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THE MEDIATING EFFECTS OF JUSTIFICATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT HELPING OF A DISABLED OTHER

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by

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Abstract

THE MEDIATING EFFECTS OF JUSTIFICATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT HELPING OF A DISABLED OTHER

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The "foot-in-the-door" phenomenon (Freedman & Fraser, 1966) is a method of increasing the likelihood of compliance with a request for help by first inducing compliance with a smaller request. The present study tested the hypothesis that the amount of justification provided for performing the initial favor affects the degree to which the likelihood of subsequent helping is increased. Specifically, it was predicted that the increased likelihood of subsequent helping should occur only when no external justification is provided for the initial favor. When external justification is provided for the initial favor, subsequent willingness to help should be no greater than if no initial favor was performed.

The effect of the help-seeker's physical characteristics on the relationship between prior and subsequent helping was also investigated. According to ambivalence-amplification theory (Katz & Glass, 1979), attitudes toward the physically disabled are ambivalent. Behavior toward a disabled other which contradicts either the positive or negative component

of ambivalent feelings arouses conflict which may be resolved by either denying or defending the discredited attitude. This in turn can lead to subsequent reactions of a more extreme nature than if the initial act had been done for an unambivalently-viewed, i.e., nondisabled, other.

Subjects were induced to perform a boring task under one of the following conditions: (a) as part of their paid service in an experiment, (b) as a favor for which they later received strong external justification, or (c) as a favor for which they received no justification. The stimulus person who made this request appeared to be either: (a) normal or (b) physically disabled. Responses to a subsequent request for a personal favor constituted the main dependent measure.

Only subjects who did the task as a favor with no justification offered more subsequent help than did those who had simply been required to perform the task. This essentially confirmed the prediction regarding the effects of justification on the relationship between prior and subsequent helping. Furthermore, the relevance of this finding to the issue of the timing of justification manipulations in dissonance paradigms was discussed.

The help-seeker's physical characteristics did not affect later helping. However, subjects who received no justification for having done the favor tended to deny the uniqueness of their action or that they had done a favor at all, and there

was strong evidence that these subjects denied that the initial task had been boring. Therefore, an additional condition was tested in which subjects who performed the initial favor, while receiving no justification, were reminded that they had done a favor and that the task had been a boring one. Under this condition of no justification, an additional pattern emerged: subjects who had performed the initial task as a favor for the disabled stimulus person without justification tended to offer more subsequent help than did subjects who had done the favor for the normal stimulus person. This pattern corresponded more closely to the prediction derived from ambivalence-amplification theory.

These findings were interpreted as reflecting a tendency, whenever possible, to reduce the conflict aroused by having freely performed a favor for an ambivalently-viewed, i.e., disabled, help-seeker through denial of the favor itself or its uniqueness and/or a re-evaluation of the task's appeal, rather than through modification of one's reactions to the help-seeker. When the opportunity to engage in such denial was minimized, there was a greater tendency for amplified helpfulness to appear.

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Finally, as a small token of my love, I dedicate this work to my parents.

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Introduction

Overview

The present research brings together two areas of concern: the relationship between prior and subsequent helping, and the nature of reactions to the physically disabled.

Research on the "foot-in-the-door" phenomenon has demonstrated a method of increasing the likelihood of compliance with a request for help by first inducing compliance with a smaller request. The predominant explanation of this phenomenon is derived from self-perception theory. While this explanation has been refined by some and challenged by others, it remains the most useful and comprehensive, with few modifications.

Several issues, however, have only been touched on in past research, and are addressed in the present study. One of these issues follows from the implications of the self-perception theory explanation of the foot-in-the-door effect, and concerns the effect of justification for the initial act on the relationship between prior and subsequent help. A related issue concerns the applicability of the foot-in-the-door technique to requests for personal favors, as opposed to more impersonal requests. Another important issue, but one which has been virtually overlooked by foot-in-the-door researchers, involves the characteristics of the person seeking

help. In particular, there is evidence from research on reactions to the physically disabled that physical characteristics of the help-seeker affect reactions to requests for help.

The present study examines the effect of induced helping on subsequent helping as a function of: (a) the physical condition of the help-seeker, and (b) the amount of external justification provided for engaging in the initial favor.

The Foot-in-the-Door Phenomenon: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Perspectives

Freedman and Fraser (1966) have demonstrated a method of increasing the likelihood of compliance with a request for help by first inducing compliance with a smaller request. In one study, subjects were contacted by phone and asked to participate in a consumer survey by responding to a few questions concerning household products. One group of subjects was required to actually answer the survey questions, while another group was asked merely to make a commitment to participate at a later date. A third group heard the questions but was not asked to respond to them. In this way, the individual effects of compliance with the request, commitment to comply with the request, and mere familiarity with the request and the requester could be distinguished. Three days later subjects were contacted by the same experimenter and asked to allow

a survey team to examine the products in their home. A control group was contacted for the first time and presented with the same request. Only those subjects who had actually performed the initial request were significantly more likely to agree to the second request than the control subjects. Subjects who had agreed to, but not actually performed, the first request fell in between the control subjects and subjects who had performed the first request, but did not significantly differ from either of them. (Freedman and Fraser took this finding as evidence that agreement alone may produce part of the effect.) Subjects who were familiar with the nature of the first request but had not been asked to comply with it did not differ from control subjects. Summarizing, actual compliance with the initial request, but not mere agreement to comply, produced a significantly higher rate of agreement to perform the second, larger request than both mere familiarity with the initial request and no initial contact at all.

In a second study, Freedman and Fraser varied the degree of issue and task similarity between the initial and subsequent requests. This was done in order to test the possible influence on the prior help effect of increased involvement following compliance with the first request. Subjects were asked to place in front of their homes a large unattractive sign advocating driving safety. Two weeks earlier one group of subjects had received a request to promote either driving safety or

keeping California beautiful, by either signing a petition or displaying a small sign. Regardless of how similar the first and second requests were and despite the fact that the two requests were made by different people, compliance with any initial request for help increased the likelihood of compliance with the subsequent request.

Taken together, the results of these two studies indicate that the two requests need not be similar nor even be made by the same person. In fact, somewhat surprisingly, there were no significant differences among the four experimental conditions in the second study. Since increased compliance was found even when the first and second requests did not deal with the same issue, Freedman and Fraser rejected explanations based on increased commitment to or involvement with a particular issue as a result of compliance with the initial request. Similarly, commitment to a particular task did not appear to be responsible for increased subsequent cooperation, since increased compliance was found even when the two requests required different types of action. Commitment to the help-seeker following compliance with the initial request, which might explain the results of the first study, fails to explain the results obtained in the second study, since in that case the two requests were made by different people.

Freedman and Fraser suggested that a more general process underlies the increase in subsequent compliance. They

attributed the relationship to a change in self-perception in the direction of seeing oneself as a helpful person. The change, according to Freedman and Fraser, is not necessarily "toward any particular issue or person or activity, but may be toward activity or compliance in general" (Freedman & Fraser, 1966, p. 202).

Pliner, Hart, Kohl, and Saari (1974) replicated Freedman and Fraser's original studies with a few differences. First, instead of using a solely discrete dependent measure, i.e., compliance or refusal, these investigators measured donation to a charity, which could be treated as either a discrete or continuous variable. This allowed the measurement of degrees of helping as well as of the rate of compliance. In addition, the size of the initial request was varied. Finally, actual compliance, rather than just reported willingness to comply, was measured. The small initial request was to wear a pin publicizing a Cancer Society fund drive; the large initial request was to wear the pin and to persuade a family member to do the same. The second request was for donations to the Cancer Society. The two requests were made by different people. Subjects were significantly more likely to make a donation following either-sized prior request than if no previous request had been made, and size of request did not affect the rate of compliance. The same pattern emerged when the size of the donations was analyzed: a prior request of

either size led to larger contributions than no prior request, and the magnitude of the initial request did not affect the size of the donation. However, the difference in average donations appeared to be due to the differences in the numbers of donors rather than to different levels of generosity among conditions, since when only donors were compared there were no differences in mean contributions among groups.

Pliner et al. drew two conclusions from their findings. First, they suggested that since prior requests increased the likelihood but not the degree of compliance, their results are consistent with the qualitative change in self-perception implied by Freedman and Fraser's hypothesis. Second, Pliner et al. believed their data suggest that even a rather trivial behavior is sufficient to produce a change in self-perception to a substantial degree. Two additional points are worth noting. First, since both requests involved the Cancer Society, this study provides no further information concerning the importance of issue similarity. Second, since the "large" initial request was rather trivial and not much larger than the "small" request, it would appear that this was not a strong test of the effect of initial request size.

Snyder and Cunningham (1975) also replicated Freedman and Fraser's findings. They induced compliance in one group of subjects by making an extremely small request and induced noncompliance in another group by making an extremely large

and demanding request. Subjects were contacted by an experimenter who posed as a member of either a consumer or a civic-safety group. The experimenter asked subjects to agree to respond to either 8 or 50 questions. Two days later subjects were contacted by a different experimenter, posing as a representative of the unfamiliar group, and were asked to agree to respond to 30 survey questions. Control subjects received only this intermediate size request. In line with the self-perception hypothesis, subjects who had received the small initial request (and had, therefore, agreed to fulfill it) were more likely to agree to the intermediate subsequent request than were control subjects, while subjects who had received the large initial request (and had, therefore, refused it) were less likely to agree.

In this study, in contrast to that of Freedman and Fraser, mere agreement to perform the first favor was sufficient to produce a significant increase in subsequent compliance. This suggests that change in self perception does not rely on actual performance of the first favor. Another possibility, however, is that at the time of the second request subjects felt they were fulfilling an earlier commitment to answer questions, although for a different person and concerning a different issue. Thus, a somewhat different process from a change in self-perception may account for the effect in Snyder and Cunningham's study and in other studies requiring only commitment at the first contact.

To further test the self-perception explanation of the foot-in-the-door technique, Seligman, Bush, and Kirsch (1976) varied the size of the initial request relative to that of the second. They reasoned that if a self-perception process is operating, the strength of the self attribution should increase with the size of the initial request complied with. (This was presumably the reasoning behind Pliner et al.'s similar manipulation.) Two days before subjects were requested to answer 55 questions for a consumer survey of reactions to the energy crisis and inflation, they were requested by another experimenter to answer either 5, 20, 30, or 45 questions for the same survey. (In this study subjects actually complied with the initial request.) Subjects who had responded to either 30 or 45 questions at the initial contact were significantly more likely to agree to the second request than were control subjects who had not been contacted previously. Seligman et al. concluded, therefore, that compliance with a request for help will generalize only if the initial request is sufficiently large to motivate the individual to draw an appropriate dispositional inference. This, then, is a refinement of Freedman and Fraser's more general self-perception explanation.

Harris (1972) challenged Freedman and Fraser's change in self-perception explanation of the prior help effect. Instead, she attributes the effect to the social responsibility norm aroused by a request for help. In one experiment, the

second request was for a dime. The prior favor, requested by the same person, was a small one, either telling the time or giving directions. In order to test the possibility that Freedman and Fraser's prior-help effect was due to the thanks the person received for the first favor, no thanks for the first favor were given in the study. Giving the time and giving directions were deliberately chosen for the initial favor in this study not only because they were expected to elicit a high rate of compliance, but also because they are "so common that they seemed unlikely to change anyone's perception of himself" (Harris, 1972, p. 67). Subjects who had been asked either of the prior favors were more likely to give the experimenter a dime.

In another study, Harris varied the reinforcement received for the first favor and tested the prior-help effect in a situation in which the two requests were unrelated. Undergraduate and graduate students were asked to participate in an admissions recruiting program by writing a letter to a minority student and offering to answer questions about being a student at their university. Subjects who wrote the letter later received either no comment, positive feedback, or negative feedback, ostensibly from the student to whom they had written. Two weeks later all subjects received an appeal to help in a campaign to improve the university's image for the purpose of gaining community support for state funding. Harris

obtained greater compliance from subjects who had received the first request than from those who had received only the second request. Contrary to expectations, however, Harris found not only no significant differences in volunteer rates among the three reinforcement conditions, but also no difference between subjects who had written the letter and those who had refused. A difference was found, however, between subjects who had received the first request and those who had not. Furthermore, those who had been requested to do the first favor but refused volunteered for the second favor more than those who had never received the first request.

On the basis of these two studies, Harris ruled out the importance of reinforcement for the prior-help effect. However, in addition to her own reasons for questioning the adequacy of her test of the reinforcement hypothesis (including individual differences in personality and reinforcement history), it may be the case that the type of reinforcement she used was more complex than it appeared. Harris acknowledged that subjects may have discussed their feedback. It is possible, then, that some subjects may have volunteered for the publicity campaign as a way of restoring their self-esteem. For instance, subjects who received no feedback or negative feedback may have felt responsible for the poor response to their letters. Whether or not this was the case, Harris' conclusion that reinforcement is not an important variable seems premature.

More important is Harris' conclusion that Freedman and Fraser's self-perception change explanation is inadequate inasmuch as more of those who refused to write the letter volunteered to help with the publicity campaign than those who were never asked to write the letter. According to Harris, if doing a favor changes one's self-concept then so should refusing to do a favor, so that refusers of the first request should have been less, rather than more likely to comply with the second request than those who never received the first request.

Harris suggested a social norm interpretation as the most adequate explanation of her results: a request for altruistic behavior makes the norm of social responsibility more salient than it would otherwise be. Compliance with the request does not appear to be a necessary factor. Harris' earlier notion, that the social responsibility norm may be invoked as an explanation for an altruistic act that was initially committed without any awareness of the norm, does not appear to fit the findings of these studies, since if this were the case prior helpers would have volunteered more than nonhelpers. One problem with Harris' explanation is that it implies that the social responsibility norm's increased salience lasts for a period of over two weeks. It seems more likely that it was the discussions of the letters and feedback that maintained the norm's salience, which would otherwise have

dissipated. Furthermore, if such discussions took place, subjects who had refused the initial request might have felt some pressure from their peers to perform an altruistic (or possibly school-spirited) act the next time the opportunity arose. That is, it may have been these discussions rather than the initial request which increased and maintained the salience of the social responsibility norm.

Finally, Harris' assertion that in her second study the effect of a prior request had generalized to an unrelated situation seems unwarranted, since the two requests, although made by different people and involving different tasks, both concerned the university and its image. It is still not clear how the effect would hold up with two more clearly unrelated requests.

Cialdini, Vincent, Lewis, Catalan, Wheeler, and Darby (1975) conducted a group of studies to test a different technique for increasing compliance, one based on reciprocal concessions. They found that the likelihood of compliance with a request was increased immediately following refusal of a larger request. However, when the two requests were of equal size, or when the two requests were made by different people, that is, when there was no pressure to reciprocate a concession made by the help-seeker, subjects displayed a tendency for consistency by either complying with both requests or refusing to comply with both. In this study, the initial,

extreme request was to volunteer as a counselor to juvenile delinquents for a period of at least two years. The subsequent, smaller request was to volunteer to chaperone a group of juvenile delinquents on a 2-hour field trip.

From this study and that of Snyder and Cunningham, it would appear that the crucial factor regarding large initial requests and the reciprocal concession vs. self-perception effect is whether the second request is made by the same or a different person. However, the timing of the second request also differed in the two studies. In Snyder and Cunningham's study, the first and second requests were made by different people and there was always a 2-day delay between the two requests, while in Cialdini et al.'s study there was never a delay between the two requests. A self-perception effect (i.e., noncompliance with both requests) was found in both timing conditions when the large initial and smaller subsequent requests were made by different people. It is possible that the reciprocal concession effect Cialdini et al. found when the same experimenter made both requests was due to the timing of the requests. The reciprocal concession effect was not tested under conditions of a delay between the two requests.

The timing of the two requests, rather than whether the same or different experimenters make the requests, is the crucial difference between the self-perception and reciprocal concession effects in the large initial request conditions,

according to Cann, Sherman, and Elkes (1975). They varied the size of the initial request and the timing of the second request. An experimenter contacted subjects by phone, identified himself as a member of a local traffic safety group, and made an initial request, either small (and likely to elicit compliance) or large (and likely to produce noncompliance). The small request was to answer three brief questions over the phone. The large request was to keep a record of traffic flow at an intersection over a 2-hour period. A second request was made by the same experimenter either immediately or 7-10 days later in a second phone contact. This request was to pass out to fifteen neighbors pamphlets dealing with traffic safety. Control subjects received only this request. When the initial request was small there was no difference in the rate of compliance as a function of the timing of the two requests; subjects who received the first request were more likely to agree to the second request than were control subjects. On the other hand, when the initial request was large the timing of the second request was crucial. Relative to the control condition, compliance with the second request increased when the second request followed immediately, while compliance decreased when there was a delay.

The self-perception explanation appears to account for all but the large request-no delay condition. Compliance with the trivial request or noncompliance with the extreme request

in the delay condition, which replicates the large initial request condition in Snyder and Cunningham's study, becomes the model for behavior when the second request is received. According to Cann et al., "the self-attribution occurs because the initial response is induced in a free-choice situation, so that no external pressure can be perceived as causal" (Cann et al., 1975, p. 779).

In the large-request-no-delay condition, which replicates the same-experimenter condition in Cialdini et al.'s study, the reciprocal concession process appears to account for the increased compliance with the second request following non-compliance with the initial request. Cann et al. suggested that a perceptual contrast effect, first suggested by Snyder and Cunningham in this context, may also be operating, making the second request seem smaller than it would alone.

Conflict resolution processes may also account for these results, as Cann et al. pointed out. Subjects justify their compliance with the initial request by convincing themselves that the issues are worthy or that they are socially involved people. When subjects refuse to comply with the large initial request, they can resolve the guilt or conflict they feel by complying with a second request immediately or, in the absence of this opportunity, by derogating the requester or the issue, leading to less compliance if a delayed second request is made.

Harris' norm salience explanation seems inappropriate in these studies, according to Cann et al., since all the initial requests should have aroused the social responsibility norm, and yet compliance decreased in the delay condition with a large initial request.

Seligman et al.'s study, cited earlier, examined the self-perception explanation of the foot-in-the-door effect by focusing on the cost of complying with the first request. They pointed out that if the foot-in-the-door effect reflected a self-attribution process, large initial favors, which demand more effort, should require more justification than smaller ones. Following a similar line of reasoning, Uranowitz (1975) tested the implications of a self-perception theory explanation of the foot-in-the-door effect by directly varying the amount of one form of justification provided for complying with an initial request for help. Women leaving a shopping center department store were approached by a college-aged male who asked them to watch his grocery bags while he went back into the store to find something he had lost. This was either a dollar bill (low justification) or a wallet with "a lot of money" in it (high justification). In both cases all subjects agreed and had to wait approximately one minute, after which the experimenter returned and reported he had found the lost item. As subjects continued on their way, they passed a second, female experimenter who dropped one of her packages,

apparently without noticing. Subjects had an opportunity to help the second experimenter by either picking up her dropped package or informing her that she had dropped it.

Uranowitz found that low justification subjects helped the second experimenter more than both high justification subjects and control subjects (who were only given a chance to help the second experimenter). The rate of helping did not differ between high justification and control subjects. This suggests that having received sufficient justification for the initial favor, high justification subjects felt no need to alter their self-perception. Low justification subjects, on the other hand, did have to search for an explanation of their behavior, one which appeared to increase their willingness to help in the future.

Uranowitz' study is important for several reasons. First, it differs from other foot-in-the-door studies in that the dependent measure was of voluntary or spontaneous helping, rather than compliance with a direct request. This suggests that the effect of prior helping is not restricted to compliance situations, but can also generalize to a situation in which only far more indirect helping cues are present.

Uranowitz' study was also the first of the foot-in-the-door group to use personal favors of more than trivial size. (Harris used personal favors in one of her studies, but these were extremely trivial. There is also a possibility that the

two favors were seen as one by subjects.) Previous studies had elicited mere compliance, albeit pro-social in nature, rather than helpfulness. In these studies the requests were impersonal, for charities, organizations, etc., and did not personally benefit the requester. On the other hand, Uranowitz used two different experimenters in his study. Thus, the effect of doing a personal favor on one's willingness to do another favor for the same person has not yet been examined.

Most obvious, perhaps, is the variation of the importance of the initial favor in Uranowitz' study. By varying the amount of money lost by the experimenter, Uranowitz also modified the help-seeker's need and the justification for the helping act. There are many forms of justification, however, and need or importance is just one. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) and attribution theory (e.g., Bem, 1967) usually conceive of justification in terms of situational or external vs. dispositional or internal causes. For instance, external incentives such as monetary rewards (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) and threat of punishment (e.g., Lepper, 1973) have been used to alter the amount of external justification for performing or not performing various tasks (e.g., telling a lie, not playing with attractive toys). It is unclear how Uranowitz' form of justification fits into an attribution theory framework. First, although the physical action required of subjects was exactly the same, subjects

in the high and low justification conditions were, in a sense, actually performing different favors since some were helping the experimenter retrieve "a lot of money" while others were helping him find only a dollar. This manipulation of the nature of the favors is somewhat different from varying the level of justification for the same act. Furthermore, it is not clear how the level of the favor's importance to the help-seeker changes justification for the helper. Obviously, to some extent the less trival the consequences of the favor, the more justified the favor is. On the other hand, this variation seems to affect the legitimacy of the help-seeker's request more than it affects the justification for the helper's behavior. Nevertheless, Uranowitz did obtain a justification effect using his manipulation. It remains to be seen whether other forms of justification produce the same effect.

Justification and the Prior Help Effect

Dissonance and self-perception theories were alluded to briefly in the preceding discussion of Uranowitz' study. Uranowitz pursued an important implication of the attribution theory explanation of the prior help effect. He reasoned that if the effect reflects a change in self-perception following the performance of the initial favor, then the less external or situational justification provided for the favor, the greater the subsequent change in self-perception.

Both dissonance and attribution theories consider attitude change in relation to the amount of external justification present for behavior. According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), when two cognitive elements are in a dissonant relationship, a motivational tension state arises which calls for reduction. When the two dissonant elements are an apparently freely chosen, but irrevocable behavior (e.g., a favor for a stranger) and an attitude or set of attitudes (e.g., "I don't spend time or effort on unimportant things."), one of the easiest dissonance reduction methods consists of changing the dissonant attitude and making it consonant with the behavior (e.g., "I think this was an important issue"; "I like the person I helped"; or "I'm a helpful person."). Thus the internal conflict aroused by having done a favor for a stranger for no apparent reason may be resolved through altering one's attitude (e.g., toward the task, the recipient, or oneself).

Bem's (1967) self-perception theory provides a similar but basically non-motivational attribution analysis. Within this framework it is generally assumed that actors are initially unaware of the reasons for their behavior and only subsequently search for an explanation of it. An individual who has done a favor for someone, then, might infer that he/she is a helpful person, believes in the cause, or likes the recipient of the favor.

The purpose of the foot-in-the-door technique is to achieve compliance with the application of only minimal

external pressure. The underlying concept of the most widely accepted explanation of the prior help effect is that after having complied with the initial request, with ostensibly minimal pressure, helpers are faced with the task of justifying their behavior. This is accomplished, in the apparent absence of sufficient external factors to explain the behavior, by changing one's self-perception and/or inferring that one is a helpful person or a "doer."

It should be noted that the major competing explanation of the foot-in-the-door effect (see Harris, 1972) assumes that the social responsibility norm, made salient by the initial request, produces compliance with the subsequent request. This would seem to be a very different process from that of a change in self-perception. Yet, norms, while they are usually thought of as external pressures, must be internalized in order to be effective. The externally derived negative consequences of failing to respond to a norm are not obvious. It would seem that such norms are complied with out of an internal need rather than external threat. So, to consider oneself a doer or a helper may just be a different way of saying that one values the social responsibility norm. Thus, the norm explanation can be incorporated into an attribution theory explanation.

Where there is pressure to comply, there is the danger of reactance arousal (Brehm, 1966). It is, therefore, worth considering the implications of reactance theory for a prior

help paradigm. Cann et al. (1975) have considered several of the relevant issues.

First, since the prior help paradigm is, in fact, designed to elicit greater compliance with a later request, there is a danger that this intent will be perceived by potential helpers. Reactance theory predicts that when external pressures are perceived as unjustifiably threatening to one's behavioral freedom or ability to choose one's behavior for oneself, the individual tries to reassert his/her behavioral freedom by choosing to do the opposite of what is being demanded. As Cann et al. pointed out, this can happen when there is an escalation of requests, as in the traditional foot-in-the-door paradigm, or even when the size of the request represents a decrease, if that can be interpreted as a pressure on the refuser of the initial request to reciprocate a concession or if the help-seeker uses the smaller size to "shame" the refuser of the larger, initial request into complying with the second one.

In addition to the size of the two requests, there is a timing factor, according to Cann et al. If the two requests are made during the same interaction or within a short period of time, it would seem more likely that potential helpers will perceive the situation as a manipulative one.

Unfortunately, it is not clear as to when social responsibility norms or norms to reciprocate a concession will elicit the desired behavior, and when they will be perceived as overly strong and reactance-arousing pressures. However,

Cann et al. cited Berkowitz (1973) who suggested that impersonal requests are less likely to arouse reactance than are requests for personal favors. The reason for this is, presumably, that requests which will not benefit the help-seeker directly should be less likely to arouse the perception of undue pressure. Another factor was suggested by Brehm, who noted the importance of the perceived legitimacy of imposed pressures to comply as a variable in reactance arousal. Pressure, per se, does not arouse reactance. When the desired outcome seems justified or even socially desirable there should be less danger of reactance-arousal.

Reactance-arousal would seem to be less of a problem in foot-in-the-door situations than in reciprocal concession paradigms and other situations in which initial refusal is a factor (e.g., as in Cialdini et al.'s study in which one experimenter reminded subjects of their refusal to comply with another experimenter's request). The reason for this is that the idea behind the foot-in-the-door technique is to induce subjects to comply with the initial request using as little external pressure as possible. Then, if subjects find external pressures insufficient to explain their behavior, they should need to justify their compliance by attributing it to some internal cause. Of course, the possibility remains that helpers will recognize the manipulative nature of such situations. Furthermore, external pressures which are unintended or unrecognized by the help-seeker

may nevertheless be recognized or imagined by helpers, and thereby affect willingness to comply with the subsequent request. This danger, however, may be reduced even further if at least one of the requests for help appears not to be premeditated. Even if the request is for a personal favor, its potential to arouse reactance may be minimized if it appears to be relatively innocent and incidental to the interaction (unlike the classic foot-in-the-door situation).

Characteristics of the Help-Seeker and Reactions to Requests for Help

Freedman and Fraser concluded that the foot-in-the-door effect could not be attributed to a change in the helper's attitude toward the help-seeker. Their conclusion was based on their having obtained the effect even when the two requests were made by different people. However, despite the fact that the prior help effect has been found even in studies using two different experimenters, there is still some reason to expect that helping will lead to increased liking for the recipient. First, it is important to remember that only Uranowitz' study involved a personal favor, and in his study there was no condition in which the same person was the recipient of both favors. In the other studies, since the compliant act did not directly benefit the person making the request, it is not surprising that no evidence was found of increased liking for or involvement with the help-seeker. It is possible, on the other hand, that liking would be a factor when the helper perceives his/her behavior as a personal favor for the help-seeker.

Schopler and Compere (1971) found that subjects rated someone they had just been kind to as more attractive than someone they had been harsh to. Subjects had been induced to compliment one confederate when he was correct on trials of a learning task and to criticize another confederate when he was incorrect. They were then asked to evaluate both confederates. The kindly treated confederate was rated more attractive than the harshly treated confederate. Earlier, Jecker and Landy (1969) found that subjects who were induced to return part of what they had won during an experiment to the experimenter liked him better afterwards than did subjects who had not returned their winnings. Similarly, it has been found that after administering harsh treatment (e.g., shock or derogatory remarks), subjects devalue the recipient (e.g., Davis & Jones, 1960; Glass, 1964).

Apparently since Freedman and Fraser discounted the importance of commitment to the help-seeker in the prior help effect, subsequent investigators virtually ignored the influence of the help-seeker's characteristics. Indeed, only a few help studies of any kind include variations of the help-seeker's characteristics, and fewer still tested adult subjects.

Gross, Wallston, and Piliavin (1975) found that subjects were almost twice as likely to promise to complete a questionnaire for a warm and pleasant experimenter as for a rude and unpleasant experimenter (actual helping behavior, however, did not differ). When attractiveness was manipulated by varying

the similarity between subject and help-seeker, greater similarity was associated with greater willingness to perform a favor (Baron, 1971) and more actual helping behavior (Pandey & Griffitt, 1973).

An entirely different area of theory and research provides evidence of the importance of the help-seeker's physical characteristics. This area of inquiry concerns attitudinal and behavioral reactions to the physically disabled. More specifically, evidence has been found to suggest that attitudes toward the physically disabled are ambivalent, consisting of both sympathetic and negative feelings for members of this group. The implication of this evidence for the foot-in-the-door paradigm is that the perception of having done a favor for a member of this group should arouse more conflict or need to explain this action than if the favor were done for a less ambivalently-viewed person. Therefore, the effect of prior help on subsequent helping should be stronger when the help-seeker is physically disabled.

A comprehensive review by Barker, Wright, Meyerson, and Gonick (1953) led the authors to conclude that while public, verbalized attitudes toward the disabled are on the average mildly favorable, openly expressed negative attitudes are occasionally found also, and indirect evidence suggests that deeper, unverbalized attitudes are more frequently hostile. Wright (1960), Davis (1961), Goffman (1963) and others have made similar observations.

Wright, for instance, observed both inferior and salutory status positions among the disabled. On one hand, publicly expressed attitudes toward the disabled tend to be favorable; on the other hand, the disabled are subject to devaluation and underprivileged or outgroup status.

Goffman also saw evidence of a dual perspective in the attitudes of normals: "The special situation of the stigmatized is that society tells him he is a member of the wider group, which means he is a normal human being, but that he is also 'different' in some degree and that it would be foolish to deny this difference" (p. 123). The fact that normals do not really accept the stigmatized is evidenced by the requirement of the stigmatized that "he act so to imply neither that his burden is heavy nor that bearing it has made him different from us; at the same time he must keep himself at that remove from us which ensures our painlessly being able to confirm our belief about him" (p. 122).

Thus, while the disabled may be viewed sympathetically as merely unfortunate and disadvantaged, their deviance and inferior status elicit aversion and denigration.

In addition, a series of experiments by Kleck and his associates (Kleck, Ono, & Hastorf, 1966; Kleck, 1968) have demonstrated the ambivalent and conflicted nature of reactions to people confined to wheelchairs. In face-to-face interactions, nondisabled subjects interacting with a disabled stimulus person

displayed more stereotyped and highly controlled behavior and terminated the interaction sooner, but also formed more favorable first impressions of the stimulus person and showed more distortion of their true beliefs in line with his assumed opinions. Doob and Ecker (1970) found that subjects were more willing to help a person wearing an eyepatch than a person without an eyepatch, but only when the help did not require extended contact with the help-seeker. Samerotte and Harris (1976) found that subjects helped pick up fewer envelopes dropped by a confederate when he had a 3 1/2-inch scar on his face than when he was wearing a bandage wrapped around his forearm or appeared completely normal.

It would seem, then, that attitudes toward the disabled can best be described as ambivalent. Positive and negative stereotypes both appear to be prevalent, and while some behavior may appear to reflect favorable attitudes, other behavioral reactions, particularly those involving social contact, appear to reflect aversion and other negative feelings. Assuming that attitudes toward the disabled are ambivalent, what are the implications for behavioral reactions? And how are we to interpret the inconsistent behavioral reactions already noted?

Katz and Glass (1979) have examined the concept of ambivalence and its relation to behavioral reactions to members of stigmatized groups. They assumed that attitudes toward members of many stigmatized groups, including the physically

disabled, are ambivalent, rather than solely positive, negative, or even neutral, and that, consequently, behavioral tendencies with respect to members of these groups are unstable. By virtue of simultaneously holding both positive and negative predispositions toward the same object, an individual is capable of either positive or negative behavioral reactions, depending on the situation. If, in an interaction with a stigmatized individual, one's behavior toward the stigmatized other is inconsistent with either the positive or negative component of an ambivalent disposition, this may pose a threat to one's self-esteem. That is, the perception of one's behavior as inconsistent with either component of an ambivalent attitude should pose a threat to one's self-image "as one who is humane yet discerning in his evaluation and treatment of others" (Katz & Glass, 1979). Efforts to reduce this threat and conflict might consist of either denying or defending the discredited attitude component, depending on the structure of the situation. Such coping efforts might be manifested in subsequent behavior, either favorable or unfavorable, of a more extreme nature than that displayed toward an unambivalently-viewed, i.e., nonstigmatized, but otherwise similar person in a similar situation.

One situation within the ambivalence-amplification theory framework which has not yet been investigated is an interaction in which a nonstigmatized individual is induced, with

the perception of free choice, to initially act favorably toward a stigmatized person, by helping, for instance. Such behavior contradicts the individual's negative attitude toward the stigmatized group, thereby threatening his/her self-image as one who does not favor unworthy people. According to the theory, when circumstances allow, the individual will be likely to cope with the threat by denying the negative attitudes that are inconsistent with the favor and expressing or displaying strong liking for the stigmatized person. This is done by the actor to justify the initial, favorable act. Thus, if later given another opportunity to give low-cost help to the stigmatized person, the individual should offer more assistance than if no conflict had been aroused (i.e., than if the recipient of help was not stigmatized, or no previous help had been given to the stigmatized person).

A situation in which an individual is first induced to do a favor for a physically disabled person and then given the opportunity to offer further help to the recipient represents a special case of the foot-in-the-door paradigm. If the help-seeker is handicapped and it is assumed that negative feelings exist toward the handicapped, ambivalence-amplification and dissonance theories can both make the same prediction. That is, each allows for the possibility that the relationship between prior and subsequent helping is mediated by an increase in liking for the recipient. According to

ambivalence-amplification theory, psychological tension should be aroused by the perception of the discrepancy between a friendly act and the negative component of an ambivalent disposition toward people like the recipient and one way to reduce this tension is to deny one's negative feelings toward the recipient, leading to a greater likelihood of helping the same person again. Similarly, according to dissonance theory, doing a favor for a disliked other should arouse conflict, and one way to resolve this conflict is to change one's attitude toward the recipient in a more favorable direction, resulting in an enhanced tendency to do another favor for the same person. Other changes are possible, of course, such as re-evaluating the initial favor's appeal or costliness, increasing one's regard for the issue involved, reassessing the external pressures to do the favor (e.g., social responsibility norms), etc. A favorable change in one's attitude toward the help-seeker, however, may be an easier or more readily available way of resolving the conflict.

Present Research: The Mediating Effects of Justification on the Relationship between Prior and Subsequent Helping of a Disabled Other

The present research examines two issues related to the foot-in-the-door phenomenon as it applies to requests for personal favors: (a) the effect of varying the amount of external justification for the initial favor, and (b) the effect of the help-seeker's apparent physical condition, either normal or disabled. Ambivalence-amplification theory, as well as attribution and dissonance theories, can contribute to an understanding of these issues.

According to ambivalence-amplification theory, if an individual is induced to do a favor for a member of an ambivalently-viewed group, and perceives this act as having been freely chosen, the individual should experience a threat to his/her self-concept as someone who does not treat unworthy people kindly. That is, a helpful act, while consistent with the sympathetic and kindly feelings held for a member of a disadvantaged and unfortunate group, may at the same time be inconsistent with the rejectant and subordinating sentiments held for a group also considered to be deviant and inferior.

One way to deal with the conflict and threat aroused by having helped a disabled (or otherwise stigmatized) person is to deny the negative attitude component which is inconsistent with the helpful act. This need to deny having negative feelings for the person one has just helped may manifest itself in

enhanced expressed liking for the other person or in the offering of additional help.

A pilot study was conducted by Katz (Note 1) to test this line of reasoning. Half the subjects were induced to do a small favor for either a physically normal or disabled (in a wheelchair) stimulus person who needed help with his dissertation research (working on a repetitive paper-and-pencil task for 10 minutes). The other subjects worked on the same task as part of the experimental session they were being paid to participate in. All subjects later received a written request for help from the stimulus person (delivered by someone else). They were requested to volunteer to participate at a future date in either a 1/2 hour, 1 hour, 1 1/2-hour, or 2-hour session as part of the stimulus person's dissertation research. The disabled stimulus person received higher commitments for help from subjects who had done the small favor than from those who had not, while the physically normal stimulus person received lower commitments from subjects who had previously performed the small favor. More importantly, while the physically normal stimulus person was slightly favored over the disabled stimulus person in the no prior help condition, in the prior help condition the disabled person received much higher helping commitments than did the normal person. Thus, the results of this pilot study conform to the predicted relationship between ambivalence and response amplification.

Both the ambivalence-amplification theory model and the pilot study just described indicate that induced helping of a disabled other may lead to enhanced subsequent helping. But this predicted relationship is assumed to reflect an underlying need to deny the negative attitudes inconsistent with the freely chosen initial favor. The model focuses on the consequences of having performed a favor which discredits the negative attitude component of an ambivalent disposition. In the absence of any other information, individuals may be forced to conclude that they did the favor because of feelings for the person to whom the help was offered. Furthermore, to resolve this completely, it may also be necessary to deny any negative feelings which are in conflict with the behavior.

What if the initial favor does not appear to contradict the negative component of the helper's attitudes? This could be the case when explanations for the helping act are available which have nothing to do with the helper's attitudes toward the recipient. If the helper can attribute the behavior to situational rather than personal (specifically attitudinal) factors, the favor-doing could be experienced as consistent with the sympathetic component yet not inconsistent with the negative component of an ambivalent attitude. If this were the case, helpers should feel no need to alter their attitudes. As a result, there ought to be no subsequent behavior amplification. Information which points to the influence of external factors or other pressures could serve to reconcile or reduce what

might otherwise appear to be a threatening inconsistency between one's feelings and one's behavior.

In both dissonance and self-perception theories, if sufficient external justification for the behavior is made available, actors should attribute their behavior to situational factors rather than to attitudinal ones. Within the dissonance model, external justification serves to eliminate any need for attitude change, since dissonance is reduced with recognition of the external pressures responsible for the attitude-behavior inconsistency. Self-perception theory, in turn, states that actors will infer they hold attitudes consistent with their behavior only when there is no sufficient external justification for the act.

It has been suggested that inducing normals to help a stigmatized other, under conditions of strong external justification, could even inhibit subsequent helping behavior. As discussed earlier, external pressures to comply with a request can arouse reactance. Under some conditions, then, requests may backfire and actually produce less compliance. With respect to a disabled help-seeker, it is possible that normative pressures to help a disabled person are perceived as threatening one's freedom to choose to help. If over-justification is potentially reactance-arousing, it could be argued that the additional pressure exerted when a help-seeker is disabled could tip the scales away from compliance and toward

reactance. In general, however, norms to help a disabled person should not act differently from other potentially reactance-arousing pressures, and it is not clear when such pressures will produce the desired outcome and when they will not.

Another possibility can best be understood in terms of a tokenism phenomenon. Dutton and Lennox (1974) defined white tokenism toward racial minorities as a tendency to engage in relatively trivial favorable acts as a substitute for more significant ones. Helpers can feel that their compliance with the initial request fulfilled their social and moral obligation to help and feel no need to help more, as reflected in the phrase "I gave at the office."

Yet another very complex process may be initiated by helping a disabled person. A study by Katz, Farber, Glass, Lucido, and Emswiller (1978) suggests that a competent, cheerful, high status disabled person may arouse resentment in the nondisabled by disconfirming a variety of negative expectations and stereotypes. A request for help from such a disabled person might restore the proper subordinate role, i.e, as needy and inferior, for a member of this group, thus enabling the nondisabled individual to respond to the usual social norms to help. Notice that in this analysis the disabled person's request for help, regardless of the degree of external justification provided for compliance with this request, would increase the likelihood of help being offered by a nondisabled individual.

Whether or not strong external justification for the initial favor inhibits subsequent helping may depend on several additional factors, including the specific nature and content of the justification as well as the nature of the initial and subsequent favors. Another factor is the timing of the presentation of the justification. According to Wicklund and Brehm (1976), positive and negative consequences of attitude-discrepant acts must be recognized at the time of the commitment in order for dissonance to be aroused, since a sense of responsibility is a prerequisite for dissonance-arousal. In terms of dissonance-arousal, Wicklund and Brehm see no difference between an individual who unwillingly makes a commitment under strong external pressure and one who makes a commitment under weaker external pressure, but only later discovers the consequences. Knowledge of the consequences of an act is very different, however, from awareness of the pressures to perform the act. Anyone who performs a task in response to a direct request for help must be assumed to know that his/her actions will benefit the recipient. Similarly, helpers can be informed beforehand of the task's costliness or unpleasantness for them personally. These two types of consequences, that is, benefit to the help-seeker and costliness to the helper, can be known at the time of commitment, while the reasons for making the commitment might become salient only later on. The effect of this form of justification (e.g., external pressure to comply with a request

for help) has not been investigated in the context of the prior help effect. There is an important conceptual reason to vary at least this form of justification only after a commitment has been made, even at the risk of failing to produce a dissonance or self-perception effect. Varying justification beforehand can have the effect of also varying helpers' perceptions of the consequences, importance, etc. Therefore, it seems that in order to eliminate this confounding source of variation in perceptions of the act, external justification should be presented only after commitment to perform the act has been made. Post-commitment presentation of justification would also eliminate any danger of reactance in response to the initial request. It is possible, however, that by increasing the proximity of the justification for the first favor and a second request for help, the potential of reactance-arousal in response to the second request is increased.

In the present study the presence of a physical stigma was indicated by the use of a wheelchair. This was done for several reasons. First, the wheelchair is an internationally recognized symbol of physical disability. This reflects a common understanding of at least the basic functional limitations of people confined to wheelchairs: The use of a wheelchair clearly denotes the presence of a serious physical impairment. Second, a wheelchair is sufficient to indicate the presence of a serious physical disability; no alterations in the individual's

physical appearance are necessary. Such disfigurement can be overarousing and can also suggest other qualities, such as psychological deficits, which are not purely physical. Third, a wheelchair has been used to portray physical disability in the majority of studies of behavioral reactions to the physically disabled (e.g., Katz, Note 1; Katz, Farber, Glass, Lucido, & Emswiller, 1978; Katz, Glass, Lucido, & Farber, 1979 ; Kleck, 1968; Kleck, Ono, & Hastorf, 1966). In fact, in studies which did not use a wheelchair to portray disability (e.g., Samerotte and Harris, 1976), serious physical disability often seems to be equated with facial disfigurement, such as a scar, or with extremely minor or temporary physical problems, such as a bandaged forearm. The use of a wheelchair appears to be the easiest way to simulate unequivocally severe physical limitations while at the same time minimizing the possible ascription of other deficits or characteristics.

Practical considerations are not the only justification for this method of operationalizing physical disability. While several studies (Alessi & Anthony, 1969; Richardson & Emerson, 1970; Richardson, Goodman, Hastorf, & Dornbusch, 1961; Shears & Jensema, 1969) have revealed considerable variability in reactions to different verbal and visual disability stimuli, the same studies also show that "wheelchair" (whether represented by a label or picture) falls near the middle of rank orders of physical disabilities. Therefore, while caution is

called for in generalizing from one disability to others, a wheelchair-defined disability may be one of the more representative of the wide range of physical disabilities.

The present study is unique as a foot-in-the-door experiment for several reasons. It is the first to examine the relationship between prior and subsequent helping as a function of the physical characteristics of the help-seeker. In addition, it is the first to vary the amount of external justification provided for the initial favor in a situation in which both requests are made by the same person. It is also the first to vary a form of external justification other than importance. Although it is not the first study to use requests for personal favors, as opposed to requests for more impersonal pro-social behavior, it is the first to have the same person make two personal requests of more than extremely trivial size.

The major purpose of the present research was to examine the effects of the presence or absence of external justification and the physical condition of the help-seeker on the relationship between prior and subsequent helping. A secondary purpose of the study was to investigate the possible relationship between response amplification and a change in attitude toward the ambivalently-viewed help-seeker.

As in the pilot study described earlier (Katz, Note 1), nondisabled subjects interacted either with a physically normal or physically disabled stimulus person and performed a task either as a favor for the stimulus person or as a require-

ment of the experimental session. One group of subjects who did the favor received external justification for this act, while the other group did not. Subsequent willingness to help the stimulus person was then measured, along with subsequent liking of the stimulus person and interest in the initial task.

On the basis of a cognitive dissonance or attribution theory interpretation of the prior help effect, it was expected that prior help would lead to significantly more subsequent helping only when no external justification was provided for the initial favor and not when external justification was provided. When previous help has been given under conditions of strong external justification, there should be little or no need to reconcile this action. Therefore, the subsequent behavior of those who gave prior help under conditions of strong external justification should not differ from that of people who gave no previous help.

On the basis of ambivalence-amplification theory, it was predicted that the effect of doing a favor under conditions of no external justification would be intensified when the help-seeker was disabled. Doing a favor for an ambivalently-viewed person increases the conflict normally experienced when a favor is done under conditions of no external justification. Therefore, under conditions of no external justification, subjects who had previously helped

a disabled stimulus person were expected to offer more subsequent help than subjects who had previously helped a normal stimulus person.

Method

Overview

Nondisabled subjects interacted with a stimulus person who appeared to be either physically normal or physically disabled. One group was induced to do a small favor for the stimulus person, while another group performed the same task, but as part of the requirements of the experimental session, rather than as a favor for the stimulus person. One of two communications was delivered to subjects who did the favor. Subjects received either a communication thanking them for the favor and suggesting that the favor was done for largely external reasons, or one just thanking them with no further information. Subsequent willingness to help was then measured, followed by measures of liking for the stimulus person and interest in the initial helping task. The design of the experiment was a 2 X 3 factorial, with two levels of stigma (normal/disabled) and three levels of prior help-justification (prior help-external justification/prior help-no justification/no prior help).

Subjects

Subjects were recruited, through posted notices and New York City newspaper advertisements, to participate in a 1 1/2-hour session of "interesting psychological research" for $6. The subjects, 30 male and 47 female, ranged in age from 16-78 years old. The mean age was 33 years old.

Subjects were scheduled in groups of five, but smaller groups were run, when necessary.

Procedure

All subjects in a given session were run in the same experimental condition. Sessions were held in a laboratory containing five adjacent cubicles, each equipped with a desk, chair, and a set of headphones hooked up to a small metal box attached to one wall of the cubicle. The walls and headphones isolated subjects from anything else going on in the lab.

Subjects were brought into the lab and seated in one of the cubicles. The stimulus person, who was already in the room, was sitting in either a regular armchair (normal condition) or in a wheelchair (disabled condition), and introduced herself as a graduate student in the Psychology Department and one of the "Project Director's" research assistants. She then briefly described the nature of the study as dealing with "how effectively people can process simultaneous unrelated visual and auditory information."[1] Each subject was given a booklet with instructions for the experimental tasks (see Appendix A for materials). These tasks consisted of proofreading a passage, circling errors as they were found, while listening at the same time to a tape recorded series of random numbers and noting the frequency of occurrence of the number "2." Subjects were led to believe that each of them would hear a different

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[1]The cover story and experimental tasks used were from a study by Sherrod and Downs (1974).

tape, containing one of several background sounds in which the random numbers series was embedded. In fact, the same tape recording was heard by all subjects. Subjects were also led to believe that while the experimenter was in an adjacent room "monitoring the tapes," she would be able to talk to each of them individually over an intercom hooked up to each of their headphone sets.

After subjects had been working on these tasks for approximately five minutes, each of them heard what appeared to be a break in his/her tape. This "break" was followed by a message from the experimenter, apparently coming through the intercom, but actually part of the same tape recording. The experimenter's message was that the tape had broken, and that another tape would be substituted. After a few minutes had elapsed, however, the experimenter re-entered the lab and explained to each subject individually that the substitute tape could not be used after all, since having heard even part of the original tape might have affected the subject's reaction to the new one, and that, therefore, the subject's participation in the session would have to be discontinued. The experimenter went on to explain that the subject could not be paid and discharged until the rest of the subjects had finished, which would not be for another 15 minutes or so.

From this point, the experimenter continued in one of two ways to introduce the prior-help manipulation. The

experimenter was blind to the prior help condition until the moment before she re-entered the lab. In the prior help conditions the experimenter said the subject was free to go down the hall to the lounge to read some magazines and have some free tea or coffee while waiting, but that she would like to ask a favor instead. The favor consisted of scoring some data from the experimenter's dissertation research. The subject was reassured that while it would really be a great help, he/she was in no way obligated to do this and should feel free to relax instead.

When the subject agreed to help, the experimenter explained the procedure, which consisted of copying to paper a series of tape recorded responses to a word-association test. The experimenter added that she had already put the tape she needed scored on another machine inside and just had to switch the subject's headphones to the other channel. This was done by flipping a switch on the box in each cubicle, which actually transferred the subject's earphones to the second track of the same tape used throughout the experiment.

In the no prior help conditions, the experimenter told the subject that when something like this goes wrong with the study, subjects are routinely given data from another study to score during the remainder of the session. Then, as in the prior help conditions, the scoring procedure was explained and the headphones switched to the new channel.

Subjects in this condition, then, were told to do the scoring, had no choice in the matter, and, therefore, should not have thought of the scoring as a personal favor for the experimenter.

When each subject in the session had begun the scoring task, the experimenter returned to the adjacent room and waited approximately 10 minutes, while subjects worked. In the case of prior help conditions, the experimenter drew lots during this time to determine the justification condition. She then played one of three taped messages, which again seemed to be coming live over the intercom. All three messages began and ended in the same way:

> OK, the other subjects are finished with their proofreading task, so you'll have to stop now. Just leave the [scoring] sheet on the desk. I'll pick it up later ...
> Dr. _____ will be right in to pay you for the session. You can take the headphones off now, but please don't talk.

This constituted the entire message in the no prior help conditions. In the prior help conditions one of two additional communications was inserted, varying the amount of external justification provided for the favor. The prior help-external justification message was:

> Thanks for helping me. I appreciate it. The other assistants here told me they ask for help with their own research whenever the study gets fouled up, so now I do too. Luckily for us almost everybody says they'd rather have something useful to do while they're waiting to be paid, even if it's kind of boring.

The prior help-no justification message was simply:

> Thanks for helping me. I appreciate it.

At this point, the "Project Director," an experimental confederate who was blind to the experimental condition, entered the lab. He delivered a bogus debriefing concerning the effects of distraction on performance, payed the subjects, and then introduced the main dependent measure. He reminded subjects that the experimenter was a graduate student, and added that she was working on her doctoral dissertation and had to rely on volunteers for her research, since no funds were available for student research. Noting that the session had ended much earlier than usual since a new procedure was being used, the confederate suggested that subjects might be willing to read a flier the experimenter had prepared describing her project.

The flier briefly explained the experimenter's project as concerning subjective reactions to noise (see Appendix B). Volunteers were needed for 15-20 minutes to listen to one of four levels of noise (described in the flier) and then rate the amount of discomfort they experience. Subjects were asked to indicate if they were willing to participate in the study before leaving the building, and if so, which level of noise they were willing to listen to. Subjects could offer one of five levels of help. The four noise levels rose in 10-decibel increments, and the flier explained that the higher the level subjects agreed to listen to, the more help they would be offering. Subjects could also choose not to participate. This written commitment

constituted the dependent measure of helping. For various ethical and practical reasons, subjects were not actually required to participate in the study described in the flier. However, since subjects believed that they would participate in the study immediately following their written commitment, this measure was expected to correspond very closely to the amount of help they would actually have given.

After the confederate collected the fliers he administered a four-item rating scale measuring subjects' evaluations of the experimenter (see Appendix C). The confederate claimed to have forgotten to do this earlier, and explained that the scale would be used to assess the relationship between reactions to the experimenter and performance on the proofreading tasks.

The confederate collected the evaluation forms, and appeared to deliver the fliers to the experimenter who was waiting in the next room. The experimenter immediately returned to the lab to administer a post-experimental questionnaire and to debrief the subjects. She first informed the subjects that those who had volunteered to participate in her study would not be required to do so, and that the reason for this would become clear shortly. She then told them that there were still a few aspects of the study which had not been explained and that some deception had been involved. Before revealing these deceptions and their purpose, the experimenter asked the subjects to fill

out a questionnaire tapping their reactions to some of their experiences during the session. The post-experimental questionnaire consisted of a rating scale for the initial helping task, and checks on the manipulations and suspicion of deception (see Appendix D). Subjects were first asked to rate how interesting they found the scoring task they had been asked to perform after the tape broke. Two manipulation checks followed, one on the prior help/no prior help variation, the other on the external justification messages. The final question tapped subjects' suspicion of the use of deception.

After subjects had completed this questionnaire, the experimenter revealed each of the deceptions, probing further into subjects' reactions as she proceeded. Finally, the experimenter explained and discussed the true purpose of the experiment.

It must be noted that the author was the stimulus person. However, as the description of the procedure indicates, every possible precaution was taken to avoid experimenter bias by keeping the stimulus person blind to experimental conditions until just before each manipulation and by having a second person, who was completely blind, administer the dependent measures.

Obviously, the stimulus person was not blind to the disability condition. However, she had a great deal of experience in playing similar roles and her behavior had been judged uniform in practice runs for other experiments.

Results[1]

Manipulation Checks

Subjects' ratings of the scoring task as either a personal favor for the experimenter or part of their responsibility as research subjects provided a check on the prior help manipulation (see Appendix D for exact wording of all items on the post-experimental questionnaire). Subjects rated the task on the following scale: 1 = part of their responsibility as research subjects, 2 = both, but mainly part of their responsibility, 3 = both to the same extent, 4 = both, but mainly a personal favor, 5 = a personal favor for the experimenter. The appropriate test of the manipulation is a comparison of the three prior help-justification groups. Table 2 summarizes the results of the one-way analysis of variance. As expected, there was a significant difference among the three groups, $F(2, 74) = 8.29$, $p = .001$. Scheffe post hoc comparisons showed that the task was seen as more of a favor in the two prior help conditions, $p < .01$. The two prior help groups did not differ from each other. The means of the prior help-no justification and prior help-external justification groups were 3.27 and 3.22, respectively. The mean of the no prior help group was 1.79.

A second manipulation check was aimed at subjects in the prior help conditions. Its purpose was to determine

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[1]Cell frequencies appear in Table 1.

Table 1

Number of Subjects in Each Treatment Group

	Prior Help - Justification		
Stigma	Prior Help - No Justification	Prior Help - External Justification	No Prior Help
Normal	12	12	14
Disabled	14	11	14

Table 2

Analysis of Variance on Ratings of Scoring Task as a Personal Favor for the Experimenter or Subjects' Responsibility

Source	df	MS	F
Between Groups	2	18.99	8.29*
Within Groups	74	2.29	
Total	76		

*p = .001

whether the external justification message, in contrast to the no justification message, conveyed the idea that situational forces were responsible for the favor and that other people had performed it under similar circumstances. Subjects were asked to indicate whether they felt that their behavior was unique or that many other people had done the same thing (see Appendix D). The following 3-point scale was used: 1 = "I thought I was the only one who had done the favor," 2 = "I thought a few other people also might have done this at other times," 3 = "I thought a lot of other people also had done this at other times." There were two additional response choices, "Don't know" and "Does not apply." A total of 10 prior help subjects gave one of these responses: four prior help-no justification subjects and one prior help-external justification subject responded "Don't know," and four prior help-no justification subjects and one prior help-external justification subject responded "Does not apply." Subjects who, in response to this item, could not respond to one of the three scaled choices, or who failed to acknowledge the scoring task as a favor were dropped from the analysis of this item.

The appropriate test for this item is a comparison of the two prior help conditions. Since the higher the ratings the less unique the favor was judged to be, it was expected that the ratings of prior help-external justification subjects would be higher than those of prior help-no

justification subjects. The mean of the prior help-external justification group was 2.33, the mean of the prior help-no justification group 2.28. A t-test showed that, contrary to expectations, the two groups did not differ, $t(37) < 1.00$. Thus, this item failed to demonstrate the adequacy of the justification manipulation.

Later Helping

In response to the later helping request subjects could choose not to help at all ("not interested") or to offer one of four levels of help corresponding to the four noise levels described in the flier (see Appendix B). Thus, helping scores ranged from 0 to 4. Table 3 presents the mean levels of helping in each group.

The hypothesis that induced prior help would lead to significantly greater subsequent helping only when no external justification had been provided was confirmed. Table 4 summarizes the analysis of variance performed on this measure. There was a strong main effect of the prior help-justification factor, $F(2, 71) = 5.54$, $p = .006$. Post hoc comparisons of the three prior help-justification group means (collapsed across stigma conditions) showed that prior help-no justification subjects offered significantly more help than did no prior help subjects, $p < .01$, while prior help-external justification subjects did not differ significantly from either of the other two groups (see Table 3).

Table 3

Mean Level of Helping Offered in Each Treatment Group

	Prior Help - Justification			
Stigma	Prior Help - No Justification	Prior Help - External Justification	No Prior Help	Total
Normal	2.67	1.58	1.36	1.84
Disabled	2.36	1.82	1.00	1.72
Total	2.50	1.70	1.18	--

Note. Helping levels ranged from 0 to 4.

Table 4

Analysis of Variance on Helping Measure

Source	df	MS	F
Stigma	1	.52	.25
Prior Help - Justification	2	12.00	5.54*
Stigma x Prior Help - Justification	2	.66	.30
Error	71	2.16	

*p = .006

Thus, while both prior help groups offered more subsequent help than the no prior help group, only prior help-no justification subjects helped significantly more.

The hypothesis that the disabled experimenter would receive more help than the normal experimenter in the prior help-no justification condition would have appeared as an interaction effect. However, the interaction effect was not significant, $F(2, 71) < 1.00$.

Secondary Findings

Evaluation of the stimulus person. The four-item questionnaire which followed the helping measure tapped subjects' evaluations of the experimenter (see Appendix C). No specific predictions were made regarding these items; however, it was thought that if there were amplified helping of the disabled tester, it might be related to increased liking, which could have reduced the conflict aroused by having performed the initial favor.

Each of the four items consisted of a 7-point scale, with 1 = the most favorable response and 7 = the least favorable response. The first item asked subjects how much they would want the same tester if they returned for another experiment. The second item asked subjects how much they would like to get to know the experimenter better. The third item asked subjects how warm and friendly they thought the experimenter was. The fourth item asked simply how much subjects liked the experimenter.

Table 5 presents the intercorrelations of these four items. As Table 5 shows, each item was significantly correlated with every other item at or beyond the .05 level. Therefore, a composite index was constructed for each subject by averaging the responses to the four items. The means for each group are presented in Table 6. An analysis of variance, summarized in Table 7, showed no significant main effects, but a marginally significant stigma X prior help-justification interaction, $F(2, 71) = 2.41$, $p = .10$. As can be seen in Figure 1, prior help-no justification subjects tended to rate the disabled experimenter more favorably than the normal experimenter, while prior help-external justification subjects and no prior help subjects tended to rate the disabled experimenter less favorably than the normal experimenter. The normal experimenter appears to have been rated the same in all cases.

In order to examine more directly the relationship between attitudes and helping, the composite index of liking was correlated with the helping measure within each of the experimental conditions. Table 8 shows these correlations. None reached significance.

Evaluation of the induced helping task. Before filling out the post-experimental questionnaire, subjects were asked to rate the scoring task on a scale of 1 to 10, as interesting or boring, with 1 = very boring and 10 = very interesting. Originally, this item was intended to verify

Table 5

Intercorrelations of Evaluation Items

	Item			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Item	How much want same tester again	How much want to know tester better	How warm and friendly was tester	How much like tester
(1)	--	--	--	--
(2)	.52**	--	--	--
(3)	.24*	.33**	--	--
(4)	.50**	.57**	.59**	--

*$p < .05$

**$p < .01$

Table 6

Mean Rating of Stimulus Person in Each Treatment Group Based on Composite Liking Index

	Prior Help - Justification		
Stigma	Prior Help - No Justification	Prior Help - External Justification	No Prior Help
Normal	2.25	1.98	2.05
Disabled	1.59	2.34	2.30

Note. The lower the score, the more favorable the evaluations.

Table 7

Analysis of Variance on Composite Liking Index

Source	df	MS	F
Stigma	1	.01	.01
Prior Help - Justification	2	.64	.77
Stigma x Prior Help - Justification	2	2.00	2.41*
Error	71	.83	

*p = .10



Figure 1. Mean rating of stimulus person, based on composite liking index, in each treatment group.

Table 8

Correlation of Helping With Composite Liking Index in Each Treatment Group

	Prior Help - Justification		
Stigma	Prior Help - No Justification	Prior Help - External Justification	No Prior Help
Normal	-.16	-.28	.42
Disabled	.24	-.12	-.13

Note. The signs of the coefficients were adjusted to compensate for the reverse directions of the two scales. A positive correlation indicates that more favorable ratings were associated with more helping.

the boring nature of the task. The scoring task was designed to be extremely boring so as to enhance prior help subjects' need to justify the favor. Mean task ratings are presented in Table 9. Task ratings were not expected to differ among the experimental groups. However, a highly significant main effect for prior help-justification was found, $F(2, 71) = 11.98$, $p < .001$ (see Table 10). Post hoc comparisons showed that prior help-no justification subjects rated the task significantly more interesting than did both prior help-external justification and no prior help subjects, $p < .01$ (see Table 9). In addition, there was a significant interaction effect, $F(2, 71) = 3.29$, $p < .05$, due to the difference between the two prior help groups' ratings of the task performed for the disabled experimenter, $p < .01$. As Figure 2 shows, when the favor was done for the disabled experimenter prior help-no justification subjects rated the task extremely interesting, while prior help-external justification subjects rated the task quite boring. In addition, post hoc comparisons showed that prior help-no justification subjects who helped the disabled experimenter rated the task significantly more interesting than did all other subjects, $p < .05$, except those in the prior help-no justification/normal condition.

Additional Analyses

The hypothesis that induced prior help would lead to significantly greater subsequent helping only when no external

Table 9

Mean Rating of Induced Helping Task as Interesting or Boring in Each Treatment Group

	Prior Help - Justification			
Stigma	Prior Help - No Justification	Prior Help - External Justification	No Prior Help	Total
Normal	5.83	4.25	4.07	4.68
Disabled	8.14	2.55	4.57	5.28
Total	7.08	3.43	4.32	--

Note. The higher the score, the more interesting the task was rated.

Table 10

Analysis of Variance on Ratings of Induced Helping Task

Source	df	MS	F
Stigma	1	3.89	.52
Prior Help - Justification	2	89.20	11.98**
Stigma x Prior Help - Justification	2	24.50	3.29*
Error	71		

*$p < .05$

**$p < .001$



Figure 2. Mean task rating in each treatment group.

justification was provided was confirmed. However, the hypothesis that subsequent helping of the disabled stimulus person would be amplified when no justification was provided was not supported. This and the fact that no differences appeared on the justification manipulation check led to a closer examination of the messages themselves.

The initial favor was supposed to have been viewed as more unique in the no justification condition than in the external justification condition. This was expected because the external justification message explicitly stated that many other people had done a similar favor in the past, while the no justification message contained no information on this point. Yet, no justification and external justification subjects did not differ in their ratings of the uniqueness of the favor. This led to a search for other possible characteristics of the two messages which could account for the results of this and other measures. One important difference was discovered in the way the task was depicted. The external justification message referred to the scoring task as boring, while the no justification message made no reference at all to the nature of the task. No prior help subjects, whose message also made no mention of the task, rated the task just as negatively as did prior help-external justification subjects. No justification subjects, however, especially those in the disabled condition, rated the task more interesting than did both external

justification and no prior help subjects. This suggests that no justification subjects may have invoked task interest as a justification for the initial favor. Characterizing the task as interesting could have been a means of increasing external justification for the favor, which in turn could have served to dampen the expected amplification effect, especially in the disabled condition, in which task interest ratings were exceptionally high. In other words, the absence of justification, particularly in the disabled condition, may have led subjects to seek their own justification for the favor. They seemed to do this, in part at least, by turning to task interest as an explanation. The correlation of helping and task interest within the no justification condition was -.44, $t(24) = 2.40$, $p < .05$. This negative correlation between helping and task ratings lends support to the idea that task interest may have served as a form of external justification, which in turn reduced the dissonance or amplification effect which had been expected when no justification was provided.

A closer examination of responses to the two manipulation checks suggested another consequence of the no justification message. No justification subjects tended to deny that they had done the task as a personal favor. A comparison was made of the proportion of subjects in each of the two justification conditions who denied the task was a favor on one or both of the manipulation checks. The proportion

of "deniers" among no justification subjects was .35, among external justification subjects .17. The difference between these proportions was marginally significant, $Z = 1.44$, $p = .14$. Although this difference in denial was only marginally significant, it still seemed worthwhile to consider the relationship of denial to task interest ratings and to levels of helping. No justification subjects who denied having done a favor were compared with those who did not deny having done a favor on these two variables. Deniers, whose mean task rating was 8.44, rated the task somewhat more interesting than did nondeniers, whose mean rating was 6.35, $t(24) = 1.85$, $p < .10$. Thus, subjects who denied the task was a favor were also somewhat more likely to rate the task extremely interesting. A comparison of mean helping levels offered by deniers and nondeniers was also marginally significant. In this case, deniers offered somewhat less help than nondeniers, $t(24) = 1.90$, $p < .10$. The mean level of helping offered by deniers was 1.78, while that of nondeniers was 2.88.

Because cell sizes would be so severely reduced if individual treatment groups were subdivided in terms of denial, it is not possible to examine the effect of denial within the most interesting, no justification/disabled condition. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that six of the nine no justification deniers had been in the disabled condition.

To summarize, there was reason to suspect that the failure to obtain the predicted amplification effect was attributable, at least in part, to two unintended differences in the content of the justification messages. These differences concerned the boring nature of the task and its being a personal favor for the experimenter. Because the no justification message contained no information at all, subjects who heard it were free to choose from a variety of factors to explain the initial favor and may have done so rather than experience the dissonance and conflict the experimental treatment was intended to arouse. Task interest, which was tapped by one of the questionnaire items, is one such factor. There may have been others which were not tapped. In addition, another questionnaire item brought out the possibility that a way of dealing with the absence of external justification was simply to deny having performed a dissonance-arousing act.

Another type of message might have been more suitable for the no justification manipulation. The content of this message would match that of the external justification message in its characterization of the act as a personal favor and its depiction of the task as boring.

It seemed, then, that the use of another type of no justification message could shed some light on the reasons for the patterns which emerged in the original design as well as provide a more appropriate match for the content of

the external justification message. Therefore, in addition to the foregoing comparison of the effects of external justification with those of no justification at all, it was decided to investigate the effect of a new message. This message stressed the subjects' kindness and the stimulus person's need and gratitude, and reminded subjects of the boring nature of the task. It was hoped that this increased salience would force subjects to acknowledge having done a favor for the stimulus person and minimize, if not eliminate, the possibility of subjects using task interest to justify the favor, while still providing no external justification for the favor. Briefly, then, the two-fold purpose of the new message was to insure that subjects recognized both that they had done a favor and that doing it had required performing a boring task. This new message, labeled no justification-salient, was:

> Thanks a lot for helping me with the scoring. It may not seem like a lot to you, but it means a lot to me since I have so much to do and I know it's kind of boring, so I really appreciate you doing me this favor.

Two additional groups were run using this message, 18 with a normal stimulus person and 17 with a disabled stimulus person. The procedure was identical to that used in the two original prior help conditions. The two no justification-salient groups were compared to the external justification groups in a series of secondary analyses.

Manipulation checks. The mean ratings of the scoring task as either a favor or a responsibility in the external

justification and no justification-salient conditions were 3.22 and 3.23, respectively. As expected, these means were not significantly different, $t(56) < 1.00$.

The check on the justification manipulation, it will be remembered, asked subjects to rate the uniqueness of the favor for the experimenter. As in the original design, subjects who, on this item, either denied doing a favor or responded "Don't know" were dropped from the analysis of this item. There were four such cases in the no justification-salient condition, two who denied doing the favor and two who responded "Don't know." Two subjects were dropped from the external justification group. The mean ratings in the external justification and no justification-salient groups were 2.33 and 2.10, respectively. Subjects in the external justification condition were expected to rate the favor as less unique than subjects in the no justification-salient condition. As in the original design, however, the difference between the two justification conditions was not significant, $t(50) = 1.05$, $p < .20$.

A secondary analysis was performed on this item after all subjects who denied doing a favor on either manipulation check were dropped. Six additional cases were dropped from the no justification-salient condition, leaving a total of 25, and four were dropped from the external justification condition, leaving 18. Without these cases the means of the no justification-salient condition and the external

justification condition were 2.00 and 2.39, respectively. The difference between these two means was marginally significant, $t(41) = 1.69$, $p = .10$.

Later helping. The mean levels of helping in the normal and disabled groups of the no justification-salient condition were 2.00 and 2.65, respectively. A 2 X 2 analysis of variance was performed on this measure for the external justification and no justification-salient conditions (see Table 11). No effects were found. However, as can be seen in Figure 3, the pattern of means within the no justification-salient condition was in the direction originally predicted. In order to test for an amplification effect the no justification-salient groups were compared to the no prior help groups in a 2 X 2 analysis of variance (see Table 12). There was a significant main effect for the prior help-justification factor, $F(1, 59) = 9.51$, $p = .003$. However, the interaction effect, which would have reflected response-amplification, did not reach significance, $F(1, 59) = 1.85$, $p = .18$.

Evaluation of the stimulus person. A composite index was constructed by summing the responses to the four evaluation items. The means of the normal and disabled no justification-salient groups were 2.10 and 2.01, respectively. No significant differences were found in a 2 X 2 analysis of variance (see Table 13).

Table 11

Analysis of Variance on Helping Levels in No Justification-Salient and External Justification Conditions

Source	df	MS	F
Stigma	1	3.39	1.29
Justification	1	5.25	1.99
Stigma x Justification	1	.59	.22
Error	54	2.64	



Figure 3. Mean level of helping offered in each treatment group.

Table 12

Analysis of Variance on Helping Levels in

No Justification-Salient and No Prior Help Conditions

Source	df	MS	F
Stigma	1	.63	.30
Prior Help - Justification	1	20.16	9.51*
Stigma x Prior Help - Justification	1	3.92	1.85
Error	59	2.12	

*p = .003

Table 13

Analysis of Variance on Composite Liking Index in No Justification-Salient and External Justification Conditions

Source	df	MS	F
Stigma	1	.13	.17
Justification	1	.13	.17
Stigma x Justification	1	.68	.92
Error	54	.75	

Evaluation of the induced helping task. The mean task ratings in the normal and disabled groups of the no justification-salient condition were 6.44 and 5.35, respectively. A 2 X 2 analysis of variance revealed a significant effect for the justification manipulation, $F(1, 52) = 9.18$, $p = .004$, and a marginally significant effect for the stigma factor, $F(1, 52) = 2.73$, $p = .10$ (see Table 14). The task was rated more favorably in the no justification-salient condition and tended to be rated more favorably in the normal condition than in the disabled condition.

Table 14

Analysis of Variance on Ratings of Induced Helping Task in No Justification-Salient and External Justification Conditions

Source	df	MS	F
Stigma	1	25.07	2.73*
Justification	1	84.15	9.18**
Stigma x Justification	1	1.30	.14
Error	52	9.17	

*p = .10

**p = .004

Conclusions

The hypothesis that induced prior help would lead to significantly greater subsequent helping only when no external justification was provided was strongly confirmed. Performance of an initial favor did not insure subsequent helping; when external justification existed for performing the favor, the likelihood of subsequent helping was not significantly increased. Although this refinement of Freedman and Fraser's original self-perception theory formulation was suggested by Uranowitz, the present study extends earlier findings with a different form of justification, which held constant the importance of the favor at the time of the request and varied the appropriateness of compliance in terms of situational justification other than just legitimacy. The present study extends Uranowitz' findings in three additional ways. First, degree rather than merely rate of commitment was investigated and found to vary as a function of justification. Second, the findings of the present study were based on somewhat more significant favors (in terms of cost, effort, etc.) than those used in Uranowitz' study, and this further demonstrates the strength of the prior help effect. Third, the present study was the first to demonstrate the prior help effect using two personal favors for the same individual.

The present study refutes the social responsibility norm explanation of the prior help effect since the requests were

the same in both prior help conditions and should therefore have aroused the norm to the same extent. In fact, it could be argued that the norm should have been more salient as a result of the external justification message, since it emphasized the appropriateness of compliance with the request. There was also no evidence of reactance arousal in the present study. As mentioned earlier, although the requests were for personal favors, the initial request seemed to be unrelated to the second and so should not have been seen as a manipulative act. If reactance had been aroused by the induced favor, or by the external justification message in particular, there would have been less subsequent helping than in the no prior help condition. Since this was not the case, it must be assumed that reactance was not a major factor in this situation.

Another issue, evaluation of the help-seeker, was of interest for two reasons. One is that there is still some doubt as to the validity of Freedman and Fraser's denial that change in the helper's attitude toward the help-seeker is a mediator of the prior help effect. The other is that the ambivalence-amplification theory suggests the possibility that amplified behavioral reactions toward the stigmatized may be reflected in a change of attitude.

For several reasons, but particularly because the evaluative measures were not administered until after the helping commitment was obtained, it is not at all clear how

to interpret the results of the evaluation measure.[1] Nevertheless, the results tend to support Freedman and Fraser's contention in that there was neither a difference in evaluations between prior help and no prior help groups nor a correlation between later helping and evaluation. That is, subsequent helping did not appear to be related to increased commitment to the help-seeker.

On the other hand, the results of the induced help task rating measure suggest that a change in self-perception is not the only change associated with prior helping. Subjects who had been induced to do the initial favor without external justification rated the task more favorably than did subjects who had received external justification. This is consistent with typical cognitive dissonance findings. However, it raises some questions about Freedman and Fraser's conclusion that increased task involvement is not a significant factor in the foot-in-the-door effect. Unfortunately, this factor was not originally of interest in the present study, and, therefore, there was no adequate test of its importance. It might be useful to reconsider Freedman and Fraser's conclusion, however, and re-investigate task involvement.

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[1] Perceived similarity may increase threat (Novak & Lerner, 1968). If similarity was low in this study, due to differences in age, background, etc., the need for attitude change to reduce threat also may have been low.

An even more important outcome of the task interest ratings is relevant to dissonance theory, specifically to the issue of the timing of the justification manipulation in dissonance paradigms. It was mentioned earlier that according to Wicklund and Brehm justification must be manipulated before the act is performed or dissonance will not be aroused in low justification conditions. This general conclusion, however, was based on findings about only one form of justification, information about the positive and negative consequences of the act. The results of the present study strongly challenge Wicklund and Brehm's conclusion with respect to justification in the form of information about external factors responsible for the act. Subjects who performed the scoring task as a favor and did not receive external justification for the act rated the task significantly more interesting than did subjects who later did receive external justification and subjects who performed the task not as a favor, but as a requirement. According to Wicklund and Brehm, this difference should not have appeared since justification was introduced after the act had been performed. Yet in this instance, at least, and with this form of justification, it was indeed possible to manipulate dissonance-arousal not only after commitment but also after actual performance of an act. The process of dissonance reduction apparently is still incomplete even well after the act is begun.

With respect to the more specific predictions of ambivalence-amplification theory, only weak support was obtained in this study. In the original no justification condition, subjects who had helped the disabled tester failed to offer more subsequent help than those who had previously helped the normal tester. On the other hand, some of the secondary analyses did suggest that no justification subjects who interacted with the disabled tester were responding differently. Subjects in this group rated the task significantly more interesting than any of the subjects who received external justification or did not perform the initial favor. Subjects not receiving external justification also tended to evaluate the disabled tester more favorably than the normal tester.

Several additional findings eventually led to the introduction of a new no justification message. First, a significant negative correlation was found between later helping and task ratings in the no justification condition. This suggested the possibility that task interest was invoked as a justification for the favor in the absence of any other external justification. Second, no justification subjects' responses to the manipulation checks reflected a tendency to deny having done a favor. No justification subjects who denied having done a favor tended to rate the task more interesting and tended to offer less subsequent help than nondeniers. In addition, no justification subjects

failed to see the favor as more unique than subjects who received the external justification message.

Together these findings suggested that the no justification message had several effects. The absence of justification was associated with greater subsequent helping, but also with denial of the initial favor and its uniqueness. Denial of the favor, in turn, was associated with less subsequent helping and with more favorable task ratings. Finally, subsequent helping and task ratings were found to be negatively correlated in the no justification condition.

With respect to the disability variation within the no justification condition, no amplification effect was found on the helping measure. However, the task was, and the stimulus person tended to be, rated more favorably in the disabled condition than in the normal condition.

These results suggested that the disability factor was indeed having a special effect in the no justification condition, but that perhaps the no justification message allowed for alternative modes of reducing conflict to increased helping. That is, subjects could attribute the initial favor to an interesting task or a deserving help-seeker. Furthermore, the absence of any justification or elaboration of the circumstances surrounding the help-seeker's request may have allowed subjects to evaluate the request as commonplace and, in the extreme, no justification subjects may have denied the favor altogether.

The new message also provided no justification for the favor, but matched the external justification message in reminding subjects of the boring nature of the task. It also contained more information, which stressed the subject's kindness and the recipient's gratitude. This was intended to make both the favor and the helper's response to the request more salient than was the case in the original no justification condition and to be more comparable to the external justification message.

The introduction of the new message clearly produced the pattern of helping responses which were originally predicted: subjects receiving the new message did offer more help to the disabled than to the normal stimulus person. However, this difference did not reach statistical significance.

This failure does not seem to be due to a ceiling effect, since the entire range of helping levels was represented in subjects' responses. There was considerable variation in subjects' reported reactions to the noise levels. Each of the four decibel levels on the flier was accompanied by a brief verbal description. Subjects seemed to vary in their responses to these descriptions, which often appeared to conflict with their respective decibel ratings. That the noise levels may have been perceived differently than was intended was confirmed to some extent by a small survey. Thirty-three

judges were asked to respond to just the verbal descriptions of the four noise levels, by ranking them according to how much discomfort they thought they would experience if they had to listen to them (see Appendix E). The mean rankings are presented in Table 15. First, it can be seen that noise Levels I and II from the helping measure tended to be ranked in reverse order by the judges. Second, the adjacent pairs of noise levels are not separated by equal intervals in the judges' rankings. A one-way analysis of variance was highly significant, $F(3, 31) = 21.31$, $p < .001$, and Levels I and II were found to differ significantly from Levels III and IV in a Scheffe post hoc analysis, $p < .01$. Thus, in this post hoc survey, the distance between Levels II and III was found to be significantly greater than those between Levels I and II and Levels III and IV. Obviously, it cannot be concluded that the experimental subjects evaluated the noise levels in a similar way. However, the rankings do suggest the likelihood of a problem with the scale as it was presented to the experimental subjects. The results of this survey also confirm the comments made by many of the experimental subjects during the debriefing sessions. Given these data, it is somewhat surprising that the helping responses conform to the predicted patterns as much as they do. It is very likely that altering the dependent measure slightly, perhaps by simply omitting the verbal descriptions of the noise levels, would reduce the existing ambiguity.

Table 15

Mean Judges' Rankings of Noise Levels Used on Helping Measure

Noise Level			
I	II	III	IV
2.12	1.97	3.18	3.52

Note. N = 33.

Earlier it was suggested that part of the reason the amplification effect failed to appear on the helping measure in the original design could be that no justification subjects attributed the initial favor to task interest and/or a deserving help-seeker, or denied either its uniqueness or that it was a personal favor at all. Since the changes in the new no justification message failed to produce a significant amplification effect, the question arises whether the initial favor was still denied or attributed to external factors.

The new message had an unclear effect on task ratings. In the original design, no justification subjects rated the task more interesting in the disabled condition than in the normal condition. This interaction effect did not appear in the analysis of the new no justification condition. There was, instead, a marginally significant main effect for disability, the task being rated somewhat more favorably in the normal than in the disabled conditions in both justification groups. Overall, however, no justification-salient subjects rated the task more interesting than did external justification subjects. It appears, then, that the new message, despite its reminder of the task's boring nature, did not sufficiently inhibit subjects' tendency to view the task as interesting. This suggests the possibility that whenever explicit external justification is absent there is

a strong need to reconcile the initial favor, in part, it seems, by perceiving the task as interesting.

With respect to evaluation of the help-seeker, no significant differences were found either as a function of justification or disability. This was the case in the original design as well. However, the tendency to rate the disabled help-seeker more favorably was not found in the new no justification condition.

Finally, there is the issue of denial. In the original no justification condition 9 subjects (35%) denied having done the scoring task as a favor on at least one of the manipulation check items, while only 4 (18%) did so in the external justification condition. Whereas the difference between these proportions was marginally significant, the difference between the proportion of deniers among no justification-salient subjects (23%) and that of the external justification subjects was not even marginally significant. Yet, even among subjects who acknowledged having done a favor, there was only a marginally significant difference in ratings of the favor's uniqueness between the two justification groups.

This last finding requires further examination. The results of the justification manipulation check are discrepant with the justification effects found on both the helping and task rating measures. That is, subjects who received no explicit external justification for the favor subsequently

helped more overall and rated the scoring task more favorably than did subjects who did not do the favor and yet they did not rate the initial favor more unique. It is possible that the manipulation check item did not accurately tap the justification variable. However, it is also possible that subjects responded to the absence of external justification, in part, by providing their own. The main point is that while the failure of the manipulation check item to differentiate between the justification conditions would suggest that the justification manipulation was not effective, the results of the helping and task measures suggest that it was. A more straightforward no justification variation might have involved a statement to the effect that no one else had done the favor before. This would have provided a direct counterpart to the external justification message which implied that other people had done the favor. The use of such a message was rejected, however, because it was feared that it would depict the request and compliance with it as not merely unusual but inappropriate.

To summarize the findings of this study, including those resulting from the secondary analyses:

1. The justification manipulation, despite its failure to be measured by the manipulation check item, affected both subsequent helping and ratings of the initial task. Subjects who did the initial favor without any external justification

offered more subsequent help than did subjects who did not do the favor. Subjects who did the favor with external justification did not differ significantly from either of the other two groups. Subjects who did the favor without any external justification rated the task more interesting than both subjects who received external justification and subjects who performed the task as a requirement.

2. No evidence was found of a change in attitude toward the help-seeker solely as a function of either justification or disability. There was a tendency for subjects in the original no justification condition to evaluate the disabled help-seeker more favorably than the normal help-seeker, while a reverse pattern appeared for the external justification and no prior help conditions. No such tendency appeared in the new no justification condition, however.

3. There was no evidence of an amplification effect on the helping measure in the original no justification condition. The new no justification message did produce an amplified response pattern, but it was not significant.

4. In the absence of external justification, subjects tended to be more likely to deny the initial favor and rated the task more interesting. In addition, subjects who did not receive external justification nevertheless rated the initial favor no more unique than subjects who did receive external justification. This may reflect another form of denial of or external attribution for the initial favor.

5. Concern with the ambivalence-amplification issue and the interaction of the justification and disability factors may have obscured an equally important and perhaps surprising finding regarding the disability factor. It might have been expected that at least some difference would arise between the disabled and normal conditions. However, a main effect for the disability factor was found on neither the helping nor the evaluation measure. The disabled and nondisabled help-seekers were offered the same amount of help and were evaluated equally. There was no evidence, then, that disability alone affected either type of reaction to the help-seeker.

Several directions are suggested for future research. First, the use of the new no justification message and a slightly different helping measure in a replication of the present study might enhance the amplification effect which began to emerge. An effective modification of the helping measure, which was mentioned earlier, might consist of eliminating the verbal descriptions of the decibel levels. Second, in order to clarify the issue of attitudes toward the help-seeker, it would be useful to replicate the present study substituting the evaluation measures for the helping measure. With respect to the justification manipulation check used in the present study, it cannot be determined whether the measure was not sufficiently sensitive or subjects who did not receive external justification were

actually denying the uniqueness of the favor. If the former was the case, a manipulation check with a wider range of possible responses might discriminate between the two justification conditions. Finally, a future challenge of particular theoretical importance would be to tap the range of attributions made by subjects not receiving external justification. The present study suggests that subjects seek external factors to explain the initial favor when they have not received any external justification. In particular, the task interest ratings, which showed an unexpected amplification effect, suggest that amplification may occur in a variety of subsequent responses, and not solely in those directly associated with the ambivalently viewed stimulus person. A useful approach might be to measure more directly the extent to which no justification subjects attribute the initial favor to a variety of external or situational factors, e.g., the importance of research, the value of helping others, task interest, lack of anything better to do, curiosity, etc. Another method of investigating the attribution process in this context is to directly vary the type and number of external factors in the justification message and measure the impact of these variations on subsequent helping levels.

The present study examined the effect of prior helping in the presence or absence of external justification on subsequent willingness to help. In addition, the help-seeker's physical condition was varied. It was found that induced

prior help led to significantly more help later only when no external justification was provided. It was also found that physical disability alone had virtually no impact, but in interaction with the justification variable affected subjects' task ratings and, to a lesser extent, evaluations of the help-seeker and willingness to offer additional help.

Appendix A: Proofreading Task Instructions, Work Sheet, and Sample Page

Name _____ Date _____

Age _____ Sex _____

INSTRUCTIONS

On the following seven pages is a passage conatining a number of typographical, spelling, grammatical, and punctuation errors. As you read the passage and find an error, put a circle around the word or space in which it occurs. Do not correct the errors, just circle them.

Example: (t)he quick br (o)wn fox ju(m)ped over the(m) lazy dogs(.)

While you are reading, you will hear a tape recording over a set of headphones. Along with some background sounds, you will also hear a series of random numbers. On the separate sheet provided, you are to keep a tally of the number of times you hear the number "2."

Keep the booklet face down on your desk until you hear the tape begin. Then turn the booklet over, take out the tally sheet, turn to the first page of the passage, and begin working. Continue working until you are told to stop. That will be in about 35 minutes. If you finish the proofreading passage before time is called, begin again and check your work, while you continue to tally the "2's."

Research Project #320B
Psychology Department
Graduate Center, CUNY

TALLY SHEET

Use this sheet to keep a tally of the frequency of number "2's" on the tape.

"Slumming and unslumming"

from The Death and Life of Great American Cities, by Jane Jacobs

Slums and their populations are the victims (and the perpetuators) of seemingly endless troubles that reinforce each other. Slums operate as vicious circles. In time, these vicious circles emmesh the whole operations of cities. Spreading slums requires even greater amounts of public money - and not simply more money for publicly financed improvement, or to stay even, but more money to cope with ever widning retreat and regression. As needs grow greater, the wherewithal grows less.

Our present ur ban renewal laws are an attempt to break this particular linkage in the vicious circles by forthrightly wiping away slums and their populations, and replacing them with projects intended to produce higher tax yields, or to lure back easier populations with less expensive public reuirements. The method fails. At best: it merely shifts slums from here to there, adding its own tincture of extra hardship and dirsruption. At worst, it destroys neighborhoods where constructive and improving communities exist and where the situation calls for encouragement rather than distruction.

Slum shifting fails because it tries to overcome causes of trouble by diddling with symptoms. Sometimes even the very symptoms that preoccupy the slum shifters are, in the main vestiges of former troubels rather than significant indications of future ills.

Conventional planning approaches to slums and slum dwellers is thoroughly peternalistic. The trouble with paternalists is that they want to make impossible prfound changes, and they choose impossibly superficial means for doing so. To overcome slums, we must regard

Appendix B: Helping Measure

To Experimental Subjects at the Graduate Center:
Please take a moment to read this before you leave.

I need men and women volunteers as subjects for my Ph.D. dissertation research. I am studying people's reactions to noise and I need volunteers to listen to one of 4 noise levels and then rate the amount of discomfort the experience. The 4 levels range from moderate to very loud:

Level I: 90 decibels. This is equivalent to the sound of a passing subway train.

Level II: 100 decibels. This is equivalent to the sound of a blaring radio 10 feet away.

Level III: 110 decibels. This is equivalent to the sound heard by the operator of a jackhammer drill or riveting machine.

Level IV: 120 decibels. This is equivalent to the sound of a jet plane takin off is one were standing right next to it. It is just below the pain level for most people.

Note: The noise levels are all very unpleasant, but none of them will cause any physical harm or damage.

If you are interested and have some time to spare today before you leave, please sign up in the sapce provided. The whole procedure will take between 15 and 20 minutes. There will be some preliminary questionnaires to fill out while I set things up. Then you will listen for 5 minutes to alternating periods of noise and silence. This will be followed by a questionnaire measuring your reactions.

Please note that since I can't pay you, and because noise is used in this study, I am asking those of you who are interested to choose which level of noise you will listen to. As you might guess, it's been harder to find volunteers for the higher levels of noise. So while I need volunteers for all the levels, the higher the level you agree to hear, the more helpful it will be to me in completing my project. Please indicate below which one of the four you will listen to, so I can prepare the appropriate materials before we begin.

If you are not interested, just write your name and check "not interested," so I will know you saw this message.

Thank you,

Joan Farber

****

Subject Reply Form

Name _____

I will volunteer _____ (Check one) Level I _____
Level II _____
Level III _____
Level IV _____

I am not interested _____

Appendix C: Stimulus Person Evaluation Form

RESEARCH PROJECT INVENTORY
PROJECT # _____

Task performance in experimental sessions is sometimes influenced by reactions to the other people present. Your reactions to the test administrator are especially important since they can affect your mood, motivation, and understanding of the tasks. Therefore, we would like to get your personal impression of the individual who administered your session today.

We are interested in your subjective opinion. Please answer as candidly as possible. The anonymity of all research personnel is protected by a special coding system that concelas their identity from project directors and faculty members.

Please put a checkmark at the point on each scale that most accurately reflects your opinion.

1. If you volunteered for another project, would you want the same person or a different person to test you?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
would very much want same person			wouldn't care			would very much want a different person

2. Is the test administrator the sort of person you would like to get to know better?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
would very much like to know better			wouldn't care			would very much not like to know better

3. How warm and friendly was the test administrator?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
extremely warm and friendly						extremely cold and aloof

4. Overall, how much did you like the test administrator?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
liked very much						disliked very much

Appendix D: Post-Experimental Questionnaire

Name _____

POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Please rate the scoring task on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 = very boring and 10 = very interesting.

2. Think back to what you were asked to do after the experimenter came in and told you the proofreading task could not be completed. When you copied down the taped responses from another session did you feel this was: (a) a personal favor for the experimenter or (b) part of your responsibility as a subject in Dr. _____'s research project?

   1. It was part of my responsibility as a subject in the research project

   2. It was a personal favor for the experimenter.

   3. It was both, but mainly part of my responsibility as a subject.

   4. It was both, but mainly a personal favor.

   5. It was both to the same extent.

3. Now think back to when the experimenter told you to stop copying the taped responses and to take off your headphones. If you felt that you had done the experimenter a personal favor, did you feel then that: (a) your behavior was unique or that (b) many other people had done the same thing?

   1. I thought I was the only one who had done this favor.

   2. I thought a few other people also might have done this at other times.

   3. I thought a lot of other people also had done this at other times.

   4. Don't know.

   5. Does not apply (did not think I had done her a favor).

4. Did any aspect of the procedure cause you to suspect that deception was involved in this study? If so, please describe:

   a) what aroused your suspicion;
   b) what you thought the deception was;
   c) what you thought its purpose was.

Appendix E: Noise Levels Ranking Form

We are interested in people's reactions to different kinds of noise.

What we would like to know is how much discomfort, physical and mental, you believe you would experience while listening to each of the four noises listed below. Each is identified by a general verbal description in addition to its decibel rating. Scientists usually evaluate noise in terms of decibel levels. However, there is more to the psychological experience of noise than just decibels.

Try to imagine that you are in a research project in which you must listen to one of the four noises. Then rank them according to your preference and how uncomfortable you think each would be:
1 = least unpleasant; would most prefer to listen to
4 = most unpleasant; would least prefer to listen to

Imagine that you would be required to listen for 5 minutes to alternating periods of noise and silence. This would be followed by a questionnaire measuring your reactions. If you cannot decide between two or more of the choices, you may assign the same number to each of them.

_____ 90 decibels. This is equivalent to the sound of a passing subway tra

_____ 100 decibels. This is equivalent to the sound of a blaring radio 10 feet away.

_____ 110 decibels. This is equivalent to the sound heard by the operator of a jackhammer drill or riveting machine.

_____ 120 decibels. This is equivalent to the sound of a jet plane taking off if one were standing right next to it. It is just below the pain level for most people.

Note: The noises are all very unpleasant, but none of them will cause any physical harm or damage.

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