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FULKE GREVILLE'S CAELICA:

THE LYRICS OF A COURTIER AND CALVINIST

by

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Abstract

Fulke Greville's Caelica:
The Lyrics of a Courtier and Calvinist
by
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Caelica is both a difficult and an unusual collection of lyrics. In them, Greville expresses a Calvinist view of reality, for which he lacks poetic models. Even in the love lyrics, his main concern is rather with the Fall of man, a Calvinist preoccupation, than with love, the subject of the courtier poet. The notorious diversity of the Caelica lyrics, including the major thematic change from love to religion and philosophy, reflects Greville's search for a language and set of conventions in which to express his view of the world, since those adopted by contemporary poets were unsuited to his purposes.

As Greville uses the tradtional language of love, it becomes something of a metaphor for man's misery in the fallen world and for his desire to transcend his fallen condition. Consequently, when Greville tries to write like a courtier poet, with Sidney as his consciously chosen guide, his own interests are so far from courtly that he writes against the convention of the courtly love lyric rather than within them.

He writes in oppostion to Sidney's world view. While Sidney, in both his prose and poetry, tempers the violence of romantic passion so that it is to some degree subject to the control of society, with its demands for honor and order, Greville does not. Treating the problems of love as representative of the devastation wrecked by the Fall, he depicts erotic passion as too violent to be restrained by society and society itself as too corrupt to deter the excesses of individual lovers. Greville also writes in opposition to Sidney's style, even where he apparently tries to imitate it. While Sidney writes within the courtly conventions of praise and blame and has his protagonists express their feelings of love and desire through those conventions, Greville writes as a deliberative poet who contemplates love from afar. Greville turns both the eloquent mode of the Certain Sonnets and the Arcadia and the conversational mode of Astrophil and Stella to the purposes of defining and generalizing. His aim is to understand reality, not to express love.

In the religious and philosophical lyrics of the last third of Caelica, Greville abandons Sidney as his model and turns more overtly to Calvin and to the ways of thinking that grew out of Calvin's theology. The thematic focus of these lyrics is on man's simultaneous need and inability to know God. Even though contemporary religious poets wrote primarily of the love of God, Greville, following Calvin, regarded the problem of knowing God as the real problem of fallen man. Greville abandons the metaphor of love and writes directly about what has always been at the heart of his lyrics -- the

Fall. He develops a highly literal style, which is well suited to conveying a monolithic truth in an objective manner and which, moreover, emphasizes the inability of fallen man to know or to reach any extra-terrestrial reality that metaphor might probe. Like his focus on knowledge, Greville's literalism is supported by Calvin's attitude toward language, as it is contained in his views of biblical interpretation; it is also supported by the literalistic notions of Bacon and of the Ramists, which are related to Calvin's. Finally, in some of the later lyrics, Greville achieves a synthesis of thought and feeling, such as he had not accomplished in the love poems. With the aid of specifically Puritan theories of meditation, which brought thought and feeling together without the aid of the imagination or of metaphor, Greville uses his literal language to express deep feelings of estrangement from God and the yearning to know Him -- that is, the suffering and hope of fallen man.

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I. Introduction: The Poetry of Two Ages

Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke, was a man of two ages. He was born in 1554, four years before the ascension of Queen Elizabeth, and died in 1628, three years after Charles I mounted to the throne. He served Elizabeth as a courtier, as a minor ambassador, as a member of the House of Commons, and as Treasurer of the Navy. Under James, he was excluded from office between 1604 and 1614 but then regained power as Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer, as Privy Councillor, and as a member of the House of Lords. Yet, although he was an active and competent public servant, Greville is barely remembered by historians. He lacked the daring to make a decisive impact on events and, in the assessment of Ronald Rebholz, his chief modern biographer, he "was always deeply out of joint with his times."[1]

Caelica, the collection of 109 lyrics on which Greville's literary reputation is based, is similarly wedged by critics between the poems of Sidney and Donne, which represent respectively the accomplishments of the Elizabethan and Metaphysical eras. Critics, noting that Sidney and Greville began writing together as "mates in song,"[2] and observing the deep indebtedness of the early Caelica lyrics to poems in The Arcadia, Certain Sonnets, and Astrophil and Stella, have tended to censure Greville for his comparatively weak verbal facility. Greville's poems are "harsh, fantastic echoes which but rarely recall the music" of Sidney's Mary A. Ward complained in 1907.[3] Una Ellis-Fermor thought

better of Greville, but she did him poor service in commending "posterity" for having "for once obeyed the poet's intention and remembered him, as his own epitaph directs, as 'Frend to Sir Philip Sidney.'"[4] When he was regarded as a precursor of Donne, Greville was received somewhat more favorably. Morris W. Croll approvingly compared Donne and Greville on both stylistic and substantive grounds; stylistically, both poets "renounced classical allusion, . . . illustrate the boundless power of poetic suggestion in a bare as distinguished from an ornamental diction"; substantively, both "were activated by the desire to say more incisive and significant things than the conventional sonneteers and the diffuse Spenserians; and they are distinguished among their contemporaries by extraordinary richness and subtlety of thought."[5] William Frost commended Greville's later verse in similar terms, noting that there he "shakes off the trammels of Elizabethan formalism in poetry . . . and in suppleness and originality of intellect . . . resembles Metaphysicals like Donne, who followed him, far more than he does his predecessors and contemporaries among Renaissance poets."[6] Such comparisons not only subject entire literary movements to the judgment of taste, but they also insinuate, even when that is not their intention, that Greville is less than a major talent in his own right and would be best appreciated in association with more estimable figures.

Yet, while the comparisons may obscure Greville's unique talents, they are not entirely irresponsible. Greville himself is partly to blame for the persistent compari-

sons with Sidney. In an age when literary imitation was commonplace, Greville emphatically pointed out his own indebtedness. He saw himself more as an inadequate follower of Sidney than as an independent individual, and when in his Life of Sidney, he compared their abilities, he measured himself modestly, apologizing for his "creeping Genius" at the same time as he defended the comparative realism of his poetry (p.324)[7]

As for the comparisons between Greville and Donne, those are the work of apologists trying to account for the intellectualism and obscurity of much of Caelica. The Romantics had criticized Greville for those qualities that the twentieth century was to praise or excuse. Charles Lamb censured Greville's writing as "frozen and made rigid with intellect,"[8] while William Hazlitt, supposedly responding to a visitor's admiration of Greville's "apocalyptical, cabalistic" style, conjectured that "if the mystery were once cleared up, the merit might be lost."[9] To claim that Greville is like Donne is a way for apologists to condone the obscurity of Greville's verse by insisting on its deep thought and complex emotions. Coleridge, more appreciative than his contemporaries, may have suggested the defense (though not the comparison) when he prefaced his volume of Greville with these lines from Cowper: "A quarry of stout spurs and knotted fangs -- That crook'd into a thousand whimsies clasp -- The stubborn soil."[10]

Of Greville's more modern critics, Frost and Croll used such a defense, and more recently Fred Inglis elaborated on it in a way that reveals its weakness. Inglis lauds Greville

as a metaphysical poet but, recognizing that Greville's verse boasts neither the wit nor the concrete imagery we associate with the early seventeenth century, redefines the term almost out of recognition. According to Inglis, Greville "exhibits his distinctly metaphysical cast of mind: he holds powerful general opposites simultaneously in his verse and resolves the poem by the perfection and completeness of his style."[11] In response, we may note that if an umbrella is big enough it will cover a good deal and that Inglis' praise is more well-meaning than substantive.

Recently, however, Greville has received the type of reading that recognizes his special talents. Yvor Winters is probably the man most responsible for the trend. Although he too makes comparisons, he does so for the sake of establishing a tradition of the "plain style" in which Greville is an equal member and stands on his own merits. Winters groups Greville with Ben Jonson "as one of the two masters of the short poem in the Renaissance." And when Winters compares Greville with Donne, it is not to justify the older poet but to suggest that he is better, that while the emotion in a Donne poem is often "momentary" or "rhetorical," a poem by Greville "means what it says."[12] Winter's appreciation of the plain style has had a great impact on Greville criticism. Thom Gunn, in his introduction to his edition of Caelica; Douglas Peterson, in his book The English Lyric from Wyatt to Donne; and John Williams, in his anthology of English Renaissance Poetry all follow Winters' lead.[13] They focus not on the difficulty of Greville's verse but on its equally notable perspicuity and directness.

Moreover, the last few years have seen the publication of three major books on Greville: Richard Waswo's The Fatal Mirror, Joan Rees' Fulke Greville . . . A Critical Biography, and Ronald Rebholz' The Life of Fulke Greville.[14] The sheer bulk of these works testifies to the high esteem in which these scholars hold Greville. Rebholz justifies his extensive historical research by claiming that "the ultimate reason for any study of Greville is his remarkable accomplishment as a writer."[15] The most valuable contribution of these books is that they all try to place Greville's writing in historical and biographical contexts that neither demean his talents nor gloss over his flaws. They all point out Greville's extensive debt to Sidney; but they are also aware that "the poets are doing different things"[16] and conscientiously document Greville's deliberate departures from Sidney's ideas and techniques. They show Greville entering the seventeenth century and his writing changing in the course of time, but, aware of the many stimuli to which Greville responded, they avoid misleading comparisons with Donne. Waswo is particularly interesting in that while he minimizes Greville's similarity to Donne, he points out Greville's debt to Calvin. All in all, the contextual study of Greville's writings has illuminated Caelica and yielded a fine critical appreciation. For example, Waswo, insisting on the strangeness of Greville's way of thinking and on its antipathy to our own, commends "the effect of such poetry [which] is to get us out of ourselves, to enlarge our perception of the world by providing . . . a full, sympathetic, and disinterested contact with other human beings."[17]

But now that Greville's status as a poet is more secure, we may allow ourselves to feel again the uneasiness with which earlier critics had read him. Caelica does pose problems for its readers. The most obvious difficulty is that the quality of the poems is extremely uneven. As Douglas Bush notes, "we are sometimes tantalized by the spectacle of such an interesting writer failing so often."[18] The other difficulty involves the relation of the lyrics to their time. Rebholz has shown how the love lyrics grew out of Greville's friendship with Sidney, how the political poems emerged from Greville's experience in and out of public office, and how the religious poems may have charted a personal experience of conversion. Yet while Rebholz' detailed demonstration is informative, it remains that in some ways Greville's verse does not conform to the standards for the lyric poems of his age.[19] The very efforts to assimilate Greville to Sidney and Donne, resulting as they generally did in either unflattering or misleading readings of Greville, suggest that Greville stands somewhat to the side of the mainstream.

David Daiches observes that Greville's love lyrics differed from Sidney's and Spenser's in that while these poets "were able to resolve some of the conflicting currents of Renaissance thought, Greville tended to hold them separately in his mind, living in several worlds at once."[20] Daiches is referring to Greville's well-known dualism, which separated world and spirit far more ruthlessly than Sidney or Spenser ever had, and which ultimately made his love poems vastly different from most of the others of the period. The

religious and philosophical lyrics that occupy the last third of the sequence are equally difficult to place. C. S. Lewis rightly hesitates in categorizing them. He observes that Greville "began by being, as far as his talent allowed, Golden, and then went on to develop a new manner which pointed neither to the metaphysical nor to the Augustan, though it had more in common with the latter."[21] Helen C. White, without mentioning Greville, hints, in her introduction to the Metaphysicals, at why his religious poems were unlike Donne's or Herbert's. Theirs, she insists, came out of "the more moderate and central tradition of the English Church."[22] To the Anglican tradition Greville belonged in his politics, but not in many of his basic attitudes.

In short, Caelica is both uneven in artistic quality and unusual. Moreover, far from being two separate phenomena, these circumstances are closely linked. For, what Greville had to say differed in fundamental ways from what other poets of his time were saying, yet the means of expression available to him were the language and conventions which others defined. Such tension between language and thought disturbs all writing, and it may have been particularly pronounced in the Renaissance, when the functions of genres and styles were more clearly defined than they are today, and when poets did consciously write within or in opposition to prevailing modes. In the case of Greville, the tension seems to have been exceptionally strong. On the one hand, he had, as Rebholz concludes, an "independent, flexible mind";[23] but on the other hand he also seems to have had a fairly strong

need for the sanctions of external authorities. This does not mean that Caelica was more derivative than other contemporary verse collections, which is doubtful, or even that it was more original. Rather, the disparity leads to a discernibly problematic relationship among Greville's own basic concerns (as they are manifested in repeated themes and attitudes in Caelica), the authorities he followed, and the quality of his lyrics. This dissertation will explore these complicated relationships. Its thesis, loosely stated, is that the closer Greville's own interests are to the authority he adopts, the more coherent and powerful is his writing.[24]

Among such authorites, Sidney and Calvin are the most important.

Sidney, as is well known, was Greville's first mentor. The Arcadia, Certain Sonnets, and Astrophil and Stella set the norms of the love lyric for Greville, and he borrows extensively from them. The title Caelica, Latin for the heavens, is a clear parallel to Astrophil and Stella, and both collections number one hundred nine "sonnets." In later chapters we will explore exactly how Greville uses Sidney's works. Here I wish to suggest that Greville's extensive reference to Sidney's prose and poems represents more than the astute borrowing every Renaissance poet practiced, but rather the deep veneration of one poet for another whom he considered his master in all respects.

The details of their friendship are familiar.[25] The two men were acquainted from boyhood, when they attended Shrewsbury School together. Greville entered court in 1575

under the patronage of Sidney's father, Sir Henry Sidney, probably at the same time as Sidney made his appearance there. With numerous intermissions, they served together at court. In 1577 Greville attended Sidney on a diplomatic mission to Germany, where Sidney sounded several German princes on the formation of a Protestant League for defense against Spain. In 1585 both men attempted to join Drake on an offensive voyage against the Spanish in America but were called back by Elizabeth. They shared the same aspirations for public service and for the advancement of the Protestant cause. These are but the barest details. Greville's life-long affection for Sidney is revealed in the inscription Greville wrote for his tombstone, where he identifies himself as "Servant to Queen Elizabeth, Councillor to King James, And Friend to Sir Philip Sidney," and more extensively in his Life of Sidney. More than a biography, this work is a deep tribute from one friend to another. In his idealized portrait, Greville praises Sidney for those qualities which he himself lacked. Notably, Greville commends the moral courage which enabled Sidney to stand behind his convictions in instances where Greville could not, as for example when Sidney spoke out against Elizabeth's projected Catholic marriage with Alencon of France, while Greville had let his opposition be known only indirectly and, years later, would seem to condone King James' negotiations for a Spanish marriage.[26] He praises the "freedome" that made Sidney a leader while he remained "inevitably a follower of . . . political patrons throughout his life."[27] For Greville, Sidney was above all

an ideal to be followed. Greville refers to his friend as a "model," an "example," a "pattern."[28] He acknowledges the wish to emulate Sidney and explains why he could not: "So that (if my own creation had been equal), it would have proved as easie for me to engage my self into this Characteristicall kind of Poesie" (p. 2). He confesses the desire to "tread in the steps" of Sidney's life and art both: "So that to saile by his Compasse, was . . . one of the principall reasons I can allege, which perswaded me to steale minutes of time from my daily services, and employ them in this kind of writing." (p. 150). Greville was referring here to his plays and treatises, but he might have said the same of his lyrics. The point to be borne in mind is that idols are nearly impossible to imitate successfully.

The influence of Calvin, and of the ways of thinking that grew out of his theology, is more difficult to define than with Sidney. Greville could hardly have borrowed from a theologian as directly as from a fellow poet; nor could he have admired a slightly older and distant thinker with the same warmth and immediacy he had for a friend. Nonetheless, without delving into specifics at this point, we can suggest that Calvin's ideas permeated both the content and style of Greville's lyrics. From Calvin, Greville seems to have absorbed a set of concerns and biases. With Calvin and the English Puritans, Greville emphasized the awful effects of the Fall, and was more concerned than the Anglicans with the fact that man lived in a fallen world. Like Calvin, he tended to dwell on man's alienation from God and, more

specifically, on the fact that man could not know God; at the center of his religious lyrics, he placed the Calvinist conviction that the knowledge of God was the goal of human life. He shared with Calvin and with others who were influenced by Calvin's ideas of biblical interpretation, a deep distrust of the imagination; and in keeping with that suspicion, he eventually created a literal style of writing and adopted a method of religious meditation that bypassed the imagination.

Greville had ample opportunity to absorb Calvin's philosophy. At Shrewsbury he studied Calvin's Catechism and read the Institutes. During his attendance at Cambridge, that University was a center of religious controversy, and Thomas Cartwright preached and taught divinity there. In London, the pulpits were dominated by Puritan preachers. Later in life, Greville corresponded with the Puritan Thomas Wilcox and was a patron of the Puritan John Preston.[29]

Greville's Calvinism consisted in a set of interests and in an inclination of temperament rather than in a precise political or doctrinal position. Politically, Greville supported the Church of England. In his Life of Sidney, he commended Elizabeth as a "defendress of the faith" (p. 45), and he approved of her steering a middle way between the bishops on the one hand and the Separatists and Presbyterians on the other (pp. 165-6). When it came to wielding his own political power, he supported moderate churchmen. He secured the Deanship of St. Paul's for John Overall, and he

recommended the appointment of Lancelot Andrews as Dean of Westminster.[30] Greville was neither a political dissident who wanted to reform the Elizabethan Church along Genevan lines nor a moral precisianist unwilling to compromise in matters of conscience.[31] Above all, he was a statesman. With other Radical Protestants, such as Sidney and Essex, he supported an anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic policy. But his scruples did not require that he object strongly either to Elizabeth's or to Jame's projected Catholic marriage, that he sever his friendship with Bancroft, the Archbishop of Canterbury, on account of the latter's harassment of the Puritans.[32] Theologically, Greville was equally conservative. Burnham Carter, Jr., has demonstrated that "on the central and distinguishing points of total depravity, predestination, and the efficacy of any sort of good works or positive action, Greville takes his place besides the softened Calvinism of the Elizabethan Church."[33] As a poet, Greville properly avoided disputation on sensitive doctrinal issues,[34] and when he did take a stand he tended to align himself with those, such as Andrews and Overall, who modified Calvin's rigid theories of predestination to allow for some measure of self-determination in living a moral life. Greville is known to have corresponded with Peter Baro, the Hugenot lecturer at Cambridge, who maintained that God's predestination did not take away man's free will.[35]

Yet, on issues that were not sensitive doctrinally or politically, Greville tended to take a stand closer to Calvin than to Hooker, closer to the Puritans than to the

Anglicans. Greville could do this without opposing the Church of England because party lines were less rigidly drawn and matters of doctrine less crucial in the sixteenth century than they were to become in the seventeenth. The issues of predestination and reprobation were, according to Knappen, brandished by both groups mainly as weapons against the Catholics;[36] and insofar as there were differences of opinion on these matter, they could not, as Charles and Katherine George have shown, always be drawn along party lines.[37] The English Church retained within itself a wide spectrum from left to right.[38] And, according to several historians, what would later become party differences were still in the sixteenth century differences in temperament and degree.[39]

Greville's Calvinism was largely a matter of disposition, of emphasis. Ronald Rebholz, in fact, has argued that Greville's youthful conviction that man could cooperate with God's grace to perform good works gradually eroded under the pressure of events until, by the end of his life, he retained little faith in man's capacity for anything but evil and error.[40] Whatever the change in emphasis, the seeds of Greville's pessimism were already evident in the earliest lyrics of Caelica, and had a major effect on the shape of the poems. As William Frost has remarked, "Greville stands alone among all English sonneteers up to his time . . . in his melancholy," which "is the most striking quality of mood that one meets in Caelica."[41] While it obviously takes more than melancholy to make one a Calvinist, this may be a less super-

ficial beginning than it seems, if, in fact, it is true that temperament more than doctrine divided the two religious groups.

More specifically, though, the authority of Calvin seems to have given Greville the confirmation he needed for his own feelings. In his love lyrics, where Sidney was his consciously chosen guide, a Calvinistic preoccupation with the Fall resulted in the intrusion of a set of concerns and assumptions so radically different from those of the conventional love lyric that the entire language of the love lyric soon proved entirely inadequate for expressing what he had to say. The protestation of love was, in a very real sense, little more than a circuitous route for dealing with more fundamental issues of man's place in a fallen universe. In the religious lyrics, Calvin's influence is more overt. It extends beyond the clear parallels between Calvin's and Grenville's treatment of the theme of knowledge to the more pervasive matter of language. Greville's acute consciousness of living in a fallen world eventually compels him to abandon the language of the love lyric, which he had tried to adapt from Sidney; and the sanctions of a Calvinist aesthetic enabled him to forge a literal, yet emotive, language which could deal directly with man's alienation from and desire for God. In Calvin, then, Greville finally found an authority more congenial to his own way of thinking than Sidney was. And when he eventually went his way without Sidney, he derived sanction not from other poets but from a religious and philosophical system which, though it was never completely

accepted in England, did have a great intellectual impact there.[42]

This argument, that Greville began writing under the auspices of Sidney and, finding them constraining, turning to Calvin entails assumptions about the composition of Caelica which, in all fairness, require clarification. The basic assumption is that the order in which the Caelica lyrics have come down to us, is substantially the order in which they were written. Since Volume E of the Warwick manuscript, where the lyrics are found (and on which Geoffrey Bullough bases his modern edition), is a scribal rather than original copy, one cannot know to what extent Greville shifted the placement of the lyrics after he wrote them. From holograph comments in the margins, we can determine only that Greville probably approved their arrangement.[43] Most scholars, however, have put forth a chronological theory, partly on the grounds that, aside from occasional clusters of two or three poems based on the same theme or image, the lyrics are arranged in no other exact order, either of subject, person addressed, or form.[44] Furthermore, the changes that occur in the course of the collection do seem to indicate a chronological development. Poems of Petrarchan love tend to appear early on in the collection and then to drop out almost entirely; while poems of carnal love, which are introduced in the beginning, become far more prevalent. In the early poems, Greville's political and religious interests are submerged in conceits having to do with love; but with sonnet LXVII these concerns become increasingly overt, and after

LXXXIV, a farewell to love poem, they take over the collection entirely. The style of the poems changes accordingly. The earliest lyrics are written in the ornate, rhetorical style of much of the Arcadia and of Spenser's Amoretti; the middle poems, modelled on the conversational mode of Astrophil and Stella, tend to be more colloquial and less figured, and their crude addresses to a promiscuous mistress often approach the obscenity of many of Shakespeare's sonnets to his dark lady; and, finally, the last third or so of the sequence consists of somber, bare, direct, and highly literal admonitions and meditations such as are found in no other poet of the period. As for the form of the lyrics, there are fewer and fewer fourteen line sonnets as the sequence progresses and an increasing proportion of poems formed out of six or four line stanzas. These descriptions are all approximations, but nonetheless they do suggest a rough chronological development.

The other assumption is that the writing of Caelica involved Greville in a struggle with the genre of what later critics would call the sonnet sequence, or to put it somewhat differently, that the varied and anomalous character of the collection indicates that Greville was in fact searching for the appropriate authority, was searching for the language and conventions that would suit what he had to say. While we know very little about the dating and composition of Caelica, what we do know suggests that Greville's efforts were indded groping and tentative. Caelica was written over an extraordinarily long span of about forty years, begun in

1577-8 and completed in 1610 at the earliest and probably closer to 1620 or thereafter.[45] Unlike other sonneteers of the late sixteenth century, Greville did not simply dash off a sonnet sequence. In the long process of composition, Greville strained the limits of the traditional sonnet collection. At their loosest, these were "collections of variously-styled love poems bound together by persona, plot, rhetoric, theme, and a dedication to the same lady."[46] Greville's rhymed sapphics, ottava rima, poulter's measure, sonnets, and poems composed of quatrains, sextains, or a combination of the two are more than means of achieving variety. In the absence of other unifying features, the profusion of forms may well hint at a conflict between artistry and expression. Greville's opting for looser forms as the sequence progresses suggests as much.

Struggle is also indicated in Greville's treatment of Caelica's subject matter, which is even more far-reaching than its forms. It is not simply that Greville eventually abandons love for politics and religion, but that throughout Caelica "the sonnet is used . . . for purposes to which it was turned by nother poet during the Elizabethan flourishing."[47] Morris Croll was here referring to the inclusion of poems of morality and religion in a love sequence but his insight is applicable even to the poems ostensibly about love, whose basic concern is not with love at all but with the human condition after the Fall of Adam. The love poems occupy themselves with such large matters as universal flux, man's pride, and the difference between appearance and real-

ity. They introduce political and religious motifs, and they generalize about the nature of man's experience. While the incorporation of other themes into a love sequence is not entirely unusual -- witness Sidney's and Shakespeare's sonnets on the writer's craft[48] -- the various themes are generally subordinated to the love interest and bound together by a common reference to a loved object. This is patently not the case in Caelica. The most immediate indication of the absence of such a centrifugal force lies in the indifferent characterization of the collection's personae. That the women in Petrarchan poems are rarely more than shadows is an accepted truism, but in Caelica they are not even dramatically consistent shadows. Greville addresses three laides, Cynthia, Myra, and Caelica, who are not only indistinguishable but also self-contradictory. They all may be depicted alternately as models of chastity and as examples of promiscuity; and in several lyrics (XXXVII, XLVI, XLVIII, LXXIV) Greville freely substitutes one for another as rhyme or meter dictates.[49] Similarly, the male persona may be depicted as an innocent, doting, and long suffering supplicant in one lyric and as a worldly, unscrupulous seducer in the next. Greville is barely interested in his lovers. He seems rather to struggle with them and with the entire theme of love as he tries to deal with more pressing philosophical concerns.

In the religious and philosophical lyrics that occupy the last third of Caelica, Greville seems to have harmonized his own interests with the lyric form. But even those poems

seem to have been difficult for him. By 1610 or so, when he wrote his biography of Sidney, Greville seems to have been so embarrassed not only by the subject of love but also by the lyric form itself that he pointedly omitted mentioning either Astrophil and Stella or Caelica, which by then presumably included a large number of religious and philosophical poems, in his account, where he did discuss both his own and Sidney's other creations. When Greville lost interest in the love lyric, either immediately after Sidney's death in 1586 or in the following decade,[50] Greville devoted the larger part of his artistic energy to longer works: the prose Letter to an Honourable Lady, the heavily revised closet-dramas Mustapha and Alaham, the Life of Sir Philip Sidney, and the verse treatises on Fame and Honour, Warres, Humane Learning and Religion. The ample size of these works allowed Greville the scope to explore as fully as he wished new and important subjects, and the later lyrics are so similar to the longer works that Morris Croll has called them "chips thrown off" in their making.[51] The point of these observations is to suggest that Greville wrote the later lyrics at the same time as he apparently regarded longer forms as more valid in themselves and as more appropriate to the ideas he had to convey. It seems too that Greville wrote those lyrics despite some hesitation and reluctance. Yet, many of those lyrics are of an extraordinarily fine quality, which suggests that Greville may have been trying to do someting in the lyric form that he could not do in other genres. In other words, in the later lyrics, Greville seems to solve a problem of language

and style that is peculiar to the lyric as he was trying to write it throughout Caelica.

What was Greville grappling with in Caelica? What necessitated the search for appropriate authority and the re-creation of the lyric form? We have already suggested that the root of the difficulties as well as of the originality of Caelica is Greville's absorption with the Fall. For all of its derivativeness, Caelica is a more personal collection of poems than was customary for the age or the genre, for in it Greville struggles with the very questions that make a man write in the first place -- the problem of human destiny. The language and conventions that were represented by Sidney's work were made for less monumental uses and buckled under the pressure of Greville's thought. Calvin, who was not a poet and could not provide poetic models, freed Greville to follow his thoughts and to create his own language.

NOTES

1. The Life of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 323

2. The phrase is from Sidney's "Dispraise of a Courtly Life," the second of the "Two Pastorells" that were written, according to the subtitle, "Upon his meeting with his two worthy Friends and fellow-Poets, Sir Edward Dier, and Maister Fulke Greville." Quoted from The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, ed., William A. Ringler, Jr. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 260, 263. All quotations from Certain Sonnets and from Astrophil and Stella will be taken from Ringler's edition.

3. In Thomas Humphry Ward, ed., The English Poets: Selections With Critical Introductions (London: Macmillan, 1907), I, 367.

4. Ed., Caelica (Newtown, England: Gregynog Press, 1936), p. v.

5. The Works of Fulke Greville: A Thesis (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1903), p. 28.

6. Fulke Greville's Caelica: An Evaluation (Brattleboro, Vt.: Privately Printed, 1942), p. 154.

7. The Life of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Nowell Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907). Life of Sidney is the conventionally abbreviated title. Hereafter referred to as Life. Page numbers will be included in my text.

8. The Works of Charles and Mary Lamb, ed., E. V. Lucas (1903; rpt. New York: Ames Press, 1968) I, 50

9. The Complete Works, ed. P. P. Howe, 21 vols. (1933, rpt. New York: Ames Press, 1967) XVII, 124.

10. Miscellaneous Criticism, ed. Thomas Middleton Raysor (1936; rpt. Folcroft, Pa.: Folcroft Press, 1969), p. 243.

11. "Metaphysical Poetry and the Greatness of Fulke Greville." The Critical Review, Melburne, Sidney. no. 8 (1965), 103-4.

12. Forms of Discovery: Critical and Historical Essays on the Forms of the Short Poem in English (Chicago: A. Swallow, 1947), pp. 44-6.

13. Peterson, The English Lyric from Wyatt to Donne: A History of the Plain and Eloquent Styles (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1967); Williams, English Renaissance Poetry: A Collection of Shorter Poems from Skelton to Jonson (New York: Anchor, 1963).

14. Richard Waswo, The Fatal Mirror: Themsa and Techniques in the Poetry of Fulke Greville (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1972); Joan Rees, Fulke Greville Lord Brooke,

1554-1628: A Critical Biography (Berkely: Univ. of California Press, 1971).

15. Life of Fulke Greville, p. ix.

16. Waswo, Fatal Mirror, p. 57.

17. Fatal Mirror, p. 167.

18. English Literature of the Earlier Seventeenth Centuries, 1600-1660, Oxford History of English Literature, 2nd ed. (1945; rpt. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 524.

19. Rebholz makes highly elaborate connections between Greville's life and works, and he bases arguments about the dating of individual works on his interpretation of Greville's life. A refutation of Rebholz' view of Greville is offered by F. J. Levy, "Fulke Greville: The Courtier as Philosopher Poet," Mod. Lang. Q., XXXIII (Dec. 1972), 433-48.

20. A Critical History of English Literature (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1960), I, 201.

21. English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, Excluding Drama, Oxford History of English Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 523.

22. The Metaphysical Poets: A Study in Religious Experience (New York: Macmillan, 1936), p. 53. For an extended contrast between Greville and Donne and Herbert, see Waswo, Fatal Mirror, pp. 131-42.

23. The Life of Fulke Greville, p. 323.

24. William Frost adopts a similar view, as he observes that "Greville's increasing power reaches the fullest extent where the similarities to Sidney cease or become unimportant." Fulke Greville's 'Caelica,' p. 154. The idea is a commonplace of Greville criticism. My own thesis expands the theory by first exploring more fully why Greville was unable to adapt Sidney's way of writing and, then, by insisting that even where he departed from Sidney, Greville always needed some sort of authority ot sanction his own work.

25. My account is based largely on Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, passim, and on Geoffrey Bullough's Introduction to his edition, The Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945), I, 2-8.

26. Life, pp. 3, 35, 45-61.

27. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, p. 32..

28. Life, pp. 2, 32, 33, 34, 150.

29. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, pp. 10, 14-15, 27, 310. A. A. Dickens, The English Reformation (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 314. Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), p. 87; William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism . . . 1570-1643 (1939; rpt. New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 71-2.

30. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, p. 142

31. The Puritan as political dissident is described by Horton Davis, The Worship of the English Puritans (Westminster: Daco Press, 1948) Harold C. Porter, Puritanism in Tudor England (Columbia, S.C.: South Carolina Press, 1971) and Everett H. Emerson, English Puritanism from John Hooper to John Milton (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1968) anthologize and comment on the writings of the dissidents. The Puritan as moral perfectionist is described by Marshall M. Knappen, Tudor Puritanism: A Chapter in the History of Idealism (1939; rpt. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 341-6. Clearly, the very name "Puritan" causes difficulties, because it was originally a term of abuse that conjured up images of hysterical zeal and sedition and, later, was left to historians to apply and define. Knappen, pp. 494-518, gives a concise account of the history of the term. Unfortunately, this dissertation cannot do justice to the complexities of the word and thus uses it with little precision.

32. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, pp. 18-21, 27-9, 35-8, 47, 272-6.

33. "The Intellectual Background of Fulke Greville," Diss. Stanford, 1955, p. 83.

34. "Intellectual Background of Fulke Greville," p. 44, 71. For the claim that Greville held firmly to Calvin's theories of predestination, see Jean Jacquot, "Religion et raison d'état dans l'oeuvre de Fulke Greville," Études Anglaises, V (1952), 211-22.

35. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, pp. 24-5, 107, n. 58.

36. Tudor Puritanism, p. 370.

37. The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation, 1570-1640 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), p. 66.

38. Collinson, Elizabethan Puritan Movement, pp. 36-7; Dickens, English Reformation, p. 313.

39. Collinson, Elizabethan Puritan Movement, pp. 27-8; George, Protestant Mind, pp. 7, 35; John F. H. New, Anglican and Puritan: The Basis of Their Opposition (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1964), p. 17.

40. Life of Fulke Greville, pp. 21-5, 303-13.

41. Greville's Caelica, p. 26.

42. Knappen, Tudor Puritanism, p. 349. For the intellectual impact of Calvinism on England, see Charles David Cremeans, The Reception of Calvinist Thought in England (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1949), p. 60; Hardin Craig, The Enchanted Glass: The Elizabethan Mind in Literature (1935; rpt. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), pp. 55-8; and John T. McNeill, The History and Character of Calvinism (1954; rpt. New York: Oxford, 1967), pp. 309-23.

43. Besides sonnet LXXXVIII Greville left a note stating that the poem should have been placed after sonnet LXXVI.

44. The theory of chronological order was held by every Greville scholar until very recently (see note 45), when Gary L. Litt, "Images of Life: A Study of Narrative and Structure in Fulke Greville's Caelica," SP, LXIX (Apl. 1972), 217-20, argues that Greville both revised and rearranged his manuscript so as to attain a progressive and unified sequence. Litt does concede, however, that most of the lyrics probably are in chronological order.

45. The subject of the composition and dating of Caelica is fraught with controversey, mainly because the posthumous publication of the poems leaves little concrete evidence. My own discussion is culled from the following sources: Bullough, Poems and Drama, I, 23-44; G. S. Wilkes, "The Sequence of the Writings of Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke," SP, LVI (1959), 485-503; Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, pp. 326-40; Rees, Fulke Greville, pp. 207-12; _____, "Fulke Greville's Epitaph on Sidney," RES, XIX (Feb. 1968), 47-51; Croll, Works of Fulke Greville, pp. 7-17; Frost, Greville's Caelica, pp. 12-15; and W. Hilton Kelliher, "The Warwick Manuscripts of Fulke Greville," British Museum Quarterly, XXXIV (1970), 107-21. Croll and Frost are dated, and Bullough seems to be. Bullough assume that Caelica was completed by about 1610; he arrives at that date by determining, on the basis of watermarks and other uncertain evidence, that Volume E of the Warwick manuscript was copied by then. Rebholz dates the end of Caelica at 1622-8; his conclusion is based on further conjectures about the relation between Greville's life and his works. Kelliher, who has analyzed the Greville manuscripts most recently, marks the terminal date for Caelica at 1625. There is less controversy about the date when Caelica was begun, and that is usually taken as 1577-8, when Sidney began to write verse seriously.

46. Paula Bernat, "Images of Life: A Study of Theme and Convention in Faulke Greville's Caelica," Diss. Columbia, 1972, p. 87. As an example of a collection of love lyrics in various forms, Bernat cites Barnabe Barnes, Parthenophil and Parthenope: Sonnets, madrigals, elegies, and odes.

47. Works of Fulke Greville, p. 7.

48. For a comment on diversity of Shakespeare's sonnets, see Patrick Crutwell, The Shakespearean Moment: And its Place in the Poetry of the Seventeenth Century (New York: Vintage, 1960), p. 10

49. Norman K. Farmer, Jr., "Fulke Greville's Caelica: A Study in Meaning and Style," Diss. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1966, pp. 41-2, argues that Caelica consistently represents chaste love and Myra sexual love. The sonnets hardly validate this interpretation.

50. Determining when Greville bid his farewell to love and confined himself to writing poems of religion, philosophy, and state is as complicated as dating the rest of the poems. Sound circumstantial evidence allows us to date the completion of Caelica I-IXXVI and IXXXIII by 1583. For the rest, whether Greville stopped writing love lyrics in 1586, when Sidney died, or in 1603, when Queen Elizabeth died, or sometime inbetween, cannot be known for sure.

II. Caelica and the Fall of Man

The Edenic story -- the brief time in Paradise, the Fall and expulsion from bliss, the life of deprivation and sin, and the longing to regain that lost communion with God, that lost and ever-remembered joy -- is central to Caelica. It is the one story reiterated, in whole or part, throughout the collection of 109 lyrics; the one adventure that permeates the poems of love, of government, and of religion; and the one theme that held Greville's interest through the long span of his poetic career.

The theme seems to arise naturally enough out of the traditional language of love poetry. Poets before and after Greville would write that the requited lover gloried in paradise, where he enjoyed the fruits of a rich garden, and where he acquired knowledge, carnal or spiritual, which he had never had before. They would write that the rejected lover had fallen from heaven to hell, that he had been betrayed and banished, as Adam had been betrayed by the serpent and banaished from the place of pre-lapsarian bliss.

It is no novelty for Greville to call love "The paradise of Nature in perfection" (IX), sexual pleasure "the fruit that is forbidden" (V), and the lover's rejection by his mistress as his "fall" (LXIV). Nor are the terms of the lament "My Saint hath turn'd away her face, and made that heaven my hell" (LXXXIII) anything but traditional. It is not surprising that the words "you banish'd were" (LXXIII) describe the mistress' rejection of her lover; or that the

lover identifies earthly love as a love which will "betray me" (LXXXIV) and Christian love as the love "Which of the joyes to come doth witnesse beare" (LXXXV). For these references, Greville had only to adopt a language long familiar in and appropriate to love poetry.

What is striking are the explicitness and thoroughness with which the Edenic myth is integrated into the lyrics. In LXXI, Cupid recalls the myth to explain that his failure in love was caused by his naïveté: "My Paradise and Adams diverse were:/ His fall was Knowledge, mine Simplicitie." In XLVI, the lover evokes the myth to reject the counsels of an allegorical Patience: "Perswade you me to joy, when I am banish'd?/ Why preach you time to come, and joyes with it,/ Since time already come, my joyes hath vanish'd?" Finding himself banished from his first Paradise, the lover repudiates the Christian heaven of an indefinite "time to come." In XLIV, the speaker identifies the classical Golden Age with pre-lapsarian times, when "the Serpents had not stung," and contrasts the perfection of those times with the decadence of his own. The use of the myth in these three poems is unusual, for the myth does not simply provide a source of allusion, but seems to form part of the poems' arguments and meanings.

The Edenic myth is even more essential to the philosophic and religious poems of Caelica than it is to the love lyrics. It is the Fall, and man's subsequent life in sin, that give rise to the poet's rejection of book learning in LXVI:

> What then need halfe-fast helps of erring wit, . . .
> Since outward wisdome springs from truth within,
> Which all men feel, or heare, before they sinne.

It is the Fall that explains, in LXXIX, why men tend to select the worse over the better government:

> So likewise mankinde, when true Government
> Her great examples to the world brings forth,
> Straight in the errors native discontent,
> Sees apparitions opposite to worth.

In the sixteenth century "error" meant sin (OED, 5). The quatrain asserts that man's power to alleviate the unhappiness that stems from sin is thwarted by sin. Confined within the misery of "error," that is ignorance and sin, people try to improve their lives by perversely making those false and futile choices that can only worsen their condition. In XCVI, Greville claims that man is motivated by sin: "So his affections carries on, and casts/ In declination to the errour still." All of CII is devoted to exploring how "The Serpent, Sinne, by shewing humane lust/ Visions and dreams inticed men to doe/ Follies" -- that is, to fall. The penitential meditations, XCVII-XCIX, and CIX, are organized around the problem of "Mans degeneration."

These are only the most demonstrable examples, but by now it should be obvious that the myth of the Fall is more than the simple source of allusion that it may at first appear to be.[1] For Greville, the Edenic story was real. It was not a myth as I have been calling it. The Bible told that man had lived in Paradise, that he had sinned, and that he had fallen. In Greville's thinking, man had done all those things. Thus, when Greville incorporates the story into a lyric, the subject of that poem must be, to some extent,

man's loss of perfection. Greville finds in the Fall an explanation for the persistent unhappiness in human life, for man's failure to understand the reality around him, and for his perverse wrong choosing. To read Caelica sympathetically, one must understand the power that the Fall had in Greville's thinking and in his poetry.

But before considering the place of the Fall in Greville's lyrics, we should be aware that in his intense and persistent reference to the fatal event, Greville read history with Calvin and Perkins (Calvin's Puritan interpreter) rather than with Hooker and Andrews and other moderates of the English Church.

Of course, the memory of a paradisal place, the catastrophe of the Fall, and the longing to regain lost bliss are common to all Christians. The literature and painting of the Middle Ages and Renaissance are replete with images of unspoiled gardens, accounts of the Golden Age, and other allegories of Eden, which gave expression to the "longing for the Earthly Paradise" that Christianity encouraged.[2] More immediately, the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England made ample reference to the Fall. Article IX determined that on account of the Fall "man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil." Article X asserted that "after the fall of Adam . . . we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will."

Despite their shared Christian reading of history and their common doctrinal reference, Anglicans and Puritans differed precisely "in their measurement of man's fall at the Fall."[3] On the whole, fallen man was a comparatively more decent creature and the fallen world a more comfortable place in Anglican theology than in that of the Puritans. The Thrity-Nine Articles, a compromise designed to include among its adherents as many Englishmen as possible, incorporated a doctrinal looseness which, according to Cremeans, "allowed members of the Established Church of England to follow whatever theology they chose."[4] Thus, the Articles were intentionally vague as to exactly how corrupted man was by the Fall, as to how evil his natural inclinations were, and as to how much, if at all, he could help reverse the damage of the Fall by cooperating with God's grace. Anglicans and Puritans both regarded man as absolutely impotent spiritually, as a miserable sinner unable to effect his own salvation. But they differed markedly in their assessment of man's earthly status.

Taking Hooker and Calvin as convenient poles (for their respective views mark the Anglican-Puritan division in English thought), one can see the difference in the very first pages of their major works. Calvin's Institutes opens with immediate notice of the damage done by the Fall and with an emphatic contrast between God's majesty and fallen man's depravity: Calvin writes that "the miserable ruin into which the rebellion of the first man cast us

compels us to look upward . . . Thus, from the feeling of our own ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity, and -- what is more -- depravity and corruption, we recognize that the true light of reason, sound virtue, full abundance of every good, and purity of righteousness rests in the Lord alone" (1.1.1).[5] Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity opens with a view of universal order, which binds God to man; "All things therefore do work after a sort, according to law," writes Hooker; and even "the Being of God is a kind of law in his working" (1.1.2).[6] The idea of a well ordered, comprehensible universe, run by a rational God who himself embodies law implicitly mitigates the Fall's awful effects. This difference in emphasis would lead to very different interpretations of the Article's statement that man is "very far gone from original righteousness."

In Hooker's view, the Fall left man with some capacity for doing and being good. The fallen soul, according to Hooker, was capable "of a more divine perfection" and retained "the ability of reaching higher than unto sensible things" (1.6.3). Hooker not only accorded to man's fallen will some freedom of choice but held that it "naturally and necessarily doth desire the utmost good and greatest perfection whereof Nature hath made it capable" (1.8.1). Like all Christians, Hooker "presupposed" the "corruption of our nature" (1.10.9) and man's inclination to err. But he also believed that "evil as evil cannot be desired" (1.7.6), and consequently he sought correctives for man's misguided inclinations in education, which would teach man to distinguish

good from evil (1.6.7), and in civil laws, which would restrain individuals where their own reason failed (1.10.1-7). This is not to say that man had no need for grace; he did. But in Hooker's view, grace simply complemented nature. Nature itself, both in man and in the universe at large, was, according to Hooker, "nothing else but God's instrument" (1.3.4). It lacked perfection, certainly, but that could be added to it. And thus Hooker insisted on a reciprocity between nature and grace, whereby "nature hath need of grace" but "grace hath use of nature" (3.8.6).

While for Hooker the Fall was damaging, for Calvin it was utterly incapacitating. Calvin repeatedly insists that in fallen man and fallen nature there is nothing but evil. At the Fall, God's image in man was "so corrupted that whatever remains is frightful deformity" (1.15.4). Not only man's body, but his soul too is utterly depraved. Calvin uses the word "flesh" to define both the body and soul of fallen man. He asserts that "in man's nature there is nothing but flesh" (2.3.1), and he argues that flesh is "so perverse that it is wholly disposed to bear a grudge against God, cannot agree with the justice of divine law, can, in short, occasion nothing but death" (2.3.1). Thus, in contrast to Hooker, Calvin denies to man's fallen will even the striving for ordinary moral decency, saying that at the Fall the will "was so bound to wicked desires that it cannot strive after the right" (2.2.12). In fact, fallen "nature is not only destitute and empty of good, but so fertile and

fruitful of every evil that it cannot be idle" (2.1.8). Given the absolute evil of fallen nature, both in man and in the universe, mere correctives such as education and law are obviously wholly inadequate to improve man's condition. Nor can nature in its fallen state be considered a base to which God's grace may be added. For Calvin, nature and grace are antithetical, and the function of grace is not to perfect nature, but to overthrow it. Thus, Calvin insists that "we are not conformed to the fear of God and do not learn the rudiments of piety unless we are violently slain by the sword of the Spirit and brought to nought" (3.3.8). He asserts that "we have nothing of the Spirit . . . except through regeneration" (2.3.1), and that man's totally corrupted sould needs not only to be healed but also "to put on a new nature as well" (2.1.9).

Greville, at any specific point in his life, may or may not have agreed with the details of Calvin's interpretation. As we have already noted in the Introduction, Greville's theological views are difficult to assess, though in his later years he clearly held to the need for renewal and regeneration. What we wish to emphasize is that the anxiety clearly inherent in Calvin's view of the Fall is behind Greville's many references to the event, even in the love lyrics, where the problem seems extraneous.[7] After all, if the damage done by the Fall was so totally devestating that one could not make the best of a bad situation, and, with the help of grace, live a reasonably moral and comfortable life,

but needed rather to become a totally new being in a totally new world, one would give the fateful incident a great deal of thought. Calvin certainly does; Hooker rarely mentions it. Milton, who was troubled enough by the theme to write an epic of "man's first disobedience" was Oliver Cromwell's secretary. And Greville endows the event with such magnitude that it becomes in his lyrics a primal situation through which everything else is felt and experienced.

I do not think that it is too sweeping a generalization to claim that the poems in Caelica are basically about the Fall, and that in the love lyrics Greville uses love as a metaphoric situation through which to discuss its effects, though one may question whether he always does so intentionally. The theme of love lends itself to this use because fulfilled love is an experience in which a person may hope to extend himself beyond the customary limitations of his fallen nature, and, conversely, failed love indicates most poignantly how limited one may well be.

Two poems, XXXVIII and LIX, indicate with particular clarity the way in which the Fall operates in Greville's love lyrics. Each sonnet may be read in a traditional Petrarchan context, the first as a complaint of the lady's infidelity, the second as an explanation for the lover's proverbial sufferings. Yet, an analysis of these lyrics suggests that the Fall, not love, is uppermost in Greville's mind. Caelica XXXVIII and LIX deal respectively with man's expulsion from Paradise and his desire to regain it.

In Caelica XXXVIII the expulsion from Paradise seems to form an allegorical base upon which the story of a sexual adventure and rejection is narrated.[8] Like Adam, the lover enjoys the fruit of paradise, is expelled when he obtains a hidden, illicit knowledge, and is prevented by angelic guards from re-entering the place of bliss:

> "Caelica, I overnight was finely used,
> Lodg'd in the midst of paradise, your Heart:
> Kind thoughts had charge I might not be refused,
> Of every fruit and flower I had part.
>
> But curious Knowledge, blowne with busie flame,
> The sweetest fruits had downe in shadowes hidden,
> And for it found mine eyes had seene the same,
> I from my paradise was straight forbidden.
>
> Where that Curre, Rumor, runnes in every place,
> Barking with Care, begotten out of feare;
> And glassy Honour, tender of Disgrace,
> Stands Ceraphin to see I come not there;
> While that fine soyle, which all these joyes did yeeld,
> By broken fence is prov'd a common field.*

While a sexual reading of the poem is certainly valid, it is insufficient. Such an interpretation would compel us to regard the biblical terms as no more than tactful fillers for sexual ones. Unraveling the allegory, we would read in the first quatrain an account of a sexual adventure, to which the words "Paradise," "fruits," and "flowers" clearly refer. We would read the second quatrain as an account of sexual rejection in which the lover was forbidden to enjoy his mistress again; we would notice that his expulsion, like Adam's was on account of his obtaining a forbidden "knowledge." The third quatrain, we would read as an explanation

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*I have modernized the i, j, u, and v in all quotations

of the way in which social pressures contributed to the lover's frustration. The phrase "Stands Ceraphim" we might regard as a witty extension of the initial allegory.

With this interpretation the poem falls flat, because such an interpretation regards the poem's language as extrinsic to its meaning. Of course, this may be the case. But if we read the poem carefully, we cannot fail to see that it is only ostensibly about a sexual experience. The sonnet does not primarily evoke that experience.

The first stanza, which purports to describe a night of sexual activity, is hardly sensual. The words "paradise," "fruit," and "flower," which in a poem by Spenser might be highly evocative of sensual experience, here merely refer to that experience. The evocative power that the words potentially have is cut off. The potential of "paradise" to suggest sexual pleasure is obstructed by the appositive "your heart," which immediately delimits the word. The potential of "fruit" and "flower" to suggest the sweetness and fulness in the sexual act is stunted by the way in which the phrase is locked into an end-stopped line and the way in which that line comes as the close of a quatrain in which every line follows the first with the order of a list. In fact, the quatrain is singularly static for its supposed subject. Although the protagonists Caelica and "I" appear, they scarcely act. Caelica's own volition is supplanted by the"charge" of "kind thoughts." The lover is passive. He was done to: "finely used," "lodge," "not . . . refused"; he did not savor or enjoy, but "had part." Similarly, the

second stanza fails to evoke the emotions of a rejected lover. The action of that quatrain is dominated by "curious knowledge," whose allegorical force had "hidden," "found," and "forbidden." In the sestet, which deals with the aftermath of the sexual experience, the biblical language of the Fall is retained beyond the possible requirement for modesty or obliqueness. We see the image of "Honour" standing "Ceraphin," guarding both Caelica and the gates of Eden. The apparently gratuitous extension of the language of the Fall, coupled with the poem's lack of sensuality and the speaker's passivity, suggests that the Fall is the poem's main subject. In this poem, sexual exclusion symbolizes the exclusion from Paradise, not the other way around.

The expression of sexual disgust in the closing couplet -- "While that fine soyle, which all these joyes did yeeld,/ By broken fence is prov'd a common field" -- is also notable. The extreme nastiness of the tone arises, I believe, from the fact that the poem is written from the perspective of a man strongly conscious of living in the fallen world, which is after all a "common field." Given a sexual interpretation, the last two lines accuse Caelica of promiscuity. On one level the bitter sniggering of "broken fence" and "common field" is entirely in accord with the rejecting and hypocritical behavior which elicited it. Yet the tone also expresses, I believe, the rage at being excluded from a real Eden. Again, the sexual event seems to be symbolic of the Fall. What has happened is that the "fine soyle" of Paradise which yielded all man's "joyes" has degenerated into

the "common" -- that is vulgar and ordinary -- soil of the fallen world, which all men share and live in.

The entire poem is pervaded by an intense sense of loss that seems to refer more to the loss of Eden than to the loss of a woman. The narrative is told in retrospect. It emphasizes not the pleasure of sexual experience, but disappointment with its transience. Greville conveys his disappointment through the increasing nastiness of his tone. In the first line, the slightly satiric tone of "finely used" undercuts the sense of sexual pleasure. The satire grows stronger as the poem progresses. In the second quatrain "knowledge" is depicted not only as overly "curious" but also as actively malicious in "hiding" the "sweetest fruits" of Paradise, of sexuality, in "shadowes," where they are inaccessible. In the third quatrain, satire gives way to abuse. Rumor is called a "Curre," and the mistress' honor is described as "glassy" and merely concerned with public appearances, "tender of disgrace." The ugly tone of the couplet is thus the culmination of an anger which builds as the event is narrated. The recollection of the "joyes" of paradise in line 13, evokes not the sense of pleasure, but nostalgia. Nostalgia takes the place of sensuous evocation of experience because the experience of being in Paradise is not remembered but longed for.

Caelica LIX is about the desire to return to Paradise. The poem is organized by an analogy: trying to move Caelica is like sailing past the Bermudas. The first two stanzas detail the difficulties and rewards of sailing past the

Bermuda Islands on the way to the New World. The last two stanzas present the difficulties and rewards of seeking "the God of Love, in Beauties skye":

> Who ever sailes neere to Bermuda coast,
> Goes hard aboord the Monarchy of Feare,
> Where all desires (but Lifes desire) are lost,
> For wealth and fame put off their glories there.
>
> Yet this Ile poyson-like, by mischiefe knowne,
> Weanes not desire from her sweet nurse, the Sea;
> But unseene showes us where our hopes be sowne,
> With woefull signes declaring joyfull way.
> For who will seeke the wealth of Westerne Sunne,
> Oft by Bermuda's miseries must runne.
>
> Who seeks the God of Love, in Beauties skye,
> Must passe the Empire of confused Passion,
> Where our desires to all but Horrors die,
> Before that joy and peace can take their fasion.
>
> Yet this faire Heaven that yeelds this Soule-despaire,
> Weanes not the heart from his sweet God, Affection;
> But rather shewes us what sweet joyes are there,
> Where constancy is servant to perfection.
> Who Caelica's chast heart then seeks to moue,
> Must joy to suffer all the woes of Love.

To understand this poem, we must understand the purpose and form of its analogy.

Ordinarily, one term of analogy is subordinate to another. The subordinate term may lend emotional color to the main one and/or clarify the latter's meaning. In the first case, the aura of adventure and religious fervor with which the Bermuda voyages were invested in the sixteenth century might glamorize and enoble the strivings of the suffering lover. In the second, the account of the voyage might help explain why the lover "Must joy to suffer all the woes of love." The reasoning might go something like this: Sailing past the Bermudas was notoriously dangerous. The islands,

called by sailors "The Devils Islands," were rocky, tempestuous, and believed to be inhabited by devils.[9] Yet it was obvious that anyone who wanted the profits that could be extracted from the American mainland had to pass the Bermudas, though they risked shipwreck there. The necessity that the lover suffer, however, was less obvious. To explain the pain traditionally associated with love, the poem states that seeking love is like sailing past the Bermudas and that just as the sea voyager must endure the treacheries of the seas, the lover, "Must joy to suffer all the woes of love."

The above formulations are not entirely valid, however, because the first half of the analogy is not subordinate to the second half. The two parts of the poem have equal space. They are not tied together by a subordinating like or a rationalizing thus or therefore, but linked paratactically. They are held together by a succession of parallel constructions, which make them almost mirror images of each other. The first quatrains of each part set forth the sufferings of the protagonists. "Who ever sails" and "Who seeks" both endure emotional pain: the first in the "Monarchy of Feare," and the second in the "Empire of confused Passion." Both lose all desire but for the mere sustenance of life. The second quatrains of each part state that the source of pain is also the source of joy. The teacherous Bermuda, "poyson-like, by mischiefe knowne,/ . . . showes us where our hopes be sowne." Love, "that yeelds this Soule-despaire,/

. . . shewes us what sweet joyes are there." Moreover, in neither instance is the pain so severe that it "weanes" the person away from experiencing it: the voyager continues to desire the "sweet nurse, the Sea"; the lover remains attached to the "sweet God, Affection." Each half concludes with an epigramatic couplet that summarizes the lesson of the preceding two quatrains.

I am belaboring these obvious likenesses in order to emphasize the equality of the parts of the analogy. This equality makes the poem as much about the voyage past Bermuda as about the yearnings of the Petrarchan lover. These two subjects are related as separate examples of the same theme: the Christian life seen as a voyage to another life.

In the first half of the poem, Greville draws on contemporary associations of the New World with the Earthly Paradise. At the time, the Bermuda Islands were considered a dangerous way station en route to the American continent. It is easy enough to see the voyage past Bermuda as a voyage to the terrestrial paradise. Hakluyt had called Virginia "the paradise of the world."[10] In 1610, William Strachy would write of Sir Thomas Gates' shipwreck on the Bermudas and his subsequently successful transport to Virginia under a title suggestive of such a spritual journey: A True Reportorie of the Wrack and Redemption of Sir Thomas Gates; upon and from the Islands of the Bermudas. Note the religious terms "wrack" and "redemption," and the way in which respectively they suggest that the Bermudas is a kind

of proving ground and the mainland a kind of heaven for the Christian voyager.[11]

Greville adapts the imaginative view of the voyages to write about a journey to an extra-terrestrial paradise. Thus, while he notes that travellers must sail "neere to Bermuda coast" and risk the dangers of "this Ile poyson-like, by mischiefe knowne," to reach another place, he is singularly reticent about the continent itself. He does not name it; he does not mention its temperate climate, vegetable abundance, gold, fragrant air or any of the other things for which it was known. For the destination of his voyagers is a spiritual place. They "seeke the wealth of Westerne Sunne," a spiritual wealth which is explicitly contrasted with the material "wealth and fame" that "put off their glories there." Their journey is to the next life, the place of the "Westerne," or setting, "Sunne"; to heaven, "where our hopes be sowne."[12] Their only remaining desire is "Lifes desire"; that is the desire not only for physical life or for the bare necessities which maintain it, but also for the Christian life of the soul after death.

The poem thus presents the voyage "neere to Bermuda coast" as a voyage through this life to the next. To reach heaven, the good Christian "Oft by Bermuda's miseries must runne." That is, he must suffer through his life. He must live it in trepidation, and he must reject physical goods for spiritual ones. However, he cannot simply despair and give up this life. The actuality of fear, pain, and de-

privation "Weanes not desire from her sweet nurse, the Sea." Experience, though painful, is still valued. For it is the pain of this life that "showes us where our hopes be sowne,/ With woeful signes declaring joyful way." The way is joyful because it leads to the next world.

The second part of the poem provides another example of the Christian life. The lover, like other Christians, is a voyager. In seeking "the God of Love, in Beauties skye," he seeks transcendance. His destination is like the Christian heaven, a place of "joy and peace." Before he can reach it, he must suffer a life of emotional turmoil, "Must passe the Empire of confused Passion." He too must relinquish material goods; he lives on "Horrors." Nor may he despair. He "Must joy to suffer all the woes of Love." The anticipation of earthly pain "Weanes not the heart from his sweet God, Affection"; for this life is on the way to the next.

Like Caelica XXXVIII, this poem is also written from the perspective of a man who is painfully aware of being on the outside of bliss. In its tone there is also longing and wistfulness. How hazy the "wealth of Westerne Sunne." How remote there is "Where constancy is servant to perfection." The entire poem is written as a proposition, without commitment. "Who ever sailes" and "who seeks" may be able to find peace after suffering, but the speaker does not directly include himself among the voyagers. Though the tone is not bitter, it is not really joyful either. Like other fallen men, the poet is most aware of the pain of life, "the Monarchy of Feare," and the "Empire of confused Passion." He

follows "woefull signs" and his heaven first "yeelds this Soule-despaire."[13] His perception of loss tinges his anticipation of gain.

In short, as in XXXVIII, what appears to be a metaphor for a love experience is in itself the subject of the poem, while love becomes a metaphor for the desire to regain Paradise. The structure of the analogy and the tone of the poem both caution us to read the second two stanzas as an example of the Christian paradox that suffering in this life leads to joy in the next. In a Petrarchan reading, the lines "this faire Heaven that yeelds this Soule-despaire,/ . . . shews us what sweet joyes are there" would indicate that the mistress who gives the lover pain also leads him to pleasure. In a Christian reading, the lines indicate that a pious life of deprivation and despair on earth leads to joy in the afterlife.[14] The lover's plight, then, figures the plight of every Christian.

Yet, now that the point, that sonnet XXXVIII is about the expulsion from Paradise and sonnet LIX about the effort required to regain the lost place, has been made, it needs to be modified. For a simple reading of these poems tells how much is lost in overlooking the sexual content of XXXVIIII and the Petrarchanism of LIX. What I am trying to show, however, is that the Edenic perspective enormously undercuts the poems' conventional love content, and that in order to deal with the Fall Greville tends to elevate the imagery of the Fall to literal significance and to reduce the language of love to metaphor. But clearly the reversal

is less than complete. And it is because love serves Greville neither as a complete nor adequate metaphor for man's experience in the fallen world that many of Greville's love lyrics are at points strained, obscure, or unclearly focused.

In XXXVIII, for example, the second quatrain is ambiguous:

> But curious Knowledge, blowne with busie flame,
> The sweetest fruits had downe in shadowes hidden,
> And for it found mine eyes had seene the same,
> I from my paradise was straight forbidden.

The difficulty hinges on the word "Knowledge." I have suggested that Greville brings the word into the poem to help tell the story of the expulsion from Eden. Within the sexual narrative of the stanza, however, the word works differently. We can interpret the first two lines as saying that the inquisitiveness of neighbors compelled the lovers to take their pleasure in secret, "in shadowes," and the second two lines as saying that when the neighbors obtained knowledge of the affair, the mistress ended it. However, this reading, which I think is accurate in its own right, does not fit well with the Edenic story. In that story not somebody else's knowledge but the knowledge of the protagonist was in question. Thus, the word "knowledge" does not really serve the dual function required of it, and as a result there is a certain confusion in the quatrain.

In LIX, both the Petrarchan and the Christian readings leave unresolved tensions. To give the last two stanzas a Petrarchan interpretation detaches them too much from the first half of the poem: the voyage past the Bermudas

is too weighty a companion for a lover's travails. To give them a Christian interpreation imposes more weight on the Petrarchan language than it can really bear. The sonnet is less didactic than my interpretation makes it seem.

The problems in reading these poems reflect Greville's own difficulties in applying the language of the love lyric to the contemplation of man's fallen condition, that is to his underlying Calvinistic perspective. Yet while Greville's absorption with the Fall is responsible, at least in part, for much that is confusing or obscure in Caelica, it is also the source of the vitality, depth, and complexity of the best of the love lyrics.

NOTES

1. Other scholars have observed the importance of the Fall in Greville's thinking, though in general they have not attempted to show how his concern with the subject shaped his entire lyric creation. See, Jacquot, Études Anglaises, V, 212; Bernat, "Images of Life," p. 233; Utz, Hans Werner, Die Anschauungen über Wissenschaft und Religion im Werke Fulke Grevilles (Bern: A. Franke, 1948) p. 18.

2. The phrase is from A. Bartlett Giamatti, The Earthly Paradise and the Renaissance Epic (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966). See also, Harry Levin, The Myth of the Golden Age in the Renaissance (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1969); and Harry Berger, Jr., "The Renaissance Imagination: Second World and Green World," Centennial Review of Arts and Sciences, IX (Winter, 1965), 36-78.

3. Anglican and Puritan, p. 6. For a fuller discussion of the minute differences between the views of the two groups see Harold C. Porter, Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge, (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958), pp. 323-413; Virgil K. Whitaker, The Religious Basis of Spenser's Thought, Stanford University Publications, University Series, vol. VII, no. 3 (Stanford, California: Stanford Univ. Press, 1950), pp. 3-8, 30-9; Carter, "The Intellectual Background of Fulke Greville," pp. 17-40; William A. Curtis, A History of Creeds and Confessions of Faith in Christiandom and Beyond (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1911) pp. 164-92. My own observations are heavily indebted to these studies.

4. The Reception of Calvinist Thought in England, p. 61.

5. This and subsequent quotations are from John Calvin, Institutions of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans Ford Lewis Battles. Library of Christian Classics, vols. XX-XXI. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966.)

6. This and subsequent references are from Richard Hooker, The Works, ed. John Keele, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888).

7. The PMLA Bibliography lists an intriguing title, which indicates that someone else has studied the relation between Calvinism and Greville's love lyrics: Mitsuo Shikada, "Fulke Greville as a Calvinist (11) -- Aspects of Love in Caelica," Essays and Studies in English Language and Literature, Tohoku Gokuin Univ., Sendai, Japan, Li-Lii, 127-44. Unfortunately the article is in Japanese and inaccessible to me. I should distinguish here between my claims about Caelica and Denis de Rougemont's theory, in Love in the Western World (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940), that the medieval love passion of the troubadors developed as an expression of discontent with the world and embodied the search

for a transcendent reality entered only by death. In Tristan and Iseult, as well as in the love poetry later developed from it, the symbolic quest intensified the experience of romantic love and added to its significance. In Caelica, however, love does not so much embody the quest as represent it. This means that the quest itself exists apart from love and can be represented in other experiences, which is not the case in Tristan and Iseult. What I am arguing is that Caelica shows astonishingly little interest in love itself.

8. Bernat, "Images of Life," pp. 262-67, also analyzes this sonnet in terms of the Fall. I read her analysis after I wrote my own. Our perceptions differ in that while I see a conflict between the theme of the Fall and the theme of love, Bernat assumes they go together harmoniously.

9. Philip Brockbank, 'The Tempest': Conventions of Art and Nature, Later Shakespeare, Stratford-upon-Avon Studies 8 (London: Edward Arnold, 1966), p. 189.

10. Richard Hakluyt, "The Third Voyage to Virginia, 1586," in Principal Navigations (Glasgow: James MacLahose and Sons), VIII, 347. For the association of the New World with the Terrestrial Paradise see Robert Ralston Cawley, The Voyages and Elizabethan Drama (London: Oxford, 1938), passom; Cawley, Unpathed Waters: Studies of the Influence of the Voyages on Elizabethan Literature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1940), pp. 20-31; and Cawley, "Shakespeare's Use of the Voyages in The Tempest," PMLA, XI (1928), 688-726.

11. In Purchas his Pilgrimes (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1906), XIX, 3-22. As Strachy describes the islands, they have little to offer but wild hogs and apparitions; in contrast, Virginia, where the sailors go after their wreck on the Bermudas, is described as a place of rich vegetation. Brockbank, Later Shakespeare, p. 183, makes the point that Strachy conceived of the shipwreck as both a physical and moral trial.

12. This image recalls the parable of the sower: "But he that receiveth the seed in good ground in he that heareth the word, and understandeth it." Mark XIII, 8, 23. The ground is the ground of faith, but it is also heaven, which is the origin of faith.

13. The despair of these lines is similar to that of Spenser's Despair Canto (KQI, IX). Spenser observes that the most pious are the most prone to despair, because they are the ones who feel their own wrong doing most strongly. Yet the same piety which makes them feel their own unworthiness and fear God's wrath convinces them of God's mercy and restores them to faith.

III. *Caelica* I-X: The Failure of Courtly Eloquence

Greville, like Sidney, served as a courtier in Elizabeth's court, and, like Sidney, he tried to write like one. In the first ten lyrics of *Caelica*, he adopted the fashionable Neo-Platonic-Petrarchan conventions of love, as they were mediated by Sidney's *Certain Sonnets* and old *Arcadia*.[1] From both works he drew an ideal of stylistic eloquence, and from the *Arcadia* he borrowed the structure of a love debate. As the conventions were defined by Sidney, they lent themselves to the serious and even intellectual treatment of love that we find in Greville's lyrics. Although Greville was never a slavish imitator of Sidney, he could not know at the beginning just how unsuitable the norms established by Sidney were for his own purposes. After all, the image of the suffering and supplicating Petrarchan lover, tossed about by his own passions and alternately invited and rejected by a divine or saintly lady, is not far from the image of a man suffering in a fallen world and longing to transcend its complexities. Nor was this type of interpretation unknown in the Renaissance. In another context, Eric La Guardia observed that Renaissance writers did in fact use the theme of love figuratively, with "chaste love . . . serving as a figure for a perfected or redeemed world."[2] The problem is that basically Greville, like Calvin, can conceive of no such perfection, either in love or in the world, and the conventions of style, language, and attitudes that were predicated on that possibility prove inadequate to his view of the world as irreparably fallen.

The first ten lyrics of Caelica are arranged in a sort of love debate, such as was found in the Neo-Platonic treatises fashionable in Renaissance court circles and, more immediately, in Book I of Sidney's Arcadia. In these debates, the various facets of love were subjected to close scrutiny, with the aim of determining such things as whether love was a base or enobling passion, a source of joy or pain, an impetus to lust or chastity, and so forth. The basic assumption was that love was an experience fraught with conflicts, and the purpose of the debates was to explore the conflicts and arrive at a resolution, either in a Neo-Platonic flight of the imagination or, in the case of Sidney and other English Protestants, in the harmonies of marriage.[3] In distinction from Sidney, however, Greville not only seeks to resolve the contradictions of love in Neo-Platonic theory rather than in marriage, but he also fails in the attempt.

Greville was probably familiar with the love debate in the Arcadia. In Caelica VI Greville puns on the word "measure" --

> Eyes, why did you bring unto me those graces,
> Grac'd to yeeld wonder out of her true measure,
> Measure of all joyes, stay to phasie-traces,
> Module of pleasure?

-- in much the same way as Sidney's princes do in their debate:

> Nay, rather (answered Pyrocles) as eche excellent thinge Once well learned, serves for a measure of all other knowledges. And ys that become (sayde Musidorus) a measure for all other thinges, which never receyved measure in ytself? Yt is compted withoute measure (answered Pyrocles) bycause ye workinges of yt are

> withoute measure, but, otherwyse, in nature, yt hathe measure, synce yt hathe an ende allotted unto yt. (p. 20)[4]

In both passages, "measure" has three meanings: standard, limit, and proportion (OED 7.10-12). And in both passages, the pun suggests the contradictoriness of love, which can serve as a standard for commendable behavior at the same time as it may engage people in reprehensible excesses of passion.

Greville adopts from Sidney mainly the argumentative structure and serious intent of the princes' dispute. Although the details of the dialiectic in Caelica differ from those of the Arcadia, the princes' debate is worth summarizing because it indicates the serious cast of thought and habit of orderly thinking that seems to have attracted Greville. Narrative and psychological conflict aside, the princes' discussion is organized around their opposing views of love.[5] Where Musidorus vehemently asserts that "Love [is] a passyon, and the barest and fruitlessest of all passion," Pyrocles counters that love is "of the highest power of the mynde." Musidorus says that love "worckes uppon . . . no thing but a certeyn base weykenes whiche, some gentle fooles calle a gentle harte," and Pyrocles contends that "love hathe his worcking in a vertuous harte." Musidorus disclaims against the emotional turmoil love causes: "unquietness, longinges, fonde Comportes, faint discomfortes, hopes, Jealousyes, ungrounded rages, [and] Causeles yeeldinges," but Pyrocles protests that "Those trublesome effectes yow say yt breedes bee not the faultes of Love, but of him, that loves, as an unable vessell to beare such

a power." To Musidorus love is transient, since "the highest ende yt aspyres unto [is] a little pleasure with much payne before, and greate repentance after." For Pyrocles, however, "the ende to which yt [love] is directed . . . endes not, no sooner than the life." Their opinions on women are similarly opposed. "This effeminate love of a woman," Musidorus scolds, "doth so womanize a man, that, yf, you yeelde to yt, yt will not onely make yow a famous Amazon but a Launder, a Distaff spinner, or whatsoever other vyle occupacyon theyre idle heades can imagyn, and thyre weyke handes perform"; how far that is from the love of "vertue," which makes one "vertuous." But Pyrocles holds not only that women "are Capable of vertue," but that "yt likes mee muche better, when I fynde vertue in a fayre Lodging, then when I am bounde to seeke yt in an yll favored Creature."

Caelica I-X similarly test the Petrarchan-Neo-Platonic view of love from several directions. The poems are arranged in pairs. Caelica I-IV are written from within the framework of Petrarchan-Neo-Platonic idealism, but question it.[6] In Caelica I, the persona praises an idealized Petrarchan lady who attracts "well-thinking minds," while in II he writes an angry diatribe to a promiscuous mistress who "bound" his "reson" to her "servant humour." In III, he poses as a Petrarchan devotee honoring the "shrine" of his "saint," while in IV he examines his worship with a critical eye and concludes that the unrequited love he has vowed is

of the "strangest fashion." In V and VI he turns his attention to sexual love and subjects that to contrasting interpretations. Suffering the pains of rejection, he complains in V about the "light God" Cupid and his own frustrations, yet in VI he celebrates his loss of reason ("Reason is now growne a disease of reason") and ebulliantly anticipates pleasure "In Cupid's faire skie, which her beauty showes me."[7] Sonnets VII and VIII return to an idealistic context to contemplate the theme of change. For the idealizing Petrarchan lover of VII, the mistress, the only stable entity in an ever changing world, "never varies"; but the languishing lover of VIII takes consolation from the fact that his unyielding mistress will age and decay like everything else, with time "Writing in furrows deep, she once was faire." Finally, IX and X attempt to resolve the dispute. They both accept the possibility that love is in some way divine, IX treating it as the operation of divinity in human life and X as the longing of mankind to reunite with the divine source. Taking love seriously, these poems grapple with the question of why it should make people so miserable.[8]

At the end of the Arcadia, the potentially destructive forces of passionate love are contained by the ritual "solemnities of Marriage" (p. 389). Pyrocles marries Philoclea; Musidorus marries Pamela; the King and Queen are reunited in matrimonial harmony. Marriage is a human solution, and to consider it implies some faith in the ability of individuals to love and succor one another.and, furthermore, to confine their passion to a single partner. For

Greville, however, stability and assurance are as remote from married love as they were from romantic passion, and in later lyrics he treats extensively the theme of adultry. Greville opted instead for Neo-Platonic idealism, which promised that the contradictions of human love could be transcended in the supernatural realm of ideas. His choice seems to have been motivated by his sense that human life was not perfectible, and not even capable of improvement. Sonnets IX and X imply, though they do not actually state, the Calvinistic view that the resources of the fallen world and the capacities of fallen man are all but nonexistent.

Caelica IX opens with the question of why the love which might be "The paradise of Nature in perfection" is a source of unhappiness instead:

> O Love, thou mortall sphere of powers divine,
> The paradise of Nature in perfection,
> What makes thee thus they Kingdome undermine,
> Vailing they glories under woes reflection?

At this point, the speaker still clings to the hope that nature is perfectible. In the second stanza, he argues with Love as a pious and moral man whose goodness is rewarded only with suffering might argue with an unjust God:

> If I by nature, Wonder and Delight,
> Had not sworne all my powers to worship thee,
> Justly mine owne revenge receive I might,
> And see thee, Tyrant, suffer tyrannie:
> See thee thy selfe-despaire, and sorrow breeding,
> Under the wounds of woe and sorrow bleeding.

But in the third stanza he relinquishes such notions of reciprocity and concentrates instead on the given nature

of the world. He answers his own question by depciting a world where "sorrow holds mans life to be her owne":

> For sorrow holds mans life to be her owne,
> His thoughts her stage, where tragedies she plaies,
> Her orbe she makes his Reason ouerthrowne,
> His love foundations for her ruines layes;
> So as while love will torments of her borrow,
> Love shall become the very love of sorrow.

The feeling of this stanza is enormously powerful. The stanza dominates the poem even though the verse is marred by Greville's tendency to itemize in random order (His thoughts, . . . his reason, . . . his love, . . .) and by his use of metaphors that neither expand nor clarify his meanings (thoughts as a stage, reason as an orb). Within the limited space of the sextain, sorrow is an abstraction which has all the force of the lady depicted in Sackville's Induction to the Mirror for Magistrates. In part, the force is fortuitous, for the abstraction is one which draws much of its potency from our own sense of human existence. But also, sorrow is one of the most potent emotions throughout Caelica. In the first line, the verb "holds" describes with extreme aptness the way in which sorrow dominates and restricts a man's life. The structure of the line emphasizes the grip of the word by linking it in rhyme to word "owne" at the line juncture, so that the sorrow which "holds" a man's life also "holds" the line. In the fourth line, the image of sorrow laying foundations for "ruines" on man's loves is similarly apt. The image captures the irony by which the love which should be the source of joy becomes the foundation for pain. The word "ruines" evokes the underlying image of a once sturdy

and inhabited building, a once strong and pleasurable love, which has now been destroyed. It is because of the essential emotional power of the stanza that the commonplace Petrarchan assertion at the end -- "Love shall become the very love of sorrow" -- does not seem quite so trite but strikes one as the inevitable condition of human love.

It is this unmitigated sense of sorrow that leads Greville to seek in sonnet X a Neo-Platonic resolution to love's conflicts and that, paradoxically, makes that resolution itself impossible. At the end of sonnet IX, however, the lover, despite what he knows, still hopes to ameliorate his situation in a human way and asks Love to intercede on his behalf for his mistress' "pitty":

> Love therefore speake to Caelica for me,
> Show her thy selfe in everything I doe;
> Safely thy powers she may in others see,
> And in thy power see her glories too;
> Move her to pitty, stay her from disdaine,
> Let never man love worthiness in vaine.

The request is conventional and apparently unheeded.

Thus, Caelica X reintroduces the question with which IX had begun, but rephrases it in such a way that the new question takes into account sonnet X's meditation on sorrow. It broadens the question. It asks why love, which naturally answers to some call in the universe, having "from my mind with glory [been] invited," should be so completely thwarted in its efforts to respond. But it phrases the problems in terms of the Fall:

> Love, of mans wandering thoughts the restlesse being,
> Thou from my mind with glory wast invited,
> Glory of those faire eyes, where all eyes, seeing
> Vertues and beauties riches, are delighted;

> What Angells pride, or what selfe-disagreeing,
> What dazzling brightnesse hath your beams benighted,
> That fall'n thus from those joyes which you aspired,
> Downe to my darkened minde you are retired?

Love is addressed as an image of Lucifer, whose "Angells pride" was benighted by God's more "dazzling brightness" and who had "fall'n" from bliss to the hell of the lover's "darkened minde."[9] The very terms in which the problem is posed suggest its answer: love is full of misery because man is fallen, and nothing on earth can assuage the pains of love, or life, for very long.

In the second stanza, the speaker describes his "darkened minde" as a hell to which rejected Love (Lucifer) has returned:

> Within which minde since you from thence ascended,
> Truth clouds it selfe, Wit serves but to resemble,
> Envie is King, at others good offended,
> Momorie doth worlds of wretchednesse assemble,
> Passion to ruin passion is intended,
> My reason is but power to dissemble;
> Then tell me Love, what glory you divine
> Your selfe can find within this soule of mine?

This stanza serves the same function as the stanza on sorrow had in IX, though its language is more technical. The stanza outlines exactly those evils that make the fallen soul a hell -- or, as Calvin calls it, "flesh." Just as love perversely turns upon itself, so all the mind's faculties do precisely the opposite of what one expects of them. "Truth" obscures itself; "wit" and "reason" lead to the falsification rather than the comprehension of reality; "passion" proliferates in such confusion that in the end one can feel nothing; and "memory" dwells on past "wretchedness" to the exclusion of past pleasure. Such perverseness is pretty

much the nature of the fallen world as Calvin conceives it.

Thus, in the closing stanza the poet suggests that the ills of love can be cured only through a complete rejection of earthly love, both chaste and sexual. Love "Must, as Ideas only be embraced," he counsels:

> Rather goe backe unto that heavenly quire
> Of Natures riches, in her beauties placed,
> And there in contemplation feed desire,
> Which till it wonder, is not rightly graced;
> For those sweet glories, which you doe aspire,
> Must, as Ideas only be embraced
> Since excellence in other forme enjoyed,
> Is by descending to her Saints destroyed.

The Platonic love of ideas certainly antedates Calvin, and English Protestantism in fact encouraged the resolution of love's conflicts in marriage. Nonetheless, the advice in this stanza does have something in common with Calvin's insistence that nature must be destroyed before it can be redeemed. Both the Platonic ladder of ascent and traditional Catholic, and to some extent Anglican, thought assumed an unbroken continuum between natural man and either the realm of ideas or God. The continuum was decidedly broken in Calvin's thought. This stanza suggests a similar disruption in placing "Nature's riches" in the "heavenly quire" above the natural world and by asserting that "excellence" is "by descending to her Saints," that is to a human level, "destroyed."

But Greville's resolution to the dilemmas of love differs not only from Sidney's but also from that of the Neo-Platonists themselves. Greville, like Calvin, was no mystic, and he was too much of an Englishman to be able to

envision or enjoy impalpable bliss. Like Calvin's, his vision is focused on the troubles of earth rather than on the joys of heaven. The tone of the above stanza is remarkably tepid, especially in contrast to that of the stanzas describing suffering. Surrounding the advice to "feed desire" in "contemplation" is an aura of merely rational acquiescence, which is created by the accumulation of the logical and explanatory transitions, "rather," "for," and "since." The contemplation of ideas seems to be decidedly second best to the living experience of human love. What emotional power the stanza possesses seems to be centered on "desire" and "aspiration," on the longing for "excellence," rather than on a sense of its potential attainment in contemplation.

We need only to contrast the tone of this stanza with the extraordinary sense of celebration and joy that accompanies other Neo-Platonic resolutions to see how remote the possibility was for Greville. The descriptions of bliss in Bembo's Gli Asolani and in Castiglione's Courtier are cases in point, for both works were popular in England.[10] In Book IV of Gli Asolani, the Hermit describes a Neo-Platonic world "which is neither material nor evident to sense":

> But there the grass is never brown, the plants are never withered, the creatures never die, the seas are never rough, the air is never dark, the fire never parches, nor must its heavens and their bodies turn continually. That world has no need of any change, for neither summer nor winter, nor yesterday nor tomorrow, nor near nor far, nor large nor small confines it; but it rests contented with its state, having achieved the highest self-sufficiency and happiness.[11] (pp. 189-90)

The ecstacy in this passage is evident. It is communicated by the precise references to grass and creatures, seas and stars, the elements, and the seasons. Likewise, Castiglione, drawing on the idea of the Platonic ladder, has Bembo, in Book IV of the Courtier, describe the top step as "the high mansion place where the heavenly, amiable and right beautie dwelleth":

> there shall wee finde a most happie end for our desires, true rest for our travels, certain remedie for miseries, a most healthfull medicine for sicknesse, a most sure haven in ye troublesome stormes of the tempestuous ses of this life.[12]

Again, Castiglione has a fair idea of what he will find in the Neo-Platonic realm of ideas and is able to describe it rapturously.[13] If his details are less concrete than Bembo's, his metaphor of a "mansion" and his images of rest, remedy, and a happy end are as evocative. In Greville we find similar concreteness only in the description of the "darkened minde" and similar evocative power in the description of sorrow.

In short, the subject of love is quite a bit more complicated for Greville than for his contemporaries, for, unlike them, he cannot find a resolution for love's conflicts. Seeing love as an image of man's life in the fallen world, he enlarges its complexities; and conceiving of the Fall as an utterly devastating event which made it impossible for a man to ameliorate the condition of his life, he places any solution out of reach.

Throughout Caelica, Greville treats love as a problem to be analyzed rather than as a human situation to be experienced and dealt with. This inclination makes it difficult for him to adopt the other aspect of the courtier's trade, the eloquent style and accompanying Petrarchan conventions in which Sidney wrote his early verse. Restricting our discussion for a moment to the matter of style, we should be aware that the eloquent style was a style expressing the ethos of an aristocratic class. Its ornate and rigorous forms and complicated rhetorical figures were, to paraphrase an analogy offered by George Puttenham in The Arte of English Poesie, like the sumptuous clothing worn by the nobility, "Figures and figured speeches" removed the writer's thoughts "somewhat out of sight, that is from the common course of ordinary speech and capacitie of the vulgar judgment, and yet being artificially handled must need yeld it much more bewtie and commendation" (pp. 137-8).[14] Helping to maintain an explicit distance from the commonplace, highly rhetorical verse was as necessary for public decency as were the elaborate costumes worn in the Renaissance court. Accordingly, Puttenham priased the ability of the "Courtly Poet to be a dissembler . . . in the subtilties of his arte; that is when he is most artificiall" (p. 302). Within an individual poem, the function of the elaborate verse and verbal ingenuity of the eloquent lyric was to praise or to blame a lady or to plead with or to persuade her to yield. Puttenham echoed a long tradition when he defended poetic

embellishment on the grounds that "our maker or Poet is appointed not for a judge, but rather for a pleader . . . of the ears of princely dames, yong ladies, gentlemen and courtiers (p.154)."[15] In its sheer difficulty and complexity, eloquent verse paid homage to the lady's character and a lover's devotion and of his innate ability to bestow the care and respect she merited.

Greville, however, is neither a pleader nor a persuader, but rather a deliberative writer, whose aim is to define, analyze, and explore his subject. The courtly style and conventions he uses come into conflict with his abstract, intellectual consideration of love. His early lyrics reveal the confusion of his purposes. Caelica I and II provide convenient illustrations. The first is constructed as a poem in praise of an idealized mistress, the second as a poem blaming a rejecting but sexual one. The first uses numerous rhetorical devices of the eloquent style, and both employ Petrarchan commonplaces. Yet, what one actually finds is, in the first, a definition of ideal Petrarchan love and, in the second, an analysis of the effects of passion.

A clearer idea of how Greville used the devices of the eloquent style may be gained by comparing Caelica I with the third of Sidney's Certain Sonnets, on which Greville's poem is based. In Sidney's version, rhetorical eloquence does help a lover to praise and to plead. While the lover pleads for himself, he implicitly praises the woman whose virtue and beauty can inflict such exquisite suffering:

The fire to see my wrongs for anger burneth:
The aire in raine for my affliction weepeth:
The sea to ebbe for griefe his flowing turneth:
The earth with pitie dull the center keepeth:
  Fame is with wonder blazed:
  Time runnes away for sorrow:
  Place standeth still amazed
  To see my night of evils, which hath no morrow.
    Alas, all onely she no pitie taketh,
    To know my miseries, but chaste and cruell:
    My fall her glorie maketh,
    Yet still her eyes give to my flames their fuell.

Fire burne me quite, till sense of burning leave me:
Aire let me draw no more they breath in anguish:
Sea drownd in thee, of tedious life bereave me:
Earth take this earth, wherein my spirits languish.
  Fame say I was not borne:
  Time haste my dying hower:
  Place see my grave uptorne:
  Fire, aire, sea, earth, fame, time, place, shew your power.
    Alas, from all their helps I am exiled,
    For hers am I, and death feares her displeasure.
    Fie death, thou are beguiled,
    Though I be hers, she makes of me no treasure.

Among the lyric's numerous rhetorical devices, two are imitated in Caelica I and are thus noteworthy. One is correlative verse, a rhetorical scheme which enumerates a number of statements and then collects the main term of each in one or two lines. A difficult figure, it was used by the more affected poets of the period.[16] The other device is extensive personification, of the four elements and of abstractions. The personifications are marshalled in a correlative pattern and collected in line 20: "Fire, aire, sea, earth, fame, time, place, shew your power."

In Sidney's poem, the function of these devices is to express feeling in a controlled manner. As Neil L. Rudenstine observed of another ornate poem of Sidney's, "in the symetry they create, in the fine syntactical order and delicate pattern of sound which they articulate," elaborate figures "refine passion, translating it into the harmonious

forms of artful, polished speech."[17] Although Certain Sonnets 3 may in fact be less than entirely successful in conveying emotion, that at least seems to be its aim. The enumerated abstractions are intended to convey the sense of accumulated grief, at the same time as they confirm the sympathy of the universe with the lover's plight. Within each stanza, the repetitive structure of the imagery and syntax seems means to intensify the lover's expression of his sorrow. The speaker always directs the personfications to his own sufferings, as he reminds his mistress of "my wrongs," "my affliction," "my night of eviles," "my miseries," "my dying hower," and as he repeatedly directs her attention to "I" and "me." The collection of terms in line 20 gathers the emotions of the poem and indicates a climax in the speaker's unhappiness. The lover's emotion is crystalized in the last quatrain by the Petrarchan paradox that even in the misery that makes him long for death, he is, as his lady's humble servant, too bound to her to die.

The key to Sidney's ornate rhetoric is, as Rudenstine has insisted, passion. Without passion, the abstractions and the elaborate verse figures would sit as garments on a skeleton. In a sense that is what happens in Caelica I. Greville's poem echoes Certain Sonnets 3 in its general attempt at ornateness and particularly in its use of correlative verse and of the personifications of time, place, and death.[18]

> Love, the delight of all well-thinking minds;
> Delight, the fruit of vertue dearely lov'd;
> Vertue, the highest good, that reason finds;
> Reason, the fire wherein mens thoughts bee prov'd;
> Are from the world by Natures power bereft,
> And in one creature, for her glory, left.

Beautie, her cover is, the eyes true pleasure;
In honours fame she lives, the eares sweet musicke;
Excesse of wonder growes from her true measure;
Her worth is passions wound, and passions physicke;
From her true heart, cleare springs of wisdome flow,
Which imag'd in her words and deeds, men know.

Time faine would stay, that she might never leave her,
Place doth rejoyce, that she must needs containe her,
Death craves of Heaven, that she may not bereave her,
The Heavens know their owne, and doe maintaine her;
Delight, Love, Reason, Vertue, let it be,
To set all women light, but only she.

Initially, Greville's poem does seem to be a conventional Petrarchan lyric with Neo-platonic coloring, in praise of a conventionally idealized lady. The first stanza praises her effusively by setting her above all other people: she is the "one creature"favored by nature. The second stanza mingles Petrarchan and Neo-platonic admiration: as other Petrarchan ladies, she is beautiful, honourable, and wise, and she both excites and restrains sexual passion; in Neo-platonic terms, she gives delight to the eyes and ears, the highest of the senses.[19] The third stanza praises by locating the lady's significance in the universe: time, place, death, and the heavens all take an interest in her.

The poem's formal devices should augment the praise of its lady. This is what their purpose seems to be. The opening stanza uses the device of anadiplosis, which employs the key word of one line at the beginning of the next. The technique makes a kind of circular chain of love, delight, virtue, and reason, so as to suggest the propriety, pleasure, and stability of the rational love that this lady evokes. The rhetorical linkage as much as the words themselves tells

how inevitably and thoroughly good that love and the lady who embodies it are. The formality of the second stanza consists in the balance of various opposites: beauty and honor, eyes and ears, excess and measure, passion's wound and passion's physic, internal wisdom and its external manifestation in words and deeds. These formal antitheses might suggest the complete harmony the lady is in with herself and her surroundings. In the third stanza, epistrophe (rhyme on one word) points happily to the lady herself, to "her"; and that is supplemented by the stanza's closing on the word "she." The rhyme and the closing "she" make the lady something of a magnet to which all the lines of the stanza lead. They suggest her primacy in the universe as much as does the verbal ennumeration of the wishes that time and place, in this world, and death and the heavens, in the next, have for her. Finally the correlative verse, the collection of the key words of the first stanza in the closing couplet of the last, completes the circular arrangement that suggests the fullness and completeness of this love and of the lady who inspires it.

But Caelica I lacks the passion that would hold form and content together in the easy harmony that this analysis suggests. Most glaringly absent is any genuine sense of the lady herself, whether in an earthly or idealized version. Thus, her praises ring hollow. She is introduced as a "creature" at the end of the first stanza and as "her" and "she" in the third. We hardly feel her presence. The tepidity of Greville's tone suggests just how uninterested he was in

praising her. What could be blander than a "well-thinking" mind or than virtue "dearly" loved? What could be less distinctive than "true" pleasure, "true" measure, and a "true" heart, or more expected than "sweet" music and "clear" springs? Even the metaphors -- "fruit" of virtue, "springs" of wisdom -- are for the most part so commonplace as to be without the expansive force that metaphors might have. Abstractions dominate Greville's poem. Although they also govern the course of Certain Sonnets, it is in Greville's lyric that one feels that they -- love, delight, virtue, reason, honor's fame, the highest good, worth, time, place, and death -- rather than a human being or human feeling usher the reader from one stanza to the next. In fact, in contrast to Sidney's version, Greville's poem lacks even a male protagonist.

Greville's major interest lies in defining the nature of love, and it is to this end, rather than to praise, that his rhetorical schemes are directed.[20] The first stanza has more to say about the nature of rational love than about the sonnet lady. Love is "the delight of all well-thinking minds"; delight is "the fruit of vertue"; and so forth. The is need not be stated to be felt. Syntactically, the descriptions of love in the first four lines may well be intended to climax in the couplet with the hyperbolic praise of lady. But the rhythmic and syntactic division between the quatrain, (with its self-enclosing rhetorical pattern) and the couplet annuls any crescendo effect, and one does not feel, as one

might after such acclaim, wonder at the lady's extraordinary superiority.

The second stanza is similarly controlled by definition. Beauty is defined as "the eye's true pleasure," honor's fame as "the eares sweet musicke," and "her worth is passions wound, and passions physicke" (italics mine). True, the definitions carry report of the lady's own attributes: beauty is "her cover"; and "she lives" with the good reputation of her honor; "her true measure," "her worth," and "her true heart" are all mentioned. However, one feels that the definitive statements are more important to the poet than she is. In fact, the stanza's closing couplet again distracts our attention from her, from "her wisdome" and "her words and deeds," to the detail that "men know" about the first through the second. Finally, although the third stanza avoids the kind of defining statements that the first two contain, by the time we read that stanza it seems as though all the fervent motions of time, place, death, and the heavens are on behalf of someone who does not exist even in the poet's imagination.

The end result here is a poem that neither fully praises nor fully defines.

The same confusion permeates Caelica II, a vituperative sonnet which inverts Petrarchan conventions in order to defame the mistress.[21] Berating his mistress for cruelty, the lover in II implies that her chastity is no more than a veneer and obliquely asks for sexual favors. The absence of

elaborate rhetorical patterning accords with the sonnet's vituperative aim. Yet, in a manner that is analogous of Caelica I's redirection of eloquent rhetoric, itself an important feature of Petrarchan love convention, to definition, this sonnet applies Petrarchan commonplaces to the intellectual analysis of passion.

> Faire Dog, which so my heart dost teare asunder,
> That my lives-blood, my bowels overfloweth,
> Alas, what wicked rage conceal'st thou under
> These sweet enticing joyes, thy forehead showeth?
>
> Me, whom the light-wing'd God of long hath chased,
> Thou hast attain'd, thou gav'st that fatall wound,
> Which my soules peacefull innocence hath rased,
> And reason to her servant humour bound.
>
> Kill therefore in the end, and end my anguish,
> Give me my death, me thinks even time upbraideth
> A fulnesses of the woes, wherein I languish:
> Or if thou wilt I live, then pittie pleadeth
> Helpe out of thee, since Nature hath revealed,
> That with thy tongue thy bytings may be healed.

The sonnet is organized around Petrarchan commonplaces. It opens by addressing the mistress as a "Faire Dog" -- which is simply a slightly cruder term that the "tiger" that Spenser called his recalcitrant mistress in Amoretti LVI. In Petrarchan fashion, the lover criticizes his mistress for the cruelty that her beauty masks, and, in the sestet, voices the conventional plea for death or mercy.

Yet, instead of using these conventions to express feeling, either of anger or desire, Greville uses them to examine the effects of feeling. Once again, the lady barely figures in the poem; after being addressed directly in the first line, she disappears until the closing couplet. Even the

first line immediately shifts from apostrophe to description: "Faire Dog, which so my heart dost tear asunder,/ That my lives-blood, my bowels overfloweth" (italics mine). With the shift, the octave reads more as an analysis of the effects of passion -- "Which my soules peacefull innocence hath rased,/ And reason to her servant humour bound" -- (italics mine) than as a lover's complaint. The potential anger of the opening statement is dissipated, and the material of the complaint becomes a means whereby the speaker examines the effects of passion on his body and psyche.

In the sestet, Petrarchan conventions are turned to irony. Irony is the manifestation of unresolved intellectual conflicts, and it is one of the most characteristic moods in Greville's love lyrics. The irony in this sonnet derives from the perception that virtuous and sexual love have too much in common for even the best intentioned of mortals to keep them distinct. The irony is concentrated in the closing couplet, where the lover nastily observes that "Nature hath revealed,/ That with thy tongue thy bytings may be healed." The violence in this line is less an expression of personal rage than a manifestation of understanding. The speaker realizes that the conventional Petrarchan lover who conventionally longs for death to put an end to his miseries may well be the same man who asks for "death" with the sexual meaning of the word uppermost in his mind. Moreover, the couplet glances back at sonnet I, which had suggested that "men know" of the lady's wisdom through her "words and deeds," to note that the "tongue may be as much an instrument of sexual pleasure as of eloquent speech.

Like the speaker's statements throughout the sonnet, the remark in the closing couplet is depersonalized. Abstractions in this poem function to create an emotional distance between the speaker and his feelings, not, as they had in Certain Sonnets 3, to externalize the lover's emotions. The assertions in the sestet that "time upbraideth" and "pittie pleadeth" transfer suffering to an abstract realm where feeling recedes before the impersonal sarcasm with which the poem ends. It is notable that the details in the last line are communicated as information that "Nature hath revealed." Indirectly, of course, the couplet contains a plea for sexual favors, for "helpe out of thee"; but the reference to Nature as an informant transfers the personal request to a piece of information about the reductive impersonality of nature's ways.

The net effect of Caelica I and II is not praise, or blame, or pleading, but rather the intellectual assessment of the nature of love. If a conclusion is to be drawn from the justaposition of the two poems, it is that rational and sexual love have a good deal in common. Caelica I notes that "Excess of wonder grows from her (the lady's) true measure." In Caelica II, the excess of wonder becomes an excess of passion. Caelica I observes that the lady's chastity restrains the passion she provokes, that "Her worth is passions wound, and passions physicke." In Caelica II, the restraint is seen as hypocritical cruelty. Caelica I endows the lady with uniqueness, and the various abstractions in the poem recognize that "only she" is important. In Caelica

II, her uniqueness is undermined by the commonality of nature. The intellectualism of the sonnets, however, tends to confuse them. The elaborate rhetorical devices of sonnet I seem gratuitous, and their presence simply indicates that Greville was uncertain as to whether he wanted to praise or to contemplate. More important, the conventions of both lyrics imply that there should be some sort of controlled emotional expression, which in fact does not occur. Caelica I is notably tepid in its admiration; in Caelica II the expression of both anger and desire is immediately deflected by analytic description or intellectual irony.

Yet, the intellectual probing of these two lyrics of course resembles the probing of the Arcadian princes, which seems to have been behind Greville's proceedure in the first place· and the conclusion that love may be a destructive emotion if not carefully contained was equally drawn by both Greville and Sidney. Why I then claim that Greville's intellectual consideration of love made courtly conventions of language and versification difficult for him to adopt may thus seem somewhat mysterious. Or, the root of Greville's difficulties may be attributed to the problem of versifying a prose argument, especially since in Caelica I Greville then turns the relatively straightforward prose style of the old Arcadia into rhetorically complicated verse.

There is, however, another point to be borne in mind, which has to do with the social and expressive functions of the high style and of Petrarchan conventions. This is that

Greville failed to take over from Sidney the specifically social context of the princes' intellectual argument, which if he had adopted might have justified the style and conventions he used. To clarify: the dispute in the Arcadia is less about the nature of love as such than about how people should behave, about whether and how men should love. The intellectual content of the princes' discussion is contained and finally judged within a fictional context of characters and action. As significant as the points of the debate is the human situation: Pyrocles, carried away by his passion, is dressed as a woman; his emotions bring him into conflict with a friend; and in the course of the narrative, all of the characters behave reprehensibly or foolishly on account of their passions. These things, more than the points of the debate, illustrate the nature of passionate love. But Greville's concern was not with the quality of love as people actually experienced it, but rather with love as an intellectual abstraction, which, as an abstraction, could stand for man's life in the fallen world. It is true that neither Caelica I nor II refers to the Fall, but the concern with the abstract qualities and manifestations of love apart from active human protagonists does suggest love's symbolic character for Greville. One does not praise or blame, or plead with an abstract concept or a symbol, but only with another human being.

It seems fair to claim, then, that Greville's disinclination to apply Sidney's solution of marriage to the conflicts

of love and his inability to transfer the eloquent style of Sidney's early verse to his own lyrics are related: Both manifest a distrust and disinterest in the immediately human and social. Both ultimately stem from his preoccupation with the devastation of the Fall, which leads, on the one hand, to his despair of man's abilities and, on the other hand, to his contemplation of love as an abstraction. In the last analysis, neither Greville's world view or his style is a courtier's.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of Greville's respect for Sidney as a "courtier," see John Danby, Poets on Fortune's Hill: Studies in Shakespeare, Sidney, Beaumont and Fletcher (1932; rpt. Fort Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1966), pp. 26-33. Every writer on Greville recognizes his debt to Sidney, The only single work devoted to a comparison between the two poets, however, is J. M. Purcell, "Sidney's Astrophel and Stella and Greville's Caelica," PMLA, L (1935), 413-22. On very slight evidence, Purcell argues that verbal and conceptual similarities in the two sonnet sequences are to be found in identically numbered lyrics.

2. Nature Redeemed: The Imitation of Order in Three Renaissance Poems (The Hague: Mouton & Co, 1966), p. 10

3. For a discussion of late Renaissance praise of marriage, see William Haller, "Hail Wedded Love," ELH, XIII (1946), 79-97. Mark Rose, Heroic Love: Studies in Sidney and Spenser (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 19-37 provides a most useful discussion of both marriage and Neoplatonism in the renaissance, and shows how theorists and poets tried to adopt both as solutions to the problems of passion.

4. The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia, in The Prose Works of Sir Philip Sidney, ed Albert Feuillerat (1912; rpt. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965), IV. Page references are given in the text.

5. Details of the princes' debate are quoted from Prose Works, IV, 14-20. In the Arcadia, each of the characters makes a number of long speeches, and the points are not neatly juxtaposed, as they are in my text. I have rearranged the points as they are made in Arcadia and placed them in contrasting pairs for clarity.

6. For the anti-idealistic tendencies of the Renaissance lyric, see Lever, Elizabethan Love Sonnet, pp. 27-8, 74-85; Peterson, English Lyric, pp. 99-110, 188, 194-7; and Donald L. Guss, John Donne, Petrarchist: Italianate Conceits and Love Theory in the Songs and Sonets (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1966), pp. 28-9, 34-45, which deal first with the Italian adaptations of Petrarch and then with Wyatt and Gascoigne. Although the Pléiade poets were no more idealistic than the English, a number of scholars have traced Neo-Platonic motifs without taking into account the un-Platonic purposes to which they were often put. See Robert Valentine Merrill, The Platonism of Joachim du Bellay (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press. 1925); André Marie Jean Festugière, La Philosophie de l'amour de Marsile Ficin et son influence sur la litérature francaise au XVI siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1941).

7. The observation that "Reason is now growne a disease of reason" need not be condemnatory, as Peterson implies in his interpretation that "The lover here confesses his failure as a follower of the Platonic religion," English Lyric, p. 258. There is precedent in the NeopPlatonic theory of Leone Hebraeus for holding that "perfect love, though born of reason, is not subject to reason." Leo Hebraeus, The Philosophy of Love, trans., Freidherd Seeley and Jean H. Barnes (London: Socino Press, 1937), p. 339.

8. For a slightly different reading of the first ten lyrics, see Peterson, English Lyric , pp. 254-9. Peterson also arranges them in pairs and considers tham a kind of debate.

9. My interpretation of this stanza is more or less that suggested by Thom Gunn in his introduction to Fulke Greville, Selected Poems, ed. Thom Gunn. (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), p. 22. Another reading is also possible. The "Angells pride," the "Selfe-disagreeing" and the "dazzling brightnesse" can all be read as belonging to the sonnet lady. For in Neo-Platonic theory the lady's "beautie is bodiless, and an heavenly shining beam," and that beam itself is "a shining image of that light which is the true image of Angelic beautie." See Ellrodt's discussion of the Neo-Platonic ladder, Neoplatonism in the Poetry of Spenser (Geneva: Droz, 1960), p. 29. My reading,on the other hand, suggests that the "Angells pride" and "selfe-disagreeing" belong to the lover. However, if we see these as pertaining to the lady, what is implied by the stanza is that the lover tries to reach Neo-Plantonic heights and is prevented. Then, the poem would move in a circle with the advice to contemplation in the last stanza merely inviting the lover to repeat the fruitless attempt he had made in the first.

10. I do not wish to imply that Greville was a scholar of Neo-Platonism or that he necessarily read either Bembo or Castiglione, simply that their attitude towards love and their way of discussing the subject were commonplace enough to have been influential. For the most thorough statement of the differences between technical Neo-Platonism and the widespread commonplace, see Robert Ellrodt, Neoplatonism in the Poetry of Spenser. John Charles Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love: The Context of Giordano Bruno's 'Eroici fuori' (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958) provides a comprehensive discussion of love treatises before Bruno's. John Smith Harrison, Platonism in English Poetry of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (1903; rpt. New York: Russell and Russell, 1965) is too general to be helpful.

11. Pietro Bembo, Gli Asolani, trans., Rudolph B. Gottfried (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1954). pp. 189-90.

12. Baldassre Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans., Sir Thomas Hoby, ed., W. H. D. Rouse, Everyman (1928; rpt. London: Dent, 1953), pp. 120-1.

13. Of course, the Renaissance Neo-platonists also recognized that there might be some difficulty in transferring human affections to an ideal realm. Consequently, Castiglione reserves the role of the Platonic lover for old men and Bembo makes a hermit, an aesthetic who is removed from society, the exponent and teacher of Platonic love.

14. References are to Gladys Doidge Willcock and Alice Walker, ed. (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1936). Pages are noted in my text. The subject of rhetorical elegance in the sixteenth century is a very complicated one. See Peterson, English Lyric, p. 350-1, who documents the increased mixing of plain and eloquent styles as the century moves on; Veré L. Rubel, Poetic Diction in the English Renaissance: From Skelton to Spenser. Modern Language Association XII (1941; rpt. New York: Kraus Reprint, 1966), who claims that the use of decorative rhetorical figures became increasingly widespread; G. K. Hunter, "Drab and Golden Lyrics of the Renaissance," Selected Papers from the English Institute, ed. Reuben A. Brower (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 1-18, who attempts to show the difference in the social origins and the purposes of the poets who used the plain and eloquent styles; and _____, John Lyly: The Humanist as Courtier (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 5-8, he makes some generalizations about the importance of artificiality in the Elizabethan Court and in courtly writing.

15. The place of praise and blame in the Renaissance lyric is studies by O. B. Hardison, Jr., The Enduring Monument: A Study in the Idea of Praise in Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice (Chapel Hill: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 95-106. Rosemond Tuve notes briefly that "The general intentions of the (Renaissance) lyric are to praise and to plead. The converse of the first is always included -- vituperation, dispraise." Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery: Renaissance Poetic and Twentieth Century Critics (1947; rpt. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 85.

16. For a description of correlative verse, see Ringler, "Commentary, Old Arcadia, 43" and Joseph G. Fucilla, "A Rhetorical Pattern in Renaissance and Baroque Poetry," Studies in the Renaissance, III (1956), 23-48. Fucilla calls the pattern the "Disseminative - recapitulative type," and notes that "Fulke Greville . . . allies himself with his more affected contemporaries in the use of our formula and even out does most of them" (p. 42). Greville uses the pattern in Caelica, I, VIII, XIV, XXI, LIV, LXXVII and LXXXVI.

17. Sidney's Poetic Development (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), p. 56. I owe more to Rudenstine's study than I can credit by quotation. His insights into Sidney's poetry suggest a way of reading courtier's verse and form the basis of some of my thoughts about Greville's.

18. Caelica VII also draws on Certain Sonnets 3, borrowing both its verse pattern and its conceit on the four elements.

19. "There is, therefore, this triple beauty: of the soul, of the body, and of sound. That of the soul is perceived by the mind; that of the body, by the eyes; and that of sound, by the ear alone. Since, therefore, the mind, the sight, and the hearing are the only means by which we are able to enjoy beauty, Love is always limited to the pleasures of the mind, the eyes, and the ears." Ficino, Marsilio, Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on Plato's Symposium, trans., Sears Reynolds Jayne (Columbia, Missouri: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1944), p. 130.

20. Napoleone Orsini attributes the failure of Caelica I to its extensive use of abstractions. "E una serie di astrazione," he writes contemptuously. "Non c'e slanco lirica o calore di immagini." Fulke Greville tra il mondo e dio (Milan: Casa Editrice Guiseppi Principato, 1941), p. 38. I doubt, however, that the abstractions are alone to blame. As we shall see, Greville often invests his abstractions with enormous emotional power and gives them the force of absolutes. The problem in Caelica I is not that there are abstractions but that they are somehow lifeless.

21. This seems to be one of the earlier vituperative sonnets in English. Lu Emily Pearson points out that the vituperative sonnet was rare in English until Shakespeare's sonnets to the dark lady appeared. Elizabethan Love Conventions (1933; rpt. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), p. 213-4. The arguments in Caelica II are less elaborate than the libertine arguments derived from the Latin poets; for a summary of those arguments, wee Douglas Bush, Mythology and the Renaissance Tradition in Poetry, 2nd ed. (1932; New York: Norton, 1963), p. 133.

IV. Earthly Love

Through most of Caelica, Greville considers love in its most earthly form -- as lust. Only occasionally does he glance at love capable of transcendence or even of chastity. Emphatically, Greville places that kind of love out of human reach, "above these middle regions,/ Where every passion warres it selfe with legions," and observes with a mixture of longing and contempt that men who try to reach it are like "Starre-gazers" who "only multiply desires." (XVII).[1]

Despite the contempt, however, Greville's treatment of human love is conditioned by the memory of something better. One of the patterns most frequently repeated in Caelica is the contrast between past perfection and present misery. In sonnet XLIV Greville evokes the images of the Golden Age "when the laws were inward that did rule the heart." More often, he contrasts a past when his mistress was faithful and loving with a present when she rejects him in favor of others. Sonnet LXXIII illustrates the cynical devaluation of love in the present, as the mistress justifies her present promiscuity by disparaging her earlier fidelity as "earnest Youths simplicitie":

> Myraphill, 'tis true, I lov'd, and you lov'd me,
> My thoughts as narrow as my heart, then were;
> Which made change seems impossible to be,
> Thinking one place could not two bodies beare.
> This was but earnest Youths simplicitie,
> To fathome Nature within Passions wit,
> Which thinks her earnestnesse eternity,
> Till selfe-delight makes change looke thorough it:
> You banish'd were, I griev'd, but languish'd not,
> For worth was free and of affection sure;
> So that time must be vaine, or you forgot,
> Nature and Love, no Vacuum can endure;
> I found desert, and to desert am true;
> Still dealing by it, as I dealt by you.

Myra, the speaker, presents the past in a most cynical way, proud that she has since learned that passion, however intense, does not last an "eternity" and that one's heart, that troublesome seat of emotions, is merely a sexual "place" that can "bodies beare." Yet the past is clearly a standard against which the present is to be judged. The lover has been "banish'd" and the word suggests a parallel between his experience and Adam's loss of perfection. The present world is seen as a "Vacuum" which must be filled at all costs. The puns on "dealing" and "dealt" in the closing couplet capture the compulsive activities of commercial trading and sexual intercourse (OED, deal, 5.13, 16) with which people fill time or other emptinesses. The standard of "nature" that Myra upholds is a dehumanizing one, in which people are interchangeable and in which lovers do not "grieve" or "languish" for one another but rather find replacements. As other poems in Caelica will indicate, this is Greville's version of reality too. He accepts it as reality, but he measures it against a barely stated but pervasive ideal.

In his consideration of earthly love, Greville again writes from the vantage point of Sidney's world. This time he takes instruction from Astrophil and Stella; for in Astrophil he finds an image of impulsive physical desire, of unabashed eroticism, that accords to some degree with his new perspective. Yet, again, his own world view is different from Sidney's, and in adopting the themes and conventions of Sidney's sonnet sequence, he changes them almost out of recognition.

Sidney writes as a courtier. Greville uses the conventions and themes of courtly verse that he finds in Sidney's poetry, but he writes against them. Astrophil and Stella is an English version of a Petrarchan sonnet sequence.[2] As Sidney percieves it, Petrarchanism, sheared of its mysticism, is viable enough to maintain a concept of sexual honor.[3] The key to the preservation of Petrarchan values in Astrophil and Stella is the court. The court humanizes the brute force of physical desire. It elevates abstract and social values, like virtue, above the egotistical drive for concrete physical pleasure. It tempers the excesses that Astrophil might be prone to. In Caelica, however, no institution supports a code of honorable conduct. Greville's own idealistic yearnings constantly fall prey to lust, inconstancy, and falsity, those ills that inevitably plague the love of fallen man. The court, far from mitigating the excesses of passion, provides a setting in which individuals can act out their desires. Sidney's "Eighth Song" and Caelica LXXV aptly illustrate the difference in the two poets' treatment of the court.

A pastoral lyric, the "Eighth Song" opposes the "natural" claims of sexual love against honor, an "unnatural" restraint associated with court and culture. The young lovers meet "in a grove most rich of shade," where all nature encourages their passion. Pleading his desires, Astrophil invokes the sanction of Nature:

Never season was more fit,
Never roome more apt for it;
Smiling ayre allowes my reason,
These birds sing: "Now use the season".

Stella opposes him:

Trust me while I thee deny,
In my self the smart I try,
Tyran honor doth thus use thee,
Stella's self might not refuse thee.

At the end of the song, Stella departs, Astrophil is left "passion rent," and "Tyran honor" has made both thoroughly miserable.

Yet, neither honor, nor the court that upholds it, is simply condemned. There is a genuine tension between the claims of civilization and those of nature. Above all, Stella, a representative of the court, gives credit to its values, for she is loving, and her chastity is a sign of her love.

While such wise she love denied,
As yet love she signified.

Sidney presents her sympathetically, as a woman who genuinely believes in the honor she upholds and who fears more than anything else the reproaches of her own conscience:

Therefore, Deere, this no more move,
Least, though I leave not thy love,
Which too deep in me is framed,
I should blush when thou art named.

Without actually criticizing Astrophil's desires, the poem identifies genuine love with honor, with restraint. The identification is not complete, for the song ends on a note of tension. But what is important for our purposes is that an "unnatural" control, a control associated with the ideals

of court and culture, is upheld as valid in its own right. Not even Astrophil, once his initial overtures are repulsed, contradicts it.

Yet Caelica LXXV discredits the ideal of sexual virtue, and with it, the world of the court. Like Astrophil and Stella, Philocell and Caelica meet in the pasture, where lush spring-time growth "Teach the earth that heate and raine/ Doe make Cupid live againe." Philocell pleads his love, and Caelica repulses him. Greville's version, however, does not oppose desire and honor, or nature and culture; for no one in the lyric holds sexual restraint to be a virtue.

Much of the difference between Sidney's song and Greville's lies in the characterization of their ladies. Unlike Stella, Caelica is not loving. In rejecting Philocell she offers a number of excuses, but none of them is honor. The last excuse is the most telling. Caelica admits caring only for herself and, very pragmatically, informs Philocell that he is nor worth the risk of people gossiping:

> My delight is all my care,
> All lawes else despised are,
> I will never rumor move,
> At least for one I doe not love.

Stella's love is replaced by Caelica's lovelessness, Stella's honor by Caelica's fear of rumor.[4] Moreover, whereas Sidney's lovers come into conflict over the question of ideals, Greville's seem to part on the question of money. Greville characterizes Philocel as "poore" and makes him plead with Caelica not to "scorne/ Love in humble humor borne." The implication is that Caelica rejects Philocel because he is

not wealthy enough for her. Thus, insofar as Caelica represents the values of the court, she represents them as hypocritical and mercenary.

Nor does Greville present men as more honorable than women. One of the excuses Caelica offers is that she fears men are false:

> Philocell, farre from me get uou,
> Men are false, we cannot let you;
> Humble, and yet full of pride,
> Earnest, not to be denied;
> Now us, for not loving, blaming,
> Now us, for too much, defaming.

Within this lyric, Caelica's doubts are excessive. Philocell is a "true Martyr at the fire," and the narrator reproaches Caelica with the question, "Can doubt of true affection/ Merit such a sharpe correction?" But within the context of Greville's sonnets as a whole, Caelica is certainly not overcautious. If an example is needed, in sonnet XXXVI the speaker criticizes women for "yeelding to the pleasing charmes/ Of Mans false lust disguised with devotion."

Thus, in Greville's poem neither an individual nor the court embodies the value of sexual honor. To the extent to which honor exists at all, it is, as the narrator puts it, "slave to will," a ready and socially acceptable excuse for coldness. The court is not a mainstay for idealistic values, as it is in Astrophil and Stella, but rather a degenerate perpetrator of rumor, and mercenary at that.

The differences between the "Eighth Song" and Caelica LXXIV reverberate throughout the two sonnet collections. In Astrophil and Stella, the court embodies a moral ideal, and it does so despite its shortcomings; Astrophil is aware that

"to my birth I owe/ Nobler desires," and that "Plato I read for nought, but if he tame/ Such coltish gyres" (XXI). True, he is here mocking a friend's criticisms, and at the end of sonnet he dismisses them by reassering the priority of his love ("Hath this world ought so faire as Stella is?"); but certainly the reproaches carry their own weight. Throughout the sequence, Astrophil remains aware that the behavior which becomes him is the rational self-control for which his place in society -- his birth and training -- has prepared him and which his peers expect of him. David Kalstone shows that in Astrophil and Stella, "we find a sharply defined concern for the corrosive effects of love upon the heroic life and the education of a Renaissance hero."[5] Astrophil has internalized the demands for restraint; and consequently he articulates a strong, continual conflict between desire and control, between nature and honor.

Nowhere in Caelica is there a similar societal counter to the violence of passion. If anything, sexual desire is more innocent in Nature than in court:

> Fortune should ever dwell
> In courts, where Wits excell:
> Love keepe the wood.
> (XXIX)

Society, as Greville depicts it, is concerned more with external conformity than intrinsic values; it makes itself felt as a perpetrator of gossip rather than as a bolster for individual morality. Rumor is a substantial force in more than sonnet LXXV. We may recall that in XXXVIII the "Curre, Rumor, runnes in every place" to prevent the continuance of the lovers' alliance, and that it is rumor, not

conscience, that makes Caelica wary enough of her "glassy Honour" to stop the affair. In LI, the lover, who is for once faithful, is still worried that people will say otherwise, that "Straight curious Rumor doth her censure give/ That our aspects are in another zone." The importance of rumor indicates just how shallow the morality of the society is and how little the society does to exemplify and transmit a standard of ethics.

Moreover, there is no character in the collection of lyrics who is consistently high-minded enough to embody any positive social value. There is no trustworthy friend to advise the lover of his moral obligations. The women in Caelica are only rarely depicted as virtuous. The importuning lover never attempts to restrain either his passions or his speech, as does Astrophil even at his most vociferous.

Numerous analogies relate failures in love to failures in the social order:

> Thus Rome and Myra acting many parts,
> By often changes lost commanding arts. (XXX)
>
> Kings that in youth like all things else, are fine,
> Have some for whom their childish faults are beaten;
> . . . . .
> So Cupid, you, who boast of Princes blood,
> For Womens princelike weaknesses are blamed. (XXXVI)
>
> Princes we comprehend, and can delight,
> We praise them for the good they never had;
> But Cupids wayes are farre more infinite,
> Kisses at times, and curt'sies make him glad. (XLIX)
>
> Unconstant thoughts were light desires do moue,
> With euery object which sense to them showes,
> Still ebbing from themselues to Seas of Loue,
> Like ill led Kings that conquer but to lose,
> With blood and paine these dearely purchase shame,
> Time blotting all things out, but euill name.
> (LXVII)

The analogies all suggest that the floundering, the thoughtlessness, the self-destructiveness in love all have their counterparts in the political realm. They suggest that the society lacks the resources of wisdom and decency to support an idealistic form of love.[6]

The utter vacuity of both social and personal contacts is most pessimistically presented in Caelica XXIII, an extended sonnet based on the fabliau of the child-seer, Merlin. The genre of the fabliau, with its traditional disinterest in character andemphasis on event, is a particularly apt source for a poem that shows the shallowness and instability of human ties. The meaning of this sonnet, as of the fabliau, lies largely in its plot. As narrative has it, the young Merlin is reprimanded by his mother for laughing at a funeral procession. He explains that he is laughing because the man weeping for the dead child is not the real father, but that the monk singing the dirge is:

> Merlin, they say, an English Prophet borne,
> When he was yong and govern'd by his Mother,
> Took great delight to laugh such fooles to scorne,
> As thought, by Nature we might know a Brother.
>
> His Mother, chid him oft, till on a day,
> They stood, and saw a Course to buriall carried,
> The Father teares his beard, doth weepe and pray;
> The Mother was the woman he had married.
>
> Merlin laughs out loud in stead of crying;
> His Mother chides him for that childish fashion;
> Sayes, Men must mourne the dead, themselves are dying,
> Good manners doth make answer unto passion.
>
> The Child (for children see what should be hidden)
> Replies unto his Mother by and by,
> "Mother, if you did know, and were forbidden,
> "Yet you would laugh as heartily, as I.

"This Man no part hath in the child he sorrowes,
"His Father was the Monke that sings before him:
"See then how Nature of Adoption borrowes,
"Truth couets in me, that I should restore him.
"True fathers singing, supposed fathers crying,
"I thinke make women laugh, that lye a-dying.

Just what, we want to know, is so humorous?

First of all, we should understand that the basic assumption of the poem is that feeling between people is meaningless in itself, and that in order to be valid it must be substantiated by physical-sexual-fact. When Merlin observes that "'This Man no part hath in the child he sorrowes,'" he does more than exclude the man from legitimate siring; he denies that the man has any emotional "part" in the child. Moreover, at the same time as sexual bonds are admitted as the only valid ones, they are seen as easy to nullify, through adultery, and difficult to know, especially where there is illegitimacy. In laughing at "fooles . . ./ As thought, by Nature we might know a Brother," Merlin scorns the idea that people have instinctual knowledge of their objective relationships. What the poem is concerned with is that all communal bonds are insubstantial, since their grounds are so tenuous.

Family ties are swept away by the two cryptic lines: "The Father teares his beard, doth weepe and pray/ The Mother was the woman he had married." That the father might have loved the child he raised and genuinely grieve the loss is irrelevant. The poem does not ask the sincerity of his feelings, but merely sketches the stereotypic antics of grief that will fit into one line and sniggers at the misplaced emotion. The mockery in the portrait nullifies any

bonds of affection that might have existed between the man and the child he had brought up. Moreover, husband and wife are similarly separate. The two are not brought together in joint mourning. In fact, the poem says nothing about the mother's grief; which is unimportant. What matters is the implication in the second line that she is only the woman the husband had married, and not the mother of his child. Husband and wife are thus divided by deception on one side and ignorance on the other. The disintegration of the family, the basic social unit, involves the destruction of both personal and societal ties.

On a larger scale, the destruction of social bonds is represented by the improprieties of the funeral procession, since the funeral is a manifestation of mourning. Most obviously, the monk should not be singing the dirge for his own child. Beyond that, however, the poem insists on the impropriety of the father's actions as well. "See how Nature of Adoption borrowes," Merlin tells his mother, pointing at once to the hypocritical role that the monk has "adopted," and to the excessive emotion that the father shows for a merely "adopted" child. In its double application, the word "adopted" suggests that both the monk's singing and the father's crying falsify the objective state of things. The neat disposition of the penultimate line captures the precise inversion of roles between father and monk" "True fathers singing, supposed fathers crying." The reversal of truth and supposition in our perceptions makes a mockery of all social relationships.

So Merlin is laughing at the hollowness of personal and social intercourse. But his laughter itself is the poem's strongest statement of that hollowness.[7] For, by laughing at suffering, Merlin (and Greville) not only refuses sympathy to others, but repudiates the minimal bonds of a shared humanity. As his mother points out, sympathy reflects the commonness of human suffering: "Men must mourne the dead, themselves are dying." Merlin's laughter protests that the bonds of shared mortality are paltry next to the objective "Truth" that people are false and ignorant. "Truth covets in me, that I should restore him," Merlin insists, despite pain, despite death.

Without social restraints, the tempered eroticism of Astrophil and Stella is replaced in Caelica by an extremely energetic, overt, and crude sexual energy. Since in Sidney's sonnets, sexual desire exists simultaneously with Petrarchan notions of love, "love is potentially a mode of aspiration," for Astrophil.[8] Astrophil's classic expression of sexual desire, "'But ah,' Desire still cries, "give me some food'" (LXXI), as well as his more rambunctious dismissal of virtue, "Let Vertue have that Stella's self; yet thus,/ That Vertue but the body grant to us," (LII), may be out of line with Petrarchan idealism; yet, basically, they are the outbursts of youthful passion buckling against restraint.[9] Their tone is slightly exaggerated, slightly humorous; we are asked to tolerate Astrophil's impetuousness, but not to take it as a standard for conduct. As-

trophil's protests of sexual desire are almost polite compared with the authoritative, sweeping, and reductive generalization at the end of Caelica LVI: "None can well behold with eyes/ But what underneath him lies." With the word "underneath" denoting both a place in the universe and a sexual position, Greville's is an emphatic statement of the limitations of human perception, sympathy, and love. It is a flat assertion not only of the potency of physical desire but of its primacy.

One of the major themes in Caelica is infidelity, in marriage as well as in romance. Infidelity captures precisely that distinction between past bliss and present misery that marks Greville's perception of reality. As a particularly disruptive manifestation of sexual desire, it epitomizes all the violence and aggression of lust. As an experience that breaks the bonds of trust and loyalty that hold people together, it provides evidence for the impossibility of lasting affection between a man and woman. It crystalizes whatever sense of rejection and isolation one may feel in a hostile universe. In short, it is the theme that fully exemplifies man's misery, helplessness, and moral turpitude in the fallen world.

Greville is positively obsessed with the subject of inconstancy. He refers to it in no fewer than thrity of his lyrics.[10] He generally characterizes his mistress as promiscuous and deceitful. She "Thinks wit of change while thoughts are in delight" (XXII); she is apt to "change as

others doe" (XXXII), and her love is a brittle as "vessells made of glasse" (XLI). The importuning lover is little better. While he complains of his mistress' desertions, he confesses his own: "I scorne, I change, I falsify my love" (XVIII). For Greville, inconstancy is in the nature of love:

> But Love is of the Phenix-kind,
> And burnes it selfe, in selfe-made fire,
> To breed still new birds in the minde,
> From ashes of the old desire:
> And hath his wings from constancy,
> As mountaines call'd of moving be. (LXI)

The emphasis on infidelity constitutes another departure from the norms Sidney had established. In the Petrarchan tradition, the lady is inaccessible, not inconstant.[11] Sidney even goes out of his way to avoid the issue in Astrophil and Stella, in spite of the fact that the biographical basis of his sonnet might have encouraged his using it. As is well known, Stella is partially modelled on Penelope Devereux, who was the wife of Robert, Lord Rich and the mistress of Charles Blount. In two sonnets, Sidney puns on Lord Rich's name. But the allusions function to praise Stella as "the richest gem of love and life" (XXIV) and as a woman "most rich in every part" (XXXVIII). They never raise the possibility of her committing adultery with Astrophil or anyone else. Where Sidney is reticent, Greville is emphatic.

In quite a number of sonnets, Greville exacerbates the issue of infidelity by bringing it into a marital situation. References to adultery abound. Zeus' extra-marital affairs provide images for sonnets XI, XXXI, and LIII; Venus' betrayal of Vulcan for sonnets XXII and LIII. Sonnet

XXXIII contains an allusion to "the well-known secrets of Astolpho's cup" -- which, in Arisoto's Orlando Furioso, are the secrets of unfaithful wives.[12] Sonnets XXII and L are based on fabliaux of unfaithful wives. Nor is the significance of adultery simply a matter of quantity. In his presentation of the motif Greville depicts an amoral universe in which sexual aggression is not only the most powerful force but also the most attractive and alive.

For example, in sonnet XX, which voices the claims of a man who intrudes on a marriage, the reader is encouraged to respond to the vitality of the speaker's sexual aggression, not to judge its morality. One is drawn by the imperative nature of the speaker's question to Cupid: "What shall we doe that with your bowe are wounded."

> Why how now Cupid, doe you covet change?
> And from a Stealer to a Keepers state,
> With barkings Doggs doe you the Coverts range,
> That carried bread to still them but of late?
>
> What shall we doe that with your Bow are wounded?
> Your Bow which blindeth each thing it doth hit,
> Since feare and lust in you are so confounded,
> As your hot fire beares water still in it.
>
> Play not the foole, for though your Dogs be good,
> Hardy, loud, earnest, and of little sleep,
> Yet mad desires with cryes are not with-stood,
> They must be better arm'd that meane to keep:
> And since unweapon'd care makes men forlorne,
> Let me first make your Dogge an Unicorne.

Within the poem there is nothing to counter the emotional thrust of this question. The husband and intruder are presented as morally equal in their mutual unsavoriness. If the speaker, by his own admission, is a "stealer" of love, the husband is only a "keeper." The husband's right to his

wife seems hardly more valid than the interloper's, since both their claims have the same source in sexual passion. It is the nature of sexual desire, here embodied in Cupid, both to "steal" sex and to "keep" what it has from others. The image of Cupid's dogs reduces everything to appropriate crudeness, by pointing to the dual workings of the same lust. For the dogs represent carnal desire, the lover's as well as that of the jealous husband, who (as the first quatrain indicates) uses "Doggs" to ensure the safety of his game preserve.

The poem defines sexual passion as "mad desires" that "are not withstood" by mere "cries" -- that is by another's moral objections or jealous passion. The speaker's threat in the sextet to cuckold the husband is thus to be taken as the logical and valid end to the momentum which had been established. In the couplet, in fact, the lover implies that the cuckold's horn can serve the husband as a weapon with which to protect himself: "And since unweapon'd care makes men forlorne,/ Let me first make your Dogge an Unicorne." If this at first seems bizarre, it appears less odd on deeper consideration. For when the lover offers to arm the husband by cuckolding him, he offers to relieve him of his ineffective anxiety. "Unweapon'd care," by doing once and for all what is inevitable.

Greville's assumption that human relationships are based on sexual desire, and only sexual desire, entails such a thorough condemnation of humanity that it undermines the strength of his moral vision. Sonnet XXXI also aligns itself

with the sheer vitality of sexual energy, even though its narrator makes glancing aspersions at "Those that doe live at warre with truth, & shame":

> Good-fellowes whom men commonly doe call,
> Those that doe live at warre with truth, & shame,
> If once to love of honesty they fall,
> They both lose their Good-fellowes, and their name;
>
> For theeves, whose riches rest in others wealth,
> Whose rents are spoiles, and others thrift their gaine,
> When they grow bankrupts in the Art of Stealth,
> Booties to their old fellowes they remain.
>
> Cupid, thou free of these Good-Fellowes art:
> For while Man cares not who, so he be one,
> Thy Wings, thy Bow, they Arrowes take his part,
> He neither lives, nor loves, nor lyes along;
> But be he once to Hymens close yoke sworne,
> Thou straight brav'st this Good-fellow with the horne.

The point of the sonnet, as stated in the closing couplet, is that husband and knave will eventually be in the same situation, and that all the "Good-fellowes'" illicit triumphs will be punished in kind when he is married and himself cuckolded. Nonetheless, throughout the poem the position of man as knave is the more appealing one. While the husband is caught in the "close yoke" of marriage, the knave who "neither lives, nor loves, nor lyes along" embodies freedom and pleasure. It is to these that one is drawn. The obvious, and rather nasty, glee of the closing couplet reflects not simply the moralist's pleasure that a singularly appropriate punishment will be meted out, but the poem's delight in aggressive sexuality. For who is it that will discomfort the knave when he marries but someone as licentious as himself. In the end, one is less bothered by the "Good-fellowes'" immorality than pleased by their vitality.

Yet, though sexuality is the source of energy in these and other Caelica lyrics, it is decidedly not a source of full or unspoiled pleasure. As Greville depicts it, sexuality may be potent, but it is also degrading. The lightness of the first stanza of sonnet LII is an exception:

> Away with those selfe-loving Lads,
> Whom Cupids arrow never glads:
> Away poore soules, that sigh and weep,
> In love of those that lye asleepe:
> For Cupid is a meadow-God,
> And forceth none to kisse the rod.

On no other occasion in Caelica is Cupid a "meadow-God," and his arrow more often blinds than "glads" those it strikes. More representative of Greville's tone is the cynical brutality of the closing stanza:

> The worth that worthinesse should move,
> Is Love, that is the bow of love,
> And Love as well the foster can,
> As can the mighty Noble-man.
> Sweet Saint 'tis true, you worthy be,
> Yet without Love nought worth to me.

The reductive equation of a woman's"worth" with her sexual availability, and of "love" to a physical act the "foster" can perform suggests the way in which physical desire can strip both man and woman of their distinctly humane qualities.

The point seems to be that sexuality, destructive, enervating, and degrading, is all that man has. Greville is caught between his expectation that an ideal sexuality embody and recreate a type of pre-lapsarian joy and his perception of sexuality as it is in the fallen world. Thus, in lyrics where Greville does not align himself with the impulses of aggressive sexuality, he sees himself or his protagonist in the role of a man who is disappointed, rejected, and, above all, betrayed.

Here again, Greville's vision of love is strikingly different from Sidney's. Sidney seems to expect less of love than Greville and to be less inclined to give it the status of a cosmic phenomenon. By the same token, however, Sidney's protagonist is never quite as bereft by the disappointments of love as is Greville's. The difference can be seen in the use that the two poets make of the image of the Anacreontic Cupid.

The Anacreontic Cupid was the Renaissance image of erotic desire. It was a child God, sometimes mischievous, sometimes helpless, but always diminuative. In its smallness, it betokened the triviality of love, and it was distinctly opposed to the Ovidian Cupid, the full-sized tyrant of Ovid's Ars Amatoria and Remedia Amores, which in the Middle Ages developed into a "visionary figure . . . endowed with emotional reality" and represented "a metaphysical glorification of love."[13] Popularized in England by Sidney, the child god derives from The Greek Anthology and The Anacreontea, the first being a collection of epigrams, many of which are satiric, and the second a collection of about sixty lyrics celebrating wine, women, and song.[14] Republished on the continent, respectively in 1494 and 1554, these works brought to the Renaissance the conception of love as a purely earthbound experience, and, indeed, in The Greek Anthology an explicitly erotic one. The poems reached England primarily through the elegant works of the Pléiade,[15] where Cupid was depicted as simultaneously potent and slightly ridiculous.[16]

Sidney shows a similar sense of proportion. As Waswo points out, Sidney uses the figure of Cupid "for conventional ends to suggest the debilitating power and frustration of loving the physically enticing but chaste Stella."[17] In his use of the figure, he maintains a firm balance between its representation of the "capricious and destructive side of love"[18] and its indication that in the larger scheme of things passionate love is finally unimportant.

Astrophil and Stella 65 is a case in point. It employs the Anacreontic tale of the vagabonding Cupid to demonstrate the unkindness of unrequited love:[19]

> Love by sure proofe I may call thee unkind,
> That giv'st no better eare to my just cries:
> Thou whom to me such my good turnes should bind,
> As I may well recount, but none can prize:
> For when, mak'd boy, thou couldst no harbour find
> In his old workd, growne now so too too wise:
> I lodg'd thee in my heart, and being blind
> By Nature borne, I gabe to thee mine eyes.
> Mine eyes, my light, my heart, my life, alas,
> If so great services may scorned be:
> Yet let tis thought thy Tygrish courage passe:
> That I perhaps am somewhat kinne to thee;
> Since in thine armes, if learnd fame truth hath spread,
> Thou bear'st the arrow, I the arrow head.

Astrophil poses as an innocent fool whom love has offended and mistreated. He is fully cognizant of all that he had lost in unrequited love, having given Cupid control of both his intellectual and emotional faculties, his heart and eyes, which together make up the most important features of his existence -- his "light," with all of its metaphoric overtone, and his "life" itself. These love has sapped. Nonetheless, after detailing his losses, Astrophil reassesses his situation and counts himself ahead. In the last four

lines, he asserts that, having loved and having given so much of himself to love, he himself shares some of love's strength. The triumphant wit of the closing couplet reminds Cupid that the Sidney family arms bear an arrowhead.[20] If, in one sense, the lodged arrowhead provides evidence that love had struck, it also, being a coat of arms, represents Astrophil's power and pride. Love is given its due in this poem, but no more than that.

No such sense of proportion marks Greville's view of love or his use of the Anacreontic Cupid. True, Greville held love to be frivolous, as his repeated references to Cupid's boyishness or childishness indicate. Yet, for a trivial figure, the "light-wing'd God" (II) plays an exceptionally large role in Caelica. In contrast to the nine Cupid poems in Astrophil and Stella, there are more than twenty lyrics in Caelica where Cupid is prominant and about the same number where he serves as a source of allusion. In fact, as Lisle Cecil John notes, "the conception of the Anacreontic Cupid is the chief motif in Caelica."[21] Greville seems to have been both attracted by the trivializing nature of the child god, which permitted him to treat human love with some distance and contempt, and disturbed by the nature of the love that he used the figure to represent.

Greville's version of the story of the vagabonding Cupid, Caelica XII, depicts a more malicious deity than the negligent and fatuously arrogant, or "Tygrish," one of Sidney's sonnet; and the destructiveness of Greville's Cupid is not similarly tempered:

Cupid, thou naughtie Boy, when thou wert loathed,
Naked and blind, for vagabunding noted,
Thy nakedness I in my reason cloathed,
Mine eyes I gave thee, so was I devoted.

Fye Wanton fie; who would shew children kindnesse?
No sooner he into mine eyes was gotten,
But straight he clouds them with a seeing blindness,
Makes reason wish that reason were forgotten.

From thence to Myra's eyes the Wanton strayeth,
Where while I charge him with ungratefull measure,
So while faire wonders he mine eyes betrayeth,
That my wounds, and his wrongs, become my pleasure;
Till for more spite to Myra's heart he flyeth,
Where living to the world, to mee he dieth.

Greville's Cupid robs the protagonist of his intellectual discernment to such an extent that he derives a masochistic pleasure from the pains of love. In the first twelve lines of the sonnet, Greville's protagonist may seem to have suffered somewhat less injury through love than Astrophil, for he has lost only his reason and not his emotional integrity. At least he talks about his confusion rather than about his loss of "light" and "life." Yet the loss of reason is deprivation enough for Greville. It constitutes, as the third quatrain indicates, a betrayal. Nor is there reparation for it, as there is in Sidney's poem. In the closing couplet of Greville's, Cupid is lodged in Myra's heart. Myra has also been enflamed by passion but, ironically, not for the lover. This ironic twist signifies for Greville love's inherent spitefulness, that is the tendency of love to incite and arouse and then inevitably to disappoint. Greville's protagonist is left with nothing, not even a sense of personal dignity, as his mistress rejects him and perversely accepts other lovers. The malicious Cupid

of this poem is an image of love's inevitable and total betrayal.

In Caelica, the Anacreontic Cupid of the Renaissance court is transformed from a diminutive figure of erotic desire to an image which represents all those irresolvable contradictions in the nature of love that make love a disappointment and a betrayal.[22] At their best, Greville's Anacreontic poems probe into the nature of love. If Greville's Anacreontic lyrics lack the wit and charm of Sidney's, they probe depths of experience that Sidney hardly touches. Greville's most consistent characterization of Cupid is as a promise breaker. Love promises happiness which never materializes. By the same token, though, the promise is so rich and enticing that it seems to exclude other sources of happiness.

Caelica XXVII explores the inhibiting effect of fear on sexual desire. A favorite theme in Caelica (reiterated in sonnets XI, XXII, LXV, LXXIV, and LXXV), the problem derives from the Petrarchan antithesis between enticement of the lady's beauty and the prohibition of her virtue, but it also hints at man's timidity in seeking after any kind of deep happiness. The image of Cupid first "bound for honours sacrifice" and then heading and feathering his "shafts with feare" suggests the living corollary of a lover frustrated first by the external restrictions of his lady's honor and then by his own, internal fears:

> Cupid, in Myra's faire bewitching eyes,
> (Where Beauty shewes the miracles of pleasure)
> When thou laist bound for honours sacrifice,
> Sworne to thy hate, equality and measure.

With open hand thou offeredst me her heart,
Thy **bow** and arrowes, if I would conspire,
To ruine honour, with whose frozen Art
She tyranniz'd thy Kingdome of desire.

I glad to dwell, and raigne in such perfections,
Gave thee my reason, memory, and sense,
In them to worke thy mysticall reflexions,
Against which Nature can haue no defence;
  And wilt thou now to nourish my despaire;
  Both head and feather all thy shafts with feare?

In this narrative of a bargain the lover makes with Cupid, the lover finds that there is no way of winning. Love offers a man a woman's affection, her "heart," and the erotic energy, Cupid's "bow and arrowes," with which to win it. He, in turn, sets out to "ruine honour," which he initially perceives as the only impediment to his pleasure. But once he has abdicated his "reason, memory, and sense," and thus unburdened himself of his more obvious inhibitions, he finds both himself and his mistress (the poem seems to suggest both without naming either) inhibited by "feare." The irony of it all is that fear is an intrinsic part of love in the Petrarchan tradition.

Nor will trying to deny or transcend physical passion resolve the dilemma, the sonnet suggests. This is one of the few poems in Caelica in which sexuality does not have lewd overtones. Sexuality itself promises fullness and richness that are unavailable elsewhere. Myra's beauty "shewes the miracles of pleasure." Once again, we are reminded, if only faintly, of an earthly paradise -- in Cupid's "Kingdome of desire" where the lover-king is "glad to dwell, and reigne in such perfections," where Cupid's "mysticall reflexions" seem more exalting, more potent, and more attractive than

the humdrum of "Nature" which "can have no defence" against them. Yet it is that very promise which enforces thh lover's enslavement. Unlike in sonnets I and IX, positive value is not to be found outside of sexuality. The only and familiar alternative, honor or chaste love, is rejected out of hand. Honor, with its "equality and measure" and with its "frozen Art," seems mean and little. Thus, when fear inhibits desire, one is left with nothing but "despaire."

Sonnet XXVII, however, shows the inadequacy of gratified desire. The same lover who had in VXVI taken Cupid's "oath of dalliance and desire" here again complains that the "faithlesse Boy" had reneged on an agreement. For although the protagonist seems to have satisfied his sexual desire, he remains wanting, yearing not simply for physical consummation, but for the "miracles" it had promised. The speaker reminds Cupid that he had promised "Excesse and infinite, in love," not the mere release of physical tension. The juxtaposition of XXVI and XXVII as companion poems emphasizes the overwhelming inevitability of frustration.

> You faithlesses Boy, perswade you me to reason?
> With vertue doe you answere my affection?
> Vertue, which you with liverie and seizen
> Have sold and changed out of your protection.
>
> When you lay flattering in sweet Myra's eyes,
> And plaid the wanton both with worth, and pleasure,
> In beauties field you told me vertue dies,
> Excesse and infinite in love, was measure.
>
> I tooke your oath of dalliance and desire,
> Myra did so inspire me with her graces,
> But like a Wag that sets the straw on fire,
> You running to doe harme in other places,
> Sware what is felt with hand, or seene with eye,
> As mortall, must feele sickensse, age and dye.

Cupid again provides an image of unfulfilled promise. He arouses men's passions yet assures that they will burn as rapidly and furiously as straw, without being quenched, until there is nothing left of them. And desire burns out, exhausted, not for a lack of sexual release but because, as the closing couplet explains, both man and the object of his passion are mortal. The images of seeing and feeling, of hand and eye, anchor love's pleasures firmly to the world of limited and passing events, while the inevitablity of sickness, age, and death belies the infinite bliss that love promises.

Yet while mortality denies the infinitude that love promises, it provides no compensation. Again the lover rejects alternatives to fulfillment, the slaves of "vertue" and "reason" that Cupid offers. The depiction of Cupid, who had "sold" virtue as in a business transaction and "plaid the wanton" with a woman's honor, as a hypocritical moralizer undermines the traditional conception of rationality and ethics as bulwarks of stability which are to be preferred (if not to fulfilled love) to the frustrations attendant on all human passion

In both XXVI and XXVII love as an idea offers a measureless consumation but as an actuality yields, if anything at all, only the barest physical gratification. Caelica XXXIV conflates the image of Cupid as a deity with that of the Calvinist God to suggest, on the one hand, how close the aspirations of love are to those of a real religion and, on the

other hand, how far the rewards of the religion of love are from those of Christianity:

> The Gods to shew they joy not in offences,
> Nor plague of humane Nature doe desire,
> When they have made their rods and whipt our senses,
> They throw the rods themselves into the fire.
>
> Then Cupid, thou whom Man hath made a God,
> Be like they fellow Gods in weight and fashion,
> And now my faults are punish'd, burne the rod
> In fires blowne with many-headed passion
>
> Thy rod is Worth, in Myra's beauty plac'd.
> Which like a Sunne hath power to burne another,
> And though it selfe can no affections taste,
> To be in all men else affections mother:
> Therefore if thou wilt prove thy self a God,
> In thy sweet fires, let me burne this faire rod.

The aspirations of sexual love and Christianity are related by a series of double entendres involving the images of "rod" and "fires." The poem's argument is based on the notion that the Christian God seems harsh and punitive but is not. The attributes of the Calvinist God underlie Greville's depiction of the pagan pantheon. Given the Christian reading, which the octave calls for, the "rod" is a disciplinarians instrument to be discarded once one's "faults are punish'd." Yet from the point of view of the religion of love, the rod is a phallus, to be burnt "in fires blowne with many-headed passion." The connection of course is that unsatisfied desire can itself be a torment -- so the line "Thy rod is Worth in Myra's beauty plac'd" makes clear. This line, punning, combines an image of sexual intercourse ("rod" as phallus, "worth" as worthwhile) with the Petrarchan commonplace that the lady's chastity ("worth" as virtue) torments the lover by simultaneously arousing and prohibiting his

desire. Aside from the reductive wit the point seems to be that the person who inflicts torment should be the one to end it, just as the Christian God does. Following upon the analogy between the merciful Christian God and Cupid, the speaker confidently begs Cupid, in the last line of the poem, to put an end to his torment by providing the sexual release that is love's to give.

If, as the argument claims, love resembles religion in being source both of pain and of its amelioration, the affinity also points to vital differences. The Calvinist God is a very muted presence in this poem, and one should be careful not to overemphasize his significance. Yet, even as a background figure, He serves to point up Cupid's gross physicality. Cupid whips men's "senses," not their consciences; his mercy is not spiritual rest, but physical release. He is the idol "whom man hath made a God." These implicit contrasts suggests how limited is love's power to provide the spiritual gratification that men long for.

In short, love seems to be an infinitely more troublesome phenomenon for Greville than for Sidney. As Greville sees love, its violence is not subject to social containment or control; the power of sexuality, epitomized in infidelity and adultery, disrupts any potential social harmony; the individual lover is inevitably left disappointed and wanting. The Caelica lyrics challenge the very conventions from which they are written. To compound the problem, the failure of love in actuality is matched by a vision of such promise and fulfillment that one wonders if the high expectations

themselves do not contribute to the disillusionment. In fact, the lyrics contain much more desire and longing than they do love, in the sense of genuine concern between people. The lover himself, in his aggression and in his sense of rejection, is ultimately loveless.

NOTES

1. Peterson, English Lyric, p. 262, claims that "following his dismissal of Platonic love, Greville turns to treat love as an erotic game." I think that the notion of love as a game underestimated the great seriousness of the lyrics. Even where Greville's attitude seems to be "amused," as Peterson calls it, the amusement seems quite bitter. There is almost no genuine humor in Caelica.

2. Note the propriety of Richard B. Young's title, English Petrarch: A Study of Sidney's 'Astrophil and Stella', in Three Studies in the Renaissance, Yale Studies in English, no. 138 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1958).

3. This process is suggested by David Kalstone, in Sidney's Poetry: Contexts and Interpretations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 105-132.

4. For a similar observation, see Kenneth Muir, Introduction to Elizabethan Literature (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 48.

5. Sidney's Poetry: Contexts and Interpretations (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965), p. 106.

6. Rebholz , Life of Fulke Greville, p. 61, suggests that the political conceits are strained and obscurantist. While there is much truth in this contention, it seems to me that the difficulty derives less from the nature of the conceits than from Greville's efforts to write about politics and the world at large in the language of the love lyric.

7. Merlin's laughter is part of the original fabliau. See, for example, Henry Lovelick, Merlin: A Middle English Metrical Version of a French Romance, ed.Ernest Kock. (London: Early English Text Society, 1904), line 2439. But it seems to me that Greville emphasizes and points the laughter in a way that the original narrative does not.

8. Neil Rudenstine, Sidney's Poetic Development (Cambridge, Mass.: 1967), p. 172

9. Rudenstine, Sidney's Poetic Development, pp. 209-211, discusses the opposition of love and authority, youth and age, in Sidney's poetry.

10. Caelica XII, XIII, XVIII, XXII, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXVI, XXXVIII, XXXIX, XLI, XLII, XLIII, XLIV, XLVI, XLVIII, L, LIII, LXI, LXII, LXIV, LXV, LXVII, LIX, LXXI, LXXII, LXXIII, LXXV, LXXVI, LXXVII, to name only the most obvious.

11. Of course, Greville is not the first to introduce the theme of inconstancy into the love lyric. The theme also appears in the poems of Tottel's Miscellany. What is unusual is the great emphasis that great emphasis Greville gives to the motif, the very large number of his lyrics that deal with it.

12. This reading is Napoleone Orsini's, Greville tra il monso e dio, pp. 36-37. Orsini suggests that Greville confused Astolpho, who has retrieved Orlando's lost wits in a jar (XXXIV, 87) with Rinaldo, who had refused to taste wine from a magic cup which would cause the wine to spill if his wife were unfaithful (XLII, 70ff). Bullough offers a different interpretation; see his Notes.

13. Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance (1931; rpt. New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 99. Unless otherwise stated, my information about Cupid's fate in England comes from Lisle Cecil John, The Elizabethan Sonnet Sequences: Studies in Conventional Conceits (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1938), pp. 67-77.

The Ovidean Cupid is the figure we find in Caelica IX and X. In X, Love is invoked conceptually as the "mortall sphere of powers divine," (italics mine) and anthropomorphically as king and tyrant. In X, he is the "restless being of mans wandering thoughts," who can span the distance from the human mind to "that heavenly quire" where Platonic "Ideas" have their origin. In these poems, love has transcendental powers: moving between earth and heaven, it can raise men above their mundane condition. The Anacreontic Cupid cannot.

14. These works are available in modern English translations. The Greek Anthology, translated, W. R. Paton, Loeb Classical Library, 5 vols (1918; rpt. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960); Elergy and Iambus, with the Anacreontea, trans., J. M. Edmonds. 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library (1911; rpt. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968); The Anacreontea in English Verse, trans., Judson France Davidson (London: Dent, 1915); and The Anacreontea, trans., P. M. Pope (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1955).

For a study of the influence of the Greek Anthology on the continent, see James Hutton, The Greek Anthology in France, and in the Latin Writers of the Netherlands to the Year 1800 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1946), and _____, The Greek Anthology in Italy to the Year 1800 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1935).

15. The Anacreontic verse of the Pléiade is available in Anacréon et les Poéms Anacréontiques: texte grec avec les Traductiones et Imitationes des Poétes du XVIth Siècle, ed., Archille Delboulle (1891; Genéve: Slatkins Reprints, 1970). For a brief discussion of the relation between French and English anacreontics, see Sidney Lee, The French Renaissance in England: An Account of the Literary Relations Between England and France in the Sixteenth Century (1910; rpt. New York: Octagon, 1968), pp. 193-8, 217-21.

16. The poets of the Pléiade tended to treat Cupid as they did love -- lightly. See Henri Chamard, Histoire de la Pléiade. (Paris: Didier, 1961), II, 59-60.

17. Waswo, Fatal Mirror, p. 57.

18. Kalstone, Sidney's Poetry, p. 57.

19. See Ringler, ed., Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, p. 479, note to sonnet 65.

20. Ringler, ed., Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, p. 179, note to sonnet 65.

21. John, Elizabethan Sonnet Sequences, p. 76.

22. There is precedent for the serious treatment of the image of Cupid in what Panofsky describes as a tradition of "Moralizing Mythography." Studies in Iconology, p. 99. This involves an allegorical interpretation of Cupid, which began with Proprtius' Elergy II, xii., and continued on through the Middle Ages. With relation to Greville, two points about these interpretations are important: (1) they were consistently pessimistic about love, and (2) they tended to conceptualize Cupid.

V. The Voice of an Observer

Greville is a deliberative poet. Opposing the norms that Sidney had established for the courtly love lyric, Greville seems to have had to think about his subject a good deal more than a person who could accept a modified Petrarchanism. Perceiving an incredible distance between the promise of love and its fulfillment in actuality, he seems to have been impelled to ask why. Whatever his motive, the fact remains that his lyrics contemplate love; they do not express it.

In contemplating love, Greville again departed from the conventions of the courtly lyric, whose function was specifically expressive: to praise or blame, to plead or persuade. The intent of the courtly lyric is clearly expounded in the first sonnet of Astrophil and Stella:

> Loving in truth, and faine in verse my love to show,
> That the dear She might take some pleasure in my paine:
> Pleasure might cause her reade, reading might make her know,
> Knowledge might pittie winne, and pittie grace obtaine.

Astrophil wishes to "show" his love "in verse" so that he "might pittie win" and "grace obtaine."[1] Hyperbolic praise and emotive pleading help serve his ends.

Yet despite its deep conflict with Greville's purposes, the style of Astrophil and Stella imbues most of the Caelica love lyrics, after sonnet X. In some ways, that style may have seemed appropriate to Greville's contemplation of earthly love. At least in contrast to the ornate verse of Sidney's early works, the relatively informal, colloquial, style of Astrophil and Stella, suited as it was to the day to day realism of Astrophil's world, did not elevate love

to an ennobling passion or lend it any unbefitting dignity.[2] But, like the ethical Petrarchanism of Sidney's sequence, its style was also rooted in the values of the court, as firmly, in fact, as was the ornate style. For, as an expressive style, it depended on an audience which could hear and be moved. In Astrophil and Stella the required audience, though it was obviously imaginary in any given sonnet, was confirmed by the pervasive presence of the court, that is by the sense of a society firmly conditioning Astrophil's every action and thought, and perhaps Sidney's too.

Greville's sonnets, however, seem to exist in a social vacuum, where there is no one to talk to. Greville, more deeply critical of society than Sidney, sees himself outside it, and he appropriately creates a persona who is an observer and who makes generalizations about society from afar. Unlike Astrophil and Stella, Caelica contains neither a clearly deliniated dramatic character such as Astrophil is nor a well conceived audience; as we observed in the Introduction, the several characters of each sex are indistinguishable as well as inconsistent in their attributes. Moreover, in treating love as representative of man's condition in the fallen world, the Caelica lyrics describe a predetermined situation which can be ameliorated neither by praise nor by pleading. Greville's persona neither expresses feelings of love nor tries to persuade a woman to yield, even physically. Rather, both in his aggressive statements of sexual desire and in his reiterated complaints of inconstancy, he describes a fixed and hopeless situation.

Yet, out of and in opposition to the style of Astrophil and Stella, Greville creates a style better suited to his own purposes, just as he had formed his own view of love in contradition to Sidney's. He develops a deliverative style, one that enables him to analyze love, to treat it with symbolic import, and, moreover, to express his own divided allegiance between the ideal world of Edenic bliss he envisions and the reality he perceives.[3] Furthermore, he forges the style of his love lyrics not by discarding Sidney's influence -- as he will do in the religious lyrics -- but by integrating what Sidney had to offer into his own poems.

Considering the complexity of what Greville had to do, the numerous near failures in his love lyrics are hardly surprising. There are poems where his own aims and the aims of his model collide, and where Sidney seems like the master of the form and Greville like the struggling and recalcitrant pupil. If this image proves in the end to be grossly inaccurate, Greville's flawed poems nonetheless illuminate his accomplishments and point up his difficulties in working with conventions that were inhospitable to own bent of mind. Thus, before we examine how Greville integrates Sidney's influence, we should find it profitable to see how he departs from it, and wrenches and pulls as he does so.

The basic distinctions are that where Sidney praises, Greville analyzes; and where Sidney pleads, Greville describes. Or, to put the matter differently, where Sidney expresses, Greville deliberates.

The difficulties that Greville experienced in trying to write very serious verse when the conventions, as they were imparted by Sidney, encouraged a gracious and light charm may be seen in a comparative reading of Astrophil and Stella 11 and Caelica XXVI. Both sonnets employ the motif of the child Cupid, which, we recall, was held to represent the childishness and frivolity of love. But Sidney turns the image into an instrument of graceful praise,[4] while Greville uses it to analyze the nature of sexual desire.

The virtue of Sidney's poem lies in the easy and smooth charm of its surface. Astrophil's criticism of Cupid's boyish superficiality, of his attention to Stella's external qualities rather than to her "hart," functions peripherally to condemn the tendency of a young man to be so attracted by a woman's beauty that he ignores her internal virtues. But on the whole, the sonnet offers little encouragement to read Cupid as an allegorical figure. Instead, it proceeds in a unified and coherent manner to praise Stella's beauty and character:

> In truth, ô Love, with what a boyish kind
> Thou doest proceed in thy most serious wayes:
> That when the heav'n to thee his best displayes,
> Yet of that best thou leav'st the best behind.
> For like a child that some faire booke doth find,
> With guilded leaves or colourd Velume playes,
> Or at the most on some fine picture stayes,
> But never heeds the fruit of writer's mind:
> So when thou saw'st in Nature's cabinet
> Stella, thou straight lookst babies in her eyes,
> In her cheeke's pit thou didst thy pitfould set,
> And in her breast bopeepe or couching lyes,
> Playing and shining in each outward part:
> But, foole, seekst not to get into her hart.

The rebuke in the first quatrain that Cupid neglects the "best"

of the "best" of Stella's qualities sets the pattern for the poem's praise of her external and internal perfections. The account of Cupid's looking "babies in her eyes," of his setting his "pitfold" in her cheeks, and of his lying "bopeepe or couching" in her breast, functions to praise Stella's eyes, cheeks, and breast. The image of Cupid "Playing and shining in each outward part" suggests the lively glow of her beauty. The comparison of Cupid to a child who reads a book only for its pictures serves to commend Stella's beauty and character both: In the implicit analogy between that book and Stella, the images of "guilded leaves," "colourd Velume," and "some fine picture," suggest the almost artistic perfection of Stella's looks. The contrast between these and "the fruit of writer's mind," which the child ignores, adds the praise of Stella's mind to that of her beauty. Whatever criticism of love's superficiality the sonnet contains is well tempered by a tolerant, respectful tone. Astrophil qualifies his condemnation of love's childishness by calling love itself "most serious"; and even in the epithet of "foole," which he slings at Cupid in the last line, he is more affectionate than condemnatory. In short, the poem's meaning lies in the gracefulness and sophistication of its praise, not in an inquiry into the nature of love.

Caelica XXVI, on the other hand, is only superficially a poem of praise or its corollary, blame, and deals more essentially with the nature of love. The sestet praises "Caelica's sweet eyes, where love and Beauty play," and criticizes her "mad changes." But this is all the sonnet

has of the courtly compliment and complaint that the genre calls for. Instead, Greville creates a more allegorical Cupid, who represents the nature of sexual desire: obtrusive at inconvenient moments, impossible to repress or excite at will, and generally erratic. Cupid is weighted with meaning, which, in this poem, seems somewhat oppressive:

> Was ever Man so over-match't with Boy?
> When I am thinking how to keep him under,
> He plaies and dallies me with everie toy;
> With pretty stealths, he makes me laugh and wonder.
>
> When with the child, the child-thoughts of mine owne
> Doe long to play and toy as well as he,
> The Boy is sad, and melancholy growne,
> And with one humor cannot long agree.
>
> Straight doe I scorne and bid the child away
> The Boy knowes furie, and soone sheweth me
> Caelica's sweet eyes, where Love and Beauty play,
> Furie turnes into love of that I see
> If these mad changes doe make children Gods,
> Women, and children are not farre at odds.

The action of this sonnet takes place in the speaker's mind, where Cupid, the "Boy" who "plaies and dallies" the lover with "everie toy," who distracts the "Man" from adult pursuits, embodies the lover's fantasies and reflects their childishness. The second quatrain takes pains to point out that the "child" Cupid is comparable to the lover's "child-thoughts"; and in the third quatrain, Cupid's "furie" merges with the lover's own anger, as his "Furie turnes into love of that I see." The image of "Man so over-match't with Boy" indicates the extent to which a lover is unable to control the workings of his own mind. When he tries to repress his desires, to "keep" Cupid "under," they, Cupid's "pretty stealths," disturb him, make him "laugh and wonder." Then,

as soon as he would like to think about his mistress, he cannot, for "The Boy is sad, and melancholy grown." His frustration makes him angry, so the sestet indicates; but even his rage is dissipated in "love" as soon as Caelica appears. The point of the narrative, as it is explained in the closing couplet, is that love is an utterly confusing but also absorbing experience.

Because Greville's sonnet forces the reader to analyze and think, because it directs him away from external events towards internal ones, it lacks the smooth surface and integrated effect so pleasing in Sidney's The praises of the mistress seem inappropriate in a critique of love. The fact that Cupid plays a double role, as a symbolic analogue to the poet's mind and as a conventional character who, as in Sidney's poem, traditionally appears in the lady's eyes, causes some confusion. For, throughout the first twelve lines of the sonnet, Cupid's "mad changes" refer to the changes in the lover's mind, while in the closing couplet they serve also to criticize the mistress' inconstancy. In this poem, Greville seems to be struggling with the contradictions between his own deliberative intentions and the conventions of praise and blame.

Greville's adaptations of Sidney's persuasive mode may often be similarly marred. For the purpose of persuasion in Astrophil and Stella, Sidney developed two related techniques. One is the creation of the dramatic fiction of speaker and audience. The other is the creation of a conversational style, which is achieved by the use of natural syntax, varied

rhythms, a simple, direct vocabulary, and images drawn from immediate experience; as well as with the help of direct address, exclamatory and interjectory expressions, and the posing of direct questions. Astrophil is a fully conceived dramatic character, and he generally addresses himself to a clearly conceived audience, even if that is a personification or an inanimate object. It is through his self-dramatization and expressiveness of his voice that Astrophil will try to convince Stella of the sincerity of his love and move her to yield.[5] These achievements of drama and voice Greville will try to imitate, only to find that philosophic deliberation requires neither audience nor speech.

A comparison between Astrophil and Stella 56 and Caelica XLVI illustrate the differences in the two poets' aims as well as the difficulty Greville had in adapting the conversational-persuasive mode to his own purposes. Each of these sonnets begins with a rude opening address to Patience, in which the lover dismisses the virtue in a tone that decidedly expresses his impatience. In each sonnet, the speaker makes demands and creates a dialogue between himself and the counsels of Patience.

Yet it is only Sidney's version that sustains the dialogue and attempts to persuade:

> Fye, schoole of Patience, Fye, your lesson is
> Far, far too long to learne it without booke:
> What, a whole weeke without one peece of looke,
> And thinke I should not your large precepts misse?
> When I might reade those letters faire of blisse,
> Which in her face teach vertue, I could brooke
> Somewhat thy lead'n counsels, which I tooke
> As of a friend that meant not much amisse:
> But now that I, alas, do want her sight,

> What, dost thou thinke that I can ever take
> In thy cold stuffe a flegmatike delight?
> No Patience, if thou wilt my good, then make
> Her come, and heare with patience my desire,
> And then with patience bid me beare my fire.

Sidney maintains a fictional distance between himself and Astrophil by exaggerating the impatience in Astrophil's voice so as to indicate that there is a more mature poet who is mocking, though affectionately, the unwillingness of a young man to "bear" his "fire." Sidney makes Astrophil a fictional character and Patience an audience which has more of the attributes of a person than of a concept. Patience, tacitly compared to a teacher and a friend, can be addressed as someone who hears and speaks. These fictions permit a conversation to take place.

The rhythms, vocabulary, images, and structure of this sonnet resemble those of living speech.[6] Perhaps more than anything else, the sheer force of the rhythm, with its quick and varied pace, simulates the voice of a rapidly speaking, impatient person. The lines are punctuated frequently and at odd intervals by strong pauses. Often the caesura is placed near the beginning or end of a line, so as to create a sense of breathless, uneasy starts and stops. Several of the lines are sharply enjambed between verbs and their objects or modifying adverbs (is/ Far, brook/ Somewhat, make/ Her); a number of lines end in verbs (is, brooke, looke, misse, tooke, take, make); and the rhymes tend to be percussive sounding (booke . . . looke, brooke . . . tooke, take . . . make) or hissing (is . . . misse, blisse . . . amisse). The sharp enjambements, the ending of lines on

verbs, and the sounds of the rhymes all join to create a sense of momentum in the verse. Moreover, many of the words are monosyllabic, and the syntax often demands that they be strongly accented:

> Fye, school of Patience
> Far, far too long
> What, a whole weeke without one peece of looke
> And think I should not your large precepts misse
> Which in her face teach virtue
> What, dost thou think
> In thy cold stuffe

The monosyllables and successive strong accents help create the emphasis and momentum of an impatient, speaking voice.

The vocabulary of the poem conveys the speaker's emotions. The adjectives and adverbs tell us less about the words they modify than about Astrophil's feelings after not seeing Stella for a week. In "far, far too long" and "whole week" we hear the sense of unendurable duration. (All italics in this paragraph are mine.) In the phrases describing Patience's "large precepts" "lead'n councels" and "cold stuff," we learn that Astrophil feels simultaneously contemptuous of and overburdened by the advice. In the qualifying words of "I could brooke/ Somewhat" and "I could ever take," we hear Astrophil's reluctance to restrain himself.

The images, which seem to be drawn from a young man's ordinary experience, convey both Astrophil's emotional state and the social millieu in which he speaks. The ruling metaphor is that of a schoolroom -- patience is a "lesson" to be learned "without booke" by an unwilling student -- and it

aptly reflects the psychological condition of a young man bucking against socially imposed restraints. So does the sonnet's one simile, which compares the "lead'n counsels" of Patience to the advice of "a friend who meant not much amisse." The simile makes it clear that Astrophil feels imposed upon yet can no more reject the virtue of patience than he can reject a friend.

Finally, in the structure of the poem, Sidney builds a progressing argument in which statements follow one another as they might in an actual dispute. After his initial outburst of annoyance, Astrophil sets out to make a logical case for himself and, furthermore, becomes increasingly heated as he speaks. In the first quatrain, he voices his complaint and justifies his anger: after not seeing Stella for a week, he has every reason to chage, he contends. In the second quatrain, he reminds Patience that he had been better able to contain himself when he could see Stella. In the first half of the sestet he concludes that without the sight of Stella, he cannot possibly be patient. And in the final tercet, he caps his argument with the imperative demand Patience "make" Stella "come." All of these points are linked and reinforced by the logical connectives -- "when," "but," "now," "no," "then" -that one might hear in a discussion.

The rhythms, language, and structure of this poem create a voice so impatient that no listener can doubt that Astrophil cannot endure waiting any longer to see Stella. Whether Stella will respond is another matter; for the voice is so impetuous, so eager, that a woman hearing it might conclude that the

speaker is juvenile and self-absorbed. But nonetheless the sonnet does succeed in its aims: it creates a fictional lover who tries to persuade a woman to yield.

Greville's version borrows, in its first quatrain, the colloquial tones and the direct questions of the conversational style. But its aim is rather to define than to persuade.[7] Although the poem opens with an apostrophe it ends with a definition, which distinguishes "true Patience" from its false version as "a senseless state."[8] The humanized personification of Sidney's sonnet becomes an abstract concept about which objective statements can be made. The fiction of audience and speaker has been destroyed.

> Patience, weake fortun'd, and weake minded Wit,
> Perswade you me to joy, when I am banish'd?
> Why preach you time to come, and joyes with it,
> Since time already come, my joyes hath vanish'd?
>
> Give me sweet Cynthia, with my wonted blisse,
> Disperse the clouds that coffer up my treasure,
> Awake Endymion, with Diana's kisse,
> And then sweet Patience, counsell me to measure.
>
> But while my Love feeles nothing but correction
> While carelessnesse o'reshadowes my deuotion,
> While Myra's beams shew rivall-like reflection,
> The life of Patience then must be commotion;
> Since not to feele what wrong I beare in this,
> A senseless state, and no true Patience is.

The keys to Greville's purposes lie in the objectification of the sonnet's language and the patterning of its structures.

Greville's sonnet describes and organizes a universal experience rather than an individual or social one. Its imagery refers to the generic motive of infinite loss and infinite desire, which is so central to Greville's lyrics. The first quatrain alludes to the expulsion theme. Its "banish'd" lover rejects the consolation of a Christian heaven, "joyes"

in "time to come" for his loss of a "vanish'd" Eden. The introduction of the Genesis myth prepares the way for the universalization of the lover's experience in the second quatrain, where he speaks of his desire for his mistress in the language of classical allusion. In demanding the consolation of "sweet Cynthia" and of "Dianna's kiss" in the same breath as he complains about a loss greater and more primal than any one woman can inflict and seems to be asking for a recompense deeper and more extensive than any one woman can offer.

Since Greville is concerned with a generic experience, the vocabulary of the poem is generally confined to describing external and objective realities. Only in rare phrases, such as in the epithets "weake fortun'd" and "weake minded" and in the sarcastic "sweet Patience," does the protagonist express anything resembling personal emotion. In contrast to Sidney's sonnet, Greville's has few adjectives and adverbs, and those that it does have -- "time already come," "wonted bliss," "rivall-like reflection," "senselesse state," and "true Patience" (italics mine) -- give factual information. Of the speaker's own emotions, we learn comparatively little. From the final couplet, we may judge that he suffers mental "commotion" and that he "feele(s)" the "wrong he""beam(s)." But even this assessment is extrapolated from a statement that is objective in form. The speaker never says that he feels confused, but instead makes a generalization to the effect that it is impossible for a man to be calm when his mistress is unfaithful. This detached explanation describes the feelings not of an individual but of suffering humanity.

The structures of the sonnet consist in patterns of sound and syntax through which a generic situation can be impersonally presented. The poem's rhythms are static. They minimize the variety and flexibility of even the dullest of spoken voices, while they provide the impersonal, formal structure for an objective statement. With the exception of the first line, which requires strong consecutive accents (Patience, weake fortun'd, and weake minded wit), meter and rhythm are almost identical, with only the few standard variations allowed in the iambic pentameter line. For the sake of the meter, Greville will even contort natural syntax, as in the phrase "Perswade you me." The pauses are also arranged in patterns. All of the lines are end stopped. And internal caesuras tend to come in the same place in a given section of the poem: after the third foot in the first quatrain, after the second foot in the remainder of the sonnet. These rhythms are hardly designed to express feelings or to persuade anyone of anything.

The sonnet is organized by various sorts of parallel constructions, which not only constrain the spontaneity of the speaker's voice but also emphasize the paradigmatic quality of his experience. The first quatrain is equally divided between two questions, each of which opposes the pain of past lost with the emptiness of the future joy that Patience promises. The third and forth quatrains are also patterned and also internally repititious. In the second quatrain, each of the first three lines begins with a command to patience; each of these demands -- for Cynthia, for Diana, and for the dispersal

of clouds -- is essentially the same one; and their orderly succession in the quatrain helps suggest that the speaker's wishes are all-encompassing wishes for all women. Similarly, in the third quatrain, each of the first three lines begins with the word "while" and introduces a complaint about Myra; each of the complaints -- of Myra's "correction," of her "carelessness," and of her "rivall-like reflection" -- is the same one; and their orderly succession helps convey the sense of enormous loss, greater than the loss of one woman. There is nothing in the progression from one statement to the next that resembles the movement of a living argument.

Greville's aims and methods in this sonnet are clearly connected. Since the poem's complaint is of a generic and irrevocable loss, the poem need not plead or persuade -- nothing will change. No man need convince any woman of his suffering on her behalf, so the poem requires neither a particularized speaker; language, rhythms, or images that express emotion; nor a consistent audience. Nonetheless, Sidney's version is the more enjoyable one. Greville's seems stiff and weighted. Patience seems no more suited than Cupid to bearing the complexity and enormous seriousness of Greville's thoughts. Moreover, the poem seeks to lack an internal coherence, since its few conversational features set up false expectations and thereby confuse the reader.[9]

Yet flawed as they are, Caelica XXCI and XLCI show Greville trying to bring two very different worlds together. One is the world of his idealistic longings, which, set apart from deaily realities, gave rise to his deliberative style, with

its linguistic generalization and structural patterning. The other is the world of the court, where poets praised and persuaded reluctant mistresses in a style which, as Sidney developed it, required linguistic particularization and structural movement. That Greville does bring these two worlds together in quite a number of his love lyrics is, indeed, an accomplishment both of intellectual perspective and poetic inclusiveness. To be sure, the harmony always remained an uneasy one. For Greville himself was deeply divided in his loyalties, and his lyrics reflect that division. Nonetheless, he was able to modify Sidney's style, in keeping with his own very different perception of the court world, and fuse it with his own.

The fusion is epitomized in the complex nature of Greville's protagonist (or protagonists). Whether designated as an objective narrator (XXIII, XXXI) or as a lover who speaks in the first person (XXVI, XLVI), he is always an observer. But more specifically, he is an observer who sees the world from a double perspective: As a man who yearns for the perfection of a world where "The Sepents had not stung" (XLIV), he stands aloof and coldly criticizes the depravity of the world he lives in. Yet as a man who knows his own weakenesses (though he cannot tolerate them), he speaks as one intimately bound up with the corruption he condemns. He is both a moralist and a cynic.

As a moralist, he objectifies the courtier's complaints and makes critical pronouncements that can be easily abstracted from their contexts:

> Mad Girles must safely love, as they may leave,
> No man can print a kisse, lines may deceive. (XXII)

> And who intreats, you know intreats in vaine,
> That Love be constant, or come backe again. (LIII)

He presents himself as a passive, innocent victim of the world's wrongs. Things happen around him and are done to him.

> But when I thought my selfe of her selfe free,
> All's changed: she understands all men but me. (XXXIX)

> I, like the child, whom Nurse hath overthrowne,
> Not crying, yet am whipt, if you be knowne. (XLIII)

> For when with time, Desire had made a truce,
> I only was exempt, the world left free. (LXV)

In their impersonality and passivity, such complaints tacitly uphold standards of fidelity and permanence in love, and implicitly condemn all who fail to meet them, whether Cupid, a mistress, or the impersonal force of change.

As a cynic, however, the protagonist is a man who knows the temptations of the world as well as anyone. At times he justifies moral lapses as part of the way things are:

> If Cynthia crave her Ring of me,
> I blot her name out of the Tree,
> If doubt doe darken things held deare,
> Then well-fare Nothing once a yeare. (LII)

> Change I confesse it is a hatefull power,
> To them that all at once must thinke,
> Yet, Nature made both sweet and sower,
> She gave the eye a lid to winke. (LXI)

We we have already observed, he often asserts his sexual desire in brutal, reductive language, sniggering, and reminiscent of a schoolboy's sexual jokes. The method of the following statements is to suggest the sexual connotations of words -- tongue, biting, dog, field, rod, burn, fires, love, worth and underneath -- whose denotations are not sexual:

> Or if thou wilt I live, then pittie pleadeth
> Helpe out of thee, since Nature hath releaveth
> That with thy tongue thy bytings may be healed. (II)

And since unweapon'd care makes men forlorne,
Let me first make your Dogge an Unicorne. (XX)

Therefore if thou wilt prove thy selfe a God,
In thy sweet fires, let me burne this faire rod. (XXXIV)

While that fine soyle, which all these joyes did yeeld,
By broken fence is prov'd a common field. (XXXVIII)

Sweet Saint, 'tis true, you worthy be,
Yet without Love nought worth to me. (LII)

None can well behold with eyes,
But what underneath him lies. (LXVI)

Throughout, the assumption is that no one in the fallen world, including himself, is honest or idealistic.

In a given lyric, both perspectives usually exist together, with greater weight given sometimes to one and sometimes to the other. What this dual persepctive has to do with Greville's style is that the deliberative, universalizing, static qualities of his verse tend to point to the world of the moralist, while courtly persuasion and flattery, and conversational language and rhythms tend to point to the world of the cynic. For Greville's most successful adaptations of Sidney's techniques are those lyrics where he uses them parodically to mock his lady and the courtly values she represents and, at the same time, to indicate how fully he himself understands that corruption.

Sonnet XVIII provides an early example of the integration of Sidney's influence. The sonnet, a somewhat uncourtly complaint of the mistress' combined infidelity and demandingness, brings together objective, moral statements about the nature of infidelity and parodic mockery of the mistress' point of vi . It has the flavor of Sidneyean drama and

conversation, with supple and varied rhythms and homely images. As Bullough notes, "we are in the thick of a lovers' quarrel."[10]

> I offer wrong to my beloved Saint,
> I scorne, I change, I falsify my love,
> Absence and time have made my homage faint,
> With Cupid I doe every where remove.
>
> I sigh, I sorrow, I doe play the foole,
> Mine eyes like Weather-cocks, on her attend:
> Zeale thus on either side she puts to schoole,
> That will needs have inconstancy to friend.
>
> I grudge, she saith, that many should adore her,
> Where love doth suffer, and thinke all things meet,
> She saith, All selfe-nesse must fall downe before her;
> I say, Where is the sauce should make that sweet?
> Change and contempt (you know) ill speakers be:
> Caelica: and such are all your thoughts of me.

As is the case in all of Greville's lyrics, the basic impulse here is deliberative. The very dramatization of the quarrel, which in a Sidney sonnet would serve to present Astrophil's point of view, here objectifies it. By methodically recording Caelica's contradictory demands, presumably as she made them, the protagonist first allows her to incriminate herself as unfaithful yet tyranical, and then he steps aside to judge them with all of the coolness of an impartial observer. He records in the first quatrain her complaint of his infideltiy, in the second quatrain her complaint of his excessive devotion, and in the third quatrain her objection to his jealousy of her other lovers. Then, with the apparent impartiality of a judge, he draws the logical conclusions from her contradictory accusations. In lines 6 and 7 he observes that any inconstant woman will criticize a man indiscriminately, if only to protect herself. In line 13 he observes that a woman's mistreatment of a man invalidates any demands she may make of him. In line 14 he applies this conclusion specifically to his mistress.

The point to note about these conclusions is their tone, which is removed and objective, not the tone of a lover who has been humiliated, confused, or hurt by his mistress, but that of a judge who, himself in command of an implicit standard of fidelity which has been violated, draws fair and valid conclusions from the evidence. It is hardly incidental that these summarizing statements tend to be the most awkward ("will needs have") and formal ("such are all your thoughts of me") in a relatively adept and informal poem. For persona and poet, fictional situation and actual conviction, tend to merge in these lines, and Greville the moralizer has important generalizations to make, which will not be impeded by the demands of dramatic, conversational versimilitude.

But beside the objective moralizer stands the worldly cynic, unloving and as removed as his mistress from those Petrarchan values he invokes when he criticizes her "change and contempt." Greville conveys this aspect of the protagonist's character, and perhaps of his own too, by having the speaker mimic Caelica's complaints in an unsympathetic and ultimately subjective matter and by having him reveal in somewhat crude terms his own indiscretions. It is for this purpose that Greville employs Sidneyan rhythms and language.

In his use of Sidney's techniques, Greville remolds them into parodic shapes which reveal both his contempt for and complicity in the world of the court. This sonnet reforms Sidney's speechlike rhythms into the rhythms of satire, calculated to mock the woman's argument. The climactic progressions and studied parallelisms in lines 2 and 5 point to the incon-

sistency in her accusations: the grammatical similarity in the lines "I scorne, I change, I falsify my love" and "I sigh, I sorrow, I doe play the foole" emphasizes the opposition in their content. The rhythms mimic the complaints of a nagging woman. The first six lines of the octave accumulate accusations in regular and all too rapid succession, without even connecting words. The pace suggests that the lady is demanding too much too fast. In the first and third lines of the sestet, the punctuation of Caelica's accusations by the Speaker's "She saith" helps to undermine their validity and to give her demands a niggling, mincing quality that they would not have in an objective presentation. Similarly, the commonplace imagery of Sidney's sonnets is contorted into homely and even coarse expression. The simile in the line "Mine eyes like Weather-cocks, on her attend" may be a faithful record of Caelica's own words, but it nonetheless makes her objection to the lover's attentiveness sound rude. The image of the sweetening sauce in the line "Where is the sauce should make that sweet?" undermines the speaker's stance, implied in his criticism of Caelica, as a man who desire mutual love. The line is a rejoinder to Caelica's contradictory demand that the lover tolerate her infidelities while he himself remains constant, and Waswo believes that "this justly crass insistence on a quid pro quo" expresses "the absurdity of adoring" a woman who "adroitly perverts the ideal into an excuse for her own promiscuity" and that it "implies the larger absurdity in the whole notion of selfless service as it existed in the literary convention."[11] While this observation is cer-

tainly accurate, the image of a sweetening sauce suggests that a man's devotion is unpleasant and must be made palatable.

Reshaped as they are, Sidneyan rhythms and images reveal that the protagonist is no more a constant worshiper than his mistress a "saint." They undermine his claims to moral objectivity. The techniques that Sidney used for courtly persuasion are used by Greville to both condemn the world of the court and to confess his own participation in it.

Sonnet LXXII offers an example of Greville's using the modes of courtly praise and persuasion in a deliberative context. The sonnet deals with the question of why love is inconstant, and the praise and persuasion, again twisted into parody, provide the answer.

> Caelica, you that excell in flesh and wit,
> In whose sweet heart Love doth both ebb and flow
> Returning faith more than it tooke from it,
> Whence doth the Change, the World thus speakes on, grow?
>
> If Worthiness doe joy to be admired,
> My soule, you know, onely be-wonders you;
> If Beauties glorie be to be desired,
> My heart is nothing else; What need you new?
>
> If loving joy of worths beloved be,
> And joyes not simple, but still mutuall,
> Whom can you more love, than you have lov'd me?
> Unlesse in your heart there be more than all;
> Since Love no doomes-day hath, where bodies change,
> Why should new be delight, not being strange?

Once again, the protagonist speaks with two voices and from two vantage points.

Posing as an objective observer, he addresses his mistress in the formal and dignified manner of a man who is genuinely trying to solve the problem of why lovers are unfaithful. Although he addresses Caelica directly, as one who is speaking to her, his tone is measured and impersonal. Almost

ritualistically, he rephrases essentially the same question about what causes love's instability four times, once in each of the three quatrains and final couplet. This repetition patterns the poem and universalizes the inquiry.

The even rhythms of the lines are those of a man who is deliberating on a subject with some detachment. For example, the monosyllables, rounded vowels, and succession of accents in the line "Whóm can you móre lóve, than you háve lóv'd me?" combine to create a slow and stately pace suggestive of careful thought, while the placement of the accents draws attention away from the speaker's personal loss to the conceptual distinction between past and present, and between old and new lovers. Similarly, the trochaic inversions in the line "Why should néw be delight, not béing strange?" forces one to read the line slowly, which makes the words seem carefully considered, at the same time as the position of the acdents reinforces the disinterested logic of the contention that since "new" lovers are not "strange," people should find no special pleasure in inconstancy. The syntax too, without being as stilted or repetitive as in the sonnet to Patience, arranges the statements in an orderly manner suggestive of clear and calm thought. Namely, the second quatrain and the first half of the sestet are structured by three propositions, each beginning with a conditional "if," and each containing parallel phrases and syntax. The first two propositions each are two lines long while the extra line in the third proposition represents the methodical building up to a point.

But the protagonist's innocent posture, his apparent inability to understand why his mistress, or anybody else, should be unfaithful is again discredited, this time not so much by his images and rhythms as by his parodic devotions to this mistress, which very soon make the causes of infidelity all but transparent.

In the octave, the speaker uses the techniques of a lover's praise only to reveal his mistress' weakness, insincerity, and vanity. Remarking on the superiority of her "flesh and wit," he complements precisely those qualities that the Renaissance associated with lewdness and transience (flesh) and with the intellectual dishonesty and presumption that led to man's Fall (wit).[12] Omitting all reference to Caelica's spiritual beauty, he implies that she lacks the inward grace that secures the virtuous love of the lady in the Petrarchan tradition.[13] Furthermore, the water imagery in the first quatrain is decidely double edged; it is included in a piece of courtly "praise" because on one level water suggests the life and fullness of love, yet the speaker's use of it refers to love's transience, as like the tide, "it doth both ebb and flow," and the heart's devouring selfishness, as, like the ocean, it re-turns everything back into itself.[14] By the end of the first quatrain, the answer to the question, "Whence doth the Change, the World thus speakes on, grow?" is obvious. It grows from flesh and wit, unstable affection, and a selfish heart. The praise in the second quatrain is similarly damaging. As the speaker protests his admiration and desire for Caelica, he also hints at her egoism. Repeating the word "be" four times in a

single quatrain, the speaker indicates just how excessively Caelica may like to "be admired" and "be desired." The question "What need you new?" is easily answered, for such a woman will want many lovers to feed her vanity.

In the sestet Greville turns from parodic praise to parodic persuasion. The ostensible aim is to persuade the mistress to be faithful. But the arguments, based on a misapplication of Neo-Platonic theory, better support the opposite cause. The question in the first part of the sestet is based on the Neo-Platonic distinction between "simple," or unrequited and "mutual" love. The point of the distinction is suggested by Ficino's contention that "whenever two people are brought together in mutual affection, one lives in the other and the other in him."[15] The implication of this statement is that mutual love is totally absorbing and exclusive. The speaker's argument that since the feelings between himself and Caelica are "still mutuall," she could not conceivably love another more than she loves him runs along the same lines. There is one crucial difference, however, Ficino was writing about chaste love, but the protagonist is talking about sexual love, whose "joyes" may well be mutual but need not be exclusive or permanent. In the context of sexual love, the question "whom can you more love, than you have lov'd me?" admits of a logical answer that ideal love precludes; and the answer is suggested in the following line, "Unlesse in your heart there be more than all." What the Neo-Platonic theory points to is the great difference between ideal love, in which lovers are totally absorbed in one another, and sexual love, in

which the heart, having room for "more than all," knows no surfeit.

The misapplication of Neo-Platonism in the closing couplet is even more blatant. The argument here plays on the Neo-Platonic commonplace that a person loves a "form," not the particular body it happens to inhabit. In Neo-Platonic theory this idea permits one to rise from the love of an individual to the love of many people, and from there to the love of the idea. Thus, Ficino writes that "A form once loved is always loved," and argues that as a form moves from one body to another, a lover can legitimately transfer his affections: "for as long as the same form remains in the same man, it is loved in that man himself; but when it has left him, the same form which you loved before is no longer in him" and "a fervor which has completely faded today in one thing may somehow come back to life in another."[16] Similarly, the speaker aruges that "Love no doomes-day hath, where bodies change" and uses this commonplace to ask, "Why should new be delight, not being strange?" Ficino, however, was innccent of the erotic implications of wandering form, while Greville's protagnost could certainly not have missed them. Given its Neo-Platonic background, the answer to the final question is quite simply that "new" is "delight" precisely because it is "not . . . strange."

While the "praise" of the octave elucidates the grounds of Cealica's infidelity, the "persuasion" of the sestet, leading as it does to an argument for promiscuity, indicates the protagonist's sound and personal knowledge of the weakness

of the human spirit. What prevents this poem from being seductive is the clear disapproval of the mistress' character. The "praise" and "persuasion" in the sonnet do suggest, however, the licentious uses to which courtly conventions can be, and are in fact, degraded.

Caelica XVIII and LXXII are both coherent lyrics in which deliberation joins with the techniques of the courtly poet to create a complex voice which reflects a complex world view. One wonders, however, whether Greville was entirely conscious of the double role his personae played. For all the careful construction of these sonnets, it may be that he was not. He lacked Sidney's keen sense of fiction, and his own identity seems to have been too close to those of his protagonists for him to have been fully aware of the contradictions in their statements and tones. When the double facets are put together, the voice in both of these lyrics, as in many others in the collection, sounds unpleasantly self-righteous. In XVIII, the speaker makes moral judgments as though he himself were free of the wanderlust he criticizes; yet he reveals himself to be as hedonistic as his mistress. Whatever the validity of his criticisms, it would seem appropriate for someone who is himself licentious to speak less emphatically for moral purity. Nor does the speaker in LXXVII have more right to condemn another. The propriety of his moral criticisms is undermined by his various pretences. He pretends not to understand why love is unstable, when he understands very well; he pretneds to praise his mistress when he is actually criticizing her; and he pretends to respect her when he

has only contempt. While his criticisms may be valid, their indirectness is ugly.

Self-righteous is a pejorative term, and I use it with full ccgnizance of its overtones. The term indicates and allows me to criticize the fact that Greville is not fully aware of the contradictions in his protagonists' double role. I might have used the less offensive adjective satiric, for a satirist may also mock women, may criticize them covertly, and may play the innocent; but that term implies a greater separation between poet and persona and a greater control of one's performance than Greville demonstrates.

Yet, there may also be some positive value in the term self-righteous. Contrary to the customary association of the term with hypocrisy, a self-conscious person is in a certain sense sincere. Greville is not entirely playing the role of the naive observer who criticizes and judges inconstancy as though he cannot understand its motivation. To the extent to which he holds before him the Edenic ideal, he is innocent -- and this is so despite his frequent alignments with sexual aggression. When he asks questions like "What need you new?" and when he makes generalizations like "Change and Contempt (you know) ill speakers be," he is not entirely pretentious. At some level, Greville is baffled and pained by the world he sees around him. As abstract and general as his moral pronouncements may be, they are pervaded by a deep sense of loss, frustration, and exclusion. If the pronouncements are somewhat suspect, their sadness is not. It indicates that Greville is unable to accept the reality of human deprivation with the same synicism with which he proclaims its inevitability.

NOTES

1. Although the aim that Sidney announces in Astrophil and Stella I is courtly, the sonnet itself is not entirely conventional. As Kalstone points out, in Sidney's Poetry, pp. 124-30, the sonnet questions conventional means of achieving that end.

2. Rudenstine, Sidney's Poetic Development, pp. 172-82, contrasts the idealizing function of the Arcadia's style with the function of the style of Astrophil and Stella, which is to express tension.

3. Bernat, "Images of Life," p. 237, also observes that the Fall is at the heart of Greville's image of love; but she never connects the centrality of the Fall to the style of the love lyrics.

4. Waswo, Fatal Mirror, p. 57, names hyperbolic praise as among the conventional uses to which Sidney puts the Cupid figure.

5. Astrophil's self-dramatization is emphasized by Young, English Petrarch, pp. 23-9 and by Robert Kimbrough, Sir Philip Sidney (New York: Twayne Publishers Inc. 1971), pp. 107-14. Rudenstine, Sidney's Poetic Development, pp. 148-71, suggests that the function of drama in Astrophil and Stella is as a means of achieving "energia," or forceful, expressive verse.

6. John Thompson, The Founding of English Meter (1961; rpt. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1966) p. 140, observes that in Astrophil and Stella Sidney exploits the difference between metrical pattern and the rhythms of his language in order to produce the effect of speech.

7. Waswo, Fatal Mirror, p. 101, asserts that in this sonnet Greville uses Sidney's "dramatic structures as vehicles for logical analysis of experience." I would question the phrase "of experience," however, since the subject of Greville's logic seems more abstract to me. Waswo urges that both Greville and Sidney try "to present feelings convincingly by dramatic structures," (p. 102), and that Greville simply emphasizes the logical aim. I, however, wonder if Greville does actually try to convey feeling, at least the sort that Waswo seems to be referring to.

8. Rebholz notes, in Life of Fulke Greville, p. 60, that Greville often begins a sonnet by addressing a particular person or idea, but then ends by addressing a general readership. Rebholz notes Greville's failure to sustain the "immediacy of conversation" in Caelica XII, XXX, XXXVIII, and XLVI.

9. Rees, Fulke Greville, p. 89, contrasts the two versions as follows: "With easy mastery of the form Sidney fashions his sonnet into a little dramatic jeu d'esprit, and the virtues of Greville's 'earth-creeping Genius' can hardly be recognized."

10. Poems and Dramas, I, 239.

11. Fatal Mirror, p. 61.

12. Note the association of flesh and wit with sin in sonnet XXXIX: "The pride of Flesh by reach of humane with," and in LXIII: "The greatest pride of humane kind is with."

13. Hardison, Enduring Monument, pp. 98-9.

14. Note in sonnet XII a similar image of love enclosed in the women's heart and denied the lover: "Till for more spite to Myra's heart he [Cupid] flyeth,/ Where living to the world, to me he dieth."

15. Symposium, II. viii, p. 144

16. Symposium, VI, x, p. 201.

VI. Calvinist Theology and the Knowledge of God in the Later Lyrics

When Sidney died in 1586, Greville fell into an intense depression.[1] He had lost a friend and mentor. Yet painful as the loss must have been, it was also liberating. We cannot know exactly when Greville began to write political and philosophical lyrics or when he decidedly bid farewell to love.[2] But bereft of a living model for courtly verse, Greville was free to abandon the constraining metaphor of love and to write directly about what had always been at the heart of his verse -- the miseries of the depraved soul and its spiritual aspirations.

More specifically, the dilemmas of knowledge replaced those of love as the focal point of Greville's lyrics. For Greville, the problems of knowledge are, in fact, the real problems of fallen men: the lack of knowledge is one of the most blatant stigmata of man's fallen condition; the desire for illicit knowledge is evidence of man's prideful unwillingness to accept his human limitations; and yet the right knowledge gives man the only opportunity he has of re-entering into contact with his awesome and distant God. The matter is so central to Greville's thinking and so laden with conflicts that it appears and reappears in his lyrics.

Although the theme emerges to the foreground in the religious and political lyrics of Caelica, it had already appeared in the love poems. Indeed, the problem of knowledge is intrinsically related to Greville's view of love as impermanent and deceptive.[3] The lines --

> Love is no true made Looking-glasse,
> Which perfect yeelds the shape we bring,
> It ugly showes us all that was,
> And flatters every future thing
> (LXI)

-- suggest that the inability of lovers to perceive themselves and each other accurately, their inability to know, contributes to their incessant restlessness and dissatisfaction. But in the love lyrics the problems of knowing are treated indirectly; in puns, for example, on carnal "knowledge" in sonnet XXXVIII; or in distinctions between true and false versions of things, such as patience in sonnet XLVI or fatherhood in the fabliau of Merlin.

Man's quest for knowledge is dealt with in much the same way as are his spiritual longings in the Bermuda poem (LIX) that is as an analogue to the desire for love. Caelica XXXIX, for example, compares the lover's error in seeking "heavenly peace" in the "mortall seat of Caelica's faire heart" to mankind's abortive intellectual efforts in building the Tower of Babel to "over-reach the skye":

> The pride of Flesh by reach of humane wit,
> Did purpose once to over-reach the skye;
> And where before God drown'd the world for it,
> Yet Babylon it built up, not to dye.
>
> God knew these fooles how foolishly they wrought,
> That Destiny with Policie would breake,
> Straight none could tell his fellow what he thought,
> Their tongues were chang'd, & men not taught to speak:
>
> So I that heavenly peace would comprehend,
> In mortall seat of Caelica's faire heart,
> To babylon my selfe there, did intend,
> With naturall kindnesse, and with passions art:
> But when I thought my selfe of her selfe free,
> All;s chang'd: she understands all men but me.

The desire for forbidden knowledge is treated along with the desire for sex as an example of the "pride of Flesh," and the

sonnet's lesson, if it is read from a moral point of view, is that human "pride," that is the desire to exceed limitations of any sort, is inevitably confronted by humiliation, whether sexual or intellectual. But if the analogy between the aspirations of sex and of intellect points to a certain truth, it also depends on a barrage of puns: "pride" (arrogance and sexual power), "Flesh" (the physical body and man's fallen nature), "comprehend" (to attain, perhaps sexually, and to understand), "intend" (to wait in attendance on, as a lover does on a woman, and to have an understanding of something), and "understand" (to understand intellectually and to understand sexually).[4] In the context of this sonnet, as in other love poems, the weight of the puns is on sexuality; and the serious contemplation of intellectual hubris is subsumed under the poem's familiar, sniggering tone.

The only poem among the "love" group that can be counted as an exception to this general trend is sonnet LXVI, a discursive poem in which the speaker rejects book learning, first in favor of the direct observation of nature and society and then for the "wisdome that springs from truth within,/ Which all men feele, or heare, before they sinne." But even this poem starts with an address to Caelica, in which the lover apologizes for his presumption in rejecting his mistress' advice.

The political and religious lyrics require no such indirection. The deceptiveness of love is translated into the overt and universal theme of the difference between appearance and reality. Greville is adamant in teaching that

"Rewards of earth, nobility, and Fame," are not what they seem to be and that people who value them are "deceav'd" by "calves of brasse" (XCI). Titles of nobility, he observes, hide a man's faults from general view: "For place a Coronet on whom you will,/ You straight see all great in him, but his ill" (XCII). Errors in religious dogma indicate to Greville that people are ignorant of the true God. Christians, who merely "seeme more inwardly to know the Sonne," are as ignorant and guilty as Manicheans, who "Idolls did in their Ideas take" (LXXXIX).

The knowledge of God, not the love of Him, occupies Greville's thoughts in the later lyrics. The point is worth insisting upon, firstly because critics generally overlook it, and secondly because the change from "love" to knowledge marks Greville's most emphatic break with Sidney's world and the shift in his allegiance to Calvin.

Most critics read Caelica as a sequence that first contemplates human Love and then divine Love. Joan Rees' chapter title, "Caelica: Divine and Human love" typifies the prevailing interpretation.[5] But the connection, in Rees' title as well as elsewhere, hinges on a facile play on the word "love" and also on oversight. We have already seen that Greville had little love to spare for people. And if he loved God or felt loved by Him, he certainly said little enough about it in Caelica. Aside from a few lyrics that allude to Christian love (XVI and LXXXVI), only one in all of Caelica makes the subject its theme. And that sonnet, LXXXV, is Greville's last homage to Sidney. Caelica LXXXIV, Greville's farewill to

human love, is modelled on Sidney's Certain Sonnets 31, and Caelica LXXXV, a definition of Christian love, is modelled on Certain Sonnets 32. Certain Sonnets 32 evokes "Eternall Love" in biblical and Neo-Platonic images. Caelica LXXXV defines Christian love:

> Love is the Peace, whereto all thoughts doe strive,
> Done and begun with all our powers in one:
> The first and last in us that is alive,
> End of the good, and therewith pleas'd alone.
>
> Perfections spirit, Goddesse of the minde,
> Passed through hope, desire, griefe and feare,
> A simple goodnesse in the flesh refin'd,
> Which of the joyes to come doth witnesse beare.
>
> Constant, because it sees no cause to varie,
> A Quintessence of Passions overthrowne,
> Rais'd above all that change of objects carry,
> A Nature by no other nature knowne:
> For Glorie's of eternitie a frame,
> That by all bodies else obscures her name.

The sonnet identifies love with Christ, first as "Peace," as He is named in Luke 10:6, Rom. 15:33, and Eph. 2:14, and then as the "first and last," as He calls himself in Rev. I:II, I:17, 2:8, and 22:13. It also identifies love with the lady Wisdom of Proverbs, when it calls love "Perfections spirit, Goddesse of the minde." It stipulates that love is achieved after a process of religious purification, after man has "Passed through hope, desire, griefe and feare," and equates love, "A simple goodnesse in the flesh refin'd,"[6] with the perfection of regenerate man. It attributes to divine love the constancy that human love so badly needs and asserts that divine love, as "A nature by no other nature known," has no human analogue.

As a definition, Caelica LXXXV refers back to the definition of Petrarchan love with which the collection had started. We may recall that sonnet I read more like a definition than

a poem of praise. The opening quatrain should serve as a reminder:

> Love, the delight of all well-thinking minds;
> Delight, the fruit of vertue dearely lov'd;
> Vertue, the highest good, that reason finds;
> Reason, the fire wherein mens thoughts bee prov'd.

In referring back to the opening lyric, sonnet LXXXV seems to provide closure for the first part of the collection. If sonnet LXXXV also looks forward to the remaining lyrics, as Peterson claims, it does not look forward to other meditations on love.[7]

There is nothing in Caelica of man's love and longing for God that we find, for example, in the opening of Spenser's "An Hymn to Heavenly Love":

> Love, lift me up upon they golden wings,
> From this base world unto thy heavens hight,
> Where I may see those admirable things,
> Which there thou workest by thy soveraine might,
> Farre above feeble reach of earthly sight,
> That I thereof an heavenly Hymne may sing
> Unto the god of Love, high heavens king.[8]

Nor is there anything of God's love and longing for man that we find in Herbert's "Love III," where Christ is the host and Lord "Love" who warmly urges the sinner to partake of the love he Himself offers:

> Love bade me welcome: yet my soul drew back,
> Guiltie of dust and sinne.
> But quick-ey'd Love, observing me grow slack
> From my first entrance in,
> Drew nearer to me, sweetly questioning,
> If I lack'd any thing.[9]

Human love for God, the ennobling love through which man ascends to equality with the deity, and divine love for man, through which God descends with offers of mercy and grace to frail and fallen humanity, form, according to Anders Nygren, respectively

the pre- and post-Reformation models of Christian caritas.[10] Neither is found in Caelica.

The omission is significant because it sets Greville apart from other relgious poets of this time, who did write in love of and in praise of God, and thus highlights the importance of knowledge in his religious thinking. It is true that in abandoning his mistresses and turning to God, Greville shared the company of other poets who were reaching for a deeper reality than that afforded by the contemporary love lyric.[11] Behind the transition in Caelica lie decades of activity when psalms were translated from Latin to English verse, when biblical themes and stories were turned into plays, epillia, and sonnets, and when the production of all sorts of religious writing exceeded that of secular writing in quantity if not in quality.[12] By 1596 Spenser had written not only Book I of The Faerie Queene but also his hymns to heavenly love and heavenly beauty. The poems of the Jesuit Robert Southwell had already been written. Henry Lok had published two hundred sonnets under the title "Certaine Christian Passions"; Henry Constable had written his "Spirituall sonnettes"; and Donne had written some of his "Holy Sonnets." But despite the company, Greville was not an integral part of the movement that issued in the magnificent flourishing of religious verse in the early years of the seventeenth century. As far as I can tell, Greville did not model his religious lyrics on those of other poets. And the reason for the distance seems akin to that for his earlier departures from Sidney: Greville was not a poet of love; his contemporaries seem to have been.

For Greville, accurate perception is the ideal of religious experience. When he turns away from human love, he turns to "thoughts that . . . lesse betray me" (LXXXIV). He describes heaven as a place or state of mind where "flames enlighten Nature, never burne thee" (LXXXVI -- italics mine). He formulates the contrast between depravity and regeneration as a contrast between ignorance and knowledge of God. In substituting knowledge for love as the cornerstone of his religious faith, Greville relies on the spiritual authority of Calvin and separates himself from the moderates of the English Church, such as Hooker; and he sets himself apart from Sidney as well. Since the motive force behind many of the Greville's religious lyrics becomes clearer if they are read in the context of the alternative views that Greville selected from, we will pause to consider the contending theologies.[13]

Calvin makes knowledge the major theme of his theology.[14] In the very first sentence of the Institutes, he announces that "Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists in two parts, the knowledge of God and of ourselves," and the remainder of the four books propounds that knowledge. The Catechism of the Church of Geneva, which Greville probably used in school, opens with the same emphasis. The Master's first question is, "What is the chief end of human life?" And the Scholar replies, "To know God by whom men were created." To the question, "What is the highest good of man?" he answers, "The very same thing."[15]

The reason for this emphasis is that for Calvin knowledge is both the prerequisite and the reward of salvation. "Faith justifies" (3.18.8) man before God, Calvin insists, and in so stating he reverses the traditional hierarchy of Christian values which had made love the crucial issue in man's salvation. Bitterly critical of the Scholastic view "that love is prior to faith and hope," Calvin condemns it as "sheer madness; for it is faith alone that engenders love in us" (3.2.41). And for Calvin faith is knowledge -- knowledge of those things that cannot be known through the oridinary workings of the senses and reason (3.18.8). Consequently, he holds that "all men are born and live to the end that they may know God . . . [and] all those who do not direct every thought and action in their lives to this goal degenerate from the law of their creation" (1.3.2). For if "faith justifies," knowledge is then required for salvation. And since all earthly knowledge must be limited, it is only fitting that "The final goal of the blessed life rests in the knowledge of God" (Comm., Gal., 1.5.1), that is in comprehension of Him.

Exactly what Calvin means by the knowledge of God is beyond the scope of our inquiry.[16] What is noteworthy, however, is that his position is extreme, as becomes clear if one reads Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. In Hooker's work the problem of knowledge is well subordinated to a general confidence in the rationality of both God and man, and consequently the theme is discussed only occasionally and in connection with other matters.[17] For Hooker, knowledge is not the one requirement for salvation that it is for Calvin. Hooker's

tolerant God extends His saving mercy even to heathen who "err out of ignorance" (26) and to Catholics, "abeit they carried to their graves a persuasion so greatly repugnant to the truth" (17).[18] And if salvation happens to bestow knowledge, as it generally does in Christian theology, the special reward that Hooker envisions at the end of a good life is rather union with the deity -- "participation and conjunction with him" (1.11.2).

For Calvin, as well as for Greville, the inter-relatedness of knowledge and salvation gives the entire subject of knowing great an emotional immediacy. The theme of knowledge forms a nexus of hopes and desires. It is also laden with anxiety. For as Calvin expounds his doctrine, knowledge is not only necessary for salvation, but it is also difficult, if not impossible, to attain without salvation.

According to Calvin, sufficient knowledge of God is beyond the reach of man's reason and other natural facilties. For Calvin, man is so estranged from God and so compulsively evil as to be totally incapable of receiving even the knowledge of God that He Himself offers. Following traditional Christian teachings, Calvin affirms that God manifests Himself to men through His Creation and through Scripture. But rather than celebrate such revelations, Calvin points to them only to asser that fallen man is so depraved that God's revelations are all but useless to him:

> But although the lord represents both himself and his everlasting Kingdom in the mirror of his works with very great clarity, such is our stupidity that we grow increasingly dull towards so manifest testimonies, and they flow away without profiting us (1.5.11).

And when men read Scripture,

> our mind has such an inclination to vanity that it can never cleave first to the truth of God and it has such a dullness that it is always blind to the light of God's truth (3.2.33).

To clarify the revelations of God in Nature and in Scripture, special grace is required. Calvin insists that unless man is "illumed by the inner revelation of God through faith" (1.5.14), he will not see God in the creation. Nor will "the Word [Scripture] . . . find acceptance in men's hearts before it is sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit" (1.7.4).

Whatever knowledge of God man gains without special grace is not only useless, it is positively pernicious. Calvin argues that God manifests Himself to the non-elect for the sole purpose of rendering men themselves culpable of their ignorance. Possessing partial knowledge, men are totally responsible for their sins and deserving of damnation:

> But although we lack the natural ability to mount up unto the pure and clear knowledge of God, all excuse is cut off because the fault of dullness is within us. And, indeed, we are not allowed thus to pretend ignorance without our conscience itself always convicting us always of baseness and ingratitude . . . Therefore we are justly denied every excuse when we stray off as wanderers and vagrants even though everything points out the right way' (.5.15).

Even in moral matters, partial knowledge is damning:

> That apprehension of conscience which distinguishes sufficiently between just and unjust . . . deprives men of the excuse of ignorance, while it proves them guilty by their own testimony. (2.2.22).

Hooker's theology, we should point out, avoids such a contradiction. Unlike Calvin, Hooker assumes that God had made available in Nature and in Scripture all the knowledge necessary for salvation.

> It sufficeth therefore that Nature and Scripture do serve in such full sort . . . that unto everlasting felicity we need not eh knowledge of any thing more than these two can easily furnish.
>
> (1.14.5)

To be sure, Hooker stipulates that "if the special grace of the Holy Ghost concur not in the enlightening of our minds" (111.8.15), men can make no use of the information. But grace complements nature in Hooker's theology,[19] and Hooker's God seems to make sufficient grace, both for knowledge and salvation, more accessible than Calvin's. Hooker's God apparently goes to great lengths to make knowledge available. Hooker explains that since the effect of the Fall was to make "the search for knowledge a thing painful," God has so created man that "for a spur of dilligence we have a natural thirst after knowledge ingrafted in us" (1.8.1). And even if men prove slow to learn, "God doth liberally promise whatsoever appertaineth to a blessed life, unto as many as sincerely keep the law, though they be not able exactly to keep it" (9). Whatever anxiety Calvin's theory of knowledge might provoke, Hooker's would alleviate.

Moreover, Calvin exacerbates the problem even further, by defining the knowledge necessary for salvation in such narrow terms that any error, misinterpretation, or divergent opinion in religious doctrine might be tantamount to damnation. "We shall not say that properly speaking, God is known where there is no religion or piety" (1.2.1), Calvin insists, and he means by piety precisely the sort he outlines in the Institutes, and no other. Throughout the Institutes, he repeatedly distinguishes between "true" knowledge, "true" religion and

their false versions; and we have already seen that Greville makes much the same sort of distinction in his analyses of experience. Linking proper knowledge of God to his own brand of piety, Calvin violently condemns those who "think that any zeal for religion, however preposterous, is sufficient" (1.2.3). He emphatically asserts that the "confused knowledge of God," which is the heritage of most men, "differs from piety . . . which is instilled in the breasts of believers only" (1.4.4). Thus, while he acknowledges that "the seed of religion has been divinely implanted in all men," he reverses the syncretic implication of that statement to claim that "yet all fall away from the true knowledge of him [God] " (1.4.1).

Again Hooker modifies Calvin's exacting standards. Hooker is syncretic. His God not only forgives error but seems to permit such a wide range of behavior, and thus opinion, that all men, including Pagan, Turk, and Catholic, can do His will:

> By force of the light of Reason, wherewith God illuminateth every one which cometh into the world, men being enabled to know truth from falsehood, and good from evil, do thereby learn in many things what the will of God is; which will himself not revealing by any extra-ordinary means unto them, but they by natural discourse attaining the knowledge thereof, seem the makers of those Laws which indeed are his, and they but only the finders of them out.
>
> (I.8.3)

The broad tolerance of Hooker's God and the efficacy of reason combine to make sufficient knowledge to live a life pleasing to God the property of all men who seek it.

In Calvin's theology, knowledge sufficient for salvation is reserved for the elect and is obtained only through

special grace. This idea is hardly new to Christian thinking, and there are places where the traditional minded Hooker says the same thing.[20] But for Calvin, revelation opposes reason and grace overthrows nature, and this onctradistinction makes it necessary for men to endure the process of conversion, or rebirth, repentance, or renewal, as it may be called, before they can know God. We have already indicated the need for rebirth in Calvin's thinking.[21] But it is important here to outline the process, because Greville refers to it extensively in his religious lyrics.

The process consists in two parts, "mortification of the flesh and vivification of the spirit" (3.3.8). Mortification is the "destruction of the whole flesh" (3.3.8). Vivification is the correllary through which man is "raised up unto the newness of life" and "renewed into the knowledge and the image of him who created him" (3.3.9).

The description of the process indicates not only that conversion is necessary for knowledge, but also that knowledge is the end of conversion: one is "renewed into knowledge and into the image" of God, The restoration of God's image in man reverses the damage of the Fall and it enables man to know his maker by restoring God to him. The knowledge is an accomplishment not of the intellect but of a re-identification of God and Man. Naturally, such knowledge belongs to the next life. "Not only becaUse many things are yet hidden from us, but because surrounded by many clouds of errors we do not comprehend everything . . . . Experience obviously teaches us that until we put off the flesh we attain less [knowledge] than we should like" (3.2.4).

In adopting the anxieties and expectations (if not all the details) inherent in Calvin's view of knowledge, Greville follows the Calvinist interpretation of the Fall to its logical conclusion in the utter separation of God and man until the time when sin is destroyed and man is reborn into a new life. Following the rigors of Calvinist logic, Greville finally severs contact with Sidney's humanism.

Before turning to the Caelica lyrics, we should observe that Sidney, like Hooker, was hardly exorcised by the dilemmas of knowledge. Astrophil and Stella evidences a basic rationalism in its repeated insistence that Astrophil use his reason to curb his passion. Of the Trewnesse of the Christian Religion, Sidney's translation of the work of his friend Phillippe de Mornay, a distinguished leader of the French Huguentos, contains parallels to Hooker's thought rather than to Calvin's; and although it is difficult to know when a translator shares the opinions of an author, it seems that Sidney did share Mornay's views, since nothing in his own work contradicts them.[22]

Like Hooker, Mornay and Sidney seem to have assumed that if men simply knew enough, they would behave morally and religiously, and, moreover, that they could knew enough. Mornay asserts that the purpose of his work is "to take reason to our helpe against the Infidels" (p. 197) in persuading them of the basic tenets of Christianity. He hopes that reasonable arguments will bring non-believers and those of weak conviction up to the point where they can accept Christianity on faith. (p. 194). He has confidence that if people "applied

their wit . . . advisedly to judge betweene truth and falsehood, godlinesses and worldinesses" they would soon be able to "discerne the true Religion from the false" (p. 190). In his efforts at persuasion, Mornay, like Hooker, shows relative tolerance for pagan ideas, using them to show that even the opponents of Christianity share fundamental Christian beliefs, from one omnipotent God to the Trinity. Although Mornay hesitates to comment about whether people with mistaken beliefs, with wrong knowledge, can be saved, he and Sidney seem to assume with Hooker that all men can know enough to live decently and think more or less rightly.

But Greville, like Calvin, was plagued by the thought of how very dangerous insufficient knowledge could be. A curious example of this dread may be found in sonne CII, a discursive inquiry into the causes of Adam's fall. Painfully conscious of the weakness of fallen man's cognitive abilities, Greville cannot imagine that Adam might have possessed greater clarity of vision. Keenly alert to fallen man's strong desire for knowledge, Greville cannot imagine that Adam might have felt less urgently about the matter. Thus, Greville attributes the Fall both to insufficient knowledge, which prevented Adam from perceiving Satan's enticement, and to the desire for excessive knowledge:

> The Serpent, Sinne, by shewing humane lust
> Visions and dreames inticed man to doe
> Follies, in which exceed his God he must,
> And know more than hee was created to,
> A charme which made the ugly sinnes seeme good,
> And is by falne Spirits onely understood.
> (st. 1)

Of course, blaming the Fall on insufficient knowledge and on the desire for illicit knowledge is inherent in the Genesis story itself as well as commonplace in Christian interpretation. To take as an example another Renaissance poet, John Davies remarks in Nosce Tepiscum that Adam and Eve "knew not poison's power to kill"; and he summarizes the cause and result of the first defection thus: "When they sought knowledge they did error find/ Ill they desired to know and ill they did."[23] Greville stresses these same ironies, though Calvin himself had attributed Adam's fall rather to his inconstant will.[24]

What should be noted, however, is not simply the intellectual content of Greville's analysis, but the emotional force behind it, for it is the latter that reveals the intensity of his concern with the dangers of insufficient knowledge. The verbal emphases on misleading information, whereby "visions and dreames inticed" man to sin; on intellectual entrapment, by which the Serpent's "charme" made sin "seeme" good; and on the unfair intellectual advantage the Serpent had, in having "understood" sin before Adams did are typical of the poem as a whole. Moreover, although Greville determines the causes of the Fall in the very first stanza, he re-examines and re-asserts his conclusions throughout the remaining twelve stanzas, so troublesome his assessment seems to have been.

In stanzas 1 through 4 he examines his interpretation in light of his feelings that the results of the Fall, such as moral confusion, the loss of the capacity for genuine pleasure, and the very deprivation of being, are so catastrophic that the sine itself must have been heinous and inspired by the

most malevolent of motives. In stanzas 5 through 8, he examines his assessment against the feeling that the Fall was illogical in a world ruled by an omnipotent God and in which man already had everything he could have wished for; Greville can hardly account for why Adam, who was already "in goodnesses like his Maker wise," would seek additional knowledge.

The issue is finally clarified, at least as well as it can be, in stanzas 9 and 10, where Greville explores the nature of uncertainty itself and arrives at some explanation of how insufficient knowledge and evil may be linked. His explanation hinges on the words "Probable" and "Possibility":

> So as within the Man there was no more,
> But possibility to worke upon,
> And in these spirits, which were falne before,
> An abstract curst eternity alone;
> Refined by their high places in creation,
> To adde more craft and malice to temptation.
>
> Now with what force upon these middle spheares,
> Of Probable, and Possibility,
> Which no one constant demonstration beares,
> And so can neither binde, nor bounded be;
> What those could work, that having lost their God,
> Aspire to be our Tempters and our Rod.

"Probable" and "Possibilty" are both puns on intellectual uncertainty and freedom of action.[25] As Greville points out, "Probable, and Possibility" bear "no constant demonstration"; that is, they lack invariable proof. Moreover, they are incapable of "binding" or being "bound," of restraining that is, and they thus permit things to happen by not excluding them from the realm of what can be. For Greville, freedom is merely contingency, and the connection between freedom and uncertainty is that both are a kind of empty space into which

alien thoughts and alien deeds can enter. In working on the "possibility" inherant in all human nature, the Serpent manipulated the combination of man's inability to know with certainty and the absence of restraining forces. In stanza 11, Greville suggests that the Serpent played on the uncertainty inherent in language by persuading man that since his will was "free" he did not have to obey laws, "Since where no sinne was, there no law could be." The confusion resides in conflating "free" in the sense of unbound by the fetters of sin. with "free" in the sense of permissible, and the linguistic confusion itself results from uncertainty about reality and about meaning.

The final couplet of the poem collects all of the frustrations, the sense of double bind, that the lack of sufficient knowledge to remain unfallen elicits:

> Sin, then we knew thee not, and could not hate,
> And now we know thee, now it is too late.

Turning for the first time in the poem to address sin directly, Greville discourses with it, as the natural object of fallen man's dealings, at the same time as he acknowledges and decries their acquaintance. Concisely and sharply, he indicates the disparity between "then" and "now," and points up the irony that the knowledge of sin came only after its damage had been done.

This poem not only demostrates the anxiety that the thought of insufficient knowledge elicits in Greville, but it also demonstrates his willingness to accept the limitation as proper to fallen man. For in its careful probing and rational explanation, the poem moves in a circle, starting and ending

with the same theory. Greville makes no effort to penetrate the unknown, either through an imaginative or dramatic re-creation of the scene in Paradise, which might enable him to comprehend Adam's motives outside the context of his own, or through the extensive use of metaphor by which he might attempt to comprehend God's motives in creating man free or in leaving a great hole of uncertainty in the nature of even the pre-lapsarian universe.[26] Greville's entire treatment of the defection in Paradise is punctuated, in stanzas 5, 6, and 8, by amazed question --

> Yet is there ought more wonderfull than this?
>
> What greater power ther was to master this [God's],
> Or how a lesse could workd, my question is?
>
> Where did our being thus seeke out privation?

-- that mark the wonder of a man who stands well outside of Paradise, even in his own imagination, and dares not conceive a world different from his own.

If insufficient knowledge was Adam's nemisis, then fallen man must suffer ever worse. And Greville, like Calvin, identifies the condition of the depraved soul unilluminated by special grace as one of ignorance. Sonnet C examines a single instance of that ignorance: the failure of visual perception at night. In his Treatise of Humane Learning, Greville systematically arraigns all of man's senses as deceitful and man's imagination as distorting:[27] But in sonnet C he focuses on the effects of night on the eye; sight was considered to be the highest and most useful of the senses, and thus its failure the most emotionally charged.

In Night when colours all to blacke are cast,
Distinction lost, or gone downe with the light;
The eye a watch to inward sense plac'd,
Not seeing, yet still having power of sight.

Gives vaine Alarums to the inward sense,
Where feare stirr'd up with witty tyranny,
Confounds all powers, and thorough selfe-offence,
Doth forge and raise impossibility:

Such as in thicke depriving darknesses,
Proper reflections of the errour be,
And images of selfe-confusednesses,
Which hurt imaginations onely see;
And from this nothing seene, tels newes of devils,
Which but expressions be of inward evils.

The failure to see at night is analyzed as a symptom of spiritual illness. The octave gives an almost clinically precise account of how night-time hallucinations are formed. The first quatrain explains that the effect of darkness on the eye is to prevent it from distinguishing any but the grosest of forms. The second quatrain explains what happens in the mind when it receives from the eye "vaine Alarms" instead of concrete images. In the absence of illumination which would provide the check of reality, "witty tyranny" -- that is the tyranny of intellect -- transforms the danger signals it receives into hallucinatory visions, or "impossibility" as they are called. The attention to the physiological process gives concreteness to the analysis.

What is important for us to observe, though, is that the physiological changes are symptomatic of man's spiritual incapacity. First of all, Greville maintains that the eye retains "power of sight" even when it fails to see. Thus Greville lodges the responsibility for the visual failure specifically with man himself, rather with an organic defect

or with the physical darkness. The responsibility is much the same that Calvin places on man for his inability to know God despite generous testimonies in Nature and Scripture. Then in the sestet, Greville identifies the delusions as the "proper reflections" of sin and as the "images" of the confused mind, "Which hurt imaginations onely see." Taking the form of "devils," the hallucinatory visions are projections, or as Greville calls them, "expressions . . . of inward evils."[28] Greville states that the visions are created out of "nothing" because the eye sees nothing in the dark and, moreover, because devils are non-existent. In Greville's vocabulary (which goes back to Augustine and beyond, and which was commonplace among contemporary Protestants), evil is not a positive attribute, but merely the absense of good -- "nothing," in other words.[29] The "depriving darknesses" of the depraved mind, devoid of the illuminating light of grace, is the emptiness into which man projects insubstantial visions.

Greville imbues this sonnet with a good deal of emotional force, through both the preciseness of his details and the encompassing power of his generalizations. The sonnet proposes that "at night," all nights, "the eye," everyone's eyes, "doth forge and raise impossibility," always and inevitably. All people's imaginations are "hurt imaginations," and all suffer from the spiritual illness that engenders hallucinations, because all men are fallen. Greville's capacity to generalize informs a single event with the universal significance that enables others to feel its enormous import.

Caelica C and CII are not doctrinal poems, and it may seem that in concentrating our discussion on the emotional power of their anxieties about insufficient knowledge we have over-emphasized the influence of Calvin. Yet if emotion may not seem a specific enough feature for the attribution of influence, other lyrics do show more specific adherence to Calvinist theory. Namely, they insist on the necessary connection between knowledge and spiritual rebirth.

Caelica LXVI, the poem among the "love" group in rejection of book learning, leads to that connection gradually. First Greville rejects book learning in favor of immediate observation, and it may seem that his view of man's ability to absorb the revelations offered by Nature is akin to Hooker's:

> I have for books, above my head the Skyes,
> Under me, Earth; about me Ayre and Sea:
> The Truth for light, and Reason for mine eyes,
> Honour for guide, and Nature for my way.
> With change of times, lawes, humors, manners, right;
> Each in their diverse workings infinite.

But Greville soon modifies the apparently liberal view of this stanza.

His reason for rejecting books, he explains, is that they are merely one of the "arts" of fallen man and consequently simply reflect his "follies." They are "False Antidoes for vicious ignorance" because the "causes" of ignorance "are within, and so their cure." To take this argument one step further, as Greville does, "Errour," or sin, corrupts Nature, and the products of fallen man's perceptions must also be erroneous. But if books can do no more than refleft human error, then certainly all of man's perceptions, even his direct perceptions

of nature and society, must be similarly inaccurate. And thus Greville assets that man will have reliable knowledge only when he is reborn:

> But when the heart, eyes light, grow pure together,
> And so vice in the way to be forgot,
> Which threw man from creation, who knowes wither?
> Then this strange building which the flesh knows not,
> Revives a new-form'd image in mans minde,
> Where arts reveal'd, are miracles defin'd.

"This strange building which the flesh knowes not" is regenerate man.

Caelica LXXXVIII contrasts man's misguided search for illicit knowledge with the promise of the knowledge of God after regeneration. The structure of the poem moves from the condemnation of intellectual probing into divinity, through the exhortation to repent, to the assurance that regenerate man will know everything that he may have wanted to know in his regenerate state:

> Man, dreame no more of curious mysteries,
> As what was here before the world was made,
> The first Mans life, the state of Paradise,
> Where heaven is, or hells eternall shade,
> For Gods works are like him, all infinite;
> And curious search, but craftie sinnes delight.
>
> The Flood that did, and dreadfull Fire that shall,
> Crowne, and burne up the malice of the earth,
> The divers tongues, and Babylons downe-fall,
> Are nothing to the mans renewed birth;
> First, let the Law plough up thy wicked heart,
> That Christ may come, and all these types depart.
>
> When thou hast swept the house that all is cleare,
> When thou the dust hast shaken from they feete,
> When Gods All-might doth in thy flesh appeare,
> Then Seas with streames above thy skye doe meet;
> For Goodnesse onely doth God comprehend,
> Knowes what was first, and what shall be the end.

In the first stanza, Greville warns against "curious search" into "curious mysteries," that is against prying inquiry

into recondite theological matters. While the prohibition itself was commonplace,[30] Greville's firm and absolute tone seems to be based on the Calvinist conviction that the operation of reason in theological matters must be base and perverse; and the terms he uses are reminiscent of Calvin's attack against people who ask too many questions about the origins of the universe. Paraphrasing St. Augustine, Calvin tells of how "when a certain shameless fellow mockingly asked a pious old man what God had done before the creation of the world, the latter aptly countered that he had been building hell for the curious" (I.14.1; Confessions XL. xii).[31] The general idea behind both rebukes is that since Scripture is reticent about the condition of the world before and after fallen man inhabits it, people are not to speculate.

In the second stanza, Greville directs his readers towards the proper knowledge of God, which, as Calvin had taught him, is attained through repentence. Like Calvin, Greville is particularly concerned with saving knowledge, and for this he directs his reader towards the contemplation of Scripture, where, as Calvin teaches, God reveals himself as the Savious of mankind.[32] Rather than wonder about the unknown occurrences outside the boundaries of Scriptural space and time, the reader is to consider specific Scriptural events -- the flood, the destruction of Babylon, the final cataclysm, and "the man's renewed birth," that is both the Second Coming of Christ and the renewal of mankind. Greville focuses on events that contrast punishment and promise because such events are to bring man to the understanding of God's punitive justice and His

saving mercy, which, according to Calvin, should instill in the sinner precisely the fear of punishment and hope for forgiveness that together will induce him to repent. Behind Greville's choice of events lie Calvin's dictims that "before the mind of the sinner inclines to repentance, it must be aroused by thinking upon divine judgment" (3.3.7), and that men "derive the reason for repenting from grace itself and the promise of salvation" (3.3.2). Greville introduces the necessity of repentance as a prerequisite for the proper knowledge of God.

The last two lines of the sextain thus direct the reader to repent. The image of plowing corresponds to the idea of repentance. In Calvin's interpretation, "no passage better reveals the character of repentance than Jer. ch. 4: 'if you return, O Isreal,' says the Lord, 'return to me . . . Plow up your arable land and do not sow among thorns'" (3.3.6). Greville designates the Law as the instrument which uproots man's sins because that is the function Calvin assigns it. According to Calvin, the Law is too stringent for man to be able to obey, but "The usefulness of the law lies in convincing man of his infirmity and moving him to call upon the remedy of grace which is in Christ" (2.7.9). The law mortifies the flesh so "that Christ may come" into it.

The third stanza takes up the act of repentance. The images of sweeping one's house so that it is "cleare" of flesh, of shaking the dust of earthly existence from the very lowest part of one's body, and of the infusion of the flesh with "Gods All-might" correspond to the two parts of repentance Calvin had described: morification, through which the flesh is

destroyed, and vivification, the rebirth to spiritual life in Christ. The third line of the stanza, "When Gods All-might doth in thy flesh appeare," signals the completion of the process. That is the point where the aim of repentance, which, in Calvin's words, is "to restore in us the image of God which had been disfigured and all but obliterated through Adam's transgression" (3.3.9), is accomplished. It is with the completion of his renewal, when God's image, Christ, is restored in him, that man "knows what was first, and what shall be the end." He knows God, who is first and last, beginning and end, and knows Him more deeply than he could ever have known by "curious search."[33]

With the closing couplet, the poem comes full circle. What man learns through repentance replaces what he had speculated about in his sinful state. The "Goodness" that "doth God comprehend" replaces the "craftie sinnes delight" of the first stanza. The recognition of God as the beginning, (the "first") and "end" of man's life replaces the first stanza's futile speculations about the beginning and end of the world. In the double reference of the word "comprehend," Greville asserts that man <u>understands</u> God when, and only when, he <u>contains</u> Him within himself (<u>OED</u>, II.4; III.8,9), as happens when the image of God which had been obliterated in man at the Fall is restored to him when he is regenerate.

Many things in <u>Caelica</u> LXXXVIII may not be entirely to our liking. Lacking Greville's and his contemporaries' knowledge of the Bible and of Calvinist theology, we perhaps find the poem too compressed. We may find the purpose of its images

somewhat unclear as they move rapidly by, and their emotional evocativeness, which depends on familiar biblical associations, unavailable to us. We may find the poem stark or we may resent being addressed as "man" and censured in public, authoritarian tones.

But we cannot doubt the full coherence and integrity of the poem. Greville speaks with the conviction and seriousness of a man who knows that he has universal truths to tell. He excludes personal emotions and idiosyncration perceptions that might detract from his responsibility and relies instead on the certainty that the Calvinist theology gives him. This is the poem of a man who is no longer writing in oppostion to existing norms about which he may be ambivalent, but that of a man who, having found a reliable authority, knows what he has to say and says it.

Caelica CIII contrasts the uncertain knowledge of this life with the clear vision of God to be gained in the next. It combines anxiety about inadequate knowledge with hope and longing for perfect knowledge.

> O false and treacherous Probability,
> Enemy of truth, and friend to wickednesse:
> With whose bleare eyes opinion learnes to see
> Truths feeble party here, and barrennesse.
>
> When thou hast thus misled Humanity,
> And lost obedience in the pride of wit,
> With reason dar'st thou judge the Deity,
> And in thy flesh make bold to fashion it.
>
> Vaine thought, the word of Power a riddle is,
> And till the vayles be rent, the flesh newborne,
> Reveales no wonders of that inward blisse,
> Which but where faith is, every where findes scorne;
> "Who therefore censures God with fleshly sprite
> "As well in time may wrap up infinite.

As he does in Caelica CII, Greville here blames "probability" for the Fall. But now he identifies it as an independant force which opposes God's truth, rather than as a principle of His creation. The result is an awkward personfication with "bleare eyes," who can be a "friend" to evil and an "enemy" to truth, and who "misled" mankind and "dares to judge" God. Greville's purpose in the octave is to identify probability with fallen man's tendency to misuse his reason and to judge by appearances, and then to fling the vice as far from himself as he is able.

But in the sestet, Greville draws upon biblical imagery whose deep reverberations point to a world where God may be known. Recognizing God's word as a "riddle," Greville states that it will be opened not by reason, but by revelation, and then only when "the vayles be rent, the flesh newborn." Syntactically, this line equates the rending of the veil and the rebirth of the flesh so that together they form an image of conversion. Greville is saying that until man is converted to God, God "reveals no wonders of the inward bliss."

The image of the veil brings together both the distress of not knowing God and the expectation of knowing Him. To begin with, the image recalls the veil that Moses wore when he approached God on Mount Sinai and thus indicates that fallen man, at best, is like Moses and can see God only dimly through a veil. Moreover, the obstacle of the veil is insurmountable in this life, for as Paul allegorizes the veil in Hebrews 10:20, it stands for the flesh. Yet at the same time, the image also recalls Paul's promise to the Corinthians that

"when their heart shalbe turned to the Lord, the veils shalbe taken away," and then "we all beholde as in a mirror the glorie of the Lord with open face" (II Cor. 3:16-18). The turning of the heart was understood by Greville's contemporaries as a metonomy for conversion; and Paul's promise forms the basis for Greville's assertion that regenerate man will, indeed, know God. Furthermore, the reference to the rending of the veil refers to the gospel accounts of Christ's life, where Matthew, 27:51, Mark, 15:38, and Luke, 23:45, report that the veil of the temple was rent in two at the moment of Jesus' death. The image thus invokes the promise of salvation inherent in the crucifixion, In short, the image crystalizes all of the worries and hopes of the Calvinist theory of knowledge.

Yet none of the poems discussed in this chapter ever enters the world beyond the veil. They express ideas; they analyze the limitations of man's knowledge; they condemn intellectual pride and extoll repentence. Their virtues are intellectual substantiality, directness, clarity and honesty, They rely on Calvin's theology for their understanding of the Truth and on biblical images to translate the theology into poetic directives and promises. If none of the poems approaches a vision of God, that is because the vision is inaccessible: and as readers we should not expect it.

NOTES

1. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, pp. 77-8.

2. See Introduction, p. 15 and N. 45.

3. See Waswo's development of the idea that Greville regards love as deceptive. Fatal Mirror, pp. 58-72, 109-12.

4. See OED: pride, I.1; II.11; flesh I.1g; II.10-11. comprehend, I.2; II.4; intend, III.11; IV.13;

5. Rees, Fulke Greville, p. 78; Waswo, Fatal Mirror, p. 110; Peterson, English Lyric, p. 226;

6. Thom Gunn, ed. Selected Poems, p. 34, praises this line as "a beautiful expression of the Protestant ideal."

7. Peterson, English Lyric, p. 271. Peterson also claims that Caelica LXXXV is a version of a penitential lyric (p. 267) and thus a preparation for other poems of Christian love. But his contention seems fallacious, since the farewell to human love in favor of divine is commonplace within the tradition of the love lyric itself.

8. Quoted from The Works of Edmund Spenser, Variorum Edition, ed. Edwin Greenlaw, Charles Grosvenor Osgood, Frederick Morgan Padelford, Ray Heffner (1943; rpt. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), VII, 213.

9. Quoted from George Herbert, The Works of George Herbert, ed. F. E. Hutchinson (1941; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 188. For a more detailed discussion of the contrasts between "Love III" and Greville's religious lyrics see Waswo, Fatal Mirror, pp. 139-41. It is Waswo who brought the differences to my attention.

10. Agape and Eros, trans., Philip S. Watson (1932, pt. I; 1938, pt. 2; New York: Harper & Row, 1969), passim. M. C. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love: Lion and Unicorn, A Study in 'Eros and Agape' (London: Faber & Faber, 1946), takes issue with Nygren. His dispute, however, is with the philosophy of the Protestant reformers who denied man's ability to love God rather than with the historical accuracy of Nygren's study, so it is extraneous to our purposes.

11. The idea that writers turned toward religious subjects on the ground that they came to regard love as trivial is based on Russell Fraser's study, The War Against Poetry, (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970) pp. 4-7. Peterson, English Lyric, p. 173, observed that the late sixteenth century religious lyric "developed quite specifically out of the awareness of the English Petrarchists made English poetry vulnerable to charges of vacuity and licentiousness."

12. Douglas Peterson, English Lyric, pp. 266-9, discusses the change in Caelica as part of a general trend in English literature at the turn of the sixteenth century. Lily Bess Campbell, Divine Poetry and Drama in Sixteenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957) traces the development of biblical literature in the century. Hallett Smith, "English Metrical Psalms in the Sixteenth Century and Their Literary Significance," HLQ, IX (1946), 249-71 provides a brief history of psalm translation. Edward Farr, ed., Select Poetry Chiefly Devotional, of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, The Parker Society Publications, no. 41 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 1845, collects religious verse of the period with a chiefly protestant bias.

13. In addition to theology, sceptical philosophies and the ideas of Bacon influenced Greville's treatment of knowledge. For documentation, see Bullough, Poems and Dramas, I, 55-6; Marie Helen Buncombe, "Fulke Greville's A Treatise of Humane Learning: A Critical Anaysis," Diss. Stanford Univ., 1966; and Theresa Stella Kubis, "Fulke Greville and the Problem of Knowledge," Diss. Columbia Univ. 1972. For a discussion of Renaissance scepticism, see Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen, Netherlands: Koninklijke, 1960); Hiram Haydn, The Counter-Renaissance (1950; rpt. Gloucester, Mass.; Peter Smith, 1966), chapter 2, pp. 176-130, which focuses on the relationship between scepticism and fideism: and D. G. James, The Dream of Learning: An Essay on Learning, Hamlet, and King Lear (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 9-31, which shows that once religion was made an affair of faith and rational probing barred, inquiry into scientific matters could proceed unhampered by metaphysical concerns.

14. François Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious Thought, trans. Philip Mairet (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 150, includes Calvin's theory of the knowledge of God among "the most original aspects of Calvinist thinking." Forstman, Word and Spirit, p. 9, asserts that "the exposition of the knowledge of God and self is, in the most general view, Calvin's theological work." For detailed studies of Calvin's theory of the knowledge of God, see Edward A Dowey, Jr., The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952) and T. H. L. Parker, Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, 2nd ed. (1952; Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1969). The latter two books have been invaluable guides in helping me to understand a very complex theory.

15. Catechism of the Church of Geneva, in Tracts and Treatises on the Doctrine and Worship of the Church, trans., Henry Beveridge, notes by Thomas F. Torrance, 2 vols. (1949; rpt. Grand Rapids, Mich.; Eerdmans, 1958), II, pp. 37-38.

16. We may note, however, that Calvin does not mean the knowledge of God's essence, which Christianity traditionally considered out of reach. Calvin instructs his readers that "it is not so much our concern to show who he is in himself, as

what he wills to be toward us" (3.2.6). In other words, by "the knowledge of God and ourselves" (1.1.1), Calvin seems to mean an understanding of the relationship between man and God. For Calvin, this understanding includes the realization of man's depravity and of God's greatness. But even this knowledge, which seems possible to grasp, Calvin places beyond the capacity of fallen man.

17. The ensuing discussion offers a necessarily simplified interpretation of Hooker's thought. It emphasizes his rationalism and understates the complicated and problematic relationship between reason and faith that he expounds. In preparing my discussion, I have found three authors particularly useful: John S. Marshall, Hooker and the Anglican Tradition: An Historical and Theological Study of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity (Sewanee, Tennessee: Univ. of the South, 1963), pp. 93-101, gives a good idea of Hooker's debt to Thomism; Gunner Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation in Richard Hooker (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1962), claims that Hooker creates a tautology whereby grace is necessary to the right functioning of reason while reason confirms and supports the existence of revelation; and Egil Grislis, "Richard Hooker's Image of Man," Renaissance Papers, 1963, pp. 73-89, and ____, "The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker," Studies in Richard Hooker, ed., W. Spped Hill (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 1972), pp. 159-206, disputes the idea that Hooker's reasoning is tautological and emphasizes Hooker's exaltation of human diligence and intelligence.

18. The quotations from Hooker that are followed by a single arabic numeral are taken from "A Learned Discourse of Justifications, Works, and How the Foundation of Faith is Overthrown," which is prefaced to the Laws, vol. 1. Arabic numerals refer to the section in the preface.

19. See Chapter 2.

20. Laws, III.8.15. to be after freedom

21. See Chapter 2.

22. In Sidney's Prose Works, vol. 3.

23. Quoted from Silver Poets of the Sixteenth Century, ed. Gerald Bullett (1947; London: Dent, 1962), p. 346.

24. Inst. 1.15.8.

25. Brian John Meehan, "Fulke Greville's Caelica: A Study in Sources and Meaning," Diss. Univ. of California at Los Angeles, 1972, pp. 157-61, traces the idea of probability back to the sceptical philosopher Carneades of Cyrene and contends that St. Augustine criticized as morally dangerous the sceptical notion that the best information we have is only probable.

26. One may contrast Greville's inability to conceive freedom anything but a burden with Milton's celebration of it; one may

also contrast Greville's refusal to imagine pre-lapsarian life with Milton's re-creation of it.

27. A discussionof Greville's philosophical treatises is beyond the scope of this dissertation. We may, however, pause to observe that in A Treatise of Religion, Greville clearly expounds many of Calvin's ideas about knowledge. He adheres to Calvin's stricture that "there lives a true God in the heaven," and a "true religion here on earth" (st. 34; italics mine), and with Calvin he insists that these are "by grace/ Inspir'd, not taught" (st. 34). The Treatise of Religion is anti-syncretic, proclaiming in the first stanza that "diverse worship which mans souls deflowre/ Are ignorance, sinne, infidelitie." It accuses wrong believers of "grosse superstition" (17), of "bottomlesse hypocrisie" (18), and of idolatry (24). It confines true understanding to the regenerate, saying that "Our fleshe cannot this spirit comprehend" until "Death, and new birth, in us . . . joyne together" (50). For, "Though fleshe cannot believe, yet God is true;/ And onlie knowne where he creates anew" (101)

28. Thom Gunn, ed., Selected Poems, pp. 36-7, reads the octave of the poem symbolically, claiming that the darkness of night stands for the spiritual darkness, the absence of light for the absence of illuminating grace, and the hallucinatory vision of "devils" for the inner hell of the soul. But it seems to me that the hallucinationary visions that occur at night are not symbols but rather symptoms of man's spiritual defect. The sestet explains them according to their origin and nature, as actual things are explained, rather than as to their meaning, which is how symbols are explained.

29. Bullough, Poems and Drammas, I, 285, n. XCIX, points out Sidney's translation of de Mornay's assertion that the ancient philosophers regarded evil as the deprivation of good (Prose Works, III, 231). See also Saint Augustine, "Concerning the Nature of the Good," chapt. I-VI, in Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, ed. Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1948), vol. I. For a discussion of Augustine's theory, see Étienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 143-44. For the history of the idea and its application, see Jannes Louis Rosier, "The Chain of Sin and Privation in Elizabethan Literature," Diss. Stanford Univ., 1957. Calvin never uses the word privation, but his deprecation of fallen man and his vision of man separated from God through sin make him an exponent of the idea.

30. Howard Schultz, Milton and Forbidden Knowledge (New York: Modern Language Association, 1955) documents the thorough disparagement of intellectual pride in the early seventeenth century.

31. Of course people did ask, at least about Adam's life and the condition of Paradise. Joseph E. Duncan, Milton's Earthly Paradise: A Historical Study of Eden, Minnesota Monographs in

the Humanities, vol. 5 (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1972); J. M. Evans, *Paradise Lost and the Genesis Tradition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

32. Calvin divides the knowledge of God into two parts, the knowledge of God the Creator and the knowledge of God the Redeemer (1.2.1). He entitles Book II of the *Institutes*, "The Knowledge of God the Redeemer in Christ, First Disclosed to the Fathers under the Law, and Then to us in the Gospel."

33. The line "Then Seas with steams above thy skye doe meet" poses some problems. Its image is obviously one of harmony and completion, but there seems to be a more precise reference too that I have not been able to determine.

VII: The Development of a Literal Language

As a poet of the Fall, Greville develops a language that emphasizes the limitations of man's fallen state. He develops a literal language that never reaches into the beyond, never bridges two worlds, as does Yeats' "burning bow" of metaphor "that shoots out of the up and down,"[1] and never attempts to apprehend the unknown through images of the know. It is a style well suited both to the intellectual analyses Greville so values and to his emotional sense of exclusion and separation from any extra-terrestrial world that metaphor can probe.[2]

His language is intended to convey objective and ascertainable realities. It is not that he abjures figurative language entirely. That would be difficult to do in any period and perhaps particularly so in the Renaissance, which had a rich heritage of literary allegory and pictorial iconography. Indeed, a survey of Caelica finds metaphors and similes through to the very last lyrics. The point is, though, that Greville tends to use similes and metaphors as addenda to the rational content of his poems rather than as intrinsic to their meanings.

The abandonment of the metaphor of love, and with it of all aspiration for transcendence, seems to be the major stylistic change in the later lyrics. With the exception of a few ornate poems, most of Caelica is written in what is recognizable as the native plain style.[3] They address a general audience; they make critical observations in the form of universal precepts; they are structured by acccumulated aphorisms which tend to reiterate rather than to develop a point; and their rhythms and syntactic structures are highly uniform, with

medial caesuras and stopped lines. But the religious and political poems alone disburden themselves of all fictions, such as that of a love situation and of a protagonist, and say what they have to say directly.

Not only does Greville abandon the fiction of love, but he refuses to translate it into the metaphors of religion, as other poets of the period were doing.[4] Greville's contemporaries, who were writing poems of religious love and praise, appropriately addressed God in the images and conceits long familiar in the secular love lyric. The sestet of Donne's "Batter my heart" is only one of many examples of this type of poetry:

> Yet dearly I love you, and bould be lov'd faine,
> But am betroth'd unto your enemie,
> Divorce mee, 'untie, or breake that knot againe,
> Take mee to you, imprison mee, for I
> Except you'enthrall mee, I never shall be free,
> Nor ever chast, except you ravish mee.[5]

The language of this and of other poems of its kind is metaphoric and, by its very nature, aspires to reconcile earth and heaven, known and unknown.[6] Here, the imagery of marriage seeks to comprehend God in terms of human activity. Greville, however, calls religious love "a Nature by no other nature known" (LXXXV); and his religious and philosophical lyrics contain neither amorous images of supplication, betrothal, or union, nor metaphoric language in general.

In his few comments on poetic and prove literature, Greville insists that the poet's task is to tell objective truth in a literal manner. He distinguishes his own methods from Sidney's (explicitly) and from those of the metaphysical poets to whom he is so often compared (implicitly).[7]

In A Treatise of Humane Learning, Greville displays a mistrust for language that seems remarkable in a poet. He argues that truth exists prior to language and that it is worldless, consisting of "precepts of such kinds,/ As without words may be conceiv'd in minde" (st. 106). Of all types of language, metaphor strikes him as the most culpable:

> Besides, this Art, where scarcity of words
> Forc'd her, at first, to Metaphorike wings,
> Because no Language in the earth affords
> Sufficient Characters to expresse all things;
> Yet since, she playes the wanton with this need,
> And staines the Matrone with the Harlots weed.
> (St. 108) 8

The only function that Greville can conceive for metaphor is to supply the deficiency of literal equivalents in the language. Ironically, Greville dismisses metaphor using one of his own, the comparison of metaphor to a harlot. But his preference is clear: he wants a language in which words and things are associated on a one to one basis. "Words must sparkes be of those fires they strike" (st. 109), he stipulates.[9] He does not conceive of nuance or of a reality that cannot be expressed by literal statements.

The function of language as he sees it is to express a monolithic truth, "to declare/ What things in Nature good, or eville are" (st. 110). He denies language the psychological function it had in courtly verse, which was, to use his own disparaging terms, "to flatter, or beseech,/ Insinuate or perswade" (st. 110). Like other poets of his day, he assigns poetry a moral function, "to describe, or praise/ Goodnesse, or God" (114). But unlike others who may have shared this general view, deeply engrained as it was in Christian humanism, Greville mistrusts the very means by which poetry seduces

its readers into swallowing the moral pill. Greville is suspicious of anything but direct statement, and while he admits the need for linguistic embellisment, he tolerates it as a barely admissible deception which, "while it seemeth but to please,/ Teacheth us order under pleasures name" (st. 114). Greville's reservations about literary artistry seem to be stronger even than those of many Puritans, who also regarded art as useful in teaching religious and moral lessons.[10]

The same suspicion of anything that enhances the basic philosophic precepts of a work informs Greville's few comments on literature in his Life of Sidney. About Sidney's rich artistry, Greville is necessarily ambivalent, since he was obviously required to justify the work of an admired friend, as well as hiw own hand in the publication of the revised version of the Arcadia.[11] Yet by the same token he was discomforted both by the subject of love and by the notion of fiction in literature. The conflict focuses on Sidney's talents as an image maker, particularly on the relationship between Sidney's "images" and the morality they teach. On the one hand, Greville praises Sidney's ability "to turn the barren Philosophy precepts into pregnant Images of life" (p. 15); and he even takes pains to interpret the "images" of the Arcadia as pertaining to the worthy theme of statecraft rather than to the frivolous one of love. But on the other hand, he questions the entire image making technique. Soon after he praises Sidney's talents and moral vision, he informs the reader that before Sidney died he asked that the Arcadia be burned. If the request is a fact, Greville's explanation that

Sidney was motivated by "seeing that even beauty it self, in all earthly complexions, was more apt to allure men to evill than to fashion any goodness in them" (p. 16) seems to disclose Greville's own mistrust of artistic beauty more than his friend's opinions. And toward the end of the Life, Greville contrasts his own work and Sidney's precisely on the basis of the images each used: Sidney employed "Images of Wit," while he himself wrote in "Images of Life" (p.224). He rejects Sidney's images because they aspire to create a golden world of "Gardens, and groves" (p. 224), while his own choice of images reflect the real world of "Rocks, and quick-sands" (p.224).

When it comes to the account of his own works, of his tragedies, Greville shows similar discomfort with all but direct speech. He explains that he avoided using "witty Fictions," that is ingenious or unusual plot materials, on the grounds that in them "the affections, or imagination, may perchance find exercise, and entertainment, but the memory and judgment no enriching at all" (pp. 222-3). Plot, like imagery, metaphor, simile, or drama, can be superimposed on the idealogical skeleton of a work, but is not intrinsic to its meaning. All such additions may enchange the pleasure a piece of writing gives, but they little further its moral purpose and are readily dispensible.[12]

On first consideration, it seems remarkable that Greville held such constraining views as a poet. Yet like many types of limits, literalism was also purposeful. It grew out of a deep conviction that a writer's task was to tell the truth. That truth, for Greville as well as for others at the

time, existed in a definitive and monolithic form, and was thus best communicated in language that was free both of ambiguity and of the personal bias inherent in "images of wit." The purpose of the limits Greville extolls becomes clearer when we understand some of the groups who expounded them -- the Puritans, the Ramists, and the early pragmatic scientists like Bacon. Although it would be difficult to prove that the views of any or all of these groups impressed Greville directly, it is clear that their opinions were very much part of the contemporary cultural milieu and that they overlap with Greville's at important points. Greville, never having fully enjoyed the cultural support of Sidney's world, seems to have found the authority he needed in more radical figures and ideas.[13]

Calvin seems to have provided the spiritual authority for literalism. He encouraged a form of scriptural interpretation that treated the Bible as a document that had only one literal meaning. His classical statement is in his commentary on Galatians 4:22:

> Scripture, they say, is fertile and thuse bears multiple meanings. I acknowledge that Scripture is the most rich and inexhaustible fount of all wisdom. But I deny that its fertility consists in the various meanings which anyone may fasten to it at his pleasure. Let us know, then that the true meaning of Scripture is the natural and simple one (verum sensum scripturae, qui germanus est et simplex), and let us embrace and hold it resolutely. Let us not merely neglect as doubtful, but boldly set aside as deadly corruptions, those pretended expostions which lead us away from the literal sense (a literali sensu).

With this assertion, Calvin strips Biblical language not only of ambiguity but also of possible suggestiveness. He remains undaunted by the fact that the Bible contains figurative

speech, parables, and metaphors. For he is certain that these too have single, literal meanings, which are inherent in the natural use of the words and can be logically determined.

The immediate, though not the only, purpose for so narrowing the scope of scriptural interpretation was to make the Bible a potent instrument in the hands of the reformers. As a literal document, and moreover as the actual word of God as He spoke it, the Bible afforded a concrete basis for theology and a guide to moral action. Later, various sects would dispute the interpretation of supposedly "literal" statements; but the possibility of divergent readings which could not be resolved into the one true and right meaning did not become entirely clear for another century. Initially, the claim that the Bible had a single literal meaning promised certainty about the nature of reality and brought truth within sight of all who were willing to recognize it.

Both the possibilities and limitations of Calvin's interprerative method may be seen if we contrast it with the Catholic practice, against which it was a reaction. The Catholics interpreted the Bible as a fourfold allegory, in which any passage could be read on a literal, historical, anagogical, or tropological level.[16] Such an approach treats each text as having four possible meanings, some of which would be hidden beneath the literal tenor of the words and possibly quite distant from it. The Catholic theory thus implied a multi-layered reality and viewed the Bible as a symbolic document, With the increased complexity of reality, the truth that the Calvinist's sought would be less accessible, less

certain, and less subject to objective criteria. With the Bible a symbolic document, there was supposedly more chance for error, misinterpretation, and sheer human bias. These are the limitations of the Catholic approach. And what the Catholic approach did have to offer -- the attainment of reality beyond the scope of one's immediate perceptions and contact with deep and remote truths -- the reformers rejected as sinful probing into recondite matters.[17]

Calvin's sense of having before him a concrete, visible truth in the Bible which must be communicated is somewhat akin to Greville's sense that the poet must communicate the visible truth of the world around him. And Calvin's guidelines to preachers and biblical interpreters suggest why the poet must discipline his imagination as he perceives the world and why he must restrict his language to as literal a vocabulary as possible when he communicates his findings. Since for Calvin the biblical text is literal, the task of the interpreter and preacher is to explain the words in light of their textual, historical, and doctrinal contexts. It is through this type of analysis, which employs the "scientific" aids of grammar, rhetoric, logic, and etymology, that one arrives at the literal truth of the text. And the licence that Catholic theory had afforded to priests to exercise their imaginations over the surface of the text is sharply curbed, because that would only introduce subjectivity and conjecture onto a document whose single meaning could be discerned in an objective way. As for the communication of such a truth, that too must be done as directly as possible. Calvin considers anything that

might interfere with the transmission of God's literal Word, from the introjection of personal opinion to the use of figurative language, close to sacrelige. The poet who interorets a concrete, monolithic reality would naturally be bound to the same rules.

Calvin's theories of hermeneutics and preaching were highly influential during Elizabeth's reign, with adherents in both Anglican and Puritan camps.[18] A systematic exposition of his thought is offered by William Perkins, a Puritan preacher, in his homiletic treatise "The Art of Prophesying."[19] While Calvin expounds the theory, Perkins deals more closely with the problem of how the "one entire and natural sense" of Scripture "may appear" (p. 38). He offers guidelines for interpreting the Bible and for communicating its message, and he discusses difficulties that arise because neither biblical nor any other language is unfailingly literal. Thus, he touches on problems that a poet whose aim is to communicate literal truth might have with language.

Perkins outlines a three part process of interpretation and preaching: analysis of the text to determine its literal meaning, the extraction of doctrines, and moral instruction. Each of these stages poses linguistic difficulties, and at each stage Perkins' advice is to make language as literal as possible, both in reading and in writing.[20]

In analyzing the text, one may come across "cryptic or hidden"passages whose "native [i.e., literal] signification" either conflicts with that of other passages or contradicts accepted, that is true, doctrine. Perkins counsels that in

such an event, "the other meaning which is given of the place propounded is naturall and proper" (p. 339). That is to say, Perkins' directive encourages the interpreter to find what is presumably the literal meaning of a text, even if that is not the most obvious one. Perkins of course assumes the consistency of the Bible; but beyond that he assumes that all words have literal equivalents in reality, just as Greville assumes that words can be "sparkes" of the "fires they strike."

When it comes to the extraction of doctrines from a text, Perkins again opts for logic and literalism. Doctrine involves two problems, One is how to derive it from a text, and Perkins suggests that the interpreter do so with the "help of the nine arguments" (p. 340), which are set logical procedures by whhch one thinks through a subject, rather than by letting his imagination wander freely until it sees into the mysteries of the page. The other problem involves what to do with allegorical passages that the Bible does contain. This is a difficulty because on the one hand the validity of doctrines depends on their being "derived from the genuine and proper meaning of the scripture" (p. 340) and after all scripture does contain allegories, yet on the other hand allegories (or similes and metaphors) tend to permit less certain interpretations than straightforward statements. Perkins' solution is to discourage the derivation or the teaching of doctrines from allegories, for matters of faith are too important, and to restrict allegories to occasional use in moral instruction (pp. 340-1). Considering the fact that the allegories Perkins suspects are in the Bible itself, his wariness is indeed great

and gives some indication of the intellectual and moral inferiority he and people who thought similarly must have attributed to figurative language.

As for moral instruction, Perkins, like Calvin, advocates a spare sermon style which discourages, among other things, "the telling of tales" (p. 346).

Perkins' position was extreme: As historians have shown, Puritan preachers often diverged from his rigid theory and the theory itself was modified to accommodate the practical demands of persuading an audience of Christian truths, and later in the seventeenth century, Puritan sermons even developed elaborate symbolisms of wandering and warfaring in order to portray the individual soul's quest for salvation.[21] What I am trying to show here, however, is a general attitude. The Puritans wished biblical language, and the reality it reflects, to be reducible to a unifed, literal level. Where the Anglicans admired the literary beauties of the Bible, the Puritans regarded tropes, metaphors, allegories, and other devices that might make the text obscure as riddles to be solved.[22]

The Puritans' endeavor to make language an instrument of literal, rational discourse was enormously aided by the work of the Ramists. Logicians and rhetoricians, the Ramists too were determined that language should communicate truth directly and without falsification. Of all the Elizabethan rheoricians, they were "the least interested in stressing the imaginative pattern of Rhetoric."[23] For they believed that reality could be comprehended by their own system of logic. Although that idea may seem naive to us, it proved enormously exciting to the early seventeenth century.

Ramism is a system of logic whose effect on literature was indirect. But in order for us to understand what Ramism did to literature, it is necessary for us to know what Ramus did to logic. Peter Ramus was a French logician whose murder in the Saint Bartholomew's day massacre made him an international Protestant hero. His work consisted in the reorganization of Aristotelian logic and rhetoric.

Up through the sixteenth century, when a student studied rhetoric, he also studied logic. In the standard rhetorical textbooks, he would find instruction on invention, or how to find subject matter; disposition, or organization; elocution or tropes and figures; pronunciation; and memory. The instruction was directed toward the composition of orations; and matters of content were taught along with matters of style on the assumption that an orator, whose task was to persuade an audience, would first require a firm foundation in content and then have to know how to present it persuasively. Style and content were directed toward the one aim of persuasion. The flaw in the system, however, was that it involved an apparently unnecessary duplication, for the student of rhetoric had already learned invention and disposition when he had studied logic. Ramus was uninterested in oratory, and in an effort to systematize what struck him as chaotic, he firmly partitioned the two disciplines. Logical took possession of invention and disposition and rhetoric was reduced to elocution and pronunciation; memory was striken out of the curriculum altogether on the theory that if something were organized properly it could be remembered. A student who approached logic through Ramus' Dialecticae Libri Duo and

rhetoric through Omar Talon's Rhetorica, its companion text, would learn much the same things as someone who used the standard books, but he would learn them with new emphaes and new biases.[24]

One implication of the Ramist reorganization is the separation of meaning and style in a literary work, which is similar to the separation suggested in Greville's statements about the ornamental function of figurative devices. According to father Ong, whose study of Ramus is the most recent and the most substantial available, the Ramists treated tropes and figures as "applique work of the worse mechanical sort."[25] And Perry Miller discloses that seventeenth century New England Puritans used Talon's Rhetorica, which consisted in one of the shortest available lists of rhetorical figures, as an aid in stripping tropes and figures from biblical passages in order to arrive at their literal meanings, that is in order to solve the riddles they posed.[26] Such a separation was made possible by the elevation in the importance of logic and reduction in the function of rhetoric that Ramism encouraged.

To take the latter first, traditional rhetoric acknowledges that tropes and figures had valid psychological functions in helping to persuade an audience. For example, Puttenham claims that even though many people criticize figurative speech as immoral and deceptive, it is in fact a virtue in a poet, who "is appointed not for a judge, but rather for a pleader," and whose "abuses tend but to dispose the hearers to mirth and solace by pleasant conveyance and efficacy of speach."[27] In contrast, Ramist rhetorics tend to limit the function of tropes and figures to ornament. Not only does the list of figures they provide tend to be short,

but their discussion of them is perfunctory. Abraham Fraunce, whose Arcadian Rhetoric is an adaptation of Talon's, defines rhetoric merely as "braverie of speech" and says nothing at all about its psychological function. Fraunce happens to think highly of ornament, but his preference hardly mitigates the contempt in which Ramists generally held it.[28] Ramus himself had proclaimed that "tropes and figures of elocution . . . serve no other purpose than that of pulling along the troublesome and mulish auditor.:[29] This scorn for both the audience and for the persuasive function of language was probably very congenial to Greville's poet who did not "flatter, or beseech,/ Insinuate, or perswade," and so did not require figurative language.

Ramist logic was also well suited to Greville's poet in that it emphasized the logical properties of literature at the expense of their persuasive and non-rational ones. In his introduction to his logic, Ramus taught that all people, even poets, were natural logicians. In the first book of his logic, he listed and explained nine places of invention, that is nine ways of analyzing a subject. (Incidentally, the nine places listed by Ramus are the same as the nine "arguments" named by Perkins as "helps" for extracting doctrines from a Biblical text.)[30] To reinforce the point of his introduction, Ramus dramatically illustrated each argument with passages from poetry and prose literature. The places themselves were abbreviated from Cicero's Topica, but the method of illustration was original and emphatic.

In addition to emphasizing the logical properties of poetry, the Ramist theory of logic encouraged a poet "to declare,/ What things in Nature good or eville are" (italics mine), as Greville wanted to do. Ramist logical theory abandoned the syllogistic reasoning of the Scholastics and substituted for it a theory of dialectially arranged "arguments." "Argument" is a technical term in Ramism which denotes not so much what proves, in our sense of the word, as the name or mental conception of a thing.[31] For example, as seen by a Ramist, "white" may be adduced as an "argument" for "black" by virtue of their being opposites or "sickness" as an "argument" for "death" on account of their cause and effect relationship. The Ramist logician or poet simply had to "argue" or "declare" something in a methodical way in order to assert its truth. Moreover, since the Ramists assumed in their definition that "arguments" derived directly from the things themselves, and not from the actions of the mind on them, logical, direct speech could mirror reality and words and things could be related on a one to one basis, as Greville wished them to be. In such an event, figurative language would certainly distort and encumber the truth.

The third guardian of truth whose linguistic ideals Greville seems to have shared is Francis Bacon. Greville's friendship with Bacon has been documented, and so has the theory that his Treatise of Humane Learning was written partly in answer to Bacon's Advancement of Learning.[32] In the Advancement Bacon expresses attitudes towards language that later influenced the linguistic ideals of the Royal Society. He urges

the equivalence between a single word and single thing and is highly critical of distortions through firurative, especially metaphoric, language.[33]

Bacon is less optimistic than the Ramists about the capacity of language to discover and tell truth, and his wariness seems to come closer to Greville's own attitude towards language. Bacon combines a sense of urgency about the accuracy of language with caution that we "consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words," because "although we think we govern our words . . . yet certain it is that words, like a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert their judgment" (p. 134).[34] He is determined that language be able to convey the vast scientific knowledge he saw open before him.

Like Greville, Bacon divides language into that which tells the truth and that which pleases or persaudes an audience. The first is aphoristic, spare, free of illustration, connectives, and any kind of verbiage. Presumably, such writing forces the writer to be accurate and pithy, to set down only "some good quality of observation," and encourages the reader to examine the writer's assertions carefully and to ask questions about them (p. 142). The second is eloquent, flowing, and figured. It is indispensible for the public use of knowledge, even scientific knowledge, because it is this language that wins consent. Yet, like Greville, Bacon is also wary of all but the sparest of speech. For example, at the same time as Bacon acknowledges the need for figures, he regrets that in their very appeal they hinder the persuit of

knowledge because they invite unconsidered assent to ideas and discourage further inquiry. "There is a kind of consent of error between the delivered and receiver" of learning, he objects, "for he that delivers the knowledge, desireth to deliver it in such a form as may be best believed, and not as may be best examined" (p. 141).

Thus, at the same time as Bacon himself uses figurative language and recommends the use of "similitudes and translations" in order to introduce concepts that are new or difficult to accept, he disparages them:

> For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, need only but to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate: so that is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for paradoxes, that which was offered, before they had understood or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are: for it is a rule that whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitudes.(pp. 143-44)

He assigns figurative language rather pejorative contexts. "Trivial" fictions functioned well "in rude times," but supposedly have outlived their use. "Parables and tropes" are helpful in "divine learning," which may be worthwhile but is not the province of the rational mind. Like Greville Bacon holds that "Sacred theology . . . is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature" (italics mine, p. 209), as this places it outside the bounds of man's inquiry and language.

When Rosemond Tuve argued that Elizabethan and metaphysical poets regarded imagery necessary to "precise communication,"[35] she implied that these poets believed that not all things could be said in rational, discursive language. Calvin, Ramus, Bacon, and those who expounded their theories, seem to have felt -- so their theories imply -- that everything could. If they allowed rhetoric its traditional persuasive function, they surely made it known how inferior persuasion was to the discovery and communication of truth, for which literal language sufficed.[36] All three were practical men; none, not even the theologian among them, had strong feeling for the numinous and none felt a gaping chasm between perceived reality and the capacity of words to grasp and convey it. Since none of these men conceived of a legitimate purpose that was beyond the powers of literal language, none had reason to believe that metaphor, simile, or figurative speech could ever be essential to any statement. At the same time, though, they believed that they could know and communicate the truth that was within the grasp of their logical and sensory perceptions, and were fervently driven to do so. In their craving for immediate truth, they elevated literal language above the mere system of arbitrary signs which we now consider all language to be and extolled it as reality itself.

Greville need not have agreed with the theories of these men at all points. He certainly lacked their faith in the all-sufficiency of language, literal or otherwise. But he did join them in their quest for immediate truth and in their re-

traction from the ineffable. Although he wrote a good deal about the desire for transcendence, he almost always wrote in relation to the failures that bound people to the frustrations of their earthly existences and never about intuited bliss or fulfillment. As a man of religious feeling, Greville certainly did believe in an otherworldly reality, just as almost everyone else in the period did. But he believed also that the powers of the human mind to grasp it were entirely too limited and that all efforts to exceed the limitations were sinful. The predominant literalism of his lyrics is one of the deepest and most pervasive indications that the world his imagination inhabits is, despite his persistent idealism, decidedly this one.

But the literalism also represents his commitment to "project truth" through poetry.[37] With this aim in mind, and with his sense that it is literal language that grasps reality, Greville keeps figurative language in careful check. He uses it, as did all poets of the period, but he uses it as ancillary to the "meaning" of a poem, which presumably can be collected in a moral aphorism or in some other direct statement.

He reduces the complex conceits of Elizabethan and Metaphysical poetry to the status of moral illustrations, which serve as neumonic devices but have little importance or impact on their own. Sonnet XCIV provides an example. The second and third stanzas follow:

> The little Maide that weareth out the day,
> To gather flow'rs still covetous of more,
> At night when she with her desire would play,
> And let her pleasure wanton in her store,
> Discern the first laid underneath the last,
> Wither'd, and so is all that we have past:
>
> Fix then on good desires, and if you finde
> Ambitious dreames or feares of over-thwart;
> Changes, temptations, bloomes of earthly minde,
> Yet wave not, since earth change, hath change of smart.
> For lest Man should thinke flesh a seat of blisse,
> God workes that his joy mixt with sorrow is.

The image of the "little Maide" who pickes flowers only to find them "wither'd" in the evening is clearly intended to illustrate the lesson of the closing couplet, that God tempers pleasure with sorrow as part of His universal plan. And the fate of the girl picking flowers is secondary to the moral injunction "Fixe then on good desires." Since much Renaissance imagery did function didactically, there is nothing unusual in the moral purpose to which Greville puts the story of the flower girl. What does appear to be special, though (if only in a negative sense), is that Greville seems not to be concerned that the image itself bear part of the burden of driving the lesson home. Unlike the images that illustrate the destructiveness of time in Shakespeare's sonnets, for example, the image of a maid picking flowers is neither the impressive reality that generates the idea in the first place nor a vivid or compelling example that strongly enforces the idea. The principle comes first in Greville's mind, and the illustrative figure may be trivial or uninspired because it is basically unimportant to him.

Moreover, wary lest his illustrations become seductive, interesting on their own behalf, or suggestive of experiences

or feelings beyond the comprehension of the conscious mind, Greville keeps his images in firm check, tying them carefully and explicitly to the moral he wishes to expound. Sonnet CVII, which employs a traditional emblem of Isis sitting on an ass, is a case in point:

> Isis, in whom the Poets feigning wit,
> Figures the Goddesse of Authority,
> And makes her on an Asse in triumph sit,
> As if Powers throne were mans humility;
> Inspire this Asse, as well becoming it,
> Even like a Type of wind-blowne vanity:
> With pride to beare Powers gilding scorching heat
> For no hire, but opinion to be great.
>
> So as this Beast, forgetting what he beares,
> Bridled and burdend by the hand of might,
> While he beholds the swarmes of hope and feares,
> Which wait upon ambition infinite,
> Proud of the glorious furniture hee weares,
> Takes all to Isis offer'd, but his right;
> Till wearinesse, the spurre, or want of food,
> Makes gilded curbs of all beasts understood.

This poem illustrates the extreme consciousness with Greville sometimes uses images. In the first stanza, Greville is most careful to tell the reader that he is using an image, which merely represents reality but is not real in itself. He seems to be embarrassed by the emblem even as he uses it, and he takes pains to point out that the emblem was created by "the Poets feigning wit" (Italics mine).[38] Then, lest the reader be led astray by the verbal picture, Greville explains that Isis and the ass are merely "figures" and "types" that the poets themselves created, and he carefully states what quality in humanity each image represents: Isis stands for "Authority," the ass for "wind-blowne vanity."

After explaining what the images stand for, Greville goes on to explain their significance. The sestet, working

from the analogy of a grand personage sitting on a beast of burden, analyzes the way in which the powerful enlist the willing degradation of those who make their power possible. The stanza points out the emotional enticements of ambition that keep the underling unaware of and an accomplice to his suffering at the hands of the mighty.

The emblem serves to emphasize what Greville believes to be the bestial stupidity of the mass of men, and the closing couplet brings home the analogy between man and beast. What is important, though, is that this association never takes control of the poem, and that Greville always keeps the conceptual reality that the image stands for clearly in the reader's mind.

In addition to illustrative figures, Greville also uses mental figures, or so we may call them for convenience. These are figures of a supernatural or transcendental nature which Greville insists originate in the mind itself and not in external reality. For example, in sonnet C Greville uses the image of devils only to insist that they are merely hallucinations "Which but expressions be of inward evile" (italics mine).

Another example of a mental figure is that of the "Goddess" which Greville uses to personify the idea of pleasure in sonnet XCVI. He uses the personification of a goddesse not to suggest that pleasure has any superlative or extraworldly qualities but rather to indicate the way in which people themselves deify the idea and attach exaggerated importance to it. Greville reduces the mythological eminence of the Goddesse by placing her "In all the glories of orinion's art" -- that is, in the limited sphere of man's imagination.

> In those yeeres, when our Sense, Desire and Wit,
> Combine, that Reason shall not rule the heart;
> Pleasure is chosen as a Goddesse fit,
> The wealth of Nature freely do impart;
> Who like an Idoll doth apparel'd sit
> In all the glories of Opinions art;
> The further off, the greater beauty showing,
> Lost onely, or made lesse by perfect knowing.

The personification is barely tangible. Greville permits neither himself nor his readers to be seduced by the image that people form of pleasure, or by images in general. Rather he insists on the "perfect knowing" of abstract concepts, so that the value of each can be abjectively ascertained. Literal and abstract terms have counterparts in the real world, while figures exist only in men's minds.

Thus far we can see that Greville uses figurative language in a very restricted way and firmly controls its suggestive power. He does this even with language that may strike us as highly figurative, for there are terms that we, as twentieth century readers, may take as figurative but that Greville seems to use in a literal sense, just as Calvin and Perkins had interpreted biblical figures as having specific literal meanings. For example, Greville often uses the image of the mind as hell; but he means by hell not the Christian netherworld of torment to which the mind can be compared in a simile or metaphor but rather the spiritual suffering of the falen mind itself. The image of the mind as hell in Caelica seems to mean what Milton's Satan means when he proclaims "myself am hell," that is that the sinful soul is always in a state of hell, even when it is not bound by a particular location. Thus, in describing the effects of the

Fall in sonnet CII, Greville explains that "immortal life, made for mans good/ Is since become the hell of flesh and blood" (italics mine). He equates hell with spiritual suffering. In the same sonnet, he goes on to explain that even if "there were no eternity," men would still be miserable because "In sinnes excesse there yet confusions be"; and only then does he compare the confusion and pain wrought by sin to hell fire:

> And as Hell fires, not wanting heat, wnat light;
> So these strange witchcrafts, which like Pleasure be,
> Not wanting faire inticements, want delight,
> Inward being nothing but deformity:

The boundary between the image's figurative reference to the Christian place of torment and the literal equation between hell and spiritual suffering tends to be somewhat blurred here. But what is important to notice is that Greville never uses the image to probe into the nature of the infernal unknown but confines its use to the relatively known world of the fallen mind.

Greville also uses biblical images to refer to specific literal equivalents. For example, the meaning of the image of the "vayle" in CIII (which we discussed in the last chapter) is determined by its biblical contexts. We who read the poem without a deep knowledge of the Bible may be moved by the image itself, by the notion of a figurative veil separating man from reality. But for Greville, that veil was an actual one: it hung in the temple; it was worn by Moses; and it could be translated, with literal validity, into the flesh.

The images suggesting regeneration in sonnet LXXXVIII (also discussed in the previous chapter) are equally precise

and controlled. The image of the law plowing up the wicked heart refers specifically and only of repentance, an idea that is the accepted and public meaning of the image, not one that Greville himself assigns to it. Greville is never tempted to develop that image into a conceit of harvesting or to suggest multiple meanings. The same can be said of the images of cleansing in the third stanza of that poem. The images in the lines, "When thou hast swept the house that all is cleare,/ When thou the dust hast shaken from thy feete" refer to spiritual cleansing, and all thoughts of physical housekeeping are excluded. In other words, the literal meaning of these images is the spiritual process; there is no physical action suggested, and no metaphysical leap between the physical and spiritual worlds. Rather, there is a precise injunction to repent.

In his restriction of language to its denotative values and of images to illustrative functions, Greville was not always sensitive to the meanings that words took on in excess of what he wanted them to say. And to this insensitivity may be attributed the confusion of some of his verse. For example, in Sonnet CVI, Greville uses metaphoric descriptions of fame, friends, and fortune to illustrate the moral that these are "False visions all." But although the intention of each of his metaphors is clear with respect to the moral, internally they tend to be mixed and confusing. We may take the stanza describing fortune as an example:

> For what is Fortune, but a wat'ry glasse?
> Whose chrystall forehead wants a steely backe,
> Where raine and stormes beare all away that was,
> Whose shape alike both depths and shallowes wracke.

The stanza begins by asking us to regard fortune as a "wat'ry glasse," that is a mirror without a "steely backe." Drawn out, the image suggests that viewing affairs in the light of immediate circumstances results in a distorted perception of them, just as looking at the image of something reflected in glass, instead of in a mirror, yields an inaccurate picture. The first two lines are clear enough. But confusion is introduced as the third as forth lines pick up the adjective "wat'ry," which had described how unbacked glass looks, as the basis for a new metaphor. The stanza moves from the image of a distorting glass, through the unstated but implied image of a distorting body of water (water gives only an inaccurate reflection of objects), to the image of destructive waters, first in the form of rain and storms, then in the form of a sea where one can be shipwrecked. The idea that the "shape" of "all . . . that was" can be "wrack'd" in the water goes back to the notion of water as a type of mirror, but tends to be confusing because the "depths and shallowes" that are said to be responsible for the destruction are found only in real waters and have no analogues in the mirrors. Thus the shipwreck metaphor which was introduced to show the destructiveness of fortune and to explain why it could not be trusted conflicts with the mirror metaphor.

Yet if we criticize this kind of confusion, we should also realize that Greville himself was made aware of it and seems to have struggled against it. In 1615 he recieved a letter from John Coke, the friend and mentor who replaced Sidney as his confident, in which Coke commented line by line

on a latin epitaph Greville wrote for a projected tomb for Sidney.[39] And Coke's comments focus precisely on the difficulties Greville had in controlling the suggestiveness of his figures. For example, Coke observes that a particular metaphor . . . strains the mind of the readers against the true intent of your worke" and that another is "darck and hard to be construed in a literal plain sense."

We should realize, too, that Greville was trying to create a kind of language for which he seems to have had no poetic models. Occasional failures are only to be expected. And ther are poems where Greville uses literal language to elucidate the nature of the known world and to communicate its terrors, which is why we read him in the first place.

NOTES

1. "The Phases of the Moon," quoted from William Butler Yeats, Collected Poems (New York: Macmillan, 1772), p. 164.

2. For a discussion of literal and symbolic language in religion, see Edwyn Bevan, Symbolism and Belief (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1938), pp. 252-74.

3. My assertions about the plain style are taken from Wesley Trimpi, Ben Jonson's Poems: A Study of the Plain Style, (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 18-20. Trimpi's discussion of the plain style in both the classical and native traditions is the clearest I have found. It supercedes the earlier studies of Morris Croll, which have been reprinted and collected in Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm, ed. J. Max Patrick, Robert O. Evans, John M. Wallace, and R. J. Schoeck (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966). Peter Heidtmann, "The Lyrics of Fulke Greville," Ohio Univ. Review, X (1968), 28-41 discusses Greville as a plain stylist, but tends to be vague in his definition of the term. Peterson, English Lyric, concentrates on showing how the native plain style borroed features of the eloquent style and became by the end of the sixteenth century a medium for complicated expression.

4. Peterson, English Lyric, p. 173, emphasizes the idea that the religious lyric of the period owed much of its language to that of the Petrarchists

5. Quoted from Divine Poems, ed. Helen Louise Gardner (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952), p. 11.

6. Joseph E. Duncan, The Revival of Metaphysical Poetry: The History of a Style, 1800 to the Present (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1959), p. 6, also classifies Greville with Donne, noting that he "approached Donne in his bare, irregular verse and abstract, involved, unconventional conceits" (p. 9). Yet his discussion of the metaphysical conceit as an analogy that "often linked different levels in the great chain of being" (p. 12) in a "desperate attempt to reunite the natural and divine orders" (p. 13) goes contrary to the major impulses in Greville's lyrics.

7. For the comparison of Greville to the metaphysicals, see Introduction, pp. 2-4.

8. Quoted from Poems and Dramas, ed. Bullough, vol. 1.

9. For a history of this idea in the Renaissance see A. C. Howell, "Res et Verba: Words and Things," ELH, XIII (1946), 131-42.

10. For a discussion of Puritan ambivalence, see Laurence Sasek, The Literary Temper of the English Puritans (Baton Rouge: Louisianna State Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 39-56.

11. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, p. 76; Rees, Fulke Greville, p. 47.

12. Hugh N. Maclean, "Greville's 'Poetic,'" SP, LXI (April 1964), 170-91, gives a more thorough account of Greville's ideas about poetry than I can here. I find it a very useful and perceptive study, though Norman Farmer disputes its conclusions in his article, "Fulke Greville and the Poetic of Plain Style," Texas Studies in Literature and Language, XI (1969), 657-71.

13. It is true, also, that some of Greville's literary contemporaries were beginning to be disaffected with the old allegorical style. Don Cameron Allen in his recent study, Mysteriously Meant: The Rediscovery of Pagan Symbolism and Allegorical Interpretation in the Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 279-311, traces the end of the Elizabethan fondness for pagan myths; the change of direction, he claims, began with Donne. Michael Murrin, in The Veil of Allegory: Some Notes Toward a Theory of Allegorical Rhetoric in the English Renaissance (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 171-98, connects the end of allegory with the shift from a Platonic and metaphysical concept of art, in which the poet was thought to be divinely inspired and able to communicate divine truths, to a craftsmanlike and practical concern with informing people's manners and morals. Murrin places Sidney and Donne inbetween the two modes. Sidney shared Greville's concern for instruction, yet held to the allegorists' faith that the poet could conceive and create a visionary paradise distinct from man's mundane perceptions and lives. Donne, like Greville, was not a visionary poet, but he had the allegorists' fondenss for wit and obscurity.

14. Quoted from Commentaries on the Galations, Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians, trans. T. H. L. Parker, ed. David W. Torrance and Thomas Torrance (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1965), pp. 84-5.

15. My summary has simplified, and therefore somewhat misrepresented, a complex subject. For further information on the history of exegesis consult Frederick William Farrar, History of Interpretation (New York: Macmillan, 1886) and the more recent and less compendious study by James D. Wood, The Interpretation of the Bible: A Historical Introduction (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1958). On Calvin's theories of interpretation, see H. Jackson Forstman, Word and Spirit: Calvin's Doctrine of Biblical Authority (Stanford: Stnaford Univ. Press, 1962); and T. H. L. Parker, Calvin's New Testament Commentaries (London: SCM Press, 1971); and on his theories of preaching, Parker's The Oracles of God: An Introduction to the Preaching of John Calvin (London: Littleworth Press, 1947), I am particularly indebted to the information in the last three titles.

16. The application of the fourfold interpretation of the Bible to literature is of course suggested in Dante's letter to Can Grande.

17. The reformers, however, did permit typological interpretation, where events in the Old Testament were read as foreshadows of events in the New. Ideally, typology was more restricted than other types of allegories in that it preserved the historical integrity of the people and events in the Old Testament and referred only to the known events of the New Testament. Yet typological interpretation certainly invited its own complexities. See Ursula Brumm, American Thought and Religious Typology, trans. John Hooglund, from the 1963 German edition (New Brunswick: New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 21-4, and Thomas M. Davis, "The Tradition of Puritan Typology," in Typology and Early American Literature, ed. Sacvan Bercovitch (Boston: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1972), pp. 11-45. See also William G. Madsen, From Shadowy Types to Truth: Studies in Milton's Symbolism (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968). Madsen shows the ways in which the seemingly rigid method of typological interpretation was made flexible.

18. The conformity of opinion between Anglican and Puritan on this matter is emphasized by J. W. Blench, Preaching in England in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, 1450-1600 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964); his chapter headings make the scattered information easy to find. The differences are emphasized by Perry Miller, The New England Mind in the Seventeenth Century (1939; rpt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 332-33, and by Mitchell Fraser, English Pulpit Oratory from Andrews to Tillotson, (New York: Macmillan, 1935).

19. Quotations are from The Work of William Perkins, ed., Ian Breward (Appleford, England: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970). I am including page references in my text.

20. Until the eighteenth century, the word "literal" referred to a way of reading a text, rather than of writing one. OED, 3a, b, d.

21. William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, pp. 128-172, and Lawrence Sasek, Literary Temper of the English Puritans, pp. 39-56 have careful studies of the nuances and ramifications of the basic Puritan ideas about sermon styles and have done much to dispel the cliché that Puritan sermons were unartistic.

22. This idea was crystallized for me by Joan Webber, The Eloquent "I": Style and Self in Seventeenth-Century Prose (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1968), pp. 50-51.

23. Brian Vickers, Classical Rhetoric in English Poetry (London, Macmillan, 1970), p. 108.

Two major problems confront us in trying to understand the effects of Ramism on literature. One is that since the effects of a philosophy are not provable, but merely to be inferred, critics can legitimately differ in the influence they

assign it. Thus, Rosemond Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery, pp. 131-53, holds Ramist teachings responsible for the specificity and logical complexity of metaphysic images, while others, including Perry Miller, New England Mind, who has made a most thorough analysis of the connection between Ramism and Puritanism, and Wlater J. Ong, S. J., Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958), whose book on Ramus is the most complete work on Ramus available in English, both argue very convincingly that Ramist theory was hostile to poetry, and especially hostile to its metaphoric and imaginistic properties. To complicate matters, all three base their contentions on the identical recognitions that Ramist reforms greatly increased the importance attached to logic in the period and that his methodology taught one to think from generalizations to progressively more specific details, Tuve tries to capture the positive influence that deductive logic might have had on poetry; Miller and Ong stand on the other side of the street and point out that as logic becomes more important in poetry, language that transcends rationative processes becomes less important. I myself believe that Tuve has made a mistake and that Miller and Ong are correct; but it is well to keep in mind Vicker's disclaimer that he "cannot detect any ways in which a Ramist's writing differs in style or method from that of a non-Ramist" (p. 42). It is possible, moreover, that one theory of logic may have more than one effect. The following studies may be useful to anyone who wishes to pursue the matter further: Peter Sharratt's bibliographical essay, "The Present State of Studies on Ramus," Studi Francesi, XLVII-XLVIII (May-Dec. 1972), 201-213: Graham Castor, Pleiade Poetics: A Study in Sixteenth Century Thought and Terminology (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 128-135, which contains a brief but clear outline of some of the Ramists' cardinal ideas; Jackson I. Cope, The Metaphoric Structure of 'Paradise Lost', (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 27-49; and the articles by A. J. Smith, "An Examination of Some Claims Made for Ramism," RES, VII (1956), 348-59, and by George Watson, "Ramus, Miss Tuve, and the New Petromachia," MP, LV (1958), 259-62. which refute Tuve's claims. I am indebted to all of the studies mentioned in this note, though most of all to Ong and Miller.

The other problem is determining the influence Ramism might have had on Greville, and that again is a matter of inference. Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956), pp. 173-288, has shown that Ramist books of logic and rhetoric were widely dispersed in Elizabeth's and James' England. Walter J. Ong, in his concise article, "Tudor Writings on Rhetoric," Studies in the Renaissance, XV (1968), 36-39, has supported Howell in linking Ramist thought to Ascham, Lawrence Chatterdon, Gabriel Harvey, William Temple, Dudley Fenner, Abraham Fraunce and George Downname, a list which mingles literary figures and spokesmen for Puritanism. Christopher Marlow's reference to Ramus' logic in The Massacre at Paris (vi, viii) and Sidney's knowledge of Ramism are both well known. Greville, too, possibly alludes to Ramist ideas, in stanza 22 of Humane Learning:

> Indeed to teach they confident pretend
> All generall, vniforme Axioms scientificall
> Of truth, that want beginnigs, have no end,
> Demonstrative, infallible, onely essentiall.

The word "axioms" is found repeatedly in Ramist texts; Greville's criticism may also refer to Bacon, however. To know about Ramism and to adopt its teachings are not quite the same. George W. Hallam, "Sidney's Supposed Ramism," Renaissance Papers, 1963, pp. 11-20, has demonstrated that Sidney approved of Ramism from the standpoint of a logician but as a poet saw its limitations. Waswo, Fatal Mirror, p. 81, has pointed out that Greville's reference to Ramist ideas is derisive, that Greville is contemptuous of the Ramist boast that one can easily learn the truth simply by following Ramus' prescribed dialectic method from one axiom to another. However, since my own contention is merely that Ramism was one of several contemporary cultural forces that encouraged people to regard language as an instrument of literal discourse, it is unnecessary for me to argue that Greville agreed with all Ramist principles.

24. Recently several modern versions of these texts have been made available. The 1574 adaptation by MacIlmaine, The Logic of Peter Ramus has been edited by Catherine M. Dunn (Northbridge, Calif: San Fernando Valley State College Press, 1969) and it is also available in a Scholar Press facsimile (Leeds; 1966). Dudley Fenner, The Artes of Logic and Rhetorike, a 1584 unacknowledged adaptation of Ramus, is printed in Four Tudor Books on Education, ed. Robert D. Pepper (Gainesville, Fla.: Scolar, 1966). Abraham Fraunce's adaptations, The Shepherd's Logic, ca. 1585 (Menston, Eng.: Scolar Press, 1968), The Lawyer's Logicke, 1588 (Menston, Eng.: Scolar Press, 1969), and The Arcadian Rhetoric, 1588, (Menson, Eng.: Scolar Press, 1969) are all recently accessible. So is the 1555 French version, Pierre de la Ramee, Dialectique (1555), ed., Michel Dassonville (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1964). I am noting these versions here in order to make it easier for the reader to make his own judgments about Ramism. From my own experience, it seems that even the best scholarly accounts need to be supplemented by a look at the texts themselves.

25. Ramus, p. 282.

26. New England Mind, p. 341-4.

27. Puttenham, Arte pp. 154-55. See also Vicker's discussion, Classical Rhetoric In English Poetry, pp. 107-9.

28. Bk. I, Chapter 1, A.2. Fraunce's praise of ornament and of literary eloquence shows that Ramism could be put to more than one use.

29. Quoted from Ong, Ramus, p. 254. Passage is translated from Ramus' Dialectique (1555), p. 134.

30. Perkins never mentions the influence of Ramus, but several scholars have interesting and convincing cases for it: Miller, New England Mind, pp. 338-9; Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 206-7; and Francis A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 266-88).

31. The concept of "argument" is a rather difficult one, if only because it is unusual for us. Further discussion may be bound in Miller, New England Mind, pp. 147-51, from whom I take my examples, and Castor, Pléiade Poetics, pp. 130-1.

32. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, pp. 8-9, 97-9, 122, and Bullough, Poems and Dramas, I, 17-8, 35, document their friendship. Vernon F. Snow, "Francis Bacon's Advice to Fulke Greville on Research Techniques," HLQ, XXIII (1960), 362-78, prints a letter that Bacon supposedly wrote to Greville in which Bacon recommends, among other things, the reading of Ramus' Logic and disparages poetry. Unfortunately, neither the author or receiver of the letter can be identified for certain.

33. Richard Foster Jones, Ancients and Moderns: A Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth Century England, 2nd ed. (1936; rpt. St. Louis: Washington Univ. Press, 1961), p. 19; and his "Science and Language in England of the Mid-Seventeenth Century," JEGP, XXXI (1932), 315-31; and George Williamson, The Senecan Amble: A Study in Prose Form from Bacon to Collier (1951; rpt. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 150-85. Both scholars show that Bacon approved the use of rhetorical techniques for the purposes of persuasion and that he himself used a full array, particularly imagery, metaphor, and simile, in order to sway the audience of the Advancement. See also, Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric; or, The Art of Applying Reason to the Imagination for the Better Moving of the Will (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1948); Brian Vickers, Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968).

34. Quotations are from the W. Kitchin ed., Everyman Library (1915; London: Dent, 1954). Pagination is in text.

35. Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery, p. 413

36. In an effort to circumvent a discussion of the "plain style," I have also avoided placing these thinkers in the larger context of scientific, religious, and literary opinion which brought moral and utilitarian arguments to bear against eloquence and in favor of a simple, unrhetorical writing. See Richard Foster Jones, "The Moral Sense of Simplicity," Studies in Honor of Frederick W. Shipley, Washington Univ. Studies, New Series, Language and Literature, No. 14 (St. Louis: Washington Univ. Press, 1942), 265-287.

37. The phrase is from Rees, Fulke Greville, p. 200. Although Rees inteprets Greville's poetic aim in the same way I do, she claims that Greville did approve of metaphor in its appropriate contexts (pp. 195-7).

38. Bullough points out in a note to this poem that similar emblems exist in Alciatus, Emblemata (No. VII) and in Geoffrey Whitney's A Choice of Emblems (1586), p. 8. Bullough's interpretation of the ass as "a type of all those officers under authority who arrogate to themselves the power and reverence which rightly belongs only to their masters," however, strikes me as being too narrow. Greville's criticism seems to be directed at all people who fawn and serve and otherwise wear themselves out in order to bask in the glory of people in authority as well as towards those in authority who take advantage of those beneath them.

Greville's procedure of first naming and then explaining his figure is also the same as that of the emblemists, who use this method because the connection between a graphic emblem and what it stands for is not always a necessary and obvious one: Rosemary Freeman, English Emblem Books (London: Chatto & Windus, 1948), p. 163. George Williamson, The Proper Wit of Poetry (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), p. 12, brought the word "wit" in this poem to my attention; he names the first chapter of his book after Greville's line "the poet's feigning wit."

39. The letter is published by Norman Farmer, Jr., "Fulke Greville and Sir John Coke: An Exchange of Letters on a History Lecture and Certain Latin Verses on Sir Philip Sidney," MLQ, XXXIII (May 1970), 217-36. Quotations in the paragraph are from p. 222.

VIII: From Thought to Feeling

The claims made in the previous two chapters raise questions about the emotional quality of Greville's lyrics: If Greville longed for the knowledge of God rather than the love of Him, and if he preferred the literal language of immediate reality to the leaps of metaphor, what do the emotions of his lyrics consist in and how are they expressed? We have been emphasizing the conceptual nature of Greville's verse; yet abstract ideas couched in literal and often cryptic language hardly seem capable of cutting beneath the surface of experience through to the deep centers of the self. Some of Greville's lyrics, though, are profoundly moving and particularly so his devotional poems, Caelica XCVII-XCIX and CIX. These are concerned with the knowledge of God and all are fairly literal. Yet in all of these poems, the intellectual consideration of man's alienation from God, that is of his not knowing Him, conveys both the pain of the soul without God and the longing and anticipation for the time when He will be known. And both in the sequential group XCVII-XCIX and in sonnet CIX, intellectual contemplation leads to the emotional fervency of prayer. This chapter will deal with the question of how thought and feeling come together in these poems, which are among the most powerful of Greville's lyrics.[1]

In order to answer this question, or even to understand the outlines of these lyrics, we must first return briefly to the subject of the knowledge of God and then embark on an inquiry into the nature of Puritan devotion.

By the knowledge of God, both Calvin and Greville intended a cognizance that included both intellectual awareness and spiritual feeling. Thus, when Calvin asserts that theological ignorance is the lot the reprobate, he emphasizes that ignorance and hardness of heart go together.[2] And when he speaks of the knowledge of the elect on earth, he speaks of it as faith and indicates that "the knowledge of faith consists in assurance rather than in comprehension" (Inst. 3.2.14), that is in emotional rather than intellectual certainty. Greville too confesses to the inadequacy of intellectual persuasion without feeling for the living of a Christian life; and he makes the theme of Caelica XCVII the dichotomy between intellectual assent to the "true words" of Christianity and the inability of man in sin to "feele" their validity. What Calvin and Greville both want is a feeling-knowledge of God.

There were two overlapping ways of attaining such feeling-knowledge. One, which we discussed in Chapter V, was through the process of spiritual death and rebirth -- or, as it was variously named, conversion, repentance, regeneration, or renewal. The process of conversion, by which the depraved soul is turned to God and freed from the bondage of sin, was at the heart of Puritan spiritual life.[3] Its end, as explained by the Puritan divine Richard Rogers was that "our minds be thus enlightened and we feel clearly our sinnes are forgiven us" (italics mine).[4]

The other method was religious meditation. As Louis Marts has demonstrated in his Poetry of Meditation, the aim of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century meditation was to

stimulate feelings of religious devotion by means of the intellectual analysis of an appropriate subject.[5] Martz restricts his study to Catholic and Anglican meditation, but Puritan theorists were no less adamant in proclaiming the cooperation of mind and heart. For example, Louis Bayly, whose Practice of Piety Greville admired, rules that the purpose of meditation on the Bible is "either to confirm thy faith, or to encrease thy repentance."[6] Richard Greenham associates meditation with prayer and singing as an exercise which "doth more increase feeling than knowledge."[7] Richard Rogers suggests that the knowledge acquired through meditation leads to religious feeling, as he instructs his reader that "We must there set our minds to worke, about the cogitation of things heavenly, by calling to remembrance some one or another of them which we know; and so debate in a reason about the same, that our affections may thereby be moved to love and delight in, or to hate and feare, according to what we meditate on."[8]

I wish to argue that Caelica XCVII-XCIX and CIX are meditative poems, written according to a fairly consistent and demonstrable theory in which thought and feeling were brought together, and that their aesthetic success depends on that convergence.

Unfortunately, the present state of scholarship makes it difficult to discuss any of Greville's lyrics as meditations, and we must offer our conclusions tentatively and spend some time establishing that there were in fact some

Puritan conventions of meditation that Greville could draw on, since he did not use the Ignayian method. Martz confines his study of meditation to practices within the Ignatian tradition, which Catholics and Anglicans adopted but Puritans generally avoided. He argues that the Calvinist theory of grace, which asserts that man can do nothing to merit his salvation, discouraged the Puritans from engaging in the sort of methodical meditation he discusses. In keeping with this theory, he omits Greville from his collection of seventeenth-century meditative verse, where he includes many lesser figures. And Douglas Peterson and Richard Waswo follow suit by claiming that Greville never wrote formal meditations.[9]

Recently, Martz' notion of Puritan antipathy to meditation has been challenged. Norman Pettit, in The Heart Prepared, proposes that Puritan divines who wished spiritual development modified the stringent Calvinist theory of grace to allow that "man, although utterly depraved, might somehow predispose himself to saving grace," and he suggests that meditation was one of the approaches they devised.[10] Terrance C. Cave, in his book Devotional Poetry in Freance, argues that it is legitimate to speak of a Protestant (i.e., Calvinist -- he uses the terms interchangeably) devotional tradition running parallel to the Catholic one and encouraging private prayer and meditation."[11] U. Milo Kaufmann, in a study of the background of The Pilgrim's Progress, shows that Puritans did meditate in a formal manner, substituting their own procedures for Ignatian ones.[12] Although the practices Kaufmann describes are not the same as Greville's, his discussion

and other studies encourage us to reopen the question of Greville's meditation.

The hesitancy in reading Greville's devotional poems as meditations is perhaps attributatble to their divergence from the Ignatian method. Specifically, Ignatian meditation relies heavily on the senses and the imagination as means of arousing feeling; and this reliance is reflected in the imaginative and sensuous vividness of the verse of Catholic and Anglican meditative poets such as Southwell and Donne. But Greville's meditations move directly from thought to feeling without the intercession of the imagination or sense. And it is precisely on this question of how thought and feeling were to be bridged that Catholics and Anglicans had on the one hand and Puritans on the other parted complany.

The Catholics and Anglicans assumed that the two were to be bridged by the imagination; and meditation in the Ignatian tradition thus specifies how the bridge is to be crossed. As Martz has shown, Ignatian meditation consists of three parts: composition of place, analysis, and colloquy. In both the composition of place and colloquy the meditator uses his imagination to stimulate his emotions. In the composition of place, he draws as vivid a picture as he is able of the subject at hand. For example, he may imaginatively re-create an event in the life of Christ or the torments of hell., He sets the scene in all of its physical details and mentally places himself in a specific location, such as Calvary, hell, heaven, a prison, a court, and so forth, and he imagines that he is there at a specific time and under specific circumstances.

His aim is to experience his theme in his imagination and thus to stimulate all of the emotions appropriate to it before he analyzes it. Thus, he may create a detailed mental picture of the crucifixion to evoke sorrow or shame or a picture of the last judgment to evoke fear. Only after he sets the scene and establishes the mood does he analyze his subject intellectually. And when he completes that he again invokes the help of his imagination, this time by engaging in conversations or colloquies with God. He might imagine himself as a prisoner talking to God as his judge, as a servant talking to God as his master, or whatever else is appropriate to his theme.[13] The important thing is that his imagination and senses are what enable him to feel the impact of what he thinks about.

The Puritans, on the other hand, seem to have assumed the existence of a direct connection between intellect and emotion. Although they made no explicit reference to such a connection, much in their way of describing meditation implies one. Believing as they did that the imagination sooner led one to error than to truth, they avoided the Ignation structure, which relies heavily on the imagination.[14] When they wrote about meditation, they did not write about composition of place, analysis, and colloquy. When they meditated on Christ, they concentrated on the doctrinal and moral significance of his life and de-emphasized the human aspects, which would have lent themselves to imaginative re-creation.[15]

Yet the Puritans' simple reticence about meditational procedures is telling: it seems to imply that thought, on the part of a man who is cognisant of his limitations and

predisposed by grace to piety, can lead directly to strong religious feeling. Early Puritan writers tell their readers to meditate, but avoid explaining how. Bayly advises his readers to meditate in the morning on God's mercy and love, in the evening on His wrath and their sins, and three times a day on passages from the Bible.[16] But as for how to meditate, he has few pointers. Other early Puritans adopt a similar pattern. Greenham urges the necessity of meditation, but says even less than Bayly about how to proceed.[17] Rogers, who devotes two chapters in the third of his Seven Treatises to the subject, spends most of his effort on explaining preparatory steps, such as how to select a subject and how to conquer one's reluctance to meditate, but he too stops short of outlining the method.[18] In the light of the constant exhortation to end meditation with heartfelt prayer, such scanty procedural guidelines suggests that these writers believed that thinking about a religious subject would in and of itself produce the right feelings.

The one piece of advice they do give is that the meditator avoid merely intellectual speculation but channel his thoughts into those areas that he is able to apply to his own needs and life situation. Thus, Bayly's fifth rule of Bible meditation reads: "Apply these things to thine own heart, and read not these chapters as matters of historicall discourse: but as if they were so many leters or Epistles sent downe from God out of Heaven unto thee."[19] And Rogers is thinking along similar lines when he proposes that the best subjects for meditation are "those things we have most speciall need of."[20]

The point of such advice is to prevent purely speculative thinking and to channel intellectual activity into devotion.

The unstated assumptions of Bayly, Rogers, and Greenham are confirmed in the first quarter of the seventeenth century by John Downame, whose A Guide to Godlynesse (1622) gives lengthy and detailed instructions on meditational procedure. As silent about the Ignatian exercises of the imagination as were earlier Puritan writers, Downame focuses instead on exactly how to think through a subject so as to stimulate feelings. Like his predecessors, he divides meditation into the work of the understanding and the work of the affections. The first leads one to know what is right, the second to do it. His explanation of their function in meditation is noteworthy, because it indicates with particular clarity the complete interdependence of intellect and emotion.

> There is a two-fold accesse or progresse of contemplation; the one in the understanding, the other in the affection; the one yeelding light, the other heate; the one in acquisition of matter, the other in devotion. Of which two, the understanding is to have the precedencie in this exercise, that the will, heart, and affections, may worke by its light, being led and guided, moved and excited by it, to chuse or refuse, love or loath that which is propoundeth unto them, either good or evill. But yet the chief part of our time and strength is not to be spent in the discourse of the understanding, theory, and speculation, but having attained hereby to some knowledge of the point in hand, we are chiefly to labour, that wee may work it upon our hearts & affections, for the increasing of their holines, the inflaming of our love, stirring up of our devotions.[21]

Knowledge is necessary in order to direct the vagaries of emotion but useless unless it leads to emotion, for without emotion the religious life is impossible.

Downame outlines a procedure whereby the intellect, properly handled, fully sensible of its limitations, and rigorously disciplined by faith, leads a person directly to relgious feeling, without the aid of imagination. Beginning with the understanding, Downame proposes that the meditator think through a spiritual subject in much the same way as one thought through any other subject in the Renaissance, whether a philosophical problem or a poem. He explains that after the meditator selects and delineates his subject, he is to "amplifie and inlarge" the matter "by bringing it through the common places of invention." These places of invention (which are much like the Ramists' arguments) are described by logicians and rhetoricians of the period, and they consist in such things as the consideration of the causes, properties, names, similarities, and opposites of a subject. The same procedure that enlightens the mind stimulates the emotions, so Downame implies as he explains that the purpose of amplifying a subject is that "our minds may more clearly and distinctly conceive and comprehend it, and our willes, hearts, and affections may afterwards worke upon and apply it for better and more plentifull use, in the inflaming of our love, and the stirring up our devotion."[22]

Downame implies that the more deeply one thinks about a subject the more deeply one may feel it. For example, he explains that if the subject of the meditation is in any way evil, a careful consideration of its "pernicious ends, mischievous effects, losse and misery, unprofitablenesse and maliciousnesse" will "worke our hearts to a further detesta-

tion and loathing." Like his predecessors, he advises that the way to stir up the emotions is "to bring all which we have thought upon, by speciall application to our owne particular use."[23] But he seems particularly sensitive to the way in which a thorough knowledge of something may color one's emotions towards it.

Following these steps, Downame lists and expounds on seven stages in the devotional process proper. These exercises are more clearly emotive and more immediately personal than the analysis preceding them, for they include self examination, the acknowledgement of sin, "lamentalble complaint" of one's deficiency in grace, "mournful sorrow" and "holy anger" against oneself, "earnest petition" for grace, and confidence that God will grant what was asked.[24] But still the emphasis remains on the application of one's understanding of divinity to oneself rather than in imaginative re-creation of experience.

Greville probably wrote his meditative poems before Downame published his instructions. But it is not necessary that Greville actually read Downame. For by 1922, when Downame published his guide, meditation was a subject "much beaten upon"[25] (to use his own expression), and it seems clear that Greville could have gathered similar ideas from other sources. What should be emphasized, though, is that in Caelica XCVII-XCIX and CIX Greville follows a pattern that begins with thought and ends with feeling. In these poems, intellectual contemplation does indeed stimulate the emotion

that the meditative procedure calls for; and it does so without the aid of the imagination but through the same attention to objective and conceptual reality that characterizes Greville's entire manner of thinking and writing. Moreover, in the course of his meditations he gains the feeling-knowledge of God that is the aim of all religious experience for him.

Turning to the poems themselves, we find that sonnets XCVII-XCIX are organized around the experience of conversion,[26] and that the noetic aims of conversion and of meditation converge in them. Conveniently, sonnet XCVI outlines the course of misery, prayer, and redemption that the following three lyrics will enact. It explains that conversion is necessary because fallen man on his own can do nothing but entangle himself in misery, because his will, trapped in the bondage of sin, "casts/ In declination to the errour still" -- whether he enjoys evil or not. It explains too that it is through suffering such misery that man is "forc'd up to call for grace," and that his conversion thus begins at the absolute nadir of existence, when "from the depth of fatall desolation/ Springs up the height of his regeneration."[27] Sonnet XCVI, though, is not in itself devotional, though it prepares for devotion, and its impersonal, didactic tone contrasts markedly with the tone of the three lyrics that follow it. Only the last stanza of XCVI is at all emotive. But consisting of a set of metaphors that seem intended to arouse disgust for the living-dead flesh of unregenerate man, it is so out of character with the preceding six stanzas that it reads as though it were tacked on. The integration of thought and feeling takes place in the meditative poems themselves.

Caelica XCVII, XCVIII and XCIX each represents a different stage of the conversion process and a different stage in the development of Greville's knowledge of and feeling for God.

Greville begins in XCVII as a man who suffers all the internal contradictions of one who has not yet called for grace. He is cognizant of his sinfulness but can do nothing to abate it. Of the three conversion poems, this is the one where Greville is the least perceptive, where he knows least and feels least:

> Eternall Truth, almighty, infinite,
> Onely exiled from mans fleshly heart,
> Where ignorance and disobedience fight,
> In hell and sinne, which shall have greatest part:
> When thy sweet mercy opens forth the light,
> Of Grace which giveth eyes unto the blind,
> And with the Law even plowest up our sprite
> To faith, wherein flesh may salvation finde;
> Thou bidst us pray, and wee doe pray to thee,
> But as to power and God without us plac'd,
> Thinking a wish may weare out vanity,
> Or habits be by mircales defac'd.
> One thought to God wee give, the rest to sinne,
> Quickely unbent is all desire of good,
> True words passe out, but have no being within,
> Wee pray to Christ, yet helpe to shed his blood;
> For while wee say Believe, and feele it not,
> Promise amends, and yet despaire in it,
> Heare Sodom judg'd, and goe not out with Lot,
> Make Law and Gospell riddles of the wit:
> We with the Jewes even Christ still crucifie,
> And not yet come to our impiety.

The poem turns on the Calvinist distinction between the knowledge that God in His beneficence offers man and the sacreligious use that unregenerate man makes of it. God offers the "light of Grace," but man, blind, cannot accept it. God gives man the law and the Gospel, where He reveals His will and his promise of salvation, but man perverts these to "riddles of the wit." Although intellectually cognizant of sin, able to "hear Sodom judg'd," he cannot amend his life.

His knowledge is sterile because it never touches his emotions. His "heart" is still "fleshly"; God is "exiled" from it; and the heart's "ignorance and disobedience," that double stigma of the unregenerate replace the image of God that belongs there. He is unable to "feele" the conviction he professes; and his inability to pray epitomizes his spiritual and emotional death.

The sterility of knowledge and the dearth of feeling are intensified by the structure and sound of the verse. Greville rallies his lines into lists and patterns that emphasize the intellectual problems of fallen man, while they evade personal responses and feelings. We may take the fifth quatrain as an example. The quatrain lists four manifestations of impiety: the lack of religious feeling, the inability to amend one's life, the refusal to act on the knowledge that one does possess, and the intellectualization of scripture. Each manifestation takes up exactly one line. Each of the first three lines is divided in half by a conjunctive "and", which in each case separates a pair of verbs that contrast man's overt piety with his actual misdeeds. The structure emphasizes intellectual formulae and avoids feeling. While all of Greville's poems show similar kinds of patterning, this one has little to mitigate its rigid outlines. It has little of the sonority that poets use to evoke feeling; it has less alliteration than XCVIII and XCIX; more of its lines are end stopped; and more of them end on hard, monosyllabic rhymes. As for the poem's language, there is only one distinctively affective phrase, "sweet mercy."

As the speaker of the poem, Greville in fact seems detached both from God, to whom he is speaking, and from what he himself is saying. Although he addresses God directly, he seems to be speaking more about Him than to Him. Calling Him by formal, abstract attributes, "Eternall Truth, almighty, infinite," he seems to be defining God, and by the definition he separates himself from God, just as that technique in love lyrics had placed distance between himself and his mistress. Moreover, unable yet to feel the impact of his sins on his own soul, he speaks in the plural "we" and about God being exiled from "mans" heart. This is the only of the three conversion poems where he does not speak of himself as "I."

Greville ends the poem with a confession to being among those who "even Christ still crucifie." This monumental sacrelige brings Greville to that nadir of existence from where man is forced to call for grace and from where his "regeneration springs."

Thus from the very first lines of XCVIII Greville begins to know God and to feel His presence. In part, he achieves that knowledge by following the meditative prescription of applying one's general cogitations to one's own particular use. Confessing the desolation of his own soul, he speaks in the first person "I" and "my," and with a sense of intimacy he refers to "my Saviours glory" (italics mine). Rather than attempt to define God by His formal attributes, he addresses Him as "Lord." Although he is still, as always, concerned with the failings of all mankind, and consequently speaks as an observer of "mans degeneration," he does seem to feel God's presence and to talk to Him, rather than about Him.

Wrapt up, O Lord, in mans degernation;
The glories of thy truth, thy joyes eternall,
Reflect upon my soule darke desolation,
And ugly prospects o're the sprites infernall.
  Lord, I have sinn'd, and mine iniquity,
  Deserves this hell; yet Lord deliver me.

Thy power and mercy never comprehended,
Rest lively imag'd in my Conscience wounded;
Mercy to grace, and power to feare extended,
Both infinite, and I in both confounded;
  Lord, I have sinn'd, and mine iniquity,
  Deserves this hell, yet Lord deliver me.

If from this depth of sinne, this hellish grave,
And fatall absence from my Saviours glory,
I could implore his mercy, who can save,
And for my sinnes, not paines of sinne, be sorry:
  Lord, from this horror of iniquity,
  And hellish grave, thou wouldst deliver me.

Having shaken off the deadly stupor of flesh, he achieves the partial comprehension and partial feeling that mark one's awakening to spiritual life. He perceives God "wrapped up" in the sin that had formerly "exiled" Him, His full presence hidden but most definitely asserted. At its inception, Greville's perception is still indirect and confusing. God's "truth" and "joys" "reflect" on his soul, but the reflection is like that of a light when it creates shadows, and Greville perceives it as "darke desolation." God's "power and mercy" are now "lively imag'd" in his conscience, but they are not "comprehended" and Greville is "confounded" by his incomplete vision.

His religious feeling, at its dawning, is marked by pain. No longer numbed by sin, he feels the "painse of sinne." These are a sign of health, as the pain in a limb that had been numb indicates recovery from illness. His conscience is "wounded"; God's "power" afflicts it with "feare"; and he is "sorry" for the "pains" sin causes him. He feels himself in sin's "hellish grave."

To be sure, Greville locates himself at the beginning, not at the end, of conversion. Not yet inspired with the objective hatred for sin itself that full conversion requires, he is discomforted mainly by his own pains. And although he asserts the required confidence that God would save him "if" he could pray, he does not yet pray.[28]

Reflecting the development of his knowledge and feeling, Greville's verse has relatively strong emotional overtones. Sonnet XCVIII has more affective phrases than XCVII. Greville responds to the "glories" of God's truth and to His "joyes eternall"; and he feels his own "darke desolation," his "fatall absense" from God, and the "horror" of his sins; while he sees the "ugly prospects" of his sinful soul.

Emotion is conveyed too by the poem's increased sonority. It is almost impossible to put into words the feelings that sounds express, and that is why the poet uses sound. However, repeated sounds tend to reinforce whatever emotions the words they appear in suggest. The repetition of d intensifies the depressing sense of the words "dark," "desolation," "degeneration," "depth," and "deserves" (in its context), so that even the cry for deliverance is tinged with somberness. Repeated sounds may also connect emotions and ideas, so that they are held together in the mind in an almost indescribable way. The insistance of s in the first and third stanzas ties Greville's "soule" to the "desolation" he feels, to the "prospects" of infernal "sprites" that he overlooks, to the "sinne" of his nature, to the punishment it "deserves," to tis "absence" from God, and to the feeling of being "sorry." The s also connects

this negative cluster of damnation with the promise of "mercy" and "grace" with the coming of the "saviour" who will "save" the fallen "soule." The reptition of the hard c in the words "comprehend," "conscience," and "confounded" in the second stanza emphasizes the moral and noetic confusion of sin. This argument should not be pushed too far, since obviously patterns of sound are to be found wherever there are words and sentences. But it does seem to me that in this poem the sounds do create an emotional atmosphere that is palpable although difficult to describe.

As for the syntactic patterning, which is rarely absent from Greville's verse, it here emphasizes emotions rather than intellectual contrasts between appearance and reality, as it had in XCVII. The first four lines of the second stanza should provide a convincing example, because they are the most patterned in the poem. The quatrain is neatly divided into two independent clauses, each of which takes up two lines, and each of which mirrors the other. But the mirror words, "power" and "mercy," which first appear as a compound phrase at the beginning of line 1 and then in reverse order spread out over line 3, suggest attributes of God that one can feel (His eternality and infinitude are more abstract); and both clauses end on words, "wounded" and "confounded" respectively, that suggest feeling. The total effect, which is intensified by the repetition of the word "both" in line 4, is to emphasize Greville's pain and perplexity in the face of God's mercy and power.

To further emphasize the disturbance in his emotions, Greville makes the refrain lines unusually expressive. Ordi-

narily, Greville uses places of poetic closure to emphasize intellectual paradoxes, and in these lines he refers to the paradox of man's depravity, for which he deserves damnation, and God's mercy, which saves him. But rather than treat this as an abstract, intellectual concept, Greville emphasizes his own emotional response: he confesses his sin, acknowledges the rightness of God's punitive justice, and begins to ask for mercy. The emotional response is extremely important, because the awful hiatus between God and man can be closed somewhat only by faith, by emotional conviction which enables man to accept the grace God offers. Thus, to draw attention to the urgency of his call for grace, Greville opens the refrain with an accented, monosyllabic apsotrophe to his "Lord." To convey his sense of guilt in the face of God's justice, he makes the refrain lines the most enjambed in the poem, sharply separating the subject "iniquity" from its verb "deserves." To point up the emotional tension he feels, he abandons the generally even syntactic groupings that he usually favors and divides the two line refrain unevenly into three independent clauses:

> Lord, I have sinned,
> And mine iniquity,/ Deserves this hell,
> yet Lord deliver me.

All of these things help convey the turbulence of mind and soul of a man who feels the first stirrings of his conversion but has not yet fully submitted his heart and will to God nor gained assurance of his salvation.

Somewhere in the white space between the end of XCVIII and the beginning of XCIX, Greville seems to have prayed successfully. In XCIX he charts his deliverance from the

"hellish grave" of sin and thus brings to completion the pattern of misery, prayer, and grace he had outlines in XCVI. The poem ends with his soul "rais'd up" and in possession of the feeling-knowledge of how God works salvation in His elect;

> Downe in the depth of mine iniquity,
> That ugly center of infernall spirits;
> Where each sinne feeles her owne deformity,
> In these peculiar torments she inherits,
> Depriv'd of humane graces, and divine,
> Even there appeares this saving God of mine.
>
> And in this fatall mirrour of transgression,
> Shewes man as fruit of his degeneration,
> The errours ugly infinite impression,
> Which beares the faithlesse downe to desperation;
> Depriv'd of humane graces and divine,
> Even there appeares this saving God of mine.
>
> In power and truth, Almightly and eternall,
> Which on the sinne reflects strange desolation,
> With glory scourging all the Sprites infernall,
> And uncreated hell with unprivation;
> Depriv'd of humane graces, not divine,
> Even there appeares this saving God of mine.
>
> For on this sp'rituall Crosse condemned lying,
> To paines infernall by eternall domme,
> I see my Saviour for the same sinnes dying,
> And from that hell I fear'd, to free me, come;
> Depriv'd of humane graces, not divine,
> Thus hath his death rais'd up this soule of mine.

The poem reflects the Calvinist division of knowledge into the knowledge of one's own depravity and of God's greatness and demonstrates the interdependence that Calvin claims that each type of knowledge has on the other.[29] The experience of the poem consists of deep introspection and with that of the attainment of an emotional and intellectual comprehension both of the magnitude of one's own sins and of the power of God's saving presence.

Greville begins by looking "down in the depth" of his soul, where, as one of the chosen, he perceives simultaneously

his own iniquity and God's saving presence. As he phrases it in the second stanza, his soul is a "mirrour of transgression," where if a man looks at himself without vanity and without pride he must see the full extent of his depravity -- so Calvin teaches. Greville's vision of himself is clearer than it had been in XCVIII. He is now able to see what God "shows" him without fear and without confusion. In place of shadows of "darke desolation," which God's light had revealed to him in XCVIII, he here perceives a definite "impression" of "each" individual sin and sees the "peculiar torments she inherits" (italics mine). His clear vision of his depravity is made possible precisely by his sense of Christ's "saving" presence, which he announces in the refrain, while his acknowledgement of his depravity enables him to perceive Christ in all of His immediacy as He routs sin from his soul.

This intellectual and emotional perception of Christ in his own soul is the most important revelation that Greville has in all of the three poems. And we should emphasize that the perception is not of an external agent who comes into his soul but of a felt affinity between the life of Christ and his own. The image of the mind as hell brings the entire action of salvation into soul of man himself. Greville insists with Calvin that Christ saves sinners not by having once died for them, but by enabling each man to re-enact the pattern of death and rebirth in his own soul.[30] And in the third stanza, he follows Calvin's interpreation of the harrowing of hell by bringing the event into his own soul, where he sees God "With

glory scourging all the Sprites infernall,/ And uncreated hell with unprivation."[31]

Careful syntactic ambiguities help to equate Christ's life in the flesh, His death, and His rebirth with man's life in sin, and with the mortification and vivification of his flesh, which are the two stages of conversion. Yvor Winters has pointed out that in the refrain line, "Depriv'd of humane graces, not divine," the verb "Depriv'd" is gramatically suspended so as to refer both to the experience of the sinner and to the deprivation that Christ endured during His earthly sojourn.[32] In the fourth stanza, the ambiguity in the placement of "I see" and the uncertain reference as to exactly is on the cross enable Greville to conflate the sense of his own afflictions on the "sp'ritual Crosse" with the vision of Christ being crucified:

> For on this sp'ritual Crosse condemned lying,
> To paines infernall by eternall doome,
> I see my Saviour for the same sinnes dying,
> And from that hell I fear'd, to free me, come.

Moreover, the syntax of the fourth line of this quatrain equates Christ's coming from hell with the image of Greville himself having been in hell. And it is precisely because Greville is able to see Christ dying for the "same sinnes" for which he himself is suffering that he is able to realize that both suffer to "free" him from the "hell" in which his sins had incarcerated him. Ultimately, what Greville perceives in this poem is the applicability to himself of Paul's assertion: "if so be that we suffer with him [Christ], that we maye also be glorified with him" (Rom. 8:17).[33]

The feeling-knowledge of both sin and salvation is reflected in the tone of the poem, where the emotional turbulence of ZCVII is resolved into relative tranquility as Greville gains confidence in his salvation and where the depressing effects of sin are tempered by the positive response to God's saving presence. Like all fallen men, Greville still "feeles" the "torments" and the "deformity" of sin. He is repulsed by the "ugly infinite impression" sin makes on his soul. His overall mood is still somber; and the same types of alliterative patterns that helped create the mood of XCVIII reappear here. Alliteration on d intensifies the sense of the dolorous phrases: "down in the depth," "depriv'd," "down to desperation," "desolation," "desperation," "doome," "dying," and "death." In this context, even God's divinity is somber. Alliteration on f has a similar effect: looking into himself, Greville sees "infernall sprites," and "feeles" his "deformity": his soul is a "fatall mirrour" which shows him the "fruit" of his sins and the "infinite" evidence of his error, so overwhelming that the "faithlesse" despair. And in the triumphant statement that Christ has "from this hell I fear'd to free me come," Greville seems to be using the same alliteration to recall the tight connection between human sin and God's saving mercy in Protestant theology.

But although the suffering and revulsion are no less intense than they had been in XCVIII, they seem to be borne with greater equanimity, as is suggested by the rhythm of the refrain. The refrain is less sharply punctuated and enjambed. The last line, "Even there appeares this saving God of mine," has a rhythmic uplift which suggests that Greville actually

feels and responds to the presence of God that he perceives. As the only independent clause in each of the first three stanzas, and as the culmination of several suspended clauses in each, the line reinforces the announcement of God's presence with a note of celebrative acclaim.

Knowledge and feeling come together in this poem with such integrity that they are difficult to separate, as indeed they should be. Greville's understanding of how God saves sinners follows Calvinist dogma, but within the immediacy of the poem it derives from intense personal introspection. In the most reflective of the three conversion poems, Greville combines an explanation of how God shows "man" the effects of sin with personal confidence in "this saving God of mine" (italics mine). The modified refrain in the last stanza "Thus hath heas death rais'd up this soule of mine," captures, through the combination of the logical word "thus" and the personal reference "mine," both the reason and feeling in the final comprehension of God.

In comparison to other seventeenth-century devotional poets, Greville perhaps seems less obviously moved by his meditations. His emotional range is narrow, It excludes joy; it rarely, if ever, encompasses intimacy; it avoids extended prayer and expostulation. But misery and longing are clear enough, and are perhaps even intensified by the control and restraint in Greville's voice.

In Caelica CIX, the last poem in the collection, Greville leaves the world of his own soul and turns to the prophetic books of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Lamentations for his immediate

frame of reference. The theme of his last meditation is the unknown God, which is at the heart of his, and Calvin's, vision of fallen reality. And meditating on the ways in which God is hidden from man's perceptions leads Greville to pray for the end of time when He will be known. In basing his meditation on "the divine testimonies of the Holy Scriptures," he brings to his aid that information which Downame considers "the most effectuall for the inlightening of the understanding, the convincing of the judgement, the perswading and inclining of the will, and the working of the poynte in hand upon the heart and affections."[33]

Since Isiah, Jeremiah, and Lamentations provide, the point of intellectual departure for Greville's meditation, it should be worhtwhile for us to pause and see what these books contribute. Unfortunately, though, we can only suggest the broader influences here, while the tremendous impact that the books must have had can be appreicated only by reading the Prophets themselves, fully, repeatedly, thoughtfully, and feelingly, as Greville himself must have done.

Basically, for Greville as well as for the Puritans, who valued these books above all the others in the Old Testament,[34] the prophesies of Isaiah and Jeremiah offer an objectively true picture of reality. More specifically, they outline a pattern of wrath and redemption which gives form to the experience of isolation and longing in the poem. Their unremitting record of destruction, of famine and pestilence, of cities overrun by foreign soldiers, of women raped, of deserted roads, abandoned houses, and fallow fields finds a counterpart in the

poem's accumulated misery, if not in all of its details. Isaiah's descriptions "Your land is waste . . . . and it is desolate" (I:7), "Thine holie cities lye waste: Zion is a wildernes, & Jerusalem a desert" (64:10), and their many, many repetitions throughout the three books are invoked in the poem's opening lines:

> Syon lyes waste, and they Jerusalem,
> O Lord, is falne to utter desolation.

Isaiah tells also of spiritual loss, and specifically of the separation of God and man, as he admonishes his people, "But your iniquities have separated between you and your God, and your sins have hid his face from you" (59:2). And the sense of this admonition, in all of its repetitions, supports the poem's thematic assertion that sin has made the "living Lord, a God unknowne." Greville takes, too, Isaiah's message of salvation, "A Redeemer shal come unto Zion, and unto them that turne from iniquitie" (69:20), and his promise that "Zyon shal be redeemed with judgement" (1:27). Alhtough not repeated explicitly, Isaiah's promise of redemption and judgment is the foundation for the confident prayer at the end of the poem:

> Rather, sweet Jesus, fil up time and come,
> To yeeld the sinne her everlasting doome.

In short, Greville's Zion and Jerusalem are real cities. As historical cities that yet exist in all times and places, they concretize Greville's vision of waste and desolation and validate his expectations of redemption. The prophetic books are the foundation of reality and of knowledge in Caelica CIX.

But the important thing in meditation is that one make the knowledge one obtains from reading and thinking about the Bible one's own. And Greville does this not only by bringing

the reality of the ancient cities into contemporary England but by seeing himself as a modern prophet, who has the same burden to carry as did Isaiah and Jeremiah. Thus, he rails with Isaiah against the sins of his people and laments with Jeremiah for their sufferings and his own. With them, he declaims against contemporary versions of idolotry and against the contempt that a sinful populace had for its prophets and teachers. What the prophetic role enables Greville to do is to communicate a version of sacred truth in poetry, yet to communicate it as something he himself perceives and experiences.

Like many passages of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Lamentations, Caelica XCIX is a lament: like the Prophets, Greville addresses God, first describing to Him the wreckage left by sin and then praying for succor:[35]

> Syon lyes waste, and thy Jerusalem,
> O Lord, is falne to utter desolation,
> Against thy Prophets, and thy holy men,
> The sinne hath wrought a fatall combination,
> Prophan'd thy name, thy worship overthrowne,
> And made thee living Lord, a God unknowne.
>
> Thy powerfull lawes, thy wonders of creation,
> Thy Word incarnate, glorious heaven, darke hell,
> Lye shadowed under Mans degeneration,
> Thy Christ still crucifi'd for doing well,
> Impiety, O Lord, sits on thy throne,
> Which makes thee living Light, A God unknown.
>
> Mans superstition hath thy truths entomb'd,
> His Atheisme againe her pomps defaceth,
> That sensuall unsatiable vaste wombe,
> Of thy seene Church, thy unseene Church disgraceth;
> There lives no truth with them that seem thine own,
> Which makes thee living Lord, a God unknowne.
>
> Yet unto thee, Lord, (mirrour of transgression)
> Wee, who for earthly Idols, have forsaken
> Thy heavenly Image (sinlesse pure impression)
> And so in nets of vanity lye taken,
> All desolate implore that to thine owne,
> Lord, thou no longer live a God unknowne.

> Yet Lord let Israels plagues not be eternall,
> Nor sinne for ever cloud thy sacred Mountaines,
> Nor with false flames spirituall but infernall,
> Dry up thy mercies ever springing fountaines,
> Rather, sweet Jesus, fil up time and come,
> To yeeld the sinne her everlasting doome.

As a meditation, the poem moves from the work of the understanding to that of the affections. In stanzas I through 3 Greville examines the ways in which sin has obscured the vision of God, and in stanzas 4 and 5 he prays for the restoration of that vision.

The first three stanzas are highly intellectual in their procedure. Greville accumulates information and presents it in list form, with little elaboration. His details are generally reminiscent of Calvin's analysis in Book I of the Institutes of why fallen man does not know God. In the first stanza, Greville points out the "fatall combination" whereby sin"profan'd" God's "name," which is one of His means of identifying Himself to man, [36] and overthrew God's proper "worship," through which He is known at the level of individual action and praise, in accordance with His will. The second stanza refers to the obfuscation of God's revelation in Nature, His "wonders of creation," and in Scripture, that is His "Word incarnate," where He reveals "glorious heaven" and "darke hell," that is his promise of salvation and rule of justice. Like Calvin, Greville attributes the obfuscation to "Mans degeneration." The third stanza focuses on the way in which the mistaken convictions of the "seene Church," which comprises indifferently the elect and the reprobate, blocks the truth of the "unseene Church." Greville here makes the same distinc-

tion that Calvin does between true knowledge, which results in the proper worship of God, and its false versions born of impiety; and, like Calvin, he censures what he believes to be the latter under the titles of "Atheisme" and "superstition," and, in stanza 4, idolatry.[37] In the last line of each of these stanzas, he emphasizes the import of his analysis, bringing home the point that each detail he mentioned "makes thee living Lord, a God unknowne."

Then having thought through all the ways in which God is hidden from man, Greville turns to confession and prayer. Thematically, the fourth and fifth stanzas also concentrate on the problem of knowledge, but their rhythms convey the emotions of a man who longs to know God. Thus, in the fourth stanza, Greville confesses to being among those who have rejected the true God for "earthly Idols," that is for false representations of Him,[38] and changes the words of the refrain to plead that God "no longer live a God unknowne," Yet the tempo of the stanza is slow and the voice quiet, and the tone suggests the sadness and contrition of a man who "all desolate implore[s]" God out of a deep sense of isolation and misery in a world where He is hidden. For example, the apostrophe "Lord," in the line "Yet unto thee, Lord, (mirror of transgression) " is in a position where it receives no metrical accent and where by drawing minimal attention to the personal urgency of the voice, it suggests the proper humility of one who recognizes his own sinfulness. Similarly, the awkward syntactic inversion and double caesura of the line "Wee, who for earthly Idols, have forsaken." compel one to pass very

slowly over the sin it mentions and thus emphasizes the contrition of the man who confesses it.

Then, in stanza 5 Greville elaborates on his prayer, and as he gains confidence that God will answer it, his voice mounts in excitement. The language of the stanza again draws attention to the noetic problem, to the ability of sin to "cloud" the vision of God, and to the distinction between the "false flames" of sin, which do not enlighten man, and, implicitly, the light of God, which does. And the prayer for doomsday is a prayer for the end of time when God will finally be known. Yet, in the voice of the stanza, we now hear urgency and excitement. The apostrophe "Lord" in the line "Yet Lord let Israels plagues not be eternall" is now in a position where its metrical accent reinforces the insistence of the call. And in the several requests, climactically suspended on the single imperative "let" and further intensified by the repetitions of the negatives "not" and "nor," one hears the heightened anticipation of a man who in fact expects God to answer his prayer, just as he should expect an answer if he has prayed in accordance with God's wishes.

The assumption under which this meditation (as well as sonnets XCVII-XCIX) is written is that proper knowledge will indeed yield the right emotions. Nor is emotion restricted to the affective part of the poem, though it is intensified there. Even in the first three stanzas, Greville's thoughts and feelings become intertwined. We may take the third stanza, which is at the height of the intellectual process, as an example. The syntax and vocabulary of the third stanza, like

those of the two preceding it, emphasize the intellectual details that Greville is exploring. Lines I and 2 name respectively the effects of man's superstition and his atheism, while line 4 neatly contrasts the seen and the unseen church. Lines 1, 2 and 4 each end on a verb that describes how God's image is eradicated by sin -- entombed, or hidden from view, disgraced, or marred; and defaced, or partially obliterated.[39] In order to end line 4 on the word "disgraceth" and to sharpen the contrast between the "seene Church" and the "unseene Church," Greville reverses the normal order of verb and object, torturing the line into an unnatural syntax. Yet, since perceiving accurately means responding, even this highly intellectual description conveys the distaste that the visible church, with its ordinary run of men, evokes in Greville. The first two lines of --

> His Atheisme again her pomps defaceth,
> The sensuall unsatiable vast wombe
> Of thy seene Church, thy unseene church disgraceth

-- are difficult to say. The first line can be forced into a regular iambic pentameter only by placing excessive emphasis on the last syllable of "atheisme," and the second line resists even such compulsion. Moreover, the accumulation of s, sh, v, and w sounds in the second line make the words sound clogged and feel unpleasant to mouth.

Greville's role in this poem, as in most of his lyrics, is basically that of an observer. Here he observes a cosmic drama in which God and sin are the protagonists, and as he describes their conflict, objectively and impersonally, he

also registers in the languate of his observations both the strengths of each combatant and his emotional responses to them. Thus, in describing the effects of sin he uses strong adjectives. and verbs to convey the full force of its destructive power aa well as hiw own feeling of that power. The conspiracy of sin against man's life is "fatall," and the desolation it causes is "utter." Sin makes God unknown; it entombs, defaces, and disgraces His truths; it profaned his name and overthrew his worship. And Greville's response to this catalogue of misdeeds is the objective hatred of sin which true piety demands.

Equally important, Greville observes the presence of God, even in the first three stanzas where sin obscures it. He knows that God's laws are "powerful," His creation wonderful, and heaven "glorious" and hell "darke" -- in short, that God is a "living Lord." It is his understanding of the creative force of God's livingness, he brings God into his poem, more so than he had in any lyric of the collection, by repeatedly addressing Him. The accumulated effect of the word "thy" in "thy Jerusalem," "thy Prophets," "thy holy men," "thy name," "thy worship," "thy . . . lawes," "thy wonders," "thy word," "thy Christ," "thy throne," "thy seene Church," "thy unseene Church," "thy heavenly image," "thy . . . mountains," and "thy mercies" is to make one feel the pervasive power of God, just as Greville does, and to quietly urge that God is stronger than sin, whatever havoc sin may wreck.

The prayer in the last two stanzas is thus an outgrowth of the emotional and intellectual realization that God is stronger than sin. Greville realizes that ultimately it is God Himself who chooses whether or not to "live a God unknowne."

He realizes that it is God who permits sin to plague his people, to "cloud" his mountains, to "dry up" his mercy, and to make a waste and desolate land. God's power resides in giving or withholding that permission, and without God sin is impotent. Greville calls upon Christ out of faith in his victory and uses words that convey God's strength. The God who will "come" and "fill" the desolate void and "yeeld" judgment and destroy sin as though "doome" were a harvest will totally undo and reverse sin's "fatall combination."

Calvin's God, the omnipotent source of all goodness, leaves little for people to do in the struggle against sin, and Greville's participation in the events he is describing consists simply in perceiving accurately, feeling appropriately, and praying. Greville's achievement in this poem is bringing his own will into conformity with God's, to observe the truth of what God reveals and to pray for the end that He promises. And the evidence of the religious achievement is the convergence of intellectual perception and emotional response in his verse.

Having read the four meditative lyrics, we are prepared to return to our opening question of how abstract ideas couched in literal and objective language can touch the core of personal experience, and to answer it a little more comprehensively. In our discussion of Greville's meditations, we have emphasized technical details, in order to show that his perceptions and emotions do, indeed, come together. But there remains a more fundamental point, which is that meditation as Greville practiced it, without the aid to the imagination, is a pro-

cedure that brings together two realities that had been separate in many of the Caelica lyrics: the reality of the external, objective, and public world with the reality of the internally subjective and private one. In the meditative poems, these two realities are experienced as the same. Thus, as Greville writes intimately of the condition of his own soul, he may assume that his assertions are objectively true, verifiable, and, moreover, applicable to others. Conversely, as he writes in a public or prophetic voice about the sins of mankind, he may respond as one who shares those sins and feels their pain. Moreover, meditation as Greville practiced it brings the two worlds together on the level of consciousness. Greville writes about what he knows consciously -- about what he has learned from scripture, about what a rigorously coherent theology holds, and about what his own intelledtual analysis tells him is true, rather than about what he intuits or tries to know. The language of consciousness is of course the literal and objective language that Greville uses, rather than the metaphoric language whhse aim is to grasp the unknown with the hand of the known. And when outer and inner, perception and response, converge, the literal language that describes one reality may simultaneously convey the other.

1. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, p. 225; Rees, Fulke Greville, p. 111; Waswo, Fatal Mirror, p. 127.

2. Inst. 3.23.13-14.

3. According to Wendel, Calvin, p. 191, conversion is literally "turning" of the depraved heart and will to God, which frees it from the bondage of sin. See Calvin, Inst. 3.2.6-14. Norman Pettit, The Heart Prepared: Grace and Conversion in Puritan Spiritual Life (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 48-86, offers a detailed discussion of Puritan ideas on conversion.

4. Seven Treatises (London, 1603), p. 99.

5. The Poetry of Meditation: A Study of English Religious Literature (1954; rpt. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 15-18. See also Douglas Peterson, "Donne's Holy Sonnets: an Anglican View of Contrition," SP LXI (1959), 104-18.

6. The Practice of Piety, Directing a Christian how to Walk that he may please God, 35th ed. (London, 1669), p. 144. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, p. 216, n. 2, observes that there is "good evidence" for believing that Greville admired Bayly's work.

7. The Workes, 4th ed. (London, 1605), p. 426.

8. Seven Treatises, p. 235.

9. Martz, The Meditative Poem: An Anthology of Seventeenth Century Verse (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1963); Peterson, English Lyric, p. 283; Waswo, Fatal Mirror, p. 123.

10. Heart Prepared, pp. 3, 17-18. William Perkins asserts that meditation is a help to faith; see his A Golden Chain in his Work, ed. Breward, p. 230.

11. Devotional Poetry in France, c. 1570-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969), p. 22. In his article, "The Protestant Devotional Tradition: Simon Goulart's Trente Tableaux de la Mort," French Studies, XXI (Jan. 1967), 1-15, Cave argues that Calvin's theories of preaching contributed to Protestant devotional practive.

12. 'The Pilgrim's Progress' and Tradtions in Puritan Meditation (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966) pp. 118-33. For detailed information about Puritan devotional literature, see Louis B. Wright, Middle Class Culture in Elizabethan England (1935; Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 228-96; Helen C. White, Tudor Books of Private Devotion (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1951); and _____, English Devotional Literature (Prose): 1600-1640, Univ. of Wisconsin Studies in Lang. and Lit., 29 (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1931).

13. Martz, Poetry of Meditation, pp. 25-39, was the first to outline the procedure, and all subsequent studies of sixteenth and seventeenth century religious meditation have been based on his.

14. Cave, Devotional Poetry, p. 18, notes that "the reliance on the senses, which characterizes Loyola's Spiritual Exercises. . . would appear to be foreing to the austerity of Calvin." Kaufmann, 'Pilgrim's Progress' provides an extended discussion of the Puritan attitude towards the imagination and of the effect of their views on their hermeneutic and meditational practices (pp. 25-60). For Greville's statements about the imagination, see Humane Learning, st. 10-13.

15. White, Tudor Books, pp. 147-8, 223, 246-7. Discussing the effects of Protestantism on religious devotion, White explains that in English meditation of the sixteenth century, "the tendency was to adhere pretty closely and objectively, if not literally, to the data of Scripture. And where the editor essayed something of his own, he was more apt to concern himself with the drawing of the appropriate theological lessons or moral reminder than with any elaborate imaginative or emotional interpretation or recreation of his own. This was one of the most important developments of the time for religious literature, both prose and poety" (p. 240).

16. Practice of Piety, p. 144.

17. Works, 2nd pt., chapt. 8 (on biblical meditation), and 5th pt., chapt. 58 (on meditation and prayer).

18. Rogers calls meditation "the second private help to the practice of piety" (Seven Treatises, p. 236).

19. Practice of Piety, p. 144.

20. Seven Treatises, p. 236.

21. A Guide to Godlynesse, or a Treatise of a Christian Life (London, 1922), pp. 572-3.

22. Guide to Godlynesse, pp. 574-5.

23. Guide to Godlynesse, p. 526.

24. Guide to Godlynesse, pp. 578-80.

25. Guide to Godlynesse, p. 553.

26. Rebholz, Life of Fulke Greville, p. 222. For the place of conversion in seventeenth century poetry, see William H. Halewood, The Poetry of Grace: Reformation Themes and Structures in Seventeenth Century Poetry (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970). Also, Webber, The Eloquent "I", p. 14 points out that Puritan writers tended to present their own conversions as examples of God's mercy toward mankind.

27. The sharp contrast expressed in these lines between the depth to which man's sin brings him and the great mercy of God in descending so far to save man is standard in Puritan thinking. See Halewood, Poetry of Grace, pp. 53-4; Knappen, Tudor Puritanism, p. 393; Calvin, Inst. 2.3.6-9.

28. For the importance of confidence in prayer, see Downame, Guide to Godlynesse, p. 579; for the distinction between objective hatred of sin and regret for the pain sin causes to oneself, see Rogers, Seven Treatises, p. 98.

29. Inst. 1.1.1-2.

30. In Inst., 2.16.8 Calvin asserts: "The second effect of Christ's death upon us is this: by our participation in it, his death mortifies our earthly members so that they may longer perform their functions; and it kills the old man in us so that he may not florish and bear fruit."

31. Calvin interprets Christ's harrowing of hell not as a descent into the grave but as His suffering all of the spiritual torments of men estranged from God through sin. Inst. 2.16.9-12.

32. Forms of Discovery, p. 50.

33. Guide to Godlynesse, p. 275.

34. Perkins, The Art of Prophesying, in Works, ed. Breward, p. 40.

35. Although Greville uses the Prophetic books as a basis for CIX, his own emphasis is often different from theirs. For one thing, the Prophets convey the idea that the destruction of the holy cities is a punishment that God himself meted out, while Greville, intent on emphasizing man's own culpability, attributes the desolation to the activities of sin.

36. Calvin associates God's name with His attributes (i.e. mercy, grace, truth, and so forth) and suggests that to profane His name is to obscure his glory. Inst. 1.10.2-3; 3.20.41.

37. Inst. 1.3.1-3, 1.4.1, 1.5.4, 15.11.

38. I am interpreting the worship of "earthly idols" in the poem as a version of mistaken religious belief, though it clearly refers also to worldly values. The Prophets too had railed against idolotry, but seemed to have been referring to physical representations of God, while Greville seems to intend something intangible by the word "idol."

39. The OED defines each of these words epistomologically, as well as in other ways. "Entomb" (2) has a figurative meaning of "to bury"; "deface" (I) means, both literally and figuratively, "to mar the face, features, or appearance of"; and "disgrace" (1) is defined as "to disfigure."

Conclusion

In tracing the development of Caelica, we have emphasized a consistency, in Greville's consistent preoccupation with the Fall, that underlies the variety of forms, subjects, attitudes, and styles. We have suggested that the major difference between the lyrics written, so to speak, under the diretion of Sidney and of Calvin lies in the directness with which they treat that fundamental theme. We have argued that instead of writing poems expressing love, Greville wrote poems contemplating love as an image of man's life in the fallen world. The lovers' infidelities and deceits were often extended to refer to larger social and political treacheries and almost always generalized to represent the inability of all people in the fallen world either to love or to know one another. Similarly, the lover's desire for a woman and his repeated rejection and betrayal were usually enlarged to suggest man's desire for the infinitude of bliss beyond human reach.

In the later lyrics, Greville removes the subject of the Fall from its metaphoric encasement. Not only does he write a poem probing the causes of Adam's defection, but he focuses his lyrics on the problem of knowledge, which, from the standpoint of Calvinist theology, is the real problem of fallen man. From repeated efforts to distinguish between "true" and "false" versions of such things as patrimony and patience in the secular world, and from strained puns on carnal "knowledge: and "understanding" emerges the direct, literal, treatment of fallen man's inability and desire to know God.

Yet, along with the underlying consistency in Greville's concern with the Fall, there is also an implicit change in his attitude towards it, as he moves from trying to adjust his own views to Sidney's to relying on the sanctions of Calvin, and as he moves from metaphoric to literal language. Literal language implies the acceptance of human limitations, the acceptance that man can neither perceive nor reach very far beyond his immediate self and can in no way move towards God or towards any transcendence. If literal language is, however, the language of man's fallen state, metaphoric language, even if stripped of both vision and sensuousness (as it is in Caelica), rebels against the confines of the fallen condition. For Greville, the language of love retains some measure of aspiration, thwarted to be sure and constantly subverted by cynicism. Nonetheless, there is the land past the Bermundas; and in the very self-righteousness that mars the tone of many of the lyrics, there is an unwillingness to accept man's finitude even as it stares one in the face.

The literalism of Caelica's religious lyrics marks Greville's acknowledgment that the fallen state cannot be transcended. Instead of aspiring towards God or even trying to reach Him by means of knowledge, Greville looks inward in the later lyrics and waits for God to come to him, to slay the sin of his soul and to infuse him with new life. Death and rebirth replace the concept of transcendence, self-annihilation the concept of self-fulfillment.

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