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**“This bloodshed must stop”: Land claims on the Guarita and
Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations, Brazil**

Simonian, Ligia T. L., Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1993

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**"THIS BLOODSHED MUST STOP": LAND CLAIMS
ON THE GUARITA AND URU-EU-WAU-WAU
RESERVATIONS, BRAZIL**

by

LIGIA T. L. SIMONIAN

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, The City University of New York**

1993

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

THIS BLOODSHED MUST STOP: LAND
CLAIMS ON THE GUARITA AND
URU-EU-WAU-WAU RESERVATIONS, BRAZIL

by

Ligia T. L. Simonian

Adviser: Professor June Nash

This dissertation analyzes land claims on Indian territories in Brazil, and compares claims laid on the Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations. Archival and ethnographic data are used to reveal past and contemporary transformations. Despite the differences between the two reservation settings and the differential time gap in the colonial encounter, conquest and process of domination and accommodation, both the Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservation Indians have undergone similar dispossessing experiences. Indian land loss, depopulation, kin and biological changes are, therefore, examined. The state, non-Indians and Indian role as claimants are simultaneously analyzed, as well as the role of some Indians as usurpers of their own kin possessions and natural resource rights are explored.

Emphasis is given to recent land claims in a discussion of the consistent and persistent control exercised by the state and local elites on Indian lands. This process of control has been accomplished through state sponsored developmentalist policies, usually in

collaboration with international interests. The research suggests that in the Amazon these policies have been imposed since the mid-1940s during the rubber-boom, and continued ever since with mining, road building, colonization and lumber exploitation. In the south they have been imposed through a "green revolution," primarily with the intensification of crops such as wheat and soybean, the latter for export. Indian land and natural resources have been great, both in the Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations, where the Indians have suffered genocidal policies and actions.

Finally, these processes are compared with similar situations worldwide, where the state, non-Indians, and eventually Indians have deliberately sponsored anti-Indian policies and strategies. Changes in Indian land policies have also occurred as the state began to recognize vast areas as Indian lands, but threats persist through powerful non-Indian economic and political interests. Growing Indian political organization may be a sign of hope, especially if the ongoing inequalities including Indian landlessness within and between different groups, is addressed by the state, non-Indians and Indians in the near future.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The making of a dissertation becomes a hard task in extremely difficult and hopeless times, as these last years have been. In fact, I felt more despair than hope almost every morning when I read the news before starting to write. So far, the fall of the Berlin Wall has not saved the millions of starving people in the world. Eventually, some good news appeared--as the 1992 Nobel Peace award to Rigoberta Menchú--but this just shows that hope is also part of life and that there is inspiration in spite of the absence of true utopias.

Still despite continuous economic crisis, I was fortunate to get support for most of my doctoral studies and research. CNPq--the Brazilian National Research Council--supported my work for four and a half years, for which I am very thankful. This acknowledgement would not be complete if anthropologists Dr. George Zarur and Marinho were not mentioned. I also thank the City University Research Foundation for small grants which partially supported three months of research in Brazil and my participation in scientific meetings.

My dissertation committee helped in many ways and different moments, for which I am grateful. Dr. June Nash brilliance and commitment to students make her a unique person. Since the very beginning she has helped me to get through my doctoral studies. Her guidance and patience in

reading my first drafts impressed me. Dr. Delmos Jones assistance has been of great help both through my second examination, field work and dissertation writing. Dr. Edward Hansen generosity astonished me. He not only agreed to be a last minute member of the dissertation committee, but was patient enough to read my manuscript many times and to make interesting suggestions. Dr. Daniel Gross, my outside reader, made a meticulous critique of my first draft. His observations on theoretical and methodological issues as well as on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation material were particularly useful. None of them, of course, are responsible for the shortcomings of this dissertation.

I also extend my recognition to Prof. Eric Wolf and Prof. Glenn Petersen, who were on my second examination committee and made useful critiques of my proposal. I thank Prof. Gerald Sider, who inspired me in many ways as my advisor for most of my doctoral studies. I also thank my former professors in Brazil for their continuous support: Roque de B. Laraia, Roberto C. de Oliveira, João P. de Oliveira Filho and Mireya Soares. My ex-colleague Prof. Jaeme Callai from UNIJUÍ supported me while I was applying for the CNPq scholarships. Maria A. C. de Sá Leao found ways to speed the FUNAI bureaucracy in the process of issuing a research authorization for the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation.

My deep thanks to friends and professors who gave up hours of leisure to help in the editing of my dissertation:

Paula Chiardi, Daniel Gross, Edward Hansen, Karen Judd, Sharryn Kasmir, Margo Matwychuck, David Maynard, June Nash, Maureen O'Dougherty, Jonathan Poor and Richard Shryok. Gerald Creed, Margo, Karen and Sharryn helped to keep my morale high while writing and to ease the tensions of writing in a windowless room. I also thank Terri Vulcano and Judith Attride for their help to get through the academic bureaucracies of the Graduate Center.

Being in the field in the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations and surroundings, was not an easy task. I was intimidated in many occasions but I was also encouraged by many people, both Indians and non-Indians, who have my deep appreciation. Many indeed received me in their houses and invited me to numerous social, cultural and political occasions which were crucial for the understanding of their past and ongoing experiences.

In the Guarita Reservation I owe special thanks to: Carlos and Elói, Afredinho and Francelina, Nildo and Noemi, Ramão and Maria Salles, Domingos and Maria, and Neri and Remi, all Ribeiro families; Luís Emílio and Ilva Veloso, Enio and Noemi R. Dias, Poli Salles, Sebastião Alfaiate, "Pretinha" (Kaingang), Turíbio Gomes, Antônio and Alzira Oliveira (Guarani). I spent hours and hours drinking *chimarrão* and talking with my friends Ilva Veloso, Elói, Remi, Ema (all Ribeiro) and Conceição Pinto about life in the reservation. Ilva was kind enough to eventually prepare

émí--roasted bread on ashes--and *fuá*--a wild vegetable prepared in a soup form--traditional Kaingang dishes, which are no longer part of their daily table.

In the Guarita Reservation I had the support of many people, who received me and provided valuable information. Father Víctor offered me accommodations in the RCA Church's parish house, in Miraguaí. Though we diverged in many points concerning Indian affairs and local politics, he respected my work and I ended up understanding his difficult role in that sadly conflictive inter-ethnic and racist and class society. Despite my lack of faith, Father Víctor was of a great comfort when I lost my brother--Airton M. Lopes--and could not attend the funeral. I thank Father Víctor, Eva da Silva and Martinho Meyer for their warm company. I also enjoyed the stay of Father Dr. Bortomeu Meliá, an anthropologist, in his short visit to the house he was leaving after many years in exile, as he was returning to Paraguay.

Still in Miraguaí, Arlindo and Renata Moraes and their lovely daughters Cristina and Fernanda welcomed me in their home. Besides the daily *chimarrão*, I was frequently invited to sit at their table. With Arlindo, Renata, Martinho and the Miraguaí city council representative Milton Morcelli, I learned a lot about local politics. Eli Trenéfolo, a FUNAI nurse, and Nilva Stürm, a FUNAI teacher, not only offered their friendship but shared their knowledge about the

Indians' health and educational conditions. I also am grateful for the friendship of the Morcelli and Rebellato families.

The Indians of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation were extremely kind and giving. The Amundáwa and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau from Barreiro made me confident enough to stay in their communal house, which also serves as cemetery for their deceased kin. I never even imagined I could rest and sleep over a cemetery. Though I only got introduced to their language--Tupi-Kawahiv--Indians appreciated my efforts to learn. The children were always around and were very curious about me and my world. Despite the fact that many FUNAI officials saw them as "savages" still "in the process of pacification," I was confident enough to travel alone with the Indians, to the surprise of many non-Indians. Although the Indians were already facing the worst scars of oppression, domination and exploitation, their respectful-intelligent interaction with the forest and broader environment impressed me. I thank them all for their teaching and comradeship, especially Awarina, Mboreá (Amundáwa), Tari, Mboreá and Mandeá (Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau).

People outside the reservation also offered hospitality and support. I spent a considerable length of time with the Luchemberg family, nearby the Trincheira Indian post. Mercedes and Gaúcho, as they are locally known, became more than friends as they offered moral and emotional

support while I was battling with some FUNAI officials. Furthermore, they not only shared their house and food but also their knowledge about the Amundáwa and Indigenist policy at the colonization frontier, of which they were part. In the surroundings of the reservation, I thank the hospitality of the Kupinski family, Antônio Carioca and Dona Maria, Seu Maranhão, Clair and Cido (Linha Eletrônica), Luiz and Erma Martins (Urupá River), staff of the Rondon Ranch and of the Parati rubber estate, rubber tapper families along the Paccas-Novos River and Irmazinhas de Jesus (Mirante da Serra). I am also thankful for the support and hospitality of: Dr. Maria C. Filipini (Bia), Carlos I. Lucena Filho family, José S. Galvão, Maria Kaingang and Manoel Valdez (Porto Velho), Itagiba C. de Campos Filho, Caia and Ariovaldo J. dos Santos (Cuiabá).

Invaluable assistance was provided by many people and friends, while I was searching documents and bibliographic references. I thank the staff of: Diretor Pestana Anthropological Museu, FUNAI Indian Museum, PETI, ANAÍ-RS, RGS Agriculture Secretary's Land Division, Miraguai City Council, CIMI-RO, Rondônia State Assembly, CEDI, NDI and GC-CUNY-Mina Rees Library. Some people, however, deserve especial thanks for archival and bibliographic assistance: Rubens Aranha Filho, Maria L. Azevedo, Luiz Rudi Gesing, Dulci Matte, Milton Nascimento, Fanny Ricardo, Sheila Vaz and Rodrigo Venzon. Thanks also to Tom Burgess, who helped

me with the maps.

Many friends also helped in many ways to make my life easier. The following, however, have been extremely giving: Mary Allegretti, Hilário and Lúcia Barbian, Ana M. Costa, Elza and Jorge Falkemback, Cláudio and Ercília Garcia, Márcia Gramkow, Cleusa Iansen, Maria E. Ladeira, Simone Maldonado, Themis Quesada, Yara and José M. Rasia, Mireya Soares, Virgínia Valadão, Inês Zatz (in Brazil), Cristiana Bastos, John Burdick, Regina Correa, Sylvia Davini, Arlene D'Ávila, Carmen Ferradas, Alcira Forero, Alfredo Gonzáles, Daniel and Silede Gross, Harriet Klein, Audrey Kolerstein, Ivonne La Salle, Carmen Medeiros, Zahra Nafez, Mohamed Razavi, Nestor and Patricia Tovar, Neal Weilstok (in the U.S.), Beth and Wilson Trajano, Sérgio and Sonia Ramagem, and Gustavo Ribeiro, in both countries.

My thanks go too to those who ended up becoming part of my extended family and to whom I owe so much: Hélvio and Gerondina Amaral, Dinarte and Neyta Belato, Elvira França, Nara and Luiz R. Gesing, Ilsa Homerich, Antônio C. de S. Lima, Yara Penteado and Marly E. Rodrigues. I am also thankful to my brothers José Lari, Paulo Renã, Álvaro Luiz, and my sister-in-law Marlene, who have been of much help in different circumstances. No words can convey my love and deep thanks to Alain Moreau, who has been a fundamental source of encouragement and support.

For Patricia Simonian

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
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
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Map 1: Location of Rio Grande do Sul Northwest and Guarita Reservation



Map 2: Location of Uru-eu-wau-wau Reservation
Indians' Territory in the Late 1970s



GLOSSARY

AALRS	House of Representatives of the Rio Grande do Sul' Archive
AES	American Ethnological Society
AHRS	Historical Archive of the Rio Grande do Sul State
AI	Indian Reservation
ALR	House of Representatives of Rondônia
ALRS	House of Representatives of the Rio Grande do Sul
AMADP	Archive of the Diretor Pestana Antropological Museum
ANCC	Constitutional National Assembly of Colombia
APF	Alliance of the Peoples of the Rainforest
APS	Aborigines Protection Society
ASEARS	Agriculture State Secretary of the Rio Grande do Sul's Archive
ASDAP	Highland Association for the Defense of Farmer-Cattle-Raisers
CCA	Agrarian Conflicts Coordination
CAP	Commission for Agriculture and Cattle-raising
CCPY	Commission for the Creation of the Yanomami Park
CEDOC	Center of Documentation
CEDI	Ecumenic Center of Documentation and Information
CMV	City Council
CNE	Statistics National Committee
CNS	Rubber-Tappers' National Council
CONAGE	Geologists National Council
CPI	Parliamentary Inquiry Commission

CS	Cultural Survival
CSN	National Security Council
CTCI	Land and Colonization Commission of Ijuí
CTI	Work Indigenist Center
CTI	Indian Lands Coordination
CTPCC	Professor Clara Camarão Training Center
CTPM	Land Commission of Palmeira das Missões
CUNY	City University of New York
CUP	Cambridge University Press
D.C.	District of Columbia
DGI	Indian General Directorate
DGPI	General Department of the Indian Patrimony
DNPM	National Department of Mining Production
DR	Regional Directory
DTN	North Land Directory
DTC	Land and Colonization Directory
FEE	State Statistic Foundation
FIDENE	State Northwest Foundation for Integration, Development and Education
FUNAI	Indian National Foundation
GEA	Entrepreneurs Group of Amazon
ICAR	Roman Apostolic Catholic Church
IAMA	Anthropology and Environment Institute
IBDF	Brazilian Institute of Forestry Development
IBGE	Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
INCRA	National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform

MA	Agriculture Ministry
MADP	Diretor Pestana Anthropological Museum
MIRAD	Development and Agrarian Reform Ministry
MJ	Justice Ministry
MPF	Federal Attorney
MASTER	Movement of Landless Farming Workers
n.d.	Non Dated
NDI	Indian Rights Center
P.A.	Personal Archive
P.C.	Personal Communication
PI	Indian Post
PIN	National Integration Plan
PUC	Pontifical Catholic University
SAERS	Secretary of Agriculture of the Rio Grande do Sul State
SEAIC	State Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce
SENOP	State Secretary of Public Works
SPI	Indian Service Support
SUCAM	Superintendency for Public Health Campaigns
TI	Indigenous Reservation
TMP	Municipal Lands of Tenente Portela
TRT	Work Regional Court
UNI	Union of the Indigenous Nations
UCG	Catholic University of Goiás
UnB	Brasília University
UNIJUI	University of Ijuí

UP University Press
USP São Paulo University
UNISINOS University of the Sinos River Basin
U.Ms. Unpublished Manuscript

INTRODUCTION

The tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living (Marx [1869] 1973: 146).

the stories are always more simple than the events they claim to illuminate (Kennedy in Village Voice July 2, 1991: 24).

Introduction

This dissertation examines the claims placed upon Indian¹ lands in two reservations in Brazil. It is based on ethnographic and archival research which I conducted over a 12 month period--between mid-1989 and late-1990--in the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations, located respectively in the Brazilian states of Rio Grande do Sul and Rondônia. The principal residents of these reservations were Kaingang and Guarani, and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau, Amundáwa and autonomous Indians, who have inhabited lands in what is now Brazil since long before the Portuguese colonization. As an ethnographer, I am primarily concerned with the period of 1940 to the present, the time frame in which most of my informants have lived their lives, and experienced the strife and contradictions that characterize the battles over claims. In substantial measure, this these is a testimonial

¹ The terms "Indian" and "indigenous" are used throughout to peoples indigenous to the Americas, although the term Inuit is used to refer to Northwest Coast of US and North Canada, according to local usage (Morrinson and Wilson 1989: 12). The term Indian is dominant in Brazil, and was again incorporated in the recent Constitution (Constituição 1988: 82, 122, 150-151).

to the nature of the current struggle of these Indians to preserve their resources and lifeways. While this struggle is moving in its own right, the voices of Indians concerning land claims deserve serious attention as they are increasingly effective. Yet, as I will argue at length below, they are seldom taken seriously by even pro Indian advocates, many of whom clearly have non-Indian agenda at heart. In some small way, this thesis seeks to establish the Kaingang, Guarani, Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa as primary actors in their own fate. They may not win the struggle--indeed they struggle against very long odds--but they enjoy an agency hitherto unrecognized.

That these Indians have survived at all is something of a miracle. For over four centuries, they have been victims of the normal deprivations visited by expansive Western societies upon indigenous peoples the world over. The Kaingang, Guarani, Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa have experienced a bitter history of resource and territorial expropriation, dislocation, disease, labor exploitation, and murder, which at times has reached the point of genocide. Nor does the fact that they now live on reservations mean that they are more secure in today's Brazil than they were in the times of the *bandeirantes*, who set out from the 16th century São Paulo to find gold and to enslave Indians, or of the rubber barons, who came out of the Brazilian Northeast to engage in the Indians' decimation or enslavement. It

would be hard to differentiate--in terms of their intended effects upon the Kaingang, Guarani, Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa--between the *bandeirantes* of yore and mining and other entrepreneurs of today, save to note that the former justified their activities in the name of crown and cross, whereas the latter promote their actions in the name of national development.

This thesis tries to explain why the intended effects of all manner of usurpers of Indian lands and lives have not reached their logical conclusion, namely the extirpation of the Kaingang, Guarani, Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau, Amundáwa and autonomous Indians and the total expropriation of their resources. It rejects any explanation of Indian survival that focuses simply on partially successful resistance on the part of the Kaingang, Guarani, Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa to aggressions committed by a dominant European derived society. That is, explanations that consider only the mortal struggle between colonialism (or a nation state) and Indians would result in gross distortions of both the historical record and contemporary reality. In fact, seldom has either of these antagonists presented a unified front to the other. Currently, Indian rights are supported by most Indians, the United Nations, Indian rights activists (both Brazilian and foreign), some prominent Brazilian politicians, and organized Brazilian rural poor people. Such rights are opposed by mining, agriculture, rubber and timber

interests, who enjoy the support of other prominent Brazilian politicians, and a small number of Indians, who seek to benefit themselves at the expense of their own.

Both historical and ethnographic evidence suggest that the current situation is paradigmatic for the past as well. Past and present alike are a chronicle of contradictions on both sides. The "Indian question" could be best understood as a complex political process in which coalitions are put together on both sides for different ends at different times. These constant alignments and realignments are formed and reformed on ideological bases as much as they are long the lines of pragmatic goals. This thesis examines the ideologies of claims and counterclaims upon Indian lives and resources and views these ideologies as central vehicles to the fashioning (and subsequent dissolution) of the coalitions contending for these resources at any given time. By so doing, I hope to do justice to the complexities involved in this struggle.

The history and extent of claims to Indian lands, by both Indians (internal claims) and non-Indians (external claims) are also taken into consideration. Hohfeld (in Noyes 1936: 289-290) considered a claim as part of a "bundle of rights," which also encompasses privilege, power and immunity. Though he later restricted this juridical construct to embrace only rights, his first approach received widespread validation, especially regarding claims

to property in capitalist societies.

Indian land claims are conceived in this dissertation as existing in a relational, inter-personal and collective context. In this way, claims are defined beyond the strict context of capitalist societies, since Indian collective claims are also taken into consideration. This perspective allows me to view claims in their political and historical, as well as their juridical, dimensions. Expanding the context still further, the dissertation looks at the nature of rationales advanced for such claims. It suggests that the rationales of land claims on Indian lands are related to the process of domination, as well as on antagonisms and struggles with the claimants' communities to secure their settings.

The Guarita Reservation is located in Brazil's Southwest, on the western bank of the Guarita River, a tributary of the Uruguay River, in an area characterized, until the 1940s, by plains, sub-tropical and tropical forests (see Map 1). This reservation extends over 23,406 hectares, and was created by the RGS government in 1918.² It was homologated by the federal government in 1991, one of the final steps for its complete regularization (Decreto de Homologação 1991b). The Guarita reservation is inhabited by

² Many numbers regarding the Guarita Reservation total hectares have appeared; among others are 23,183 ha, this given in the year of the demarcation (Gonçalves 1918: 311), and 25,375 (Pivetta and Pires 1969: 2).

Kaingang and Guarani Indians, who have lived in southern Brazil for centuries (Brochado 1984). The Kaingang are a Gê speaking people (Rodrigues 1985), who speak the Kaingang southwest dialect (Weisemann 1971). The Guarani are speakers of Tupi-Guarani (Rodrigues id.). In 1989, the Indian population of the Guarita Indian post was of about 1,800 Kaingang and of 160 Guarani.

This reservation represents a small fraction of the original Guarita Kaingang territory. Despite this severe reduction of their territory, in 1990, the Indians were leasing out about 14,000 hectares of their lands to non-Indians, and opening up new fields to let. Though the contemporary Kaingang leadership and its non-Indian mentors maintained that leasing benefited the entire community, in fact it deepened old inequalities. Indeed, growing numbers of Indians now suffer the pains of landlessness, malnutrition and environmental degradation. The 1991 homologation did not represent any hope for changes, as public authorities did not simultaneously address the leasing issue. In addition, the Indian leadership has recently abused the Indian right of self-determination.

The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation is located in the southwestern Brazilian Amazon, near the Bolivian border and forms part of the Amazon rain forest (see Map 2). It was constituted in 1985 with 1,867,111 hectares (Decreto 91.416 1985) and the presidential sanction was signed in 1991

(Decreto de Homologação 1991a). Like in Guarita, in this case the legal validation of the reservation did not guarantee the Indians' sole right of usufruct too. This reservation is occupied by the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau, Amundáwa, who speak Tupi-Kawahiv (Rodrigues 1985)--and yet by some autonomous Indians--who are identified Iruré-y, Putakuaranha and Urupá by the Amundáwa and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau--and resettled Karitiana and Oro-in. Except for the autonomous Indians for whom data is not available, 122 Indians lived at the reservation by the end of 1990; in the following year about 20 Oro-in were resettled at the São Luiz rubber estate surroundings, their former village.

In the mid-1980s, when officials and anthropologists were making decisions about the local Indians lands, Indians were still resisting non-Indian invaders (Leao *et al.* 1984). Indians recently began to dispute these decisions made in the mid 1980s, and began to claim lands that were not included in the demarcated area. At the same time, the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau in particular, were simultaneously facilitating timber and rubber extraction and the work of mining companies and prospectors on their lands, in a hopeful effort to alleviate economic hardship.

Past and Present Debate on Indian Land Claims

Indian land claims have been subject to a large debate, in European courts, as well as by scholars, theologians,

missionaries and non-Indians on the frontier. A central point has been the so called right of discovery. This right was established well before Columbus' arrival in the Americas, having been widely debated in Europe since the thirteenth century, especially by Henrique de Susa, Armagh, Fitzralph and Wycliffe (Cunha 1987: 54-58; Hank 1974; Henderson 1985: 187-189), and was taken up later by theologians and philosophers such as Blackstone, Las Casas, Locke, Montesquieu, More, Sepúlveda, Vattel, Victoria, Vieira and Williams (e.g., Cohen 1942; Deloria, Jr. 1985). Though Indians have not directly taken part in these debates. Although many non-Indians have been sensitive to the Indians' claims and many governments recognized some Indian claims, the most part of their claims have rarely been recognized and implemented.

Land and the corresponding natural resources provide the very basis for Indians' lives, social-economic well-being, and opportunities for cultural and political growth (Deloria, Jr. 1970; Yanomami 1989). They have been essential to capitalist primitive accumulation, development and consolidation as well (Davis 1977; Ribeiro 1970; Sider 1987; Wolf 1982). Non-Indian struggles to dispossess Indians have recently shifted from systematic massacres, intentional poisoning and virus contamination, to the political and judicial arenas. Indians have been involved in political and judicial struggles on local, national and international

levels (Hiatt 1989; Sampaio 1985; Tapuy 1985).

Growing awareness of Indian land claims has been impelled in part by efforts to open the Brazilian Amazon frontier (Brooks et al. 1973; CSN 1985; Tukano 1984; Yanomami 1989). The struggles to get the Yanomami Indian territory protected and demarcated both in Brazil and in Venezuela are just the most recently (CCPY 1989; New York Times November 11, 1991: A3; Yanomami id.). Also important in publicizing Indians' plight has been Australia's bicentennial (Beckett 1988; New York Times January 26, 1988: 2; Reynolds 1986),³ the inclusion of Indians' rights in new legislation in Canada, Brazil and Colombia (ANCC 1991; Gibbins 1986; Silva et al. 1985; UNI et al. 1986),⁴ the Inuit struggles for an autonomous territory (New York Times May 03, 1992: A8); the official commemorations of the "Quincentennial" and the Indians' "500 Years of Resistance"

³ Recognition of Aborigine land rights is very recent, in contrast to of the debate, which is ancient. Only during the 1970s were Aborigines' land finally respected, albeit slowly and in a contradictory way (Reynolds 1986: 194).

⁴ Views ranged from progressive and pro-Indian, to very conservative (CEDI 1987; Franco 1986; GPDPI 1986; PMDB 1986; Silva 1985), with paradoxical results. Regarding the land rights pro-Indian views prevailed, but Indian lands continued being Union's property rather than of the Indians (Constituição 1988: art. 20, XI; art. 231 caput and 2nd, 4th-6th paragr.; id., Transitory Dispositions, art. 67). Moreover, though in specific conditions, Congress approved mining and hydraulic energy exploitation in Indian lands (op.cit., art. 176, 1st paragr., art. 49, XVI, art. 231, 3rd, 6th and 7th paragr.).

(Millamán 1991) movement.⁵ These developments, however, have revealed that despite changes in legal systems and some specific policies, the gap between Indians' claimed and protected rights has not been overcome.

The contemporary debate about demands and claims on Indian lands and the resulting changes have mostly dealt with the historical and cultural background of Indian legal rights, with patterns of settlements and Indians land losses and or eventual partial restoration (Deloria Jr. 1974; Frideres 1986; Little Bear 1986; Talbot 1983; Wilmsen, ed. 1989). The literature has addressed contradictions among the diverse claimants, which have appeared within bureaucratic domains, in court proceedings, and political struggles (Gordon 1989; Little Bear 1986: 253-254; Frideres 1986; Smith 1989). Most analysts focus on the opposition between the Indians' conception of property and the capitalist nation states' system of land tenure, as the major basis for contested claims.

Concepts of Property

In general, the Indian conception is based on common land tenure and usufruct (Little Bear 1986; Whiteman 1987; Yanomami 1989). Many indigenous peoples developed patterns where control over land possession and usufruct was held by

⁵ Organized to protest the official 1992 5th centennial celebration of Columbus' arrival, the movement succeeded in getting 1993 declares the Year of the Indian by the UN.

a political minority, as in chiefdoms and state societies (Murra [1955] 1978: 62-81; 1975: 25ff). Even in these cases, however, they differ from the private basis of the capitalist concept of property. These contradictory modes of social relationship toward land have even become a barrier to Indian land rights recognition by the state. Though the question issue is usually about how to accommodate both systems, the size of Indian territory has also arisen--being portrayed as empty, free for other's appropriation (Gordon 1989; GEA et al. 1989). Recently, a trend involving an acceptance of a vision based on cultural diversity toward Indian land is emerging--a result of states acknowledging diversity within their legal and political systems (Beckett 1988; Constituição 1988; New York Times May 03, 1992: A8). However, the trend is still very tenuous.

As policies and social systems have been imposed in the wake of the colonial encounter, no system of land tenure could be conceived as frozen and totally ascendant. Despite the diverse forms that the encounter has taken, it has transformed both claiming paradigms and systems of land tenure (Malinowski 1913; Balandier 1951; Leacock 1954; Asad 1973; Oliveira 1976, 1966; Nash 1981; Ribeiro 1970; Sider 1987; Wolf 1982). As "The law usually accepts what it finds and clothes it with legal sanction" (Noyes 1936: 431), western nation states ended up even accepting the indigenous claim of collectively held territory, at least partially.

Nevertheless, some Indians have accommodated to or even accepting arrangements involving individual ownership or possession of land.

Despite these transformations, non-Indians have not given up their Indian dispossession attempts. Though the Indians and some non-Indian allies have jointly struggled to decolonize the land and other policies and actions toward them, these processes have been very slow (Davis 1988; Ponting, ed. 1986; Simonian 1989; Wilmsen, ed. 1989). Progress has been hampered by the defection of some Indians to the other side. The actions of this Indian minority has imperiled both Indian land rights and the lives of their kin, in a clear defiance for Brazil's laws and jurisprudence issued to ideally protect Indian interests including land.

The Struggles Resulting from Claims on Indian Lands

Although Indians have often laid claims to other indigenous peoples' lands before the colonial era, and some often ended up as "conquerors" (Brochado 1975), European expansion from the 15th century to the present has expropriated the lands and resources of indigenous societies on a wholesale basis. When not exterminated these societies were pushed into tiny areas compared with those they had before the conquest (Jacobs 1972; Simonian, ed., in press; Talbot 1983; Vogel 1972). Even so, the state and non-Indians have continued to claim Indian land, based primarily on the

value of the Indian lands' natural resources for development and on the low density of the Indian population. Though many Indian populations experienced epidemics before the European arrival as archeological evidence has showed, thereafter their numbers were drastically reduced by the spread of diseases (Denevan 1976; Dobyns 1966; Ribeiro 1970).⁶

Various rationales and ideologies, founded on distinct political and economic interests, have informed the process of claims on Indian lands. Since the right of discovery, the fundamental claims have involved the right to seize Indian land⁷ and to appropriate their labor capacity, both based on the theory that land, labor, and natural resources exist only to be exploited (Gallatin 1836 in Dippie 1982: 41; Jennings 1976: 61ff).⁸ The ideological paradigm of many Indian societies stresses a unity among living beings and

⁶ Though most of this was spontaneous, some instances were intentional or criminal; the 1854 gift of clothes contaminated with smallpox virus in the Cacique Doble Kaingang settlement, RGS province, was not unique (F.W. 1913 in Becker 1976: 20, 28). In the 1970s, Brazilian cattle-ranchers presented Amazonian Indians with poisoned sugar (Davis 1977).

⁷ After the "discovery right", the 1832 US Supreme Court decision on Indians as "dependent domestic nations" became probably the most known and used legal mechanism to support State and nonIndian claims on Indian lands and the widespread Indian dispossession (Deloria, Jr., 1973: 114-115).

⁸ The use and abuse of the Indian labor by the Spaniards through the *encomienda* have been widely reported (Galeano 1980; Montoya [1631] in 1985); see also (Jennings 1976: 61 ff.). Sider suggests that North American Indians were integrated into the broader market but as producers of "diminishing resources" (Sider 1987: 16).

the environment, including the land, and emphasizes a communal approach to land tenure or ownership (Deloria, Jr. 1974; Little Bear 1986; Yanomami 1989). Others, however, lived in hierarchical or state societies as already mentioned, where land was controlled by chiefdoms or state centralized authorities.

Underlying these rationales are power relations. The main claimants on Indian lands have been the state and national elites, historically best able to seize and control their free distribution or sale. In the colonial era the Spanish, Portuguese, English, French and Dutch empires were the classic demanders on Indian lands, transforming them into "crown lands" on the basis of the "right of discovery" (Little Bear 1986; Todorov 1981). To these empires it did not matter if Indian lands were held collectively or were controlled by centralized authorities. The ability to do so ultimately rested on force--which was frequently employed. The decision to slaughter Indians--whether limited to individuals or extended to an entire social category--was as likely to be made on the spot as it was to be planned in advance; it could be executed by non-Indian individuals, groups, or an army.⁹ After independence, state and national elites have claimed Indian lands in different ways, which

⁹ The reasons for such decisions varied, but usually they reflected a response to Indian resistance. In 1534, for instance, in the Plata River, Spaniards hunt and murdered the Querandies, who had refused to supply them with food (Schmidl id.).

changes can be traced in the laws and statutes ratifying them (Cohen 1942; Cunha 1987; Mendes Júnior 1912).¹⁰

Here too force has played a role--ranging from declaration of war to violence of various sorts and direct seizure, other forms of violence, including forced removal and dislocations. Despite the fact that such strategies were undertaken everywhere, the U.S. experience during the 19th century, especially after Andrew Jackson and the Indian Removal Act (1830), probably became the most paradigmatic (Deloria, Jr. and Lytle 1983: 6 ff.; Mendes Jr. 1912: 12-15; Olson and Wilson 1984: 29-47; Satz 1975).¹¹ Wars and other forms of violence often led to extermination or population reduction, thereby breaking resistance and "clearing the land" for immediate or future occupation. Direct confrontations and increasing encroachment have forced surviving Indians into reduced areas, or to move into urban

¹⁰ Cunha shows some of such changes in the Brazilian case, especially since colonial times. While she suggests that colonial law was more positive to the Indians than those of independent Brazil (pg. 63), she did not consider the history of dispossession, land loss, and resettlement that overwhelmed Indians in Portuguese colonial times. Cohen (1942) extensively analyzes changing Indians rights to land in the United States. Deloria, Jr. and Lytle (1983: 2-24) summarize U.S. policies, most of which were strategies to expropriate Indian lands.

¹¹ The 19th century D. Joao VI's "just wars" against Brazilian Indians ended in the clearing of huge areas along the eastern part of the country, mostly in the rich Atlantic Forest (Moreira Neto 1979; Ribeiro 1970: 95). Similar experiences were developed in Tasmania and in Argentina, where Aborigines and Indians were virtually exterminated (Bonvick [1870] 1970: 28ff; Lynch 1986; Reynolds 1987: 4-5, 145).

slums, which by no means become "refuge regions" (Beltran 1979).

External claims worked through other informal but effective pressures, ranging from lies and intimidation to persuasion and concessions. Formal strategies, also imposed through diverse pressures, include sales and or purchases,¹² and even treaties and other anti-Indian agreements, all designed to assure the acceptance of either Indian removal and or of land tenure reduction.¹³ Such acceptance has often been temporary as in many cases Indians later changed their minds and requested the return of what they had lost.

When internal land claims have been laid by the Indians political divisions have become common, which has impacted their land possessions. Though many Indians have resisted invasion (Flowers 1982; Padden [1957] 1974; Spicer 1962; Utley 1985), many ended up totally powerless due to long

¹² Indian land purchases by outsiders and by Indians was common among colonists in North America, but the commercial transactions had to be ratified by the Crown (Jennings 1976). In Brazil it has been rarely used as a way of repairing former dispossession, except in cases of resettlement (see Chapter One; also CEDI 1991: 371).

¹³ These strategies may occur simultaneously. U.S. President Jackson pressured, intimidated and openly lied to Creek Indians. In 1829 he told them: "Beyond the great river Mississippi, where a part of your nation has gone, your father has provided a country large enough for all of you, and he advises you to remove to it. There your white brothers will not trouble you; they will have no claim to the land, and you can live upon it, you and all your children, as long as the grass grows of the water runs, in peace and plenty. It will be forever" (Jackson in Dippie 1983: 45).

periods of imprisonment (White 19883) or forced settlement in missions or cattle stations (see Coombs et al. 1982). Also from the time of contact, many Indians have become European scouts, mediators and or front liners in European led battles against Indians (Schmidl id.: 209-323), acting out of fear or gratitude. Non-Indians have indeed used such Indians extensively and creatively since the colonial times, often with some success (De Coll 1976; Utley 1985).

Indians have also faced total denial and or disregard at their legal systems (Deloria, Jr. 1974; Henderson 1985; Little Bear 1986: 248). As a result Indians have had to count basically on the laws of states, which most of the time have been issued to protect land rights others than theirs. Despite this, especially along the last decades Indians corporations or communities have sometimes sued the state or specific non-Indian claimants and then furthered their own claims (Frideres 1986; Maddock 1989). Initially they were often supported by some non-Indians such as missionaries, officials, politicians and humanitarians or reformers, and lawyers (CPI-SP 1987, 1986; Deloria, Jr. 1974; Reynolds 1988; Peterson 1982). Anthropologists began to engage in such processes later on, some of whom have taken their cases into courts or worked as consultants.

In fact, indigenous people have struggled in committees, judicial courts, and through public opinion, often ending up with only few of their claims and rights

recognized. This recent worldwide spread of judicial suits on claims to Indian lands is one outcome of indigenous political organization which emerged in the context of the 1960s "libertarian" and civil rights' movement (see Beckett 1988: 20, Josephy Jr., ed. 1971, and Mercredi 1992 in The New York Times June 16, 1992: A4). This might be considered an advance in light of previous conditions, but does not necessarily mean that all cases have been adjudicated in favor of Indians. The establishment of the US Indian Claims Commission Act in 1946 could have been an auspicious event but ended up pointing out the basis for the termination policy (1953), a new assault on the Indian collectively held lands (Deloria Jr. and Lytle 1984; Talbot 1981). In Australia, for instance, claims on Aborigines lands reached the judicial system only in 1971 (Reynolds 1988: 133). In Canada this also happened in early 1970s, though in the Nishga case (1973), their claims were defeated, as the Supreme Court of Canada's final decision considered their title extinguished (Frideres 1986; Little Bear 1986: 253-254). The Cree and Inuit recently reached a judicial agreement with the State, but had to surrender the right to further land claims (Feit 1989; Village Voice July 30, 1991).

Indians and those who have favored their claims took such a step in order to overcome their total or partial powerlessness to face dispossession, or yet to repair

specific lands' rights damage, occasioned by hydroelectric and road constructions, the passing of power transmission lines, and so on. In general, however, the state and non-Indians continue to be the most successful claimants.

The Anthropological Literature

The raising of claims on Indian lands must be cast in a broad theoretical framework related to studies on power, domination, and resistance (Gramsci 1971; Marx [1887] 1977: vol. I, III; 1972; Simmel [1908] 1971). A significant body of scholarly works by both non-Indians and Indians, have dealt directly or indirectly with claims on indigenous lands in different contexts. Three basic approaches have characterized these works. These are: 1) functionalism, 2) the colonial critique and 3) cultural integrationists.

The Functionalist Framework

The first approach relies on a functionalist framework, defining demands on Indian lands as part of distinct but past ideal reality, some of which were manipulated through biased views. Consonant with dominant ethnocentric views, some suggest that indigenous people primarily engaged on foraging had no territorial affiliations, and consequently, no claims and or rights to land (Hitchcock 1982). Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown considered the Australian Aborigines demands to land, but in an idealistic view connected with a

timeless past. Malinowski (1913) argued that Aborigines claimed their lands through individual or individual family, local group and tribe, while Radcliffe-Brown (1913) argued that social groups were the main demanders. Speck (1926) regarded the Montagnais' hunting territory boundaries as well defined and belonging to specific families "from immemorial time." Like Radcliffe-Brown, Speck also stressed the issues of boundary rigidity and punishment for trespasses.

The Colonial Critique

Throughout the pre and the independence movement in the mid-century and the 1960s, the critique of colonization addressed the specific contradictions and interconnections imposed through colonial and imperialist relations. In doing so, it advocates distance from a "frozen and past reality" as it focuses on the social, economic and political relationship imposed upon the Indians (Asad 1973; Balandier 1951; Cardoso 1976, 1967; Malinowski 1938; Ribeiro 1970; Sider 1987; Wolf 1982). Capitalist expansion in the frontier and the consequent impact on Indian territories and lives has been emphasized (Gordon 1989; Ribeiro 1970; Reynolds 1987; Wolf 1982), along with state policies toward Indian land and the legal aspects of the claims on Indian lands in the context of the nation state societies (Cohen [1947] 1971; Deloria, Jr. and Lytle 1984; Frideres 1986; Little

Bear 1986; Mendes Jr. [1912] 1988; Paula 1944; Deloria, Jr. 1974; Simonian 1981; Talbot 1981). Within this analytical framework Indian resistance (Feit 1989; Smith 1989; Warman 1979), as well as transformations in the Indian land tenure system (Brody 1981; Jorgensen 1978; Leacock 1954; Wagley 1941; Wilmsen, ed. 1989), are taken into account.

Leacock (1954) challenged Speck's (1929) view of the Montagnais Naskapi "hunting territory," asserting that:

... such private ownership of specific resources as exists has developed in response to the introduction of sale and exchange into Indian economy which accompanied the fur trade and, second, it was these private rights - specifically to fur bearing animals - that laid the basis for individually inherited rights to land (Leacock id.: 2).

Leacock's research revealed wide variation in the kinds of private ownership formation among the Montagnais-Naskapi.

Specifically:

... the strength of individualized land-holding patterns characteristic of the western Montagnais decreases not only northward the tundra, where the Naskapi used to depend almost entirely upon the migratory caribou, but also outward from the center of the earliest and most fur trade (1954: 6).

Leacock (pg. 40) concluded that despite the "virtual completion of the shift in native economy from hunting for consumption to trapping for exchange," territories were still "fluid" and only few hunters would function solely as individuals.

Wolf (1982: 161) also stresses the transformations

imposed by fur trade enterprises on the North America's Indian territorial basis as early as during the seventeenth century in the east coast and in the 1700s in the west coast. He dates changes in the warfare among the Indians, which ended up being crucial to Indian decimation, from this period as well. Both the "clearing" of the Indian presence from vast areas and the exhaustion of natural resources proved essential to French and English expansion, and resulted in Indian and non-Indian claims on these frontier areas (1982: 172ff).

The role of the fur trade in changing Indian hunting territory was strengthened by the state. Brody (1981: 84-102) shows in his study of the British Columbia Indians that beginning in the 1920s state policies enforce trapline registration not only among non-Indian trappers, but among Indians too. According to Brody (id.), beyond aiming at coordinating the European presence and to some extent protect the region's wildlife, registered traplines

were equally an attempt to bring what were considered the Indians unusual economic practices into line with ideas of ownership and exclusivity in the interest of rational production for a market economy.

Ribeiro (1970: 21ff) defines the economic expansion in the case of Brazil, in terms of specific "frontiers of civilization": the agricultural, the pastoralist, the extractive and the military. The impact of the resulting changes on the local Indian populations led to depopulation,

land loss, labor exploitation and ethnic transformations (id.). Oliveira (1972: 89-90) analyzes both economic expansion and power relationships within "interethnic systems," which he states are would include the Indians "offer" and the non-Indian "taken" of land and natural resources.

A variant on this second approach stresses the role of state in defining, shaping Indian land use practices. Grasmick (1979), Mendes, Jr. (1912), Paula (1944), and Ribeiro (1970: 197-204) did this when considering state Indian affairs and law on Indian land. Warman (1979: 238ff) raises an important point when he defines the Morelos *ejidatarios* in Mexico as having land but not being free to deal with it, as the Mexican state had fixed its size and made selling it illegal. Although *ejidatarios* have laid claims to increase the land availability, justified by population growth, they have not been successful. Younger generations may have access to land as they become part of an extended family, with which they begin to work and to share the final production.

The local *ejidatarios* have found extra legal ways to redistribute their indivisible possessions: land may also be lent, sharecropped, leased or sold (Warman, pg. 239). In the case of lending a reimbursement in kind is required. The leasing may be done through anticipated payment and the selling through a right deed concession--the *traspaso de*

derecho. Kinsmen may have these modalities of access but non-kin from the vicinities may have a chance through favor debt or patron-client relationship. Landlessness resulted through this redistributing process.

The federated states or provinces role on Indian land definition appeared within this same approach, as it has been mentioned for the Brazilian case. My (in press; 1981; 1979) research on the RGS Indian lands unveiled how the local government has manipulated the Indian land law according to local elites and landless peasantry's interests. Piccoli (1980) has stressed the Paraná state similar ruthless government action on the Mangueirinha Reservation lands. Resink (1984) and Silva (1983) studied the Bahia Land Institute successful intervention on the Kiriri and Pataxó-Ha-Hae lands.

Recognition of the state role in supporting non-Indian claims on Indian lands has followed. Santos (1973: 54ff) unveils the state participation in the process of creating conditions for the non Portuguese European immigration in the Xokleng territory, in Brazil. Beyond land allocation for colonization, the Santa Catarina state government committed itself to such endeavour through the formation of armed pedestrian corps and the covering of the *bugreiros*--Indian killers--troops (id.). In the Mexican case, Warman (1979) has stressed such a role while describing the Morelos Indian determined efforts to further claims to their lands.

Elsewhere I also (ed., in press, 1992, 1981) reveal the RGS Indians' struggles to recuperate and protect their claimed lands. Brody (1981) states that due to oil frontier expansion in British Columbia, even registered traplines may be threatened by new investors who can count on the state support.

Within this focus, several authors look at Indian efforts to resist. Friede (1944) reveals the Colombia's widespread Indian demands and struggles to protect their lands. My work (1992, 1981) on the Nonoi Reservation, Brazil, unveils the local Kaingang centenary similar claims and struggles in defense of both their possession and dispossessed lands. The Peruvian Huasicanchinos have been described by Smith (1989: 169ff) as tireless claimants of their forebears' lands. From 1930 to the early 1970s they engaged in what he defines as the "Land Recuperation Campaign."¹⁴ Then the Huasicanchinos denounced the *hacendados'* abuses and invasion of lands that they claimed as their, invaded them and struggled to have their rights recognized.¹⁵

¹⁴ This campaign consisted in three invasions, of areas which they succeeded in recuperating: La Falda (in the 1930s), La Pampa (in the 1940s), and La Puna (in the 1960s and early 1970s) (id.: 174).

¹⁵ The first campaign claim emphasized the economic necessity of the community, the second one ended reasserting the *hacienda* ownership, as what was won was through a deed of sale, and the third stressed both the illegality of the *hacendados* occupation, the economic necessity of the community and a deed of ownership which dated from 1608.

Cultural Integrationists

More recently Indian intellectuals and scholars have adopted a third approach to Indian land use and land claims. They have focused on the holistic or integrationist relationship of indigenous people which was commonly held through tenure or ownership. Indian intellectuals have made their points through speeches, prophecies, letters, communications, declarations and broad discourses, in what western scholars define as the testimony genre. When in the early 1970s anthropologists perceived a crucial missing factor in the field--the lack of Indian voices--Indian scholars had already begun to emphasize their own approaches (Josephy, Jr., ed. 1971; Watchel 1971). The 1752 Sepé Tiarajú stand--"This land has owners"--has echoed through history, but especially from the early 1970s on.¹⁶

The sacredness of the land and the many indigenous peoples' attachment to it have been singled out as crucial elements in the defining process about indigenous peoples' claims to their lands (Little Bear 1986; Trask 1987; Whiteman 1987). Furthermore they have stressed the destructive impact of land loss (Akwesasne Notes 1978; Deloria, Jr. 1974). Many have stressed that prior to the European invasion their way of relating to the land and the

¹⁶ These works have been written down by non Indians or written by the Indians themselves (see La Vega ([1609, 1617] 1979), Lame Deer and Erdoes (1972), Black Elk in Vogel (1972)).

environment was far better, especially because it did not imply in widespread destruction (Deloria, Jr. 1970 in Josephy, Jr. 1971; Yanomami 1989).

As Trask (1987: 172) recalls her Hawaiian mother teachings about the Hawaiian land tenure system possibilities, "No one had owned the land before the *haole* [White] came; everyone could fish and plant, except during sacred periods." She (1987: 173) adds:

The land - like the air and the sea - was for all to use and share as their birthright. Our chiefs were stewards of the land; they could not own or privately possess the land any more than they could sell it.

Trask refutes early ethnocentric interpretations of her people's way of living, such as those produced by Bingham (1848), Daws (1968), Dibble (1909), Kuykendall (1938) and Lind (1938) (id.: 175). She also describes the negative changes imposed by US citizens, which she defines as "then made to appear beneficial But in practice, such changes benefited the *haole*, who alienated the people from the land, taking it for themselves" (1987: 173-174). In addition, she states that the "debt-ridden king ... who succumbed to enormous pressure from the Americans and followed their schemes for dividing up the land" (id.).

Whiteman (1987: 162) also follows her Cheyenne great-grandmother White Buffalo Woman teachings about the sacredness of the "Earth Woman," a creation of "the Grandfather of all Grandfathers." In doing so, the author

aims "To rectify gross historical distortion ..." (id.). The Bear Butte, which is part of the Black Hills (South Dakota), was mentioned as the "spiritual center of the world" and the creator of the "Sacred Arrows" and of their "way of life" (1987: 163). Whiteman also recounts her people migration from the southeastern Canada to the northern Plains. Though she does not stress the Cheyenne past land tenure system, she mentions the people as "divided into ten bands [who] came together only for the ceremonies" (id.: 164). After the U.S. army and citizens invasion, "The reservation history of the southern Cheyennes is one of oppression, hunger, broken promises, and rapid environment degradation" (1987: 165-168).

According to D. Yanomami (1989: 37), his people's "way of thinking is based on the land." As he criticizes the Brazilian government and non-Indian invaders for the abuses against the environment and the attempts at reducing the Yanomami lands, he goes on to demand their lands in their name. He also states that "The rivers, the fish, the forests are crying for help" After naming the many sacred mountains of their lands, Yanomami emphasizes that these are sacred sites, "where the first Yanomami were born, where their ashes have been buried" (id.).

Following the trend of many Indian leaders in the past, Deloria, Jr. (1971), Yanomami (1989) and "500 Years of Resistance" (Liberal November 06, 1992: 20) revitalize the

claim that "This country was a lot better when the Indians were running it" (Deloria, Jr., id.: 235ff). In the Yanomami words (1989: 40) one find that their "way is better than the whites' because [they] preserve the rivers, the streams, the lakes, mountains, game animals, fish and fruits, what is already there, what Omam created". In this case, despite recent systematic contact with non-Indians and the deadly character it has assumed, Yanomami further offers to teach non-Indians "how to make a better world." The world's indigenous nations states through the "500 Years of Resistance" final document--the Earth Letter--that "We want to open your mind and heart. We are not a threat to your civilization, we are forest, water and nature citizens" (Liberal, id.).¹⁷

The importance of these current approaches to demands on Indian lands rests in both their originality and their revelation of specific continuities underlying claims on Indian lands. These continuities involve the use of economic and political power in an abusive and or illegal ways to seize Indian lands, ranging from genocide, to official mismanagement of these lands. The analysis of claims on the Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservation lands reveals the persistence of these practices in their full complexity.

¹⁷ This was read to the UN 1992 Earth Summit representatives by Marcos Terena, the coordinator of the above committee, though indigenous nations were not allowed to participate as official representatives.

This complexity might be captured through the Whiteman (1987: 170) point that European and Indians views in relation to their histories, and by extension towards their cultures and ideologies are irreconcilable. However, alone such an approach does not explain the changes since the European arrival, and the consequent tensions, conflicts, contradictions that characterize Indian and non-Indian claims on Indian lands and struggles (Beckett 1988; Sider 1987; Wolf 1982). Rather, the destructive character of colonialism and neocolonialism have to be considered too, as Fanon (1968) so accurately teaches and as some Indian authors have recalled (Trask 1987).

This dissertation takes aspects of the second and third approaches, both arguing and expanding them. It starts stressing the anti-Indian dominant nature of non-Indian claims on Indian lands, as well as its persistence. In so doing the deliberated character of state Indian affairs which have guaranteed indigenous people, Aborigines and Inuit dispossession are unveiled. It also emphasizes the critical outcome of the Indians eventual or even systematic complicity with non-Indian demands and interests. The Indians' deceptive and collusive actions and demands on their lands have to be stressed, as must the actions of the mixed bloods who for various reasons, have felt more comfortable within the dominant milieu of their non-Indian kin. In addition, their own violent actions and strategies

against their Indian kin, which are practiced shall be revealed too.

Brazil: Center of Claims on Indian Lands

Due to a persistent anti-Indian policy, Brazil has been subject to continuing investigation of claims, both internal and external, on Indian lands (Davis 1988; 1977; Junqueira and Mindlin 1988; Leonel, Jr. 1991; Oliveira Filho 1987; Simonian, ed. in press; Yanomami 1989). The recent expansion of the Amazon frontier turned this area into the very *locus* of demands on Indian lands, which were laid not only by the Brazilian State, non-Indians and Indians, but also by multinational claimants (Davis 1977; Gross 1982; Martins 1980; Schmink 1982). Besides, the area also became the *locus* of Whites atrocities, brutalities and genocidal actions against local Indians (Brooks et al. 1973; Moreira 1989; Simonian 1991b; Yanomami id.). Though many reservations have been reconized and demarcated, threats to the land and actual reservation land loss and environmental devastation also occurred, primarily through rubber-estates, cattle ranching and mining enterprises (Andujar 1984; Aquino 1977; Folha de São Paulo April 22, 1986: 3). Efforts to deal with landless people through official projects of colonization have also resulted in losses to Indian reservations (Almeida 1987; Cardoso 1989; Leonel, Jr. 1988; Simonian 1979).

The most recent opening of the Amazonian frontier

astonished the world, as Indian vulnerability to powerful enterprises was fully and overtly exposed. The spread of violence against Indians and other Amazonian dwellers--such as rubber-tappers and *ribeirinhos* (river bank dwellers)--has been part of the capitalist expansion in the region since the mid-1980s (Mendes 1989).¹⁸ The Tükuna massacre in the Solimees river, the genocidal policy specifically towards the Yanomami, and the assassination of Francisco Mendes in the late-1980s, were only some of the violent actions directed against Indians and rubber-tappers, with close links to their own claims on their land (CCPY 1989; Moreira 1989; New York Times June 18, 1991; Oliveira Filho, ed. 1988; Yanomami id.). The immediate outcomes of these actions were the displacement and dispossession of both Indians and other long-time local populations, along with Indian depopulation.

The main cause of these actions has been state-directed development programs, favored by those who feel Indians, rubber-tappers, *ribeirinhos* and landless non-Indians should not become obstacles to economic development (CSN 1985; GEA et al. 1989; PIN 1970). Development in the Amazon is thought to be primarily cattle-ranching, lumber, mining, hydroelectric and road building (CPI 1985; Davis 1988, 1977; Gross 1982), for which both the federal and or the state

¹⁸ Between 1985 and 1988 alone a total of 540 peasants, rubber-tappers or river-dwellers were murdered in the Brazilian Amazon (CCA-MIRAD 1988).

government and non-Indians have requested Indian lands. Claims involving a major extension of lands rich in minerals and lumber were pointed during the 1980s and continue to be emphasized in the Yanomami case.²⁹ Brazil's former President, José Sarney, submitted to powerful economic interests and reduced the area by 70 percent of the 9,419.108 hectares claimed by the Indians (Decretos 97.512 and 97.530 1989). Despite the 1991 rebuff of this decision, which was done in part due to international pressure, the Yanomami land rights continue to be threatened (CEDI 1991; CCPY id.; Decretos id.; Moreira id.; New York Times November 19, 1991: 3; Yanomami id.).³⁰

The developmentalist model has been opposed by Indians, rubber-tappers, ecologists, scholars, and a few politicians, who argued that economic development was not totally incompatible with protection of Indian lands, forests and environment. Such protection, plus the creation of extractive preserves for the rubber-tappers and other non-Indian extractors, and sustainable development might guarantee Indian lives, ways of living, the environment and still produce profits (Allegretti 1989; CNS 1985; CNS-UNI

²⁹ For recent claims on the Waimiri-Atroari, Kaiapó, Tükuna, Waiapi, Galibi, Marubo and other Amazon Indian peoples, see CEDI 1991.

³⁰ The interruption of the Yanomami Indian Park's demarcation works and the National Defense Commission's unanimous vote to revoke the edict of the Justice Ministry ordering its demarcation are among these threats (Jornal do Brasil May 25, 1992: 1, 7).

1989; Cowell 1989; Mendes 1989; Yanomami 1989). As Indians and rubber-tappers were establishing an alliance to fight for their views and plans elsewhere, I suggested elsewhere that when possible extractive reserves should be created around Indian reservations.³¹ Júlio Barbosa, the CNS' secretary, recently told me, that although President José Sarney created various extractive reserves in 1989, the necessary resources to implement the rubber-tappers plans had not yet been made available. This lack of support has lately persisted even after the 1992 Environment Conference in Rio de Janeiro, which has resulted in the rubber-tappers' widespread abandonment of their forest possessions

Though the demands and consequent abuses against Amazon Indian lands have been best publicized, they go beyond that area. In fact, all over the country external and internal claims have been made upon Indian lands. In the south, for example, the Xokleng lost a considerable area for a hydroelectric project but were not compensated with land as the 1973 Indian Statute guarantees.³² At Mangueirinha, the Kaingang and Guarani continue to be threatened with the expropriation of their demarcated reservation's pine forest,

³¹ This proposal was specifically made in the case of the AI Campa of the Amônia River and the Alto Juruá Extractive Reserve (Simonian p.a.). Though the latter was created in 1989, the former was only *interditada* (protected) by the FUNAI administration (CEDI 1991: 394-395).

³² Ultimately they have been occupying the *canteiros de obra* - construction site - in an attempt to have their compensation claims recognized.

in this case both by Paraná state government and the Slaviero entrepreneurship (F. Kaingang P.C.). The Iraí municipal government, the local tourism enterprises, and lower instances of the judiciary have fought against the Kaingang claims for a small reservation (Simonian, ed., in press). After exhausting their efforts to restore their demarcated lands, the Nonoai Kaingang took their weapons in February 1992 and reoccupied the lands that were expropriated by the RGS state in 1941 and 1949 to create a state forest park (Correio do Povo February 15, 1992: 1).

The conservative character of the Brazilian constitution regarding land tenure does not allow major changes in such cases. While at times Indian lands have been protected by the Constitution, this has also supported non-Indian *latifundia* owners (Constituição 1988: 124-127, 150-151). As I mentioned elsewhere (Simonian 1989), adequate land reform was basically prevented in 1988, which not only frustrated the millions of landless Brazilians but made it more likely that the existing Indian rights to land and natural resources will not be honored. Examples in this matter may be found widely as the 1993 constitutional deadline to demarcate all Indian lands (Constituição 1988: 67th art.) will not be fulfilled by the federal government. Anthropologists and lawyers have raised a critique of old rationales or contradictory policies which have sustained demands on Indians lands, and land legal rights and judicial

decisions on claims on Indian lands have been scrutinized (Almeida and Oliveira Filho 1985; Cunha 1987; Laranjeira 1985; Leite and Lima 1986; Lima 1987a; Lobato 1988; Moreau 1990; Oliveira Filho 1984; Santos, ed. 1986, 1982; Silva 1984; Souza Filho 1983).

In the cases of the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations, the evidence suggest that external claims on Indians lands were not only affecting Indian land tenure, use, and the inheritance's systems, but were also weakening already fragile Indian control over their land and natural resources. Even so, the choice to study these reservations did not necessarily imply that they were the most dramatic with regard to demands on Indian lands, and the consequent transformations on Indian life. Rather, the choice follows theoretical and practical considerations. The existence of non-Indian claims on Indian lands, as well of Indians' demands upon their own lands, were major reasons: claims on these Indian lands have lead to overt violence and all sort of impositions, but also to accommodations and collusion, which nevertheless have varied through time and according to their nature, degree, extension and forms.

Beyond this, the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservations include Indians experiencing different levels of contact with the Brazilian State, of whom they are wards, and with diverse sectors of Brazilian society. Moreover, these reservations were located in distinct regions - the

Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau in the western Amazon frontier, the Guarita in the south. Although both have similar cultural and historical backgrounds, they have experienced very specific historical circumstances through time and, particularly, through the last decades.

The Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau Research' Content

Following are some of the features which make the current study unique in the context of claims on Indian lands and natural resources.

a) The Guarita are dominated by an active and oppressive non-Indian local and regional rural elite, which has successfully coopted Indian leaders, and promoting their own interests. Demands on land through leasing, on natural resources (timber), and on Indian labor are systematically made by farmers, peasants, tenants farmers, merchants, and landless folks, as well as by the Indian leadership, which has been controlling land distribution and seizing land for many years.

Claims on Indian land in Guarita have two unique consequences: 1) the threatened expansion of an incipient but already meaningful landless class among Indians, and 2) the worsening of the already precarious conditions of controlling land, natural resources, and living conditions, especially through the pollution of the environment by agricultural chemicals, said to be the main reason for the

growing number of spontaneous abortions.³³ The Guarita non-Indian claims on land, natural resources and on Indian labor, are the real basis for the 1983 fratricidal war among the Kaingang.

b) The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau, the Amundáwa, and other still unknown Indians who live in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation, constitute probably the only case where isolated Indians have international forces (the World Bank, among others) demanding land for them (Mindlin 1987: 71). Moreover, even after the demarcation some groups have been able to maintain their independence.

The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation constitutes a unique case in which land was defined before contact was established. Claims on the lands of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau, Amundáwa and local autonomous Indians were made since the beginning of the century, and many of the claimants have been successful in their claims, as I will show later. Despite the mentioned international pressure, the protective measures failed to guarantee total Indian possession and usufruct, nor suspended threats to Indian lands and or to the environment. While international pressure and support cover other Indians and reservations, only in the Uru-Eu-

³³ Though no specific research has been done about this later claim, it has been suggested both by health experts and the FUNAI-RS administration (Zero Hora August 30, 1988: 44).

Wau-Wau case are autonomous Indians known to be living there too³⁴.

Despite the distinctiveness of these case studies, they bear similarities to Indians elsewhere, whose lands and resources are being demanded by different interests. Indians have hardly been heard regarding claims on their own lands. The FUNAI and other instances of power's refusal to listen to the Indians while considering claims on their lands and resources may be designated to secure actual or eventual Indian dispossession. In the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau case the Indians already contacted were not heard by the time the reservation was defined. It has been said by experts on this reservation land matter that its definition was made in an emergency context, due to non-Indian overwhelming pressure. And yet, even if the Indians did find an audience, due to the wider background, their demands probably would not be respected.

The Guarita experiences show this same trend. Indians were heard through their leaders when a new "wave" of dispossession was under way in the beginning of the century, but not all demands were considered and respected. It is possible that at the time the leaders, who made deals with governmental officials (state level), were not aware of what was being presented to them. The ones who refused giving up huge tracts of land, simply responded by moving to

³⁴ This does not mean that they should be privileged compared to the others, but that their situation is certainly more vulnerable.

Argentina. These leaders probably felt powerless to sustain their own claims. So, listening to Indian demands on their own lands does not necessarily mean that they will be respected.

The uniqueness of each of the studied cases, and even possible similarities among them and with reference to others, may enrich actual discussion especially those dealing with domination, power, legitimacy, resistance and all contradictions that are entangled through such realities. The military dictatorship in power in Brazil for more than twenty years - 1964-1985, was devastating for the entire Brazilian society, but especially for Indians who were considered wards of the state. The FUNAI's militarization indicates the nature of the inter-ethnic relationships, imposing a very oppressive, restrictive socialization system inside Indian reservations and along their fringes, but especially repressing most of the Indians' own claims on their land and on their natural resources.

Indians, in turn, sometimes yield to such patterns of domination and control, but other times, or even simultaneously, confront them too, even imposing their demands. In both cases non-Indian supporters struggle together with them, in an attempt to make their claims victorious. Yet, I will show that Indians' growing political mobilization already reached the Amundáwa, one of the Indian

people who occupy the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation. Seven years ago these Indians were still dealing with their stone axes. The same happens to the Guarita Reservation's Indians, as many struggle to defeat the present authoritarian leadership, which is considered illegitimate by many, and so stand up for demands that favor their own rights and interests. The studies undertaken may also contribute to wider debates about the slow pace of the democratization and of the civil society's empowerment processes, and address how the military power has resisted to give up the control of Indian affairs in Brazil.

Organization of Chapters

Chapter one presents a general history from the 1630s to mid-1800, of the Europeans encounter in the RGS northwest's Guarita Kaingang ancestors' territory, and the area's resulting transformations. Spanish Jesuits first conquered local land, Indian lives and souls through mission settlements. Portuguese and Brazilians installed themselves by force later on in the same area and began the process of what became permanent dispossession. As non-Indians expanded into the area, they dispossessed and frequently exterminated the Indians, destroyed the natural resources, and attempted to impose their way of life upon surviving Indians. Many times Indians fought to death. They were also conquered through epidemics or the superiority of western weapons.

The consolidation of the non-Indian expansion into the Guarita Kaingang ancestors' territory is unveiled in the second chapter. "Men of resources" initially dominated the area as they were supported by the state, which was accomplished through Indian dispossession, the imposition of the *latifundia* and the Caboclos expulsion of their possessions. As it will be seen, Caboclos were people of mixed origin, whose forebears were either Indian or Whites, and formed the area's poorest people. The *latifundia* was crucial to Brazilian territorial expansion and domination of the Indians; later, during the nineteenth century, "men of resources" began to lose power as public policies favored non Portuguese immigration and the constitution of colonies based on small properties and agricultural production. Beyond diverse internal conflicts, this colonization project was made at the expense of Indian lands, not on those appropriated by non-Indian *latifundiários*. The Caboclos too had their possessions expropriated. Only in the twentieth century was a special effort made to guarantee lands to the Caboclos, but again at the expense of Indian lands. The Indians ended up with a small fraction of their ancestors' territory, which they have been sharing with Guarani who have been arriving in the reservation since the 1880s.

Chapter three describes the Guarita Reservation's natural resources and setting and the recent devastation and the Indians despair. Throughout this chapter I attempt to

demonstrate how Indians have tried to overcome all sorts of recent impositions and violence, to endure demanding their lands and other rights. However, in addition I show that the cost of such resistance has resulted internal fission, tensions, and even brutalities, especially against women.

The fourth chapter deals with the 1940-1975 non-Indian demands on Guarita Indians lands and subsequent events, all intertwined with repressive state and development policies. These demands were made mostly by federal and state authorities in the state name and by local non-Indian farmers, cattle-raisers, lumber entrepreneurs and landless people. Accordingly, they claimed the local Indian lands to install a forest park, to develop crops and cattle to the internal market, for export and to subsidize the SPI and the FUNAI works, to expand subsistence agriculture, to open roads, for a land reform official project, as private property and to install an airport and a religious mission.

Chapter five considers the 1975-1990 non-Indian claims on the Guarita Reservation lands and the changes that they produced. Despite the fact that state developmentalist policies dominated most of this period, changes were closely connected with local economic interests, which were nevertheless defined in national and international political terms. Except for the demand to install a forest park in the Guarita Indian lands, all the above mentioned persisted. In addition other demands were made: to improve and expand

access roads, to deposit garbage, to exploit stone and earth, to cultivate a farm to produce school food for the Miraguaí non-Indian children, and a tourism project.

Guarita Indian current land claims are addressed in chapter six, primarily in response to recent non-Indian demands and their attendant violence. Though the Kaingang and the Guarani have developed distinct rationales while making their land claims, both have split internally in recent years. The local Kaingang maintain a unified demand toward their ownership of the reservation lands and resources, some have claimed their communal lands to serve non-Indians to whom they have leased or, in a lesser extent, engaged in sharecropping. The Guarani have requested that they have the right to maintain their possession in the Guarita Reservation because it comprises "Guarani lands," as they define the Brazil's southeast.

In chapter seven I discuss both non-Indian and local Indian's claims on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands and the resulting land loss, socio-economic changes and demographic transformations. Although the claims laid during the rubber-booms and those part of the mid century development policies are mentioned, an emphasis is put on recent claims laid on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands. As it will be seen, in this case non-Indian claimants have been able to get even the direct support of the Republic President. Although the Indians had a significant part of

their former territory demarcated and validated by the federal government, the Indians had their own claims but were not listened when the amount of land was being defined.

Chapter eight includes both a concluding section about recent external and internal claims on the Guarita Indian lands and a comparative analysis. To accomplish this I first describe and analyze the recent external and internal demands laid upon the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation's lands, after which other cases from the Brazil's Amazon and South, Americas, Australia and Africa are also taken into consideration. In the concluding analysis the concepts of domination, resistance and collusion are considered.

Chapter One

THE GUARITA KAINGANG ANCESTORS AND THE NON-INDIAN: First Encounters and the Ensuing Changes

... where each of the individuals is supposed to possess a given number of acres of land, the advance of population is already under way. If this is to be corrected, then colonization, and that in turn requires wars of conquest (Marx [1939] 1981: 493-494).

Introduction

In this chapter I document on the first experiences of the GKa--Guarita Kaingang ancestors--with non-Indians. These encounters probably began in the mid-1620s, when the Spanish Jesuits established themselves in the area to carry out what they called a "Spiritual Conquest" (Montoya [1639] 1985). They terminated when the GKa surrender to the Portuguese and Brazilians in 1847. I will discuss the ways in which these experiences changed the Guarita Kaingang as well as ways in which their culture survived despite dramatic upheavals. I am particularly concerned with the local Indians' ability to control their territory, in demographic composition of the local population, and their social organization. The GKa came into direct contact with the Guarani, another Indian group, as a result of the Spanish presence. I will focus on their relationship with the Guarani, since it is an important aspect of the demographic and cultural changes experienced by the GKa. I will also detail the anti-Indian

policies, actions and views of the various non-Indian populations.

This chapter reveals that the GKa were imbedded in diverse relationships with Europeans and with other Indians since the time of the European invasion of their territory and surroundings.¹ Other anthropologists have been concerned with the relationship of historical analysis to anthropological analysis (e.g. Wolf 1982) and particularly the historical role of European invasions and European colonialism in transforming Indian culture, social relations, politics, and economy (Balandier 1951; Nash 1981; Oliveira 1972; Ribeiro 1970). In this chapter, I share this concern to analyze the impact of European involvement in the area on the GKa, to see GKa society as a product of the historical interaction of various actors in the region.

Located in the Plata river basin, the GKa were in the very center of colonial and neocolonial geopolitics of the South American southern cone.² By the 17th century they controlled the highlands in the right bank of the Uruguay river,³ in the northwestern part of the current Rio Grande

¹ In this case connections could even be reported for earlier periods though of a different nature, as archeological evidence now show (Brochado 1984, 1975).

² The local disputes had their roots in the Spanish invasion of the Philippines, which Portugal had acquired from Spain in 1529 (USB 1894 III: 3).

³ For a description of the setting and natural environment, see Becker (1976: 33-37) and Brochado (1984: 11ff).

do Sul (RGS) state, bordered by the Ijuí, the Uruguay and the Uruguay-Puita or Várzea rivers (see Map 1). In the past, a dense tropical and sub-tropical forest and natural plains covered the area. Extensive maté woods - *Ilex paraguaiensis* - and *araucária* - *Araucaria angustifolia* - enhanced the natural environment. The weather was temperate, and the soil had both an arenicolous and a basaltic substratum.

The local population has been called "Cráubaba," "Caaguaras," "Cainguá," "Caaró," "Tupi," "Guaianazes," "Coroados,"⁴ "Bugres" (Mabilde [1836-1866] 1983: 11; Métraux 1963 I: 445-448; Teschauer 1929: 341-347).⁵ In 1882 Telêmaco M. Borba (Métraux 1963 I: 445) introduced the name "Kaingang," meaning "our people."⁶ The contemporary Kaingang, including the Guarita, use this name though it may not have been used by their forebearers. Parés, for instance, reported that until about the mid-1850s, the Guarita called themselves *Fonk-indõni* or Bugres Coroados (Parés 1848/06/01; 1948 in Pérez 1901: 475).

⁴ Coroado--the "crowned people"--referred to their hair, cut in the style of a friar.

⁵ Southern Brazil's Kaingang and Xokleng have been called Bugre since at least the eighteenth century. According to Mabilde ([1836-1866] 1983: 7-8) this term might be connected with *pucrí*--a Kaingang shout or word--that could be translated as "be alert," as they uttered it when surveying enemies. Anyway, as used by non-Indians it has the derogatory meaning of "uncivilized," "the brutes of the forests."

⁶ These Indians were also identified by the Missions' Guarani as *curupira* (devil of the woods) or as *tapya-caápora* (fierce, bad, wild man), which they did following Jesuits' instructions (Mabilde id.: 12).

Ethnographic accounts suggest that the Kaingang recently migrated to the area, claiming they came from the north due to the invasions of Portuguese.⁷ However, these accounts confuse the original Kaingang inhabitants with more recent Paraná Kaingang who came into the area in the mid-1800s (Queiróz 1966: 18; Villarrubia 1850/01/06).

Archeological evidence challenges this interpretation. Brochado (1984: 374; 1975) documented native populations in the area from at least 200 B.C. and linguistically related groups at the time of the European conquest. In the 17th century, Spanish Jesuits noted the Kaingang presence in the area (Montoya [1639] 1985; Teschauer 1929: 342). The Jesuit father Parés distinguished between the local Indians and the newcomers. Besides the indigenous Guarita Kaingang, he identifies two groups of migrant Kaingang (Parés 1848 in Pérez 1901: 494-495). Parés called the local GKa population propertyless "savages," in contrast to the newcomers who enjoyed their "livestock and properties" and who also refused to engage in communal labor, "for which they demanded payment" (Parés 1851/14/01). It seems clear that the GKa were native to the area.

The European invasion of this territory should be understood in the broader framework of the contemporaneous political economy. Early in the 17th century, the Spanish

⁷ Fischer 1959, Hensel 1928, Jacques 1912 in Laytano 1957 VIII: 65, Schaden 1963: 80, Vasconcellos in Teschauer 1929. Becker (1975: 17) too accepts this interpretation of events.

were harshly exploiting Indian labor and resources in Paraguay and in Guaira Provinces. The Jesuit father Montoya affirmed in 1639, that he witnessed that "the most fair or correct among those invaders were using the Indians they had in their estate without paying them anything" (Montoya [1639] 1985: 42). Work in maté extraction was especially difficult, killing thousands of Indians. Montoya (id.: 41) recounted: "I am an eyewitness to the existence of an enormous number of Indian bones in those woods."

Spanish Jesuits were the first Europeans to come to the RGS northwest. Their purpose was said to have been to save souls and to resist the Spanish *encomienda* or estate system, which they considered especially cruel. The Jesuits established Missions of which another Indian group, the Guarani, comprised the majority of the.⁸ However, at least some GKa were also found in Missions by the 17th century. Furthermore, in the Spanish Jesuit Missions the GKa and Guarani shared a common fate. In the 17th century Portuguese and Brazilians invaders mythfied interest in the area resources as an eldorado became more purely economic

⁸ According to Meliá (1984a: 11), in 1626 the Spanish Jesuits controlled fifteen settlements in the area, where one 100,000 Guarani lived. The missionaries not only dominated the Indians political and ideologically, but also exploited Indian labor and the maté woods, though this last point has been disputed. See Teschauer id.: 384-390.

(Silveira 1909: 223; Teschauer 1929).⁹ After that, Indian souls and labor, cattle, plains, maté woods and other forests, quarries, and the land itself were sought for centuries.¹⁰

The mid-1700s Guaranítica War was devastating to the local Indians (Hemming 1987: 107; Meliá 1984a: 12-13), though in the long run it temporarily empowered the GKa. In the early 1800s, the Portuguese and Brazilians began the conquest of the GKa land and thereafter secured "Crown possessions," and exploited the plains, the maté woods and other forested lands. Many Caboclos (Mestizo offspring of Indians and Whites) deserted the military and installed themselves on the fringes of the GKa lands. Additionally, wealthy "men of resources"¹¹ settled on the GKa lands, where they became the local hegemonic (Hansen and Parrish (1983: 258) elite.

The following section provides an analysis is an analysis of the GKa's first encounters with Spanish Jesuits as well as the Guarani Indians who populated the Missions.

⁹ See Cafruni 1966: 628; Domingues 1975: 61ff; Duarte 1941; Martins 1816 & Santos 1916 in Roderjan 1991: 70-73; Pinto 1850, 1848; Silveira 1909; Soares 1974: 101.

¹⁰ Due to its high market value and its desirability for local consumption, especially the maté was identified as the "green gold."

¹¹ This phrase is inspired by Rocha's (1980: 11) reference to the "persons possessing ownership," the first Portuguese/Brazilians whom, in the 1820s, received titles to land in the area.

Later I will detail their second encounter was with Portuguese and Brazilians and the resultant appropriation of the GKa's territorial base. The Indians' resisted these invasions but they nonetheless had most of their lands dispossessed, and their population and social organization transformed.

The GKa and the Ijuí River Basin Reductions

In the 17th century, the Spanish Jesuits established a number of Indian settlements in the Plata River basin. According to a contemporary Jesuit Indians "were settled through our effort or industry to big settlements and transformed from crude people into civilized christians, who continue to receive the Gospel teachings" (Montoya id.: 20). Since extensive texts are not available to outline the effects of the Jesuit enterprise on the GKa (I rely on fragmentary evidence)¹² I suggest that the GKa formed at least part of the Indian population settled in the Jesuit reductions located in the southernmost part of GKa territory. Later the GKa offspring adopted a Jesuit brother, a massacre survivor taken captive (Konkó¹³ 1930 in Mendes 1954), who played important role in their lives as he remained among them.

¹² As Lowie (1920: 331) wrote, "shreds and patches."

¹³ In this published report the author's name appears as Konkó. However, surviving relatives say his name was Kenkó.

From 1628 to 1634 the Jesuits created several Indian settlements in the Ijuí River basin and its surroundings: Conceição, Assunção do Ijuí, Candelária do Piratini, Caaró, Apóstolos, and Sao Carlos (Teschauer 1929: Map/btw. pgs. 228-229).¹⁴ By establishing settlements, Jesuits soon ended up dominating the area's plains and maté woods, where they opened a network of paths, which facilitated future invasions. According to Teschauer's map, the Jesuits expanded into the GKa territories, where they installed the Assunção, Apóstolos, and Sao Carlos settlements and the Sao Bernardo cattle-ranch. Father Romero (in Porto 1954 I: 233) reported, for instance, that in 1633 Dom Rodrigo Araçay, a Guarani, from San Tomé was in Inhacorá making maté. The São Lourenço Mission maté woods were abandoned by the Indians, after many of them were killed by Tupis (virtually certain, GKa) (Porto 1954 I: 228, 479).

References to the origins of the population on the Conceição Indian settlement and its precise location are controversial but crucial to understanding the possible relationship established between the GKa and the Spanish Jesuits. Schaden (1963: 74) asserted that this settlement was located in the northern part of the RGS, specifically at the Forquilha River (id.). Looking at the contemporary

¹⁴ The Indians settled by the Jesuits at Caaró could have been GKa as some authors have hypothesized (Porto 1954 I). This point, however, has also been disputed (Cafruni 1966).

toponymy, Becker (1975: 67; map on pg. 89) located the Forquilha in the Ijuí River basin, as a small tributary of the Conceição River. Nussdorfer (in Cafruni 1966: 479-480) said that the Ijuí and the Inhacorá valley's maté woods were those of the Conceição Indian settlement, but he does not offer a precise location. Teschauer (1929: 174) located a reestablishment of this Indian settlement in the late 17th century "between the Ijuí rivers."

The Conceição settlement was founded by father Roque González in 1619 and received people from Sao Joaquim, Sao Pedro and Sao Paulo, Caaçapá-mini, Jesus Maria do Ibiticarai, and Sao Carlos do Caapi Indian settlements (Porto 1954 I: 81). Porto (id.: 58) referred to the Indians settled in Sao Joaquim as Kaingang, since some of their reported cultural traits were like those of the Kaingang. Schaden (id.: 74) also assumed that the population of this Indian settlement was Kaingang. It is debatable whether or not these authors were correct, especially if the location mapped by J. I. López for the Conceição Indian settlement is correct. López located the settlement on the right bank of the Uruguay River, and he believed, it was founded in 1619.¹⁵

Montoya reported widespread epidemics destroying the area's Indian population. A total of three thousand Indians

¹⁵ J. I. López map was included by Arthur Rabuske in the Montoya's new edition of his 1639 "Conquista Espiritual" (Montoya [1639] 1985: 177).

were reported at the Sao José Indian settlement, though many were dying (Montoya id.: 214).¹⁶ The same was occurring in the Assunção do Ijuí settlement (id.: 192). It is unknown whether these epidemics were spread intentionally. Regardless, the epidemics were brought by the Spanish presence in the area and certainly weakened the GKa, possibly preventing any major armed resistance to the missionary enterprise in this area.

Though some among the GKa might have decided to settle on the Jesuit reductions, their experiences there would have been quite complex. There they lived alongside of the Guarani with whom they had been competing for space and natural resources (Brochado 1984, 1875; Meliá 1984a). Moreover, the expansion of the Jesuit missions over their lands was probably responsible for the increase of warfare, the taking of captives, their adoption and the growth of a Mestizo population (Konkó 1930). Their contemporary relationship with the Guarani and the Jesuits would have been tense. Despite widespread resistance undertaken by thousands of Guarani they ultimately accepted the Jesuit domination.¹⁷ Thus, they might have been seen by the GKa as

¹⁶ Though Montoya did not mention this Indian settlement's location, it could be the Conceição one (Schaden 1963: 74).

¹⁷ The Guarani responded to the Spanish Jesuit proselytism and attempts at settlement in various ways, including murdering of priests (Montoya [1639] 1985: 196-198; Teschauer 1929: 32-36). In the GKa territory the fathers Roque Gonzales, Afonso Rodrigues and Joao del Castillo were killed in 1628 by the Caaró and Assunção do

foes. Besides, there would have been tension over land, as the Indians' land base was appropriated by the Jesuits reductions.

However, as the GKa settled in some of the mentioned Jesuit missions, they then began to experience a closer interaction with Spanish Jesuits, Guarani and with Indians from other similar Indian settlements. Becker (1976: 11) noted that together with the Pindaré dwellers, those of the Conceição settlement were the most influenced by the Jesuits. Schaden (1963: 74) referred to the Conceição Indian settlement as a main event in "the pacification of the colonial RGS Kaingang." Cultural changes included the adoption of Guarani words, the use of clothing by men,¹⁸ and the absorption of christian teachings (Becker 1976: 17; Serrano 1936: 48; Teschauer 1929: 352). However, these were only some of the cultural transformations.

Due to the 1630s epidemics and the resultant population decline, the settled GKa might have been forced to seek mates among the Guarani and or other Indians at the Missions. Nevertheless, Indians resisted giving up their tradition of polygamy, despite pressure to do so. The

Ijuí Indians (Montoya, *ibid.*). Local "witches" were accused of committing their murders.

¹⁸ Women's clothing (Métraux 1963 I: 456; Teschauer 1929: 215; 352) was probably an ancient and widespread southern phenomenon among Indian population in the area. The Xokleng, for instance, who were not influenced by these missionaries, used to weave and to wear clothes (Henry 1941).

missionaries had to struggle even among the Guarani to break polygamy. The above mentioned Caaró massacre is thought to be an example of Indian resistance to Jesuits' attempts to extinguish that cultural tradition (Montoya [1639] 1985: 52ff). It is also likely that Jesuits interfered with GKa shamanism and shamans' power might thereby have been diminished. In sum, GKa probably incorporated Guarani and western goods and behaviors, which became part of their own culture.¹⁹

However, the Jesuit enterprise in the area and the ongoing changes were soon interrupted by Portuguese and Brazilian invaders to the advantage of the GKa. Indeed, paulistas (people from São Paulo) pathfinders, destroyed the entire area, which occurred between 1633 and 1641.²⁰ Thirty thousand Indians were then taken captive and taken to central Brazil to be sold as slaves (Meliá 1984a: 11). The Sao Joaquim Indian settlement, where some Guarani and Kaingang, and possibly some GKa remained after a major migration, was destroyed by Raposo Tavares in 1635 (Porto 1954: 50). Montoya's description of the paulistas action at the Jesus Maria settlement provides a clear idea of these

¹⁹ Montoya ([1639] 1985: 228-229) referred to an earlier presence of Tupis trading with Indians of the area, through whom Brazilians from São Paulo--paulistas--acted in the area. Thus local Indians had access to western goods.

²⁰ This widespread destruction was mainly led by Antonio Raposo, Fernao Dias Paes, Francisco Carneiro and André Fernandes (Cafruni 1966: 299ff; Rocha 1980: 13; Southey 19 , Vol. 3: 420).

invaders' treatment of the Indians:

They tried their swords' steal edge while cutting the boys in two parts, while opening their heads and tearing apart their weak members. ... They did not show any compassion with the wounded, rather they put them in a prison ... (1985: 245).

The paulistas also burned local buildings and stole church paraphernalia (id.). Schaden (1964: 74), however, was not able to verify the termination of the Conceição Indian settlement, but it certainly happened between 1636-1641. In this turbulent environment at least part of the GKa probably escaped to their former territory where they were able to regroup.

The GKa Control of the RGS Northwest

From the mid-1600s, the GKa retreated to the RGS northwest where they were able to strengthen themselves again and to act as a sovereign people. Initially the GKa even expanded into the Inhacorá, the Ijuí and the Botucaraí maté woods, all on the southernmost limits of their territories. They were able to control the area by unifying GKa villages and later by establishing allegiances with Mission Guarani. (The GKa's control over the area lasted until the 1820s, when new and larger waves of Brazilians reached their lands and imposed widespread dispossession and massacres). Konkó's (a Kaingang) report published twenty four years after it was written is the most important source of data on the GKa experience. Some authors (Bindé 1986;

Mendes 1954: 6; Souza 1954: 3) consider it to be a total or partial legend. Mendes innacurate interpretation of the Kaingang rule as an empire diminished the ethnological value of Konkó's report.

A peaceful period helped the GKa in their expansion and autonomy. *Paulistas* pathfinders moved into Brazil's midwest, where they went to look for metals and precious stones (Teschauer 1929: 173), thus temporarily leaving the south. The Jesuits and the Guarani even returned in 1680s, when they built the Sete Povos das Missees--Seven Peoples Missions, also known as the Guarani "Communist Christian Republic" (Lugon 1968), on the southwestern part of the GKa territory. Then they expelled the GKa from part of their woods. As Nussdorfer (in Cafruni 1966: 480) pointed out, the Inhacorá and Ijuí maté woods were appropriated by the Sete Povos das Missees' Sao Luiz and Santo Angelo villages respectively. Indians from this later village also controlled three cattle-ranches located between the Ijuí and the Inhacorá rivers (Porto 1954 I: 324).

The GKa resisted both the Jesuit missionaries, and the first Portuguese and Brazilian invaders' attempts to expropriate their lands. This might be the cause of existing enmity between the GKa and the Guarani of the Sete Povos das Missees (Konkó, pg. 15). One may even wonder how frequently the GKa raided the Guarani missions to take captives. Kachú (in Venzon in press) reported that in the past Nonoi

Indians fought those from Borboleta, the area of the São Joaquim reduction. The GKa not only attacked and slaughtered numerous mission Guarani (Konkó, pgs. 27ff; Nussdorfer id.: 479), but adopted prisoners whom were found among the GKa in 1752. In this year a Sao Miguel mission team tried to advance further along the Turvo river; they were looking for maté woods and possessed a detailed map of the area (Konkó, pg. 6ff). Thirty Guarani warriors and one Spanish Jesuit brother perished in GKa hands; one member of the team survived (id.: 19-24).

The survivor, the Jesuit brother Dom Miguel de Aguillar, was then taken captive and was later adopted by the GKa. He was given the name of Fondengue, a name that ridiculed his beardless face (Konkó, pg. 26). Konkó reported that as soon as Aguillar recovered his consciousness, he announced that he wanted to stay with the GKa, and even offered to teach the local Indians to battle in the "whites' style" and to cure sick people. In addition, he also shared the goods his team had brought from San Miguel, including clothes, medicine, food, and cereals (id.: 28-29). Though this adoption marked the beginning of significant transformations for the local Indians, such as the restructuring of their political organization, in the long run, it promoted their defeat. The proof of Fondengue's loyalty came later on, during a Botocudo attack, when he fought alongside the GKa and did not attempt to escape from

his foster people (Konkó, pgs. 31-32). From then on, the local Indians developed a dependency on Fondengue. He was their leader from the 1770s till the late 1820s (id.: 33ff). To what extent Fondengue's presence among them imposed a more formal sort of political leadership is unknown, but it is very probable that it did encourage political change.

The GKa population grew and diversified, and their social organization underwent major transformations. By the mid-1700 the GKa population was probably different than it had been in early 17th century. Marriages with people from diverse ethnic groups were by then probably well known. The adoption of captives was just one of the mechanisms for incorporating outsiders (Konkó, pgs. 25-26, 38). Fondengue's adoption and the fact that he married several GKa wives and procreated with them, were not novelties for the local Indians.²¹ It was possible that the GKa already considered the Guarani and non-Indians as members of their social moieties--Kamé and Kadnyerú-Kra.²² Guarani and non-Indians, and the mestizo children were probably adopted by their spouses' opposite moieties. Moreover, by the end of the 18th century the size of local Indian population would have been considerable. According to Konkó (1930: 39) in the early

²¹ Konkó (id.: 33) said Fondengue was given "some women, of the most beautiful, to be his wives." He referred to only two sons, Nonoai and Goio-Ming, who, by the 1770s, would be the Nonoai and the Campo Novo caciques, respectively.

²² For an ethnographic account on the Kaingang moieties, see Baldus (1937).

1770s the cacique Fong left 200 warriors in Nonoai, in the northeastern area of their territory. He also referred to 250 warriors who perished or were wounded years later at Mortandade (id.: 52). The numbers indicate the existence of a large local Indian population.

It was through these social and political processes that the GKa expanded their territories. They expanded further into the south, where they transformed the Santo Ângelo mission into a settlement until 1767 (Silveira 1909: 332). This was possible not only due to Fondengue's presence among them, but also because the Sete Povos das Missões lost most of its population in the 1752-1756 Guaranítica war. The GKa also advanced into the northeastern, when 300 GKa warriors defeated the Botocudos in 1772 (Konkó, pg. 35). The battle ground was located at the confluence of the Uruguai-Pita with the Uruguay River, where part of the GKa would establish and build the Nonoai village. The Botocudo defeat freed them to expand into the southeast.

By then Fondengue was already leading the GKa, succeeding the previous leader Tandú. Planning the war against the Botocudo seems to have been his first job. After the Botocudo defeat, Fondengue (from Fortaleza) along with Fong (from Guarita) and Niatá-Goici (from Inhacorá) organized in 1772 what Mendes (1954) called as the "Coroado Empire" (Konkó, pgs. 42-45). Despite his youth, Fondengue's son Goio-Ming lead the Campo Novo village. Nonoai was

organized by his son Nonoai, who was also part of this alliance. Nonoai was also instructed to create a new village, the Serrinha, south of his own settlement (id.: 43). Dispersed in this way in Nonoai, Fortaleza, Guarita, Inhacorá, Campo Novo and Serrinha villages the GKa battled Portuguese and Brazilian invaders.

Throughout the 18th century the GKa seemed to be developing a friendly policy toward the Sete Povos das Missões Guarani. Cafruni (1966: 613) even suggested the existence of an alliance between them. Despite ongoing antagonisms, the GKa may have engaged in commerce and other relationships with the Jesuits and Guarani. In fact, they did not react with hostility when the Guarani militia crossed the southern border of GKa lands (id.: 485). The Santo Ângelo mission's Guarani were even reported as having settled among the eighteenth century Passo Fundo Indians (Nussdorfer in Cafruni 1966: 487).²³ Those Guarani were by then possibly fleeing their mission after the 1750 Madrid Treaty and the ensuing takeover by Gomes Freire de Andrade (Andrade 1757 in Cafruni 1966: 604).

The extent to which the GKa may have supported the Sete Povos das Missões Guarani while these Indians fought the genocidal Guaranítica war is unknown. Anyway it was reported that the GKa were in the Santo Angelo mission,

²³ Note that by then Passo Fundo had a larger territorial base, which probably included the Nonoai and the Serrinha Kaingang villages.

which seems to have been reoccupied both by Guarani and the GKa, but was abandoned later in 1767 due to the Jesuit expulsion (Silveira 1909: 332). The probability that some GKa were sharing the Botucaraí settlements with the Guarani must be taken into account. In fact, elders Kaingang from Guarita have affirmed that Fondengue, Fong and their people often travelled and stayed in the Botucaraí area.²⁴

Such alliances surely strengthened the GKa in their expansion. Though the GKa dispersion and alliance assured more efficient control over their territory and natural resources, they were not able to resist future internal and external pressures. Cafruni (id.) recalled a specific alliance during the 1779 Indian rebellion, when prisoners were summarily executed by the Portuguese. According to Duarte (1944: 197-198), Capt. José Joaquim Pereira organized troops from Lagoa Vermelha, in the RGS northeast, and advanced against the rebels who were then massacred.

In addition, in the late 1770s the GKa probably reached the Cavará-Cuiá plains, in Argentina's current Misiones Province. Later on these Indians were welcomed by cacique Fong to settle in Inhacorá (Beschoren 1989: 63),

²⁴ Kaingang and Guarani survived together in the surrounding woods after the *bandeirantes* devastation (Porto 1954: 50, 107). According to a Captain José Saldanha's 18th century report (in Franco: 1975: 18): "... the Bugres or the Tupi ... inhabited the area." Besides, as has recently been known, the offspring of both Kaingang, Xokleng, Charrua and Jesuit Mission Guarani continued living together in the area (Venzon in press).

perhaps indicating a close relationship between them. Their migration to Brazil might be suggested by the Brazilian military Sergt. Antônio José Mendes Tavares, who, in 1856, visited those Kaingang in Misiones (Mabilde [1836-1866] 1983: 77-79). By then, the government was also proposing the unification of the Indian settlements, as I will discuss later.

Fondengue was not only considered the main architect of the GKa military organization, but he also engineered a policy which foresaw the establishment of pacific relationships with the Brazilian invaders. Pressures from non-Indians were already overwhelming. Non-Indians grew in number and attacked the GKa with both better weapons and with Indian allies, and caused internal splitting among the GKa. Fondengue reportedly established an agreement with Lt. Col. Oliveira in 1828, a newcomer in the area (Konkó, pg. 46; Silveira 1909: 222). The arrival of this Lt. Col. can be interpreted as a clear signal of the local Indians' weakness. In addition, the agreement certainly accelerated final defeat of the GKa in 1834, especially because it did not please all the Guarita Kaingang.

The Definitive Conquerors of the GKa's Lands

Portuguese and Brazilians were already involved in a broader dispute in the southern cone of South America by the

17th century.²⁵ They founded Sacramento Colony in 1680, as a way to control access to the Plata River basin. In 1684, for instance, the Portuguese Francisco Brito Peixoto advanced into the Botucaraí mountain seeking gold (Menezes 1718 in Rocha 1980: 14). He was, however, kept away by the local Indians. A 1750 team also surveyed the southern and east limits of the GKa lands, at the Uruguai-Pita or da Várzea River (Nussdorfer in Cafruni 1966: 601-602). In 1801, the Portuguese and Brazilians conquered the left bank of the Uruguay river, especially the Sete Povos das Missões. This conquest was crucial to the surrender, dispossession and domination of the GKa. An order involving cattle robbery was at the heart of the 1801 conquest.²⁶

As early as in 1802, an expedition was ordered to explore the left bank of the Uruguay river, exactly where the GKa lived. These actions resulted from the widespread destruction of the Sete Povos das Missões, a process in which the Platinos caudillos--political bosses--participated

²⁵ As early as 1731 the south Brazil lands were described as follows: "These highlands contain many kinds of wood, good forests, and a great many pines. ... Nature shaped and created those lands into perfect pastures for the raising of livestock, and in addition to that, the area is extremely healthy. ... Above all this area promises much wealth and not a little increase in the Treasure of His Majesty ..." (RIHGB 1909 in Burns 1966: 120).

²⁶ An official document reported that Borges do Canto - a troublesome soldier - received an order from the Commander of the Regiment of Rio Pardo, to steal cattle from the Jesuit missions for the Portuguese army (Domingues 1975: 61-75). The decision to undertake the conquest would be, according to Domingues (id.), his own.

(Domingues 1975; Hemming 1987: 109-110). After that, the new conquerors imposed closer and more brutal contact with the GKa. The D. Joao VI's 1808 "Royal Letter" allowed the massacre of the Indians and their imprisonment as war captives. Gal. Patricio C. da Câmara, the RGS governor, attempted to exterminate the Botucaraí Indians and those of the surrounding area (Bonpland in Venzon in press). Moreover, the Indians were systematically cast as obstacles to economic development. As this trend persisted, the Portuguese and Brazilian repeated their earlier experiments with the Jesuit missions' Guarani population (see next chapter), this time with the GKa. The Portuguese and Brazilian treatment of Indians was considered to be worse than that of the Spanish (Pinto 1855a, b; Saint-Hilaire 1823: 69).

While the local authorities were busy with both the exploitation of the Jesuit missions' resources and the protection of international borders, Portuguese and Brazilians advanced into the GKa territories. It was possible that many of those newcomers were already living in the GKa southern limits, as they might have deserted the army and taken refuge among the Indians, or even have settled with their consent. Gomes Freire de Andrade (1757 in Cafruni 1966: 605), wrote that soldiers under his command followed the first path. It is even possible that the first few hovels built in the Cruz Alta area were constructed by

these soldiers (Castro in Rocha 1980: 25-26).

These first settlers, most of whom were Caboclos--westernized Indians or the offspring of Whites and Indians--enslaved Blacks, and poor Platinos, would have constituted the basis for the local labor force for most of the nineteenth century. The Caboclos mainly established themselves in the forests, where they practiced subsistence agriculture and worked in maté extraction. As Callai (1983: 84-87) and Massarollo (1976: 50-74) stated, Caboclo culture was based on slash-and-burn farming and "nomadism." Though the enslaved Blacks entered the GKa lands with the ranchers (Silveira 1909: 222), there were probably few at the beginning of the Portuguese and Brazilian invasion. The Platinos came from the non Portuguese Plata river basin. Some reached the area following caudillos or had moved into the Sete Povos das Missões after the time of the Jesuits.²⁷ If Leme's (1872 in Soares 1974: 113) report is accurate, the Portuguese and Brazilian were already invading the GKa by about 1808 in the north and east areas of Cruz Alta.

From the beginning, enslaved persons had no access to land. Caboclos and other had a little more success. The Ijuí and the Botucaraí maté woods (located nearest to the Cruz Alta settlement) were probably already invaded by about

²⁷ The area's 'Platino' elite went to Buenos Aires after the 1801 conquest, despite the fact that the Portuguese/Brazilians recognized their "property rights" (Silveira 1909: 218).

1808. Leme reported (id.) that early in 19th century, groups of people were already exploiting maté near this locale. New waves of people expanded up north a decade later, as thousands of unemployed rural workers were said to have been migrating to this area by 1820, most of whom were fleeing the crisis in the cattle-raising economy in the southern plains (Linhares 1969: 114). In the RGS northwest these migrants, most of whom were Caboclos, worked primarily in maté extraction, but also in sugar-cane production and in agatha prospecting (id.).²⁸ Even when they were able to secure some possessions, the Caboclos continuously lost them since their early presence in the RGS northwest, as they were usually expropriated by the "men of resources." Therefore, their alledged "nomadism" must be understood as part of this processual and oppressive context.

However, as the military took control of the area and imposed a certain sense of security, "men of resources" advanced into the GKa lands. Most of these invaders were or had been part of the military troops. "Men of resources" came from traditional *paulistas*--from Sao Paulo province--families, most of them from Curitiba and Castro, located in present-day Paraná state (Roderjan 1991: 122ff; Silveira 1909: 222-223). They came not only with their families, but

²⁸ The first settlers at Pontao do Ijuizinho, north to Cruz Alta, for instance, were reported as occupying the area in 1840 (CTCI 1900 in Lazzarotto 1976). However, as Linhares (id.) revealed, they may have been there even before.

with resources, including enslaved persons and became an enduring hegemonic elite. They arrived as muleteers, explorers, military, "wild" cattle appropriators and maté extractors. Despite their arrival, local Indian populations endured in the area.

About mid 19th century, Portuguese and Brazilians controlled most of the Indians' previous possessions. The "men of resources" became owners of huge tracts of lands, especially *sesmarias*. There they introduced the latifundium system while continuing to engage in cattle ranching, maté production, and they became the local economic-political elite. This was the process by which the first Portuguese and Brazilian urban settlements were developed in the RGS northwest. Cruz Alta, for instance, emerged as a muleteer camping site in the GKa southern territory as early as 1810. The Vilinha da Palmeira, the future Palmeira das Missões, already existed further north in the 1820s.²⁹ The new elite involved itself in the defense and exploration of the area, and endured in its hegemony. The state counted on them to secure the region, especially areas with economic potential. The state even expelled the local Indians from their lands, as it seized them to grant to first invaders. These actions were ratified by the state through laws (see next sections). Non-Indians also engaged in extra legal expropriation and

²⁹ Leme (id.) reported the existence of this village in 1824.

slaughtering of the GKa.³⁰

Paths, Local Resources and GKa Resistance

This new elite led 19th century capitalist development in the area. The rich *paulista* muleteer, Joao José de Barros, for instance, reached the Cruz Alta in 1808, and from there he returned to Sao Paulo using "the missions path" (Soares 1974: 102).³¹ This path was by then very well known by the Portuguese authorities, since Capt. Varela had used it in 1801 to reach the Jesuit missions and to support the Portuguese troops (id.: 101). This path would play a crucial role in the processes of the Portuguese and Brazilian expansion and the GKa dispossession. Barros' arrival began commercial consolidation in the area, especially marketing of mules to Sao Paulo and to Central Brazil, which in turn encouraged local settlement. Barros even settled there, despite the resistance of the GKa who were forced to move to a site further south (Leme 1872 id.; Rocha 1980: 15).³²

³⁰ In this area, it was the Sao Borja's frontier army commander who had the power to grant land, especially as compensation for public services (Silveira 1909: 223).

³¹ This path linked those settlements with the Vacaria plains, where the Jesuits used to maintain part of their cattle.

³² There he became one of the most important leaders among the first settlers, but he did not become a land grantee (Rocha 1980: 14-16).

The GKa were resisting everywhere. In the Botucaraí settlements, the Indians were almost entirely massacred in 1810 by the military team which was reconstructing the "Botucaraí path" by order of the provincial government. The path was meant to link Rio Pardo, the present-day capital, to the Missions area. The commander Capt. José Machado da Silveira destroyed an entire Indian village at the Botucaraí river headwaters, and the local dwellers fought back with extreme violence (Franco 1975: 20). A total of seven children, who were at most 11 years old, were imprisoned. Continuing to build the path, the military team continued to battle the Indians, especially in the Lagoao stream and in the Jacuizinho river (id.: 21). Many of them escaped to surrounding forests, where they survived for some time, but would later be dispossessed again (see below).

The next major wave of newcomers was part of a 19th century governmental project. The Crown expected to open Brazil's southern highlands to economic exploitation and to secure the area from the abuses of the Platinos caudillos.³³ The project began with the Guarapuava Royal Expedition in 1808-1809 (Roderjan 1991: 57ff). In 1816, the *Alferes*

³³ Many references suggest that the mission dwellers received the Portuguese without resistance, and some suggest that this was due to the Platinos' mismanagement (Domingues 1975; Ferradas 1990: 60; Silveira 1909). Brutalities were committed by both sides. For a description of the Portuguese and Paraguayan actions upon the Argentinean missions, see Lista 1883 in Ferradas id.: 61. For an account of the Argentinean Andresito and his Guarani army's contribution to the destruction of the missions see Hemming id.: 109-110.

Athanagildo Pinto Martins team reached the southern highlands. Martins, a soldier and rancher, was sent to the south by an order of the governor of the Sao Paulo capitania, and would settle in the area later on (Palma in Roderjan id.: 65-66).³⁴ Beyond their geo-political strategy, this expedition was to find a shorter path to reach the Jesuit missions, therefore to facilitate the mule trade (Pinto 1816 in id.: 69).

According to the original plan, the path should have cut through the RGS Kaingang territory. Jongong - a Kaingang from Paraná and a member of the team - directed the team eastward since he feared the local "savages," consequently directing the path away from the area of the Jesuit missions. The expedition ended up reaching the southern limits of the GKa territory. On their way back, the commander decided to send part of his team via the original route. This group reached the north from Pinheiro Mercado, but the Nonoai and the Serrinha GKa resisted and massacred Jongong and eight other non-Indians (Roderjan 1991: 84-90). These Indians viewed the Portuguese and Brazilians as "devils," as the Jesuit had taught the Guarani (Golin 1985: 38), and probably the GKa as well. The proposed route would eventually be shortened in 1845 when Francisco da Rocha Loures' expedition crossed the Goio-en passage at the

³⁴ For the exact itinerary of the expedition see Roderjan 1991: 70-73.

Uruguai river (Conde de Caxias 1846: 22). Though this event was a true achievement for the development of South Brazil, it sprang especially from the domination and oppression of the Nonoai and the Serrinha Kaingang.

Notwithstanding systematic resistance of the GKa, Cruz Alta grew as the first main "missions' path" village and became the center of Portuguese and Brazilian invasion of the GKa's lands. Although Zarth (1988: 33) argued that Cruz Alta took on its role as the RGS highlands political and economic center after it was legally recognized as a village in 1834, this process seems to have begun much earlier. It was probably the influx of people in the early 1820s and the resultant economic dynamism that set the conditions for major political struggles (Linhares, id.). In fact, in 1821, the local settlers organized and formalized the recognition of Cruz Alta as a village (Paulet et al. 1821 in Rocha id.: 19). In addition, the 1822 Cisplatine campaign (the invasion of Uruguay by Brazilian imperial troops) put new energy into the area, as many military men, all "men of resources," received lands and settled.

These newcomers settled in the very center of the GKa settlements, not just on their fringes or in surrounding areas. The Indians were first expelled from the lands closer to the mission area, especially from the local plains and maté woods. Silveira (1909: 218) notes the presence of Miguel Guirané, the Santo Ângelo Mission ex-administrator

whose lands were recognized in 1801 by the Portuguese conquerors. In 1831 Francisco de Paula required leagues of sesmarias in the area, both for his brothers and for himself. Other "men of resources" arrived: Antônio Manoel de Oliveira (who came from Sao Paulo with his family and slaves, and received a league of 'sesmaria' in the Santa Tereza plains), Manoel Corrêa Taborda (who soon sized the entire Inhacorá maté woods [Silveira 1909: 222]), Antônio J. Antunes (who received more than two leagues of sesmarias), and Bento Barboza de Lima (a Goiás' Tenent of *Milícias* who received one league of sesmaria, between the Sao Joao stream and the Comandaí river). In 1828, Lt. Cel. José Joaquim de Oliveira was close to the Guarita river, where he maintained a sesmaria of two leagues (Bindé 1986: 35). The Botucaraí Indian lands began to be distributed among the invaders after 1810 (Franco id.: 24-25). Lt. Col. Antônio José de Mello Bravo was said to occupy the Borboleta Ranch in the area early in the 19th century. The local Indians remained in the area but most of them were later expelled (Venzon in press).

About this time the GKa were already surrounded in their villages and neighboring areas, but unable to unify their forces to battle the Brazilian invaders. Fong resisted and even continued to attack Vilha da Palmeira (Stysinski [1903] 1979: 2). In 1828, however, he accepted the agreement of the Fondengue and Brazilian invaders (Konkó pg. 47),

which primarily served anti-Indian purposes and the interests of the White invaders. In addition, a new expedition was ordered in 1831 to explore the RGS northwest, following the traces of the old Jesuit paths (Silveira 1909: 222).³⁵ The Campo Novo Kaingang led by cacique Goyo-Ming, continued to resist.

Evidence also shows that in 1834, teams of people were entering the Campo Novo area. Joao Vicente de Souza, the invader who was given with the title of the area's "discoverer," faced harsh resistance undertaken by the GKa and Goio-Ming, the local cacique (Beschoren 1988: 60; Konkó id.).³⁶ After initial military victories in the early 1830s, these Indians too were massacred by maté extractors and plains invaders. Since then, the area's "men of resources" organized to conquer local lands and resources. Goio-Ming and about two hundred Indian warriors fell in the battlefield, and another fifty were wounded (Konkó, pg. 52). In addition, the Brazilian invaders set fire to the local Indian village. Simultaneously, fewer than one hundred Indian warriors dispersed and later moved to the Inhacorá woods.

³⁵ This expedition was led by Francisco de Paula. The paths were all built by Guarani from the Jesuit missions. They originally linked the maté woods, but had disappeared by the time. However, as the non Indian expansion over the area continued, they were rebuilt.

³⁶ Vicente de Souza entered the area with his sons and a team to make maté (Beschoren id.: 62).

Despite the brutality of this invasion and massacre,³⁷ the Indians who perished were almost entirely forgotten in the written accounts, with the exceptions of Konkó (1930) and the Bindé's (1986) brief reference to the Konkó's work. Nevertheless, the Indians's defeat certainly empowered the Cruz Alta inhabitants. In the same year Cruz Alta obtained "village" status. The GKa continued to resist in various settlements, where they faced similar anti-Indian policies and strategies from the Brazilian "men of resources"³⁸ Indians from Nonoai and Serrinha were especially known by the Cruz Alta City Council for their acts of resistance, and were called "bloody beasts" and "untamed Monsters" (CACC 1845 in Rocha 1980: 60). Mabilde (1899: 138) similarly described RGS Kaingang "ferocious nature" and sustained that vengeance was their main motif when fighting others. He (in Serrano 1957: 175) still mentioned their wars as always meaning extermination, "as they never reconciled." Father Parés (1848/06/11), who was in close contact with the Kaingang in RGS on mid-19th century, described the Guarita Indians as "Burgres Coroados, properly savages and wandering."

Though the Guarita Kaingang still dominated vast woods

³⁷The site where most of them were massacred has been called Mortandade, or Slaughter.

³⁸For an analysis of these policies and the processes by which the Inhacorá, Nonoai, Serrinha, and Borboleta Kaingang were dispossessed of their land processes see Simonian (ed. in press, 1981, 1979) and Venzon (in press).

in the RGS north-northwest, they would soon be expropriated, following the 1835-1845 Farrapos War, which erupted throughout the RGS Province. That dispossessing process was supported by the emerging Republic of Piratini government, which favored the maté production, as a major economic base (Linhares 1969: 114-115). As far as it is known, the GKa were not involved in this struggle, but thousands of people, most of whom were fleeing the widespread violence and or the possibility of being forcibly drafted by the revolutionary or the loyal armies, invaded the GKa lands.

The first "men of resources" *sesmarias* were in fact granted illegally. Although land granting laws were often restricted by the central government and even prohibited by the 1822 Resolution (Mendes Jr. 1912: 55), they were systematically ignored at the local level. Indeed, neither the Indian rights to land nor governmental decisions were respected by the newcomers, who had the power of the military in their side. This lawless environment produced all sorts of abuses and social conflicts (Annes et al. 1845 in Rocha 1980: 58). In this case, local "men of resources" were dispossessing local Caboclos and poor squatters (id.), who also acted similarly against the GKa territory as they invaded the area.

The taking of Indian land in fact broked the still valid 1755 Law and the Ord. L. IV tit. 43, through which the land of other interested peoples was guaranteed (Mendes Jr.

1912: 55). This legislation explicitly stated that "while granting lands to private peoples the rights of other peoples must be preserved, and much more I want it to be understood, must be those of the Indians, their primary and natural sovereign" (id.: 55-56). However, since the very beginning the area's "men of resources" used tricks to acquire tracks of land. Among these tricks was to put some land in the name of relatives or other peoples, to assure that separate land grants would be issued on one large tract of land (Rocha 1980: 12). The lands would later be purchased for a half a dozen patacas, a Brazilian imperial coin, or for a team of oxen and an ox cart.

The situation reached a point by the late 1830s, where one person alone could retain an enormous amount of land, including plains, sub-tropical forests and maté woods. Though this was perceived as problematic by the local authorities, the Indian dispossession were not (Annes et al. 1845 id.; Rocha 1980: 12, 57-58; Silveira 1909: 222).³⁹ Still, as the "men of resources" invaded and established themselves in GKa lands, they brought about an interrelationship of landscape and human activities, which seems more complex than the usually accepted dichotomy of

³⁹ The monopoly over land might have led to food shortages in the area, which could have been the main reason for the concern of Cruz Alta's City Council (Annes et al. 1845 id.). By then this City Council consulted the Province's authorities regarding the actual policy towards land granting, especially in the forested areas.

the plains and forest or ranching and peasant agriculture for the RGS experience, at least as it concerns to the northwest (Roche 1959; Zarth 1988: 16). The sub-tropical and maté woods' were incorporated by ranchers into their plains possessions (Annes et al. 1845 id.: 58; Silveira 1909: 222).

The Guarita Indian Settlement

The settlement in the Cruz Alta by "men of resources" sealed the Guarita Kaingang's fate; it was the final blow to any project that might guarantee Indian autonomy. Their policies were not only prejudicial and authoritarian (although paternalistic), and initially related to anti-Indian policies and actions at the provincial and imperial levels. The mission settlements, the path openings, the use of force, and the proposition of the unification of the Province settlements were the dominant policies (CMCA 1845 in Rocha 1980: 60; Conde de Caxias 1846: 21; Regimento das Misseees 1845). As these endeavors were carried out, they consolidated the previous loss of Guarita Kaingang lands and subjected the Indians to the interests of the state and non-Indian invaders.

Ideology was fundamental to the domination of Indians, especially as land was concerned. As already mentioned, in 1845 the City Council of Cruz Alta called them "savages." Its members, all "men of resources," reported on the Kaingang "atrocities" (CMCA 1845 in Rocha 1980: 60).

Although most of the references regarded the *Castelhano* and the *Português* woods' Kaingang (Rocha id.), the City Council was expressing the local elite's prejudices against the Indians in general, including the Guarita. These conceptions of Indians as savages became definitive and have continued to work to assure new dispossession of Indians, even after the Indians began to be seen as more civilized and were named Bugres. However, almost nothing was said about the "men of resources" own savagery.

At the local level, "men of resources" and Jesuit missionaries led the settlement processes of the Guarita Indian.⁴⁰ Fong is reported to have made contact with Oliveira in 1828, and this acquaintance was renewed in 1847, as the Indians searched for a way out of their severe situation (Konkó pg. 46; Parés 1848/06/11: 1). Testimonies suggest the 1847 encounter was peaceful but frightening. Oliveira reported to the provincial governor that the Guarita Kaingang arrived "in peace" at his lands, and asked to settle (Galvao 1847: 14; Oliveira 1851/28/06; Parés id.). At the beginning Lt. Col. Oliveira fed the Indians, who ate "... all his corn field ..." (Parés 1848). Next Oliveira looked for support among his peers and public authorities

⁴⁰ The Jesuits were called by the provincial government to help on the proposed Indian submission process, in a time when they were been persecuted by Rosas, in Argentina (Pérez 1901: 234-235). Besides father Bernardo Parés, the mission coordinator, Solanellas, Luiz Cotz, and Ignácio Gurri spent some time in the local Indian settlement (Parés 1850/01/03; Pérez 1901: 472-473).

(Galvao 1847: 13-14). The Judge of the *Comarca das Missees* distributed "... 165\$240 réis in gifts to them ...," and proposed "a monthly expenditure of 200\$000 réis ..." for the Indians (id.: 14). However, this Judge's generosity was questioned by the president of the Province because he thought the Indians might get spoiled, which would drain the public resources (id.).

The situation, however, became much more tense even brutal. In fact, Oliveira (1848/14/08) reported that the lands nearby the Guarita river were totally occupied by non-Indian ranchers as well as others who were in the area for many years. The maté extractors and ranchers' violence was an important factor in the area. In 1848, for instance, the Guarita Kaingang were already claiming their last maté woods, the Pari (Parés 1848/14/01).⁴¹ Parés even mentioned the invasion of undesirable swindlers (in Pérez 1901: 542). The reasons for the Indians desire for a settlement was based on pressures on their lands and scarcity of subsistence resources.

Lt. Col. Oliveira, the director of the Guarita Indian settlement, also feared non-Indian invaders, especially the "men of resources." He expressed this fear when considering the government suggestions regarding an area to be reserved

⁴¹ In a 1859 report, the engineer Francisco Nunes de Miranda (in Soares 1974: 87-88) mistakenly affirms that the Guarita Kaingang Pari maté woods was "discovered" by Oliveira.

to the local Kaingang.⁴² On August 14, 1848, Oliveira declared that if the provincial government was to simply determine the local ranchers dispossession, they might instigate the Indians against his work. Oliveira (id.) favored a compensation, though the Province Indian Settlement's general director Joaquim José de Andrade Neves intended to acquire the settlement lands (Neves 1849/01/01). Beyond this, Oliveira tried to limit the extension of the proposed settlement. Rejecting the Provincial president's suggestion that it included three leagues of plains (Parés 1849 in Pérez 1901: 496), Oliveira proposed one league, arguing that this "was more than sufficient for the "savages" to keep their cows, horses and sheep ..." (Oliveira 1848/14/08).

Oliveira and Parés were even proposing the distribution of the local Indian lands to Caboclos whom they were willing to bring to the reservation to organize a pedestrian military guard. This point was made explicit when Parés stated that there was land enough for the Indians and possible newcomers (Parés 1849 in Pérez 1901: 497). Notwithstanding, Neves (1850/01/01), Oliveira and Parés (Parés 1851/14/01) asked for governmental protection of the Indian maté woods, as a way to prevent non-Indian invasion,

⁴² Three edicts were issued in 1848, two on May 31st and one in June 1st ordering the creation of the Guarita Indian settlement and the preservation of settlement lands (Oliveira 1848/24/07).

but they were not successful. Instead of guaranteeing Indian lands and resources, the provincial government soon proposed the Indian's resettlement into the Nonoai settlement (Bello 1852: 17), despite the fact that it was suspected that this would cause rivalry among the different Indian groups.

The return of many Indians to the woods terrorized Lt. Col. Oliveira. Though Oliveira stated that he loved the Guarita Indians, he ended up fearing that he would be the first killed by them in the event of an attack (1851/18/05; 1850/28/06; 1850/01/01). Many Indians resisted settlement, especially when their desires for western goods and food were not satisfied. Therefore, it was no wonder that Parés (1848/06/11) and Oliveira (1848/14/08) described them as always "distrustful" and "feared." The settlement seems not to have offered any security to either the Indians or to administrators, which was one of the reasons Oliveira proposed the establishment of a pedestrian military guard within the settlement (Oliveira 1851/28/6, 18/05; 1850/01/01). Despite the fact that the provincial government claimed lack of resources for such an enterprise, it was finally provided and the guard corp and their families reached the settlement in 1852 (Oliveira 1852/28/02).⁴³

⁴³ Meliá's (id.: 178) information that the plan to bring Caboclos to the settlement was not executed is inaccurate. The pedestrian military guard was inaugurated in June 13, 1851 (Neves 1851/06/13).

Despite his dislike for them, Parés left important ethnographic data on the Indians. He provided, for instance, the first indications of their population size in 1848: around 30 families, 250 people (1848/06/11). He estimated that counting those who remained in the forests, the entire population might reach from 300 to 400 peoples. Parés was right in his estimate, because in 1851 the settled people summed 430 (Neves 1851/05/07: 1). In that same year they were living in a village between the Turvo and the Guarita rivers (Parés 1851/ 14/01; 1848/06/11), said to be located 25 leagues up north from Cruz Alta and on a high plain, where about 20 shacks were set (Parés 1848 in Pérez 1901: 469).

Parés visited this village in 1848. He was well received and treated as an equal. The Indians referred to him as *Pandara* - probably preacher - and he was fed by the local *Pandara* and the caciques (Parés in Pérez id.: 470). In spite of this kindness, Parés saw the Indians as living in extreme poverty and as "... indifferent and savage, only interested in asking for fabric, shirts, glass beads and foods" (id.: 468-469). To make his point clear, he noted that they were making their living through hunting, fishing and gathering (Parés 1851/14/01: 1).

Oliveira and Parés immediately decided to take some Indians to the Provincial capital. Though this visit would reinforce the Indians' desire for western goods, Oliveira

and Parés expected to impress the governor and get financial support for the settlement. The Indians decision to make the trip was not an easy one. Indeed, only after some initial disputes did two of Fong's sons accompany Parés to Porto Alegre, the Province's capital (Parés 1848 in Pérez 1901: 471-472). Caitó, also known as Joao, offered first to go.⁴⁴ The other son, Wayetó, was encouraged to go by his wife, whom Parés referred to as a powerful woman. As his Jesuit peers had done in the past, Parés soon "took possession" of the Indians. Even before leaving for Porto Alegre, he referred to his companions as "mis bugres" (Parés 1848 id.: 472).

Along the way, Caitó made a great effort both to teach his language to Parés, to learn Portuguese himself, and to read the missionary's writings. According to Parés, when they reached Porto Alegre, they could already understand each other, though "in a language that was neither 'bugre' nor portuguese" (in Pérez 1901: 473). These Indians also talked among themselves: "Are the Portuguese bad? No this is a lie. The Portuguese are good people. The President is very good" (id.). As Parés describes, they were enchanted by the Brazilian way of life. In the provincial capital they planned to build a house, a school (they made requests for books and papers) and a church like the ones that had seen

⁴⁴ According to father Villarrubia (1850 in Pérez 1901: 527), this was Fong's son, who was sent by his father to battle Rosas (see next chapter), the Argentinean caudillo.

(Parés in id.: 474). They even said they would stop cutting their hair in the Kaingang fashion, and would work hard to buy clothes and other things. However, they were not able to accomplish most of these plans.

In the capital they were treated kindly by their hosts, who presented them with complete outfits and even sent clothing to their relatives. In fact, besides the personal gifts given to Caitó and Wayetó and their relatives, the president sent everything that Oliveira had requested "to formalize the Indian settlement" (Parés 1848 in Pérez 1901: 474-475). After the trip Parés stressed his hopes: "I hope that this trip will result in great well-being, as the Indians begin to change their views on the Portuguese, whom they always saw as natural enemies" (id.). However, the actual benefits of this trip would soon revert to local rich non-Indians, who, backed by public authorities, increased their possessions.

Despite this event, when back at his village, Caitó helped father Parés in his attempt to convince the Indians about God's goodness. Soon he asked father Miguel Cabeza to baptize his son, whom he named Bernardo, to honor the missionaries coordinator (Parés 1848 in Pérez 1901: 488). But his and his brother's dreams of incorporating the cultural achievements of the city's inhabitants did not materialize. Parés plan for the mission also foundered; despite having reported to the Province's governor his plan

to build a chapel, houses for the missionaries, and a room to install a school, he was only able to build a stucco shack covered with cane and *girivá* palm (Parés 1848/06/11; Pérez 1901: 896).

Nevertheless, the Guarita Indian settlement was praised by many provincial and missionary authorities, especially compared to that of Nonoai, where many Kaingang were still resisting settlement (Andréa 1849: 9, 12; Bello 1852: 17; Bueno 1850: 29; Parés 1851/01/03; 1849/23/10; Villarrubia 1850/01/06). At the beginning not only the local people and authorities supported the settlement, but the Indians were soon able to produce food and export maté (Andréa id.; Galvao 1847: 13; Oliveira 1850/01/01 and 1848: 01/01). By June of 1849, they had already sold 500 arrobas of maté. However, just two years later, during the winter, Oliveira (1851) found them miserable, "almost nude" and "unable to make maté."

Final Remarks

This was a new step in the ongoing process threatening the Indians lives and the survival of the community. As early as 1851, Jesuits working as instructors and missionaries were criticized by provincial politicians and the elite. As in Guarita, they supported Oliveira's project to organize a pedestrian guard, but the Jesuits were accused of planning the creation of an "independent republic" (Parés

1851 in Pérez 1901: 542).⁴⁵ The Jesuits were soon asked to leave the RGS missions. In the aftermath of the Jesuit departure, Oliveira (1852/28/02) was successful in his struggle to establish a guard in the Guarita settlement. However, he finally surrendered to the pressures of the local elite and to the provincial government policies to unify the Indian settlements at Nonoai.

The Indians were forced to leave the area and to settle in Nonoai, on the southern Serrinha dwelling. This move was suggested as early as in 1848, but the Guarita Indians did not want to live with cacique Condá and his people, with whom they had no confidence, according Parés (1848/06/11). The Province's president affirmed that the Guarita Kaingang agreed to this resettlement on the condition that Oliveira accompany them, which he did in 1854 (Bello 1852: 17; Penteado 1856).⁴⁶ Despite this, the Guarita Kaingang made a stand and returned to their former territories, which they found even more encroached by non-Indians, mostly by "men of resources" and poor Caboclos. The Guarita Kaingang and the RGS Kaingang engaged in major

⁴⁵ As Parés affirms in the same report, an imprisoned woman, who said she had been with the Indians, made the accusation to the Cruz Alta sheriff, which was immediately transmitted to the Province's president.

⁴⁶ Hemming (1987: 455) says that the Guarita Kaingang were resettled in Nonoai in the late 1840s, but has no data to support his claim. The missionary Antonio Penteado (1856/02/02), who worked in Nonoai, affirms that the resettlement was made in 1854.

rivalries (Oliveira 1851/02/ 10), due certainly to the impact of the state intervention. The state, in fact, had contracted the Paraná "civilized" Kaingang to capture the local Kaingang in the woods, whom would then be settled (Moreira Neto 1971: 398; Parés id.).

The impact of the European encounter on the GKA resulted in tight control of frontier expansion by the colonial authorities, widespread dispossession, depopulation, and subordination of the indigenous peoples. Although Europeans did not succeed in exterminating the entire local Indian population, they successfully concentrated the Indian population in settlements coordinated by missionaries and entrepreneurs beginning in the 17th century. Indeed, the role of European and Brazilian newcomers--first Jesuits and later "men of resources"--was crucial to the implementation of the anti-Indian policies of the colonial administration throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, as this chapter has demonstrated. The following chapter will look at the imposition of the Portuguese and Brazilian system of latifundia in the RGS northwest, beginning in the late 19th century, and its impact on the Guarita Indian lands.

Chapter Two

PORTUGUESE AND BRAZILIAN CONSOLIDATION

These Whites tried to destroy our people. We cannot count the ones who died or had to leave. Now that we are poor and miserable, they put an Indian fake house and a statue in the square.¹

Introduction

This chapter looks at the consolidation of the Portuguese and Brazilian presence in the RGS northwest, a process which began in the early 1850s, with the expansion of dependent capitalism, and continued until the late 1930s. The first stage in this process, linked to a transformation in the local political economy, was brought about through the expansion of latifundia, the initiation of imperial colonization projects, and the growth of urbanization. A second stage was linked to demographic changes, and involved the spread of epidemics; new waves of non Portuguese Europeans and their Brazilian descendants; and a process of interethnic union. It is in this twofold context, I suggest, that local Indians were definitively dispossessed.

As Portuguese and Brazilians invaded Guarita Indian lands, they continued to refer to them as "an immense desert" (Neves 1851; Parés 1848 in Perez 1901 497). By the early 1860s, they had appropriated most of the local lands,

¹ The square to which a Kaingang is referring is Miraguaí, in front of the Tenente Portela city hall. The Indian statue was signed by Paulo de Siqueira.

including the plains and the erva-mate woods. This situation worsened from the 1870s until 1890, as the RGS population doubled.² Although state authorities praised the Indians as "natural colonists," who would be cheaper to support than importing European labor (Bueno 1850 in Azevedo 1984: 110), land conflicts increased in the RGS northwest during the mid nineteenth century; by the 1870s and 1880s they were generalized throughout the region.

As latifundia expanded into the RGS northwest, the political and economic power of the local elite, or "men of resources," increased. This process was facilitated by the 1850 Land Law (Lei Nº 601 1850), which ratified all past and future expropriation of Indian and Caboclos land by ranchers and extractors. In addition to land speculation, the local elite engaged in cattle-raising, maté extraction, lumber cutting, and agriculture, exporting to various regions of the country (Linhares 1969; Silveira 1909). Though the most conservative "men of resources" lost power with the proclamation of the republic in 1889, they continued to dominate the local elite (Pesavento 1979: 209).

The imperial colonization projects in the RGS northwest, which began in 1878, were designed to ensure an "organized flow" of labor (Ribeiro 1987: 14). Europeans regarded them as an outlet for their own surplus labor at a

² "Between 1872 and 1890 the gaucha population grew from 446,962 to 897,455 inhabitants" (Kliemann 1986: 34).

time of economic contraction. Brazilians expected they would increase border security and transform "free" lands or *terras devolutas* (Law 601 1850: art. 3, I-IV) into "productive" ones. Later on, pressed by the demands of the poor for land, the state elite proposed establishing colonies for poor nationals as a way to remedy their devastating social and economic conditions. Accordingly, around 1915 the RGS government opened colonies to include poor nationals and Caboclos (Gonçalves 1915).

Colonization was done at the expense of the RGS Indians. Although the state created a bureau to support the local Indians, linked to the state Secretary for Businesses and Public Works, in 1909, two years later its officials started a survey of Indian lands to be set off as reservations, a process that ended in 1943. Despite the huge Indian land loss, the Guarita Reservation was demarcated in 1918 with 23.183 hectares (Gonçalves 1918: 311). Powerlessness rather than collaboration seems to have underlined the Indians response by the time.

Economic and demographic expansion resulted in a process of urbanization, beginning with the growth of Cruz Alta in the mid 19th century. By 1940, the Guarita Reservation was literally surrounded by urban dwellings, in the form of small cities, districts or villages. Some were located within the actual limits of the Indian lands. Due to the growing deprivation of the area's rural population,

resulting from mechanization and export production (Massarollo 1974), non-Indian landless people moved to local cities as well as to other rural areas.

Caboclos and Blacks soon began to settle in the area as seen in the former chapter. Caboclos, fleeing the forced army draft or local revolutions (DTP 1988: 11ff; Oliveira 1851/28/02), were seen by the local elite as useful to repress and "civilize" the Indians. In a new wave Blacks came as highway and railroad construction workers (Brum 1962; Busanello n.d.). Guarani also reached the area as they fled the War against Paraguay or were expelled from land in Paraguay or Argentina.

Caboclos, blacks, and Guarani were joined by a "'disposable mass' of laborers" (Wolf 1983: 380) from all over Europe, at the same time as a series of genocidal actions occurred against the Indians. The result was a dramatic demographic shift.³ Encouraged by an official ideology of "racial democracy" (Freire 1956) and state integrationist policies, a mestizo population expanded

³ The existing demographic information are difficult to follow (see Salzano 1961: 28-31). As mentioned in the former chapter, Parés (1848/06/11) provided first hand data as in 1848 he counted 250 Indians in the settlement, though his estimation for the total was about 300, 400 peoples. For the following year Salzano mentions Camargo (1868) who cites a total of 131 Indians. No information is given if this reduction was produced by diseases or by evasion, but both might have worked. Sources used by Salzano (id.) also indicates a relative growth between 1849-1853; from then to 1860 the local Indian population declined with some fluctuations, though again no evidence is given about real birth or possible migration.

throughout the area, especially among the Guarita Indians (Oliveira 1851 in Azevedo 1984:119).

The consolidation of latifundia, the creation of colonies, and the process of urbanization in the RGS northwest were engendered through violence and illegality, including corruption and abuse by the local elite, illegal land appropriation, forced dispossession and expulsion of poor non-Indian dwellers, and threats and murder of Indians (Costa 1985; Kliemann 1986; Simonian 1981). The Spanish and Brazilian authorities tacitly condoned these actions--refusing to punish the perpetrators and officially sanctioning their land seizures. state reservations ultimately provided no protection against dispossession.

Land Expropriation

The proposal to treat the Indians as the "natural colonists" was not supported by the local elite, who with the 1850 Land Law in effect became the local or state authorities. The provincial vice president alleged in 1852 that "a profusion of Indian settlements not only will increase public expenses, but will perpetuate rivalry among the tribes" (Bello 1852: 17). A few years later, the provincial assembly expressed greater concern about the costs of Indian settlements, and decided to terminate most of them, under a policy known as the "Indian Settlement Unification." Father Branco (1867/08/03) questioned the

decision, saying that he worked as director for five years in the faraway Santa Isabel settlement, without pay, and that the Indians received moth-eaten clothing and inferior tools. In fact, Indian Settlement Unification represented a cover for the state-sanctioned land takeovers; yet it would persist for decades (Gonçalves 1930, 1911).

Dispossession of Indian lands increased in the mid 1850s. The former 'Sete Povos das Missões' Guarani saw the disappearance not only of their land but of their people as well (Neves 1850/28/12, 1849/01/01; Pinto 1848/24/10). Few indeed were able to resist and maintain a sense of community (Venzon in press). Many of the Sao Nicolau Guarani were forced to emigrate to other areas, expelled from their remaining lands by "men of resources" who had invaded their lands during the Farrapos revolutionary period (Pinto 1851/29/12). Their maté woods, for instance, were violently seized by Eleutério Rodrigues Lima (Neves 1850/28/12). The widow of the Guarani Indian Antonio Gonçalves, Gertrudes Gonçalves, similarly lost her two leagues of *sesmarias* in the Giruá district's extreme north, despite her possession of a legal deed (Silveira 1909: 223). These lands had probably been granted by the Sao Borja Portuguese and Brazilian officials to Gonçalves (who had worked as an "Indian hunter," as his nickname *Bugreiro* reveals) years earlier.

When the Guarita Kaingang returned from the Nonoai Indian settlement--to which they had been relocated in 1854--they found their lands again invaded (Penteado 1856). Poor non-Indian Brazilians, mostly landless Caboclos, had moved north into Guarita Kaingang maté woods near the Turvo River, only to be expelled a decade later. Although many of them had managed to obtain tenure rights to their small holdings in these woods (Silveira 1909: 185), the Ministry of Agriculture simply transformed these lands into 'public property' through an edict issued in March 20, 1861 (Abaixo-assinado 1879; Memorial 1876).

One local landowner, together with a local commissary judge, Tibúrcio Alvares de Siqueira Fortes, was said to have spread the word that the 1861 edict had been revoked by the imperial government (Abaixo-assinado 1879). That same individual contracted the German surveyor Maximiliano Beschoren in 1877 to demarcate a land claimed in the same woods. As this was done illegally, the Caboclos tenants appealed to the local and higher authorities, including the Emperor, denouncing "local powerful people" (id.; see also Memorial 1876). Despite their mobilization, at least 200 of them were expelled from their territory, and were forced to move north to Santa Catarina (Soares 1974: 158).

In the late 1870s and early 1880s, local "men of resources" were not only trying to legitimize their possessions within the territories claimed by the Guarita,

but were pressing claims on the Guarita Indian lands as well.⁴ By the end of the "Triple Alliance" war by Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina against Paraguay in 1868, the Emperor promised to demarcate a reservation for the Guarita.⁵ With the end of the war, the Paraguayan Guarani also began to migrate to the area--a process that would continue until contemporary times.⁶ However, the local Kaingang resisted new attempts at resettlement, so the local elite pressured the provincial president to get Indians resettled in Nonoai or Pinheiro Ralo (Serrinha) reservations (Flores 1880 in Laytano 1957 VII; Moreira Neto 1971: 395).

The local elite then went after the Inhacorá Kaingang. The provincial president (Moraes 1874) had ordered the Inhacorá Reservation's *in locus* despite pressures to get them resettled in the Nonoai Indian settlement. However, as Inhacorá Kaingang resisted, local notables Fernando Westphalen, Bento Rolim de Moura, Joao Rodrigues da Fontoura

⁴ By that time M. Beschoren worked extensively in the RGS northern area demarcating lands. Nearby the Guarita Indian lands he demarcated six properties, with a joint total of 30 thousand hectares. The landowners were: Antonio Novaes Coutinho, Manoel Joaquim Borges, Francisco de Carvalho Leite Ferreira, Laurindo Ferreira de Lima, João Antonio da Silva, and Athanagildo Pinto Martins (Beschoren in Rubert 1972: 40).

⁵ Local Kaingang told me that a Guarita Reservation was indeed defined and included the lands between the Turvo, the Uruguay and the Guarita rivers (see Chapter Six).

⁶ As Guarani informants have reported, their relatives left Paraguay, where conditions were very bad, for northeastern Argentina, and from there moved to the Guarita and other Indian settlements in south Brazil (see also Ferradas 1990: 66ff).

and José Rodrigues da Fonseca acted against their lands (Andrade 1879: 73-74).⁷ The Inhacorá settlement's director, Bento Rolim de Moura, even proposed brutality to get them to move (id.: 74).⁸

Although both Guarita and Inhacorá Indians remained in their present-day lands, they were powerless to resist new dispossession. As since 1828 Fong was somehow collaborating with non-Indian invaders, his behavior became a factor throughout these land expropriation processes. In addition, oppressive labor conditions reduced the Indians potential to confront and fight non-Indian Invaders.

Labor Exploitation

Facilitating the ability of the local elite to claim new land was their ability to exploit local labor. Despite the illegal and even brutal land acquisition strategies, they could count on the availability of cheap labor, of diverse origins.⁹ They relied especially on Black slavery, especially in cattle-ranching and for domestic labor. They

⁷ By then Beschoren demarcated 58 rural estates in the Inhacorá Indian lands, between the Inhacorá and the Turvo rivers (in Rupert 1972: 38-40).

⁸ About the same time Castro (in Laytano 1957 VII: 207) estimated the local Indian possessions as being one league of land, though they were using only half of it. A total of 181 Indians were counted, being 86 male and 95 females.

⁹ This process was identified by Wolf (1984: 379-381; see also Bourgois 1989: 216-220) as the "ethnic segmentation" of the labor force.

also exploited Kaingang and Caboclos labor, primarily in maté and timber extraction, subsistence agriculture, and road construction.

The local elite not only exhausted the local labor force, but was brutal. A criminal suit against Luiz Antonio dos Santos, a Cruz Alta rancher, in the 1870s gives a clear but painful sense of the brutalities imposed upon the local slaves (Figueiredo 1877 in Zarth 1988: 200-202). Dos Santos was indicted for slave mistreatment, including the death of two slaves. He was accused of imposing excessive punishment on Maria, an under-age female who later died, and of starving the juvenile Francisco to death. The public prosecutor affirmed that the ranchers "treat cruelly" all their slaves.

The Indians were soon forced to sell their labor or join the armies of local insurgents for free. Available information for the Sao Nicolau Indian settlement affirms that the Indians were forced to join the Farrapos Revolution in 1835, by the two belligerent parties (Pinto 1852/29/12). The Indians from São Nicolau were left in extreme poverty and after the revolution the state did not support them, leaving them to provide for themselves (Neves 1849/23/06; Pinto 1848/24/10). Indians were also pressed into work as soldiers, in quarries, in cart transportation, and in meat processing (*charqueadas*) (Neves 1849/01/01; Pinto 1850/21/08). Ave-Lallement (1980: 168), who visited the Sao

Nicolau Indians in 1858, was unable to apprehend this devastating process and described them as "retarded" people.

Guarita and Inhacorá Indians were also recruited as soldiers by the Imperial army, a role which provided the basis for their own later land claims. Following the Imperial "Indian Settlement Instructions," in 1851 Lt. Col. Oliveira (1851/01/10) took to Cruz Alta forty two Guarita Kaingang, all "young and strong,"¹⁰ who were expected to battle the Argentinean caudillo named Rosas.¹¹ The Guarita Kaingang also participated in the War against Paraguay, recounted by them as glorious, a role which became the basis of their descendants' land claims (see Chapter Six). Fong, then settled in Inhacorá, sent his first-born Feliciano as a commander to the battle camp (Oliveira 1974: 31).¹² The Borboleta and the Serra Grande Indians also participated in this war and in the Federalist Revolution in 1893 (Franco 1975: 66-67; Venzon in print).¹³

¹⁰ These Indian soldiers were under the orders of both Caitó and Lt. Col. Joao Batista de Oliveira Mello, a Cruz Alta "man of resources" (id.).

¹¹ Oliveira expressed the hope that the experience would serve their adjustment to civilization (id.).

¹² Fong was even prized for his loyalty to the Imperial troops, and awarded the rank of major by the National Guard (id.). For other aspects of his life see also Becker 1975: 125-126, Beschoren 1989: 62ff; Fischer 1959, Konkó 1930: 36ff, Oliveira 174: 31-32, Parés 1848 in Pérez 1901: 470-471; and Silveira 1909: 222.

¹³ The Borboleta Indians were under the command of the Lt. Col. Antonio José de Mello Bravo (Venzon id.).

In Guarita, too, the Indians were put to work in fields, in maté extraction, and on road construction. This was considered a way for them to both provide their own subsistence and "to advance into civilization" (Andréa 1849:9; Oliveira 1848/01/01; Parés 1848 in Pérez 1901: 486). Evidence suggests that the "men of resources" were even harsher in their exploitation of the Guarita Kaingang than the Jesuits had been of the Guarani (Saint-Hilaire 1823: 69). In 1848 Parés refers to the Guarita Kaingang working for maté extractors; they were preferred as workers due to their "ability" to climb trees (in Pérez 1901: 486). This seems to have been a general practice, as the missionary warned about its possible abuse due to the Indians' "simplicity" (id.: 487). Some years later father Lemos (1872 in Soares 1974: 113) found the Inhacorá Kaingang working as enslaved persons in the Inhacorá maté woods.

The Guarita Indian settlement authorities, including the director Oliveira, used and or approved the use of free Indian labor. This was the case defined by Parés as *ajutório*, or help, as the Indians worked in the road openings (Parés 1851; Oliveira 1852/28/02). To what extent Oliveira might have used free Indian labor in his maté enterprise is unknown, but that he did is not improbable.¹⁴ From the 1880s until the 1930s, local and Inhacorá Indian

¹⁴ Parés (1849 in Pérez 1901: 496) mentions his engagement in the maté exploitation process.

labor was exploited in both maté and timber extraction (Castro 1887 in Laytano 1954 VII: 206-207). Local Indians have said that many from Guarita were recruited to cut trees and transport them to the Uruguay river for the Platino market. Informants also told me that their elders used to work for the local maté mills, where they were barely fed at the end of the last century. Those Indians were also engaged as explorers' assistants, helping Lt. Col. Campos' expedition in 1860 (Brandao 1860 in Veit 1990: 3).

The local elite also employed poor non-Indian labor. In 1860 Cruz Alta officials accused Paraguayans extracting maté in the Brazilian Missees of paying too much money for the hired workers, who would stay in the woods almost without working (Campos 1860 in Zart 1988: 69). These workers were also recruited to build and maintain roads (Brandao 1882: 21; Gonçalves 1918: 309; Oliveira 1852/28/02).

Although Caboclos wasted their blood in 19th and 20th century revolutions, none were rewarded with support of their own claims by the local elite. According to Caboclo testimonies, they were forced to join the revolutionaries everywhere: against the 1922 Prestes column, in the 1923 war which spread through RGS, and in the 1932 Sao Paulo Constitution revolution (Almeida n.d.:1-7; Macaulay 1974: 33ff). Despite this, even the few lands granted to them were by the end mostly dispossessed.

Production and Market Constraints

Throughout the 19th century, cattle-raising and maté production was essential to the power of the local elite. Both industries were dependent on external markets, either Sao Paulo, where processed meat (*charque*), leather, and mules were sold to be shipped to the mining and sugar plantations, or Platino, which supplied Buenos Aires and surrounding areas.

In the late 1840s and 1850s the Cruz Alta City Council and the provincial government responded to the demands of the elite for roads and market access. The establishment of Indian settlements was viewed as a strategy both to keep the Indians far away and to train them for "systematic work," and simultaneously to ease the spread of non-Indian rural and urban settlements. Silveira (1909: 222) affirmed that the roads in the RGS northwest originated in the old maté paths, opened in the time of the Jesuit missions. In 1850 the provincial president suggested opening a river route to link the central lands with Entre Rios, Misiones and Paraguay (Bueno 1850: 12).

First a dirt road was planned to shorten the Cruz Alta access to the Uruguay and Plata river basins, especially for the maté trade. According to the provincial president Bueno (*id.*), this would cross "the Ijuí woods" It followed the existing Conceiçao trail, which was opened probably in 1848 (Brum 1990: 15, 18). The Indians had simultaneously

opened a trail to link their Pari maté woods to the Uruguay River,¹⁵ where they were selling their products by 1850, as noted above (Oliveira 1850/01/01). A few years later, herds of cattle were driven out of the region through the road opened by Indians and Caboclos under Oliveira's (1855/04/07) order.¹⁶ This road linked the Palmeira das Missoes and the Nonoai plains, and allowed the herds to cross the Uruguay River's Goio-en passage to get to the north. By the 1890s the Guarita Indian lands were cut by dirt roads (PTG 1924), which actually served non-Indian interests.

The Regionalization of Politics

During the process of consolidating their holdings in the RGS northwest, the local elite claimed the right to establish a separate province, arguing that the area was misrepresented in RGS politics. In 1858 Antonio Gomes Pinheiro Machado led a movement to restore the former "Eastern Missions" Province (Silveira 1909: 360), which would encompass the RGS northern area plus the western part of the current Paraná and Santa Catarina states in the

¹⁵ Kenkó (1930: 53) mentions the involvement of Campo Novo settlers (Joao Vicente de Souza and José Antônio da Cruz), but in the opening of a road linking Campo Novo and Guarita by 1845. Though Campo Novo settlers did not open the Pari trail, they were reported as working on it in 1859 (Soares 1974: 155). A year later Alferes Brandão and his military men were working in the same path (Brandão 1860 in Veit 1991: 135).

¹⁶ Parés planned this road (1849 in Pérez 1901: 497-498). It was built in 1853 and improved in 1855 (Oliveira 1855/13/06).

north. The movement was interrupted in part due to the government decision to colonize the area, though the participation of Brazil in the war against Paraguay in 1865 might have been a factor. Then in 1883 the local media proposed a reestablishment of the province under the name "High Uruguay," encompassing only the RGS northern area. The idea was finally forgotten (Silveira id.), due to the increasing participation of the local elite in imperial politics and the construction of railroads that tied the province more closely to the capital and to São Paulo (id.: 361-362).¹⁷

Colonization in the RGS Northwest

Though provincial and local politicians had proposed colonization in the northwest area in about 1860, military and civil colonies began to be a reality only in 1879.¹⁸ The military post was meant for defense purposes, and the civil authority was supposed to increase the area's population and to develop agriculture and crafts. The plan was especially designed for woodlands, once part of the GKa territory or possessions, which the state regarded as "free" --*devolutas*--lands. As the colonization projects grew, they

¹⁷ This railroad would connect the area with Porto Alegre, the Province's capital, and with Sao Paulo.

¹⁸ As Veit (1990: 3) explains based on the 1860 Alferes Brandao report, these were planned through the Cruz Alta imperial army, established in 1860. The actual expedition was coordinated by Lt. Col. José Maria Pereira Campos.

began to divide the local elite.

Colonization began with the 1879 creation of the Alto Uruguay military colony.¹⁹ Located between the Turvo and the Caa-iari rivers, on the east bank of the Uruguay river (Silva 1879: 22; Veit 1990: 5), the colony was designed to protect the southern border, settle the area, and serve as a detention area for both dangerous criminals and disobedient soldiers (Brandao 1882: 21; Segat 1981: 63). This project was imposed at the expense of the Guarita Kaingang as some mentioned to me, especially those from villages on the Turvo River, who seasonally occupied the area.

In 1882 the Alta Uruguay military colony was inhabited by 486 people, 112 more than reported in the December 1880 census, and 41 pupils (30 males and 11 females) were attending the local school (Brandao 1882: 21). Even the military men were involved in the construction - houses, roads - and in land plot demarcation; though agriculture was not yet successful, tiles of very good quality were being produced (id.). However, the colony soon faced difficulties, mostly for lack of public investment, and would end up as a setting for a poor and "marginal" population (Veit id.: 18). The national guardsmen who were stationed there in September of 1882 were dispensed with but the men were offered the possibility of engaging in cultivation as *colonos*, or tenant

¹⁹ It was created by the Imperial Decree 7.221, of March 15, 1879 (Silva 1879: 22).

farmers (Vasconcellos 1882: 14).

Civil colonies, also known as "new colonies," developed in the 1890s (Roche 1959).²⁰ By that time the RGS northwest Indians were almost totally divested of their possessions. This was true for the Guarita, who had lost their former reservation lands, as well as those from Campina village, who numbered 159 (86 male and 73 female) (Castro 1887 in Laytano 1954 VII: 207).²¹ These Indians were forced to move north to the Pari area, a former fishing and gathering camp site. The Estiva village Indians, numbering 126 (55 male and 71 female) by the mid 1880s, controlled only about half a league of land (Castro id.: 206).²²

The new colonies were initiated primarily by the RGS government, although later on they were also organized by private enterprises. All were based on small properties or family farms, and designed to receive only non Portuguese European immigrants. By then these were considered better workers, especially compared to poor Nationals and Caboclos

²⁰ An earlier experience was attempted in this western part of the RGS, but in the Jesuit mission's former area (F. Pinheiro 1824 in Porto 1954 I: 535). German immigrants were taken to the Sao Joao das Missoes (id.). According to Zarth (1988: 19), it failed due to isolation from the farming market.

²¹ This Kaingang village, according to Castro (id.: 207), was built by the Kaingang Captain Serafim José Antonio, known as Colum by his people.

²² This village was reported by Castro (ibid.: 206) to have been settled by people who had been discontent with the Inhacorá cacique Fong.

(Couto 1890 in Lazzarotto 1976: 128). Caboclos found themselves subject to the same derogatory rhetoric used against the Indians; along with the Polish immigrants, who came later, they were viewed as heirs to Indian laziness, violence, and lack of ambition (Brandao 1882:32; Fischer 1967).

The first of these new colonies, established in 1890, was Ijuí, located on the southwestern part of the RGS northwest woods. Numerous nationals, Caboclos, and some non Portuguese European immigrants were already dwelling in this area (Lazzarotto 1991, 1977, 1976). Linhares (1969) argues that nationals and Caboclos had been in the area since the 1820s, though archival documents indicate 1840 as the date of the Brazilian occupation (CTCI 1900b). In any event, the poor newcomers were soon expropriated. Besides, as H. Paz told me, poor Nationals and and or Caboclos were recruited to work in the Ijuí colony, for both the administration and the non Portuguese European immigrants, but "worked for food and hearts of palm only."

European immigrants began to arrive in 1883. Some Italians and Alsatians settled around 1887, buying small properties in the Passo do Ajuricaba²³ and the *Picada da Conceição* (Lazzarotto 1991: 10-11, 1977: 15; Brum 1990: 20-22). Germans, Italians, Austrians, Latvians, Russians,

²³ The lands in these area were first bought by immigrants in 1883 and 1885, but only settled in 1877 (Da Ros in Lazzarotto 1991: 10).

Swedes, Poles, French, Belgians, US citizens, Syrians, Spaniards, Argentineans, Uruguayans, Brazilians, many of them Caboclos, made up the colony in the beginning (Cuber [1898] 1975; Roche 1959; Silveira 1909: 364). By the late 1800s, especially Germans began to expropriate the Serra Grande Indians (Venzon in press).

The many ethnic groups led to conflicts, and Poles especially were subject to discrimination (CTCI 1900a; Cuber id.). As soon as they settled in Ijuí, their immigration was called "improper" and "unproductive" (Lazzarotto 1977: fns. 18 and 19). The fact that many of them were artisans, and so not used to agriculture, was not taken into account (Lazzarotto 1991: 9).²⁴ Many left their plots, while others were sent back to Rio de Janeiro (id.; Kliemann 1986: 100-103). Even so, a special colony was organized primarily for Poles in the Guarani das Missees, from which the Guarani Indians were expelled (Gonçalves 1924: 506).

Colonization for Poor Nationals

By this time the situation of poor Brazilians and Caboclos was very bad. Local authorities not only viewed them as vagabonds, requiring special legislation, but devised a policy forcing them to live and work in separate penitentiaries or civil colonies (Couto 1890 in Lazzarotto

²⁴ Agriculture was meant to be the main orientation of the nineteenth century Brazilian immigration policy

1976: 128). While they were allowed to receive plots in the colonies planned for the non Portuguese European immigrants, they had to require permission from the same hostile authorities. Informants stated that brutality was part of daily life for Caboclos, as they moved constantly from one boss to another, when they were not simply dismissed and thrown on the road. Descriptions of them as "wandering" were common (Massarollo 1977: 25).

In 1910 the federal government created SPILTN--"Indian Protection Service and Settlement for National Workers," designed for poor nationals and Caboclos (Gonçalves 1915; Lima 1987b: 154-167; Simonian 1981). RGS officials again found Indian land "surpluses," which were distributed to those non-Indian folk. Even so, local *coronéis*--political bosses--apparently dominated the process of land distribution. As Almeida (n.d.: 9) describes the situation in Miraguaí, Capt. Ferraz of Irapuá not only was abusive but "distributed land and gave permission to sell possession rights"

The first colonies included Santa Rosa (in 1915), Guarita, and Santo Augusto (Gonçalves 1918: 308-310). Three years after its creation, Santa Rosa, which wiped out the local Guarani settlements (Gonçalves 1926: 442), had 5,900 inhabitants, 5,000 of which were poor Nationals and and or Caboclos (Federação 1918 in Segat id.: 56). With the creation of the Guarita colony, the local Indians not only

lost more land, they also lost access to important natural resources, especially wild vegetables, roots, fruits, honey, and so on. Indians had had many villages on the Turvo east banks, and one in Redenção, the current Redentora, whose lands were entirely expropriated. As colonization expanded into the Inhacorá area, the local Kaingang lost about 8,000 hectares of land (Simonian 1979).

Poor nationals and Caboclos in turn were powerless to resist new pressures. The colonies were soon flooded by new waves of non Portuguese European immigrants or their local descendants, especially after 1930. Many had lived in--or even been born in--the so-called old colonies (in the Taquari and Antas River valleys), which by then were already over crowded (Almeida n.d.; DTP 1988: 12; Roche 1959). Soon the area was saturated.

These were also difficult times for local Indians. The RGS was then ruled by the Riograndense Republican Party (PRR), which was pursuing a somewhat autonomous policy with regard to Indian land claims (Love 1971; Simonian 1981: 81). Indians in both Guarita and Inhacorá suffered a devastating epidemic in 1910 (Abbot id.: 18-19).²⁵ Current Kaingang have stated that their elders were told that they had too much land for their small population, which in 1910 was

²⁵ In Guarita 28 Indian deaths were reported (id.: 18). In Inhacorá the deaths were many, but the Indian did not count the total. As Abbot further describes, the Inhacorá Indians then said that they did not count because if they would have done more would die (id.: 19).

reportedly only 200 (Gonçalves 1910: 155), and that non-Indian squatters also needed to be settled.²⁶ This total is suspect, however, because in 1919 the same author listed a population of 560 (Gonçalves 1919: 436) and of 578 in 1922 (Gonçalves 1923-1922), despite the losses to "Spanish flu" in 1919-20.²⁷ The population could not double in a decade, even allowing for eventually resettled Inhacorá Kaingang or Guarani Mbyá and Nhandéva Indians.²⁸ However, officials manipulated the alleged small size of the local Indian population when defining small reservations.

Some areas were therefore reserved for Indians (Gonçalves 1910), though they were all small.²⁹ The Guarita Reservation was demarcated in 1918 (Gonçalves 1918: 311). Though title was issued by the Palmeiras das Missões Land

²⁶ These were mainly Caboclos, most of whom reached the area fleeing the Federalist Revolution of 1894 (DTP 1988).

²⁷ Officials and the local elite certainly did not have any major interest in showing accurate totals. The lower the population, the less interest the authorities would have in reserving lands to the Indians or in guaranteeing other rights (Oliveira 1972: 72-73).

²⁸ Numerous times non-Indians invaders and province and state authorities attempted to transfer the Inhacorá Kaingang to the Guarita Reservation, but faced their resistance (Simonian in print).

²⁹ Though Abbot (1911: 18) mentions that the Guarita demarcation was not done in 1910-1911 due to the Land Commission's lack of resources and personnel, these motives might have worked in the Inhacorá too (Simonian in press; 1979). In Guarita, Col. Pompeu Rodrigues and his people dominated the Gramado area, near Miraguá. The other local Kaingang were lead by Col. Geraldino Mineiro, who dominated the Mato Queimado sector.

Commission in 1921, and dated and sealed by local officials, it was not signed by state officials, who maintained that titles were not necessary.³⁰ By the end of this process many Indians left the land, while others wandered from place to place, and some simply refused to move.

The Inhacorá Reservation was done in 1921 (Simonian 1979). The following year, 1922, two Indians, including their cacique, Tibúrcio Fong, were ambushed and murdered in the Ramada site while returning from Porto Alegre, where they had gone to request inclusion of lands that had not been included in the demarcated area.³¹ Getúlio Dorneles Vargas, a future Brazilian president, and Soriano Serra were accused but never brought to trial (Gonçalves 1923-1922: 583; Kliemann 1986: 135).

The Development of the "Urban Circle"

Central to the consolidation of the Brazilian presence in the RGS northwest were local urban centers. These became a place not only for the articulation of local elite power but also where the area's conflicts were played out. It was through their city councils that regional development policies were raised, including those regarding the Indians.

³⁰ The local Kaingang referred to me about this title, which was even mentioned in a recent FUNAI report (FUNAI 13 DR 1985: 5).

³¹ See my forthcoming work on Inhacorá: "Os Kaingang de Inhacorá - Uma Experiência de Opressão, Lutas e Desencantos."

It was there that the powerless went to make their own claims, and eventually to compromise. In the course of a century, these urban centers entirely encircled the Guarita Reservation.

Urbanization in the RGS northwest was slow but steady. Diverse waves of people encroached upon the area, first from the south through Cruz Alta, and later on from the east through Passo Fundo. They included ranchers and farmers, peasants, extractors, landless people, and all sorts of entrepreneurs. The "urban circle" started last century with Santo Angelo, Cruz Alta and Villinha da Palmeira. During the 1940s it gradually surrounded the Guarita Indians' land. Lately the process also contributed to Indian dispossession, mainly through arrangements made by city dwellers to lease land belonging to the Indians.

Cruz Alta city historically dominated the local urban scene: RGS "men of resources" operated from that city for most of the nineteenth century, and the first decades of the twentieth, when they enforced the politics known as coronelismo, or "bossism." Most of them also sat on the city council, which supported most of the brutalities against the local powerless, including the Indians. By the 1870s Cruz Alta began to decline, primarily due to the growth of Villinha da Palmeira after the exploitation of the Campo

Novo' plains and the local maté woods,³² and the emergece of colonization centers.

In the late 1800s, violence was part of daily life in these urban centers. In Campo Novo, as Beschoren (1989: 59) stated, conflict was settled through street sword struggles. Rural Caboclos and the Indians went there to shop, to lay legal claims, or to pick up government supplies. The non-Indian poor tenants of the maté woods, for instance, were mentioned as traveling to Villinha da Palmeira in the 1870s, to claim their land rights (Memorial 1876).

Indians also increasingly went to the cities--notably Kaingang men as well as the Guarani newcomers.³³ Caitó and Wayetó visited Passo Fundo, Rio Pardo em Porto Alegre, as early as in 1848, as mentioned in chapter one (Parés 1848 in Pérez 1901: 471ff). In 1850, three of "the most influential" Guarita Indians took their maté to the Itaqui market, at the Uruguay river (Oliveira 1850/01/01). Caitó and 40 Indian soldiers traveled beyond Cruz Alta in 1851, when they were recruited by the imperial army (DGI 1851/04/02; Pinto 1851/29/12); in the same year he and another Indian companion traveled to the capital, expecting "to kiss His Majesty, the Emperor's hands," which they did (Neves

³² Campo Novo became a an independent district in 1890 (FEE 1981).

³³ No woman was recalled as travelling on any of the documented trips.

1851/05/07).³⁴ Caitó and other Indians traveled across the RGS northwest assisting explorers (Brandao 1860 in Veit id.). Cacique Fong was a constant guest, especially in the Vilinha da Palmeira and in the Alto Uruguay military colony, and as Silveira recounts he went once to Porto Alegre on foot (Oliveira 1974: 31; Silveira id.: 222). As mentioned above, in these visits he may have compromised Indian interests, as he did in 1828. Veit (1991: 136) also mentions a 1906 Guarita Indians' protest against the municipal authorities of Palmeira.

It was in the local cities that the Indians probably became addicted to alcohol. They were introduced to this habit in Passo Fundo, where people used to advise the Indians "on the utility of this vice" (Parés 1848/06/11). Social disturbances were the immediate outcome, but the eradication of the Indians was the invaders' main goal. As a Kaingang recounts, their ancestors were used to alcohol from "cattle-ranchers and Jesuit times." They probably acquired liquor first in Cruz Alta and Vilinha da Palmeira, and later in Campo Novo, Alto Uruguay, Redençao, Pari, and so on. Generations of Indian land deprivation was facilitated by

³⁴ Pinto (1851/29/12) does not refer specifically to the Rio de Janeiro city, but when writing to the Empire Ministry, he mentions that the two Guarita Kaingang went "... to this Court ...," which had its headquarters there.

liquor addiction.³⁵

RGS northwest cities grew with the area's business expansion, which included commerce and industrialization. In the early 19th century Cruz Alta must have benefited from maté extraction near Ijuí (Conceição maté woods) and in the Botucaraí, where the mills were probably located. Despite the early devastation, maté was by about the late 1850s the province's third source of commerce, most of it produced in the northwest and sent to the Plata market (Miranda 1859 in Soares 1974: 87). Even the Guarita Indians participated in this process, selling maté at the Itaqui harbor, as soon they were settled (Oliveira 1850/01/01).³⁶ There is evidence that in 1857-1858 alone, RGS Province exported 3,560,000 kg of maté, about four times that of Paraguay, through the port of Itaqui (Dictionnaire Universel 1860 in Linhares 1969: 105). In the following year the Inhacorá, Corá, Guarita, and Pari maté woods, all located in the province's northwest, produced a total of 176 arrobas (Miranda id.: 87-88).

Cities grew too with local rum, sugar, and lumber production (Massarollo 1976: 72). The Ijuí Hickembick and Silva families maintain that their lumber industries

³⁵ Those from Inhacorá have even said that in the early 1960s state authorities got their 'cacique' drunk, the only way they could get his consent for Bresolin's proposal to reduce their reservation (Simonian 1979).

³⁶ Though Oliveira does not indicate the amount in arrobas or kilograms, he further reports a total of five loaded ox-carts.

(sawmill and cart work) were installed in the area by 1888 and 1898 respectively (Weber 1987: 16-17). Brazilian rum (*cachaça*) and wine production began in Ijuí soon after its creation (id.: 38). As Weber notes, the local industry diversified and began a process of consolidation.³⁷

Small businesses also thrived in Pari--present-day Tenente Portela--in the north of the province, where *cachaça* became the main commercial product. Though the population of Miraguaí was still small in 1935, seven Brazilian rum mills were working. One year later, Pedro Borges dos Santos opened a store in Irapuá, where his major business was selling Brazilian rum to Indians (Almeida n.d.: 12). Ever since, non-Indian merchants have benefited from this commerce, pouring the liquor primarily into Indian and Caboclo mouths. This process contributed to the ongoing violence among Indian and Cabocla communities, as Almeida (id.: 9, 11) recalls.

The accumulated merchant capital was used to expand industry in the RGS northwest, and helped to break the "men of resources" hegemonic power. In the Guarita Reservation, for instance, the lumber industry was exporting to Argentina in the 1940s. According to Indian and non-Indian informants,

³⁷ Weber (id.: 168, 179) questions the assumption that local industrial production was linked to the rural areas, but she overlooks the fact that it could not be sustained solely on raw materials from outside. Existing capital, skills and market possibilities would not be sufficient for its development.

the untreated logs were transported to the Uruguay river, and sent downstream to Sao Borja harbor. Lumber mills flourished in and around the Guarita and Inhacorá Indian reservations by the early 1950s. As dependent development increased during the 1950s and 60s, mostly through the mechanization of agriculture, poor non-Indian people were expelled from their rural possessions and and or jobs (Massarollo 1976: 83). A "belt of misery" simultaneously surrounded the areas' urban centers. As Fischer (1967: 7) prejudicedly states, during World War II Ijuí suffered "a true invasion of Caboclos," who he describes as a sort of "waste people," as "they did not give any contribution to the city," but rather "constituted a true burden."

This growing poor population began to intensify pressure on Indian demarcated lands, pushing them to the breaking point. Those who did not leave (Bresolin 1961 in Correio Serrano 1961/07/10), drank. Despair was so widespread in the Inhacorá Reservation that it was identified as the "Drunk's Village" (Correio do Povo 1953). In Guarita a SPI official defined alcoholism as the flagelo (scourge) of the Indians (SPI-7ª IR 1947).

Around the 1950s, the Guarita Reservation was entirely encircled by towns, including Palmeira da Misseees (84,896 inhabitants), Três Passos (111,808), Redentora (18,308), Tenente Portela (16,839) Miraguaí, and Santo Augusto

(6,712), and later, Palmitinho and Bela Vista.³⁸ They became centers of commerce and education as well as locations for widespread abuse of Indians. Miraguaí, Irapuá, Tronqueiras, Gamelinhas, Barra do Guarita, Sao Joao ultimately spread into reservation lands. Since then, these urban centers have sent hundreds of people daily to work in reservation lands.

Demographic and Social Transformation

As diverse waves of Brazilian and other European invaders displaced the Indians in the RGS northwest, they impacted not only the local Indian communities but also their own traditions. Changes in kin and social organization transformed the demographics of the area, in part due to genocidal brutality against the Indians. Inter-marriage affected both Indians and non-Indians, producing a local Mestizo population, though non Portuguese European immigrants first tended to resist.

A more intrusive process began in 1851, when Caboclos were brought from Sao Paulo to live in the Guarita Indian settlement and work in the local security force, but also to marry and have children (Oliveira 1852/28/02; 1851/05/01). Missionaries supported Oliveira's plan to bring Caboclos and "civilized" Indians to live with Guarita Indians, where

³⁸ These population information were published in FEE 1981. The Miraguaí population was surely included in the Tenente Portela and Redentora ones. Moreover those numbers certainly included both the rural and the urban population.

inter-marriage and and or breeding were encouraged (Parés 1851 in Pérez 1901: 542; Parés 1851/14/02). Mestizos from Guarapuava and Palmas were already living in the settlement (Parés 1851/14/02: 4).³⁹ Their 1854 forced resettlement at Serrinha strengthened and simultaneously changed their kin ties, as well as their broad social relationships, despite the shortness of their stay. The Serrinha Indian population simultaneously intermarried with both local Blacks and Caboclos, as well as Indians from the Borboleta settlement, most of whom were already mestizos.⁴⁰ As far as it is known, the Guarita Indians maintained close contact with their relatives in Serrinha, whom they visited or received as guests, at least until the 1940s.

About the early 1880s a number of mestizos were said to be active among the Guarita Indians. Castro (1887 in Laytano 1954 VII: 206) mentions the presence of a "mestizo Indian," *Alferes Joao Batista*, known by his people as *Enxongre*, who was working for the Estiva village "prosperity and advancement." Non-Indian men continued to come to the Guarita Indian lands and marry the Kaingang women. The

³⁹ Unfortunately, Parés did not specify the year of these mestizos arrival and settlement among the Guarita Kaingang.

⁴⁰ Niré (1989), for instance, recounts that his great-grandmother was a Black ex-slave, who was made captive and adopted by the local Kaingang, and ended marrying one local Indian, with whom she bore a family. Many of the Borboleta Indians have said that they were descendants of Lt. Col. Bravo and the Indian Conceição Campos Novos whom he captured when almost a child, and of his son Alexandre Mello and his Indian wife Maria José Veloso de Linhares (Venzon in print).

Manoel Ribeiro case has become famous in the reservation, which he entered in 1894.⁴¹ They bore many children, who in the second third generations began to distance themselves from the "traditional" local Kaingang way of life, especially through marrying out.⁴² Despite possible conflicts, the mestizos were accepted by the Kaingang community, as their children carried Kaingang identity (Wiesemann 1964; see next chapter) and at least the older generations were named accordingly.

Except for the Caboclos brought to the Guarita Reservation in 1852, whom Lt. Col. Oliveira described as a people of high morale (1851/18/05), most of the newcomers have been defined as "fierce" peoples:

Adventurers, hunters, uninherited peoples from the semi-feudal latifundia, plunderers, thieves, reminiscent of political revolutions, most of whom are mestizos and Caboclos ... who start to camp in the forests' clearings, to construct rude huts, which would be eventually abandoned due to their semi nomad way of life or to the confrontation with the local Indians ... (DTP 1988: 11).

Thereafter, banditry was mentioned as widespread around the

⁴¹ Sometimes he was described by local Kaingang both as a Paraguayan, Castilian, and as a mestizo with Guarani ancestors. This latter identification was surely possible but also a way of acknowledging some Indian origin. In addition, his grandson Ramão told me that he spoke Guarani and that M. Ribeiro fled the Federalist Revolution atrocities practiced against the Borboleta Indians. He entered the Guarita Reservation with his wife Maria Leopoldina Padilha, also known as Maria Dias.

⁴² By 1989-1990, R. P. Ribeiro was the oldest living grandchild of Manoel Ribeiro, said to be around one hundred years old. Despite having married a "pure" Kaingang - Maria Salles - he struggled with the reservation's directors for consent for his children's marriage to non-Indians.

Guarita Reservation (Almeida n.d.: 1-9), affecting poor and rich alike. The Irapuá Capt. Ferraz, for instance, once used the "Negro" Júlio as his hands to lash the Cabocla Mendica sons, as he hired them but were considered lazy (Almeida id.: 8).⁴³ Guarita Indians might have hidden some of the poor "bandits" and even married or mated with them. Their Inhacorá kin did this in the 1920s, when they sheltered Artur Arao, avenger of his family's dispossession by "men of resources" (Meneghello 1979).

As non Portuguese Europeans and and or their descendants reached the RGS northwest, they were confident that they were "superior." Consequently, they tended to segregate, resisting involvement with both the former non-Indian dwellers and the local Indians, who, however, were hired as labor (Massarollo 1977: 25). Later on, those non Portuguese immigrants and and or their descendants became the "new bandits" of the area. In addition, non-Indian males might have maintained sexual relationships and produced mixed descendants with both Caboclas and Indian females, but only eventually they marry them. In fact, only later on did they begin to change their attitude toward interethnic marriage, but primarily toward other non-Indians.

Though Guarani Mbyá and Nhandéva had by then been living in the Guarita Reservation for decades, they resisted

⁴³ The suffering of the victims must have been endless. Capt. Ferraz not only ordered "Negro" Júlio to slash them 40 times, but the latter did not know how to count, and started over each time he lost count (Almeida id.: 8).

integration both with local people and in relation to the broad society. Informants recalled that it was easier to keep separate, since the area had enough wild woods and food; when they needed some cash they crafted sieves or other basketry for the local market. Many regarded the local *teko'á* (village) as a temporary home, as they were trying to reach Brazil's southeast. However, by the 1950s, as some established themselves in the area, they entered the local labor market, then booming due to demand for wheat and soybeans.

The RGS northwest Indians faced a new genocidal threat, probably initiated by the local "men of resources" by early 1883. An epidemic was then decimating the Guarita people (Castro 1887 in Laytano 1957 VII: 206). One Kaingang, Ramão P. Ribeiro, did not witness the disaster, but he heard the horror stories from his mother, who did live through it. "She herself used to say that the epidemic was a job of the invaders, to rip them entirely from the lands," he said. This seemed to have been a very localized epidemic, as Castro (*id.*) does not refer to its spreading among the local non-Indian population. It might have been the result of deliberate exposure to the virus, a practice previously imposed upon the *cacique* Doble people, who were infected through the "donation" of infected clothes (F.W. 1913 in Becker 1976: 306). Both Guarita and Inhacorá Indians would experience this again in 1910 and in the early 1940s (Abbot 1911; Almeida 1941a: 12; Kliemann 1986: 135).

Depopulation through epidemic certainly increased the mating-out strategy. When Salzano (1961: 51) investigated Kaingang genetic composition and demographics in the 1950s, he found that among 187 marriages, 26,23 percent were interethnic. This percentage grew with the acceleration of changes in the area's population and economics. By about 1950 the Guarani began to share in this process; one Guarani man married a local Kaingang woman, for the first time since they arrived at the Guarita Kaingang lands. A decade later, interethnic marriages and children increased, especially with the Caboclos who were living inside the reservation. In addition, many Indians simultaneously left the reservation and settled in surrounding communities, where some married non-Indians and had children, with whom they later returned to the reservation.

The process of demographic and cultural change has accelerated in recent years, as the following chapter describes. It is this twofold process of dispossession--losing not only their lands but their very identity--that provides the context necessary to understand the resulting despair among the local Indian communities. Some individuals, powerless in the face of the formidable power of the new colonizers, collaborated with anti Indian interests in this dispossession, as will be discussed in what follows.

Chapter Three

THE CURRENT GUARITA RESERVATION: The Area and the Indians

This land is now garbage. Look at the soil; at Estiva only weeds grow. Moreover, everybody became corrupt, unreliable.

We are living here but we do not have any peace of spirit. Poverty and abuses are everywhere. We are actually afraid of all this violence.

Introduction

This third chapter discusses the contemporary ecological setting and social organization of the Guarita Reservation. I also describe the early 1960s while pointing out as well as the continuing problems faced by Guarita. Most recent accounts focus on the economic disorganization and depressed state of the majority of the area's residents. As Guimarães (1982), Meliá (1984), Simonian (1980) and field suggest, these problems are exacerbated by the widespread economic, political and ethnic tensions, brutality, and violence intertwine in this reservation and its surrounding areas. The incessant struggle to maintain the *status quo* has, in general, resulted in both the reproduction and intensification of inequalities and violence rather than in their decline. In this chapter I also explore how this domination and repression becomes part of every aspect of the peoples' everyday life private and public lives (Foucault 1981; Sider n.d.: 1). Space for joy and hope have constantly been restricted within the reservation.

The spacial organization of this reservation has constantly changed over the last three decades. In the early 1990s the Guarita Reservation was divided into two Indian posts--the Guarita and the Sao Joao--which resulted of the early 1980s Indian struggles to control the local resources (Meliá id.; Simonian 1980; Zero Hora January 28, 1983: centr. pgs.). The despair of ecological and peoples' conditions and images may be witnessed directly, or by learning, for example, of the lethal effects of the farming chemicals put on the lands. However, it is not only toxic pollution spreading over the land, air and water that affects the local Indian reservation lands and population.

Recent accounts about this reservation indicate a powerless and disrupted social and political organization (Guimaraes 1982; Meliá 1984b; Simonian id.), which surely reflects their immersion on a broad non-Indian social and historical context. Such a depressing context has constituted the basis for an ethnic diversification, mainly among the local Kaingang. Violence has repeatedly erupted throughout the past decade and up to the present within and outside the Guarita Reservation, both on the public and private spheres (Simonian 1991b). In addition, as no effective action has been taken to stop non-Indian illegal over-exploitation of Indian lands, nor to transform the local Indian brutal leadership, a process of class formation is in its way.

The following sections describe the ecological, social, economic and political conditions of the Guarita Reservation. Local ecological conditions will be described both in terms of ongoing disintegrating processes and contemporary power struggles. The socio-economic and political processes will be demonstrated through a discussion of the enduring structures of domination in the region. In both cases, the realities of reservation life will be explored in relation to the connections with the surrounding area and with non-Indians, many of whom have even lived in the Indian lands. Broader connections need to be established as well since the local Indian lands have been exploited in a way that serves wider interests of capital production and concentration and which maintains an unjust and especially anti-Indian social system.

The Local Setting and the Environment Degradation

The GKa lands were originally covered by sub-tropical and tropical forests and plains, in the highlands. The area and the lands demarcated for the Guarita Indians in 1917, however, have undergone major changes in the last three decades. The environment has deteriorated drastically as a result of extractive activities such as cattle ranching, timber exploitation and agricultural production (Moreno et al. 1961). As pointed in the introduction, the Kaingang, the Guarani Mbyá and Nhandéva some landless non-Indians are

currently living in the Guarita Reservation.

The highlands of the Guarita Reservation is part of the western buttresses of the *Serra Geral*--the General Mountain--which is also known locally as the *Serra do Alto Uruguai*--the High Uruguay Mountain. These are rolling hills which slope toward the river valleys. The hills in the Tronqueiras section which slope towards the Irapuá stream as well as those in the northeast of the reservation which border the Guarita River were, until the late 1960s, covered with "abundant woods" (Pivetta and Pires 1969: 6). Today these hills are bald and increasingly eroded.¹ This development was not an isolated case, as the RGS area was almost entirely cleared. Although in mid-19 century 41 percent of the state area was covered by original forests (Roche 1959:55), in the early 1990s it held only about three percent (SAERS 1992).

In lower elevations, "impenetrable" (Parés 1848 in Pérez 1901: 468) sub-tropical and tropical forests covered much of the area. The forests contained an abundance of both lumber and wild fruit trees, medical herbs and bushes, and

¹ A specific study about this process is under preparation. In fact, within and around the Guarita Reservation, little forest remains. The major stands of forest are to be found in the Turvo Forest Park (it was created by the federal government in 1947, with an area of 17,637,5 hectares [DTP 1988: 38]), located at the east bank of the Uruguay River and in the northwest of the reservation. Even within the park, wildlife is threatened by illegal hunting and the state's unwillingness to indict and punish the abusers.

by other foodstuff, and various reeds, grasses and vines. *Araucaria augustifolia* and *Ilex paraguayensis* trees used to dominate a significant part of the reservation lands as well as 'canelas,' 'grapia,' 'angico,' cedar. However, natural plains covered much of the southern part of the Guarita Reservation. Like other plains in the region, they were largely made up of grasses, especially *Paspalum notatum* and *Aristida pallens*, but with occasional bushes of 'timbó' or *Ateleia glazioviana* (DPP 1973: 75).

The west bank of the Guarita River forms the northeastern boundary of the Guarita Reservation while the Irapuá stream, a tributary of the Guarita River, runs across the entire area from south to north (FUNAI 1981). West from the Irapuá, its tributaries--the Miraguaí, the Batista, the Guajuvira, the Quina and the Moquém streamlets--are located within the reservation. East from the Irapuá, the Anta, the Mariano and the Limeira streamlet are also located within the reservation (id.). Despite the intermittency of the Guarita River's tributaries, the area traditionally had sufficient water (FUNAI 1981). Today, much of this riverain system is polluted and unusable.

The original richness of the local natural resources was discussed in Chapter One. As early as the mid-1800s, for instance, hunting, fruits and honey were mentioned as the basis for the local Indians' subsistence (Parés 1851; 1851/14/01: 1). Even the eldest Guarita Indians alive today

could testify to the area's abundance and diversity just few decades ago. They remember hunting and collecting wild pigs, 'pacas', deer, huge 'dourados' and 'traíras', pine nuts, all kinds of wild berries, and honey. While the Indians and their ancestors used to rely totally or partially on the natural resources of the reservation for their subsistence, these resources had already began to become scarce by the turn of the century.

Reports on the local soil present diverse and even contradictory conclusions. Some studies described the lands as "magnificent for agriculture" and "rich" for diverse crops (Pivetta and Pires 1969: 7; SPI 1945-1950 in Laytano 1957 VIII: 100). Others, who have tried to use the land, have noted the dryness of the soil, the excess of stones and gravel, and the tendency toward erosion. According to a report prepared by the DPP (Departamento de Pesquisas Pedológicas) (1973: 74), the soils in the region were primarily "dystrophic purple latosol," with a basaltic substratum, and very vulnerable. In the words of a Kaingang, his own lands were composed of

1. 'Guaçuzal' land, of a medium quality.
2. Red land but with palm forest; too weak for agriculture.
3. Bush land, of a second category.
4. Black gravel land, good for everything, especially for beans.
5. 'Araucária' pine woods land; arid.
6. Grown bush land, good for everything; first quality, but still to be used (in Pivetta and Pires id.).

The local weather is tropical and humid and with eventual dry seasons. In general, "the annual average

temperature is 19 5° Celsius and an average of 1,850 mm of rains falls annually" (DPP 1973: 75). Occasionally, it may be very cold, windy and rainy in the winter and very hot throughout the summer. Local valleys have been covered either by dense fog or by frosts during the winter and dry seasons have come more frequent. In the past, the harshest droughts usually happened every three years, during the summer. As Indians told me, the overall climate changes have been speeding up year after year, probably in connection with the current world warming conditions due to ozone effect. The eldest Indians stated that they could not predict the climate conditions according to their traditional knowledge anymore, as they did in the past.

The most extensive changes have occurred in relation to the natural environment. The traditional flora and fauna have basically disappeared, since capitalist development intensified in the region in the 1940s. The high commercial value of pine stimulated the forest industry (Correio Serrano July 16, 1952; Moreno et al. 1961). The fact that pine tree was a nutritional source for the local Indians was not taken into account when policy makers, non-Indians farmers, timber extractors and merchants decided to exploit it. Further deforestation occurred as a result of agricultural expansion.

Continuing exploitation has made it difficult to estimate the current extension of the Guarita Reservation

forests. In 1968, forests still covered 72,83 sq. km. (Pivetta and Pires 1969: 7). The 1970s, however, saw farming for export expand in the area in general and particularly in the Três Soita, Gamelinhas, ABC and Lagoa Bonita sections. In the same decade the IECLB missao cleared a substantial area for a new mission site, the Missao Nova or the Guarita Indian post. In addition, the local remaining forest continued to be illegally exploited on almost a daily basis. Lately, Indians have collaborated with the local and regional lumber industry in harvesting the remaining forests (Justiça Federal 1989; 1989-1988). Hundreds of cubic meters of timber, fence sticks and firewood leave the reservation monthly. Saw motors whizz incessantly, despite the illegality of the activity. In 1990-1989 the exploitation of the reservation woods had spread to the backs of the Pau Escrito, the Guajuvira, and the Barra do Guarita. By 1990, approximately 5,000 hectares were estimated at risk of imminent destruction.

This environmental destruction has had a lasting negative impact on indigenous peoples and their culture. As most wild land and riverain animals became extinct, the Indians have little use for the botanical and zoological knowledge of their ancestors. The younger generations rely less on the traditions and knowledge of their elders. If contemporary children know anything about wild threatening animals, it is through storytelling. When they have

undertaken hunting and fishing, it has only been for wild guinea pig and 'lambaris.' Some, especially those living near the forests (including most of the Guarani), may occasionally get monkeys for pets or food. The young might know pine nuts but they are primarily known because relatives buy them in the local markets during the winter.

The extinction or near extinction of numerous animal and botanical species, and the scarcity of clean and fresh water, of fire woods, of fallow and fertile lands, of building timbers, and of honey, an important item in the Kaingang and Guarani diet, have been lamented in the main by Indian elders. Indian elders (and some members of the younger generations) had increasingly become concerned with the destruction of their environment. For example, they spoke of the problems in the Estiva section. This land in this section was, in fact, so exhausted that commercial farmers refused to lease it. Others were talked about the need for large amounts of capital investment just to recover and keep them afloat. Few individuals felt that there was any possibility of obtaining capital investment in the near future. Capital was also be needed to adequately exploit newly opened fields and to control air and water pollution.²

² In contrast, non-Indian tenants were unlikely to think of investing in fields or stopping the use of toxic chemicals.

The Spatial Organization of the Guarita Reservation

Located within the boundaries of the Guarita Reservation are two towns, ten sections, two Indian posts, as well as numerous places considered special or sacred by the Indians. The two towns, the São João do Irapuá and the Guarita Indian post, are located in the reservation's western half and peopled primarily by Kaingang. These towns are also considered Indian posts since it is here that FUNAI headquarters and facilities are located. Seven Kaingang sections and three Guarani villages are found in the central and northern area of the reservation and under the administration of the Guarita Indian post, which in itself forms a town. Around 1,800 Kaingang lived in this broad area, where I did my research.³ The Kaingang seven sections are Pau Escrito, Gamelão, Três Soitas, ABC, Pedra Lisa, Aéroclube and Lagoa Bonita. The remaining forest of the reservation was also in the Guarita Indian post area. The Estiva, the Missao Velha and the Gramado sections were under the administration of the Sao Joao do Irapuá Indian post, which was located in the southern area of the reservation.

³ I began a census in 1989 but was unable to finish it especially due to Assembly of God faithful people's pressures. My estimation is based on what I could accomplish until the census interruption and refers to the Kaingang living inside the reservation. Despite the interruption I was able to finish the work in some villages, especially among the Guarani whose total population was then of 160 individuals.

Many Kaingang still live in scattered sites on the borders of the sections.

The Kaingang also recognize special or sacred sites, which they visit or fear. These sites are often very old. Some of these sites were identified as *cabidel* sites or places where the Jesuits were supposed to have buried their wealth.⁴ Most of these sites are located in caves and are considered to be enchanted. The Indians say that only individuals chosen by "spirit beings" can find the sites. Although people might see a sign, such as "a vision of a woman dressed in white," the vision disappears [and the site remains unfound] if the individual is not a chosen person. Many *cabidéis* are reported to exist in the reservation, nearby Miraguaí. For many Indians, the hope of finding a site promises freedom from deprivation.⁵

Guarani villages or *teko'á* (locally known as *toldos*), were traditionally quite isolated and widely spaced from each other and from the Kaingang. The 1989 local population was of 160 individuals. Today they have been encroached upon. The Gamelinha *toldo*, located in the western part of

⁴ Teschauer (1929: 437ff) suggests that the origins of these beliefs go back to the 17th century and they extend throughout the southern cone of South America.

⁵ As they disclosed this hope, they simultaneously recounted the story of a fellow "who found a great amount of gold in the area," which he took to the headquarters of the government in Rio de Janeiro. (In recognition of his honesty this Kaingang was given a share of the gold and invited to remain in Rio de Janeiro.)

the reservation and inhabited by 37 peoples, is totally surrounded by the fields of non-Indian leasers and by the the town of the Guarita Indian post. Guajuvira toldo, with a population of 48 individuals in that same year, on Guajuvira stream, is situated in the center of the reservation nearby the current limits of the forest. Toldo Velho was located in the mid-west of the reservation. Toldo Velho is expanding in the direction of the former d'Amaro toldo, which remained for quite a while totally unpopulated. Together these areas were peopled by 75 individuals.

Many landless non-Indians also inhabited the Guarita Reservation. Some of them have been there since the 1940s and 1950s, when the SPI officials opened the reservation to outsiders. In 1990, 15 non-Indian families lived in the Gamelao section while seven families lived in the Toldo Velho section.⁶ Another ten non-Indian families were living within the Guarita Indian post lands as Kaingang's hired workers, sharecroppers or tenant dwellers or as Indian in-laws. A few non-Indian individuals were also living within the reservation, where they helped the Indians. Many non-Indians who lived off the reservation entered the area daily or on early Mondays and then stayed for the week as tenant farmers, sharecroppers, or loggers. Their comings and goings--by truck, tractors, oxcarts or foot--resembled an

⁶ An individual from one of these families had recently become engaged to a Guarani woman, with whom he had a child.

"ant trail." Much of the economic activity by non-Indians within the reservation limits is illegal and, therefore, constitutes trespassing. This has led to occasional confrontations among Indians and non-Indians.

The cities of Miraguai and Tenente Portela and the villages of Irapuá, Missões, Tronqueiras and Gamelinhas have by various means, increased their use of the Guarita Reservation lands. Population growth, public interest, or Indian "duty," are given justifications by non-Indians for their claims to Indian lands.⁷ For years, the Indians have had to deal with intrusions onto their lands. These intrusios have been a source of tension, between Indians and non-Indians as well as a source of ecological and moral damage to their community. In addition to these settlements, the Indians also had to cope with a variety of other intrusive elements serving non-Indian interests, such as an airstrip, waste disposal sites, and a web of roads.⁸

The Internalization of External Repression

The Kaingang and Guarani have been deeply affected by oppressive public policies and actions imposed on them and on their resources during the last fifty years. As discussed

⁷ For more details on these municipalities' public authorities and non-Indian population claims on local Indians lands, see the next three chapters.

⁸ For the specific claims and intrusions see Chapter Four and Five.

in the next chapter, they had a "developmentalist," an "integrationist" (Davis 1977) and an oppressive character. In the Guarita case, the exploitation of the local forest and the use of land for commercial farming were the main proposals (Vasconcelos 1942). The end result of these policies and actions has been the exhaustion of the Indian's resources and labor force (see Chapter Four).

A state policy that Indians had repeatedly identified as oppressive, the *cativeiro* or the *panelao* system. This system consisted of a repressive use of the Indians' labor force and resources, as strategies to produce resources for an Indian fund which benefited but non-Indian interests, as it is discussed in Chapter Four. This policy was in place in Guarita and in southern Brazil from the 1940s to the 1960s, but it also reached some other areas. The policies and actions that the *cativeiro* system encompassed were sponsored and put into practice by diverse levels of public authorities, national institutions and by non-Indian individuals. International interests participated in their formulation and support as well, especially in their support for "green revolution" practices which emphasized grain production throughout the world's dependent areas.

Although the *cativeiro* system was formally abandoned in the late 1960s, the practice of imposing externally generated policies and activities on Indian peoples has continued. Many of FUNAI policies and strategies have been

repressive and contrary to Indian interests. The control on any possibility of Indian mobilization to demand their rights and the implementation of plantations and the exploitation of the forest for cash are some examples. More demanding perhaps has been the internalization of some of these repressive practices by the Indians themselves. Increasing violence among the Kaingang is fundamentally a response to structural inequities and repressive policies and practices but it is reproduced within as well. Kaingang leaders, with the encouragement and example of external interests have played a part in the implementation of political and economic structures which are so repressive that they ultimately resemble the *cativeiro* of earlier years. This process has contributed to a renewal of both "traditions" (Reynolds 1987) and "cycles of violence" (Wolf 1987), but especially of violence on an everyday basis.

Instead of leading to self-determination the emerging Indian political organization relied on oppressive practices against their kin. The Kaingang leaders supported the continuation of an Indian police corp⁹ modelled on non-

⁹ This process certainly has its roots in a remote past. Parés notes in 1848 that the Indians addressed some of their leaders as *capitan*, captain in Spanish (in Pérez 1901: 527). They probably adopted this custom by the Jesuits or in the Fondengue's times. Later, during the Brazilian Empire, they were also influenced by alien practices; for instance, Fong and his close aids were awarded with military honors and commissions (Oliveira 1974: 31). This process was reinforced by the SPI policies, as officials relied on it to keep the Indians fulfilling the *cativeiro* system's impositions. In the early 1960s the SPI issued instructions

Indian police and military institutions and an Indian council whose members' number has varied (Machado id.).¹⁰ The main purpose of this police corp was to enforce general leadership policies and decisions and in particular, those relating to land distribution and the leasing and sharecropping systems. In the field, however, I saw the wounds of police brutality on Indian bodies, the imprisonment of people without trial and I was told about the expropriation of Indian resources, including land. Due to systematic brutalities, some even refer to the recent conditions on the reservation as constituting "concentration camps" (Zero Hora September 02, 1988: 31). Despite changes in membership, the *cacicado*--chiefdomship--in Guarita has persisted with its anti-Indian policies and actions.

After being in power since 1965, S. Alfaiate was overthrown in 1982. Although he first cooperated with the SPI authorities and was even hired as a SPI official, later

(whose numbers were 29, 30 and 31) which required the organization of an Indian police corp, whose members should be appointed by the local administration (Machado 1961b: 3). The one then organized in the Guarita Reservation was formed by Sebastiao Jacinto (Colonel), Valencio Sales (Lieut.Cel.), Acelino Bento, Apolinario Crespo (Captains), Gumercindo Ribeiro (Tenant), Antoninho Rosa (Sergeant), and Joao Batista (Yard Corporal) (id.).

¹⁰ This was an elders' council, which before the SPI presence in the area, used to choose the cacique. After the SPI takeover in early 1940s, however, the caciques were identified as colonel, the commander of the Indian police. After the FUNAI took power over the reservation, officials began to use the cacique title again, for the Indian leadership maximum status.

in the mid-1970s he chose to lead Kaingang struggles against the *cativeiro* system and the land leasing system. Nevertheless, charges of corruption and misuse of control led to Alfaiate's overthrow in 1982. The new cacique, Ivo S. Ribeiro was no better. He began redistributing land to his followers, and his general policies regarding the expenditure of lease contract fees were hardly pro-Indian. In practice, he reinforced the leasing and sharecropping system, allowed non-Indians to become tenants on Guarita Reservation lands, and turned a blind eye to the misuse of communal resources.

It was Ribeiro's mandate that the leased area of the Indian lands practically doubled and the destruction of the remaining forests increased. Cacique Ivo Ribeiro also engaged in corruption and illegally sold Indian timber and appropriated Indian land (Justiça Federal 1989-1988; Zero Hora December 13, 1987: D5). His anti-Indian actions reached such a point that just six months after taking power, many Indians began to publically criticize his practices. Late in 1982, Ribeiro dismantled the Indian council and imprisoned some community members.¹¹ Feeling terrorized and yet hoping for an immediate and peaceful solution, some Indians called on FUNAI officials and RGS military brigade for a solution

¹¹ The ex-cacique S. Alfaiate was among the imprisoned people. Together with some Kaingang teachers he was accused of conspiring. Alfaiate and his family were forcibly moved to RGS Nonoai Reservation.

to the crisis. In the aftermath of these events the Kaingang Eloir Jacinto attempted to oust Ivo Ribeiro. As the plot was unsuccessful he was harshly repressed (Meliá 1984b: 237-238).¹²

FUNAI and RGS officials then called Ribeiro and the Guarita Indian post FUNAI chief to a meeting at the FUNAI headquarters in Porto Alegre, the state capital. Because the Kaingang cacique feared a coup in his absence, he brought with him some of his opponents, including a potential Guarita leader named Domingos Ribeiro. This tactic did not, however, prevent Domingos' allies from attacking the Irapuá Indian post, beating up Ivo Ribeiro's police and destroying the prison. The reformed Indian Council relieved Ivo Ribeiro of his position of cacique and declared Domingos Ribeiro his successor. In face of these events, Ivo Ribeiro returned to the reservation and armed his followers to resist the council decision, although his opponents had already returned to their sections up north. The followers of Domingos urged Ivo Ribeiro to resign. Ivo refused and threatened further land expropriations. Fearing revenge, around 350 Kaingang sought refuge in the RCA Church parish of Miraguaí. Ivo's proposal to hold an election in which he

¹² Jacinto was exiled for a time with his family to the RGS Ligeiro Reservation. He lost his cultivated land and other belongings which were not restored to him on his return.

would compete with his opponent was turned down because most of the Indians feared fraud.

Domingos then initiated a struggle to divide the reservation, a strategy widely supported by his allies. This proposal was being discussed and considered when in 1981 the FUNAI administration created and imposed a second Indian post on the reservation lands. Although this did not bring an end to the tension and conflicts FUNAI accepted and ratified the division of the area in two. This division left the Indians with even less power as non-Indian interests were favored (Meliá 1984b: 236-237). The Kaingang of the reservation created a new *cacicado* under the leadership of Domingos Ribeiro who became the Guarita Indian post cacique.¹³

The tensions among the two caciques continued, most of which emerged in the context of land-leasing and

¹³ These struggles revealed deep cultural and historical internal tensions. Kenkó (1930: 46, 50ff), for example, reported major tensions among the Indians in the 1830s when many did not accept the Fondengue proposal to negotiate with non-Indian settlers and decided to fight them to the last warrior. Although Parés (1848) does not mention specific internal conflicts, he notes that the Guarita Kaingang feared other Indians. Around the 1880s, two *cacicados* were already established in Guarita: Nihi or Cândido Melo who was ruling at Campina and Fifu or Manoel Francisco, ruling in the Estiva settlement (Castro 1887 in Laytano 1957 VIII: 206-207). Early in this century Col. Pompeu Rodrigues from Gramado, and Kenkó, also known as Geraldino Mineiro, from Mato Queimado, led local politics through systematic struggles for power, which Almeida (n.d.: 9) defined as a "personalized policy." From further accounts it seems that G. Mineiro imposed himself as the sole Indian colonel (Pivetta and Pires 1969: 19).

sharecropping systems within the reservation. The same Kaingang caciques and their police force contributed, at least partially, to the 1983 reservation division and together with their non-Indian allies prompted a 1983 Kaingang "fratricide war," which ended with numerous Indian casualties and wounded (Polícia Civil 1983; see section below). In the aftermath of this bloody war, the caciques agreed with the land lease-sharecropping termination and accepted 1984 as a final deadline. As this agreement was not respected by the Guarita caciques, the other Indian caciques in the state reacted (Rosa et al. 1984). They proposed reversing the Guarita Indians' oppressive and deprived conditions of life (id.). However, they lacked the means to enforce it. Both the ANAI-RS (1983) and Meliá (1984b) singled out FUNAI neglect of the Guarita Reservation, although they failed to relate this to enduring anti-Indian policies and strategies. It was not neglect per se which brought the Guarita Reservation to its present state, but FUNAI and Federal Police actions which favored non-Indians and the *status quo*.

At the beginning of his mandate, Domingos Ribeiro had searched for support to expand and develop agriculture, but as he was not successful, the existing lease and sharecrop systems were maintained and again reinforced. He counted on the local FUNAI officials and on the RCA Church and IECLB's nominal support, but he was soon accused by his followers of

being too weak to perform his duties. People noted that he was commanded by his wife, *Wãn-féi*--Joana Salles Ribeiro-- who has been usually described not as the power behind the throne, but as the actual *cacica*. It has also been argued that cacique D. Ribeiro facilitated the continuation of corruption and bribery, particularly in relation to the misuse of forest resources. He was also accused of maintaining too close an association with the Miraguai political right wing. Others accused him of turning a blind eye to the violence against and among Indians.

Domingos Ribeiro's fall from power in 1988 was hastened when community members turned against his wife. Joana S. Ribeiro's reportedly observed burying items in the Tronqueiras' Indian cemetery and was accused of practicing sorcery. Police from the Guarita Indian post arrested her and made her unearth and surrender the "proof" of her "crimes" and "sins." This material was then exhibited at the Guarita Indian post headquarters.¹⁴ Domingos, in turn, was informed by the other Indian authorities that he could no longer continue as cacique. Although Domingos did not resist this demotion, he was forced to negotiate with the new leadership to ensure that he could keep "his" 300 hectares of land.

¹⁴ Joana died unexpectedly several months later. Her illness and death were viewed by many in the community as evidence of her guilt, punishment by God or self-remorse.

Many individuals, however, disputed the changes against Joana and suggested a possible plot against Domingos. Cristina Viggiano, acting president of the ANAI-RS, publicly warned of the possibility of a major conflict due to Domingos' ouster (Diário do Sul June 14, 1988: 43). She also reported that "the new cacique [Samuel R. Claudino] had leased huge areas of Indian land to non-Indians and had the support of Chiquinho, an Indian who is a violent ex-soldier of RGS Military Brigade" (id.). Others argued that the accusations against Joana were initiated by both Ivo Ribeiro and members of the Assembly of God church of which both Ivo and Domingos' successor were members. A former vicar of the Miraguaí RCA Church, however, told me that he did not believe what was said about Joana at all, as he knew her as "a faithful and fervent" parishioner.

The Guarita Indian post's new cacique, Samuel Rezo Claudino, continued various practices which were detrimental to the Indian population and expended his ties with non-Indians. He supported further clearing of the reservation forests for agricultural fields. These lands were immediately leased or sharecropped to non-Indians. Indian prisoners were reportedly subject to torture. In 1988, Samuel Claudino and his Indian police force attacked the Kaingang of ABC and Três Soita, who accused him of abuse of power and called for his overthrow. That was only a new

brutal step in the ongoing repression (Zero Hora August 30, 1988: 44).

Most of those Claudino's opponents exiled in the FUNAI headquarters in Passo Fundo after that attack.¹⁵ When they returned to the reservation after three months, an election was held to choose a new cacique. Though the community were leesy of carrying out the election in an atmosphere of terror, fear, and threats, the election was held as planned. Cacique Claudino won the election. Some community members condemned the election and its anti-democratic nature. Many complained that they could hardly find a honest candidate among themselves. The only ones who had anything to celebrate were the leaders of the Guarita Indian post and local farmers.¹⁶

In the last few years, morale among the Indians seems to have reached a new low. Both cacique Claudino and cacique Ivo were and their supporters are rumored to be heavily involved in alcohol abuse, gambling, and prostitution within and outside the reservation. Local Indians report that the land-leasing fees, the exploitation of forest resources and

¹⁵ Though cacique Claudino (1988) signed a document stating he would respect his opponents rights, ANAI-RS associates say that he was in fact trying to expel 25 Kaingang opponents families.

¹⁶ Despite Claudino's victory, his opponents were partially successful in their challenge to his control. He then returned the formerly expropriated lands to two leaders of the opposition, and began to pay a share of the lease contracts fees to a third one who became his main advisor.

bribery sustain these vices. Some accuse non-Indian leaseholders of encouraging such activities to further their own interests. Most Kaingang consider these activities immoral, even as they join in them. Others criticize the performance of their leaders as setting a bad example for their youth.

As the local situation deteriorated and violence increased, some even advocated federal intervention. FUNAI-RS officials and ANAI-RS associates began to call for an enforced solution to the problem (Correio do Povo 1988: 12; Zero Hora September 02, 1988: 50). Proposals were made for the national army to occupy the area to ensure the expulsion of non-Indian leasers, return the land tenure to the local Indians, and fair elections. Though intervention was possible according to law (Lei 6.001 1973: 20th article), this plan of action was not pursued. Rather FUNAI administrators in Brasília decided to send a research team to study new plans for the area.¹⁷ However, FUNAI officials argued that they were essentially powerless to confront the ongoing conflicts. They complained of having to judge the interests of the Indian community, regional politicians, and non-Indians who supported the leases" (Zero Hora *ibid.*).

¹⁷ This frustrated many Indians who state that they are tired of researchers making inquiries to support projects that should, but never, deal with their needs and interests.

Municipal Elections and the Indians

Detructive political factionalism intensified during the municipal elections in 1988. Several Kaingang entered the race.¹⁸ Antonio Salles, a candidate for the PFL, the Liberal Front Party, in Miraguaí, who, incidentally, was supported by Ivo Ribeiro was the only Kaingang elected to office.¹⁹ As the Indians could at least elect three city council men, the lack of success by Kaingang candidates might seem surprising. However, in the light of pervasive electoral fraud and bribery, their losses are not unexpected. Moreover, violence or the threat of violence was also used to control Indian votes. In Miraguaí, incidents of violence formed the basis for a legal challenge to invalidate the municipal elections (PMDB-PDT 1988).

Charges of vote buying were widespread. In Miraguaí, individuals of a variety of political affiliations accused the former mayor, Jorge Porolnick dos Santos, of corrupting

¹⁸ In Tenente Portela Carlos Ribeiro was candidate for the PT. In the municipality of Miraguaí, Domingos Ribeiro ran for the PDS, Francisco Ribeiro for the PDT, and Antonio Salles, the only one elected, for the PFL. Cacique Claudino attempted to run for city council but his candidacy was rejected by the RGS Judicial Electoral Tribunal since he was indicted by the Federal Justice for illegal use of forest resources (MPF 1988). The same happened to Joao Batista Claudino, the Tenente Portela Indian captain, when he tried to run as a PDT councilman.

¹⁹ Mr. Salles tenure on the Miraguaí City Council will require a separate study, especially due to widespread prejudices against him, but also due to his volatile behavior as a politician. His peers eventually supported some of his proposals as the meeting minutes reveal (CMV 1989-1988), but he was also grossly attacked by them.

the Miraguaí politics." Santos was accused of buying the votes of Indians and non-Indians with money, commodities or promises.²⁰ Ivo Ribeiro was accused in a judicial process of receiving an automobile from the local leadership of the PFL (Justiça Eleitoral 1989: 36). Samuel Claudino was reported to have also received an automobile which was later taken back by the local non-Indian donors. Indian leaders in the area were accused of being " ... bought through beer rounds, barbecues, prostitutes, automobiles, and political candidacies for the municipal city councils."

As these strategies persisted and and Antonio Salles tenure became a failure concerning Indian interests, the Guarita Indians were totally manipulated by non-Indian politicians in the municipal elections last year. As a result they were not able to elect their own representatives.²¹ City councilman M. Morecelli, from Miraguaí, reaffirmed anti-Indian prejudices as he told me that to local politics " ... it was better that the Indians were not elected." He then argued that the experience with

²⁰ In 1990, when Santos was beginning to prepare for the 1992 municipal elections, one of his supporters predicted Santos' election as mayor of Miraguaí. The distribution of *galinhada*, chicken rice, in parties, and Santos' own accordion show would make the required votes, the supporter added. As he indeed used these tactics, they became a strong factor on his 1992 victory.

²¹ A Kaingang and then a candidate told me that the Indian's chances to be elected are from now on almost inexistent. In spite of this, in the elections of 1992 Guarita Indians had enough votes to elect at least four municipal representatives.

Antonio Salles had been a "disaster," as this Indian city councilman "sided with whom paid better."

Recent Resistance to Land Leasing Termination

The Guarita Kaingang leaders from both the Irapuá and the Guarita Indian posts, also resisted open debate on the land lease system. They did, however, participated in the constitutional talks organized by FUNAI-RS. Nevertheless, when the new Constitution (1988) prohibited the lease of Indian lands, local leaders pressured community members to renew existing leases for three or five years. They to generate further income before possible federal intervention and termination of the leasing and sharecropping and of the forest-use arrangements. Their actions, they argued, were justified by constitutional provisions for native self-determination.

Judicial pressures on Ivo Ribeiro were, however, overwhelming in the following year. Because of the many criminal suits filed against him in the Federal courts the Irapuá Indian post cacique was prohibited by a federal judge from leaving the area. Samuel Claudino allied himself with the Miraguaí Kaingang city councilman Antonio Salles to overthrow Ivo Ribeiro.²² Claudino and Salles also counted on

²² People recalled that during the 1989 September events, Ivo Ribeiro attempted to resist and a "minimum" of violence was used. Injured, Ivo was placed under guard in the hospital but escaped. However, he was soon recaptured and brought to the reservation, where he was settled in the

support of non-Indian politicians, rich farmers and entrepreneurs.²³ These leaders enforced the unification of the reservation and terminated the cacicado of the São João do Irapuá Indian post. In practice, however, their policies were still detrimental to the Indians. By 1990, Antonio Salles, who had supported those policies for more than a decade, called for a new direction and an end to the "bloodshed." He also noted that Samuel Claudino, the cacique, " ... is paranoid about an imminent coup and sees foes in anyone."

With the Attorney General of the Republic was not fulfilling its constitutional duty to protect the Indian and interests, especially those of the powerless, the leasing contracts were renewed in 1989-1990. More of the forest had been cleared and new fields were being planted. Many Indians supported the deforestation, as offering "the unique opportunity to make a living." A growing number of Indians, however, also pointed to their losses. They noted, in particular, the reduction in soil qualities as a result of agricultural practices and deforestation.

Guarita Indian post area. The cacique Claudino's father, his own Lt. Cel. José Claudino, was assigned to care for the area of the São João do Irapuá Indian post.

²³ With the 1988 Constitution promulgation, which at least on the level of principle is very advanced regarding Indian rights, these local politicians, rich farmers and entrepreneurs began to feel uncomfortable with what were identified as the "excesses" of the cacique Ivo Ribeiro.

Exploitation of Labor

As far as the social relations of production are concerned, the bulk of the income received by the Kaingang comes from the leasing of land to non-Indians. Although a few individuals control large tracts of communal land, the majority of these leased plots are fairly small. A substantial portion of the Kaingang have little or no income, relying instead on small patches of land for minimal subsistence. Crafts are still produced but on a very small scale and of poor quality. Accusations of idleness by non-Indians have been constant through recent years, especially towards the youth, most of whom were recently described as not knowing "how to catch a hoe's handle," but also against the Indians who lease all their lands and do not work.

Illegal activities are also increasingly a problem on the reservation. Gambling and prostitution have increased. Both Indians and non-Indians have accused Indians of harvesting or destroying fields which do not belong to them. Stealing crops, burning houses, and committing armed robbery were also recent practices, most of which have been done against non-Indians and well-to-do Kaingang. Some individuals maintain that these activities are justified since the resources belong to the Indians as a group and should be equally shared rather than concentrated in the hands of individuals. These activities are obviously to some extent related to class relations or labor exploitation on

the reservation. Similar to Hobsbawm's (1959) "social bandits" or Scott's (1986) "every-day forms of resistance," the increase in crime relates to increasing inequalities and deprivation. Other illegal activities provide powerful Indian leaders with fairly substantial incomes. As discussed above, these leaders are enriched by bribes and lease contract fees. They and a few others have also received monies from non-Indians in exchange for contracts to harvest the forests or have felt free themselves for the sale of fence posts.

Some Indians have found legal employment in wage labor both on and off the reservation. Some find work as field hands on Indian and non-Indian lands. Others have been employed as housekeepers, maid or nannies both inside and outside their lands, including in the local urban centers. A few have worked as employees for FUNAI and local city governments as officials, teachers or nursing aids. Within the reservation a few individuals have become shopkeepers or vendors. As municipal garbage dumps expanded onto the reservation lands, some Kaingang turned to engage in garbage-picking as source of income. At harvest time, old women might be allowed onto non-Indian fields inside the reservation to pick soybeans left laying on the ground.²⁴

²⁴ This is obviously a shameful activity for these women as they walk the fields with their heads bowed, avoiding the eyes of others.

Until recently, the Guarani were primarily farmers and artisans. They could also count on game, fish, wild fruits and honey. Today these resources are still collected but on a much smaller scale. Their fields were usually small and they lacked storage facilities. They grew grains and legumes, mostly for their own subsistence and their harvests hardly lasted until the next crop. In the early 1990s, only two families farmed more than two hectares of land to farm, while most families farmed just one-half a hectare of land. Their crafts have long been appreciated in the area for their beauty and perfection, and were more valued in the local market than those of the Kaingang, though both were equally underpaid.

Since the early 1980s, the Guarani, like the Kaingang, have also become dependent on selling their labor to their non-Indian neighbors, and on cutting fence posts to sell in the local market. They have argued that these changes resulted from Kaingang encroachment. However, even when working for others, they have kept their custom of working in groups, which in general has involved an entire village. The coordinator of such work teams has gotten both prominence and some possibility of accumulating some material resources. One Guarani was involved in timber enterprise and in leasing lands (Justiça Federal 1989: 60-61). Other individuals recently began to lease small tracts of land in the Toldo Velho area. Although wage labor and the

marketing of local resources are recent phenomena, these activities have already begun to disrupt local communities especially due to accumulation of some resources and growing tensions.

Equally disrupting and exploitative were the public service requirements imposed by Indian leaders supposedly in the public interest. This could take the form of *puxiões* or collective works. In this case, male Indians are drafted to perform diverse agricultural tasks in fields created for the benefit of the community as well as those to which support the cacique and Indian captains.²⁵ Although this labor arrangement has deep roots in South America lowland Indian communities (e.g. Graff 1923: 202), in the past, government policy makers abused and transformed it into the *cativeiro* system--a form of mandatory and unpaid labor.

Male members of the community are also subject to be drafted for security activities and policing duties. Many individuals resent these assignments and the work conditions involved. The lack of food supplies is a recurring concern. The conscripts stationed in the Guarita Indian post, for example, survive on chicken carcasses and rice while their children, wives or old parents stay home with almost no

²⁵ Community members usually say that they agree to work for schools, elders, and widows with children. However, they refer to the work on the Indian authorities as abuse; a woman explicitly stated: "While they are drinking, eating well, abusing women and in houses of prostitution, our husbands, sons, and brother have to work in their fields." Despite this, few have real condition to resist any call.

food. It is the families of these conscripts that have been most vocal in complaining about the conditions and criticizing the practice, reporting that intimidation and threats of violence silence their sons and limit dissent. As those in the lower ranks have no power at all but only follow orders; they have not been able to articulate any major resistance to this system. Eventually, though, one or another has engaged in misdemeanors in the hope of being discharged.

Exploiting Retirement and Pension Benefits

In 1990-1989, many Guarita Indians were retired from rural work or were pensioners. Their monthly pensions averaged fifty percent of the national minimum wage or a little less than 25 dollars a month. Much of this income was immediately seized by local merchants as soon as it came due to pay for goods bought in advance.²⁶ In some cases the merchants actually held on to the pensioner's book of checks.²⁷ In 1989, Sueli Schuchezki and Marcelino Lorenzon from Miraguaí were reported to be keeping most of the *carnês* of community members. Other merchants from that city and from Tenente Portela, including Alceu Lorenzon, Rudi Borth,

²⁶ The social security system used to advance a book of checks, locally known as the *carnê*, though each check was payable only on the due date.

²⁷ Forty-six Indians from the Guarita Indian post, most of whom were Kaingang, identified the merchants who had their *carnês* (Simonian P.A.).

Vitorino de tal, Milton Borth, Sebastiao Reis and Mercado Safra, were identified as keeping carnês as well. Merchants also charged exorbitant interest, which reduced the final pension to almost nothing.²⁸

A great number of Indians claimed that although they found these practices exploitative, they did not have the resources to survive without them or to get out of debts. These points were repeated by poor non-Indian retirees and pensioners who also had their carnês seized in the same way and by the same people. Despite the illegality of these practices, no action was being taken to prevent this exploitation of the poor or to punish the criminals.²⁹ Some people in Miraguaí said that even the police knew a lot about the abuses, but "washed their hands" of them. At the request of some of these individuals, I reported the withholding of books of checks to the Brazilian Attorney General's office in the state of RGS (Simonian P.A.). Judicial authorities came to the area to make inquiries and forced the return of the carnês to the Indians. Soon after

²⁸ Interest was frequently calculated on the price of the commodity on the day that payment was made rather on its price when it was received. Because of inflation and price-gorging, the price of the good may have increased 100 percent or more during that period. These highs were found in a comparative survey in the local supermarkets, including those of the COTRIJUI, which were reported as the cheapest.

²⁹ FUNAI officials have alleged that some time earlier those who tried to terminate the system but were prevented by the Indians. In fact, no alternative has been offered by the same officials.

the same merchants began accompanying their Indian clients to the banks when they went to cash their monthly checks. As soon as pensioners received their money, the merchant was at their side to take it away.³⁰

Impoverishment and Surviving Conditions

Despite Indian involvement in production or in services, poverty was widespread. Local FUNAI health personnel and those of Tenente Portela and Miraguaí hospitals affirm that hunger had been the major sign of the impoverishment of the Guarita Indians over the several last years. One physician in Tenente Portela had worked with the Indians for years, stated that in the Guarita Reservation, the increasing hunger among the Indians paralleled to the growth of the leasing of reservation land." He also referred to the current level of hospitalization as alarming, as well as the growth of infant mortality and miscarriages. The director of the hospital in Miraguaí also felt that FUNAI had thrown the Indians into their hands, as if they could simply overcome the lack of proper nutrition and poor health conditions with medicines.

Evidence of serious health problems was easily found in the Guarita Reservation. One Guarani and five Kaingang children died in the period from February until May of 1990.

³⁰ Although some individuals reported that these practices were also imposed on poor non-Indian retirees, I did not have the chance to investigate this.

One of these children had been taken many times to the Passo Fundo hospital where patients were always suffering from malnutrition. On one particular day, two Irapuá children were mourned. However, evidence in the Guarita cases did not suggest intended neglect, therefore no similarity was found to the "mortal selective neglect" that Sheper-Hughes (1989: 10) argues she found among impoverished non-Indians of Brazil's urban shantytowns. Only recently has malnutrition as a cause of child mortality become a concern in this region. Accusations of culpability have begun to be levelled, within and outside the reservation, at the cacique's control over land and other local natural resources, at the expense of most of the Indians. Nothing was said, however, regarding the broader structures of domination except in regard to the child-care practices of some of the local and regional hospitals. The Passo Fundo and the Três Passos hospitals were accused of insensitivity in not allowing breast-feeding mothers to stay with their babies and in not providing adequate food for their patients. These and other nearby hospitals were reported to be careless and discriminatory toward the Indians.

Abortions and miscarriages were also reported to be related to impoverishment. Although no record have been kept, their numbers were regarded as high. As no specific research has been done, it is difficult to say to what extent the increasing numbers of terminations of pregnancies

have been due to abortions, influenced perhaps by the unwillingness to cope with another malnourished child, or whether they were more often miscarriages induced by the malnourishment of the mothers or environmental contamination. The widespread use of poisonous chemicals by non-Indian capitalist farmers has been suggested as a cause of fetal death (Correio Brasiliense January 28, 1989: 10).³¹

In the face of increasing Indian and non-Indian concerns over widespread unemployment, landlessness, poverty and hunger among local Indians, in 1990 cacique Samuel Claudino began urging people to farm. He proposed that each household should farm at least four hectares of land. His plan, however, met with skepticism. Most of the Indian farmers did not have the minimum resources to engage in this task, nor could they count on their close kin and peers, who were all operating under similar circumstances. Although the various problems to the proposal were raised, there was no attempt at reaching a community-wide solution to some of the problems. In the Três Soitas section, for instance, a small group of individuals did band together to work land communally to overcome their lack of technical resources and knowledge. In this case, however, they were threatened by Kaingang leaders. In fact, if Indian leaders had a plan, it was to follow the local capitalist model rather than to

³¹ The FUNAI administration was certainly aware about, but higher officials had not gone beyond press interviews.

implement communalistic programs. FUNAI officials--as usual--were promising to support them, but only when the land leasing and sharecropping was terminated (as if this could miraculously happen).

Ethnic Identities

The continuing impoverishment and unbalanced distribution of power and resources among the Guarita Kaingang throughout the last several decades have spurred an ethnic "re-structuring" and "differentiation" (Vincent 1974; Wolf 1982: 380-381). After being "savages" and Bugres, the Kaingang identity as "generic Indians" (Ribeiro 1970: 222) was emphasized by the SPI officials decades earlier. Lately, however, the Guarita Kaingang began to be specifically labeled as "Indians," or "Indians of the Indian post," and as *Bugres*.

Since the 1940s, those Kaingang living in or nearby the SPI Indian post began to be identified as *Indio do posto*--Indian of the Indian post.³² Some of them have been hired as workers by SPI-FUNAI officials and received other benefits. The structural configuration of the *Indio do posto* social identity resembles the *Bicho-de-Obra*, which was found by Ribeiro (1991: 156ff) in the context of the Yaciretá hydroelectric--a big project--site. In the late 1970s, the

³² This identification was primarily used by the poor Kaingang, by those who say they never benefited from the federal administration of the area.

term Indian began to be used more specifically by non-Indians when referring to the local Kaingang social, economic and political elite. This "elite" usually included some of the Guarita Kaingang leaders, their close allies, and other better-off Indians, who formed the "rich" social stratum.³³ The *Bugre* ethnic identity relates to the poor Kaingang, the landless, the ragged. While the term *Bugre* once implied wild, it now signifies poverty, landlessness, and powerlessness. The "Indians" themselves have too frequently identified the poor Kaingang as such.

Although "pure" and "mestizo" distinctions have been made and then among the Kaingang at least since last century (see Chapter One), they were never considered very crucial. In fact, the "pure" and "mestizo" distinctions tended to appear only in tense circumstances, therefore, not central as Valadao and Simonian (1982) showed for the Xokleng from the state of Santa Catarina. Referring to the Kaingang of Três Soita and ABC sections, most of whom have recently challenged his legitimacy cacique Claudino said that they were all Mestizos. However, Claudino, who described himself as pure, has also been accused by some Indians and non-Indians for "neglecting the ways of his ancestors and

³³ These individuals used ostentatious displays of wealth, which were seen to "transform" the ethnic and social identities. Wealth displays included automobiles, good furniture, television sets, "modern" clothing, and money for parties, prostitution houses, and so on. Body fat was also used as a symbol of wealth. Fatness was attributed to leisure, not farming and to having servants.

culture." These people have argued that Claudino can no longer be seen a pure Indian since he married a woman of his own moiety - the *Kamé*, spoke Portuguese even in Indian meetings, and favored non-Indian interests. Even socially recognized mestizos complained about their own loss of "Indian traditions."³⁴ Although in the past mestizos were incorporated into the Kaingang social moieties as Wiesemann (1964: 315-317) demonstrated, this practice is seldomly in use nowadays.

The Guarita Guarani have presented themselves and seen by others as simply Guarani. Despite this, ethnic differences are revealed by the presence of *Mbyá*, *Ñhandéva*, and mestizos. As the Guarita Guarani defined the use of their indigenous language the main criteria for ethnic inclusion, and all mestizos speak Guarani, they are considered Guarani. Furthermore, social-economic differences are still minimal among the Guarani.

In an attempt to reconcile these internal antagonisms and also to project a positive image of Indian reality to the outside world, an "Indian Feast" is held once a year on Indian Day--the 19th of April. This event has been held since mid-century, and began as a sort of "enforced

³⁴ Ramão P. Ribeiro specifically mentioned his annual reverence to Saint Roque, when he prepares a "cargo cult" festival, not only in his saint's honor but to congratulate his fellows. He further noted that in the last couple of years people came for the food, not for the "culture," "which they ridiculed."

primitivism" (World Bank 1982: 21). In the early years, the SPI provided the Indians with an ox to barbecue, bread, salad, soft drinks and music. Some Indians, however, reported that SPI, and later FUNAI agents, gave the best food and drinks to non-Indians, who were served separately at a big table. Although FUNAI continued these practices for a few years, nowadays the Indians must provide for themselves. Usually soccer games and a dance follow a big meal while non-Indians were astonished with the Indians' skills in sports and "the Indian dances."

Recently, people have begun to complain that the festivals are controlled by the caciques and serve their interests. In 1988 the Guarani began to put on a separate festival so they would get enough to feed themselves. Numerous Kaingang families were not attending the meal anymore for the same reason. In 1990 the cacique and other Kaingang leaders were accused by non-Indians of using required contributions from leaseholders for their own benefit. In fact, they had appropriated 20 head of cattle, mostly milking cows, that were killed for the party.³⁵ As many Indians were discontent with the actions of the Kaingang leadership, for the first time the cacique invited non-Indian guests to a civic ceremony to have lunch in the restaurant of Tenente Portela soccer team, where each one

³⁵ In this case, the milking cows were received through a state government social program, a year before.

would pay their own bills. However, numerous non-Indians from Tronqueiras stayed in the Guarita Reservation and feasted, and yet took food to their homes. The Guarani, in their turn, had to sell fence posts to non-Indians to be able to buy one ox and to pay the accordionist.

Churches' Overwhelming Domination

Churches domination has also contributed to and embodied the oppressive conditions of life on the reservation. Kaingang shamanistic knowledge, power and performances, for example, were deeply affected. Though all of them affirm that they are Christians most still fear spiritual beings and especially the "uaicupri"--the death soul. Guarani religion is facing major pressures as well. Although they have frequent contact with other Guarani in Argentina--whom they view as very "traditional"--this has not been enough "to fuel their traditions," including the religious ones. The Guarani elders felt shame and powerlessness when they cut trees to make fence posts. This suggests that religious beliefs and practices have not been completely lost--there is but incongruence and dissonance, especially among the elders.

Throughout the 1980s, the reservation became indeed "over-churched."³⁶ For instance, in 1989 11 non-Indian

³⁶ This situation is similar to what Du Bois (1926 in Osofski 1971: 144; [1903] 1989: 137) found both among Blacks in the U.S. 90 years ago, and in Harlem more than 50 years

denominations were working with the local Kaingang. They were the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church--RCA church, Brazil's Evangelic of Lutheran Confession Church--IECLB, Baptist, Seven Day Adventist, God is Love, Salem Baptist, Just the Lord is God, Pentecostal of the Divine Love, Jehovah Witness, "Batuque," and "popular catholicism".³⁷ Many among the Kaingang have also searched for popular healers, "miracle makers," visionaries and or card readers. The Guarani, on the other hand, stated that they did not need any alien church as they had their own religion and priests--the *uraidjá'mirí*. Therefore, they did not attend the alien churches.

As in many other areas of Latin America (Brandão 1985: 105; Burdick 1990: 109), protestant fundamentalism has grown among the local Kaingang. SPI involvement in these early missionary activities became clear, when SPI officials brought protestant fundamentalist missionaries to work on the reservation, primarily to discourage alcoholism, and even lent the facilities of the Indian post. As Almeida

ago. I came upon with this concept when living in Harlem, in New York. As I began to read about the history of the neighborhood, I discovered that in 1926 W. E. B. Du Bois discovered 140 Black Churches in 150 blocks, which he then characterized as an "over-churched" situation.

³⁷ Long before this recent "over-churching," Jesuit missionaries had first entered the lands of the Guarita Indian around the mid-1800s. They did not succeed in gaining a significant number of converts (Meliá 1984a: 178-179; Parés 1851; Pérez 1901). This process was repeated in the first decades of this century, as other RCA Church priests installed themselves in the region.

(n.d.: 16) reports, a Batista mission was brought to the reservation in 1943.³⁸ The mission, however, would not prosper. In 1956, the Assembly of God missionaries arrived,³⁹ and since a growing number of Kaingang have faced the relentless pressures of the proselytizing.

Though no records were available that recorded the total number of the current followers, it is clear that the Assembly of God has been the church that attracts the majority of the Christian Indians. I was in fact told that around 55 percent of the Guarita Kaingang are now members of the Assembly of God Church. Few people, particularly among the church faithful, were willing to discuss the conversion process, although there were some reports of pressure from the reservation's caciques in the 1980s for people to convert. Despite this, the number of Indians who have deviated from the church every year, especially due to alcoholism, has been great. Eventually some have repented and their stories were always described as spiritually glorious.

Contrary to the possibility of ideological variation among Fundamentalists, as Burdick (1990: 578ff) and Fernandes (1983) have found, in the Guarita Reservation

³⁸ The teacher Antonio Santolin arrived in the reservation both to implant a school and to preach the Baptist church's religious teachings.

³⁹ The Assembly of God's first preacher was José Ramos (id.: 16).

those faithful people have acted through a unified and hegemonic conservative way. The Assembly of God's non-Indian and Indian preachers who lead the majority of them in the reservation, have emphasized the acceptance of both earthly and heavenly authority, and especially the abandonment of the cultural patterns of the Indians' ancestors. An Irapuá Kaingang minister recently spoke in Kaingang to some mourning people, to whom he said that "things of the past and of the present should not worry you anymore." He went on to say that "being *Kamé* or *Kadnyerú-kra* [the traditional social and patrilineal moieties] and facing death should not worry you." As he proceeds, he emphasizes: "Now you have Jesus and heaven, but still you have to worry about the hell flames."

Especially these Assembly of God's preachers actions are viewed by many Indians and non-Indians in the area as part of the "domestication" of the Indians, a process which has transformed the Indians into the powerful non-Indians' allies in the case of land leasing. As another Kaingang states, "Assembly of God are the people who talk only about death, hell; there is no hope in their talk, sermons." Due to its strength in the area, the Assembly of God might be characterized as constituting a state, a possibility envisioned by Croce (in Gramsci 1985 [1947]: 245-246) and later on analyzed by Gramsci (id.).

The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church--RCA Church--had the second largest group of believers, although it has not increased lately. In the early 1970s, the members and leaders of the RCA Church began a process of self-criticism of their work among the Indians. Working through CIMI-Sul (Indigenist Missionary Council in the South) agents and local parishers, RCA Church began to formulate a critique of public policies relating to Indians. RCA Church leaders and officials have also systematically supported Indian land claims and complains about their persistent oppression. In the late 1970s, some CIMI-Sul agents reprimanded the Brazil's Evangelic of Lutheran Confession church activities in the Guarita Reservation. D'Angelis and Weschenfelder (1979: 2) stated: "We lament ... that through its local Mission and Agricultural School, the IECLB has not contributed to a major enlightening of the local indigenous community."

Due to their involvement in local Indian affairs, the RCA Church agents became victims of repression. In the 1970s, FUNAI officials viewed them as *persona non grata*. For example, in 1974, a CIMI-Sul agent, the Jesuit Egídio Schwade, was denied a one-night stay in the IECLB mission by the present-day pastor (Simonian P. A.). CIMI-Sul agents were also controlled by Bishop Maldaner of Frederico Westphalen. Bishop Maldaner was a leader of the church's right wing in RGS (id.). RCA Church priests Luís Hass,

Víctor de tal, and Bartolomeu Meliá were continually harassed and warned to stay off the reservation.⁴⁰ When they ignored the warnings and entered the reservation, they were detained by FUNAI officials and the Indian leadership. Probably for this reason, the Jesuit provincial prohibited a novice from working in the Guarita Reservation. After a year of work in one of the local parishes, the novice had yet to enter onto Indian lands.

Despite the political activities of some RCA Church personnel, they have always to confront more conservative elements within their ranks and lay followers. In fact, many of the active members of the local RCA Church are the most powerful non-Indian leaseholders of the Guarita Reservation lands. Recently, these conservative elements appear to reasserting their influence. As a result the church has become more concerned with spiritual matters on the reservation and have recently constructed an appealing stone church.

The Brazil's Evangelic of Lutheran Confession Church--IECLB--missionary work on the Guarita Reservation has generally followed a very conservative approach to Indian affairs. At the same time that CIMI-Sul began its critique of IECLB mentioned above, IECLB missionaries began a process of criticising themselves. This process seems to have been linked with the church's concern about the loss of Indian

⁴⁰ Father Bartomeu Meliá is also an anthropologist.

members to the Assembly of God church. In 1979, Pastor Steen of the IECLB (Deckmann 1985: 30) suggested that membership loss resulted in part from:

the lack of knowledge regarding the Kaingang language ..., the tendency for social aid, the accumulation of administrative and spiritual functions by the pastor, and the fact that the work continued to be possible due to German and Norwegian resources....

However, as the IECLB missionaries began to raise occasional criticism about the Guarita Kaingang leadership, land-leasing and repressive policies and actions, tensions permeated their relationship with the Indians. Norberto Schwantes (1984 in Deckmann 1985: 113), an ex-pastor of the IECLB and one of the first coordinators of the mission at Guarita, concluded that the church's accusations against the caciques had been ineffectual.

Despite those critiques, no major transformation of IECLB missionary policy was implemented and the relations between the IECLB and the Indians deteriorated. In 1985, the Indians from the Sao Joao do Irapuá Indian post imprisoned and later expelled the missionaries for abusive trade practices.⁴¹ The missionaries, in turn, accused the Kaingang

⁴¹ Since 1974 I have heard complaints on the part of the Indians about unfair trade practices (Simonian P.A.). The complaints relate to the practice by the missionaries of exchanging donated clothes and other items for Indian crafts. The Indians argue that the missionaries paid nothing for the goods and they should be given to the Indians free of charge. The missionaries counter with the argument that the crafts received in exchange were sold to buy medicine for Indians at the mission. The Indians responded that non-lutherans were discriminated against in access to medical

caciques and FUNAI officials of having manipulated their expulsion; these would be then claiming that the missionaries were organizing the Indians against them (Zero Hora March 26, 1985: 27, 31; March 22: 35). Schwantes (id.: 115) then adds his voice in the debate, saying that he read "too much" about the church's "justification, self-defense and hypocritical thinking regarding the mission's expulsion by the Guarita Indians."

In the aftermath of these events, the same missionaries have continued to work in the area but from the headquarter of the Yucuma Indigenous Mission located in Tenente Portela. Their decision to work from outside the area goes beyond the expulsion to their earlier unsuccessful experiences in the area. This, together with concern for the waste of a substantial amount of international financial aid, probably lead them to shift their resources from material support for the Indians to "political education." Despite this, they were lately involved in a project of the Tenente Portela Workers' Association for the Indians (Schwingel and Kaminski 1990: 5-7). In 1989-1990, some material support were proposed or delivered through that project although it reached only a few Indians of the Guarita Reservation. This project involved the distribution of materials for community vegetable gardens and small allowances for three Indian part-time health agents. By the

care.

same time, missionaries also claimed to be conducting "political education" among the Guarita Indians (id.: 4-5).⁴²

Although the RCA Church and the IECLB missionaries have lately come out with "liberation theology" and against the corruption and brutality of some of the caciques and leaders, this have not been enough to limit the growing resentment of their followers. Church members have accused the missionaries of not paying attention to their material needs or helping them secure the resources to overcome their poverty. Although some Indians have acknowledge that the missionaries are attempting to assist them, they disagree with the organization of these "collective work" projects. Those Indians noted that they would not agree to participate in such a project because "the swindlers and corrupt ..." would act as "crows" and abuse and steal common resources.

Some Indians also characterize the missionaries as people who have "a good life, with enough money, cars, and plenty of food while many of us starve." In 1990, for instance, this was a frequent complaint from Indians working with the churches in the "Indian movement." These Indians

⁴² This is by no means a forum for an assessment of the IECLB mission's work in Guarita, but while in the field, I hardly ever observed this claimed work. On the contrary, I was able to elicit many reports, most of them given by Indians, some of whom were even engaged in IECLB work. Unfortunately, Pastor Schwingel who I looked for as soon as I arrived, did not welcome my work in the Guarita Reservation and waged a verbal campaign against me.

complained of not receiving enough resources for the necessary expenditures or to provide for their families while they were away. Some felt so deceived that they have even abandoned their formal religious practices. Some evangelical Lutherans recounted that the church gave them no assistance at all, nor did they envision receiving any in the future. Others accused a RCA Church priest of illegally appropriating a small fund that the ABC section Indians had accumulated for religious activities.

A Kaingang said that the RCA Church parish coordinator turned his back on him when he decided in 1989 to open a bar and a pool hall within the reservation. In this case, the individual felt that this establishment would discourage Indians from going into the city to drink where they might be attacked or come to harm on the road home. In the city, he pointed out, non-Indians often give drinks to the Indians just "for the pleasure of seeing them falling or to turn them into better prey for beating." Another Kaingang accused the same priest of accepting building materials for a new chapel that had come from his home which had been seized by the cacique and the Indian police (this, while he was living in one of the worst shacks of the reservation). Many Indians also complained of priests and pastors who pretended to side with the Indians, but still kept worshipping with, and for the rich and better-off non-Indians.

Daily Brutalities and Widespread Violence

During the 19th century most discussions of the Kaingang portrayed them as a violent people (see Chapter One). Almeida (n.d.: 9) comments on internal feuds among the Guarita Kaingang. He (id.) attributed the feuds to personality politics while some Guarita Kaingang have focused on the role of witchcraft accusations in initiating feuds. Almeida (id.ibid.) described their feuds as bloody--*encarniçados*--and widespread until the 1930s. This approach did not differ from Henry's (1941: 51ff) description of feuds among the Xokleng,⁴³ a Gê speaking people, as a pervasive and "disruptive forces."⁴⁴ Non-Indians have changed their vocabulary but not the content, as they recently described the reservation as "nothing else but a criminals' nest."

Furthermore, as in the past reports on non-Indian violence and brutalities against them are scarcer. The beating up of two Indians by a Tenente Portela sub-sheriff was eventually reported in 1949 by the SPI Indian post chief, who demanded the punishment of the official (SPI-PI Guarita 1949). Killing by the Indians for the practice of anthropophagy were reported in 1956 and and in the early

⁴³ Henry misidentified the Xokleng as Kaingang.

⁴⁴ While Henry (1941: 60) stressed the "unhibited ferocity" of the Xokleng "toward all outsiders," he ignored the possible impact of Brazilian society on Xokleng activities.

1980s as well (Correio do Povo 1956; Justiça Pública 1988-1987; Simonian P.A.).

A remarkably violent scenario has, in fact, ultimately dominated the Guarita Reservation and neighboring areas. Throughout the 1970 the Guarita Indians were victims of local non-Indians' brutalities and violence. The 1980s especially may be identified as "the decade of bloodshed." Non-Indian domination, oppression, and deprivation have been imposed on the lives of the Indians and form the basis of their existence. Many Indians have concurred to such a development as well (Meliá 1984b; Sampaio and Krenak 1983; Simonian 1980), who have also contributed to transform violence as part of the local Indians everyday life. Violent actions include murder, torture, sexual assault and rape, robberies and extortion.

"The Decade of Bloodshed": Linking Land and Death

Power struggles to control local resources as well as deprivation and psychological stress explain the widespread violence on the Guarita Reservation. The recent murders of Indians by non-Indians might be viewed as a form of intimidation designed to challenge the 1973 Indian Statute which explicitly prohibited the leasing of Indian lands (Lei 6.001 1973: 18th art.). Although this strategy was probably contained during the 1970s due to the duress of the military dictatorship, it spread and intensified in the following

decade. The killing by Indians of their kin or of non-Indian is surely linked to deprivation, powerlessness, and psychological stresses. In Guarita, similarly to what has happened in Latin America at large, "Women are most often injured or killed in contexts of generalized violence ..." (Bunster-Burutto in Nash and Safa 1986: 297). Moreover, Indian women continue to be special targets in violent scenarios, as has happened in the Guarita, Kaiowá and Yakima reservations.⁴⁵

The slaughter among the Guarita Kaingang has been brutal.⁴⁶ Thirteen Kaingang were known to have been killed from the late 1970s until the end of the 1980s. This number should not be taken the total of criminal casualties on the reservation. Similar research was not undertaken at the Irapuá Indian post and people, in general, were reluctant to discuss de situation. The bodies of the Indians have been discovered along roads outside the area. Other Indians have died in local and regional hospitals, for lack of proper medical care.

⁴⁵ Indian women rapes were recently reported among the Chimanes of Bolivia (Castillo 1989: 25). 13 women were recently murdered and two disappeared in the Yakima Reservation, in the United States (New York Times April 18, 1993: L24).

⁴⁶ As vengeance was feared, Indians who agreed to talk about these crimes asked for anonymity. In one specific case they asked that the criminal's names not be mentioned either, as even this might be risky. Information was also collected from court records for few cases in which the accused were being prosecuted.

Some of the most notorious murders included Alcides Faque, who was ambushed and killed by non-Indians in the mid-1970s.⁴⁷ In 1984, Sharina da Rosa had her body mutilated with a *taquara* stick, which passed from her genitals to her mouth. Her neck had also been broken and her head turned to her back.⁴⁸ In this same year, Basílio Krag-Far Claudino was stabbed to death by Joao Mário de Moraes.⁴⁹ Élio Rubens Segura, a physician, was also prosecuted for negligence in this case (Justiça Pública 1984).⁵⁰ Adelaide Salles was killed with an iron stick by her companion, the non-Indian Caetano, who crushed her neck and head.⁵¹ Nair Salles was stabbed to death by José Bonifácio in 1986. His genitals had been removed and placed on his chest and his body hung from

⁴⁷ Nobody was charged in this case, which happened in Palmitinho. Some Indians have said that this was certainly an act of revenge the 1956 killing of Florenal Alves Fontoura by Indians. The farmer was reported to have been abusing Indians in the surroundings of the town of Vista Alegre. The Indians, in turn, were accused of eating parts of the victim's body (Correio do Povo 1956).

⁴⁸ It is possible that her death followed a rape, but her murder was not investigated by the judicial system. She was found dead just outside of Tenente Portela.

⁴⁹ The victim's body was found close to the COTRIJUI headquarters, in Tenente Portela.

⁵⁰ The judicial process reports that the physician lived near Tenente Portela hospital but took him almost an hour to reach the victim (Justiça Pública 1984). At that point, he decided to send the wounded man to the hospital in três Passos but the victim died on the way.

⁵¹ Her death occurred in Tenente Portela's Operária neighborhood, where they lived. The murderer was found burying the victim. He was imprisoned but almost immediately freed.

a barbed wire fence.⁵² Pedro Bento was killed by his Kaingang wife, Alvina Ribeiro. Two of her brothers helped her to commit the murder.⁵³ An elderly Kaingang woman was burnt to death.⁵⁴ A Kaingang beat so much his father-in-law that he eventually died as a result of lung damage he sustained. Another Kaingang known as *Cabo* was murdered and partially eaten by Fausto Pinto in 1980, a lover of the victim's companion.⁵⁵

Despite the horrendous nature of the above crimes, one specific crime focussed attention on the need for justice in the surrounding area (Simonian 1991b). In 1987, Lorinete Maria Brombati, a non-Indian woman who was living and

⁵² This crime happened in the vicinity of Tenente Portela. The Indians recounted that the killer was imprisoned but then freed due to the action of his lawyer Joao Gehller. The criminal was defined as member of a family that "... loves to attack [*judiar*] and kill Indians."

⁵³ The two brothers, Dirceu and Ornélio Ribeiro, were transferred to the Ligeiro Reservation. This practice of transferring criminals was introduced by SPI officials in the 1950s and is currently described as "Indian law." The victim's wife was reported to be a fugitive hiding, probably, in the city of Ijuí. Members of her family say that P. Bento was killed because then "... he was involved with his wife's sisters and with other Indian women."

⁵⁴ The early official version of her death reported that she had fallen in the house's central fireplace and couldn't get out. Lately, people have begun to discover her death as a murder by a Kaingang.

⁵⁵ In this case, the victim's viscera was said to have been eaten by the killer. His corpse arrived at the reservation, said one FUNAI official, with the chest opened and the arms dismembered. After being a fugitive for years, F. Pinto had been captured and was also being prosecuted in Seberi in the late 1980s.

working as a teacher on the reservation and was engaged to an Indian, was murdered. Three Indians - Leontino N. Salles, Joao K. Salles and Joaozinho K. Salles - were accused of the rape, murder and robbery of the teacher (Justiça Pública 1988-1987). In addition, her body and house were burnt. Although they were found guilty of all charges, in 1989 they still maintained their innocence and attempting to get their case reopened.⁵⁶ An analysis of the judicial process revealed that in this case the procedures and some local Kaingang and FUNAI officials' behavior were discriminatory to the defendants (Simonian id.). Their witnesses were intimidated by the Indian police or had their testimonies ignored. The three Indians also accused the Indian police of having tortured them. Some people reported that the cacique was planning to have them burnt when they were rescued by non-Indian police officers.

Many Indians suspect that the lives of those Indians found dead on the roadsides have been taken through criminal actions. Though it was not possible to confirm the total number of these occurrences, they appear to have been fairly frequent. The most recent case I know of occurred in 1992. A Kaingang woman was found dead on a road just outside the

⁵⁶ Some of their relatives asked me to initiate a process against the State for judicial biases and abuse. As I was not going to be in the country for very long, I suggested that the prisoners (I spoke to two of them in the Três Passos State prison) request assistance from ANAI-RS, which was done. Soon after, their case was reopened by the RGS Federal Attorney.

reservation near the Mission section. Her close kin told me that she had disappeared in the day she had received her pension money. Although they suspected foul play, no investigation was launched by FUNAI officials. It was simply assumed that she might have suffered a heart attack as a result of alcoholic over dose.

Hospitals have frequently been implicated in malpractice or negligence. It seems that few of the suspected cases were ever legally pursued. One exception to this lack of investigation until early 1990, was was Basílio Krag-Fra Claudino's death, as mentioned above, when the physician who neglected the required care was sued. Also in 1990, the death of Geraldino Rera Emílio was investigated by the judicial authorities. Geraldino's brother, L. S. Emílio, recounts that his brother had swallowed a small chicken bone which became lodged in his throat. When he left the reservation, however, he was walking and talking. He was taken first to the hospital in Redentora. From there he was ordered to Tenente Portela and then to Sao Vicente Hospital in Passo Fundo. He remained in the hospital there for a few days without receiving any medical treatment. When he was finally operated on, it was too late and he died as a result of infection. When Geraldino's body was returned to the reservation, his brother was concerned that the death certificate misrepresented the cause of death and treatment

received.⁵⁷ As he expressed his anger over his brother's death, L. S. Emilio concluded that "a hospital is a place where Indians go only to return dead."⁵⁸

The following are instances of violence practiced by non-Indians which are reported to have taken place in Miraguaí during 1989 and 1990. In 1989 domestic aide on her way home witnessed the beating up of an elder Indian who was thrown from his horse by a nonIndian. She identified the aggressor, but did not denounce him because she feared the criminal retaliation. Jesus Farias, Joao Matias and Valdir Salles were beaten up in 1990. The city councilman Milton Morcelli saved the latter from death.⁵⁹ The executioners in these cases were said to be "Cascalho," Henrique Polanski and César *de tal*. When the attack was reported to the police, the executioners blamed their boss, Ernesto Cassol, a powerful and abusive non-Indian farmer and Indian lands

⁵⁷ He then asked for me for judicial assistance. I prepared the main petition for him to present to the Attorney General in RGS.

⁵⁸ The death certificate states that Geraldino arrived at the hospital on the 11th and died on the 16th of April (Guarienti and Soares 1990). It lists the following medical problems as *causa mortis*: brain 'hepóxica,' heart and respiratory condition, brain injury, strange *corpus* in the esophagus (id.).

⁵⁹ This city councilman said that he saw the Indian being beaten at the side of the RS 330 highway as he drove by. Antonio Salles, the Miraguaí Kaingang councilman, registered the Morcelli humanitarian action in a session at City Hall (Salles 1989a: 2).

leaser, of having orchestrated the attack.⁶⁰

The violence perpetuated by some Indian leaders against Indians must be recognized as well. The Ivo Ribeiro term as cacique has, in particular, been accused of engaging in torture as a mechanism of control and intimidation. The bodies of many Kaingang bear marks of physical torture, reportedly inflicted by members of the Indian police while psychological torture of victims and their families has also been reported. Imprisonment and forced labor as punishment, imposed without any opportunity for defense, had become frequent occurrences. The local prison was always full. Cacique Ivo Ribeiro was rumored to have developed ways to intimidate through threats, extortion and land expropriation. Recalling his abusive policies, people described him unfavorably as a *judeu* [Jew].⁶¹ It is in this context of escalating violence and abuse that the so-called "fratricide war" broke out among the Indians in 1983.

Although this war was part of the ongoing struggle among different Indian factions to control resources on the reservation, it was instigated in part by powerful non-

⁶⁰ Soon after I interviewed the Miraguaí sheriff, who confirmed this allegation. For other information about this non-Indian farmer's anti-Indian actions see Chapters Three and Five.

⁶¹ The term *judeu* was commonly used in the area as a derogatory term to describe a "bad", "harmful", "wicked" person. Although I did not note any conscious anti-semitic connotation among the Indians, the use of the term in itself has an anti-semitic connotation.

Indians and by the complaisance of FUNAI officials in part (see Chapter Six). The war began when cacique Ivo S. Ribeiro's warriors invaded and attacked cacique D. Ribeiro followers in June of 1983. In self-defense, D. Ribeiro's people ended up killing six aggressors and wounding thirteen (Meliá 1984b; Simonian P.A.; Zero Hora January 28, 1983: central pgs.). As one Kaingang recounted: "I could not believe what I saw before my eyes, kin attacking or killing each other, the terrifying screams, the pools of blood ..." and later the "collective mourning" Beyond the suffering and rage, fear of revenge left the Indians at the Guarita Indian post in terror for quite a while, despite the presence of the RGS military unit in the area. In the aftermath of the attack, FUNAI officials staged a public but empty reconciliation between the two caciques at a meeting held in the city of Três Passos. Promises were made by Ivo and Domingos Ribeiro to end the land leasing-system by 1984 and to formulate wider policies to reduce tensions on the reservation (Ata da Reuniao dos Caciques 1983; Rosa et al. 1984).

Later on cacique S. R. Claudino persisted with similar practices against the Indians. As seen above cacique Claudino has reportedly been relentless in his attacks on those who opposed⁶² his activities relating to resource use,

⁶² The Kaingang Sebastiao Alfaiate, Francisco and Armândio Ribeiro lead this opposition movement.

corruption, embezzlement of contracts fees, immoral leadership, and so on.⁶³ In 1988 he and fifty armed Kaingang attacked the ABC and other Indians from Indian sections of Tenente Portela (Zero Hora September 01, 1988: 38). As this attack had been expected, the defenders had prepared themselves and no deaths occurred. Ten individual, however, were severely wounded and four were captured and imprisoned by cacique Claudino's Indian police, and some lost their possessions (Zero Hora August 30, 1988: 44). Many Indians from the Três Soita and the ABC left the area because of the lack of safety on the reservation.⁶⁴ Following difficult negotiations⁶⁵ the exiles began to return only to be threatened again.

⁶³ In 1990, this cacique was publically accused of the appropriation of Cr\$ 1.500,00 of each Indian leaseholder for each leased hectare, which, even in the devaluated Brazilian economy, was a fortune.

⁶⁴ Some initially hid in the forest or in the homes of non-Indians outside the reservation. Eventually 80 families took refuge in the FUNAI headquarters of Passo Fundo (Zero Hora September 09, 1988: 32).

⁶⁵ These negotiations took place in Passo Fundo (Zero Hora September 09, 1988: 32). According to the Indians, the Irapuá Indian post cacique Ivo S. Ribeiro offered to accept Mr. Claudino opponents on a temporary basis, but the latter ended agreeing with their return, except for three of them. FUNAI, federal police, national army, state military brigade officials, pastors of distinct protestant denominations, RCA Church priests, ANAI associates and others participated in this dispute settlement process (Zero Hora id.). However, it has recently been said that the nonIndian pastor of the Irapuá Assembly of God Church was the one who played the most important role in such a decision.

Some of the off-reservation attacks involved Indians only and as such might be considered factional or personal squabbles spilling outside the reservation. José Salles was hit on the head as he was leaving the property non-Indian farmer in Lagoa Bonita in 1989, where he had been working for a week. His Indians attackers reported they had robbery as their motive.⁶⁶ In the middle of 1990, the Miraguai councilman Antonio Salles, a Kaingang, was beaten up by cacique Claudino and other members of his Indian police in a local nightclub.⁶⁷ Two Indian women also got into a fight in the center of the city but the RCA Church priest separated them before anyone was seriously injured.⁶⁸ C. Ribeiro was also beaten up in 1990 as he left a Tenente Portela bar and illegal casino. Despite his wife's pressure to report the perpetrator, he preferred to remain silent, an attitude

⁶⁶ Salles lost his memory as a result of the attack and one year later he was still unable to work and remained under medical care.

⁶⁷ Salles then left the reservation with his family, and camped in the city's public stadium.

⁶⁸ Father Víctor was with his clothes still full of blood when I got home for lunch that day. Some non-Indian watched the fight but were afraid to intervene for fear of being beaten up too. The attacker was said to have been revenging the other woman's attempts to steal her husband. This is an old practice among Kaingang women as some authors have mentioned (e.g., Mabilde 1983 [1836-1866]: 48). I myself witnessed a similar incident in 1975, when women from the Irapuá section prepared wood swords to ambush and attack other women for the same reason.

followed by many victims.⁶⁹

Verbal abuse and violence have also often occurred when Indian soccer teams leave the reservation to play in outside competition. In 1990 a violent scene erupted after a game in Braço Forte, a district in Tenente Portela. As the game ended, non-Indians went to their cars, pulled out machetes and knives and surrounded the Indians, including women and children. During an otherwise "amicable" game, between the non-Indian Tamoio and the Indians' ABC teams, a scuffle broke out. As happens at many soccer games in Brazil, the Indians had been harmlessly tauting the referee, Edivan de Castro. As I could observe being at the scene, the Indians had no intentions of becoming involved in a fight, because not only did they not have any weapon, but they knew that non-Indians always carried weapons. An non-Indians took their weapons, one Indian grabbed a piece of wood and rushed toward the non-Indians. He was immediately restrained by myself and others. The non-Indians took the opportunity to shout all sorts of racist slurs against the Indians.⁷⁰ Initially, the Indians had proposed reporting the event to the police in Tenente Portela since the non-Indians

⁶⁹ His wife noted that this was not the first time that he came home bleeding. She also mentioned that this was common in the area, especially among Indians who spent most of their time in the city's bars, prostitution houses or gambling establishments.

⁷⁰ They stopped as the Indian women and I began to shepherd the Indian men back to the truck they had rented.

had threatened to ambush one of them later on.⁷¹ The Indians did not eventually file a report.⁷²

While violent and criminal actions committed in public are usually acknowledged, those which occur in the intimacy of individuals' homes are often silenced. Occasionally they become public knowledge as a result of gossip or criminal charges. Violence on the family level has usually been silenced, although in most cases through gossip the news end up spreads. Kaingang women are the main victims and men, as the initiators and perpetrators of much of this violence, tend to avoid any discussion of it. Though many of the recent instances of violence against Guarita women are influenced by non-Indian practices and beliefs, some might be connected with earlier Indian factors. Mabilde (1897: 159-160) and Teschauer (1929: 343-356), for example, stated that in the 19th century, Kaingang women were not only the most "hard-working" among their people but also victims of male jealousy and the reason for fights and warfare. This point is debatable however since some might argue that these early observations were biased both by stereotypes of Indians and by the observers' own biases against women.

⁷¹ The targeted individual was actually a non-Indian married to an Kaingang woman. He characterized the "Portelenses" (non-Indian from Tenente Portela) as racists who hated him because the married an Indian.

⁷² When asked why one Indian said: "It is too hard for us. If in any of this kind of aggression, which happens quite often, we start a suit, we would have time for nothing else."

Others might also point out that by the 19th century, Indian life had been disrupted by contact and the violence against women might have been a reflection of that disruption.

Violence against women, particularly among the Kaingang, has become the most common form of conflict within the family and household. While alcoholism and poverty are the most frequent cited causes for this violence, others have suggested that men's resistance to monogamy⁷³ and jealousy might be important factors.⁷⁴ According to an elderly Kaingang, "men get mad when they cannot support their families and the first they look to blame and beat are their wives." This woman went on to note that she never allowed one of her five former husbands to beat her. Several

⁷³ The Kaingang were traditionally polygynous (Mabilde 1983: 48; Teschauer *ibid.*). Though monogamy was enforced to them in the last century, some individuals reportedly kept other wives secretly or freely entered into affairs with other women. Castro, who visited the Kaingang in the 1880s, describes many Guarita Kaingang as living in a state of bigamy, as they "... lack principles of morality and did not know nor practice our laws (Castro 1887 in Laytano 1954 VII: 206-207). A century later, a significant number of Kaingang men and particularly, Kaingang leaders, are known to maintain second households and to frequent houses of prostitution in the neighboring cities and district's urban centers. Many others are reported to rely on *betúm*, single Kaingang women who engage in extra-marital affairs.

⁷⁴ Most of the Guarita Kaingang and non-Indian wives say that they suffer as a result of the jealousy of their Kaingang husbands. Non-Indian wives in particular complain that Indian authorities are not sympathetic to their cause. One non-Indian wife confided that she knew that she had rights (she referred to the 1988 Constitution) and told her husband so. She also told him that he did not find her on the streets and that she and the kids would move to her parents home off the reservation if he continued mistreating her.

Kaingang and one Guarani woman reported that they did not usually report these violences to Indian authorities because they did not take their complaints seriously.

Among the Guarani, there is a saying that people "know to respect their families." In fact, while in the field I heard of just one case of domestic violence among the Guarani.⁷⁵ This, however, involved a Guarani and Kaingang couple. The husband, a Kaingang, was accused of beating his Guarani wife and attempting to kidnap their child. Residents of Gamelinha, the village in which this took place were extremely embarrassed when the husband was arrested. He was taken to the Kaingang cacique, who immediately released the guilty man. The Guarani woman was forced to flee temporarily to the Guarani Peperi-Guaçú village in Argentina in an attempt to avoid his wrath and the loss of her daughter.

Kaingang women, in general, felt that the Kaingang authorities lacked the moral authority to impose punishment against their fellow men. In 1988, for instance, both Kaingang women and men identified cacique Claudino as "the prostitutes' cacique" (Zero Hora September 01, 1988: 38). Women increasingly refused to have their cases against their

⁷⁵ The Guarani, in fact, portray themselves as a non-violent people. Kaingang and non-Indian neighbors agree with this assessment and define the Guarani as "pacific" people. In 1990, I witnessed my first view of violence among the Guarani when a fight broke out during a soccer game at the Guarani Indian Day festival. One Guarani individual beat up another Guarani. Blood was drawn although the injuries were not serious.

partners heard by Kaingang authorities. In many cases the Kaingang cacique indeed requested that Guarani officials hear the women complaints. Kaingang women have accused their "leaders" of inflicting violence on the women of their own family and being negative role models for their husbands, sons and relatives. Cacique Claudino's violence action against his pregnant wife was always mentioned--he had reportedly killed his unborn child while kicking his wife's stomach with his feet. Kaingang women reported that she was angry with the cacique for "deceiving the men" and for taking her husband with him to spend a night with prostitutes.⁷⁶

Instances of sexual abuse and rape or rape attempt by close relatives were also common. Accusations of rape were frequently reported by both the Indian and non-Indian wives of Indians as well as by FUNAI officials. The non-Indian wife of a Kaingang, for example, said that she had to threaten her husband with his own gun as he attempted to rape her teenage non-Indian daughter who was forced to escape through her bedroom window. Non-Indian males were also accused of raping Indian women or of trapping them with promises and then abandoning them. Some of these women gave birth to fatherless children as a result of these liaisons. Some ended up pregnant and had their babies, who were

⁷⁶ The women warned her husband that she would leave him if he cheated on her just one more time. She informed him that for the time being he could not share her bed.

abandoned by their fathers.⁷⁷ This non-Indian behavior does not differ of that involving half-caste Tasmanians last century, as Bonwick stressed: "That which has excited most astonishment and disgust has been the indifference of English fathers to the future being of their half-caste progeny" ([1884] 1979: 197-198). Others complained not only of being violated by men but then systematically harassed by these aggressors, many of whom were married and had families.

Recently, the incidences of reported rape of Indian women, by both Indian and non-Indian, have increased substantially.⁷⁸ In Miraguaí, a gang of non-Indians raped a young Kaingang woman in January 1992. The minor, not only had to be treated in the hospital for broken ribs suffered in the attack but she also was impregnated. The victim, unfortunately was influenced by her family of faithful Assembly of God members to see the attack as "God's will." Anyway the case was taken to the police as the FUNAI official had to report. In the following month a group of Kaingang men raped another Kaingang woman who was also a minor. This woman brought hope to many when not only because

⁷⁷ When asked why they did not hold the fathers responsible, the women said that they lacked the resources to undertake any judicial action. They also noted that FUNAI officials and Indian leaders ignored their plight or accused them of being "simple prostitutes."

⁷⁸ Data for this paragraph were either taken from Zero Hora (February 18, 1992: 44; February 17, 1992: 35) and judicial processes (Justiça Pública 1992a, b).

for the first time she laid a complaint against Indian rapists with non-Indian authorities, but the case was reported in the media.⁷⁹

Violence against children also occurred on the reservation although it has rarely been reported. In general, Indians are described by Indians and non-Indians as being kind to children. Nevertheless, one non-Indian wife described her husband's attempt of rape against her non-Indian daughter, as discussed above, and of physically abusing their foster Indian son as well. In regards to these attacks on their son, the woman said to me:

You cannot imagine dealing with him but I have seen his savagery, especially when he is drunk. I have seen him attack the boy and attempt to strangle him. He now knows that I will leave him if he mistreats that innocent again (id.).

To what extent this woman will be able to carry out her threat to leave and protect her son is unknown. As trapped by poverty and powerlessness, it is unlikely to happen.

Children are further abused, intentionally or unintentionally, by poverty on the reservation. Malnutrition is widespread. In addition to a shortage of resources in general, the hardest hit children appear to those living with individuals dependent upon government pensions and or those living in foster families. The exploitation of

⁷⁹ Cacique Claudino disagreed with her decision to report and publicize the incident and he said he would ensure that the proper rules and mechanisms functioned to punish the criminals. Despite this, he ended turning the Indian rapists to non-Indian authorities.

retirees by merchants was noted above, The result of these abusive practices has meant that children in these households are fed last and fed least. Fostering also places an added burden on households. Not even the poorest Kaingang would refuse their relatives' children although these situations were not without conflict. In some instances Indian men complained about their sisters and daughters who had become single mothers and whose children were now their responsibility. One man expressed his anger, saying that he was "tired of feeding other men's children" and that he would leave the house if one of his sisters became home pregnant again. A poor woman who was fostering a malnourished and mentally ill grand-nephew stated: "The little I get I share with him. He helps, he put water in the kettle for me. His mother abandoned him as she knew he would be abnormal and probably would not survive, but my heart told me to help him, as he was the grand-son of my dead brother." As tears came to her eyes, she added: "What I resent is that neither the caciques nor FUNAI officials have ever looked at my suffering."

This chapter has examined the impact of physical dispossession and environmental degradation on the Guarita Reservation and its effects on the Indian community. I have argued that the most devastating consequence of this process has been despair, which in turn has produced internal fissions within the Indian community and the corruption of

Indian leaders. Competition for land in this context has led to further violence, especially against women. Contributing to this has been the nature of Guarita land tenure, which facilitate leaders's abuses, such as to claim reservation lands as their own. The following chapter will take up the issue of non-Indian land claims, especially those between 1940 and the mid-1970s, when state directed developmentalist, integrationist and repressive policies were carried out.

Chapter Four

NON-INDIAN LAND CLAIMS: The Preponderance of the State Power - 1945-1975

... it seems reasonable that while transferring the Guarita and the Nonoai toldos' [Indian reservations] Indian affairs to the federal government, RGS state should reduce their lands (Ramos 1941b: 3).

Introduction

In this chapter I examine non-Indian claims on Guarita Reservation lands and the complex processes that the articulation of these claims set off, with an emphasis on developments from the early 1940s through the mid-1970s. These claims emerged in a context marked by widespread capitalist transformation and at a time when a succession of different political coalitions dominated the northwestern part of RGS state. Whether associated with authoritarian or populist governments, these coalitions contributed to the dispossession of the Guarita Indians. Despite differences in political orientation, non-Indian claimants acted together against Indians in order to achieve their goals.

Diverse non-Indian actors in advancing their claims to Guarita lands did not take into consideration the fact that these lands constituted only a small fraction of the Indians' prior domain. Moreover, unrelenting requests for access to reservation lands by non-Indians generated a multitude of diverse and at times contradictory claims. For instance, while one proposal envisaged establishing a "state

forest" in part of the reservation lands, others requested the same lands for subsistence farming as well as commercial farming for the internal and international markets, which would be carried out together with cattle-breeding and timbering. Coupled with these was a land reform scheme and calls for the establishment of a mission and the creation of a unified Indian settlement. This range of uses proposed for the Guarita Indian Reservation reflects the diversity of non-Indian claimants, among whom were the state (acting through the SPI and the FUNAI), RGS government, local municipalities, granjeiros or capitalist farmers, timber interests, peasants, landless people, and some Christian missionaries. None of these claimants made any effort to balance their own interests with the Indians' land tenure and usufruct rights.

Those non-Indian claims on the Guarita Reservation lands reflected the economic transformation in the area, largely engineered by the state. The prevailing diversified and basically subsistence-oriented production was transformed under the impact of the emerging export-oriented economy in the mid-1960s (Massarolo 1977: 25). Export-oriented production, organized through the expansion of wheat and soybean plantations, began to spread in the area during the late 1950s (id.). The most direct and immediate outcome of this change was the overwhelming concentration of lands and wealth into a few hands, a process ratified by the

1964 Land Statute (Belatto and Coradini 1981: 156). As this chapter details, these developments threatened the very livelihood of Brazil's Indians. In the Guarita case, while the Indians' legal claim on the 23,403 ha-sized reservation set up in 1918 was not infringed upon (see Introduction, fn 2), a substantial part of the land was leased out or used by the SPI-FUNAI administrations and non-Indian leaseholders.

Land prices increased as non-Indian peasants, sharecroppers and tenants were expelled from areas adjacent to the reservation as a consequence of the emerging export-oriented production and the formation of large estates. Moreover, population pressure on Indian lands intensified. Around mid-century, as reflected in the 1950 census, the neighboring non-Indian population was still small: at that time, the Miraguai inhabitants were included in the population of Tenente Portela and Redentora, which numbered respectively 16,839 and 18,308 (FEE 1981). However, demographic pressure was on the increase from the mid-1940s and accelerated in subsequent years.¹ In the early part of 1944, the Indian population numbered merely 614 (SPI-PI Guarita 1967-1944); 20 years later, when the SPI was replaced by FUNAI, it had increased to 1,118 Kaingang and

¹ As mentioned above, a major population influx occurred in the area in 1940. A total of 90 families are reported to have arrived at Pari, the current Tenente Portela, most of whom were the sons of non Portuguese European immigrants (Ruschel et al. 1980: 9).

Guarani (id.).²Throughout this period, the Guarita Reservation was defined as a new frontier of "free lands."

Authoritarian and populist governments alike supported non-Indian claims on reservation lands while simultaneously promoting the overall economic transformation of the area and the dispossession of the Indian population. The Vargas dictatorship, a succession of populist governments and the military regime imposed a developmentalist and integrationist policy on Indian affairs (Davis 1977; Oliveira 1972; Ribeiro 1977), which was underlined by repression. This type of development ended up favoring non-Indian claims on Indian lands and resulted in the appropriation of Indian land and exploitation of local resources by non-Indians. As a consequence of these developments, the Indian population experienced impoverishment and deprivation, when they were not exterminated altogether. Oliveira (1972: 62) even points out that "it never occurred to Brazilian officials that the praxis of this politics carried in its own entrails almost a total suppression of these societies' self-determination."

One must also note that no major tension existed between the two state levels--the national and the regional.

² From 1944 to 1967 the SPI local administration provided monthly censuses of the Guarita Indians, but for most of the period the Guarani were counted together with the Kaingang, which constituted the majority of the population (SPI-PI Guarita 1967-1944). One of the first counts of Guarani appeared in 1947, when an official listed 69 Guarani along with 660 Kaingang (Lima Filho 1947: 4).

³ In fact, while supporting government development policies, the SPI never championed RGS Indian land rights, in especial when they were being threatened and or suppressed by local governments (Vasconcelos 1941b).⁴ As Westphalen stated, "the SPI did not hinder the monstrous plundering. It seems to have become neglectful in this painful unfolding of events" (1963 in Simonian ed. 1979: 92).⁵ Since the SPI administration was imposed in Guarita, the Indians faced all sorts of abuse, violence and brutality.⁶

What made the Guarita Indian lands so desirable were the timber resources (pines and other varieties), the agricultural potential, and the availability of cheap Indian

³ The RGS State was administered through a federal intervenor--Gal. Cordeiro de Farias--who worked under the direction of and together with the federal government, then dominated by the Vargas dictatorship. Though tension existed between the Gal. Cândido M. da S. Rondon, the dictator and the intervenor (Macaulay 1979; Ribeiro 1977: 144-145), whatever disagreements surfaced did not concern the ways in which the RGS state Indian lands were handled; on the contrary, basic agreement existed on this issue. Gal. Rondon himself had supported harsh anti-Indian policies and actions while in office (Azanha 1987; Lima 1987b).

⁴ As president Vargas decided to support the SPI policies and activities in the 1940s (Ribeiro 1977: 147), the Guarita and the Nonoai reservations also came under its jurisdiction.

⁵ Such reprehensible conduct was clearly displayed by the SPI and the FUNAI administration in connection with the threats on the Guarita, and the expropriation of Nonoai and Serrinha Indian lands in the early 1940s.

⁶ People recalled that Vargas visited the Guarita Reservation in 1950 (Zero Hora March 28, 1991: 29), when the SPI local plantations were expanding. One can only speculate as to Vargas' feelings at that time, after he had killed two Kaingang in the nearby Inhacorá Reservation.

labor. Thus, the multitude of claims on the Guarita lands must be set against this economic scenario. Their anti-Indian character, in turn, was boosted by the federal government and RGS' increasingly anti-Indian attitude. On the other hand, although numerous attempts aimed at expropriating the Guarita Reservation lands from the Indians failed, in the end leasing practices facilitated the growing number of piecemeal land appropriations by non-Indians.⁷

In the following sections I suggest that despite their heterogeneity, non-Indian claims on the Guarita Indian lands shared a number of common features. The state's constant presence throughout the Indian growing dispossession, both as claimant and as a supporter of non-Indian claims, played a major role from the very beginning. Moreover, all claimants have consistently stressed that the Guarita Indians had "too much land" which was "magnificent for agriculture." Due to their "laziness" and "idling" if not outright "savagery," these Indians did not deserve the reservation lands (sic). Such ideological arguments, I suggest, gave a real boost to all non-Indians claims and fed right into the aggressive methods through which claimants sought to appropriate Indian lands.

⁷ Indeed, neither the state nor other non-Indian claimants ever gave up their claims on the local Indian lands. By the mid-1970s these claimants occupied almost half of the local Kaingang and Guarani lands, whereas Indians were losing control over a growing number of hectares.

The Creation of "State Forests" on Reservation Lands

This and the following sections discuss the establishment of state forests on Indian Reservations and the reasons why such a project did not materialize in the particular case of the Guarita Reservation.

The idea of constituting "state forests" in proximity to state Indian toldos was actually instigated by the government in 1925, through the "Instructions for the Forest Service." The first article outlined two possibilities for RGS state forests: they might be demarcated "within the boundaries of the Indian lands or [they might] include them [ed. i.e. Indian lands]...." (Gonçalves 1926: 439). This policy was not carried out during the 1920s and 1930s probably due to both bureaucratic delays and or lack of necessary resources. However, as RGS state government implemented its forestry policy in the early 1940s, the second alternative was chosen.

This decision was certainly prompted by SPI instructions concerning the exploitation of local forests. The General Director's orders were implemented by the Nonoai SPI official who also favored promoting the exploitation of the local timber resources (Santos 1941; Vasconcelos 1941a). Godolfim T. Ramos, the director of RGS Land and Colonization Directorate, stated that RGS government should not allow lumber companies on reservation lands. Instead, it should create state forests within the Indian lands and reduce the

size of all toldos before turning the Indian affairs over to the federal government (Ramos 1941b: 3).⁸ The SPI voiced its objections to these proposals, but it did not do so with the vigor necessary to defeat them (Vasconcelos 1941b).

The decision to create state forests was certainly critical to the development of the lumber industry, which had gained a foothold in RGS state in 1919 and had been expanding ever since. Indeed, the report of the state Secretary of Public Works indicated that by 1919 the few remaining private woods surrounding the Guarita Reservation had been severely overcut. The same report also stated that the forests in the state northern area would have to supply the necessary lumber for local consumption and for export to Uruguay and Argentina (Pinto 1919: 444). As Jean Roche (1959: 55) discovered,⁹ after the spread of colonization, the state's original forests (that formerly comprised 41% of total RGS area) had been reduced by 1945 to just 17.5%. Therefore, by incorporating Indian woodlands within the newly created state forests, RGS public authorities were making them available for commercial ventures. At the same

⁸ A suggestion that, indeed, would be followed in the next decades by different state governments; see especially Simonian, in press. Ramos certainly acted as the main proponent of this anti-Indian policy, though other state officials also played a significant role: Ataliba de F. Paz, João Dahne, Luiz Fagundes, Artur Ambros, and Octacílio Ribas (SENAIC 1941b).

⁹ See this same author (1959: 56) for maps showing the spread of lumber mills in the area between 1916 and 1950.

time, they were also opening other publicly controlled wooded areas to private exploitation.

As a way to achieve the proposed goals, state Secretary Ramos revived both the "vanishing Indians" and the "excess of land" arguments, suggesting that a shrinking Indian population controlled an oversized land patrimony (Ramos id.: 2). He noted that the Guarita population consisted of only 690 Indians and about 172 families but omitted a chickenpox epidemic that had devastated the local population (Almeida 1941a: 12) and had spread as a result of the authorities' total neglect of health conditions among the Indians. Although both illegal and unconstitutional, RGS government determined that each Indian family would be assigned a maximum of five colonial tracts of land. The authorities thus proceeded to dispossess Indians with full knowledge of the unconstitutionality and illegality of their acts, as reflected in Ramos own writings (1941b: 2-3).

The same Secretary even tried to convince both the SPI agents and the Indians of his supposedly good intentions. Thus, Ramos (1941a; see also Almeida 1941) insisted that state forests would continue as an Indian patrimony and would prevent any further devastation of Indian lands. Moreover, the Indians would be neither resettled nor bothered (Almeida id.); the "state forest" would simply be supervised by the Forest Service of RGS state. Although Paulino de Almeida, the SPI higher agent in south Brazil at

that time, suggested some amendments,¹⁰ he eventually agreed to the state claim and supported Indian dispossession (Almeida 1941 in Ramos 1941a). The Serrinha¹¹ and the Nonoai¹² "state forests" were thus created, despite Indian resistance (Ramos 1941b: 1-3; Santos 1942).¹³ The total land loss imposed on RGS Indians constituted 27,242 hectares (SENAIC 1941).

None of Ramos' proposals supporting forest protection and the usufruct to the Indians were transformed into reality. Both the Nonoai and the Serrinha "state forests" were, in fact, further devastated and or expropriated by non-Indian claimants, whose actions were, in most instances, subsequently ratified by RGS government. In the Serrinha

¹⁰ Accordingly, each Indian family would need a minimum of 100 hectares, plus 50 hectares to each bachelor over 18 years old.

¹¹ This Indian toldo was located in the RGS center north area. It was demarcated with a total of 11,970 hectares in 1911-1912 (Simonian in press; 1981). Of this total, 6,623 hectares were transformed into a "state forest" while another 622 hectares were expropriated by the RGS state to constitute private property, which had been claimed since the nineteenth century (id.).

¹² This reservation is located in the RGS northern area. This reservation underwent a second demarcation in 1911-1912, ending up with a total of 34,908 ha. In 1941 19,997 ha were transformed into a "state forest." As the Guarita Reservation it is also inhabited by Kaingang and Guarani, who amounted about 1,600 in 1989 (FUNAI 1989). The Guarani arrived in the area by about the late 19th century (Simonian 1981), under similar conditions of those who settled in Guarita.

¹³ The state government later on ratified the creation of these two state forests (Jobim 1949).

case, the forest was invaded and devastated. Eventually, this particular state forest was terminated and its lands redistributed among non-Indian squatters (Meneghetti 1958). Somewhat later, the Nonoai forest was also invaded by peasants, following the Brizola governor's decision to reduce its size in order to favor a "land reform" program (Brizola 1962; Decreto 13.795 1962).¹⁴ In the early 1960s, a total of 2,499 ha. was separated from the "state forest" in order to create the Seção Planalto settlement. This process was linked to the government's lending support to the claims of landless people when they were being expelled from former possessions, as hundreds among them chose to remain in RGS and began to pressure for the termination of Indian lands.

The illegality of the 1941 dispatch was revealed later by some state politicians and indigenists. Dutra et al. (1968: 322-323, 328) and Westphalen (in Simonian 1979: 129) stated that nothing was done to reinstate the Indians who lost land. Schwade and Lisboa (1968) defined the 1941 act of RGS government as a manipulative strategy, which allowed the government to conveniently use the Indian lands for its land reform schemes. Despite these criticisms, these authors fail to emphasize that the imposed policy had been considered viable earlier nor do they explain why the Guarita

¹⁴ Between 400 to 500 families invaded the Nonoai Reservation in the early 1960s (Machado (1963: 6), though this invasion was rather undertaken upon the "state forest," precisely in the Passo Feio's area (Funk 1979 in Simonian 1981: 140-141).

Reservation's proposed state forest was never established.

The actions of state authorities in these areas went beyond the dispossession of Indians, as the SPI and RGS state agents not only intimidated the Indians but even used brutality against them. In Serrinha, the Indians were resettled in other Indian lands and repressed; some individuals were imprisoned and the houses burned of those who rebelled (Simonian 1981). In Nonoai, Indians from the Campina da Pedra, Passa Quatro, the Passo Feio and the Péi-Kār villages were also forced to resettle. Though Fagundes (1952: 1) says that no violence was perpetrated against Indians, in the Péi-Kār case the Kaingang resisted and kept most of their former possessions despite suffering persecution and violence, mostly from the state guards (Simonian id.: 106-109). More recently, the Nonoai Indians reconquered most of the previously expropriated "state forest" (Correio do Povo February 15, 1992: 01).

Why a State Forest was not Created in the Guarita Reservation.

As soon as the SPI took over the Guarita Reservation administration in 1941, RGS government did not waste any time and immediately lay claim to its lands. This was couched in an ecological argument: RGS federal intervenor Gal. Cordeiro de Farias' proposed in a 1941 "administrative dispatch" a reduction of almost a third of the Indian lands

in order to create a "state forest" (Farias 1941). In the proposal, a total of 7,283 hectares in the northwestern part of the reservation had to be set aside for this enterprise.¹⁵ This "state forest" was demarcated in 1942 by the North Land and Colonization Commission (Machado 1942: 12; PTG n.d.).¹⁶

The creation of the Guarita "state forest" was never officially endorsed by any of the governments of this period; however, no official argument can be found to explain why. Almeida (1941a: 11) indicated that the area had been demarcated by RGS state but also mentioned that no further steps were taken by state officials with regard to finalizing the constitution of a "state forest" in the area. In 1963, the director of the State Land and Colonization Directorate (Machado 1963: 3) stated that "despite the fact that the area destined to the forest reservation was demarcated, no legal act was issued in this respect. Thus the size of the *toldo* remained unchanged." This, however, hardly constitutes an explanation.

The Guarita Kaingang, in turn, have stated that their lands were not effectively dispossessed because there were other forested lands in nearby areas. Local Kaingang reasoned that RGS state had not expropriated their lands and

¹⁵ 15,900 ha would remain with the local Indians.

¹⁶ The state forest proposed limits were the Guajuvira, the Irapuá, and the Antas streams and the Limeira and Pacas streamlets (Machado 1942: 12).

woods because, by then, the Turvo Forest Park had been created by the state using the remaining reservation forests.¹⁷ Furthermore, it appears that resettlement would have been a complicated matter given that, by the early 1940s, Indians were living in scattered settlements in the areas adjacent to Tenente Portela.¹⁸ Though this later factor may have saved the Guarita lands from dispossession, similar conditions did not produce the same result in the Nonoai and in the Serrinha cases.

The preservation of the Guarita Reservation surely resulted from the coexistence of other claims. For example, by then the SPI had come to consider the local woods as a crucial trump card in achieving its economic goals (Vasconcelos 1941a). It is also possible that the SPI may have struck a compromise with the state authorities: while the Nonoai and the Serrinha "state forests" were transferred to RGS state, the Guarita remained under SPI control. While such a deal may have indeed saved the Guarita Reservation lands and woods from RGS attempt to create a state forest, it could not prevent their destruction. Be as it may, such an arrangement enabled the SPI to claim the right to exploit

¹⁷ Despite the alarming devastation of the RGS northern area, the Turvo Forest Park was officially created in 1947 (DTP 1988: 38).

¹⁸ The SPI Guarita official was recalled by local Indians, for instance, for instructing the Indians to expand and install themselves along the demarcation line, in the northwest part of the reservation, exactly where the "state forest" was proposed.

them in the near future. This indeed would be systematically pursued later by the FUNAI administration.

The Limitless "Magnificent" Lands for Agriculture

A "wilderness" was rediscovered within the Guarita Reservation in the early 1940s, both by public authorities and first or second-generation European immigrants who were still coming to the area. Indeed, since that time, these lands, which were considered to have great agricultural potential, have been claimed by a great many groups and organizations for farming. In this respect, the SPI's view was paradigmatic in its emphasis that the Guarita Reservation "lands are magnificent for agriculture ..." (SPI 1945-1950 in Laytano 1957 VIII: 100). At approximately the same time, the economy underwent a phase of expanded capitalist development under the aegis of an authoritarian government. The ensuing political economy and ideological framework constituted the bases for Indian dispossession on the Guarita Reservation--which is still continuing today--and the perpetration of brutality against the Indian population.

Since the early 1940s, the state, through the actions of the SPI and the FUNAI, has systematically backed non-Indian claims on the Guarita lands. The SPI and the FUNAI, in turn, have invariably sided with politicians and missionaries, local farmers, peasants and the landless non-

Indian population who wanted to use Reservation lands for farming activities. The corollary of this policy was total disregard for the legal and constitutional rights of Indians. As a consequence, their lives were demeaned, their labor exploited, their land and its natural resources ravished. The development policy which was at the base of so much destruction was implemented through the SPI-FUNAI Indian post farms--the *roças do posto* or *roças coletivas*, and the FUNAI-DGPI-CTI.

The establishment of non-Indian farms was not the only thing that eroded Indian tenure on Reservation lands: leasing and service contracts played a big part, too. Initially, these contracts were drawn up between the SPI-FUNAI and non-Indians (without Indian involvement or consultation). Later, the same contracts were drawn up and signed between non-Indians and individual Guarita Indians or their leadership (see Chapter Six). Non-Indian sharecropping, squatting, and border trespassing also constituted ways of establishing a claim on the Guarita Reservation lands. All these methods shared an authoritarian and anti-Indian character.

Indian Post Farms

The SPI established the Indian post farms, *roças do posto* in the Guarita Reservation lands in 1941, allegedly

established in order to create a fund, the *renda indigena*.¹⁹ In 1942 a total of 31 hectares were cultivated by the Indian post (Almeida 1942a: 56).²⁰ These farms, originally introduced by the SPI both as a stimulus and a way to raise funds for the Indian affairs self-sufficiency, continued under FUNAI control from 1967 on (Guedes 1957; Oliveira 1972: 64).²¹ In the Guarita Reservation, the monies for the fund came from farming, Indian timber and labor exploitation (Moreno et. al. 1961). In the beginning, the Indians lost only a few hectares of land through these fund-connected activities, but the amount of land over which they lost control grew exponentially over the years. The SPI Directorate updated farming technology in 1952 with tractors and other farming devices and promoted industrial growth in the area (promoted local industries) (Malcher 1963: 21). The resources of the Indian fund produced by the Guarita and other Indian post farms supported this "modernization."

During the 1950s, the Guarita Indian post farms became famous in the entire RGS Northwest as a result of local

¹⁹ These Indian post farms were installed as soon as the first official, Arnaldo Gomes, arrived in the area.

²⁰ Though in 1941 the SPI local officials implanted *roças do posto*, Almeida (1941a: 14) reports only the total hectares farmed by both the Indian post and the Indians (400 in this case).

²¹ In 1957 the SPI director defined the Indian fund as the fund produced by the Indian collective labor, which should be applied to the country's entire Indian population and therefore not restricted to those who actually produced it (Guedes 1957).

products being shown in the rural production exhibits of the area, which were used by the SPI for propaganda purposes.²² In its 1954 annual report, the SPI president referred to Guarita Indians as having "a satisfactory production level" (id.). The same author also states that the bases of such a remarkable success were "Fertile lands, access to market and well oriented administration." Local farms contributed a large share of the resources to maintain the SPI South Directorate along with the farms of the Paulino de Almeida Reservation (Ribas 1971: 51).²³ These reports, however, were silent on the conditions under which Indians were made to work and the human cost of this production output, which ultimately did not benefit the Indian population.

Repression of Indian Labor

The Guarita Indians toiled under repressive and exploitative conditions under the supervision of SPI and FUNAI agents. This was the outcome of the ongoing development policy--conceived and implemented by SPI-FUNAI high officials and their agents--the outright repression of the Indian population. This policy toward the Indians in the

²² The Guarita Indian post received the second prize in the Ijuí's 1952 Corn Festival contest (ASDAP 1952). Other prizes were awarded to them in the 1954 Santo Ângelo National Corn Festival. On this occasion, they also received an "honorable mention" for wheat production and a "silver medal" for corn and bean production (Malcher 1954: 38).

²³ The present-day Cacique Doble Indian Post.

Guarita Reservation envisions a new model of the Indian affairs bureau policies--a repressive one--as it went beyond the "developmentalist" and the "protectionist" behavior, as defined by Davis (1977: 47-48). This repressive environment assumed an ethnic (Burgois 1989: 215) and or even racist dynamic and had a perverse nature.

A large number of incidents were linked to the claims made by non-Indians on reservation lands. According to Paulino (Pivetta and Pires 1969: 30), the SPI agent Romildo Ramos "beat the Indians who worked for him in the winter time...[they] only received food for their work." Silvio was also described as a "tyrant." As the Indians still recall, SPI agents forced them to work in cold wintery conditions, face long separation from their families, and eat spoiled and insufficient food. They beat Indians with gun handles, imprisoned them without trial, and even forbade them to care for the ill and or attend funerals. Due to such oppressive conditions, Indians remember these times as the "captivity" or the "panelão" system.²⁴ Here it is simply defined as oppressive Indian affairs.

The Kaingang, deprived of the material means for their own survival, could hardly feed their families. Due to these conditions, many left the reservation to settle temporarily in the neighboring rural areas. Some were alleged to have

²⁴ The Indians identify this labor force repression as the Panelão system, since all workers would eat from the same big pot. In Portuguese "panelão" means big pot.

practiced cannibalism, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Others were accused of stealing 3,200 kg of beans from the Indian post supplies (Machado 1960). The SPI official reported that Indians behaved irresponsibly in spite of the support they received in the form of seeds for their fields. However, he forgot to mention the deprivation in which they lived (id.). The local Guarani, on the other hand, have stated that they did not work for the Indian post enterprises. If they were eventually pressured to do so, they simply escaped to Misiones, Argentina, where they spent a season with relatives, and where they were not hunted by the SPI officials.

Leasing the Indian Lands

As part of its development policies, the SPI also maneuvered to lease the Guarita Indian lands to non-Indian farmers, peasants and landless people, especially for farming. As in the case of former claims, this was also seen as a strategy to produce resources for the *renda indígena* fund and to subsidize Indian affairs. Though Moreno et al. (1961: 14) referred to 1956 as the year of the first contract, leasing had actually started long before then.

Indians have in fact stated that they began leasing out the land in the mid-1940s, after numerous non-Indians had already been farming in their territory for a while. For instance, Hermes Caxambú, Afonso Molinare and Diniz Carlos

de Souza were listed in the SPI documents as holding three leasing contracts issued in 1948 (PI Guarita 1948a, b, c).²⁵ The amount of leased land was still small compared to later contracts. Furthermore, leasers often paid rent with a part of their harvest.²⁶ It is also possible that some leases, whose origin was listed as unknown in later documents, were first drawn up in the 1940s (Machado 1963: 2-3).

Since the 1950s, non-Indians who wanted to have access to these lands in order to farm on them resorted to a variety of tactics. Astolfo Braga reportedly entered a contract in July 1955, though no reference was made as to the amount the land or to contractual conditions (id.: 2). A year later, a leasing contract involving a bigger area of 300 hectares was signed (Carvalho, Arbo and Roewer 1956). The non-Indian farmers Waldomiro Arbo and Frederico Roewer organized the Granja Marta Rocha to grow soybean, wheat and corn and to raise pork.²⁷ In 1964 Frederico Roewer owed 3

²⁵ No reference to prior land-leasing contracts were found for the Guarita Reservation, though in many other RGS Indian lands such practices dated to the mid 19th century.

²⁶ According to these documents, they were leasing respectively 2.5, 7.5 and 2.5 hectares (id.). The percentage of the production was not given but rather the the total in kilograms. It was yet said that the gains were being both distributed to the Indians and used as the Indian post supplies.

²⁷ It was named in honor of the most famous Brazilian Miss Universe.

years worth of leasing dues (Land 1964: 5).²⁸ As he was paying a ridiculously small amount for the land leased, the SPI urged him to pay more; however, the outstanding payment was never collected (id.: 5-6).

Since the mid-1960s, the number of contracts and the size of leased land have grown constantly along with the abuses perpetrated by the non-Indian population, the SPI and the FUNAI officials. A few statistical surveys were carried out to assess the extent of the destruction and dispossession resulting from non-Indian farming. In the late 1950s, 201 non-Indian leasers were on the Reservation, though this number was reduced to 61 in 1961 (Moreno et al. 1961: 16-17). Due to claims and pressures by non-Indian landless peasants, new leases were issued and in the mid 1960 a total of 195 non-Indians were working there (SPI-PI Guarita 1969-1968). The replacement of the SPI by the FUNAI in 1967 did not modify this situation; on the contrary it favored the multiplication of non-Indian claims. FUNAI officials demanded the right to renew land-leasing contracts, and in 1971 about 290 to 300 local non-Indian leasers had their contracts renewed (FUNAI-DGPI 1971: 17).

The leases were renewed in spite of the high level of tensions and brutality that marked Indian and non-Indian relationships on the reservation. As far as the leasing

²⁸ He was then recounted as the Granja Marta Rocha's proprietor (id.).

contracts are concerned, in 1971 FUNAI officials noted that:

- 1) "The occupied areas are in general bigger than those declared in the contracts";
- 2) "Some leasers do not have payment receipts for former contracts and they sometimes contend that that they had paid with a part of their harvest";
- 3) "There is some collective land leasing";
- 4) "There are also land subleases";
- 5) "There is invasion due to FUNAI negligence primarily regarding land demarcation"; and
- 6) "In some cases there is incompatibility between non-Indian leasers and Indians" (id.).

These observations revealed both daily struggles and confrontations among Indians and non-Indians and stressed "under-the-table" and corrupt arrangements, intimidation and the use of force.

As the only option offered by the federal government to landless peasants was resettlement in the Brazilian Amazon, which most of them resisted, tensions were not eased. The 1973 Indian Statute rendered the land-leasing contracts explicitly illegal (Lei 6.001 1973: 18th article).²⁹ This statute determined that the Brazil's Indian lands could not be leased anymore, but it also included the possibility of extending the deadline (id.: art. 18; art. 62, 3rd paragr.). The legal text referred to this possibility as "exceptional" and limited the extension to a "reasonable" time (id.: art. 62, 3rd paragr.). The same statute proposed a 1975 deadline for non-Indian leaseholders to turn in their possession. In the case of the Guarita Reservation this was not respected.

²⁹ Until then the existing law did not explicitly prohibit the lease of Indian lands; this omission was used as an excuse by both the SPI and the FUNAI to do so.

The Tenente Portela authorities undertook another survey in 1973, and argued about the perils of imminent social tensions as a strategy to prolong the deadline of the contracts. It found 173 land-leasing contracts in the area, a great number of which was then held by the local elite (Prefeitura Municipal 1973: 1-5). Representatives of non-Indians and COTRIJUI traveled to Brasília along with local politicians to pressure the Interior Ministry into accepting their claim to continue farming on the Guarita lands (Jornal da Terra March 08, 1973: 1).³⁰ Such actions resulted in a new policy which ratified the postponement of contracts deadlines which, in turn, gave rise to a "leasing contract industry." At the time, Antonio Bresolin, president of the Agriculture Commission of the Federal House of Representatives, endorsed the local non-Indian claim and even became an active and successful campaigner for non-Indian claims (Correio do Povo January 31, 1973: 25).

As a way to postpone a pro-Indian decision, a federal and state joint work group was organized in 1974. The team worked with officials from different federal institutions such as the FUNAI and the INCRA and with agencies of RGS

³⁰ In this same year the COTRIJUI also produced a socio-economic survey among the leasers and squatters who were dispossessing the Guarita Indians and in the end decided to assume an anti-Indian policy as they supported the non-Indians, most of whom were associates.

government.³¹ In its final deliberation, the team declared that the law was clear and that the Indian lands should be evacuated. Non-Indian landless leasers were to be relocated to the Amazon colonization projects, a move which most of them resisted (GT FUNAI-INCRA-Governo do Estado 1975). The ones who had farming properties were to simply stop their activities on Indian lands. In the end, however, these decisions were implemented selectively or totally ignored: indeed, only smallholder non-Indians were eventually expelled from the area.

In the mid-1970s, the judicial and military authorities at the local level acted publicly in favor of non-Indian claims to continue working in Guarita Indian land. This was indeed the case of Tenente Portela's state judge, Luiz Arnaldo Bertanha de Souza Leal, who spoke out against the lease termination (FUNAI-PI Guarita 1975: Nº 193).³² A FUNAI judicial process against the leasing renewal continued, and in 1975 some merely symbolic measures were taken against

³¹ The team conducted a survey of Indian lands located within the borders of the RGS state and planned to review similar situations in the Paraná and the Santa Catarina states, where Indian lands were for the most part also leased and or invaded.

³² Many non-Indians left the Guarita Reservation lands in 1975 and dispersed into the nearby rural areas, migrated to cities, or tried to buy cheaper lands in Misiones, Argentina (Folha da Manhã September 09, 1975: 16). Those who moved to Argentina were soon repressed by the military dictatorship's agents. According to one of them, these agents invaded the homes of many in search of the guerrillas' "tupamaros," and often threw the Brazilians on the other side of the Uruguay River, even those with Argentinean children.

non-Indian leaseholders who controlled the largest areas inside the Reservation. This occurred even though the local Kaingang leadership travelled to Santa Rosa to request troops to guarantee their claims and rights (FUNAI-PI Guarita 1975). In a merely symbolic act Nilo Roewer - a former and the current Redentora mayor and yet a leaseholder of the Guarita Indian lands - was taken by military men to the Guarita Indian post, where, under a judicial notification, his farming was "paralyzed" (id.: N^os 196, 194). However, together with the other institutions involved, the military stopped the Indians from recuperating their lands. In addition, the Indians were not reintegrated into their possessions and non-Indians would continue to farm the same lands.

Non-Indian leaseholders of the Guarita Indian lands also pressured federal authorities for a solution. The Miraguaí mayor wrote to Brazil's President General Ernesto Geisel, asking for a INCRA resettlement of non-Indian landless leaseholders (Zero Hora May 25, 1975: 2-3). A commission was even formed by three of the richest local leaseholders - José Sharneski, José Pitt, and Benjamin Schwantes - who travelled to Brasília aiming to get a leasing contract renewal.³³ Rangel Reis was the very anti-

³³ Upon their return, José Sharneski declared that he had "a promise from a politician" that they would be able to continue working in the Guarita Reservation for at least three more years (Folha da Manhã September 02, 1975: 16). Sharneski planted 210 hectares of the Guarita Indian land in

Indian Interior Minister, who together with Gal. Bandeira de Mello, the FUNAI president, conceded the prorogation to non-Indian claimants (id.: October 06, 1975: 6). This decision was widely criticized. For instance, E. Schwade, then a CIMI agent, stated that the FUNAI administration was "only joking about expelling non-Indian farmers" (id.: August 08, 1975: 11).

By then the total of non-Indian leases decreased slightly in the Guarita Reservation, as many among those with resources began resettling to Mato Grosso or Paraguay, where lands were cheaper (see next chapter). Moreover, they could take advantage of economic incentives offered by the federal governments of Brazil and Paraguay, to those who elected to settle there. Despite this, local politicians and non-Indian claimants organized themselves and soon defeated the FUNAI attempt to get a judicial eviction against non-Indian leasers.

Non-Indian claimants also resisted termination of their leases through violence against the Guarita Indians. Though violence has been part of the local historical and social context ever since the European invasion, these mid-1970s non-Indian claimants certainly were inspired by abuses and brutalities of the military dictatorship when the most brutal aggression ever was unleashed against Indians (Câmara

1975, and harvested 12,400 bags of 60 kg. each of soybean and wheat.

dos Deputados 1978, 1971; Davis 1977). At the Guarita Reservation, the current wave of aggression was directed especially against the Kaingang, who claimed the land as theirs. It was at that time that the Kaingang Alcides Fague was slain by local non-Indians (see Chapter Three).

In addition to promoting non-Indian claims for farming and introducing the various practices connected to the *renda indigena* (such as the service contracts), the SPI administration also permitted (and even championed) the commercial exploitation of reservation forests. Indeed, the latter was an integral part of the overall development strategy. As already mentioned, the SPI president had supported the exploitation of local woods in the early 1940s. Since that time, abusive practices have been the rule on the Guarita Reservation (Vasconcelos 1942). At the very beginning of this administration (1941), the Indian post chief had stated that only the companies and individuals already present on the reservation had a claim on the exploitation of timber (Gomes 1944). However, as non-Indian claims to farm on these lands increased over the following decades (Correio Serrano July 16, 1952; Moreno et al. 1961), local woods were cut down to clear new tracts of land to the advantage of non-Indian interests.

Indian Land and Service Contracts

The SPI insisted that the Guarita Indian lands be put

up as payments to honor "service contracts." Service contracts refers to the practice, started in the early 1950s whereby the SPI would entrust non-Indians (usually farmers or cattle-breeders) with service work connected to the management of the reservation. This illegal practice increased dispossession of Indians, as non-Indians were paid with access to tracts of reservation lands. These "service contracts" were presumably made on the basis of personal relationship, since there is no record of public bids. These contracts were primarily thought of as a way of saving the resources of the *renda indígena*.

The first known contract was established in 1953 and involved tasks of inspection in the northern area of the reservation. In this case it was signed by the SPI agent Alísio de Carvalho and the non-Indian Altino Machado, a "true Caboclo," as he recently defined himself.³⁴ The latter's job was to prevent trespassing by non-Indian squatters, hunters, and fishermen. As payment he was granted the use of Indian lands which would enable him to establish himself as a farmer and pork raiser. According to Machado's own statement, he never fulfilled his contractual obligations--only the last part of the contract was carried

³⁴ Machado, born in the distant Estrela municipality, was 85 when interviewed in 1990. He told me that he had arrived in Tenente Portela in 1953, after a long experience as a rural daily worker and with squatting, violence, and expulsions.

out.³⁵ Some Kaingang living in that part of the reservation witnessed Machado's other anti-Indian attitude and one reported seeing piles of wild animal fur in one of his storage houses in the Guarita river waterfall. Machado not only hunted for fur but also smuggled it into Argentina where, at that time, he sold timber.³⁶ Indians still recall that he paid very low wages for their labor, exploited their land and woods for free, and that he occupied more land than he was assigned in the service contract.³⁷

Machado also transformed himself into an "agency" for the recruitment of peasants, sharecroppers, and landless people, whom he would then help settle in the area as leasers or invaders. Some even became rich through the

³⁵ However, he made "good money in the Indian reservation," where he lived for 28 years. Most of this money, he said, was spent on hospital care in the state capital, due to his second wife's illness. There he exploited 72 *alqueires* of lands and grew corn to maintain his pork-raising (*alqueire* is a portuguese measure for liquids and grains equal to 13 liters, 52 hectoliters, or approximately 13 kg and 52 grams [Pérez 1901: 506]). Machado also sold timber, which he claimed to have bought from local peasants who were clearing their land. During the interview, Machado insisted that these peasants had possessions or small properties located outside the Guarita Reservation demarcated limits.

³⁶ He is also remembered for being "a fine robber" and supporter of other invaders and thieves. Machado in fact told me that he used to cover up the crime of those he caught red-handed, as in the case of the Velho Vaida. This was the owner of the Yucum Hotel in Tenente Portela, who used to steal lumber and hunt for fur on the local Indian lands.

³⁷ In contrast with the Indians account, Machado stated that he usually contracted Indians to work but "always paid the just price."

exploitation of these lands and or famous due to their involvement in local politics. He mentioned specifically the Lorenzon brothers, who used to live as sharecroppers in the São Pedro village. In addition to acquiring numerous estates and stores, one of them, Amadeus Lorenzon, became the mayor of Miraguaí and one of the leaders of the local anti-Indian politics.³⁸

Though Land (1964: 5) mentions the existence of another service contract in the Guarita Reservation in 1964, he does not include its starting date. This one involved the tasks of cattle care on Indian post, milk distribution to the Mato Queimado's Indians, and vigilance of this area's border. The non-Indian contractor was João Rodrigues. He did not receive a cash wage but was instead granted the use of Indian lands for farming, a decision then made by the SPI officials, which did not involve any Indian participation (id.).

A similar contract, well known in the area, involved access to both credit and transportation in exchange for Indian land to farm and raise cattle. It was arranged by the SPI agent Alísio de Carvalho and Santos.³⁹ The latter

³⁸ In a 1990 public meeting in Miraguaí, I witnessed Amadeus Lorenzon to acknowledge that he had lived inside the Guarita Reservation and exploited its lands and resources from 1966 to 1972. Later it also came out that he had continued working in the area until at least the mid-1980s.

³⁹ Santos died soon after I interviewed him. Another meeting had been planned with this informant, in this case to expand on the issues raised in the previous interview. After he passed away, one male Kaingang of the same age who was well acquainted with Santos told me: "If you want the

recounted that he indeed became a rich man and a powerful politician thanks to his work on the Guarita Reservation.⁴⁰ This was made possible by the exploitation of cheap Indian labor and land. According to various reports, this contractor fulfilled his obligations with the SPI Indian post. However, it is suspected that he was abusive to the Indians and involved in wrong-doing. As to his obligation to provide credit to run the Indian post, evidence suggests that he did so but at excessive prices and or interest. He was also accused of having transported Indians on SPI orders to be beaten and abused.⁴¹

truth, he should have gone earlier. He was very experienced in deceiving and abusing us. He made a lot of money from that."

⁴⁰ For decades after 1926 his father carried on the family's livelihood in Irapuá on the basis of selling liquor to the Indians (Almeida n.d.: 11). Therefore, he was very experienced with the local anti-Indian environment. As an independent entrepreneur and cattle-rancher, he invested all his profits in land in the Mato Grosso state, where he had large estates for cattle raising. He was also among those who signed a 1984 Tenente Portela's City Council document (see next chapter) threatening and intimidating the Guarita Indians.

⁴¹ Local Indians have said that he helped the SPI agent to do this in the early 1960s. They also stressed the incident in which they arrested the Kaingang Getúlio Amaro in the Mission village, who the SPI official had accused of stealing the bean production of the community; however, this should be seen as "taking back" part of what had been taken from the local Indians. Durval A. Machado (1960) reported what was possibly this same theft to the SPI 7th Inspeactory. The only beneficial services he reportedly provided were transporting sick Indians to the Braga, other hospitals, or neighboring cities and bringing supplies to the Indian post.

Non-Indian Claims to Cattle-Raising

Though in the mid 1900s farming was by far the more important activity in the area, the SPI and a number of non-Indians utilized the Guarita Reservation lands for cattle-raising. The area within the reservation that was appropriated for this purpose were the plains that had been formerly used by RGS state official Cap. Ferraz. The records show that in the 1940s, the SPI official Arnaldo M. Gomes was struggling to raise a herd.⁴² The same plains were also exploited to pay for "service contracts" by cattle or pork raisers.

The SPI was involved in cattle-raising primarily to increase the funds for the renda indígena. In this regard, although Indians were told and lead to believe that the herd eventually would belong to them, this proved to be a mere fiction. At most, they received a few head to eat on "Indian Day" parties, but since such parties were under local SPI sponsorship, the best pieces were invariably reserved to the local non-Indian authorities, who were invited to the barbecues held on these occasions. Furthermore, only those Indians living close to the Indian post headquarters in Irapuá received any milk. If this was not bad enough, at

⁴² In this regard, although there is evidence that he attempted to procure the barbed wire necessary to fence the cattle, there does not seem to be any record as to the size of his herd.

some point the SPI officials were charged with stealing the cattle belonging to the Indian post.

The Guarita Reservation Lands for Land Reform

The state government, operating either alone or in concert with non-Indian claimants attempted, on various occasions, to initiate "land reform" projects on the Guarita Reservation lands. Such attempts were made in 1943, 1961, and throughout the 1970s. These projects reflected the state's reluctance to interfere with the dominant latifundia system of the time. In 1960 RGS governor Leonel de Moura Brizola expropriated only the area known as Banhado do Colégio to implement a limited land reform scheme. Furthermore, the anti-Indian land policies of RGS state did not change and in this regard the government's political orientation was inconsequential (Simonian, ed. 1979: 49). In the end, RGS state reduced the local reservations by thousands of hectares.

The official report regarding the attempted 1943 land reform indicated that it was not the first time that the down-sizing of the Guarita reservation had been suggested. Though no specific evidence was found of a "landless people's movement," it is certain that the non-Indian residents of the area were constantly seeking access to the land (DTP 1988: 12). It is probable that newcomers to the area pressured local authorities to grant them access to the

Guarita Indian lands.⁴³ Eventually, a proposal was advanced to redistribute 3,125 hectares of Indian lands. This land would have been subtracted from the remaining 15,900 hectares if a state forest had materialized on the Guarita Reservation (Farias 1941; Machado 1943: 2). If both the state forest and this redistribution scheme had been implemented, the Guarita Indians would have been left with only 12,775 hectares.⁴⁴ In later years, this attempt at downsizing the Reservation was cited to legitimate non-Indian claims on Reservation lands, as attested to by records which often referred to "the Guarita Reservation's excess of land" (see Chapter Five).

In the early 1960s, Antonio Bresolin, a RGS State Assembly representative, presented an enlarged plan for a state "land reform" to be carried out on the Guarita Reservation (Correio Serrano September 16, 1961).⁴⁵ A

⁴³ They might even lay claim to these lands with state officials, when these were in the area demarcating the proposed state forest. Note that at the same time Francisco V. dos Santos (1942/13/01), the first SPI Nonoai chief, discovered a substantial mobilization of landless non-Indians close to the Votouro Reservation, which surely indicated a widespread mobilization to claim and dispossess the state Indian lands.

⁴⁴ This total results from the sum of 75 hectares of land proposed per Indian couple plus a total of 25 hectares to each of the single Indian males. Those 3,125 hectares of lands would have been distributed to 125 families, as a track of land for a peasant's small farm--*uma colônia de terra*--was then usually estimated at 25 hectares.

⁴⁵ Bresolin is from the RGS northwest. Throughout his political career, he showed himself to be not only a populist but a very anti-Indian one (Simonian 1981: 146).

landless people's movement was by then very widespread and strong as a result of democratic struggles and populist support (Simonian 1981). Bresolin's legislative initiative did not only represent his own personal political ambitions but also the interest of non-Indians in this northern region.

Such "land reform" initiatives at the expense of the Indian population reflected the wider historical and social-economic context, at a time when a growing number of non-Indian families were being expelled from the land and forced into leaving RGS state. After the 1950s, large numbers left for Brazil's northern region and Misiones in Argentina (Callai 1983; Roche 1959: 279).⁴⁶ Many of those who left in the early 1960s did so for political reasons (i.e, to avoid persecution and reprisals).⁴⁷

Those who stayed behind split and organized themselves in the Movement of Landless Farmers (MASTER) or in the Gaúcha Agrarian Front (FAG). The MASTER adopted a rather

⁴⁶ At that time especially into the Santa Catarina, Paraná and Mato Grosso states.

⁴⁷ They were persecuted because of their past membership in the leftist "group of the eleven," the grupo dos onze, some informants said. During the 1970s, however, they fell under the repression of the Argentinean military forces. Their houses and fields were searched for Tupamaros and many were tortured for suspected involvement in the Tupamaros movement (id.). A number of them left the RGS taking along some savings which they intended to invest in land and equipment in the new areas. Most of them, however, were destitute when they left and had only their labor to fall back on.

populist approach to land reform, and the FAG a conservative one.⁴⁸ Regardless of their political orientation, both organizations sought access to Indian reservation lands in the state. Indeed, the 1961 Bresolin plan called for redistributing a substantial amount of the Guarita Reservation land among landless people. Some 14,487 ha were claimed for redistribution, more than 50 percent of the demarcated Indian lands (Correio Serrano id.).⁴⁹ The city council men in Tenente Portela--Almeida, Salamoni, Noedi Pinheiro, Beno Frizzo, and Rivadávia Corrêa Borges--publicly endorsed non-Indian claims on the Reservation (Correio Serrano October 07, 1961).

A few RGS state politicians and professionals spoke out to support Indian land rights in an attempt to defeat such an anti-Indian proposal. Moisés Westphalen, a Comtean scholar denounced this legislative project as well as the SPI lack of action in 1962 (when the down-sizing of the reservations took place) (Simonian, ed. 1979: 72).⁵⁰ Some of Bresolin's peers also criticized his proposal. Paulo Brossard championed the contemporary legal and

⁴⁸ At the time, the MASTER was also known in the RGS northwest as the agrários, which includes landless people and peasants from nearby Guarita and Inhacorá areas.

⁴⁹ Bresolin was more ambitious, as through the same project 1,250 and 30,480 hectares were claimed for the same purpose from the Nonoi and the Cacique Doble reservations respectively.

⁵⁰ For his struggle in defense of the RGS Indians' land rights, see Simonian ib..

constitutional guarantees of Indian land rights (Correio Serrano September 16, 1961). Espousing an agricultural modernization approach, Jairo Brum also engaged in the defence of Indian rights (id.). Finally, Porcínio Pinto (id.) denounced Bresolin's use of the project as a demagogic strategy aimed at improving his chances of re-election.

The defeat of Bresolin's proposal in the plenary did not stop local non-Indians from seeking access to RGS state Indian lands (including the Guarita lands), and Bresolin never gave up his plan. A "land reform" project was imposed by successive RGS state governors (among them Leonel de M. Brizola and Ildo Meneghetti) throughout the last decades, (Meneghetti 1958; SENA 1961).⁵¹ Finally, at the time his proposal was defeated in the State Assembly, Bresolin was appointed Secretary of Agriculture in the Brizola government. From his new position, he was able to obtain the governor's approval for a broader plan calling for the redistribution of Indian lands to non-Indians (Brizola 1962).⁵² In 1961 Indian dispossession amounted to almost 50 percent of formerly demarcated lands.⁵³

⁵¹ For Brizola's persistent anti-Indian attitude, see Estado de São Paulo September 20, 1989: 5.

⁵² This time the Inhacorá, Serrinha, Votouro, Guarani, Cacique Doble and Ventarra toldos were effectively dispossessed.

⁵³ From an initial total of 120,323 hectares making up the demarcated or identified lands, by the mid-160s the RGS state Indians were left with just 47,733 hectares (Simonian, ed. 1979: 49, ftn. 135).

The Guarita Reservation was saved by the prompt action of some local agents including the Indians, after information on an imminent invasion was leaked. Indeed, in 1963 the Guarita lands came close to being invaded by hundreds of landless people, the agrários. This movement, organized by the Tenente Portela politicians, had planned to take possession of the Indian lands on October 7th (Machado 1963a: 1). However, when the Indian post chief was informed of the plan by Mário Calegari, a Tenente Portela merchant, he sought out assistance from the local state civil police, the Santa Rosa and the Passo Fundo military brigade (Machado id.: 2). Such a mobilization and the Indians' vigilance on the Reservation prevented the planned land invasion and as a consequence the landless people movement was aborted.⁵⁴ Though the Guarita Reservation was saved, RGS government plan and actions in other Indian lands should nonetheless be seen as a "pseudo land reform," as the author has argued elsewhere.⁵⁵

New claims to have the Indian lands distributed to non-Indian landless people were renewed throughout the 1970s. Two basic rationales have been at the bottom of this demand. The first one has referred to "excess land" or "land

⁵⁴ The six families who entered the reservation lands were expelled by the military (id.: 1).

⁵⁵ In this case, no further support was offered to the landless people; consequently, they were almost immediately expropriated by local capitalist entrepreneurs, farmers, and urban middle-class professionals.

leftovers" in the area.⁵⁶ This argument was promoted throughout the 1970s primarily by Joao Gheller Filho, a Tenente Portela lawyer who ever since has been considered responsible for reviving it (Celeiro 1978: 18).⁵⁷ Gheller has specifically claimed 3,125 hectares of the Indian lands, which should be distributed among local landless people, but he has failed, as he has not been able to build enough political support.

The other argument said "land reform" has pointed to the Indians' "nature," to "the people who belong to the forests." This viewpoint seems to have been engendered in the context of transference of former leaseholders of the Guarita Indian lands in the late 1970s to the Amazon region. Those non-Indians used to say that all Indians could be sent to that area, not them. Indian lands should then be distributed for local landless people.

As they persisted with their claim to distribute the Guarita Reservation to non-Indians, the same claimants orchestrated a plan to intimidate the Indians, in the hope that the Indians would abandon their lands. For example, in 1975 they spread a rumor about the presence of a "monster with big feet and ears" in the local woods (Simonian P.A.). Numerous descriptions claim that the monster was seen by

⁵⁶ See Chapter Four, for the roots of this claim.

⁵⁷ Gheller used to refer to himself as "the attorney of non-Indian leasers of the Guarita Reservation" (Simonian P.A.).

many local Kaingang, who viewed him as a new "Botocudo," one of those "savages" who used to come to devour them. Although more than a century has passed since the "Botocudos'" (Xokleng) last attack on the Guarita Kaingang (Konkó 1930 in Mendes 1954: 6), these Indians still fear their presence when they are under uncontrollable land pressure. This was indeed the case when this rumor was spread in the Guarita Reservation.

Numerous Kaingang escaped the reservation temporarily, exposing their powerlessness and the terrorizing they experienced. In this case, it was mainly the Kaingang from Irapuá who looked for refuge in the homes of non-Indians in the Irapuá town.⁵⁸ As panic spread, the state Military Brigade arrived to guarantee the return of the Indians to their lands, which some have said was done after a non-Indian scapegoat was indicted.⁵⁹ This military force did not guarantee rights to full possession to the Indians, nor did this event end the non-Indian demand to impose land reform projects in the area. Furthermore, it did not avoid the ongoing intimidation and violent non-Indian actions,

⁵⁸ While there, Kaingang women hoped to hide their Indian identity by wearing their long dresses on the reverse side, so the customary layered clothes would not appear. Together with non-Indian women, they washed their clothes in the Irapuá stream, but guarded by an Indian male escort.

⁵⁹ Local people have systematically pointed to Joao Gheller Filho as the head of this orchestration, who then would be representing the interests of local capitalist farmers intending to expand their leased areas within Guarita Indian lands.

primarily against the Kaingang.

The Plan to Unify RGS Indian Toldos

The plan to make the Guarita lands the only Reservation for all RGS Indians was articulated by federal and state officials in the mid-1950s during a time of mounting pressures for land (Carvalho 1954 in Correio Serrano 1954). This was actually an old project which had been taken up previously at both the provincial and state levels. It dated to at least the 1850s, when the the Nonoi Reservation was proposed as the site for a unified Indian settlement (see Chapter One). In the mid-1950s, RGS government was still considering the possibility of consolidating all toldos in one area, which was a way to "liberate" Indian lands for the growing non-Indian landless population (Simonian 1981: 138).⁶⁰

At the time, the Guarita Reservation was targeted as the site for the project probably because it was the largest reservation in RGS state. The resettlement of the Inhacorá Kaingang was immediately proposed. The deprivation of these Indians inspired the idea of a "vanishing people," which was used as the primary argument to justify dispossession, which the Indians resisted. Indeed, according to contemporary

⁶⁰ Due to numerous problems in the state Indian affairs system, Gonçalves (1930: 765) argued that the reservations' unification in one or two in each Land Commission area was suggested, "where all material, moral and social support could be better offered."

reports, the Inhacora Kaingang were alcoholics, infected with syphilis and tuberculosis, and suffered from a high infant mortality rate.⁶¹ The Inhacorá Kaingang's resistance to resettlement defeated the attempt to transform the Guarita Indian lands into a unified settlement. Nevertheless, the Guarita and the Inhacora Indian reservations were appropriated by non-Indians further on.

Claiming Indian Lands to Build a Mission

The IECLB pastor Norberto Schwantes has described the events that lead to the establishment of a mission on the Guarita Reservation in the 1960s. It all started with a solicitation to establish a school in a PI Guarita empty house, as at that time there was no official school on the reservation (Becker and Schwantes 1960). Cognizant that people of German heritage had taken over Indian lands, Pastor Schwantes decided that something should be given back to the Indians. In his opinion, such restitution could be made by building a mission on the reservation (Deckmann 1985: 110). Though this rationale was disputed within his own congregation, his project (i.e. the establishment of a mission) was supported by the church on an international

⁶¹ Numerous newspapers and magazines (Correio do Povo 1953; Folha da Manh 1954; Revista do Globo 1946: 26) reported the precarious condition of the Inhacorá Kaingang, using sensationalist titles such as "Inhacorá - the Village of the Drunk." These stories were also later used to sustain the "land reform" plan (Simonian, in press) which imposed a huge dispossession on these Indians.

level.⁶² The mission, founded in 1963 on Indian land, operated on the Guarita reservation until it was expelled by the Indians in 1985.

Other denominations have also requested land to build temples on the Guarita Reservation and have used local housing for their proselitising activities. Some pastors belonging to the Assembly of God have been known to farm these lands through individual enterprises as land leasers and or sharecroppers. They have been accused of working "to domesticate the Indians ..." and, in so doing, buttressing non-Indian claims on the Guarita Indian lands in connection with farming and other activities (id.). However, the IECLB was the only one among the many churches operating in the area that has sought access to Indian lands not only to put up a mission but to farm as well.

According to an agreement between the SPI-FUNAI and the mission, the latter was granted access to Indian land but committed itself to doing other work besides proselytism. Thus, the mission initially got involved in providing elementary education and community and nursery services. The first IECLB school was thus established in the Gamelinhas section (Machado 1961a: 5-6) and within a short time the mission compound was renovated and expanded in the Mato

⁶² Pastor H. Pfeifer (1965 in id.), for instance, said that "when he asks where the Indians are and what the German gave in exchange for all the lands, I answer that the government distributed lands, both to the Indians and to the German peasants."

Queimado section, which is known as "Missao Velha." In the late 1970s the mission expanded its activities, which required clearing new sites and land for farming.⁶³ In 1975 the CTPCC was established.⁶⁴ Two years later it co-sponsored (with RGS state government) technical agricultural training for Indian pupils and started modernizing its farming activities (Correio do Povo May 14, 1977).⁶⁵

The trainees of the agricultural school have stated that the lack of necessary inputs (equipment, seeds, fertilizers, etc) did not allow them to apply the new knowledge and techniques in which had been trained. Many among those who were trained as bilingual teachers did not get jobs; some other individuals only recently found employment in underpaid positions. Finally, Indians are known to complain about the lack of tangible benefits accruing to the community from the IECLB mission. According to the Indians' harshest criticism, "missionaries used to eat well, wear good clothes, and sleep well, and even had their own cars, but nothing of all this was for us." The same Kaingang also noted that they remained in the area but

⁶³ Indians in the area say that by then the CTPCC chosen site was still completely covered with the original forest.

⁶⁴ In this year an agreement was made between the IECLB and the FUNAI concerning the funding of the CTPCC activities in the Guarita Reservation (Deckmann 1985: 117).

⁶⁵ In that year a total of 24 Guarita Indians received training certificates, in soil correction and conservation and in other agricultural techniques.

"only to continue receiving dollars from abroad."

The influence of the IECLB mission has been huge. The presence of the mission has affected in particular the Kaingang leadership, which has come to view the development of their lands' productivity potential as their primary objective. Accordingly, Indian leaders have insisted that, in order to be able to regain control over their lands, all they needed to do was to implement intensive mechanized farming. Nothing was done to strengthen Indian land tenure and ownership rights. In fact, during most of its presence in the Guarita Reservation, the IECLB mission adopted a very conservative approach to Indian affairs in the area. In 1975 pastor Güttinger revealed that the IECLB knew that land leasing was illegal and harmful to the Indians.⁶⁶ He also explained that the missionaries could not take on this issue publicly, as the own existence of the mission depended on FUNAI's support.

Claiming Property on Guarita Reservation Lands

Though the limits of Guarita reservation had been set in 1917, non-Indian neighbors continued to claim tracts of land within reservation limits as lawfully theirs; this happens especially at the edges of the southern and northern borders. Most of these claimants trespassed the demarcated

⁶⁶ Note that these points were made by him after she witnessed his refusal to lodge Father Egidio Schwade, at the time a FUNAI *persona non grata*, for one night.

line and in so doing caused conflicts and tensions between the Indians and non-Indians. The state never intervened to solve these disputes (as would have been its prerogative) which can be taken as an indication that the authorities were clearly on the side of non-Indian claimants.

The Marroni family, for example, still claims land on the southern border of the reservation: a strip of about two hectares, located on the eastern side of the road linking Redentora and Miraguaí and another small piece or "end" further east. The two hectares were given up by the Marroni to comply with a 1984 decision following a 1981 conflict with the Indians.⁶⁷ They maintained their claims both on the "end" and on the western part of the reservation's southern border. A FUNAI lawyer, after examining their documents, concluded that these did not prove their claims (Pinto 1982: 54-56). More recently, an old mark was found that might be used to support their claim, but the Marroni family did not file a suit to resolve the remaining doubts.

S. A. Marroni has argued that the documents proving their land ownership rights were issued in 1890, a long time before the Guarita Reservation was demarcated. However, such a statement is very misleading, as the history of Indian dispossession in the area precedes the establishment of the reservation. In effect, Indian lands were appropriated both

⁶⁷ The Marroni sold this claimed land in 1984, when the Indians reacted.

by the sesmeiros Athanagildo Pinto Martins and José Joaquim de Oliveira, in the late 1820s, and by Laurindo Alves Ferraz with Walzumiro Dutra (Col. Bicaco).⁶⁸

Several other non-Indians have claimed property in the northern limits of the reservation. Benjamin Schwantes, Adelindo Varela (in the ABC section) and João Recliski--the 'Polaco'--(in the Aero clube section), for instance, were among those who claimed property on strips of land at the northern border.⁶⁹ Moreover, most of the non-Indians who own lands in the Lagoa Bonita section have also advanced claims on reservation land. These claimants have used the strips of land they have illegally occupied and some have even fenced them. Local Kaingang have stated that these claimants invaded their lands only to show off their power and humiliate them, since they have enough land for their rural businesses. The FUNAI administration recently re-drew demarcation lines on the Guarita Reservation using satellite instruments (a device largely used by the Sarney government as propaganda), but tensions and anger remain as these border problems were not consequently resolved. Though some

⁶⁸ From whom S. A. Marroni's father bought the family property in the west side of the Guarita Reservation.

⁶⁹ Benjamin Schwantes, a former Tenente Portela City Council representative and powerful local politician, not only claimed the local Indian lands to farm but became a leasor for decades. In 1979 he began to use an Indian path area as his property but was forced to leave by the Military Brigade (Folha da Manh July 06, 1979: 18). Later on he resumed the invasion.

Indians have expressed their desire to solve these disputes by simply destroying fences and repossessing the land, they have hesitated for fear of incurring the disapproval of official Indian leaders.

This chapter has examined examples of non-Indian claims on Indian land from 1940 to 1975 and has pointed out that anti-Indian policies developed under conservative or populist banners produced similar policies of dispossession. The unfolding of events described here leaves no doubt that such claims were one of the primary causes leading to the down-sizing and devastation of Indian reservations. The Guarita lands did not escape this fate as they were taken over by squatters, leased out and sharecropped. At least until the 1970s, the state controlled this process which primarily benefitted non-Indian interests, including farmers, peasants, sharecroppers, merchants, politicians and the Indian Affairs administration. In this regard, one must note that non-Indian interests were also supported by the 1973 Indian Statute. The following chapter will document such experiences since 1975, resulting in widespread deprivation and the emergence of a landless Indian population.

Chapter Five

NON-INDIAN CLAIMS ON THE GUARITA INDIAN LANDS: Continuities and New Configurations of Power, 1975-1990

The Indians of this state are *latifundiários* (V. Scherer, RCA Church Archbishop 1978).

These [Guarita] lands are too good for the Bugres, who do not farm. The government should give them to us and send them to the Amazon (Non-Indian squatter).

Introduction

Recent non-Indian claims on Guarita Reservation lands are summarized in this chapter, together with the changes that they have produced, especially from the 1970s on. Indian reservation lands continue to be federal property under the administration of FUNAI, giving Indians only tenure and usufruct rights, yet non-Indians have been persistent in their diverse claims to exploit them. In fact, they have been so successful in their efforts to farm on the Guarita Reservation lands, that they control about 50 percent of the total land area. In order to do so, non-Indians had to involve most of the Guarita Indians, but mainly the Kaingang. I shall argue in the next chapter that this collusive engagement has not only worsened the Indians' material conditions of life but also their pride. Here I will focus on anti-Indian historical acts undertaken by the state and non-Indians after the mid-1970s.

Farm lands became crucial in the RGS northwest, an already closed frontier by the 1950s, but more so with the

"developmentalist" economic policies of early 1970s. By then the military dictatorship had already established the policy of colonizing the Amazon (Santos, Lacroix and Schmidt 1981: 26). No change was foreseen in the local land tenure system characterized by land accumulation and widespread subdivision of land tracts. Most of the local non-Indian landless people and many who possessed capital did not want to distance themselves from the state of RGS or were afraid of the tropics. Many of those with capital therefore emigrated to eastern Paraguay in the 1970s (New York Times January 03, 1991: 17).¹ However, thousands of landless people were forced to move to the Amazon, many of whom at the time had been dispossessing the Guarita Reservation.

Still in this same decade, FUNAI agents struggled to act in a fully entrepreneurial manner as Oliveira (1972: 64) already noted. This trend was even supported by the 1973 Indian Statute, through which the authoritarian federal government turned Indian patrimony and labor into legally exploitable resources (Lei 6.001 1973: Tit. I, cap. IV; Tit. IV). Therefore, this statute served purposes other than to respond to international criticism toward Brazilian Indian affairs, as stressed by Oliveira Filho (1984: 19-20). In the case of Guarita Reservation, FUNAI officials and other non-Indian claimants demanded and struggled for access to this

¹ A total of about 250,000 Brazilians have migrated to this area since the early 1970s (id.).

reservation land, woods and Indian labor, which were conceived of as vital to guarantee both the *renda indigena* production and the local economy.² When Kaingang leaders took control of Indian lands to lease out in 1978, officials acknowledged the ongoing inequality in the process of land distribution (Gonçalves 1979), but continued to ignore the interests of the powerless Indians.

Throughout the two decades of the 1970s-80s, state agencies, municipal authorities, local non-Indian farmers, peasants and landless people have claimed Indian lands, primarily to transform them into productive ones. They follow their forebears' notion of taking "free lands", of transforming the frontier, a rationale implying that the last woods must be cut down and replaced by agriculture. As stated in the preceding chapter, the 1973 Indian Statute facilitated the accomplishment of such proposals by allowing exceptions so that Indian natural resources could be exploited (Lei 6.001 1973).³

Although most claimants have acknowledged that access to the Guarita lands should be achieved through land leasing, federal and state agencies acted in an

² Those officials excelled when engaged in the exploitation of local resources, which was achieved through plantations and repressive policies.

³ This was indeed the case for both the possible extension of the land-leasing contract and exploitation of Indian natural resources (i.e., lands, timber, mines) (id.: art. 20, 1st paragr., line f, and art. 62, 3rd paragr.).

authoritarian manner, as if recreating *conquistador* tactics, claiming the right to take possession and to farm. Local non-Indians claimants, including the municipal authorities, or "the mafia," as they are now popularly known, ended up developing what could be called an "industry" of leasing-contract renewal. These illegal tactics became a lasting paradigm for the politics of Indian land exploitation. In addition, some have claimed the lands for land reform, as private property, or based on tenancy rights.

As rural development policies continued to be implemented and expanded in the area, local municipal authorities have also claimed these same Indian lands for diverse public works, for example, from an airport and internal roads to garbage dumps and a tourism project. Beyond these diverse claims, the Guarita Indian lands were claimed by a private cooperative enterprise to receive its sewage. Though these claims did not produce as widespread a dispossession as those linked to farming, the struggles to guarantee their fulfillment have been disruptive, when not extremely tense, and with other claims, have primarily benefited non-Indians.

Local non-Indians and municipal governments have not only claimed the Guarita Indian lands, but have taken advantage of the economic definitions embedded in the Indian Statute establishing exceptions to Indian patrimony and labor exploitation. The claim that uncontrollable social

tension would possibly result in suspension of Indian land-leasing contracts was largely manipulated by local and state claimants and politicians. Most of these claimants and politicians have even asserted that the Miraguaí municipality "is going to vanish from the map . . .," if local farmers are prohibited from tilling reservation land. Other nearby municipalities have also made the same claim, though they have a lesser dependence on non-Indian production on Indian lands. No non-Indian, however, has accepted the possibility of retaining the Indians as the local producers.

A democratization process emerged in the 1980s and culminated with the "new republic" and the 1989 presidential elections. Though the new Brazilian Constitution (1988) highlighted Indian land rights, the structure of land tenure was not touched as non-Indian *latifundia* owners impeded a broad land reform, thus keeping the Indian lands as the ones most claimed by non-Indians (Simonian 1989). It was in such a context that both state and non-Indian claimants persisted in claiming Indian lands. Non-Indian claims were indeed even strengthened and involved diverse economic and political interests, such as farming, mining, timber, electrical power, roads, tourism, and military enterprises (CCPY 1989; Oliveira Filho 1988).

In the following sections I will describe the context of these demands, as well as specific transformations and continuities that they ultimately helped to produce. First

the claims for farming the Guarita Indian lands are emphasized, as they related to major social, economic and political changes, which certainly have gone beyond simple dispossession. Other non-Indian claims for access to the same lands are then analyzed in terms of their intrinsic contradictions, antagonisms and collusive goals.

Claims on the Guarita Reservation Farm Land

Non-Indian claims on Guarita Indian land for farming have indeed been prevalent since the mid-1970s. By then local farmers were widely incorporated into the soybean and wheat production process and struggling for more and cheaper lands. Because the local land tenure system was characterized by land concentration, thousands of peasants have been expelled from their small rural properties or possessions. With the support of local politicians, these farmers and landless people continued to demand and press for the Guarita Reservation lands to farm. The FUNAI administration has mostly upheld the SPI's former claims to use these same lands to farm, as they were expanding soybean and wheat plantations. This development has been promoted at the expense of Indians, who have not been supported in a way that would allow them to expand their own production.

Diverse rationales have been stressed to sustain such claims. Local non-Indian claimants have rarely considered Indians fit for agricultural work; they have instead

expressed prejudices about their ability to work. FUNAI officials have encouraged subsistence farming for the Indians, although they have then failed to support their efforts. Indeed, by the time seeds arrive in the area, most of the time it was too late to sow. One exception to this was an economic project for the Indians intended to emphasize farming production for the market, proposed by Bertini and Schwantes (1978). However, since this would have required the expulsion of non-Indian reservation leaseholders, which, as will be seen, did not occur for diverse reasons, the project remained on paper.

Non-Indian claimants have tended to stress the beneficial character of non-Indian farmers on reservation lands, both as "supporters" and as "educators."⁴ Connected with this reasoning is the assumption that the Indians needed time "to adjust, to prepare themselves to produce," as Jorge Porolnick dos Santos, a former and current Miraguaí mayor, emphasized (Zero Hora May 1st., 1984). In addition many local non-Indian farmers have been lately not only conservative but very aggressive toward the possibility of Indian engagement in farming their lands. While talking to me Ernesto Cassol reasoned that "this bunch of Indians will

⁴ Benjamim Schwantes (1973: 2), a former Tenente Portela mayor, stated early in the 1970s that "the presence of non-Indian leaseholders was always beneficial to the Indians." He further added that "beyond having the opportunity of work, they acquired knowledge in agriculture, one of the means to transform them into self-sufficient peoples" (id.).

die of hunger the day that land-leasing contracts terminate." He went on to predict that Indian extermination was a foregone conclusion due to their "laziness, idleness." Though the "captive system" was terminated in the area by about the mid-1970s, as pointed out in chapter three, Cassol himself has hired Indians and moreover relied on persistent prejudices to rationalize under-paying those whom he has continued to hire.

These negative attributions were ideological tools not only to assure differential and lower payment to the Guarita Indians, but to annihilate Indian self-confidence and especially to strengthen claims on their lands. Oliveira (1968) identified this process as "over-exploitation," which was enabled by ethnic prejudices. In the case of the Guarita, local Kaingang labor has, however been essential in the surrounding areas, yet it has been abused by both FUNAI officials and non-Indian farmers. Though some positive characteristics have been attributed to the Indians, who were eventually described by some as "hard" and "conscientious workers," these attributions serve the same purpose as most continue to be underpaid. The Indians do not have social security or other labor protection either, a fact which surely warrants a specific and independent investigation.

It was in such a context that non-Indians and the FUNAI administration continued to request Indian lands to farm,

despite the illegal and unconstitutional character of these claims. Despite the legal restrictions imposed by the 1973 Indian Statute (see Chapter Four), local non-Indian leaseholders received a renewal of their leasing contracts in 1973 (Jornal da Terra March 08, 1973: 1) and in following years. Moreover, many non-Indian leaseholders vigorously resisted the ongoing political and judicial decisions concerning the termination of Guarita Indian land leases and farming.

An explosion of tensions and conflicts emerged in the late 1970s in the area, all produced by the non-Indian resistance to lease termination. By 1978, for instance, the 1975 agreement on the lease extension deadline was applied only to poor non-Indians who were working in Guarita Reservation lands. They were expelled through judicial determination, but, together with the landless who were also expelled from other Indian reservations, they demanded to be resettled in RGS lands. This demand was supported by opposition politicians and diverse civil organizations. Among them were state assemblymen Aldo Pinto, Nerone Campos and Rospide Neto, the FAG, the Justice and Peace Commission of the CNBB, the FETAG (Zero Hora June 02, 1978: 24).⁵ The

⁵ Many of these politicians were accused by a high state official, Nerone Campo, of being themselves latifundia proprietors, who should distribute their land to landless people (Folha da Manhã June 10, 1978: 3). The State Assembly representatives Rospide Neto and Aldo Pinto had their names printed in the media as proprietors of huge rural estates, but the list did not do justice to the other numerous

state Archbishop of the RCA Church, Vicente Scherer, also supported the non-Indians and simultaneously campaigned against the Indians (Folha da Manhã June 29, 1978: 21).⁶

Poor non-Indian claimants and leaseholders tried to resist their eviction. They looked for support outside the area, especially from the state and federal politicians, since they aimed to defy the recent legislation. In fact, neither the state nor the federal government took measures against the latifundia, such as an aggressive land reform policy which could have solved their landlessness condition within the state. The present-day RGS governor, Synval Guazzelli, reiterated that "the state could not accommodate" the non-Indians being expelled from the Guarita and other Indian Reservations (Zero Hora June 10, 1978: 17). Local landless non-Indians then complained that they had been "abandoned" by both local authorities and capitalist farmers. They simultaneously accused the FUNAI and the Indians of protecting the interests of the capitalist leasing farmers.

Clearly the military dictatorship's Amazon colonization project (Martins 1980) favored the continuity of the prevalent land structure, as shown by the transfer of most peasants and landless leaseholders and claimants of the

latifundia owners holding positions in the State Assembly.

⁶ This archbishop then used a widely heard church radio program, "A Voz do Pastor," to campaign against the Indians, who he said had too much land.

Guarita Indian lands to the Amazon (by the Canarana Cooperative Ltda [Bertoni and Schwantes 1978]). As the Indians decided to expel the poor leaseholders, many threatened to invade Indian lands, and even accused the Indians of having submitted to the interests of Norberto Schwantes (Folha da Manha June 08, 1978: 18).⁷ The federal government and Schwantes were then accused of transferring people to areas already problematic in terms of agricultural production, and of serving the latifundia owners (Folha da Manha *ibid.*: 19; June 29, 1978: 21-22).⁸ Despite this mass resettlement, by 1981 local non-Indian landless people were again directing their pressures against the Kaingang, and were finally victorious. Since then, many of these landless people returned to the Guarita Indian land.

In contrast, rich claimants on Guarita Indian land could afford further mobilization, and even travelled again and again to Brasília. Once they pressured Rangel Reis, the Interior Minister, to renew the leasing contracts. A total of 60 families simultaneously prosecuted the FUNAI administration as a strategy to gain time, because having

⁷ This is the same IECLB pastor who started the church mission in the Guarita Reservation in the 1960s, as it was seen in chapter four. In a further written testimony Schwantes criticized the FUNAI and the IECLB because they did not struggle to keep the invaders out of Guarita (Schwantes 1984 in Deckmann 1985 115).

⁸ One would wonder about his support of the Indians, given that he and his associate had a project to privatize local Indian affairs (Bertoni and Schwantes *op.cit.*).

their claims in a *sub judice* condition their expulsion would be automatically suspended (Zero Hora August 31, 1978: 34). Some of these capitalist farmers, locally known as *granjeiros*, also migrated to Mato Grosso, where they bought huge rural estates for both soybean plantations and cattle raising. Most of them, however, had their contracts renewed by the Indians in 1978 (see next chapter). Wealthier leaseholders organized local tenants' associations and also worked with the Indians who ended up accepting the lease system (Zero Hora March 21, 1981: 25; Simonian 1980).⁹ In addition, the same leaseholders were already well installed as farming people in the Guarita Reservation, with almost no major challenge to their tenure, although they claim that they face daily tensions and Indian threats.

Throughout the 1980s these claimants maintained the same sort of struggles as a way to reinforce their claims to farm on the Guarita Indian lands. The FUNAI administration continued ratifying non-Indian claims since the 1973 Indian Statute's prohibition on the Indian land leasing had not been imposed. As justification of this failure FUNAI officials have referred to the federal government's lack of

⁹ Arnaldo Herрман (Miraguaí) and Alcides Shepp (T. Portela) have been leading these associations. While in the field I tried several times to talk to these non-Indian leaseholder leaders. I went to each of their houses twice, but they either were not at home or did not want to receive me. Once in Shepp's house I even waited while he butchered a sheep; as he never ended his task I left. I had to read his attitude as a silent no.

support (Zero Hora May 30, 1985: 33). Officials have also mentioned the rights of the Indians to self-determination, though in the Guarita case these rights have been recognized but to a small minority linked to the Kaingang leadership. Nevertheless, accusations of corruption and bribing acceptance have abounded in the surrounding area, suggesting lack of commitment on the part of the officials. This trend was not interrupted with the 1988 Constitution (231st art., 6th paragr.) proclamation on the nullity of any Indian land lease contracts. Even a recent federal judge's (Oliveira 1991) sentence on the Kadiwéu land lease contracts, in which he ratified the mandatory character of the constitutional determination has not been taken into account.

Local Mayors: Supporters and Claimants

Local mayors--most of whom were simultaneously leaseholders--have acted on behalf of non-Indian leaseholders of the Guarita Reservation lands. Jorge P. dos Santos, the mayor of Miraguai, has been said to have succeeded in corrupting the Indians, mainly the Kaingang leadership, who internally controlled the leasing system expansion in the late 1970s (see next chapter). Furthermore, Santos led the non-Indian claimant mobilization which maintained that system during the 1970s. He was not alone in this project.

Other local ex-mayors and mayors also became champions of such demands and pressures. Nilo Roewer, Benjamim Schwantes, Alcides Schulzeski, Amadeus Lorenzon, to name a few, were outstanding in that role. Specific arguments proposed by them varied, but all supported renewal of the leasing contracts. In so doing, they articulated the conditions for the "industry" of renewing leasing-contracts of Indian lands, which despite its illegality and unconstitutionality has persisted. Following the trend of the 1970s, this necessitated trips to both state and federal capitals (Zero Hora July 20, 1988).

In 1983, these policies raised considerable protest among those concerned with Indian rights. These included the ANAI (RS, Ijuí), FIDENE, local RCA Church and IECLB representatives, and a few RGS assemblymen and woman, who assembled both in Redentora and in Porto Alegre (Vigários e Pastores 1983; Abaixo-assinado 1983).¹⁰ There the matter of renewal was debated, but no agreement was reached. Local mayors requested a leasing contract extension until 1984, while all other participants restricted the proposed renewal until 1983.¹¹ New protests against the enduring

¹⁰ As was usual at that time, FUNAI officials promised to attend the Porto Alegre meeting, but did not appear.

¹¹ At that time the only dissident among the local politician and union representatives was the mayor of Tenente Portela, Lúcio Abelardo Mota, which might indicate his inability to neutralize Miraguaí and Redentora local power in controlling Indian land matters. Later on this former Tenente Portela mayor accused the Guarita Indian

dispossession of the Guarita Indians were made during the following years through judicial suits and formal denunciation to judicial authorities (Geiger and Guimarães 1986; Kunkel and Geiger 1984; Simonian P.A.¹²).

The encroaching municipal governments have, in fact, not only supported local non-Indian leaseholders, but have also raised their own claims to farm on the Guarita Indian lands, which, they have stressed, should be entirely tilled. Although these mayors have claimed these lands for other purposes too, their support has centered on non-Indian claims and on the importance of such production to municipal revenues. Many of these municipal governments have been exclusively headed by non-Indian leaseholders of and claimants to the Guarita Indian lands. Their interests, therefore, have gone beyond those of their constituent non-Indian leaseholders. When offering their support to local non-Indian claimants, they have done so in their own behalf. The same has happened when they have interceded at the state and federal level of politics, while attempting to get support for their demands.

The same local non-Indian authorities proceeded with their claims on the Guarita Reservation; by 1983 they were

leadership of keeping the resources provided by the leasing system (Liberal May 11, 1984). However, he did not say a word about the local non-Indian farmers and politicians, who were bribing and pressuring them to do so.

¹² These are documents respectively sent to RGS and to the Republic General Attorneys (Simonian P.A.).

urging federal intervention. By then their claims centered on the distribution of tracts of land for Indian families and on the liberation of the remaining lands for fixed leased contracts (Meliá 1984b: 238). In the following year, Jorge P. dos Santos, mayor of Miraguaí, returned with an old but efficient argument, proposing that non-Indians would need two more years before leaving, allowing time for Indians to prepare themselves to cultivate the land (Zero Hora May 1st., 1984). In addition, he supported those non-Indian leaseholders who demanded the right to farm the same lands for a longer term and, simultaneously, promised to improve the local material conditions through reforestation, the building of community dams, and soil recuperation. The continuity of the policies of dispossession and oppression against the Indians were presented rather as requirements for the Indians "redemption" from poverty.

Local mayors also became involved in convincing the current Indian leadership that the Indians, not FUNAI officials, should control the leasing system of reservation lands, since, from SPI times, these officials have often "vanished" with the money. The mayor of Miraguaí, Jorge P. dos Santos, has been called--the main articulator--of the takeover of the Guarita Reservation by the Kaingang in fact a success for non-Indians. In this municipality, similar struggles have continued, despite the fact that the right of the Indians to their lands was recently inscribed in the

Municipal Charter. Accordingly, the City Hall representatives approved the 151st article, where they stated among other things that

The Municipality will respect and enforce all the principles approved in the Federal and State constitutions that deal with the Brazilian Indian question ... [so as] ... to protect the Indian lands ... (CMV 1989: 8).

Like most Brazilian laws or constitutional determinations, this too has become irrelevant.

Connected with the necessity of the renewal of leasing contracts, politicians, local mayors and city councilmen and women have stressed the importance of the Guarita Reservation lands for farming to produce local revenues. Estimates of the contribution of Guarita Reservation harvests to the municipal revenue have varied widely, and in accordance with the political interests involved. The Miraguaí case may be seen as exemplary, since the Guarita Indian lands have in fact been considered to be an extension of municipal lands.¹³ Some have claimed that 90% of those revenues have been guaranteed by the local non-Indian production on Guarita Indian lands (Tobias 1989: 6).¹⁴ As already mentioned, local authorities and non-Indian leaseholders have also warned that the Miraguaí municipal

¹³ These urban centers are located on the very western limit of the Guarita Reservation.

¹⁴ According to Zero Hora (June 14, 1988: 45), the Guarita's "clandestine plantations represented about ... ten percent of the Tenente Portela and fifty percent of the Miraguaí total production."

hall will definitively close the day the Indian land lease system is terminated.

Abusing its own rethoric, both in 1981 and in 1988, the FUNAI administration affirmed that it would take non-Indians off the Guarita Reservation lands. Especially this FUNAI decision was linked to the debate that the 1988 Constitution generated because it approved a period of five years to settle Brazil's Indian lands (67th art.). Again the local non-Indian claimants used widespread violence in the area as a way to get their claims imposed and accepted, as described in former chapters. Lately they have focused as well on "a reorganization of the Indian land leasing contracts".¹⁵ Having been pressured by them as well as by the local politicians the Kaingang leadership responded by siding with non-Indian tenants, i.e, sharecroppers or squatters.

At times some powerful municipal agents have also claimed that the Guarita Indian lands are not municipal ones. This has been the case when they have wanted to emphasize FUNAI responsibility for Indian affairs, mainly regarding investments of any resources to benefit the

¹⁵ As the same informant pointed out, "the number of contracts should be reduced to a few, the lands leased to people with capital, who would be able to care for the land." The Indians could start "a rational production with payment ...", but "iron hands would be needed to make it effective."

Indians.¹⁶ This clearly appeared in a recent juridical appeal to annul a local election, in this case, to void Indian votes. Local politicians who pretended to be progressive then specifically stated that "the area where these Indians live does not belong to the Miraguaí municipality, but to those of Redentora and Tenente Portela" (PMDB-PDT 1988: 5).

Local Farming through Numbers

It has been difficult to accurately estimate the total in hectares in farming production under non-Indian possession and the tenants' population throughout the last decades. Non-Indians, the FUNAI administration, and the Indians themselves have considered this issue a question of "confidentiality" and none ever opened their archives. In this case, corruption, intimidation, and or fear apparently underlined this "confidentiality" matter.

Even near the end of the 1980s it was still almost impossible to get a number estimating either the current non-Indians working in the Guarita Indians lands or the amount of leased out lands. Neither FUNAI officials nor local priests and pastors had even a tentative or starting

¹⁶ According to the 1988 Constitution, federal, state, and municipal governments are responsible for Indian affairs.

list.¹⁷ The Kaingang leadership refused to reveal the extent of their own farm lands and that of non-Indian leaseholders.¹⁸ Furthermore, many Indians declined to reveal the names of the people to whom they leased their lands, much less the precise amount of the leased area. The main reason for such behavior was either fear of the cacique or of reprisals of the Assembly of God pastors.¹⁹ Non-Indians holding the biggest areas were difficult to identify, though Arnaldo Hermman was counted as among those who had one of the largest leased areas in the Irapuá Indian post area.²⁰ Some neighbors eventually identified his and her neighbor's land as held by a non-Indian leaseholder.

The constant trespasses on contracted plots and the leasing or sharecropping without the FUNAI and later the cacique endorsement have made any estimates even more

¹⁷ This despite having been working in the Guarita Reservation or surrounding areas for decades.

¹⁸ The cacique kept the copies of the contracts "under seven keys," people used to say. Despite this and the ongoing repression of most local Indians, some estimates were disclosed. It was then estimated that 350 non-Indians were farming in the Guarita Indian lands. In the Guarita Indian post a total of 138 names of non-Indians were actually identified (Simonian P.A.).

¹⁹ The pastor from Tronqueiras (Miraguai) even seems to have convinced his Indian followers that the author was the actual "anti-Cristo."

²⁰ In the Guarita Indian post some farmers having various contracts and, therefore, large leased tracts were identified: among others were Paulo and Djalma Schneider, Albino Shepp, Ernesto Cassol, Ervino Tolotti, Celso Schwantes, Florano Preniskra, and Nelci Francisquetti.

difficult. This process has also been immersed in widespread corruption, as the FUNAI officials have been reported to have caught leaseholders red-handed and to have accepted bribes instead of sizing their plots. Similar accusations were levelled against the Indians ever since they have been controlling the leasing system in their lands. Neri Winck even told me that he controlled 20 hectares of land, but that only half of them were guaranteed by a lease contract. The extra contracted lands he "arranged" directly with "particular" Indians, so he could have extra and cheaper land.²¹ Such a situation has indeed become prevalent and now totally out of control, as most non-Indian leaseholders exploit more than what is defined in their contracts.

Some estimates of the extent of non-Indian farming production did emerge and even allows us to see the extension of the Guarita Indians' current land loss as well as the devastation. It is known, for instance, that in 1975 FUNAI was farming 500 hectares of the local reservation, this besides the 271 non-Indians²² who were farming a total of 4,700 hectares (FUNAI-PI Guarita 1975; Westphalen et al. 1976). In 1980 a total of 1,000 hectares of the same lands

²¹ This same non-Indian said that the list would be too long to name all those who work on local Indian lands under the same circumstances. He has worked in the Guarita Indian lands since 1980, when he started as a tenant farmer of Bastiao Reis, an urban dweller from Tenente Portela but with leased lands in the reservation.

²² Of these, 152 were leasers, six squatters, and 113 tenant farmers.

were being tilled by the Indians, and around 9,000 hectares by non-Indians (Guimaraes 1982: 1). Four years later Zero Hora (May 1st., 1984) reported a total of 400 families working on the same Indian lands. Edivio Batistelli mentions the presence of 500 non-Indians farming on the Guarita Reservation in 1988 (Zero Hora July 19, 1988). Finally, fourteen thousand hectares of land were reported by the main Guarita FUNAI official in 1990 as leased out in the entire Reservation. Beyond having control over such an enormous amount of Indian land, still crucial has been the continuous engagement of non-Indians in a sort of "catharsis of pressures" to have the contracts renewed.

The leased lands of the Guarita Reservation have been used mainly to cultivate soybean and wheat, but also corn, other grains and subsistence items, with most of the farming done through highly mechanized techniques and devices. Non-Indian capitalist farmers have counted on governmental credit to expand their activities.²³ Mechanization has helped the production of tons of grain which have been harvested annually in the Guarita Reservation by non-Indian farmers, the SPI and the FUNAI Indian post farms or

²³ Bank agencies spread through all local municipalities, which might be seen as one proof of the 1970s economic boom. As I was interested in data for the amount of investments in the area, I tried to get access to the local banks' archives. I was then informed that all loans for agriculture production in the area were made on an individual basis, so the information could not be released.

plantations.²⁴ It has been difficult, however, to figure out just how many tons of grain have been harvested on these Indian lands, since non-Indian farmers have sold their products to various cooperatives and or cereal merchants. Yet in 1988, local authorities estimated that Tenente Portela and Miraguaí non-Indian farmers alone produced 18,000 tons (Zero Hora June 14, 1988). Some local experts have even said that this underestimation by almost half the actual production of grain, surely was made in connection with tax evasion.²⁵

The Abusive Leaseholders

Despite this huge production on reservation lands, abusive non-Indian leaseholders have created tension and violence inside the reservation and surroundings. They have specifically been accused of bad dealings with the Indians, such as refusing lease payments, setting forest fire,

²⁴ In the 1970s the FUNAI administration tried to adapt the local and regional apparatuses to the new market demands. For example, FUNAI created a regional Indian Patrimony Coordination, subordinated to the DGPI, to manage the *roças do posto* and the plantations. By then the DGPI-CPI also relied on a highly mechanized technology (for quantitative data see FUNAI n.d.: item 6.3), modelled both on the 1950s' trend, as explained in the former chapter, as well as on the area's ongoing capitalist farming. Under Indian pressure, the FUNAI plantations were terminated by the late 1970s. In addition, that coordination was to be responsible for the other Indian resources such as the exploitation of timber, with revenues mainly directed to the *renda indígena* fund.

²⁵ Those experts have even claimed that about 40,000 tons of grain have left local Indian lands every year.

stealing from them, and aggrandizing in such a way as to engender tension inside the Guarita Reservation. By harvest time these practices have become well established.

In the late 1970s, local non-Indian leaseholders even set fire to the local woods. This action might have been a sort of revenge, since they were struggling to impose their demands on lease renewal. To do so, they took advantage of a drought going on in the region, and blamed the Indians for their criminal act. The Tenente Portela mayor at the time, Salamoni, directly accused the Guarani of starting the fire, but it was later found out that they were innocent, and that their houses have even burnt down. As a result, non-Indian capitalist farmers had access to about 600 hectares of cleared land (Correio do Povo April 19, 1978: 32), indeed a huge area compared with the local forest left.

Many non-Indian leaseholders have been criticized for meanness. One local Kaingang reported, for instance, that once he asked for about 15 kilos of wheat from Noedi Oliveira, who told him that if he needed or wanted any he ought to plant it. The Indian then promptly replied that he did not farm because his lands were being farmed by Oliveira, but in any case he went and took an amount of the product. Sadi Piacini recently stole the harvest of a small rice field that he had planted for A. Ribeiro, an elder Kaingang woman, who cared for it and to whom it was

essencial for survival.²⁶ R. Ribeiro's rice field was destroyed in that same year by E. Cassol, a non-Indian leaseholder, as one of her in-laws rented the lands.

Non-Indians who farm on the Guarita Reservation, for their part, claim damages to their farms were committed by Indians, an accusation that has been volleyed back by the latter. Though some have said that they have not cared when the Indians have gathered "just a bit," others have accused them of widespread crop robbery, which must be seen instead as an exaggeration. In a concrete instance in 1990, Ferreira from Agua Fria threatened to kill "a bunch" of Indians, if his family's harvested corn was not returned. The Kaingang A. K. Jacinto, the present-day lieutenant colonel of the cacique police corp, has harvested their rented field. As tenants denounced the Indians' action to the Miraguaí Civil Police and even identified the merchant who bought the product, 'Bigode,' cacique Claudino decided to settle the case by returning the corn. Complicating matters further, the Indian leadership accused the non-Indian family of not having paid the rent.

Another source of dispute within the FUNAI and or Indian and non-Indian farming leaseholders' relationship is the latter's insistence on refusing payment or on lowering the established prices for the leasing contracts. The 1980

²⁶ He did this while she was unjustly transferred to the Indian post section.

case of Benjamim Schwantes is not exceptional. The Indians and some FUNAI officials assert that this non-Indian farmed 100 hectares of land for five years without any rent payment.²⁷ Other non-Indian leaseholders have argued for lower prices, because their contracts lack security, despite the fact that many of them have been working in the Guarita Reservation for more than 30 years. They have further argued that due to overuse for decades, the lands were not fertile enough after two or three years of use. In this case these same leaseholders have even affirmed that they will not use fertilizers or improve the land, since they might be removed at any moment. Some consideration has, however, been raised by some of these non-Indian leaseholders regarding the growing deterioration imposed by their own activities in the Indian lands.

In connection with land deterioration and non-Indian claims to farm on Indian lands, local woods have been devastated and many hectares per year integrated into the local land leasing market.²⁸ (The above mentioned arson is just one instance in this direction.) The FUNAI administration, its officials who abused their power, and local and faraway non-Indians have all engaged in this

²⁷ Although no suit was activated against him by the Indians or by the FUNAI administration to demand economic compensation, he was finally expelled by the Indians from the local reservation's leased lands.

²⁸ This serious issue will require separate and detailed study, as already mentioned in Chapter Three.

exploitation, who have been joined by a growing number of Indians (ANAI-RS 1987; Matte 1991; MPF 1989, 1988, 1987). Entrepreneurs (many of whom were politicians too) and poor people have been part of local non-Indian exploitation of the remaining forest. Many local entrepreneurs (who do not want their identity disclosed) with resources have contracted the Indians to cut the woods down and open up the fields, so they could immediately lease them. Other have dealt both with farming and timber, fence stick and or firewood exploitation. The poor have mostly exploited the woods for their own consumption in or outside the reservation, in both cases without paying any compensation to the Indians.

Land Reform, Private Property and Tenancy Rights

A claim on Guarita Reservation lands in order to implant a "land reform" program is recurrent in the vicinity of the reservation since the early 1970s. Some non-Indians have also continued to claim part of the local reservation as their private property. Others have insisted on claiming tenancy rights.

The claim to transform the Guarita Reservation, or at least part of it, in an area for land reform has been lately put forth by non-Indian peasants, landless people and local politicians. In the early 1990s, local non-Indians were reiterating this claim again, some referring to the "excess

of land" rationale, but others insisting that the Indians should finally be removed to the Amazon (see Chapter Four). These non-Indian claimants' interest in land, and primarily in staying in the state, did not disentangle this claim from lasting prejudices toward Indian unfitness for rural labor, and especially for tilling the land.

In fact, very few non-Indians still making claims and working in the Guarita Indian lands have in fact engaged in the MST, the organization of landless people.²⁹ Some have affirmed that they do not have the necessary resources to sustain the struggle;³⁰ others have said that they fear the hardship of the winters in the camps, police brutalities, and even possible imprisonment as landless people recently faced when squatting in the Elmira hacienda.³¹ Not incidentally, local powerful men feared the success of the

²⁹ However, as the MST, the organization of landless people, strengthened in RGS and landless camps have spread (Görge and Stédile 1991), landless non-Indians have recently been discouraged from such pursuits.

³⁰ Some non-Indian poor who have been living or exploiting the same Indian lands also found other ways of leaving the Guarita Indian lands without involving the MST. In this case, they have opted for migrating to work in shoe plants located in different cities nearby Porto Alegre, the RGS capital. For the most part, these people have recently admitted that the Guarita Indian lands were not theirs. This seems indeed to be happening especially after the 1988 Federal Constitution, in which Indian rights to their lands were more broadly and precisely defined.

³¹ For the state police recent and abusive action against RGS landless people, see especially the Zero Hora coverage (August 09, 1990: 36-44; March 13, 1989: 24; March 12, 1989: 36).

landless people's movement for broad land reform, they repressed local landless people organization.³² Such an organization would indeed imperil the availability of labor, consequently raising the costs of production.

In addition, federal and state authorities have not given up taking RGS Indian lands for "land reform" projects. The Inhacorá and the Iraí Indian lands have, in fact, lately undergone through many threats. In 1984, for instance, Joao Jardim--the Labor Secretary--suggested that the Inhacorá Indian lands should be given to landless non-Indian peoples who were invading them (Simonian 1985). When in the following year the INCRA-RS officials displayed the list of lands to be used by the new national program of land reform, in it was listed the Iraí Indian lands (Zero Hora May 31, 1985). The same claim was revived in 1991 by the RGS State Assembly. When the assemblymen were selecting lands to resettle landless non-Indians in the state, part of Inhacorá Indian lands were again indicated for land reform.

Because leading public authorities have claimed state Indian lands for land reform, they ended up inspiring poor and landless non-Indians people to make demands or even invasions of those lands. Many among these non-Indian invaded the same Inhacorá Indian lands as soon as these lands were added to the list publicized by those

³² For example, Rudi Borth from Tronqueiras attacked a group which was organizing to start a landless people's camp in July of 1989.

politicians.³³ Though non-Indians were squatting in the Inhacorá Indian lands, at that time the MTS declared its objection to such an anti-Indian proposal and sided with the Indians (Correio do Povo October 30, 1991: 14). The landless non-Indians living in the Iraí Reservation have remained in the Indian lands against the Indians' will and the law.

Non-Indians have continued to claim the property of strips of lands in the Guarita Reservation and also tenancy rights due to kin ties to Indians and to abuses of SPI officials. Some have even insisted that they were raised in the area and were "registered as Indians" by the SPI officials. Marriage has constituted an already old strategy used by non-Indians to get access to the Guarita Indian lands. Thus, many have insisted that they have the right to stay because they had children with Indians, or because the cacique gave consent, since their children married Indians.

Guarita Indian Lands for Public and Private Works

The claims on the Guarita lands have diversified over recent years. Lands are claimed to build and pave local roads, to install an airport or garbage dump, to erect a shoe plant or a public school for agronomy, to gather earth and stones in order to repair and build roads and terraces

³³ Aldo Pinto, the current RGS Agriculture Secretary and a well-known foe of state Indians, was accused of permitting the continuity of this illegal invasion, though this was later denied (Correio do Povo October 30, 1991: 14).

and even to organize a tourist enterprise. As these claims have served non-Indian interests, demands to use the Indian lands have usually been laid successively by non-Indian cattle-ranchers, extractive entrepreneurs and farmers, and have been endorsed and even campaigned for by public authorities. In no case have the Indians been consulted in advance. Rather, authoritarian and even violent strategies have been used against Indian claims, legal rights and interests.

The diversification of the claims to use Indian lands to open and or improve services was in part due to the recent and wide economic transformations in the surroundings of the Guarita Reservation. From the mid-1970s on, nearby non-Indians and public authorities have pressured the federal, state and municipal governments to get their demands recognized. These claimants have seen those lands as their own back yards, where they can do whatever comes to their mind, including the dumping of polluting garbage. They have even followed a lasting pioneer conception of the Indian lands as "free lands," as Indian lands have continuously been seen as the only ones available.

As early as 1973 capitalist farmers in the area surrounding the Guarita Reservation, the municipality and national security authorities of Tenente Portela claimed Indian lands to construct a municipal airport. An authorization was given by FUNAI administration. Though its

first construction was in a very rough form, it would be used throughout the same decade to promote "the Brazilian Miracle" policies and actions in the area.³⁴ Capital accumulation indeed expanded in the area, but when land prices inflated, the local economic elite started flying to the state of Mato Grosso, thereby transforming the local airport into a busy one. Non-Indians also used it to fly to Porto Alegre on their way to Brasília, to struggle for their requests to farm the Indian lands.³⁵

Reflecting their non-Indian constituencies' interests, local municipal governments have supported their claims on the Guarita Indian lands to construct a wide dirt road system within.³⁶ The local road system has been thought of for decades as a resource basically to facilitate the draining away of local non-Indian production. The same claimants have also demanded the same Indian lands as a

³⁴ These policies and actions stressed farming production for export and "the export of people," the landless ones, into the North.

³⁵ The overall and lasting economic crisis imposed by the 1973 world setback in petroleum affected local airport traffic too. Even the plan to asphalt the runway and to transform it into a regional airport, made after obtaining FUNAI's agreement to cede 50 hectares of land for the planned improvements, was abandoned. The ANAI-Ijuí (1978) then denounced the plan to the public, as a new attempt to solidify the current Indian dispossession, and to fly landless non-Indians to the federal government's Amazon colonization projects. It has since been reduced to such a point that for a few years no plane landed there (see next chapter for the Indians claims on the area).

³⁶ This has been a constant concern of the Miraguai city councilmen (CMV 1989-1985; Morcelli 1989b: 2).

space for raw materials to be taken freely to extend or repair the municipal road system. Earth and stone have been continuously taken out of the reservation to fix dirt roads inside and outside its limits. For most of the year roads have in fact remained almost impassable. Although Indians have needed some of the local roads too; in fact, when roads have been fixed it has been for non-Indian harvests. The requests of Indians to repair the roads have not been attended to (Salles 1989a: 2; 1989b: 3). In Miraguaí this has happened even when Indian votes were essential to the victory of recent mayors, including former mayor Amadeus Lorenzon and current mayor Jorge P. dos Santos (Ivo 1989: 5; PMDB-PDT 1988: 5).

As soybean and wheat plantations expanded in the area, demands to pave local roads were intensified within both private and public sectors of the economy. The one which mostly interested local non-Indians was that linking Tenente Portela to major state and federal roads. The present-day mayor Jorge P. dos Santos of Miraguaí summed up their expectations when he said that progress would reach the region with the paving of the RS 330 highway (Zero Hora September 29, 1984: 25). It was in such a context that in the early 1980s, RGS government, especially through the DAER, the state Road Department, demanded, invaded and expropriated about 25 hectares of Guarita Indian lands for

the RS 330 highway (Kunkel and Geiger 1984).³⁷ These actions were sanctioned by the 1983 31.367 Decree. State governor Jair Soares acted in this case, but as usual, without any consultation with the Guarita Indians. These Indians reacted to this invasion and dispossession and suspended the paving works (Zero Hora September 15, 1984: 36).

Their decision, however, prompted a situation where the Indians had to face numerous non-Indian intimidation strategies and aggressions, as the following set of events show. A letter signed by some Tenente Portela organizations, most of which claimed a philanthropic nature, threatened the Indians and was even publicized [September, 17, 1984]. Almost simultaneously, the councilmen threatened to boycott the Indians as customers in the facilities of local cities (Furini et al. 1984).³⁸ This prejudicial situation was denounced immediately by both the Guarita Indian post Kaingang cacique and the local FUNAI chief (Ribeiro et al.

³⁷ Local politicians, capitalist farmers, and state authorities totally ignored any possible alternative path for the paving of the RS 330 highway. Any other alternative would necessarily enter non-Indian properties along the way.

³⁸ Three main threats were then pointed out. The first referred to "prohibition of selling food and gasoline to Indians" (Furini et al. 1984: 1). The second proposed "the cessation of medical care... " and the third, "the return of municipal teachers working in the Reservation...." As the same politicians affirmed that "they would retribute the Indians' attitude with a similar coin" (id.), they even revived the *lex talionis*.

1984).³⁹ Some local churches then positioned themselves in "surprise and pain" against anti-Indian stands by the city's non-Indian leadership (ICAR and IECLB 1984).⁴⁰ All these threats were surely linked to ongoing hatred and ethnocentric views of Indians.

Most of Tenente Portela city councilmen were old enemies of Indians. Some had made fortunes through actual dispossession of their lands, and over-exploitation of their timber and labor. However, they simultaneously presented themselves as benefactors. Those who signed the document led the struggle in the region, both for road paving and against any Indian resistance.⁴¹ As the local politicians opted for threatening the Guarita Indians, they faced a negative repercussion of public opinion outside the area. This event, however, did not reverse the situation to the Indians' favor.

³⁹ In their document those who denounced the ongoing events referred especially to Tenente Portela politicians as the boycott's main articulator, but also to local City Hall officials. The President of the city council, Alberto Furini, and the mayor, Israel Capellari, were nominally cited as the main aggressors (Ribeiro et al. 1984).

⁴⁰ These church representatives stated that they did not see the recently publicized anti-Indian stands as representative of the local majority of the non-Indian population (id.).

⁴¹ In this case, Albino Furini, Benjamin Mário Lorenzon, Alsério Zanata, Odilo Gabriel, Waldomiro Fortes dos Santos, Élio Bauer, José Cirino Zimmermann, Joao Gheller Filho, Gildo Martens, Alceu Borges dos Santos, and Enio Panassolo Pastório signed (Furini et al. id.). Still crucial for these anti-Indian claims and struggles were Miraguaí mayor Jorge P. dos Santos, and the Roewer family from Redentora.

The state governor ordered the DAER director Evandro Beher to attempt an agreement with Indians (Zero Hora February 25, 1984: 14). A meeting was then held in which the local Kaingang leadership, mayors and politicians, the FUNAI-RS and the DAER high officials took part, but, it ended up not being democratic. In this meeting the Kaingang leadership surrendered specific rights, especially upon their lands, which they did without consulting the Indian community.⁴² Dissident Indians and non-Indians have affirmed that those caciques were heavily bribed in exchange for the agreement.⁴³ Once again, the Miraguaí mayor was accused of manipulating the Kaingang leadership, as he used to do in other circumstances.⁴⁴

⁴² By the current law, a presidential decree authorizing any reduction of their lands was required (Lei Nº 6.001 1973: art. 20, 'caput' and d). Though this was not issued, the Kaingang leadership ended up accepting the imposed illegality. In addition, the Indians should have had the right to receive a compensation for the 20 hectares of land lost with the road paving. They were entitled an equal and similar amount of land and characteristics (as the 5th paragr. of the same law [6.001] 20th art. can be interpreted).

⁴³ The FUNAI official Irani Cunha then accused the Kaingang caciques, Ivo S. Ribeiro and Domingos Ribeiro, of making their decisions too hurriedly (Zero Hora September 29, 1984: 25).

⁴⁴ Such as in electoral processes or when non-Indian were requesting the renewal of the Indian lands' leasing contracts. Santos also told the press that it was easier to get the "agreement" accomplished when the Indians started to talk (Zero Hora id.). This may be seen as a suggestion that on that occasion some FUNAI officials attempted to halt the "agreement," which they saw as an anti-Indian decision.

Not incidently, FUNAI, the legal tutor, did not stand in defense of the Indians' rights. In addition, FUNAI officials did not explain why they did not fulfil their legal duty. As that meeting went on, the Indians were promised services, though these were already foreseen by law (Lei 6.001 1973: art. 02), and could hardly count as compensation.⁴⁵ As the agreement reached did not do justice to Indian rights to their lands, a citizen living in the state capital sued the DAER administration (Kunkel and Geiger 1984). The first judicial decision favored Indian rights, as the judge ordered the suspension of the works.⁴⁶ The judge's order, however, was not only disrespected by the state agency, but appealed. The new court decision guaranteed the agency's "right" to resume the works (Silva 1985: 3-4). The debate by then had reached a surreal level and would require an independent analysis. Suffice it to say here that the data show that the defendant, and even the second judge, were involved in prevarication if not in bribery.

⁴⁵ Among those services were the opening and improving of internal dirt roads, dams, and soccer fields (Zero Hora December 18, 1984: 07). They would be built by both the DAER and public administrations of Tenente Portela, Miraguai and Redentora. These state and municipal institutions also made a compromise through which gas posts and bars would not be built on the roadside, as it crossed the reservation (id.).

⁴⁶ As he then stressed, he expected that Indian legal and constitutional guarantees would be restored and respected (Kunkel and Geiger id.; Zero Hora December 13, 1984: 53).

Still other claims have been placed by local public authorities on Guarita Reservation lands. The Tenente Portela administrations successively destroyed various areas inside the reservation in order to deposit local garbage.⁴⁷ In Miraguaí, the local government has recently thrown garbage in a very open and accessible site too (located near the RS 330 highway, in front of the Pau Escrito section). Besides the current dispossession imposed on Guarita Indians through these works, the waste thrown on their lands has not received any treatment. This process has threatened the very lives of Indians, their woods and the broader environment.⁴⁸

Moreover, the Miraguaí politicians recently requested Indian lands to install a plant for shoe production. The ex-city representative Rude Borth struggled to support it (Borth 1988: 4), always considering the Indian lands as if

⁴⁷ In the early 1970s a deposit was built in the very center of the Aéroclube village. Later on a deposit was opened in the Lagoa Bonita woods, which have been cut down and are being devastated. In addition, the COTRIJUI has used the Guarita Reservation lands as its own, in this case, to drain the sewer of its local headquarters. The area affected by the COTRIJUI action is located on the northwest border of the reservation.

⁴⁸ Unaware of possible contamination, local Indians have looked for salvageable waste. Even children have been engaged in this job, and on a daily basis they may be seen dealing with hospital garbage or other hazardous and polluting waste. In spite of the fact that this is an old reality within the Guarita Indian lands, no concern has been raised, either by local non-Indian public health officials or on the part of Indian authorities.

they were practically the only adequate site.⁴⁹ In compensation, Indians were offered employment by the plant. This project was conceived as a response to continuous youth emigration (Barbosa 1988: 3).⁵⁰ However, due to the crisis imposed by U.S. restrictions on Brazil's shoe exports, by 1990 many were returning to Miraguai, whose administration was burdened with the return expenses. Since local people were also facing the unavailability of capital, the proposal has remained on paper.

The Miraguai public authorities also recently claimed Guarita Indian lands to install a farm to produce food for poor students of the municipality. It was suggested that as Indians "have too much land . . .," they "should recognize the municipality's support of their education system and give up a certain amount of land . . .," for the proposed endeavor.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Regarding this matter, only one reference was found referring to possible land outside the Guarita Reservation (Barbosa 1988: 3).

⁵⁰ Between 1987 and 1990 hundreds of young people emigrated to the Porto Alegre metropolitan area, to work in shoe plants. A local union representative informed me that from Miraguai alone, a total of 80 families left in 1989.

⁵¹ The formal education delivered to Guarita Indians requires a specific study. Here it is enough to say that Indian schools in Miraguai were having some teachers paid with municipal resources, even though some of them hardly had the required training. In addition their wages were inferior to those paid by FUNAI to its own hired teachers. The Indians have indeed said that the worse were sent to work with them by the distinct local city halls. Only in 1990 were the Miraguai education officials implementing a plan to improve human resources, which included teachers working on the Indian reservation.

Despite this allegation, Indians were hardly considered by local public authorities as entitled to rights to municipal services, even when inscribed in the legal and constitutional system (Lei 6.001 1973: 2nd. art.).⁵²

Evidently, the Miraguaí Municipal Secretary of Education was attempting to solve budget problems by dispossessing Indians.

Finally, in the early 1990s the Tenente Portela municipality made a claim through which Indian lands would make a tourist project feasible.⁵³ The creation of a tourist park with an Indian culture house in the Guarita Reservation was conceived as a way to attract tourists to the municipality, and thus to increase revenue collection. The tourist project was certainly viewed as an extension of the municipal "Culture House," a round structure in the Miraguaí Square, built according to an idealization of Indian houses. This house has served as a sort of museum where local Indian crafts have been exhibited and sold, and Indian photographic, historic, ethnographic and archeological items have been exhibited as well. Neither a text nor an image

⁵² So, according to the claimed rationale, any service or work allegedly made to favor the Indians ought to be paid back through giving up land.

⁵³ To advance the project, the current mayor even created a Secretary of Tourism and hired an expert to administer it, all this despite the illegal character of his plan (id.: art. 58, II). In this case, the people hired occupied the same position in the Iraí municipality, where the local Kaingang have been used for decades as "tour attractions" by public authorities (Simonian P.A.).

showing the Indians' current deprived social conditions were inscribed or exhibited in this "Culture House."

This could, however, have constituted a *locus* where old and persistent processes of Indian dispossession, exploitation, and oppression could be displayed on the local level. This view was rooted in the municipal policies on the reservation at least since the 1960s, when it was already seen as a tourist attraction (Colossi 1969: 18). Indians were thought of as the main "tourist attraction," since through this new plan some aspects of Indian culture would be emphasized.⁵⁴ Some years ago the local public administration issued postcards showing local Kaingang, as propaganda material. Performances such as dance and selling of their crafts are being emphasized nowadays.⁵⁵

Continuities and ever changing configurations of power concerning the use and devastation of the Guarita Reservation lands in recent times have been described and analyzed. Non-Indian orchestration of the Indian leadership

⁵⁴ When people involved in the project were talking about it, they referred to "Kaingang women's dresses," actually a late nineteenth century non-Indian women's dress style. They did not take into account, for instance, the fact that except for elder women, most were not using the dresses anymore. By the way, when interviewed by the author, some women said they were simply updating their clothes according to the current non-Indian models. Others were not able to cope with textile prices, as they require many meters.

⁵⁵ Nothing was thought or planned in the early 1990s concerning teaching Kaingang language, as many Indians were not speaking it anymore, or about other aspects of their culture which might have been for the Indians' own use.

cooptation to anti-Indian interests were highlighted too, as well as the development of a powerless Indian majority. In order to succeed in their aims, non-Indians relied on the prevalent impunity, not hesitating to intimidate and practice all sorts of violence against Indians. Furthermore, they continued using old rationales to justify Indian dispossession through leasing or other strategies. The recent Indian claims on Guarita Reservation will be considered in the next chapter, especially the ever growing tensions and conflicts between the Indian leadership and those Indians who were eventually able to take a stand against land leasing.

Chapter Six

THE GUARITA INDIANS LAND CLAIMS: Resistance, Subordination and Self-Deception

If this is Indian land, it should be used only by Indians. I and my husband are Kaingang and we were born here, but we do not have a quarter [of one hectare] of land to till, just corners lent by relatives.

These are Guarani lands and if we want to plant beans close to the village, we should not be paying rent to the Kaingang.

Introduction

In this chapter the Guarita Indians' recent claims on their own lands will be described. Most of them have emerged in the context of a growing expropriation of the Guarita Indians demarcated lands, a process that began the early 1940s. Since that time, the Indians have moved from a quasi-apatetic response to dispossession, to a more confrontational claiming process. Through their leadership most of the Kaingang indeed started to lay claim to their lands. However, many now lease land to others, therefore imposing self-dispossession. The transformations ended up perpetuating their deprived situation, which was further worsened by conflict and violence.

While the dispossession of the Guarita Indians has been going on for decades their land claims have been scarcely reported in the literature. In spite of this, some of these claims might be inferred through indirect clues. The case of the Gka resistance to invasion and to forced

resettlements (Leme 1872 in Soares 1974: 116; Parés 1848/06/11) and the Guarita Indians' visit to the Imperial Court and the Emperor (Pérez 1901: 542) may be instances of such claims. Cacique Fong is reported as claiming land for his people (P. Claudino in Pivetta and Pires 1969: 5).¹ Early this century Indians protested the invasion of their lands in Palmeira das Missões and continued to claim them and to demand their demarcation (Gonçalves 1972: 4; Veit 1991: 36). In 1928, the Guarita Indians requested the reservation map and title directly to Flores da Cunha, the state governor (P. Claudino id.).²

Recent Guarita land claims have also been under-reported, except for those related to the land-leasing system. Even when the SPI started to dispossess the Guarita Indians in the 1940s, no reports were found on their own immediate land claims. At least some among them may have raised their voices and claimed their lands for their exclusive use and usufruct. As for the rest, the Kaingang seemed to act as if they did not accept or understand the ongoing impositions, while the Guarani seemed simply to ignore them.

¹ The same might be said about the 1887 cacique Fong visit to the province's capital, to see the president (Oliveira 1974: 31).

² The Indians also reported that their representatives intended to go to Rio de Janeiro to talk with federal authorities. Governor Flores da Cunha then promised them to deal with the legal validation of the reservation, which he never did (id.).

The Guarita Indians themselves have offered some explanations for such a behavior. Some Kaingang recently pointed out that though their lands were being dispossessed, both SPI and FUNAI officials proposed numerous "benefits" in exchange, and said that everything was ordered by the federal government.³ The idea of the government programs was to integrate the Indians into the wider Brazilian society, though it would actually emphasize their specificity. Instead of the promised "protection," "order," and "development," the Guarita Indians were oppressed. SPI officials engaged them as labor force, and the resources produced in their lands would go to the *renda indígena* fund. In this case, the actual SPI agenda was indeed hidden from Indians. The Kaingang were subjugated to this anti-Indian policy and practice. They were drawn into "captive" labor in the "Indian post farms," were dispossessed of their lands, and suffered from outside exploitation of timber resources. In response many Indians simply fled the reservation.

The SPI-FUNAI policies and actions also emphasized the local Kaingang and Guarani ethnic identity, which worked as a crucial mechanism to keep them powerless, especially with respect to dispossession. This was done through an appeal to a revival and or recreation of old traditions, this "imposed primitivism" (World Bank 1982: 21; see also Hobsbawm 1983:

³ They then promised to implement agriculture and cattle-raising among and for the local Indians, promises that certainly abated any imminent Indian contrary response.

4; Sider n.d.: 1) would be accomplished through the Indians' participation as "Indians" in diverse events. In 1941, a SPI official wrote that the 19th of April "Indian Day" party was dedicated to the Indians, so they could "bring their traditions to their memory" (Machado 1961a: 3). The other events were the patriotic parades, when they had to wear feathers, arrows and bows or feminine "Indian dresses,"⁴ agricultural regional production fairs when they participated as producers, and in Indian Day parties and balls. The Kaingang had been regularly participating in "independence" days parades in Tenente Portela and Miraguai. They even paraded in the 1954 Sao Paulo city's fourth centenary commemorations. The Guarani shunned these events, but used to stand by in some corner to sell their crafts.

The SPI-FUNAI used these strategies to highlight Indian identity. However, they did not overcome the persisting non-Indian negative prejudices against Indians. Indians ended up unable to compete in the surrounding capitalist environment, to which the process of ethnic segmentation, as Wolf (1982: 379-381) pointed out, was fundamental. Though this reinforcement of identity simultaneously guaranteed specific rights to Indians, including those to land, it was not enough to enforce them. This fact slowed the pace of the Guarita Indians' claiming

⁴ These, in fact, followed the 1800s non-Indian women style in dressing.

processes on their lands after 1940.

It is through their struggle against violent efforts to secure their labor that the Guarita Indians and especially the Kaingang began to make their claims on their lands public. In 1955 seven Guarita Indians travelled to Rio de Janeiro, the federal capital, to make land claims. However, their requests were disregarded (Cabral 1955: n.pg.). In one instance the Guarita Indians have been reported as working hard in support of the RGS Military Brigade to prevent a 1962 non-Indian invasion, though the resistance was articulated by SPI officials (Machado 1963a: 2). Later on in 1968, when congressmen investigated and visited their reservation, the Guarita Indians raised the issue of their land claims just as the Indians from other reservations did (Câmara dos Deputados 1971).⁵ Sebastiao Alfaiate, then the reservation Indian colonel, reported the resentment of his people against the SPI, both for the imposed lease of their lands and the exploitation of woods. In contrast, there is evidence in a 1969 claim of Indian collusion with the SPI.

As far as land tenure has been concerned, it was in fact during the 1970s that local Kaingang not only stressed their disagreement with the lease system and with FUNAI appropriation of their lands, but also issued precise claims on their lands. These processes emerged in the context of

⁵ The records for their case, however, were lost (id.).

both widespread Indian dispossession and empowering organization (A. Inácio in Folha da Manhã August 12, 1975: 20-21). The recent roots of this mobilization can also be found in the Indian struggle to face oppressive labor exploitation. Such an "organizational power" (Wolf 1974: 586) was indeed crucial despite simultaneous contradictions, ambivalence, and collusion (Sider 1986).

Initially Indians claimed their collective and exclusive tenure and struggled to terminate dispossession. However, when they were able to take over their lands in 1978, especially the Kaingang leadership gradually began to control both the lease and sharecropping systems and timber exploitation. Internal struggles to control the leasing and the woods revenues produced a major split among the Kaingang in 1983, when a new *cacicado* was created and the Guarita Reservation divided in two. Ever since they have been disputing the rights to use, usufruct and to dispose of their lands. Though they unified their lands and leadership in 1989, most of the Guarita Indians have been unwilling to terminate the dominant leasing land tenure system.

Available data have suggested that the Guarita Kaingang and Guarani recent land claims were related both to general or communal, and to individual and family land tenure rights. Furthermore, their claims on their lands were rooted in their own cultures and in the state society and capitalist expansion processes, in particular when new

dispossession had been imminent or already widespread among the Indians. In the next section the Kaingang and Guarani claims will be described, especially their own explanations of them, which mention "ownership," tenure rights, and even rights to dispose for leasing and sharecropping.

The Guarita Indians General Land Claims

The Guarita Kaingang and Guarani primarily claimed rights of "ownership" or occupation upon their reservation lands, which they perceived as anchored in their ancestors experiences. These claims had a broader character, as then refer to the whole demarcated area and to defined communal rights. The Kaingang Indians have stressed that they are the Guarita Indian lands' "owners." Their common rights, they have said, were defined through a precise historic event. The local Guarani have stated their occupancy right to the same lands. While making such a claim, they have emphasized immemorial tenure rights.

The Guarita Kaingang General Land Claim

Though Kaingang occupation of the Guarita Reservation is much older, these Indians have argued that those rights were established by the end of the Triple Alliance war against Paraguay. Claudino (in Pivetta and Pires 1969: 5) and other local Kaingang have recounted that their lands were reserved to them by the Brazilian Emperor, Pedro II,

though Princess Izabel also appeared as responsible for its creation. The Kaingang believe the reserved lands were turned over to their ancestors as payment for their service in the Brazilian imperial troops.⁶ Claudino (id.) states:

Fong travelled to Mato Grosso to make war, to help the government in the Paraguayan war, who gave these lands. The Queen gave them. Queen Izabel. When in the battlefield, he once went with twelve Indians but they did not have a specific hour to attack So the government inquired: Do you want money or what? Fong then answered: No, I want land, to procreate.⁷

Through this claim the Guarita Kaingang have suggested an economic transaction as the basis of their alleged land rights. In addition, the Kaingang from Inhacorá and the Indians from Borboleta have a similar land claim.⁸

The Inhacorá land claim was attacked particularly by Fisher (1959: 5), who considered it mere myth. Even in the case of its being a myth, this claim ought to have a social and historical meaning (Eliade 1975; Lowenthal 1985;

⁶ A Guarita Kaingang specifically described their ancestors' job as being a hard one: to battle the Paraguayans, the "ferocious" warriors, through surprise attacks during the night. To undertake these tasks they relied on clubs and on energy provided by forest drugs.

⁷ Though by then the Guarita and the Inhacorá Indian communities had already been separated for decades, Fong seems to have been the coordinator of the Indian *milícias* for war operations in these areas.

⁸ This claim on the Inhacorá Indian lands was first registered by Correio Serrano (1955), through the publication of an interview made with Titi, then the reservation's cacique. Following a Bernardina P. de Mello--an Indian woman from Borboleta--(1988) oral report, Venzon (in press) documented the local Indians similar land claim.

Rosaldo 1980). As the Guarita and Inhacorá Kaingang have recounted, their land claims were intended to deliver a message: to call attention on the injustices and brutality, including land losses, imposed on them. The same claims also dramatized some inner dream toward the recovery of those same lands.

Independent of being a myth or not, the Guarita Kaingang still occupied vast areas of those reserved lands by the turn of the century, and at least the elders know the limits of the 1870s reservation very well. Furthermore, in 1874 the province government sent a team to demarcate the Inhacorá lands (Moraes 1874 in Laytano 1957 VII: 186). As Venzon (in press) maintains, the possessions of the Borboleta Indians were being protected due to the the Lt. Cel. Brabo intervention, who in 1876 was struggling to get compensation for land losses as a local road was altered. The Guarita reserved lands encompassed the area between the Turvo, the Uruguay and the Guarita rivers.⁹ The Borboleta settlement had 48,471 ha (Verdum in Venzon id.) and the Serra Grande Indian lands have yet to be estimated. In contrast, the Inhacorá Indian had only about 14,000 ha then (Beschoren (1989). The designation of a huge area to the Guarita Kaingang certainly terrified the local elite.

⁹ Though I still did not have the chance to obtain the precise total hectares for this area, it had about 200,000.

As latifundia squatters were simultaneously legalizing their holdings in the RGS northwest (Beschoren id.), then they hardly would have any interest in reporting the reservation's existence and much less in promoting its legalization. If authorities at that time issued some official document on the Guarita Kaingang reserved lands claim, it was probably destroyed by the local elite, or as happened in similar cases, the same squatters or even officials stole it from the Indians.¹⁰ The director of their settlement, Lt. Col. Tibúrcio Alvares da Siqueira Fortes is in this case the main suspect. He was not only one of the most well known land invaders in the area, but by then had widely used illicit expedients to secure his claimed possessions (Abaixo-assinado 1879).¹¹

The crucial point here is to understand why the Guarita Kaingang have not requested the entire 1870s reserved lands, especially when some proofs were already

¹⁰ According to my own research experiences in South Brazil and elsewhere, such a possibility has indeed been a widespread reality. The Inhacorá, Nonoai and Serrinha Kaingang, for instance, always referred to events in which official maps were simply burnt or stolen by powerful local non-Indians or officials. Venzon (in press) documented a similar experience among the Borboleta and Ssrra Grande Indians. For similar vandalism against the faraway Tasmanians see Bonwick ([1870] 1970: 39).

¹¹ In addition, in 1881, he asked for his exoneration as director both of the Nonoai and the Guarita reservations (Brandao 1882: 49). This decision might have been an outcome of his involvement with corruption and other abuses. By then, however, the Guarita and Inhacorá Indians were resisting forced relocation (see Chapter Two).

determined as historic and actual. Nevertheless, those Indians have ultimately claimed only the 1918 demarcated lands, which were not the ones claimed by the contemporaneous leadership.¹² However, opting for a smaller claim is probably linked to a knowledge of processes of dispossession: as seen in the previous chapters, this has included systematic violence against their ancestors, an experience that they continue to face. A claim on the entire former area would certainly face a harsh critique. In fact, for more than a decade, most Guarita Kaingang have been giving up their tenure through leasing, but to benefit non-Indians interests.

The Guarita Guarani Land Demands

Local Guarani dwellers stressed that being located in southeastern South America, the Guarita Reservation was

¹² Though Gonçalves (1972: 4) does not report the size of the Guarita Indians contemporary possession and claimed lands, many among them left their lands at the time, as they did not agree with the imposed dispossession. This development surely reflected the Indians' debilitating environment, since few years earlier they were facing dreadful epidemics (Abbot 1911: 18). These Indians were recalled by many Kaingang as moving into Misiones, Argentina, where they settled in the Sao Pedro locality. A survey in this area is being planned, which I intend to do by early 1994, in the company of some Guarita Indians, especially those who claim kin relationship with those who then left. By that time other Indians also began to wander into the neighboring areas. Some stayed in their possessions, especially those from the Capinzal rural district, whom were led by Xindangue. Many mestizos still live in Capinzal, especially in the Canjica section, some of whom have been recognized by Guarita Kaingang as their relatives.

"Guarani land," therefore they were entitled to live and use them. Karáí elaborated this point when he argued that the Guarani had a "free letter" or a laissez-passer, which empowers them to occupy any land in this broad region (Folha da Manhã June 26, 1977; see also Almeida 1985: 11).¹³ This approach to land claims has in fact been linked to the Mbyá and Nandeva tradition and the search for the "land without evil" (Nimundajú [1914] 1978: 31) which has been described as located by the sea. This approach is also linked to the closing of the state frontier and to land conflicts and frustrated migrations (Meliá 1986: 107; Nimuendajú id.: 29-39). The Guarita Guarani have also emphasized some specific conditions regarding a proper teko'á or settlement. The land site had to be in the woods, good to farm, far from non-Indians and primarily peaceful. These are unlikely conditions.

The Guarita lands's proximity to Argentina, and especially to the Peperi-Guaçu Guarani teko'á, have guaranteed a unique mobility to the local Guarani. Confronting harsh conditions and threats, they have retreated to the west. However, when they have done so, it

¹³ Karáí was then migrating from Argentina and looking for lands in the state. He was inquired by the assembly state representative Rubem Scheid, especially about his documentation. Revealing lack of sensitivity and ignorance toward Indians immemorial rights to land, R. Scheid mentioned (Folha da Manhã id.) that the Karáí presence in the Brazilian territory was "a problem of international rights", therefore he and his people should "simply go back to Argentina."

has generally been for short stays. The most usual situation has been their moving east, which has basis both in their cultural and religious inspiration and on local lands' tenure conditions. As an alternative, they have also moved faraway and reached Sao Paulo, or other lands further north (Baldus 1952: 487; Ladeira and Azanha 1988: 16).

Due to their approach to land claims, occupation and rights, Baldus (1952: 487) and Pivetta and Pires (1969: 8, 30) referred to the Guarita Guarani as basically "nomads".¹⁴ Pivetta and Pires (id.) also stressed their isolation within the reservation context and even presented them as settled in "an inaccessible site." Becker (1976: 68), in her turn, defined the Guarita Guarani relationship toward the local Kaingang as harmonious. In spite of these views, their local modern occupation has been a lasting one, at least since the 1880s. It has even produced new Indian claims on the Guarita Reservation lands and resulted in a strongly marked hierarchy among these Indians.

Although Baldus (1952: 487) and Santos (1979: 219) stated that in fact the local Guarani were considered and treated by the Kaingang as mere squatters, the Guarita Kaingang have simultaneously stressed that their ancestors

¹⁴ Despite this misconception, Pivetta and Pires (id.) also stressed the fact that the local Guarani deserved a special investigation.

agreed with the Guarani occupation.¹⁵ Moreover, though they did not consider them "owners," they have continued to consent to their settlements. On the other hand, the Guarani had not disputed the local Kaingang claims on the "ownership" of the reservation lands.¹⁶ Many Guarani newcomers have even continued to conceive of these lands as merely a site for temporary settlement. In addition, due to the recent widespread devastation and non-Indian and Kaingang encroachment, their local *teko'á* can no longer be perceived by most of them as a *teko pora* or a beautiful place. Consequently, even families who were settled in the area for decades have lately been dreaming of new areas.

The Kaingang Individual and Communal Land Claims

The Guarita Indians' recent public claims on their lands were made by Kaingang peoples. The seven Guarita Indians who travelled to Rio de Janeiro in 1955 claimed their lands and natural resources for only their people's usufruct.¹⁷ No immediate remedy was imposed, since they were

¹⁵ As yet noted by Santos (id.), a similar situation was experienced by most of the Guarani living in the south Brazil's Indian reservations.

¹⁶ This has been the position of other Guarani in relation to other areas and people, including when referring to non-Indian occupation (Karaí id.; Ladeira and Azanha 1988: 24).

¹⁷ Then a delegation of 21 Indians from south Brazil travelled to the federal capital. In his information about the issue, the SPI's highest southern official argued that "... In all social groups there exist morally deformed

described as wandering by diverse RGS Indian posts and because they did not know the name of the local SPI official (whom they accused of mismanagement, corruption and Indian oppression [Cabral id.]), no immediate remedy was imposed.

Later on Indian claims on land were made with both an individual and deceptive approach. In 1969 an Indian claimed some land within the reservation. He intended to lease this land, with profits benefiting his own family. Around 1973 the local Kaingang not only began to demand the right of usufruct on reservation dispossessed lands, but also engaged in a persistent struggle to get them back. Even though by the late 1970s, they had reached a high level of unity and were able to control their lands, they ultimately ended up compromising with non-Indian interests.

Alfredinho Ribeiro recently told me that this recent Guarita Kaingang individual claim to their lands already led them to self-dispossession. In this case, he explicitly said, that after analyzing SPI actions upon his reservation lands, he asked himself why as an Indian he could not lease land.¹⁸ He then inquired to the local SPI official about this question, explaining that he was willing to rent a

individuals....

Within the Indian groups, in the diverse Indian posts spread in Brazil, the unsatisfied and dissatisfied, the envious and unmanageable, the lazy and liar Indians" (Cabral id.).

¹⁸ All the following information about this case is based on data obtained from the same Kaingang.

piece of the Indian lands as a way to obtain the means to start his own farming.¹⁹ Ribeiro even argued that he was then returning to the reservation after many years of absence, as he had left the area due to the hardships imposed by SPI officials, in the context of the *cativeiro* system. At the same time, he stated that he did not have the resources to support his many children.

A. Ribeiro was then informed by the local SPI agent that this public institution could not support him and his family, so he himself would consent to his leasing plan. He was also instructed to keep the arrangement "under the table" and in a sharecropping form, which, as he said, was thought of as way to prevent the spreading of similar requests. In addition, to make it easier, the contract was signed with a current non-Indian leaser of Indian lands, and the sharecropping was to appear as a lease contracted by the Indian post.²⁰ In the case, A. Ribeiro's 1968 action planted the seed of a lasting anti-Indian land policy on the Guarita Reservation.

The Guarita Indians have recently made claims on dispossessed lands for self-use and usufruct. However, now do they themselves explain the delay in making such claims.

¹⁹ The SPI Indian post chief was then Capt. Arnaldo de Souza.

²⁰ In this case, with Arnaldo Roewer. According to A. Ribeiro, A. Roewer performed the land work with tractors, while himself (A. Ribeiro) performed all the other farming tasks.

According to another Kaingang, they did not insist on exclusive rights to occupancy and usufruct by the time of SPI first dispossession actions because at that time "... were probably too ingenuous." Others have said that they would never have imagined that SPI officials would persist in expanding the land leasing. On the other hand, by then the Indians were used to the exploitation of their pastures for cattle-raising by Capt. Ferraz, the former reservation caretaker.²¹

The relatively small size of the Indian population has also been suggested as one of the reasons for the Indians' passivity when facing SPI intervention and dispossession. S. Alfaiate raised this argument, pointing out that in 1941 the Indian population was 690 (Ramos 1941: 2), and therefore the internal pressures upon their own lands were not yet that huge.²² Yet, until the early 1940s they were able to keep the land use and distribution among themselves. This continued to some extent for one more decade. Though the Guarita Indians were already pretty much adapted to a peasant economy, they were still able to engage in some gathering, fishing and hunting. These activities worked

²¹ This caretaker told, some Kaingang have said, that "the government gave him permission to use the local Indian lands as part of his payment."

²² This total referred to the entire population, regardless of the distinct Indian nations, genre or age (Ramos id.). The SPI reported a total of 654 Indians for 1945, and of 660 Kaingang and 69 Guarani for 1946 (in Salzano 1961: 28-31).

mostly as a way to supplement their subsistence, together with income from sale of crafts or labor. A new couple, a bachelor or an extended family had merely to communicate to the caciques that they needed to open a new field or site for their residence or subsistence enterprise.

Fear might also be an explanation for the postponement of the Guarita Kaingang recent claims on their lands. The above mentioned "caretaker" was reported by Almeida (n.d.: 8) and by many Indians as an intimidating and brutal man, who not only exploited their ancestors' lands but also their labor. His attitude might have inhibited any Kaingang major resistance by the time the SPI began to dispossess them. The SPI and the FUNAI officials, however, also imposed a repressive control on them, which went beyond the *cativeiro* system. Repression was indeed used against the Indians who went to Rio de Janeiro, to make land and natural resources claims. Later, as Indians began to organize against the local *status quo*, political repression was imposed on them.²³ This surely reinforced the Indians' fear, especially since their so-called leadership was powerless, or worse, in collusion with the oppressors.

This situation along with the issuing of the 1973 Indian Statute, reinforced the Guarita Indians will to claim their lands for their exclusive use. Although this

²³ The recently created "Indian police" (see Chapter Three) was manipulated by SPI officials when imposing this oppressive policy.

legislation determined the termination of Indian land lease contracts (Lei 6.001 1973: 18th art.), it was not enforced by either the administrative and political authorities, or by the judicial ones. In addition, to persist with their claims, the Guarita Kaingang had to face distinct non-Indian interests, and yet widespread violence and repression. Capitalist operations were increasingly present on the reservation. Farmers and entrepreneurs, linked to the "green revolution" were producing grain for export. This expansion of capitalist production can be seen as part of the military dictatorship's overall political strategy to defend national security.

These Indians therefore had to face diverse political economic interests and agents, all involved in protecting non-Indian claims on their lands. The agents, both civilians and military men, engaged in violence and all sorts of intimidation against them. In addition, the local FUNAI officials, who in the 1970s were civilians but representative of the military regime, were very abusive toward the Indians. As these Indians not only claimed their lands but in the early and mid-1970s even chose to rebel as a strategy to gain them back, they had to face teams of RGS and of the national army and of the federal police. Despite these hardships, those were hopeful times. Nonetheless, Indians, especially the Kaingang, even dreamt that if they

had their lands back, they would overcome deprivation and regain autonomy.

As local non-Indian leasers decided to defy the July 31, 1975 deadline (Lei 6.001 1973: 67th art.), and as the law was not enforced, the Guarita Indians accelerated their political involvement in defense of their claims. Andila Inácio (op.cit.), a Kaingang first grade and bilingual professor, sent a letter with an appeal to Gal. Ernesto Geisel, the Brazil's military dictator.²⁴ In that letter Miss Inácio mentioned precisely the land demands of the Guarita and other RGS Indians, especially on their effectively dispossessed lands, and their anxieties and hopes.²⁵ Repressive actions were prompted against her, but in spite of this in few days the Indians began to reoccupy their lands (Folha da Manhã August 18, 1975: 24).²⁶

The Guarita Indians disagreed with the FUNAI decision to suspend the order to evacuate the non-Indian farmers and insisted on the 1973 Indian Statute's foreseen deadline. As

²⁴ Andila Inácio was born in the Carreteiro Reservation but studied in the Guarita CTPCC and, at the time, was working there. Then she entrusted the author with her letter, with a request that it should be sent simultaneously to the addressee and the media.

²⁵ Inácio's letter was published by Folha da Manhã (August 12, 1975: 21-22), which had immediate local and nationwide repercussions.

²⁶ In this case, FUNAI officials attempted to demoralize her (Folha da Manhã August 21, 1975; Simonian P.A.) on the basis of sexual behavior, and they prohibited her from giving interviews to the media.

the July 31st deadline expired, Indians attempted by themselves to expel non-Indian tenants and squatters from their lands (Folha da Manhã *ibid.*). As Folha da Manhã reported (*id.*), "... the Indians began to occupy the non-Indian fields, especially in Irapuá, as they let their cattle upon them and began to replant." They even travelled to Santa Rosa to look for the RGS troops support (FUNAI PI Guarita 1975: Nº 192). S. Alfaiate, the present-day Kaingang cacique, emphatically explained that he knew that Indians no longer could return to the woods, so they needed their lands back to farm, through which they could provide for their families. After an initial success they were again repressed both by FUNAI officials, military and policemen. In addition, non-Indians reacted violently. Non-Indians slaughtered one Kaingang, Alcides Faque, and beat and attacked uncountable others. The criminals were never indicted nor punished.

Despite the local Kaingang determination to claim their lands, the FUNAI lease contracts were indeed officially renewed in 1975. By then the Kaingang began to realize that their struggle would last even longer. The mid-1970s were important years. As a way of strengthening their land claims, the Guarita Kaingang started to contact Indians from other reservations. In the following year, for instance, they received the Nonoai cacique - Alcindo Nascimento. A. Nascimento was also denouncing the invasion

of RGS state Indian lands including his own reservation, and the expansion of violence against Indians as well.²⁷ Some began to participate in the CIMI promoted Indian meetings, though they faced repressive actions.²⁸

Despite this empowering organizational process, the local Kaingang leadership assumed an ambiguous position regarding the Indians claims on their lands. This behavior might even suggest a possible hidden agenda on the part of the leadership. Cacique Alfaiate did not in fact state that they would lease the reservation lands, but in 1975 he explained (Folha da Manhã August 18, 1975: 24) that they were claiming them because FUNAI was keeping the lease contracts revenues. Was he saying that they, the Indians, should control it? Whether he meant this or not, the Indians finally reoccupied part of their lands in June of 1978, when 150 non-Indian families left the reservation (Folha da Manhã June 18, 1978: 18). As soon as the Indians regained complete control of the lands in that same year, the lands were immediately leased to non-Indians by the Indian leadership.

²⁷ He also sent a letter to president Gal. Ernesto Geisel and attended a meeting then held in the Guarita Reservation, to discuss the current RGS state Indians' general conditions of life (IECLB 1976). The IECLB, UNISINOS, FIDENE (current UNIJUI), UFRGS, and the FUNAI Rio de Janeiro Indian Museum promoted it.

²⁸ Between 1974 and 1980, 15 of these meetings - *Assembléias Indígenas* - were organized throughout Brazil, involving most of the leadership of the Brazil's Indian nations.

This became a turning point in the Kaingang struggle to legitimize claims on their lands, especially because their leadership has been reported as having been bribed.²⁹ Local non-Indian farmers and their politician supporters pressured Kaingang leaders into a collusive compromise (Schwantes 1984 in Deckmann 1985: 115). Besides their strict economic interests, non-Indian claimants saw this as a strategy to accelerate the overthrow of FUNAI's control over the Indian lands lease system. Bargaining for the amount of the lease would be easier, they thought, if the control were in Indian hands. Local Kaingang leaders stopped to claim their lands for their own usufruct and started to lease the land. This shifted the entire victory over the Indian affairs policies of dispossession to the local rich farmers' side. The local Guarani would not immediately involve themselves in such a process, as it will later be seen.

Claiming Their Lands for Self-use and Self-dispossession

Though the Kaingang continued to claim the reservation lands for self-use and usufruct, since the late 1970s, most of the lands claimed were subsequently leased to non-Indians. The strategy of claiming land in order to subsequently lease it followed the precedent set by SPI-FUNAI and A. Ribeiro's 1969 experiment. Kaingang leaders

²⁹ Those leaders were bribed with both money, parties (barbiques, beverages--alcoholic and soft drinks), prostitutes, and automobiles.

increasingly adapted this strategy. Involvement with leasing widened and did not stop grow until recently. Regular Kaingang folk began to demand similar "rights" toward their lands and to engage in leasing them. At the same time, most of them reduced their engagement in agriculture.

As early as August of 1978 the Guarita Kaingang top leaders were leasing the "mechanized"³⁰ lands.³¹ In this case, they contracted the leases with the 60 non-Indian farmer families that were still working in the Guarita Reservation.³² In addition, together with local politicians, these farmers not only applauded and praised the Kaingang decision, but strongly supported them. Indeed, from then on bribery has mediated in and intertwined with local Kaingang and non-Indian interests in the area.

The Guarita Kaingang have argued that they then engaged in leasing their lands because they were unable to get effective support to work the land themselves. The Indians maintain that they initially planned for farming, cattle and fish raising, projects which were presented both

³⁰ Mechanized=cleared of tree stumps, allowing use of tractors, therefore the most valuable.

³¹ Especially cacique Alfaiate, his son Felipe, and his Captain I. S. Ribeiro were recounted as holding and leasing hundreds of hectares by that time.

³² These 60 non-Indian farmers remained in the reservation lands after the 1978 lease termination deadline, because they had prosecuted FUNAI in an attempt to renew their contracts (Zero Hora August 31, 1978: 34; see Chapter Five).

to FUNAI and to local banks and or cooperatives. In justification for the failure to achieve effective reoccupation of their lands, local Kaingang have stressed external factors. Former leaders have cited FUNAI's total lack of support, their legal status as ward of the state at the time, and the juridical definition of their lands as state property. Due to these last two conditions, Indians were prevented from getting steady and affordable loans.

It is not surprising that this same leadership systematically maintained the land claims which have engendered self-dispossession, and therefore their compromises with non-Indian claimants. This situation has persisted in spite of the fact that since then local Kaingang caciques have been overthrown and new ones have taken power. In addition, as stressed in chapter three, these transformations have produced an internal social, economic and political differentiation among Indians. Indian landlessness spread and landless folk rarely encountered the support needed to demand their rights to the local lands. If some did make demands, they were not taken into consideration. The more successful Indian claimants were really struggling for power, as a way not only to dispose of the local lands for leasing, but to control all the reservation's resources.

The Kaingang Empowerment

As soon as the Guarita Kaingang leadership--mainly the cacique and the Indian police--engaged in claiming the reservation lands for leasing and in imposing the lease system, they usurped the entire benefit of Indian control over land. Indian autonomy here ended up benefiting non-Indians. To achieve this, the local Kaingang leaders had to augment control over their political organization. In fact, ever since, this leadership has relied on contract-making procedures and fees, and on repression. The latter has taken the form of Indian police and a prison. These have been sustained through the effective use of force and the support of governmental authorities and non-Indian leasers.³³ In addition, they have been crucial in controlling the growing Kaingang counter claims on Indian lands.

Another crucial aspect of the Kaingang empowerment process regarding their claims on their own lands has to do with land distribution. Who gets control over land for their own use, to lease, and to sharecrop. The will of the cacique and the Indian leadership became law, with every case decided on an individual basis. Since 1978 the top Kaingang

³³ In this case, both in the federal, state and municipal levels. Municipal authorities have supported and praised the Guarita Indian leadership takeover regarding the decision-making power towards their lands in the late 1970s. They have stressed coincidence of this Indian leadership agreement with the continuity of illegal leasing (Feller 1989: 1) or other relinquishing of control (Santos in Zero Hora May 1st., 1984) related to their own lands.

leaders disposed of the biggest and most valuable tracts of local land. Faithful allies received larger areas, while most of the Kaingang had control over insufficient amounts, if they controlled any. The opening of new fields has been encouraged by Indian leadership so called leadership, as already explained (see Chapter Five). In any case, no charter was ever created for land distribution.

In 1979 the Kaingang were already split on the question of their land claims. Many Indians were then disputing the leadership's self-declared right to control and lease huge amounts of land, benefiting just a few people (Simonian 1980). The IECLB reported an imminent conflict among the local Kaingang, and affirmed that some Indians were being armed by non-Indians (Folha da Manhã December 12, 1979: 3). Yet, it stressed that "it was not the case of peasants struggling for a piece of land, but of capitalist farmers only intending to exploit the Indians" (IECLB 1979 in Meliá 1984b: 236). Non-Indian capitalist farmers who did not get a piece of the pie promoted an Indian rebellion. By disrupting the existing unequal distribution of land, excluded non-Indian farmers hoped to gain a share of part of the local land.

Cacique Alfaiate was simultaneously leading a campaign to achieve legal emancipation from the state ward status (Estado de Sao Paulo February 13, 1979). The Guarita Kaingang leadership then expected to participate in local

level politics, and to nominate a Kaingang to manage the local reservation. Non-Indians were supporting this proposal, which, they thought, would free them of FUNAI's constraints (Simonian P.A.). If recognized, however, such a demand was seen as threatening to the Indians collective tenancy rights (CIMI-Sul 1979). The Guarita Kaingang made history when in 1983 they became the first Brazilian Indians in modern times to advocate emancipation. They did this precisely at a juncture when many Indians, concerned politicians, citizens, civil and religious organizations were battling against the government proposal to emancipate the Indians.³⁴

The cacique's control of these illegal contracts included the establishment of the rents for the land leasing itself. As far as the evidence goes, from the beginning the rents have been economically injurious to local Kaingang interests, as they were largely determined by powerful non-Indian farmers (Meliá 1984b: 238; Zero Hora January 28, 1983: centr. pgs.; Simonian id.). Though rents have in some instances been adjusted through the year--due to overwhelming and persistent inflation in the Brazilian natural economy--and fixed by hectares, they have always

³⁴ By that time the FUNAI administration was trying to impose *indianidade* criteria. These ethnic identification devices were formulated by Lt. Col. Ivan Zanoni Hausen, as a way to deny the Indian identity to thousands of Indians in Brazil, which in part followed U.S. ethnic policies.

been low when compared to the regional land market.³⁵ Only a few Indians have been slightly more protected, having their contracts paid in percentage of production, rather than fixed by hectares. The Guarita Kaingang argue that at the beginning it was possible to make such an agreement for percentage, but later on non-Indian leaseholders began to refuse.³⁶

While these lease contracts were technically illegal (see Chapter Five), they have been formally negotiated and drawn up in non-Indian registries in local cities and towns. Previous arrangements were made informally both inside the reservation and in non-Indian houses, in bars, streets, or in the nearby villages, towns and cities. However, for the convenience of the cacique or his representative, who had to attend the preparation and execution of agreements, a special office was later organized inside the reservation. To consolidate such a process, a special fee was also

³⁵ In 1968, for instance, congressmen found that in RGS Indian lands were being rented by Cr\$ 70,00 while non-Indian lands were priced at Cr\$ 150,00 (Câmara dos Deputados 1971: 61).

³⁶ In the early 1990s, only one among the 40 Kaingang families from the Três Soita section was indeed receiving the payment in product. This Indian family was then receiving 30% of the yearly production of his non-Indian leaseholder, Albino Shepp. R. P. Ribeiro, the head of the family, told me that he never leased his tracts of land for cash. He did not want to simply watch the harvest been taken away from his fields by non-Indians, as happened with his friends year after year. By that time their own expenses had equalled the value of the rent collected, while he was beginning to fill his silo with his share of the crops produced by his leaseholder.

instituted. Its value was established at around 10% of each contract, which was required in advance by the non-Indian leasers. The fee was thought of as a way to both control and profit from the lease system. Its basic rationale was probably inspired by the SPI and FUNAI *renda indigena* project.

The Indian leadership indeed rationalized that the leasing contract fees would not only provide resources to maintain the lease system, but also to form a fund to support community services. In addition, the local Kaingang leadership has claimed the right to request further support from non-Indian leasers for diverse events or necessities. These collections or extra fees have been arbitrary and funds have been allotted to be used for the Indian day party, travelling, mournings, and so on.³⁷ These fees were even claimed as a way to compensate the low prices of the leased Indian lands and or inflation.³⁸ Initially the cacique and his close aids controlled funds generated by these fees.

Despite the Kaingang leadership's excessive control over the lease system, there have been specific strategies

³⁷ The value has mostly changed year to year--in 1990, for instance, a Cr\$ 1,000,00 fee was being charged to each non-Indian leaser to support the Indian day party.

³⁸ Non-Indian leaseholders, however, have argued that the fees are simply extortion. Like the regular leasing contract fees, these extra fees have rarely been used to benefit the entire local Indian community.

to avoid it. The local Kaingang have made "under-the-table" contracts, or they have leased more than the allowed amounts, or assigned smaller tracts in the contracts, though in reality leasing bigger ones. In these cases, Indians and non-Indian leasers have been able to share part of the fees owed to the Kaingang leadership. They have also been able to charge or pay a cheaper or higher rent, depending on particular conditions. These practices have existed ever since the leasing contracts were under SPI or FUNAI control, and have continued up to the present.

The Kaingang also have noted the persistence of strategies aimed to disrupt attempts at wealth accumulation. These are internal mechanisms of control, in which, as the local Kaingang have said, envy and sorcery play an important role. Those Indians who at a certain point were able to accumulate some resources have stressed this accusation. The same Kaingang further emphasized that besides the leadership control and abuse, their poorer neighbors have found ways to both disturb their path and to assure their bankruptcy: robbery and burning. Some even mentioned that because Indians have lost too much, they also lost the will to continue the struggle to surmount poverty.

Despite this, Indian leaders and influential non-Indians made reference to the existence of "an economic

renaissance" in the reservation.³⁹ Reports spread stating that Indians had won their battle against poverty. This was mainly a result of land leasing, the reports stated. The Miraguaí mayor Noedy R. de Almeida, mentioned that the Indians had money to go shopping and had stopped begging (Folha da Tarde May 13, 1980: 5). Kaingang from other state reservations even started to ask to be transferred to Guarita Reservation, where all their relatives "were rich." In 1980 I found the Péi-kar, the Iraí, the Nonoai and the Votouro Kaingang talking about moving to Guarita, and asking for news and information on the issue. This was soon proven to be merely a false alarm, or a way both to advocate the continuance of the established lease system and to stress its advantage.⁴⁰

Both due to abuses and deviation of resources, the Kaingang created a Rural Producers Association in 1981, which regulated the charges of the lease contracts fees throughout its short existence.⁴¹ The Association began by

³⁹ Cacique Alfaiate was asking for support, as a way to render the local land and Indian population productive (Folha da Tarde May 10-11, 1980: 6-7). In this case, Alfaiate emphasized the necessity for loans and a license to open a lumber mill in the reservation.

⁴⁰ This outcome was already clear in 1980, when I undertook a survey of the conditions of both the formerly mentioned Guarita Kaingang "renaissance" and economic failure (Simonian 1980). At that time the research focused on the lease system and on the wider economic and political power, including Brazil's Indian affairs.

⁴¹ Kaingang bilingual teachers, not farmers, ended up being elected as the first directory.

running a recovery program, which emphasized the economic domain (FUNAI 1982).⁴² However, its administrators did not focus on ending land-leasing. In addition, they defined the main goal of the association as being exploitation of forest and agriculture. By the same time some Kaingang were successful in securing resources necessary for farming. The Association played an important role in this, by providing temporary credit. According to the Indians and a Correio do Povo (June 12, 1981) report some obtained funding through the Bank of Brazil, others through the Campo Novo Cooperative or even through bribery extortion.

Most of the Guarita Kaingang supported the Association at the beginning, as it started in a very active way. However, these same Kaingang ended up contributing to its fall in the following year. Most of the Kaingang who had received advance payments to be able to engage in cultivating their fields ended up not paying their debts.⁴³

⁴² It began its work measuring the leased areas, claiming the right to administer the leasing contract fee, constructing schools, demanding the reservation re-demarcation, and so on.

⁴³ In 1981 they contracted their production with the Association as a way to guarantee the money that they were receiving to invest in farming (FUNAI 1982: 82). As a way to avoid repayment by harvest time, most of them sold the crops to their non-Indian neighbors' merchants. Some of these Indians have explained that they did this because they were witnessing the corruption going on among the Association directors and FUNAI officials. Another reason was they did not harvest enough to pay both their debts and to feed their families. Most of those Kaingang who received loans from the Bank of Brazil were not able to pay their debts either. Like many non-Indians, they were thus entrapped by the bank

The directory also engaged in widespread corruption. Despite the Association investments, its directory also embezzled wealth generated through leasing land and lumber exploitation. The Association became in debt to banks, cooperatives, and commercial enterprises of the surrounding area.⁴⁴ Other FUNAI non-Indian officials were partially responsible for this outcome (FUNAI-PJ 1983). The Indian Association was considered illegal by FUNAI bureaucrats, because, they argued, the Indians were wards of the state and could not organize independently (id.).⁴⁵

When in 1981 the FUNAI administration tried to confiscate 40 percent of the reservation non-Indian harvest, its plan was defeated both by the Kaingang and non-Indian leasers. In the FUNAI scheme, non-Indian farmers would keep 30 percent and the Indians the other 30 percent. As the Jornal do Brasil (March 19, 1981) reported, non-Indian leasers had planted 10,000 hectares in corn and soybean. The Guarita Kaingang, however, persisted in their claims to the right to lease out their lands. These Indians argued that they could not count anymore on FUNAI promises of support.

system interest policies, by an inflationary process which had bankrupted small and medium enterprises in rural and urban areas throughout the country, and by bad harvests.

⁴⁴ Indeed, 1982, a FUNAI (1982) team found some of them responsible for "numerous debts", "cartorial protests" and having "closed bank accounts."

⁴⁵ The FUNAI administration even prohibited new loans for the local Indians' agricultural production.

At this juncture, many the wives, daughters and sisters of the Kaingang leadership got involved in violence. Then they attacked a FUNAI envoy from Brasília; specifically they slapped Lt. Col. Anael Gonçalves and attempted to pull out his hair, but the federal police counter-attacked (Simonian P.A.). The Kaingang Hélio Alves was even wounded in the skirmish (Jornal do Brasil id.).

This incident precipitated the heavy intervention of Jair Soares, the RGS governor, after which FUNAI liberated all of the non-Indian harvest. This alleged victory strengthened the Kaingang claims toward leasing their lands, and yet reinforced the position of the Kaingang leadership. So far, Indian autonomy in dealing with their lands benefited non-Indian interests, thus to most of them this process represented a "Trojan horse" gift. In fact, the situation was one of a growing process of impoverishment.

Despite the cacique S. Alfaiate's compromises with non-Indians, strong and persistent struggles aiming to overthrow him were then articulated both by some non-Indian farmers and the Kaingang Ivo Ribeiro. Sebastiao Alfaiate, and was finally usurped in 1982. The new cacique Ivo Ribeiro began by regaining the control of the land lease contract fees, which has ever since continued to remain in the hands of the ruling leadership. It was especially during the Ivo Ribeiro *cacicado* that the local Kaingang leadership started to use its power to seize land and other possessions. He

himself simultaneously took advantage of exposing fear and suspicion of plot organization. The leadership since tended to act through basically repressive strategies, together with all sort of material extortion, mainly imprisonment, torture, and exiling.

In keeping with its political orientation, the FUNAI has not advocated a pro-Indian policy in the Guarita case, one which could consider the interests and claims of the Indian majority. Violent strategies have been enforced as ways both to dispossess the Indians and to guarantee non-Indian claims the right to dispose of their lands. In the aftermath of these trends, major ruptures occurred through the next decade, though tensions were already at a high level in the late 1970s, both between Indians and non-Indians, and the Indians own internal fissions. Many Kaingang were going to fight for the termination of the imposed lease system through the last decade, but they felt hopeless. Some even affirmed that like non-Indian authorities and FUNAI officials, everybody among them was corrupt, so they could not envision a way to end the imposed self-dispossession. Landlessness has expanded and the victims continue voiceless and the Kaingang have imposed huge pressures on the Guarani.

Since the late 1970s, the Kaingang leadership has developed diverse plans to engage in rural production, as a way to gradually terminate the land-lease system. However,

these plans were inspired by a very capitalist and mechanized model of agricultural development. As mentioned before, this model was introduced to their reservation and nearby areas by the wheat and soybean boom of the 1950s-1970s, the SPI-FUNAI *roças do posto* and the FUNAI-DGPI and the IECLB mission plantations. Successful development seems unlikely, given the huge capital inputs the capitalist model requires. Indian leaders have systematically talked in terms of dozens of tractors, harvesters, thousands of kilos of seed, tons of fertilizers and other chemicals. A growing number of Indians have not agreed with this development plan, especially after their experiences with the Indian affairs officials and the Indian leadership's corrupt engagements.

The Kaingang political economy of land claims began with the administration of cacique S. Alfaiate. It was widely expanded with the following caciques--Ivo Ribeiro, Domingos Ribeiro and S. R. Claudino--who involved themselves in illegal timber exploitation.⁴⁶ The first and the latter were even sued by the federal judicial system (Justiça Federal 1989-1988). Despite this, all were involved with the surrounding capitalist farmers and timber entrepreneurs, who in fact have pressured the Indians to make deals. Besides

⁴⁶ Others besides the top Kaingang leadership have claimed the right to exploit the local forest. The captains of the Indian sections, the ex-cacique D. Ribeiro and even N. K. S. Ribeiro, the FUNAI Guarita Indian post former administrator, have all recently made such a claims.

the profits from the timber exploitation itself, one of the most direct outcomes of this process since the early 1980s, has been the delivering of about 8,000 hectares into the local land market.⁴⁷ Recent evidence have shown that the Indians continue to defy the 1988 Constitution prohibition of Indian land lease. They even did not take Judge Oliveira's (1991: 182-183) judgement on such matter. This Judge (id.) ruled that the Indians--in the Kadwéu case through an association--are "... not authorized to practice any act or to sign contracts involving land lease and rights on Indian lands."

Tensions and even violence were often the result of the Kaingang claims on the right to exploit reservation woods. The number of Indians decrying the corruptive and destructive impact on the forest has indeed grown. Though their points have been made mostly on the discursive level, bloodshed has resulted too, especially when some Indians have reacted to the accusations of their kin or peers. Recently in 1990 some of the fights in the nearby cities were said to be related to these claims and activities. One of them involved two Kaingang brothers from the ABC section, in which the accuser was beaten and slashed in his face and

⁴⁷ Besides the corrupt leadership, other Indians are also involved in forest claims and in the production of loggs, fence posts or firewood. However, many among them do not have the necessary skills, nor the required connections, to engage in such activities. As one of them recently emphasized, one needs to have "some power," especially to exploit timber; by power he specifically meant capital.

head. Non-Indians were also described as engaging in brutal actions against the Indians, as they have reportedly formed "a wood mafia," primarily to avenge their losing some business.

Despite these developments and the deteriorating condition of the land, no argument has been made for the need to reforest the reservation. The FUNAI Guarita Indian post former chief has mentioned that in 1989 the Kaingang cacique refused a FUNAI proposal to reforest some hectares west of the RS 320 highway.⁴⁸ In this case, cacique Claudino was reported as saying that he would agree with the reforestation but on the Estiva section, where the land was completely deteriorated. Then the same Indian post FUNAI official even criticized the Indians, saying that to get involved with reforestation, they would require somebody else to plant and tend to the trees, and in addition free pesticides.

Even so, a growing number among the Kaingang Indians have recently claimed their lands for their own use. Most among these claimants were landless Indians. Though some among these Indians did not have lands because their parents did not have enough to share with them, others were described as lazy, as "they do not make any effort to open a

⁴⁸ As the present-day local FUNAI official pointed out, this plan was made to help protect the reservation borders, but this strip of land is instead being leased to local non-Indians for farming.

field in the woods." Many Indians had been dispossessed due to the Kaingang leadership's political persecution and enforced punishments, but also due to simple powerlessness. Among these claimants, however, were some of the few hard workers or some of those who had never leased reservation land. They were realizing that their gains under current arrangements were not compensatory and that they should search for new ways to work the land by themselves.

A landless Kaingang woman has claimed the local lands for the Indians' use only. As mentioned at the opening of this chapter, she based her claim on her and her husband's ethnic identity. Being a neighbor of non-Indian invaders--the Recliski family--who have claimed ownership of a strip of land, she made claim to it also, so she would not have to rely on her family's offer of scraps of land to till. Asked why she and her husband did not open a new field, she affirmed that they lacked personal resources, as she and her husband had to work "during the day to eat by night." Moreover, she stressed the lack of interest from the cacique and Indian leadership, who had been thinking of their own pockets only. She raised the same criticism about FUNAI officials, who supported only the non-Indians claimants' interests. She also mentioned the Aéroclube section inhabitants' claims on the land invaded by the Recliski,

which were not taken seriously by those same officials.⁴⁹

Many Kaingang have also re-claimed the lands they partially or totally lost due to political persecution. This persecution followed Kaingang struggles for control over local resources, which occurred after the early 1980s. With the 1983 division of the area, the Kaingang fled persecution, moving to the other side. In 1989, fifteen of the Pau Escrito section's 43 families declared themselves as living in the Sao Joao do Irapuá's area prior to 1983. A huge concentration of migrants from this latter reservation area was also found in the Guarita Indian post section. Some also left to other RGS Indian reservations.⁵⁰ Their personal properties were also confiscated, including heads of oxen, poultry, pork, and even stoves. Besides, those whose fields lay where the division line passed simply lost them, and they did not receive any compensation.

An uncountable number of local Kaingang also have claimed lands that they lost merely due to the greed of the leadership. Many among them have complained that he was dispossessed due to his sons' criminal activity within the reservation. The father argued that he should not be

⁴⁹ As one Kaingang described this case, he said that FUNAI authorities were waiting for the elders who helped open the reservation limits to die to then declare the non-Indian claims as property rights.

⁵⁰ For instance, eight Kaingang families left for Inhacorá, where they still live (Simonian P.A.).

penalized for his sons' transgressions.⁵¹ A widow has claimed her 26 hectares of lands, which were expropriated by cacique Ivo Ribeiro in 1987, when he accused her of being a prostitute after her husband's death, while in fact he had already promised the land to non-Indian leasers (Zero Hora December 12, 1987: 5). This Kaingang woman was even imprisoned, and she later fled the reservation. F. Alfaiate was stripped of 55 hectares for political reasons, although he had been abusing the claiming process by holding 100 hectares of land at the expense of numerous local landless Indian people.

Indians from the Aéroclube section Kaingang were recently claiming that the airport wasted lands for farming. Some have said that they not only were not asked permission for its construction, but that it was not being used. Therefore, some landless people could transform it first into a "landless camp" and later on into farming fields. The Indians further argued that they would just be following the example of the non-Indian landless organization. Though they were saying this in joking tones, they also recalled their legal and constitutional rights. To do so, they said, they would have to face both the local leadership and the high cost of the enterprise. The former would hardly agree with the project, due to its strong alliances with the non-

⁵¹ He himself never committed a crime, nor did he teach his kids unacceptable behavior.

Indians and the local municipal governments. Moreover, the same Indians were also wondering about who would pay for the necessary land and ecological recovery project.

Inheritance claims seems to be a recent development among the Guarita Indians, especially when relating to land. Mabilde (1899: 142-144) reported that the Kaingang emphasized territoriality through pine woods distribution according to each "tribe" population.⁵² This and the fact that the Kaingang would fight any invasion on their pine woods and would establish landmarks to differentiate them (Tavares 1856 in Mabilde id.) suggest the existence of a solid land inheritance system. To what extent such a situation could be generalized is difficult to know. Some Kaingang from Guarita and Péi-kaar have said, for instance, that their forebears indeed did not have to worry about land or pine nuts harvest, as there was an abundance of both. Their forebears land inheritance system would not go beyond general claims, which was viable through kin and, eventually, captivity relationships. In fact, they would have access to land through the social criteria set by the social moieties. Claims on possessions of a deceased person

⁵² This author relied on Sgt. Antonio José Méndez Tavares' information, obtained during a visit he paid to the Misiones (Argentina) Cavará-Cuiá plains' Kaingang.

would not work, they claim, because they were lost with her or his death.⁵³

As the Indians were entrenched in small areas due to a growing encroachment and the imposition of permanent villages, the Kaingang forebears did not have another option to remain in the same setting and house. As one Kaingang recalled this change, "The Portuguese assured [their] elders that the *uaicupri* would not return." Consequently, houses, farming sites and orchards began to be transmitted through generations. As another Indian described, the most common rule was to pass them on to the surviving spouse or the children still living with the deceased. Until 1940, the same Indian further noted, no major conflict was raised as far as an inheritance was concerned, because plenty of land was available to all of them. However, due to the continuous land loss, that new arrangement became difficult to follow. Besides, as poverty spread, it has even been said that "nowadays we have nothing more than hope to leave for our dear people." Due to the growing number of interethnic marriages and mestizo offspring, social moieties have not been the sole criteria for land access.

⁵³ Mabilde (id.) and Serrano (1936: 61) also describe how the Kaingang used to burn the deceased's personal belonging and to abandon the site where he and or she lived as an adult. The Indians did this, all agree, as they feared the dead *uaicupri* or spirit, who could avenge in the event of disputes on his and or her possessions.

Nevertheless, many Guarita Kaingang have claimed land as their inheritance. Ema Ribeiro, for instance, has claimed her father's possessions, which were expropriated mostly by her cousin Francisco Ribeiro or "Chiquinho." Though she has been caring for her old and sick father, she had to move out of the reservation in 1989, due to landlessness and total lack of support for getting her father's land back.⁵⁴ Poli has claimed the lands that he inherited from his father, which his brother Perrô expropriated to lease out to non-Indians. Despite this, most of the local Kaingang have still resisted keeping the dead's personal belongings when there are some to inherit. However, due to the recently evolved inequalities among the reservation's inhabitants, those belongings began to exist and to be claimed.⁵⁵ This outcome led to a widespread criticism and concern on the local level, and some Indians even affirmed that was not the Kaingang tradition.

⁵⁴ Outside, she expected, her nonIndian husband and kids would be able to get some job and then later to study.

⁵⁵ Joana S. Ribeiro's offspring and husband recently claimed her personal belongings (clothes, jewelry), cattle and land share. Some children even accused their father of basically usurping everything, even one cow she had given specifically to one foster daughter. The younger son was even reported as landless, though the widower was leasing out a huge amount of land. Daughters and daughters-in-law have been recounted as disputing over her beautiful and expensive "Indian dresses" and accused of burying the Joana's corpse in a simple cloth, not the one she had previously requested.

Specific Guarani Claims on the Guarita Indian Lands

The Guarita Guarani have persisted with their claims to the use and usufruct of the Indian lands. Despite the adversities and the encroachment on their villages, they have been struggling to maintain their way of being, though some have been ultimately consenting to the presence of non-Indians among them. In the early 1980s several Guarani claimed rights to lease local lands. Most of them have emphasized their resentment toward the widespread devastation of the reservation forest, and expressed their powerlessness to change the *status quo*. Despite this, some have engaged in timber exploitation, though to a very small extent.

The first move by local Guarani toward claiming lands for leasing was linked to an interethnic marriage and to pressure from a FUNAI official. Though the FUNAI Indian post chief Albertino Soares Pereira failed to get the Guarani's agreement to engage in lumber exploitation, in 1981 he pressured the Guarani Valdomiro Silva, who had been married to a Kaingang - Rosa da Silva - to lease lands (Guimaraes 1982: 3).⁵⁶ V. Silva ended up capitulating to the official

⁵⁶ These Guarani were repressed due to their resistance, when the Irapuá Indian post chief took the only oxen team they possessed to work their fields and turned it over to a Kaingang family (Guimaraes *ibid.*).

Pereira's arguments.⁵⁷ He further argued that it was his wife who claimed the right to lease, after which he received 30 hectares of the reservation lands to lease.

Though other local Guarani disagreed with Silva's position, as he was also their current captain, he was at least expected to share the income that the lease contract provided. However, this sharing never took place. V. Silva was indeed reported as using the lease income basically to benefit his own family.⁵⁸ The same Guarani also engaged in forest exploitation, for which he was prosecuted (Justiça Federal 1989). In the aftermath of this judicial action he was both stripped of his leased lands and dismissed as Guarani captain.

Lately other Guarani from Toldo Velho have been claiming rights to lease lands too. Except for V. Silva's more substantial contracts, which involved a greater amount of land and cash payments, the way lands were being leased by those Guarani has a land loan. These land-leasing arrangements have only involved *quartas* or small land points or strips, which have been ceded to non-Indian neighbors in exchange for an old broken radio or accordion, bottles of

⁵⁷ According to Guimaraes (1982: 3), Albertino Pereira stressed that the Indians ought to become full entrepreneurs.

⁵⁸ He then acquired a car, which he received in a lease transaction, but his fellow Guarani never derived any benefit from it. Some even recounted that when they asked for a ride, V. Silva would ask them if they didn't have "any feet to walk."

rum, or some food. Moreover, the same Guarani have made deals with a small community of Caboclos, whose permanence among them has been questioned especially by the Guajuvira and the Gamelinhas Guarani.

As far as their common cultural heritage of land has been concerned, the Gamelinhas and Guajuvira Guarani have referred to those from Toldo Velho as traitors. As one Guarani from Guajuvira village stated, "... if one of our people is leasing land out to non-Indians, it is because he is no more a Guarani." They questioned them even while considering the acceptance of the above mentioned Caboclos,⁵⁹ though one of the Gamelinhas Guarani was also married to a member of that community. In this case, they said, the Caboclo spoke Guarani. The Gamelinhas Guarani have emphasized their landlessness, as their fields were expropriated by the Kaingang throughout the 1980s, and were leased out to non-Indian farmers. These Guarani have been pressured to resettle in the Guajuvira settlement, and nowadays they are even leasing small plots from the Kaingang.

Despite their critique and point that this was not a way of Guarani tradition, both the Gamelinhas and the Guajuvira Guarani were also engaged in the process of breaking former customs. Together with the Toldo Velho

⁵⁹ As most of the Toldo Velho Guarani resisted these trends, they moved and opened Guajuvira tekhoá.

Guarani, they have been dealing with fence posts production for sale or, as some have said, exchanging the posts for food and rum. Beyond their internal contradictions regarding their claims on the Guarita Reservation lands, most of the Guarani living there have been extremely concerned about whether they had real possibilities of staying. Though some were indeed leasing or basically ceding plots of the Indian lands to non-Indians, they simultaneously stressed their desire to regard them as just as a temporary arrangement.⁶⁰ In February of 1990, for instance, eight Guarani families left the reservation.⁶¹ Most of the remaining Guarani have also expressed their concern, as they are aware that nowadays it would not be easy to find a *teko pora*.⁶²

⁶⁰ This has been the case of many now living in the other RGS *teko'á* or Brazilian southeastern lands, most of whom first settled in the Guarita Reservation (Azanha and Ladeira 1988: 16; Simonian in press).

⁶¹ These families had camped in the Redentora periphery for weeks. Finally the local mayor Nilo Roewer arranged transportation, and they left for Porto Alegre, the state capital. Rationalizing their abandoning the area, they said that they could not accept the Guarani leasing even small portions of land. At the time, they were also criticizing the Redentora mayor, because instead of helping the Guarani with their farming activities in Guarita, he was finding resources to help them leave the land.

⁶² In the past, they mentioned, it was easier to withstand repressive policies of the SPI and FUNAI, since they could easily leave the area, both to other Indian reservation in south Brazil and to Misiones, Argentina. However, their capacity for such moves was now reduced, they admitted. Despite this, many were talking of a possible search for other places to settle. They were especially referring to the Osório and the Borboleta's RGS State Indian lands.

This chapter has outlined the main contradictions in the Guarita Indian various responses to non-Indian claims on their reservation lands. Though the Kaingang have pled to be landowners, their attitude towards Indian lands has been far from homogeneous. Rather, many have accommodated and colluded with state and non-Indian efforts to lease their land and exploit their natural resources. Repression has been part of this process, which has left many Indians in a landless condition. The Guarani have a different approach to the local lands, as they conceive the Brazil's South and East as their homeland. Many have indeed treated the Guarita lands as a passage, and although some have also stayed and claimed their possession rights only a few ultimately began to lease small tracts of land. Despite the growing landless Indian population, the Indian leadership of the Guarita Reservation has not changed their repressive and collusive policy toward land. Next comes a description and analysis of policies and claims on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation, which will serve a comparative purpose.

Chapter Seven

CLAIMS ON THE URU-EU-WAU-WAU RESERVATION LANDS

Isolation for the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau is something of the past (A. Meirelles 1980 in Cowell 1989: 96).

This land [Rondon Ranch] cannot be taken from us by FUNAI, cattle-rancher, or mining company (Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Indian).

Introduction

In this chapter I discuss both non-Indian (external) and Indian (internal) claims on Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands. I analyze social and historical processes, especially those unfolding after the early 1940s. These processes are: Indian land loss, and concomitant transformations in social organization and demography. Emphasis will be placed on very recent land claims (especially on those occurring after systematic contact of the early 1980s). Local autonomous Indians' claims will be estimated from available evidence. Possible internal contradictions among non-Indian and Indian will be simultaneously analyzed as both make their claims on Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands. Various forms of aggression will also be discussed including non-Indian invasions and Indian defensive warfare.

Much recent literature on land claims on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation (Cardoso 1988; Leão *et al.* 1984; Leonel Jr. 1991, 1988; Mindlin 1986; Santos *et. al.* 1988; Silva *et al.* 1988) reflects both anti and pro-Indian non-Indian land perspectives. This literature became crucial in the context

of policy making aimed to protect the Indian lands. However, understanding this reality requires more consideration. These works did not take the Indians recent claims on their lands nor FUNAI officials' role of desimpowering the Indians into consideration. As will be seen, this outcome ended up producing tensions and conflicts within the reservation, thereby reducing the Indians possibilities of making effective land claims.

As mentioned earlier, the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation is located in the midwest of the Rondônia state, in the Brazilian southwestern Amazon. It was defined and finally legally recognized in 1985 after a series of proposals which began to be presented in the 1940s (Leão et al. 1984). The demarcation of 1,867,117 hectares for this reservation was undertaken by a military team according to a presidential decree which, however, did not reflect former territories of the Indians (Decreto 91.416 1985). The decree delineating the area was issued by the President of the Republic in 1991, after many non-Indian land claims and struggles on parts of Indian lands (Decreto de Homologação 1991a). Despite this decree and the Indians' constitutional rights, many anti-Indian pressures still exists on Indian lands and natural resources.

At least half a dozen Indian groups were lately mentioned as living this reservation. The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and the Amundáwa form the largest part of the Indian

population.¹ According to Indians, throughout the last decades the former group had been occupying the northern part of the area, while the latter group dominated its southern lands. Until recently they were considered parts of one people (Leao *et al.* 1984: 7; Leonel Jr. 1991: 419-420; Puttkamer 1986: 87).² This issue, however, seems to be more complex because these Indians themselves have insisted that they are different. Amundáwa Indians, for instance, construct their cultural identity around social organizational differences, as they affirm that they were not kin and that only recently they began to communicate with each other and to inter-marry.³ In spite of this, they speak Tupi-Kawahiv;⁴ their language was classified by Rodrigues (1986: 39) as Tupi-Guarani. These Amundáwa still

¹ For references on the other Indians see next section.

² The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau identify themselves as Taukananha, which means "our people" or "we, the relatives," they have ultimately carried a Pacaas-Novos denomination. Meireles (1986: 143) states that it comes from the expression "Oro Wau" which means "players or blowers of taboca." The Amundáwa have been identified as "Mondawa," "Mondava group" or "clan" (Leao *et al.* *id.*; Leonel Jr. 1988: 155; Puttkamer 1986: 87).

³ Further research is also needed to establish a better understanding of their cultural differentiation process, which I have planned for 1994.

⁴ As soon as the Uru-Eu-Wa-Wau and the Amundáwa were contacted their language was identified as Tupi-Kawahiv by Parintintin, Tenharin, and Karipuna interpreters. Despite this, there can be noted a slight difference in the pronunciation of many words. A Parintintin, who had been working with them for some years, told me that "... they speak a little bit different." To establish the existence of dialects specific research will be needed.

share the Mytúm and Kanindé patrilineal moieties, as well as other cultural features.⁵

The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation census of 1990 indicates a significant decline in the Indian population, if earlier estimates are correct (see below). A total of 52 Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and of 50 Amundáwa were living in the reservation in November of 1990, who lived in seven distinct villages.⁶ Indians have mentioned the existence of autonomous Indians as also inhabiting the same reservation: Iruré-y, Putakuaranha, Parakuára, and Uruparakuára.⁷ Due to

⁵ It seems that Mytúm is the Tupi-Kawahiv social moiety *par excellence*, as it unifies all known groups though some cases, the other varies. Among the Parintintin and Tenharin, for example, the other is the Kwandú (Nimuendajú 1924: 225; Kracke 1984: 6; Menéndez 1989: 81), and according to Katikaí--a Karipuna woman--among her people the other is Tukano.

⁶ The Amundáwa are organized in one group but maintained two villages, which they used alternatively, one in the Trinchreira Indian Post, and another at a distance of eight km west. The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau are organized in five groups, and occupied seven different villages or sites: Comandante Ari Indian post, Barreiro, Jamari Indian post, Jamari River, Paraty, and Fazenda Rondon, being this outside the Reservation borders (for more details on this villages, their Indian leaders and the specific population in late 1990, see Simonian (1991a)).

⁷ See map 10 for their approximate location. The Parakuára were mentioned by Mawá (Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau), who recounted them as inhabiting the Jamari River, where they had big fields. As this information could not be checked with other Indians, it was not mentioned nor located on that map. As Leonel Jr. (1988: 156) reported, the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau recalled the Jurureí, who would have been inhabiting an area outside Reservation borders, at the Muqui and Ricardo Franco rivers. Awarina (Amundáwa) and Tarí (Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau) have told that the Iruré-y were recently located inside the reservation, at the Cautário River western headwaters.

the diversity of numbers, no accurate estimate can be made for autonomous Indians living on the same reservation. Fourteen Karitiana were living there in late 1990.⁸ About 20 Oro-in were resettled in the same area in 1991.⁹

FUNAI and IBDF also maintain headquarters in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation. In 1990 the FUNAI administration had three Indian posts (Comandante Ari, Trincheira, and Alta Floresta) and four Vigilance posts (Alto Jarú, Cajueiro, Linha 621, and Jamari) inside the reservation. These units have tended to serve non-Indian interests. However, FUNAI officials have proposed the creation of others in the reservation southwestern border and in the Jamari River headwaters (Azevedo 1990: 3; Poquiviqui *et al.* 1990: 10-11, 13-14, 16). In addition, the IBDF maintains an administrative unit in the east part of Pacaas Novos National Park through which non-Indian interests have been similarly supported. I discuss the invading non-Indian enterprises later in this chapter.

In the following sections the major 20th century claims and pressures against the Indian lands will be

⁸ In late 1980s, for instance, FUNAI officials exiled as punishment these Karitiana Indians, who were living in the reservation. Due to early rain in 1990 I could not visit the Jamari Indian post, where I had intended to survey the living conditions of these Karitiana.

⁹ These Oro-in Indians were also resettled there after a stay for 19 years in the Rio Negro Ocaia Reservation, to where they were transferred by FUNAI officials after a genocidal attack in 1962.

described, as well as the Indian responses to protect their territory. I will suggest that demographic, economic and political struggles to accomplish the expulsion of Indians have occurred as the state of Rondônia and the federal government have supported non-Indian claimants. Various evidence has demonstrated that the existence of protective Indian land laws has not strictly guaranteed the autonomy of Indian lands. Indian responses to this have varied, but since direct contact few alternatives remain for contesting invasions which certainly has contributed to a trend towards powerlessness and or accommodation.

The Environment: Diversity and Destruction

The lands of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation encompass a variety of natural ecosystems as it is located in a transitional area between the rainforest and the highland savannah. The ecotypes include dense and scattered rain forest, palm forest, scrub-land, rock and mountain lands, plains and lowlands (Cardoso 1989: 22). Two major mountain ranges spread in its northern and southern areas - the Paccas Novos and the Oupianes, with altitudes that range from 200 to 1,200 meters (id.: 19). Both poor soils and high altitude were bases of the area's unsuitability for agriculture (Cardoso 1989: 19-20). In addition, many rivers, streams, and streamlets cut across the reservation, and a substantial area is flooded yearly. Tributaries of the

Madeira, Mamoré, and Guaporé rivers have their headwaters within the reservation.¹⁰

In the past this environment provided the Indians with plenty of food and other resources. Hunted animal species were abundant as were fish. A variety of birds provided meat, but some have been hunted for feathers, an important resource for the Indian cultures. As both Indians and outside experts (Cardoso 1989; Mindlin 1986) have suggested, the forests were originally rich in palm trees, waxes, timber - especially mahogany, cedar, rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*) and Brazilian nut trees (*Bertholletia excelsa*). The subsoils were said to be rich in precious stones and other minerals - gold, tin, and amethyst (Romanini et al. 1977).

It is in the context of this diversity that natural resources have been extensively exploited at the local level since the 1940s by non-Indians. In fact, the activities of professional hunters, settlers, miners, and timber entrepreneurs, have since helped to imperil the survival of Indians (Costa 1984: 155-156). As I will discuss later, this environmental diversity has always been at the root of non-Indian claims on the Indian lands.

¹⁰ These are especially the Cautário, Sao Domingos, Sao Miguel, Muqui, Urupá, Jarú, Jamari, Candeias, Jaci-Paraná, Ouro Preto, and Pacaas Novos rivers.

The Indians and the "Death Frontier"

Tupi peoples were found in the midwest of Rondônia and on the Guaporé River right bank,¹¹ when non-Indian newcomers began to expand into the area during colonial times.¹² Since these first encounters, and despite harsh defensive wars undertaken by Indians, the area became rather a persistent "death frontier," the Indians being the most vulnerable people in it.¹³ If there was ever an Indian "Eden" in the

¹¹ Though a Tupi-Kawahiv recent migration from the upper Tapajós River into the center of Rondônia has been mentioned by many authors (Nimuendajú 1948: 283-284; 1924), archeological evidence suggest that they might be old dwellers in the latter area. Archeologists of the Goiás Catholic University have been working in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation. Leonel Jr. (1988: 56) mentions that in the Arahi site they found human occupation that was dated in 12,000 years. Miller (1983) found the east bank of the Guaporé River as inhabited by the Tupi at about 900 a.d.. For a summary of Tupi-Kawahiv pre-colonial migration and occupation hypothesis see both Brochado (1984) and Menéndez (1989).

¹² The Cautários, or Cau ta yó according to the Moré, were mentioned in the eighteenth century on the Cautário River (Almeida Serra 1781, 1800 in Meireles 1989: 125; Ferreira [1759] 1974: 28), where they attacked the construction of Príncipe da Beira Fort. In the nineteenth century Martius (1867: 201) identified a widespread Tupi occupation, which covered vast areas both in the (high) Tapajós and in the Madeira (right bank) rivers. Those living between the Jamari and the Jaci-Paraná were among those who resisted rubber entrepreneurs and the Madeira-Mamoré Railroad's construction team (Pinkas 1887: 296). The Guaporé River banks have been defined as an ethnic and cultural frontier, since they have been inhabited by Txapakura and Tupi speaking peoples (Lévi-Strauss 1948: 371; Nimuendajú 1981, 1924).

¹³ The Indian population of the area was identified by an endless list of names, most of which became mere identifications for regional sites due to total extermination (Leao et al. 1984: 7; Leonel Jr. 1988: 25; Meirelles and Meirelles 1984: 134). The Moré reported their

area, it was gone much earlier than McEntyre and Puttkamer (1988) put. Early and mid-century rubber booms resulted in permanent non-Indian settlement in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation region (Hugo [1959] 1991 II; Rondon 1916). However, it was with the 1970s development policies that Indian lands were definitively invaded and circumscribed. A history of successive Indian enslaving raids, massacres and labor exploitation, all accompanied persistent colonial policies and strategies.

Rubber entrepreneurs and tappers confronted diverse Indian groups in 1900 in the Rondônia midwest. They were followed by SPI surveyors (Rondon 1916).¹⁴ The Cautários were invaded by the Guaporé Rubber Company in the early 1910s. At that time they were still struggling to prevent new invasions, as they tried to impede the landing of SPI officials to survey the area (Rondon id.). In 1930 it was still considered dangerous to look for land on the low Guaporé River surroundings (Ferreira 1929 in Menezes 1984: 31). Arikém were recounted as staying on the headwaters of Candeias and Jamari rivers, where with other Indians from the same area they were virtual slaves in rubber-estates

past encounters with the Cau ta yó, when these Indians were described as being used to anthropophagic rituals (Castedo 1957 in Meireles 1989: 123, 125). For the Portuguese expansion in the area by the 19th century, see Davidson 1973 and Meireles id.: 119ff.

¹⁴ Marshall Rondon even engaged in direct contact with some of them. A landmark of the SPI officials' passage still endures in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation inner lands.

(Magalhaes 1941).¹⁵ Tupi-Mondé Aruá were located in the Rolim de Moura and Ricardo Franco rivers at that same time, but only some of them survived (Rondon and Faria 1948: 18).¹⁶

The 1940s were particularly devastating for Indians.¹⁷ About 1,000 Black Mouth Indians were contacted in 1942 with the help of Parintintin interpreters (Hugo id.).¹⁸ Some had their labor exploited on the Uniao and Santo Antônio rubber estates or were forcibly settled in the Rodolfo de Miranda

¹⁵ Arikém were later on installed in the Rodolfo Miranda Indian Post and later Colony (which had been created by the SPI). This ideally protective enterprise ended up so destructive like the rubber estates regime; in 1941 25 Indians were settled there, who belonged at least to seven different Indian groups (Lévi-Strauss [1955] in 1963: 329-330). About late 1940 these Indians were dead or expelled by non-Indians, who were already claiming Indian lands (SPI 1957 in Leonel Jr. 1988: 84-85).

¹⁶ The survivors have been reported as now living in Rio Branco and Rio Guaporé reservations (CEDI 1991: 417; Leonel Jr. 1988: 51).

¹⁷ Badra (n.d.: 205, 211) also mentioned dreadful dangers faced throughout 1940s by rubber-estates invaders and rubber-tappers in the area: "treacherous" resisting Indians, poisonous snakes, ferocious jaguars, and anopheles. J. Canuto, who has lived all his life in the Guaporé River east bank, recently reported simultaneous anti-human actions of rubber entrepreneurs, who simply carried rubber-tappers "as pigs," and left them in inner forests without assistance (Simonian P.A.). In the Cabixi River, for instance, out of 150 resettled rubber-tappers, in this case, by Tenente Cabral, only Manoel Luís survived to report their deadly experience (id.).

¹⁸ The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and the Amundáwa could be among the generic *Boca Preta* or *Negra* - Black/Negro Mouth - as mentioned by Leonel Jr. (1988: 54). Like the two first and the Tupi-Kawahiv Karipuna, men too tattooed their lips and/or the area between their mouths' ends and their ears. Women tattooed this latter area and chin.

Indian Colony; others were simply massacred or died from influenza (id.: 234, 236-244). In 1948 the rubber entrepreneur and Indian hunter Joao Chaves, believing himself immune from prosecution, publicly admitted to having killed with impunity 118 of these Indians three years earlier (Leao et al. 1984: 14).¹⁹ Moreover, Chaves held 600 Indians captive to exploit his rubber estate (SPI 1948 in Leonel Jr. 1988: 90). About the same time, Luiz Dantas, the Sao Luiz rubber-estate invader was also reported as having killed many Indians in this area.

Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, the invasion of non-Indians intensified. In the late 1960s, for instance, the Alta Lídia cattle ranch was built in the heart of Indians lands.²⁰ The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau expelled these cattle-ranchers in 1970, when they killed José Rodrigues de Moraes, a cowboy, and 40,000 cattle (Leao et al. 1984; Leonel Jr. 1988: 30). The future BR 364 highway was built as a dirt road aimed to facilitate non-Indian expansion and to contain the Indians in their eastern territorial border (McIntyre and Puttkamer 1988: 816). The fact that Manoel Lucindo da Silva directed the Oro-in massacre inside the current Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands in 1962 is significant because

¹⁹ Though a criminal suit was started against this rubber entrepreneur, it was soon dismissed (SPI 1948 in Leonel Jr. 1988: 89).

²⁰ The Indians maintain some "wood relics" from those installations, which were shown to me.

it is the only case that was taken to court on charges of practicing genocide (Justiça Pública 1990-1978).²¹ The government contributed to these processes as it assured basic facilities like roads and issued permit for mining and cattle-ranching.

Throughout the 1970s the federal government launched an overarching developmentalist policy (Davis 1977; Gross 1982) with genocidal consequences. This policy not only resulted totally surrounding these Indian lands, but again imposed devastation on Indian lives and resources. The Indian lands continued to be claimed by outsiders and were almost immediately invaded by major mining enterprises, colonization and road projects, as well as for the creation of a national park (Almeida 1987, 1986, Cardoso 1989, Costa 1984, Cowell 1990, Ellis 1988 and Leonel Jr. 1987, 1986). As non-Indian invaders substantially reduced Indian territory, Indians became more aggressive both against those invaders and the local autonomous Indians. In the mid-1970s, the Indians launched many deadly attacks on non-Indians (Benamour 1975; Meirelles 1978).²² In 1979, the Uru-Eu-Wau-

²¹ Those Indians inhabited Pacaas Novos River and the surroundings of the headwaters of the Água Branca *igarapé*. Besides killing about 30 Indians on that occasion, Silva also imprisoned some of them to gift single rubber-tappers that were working in his invading rubber estate. Though he has been prosecuted for genocidal practices, the process became an endless judicial process.

²² The confrontational character of these invasions persisted as the Indians resisted them but simultaneously got curious about the invaders (see Ferreira 1976).

Wau responded to an attack by non-Indians, killing two non-Indian children and kidnapping another in the Nova Floresta igarapé (Cowell 1990: 94ff).²³

The Government Oriented Contact

As the government had failed to protect the Indians' lives and territory, in the late 1970s it surrendered to non-Indian newcomers and politicians' pressures to end Indian and non-Indian confrontations. A 1981 imposed direct contact mediated by a FUNAI traditional *frente de atração*--attraction front--resulted from those pressures. Traditional attraction fronts have been organized to search for Indians in isolated regions. Officials or missionaries left gifts expecting to persuade the Indians of their supposedly pacific intentions.²⁴

²³ Luiz Prestes died immediately; Dimas Prestes was wounded but ended up dying too; the youngest, Fábio Prestes, was kidnapped and never seen again (Costa id.: 148, 152; Cowell 1990: 106-110; Cowell et al. 1984). Still in 1979 non-Indians organized a punitive expedition in an attempt to recover the little boy, but were not successful (id.). Soon FUNAI official would be working with his family, and searched for the "White kid" when the Indians first approached the local FUNAI attraction post.

²⁴ An innovative though still problematic way of dealing with autonomous Indians was developed in the late 1980s by FUNAI indigenists, under the leadership of Sydney Possuelo. Ever since the Indigenist team have been identified as *Equipe de Localização de Índios Isolados*--Localization Team of Isolated Indians--whose policy is to protect the borders of the Indians' presumed territory instead of engaging in actual contact (Possuelo et al. 1988; Simonian, P.A.).

The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau specific attraction front followed a traditional way of dealing with autonomous Indians. It was made up of FUNAI officials known as *sertanistas*, interpreters, and unskilled workers, and it was initially led by Apoena Meirelles and José do Carmo Santana (Costa 1984-1981; Cowell 1989, 1984; Meirelles 1979). The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau were first contacted in 1981 and the Amundáwa in the following year, but many remain autonomous.²⁵ As is usually the case (Davis 1977; Ribeiro 1970), the "pacification" of the Indians primarily benefitted non-Indians, and it also meant death, dispossession and exploitation for the Indians.²⁶

Though some survived, after direct contact, most died primarily due to contagious diseases which were not promptly attended to (Leonel Jr. 1986; Mindlin 1985a: 224).²⁷

²⁵ For a write-up and a visual description of these first direct contact see Costa 1984, Cowell 1990, Cowell et al. 1980, McIntyre and Puttkamer 1988.

²⁶ Despite this, the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau continued to attack non-Indian invaders, and even shot with arrows the officials of the FUNAI attraction front (Costa 1984: 158-159, 165-166, 170-171). Before the reservation demarcation and as late as in 1984 the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau killed a rubber-tapper in the Guaporé River basin and in the same week a hunter in Ariquemes (Tribuna da Imprensa January 07, 1984). For recent killings see below.

²⁷ In this respect they experienced a similar fate as that of the Arikém, Boca Negra, Karipuna, and so many other Indians of the same area. I tried to get the yearly censuses and health reports about the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation Indians in the FUNAI headquarters in Porto Velho. The archival, however, was closed for the public and researchers.

According to a FUNAI official, in 1983 twelve Indians died of chickenpox, introduced by infected clothes presented to them by the Sao Luiz rubber estate invaders.²⁸ In 1984 the entire Indian population of this area was estimated at between 1,000 and 1,200 people, though those already in direct contact with FUNAI Indian posts were estimated at 250 individuals (Leao et al. 1984: 7).²⁹ Non-Indian have used this evidence to justify land claims on the reservation lands (Santos et al. 1988; Silva et al. 1988). Other deaths followed this deliberate introduction of infectious disease. The Indians have said that their kin then "fell with fevers and died one after the other, like corn when it is been threshed." Despite the death toll, the federal government was not indicted when the Indians' case was presented in an international jury in 1990 (TPP 1990).³⁰ Meanwhile, Indians

²⁸ The only social daily remainder of this unpunished tragedy is the nickname of an Amundáwa Indian "Chickenpox," Catapora in Portuguese, who still bore physical marks of the disease.

²⁹ Leonel Jr. (1988: 155) mentioned 150 as the number of the Amundáwa in 1986. However, a FUNAI official, who witnessed the Amundáwa first arrival at the Comandante Ari FUNAI Indian post in 1982 and followed up their first contact with FUNAI officials, affirms that then the entire community was made up of only 76 persons.

³⁰ This international jury met in Paris, to judge genocidal practices against Indians and other powerless people. The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation's Indian case was oddly introduced by a Suruí Indian, who was not known to the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and the Amundáwa. Though I did look for it, I did not have access to the text o his speech.

continued to die without or ever with inefficient medical assistance.³¹

Intertribal warfare was also a crucial factor leading to Indian depopulation. In this respect it did not differ from many other Indian societies in the Amazon as Ferguson (1992) has demonstrated. Although specific data were difficult to obtain in the field, the Iruré-y were surely near extinction if not actually extinct. In this case, soon before the Amundáwa engaged in direct contact with the local FUNAI attraction front they waged a war against those autonomous Indians probably killing most of them. The Amundáwa captured a child who was immediately killed because of her "loud and incessant screams."³²

The deliberate neglect of the Indians' fate by the government persisted even when financial resources were available (Mindlin 1986). FUNAI officials who have worked in the reservation have said that these funds were used instead to pay for the trips of officials and experts. These trips were ostensibly made to assess the conditions of Indians,

³¹ Numerous deaths were reported as happening in the aftermath of the first contact, all in the same circumstances. One of the most shocking happened a year before my arrival into the reservation--Djaí or Careca--the man who first agreed with the attraction front contact, died of Tb, a curable disease.

³² The Amundáwa and Leonel Jr. (1988: 156-157) described that FUNAI officials contacted a Jururei (the same Iruré-y) couple in 1986, whose woman informed them through a Parintintin interpreter that their village encompassed 50 persons.

and at the very beginning of the contact, to distribute supplies to the Indians.³³ However, the trips actually benefited the officials and experts who were always getting their *per diem* payments.

In 1985 this reservation was legalized according to the ninth proposal (Decreto 91.416 1985; Leão *et al.* 1984: 52).³⁴ As the Indians were not consulted when preparing the reservation proposal the team of experts acknowledged that the proposal included only the areas where evidence of Indians occupation could be found for the last seventy years (Leão *et al.* *id.*).³⁵ They simultaneously called for new research to define other Indian possessions, especially on the Sao Miguel, Cautário, Muqui, and Sotério rivers. Though some programs to identify those Indians were ordered and resources were available, no major results have been

³³ Indians said that helicopters frequently landed in the reservation, all full with those specialists.

³⁴ A total of nine administrative proposals for a local reservation were made between 1945 and 1984 (Leão *et al.* 1984: 38-41).

³⁵ Though the Indians were experiencing their first direct contacts with nonIndians and officials, some Tupi-Kawahiv Indians were working with them as interpreters, therefore they could have been heard. Instead, the experts team chose to consider the areas of the Indians' attacks as their borders and land claims criteria to propose the Reservation current borders. In this case alone, a total of 73 Indian defensive attacks were located (FUNAI 1984), from 1940s-1983.

achieved.³⁶ Despite World Bank supervision, the demarcated lands were not protected at all, and many old invasions continued while new ones threatened the Indians, their lands, and their resources.³⁷

Recent Anti-Indian non-Indian Land Claims

Non-Indian claims on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands from 1980s to the present have been presented to various levels of the Brazilian government by interests with strong political connections. As will be seen, two important local claimants hold positions in state and federal governments. Further, an extensive area is being claimed by many rubber estates. Non-Indian politicians, officials, land speculators, military, and landless people have been also claiming local lands for colonization projects. Claims to access to local lands have been made to facilitate the

³⁶ Both Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa have been invited to participate in some of these expeditions (usually as guides, as porters, fishermen and hunters.) In these occasions, not only did not reach the planned destination, but they did not as well presented any proposal involving the Indians possessions. From what could be elicited in the area, the FUNAI Porto Velho administration had already incorporated the notion that the area was too vast and could eventually even accommodate not only new contacted Indians, but Indians from other areas (see, for instance, the Karitiana punishing resettlement.) In late 1992, FUNAI officials continued investigating evidence on local autonomous Indians. They came out with the same known information about their presence in the area, except for the Urupá-in information about a group of relatives that would still be wild in the São Luiz setting neighboring areas.

³⁷ In Ariquemes-RO, the registry office even refused to register the Reservation demarcation (FUNAI 1985).

production of timber, minerals, rubber, and foodstuffs.

However, a few claims have also been made to support Indian land rights. Two persistent ideological rationalizations have been used to justify ongoing anti-Indian claims to the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau lands. The first posited the idea that Indians were not fit for the hard work needed to develop the Rondônia state. A second argument has stressed that the reservation had an "exaggerated size" compared to its population. Governor Jerônimo Santana (1987) even claimed the exclusion of an area where Marechal Dutra, Padre Adolfo Rohl, Rio Alto and Alta Lídia colonization projects were. "Organic intellectuals" (Gramsci 1979) supported those argument as well as public officials and or authorities (Moreira et al. 1988; Santos et al. 1988; Soares et al. 1989). These two rationales supported the expropriation of part of these Indian lands (id.).³⁸ A third approach, a pro-Indian argument, has advocated the preservation of the defined and legally recognized

³⁸ In a Rondônia State Government-FUNAI-INCRA report, Silva et al. (1988) argue the Leao et al. (1984) delimitation proposal, which they say, reflects "existing internal disputes among the FUNAI attraction front." The other study resulted from a FUNAI "special team," which was coordinated by José A. M. dos Santos. It was then proposed that the Reservation should be reduced to 1,648,658 hectares, as "a way to re-establish equilibrium and harmony on those who underwent an impact due to its borders" (Santos et al. 1988: 19). In support of this view, the FUNAI superintendent from Cuiabá argued that the 1985 demarcation studies were precipitated and accomplished due to "external pressure" (Moreira 1989: 1).

reservation area (Cardoso 1988; Leonel Jr. 1991; 1988; Mindlin 1986).

The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation Indians have not only recently faced claims on their lands and resources. They have also faced actual invasion and occupation. The Bennesby family, Manoel Lucindo and Miranda control rubber estates within the reservation. The first two are also involved with cattle ranching and mining. Entrepreneurs are also invading the same reservation lands to exploit timber. The past bloodshed diminished, but in pursuing their claims and struggles, non-Indians have both brutalized Indians and found other ways to exploit, oppress, and demoralize them. Non-Indian strategies include bribing, deceiving, or simply stealing.

Although resources were allocated by a World Bank-Brazil loan to finance the Polonoroeste Programme in the 1980s, the Brazilian government refused to use the money to Indians.³⁹ In spite of this, the same government did allocate funds to the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation case, but was used ineffectively to expel non-Indian invaders nor to prevent new claims and actual conflict on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation (Arab 1985: 1). The money ended up producing deliberate policies and actions that did not benefit Indians. In fact, not only did corruption, robberies, abuse

³⁹ See Price (1989) for a critique of the World Bank lack of commitment about the Polonoroeste impact on the Nambiquara Indians.

of the Indians and of many workers spread, but became more pervasive. An investigation was conducted on the Porto Velho FUNAI administration's alleged crimes.⁴⁰ Lack of effective supervision and of qualified personnel destroyed any possibility of hope for the Indians.⁴¹

It was not only local, regional, national and international powerful politicians and entrepreneurs who were supporting the ongoing land claims and struggles on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation. In this case, ex-president José Sarney and some of his ministers also played a major role throughout these processes. Rondônia's former governors as well as the current governor, Oswaldo Piana (PTB--Brazilian Work Party), were publicly known as state's leaders of

⁴⁰ When I left the field the final report was yet not finished. The local ex-administrator Amaury Vieira was being charged with corruption involving embezzlement, acceptance of bribes, and neglect. He then argued that he would be able to discredit the accusations. Despite the array of documents that he would present to the court, I could verify that even simple things to guarantee the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation Indian lives and resources were not done. Though I still could not get information on the investigation's conclusions, I discovered that Vieira was transferred to a South Brazil FUNAI unit. In addition, the ex-Cuiabá FUNAI superintendent Nilson Campos Moreira was being sued by the Republic's Attorney General together with the president of FUNAI Romero Jucá Filho (Gazeta Mercantil 1990: 46).

⁴¹ The current reservation administrator was a former driver, who received no training at all to fulfill his new responsibilities. Moreover, none of the 1990's reservation Indian and non-Indian personnel were trained *indigenistas*. See later on for their anti-Indian actions.

claims against Indian rights to land and natural resources.⁴² Local senators and federal representatives have also been very supportive of anti-Indian claims. Soares et al. (1989: 1) argued that the 1985 reservation demarcation includes "areas which no Indian had inhabited" and that each Indian had 18,000 hectares."⁴³ State representatives failed to address a pro-Indian policy when they recently went against the interests of the Indians in a major investigation of illegal timber cutting in the same reservation (ALR 1989). Entrepreneurs such as Arantes from Sao Paulo, Bennesby from Guajar-Mirim, Jos Alagoano from Ariquemes, Bezerra from Bolivia, and many others both nearby and from distant areas, were utilizing Indian lands resources, and labor.

Claims on Indian lands as properties have been made primarily by rubber estates alledged owners, mining and cattle entrepreneurs, most of whom were involved in collective murders and other criminal activities against the Indians. Some people with properties on the border did not claim Indian lands directly but destroyed the landmarks and

⁴² The current governor's choice for the Secretary for Agriculture Affairs, Nilson Campos Moreira (ex-INCRA and FUNAI official), became a strong supporter of his view on Indian affairs.

⁴³ Though their arithmetic was wrong and even minimized the hectare to Indian average of land possession in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation, they proceeded to claim the reservation demarcation as responsible for the state's economic chaos.

invaded land strips⁴⁴. Though these claims dated from the 1940s, the claimants were now actively pressing them with the support of the President, who revoked the reservation delimitation (Decreto 98.894 1990: 1st. art.), just before he left office in 1990.⁴⁵ The Bennesby family was instrumental in bringing this about.⁴⁶ Having a federal and a state representative and being one of the richest families in the state, they pressured the President of the Republic, and through him the Minister of Justice Saulo Ramos and the then Interior Minister Joao Alves Filho (Ramos 1990; Sarney 1990).

In that same year the FUNAI Administration issued a new edict through which 118,460 hectares were removed from the Reservation and remaining lands were simultaneously interdicted for Indian occupation (FUNAI-PP 127 1990). As

⁴⁴ The lumber entrepreneur and ranch owner, José Alagoano, for instance, invaded the reservation where it limits his own property, but to exploit the Indians' timber (Poquiviqui et al. 1990: 13-14).

⁴⁵ This decree was issued in 01.30.90, but declared unconstitutional by the Attorney General in the same year.

⁴⁶ Their claimed properties within the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation were the Sao Tomé (55,000 hectares), and the Branco (170,000 hectares) rubber estates. Though they did not have official land deeds, the Branco was registered in the INCRA in Moisés Bennesby's name (001 015 051 912/2). Besides rubber, gold has also been exploited in this invading rubber estate. The Sao Tomé was registered in the INCRA in Isaac Bennesby's name (541 2135 2354), where besides rubber, cattle were also being raised, but it also had a commercial register as Saul Bennesby & Cia. de Comércio Exterior (Livro 28, fl. 47-49 V, 3ª Traslado/ Cartório de Registro de Imóveis de Guajará-Mirim).

CEDI (1991: 421) stated, "from demarcated lands they became protected by an edict." Such legal status reflected an administrative and political compromise whereby invading rubber estates would not have their claims recognized, but Bennesby and other politicians would nevertheless be rewarded with votes.⁴⁷ In the late 1990, however, state assembly man I. Bennesby and Raimundo T. de Menezes (the holdleaser of the Paraty rubber estate)⁴⁸ and other Guajar-Mirim rubber estate invaders were confident that the government would finally recognize their property claims.

The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands have simultaneously been claimed for colonization, land reform, and or for speculation. After the INCRA Burareiro project instalations and the 1988 judicial expulsion of hundreds of non-Indian homesteaders (including those of the Bico da FUNAI area, near the Trincheira stream) renewed claims were still being made (Almeida 1987; Estado March 27, 1988: 1,

⁴⁷ All around the reservation borders, in 1990 people were predicting who would end up having access to the area reduced by ex-president Sarney, which was under judicial deliberation. People said openly that politicians would not lose an opportunity to get the lands distributed to a major number of people and make new clients, since in the state votes were essentially bought and sold and it was an election year.

⁴⁸ Mr. Menezes has leased the Paraty rubber estate since 1978, from Raimundo Miranda da Cunha, who was claiming 40,000 hectares of the local Indian lands as his property, though he lived in Fortaleza, in Brazil's Northeast. His INCRA register number was 1,078, issued in 1960.

4).⁴⁹ Local and state politicians have been deeply involved in this process of land claims.⁵⁰ This trend has persisted as thousands of newcomers continued to arrive in Rondônia, though the colonization boom was partially over because the land was found to be inadequate for farming. Many of those newcomers ended up as tenants or sharecroppers, as victims of the ongoing land concentration process, or they have abandoned their land tracts as useless for agriculture, and migrated to crowded urban centers.

Indian lands had been claimed for mining exploitation which is an old activity in the area. Mining for cassiterite, tin and other minerals began in the mid-1960s.⁵¹ Throughout the 1980s many licenses were required by the DNPM--National Department for Mineral Production; Rondônia and Roraima's Indian lands were among the more threatened (CEDI-CONAGE 1988). Mining enterprises were only able to have 24 prospecting authorizations approved or renewed by DNPM, this in the short period of 1984-1985 (id.:

⁴⁹ Although the invaders were recounted as accepting the decision, federal and state police then acted brutally (Dutra 1988).

⁵⁰ Politicians from Tarilândia, on the edge of the reservation, for instance, were among the most active claimants toward the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands. There were even rumors about a massive invasion, of a minimum of 1,200 local non-Indian landless families. While claiming local Indian lands, some non-Indians even proposed the transference of the Indians to "Acre state, where there is real forest, indeed jungle, the Indians place."

⁵¹ See Leonel Jr. (1988: 104-110) for a summary of the SPI contemporaneous documents.

47-49). Local non-Indians and O Estado (May 26, 1988: 1, 4) reported that four hundred non-Indian mining prospectors invaded the reservation in 1988, most of whom were from Mirante da Serra, Eletrônica and other surrounding areas.⁵² To assert their own land claims Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau warriors then killed two non-Indian invaders. As invasion of mining prospectors spread further, FUNAI officials were also accusing the coordinator of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation, Hugo Pedro da Silva, of being the person responsible for the ongoing invasion of gold prospectors.

Isaac Bennesby recently denied his family's involvement in mining (gold and diamonds) in the Branco rubber estate. This proved to be false. In fact, an investigative team found about 120 gold and diamonds prospectors in February of 1990 working for his father Salomao Bennesby, who was planning to further expand his mining activities (Azevedo 1990: 2).⁵³ In addition, I. Bennesby was described as being associated with the Pompéia

⁵² From the Trincheira Indian post's neighboring area only two families did not send people to participate in this invasion. One of these people said: "When people came to invite me I told them right way - I will not enter because I did not lose anything inside the Reservation." In addition it was also stated: "Many people here have two faces when Indian interests are at stake. In front of outsiders they show they respect the Indians, but when these leave they even begin claiming that the Amundáwa were not from this area, that FUNAI people brought them from Amazon state only to guarantee this part of the reservation and expel the farmers who were occupying part of it."

⁵³ This illegal exploitation was accomplished despite a warning from the Rondônia Environment Secretary.

mining enterprise (Leonel Jr. 1991: 419).

In late 1992, while surveying the Cautario river in West Rondônia, I witnessed a team of mining prospectors leaving the Bennesby mining site to repair equipment. They told me that about 40 prospectors were working in that area for the same family. They also stated that the area's forest and river ecosystem was being endangered by mercury used to produce gold. Their concerns were echoed by many rubber-tappers of the Cautário River who complained about declining water quality. Amundáwa and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Indians complained in 1990, that these activities not only wiped them out of the area but were profaning one of their most sacred places.

Manoel Lucindo da Silva was also very active in his invaded lands. In the early 1990s he was exploiting both rubber and amethyst, and raising cattle in the Uru-Eu-Wa-Wau Reservation. The Bolivian federal representative Alfonso Bezerra and the Guajará-Mirim entrepreneur Júlio Freitas were engaged in amethyst exploitation inside the reservation, whose access was the Pacaas Novos River.⁵⁴ At

⁵⁴ In early December of 1990, I witnessed the Alfonso Bezerra's 10 workers leaving the area in a hired launch after eight days of work in the Indian lands. The workers were then still working in the area. Riverine people, including the Orouari, then affirmed that the river traffic was heavy those days due to ongoing mining activities. In addition, there was suspicion that illegal production was leaving the area by plane, as small aircraft were seen crossing that side of the Reservation, flying very low. Local non-Indians said that the mineral products were being smuggled to Bolivia.

the Jamari River headwaters non-Indian gold prospectors were extracting gold, though another surveying team reported that none were found (Poquiviqui et al. 1990).⁵⁵ Metalcon and Mibrasa mining companies were also exploiting gold and tin in the north.⁵⁶ According to the Indians, prospectors were not only removing gold, but devastating fish and water on the Urupá River because they used mercury in gold extraction.

Claims were also being made to exploit Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation timber. Although Mindlin (1987) had already called attention to the local endangering environmental conditions, Nilson Moreira (1988) proposed a plan to exploit Indian timber of the FUNAI 2ª SUER area. He then argued that "rational exploitation will not devastate the woods" (id.). As a result of fraudulent contracts, the finest timber of Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation --mahogany-- was totally cut down (Alto Madeira June 04, 1991: 1; Estadao June 02-03, 1991: 1, 5). Mahogany stripping became widespread on Rondônia's

⁵⁵ One member of the expedition then said that in fact Hugo Pedro da Silva did not want to find the non-Indian prospectors; he had ordered the team return before finishing the inspecting survey.

⁵⁶ The CIMI-RO had already denounced the Metalcon presence in the area in 1988 (Estadao August 11, 1988: 5). In 1990 that enterprise was taking Indians to serve as guides, who were paid with small amounts of food. Despite these scraps, the Indians were starving at the Rondon Ranch, as mentioned above. They were hoping that after they found a good mining site they would exploit it by themselves, as Kuarí (an Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau informant), then stated unconvincingly.

Indian reservations. The State Assembly began a special parliamentary commission to investigate abuses (ALR 1988-1987). Amaury Vieira, the FUNAI's regional administrator in Porto Velho declined to testify.⁵⁷ The parliamentary commission did not result in any effective preservation. The same failure later happened with a 1990 inspection team, though they took some repressive measures against abuse (Azevedo 1990; Poquivique *et al.* 1990).

Many local and international lumber enterprises have benefited from this process including Cometa, Andrade, Mabal, and Unimar. Many non-Indians, the *toreiros*, worked independently and sold logs to those enterprises. Though illegal, *toreiros* acted freely, as observed in Mirante da Serra or in any other nearby urban locality. The BR 429 and 364 highways plus many dirt roads have facilitated their access to reservation forest. Beyond the Indians' ecological and economic losses, this timber cutting was ultimately endangering Indian lives due ecological degradation.

Overwhelming corruption and other abuses in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation has made it almost impossible to determine the amount of timber left. Moreover, statistics on the exports of some enterprises continue to be kept secret due to tax evasion and diverse corrupt business. Workers were not willing to disclose any information for fear of

⁵⁷ Of. 036-CPI-M/88 *id.*. See also Of. 048-GAB-ADRPVH-FUNAI 88 in ALR 1988-1987, for the justifying arguments of that official.

repression and losing their jobs.⁵⁸ In the area of the Alto Jarú Indian vigilance post a total of 20,000 logs of mahogany left the reservation in 1988-1989.⁵⁹ As Indians and non-Indians stated, in the Trincadeira Indian post additional thousands were cut down during the same period. Ever since, José Alagoano and Rondon Ranch have cleared vast reservation and Indian claimed areas for lumber export.

Besides the illegal contracts (though some had IBAMA approval for their management projects) irregularities were frequently found in 1990, as entrepreneurs were exploiting Indian woods rather than authorized areas. José Alagoano and Rondon Ranch actions are again illustrative regarding this point. This former timber entrepreneur indeed alleged in 1989 that landmarks were not visible so he trespassed reservation borders. The dividing line was then renewed by FUNAI officials but this entrepreneur did not stop his illegal action (Lucena Filho 1989). The official checking team known as "Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Operation-1990" found significant evidence of Alagoano's action within the reservation (Poquiviqui et al. id.). At Rondon Ranch, the Indians were being repressed (attempts at expulsion, for example) as they

⁵⁸ The extent to which the Justice System is going to be able to elicit information through the suit on FUNAI ex-president Romero Jucá and other officials is by now difficult to assess. In the future, however, the process will require a legal-anthropological analysis.

⁵⁹ This information refers only to those controlled and counted by one worker, who asked for anonymity.

were questioned about who recently took official inspectors to view extractive sites.

Claims were also being made in the early 1990s on Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands to exploit rubber and caucho. Besides the invading rubber estates annual production, many non-Indian living nearby had been rubber tapping inside the reservation.⁶⁰ In 1989, for example, the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau had planned to kill rubber-tappers who were working at the nearby Nova Floresta Indian post. FUNAI officials intervened to prevent probable casualties, but in one instance the Indians seized a hunting gun and kitchen utensils (Lucena Filho 1989). Some invaders would engage in caucho exploitation, as the work was easier and faster, and did not require special care. All that they had to do was to cut the trees down, collect the latex and leave the Indian land without being caught.

Many non-Indian living nearby the same reservation, including many FUNAI and IBAMA officials, have used Indian land to extract food or have directly appropriated Indian food production. This expropriation took place beyond the ongoing foodstuff exploitation in local rubber estates. The

⁶⁰ In Paraty, for instance, the 1990 estimated production would be 8,000 kg of rubber. This was less than 10 percent of the 104,000 kg produced ten years earlier, said the leaseholder R. T. de Menezes. In the Branco rubber estate a total of 13 rubber-tappers were working 1,200 rubber trees (Azevedo 1990: 3). Twice a year each one had to turn 100 kg over to Salomao Bennessy and that year estimated production would be of five tons (id.).

decline on naturally occurring food resources accelerated in the area and surroundings. However, in 1990 well equipped non-Indian neighbors were still engaged in hunting.⁶¹ Some among them were even relying on reservation resources for their animal protein. Well equipped officials also hunted and fished for their consumption on Indian lands.⁶² Others were also reported as allowing non-Indian friends to come for hunting and fishing seasons to take food to their city homes.⁶³

Indian land loss was the most direct outcome of the criteria chosen to determine boundaries of reservation lands and of the authorities accompanying deliberated neglect. Leao et al. (1984) hopes that after the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation demarcation the government would finally protect those lands were hardly fulfilled. It was the same area's ecological diversity that ended up constituting an additional factor when the integrity of the Indian land was requested by non-Indians in the Indians name (Cardoso 1989).

⁶¹ NonIndians, both invaders, settlers and officials, have been in general abusive as they invade the reservation woods and rivers both to hunt and fish. Moreover, as mercury has been used by mining prospectors and the forest have been devastated by lumber enterprises, local fauna has widely diminished in the last decade, a process which has persisted ever since.

⁶² The Indians then complained that these officials did not share the food they brought from the city, but simply took theirs while they had to sometimes starve.

⁶³ Both FUNAI and IBAMA officials were accused of these illegal practices, especially some from Porto Velho and from Ji-Paraná.

The 1989-1990 struggles to save the ninth proposal and to protect Indian land rights from ongoing anti-Indian claims reached the Attorney General, who ended up supporting Indian interests (Azevedo 1990; Azevedo and NDI 1990; Gonçalves 1990).⁶⁴ Although the reservation was confirmed in 1991 by President F. Collor de Mello, some questions remain about how the state will respond to recent Indian claims on other lands which were already considered too great by many non-Indians.

Indian Recent Claims on Their Own Lands

Most of the debate on the integrity of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation (Cardoso 1989; Leonel Jr. 1991; Santos et al. 1989) has not addressed the Indians' recent land claims. Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa Indians have now claimed lands outside the reservation current borders, which they argued were areas that they used for settlement and resource exploitation. Furthermore, autonomous Indians advanced the same borders and attacked non-Indians, in an expression of their land claims.

⁶⁴ The impact of this final legal measure required to protect Indian lands in Brazil on both Indians and non-Indians is still to be seen. Unless a major twist is enforced on the dominant anti-Indian politics and strategies, they will hardly benefit the Indians. In fact, by late 1992 all rubber estates, mining and lumber enterprises, illegally occupying the reservation lands were still there exploiting the local resources.

Despite their powerlessness to face non-Indian invaders, early in the 1990's some Indians were engaged in their own land claims struggles. Those led by Mawá have argued that the reservation northern areas belong to them. Mawá himself has reported that his forebears had many villages in that specific area, where they lived, to the best of his memory, for decades. The Amundáwa not only claimed Mirante da Serra and the surrounding area as theirs, but had recently threatened to repossess some of the Trincheira stream lost banks.⁶⁵ Piaká's Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau group was intimidating the Jarú River non-Indian dwellers in 1990, who they accused of changing border landmarks.

Though some Indians have indeed collaborated with interests other than their own, particularly with rubber, mining and lumber entrepreneurs, they did not have total control over such a process. With very few exceptions Indians could still could not comprehend capitalist logic, but a strong counter-hegemonic critique was already emerging among themselves regarding their lands' natural resources commercial exploitation. This was the case of Awarina, who raised criticism of Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau involvement with non-Indian invaders. In Tari's case he recognizes Paraty and surrounding lands as theirs. However, Tari recently affirmed that he was "now weak" to expel non-Indians and added that

⁶⁵ Awarina, for instance, recently recalled that his father had a village in the Mirante da Serra site, where they used to settle especially during summer time.

FUNAI did not help.⁶⁶ In the early 1990s, Piaká and Payadjup' (Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau) were pressed by Hugo Pedro da Silva, the reservation coordinator, to facilitate lumber and mining invasions.⁶⁷ Indians and non-Indians were also recruited and organized by Joao Mimico, a Parintintin Indian and FUNAI official, to prospect gold inside the reservation.⁶⁸

Autonomous Indians were also claiming their possessions in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation surroundings. Throughout 1990, they were seen in diverse areas, especially around Das Pedras and Bom Destino rivers. They simultaneously battled non-Indian invaders, killed Armando Inácio, a non-Indian settler, and wounded his son Ézio Moreno Inácio in the Alvorada D'Oeste municipality (Freitas 1990; Inácio 1990). By then, non-Indian concern was directed

⁶⁶ In this case the Indians were weak both due to their number--four Indians-- and health and living conditions. In 1990, at least two of them were infected with Tb. I then asked the FUNAI official who accompanied me in a trip to the Paraty rubber estate to take Tari and his brother Iapó to Guajará-Mirim to be treated, which was done but did not result in effecient treatment. After I was informed in late 1992 that Tari and Iapó were again with Tb infection I demanded the FUNAI president, Mr. Sydney Possuelo, to guarantee them treatment. Some action was taken, but these Indians were not being adequadely treated.

⁶⁷ Then it was even said that the same coordinator used to tell the Indians that as FUNAI did not have resources for food and other goods, so they could obtain them through those entrepreneurs.

⁶⁸ Mangtá and 'Borbura' (Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau) were mentioned as having been sent by J. Mimico (a Parintintin FUNAI official) with a team of prospectors from Mirante da Serra, ibn this case, lead by 'Zequinha' and Domingo de tal.

to their peers' death and wounding, not to the significance of the Indians' actors. One FUNAI official (Pereira 1990) tried to explain the Indians' attack: either they could have been looking for local resources or simply returning to a sacred area.

Though many of Indians have since spoken out on some specific land claims, they will hardly be heard. The 1991 presidential confirmation of Indian lands as it was created in 1985 was a sign that their voices continue to be ignored. Though arguments for Indian land rights were stressed, the areas' ecological diversity (Cardoso 1989) possibly proved to be a stronger case when the state needed to respond to ongoing international outcry against rain forest destruction. In fact, a government which has posited modernization and liberalization as a major policy had to some extent to dismiss the image of backwardness. Moreover, officials and other non-Indians who have been involved in expropriation of Indian lands, seem to have absorbed the rationale that the reservation was already too big. To support the recent claims of Indians could have frustrated the Attorney General decision on ex-president José Sarney's unconstitutional reduction of the reservation lands.

Indians have resisted laying down their weapons when land invasion or other non-Indian abuses have taken place. They have been doing this despite FUNAI officials persistence in persuading the Indians that they no longer

should kill or hurt non-Indians. One frustrated Indian angrily said that they were "tired of listening to that" from those officials. In fact, though they were unaware of President Sarney's threats in 1987, the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau killed some of a huge group of mining prospectors who invaded their lands in the eastern part of the reservation. Their old tactics were again put in use in 1991, as they killed other persistent non-Indian invaders nearby Nova Floresta area, this after expelling others and setting fire to their trucks and bulldozers.

Dispossession and Social-Economic Changes

Indians' settlement and dispossession have been crucial to ongoing changes in the Indian social and economic domain. At the time of direct contact the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and the Amundáwa were primarily relying on hunting, fishing and fruit collection, though they cultivated some fields too. Due to continual movement and defensive battles, their fields were then reduced in the inner forest. The early 1980s enforced settlement and depopulation offset a substantial transformation on the Indians' daily involvement with production. From then on they were encouraged by FUNAI officials to increase their cultivation.

Except for those settled or temporarily stationed in Indian posts, food supplements hardly reached the Indians. In fact, food supplies have been subject to corrupt

manipulation by local FUNAI officials. This process was reported as beginning in Porto Velho, where people diverted supplies, which would then reach their family houses or the houses of FUNAI staff. Reports on Trincheira Indian post reveal officials both giving gifts to non-Indian (cooking oil, medicine and other items), and at least in one instance giving gifts in exchange for sexual privileges.

Despite some increase in food production, food has lately been scarce. The ongoing devastation of forest and rivers has diminished the availability of natural resources. The production of some specific "Indian items" or of other marketable agricultural and extractive products have particularly grown among the Amundáwa. The official Manoel G. da Silva was named by those Indians as telling them not to wait for FUNAI resources, but to work hard and sell their products in the local market. In the Amundáwa case, Silva did not foresee possible abuses and robberies committed against the Indians, some of which came to be perpetrated by his own work colleagues.

Amundáwa Indians were primarily producing some honey, bows, arrows, sieves, banana, coffee, and caucho. Banana and coffee plantations were planted by non-Indians in the so called FUNAI Bico strip, nearby the Trincheira Indian post, which they did under order of INCRA officials. As some non-Indian neighbors then stated, if well cared for, those small plantations would be enough to feed Indians well on a yearly

basis. In addition, the Indians would also be able to acquire other items, such as clothes and hammocks.

An influx of western goods has certainly changed the Indians exchange and gifting system, but in a variable way. FUNAI's "attraction front" was recalled as spending "millions of cruzeiros" on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau, in addition to those brought by Jesco von Puttkamer, a photographer and researcher (McIntyre and Puttkamer 1988: 816).⁶⁹ In contrast, the Amundáwa recalled as receiving almost nothing. They even searched for *Borbula* or the "great moon face," as they identified Puttkamer, in an attempt to receive western goods too, said one FUNAI official.⁷⁰ Indians ended up becoming both consumers of western commodities, producers of some surpluses, and had their labor exploited.

The handcraft production of Indians was widely transformed--exploited when not directly stolen. The replacement of ceramic pots and other kitchen utensils by aluminum ones ended up eliminating traditional knowledge, as local women do not engage in potting anymore. The use of

⁶⁹ I myself was trapped by this occurrences and especially by pressures for expensive gifts. In addition, my gifts were being compared with those given by an U.S. citizen anthropologist who was in the reservation at the same time, but especially by Indian officials. Some officials indeed told the Indians that "hers' were poorer than his."

⁷⁰ Amundáwa women insisted with me that I should not gift the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau. The former recalled their memories on the latter destroying most of their gifts soon after contact. Archaeologists may nowadays find interesting sites of crushed aluminum pots and other kitchen utensils throughout the Reservation.

clothing soon began to reduce most of them to a beggar look, especially the Amundáwa, further socially differentiating them. As "new gifts" were already scarce by late 1980s, the Indians began to accept old clothes in their exchanges with non-Indian neighbors.

Many FUNAI (both non-Indian and Indian) and other officials have simply taken Indian surpluses and glass beads⁷¹ to sell in regional markets and to partially or totally appropriate the money.⁷² Indian anger against these occurrences was constant inside the reservation in 1990 (Poquiviqui *et al.* 1990: 10-11).⁷³ By then they even tried to get advice from non-Indian neighbors, but they still did not feel powerful enough to stop the process.⁷⁴ SUCAM officials have also engaged in the same exploitative process, though they have in addition exchanged the Indians'

⁷¹ A true bartering activity has been established on the borders of the reservation with the beads the Indians have received from officials and researchers. They became a currency to exchange two pounds of sugar or rice, used clothes, ammunition when not exchanged for money.

⁷² The coordinator of the reservation, Mr. Silva, was recalled as asking for Uru-Eu-Wa-Wau bows and arrows which would be taken by the dozens to Porto Velho and was done in the administrator Amaury Vieira's name. As far as data was elicited, the Indians never received any return for their production.

⁷³ Abuses were so widespread in 1990 that I did not have other option that to denounce those directly involved; see Simonian P.A..

⁷⁴ In 1990 the Amundáwa were willing to kill a FUNAI official--Enoque *de tal*--who was continuously stealing their production, eating their food and threatening to beat tem.

handicraft products for old and almost unwearable clothes. Furthermore, river merchants and many non-Indian neighbors have exploited Indian production, which they exchanged for ragged clothes, candies, or other useless items.

Few FUNAI officials and non-Indian neighbors have supported the Indians in acquiring many of their material necessities. Officials were reported as using their own resources to feed the Indians, especially the Amundáwa, when they were resettled nearby the Trincheira Indian post. A FUNAI non-Indian nurse was mentioned by local non-Indians as using resources of folk medicine to deal with the Indians health conditions, as a response to lack of governmental support. Another official used his own wages to address the Indians' malnutrition (see below). Some non-Indian neighbors have also supplied or lent them seeds, other furnish farming technical advice and even labor help in harvest times.⁷⁵ Others have treated their illness, lodged them when ill, and fed them as well.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ From the corn and other fields of the Luchtemberg family the Amundáwa ate everything when they had just left their forest villages for an uncertain future. The patience of that couple has been praised by many non-Indians, in especial by Amundáwa Indians. Though the Amundáwa visited many local neighbors, they rarely did not stop by this couple's house when staying in the Trincheira Indian post. Quite a few would go to be fed and they always were.

⁷⁶ This was the case of Antônio Seringueiro, from the Urupá. The Amundáwa got flu when fishing in the Urupá river, but FUNAI was recalled as abandoning them.

Eventually, some Indians also colluded with non-Indian exploitation of their resources. In the early 1990s some Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau were selling their knowledge and or labor power to non-Indian invaders. Though these were coerced strategies, in some way they ended up replacing previous FUNAI donations of gifts and food. Indians led by Tarí in the Paraty rubber estate were pressured to extract rubber in return for western goods. In addition, they were providing meat consumed by local non-Indian laborers. Those settled in Rondon Ranch were helping mining prospectors to locate mining sites.⁷⁷ In previous years, another administrator provided them with food, clothes, and transportation when medical treatment was needed. However, by then there were many attempts to expel the Indians from the cattle ranch site, certainly because the Indians began to claim local and surrounding lands.⁷⁸ Memó and other Indians from Barreiro and Comandante Ary Indian post allowed José Alagoano lumber entrepreneur to extract logs and received minimum payment in return.

⁷⁷ One of the local employees reported that a Metalcon Mining Company prospector arrived at the hacienda with a FUNAI authorization to hire the Indians. I was unable to check this information, both because an appointment with the Porto Velho mining company administration was denied and because local FUNAI officials denied it.

⁷⁸ FUNAI officials were being mentioned as responsible for the food curtailment. They have argued that while the hacienda administration continued to feed the Indians, they would not return to their Jamari village. Despite this, FUNAI itself was not supporting them when taking them back to that village.

Transformations of Indian Social Organization

Since systematic contact was imposed on Indians of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation many changes have happened besides land loss. They have also experienced many forms of coercion, such as settlement, restrictions on their right to go and come, sexual abuses, and impositions of new social arrangements due to non-Indian discrimination and depopulation. Leisure time decreased because the search for food and or its production required, together with incessant illnesses, much of the Indians' labor time.

Settlement and Spatial Organization Transformations

Changes have resulted from FUNAI officials and non-Indian invaders' interference into settlement and spatial organization patterns of Indians. They intended to resettle the Indians in or nearby Indian posts. Settlement would impact the Indians former village moving pattern.⁷⁹ The argument that the Indians would be better served by officials when settled underlined these policies and

⁷⁹ The permanence of Djaí's group on the same maloca after his death in 1990 became a strong evidence of such transformation. In 1986 the Amundáwa were transferred by the FUNAI local administration from the headwaters of the Cautário River to a locality nearby Trincheira Indian post. In the aftermath of this resettlement those Indians were pressured to stay together despite the attempts of Muha to install a new village formed with his extended family at the Urupá River headwaters. FUNAI officials and the Fazenda Rondon employees were also pressuring the Mawá's group in 1990 to transform their Jamari village in a permanent settlement.

strategies. The 1991 changes in the FUNAI administration of Porto Velho reversed former resettlement policies, which was been accomplished but not without conflicts.⁸⁰

Though the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa still maintained much of their "andanças" (see Cardoso 1989: 24-25), this custom was less prevalent in the early 1990s. Tari and his group stay of nearly four years at the Paraty rubber-estate and the Amundáwa reluctance and eventual refusal of engaging in a trip by foot to their former village setting,⁸¹ and the emergence of the *Cria do Posto*--"Indian post child"--social identity,⁸² are examples of ongoing changes in that direction. Settlement, painful memories, and their physical weakness and illness explain in part these transformations.

⁸⁰ In fact, officials resettled the Oroin in their former lands as mentioned above, but the newcomers initially resisted to live together with Indians who lived in the São Luís rubber-estate, and who had helped in the 1962 massacre of their relatives. In 1992 the Amundáwa rebelled against officials will to resettle them in the São Miguel and Cautário rivers headwaters, their far-a-way former homeland. Then they argued that they would not adapt anymore to the area, plus, by experience they might have realized that FUNAI would hardly support them till they could get a new harvest.

⁸¹ Awarina, the Amundáwa chief, then suggested that he might accompany me and would enjoy a return to their latter Cautário River maloca, but only if I rented a helicopter for the trip.

⁸² Indian post child wer those raised by FUNAI officials in the post or who spend considerable amount of time there. This social identity is similar to the Guarita Kaingang "Indians of the Indian post" and the *Bicho da Obra* of the Yaciretã hidroeletric site (see Chapter Three and Ribeiro 1991).

Women Scarcity and Sexual Patterns Transformations

Recent research has demonstrated the importance of women within Amazon Indian societies in the past and recent times (Murphy and Murphy 1970; Neto 1985; Roosevelt 1991: 80ff). Despite this, little or no attention has been paid to the various forms of abuse and violence have been perpetrated against Indian women, both by their kin and by non-Indian invaders since contact was established. However, those occurring during past rubber-booms have been widely reported (Casement 1913-1912; Hardenburg 1912; Ribeiro 1970), which seems to be a continuous general practice in the western Brazilian Amazon.⁸³ As similar process unfolded upon the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa Indians' territory, Indian women became very scarce.

Ecological adaptation (Goldman 1963; Vayda 1961), social fission and tension (Carneiro 1970; Chagnon 1968), or a breeding of both arguments as in the case of Siskind (1973: 226-227, 236),⁸⁴ were produced to explain such a phenomenon among many Lowland South America Indians. Among the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa (and probably among the reservation's autonomous Indians) women began to be scarce

⁸³ In the nearby Guajará-Mirim FUNAI regional administration, for instance, two officials had recently been indicted with rape against Indian women and, consequently, lost their jobs (TRT-RO 1989).

⁸⁴ According Siskind, "The scarcity of women is [...] a cultural artifact which produces competition between men and provides incentives for hunting" (1973: 236).

during the "intermittent" contact (Ribeiro 1970: 222), when they were kidnaped or killed by non-Indians. This phenomenon was intensified after 1981, then as product of deaths emerging throughout permanent contact with non-Indians. Unknown diseases, according to the Indians, are held responsible for for both population decrease and women scarcity. In addition, scarcity has been a source for disputes, and yet remained the target for kin, non-Indian and other Indians' abuse.

Due to scarcity of women Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa leaders could no longer afford to have a polygyneous family in 1990. There was only one exception, as Muha, the Amundáwa elder man, had two wives. Tarí had none and due to accusations that he killed one of his former wives, his chances among Indian women were almost non existent.⁸⁵ Besides the critical situation of the Tarí group where none had a wife, among the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau many other men and youth do not have wives and hardly have any prospect of getting one among their relatives in a short or medium range of time.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Two Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau leaders tried hard to find a second wife. Payadjup' or Afonso tried to get Piaká's young sister, but he was prevented and even had to flee the village for a while to avoid conflict. Almost simultaneously Piaká tried himself to get the daughter of the Amundáwa chief as a new wife, but his aims were frustrated as she was already promised to one father-sister's elder son.

⁸⁶ Of a total of 14 Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau men and youth only three had real possibility of marrying their relatives. One had his future young bride living with his family and under

Though some inter-group marriages have occurred in recent times, this was not likely to happen in the near future so local youth began a search for alternatives.⁸⁷ In fact, the Amundáwa ceded three women to the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau. Two of them were living with their own families as precaution against possible battering or murder. The woman married to a Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau leader had no option but to live with her in-laws. Moreover, two marriages have recently involved brides from the same social moiety, the Canindé, which was considered taboo though there had been some similar cases in past times. Besides the already mentioned contact with prostitutes, Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa youth developed a growing interest in non-Indian girls.⁸⁸ In one

his mothers tutorship. Another could eventually get a wife though he would have to wait a couple of years, as he had a young sister to eventually exchange with another extended family. Among the Amundáwa, only one man did not have a wife. His prospect was not good, as he had previously abandoned his wife, who was now married to his brother. Muha's second wife and one widow sister, respectively Djué and Cunha, would be considered to old for him.

⁸⁷ Besides the nonexistence of prospective wives, I asked Djué why she did not prefer to be married to a Uru-Eu-Wa-Wau instead of being a second wife to a much older husband. She then repeated what I had been hearing from other Amundáwa in other instances - she said that those Indians "treated their wives badly." She proceeded recounting that Tari had provoked one of his former wives' death from continuous battering, which he tried to repeat when married to Adjuva, but this woman fled to her family. Borbura also is accused of killing his first Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau wife. Piaká, the former Arima, was also recalled as beating his wife, once even breaking one of her legs.

⁸⁸ One was having an affair with a neighbor and even dreamt of moving to Sao Paulo when her family decided to do. Another was planning to engage with a young woman, whose

case a married Indian man was reported by a local non-Indian woman as "... been allowed by ... a neighbor non-Indian girl to put his hands between her legs."⁸⁹

Non-Indian and other Indian sexual abuse of Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa women has also contributed to changes in social organization. Disruptive implications of such occurrences have been dramatic for Indian communities, and among Indians it could be felt even before contact with non-Indians in the early 1980s. FUNAI non-Indian officials have been recalled as recently abusing reservation Indian women, and in one instance producing a child. In this latter case the boy was identified as mestizo, the son of a Amundáwa woman by a FUNAI official. The Jamari FUNAI official nicknamed "Pará" reported the facts to the FUNAI regional administration, but no punishment was imposed on the guilty official, as the law requires.⁹⁰ Field observatios in 1990

protestant fundamentalist family was trying to proselytize the possible Indian bridegroom. This relationship was cut by a FUNAI official in 1990, who said he could not permit non-Indian religion intrusion within the Indian community. One of the Indian youth living in the Paraty rubber estate was dreaming of a non-Indian girl too, while his older uncle made frequent visits and gifted a non-Indian family who had some daughters in the Pacaas Novos river, from among whom he was hoping to find a wife.

⁸⁹ Non-Indian neighboring women blamed the youth for "her lack of morals." One among those women even seemed to support the Indian wife who painted herself and used her native paraphernalia for days, in her aim to attack the non-Indian lover of her husband.

⁹⁰ Though I could not interview Pará, the official who made a report on the case, another recounted that the regional administration sent a lawyer to the Reservation,

suggested that the Amundáwa woman's Indian husband treated the child as his own.⁹¹

FUNAI Indian officials have also engaged in sexual abuse against the Indian women and simultaneously introduced pornographic magazines and prostitution to Indian men. In the former case Indian officials have argued that "we can because we are relatives." Though Indians have not violently responded, they have expressed discontent which clearly indicates their disagreement with the behavior of those officials. In addition, Indian men have been taken by FUNAI Indian officials to prostitution houses both in Mirante da Serra and in Porto Velho. In one instance, at least, one of them brought two prostitutes to Trincheira Indian post, "one for himself and the other to Mongtá." Risks for the spread of venereal diseases and HIV have, consequently, increased.

IBAMA officials working in the Pacaas Novos National Park at the Urupá headquarters have behaved in similar ways. In many instances those officials have gotten Amundáwa Indians drunk, with the sole purpose of abusing their women. Non-Indian neighbors have witnessed what they define as bacchanals, as the Indians were offered cachaça by the

who not only did not receive the incriminating report. He also argued that the case should not proceed because the accused had children to feed and would not been able to find another job with similar pay.

⁹¹ However, probably due to ongoing gossip, the mother herself brutalized the child and even attempted abandoning him in the house of one non-Indian neighbor.

officials, after which "all got naked and danced," said a non-Indian settler. This settler went on while mentioning this event and said that adult Indian men then fell asleep, while officials harass Indian women and engage in sexual abuse.⁹²

Non-Indians living nearby the reservation borders have also engaged in sexual abuse against Indian women. Near the Trincadeira Indian post a non-Indian was also reported as sexually abusing Amundáwa women, through whom he expected to have access to the reservation mining sites.⁹³ At Rondon Ranch headquarters the cowboys, some of which were even married and living with their families in the site, abused Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau women.⁹⁴ One married Indian woman recently got pregnant after having sex with a non-Indian worker, but was reported as inducing an abortion.

⁹² After one of these stays, one Indian woman was killed in a truck accident, when the group was returning to the Trincadeira Indian post. The FUNAI did not investigate the case, neither requested compensation. The truck driver was reported as vanishing from Mirante da Serra, as he feared Indian vengeance. His boss, however, was recalled as "entertaining the Indians with candies and medicine," when they would visit that urban center, also for fear of any revenge.

⁹³ In this case the official Manoel G. da Silva was recalled is intimidating the aggressor, who ended up leaving his tenancy.

⁹⁴ Non-Indian women living in the Rondon Ranch did not blame non-Indian men, rather they argued that Indian women were who looked for sexual relationship. In addition, they said that the latter preferred non-Indian men due to their bigger genitals.

To what extent Indian women's abortion and infanticide practices will persist remains to be seen. Though these women continue to practice them, pressures have been constant against them. FUNAI officials and non-Indian neighbors have criticized the women's decision to perform abortion and infanticide. Following a simplistic, moralizing approach some non-Indian local women have said that Indian women were contributing to the demise of their own society. In fact aborting a fetus or killing a child are not a solely woman's decision in either Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau or Amundáwa societies. Rules have been constructed over generations by both men and women, to which they conform. For example, they believe that an out-of-wedlock child should be killed by her or his mother. The rationale for such a rule states that "if there is not a father to hunt and to feed the kid she or he will die anyway."⁹⁵

Three infanticide occurred among the Amundáwa in 1990. Despite this, recent changes have occurred due to non-Indian pressures. A child was already saved from death in 1989, as will be seen below. In 1990, a mother was urged not to kill a kid; the Amundáwa leader told his sister to travel to the

⁹⁵ Dr. Nancy Flowers (P.C.) mentioned the possibility that infanticide is a post-contact phenomenon in Indian societies of lowland South-American. Though I was not looking for "pristine patterns," when talking about this hypothesis with some local Indian women, they affirmed that their mothers and grandmothers "always did that." One even said that when a child--about 40 years ago--she saw an aunt to smash a baby head in a tree.

Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and to look for the father of the newborn. He had apparently been convinced by his non-Indian neighbors and began to say that "non-Indians do not kill their kids, so we should not do it either." Though the mother left for one of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau villages, she was reported as killing the child on her way.

Ritual, Religious and Other Social Transformations

Other aspects of Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa social organization have changed too. Indian naming and ritual social processes were among the transformed ones. They have traditionally changed their names after a period of two to two and half years, and each social moiety has a stock of names for each segment of the life cycle. The names are presented in ascending age order. Only when in full adulthood at about forty to forty five years old, they stop changing, because that is when "people know a lot, almost everything." In doing so they put an ideological emphasis on the collectivity. As one Amundáwa explains, "everyone has to carry all other names once, as everyone is one people." Moreover, the system ties together the past, present and future generations. Local non-Indians tended to adapt to the Indians' naming system, however, most FUNAI officials were recently insisting on its abolition.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Those officials indeed not only nicknamed many Indians (Borbura, Catapora, Afonso, Sócrates, etcetera), but rationalized that through their own way "it is difficult to

Changes on their physical appearance also began, especially as teenage boys refused to tattoo. Despite clear pressures from some FUNAI officials, those youth have argued that as the food is not nourishing anymore, they could not support the pain. Though this refusal refers primarily to the low cheek tattoo, they still continued tattooing their right arm. As far as tattooing of women was concerned, this approach was followed in the group led by Piaká as he did not allow tattooing of his younger sister. However, Amundáwa young girls were recently tattooed, but due to ongoing pressures, the new generation of women will hardly be. The use of western clothes has also led to broad transformations of Indians appearance.⁹⁷

Shamanism among Indians for the most part disappeared with the death of old shamans. Awarina, the Amundáwa leader, confirmed that none of past powerful shamans survived. Beyond the social and emotional implications of these losses, new shamans could not face and cure the diseases that devastated both the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and the Amundáwa in the early 1980s. Moreover, as FUNAI nurses and physicians have stressed the importance of allopathic medicine, Indians

keep control of health records." By then they had already imposed a fixed name on those who made the Brazilian identity card.

⁹⁷ A comparison of the Indians in their tradition costumes as photographed by von Puttkhmer (McIntyre and Puttkhmer 1988) and the ones I took in 1992 shows a shocking reality with this respect.

tend to deny the existence of any acting shaman among them.⁹⁸ Despite this, I could observe at least four Indians (Amundáwa and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau) behaving as shamans and ritual performers.⁹⁹ The first of these Indians even performed the burial ritual of the corpse of the son of Uká and Mbú, which in former times was usually done by shamans.

Indians involvement with non-Indian religions has been minimal or nonexistent. Despite this they have been approached by Protestant fundamentalists, but FUNAI officials have prevented any proselytizing among the Indians. The Rondônia's CIMI--Indigenist Missionary Council-- and CPT--Land Pastoral Commission--have engaged in advocacy to defend Indian possessions and natural resources, though local agents have in fact complained about the lack of support from the RAC Church state archdiocese. However, most of local lay people have expressed their disagreement with the extension of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation, which they insist is excessive.

Only recently some Indians have left the reservation to participate in non-Indian social or political events, and for medical treatment. The risk of drinking alcoholic

⁹⁸ Awarina told me to return "in a while," because it was not time yet to talk about those powerful men. In addition, when I tried to elicit information from the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau they avoided the conversation.

⁹⁹ Even before going to the field, Costa (1984) statement that shamans lived with Mondáwa people seemed to me much premature ethnographically.

beverages existed in social occasions.¹⁰⁰ However, except for forced drinking only one Indian was reported and seen drinking beer.¹⁰¹ Some also were leaving the reservation to go to political meetings, but this was very rare in the early 1990s.¹⁰² When taken to Porto Velho for treatment, Indians have had the opportunity of meeting other Indians from Rondônia, Acre and Amazonas, in the FUNAI "Indian House" of Porto Velho.¹⁰³ One Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau had stayed with the Tenharim for a couple of months, to where FUNAI officials took him there to learn reading and writing skills in Portuguese, but he did not adapt.

¹⁰⁰ Few Amundáwa have been in non-Indian birthday, religious, and sport events and parties. The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau settled in the Paraty rubber-estate also participated in nearby *brincadeiras*, when neighbors drank and danced. At the Fazenda Rondon headquarters Indians joined the local non-Indian workers every night to watch television shows.

¹⁰¹ The risk of becoming alcoholic was rather inside the reservation, where many of FUNAI and IBAMA officials were heavy drinkers. The Indians laugh when reporting stories about the officials' drinking behavior.

¹⁰² For instance, the Amundáwa Awarina, Uká and Mongtá (all men) participated in the second meeting of Indians, Rubber-tappers of Rondônia and bordering areas, in Guajará-Mirim, in November of 1992. As the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Tari and his brother Iapó were in the city for Tb treatment, they also attended some sections of the Guajará-Mirim meeting. The same Amundáwa Indians have also been in Porto Velho, where they have denounced the Reservation problems at FUNAI and CIMI. In a Workers Party meeting in Eletrônica, Ouro Preto D'Oeste, one Amundáwa was invited to give a speech.

¹⁰³ There they have been around the city, and some were already found looking for leftovers in public spaces. The hygienic, health treatment and the quality of the food offered by this "Indian House" deserves a special study, but it can be said these conditions have been harmful to the Indians.

Demographic Changes

Though in previous years Indians were reduced mainly through non-Indian massacres and abductions, and intertribal warfare, since early imposed direct contact the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa suffered a major depopulation process. This trend has persisted and might even be defined as official genocidal policy and action.

Malnutrition has also played an important role where their life expectancy is concerned. This has been acknowledged by FUNAI officials. In fact, the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation devastation process has resulted in changes in the Indians daily diet and physical strength. A Suruí Indian even left his job because with his salary he could not face Amundáwa malnutrition.¹⁰⁴ For example, Nascimento (1990) mentions that "food is deficient as we already know." The imposition of sugar consumption has also victimized the health of Indians in general, and oral hygiene in particular.¹⁰⁵ While in the field I witnessed the death of a

¹⁰⁴ As the same Indian continued, at the beginning he used his monthly wages to provide them food, but he suddenly perceived he could not continue like that. He requested support from the FUNAI regional administration but as he did not get anything he resigned.

¹⁰⁵ Physician Joao Moreira Júnior (1986) reported that Comandante Ary Indian post Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau had their mouth health deteriorated. He then not only identified the main reason: "exaggerated distribution of sugar and sweets ..." both by "FUNAI officials and researchers ...," but suggested a "... rigorous supervision" (id.), which was never accomplished. I did not undertake a dental exam, but being in the field I noted that the entire local population had teeth problems in 1990, and even the youth were loosing

child from anorexia, who did not receive even minor treatment, though a nurse was stationed there to supposedly treat the Indians.¹⁰⁶

Although in a minor degree, detribalization has also affected the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation Indian population. Two female Indians are known as living outside its borders--one was kidnaped years ago and the other adopted by a non-Indian family.¹⁰⁷ Tchéréna is a Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau woman who was kidnapped in late 1950s or early 1960s when four years old by Alfredo dos Santos, locally known as Alfredo, a rubber estate invader (Costa 1984: 155; Cowell id.; Cowell et al. id.).¹⁰⁸ When she turned fourteen she was held as a mate by her kidnapper, with whom she had children and lives in the

theirs.

¹⁰⁶ When asked why she did not take the child to the hospital of the closest city, she answered that "death does not announce itself." I then informed the Attorney General for Indian Affairs in Brasília, but though the nurse attitude was clearly a crime, Dr. Wagner Gonçalves answered that the matter was of FUNAI competence (Simonian P.A.).

¹⁰⁷ Ten years ago an Indian who could be a detribalized Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau was also met by Costa (1984: 153, 179) and by a documentation team of the Catholic University of Goiás. As this author reported, in 1932 some Indian children were found in a Cautário village, captured, and two of them were raised by Maria Laia, from Guajará-Mirim.

¹⁰⁸ In this case, she was kidnapped with two other women--Tchiró and Djacuí--who died two months after their kidnapping; they were respectively Tari mother and sister, of whom Tchéréna is a niece (Costa id.; Leonel Jr. 1988: 155).

vicinity of the reservation.¹⁰⁹ The other is Iná, an Amundáwa girl who currently lives in Porto Velho and was saved from infanticide in 1989, as her mother agreed to an adoption offer made by a non-Indian couple.¹¹⁰

The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau were soon described as being both mixed and as having incorporated other ethnic groups among them, especially non-Indian individuals. It was suggested that these Indians both kidnapped and adopted non-Indian children and had children with non-Indians.¹¹¹ Djaí, the first Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau leader to arrive at the local FUNAI attraction post in 1981, was recounted as not a "true"

¹⁰⁹ Leonel Jr. (1988: 155) mentions that Tchérena was willing to live again with her relatives, but that FUNAI officials were doing nothing to accomplish this. A crucial point connected with the possible return of Tchérena is the Tari approach to the matter: Would he be willing to recapture his sister only? Alone or with only her children Tchérena would enable her brother to enter the Indian women exchange arena. Or would he accept her husband and mestizo children? Anyway, he turned his head and remained silent when asked about it.

¹¹⁰ I am reporting this family's version of the facts. Despite this, in Porto Velho I heard some FUNAI officials rumors that Iná's mother was not willing to kill her child. These rumors probably reflected the fact that Iná's foster father was suing FUNAI in the Labor Justice. Moreover, in the Reservation I heard from the child's mother that she would have practiced infanticide anyway, as she was not married and the father did not want to recognize the daughter. Also I witnessed the pressures for infanticide, when the same women had other child, now a boy, again out of wedlock.

¹¹¹ For instance, Costa (1984: 179) reported the impressions of Lauro, the FUNAI team cook, who explained that "The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau are too mixed. They are tall, strong. There are short Indians, others almost Black, others almost White. Some are bold, others hairy."

Indian. The explanation then raised was that he was the child of a rubber-tapper family (Costa 1984; Cowell 1990; Cowell et al. 1980; McIntyre and Puttkamer 1988: 813).¹¹² Non-Indian women and mestizas were also mentioned in the early 1980s as comprising part of the Indian population. Cowell (1990) stated that they were mestizas and mentioned a woman who he supposed was a non-Indian because she tried to cover her body as soon as she saw FUNAI officials wearing clothes. This same author (id.: 150-151) also described the adoption of a non-Indian rubber-tapper, Pézinho.¹¹³

Reports on clear-skinned or White Indians in the region have indeed been made since colonial times (Souza 1875 in Leonel Jr. 1988: 35). When encountering the Tupi-Mondé in 1930, Lévi-Strauss (1955 in 1963: 324) described them as having both "very light skin . . .," and "a Caucasian look." However, FUNAI officials and researchers who then worked with Indians were possibly rather impressed by the kidnapping story of Fabio, as above mentioned. A FUNAI official who managed to learn their language has argued the above hypothesis. He recently mentioned his long conversations with Mondáwa, the previous Amundáwa leader, who affirmed that he knew Djaí since he was a small child as

¹¹² Cowell (1990: 121) stated that Djaí was "obviously" a non-Indian, and physically described him as bold, densely bearded, and with a Brazilian "northeastern" type of body.

¹¹³ This non-Indian lived with Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Indians for some years, and died when fighting on their side against a non-Indian punishing team (id.).

well as his father, both of whom were Indians.

The persistence of an anti-Indian policy has been described, but specifically the enduring and destructive non-Indian claims on Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation lands. This case is illustrative to demonstrate the dreadful implications of such claims and policies for the Indians, especially among those that were experiencing their first systematic encounters with non-Indians. The plight of those still living autonomously has not been addressed by the government in a way to save their lives and protect their interests. Even when the so called "allies" were eager to support the Indians, other powerful local and international forces made their way to make claims, to impose a genocidal policy, and to exploit local natural resources and Indian labor. With its deliberate anti-Indian policy the state has supported these processes. The recent validation of the reservation boundaries may protect the Indians from expropriation or attempts to reduce the reservation area. The Indians, who have just begun to recover their political will to claim their own territory, continue to pay a high price in lives and resources for the imposed contact. A concluding comparative summary are presented in the next chapter.

Chapter Eight

FINAL REMARKS: THE DOMINANT UNCHANGED CLAIMS ON INDIAN LANDS

My [Kaingang] elders agreed with the demarcation of the [Nonoai] reservation, but they did not know that the Portuguese would grow so fast like ants, and then invade the lands again.

I wasn't taught anything about [Indian] land being stolen (L. Aftergut in The New York Times March 24, 1993: B8).

Introduction

A quick glance at the history of Indian land claims both cross-culturally and historically reveals remarkable resemblances among them. Both Kuper (1983: 197ff) and Shavit (in The New Yorker Review 1991: 3) have questioned the utility of the comparative approach, which is central to the field of anthropology (Barth 1987; Jones 1962). Kuper suggests that that tradition might be seen as a claim. In Shavit's view "... the problem is not in the similarity ... but that there isn't enough lack of similarity" (id.). However, my comparative study of claims on the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservations revealed few differences, despite the historical specificities of the area, people, and cultures. In this chapter I adopt a comparative approach to Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau land claims. Moreover I stress the similarities of state and non-Indians' claims to Indian lands.

Like the claims of Indians themselves, anti-Indian land claims made by the state and non-Indians have also remained largely unchanged over time. This is due in large part to consistencies in political economic circumstances and ideology, particularly under capitalism where Indian land and labor became new forms of value. As Rosa Luxembourg wrote:

The interrelations of accumulating capital and non-capitalist forms of productions extend over values as well as over material conditions, for constant capital, variable capital and surplus value alike ([1913] 1968: 365).

As Wolf (1982: 23) also notes, it is this logic of accumulation that is responsible for connections involving peoples and their ways of living cross culturally and over time. The similarities produced in Guarita and in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations may be seen through similar perspectives.

In addition, though land claims made by the state and non-Indians have benefited non-Indian interests, as the state and non-Indians compete among themselves, they eventually supported the claims of the Indians. Indian claims on their own lands were, in fact, intensified in response to anti-Indian claims. The Indians' traditions of environmental adaptation and their ideologies became their main support, but while struggling to lay their own claims, Indians have largely been ignored and even violently repressed by non-Indian claimants, including the state.

Interdependencies and specific channels for conflict resolution have also emerged (Oliveira Filho 1988a: 59), although these have mostly assumed anti-Indian characters. Moreover, Indian autonomy has not always served Indian interests. Due to powerlessness, deception, and or bribery, the Indians and or the institutionalized leaders have eventually sided with non-Indians in their anti-Indian land claims. Many have even engaged in repressive actions toward their own kin as a way to guarantee non-Indian land claims. This has been the case in many Indian communities.

Consequently, the commonalities in the experiences related to land claims on the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations are not an isolated phenomenon. These cases are similar to many others in Brazil and elsewhere, when Indian, Aborigine, and Inuit lands have been at stake. Though many of these peoples have been able to thwart non-Indian land claims or to resist invasion for shorter or longer periods of time, most of them ultimately end up being dispossessed (Davis 1988; Deloria, Jr. 1974). For instance, the Mapuche and the Shuar, who engaged in some of the longest struggles to keep non-Indian invaders out of their lands, were nonetheless dispossessed (Mariqueo 1979; Stutzman 1981). The same may be said of the Pueblos, who were successful in uniting to massacre and expel the conquistadors but ultimately lost most of their land (Spicer 1962). Exceptions to this trend were rare but can be found, as in the the case

of Papua, New Guinea Aborigines and the Greenland's Inuit experiences, where due to lack of interest on the part of the colonial powers to colonize these areas, the Indigenous peoples were able to retain most of their tenure (Jacobs id.; Rudnicki and Dyck 1986).

In this chapter I will first summarize the history of land claims to the Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations. A comparative analysis follows, in which I will stress similarities between the cases. I will also address other similar Brazilian cases, especially land claims on the Nonoai Reservation and Aripuana Indian Park, in addition to which I will briefly discuss some South American, United states, Canadian Australian, and African experiences. Finally, I will suggest that the many worldwide advances in the political and legal spheres have not necessarily resulted in fair recognition and actual guarantees for Indians, Aborigines, and Inuits. Rather, in many instances anti-Indian land claims have not only persisted but even worsened. The persistence of many Indians in pressing their claims remain Indians' main hope in recovering their lands.

Lasting Claims on the Guarita Reservation

In this dissertation I considered claims on the Guarita Indian lands in both their historical and recent social contexts. Non-Indian economic activities and interests

varied through time since the first European contact with the Guarita Kaingang ancestors in the 17th century. Non-Indian settlement in the RGS northwest and economic exploitation of the area have resulted in brutalities against the Indians and the exploitation of natural resources, which were systematically claimed by non-Indians. Indians responded to these claims by battling invaders, accommodating to land loss (due to their powerlessness), and or colluded with non-Indian land interests.

The GKa faced land loss as early as the 17th century, when Spanish Jesuit missionaries invaded their southernmost territory to implant mission settlements. Their lands were exploited through the missions' cattle-ranching and maté exploitation. The Jesuits' rationales, that they were redeeming souls and that they had "right of discovery" as they acted in name of the Spanish Crown, justified their 17th and 18th century policies and actions, which served non-Indian interests. Although many Indians were exterminated by epidemics throughout the 1630s (Montoya id.), most of the survivors succumbed or perished at the *paulistas*--people from São Paulo--pathfinders' hands. The authoritarian character of Jesuit domination must have been painful to the Indians, despite the apologies made by many authors about the missionary enterprises (Cafruni 1966; Lugon 1968; Porto 1954). The promised divine protection did not help when the Indians faced diseases, domination, and

other genocidal actions.

In the early 19th century, the Portuguese and Brazilians invaded the RGS northwest and attempted to seize control of land and resources by wiping-out the Indians. Military men, most of whom were or became "men of resources" (an emerging economic elite) had the state support in their efforts to dispossess the Indians. Many Indians resisted, and hundreds were massacred. The massacres of the GKa at Mortandade in 1834 meant more than the loss of their warriors' lives, it also weakened their strength to impose their claims on their lands, natural resources and way of life. The cacique Fong's (the present-day Guarita Kaingang cacique) accommodating and even collusive behavior further facilitated the state's creation of only two small "islands" as reservations for his people in the RGS northwest. Those reservations were the Guarita and the Inhacorá.

Throughout the 19th century, non-Indians overwhelmed GKa with their claims, aimed for the most part at the Indian lands and resources: the plains for cattle-raising, the woods for erva-mate, lumber extraction, colonization, farming, military installations, and roads. A few non-Indians made efforts to impose protective laws which would have allowed for the creation of Indian reservations, but they failed. Even when a third reservation was proposed in 1910, officials reduced the Guarita and the Inhacorá Indians' territories. Despite this seizure of their lands

and though they were just recovering from deadly epidemics, the Indians persisted with their claims. Among the Guarita Indians, many did not accept the new borders and fled to Argentina, since they felt powerless to make their land claims effective.

After the demarcation of the reservation new borders in 1918, the Guarita Indians did not formally lose much land but they were dispossessed through leasing, sharecropping, and abusive land use by public authorities, especially since the 1940s. From then on, most of their valuable woods were exploited. Currently about half the reservation land is being exploited by non-Indian farmers. Since 1940s, though the nature of the Brazilian state has changed, the essence of Indian affairs has not. Both democratic and authoritarian regimes of the last few decades have assumed an anti-Indian character. As in the past, non-Indian farmers and public authorities maintained that the local Indian lands were crucial to development and to the stability of non-Indian society. The Indian plight, however, did not receive any serious attention, though the Indian leadership continues to resist any attempt to terminate the lease of their lands. This situation is likely to get worse, since Samuel Rezo Claudino was recently appointed by FUNAI officials as the FUNAI chief of the Guarita Indian post.

Cacique Claudino claimed the right to continue to lease the reservation lands throughout his entire chiefdomship,

and also engaged in repressive actions against the Indians who fought against the leasing system. He even resisted a 1991 attempt of the state to prevent non-Indians from farming on reservation lands. The seriousness of the state's commitment to this policy should be questioned, though Claudino announced that he would bar police or military from imposing such a judicial order by barricading the access roads to the area. His land policies and actions, therefore, were nothing other than the continuation of those previously conducted by both non-Indian officials and the diverse Indian leaders who were in charge of the reservation Indian affairs, especially after the Indian takeover of the leasing system in the late-1970s.

In the face of Claudino's actions, the future of the Guarita Kaingang is threatened, especially as land possession and rights were concerned. Many among them, have experienced extreme deprivation, becoming powerless to struggle to claim their land. Fear has also been an impediment to their struggle, as dissenting people have been systematically repressed. The disenchantment the majority of Indians with Indian and non-Indian authorities has also inhibited resistance. Due to widespread land deterioration and the devastation of woods, even if they come to participate in the land share, Indians will get land that has been devaluated. The Kaingang have hardly any hope for change. In fact, they frequently repeated this saying: "As

long as the cacique and a White leaser see a tree and a strip of valuable reservation land they will not stop their destruction." If the new Indian Statute now being debated in the National Congress ratifies the termination of the Indians' usufruct exclusive rights on their lands and resources, as many congressmen are proposing, the Guarita Indian lands will not return to Indian use. In addition, it will jeopardize the pro-Indian gains won in the 1988 Constitution.

The loss of possessions has been part of the Guarita Guarani experience. Though those from Gamelinas reached the point of having to lease half of an hectare of land to farm some legumes, they have not accepted this development. It is too different from their conceptions and standards about land use and distribution. They have consequently harshly criticized the Kaingang and those Guarani who leased land to non-Indians. As the possibility of an effective resistance to these pressures was almost nonexistent in the early-1990s, many Guarani were searching or thinking of looking for new lands to settle. This is also part of the Guarani "tradition," as they have looked for "the land without evil" and systematically moved from or were expelled from their previous possessions.

Evidence from the Guarita case does not support Pires and Ramos (1980: 205) view that the Kaingang prefer to accept non-Indian imposition than leave their lands, and

that political autonomy rather than a settlement site is a priority to the Guarani. Through past experiences, Guarita Indians--Kaingang and Guarani--have either stayed in their territories or opted for leaving their lands when faced with invasions and other abuses of their lands. When interviewed most Guarita Indians (including many who were leasing lands) responded that they would prefer to manage their by themselves instead of leasing it to non-Indians.

The Guarita Indians are not alone in their experiences of expropriation or other forms of land loss. Thousands of landless non-Indians have lived through similar social conditions in the RGS northwest. This process began in the mid-1800s, when Caboclos and other nationals were expelled from their possessions by latifundia landowners or by the state. Since the late-1870s the state was expanding the Brazilian occupation in the area, especially through colonies for military defense and non Portuguese European immigrants, as seen in Chapter Two. Despite some instances when the democratization of land tenure was expected, the state has continuously supported land concentration processes, which were responses to the internationally promoted and demanded "green revolution."

Many landless non-Indians have therefore claimed Indian lands, when they did not just invade them. Though these landless non-Indians have left the region or were resettled in the Amazon in the late 1970s, other non-Indians have

demanded the Indians resettlement into the Amazon, which would free local Indian lands for themselves. Some non-Indians who were living inside or by the roadsides nearby the Guarita Reservation in the early-1990s were as poor and desperate as the poorest Indians in the area. In fact, simply to buy a canvas or plastic tent, and to store some food or to join the squatting of *latifundia*, were not possible for all. In March of the current year, many RGS landless non-Indians were engaged in a hunger strike to press their land claims and their will to stay in the state.

Non-Indians' struggles to claim the Guarita Indian lands have resulted in some of the worst scars of Indian and non-Indian contact, including torture, beatings, murders, rape, chemical poisoning, and devastating social and economic conditions. The 1980s' "decade of bloodshed" continues into the current decade, as the only hope left is that there would be less bloodshed. The two recent rapes of Guarita Kaingang women were the most recent incidents, one of which was practiced by a non-Indian gang (Justiça Pública 1992a, b). Though in the past Brazilian authorities have not properly responded to crimes committed against Indians, the recent involvement of the Attorney General and federal prosecutors on Indian matters may produce some improvements.

The exploitation of Guarita Indian labor has also constituted one of the strategies of non-Indian claims on their lands. Though their labor was exploited for centuries,

there is evidence that in the period of 1940-1960 there was official use of physical and psychological torture. Non-Indian farmers hired Indians as day laborers, especially to work on their soybean plantations inside and or outside the reservation lands. Wage exploitation and the refusal to pay social benefits are examples of the common practices. Some Kaingang have also exploited their kin's labor, who were faced similar or even worse conditions. The revival of old but persistent ideas--e.g. wondering, lasy people--about the social value of Indian labor has reinforced the brutal exploitation of their labor. Non-Indians consistently repeat prejudicial generalizations about the "essence" of the Indian being. In the late-1870s, Beschoren (1989: 62) wrote that the eyes of the Inhacorá (also known as Campo Novo) Indians revealed their inner savagery, despite efforts to "civilize" them.¹ During the administration of the SPI the idea of "feathered"--those wearing feather headdresses and paraphernalia--but non-violent and productive Indians was disseminated on the local level. According to Schwantes, in the early 1960s, local farmers of German heritage did not consider the Guarita Indians totally human (1979 in Deckmann 1985: 96). Some relatively recent events have fueled the non-Indian imagination, including the practice of cannibalism, a rape, murder, and burning of a non-Indian

¹ These Beschoren's statements also apply to at least most of the Guarita Indians, as many of Inhacorá Indians soon moved to Guarita.

women in the reservation, and an Indian gang rape of two Kaingang women (Justiça Pública 1992a; 1988-1987). Other non-Indians were even suspicious that the Guarita Indians might be eating parts of their relatives' corpses.

Non-Indian plundering has also been noted by the area's chroniclers (DTP 1988; Oliveira 1848/14/08; Parés 1848/14/01). The non-Indian elite was considered by local people as "the sharpest, the more experienced dishonest people." Others said that they formed a sort of "network" regarding the Brazilian version of a "violent and corrupting culture."² A newcomer to the area, a Christian priest told me in 1992 that Whites in the area are "the worst people" he had ever met, they "are heartless, totally careless about their own community, but especially when related to Indians, whom they hate." It is no wonder that many Guarita Indians have widespread negative ideas about non-Indians.

Persistent Land Claims on The Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation

Claims on lands belonging to the Indians inhabiting the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation have been made since at least the 19th century by both Indians and non-Indians. They became especially persistent after World War II. Since those years the federal government's Amazon development policies

² The political and economic scandal involving Fernando Collor de Mello (the Brazil's former president) and his close aides, is only the most recent example of such a phenomenon (New York Times September 12, 1992: A4; Veja 1992, 1990, 1989).

stressed not only natural resource exploitation but colonization or non-Indian settlement as well (Davis 1977; Gross 1984). A rubber boom then transformed this area (Leao *et al.* 1984; McIntyre and Puttkamer 1988). On the local level this caused a gradual but effective loss of Indian land, depopulation, and major social changes such as their involvement with the market and submission to FUNAI officials and other non-Indians' abuses. The early-1980s pacification of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and Amundáwa was a twofold event, as it worsened ongoing devastating conditions in the area and consolidated non-Indian occupation. In this context, the Indian voices have been silenced, especially when they have made their land claims explicit.

International demand for rubber, mining, and timber were essential to those processes. As the government sent rubber entrepreneurs and thousands of rubber-tappers to the area to exploit rubber in the mid-1940s, new and lasting conflicts resulted. The Indians were hunted and massacred by non-Indians who went unpunished. This persisted until the 1970s, and simultaneously other strategies to reduce the Indian population and to dispossess them of their lands were imposed. The concern of some international NGOs and banks may have played an important role in creating the local reservation (Mindlin 1987: 71), though it did not help to prevent the devastation of the Indians' lives and natural resources. The government's failure to effectively protect

Indian lives, even when resources were available, has been responsible for an astonishing death toll. Similarly the government did nothing to protect the depletion of resources, labor exploitation, and non-Indian profiteering. In addition, the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and the Amundáwa have systematically been physically and emotionally abused by non-Indians, and even by some Indian officials.

Recent non-Indian claims on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation again revealed how closely the state and non-Indians have aligned in their attempt to dispossess the Indians. The direct involvement of public authorities, including the Republic President, in the 1989 attempt to reduce the reservation is only one instance. Though that attempt was thwarted in the following year by both the Attorney General and the present-day President, local non-Indians and authorities have not abandoned their struggle. Those who were occupying and exploiting the lands not included in the reservation, but still claimed by the Indians, had not contemplated the possibility of turning them over to the Indians.

The Indians' own land claims have neither been heard nor considered. Although Leao *et al.* (1984) argued that battle sites, where they attempted to defend themselves, were considered to be land claims, this view was disputed by Santana (1989) and Santos *et al.* (1989). However, although the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and the Amundáwa land claims were not

taken into account, they have laid claims on the Rondon Ranch and on the Trincheira stream surrounding lands, respectively. Instead of considering their claims, especially in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau case, FUNAI officials tried to persuade the Indians to abandon their claims. A non-Indian neighbor also tried to convince the Amundáwa leader that they already had "too much land, and should avoid trouble with non-Indians." The 1990 ambush by autonomous Indians on non-Indian settlers in the southeast reservation was probably envisioned by them as a message about their land claims or a sign of their resistance to non-Indian encroachment of their territory.

The consequences of non-Indian land claims on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation have been especially deadly. Not only has land loss itself furthered their decimation, exploitation, and deprivation, but the struggles to dispossess the Indians destroyed many of the basic survival conditions of the Indians, such as hunt, fish, fruit. Non-Indians, including FUNAI officials, have also intentionally changed many aspects of their culture. Since most Indians were in contact with non-Indian officials, they too began to adopt non-Indian customs. This trend intensified Indians' alienation from their own culture and history, which worsened with the deaths of their shamans and intellectuals.

It is also important to take into consideration the demographic issue. Indeed, the infant mortality rate has

become astoundingly high in the last ten years among the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and the Amundáwa. Two main factors have contributed to this situation. On the one hand, the state has not promoted the necessary conditions for Indian population increase. Indeed, not only there are not effective health services in the reservations but there are no actions taken against the depletion of resources crucial for Indian subsistence. On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter Seven, infanticide still is a common practice among these two Indian groups. Moreover, the extent to which the local "autonomous" Indians will be able to keep non-Indian settlers out of the reservation borders is not known. Though still fierce, it is not likely that the Indians comprise a sizable population. The death toll among them will not be restricted to the Amundáwa massacre, but will likely include death from viruses or diminishing food resources.

Commonalities of Claims on Indian Land

A comparative analysis involving the Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservations' Indian and non-Indian land claims shows many similarities between them. State interference with their claims has been notable. The seizure of Indian land, in particular, has been taken for granted, even in recent times. International demands for resources exploitation on the one hand and environmental and human rights protection on the other, have encouraged both the

frontier expansion of non-Indian territories, and the destruction of the Indians' surviving conditions. Many non-Indian claims are pursued at the local level of politics, where their anti-Indian character becomes evident, with the support of the state. When resisting dispossession and non-Indian laid claims, Indians have usually been repressed or silenced; some have also colluded with non-Indian interests.

Primarily, the state has coordinated the areas' frontier expansion policies and actions. Its involvement in military enterprises (including frontier defense and territorial conquest), resource exploitation, and colonization have been extraordinary. Independent entrepreneurs have also been important to these exploits, as Davidson (1973) suggests for the 18th century conquest of western Brazil; however, those entrepreneurs have been supported by the state as well. Massacre and other genocidal practices were a frequent strategy to remove Indians from the land (this when "just war" was not legal as in the 19th century), and impunity has remained simultaneously out of the question and supported by state authorities.

The Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation's Indians have been harshly affected as Indian life, land tenure, and self-determination have been at stake. Though the Indian populations of these areas have been decimated, the state and non-Indian invaders have not been able to impose a total Indian holocaust. The last century's "just

war" justified many local massacres, which have been followed by mass killings produced by rubber booms, intentional virus infection, slavery, bondage, and the public authorities. The capacity of the Indians of the Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations to resort to "savagery" and the non-Indians' savagery imagery, were important factors in the Indians endurance as peoples. The state and non-Indians have, however, insisted in their land claims on these two reservation lands.

Land claims have been issued not only to dispossess the Indians but to create Indian reservations as well. Despite this, the creation of the Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations reflects the state and non-Indian policy of expropriation in itself, since through it the Indians have not regained their former territories. In both cases the demarcation of the Indian lands has in fact meant the loss of most or large parts of those territories and, consequently, of crucial natural resources. Moreover, they have faced official threats of further land reduction after having their reservation demarcated. In fact, the previous President of the Republic even reduced the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation. In addition, these reservations have been invaded and or leased by non-Indians.

While laying their anti-Indian land claims, the state and non-Indian claimants and invaders continue to demand the resettlement of the local Indians. These claimants have

stated that either grouping the Indians together in a single area or relocating them facilitates the necessary work to support them. It has also been said since they are "savages" they ought to live in the Amazon, or specifically in Acre, as these areas are viewed as the Indians' "proper places." Indian resistance has largely thwarted these efforts; however, social inequalities have also spread among the Indians, due to landlessness, resources and labor exploitation, and continuous economic crises.

Indians of the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations systematically made their own land claims, and have been able to reconquer some land. In the past and currently, they used war tactics and attack skills to press their territorial claims. Though the Guarita Reservation's Indians used other means, especially the political and the bureaucratic domains to argue their land claims, only recently have the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau and the Amundáwa Indians begun to grasp such possibilities. In fact, the Guarita Indians took back their leased lands in 1978 but were not able to keep them for their own use. The group of Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau, led by Mawá, virtually reoccupied the Rondon Ranch in 1990, despite the attempts to expell them. Another common strategy has been accommodation. Many of the Indians of the two reservations have submitted to non-Indian interests, though in the case of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau this fact may be unrecognized.

Brazilian legislation has in principle guaranteed the Indians' land tenure and traditional possessions rights, although the state and non-Indian authorities have simultaneously developed anti-Indian land policy. In Guarita, for example, the state has ignored the growing landless Indian population interests, while non-Indian use the reservation's communal lands through illegal leases and other violations. In the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation, the state has both ignored the enduring presence of invaders and disregarded the recent land claims of both contacted and autonomous Indians. These same Indians' very recent land claims were also ignored by the government in 1991, when the validation procedures were concluded.

In southern Brazil, other Indians have faced and made similar land claims. In the Nonoai case, for example, they were forced to make contact with Brazilians in the mid-19th century (Simonian, ed., in press; 1981). Then they began to be successively dispossessed by "men of resources," landless non-Indians, and the state.³ In response, Indians laid their own claims to their land. Despite the violent confrontation and the demarcation of the reservation in 1911-1912, the state and non-Indians persisted and broadened their land claims on the Nonoai Indian lands, dispossessing and or leasing part of these lands.

³ One of the first contemporary non-Indian invaders was the Indian settlement's first director.

The state and non-Indians have been aggressive with their land claims and in their struggles to dispossess Nonoai Indians. Despite this, Indians not only laid their own land claims but recently recouperated parts of their lands (Simonian 1992: 11). While Nonoai Indians were able to recuperate lands leased in 1978, many Kaingang have struggled to reinstate the practice of leasing (Venzon 1991: 561ff). Though there are Indian advocates of Indian land leasing, few have benefited from these developments.

Beyond the tensions created by land leasing and the social inequalities that emerged in Nonoai, the state and the government of the RGS state have systematically denied any recognition of the Indians land claims and rights. Nonetheless, early in 1992, the Nonoai Indians reconquered part of their lands expropriated by the RGS government in 1941-1949 (Simonian id.). This action was prompted by yet another episode of Indian defiance. On that occasion, the Nonoai cacique Penry and his people entered the "state forest" and declared their intention to retain possession. Instead of complying with the law, the state governor Alceu Collares threatened to use force to expel. Since the governor has continued his anti-Indian policies, and after a year did not make a move to return the Fourth Section area to the Indians, the Indians were throughout April 1993, threatening to blow up a highway bridge inside the reservation.

The extent to which judicial authorities will be able to enforce the Nonoai Indians constitutional rights remains to be seen. Though the Attorney General has taken some judicial measures (Justiça Federal 1992-1991), the RGS government decided to repress the Indians. As I pointed out in an article (Simonian 1992), the 1992 reconquest has been viewed by the RGS authorities, politicians and even the media as an inconsistent confrontation. These non-Indians then argued why the Indians did not act, did not care for their lands, their ancestors' burials before, which in itself reveals a simplistic approach to Indian affairs in the state. The harshness of the RGS authorities has discouraged the local Indians, as their leaders recently noted (Correio do Povo June 19, 1992: 14). Non-Indian accusations and the lack of economic resources and political support to sustain the struggle may imperil the Indians' project. In this case, they planned both to keep and to protect the recuperated lands and natural resources (Simonian P.A.). Moreover, as the Nonoai Reservation is outside the "rain forest" circuit and the Indians are no longer "feathered," no international attention is given to their plight, which could eventually make a difference.

Non-Indian and Indian claims in the Amazon do not differ from those of other areas, Mato Grosso and Rondônia

Aripuana Indian Park are only new examples.⁴ In this case, international economic interests and political support have recently contributed to both Indian land loss and demarcation. In the 18th century, the local Indians faced gold prospectors in their territory. In the following century, RAC Church missionaries claimed Indian lands in the area between the Aripuana and the Ji-Paraná rivers, and in the Guaporé River right bank, to establish missions (Hugo [1959] 1991).⁵ The late 19th century rubber-boom also affected Indians in the area. Highway construction, mining companies and prospectors, cattle-raising, and colonization expanded into the area throughout and after the 1960s (Davis 1977: 77ff).⁶ Massacres were committed to wipe out the Indians from their rich lands (Sunday Times February 23, 1969).

At the beginning of the 1970s, the PIN--National Integration Project--brought in an endless wave of Brazilian expansion into the Amazon. By then Meirelles (in APS 1972:

⁴ The Indian Park is located in the Mato Grosso northwest and in the Rondônia east. It has 3,5 million hectares and in 1987 it was inhabited by about 16,000 Gavião, Suruí, Arara, Zoró, and Cinta Larga Indians (Junqueira and Mindlin 1987: 1). One Tupi and another Tupi-Mondé 'independent' groups still live in the area (id.).

⁵ Concerning the area between the Aripuanã and the Ji-Paraná rivers, the missionaries were unsuccessful in their attempts to settle the Arara and the Mura (id.).

⁶ For the cassiterite and international tin mining interests in Rondônia and in the Amazon broader area see Davis (id.) and Lewis 1969.

90), denounced both the park project and the FUNAI administration for not protecting local Indian lives, lands, and interests. Galvao documented national and international mining claims on Indian lands in the Brazilian Amazon (Los Angeles Times April 26, 1973). Brooks et al. (1973) also denounced the invasion of Indian lands by agricultural and rubber businesses and the possibility of them being sold or leased by FUNAI. Brooks et al. (id.) wrote: "Unless the law safeguarding their homeland is enforced, the Indians will be swept away by the advancing frontier of colonization and economic exploitation." Chippiano (1975) unveiled the government's unwillingness to protect Indian lands and lives. After losing about half of their lands, the Paiter still had to struggle for years to expel non-Indian invaders (Mindlin 1885b: 132-143). Ongoing anti-Indian land claims continued throughout the 1980s.

The Polonoroeste Programme opened new opportunities for non-Indian land claims, especially through investments in highway construction, colonization, mining, and lumber exploitation (Brunelli 1985). Junqueira and Mindlin (1987: 17-40) reported non-Indian claims and the invasion of many Indian lands in the area covered by the Polonoroeste Programme. The Ji-Paraná Hydroelectric project has also threatened the Arara, the Gaviao and the Zoró lands and natural resources (Forseth and Lovold 1991: 428ff). Late in the 1980s, the Zoró were struggling with non-Indian invaders

who intended to be settled there, and with their non-Indian political supporters.⁷ The lands of the Arara Beiradao Reservation have also been threatened by non-Indians and FUNAI officials (Dal Poz 1991: 442-445). The Indians themselves began to participate in the process of explicitly laying land claims and of searching for support in national government and international organizations.⁸ However, they have also exploited and devastated the resources of the area.⁹

To mention other claims on Aborigines, Africans, Inuit and other Indigenous peoples' lands after European conquest may seem repetitive, as they have been similar to those in Brazil. It is interesting to note, however, the persistence and dominance of anti-Indian claims and the similarities in non-Indian and Indian motives, expectations, and strategies. Examples of these trends can be found in Gordon (1989: 138-154), Hiatt (1989: 98-117), Davis (1988: 17-40) who offer accounts of the Sun of Namibia, Australia Aborigines,

⁷ For news on these struggles see CEDI 1991: 434-436.

⁸ Many Indians from this area have participated in international meetings, at the World Bank, BIRD, UN headquarters, and elsewhere.

⁹ Many of the local Indian leaders have argued that such exploitation has not benefited their communities (see my notes on CEDI 1991: 448). Despite this, there is evidence that those leaders have personally benefited. In 1992 fieldwork in the Rio Branco Reservation, I collected many reports of angry but powerless Indians against their leaders. These leaders, the Indians said, collaborated with the local timber exploitation.

Colombia Guahibo, and on the Paraguay Aché land cases. In fact, they reveal how conservative non-Indians have been in their claims and strategies to impose "modern" western concepts of expropriation and private property.

In those countries, as almost everywhere, non-Indians imposed the *territorium nullius* concept and denied Indian title to their territories. The growing and persistent Indian dispossession, the eventual creation of small Indian reservations, resettlement, Indian resettlement on other Indians' lands, the transformation of Indian lands in areas for preservation, the assumption that the local people did not have a property and land use system were common and widespread. Non-Indians have successfully "rulled and divided" the Indians, thus splitting the Indians interests. The recent Hopi land claims may be seen as paradigmatic:

they never signed a treaty with the U.S.; they did not participate in the election of the Tribal Council which now claims to represent them; ... as a whole people they never approved any encroachment upon their land (Akwesasne Notes 1977: 18).

The Hopi too were caught in a land dispute with the Navajo, while mining industries and the government profited from the resources of their land (id.).

Some changes in Brazil's political regime have recently helped in the recognition of some Indian land claims, but they do not seem to present the possibility of major transformations. Promising political achievements were recently developed in: Nicaragua--the Atlantic Coast

Autonomy, in Brazil--the Yanomami Park, in Canada--the Inuit Nunavut autonomous territory, in Ecuador--the Pastaza Indian Territory and in French Guiana the French government is promising to secure a third of the lands to the local Indians (Ante-Proyeto 1986 in Díaz-Polanco 1988; New York Times August 30, 1992; May 03, 1992: 8). The extent to which these protected lands are going to be effectively guaranteed is, however, doubtful.

In fact, powerful non-Indian claims and interests continue to threaten Indian lands and resources. Deforestation became a major threat to Miskito, Suma, and Rama Indians of the Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, as timber enterprises were allowed to exploit local forests (New York Times October 12, 1991: A25). Military authorities, mining and timber enterprises, and politicians have recently claimed access rights to and the termination of the Yanomami Indian Park (Jornal do Brasil June 25, 1992: 1, 7). Miners even re-invaded this Park but were recently expelled by the federal government (Crítica March 13, 1993: 10). Despite this, the chances that it will keep them out of the Park borders are almost nonexistent, unless miners are given an economic alternative or repressive action is taken against them. With his eyes on the potential oil resources of Pastaza, Sixto D. Bellén, the Ecuadoran president and a crusader for the free market economy, has stressed the integration of the country's Indians "within one nation"

(New York Times June 09, 1992: L10). This is an anti-Indian old and well known banner, which has proved to benefit non-Indians.

The Indians and Inuit plight in developed countries has not been that much different from that in underdeveloped countries. In Canada, for instance, Indian lands have not only been encroached since colonial times, but the British Columbia' chief justice McEarchern recently ruled that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en "retain no aboriginal title to their territories," and that "B.C.'s Indians enjoy no aboriginal land rights at al" (Weekend Sun March 09, 1991: 1). The Creek have struggled in the international arena to have their claims to their threatened lands respected (Village Voice 1991). The Samish, in the United states, are battling in the courts to have their indigenous heritage recognized (New York Times June 09, 1992: L26). Yakima Indians have their lands leased to non-Indians and have faced recent killings and kidnaping of Indian women (id. April 18, 1993: A6), which may be related to land conflicts as I have suggested in the Guarita case. And as far as land is concerned, it did not change that much after the Kennedy findings showed that Indians hold only two percent of the 100 percent of the possession that they had before non-Indian invasion (U.S. Senate 1969). It is still to be seen how Russia and other ex-Soviet Union nations deal with the land claims of local "small nations" (IWGIA, ed. 1990).

Claims on Indian Lands: A Question of Power

If claims on Indian lands are considered in the international context, not many difference emerges. Indeed, materials have been analyzed from diverse areas, but all suggest similarities in the nature of land claims as well as the processes through which they have developed. Economic exploitation, political domination, and ideological control are to be found at the bottom of these processes and claims. Although Indians have gained in terms of power and land guarantees, especially throughout the last decades, their struggles to impose their claims have strained their social energy, but simultaneously renewed the fading hopes.

Domination and resistance are ancient and simultaneous realities within human existence and relationships, and also have been at the center of the claims laid on Indian lands. Domination implies different sort of impositions, which can be accomplished in distinct levels of depth, intensity and or expansion (Foucault 1981; Sider 1987; Simmel [1908] 1971). It is in the levels of economic, political and ideological power that claims on Indian lands have been produced, laid, and imposed. The issue taken into consideration here contradicts Simmel's claim that people tend to accept domination and are always prepared for such. Despite the fact that domination has in fact been imposed through hegemonic form from European conquest on, most indigenous peoples have consistently defended their lands,

laid their claims, and struggled for.

Resistance takes place as distinct kinds of responses to impositions or attempted imposition and, it can also be developed in diverse ways (Gramsci 1978; Ranger 1972; Scott 1990; Smith 1986). Yet, as the issue of claims on Indian, Aborigines and Inuit lands have shown, these peoples have eventually experienced empowering conditions (Wolf 1990),¹⁰ resistance should be taken with caution, as D. Jones cautioned (in Nash 1992). In fact, as Indian, Aborigines and Inuit's efforts have occurred in a context where powerlessness dominates, collusion may happen as well.

The Guarita and the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau cases are of particular relevance to power relations. The Guarita Indian leaders have recently colluded with non-Indian land interests, thus distorting the legal guarantees of self-determination. Despite this, the Indians' growing awareness of the possibilities of self-empowerment might lead to a process where vigorous defense of their own interests becomes hegemonic. Some of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation Indians recently began to experience non-Indian domination. Their chances to overcome the traps built up by non-Indian officials, entrepreneurs, and other non-Indians are still weak. However, they may even resort to their pre-direct

¹⁰ For the Indians, Aborigines, and Inuit empowering conditions see especially Beckett 1990; Jones and Hill-Burnett 1982; Oliveira Filho 1987; Paine 1977; Sider 1987; Smith 1989.

contact resisting strategies (including violence). It is within similar paradoxical social contexts that hope for the empowerment of indigenous peoples resides. Although the recognition of the 1993 as "the Indigenous People Year" by the United Nations may seem a small step on that direction, it shall be seen as hope or at least a starting point for new pro-Indian commitments.

APPENDIX

Research Procedures and Fieldwork

The research for this dissertation required a combination of diachronic, synchronic and comparative methods. I elicited data from informants about past and present claims on Indians lands in the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations, as well as on the Brazilian, regional, and Indian land tenure systems, conflicts and transformations. I focused mainly on those struggles which led to Indian land dispossession, leasing, squatting, or landlessness. Indian systems of land tenure and use, as well as the way or way land is transmitted through generations were examined. Since Indians were considered wards of the State in Brazil, I had to look for data on this relationships. I considered these data to be crucial to know the extent of the state intervention both in the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations' past and present, and especially to assess the extent to which the state has effectively secured Indian rights to land tenure and use.

I undertook fieldwork in the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations and surrounding areas. In the Guarita case, I did not apply for a "research official authorization" to FUNAI's President. As Brazilian citizen I had reasons to do this. I told the Indian leadership and FUNAI officials that it would be very unrealistic to ask permission to enter in a place actually invaded by hundreds of leaseholders, landless tenants, loggers, and surrounded by hungry merchants, who

were exploiting not only Indian land, resources, and labor, but also threatening their very lives. Despite this, only the Guarita Indian post's leaders accepted my presence in the area (by then the Guarita Reservation was divided in two administrations and two Indian leadership). Anyway I managed to do a survey in the Sao Joao do Irapuá Indian post, where I elicited interesting data on claims on local Indians lands

In the Guarita Reservation I worked six months in the Guarita Indian post, from June to August 1989, and from March to May 1990. Though I did not live inside the reservation I spent most of my time there, interviewing the Indians, non-Indians married to Indians, non-Indians leaseholders, and landless tenants. I also began a census of the Indian population and observed special aspects of their everyday life, attended parties in Indian homes, churches and schools, and even participated in a ball. Fieldwork was facilitated by the fact that I already knew many of the local people, as I had conducted research in this reservation both in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. I also had met Indians before, especially in Indian meetings. The official in charge of the Guarita Indian post, a Kaingang, had also attended the Ijuí University and taken a course I taught.

While staying in Miraguaí city, I had the opportunity to be simultaneously involved with non-Indians. Among these were some of the people who were claiming Indian lands,

leading the struggles to keep Indians lands' leasing unchanged, or supporting non-Indian demands and interests within the Guarita Reservation. That city has its eastern limit along the reservation's border. Moreover, Indians were constantly in the city, shopping, contracting leases, receiving extra lease fees, looking for other resources or selling their produce. Being invited by the Municipal Secretary of Education, Prof. Arlindo Morais, to give a talk to municipal teachers, I made it clear about the responsibilities of the federal, state and municipal governments and of non-Indians on the Indians' ongoing deprivation and abuses.¹ I also did surveys in other cities where the reservation is located, especially in Tenente Portela, Redentora and Palmitinho. I interviewed municipal authorities, labor union people, church members, and other people involved with the current Indian land leasing.

I also went to the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation without the required research authorization. In this case, I was instructed by a colleague who knew the area that there was not such need, because "the regional administration of FUNAI was accessible". Despite that I took all the required vaccinations and medical examinations which proved providential. When I arrived in Porto Velho the

¹ The mayor Amadeus Lorenzon was among the audience and during the debate he publicly acknowledged that he had made his fortune in the Indian lands. Despite this, the Mayor complained with the Secretary about the "political" tone of my talk.

administrators were out of their positions, accused of corruption and other misdemeanors, being then under investigation. The acting administrator did not receive me, but sent a message saying that if I wished I could take the risk to start the fieldwork in the reservation, as he would not take me out, a compromise that he did not honor.

In spite of that the way I entered the reservation proved to be an interesting experience for getting acquainted with what was really going on among Indians, officials, neighbors, and all sort of exploiters. Then, those events which happen in the margins of human interaction and reality, reveal what is being hidden from major audiences. I found that many aggressions against the Indians, their culture and lands had been reported to some high official in the FUNAI's hierarchy in Porto Velho, but they were not investigated. As I assumed as soon as I arrived at the reservation, these realities were intimately related to claims on Indians land, and to struggles toward seizing them or appropriating the Indian resources.

Before leaving Porto Velho, the Rondônia's capital, I phoned a FUNAI anthropologist in Brasilia, and she advised me to send as quick as possible the proposal and other required documents, which was done. I knew I had to wait a while for the authorization, if it should be issued.²

² Oliveira Filho (Oliveira Filho 1988) recently raised the question of the authoritarian power of FUNAI officials, when they were dealing with requests of authorization for research

However, when I arrived at the reservation I had to face very difficult situations, as the FUNAI's official looked and sounded more like a policy man on duty, than a civil worker hired to deal with Indians in a process that FUNAI still presents as "in the way of pacification."

As I decided to wait for the authorization, since the very beginning of my stay I began to witness all the tensions, the struggles and the knowledge that this situation revealed. Finally, they were crucial for the data I elicited in the reservation, and gave me a better clue on how policies and actions toward Indians happens to be in the very local level. Furthermore, investigating claims on the Eru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation's lands and resources brought me close to situations where powerful forces leading to destruction or extermination of local Indian peoples occur. This may teach how weak, and possibly insignificant are theories and scholarship, compared to crude realities faced

on Indian reservations. In my case, I wrote to anthropologist M. A. Sá Leão in Brasília alerting her that officials probably would not consult the Indians--a current requirement for issuing a research authorization--to know about their interest in having another anthropologist among them, as they already had one U.S. citizen anthropologist from the Pittsburg University among them. The main reason for such attitude, I then advanced, was the fact that the FUNAI official of the Trinchreira Indian post transmitted radio messages, heard in other Indians posts, doubting about my identity. In one of them he is reported to have said that I indeed looked rather a journalist, as I used to spend my days writing. Beyond that, though apparently democratic a consultation with Indian leaders may be very ambiguous; evidence show that officials tend to press Indians while they are being consulted. Moreover, in my case they were not either consulted.

by people in their everyday lives. With my work especially on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation Indians I did not want to revive the "vanishing" Indian (Dippie 1985), but I ended up finding that a genocidal policy was under way.

I also spent six months on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Reservation, concentrated in the second half of 1990. I did research with all five known Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau groups and with the Amundáwa. I made the same effort to learn at least the basics of their Tupi-Kawahib language, so I could communicate with the few elders, who hardly speak Portuguese. With the exception of the Memó's group,³ I met all the other Indians in their own or current living villages. I stayed with Mawá's group in the Marechal Rondon ranch, which was located outside the reservation, but in an area where these Indians live during some periods of the year, and which, incidentally, has been requested by them.

I spent most of the time in the vicinity of Trincheira Indian post, at the eastern border of the reservation. This was a place which I could reach by bus and walk to the nearest Indian village, but it was also where the Amundáwa were temporarily living. Inside the reservation I had to travel by foot through the jungle, prairies, scrub-lands, or

³ I was on my way to go to his village at the Jamari River bank when I met Mawá and his people in the Barreiro village, where he took refuge after having his own village destroyed by arson. As by those days only non-Indian mining prospectors were adventuring and invading on that part of the reservation, the Indians assumed that they might be the responsible for that arson.

via long boat voyages. Besides the Amundáwa and Barreiro Indian villages I also visited for a few days the FUNAI Comandante Ary Indian post, Alto Jarú Vigilance post two rubber-estates located inside the reservation and the Rondon Ranch (Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau claimed lands).

In the Trincheira Indian post I stayed in a non-Indian family's house on the boundary, where Indians and FUNAI officials visited every day. As the Indians were being hyper-exploited by the local FUNAI officials, as it was demonstrated, they would then come by to borrow rice, to ask for seeds, for tools, to have their hunting guns repaired, or in search of advice (some even came to get a meal or to drink *chimarrão*, the gaucho erb drink). Moreover, from there I would go every day to the Amundáwa Trincheira Indian post village, where they were temporarily staying. I also did fieldwork in the Eletrônica Line, an area close to the same FUNAI Indian post, by then occupied mostly by smallholding peasants.

I spent some time doing archival research, especially at the following: Diretor Pestana Anthropological Museum in Ijuí, Rio Grande do Sul State Historical Archival, ANAI and SAERS in Porto Alegre, Federal and Public Justice archivals, respectively in Santo Angelo and Tenente Portela, House of Representatives archives in Miraguai, FUNAI archives in Cuiabá and in Brasília, CIMI/RO in Porto Velho, PETI (National Museum), Indian Museum in Rio de Janeiro and CEDI

in Sao Paulo, and NDI in Brasília. I looked basically for official documents and reports, historical and anthropological accounts, mainly on claims on Indian lands on the Guarita and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau reservations, on land conflicts in both regions.

In addition, I searched for archival evidence about the ways policies towards Indian lands and other natural resources were articulated and put to work at the local, regional, and international levels. Finally I looked for archival data that could help me to understand the contemporary and historical socio-economic and political texture within and in surrounding areas of the reservations where I did fieldwork. These areas included the border areas of Argentina (Misiones), Paraguay (eastern border) (in the Guarita case), and Bolivia (Beni) (in the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau case), where history and culture transcend physical frontiers and delimitations.

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