
- Mirzokhoja Nizomov from Garm. In 1992, he was a commanding officer of MOI in Tojikobod, fled to Afghanistan in 1993 but soon returned. Appointed to the head of customs committee in 1999 but Committee was dissolved after his patron and relative Habib Sanginov was assassinated in 2001. Reappointed to deputy head of the border protection committee but unexpectedly dismissed in 2006 when BPC became the state committee on border protection.
- Ali “Ali-boxer” Pirmuhammadov. Detained in Kazakhstan in 2003 for crimes committed during and after the civil war.
- Abdullo Rakhimov “Mullo Abdullo” from Darbard. Fled to Afghanistan after

government action in 2001, joined Namangani and Taliban. His fate is unknown.

- Mubakhsilloev “Shoboi” Ruslam from GBAO. Reintegrated into a subdivision of the MOES.
- Hasan Saidmahmadov. Integrated in the MOES but arrested for hostage taking in 2001.
- Makhmadruzi Saidov. Appointed to the head of MOI in Nurobod and transferred to the head of MOI in Baljuvon.
- Zayd Saidov (was not involved in combat operations or a UTO member). Appointed to minister of industry (elevated from Committee) in 2002, apparently to fill the quota.
- Habib Sanginov from Garm. Former chief of traffic police (1987-1991), head of the transport police administration in 1991-1993, and head of “Umed foundation” in Moscow in 1993-1997. Appointed to First Deputy Minister of Interior but assassinated in 2001.
- Rahmon Sanginov. Killed in a government action after taking hostages in 2001.
- Safar Tagyoyev “Podabon”. Killed along with Sanginov.
- Assliddin Sohibnazarov. Deputy chair of the Democratic Party, appointed to first deputy chair of the tax committee but dismissed in 2001.
- Khoji Akbar Turajonzonda from Kofarnihon. Appointed to deputy prime minister in 1998 but dismissed in 2005.

- Dalvat Usmon from Kurgan Tube. He was deputy head of IRP and appointed to vice prime minister in 1992-1993. After the dissolution of the Government of National Unity, he left for Afghanistan in 1993 and came back in 1996. Appointed in 1998 to minister of economy but replaced by Yahyo Azimov (former prime minister) in 2000. His son was kidnapped on the eve of the 1999 elections when he announced of challenging Rakhmonov.
- Saidmukhtor Yorov. Killed in 2001, his associates sentenced to long prison terms in 2003
- Mirzo Ziroyev from Tavildara. UTO's commander-in-chief. Appointed to minister of emergency situations in 1998 (originally proposed for the minister of defense but Rakhmonov did not approve). Dismissed in 2006 and allegedly after a serious of meeting with other remaining former UTO commanders, such as Salamsho, decided to leave Tajikistan for fear of government prosecutions and seek refugee in Dubai.

Popular Front/government troops

- Faisullo Abdulloev from Kulyab. Killed in 1992
- Abdurakhim Abdurakhim from Kulyab. Fought under Rahim Karimov.
- Ibod Boimatov, Uzbek from Tursunzade/Hissor. Driver before the civil war. Appointed to Mayor of Tursonzade in 1994 but removed reportedly after firing shots at Mikhail Sinani, then director of the TADAZ. Fled to Uzbekistan but returned to seize control of Tursunzade in early 1996 (at the same time as Khudoiberdiev rebelling in Kurgan Tube), calling for the resignation of Kulyabi figures in the regional and national government. Died in 1997 fighting against the government.
- Kurbon Cholov from Kulyab. Appointed to commander of the Tajik border forces detachment and a member of the parliament but dismissed in 2002.
- Suhrob Cholov. Appointed to commander of detachment of the ministry of defense but apparently died of drug overdose.
- Sulaymon Cholov. Appointed to deputy chair of customs committee in Dushanbe but later convicted of extortion, kidnapping, marrying a minor, and polygamy and 6 years in prison.
- Khuja Karimov. Appointed to a member of the Parliament. Arrested for his criminal activity but released in a month and restored to the Parliamentarian status. Left the country to attend the session of football associations of Asian states in Malaysia but never returned.

- Sukhrob Kasimov from Dangara, Kulyab. Appointed to commander of special forces of Dushanbe Police (1992-1994), MOI rapid deployment brigade (1994-), fought against Khudoiberdiev and Yakub Salimov. Dismissed in 2005 and now president of football federation.
- Safarov Kenjayev from Hissor. Former speaker of the supreme soviet and founder of the PFT. Killed in 1993. He was also chair of Galla (a wheat factory) which had trade relations with Kazakhstan.
- Jamoliddin Mansurov from Hissor. Appointed to deputy chair of Majilisi Namoyandagon and Mayor of Dushanbe until replaced by Ubaidulloyev in 1996.
- Ghaffor “Sedoi (gray-haired)” Mirzoyev. PFT’s commander-in-chief. Appointed to head of presidential guard in 1995 and head of the Olympic committee in 2001. Dismissed but reappointed to director of the national drug agency in 2004. Arrested in 2005 and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2006.
- Sodig “Sachan” Muhammedoakhunov, a Uygur. Appointed to a member of Sogd Majilie and also director of a cotton ginning factory in Jabborrasulov District, but arrested in 2003 along with five of his associates for criminal activities, including trying to establish, with Israeli businessman, arms production sites in the north. Tried in a closed trial and sentenced to 25 years in prison.
- Colonel Bahriddin Muzaffarov. Former commander of the government troops stationed in Rasht Valley. Appointed to the chair of the council of veterans of war and labor in Hissor, arrested in 2002 for killing civilians during the civil war.

- Habib Narsulloev. Appointed to chair of Tajikmatlubot (consumers union) for 1992-1998. Joined Khudoiberdiev in the 1997 revolt. Left the country in 1998 and arrested in Moscow based on a Tajik warrant in 1994.
- Radjabali Rakhmonaliev from Kulyab. Nephew of Rakhmonov. Appointed to commander of air force battalion (1997-1999), head of national guard (formerly presidential guard) since 2004.
- Sangak Safarov. A PFT commander. Killed in 1993 during a meeting with Faizali Saidov.
- Faizali Saidov. Served in the Soviet Army in Germany before the war, all his relatives and family reported to have been killed in the first days of the civil war. His father was Lakai-Uzbek from Kurgan Tube. Killed in 1993.
- Yakub Salimov from Kulyab. Appointed to minister of interior (1992-1995) but dismissed on the charge of plotting a coup with former chair of the supreme council Abdulmajid Dostiev (Kulyabi) to overthrow Rakhmonov in May 1995. Appointed to ambassador to Turkey in 1995 and reappointed to the chair of the customs committee in 1996. Joined Khudoiberdiev in the 1997 revolt. Detained in Moscow in June 2001 and sentenced to 16 years in prison.
- Saidsho Shamolov from Varzob. Appointed to commander of the Tajik border forces and dismissed in 2002. Reported to control several private companies in Dushanbe and used to have a casino and several restaurants. Appointed military attaché in China in 2003 and is involved in trade and business with Chinese companies.

Mustafo Taghoyev, appointed to deputy commander of MOI Unit 3502 in 1993. Charged in 1999 for criminal proceedings and sentenced to four years in prison but released under the amnesty law. Arrested again in 2001.

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