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**THE EXPRESSION OF SHAME AND HOSTILITY IN FEMALES AS A  
FUNCTION OF PERCEPTUAL ORIENTATION AND ALIENATION**

by

**SELINA BENDOCK**

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City  
University of New York**

**2000**

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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**Abstract****THE EXPRESSION OF SHAME AND HOSTILITY IN FEMALES AS A  
FUNCTION OF PERCEPTUAL ORIENTATION AND ALIENATION****by****Selina Bendock****Adviser: Professor Herbert Saltzstein**

**This research examines the effect that alienation and field orientation have upon the overall level and manifestations of expressed shame and hostility in a sample of middle class professional females under warm interpersonal environmental conditions. Based on the theories of Lewis (1971) and of Scheff and Retzinger (1991), a model was proposed which reconciles the disparate findings of previous research (Crouppen, 1976; deGroot, 1968; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968) by incorporating level of alienation as an additional element which influences the manner in which shame and hostility are expressed. This research tests hypotheses generated from that model.**

**Sixty female volunteers completed a session comprised of a video-taped five minute monologue interview prompted by a standardized statement based on the instructions of Gottschalk, Winget, and Gleser (1969), an alienation questionnaire (Maddi, Kobasa & Hoover; 1979) and the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin et al., 1954/1972). To cultivated a warm interpersonal**

environment for the sessions, the interviewer used friendly gestural behavior, i.e., having direct eye contact and smiling at the interviewee. Measures of total shame and hostility as well as manner in which shame and hostility were expressed were obtained through content analysis of the verbal and paralinguistic cues captured in the recorded interview.

A 2 x 3 factorial design was used to test the effects of alienation (low versus high) and field orientation level (field dependent, middle orientation, and field independent) on the shame and hostility variables. A significant main effect for alienation on total shame expressed was observed in two separate analyses. Higher shame scores were found within the high alienation group versus the low alienation group. This finding lends support to Scheff and Retzinger's (1991) contention that shame and alienation are positively related.

An auxiliary observation of this research was that this group of women expressed shame in primarily an overt, unidentified manner, i.e., through hiding behaviors such as embarrassed laughter, aversion of the eyes, etc. The lack of expression of shame in either an acknowledged manner, clearly stating shame feelings, or a by-passed manner, distancing oneself, is discussed.

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In memory of my mother, who never told me I couldn't, and of my father, who never told me I shouldn't.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

**The association between experiences of shame and anger/aggression has been discussed by several researchers (Kaufman, 1974; Lewis, 1971; Miller, 1985; Morrison, 1999; Piers, 1953/1971; Retzinger, 1991, 1998; Scheff, 1987, 1998; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Stierlin, 1974; Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Salovey, 1999; Tangney, et al., 1996; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). It is a relationship which is characterized by cyclical interaction between the two emotions. Shame evokes anger or rage which, in turn, elicits shame again or guilt and then shame. Because the shame experience signals that a positive bond is threatened, shame feelings play a significant role in the maintenance and growth of relationships. Shame feelings involve a heightening of self-awareness along with the identification of oneself as inadequate or inappropriate. When shame is fully acknowledged, it forces one to recognize the need for change in either oneself, one's relationship with another, or one's environment. However, when shame is unacknowledged or denied, it may lead to unwarranted aggression towards the self or others (Lewis, 1971; Retzinger, 1991, 1998; Scheff, 1998; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991).**

**Through extensive analysis of patient transcripts, Lewis (1971) identified the presence of shame which was not acknowledged by either the patient or the therapist but which greatly affected the patient-therapist relationship and their sessions. She found that unacknowledged shame could be categorized into two forms based on the extent to which the patient consciously experienced the affect. She describes shame which the patient consciously felt**

but did not label as shame as "overt, unidentified" shame. The second form, "by-passed" shame, was identified through the patient's description of involvement in a shameful or shaming situation in conjunction with a lack of any apparent affect. Lewis (1971) also noted that in a study (Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968) involving a small group of psychiatric outpatients, the manner in which unacknowledged shame was expressed was related to both field orientation and the manner in which hostility was generally discharged. Incidents of overt, unidentified ("leaked") shame were more common among field-dependent patients while by-passed ("distanced") shame was displayed more often among field-independent patients. Further, overt, unidentified shame experiences were typified by shame-rage, anger felt towards another which is directed back towards the self by guilt. Hostility directed outwards towards another person or thing often characterized the by-passed shame episodes.

According to Scheff and Retzinger's (1991) theory of social action, dysfunctional communication, unacknowledged shame and alienation are at the core of destructive conflict. The principles of their theory are that cooperation is dependent upon effective communication which, in turn, depends upon secure social bonds and pride. Conversely, dysfunctional communication, which is produced by unacknowledged shame and alienation, generates conflict. Scheff and Retzinger consider shame to be the emotional aspect of alienation and alienation the relational aspect of shame. As the shame experience is the emotional signal of a threat to one's social bond with another, alienation is the result of the threatened bond. Alienation may result from

either engulfment or isolation of the individual. If the shame which is felt in conjunction with the alienation is acknowledged, the threat to the social bond can be recognized and thus repaired resulting in attunement, i.e., social solidarity and cooperation. However, if alienation evokes shame that is not acknowledged (either overt, unidentified or by-passed), anger will also be elicited as a defense against the felt attack on the self. Scheff and Retzinger also contend that the form of alienation is related to the experienced mode of unacknowledged shame. Engulfment, as indicated by speech patterns dominated by the use of "we," "us," and "ours," is associated with overt, unidentified shame. Isolation, as signaled by the dominate use of pronouns which designate the separation between individuals, (e.g., "I," "you," "me," and "mine") is related to by-passed shame. Further, Scheff and Retzinger suggest that it is in the isolation mode of alienation that overt hostility or even violence occurs.

The relationships that Lewis has described between field-dependence and overt, unidentified shame and hostility directed inwards and between field-independence and by-passed shame and hostility directed outwards closely parallels the association described by Scheff and Retzinger of shame, hostility and alienation. For Scheff and Retzinger, overt, unidentified shame is linked with alienation experienced as engulfment and by-passed shame is associated with alienation experienced as isolation. Additionally, they associate hostility directed outwards with alienation experienced as isolation. While the similarities in these theorized relationships may suggest a positive association

between field-dependence/field-independence and alienation, the results of previous research investigating the relationship between field orientation and shame-proneness and guilt-proneness provide some indication of an alternate explanation.

The results of two previous studies (Crouppen, 1976; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968) illustrated a positive association between field-dependence and shame-proneness and between field-dependence and hostility directed inwards, i.e., hostility directed towards the self. While the measures of shame-proneness used in both these studies were not developed to intentionally assess overt, unidentified shame, it is possible that both measures used did indeed tap shame feelings which could be described in this manner. In Crouppen's (1976) study, participants were asked to rate how "upset" they would be if involved in a given situation. Each of the situations presented involved one of the main themes described in shame literature: failing to live up to an ideal, being embarrassed, being exposed, and having deficiencies exposed. Similarly, in the Witkin, Lewis and Weil (1968) study, verbal references regarding these shame themes were used as a measure of shame-proneness. In both instances, expression of feelings regarding an incident which was characterized as a shame experience were used as measures of shame although the affect expressed was not necessarily labeled as shame. Again, Lewis (1971) describes shame which is consciously felt but not labeled as shame as "overt, unidentified" shame.

Crouppen (1976) examined the effect of field orientation on the expressed direction of hostility (inwards versus outwards), shame-proneness and guilt-proneness in a sample of individuals participating in a special college education program for veterans, the non-depressed group, and a sample of primarily voluntary in-patients at a veteran's hospital, the depressed group. The relationship between shame-proneness and field-dependence was primarily due to the non-depressed sample in this study. The participants of Witkin, Lewis and Weil's (1968) study were a small group of psychiatric outpatients. Besides the positive association already noted between field-dependence and shame-proneness, and between field-dependence and hostility directed inwards, in both studies a positive relationship was also observed between field-independence and hostility directed outwards.

In contrast, a pair of studies by deGroot (1968) demonstrated non-significant results and results opposite of those described by Lewis. In deGroot's first study, shame-proneness was found to be positively associated with field-independence. While deGroot used the same measures as Witkin et al., many of the other factors between the two studies varied including type of sample measured and interview conditions. In the Witkin et al. study, the therapy sessions of extremely field-dependent and extremely field-independent outpatients were assessed for shame-proneness and hostility. In the deGroot study, college freshmen were interviewed during orientation week. Also, deGroot included in her study representatives from the entire field orientation continuum. To determine if the dissimilar results of the two studies were

possibly attributable to sample or condition differences, deGroot conducted a second study in which she varied the hostility and anxiety level of interviewers as well as the manner in which the interviews were conducted.

In deGroot's (1968) second study, no meaningful relationship was observed between field orientation and the expression of shame or between field orientation and hostility directed inwards. However, there was an interesting finding showing an interaction effect of field orientation and interpersonal climate on the expression of hostility directed outwards. When either the assistant who conducted the interview had a low anxiety level as measured by the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, or the interview was conducted under conditions which may be considered "cold," i.e., the interviewer was unresponsive and non-attentive, field-independent participants expressed greater hostility outwards than field-dependent participants. Conversely, in situations where the anxiety level of the interviewer was high or the interview was conducted in a "warm" manner, i.e., having direct eye contact and smiling at the interviewee, field-dependent participants displayed greater hostility directed outwards than field-independent participants. Considering that the conditions under which the interviews were conducted in deGroot's earlier study may have been relatively "warm" as compared to the assessment conditions for the Crouppen depressed group or the Witkin et al. sample, one possible factor leading to the disparate findings among these studies was a difference in interactive climates. As previously mentioned, the Witkin et al. interviews came from therapy session transcripts. Measures were completed

by Crouppen's depressed sample at an office in the veteran's hospital in sessions set up by appointment. Crouppen's non-depressed group, however, completed the measures in small classroom settings.

The participants of Crouppen's study, like those of the Witkin et al. study, were comprised of highly field-dependent and highly field-independent individuals rather than individuals within the middle range of the field orientation continuum. The two groups from Crouppen's study, the depressed and normal samples, were matched on level of field-dependence and field-independence as well. The fact that dissimilar results were observed regarding the effect of field-dependence on shame-proneness within these groups suggests that the divergent results of the deGroot studies are attributable to more than field orientation level. Interestingly, a group effect was also found in the Crouppen study on level of shame. The depressed sample demonstrated higher shame scores overall than the non-depressed sample. Assuming, as Scheff and Retzinger contend, that shame and alienation are positively related, an explanation for observed differences between the Crouppen depressed and non-depressed groups may be that the groups varied with regard to levels of experienced alienation. Since there was no effect of field orientation on shame-proneness among the depressed group, which had much higher shame scores than the non-depressed group, it may be that at high levels of alienation, field orientation has no effect upon the expression of shame. Since the depressed sample were psychiatric inpatients, it is possible that this sample was indeed experiencing greater levels of alienation than either the

Crouppen non-depressed group or the samples investigated by Witkin et al. or deGroot. Further, it is plausible that the Crouppen non-depressed group and the Witkin et al. participants were experiencing levels of alienation which were above that of the deGroot undergraduate participants. It is reasonable to believe that both outpatients undergoing therapy and veterans with either deficient academic records or a low socioeconomic background may have been experiencing greater alienation than undergraduates at a large university. Possibly, one factor contributing to the dissimilar results of these studies may be the level of experienced alienation.

Questions raised with regard to the results of the studies reviewed above are still numerous. Foremost, will either or both of the relationships hypothesized by Lewis and Scheff and Retzinger concerning the expression of unacknowledged shame be observable using actual measures of overt, unidentified shame and by-passed shame? Additionally, were differences in the observed results of these studies attributable to differences in alienation level, interpersonal climate, the extent of field-dependence/field-independence, or other unknown factors? While it is not possible currently to answer these questions, the following explanation based on the theories of Lewis and of Scheff and Retzinger does reconcile the disparate findings of the previous investigations: while the level of alienation determines the level of shame and thus the level of hostility, the mode of alienation (ranging in extremes from total engulfment to total isolation) determines the manner in which hostility will be expressed, i.e., either hostility directed inwards or hostility directed outwards,

respectively. The mode of alienation in conjunction with the level of shame will affect the manner in which shame is expressed. At low levels, shame may be recognized as such and clearly communicated in an acknowledged manner. At higher levels, shame is more likely to be unacknowledged and expressed as either overt, unidentified or by-passed depending upon the mode of alienation. Finally, level of alienation, field orientation, and interpersonal climate conditions interact to decide the mode of alienation. At low levels of alienation, field orientation and interpersonal climate influence the mode of alienation. At higher levels, field-orientation alone affects the mode of alienation.

The following set of hypotheses were generated from the model described above:

- I. Level of alienation is positively related to the overall amount of shame and total hostility expressed.
- II. Alienation is negatively related to the clear communication of shame, i.e., acknowledged shame.
- III. Alienation, field orientation, and interpersonal climate interact to determine the manner in which both unacknowledged shame and hostility are expressed.
  - A. At low levels of alienation, field orientation and interpersonal climate influence the mode of alienation.
  - B. At high levels of alienation, field-orientation alone influences the mode of alienation.

**It was the intent of this research to examine the merits of the model proposed above by testing aspects of these hypotheses. A second goal of this research was to investigate the feasibility of identifying and coding overt, unidentified (“leaked”) shame and by-passed (“distanced”) shame. Because previous research had not focused on the two forms of unacknowledged shame, there existed some question as to whether they could be reliably measured.**

## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

**In the following literature review, works by several theorists and researchers regarding shame will be discussed. General definitions of the word "shame" as well as explanations of the origins, physical and phenomenological expressions, and social and cultural aspects will be reviewed. The relationship between shame and personality and social correlates will be examined. Finally, the association between shame and aggression will be explored including a separate section dealing with the relationship between the expression of shame and/or hostility and alienation and field orientation.**

### **Shame Defined**

**The word "shame," while generally understood by and between English-speaking individuals, is an extremely ambiguous term. This single word is used to denote a negative feeling state, a defense, a motive for behavior, as well as a deference essential for harmonious social interaction. Shame may be experienced as an unexpected powerful, negative emotion related to dramatic personal failure. It may also be the incessant slight uneasiness one experiences when dressed too immodestly. Intense shame may be the motive which prevents one from telling the truth and thus leads to further feelings of shame. Yet, a sense of shame also allows one to accept another's lie in order to maintain social decorum. While some people maintain that they often experience shame, others contend that shame is not very prevalent in their lives. To better understand the complex construct of shame, several theorists**

(Lewis, 1971; Lynd, 1958; Schneider, 1977) have discussed the common definitions of the word shame.

Because of the close and often confusing association between the two major socializing/conforming agents, shame and guilt, much of our understanding of shame has resulted from discussions and studies which contrast them. Lynd (1958), in distinguishing between shame and guilt, examined the meaning of both terms linguistically. She found the Old English root of the word shame means to cover up; to envelop; and also wound. Guilt's Old English roots mean both guilt and debt. While the root meanings of guilt denote a violation and penal liability, there is no reference to the self as there is in the roots of shame. In defining shame, she notes that an awareness of self is always inherent. An awareness of others may or may not be connoted. As the negative feeling arising from being in a situation where the contempt or ridicule of others is present, shame invokes both awareness of the self and the other. Shame as a "wound to one's self esteem" incurred through the awareness of one's deficiencies or inadequacies does not necessarily involve the awareness of the other.

Though English has only one word to relate shame experiences both public and private, many other Indo-European languages have two or more words to denote the differences in shame experiences. In French, "pudeur" denotes shame as modesty while "honte" describes shame as disgrace. The Greek words "aidos" and "aischyne" distinguish shame felt as reverence or respect and dishonor (Lynd, 1958; Schneider, 1977). Lynd (1958) further

linguistically distinguishes shame and guilt by examining the meanings of shameless and guiltless. Guiltless is a positive state. One is innocent, blameless. To be shameless is to be disgraceful, brazen, incorrigible.

To understand the meaning of shame and guilt among English speaking people, Lewis (1971) examined the definition of these words as found in the Oxford English Dictionary (1914) and Webster's International Dictionary (1914). Three separate meanings of shame are illustrated in the definitions. Shame is first defined as a painful or negative emotion. The source of this emotion may be one's self or one's circumstances or that of another for whom one has an affinity. Shame may also be a motive of behavior. Shame is further defined in connection with feelings regarding sexuality, i.e., " 'privy parts' or the parts of shame."

In contrast to the feeling state of shame, guilt does not necessarily involve a feeling state. While all of the given definitions of guilt involve some transgression or violation, only one suggested a feeling state: the state of reproach in association with the state of being guilty. Guilt is also defined as 1) an offense, 2) the responsibility for an offense, and 3) the fact of being guilty of some offense.

Schneider (1977) describes the dual nature of shame as shame "before the act" or discretion-shame and shame "after the act" or disgrace-shame. Discretion-shame, or what is more generally described in English as a "sense of shame," is an important positive restraining force. It is this sense of shame which is considered deficient in those regarded as shameless. Schneider

suggests that discretion-shame is more than simply an emotion. It also involves a dispositional or attitudinal aspect. It is discretion-shame which "not only reflects, but sustains, our personal and social ordering of the world" (p. 20).

Disgrace-shame is the painful, unexpected experience of the confrontation between the lesser/inadequate self and the better self. Schneider posits that the link which explains the use of the word "shame" to describe varying experiences lies in its Indo-European root meaning of "to cover." In both discretion-shame and disgrace-shame the need to cover that which is exposed is common. In disgrace-shame it is exposure of some discrediting quality of the self. Discretion-shame is felt at the exposure of something which is private, e.g., individual prayer, lovers' conversations, vanities, hidden feelings, etc.

### **Differentiating Shame and Guilt**

#### **Origins**

While shame is usually considered a learned emotion, a few theorists including Freud (1905/1953) and Tomkins (1963) regard shame as innate. However, even among these theorists, learning or training is an essential element to the development of shame. Common to discussions of the etiology of shame feelings is the idea that shame is dependent upon the internalization of one's environment. Whether characterized as the tension between the ego and the ego ideal (Piers, 1953/1971) when one experiences a disgrace, or as the emotion elicited by a partial reduction of the neural activity (Tomkins, 1963) in conjunction with viewing another's nakedness, shame involves an

identification and internalization of a positive image or standard. In the case of disgrace, it is that standard which is not achieved. In the situation of impropriety, it is that standard which causes the reduction in interest-excitement.

In contrast to the attention given guilt, Freud rarely mentions shame in his works. In *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* (1925/1953) he does describe shame as a psychic force which restrains the sex instinct. Specifically, he describes shame as the reaction-formation which defends against exhibitionism and scopophilia (1905/1953, 1930/1961). While he implies that shame is innate, he states that the development of shame is largely derived through education or training. Freud (1896/1962) also characterizes shame as self-reproach exposed before another. Self-reproach regarding a sexual act in childhood may become shame "in case someone else should find out about it" (p. 171).

While still based in psycho-analytic theory, Erikson (1950/1963) emphasized the psychosocial aspect of ego development including the development of both shame and guilt. He maintains that the propensity for shame to naturally evolve occurs earlier than that for guilt. The development of feelings of shame are primarily witnessed during the anal stage when the child is learning to walk and control bowel movements. Guilt develops later when the child is ambulatory and finds interest in his/her genitalia during the phallic stage.

In discussing the "eight stages of man," Erikson describes eight conflicts or crises which characterize a unique stage in the development of personality. At each stage, successful resolution of the conflict results in a stronger personal and social identity. If the conflict is not constructively resolved, difficulties as adults may arise in association with the particular crisis.

The crisis central to Erikson's second stage is autonomy versus shame and doubt. Shame results from a feeling of "loss of self-control and foreign over-control" during attempts at autonomy. Conversely, pride develops from a feeling of self-control and self-worth at this stage. Integral to the development of shame is a sense of self-consciousness; the child is aware of being upright and exposed. Excessive shaming during this stage may lead to later defiance and even shamelessness.

In the third stage, guilt comes to the fore in conflict with initiative. Guilt is based in the "castration complex," the fear of genital harm as a punishment against initiative. At this stage, the child's abilities of self-observation, self-guidance and self-punishment advances through the internalization of parental controls.

One of the most commonly accepted definitions of shame was put forth by Gerhart Piers (Piers & Singer, 1953/1971). He described shame as the tension which is felt between the ego and the ego ideal when the ego ideal is not reached. The ego ideal represents the positive identification with parental, sibling and peer images and with the ego's own potentials. Shame then is the tension felt when one fails to live up to internalized standards or goals. When

one fails, there is a fear of the loss of positive bond with that ideal, the loss of love of the parental image; the anxiety of shame is the fear of abandonment.

In contrast, Piers discusses guilt as the tension which results from aggressive or destructive impulses touching or going beyond the limits set up by the super ego. The super ego is developed from the internalization of the punitive aspects (real or imagined) of the parental image. Thus, the anxiety felt in guilt is produced by the fear of punishment. Because the formation of the super ego is basic to the development of guilt, Piers also maintains that the development of shame precedes that of guilt.

Stepik (1983) posits that shame is a learned emotion acquired from social interactions and linked to cognitive level. Similar to Piers, she suggests that the psychological basis for shame may be fear of abandonment. She believes this fear may actually have originated with a confusion between parental disapproval of a behavior and rejection of the person who committed the behavior. Shame is felt when one's performance does not meet the standards of parents or significant others which have been internalized or when judged negatively by others. For either shame to develop there are conditions which must exist. These are a belief in both causality and control over an outcome, reflective evaluation of the self regarding an outcome, and a relationship between the outcome and self-worth. Thus, it may be that the experience of shame is modified as developmental factors which effect the four conditions change, i.e., cognitive development alters one's perceptions of responsibilities,

social values, etc., which in turn changes the situations in which one experiences shame.

Kemper's (1987) theory of social interaction describes both shame and guilt as secondary emotions linked through socialization to the autonomic reactions of primary emotions. Shame is associated with the primary emotion of anger. It is felt when one behaves contradictory to the status which has been attributed to oneself. Through identification, the child takes on the witnessed parental response of anger and disappointment towards the self when s/he does not live up to the conferred status. Analogously, guilt is related to the primary emotion of fear and the sense of using excess power against another. Fear of parental punishment, including loss of love, is linked to episodes of forbidden excess power.

Kemper emphasizes that the verbal reinforcement of the situation is essential for the child's differentiating shame and guilt. In the shame context the parent would make a reference to the child as unworthy of his/her previous image, e.g., "how could you make such a mess? I thought you were a big boy?" Conversely, in guilt admonitions, the prohibited act and the threat of retribution are expressed, e.g., "Look how you made your sister cry. God will get you for that!"

Tomkins (1963) proposes that shame is an innate auxiliary affect. The affect of shame is felt when an incomplete reduction of neural activity in interest or joy is experienced. He makes the point that shame does not always further inhibit excitement or joy. The original excitement or joy may also

increase and inhibit the shame response. For Tomkins, shame-shyness, shame-disgrace, and guilt are "one and the same affect." How they differ at a conscious level is determined by the affect intensity, the objects which activate it, and those which reduce it. For example, he suggests that guilt is associated with experiences in which deeply held values or morals are violated, shame-shyness with stranger interactions and strange sexual impulse, and shame-disgrace with defeat or rejection. According to Tomkins (1963) and Izard (1977), the first probable source of the shame response involves the infant's interaction with a stranger when the infant is expecting the mother. At approximately four to seven months, a child learns to differentiate the face of the mother (or familiar caretaker) from the faces of others. At this point, shame may be experienced when the typical responses of joy, excitement, and a wish to communicate at the appearance of the face are inhibited by the child's recognition of the face as that of a stranger. As with the other authors discussed previously, Tomkins alludes to the parent's integral role in the activation of shame by creating barriers (often through socialization of accepted/expected behavior) to the child's interest and enjoyment.

Mascolo & Fischer (1995) describe both shame and guilt as self-evaluative emotions that develop from a simple affect into complex action tendencies that contribute to one's actions as well as thought processes and feelings. Shame is believed to stem from distress while guilt is held as originating from empathy or feelings of concern regarding another's distress. Each emotion begins with an appraisal or event meaning from which action

tendencies are formed. For the generation of shame, the appraisals of having failed to live up to standards of worth are necessary. Appraisals that one is responsible for wrongdoing generates guilt. Mascolo & Fischer emphasize that these emotions do not emerge at one set point in time but rather take on different forms at different phases of development. As the child ages, a more and more complex form evolves from the previous stage. They contend that the shame prerequisite of social referencing, i.e., a baby will respond with distress to the negative reactions a caregiver expresses regarding the baby's behavior, usually develops by seven or eight months. Shame will then continue to dynamically evolve until the teenaged years. Analogously, the development of interpersonal guilt begins once the child is able to connect another's distress with his/ her own aggressive actions, usually by seven or eight months, and continues through the teen years.

Interestingly, a series of recent studies by Tangney and colleagues (Tangney, 1995) and by Leith & Baumeister (1998) that investigated the relationship between shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and empathy have demonstrated that shame was positively associated with the personal distress component of empathy. Guilt was positively related to the perspective taking aspect of empathy in both sets of researcher's studies. In the Tangney studies, guilt was also associated with empathic concern. Personal distress is defined as the negative experience of the self arising from the suffering or distress of another. Perspective taking is related to the ability to imagine a situation from the standpoint of the other. Empathic concern refers to the ability to care for

the welfare of the other and to experience concern regarding the other's misfortune.

Similar to Mascolo & Fischer (1995), Barrett (1995) does not believe that emotions emerge as a whole at any specific phase of development. She contends that while cognitive development is a factor in shame and guilt development, cognitive understandings do not determine the emergence of these emotions. She argues that even in the first three months of life, operant conditioning results in an infant's rudimentary awareness of the way things "ought" to be and of one's efficacy/inefficacy. She further sees socialization, most significantly that of the early parent-child relationship, as an important key between awareness and the elicitation of shame and guilt. Socialization not only is the source for communicating information about rules and standards but also for conveying the significance and importance of the child's adherence to these criteria. For Barrett, shame and guilt are associated with distinct "appreciations" regarding the self and the other. Shame is related to the appreciation that one is bad or that another thinks one is bad, and that one is being viewed. Guilt involves appreciations that one has committed a wrongful act and that someone has been negatively effected by it. Interestingly, she points out that shame and guilt are important elements in gaining knowledge regarding the self. Shame aids in the development of understanding self as object while guilt promotes the development of understanding of self as agent.

## **Physical Expressions**

The most apparent physical expression of shame, blushing, was described by Darwin (1872) in *The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals*. Darwin explains that blushing, which is common to probably all races of man, is usually not experienced until a child is two or three years old. Older children seem to blush more than younger, women more than men, and the older adult less than the younger. Further, he states that a casting down of the eyes or looking askance accompanies the blush. In most people there is also a confusion of the mind. He believes that the blushing which is precipitated by shame, shyness and modesty is caused by the self-attention which is a common element to all those states. This self-attention is brought on by the opinion of others, either real or imagined.

Tomkins (1963) describes blushing as a paradox because while the intent of the shame response is to reduce facial communication (i.e., the dropping of the head, eyes and upper body inhibiting a person from looking into the face of another and also inhibiting the other from looking into the face of the one shamed), the blush of shame increases facial communication. Blushing is at once a consequence of shame and a cause for further shame since it increases self- and face-awareness. He suggests that adults may modify the shame response so as to not express shame too openly. The shame response may be exhibited as a simple momentary downward glance, a look of perpetual humility or depression, a frozen face, or perhaps a look of contempt or haughtiness.

Given that some people have reported experiences of shame which were not accompanied by blushing, Izard (1977) has questioned whether shame and blushing, in some degree, always co-exist. He suggested that, as with other autonomic functions people learn to control through biofeedback or meditational practices, blushing can also most likely be voluntarily controlled. He also notes that while guilt has few distinct facial characteristics, those that are exhibited are similar to those of shame, i.e., a person may be likely to hang his/her head lower and to avoid eye-to-eye contact. However, in cases of intense emotions, two characteristics discriminate shame from guilt. Guilt is likely to be expressed in the face as a heavy look; shame is shown by a blush and the bow of the head or eyes. Also, guilt is likely to influence a person's expressions and demeanor for a longer period of time.

In reviewing the findings of observational, self-report, and shame-proneness studies, Keltner and Harker (1998) noted the consistent pattern of non-verbal expressions which were associated with shame: blushing, eye gaze aversion, lowering of lip corners, a collapsing or folding in of the body, and avoidant or closed posture. Interestingly, they observe that the physical shame expressions as well as the general desire of the ashamed individual to withdraw or escape from the situation are consistent with signals of submission. They further noted the similarity between shame displays and appeasement markers of other species. They suggest that as with appeasement displays of other species, shame acts to de-escalate conflict. Through studies which investigate other's reactions to those who display shamed behavior, they

illustrate how shame may function to reestablish social harmony following social transgressions by evoking in observing others feelings of affiliation.

### **Phenomenological Expressions**

The phenomenological expressions of shame are as diverse as the many meanings of the word shame itself. Several authors including Lewis (1971), Lynd (1958), Miller (1985) and Tomkins (1963) have written extensively on the phenomenological aspects of shame. Commonly discussed experiential aspects of shame are the heightened self-awareness, the diminished sense of self, the difficulty in communicating shame experiences, and the frequent co-existence of shame with another emotion.

In her book, *On Shame and the Search for Identity*, Lynd (1958) utilizes linguistics, philosophy, and literature to describe the nature of shame. She proposes that because shame brings to conscious awareness our unconscious identifications, experiences of shame are important in discovering one's sense of self, one's place within society, culture, the universe, and one's potential for being. In contrasting aspects of shame and guilt, she provides a rich description of the nature of shame.

A major difference in the two experiences of shame and guilt is the sense of unexpectedness which accompanies shame. In guilt, there is an element of choice, foresight, awareness which is associated with the experience. One may feel the temptation of perpetrating an act as well as the fear of punishment before one has actually committed a wrongdoing. Like Piers (1953/1971), Lynd views feelings of guilt as resulting from transgressions while shame feelings as

being produced through a failure to reach goals or ideals. A second element which distinguishes the two experiences is the focus of one's awareness. Shame involves the whole self, that is, the self recognizing the self's inadequacies or inappropriateness. Experiences of shame heighten one's awareness. In contrast, the focus in guilt is upon the wrongful act. To rectify or mitigate experiences of shame, one must change the self, or one's conception of the self. The guilt experience may be ameliorated through punishment or forgiveness.

Basic to understanding the mitigation or alleviation of shame and/or guilt feelings is the comprehension of the differing elements which are valued and thus threatened in these experiences. Morris (1976) maintains that while it is one's identity which is threatened in shame, it is one's relationship with others that is threatened in guilt. The idea of transgression is based on a scheme of obligations and entitlements. As such, the whole concept of guilt denotes a relationship with others, a relationship that is jeopardized by the act which results in guilt. The process of relieving shame suggests creativity, change. The process for rectifying guilt leads to restoration. Further, with shame, one's sense of status is belittled. In guilt, one's status does not change; it is the relationship with others that is altered.

Several authors (Izard, 1977; Lamb, 1983; Morris, 1976) emphasized that while one feels guilt as a consequence of wrongdoing, one must feel, correctly or incorrectly, responsible for the wrongdoing before guilt is incurred. That guilt is associated with codified acts while shame is related to the self means

that the things for which one can feel guilt are much more limited. As Lamb (1983) enumerates, one may feel guilt in regard to: one's actions, one's intention to act, and what one considers to be one's action. Shame may be felt in relation to any aspect of oneself including voluntary and involuntary actions, disposition, personality, appearance, social class, race, religion, political affiliation, and actions of others which occurred prior to birth.

The belief that the central focus differs in shame and guilt experiences was tested in a set of studies by Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski (1994). Strong support was obtained for the judgment that the self is the focus of shame while the behavior is the focus of guilt. Through asking participants to describe a personal shame or guilt experience or to imagine themselves in shame and guilt scenarios provided to them and then to list what might have been changed so that the situation would have ended differently, assessments were made regarding whether participant's felt aspects of the self, one's behavior, or the situation were the central factor in shame and guilt experiences. While participants were more likely to change aspects of the self when relating how they could have changed the outcome of either the imagined or personal shame experience, they were more inclined to alter their actions to "undo" the outcome of the imagined or personal guilt experience. Additionally, participants of further counterfactual studies were instructed to imagine themselves in a distressing scenario which could elicit either shame or guilt and then to focus on how they could have avoided the distressing situation through specifically changing either aspects of the self or their actions. Those

participants who were asked to mutate aspects of the self in order to alter the outcome reported anticipating greater shame in such a situation. Conversely, those asked to change their behavior thought they would feel more guilt.

Lynd (1958) emphasizes that it is the total nature of shame - the unanticipated feelings of inadequacy or incongruity, the threat to one's idea of one's self, the loss of trust in one's sense of one's position in society or even the world - that makes shame so hard to communicate. Shame is an isolating and alienating experience which results in further isolation. It results in the wish to be out of the view of others. As Erikson notes (1950/1963), shame is visual in nature while guilt is auditory. The wish to be invisible, for the world to not notice one's exposure, to "bury one's face," or to "sink into the ground" are early expressions of shame. Perhaps it is the auditory aspect of guilt, the "voice of conscience," that formulates the words necessary to make communication easier regarding guilt than shame (Morris, 1976). Lynd (1958) contends that because guilt deals with a codified act rather than an ambiguous feeling of personal inadequacy, guilt is easier to communicate than shame. Also, the first step to alleviating the guilt feeling is through talking about it. To obtain either punishment or forgiveness, the act must first be communicated. Lynd further points out that if one does find a way of communicating and sharing a shame experience with others, than it may lead to a certain closeness between individuals. Thrane (1979) suggests that when it is possible to talk about shame experiences with others, it is with the hope of

acceptance rather than forgiveness as is the case of guilt. He uses the ritual confession of Alcoholics Anonymous as an example.

Most theorists and researchers concerned with the study of shame identify the close relationship between shame and guilt. It has been suggested that the analysis of shame was neglected early on because of this close association; it was subsumed under the study of guilt (Erikson, 1950/1963; Lewis, 1971; Lynd, 1958). Because shame and guilt are often both elicited in response to a moral transgression, the differentiating elements of the two affects go unnoticed and thus they merge under the label guilt. Piers (1953/1971) was among the first to describe how shame and guilt can evoke each other and how each can act as a defense against the other. In the guilt-shame cycle, the experience of one of these affects provokes a behavior which will lend a sense of relief against that experienced affect. The relief behavior, in turn, produces the experience of the other affect. As an example, consider an adolescent who cuts school with some friends in an attempt to alleviate feelings of shame regarding her dowdy, uncool character. However, she then incurs guilt in response to cutting school. Insidiously, she then may try to make reparations to her parents by over-achieving in school leading her to have shame feelings regarding what she perceives as her "goody-goody" character in regard to her peers. Given that adolescence is a period of actively striving for one's personal identity, it is also a time abundant in potentially shame-inducing situations. As Thrane (1979) states, "it is one of the torments of adolescence that one can feel

ashamed of not pursuing a course of action which will, as assuredly, provoke guilt if pursued" (p. 142).

Shame and guilt can also act to hide each other. Because some people find one of these affects easier to endure, they experience that feeling as a defense against the other. As illustration, to defend against feelings of shame over the inability to have an mature, meaningful sexual relationship, one has illicit, fleeting affairs over which one feels guilt.

Tomkins (1963) posits that many affects may be experienced in conjunction with shame as a result of certain child rearing practices. For example, if a child was controlled by shame to suppress contempt, situations which elicit disgust would also provoke shame. The often apparent interaction between shame and anger or aggression was a facet of shame experiences which was noted by Piers in 1953/1971 and by several authors analyzing the content of patient/subjects interpersonal interactions (Lewis, 1971; Miller, 1985; Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 1987; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991) and also more recently through correlational studies of shame-proneness (Tangney, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney, Wagner, Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996). While Piers viewed shame as leading to aggression and, in turn, aggression sponsoring guilt, Lewis viewed overt shame as primarily inhibiting outward aggressive responses. Miller suggests that shame and anger may function as defenses against each other much in the same manner as has been witnessed in the relationship between shame and guilt. She concludes that one may be ashamed of one's anger and anger

will be inhibited or one may exhibit anger because of underlying shame.

Similarly, Scheff and Retzinger have recently proposed that shame evokes anger or aggression when the shame is unacknowledged.

While most studies of shame are focused on ascertaining level of shame-proneness or differentiating shame-proneness from guilt-proneness, a few studies have investigated the phenomena of shame. In 1983, Wicker, Payne, and Morgan investigated whether naive raters regarded shame and guilt experiences in a manner similar to that theorized by several authors. They found that people did seem to naturally distinguish between shame and guilt on many of the hypothesized differences presented by several theorists. Shame versus guilt was more often characterized by feelings of inferiority, inadequacy, situational ambiguity, desire to hide, blushing, confusion, surprise, exposure, rejection, ridicule, and a lack of status. Guilt situations were related more often than shame as feelings of having done an unjust thing, power or domination, control, lack of inhibition, and threat of punishment rather than abandonment. They did not find that shame experiences were considered to involve concern with how others view oneself, unhappiness with the total self rather than one's behavior, or an excess of status. Nor did the results reveal that guilt is easier to discuss, related to negative self-evaluation rather than evaluation of others, or more likely to result from exceeding boundaries of correct behavior.

In a study by Lindsay-Hartz (1984), several individuals were asked to recount experiences of shame and guilt for the purpose of determining the aspects which distinguish the two experiences. Many of the differences which

were unidentified as contrasting the experiences had already been discussed by several theorists. She found a reticence to describe shame experiences versus a willingness to talk about guilt experiences. The desire to hide or "get out" were common in descriptions of shame experiences. A desire to set things right with the person one believes was wronged was related in discussing guilt experiences. In describing shame, often mentioned was the manner in which a person believes s/he appears to others and also an exposure of the self which one does not want to be. Guilt experiences often included an intentional violation of a rule and sense of responsibility towards the consequences. In shame, one's identity is negatively transformed. One's identity is not altered with the guilt experience. In fact, there is often a sense of mystery involved with guilt such that a good person may question why s/he did something bad because s/he still remains a good person. Additionally, Lindsay-Hartz noted how time was altered differently in the two experiences. In shame experiences, time seems endless, an eternity. Because of constantly reviewing the guilt experience, there is a sense of past involved with guilt.

Further support for theorized differentiating aspects of shame and guilt were reported by Tangney and her colleagues (Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996). In a group of undergraduates asked to relate experiences of shame, guilt, and embarrassment, Tangney et al. found that shame in comparison with guilt was characterized by greater intensity, suddenness, physiological arousal, a desire to hide, and feelings of being small or inferior and isolated. Additionally, in the shame experiences there was a greater

tendency to not want to admit to what had been done, of being more intensely viewed by others and of focusing on the other's thoughts regarding the self. The types of situations which evoked shame and guilt were found to be similar and no evidence was reported to support the notion that shame results from public disclosure of failures while guilt results from private actions. In general, shame and guilt were found to be more similar to each other than to embarrassment. Embarrassment was less intense, less likely to occur alone and more likely to result from trivial or humorous situations than either shame or guilt. Experiences of embarrassment were associated though with the greatest sense of surprise and physiological changes.

Through extensive interviews with a small number of volunteers, Miller (1985) explored the experiential nature of shame. Through assessing interviewees' understanding of shame, embarrassment, and humiliation, shame is defined as the "experience of the self as diminished." Miller contrasts shame, embarrassment and humiliation based on the differing "rhythmic elements" or "temporal organization" of the experiences. In shame, the rhythmic element is described as an experience of shrinking away from others, pulling inwards and downwards. This rhythmic quality is exemplified by the wish to hide, sink into the floor, disappear. Embarrassment involves an outward and inward movement simultaneously. Characterizing embarrassment, one may feel the outward flush and concurrent desire to hide some aspect of the self. Miller points out that embarrassment may equal shame in painful intensity, but it is not necessarily so. Indeed, embarrassment

may be a partially pleasant experience as is often the case of an award or surprise. Embarrassment may also lead to shame if the feeling of uncomfortable exposure is linked with a negative image regarding one's status. Humiliation is described as a feeling of being forced down into a debased position. Rather than the focus being on the self as in shame, the focus in humiliation is on the situation or current status. Humiliation may also result in shame if one identifies with the debased status.

Tomkins (1963) asserted that laughter was an avenue of expression for shame. Miller (1985) also noted that while regarding past shame experiences, shame may be evoked concerning one's thoughts. This momentary shame image is often accompanied by a quick laugh. In disclosing shame experiences which elicited shame reactions, speech may initially be fragmented and later aggressive. Miller concludes that the fragmentation is a symptom of the struggle between impulses to disclose versus not disclose. Once decided, the speech may acquire an aggressive quality. Retzinger (1987) describes laughter as a release for shame feelings.

Miller (1985) also noticed that shame often interacts with several other emotions. In addition to guilt and anger, she described episodes where shame precipitated self-hate, contempt or disgust, and omnipotence. In each case, the resulting emotion appeared to be a defense against shame. That is, by focusing on one's self-hate or superiority, or one's contempt for others, attention is drawn away from that undesirable quality of the self.

Morrison (1999) also contends that to protect against the negative feelings of shame one may consciously or unconsciously utilize defensive strategies. He lists rage, contempt, envy, grandiosity/exhibitionism as common defenses against shame. Additionally, he sees hiding, i.e., downplaying the labeling of one's feelings of shame by substituting another descriptor such as "trivial" or "silly," and disavowal of feelings as other defensive strategies. He also notes that shame may be experienced as a defense against other drives or emotions, including anger, competition, and romantic or sexual longing.

### **Social/Cultural Aspects**

According to some theorists (Ausubel, 1971; Gaylin, 1979; Piers & Singer, 1953/1971), shame and guilt are the primary socializing agents of any society. Along with pride, these two emotions serve as the chief motivating factors for compliance to the group's or society's rules or structure. As Izard (1977) summarizes, shame and guilt function to facilitate group living and thus the survival of the individual through conformity, compliance, sexual regulation, and growth-order.

Like Piers (1953/1971), Izard (1977) describes identification as the process which allows for social conformity through shame. In contrast, guilt promotes conformity through submission. Izard (1977) explains that because the individual is sensitive through shame to the criticisms of the group to which one belongs (or wishes to belong), the individual can be relied upon to fulfill responsibilities towards the group, such as, defense needs and food gathering. Nachman (1984) points out that shame may arise from direct censure such as

criticism, derision, accusations, or from indirect censure, gossip. He suggests that the use of public ridicule, etc., in the community or group invokes shame feelings because the individual identifies with the group and does not wish to be exposed or known by members in such a manner.

Tomkins (1963) sees the vicarious experience of shame, and the vicarious experience of distress, as both a measure and a condition of civilization. He explains that one may feel shame at what happens to others because of the human capacity to empathize and identify with the other, and that shared shame is a vehicle for strengthening a sense of community/mutuality. For when one is ashamed of the other, the other is reminded that this shame is derived from positive as well as negative concerns. As long as there is sufficient interest in others, shame through empathy is possible.

Gaylin (1979) emphasizes that shame is felt most strongly within groups with a heightened sense of group identity or community. Because family members and friends are usually closely identified with, their acts are more likely to elicit shame than the acts of strangers. However, the potential for shame experiences extends as far as the group identification. Consider, as illustration, the case of financial improprieties by congressional representatives of New York that elicited shame in some individuals simply because they are New Yorkers.

In identifying with others, one may also alleviate shame. It has been suggested that through identification with a group or a powerful leader, one may restore a sense of pride and power in oneself (Steirlin, 1974; Wright,

1987). In fact, it may be the seemingly antisocial or shameless behavior within the group which generates great pride. Feelings of shame and pride have been recognized as mutually inhibiting by several theorists (Isenberg, 1980; Lewis, 1971; Nathanson, 1987; Scheff, 1988; Stierlin, 1974; Tomkins, 1963; Wright, 1987). Like shame, pride involves an awareness of the self (Isenberg, 1980; Nathanson, 1987; Scheff, 1988). Nathanson proposes that "anything that brings the self into focus can be placed somewhere on the axis of shame and pride" (p. 185).

Tomkins (1963) stresses that the loss of pride and the burden of shame are central motives. He maintains that the experience of shame may be so shattering to one's identity that an individual will go to great lengths, including risking life, rather than risk losing one's pride. Nathanson (1987) also suggested that a proud attitude may act as a defense against shameful feelings of inadequacy. Majors and Billson (1992) maintains that the "cool pose" of the inner city is used by young black inner city males to illustrate that they are strong and proud despite their troubled status within American society.

Goffman (1955/1967) describes the considerable importance of one's positive public image in his analysis of the maintenance of "face." Face is defined as the positive image of the self defined by approved social attitude. To be in face is to feel confident and assured that the line or pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts one expresses are consistent with the image one wishes to convey. When one is in wrong face or "loses face," one is likely to feel

ashamed or inferior because of what has happened to the situation through one's actions and because one's reputation or image is altered.

Goffman (1955/1967) suggests that the individual's social face may be one's "most personal possession and the center of his security and pleasure" (p. 10). However, this face is only contrived through social interaction and it may be taken away from one if society does not deem the individual worthy because of the individual's misconduct or lack of consideration. The rules of self respect within society demand that the individual behave during social interactions in such a manner as to maintain both the individual's face and the face of the other participants. One who can witness another's humiliation without being affected by it is considered "heartless." One who causes one's own defacement without concern or care is deemed "shameless." Goffman argues that universal human nature, the elements of behavior which a person possesses that allow the individual to socially interact, is not innate. Rather, it is created by society through a system of interactions organized on ritual principles.

Both Izard (1977) and Schneider (1977) discuss the role of shame in establishing bonding in regard to sexual activity. Izard (1977) posits that shame-shyness is found appealing or sexually exciting to many males and possibly influential in the preservation and growth of long-lasting sexual relationships. He suggests that shame-shyness may serve to heighten the sexual experience, especially in early stages of a couples' growing intimacy.

**Schneider (1977) views shame as extremely important in relation to love and sex. Shame protects sexual relation from profanation and degradation by linking bodily acts to their social, personal, and moral implications. Also, as previously mentioned, shame keeps from public view a private experience. Schneider relates Max Scheler's views that shame plays a central role in the formation, regulation and facilitation of sexual expression. First, shame, in conjunction with compassion or empathy, are integral in the formation of human sexual instinct. It modifies the libido so as to desire sexual satisfaction that involves another person. The sentiment of sympathy, compassion or empathy further heightens the desire for the emotional involvement of one's sexual partner. Shame further regulates sexual activity by creating a sense of hesitation which allows sexual partners to know each other without a sense of brusqueness or intrusion. Finally, shame facilitates love and sexual expression by providing a resistance to physical intimacy until accompanied by a loving attitude. Shame acts as a barrier to sexual expression until the whole self responds to the partner's self as a whole. Because of this restraint, love may continue to exist without violation.**

**Shame also serves to reduce the possibility of conflicts over mates. Izard (1977) notes that shame discretion leads to the concealment of sex organs and the act of sexual intercourse, thus helping to limit sexual conflict and aggression over partners. This, in turn, contributes to a higher sense of harmony and cooperation within the group.**

**Izard (1977) believes that shame also functions to encourage growth or development within a society. Shame promotes the development of a stronger, highly skilled group since the individuals of the group develop whatever skill or strength they possess in order to avoid the shame of inadequacy and weakness. Similarly, Greenwald & Harder (1998) see shame as an evolutionary adaptive signal that, if heeded, promotes the fitness of the human organism through regulation of behavior with regard to group identity, social bonding, and mating behavior. The threat of shame over lack of conformity helps to establish group identity while that of ostracism from the group is a strong motivator for ensuring the cooperative efforts that produce social bonding. Behavior which is unacceptable to the group with regards to bodily exposure, choice of mate, and sexual practices may be controlled through the threat of reduction in status and consequentially reduction in mating possibilities.**

### **Shame and Guilt Cultures**

**Benedict (1946), in her description of the Japanese culture as a culture which relies primarily on shame to regulate behavior, notes that guilt may indeed affect the behavior of individuals in Japan. However, it is shame which is the major sanction and, therefore, the Japanese are identified as a "shame culture." She describes a true shame culture as relying on external sanctions such as ridicule or rejection by others, either real or fantasized, for proper behavior. A guilt culture is distinguished by its dependence upon internalized sanctions, e.g., the conviction of sin, for proper behavior. She sees the early**

**puritan United States as a guilt culture since the base of morality was guilt. Though, with the "overall relaxation of morals," shame plays a growing role in controlling social behavior in the United States.**

**Singer (1953/1971) considers the use of internal/external sanctions to differentiate shame and guilt cultures as an inadequate criterion. This distinction does not consider the many aspects of shame and guilt which affect compliance: internalized shame, conscious and unconscious guilt, the use of shaming, feelings of shame or fear of shame. Using Pier's (1953/1971) definition of unconscious shame as the tension arising from a failure to live up to the internalized ideal of a rewarding parent which is based in the threat of abandonment and unconscious guilt as the tension resulting from transgression of the boundary set by a punitive parent which is founded in the threat of mutilation, Singer reinterpreted the psychometric data of five American Indian tribes and a Midwestern (non-Indian) community. He found that guilt and shame are found in most cultures. Further, contrary to previous supposition that guilt sanctions are related to a progressive or highly individualized and industrialized culture and shame is associated with cultures which are static or industrially backwards, Singer concluded that sanctions related to each shame and guilt had little reference to the progressive or backward character of the culture.**

**Ausubel (1971) similarly rejects the idea that guilt and shame are mutually exclusive in socialization. While he maintains that shame relies on external sanctions, he views guilt as resulting from both external and internal sanctions.**

Shame is here considered the painful emotional response to the real or imagined negative judgment of others. Guilt is defined as the negative feeling resulting from perceived violation of moral obligations. Since a moral offense against the group is present in guilt, it incorporates an external dimension. Ausubel argues against Benedict's (1946) conception of early puritan United States as a guilt culture by pointing out that shame played a significant role as guilt during this period. As example, he points out that the stocking pillar and dunking stall were located in the central market place during this time. He also regards much of Japanese shame as shame of guilt. That is, it is the shame resulting from the awareness of violating moral obligations. In discussing the behavior of confession or atonement which has been considered a sign of guilt's presence within a culture, Ausubel suggests that because of the Japanese' pronounced sensitivity to shame such exposure would be seldom.

Lebra (1971) discusses the role of both shame and guilt in Japan. Like Singer (1953/1971) and Ausubel (1971), she sees the internal-external sanction as untenable in describing a culture. However, she does believe that there are cultural variations in the usage of shame and guilt. Further, they can be differentiated through strictly "social" mechanisms rather than the previously used psychoanalytic or culture-personality approaches. She believes that shame and guilt are identified with different social structures: shame with social asymmetry, especially with regard to status, and guilt with a reciprocity model. Shame issues from inconsistency of claimed or perceived status and

**actual status. For shame to transpire, two social conditions must exist: the knowledge of actual status and espoused, incongruous status. Guilt emerges when the balance between donator/creditor and debtor/recipient collapses. When an individual abuses the rule of reciprocity or fails to fulfill obligations in regard to another, guilt ensues.**

**Lebra (1971) proposes that monotheistic cultures are more generalized in terms of guilt and specific in regard to shame. In a sociocultic culture, a non-monotheistic culture, where society takes the place of God, shame is more generalized and guilt specific. While guilt has a dyadic nature where one is out of balance with a specific or generalized other, shame has a triadic nature such that the displayed status is incongruous with the perceived status and exposed before a generalized or specific other.**

**Lebra (1983) explains that because the Japanese are socialized to be self-reflective, they are more aware of others in guilt as well as shame than those socialized in Judeo-Christian tradition. She suggests that because self-denial is closely related to moral value in Japan, it is possible that much of what is interpreted as shame behavior may actually be the result of guilt avoidance or guilt feelings. Acts of self-denigration or shyness may actually be motivated by thoughtfulness and avoidance of hurting others.**

**In a recent study, Liem (1997) interviewed first- and second-generation Asian Americans as well as multigenerational European Americans regarding their own experiences of guilt and shame. The responses of the first-generation Asian Americans illustrated the central role of others in recounted**

experiences of both guilt and shame and the close intermixed association of the two experiences. In depicting guilt experiences, only the first-generation Asian Americans described shaming another, through violating a code of duty/obligation tied to family status or social hierarchy, as the source of guilt. For example, not passing an exam would create guilt feelings for having shamed one's family. Similarly, by unintentionally speaking to a professor as an equal one would feel guilty for having shamed the professor. For second-generation Asian Americans and European Americans, even when probed, no such examples were given. Instead both of these groups recounted experiences in which the self-violation of one's own values/conscience induced guilt feelings.

Liem also emphasizes the triadic nature of the described shame experiences of the first-generation Asian Americans. When one fails to achieve a certain standard, the self is shamed, the family and/or social affiliate is shamed, and the shaming is felt to take place before the eyes of another. Interestingly, the examples of shame experiences given by second-generation Asian Americans could also be described as generally being triadic in nature. However, the pattern differed from the first-generation group by involving an anger element rather than self-felt shame. For second-generation Asian Americans, there was a cognitive understanding of having shamed another before through one's failure to meet family/group obligations. Rather than experiencing shame and guilt at having shamed another, anger is expressed in reaction to the other's judgement that one's behavior is shameful. Liem

suggests that this occurs because the sense of self that is defined by one's positions within socially and culturally defined relationships has not been internalized for these individuals. The shame experiences recounted by the European Americans were characterized as dyadic: one's failures are described as being apparent to either a real or imagined other.

In discussing criticism of Benedict's (1946) work, Creighton (1990) defends Benedict against the accusations that her description of Japan as a shame culture involved a value judgment or negative prejudice. Because guilt is believed to develop later than shame, Benedict's description of the Japanese as a shame society has been interpreted by some as indicating that the Japanese culture lacks in moral development in comparison to that of the West. While Creighton agrees that different cultures emphasize either shame or guilt, she disagrees with Benedict's use of internal versus external sanctions as differentiating the two affects. She views shame as the awareness of a failure in acquiring a wished-for self which originates in the fear of separation or abandonment. In distinction, guilt is based in the fear of punishment and is felt when one's transgression is internally realized.

Creighton (1990) proposes that an absolute balance between shame and guilt in societies as with individuals is probably not possible or desirable. The choosing of defenses and behaviors would be impossible in such a condition. As such, one type of sanction predominates, at least to some extent, in most individuals and cultures. Analogous to Lebra (1971), Creighton believes that shame is a more pervasive influence in Japan while guilt is emphasized in the

United States. She believes that the relative dependence on either sanction is affected by cultural values, philosophies, and child rearing. In illustration, Japanese place a high value on group-oriented behavior while Americans value independence. Within Western tradition, there is a belief of an inherent evil in the individual, an id, an "original sin." Japanese philosophy contends that human impulses are basically good or neutral. It is the situation which defines whether an action is negative or not. Through pretending a child is nonexistent, a Japanese mother may induce her child to behave. More common in the West is the threat of punishment. The Western child feels the force of dependency or control as a sanction, the Japanese child the lack of union.

Gaylin (1979) proposes that within a homogenous society shame is a more powerful and influential source for good because of the greater likelihood for identification since common traditions and ideals are shared. In a heterogeneous society, social behavior is more likely to be controlled through guilt as opposed to shame because of the existence of subcultures and multiple traditions, ideals, and moral codes. Gaylin also discusses the need for a hero when the "burden for social behavior" rests upon guilt. Heroes provide an overt model for developing a communal standard of ideal behavior.

Both Tomkins (1963) and Nachman (1984) emphasize that in democratically organized groups or societies, shame sanctions maintain the egalitarian principles of the society. The threat of shame curtails willful and idiosyncratic behavior. It also motivates the individual to fulfill obligations to

others and restrains the others from unfairly coercing the individual. Shame limits freedom and also insures the limited freedom.

Recently, Wallbott & Scherer (1995) investigated differences in shame and guilt experiences in respondents from 37 countries by asking them to recall a number of different emotional experiences and answer questions regarding those experiences. To understand differences in emotional experiences between countries, they classified countries according to four cultural dimensions that had been used in previous research. The dimensions were: power distance, the extent to which it is accepted that power is distributed unequally; uncertainty avoidance, the extent to which beliefs and institutions have been created to defend against ambiguous situations; individualism versus collectivism, the extent to which people immediate concerns are for themselves versus for the group; masculinity versus femininity, the extent to which people value external objects including money and success versus internal qualities such as caring for others and quality of life.

Wallbott & Scherer (1995) found that the definition of shame and guilt experiences were influenced by cultural factors. In countries characterized as individualistic, low in power distance, and low in uncertainty avoidance, e.g., Sweden, Norway, Finland, New Zealand, United States, shame experiences are described as being similar to guilt experiences. In countries classified as collectivistic, high in power distance, and high in uncertainty avoidance, e.g., Mexico, Venezuela, India, Brazil, France, Spain, Greece, shame experiences are distinct from guilt experiences. Shame in these countries as compared to

other countries is expressed as being: more acute, of shorter duration, having less immorality involved, less trophotropic arousing (lump in throat, stomach troubles, crying), less negatively influencing self-esteem and relationships, higher felt temperature, and greater incidence of laughing/smiling.

### **Social and Personality Correlates of Shame**

Shame has been related to several social and personality disorders including alcoholism (Cook, 1988; Lighty, 1990), dysfunctional families (Fossum & Mason, 1986; Stierlin, 1974), narcissism (Broucek, 1982; Kinston, 1983; Sorotzkin, 1985), eating disorders (Frank, 1991; Silberstein, Striegel-Moore, & Rodin, 1987) and depression (Harder, 1995; Harder & Lewis, 1987; Hoblitzelle, 1988; Lewis, 1971; Smith, 1972; Wright, O'Leary & Balkin, 1989). Also associated with shame is a field-dependent perceptual style (Crouppen, 1976; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968).

One of the most influential studies of shame-proneness was provided by Helen Block Lewis in her book, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis* (1971). She discusses shame and guilt as equally advanced superego functions which develop through identification. Guilt is the internalized threat of the punitive parent while shame is the internalized threat of loss of parental love due to a failure to live up to the ideal. She suggests that personal differences in superego style are reflected in perceptual style and psychopathology.

Proneness to shame is related to field-dependence while guilt is related to field-independence (Crouppen, 1976; Lewis, 1971). Lewis (1971) further proposes that differing neurotic symptoms result from difficulties in discharging

shame and guilt. Undischarged shame is connected with affective disorders, primarily depression and hysteria. Field-dependence is more likely among people with these affect disorders. Similarly, undischarged guilt and field-independence are associated with thought disorders, paranoia and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. In 1972, Smith found that among a group of individuals diagnosed as depressive neurotics, shame-proneness was positively associated with an passive-aggressive-hysterical character structure while guilt-proneness was positively linked to an obsessive-compulsive-paranoid character structure.

As evidence that perceptual style is related to shame and guilt, Lewis (1971) cites a clinical study by Witkin, Lewis and Weil (1968) in which the verbal production of four field-dependent and four field-independent patients matched for age, sex, education and occupation were analyzed for proneness to shame or guilt using Gottschalk and Gleser's (1969) methods of assessment. In this study, field-dependent patients demonstrated more shame reactions whereas field-independent patients expressed more feelings of guilt. In addition, field-dependent patients expressed more feelings of diffuse or nonspecific anxiety. Lewis relates this finding to the notion that shame is more ambiguous and difficult to discuss than guilt. Also noted in this study's results was the finding that greater incidents of hostility directed outwards were observed among field-independent patients as compare to field-dependent patients. Conversely, hostility directed inwards was more likely among field-dependent patients than among field-independent patients. Lewis (1979)

explains that in shame the rage which is felt is turned back upon the self because the self is in a passive position and, because the other is valued, the rage cannot become externally directed. In depression, the focus of hostility is the self. Lewis characterizes depression as two aspects of shame; hatred of the self and helplessness of the self to change the vicarious experience of the other. In several studies (Harder, 1995; Harder & Lewis, 1987; Harder & Zalma, 1990; Hoblitzelle, 1988; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Wright, O'Leary & Balkin, 1989) shame-proneness has been found to be positively correlated with depression.

In discussing the connection of shame and guilt to perceptual style and neurosis, Lewis (1971) points out that there are gender differences related to both proneness to shame and guilt and perceptual style. A significantly higher proportion of women than men are field-dependent. Women also are more prone to shame and have a higher incidence of depression and hysteria than men. (Although included in Lewis' discussion as hysteria, such psychiatric symptoms are now recognized as "somatization disorders" according to the current *Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, DSM-IV*). Men, in contrast, are more likely to be field-independent, prone to guilt, and have a higher incidence of obsessive-compulsive symptoms and paranoia. Lewis suggests that it may be the females' heightened significance of others which make them more susceptible to shame. Further, it may be the greater aggressiveness in males which make them more prone to guilt.

In her review of past research on gender differences in emotional development, Brody (1985) found that the theoretical predictions regarding shame and guilt differences between males and females have been virtually untested. More recent studies by Harder & Zalma (1990) and Wright, O'Leary & Balkin (1989) which utilized college student's self-assessments on shame adjective scales have not demonstrated gender proneness to shame. Harder (1990) proposes that the absence of sex differences in these investigations is attributable to the samples studied. In both cases, highly educated, well-functioning college students participated as subjects, thus limiting the extent of scale variability within the population. However, a study by Ferguson & Crowley (1997) demonstrated some support for Lewis' (1971) description of gender differences with regard to shame and guilt-proneness. Using canonical correlation analysis, scores for shame and guilt-proneness were used as criterion variables and scores of five defense mechanisms and three gender-role assessments were used as predictor variables. It was found that the principal canonical function for females was dominated by shame-proneness. Additionally, for females, shame-proneness was negatively associated with defenses of denial or intellectualization but positively related to defenses of "turning against the self" and "turning against the object." It was also positively related to a passive-dependency regard for the self and communal values. In contrast, the significant canonical function for males was dominated by guilt-proneness. For females, guilt-proneness was positively associated with defenses of denial or intellectualization but negatively related to defenses of

projection, "turning against the self," and "turning against the object." It was also very positively related to a sense of communal values.

Lewis (1971) also relates the high occurrence of field-dependence among alcoholics, obese persons, and ulcer patients. She proposes that patients who display these dependency needs are characteristic of the "passive-aggressive" aspect of shame-proneness. Fossum and Mason (1986) found in their work with dependent family systems a common element of family shame. They noted that addictive behavior is one of the most easily recognized indicators of shame in families.

Fossum and Mason (1986) describe the shame-bound family as "a family with a self-sustaining, multigenerational system of interaction with a cast of characters who are (or were in their lifetime) loyal to a set of rules and injunctions demanding control, perfectionism, blame and denial. The pattern inhibits or defeats secrets and vague personal boundaries, unconsciously instills shame in the family members, as well as chaos in their lives, and binds them to perpetuate shame in themselves and their kin" (p. 8).

Similarly, Stierlin (1974) recognized that disowned shame within a parent may lead to utilization of the child as a delegate to relieve the unacknowledged shame through projective identification. He illustrates such an intergenerational bind in his example of a mother who pushes her daughter to act promiscuously and so attacks her own disowned shame over youthful sexual encounters through punishment of her daughter's exploits. Kaufman (1974) posits that parents produce shame in their children primarily with regard

to that which continues to generate shame in the parent. Stierlin (1974) describes the family dominated by shame as pseudohostile. Afraid of seeming weak, the family members take on a tough, hostile demeanor. Fossum and Mason (1986) relate that masks are typically used by dysfunctional families to cover their shame. They describe some of the most common family masks: the fairytale family, the disconnected family, the rough and tough family, and the nice-nice family.

Several theorists have also discussed the underlying role of shame in narcissism. Broucek (1982) explains how the defense against shame may lead to either a grandiose self or a dissociative self. Shame is aroused through self-awareness of one's deficient status. The grandiose or "shameless" self eliminates shame by refusing to recognize the "actual self." The dissociative personality is one who rejects the grandiose self and accepts the actual self. This personality is usually distinguished by low self esteem. As the grandiose personality is likely to maintain his or her lofty position by devaluing others, the dissociative type conserves his or her lowly status by idealizing the other.

For Warren Kinston (1983), shame is the signal that a move from self-narcissism, an extreme or exaggerated concern with oneself in conjunction with a lack of concern for others, to object-narcissism, a sublimation of the self or one's identity so as to merge with an idealized object or other, is about to occur. It is when the child starts to develop autonomy and the parent curtails the child's individuation because of the parental wish to remain symbiotic that the origins of the child's negative core self-image develop. Shame is the signal

experience the child feels when the child wishes to comply with the parental desire for symbiosis even though it means disregarding the individuated and unique self. Shame recedes once the child is in a state of object-narcissism and denies the individual feelings. Kinston further notes that it is guilt which may spur the move from object-narcissism to self-narcissism. The awareness of the destruction to the individual results in guilt and this moves the individual towards a self-narcissistic state.

Sorotzkin (1985) proposes that the foundation of perfectionism in narcissism differs from that of neurotic perfectionism. Perfectionism in narcissism is the result of attempting to avoid shame by living up to a grandiose image of the self. Since in narcissism the self is poorly differentiated, a threat to the cohesiveness of the self is perceived through the loss of object love. Neurotic perfectionism is the result of attempting to circumvent feelings of guilt which arise over giving expression to forbidden wishes or thoughts.

Studies by Harder and colleagues (1987, 1990) and Wright et al. (1989) have illustrated significant negative correlations between shame-proneness as measured by self-endorsed shame adjectives and narcissism or self-centered attitudes. Harder (1984) found that shame-proneness assessed through recall of early memories was significantly lower for defensively high self esteem men than for non-defensive high self esteem men. These results, in conjunction, support the hypothesis that aggrandizing personalities defend against conscious shame.

Wright (1987) describes the protection of the self from injury or the repair of existing injury as essential to the narcissist. He posits that the manner in which males protect themselves differs from that of females. Males are more likely to exhibit behavior which may be characterized as antisocial. He suggests that the importance placed on self-definition, self-reliance and achievement in the Western culture has promoted a "shame phobic" culture, especially for males.

### **Shame and Aggression**

As previously noted, many theorists have identified an interaction between shame and anger or aggression. Piers (1953/1971) described the cycle of shame eliciting aggression which results in guilt. More recently, Stierlin (1974) described the sequence of shame and angry shaming attacks which characterized one shamed-based family. Stierlin proposes that guilt plays a role in regulating the attacks and counter-attacks within partners' quarrels. The shame-guilt bind is homeostatic in that it regulates each partner's attempts at individuation and separation. Analogously, it has been proposed that in violent spousal relationships, the violence functions to replace shame in the abusing partner with guilt over the transgression (Faulkner & Cogan, 1990). The remorse of the abusing partner promotes the reduction of shame in the abused partner. Stierlin (1974) further emphasized that it was each partner's own disowned shame which was the underlying cause of the angry attacks on the spouse.

In her analysis of patient transcripts, Lewis (1971) identified the presence of shame which was not acknowledged by either the patient or the therapist. She found that unacknowledged shame could primarily be categorized in two ways depending on the availability of the affect to the patient. The denied shame which she labeled "overt, unidentified" shame, is described as shame that is consciously experienced but not identified as shame by the patient. In overt, unidentified shame, the person may describe the feeling state in undifferentiated terms such as "lousy" or "bad" but not as definite shame feelings and/or the person may have observable shame reactions (e.g., blushing, lowering one's gaze, et cetera). Scheff and Retzinger have characterized the verbal and nonverbal indicators of overt, unidentified shame as "hiding" behaviors (Scheff, 1990). "The verbal terms hide shame under a disguising label; the nonverbal forms manifest suggestions of physical hiding: averting or lowering the gaze to escape the gaze of the other, and speech disruption and oversoft speech to hide the content of one's speech and thoughts." (Scheff, 1990, p. 86).

The second form of unacknowledged shame described by Lewis (1971), "by-passed" shame, is recognized by the lack of shame affect available to the person. In by-passed shame experiences, there is a cognitive awareness of a shame situation involving the self but the shame is experienced only as a "wince" or "jolt." Along with the apparent lack of consciously experienced affect, additional indicators of by-passed shame are the ideation of the self from the "other's" viewpoint, especially doubts regarding how one appears to

the other, and obsessive or ruminating ideation, i.e., the repetition of a story or thought without really coming to a point or conclusion. Through experiencing shame in a by-passed manner, the individual seems to have avoided the affective component of shame by intellectualizing or distancing the experience from the self.

Lewis (1971) contends that during experiences of shame, hostility is directed towards the deficient self. The impulse to "bury one's face" and "sink into the ground" are the feelings of rage towards oneself (Erikson, 1950/1963; Lewis, 1971). Lewis (1971) describes the self as feeling small and helpless against the hostility of the rejecting "other." In most cases, hostility towards the rejecting other accompanies that which is directed inwards. However, this hostility is experienced as "humiliating fury" or "shame-rage" since the self is still deficient, contemptible. "To be furious or enraged with someone because one is ashamed of being unloved renders one easily and simultaneously guilty about being furious. Evoked hostility is readily directed against the ashamed, guilty, i.e., vulnerable, self." (p. 41).

Lewis (1971) further notes that the manner in which hostility is discharged varies symptomatically depending on the type of unacknowledged shame experienced. Overt, unidentified shame experiences were typified by shame-rage, anger directed towards the self by guilt. In contrast, overt hostility often characterized by-passed shame episodes. In examining field-dependent and field-independent patients, Lewis determined that field-dependent patients were more likely to display overt, unidentified shame and that field-independent

patients demonstrated a greater propensity to experience by-passed shame. Similarly, Crouppen (1976) found that among a group of normal and depressed males, field-dependent males were more likely than field-independent males to be shame prone and to express hostility inwards. Shame and guilt-proneness in this study were determined from Beall's Shame and Guilt Test. This measure uses self-ratings of the extent to which one would feel uncomfortable in given situations to assess shame and guilt-proneness. Shame items are comprised of situations which involve a failing to live up to an ideal, being embarrassed, and being exposed or having deficiencies exposed. Guilt items deal with wanting to violate or the violation of one's moral code which results in injury to oneself or another. In the same study, field-independents demonstrated more hostility outwards but they were not significantly different from the field-dependents on guilt as measured by Beall's measure. In this study, shame-proneness is certainly consistent with Lewis' idea of overt, unidentified shame since ratings are made on the extent to which one would be "upset" rather than "ashamed" in situations which involve a sense of inadequacy. Interestingly, in a 1966 study of a non-psychiatric population cited by deGroot (1968), field-independence rather than field-dependence was found to have a small but significant association with higher shame scores. Here, shame, guilt and hostility scores were derived from five-minute verbal samples using the Gottschalk-Gleser content analysis method (Gottschalk, Winget, & Gleser, 1969). When the verbal samples were later analyzed (deGroot, 1968; Lewis, 1971), it was found that the 10 most field-independent participant's

shame scores were based on concerns raised regarding privacy. The 10 most field-dependent participants verbal samples, which also contained no shame anxiety, were more mundane in content and positive in feelings expressed. Lewis suggests this may reflect the responses of repressors.

Miller (1985) also found that people who professed little or no shame were likely to reflexively attack anyone who might involve them in a shame experience. She suggests that anger relieves shame by moving the self from a passive state of shame to an active state of aggression. She also observed shifts from shame to self-hate or aggressive self-attack in several subjects. If one actively assumes the position of aggressor, even towards oneself, the passive helplessness of being ashamed may be temporarily abated. Miller also related instances when because of shame or fear over expressing anger, one may deny aggressive feelings by experiencing shame. In the concluding remarks of her phenomenological study, Miller emphasizes the close relationship of shame and anger. She states that she was "repeatedly impressed by indications that inhibition of anger either directly motivated the shame experience, as a punishment for aggression, or it allowed shame to proliferate by rendering the person shamefully weak or by denying the person the opportunity to defend himself or herself against attacks on self-esteem." (p. 170).

Kaufman (1974) explains that rage may be used to protect the self from exposure and further shame by isolating the self and deterring others from involvement. He contends that the rage invoked in one because of a severing

of an interpersonal bridge by the other is likely to elicit shame in the other as well. A vicious cycle of shame and rage between the participants may ensue. Kaufman, however, suggests that the cycle may be avoided totally or halted by the other's acknowledgment of his or her role in creating the shame experience. For example, tired from working a double shift at the local hospital, a mother comes home. Rather than taking the time to listen to her son's explanation of why the house is not clean, she "cuts him off" and accuses him of not being responsible. He, in response, feels angry and shuts her out with accusations of his own. If the mother were able to recognize that she snapped at her son because she was experiencing shame at not being a "responsible mother," she could rebuild the interpersonal bridge with her son by sharing with him her feelings of shame and showing him that he is valued.

Scheff (1987) emphasizes the importance of Lewis' (1971) finding that shame evoked but not acknowledged usually results in a rapid series of emotions. He describes the most common of sequences, unacknowledged shame followed by anger, as the shame-rage spiral. By labeling the emotional sequence a spiral, Scheff portrays the contagious effect emotional reactions to emotional reactions may have. He refers to the chain reaction of shame and anger both between and within the parties which results from the rejection of one or both parties as "triple spirals" of shame and anger (Scheff, 1988, 1998).

Retzinger (1987, 1998) also describes rage as functioning to ward off shame and maintain one's image and connections with others. She views rage as normal and short-lived when experienced alone. However, rage which is

bound by shame is usually problematic. Rage in this situation is likely to be redirected onto the self or displaced onto an undeserving other. Retzinger maintains that when hostility is traced back to its origin, it is likely that an incident of shame which was not consciously acknowledged remains at its core. Unless shame is acknowledged, shame-rage or resentment is likely to perpetuate itself.

Like Cooley (1922), Scheff (1988) perceives the self as continually monitoring itself on a social basis, and this social monitoring as always resulting in shame or pride. Further, he proposes that the states of shame or pride which the self experiences are often inconspicuous even to the self. Using Lewis' (1971) concepts of overt, unidentified shame and by-passed shame, he describes unacknowledged shame as under- and over-distanced. Under-distanced shame or overt, unidentified shame interferes with thought and/or speech. The pain of shame is obvious but mislabeled. In over-distanced shame, i.e., by-passed shame, the pain escapes consciousness through obsessive or hyperactive thought, speech and/or actions. Scheff suggests that the patterns of unacknowledged shame correspond to Adler's (1956) theory that children denied love at crucial points develop an adult personality dominated by either an inferiority complex or drive for power. Shame experienced as under-distanced, overt, unidentified shame characterizes the behavior of the inferiority complex personality, while over-distanced, by-passed shame describes the shame experiences of the personality with a drive for power.

In her book, *Violent Emotions: Shame and Rage in Marriage Quarrels*, Retzinger (1991) describes the central role of shame in initiating and maintaining conflicts. Shame initially functions as a signal that a bond is threatened. As social beings, the bond which exists between individuals is continually being built, maintained, repaired, or damaged. Shame signals that we are either too close, engaged in engulfment, or too far apart, in a state of isolation, for the well-being of the self. Anger acts as protection against shame as well as a warning to others that readjustment in the relationship is necessary.

In her theory of conflict, Retzinger (1991) contends that when shame and anger are acknowledged, they function properly to reinstate the bond. By acknowledging the shame, the self is recognizing the threat to the bond and the respect for the other's opinion. The partners may then engage in dialogue regarding the problem which will lead towards the resolution of the problem and the repairing and building of the bond between the partners. As previously indicated, when shame is unacknowledged it may lead to anger or withdrawal. The bond is thus further threatened and damaged. As shame continues unacknowledged within each partner and between the partners, the conflict escalates. Retzinger noticed that if a resolution between parties seems impossible because of continually erupting anger, it is usually an indicator that there is some unacknowledged humiliation in one or both parties, i.e., the bond is constantly being damaged.

**Retzinger (1991) maintains that the less differentiated the individual, the more likely he or she is to engage in dysfunctional conflict. When the sense of self is dependent on the other, there is an intolerance for emotion in the other since it results in emotional reactivity in the self. Low level differentiation maintains an insecure, rigid bonding system. Because of the reactive nature of undifferentiated partners, movement by either party towards either closeness or distance is perceived as threatening. The threat of alienation may be experienced as either engulfment or isolation. Mirman (1984) using a composite shame score derived from several measures of shame, embarrassment and shyness, did indeed find that shame was positively correlated with scores indicating greater emotional reliance on others. Fossum and Mason (1986) similarly describe the unclear boundaries which characterize members of the shame-bound family. The shame-bound family members view others, the outside world, as regulating them since they have no real sense of self. Fossum and Mason suggest that one indicator of the low differentiated person is the adherence to highly stereotypic sex-role behavior.**

**Scheff and Retzinger (1991) discuss how shame is related to both preventing and promoting violence. While acknowledged shame inhibits violence, unacknowledged shame encourages it. Using the work of Lewis (1971) and Braithwaite (1989), Scheff and Retzinger explain how shame affects violence on both an individual and social level. Lewis describes the affect of shame which is acknowledged as short-lived and a signal for repair of the damaged bond. Denied shame in the individual evokes shame or anger in**

response to being ashamed and thus leads to lack of communication or separation between individuals. Similarly, Braithwaite proposes that reintegrative or normal shaming controls crime but stigmatization promotes more crime. Scheff and Retzinger posit what they have named the Lewis-Braithwaite hypothesis to explain the destructive and constructive nature of shame. The hypothesis states "that normal shame and shaming produce social solidarity, whereas pathological shame and shaming produce alienation" (p. 30).

Central to Scheff's and Retzinger's (1991) theory of social action are the emotions of pride and shame. They theorize that superior cooperation is dependent on effective communications. Effective communication, moreover, causes and is caused by attunement or social solidarity and pride. Further, shared pride is the result of and an impetus for solidarity. Conversely, destructive conflict is related to dysfunctional communication, unacknowledged shame and alienation. Scheff and Retzinger contend that the form of alienation is related to the experienced mode of unacknowledged shame. Engulfment as indicated by speech patterns dominated by the use of "we," "us," and "ours," is associated with overt, unidentified shame. Isolation, as signaled by the predominate use of pronouns which designate the separation between individuals (e.g., "I," "you," "me," and "mine"), is related to by-passed shame. Further, Scheff and Retzinger suggest that it is when alienation is experienced as isolation that open conflict, including violence, is possible.

In a summary profile of men who batter their spouses or children, Wiger (1988) describes a male population befitting shame theorists' characterization of alienated and shame prone individuals. He recounts the following attributes as being common in men who batter: inhibition of emotional expression, emotional dependence on a primary figure along with a sense of isolation from others, and a conceptualization of the masculine role that includes a belief in male dominance with regard to women. When Wiger compared men who reported one or more acts of physical violence to those who reported no use of violence, he found a positive relationship between violence and internalized shame. Internalized shame refers to frequently experienced negative self-perceptions as reported on Cook's (1988) Internalized Shame Score. This score differs in many respects from other shame scales as it is not an obvious measure of the frequency of shame or shame-related feelings. Rather, this scale assesses the frequency of experiences which are proposed as typical of denied shame that results from abuse, rejection, and/or significant loss in one's family of origin (e.g., I scold myself and put myself down). Wiger further found that when comparing males who scored above the mean on internalized shame with those who scored below, those high in internalized shame not only reported having used physical violence more often but also verbal aggression and reasoning. That is, men reporting higher levels of internalized shame engaged in more conflicts overall.

In a number of recent studies, Tangney and colleagues (Tangney, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney, Wagner, Barlow,

Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996) have found a positive correlation between shame-proneness and anger and/or self-reported aggression. They found that undergraduates with high scores for shame-proneness on a scenario-based measure designed to assess indices of shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, externalization, detachment-unconcern, and pride, were also likely to score higher than other study participants on externalization and on measures of trait anger and several hostility scales including the following: suspiciousness, resentment, irritability, and indirect expressions of hostility (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). Studies investigating the relationship between shame-proneness, guilt-proneness and the management of anger, i.e., how people react once they become angry, (Tangney, Wagner, Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996) have shown that, across all ages, shame-proneness is related to maladaptive or nonconstructive responses to anger. Shame-proneness was found to be positively correlated with both active aggressive responses and also passive aggressive responses, i.e., ruminative, unexpressed anger, self-directed hostility, and a tendency to withdraw from anger-related circumstances. The researchers further reported that shame-prone individuals rated the long term consequences of anger episode as more negative than did less shame-prone participants.

### **Shame and/or Hostility Expression, Alienation and Perceptual Orientation**

As previously discussed, Scheff and Retzinger (1991) propose that alienation experienced as engulfment is positively associated with overt, unidentified shame and alienation as isolation is related to by-passed shame

**and hostility expressed outwards. The fact that the relationship they describe between alienation, shame and hostility parallels that of field orientation, shame and hostility as advanced by Lewis (1971) suggests that extreme field-dependence as well as field-independence may be linked with alienation.**

**An alternative explanation for the relationship between field orientation, alienation and the expression of shame and hostility is that alienation and field orientation, in conjunction, determine the mode of expression. The findings of previous studies which have attempted to link the expression of shame with field-dependency and guilt with field-independence suggest that it may be that at greater levels of alienation, field orientation determines the predominate manner in which shame and hostility are expressed. At low levels of alienation, the expression of shame and hostility may be determined by both field orientation and emotional/environmental components of the situation. The rationale for this proposed relationship is based on the several older studies (Crouppen, 1976; deGroot, 1968; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968), the findings of which have not been explored in more current works. Data base searches of PsycLit for 1974 through June, 1999 and of the Social Science Indexes for 1974 through July, 1999 did not locate more recently published studies in this area.**

**The study by Witkin, Lewis and Weil (1968), which was discussed earlier in the section on social and personality correlates of shame, illustrated a positive relationship between the following: field-dependence and shame-proneness, field-dependence and hostility directed inwards, field-independence**

and guilt-proneness, and field-independence and hostility directed outwards. Because of the paucity of participants, their status as outpatients in therapy at a mental hygiene clinic, and their location at the extremes of the field orientation continuum, the generalizability of the results is debatable. Both the study by deGroot (1968) and by Crouppen (1976) ventured to address this issue as part of their studies.

A study by deGroot (1968) in 1966, which utilized the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin et al., 1954/1972) for measurement of field-dependence/field-independence and the Gottschalk-Gleser (Gottschalk, Winget, & Gleser, 1969) procedure for assessment of shame, guilt, and hostility, investigated the generalizability of Witkin, Lewis, and Weil's results. In this study a population of male and female undergraduates were defined as field-dependent and field-independent by a median split on embedded figures scores. In contrast to the findings of Witkin et al., shame scores were slightly correlated with embedded figures scores but in a negative direction. No other correlations with the embedded figures measurement were significant. Interestingly, deGroot (1968) noted in her earlier 1966 study that there was a significant difference in the expression of hostility outwards and anxiety which was attributable only to the non-gender differences among interviewers since sex of the interviewer was controlled in the analysis. Although deGroot gives no particulars of the exact differences that were seen among the interviewers, she does conjecture that differences in the interviewer's level of anxiety and hostility was responsible for the variance of the amount of the same affect shown by their participants.

Thus, while it was possible that the differences in populations between the Witkin et al. study and this study were attributable for the discrepant results of the two studies, it was also conceivable that differences in the emotional climate were responsible for the dissimilar findings. DeGroot's 1968 study addressed these possibilities.

By using male interviewers of differing anxiety and hostility levels, i.e., low versus high, and instructing them to conduct the interviews in either a cold or warm manner, deGroot (1968) investigated the effects of the interpersonal interaction situation as well as field orientation on the emotional content of male undergraduate's verbal productions. In deGroot's study, 88 male undergraduate participants were defined as either field-dependent or field-independent by whether their embedded figures scores were above or below the median for the total participant group. They were then randomly assigned one of eight possible interviewes, two interviewers were selected for each of the anxiety and hostility combinations, and to either a warm (friendly) or cold interview manner type. Analysis of variance results of this unpublished dissertation study revealed no meaningful relationship between field orientation and the expression of shame, guilt or hostility directed inwards. The highest order interaction, anxiety by hostility by manner of interview by field orientation, was significant for both shame and guilt but the relationship between the scores was uninterpretable. Of particular note in this study was a finding illustrating that the extent to which hostility is expressed outwards is dependent upon different conditions for field-dependent and field-independent individuals.

When either the interviewer's anxiety was low or the interviewer conducted the experiment in a cold manner, the field-independent participants expressed greater hostility outwards than field-dependent participants. When the interviewer's anxiety level was high or the interview was conducted in a warm manner, the field-dependent participants displayed greater hostility outwards than field-independent participants. Among field-dependent participants, the effect of the two conditions was additive, i.e., the highest hostility directed outwards scores were obtained when interviewers with high anxiety scores conducted the interview in a warm manner, and the lowest hostility directed outwards scores were observed when interviewers with low anxiety scores conducted the interview in a cold manner. DeGroot points out that because of the greater influence which the "field" is understood to have upon field-dependent individuals, as compared to field-independent individuals, this result is consistent with field orientation theory. The field-independent individuals behavior would be expected to vary less from situation-to-situation than field-dependents since they rely more directly on internal referents. In her study, deGroot found that while the field-independent participants did express greater hostility directed outwards than field-dependent participants under certain conditions, the scores of the field-independent participants varied less as a group among the different conditions than did the field-dependent participants.

Crouppen (1976) conducted a study which tested the effects of field-dependence/field-independence on proneness to shame and/or guilt and the expression of hostility in a group of normal, non-psychiatric, and depressed

males. As described earlier, his study demonstrated results similar to that of Witkin, Lewis and Weil's. Field-dependence was positively related to shame-proneness and hostility directed towards the self while field-independence was positively associated with hostility directed outwards. Specifically, it was found that the difference between field-dependent and field-independent participants on shame-proneness was due primarily to the differences in the non-depressed sample. The difference in the depressed group, while in the same direction as the non-depressed sample, was not significant. Further, the depressed participants had significantly higher shame and guilt scores than the non-depressed group. The effect of field orientation on ratings of hostility outwards and hostility directed inwards was significant in both depressed and non-depressed groups. As with the Witkin et al. study, Crouppen also used the extremes of field orientation in his investigation. He established the field-dependent and field-independent groups by first selecting out of sixty depressed patients those with scores in the upper-third and bottom-third of the distribution of all patient's Rod and Frame Test (RFT) scores. Crouppen then used the RFT score distributions from these extreme field-dependent and field-independent depressed participants as criteria for selecting a comparable sample of normal or non-depressed participants. The non-depressed group was drawn from individuals participating in a special education program for veterans. The program was established to help those who would not usually be accepted through regular college admissions and/or those whose economic background may have deterred them from pursuing additional education. The

depressed group was comprised mainly of voluntary in-patients at a veteran's hospital; however, a few involuntary admissions and outpatients were among both the field-dependent and the field-independent participants.

In examining the three studies discussed above, it is apparent that the results from the Witkin et al. study closely resemble those from Crouppen's non-depressed sample. One possible explanation for the similarity of findings relating to shame and field-dependence in the two studies and the lack of results with regard to a relationship between guilt and field-independence in the Crouppen study may lie in the measures utilized. In the two studies, the instruments used to measure shame are similar in that they both appear to assess overt, unidentified shame. The two instruments used to measure guilt do not seem to share such a common dimension of assessment.

In the Witkin et al. study, the Gottschalk method was used to assess shame and guilt-proneness from verbal samples. Based on Lewis' definitions of overt, unidentified shame and by-passed shame, most indicators of shame under the Gottschalk procedure would be considered overt, unidentified shame since references to the self as feeling inadequate, embarrassed, exposed, et cetera are coded for shame whether the speaker labels the feeling as shame or not. However, because in by-passed shame episodes the speaker depicts the self as involved in a shame situation but not as experiencing any affect connected with that experience, it may be that the Gottschalk method may include as examples of guilt what Lewis would characterize as by-passed shame indicators. Because the Gottschalk scoring method includes examples

of the self as being adversely criticized or abused as guilt anxiety, it is possible that by-passed shame indicators are included in the guilt score. Lewis (1971) has noted that by-passed shame is often hard to distinguish from guilt. This is because ideations of doubt regarding how one appears to the "other" and of guilt about the shame-connected event are common to by-passed shame experiences. With the Beall Shame and Guilt Test, the measure used in Crouppen's study, the shame measure may be tapping overt, unidentified shame feelings since individuals are asked to rate the extent to which they would experience discomfort rather than "shame" in depicted shame situations. Given that Beall's measure assesses guilt-proneness through self-ratings of how upsetting one finds particular situations involving moral code violation, it is unlikely that this scale is obtaining any measure of by-passed shame.

In considering the Witkin et al., deGroot and Crouppen studies further, it is evident that the deGroot studies' results differ substantially from those of the other two studies. The only result which was replicated in the deGroot study from the Witkin et al. study was the association between hostility directed outwards and field-independence under cold/anxious conditions. Based on this finding, deGroot suggested that a cold type of interview situation may be closer to approximating a therapy environment. She had originally thought that a warm interview situation would be more similar to a therapy interaction. In her 1966 study, deGroot's analysis of freshmen's interviews which were conducted during orientation week demonstrated a relationship between shame-proneness and field-independence which was opposite of that reported by both

Witkin et al. and Crouppen. That these freshman interviews probably represent the warmest environmental conditions of each of these studies, it seems likely that the emotional atmosphere of the interview in conjunction with field orientation influence the manner in which shame and hostility are expressed. However, the findings of Witkin et al. and Crouppen support Lewis' (1971) suggestion that the differences in superego style, proneness to shame versus proneness to guilt, parallel differences in field orientation, field-dependence and field-independence respectively.

One explanation for these incongruous conclusions is that only the deGroot studies involved an environment which was "warm" enough for the relationship between shame and field-independence and between hostility expressed outwards and field-dependence to be demonstrated. Another justification for the dissimilarity between the results of the deGroot studies and those of Witkin et al. and Crouppen may be related to differences in the experienced level of alienation in the varying samples. While undergraduate volunteers also participated in Crouppen's study, they differed from deGroot's participants in that they were part of a special education program developed for "veterans whose educational achievement would not normally be acceptable for admission into a regular college program and/or whose economic background has not encouraged them to seek further education" (p. 91). Assuming a lower socioeconomic status for the Crouppen undergraduates as compared to the deGroot undergraduates, one would expect the Crouppen undergraduates to be experiencing a higher level of alienation than the

deGroot groups since alienation has been negatively associated with socioeconomic status (Dean, 1961; Maddi, Kobasa & Hooper, 1979; Neal & Groat, 1974). Given that depression and alienation have been positively related in several studies (Abdallah, 1997; Oliver & Novak, 1993; Schimek & Meyer, 1975; Tolor & LeBlanc, 1971), it may be that Crouppen's depressed sample of primarily psychiatric in-patients could possibly have been higher in alienation levels than any of the other samples being discussed. A key criteria for the selection of the other sample of participants in Crouppen's study was their status as "non-depressed." As previously noted, the participants of Witkin, Lewis and Weil's study were outpatients undergoing therapy. Of these outpatients, only one gave depression as a reason for seeking treatment.

Interestingly, a comparison of the results for the two Crouppen samples illustrates that the depressed group expressed greater shame-proneness and guilt-proneness than the non-depressed group. Also, there was no difference between the depressed field-dependent and depressed field-independent groups on shame-proneness. Among the non-depressed sample, this difference was significant. This may indicate that if alienation is associated with shame as Scheff & Retzinger suppose, field orientation no longer influences the expression of shame at heightened levels of alienation. Since field orientation levels were matched for the depressed and non-depressed groups, the differing results between the two groups may indeed be due to differences in alienation among the groups or possibly situational differences.

While it is not possible to ascertain the differences in emotional climate of Witkin, Lewis and Weil's or Crouppen's study or that of deGroot's first study, there are certainly some similarities in other situational conditions that can be noted. The situations under which the measures of shame, guilt, and hostility were obtained were probably more similar for the Crouppen depressed patients and the participants of the Witkin et al. study than for the Crouppen non-depressed sample and either group. Assessment of the Witkin et al. sample came from transcripts of therapy sessions at a mental hygiene clinic. In the Crouppen depressed group, the measures were completed at an office in the veterans hospital in sessions set up by appointment. The undergraduates from Crouppen's study completed the measures in small classroom settings.

Given the situational and sampling differences in the Witkin et al. and the Crouppen studies and yet the similarity of the results from the Witkin et al. participants and the Crouppen non-depressed group, it is credible that both field orientation and some other dimension, possibly alienation, influence the expression of shame and hostility. When the situational similarities between the Witkin et al. study and the depressed group of the Crouppen study and the sample similarities between the depressed and non-depressed groups in Crouppen's study are appraised along with the recognition of dissimilar results from these groups, the plausibility of this proposal is given additional weight. Of particular note in each of the investigators findings is the result that under certain conditions in each study, hostility directed outwards was linked to field-independence. However, shame and hostility directed inwards were not

necessarily associated with field-dependence nor was guilt with field-independence under those same conditions. Thus, it would appear that under certain conditions hostility directed outwards is associated with field-independence regardless of possible alienation level.

### **Summation**

In the review above, an understanding of shame has been advanced through discussion of shame's etiology, physical manifestations, experiential components, social and cultural aspects, and social and personality correlates. Further, the interaction of shame and aggression was emphasized as was also the relationship between expression of shame and hostility and levels of alienation and field perception or orientation. In general, shame may be considered a negative affect and a motive for behavior. The experience of shame is characterized by a heightening of self-awareness and the recognition of one's self as inadequate or inappropriate. On a social level, shame establishes and maintains standards of behavior. At the individual level, shame reveals to consciousness one's actual and idealized self as well as one's position vis-à-vis the environment.

Shame feelings are most commonly described as being produced through a failure to reach goals or ideals. In psychoanalytic terms, shame is the tension felt between the ego and the ego ideal when the ego ideal is not reached. As a learned emotion, shame is experienced when one fails to live up to the internalized standards or goals of one's parents or significant caretaker.

**Underlying shame is the fear of abandonment which stems from the fear of the loss of positive bonds or love between oneself and the loving parent.**

**Given that experiences of shame bring to awareness one's self and one's relationship with others, shame may be considered a constructive element in establishing one's identity and recognizing the need for change in either the self or the environment. Experiences of shame signal that a positive bond with another or the self is threatened. By acknowledging shame, one recognizes the need for readjustment of one's self-image, one's behavior, or perhaps one's relationship with another or one's environment. Shame allows one to repair the damaged bond.**

**However, when shame is not acknowledged, the damaged bond remains ignored, continuing to threaten one's identity and one's relationship with others. In this state, other emotions including anger and guilt are often experienced as defense against the shame feelings. As a result, dysfunctional behavior such as anger directed towards the self or unwarranted aggression towards others may ensue, promoting further shame as well as alienation of other individuals. Recent discussions of destructive conflict have proposed that its cause is based in unacknowledged shame and alienation, or threatened social bonds, along with dysfunctional communication.**

**Unacknowledged shame is categorized into two forms of manifestation based on the extent to which the affect is consciously experienced. "Overt, unidentified shame" is felt on a conscious level but not identified as shame, e.g., shame is described as uneasiness, awkward feelings, et cetera. "By-**

passed shame" is recognized by a cognitive awareness of a shame situation involving the self but lacks any apparent experienced affect. These forms of unacknowledged shame have been linked to differences in field orientation and the manner in which hostility is discharged. While overt, unidentified shame is associated with field-dependency and self-directed hostility, by-passed shame is related to field-independency and hostility directed outwards. It has been similarly suggested that a sense of engulfment is correlated with expression of shame through overt, unidentified manifestations, while a sense of isolation corresponds to indications of by-passed shame and hostility directed outwards.

Previous research investigating the association between perceptual orientation and the expression of shame, guilt, and hostility directed inwards and hostility directed outwards suggests that the positive relationship between field-dependence and overt, unidentified shame and hostility directed inwards, and the positive relationship between field-independence and by-passed shame and hostility directed outwards perhaps only exist at certain levels of alienation and under certain situational or emotional climate conditions. In table 1, the positive association between differing perceptual orientations and manner of shame and hostility expression are illustrated as they may exist at varying level of alienation and emotional climate conditions.

At low levels of alienation, situational conditions may interact with field orientation to influence the manner in which shame and hostility are expressed. While under cold interpersonal interaction conditions the relationship between

Table 1

**ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN FIELD ORIENTATION & MANNER OF SHAME AND HOSTILITY EXPRESSION**

**At High Levels of Alienation:**

**Field-dependence is**  
Positively associated with:

**Field-independence is**  
positively associated with:

Hostility Directed Inwards	Hostility Directed Outwards
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**At Middle Levels of Alienation:**

**Field-dependence is**  
Positively associated with:

**Field-independence is**  
positively associated with:

Overt, Unidentified Shame Hostility Directed Inwards	By-passed Shame Hostility Directed Outwards
---------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------

**At Low Levels of Alienation:**

**Field-dependence is**  
Positively associated with:

**Field-independence is**  
positively associated with:

(Under Warm Conditions)	(Under Cold Conditions)	(Under Warm Conditions)	(Under Cold Conditions)
By-passed Shame	Overt, Unidentified Shame	Overt, Unidentified Shame	By-passed Shame
Hostility Outwards	Hostility Inwards	Hostility Inwards	Hostility Outwards

under warm situational conditions, the relationship may exist in a direction

field orientation and shame may be as previously hypothesized. However, under warm situational conditions, the relationship may exist in a direction opposite of that expected. Specifically, in warm conditions field-independence will be related to overt, unidentified shame and hostility directed inwards while field-dependence will be positively associated with by-passed shame and hostility directed outwards. When alienation is heightened, field orientation is once again expected to predominately affect the mode in which shame and hostility are expressed. Thus, field orientation will be associated with the expression of shame and hostility in the traditionally hypothesized style, i.e., field-dependence will be positively related to overt, unidentified shame and hostility directed inwards while field-independence will be associated with by-passed shame and hostility directed outwards. At levels of even greater alienation, however, while field orientation may still influence the way in which hostility is expressed, the manner in which shame is expressed is not expected to differ across the field orientation continuum. Posited theories suggest that the overall level of shame is positively related to the level of alienation. This research empirically examined the effect of alienation and field orientation on the overall level of shame and hostility and the manner in which they were expressed within a sample of socioeconomically middle class adult women working and/or residing in the New York City metropolitan area, i.e., this research focused on a sample of adults which were not predisposed to heightened shame or alienation because of their status as either psychiatric patients or lower socioeconomic class.

### **III. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The purpose of this study is to investigate the manner in which alienation and field orientation influence the amount of shame and hostility expressed and the mode of expression in a sample of the nonclinical, female adults residing in the New York City metropolitan area.

Lewis (1971) and Scheff and Retzinger (1991) have proposed theories which positively associate unacknowledged shame with the discharge of hostility. Again, either overt, unidentified shame or by-passed shame experiences are considered unacknowledged shame. Based on the work of Lewis (1971) and Scheff (1987), several observable patterns have been identified which differentiate overt, unidentified shame from by-passed shame and both of these forms of unacknowledged shame from acknowledged shame. These patterns are reviewed in table 2.

While Lewis' discussion links the mode of unacknowledged shame and the direction in which hostility is discharged with field orientation, Scheff and Retzinger's conceptualization associates the mode of unacknowledged shame and hostility expression with the manner in which alienation is experienced. The diagrams in figures 1 and 2 below depict the relationships proposed by Lewis and Scheff and Retzinger.

Table 2

## **SHAME MANIFESTATIONS: ACKNOWLEDGED AND UNACKNOWLEDGED**

### **Acknowledged Shame:**

Direct verbal reference to shame feelings: ashamed, chagrined, embarrassed, humiliated, ignominious, mortified, et cetera.

### **Unacknowledged Shame:**

Indirect reference to shame feelings: the combination of word usage, verbal presentation and visual mannerisms which suggest an experience of the self or another as diminished.

***Overt, Unidentified Shame:*** Unacknowledged shame which is manifested in this manner is typified by hiding behavior in one's verbal and visual behavior. Shame feelings are obvious to the observer in that they produce a disruption of thought and speech.

- **Hiding Vocabulary:** Down playing or lessen the severity of shame expression through utilization of mediated or ambiguous shame labels, mitigation, and denial.

**Mediated or Ambiguous Shame Labels:** Shame feelings which are identified but not directly labeled, e.g., foolish, stupid, ridiculous, inadequate, defective, incompetent, low self-esteem, awkward, exposed, vulnerable, insecure.

**Mitigation:** The inclusion of words or phrases which serve to lessen the severity of the statement (Labov & Fanschel, 1977), e.g., "I felt just a little foolish," "Well, not really degrading, more like upsetting."

**Denial:** Shame feelings which are expressed through specific negation of the feeling, e.g., "It doesn't bother me when they tease me," "I don't worry about not being as pretty as my sisters."

- **Verbal Hiding Behavior:** Variation in pitch, length, and loudness of verbalization which indicate a sensitivity for the issue being discussed.

**Long or Filled Pauses:** Pauses which are "filled" with expressions such as "ah," "uh," "like," "well," and "you know" and silences of more than a second in length.

**Repetition or Self-Interruption:** Repeated words or sounds, stammering, or interruption of the dialog to change or modify one's discussion, e.g., "He didn't want to, want, wa, I didn't want him to stay."

**Lowered or softened volume:** Lowering or softening the loudness of speech, often to a point of inaudibility

**Laughed Words:** laughter released in response to overt embarrassment or self-mockery or ridicule of another

Table 2 (Con't)

- **Hiding Behavior - Visual Indicators:** Full or abbreviated physical gestures which serve to limit facial communication.

Face Touching with one's hand to cover all or part of the face

Gaze Aversion, eyes lowered or askant

- Other Indicators of overt shame include blushing and speech patterns which imply disorganization of thought, e.g., forgetting what one was talking about, changing topics, et cetera.

***By-passed Shame:*** Unacknowledged shame which is "by-passed" is characterized by a distancing of the emotion from the self. An interest in the self from the point of view of the other is typical. Further, this separation or distancing of the self from shame feelings through visualizing the other's experience results in a sense of doubt, a balancing of issues from both perspectives. While thought and speech are not disrupted, as is the case with overt shame, they do take on a repetitive or obsessive quality.

- **Affective Indicators.**

Initial Wince: The most conspicuous sign of the emotional component of by-passed shame is an initial "wince," "jolt," "groan," or wordless "shock" followed by ideation of the self from the other's viewpoint.

- **Verbal Indicators.**

Repetition or Rumination: Repetition of a story or thought without coming to a point or conclusion. The continuous mental re-enactment of a scene where the individual was judged, by the self or another, to be deficient.

- **Visual Indicators.**

Controlled Expressions: An outwardly appearance of indifference or control is indicative of shame which is by-passed, e.g., the stare of false pride, the look of one attempting to "outface the other."



**Figure 1. Lewis: The Relationship Between Field Orientation, Unacknowledged Shame and Hostility**



**Figure 2. Scheff & Retzinger: The Relationship Between Mode of Alienation, Unacknowledged Shame and Hostility**

Results of previous research which explored the relationship between field orientation and shame- and guilt-proneness, and between field orientation and the direction of expressed hostility have produced conflicting results (Crouppen, 1976; deGroot, 1968; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968). Among groups of undergraduates split on the median of the field-dependence/field-independence continuum and interviewed under warm interpersonal climate conditions, the relationship between field orientation, shame, and hostility was either non-existent or in a direction opposite of that predicted with regard to Lewis' theory. Again, Lewis hypothesized that a positive relationship between field-dependence, overt, unidentified shame, and hostility directed inwards would exist as would a positive association between field-independence, by-passed shame, and hostility directed outwards. Under cold interactive conditions, hostility directed outwards was linked with the expected perceptual orientation, i.e., people who expressed greater hostility outwards were more

likely to be field-independent. Among psychiatric outpatients and college students in a veteran's special education program, the association between field orientation, expression of shame and direction of hostility was as proposed. The expressions of shame, hostility directed inwards and hostility directed outwards were assessed through therapy transcripts for the outpatient group while group measurements were conducted in small classroom settings on the college sample. Given that the measures of shame-proneness utilized in these studies actually assess overt, unidentified shame, the findings of these previous investigations indicate that overt, unidentified shame may be related to field-dependence and the expression of hostility inwards under certain conditions. Questions regarding what were those particular conditions still exist.

Assuming the importance attributed by Scheff and Retzinger of alienation in the expression of shame and anger, alienation could provide a possible key to the different results generated. It is certainly plausible that the alienation level of the outpatients and veteran undergraduates was greater than that of the other undergraduate sample. Perhaps, it may be that heightened alienation and extreme field-dependence are at least two of the conditions necessary for the positive association proposed by Lewis among field-dependence, hostility discharged inwards and overt, unidentified shame to occur. Similarly, it may be that heightened alienation and extreme levels of field-independence are necessary for the manifestation of the positive relationship contended by Lewis between field-independence, hostility directed outwards and by-passed shame.

Given that Scheff and Retzinger contend that shame and alienation are directly related, it would appear that the suggestion posed above that alienation acts as a modifier would conflict with their assertion that alienation and shame are directly associated. However, this is not the case since what is suggested above is that the *manner* in which shame and hostility are expressed, not the *amount* of shame and hostility expressed, may differ depending upon level of alienation and field orientation. It may be that these two factors influence the perception of a given situation and that the manner of expression is dependent upon that perception. The fact that, in one study, the expression of hostility directed outwards within the field oriented groups varied systematically with the type of emotional interactive situation encountered does suggest that situational context may have a greater influence upon individuals experiencing lower levels of alienation than upon those experiencing greater levels.

Considering Scheff and Retzinger's belief that shame and alienation are directly affiliated, at low levels of alienation the experience of shame should be limited. Also, if one is experiencing little alienation there is a greater likelihood that the shame, which is evoked in conjunction with that threat of isolation or engulfment, may be more readily recognized as shame by the self and thus communicated to the other clearly. One explanation then for the lack of consistent findings among the median split undergraduate group is that there are no significant differences between the groups on overt, unidentified shame because both the field-dependent and the field-independent groups are

experiencing so little alienation and, in turn, so little shame and that limited shame which does exist is more likely to be experienced and expressed as acknowledged shame rather than unacknowledged shame. Further, Scheff and Retzinger propose that unacknowledged shame leads to anger because anger acts as a defense against admitting to the self one's feelings of shame and alienation. Given this asserted relationship between unacknowledged shame and anger, under low alienation conditions there should be no consistent differences between the undergraduate groups on the expression of hostility since individuals in both groups are more likely to acknowledge whatever limited shame that may exist.

The objective of this research was to investigate several of the questions generated from previous research. Of fundamental importance was the question of measurement. Previous research has associated shame- and guilt-proneness with field-dependence and field-independence, respectively. Would the same theorized relationships be observable when actual assessments of by-passed shame and overt, unidentified shame were made? Further, what would be the relationship between expressions of acknowledged shame, unacknowledged shame (both overt, unidentified and by-passed), hostility and field orientation among those individuals in the middle of the field-dependence/field-independence continuum? Past investigations have either focused only on the extremes of the field orientation continuum or have median-split samples so as to include these individuals into a field-dependent or field-independent category. Finally, what effect would alienation have on the

expression of clearly communicated shame or "acknowledged shame," unacknowledged shame, and hostility? Perhaps an interactive effect of alienation, field orientation, and interpersonal climate conditions would exist. An interaction such that the manner of expression of unacknowledged shame and hostility was dependent upon both field orientation and interpersonal situational conditions when alienation is low but only influenced by field orientation when alienation is high.

Although previous research raises many additional questions including issues regarding a cold versus a warm environment, male versus female participants, and clinical versus non-clinical samples, the time and financial constraints of actually conducting a study necessitate that certain limitations be imposed. In the case of this study, for practical reasons, the conditions under which research questions were asked were the following: non-clinical, female adults were employed as participants and situational components which were considered characteristic of a "warm" interactive environment were advanced. "Warm" interactive gestures would include such behavior as having direct eye contact and smiling at the interviewee. The hypotheses for this research were generated from a model which was formulated using the theories of Lewis and of Scheff and Retzinger to reconcile the disparate findings of previous investigations. The following description of the model and of hypotheses generated from the model will deal only with those issues pertinent to the conditions under which the research was actually conducted.

According to the model, while the level of alienation always determines the overall level of shame which then consequently influences the level of hostility, it is the mode of alienation (either engulfment or isolation) which determines the manner in which that shame and hostility will be experienced and expressed. Alienation experienced as engulfment is positively associated with overt, unidentified shame and hostility directed inwards, while alienation experienced as isolation is related to by-passed shame and hostility directed outwards. The mode of alienation, however, is dependent upon the level of alienation, the interpersonal climate and the extent of field-dependency/field-independency. At low levels of alienation, interpersonal climate and field orientation give direction to the mode of alienation. At higher levels, field orientation determines the mode of alienation.

Based on the measures which are used to define field perception, field-independent individuals are those more adept at separating elements from an organized field. It is therefore likely that they also make greater "self versus other" differentiations than field-dependent individuals. Evidence of this phenomenon has been observed by Davies (1982). Given this background, it is not hard to imagine that a field-independent individual experiencing a heightened sense of alienation might experience a persistent sense of isolation because of the constant awareness of the differences between the self and others. Conversely, a field-dependent individual with a enhanced sense of alienation might experience an overall sense of engulfment since the external field as a whole is dominating the individual's perception.

However, a field-independent individual without the heightened alienation in a situation which is very demanding with regard to involvement, i.e., a "warm" situation where the interviewer is constantly encouraging interaction through direct eye contact, nodding, smiling at the individual, may feel a sense of engulfment since the individual is being overpowered by the field, i.e., the attention of the interviewer. In a similar "warm" situation, a non-alienated field-dependent individual might have a greater likelihood of feeling isolated since the continual focus of the interviewer is directing the attention of the individual on to the self. In table 3, the predicted mode of alienation experience is presented for the field orientation groups by level of alienation.

One additional relationship in this proposed model remains to be described. The manner in which shame is experienced is affected by both the mode of alienation as well as the level of shame experienced. While the expressive manner of unacknowledged shame (overt, unidentified or by-passed) is determined by the mode of alienation, the expression of acknowledged or unacknowledged shame is most probably decided by the overall level of shame experienced. This relationship may account for the presence of field-dependent/field-independent group differences with regard to the expression of hostility when no significant group differences were observed in the amount of shame expressed. The proposed model of alienation, interpersonal climate, and field orientation's influence on shame and hostility is illustrated in figure 3 below.

Table 3

**EXPECTED MODE OF ALIENATION EXPERIENCE  
BY FIELD ORIENTATION AND ALIENATION LEVEL**

(Under Warm Interactive Conditions)

Level of Alienation	Field Orientation	
	Field-dependent	Field-independent
High	Engulfed	Isolated
Low	Isolated	Engulfed




Figure 3. The Proposed Model of the Effect of Alienation, Interpersonal Climate, and Field Orientation on Shame and Hostility

Based on the model described above, several hypotheses were generated. Each of these hypotheses, along with a path illustration of the proposed relationship between the variables involved in that hypothesis, are presented below.

1. *Alienation is positively related to the total amount of shame and hostility expressed.*


Individuals experiencing a higher level of alienation express more overall shame and hostility than those individuals experiencing a lower level of alienation.



**Figure 4. The Proposed Relationship Among Levels of Alienation, Shame and Hostility**

*II. Alienation is negatively related to the clear communication of shame.*

The ratio of expressed incidents of acknowledged shame to unacknowledged shame (overt, unidentified + by-passed) is greater among individuals low in alienation than those individuals with higher levels of alienation.



**Figure 5: The Proposed Relationship Among Levels of Alienation and Shame and Clarity of Communication.**

*III. Level of alienation and field orientation interact to determine the mode of expression for both unacknowledged shame and hostility.*

A. Among individuals low in alienation, it is expected that extremely field-dependent individuals are more likely to display a greater amount of by-passed shame and hostility directed outwards than either field-independent individuals or individuals in the middle range of field orientation. Conversely, extremely field-independent individuals are more likely to express overt, unidentified shame and hostility directed

inwards than either field-dependent individuals or individuals in the middle range of field orientation.





Figure 6. Under Conditions of Low Experienced Alienation: The Proposed Relationship Between Field Orientation, Mode of Alienation Experienced, and Mode of Shame and Hostility Expression.

B. Among individuals experiencing greater alienation, it is expected that extremely field-dependent individuals are more likely to display more overt, unidentified shame and hostility directed inwards than either field-independent individuals or individuals in the middle range of field orientation. In contrast, extremely field-independent individuals are more likely to display more by-passed shame and hostility directed outwards than field-dependent individuals or individuals in the middle range of field orientation.



**Figure 7. Under Conditions of Highly Experienced Alienation: The Proposed Relationship Between Field Orientation, Mode of Alienation Experienced, and Mode of Shame and Hostility Expression.**

As mentioned previously, because of the time and financial constraints, this study focused only on those hypotheses that could be generated from the model which related to "warm" interactive conditions. Additionally, this research was limited to adult female participants who were not likely to have any bias towards feelings of shame or alienation due to low socioeconomic class or psychiatric patient status. Given these limitations, a few of the questions generated from previous research can be addressed. These questions include what effect field orientation has on the expression and level of acknowledged shame, unacknowledged shame and hostility for all individuals on the field orientation continuum, and also, whether the dissimilar findings of previous studies stem from differences in alienation level, degree of field orientation extremity, and/or situational conditions.

## **IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **Subjects**

A total of seventy-five adults, sixty-two females and thirteen males, working in the New York City metropolitan area volunteered as participants for this study. Participants were recruited from among the researcher's associates and friends. The participants were primarily Caucasian, middle-income professionals employed within the banking industry. The estimated age of all volunteers was between early and mid-thirties. To satisfy the data requirements for the design of this study, only data from sixty of the female participants were analyzed. The additional video interviews of the first female subject and twelve of the male subjects were utilized as training videos for coding. Because of technical problems during the interviews, the videos for one female subject and one male subject were unusable.

Of the sixty female subjects, eighty-seven percent ( $n = 52$ ) were employed within the banking industry. The other eight subjects were also employed in middle income earning professions from various other fields including video production, nursing, and financial consulting. The ethnic background of the subjects is presented below in table 4.

### **Instruments**

#### **The Interview**

Several measures were assessed from audio- and videotaped interviews: unacknowledged shame in the forms of both overt, unidentified and by-passed

Table 4

<b><u>Ethnic Group</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency</u></b>	<b><u>Percent</u></b>
African American	8	13.3%
Asian	6	10.0%
Caucasian	43	71.7%
Hispanic	2	3.3%
West Indian	1	1.7%

shame, acknowledged or openly expressed shame, hostility directed inwards, and hostility directed outwards in the forms of both overt and covert hostility.

The taped interview consisted of participant's responses to a request to speak for five minutes. The standardized interview prompt which was used in this study incorporated the original instructions of Gottschalk, Winget, and Gleser (1969) to speak for five minutes, without input from the interviewer, about any interesting or dramatic life experiences as well as a directive to speak about an incident which involved other people. While the Gottschalk et al. original instructions were devised to simulate a projective test situation such that the participant's current feelings of underlying shame and anger might be assessed, it was maintained that the additional instructions to speak of an interpersonal experience might increase the likelihood of eliciting responses which include shame and anger themes. Gottschalk et al. described the presence of low-visibility shame and anger in verbal production as shame anxiety and hostility overtly directed outwards, hostility covertly directed outwards, and hostility directed inwards. Although not utilized in this particular study, Gottshalk et al. also provide instructions for scoring verbal content for indications of other anxieties including death anxiety, mutilation anxiety, separation anxiety, guilt anxiety and diffuse anxiety. To score a verbal production for a particular anxiety, each clause in each sentence spoken is evaluated for the presence and intensity of that affect or anxiety. Scores for each of the scales are adjusted for number of words spoken and transformed to approximate an interval scale by taking the square root of the initial score. In

this manner, the score is corrected for verbal fluency and the natural skewness of the scores is reduced.

Gottschalk and Gleser (1969) report adequate interrater reliability for each of the anxiety scales and hostility scales; the correlation coefficients ranged from .79 to .94 for the anxiety scales and between .79 and .98 for the hostility scales. While the test-retest reliability of the scales has raised some doubt regarding their use as a trait measures (Harder & Lewis, 1987), this concern is not an issue here since they were used in this study to obtain a state measure of shame and anger. As discussed by Gottschalk and Gleser (1969), there does not appear to be any relationship between either shame or hostility scores and age or education. However, higher scores on the shame scale were related to lower intelligence in one study reviewed by Gottschalk and Gleser. This relationship was explained as being due to greater feelings of inadequacy among those with lower intelligence given a situation where one is asked to give a five minute monologue in the presence of another person. Results of a retest of the same sample three years later did not show the same relationship of higher shame scores for individuals with lower intelligence scores. No relationship was found between the hostility scores and intelligence. However, Gottschalk and Gleser do report a relationship between gender and both shame and hostility scores, as well as between shame and hostility scores. Females are more likely to have higher shame scores than males. They are also less likely to indicate hostility directed outwards than males. Further, shame scores correlate positively with hostility inwards scores

while there is a negative or non-existent relationship between shame and hostility outwards.

While Gottschalk and Gleser (1969) extensively discuss the total anxiety measure, i.e., the composite measure of the following individual anxiety subscales: death, mutilation, separation, guilt, shame, and diffuse, they do not examine the individual subscales of their anxiety measure in their validation studies. They do, however, review numerous studies which substantiate the use of their verbal hostility scales. For example, they found that Adjective checklist hostility scores and Oken hostility ratings correlated positively with verbal hostility outwards scores for males. Female's scores on the hostility inwards scale correlated positively with Adjective checklist scores for hostility, depression and fatigue and also ratings on the Beck depression inventory. Interestingly, it is the hostility outwards scores which were found to be positively related with clinical depression ratings for males. Gottschalk and Gleser suggest that the different social demands of males and females contribute to these findings. Males are allowed or even encouraged to express their aggression while females are discouraged. Thus, it may be that reactive depression is more common to female than males given their greater likelihood of experiencing frustrated aggression.

Transcript Preparation. The initial steps for preparing an interview for the identification of both shame and hostility markers involved transcribing the interview into text, splitting the text into main and subordinate clauses, and counting the words spoken to determine the word fluency correction factor. For

each of these steps, the instructions provided by Gottschalk, Winget, and Gleser (1969) were followed with a few exceptions. As recommended, a typist transcribed the interview using the prescribed notations, e.g., noting any additional sounds such as coughs or laughs in parentheses. The researcher then was responsible for checking the transcription for accuracy, splitting the text into clauses, and making a count of all non-filler words. (Filler words are utterances such as "uh," "ah," et cetera.) Because of minor personal variations in determining a codable unit or clause, as advised by Gottschalk et al. only one person, the researcher, was responsible for splitting the text so as to keep that source of error constant. Similarly, only one person, an assistant, conducted all interviews for this research so that the variance associated with the interviewer was also minimized. Since Gottschalk et al. question the adequacy of interviews with limited verbal samples as measures of any psychological variable, they suggest that only those five-minute interviews which include a minimum of 70 words be utilized. This guideline did not affect the present research as all participants spoke well over the minimum necessary.

In the transcript preparation phase, this research varied slightly from that outlined by Gottschalk et al. Because one of the initial objectives of this research involved identifying unacknowledged shame, it was important to note wherever possible in the transcript the paralinguistic cues which have been associated with shame identification. Based on examples of speaking behavior which illustrate unacknowledged shame as set forth by the shame theorists and

also the examination of interviews gathered during pilot testing, additional notations were identified as being necessary and incorporated into the coding scheme. Specifically, notations were made of changes in speaking manner which signal a disruption of thought or speech or an avoidance of painful feelings through obsessive rapid speech. The Gottschalk instructions provide for the inclusion of pauses, self-interruptions, laughed words, all of which may be considered verbal hiding behavior since they indicate a sensitivity towards the issue being discussed. However, since it was important to note other hiding behaviors, such as filled pauses and speech which is overly soft in volume, the final transcripts was prepared with all additional fillers such as "ah," "um," and "uh" included. Speech which was lowered significantly in volume was indicated by words printed in italics. Also, rapidly spoken words were denoted by a dash between words (Retzinger, 1991). Finally, two assistants, neither of which was the person conducting the interview, coded the transcripts. Each scale was scored independently (shame, hostility outwards, and hostility inwards) and a separate copy of the transcript was used to record each score. It was felt that individual copies made both the coding and recording of affect less confusing then using the colored pens recommended by Gottschalk et al. to differentiate the scales. The coded clauses were also underlined in addition the Gottschalk et al. instructions to note the code above the referenced clause. In this manner, it was easier to later identify and record the scored clauses.

**Coding Shame.** Using the Gottschalk method, verbal content referring to ridicule, inadequacy, shame, embarrassment, humiliation and over-exposure of, or threat of over-exposure of, deficiencies or private details is scored as shame anxiety. References to the self are weighted 3 points, references to animate others are weighted 2 points, and denials of shame are weighted 1 point. This scoring method assumes the more a person is experiencing a given affect at a given moment, the more likely the person's verbal production will contain content of that affect and that the intensity of that affect will be reflected in the manner of reference. Because the identification and weighting of both acknowledged and unacknowledged shame was integral to this study, the Gottschalk weighting system was revised so that shame ideation, which would not be identified through Gottshalk's method, was scored. Several researchers (Lewis, 1971; Retzinger, 1991, 1995; Scheff, 1990; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991) have proposed additional verbal, visual and paralinguistic cues as indicators of unacknowledged shame experiences. These indicators were utilized in the modified scoring procedure.

The first change to the scoring procedure involves the weighting of verbal denials of shame. Many of the terms which Gottschalk et al. describe as indicators of shame may be characterized as "hiding" behaviors, i.e., terms which disguise the shame experience (Scheff, 1990). For example, a person may relate feeling "silly" rather than embarrassed or ashamed. Using Lewis' (1971) classification of unacknowledged shame, most of these examples would be described as overt, unidentified shame since the person consciously

experiences the affect, but cannot or will not identify it as such. In the same manner, denial of shame reflects the conscious awareness of the affect but also the inability to describe the affect as one's own. Since no distinction can be made as to the intensity of feeling when the verbal hiding behavior of ambiguous labeling, e.g., "I felt silly," is applied to a shame experience versus the verbal hiding behavior of denial, e.g., "I wasn't at all embarrassed," both were weighted equally for the present study. Denials of shame were scored either a 3 for reference to the self or a 2 for reference to another. Additionally, the interviews were coded for shame references which were not identified through Gottschalk's method of assessing explicitly inferred shame but rather were identified through the context of the narrative in conjunction with visual and/or paralinguistic cues. Examples of these occurrences will be reviewed later in this section.

Since it is essential that one be familiar with both the content of the narration or interview and the speaking manner of the narrator to identify shame episodes, it was recommended that the videotaped interview be reviewed and the transcript read at least two or three times before the initial coding. The coders were also instructed while reviewing the interview to pay special attention to the general themes of the narration so as to determine if any involve shame ideation, i.e., did the interviewee refer to either the self or another as experiencing or being in a situation of ridicule, inadequacy, shame, embarrassment, humiliation or overexposure of private details?. The thematic

categories of reference for shame (Chang, 1989; Gottschalk, Winget, and Gleser, 1969) are presented in table 5. After familiarizing themselves with the general content and style of the narratives, the coders then went through the interview locating shame markers, both those that were easily identifiable such as the verbal production, "they made fun of me" and also less easily distinguishable ones such as a change in speaking behavior, e.g., laughed words, filled pauses, softened speech, repeated phrases, rapid speech, et cetera, and changes in facial displays, e.g., blushing, looking down or askance. If the located shame marker was readily coded as a shame experience according to the traditional coding rules, the clause or clauses were underlined and coded according to Gottschalk's standard instructions, i.e., a "5" for the fifth scale or shame scale, an "a" for reference to the self or an "b" for reference to an animate other, and a weight of "3" for reference to the self or a "2" for reference to an animate other. Each weight could be raised one point if the clause included a reference to the condition being extreme. For example, "he was ashamed of his family," would receive a score of "5b2." "He was extremely ashamed of his family," would receive a code of "5b3." If the clauses were not clearly identified as shame experiences via verbal content than the visual and paralinguistic shame cues present were evaluated with regard to the content and context of what was being said. Each clause in which a display was present was underlined and coded "5a3" or a "5a4." Because it must be inferred in these cases that it is the narrator that is experiencing a shame episode, there is always reference to the self or the code of "a" for self and the

Table 5

**THEMATIC CATEGORIES FOR IDENTIFICATION OF SHAME IDEATION**

- **RIDICULE:**  
Words, phrases, or context which imply being emotionally hurt by another.  
Examples:  
Boy, did he make me feel foolish.  
They just stared at me and laughed.  
She can't just go on and on mocking me.  
He got a lot of razzing over that incident.  
Her brothers taunted her about her boy friend.
- **INADEQUACY:**  
Words, phrases, or context which refer to a feeling of inferiority, defectiveness, unimportance or smallness. References to not living up to one's own or another's ideal image.  
Examples:  
I never do as well as I think I should.  
I might just as well be invisible.  
I feel so naive.  
She was constantly disappointing the family.  
He'll never be really good looking like his brother.
- **SHAME, EMBARRASSMENT AND HUMILIATION:**  
Word, phrases, or context which imply a diminished public or social self as well as direct reference to shame feelings or physical shame reactions.  
Examples:  
I felt awful about having to go on welfare.  
It was degrading to be beaten by such a pip-squeak.  
The teachers really sort of held them up as objects of scorn.  
I felt myself blushing and became even more self-conscious.  
It was humiliating to ask for his permission again and again.  
Under those circumstances anyone would feel abashed.
- **OVEREXPOSURE OF DEFICIENCIES OR PRIVATE DETAILS:**  
Words, phrases, or context which refer to a violation of either personal or social privacy requirements.  
Examples:  
I just can't reveal such personal things.  
I walked in on them having sex.  
I feel so exposed in those robes the doctor gives you.  
He tried his best to hide how his family treated him.  
She's sensitive about people overhearing her conversations.

magnitude of 3 or 4 points.

After identifying shame episodes, the reference was categorized as acknowledged shame, overt, unidentified shame, or by-passed shame. Already presented in the research objectives section is Table 2. This table summarizes the observable patterns which differentiate the three manifestations of shame. If the participant expressed shame feelings openly and directly, e.g. "He was ashamed," an "A" for acknowledged was noted next to the clause code, e.g. "5a3 - A." If shame feelings are obvious to an observer but not openly expressed, an "O" for overt, unidentified was added. That is, the content of what was spoken described a shame episode that was consciously experienced and one or more of the cues listed in Table 2 under overt, unidentified shame was used in expressing that episode. Finally, by-passed shame was noted with a "B" when a shame episode was depicted but there are no apparent indicators of any consciously felt affect. In fact, as outlined in Table 2 under by-passed shame, there is a distancing of the emotion from the individual through visualization of the situation from another's viewpoint and control of affective expression. In the case where there was some question as to how the shame episode should be coded, a "U" was used for undefined. This was the case when there was more than one type of display in a clause, e.g., rapid speech which signals a possible by-passed experience running directly into laughed speech which is an indicator of overt, unidentified shame.

Examples of overt, unidentified shame which would not be recorded utilizing verbal references but would be using context and visual and

paralinguistic cues are numerous. A rather common occurrence during the interview was for the participant to interrupt the narrative, laugh, and utter words such as "I don't have anything else to say" or "how much longer do I have?" et cetera. In fact, this happened in roughly 40% of the interviews. Further, in 79% of these cases, what seemed to be embarrassed laughter was accompanied by at least one other facial indicator of shame, a lowering of the eyes or face or turning aside of the eyes or face. In a few cases, additional cues such as a lowering of voice volume or facial changes such as blushing were present. Under Gottschalk's coding rules such clauses would not be coded for shame since the spoken words do not by themselves indicate a feeling of ridicule, inadequacy, embarrassment, humiliation, or overexposure of private details. However, since the utterance of these words was accompanied by embarrassed laughter and other shame markers, one can interpret these clauses as overt, unidentified shame experiences and each clause would be coded a 3 for a shame experience with reference to the self. To illustrate further how contextual, visual, and paralinguistic cues may be used to identify shame episodes which would not be recognized solely through verbal references, consider the following passage, "I guess one of the things that is kind of old at this point / because I, I don't know why, / I mean, it just comes up every now / and that is the fact / that I moved / when I was 16." On the surface this statement does not seem to refer to a shameful experience but given the fact that the speaker is hesitant or self-interrupting, e.g., "I, I don't know why, I mean" and while saying this the speaker averts her gaze, totally closes her

eyes twice, touches her neck, and concludes with a slight smile, it may indicate that an example of overt, unidentified shame has been witnessed. Additional support for the interpretation of this as a shame experience comes from the content of the interview. In the narrative, the speaker expresses a sense of inadequacy because of her lack of continuity with either a place or a group of people which she, in turn, views as being caused by the move. Thus, while not readily apparent as a shame experience from a purely verbal interpretation, the above clauses were each coded a 3 for reference to the self and coded as incidents of overt, unidentified shame. Frequently, shame episodes that would not be identified using the traditional procedure occurred either directly before or after a clause which would be categorized as shame using the Gottshalk method. For instance, during an interview in which a participant was describing a work "reorganization" that resulted in her gaining one of the few good positions and also in losing the camaraderie of her fellow workers, she makes the following statement. Note here that words printed in italics indicate words which are spoken softly, i.e., significantly lower in volume than normal. "I'm feeling kind of awkward / I mean, the *truth is / I'm the only one in the whole department that's really happy with the results of the reorg.*" All three of these clauses were coded as overt, unidentified shame and coded a 3 for shame with regard to the self. The first clause would have received a shame coding of 3 according to Gottschalk's rules since the individual is openly expressing a sense of inadequacy. With the inclusion of the mitigating words "kind of," the expression becomes an example of overt, unidentified shame. In the following

two clauses, the speaker changed her speech pattern significantly by lowering / softening her voice. Since this also is an indicator of overt, unidentified shame and these clauses can be interpreted as expressing a reason for embarrassment, these clauses were also coded as overt, unidentified shame episodes even though they would not have been coded as a shame incident according to the standard rules.

Within the narratives of this study the noted incidents of by-passed shame were not as abundant as those of overt, unidentified shame. However, like many of the examples of overt, unidentified shame, the identification of by-passed shame depends upon the use of contextual, visual and paralinguistic cues. As illustration consider the following situations. A young woman is telling a story of giving back money which was incorrectly dispersed to her from a malfunctioning ATM machine. In describing her reasons for returning the money and the reactions of others to her returning the money she makes the following statement, " I know, I'm telling this story / and everyone's probably thinking, / 'it's because she really did wanna steal the money.'" That she is seeing herself from the point of view of others and sees herself as an object of scorn in others eyes are indicators of a by-passed episode (see Table 2). Additionally, the absence of verbal pauses and fillers in her speech and the absence of visual hiding cues such as a downward glance or touching her face would indicate a lack of consciously experienced or rather a "distanced" shame affect. The clauses above would all then be coded as a by-passed shame episode and each would be coded a 3 for a shame experience with reference

to the self . Another example of clauses noted as by-passed shame and each coded a 3 for a shame experience with reference to the self are the following, "the-truth-in-the-matter-is-that-going-through-something-like-that-at-such-a-tender-age / it-sort-of wises-you-up." These were rapidly spoken by a young woman relating an account involving surgery that she had undergone when she was very young. She explains after speaking the above that she was subject to ridicule by her peers during that period. Again, there are no obvious signs that she is experiencing shame but the distancing of the emotion through rapid speech in combination with the content of the narrative allows one to identify these clauses as a by-passed shame episode.

An example of by-passed shame being identified through rumination (see table 2) is found in the narration of a sports fan recounting a particularly disappointing game after which he became depressed. Several times throughout the narration he mentions that something at that point in his life is making him unhappy but he does not clearly explain what is that is causing his depression. Rather, he makes statements such as "it was a very depressing time ... a lot going on at the time just added to it, like the onset of Winter," "Its' just something that I remember / and I have really no idea / why it came back to me ... maybe it was just symbolic of the onset of Winter and whatever," "again it was probably just representative of other things that were going on at the time," "I think I tend to release only at certain times, tend to be at sporting events or while playing in competitive events ... So, I guess, that again was symbolic of something / which I tend to hide most of the time ." The underlined statements

here all refer again to the self so they would be coded 3 and since no other obvious shame cues are displayed in conjunction with these declarations, they were also coded as by-passed shame episodes.

Within a 20% sample of the interviews, the recording of shame using the traditional Gottschalk method versus the revised coding which includes non-verbal indicators as well as verbal indicators were compared. As expected, the mean revised shame score was substantially higher than the traditional score, 2.55 versus 0.92. As also anticipated, the two scores were highly correlated,  $r = 0.71$ ,  $p < .01$ . Thus, while the revised scoring reflects the shame that is displayed with regard to the total interview encounter rather than just the words a participant chooses to speak during the interview, the amount of shame which is judged as being displayed using either method of interpretation is positively associated.

To test the hypothesis which were put forth with regard to the expression of shame in an acknowledge manner versus unacknowledged manner and also the expression of shame in an overt, unidentified manner versus shame expressed in a by-passed manner, it was originally planned that the following three scores would be computed based on the percentage of total shame occurrences accounted for by each: the acknowledged shame score, the overt, unidentified score and the by-passed score. However, because only one participant actually expressed a shame experience in an acknowledged manner and only sixteen expressed any shame in a by-passed manner, either

in a clause coded as "by-passed" or "undefined," it was not reasonable to create the scores described above.

**Coding Hostility.** The method used for assessing hostility directed outwards and inwards was taken primarily from Gottschalk, Winget, and Gleser (1969). Hostility directed outwards is quantified by the number of references to the self (hostility outwards - overt) or others (hostility outwards - covert) directing destructive, injurious or critical thoughts and actions towards others. Weightings are applied in diminishing magnitude to hostility directed towards human beings, animals or other humans in a vague manner, wildlife and inanimate objects and situations, and anger without reference and denial of anger. Hostility directed inwards incorporates all thoughts, actions, and feelings which are self-critical, self-destructive, or self-punishing. Death to the self receives the highest weighting, followed by mutilation or injury, anger, hatred or despair, self-criticism or need for atonement, and denial. Presented in table 6 is a summary of the themes incorporated into the Gottschalk, Winget, and Gleser hostility scales as well as the actual hostility schedules outlined in the instruction manual. Schedule 2 illustrates the theme and weight of hostility outward categories while schedule 3 shows the theme and weight for the different hostility inwards categories.

Only two modifications were made to the original coding instructions for hostility. The first change was a purely cosmetic change which facilitated the scoring of hostility directed outwards. Rather than using a scale code of "I" for hostility outwards - overt and a scale code of "II" for hostility outwards - covert,

Table 6

**HOSTILITY MANIFESTATIONS:** The expression of anger, contempt, or hostility in any verbal or non-verbal manner directed at either an outside "other" (hostility directed outwards) or at oneself (hostility directed inwards). Expressions may range from manifestations of mild dislike or criticism to displays of severe aggression including physical violence.

**Hostility Directed Outwards:**

Hostility which is expressed towards an "object" that is outside of the subject expressing the emotion. "Objects" of hostility range from animate objects, i.e., humans, domestic animals, pets, wildlife, flora, to inanimate object or ideas, i.e., situations, places, feelings, .... The themes of hostility directed outwards include the following:

- a. killing, destroying, fighting, injuring, or threatening to do so
- b. robbing, abandoning, causing suffering or anguish or threatening to do so
- c. adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, expressing anger or dislike, using hostile words or cursing
- d. depriving or disappointing
- e. dying or killed violently in death-dealing situations or threatened with such

**Overt Hostility:** Hostility expressed by the speaker towards another.

**Covert Hostility:** Hostility which is described as being experienced by another as either the agent (e.g., She hated that old lamp) or the recipient (e.g., She was killed in the earthquake). Also considered covert hostility are feelings denied by the speaker (e.g., I wouldn't hurt a flea).

**Schedule 2**

**I Hostility Outwards - Overt**  
Thematic Categories

- a3 Self killing, fighting, injuring other individuals or threatening to do so.
- b3 Self robbing or abandoning other individuals, causing suffering or anguish to others, or threatening to do so.

**II Hostility Outwards - Covert**  
Thematic Categories

- a3 Others (human) killing, fighting, injuring other individuals or threatening to do so.
- b3 Others (human) robbing, abandoning, causing suffering or anguish to other individuals, or threatening to do so.

Table 6 (Con't)

<b>Schedule 2 (Con't)</b>	
<b><u>I Hostility Outwards - Overt</u></b> Thematic Categories	<b><u>II Hostility Outwards - Covert</u></b> Thematic Categories
<b>c3 Self adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, expressing anger, dislike of other human beings.</b>	<b>c3 Others adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, expressing anger, dislike of other human beings.</b>
<b>a2 Self killing, injuring or destroying domestic animals, pets, or threatening to do so.</b>	<b>a2 Others (human) killing, injuring, or destroying domestic animals, pets, or threatening to do so</b>
<b>b2 Self abandoning, robbing, domestic animals. pets, or threatening to do so.</b>	<b>b2 Others (human) abandoning, robbing, domestic animals, pets, or threatening to do so.</b>
<b>c2 Self criticizing or depreciating others in a vague or mild manner.</b>	<b>c2 Others (human) criticizing or depreciating other individuals in a vague or mild manner.</b>
<b>d2 Self depriving or disappointing other human beings.</b>	<b>d2 Others (human) depriving or disappointing other human beings.</b>
	<b>e2 Others (human or domestic animals) dying or killed violently in death-dealing situations or threatened with such.</b>
	<b>f2 Bodies (human or domestic animals) mutilated, depreciated, defiled.</b>
<b>a1 Self killing, injuring, destroying, robbing wild life, flora, inanimate objects or threatening to do so.</b>	<b>a1 Wild life, flora, inanimate objects, injured, broken, robbed, destroyed or threatened with such (with or without mention of agent).</b>

Table 6 (Con't)

<b><u>Schedule 2 (Con't)</u></b>	
<b><u>I Hostility Outwards - Overt</u></b> Thematic Categories	<b><u>II Hostility Outwards - Covert</u></b> Thematic Categories
<p><b>b1 Self adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, expressing anger or dislike of subhumans, inanimate objects, places, situations.</b></p> <p><b>c1 Self using hostile words, cursing, mention of anger or rage without referent.</b></p>	<p><b>b1 Others (human) adversely criticizing, depreciating, expressing anger or dislike of subhumans, inanimate objects, places, situations.</b></p> <p><b>c1 Others angry, cursing without reference to cause or direction of anger. Also instruments of destruction not used threateningly.</b></p> <p><b>d1 Others (human, domestic animals) injured, robbed, dead, abandoned or threatened with such from any source including subhuman and inanimate objects situations (storms, floods, etc.).</b></p> <p><b>e1 Subhumans killing, fighting, injuring, robbing, destroying each other or threatening to do so.</b></p> <p><b>f1 Denial of anger, dislike, hatred, cruelty, and intent to harm.</b></p>

Table 6 (Con't)

**Hostility Directed Inwards:**

Hostility which is **expressed towards the self** by the self. The themes of hostility directed inwards include the following:

- a. **attempting to kill, injure, mutilate or disfigure or threatening to do so (with or without conscious intent; deserving punishment or needing to atone; being disappointed in oneself, unable to meet one's own or other's expectations**
- b. **wanting or deserving to die; considering oneself at blame, worthless, the cause of grief; self-criticism or depreciation; feeling sorry or ashamed of one's actions, errors or oneself; the denial of dislike, hatred, blame, or destructive impulses towards oneself**
- c. **disappointment. despair, lonesomeness; feelings of being painfully driven to meet one's expectations or standards**

**Schedule 3****I Hostility Inwards****Thematic Categories**

- a4 References to the self (speaker) attempting or threatening to kill self, with or without conscious intent.
- b4 References to the self wanting to die, needing or deserving to die.
- a3 References to the self injuring, mutilating, disfiguring self or threatening to do so with or without conscious intent.\*
- b3 Self blaming, expressing anger or hatred to self, considering self worthless or of no value, causing oneself grief or trouble, or threatening to do so.
- c3 References to feelings of disappointment, giving up hope, despairing, feeling grieved or depressed, having no purpose in life.
- a2 References to the self needing or deserving punishment, paying for one's sins, needing to atone or do penance.
- b2 Self adversely criticizing, depreciating self; references to regretting, being sorry or ashamed for what one says or does; references to self mistaken or in error.
- c2 References to feelings of deprivation, disappointment, lonesomeness.
- a1 References to feeling disappointed in self; unable to meet expectations of self or others.
- b1 Denial of anger, dislike, hatred, blame, destructive impulses from self to self.
- c1 References to feeling painfully driven or obliged to meet one's own expectations and standards.

\* This code is reduced to a weight of 2 if the injury is slight.

a "O" and "C" were applied respectively. Parallel to the changes made in the coding of shame, the second alteration was to modify the hostility scoring procedure to incorporate incidents of hostility which are not identified solely through verbal production. Because expressions of hostility which are demonstrated through non-verbal displays in this type of interview session must be produced by the speaker, they were all considered examples of hostility directed outwards in an overt manner (see table 6). Although obviously obscene hand gestures might be construed as expressing anger or dislike, none of the participants displayed non-verbal hostility in this fashion. Thus, the non-verbal hostility displays were interpreted as expressing criticism, depreciation, or dislike. If the hostility was directed towards an other, the expression was weighted a 2. If the hostility was directed at a non-animate objects, which could include a situation or place, it was weighted a 1.

Presented in table 7 is the list of displays or cues that the coders used to recognize visual and paralinguistic hostility markers. This list was modified from a table presented in a study by Malatesta-Magai and Dorval (1992). As with shame ideation which is not identified through Gottschalk's coding rules, it is very important that the content of the narration support the interpretation of an episode as hostility when it is perceived from visual and paralinguistic cues.

While the majority of non-verbal hostility displays were accompanied by verbal production which was interpretable as hostility outwards according to the Gottschalk coding rules, there were a few instances where hostility was displayed solely in a non-verbal manner. For example, in relating a story

Table 7

## **Hostility Displays**

### **1. Facial Displays**

- curled lip of disgust, retracted upper lip
- disgust face: nose flattening with flared nostrils and mouth set
- William F. Buckley face: head tilted back, looking down nose or nose in the air, haughty
- smile of derision, contempt or superiority
- eye roll of dismissal, mocking or sarcastic face

### **2. Postural Displays**

- pulling away, either whole body or just upper body or head or twisting body away or to present shoulder
- shoulders back, chest out in display of superiority

### **3. Vocal Displays**

- contemptuous, derogatory or domineering tone in any statement, "tsk" of contempt
- disciplinary tone
- derisive snorts or laughter, "hrumphs"
- sharp inhale, exhale or other displays of a "huff"

about discovering that a woman who had been considered a friend but indeed was not, the narrator re-enacts her reactions to this woman asking the narrator what she was doing. She replies, "oh, I'm putting my clothes away, Ma." By calling the woman "ma," it is apparent that the narrator believes the other woman has over-stepped the bounds of their relationship. In addition, the statement was said in a totally derisive tone in combination with the narrator rolling her eyes. While this clause would not be codable as hostility under the traditional method of scoring, it is apparent that the narrator was expressing dislike of this woman's actions. Another example of hostility expressed outwards in an overt fashion that would not be defined as such using the Gottschalk scoring method was the following statement made by a woman who was relating how the burden of her sister's wedding and marriage had fallen onto her shoulders: "and since our mother, still alive, didn't want to have anything to do with the wedding." It is clear from the content of the narrative that the interviewee felt like she was unjustly put into the role of the mother. With this fact in mind and the openly sarcastic way the statement was made the clause was coded an "Oc3," for overt hostility expressed towards another human being.

Using the revised scoring for the shame and hostility scales, the following interrater reliability coefficients were obtained: total shame scale, .87; overt, unidentified shame score, .88; hostility directed outwards - overt, .80; hostility directed outwards - covert, .96; and hostility directed inwards scale, .82. Using the interviews which were gathered as part of a pilot study for this research as

well as the interviews from volunteers not used as subjects in this study, two assistants were trained to code interviews for implied affect. Because one of the coding assistants took slightly more time in learning to recognize and code the hostility scales, the first eight actual interviews coded by the other assistant were also used as training examples for this coder. The reliability statistics mentioned above were based on the correlated ratings of the two assistants on twelve interviews randomly chosen from a pool of twenty-six interviews that both interviewers coded. The sampling pool did not include the interviews used for training. Because of the amount of attention which was involved in scoring this research project, the coders were instructed to code only one scale at a time and check the coding on subsequent days. To minimize the risk of diverging from intended scoring patterns, the researcher met with either one or both of the assistants on a semi-weekly basis to go over one of the latest interviews scored.

### **The Alienation Test**

The Alienation Test, devised by Maddi, Kobasa & Hoover (1979) to be a comprehensive measure of alienation, measures four types of alienation and five contexts of alienation. The four types of alienation are: *powerlessness* (the feeling of lacking influence over personal and social matters), *adventurousness* (the feeling of diminished vitality unless involved in extreme and dangerous activities), *vegetativeness* (a feeling of apathy or lack of interest towards one's involvements), and *nihilism* (a feeling of disbelief towards anything that appears to have meaning). The contexts to which each of these types of alienation are

applied are work, social institutions, family, interpersonal relationships, and self. The test is comprised of 60 items, 15 per type of alienation and 12 per context, to which respondents rate their general agreement on a scale from 0 (not true at all) to 100 (completely true). All items are worded so that higher ratings reflect greater alienation.

Reliability measures of internal consistency and test-retest correlations for the measure proved adequate. In two studies similar findings for internal consistency were observed; the correlational estimates or coefficient  $\alpha$  values ranged from .75 to .95 for the initial study. Intercorrelations of type and context scales were also moderate to high in five different studies. However, product-moment correlations between initial scores and scores derived from readministration of the test three weeks later ranged from .59 to .78, suggest only moderate test-retest reliability.

Findings from five studies showed that lower alienation scores tended to be associated with higher socioeconomic status and age levels and that males had generally lower alienation scores than females. However, because the samples varied with regard to age, sex, and socioeconomic status these results were not considered conclusive.

As evidence of construct validity, results of four studies were described which revealed that alienation scores correlated positively with belief in external locus of control, experience of existential vacuum, and conformist values or views. Alienation scores were negatively related to orientation

towards achievement, dominance, endurance, nurturance, or socially desirable responding (Seeman, 1991).

An advantage of this alienation test over other alienation measures for the present research is that many of the items which comprise the scales seem to assess the fear of either isolation or engulfment. For example, strong agreement with items such as "I am better off when I keep to myself," and "I try to avoid close relationships with people so that I will not be obligated to them" represent attitudes favoring isolation. Strong agreement with items such as "I would drop almost anything in order to join some big cause," and "I wish I could be carried away by a revelation, as apparently happened to some historically important persons" connote attitudes which promote engulfment.

### **The Embedded Figures Test**

The Embedded Figures Test (Witkin et al., 1954/1972) is commonly used as a measure of field-dependence and field-independence. As with other measures of perceptual style, the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) assesses the influence of the immediately surrounding field on one's perceptions. The EFT is a test of the ability to separate elements of an organized visual field. The test is comprised of 12 simple and 12 complex figures. The speed with which one finds the simple figures within the complex figures reflects the relative degree to which one is field-independent versus field-dependent.

Reports of reliability and validity for the EFT are substantial (Witkin et al., 1971). Test-retest reliability coefficients for several age levels range from .61 to .92. The reliability among adults with an average age of 34 to 35 was .82 for

women and .90 for men. Convergent validity has been extensively demonstrated for the EFT as a measure of the ability to separate elements from an embedded context both perceptually and intellectually. The EFT was found to be positively correlated with other disembedding tasks, e.g., the rod-and-frame test, the body adjustment test, and Duncker problems of functional fixity, but not with tasks requiring sustained attention. Validity studies which support the use of the EFT as a measure of the tendency to separate or articulate the self and surroundings, including others, are also numerous. A few examples of the findings from studies utilizing the EFT include: lower confidence and more requests for examiner's guidance was related to greater field-dependence in boys taking the Thematic Apperception Test, a stronger "twinship bond" was associated with field-dependence in twins, a higher recall of dreams was indicated among individuals with greater field-independence, and greater articulation of body concept was assessed in human figure drawings by field-independent individuals. For an extended summarization of relevant studies, the reader is referred to Witkin, Oltman, Rasskin, and Karp (1971). Additionally, Wapner and Demick (1991), provide a more recent source for studies regarding field-dependence versus field-independence including work utilizing the EFT.

### **Procedure**

#### **Data Collection:**

Potential participants were contacted by the researcher via telephone.

The researcher informed all respondents that they were being asked to

participate in a study of emotion and perception which was being conducted as part of the researcher's requirements for completion of a Ph.D. in psychology from the City University of New York Graduate Center. They were also informed that because the researcher wished to get unbiased responses from all participants the study was not going to be discussed in more depth at that time, but if the participant wished s/he would again be contacted upon completion for a detailed explanation of the research. Potential respondents were then apprised that their participation would involve a short videotaped interview as well as a questionnaire and short perceptual test. Further, they were told that they would be allowed to review the video-tape and delete any portion for whatever reason. The potential participants were also informed that while a signed agreement was necessary for this research to be conducted, it would be the only form with their actual name. That is, all responses and answers which any participant gave were to be identified by code number alone or by any name/identifier which the respondent may choose. At this point, people who volunteer were advised that they would be contacted by a research assistant to set up a session at their convenience.

The research sessions were conducted by an assistant at various locations throughout the New York City metropolitan area. In an effort to make the sessions as convenient as possible for the participant, each volunteer had a choice of having the interview conducted in their office, the home of the researcher or the home of the interviewer. To limit unintentional bias effects from the interviewer, this assistant also only had knowledge of the research as

a study of emotion and perception. The assistant who conducted these sessions was a female undergraduate in her late twenties. To create a "warm" interactive atmosphere similar to that of deGroot's (1968), the assistant was instructed to lean towards the interviewee and to smile and look directly at the interviewee throughout the session. Each session began with the assistant expressing gratitude for the respondent's participation, a reminder that the study would be comprised of an interview, perceptual test and questionnaire, and an assurance that all answers and the respondent's identity were confidential. Participants were then again asked for verbal permission to tape the interview and also to sign a permission form for disclosure of the session responses to individuals assisting in the research.

As discussed above, three instruments were utilized in this study: the Alienation Test (Maddi, Kobasa, & Hoover, 1979), the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin et al., 1954/1972), and an audio- and videotaped interview (Gottschalk, Winget, & Gleser, 1969). Each session began with the interview which produced a verbal sample according to the Gottschalk-Gleser method (1969). In the interview, the participant was asked to speak for five minutes about any "interesting or dramatic life experiences" the participant may have had and that during that five minutes the interviewer would be listening but would not speak so as not to impede the discourse. Upon completion of the five minute narration, the participant was then directed to either complete the alienation questionnaire according to the printed instructions or the instructions that were given for taking the Embedded Figures Test. The presentational order of the

alienation questionnaire and perceptual test was varied randomly. The interview was always conducted first for two reasons: (1) to assess any inherent underlying shame and hostility rather than shame or hostility which may be the product of cueing from the alienation test or the effect, e.g., frustration, of taking the perceptual test, and (2) to insure that the participant was not overly fatigued from the questionnaire/perceptual test so as to make discussion difficult. The average time for each session is approximately 50 minutes.

Once all forms were completed, the interviewer asked the participant whether they were familiar with any of the forms or procedures so as to assess any possible unforeseen biases. The interviewer then recorded the approximate age and sex of each participant as well as any comments the participant may have had for the researcher. As a final step, all participants were verbally thanked and asked again if they chose to have the researcher contact them with a detailed explanation of the research.

#### **Data Analysis:**

The comments recorded by the interviewer indicated there was no reason to believe that participant's familiarity with any of the instruments used in this study may have affected the study in any particular manner. While several of the participants related having volunteered for other psychological studies during college, none stated that they were acquainted with any of the instruments used here. Further, there was no suggestion of awareness of the

study assessing any emotion in particular, i.e., shame or hostility, by any of the volunteers.

Analyses of this study were based on a factorial table of the two levels of alienation by three levels of field orientation. Assignment to the six table cells was generated by first splitting the population according to relative position on the field-dependence/field-independence continuum and then splitting them again into low and high alienation groups through a median-split on alienation score. An initial examination of the distribution of caucasian versus non-caucasian participants within each of the six test cells showed no indication of an association between condition and race. Likewise, a check of the distribution of participant's choosing to have the interview conducted at the office versus outside of the office showed no apparent association. Table 8 shows the frequency of caucasian and non-caucasian participants in each of the six test cells. In Table 9, the frequencies for participants choosing to have the interview conducted within the office versus outside the office are shown.

The distribution of participants within each cell by presentational order did, however, show an interesting possible order effect: the likelihood of having a higher alienation score was greater for those volunteers who were presented with the alienation questionnaire prior to the perceptual test. Presented below in Table 10 is the frequency of participants in each sequential order for each of the six test cells. A contingency analysis was used to test the association between sequential order (perceptual first versus questionnaire first) and alienation level (low versus high). The chi-square results show that a

Table 8

**Frequency of Participants: Ethnic Grouping by  
Alienation Level by Field Orientation Level**

**Caucasian:**

		<b>Field Orientation</b>			
		<b>Dependent</b>	<b>Middle</b>	<b>Independent</b>	
<b>Alienation</b>	<b>High</b>	7	8	6	21
	<b>Low</b>	8	8	6	22
		15	16	12	

**Non-Caucasian:**

		<b>Field Orientation</b>			
		<b>Dependent</b>	<b>Middle</b>	<b>Independent</b>	
<b>Alienation</b>	<b>High</b>	3	2	4	9
	<b>Low</b>	2	2	4	8
		5	4	8	

Table 9

**Frequency of Participants: Interview Location by  
Alienation Level by Field Orientation Level**

**Office Interviews:**

		<b>Field Orientation</b>			
		<b>Dependent</b>	<b>Middle</b>	<b>Independent</b>	
<b>Alienation</b>	<b>High</b>	9	8	9	26
	<b>Low</b>	7	9	8	24
		16	17	17	

**Non-Office Interviews:**

		<b>Field Orientation</b>			
		<b>Dependent</b>	<b>Middle</b>	<b>Independent</b>	
<b>Alienation</b>	<b>High</b>	1	2	1	4
	<b>Low</b>	3	1	2	6
		4	3	3	

Table 10

**Frequency of Participants: Presentational Order by  
Alienation Level by Field Orientation Level**

**Field Orientation Perceptual Test Presented First:**

		Field Orientation			
		Dependent	Middle	Independent	
Alienation	High	3	5	1	9
	Low	6	5	7	18
		9	10	8	

**Alienation Questionnaire Presented First:**

		Field Orientation			
		Dependent	Middle	Independent	
Alienation	High	7	5	9	21
	Low	4	5	3	12
		11	10	12	

**Note: Alienation scores tended to be higher when that measure was presented first and lower when it followed the Field dependence-independence test.**

significantly higher percentage of participants in the high alienation condition are found among volunteers receiving the questionnaire before the perceptual test,  $\chi^2(1, N = 60) = 5.46, p < .05$ . Thus, it may be that receiving the alienation questionnaire first actually created a more alienating atmosphere than when it followed the perceptual test of field dependence-independence. Although the frequencies illustrated in Table 10 indicate that perhaps the relationship between sequential order and alienation is stronger among the field orientation extremes, especially among the field-independent participants, the number of observations in each cell were too few to perform a valid chi-square test of association.

The planned analyses for this study were based on a factorial table of the two levels of alienation by the three levels of field orientation. This manner of examination importantly allows for the middle field orientation group to be assessed as distinct from either the field-dependent group or the field-independent group. Unfortunately, adding the presentational order as a third independent variable in the factorial design was not possible since the result would be cell sizes of too few cases to analyze. Although correlational analyses did not reveal a linear relationship between alienation and field orientation, it was considered possible that a curvilinear relationship between alienation and field orientation might exist considering the presentational order differences already discussed. To test this possibility, a regression analysis using a polynomial model was conducted with alienation as the dependent variable and powers of field orientation as the set of independent variables.

**The results of the regression revealed no indication of a curvilinear relationship.**

## **V. RESULTS**

### **Descriptive Statistics**

The descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study are presented in Table 11. To achieve distributions most closely resembling normal distributions, each of the variables used in this study was transformed through either taking the common logarithm of the raw score or through taking the square root of the raw variable. Table 11 provides statistics on both the transformed as well as the raw variables. Scatterplots of each of the transformed dependent variables by the two independent variables were examined to assess patterns and possible outliers. The examination revealed no indication of non-linear relationships or need for further data adjustments.

Of the three studies which were used as a base for this research, only the deGroot (1968) study utilized the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin et al., 1954/1972). Unfortunately, no information regarding the mean scores of the Embedded Figures Test was provided in that report. However, based on the norms presented by for the Embedded figures test (Witkin et al., 1971), the mean score of the participants of this study fell between the two sets of scores for women of similar age. Both the deGroot (1968) study and the Witkin, Lewis and Weil (1968) study utilized Gottschalk and Gleser's (1969) method of assessing shame, hostility outwards, and hostility inwards from content analyses of verbal interactions. In the deGroot study, the mean scores for these three affects was 0.63, 1.14, and 0.71, respectively. The means reported

Table 11

**Study Variables: Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Skewness</b>	<b>Kurtosis</b>
<b>Alienation</b>	1032.97	590.54	0.76	0.42
<b>Alien - Log 10</b>	2.93	0.29	-.79	0.61
<b>Field Orientation</b>	72.92	41.12	0.75	-.16
<b>FO - Log 10</b>	1.79	0.27	-.59	0.61
Shame	2.58	0.81	1.27	2.69
Shame - Log 10	0.39	0.13	0.11	0.73
Hostility	1.94	0.71	1.94	6.88
Hostility - Log 10	0.26	0.15	-0.27	3.51
H-In / H-Out	1.02	0.22	0.86	1.88
H-In / H-Out - Sqrt	1.01	0.11	0.47	0.77
<i>Eng / Iso</i>	1.04	0.33	1.49	3.54
<i>Eng / Iso - Sqrt</i>	1.01	0.15	0.92	1.60
<i>Hostility Inwards</i>	0.68	0.32	0.60	-.03
<i>H-In - Log 10</i>	-.22	0.22	-.39	-.67
<i>Hostility Outwards</i>	1.26	0.55	2.61	13.72
<i>H-Out - Sqrt</i>	1.10	0.21	-.11	2.48

**Independent Variables reported in bold.**

*Italicized Variables were not used to test original hypotheses*

**Alienation/Alien = Alienation Score**

**Field Orientation/FO = Field Orientation Score**

Shame = Total Shame Score

Hostility = Total Hostility Score

H-In / H-Out = Ratio Score: Hostility Inwards to Hostility Outwards

*Eng / Iso = Ratio Score: Engulfing to Isolating*

*Hostility Inwards/H-In = Hostility Inwards Score*

*Hostility Outwards/H-Out = Hostility Outwards Score*

Log 10 = Common logarithm transformation of variable

Sqrt = Square Root transformation of variable

for these same scores in the Witkin, Lewis and Weil study were higher: shame, 1.07; hostility outwards, 1.63; and hostility inwards, 1.32. As you can see from the table, the mean score obtained in this study for hostility outwards, 1.26, was between that of the other two studies. Although it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions regarding the similarity of scores without the statistics available to conduct a t-test, the score of this study does appear [on the surface] to be closer to that of the deGroot study. The score for hostility inwards was actually lower than that of the other studies. However, it was very similar to the deGroot study, 0.68 in the present study versus 0.71 in deGroot. Because of the revised scoring used to assess shame in the present study, the shame scores of the previous research are expectedly much lower than the score of this study. However, the mean shame score, 0.92, obtained from using the traditional Gottschalk method on a sample of this study's interviews does again fall between the scores presented by deGroot and by Witkin, Lewis and Weil.

### **Tests of Hypotheses**

As shown in Table 12 below, a significant correlation exists between several of the dependent measures, including shame and hostility. Because of this relationship, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to determine the effect of alienation and field orientation on the dependent measures. The two levels of alienation by three levels of field orientation factorial table for the analyses was created by first splitting the sample into thirds according to relative position on the field-dependence/field-

Table 12

**Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Study Variables**  
(Significance probability of the correlation reported below coefficient)

	<b>Alien</b>	<b>Field Orient</b>	Shame	Hostility	H-In / H-Out	<i>Eng / Iso</i>	<i>H-In</i>	<i>H-Out</i>
<b>Alien</b>	----	0.06 0.66	0.21* 0.10	-0.14 0.28	0.09 0.51	-0.05 0.72	0.04 0.78	-0.19 0.15
<b>Field Orient</b>		----	0.11 0.38	0.21 0.11	0.13 0.31	-0.03 0.83	0.15 0.26	0.14 0.28
Shame			----	0.36*** 0.00	-0.06 0.66	-0.27** 0.04	0.33*** .01	0.28** .03
Hostility				----	-0.06 0.64	-0.01 0.91	0.60*** 0.00	0.84*** 0.00
H-In / H-Out					----	-0.26** 0.04	0.42*** 0.00	-0.38*** 0.00
<i>Eng / Iso</i>						----	-0.15 0.24	0.11 0.41
<i>H-In</i>							----	0.19 0.14
<i>H-Out</i>								----

**Alien = Alienation Score**

**Field Orient = Field Orientation Score**

Shame = Total Shame Score

Hostility = Total Hostility Score

H-In / H-Out = Ratio Score: Hostility Inwards to Hostility Outwards

*Eng / Iso = Ratio Score: Engulfing to Isolating*

*H-In = Hostility Inwards Score*

*H-Out = Hostility Outwards Score*

**Independent Variables reported in bold.**

*Italicized Variables were not used to test original hypotheses*

**Note.** \*  $p \leq .10$   
 \*\*  $p \leq .05$   
 \*\*\*  $p \leq .01$

independence continuum. The sample was then split again into low and high alienation groups through a median-split on alienation score.

**Hypothesis #1: Alienation is positively related to the amount of shame and hostility expressed.**

It was predicted that shame and hostility would significantly contribute to the difference in alienation. Using an alpha level of .10, this prediction was supported with regard to the positive relationship between alienation and shame. The multivariate tests of significance illustrates a main effect for alienation,  $F(4, 51) = 2.14, p = .09$ , and the results of univariate analyses of variance for each of the dependent variables indicate that the differences in the high and low alienation groups was primarily due to shame score,  $F(1, 54) = 4.58, p = .04$ . The average shame score for the high alienation group was greater than that of the low alienation group. The mean scores were 0.43 and 0.35, respectively.

The results of univariate analyses of variance for each of the dependent variables did not illustrate hostility score as a significant contributor of the observed differences in the high and low alienation groups,  $F(1, 54) = 0.28, p = .60$ .

**Hypothesis #2: Alienation is negatively related to the clear communication of shame.**

To not reject this hypothesis, it was necessary for the MANOVA to show a main effect for alienation. Additionally, it was expected that the acknowledged-to-unacknowledged ratio score would be higher for those participants in the lower alienation group. These results would have been illustrated if the case were that individuals low in alienation were able to communicate any shame experienced in a more open manner, i.e., acknowledged versus unacknowledged, than those high in alienation. Unfortunately, as previously noted in the Instruments section of this paper, only one participant clearly labeled the shame episode that she was experiencing as such. Thus, it was not feasible to devise a score based on the ratio of acknowledged to unacknowledged shame incidents. However, the one occurrence of acknowledged shame expression was made by a participant in the low alienation, field-dependent group.

**Hypothesis #3: Level of alienation and field orientation interact to determine the mode of expression for both unacknowledged shame and hostility.**

To not reject this hypothesis, an interaction effect for alienation and field orientation would need to be observed in the multivariate tests of significance, for it was predicted that:

(1) for those participants in the low alienation score group,

**(a) individuals with scores reflecting greater field-dependence would display**

- fewer incidence of overt, unidentified shame compared to by-passed shame, and**
- fewer incidence of hostility directed inwards compared to hostility directed outwards.**

**(b) Conversely, individuals with scores reflecting greater field-independence were expected to display**

- greater incidence of overt, unidentified shame compared to by-passed shame, and**
- greater incidence of hostility directed inwards compared to hostility directed outwards.**

**It was further predicted that**

**(2) for those participants in the high alienation score group,**

**(a) individuals with scores reflecting greater field-dependence were expected to display**

- greater incidence of overt, unidentified shame compared to by-passed shame, and**
- greater incidence of hostility directed inwards compared to hostility directed outwards.**

**(b) Conversely, individuals with scores reflecting greater field-independence were expected to display**

- lower incidence of overt, unidentified shame compared to by-passed shame, and
- lower incidence of hostility directed inwards compared to hostility directed outwards.

Unfortunately, the part of this hypothesis pertaining to the expression of shame as overt, unidentified versus by-passed was not testable because of the paucity of incidents of shame being expressed in a by-passed manner. To test this hypothesis with regard to the hostility, a ratio score of the incidence of hostility expressed inwards to the incidence of hostility expressed outwards was devised and analyzed by MANOVA. The MANOVA results did not demonstrate an interaction effect for alienation and field orientation. Thus, with regard to the direction of hostility expression, this hypothesis is rejected.

#### **Results of Additional Analyses:**

##### **Multiple Analysis of Variance - 1:**

The third hypothesis which deals with the manner in which shame and hostility are expressed was based on the theory that alienation experienced as engulfment would lead to the greater expression of shame in an overt, unidentified manner rather than in a by-passed manner, and also of hostility as directed inwards versus outwards. Conversely, alienation experienced as isolation would lead to the greater expression of shame in a by-passed manner rather than in an overt, unidentified manner, and also of hostility as directed outwards rather than inwards. While this hypothesis was not testable with

regard to the manner in which shame is expressed because of the low incidents of by-passed shame, it was believed that a related hypothesis might be tested using dominant pronoun usage. Scheff & Retzinger (1991) suggest that style of dominant pronoun usage may be a manifest indicator of the mode of experienced alienation. They contend that feelings of engulfment are indicated by speech patterns dominated by the use of relational terms such as, "we," "us," and "ours," and that experiences of isolation are signaled by the prevalent use of individuating words such as, "I," "you," "me," and "mine." To test whether level of alienation and extent of field-dependency/field-independency influenced dominant speech pronoun patterns, a ratio score of the proportion of words spoken which were engulfing words to those which were isolating words was devised and also analyzed in the original MANOVA. As previously stated, the results of the multivariate tests of significance did not demonstrate an interaction effect for alienation and field orientation. Therefore, the third hypothesis is also rejected with regard to mode of alienation.

#### Multiple Analysis of Variance - 2:

Although it was not the intent of this investigation to verify the findings of the deGroot (1968) study, the fact that the interviews for this study were conducted under "warm" interpersonal conditions, as were a portion of the deGroot's interviews, and that three of the measures analyzed in the deGroot study were also obtained within this study made a comparison of the results opportune. In deGroot's study, the following three measures were obtained using the traditional Gottschalk-Gleser (1969) method of verbal analysis:

shame, hostility outwards, and hostility inwards. These same measures were obtained for this study also. The two measures of hostility are the component parts of the total hostility score used in this study.

DeGroot found that under warm conditions higher hostility outwards scores were associated with field-dependence. Conversely she noted that under cold conditions, it was the field-independent group which demonstrated higher hostility outwards scores. To test whether the warm condition findings of DeGroot's study would be replicated, a MANOVA was executed with alienation and field orientation again as independent measures (two levels of alienation by three levels field orientation) and shame, hostility outwards, and hostility inwards as dependent variables.

For DeGroot's findings to be supported, it was expected that the multivariate tests of significance would reveal a main effect for field orientation and that follow-up univariate F-tests would demonstrate that hostility outwards was a significant contributor to the difference in the field orientation groups. The results of the MANOVA did not support the deGroot's findings. Instead, again a significant main effect for alienation was observed using an alpha level of .10,  $F(3, 52) = 2.57, p = .06.$ , and the results of univariate analyses of variance for each of the dependent variables indicate that the differences in the high and low alienation groups was primarily due to shame score  $F(1, 54) = 4.58, p = .04.$

Because deGroot did not include a correlation matrix of the dependent variables, it is not clear if these measures were found to be related in her

study. However, it is certain that she utilized a series of univariate analyses of variance to examine her data. As this method was previously used, the results of 2 X 3 (alienation by field orientation) analyses of variance (ANOVA) performed on shame, hostility outwards, and hostility inwards were examined to better understand differences in the two studies. The ANOVA results illustrated a significant relationship between alienation and shame,  $F(1, 59) = 4.58, p = .04$ , and a significant interaction effect of alienation by field orientation on hostility outwards,  $F(2, 58) = 4.34, p = .02$ . Shame scores as previously indicated were higher overall in the high alienation groups than in the low alienation groups. The interaction for hostility outwards is such that greater hostility outwards scores are seen within the field-dependent group of participants with higher alienation scores but, for those participants with lower alienation scores the greatest hostility outwards scores are within the middle orientation group. Presented in Table 13 are the independent and dependent variable means associated with each of the six cells analyzed in this study.

Using analysis of variance technique, as did deGroot, to examine the data, similar results for hostility outwards were observed within the high alienation group. However, within the low alienation group it was the middle field orientation group which displayed greater hostility outwards. Thus, these results may lend limited support to deGroot's findings.

In summary, MANOVA and ANOVA results illustrated two significant findings. The first finding, that shame and alienation are positively related was demonstrated using both methods of analyses. The second finding, that a

Table 13

**Variable Means and Standard Deviations  
by Alienation and Field Orientation Group**

		<b><u>Field Orientation</u></b>					
		<b><u>Dependent</u></b>		<b><u>Middle</u></b>		<b><u>Independent</u></b>	
		<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
<b><u>High Alienation</u></b>	<b><i>Alienation</i></b>	<b>3.15</b>	0.13	<b>3.18</b>	0.10	<b>3.15</b>	0.13
	<b><i>Field Orientation</i></b>	<b>2.09</b>	0.11	<b>1.84</b>	0.07	<b>1.51</b>	0.12
	Shame	0.46	0.20	0.46	0.10	<b>0.36<sup>a</sup></b>	0.08
	Hostility	<b>0.37<sup>b</sup></b>	0.13	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.14
	Hostility In / Out	1.03	0.16	1.03	0.11	1.03	0.11
	<i>Engulf / Isolate</i>	0.98	0.15	0.96	0.10	1.03	0.15
	<i>Hostility Outwards</i>	<b>1.22<sup>b</sup></b>	0.14	1.00	0.23	0.99	0.25
	<i>Hostility Inwards</i>	-0.11	0.23	-0.23	0.25	-0.24	0.17
<b><u>Low Alienation</u></b>	<b><i>Alienation</i></b>	<b>2.65</b>	0.28	<b>2.71</b>	0.20	<b>2.73</b>	0.22
	<b><i>Field Orientation</i></b>	<b>2.04</b>	0.13	<b>1.80</b>	0.09	<b>1.47</b>	0.24
	Shame	0.32	0.15	0.40	0.12	0.34	0.12
	Hostility	0.26	0.07	0.33	0.15	0.25	0.14
	Hostility In / Out	1.00	0.11	0.95	0.11	1.02	0.10
	<i>Engulf / Isolate</i>	1.05	0.24	1.02	0.10	1.00	0.12
	<i>Hostility Outwards</i>	1.07	0.17	1.22	0.23	1.09	0.15
	<i>Hostility Inwards</i>	-0.25	0.20	-0.29	0.24	-0.20	0.26

**Means in bold indicate significant differences within row.**

a = Field-independent < Middle Orientation,  $p < .05$

b = Field-dependent > Either Dependent or Middle Orientation,  $p < .05$

***Bold Italicized Variables are Independent Variables. Note: (1) all field orientation groups are significantly different across rows but not significantly different within columns, and (2) alienation groups are significantly different within columns but are not significantly different across rows.***

***Non-bold italicized variables were not used to test original hypotheses***

**significant interaction effect of alienation by field orientation on hostility outwards exists, was illustrated only in the ANOVA results. This interaction is such that among participants with higher alienation scores, greater hostility outwards scores were observed within the field-dependent group. For participants with lower alienation scores, the greatest hostility outwards scores were found within the middle orientation group.**

## V. DISCUSSION

Of the originally proposed hypotheses, the test results supported only the first, that shame and alienation are positively related. The original MANOVA results illustrated an effect of alienation on shame which was significant at an alpha level of .10, this finding along with the significant results from the ANOVA lends support to the Scheff and Retzinger's (Retzinger, 1998; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991) contention that shame and alienation are related. Shame scores for the high alienation group were greater than those of the low alienation group. The MANOVA, which allows for the dependent variables to be analyzed simultaneously, may theoretically also obscure differences since it is the composite or vector of means which are being compared across groups. Usually, the MANOVA may show significant differences when they are not seen in an ANOVA because the effect of the interdependencies among the dependent variables is included in the analysis. In this case though, the directional differences in correlations of the variables for each of the cells or a number of the cells may counteract any effect of a single variable. However, by conducting multiple univariate analyses the risk of Type I error also increases, i.e., the probability of significant results as a matter of chance, thus the ANOVA results must be interpreted with caution as well. While the main effect for alienation on shame reflects an overall difference between high and low alienation groups on shame scores, as shown in table 10, the difference between the high and low alienation groups within the field-dependent group are the most dramatic. *This finding of the association between shame and*

*alienation is especially notable given that different methods were employed in measuring the two emotions: shame was assessed through behavioral indicators while alienation was measured through a cognitive questionnaire.*

While not part of the original hypothesis, a second significant finding from the ANOVA testing was that of an interaction between alienation and field orientation on hostility outwards. For participants with higher alienation scores, greater hostility outwards scores were observed within the field-dependent group. However, among participants with lower alienation scores, the greatest hostility outwards scores were within the middle orientation group. Because of the warning already mentioned with regard to Type I error and the lack of any near significant finding in the MANOVA results, this finding must be treated with caution. The pattern of the interaction does though deserve some attention. The higher hostility outwards score among the high alienation/field-dependent group are consistent with deGroot's (1968) results that under warm interactive conditions field-dependent participants display more hostility directed outwards than field-independent participants, or in this case than either the middle group or the field-independent group. However, the higher hostility outwards scores for the low alienation/middle field orientation group would suggest that there may be interesting differences among mid-ranged field orientation volunteers as compared with volunteers within the extreme field orientation groups when alienation levels are low. The similar pattern of means for the shame score within the low alienation groups further indicates that the mid-ranged field orientation participants may be quite unique in

comparison to field extreme groups. It may be that the alienation modifies the relationship between field orientation and shame as well as hostility directed outwards in a non-linear fashion. A curvilinear relationship between field orientation and locus of control in a group of primarily female undergraduates relationship was previously noted by Lau, Figuerres and Davis (1981).

Another interesting point, which was noted during the course of this study, was that a significantly greater percentage of the high alienation group were among those participants who received the alienation questionnaire prior to the Embedded Figures Test. Further, it was observed that this association may have been attributable to the greater number of field extreme participants, especially the field-independent participants, who were distributed among the high alienation group that were presented the questionnaire first. As mentioned previously, the cell frequencies were unfortunately too small to perform a valid test of this association. One possible explanation for this difference in alienation level between presentational groups may be that the act of quickly concluding the perceptual test positively altered the attitudes of field-independent participants prior to completing the alienation questionnaire.

Surprisingly, one of the results of this investigation was simply that within an interview context such as this study, the clear labeling of an experience as shame is very rare. Only one of the pilot study volunteers also clearly labeled an experience she was describing as being "ashamed and very embarrassing" but it was expected that in analyzing a larger sample more incidents would be

present. Perhaps, as Scheff (1997) suggests, the language of modern societies “skirts” the expression of emotions, especially shame.

The small number of participants who employed by-passed methods of expressing shame was likewise unexpected. It may be that the expression of shame in a by-passed manner is more common among males than females. Certainly, this seemed to be the case in the male volunteer pilot interviews which were used to establish scoring procedures and train the coders. Given that in this society the hiding behaviors that are associated with overt, unidentified shame, i.e., touching one's face, hesitancy in one's speech, softening of speaking volume, blushing, et cetera, are identified more commonly with female behavior, it may be that acceptable forms of publicly managing shame differ for men and women. In addition, the few times that shame was expressed in a by-passed manner among the participants of this study, it was always accompanied by overt expressions as well, sometimes so quickly that differing expressions were in the same clause. At least among middle income professionals presenting a monologue interview, by-passed expression of shame is not a predominant mode for expressing shame.

Past investigations of the differences in emotional communication of females and males have shown that females both see themselves and are seen by others as more emotionally expressive than males and that, similarly, males view themselves and are viewed by others as being more controlling of emotional displays than females (Guerrero & Reiter, 1998). Given the differences in the expressive nature of two manifestations of unacknowledged

shame, it would not be surprising that males would exhibit greater by-passed shame as this manner of expression is exemplified by the controlling of shame through distancing oneself. Conversely, it would not be unexpected that females would display greater overt, unidentified shame, as this shame manifestation typifies emotional expressiveness in that shame displays are obvious to the observer. While less likely, given the equal or superior economic status of the females in this study compared to the few males from the pilot study volunteers, a second explanation for the general manner in which the female participants of this study spoke is that female expressive behavior is reflective of the power disparity of women as a whole. Wood & Dindia (1998), in discussing the impact of power differences on gender differences, characterize those in the subordinate role as learning to speak indirectly, tentatively, and non-threateningly.

Carol Gilligan (1982) wrote, "when women construct the adult domain, the world of relationships emerges and becomes the focus of attention and concern" (p. 167). Certainly with regard to the content of the monologues of the women in this study, this sentiment is true. The prevailing themes of the dialogs provided was that of relationships, both lost and found. The women of this study spoke most often of the loss (or threatened loss) of a loved one through death or near death. But they also spoke of new relationships: meeting their husbands for the first time, finding a "best" friend, the birth of their children, discovering new relationships through travel and/or group involvements, and marriages, both their own and others. They spoke of how

events effected them and how they effected their relationships with others. They often spoke of their roles as caregivers and sometimes of the sudden realization of immense responsibility facing them. As one woman speaking of the night she had to go home and take care of her daughter after leaving her husband in the hospital with what might have been a fatal condition recalls, "it kinda made me an adult in one day." Another, faced with helping a friend determine whether to stop all artificial resuscitation on the friend's mother describes, "how does one go about making a God-like decision at that point?"

As an interesting aside, the prompt for these dialogue was to speak of an "interesting or dramatic" event. When the word "dramatic" was used in the description, the event most often involved death or an extremely physically threatening situation. When "interesting" was mentioned, a variety of subjects were talked of: being involved in a new learning environment, being single and meeting people through personal ads, meeting one's husband for the first time, tracking down an old boyfriend, experiencing resentment in work relationships, et cetera.

The results of this study did not offer any support to the notion that an internal versus external mode of expression (i.e., primarily hostility expressed outwards versus inwards or vice versa, and alienation expressed primarily in isolating terms versus engulfing terms, et cetera) is dependent upon level of alienation and field orientation level. Unfortunately, no differences were found either in the low or high alienation group in the manner in which the different

field orientation groups predominately expressed hostility or used forms of pronouns.

The results of this study did though provide further quantitative support for the relationship between the shame and hostility. The correlational results illustrated that the expression of shame is positively related to the expression of both hostility directed outwards as well as hostility directed inwards. Most recent research investigating the association between shame and anger/hostility has been correlational studies which utilized self-reports or cognitive measures of anger and cognitive measures of shame-proneness, i.e., questionnaires which assess shame sensitivity through individual's reports of how they would respond to potentially shame-inducing situations (Tangney, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney et al., 1996). The findings of this study demonstrate that, within a social context, the co-occurrence of expressions of shame and hostility are significantly observed.

#### Limitations of the Study

One of the major limitation of this study is that the hypotheses which were being tested were derived primarily from the theories of Lewis (1971) and Scheff and Retzinger (1991) which were developed from observing the interaction between people. In the case of Lewis, it was the interactive session between therapist and patient. Scheff and Retzinger's theory of social action was based primarily on observation of couples in conflict. In this study the amount of shame and hostility expressed and the mode of expression was

observed during what was essentially a monologue interview given by individuals since they did not expect interactive comments from the interviewer.

That the sample used in this study was comprised of only female participants was a second limitation. The fact that men and women express themselves in different fashions is becoming popularly accepted as evidenced by the best sellers such as *Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus* (Gray, 1992 ) and *You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation* (Tannen, 1990). Another consideration regarding the generalizability of these results was the professional status of this sample of females. For the most part, because of their professions these women were familiar with speaking in front of strangers on a relative regular basis. Further, because two of the previous studies, deGroot (1968) and Crouppen (1976), which used in part similar instruments, included or were totally comprised of male volunteers, it is hard to determine if gender may have contributed to the lack of replicability between the studies.

A third limitation of this study was the number of participants included. To be able to actually test the causal paths between field orientation level, alienation level, and amount of shame and hostility expressed in the proposed model, more than 200 participants would have been required for such an extensive investigation.

#### Recommendations for Future Research

Considering the differences in how men and women express themselves and also the differing patterns of expression which are deemed acceptable by

society for the two genders, i.e., it is more acceptable for women to cry in public and conversely for men to swear, a similar study which investigates the manner in which alienation, field orientation, and interview conditions influence the amount of shame and hostility (both outwards and inwards) expressed and the mode expression in both males and females is warranted. Optimally, a series of similar studies conducted between interacting couples, both same-sex and opposite, familiar and non-familiar, would be the most beneficial to gaining a better understanding of the possible factors which contribute to differing reactive responses including the amount of shame and hostility expressed as well as the manner in which they may be expressed.

Recently, in a literature review on aggression/violence, Baumeister, Smart & Boden (1996) proposed that aggression is linked not to low self-esteem as previously thought but to high self-esteem. They suggest that aggression stems from the feeling that one's favorable self-appraisal is being threatened by an external source. They outline two paths that can result from such an experience: (1) one can lower one's estimations of the self, feel negatively towards the self, and withdraw from the situation or (2) one can maintain one's appraisal of the self, feel negatively towards the source, and display aggression or violence outwards. The similarities between this model and the patterns theorized regarding overt, unidentified shame and hostility expressed inwards and between by-passed shame and hostility expressed outwards suggests that self-esteem may be an important component in any study of the expression of shame and hostility. As a starting point in fitting some of these

**theorized pieces together, in depth interviews might be conducted of individuals who display during interaction with their mates any of the shame or hostility expressions under study. Specifically, questions should be explored regarding how one feels about the self and one's perceived emotional distance from the other throughout the interchange and also what changes in situational or personal factors that might have altered the outcome of the interchange for the better.**

**Another, more easily executable study would be to investigate the types of items that contribute to higher alienation scores for the different field orientation groups. Given that a greater proportion of the extreme field-dependent and extreme field-independent participants were located within the high alienation group when the questionnaire was presented prior to the Embedded Figures Test, the question arises as to whether the field-dependent group and field-independent group were responding to similar items, which differed from items to which the middle group was responding. Based upon the proposed theory, it would be expected that high alienation scores among field-dependent individuals would be the result of greater agreement to questions which represent attitudes favoring engulfment, i.e., "I would drop almost anything to join a big cause." Conversely, attitudes which promote isolation, i.e., "the idea of a family is a social invention to limit individual freedom of action," should contribute largely to field-independent individuals high scores. The alienation factor for middle orientation individuals with high alienation scores should theoretically be a general factor.**

### **Conclusion**

**In summary, an investigation was conducted to determine the effect that alienation and field orientation have upon the level of shame and hostility expressed and the mode in which shame and hostility are expressed within a sample of nonclinical, socioeconomically middle classed professional females. The rationale for the investigation stemmed from a proposed model which explained the disparate results of previous research with regard to shame, hostility and field orientation. In large part, the model was based on the theories of Lewis (1971) and Scheff and Retzinger (1991).**

**One female assistant, using warm or friendly gestural behavior, conducted all research sessions. Within each session participants completed a five minute monologue interview prompted by a standardized statement based on the instructions of Gottschalk, Winget, and Gleser (1969), an alienation questionnaire (Maddi, Kobasa & Hoover; 1979) and the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin et al., 1954/1972). The presentation of the latter two instruments were randomly switched. A typist then transcribed all interviews. The researcher was then responsible for further clarification and preparation of the transcripts which were then coded by two separate assistants. The responses of the sixty female participants were then assigned to one of the six factorial cells by first splitting the population into thirds according to relative position on the field orientation score. The population was then split again into low and high alienation through a median-split on the alienation score.**

**A 2 x 3 factorial design was used to test the effects of alienation (low versus high) and field orientation level (field-dependent, middle orientation, and field-independent) on the following dependent variables: total shame score, total hostility score, hostility - outwards score, hostility - inwards score, the ratio score for hostility expressed inwards to outwards, and the ratio score of engulfing pronouns to isolating pronouns. The latter two scores were used to assess mode of affect expression rather than just the amount of affect. The factorial design was based on several hypotheses generated from the proposed model under one of the model's test conditions, the "warm" interpersonal atmosphere condition. Under this condition, the specific hypotheses tested were such that the following conditions were expected: (1) individuals within the high alienation group would express more total shame and hostility than those in the low alienation group, and (2) an interaction would exist such that individuals within the low alienation - field-dependent group would have lower hostility inwards to outwards scores compared to either the middle orientation group or the field-independent group. Conversely, individuals within the high alienation - field-dependent group would have greater hostility inwards to outwards scores versus either the middle orientation group or the field-independent group. Additional hypotheses were generated; however, they could not be tested because so few participants expressed shame in the necessary manner as to make the additional dependent scores devisable.**

Multiple analysis of variance was used to test hypothesized relationships between independent and dependent variables. A significant main effect for alienation on shame was observed in two separate analyses. To investigate differences between previous research and the present study, three of the dependent measures (shame, hostility - outwards, and hostility - inwards) were also analyzed using a series of univariate analysis of variance, the method used in the previous analysis. Because this method may increase the chance finding of significant results, the analyses of variance were interpreted as only indicating possible tendencies in the data. The analysis of variance results illustrated a significant main effect for alienation on shame and a significant interaction of alienation and field orientation on hostility outwards. Higher shame scores were found within the high alienation group compared to the low alienation group. This finding combined with the significant results from the multiple analysis of variance lends support for Scheff and Retzinger's (1991) contention that shame and alienation are positively related. The interaction effect for hostility outwards was such that higher scores were observed among participants in the high alienation / field-dependent group. However, within the low alienation groups, it was the middle orientation group which displayed greater hostility outwards scores. This result extends limited support to deGroot's (1968) earlier finding that under warm interactive conditions, field dependency and hostility outwards are positively related.

An unexpected trend of this research was that a significantly greater percentage of the high alienation group were among those participants who

received the alienation questionnaire prior to the Embedded Figures Test. Further, it was observed that this association may have been attributable to the greater number of field extreme participants, i.e., non-middle field orientation group, who were distributed among the high alienation group who were presented the questionnaire first. This finding in conjunction with the significant interaction for hostility outwards, described above, does suggest that similar situational conditions have possibly different effects on individuals depending on the level of field orientation.

An auxiliary observation of this research was that among a group of homogeneous professional women, shame was expressed in a very consistent manner characterized by overt hiding behaviors: hesitancy in one's speech, embarrassed laughter, aversion of the eyes, covering one's face, mitigated statements, et cetera. Within this population, a clear labeling of an experience or feeling as shame was seldom observed. The expression of shame through distancing or defensive control, e.g., rapid speech, viewing the self from the third person perspective, occurred more frequently than clear labeling, but overall very few participants expressed themselves in a distancing manner. Further, there appears to be no evidence that mode of expression, i.e., expressing hostility predominantly inwards versus outwards, or vice versa, or using primarily engulfing versus isolating terms, or vice versa, is affected by either alienation level or field orientation.

**Appendix A****Release Form**

I, \_\_\_\_\_, agree that the audio- and videotape of my interview with \_\_\_\_\_ held on \_\_\_\_\_, 1993 may be shown to those individuals who are assisting or advising Selina Bendock in her psychological research.

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Name: \_\_\_\_\_

## **Appendix B**

### **Interview Instructions**

**Thank you very much for consenting to participate in this study.**

**As you know, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of emotions and perception. This study consists of three parts: a short interview, a short test of perceptions which I will administer and a questionnaire. Let me remind you that all of your answers and your identity will remain anonymous for all portions of this research. As you may remember, it would be preferable if the interview portion of this study was videotaped. Again, you are welcome to review your tape and to erase any portion of the interview for whatever reason. Do you mind if I tape the interview? Would you please sign this release form? It is the only form with your actual name on it. If you would like any information on your responses or have any questions where you feel it would be best if you were identified in some way, you may either pick a pseudo-name or I can give you a code-number to which the researchers may later refer.**

**Thank you.**

**Now, upon a signal from me, I would like you to speak for five minutes about any interesting or dramatic personal life experience you may have had involving yourself and other people. Once you have started I will be here listening to you but I would prefer not to reply to any questions you may feel like asking me until the five minute period is over. Do you have any questions you would like to ask me now before we start? Well, then you may begin.**

## Appendix C

### The Alienation Test (Maddi, S. R., Kobasa, S. C., & Hoover, M., 1979)

Instructions. The items below consist of statements with which you may agree or disagree. Please indicate how you feel about each item by placing a number from 0 to 100 in the space provided. A zero indicates that you feel the item is not at all true; 100 indicates that you feel the item is completely true.

As you will see, *many of the items are worded very strongly*. This is so you will be able to decide the *degree* to which you agree or disagree.

Please read all items very carefully. Be sure to answer all on the basis of the way you feel now.

These items have to do with your attitude toward WORK.

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. Those who work for a living are manipulated by the bosses.
- 0    10    20    30    40    50    60    70    80    90    100
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. I wonder why I work at all.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Most of life is wasted in meaningless activity.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 4. If you have to work, you might as well choose a career where you deal with matters of life and death.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5. No matter how hard you work, you never really seem to reach your goals.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6. I find it difficult to imagine enthusiasm concerning work.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. It doesn't matter if people work hard at their jobs; only a few bosses profit.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 8. Ordinary work is too boring to be worth doing.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 9. I feel no need to try my best at work for it makes no difference anyway.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 10. I don't like my job or enjoy my work; I just put in my time to get paid.

\_\_\_ 11. I find it hard to believe people who actually feel that the work they perform is of value to society.

\_\_\_ 12. If a job is dangerous, that makes it all the better.

These items have to do with your attitude toward SELF.

\_\_\_ 13. Thinking of yourself as a free person leads to great frustration and difficulty.

\_\_\_ 14. The human's fabled ability to think is not really such an advantage.

\_\_\_ 15. The attempt to know yourself is a waste of effort.

\_\_\_ 16. I am really interested in the possibility of expanding my consciousness through drugs.

\_\_\_ 17. No matter how hard I try, my efforts will accomplish nothing.

\_\_\_ 18. Life is empty and has no meaning for me.

\_\_\_ 19. The belief in individuality is only justifiable to impress others.

\_\_\_ 20. I wish I could be carried away by a revelation, as apparently happened to some historically important persons.

\_\_\_ 21. Often I do not really know my own mind.

\_\_\_ 22. I long for a simple life in which body needs are the most important things and decisions don't have to be made.

\_\_\_ 23. Unfortunately, people don't seem to know that they are only creatures after all.

\_\_\_ 24. The most exciting thing for me is my own fantasies.

These items have to do with your attitude toward SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

\_\_\_ 25. Politicians control our lives.

\_\_\_ 26. Our laws are so unfair that I want nothing to do with them.

\_\_\_ 27. The only reason to involve yourself in society is to gain power.

\_\_\_ 28. I would drop almost anything in order to join some big cause.

- \_\_\_\_\_ 29. **Most of my activities are determined by what society demands.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 30. **In order to avoid being hassled by society, I feel I must go my own way and not get involved.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 31. **No matter how sincerely you work for social change, society never really seems to improve.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 32. **My most meaningful experiences have come through participation in social movements.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 33. **There are only certain strict paths to follow if one is to be successful in our society.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 34. **Our society holds no worthwhile values or goals.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 35. **Why should I bother to vote; none of the candidates will be able to change things for the better.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 36. **I admire those who participate in protest movements that are full of danger and drama.**

**These items have to do with your attitude toward INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS**

- \_\_\_\_\_ 37. **Everyone is out to manipulate you toward his own ends.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 38. **I am better off when I keep to myself.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 39. **Most people are happy not to know that what they call love is really self-interest.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 40. **Big parties are very exciting to me.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 41. **Often when I interact with others, I feel insecure over the outcome.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 42. **There is no point in socializing - it goes nowhere and is nothing.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 43. **Why bother to try to love or care for people; they'll only hurt you in the end.**
- \_\_\_\_\_ 44. **What really turns me on about socializing is the challenge of a group of people disagreeing and arguing.**

- \_\_\_\_\_ 45. I try to avoid close relationships with people so that I will not be obligated to them.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 46. Most social relationships are meaningless.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 47. People who believe that "Love makes the world go around" are fooling themselves.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 48. The best reason for getting involved with other people is participation in some action that can catch everybody up.

**These items have to do with your attitude toward FAMILY**

- \_\_\_\_\_ 49. When you marry and have children you have lost your freedom of choice.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 50. I would just as soon avoid any contact with my children except an occasional letter.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 51. The idea of a family is a social invention to limit individual freedom of action.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 52. It would be really exciting to have another, secret life to supplement your family life.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 53. My parents imposed their wishes and standards on me too much.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 54. Parents work hard for their children only to be disappointed and rejected.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 55. The only reason to marry is for convenience and security.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 56. Strange though it may seem, it is at times of family crisis that I feel most alive.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 57. I am not sure I want to stay married because I don't want to feel tied down.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 58. For me, home and family have never had much positive meaning.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 59. Families do not provide security and warmth; they just restrict a person and give him many unnecessary responsibilities.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 60. What I really like about family life is the huge, action-filled reunions at holiday times.

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