CALL OF DUTY: A QUESTION OF POLICE INTEGRITY

By

ALBERT O. GAMARRA

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Maria Haberfeld

Date	Chair of Examining Committee

Joshua Freilich

Date	Executive Officer

Dr. Maria Haberfeld

Dr. Barry Spunt

Dr. Larry Sullivan

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

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Albert O. Gamarra

Adviser: Professor Maria Haberfeld

Policing is a profession linked to ideals of integrity and honor. In spite of this, the profession has not been immune to corruption within its ranks. Most research in policing has concentrated on police corruption rather than police integrity. Research studies have examined the issue of corruption but they have encountered a multitude of measurement issues, making the direct study of corruption difficult.

The goal of this research study was to replicate the seminal Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver & Haberfeld (2000) study examining police integrity within the United States. There has been a lack of research dedicated to the study of police integrity within the United States since the Klockars, et al. (2000) data was collected. This study aims to further understand the dynamics of integrity issues within the United States with the intension of offering policy recommendations to help reduce and eliminate their prevalence in American police departments.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Integrity is a trait that we all wish to encompass and project in our daily lives. Integrity requires a consistency in our values and the ability to not compromise them. It is one of the most important traits to have in any occupation but especially for police because of their important role in maintaining societal order. The goal of any police department is to enlist a force of integrity. Nearly all police departments have highly scrutinized selection standards and guidelines that assist in reaching this goal of integrity (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). In spite of this policing has constantly been affected by instances of corruption in departments across the United States. Corruption is the opposite of integrity. It is the ability to compromise your values or those of your occupation. Corruption and integrity have a complex relationship but are symbiotic because they cannot exist without each other.

In spite of this most research in this field has concentrated on police corruption rather than police integrity. Some areas of concentration have included definitional issues, typologies of corrupt activities, micro and macro level theoretical approaches, and accountability measures to reduce corruption. Despite research into these areas there exist the need to further examine the topic because of the many debates that exist. Additionally, most researchers have failed to examine the many "good" or officers of integrity that exist within many of these departments. These officers can provide important insight into the factors that can improve integrity and eliminate corruption.

Examining these areas from the integrity research approach will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of corruption research.

The goal of this research study is to replicate the seminal Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver & Haberfeld (2000) study examining police integrity within the United States. This study will examine integrity among a sample of police officers in the United States using the Klockars, et al. (2000) integrity survey. A comparison will be made to the Klockars, et al., (2000) study, to examine whether the behaviors and attitudes among police officers in the United States have changed in the decade since its publication. In addition, it has been nearly two decades since the rash of high profile incidents that led to the influx of new research into police corruption (Klockars, Ivokovic & Haberfeld, 2006). Although researchers have duplicated the study internationally there has been little replication of the research domestically during the twenty years since the original project (Klockars, et al., 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006; Newham, 2002). There is a need to examine whether the effects of time have either strengthened attitudes and behaviors associated with police integrity through increased attention and corresponding reforms or if police integrity has been weakened through the passage of time.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

History of Policing

The evolution of policing as a profession had a major influence in the integrity and corruption issues of modern police. Changes in training, accountability and policing models throughout time have affected levels of corruption and integrity. Even today these factors have a central role in policing but to properly understand them we must understand the beginnings of the policing as a profession. In nearly every society, whether it is tribal groups or large city states there has been a need for individuals to operate as peacemakers. These individuals are normally given special privilege that allows them to use coercion against those who seek to violate societal norms (Bittner, 1975). The definitions of these norms are different across societies and can explain the differences in these peacekeepers across nations. The individuals who served in these roles were not always identified as police. This role was performed in many societies by the military, constables, private guards, and even in some cases outsiders (e.g. mercenaries) hired for the expressed purpose to maintain the political status quo (Bittner, 1975).

In 1829 as the first professional police department was developed in London by act of the Parliament (Bittner, 1975). The person responsible for this change was Sir Robert Peel who proposed the "creation of a full-time, professional police force called the London Metropolitan Police" (White, 2007; 68). Peel believed there was a need for a

more organized and professional police force because of increased crime and disorganization occurring in relation to the industrial revolution (Harring, 1983). This police force would serve as a model to police departments in cities across the world. Peel created a model that was based on a number of principles that remain integral to modern police departments. These include: the quasi-military organizational structure, vital role of crime fighting, communication with the public about criminal affairs, proper recruitment and training techniques for qualified persons, and finally that police serve as the law in communities (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).

As in London industrialization would serve as the impetus for a professional police force in the United States. Increased crime and disorganization along with population growth led to the need for a more organized police force. Many cities in the United States would adopt the Peel model of policing (Walker, 1977). The New York City Police Department was the first major city in the United States to adopt the Peel model (Harrison, 1999). The major difference in policing models across both nations was that the London police department was controlled by the national government while police departments in the United States were controlled by local governments. This "decentralized" model of policing led to more discretion being given to individual officers in the United States (Kelling and Moore, 1988).

This first era of policing in the United States has been called the Political Era by some leading scholars (Kelling and Moore, 1988). This era of policing was highlighted by the lack of proper recruitment, selection and training (Haller, 1976). Most police during this period were given their positions based on political associations or through bribery of officials (Harring, 1983). Corruption and brutality among the police force was

pervasive during this era. In many cases these activities were directly tied to the benefit of local elected officials (Harring, 1983). There was little supervision of police officers and they were rarely held responsible for civil right violations.

The Pendleton Act of 1883 was an attempt to eliminate the system of "spoils" that was pervasive in the federal government (Theriault, 2003). Many civil service positions were rewarded to individuals based on their political association or bribery rather than actual qualifications. This held true across many police departments in the United States (White, 2007). Although this act was solely implemented on the federal level it would influence similar initiatives implemented on the local level to eliminate police corruption (White, 2007). Other initiatives were also implemented to improve the state of policing with hopes of creating reforms that would professionalize the force. August Vollmer, Robert Sylvester and O.W. Wilson were at the forefront of these reforms (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Walker, 1999). Their proposals for reform were similar to those instituted by Sir Robert Peel in London. These reforms included prioritizing crime fighting, removing political control, instilling an organizational design that created a centralized command and supervision, and mandating minimum standards for recruitment and training (Kelling and Moore, 1988). The development of the automobile led to another of the reforms that was instituted during this time period. The force transformed from foot patrol to automobile patrol in many communities. Some argue that this change is partly responsible for the development of the "police subculture" (White, 2007). This "police subculture" was defined by isolation from the public, the "blue wall of silence" and an antagonistic view of non-police officers (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).

Many of these reforms were implemented during the 1920s (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1994). During this decade police deviance was characterized by brutality related to racial tensions and corruption associated with the prohibition of alcohol. In the 1930s and 1940s attention was drawn to the issue of police brutality and the third degree as a means of attaining information from suspects (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). This would mark the first time that many in the media and public would be exposed to police corruption. It also signaled a change as the public was no longer willing to ignore corruption and specifically brutality perpetrated by the police (Kappeler, et al., 1994).

During the 1950s and 1960s increased media attention was given to police corruption as the public responded with awareness towards the illicit activities of police officers. In addition, attention was drawn to the "Professional Policing" model and its possible influence on police corruption. Specifically, how isolation from the general public and an aggressive policing style can create conditions that promote corruption (Kappeler, et al., 1994). A number of notable cases related to search and seizures and police interrogations occurred during this time, leading to restrictions in how police could interact with the public (Skogan & Meares, 2004). This time period was marked by a number of reforms in Due Process (Walker, 1999). The 1960s brought about a sharp increase in the number of violent crimes. This increased police interaction with the general public, creating more opportunity for corruption (Walker, 1983).

The 1970s was notable because of the Knapp commission that investigated police corruption within the New York City Police department. The impetus for this investigation was Frank Serpico, an honorable police officer who nearly lost his life because he refused to participate or ignore the corrupt behavior within the department

(Kappeler, et al., 1994). The commission found organized corruption in the department with nearly half of the department personnel participating in mostly payoff violations (Knapp Commission, 1972). These payoffs were mostly associated with gambling, construction, bars, traffic violations and other associated crimes. Another issue was the common occurrence of officers accepting gratuities and getting bribes as part of their daily activities. The commission found that most administrators were not actively monitoring their subordinates and many departments lacked the ability to properly investigate corruption. Problems within internal affairs sector was the main culprit in corruption issues permeating the department. Increased selection, recruitment and accountability measures in addition to proper supervision were among the major recommendations made by the commission (Knapp Commission, 1972).

The 1980s can be considered a transitional period for many police departments in the United States. A number of research initiatives attempted to challenge the Professional Policing model and its link to the development of a "police subculture" (White, 2007). This research brought about a number of concepts associated with Community Oriented Policing. This is the newest model of policing and it has been growing over the past couple of decades (Chappell, 2008). It is predicated on two beliefs, the first being that the police cannot prevent crime without the assistance of the community and that social disorder can lead to increases in crime (Kelling and Moore, 1988).

The 1990s brought about a new wave of crime commissions in New York, Chicago and Philadelphia (Government Accounting Office, 1998). These commissions differed from earlier commissions because of the type of corruption found to be pervasive

(Mollen Commission, 1994). The Knapp commission determined that corruption was mostly related to gambling related payoffs and gratuities with most police involved being considered "grass eaters". The 1994 Mollen Commission into corruption in the New York City police department determined that most corruption was related to drug crimes with money, power and vigilante justice being the main motivating factors behind these activities (Mollen Commission, 1994). The crimes committed during the Knapp Commission were mostly consensual while the Mollen Commission was mostly characterized by blatant abuse and brutality (Mollen Commission, 1994). The Mollen Commission also identified "meat eaters" as becoming the norm among corrupt officers (Mollen Commission, 1994). Similar to the Knapp Commission accountability measures and supervision were ineffective in deterring corruption as found by the Mollen Commission. This was associated with the new structure of specialty units created to combat the drug war. These units were participating in blatant crimes and because of the secretive nature of the units lacked proper supervision. The commission recommended that accountability be improved so that specialty units are properly monitored to reduce opportunities for corruption. These findings from the Mollen Commission also held true in a number of other major police departments (GAO, 1998).

The greatest influence on policing and nearly all areas of justice in the 21st century has been the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These attacks led to legal reforms and expanded police powers (Caldero & Crank, 2004). They have also created the opportunity for corruption. Noble cause corruption has the potential to become the pervasive form of corruption in the aftermath of 9/11. Caldero & Crank (2004) posited that the means even if they are corrupt, are acceptable if they achieve the ends of

policing. The extent of corruption during this decade is still being studied and will not be known for years.

Policing is an evolving field exemplified by its ever changing eras and accompanying organizational changes. It is a unique career and has a vital role in democracy (Caldero & Crank, 2004). Throughout history police have been obliged to many duties including: crime fighting, order maintenance, political advocacy, information gathering and providing social services to the community (Bittner, 1975). These all go well beyond the law enforcement duties that are generally associated with police. These duties at times have conflicting goals that create opportunities for police corruption. It is this dynamic that has made eliminating corruption from policing difficult. The irony of policing is that they represent the law and are supposed to protect the rights of citizens. However, these goals can conflict at times creating opportunities for corruption (Caldero & Crank, 2004).

Corruption

The multiple functions of policing and the complex nature of their interaction make it a challenging profession. Policing provides many opportunities for corrupt behavior. But the issue of corruption is not unique to the field of policing (Moran, 2005). Corruption can be committed in nearly any profession ranging from the stockbroker that sells insider information, to the accountant who "cooks" the books. Even within the justice system there are corrupt judges and prosecutors. However, corruption among police officers is the most publicized because police are the face of the law.

Many researchers have offered their own definition of police corruption but there have been no universally agreed upon definition (Punch, 1985; Stana, 2003). These definitions range from the very broad, that encompass all types of police deviance, to the very specific that exclude nearly all but a select few deviant police activities (Goldstein, 1975). Since "corruption is a form of police deviance, before defining police corruption, police deviance must be conceptualized" (Bucak, 2009; 3). Although some corruption can be considered as police deviance, not all deviant activities committed by police can be defined as corruption. Deviance has long been defined by social scientist as participating in behavior that violates the norms of a society (Durkheim, 1938).

Durkheim's (1938) definition of deviant behavior prevents the creation of a universal definition for police deviance because the definition would rely upon the norms of the department and society. Each society has their view of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. This makes defining deviance much less police deviance a difficult task for any researcher (Kappeler, et al., 1994). Despite this Kappeler, et al. (1994) developed a model upon which they define police deviance as violating the

standards of both the "external" or societal norms and the "internal" or occupational norms. Another important aspect of their definition of deviance was "the threat of social sanctions" (Kappeler, et al., 1994; 16). Kappeler, et al., (1994) believed that a third informal set of rules and customs existed within individual police departments. The violation of these informal rules could also be defined as police deviance.

Barker & Roebuck (1973) supported this argument for a third set of informal rules governing activities within police departments. They found there were operating norms in all police departments that differed from "either the law or departmental written rules" (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; 8). To analyze any corrupt police behavior there must be a definitional analysis at the formal, informal and social levels (Barker and Roebuck, 1973). Towards this goal they defined police corruption "as any type of *prescribed* behavior engaged in by a law enforcement officer who receives or expects to receive, by virtue of his official position, an actual or potential *unauthorized* material reward or gain (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; 9).

Punch (1985) included in his definition of police deviance activities such as: "brutality, discrimination, sexual harassment, intimidation, and illicit use of weapons" (12). He argued that corruption was simply a form of police deviance that encompassed "*profiting* in some way from abuse of power and the abuse of power itself" (Punch, 1985; 12-13). He further divided corruption into a four-level typology: Straightforward corruption, predatory corruption, combative corruption, and corruption as perversion of justice (Punch, 1985). These types all have different motivations and rewards for participants. Punch (2000) later divided police deviance into 3 activities: corruption (to do something or not do something in "exchange for money or gifts" from an external

source), misconduct (mostly violations of minor internal disciplinary regulations) and police crime (excessive force and other criminal endeavors including those that could violate a person's rights) (302).

Goldstein (1975) defines police corruption as "the misuse of authority by a police officer in a manner designed to produce personal gain for himself or for others" (3). His definition differs from those of other authors because he argues that corruption does not have to benefit the corrupter. Corruption could be committed for the benefit of others, which encompasses a wide range of activities that would be eliminated based on definitions offered by other authors (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; Punch, 1985). Although all types of bribery can be considered corruption based on Goldstein's (1975) definition, not all corruption is bribery.

Caldero and Crank (2004) took a new approach to define police corruption. They divide corruption into two major types: economic corruption and noble-cause corruption. Economic corruption is easily understood as it encompasses financial rewards through abuses of power. However, in their book Caldero and Crank (2004) ignore this common form of corruption instead choosing to concentrate on noble-cause corruption. The precipice for this movement away from economic crime was the argument that reforms in policing have led to large decreases in economic crime during the 20th century (Caldero and Crank, 2004). These reforms have created opportunities for noble cause corruption which is "corruption committed in the name of good ends" (Caldero and Crank, 2004; 2). Caldero and Crank (2004) argue that in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, increased police powers have created ample opportunity for this type of corruption.

Klockars, et al. (2000) defined corruption as "the abuse of police authority *for gain* is one type of misconduct that has been particularly problematic" (1). This definition again brings up the complexities in defining corruption because it does not explain the type of gains and identifies corruption as only "one type of misconduct" further highlighting the issue of understanding police deviance (Klockars, et al., 2000; 1). Ivkovich (2005) narrows this further by distinguishing corruption from other forms of police misconduct by highlighting "achievement of personal gain" as the main factor influencing it (547).

Sherman (1978) also describes "personal gain" as an integral part of defining corruption but includes the illegal use of the organization within this definition (30). Sherman (1978) argues that this definition is best because it can be used for both individual and organizational examinations of the topic. Perry (2003) believed that nearly all acts of corruption can be considered police deviance and that not all corrupt acts are completely corrupt. He found that the process of committing corruption can encompass many illicit activities that could be considered corrupt, deviant and in some cases non-deviant.

Types of corruption

Barker and Roebuck (1973) offered one of the earliest attempts at creating a typology of police corruption. This typology was later altered by Punch (1985). Their typology has been widely cited and overlaps with nearly all activities included in corruption definitions.

Corruption of Authority

Police officers who accept goods given to them solely because of their position in society have committed a corrupt act. These goods include free and discounted coffee, meals, commercial and non commercial goods. This is a common occurrence even though most departments have expressed written rules that such activities are in violation of police mandates (Knapp Commission, 1972). Most police officers feel they are accepting a gift for protecting the community. In the United States most officers are unlikely to report such activities within their department (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; Klockars, et al., 2006). This differs from other nations where such activities are disciplined severely (Huberts, Lamboo & Punch, 2003). This behavior places the officer receiving the gift, in debt to the person giving the gift presenting an opportunity for repayment by overlooking a future indiscretion. Some consider this type of activity an entry point to other more serious forms of misconduct (Sherman, 1985)

Kickbacks

This activity is similar to *corruption of authority* because the officer receives goods from an otherwise legitimate business person and the receiving officer is usually in good standing in their department. The difference is the good or services are received in exchange for referring customers to a number of service sector businesses (Barker and

Roebuck, 1973). This activity is normally accepted within many departments despite being against organizational rules but becomes more likely to be disciplined if cash is the reward for the activity. Both *corruption of authority* and *kickbacks* are considered types of gratuities for police officers because of the hazard and low pay normally associated with the profession (Walker, 1983).

Opportunistic Thefts

This type of corruption takes place when an on duty officer steals goods or money during the performance of their duties. This could encompass taking money from suspects, stealing jewelry from homes they investigate, or stealing items from the evidence room. This type of activity is viewed more severely than the earlier examples (Barker and Roebuck, 1973). The seriousness of this offense and likelihood of being reported is normally associated with the size of the theft, its detection by victims and the informal policies within departments (Barker and Roebuck, 1973).

Shakedowns

During the service of their duties police officers will witness criminal violations. Some officers will take advantage of this and seek "hush money" from the violator. These rewards can be either: money, goods or services. These can be sought from both normal citizens committing minor violations and known criminals committing major criminal violations. Money received from otherwise normal or law abiding citizens is considered "clean" money, while money received from known felons and violators is considered "dirty" money. Fellow officers are more likely to report instances involving "dirty" money rather than "clean money". Participation in shakedowns by officers can

ruin a departments' reputation and erode community confidence in the justice system (Barker and Roebuck, 1973).

Protection of Illegal activities

At times those involved in illicit activity will seek to "payoff" police officers for protection, to avoid prosecution and prevent harassment. These individuals are normally involved in illegal gambling rings, pornography rings, and other frequently victimless crimes. This type of activity is also committed by legitimate businesses that participate in illegal activities such as truck companies paying to transport illegal goods or goods for which they are not licensed to transport. Acceptance of this activity is normally based on how widespread such activity is within the department (Barker and Roebuck, 1973).

The Fix

This type of activity is divided into two subtypes: "(1) the quashing of prosecution proceedings following the offender's arrest and (2) the *taking up* (disposal of record) of traffic tickets" (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; 34). This can range from minor fixing such as disregarding a traffic ticket for a small fee, to major offenses such as tampering with evidence for a felony case to affect the outcome. This activity is normally subject to severe punishment under departmental rules. In spite of this minor offenses are normally disregarded by fellow officers and only the most severe types of fixes are likely to be reported (Barker and Roebuck, 1973).

Direct Criminal Activities or Police crime

At times a police officer will not need to be corrupted by another individual. These officers chose to participate in criminal activities such as robberies and burglaries.

They do this for personal gain and are normally not supported by their peers and face serious punishment for have participating in these activities (Barker and Roebuck, 1973).

Internal Pay-Offs

This type of corrupt activity is unique because it involves solely police officers as both corruptor and corrupted. "Bribing" officers for assignment to patrol routes, days off and popular assignments are examples of this. This type of activity may also involve other types of corruption such as *fixes*. Police officers may pay off fellow officers to destroy evidence in cases against themselves or paid associates. This type of activity is normally associated with widespread corruption within departments and can severely undermine the justice system in communities (Barker and Roebuck, 1973).

Flaking and Padding

There is one corrupt activity that has received much research attention recently that was missing from the 8 part typology offered by Barker and Roebuck (1973). "Flaking" or "Padding" involves altering evidence by either planting false evidence at crime scenes or altering evidence to create the impression of criminal involvement by a defendant (Punch, 1985). This type of activity is normally associated with "noble-cause" corruption (Caldero and Crank, 2004**).** Officers will participate in this activity because they would like to "put away" a known felon but lack the evidence necessary. By altering evidence they feel they are not committing a crime because they are putting away someone who will probably commit criminal acts in the future. This activity can be done to protect an officers criminal associates and to put away competitors of an officers criminal associates (Punch, 1985).

Police officer typology

The Knapp Commission defined a two-part typology of corrupt police officers (Knapp Commission, 1972). This two part typology has identified corrupt police officers as falling into two groups either "meat eaters" or "grass eaters". This typology was later expanded by Barker (2006) to include three other groups of officers within corrupt police organizations. The "grass eaters" were police officers that take gratuities from the public such as free cups of coffee or discounts on household items. They mostly participated in relatively minor offenses that violate departmental guidelines but were nevertheless found to be common within many departments (Knapp Commission, 1972).

"Meat eaters" were identified as those individuals that actively seek to participate in illicit activities. They are considered to be among the worst of all corrupt officers because they participate in criminal activity. They are solely concerned with personal gains and will impede investigations if it means attaining these gains (Barker & Roebuck, 1973). They committed a diverse range of crimes with the Knapp commission identifying gambling payoffs as being the most common type of crime among meat eaters in the 1960s and 1970s (Knapp Commission, 1972). The Mollen Commission also examined corruption in the New York City police department. It found that by the 1990s "meat eaters" within the department were now participating in mostly drug related offenses (Mollen Commission, 1994).

Barker (1986) believed that three additional groups of officers existed within corrupt police organizations. He defined them as "white knights", officers that "are honest to a fault" (62). They stand by their ethical beliefs and this can lead to issues with those within the department who do not share their extreme view of ethical issues.

Another group was “rogues”, officers who are blatant in their participation in criminal activity. They participate in criminal activity on a more persistent level than even those corrupt officers considered to be “meat eaters”. The last group identified was “straight shooters”, honest officers who do not participate in any type of corrupt activity but did not report the activity of other officers. They do not approve of corruption but are willing to overlook the corrupt activities of others to avoid conflict within their organization (Barker, 1986).

Theoretical Approaches

Rotten Apple

The earliest explanations for police corruption centered on the individual being responsible for their actions. It posits that a few bad individuals or "apples" were responsible for most police corruption (Walker, 1983; Delattre, 2006). It was argued that morally and personally corrupt individuals were able to infiltrate the department, using their predisposition to deviance to commit illicit activities (Bucak, 2009). These individuals acted without involvement, knowledge or support of their co-workers and their superiors. This theory receives a lot of support from police supervisors because it provides a quick fix to the problem of corruption. It creates the impression that once these problem officers are identified and removed, the problem of corruption will be eliminated from the department. It furthers the image of police being bound by the law and that they are subject to the same discipline as those in the general public (Kappeler et al., 1994).

A problem with this view of corruption is its failure to explain cycles of corruption that exist in departments such as New York and the pervasiveness of corruption in other departments (Klockars, Ivkovich, and Haberfeld, 2004). Another problem with the rotten apple theory is its failure to explain how seemingly honest and moral officers become corrupted and begin to participate in illicit activities only after joining the department (White, 2007). The Knapp commission further disproved the "rotten apple" theory because it found that corruption was common within the department with nearly all individuals in the department being aware or participating in corruption themselves (Knapp Commission, 1972). This has also been found to be the case in other

departments including those in Washington DC, Chicago, Oakland and Los Angeles (Klockars, et al., 2006). All of these concerns have led some researchers to argue that the "rotten apple" theory should not be used to explain police corruption (Goldstein, 1975).

In spite of these criticisms support for rotten apple theory has been found by some researchers. Walker, Alpert and Kenney (2001) found that most police corruption was caused by a small number of individuals within the department. Their findings indicated that nearly 90 percent of all problems were caused by 10 percent of the workforce. Porter and Warrender (2009) found in their analysis of deviant police behavior that most officers involved in this activity were likely to act alone. There are also cases that support the rotten apple theory such as that of the Miami River Cops who were involved in drug related corruption, which was not found to be pervasive within the department (Delattre, 2006). The 1994 Mollen Commission of the New York City police department also found support for this theory as it identified only a small number of corrupt officers who were participating in drug related corruption (Mollen Commission, 1994). Klockars et al., (2006) argue that individual integrity is a part of organizational integrity and that they cannot exist without each other. But at times the processes that establish them may be different. The nature of this relationship is too complex to understand. The conflict of support and rejection for this theory and its link to organizational integrity warrants the need to further examine the issues that could be responsible for police corruption.

Rotten Orchard/Barrel

The "rotten orchard/barrel" theory posits that just like any other organization police departments are responsible for the deviance that occurs among its members. Ermann and Lundman (1978) created a four part framework for organizational deviance.

First, to be considered deviant the activities of the organization must be in violation of greater societal norms; Second, actions must be supported at some level within the organization; Third, administrators must know and support the deviant activity (either actively or passively) and Finally, new members to the organization must be socialized into the "norms and rationalizations supportive of such an action" (Ermann and Lundman, 1978; 57-58).

The nature of the policing profession provides the opportunity to engage in corrupt activities that would otherwise not be available to individuals (Johnson & Cox III, 2004-5). Furthermore, it is argued that this behavior is known, supported and in some cases even taught to individuals by their co-workers and/or their superiors (Delattre, 2006). The structural aspects of the policing profession that have been identified as being responsible for corruption include: Legitimizing Police Deviance, Public Perception, Isolation and Discretion, Supervision, Division of Labor/Specialization, Limited Career Mobility and Salary, Police Subculture and organizational model (Kappeler, et al., 1994).

Legitimizing Police Deviance

The police have a unique role in society because they participate in activities and take actions that in many cases are illegal for nearly everyone else in society. Police can conduct search and seizures, use force to subdue suspects, and access private information about citizens (Kappeler, et al., 1994). Kappeler, et al., (1994) found that even though police decisions are bound by the law, they have vast discretion in interpreting the law as it best applies to their interactions with the public. This can lead to misconduct over time as officers adopt a view of being above the law. Creating a conflict of policing because

they are given a power that places them above the law yet they must follow the law (Caldero and Crank, 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006).

Isolation and Discretion

The Professional Policing model promoted by Vollmer in the early 20th century created an environment where police mostly operated in isolation from the general public (Kappeler, et al., 1994). In addition police interactions with the general public are normally isolated with very few witnesses available. Police are expected to rely upon personal discretion when interacting with suspects. This creates plenty of opportunity for officers to participate in illicit activities and victimize individuals from the general public. Victims of the police will normally ignore reporting violations for fear of reprisals by officers (e.g. drug dealers) (Kappeler, et al., 1994).

Supervision

Policing is a field where there is little interaction with supervision. In most cases while performing their duties and interacting with the general public most police officers have no interaction with supervisors. This creates the opportunity for officers to participate in illicit activities. Another issue with supervision is that many officers are supervised by former partners, colleagues and/or friends (Kappeler, et al., 1994). This can lead to conflicts of interest where supervisors will not discipline individuals or will ignore illicit activities by those working beneath them (Kappeler, et al., 1994). Engel and Worden (2003) found that the lack of direction from supervision will lead to officers using their own discretion to influence decisions. These misinformed officers' actions are more likely to result in incidents of corruption. Also certain individuals may not have

been properly trained to be supervisors; this poor supervision can create opportunity for corruption to flourish within many police departments (Kappeler, et al., 1994).

Division of Labor/Specialization

Specialized units are meant to be a solution to problematic issues within communities. These include units dedicated to narcotics, homicide, gangs and other illicit activities. These units have been found to be breeding grounds for corruption within police departments (Klockars, et al., 2004). This is because these units have less supervision, greater secrecy and plenty of opportunity to participate in corrupt activities when compared to normal patrol officers. These individuals also tend to have stronger ties between unit members and increased support for the "blue wall of silence" among its members (Kappeler, et al., 1994).

Limited Career Mobility and Salary

Police officers are restricted in their ability to advance within departments. Most departments only have limited positions available with large numbers of individuals vying for these supervisory positions that come with increased pay. The constraints of promotion create an environment where many individuals are unsatisfied with their salary or position of power within a department. These individuals can becomes dissatisfied and begin to participate in illicit activities as a means to improve their economic situation or to get back at those they feel overlooked them (Kappeler, et al., 1994).

Police Subculture

The police subculture is identified as perhaps the most responsible part of the policing structure that leads to corruption. One of the key aspects of the subculture is the blue wall of silence. The code "informally prohibits or discourages police officers from

reporting the misconduct of their colleagues" (Klockars, et al., 2000; 2). It argues that since police can only rely upon each other they should be willing to condone the misconduct of fellow officers (Chan, 2003). Kaariainen, Lintonen, Laitinen, and Pollock (2008) argued that because of the pressures of control and suspicion, "a police officer may lose his/her confidence both in the citizen and in the police administration" leading to characteristics (e.g. isolation, etc.) that result in the code of silence (87). Some view the code as a necessary part of survival for those in the force (Bucak, 2009). It is unique because its parameters can differ not only between different nations but within nations in police departments (Klockars, et al., 2000). Klockars, et al., (2006) found support for the blue wall of silence especially when it related to less serious criminal incidents. But all officers who participated in this activity were not necessarily corrupt themselves. At times officers will wish to protect partners from harm even if they do not agree or participate in these illicit activities (Klockars, et al., 2006). Weisburd, Greenspan, Hamiliton, Williams and Bryant (2000) found that even though most police officers did not accept the "code of silence" nearly two-thirds believed that other officers followed it even in cases of serious abuses of power.

The development of a subculture personality is the result of the dangers that go with policing as an occupation and the cynicism about the justice system that accompanies it (Bittner, 1975). The "us vs. them" mentality is an embodiment of this personality (Westley, 1970). The "symbolic assailant" is another development that occurs because of the subculture personality. Police use identifiers based on experience to identify potential threats or indicators of illicit activity (Skolnick, 1994). Reuss-Ianni (1983) defined guidelines that shaped the police subculture as being divided among

"street cop" and "management cop" culture. She identified twenty-one maxims that define "street cop" culture and their interactions with other officers. She found that conflicting values between these two cop cultures leads to further development of the subculture personality (Reuss-Ianni, 1983).

Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) believed that the police personality developed from the quasi-military model of policing. They argued that police see themselves as soldiers in a never ending war which leads to misconduct (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). Others have found that the police subculture can undermine the official guidelines of police departments with written rules being ignored as officers instead choose to let informal subculture guidelines influence their behavior (Klockars, Ivkovich & Haberfeld, 2005; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008). Supporting this Terrill, Paoline III, & Manning (2003) found that close embodiment of this police subculture personality can lead to coercive and possibly corrupt behavior among officers. This can occur despite the fact that officers understand that they are in violation of agencies guidelines.

Police organizational model

Policing within the United States is decentralized to the effect of nearly 20,000 police agencies existing across local, state and federal levels (Klockars, et al., 2004). The decentralization model is supported by citizens for two reasons: First, the immense lack of distrust many U.S. citizens have of the federal government and second, many citizens believe that a local police department will be more concerns with the needs of the community (Klockars, et al., 2004). Compared to the integrated policing model used by the London Metropolitan police department it appears that there is more room for corruption within the American system. A comparison of integrity across agencies found

that police within the American model of policing were more likely to lack integrity especially when compared to the London Metropolitan police department (Klockars, et al., 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006). The lack of oversight and differences in organizational rules across agencies in the decentralized policing model creates opportunities for corruption to occur within many departments (McCormack, 1986).

Noble Cause Corruption/ Golden Apple

Most police corruption research has used the "rotten apple" and/or "rotten orchard/barrel" theoretical approach to explain misconduct within police departments. These theories are predicated on the belief that officers that participate in corruption are acting in their own self interest to attain some type of personal gain. However, there is a third approach that attempts to explain police corruption that is not in the self interest of officers or results in personal gain. Noble cause corruption is defined as corruption committed to attain a good end but using illicit means to attain these goals (Harrison, 1999; Caldero and Crank, 2004; Crank, Flaherty & Giacomazzi, 2007). Noble cause corruption can involve using a number of illicit means that violate due process, and procedural policies to achieve policing goals. These goals include maintaining public order and securing public safety (Caldero and Crank, 2004).

Testilying is a type of noble cause corruption that has been studied extensively in the literature (Cunningham, 1999; Foley, 2000). Testilying is the name given to perjury committed by police officers as identified by the Mollen Commission. The occurrence of perjury was found to be a common occurrence among many officers in the New York Police department at the time especially as it related to drug related crimes (Mollen Commission, 1994). Foley (2000) found that as it related to drug, sex and crimes against

children officers were found to be more likely to commit perjury. These crimes elicit an emotional response in officers that the other crimes studied did not. This supports the view that officers will break the law to achieve the "greater good" as they view it.

Noble cause corruption is viewed as excusable wrong doing and has been controversial among researchers and practitioners (Caldero and Crank, 2004). Those who support the use of noble cause corruption believe that officers who participate in these activities are not "rotten apples" or "rotten orchards/barrels" instead they refer to officers who participate in these activities as being "golden apples". They are "golden apples" because they are doing all that is necessary to achieve the goals of the organization (Caldero and Crank, 2004). Critics argue that officers who participate in "noble cause corruption" are no better than officers that participate in other corrupt activities. That no matter the ends the means should never violate the law because no one, not even the police themselves are above the law. Critics also argue that noble cause corruption can lead to material rewards corruption because it creates an environment for individuals to feel above the law (Caldero and Crank, 2004).

Noble cause corruption has become an increasingly common issue in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks. Expanded police powers through the relaxing of constitutional rights and the want to achieve noble ends of preventing another attack have provided incentive for officers to participate in illicit means to achieve their goals (Kleinig, 2008). Economic corruption was the most common type of corruption during the 19th and 20th century but it has been decreasing over the last century (Caldero and Crank, 2004). In the post 9/11 world it appears that noble cause corruption has the possibility to become the predominant form of police corruption within the United States.

Corruption prevention

The impact of corruption has not gone unnoticed by police departments, the public and government. There have been a number of accountability measures implemented that attempt to reduce, prevent and eliminate corruption. These accountability measures can be examined using the framework posited by Ermann and Lundman (1978) that argued that all organizations are controlled by "controller organizations" outside of the organization to reduce deviance (59). These "controller organizations" can be a parent company, regulatory agency, or even the general public. This presence of "controller organizations" however is not enough to deter deviance. Ermann and Lundman (1978) found that a combination of routine and unexpected review of organizations by "controller organizations" was important to ensure integrity. "Certainty and Severity" of punishment to reduce organizational deviance is important because of the much more rational nature of organizational deviance when compared to the random nature of most individual deviance (Ermann and Lundman, 1978; 64). Accountability measures are a means of attempting to ensure this "certainty and severity" of punishment deters deviance among police departments.

Some of the accountability measures are internal, in that they are created and monitored by the department itself. Others are external, in that an organization outside of the department is conducting the investigation into issues of corruption. External accountability measures create openness and transparency that some believe does not exist in internal accountability measures (Klockars, et al., 2005). These different types of accountability measures can be used individually or in combination with other measures

to address corruption within the department. The type of accountability measure that works best will differ based on the department.

A major critique of most internal mechanisms of police accountability is that the police are themselves conducting the investigation. It is suggested that this can lead to inefficient investigations. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina police department sought to increase integrity within their department by enlisting an outside review of their internal reviews department to identify and remove any factors that could lead to it working improperly (Klockars, et al., 2006). External accountability measures can be critiqued because individuals outside of the department might not have the proper expertise to conduct such investigations. Many departments are averse to being investigated externally because of fear the findings may tarnish the reputation of the department. Despite the critiques of both measures they each present benefits to attaining information about corruption and promoting integrity.

Police Accountability: Internal Mechanisms

Recruitment

Police departments attempt to recruit the most qualified candidates to fulfill positions. Different techniques are used to recruit these individuals including fliers, job fairs, meet and greets at local academic institutions, radio and television advertisement and even online recruitment. A good recruitment pitch will appeal to a large audience and will inform them of the duties and responsibilities of the position. The main role of recruitment is that it does not misinform potential candidates and reaches a diverse number of individuals. Finally, recruitment officers should project an image of integrity

and professionalism so that potential recruits understand that these are the qualities that are prioritized by the department (Klockars, et al., 2006).

Selection

Selection techniques differ across police departments but they are normally based upon a number of common factors including age, criminal history, military record, education and health (Caldero and Crank, 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006). Furthermore some departments require that applicants pass academic and physical exams, an interview, credit check and drug test (White, 2007). One of the initial tests of integrity in some police departments is a pre-employment polygraph exam. All of these selection guidelines serve to achieve the purpose of preventing unqualified applicants from joining the force. While attempting to create an environment of integrity and honor within the police force.

Police Training

Effective training is the next step in the process of creating an honorable police department devoid of corruption (White and Escobar, 2008). Police training seeks to provide the applicant with the basic skills, knowledge and expertise required to be a police officer. This training includes in class training and on the job or in field training (Kappeler, et al., 1994). The purpose of the in class training is to provide recruits with the knowledge of departmental and legal guidelines (Kelling, Wasserman, and Williams, 1988). The in field training provides recruits with the experience necessary to operate at their own discretions once they graduate from the academy. It also initiates the socialization of an officer into the culture of the police department (Klockars et al., 2006). "War stories" are taught to officers during their infield training and further their

initiation into the policing subculture (Caldero and Crank, 2004). Proper training is important because it reduces the likelihood of errors that could result in misconduct.

Supervision

Supervision in policing is different than nearly all other occupations because of the solitary nature of the policing profession. Police interactions with the general public are normally guided by their own discretion (Kelling, et al., 1988). Most officers only interact with their supervisors at the station house when they begin and end their shift or when they are filing a report. Despite this supervisors play an important role in maintaining an environment of integrity within police departments (Engel, 2001). They promote the ideals of the organization and ensure that officers do not deviate into corrupt behavior (Schafer & Martinelli, 2008). Klockars et al., (2006) found that integrity was directly tied to the view and actual severity of punishment for officers who participated in corrupt activities. In the three southern American police departments examined supervisors enforcing departmental guidelines increased the chances of maintaining an environment of integrity within the department.

Administrative Guidance

These are the guidelines that form the parameters of police interactions with the public. Guidelines have been a vital part of preventing misconduct since the inception of the first police department. Knowledge and belief in these guidelines is a necessary component of maintaining an agency of integrity (Klockars, et al., 2006). The problem is that at times an agencies official policy may be in conflict with the agencies unofficial policy. This unofficial policy may be the result and encouraged by the subculture of policing (Klockars, et al., 2006). Another issue is that some departments will fail to

inform their officers of these guidelines or inform them of these guidelines improperly creating confusion among police officers (Klockars, et al., 2004). Since discretion is a vital part of policing the lack of proper knowledge of these guidelines increases the chances of police misconduct occurring due to lack of direction in citizen interactions. Police legal advisors are a growing method of teaching administrative guidelines to departments. Archbold (2006) found that police legal advisors have a crucial role in informing police management of changes in law influencing administrative guidelines. This results in a more informed police force and leads to reductions in civil liability cases related to corruption.

Internal Affairs

Internal affairs bureaus have long been associated with misconduct within police departments (Goldstein, 1975). It is the duty of an internal affairs bureau to monitor corruption within police departments and investigate any officers suspected of being involved in corrupt activities (Delattre, 2006). Internal affairs bureaus work by gathering evidence from the public, co workers, planting moles within the department to report misconduct, and integrity test. These tests involve examining whether potential or existing police officers when presented with an opportunity to participate in illicit and/or illegal activity will take advantage of the situation (Klockars, et al., 2006).

Citizen reports of misconduct are a tool used by internal affairs to begin investigations. The number of these reports has grown since anonymously and confidential reporting has been adopted by many departments (Klockars, et al., 2006). These different methods work to prevent or remove corrupt individuals from the police force increasing police integrity. These all work to ensure that misconduct is not allowed

to operate impeded within a department. The problem with internal affairs is that they are highly influenced by those who work in the unit. Relationships with officers outside the unit can affect investigations and in some cases can lead to corruption within the internal affairs unit itself (Kappeler, et al., 1994).

Early Warning Systems

Early warning systems are a recent phenomenon that attempt to prevent serious police misconduct. These systems collect information on officers within a department and flag any officer who exhibits the signs of possibly being a disciplinary issue using quantitative information to analyze them (Walker, 2007). Items utilized within an early warning system include use of force data, citizen complaint reports, problematic behavior reports and other factors that vary across departments (Bucak, 2009; Lersh, Bazley and Mieczkowski, 2006). The types of factors and number of factors collected by early warning systems vary by department with no universal system existing (Bazley, Mieczkowski and Lersch, 2009). The system operates on the belief that officers who participate in corruption are likely to exhibit early warning signs that if unchecked will lead to crimes of more severity (Sherman, 1985). They are based on the belief that if caught early, officers could be reformed to prevent future corruption and furthering the environment of integrity within departments.

Changing the Subculture

The policing subculture has long been cited as the main factor motivating an environment of corruption within departments. It can be argued that this subculture developed in the aftermath of the Professional Policing model established by Vollmer in the 1920s (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). Specifically, the aggressive policing style and

solitary nature of this traditional policing model led to the subculture which many feel is responsible for corruption within departments. It has been found that officers across decades continually join the force for the betterment of society and to help people (Foley, Guarneri, & Kelly, 2008). Despite this finding the subculture has been an ever present part of policing. This has only added to the need to reform the policing style (Micucci & Gomme, 2005).

Community policing is the new policing model that has been created to help in the removal of this subculture of policing. Specifically, there is more emphasis placed on communication with the community, more attention given to non-crime control duties of policing such as problem solving and a more proactive rather than reactive approach to societal problems (Micucci & Gomme, 2005). Changing to a community policing model is a time consuming process because of needs to reform the recruitment, training and organizational structure of policing to properly follow the model. However, it is a vital step in helping to change and remove the policing subculture.

The central role of the Chief

The chief is the person in charge of a department and creates the atmosphere that is to be followed by officers under his power. It has been argued that the police chief influences not only the style within their department but whether their department is one of integrity or corruption (Skolnick, 2008). If the chief maintains an environment of strict discipline they will increase the chance of maintaining integrity. But if the chief does not hold officers accountable he is created an environment where misconduct and corruption will flourish. Klockars et al., (2006) found that in Charleston, South Carolina the long tenured police chief played a vital role in creating a department of integrity. He

was aware of all activity in his department and aimed to eliminate the code of silence that is common in most departments. To reach this goal he provided incentives for officers to report the misconduct of fellow officers and severely disciplined officers that protected the corrupt activities of others within this department. The chief understood the importance of first line officers and their assistance in preventing instances of corruption (Klockars, et al., 2006). This method of fear and control created an environment where there was no or little support for the police subculture eliminating the corruption that is normally associated with it (Klockars, et al., 2006).

Police Accountability: External Mechanisms

Criminal Law: Prosecuting the police

Officers are not above the law and should be punished the same as normal citizens if they violate the law. Police participate in a number of activities that are in violation of the law in the performance of their duties. The law allows this as necessary however some officers participate in crimes outside the guidelines of their duties. For this they must be punished. Prosecuting police that participate in corruption is a means of the justice system promoting an environment of integrity and strengthens the justice system entirely (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). It provides a message to the community and police that corruption no matter the occupation is unacceptable in a society of integrity.

Civil Litigation: Suing the police

Police officers are given a duty to protect the general public. If they fail to perform this duty because they are negligent or because they use their position for personal gain they should be held responsible. Civil litigation is a method of holding police responsible but it is different from criminal prosecution because police

departments are held financially responsible for the actions of their officers (Kappeler et al., 1994). Suing the police sends a message that their corrupt activities will not be accepted by the general public. In the aftermath of civil litigation reforms are normally instituted in departments to remove the factors that led to the behavior responsible for corruption. This can include firing officers and supervision, creating new methods of oversight or completely overhauling the department structure (Scolnick and Fyfe, 1993).

Judicial Intervention

The courts influence how the police interact with the general public. The due process revolution of the 1960s is probably the best example of this as it completely overhauled the rights provided to citizens in their interactions with police (Walker, 1999). The courts have continued to intervene on the part of citizens in holding police accountable for their actions. By doing this the courts continue to protect the rights of citizens while upholding and maintaining the standards of integrity in police departments. By holding these departments accountable for their actions it serves notice that police are not above the law (Scolnick and Fyfe, 1993).

Special Investigations

Commissions occur when the local, state or federal government mandates an investigation into activities occurring within a police department. These commissions normally are appointed by government leaders and they seek to investigate a department through a complex process involving witnesses, evidence and experts (White, 2007). These commissions have been at the forefront of bringing attention to the issue of corruption in many police departments across the nations (Knapp Commission, 1972; Mollen Commission, 1994). They normally produce comprehensive reports examining

misconduct on the part of police and the reforms that could be instituted to remove factors leading to this corruption.

U.S. Department of Justice Consent Decrees

Consent decrees are agreements that normally occur in the aftermath of litigation (Kupferberg, 2008). These agreements are normally between a police department and the DOJ. They create guidelines that are to be placed on a police department requiring that a number of initiatives occur to prevent further litigation. Although corruption does not have to be a central focus of decrees it is normally a part of them (Kupferberg, 2008). The guidelines placed forth in a decree attempt to create reforms that aim to eliminate the problems within police departments. Failure to follow these decrees can result in increased oversight and discipline for departments (Schafer & Martinelli, 2008; Caldero and Crank, 2004).

Citizen Oversight

The common factors missing from many of the methods of police accountability is input from the citizenry (Kappeler, et al., 1994). It is argued that the individuals that are being affected by corruption are the best to provide feedback to police on issues related to corruption. The main concern of citizen oversight committees is to ensure that the public has a role in police accountability (Walker, 2007). Having the public involved in the accountability process can reduce the secrecy normally associated with the police. The erosion of this secrecy can increase public confidence in policing and the justice system as a whole (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).

Public Interest Groups, the Media, and the Public

All of these serve the same purpose of keeping the public informed of police activities. They bring attention to issues that in the past would have been kept secret. The main thing they aim to do is hold the police accountable to the public they serve. The intense attention that results because of these organizations bring attention to corrupt behavior often leads to reforms more quickly than is possible with other accountability techniques (Bucak, 2009; Kappeler, et al., 1994; Warren & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2009).

Integrity Research

Research studies have attempted to examine the issue of corruption but it is a field of research which has a multitude of measurement issues which make directly studying corruption difficult (Bucak, 2009; Klockars et al., 2000; Skogan & Meares, 2004). Most corrupt transactions involve parties that would rather not identify their involvement in this activity. Victims of corruption normally refuse to report these activities because of fear of reprisal and police officers do not want to break the camaraderie with their fellow officers (Klockars, et al., 2006). This creates issues as it pertains to data analysis because there is no official or reliable source for corruption data (Ivkovich, 2002; Klockars et al., 2006). Since this data source does not exist there is a need to attain data from alternative sources.

Alternate sources of data normally used in criminal justice research such as victimization and self-report surveys also present their own validity concerns. Most departments refuse to participate in studies examining corruption because fear of self incrimination (Klockars, et al., 2006). Police administrators do not want to be associated with corruption research because of the negative impression of the department that may result if corruption is found within the department (Ward and McCormack, 1979). Even if they agree to participate in studies most police officers will refuse to break the blue wall of silence which leads to validity concerns with any data collected (Klockars, et al., 2006).

Understanding the difficulty that came with researching police corruption, Klockars, C., et al, (2000) decided to take a new approach to corruption research. Adopting the police integrity approach first suggested at the COP/NIJ conference

(Gaffigan & McDonald, 1997; Klockars, et al., 2006). At the conference the COPS/NIJ team decided to eliminate the use of the word corruption and implementing the word "integrity" (Gaffigan & McDonald, 1997; Klockars, et al, 2006). The adoption of this approach had a number of advantages. There are many negative stigmas associated with using the word corruption by replacing it with the less negative term of integrity researchers made investigating this issue more amenable to police administrators and unions (Klockars, et al., 2006). Another advantage of the use of the term integrity is it can be used to explain activities of individuals, organizations and any group police can be assigned (e.g. community districts, precincts) (Klockars, et al., 2006). This can be used by researchers to provide comprehensive analysis across all levels of a police organization. In addition, the decision to adopt the use of the term integrity was supported by both researchers and practitioners (Klockars, et al., 2006).

Klockars, et al., (2000) defined "Police Integrity as the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation" (Klockars, et al., 2006; 1). The definition aims to include both micro (individual) and macro (precinct, departmental) levels of the police organization. The definition also includes all types of abusive police behavior, avoiding the issues that accompany the lack of a universally agreed upon definition of corruption and its associated crimes (Klockars, et al., 2006). The Klockars, et al., (2000) study on police integrity was a seminal piece in the field of policing because it was one of the first studies that examined the topic from this new and innovative approach. Corruption and integrity share a relationship where the presence of more integrity means that less corruption will exist. By examining integrity Klockars, et al., (2000) were able to examine corruption indirectly. The

presumption of the research was that the indirect study of corruption was more amenable to honest response and openness on the part of participants when compared to earlier corruption research which has long been critiqued for validity concerns (Klockars et al., 2006). Another advantage of this view point is that by using the organizational approach it allows officers' to simply examine responses in the research tool to understand the factors affecting integrity and implement administrative responses to reform these problems (Klockars, et al., 2000).

In their study Klockars, et al., (2000) distributed their integrity survey to 30 police departments across the United States. They collected nearly 3,300 surveys from these different agencies. They found that the more serious a behavior, the more willing officers were to report this behavior. Officers were more likely to recommend stricter disciplinary action if they viewed a behavior as more serious. Officers also supported the recommended discipline in the survey as it related to most of the cases. Despite this the study found support for the blue wall of silence within many departments in the United States as most officers were unwilling to report less serious violations by colleagues.

Klockars et al. (2004) using the earlier collected data from the United States decided with the assistance of other researchers to examine the issue of integrity from a cross-cultural perspective. Their integrity survey was distributed internationally across 14 countries with minor revisions made to address cultural differences in the cases. They found that as it pertains to the rank order of evaluated seriousness of misconduct for the 11 cases nearly all 14 countries included in the study were similar. However, there were some offenses that were ranked differently across these nations, this included "case 8, the cover up of a police DUI (driving under the influence) and minor accident" which was

ranked among the least serious in some nations while it was marked as the most serious offense in others (Klockars, et al., 2004; 13). "Case 10, which involves the use of excessive force on a car thief" also had different levels of seriousness responses across nations (Klockars, et al., 2004; 13). The differences appear to be directly tied to cultural views for driving under the influence and brutality respectively within the nations.

Overall, the nations were similar in the ordering of the "three measures of integrity—seriousness, discipline, and willingness to report" (Klockars, et al., 2004; 13). Willingness to report was found to be the measure with the most deviation across the nations. This directly ties to the blue wall of silence and its cross cultural role in these police departments. Across these nations it appears that the expected severity of punishment for an offense is related to the view of severity by police officers (Klockars, et al., 2004). Indeed most officers' especially young ones were willing to overlook minor offenses even if they were against guidelines of a department. In spite of this when it came to more serious offenses it was universally reported by officers of all ages (Klockars, et al., 2004). This was the most alarming finding from this study because it proved that the blue wall of silence was a worldwide issue affecting decision making and not solely restricted to the United States.

Newham (2002) examined integrity within the Hillbrow Police Station in South Africa. Using the integrity survey developed by Klockars, et al. (2000) he surveyed over 100 officers in the department. The study found strong support for the blue wall of silence. Most respondents believed that their colleagues would not report participation in misconduct such as those in the cases. An additional survey examining integrity found that most line managers refused to report misconduct for fear of reprisal and because they

did not want to affect the reputation of the department (Newham, 2002). Chan (2003) found that most officers were quickly socialized into the policing subculture. They were exposed to the informal rules of the departments which required them to not report illicit behaviors of colleagues unless the behavior was serious. The impact of reporting such behavior was normally reprisal from others within the department.

Huberts, Lamboo & Punch (2003) conducted a comparison study of integrity in the Netherlands and the United States. They found that Dutch police officers were stricter than their American counterparts as it came to rating the cases in the Klockars et al. (2000) integrity survey. A notable finding of this study was that the case involved the accepting of free gifts was considered much more serious by Dutch officer than it was by American officers. The Dutch were also more willing to report the activities of their colleagues when compared to counterparts in the United States. This alludes to the possibility that cultural norms of acceptance for corrupt behavior in the United States are directly tied to the stronger blue wall of silence. This finding of less severe views of integrity issues in the United States was supported by Ekenvall (2003) in his cross cultural comparison of integrity among Swedish, American and Croatian police forces. He found that Swedish police were stricter in their views of integrity issues when compared to both their American and Croatian counterparts.

Alain (2004) examined integrity in Quebec police officers using the Klockars, et al. (2000) integrity survey. He found that younger officers in Quebec were less likely to report less serious cases from the integrity survey. It appears the longer an individual remains within the department the more likely they are to enforce the official policies of that department. Support for the "blue wall of silence" was also found by Westmarland

(2005). Behaviors associated with noble cause corruption were more likely to be privy to the "blue wall of silence", while personal gains corruption was often not privy to the "blue wall of silence". Indicating that the subculture of policing is deliberate in the types of crimes it supports and does not support.

Ivkovich (2005) examined integrity across three countries (e.g. Croatia, Finland and United States) using the Klockars, et al., (2000) integrity survey. The study had a sample of both supervisors and line officers. She found that supervisors rated cases more seriously than line officers. This finding would later be supported by Schafer & Martinelli (2008). Supervisors were especially stricter in their views, when compared to line officers as it pertained to the less severe cases of misconduct.

Schafer & Martinelli (2008) examined integrity in first-line supervisors in the Sunnyville Police Department. The study replicated the earlier Klockars et al. (2000) examination of police integrity but utilized a sample of supervisors instead of line officers as the sample population. Their study found that in comparison to the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study his sample rated the cases with more severity especially when it came to low and mid level cases. Female and African American respondents in his sample viewed the cases more seriously and were more likely to report the cases in comparison to the rest of his sample (Schafer & Martinelli, 2008).

Research Tool

Klockars et al., (2000) created a research tool to examine police integrity through an organizational approach otherwise known in the literature as rotten orchard/barrel theory. They utilized this approach because it allows for an indirect examination of the topic of corruption that is less likely to encounter resistance. By making inquiries that are from an organizational approach rather than an individual approach, officers will be more willing to be honest with their responses increasing the validity of the study (Klockars, et al., 2000; Klockars, et al, 2006). Specifically, officers will feel that they are giving insight into the factors that influence integrity within an organization rather than providing information on fellow officers that participate in corrupt activities. Also examining the issue from an organizational approach makes it more amenable to study than examining from the individual approach which normally ties into issues of morality that are more difficult to examine (Klockars, et al., 2006).

To examine this issue a quantitative survey was created that presented questions which are the foundation of integrity in any department. This tool has proven to be useful in a number of different research studies (Ekenvall, 2003; Klockars, et al., 2000; Klockars, et al., 2004; Newham, 2002; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008). It has been even been used successfully in police departments outside the United States allowing for cross cultural comparison (Ivkovich, 2005; Newham, 2002; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008). The survey provides officers with 11 hypothetical case scenarios and asks respondents to respond to the case scenarios by answering 7 questions (see Appendix B and C). Six of these questions were designed to assess the normative inclination of police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation. The remaining question

asked respondents whether the behavior described in the scenario was a violation of the agency's official policy. Specifically, the questions seek to examine the seriousness, discipline and willingness to report the misconduct cases. To ensure the validity of responses officers were asked to respond to two additional questions at the end of the survey. These were questions asking if participants felt colleagues would answer the survey honestly and if they themselves had answered the questions honestly. Those who respond that they did not answer questions honestly had their surveys discarded (Klockars, et al., 2000).

Research Foundation

The literature review leads to a number of research questions and hypotheses that will be examined by the researcher. These research questions are based on the view that a police organization is responsible for the activity both positive, and negative, within their departments. The police subculture is a major source of concern within the literature. It is considered by many researchers to be the major influence of integrity within departments. This research will base all hypotheses on 3 prongs that have been identified as being influences of the police subculture. These include changes in police training, increases in police accountability measures and changes in policing model from traditional policing to community policing model.

Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

Research is never a simple undertaking especially as it relates to Criminal Justice issues. The importance of gathering data for research is paramount in any project. Attempting to conduct research with specific groups especially as it relates to controversial topics such as corruption and integrity is difficult. This was the task placed upon the researchers to complete this project.

As the project began there was an understanding of the difficulties that come with researching a close knit and protective group like law enforcement (Klockars et al., 2000). As Klockars et al., (2000) discovered examining police comes with a number of validity concerns that this project sought to avoid. Replicating the seminal Klockars et al., (2000) study provided the best opportunity for examining this group. Using the remaining contacts that Dr. Haberfeld had within these agencies we identified ten agencies. These departments were sent correspondent letters identifying ourselves and the intensions of the project. Out of these ten agencies which were deemed most likely to participate in the research only 2 responded with approval for participation. The research went forward based upon the guidelines set forth in the proposal.

This project used both quantitative and qualitative methods to gather data. This two fold process involved surveys and informal interviews. We held informal interviews to discuss the research instrument with a small group of officers at each agency that participated in the research. These interviews lasted from one to two hours providing

feedback on the research instrument and giving insight into the culture of integrity at each department. Notes were collected during these informal discussions with each department. After the informal interviews were conducted the surveys were handed out to contacts at each respective agency. Agency 1 received 70 surveys and returned 45 completed (64%), while Agency 2 received 160 surveys and returned 45 completed (28%), and Agency 3 received about 45 surveys and returned 25 completed (55%). Surveys were then collected by the researcher at a later date. With surveys collected from each department in a relatively timely matter and with a good success rate.

Despite the initial rejection on the part of many agencies the researchers sought to gather information from a third agency in hopes of increasing the sample size. We identified an additional 4 to 5 agencies participated in the original study but with whom Dr. Haberfeld no longer had contacts within the agencies. Letters were sent to these agencies inquiring about participation in the research. One agency replied with interest in participating in the project. Plans were then made to meet with officers at this agency for the informal interview and to discuss how the surveys would be completed by officers. These initial meeting went well and the agency seemed particularly excited about participation in the research. This agency is well known for their participation in research and environment of integrity. These factors were ever present during the initial meetings and informal interviews. We left the informal meetings about the survey with a plan to distribute the surveys electronically on the website to increase our number of surveys collected. This optimism would soon turn to disappointment as the controversial nature of the research would give the police chief "cold feet" and cause him to pull out of the research project.

Numerous attempts were made to allay the concerns of the department but they proved fruitless. "Cold feet" are a part of criminal justice research especially as it relates to police officers. Without the approval of the complete department hierarchy we are unable to conduct research. Newham (2002) encountered similar refusal from managers to participate in the study for fear of affecting the reputation of the department. Punch (1989) pointed towards how increased resistance comes from the policing organization as news of your research project travels through the organization. Controversial issues such as integrity/corruption research make it ever more difficult to conduct research. There are truly restrictions placed on researchers based upon the whims of departments (Klockars, et al., 2006; Skogan & Meares, 2004).

At this point my dissertation supervisor and member of the original research team that examined police integrity, Maki Haberfeld took control of attaining a third group to participate in the research. She identified a training facility which was involved with a number of the agencies that participated in the original research. Through this facility she was able to distribute and collect the final group of surveys that would represent the third new group on our research study.

The research sample consisted of N = 116 police officers at three different agencies. This sample includes both line officers and supervisors across all participating police departments. The police departments are departments from the northeast of the United States. All information on participants and police departments that participate in the study will be kept confidential. There was no any unique identifier information for participants.

The comparison group for this dataset consisted of a sample of N = 117 police officers at two different agencies. These agencies corresponded with two of the three agencies for which data was collected from for the current research sample. This data was retrieved from the dataset used in the original Klockars et al study. Since the third agency used in the new dataset was a training facility and not specific agency there was no corresponding data from the original study for comparison. The sample breakdown for the agencies in the current dataset was Agency one (N = 45), Agency two (N = 45), Agency three (N = 26). The sample breakdown for the data from the original dataset was Agency one (N = 37) and Agency two (N = 80). Although limited in sample size it was sufficient to provide a reliable view of the nature of the culture of policing at least among these agencies.

Agency #	# of surveys
Agency 1 Current dataset	45
Agency 2 Current dataset	45
Agency 3 Current dataset	26
Agency 1 Original dataset	37
Agency 2 Original dataset	80

Informal Interviews

Informal interviews took place at two of the three departments where surveys were distributed. Due to constraints within agency three there were no informal interviews conducted at this location. The informal interviews served to improve the survey instrument and provided insight into the culture within the departments. The researchers would like to thank those that participated in these interview sessions as their insight was invaluable in improving the research tool and proving an understanding of the policing environment at their respective departments (see appendices *A, B, C* and *E*).

The interview at agency one took place with six officers and lasted nearly two hours. At agency two nearly fifteen officers participated in the interviews and the process only lasted about an hour. The officers at both agencies seemed very open about their feelings on the cases. Below are comparisons by case scenario of the discussions that took place.

Case one was agreed upon by officers at both departments as not being serious. At agency one the officers made a number of comments to back their viewpoints as to why this is acceptable. They stated:

"what you do in your private time is your private time"

"As long as you are not committing a crime or taking away from your job"

"As long as you are not recognized as a police officer"

The officers at agency one went on to explain that if you were not certain you should contact the police chief. They stated that most of these rules come from "common sense" but that if necessary you should refer to the regulations of your department.

Agency two was very similar to agency one in recognizing case one as not being a major violation. The only issue noted by officers at agency two was an explicit rule which banned officer participation any location with a liquor license "no matter what". This included working at bars or locations where liquor may be served. Since this was noted a number of times it appeared to be of utmost importance to officers at this agency. Most officers felt that this type of case was learned with experience "as most officers did not know something was wrong" until they or others were disciplined for doing it.

Case two was similar to the first in officers viewpoints expressed. They felt that this was not a major violation as long as it was evenly distributed across all levels of the department. It was not something meant to be individualized because "it then could bring trouble". An interesting thing to note with case two as it applied to members of agency two was the belief that rules also applied to family member of officers. They stated that this was an issue at their department that had been discussed with officers to avoid issues. It brought into consideration the interesting dynamic of integrity among not only officers but their family members.

Case three involved an officer accepting a bribe from a motorist and was equally deemed inappropriate and unacceptable by officers at both agencies. Case four was a more individualized version of case two but was equally viewed as being inappropriate at both agencies unless all officers at an agency were equally given gifts as mentioned in the case. Cases five was similar to case three in that officers at both agencies viewed it as being inappropriate and unacceptable.

Case six was viewed as being appropriate as long as an officer did not accept the gratuity on the "back end". However this was not universal as some officers at

agency one felt that under no circumstance should an officer be allowed to recommend a service to citizens. Those officers at agency two were not as strict in their viewpoint of an officer referral of service. Case seven sparked debate at both departments. Most officers viewed it as being a "case by case" basis as to whether the behavior was acceptable. At agency one, the officers continually referred to an officer that was part of the "old guard". He was an officer that was known to be involved in this activity but his actions were viewed as being acceptable because he was the "old guard". They mentioned that his actions normally took advantage of the skills mentioned in this case and was unacceptable for anyone other than himself to take advantage of within the department.

Case eight involved a drunk driving incident where no one was hurt but the person involved was a police officer. In the case the officer is assisted by a fellow officer and the incident is not reported. This case brought about the most disparity of all the cases because some officers felt it was wrong to assist the person even if they were an officer. There were others in both departments that felt "you help a brother out" if possible "as long as there are no consequences" for you. It was an interesting dynamic on display at both departments.

Case nine involved an officer receiving alcohol as payment for letting a bar remain open. Those at agency two stated this was unacceptable, while those at agency one referred once again to the fact that "they left" implying that this activity was acceptable for certain individuals. They mentioned how these individuals belonged to a different generation at the department but that this was no longer accepted now that said person has departed the organization.

Case ten involved a case of excessive force which officer at both departments believed was acceptable as a means of protecting one self. Officers at agency one stated "they do what they have to do to make sure they get home" while those at agency two stated that the activity is fine as long as "it ends once the person is arrested". Finally, case eleven was viewed as being serious by most at both departments even though a small handful at agency two felt it was acceptable to take the money if there was no one easily identified as the owner of the property.

During these discussions a number of facts were brought up about each respective agency. Officers at both agencies referred to pedagogy as the dominant training style during their academy training. All officers agreed with not identifying their date of beginning service. They felt the presidential timeline used as an estimate of date of service would assist in honesty of service. The officers referred to releases of confidential documents to the general public at both departments as being indicative of how difficult it is to maintain anonymity when self-identifying information is involved.

Agency 1 had a continuing training program that was mostly for incoming and relatively new officers. While agency 2 had no continuing training program, despite this officers' at agency 2 mentioned that if continued training was offered they would be likely to take advantage of it. Community policing was deemed the type of model promoted at both departments even though officers at Agency 1 felt this was just to appease the public and that to them the department promoted more of a problem solving approach.

No early warning system was instituted at the departments as far as the officers knew. They did recognize however that if one was in place they would not know how it

would work and that it would likely not influence their activities. Finally, officers at both agencies referred to their family history as influencing their choice of profession and how they adjusted to the police force. At both agencies officers discussed how they were more adept to understand the dynamic of the policing culture because they had learned it from family members that were members of the force. This variable would later be implemented into the analysis (see table 13.1 to 13.6).

Hypotheses

H_1: Officers will judge the cases more seriously than the officers in the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study
H_2: Officers will recommend misconduct be punished more severely than the officers in the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study
H_3: Officers will be more willing to agree with departmental guidelines for discipline than the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study
H_4: Willingness to report misconduct has increased among officers surveyed when compared to the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study
$H_{5:}$ Officers will report that their colleagues are more willing to report misconduct when compared to the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study
H_6: Officers with current knowledge of departmental guidelines will rate cases higher for seriousness, discipline and willingness to report
H_7: Officers with a longer length of service will rate the cases higher for seriousness, discipline and willingness to report
H_8: Supervisors will rate the cases more seriously than line officers
H_9: Supervisors will recommend more severe discipline than line officers
H_{10}: Supervisors will be more willing to report misconduct than line officers
H_{11}: Pedagogy training will be positively associated with the code of silence
H_{12}: Lack of in-service training will be positively associated with the code of silence
H_{13}: Lack of participation in police accountability measures will be positively associated with the code of silence
H_{14}: Traditional policing model will be negatively associated with the code of silence within departments
H_{15}: Those officers with family members in policing will be more likely to participate in the code of silence within departments
H_{16}: Environments of integrity will differ across the 3 departments surveyed

Hypotheses 1 through 5 were aimed to illuminate and replicate the foundations of the earlier Klockars, et al., (2000) research study. Specifically, these hypotheses will measure *seriousness*, *discipline* and *willingness* to report. Over the last hundred years there has cyclically been a major corruption scandal at a nationally recognized police agency every 15 to 20 years and this is the time span that has passed since the original study. Changes in these research measures could be indicative of changes in the policing environments. By comparing the scores on these measures across the new departments and their corresponding older data we can examine this issue.

Hypothesis 6 will examine the influence that departmental guidelines have in the case scores. Klockars, et al., (2006) pointed towards knowledge and belief in departmental guidelines being influential in maintaining an environment of integrity. This hypothesis will examine the impact that this had within these departments as it relates to the cases. Hypothesis **7** will examine whether officer length of service will result in higher case scores. Length of service was a variable added after the informal interviews as many officers pointed towards experiences on the job influences how they would view a number of the cases from the survey instrument.

Hypotheses 8 through 10 will examine differences across the two major groups in policing, the line officer and supervisor as it relates to the previously noted measures. The literature has pointed towards differences in the viewpoints across these groups as it relates to integrity related issues (Ivkovich, 2005; Schafer & Martinelli, (2008). This will attempt to examine this issue within the departments studied as it relates to the previously mentioned measures.

Hypothesis 11 to 14 will examine 3 prongs that have been identified as being influences of the police subculture and integrity across the departments (Klockars, et al., 2000). These include changes in police training, increases in police accountability measures and changes in policing model. The researcher hypothesizes that these factors will influences changes across the measures especially as it relates to the "code of silence" relevant questions.

Hypothesis 15 was added after the informal interviews and points towards previous family experience with employment in the police force influencing views on "the code of silence". Officers mentioned that familial experience with the "code of silence" had influenced their decision to participate in the "code of silence" upon joining the force. It appeared that at least initially upon joining the force, most of these officers understood that participation in the "code of silence" was a part of the process that comes with joining the force. These hypotheses will give insight into how changes implemented have helped or deterred integrity issues over the past 15 years.

Hypothesis 16 will replicate the foundations of the earlier Klockars, et al., (2000) research study. Specifically, these hypotheses will measure *seriousness*, *discipline* and *willingness* to report across the new departments solely. Differences across these research measures could be indicative of the unique environments of integrity at the respective departments.

Variables

This study attempts to examine the culture of policing by examining the integrity measures created by Klockars et al., (2000). In addition a number of variables across the prongs identified will be tested. These variables are explained further below.

Independent variables

Independent variables include the departments, police training techniques, policing model and police accountability measures. These variables were deemed suitable for analysis based upon both the literature and the informal interviews that took place. These will give insight into changes and impacts that they may have on the environment of policing (see table *1.1*)

Dependent variables

The research tool created by Klockars, et al., (2000) will serve as the dependent variable in this study. The research tool contains seven questions to eleven cases that examine *seriousness*, *discipline* and *willingness* to report. The answers to these questions will give insight to the environment of policing and the impact of changes implemented in the aftermath of the original research study (see table *2.1* to *2.11*)

To fit the assumption that no more than 20% of the categories must have expected frequencies of less than 5 for chi-square analysis the dependent variable had to be recoded. This recoding created new categories which still measured the variables properly. Please find below charts indicating how recoding feature worked (see tables *3.1* to *3.7*).

Table 1.1: Independent variables

Variable Name	Variable Meaning
RECODEPD	Recoded police department
DGUIDELINESRECODE	Often department updates changes admin guidelines
RECODEPRESIDENT	Length of service according to presidential timeline
POSITION	Position within police department
ACADEMY TRAINING	Describe majority of academy training
POSTCONTRAINING	Required post academy or continuing training
EARLYWARNINGSYSTEM	Does department have early warning system
DEPARTMENTPOLICEMODEL	Police model believe your department mostly follow
POLICEFAMILY	Family member officer prior to joining the force
NEWDEPARTMENTS	New police departments

Dependent Variables

Table *2.1*

Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NBUSINOS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NBUSINMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NBUSINVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NBUSINOD	Discipline should receive
NBUSINMD	Discipline would receive
NBUSINOR	Own willingness to report behavior
NBUSINMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table *2.2*

Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NMEALSOS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NMEALSMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NMEALSVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NMEALSOD	Discipline should receive
NMEALSMD	Discipline would receive
NMEALSOR	Own willingness to report behavior
NMEALSMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table *2.3*

Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NSPEEDOS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NSPEEDMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NSPEEDVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NSPEEDOD	Discipline should receive
NSPEEDMD	Discipline would receive
NSPEEDOR	Own willingness to report behavior
NSPEEDMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table *2.4*

Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NHOLIOS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NHOLIMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NHOLIVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NHOLIOD	Discipline should receive
NHOLIMD	Discipline would receive
NHOLIOR	Own willingness to report behavior
NHOLIMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table *2.5*

Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about 2 days' pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NBURGOS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NBURGMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NBURGVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NBURGOD	Discipline should receive
NBURGMD	Discipline would receive
NBURGOR	Own willingness to report behavior
NBURGMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table *2.6*

Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the shop owner.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NAUTOOS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NAUTOMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NAUTOVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NAUTOOD	Discipline should receive
NAUTOMD	Discipline would receive
NAUTOOR	Own willingness to report behavior
NAUTOMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table *2.7*

Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the *supervisor's* behavior.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NSUPEROS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NSUPERMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NSUPERVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NSUPEROD	Discipline should receive
NSUPERMD	Discipline would receive
NSUPEROR	Own willingness to report behavior
NSUPERMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table 2.8

Case 8. At 2:00 a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense, he transports the driver to his home.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NALCHOS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NALCHMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NALCHVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NALCHOD	Discipline should receive
NALCHMD	Discipline would receive
NALCHOR	Own willingness to report behavior
NALCHMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table *2.9*

Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NBAROS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NBARMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NBARVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NBAROD	Discipline should receive
NBARMD	Discipline would receive
NBAROR	Own willingness to report behavior
NBARMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table *2.10*

Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NFORCEOS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NFORCEMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NFORCEVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NFORCEOD	Discipline should receive
NFORCEMD	Discipline would receive
NFORCEOR	Own willingness to report behavior
NFORCEMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table *2.11*

Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money equivalent to a full day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property but keeps the money for himself.	
Variable Name	Variable Meaning
NWALLETOS	Own view of seriousness for behavior
NWALLETMS	Others view of seriousness of behavior
NWALLETVI	Was behavior a Violation of Policy
NWALLETOD	Discipline should receive
NWALLETMD	Discipline would receive
NWALLETOR	Own willingness to report behavior
NWALLETMR	Others willingness to report behavior

Table 3.1: Own seriousness of behavior was originally rated on 5 part likert scale

1	Not very serious
2	
3	
4	
5	Very serious

It was recoded to become

1 + 2 -> **1**	Not Serious
3 + 4+ 5 -> **2**	Serious

Table 3.2: Others seriousness of behavior was originally rated on 5 part likert scale

1	Not very serious
2	
3	
4	
5	Very serious

It was recoded to become

1 + 2 -> **1**	Not Serious
3 + 4+ 5 -> **2**	Serious

Table 3.3: Violation of Policy was originally rated on a 5 part likert scale

1	Definitely Not
2	
3	
4	
5	Definitely Yes

It was recoded to become

1 + 2 ->**1**	No violation of policy
3->**2**	Unsure
4+5-> **3**	Violation of policy

Table 3.4: Discipline should receive was originally rated on a 6 part likert scale

1	None
2	Verbal Reprimand
3	Written Reprimand
4	Period of suspension with no pay
5	Demotion in rank
6	Dismissal

It was recoded to become

1 + 2 -> **1**	No reprimand
3 + 4-> **2**	Moderate reprimand
5 + 6 -> **3**	Serious reprimand

Table 3.5: Discipline would receive was originally rated on a 6 part likert scale

1	None
2	Verbal Reprimand
3	Written Reprimand
4	Period of suspension with no pay
5	Demotion in rank
6	Dismissal

It was recoded to become

1 + 2 -> **1**	No reprimand
3 + 4-> **2**	Moderate reprimand
5 + 6 -> **3**	Serious reprimand

Table 3.6: Own willingness to report was originally rated on a 5 part likert scale

1	Definitely Not
2	
3	
4	
5	Definitely Yes

It was recoded to become

1 + 2 ->**1**	No
3->**2**	Unsure
4+5-> **3**	Yes

Table 3.7: Others willingness to report was originally rated on a 5 part likert scale

1	Definitely Not
2	
3	
4	
5	Definitely Yes

It was recoded to become

1 + 2 ->**1**	No
3->**2**	Unsure
4+5-> **3**	Yes

Techniques of Analyses

A number of descriptive and inferential techniques were used to analyze the survey data collected. In the Klockars, et al. study (2000), mean scores were created for the survey results on police officers' perceptions of offense seriousness, appropriate and expected discipline and willingness to report, ranked by officers perception of case seriousness. This was done for the eleven cases and the cases were then ranked to determine the case ranking across the measures on *seriousness*, *discipline* and *willingness* to report. Similarly this study will create mean scores for the cases across these measures for the officers participating in the study (see table *4.5* to *4.9*).

Mean scores are a measure of central tendency and used to give the average distribution of scores for each case by department (Jackson, 2005). By assigning mean scores rank order can be assigned for each case by department (Klockars, et al., 2004). Mode and Median scores are other measure of central tendency that will be used along with Mean score.

Klockars, et al.., (2000) used an independent groups t-test to examine means scores across the cases for the measures on seriousness, discipline and willingness to report. The small sample size of this research sample affects the ability of the researcher to use parametric statistical test. This is a common problem in Criminal Justice research and the use of Chi-Square and cross tabs is acceptable (Dean & Gottschalk, 2011) There were other issues such as the uneven distribution of the data that prevented the use of comparisons of means such as T- Test and ANOVA's. As such non-parametric test such as Chi-Square were best for use in analyzing this data (Cronk, 2002; Weisburd & Britt, 2007). Chi-Square test of independence as a statistical test has very few assumptions

with its one important assumption being that “no more than 20% of the categories should have expected frequencies of less than 5” (Cronk, 2002; 88).

To meet the main assumption of the Chi-Square statistical test the data had to be transformed using the recoded feature in SPSS. This recoding rationale was displayed in the data analysis portion of this dissertation (see tables *3.1* to *3.7).* Recoding allowed for the data to fit this assumption of the Chi-Square statistical test and was necessary for the data analysis to go forth. Transforming data and recoding is useful part of data analysis and has been used in other cases (Weisburd & Britt, 2007).

Table 4.1: Frequency for presidency

Presidency your academy training for police force took place					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1988-1992 George Bush Sr.	21	9.0%	18.6%	18.6%
	1993-2000 Clinton	46	19.7%	40.7%	59.3%
	2001-2008 G.W. Bush	23	9.9%	20.4%	79.6%
	2009-2011 Obama	4	1.7%	3.5%	83.2%
	Other	19	8.2%	16.8%	100.0%
	Total	113	48.5%	100%	
	System	117	50.2%		
	Total	120	51.5%		
Total		233	100.0%		

Table 4.1 shows that most of the officers came into their organization during the two terms of President Clinton. Most of the study participants have been officers since before 2001. The large number of missing cases is because the original data had no corresponding information for this variable.

Table 4.2: Frequency for admin guidelines

Who informs you of changes in administrative guidelines					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	self-informed	4	1.7%	3.4%	3.4%
	direct supervisor	50	21.5%	43.1%	46.6%
	police chief	21	9.0%	18.1%	64.7%
	police legal advisor	2	.9%	1.7%	66.4%
	internal affairs	4	1.7%	3.4%	69.8%
	never informed	3	1.3%	2.6%	72.4%
	Other	32	13.7%	27.6%	100.0%
	Total	116	49.8%	100.0%	
Missing	System	117	50.2%		
Total		233	100.0%		

Table 4.2 shows that most of the officers were informed by their direct supervisor of changes in administrative guidelines. This shows the important role that supervisors have in maintaining an informed organization. The large number of missing cases is because the original data had no corresponding information for this variable.

Table 4.3: Frequency for police model

Police model believe is most important in a police organization					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Traditional	6	2.6%	5.5%	5.5%
	problem solving policing	55	23.6%	50.5%	56.0%
	community policing	48	20.6%	44.0%	100.0%
	Total	109	46.8%	100.0%	
Missing	8	7	3.0%		
	System	117	50.2%		
	Total	124	53.2%		
Total		233	100.0%		

Table 4.3 shows that most of the officers preferred a Problem solving policing or Community policing model instead of the traditional policing model. The large number of missing cases is because the original data had no corresponding information for this variable.

Table 4.4 Frequency for supervisor interaction

Description of most supervisor interaction					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	at beginning and end of shifts	50	21.5%	45.5%	45.5%
	during the filing of reports	13	5.6%	11.8%	57.3%
	at departmental meetings	5	2.1%	4.5%	61.8%
	during casual/friendly meetings	18	7.7%	16.4%	78.2%
	Other	24	10.3%	21.8%	100.0%
	Total	110	47.2%	100.0%	
Missing	8	6	2.6%		
	System	117	50.2%		
	Total	123	52.8%		
Total		233	100.0%		

Table 4.4 shows that most officers interact with their supervisors on a daily basis at the beginning and end of their shifts.

Table 4.5: Agency 1 Original Dataset Mean Scores

	Seriousness				Discipline				Willingness to Report			
	Own View		Other Officers		Should Receive		Would Receive		Own View		Other Officers	
Case Scenario	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Case 1. Off-Duty Security System Business	1.65	1	1.54	1	1.22	1	1.17	1	1.22	1	1.46	1
Case 2. Free Meals, Discounts on Beat	2.76	4	2.19	3	2.19	2	2.32	2	1.46	2	1.65	2
Case 3. Bribe From Speeding Motorist	4.95	10	4.59	10	4.65	10	4.65	9	3.46	9	3.32	10
Case 4. Holiday Gifts From Merchants	2.31	2	2.09	2	2.28	3	2.47	3	1.58	3	1.69	3
Case 5. Crime Scene Theft of Watch	5	11	4.73	11	5.65	11	5.38	11	4.05	11	3.86	11
Case 6. Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.11	7	3.7	7	3.84	8	3.89	8	3.05	8	2.81	7
Case 7. Supervisor Holiday for Tuneup	4.22	8	4.05	8	3.51	7	3.27	6	2.89	7	3.03	9
Case 8. Coverup of Police DUI Accident	2.61	3	2.41	4	2.57	4	3	4	1.78	4	1.69	4
Case 9. Drinks to Ignore Late Bar Closing	3.94	6	3.25	6	3.22	6	3.37	7	2.22	5	1.83	5
Case 10. Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.49	5	3	5	3	5	3.24	5	2.3	6	1.86	6
Case 11. Theft From Found Wallet	4.73	9	4.43	9	4.59	9	4.73	10	3.51	10	2.92	8

Table 4.6: Agency 1 Current Dataset Mean Scores

Case Scenario	Seriousness				Discipline				Willingness to Report			
	Own View		Other Officers		Should Receive		Would Receive		Own View		Other Officers	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Case 1. Off-Duty Security System Business	1.42	1	1.64	1	1.11	1	1.09	1	1.09	1	1.44	1
Case 2. Free Meals, Discounts on Beat	3.02	3	2.31	2	2.38	3	2.24	2	1.69	2	1.67	2
Case 3. Bribe From Speeding Motorist	4.98	10	4.84	10	5.05	9	4.75	10	3.86	9	3.5	10
Case 4. Holiday Gifts From Merchants	2.82	2	2.36	3	2.22	2	2.24	3	1.78	3	1.89	4
Case 5. Crime Scene Theft of Watch	4.98	11	4.91	11	5.82	11	5.73	11	4.51	11	3.93	11
Case 6. Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.47	7	4	7	4.51	8	4.36	8	3.82	8	3.47	9
Case 7. Supervisor Holiday for Tuneup	4.49	8	4.31	8	4.24	7	3.96	7	3.62	7	3.42	7
Case 8. Coverup of Police DUI Accident	3.11	4	2.87	4	2.51	4	2.47	4	1.78	4	1.73	3
Case 9. Drinks to Ignore Late Bar Closing	4.38	6	3.78	6	3.69	6	3.73	6	2.89	6	2.71	6
Case 10. Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.44	5	3.04	5	3	5	2.96	5	2.33	5	2.07	5
Case 11. Theft From Found Wallet	4.84	9	4.59	9	5.09	10	4.74	9	3.93	10	3.43	8

Table 4.7: Agency 2 Original Dataset Mean Scores

	Seriousness				Discipline				Willingness to Report			
	Own View		Other Officers		Should Receive		Would Receive		Own View		Other Officers	
Case Scenario	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Case 1. Off-Duty Security System Business	1.53	1	1.5	1	1.28	1	1.54	1	1.34	1	1.39	1
Case 2. Free Meals, Discounts on Beat	2.5	2	2.13	2	2.03	2	2.34	2	1.55	2	1.64	2
Case 3. Bribe From Speeding Motorist	4.89	11	4.68	11	4.59	10	4.68	10	3	9	2.96	10
Case 4. Holiday Gifts From Merchants	2.53	3	2.39	3	2.49	3	3.01	4	1.85	3	2.05	4
Case 5. Crime Scene Theft of Watch	4.88	10	4.64	10	5.08	11	5.16	11	3.43	11	3.23	11
Case 6. Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.08	7	3.73	8	3.84	8	4.04	8	2.75	8	2.75	8
Case 7. Supervisor Holiday for Tuneup	3.81	6	3.45	6	3.2	6	3.24	5	2.55	6	2.6	7
Case 8. Coverup of Police DUI Accident	2.6	4	2.53	4	2.51	4	2.91	3	1.95	4	1.99	3
Case 9. Drinks to Ignore Late Bar Closing	4.15	8	3.69	7	3.65	7	3.87	7	2.64	7	2.54	6
Case 10. Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.35	5	2.96	5	2.95	5	3.32	6	2.28	5	2.1	5
Case 11. Theft From Found Wallet	4.49	9	3.99	9	4.06	9	4.18	9	3.01	10	2.82	9

Table 4.8: Agency 2 Current Dataset Means Scores

	Seriousness				Discipline				Willingness to Report			
	Own View		Other Officers		Should Receive		Would Receive		Own View		Other Officers	
Case Scenario	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Case 1. Off-Duty Security System Business	1.24	1	1.31	1	1.16	1	1.16	1	1.11	1	1.33	1
Case 2. Free Meals, Discounts on Beat	2.87	3	2.31	3	2.11	2	2.2	2	1.84	2	1.75	2
Case 3. Bribe From Speeding Motorist	4.98	10	4.91	11	5.07	10	4.89	10	3.82	11	3.29	10
Case 4. Holiday Gifts From Merchants	2.41	2	2.18	2	2.24	3	2.39	3	1.93	3	1.84	3
Case 5. Crime Scene Theft of Watch	5	11	4.69	10	5.33	11	5.34	11	3.71	10	3.57	11
Case 6. Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.6	8	4.31	8	4.42	8	4.44	8	3.4	8	3.29	9
Case 7. Supervisor Holiday for Tuneup	4.22	6	3.91	6	3.48	6	3.39	5	3.09	6	2.89	6
Case 8. Coverup of Police DUI Accident	3.48	4	3.02	4	3.14	4	3.28	4	2.41	4	2.18	4
Case 9. Drinks to Ignore Late Bar Closing	4.39	7	4.14	7	3.8	7	3.7	7	3.34	7	3.05	7
Case 10. Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.93	5	3.27	5	3.45	5	3.5	6	3.09	5	2.59	5
Case 11. Theft From Found Wallet	4.73	9	4.38	9	4.56	9	4.58	9	3.6	9	3.18	8

Table 4.9: Agency 3 Current Dataset Means Scores

Case Scenario	Seriousness				Discipline				Willingness to Report			
	Own View		Other Officers		Should Receive		Would Receive		Own View		Other Officers	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Case 1. Off-Duty Security System Business	1.85	1	1.58	1	1.19	1	1.19	1	1.44	1	1.32	1
Case 2. Free Meals, Discounts on Beat	3.38	2	2.58	2	2.54	2	2.38	2	3.19	2	2.27	2
Case 3. Bribe From Speeding Motorist	5	10	5	10	5.35	8	5.38	10	4.85	8	4.58	10
Case 4. Holiday Gifts From Merchants	3.81	3	3.31	4	3.27	4	3.12	3	3.85	4	2.85	4
Case 5. Crime Scene Theft of Watch	5	11	5	11	5.92	1	5.92	11	4.96	11	4.73	11
Case 6. Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.96	8	4.81	9	5.5	10	5.35	9	4.96	10	4.42	9
Case 7. Supervisor Holiday for Tuneup	4.85	7	4.69	6	4.31	7	4.19	7	4.81	7	4.27	8
Case 8. Coverup of Police DUI Accident	3.81	4	3.12	3	3.19	3	3.19	4	3.31	3	2.38	3
Case 9. Drinks to Ignore Late Bar Closing	4.84	6	4.72	7	4.12	6	4.04	6	4.72	6	3.8	6
Case 10. Excessive Force on Car Thief	4.38	5	3.71	5	3.88	5	3.71	5	4.29	5	3	5
Case 11. Theft From Found Wallet	5	9	4.76	8	5.48	9	5.32	8	4.92	9	4.08	7

Chapter 4

Results and Data Analysis

Comparing the mean scores for the original and current dataset across agencies one and two (see tables 4.5 to 4.8) provides insight about the changing environments within these agencies. Using the .50 "rule of thumb" to determine the substantially important variables in the dataset a number of cases were found to have changed across multiple measures (Klockars et al., 2005). For both agencies the mean scores were higher across nearly all cases and all measures. Specifically for agency one cases six (auto repair), seven (supervisor) and nine (bar) were found to have changed by more than .50 "rule of thumb". For agency two cases six (auto repair), eight (DUI) and ten (force) were found to have changed by more than .50 "rule of thumb". These findings are further supported by the other analyses within this dissertation.

Appendix F will include data tables for only those variables found to be significant in the analysis. These data tables contain information provided by the SPSS analysis of the data. The dependent and independent variables included in these analyses were named earlier in the paper (see *Table 1.1., 2.1 to 2.11*).

As stated earlier in the paper the failure to meet the assumptions of parametric statistical test meant using Chi-Square test of independence to examine differences across groups. The chi-square test is used often by criminal justice researchers because of the failure of most data to meet the assumptions of parametric test of significance and the

small sample sizes of most criminal justice data (Weisburg & Britt, 2007). In this analysis the departments were combined and recoded into two groups. These groups were renamed original police departments and current police departments. To maintaining the reliability of comparison the third agency from which data was collected but lacked a comparison group from the original data was removed from this analysis. This meant that only two agencies and their corresponding data were included in this analysis (see Tables *5.1 to 5.33 in Appendix F*).

Chi-Squares were run for all 11 case scenarios using the seven questions which examined seriousness, discipline and willingness to report for each case. Below please find the results for this analysis. Please make note that only significant findings will be reported. Any unreported findings were found to be insignificant by the analyses and reported in the following (see tables *5.33, 6.2, 7.12, 8.8, 9.6, 10.1, 11.5, 12.8, 13.6* and *14.38*). All relevant data tables are in Appendix F.

Chapter 5

Discussions and Conclusions

The world has changed immeasurably in the 15 years since the seminal Klockars et al., (2000) study was conducted. This change has especially permeated in the world of policing. Police officers now add a new duty to their list of responsibilities. They are in the front lines of the War on Terror protecting citizens from those that aim to do this country harm domestically. This change along with other changes in areas such as training, policing model and administrative guidelines have all occurred in the aftermath of the original study.

The Klockars et al., (2000) study has been replicated a number of times during this time span (Alain, 2004; Ekenvall, 2003; Huberts et al., 2003; Ivkovich, 2005; Newham, 2002. These replications have contributed to the literature and provided insight into the issue of police integrity yet they have all failed to re-examine the population studied in the original study. These replications have nearly solely concentrated on examining police departments internationally using the research tool (Klockars, et al., 2004). Those agencies that participated in the original study have not been revisited. This is important because cycles of corruption normally take place at major police departments across the country in time spans of 10 to 20 years. This provides further incentive to examine the groups from the original research group.

This study was designed to investigate how the cumulative collections of factors over the past 15 years would affect the environment of policing at a number of agencies that were part of the original study. Changes in mean scores for the cases from the old agency and new

agency data could give insight into changes in the police culture. The addition of variables such as training type, administrative guidelines, family history, and early warning systems will provide insight into the impact that these tools could have in the pursuit of integrity as it relates to the cases. The literature has pointed to these being factors that influence the policing culture or tools that have been created to prevent the growth of corruption within departments (Klockars, 2006; Walker, 2007; White and Escobar, 2008).

A major part of this study, were the differences across the police departments. This held true for the comparison between the original (N = 117) and current departments (N=90). It also was noted across the current departments solely (N = 116). But these were not the only significant finding across the variables. Variables such as police model, training, length of service and officer position were also found to be significant across a number of the cases. Finally, variables such as early warning system, post academy training, having had family members in the police department and administrative guidelines offered little or no support in terms of their influence as it pertained to the cases.

The results of this study will be examined by reviewing each specific hypotheses in depth below:

Hypotheses one to five aimed to test whether environments of policing had changed at the departments from the original study (N=117) to the current dataset (N =90). Two agencies from the original study were retested using the original research tool. The third agency from which data was collected was not used in this analysis as it did not have a corresponding data group for comparison. The hypothesis predicts that the environment of policing has changed in the aftermath of the original study. The changes implemented in its aftermath plus the

passage of time, have made police officer viewpoints of seriousness, discipline and willingness to report more likely.

These findings are reflected in tables (*5.1* to *5.33*) and present a vast amount of support for these hypotheses. As it relates to own view of significance, four of the cases were found to be significant. These cases were Auto, Supervisor, Alcohol and Force (see tables *5.11, 5.17, 5.23,* and *5.28*). These analyses all indicated that those at current police departments were more likely to rate their own seriousness of offense at a higher level than those in the original police departments as it related to these cases.

The Auto, Supervisor, Alcohol and Wallet cases were all found to be significant for others view of seriousness (see tables *5.12, 5.18, 5.24* and *5.29*). The analysis for these cases resulted in findings that were similar to those of the own seriousness variable. Those at current police departments were more likely to rate their others seriousness of offense at a higher level than those in the original police departments. An interesting note as it relates to both seriousness variables was the support across both the own and other view of seriousness. As it relates to these cases officers at the current departments were likely to believe that views of seriousness had increased not only for themselves but for other officers within their departments.

The second and third hypotheses sought to test whether there had been any changes in the environment of policing as it relates to the discipline variables from the original to the new study. Once again this hypothesis predicts that changes implemented in the aftermath of the original study have resulted in increases in view of the discipline should and would receive for the cases.

Five variables were found to be significant for the discipline should receive variable. Speed, Burglary, Auto, Supervisor and Wallet were the significant cases (see tables *5.2, 5.7, 5.13, 5.19,* and *5.30*). These cases all support the hypothesis as those officers at current departments were more likely to rate discipline should receive at a higher level than those in the original police departments.

Five variables were also found to be significant for discipline would receive across the cases. These were Business, Holiday, Burglary, Auto and Supervisor (see table *5.1, 5.6, 5.8, 5.14* and *5.20*. These cases were divided on the support they offered to the hypothesis. The Burglary, Auto and Supervisor variables indicated that those officers in current police departments were more likely to feel that the behavior would receive a more serious discipline than those in the original police departments. However, in the Burglary and Holiday cases those in the original police departments were more likely to recommend a more serious discipline for the cases than those in the current police departments.

The Burglary, Auto, and Supervisor cases were all found to be significant across both the discipline should and would receive variables. This points towards not only a significant increase in the measures from the original data to the current data, but also indicates support for the departments discipline guidelines by officers. Officers in the current departments believed that the increased discipline by the departments for these behaviors was warranted as they also felt there should be an increased discipline for engaging in the activities. This supports the hypothesis that officers will agree with department guidelines for discipline.

Hypothesis five and six dealt with the reporting of the behaviors described in the case scenarios. As with the first three hypotheses, these hypotheses posit that officers will be more willing to report and feel that others will report behaviors related to the cases. It predicts that

environments of policing have changed since the original study took place at both of the departments.

Six of the cases were found to be significant for the variable would you report this behavior. Speed, Burglary, Auto, Supervisor, Bar and Wallet cases were found to be significant for own willingness to report (see tables *5.3, 5.9, 5.15, 5.21, 5.26,* and *5.31*). These cases all provided the same support to indicating that those at current police departments were more likely to report the behavior at a higher level than those in the original police departments.

Six of these cases were also found to be significant for the others willingness to report variable. These cases were Speed, Burglary, Auto, Supervisor, Bar and Wallet. Each of these cases supported the hypothesis as those at the current police departments were more likely to feel others at their department would report the behavior at a higher level than those in the original police departments (see table *5.4, 5.10, 5.16, 5.22, 5.27* and *5.32).*

It should be noted that across both the own willingness to report and others willingness to report variables all the cases were the same. At least as it pertains to these cases at these departments there appears to have been a change in the "code of silence" that these variables attempt to test. This change was especially drastic because all the cases were significant for not only ones willingness to report but others willingness to report. This points to a change in the environment of policing as it relates to the long cited blue wall of silence.

During the informal interview segment of this project an officer gave a hint that this might be a possibility in the current policing environment. The officer stated "the blue wall of silence is very thin and can crash at anytime". He referenced this statement when explaining how one would go about choosing when they would participate in the cases

used in the study. This is interesting because not too long ago the "blue wall of silence" was viewed as invincible but it appears a change has occurred in the environment of policing over the past 15 years to change this viewpoint as far as it involves these two departments.

Despite the fact that significant interactions were only found for the cases noted above as it related to the seriousness, discipline and willingness to report variables, it appeared that across the board there was an increase in mean scores in nearly all cases (see table *4.5, 4.6, 4.7* and *4.8*). The two groups of police officers that have received the bulk of the attention from corruption researchers are the "meat eaters" and "grass eaters" (Barker and Roebuck, 1973). However, there is a third group of police officers that had received little to no attention in corruption research. These groups of officers do not participate in corrupt behavior and have been identified as "the birds" (Barker and Roebuck, 1973). These officers are identified as birds because they do not "eat anything" instead they "just fly up high" because they are the officers that maintain the integrity of the department (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; 35). These individuals were later identified as straight shooters in Barker (2006) five part officer typology. The examination of this group within this project fills a gap in the policing literature.

These changes in mean scores could be most directly the result of an increased role by "the birds" in developing a department of integrity as it pertained to these two departments. Officers are less willing to turn a blind eye to questionable behavior. The "birds" are participating in a vital role within their department, they are increasing the environment of integrity. The cause of this increased view in seriousness, discipline and

willingness to report can be further explained by looking at a number of factors that have been noted as being possibly being influential of environments of integrity.

Hypothesis six tested whether departmental guidelines or more specifically being informed of departmental guidelines on consistent basis would make a difference across the case scenarios. This variable relied upon the literature that states that an individual could be participating in corruption related activities because they lack knowledge that an activity is against departmental policy (Kaariainen, et., 2008; Klockars, et al., 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006). To examine this variable both frequencies and crosstabs were run.

The variable informadminchanges was run to examine who informs officers of changes in guidelines. The most common group that informed officers of administrative guidelines were direct supervision (N=50) with 21.5%, followed by other (N=32) 13.7%, police chiefs (N=21) 9%, Self-informed (N=4) 1.7% and internal affairs (N=4) 1.7%, never informed (N=3) 1.3% and police legal advisor (N=2) .9%) (see table *4.2*). The findings support the importance of the direct supervisor in maintaining integrity within departments (Engel, 2001). This was a factor highlighted during the informal interviews when officers mentioned that they were normally informed of changes by their direct supervisor.

A crosstab was run for time period informed of administrative changes and the case scenarios. This crosstab found one significant association with time period informed of administrative changes and case scenarios (see table *6.1* and *6.2*). This points to knowledge of administrative guidelines having little to do with integrity related issues. This ties into a comment made during the informal interviews where officers stated "they did not know something was bad until someone did it". It appears that violations as it relates to

administrative guidelines were tied more directly to officers moral views and not necessarily to being the most informed department in the country.

Prior to getting into the next analysis we should examine the length of service for the sample. This variable was used to provide insight on only the new police departments and lack corresponding variables from the original dataset. To maintain anonymity of the study we provided a timeline based upon presidencies by which officers chose when they entered the service. There seemed to be a relatively even distribution of when these officers entered service with the majority (N = 46) of 19.7% entering during the two terms of Bill Clinton, Another 9.9% (N=23) entered service during the presidency of G.W. Bush, 9% (N=21) entered service during the presidency of president George Bush, 8.2 % (N=19) indicated other presidents not named and finally 1.7% (N=4) stated they entered service during the Obama administration.

The date of service variable was recoded to become a pre-2001 and post-2001 variable to examine whether younger officers differ from those officers with over ten years on the force. Although this was not part of the original research plan it was created in the aftermath of the informal interviews as officers noted that more time in service made them less likely to sanction the activities noted in the cases. Hypothesis seven predicts that length of service would result in higher mean scores for the case across the integrity measures.

Eleven significant interactions were found as it related to the variable date of service and the cases (see table *7.12*). Those officers that joined the department pre-2001 were found to be more likely to report the cases at a significantly higher rate than those that joined the department post-2001. The five case scenarios that were found significant as it related to the own reporting variable were Speed, Holiday, Burglary, Auto, Force and Wallet. This supports

what was alluded to during the informal interviews during which officers stated that they were less accepting of the behavior cited in the cases as their time in service has increased. The factors influencing this dynamic are unclear but could be tied to hypotheses eight to ten which look at differences in the cases as it relates to supervisor and line officers.

Hypotheses eight to ten tested whether position in police department affected your view on the case scenarios as it related to seriousness, discipline and willingness to report. Since this variable did not have corresponding information from the original database this variable only examines the influence across the new datasets. The findings for this variable are reflected in tables (*8.1* to *8.8*). The tables provide some support for the viewpoint that supervisors will rate cases higher than line officers.

In general the supervisors are much tougher in their assessments of incidents than line officers. This was especially true as it came to the force and speed case scenarios. This can be due to factors such as length of time (*as noted in hypothesis seven*), increased duties and responsibilities affecting viewpoints of behaviors and the possibility that they were better informed of administrative guidelines. Huberts et al., (2007) supported this finding in their study when they indicated the importance of role modeling by supervision in reducing unethical behaviors within agencies. According to this study supervisors must have a stricter view of integrity so that officers can model their behavior and result in more integrity throughout the agency.

Hypothesis eleven dealt with the impact of type of academy training and the integrity measures across the current police departments. It was hypothesized based upon the literature that a Pedagogy style of training would lead more officers to participate in activities associated with the "code of silence". These findings of this analysis are reflected in tables (*9.1* to *9.6*)

and provide little support for the hypothesis. Although a small number of interactions were found to be significant none were found to be associated with the reporting variables that would indicate an association with the code of silence. This hypothesis appears to have been disproven as its effect was negligible as it relates to this study. This stands in contrast to the literature (Caldero & Crank, 2004; White & Escobar, 2008) which as pointed to training styles being influential of environments of policing.

Hypothesis twelve dealt with the association of post academy training and integrity across the current police departments. It specifically sought to test how the environment of integrity was affected by continued training. These findings are reflected in table (*10.1*). There is no support for this variable as no interactions were found to be significant. This is interesting because the literature had identified this as possibly being an issue of integrity within departments (Klockars, et al., 2006).

Hypothesis thirteen dealt with the association of police accountability measure and integrity across the current departments. It specifically sought to test how early warning systems could influence environments of integrity within departments. The findings are reflected in table (*11.1* to *11.5*). Although significant variables were identified by the analysis there does not seem to be a pattern identified within these variables because of the small number of significant interaction identified. This combined with statements from the informal interviews indicates that perhaps early warning systems do not even serve a deterrent effect as it relates to integrity issues.

Hypothesis fourteen dealt with the association of police model and integrity across the current departments. It specifically sought to test how differences in a problem solving, community policing and traditional model might affect incidents of integrity as it relates to the

cases. Although a small number of variables were found significant for this variable they do offer directionality by pointing towards the traditional policing model being tied to less serous views on these integrity related issues (see tables *12.1* to *12.8*). This variable requires future evaluation because of the restrictions associated with this analysis.

Hypothesis fifteen examined the association between having a family member in the police force and integrity across the new departments. This variable was analyzed in the aftermath of the informal interviews, when some officers pointed to their family members influencing their viewpoints of the police integrity. Specifically, officers pointed towards family introducing them into the concept of a "code of silence" so that they knew when to keep their mouth quiet once they joined the force. Although a couple of cases were found significant for this variable there was little support for the influence of family as it relates to views on the cases.

The findings of significance support the view that some of these variables have been influential in the change in police culture over the years since the original study. The most viable variables appear to be length of service, position within the departments and police model. Despite these being the only significant variables found in the analysis all the variables deserve continued study to thoroughly understand the dynamics of factors that influence integrity.

Hypothesis sixteen dealt with the environment of integrity across the current police departments. It specifically sought to test how the environment of integrity at the new police departments differed across each other. These findings are reflected in Tables (*14.1* to *14.38*). These tables indicate a number of things about how these departments differed across case scenarios.

The Business, Holiday, Supervisor and Force cases (see tables *14.1, 14.7, 14.16* and *14.28*) were found to be significant for own view of seriousness. Holiday, Supervisor, Bar and Force cases (see tables *14.8, 14.17, 14.25* and *14.*29) were all found to be significant for others view of seriousness. Across the Holiday, Supervisor and Force cases there was support across both the own and other view of seriousness. As it related to the seriousness variables Agency three was the top rated agency as it pertained all seriousness variable while Agency two was normally the least rated agency as it pertained to most of the significant seriousness variables.

The Meal, Holiday, Supervisor, Alcohol, Force and Wallet cases were found to be significant for Discipline should receive (see tables*14.2, 14.10, 14.18, 14.22, 14.30* and *14.34*). Supervisor, Alcohol, Force and Wallet cases were all found to be significant for Discipline would receive (see tables *14.19*, *14.23*, *14.31* and *14.35*). Across the Supervisor, Alcohol, Force and Wallet cases there was support across both the discipline should and would receive variables. As it related to the discipline variables Agency three was the top rated agency as it pertained all discipline variables, while Agency one and two were equally likely to be the least rated agency as it pertained to most of the significant discipline variables.

The Meal, Speed, Holiday, Auto, Supervisor, Alcohol, Bar, Force and Wallet cases were found to be significant (see tables *14.3, 14.5, 14.11, 14.14, 14.20, 14.24, 14.26, 14.32* and *14.36*) for own willingness to report. Meal, Speed, Holiday, Burglary, Auto, Supervisor, Bar, Force and Wallet cases were all found to be significant (see tables *14.4, 14.6, 14.12, 14.14, 14.15, 14.21, 14.27, 14.33* and *14.37*) for others willingness to report. Across the Meal, Speed, Holiday, Auto, Supervisor, Bar and Force cases there was support across both the reporting variables. As it related to the reporting variables Agency three was the top rated

agency as it pertained all reporting variables, while Agency one and two were equally likely to be the least rated agency as it pertained to most of the significant reporting variables.

This could be the result of different policing environments making the case scenarios more and less acceptable within the departments. Please refer to tables *4.6, 4.8* and *4.9* to view the differences and similarities across departments in mean scores and rankings. This also provides evidence that policing environment are unique despite being in similar locations.

These analyses provide insight into the state of integrity at these departments that participated of the original study. The findings indicate as it pertains to the Klockars, et al., (2000) research tool officers at the departments will rate cases more serious, recommend harsher discipline and be more willing to report the behavior. This points to an increase in integrity among officers and indirectly indicates that there has been a reduction in corruption among these departments.

This analysis expanded upon the original Klockars, et al., (2000) study by examining the impact of a number of independent variables (see table *1.1*) on the mean scores across the cases. The analysis found that a number of factors (e.g. training, administrative guidelines and early warning system) that had previously been mentioned with an environment of integrity had very little impact as far as it related to scores across the measures for these agencies. However some factors were found to have a significant relationship (e.g. length of service, position in department, and police model) across the integrity measures as it relates to these departments. These factors should be examined in future analyses to examine whether these findings of significance can be replicated across other departments.

A factor that this study could not examine was the influence of the September 11, 2001 attacks had on policing. Since the departments examined were in the northeastern

United States they were especially susceptible to being influenced by these attacks. The literature points to changes in policing styles since 9/11 influencing police environments (Murray, 2005; Pelfrey, Jr., 2005; Ratcliffe, & Guidetti, 2008). A new policing model called intelligence-led policing which is "proactive", "managerial centered", and contains an important intelligence gathering mechanism that relies upon the general public (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; 112; Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer; 2005).

The reliance upon the general public, places increased incentive upon officers to maintain an environment of integrity within departments. Integrity related issues and involvement in organizational deviance could "threaten the legitimacy" of the organization (Poveda, 1985; 255). Losing this trust could result in a loss of confidence in police by the general public and even create dissent among officers. This would affect their ability to properly execute the intelligence gathering portion of their duties. Failure to properly gather intelligence could result in the inability for officers to carry out their important expanded duties of protecting this country at the local level.

Another factor that could be influencing the mean scores across these departments could be the "fear of scandal". Poveda (1985) found that "the anticipation of scandal may have the effect of reducing organization deviance" (p.256). Since corruption scandals have occurred cyclical, occurring every 15 to 20 years at most departments for the last 100 years. It is possible that these agencies are being extra vigilant as to not become the next notorious department noted for integrity related issues. It is ironic that fear of corruption could be at the root of an increase in integrity as found within these departments. It is possible that any of these factors could be responsible for the changes that we found across the integrity measures.

Limitation of Study

Validity issues have long been a concern as it pertained to measurement in corruption research. Similarly this concern has been raised in the growing field of integrity research. Some have argued that police officers are trained to answer questions related to integrity and corruption. This possibility was raised in a study examining integrity in the Japanese police force. Specifically, it was found that Japanese officers may be taught how to answer questions that inquire about corruption within the department (Johnson, 2004). Schafer & Martinelli (2008) found that participants in surveys of integrity normally view themselves as having more integrity than their peers. This creates a validity issue for the research tool as the answers may not be indicative of how officer truly view the cases. We attempted to address the concerns by conducting the informal interviews at the departments that participated. Allowing the officers to give feedback on the research instrument meant that revisions could be implemented that improved the response rate for the study. Despite these concerns the research tool has proven valid in its ability to examine issues of integrity and corruption (Ekenvall, 2003; Klockars, et al., 2000; Klockars, et al., 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006; Newham, 2002; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008).

This project was severely limited as a replication because it lacked the funding that the original study had from the National Institute of Justice. Additionally, the contacts that the researchers had at the original agencies were mostly no longer there because of attrition such as retirement or moving on to other organizations. As such we were limited in whom to contact at agencies for participation in the study. Finally, the environment of policing has always been extremely secretive and many departments are

against displaying their culture to researchers. Many fear that data from a study examining integrity may project negatively across the department despite anonymity being guaranteed for researchers. This is what occurred to the researchers as they pursued a third agency to participate in the study.

We were also limited because of the small sample size and small number of agencies that participated in the study. This restricted the types of analysis that could be conducted by the researchers. It also affected our ability to generalize the findings of the research study beyond the departments that were examined. Policing within the United States presents an issue for researcher because of its decentralized model. Since this study collected data from mostly Northeastern police departments it may only be generalized to police departments within this region of the country. Despite these hurdles this project does shed light on the culture of policing today and displays some of the changes that have occurred across the last 15 years since the original research study took place.

Chapter 6

Recommendations

The effects of corruption can be felt throughout a society. It effects the police department, community and even the government in some cases. Corruption can create an atmosphere of distrust within police departments. Police may feel they cannot confide in their supervisors' or partners and this could prevent them from performing their duties efficiently. It could create resentment from the community. The spread of misconduct stories can have a widespread effect on communities as negative views permeate (Hurst, McDermott and Thomas, 2005). This resentment can lead to distrust in the police force, increases in violent crimes and become a detriment to future police investigations (Kane, 2005). Finally, it can affect the government if the corruption is committed on a large enough scale to undermine the social order.

Issues of corruption have not gone unnoticed by the public especially in recent years. A study examining public confidence in a number of notable professions found that police officers received the largest drop of any group as it pertained to public confidence. Specifically in 1980 they were ranked fifth, by 1995 they had dropped to tenth in the scale of public confidence (Gaffigan & McDonald, 1997). This study into public confidence supports the belief that the public trust in police has been marred because of notable scandals that occurred prior to the original Klockars, et al. (2000) into police integrity. These integrity issues can complicate the ability of the police to properly execute their important positions in society (Gaffigan & McDonald, 1997). The current

study aimed to further understand the dynamics of integrity issues within the United States.

Issues related to corruption and integrity had not been studied thoroughly within the United States in the time period since the original study took place. This left a gap in the literature that this dissertation attempting to project some information upon. However because of the lack of resources this project was only able to begin shedding light unto how the culture of integrity has changed over the last 15 years. This issue will only to continue to grow in importance as police take a more pivotal role in national security concerns.

Future studies should attempt to include more agencies and officers in the analyses. More complex analyses that attempt to examine the interactions between the variables instead of relying solely upon one on one interactions could provide a better perspective on the those factors that influence corruption. A number of variables noted in the literature such as training, knowledge of guidelines, police model and early warning systems received little support in this study but should continue to be researched to examine any possible impact that they may have influencing integrity. Finally, future studies should examine the influence of intelligence-led policing and other changes implemented in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Since so many changes have been implanted in the intervening years it would be interesting to see how they affect integrity related issues among police. Although alluded to possibly influencing policing in the literature this topic has not been studied in any sort of complex analysis as it relates to integrity related issues. The continued study of these variables and others could provide a clearer perspective on the factors that caused the changes noted that occurred to increase scores in the integrity measures since the original study.

Appendix A

JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The City University of New York
445 West 59th Street
New York, NY 10019 -1128
(212) 237-8653

Informed Consent Form

You are invited to participate in a research study entitled "Call of Duty: A question of Police Integrity." The purpose of this research is to better understand the factors that influence Police Integrity and violations of Police Integrity. We plan to enroll approximately 150-200 participants into this study. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete a survey on Police Integrity. Participation should take about 25-30 minutes for duration of one day.

The foreseeable risks of participation in this study are minimal. In order to minimize these risks all answers will be kept confidential and there will be no link between participant identifiers and responses. The possible benefits to you could include raising your self-awareness of violations of Police Integrity and helping to better report future violations of Police Integrity. The potential benefits to society will be both scholastic and practical. The study will fill gaps in the literature and assist policymakers by providing valuable information that will aid in improving Police Integrity.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have a right to refuse to participate without consequences. If you decide not to participate your decision will not affect your relationship with John Jay College or the researcher. If you decide to participate you may discontinue participation at any time. You may refuse to answer any

specific questions or refuse to engage in any task at any time during the study. Withdrawal or refusing to answer specific questions or engage in specific tasks will not result in any consequences to you and will not affect your relationship with John Jay College or the researcher.

Information gathered from you will only be used in conjunction with this research project. Information concerning the identity of the participants will not be disclosed for any reason. Consent forms will be kept in separately locked cabinets from the questionnaires and participant responses will be totally anonymous. Both sets of information will be in locked drawers in the office of Albert Gamarra which is locked at all times, with access available to only Albert Gamarra.

Your signature below means that you have read this consent form, that you fully understand the nature and consequences of participation and that you have had all questions regarding participation in this study answered satisfactorily. If you have further questions about this research please feel free to contact the Principle Investigator, Albert Gamarra at 917 375 4841 or Dr. Maki Haberfeld at 212 237 8381.

If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research participant please feel free to contact the John Jay Institutional Review Board Office at jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu, or (212) 237-8961 and speak with Thomas Kucharski. There is no psychological or physical harm expected for participating in this study. Should you wish to speak to a counselor about your experiences, counseling services at John Jay College is available. Please find the information for counseling service below.

Counseling Services (212) 237 – 8111
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
899 Tenth Avenue, Room 3140 N
New York, NY 10019

_____	_____
Participant Name	Participant Signature
_____	_____
Principle Investigator/Research Staff Signature	Date

Appendix B

Case scenarios: The survey questionnaire presents officers with 11 hypothetical case scenarios. Respondents were asked to evaluate each scenario by answering seven questions (see **Appendix C**).

Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.

Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.

Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.

Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.

Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about 2 days' pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.

Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the shop owner.

Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the *supervisor's* behavior.

Case 8. At 2:00 a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense, he transports the driver to his home.

Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.

Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under

control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.

Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money equivalent to a full day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property but keeps the money for himself.

Appendix C

Case scenario assessment options: Six of these questions were designed to assess the normative inclination of police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation. The remaining question asked respondents whether the behavior described in the scenario was a violation of the agency's official policy.

1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious				Very serious
1	2	3	4	5

2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious				Very serious
1	2	3	4	5

3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?

Definitely not				Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5

4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow?

1. NONE
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND
3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND
4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
5. DEMOTION IN RANK
6. DISMISSAL

5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow?

1. NONE
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND
3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND
4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
5. DEMOTION IN RANK
6. DISMISSAL

6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not				Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5

7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not				Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5

Appendix D

IRB APPLICATION

Procedures

Initial inquiries have been made with police agencies to identify agencies willing to participate in the project. While conducting these inquiries the researcher submitted and received approval on July 19, 2009 for the project from the City University of New York- institutional review board (IRB). Once approval was obtained the researcher completed the literature review on the topic in preparation for the dissertation proposal. After completing the dissertation proposal stage the researcher will begin the process of collecting data from participants. Through the researchers personal contact participants will be obtained.

Approval of departmental supervisors will be obtained and they will assist in the process of distributing the surveys and collecting data. This approval will allow for the project to take place at departments with the consent of the supervisors ensuring that the surveys will not be confiscated. The surveys will be mailed to department contacts and distributed to participating officers. The participants will each be given 2 envelopes with the appropriate instructions about participation in the study and the surveys. Participants will receive a consent form about the experiment (*see Appendix A*). There will be no deception involved. The consent form will include the contact information for the principle investigator. They will be asked to read these forms and those individuals that do not wish to continue participation in the study will be allowed to not participate without penalty. Those individuals who wish to continue participation in the study will be asked to sign the forms and place it in one envelope. They will then complete the survey

and place it in the second envelope which they will then seal. Both envelopes will be sent back to the researchers by their contact in the respective police departments. Survey will not have any identifying information and will be placed in different envelopes than the consent forms.

The integrity survey developed by Klockars et al., (2000) will be adopted for this study to assess "Police Integrity" in these police departments (*see Appendix B and C*). The use of surveys raises validity issues associated with participants providing false data. The researchers will attempt to reduce these validity issues by ensuring the participants only provide information about attitudes and that each survey is anonymous with all individual information remaining confidential.

Confidentiality

Subject participation in this research will be completely voluntary. The survey will only be used in conjunction with this research project. Information concerning the identity of the participants will not be disclosed for any reason. Consent forms will be kept in separately locked cabinets from the questionnaires and participant responses will be totally anonymous. Both sets of information will be in locked drawers in the office of Albert Gamarra, which is locked at all times, with access available to Albert Gamarra (*see Appendix A*).

Harms and Benefits

This experiment does not pose any more than minimal psychological risk to participants. There will be no deception involved. This distress may arise from memories of unpleasant incidents, discomfort, possible embarrassment, as well as fears and anxiety

related to participation in case scenario activities. To minimize risk of exposure, participants will only be asked about their attitudes and furthermore will not be identified.

These risks are outweighed by the potential benefits of the research. This research will further illuminate an important part of policing research. By examining "Police Integrity" instead of corruption the study will increase surely increase honesty by participants in the study. By raising the participants' self-awareness of such behavior we may help prevent future participation in such activities. The benefits of this research will be both scholastic and practical. The study will fill gaps in the literature and assist policymakers by providing valuable information that will assist in increasing police integrity.

Debriefing

Participants will be thanked for their participation and there will be no debriefing. Debriefing is not necessary because no deception is involved and the participants will have a Consent Form that describes and gives the purpose of the study (*see Appendix A*).

Appendix E

Some dates to anchor these retrospective questions are:

US presidents:
G. Bush Sr. 1988-1992, Clinton: 1993 – 2000, G.W. Bush: 2001 – 2008, Obama: 2009 – Present

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TRAINING: PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE

1. During which Presidency did your academy training for the police force take place?

a. G. Bush Sr. 1988-1992
b. Clinton: 1993 – 2000
c. G.W. Bush: 2001 – 2008
d. Obama: 2009 – Present
e. Other

Relevant Definitions: *Answer the following questions using the below definitions*

Pedagogy: Traditional Lecture Based Training

Andragogy: Self-Directed learning with the instructor playing a facilitating role. Instructors manage classroom and allow participants to share their experiences and knowledge.

2. How would you describe the majority of your academy training?

a. Andragogy
b. Pedagogy

3. Does your department require in-service training? **(*If answer is NO, then skip questions 3a and 3b)***

a. Yes
b. No

3a. How often does this in-service training take place?

a. Weekly
b. Monthly
c. Yearly
d. Every other year
e. Every five years
f. Every ten years

3b. How would you describe the majority of this in-service training?

a. Andragogy
b. Pedagogy

4. Please describe in the space below, any changes that have been made to either academy or in-service training since you joined the police force? **Use the presidential timeline to reference the time period of this change.**

SUPERVISION

5. How often do you interact with your direct supervisor?

a. Daily
b. Weekly
c. Monthly
d. Other

5a. Which statement describes **MOST** of your interactions with your direct supervisor?

a. At beginning and end of shifts
b. During the filing of reports
c. At departmental meetings
d. During casual/friendly meetings

5b. Use the space below to further explain your interactions with your direct supervisor?

6. Have your interactions with supervisors changed since you joined the force?

a. Yes
b. No

6a. If answered **YES** to question 6, please explain in the space below, how and why you believe this change occurred. **Use the presidential timeline to reference the time period of this change.**

POLICE MODEL
Relevant Definitions: *Answer the following questions using the below definitions*

Traditional: The officer has little interaction with the citizens within a community. This is a reactive policing with little done to prevent crimes from occurring.

Problem Solving Policing: Proactive rather than reactive view on crime. Involves more resources dedicated to understanding crimes and attempting to prevent them.

Community Oriented Policing: Officers will have a zone in which to work in during their shifts. They work to get to know the citizens of the community. The officers maintain a known presence and rely on community citizens to report any suspicious behavior on criminals in the area.

11. What policing model do you believe is most important in a police organization?

a. Traditional
b. Problem Solving Policing
c. Community Policing

11a. Please explain in the space below, why you believe this policing model is the most important

12. What policing model do you believe your department mostly follows?

a. Traditional
b. Problem Solving Policing
c. Community Policing

12a. Please explain in the space below, why you believe this policing model is the one mostly followed by your department.

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
Relevant Definitions: *Answer the following questions using the below definition*

Administrative Guidelines: Parameters of police interactions with the public

Internal Affairs: Division dedicated to the investigation of incidents and plausible suspicions of lawbreaking and professional misconduct attributed to officers on the force

Citizen Oversight Committee: Procedure under which law enforcement conduct is reviewed at some point by persons who are not sworn officers and normally are appointed by the mayor or another local elected official.

Police Legal Advisor: Provides comprehensive legal advice specifically to the Division of Police on policies, procedures, and labor issues. Attorneys in this section also deliver advice to police personnel. In addition, this section tracks lawsuits, case reviews, and property damage/medical claims against the Division.

Early Warning System: Data-based police management tool designed to identify officers whose behavior is problematic and provide a form of intervention to correct that performance.

13. How often does your department update you on changes in administrative guidelines?
    a. Monthly
    b. Every six months
    c. Yearly
    d. More than yearly
    e. Never

14. Who informs you of changes in administrative guidelines?
    a. Self informed
    b. Direct supervisor
    c. Police chief
    d. Police legal advisor
    e. Citizen oversight Committee
    f. Internal affairs
    g. Never informed
    h. Other, please list _____

15. Does your department have an early warning system?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. Do not know

16. Position within Police Department?
    a. Line Officer
    b. Supervisor
    c. Other, please list _____

Appendix F

RECODEPD

This was the police department variable recoded eliminating the 3rd new agency data that had no corresponding data in the original dataset. The data for the two original agencies were combined (N = 117) and their corresponding data for the current agencies were combined (N = 90).

Table 5.1: Recoded Police Department* nbusinmd Crosstabulation

			nbusinmd		
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	87	3	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	97%	3%	100%
	Original PD	Count	96	20	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	83%	17%	100%
Total		Count	183	23	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	89%	11%	100%

Only one question was found to be significant as it related to the police recode (RECODEPD) and the business variable. NBUSIMD or discipline would receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the original and current police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 9.884, $p < .05$). More people in the current police departments felt that there would be no punishment (97%) when compared to those in the original departments (83%).

Table 5.2: Recoded Police Department* nspeedod Crosstabulation

			Nspeedod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	1	37	50	88
		% within Recoded Police Department	1.1%	42.0%	56.8%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	2	71	44	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	1.7%	60.7%	37.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	3	108	94	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	1.5%	52.7%	45.9%	100.0%

NSPEEDOD or the discipline should receive variable was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.467, $p < .05$). More officers in the current police departments (56.8%) felt that there would be a serious reprimand, than those in the original police departments (37.8%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33.3% percent of the cells had counts less than 5*.

Table 5.3: Crosstab						
			nspeedor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	13	23	53	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	14.6%	25.8%	59.6%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	47	15	54	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	40.5%	12.9%	46.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	60	38	107	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	29.3%	18.5%	52.2%	100.0%

NSPEEDOR or willingness for an officer to report this behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 17.711, $p < .05$). More officers (59.6%) in the current police departments said they would report this behavior, while only (46.6%) of those in the original police departments were likely to report this behavior.

Table 5.4: Crosstab						
			nspeedmr			Total
			No	Unsure	Yes	
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	15	36	38	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	16.9%	40.4%	42.7%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	41	32	44	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	35.0%	27.4%	37.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	56	68	82	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	27.2%	33.0%	39.8%	100.0%

NSPEEDMR or belief that other officers will report this behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.108, $p < .05$). Most officers (42.7%) in the current police departments said they felt that fellow officers would report this behavior, while only (37.6%) of those in the original police departments were likely to say they felt fellow officers would report this behavior.

Table 5.5: Crosstab						
			nholivi			
			No Violation of policy	Unsure	Violation of policy	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	25	21	43	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	28.1%	23.6%	48.3%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	20	15	80	115
		% within Recoded Police Department	17.4%	13.0%	69.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	45	36	123	204
		% within Recoded Police Department	22.1%	17.6%	60.3%	100.0%

NHOLIVI or belief that this behavior would violate official policy in your agency was significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.527, $p < .05$). More officers (28.1%) in the current police departments said they felt that the behavior would not violate official police policy, when (17.4%) compared to those in the original police departments.

Table *5.6:* Crosstab						
			nholimd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	57	29	3	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	64.0%	32.6%	3.4%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	40	71	5	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	34.5%	61.2%	4.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	97	100	8	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	47.3%	48.8%	3.9%	100.0%

NHOLIMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 17.873, $p < .05$). More officers (64%) in the current police departments said they felt that there would be no reprimand for this behavior, while only (34.5%) of those in the original police departments felt that there would be no reprimand for this behavior. *An issue to note with this finding was that 33.3% percent of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *5.7:* Crosstab						
			Nburgod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	0	9	80	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	0.0%	10.1%	89.9%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	1	39	76	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	0.9%	33.6%	65.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	1	48	156	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	0.5%	23.4%	76.1%	100.0%

NBURGOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 16.584, $p < .05$). More officers (89.9%) in the current police departments said they felt that there should be a serious reprimand for this behavior, while only (65.5%) of those in the original police departments were likely to say that they felt that there should be a serious reprimand for this behavior. *An issue to note with this finding was that 33.3% percent of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *5.8:* Crosstab

			Nburgmd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	0	14	75	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	0.0%	15.7%	84.3%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	1	40	76	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	0.9%	34.2%	65.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	1	54	151	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	0.5%	26.2%	73.3%	100.0%

NBURGMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.902, $p < .05$). More officers in the current police departments (84.3%) said they felt that there would be a serious reprimand for this behavior, while only (65.0%) of those officers in the original police departments were likely to say there would be a serious reprimand for this behavior. *An issue to note with this finding was that 33.3% percent of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *5.9:* Crosstab						
			nburgor			Total
			No	Unsure	Yes	
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	7	9	73	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	7.9%	10.1%	82.0%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	29	20	67	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	25.0%	17.2%	57.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	29	140	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	17.6%	14.1%	68.3%	100.0%

NBURGOR or willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 14.571, $p < .05$). More officers (82.0%) in the current police departments said that they were willing to report this behavior, while only (57.8%) of officers in the original police departments were willing to report this behavior

Table *5.10:* Crosstab						
			nburgmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	9	23	57	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	10.1%	25.8%	64.0%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	31	24	60	115
		% within Recoded Police Department	27.0%	20.9%	52.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	40	47	117	204
		% within Recoded Police Department	19.6%	23.0%	57.4%	100.0%

NBURGMR or willingness of other officers to report this behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.031, $p < .05$). More officers (64%) in the current police departments said that officers in their departments were willing to report this behavior, while only (52.2%) of officers in the original police departments said they were willing to report this behavior.

Table *5.11:* Crosstab					
			nautoos		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	1	89	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	1.1%	98.9%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	15	102	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	12.8%	87.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	16	191	207
		% within Recoded Police Department	7.7%	92.3%	100.0%

NAUTOOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 9.779, $p < .05$). More officers (98.9%) in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior was serious, while only (87.2%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt the behavior was serious.

Table *5.12:* Crosstab					
			nautoms		Total
			Not Serious	Serious	
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	5	85	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	5.6%	94.4%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	19	98	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	16.2%	83.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	24	183	207
		% within Recoded Police Department	11.6%	88.4%	100.0%

NAUTOMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.665, $p < .05$). More officers (94.4%) in the current police departments said that they felt their fellow officers were likely to say the behavior was serious, while only (83.8%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt the fellow officers were likely to say that the behavior was serious.

Table *5.13:* Crosstab

			natuood			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	6	46	38	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	6.7%	51.1%	42.2%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	17	77	23	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	14.5%	65.8%	19.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	23	123	61	207
		% within Recoded Police Department	11.1%	59.4%	29.5%	100.0%

NAUTOOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 13.470, $p < .05$). More officers (42.2%) in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior should receive a serious reprimand, while only (19.7%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt the behavior should receive a serious reprimand.

Table *5.14:* Crosstab

			nautomd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	5	48	37	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	5.6%	53.3%	41.1%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	12	77	28	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	10.3%	65.8%	23.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	17	125	65	207
		% within Recoded Police Department	8.2%	60.4%	31.4%	100.0%

NAUTOMD or discipline would receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.462, $p < .05$). More officers (41.1%) in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior would receive a serious reprimand, while only (23.9%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt the behavior would receive a serious reprimand.

Table *5.15:* Crosstab						
			nautoor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	18	21	51	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	20.0%	23.3%	56.7%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	53	22	41	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	45.7%	19.0%	35.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	71	43	92	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	34.5%	20.9%	44.7%	100.0%

NAUTOOR or own willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 15.326, $p < .05$). More officers (56.7%) in the current police departments said that they would report this behavior, while only (35.3%) of officers in the original police departments said that they would report this behavior.

Table 5.16: Crosstab						
			nautomr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	19	30	41	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	21.1%	33.3%	45.6%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	49	31	36	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	42.2%	26.7%	31.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	68	61	77	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	33.0%	29.6%	37.4%	100.0%

NAUTOMR or others willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 15.326, $p < .05$). More officers (45.6%) in the current police departments said that they would report this behavior, while only (31.0%) of officers in the original police departments said that they would report this behavior.

Table *5.17:* Crosstab					
			nsuperos		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	4	86	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	4.4%	95.6%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	18	99	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	15.4%	84.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	185	207
		% within Recoded Police Department	10.6%	89.4%	100.0%

NSUPEROS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 6.410, $p < .05$). More officers (95.6%) in the current police departments said that they would find this behavior serious, while only (84.6%) of officers in the original police departments said that they would find this behavior serious.

Table *5.18:* Crosstab					
			nsuperms		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	7	83	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	7.8%	92.2%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	25	92	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	21.4%	78.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	32	175	207
		% within Recoded Police Department	15.5%	84.5%	100.0%

NSUPERMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 7.188, $p < .05$). More officers (92.2%) in the current police departments said that they believed other officers would find this behavior serious, while only (78.6%) of officers in the original police departments said they believed other officers would find this behavior serious.

Table *5.19:* Crosstab

			nsuperod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	9	55	25	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	10.1%	61.8%	28.1%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	29	68	19	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	25.0%	58.6%	16.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	38	123	44	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	18.5%	60.0%	21.5%	100.0%

NSUPEROD or discipline should receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.324, $p < .05$). More officers (28.1%) in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior should receive a serious reprimand, while only (16.4%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt the behavior should receive a serious reprimand.

Table *5.20:* Crosstab

			nsupermd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	13	55	21	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	14.6%	61.8%	23.6%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	33	68	16	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	28.2%	58.1%	13.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	46	123	37	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	22.3%	59.7%	18.0%	100.0%

NSUPERMD or discipline would receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.070, $p < .05$). More officers (23.6%) in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior would receive a serious reprimand, while only (13.7%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt the behavior would receive a serious reprimand.

Table *5.21:* Crosstab

			nsuperor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	25	20	44	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	28.1%	22.5%	49.4%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	57	25	35	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	48.7%	21.4%	29.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	82	45	79	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	39.8%	21.8%	38.3%	100.0%

NSUPEROR or own willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 10.456, $p < .05$). More officers (49.4%) in the current police departments said that they would report this behavior, while only (29.9%) of officers in the original police departments said that they would report this behavior.

Table *5.22:* Crosstab

			nsupermr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	25	27	37	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	28.1%	30.3%	41.6%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	53	31	33	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	45.3%	26.5%	28.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	78	58	70	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	37.9%	28.2%	34.0%	100.0%

NSUPERMR or others willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.877, $p < .05$). More officers (41.6%) in the current police departments said that they felt others would report this behavior, while only (28.2%) of officers in the original police departments said that they felt the same.

Table *5.23:* Crosstab					
			nalchos		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	25	64	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	28.1%	71.9%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	57	59	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	49.1%	50.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	82	123	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%

NALCHOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 9.296, $p < .05$). More officers (71.9%) in the current police departments said that they would find this behavior serious, while only (50.9%) of officers in the original police departments said that they would find this behavior serious.

Table *5.24:* Crosstab					
			nalchms		Total
			Not Serious	Serious	
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	36	53	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	40.4%	59.6%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	66	51	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	56.4%	43.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	102	104	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	49.5%	50.5%	100.0%

NALCHMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.151, $p < .05$). More officers (59.6%) in the current police departments said that they believed other officers would find this behavior serious, while only (43.6%) of officers in the original police departments said they believed other officers would find this behavior not serious.

Table *5.25:* Crosstab

			Nalchvi			
			No Violation of policy	Unsure	Violation of policy	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	9	6	74	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	10.1%	6.7%	83.1%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	22	19	76	117
		% within Recoded Police Department	18.8%	16.2%	65.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	31	25	150	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	15.0%	12.1%	72.8%	100.0%

NALCHVI or belief that this behavior would violate official policy in your agency was significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.591, $p < .05$). More people (83.1%) in the current police departments said they felt that the behavior did violate official police policy, while only (65.0%) of officers in the original police departments were likely to say that they felt the behavior violated official police policy.

Table *5.26:* Crosstab

			nbaror			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	35	13	41	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	39.3%	14.6%	46.1%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	64	21	31	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	55.2%	18.1%	26.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	99	34	72	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	48.3%	16.6%	35.1%	100.0%

NBAROR or own willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.355, $p < .05$). More officers (46.1%) in the current police departments said that they would report this behavior, while only (26.7%) of officers in the original police departments said that they would report this behavior.

Table *5.27:* Crosstab

			nbarmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	38	23	28	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	42.7%	25.8%	31.5%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	71	21	24	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	61.2%	18.1%	20.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	109	44	52	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	53.2%	21.5%	25.4%	100.0%

NBARMR or others willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.954, $p < .05$). More officers (31.5%) in the current police departments said that they thought fellow officers would report this behavior, while only (20.7%) of officers in the original police departments felt that fellow officers would report this behavior.

Table *5.28:* Crosstab					
			nforceos		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	18	72	90
		% within Recoded Police Department	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	38	78	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	32.8%	67.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	56	150	206
		% within Recoded Police Department	27.2%	72.8%	100.0%

NFORCEOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 4.168, $p < .05$). More officers (80.0%) in the current police departments felt the behavior was serious, while only (67.2%) of officers in the original police departments felt the behavior was serious.

Table *5.29:* Crosstab					
			nwalletms		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	3	86	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	3.4%	96.6%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	14	102	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	12.1%	87.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	17	188	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	8.3%	91.7%	100.0%

NWALLETMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.010, $p < .05$). More officers (96.6%) in the current police departments said that they believed other officers would find this behavior serious, while only (87.9%) of officers in the original police departments said they believed other officers would find this behavior serious.

Table *5.30:* Crosstab

			nwalletod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	2	42	45	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	2.2%	47.2%	50.6%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	11	69	36	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	9.5%	59.5%	31.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	111	81	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	6.3%	54.1%	39.5%	100.0%

NWALLETOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 10.423, $p < .05$). More officers (50.6%) in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior should receive a serious reprimand, while only (31.0%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt the behavior should receive a serious reprimand.

Table *5.31:* Crosstab

			nwalletor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	17	19	53	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	19.1%	21.3%	59.6%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	42	21	53	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	36.2%	18.1%	45.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	59	40	106	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	28.8%	19.5%	51.7%	100.0%

NWALLETOR or own willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.263, $p < .05$). More officers (53%) in the current police departments said that they would report this behavior, while only (45.7%) of officers in the original police departments said that they would report this behavior.

Table *5.32:* Crosstab						
			nwalletmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recoded Police Department	Current PD	Count	23	27	39	89
		% within Recoded Police Department	25.8%	30.3%	43.8%	100.0%
	Original PD	Count	50	29	37	116
		% within Recoded Police Department	43.1%	25.0%	31.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	73	56	76	205
		% within Recoded Police Department	35.6%	27.3%	37.1%	100.0%

NWALLETMR or others willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.670, $p < .05$). More officers (43.8%) in the current police departments said that felt their fellow officers would report this behavior, while only (31.9%) of officers in the original police departments said that they felt their fellow officers would report this behavior.

*Table 5.33: Significant variables and non-significant variables for **RECODEPD***

RECODEPD							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	N	N	N	N	**X**	N	N
Meal	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Speed	N	N	N	**X**	N	**X**	**X**
Holiday	N	N	**X**	N	**X**	N	N
Burglary	N	N	N	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Auto	**X**	**X**	N	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Supervisor	**X**	**X**	N	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Alcohol	**X**	**X**	**X**	N	N	N	N
Bar	N	N	N	N	N	**X**	**X**
Force	**X**	N	N	N	N	N	N
Wallet	N	**X**	N	**X**	N	**X**	**X**

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES

Administrative guidelines recode: This variable was calculated to give an estimate of how current officers are as it relates to being informed of departmental guidelines. It was recoded to a binary format where officers were identified as either having been informed of changes to the administrative guidelines within the last year or having been informed in a period which is more than a year.

Table *6.1:* admin guidelines recode* nmealsvi Crosstabulation

			Nmealsvi			
			Violation of policy	Unsure	No Violation of policy	Total
admin guidelines recode	less than a year	Count	15	6	38	59
		% within admin guidelines recode	25.4%	10.2%	64.4%	100.0%
	more than a year	Count	5	11	22	38
		% within admin guidelines recode	13.2%	28.9%	57.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	20	17	60	97
		% within admin guidelines recode	20.6%	17.5%	61.9%	100.0%

NMEALSVI or violation of policy was found to be significant for guidelines recode. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing those who were informed of guidelines changes more than once a year and those who were informed less than once a year. A significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.495, $p < .05$). Those who had been informed of administrative guidelines in less than a year (25.4%) were more likely to believe it was a violation of policy than those who had not been informed of changes in administrative guidelines in the last year (13.4%).

Table *6.2:* Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for adminguidelines

Table 6.2: **Adminguidelines**							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Meal	N	N	**X**	N	N	N	N
Speed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Holiday	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Burglary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Auto	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Supervisor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Alcohol	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bar	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Force	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Wallet	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

Time period of service by Presidency: This variable was calculated to give an estimate of time of service. It was recoded to a binary format where officers were identified by Pre-2001 and Post- 2001 period by which they entered service.

Table 7.1: Crosstab

			New Meal		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	29	57	86
		% within recodepresident	33.7%	66.3%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	16	11	27
		% within recodepresident	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	45	68	113
		% within recodepresident	39.8%	60.2%	100.0%

NMEALSOS or own view of seriousness for behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.592, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (66.3%) were more likely to find the behavior serious than those that entered post-2001 (40.7%).

Table *7.2:* Crosstab

			nspeedod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	0	29	57	86
		% within recodepresident	0.0%	33.7%	66.3%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	1	14	10	25
		% within recodepresident	4.0%	56.0%	40.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	1	43	67	111
		% within recodepresident	0.9%	38.7%	60.4%	100.0%

NSPEEDOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.138, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (66.3%) were more likely to find the behavior serious than those that entered post-2001 (40.7%).

Table *7.3:* Crosstab

			nspeedor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	7	14	65	86
		% within recodepresident	8.1%	16.3%	75.6%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	6	10	10	26
		% within recodepresident	23.1%	38.5%	38.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	24	75	112
		% within recodepresident	11.6%	21.4%	67.0%	100.0%

NSPEEDOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 12.530, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (75.6%) were more likely to report this behavior than those that entered post-2001 (38.5%).

Table *7.4* Crosstab

			nspeedmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	9	23	54	86
		% within recodepresident	10.5%	26.7%	62.8%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	5	14	7	26
		% within recodepresident	19.2%	53.8%	26.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	14	37	61	112
		% within recodepresident	12.5%	33.0%	54.5%	100.0%

NSPEEDMR or others willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 10.382, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (62.8%) were more likely to feel others would report this behavior than those that entered post-2001 (26.9%).

Table *7.5:* Crosstab

			nholior			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	49	16	20	85
		% within recodepresident	57.6%	18.8%	23.5%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	23	3	1	27
		% within recodepresident	85.2%	11.1%	3.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	72	19	21	112
		% within recodepresident	64.3%	17.0%	18.8%	100.0%

NHOLIOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.431, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (23.5%) were more likely to report this behavior than those that entered post-2001 (3.7%).

Table *7.6:* Crosstab					
			nburgod		
			Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	4	81	85
		% within recodepresident	4.7%	95.3%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	6	21	27
		% within recodepresident	22.2%	77.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	10	102	112
		% within recodepresident	8.9%	91.1%	100.0%

NBURGOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 7.732, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (95.3%) were more likely to feel that this behavior should receive a serious reprimand than those that entered post-2001 (77.8%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 25% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *7.7:* Crosstab

			nburgor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	2	6	77	85
		% within recodepresident	2.4%	7.1%	90.6%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	5	3	19	27
		% within recodepresident	18.5%	11.1%	70.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	7	9	96	112
		% within recodepresident	6.3%	8.0%	85.7%	100.0%

NBURGOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.964, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (90.6%) were more likely to report this behavior than those that entered post-2001 (70.4%).

Table *7.8:* Crosstab

			nautoor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	8	16	62	86
		% within recodepresident	9.3%	18.6%	72.1%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	10	5	12	27
		% within recodepresident	37.0%	18.5%	44.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	18	21	74	113
		% within recodepresident	15.9%	18.6%	65.5%	100.0%

NAUTOOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 12.322, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (72.1%) were more likely to report this behavior than those that entered post-2001 (44.4%).

Table *7.9:* Crosstab

			nforceor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	28	16	40	84
		% within recodepresident	33.3%	19.0%	47.6%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	18	3	6	27
		% within recodepresident	66.7%	11.1%	22.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	46	19	46	111
		% within recodepresident	41.4%	17.1%	41.4%	100.0%

NFORCEOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.410, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (47.6%) were more likely to report this behavior than those that entered post-2001 (22.2%).

Table 7.10: Crosstab						
			nwalletod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	0	33	52	85
		% within recodepresident	0.0%	38.8%	61.2%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	2	14	11	27
		% within recodepresident	7.4%	51.9%	40.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	2	47	63	112
		% within recodepresident	1.8%	42.0%	56.3%	100.0%

NWALLETOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.646, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (61.2%) were more likely to recommend a serious reprimand for this behavior than those that entered post-2001 (40.7%).

Table *7.11:* Crosstab

			nwalletor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Recodepresident	Pre 2001	Count	8	11	66	85
		% within recodepresident	9.4%	12.9%	77.6%	100.0%
	Post 2001	Count	9	8	10	27
		% within recodepresident	33.3%	29.6%	37.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	17	19	76	112
		% within recodepresident	15.2%	17.0%	67.9%	100.0%

NWALLETOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 16.069, $p < .05$). Those who entered service pre-2001 (77.6%) were more likely to report this behavior than those that entered post-2001 (37.0%).

Table 7.12: Significant variables and non-significant variables for ***recodepresident***

RECODEPRESIDENT							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Meal	**X**	N	N	N	N	N	N
Speed	N	N	N	**X**	N	**X**	**X**
Holiday	N	N	N	N	N	**X**	N
Burglary	N	N	N	**X**	N	**X**	N
Auto	N	N	N	N	N	**X**	N
Supervisor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Alcohol	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bar	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Force	X	N	N	N	N	**X**	N
Wallet	N	N	N	**X**	N	**X**	N

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

OFFICER POSITION

Table *8.1:* Crosstab

			nspeedod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Position within police department	line officer	Count	1	19	18	38
		% within Position within police department	2.6%	50.0%	47.4%	100.0%
	supervisor	Count	0	14	40	54
		% within Position within police department	0.0%	25.9%	74.1%	100.0%
	Other	Count	0	9	8	17
		% within Position within police department	0.0%	52.9%	47.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	1	42	66	109
		% within Position within police department	.9%	38.5%	60.6%	100.0%

NSPEEDOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant for officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 9.541, $p < .05$). Supervisors (74.1%) were more likely to feel the discipline that should be received was a serious reprimand than those who were line officers (33.3%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 44% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *8.2:* Crosstab

			nspeedor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Position within police department	line officer	Count	8	11	20	39
		% within Position within police department	20.5%	28.2%	51.3%	100.0%
	supervisor	Count	1	7	46	54
		% within Position within police department	1.9%	13.0%	85.2%	100.0%
	other	Count	2	5	10	17
		% within Position within police department	11.8%	29.4	58.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	11	23	76	110
		% within Position within police department	10.0%	20.9%	69.1%	100.0%

NSPEEDOR or own willingness to report the behavior was found to be significant for officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 15.234, $p < .05$). Those who were supervisors (85.2%) were more likely to report the behavior than those who were line officers (51.3%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *8.3:* Position within police department* nburgor Crosstabulation

			nburgor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Position within police department	Line officers	Count	5	3	32	40
		% within Position within police department	12.5%	7.5%	80.0%	100.0%
	Supervisors	Count	0	3	50	53
		% within Position within police department	0.0%	5.7%	94.3%	100.0%
	Other	Count	0	3	14	17
		% within Position within police department	0.0%	17.6%	82.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	5	9	96	110
		% within Position within police department	4.5%	8.2%	87.3%	100.0%

NBURGOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 11.639, $p < .05$). Those who were supervisors (94.3%) were more likely to report the behavior than line officers (80%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 67% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *8.4:* Position within police department* nalchms Crosstabulation					
			nalchms		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Position within police department	line officer	Count	14	26	40
		% within Position within police department	35.0%	65.0%	100.0%
	supervisor	Count	24	29	53
		% within Position within police department	45.3%	54.7%	100.0%
	other	Count	1	16	17
		% within Position within police department	5.9%	94.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	39	71	110
		% within Position within police department	35.5%	64.5%	100.0%

NALCHMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.737, $p < .05$). Those who were line officers (65.0%) were more likely to believe the behavior was serious than line officers (54.7%).

Table *8.5:* Crosstab					
			nforceos		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Position within police department	line officer	Count	13	27	40
		% within Position within police department	32.5%	67.5%	100.0%
	supervisor	Count	3	51	54
		% within Position within police department	5.6%	94.4%	100.0%
	other	Count	1	15	16
		% within Position within police department	6.3%	93.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	17	93	110
		% within Position within police department	15.5%	84.5%	100.0%

NFORCEOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 13.982, $p < .05$). Those who were supervisors (94.4%) were more likely to believe the behavior was serious than line officers (67.5%).

Table *8.6:* Crosstab

			nforceod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Position within police department	line officer	Count	17	20	3	40
		% within Position within police department	42.5%	50.0%	7.5%	100.0%
	supervisor	Count	5	40	8	53
		% within Position within police department	9.4%	75.5%	15.1%	100.0%
	other	Count	4	12	0	16
		% within Position within police department	25.0%	75.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	26	72	11	109
		% within Position within police department	23.9%	66.1%	10.1%	100.0%

NFORCEOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant for officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 16.121, $p < .05$). Those who were supervisors (75.5%) were more likely to feel the discipline should receive a moderate reprimand than those who were line officers (50.0%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table 8.7: Crosstab						
			nforceor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Position within police department	line officer	Count	22	8	10	40
		% within Position within police department	55.0%	20.0%	25.0%	100.0%
	supervisor	Count	14	7	32	53
		% within Position within police department	26.4%	13.2%	60.4%	100.0%
	other	Count	7	4	5	16
		% within Position within police department	43.8%	25.0%	31.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	43	19	47	109
		% within Position within police department	39.4	17.4%	43.1%	100.0%

NFORCEOR or own willingness to report the behavior was found to be significant for officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.258, $p < .05$). Those who were supervisors (60.4%) were more likely to report the behavior than line officers (25.0%).

Table 8.8: Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for position

POSITION							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Meal	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Speed	N	N	N	**X**	N	**X**	N
Holiday	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Burglary	N	N	N	N	N	**X**	N
Auto	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Supervisor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Alcohol	N	**X**	N	N	N	N	N
Bar	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Force	**X**	N	N	**X**	N	**X**	N
Wallet	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

TRAINING

Table *9.1:* Describe Majority of academy training* nautoos Crosstabulation

			nautoos		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Describe Majority of academy training	Andragogy	Count	1	17	18
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	5.6%	94.4%	100.0%
	Pedagogy	Count	0	96	96
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	1	113	114
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	.9%	99.1%	100.0%

NAUTOOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for training. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.381, $p < .05$). Those taught in a Pedagogy (100%) style were more likely to feel the case was serious when compared to those in an Andragogy (94.4%) style. *An issue to note with this finding was that 50% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *9.2:* Describe Majority of academy training* nsupervi Crosstabulation

			nsupervi			
			No Violation of policy	Unsure	Violation of policy	Total
Describe Majority of academy training	Andragogy	Count	1	6	11	18
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	5.6%	33.3%	61.1%	100.0%
	Pedagogy	Count	2	6	88	96
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	2.1%	6.3%	91.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	3	12	99	114
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	2.6%	10.5%	86.8%	100.0%

NSUPERVI or violation of policy variable was found to be significant for training. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 12.887, $p < .05$). Those who trained under the pedagogy method (91.7%) were more likely to believe there was a violation of policy than those that trained under the andragogy method (61.1%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 50% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *9.3:* Describe Majority of academy training* nalchvi Crosstabulation

			nalchvi			
			No Violation of policy	Unsure	Violation of policy	Total
Describe Majority of academy training	Andragogy	Count	5	0	13	18
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	27.8%	0.0%	72.2%	100.0%
	Pedagogy	Count	8	7	80	95
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	8.4%	7.4%	84.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	7	93	113
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	11.5%	6.2%	82.3%	100.0%

NALCHVI or violation of policy variable was found to be significant for training. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.519, $p < .05$). Those who trained under the pedagogy method (84.2%) were more likely to believe there was a violation of policy than those that trained under the andragogy method (72.2%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *9.4:* Describe Majority of academy training* nbarvi Crosstabulation

			nbarvi		
			Unsure	Violation of policy	Total
Describe Majority of academy training	Andragogy	Count	3	15	18
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
	Pedagogy	Count	3	91	94
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	3.2%	96.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	6	106	112
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	5.4%	94.6%	100.0%

NBARVI or violation of policy variable was found to be significant for training. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.410, $p < .05$). Those who trained under the pedagogy method (96.8%) were more likely to believe that there was a violation of policy than those that trained under the andragogy method (83.3%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 25% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *9.5:* Describe Majority of academy training* nwalletmd Crosstabulation

			nwalletmd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Describe Majority of academy training	Andragogy	Count	0	3	15	18
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	0.0%	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
	Pedagogy	Count	3	50	41	94
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	3.2%	53.2%	43.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	3	53	56	112
		% within Describe Majority of academy training	2.7%	47.3%	50.0%	100.0%

NWALLETMD or discipline would receive was found to be significant for training. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.599, $p < .05$). Those who trained under the andragogy method (83.3%) were more likely to believe there would be a serious reprimand for this behavior than those that trained under the pedagogy method (43.6%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *9.6*: Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for academytraining

Table 9.6: **ACADEMYTRAINING**							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Meal	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Speed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Holiday	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Burglary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Auto	**X**	N	N	N	N	N	N
Supervisor	N	N	**X**	N	N	N	N
Alcohol	N	N	**X**	N	N	N	N
Bar	N	N	**X**	N	N	N	N
Force	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Wallet	N	N	N	N	**X**	N	N

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

POST ACADEMY TRAINING

Table *10.1:* Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for postcontraining

Postcontraining							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Meal	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Speed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Holiday	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Burglary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Auto	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Supervisor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Alcohol	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bar	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Force	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Wallet	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

Table *11.1:* Does department have early warning system* nmealsmr Crosstabulation

			nmealsmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Does department have early warning system	yes	Count	8	5	2	15
		% within Does department have early warning system	53.3%	33.3%	13.3%	100.0%
	no	Count	50	5	3	58
		% within Does department have early warning system	86.2%	8.6%	5.2%	100.0%
	do not know	Count	26	3	0	29
		% within Does department have early warning system	89.7%	10.3%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	84	13	5	102
		% within Does department have early warning system	82.4%	12.7%	4.9%	100.0%

NMEALSMR or willingness for others to report this behavior was found to be significant with early warning system. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the those who stated their department had an early warning system and those who stated their department did not have an early warning system and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 11.326, $p < .05$). Those who did not have an early warning system (86.2%) were more likely to feel officers in their department would not report the behavior; against those that did have an early warning system (53.3%) felt officers in their department would not report the behavior. *An issue to note with this finding was that 55% percent of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *11.2:* Does department have early warning system* nholims Crosstabulation					
			nholims		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Does department have early warning system	yes	Count	5	11	16
		% within Does department have early warning system	31.3%	68.8%	100.0%
	no	Count	31	27	58
		% within Does department have early warning system	53.4%	46.6%	100.0%
	do not know	Count	22	7	29
		% within Does department have early warning system	75.9%	24.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	58	45	103
		% within Does department have early warning system	56.3%	43.7%	100.0%

NHOLIMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the those who stated their department had an early warning system and those who stated their department did not have an early warning system and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.784, $p < .05$). Those officers (68.8%) in departments with early warning systems were more likely to feel other officers in their department would find the behavior serious, while those officers (46.6%) in departments without early warning systems were less likely to feel officers in their department would find this case serious.

Table *11.3:* Does department have early warning system* nbarmr Crosstabulation

			nbarmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Does department have early warning system	Yes	Count	1	6	9	16
		% within Does department have early warning system	6.3%	37.5%	56.3%	100.0%
	No	Count	24	15	17	56
		% within Does department have early warning system	42.9%	26.8%	30.4%	100.0%
	do not know	Count	15	4	10	29
		% within Does department have early warning system	51.7%	13.8%	34.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	40	25	36	101
		% within Does department have early warning system	39.6%	24.8%	35.6%	100.0%

NBARMR or believe other officers would report this behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing those who stated their department did not have an early warning system and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 10.627, $p < .05$). Those officers (42.9%) that had no early warning system at their department said they were more likely to feel officers at their department would not report the behavior, than officers (6.3%) at departments with an early warning system.

Table 11.*4:* Does department have early warning system* nforcems Crosstabulation					
			nforcems		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Does department have early warning system	Yes	Count	0	15	15
		% within Does department have early warning system	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	No	Count	20	38	58
		% within Does department have early warning system	34.5%	65.5%	100.0%
	do not know	Count	9	20	29
		% within Does department have early warning system	31.0%	69.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	29	73	102
		% within Does department have early warning system	28.4%	71.6%	100.0%

NFORCEMS or others seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing those who stated their department did not have an early warning system and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.099, $p < .05$). Those who said their agency had no early warning system felt the behavior was not serious (34.5%), while no one (0%) at agencies with an early warning system felt the behavior was not serious.

Table *11.5:* Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for earlywarningsystem

EARLYWARNINGSYSTEM							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Meal	N	N	N	N	N	N	**X**
Speed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Holiday	N	**X**	N	N	N	N	N
Burglary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Auto	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Supervisor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Alcohol	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bar	N	N	N	N	N	N	**X**
Force	N	**X**	N	N	N	N	N
Wallet	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

POLICE MODEL

Table 12.*1:* Crosstab

			nbusims		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Police model believe your department mostly follows	traditional	Count	63	6	69
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	91.3%	8.7%	100.0%
	problem solving policing	Count	23	3	26
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	88.5%	11.5%	100.0%
	community policing	Count	9	2	11
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	81.8%	18.2%	100.0%
	all of the above	Count	0	1	1
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	95	12	107
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	88.8%	11.2%	100.0%

NBUSINMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for Police Model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (3) = 8.895, $p < .05$). Those who were in departments that had a traditional policing model (91.3%) were more likely to believe the behavior was not serious, than those in a community policing model (81.8%) and problem solving policing model (88.5%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 50% percent of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *12.2:* Crosstab

			nbusinvi			
			No Violation of policy	Unsure	Violation of policy	Total
Police model believe your department mostly follows	traditional	Count	64	4	1	69
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	92.8%	5.8%	1.4%	100.0%
	problem solving policing	Count	24	2	1	27
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	88.9%	7.4%	3.7%	100.0%
	community policing	Count	9	1	1	11
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	81.8%	9.1%	9.1%	100.0%
	all of the above	Count	0	1	0	1
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	97	8	3	108
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	89.8%	7.4%	2.8%	100.0%

NBUSINVI or the violation of policy variable was found to be significant for police model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (6) = 15.031, $p < .05$). Those in a traditional policing model (92.8%) were more likely to feel there was no violation of policy when compared to those in the problem solving policing (88.9%) and community policing model (81.8%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 66% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *12.3:* Crosstab					
			nholios		Total
			Not Serious	Serious	
Police model believe your department mostly follows	traditional	Count	37	31	68
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	54.4%	45.6%	100.0%
	problem solving policing	Count	7	20	27
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	25.9%	74.1%	100.0%
	community policing	Count	3	8	11
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	27.3	72.7%	100.0%
	all of the above	Count	0	1	1
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	60	107
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	65.1%	34.9%	100.0%

NHOLIOS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for police model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (3) = 8.609, $p < .05$). Those who were in departments that had a traditional policing model (54.4%) were more likely to report the behavior as not serious, than those in problem solving policing (25.9%) and community policing models (27.3%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 37.5% of the cells had counts of less than 5.*

Table *12.4:* Crosstab					
			nholims		Total
			Not Serious	Serious	
Police model believe your department mostly follows	traditional	Count	46	22	68
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	67.6%	32.4%	100.0%
	problem solving policing	Count	9	18	27
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
	community policing	Count	5	6	11
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	45.5%	54.5%	100.0%
	all of the above	Count	0	1	1
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	60	47	107
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	56.1%	43.9%	100.0%

NHOLIMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for police model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (3) = 11.147, $p < .05$). Those who were in departments that had a traditional policing model (67.6%) were more likely to report the behavior as not serious, than those in problem solving policing (33.3%) and community policing models (45.5%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 37.5% of the cells had counts of less than 5.*

Table *12.5:* Crosstab

			nholivi			
			No Violation of policy	Unsure	Violation of policy	Total
Police model believe your department mostly follows	traditional	Count	19	17	32	68
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	27.9%	25.0%	47.1%	100.0%
	problem solving policing	Count	7	2	18	27
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	25.9%	7.4%	66.7%	100.0%
	community policing	Count	1	0	10	11
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	9.1%	0.0%	90.9%	100.0%
	all of the above	Count	0	1	0	1
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	27	20	60	107
		% within Recoded Police Department	27.7%	24.1%	56.1%	100.0%

NHOLIVI or violation of policy variable was found to be significant for police model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (6) = 14.938, $p < .05$). Those who were in a traditional policing model (27.9%) and problem solving policing model (25.9%) were more likely to believe this scenario did not violated policy than those in a community policing model (9.1%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 41.8% of the cells had counts of less than 5.*

Table 12.*6:* Crosstab

			nholimr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Police model believe your department mostly follows	traditional	Count	55	7	6	68
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	80.9%	10.3%	8.8%	100.0%
	problem solving policing	Count	14	8	5	27
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	51.9%	29.6%	18.5%	100.0%
	community policing	Count	6	1	4	11
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	54.5	9.1%	36.4%	100.0%
	all of the above	Count	0	1	0	1
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	75	17	15	107
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	70.1%	15.9%	14.0%	100.0%

NHOLIMR or do you believe others in your department would report this behavior was found to be significant for police model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (6) = 18.570, $p < .05$). Those who were in a traditional policing model (80.9%) were more likely to not believe others in their department would report the behavior than those in the problem solving policing model (51.9%) and community policing model (54.5%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 58.3 % of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table 12.7: Police model believe your department mostly follows* nforceos Crosstabulation					
			nforceos		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Police model believe your department mostly follows	traditional	Count	10	58	68
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	14.7%	85.3%	100.0%
	problem solving policing	Count	7	20	27
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	25.9%	74.1%	100.0%
	community policing	Count	0	11	11
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	all of the above	Count	1	0	1
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	18	89	107
		% within Police model believe your department mostly follows	16.8%	83.2%	100.0%

NFORCEOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for police model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (3) = 8.986, $p < .05$). Those who were in a problem solving policing model (25.9%) were more likely to find the behavior not serious, while those in a traditional (14.7%) and community policing model (0.00%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 50% of all cells had counts of less than 5.*

Table *12.8:* Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for departmentpolicemodel

DEPARTMENTPOLICEMODEL							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	N	**X**	**X**	N	N	N	N
Meal	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Speed	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Holiday	**X**	**X**	**X**	N	N	N	**X**
Burglary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Auto	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Supervisor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Alcohol	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bar	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Force	**X**	N	N	N	N	N	N
Wallet	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

FAMILY MEMBER

Table *13.1:* Family member officer prior to you joining the force* nmealsmr Crosstabulation

			nmealsmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Family member officer prior to you joining the force	Yes	Count	43	12	0	55
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	78.2%	21.8%	0.0%	100.0%
	No	Count	48	3	6	57
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	84.2%	5.3%	10.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	91	15	6	112
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	81.3%	13.4%	5.4%	100.0%

NMEALSMR or willingness for others to report this behavior was found to be significant for family member was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing those that had a family member in the police force prior to joining and those that did not. A significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 11.643, $p <$ .05). Those officers (84.2%) that had no family in the force prior to joining were more likely to believe others were not going to report this behavior, than those officers (78.2%) who did have a family member in the force prior to joining. *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% percent of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *13.2:* Crosstab

			nspeedmd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Family member officer prior to you joining the force	yes	Count	1	33	21	55
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	1.8%	60.0%	38.2%	100.0%
	no	Count	1	20	36	57
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	1.8%	35.1%	63.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	2	53	57	112
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	1.8%	47.3%	50.9%	100.0%

NSPEEDMD or discipline would receive was found to be significant for family member was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing those that had a family member in the police force prior to joining and those that did not. A significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.103, $p < .05$). Those who said they had no family in the force (63.2%) were more likely to feel there would be a serious reprimand than those who had family in the force (38.2%) prior to joining themselves. *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *13.3:* Family member officer prior to you joining the force* nburgor Crosstabulation

			nburgor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Family member officer prior to you joining the force	yes	Count	4	8	43	55
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	7.3%	14.5%	78.2%	100.0%
	no	Count	3	1	53	57
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	5.3%	1.8%	93.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	7	9	96	112
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	6.3%	8.0%	85.7%	100.0%

NBURGOR or willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for family member was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing those that had a family member in the police force prior to joining and those that did not. A significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.595, $p > .05$). Those who had family in the force were more likely to be unsure while those that did not were more likely to report. *An issue to note with this finding was that 66% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *13.4:* Crosstab

			nalchor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Family member officer prior to you joining the force	yes	Count	40	6	9	55
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	72.7%	10.9%	16.4%	100.0%
	no	Count	29	8	20	57
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	50.9%	14.0%	35.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	69	14	29	112
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	61.6%	12.5%	25.9%	100.0%

NALCHOR or willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant with family member was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the those who did/did not have a family member in the police force and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.187, $p < .05$). Those who had a family member in the police force (72.7%) were more likely to not report this behavior than those that had a family member (50.9%) in the police force.

Table *13.5:* Crosstab

			nalchmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Family member officer prior to you joining the force	yes	Count	45	7	3	55
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	81.8%	12.7%	5.5%	100.0%
	no	Count	33	14	10	57
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	57.9%	24.6%	17.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	78	21	13	112
		% within Family member officer prior to you joining the force	69.6%	18.8%	11.6%	100.0%

NALCHMR or willingness for others to report this behavior was found to be significant with family member was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the those who did/did not have a family member in the police force and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.916, $p < .05$). Those that had a family member (81.8%) in the police force were more likely to not believe others would report this behavior than those that did not have a family member (57.9%) in the police force.

Table *13.6:* Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for policefamily

POLICEFAMILY							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Meal	N	N	N	N	N	N	**X**
Speed	N	N	N	N	**X**	N	N
Holiday	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Burglary	N	N	N	N	N	**X**	N
Auto	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Supervisor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Alcohol	N	N	N	N	N	**X**	**X**
Bar	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Force	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Wallet	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

Table *14.1:* Number - police department* New Business Crosstabulation

			New Business		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	38	7	45
		% within Number - police department	84.4%	15.6%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	42	3	45
		% within Number - police department	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	18	8	26
		% within Number - police department	69.2%	30.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	98	18	116
		% within Number - police department	84.5%	15.5%	100.0%

NBUSINOS or own view of seriousness was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.303, $p < .05$). Those who were in Agency 2 (93.3%) were more likely to find the behavior not serious than those in agencies 1(84.4%) or 3 (69.2%).

Table *14.2:* Crosstab

			Nmealsod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	29	16	0	45
		% within Number - police department	64.4%	35.6%	0.0%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	38	6	1	45
		% within Number - police department	84.4%	13.3%	2.2%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	13	13	0	26
		% within Number - police department	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	80	35	1	116
		% within Number - police department	69.0%	30.2%	0.9%	100.0%

NMEALSOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 12.679, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 2 (84.4%) were more likely to feel there would be no reprimand for the behavior compared to those in agency 1 (64.4%) and 3 (50%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.3:* Crosstab

			Nmealsor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	38	6	1	45
		% within Number - police department	84.4%	13.3%	2.2%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	35	4	5	44
		% within Number - police department	79.5%	9.1%	11.4%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	10	2	14	26
		% within Number - police department	38.5%	7.7%	53.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	83	12	20	115
		% within Number - police department	72.2%	10.4%	17.4%	100.0%

NMEALSOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 32.731, $p <$ .05). Those who were in agency 1 (84.4%) were more likely to not report the behavior than those in agency 2 (79.5%) and 3 (38.5%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 44% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.4:* Crosstab

			nmealsmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	40	4	1	45
		% within Number - police department	88.9%	8.9%	2.2%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	36	7	1	44
		% within Number - police department	81.8%	15.9%	2.3%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	17	5	4	26
		% within Number - police department	65.4%	19.2%	15.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	93	16	6	115
		% within Number - police department	80.9%	13.9%	5.2%	100.0%

NMEALSMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 9.261, $p <$ .055). Those who were in agency 1 (88.9%) were more likely to not report the behavior than those in agency 2 (81.8%) and 3 (65.4%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 44% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.5:* Crosstab

			nspeedor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	5	12	27	44
		% within Number - police department	11.4%	27.3%	61.4%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	8	11	26	45
		% within Number - police department	17.8%	24.4%	57.8%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	1	25	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	3.8%	96.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	24	78	115
		% within Number - police department	11.3%	20.9%	67.8%	100.0%

NSPEEDOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.375, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 3 (96.2%) were more likely to report the behavior than those in agency 1 (61.4%) and 2 (57.8%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 22% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.6:* Crosstab

			nspeedmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	5	19	20	44
		% within Number - police department	11.4%	43.2%	45.5%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	10	17	18	45
		% within Number - police department	22.2%	37.8%	40.0%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	1	25	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	3.8%	96.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	15	37	63	115
		% within Number - police department	13.0%	32.2%	54.8%	100.0%

NSPEEDMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 25.591, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 3 (96.2%) were more likely to report the behavior than those in agency 1 (45.5%) and 2 (40.0%).

Table *14.7:* Crosstab					
			nholios		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	19	26	45
		% within Number - police department	42.2%	57.8%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	27	17	44
		% within Number - police department	61.4%	38.6%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	3	23	26
		% within Number - police department	11.5%	88.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	66	115
		% within Number - police department	42.6%	57.4%	100.0%

NHOLIOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 16.596, $p < .05$). Those who were in Agency 3 (88.5%) were more likely to feel the behavior was serious than those in agency 1 (57.8%) and 2(38.6%).

Table *14.8:* Crosstab					
			nholims		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	27	18	45
		% within Number - police department	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	29	15	44
		% within Number - police department	65.9%	34.1%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	6	20	26
		% within Number - police department	23.1%	76.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	62	53	115
		% within Number - police department	53.9%	46.1%	100.0%

NHOLIMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 13.169, $p < .05$). Those who were in Agency 3 (76.9%) were more likely to feel the behavior was serious than those in agency 1 (40.0%) or 2 (34.1%).

Table *14.9:* Crosstab

			nholivi			
			Violation of policy	Unsure	No Violation of policy	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	12	10	23	45
		% within Number - police department	26.7%	22.2%	51.1%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	13	11	20	44
		% within Number - police department	29.5%	25.0%	45.5%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	4	0	22	26
		% within Number - police department	15.4%	0.0%	84.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	29	21	65	115
		% within Number - police department	25.2%	18.3%	56.5%	100.0%

NHOLIVI or violation of policy was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 12.407, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 3 (84.6%) were more likely to believe there was a violation of policy than those in agency 1(51.1%) or 2 (45.5%).

Table *14.10:* Crosstab

			Nholiod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	31	13	1	45
		% within Number - police department	68.9%	28.9%	2.2%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	30	12	3	45
		% within Number - police department	66.7%	26.7%	6.7%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	9	14	3	26
		% within Number - police department	34.6%	53.8%	11.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	70	39	7	116
		% within Number - police department	60.3%	33.6%	6.0%	100.0%

NHOLIOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 10.224, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 3 (11.5%) were more likely to believe there would be a serious reprimand for the behavior than those in agency 1 (2.2%) or 2 (6.7%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.11:* Crosstab

			Nholior			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	35	8	2	45
		% within Number - police department	77.8%	17.8%	4.4%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	33	5	6	44
		% within Number - police department	75.0%	11.4%	13.6%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	4	6	16	26
		% within Number - police department	15.4%	23.1%	61.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	72	19	24	115
		% within Number - police department	62.6%	16.5%	20.9%	100.0%

NHOLIOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 40.948, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 3 (61.5%) were more likely to report the behavior than those in agency 1 (4.4%) or 2 (13.6%).

Table *14.12:* Crosstab

			nholimr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	34	8	3	45
		% within Number - police department	75.6%	17.8%	6.7%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	34	6	4	44
		% within Number - police department	77.3%	13.6%	9.1%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	12	5	9	26
		% within Number - police department	46.2%	19.2%	34.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	80	19	16	115
		% within Number - police department	69.6%	16.5%	13.9%	100.0%

NHOLIMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.480, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 3 (34.5%) were more likely to feel others would report the behavior than those in agencies 1 (6.7%) and 2 (9.1%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 22% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.13:* Number - police department* nburgmr Crosstabulation

			nburgmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	3	12	30	45
		% within Number - police department	6.7%	26.7%	66.7%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	6	11	27	44
		% within Number - police department	13.6%	25.0%	61.4%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	1	25	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	3.8%	96.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	9	24	82	115
		% within Number - police department	7.8%	20.9%	71.3%	100.0%

NBURGMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 11.702, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 3 (96.2%) were more likely to feel others would report the behavior than those at agency 1 (66.7%) and 2 (61.4%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5*.

Table *14.14:* Crosstab

			nautoor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	6	11	28	45
		% within Number - police department	13.3%	24.4%	62.2%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	12	10	23	45
		% within Number - police department	26.7%	22.2%	51.1%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	0	26	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	18	21	77	116
		% within Number - police department	15.5%	18.1%	66.4%	100.0%

NAUTOOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 20.031, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 1 (62.2%) and 3 (100%) were more likely to report the behavior than those in agency 2 (51.1%) were more likely to not report the behavior. *An issue to note with this finding was that 22% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.15:* Crosstab

			nautomr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	7	17	21	45
		% within Number - police department	15.6%	37.8%	46.7%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	12	13	20	45
		% within Number - police department	26.7%	28.9%	44.4%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	4	22	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	15.4%	84.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	19	34	63	116
		% within Number - police department	16.4%	29.3%	54.3%	100.0%

NAUTOMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 15.696, $p <$ .05). Those who were in agency 2 (26.7%) were more likely to feel others would not report the behavior, than those in agency 1 (15.6%) or agency 3 (0%).

Table *14.16:* Crosstab					
			nsuperos		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	0	45	45
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	4	41	45
		% within Number - police department	8.9%	91.1%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	26	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	4	112	116
		% within Number - police department	3.4%	96.6%	100.0%

NSUPEROS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.537, $p <$ .05). Those who were in Agency 2 (8.9%) were more likely to feel the behavior was not serious, than those in Agency 1 (0%) and 3 (0%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 50% of the cells had counts of less than 5.*

Table *14.17:* Crosstab					
			nsuperms		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	1	44	45
		% within Number - police department	2.2%	97.8%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	6	39	45
		% within Number - police department	13.3%	86.7%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	26	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	7	109	116
		% within Number - police department	6.0%	94.0%	100.0%

NSUPERMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.051, $p <$ .05). Those who were in Agency 2 (13.3%) were more likely to feel the behavior was not serious, than those in Agency 1 (2.2%) and 3 (0%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 50% of the cells had counts of less than 5*.

Table *14.18:* Crosstab

			nsuperod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	1	27	17	45
		% within Number - police department	2.2%	60.0%	37.8%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	8	28	8	44
		% within Number - police department	18.2%	63.6%	18.2%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	16	10	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	61.5%	38.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	9	71	35	115
		% within Number - police department	7.8%	61.7%	30.4%	100.0%

NSUPEROD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.436, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 1 (37.8%) and 3 (38.5%) were more likely to believe there should be a serious reprimand for the behavior than those in agency 2 (18.2%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.19:* Crosstab

			Nsupermd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	4	28	13	45
		% within Number - police department	8.9%	62.2%	28.9%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	9	27	8	44
		% within Number - police department	20.5%	61.4%	18.2%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	16	10	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	61.5%	38.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	71	31	115
		% within Number - police department	11.3%	61.7%	27.0%	100.0%

NSUPERMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 9.029, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 3 (38.5%) were more likely to believe there would be a serious reprimand for the behavior than those in agency 1 (28.9%) and agency 2 (18.2%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 22% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.20:* Crosstab

			Nsuperor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	10	11	24	45
		% within Number - police department	22.2%	24.4%	53.3%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	15	9	20	44
		% within Number - police department	34.1%	20.5%	45.5%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	0	26	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	25	20	70	115
		% within Number - police department	21.7%	17.4%	60.9%	100.0%

NSUPEROR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 23.469, $p <$ .05). Those who were in agency 2 (34.1%) were more likely to not report the behavior, than those in agency 1 (22.2%) or agency 3 (0%).

Table *14.21:* Crosstab

			Nsupermr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	8	15	22	45
		% within Number - police department	17.8%	33.3%	48.9%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	17	12	15	44
		% within Number - police department	38.6%	27.3%	34.1%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	6	20	26
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	23.1%	76.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	25	33	57	115
		% within Number - police department	21.7%	28.7%	49.6%	100.0%

NSUPERMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 18.466, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 2 were more likely to not report the behavior, than those in agency 1 (17.8%) or agency 3 (0%).

Table *14.22:* Crosstab

			nalchod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	27	16	2	45
		% within Number - police department	60.0%	35.6%	4.4%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	12	29	2	43
		% within Number - police department	27.9%	67.4%	4.7%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	7	16	3	26
		% within Number - police department	26.9%	61.5%	11.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	46	61	7	114
		% within Number - police department	40.4%	53.5%	6.1%	100.0%

NALCHOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.302, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 1 (60.0%) were more likely to believe there should be no reprimand for the behavior than those in agency 2 (27.9%) or 3 (26.9%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.23:* Crosstab

			Nalchmd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	26	17	2	45
		% within Number - police department	57.8%	37.8%	4.4%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	9	32	2	43
		% within Number - police department	20.9%	74.4%	4.7%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	7	16	3	26
		% within Number - police department	26.9%	61.5%	11.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	65	7	114
		% within Number - police department	36.8%	57.0%	6.1%	100.0%

NALCHMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 15.901, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 1 (57.8%) were more likely to believe there would be no reprimand for the behavior than those in agency 2 (20.9%) and 3 (26.9%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.24:* Crosstab

			Nalchor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	35	6	4	45
		% within Number - police department	77.8%	13.3%	8.9%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	28	3	13	44
		% within Number - police department	63.6%	6.8%	29.5%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	7	6	13	26
		% within Number - police department	26.9%	23.1%	50.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	70	15	30	115
		% within Number - police department	60.9%	13.0%	26.1%	100.0%

NALCHOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 21.411, $p <$ .05). Those who were in agency 1 (77.8%) were more likely to not report the behavior than those in agency 2 (63.6%) or 3 (26.9%).

Table *14.25:* Crosstab					
			nbarms		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	10	35	45
		% within Number - police department	22.2%	77.8%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	4	40	44
		% within Number - police department	9.1%	90.9%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	25	25
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	14	100	114
		% within Number - police department	12.3%	87.7%	100.0%

NBARMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.044, $p < .05$). Those who were in Agency 1 (22.2%) were more likely to feel the behavior was not serious than those in agency 2 (9.1%) or agency 3 (0%).

Table *14.26:* Crosstab

			nbaror			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	21	7	17	45
		% within Number - police department	46.7%	15.6%	37.8%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	14	6	24	44
		% within Number - police department	31.8%	13.6%	54.5%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	1	0	24	25
		% within Number - police department	4.0%	0.0%	96.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	13	65	114
		% within Number - police department	31.6%	11.4%	57.0%	100.0%

NBAROR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 22.621, $p <$ .05). Those who were in agency 3 (96%) were more likely to report the behavior than those in agency 1 (37.8%) or agency 2 (54.5%).

Table *14.27:* Crosstab

			nbarmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	23	10	12	45
		% within Number - police department	51.1%	22.2%	26.7%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	15	13	16	44
		% within Number - police department	34.1%	29.5%	36.4%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	3	5	17	25
		% within Number - police department	12.0%	20.0%	68.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	41	28	45	114
		% within Number - police department	36.0%	24.6%	39.5%	100.0%

NBARMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 14.794, $p < .05$). Those who were in agency 1 (51%) were more likely to feel others would not report the behavior than those in agency 2 (34.1%) or agency 3 (12.0%).

Table *14.28:* Crosstab					
			nforceos		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	13	32	45
		% within Number - police department	28.9%	71.1%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	5	40	45
		% within Number - police department	11.1%	88.9%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	24	24
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	18	96	114
		% within Number - police department	15.8%	84.2%	100.0%

NFORCEOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 11.048, $p <$ .05). Those who were in Agency 3 (100%) were more likely to feel the behavior was serious than those in Agency 1(71.1%) or Agency 2 (88.9%).

Table *14.29:* Crosstab					
			nforcems		
			Not Serious	Serious	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	19	26	45
		% within Number - police department	42.2%	57.8%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	11	33	44
		% within Number - police department	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	2	22	24
		% within Number - police department	8.3%	91.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	32	81	113
		% within Number - police department	28.3%	71.7%	100.0%

NFORCEMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.246, $p <$ .05). Those who were in Agency 3 (91.7%) were more likely to feel that others would find the behavior serious than those in Agency 1 (57.8%) and Agency 2 (75.0%).

Table *14.30:* Crosstab

			nforceod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	21	19	5	45
		% within Number - police department	46.7%	42.2%	11.1%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	6	35	3	44
		% within Number - police department	13.6%	79.5%	6.8%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	1	20	3	24
		% within Number - police department	4.2%	83.3%	12.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	74	11	113
		% within Number - police department	24.8%	65.5%	9.7%	100.0%

NFORCEOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 21.895, $p < .05$). Those who were in Agency 1 (46.7%) were more likely to believe there would be no reprimand for the behavior than those in Agency 2 (13.6%) and 3 (4.2%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.31:* Crosstab

			nforcemd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	19	22	4	45
		% within Number - police department	42.2%	48.9%	8.9%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	5	37	2	44
		% within Number - police department	11.4%	84.1%	4.5%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	2	19	3	24
		% within Number - police department	8.3%	79.2%	12.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	26	78	9	113
		% within Number - police department	23.0%	69.0%	8.0%	100.0%

NFORCEMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 17.821, $p < .05$). Those who were in Agency 1 (42.2%) were more likely to believe there would be no reprimand for the behavior than those in Agency 2 (11.4%) and 3 (8.3%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.32:* Crosstab

			Nforceor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	27	9	9	45
		% within Number - police department	60.0%	20.0%	20.0%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	17	9	18	44
		% within Number - police department	38.6%	20.5%	40.9%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	2	1	21	24
		% within Number - police department	8.3%	4.2%	87.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	46	19	48	113
		% within Number - police department	40.7%	16.8%	42.5%	100.0%

NFORCEOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 30.072, $p <$ .05). Those who were in Agency 1 (60%) were more likely to not report the behavior than those in Agency 2 (38.6%) and Agency 3 (8.3%).

Table *14.33:* Crosstab

			nforcemr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	34	6	5	45
		% within Number - police department	75.6%	13.3%	11.1%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	23	12	9	44
		% within Number - police department	52.3%	27.3%	20.5%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	7	9	8	24
		% within Number - police department	29.2%	37.5%	33.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	64	27	22	113
		% within Number - police department	56.6%	23.9%	19.5%	100.0%

NFORCEMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 14.366, $p <$ .05). Those who were in Agency 1 (75.6%) were more likely to not report the behavior than those in Agency 2 (52.3%) or Agency 3 (29.2%).

Table *14.34:* Crosstab

			nwalletod			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	0	18	26	44
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	40.9%	59.1%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	2	24	19	45
		% within Number - police department	4.4%	53.3%	42.2%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	6	19	25
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	24.0%	76.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	2	48	64	114
		% within Number - police department	1.8%	42.1%	56.1%	100.0%

NWALLETOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 9.753, $p < .05$). Those who were in Agency 3 were more likely to believe there would be a serious reprimand for the behavior than those in Agency 1 (59.1%) or Agency 2 (42.2%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.35:* Crosstab

			Nwalletmd			
			No Reprimand	Moderate Reprimand	Serious Reprimand	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	2	20	21	43
		% within Number - police department	4.7%	46.5%	48.8%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	1	25	19	45
		% within Number - police department	2.2%	55.6%	42.2%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	8	17	25
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	32.0%	68.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	3	53	57	113
		% within Number - police department	2.7%	46.9%	50.4%	100.0%

NWALLETMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 5.397, $p < .05$). Those who were in Agency 3 (68.0%) were more likely to believe there would be a serious reprimand for the behavior than those in Agency 1 (48.8%) or Agency 2 (42.2%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.36:* Crosstab

			Nwalletor			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	6	9	29	44
		% within Number - police department	13.6%	20.5%	65.9%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	11	10	24	45
		% within Number - police department	24.4%	22.2%	53.3%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	0	0	25	25
		% within Number - police department	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	17	19	78	114
		% within Number - police department	14.9%	16.7%	68.4%	100.0%

NWALLETOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 17.078, $p <$ .05). Those who were in Agency 3 (100%) were more likely to report the behavior than those in Agency 1 (65.9%) or Agency 2 (53.3%). *An issue to note with this finding was that 22% of the cells had counts less than 5.*

Table *14.37:* Crosstab

			nwalletmr			
			No	Unsure	Yes	Total
Number - police department	Agency 1	Count	10	12	22	44
		% within Number - police department	22.7%	27.3%	50.0%	100.0%
	Agency 2	Count	13	15	17	45
		% within Number - police department	28.9%	33.3%	37.8%	100.0%
	Agency 3	Count	3	2	20	25
		% within Number - police department	12.0%	8.0%	80.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	26	29	59	114
		% within Number - police department	22.8%	25.4%	51.8%	100.0%

NWALLETMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 11.738, $p < .05$). Those who were in Agency 2 (28.9%) were more likely to not report the behavior than those in Agency 1 (22.7%) or Agency 3 (12%).

Table *14.38:* Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for newdepartments

NEWDEPARTMENTS							
	Own Seriousness	Other Seriousness	Violation of Policy	Discipline-Should	Discipline-Would	Own Reporting	Others Reporting
Business	**X**	N	N	N	N	N	N
Meal	N	N	N	**X**	N	**X**	**X**
Speed	N	N	N	N	N	**X**	**X**
Holiday	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	N	**X**	**X**
Burglary	N	N	N	N	N	N	**X**
Auto	N	N	N	N	N	**X**	**X**
Supervisor	**X**	**X**	N	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Alcohol	N	N	N	**X**	**X**	**X**	N
Bar	N	**X**	N	N	N	**X**	**X**
Force	**X**	**X**	N	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Wallet	N	N	N	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**

Table Key:

X = Significant Variables

N = Non-Significant Variables

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