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WALTER PATER: THE POETICS OF CHANGE

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in English in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

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Abstract

WALTER PATER: THE POETICS OF CHANGE

by

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"Walter Pater: The Poetics of Change" analyzes Pater's prose in its relation to Romantic poetry. This analysis is based on the assumption that Pater's aesthetic and moral discourse is a development of Romantic visions of eternity and self-knowledge. The English Romantic poets' attempts at integrating existential anguish into imaginative self-transcendence provide the material for Pater's aesthetic perception. Pater appropriates what saving values Romantic texts offer by releasing their spirit into a meaning for himself; that is, he reads them for his own theory of aesthetic criticism.

Pater conceives aesthetic perception to be moral; the qualifying "aesthetic" does not define technique or mode of seeing only, but characterizes his theory of life in terms of an epistemology which establishes the ground of meaning. In a moment of experience, perception gathers together the past and present into a cohesive whole. Thus in the act of perception, Pater believes, a poem, a person, or a myth acquires a fresh

meaning, and through it, the subject evolves into a new self.

The pregnant moment of perception, as presented by Pater, has three constituents: the momentary statis of beauty (Chapter II), the dynamic act of experience (Chapter III), and the energy generated for aesthetic freedom or morality (Chapter IV). The three divisions of each chapter interweave these three aspects of the moment from different perspectives. Thus Section One of each chapter analyzes a given aesthetic concept synchronically, and Section Two studies diachronically the discerned components of ideas and images in relation to their philosophical and poetic past. Section Three deals with the ideals of beauty (morality) that fuse opposites to create perpetually expanding moral selves.

Pater's fusion of mind and nature in the body is both perceptible to the outward sight and is the "vision within." It is a union of the physical and metaphysical. The past as the experience of now, through the juxtaposition of flux and art, bodies forth eternal prototypes.

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Preface

I have tried to define the aesthetic and moral framework in which Walter Pater's conceptualizations of art and life take place. A conscious design is responsible for his "vision within" and that same design holds the secret to his prose style. Without discerning first the overall structure of Pater's thought, his works will continue to be subjected to misunderstanding and to be liable to unfruitful distortions. Whether we approach him through literary history or biography, knowing what holds his ideas together and how they connect to each other is essential to understanding this seminal figure in modern criticism. Pater's thoughts in their created context, not in the context of the nineteenth-century aesthetes nor of the twentieth-century psychoanalysts, are what I have tried to present in this dissertation, and nothing more than that has been attempted.

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Abbreviations

All references to Pater's works, unless otherwise indicated, are to the 10-volume Library Edition of the Works of Walter Pater published by Macmillan & Co. Ltd. in 1910 and reprinted by Johnson Reprint Corp. in 1967. The titles are abbreviated as follows:

AP Appreciations, with an Essay on Style

ES Essays from "The Guardian"

GL Gaston de Latour

GS Greek Studies: A Series of Essays

IP Imaginary Portraits

ME Marius the Epicurean: His Sensations and Ideas, 2 vols.

MS Miscellaneous Studies: A Series of Essays

PP Plato and Platonis

R The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry

Other essays of Pater, omitted from the Library Edition, appear in:

SR Sketches and Reviews

UE Uncollected Essays

Chapter I

Method and Contexts

1. From Prophet to Scholar

English Romanticism acquires a new shape when Pater invents for it a metaphor of flux, through which he gives philosophical form to the various materials of Romantic poetry.[1] His "novel juxtaposition" of the flux with the poetic (more generally, the artistic) creates a new philosophical perspective. An idea of flux, deriving from the ancient cosmologists, Heraclitus, Protagoras, Epicurus, and Lucretius, reorganizes the theory of romanticism in Blake and Coleridge, chiefly, but also in Wordsworth, Keats, and Shelley.[2] Pater is carefully selective in choosing elements from Romantic poetry and pre-Socratic and modern materialist philosophies. "Nothing," writes Pater, "but the life-giving principle of cohesion is new: the new perspective, the resultant complexion, the expressiveness which familiar thoughts attain by novel juxtaposition" (PP, 8). By novel juxtaposition, he means a metaphoric collision of terms which in turn initiates a new conceptualizing process.[3] Pater's romantic theory of aesthetic criticism is a philosophy of process, as his organizing metaphor suggests. "Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end" (R, 236). Aesthetic experience, the conceptualizing process

entails a movement of thoughts or ideas as opposing forces, and must be differentiated from concepts (fruits of experience) themselves.

In order to characterize the "life-giving principle of cohesion" of Pater's romantic vision, I shall examine, in this chapter, his selection of ideas and his method of bringing the ideas together. His "relative spirit" has remote and modern sources. The most striking paradigm of his ideas and method appear in the five relatively short paragraphs of the "Conclusion" to Studies in the History of the Renaissance,[4] where Pater defines his own essentially romantic moral outlook in scientific terms.

The essay first examines bodily change. Our physical life is a "perpetual motion of natural elements," renewed "flamelike," from moment to moment, "of forces parting sooner or later on their ways" (R, 234). Pater's matter-of-fact description contrasts sharply with Blake's urgent foreboding: "Every moment lost is a moment that cannot be redeemed; every pleasure that intermingles with the duty of our station is a folly unredeemable, & is planted like the seed of a wild flower among our wheat."[5]

The second paragraph also focuses on change, but this time on the flux of the inner world, where the "whirlpool is still more rapid, the flame more eager and

devouring" but the "cohesive force of the mind, like some magic, looses, in this constant motion, the object into impressions, reducing them to the narrow chamber of the individual mind." These impressions are kept in a "solitary prison of its own dreams" and subjected to infinitely divisible time. What is actual is then a single moment, "gone while we try to apprehend it," and what is real in our life "fines itself down in a relic more or less fleeting." Such is Pater's scientific and fearless version of the Blakean non-entity:

> I am like an atom,
> A Nothing, left in darkness, yet I am an identity:
> I wish & feel & weep & groan. Ah, terrible, terrible![6]

In the next two paragraphs, the artistic spirit of Romanticism which vivifies nature and the mind, is dramatized. "Philosophiren," Pater quotes Novalis, "ist dephlegmatisieren, vivificiren." The mind experiences some form, becoming "perfect in hand or face," some tone "choicer than the rest," some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement, "irrisistably real." The Romantic spiritualizing act is here analytically rendered. Aesthetic forms come into being in the meeting of subject and idea. Pater's "intellectual excitement" suggests more specifically than the Romantic imagination the moment when the self is united with the spirit of the past. Blake, for instance, had no interest whatever in such a union.

Ironically Oscar Wilde ended by understanding Pater's passionate urging, though Wilde had completely abused this counsel in his life. As a failed disciple of Pater, he understood Pater's aesthetic and ethical motives with added poignancy. From prison he wrote: "At every single moment of one's life one is what one is going to be no less than what one has been."[7] Only in such a moment in which the past and the future merge in one's consciousness is it possible to experience the quickened sense of life. This expanded sense of life does not come with mere multiplied sensations, as may have been assumed by Pater's "followers," but in "multiplied consciousness," as Pater states here. Exquisite sensations or any stirring of the senses signal the intellect in flame at the moment of experiencing its own life. After this passage, the focus shifts from the question of how to be, "while all melts under our feet," to how to live. We must, says Pater, "grasp at any exquisite passion, or any contribution to knowledge that seems by a lighted horizon to set the spirit free for a moment..." We must set our consciousness in motion as our passion directs us, always "testing new opinions and courting new impressions, <u>never acquiescing</u> in a facile orthodoxy, of Comte, or of Hegel, or our own." Here lies a clear shift from the prophetic to the scholarly. Again Pater's scientific

directive contrasts with Blake's prophetic warning (although their spirit is the same): "The man who never alters his opinion is like standing water, & breeds reptiles of the mind."[8]

In the final paragraph of the "Conclusion," death as a variant term for flux structures Paterian critical perception. The knowledge of death spiritualizes life. Accordingly it generates an intimate and positive force for the creative act. Death gives more life to life, for only with a proper knowledge of death may life be transformed into art, and in that transformation the body burns as the symbol of the spirit. Rousseau, says Pater, chose intellectual excitement "under an indefinable taint of death." And Hugo's conception of life as a "sort of indefinite reprieve" — "les hommes sont tous condamnés à mort avec des sursis indéfinis" — gives the condition under which glimpses of beauty may be had. The spirit of Keats, though never mentioned, hovers in this last paragraph. Pater's aesthetic choice is the apprehension of the condition of death. "Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among the 'children of this world,' in art and song" (R, 189) (my italics). Thus emerges the injunction of living in the spirit of art.

The pattern of thought delineated in the "Conclusion"

recurs throughout his work. Now we need to see what particular elements of Romantic and pre-Socratic or empiricist ideas enter into the making of this vision and what happens to them in Pater's "personalized" context. First, there is the Romantic attitude toward language which Pater maintains. Wordsworth rejected the poetic practice and rationalistic theory of the eighteenth century and adopted a philosophy which had given language a central role in understanding, perception, and expression.[9] According to this philosophy, the individual's mental act not only separates truth and sincerity from falsehood and affectation but, at the same time, refines language for expression. As Wordsworth says, "True perception is creation." Thus the Romantic attitude implies that poetry brings expression close to man's moral being. Perception of the real then depends on the individual's language, or on the degree of refinement in the use of language, and on the expression of his mental act at a given time.

Coming out of this tradition is Pater's conception that the creative use of language is dependent on some inner principle, the "character of free creation within a system of rules," as Chomsky puts it.[10] The brain wave, triggered by something conjured up by a word begins to form its own thought, unbound by the initial meaning

of the word.

> For the grave reader words too are grave; and the ornamental word, the figure, the accessory form or color or reference, is rarely content to die to thought precisely at the right moment, but will inevitably linger awhile, stirring a long "brain wave" behind it of perhaps quite alien associations.
>
> (AP, 5)

There is no immediate reference in the real world, no functional reason, for the thought forming in any particular way, but the process refines the language to express "what is most inward and peculiar in his moods and manner of apprehension" (R, 71). Pater's notion of "brain-building," thought to be derived from Wordsworth, is more attuned to the modern science of epistemology than his predecessor's developmental psychology, in his clear recognition of the inward structure of the mind that interacts with external reality. Language to Pater, as it was to the Romantic poets, is not merely changing, but perfecting itself; it builds "for the human spirit" (R, 194). The mind's interaction with the perpetually changing environment promises incalculable creative possibilities; the relative spirit, conceived in terms of perpetual flux, likewise predicts self-development or moral growth. Since the imaginative faculty also determines the scope and limit of knowledge, Pater objects to a relegation of style to subjectivity.

> ...since there is, under the conditions supposed, for those elements of the man, for every lineament of

> the vision within, the one word, the one acceptable word recognizable by the sensitive, by others "who have intelligence" in the matter, as absolutely as ever anything can be in the evanescent and delicate region of human language. The style, the manner, would be the man, not in his unreasoned and really uncharacteristic caprices, involuntary or affected, but in absolutely sincere apprehension of what is most real to him.(AP, 43)

In Pater's scheme, the perceiving mind itself is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "a kind of new idiom, constructing itself, inventing ways of expression and diversifying itself according to its own meanings."[11] Linguistic relativism, both Romantic and Paterian, suggests the relativity of truth in another sense than the limit of a particular mind's perception. According to Blake, the "Establishment of Truth depends on destruction of Falsehood continually."[12] This implies, of course, that truths become falsehoods in time. For Blake was already "much closer to the inductive scientist than to the 'reasoner' in his emphasis on the primacy of sense experience in concrete terms."[13] Each specific experience adjusts an already generalized truth toward finer and finer truths.

This "perpetual adjustments of truth" in time suggests to us another Romantic idea: the unifying world of spirit. This Romantic notion in conjunction with Heraclitean flux and Darwinian concepts of evolution constructs Pater's vision of continuity of the human spirit,

which is contingent upon accepting the world as knowledge. Pater's own vision is not apocalytic like Blake's, nor did he foresee the revolutionary impact of his own version of Romanticism. He simply asserted a gradual change toward clearer and finer truths, for he thought, in the succession of the works of the spirit, "truths ever approximate Truth," as Merleau-Ponty also says. Unlike biologists, however, poets and other humanists have not been able to pin down the units with which evolution works. Some consider the most significant unit to be some physical invention (artifacts such as plows and maps), others, some social innovation realizing a man's vision. Pater regards the power of the artist's vision as such a unit. Changes in the arts (as in the sciences) are often revolutionary, for example, the Romantic revolution of poetic language, but Pater does not conceive them as such. To him, they are fluctuations leading to gradual perfections; that is, stages of perfection. Thus we find in Pater the Romantic unity of the spirit transformed into the continuity of the human spirit manifested in all new perceptions of reality.

Pater, like his Raphael, will not forget the Romantic version of eternity which he abandons for a more scientific conception of spiritual evolution.

> How unlike the Peruginesque conception of life in its almost perverse other-worldliness, which Raphael now leaves behind him but like a true scholar, will not forget. (MS, 45) (m.i.)

Pater replaces the Romantic prophet/poet with the scholar/poet as a model for the aesthetic and moral being of his time. In The Prophetic Moment, Angus Fletcher offers a penetrating look at the prophet/poet in terms of "historicist, romantic, and deliberately momentous" qualities. He notes that primary aims of most romantic poets since Spenser have been prophetic but that their prophetic voice shows more concern for the present and the past than with predicting the future. "The method of prophecy is to hold the eternal and the ephemeral in simultaneous copresence, balancing principles against unstable reality."[15] Pater's scholar/poet with his intimate link to the past and his intensifying of the moment is in this prophetic tradition, but he reconceives the prophet/poet, by giving him a vibrant secular life. He manifests all the qualities of a romantic prophet: his method, moral purpose, historicism, momentous apprehension of reality, and yet there is a significant shift.

This shift signals a change in the method of synthesizing the past. His simultaneously historical and poetic method may best be characterized as scholarly as he himself does. In the scholarly reworking of the past lie poetic potentialities. Thus the place of the

past as ideas, as materials, plays a major role in creating a new perspective. The poet's task, says Pater, centers around doing "consciously what has been done hitherto unconsciously, to write the English language... as a scholar should write". (AP, 260-261). Only in the case of Wordsworth would Pater grant the conscious workings of poetic language; "a form of divine possession," says Pater, seems "almost literally true" in Wordsworth, although the grand, vague coherence of the whole seems to have been given passively .(AP, 41). What Pater praises in Wordsworth's language is the quality of scholarly meticulousness of Pater's own prose with its refining syntax.

> Not with the man and vulgar works of man,
> But with high objects - with enduring things -
> With life and nature, purifying thus
> The elements of feeling and thought,
> And sanctifying, by such discipline,
> Both pain and fear, until we recognize
> A grandeur in the beatings of the heart.
> (The Prelude, I:409-414)

Pater's scholarly preoccupation with the past leads to his detachment from politics. Schools or systems of thought, political and philosophical, enter into his prose but the ideas of the past remain in Pater only indirectly "political." But by staying out of the politics of his time, Pater effectively embodies the prophetic in the individual consciousness. The actualities of his time enter into his writing only as objects transformed in new

forms of thought in the mind. These forms of thought, not actualities, whatever they are, reveal more clearly the stages in the development of man's consciousness. Pater's scholarly focus on restructuring the consciousness dramatizes the continuous process of synthesis in which the common spirit unites seemingly irreconcilable schools of thought. The same process demands never "acquiescing" to any system of thought. To be scholarly then is to be ceaselessly working with forms of thought and to be detached, at the same time, from unrefined (unformed) vulgar actualities.

In the romantic journey of the mind, Pater becomes a scholar who holds diverse schools of thought and conceives their diverse forms freshly as evolutionary stages of man's consciousness. Blake, on the other hand, who read the Bible and other poetic and speculative works for their spirit, refused to read philosophical systems in the same manner, thus condemning Locke, Bacon, and Newton. It is Pater who extends Blake's method of reading to all works -- poetic, speculative, scientific, and philosophical -- transforming them into his own 'poetry'. Furthermore, Pater's Coleridgean ability to enter into thoughts of other times is free of Coleridgean obsession with the absolute, as the absolute is incompatible with the spirit of man conceived in terms of flux and art.

This spirit of motion (flux) and power (poetry) is to create a larger and saner perspective without end. Change is then the only constant in Pater's poetics and metaphysics.

The direct antecedent of Pater's scholar-poet, as we have seen, is the Romantic prophetic self with its passionate interest in and desire for beauty. With a new emphasis on the perceiving process, rather than on perceived forms, it becomes the evolving consciousness of the scholar-poet. The autonomy and freedom Pater assigns to the temperament of the scholar-poet is dangerously close to Romantic solipsism, but not quite.

> Everyone of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world.(R, 235)

Pater is right, of course, to show us how we are hostages whose purpose is unknown to us and how (here Eliot concurs) "We think of the key, each in his prison/ Thinking of the key, each confirms his prison."[16] But this evanescent flux of sensations, "that strange, perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves" is the original material that is in search of a new perspective. Pater demonstrates how the scholar-poet arrives at a fresh vision through Botticelli.

> ...the peculiar character of Botticelli is the result of a blending in him of a sympathy for humanity in its uncertain condition, its attractiveness, its vesture at moments in a character of

> loveliness and energy, with his consciousness of the shadow upon it of the great things from which it shrinks, and...this conveys into his work somewhat more than painting usually attains of the true complexion of humanity. (R, 60)

The concept of humanity in this passage depends upon Pater's own sense of Botticellian consciousness. It is the vivification of the concept, not the concept itself, that is striking. Humanity in Botticelli is not an abstract idea. It is man's "uncertain condition," overshadowed by the specter of death, his "attractiveness," his "virtue at moments in a character of loveliness and energy." Botticelli's sympathy for humanity emerges as Pater's own perspective on man. By the time this sympathy blends with Pater's own specific consciousness of the "great things" that cast a shadow on this man, the concept and Botticelli are virtually one; his painting attains the "true complexion of humanity." We should note here how Pater's array of words, which are themselves aesthetic impressions, qualify the concept. (The term "impression" will be discussed shortly in its Coleridgean connection.) Pater is not an impressionist, in the historical sense, however, who relegates the shaping spirit of the external world to the interior stream of sensations and images. What we call a new experience may largely be a re-formation of our inner being resulting from some fresh stimulus, and the new currents we sense

are, like the bloodstream circling our body, locked in, but it is the body's contact with the external world which allows the brain-building "by which we are, each of us, what we are" (ME I, 173). The building material is the past and the experience of the moment in terms of that past. The process signals personal and perpetual change within and without. The inner change has an aesthetic bearing and link to the universally human. This also suggests the Coleridgean objective truth which can be reached only through a subjective method.

Pater as critic starts his intellectual journey from Coleridge. He probes the nature of man and predicates the conscious element in art and the priority of the finite over the infinite. Despite Pater's dissociation from his predecessor's speculative sensibility, he seems to have felt affinities with Coleridge. Two elements, in particular, suggest their spiritual bond: (1) the uncompromising recognition of the world as 'it is' and the world of 'I am', as Coleridge puts it; (2) the role of the individual mind in the perception of the real. Thomas McFarland speaks of Coleridge needing to protect both ends of the moral self and of nature.[17] In his first published article, "Coleridge," Pater holds the two together in his consciousness of pervasive flux in both inner and outer realities: "...the moral world is ever

in contact with the physical," and even after estimating the complex physical organism, man is not "simple and isolated,...for the mind of the race, the character of the age, sway this way and that through the language and current ideas" (AP, 66). Holding on to the two realities like his predecessor, Pater nevertheless frees himself both from the Christian theology and any pantheistic implications that might be found in early Coleridge. Pater's probing into Coleridge secularizes Coleridge. His emphasis on "experimental, individual knowledge" and the individual's method of realizing the world bring Coleridge closer to phenomenologists.

But it is important to remember that Coleridge has already "individualized" his discursive analysis of knowledge, rescuing it from mechanistic classification. In his Treatise on Method, Coleridge writes: "...there is an inspiring passion, or desire or instinctive feeling of truth, which is immediate and proper offspring of the Mind."[18] His Method is the prolific expression of a mind that attempts to see connections in all directions and dimensions of human perception and knowledge. His view of knowledge as a "matter not of necessary connection but a connection arising from observation or supposition; that is, it consists not of Law, but Theory and Hypothesis"[19] leads in the abstract to Pater's method in which analysis

and synthesis become inseparable, as creative and critical processes become identical. "Coleridge's aim," says Owen Barfield, "was to supplement the current metaphysic, and the current science, of quantities with a metaphysic and a science of qualities."[20] The qualities are those of the individual mind which Pater elaborates into the artistic personality that limits and, at the same time, expands its perception by defining its scope in relative terms. Thus Pater reads Arnold's aim of all criticism: "To see the object as in itself it really is" as: "To know one's own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realize it distinctly (R, xix)." Pater's impression is closer to Coleridge's Initiative than to the empirical notion of impressionism, for both Pater and Coleridge never reduce the ordering power of the mind to a passive state. The power of reshaping the infinite variety of sensations, ideas, and their attendant feelings is initially instinctive. And it is the expressive source of any aesthetic organization.

Coleridge's concept of mind, as described in the Method, is Platonic; it has "its whole true being and permanence" through Idea as living law. In illustrating his Science of Method by means of Plato, Coleridge writes that the proposed object in Plato's "education of the Intellect" was to awaken the method of self-development,

with a shifted focus on the expansion of consciousness. The mind's weakness and imperfections, Coleridge believed, need to be strengthened and made perfect by a higher power if the subjective, reflective faculty is to understand objective truth. "The forms of the reflective faculty are subjective; the truth to be embraced is objective."[21] It is supposed by Plato that the "Intellect of the individual may be refined by the Intellect of the Ideal man."[22] Pater's aesthetic criticism is grounded in this general method. But these concepts serve as materials only; Pater does not argue for "an abstract reason or ideality in things," nor for a "realization of a type." For such concepts are not absolute truths, but manifestations of the aspiring spirit which should be kept alive by giving them the "elasticity" of truth as ideas. For Pater, a type is a transitory and self-limiting form that moves the spirit toward a discovery of the ideal man. It is, at the moment of perception, merely a projective ideal. But he affirms, like Coleridge, the unity of apprehending mind in expression. "All depends on the original unity, the vital wholeness and identity, of the <u>initiatory</u> apprehension or view" (AP, 19) (m.i.).

Pater finds fault chiefly with Coleridge's way of allowing theological argument to spill over into critical

precepts. Coleridge feared that, with the rejection of the supernatural, man would lose the spiritual element in life. "But what is this spiritual element? It is the passion for inward perfection with its sorrows, its aspirations, its joy"(SK,100). The Paterian spirit of man, like Shelleyean passion, struggles for intellectual beauty in the perishing clay. The mental states of such passion, says Pater, are the "higher morality of the few, of Augustine,...of Francis de Sales; in their essence they are only the permanent characteristics of the higher life." Augustine, reflecting the culture of his age, wrote in terms of a metaphysical theory, entailing "What theologians call the doctrines of grace and sin, the fluctuations of the union of the soul with its unseen friend." Those who are capable of passion for perfection still produce the same mental states. But Coleridge's religious expression of such states is incongruous with the culture of the age (SK, 101-102). Pater, who was sensitive to the present moment and concerned with the changing intellectual climate, believed that his generation had become "dead to religion...through religion." "For those who have passed out of Christianity, perhaps its most precious souvenir is the ideal of transcendental disinterestedness" (SK, 104) (m.i.). Pater goes on to point out the weakness of the dogmas Coleridge defends. They are words rather than new conceptions and are in conflict with the "common daylight of the mind," with the new understanding advanced by Descartes, Berkeley, Bacon, and

Locke. Furthermore, Coleridge uses analogies for the "empty scheme of arguments for which the data are still lacking." Pater's view of religion is of course secular and aesthetic. When the mind flows in its "passion for inward perfection with its sorrows,its aspirations,its joy"rather than freezes, there is the true spirit of religion. "...what chains men to religion is not its claim on their reason, their hopes and fears,but the flow it affords to the world, its beau ideal" (SR, 100-101). While approving Coleridge's historical method in the treatment of dogmatic theology with "learning, inwardness, a subtle psychology,a dramatic power of sympathy with modes of thought other than his own," Pater says that his predecessor lacks historical sense and relative spirit. Coleridge regards the true historical origin of a dogma as a "reason for the existence of the dogma now, not merely as reason for its having existed in the past" (SR, 110). Coleridge has not "freed himself from the notion of a sacred cannon," as he was unable to consider the books of Scripture "simply as fruits of the human spirit." So Pater concludes that Coleridge's criticism is not "entirely disinterested."

Pater's belief in the power of secular language and secular prose, in particular, was almost as doctrinal as Coleridge's belief in Christianity. Prose as the appropriate medium of expression in the modern world can be "as varied in its excellence as humanity itself,

reflecting on the facts of its latest experience" (AP, 8). A prose artist must be a scholar who knows the facts and rejects all "surplassage."[23] New effects depend on the intermingling of the old and the new with all their subtleties and refinements. Boldly proclaiming that prose is more suited than any other type of expression to the complexity of modern life, he nevertheless sought an adequate expression of Coleridge's moral outlook in a freer and more tranquil manner. No doubt, the visual bias, the "natural susceptibility to moments of strange excitement," the tendency to seek a refuge in art from a "tarnished actual present," and contemplative freedom from abstract speculations all yield a hypnotic quality to the prose all Pater's own. But the triad of nature, mind and the artistic perception rooted in the body reveals a power of sympathy and comprehension similar to his predecessor's. The depth and breath of Pater's thought is Coleridgean, although it lacks (or avoids) metaphysical and emotional exuberance.

Thus linked to Coleridge, Pater develops the motifs he introduced in his article on Coleridge, by expanding them either lyrically or dramatically, and recapitulating them throughout his later works. It is as though his entire work were a fugue, each strand of melody recurring and developing to completion. This compositional organization

gives his work a quality unique among prose writers of his time. Whereas Coleridge has left thought in notes, "just that mere preparation for an artistic effort," as Pater observes, "which the finished literary artist would be careful one day to destroy," there remain no Paterian sketches that hint at a unique vision amidst their unformed matter (AP, 72) (SR, 91).[24] The loss inherent in Paterian "artistic effort" is apparent; he has left us only the finished, purified forms of his subtle and scrupulously scholarly consciousness.

> By exquisite analysis the artist attains clearness of idea; then through many stages of refining, clearness of expression. He moves slowly over this work, calculating the tenderest tone, and restraining the subtlest curve, never letting hand or fancy move at large, gradually enforcing flaccid spaces to the highest degree of expression. (AP, 81)

Pater's own life as well as his prose seemed to have been shaped by such distillations. To sum up, Pater's Coleridgean connection is two-fold: the simultaneous recognition of the worlds within and without, and the critical faculty of the mind which at once synthesizes and analyzes. The individual mind both in Coleridge and Pater intuits and then analyzes; that is, it perceives the real through the ideal.

Pater thought that the "architectural conception" was all-important, even in prose if it is to be considered as an art. A reading, faithful both to his idea of

criticism and to the expressive qualities of his prose, is bound to take his writing as "poetry," capable of initiating aesthetic experience (as opposed to mere intellectual argument) in the manner Pater himself defines. Pater's prose has a definable aesthetic and moral design from which his ideas emerge and to which our questions must be directed for clarification of their signification. This design "foresees the end in the beginning, and never loses sight of it, and in every part is conscious of the rest, till the last sentence does but, with undiminished vigour unfold and justify the first..." (AP, 18). It is in this design, identified by Pater as "that vision within," that the secret of his prose may be grasped. A reading aimed at revealing this order may also do some justice to the scope and purpose of Pater who as scholar/poet has taken "to pieces the whole web of his mind" to create it, as Macaulay said of poetic perception. "For the literary art," Pater declared, "the problem just now is to induce order upon the contorted, proportionless accumulation of our knowledge and experience, our science and history, our hopes and disillusion..." (AP, 273). Thus he calls for a scholar/poet whose critical perception is needed to accomplish this task.

2. The Spirit of the Particular

Blake urges us to see eternity in particulars:

"...he who wishes to see a Vision, a perfect Whole,/Must see it in its Minute Particulars, organized."[25] Coleridge characterizes the poets of his age as aiming, in the main, for "new and striking images; with incidents that interest the affections or excite the curiosity."[26] An idea, according to Coleridge, can ultimately be conveyed only by a symbol. Keats' symbols reenact this particularizing idea. The nightingale and the Grecian urn are new incarnations of the sublime art, which would "tease us out of thought."[27] The Romantic poets thus sought first and foremost freedom from the deadening grip of scientific and philosophical abstractions that seemed to divide man from his own passions. The individual person, not generalized humanity, specific psychological states in an artistic organization, not inherited ideas about the nature of man, are considered imaginative and liberating. Moral generalities in this light became merely vicious.

> He who would do good to another must do it in
> Minute Particulars:
> General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite
> & flatterer,
> For Art & Science cannot exist but in minutely
> organized Particulars
> And not in generalizing Demonstrations of the
> Rational Power.
> The Infinite alone resides in Definite and Determinate
> Identity.[28]

Thus they sought the definite in things,their desire transforming an object into beauty.

> Is there a flower, to which he points with hand
> Too weak to gather it, already love
> Drawn from love's purest earthly fount for him
> Has beautified that flower[29]

Shelley goes beyond this Wordsworthian beginning and creates a separate object. It is as though, having incorporated the "ennobling interchange" of the thirteenth book of the Prelude, he projected in "Mont Blanc" a new object of intellect.

> Dizzy Raviene! and when I gaze on thee
> I seem as in a trance sublime and strange
> To muse on my own separate phantasy,
> My own, my human mind, which passively
> Now renders and receives fast influencings,
> Holding an unremitting interchange
> With the clear universe of things around[30]

As critic Pater shows the same Romantic love of sensuous beauty in things.

> To define beauty, not in the most abstract but in the most concrete terms possible, to find, not its universal formula, but the formula which expresses most adequately this or that special manifestation of it, is the aim of the true student of aesthetics. (R, xix, m.i.)

Beauty, as organized particulars, sets the spirit free for "a life of constant and eager observation" (R, 236). The spirit, however, cannot be set free for good; or into the "external." Pater emphatically limits the Romantic liberation of soul to the changing moment. Every moment has to be creatively set free. Whereas the idea of the simultaneously creative and redemptive moment as beauty comes from the Romantic Poets, the concentrated

vision of the fleeting moment of beauty is Pater's own, and that focus is what colors the organizing spirit itself. In Pater, there is no forgetting or easing out of "beauty that dies." Coleridge wrote in The Friend: "The finite forms can neither be laid hold of, nor is it anything of itself real, but, merely an apprehension, a framework which the human imagination forms by its own limits, as the foot measures itself on the snow."[31] For Pater, the moment of apprehension (of an object in nature or a work of art) is real in itself. Though it is a "framework" which the imagination forms "by its own limits," it works out into the ultimate perfection of that moment. As such, the moment's form is sufficient, though not unlike Coleridge's foot that "measures itself on the snow." Thus Pater urges us to discern such moments eagerly and methodically as they are the "never ending process of self-creation."

Beauty is momentous and sorrowful because the moment of apprehension signals the simultaneous change of the self and the phenomenon of beauty itself. Beauty, as experience, is "elusive, provisional and contingent" as expression, it is particular and individualistic (PP, 189). The Keatsean psyche in Pater is expressed with scientific and philosophical ideas of his time. But the ideas in his prose are "spiritualized," rather than

systematized, into particular and vibrant images. Pater believed that "The demand of the intellect is to feel itself alive" (R, 183). The power of Pater's philosophical prose lies in this spiritualizing of ideas or poetic particularization. Here is a passage from Marius the Epicurean which illustrates his method of expression.

> The human body in its beauty, as the highest potency of the beauty of material objects, seemed to him just then to be matter no longer, but, having taken celestial fire, to assert itself as indeed the true, though visible soul, a spirit in things. (ME, 92)

The idea of beauty as the spirit in the physical is most undogmatically stated in this passage. How does the "human body in its beauty" intimate an "intelligent soul in material things?" First, Marius associates the human body with a series of concepts: "beauty," "potency," "matter no longer"; then the body takes on "celestial fire" that readily links to the "true" "visible soul." As the Romantic poets who incorporated their own spirit in the physical to experience the world palpably, Pater spiritualizes ideas with the interplay of nouns and creates a particularized context which is both sensuous and abstract.

This context is colored by Pater's personal eye which sees flux everywhere. Pater wrote in his first published article: "To feel the change everywhere, yet

not abandon oneself to it, is a situation of difficulty and contention," (AP, 65) and again in 1873 he reiterated that whatever is real in our life is "a tremulous wisp of constantly re-forming itself on the stream," "a relic more or less fleeting" (R, 236). The image of "white light" embodies this mysterious and fleeting beauty he sees in the tragedy of pain and death. Professor George Ridenour observes that in the context of Victorian poetry, "the whiteness of loss (death) or of indifference may come to be seen as the whiteness of possibility, and even, in its 'clarity', the fulfillment of that possibility."[32] Pater presents this image centrally in a powerful myth of madness and death in his "Apollo in Picardy." The ungraspable light that reveals itself for a moment to a life surrounded by grey existence suggests a form of fulfillment in ecstasy, madness and death. The light shines in the body "from within with a light of his own, like that of the glowworm in the thicket, or the death and rotten roots of the old trees" (MS, 167).

The scholar sees the white light

> ...rising steadily in the cup,the mental receptacle, till it overflowed, and he lay faint and drowning in it. Or he rose above it, as above a great liquid surface, and hung giddily over it - light, simple, and absolute - ere he fell.
>
> (MS, 164-65)

This passionate discrimination is of course sought for freedom, freedom from time or from the past. Blake's conception of imagination is timeless in this way. "For in this Period the poet's Work is Done, and all the Great/Events of Time start forth and are conceiv'd in such a Period,/Within a Moment, a Pulsation of the Artery."[33] Freedom,to Pater, is none other than the possibility of the new forms he creates. As demonstrated by his method in the Renaissance, Pater's freedom from the past comes with an analysis of a life or an art object of the past, in which the unchanging elements of humanity (pagan sentiments, for instance, manifested in a particular historical and biographical setting) are discerned and isolated. New conceptions of the human condition are formulated on the basis of these elements. The critic as historian in this sense must be able to isolate and define the spirit within the artist and to recover the pristine condition of man it reveals, rather than the conditions of a particular time. By this method, Pater restores in his reading of Botticelli, for instance, the original Hellenic spirit which has long been dead through familiarity.

> And yet, the more you come to understand what imaginative colouring really is, that all colour is no mere delightful quality of natural things, but a spirit upon them by which they become expressive to the spirit, the better you will like this peculiar quality of colour; and you will find that

> quaint design of Botticelli a more direct inlet into the Greek temper than the works of the Greeks themselves even of the finest period.
> (R, 58)

The idea that Botticelli can embody the Greek temper or a Hellenic ideal better than the works of the ancient Greeks themselves comes from his aesthetic premise which stresses the primacy of the imaginative act over the product of that act.

Pater seeks greater freedom from received forms of thought than his Romantic predecessors. He thus avoids the language of myth which served the poets as unifying metaphors. Instead he adopts a language which is "changing on our very lips: scientific, eclectic, conscious and deliberate," and makes "the composite experience of all ages" part of his own (SK, 14-15). Even in this opting for the more scientific language of his time, the spirit of Blake presides. For Blake everything that ever existed exists as part of the city of imagination. "Word, work & wish that has existed" exist permanently and is not lost or vanished. In that sense human language itself is revelatory; that is, any text could be read redemptively for its spirit. "What have I said? What have I done? O all powerful Human Words!"[34] This Holy Word being the medium, the Blakean vision of eternity completes itself aesthetically.

> All things acted on Earth are seen in the bright
> Sculptures of Los's Halls
> And every Age renews its powers from these Words

> With every pathetic story possible to happen from Hate or
> Wayward Love: & every sorrow & distress is carved here,
> Every Affinity of Parents, Marriages & Friendships are here
> In all their various combination wrought with wondrous art[35]

Pater's 'scientific' version asserts the same: "nothing which has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality" (R, 45). Blake's eternity of the spirit, which Pater's "House Beautiful" assumes, builds civilization: what "the creative minds of all generations - the artists and those who have treated life in the spirit of art - are always building together" (AP, 241). Ironically what particularizes Pater's own perspective and his desire for greater freedom is accompanied by his sense of inescapability from the past. The past is both a burden and legacy: "For in truth we come into the world each one of us,'not in nakedness', but by the natural course of organic development...nay, fatally shrouded" (AP,138).

Freedom from the past, as Pater shows, requires a simultaneous absorbtion and rejection of the past. The past in the case of Pater is both material and spiritual source for redemption if it can be brought to life poetically. Soon after the publication of the Renaissance, Pater wrote a short essay on "Romanticism" which appeared as the "Postscript" in Appreciations in 1889. Here

Pater defines romanticism as a stable principle, one of the "two real tendencies in the history of art and literature" (AP, 235). The romantic principle, "ever-present, enduring...in the artistic temperament," is associated with principles of liberty, in the romanticist dictum of Stendhal, "all good art was romantic in its day." The needs out of which Romanticism arose were "to defend a complete independence and liberty in the choice and treatment of subject, both in art and literature, against those who upheld the exclusive authority of precedent" (AP, 268).

English Romantic poets are not mentioned in this essay, but Wordsworth's love for liberty is very much part of the argument, his liberty which intimates immortality, "something ever more to be." Blake creates systems to rescue individuals from systems. Shelley's furies of doubts and hope ("If Liberty lent not life its soul of light") and Keat's self-consciousness and self-creation disputing "Betwext damnation and impassion'd clay," embody the struggle against the ontological tyranny of nature, but also against ideas -- the tyranny of social and religious abstractions. Pater continues the battle for romantic liberation from the grip of abstract ideas. But his battle is fought with ideas; he explores in "Minute Particulars" the universal images of men lodged in dead ideas and liberates them from false

human projections.[36]

The search for liberty as an escape from "thought's stagnant chaos" may be identified with the search for the new in the romantic temper. He calls this romantic quality "curiosity." The "addition of strangeness to beauty," presumably a product of curiosity, constitutes the romantic character in art (AP, 258). This is contrasted with the "quality of order in beauty" that defines the classical element. In his final statement about the romantic temper, Pater stresses the new, the ever-changing spirit that retains the best of the past.

> To turn always with that ever-changing spirit, yet to retain the flavor of what was admirably done in the past generations, in the classics, as we say - is the problem of true romanticism.
>
> (AP, 269)

Goethe represents for Pater the union of the past with the new spirit "in its adventure, its variety, its profound subjectivity of the soul" (R, 226-7). Pater's reformulation of Romantic concepts moves toward simplicity and clarity, without abandoning the Romantic mode of visionary journeying.

> For the essence of all artistic beauty if expression, which cannot be where there is nothing to be expressed; the line, the colour, the word, following obediently, and with minute scruple, the conscious motion of convinced soul.[37]
>
> (PP, 120)

"Expression" is the "intelligible soul" observing its own consciousness in concrete terms, not the "eternal act

of creation in the infinite I AM." Imaginative perception, for Pater, simply initiates a metaphoric conception of the "convinced soul" expressing its own conscious motion, propelled by the meeting with an object. But the conception, like the Romantics', creates a self-sustaining cosmos; thus, his world is primarily metaphysical and poetic, not social and historical. In addition, Pater's psychic mimesis, like his Romantic predecessors', equates bodily humanity with the poetic spirit. Mimesis in the sense of foregrounding external events for their own sake has little significance here. For Pater, mirroring the psychic reality of a particular man can furnish a new perspective on the human condition, provided that reality is spiritualized in concrete terms. In the universal scheme of flux and recurrence, Pater sees history as the source of all poetic transformations, of all expressions of human longing for return (homesickness) and continuity. Language in this context becomes an agent/form in the evolution of the human spirit. Pater's scientific shift represents a much more intellectualized desire for beauty and truth than that of the Romantic poets.

3. The Aesthetic and the Moral

"And how goodly had the vision been! -one last unfolding of beauty and energy in things, upon the closing of which he might utter his 'vix'." Marius, dying thus in full

consciousness of approaching death, grasps a vision of life which asserts aesthetic perception as freedom. The "unfolding of beauty and energy in things" does not avail itself without the vision which "expands with the freedom and mobility of the things of the intellect" (R, 197). This visionary intellect challenges all ethical abstractions, which might have once illumined truths but have now become oppressive lies. These fixtures of history, long dead, cannot unfold beauty and energy in things. Releasing humanity from abstract ideas represents Pater's singularly moral purpose.

While Blake's aesthetic reorganization of the moral universe arises from a historical situation where traditional moral precepts could no longer stand on a solid doctrinal basis, Pater's concern centers around his consciousness of universal change which necessitates new moral precepts. Pater seizes the creative possibilities in the altering frame of reference, namely, in the mental constructs that change. Blake also saw aesthetic values in change, of course, realizing that the bodies of men, their sense and their lives always live in constant change even in those historical periods where the mental constructs of society and cosmos had been conceived otherwise. But Pater articulates this universal fact as the single most important aesthetic element, embodied

in the condition of man. Pater constructs a moral order in flux, in the body that changes in its desire for new energy and beauty. To be moral comes to signify, to both Blake and Pater, mental effort of an aesthetic kind, making beauty and moral good virtually identical. We recognize habitual rejection of this aesthetic shift of morality, but that may be largely due to the mind's refusal to be liberated. It is important to note that the patterning of moral being on aesthetic perfection is, regardless of our skepticism, not loose analogy; Pater sees living knowledge as the common fountain of beauty and moral good. The imaginative self and the developing self stand in the same relation to this knowledge. Pater did not need to show, as Keats did, that "an extensive knowledge is needful to thinking people - it takes away the heat and fever; and helps, by widening speculation, to ease the burden of the Mystery."[38] To Pater, knowledge is not external to the personality; knowledge is the mind itself that determines the personality. Self-knowledge depends on the person's critical apprehension of reality, and living aesthetically means living in the spirit of organic knowledge. Aesthetic life or contemplative life refers to an inclusive act of the mind and presumes a full conscious analysis of reality. Action, in this context, may be seen as a suspension of contemplation -

a blind, though momentarily, unconscious act compelled by the vicissitudes of life. So Pater places contemplation before action.

> That the end of life is not action but contemplation-being as distinct from doing - a certain disposition of the mind - is in some shape or other, the principle of all the higher morality. In poetry, in art, if you enter into their true spirit at all, you touch this principle in a measure.
>
> (AP, 61)

He therefore urges that action, as well as perception, must be ceaselessly disciplined into contemplation, into humanity and harmony, into comely forms of conduct. Such aesthetic discipline, according to Pater, refines facts into cultural forms of usages and sentiments.

Aesthetic criticism signals a shift "from an ethic of commitment to an ethic of signifier," as Roland Barths was later to put it, morality being the "precise opposite" of a fixed ethical system.[39] Pater supposes, of course, more than mechanical linguistic transformations by this shift; he sees in the act of the signifier an effort, a privilege, the kind of privilege the Greeks had through their religion which was able to "transform itself into an artistic ideal" (R, 163). The imaginative use of language permits a change towards a finer conception of facts, but this use of language does not fix reality in the language of the moment nor settle the user in a conceptual frame. For the artistic temperament, out of

discontent and frustration, brings forth ceaselessly a new stage in consciousness. The Greeks believed that their thoughts concerning themselves and their relations to nature were "ever in the happiest readiness to be transformed into objects for the senses" (R, 163). When such is possible, that is, when expressiveness of perception remains vital, thoughts do not imprison us but free us to be intensely alive in nature. The process of conceptualization as an activity of the body, not just the mind in its own abstract universe, does not threaten to alienate us from our home and our body. The activity that links us to the world, both sensuously and intellectually, is, according to Pater, a poetic incorporation of reality. Only the mode of poetic perception (metaphoric conception) links us to what is genuine, beautiful, and pleasurable in life. Pater's aesthetic criticism asserts finally the creative perception, the divine humanity that continues.

The young Oxford undergraduates and others who read Pater's books and listened to his lectures seems to have sought action as opposed to contemplation, through "questionable channels," ignoring the complex thought behind Paterian images of beauty and thus turning to sensation. Their experience of strange and sensual pleasure and pain had no resonance in a profounder

consciousness. They did not bother placing Pater's aesthetic precepts in their proper context, and ended up eliminating Pater's Blakean spirit. The power that balances life and death, motion and repose in flux to cultivate and sustain the spirit of man was dropped from the idea of beauty, making it static and one-dimensional.[40] Paterian beauty, even the intuitive apprehension of it, does not strike in isolation, as we are led to believe by the aesthetes. Pater never lets us forget that the perception of even the architectural construct of the thing of beauty dissolves and becomes part of the consciousness which seeks ceaselessly its own refinement. Refinement in Pater means finer truth, not polished surface. The center of aesthetic morality is the ceaseless critical effort for a clearer and better conception of truth (through beauty) and of conduct in the light of common humanity.

However, the aesthete's interpretation of the Paterian images of beauty might not perhaps have been quite without justice; Pater's mode of discourse may have invited the development to some extent. His thought, poetically and paradoxically expressed, is more open to a wide variety of interpretation than a logically developed discourse would be. A metaphorically conceptualized meaning does not emerge fully until the configurations of

crossing and recrossing of tropes are laid out. Only then does his rhetoric of the senses lead to the expression of his poetic order. And his seemingly non-commital paradoxes were open to distortion by the aesthetes. Pater's well-known social manner of hiding behind paradoxes was not a mere social trick, but had "deeper significances."[41] But they were not understood by the "dull Oxford people" as the imprisoned Oscar Wilde belatedly puts it.[42] Pater's critics, like his Oxford disciples, often misread the paradoxical significances of his sorrow that moulds beauty, the pain in pleasure, and the ascetic motive beyond appetites and sensations. What has not been made sufficiently clear in the studies of Pater in the past is that the metaphoric interlockings create a conceptual system and that the "gem-like flame" fires the intellect. The historical accident that wedges Pater between Pre-Raphaelites and the aesthetes of the 90's helped the critics to ignore the depth of Pater's conceptual system.

The method of putting the facts of reality together at any given moment depends on a specific personality; that is, the how of what one perceives depends on the sympathetic temper of the perceiver. What we express is, as Pater puts it, "such fact as connected with soul"; thus, in literary art, "like all art which is any way

imitative or reproductive of fact - form or color, or incident," the soul-connected fact embodies a "specific personality, in its preference, its volition and power" (AP 10).An aesthetic process in which the response of a specific personality to an object or a person becomes part of the object or understanding offers possibilities of self development. "Temperament plays its part," says Iris Murdoch, "whether or not we are impelled to act or we are content to remain."[43] Moral change involves private activity in the inner contemplative area. Yet this inner change signals a better perception of reality, be it a person or a poem, and a potential change. Just as the finer perception of reality signals new knowledge, so the individual's mental atmosphere created through clearer perception signifies the moral being. To be moral thus implies changing in order to create finer attitudes with a greater comprehension of reality.[44] Aesthetic and moral perception is shaped by the soul we possess; the function of this soul in aesthetic morality will be described in the last chapter of this study.

Aesthetic criticism is an integrative quest, not aesthetic indulgence. The mind's successive "apercus," its privileged moments build the moral being with "that clear-eyed intellectual consistency like spotless bodily cleanliness or scrupulous personal honor" (ME II, 17).

In the subject's movement toward oneness with the object, art is, to Pater, the only language of integration. But Pater has often been rebuked for avoiding a commitment for being uncertain in his choice of philosophy. Submission to any system of ideas would have amounted to abandoning his moral quest. Only to aesthetic and moral knowledge is Pater committed. In his quest, the ground may shift from moment to moment to free ideas from their confining forms, to reveal what is real in them, or to clarify their relations to other grounds. For the shifting ground uncovers the connections between images and ideas of diverse origins. In this process, the dialectical progression between dynamic perception and formal organization sheds errors and moves towards greater understanding of the object of love. So beauty is not only a stage in truth but also a deception, "a gilded tomb," particularly if it is fixed for worship. Aesthetic perversion occurs when the progression ceases. The "truant muse" must be taught "how/To make him /truth/ seem long hence as he shows now."[45] Pater attempts such a prolonging by avoiding, as much as possible, the platitude of mere statements. Words and images integrate the past and clarify the meaning of the moment as the religion of Marius' childhood plowing into his mature sensibility. Marius is able to clarify his "vision within"

in terms of the religion of places and things and the lesson of the sanctity of the body which he learned at the temple of Aesculpaius. Thus, though a materialist, he clings to "the sentiment of the body, and the affection it defined - the flesh of whose force and colour that wandering Platonic soul was but so frail a residue." This materialist "with something of a temper of devotee" finally apprehends the flux in terms of aesthetic ideals, "whatever form of human life...might be heroic, impassioned, ideal" (ME, I, 125).

These ideals link the past with the flimsy present. "What is the Joy of Heaven but Improvement in the things of the Spirit?" says Blake.[46] In Pater, the dialectical destiny of man is figured as hope in the evolution of the human spirit.

> The idea of Humanity - of a universal commonwealth of mind, which becomes explicit, and as if incarnate, in a select communion of just men made perfect.
> (ME II, 7)

Pater's "select communion of just men" exists only in the stages of evolution in the human spirit. It is neither a state of affairs at the end of a line (a utopia) nor even a goal, but something that shows itself across historical expanse, in the linking of the finest sensibilities in full bloom, at different periods of man's history. Blake, on the other hand, believed that a better world would result with an imaginative perception

that overthrows religious dogmas and political coercion. Neither Blake nor Pater had a doctrinaire ethical program, but their aesthetic spirit envisioned a new order of the mind, where justice and beauty are inseparable.

To move toward this order ceaselessly is the only moral requisite Pater sees. This is to perceive a fellow being or a painting, "consonant with nature" and the spirit of man. We may desire to understand and love a person, a poem or a painting, but the process of knowing with sympathy delivers an "other" that comes to exist. That this other be real and true for the self and others as an object of contemplation is the critical version of the same requisite. To fulfill it, we must not, says Pater, be dead to substance and form.

> ...in truth, the legitimate contention is, not of one age or school of literary art against another, but of all successive schools alike, against the stupidity which is dead to substance and the vulgarity which is dead to form.
>
> (AP, 274)

Had there been a moral program in Pater's writing, the contention against stupidity and vulgarity would have served it best, for it is one of the most balanced and expansible nuclei of his meditation on art and life. Since it is the act of apprehension, of understanding fact as it evolves in the flux of nature, that perfects the self, the "stupidity which is dead to substance" would

be as detrimental as the "vulgarity which is dead to form." The two requirements: sensitivity to substance and sensitivity to form are applied to criticism of life. Pater's matter, or the spiritual source, is again Blake; in the world where the moral is identical with the aesthetic, evil, like all other images, is not absolute. It arises, according to Blake, from the mistaken division of good and evil. Evil is simply another word for forms of error or delusion. "Yet they /sinners/ are blameless, and Inequisy must be imputed only/To the State they are enter'd into, that they may be deliver'd/. Satan is the State of Death & not a Human existence."[47] Blake reiterates the necessity to consolidate evil by giving it form. One must first break away from chaos and know falsehood before one can destroy it. And errors must be destroyed in light of the human spirit, not in view of some religious or moral abstractions. The moral injunction is to understand the human spirit correctly and obey its humanities.

> I care not whether a Man is Good or Evil; all that I care
> Is whether he is a Wise Man or a Fool. Go, put off Holiness
> And put on Intellect, or my thund'rous Hammer shall drive thee
> To wrath which thou condemnest, till thou obey my voice.[48]

How does one correctly perceive? Pater goes a step beyond Blake's "put on Intellect." Pater's dramatization

of the problem of perception emphasizes the simultaneity of aesthetic and moral perception. "That you yourself must have an inward, carefully ascertained, measured, instituted hold over anything you are to convey with any real power to others" (PP, 116-117) is both aesthetic and moral. How we may express "with any real power" does not depend on a rhetoric alone but on what it is that we see as true.[49] In saying that form makes understanding possible and expressive, Pater does not undo the moral force of form. For form contains within it the various perspectives with which it is formulated. Form and substance are one as they enter into each other in flux and creation.

The moral aspect of imagination resides in the ideal which perfects itself and promises a possibility of living a more human life. Finer justice is possible, Pater says, when it is "based on a more delicate appreciation" of the "true conditions of men and things" (AP, 190). Through aesthetic experience, we must cultivate "a duly receptive attitude toward such possible truth, discovery, or revelation" (PP, 188). For truth, like beauty, is forever provisional and disappointing. That is why in the very realization of beauty is contained the "ennui of the actual."

We note in summary that Pater's moral vision is

organized around the flux/art juxtaposition. The novelty of numerous juxtapositions derived from this organizing paradigm shocks the mind into an awareness of new relations. Pater's own unique thematic expressions come from the various bondings of these opposing forces: continuity (flux), morality (the aspiring temperament) and beauty (art). A brief reminder of two related points concerning the figural functions of flux and art is in order here; one, they operate on the meaning (the signified) rather than on the form (the signifier); two, they endlessly define relationships, never the terms themselves. Thus to define beauty (art) is meaningless and useless except in its concrete relation to the object in question and to the particular temperament in the act of perceiving it. The meaning of flux, likewise, emerges from its relations to art mediated by a particular artist or critic. The semantic domain of flux, signifying aspects of nature-change, death and decay, merges with that of art and creates a new domain of continuity, humanity, beauty/sorrow. Pater's ideas and images, which seem disparate at first, cohere metaphorically, always weaving together some attributes of flux and art. That life is in some sense art is not a mere metaphor in Pater but a fully developed theory of life, called aesthetic criticism. For Pater the vitally human reality is the aesthetic and

moral reality obtained by the synthesis of history and the body of particular consciousness of the moment. Here the recognition of the facts of nature and history becomes the recognition of the body's innermost nature, "that which the person really is" (AP, 18). So Pater says: "The house he has built is rather a body he has informed" (AP, 21).

The change from Coleridge's pantheistic unity or Blake's cosmic divination of humanity to Pater's historical and natural sense of continuity of the human spirit is subtle but decisive. Pater recreates the moment in history, in the "sympathetic appreciation of a kind of music in the very nature of things." His world is non-mystical even in his most Romantic passages. Pater's radical secularization of Coleridgean criticism theorizes against abstraction, rescues Romantic subjectivism from solipsism,and offers a moral ground for aesthetics. Rather than railing at language for cutting the subject off from the world, he saw that even the thoroughly internalized quest of a poet is never purely of the individual. His understanding of language and the role of ideas in his critical imagination enabled him to see the unity of the self, based on aesthetic desire. His claim that expression objectifies the self's conscious relation to the world clarifies, at the same time, the

metaphoric relationship between language and the world, the ideal and the actual, and, particularly, art and life. As he makes no ultimate distinction between life and art as material for aesthetic criticism, his theory of art is more inclusive of life than other theories advocated by Victorian critics or modern structuralists. In his critical approach to art and life, Pater has followed, as I have tried to show, Blake's example: "Thou art a Man, God is no more;/Thine own Humanity learn to adore." This humanity adoes that which is more human, more alive, more beautiful, and more perfect. Pater's divinity, like Blake's, is humanity perfecting itself. Pater's vision of man is as free as it is awesome, as familiar as it is extraordinary in its secular and profound conception. The breath and pulsation of his conception is also the moral effect of art on life. It is neither apocalyptic nor revolutionary, but it revolutionizes our conception of humanity, the "perishing clay" discerning infinite gradations of refinement.

Notes

I

[1]Pater, like Shelley, assumed that "Philosophy itself, mental and moral, has its preparation, its fore-thoughts in the poetry that preceded it" (PP, 5). This idea, of course, precedes Shelley and Pater. Taking off from Vico, Northrop Frye also recognizes three modes of writing as historical stages of development. In the first phase, in which a conception of language is poetic and hieroglyphic, there is the feeling that "subject and object are linked by a common power of energy." In the second phase, by contrast, "words become primarily the outward expression of inner thought and ideas," language having become individualized. My appropriation of this idea assumes that its historical process is continuous and dialectical. See The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982), pp. 6-8.

[2]Pater's discourse may be grounded both in Romantic poets' preoccupation with liberation, the self that spiritualizes concepts and objects, and its desire for beauty and eternity, and in the 18th and 19th century empiricists who developed what the Greeks understood; namely, that the forces issuing from the material world are also changing. See Walter Jackson Bate, From Classic to Romantic Taste in Eighteenth-Century England (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 20.

[3]The conjunction of art and flux is "novel" in the sense that it provides for Pater a new perspective with its metaphorically organized cohesiveness. We should be reminded however that Pater is less concerned with the idea of metaphor within a sentence, than with a metaphoric relation that organizes an idea, a poem, a painting, a discourse, or a life. The principle of organization involved is of course the same. Following Max Black's view of metaphor as interaction, we may say that flux is the frame and art the focus. When flux is seen through art, the art-vocabulary filters and transforms flux; the focus imposes its own structure (its system of associated meanings) on the frame and an expansion beyond the bounds of the given system of meanings. See Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1962), p. 42.

[4]The "Conclusion" was first published in Westminster Review in October 1868 as part of a review of Poems by William Morris. Pater's first book, Studies in the History of the Renaissance includes five paragraphs from this

article as the "Conclusion." He omitted the "Conclusion" from the second edition of the book which appeared in 1877 (the first edition came out in 1873) because the general misunderstanding of the essay had become socially and professionally uncomfortable for him. It reappeared in 1888.

[5]My reading of Blake is derived from Prof. George Ridenour's stimulating lectures at CUNY. Any misreading is of course my own. The Complete Writings of William Blake, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London: Oxford UP, 1967), p. 716.

[6]ibid. p. 265.

[7]Selected Letters of Oscar Wilde, ed. Rupert Hart-Davis (New York: Oxford UP, 1979), p. 476.

[8]Blake/Keynes, p. 156.

[9]Hans Aasleff cites Condillac and Humboldt as chiefly responsible for Wordworth's reformulation of poetic language. See "Wordsworth, Language and Romanticism," Essays in Criticism, 30:3 (July 1980), pp. 215-226.

[10]Noam Chomsky, Problems of Knowledge and Freedom, (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 23 & 51.

[11]The Primacy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Northwestern UP, 1964), p. 9

[12]Blake/Keynes, p. 687.

[13]Northrop Frye, Fearful Symmetry (Princeton UP, 1974), p, 28.

[14]William Buckler says that Marius the Epicurean is the "most accomplished product in English" on the 19th-century's highly developed evolutionary theory, for the novel traces the organic evolution of the "genius of cultural Western man." "Marius the Epicurean: Beyond Victorianism," Victorian Poetry, 16:1&2 (Spring/Summer, 1978), p. 163.

[15](Chicago: U of CP, 1971), p. 5.

[16]"The Waste Land," The Complete Poems and Plays (New York, 1958), p. 49.

[17]Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford UP, 1969), p. 57. See also Biographia Literaria, ed. George Watson (London, 1956), p. 139.

[18]S. T. Coleridge's Treatise on Method, ed. Alice Snyder (London, 1934), p. 59.

[19]Ibid. See also Biographia Literaria, p. 167.

[20]What Coleridge Thought (Wesleyan UP, 1971), p. 11.

[21]S. T. Coleridge's Treatise on Method, p. 46. Polanyi concurs with Coleridge in the idea of Initiative in the sense that every interpretation of nature is based on some intuitive conception of the general nature of things which is expressed by necessity in metaphors. Science, Faith and Society (Chicago UP, 1964), p. See also BL, p. 90. "Matter has no 'Inward'. We remove one surface but to meet with another." The point, as Kathleen Wheeler explains, is that it is we who supply inwardness it is we who supply causal relations to a series of associations. See Sources, Processes and Method in Coleridge's Biographia Literaria (Cambridge UP, 1980), p. 89.

[22]Ibid, p. 45.

[23]The word is De Quincy's. Collected Writings, Black, 1897, X: 162 as noted by Albert J. Farmer in Walter Pater as a Critic of English Literature (Grenoble, 1931).

[24]Pater speaks of the fragmentariness of the Aids to Reflection, The Friend, and Biographia Literaria in his "Coleridge's Writings" in the January Westminster Review of 1866 and again in the revised "Coleridge" in Appreciations. Pater's own style, by contrast, may have undergone subtle changes of purification from "Conclusion" to Plato and Platonism, resulting in less opulence and singing cadences, but his vision of man and his world remain fundamentally unchanged. The fine study of Gerald Monsman and Samuel Wright analyzing the textual history of the four versions of "Conclusion" shows that the

changes made amount to a toning down of the startling images in order not to violate traditional standards without abandoning his earlier iconoclasm. Pater, the study notes, came to believe that not offending the "mystical body" of humanity is one of the "touch-stones" on moral conduct. See "Walter Pater: Style and Text," South Atlantic Quarterly, LXXI, Winter 1972, pp. 106-123. See also Edmund Chandler's Pater on Style which examines Pater's essay on style and the textual history of Marius the Epicurean (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde and Bagger, 1958).

[25]Blake/Keynes, p. 738.

[26]BL, p. 181.

[27]Morris Dickstein, Keats and His Poetry (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago P, 1971), p. 193.

[28]Blake/Keynes, p. 687.

[29]"The Prelude" (II: 245-248), Selected Poems and Prefaces, ed. Jack Stillinger (Boston, 1965), p.212.

[30]"Mont Blanc, ii 34-40" Shelley, Selected Poetry, ed. Neville Rogers (Oxford UP, 1968), p. 330.

[31]The Friend, The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn (Princeton UP, 1969), p. 520.

[32]"Time and Eternity in Swinburne: Minute Particulars in Five Poems," ELH 45 (1978), p. 115.

[33]Blake, p. 516 (Milton I:29:1-4).

[34]Blake, p. 646 (Jerusalem I;24:1).

[35]Blake, p. 638 (Jerusalem I:16:61-66).

[36]Northrop Frye, Romanticism Reconsidered (Columbia UP, 1963), p. viii. Each poet had of course a different vision of final liberation of the soul and a different problem. Harold Bloom comments on Wordsworth's paradoxical freedom and Blake's aesthetic independence: "It is the

paradoxical freedom, the Wordsworthian imagination, that it must avoid bondage to the immediate but see the reign of the remembered world." and "In Blake the imagination strives to be totally free of both, externals and memory, and delights only in the final excellence, the imaginative land." The Visionary Company (Cornell UP, 1971), pp. 145-6.

[37]The implications of this sentence are discussed in Chapter II of this study.

[38]The Letters of John Keats 1814-1821, ed. H. E. Rollins, (1958) I:277.

[39]Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, tr. Richard Howard (New York: Hill & Wang, 1977), p. 145.

[40]For the latest documentation of misreading Pater, see Franklin E. Court, Pater and His Early Critics (English Literary Studies: Univ. of Victoria, 1980).

[41]Michael Levy, The Case of Walter Pater (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), p. 114.

[42]Selected Letters of Oscar Wilde, ed. Rupert Hart Davis (New York, 1979), p. 476.

[43]The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 16-23.

[44]Imaginative perception includes a non-perceptual factor in the sense that it assumes a "particular kind of attention to what is perceived." What appears originally to be a perceptual distinction becomes a moral one. See Joseph Margolis, The Language of Art and Art Criticism: Analytic Questions in Aesthetics, p. 26. Still the attitude determines aesthetic perception since the non-perceptual factor is an inherent part of perception.

John Casey's analogy of psychoanalysis is also useful. He says that psychoanalysis is more like aesthetics than like science in the sense that psychoanalytic interpretation cannot be imposed on the patient as though it were a causal hypothesis or a logical inference from the agreed facts. The patient's attitude must change when he accepts the interpretation by seeing his past

history in the way the analyst suggests. "No 'decision' is needed to bridge the gap between what he knows and how he feels, or between the evidence the analyst assembles and his 'acceptance of it'" (The Language of Criticism, pp. 22-23). In practical criticism, as in psychoanalysis, a sharp distinction between fact and value has little meaning.

[45]Shakespeare's Sonnet 101.

[46]Blake, p. 717 (Jerusalem, IV:77).

[47]Blake, p. 680 (Jerusalem, II:49:66-68).

[48]Blake, p. 739 (Jerusalem, IV:L:55-59).

[49]Wayne Booth writes in The Rhetoric of Fiction: "the search for truth...is answered with the discovery that truth is found not in concepts but in the reality of artistic activity." (Chicago UP, 1961), p. 292.

Chapter II

Beauty and Sorrow

1. The Syntax of Beauty

If Pater's theory of poetry and criticism was founded on Coleridge and his essentially Kantian aesthetics, his practice was measured by Hume's empirical notions of "proper sentiment of beauty" and the "delicacy of imagination." Coleridge and Kant thought that "aesthetic detachment" determined the unique character of aesthetic experience; Pater, on the other hand, thought it no more than intense attentiveness, not radically different from what is required in ordinary perception. Aesthetic disinterestedness, according to Pater, comes from loving the object for its own sake, not for the glory of god or the glory of the self. And desire directs loving attention to the object, be it a poem or a person. Thus what is singular about aesthetic perception is not so much its detachment as its essentially "moral" purpose. Aesthetic criticism is moral, because it is an end in itself, never means to an end, because it turns the act of perception into an act of love, because it induces further desire to know and love, and because it apprehends humanity and harmony. Aesthetic criticism moreover provides the justification of that love for the object in terms of beauty. Pater nowhere defines what desire

is or what kind of desire aesthetic experience satisfies, but beauty (undefinable in absolute terms), pursued and created by the mind (whether active mind or imagination), is fundamentally linked to that desire. For this reason, criticism requires both the critic's "proper sentiment of beauty" and "delicacy of imagination."

Pater was, in fact, a "true judge of fine arts," in the Humean sense, a rare character with his "strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared by all prejudice."[1] As beauty was not thought a quality in things in themselves but part of the mind that contemplates it, "to seek the real beauty, or real deformity," as Hume declares, "is as fruitless an inquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter."[2] So does Pater: "Beauty, like all other qualities presented to human experience, is relative; and the definition of it becomes unmeaning and useless in proportion to its abstractness" (R, vii). Abstract definitions of beauty are "unmeaning" also because they cannot rouse a "life of constant eager observations" of the world. The function of beauty is first to satisfy the aesthetic desire which is inseparable from intellectual desire - the life of eager observation. Pater's identification of "delicacy of perception" with "finer justice" presupposes a Humean mind or the organs

that are "so fine as to allow *nothing* to escape them, and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition." Finer emotions of the mind (Hume's "very tender and delicate nature") require "the concurrence of many favorable circumstances to make them play with facility and exactness, according to their general and established principles."[3] How does Pater express his unique formula for a special manifestation of beauty? By the delicate quality of the mind, by knowing his own exact sense of the quality, for all good qualities, the beauties are, "such, only as precise expression" (AP, 31). Flaubertian search for le mot juste, says Pater, is for the "word's adjustment to its meaning," meaning being one's own sense of things. To find this mot juste, one must know first one's own sense exactly.

> Into the mind sensitive to 'form,' a flood of random sounds, colours, incidents, is ever penetrating from the world without, to become, by sympathetic selection, a part of its very structure, and, in turn, the visible vesture and expression of that other world it sees so steadily within, nay, already with a partial conformity thereto, to be refined, enlarged, corrected, at a hundred points; and it is just there, just at those doubtful points that the function of style, as tact or taste, intervenes. (AP, 28-29) (m.i.)

Precise expression comes from the merging of the world without and within; the process is intricate but largely mechanical until the temperament intervenes and determines

a particular aesthetic response. Pater's "empirical" language describes the Romantic spirit entering the object; through sympathetic intuition (Pater's sympathetic selection), the subject identifies with the object and grasps the distinct nature or truth of the subject. Beauty is concommitant with this process. The mind with the delicacy of sentiment expresses, at this time, the qualities of the in-spirited object in terms of other objects and other ideas, selected and ordered by its own exact sense. At this time also, the vitally felt experiences of the past which we inherit as ideas are resurrected. This then is the Dionysiac presence of the past or the aesthetic moment. What is or can be resurrected by the critic is an important component of beauty.

Pater's prime object of love is the past as ideas, so his prose aims at spiritual revival of past. It converts ideas into aesthetic experience; that is, it initiates a fresh conceptualization for the reader. This poetic aim separates Pater even from Croce and Santayana with whom he shares fundamental precepts. Pater practiced his theory as an essential matter, of course, avoiding system-building or preaching. To be more accurate, Pater preached mainly by example. Even his essays, as a result, incite aesthetic response without

raising vacuous questions of a metaphysical sort.[5] His concepts are embodied, rather than defined in terms of abstract categories; ideas for Pater are then not enemies to sensuous experience but material to be transformed into living presence. The real visibility of his text therefore lies in the vivid moments when ideas are made flesh in the reader. Such aesthetic initiation depends on the method of vivification. As Whitman explains the process, "The reader will always have his or her part to do, just as much as I had mine. I seek less to state or display any theme or thought, and more to bring you, reader, into the atmosphere of the theme or thought - there to pursue your own flight."[6] What are then the ideas and images which create the Paterian "atmosphere of the theme and thought" and how do these ideas and images meet the larger conceptual frame -- Pater's sense of reality and moral purpose.

First and foremost, we are invited to enter this atmosphere by way of his syntax. Like a musical composition, his syntax presents a distinctive vertical dimension. Let me explain it by briefly returning to the sentence I have already referred to in the preceding chapter.

> For the essence of all artistic beauty is expression which cannot be where there is nothing to be expressed; the line, the colour, the word, following obediently, and with minute scruple, the conscious motion of convinced intelligible scul.
>
> (PP, 120)

The first segment of the sentence, "For the eseence of all artistic beauty is expression," may be read as an aesthetic proposition, simple and clear, but we soon realize that it is merely a thematic base, an introduction, whose full orchestration of meaning is to be completed or circumscribed as the consciousness enters into the concept through concrete images. The syntactic structure by itself is of course within the normal structure of branching and embedding, but note how in it the abstract base merges with the concrete "line, the colour, and the word" and moves into the soul. It is the expression of the finite which slides into the "conscious motion of convinced intelligible soul." The prose remains descriptive even when Pater is dealing with an abstract concept, as the composition of the sentence enacts the merging of object and subject, fact and value, and seeing and interpreting. The sentence is both the concrete example of the notion of the primacy of the finite in poetic perception and an example of the conscious design of expression. It also traces the notion of the mind in search of a finer choice of words and "finer justice." The initially suggested idea about the essence of all artistic beauty is expression, or the idea that a finer truth will emerge only if he minutely follows his mind in search, or is it convinced that the conscious

motion itself is the essence of beauty? Such questions, not resolved but lively, lead the mind to contemplate the essence of beauty in a more comprehensive way than the reader has thus far done. And the answers can come only from the larger context which the meaning of the sentence recreates. Beauty now becomes, within the awakened consciousness, an interaction between the "convinced intelligible soul" and the palpable world of "the line, the colour, the world," or the interweaving of the two that creates a new expression. The sentence begins like a musical phrase, vibrating and held in recollection by the listener, with each additional phrase demanding a re-synthesis of the phrases held in suspense. Pater's aesthetic precept, often less than a definition in its readiness for expansion and modification, grows within a sentence and transforms itself into a new conception. It is closer to a living image in its poetic truth than to a philosophical generalization. The beauty of Pater's prose is in this process, and here also is the structure of Paterian beauty.

The Paterian syntax of beauty is the compositional structure of his prose. It may be absurdly obvious to say that beauty is an expression and that Pater's syntax is a structural illustration of that concept, although I am not confining the meaning of syntax to verbal expressions. The syntax of artistic expression is of

course the artist and his material, be it verbal, musical or pictorial, and the expressive constituents function like the syntactic subject and predicate. The subject, always the artist, in spirit, whether he is a reader or a critic, is predicated by a poem, an idea, a situation, a person, or any of their combinations, if a new expression is to be born. Such a syntactic structure explains how the meaning of a new self that changes that new expression has a moral implication central to Pater's aesthetic criticism. Beauty to Pater, as it was to Romantic poets, is not just an exaltation of things (mere subjective value judgment) but an agent of change. (This will be discussed in detail in the last chapter of this study.) "Beauty...is not a third form of the good," as Frye writes of Blake's concept, "but good itself, the union in which the reality of the other two (will and understanding) consists."[7] The seal of "what is most inward and peculiar in his moods and manner of apprehension" shapes aesthetic perception (R, 71). Expression thus understood signifies more than mere self-assertiveness ungrounded in the world without. The artist "usurps" in his act of apprehension the data before him, "rejecting some, isolating others, and always combining them anew"(R, 54). Such conceptualizations are the products of beauty.

The unpredicated self, as the world unconceived, is

mute and spiritless. The subject that desires beauty recreates itself as expression. "At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action" (R, 243). The soul, responding strongly to the call, asks: "What is the peculiar sensation, what is the peculiar quality of pleasure which has the property of exciting in us, and which we cannot get elsewhere?" (R, 50-51). In order for an expression to take place, the subject must structure impressions, images, and sensations in terms of his entire psychological being. He must first feel strongly about the object; he then dissolves it into his own meaningful components and imagines it anew in the passage and dissolution of the impressions. To see an object as it really is, according to Pater, means not to copy the external reality but to follow the notion of the mind in search of an expression, to connect fact with "soul, of a specific personality, in its preferences, it volition and power" (AP, 6-7). To do this, the artist decomposes the given reality: "each object is loosed into a group of impressions - colour, odour, texture - in the mind of the observer" (R, 235). These impressions are, at the moment of discovery, synthesized according to an idea, a system of reference

points for a new vision selected by the artist's temperament. As Croce says, it is not possible to separate direct from indirect expression in aesthetic synthesis. "All impressions are placed by it on a level, insofar as they are aestheticized."[8] That is the case only if they are imbued through and through with the colour of the artist's termperament. For it is the temperament that creates the unique atmosphere around the object.

Any and all artistic beauties are the creations of a special temper, "in which a certain simplicity, taking all things literally, au pied de la lettre, is united to a vivid pre-occupation with the aesthetic beauty of the image itself, the figured side of figurative expression, the form of the metaphor" (GS, 99). Although it is difficult to separate the joints of the mind and temperament, Pater seems to emphasize by the latter inwardness and physicality (the body and the sense) and by the former the outward-looking view of our being with its links to the world of nature and history. It is the temperament, in any case, which gives character and colour to intellectual achievements. Pater cites Winckelman's enthusiastic temperament as the source of his characteristic form.

> Enthusiasm, - that, in the broad Platonic sense of the Phaedrus, was the secret of his (Winckelman's) divinatory power over the Hellenic world. This enthusiasm, dependent as it is to a great degree on bodily temperament, has a power of reinforcing

> the purer emotions of the intellect with almost physical excitement.
> (R, 191)

This artistic temperament is the Dionysiac inspiration Pater describes in his "A Study of Dionysus": "the secrets of possession by a higher and more energetic spirit than one's own, the gift of self-revelation, of passing out of oneself through words, tones, gestures" (GS, 18). This passing out of oneself promises psychic rebirth, and a moral possibility. For the Dionysiac spirit gives an artistic expression the unity of thought, and the unity means "the creation of both being and knowing."[9] Each expression makes up a stage in brain-building, the story of the individual's mental journey that refines humanity through expanding consciousness. How does Pater connect the individual temperament to the evolving humanity? Kenneth Burke's personal definition of humanist describes how they are linked: "the humanist might be redefined as a person who, carrying the principle of study beyond the stage of mere preparation, transforms it into a permanent aspect of his personality."[10] His mode of simultaneous "untanglings and entanglement" of personality in symbolic action reflects Paterian "perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves."[11] Man desires the physical world for expression; in expression, the predicated self expands into a more specific yet more various self.

Pater's term, "spiritualizing," does not mystify the process but defines the change that occurs both to subject and object in aesthetic expression.

2. The Chain of Signifiers

> The basis of all artistic genius lies in the power of conceiving humanity in a new and striking way, of putting a happy one of its own creation in place of the meaner world of our common days, generating around itself an atmosphere with a novel power of refraction, selecting, transforming, recombining the images it transmits, according to the choice of the imaginative intellect.
>
> (R, 213-214)

An artistic conception of humanity reflects the "choice of the imaginative intellect" as opposed to the "meaner world," and the choice becomes part of humanity in spiritual evolution. What is this choice, or ideal, as constituent beauty? For one thing, it is a visible ideal and not some intangible reality of the mind alone; for another, it is identical with the atmosphere,or unity, generated by the creative spirit, according to its unique choice. Wittgenstein in one of his lectures says: "If I say of a face which I drew, 'it smiles too much', this says that it could be brought closer to some 'idea', not that it is not yet agreeable enough."[12] The ideal, in this sense, demands that the conception of humanity be particular, vital, and striking. The imaginative intellect, which has "a novel power of refraction" selects, transforms, and recombines the strong images that

the past and physical world impart. Refraction explains and clarifies metaphorically the process of aesthetic conceptualization, the change from the meaner reality of our actual life to the strange and beautiful world of creation. The process is almost visible; the flow of water or music can be refracted into a Georgionesque atmosphere, or forest branches can erupt into a Turner. Refraction suggests the world of physics, the world made up of components similar to Democritus' atoms and void. The structure of reality is deflected, passing from its physical frame to the artist's vision, from motion to harmony, from matter to quality. The metaphor gives Pater the visual specificity of the structural change involved in aesthetic perception.[13] The ideal then resides in the structural change of poetic matter, which, Pater says, begins and ends with the physical world, "the sensuous material of each art" bringing with it the special quality of the material (R, 102). When the impressions of the sensuous material are strong, the ideas, however obscure or how long they have remained dormant in the subject's constitution, "float up as visible seen or imaged" (R, 124). The impressions may remain as psychically meaningful images or may generate a fresh concept through a unique refraction of them.

The structural change involved in aesthetic idealization,

which we have noted as refractive, may also be seen in the dream phenomenon as expression. Unlike Hazlitt, who equivocates as to the link between dream and poetic imagination, Pater regards dream as "the finer sort of memory." It may recall the object in greater clearness and raise it "above itself, and above ordinary retrospect" (MS, 172). German d'Hangest, observing the similar approaches of Swinburne and Pater to art, says that they make the "dream above all the major instrument of criticism."[14] The unconscious constructs a dream metaphorically, giving off sparks of clarity in interpretation of a reality that has simmered formless and merely disturbing. Creative images, like dream images, represent a reality systematically metamorphosed. As Lacan, after Freud, has shown us, the relations between desire and images of desire in dreams are both metonymic and metaphoric.[15] In a similar manner, the transfigurations in art have their metaphoric relations to the actual. In Pater's terms, the actuality is refracted by the "informing expression," by the "indwelling solemnity of expression." But poetic images, unlike dream images, primarily delight the senses, and "through this delight alone become the vehicle of whatever poetry or science may lie beyond them in the intention of the composer" (R, 104).

Returning to the idea of humanity, we are reminded

that the reality being refracted is more often than not the ideas of reality, particularly, in Pater, who speaks of "beauty attained through the conscious realization of ideas" (GS, 255). Things are new only in conception, Pater says, and there is no first expression nor a final one. Each conception is a stage in the evolution of humanity. So the philosophic temper in the artist is not content with experience but goes on "dubitating." The past (the world of ideas) is at least as real as the actual and as important as the original material for experience. Like the vapors in a rainbow, ideas are to be charmed into mysterious colors. But the brilliant shape flees with its colors as it settles into a mere idea. The analogy between beauty and humanity in their relations to ideas extends to the whole network of Pater's thinking. And he separates the "most rectified and concentrated" ideas as the seeds of humanity from mere generalizations. In the first version of "Winckelmann," which appeared anonymously in the Westminster Review in 1864, Pater introduced Hegel's conception of ideal: "With him (Hegel) the ideal is a Versinnlichen of the idea - the idea turned into an object of sense." To this is attached the following footnote.

> By the idea, stripped of its technical phraseology, he means man's knowledge about himself and his relation to the world, in its most rectified and concentrated form. This, then, is what we have to ask

> about a work of art - Did it at the age in which it was produced express in terms of sense, did it present to the eye or ear, man's knowledge about himself and his relation to the world in its most rectified and concentrated form?[16]

The function of the critic as artist is to secure a new birth of humanity by sprouting the seeds, by turning the ideas into objects of sense. In practice, Pater makes the idea of change palpable, through beauties coming into being and passing away. Pater's enjoyment of beauty was, as Pater's biographer observes, "shot through with painful awareness of its frailty, and even by pain itself."[17] But this very awareness is in fact the most significant character of Paterian beauty. Pater was, like the pre-Socratic philosophers, profoundly impressed with the fact of change; his conceptions of humanity and beauty are shaped by the overriding sense of change.

In his very first article, published anonymously in 1864, Pater was already practicing criticism in the sense of rendering a new form to humanity. The humanity as idealized in "Diaphaneite" suggests unworldly types of man: the saint, the artist, and the speculative thinker who restore worldly energy to humanity with their unworldly work. This humanity consists in crossing rather than following the main current of life. They are set apart by their intellectual "breadth and generality,"

their "colorless, unclassified purity of life," their colorless, unclassified purity of life," their "supreme moral charm" and their "spiritual simplicity."

> Simplicity in purpose and act in a kind of determinate expression in dexterous outline of one's personality. It is a kind of moral expressiveness; there is an intellectual triumph in it. Such a simplicity is characteristic of the repose of perfect intellectual culture.
>
> (MS, 249)

In this repose, we find the aesthetic attitude or the intellectual manner of perfect culture, of which an ethical result is

> an intellectual guilelessness, or integrity, that instinctively prefers what is direct and clear, lest one's own confusion and intransparency should hinder the transmission from without of light that is not yet inward.
>
> (MS, 251)

Pater regards the scholar/artist as quintessentially human, as seen earlier, compared to most men who remain in the "biosphere," unable to seize one change given in the life of the spirit.

The Paterian idea ushers in the past; his conception of beauty evokes the past. If the idea as an ideal enters into beauty as the "way to perfection," the idea as the past brings in the strange beauty of mortality in things. Death has, in Pater's discourse on ideas, ideals, and history, biographical as well as Romantic grounding. Like Keats, Pater lived through many deaths in the family, starting with his father's at the age of

three. Although he had been too young to be consciously affected by his father's death, he was to recall the effect on the three women (mother and two sisters) in his family. He writes in his fictional autobiographical essay, "The Child in the House": "Impressible, susceptible persons, indeed, who had had their sorrows, lived about him" (MS, 183). The so-called morbid strain in Pater's metaphoric web of the changing body may be more effectively traced back to his Romantic predecessors. It is in Keats, who transforms Wordsworth's austerely joyous pleasure to voluptuous sadness, that we find Pater's origin. It is also Keats who marks the "movement from the sensual to the transcendent, from pleasure to knowledge."[18] In the Keatsean dialectic of pleasure, we know the reality of sorrow. Pater concentrates on this reality of sorrow, rooted in the primitive condition of man, in the dying body. Keats's naturalistic acceptance of death and pain is both exalting and "numbing" in its most expressive moments. Shelley's scientific skepticism and intellectual recognition of death as the mind's limit, by contrast, seem invigorating and tragic. In Keats the distinction between sensuous and spiritual experience or between beauty and sorrow is hard to make: "how beautiful, if sorrow had not made/Sorrow more beautiful than Beauty's self."[19] Keats's consciousness of mutability

or death links beauty with melancholoy: "She dwells with Beauty - Beauty that must die."[20] Again, by contrast, Shelley's field of imagination intellectualizes the tragic destiny of death and dissolution. "...whatever may be his true and final destination, there is a spirit within him /man/ at enmity with nothingness and dissolution. This is the character of all life and being."[21] In Pater both strains are synthesized in an ascetic resolution, which is tragic and exquisitely sensuous even in its intellectual tough-mindedness. In Pater art (civilization or idealization) itself is equated with beauty and sorrow. As the very Paterian Nabokov writes: "Where there is beauty there is pity, for the simple reason that beauty must die, beauty always dies; the manner dies with the matter, the world dies with the individual."[22] We must observe then how death, via ideas, ideals, and the past, enters the Paterian sense of beauty.

La Gioconda, in Pater's essay on Leonardo Da Vinci, illustrates the process of the past being transformed, first melting into images and then emerging as a new discovery. The image that had been defining itself in Leonardo's mind finds expression, says Pater, in Il Giocondo's house: "for express historical testimony, we might fancy that this was but his ideal lady, embodied and beheld at last" (R, 98). Humanity as ideas enters

into the image as Pater sees and dreams it in this painting, as "expressive of what in the ways of a thousand years men had come to desire."

> All the thoughts and experience of the world have etched and moulded there, in that which they have of power to refine and make expressive the outward form, the animalism of Greece, the lust of Rome, the mysticism of the middle age with its spiritual ambition and imaginative loves, the return of the Pagan world, the sins of the Borgias. She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire, she has been dead many times, and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver in deep seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and trafficked for strange webs with Eastern merchants: and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy, and as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and flutes, and lives only in the delicacy with which it has moulded the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and the hands.
>
> (R, 125)

More specifically than any discursive argument can approximate, the passage demonstrates how a sensuous form embodies humanity: ideas a ideals and as history. The past survives in images like "the sound of lyres and flutes" that touch the new image. She sits like a vampire, says Pater, adding his romantic strangeness to beauty. She has known it all, to the breadth and bottom of the sordid glory of mankind: her languid awareness of the past hangs around her, creating an atmosphere that paints her eyelids and hands. "It is a beauty wrought out from within upon flesh" (R, 125). The flesh that dies in all its rich complexion becomes Pater's idea

of humanity that refines itself through strange and novel thoughts, fantastic dreams, and passions. Death in a sense intensifies the desire of beauty. La Gioconda demonstrates as well as construes Pater's "beauty," in which spent sentiments of the past in private and racial memories blend with dreams and visions.

As we come closer to Pater's images of death, we see clearly how flux permeates the ideational components of beauty and how the artistic permanence conferred on them is something of a paradox. In the endless essaying into the external world of flux, one's inward being is fulfilled in beauty, but the beauty dies with the fulfillment. Given this condition, death plays a vital role in perceiving beauty. It fires man to perform, trembling or languishing even in the depth of crisis, to express the "concentrated sorrow of the world." A poetic expression that possesses our inmost thoughts, says Pater, is man's inquiry into death. In this sense Michelangelo is a poet still alive with

> (his) dumb inquiry over the relapse after death in the formlessness which preceded life, the change, the revolt from that change, then the correcting, hallowing, consoling rush of pity; at last, far off, thick and vague, yet not more vague than the most definite thought men have had through three centuries on a matter that has been so near their hearts, the new body - a passing light, a mere intangible, external effect over those too rigid, too formless faces; a dream that lingers a moment, retreating in the dawn, incomplete, aimless, helpless; a thing with

> faint hearing, faint memory, faint power of touch; a breath, a flame in the doorway, a feather in the wind.
>
> (R, 95-96)

The metaphoric progression of "a passing light, a mere tangible, external effect," "a breath; a flame in the doorway, a feather in the wind" suggests lightness and motion in which death is mere change of states. Expression, as a movement of figures in our mind, sustains the poetic spirit. In expression, the concretely focused consciousness gives a soul to physical reality and rescues the reader from previous theoretical obfuscations, Romantic or Christian, and puts him in direct touch with basic aesthetic elements, which Pater calls "primitive sentiments": the mind that foresees its own death, the body that desires, and the vision that idealizes. The soul of man, conscious of the flickering body in the waves of formless mass is minutely traced an colored by Pater's overriding sense of fleeting time and death itself, upon which he must build a new body. In this way, he rekindles the idea of humanity embodied in Michelangelo.

Images of death projected as the desire of beauty recur. They give "the sense of death and the desire of beauty; the desire of beauty quickened by the sense of death" (SR,). The most strikingly paradigmatic formulations appear in "The Child in the House" and in Greek Studies: death as a private consciousness in the

former and as primal sentiments in the latter. The metaphysical homesickness in "The Child," one might say, is ontogenetically relayed, starting with the child's being overtaken by his love for physical beauty and simultaneous fear of death, whereas his Greek studies place it phylogenetically at the dawn of humanity. Pater finds in the pagan spirit the "continual suggestion, pensive or passionate, of the shortness of life," contrasted with the "bloom of the world" (GS, 19). The child Florian's peculiarly strong attachment to the home where he begins his mental journey is both autobiographical and archetypal. The sense of home, the house of our memory, gives us a "material shrine or sanctuary of sentiment," where "a system of symbolism interweaves itself through all our thoughts and passions" (MS, 178). Florian's attentive thought focuses on images which always show an element of pain in things: Marie Antoinette on her way to execution, a sister's face terrified by a spider on her sleeve, the cry of an aunt who had come to announce the death of his father, the little sorrows of dumb animals and himself unwittingly playing "pain-fugues" on a living creature, a child's grave, the physical horror of death, and the crimson flame he saw in the fading hawthorn petals and their perfume. Death is the prime subject of meditation from childhood to deathbed, as will

be seen also in his essay, "Leonardo Da Vinci" and his major novel, Marius the Epicurean. Florian's subsequent metaphysical speculations merely reinforce what has become his instinctive mode of apprehending the world through the sensible vehicle, through the impressions of beauty and sorrow.

In Marius' journey, the mental journey of Western man, death, as the ultimate unknown, becomes the supreme object of aesthetic curiosity. With the same curiosity with which Marius has lived, he observes his own death fusing into his still vibrant consciousness at last ceasing to bring the world into his consciousness. As he is dying, he experiences for a moment "a singular curiosity, almost an ardent desire to enter upon a future, the possibilities of which seemed so large" (ME II, 221). In the same mood, Pater projects Leonardo's end, his active mind focused on death as an event to be experienced with curiosity: "how one who had been always so desirous of beauty, but desired it always in such precise and definite forms, as hands or flowers or hair, looked forward now into the vague land, and experienced the last curiosity" (R, 129).

As Flaubert saw a grave in the cradle and Nabokov the infinite in the photo of his own baby carriage destined for the not yet born Vladimir, Pater sees death in the

youthful body of man. The utterly beautiful body that is perishing becomes the symbol of the Paterian soul. The sharpest and most moving reminder of life is no doubt death, particularly the death of a youth which invokes the sorrow of our own imminent vanishing from the earth. Poe's definition of beauty comes to mind here; he defines it in "The Philosophy of Composition" as an "intense elevation of the soul," and sees it in the "death of a beautiful woman," which he considers "unquestionably the most poetical topic in the world." To Pater the death of a beautiful young man, in the Greek tradition, is undoubtedly more moving. But the difference in their sexual choice is only minor; the major difference is in Pater's conception of death not merely as the most melancholic subject but as the organizing metaphor for change that governs life and art. In Pater death is not a subject matter but it structures beauty. With death change enters into beauty determinately and intimately. Death and beauty, as variants of flux and art, merge poetically, as in his essays on Leonardo, Michelangelo, and others, or by narrative juxtapositions, as in his novels and imaginary portraits. In both cases death weaves forms of beauty. The "fatal beauty" of Richard II, for instance, points to the larger framework, the imminence of change. "His /Richard II's/ eloquence blends with

fatal beauty...as the 'royal blood' comes and goes in the face with his rapid changes of temper"(AP, 202). The poignancy of Richard's "waste and broken heart" hangs on the youthful death, on the beautiful body ("the most beauteous inn"), the residence of the intensely alive consciousness. This acutely living consciousness of imminent death projects the sharpest feeling of life. In a similar manner, Pater sees the capture of a fleeting moment as the essence of Tuscan sculptures, including those of Luca Della Robbia: "the passing of a smile over the face of a child, the ripples of the air on a still day over the curtain of a window ajar" (R, 65). Della Robbia and his school were able to capture in low relief a motion, intensely and subtly alive, by getting into the effigies, "a pathetic suggestion of the wasting and etherealization of death" (R, 65).

Specificity in the beauty of the "coming of death" is the specificity of change in a sudden arrest of motion, a visible vanishing of life, which is so closely felt in the heart of man. This vividly specific feeling, though all-permeating, is not emotional. In fact death as aesthetic material is already an idea.

> ...death at first as the worst of all sorrows and disgraces, with a clod of the field for its brain; afterwards, death in its high distinction, its detachment from vulgar needs, the angry strains of life and action escaping fast.
>
> (R, 88)

Contemplation of death frees us from the tyranny of emotions, the desire for escape from a humdrum life being expressively fulfilled by death in an awakened sense of life. A saner perception of life is possible in contemplation of death. "The realm of essence is... ultimately a Thanatopsis."[23] Death in this sense is a grounding for all artistic expressions. Paterian beauty as escape paradoxically embraces life so completely as to become one with it. The effect is far from deadening or morbid because the induced detachment from life caused by the invasion of the body by death startles us into seeing reality as it really is: "the visible function of death is but to refine, to detach from ought that is vulgar" (R, 60).

At times death enters Pater's discourse singly, as in "the grace of beauty of somewhat mortified kind" or "a sort of physical beauty in the coming of death" (AP, 157). But more often as a metaphor, it forges in a vital way a new conception of the old. The "seemingly new is old also," says Pater in his last book, Plato and Platonism, in the language of his first book, "a palimpsest, a tapestry of which the actual threads have served before, or like the animal frame itself, every particle of which had already lived and died many times over" (PP, 24). Pater's text offers a perfect compositional beauty that

transforms death into an aesthetic experience both sensuous and intellectual. An expression of beauty and sorrow may often be in the aesthetic repose of the contemplation of youthful death, but the purpose of noting such an image is not to claim that Pater advocates specific kinds of expression as beautiful but to interpret it coherently within the frame of his poetics. It is difficult and pointless to separate his expressive content from the aesthetic qualities he discerns in his criticism. Pater may have been more interested in figures relating to death, escape, and the body of youth than in some others, not so much because they reflect his morbid temper but because they are the very web of his poetics of change.

3. The Principle of Motion and Repose

Pater's Romantic humanism does not envision the ideal end of the evolution of the total man in the classical sense, but a movement of ideal perceptions. In fact, the final endlessness of intellectual and moral effort gives his humanism a distinctly modern turn and a palpable yet austere character. Perceiving beauties that die with the individual and their paradoxical permanence as epiphanies has a method, which is the focus of the present discussion. The Romantic epiphany becomes

in Pater no more than "pure effect," and Pater goes about exploring methodically what produces that effect in a particular work. He characterizes epiphany often in terms of motion and repose, the Apollonian and Dionysian, or the centrifugal and centripetal dichotomies. He does not always invoke the Heraclitean metaphysical principle of opposing forces in flux, but it is there offering the largest formal framework to his moment of apprehension. "That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony."[25] Besides Heraclitus' tension of opposites, Blake's "Marriage of Heaven and Hell," Coleridge's "polarity," Hopkins' "diatonic" and "chromatic" traits in beauty, and Nietzschean (also Paterian) distinctions of Apollo and Dionysus all revolve around the dialectic of opposites. Although there are striking parallels between Pater and Nietzsche in such ideas as the Apollonian and Dionysian opposites, the two-fold nature of Dionysus himself, the supreme condition of music in the arts, the edict of living a life of sustained ecstasy or building the world for oneself largely from within, there are no indications of Pater's ever having read The Birth of Tragedy, which appeared in January 1872.[26] Pater's essay, "Diapheneite" in which he explores the Apollonian ideal appeared in July 1864 and "A Study of Dionysus" in which the distinctions are

fully developed was published in 1876. Pater's Romantic connections are, on the other hand, more general but decisive in the formulation of Pater's principle of motion and repose. Coleridge believed that the law of polarity arose out of the vital, not mechanical unity of nature. "For all things, we all of us arrange in the same way - A, and the opposite of A (Say, B) and that in which A and B coexist."[27] The reconciliation of opposites in Coleridge, like Pater's concern with the balance of opposite tendencies, is the conceptual center of his criticism. What Pater perceives as beauty is identical with what Coleridge conceived analytically as harmony of opposing forces. The unity of organic form, according to Coleridge, can be described only by the opposite elements as reconciled. The organic wholeness cannot be revealed without its twoness, or without its centrifugal and centripedal forces in equilibrium.[28]

Pater understands the ancient Greeks and modern empiricists in the Coleridgean terms: "There is the centrifugal, the irresponsible, the Ionian or Asiatic, tendency," in contrast to the centripetal Spartan tendency, "flying from the center, working with little forethought straight before it in the development of every thought and fancy...in beautiful material, in changeful form everywhere, in poetry, in music, in architecture and

its subordinate crafts, in philosophy itself" (PP, 103). Greek sculpture not only undergoes the influence of these two opposing ideals but "by harmonizing in itself their antagonism" reflects the larger pattern of Greek history in general (GS, 252). And in Plato, Pater sees a paradox but also "a reconciliation of opposed tendencies: one side, the largest possible demand for infallible certainty in knowledge...yet, on the other side, the utmost possible inexactness, or contingency, in the method by which actually he proposes to attain it" (PP, 188). Since the human mind aspires to see the wholeness despite an awareness of tentativeness of knowledge, "the philosopher of Being," writes Pater, referring to Plato, "or, of the verb 'To be,' is after all afraid of saying, 'it is'" (PP, 189). The skepticism of the modern man came with "an appeal from the preconceptions of the understanding to the authority of the sense," while the Greeks had to move in the opposite direction, "an appeal from the affirmations of sense to the authority of newly-awakened reason" (PP, 31).

The Paterian beauty is also housed in the Blakean energy. To Blake, beauty is energy, a movement of energy being (in human terms) imagination. The primacy of energy is here conceived by manifestations of contraries which are married: "Without contraries is no progress,

Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence."[29] Marriage as one of the most important metaphors in Romantic poetry fuses other commonly held dichotomies, such as mind/nature, subject/object, life/death, intellect/senses, raising imagination and freedom over nature and reason. In the Paterian dynamics of motion and repose, flux reorganizes the Romantic marriage of contraries. The fusion of contraries takes place in flux, and change, rather than harmony, gets the emphasis. Aesthetic unity means, to Pater, motion arrested in the moment of perception. In "Notre Dame D'Amiens (1894)" Pater contrasts the mere "melody" of Greek architecture with the "harmony of gothic" - the "richer music generated by opposites of sounds in one and the same moment." The musical analogy is appropriate since Pater's conception of art, including painting, occurs in the ceaseless flow of changing elements, without abandoning the Coleridgean synthesis of opposing parts. Coleridge, and Shelley, conceived all forms of creation (cosmic, epistemological, and poetic) to be such syntheses and believed that truth lies in the reconciliation of opposing systems, which saves the valid elements in both old and new theories.[30] Coleridge conceived dualism as a starting point, as he says, since the distinction between mind and nature is a fact of

experience. But to distinguish is not, he insisted, to divide absolutely: "while it is the privilege of the philosopher to preserve himself constantly aware that distinction is not division."[31] The overall effect of Pater's thought is closer to Coleridge than either to Blake or Nietzsche, despite numerous parallels to the latter two. Unlike Blake, who exalted the ecstatic creative force and revolutionary change of consciousness, Pater sought a delicate balance or tension, a formal perfection of the moment's perception, through which finer consciousness evolves. Pater recognized the Blakean creative energy as a dark force but stressed the wholeness of aesthetic moment in which Dionysian energy is arrested by Apollonian comprehension. Pater's own version of intense beauty, for that reason, carries in it ascetic ecstasy; the gem-like flame then is a metaphoric perception of contraries that vivifies the polarity even as it burns.

The Romantic principle of opposites is thus transmuted in Pater as a specific method of synthesis. The Heraclitean harmony of opposites, in any case, was understood by Pater always metaphorically and never doctrinally. In a metaphoric conception, two juxtaposed terms are lined by shared semantic features. For instance, the relationship between the house and the self, the inward

being, or thought (assumed) in the following passage is said to be metaphorical, meaning that the house is in the same relationship to the shared features as thought is to the same. "...to flash light into the house within, its many chambers, its memories and associations upon its inscribed and pictured walls" (PP, 120). The house is to the light flashed into, "memory chambers," and many other associated attributes which the given syntax suggests to the mind, as thought is to the same. This house, as in "the house of thought" or "the House Beautiful," is not an ineffective trope, in light of Pater's understanding of reality as the evolving individual consciousness which has the enclosed character of a house. But how far can one go in general with such an internal analogy? Let's take another example, "the treacherous calm," given as a quality of beauty in expression. Here deceptiveness may suggest itself as the basis of internal analogy between 'treacherous' and 'calm' from such associations as a deceptive calm of the sea before a storm and the treacherous smile of a deceptive villian. But the base does not take us far; deception is certainly an element in art and reality, perhaps a major one in such writers as Stevens and Nabokov, but Pater does not focus on this aesthetic material. "The treacherous calm" does not seem at first to clarify or reflect any aspect

of Pater's central concept of beauty or art, in any striking way, as far as one can see on the basis of the internal analogy. This, however, is where the principle of motion and rest comes in. Pater has it enter into his text as the external metaphor. By the external metaphor is meant a metaphor which invites external analogy, which takes the base of comparison from outside, in explaining the relational function of images suggested by the metaphor.[32] On the external analogy to motion and repose, the "treacherous calm," the figurative material, takes on a new life, and strengthens at the same time the coherence of Paterian universe. Without such figurative links, a poetic construct lacks coherence and conviction.

Before looking into the mechanics of external analogy, we must know what motion means to Pater. Unlike Plato to whom it was the "token of unreality in things," Pater means by motion "mobility, versatility, the habit of thought that can most adequately follow the subtle movement of things." In philosophy, these are thought to be, says Pater, the secret of wisdom: "susceptibility, sympathetic intelligence, capacity." Motion or mobility is "the spirit of God that moved, moves still, in every form of real power, everywhere" (PP, 22). Repose, on the other hand, is centripedal and ascetic. This motion and repose enters into Paterian discourse as the external

metaphor. By external analogy is meant the relationship of the following kind. Supposing A (treacherous) and Z (calm) to be the juxtaposed terms, we may say that term A is to A's domain (motion) as term Z is to Z's domain (repose). In this relationship we do not ignore the shared features of the terms, but our primary focus is on their separate semantic domains which in their entirety contribute to the effects of likes and differences. On the external analogy of motion and repose, Paterian images fall into an intricate but coherent design. The motion/repose extends itself by related pairs of images unifying the entire discourse poetically. The metaphoric similarity lies in the relationship each of the juxtaposed terms has, not to each other so much as to its proper domain of motion or repose, but, as a result, the tension (difference) between the terms is semantically more significant that that based on the internal analogy alone. In the present analysis, the reference point of the relationship of terms in either motion or repose, and semantic or syntactic contrasts may be read along the same axes. For instance, in reading "a cloudy mysticism is refined to a subdued and graceful mystery," we may, for the time being, assume that mystery is to motion as mysticism is to repose, establishing the relationship between the two terms beyond the strictly

syntactical confinement. Even if the modifying adjectives did not give away the distinction between mysticism and mystery, the significance of the expression can be understood as an example of Pater's theory of art, for it expresses analogically the fundamental element of change in perception as aesthetic value. A shared semantic feature of mysticism and mystery might be something like 'a power beyond intellectual comprehension'. This may at most suppose the ultimately unknowable reality but cannot explain the significance of the change from mysticism to mystery. But if we take the terms on external analogy, relating them to motion and repose, the change is not only meaningful in itself but confirms Pater's attitude toward reality. Mysticism suggests an arrested (beyond the moment of perception), or not yet sufficiently evolved consciousness, not balanced by the aspiration of seeing things as they really are but circumscribed by unexplored and unawakened mind; mystery, on the other hand, is a dynamic motive for the aspiring mind to explore ceaselessly changing reality. "A sustained impressibility towards the mysterious conditions of man's everyday life, towards the very mystery itself in it, gives a singular gravity to all his work..." corroborates the present reading of mysticism and mystery (AP, 220).

Pater's distinction between romantic and classical tendencies, introduced in the previous chapter, may now be integrated under the same rubric of motion and repose. Pater says that the opposition, in the culture of beauty, between the two tendencies - romantic and classical - may help us to enter into the peculiarities of a work or an epoch. But as critical terms they are as relative as form and matter. Classicism, according to Saint-Beuve, represents the qualities of order, proportion and restraint. "To the absolute beauty of its (classic) artistic form, is added the accidental, tranquil charm of familiarity" (AP, 257). But to Pater, all good art comes with the desire for the new, the fascination of novelty which passes into perfected form, so that in good art change is momentarily settled in a perfect form. The strange and subtle beauty of his prose is of course a good example of that art which arrests even the familiar in a fresh and dazzling light. The notion of curiosity, added to the formal repose of beauty, creates a romantic effect. The romantic temper represents motion that changes a novel subject into a sensuous form, while the classic temper suggests repose that creates a variation of the given form, using form as matter, so to speak. When a balanced fusion of the two does not take place, the principle of motion and repose is

not at work:

> one's curiosity is in excess, when it overbalances the desire of beauty then one is liable to value in works of art what is inartistic in them; to be satisfied with what is exaggerated.
>
> (AP, 258-259)

The romantic or classical character of a poem or a painting is determined by the proportion of general qualities of motion and repose. Their specified qualities may be liberty vs. authority, strength vs. order, or matter vs. form. The romantic spirit, as Pater sees it, is the motion of the curious temper which seeks new impressions "even of terrible things," but the strangeness of the impressions is realized only if its expression attains an artistic balance with repose. The artist must move with "that ever-changing spirit," without losing the flavor of what is well made in past generations, in the classics.

Heraclitean cosmos exists in the very tension of opposites, which Pater calls "an antiphonal rhythm, or logic," linking together contending forces. Thus Pan-Hellenism was not possible until Alexander the Great; "the centrifugal tendency had been too much for the centripedal tendency in them, the progressive elements for the element of order" (PP, 23). The Ionian ideal - independent, local, and personal - met the "saving Dorian soul" for a true Hellenism. "Perfection, in every case,

as we may conceive, is attainable only through a certain combination of opposites." Pater seems to have seen a reversal of the Victorian era in Plato's Athens; he says that, in the Athens of Plato's time, the centrifugal forces overwhelmed those of the centripedal, threatening the polity and the individual soul into dissolution (PP, 24-25). The Heraclitean Pater was saying to intransigent moralists of his time: "Change is the irresistable law of our being," as Plato had responded to the philosophy of motion: "Change...through the power of a true philosophy, shall not be the law of our being" (PP, 25). The historical method Pater champions, as contrast to the dogmatic method or the syncretic method, amounts to seeing the subject in terms of opposing forces, contraries, or reaction to the existing historical condition. The drama of translating this condition in concrete terms is locating the conflicting forces of motion and repose. Pater thus proposes to read The Republic "to watch, for its dramatic interest, the spectacle of a powerful, of a sovereign intellect, translating itself, amid a complex group of conditions which can never in the nature of things occur again, at once pliant and resistant to them, into a great literary monument" (PP, 11).

The motion/repose analogy extends itself to moment/time, passion/contemplation, art/nature, images/ideas,

matter/form, etc. These, juxtaposed or opposed somewhere along the two coordinates of motion and repose, characterize and identify the locus of beauty of a poem or a life. And their tension embodies variously the "fullness of existence" in concrete forms and reveals "the logical structure of likeness" in a metaphoric relationship. Imagination, accordingly, is this ability to produce new ideas of structures by assimilation and "to produce them not above the differences, as in a concept, but in spite of and through the differences."[33] In the scheme of motion and repose the more remote the terms are from each other, the greater are the possibilities for making a variety of powerful non-arbitrary connections. A union of "ardour and indifference," noted via Goethe, in Winckelmann's face or that of "tenderness and severity" in Leonardo's drawing, for instance, are telling examples of Paterian beauty. Winckelmann's face as "ardour and indifference" suggests the very aesthetic tension sought after in his idea of beauty. Goethe would not have been able to see that face as a perfect balance of ardour and indifference, had he not been aware of the tension between Winckelman's ardent life and dispassionate scholarship. Neither would Pater have seized on the combination, were he not theorizing the necessary tension in all things beautiful and the ideality of beauty. Such

associative beauty can best be appropriated in retrospect, when the mere beauties of places and faces are recollected in full reflection of the past. If, in recollection, repose dominates a form, it may run the risk of being largely decorative or languid. When the self-propelling motion or passion prevails, the risk may be mere realism, not duly conceptualized in expressive form. It may create the effect of raw vitality but it will lack the necessary detachment which allows great tragedies to be exalting and not merely horrifying. At any rate, the distance between the terms may be maximally expanded as in the life/death juxtaposition, as Pater does in his essays on Michelangelo, Leonardo, Richard II, and Sir Thomas Browne, or minimally or delicately manipulated as in "Luca Della Robbia," and "The School of Giorgione." Pater's novel balancing of death and life sharpens the ephemeral bloom of physical life. The momentarily stilled motion of death in the youthful Emerald Uthwart, for instance, makes Pater's meditation on change precise and passionate: "as the breath of the infinite world came about him, he clung all the faster to the beloved finite things still in contact with him; he had successfully hidden from his eyes all beside" (MS, 241-242). The quality of perpetual life in La Gioconda is sharply released in the stillness of the graves. "The presence that rose

thus so strangely beside the waters, is expressive of what in the ways of a thousand years men had come to desire. Hers is the head upon which all 'the ends of the world are come', and the eyelids are a little weary (R, 124). And the beauty of Flavian in Marius the Epicurean is given as "a carved figure in motion." Beyond the fluid images and fixed notions, ideas and images exists in a continuum, so does death and life. The effect of instantaneous conjunction is beauty, an affirmation of changelessness in change. Beauty seen in this light is an unceasing weaving of opposed images from which artistic expressions unfold dynamically.

Motion may be ascending or descending in the narrow steps of metaphoric progression or in the wider steps of analogic organization. The condition of change favorable to the creative process is not mechanical repetition but the conjunction of contrary forces that determine the pattern of motion in expression. The abstract, unseen beauty of Plato is operable, according to Pater, only through his mastery of visual expressions. Likewise the Socratic method expounded the dialectic between "what is absolute and abiding...and what is only phenomenal and transitory, as being essentially implacate with them." Rosetti's profoundly visionary "Blessed Damozel" is expressed in precise and almost grotesque imagery of the

senses. "Like Dante, he /Rosetti/ knows no religion of spirit which shall not be sensuous or material" (R, 221). Sensuous pleasure, often identified as the presiding quality of beauty, refers to one half of the dynamics of change. The spirit has to be infused, if artistic pleasure is to become manifest with the immediate sense of things. Thus Rosetti's "sensuous clearness of conception" expresses pure reflection (AP, 22). Pater's discourse is in the end his gentle persuasion of the necessity of seeing the world from a series of opposing perspectives. Creative process is precisely such a complex way of essaying in and out of consciousness to create an order.

Pater's only argument, it seems to me, is for the poetic plausibility of an order, a created order of life in terms of art, free of metaphysical or theological fastening. The problem of understanding our experiences, spiritual and existential, is itself a large part of his writing, but in his prose the questioning becomes alive as life and art fuse in his depiction of thought.

> That the soul (beautiful Pythagorean thought) is a harmony; that there are reasons why this particular harmony should not cease, like that of the lyre or the harp, with the destruction of the instrument which produced it; why this sort of flame should not go out with the upsetting of the lamp.
> (PP, 93)

Knowing the condition of change as penetratingly and inconclusively as possible is a necessary step for seeing

Pater's poetic order. Man's multiplying consciousness is not "wholly at the mercy of formal conclusions from their formally limited premises" (R, 165). For it offers an escape from the actual, the fixed. In the world of Pater, the mystery and surprise of life exists in the awareness of death that envelops life like an insistent melody. Life is thrown into the profounder realm of nothingness, and yet it is different from nihilism. For Pater asserts life's meaning as itself: what the imaginative faculty perceives directly and simply. The moments of ecstasy, of intense pleasure and pain, must be lived in themselves and for their own sake. Spirit moves thought into vibrating reality, mere thought being part of the "ennui of the actual." Motion, intellectual or spiritual, enables us to escape the ennui, but the ennui seeks an escape into imagination. Pater's order is a poetic world reconciled with life, as motion becomes integral to the moment's repose.

It is Pater's emphasis on the darker side of desire that deepens his conception of beauty and humanity. His "apollo in Picardy" reenacts the myth of Hyacinth. Here is beauty, identified as a mysterious tragic synthesis of love and violent death. Beauty, like an ungraspable light, appears to the Prior who has loved the boy whom Apolloyon accidentally struck dead in play with a quoit.

The Prior, a scholar of the Greek arts in the Middle Ages, whose religious stance is as ambiguous as Apolloyon's, experiences beauty as a refuge. The refuge is simultaneous with his passion and madness in the midst of the grey quiet life. A similar synthesis is again embodied in "Denys L'Auxerrois," Pater's recreation of the myth of Dionysus. The hunting of Denys through the streets and his painfully rendered body depicts a Dionysiac frenzy in which the human spirit suffers and dies again to be reborn. The rebirth of the spirit in the psyche of the hunter, who becomes the hunted, is projected more mysteriously here than in Pater's retelling of the Hyacinth myth. Dionysus becomes a living idea with "an outward body of flesh presented to the senses," and "its animating soul, a whole world of thoughts, surmises, greater and less experiences" of the mind (GS, 10). In his earliest phase, Dionysus occupies a place between the "ruder fancies" of half-civilized people and their poetic fancies of the "sensitive plant." Later he becomes the "soul of the whole species, the spirit of fire and dew," infused with the higher intelligence "brooding over things and thoughts." Dionysus' rural ruddy and enthusiastic phase and his dazzling white urban phase merge as a dual god of summer and winter. As a Chthonian god he represents sorrow, "hollow and devouring, an eater of man's flesh" (GS, 44).

The thought of a departing year and the hunter's foreboding fear connect him to the dangers of the hunter, lost or slain in the mountains. The tragic note rings in the transformation of the hunter into the hunted in his search for meat and by his own fierce hunger and thirst. Pater finds a different treatment of Dionysus, in an early engraving, from that of Renaissance artists who have treated Dionysus in his unfettered joy as the glory of nature; he finds it harmonious with the original motive but touched by the subtler melancholy Dionysus. "In its potential, though unrealized scope, it is perhaps the subtlest dream in Greek religious poetry, and is, at least, part of the complete physiognomy of Dionysus, as it actually reveals itself to the modern student, after a complete survey" (GS, 43). Pater's conception of Dionysus contains a polar Apollonian Dionysus. Here the dreams and ways of the primitive people are "brooded over and harmonized by the energetic Greek imagination." The Greek religious imagination brought together "things naturally asunder," welding conflicting forces into a living personality. Dicnysus, according to Pater, fills for the Greeks the place of Apollo as well as the place of Demeter: "he is the inherent cause of music and poetry; he inspires; he explains the phenomena of enthusiasm, as distinguished by Plato in the Phoedrus, as the secrets of

possession by a higher and more energetic spirit than one's own, the gift of self revelation, of passing out of oneself through words, tones, gestures" (GS, 18). The sorrowing Dionysus, as a dual god of summer and winter, fuses the opposites, "making, as it were, for the human body a soul of waters, for the human soul a body of flowers" (GS, 29). In the Bacchanals of Euripides, the sorrowing god is finally victorious, his enemy, King Pentheus of Thebes having been torn to pieces by his own mother in madness. But this victory is locked in the sorrow of the hunter, of fears and dangers faced in the woods away from home. The transformation of the beautiful into an enemy of man sounds the most tragic note of the myth. Dionysiac malady or madness is a recurring element in Pater's conception of man. The undercurrents of death and ennui in his stories are ritualistically handled, the malady being exorcised with human sacrifice in Dionysiac celebrations, so as to be sane in the clear light of order. Thus Dionysus has a peculiar messsage

> for a certain number of refined minds, seeking, in the later days of Greek religion, such modifications of the old legend as may minister to ethical culture, to the perfecting of the moral nature. A type of second birth, from first to last, he opens, in a series of annual changes, for minds on the lookout for it, the hope of a possible analogy, between the resurrection of nature, and something else, as yet unrealized, reserved for human souls; and the beautiful weeping creature, vexed by the wind, suffering, torn to pieces, and rejuvenescent again at last, like a

> tender shoot of living green out of hardness and stony darkness of the earth, becomes an emblem or ideal of chastening and purification and of final victory through suffering.
> (GS, 49-50) (m.i.)

In his essay on style (1888), Pater, after summing up artistic qualities or beauties that determine good work, appends a requirement for great art: it must have "something of the soul of humanity in it," and must find "its architectural place in the great structure of human life" (AP, 36). Critics have often discredited this appendix as a mere after-thought, unrelated to his main concerns.[34] But the idea of humanity, as we will see more in the next chapter, is the singular matter with which his concepts of beauty and continuity of the human spirit take shape. As we saw earlier, already in his "Joachim du Bellay," (1873) he has written: "The basis of all artistic genius lies in the power of conceiving humanity in a new and striving way." A beautiful form is to Pater a conception of humanity with its conflicting forces in the dialectic of motion and repose.

> In the best Greek sculpture, the archaic immobility has been stirred, its forms are in motion; but it is a motion ever kept in reserve and very seldom committed to any definite action.
> (R, 297-298)

A formal repose of motion is best seen in "the moment of death and consummation" which "expresses the simultaneity of repose and motion, death as beauty" (R, 55).

Aesthetic forms change though the spirit in them may be revived by sympathetic contact and may give the impression of permanence. In other words, the aesthetic permanence beauty affirms at the moment of perception gives the impression of truth and charm, but it does not fix that form of beauty as truth. Truth changes in that it forever requires a new form. The artist is committed to this truth alone. As the very Paterian hero, Gabriel Nash in James's The Tragic Muse says: "By never, never making the concession, one may end by becoming a perceptible force for good."[35] But the forms of art created without making the concession echo the history of man even more truthfully than do documents. The historical component in truth ages faster than the spiritual, the handling of the text, the style which treats the historical material.

We have seen that the constituent self and external reality function like the grammatical subject and predicate and that the unique quality of Pater's Beauty depends on the Romantic universe of fatal beauty. The final fiction of beauty eludes us forever, but the Heraclitean flux and the romantic temper, escaping the dreariness of the actual, provide its lineament in its deaths and rebirths. "The eye and the sun it lives by reveal themselves, after all, as Heraclitus had declared...as literally in constant

extinction and renewal" (PP, 20). Even if the ultimate order of the universe or Beauty were found, it would have to be perpetually rediscovered, if it is to be kept above the flux. For the flux prevails and the rooted sorrow. "Sorrow came along with beauty, a rival of its intricate omnipresence in life" (GDL, 23).

Notes

II

[1]David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," Contemporary Aesthetics, ed. Matthew Lipman (Boston, 1973), p. 33.

Hume's metaphysics is the science of "human nature," which includes logic, morals, politics and criticism (or aesthetics). His first principles state that the immediate objects of knowledge are perceptions of the mind, not the external world, and that these perceptions are either simple impressions or ideas. See Walter John Hipple, Jr. The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the Picturesque in Eighteenth Century British Aesthetic Theory (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1957), p. 38.

[2]Hume, p. 26.

[3]Hume, pp. 27-29

The aesthetic sentiments, according to Hume, are secondary or reflective impressions arising in consequence of sensations (primary impressions) or ideas. See "A Treatise of Human Nature," p. 76.

Both Romanticism and empiricism seek to find inspiration for proper living by judging the phenomenal world properly unlike the classical humanism that assumes the "nature" of the ideal or universals to live by. Also the notion of sentiment grew out of empirical skepticism about highly methodized neo-classical reason. See Walter Jackson Bate, From Classic to Romantic Taste in Eighteenth-Century England (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 21, 26, 51.

[4]Hegel defines beauty as "the sensuous semblance of Idea." Philosophy of Fine Art, I. tr F. P. B. Osmaston (London: 1920), p. 53. For Pater's Hegelian links, consult Anthony Ward, Walter Pater: The Idea in Nature (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1966).

[5]Croce says in his Aesthetic that criticism is possible only when the critic refuses "to join in the game; that is to say, when we reject the very possibility of Metaphysic..." (Boston: Nonpareil Books, 1978), p. 66. And Santayana, like Pater, saw Platonism not as a metaphysical system of thought but as "a refined and beautiful expression of our natural instincts, it embodies conscience which utters our inmost hopes." The Sense of Beauty (New York: Dover, 1955), p. 7.

[6]"A Backward Glance O'ver Travel'd Roads," Leaves of Grass and Selected Prose, ed. John Kouwenhoven. (New York: Modern Library, 1962) p. 554.

[7]Northrop Frye, Fearful Symmetry (Princeton UP, 1974), p. 51.

[8]Croce, p. 19.

[9]Jose Ortega y Gasset, Phenomenology and Art, tr. P. W. Silver (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 90.

[10]Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: U of Calif. P, 1966), p. viii. Pater's concept of personality, like Burke's, embodies the classical discipline as a prerequisite to genuinely personal or imaginative perception. Note the psychological shift which focuses on the personal without ignoring the traditional humanism which viewed man's intellectual and moral nature as ideally the same and which assumed as its goal "the evolution of the total man in accordance with that view." See Bate, pp. 2 & 11.

[11]Croce, p. 34.

"There is no double bottom to art, but one only; in art all is symbolical, because all is idea. But if the symbol is conceived as separable - if the symbol can be on one side, and on the other the thing symbolized, we fall back again into the intellectual error."

[12]Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 193-32, ed. Desmond Lee (U of Chicago P, 1980) as cited by John Casey, The Language of Criticism (London, 1966), p. 26

[13]Burke says that a deflection of reality occurs even in the selection of terminology of the most unemotional scientific nomenclatures. "Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a reflection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality." Language as Symbolic Action, p. 45.

[14]Other similarities noted by Germain d'Hagest are: their emphasis on the imaginative content, the source of an ecstasy, and the "same search for slow, stifled cadences,

for narcotic effects. Walter Pater: L'Homme et l'oeuvre (Paris, 1961), I, 356, n. 57 as cited by Donald L. Hill, ed. with notes The Renaissance (U of Calif. P, 1980), p. 379. See Hill for Swinburne's influence on Pater.

[15]Jacques Lacan, "The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious," Structuralism, Yale French Studies Nos. 36 & 37 (Oct. 1966), pp. 112-147.

[16]Hill, p. 430.

[17]Michael Levey, The Case of Walter Pater (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), p. 48.

[18]Lionel Trilling, "The Fate of Pleasure," Romanticism Reconsidered, ed. Northrop Frye (Cambridge UP, 1963), p. 82.

[19]"Hyperion," I, 35-36, Keats: The Complete Poems, ed. Miriam Allott (London: Longman, 1970), p. 399.

[20]"Ode on Melancholy," p. 540.

F. R. Leavis' hostile view of the 'nineties and of Pater, in particular, nevertheless points to the fact that Keatsean spirit is carried over to Victorian literary life in a central way. "The pre-Raphaelite cult of Beauty, which developed into the religion of art (or the aesthetic religiosity), is the completest expression of that Victorian romanticism which, in poetry, draws so much on the Keats of 'The Eve of St. Agnes', 'The Eve of St. Mark' and 'La Belle Dame sans Merci'. See Revaluation (New York: Norton, 1963), p. 259.

James's splendid description of "the Bronzino portrait," through Milly Theale's eyes in The Wings of the Dove epitomizes, like Paterian lives in The Renaissance and Imaginary Portraits, the sorrow of beauty. "Perhaps it was her tears that made it just then so strange and fair...: the face of a young woman, all magnificently drawn, down to the hands, and magnificently dressed; a face almost livid in hue, yet handsome in sadness and crowned with a mass of hair rolled back and high, that must, before fading with time, have had a family resemblance to her own...And she was dead, dead dead. Milly recognized her exactly in words that had nothing to do with her. 'I shall never do better than this.'"

[21]"On Life," Shelley's Poetry and Prose, ed. D. H. Reiman and S. B. Powers (New York: Norton Col., 1977), p. 194.

[22]Vladimir Nabokov, "The Metamorphosis," Lectures on Literature, ed. F. Bowers (New York, 1980), p. 251.

[23]"The range of images that can be used for concretizing the process of transformation is limited only by the imagination and ingenuity of poets. But the selective nature of existence favors some images above others - and high among them, naturally, is the images of life and death with its variants of being born, being reborn, dying, killing, and being killed." Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (U of Calif. P, 1969), p. 12.

[24]"The Genius of Plato" in Plato and Platonism was written in 1892; "Leonardo Da Vinci" in The Renaissance in 1869.

[25]Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford: Basil Balckwell, 1962), p. 25.

[26]Patrick Bridgewater, Nietzsche in Anglosaxony (Leicester UP, 1972). Bridgewater also notes that one reason for the parallels may be their common source, Karl Ottfried Muller's Die Dorier (1824), translated into English as The History and Antiquities of the Doric Race by Henry Tufell and George Cornwall Lewis in 1830. Compare The Birth of Tragedy, sects. 1, 4, and 8 to Pater's Greek Studies, particularly "A Study of Dionysus" and "The Bacchanals of Euripides." See also: G. C. Monsman, Pater's Portraits: Mythic Pattern in the Fiction of Walter Pater (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1967), p. 18. W. F. Barry, "The Ideals of Anarchy," The Quarterly Review, CLXXXXIV (Oct. 1896), 309-309. R. T. Lenaghan, "Pattern in Walter Pater's Fiction," Studies in Philology LVIII (Jan. 1961) p.69-91.

[27]S. T. Coleridge's Treatise on Method, ed. Alice Snyder (London, 1934), p. 54.

[28]Richard Harter Fogle, The Idea of Coleridge's Criticism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), pp. 4-5.

[29]The Complete Writings of William Blake, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London: Oxford UP, 1966), p. 149.

[30]Biographia Literaria, ed. G. Watson (London, 1956) XIV, p. 174.

[31]ibid., p. 171.

[32]J. David Sapir divides metaphors into two classes; internal and external, and demonstrates the interrelatedness of the two as well as the varying degrees of relatedness, in great detail, via metonymy and synechdoche by going through complete induction. "The Anatomy of Metaphor," The Social Use of Metaphor: Essays on the Anthropology of Rhetoric, ed. J. D. Sapir and J. C. Crocker (Philadelphia: U of Penn. P, 1977).

[33]Paul Ricoeur's concept of predicative assimilation which emphasizes the new semantic congruence in terms of the contrasted terms. "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling," On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (U. of Chicago P, 1979), p. 46.

[34]Edmund Chandler, Pater on Style: An Examination of the Essay on "Style" and the Textual History of Marius the Epicurean (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde & Bagger, 1958), p. 36.

[35]The Novels and Tales of Henry James, New York Edition (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), Vol. VII, p. 172.

Chapter III

Transformations

1. The Poetic Flow

Of all animals, man seems conspicuous in its aesthetic effort to overcome the past to pursue the new.[1] In cultural evolution, overcoming the past has meant recreating the past by continuing the ideas of the past in new forms. This need to construct a probable future is, according to Pater, a fundamental desire of man. In fulfilling this need, Pater conceptualizes art as the way. He had declared that what the spirit needs most in modern life is a sense of freedom and that art offers freedom. What are some of the crucial ideas Pater renews; what material of the past is he working with? What patterns of movement has he found in the cultural evolution of man? These are some of the questions with which I am concerned in the present chapter. But before turning to the question of how and to what extent poetic perception offers freedom, let me briefly examine the intellectual climate in which Pater wrote.

In the late nineteenth century when change seemed frenetic in all areas of life, Heraclitus' cosmology, as well as his intellectual skepticism and broad ethical scope, seemed to have provided Pater with a metaphor through which he gained a new perspective and an insight into modern life. Heraclitus' stress on concrete universals, particularly congenial to Pater,offers him, via Epicureanism, possibilities

of theorizing the sensual basis of aesthetic perception. While Plato, in presenting his doctrine of Forms, had to combat Heraclitus with the antecedent forces of Parmenides and Pythagoras, Pater was compelled to think with Heraclitus, in opposition to the sedate intellectual climate of Oxford. Pater's romantic temperament and the Victorian conditions, particularly those Pater experienced at Oxford, called for an opposing spirit to the orthodox forces of the Church. Pater resisted also, as latter-day Romantic, the static concepts of modern physical philosophy: "the phenomena he /the modern physical philosopher/ deals with - matter, organism, consciousness - began in a state of indeterminate abstract indifference, with a single uneasy start in a sort of eternal sleep, a ripple on the dead, level surface " (PP, 42). He saw the mechanical law leading to equilibrium, the "worn out planet, surviving all the fret of the humanity it housed for a while, to be drawn into the sun" (PP, 42). Pater's concerns, on the other hand, were with the living things, men, nature, problems of distinctions and beauty; the physical world separated from the self did not for Pater dominate the living, as the men of physical science assumed in his time. Pater's centrifugal tendencies, like Plato's centripetal tendencies, were then historically determined, at least, in part.

During Pater's undergraduate days, Oxford had many non-conforming thinkers including Matthew Arnold, who had been elected to the Poetry Chair in 1857, and Benjamin Jowett who gave him "private tuition" in 1860.[2] But Pater's originality of view quickly became suspect, revealing the force of Oxford's basically conforming "establishment Christianity." Pater was often ill at ease with his time; its conventions weighed on him particularly after the publication of The Renaissance, which provoked reactions scandalizing Oxford. As Mrs. Humphry Ward recalled, there were "various attempts at persecution."[3] Under the circumstances, it is likely that Pater felt his romantic spirit, or the centrifugal tendencies in him, contending with the centripetal tendencies at Oxford. This directional difference aside, he seemed to have felt a close affinity with Plato, who, as Pater says, already a late-comer in dealing with speculative matters, had to work with other philosophers as his material. In the same sense, Pater was an eclectic critic of earlier thinkers, working closely with ideas passed on to him. When he writes that the very air Plato breathed was "sickly with offcast speculative atoms" (PP, 6), he probably had the intellectual climate of his own age in mind. For Pater, as it was for Plato, earlier thinkers are "of the structure of his philosophy" (PP, 8). Plato, who

had to reverse the centrifugal forces that had come "to be seriously in excess of the centripetal" protested: "Change...through the power of a true philosophy shall not be the law of our being" (PP, 25). This moral purpose, according to Pater, characterizes all of Plato's thinking. Even minute details of art, education, and daily life reflect his moral end. Here "such pleasant or innocent words as 'manifold', 'embroidered', 'changeful' become synonyms of what is evil." In the Paterian context, on the other hand, these words are not merely pleasant or innocent but good. Whereas Heraclitus enters into Plato's web of thought "by way of antagonism and reaction," the same pre-Socratic scientist becomes a positive force in Pater's thought. The youthful self-conscious reflection of Heraclitus, his theory of opposites, the idea of unity in perpetual change, all come to occupy the aesthetic and moral center of Pater. He has chosen Heraclitus, whose ethical alliance is to be with the rhetoricians and the Epicureans: "the pleasure of the ideal now - is the practical equivalent of the doctrine of motion" (PP, 48). In making Marius an Epicurean Pater demonstrates his metaphysical choice and its practical equivalents. However, his second thought is even more important than his choice: "what seems hopelessly perverse as a metaphysic for the understanding is found to be realisable enough as

one of many phases of our so flexible human feeling" (PP, 48). The modern phase of human feeling, Pater accurately saw, can be realized in the philosophy of motion. This is in contrast with the Socratic and Stoic ideal which is closer to the practical equivalent of the Parmenidean doctrine of the One. Pater saw in Plato the Parmenidean static One getting embodied, or compromised, in the Many: "the true Being, the Absolute, the One, does become delightfully multiple, as the world of ideas - appreciable, through years of living study, more and more clearly, one by one, as the perfectly concrete, mutually adjusted, permanent forms of our veritable experience" (PP, 46). The Heraclitean dynamic unity, distinct from the Parmedidean static one, offers Pater multiple concrete forms of our actual experience. These, identified as aesthetic forms, carry universal values (of the spirit) as they reflect and inspire the spirit in search of finer apprehension of mind and nature. How then do the aesthetic forms carry the spirit of man?

Neither sensations nor ideas but the realized consciousness, the carrier of "truth," a theory, a vision within, is the aesthetic center. Pater's "realized consciousness" is of course a new version of the Romantic concept of imagination, with self-scrutiny and introspection

added to its shaping energy. The imagination becomes, in Pater, a kind of poem to be observed and expressed for its possible transport. The consciousness is realized when the mind poetically identifies itself with the object, in the quickened pulse of the concrete emotions. Both the consciousness and object come alive through the motion of imagination. The object, upon entering the consciousness, becomes more spontaneous and vital. As W. J. Bate says, "by means of this identification, the sympathetic imagination grasps, through a kind of direct experience and feeling, the distinctive nature, identity, or 'truth' of the object of its contemplation."[4] This Romantic particularization suggests another movement of energy, bridging the distance between feeling and thought. Movement is life in the context of Romantic imagination as interpreted by Pater. A mere idea is "realized" by feeling as it offers spontaneity and vitality which the idea by itself does not possess. Pater's emphasis is not so much on the faculty of imaginative crossing, however; it is rather on the crossing itself or the interflowing of subject and object, feeling and thought. Thus the physical fact of Zeus is felt as "that sense of mysterious will...emboided in the motion of wind;" as it is expressed in the Zeus of Dodona, "the very soul of those moving, sonorous creatures

would have passed through his hand, into the eyes and hair of the image: as they can actually pass into the the visible expression of those who have drunk deeply of them; as we may notice, sometimes, in our walks on mountain or shore" (GS, 32). Pater's realized consciousness may now be identified with his idea of repose, the visible expression of the dynamic motion of experience, sensuous or emotional, in which consciousness is vitally focused.

Motion implies freedom and freedom comes from a sense of the new, a new meaning that comes with aesthetic transformation of the old.

> To understand the various forms of ancient art and thought, the various forms of actual feeling (the only new thing, in a world almost too opulent in what is old), to satisfy with a kind of scrupulous equity, the claims of these concrete actual objects on his sympathy, his intelligences, his sense - to "pluck out the heart of their mystery,"and in turn to become the interpreter of them to others: this had now defined itself for Marius as a very narrowly practical design; it determined his choice of a vocation to live by.
>
> (ME I, 152)

In this aesthetic program, the new things in life are forms of art and thought, merging with various forms of actual feeling. These new things, in the midst of what is old, provide the only possible form of freedom Pater recognizes. Freedom to Pater is a new connection to the past, the ideas, the old. Again the emphasis is on the imaginative act of connecting and not on having connected.

Aesthetic repose, after all, rests on the flux. "Indeed, what could discovery be but rediscovery/" writes Kenneth Burke, "newness if of value insofar as it hearkens unto a primeval oldness."[5] This primal oldness, which Pater calls the "primitive condition of man," has to be recaptured or rediscovered as vital elements of aesthetic perception, if a sense of life is to be renewed. As long as forms of actual feeling - sympathy, intelligence, and senses - combine and recombine, or recreate and dissolve to recreate, a life of realized consciousness is possible. "The innumerable compositions and decompositions" Keats writes about, "take place between intellect and its thousand materials before it arrives at that trembling, delicate and snail-born perception of beauty."[6] Beauty thus conceived suggests a consciousness momentarily resting on the flux for a unique and organic totality of thought. Beauty then is a by-product of realized consciousness, which, as Bate writes, "attends the fulfillment by a creature, object or even an empirically rendered aesthetic form of its distinctive and individual function, signature, and nature."[7]

Pater's poetics of change takes, again in the Romantic tradition, rhetoric as the starting point for philosophizing the flux of nature. Poetic or metaphoric

activities offer possibilities of freedom because they see new relations between forms. The constant effort to be free from forms to create new forms consciously exclude formalisms of all kinds from the language of a romantic. For formalisms are abstractions, vehicles of life and not life itself. To him the root of human experience is concrete, and it is only in the concrete context that truth and error become meaningful. Metaphoric conception, as Prof. Samuel Levin points out, "brings to awareness more complex relationships than those that could be seen by the a priori classification of the categories." Metaphors have "accidental empirical quality," embodying "facts about the world, not relations grounded in the nature of things."

> It is not knowledge we could arrive at by raciocination over the primitive categories of being; it is knowledge about the accidents of our existence and, as such, presents itself as an unexpected discovery. In making this discovery we have learned something about the actual world.[8]

For this reason poets like Shelley have claimed that poetry makes original deductions possible. Ernesto Grassi makes a similar point when he says: "The 'imagistic' root of the human world is that in it reality is 'conveyed' or transformed into a new genus."[9] Pater's interest in the flowing in and out of categories frees him from the limitations of his own forms and

metaphorically transports him toward a greater realization of consciousness. His determined avoidance of discursiveness has this poetic aim. The new genus, or aesthetic forms in general, participates in the universal humanity in terms of ideals (beauties) or transofrmed ideas, even as it discloses its own unique character in the flow of new relations. In this sense, freedom depends on understanding the proper frame of humanity: man as nature and ideal. "Every individual man...carries in disposition and determination a pure ideal man within himself, with whose unalterable unity it is the great task of his existence, throughout all his vicissitudes, to harmonize."[10] The "harmonizing" motion of the self toward an ideal conception of man involves the changing relations between subject and object. The fluidity and elusiveness of these relations characterized the unique life of Pater's own realized consciousness. The expressive flow of Pater's prose is his vision, a new version of the Romantic theory of life, based on Blake's eternity and the organic unity of the human spirit.

To stress the poetic flow of Pater's prose is not to characterize one of the most independent Victorian thinkers as a non-thinker. His reader is not always aware of an evolving poetic conception in his prose. He expects that Pater's ideas are to be analyzed and classified for

the intellectual pleasure of argument. But, as Harold Bloom says, "Our expectations of this prose are mistaken when we find it to be an intrusion, of any kind, between our selves and its maker; it is as much of his vision as he can give to us, and its self-awareness is an overwhelming attempt to exorcize the demon of discursiveness."[11] Discursive prose may fix an idea into a dogma or build a system of thought, only to lose its life, whereas Pater's poetic prose beckons the reader's consciousness on to a fresh conception. Pater's prose, if judged as a system of ideas, appears merely provisional and speculative; as an aesthetic form, designed to offer a dramatic experience, it expresses the progressive act of thinking rather than thoughts themselves. Pater, like Keats, who wrote that "Nothing becomes real, till it is experienced," makes his prose available as experience. "To create, to live, perhaps, a little while beyond the alotted hours, as it were, but in a fragment of perfect expression" (ME I, 155). Ideas have little significance until "proved upon our pulses" or used, to borrow Adorno, to "unseal the non-conceptual with concepts, without making their equal."[12] No object is wholly known or knowable; yet, it is through the identifiable element, form or idea, that a work of art unfolds its truth. In Emerson's words, "The endless passing of one element into new forms, the

incessant metamorphosis, explains the rank which the imagination holds in our catalogue of mental powers."[13] The incessant metamorphosis of the identifiable element is also the link that relates a work to other imaginative works. The notion of poetic flow in Pater may best be explained by Ricoeur's definition of imagination that characterizes the flow of relations between ideas and feelings or between forms of an idea in time. "To imagine then is not to have a mental picture of something but to display relations in a depicting mode."[14] Pater sees, in Shakespeare's transforming of Whetstone's Promos and Cassandra into Measure for Measure, such imaginative relations depicted:

> out of these insignificant sources Shakespear's play rises, full of solemn expression and with a profoundly designed beauty, the new body of a higher, though sometimes remote and difficult poetry, escaping from the imperfect relics of the old story, yet not wholly transformed, and even as it stands but the preparation only, we might think, of a still more imposing design.
> (AP, 179) (m.u.)

The poetic flow is always open-ended. It forever promises a finer form, for a perfect expression that expands our consciousness is nevertheless a mere fragment the "preparation only," needing a "still more imposing design." This ceaseless unfolding of poetic forms make imaginative relations possible. The words or situations thrown together are kept alive through their interacting

relations. Speaking of Browning's "Le Byron de nos Jours" in his Dramatis Personae, Pater says that the two Parisians in the poem are not intrinsically interesting. Our interest is aroused because they are thrown into a choice situation. "But to discriminate that moment, to make it appreciable by us, that we may 'find' it, what a cobweb of allusions, what double and treble reflections of the mind upon itself, what an artificial light is constructed and broken over the chosen situation: on how fine a needle's point that little world of passion is balanced!" (R, 171). The interacting relations between characters and situations are compounded, says Pater, by the particular mind's reflexions upon itself.

Pater's rhythmic or syntactic balancing does not aim at the deductive or inductive end of argument, but a poetic depiction (transformation) that reveals new interstices between ideas, thus, reviving the ideas themselves. His recognition of Joachim du Bellay as a characteristic specimen of the poetical taste of his age, for instance, comes with the idea of the "impress of the writer's temper" as aesthetic distinction from a historical value in the following passage:

> But if his work is to have the highest sort of interest, if it is to do something more than satisfy curiosity, if it is to have an aesthetic as distinct from an historical value, it is not enough for a poet to have been the true child of his age, to have conformed to its aesthetic conditions

> and by so conforming to have charmed and stimulated that age; it is necessary that there should be perceptible in his work something individual, inventive, unique, the impress there of the writer's own temper and personality. (R,137) (m.i.)

The two accepted ideas are a work as a product of an age and its individuality. Between the two accepted ideas, the details of personality emerge as the ultimate conditions for a work to have a true aesthetic value. To express this value, which is the agent of evolution, after all, Pater's syntax combines and recombines not merely visible and superficial parts of an idea or object but his own emotional connection with them. Pater's method of syntactic repetition creates an atmosphere and desired value. From the self's interactions and conflicts with ideas rises a standard,a taste or an aesthetic order he envisions. "Writers," says Kenneth Burke, "who hearken into themselves, to catch the linkages that grew inescapably out of their own individual lives" believe in a common bond that assumes enough overlap with other lives to establish an aesthetic response.[15] Pater assumes such a common basis when he says that a true understanding of one's self is "ever the first condition of genuine style" (ME I, 155-6), or "to be in real contact with those elements of his own nature" is "matter of the most real kind of apprehension (ME II, 25-6). What is truly personal becomes "impersonality" in style;

conversely what is impersonal may also reflect a unique style. Thus "Merimee's superb self-effacement, his impersonality, is itself but an effective personal trait, and, transferred to art, becomes a markedly peculiar quality of literary beauty" (MS, 36). Such beauty or apprehension implies the poetic flow that progressively corrects images of the world through "personality." Pater hears in the person of Dante Gabriel Rosetti, "a really new kind of poetic utterance, with effects which have nothing like them; as there is nothing else, for instance, like the narrative of Jacob's Dream in Genesis, or Blake's design of the Singing of the Morning Stars, or Addison's Nineteenth Psalm" (AP, 219). The newness in aesthetic utterance reflects the genius of personality perfecting itself for a "fragment of perfect experssion" that dwells in the impersonal, objective domain of art.

> Occupied ever with himself, perfecting himself and developing his genius, he /Winckelmann/ was not content, as so often happens with such natures, that the atmosphere between him and other minds should be thick and clouded; he was ever jealously refining his meaning into a form, express, clear, objective.
> (R, 176).

Pater thus identifies personality as the instrument for a dialectic progression of knowledge.

> Yes! already for Socrates, we might say, to know what Justice or Piety or Beauty is, will be like the knowledge of a person: only that, as Aristotle carefully noted, his scrupulous habit of search for

> universal, or catholic, definitions was after all but an instrument for the plain knowledge of facts. (P&P

Pater paraphrases Goethe when he asks, "What is this song or picture, this engaging personality in life or in a book to me? Does it give me pleasure?" (R, viii) Aesthetic pleasure is the prime motive for recreating a song, a picture, a person at hand. This personal pleasure is the first step, the prerequisite of aesthetic criticism. The critic must of course go beyond it "by analysing and reducing it to its elements"; he must penetrate "through the given literary or artistic product, into the mental and inner condition of the producer, shaping his work" (EG, 29). But to move the soul in the poetic flow of apprehension, he must know how to communicate this insight to others. In practice, Pater looks for the "formula," the "virtue," or the "active principle" in a work. These terms refer to the "conditions under which it is experienced"; that is, the conditions under which the spirit is set free. It is similar to Taine's "master-faculty" (R, 75) and Croce's "dominant sentiment." Donald Hill notes in his textual studies of the Renaissance that Pater's favored term, "formula," comes from Baudelaire, who used the term in "Curiosites esthetiques" in 1859; "I torment my mind to to tear from it some formula which expresses well the

the distinguishing quality of Eugene Delacrois." Applying the same notion to life, Sainte-Beuve wrote in Causeries du lundi on Taine as follows: "I willingly accept as true...that every genius, every distinguished talent has a form, a general interior procedure which he applies then to everything. Subjects, opinions change, the process remains the same. To arrive thus at the general formula of a talent is the ideal end of the study of the moralist and the painter of characters."[16] The formula Pater discerns in Merimee is "enthusiastic amateur of rude, crude, naked force in men and women wherever it could be found; himself carrying ever, as a mask, the conventional attitude of the modern world" (MS, 14). This formula organizes Pater's reading of Merimee, as the following passage does his Botticelli. The personal center which determines Botticelli's vision is the result of the

> blending in him of a sympathy for humanity in its uncertain condition, its attractiveness, its investure at rarer moments in a character of loveliness and energy, with his consciousness of the shadow upon it of the great things from which it shrinks.

His paintings, because of this character, convey a "true complexion of humanity" to a degree unusual in paintings. As to Wordworth's formula, Pater locates it in his handling of nature: "By raising nature to the level of human thought he gives it power and expression; he

subdues man to the level of nature, and gives him thereby a certain breadth and coolness and solemnity (AP, 49).

Speaking of Merimee, but perhaps of himself also, Pater says: "the style is the man: - a man, impassible, unfamiliar, impeccable, veiling a deep sense of what is forcible,nay, terrible, in things, under the sort of personal pride that makes a man a nice observer of all that is most conventional" (MS 36). George Saintsbury, after scanning a passage from Pater's "Leonardo Da Vinci," discovers "a polyphony, as unique and original as anything we have seen."[17] But he does not link this polyphonic effect to Pater's poetic universe. Pater's style is his thematic illustration of perpetual motion. George Sampson contrasts Pater's "perpetual adagio" to Newman's "symphonic completeness" in his study of their styles, but he too neglects to relate them to their respective visions of reality. Here is a fragment of Newman's sentence: "the untutored movements of reason, imagination, passions, and affections of the natural man, the leapings and the friskings, the plungings with the snortings, the clumsy play and the aimless soul of the noble, lawless savage of God intellectual creation."[18] All of his syntactic elaboration in this passage amounts to a vivid description of the "untutored movements." It is a vibrant and fully orchestrated passage which exhausts

its thematic content as the sentence closes upon itself. But it is not "poetic" in the sense of displaying interrelations of subject and object in a depicting mode. Even less is it specifically designed to effect beauty in change or to demonstrate a dialectical progress of an idea or an image. Contrast this passage with the following, seemingly more discursive, sentence by Pater.

> He (Goethe) speaks of the teacher (Winckelmann)
> who had made his career possible, but
> whome he had never seen,
> as of an abstract type of culture,
> consummate,
> tranquil,
> withdrawn already
> into the region of ideals, yet
> retaining colour from the incidents
> of a passionate intellectual life.
> (R, 177)

The "consummate, tranquil, withdrawn" that modify the "teacher" work like polyphonic strands, while "withdrawn" and "retaining" are mildly dissonant and yet blending notes. This relatively short and clear statement effects, as a stanza of a poem might, a great deal more than the discursive content of the statement. The teacher is said to be consummate, tranquil, and withdrawn, and yet he retains color from the concrete life of passion and intellect. The "abstract type of culture" or "the region of ideals" also take on color in this syntax; furthermore, the regions of ideals (colorless presumably),

juxtaposed with "a passionate intellectual life," suggests the submerged analogy: intellectual life is to region of ideals as life is to after life. Thus the seemingly simple statement about what Goethe thought of Winckelmann intimates aesthetic ideals central to Pater's world. It makes concrete the abstract notions of mind and culture, relations between the actual and the ideal. The rhythm of the varied syntactic segments compels the reader to experience the flow of various strands of thought. It synthesizes the discursive and the poetic, the intellect and the sense. Moreover, the repeated segments, be they words, phrases, or clauses, are in effect harmonized to reveal the inexhaustibility of an idea or an object at hand. The sentence flows, carrying the effect like a resonant chorus of many voices each singing a different melody, yet in perfect fusion. With this musical effect, the concommittant thematic expansion reaches beyond the normal range of prose.

Pater's sensuous interweaving of concrete details with abstract notions, whether images or propositions, enables us to enter readily into his poetic world.

> Through Leonard's strange veil of sight
> things reach him so;
> in no ordinary night or day, but as
> in faint light of eclipse, or
> in some brief interval
> of falling rain at daybreak, or
> through deep water.
> (R, 111)

Pater here simultaneously colors Leonardo's landscape and demonstrates one of his most important aesthetic precepts. What effects a new form in art is not the fact but the imaginative sense of fact. This idea itself becomes an aesthetic experience in this passage. The "strange veil of sight," Pater's and Leonardo's quality of perception, is composed of three identical prepositional phrases: "in no ordinary night or day, but as in faint light of eclipse, or in some brief interval of falling rain at daybreak," and then the shorter, "through deep water." All strange and precise, they suggest a novel perspective, not ordinary night or day but an in-between reality. Nevertheless, the veil is the instrument for apprehension.

Arnold, like Pater, has also tried to define the aesthetic distinction of a unique style. But while Pater represents his idea, Arnold insists on his. Arnold says: "Take the eminent masters of style, the poets who best give the idea of what the peculiar power which lies in style is, -Pindar, Virgil, Dante, Milton." The "peculiar effect exercised by eminent power of style" is then cited to substantiate his point.

> ...an example of the peculiar effect which these poets produce, you can hardly give from German poetry. Examples enough you can give from German poetry of the effect produced by genius of thought, and feeling expressing themselves in clear language, passionate

> language, eloquent language, with harmony and melody; but not of the peculiar effect exercised by eminent powers of style.[19]

Arnold's repetition of key words, like 'peculiar effect' and 'language' is not to create the effect of power in his own prose but to preach and teach what he knows to be true. By contrast, Pater's style as his "constructive intelligence" recreates the peculiar effect he wants to explain. "To give the phrase, the sentence, the structural member, the entire composition, song, or essay, a similar unity with its subject and with itself; - style is in the right way when it tends towards that. All depends upon the original unity, the vital wholeness and identity, of the initiatory apprehension or view" (AP, 19). It is as though the grammatical appositives, repeated eight times in the passage, simulate the effect of unity he is stating to be the initiatory apprehension. Pater's words are arranged to reveal the precise and complex meaning as it is being composed. The following lengthy quotation demonstrates how his prose enters into the "delicate region of language" even as he asserts it as the common base of intelligibility inherent in true style.

> A relegation, you may say perhaps - a relegation of style to the subjectivity, the mere caprice, of the individual, which must soon transform it into mannerism. Not so! since there is, under the conditions supposed for those elements of the man, for every

> lineament of the vision within, the one word, the one acceptable word, recognizable by the sensitive, by others "who have intelligence" in the matter, as absolutely as ever anything can be in the evanescent and delicate region of human language. The style, the manner, would be the man, not in his unreasoned and really uncharacteristic caprices, involuntary or affected, but in absolutely sincere apprehension of what is most real to him.
>
> (AP, 34)

George Moore reported that Pater was always "at composition." When out walking, he was "composing his slowly moving rhythms;" at a dinner he seemed to be wearing a mask so that he could compose without being discourteous. "I doubt he ever ceased composing except when he was asleep."[20] That Pater composed when out walking seems fitting to his aesthetic ideals of fluidity and transience and to his meticulously transformed prose which contains neither mere transcriptions of his time nor abstranctions with which we cannot sympathize. His idea that aesthetically idealized abstractions of sense impression must find sensual analogues for expression is itself conveyed in such analogues, as we have seen, like a landscape seen in passing with ever changing perspectives. Abstract thinking for its own sake is avoided at every turn in his own writing and disparaged in his criticism of others; he insists on a singular sensuous representation in which every thought and feeling are "twin-born," and woven in the mind. Ancient

Greek sculptures, like all successful compositions, satisfy this primary condition of art, because they represent not the hard and lifeless actuality nor its inevitable idea but the composed reality of "intellectualized sensuous objects."

> ...though the most abstract and intellectualized sensuous object, they /Greek sculptures/ are still sensuous and material, addressing themselves, in the first instance, not the purely reflective faculty, but to the eye; and a complete criticism must have approached them from both sides...
> (GS, 190)

Pater's own intellectualized sensuousness comes largely from his scrupulous avoidance of bare systematizing, from making his critical ideas pulsate in unified and unique radiance.

> The theory or idea or system which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract theory we have not identified with ourselves, or of what is only conventional has no real claim upon us.
> (R, 237-8)

Aesthetic experience - merging with an object, identifying with an idea - implies a self-transcendance. Far from being merely ornate and obscuring his metaphysical stance, his prose allows a finer experience of an idea, a work, or a life; it allows an aesthetic experience that can satisfy the desire of beauty. As Weyl says, "It is the nature of a real thing to be inexhaustible in content; we can get an ever deeper insight into this content by

the continual addition of new experiences, partly in apparent contradiction, by bringing them into harmony with one another."[21] The continual addition of new experiences to old ideas is what Pater proposes in his prose. Desire for new experience as clearer apprehension is unbound. The poetic blow escapes from theory to experience, to intuition, to pure perception.

When a literary critic pursues the experience of critical appreciation, rather than critical theory, as a substitute for reality or art, his syntax holds for him much more than grammatical and logical functions. In fact a principled rhetorical organization transforms Pater's prose into poetry. According to Pater, the unity of an aesthetic work comes from the unique sense experiences themselves. We need to see first what is meant by unity and by "the gifts of sense."

> Its [the romantic tendency] desire is for a beauty born of unlikely elements, by profound alchemy, by a difficult imitation, by the char which
>
> a trace of distortion, of the grotesque, may perhaps linger, as an additional element of expression about its ultimate grace.
>
> (AP, 260)

In this passage Pater embodies the Aristotelian and Coleridgean critical precept of necessary unity, rather than "explain" the unity in diversity.[22] Furthermore, Pater does not focus on the organic relations of the parts to the whole, but on how the subject matter

(material content) becomes expression by some magic, technique or style. This means that the unity is first expressed in our desire to see beauty; or in our motion toward an ideal through the object we see the unity as expression. Thus Pater's own prose aims to express this romantic desire for a composed beauty. To attain it, he elevates his own critical faculty to poetic imagination and fuses critical and poetic functions. The "ultimate grace" of Pater's prose is as much aesthetic aspirations as a representation of his object of love.

The actual vehicles of poetic transformations are the senses that work as the "imaginative reason." In "The School of Giorgione," Pater writes: "For, as art addresses not pure sense, still less the pure intellect, but the 'imaginative reason' through the sense, there are differences in kind in aesthetic beauty, corresponding to the differences in kind of the gifts of sense themselves" (R, 102).[23] It is the sensuous element in art which gives each art its unique untranslatable quality. Thus a great picture, according to Pater, does not convey a message but a pictorial quality, "a space of fallen light, caught as the colours are in an Eastern carpet, but refined upon, and dealt with more subtly and exquisitely than by nature itself" (R, 104). How does the object or our unique sense experience of

the object get freed from our past expressions of the object? First, to overcome its own limitations, each art attempts to pass "into the condition of some other art," thereby gaining new forces of freedom. Thus Pater reads Love's Labour Lost" as if Shakespeare had bound together "by some inventive concert, the devices of an ancient tapestry, and give voices to its figures" (AP, 169). The tendency for each art to strive, to pass into other states partially frees itself from its own limitations. Interrelations between the arts, where music approaches to painting, architecture to sculpture, poetry to music, etc., effect changes in form and style and partake, in passing, in artistic qualities. Moreover, all art aspires to the condition of music. Music occupies the same place among the arts as the concept of the ideal within each art, "music being the typical, or ideally consummate art, the object of the great Anders-streben of all art, of all that is artistic, or partakes of artistic qualities" (R, 106). Form in all art, as Pater generalized it further, tries to obliterate matter; it penetrates the matter to initiate aesthetic experience. The "spirit of handling," form, persists in art as an "indwelling solemnity of expression." Second, in addition to these two way interchanges, there is the strife of art "to be independent

of the mere intelligence," signs of which we have seen amply in Pater's prose. These tendencies within and without the subjective forces of the mind transform an object or an idea into a new experience. Form alone is general, diagrammatic, and abstract; it needs centrifugal forces - romantic and subjective substance - to vibrate into a new being.[24] Form as the subject's construct takes shape as "a relative, somewhere in the world of thought, and it corelative, somewhere in the world of language" meet with "the readiness of 'soul and body' united." But such an analysis of form is necessarily diachronic, implying a stasis out of flux, while the concept of form is itself a process, evolving towards "the pursuit of relief of life and vigour in the portraiture of one's sense" (AP, 32).

> Into the mind sensitive to 'form', a flood of random sounds, colours, incidents, is ever penetrating from the world without, to become, by sympathetic selection, a part of its very structure, and, in turn, the visible vesture and expression of that other world it sees so steadily within, any, already with a partial conformity hereto, to be refined, enlarged, corrected, at a hundred points that the function of style, as tact or taste, intervenes. (AP, 28-9)

The process of idealization of sense experience is seen as the instrument of seeing the "truth" as "accuracy and expression." This truth, "divered from men's ordinary sense of it" determines the outermost frame of all aesthetic expressions, and this truth is visionary as all art is in the end.

The attempt to make an abstract concrete in prose is a common enough practice in a stylist; yet, if a critic carefully avoids the modes of classifying and system building, in favor of sensual exemplification, his writing deserves a poetic reading. Let us re-examine the notion of the union of sense and intellect. It takes a particular form in Pater's prose where highly abstract generalizations are made into flesh, rather than flesh being made into spirit. His aesthetic aim of "not the fruit of experience but experience itself" supports the aim. Given the mental alacrity with which sensual experience is converted into abstraction, experience and the fruit of experience were not easily separable, but Pater gives experience the priority in his criticism. Abstraction or the fruit of experience covers over all experiences, even the most passionate ones. And abstraction, no matter how instantaneous, is by definition experience plus time, and the personal immediacy is replaced by impersonal history. His fight against this mortifying process is characteristically detached but all encompassing, as he tries to reconvert abstraction into experience. But the temporal remove can't be bridged except through a new conception. The charm of his prose may have its prime source in his singular concentration on this perceptual fact.

Tranquility, that designed beauty which suggests formal perfection in his prose, reflects the same power of concentrated detachment. This detachment is however different from the withholding of emotion, as many critics have hinted; it comes from delicate intellectualizing of emotion, making it one with his method of thinking. His prose is the experience of knowing, the experiment of an idea that becomes self-knowledge.

The poetic flow we have been concerned about is open-ended, ever renewing ideas as symbols of the human spirit. The notion of perfectability, within his metaphor of flux, becomes a possibility in art and in life, and a necessity in his arrangements of ideas and sensations amidst the ever present death and decay. Pater has revived the idea of Idea, by demystifying the Platonic concept, by separating it from Plato's system of metaphysics to give it a new life as an aesthetic principle. His freedom comes from such transformation of ideas.

> Let us understand by poetry all literary production which attains the power of giving pleasure by its form, as distinct from its matter. Only in this varied literary form can art command the width, variety, delicacy of resources, which will enable it to deal with the conditions of modern life. What it has to do in the service of culture is to arrange the details of modern life, so to reflect it, that it may satisfy the spirit. And what does the spirit need in face of modern life? The sense of freedom.
>
> (R, 230).

Nowhere has Pater used, for instance, the word "perfectability"

as a moral precept or formulated an argument for his belief in continuity; yet, such a framework of evolving perception emerges from his renewed ideas about art and life. The sensual analogues of ideas, without their fetters, without historical accidents which were at one time felt to be real, give us freedom. For they put us in touch with what Pater calls the "primitive sentiment": man's love for his land, his death and sorrow, the beauty of youth and of all things ephemeral. These primordial experiences are close to man's heart at all times and are therefore greater subjects for art than merely natural or socio-political matters. Even these aesthetic elements are, no doubt, part of the perpetual flux, but they contribute to the immediacy of being alive. They thrust upon us the physicalness of being, its cosmic awareness of eternal change. Pater's words, critical precepts, and beliefs are his metaphoric, mythic, and biographic conceptions of this throbbing awareness of the basic human condition. Their appeal to the sense and common humanity includes his idealization of man's desires and dreams that spur sense experience to an abstract ideal. For the ideal form, as Pater demonstrates again and again, is a constituent of an ideal.

2. Fertile Ideas and Continuity

Pater, like Plato's Socrates, is "literally an enthusiast for knowledge." What is real, and what continues in the evolution of the mind, "in its apprehensions of Piety, Beauty, Justice," is "what is of dynamic quality in them" (PP, 83). And those elements in ideas which convey force into what one creates build character and generate virtue. (More about this in the last chapter of this study.) Here I will focus on those elements which have the "conveying force" in transmitting crucial ideas. An infusion of a particular temperament is inextricably linked with the dynamic force; thus a new conception means an old idea reconstructed by the force of a deeply feeling temperament concerned about the fundamental human situations. These situations refer to universal conditions rooted in man's nature. For these situations to come alive, they have to be concretely relized by a particular temperament. Thus an idea contemplated by Marius in Marius the Epicurean is said to be spiritualized by his poet/scholar temperament, and the transformed idea becomes an attribute of that personality. Clearly then we are here dealing with a particular set of ideas that touch us aesthetically. (Piety, Beauty, Justice are in themselves meaningless until the dynamic quality in them is apprehended by a particular mind.) To understand the universal situations

involving "primitive sentiments" and their role in aesthetic experience, I'll follow Marius's intellectual journey, which "spiritualizes" sensations and ideas into a vision.

The journey is made through Marius's temperament: his fear of external forces and desire for the security of home, his native instinct for devotion, his sense of responsibility in the reception of the world, his impressibility to flux and the fleeting beauty of the world, and his sense of health and delight in the body. The ideas he so eagerly seizes and reconstructs are processed by his constitutional traits. But they are also aesthetic substances which reveal the primordial nature of man in archetypal human situations, and as such they direct the movement of the human spirit. The spiritual world, as Whitman sings, is shaped by the material: "I will make the poems of materials, for I think they are to be the most spiritual poems,/And I will make the poems of my body and of mortality,/For I think then supply myself with the poems of my soul and of immortality."[25] Marius' new discovery in the journey is, in the same way, a series of minutely observed sensations of event or idea, in which "the two trains of phenomena which the words matter and spirit do but roughly distinguish, play inextricably into each

other" (AP, 220). Pater is remarkably consistent in this aesthetic goal: transforming the most sensuous experience into vision. Contrary to the critics' contention that Pater wrote Marius to rectify his aesthetic vision in the Renaissance, the thematic unity and motifs of the two books are continuous. What he professed to pursue in the Renaissance remains the goal of his later masterpiece. The five motifs (the aesthetic substances with which Pater works) in Marius also occur in other works as well, as part of overall figurations of his vision of man. Each motif is an "under-current of original sentiment" which "touches you as the real matter" of the work "through the veil of its ostensible subject" (R, 39). I refer to these motifs also as fertile ideas because of the dynamic qualities in them that recur in man's apprehensions of himself.

First, there is Marius' affection for the dwelling place. This sentiment is prototypal like Florean Deleal's in "The Child in the House," the earliest of Pater's imaginary portraits. It reflects man's love for the earth and his consciousness of inevitable departure from it. Like a traveller he must leave. Marius' ambivalent feelings toward his mother and the house and his simultaneous yearning for permanence evoke the ultimate fate of parting. His acute consciousness of death and beauty, which also

mirrors Florean's tremulous stirring of the knowledge of death, awakens this sentiment. In the childhood visions of Florian in the House are contained physical beauty and death, pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, all the opposing forces that make up the flux of experience. When "the two sorts of impressions came together," Florean weeps, "to the surprise of older people" (MS, 181). Similarly Flavian's death at the close of Book I of Marius may be seen as a full development of this motif. In the final exchange between Marius and his intimate friend Flavian in his death bed, Pater excludes all that is outside sense perception. Marius, lying beside the dying friend "to lend him his own warmth," whispers: "Is it a comfort that I shall often come and weep over you?" Flavian's Whitmanesque answer, "Not unless I be aware, and hear you weeping!" defines the aesthetic nature of death as Pater conceives it. The paradoxical spiritual nature of the material as Whitman expressed it in the passage quoted above, is the spirit's only link to the absolute. The intimation may simply mean, as Kenneth Burke says, "The objects exist too fully in their own right for us to treat them merely as objective words for subjects."[26] At any rate, the pagan ending of the youthful life Pater presents (its sadness and beauty) expands, rather than confines, our consciousness to past

and future humanity beyond the self-enclosing sensations. Thus it is through sensuous experience of sad mortality that Pater tries to restore our sense of humanity, paradoxically transcending mortality itself. It is as though, in the perception of beauty in death, life is affirmed and humanity freshly conceived. This universal image of man's attachment to his dwelling place, in his awareness of imminent departure, stems from man's condition of Herclitean flux which Pater delineates at length in the "Conclusion." The inevitable passage of time and decay for all things compels man to view life's vast possibilities, juxtaposed with the visible extinction of men and ideas.

> This pagan sentiment measures the sadness with which the human mind is filled, whenever its thoughts wander far from what is here, and now. It is beset by notions of irresistable natural powers, for the most part ranged against man, but the secret also of fortune, making the earth golden and the grape fiery for him.
> (R, 201)

This pagan sentiment forms the nucleus of artistic conceptions.

New aesthetic conceptions, if they have the "conveying force," transmit the primitive sentiment. Through them, it is preserved, if not in the archives of human civilization, in the hearts of men, flaring up again and again in the moments of recognition. Poe intimates the same sentiment when he writes in "Ligeia": "Yet not the more could I

define that sentiment, or analyze, or even steadily view it. I recognized it, let me repeat, sometimes in the survey of a rapidly growing vine - in the contemplation of a moth, a butterfly, a chrysalis, a stream of running water. I have felt it in the glances of unusually aged people."[27] Through beauty and sorrow, the artist achieves subtle and true psychic renewal, and, in the process, the spirit of humanity is reaffirmed. "The basis of all artistic humanity lives in the power of conceiving humanity in a new and striking way" (R, 213). A strikingly autobiographical passage (again reminiscent of Florean of "The Child") in Gaston de Latour projects such a vision.

> Sorrow came along with beauty, a rival of its intricate omnipresence in life. In the sudden tremor of an aged voice, the handling of a forgotten toy, a childish drawing, in the tacit observance of a day, he /Gaston/ became aware suddenly of the great stream of human tears falling always through the shadows of the world. For once the darling of old age actually more than responded in full to its tenderness. In the isolation of his life there had been little demand for sympathy on the part of those anywhere near his own age. So much the larger was the fund of superfluous affection which went forth, with a delicacy not less than their own, to meet the sympathies of the aged people who cherished him. In him their old almost forgotten sorrows bled anew.
> (GL, 23) (m.i.)

A mythic representation of living and grieving in man appears in Pater's study of Demeter, who symbolizes also the fertility of the earth. Her fertility, beyond

simple reproductivity, has a brooding quality, the consciousness of death which encompasses the contrariness of life. But the same consciousness contains the potentially volcanic eruptions of joys also. So people have turned to her in "awful yet hopeful" prayer "in the earth's sorrow and promise and its darkness and helpfulness" (GS, 98). Life in the awareness of death grows and expands to include the whole range of pleasure and pain in sharper and more intense images. Man as material nature transforming into opulent beauty and sorrow is best conveyed in Pater's prose.

> Its /the many colored earth/ brooding fertility: the spring flowers breaking from its surface, the thinly disguised unhealthfulness of their heavy perfume, and of their chosen places of growth; the delicate, feminine, Prosperina-like motion of all growing things; its fruit, full of drowsy and poisonous, the fresh, reviving juices; its sinister caprices also, its droughts and sudden volcanic heats; the long delays of spring; its dumb sleep, so suddenly flung away; the sadness which insinuates itself into its languid luxuriance, all this grouped itself round the persons of Demeter her circle.
> (GS, 97-98)

The awareness of this primordial human condition unites us to the past and revitalizes our sense of life. Pater sees in the ancient Greek stories the formative process of the idea of humanity, as the union of life forces and human sorrow, gradually taking hold on the mind as the confluence of life and death's sinister force of cruetly. An artistic expression is then a rediscovery

of this condition, and a successful expression represents the discovery in a novel way, adding a new insight and color to the condition. Death is, as Pater has us see again and again, the most salient image for change, the "truth" of the flux. Death that destroys is also his chosen image of life and hope. Men create images of death to extend death itself as well as to extend its emotional counterparts (suffering and sorrow).

Second, we have the past experienced as aesthetic now. The tradition of the family, particularly what Marius' father represents, links Marius to the humanity of the past and to the world of ideas with which he constructs his present. This mingling of time through ideas, through literature (the Metamorphoses of Apuleius) and philosophy (Epicureanism, Stoicism, Christianity, etc.) orders his consciousness anew. The past becomes, to borrow from Heidegger, "the totality of those entities which change in time and indeed the transformation and vicissitudes of men."[28] The sequence of early experiences makes up the interior of the mind which it perpetually synthesizes with new events in the world. Pater's own ordering of the past (and his consciousness)through his studies of Greek and Renaissance art provides a tranquil yet expanding poetic space in which the sorrowful and distorted sensuous analogues of pain and pleasure

deepen the root of man and affirm the continuity of the human spirit. His attention to the discontinuous and "infinitely divisible" time allows him to envision its aesthetic reverse. "Our existence is but the sharp apex of the present moment between hypothetical eternities" (ME I, 146). "All that is actual is a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it" (R, 235). That is true of physical time in which the body decays and the body's flame captures the moment in its flicker. Against this time is pitted the aesthetic moment which flares up in recurrent time. In aesthetic time the past is rekindled, in freshly created contexts. Abstractions of the past become experientially meaningful once more. For the mind's movement has this double process: from experience to idea and from idea to experience. The conversion of past into the aesthetic moment is experience, and expressive words for the experience discover both the past and our mind. "The very words of Plato challenge us straightway to larger and finer apprehension of the processes of our minds; are themselves a discovery in the sphere of mind" (PP, 142-3). In Heidegger's words, "The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility - that of developing itself. This development of the understanding we call interpretation."[29]

Third is the world of evolving consciousness. Marius'

journey alludes to the evolution of the Western mind with the particular paths taken for its own growth. His consciousness is minutely ordered throughout the journey largely in terms of Epicureanism and refined in his interpretation of Stoicism and Christianity. New conceptions emerge out of old material but they do not replace the old. Epicurean justice, for instance, upon which Epicurean pleasure depends, becomes in Marius the artistic justice of perception which gives pleasure to soul. Thus justice remains true pleasure and the only good. Pater's aesthetic perception of vrai verite (or aesthetic justice) does not depart, in essence, from the Epicurean sense of good. Aesthetic hedonism, or the new version of Epicureanism, says what Epicurus said: "Be perfect in regard to what is here and now," and not "let us eat and drink for tomorrow we die" (ME I, 145). The Epicurean desire to be perfect now refines the mind for finer perception. It is for culture in evolution, paideia, "an expansion and refinement of the power of reception," that aesthetic justices are sought. Pater is never dogmatic in his interpretation of inherited ideas, for they are largely material for aesthetic possibilities. By comparison, even Blake's understanding of Epicurus is dogmatic. Blake had to adjust his view of Epicureanism from his earlier understanding of it as

"the purest religion, when it is most refined" to his later condemnation of it as atheism.[30] Pater needed no revision from the Renaissance to Marius, as he read Epicurianism for its spirit as Blake recommends with regard to the Bible. Pater's interpretation of Epicureanism as well as of other systems of thought suggests, however, some organic unity of all consciousness or the eternity of the spirit. He suggests this as a feeling, not as a dogma which he nor anyone else should be compelled to affirm systematically. This is a poetic or scientific conjecture, as his analysis of the evolutionary phases of the Demeter myth show. He sees an evolving spiritual unity in three phases of the myth: (1) the primitive state where the phenomena of the natural world are not consciously expressed, where man has not fully objectified himself in nature; (2) the literary or poetic phase where the imagination solidified man's consciousness in artistic products; (3) the phase in which moral and spiritual conditions are abstracted and apprehended in aesthetic and ethical symbols (GS, 91).[31] Demeter in Iliad is only the goddess of the fields, with her yellow hair like the ripe corn, who is unlisted among the orthodox gods, and Persephone in Odyssey is the queen of the dead,but not known as the daughter of the grieving Demeter. The divine grief of

Demeter for her daughter, raped and removed to Hades, and their reunion as a promise of life to come appears in Hesiod and reveals the full meaning of the Demeter myth. Pater sees in Hesiod the subdued and dreamy nature of the gods, as contrasted with Homer's heroic forms of gods. In Hesiod, the strange double nature of sorrowful hope takes on a new significance for the human spirit, "full of purpose for the duly chastened intelligence: death, resurrection, rejuvenescence. - Awake, and sing yet that dwell in the dust" (GS, 95). The myth of Demeter is particularly significant to Pater's poetic order because it represents the primitive intelligence sensing and expressing man's sentiment about the growth and decay of all things on earth: "thus naming together in her all their fluctuating thoughts, impressions, suspicions, of the earth and its appearances, their whole complex divination of mysterious life, a perpetual wording, a continuous act of conception there" (GS, 97) (m.i.).

The fourth motif is the apprehension of the negative, or evil, along with the positive. The negative side of life exists even in what is most beautiful. Though the Romantics emphasized the notion, Pater's motif comes also from Heraclitus: "For that which is made up of both the opposites is one; and, when one is divided, the opposites are disclosed." And according to Laertios

Diogenes, Heraclitus saw War and Strife in "that which lead to the becoming of the world."[32] Pater's ordering of the mind, in any case, includes this Heraclitean tension of the opposites: their manifestations and their unity. Thus the ritual in which Marius participates with calm appreciation also provokes pity and disgust at the sacrificial victims, as he recalls "man's act of everyday butcher's work, though decorously hidden under a religious pretext" (ME I, 29). Flavian, who seems to Marius "a carved figure in motion," also appears in malign association, his beautiful head epitomizing "the depth of corruption and its perfection of form." The body is the juncture from which the world of the human spirit and the world of corruption create their separate paths. So the body which is the "celestial fire," the spirit in things, is also the receptacle of corruption (ME I, 92-93). Marius' constitutional fear of evil is symbolized by the copulating serpents, "a sort of humanity of aspect in its spotted and clouded nakedness." He sees a humanity "dusty and sordid and as if far gone in corruption, in the sluggish will, as it woke suddenly into one metallic string of pure enmity against him." In nature, too, there is the motionless winter sky the diarist described in "A Prince of Court Painters": "So chilled at heart things seem to me...like some mortal spot whence death begins to creep over the body!" (IP, 41)

Or strange motiveless misdeeds happen, turning a gentle creature into a dark force that surrounds Denys L'Auxerrois. "The pretended hunting of the unholy creature became a real one, which brought out, in rapid increase, men's evil passions. The soul of Denys was already at rest, as his body, now borne along in front of the crowd, was tossed hither and thither, torn at last limb from limb" (IP, 81).

Fifth is the vision as apprehension. Unlike the Stoic Aurelius who seeks to escape evil, Pater finds that even the perception of evil is transforming, as it was to Blake. "To cease from action - the ending of their effort to think and do: there is no evil in that" is the Stoic advice which both Marius and Pater reject. Marius seeks instead transformation of evil by a measure of moral and intellectual command and by drawing positive powers from his own soul. The visionary experience of knowledge, or perception of the value of mere quantities and representations, "under the power of that peculiar mood" is for Marius "to have apprehended the Great Ideal, so palpably that it defined personal gratitude and the sense of a friendly hand laid upon him amid the shadows of the world" (ME II, 71). Pater's language of this "divine" transformation is concrete; it is not an entry into a separate world. In the "White

Nights" chapter of Marius, Pater describes the dream-life perception that allows a vision of an "after-thought - the double or seconds, of real things." White nights "should be nights not of quite blank forgetfulness, but passed in continuous dreaming, only half-veiled by sleep" (ME I, 13-14). Visionary experience is presented as a transformation of true ideas, vitally moving toward unity and harmony in perception. Pater's rendering is always specific. Undivided time is projected through the image of the "immense age of vegetation" and the unchanging motion and the "roar of immemorial waterfall" as "unalterable rest." Marius, as though he had always sought for someone to share his joy, feels a companion in his journey, accompanied by a lively sense of gratitude. In his reflection, Marius identifies this companion with the "necessary exponent of our own and the world's life" (ME II, 68). The narrator then speculates on its diverse forms: "that reasonable Ideal to which the Old Testament gives the name of Creator, which for the philosophers of Greece is the Eternal Reason, and in the New Testament the Father of men. Man builds from the act and word and expression of the friend actually visible at his side" (ME II, 68). Then after-thoughts, again, continue to emerge: this visible companion, conceived by the active powers of apprehension,

may in fact be but "susceptibilities to influence," dependent on "its passive surrender, as a leaf on the wind, to the motions of the great stream of physical energy without it" (ME II, 69). His imperfect thoughts of today or yesterday "after the analogy of the bodily life" may be a series of impulses like pulsations in a spiritual system external to them. Recalling the Platonic hypotheses, he tries to understand the material world reflected in his intermittent consciousness. "It was easier to conceive of the material fabric of things as but an element in the world of thought" (ME II, 69-70). The person beside him seemed then to Marius not an "occasional wayfarer" but an "unfailing assistant." Note the strikingly secular connotations of unfailing and assistant.

These five fertile ideas, which recur throughout Pater's essays and fictional portraits, make new configurations of his conception of man. The impetus for change comes both horizontally and vertically, but the aesthetic substances remain constant for Pater. New forms evolve out of the old, and each art "strives to pass into the condition of some other art...while partially freeing itself from its own limitations." On the model of such strife, the evolution of the conscience of Western culture is understood analogically. Marius' journey through the Roman Empire in its waning days

illustrates the stages of this evolution: its psychological and epistemological manifestations that direct the intellectual movement. The idealized past, conceived by Marius the wayfarer, in the process of the journey, becomes the spiritual companion, the other wayfarer, "visible there across the plain." As William Buckler writes:

> The central need perceived by the Victorian writers of imaginative literature was the regeneration of the imagination itself, of the power to transform topicality into internal pattern and experience into myth, and thus to encompass past and future in a fully envisioned now."[33]

The past in Pater becomes melted down and fluid as part of his consciousness. Aesthetic expression, in this sense, is never mimetic reality, but the dream, the desire of "that nobler world of aspiration and idea." With the flux presiding always as its structural limit, continuity becomes a palpable reality as regenerated imagination.

3. The Strife of Harmony

Harmony, in Heraclitean terms, consists of "opposing tension like that of the bow and the lyre."[33] The necessary tension is created in Pater by a variety of contending forces, such as forces between inner and outer worlds, past and present; between selves and ideas, all of which are in flux. These forces meet and part ceaselessly and generate tension, energy, and harmony in

the mind that perceives the meetings and partings. The moment of apprehension or insight in time is a one-sided stasis which needs both balancing and revitalizing by other forces and other tendencies. The process that regulates the rhythm of change in history and personality perfects the balance. For instance, pre-Socratic centrifugal tendencies propelled Doric centripetal tendencies into Plato, as their sensual life was harnessed by philosophical ideals in Plato. As variously illustrated in Plato and Platonism, a particular culture or a work may be characterized as one of the polarized tendencies dominating the other until the next phase of change ripens. In Ionian art, the freest actions in restless versatility bear in time the Dorian aspiration for "what is earnest and dignified" (GS, 253). The triumph of Greek archetecture in Dorian style is likewise seen as the change-over from the religion of Hephaestus, husband of Aphrodite, to the religion of Apollo, the spiritual form of the "inward harmony and system of human personality" (GS, 256).

From the perspective of Heraclitean flux, "that which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony."[34] The very decay of the body, for instance, as such a source of beauty, may assert the fecundity of physical existence.

The most sensuous experience of a work is but an intimation of genuinely human spirit, something finer and richer than the experience of the senses. The strange and poignantly conveyed pathos in The Renaissance and Greek Studies comes from the technique of juxtaposition which reflects this Heraclitean belief in polarized unity of opposites. Life and death, and all other contrary forces and ambiguities operate here to convey the vibrant and complex harmony. The deeply probed juxtaposition of Dionysus and Demeter, like Leonardo's paintings, revives the myths of gods and men on the same sensuous plane, and reveals the conflicting condition of flesh and spirit, decay and resurrection, despair and hope.

> the goddess of summer and the goddess of death, Kore and Persephone, are identified with much significance; and that strange, dual being makes her first appearance, whose latent capabilities the poets afterwards developed; among the rest, a peculiar blending of those two contrasted aspects, full of purpose for the duly chastened intelligence; death, resurrection, rejuvenescence.
>
> (GS, 95)

And the "strange ineffable woe" of Euripides' Bacchanals (The Bacchae) expresses this harmony in the apprehension of the tragic strife inherent in man's condition.

> Dionysus Omophagus - the eater of raw flesh, must be added to the golden image of Dionysus Meilichius - the honey-sweet, if the old tradition in its completeness is to be...our closing impression; if we are to catch, in its fullness, that deep undercurrent of horror which runs below, all through this masque of spring, and realise the spectacle of that wild chase, in which Dionysus is ultimately both the hunter and the spoil.
>
> (GS, 78-79)

These conflicting forces in the external world may be seen as opposing tension or harmony only when they are apprehended as such. The subjectivity of knowledge is furthermore governed by the particular mind's aesthetic desire. "When you have listened," says the oracular Heraclitus, "not to me but the Law, it is wise to agree that all things are one."[35] But the Law (Logos), which exists independently of Heraclitus and "you," has to be heard by you and through you. "Ater Kant's criticism of the mind," writes Pater, "its pretentions to pass beyond the limits of individual experience seemed as dead as those of old French royalty" (MS, 11). Kant, after the recognition of the subjectivity of the qualities of sense by Galileo, Descartes, and Hobbes, presented the view that not only the qualities revealed by the sense but spatial and temporal characteristics are also only forms of our perception. Thus a modern scientist recognizes time as "the primitve form of the stream of consciousness."

> It is a fact, however obscure and perplexing to our minds, that the contents of consciousness do not present themselves simply as being (such as conceptions, number, etc.) but as <u>being now</u> fulfilling the form of the enduring present with a varying content. So that one does not say this <u>is</u> but this <u>is now,</u> yet now no more.[36]

This "form of the enduring present" has an aesthetic status; this may become the exhilerating moment of pure comprehension, or perception rooted in the carnal self in

change. To post-Kantians, metaphoric syntheses such as the metaphorized abstract thoughts we find in Pater make better sense than the metaphysical solutions or analyses which tend to expire before reaching our mind as experience. Metaphysical thinking, which cannot be proven to our sense, isolates man from his world, while metaphoric thinking brings man closer to the world of his own body in its native soil. Pater avoids system building or mere abstract thinking, because the intellectual content that is to fill the enduring present must serve the mind "to feel itself alive" (R, 229). Thus the Paterian question: "How shall we pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy?" (R, 236)

How do vital forces unite? Conrad's "rescued fragment before all eyes in the light of a sincere mood" sums up the Paterian moment in which an idea (from the past) is revived by a kindred spirit bringing in diverse forces and creating, with them, a new perspective, a new reality.[33]

> Perspective...and a step may be made, upon which again, the whole world around may change, the entire horizon and its relation to the point you stand on - a change from a half light of conjecture to the full light of indefectible certitude. That, of course, can only happen by a summary act of intuition upon the entire perspective, wherein all those partial apprehensions, which one by one may have seemed inconsistent with each other, find their due place, or (to return to the Platonic Dialogue again, to the actual process of dialectic as there exposed) by that

> final impression of a subject, a theorem, in which the mind attains a hold, as if by a single imaginative act, through all the transitions of a long conversation, upon all seemingly opposite contentions of all the various seekers at one.
>
> (PP, 181) (m.i.)

The "summary act of intuition" momentously creates an intellectual unity, incorporating human desire into history. Conceding that "what is secure in our experience is but a sharp apex of the present moment" and that the present moment is but a little point "between a past which has just ceased to and a future which may never come," Pater proceeds to make the moment yield:

> fullness of life, and insight as conducting to that fullness - energy, variety, and choice experience, including noble pain and sorrow even, loves such as those in the exquisite old story of Apuleius, sincere and strenous forms of the moral life, such as Seneca and Epictetus - whatever form of human life, in short, might be heroic, impassioned, ideal.
>
> (ME I, 151-2)

The past as mere memory does not yield this moment, as Blake so well understood. The moment in which opposite contentions unite is when the shaping spirit (Blake's imagination) reorganizes past experience into realized consciousness. In Shelley's words, the principle of synthesis has for its objects "those forms which are common to universal nature and existence itself." This fullness of comprehension makes the phenomenal world into an ideational space, free of definite history or dogmatic interpretations of history, like Greek metaphysics,

which incorporates both aesthetics and history.

Pater's quiet projection of the intense physicality of the aesthetic moment was as esoteric and threatening to the Victorians as gnostics and Cathars were to the churchmen of their times, largely because Pater was misunderstood as putting forward a hedonistic dogma in place of a defunct religion. But his search for the source of beauty (where the forces unite) in the sensuous is ultimately for the purpose of a redefinition of the synthesizing mind.

> It is the spirit that sees external circumstances as they are, its own power and tendencies as they are, and realizes the given conditions of its life, not disquieted by the desire for change, or the preference of one part in life rather than another, or passion, or opinion...Not the saint only, the artist also, and the speculative thinker, confused, jarred, disintegrated in the world, as sometimes they inevitably are, aspire for this simplicity to the last.
>
> (MS, 249)

The fullness of comprehension, inseparable from physical and visionary experience, sets the spirit and senses free from a conceptual frame. The senses stir with excitement of mind's discovery of "a purely empirical knowledge of nature and man." What is real to us is our own acts of discovery which place history itself in our inner space. Likewise abstract "truths" are meaningful through the person who is thinking: "it is not so much what he thinks as the person who is thinking, that after

all really tells" (PP, 155).

In the art of synthesis, as Pater projects it, the poet and the critic are identified.[38] With dream-like clarity, the critic Pater examines past philosophical investigations and derives a new perspective in which his writing, as both the agent of transformation and the symbol of the perenniality of the human spirit, becomes poetry. His understanding of the past is as critically austere as his prose materially opulent. The mind is, in the process, fired to the point of some metaphor or image, after which all ideas are renewed in terms of that image. In "The Bacchanals of Euripides," the rapturuous spirit of the women followers of Dionysus is related to "all nature worship," and the strange pagan religion is brought home to us then by means of common sentiments: archetypal, perennial, poetic sentiments:

> That giddy, intoxicating sense of spring - that tingling in the veins, sympathetic with the yearning life of the earth, having apparently, in all times and places, prompted some mode of wild dancing.
>
> (GS, 56)

In these women, in their worship of a strange and romantic god, Pater seizes an organizing image with which he illustrates the idea of the senses touching thought. Here the idea as experience obliterates chronological time and offers an aesthetic space.

> Those who experience most directly the influence of things which touch through the sense - the presence of night, the expectation of morning, the nearness of wild, unsophisticated, natural things - the echoes, the coolness, the noise of frightened creatures as they climbed through the darkness, the sunrise seen from the hill-tops, the illusion, the bitterness of satiety, the deep slumber which comes with the morning.
>
> (GS, 57)

In this passage, finite time, as well as the finite verb, is eliminated; "the influence of things which touch through the senses" that creates that peculiar mood also allows the fullness of comprehension. Note that things are of primordial nature: night, darkness, fear, bitterness, and satiety, juxtaposed with morning, sunrise, hilltops, and slumber. In the Renaissance, it was, Pater says, through "the care for physical beauty, the worship of the body, that the breaking down of those limits which the religious system of the middle age imposed on the heart and imagination" was possible (R, xii). The critic, after discerning the opposing forces at work, reshapes the human spirit that renews itself in its full awareness of the forces in flux.

Pater's poetic synthesis has a strong Epicurean component; he works with the idea that all we can know is what we see. This seeing is for Epicurus and Pater not the function of sense alone but of soul. Or in Blake's words, it means seeing through the eye as opposed to seeing with the eye. As a contemporary of Pater noted,

Pater's philosophy accepts "objects as relative, experience as everything, the Absolute as a dream - life as a flux, and consciousness as an incident in the encounter of forces."[38] We feel, think, and act in a constant motion of external forces and of internal powers of the body. Our senses tell us that there are real objects outside us, but the mind knows matter only through the body. "We are nothing but thought, but we <u>feel</u> our life to its very center" (EG, 27, m.i.)[39] As Whitman says: "I too had been struck from the float forever held in solution,/ I too had received identity by my body,/ That I was I knew was my body, and what I should be I knew I should be of my body."[40] The biological action of the body is necessary and useful, but the soul on which bodily actions are registered needs its own fulfillment in action.[41] Speaking of Ronsard, Gaston reflects this Epicurean stance.

> It took possession of the lily in one's hand, and projecting it into a visionary distance, shed upon the body of the flower the soul of its beauty. Things were become at once more deeply sensuous and more deeply ideal.
> (GD, 54)

And again in the same guise,

> The worship of physical beauty a religion, the proper faculty of which would be the bodily eye! Looked at in this way, some of the well-marked characteristics of the poetry of the Pleiad assumed a hieratic, almost an ecclesiastical air.
> (GD, 70-71)

The Epicurean stage in which Marius begins his spiritual journey and Gaston ends his, we must remember, is also dialectical and cyclical meetings of forces; that is, the Epicurean element is never abandoned in Pater's effort to understand man and nature. A brush with death, a pivotal occurrence in both narratives, directs the course of their lives in opposite ways. Marius' experience of a mass of stone, "rushing down through the stillness" touch "upon his heel" alters his Epicurean commitment toward greater asceticism (ME I, 165-6), whereas Gaston's experience "under a shower of massy stones" of a collapsing church moves him out of his clerical vows and toward a more conscious balance in his perception of the real (GD, 46). Their intellectual journey is, in the end, toward a finer balance of the spirit and the senses, whether it is Marius' Epicurean commitment leaning toward spiritual asceticism, or Gaston's religious "vows and tonsures" turning toward the liberty of heart and imagination. In both, spiritual discontent acts as the dialectical force toward a broader synthesis. A new balance in the lives of Marius and Gaston is attained as the flux continually modulates their past. As Ronsard's poetry offers to Gaston a spiritual renewal through the sense, Apuleius' Golden Ass offers Marius an Epicurean conceptualization of passion

and sorrow. And the relativism of Lucrian to Marius is the skepticism of Montaigne to Gaston. Pater has Marius recreate the Cupid and Psyche story and Gaston and Colombe reenact the Zeus-Semele myth, and so on. These parallel structures are designed to illustrate the process and means of harmonizing opposing forces, as well as bridging successive and provisional possibilities for a new order. The inner world of man, as Pater shows through Marius and Gaston, consists of ideas, selected and sifted from history by the biological constitution of man and his evolving consciousness.

Marius best illustrates this process of synthesis that Pater projects in his criticism. Marius' consciousness in its early phase, as represented by his reading of Apuleius' story of Cupid and Psyche, undergoes a change with his actual experience of Flavian's death. After the death of Flavian, Marius enteres into a year of rigorous intellectual endeavor to test his personal ground for Epicurean materialism and moves toward "healthfully sensuous wisdom" and returns to experience, concrete impressions that free him from mere ideas. "Not pleasure, but a general completeness of life, was the practical ideal to which this anti-metaphysical metaphysic really pointed" (ME I, 142). His insight gained through personal observations and meditations on cultural changes

echoes Pater's own romantic spirit:

> Life as the end of life..., refining all the instruments of inward and outward intuition, of developing all their capacities, of testing and exercising one's self in them, till one's whole nature becomes one complex medium of reception, towards the vision - the 'beatific vision', if we really cared to make it such - of our actual experience in the world.
>
> (ME I, 143)

In such readiness for experience and observation, Marius meets Cornelius, a figure of the future Middle Ages in bloom (contrasted with the depleted splendor of Rome), who is also a pagan perfection transformed into medieval chivalry. Cornelius is one imaginative force to which Marius is attracted. But he also observes with intellectual curiosity Lucius Verus who belongs to the other side of the historical junction, the degenerated end of paganism which Marius also fears instinctively. Lucius marries the Emperor Aurelius' daughter and celebrates the "Deity of Slaughter" by piercing the bellies with their foals to spill out the babies. Among the spectators, Marius observes the refined but unhappy figure of Marcus Aurelius; his detachment, refinement and scholarly rectitude are those of Marius, but Marius is critical of the emperor's Stoic and hardened view of life that is contemptuous of life's pleasure and warmth, that merely avoids the evil of death. The ascetic element Pater incorporates in Marius' consciousness through this contact begins an important strand of thought, however,

that continues through Christian mysticism in the Middle Ages to Puritan forms of our time, but Pater, like Marius, rejects the Aurelian version of Stoicism because of its indifference to the sensible world and its contempt for the body. The emperor's refusal to admit the world of the senses into his thought attests that his soul is fixed in ideas and theories of man rather than the spirit of change creating new conceptions of man or clearer understanding. It also makes him cruel in effect by tolerating the games. Still Marius, like Aurelius, seeks a vision of the future based on human intelligence and self-reliance.

The values contained in such ideas as Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Christianity, become the content of Marius' consciousness, that "enduring present" with which we are concerned. The content of this present may seem to "swarm like bees" because it is alive, but it has its own order. The ideas or system of thought, once critically apprehended by Marius, are not cast off like snake skins either. Marius in his final hours remains an Epicurean, though in its content his Epicureanism has been harmonized by Stoic ideals. Unlike Lucius Verus, Marcus Aurelius, or even Cornelius, who succumb to and live by the ideas and beliefs of a school, Marius distills the spirit of man from the ideas

of contemplation and renewal. If the other characters in Marius represent the diverse and shifting centers of Western intellectual history, Marius unites them. To cite William Buckler again, "Pater's purpose is to create a unity, a perenniality, out of the value-quest of Western man."[42] Marius projects a perenniality of the spirit, through "whatever form of human life" that might be "heroic, impassioned, ideal." His synthesis of Epicureanism and Stoicism means a "new Cyrenaicism... which might properly be regarded as in great degree coincident with the main principle of the Stoics themselves, and an older version of the precept 'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might,' a doctrine so widely acceptable among the nobler spirits of that time" (ME I, 150-1).

By the same token, it is not whether Marius or Pater can commit himself to Christianity that matters in reading Marius, but how he apprehends it and, through it, sees the historical development of the human spirit, that possibility visible in things but not yet conceptualized. He sees in the inner history of Christianity its vindication as a stage of this possibility; in other words, he sees it in the spirit of relativism. Marius' death and his unconscious acceptance of the Christian rite symbolize just that precise vindication of truth:

Christianity as a stage in the progression of human mind. We may call Marius Christian or Pater Hegelian only if we may ignore the important structural component of this relative spirit. Pater subjects all ideas and systems of ideas to the same kind of historical and critical scrutiny, with a larger conceptual possibility in mind. Appropriating a concept, first historically and then critically, is seeing the continuity of the spirit. The immediacy of the word or the thing is of the moment, and the gap between words and the thing (their difference, imperfection, and conflict) is the motive for the desire of perfection. Words and things need each other and make each other's history in the mind of the seer.

Pater's understanding of synthesis is, as I have tried to show, a transfiguring process in which his concept of man's spirit gets translated into living forms. It assumes the creative element, "the matter and loyalty to an intellectual movement," that moves the world in a purposive direction of the perceiver. Karl Popper describes the same emergence of the human spirit in consciousness in his Objective Knowledge.[43] By placing his ideal of aesthetic perception within objective knowledge and, at the same time, freeing it both from determinism and theistic metaphysics, Pater is able to conceive man in the atmosphere of the material beauties of the world,

intimately bound up with death and decay. His conception of man is unencumbered by the dogmas of the past, though they are the very subject and material for his art:

> That movement in which...the human mind wins for itself a new kindgom of feeling, sensation and thought, not opposed to but only beyond and independent of the spiritual system then actually realized.
> (R, 7)

Pater clearly goes beyond the associationist or Romantically ingrown view of the enclosed consciousness, though he recognizes such a possibility: "Every one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world"(R, 235). His firm hold on the physical world, which is undeniably beautiful, and his sense of continuity without theological implications give us a fresh view of art and life. Psychological associationism lacks, as Coleridge had pointed out, artistic purpose, the purpose of expression which is the supreme function of perception, the meaning giving function. Pater expands this function to unite the various chords of experience and feelings into the "common and general ground of humanity." Whether it is Shakespeare's conception of "Beat not the bones of the buried; when he breathed he was a man" or Browne's "awe stricken sympathy with those whose bones live at the mercies of the living," the ground for Pater's notions of artistic

autonomy and universality in his conception of humanity. In literary space/time that exists beyond the confines of history, the primitive sentiments of man are the aesthetic building blocks. These sentiments are reaffirmed when the mind holds the external reality (idea,myth, or event) in concrete terms. Through an organizing metaphor, as we saw in Pater's prose, an idea lives in the motion of feelings. The fresh import of reality is never fixed until the given metaphor again interplays with the inward hold of a reader. This means that within a given expression is contained a new aesthetic conception which is to be born. The universe, in other words, does not pulsate with life as in Carlyle's world; man must make it pulsate with his own spirit. With this constant awareness; "Men are what they are and are not wholly at the mercy of formal conclusions from their limited premises," (AP, 65) Pater chooses the continuous discourse with himself, which is "co-extensive with life itself" (PP, 185). This discourse charts the course of knowledge as self-discovery:

> It was to the lover dealing with physical beauty, a thing seen, yet unseen - seen by all in some sense, and yet, truly, by one and not by another, as if through some capricious, personal self-discovery, by some law of affinity between the seen and what is seen, the knowing and the known - that the nature and function of idea, as such, would come home most clearly.
>
> (PP, 170) (m.i.)

Notes

III

[1]/Richard Dawkins, having come up with the notion of 'meme', patterned after gene, as a self-replicating entity, still finds it necessary to fill the need for freedom. His meme, "which is capable of being transmitted from one brain to another," may explain in part the theoretical mechanism involved in cultural evolution of man but not the reality of evolution as we sense it, which calls for "man's capacity for conscious foresight." His idea-memes then do not simply replicate themselves, as the theory dictates, but must "simulate the future in imagination."/ The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University Press,1976), p. 206.

Dawkins is not, of course, alone in pointing out the analogy between cultural and genetic evolution. Increasingly more and more scientists and philosophers are using biological concepts as metaphors for conceptualizing phenomena. Karl Popper, "The Rationality of Scientific Revolution," Problems of Scientific Revolution, ed. R. Harre (Oxford: Calrendon Press, 1974), p. 322.

F. T. Cloak, "Is a Cultural Ethology Possible?" Human Ecology, 3, 161-82.

[2]Michael Levey, The Case of Walter Pater (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1978), p. 66.

[3]Ibid, p. 144.

The incomprehension and suspicion about Pater and his work continue in unnecessary mystery. In a recent article, "UnEnglish and Unmanly: Anglo-Catholicism and Homosexuality," David Hillard mentions how Pater frequented St. Austin's Priory and enjoyed "its colorful ritual without believing yet in Christianity." "Most of those connected with the St. Austin's Priory were rich men who enjoyed comfortable life, and there was 'very little of normal religious community about its spirit or observances'." Victorian Studies, 25:2 (Winter 1982), pp. 181-210.

[4]Walter Jackson Bate, From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth Century England (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 137.

[5]Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change (Los Altos: Hermes Publ., 1954), p. 181.

[6]John Keats, Complete Poems and Selected Letters, ed. C. D. Thorpe (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Co., 1935), p. 552.

[7]Bate, p. 182.

[8]"Aristotle's Theory of Metaphor," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 15: 1 (Winter, 1982), pp. 37-38.

See also Shelly's "Defense of Poetry", Shelley's Poetry and Prose, ed. Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers (New York: Norton Co., 1977), p. 482.

[9]"Can Rhetoric Provide a New Basis for Philosophyzing? The Humanist Tradition," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 11: 1 & 2 (Winter, 1978), p. 81.

[10]Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man (New York: Frederich Ungar Publ., 1980), p. 31.

[11]"The Place of Pater," The Ringers in the Tower (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 191.

[12]Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: Basic Books), p. 10.

[13]Essays, Lectures, and Poems of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. R. E. Spiller (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p. 5.

[14]Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1975), p. 6.

And it is metaphor that establishes fresh relations. "Metaphor presents itself as a strategy of discourse that, while preserving and developing the creative power of language, preserves and develops the heuristic power wielded by fiction."

[15]Permanence and Change (Los Altos: Hermes Publications, 1954), p. 53.

[16]Donald L. Hill, Walter Pater: The Renaissance, Edited with Textual and Explanatory Notes (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1980), p. 295.

[17]A History of English Prose Rhythm (London: Macmillan, 1912), p. 427.

[18]J. H. C. Newman, University Sketches, ed. George Sampson (London, 1902), p. 24

[19]Ibid.

[20]Confessions of a Young Man (New York: Brentano's 1920), p. v.

[21]Herman Weyl, Space, Time & Matter (New York: Dover Publ., 1922), p. 4

[22]"By the rule, again of beauty, which is a first requirement of art, a poetic creation must exhibit at once unity and plurality." Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, translated with critical notes by S. H. Butcher (New York: Dover Publ., 1951), p. 185.

[23]Pater's "imaginative reason" synthesizes sense and intellect. Its link to Arnold and Kant is traced by Hill and D'Hangest respectively. See Hill, p. 386.

[24]For Pater, form designates the fixed outline or type which belongs to the objective centripetal world, whereas matter is the fluid or individual ingredient belonging to the subjective centrifugal realm. See Gerald Corneilius Monsman, Pater's Portraits: Mythic Pattern in the Fiction of Walter Pater (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1967), p. 10. "So (i.) form means outline, shape, general rule, e.g. for putting together a sentence, or an argument; or it means the metre in poetry, or the type of poem, sonnet or what not. In all these it is something superficial, general, diagrammatic. We speak of empty form, mere form, formal politeness; it is opposed to the heart and soul of anything, to what is essential, material, and so forth. But (ii.) when you push home your insight into the order and connection of parts, not leaving out the

way in which this affects the parts themselves; then you find that the form becomes (as a lawyer would say) 'very material'; not merely outlines and shapes, but all the sets of gradations and variations and connections that make anything what it is - the life, soul, and movement of the object." As quoted by Bernard Bosanquet in Three Lectures On Aesthetic (London, 1915), pp. 15-16.

[25]"Starting from Paumanok," Leaves of Grass and Selected Prose.

[26]A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, John Kouwenhoven, ed. (N.Y.: Modern Library, 1960), p. 15; 1962, p. 485.

[27]The Complete Tales and Poems by Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Harvey Allen (New York: Modern Library, 1938), p. 656.

[28]Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 430.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Blake: Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966), p. 75 and p. 475.

[31]The tradition that sees the origin of human society in poetry and metaphoric thought is as old as the rhetorical tradition. Vico and Shelley were restating what was said hundreds of years earlier by Cicero and other rhetoricians. See Grassi, p. 7.

Gianbattista Vico, The New Science, tr. T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch (New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 71-86.

Shelley's Poetry and Prose, ed. D. H. Reiman and S. B. Powers (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 482.

[32]John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (New York: Meridian Books, 1930), pp. 143-147.

[33]The Victorian Imagination (New York & London: New York Univ. Press, 1980), 163.

[34]Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), p. 25.

[35]Ibid, p. 28.

[36]Lucacs says that the Greek history of art, "metaphysico-genetic aesthetic" and "their cultural development a philosophy of history." The Theory of the Novel, tr. Anna Bostock (Cambridge: MIT Press, 19 p. 35.

[37]Sidney Colvin, Pall Mall Gazette (March 1, 1873), p. 12 as quoted by Hill, p. 292.

[38]Richard Crinkly writes: "For the synthesizing relativist, the common bases of any two ideas are more important than the distinctions;...at least for Pater the emphasis is on compatibility, not contrariety." See Walter Pater: Humanist (Kentucky: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1970), p. 41. The statement is misleading because in perceiving the dynamics of living form, Pater reflects Coleridgean polarity and Blakean Contrariety.

[39]Pater quotes it from Amiel's "Journal Intime," as translated by Mrs. Humphrey Ward.

[40]"Crossing Brooklyn Ferry," Whitman/Kouwenhoven, p. 130.

[41]David Konstan, Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology (Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 72.

[42]"Marius the Epicurean: Beyond Victorianism," Victorian Poetry, 16: 1 & 2 (Spring/Summer, 1978), p. 165.

[43]Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford, 1979), p. 72.

Chapter IV

Aesthetic Morality

1. Soul as Moral Agent

> Literary art, that is like all art which is in any way imitative or reproductive of fact - form, or colour, or incident - is the representation of such fact as connected with soul, of a specific personality, its preferences, its volition and power. (AP 6-7) (m.i.)

Soul, as Pater understands it, chooses, wills,and moves. But for what does it choose, will, and move? Truth, says Pater, is after all "one indispensable beauty" in all literature from the highest to the lowliest. It is for truth, truth to bare fact in the lowliest literature, and truth to "some personal sense of fact, diverted somewhat from men's ordinary sense of it," in the highest. In proportion to how closely the writer can represent his own unique sense of fact, according to this view, his success as an artist can be estimated; for his work to be "fine art" or good art, there must be truth, truth to his own sense of fact (AP, 32). Pater, like Keats, bases his assertion of beauty as truth on sense experience, and not on a priori ideas regulating sense experience. Truth to one's own sense of fact entails both a human subjectivity and an external world; thus Pater's subjectivity implies aesthetic and moral freedom, on the one hand, and the limit of human knowledge, on the other. He begins

from the subjective, which has its Cartesian doubt as well as Epicurean perception, in addition to the Coleridgean initiative, discussed in Chapter I. My soul intuits, therefore I am, Pater seems to say.

The soul intuits facts, but facts unconnected with soul remain outside the aesthetic and moral domain. Man intuits (thinks and feels) facts of his environment, and this ability alone gives him knowledge, integrity, and pleasure. The presence of soul also modifies the environment; it chooses or rejects, apprehends or doubts, toward finer sense of fact. This is the aesthetic process of knowing the self in the world. "Is it not, streaming forth, the concord of his art/That carries back the world into his heart?"[2] The "concord" of art, or aesthetic perception, evolves with "perfecting vision." Pater's "perfection," unlike Descartes', is not a fixed idea that first exists and allows us to discern the imperfect from the perfect; it is rather an evolving idea that guides soul in its aesthetic choice.[3] The moral truth of beauty in Pater depends on the notion of soul moving toward perfection which gives the greatest pleasure in life.[4] To illustrate this, I shall examine, in this last chapter, soul as moral agent, its rhetorical act toward perfection, and some implications of living in the spirit of art.

The privileged place of soul in Pater's notion of aesthetic perception reveals once more his Romantic heritage. Here he is not so much a philosophical descendant of Plato as a late Romantic who de-idealizes the imagination. The imaginative faculty of soul chooses and apprehends reality through immediate and sympathetic contact. He has given this faculty cognitive powers of both Keats's "Soul-making" and Coleridge's "initiative," bending them further toward a natural perspective. The proper action of mind and Heart on each other is, as Keats says, "forming the Soul or Intelligence destined to possess the sense of identity."[5] In this act, powers stir and influence the self as well as others. It is soul which makes "an immediate sympathetic contact" possible, be it between subject and object or writer and reader. Some "inexplicable inspiration" beyond the discerned structure of a work, says Pater, opens a "privileged pathway from one to another." The path is initiated by a personal and sympathetic contact. Thus Botticelli with his most sincere and surest touch and without "any moral ambition" was able to create man's "mixed and uncertain condition." "His morality is all sympathy; and it is this sympathy, conveying into his work somewhat more than is usual of the true complexion of humanity, which makes him visionary as he is, so forcible

a realist" (R, 43-44). In Botticelli, color is a spirit or soul upon natural things "by which they become expressive to the spirit" (R, 45). Soul in its expressive phase becomes a more powerful and direct "inlet," in the case of Botticelli, into the Greek temper than "the works of the Greeks themselves, even of the finest period" (R, 45). This is why the quality of soul is best appreciated by those to whom real meaning exists only as "operative in a given person" (AP, 24). Soul in a particular person makes aesthetic and moral choice: not merely rational or intellectual but personal and sympathetic choice. "Mind we cannot choose but approve where we recognize it; soul may repel us, not because we misunderstand it" (AP, 22). Soul may be aesthetically and morally monstrous or incongruous in its choice. That is why "soul is a fact" in the question of style. For it secures color, vague but persuasive and infinite as "the influence of a living person," whereas mind secures forms (AP, 23-24).

Pater gives design, form, and finiteness to mind, and atmosphere, beauty and infiniteness to soul. But how does he separate soul from mind? The necessity of mind in soul's activities is obvious as the soul is endowed with vital cognitive powers. It becomes clearer that their link is more than an abstraction when Pater speaks of music.

For music is most manifestly formal (an attribute of mind) and yet soul's sympathetic contact is immediate and irresistible. "All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music."[6] Pater takes that aspect of music in which the form and the subject matter are inseparable to be the condition of the ideal for all art. In view of this ideal, the struggle in literature is first to find "the absolute correspondence of the term to its import" (AP, 35). Or the constant effort is to obliterate the distinction between the matter and the form. Pater agrees with Du Bellay, who says: "Languages are born like plants and trees, some naturally feeble and sickly, others healthy and strong and apt to bear the weight of men's conceptions, but all their virtue is generated in the world of choice and men's free will concerning them" (R, 161-2, m.i.). The subject matter of a poem (its incidents or situation) is worthless when separated from the handling of it or the form (R, 106). The balancing act is necessary because the term, and its import co-evolve with consciousness and knowledge and they, both in flux, come together only in the moment of apprehension. This is when one sees without superfluities which are "in very truth the superfluities of naughtiness, such as annihilate music" (P & P, 206-7). In music, the moment of such fusion may occur in succession. Without

destroying the balance between sense and form, the privileged moment may be sustained in a series of repeated moments. Life may itself be conceived this way "as a sort of listening to music...to the sound of water, to time as it flies" (R, 119). This is deemed possible by living in the spirit of art, which I will deal with in the last section of this chapter. Such a life, too, is related to the moment of apprehension in which soul chooses truth. It is not devoid of connection with facts of one's environment, as we shall see a little later in the chapter. In any case, in the repetitive time of music, the formal structure and soul unite with singular force. This is probably one of the reasons why music has the most powerful influence on us, as Plato recognized and even feared. Pater says that music in The Republic becomes the very substance of life to promote and inform Platonic ideals by making it float into the houses of Greece (P & P, 57, 200-1). Music as a formal development of Pythagorian number represents the external world and is knowable by affinity, as "the personal intelligible soul" being "durably resident there" (P & P, 52). Soul's empathy with a person or a work occurs in the like manner as mind discerns its form; thus, soul shows dialectical dependency on mind which is keen to know forms of perception. When the matter and

form are in perfect harmony, as in Greek sculptures, soul presumably senses the genius of form, its peculiar pleasure and energy by immediate and sympathetic knowledge. "Mind and soul: - hard to ascertain philosophically," says Pater, "the distinction is real enough practically, for they often interfere, are sometimes in conflict, with each other" (AP, 22).

If aesthetics may be conceived as a concern with formal or spatial perceptions of beauty, ethics may be its temporal counterpart. Though motion toward perfection is evident in both, moral perfection entails an idea of beauty in the natural setting of ceaseless flux, whereas aesthetic perfection is perceived to be timeless or to be in a different time, as in musical time. Aesthetic beauty is spatial because we perceive it to be a complex unity of experience of parts and their relations. (For this, let us ignore briefly the time involved in preparing for such moments of apprehension. That time is of course the crux of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics.) Moral beauty, on the other hand, involves a temporal being or his evolving consciousness. It is as though in the sphere of morality, all is preparation. "Ripeness is all." In this sense, soul seems to contain both a Kantian and a Darwinian component; it is both the essence of humanity with its moral imperative and the

evolving consciousness of the self and its environment. It is important to note here that Pater is quite often more concerned with moral beauty than with aesthetic beauty, in that to him contemplation (preparation for visionary experience) is an end in itself. His aesthetic criticism is therefore the temporal, that is, moral act that prepares or cultivates consciousness.

What is then the Kantian component of Pater's "soul" that cultivates our consciousness? Kant's"good will" is aesthetic in Pater's sense of the word. It is internally always good and even when it is externally bad, when it triggers an event which is incompatible with ultimate good, it is not culpable because it has chosen and willed in an aesthetically and morally commendable way.[7] For Kant, the act itself is not the subject of moral judgment; only the maxim, "the subjective principle of volition," may be judged morally. "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by the will a universal Law of Nature."[8] This holds also true in Pater's aesthetic morality. The primacy of subjectivity in Pater dictates that man's perception cannot surpass his humanity and that his subjective freedom of perception means freedom for all men. Thus when he chooses for himself in the spirit of art, he chooses for the spirit of humanity. And his choice, like the carrier of a

particular gene, perpetuates the spirit of humanity in the manner of Darwinian selection and evolution. "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."[9] Within this Kantian injunction, Pater equates humanity with art. Art thus becomes the essence of moral being. Art, as man, is an end in itself. In a matter of fact way, Pater deals with "the accomplished forms of human life" as he does with works of art: "The objects with which aesthetic criticism deals - music, poetry, artistic and accomplished forms of human life - are indeed receptables of so many powers of forces;" (R, xix) "What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented in life or in a book, to me?" (R, xix-xx) A work of art, like a person, is a subject with its absolute and ultimate worth. If we ignore this value of a unique subject, we become uncritical, unappreciative, and guilty of the most profound of all moral imperfection. As Kant's "good will" need reason's guidance, Pater's "art" depends on soul's peculiar cognitive powers. Reason in Kant is already a moral term, a power with which man happens to be endowed.[10] Pater, in place of reason, sees the complex process of cognition in terms of unifying patterns of personality. Thus the continual striving to become perfectly rational, which

Kant sees as the moral life, is continued in Pater but only in spirit. Pater suggests in its place aesthetic striving for finer perception. For he envisions a unity of self with his environment in this aesthetic effort. He envisions a form of self-reconcilement, "that flawless serenity, better than the most pleasurable excitement" (ME, 63). This is then Pater's moral end in the world of flux.

Such a moral end (or will) has, as I have tried to argue an aesthetic (and epistemological) ground: "Might the will itself be an organ of knowledge, of vision?" (ME, 65) In the crucial chapter in Marius the Epicurean entitled "The Will as Vision," the hero appeals to "the powers, whatever they might be," and fulfills "a definitely ascertained measure of his moral and intellectual need." The privileged moment comes, in which he apprehends the Great Ideal, those "divinations of a living and companionable spirit at work in all things" (ME II, 69). In this "peculiar and privileged hour," the self is united with nature. When "his bodily frame, as he could recognize, although just then, in the whole sum of its capacities so entirely possessed by him - Nay! actually his very self - was yet determined by a far reaching system of material forces external to it." Marius

continues to wonder if the intellectual frame, which is even more intimately himself than his body, is also, as a single process of those material forces, external to the self (ME II, 69). In this material unity he apprehends the Great Ideal as an "abiding place."

What does this aesthetic vision have to do with moral effort? For one thing, the soul has been ceaselessly at work toward perfection. For another,moral knowledge is aesthetic; this is the domain of soul that chooses, wills, and moves toward perfection.

2. The Morality of Rhetoric

"By aesthetic," writes Gregory Bateson, "I mean responsive to the pattern which connects." An aesthetic question to him is: "How are you related to this creature? What pattern connects you to it?"[11] Pater urges us to begin our aesthetic criticism with such a question, for he envisions a unity in life through relations one perceives. "What is this song or picture, this engaging personality in life or in a book, to me? What effect does it produce on me? Does it give me pleasure? How is my nature modified by its presence, under its influence?" R, xx) In the Paterian world, such questions are not merely "aesthetic" but they are inseparable from his noticns of appreciation and expression and knowing. The self must see connections and realize them for himself,

or they do not exist at all. That self thus alternately limits and expands the context for knowing, appreciating, and expressing. The processes of knowing, thinking, and deciding (epistemology) as well as loving the processes (appreciation) and inspiring others to continue these processes (expression) take place in the context defined and classified by the self, or more precisely by the soul that desires perfection. Are recognition and sympathy good in themselves? Pater seems to think so, as they are at the very root of what is to be alive and as they have the power to move toward greater unity with one's environment. Seeing things as they truly are, rather than acting for great causes or for some moral ambition, is necessary for the aesthetic critic or artist for his "most sincere and surest work." Botticelli, noted earlier, is such an artist whose morality is "all sympathy;" his ability to observe "the real" makes his expression sympathetic to others. His "informing expression of passing light" is the self's unique interaction with the world. The self, the consciousness that evolves, becomes both aesthetic and moral as its activities involve knowledge, love of beauty (order), and sympathy. It sees greater unity in things, and strives to see it as it truly in itself is. This consciousness, which is both formal and temporal,

"weighs, listens, penetrates" for "an intimate expression of natural things"; it is a "fact in mental history" (AP, 41), revealed in many different forms. Formal relations give "the sights and sounds of the natural world" a moral turn (AP, 43). Wordsworth's sense of anima mundi, says Pater, appears to the poet "like the sign of macrocosm to Faust in his cell"; he sees the "network of man and nature pervaded by a common universal life" (AP, 55). The necessary unity of mind and nature which Pater sought is not only scientific in its independence but also moral in its love and sympathy for the other (be it nature or other minds). The unity is invisible without them. Raising aesthetic questions is good because it is designed to see the relational unity, to enhance our appreciation, to generate expressions of sympathy: in short, to continue the spirit of man in finer appreciation of the world.

The notion of spiritual evolution is bound up, I have insisted, with moral life. The spatial perception of beauty becomes the temporal perception of good in the context of the evolution of human spirit. Shelley's statement, "All things exist as they are perceived: at least in relation to the percipient," does not just point to the empirical and aesthetic component of knowledge but also to the ground of moral perception. Pater, like Shelley, expounds that the mind of the poet contributes to knowledge; the poetic act creates elements of knowledge;

the poetic act creates elements of knowledge by apprehending the relationships of things hitherto unseen. Pater brings out more clearly the moral perspective by stressing that poetic apprehensions depend on what has already been known to the mind. Poetry "awakens and enlarges the mind itself by rendering it the receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of thought.[12] Poetry thus determines the path of spiritual evolution. Shelley's "Defense" clearly anticipates Pater's aesthetic morality. Poetic apprehension precedes scientific knowledge, both Shelley and Coleridge believed, although Shelley seems to claim more than Coleridge, to whom initiative, or intuitive understanding precedes analysis. Shelley writes: "Ethical science arranges the elements which poetry has created, and propounds schemes and examples of civil and domestic life."[13] Poetry acts to produce the moral improvement of man in the sense that it does the epistemological path-finding; it is the reformer of society, rejuvenator of life, and redeemer of the decay inherent in life. Such claims are possible because Shelley sees poetry as the epistemological "root and blossom of all other systems of thought."[11]

Poetry is moral for three related reasons for Shelley, all of which are tacitly built into Pater's critical language. (1) Ethical systems are built with the "elements

which poetry has created." These elements are metaphorically ordered and they become in time "signs for portions and classes of thoughts" which create ethical systems. (2) The empathy necessary for being moral is not feeling for, as the Humian ethic suggests, but feeling as another (like a metaphor) which offers a possibility of self-transcendence and which awakens consciousness to the conditions of the mind's activity. Feeling as another, however, also involves sympathy. Pater, like Hume and Aristotle, for that matter, sets great store by sympathy, for man has susceptibilities to pleasure and sorrow that are induced by witnessing pleasure and pain in life and in art. Sympathy, the soul's attribute, is thus an agent for both aesthetic experience and moral growth. (3) The utility of poetry is in education, which is a natural sequence of sympathy. In an attempt to clarify the morality of poetry, Shelley distinguishes two senses of utility.

> There are two modes or degrees of pleasure, one durable, universal and permanent; the other transitory and particular. Utility may express the means of producing the former or latter. In the former sense, whatever strengthens and purifies the affections, enlarges the imagination, and adds spirit to sense is useful.../The other is/ the narrower one of banishing the importunity of the wants of our animal nature, the surrounding men with security of life, the dispersing the grosser delusions of superstition, and the conciliating such a degree of mutual forbearance among men as may consist with motives of personal advantage.[14]

The function of poetry in the first sense is an end in

itself. Pater's "art for its own sake," whose Kantian connection we have already seen, suggests more specifically Shelley's first sense of utility rather than a state devoid of utility. Adding spirit to sense is good in itself. With this "transmutation of means into ends," Pater's aesthetics becomes moral in perspective.

Shelley's concepts of knowledge, empathy, and utility give material to Pater's aesthetic morality. Pater, who avoids mere statements of his moral stance, nevertheless creates his moral context in Shelleyan terms. Our ability to move toward seeing more, as Pater urges us to do, depends on seeing the scheme of his words in this context. Here finer apprehension is justice; the percipient attends to the object and creates an atmosphere for seeing it not only accurately but lovingly and justly. Shelleyan love or sympathy, like Aristotelian pathos, complements ordering intelligence, logos. As such, love is the great secret of moral being. In "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty," sympathy is the nourishment of thought and the redeemer of life.

> Thou messenger of sympathies
> That wax and wane in lovers' eyes
> Thou - that to human thought art nourishment,
> Like darkness to a dying flame!
> Depart not as thy shadow came,
> Depart not - lest the grave should be,
> Like life and fear, a dark reality.[15]

Shelley places death, as asthetic matter, above life. It desires to be separated from "a dark reality" that life is. As discussed in Chapter II of this paper, Pater pays even greater loving attention to the grave, seeing redemptive possibilities and beauty in it. Also, Pater's sympathies are more personal, as they are direct manifestations of a particular soul. Soul personalizes knowledge into moral attitudes which reflect changing conditions. Unlike moral abstractions, the temperament (or a particular soul) is susceptible to beauty and sorrow, and has seriousness of aesthetic purpose. It is the temperament that initially grasps an idea, an event, or a person, and then withdraws to reorder it in his own privacy, in accordance with his "ideal." What use is made of the concept is partly the function of the temperament which, as discussed earlier, has his formal as well as temporal workings. How does then the temperament determine the character of moral being?

The aesthetic response of a particular temperament that desires knowledge, beauty, and sympathy is simultaneous in expression with the rhetorical act of deliberation and choice. They both have "an element of refinement, of ascension, with the promise of an endless destiny" (R, 161). The "endless destiny" implies an evolving order, rather than an ultimate destination. They develop, endlessly defining a historical area of consciousness in

language; they humanize the "real" in rhetorical or poetic acts which realize their temperaments. Aesthetic criticism focuses on this continually active inner act, rather than a morality determined at the point of action. The temperament generates an atmosphere in the consciousness, the complex and historically cumulative and selective being. This intentional movement toward finer aesthetic models implies an anchorless voyage toward perfection, for the concept of perfection itself changes as the voyager progresses, and one's imperfect vision of the real promises hope for perfection. Pater also recognizes with Winckelmann that "the beauty of art demands a higher sensibility than the beauty of nature, because the beauty of art, like tears shed at a play, gives not pain, is without life, and must be awakened and repaired by culture" (R, 153). Be that as it may, the distinction is not as important to Pater as the act of awakening. The act of awakening to the Heraclitean flux, most of all, transcends the mechanical flux of nature. The perceiver awakens to the "splendour of our experience concurrent with our sense of its awful brevity" (R, 189). With this sense of brevity, both the impetus for the movement toward unity and order is generated.

Not to Heraclitus but to his Word would we listen

and confess that all things are one.[16] Heraclitus, who cried out that nothing was stable, that Reality was not real, nevertheless, insisted on the unity of his Word. His Word is that man should wake to the world of thought and reason which is One. In Pater's still more chastened words, the Heraclitean attempt is

> to reduce that world of chaotic mutation to cosmos, to the unity of reasonable order by the search for and the notation, if there be such, of an antiphonal rhythm, or logic, which, proceeding uniformly from movement to movement, as in some intricate musical theme, might link together in one those contending, infinitely diverse impulse.
> (PP, 17-18)

Translated into Paterian terms, the force behind the Heraclitean flux that moves toward cosmos or Word is the spirit of art that balances the contending forces. Cosmos is identical with the unity of mind in the "antiphonal rhythm" of flux or nature. Heraclitean fire, like Pater's "beauty" is "in a constant state of tension, of strife, of consuming, of kindling and of going out."[17] Discovering cosmos or realizing unity in variety which satisfies one's reasonable soul "below and within apparent chaos," says Pater, is the purpose of philosophy (PP, 52). Cosmos is the reasonable soul's recognition of inexhaustible richness in change; it is not a reduction of Reality but a perpetual re-synthesis of changing forces.

Order is a key word that describes the Dorian element in the Greek soul. "Apollo, the Dorian God," writes Pater,

"was but its visible consideration"; order is superimposed on the "rough stone" as well as on the common speech of every day. The ordering moment of insight in the fine arts "conveys into material things, of the art of discipline to enforce upon the lives of men" (PP, 36). While the Ionian philosophers saw such an ordering principle in some physical element (air, water, or fire) or in some law (motion, attraction, repulsion), Plato saw it "in an eternally appointed hierarchy of genus and species..." (PP, 37). For Plato, as it was for Parmenides, thought becomes identical with Being in its austere beauty of expression. But the order Parmenides and Plato discovered as preexistent, according to Pater, exists in an empty circle. "It has been put on a quest (vain quest it may prove to be) after a kind of knowledge perhaps not properly attainable" (PP, 40). But moral knowledge refinable through rhetoric is of probable knowledge that touches human affections and the imagination. Moral truth, C. L. Johnstone says, "admits only of probable knowledge," and rhetoric, the counterpart of dialectic, deals with probabilities.[18] Now the concept of cosmos in the Greek rhetorical tradition carries, as Raymond Dilorenzo points out, three constituent orders: an order to purpose, an order among parts, and an order of appearnaces.[19] The first constituent

as Platonic Socrates saw it clearly, is liable to deception and therefore can be an impediment to moral truth. Both Socrates and Plato accordingly warned against poetic deception. The second refers to harmony or formal relations within, and the third order of appearances enchants men with its power and color. Pater saw moral possibilities in these rhetorically conceived orders because they have power that is capable of entering into consciousness and of making it grow. Growth makes its formal demands, as Bateson says.[20] And the recognition of these formal relations within and without the self is what knowledge consists of. Knowledge perfects the knower only, but in expression it does not remain alone because of its power to persuade an other. Socrates would emphasize the potential in expression to deceive, and Aristotle, for the same reason, distinguishes rhetoric from sophistry on the basis of moral purpose. But Pater, like Schiller, emphasizes the power and beauty of expression that lead to sympathy, better knowledge for the perceiver as well as the observer. Hence the moral possibility of art lies in its potential for education. While the Paterian critic believes that art, when it is least didactic, teaches best through its power of beauty and truth as probable knowledge, the Socratic teacher would concentrate

on the order to purpose, using harmonious form for the purpose of changing to the consciousness of his student. Socrates asks in the Gorgias: "Will not a good man aim for the best form and speak with a view to something?"[21] The wise teacher who wanted to awaken the sense of self, intelligence and passion for knowledge in his student used ordered speeches. He made, by these means, his student "just and temperate."

Pater, on the other hand, works initially with the order of appearances. An order of purpose and an order among parts are deemed concommitant with expression or the beauty of expression. Aesthetic appreciation implies the process of ordering appearances followed by an analysis of that order in terms of the relations of parts. And this process reflects a unity of purpose. His order of purpose is implicit in all his criticism. In the rhetorical tradition, the order of purpose remains a question of choice. Whether we conceive art as inherently moral also remains a question of choice. As Johnstone says, "Just as it was for Plato, Aristotle, Gorgias, and Isocrates, the morality of rhetoric is central to our conception of ourselves, our objectives, and our obligations as students, teachers, and practioners of art."[22] In this regard, Pater's choice is never ambiguous; he never doubted the power of aesthetic

expression, even of evil, in cultivating "just" appreciation and "proper" judgments. For the expression of a poem or a painting, unlike scientific representations of reality, closely approximates man's contact with the external world. Through perceptions and sensations, it cultivates the power of making deliberations and reasoned choice; it incorporates man's desire and appetite, not just reason, as part of the practical intellect responsible for moral choice.

> It is not always that poetry can be the exponent of morality but it is this aspect of morals which it represents most naturally, for the true justice is dependent on just those finer appreciations which poetry cultivates in us the power of making, those peculiar valuations of action and its effect which poetry actually requires.
> (AP, 191)

The "aspects of morals" referred to here depends upon the self-epiphany of seeing "how the threads in the design before him hold together under the surface," as analogous to making that "peculiar valuations of action and its effect" in the moral realm. For Pater, aesthetic and moral judgments are both grounded in the formal order, native to perception as appreciation and expression.

More specifically Pater related poetic perception to the brain-building that enables one to make a moral choice. Here is the interdependency of spatial and temporal perception.

His notion of brain-building suggests both aesthetic cultivation and moral growth. The patterns and sequences of experience are built into the consciousness that deliberates, and the deliberation creates a moral context. That is why the end of poetic perception is not necessarily a poem but a new knowledge of the self. A new awareness of moral being comes with such knowledge. For Pater, being is a process as it was for Coleridge. Moral truths are apprehended in this process, not by discovering general principles, as Socrates attempted to do, but by seeking particular truths about the probable and the contingent. When rhetoric finds its end in judgment, it converges with ethics; when aesthetics finds its final goal in education of the self, it attains a moral purpose as it did for Schiller and Pater. Accordingly both rhetorical and aesthetic striving for greater refinement of perception become the exercise of virtue. But the language of poetry as understood by Pater is more than an instrument of education. To him a poem is not merely an object with an objective structure but an aesthetic being with a coherence of a person whose consciousness remains something to be seen through. By contrast Coleridge placed greater emphasis on the

conceptual side which gets superseded as the being progresses. So he feels that the finite form, a mere framework, constructed by the human imagination, is neither real nor lasting.[23] Pater too is acutely aware of the forms that change; but beauty, wrought in the act of perceiving them, is an end in itself. Thus the proper vocation of art is "being itself the finite, ever controlling the infinite, the formless" (PP, 60). The finite form of a poem or a person is thought as incarnated in experience at the moment of perception, and beauty rooted in that experience is no mere frame. It is rather a manifestation of the aesthetic spirit in man, or man's soul, and therefore unchanging.

The aesthetic spirit cultivates moral consciousness in the same way as the brain builds a moral context in time. Thus one's moral well-being is a function of aesthetic perception that allows moral growth. With it, valid justifications for action, or rhetorical action, is possible. The organizing principle consciousness, like the technical laws of logic, is a "means of securing in each and all of its apprehensions, the unity, the strict identity with itself, of the apprehending mind" (AP, 18). The process of interpreting the ever-expanding knowledge of the world is not a mechanical process but a personal process, which is linked with rhetorical

deliberation and choice. The activity of consciousness in this sense of coordinating scientific thoughts into the identity of the rhetorical self is moral.

3. To Live in the Spirit of Art

Pater's aesthetic intellectualism, seen as a means to potential ethical action, appears at first merely novel and impractical, but his approach is as old and as realistic as Socrates' ethical intellectualism.[24] Pater chooses to intuit the present in terms of Hellenism and Renaissance humanism as he understood them. This choice is of great thematic interest, but it also suggests his metaphysical belief in spiritual evolution. His "religion" is no more than this belief in continuity. His willingness to be ordained to the priesthood of the Anglican Church (if I may digress) and his disappointment and frustration at the denial have been a subject of comments, but it is useful to recall that religion to Pater is something like the atmosphere surrounding the earth or the body, and he had no wish to stand outside it.

> Religious sentiment, consecrating affections and natural regrets of the human spirit, above all that pitiful awe and care for the perishing human clay, of which religious worship is but a corruption, has always had much to do with localities, to actual scenes and place.
>
> (AP, 48)

The Anglican Church to Pater was, in this aesthetic sense,

no more dispensable to Pater than the churchyard in Sussex was for his character Emerald Uthward (MS, 199) or the interior of the house to Florean Deleal of "The Child in the House." The biographical fact of his willingness to be ordained in the Church of England "without faith" is indirectly dealt with in his essay on Winckelmann. In this essay he illustrates for us the conflict and solution of a problem inherent in the merging of aesthetics and ethics. This is how Pater justifies Winckelmann's conversion.

> Yet at the bar of the highest criticism, perhaps, Winckelmann may be absolved. The insincerity of his religious profession was only one incident of a culture in which the moral instinct, like the religious or political, was merged in the artistic. But then the artistic interest was that, by desperate faithfulness to which Winckelmann was saved from a mediocrity, which, breaking through no bounds, moves over in a bloodless routine, and misses its one chance in the life of the spirit and in the intellect.
>
> (R, 149)

As Pater says elsewhere, the genius "ministers to culture"; it leads and does not conform to its age. Pater would be the last to advocate martyrdom. The aesthetic man must apprehend reality, whether it be an age in transition, religion or tyranny. Pater expresses the same overview of knowing as it truly is over acting in "Robert Elsmere," a review anonymously appeared in

The Guardina

> Yes! Robert Elsmere (a latitudinarian) was certainly right in ceasing to be a clergy man. But it strikes us as a blot on his philosophical pretensions that

> he should have been both so late in perceiving the difficulty, and then so sudden and trenchent in dealing with so great and complex a question. Had he possessed a perfectly philosophic or scientific temper he would have hesitated.
> (EG, 54) (m.i.)

The aesthetic temper, identified here as "perfectly philosophic and scientific," tries to see the human ideal even in imperfect institutions, rather than to break with them. Breaking from the ties of history implies, in some sense, a breaking with the human spirit, with our own sympathy. In the politics of spirit, Pater was an evolutionary, a scientific one at that; this spirit is guided by his romantic and revolutionary vision. As he praises Mrs. Ward in the same review, Pater's aesthetic choice "abounds in sympathy with people" in its "aspiration towards something better - towards a certain ideal - in refreshing sense of second thoughts everywhere" (EG, 55). "Second thoughts" here mean new knowledge, evolution of thought; "a perfectly philosophic or scientific temper" hesitates in view of his own consciousness that grows. To live in the spirit of art is, in this sense, to refrain from rash acts. But what else does he mean by it?

> To treat life in the spirit of art, is to make life a thing in which means and ends are identified: to encourage such treatment, the true moral significance of art and poetry.
> (AP, 62)

Pater's moral vision emerges clearly in his Shakespeare criticism. He has written three eassys on Shakespeare: "Measure for Measure," "Love's Labor's Lost," and "Shakespeare's English Kings." The moral of "Measure for Measure," Albert J. Farmer says in his study of Pater as a critic of English literature, rests on "the acceptance of the intricacy of the moral world, on the recognition of the difficulty of judging rightly."[25] The intricacy and the difficulty are inherent in the dialectically unfolding vision of the subject's sympathetic knowledge. "The very advantage of man's gifts of intellect or sentiment being dependent on a balance in their use so delicate that men hardly maintain it always" (AP, 186-7). The moral injunction is that the subject be an aesthetic man who does not separate what a person does from what a person is, as he mediates between circumstance and his being. Claudio's life being dependent on Angelo's will, the youth finds "his life forfeited as if by the chance of a lottery" (AP, 187), whereas the playwright can refashion the original material "with a higher motive" in his own poetic image "with a profound designed beauty" (AP, 179). The play represents fully the difficulty of knowing the circumstances of "a dangerous and tigerlike changefulness of feeling" (AP, 184) and of judging them rightly.

> Here the very intricacy and subtlety of the moral world itself, the difficulty of seizing the true relations of so complex a material, the difficulty of just judgment, of judgment that shall not be unjust, are the lessons conveyed.
> (AP, 189)

Not action but the"peculiar valuations of action," he has said, are moral or immoral (AP, 191). By "peculiar" Pater means two things: the individual temperament (soul) and the critical spirit that appropriates reality (knowledge).

Pater sees in "Measure for Measure" art as the "exponent of morality," a complete poetic vision of moral life; he sees in "Love's Labor's Lost" an aesthetic temperament that aspires in response to the "unutterable longing" that expresses itself even in that stilted mode of speaking, Eupheism, pedantry, and speech uttered in jest." "The sweet, warm-man (Hector of Troy) is dead and rotten; sweet chucks, beat not the bones of the buried; when he breathed, he was a man." Echoing the strange beauty even in death, the play is woven in the designs of an ancient tapestry, says Pater. Biron represents "a nature truly and inwardly bent upon a form of delicate perfection, and is accompanied by a real insight into the laws which determine what is exquisite in language, and their root in the nature of things" (AP, 172-3). An insight into the nature of things comes in "a form of delicate perfection; Biron,

because he is "inwardly bent" on perfection, is able to touch our sympathy for humanity, even for the dead men.

In Shakespeare's historical plays, the irony of kingship reveals the tragedy of human nature "flung into the vortex of great events" (AP, 193). These are the "sad fortunes of some English kings as conspicuous examples of ordinary human condition"; here again Pater's concerns are with the poetic perception of humanity, with "the ironic preponderance of nature and circumstance" over men's arrangements such as kingship. Pater says that these historical plays may very well have meant to Shakespeare's contemporaries the glorification of England, read as patriotic chronicles, but that these notions, to us at least, had they not been interwoven with his perception of humanity in kingship, would have become mere ideas, no longer alive. What is still alive is the psychology of human nature and the aesthetic turns of the kings, particularly Richard II, and kingship seen in that light. Richard II's sense of kingship brings to the king as well as to the reader the strange sense of beauty in resignation and death. Shakespeare's kings are not great men; in their happiness we see but child's play and in their sorrows "children's grief" (AP, 207). But Richard's sense of

kingship is strong enough for him to create his inner tragedy, and his poetic perception of fate, the fundamental fate in the flux of fortune, becomes the character. "As in some sweet anthem of Handel, the sufferer, who puts fingers to the organ under the utmost pressure of mental conflict, extracts a kind of peace from the mere skill with which he sets his distress to music" (AP, 108). The artistic perfection of the play signifies a "singleness or identity in its impression on the mind."

Shakespeare's plays that "give humanity, for heart and imagination to feel upon" encourage a life of perpetual self-realization. Bachelard says, we act morally by breaking the bounds of habitude: "Le temps ne coule plus. Il jaillit."[26] "Time vibrates" in such a life. In conventional morality, change should not be the governor of good life; there the manifold and changeful are synonymous with what is evil. But Pater has chosen Heraclitus for his alliance and Marius the Epicurean is the fictional analogue of perpetual flux. The continual motion of Marius' consciousness is the characteristic response to sensations of beauty and pity, in which lie excitement, animation and freedom of choice. Marius exercises his freedom in his manner of being in the narrowly confined domain of history. But

this domain in terms of the human spirit is a vast one, the past entering into Pater's conception of life as art, like the cries of seagulls heard over the tremendous roar of waves. The beauty and sorrow of this past, when heard, make us alive. In the moment of such hearing, continuity is a felt truth to Pater.

> Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some form on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive to us, -for that moment only.
> (R, 188)

As self-realization, the moment vibrates with "a profounder music." Since the aesthetic effort is ceaseless, it is more an attitude, or readiness to act, than act itself.

> ...if he was to be saved from the ennui which ever attaches itself to realization, even the realization of the perfect life, it was necessary that a conflict should come, that some sharper note should grieve the existing harmony, and the spirit created by it beat out at least only a larger and profounder music.
> (R, 177-8)

The aesthetic life forever refines itself with self-knowledge, never succumbing or being reduced to a viable lie. It is a mode of perception and not a code of behavior. Emerson's "I will have no covenant but proximities" reflects the aesthetic morality in which the individual obeys "no law less than eternal law" perpetually being discovered.[27] For the same reason,

Hamelet's revenge is neither moral nor immoral; it is dictated by historical and biological accidents. The unfolding of his life however reveals the moral attitude which compels his mode of action. Attitude and action are inseparable in the sphere of morality. Attitude determines action, but action does not determine attitude, nor does it necessarily reveal attitude. Aesthetic attitude thus forever prepares us for right action, but right action may never be possible. Aesthetic criticism requires primarily that we know truth by our effort of trying to know. Hamlet's mode is moral, not his act. The artists, in Pater's critical essays and fictional portraits, illustrate various examples of the aesthetic mode of life in specific historical settings.

If the "Conclusion" is the clearest paradigm of Paterian moral perspective, "A Prince of Court Painters" in Imaginary Portraits suggests another such paradigm for aesthetic life as moral act. The eternal conflict between what is, "a life, agitated, exigent, unsatisfying," and what is desired, "that nobler world of aspiration and idea," leads to the aesthetic and moral act of solace and of finer organization of man. The act of writing a journal, for instance, affords "an escape for vain regrets, angers, impatience." By putting "this and

that angry spasm into it," we are delivered from it (IP, 42). This is an act of transforming reality for the world of aspiration with "its care for beauty, its cleanly preferences" for "what makes life really valuable" (IP, 35). The transforming act is inherent in all thought or perception, as we have seen, but here in Pater's aesthetic criticism, the aesthetic deliberation and choice are highlighted over other paths or codes of transforming act. The diarist, the critic of the life of Watteau, observes this mason's son who enters into her Flemish household only obliquely and "appropriates" him as a life lived in the spirit of art. Watteau paints from early in his life, with "a marvellous tact of omission," a world with "a kind of grace," distilled from the "vulgar reality"; he paints "that delicate life of Paris so excellently, with so much spirit, partly because, after all, he looks down upon it or despises it" (IP, 27). Escape from the actual or the nobler in the actual is a vital element in Pater's notion of imaginative perception; it plays a significant role in the perception of the actual.

> Those trifling and petty graces, the insignia to him of that nobler world of aspiration and idea, even now that he is aware, as I conceive, of their true littleness, bring back to him, by the power of association, all the old magical exhilaration of his dream - his dream of a better world than the real one.
>
> (IP, 37)

Contrast this with a life not lived in the spirit of art, the life of Jean Batiste, the diarist's brother, who had once been apprenticed to Watteau and dismissed by him.

> He [Jean Baptiste] approaches that life, and all its nothingness, from a level no higher than its own; beginning just where Anthony Watteau leaves off in disdain, produces a solid and veritable likeness of it of its ways.
> (IP, 28)

His failure as an artist is his moral failure - a failure of aspiration; it is his spiritual contentment which becomes identified, in the diarist's mind, as moral stagnation. It is Watteau's discontent with the actual that creates what is really valuable. "The world he sets before us so engagingly has its care for purity, its cleanly preferences, in what one is to <u>see</u> - in the outside of things - and there is something a sign, a momento, at the least, of what makes life really valuable" (IP, 35).

In a life lived in the spirit of art, imaginative perception means most of all criticism. In terms precisely Paterian, his kindred spirit Henry James writes: "To criticize is to appreciate, to appropriate, to take intellectual possession, to establish in fine a relation with the criticized thing and make it one's own."[28] Living in the spirit of art meant to both writers the moral act of growth, relating the self,

through learning and exploring, to the criticized thing. The critical act, rather than ending with an analysis of an object or an idea, brings change to the object and the critic (new consciousness). But this act presupposes a quality of mind which Pater calls the "conscience of art." This quality of course is dependent on the temperament (soul) of the critic and its brain-building, which I have considered in the preceding section of this chapter. This conscience of art is the link between aesthetics and ethics. Pater's claim that Platonic aesthetics is in close connection with his ethics is based on this fact. "It is life itself, action and character, he proposed to colour; to get something of that irrepressible conscience of art, that spirit of control, into the general course of life, above all, into its energetic and impassioned acts" (PP, 286). When they merge, life acquires form, and the moment of experience becomes what is passionate and refined. The best sort of act is then:

> criticism, that criticism which is itself a kind of construction or creation, as it penetrates through the given literary or artistic product, into the mental and inner constitution of the producer, shaping his work.
>
> (EG, 29)

We must be reminded once more that criticism in this fundamentally aesthetic sense is contiguous with ordinary

perception that connects us to the external world, the perception that makes the object cognitively part of our mind. The only difference is in the aesthetic aim of inducing order in life (unity of life), which may be fulfilled by linking our consciousness to the very source of power beyond the "contorted, proportionless accumulation of knowledge and experience" and by examining the "ethical result" as a "delicate and tender justice in the criticism of human life" (AP, 105). In both, the movement of consciousness must be united in apprehension of truth, but how does criticism relate to virtue or justice?

Pater's concept of virtue reflects Blake's energy; it is shapely but not fixed. When it is fixed it becomes an instrument of death, not life. That is why no form should become absolute; the justice required in expression, whether an object or a thought, comes from sympathetic perception of facts. Virtue, like the idea of justice, depends on knowledge.

> But at bottom rights are equivalent to that which really is to facts; and the recognition of his rights therefore, the justice he requires of our hands, or our thoughts, is the recognition of that which the person, in his inmost nature really is; and as sympathy alone can discover that which really is in matters of feeling and thought, true justice is in its essence finer knowledge through love.
>
> (AP, 189-190)

"Finer knowledge through love" takes new shape endlessly. Liberation, the bursting forth of imagination, must be ceaseless, as Blake taught us, and the ceaseless imagination is moral: "O holy Generation, Image of Regeneration!"[29] In Pater's words, virtue "expands with the freedom and mobility of the things of the intellect," for in this process an object or a person, not in itself poetical, is uplifted and refined upon "a thousand fold" (R, 161-2). Pater's "intellect" being alive with sympathy and love is not content with any conception of reality that sinks into an abstraction; it forever attempts to spiritualize the concept by putting it into an "express, clear, objective" form (R, 176). Virtue now becomes all new imaginative forces that shape chaos. As the shaping spirit it gives "the sense of harmony between his soul and his physical environment... like perfectly played music" (MS, 180). What is virtuous is then not morality but deliverance from a fixed moral state. To burst out of a fixed consciousness is moral. "To beat/These hypocritic Selfhood on the Anvils of bitter Death./I am inspired," says Blake.[30]

To know reality as it is, to relate to it, and to be morally transformed with new knowledge is not an intellectual process only; it is a sensuous process. "The mind begins and ends with the finite image"(R, 164).

Nowhere else does the spiritual motive exist but in the sensuous form. The body thus becomes, to Pater, an embodied spirit. Seeing in the body of man an inward vitality, a self-contained unity and harmony of various kinds is commonplace in the Greek, Renaissance, and Romantic tradition, which tradition Pater defines in terms of its "worship of the body": "its intimacy, its languid sweetness, its rebellion, its subtle skill in dividing the elements of human passion, its care for physical beauty" (R, 168). The human form is "one entire medium of expression, trembling, blushing, melting into dew, with inward excitement" (R, 168). That it aspires to expression - a new order - is the moral significance of the body, the metaphor for the aesthetic spirit. Pater transfers the total identification of body and spirit, when he sees in Greek sculptures, for instance, into his ideal of being. Sympathetic understanding of forms is not simply a means to an end but an end in itself, a virtue. A way of being is, as Kenneth Burke says, "substantival, not instrumental." The sensuous embodiment of thought is an end, for the same reason, and a virtue. For discourse without body is banality.[31] So the function of the aesthetic critic is

> to distinguish, to analyze, and separate from its adjuncts, the virtue which a picture, a landscape, a fair personality in life or in a book, produces this special impression of beauty or pleasure, to indicate what the source of that impression is, and under what conditions it is experienced.
> (R, xx-xxi)

Aesthetic pleasure, here identified with beauty, is a function of soul, or the soul in sympathetic contact, and is distinct from pure physical pleasure. Pater refers to it as "purer emotions of the intellect," which implies the fusion of body and mind. This fusion, as Blake taught Pater, generates power and allows the flow of imaginative intellect. Pater's mode of thought, the sensuous embodiment of thought, is his mode of being.

Edmund Gosse recalled Pater as saying,"I wish they wouldn't call me a hedonist, it produces such a bad effect on the minds of people who don't know Greek," and yet as never attempting to change his mode of thought.[32] To Pater's contemporaries and to many others who do not know Greek, a hedonist is a sensualist who assumes that the body's pleasure can be increased. The Greeks of course believed that only the quality of pleasure is variable, not the quantity. Pater's "sensuous pleasure" refers to a realization of the aesthetic spirit, which is distinct from sensual pleasure devoid of intellectual component. If our senses are to pulsate aesthetically, we must first be free of such confusions. The body's needs

are registered in the consciousness which alone is capable of true pleasure. Epicureanism saw that the body's needs are not only natural but must be satisfied and that true pleasure must be nurtured, not indulged.[33] But Epicurus was hostile to beauty, conceived in relation to an abstract concept of goodness.[34] In Pater's reading of epicureanism, beauty, in its concrete and varying forms, is pleasure: "the virtue by which a picture, a landscape, a fair personality in life or in a book" is "the special expression of beauty or pleasure." The following passage from "Diaphaneite" attempts to qualify the aesthetic pleasure in art.

> The beauty of Greek statues was a sexless beauty: the statues of the gods and the least traces of sex. Here there is nature, with a true beauty and significance of its own.
> (R, 176; MS, 253)

The distinction was important enough for him to repeat verbatum in his essay on Winckelmann many years later, but he is always reasonable in his claims. He does not separate beauty (aesthetic pleasure in art) from nature, as aesthetic philosophers have frequently done; he merely qualifies it.

The care for the body in Pater also comes with his Epicurean acknowledgement of sensation as our primary source of knowing the world. "That we do in fact acquire knowledge through the sense," writes J. M. Rist, "must

be defended against skeptics and Platonists."[35] Desire, perpetually frustrated in actual living, enables, nevertheless, sensations and ideas to interact as our primary means of knowing the world. Trying to free the desire from the holds of theology and other abstract systems of thought maps Pater's own moral pathways. Though his prose contains no stringent argument (only the voice that refers to our feelings and understanding the world sensuously), he succeeds in persuading us to free our consciousness from the hold of abstractions and to replant it in the native soil of the senses. He has accomplished it in the manner Epicurus reclaimed the senses from the ethical spiritualism of Plato and Aristotle.[36] Replanting the consciousness in the body, one should experience the spiritual pulsations of the senses. An aesthetic mode of life, according to Pater, allows this. The wisest spend this interval "in art and song." For ideas in art, intellectual or spiritual, become "sunk" in sensuous form. The artist may live a purer life as his sould "becomes more and more immersed in sense, until nothing which lacks the appeal to sense has interest for him (R, 176-7).

"The Greek was never ashamed of nature; he granted sensuousness its full rights and is nevertheless sure that he will never be subjugated by it."[37] To be sensuous

without being subjugated to sensuality is an aesthetic ideal which has moral implications. Schiller and Hegel concur: "Art by means of its representation, while remaining within the sensuous sphere, liberates man at the same time from the power of sensuousness."[38] In shaping a life as art, sensuous desire for beauty is singled out among the needs of the body. Pater thus indentifies true pleasure with "creating beauty" and with "feeling a certain deep emotion," not with satisfying the others needs. But both Paterian and Epicurean pleasure rests on understanding the nature of the universe and the limits of man. This understanding requires a healthy disposition. For Pater the right disposition for true understanding of the self and the world means most of all a bodily constitution which makes sense and pleasure.

The asthetic temperament derives escape from actualities of life. There is in Pater an ever-present effort to escape from the platitudes of a socially common-place world, for instance, "to cheat a little the profound enuuis" of daily life. This ennui does not imply a satiety of experience, but a threat of corruption. Our sense of beauty is made more poignant, of course, by the paradox and tension of the dying body. The quotidian life, even of the Duke in "Duke Carl of Rosenmold" enters

the reader's mind as "ennui itself made audible" (IP, 173). The young Carl has "fits of the gloom of other people - their dull passage through and exit from the world, the threadbare incidents of their lives, their dismal funerals - which, unless he drove them away immediately by strenuous exercise, settled into a gloom more perperly his own (IP, 156-7)." The moral choice is for him between a life as a sensuous receptacle of all things beautiful and real in the world and a life lived in the chill of abstractions, distanced from affections and perturbations. The past or its deadness may come alive in his choice "as elements in a great historic symphony" (IP, 169). The aspiring soul of Carl is freed in his choice: "art, poetry, fiction, an entire imaginative world, following reasonably upon a deeper understanding of the past, of nature, of one's self - an understanding of all beside through the knowledge of one's self" (IP, 169).

One may choose a manner of life solely dedicated to the world of abstract thought; the mode of life has claimed equally distinct tradition in human culture. Pater's "Sebastian van Storck" exemplifies this world. The hero of the same name, portrayed in seventeenth century Holland in a series of wintery pictures,detaches himself to study the "truth of things," and in his

moments of theoretical insight, his self effaces itself. He "dies to self" through reasoning that makes "infinite his beginning and his end." "Detachment: to hasten hence: to fold up one's whole self, as a vesture put aside: to anticipate, by such individual force as he could find himself in him, the slow disintegration by which nature herself is levelling the eternal hills" (IP, 127). He encloses himself in that disintegrating force of the universal dissipation of energy (perversion of the aesthetic doctrine in the "Conclusion"). He is compelled to do it by "some inherited satiety or fatigue in his nature." Some genuine insight about self and bodily constitution comes during his continual self-effacement, however:

> it was legible in his admission from time to time, that the body, following, as it does with powerful temperaments, the lead of mind and the will, the intellectual consumption (so to term it) had been concurrent with, had strengthened and been strengthened by, a vein of physical phthisis - a merely physical accident, after all, of his bodily constitution, such as might have taken a different turn, had another accident fixed his home among the hills instead of on the shore. Is it only the result of disease? he would ask himself sometimes with a sudden suspicion of his intellectual cogency - this persuasion that myself, and all that surrounds me, are but a diminution of that which really is? - this unkindly melancholy?
>
> (IP, 130)

The accidents of birth that determine our bodily constitution and erect impenetrable walls are to a great measure the

matter and manner of our being. Yet the manner that refines itself through matter continues to perfect itself. This recognition of the body, the warmth, the life force which he tried to deny emerges in the manner of Sebastian's death. Having rejected the woman who expected to marry him, he isolates himself and dies in a flood to rescue another life. The child was found, with Sebastian's death, "swaddled warmly in his heavy furs." Marius of Marius the Epicurean, by contrast, creates an aesthetic ideal "in connection with a vivid sense of the value of mental and bodily sanity" (ME I, 41). But poetic redemption for both involves a new dream where death itself is an element of unborn vision. As Eliot says they "Redeem/The unread vision in the higher dream/While jewelled unicorns draw by the guilded hearse."[39] Also both are true Romantic characters whose destinies are determined by their temperaments. Neither Marius nor Sebastian is a character who is subject to the "accidental influences of life" (R, 175). They are also universalized moral agents that are like seeds that grow in a given mode of thought. Their various attitudes and sensations develop and sharpen their visions of life.

To live in the spirit of art is then to desire knowledge and love; that is the body's tragedy and struggle.

In the apprehension of this conflict, the decay of the body itself becomes poignantly realized spirit; this is the crux of the Paterian conception of man. So "the visible function of death is but to refine, to detach from ought that is vulgar" (AP, 158). In this context moral life is something of "a meditation upon death" (AP, 136). Botticelli paints, says Pater, the story of the goddess of pleasure in different phases, always with "some shadow of death in the grey flesh and wan flowers" (R, 60), while Loenardo's "fascination of corruption" of the body "penetrates in every touch its exquisitely finished beauty" (R, 106). Pater's interpretations of "mournful mysteries" of Adonis, Hyacinthus, and Demeter are the flowers of his sensibility, perfectly attuned to the condition of man caught between desire and knowledge of death. The myth of Dionysus is particularly appealing to Pater, because Dionysus, unlike most other gods, is not above sorrow. His very human alternation of joy and sorrow is the soil in which all Greek tragedy springs (GS, 40). Pater uses the myth twice for his stories in "Denys L'Auxerrois" and "Apollo in Picardy." Even the Olympian gods, Pater laments, are "sullied by the thoughts of earlier divine dynasties [history], of a possible annihilation, of inevitable decay and dispossession" (R, 177). But the spirit of art, particularly

the romantic spirit in art, converts death and pain into sorrow that is exalting and reaffirming of the love for life on earth, unlike the religions of all times that teach man to abandon desire and knowledge, sorrowful attachments and regrets. Pater, through deeply attached religious forms of thought, builds his criticism of life and art upon his feeling for the material nature of man, and thus forsakes neither the self nor its environment (particularly history). And so he maintains, with Shakespeare, "Both truth and beauty on my love depends." In maintaining this position, Pater focuses on two aspects of man's tragic condition: the body in which desires are eternally frustrated (so as to seek a new harmony) and the consciousness which is constantly aware of its own end (so as to balance the harmony or beauty with sorrow for the earth we are destined to depart). Pater's "beauty and pity" are wrought of the very condition of man who desiring dies. The desolation he feels is the infinite future invading his life "like the ocean felt far inland up a tidal river" (AP, 158). To live in aesthetic awareness of this condition means to own the intensity of sorrow concomitant with his desire for beauty.

Nowhere in his discourse does Pater separate the artist who produces aesthetic forms from the artist

who lives a life in that spirit. When the ideal of formal perfection is transposed in life, the emphasis falls of course on the attitude of moral aspiration. "All arts constantly aspire towards the condition of music" symbolizes aesthetic and moral aspirations more accurately than it describes analytically the relationship between music and other arts. Each art, Pater says in "The School of Giorgione" lends other arts new forces by inspiring them to freedom from their own limitations at least, partially, while remaining uniquely itself. "Great Ideals," or poetic visions, lend us new forces to create new modes of lives. Pater has attempted to give us the "ideally consummate life," as he has offered music to other arts, in urging us to live in the spirit of art.

Notes

IV

[1]In Pater the Kantain synthesis of rationalism and empiricism is forever replayed; by returning to the original sources, he experiences the actual process of the two strands of thought freshly meeting in the mind. Epicurus says in XXII of his "Principal Doctrines," "We must consider both the real purpose and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion."

The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers, The complete extant writings of Epicurus, Epictetus, Lucretius, Marcus Aurelius, ed. Whitney J. Oates (New York: Modern Library, 1957), p. 37.

Descartes' desire for absolute certainty in thought, of course, contrasts with Pater's, but his methodological doubt, pursued like a religious exercise, and his reasonable attitude in dealing with the matters of religion and the past are similar to Pater's. One of Descartes' maxims reads as though Pater had written it for his private self alone: "to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering constantly to the religion in which by God's grace I had been instructed since my childhood, and in all other things directing my conduct by opinions the most moderate in nature, and the farthest removed from excess in all those which are commonly received and acted on by the most judicious of those with whom I might come in contact." This maxim may explain Pater's attitude toward the Anglican Church in which he wanted to be ordained "without faith" and his avoidance of Oscar Wilde and even his withdrawal of the "Conclusion" from the second edition of The Renaissance. Such maxims, we must remember, were thought to be necessary by both Descartes and Pater, while they were devoting themselves toward finding purer thoughts or truths.

Descartes, "Discourse on Method," The European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche, ed. Monroe C. Beardsley (New York: Modern Library, 1960), p. 18.

[2]Goethe's Faust, tr. Walter Kaufmann (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961), p. 75.

[3]Descartes desired to know how the notion of perfection that exists within our minds got there. Gilson and Langan reads it as follows: "In order to know I was doubting, I must have had the notion of what my cognition was lacking for it to be a certitude; so I was discerning the imperfect from the perfect; now in order to see this distinction, I must first have had the notion of perfection. Whence did that notion come to me? Since it is clear and distinct, it has an object in the mind, and although an object in the mind has not the same reality as the same object outside the mind, one cannot pretend it is nothing.

Etienne Gilson and Thomas Langan, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 63.

[4]Epicurus says in "Concerning Choice and Avoidance": "Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion." See Oates, p. 44.

[5]John Keats, Complete Poems and Selected Letters, ed. C. D. Thorpe (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1935), p. 609. "Call the world if you please 'The vale of Soul-making'...I say Soul-making - Soul as distinguished from an Intelligence. There may be intelligences or sparks of the divinity in millions - but they are not Souls till they acquire identities, till each one is personally itself. Intelligences are atoms of perception - they know and they see and they are pure, in short they are God. - How then are Souls to be made? How then are these sparks which are God to have identity given them - so as ever to possess a bliss peculiar to each one's individual existence? How, but by the medium of a world like this?" See also Chapter I, p.24 of this paper.

[6]"The prevalent influence of symbolism and of Pater on all modern poetry," says John Hollander, "has produced many equivocal aesthetic analogies between poetry and mustic on the grounds of the expostory meaninglessness of both." See Visionary Resonance: Two Lenses of Poetic Form (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), p. 22.
In the sphere of aesthetic morality, Pater's analogy is still fruitful; music as a symbol of aesthetic and moral ideal helps stretch and transform the given idea.

[7]Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, tr. Thomas K. Abbott (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1949), p. 8.

[8]Ibid., p. 38.

[9]Ibid., p. 46.

[10]Descartes also spoke of Reason or Sense to be "the only thing that constitutes us as men." Good sense or Reason, "the power of forming a good judgmert and of distinguishing the true from the false," is, he believed, "equal in all men." The mind needs to be guided by Reason because "The greatest minds are capable of the greatest vices as well as of the greatest virtues, and those who proceed very slowly may, provided they always follow the straight road, really advance much faster than those who, though they run, forsake it."

"Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences," The European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche, p. 5-6.

Shelley, on the other hand, identifies reason as "mind contemplating the relations borne by one thought to another," eliminating its moral function. The mind's moral function is given to the imagination which he defines as "mind acting upon those thought so as to colour them with its own light, and composing from them, as from elements, other thoughts, each containing within itself the principle of its own integrity."

"A Defence of Poetry or Remarks Suggested by an Essay Entitled 'The Four Ages of Poetry'," Shelley's Poetry and Prose, ed. Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers (New York: Norton Co., 1977), p. 480.

[11]Mind and Nature (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), p. 9.

[12]Shelley's Poetry and Prose, ed. D. H. Reiman and S. B. Powers (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 487.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 500.

[15]Ibid., p. 94.

[16]Freeman, p. 28.

[17]Freeman, p. 29.

[18]"An Aristotelian Trilogy: Ethics, Rhetoric, Politics and the Search for Moral Truth," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 13: 1 (Winter 1980), p. 13.

[19]Raymond DiLorenzo, "The Critique of Socrates in Cicero's De Oratore: Ornatus and the Nature of Wisdon," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 11:4 (Fall 1978), p. 255.

[20]Bateson, p. 12

[21]Plato, Gorgias, tr. W. C. Helmbold (Indianapolis, 1980), p. 77.

"Will a good man, whose speeches are for the maximum improvement of his fellows, say anything at random? Will he not always have some definite end in view?" (P.193)

[22]Christopher Lyle Johnston, "An Aristotelian Trilogy: Ethics, Rhetoric, Politics and the Search for Moral Truth." Philosophy and Rhetoric, 13:1 (Winter 1980), p. 15.

[23]The Friend, ed. Kathleen Coburn, ed. Vol. II, p. 57.

[24]Pater's aesthetic morality is close to the Socratic inquiry into knowledge as virtue. Plato writes in "Gorgias" that the world is called kosmos, 'order', because all in it is interdependent: "Wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance and justice; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of order and not disorder or dissoluteness." This moral order held together by "communion, friendship, by orderliness, temperance and justice" is what Pater's aesthetic spirit desires to see. What is unified in kosmos, for Socrates, is knowledge and virtue; for Pater, aesthetic and morality.

See Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 1 (New York: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 129-131.

[25]Walter Pater as a Critic of English Literature. A Study of Appreciations (Grenoble: Didier & Richard, 1931), p. 22.

[26]As quoted by Wilie Sypher, The Ethic of Time (New York, 1976), p. 26.

[27]"Self-Reliance," Selected Essays,Lectures,& Poems of Ralph Waldo Emerson,ed. R. E. Spiller.(New York:Simon & Schuster,1965)p.24

[28]"Preface to What Masie Knew, The Art of the Novel: Critical Prefaces with an introduction by R. P. Blackmur (New York, 1962), p. 155.

[29]The Complete Writings of William Blake, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London: Oxford UP, 1966), p. 626. (Jerusalem, I/7/69)

[30]Blake / Keynes, p. 627. (Jerusalem, I/8/15-17)

[31]Roland Barthes on Roland Barthes, tr. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), p. 137.

[32]Hill, p. 499.

[33]David Konstan, Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology (Netherlands: E. L. Brill, 1973), 72-73.

[34]"I spit upon the beautiful and those who vainly admire it, when it does not produce any pleasure." See Oates, p. 51.

[35]Epicurus (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1972), p. 15.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Hill, p. 435.

[38]Hill, p. 436.

[39]Collected Poems (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), p. 64.

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