IMPERIAL REFORM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR REGIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION: BISHOPS, INTENDANTS AND CREOLE ELITES IN AREQUIPA, PERU (1784-1816)

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1978

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in History in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 11, 1978
date

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PREFACE

Many of Peru's historical resources have yet to be fully exploited. This study is based primarily on archival sources. Of great importance were those obtained in the city of Arequipa. The Archivo Arzobispal there yielded letterbooks containing a major portion of the correspondence of Bishop Pedro José Chávez de la Rosa. The Mercedarian monastery in Arequipa was the source of important data on the establishment of the foundling home and on the attempt to force Bishop Chávez's resignation. La Merced, the Archivo Arzobispal de Lima and the Biblioteca Nacional provided rich materials on the controversy which surrounded the attempted reform of the convent of Santa Catalina. Regretfully, the eighteenth-century sources for the city council and the archives of the cathedral chapter of Arequipa were closed to public use during the time this researcher was in Arequipa.

The Biblioteca Nacional in Lima contains not only the materials mentioned above, but also the letterbooks of Bishop Luis Gonzaga de la Encina, the manuscript copy of Intendant Salamanca's Relación, and other materials of great interest to historians of early nineteenth century Peru. The private manuscript collection held by Padre Ruben Vargas Ugarte, housed, when this researcher used it, at the Colegio de la Inmaculada in Lima, contains basic documentation on the university conflict and on the political disturbances which occurred following Napoleon's capture of the Spanish royal family in 1808. The extensive collection held by the Archivo General de Indias in Seville was useful over a broad spectrum of this work. These archival sources were supplemented with several collections of published documents of the period.

There are many people who, in one capacity or another, have helped make this work possible. I wish to thank my dissertation director, Harry Bernstein, and my readers, Ruth Pike and Ralph Della Cava, for their many useful suggestions and comments. I derived a great deal of professional inspiration from my contacts with Julius W. Pratt and Marshall Smelser at the University of Notre Dame and from my work with E. James Ferguson, Editor of The Papers of Robert Morris. J. R. Fisher, James Lockhart, Keith Davies, Alejandro Málaga Medina, and Padre Phelipe Mac Gregor have graciously responded to my requests for information or assistance. I wish to thank Padre Ruben Vargas Ugarte, Graciela Sánchez Cerro, Eduarte Ugarte y Ugarte, Padre Alarcon, and especially Rosario Parra Cala for facilitating my work in the archives under their jurisdictions. I gratefully acknowledge the support given my research by the American Association of University Women.

Finally, and most enthusiastically of all, I thank my husband, Philip F. Gallagher, who spent many hours photographing documents and monuments for me in Peru, and who has spent many hours since listening to me talk about the research he made it possible for me to do.

INTRODUCTION

The eighteenth century, which saw the revitalization of much of the Spanish Empire, was a century of continued distress for Peru. With the aid of competent and dynamic ministers, the Bourbon dynasty, which came to the Spanish throne in 1700, set the peninsula and many of the colonies on the road to economic recovery and political cohesion. Peru was an exception to the pattern of improvement. Though formerly the most opulent and esteemed kingdom in the New World, the viceroyalty was adversely affected by the reforms undertaken to develop the Empire's economy and to improve its defense capabilities. Loss of territory through imperial reorganization, natural disaster and the decreased productivity of Peruvian mines heightened ever-present socio-economic tensions. In 1780 these erupted, first, in a series of creole tax riots, and then in the massive Túpac Amaru rebellion.

This study focuses on the period between the Túpac Amaru rebellion and the Pumacahua rebellion which began in 1814. It analyzes the attempt made by the leaders of the province of Arequipa to utilize the advantageous aspects of the imperial reforms, to recover from the disastrous effects of the Túpac Amaru rebellion, and to aggressively develop the provincial economy. Three parties strove to determine the course to be followed. These were the creole aristocracy, the episcopacy, and the civil provincial government, represented by the intendants. Each of these had its own interests to defend as it worked to achieve provincial well-being. This study describes the drive for recovery in Arequipa and in that context focuses on the sometimes productive and sometimes obstructive interaction of the intendancy, episcopacy, and creole elites.

By 1784 the nadir of Arequipeñan fortunes had been reached and the province began to move toward recovery. Four major aspects of the Bourbon reform program formed the basis of the Arequipeñan hope for increased prosperity and political power. These were the expulsion of the Jesuit Order in 1767, the dismemberment of the Peruvian viceroyalty in 1776, the Free Trade Reglamento of 1778, and the establishment of the intendancy system in Peru in 1784.

The expulsion of the Jesuits, while it deprived the Empire of its foremost educators, made available for distribution by municipal juntas de temporalidades the resources controlled by the Order. The dismemberment of the viceroyalty of Peru and the Free Trade Reglamento together destroyed the trade monopoly formerly enjoyed by the Lima merchant consulado. With the Arequipeñan port of Arica now open to shipping from Spain and Pacific coastal ports, Arequipeñan merchants could compete more effectively with the merchants of Buenos Aires for markets in the interior. This combination of legislation thus created possibilities which Arequipeñans hoped to exploit and made capital formerly in the hands of the Jesuit Order available to support the development of provincial capabilities.

The central government's purpose in establishing the intendancy system had been to improve colonial administration and increase its control over the farthest reaches of the viceroyalty. This had the added effect of putting high-level government officials in direct contact with creole leadership on the provincial level. Local politicians gained leverage from the very presence of the intendants and from playing them off against the bishops, who resented their intrusion into the sphere of provincial government.

Arequipa was more closely linked by its geography and economy with the interior than it was with the viceregal capital. Located within its boundaries were the western reaches of the mountain passes that led to the rich markets of Cuzco and the Altiplano. Arequipa's economy was diversified. It had some of the most promising silver deposits in the viceroyalty in its southern district, Tarapacá. Its lands, when they could be irrigated, were extremely fertile, and produced a wide variety of food and fiber crops. On the slopes of the Andes, herds of European and native domesticated animals grazed and provided meats and highly prized wools woven into a wide variety of textile goods by skilled local craftsmen. The province, thus, produced a number of goods for export and a certain amount of precious metals which facilitated exchange.

The interests of the large merchant establishments of the viceregal capital were not the only obstacle to the establishment of an economic order favorable to the development of Arequipeñan potential, however. By the late eighteenth century, the exploitation of the Peruvian Indian had been pushed to the point where the native population was continually on the verge of active rebellion. The imperial government's determination to put an end to the most intolerable excesses stood in the way of the colonists' maintaining effective control of Indian productivity and consumption. The Spanish population was, thus, forced to create new methods which would insure an acceptable level of Indian participation in the imperial economy. To maintain such control without precipitating renewed outbreaks of violence, the creole elite looked to both the intendancy and to the parish clergy.

Churchmen sympathetic to creole aspirations could and did serve as key instruments to advancing local interests, but the episcopacy and

the religious orders, more peninsular in character and outlook than the diocesan clergy, often proved insensitive to creole aspirations. They mounted effective defenses of institutional prerogatives and refused to surrender control over their sizeable assets, badly needed to finance development. Capital in ecclesiastical hands and Indian labor were equally essential components of successful exploitation of the province's relatively abundant natural resources. In the period between the two Indian rebellions (1784-1814), provincial leaders strove to manipulate each to the greatest possible advantage.

Enterprising Arequipeñans worked to achieve their common objectives through alliance with Intendant Antonio Álvarez y Jiménez. They struggled to gain control over the process of appointment to ecclesiastical benefices. Together with the intendant they obstructed those programs sponsored by Bishop Pedro José Chávez de la Rosa which utilized capital resources that the municipality wished to see allocated to projects directly related to the advancement of provincial prosperity and power. The creole clergy, including members of the cathedral chapter, gave strong support to the campaign against the bishop. They steadfastly opposed peninsular reforms and peninsular officials not in harmony with local interests.

The essential point of departure for a study of Peru during the intendancy period is J. R. Fisher's Government and Society in Colonial Peru. One modification of Fisher's findings which this work suggests is the degree of importance to be attached to the church-state conflict. Fisher describes Arequipeñan problems as minor and non-political, and states that their content was confined to matters of etiquette or appointment to vacant benefices. I see the disputes as the framework

in which the creole elite struggled for provincial political and economic development.

Creole-peninsular tensions were heightened at the end of the eighteenth century by the Gálvez policy of reserving only a third of the positions on audiencias and cathedral chapters for creoles. Although there have been several studies on the implementation and impact of this policy on the Mexican and Peruvian audiencias, the cathedral chapters have received little or no attention from historians of the period. Fisher's study amply documents the emergence of the city councils as effective organs of government in Peru. While this essay bears out his conclusions, it goes beyond them to point out the equally impressive development of the cathedral chapter of Arequipa. It details the composition of the chapter and analyzes appointments to it and to the vicar-generalcy. It bears out Gálvez's insight that cathedral chapters dominated by creoles could become political forces of some consequence.

Part I of this study concerns itself with the attempt made by Arequipeñan leadership to effectively reintegrate the Indian into the provincial economy and to insure his submission to Spanish authority. It then moves to consider the major elements of a comprehensive plan to realize Arequipeñan potential in agriculture, mining and commerce. Part II describes the conflict between the intendant and his creole supporters with Bishop Chávez. At stake were the deployment of both political and economic resources.

The outcome of this lengthy and many-faceted struggle is discussed in Part III. This describes the gradual shift in political power from peninsular officials to the creole councils, the ayuntamiento or city council, and the cabildo ecclesiastico or cathedral chapter. These

local institutions, although initially defeated in the conflict with Chávez, gained confidence and experience which ultimately made them capable of successfully challenging peninsular authority when more favorable circumstances arose. Part IV describes how the breakdown in peninsular government and the outbreak of another major Indian rebellion in Peru created uncertainties which temporarily checked the development of a sense of provincial self-sufficiency and the desire for self-determination in Arequipa.

Understanding of the strategy adopted by the Arequipeñan elite to advance regional interests must be founded on sensitivity to the interplay of secular government with ecclesiastical institutions. The latter were the most important sources of development capital in the province. Creole and peninsular ecclesiastics vied to control its dispersment to favor either local ambitions or programs of reform developed in Spain. Arequipa's first intendant, faced with the need to establish his own prerogatives as vicepatron, consciously threw the weight of provincial and municipal government on the side of Arequipeñan aspirations. He thus set in motion the gradual development of regional self-determination which is the prime matter of this study.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAA: Archivo Arzobispal de Arequipa, Arequipa, Peru.

AAL: Archivo Arzobispal de Lima, Lima, Peru.

AGI, Lima, leg.: Archivo General de Indias, Audiencia de Lima, legajo, Seville, Spain.

AMA-CG: Archivo de la Merced de Arequipa, Colección Goyeneche, Monastery of La Merced, Arequipa, Peru.

ANA: Archivo Notarial de Arequipa, Universidad de San Agustin, Arequipa, Peru.

ANL: Archivo Nacional, Lima, Peru.

BNL: Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, Peru.

CVU: Colección Vargas Ugarte, Lima, Peru.

HAHR: Hispanic American Historical Review.

CHAPTER I

ÁLVAREZ AND THE AFTERMATH OF INDIAN REBELLION

The Túpac Amaru rebellion was a tragic result of the increased pressures created by the economic depression and political corruption of eighteenth-century Peru. The three-year upheaval which began in 1780 and extended beyond the boundaries of the viceroyalty had been preceded by several natural disasters of major proportions. Programs of imperial reform and reorganization further intensified the distress by depriving the viceroyalty of resources which might have enabled it to recover.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Peruvian prosperity had been based upon its abundant production of silver. By the eighteenth century, the cost of mining and refining silver in the viceroyalty had risen dramatically because of the exhaustion of the richest and most easily worked silver deposits and the inability of the Huancavelica mercury mine to supply the needs of Peruvian refiners.[1] Furthermore, epidemics to which the Indian population was especially susceptible brought a significant decrease in the size of the labor pool. Spanish entrepreneurs who were unable to realize sufficient profit habitually tended to minimize their losses by more thorough exploitation of Indian labor.

The 1760's and 1770's saw dramatic administrative reforms implemented on an empire-wide basis. Among them was José de Gálvez's visitation of Mexico in the late sixties.[2] This served as a prelude to colony-wide political and administrative reforms. In 1776, the viceroy-

alty of Rio de la Plata was created out of territory formerly under the jurisdiction of the Peruvian viceroy. In 1778, a number of Spanish-American ports were opened to direct trade with the peninsula. Antonio de Areche, who had assisted Gálvez in Mexico, began a comparable visitation of Peru in 1777.

These measures intensified rather than alleviated the crisis in Peru. The establishment of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata deprived it of an area which was an integral part of its geographical, political and economic system. The loss of Alto Peru was most deeply felt because it shifted the rich markets of the silver mining region to the orbit of Buenos Aires, thus destroying the trade monopoly held by the Lima merchant consulado for two centuries. This disruption was made more telling by a viceregal order forbidding merchants in the Altiplano to satisfy trade debts contracted with Peruvian suppliers in unminted silver. Since coinage was in short supply, wholesale merchants in Lima and producers of textile and agricultural commodities in Arequipa and Cuzco were significantly handicapped in competition with their newly created eastern rival.[3)]

As the Peruvian merchant community struggled to adjust to these unfavorable conditions, Antonio de Areche arrived to begin the official visitation of the viceroyalty. He addressed himself to the tasks of replacing government corruption with honest, efficient administration and of augmenting crown revenue. He proposed to achieve this latter objective by raising taxes and improving the methods by which they were collected. This proved more than the hardpressed viceroyalty could bear. Tax riots broke out in several Peruvian cities. Among the first to protest was Arequipa, where members of all classes participated in the up-

rising. The disturbances registered there and elsewhere were serious enough to persuade Areche to temporarily rescind the most offensive aspects of his fiscal program.[4]

The Spanish colonial system drew off the wealth produced by the Indians by taxation and by other devices as well. Principal among these were the repartimiento,[5] or compulsory purchase of goods at artificially high prices, and the mita, or levy of conscript labor, which provided manpower for a wide variety of essential projects. To this control of the Indian's earnings and productive capacity, the Spanish colonists added usurpation of much of the land legally owned by Indian communities and individuals. As conditions worsened, the margin left to the native population for survival became less and less adequate and tensions increased proportionally.

The year 1780 opened with the urban, creole tax riots and closed with the outbreak of the massive Indian rebellion led by Túpac Amaru. The movement, centered in the province of Cuzco, began with the execution of a corregidor who had amassed a fortune in the repartimiento trade with the Indians. It rapidly spread north, south and east, to the city of Cuzco, into neighboring districts of the province of Arequipa,[6] and into the Altiplano. Before it was finally quelled in 1783, it had touched off disturbances in all three viceroyalties of Spanish South America. Villages, fields, farms, textile factories, government offices and other such facilities in its path were destroyed. Casualties from the battlefield, disease and starvation were extremely heavy. The overall condition of the viceroyalty had never been worse.

Although the movement was brutally suppressed, the Indians' grievances were given serious consideration by the Spanish colonial ministry.

Within a month of the outbreak of the rebellion, repartimientos had been banned by viceregal edict. In 1784, complaints about the tyranny and corruption of the inadequately salaried corregidores were met with the establishment of the intendancy system throughout Peru.[7] Its top-ranking officials were selected with greater care, paid at a level commensurate with their responsibilities, and forbidden to engage in trade. They were equipped with new powers and prerogatives and charged with implementing the government's program of reform and reconstruction.

The Indies Ministry limited its efforts to rectifying obvious abuses. None of the reforms undertaken aimed at basic revision of the colonial system or hierarchy. Spain continued to demand that the Indian accept his status as vassal and his obligation to pay his taxes and participate actively in the imperial economy. It made the intendants directly responsible for preventing widespread recurrence of the excesses which had provoked the rebellion and for returning the Indians to a state of political and economic reliability. The manner in which Arequipa's first intendant worked to achieve these government objectives with regard to the Indian will be discussed in this chapter. His interactions with the Spanish colonial population and his efforts to promote provincial prosperity are treated in the next.

Antonio Álvarez y Jiménez was the first appointee to receive royal confirmation as intendant of Arequipa. It was not until November of 1785 that he took over the government of the province from Jorge Menéndez Escalada who had filled the office on a provisional basis.[8] Although born in Spain, probably in the province of Galicia,[9] Álvarez spent a considerable portion of his youth in Lima, where he had perhaps resided with a merchant uncle.[10] There, as álferez or standard bearer of the

Lima Battalion of Commerce, he began a military career which took him back to Spain, and then to active service in North Africa. He later travelled to Buenos Aires with the Cevallos expedition in 1776, and then returned to Spain once again. He participated in the attack on Gibraltar, mounted after Spain entered the war against Great Britain in 1779. Subsequently, he was assigned to the garrison in Ceuta.[11]

Álvarez had indicated his interest in parlaying his distinguished military service into an appointment to a Peruvian corregimiento as early as 1775.[12] This, when considered in conjunction with his family's mercantile interests, suggests that he may have hoped to use his position to provide his relatives with a trade monopoly within his jurisdiction. His appointment to the Peruvian bureaucracy came only after the establishment of the intendancy system, which strictly forbade governors to trade as the corregidores had. Despite this new regulation, Álvarez accepted his appointment and seems never to have been accused of participation in illegal mercantile activity in the course of his ten years in office.

Throughout his years as governor, Álvarez demonstrated organizational and leadership ability, a commitment to effective administration, an understanding of the needs of the business community, and awareness of current scientific and economic thought. Precisely how he developed his capacities along these lines is difficult to say, for no information on his education has come down to us. His career in Arequipa and the lengthy accounts of his visitations of various districts of his province show the influence, direct or indirect, of Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, two young naval officers who had visited the viceroyalty earlier in the century. Álvarez may well have read their well-known Voyage to

South America, published in Spanish in 1748 and widely appreciated for its careful attention to the details of geography, flora and fauna of the New World and for its insightful descriptions of life in the major cities of Caribbean and Pacific South America.[13]

It is also possible that Álvarez's first period of residence in Peru coincided with Ulloa's controversial administration as governor of Huancavelica (1758-1764). Prior to his appointment as intendant of Arequipa, before he made his last trip from Spain to the New World, Álvarez may also have been given access to the top-secret Discourse and Political Reflections on the Present State of the Peruvian Realms written by Juan and Ulloa and subsequently famous as the Noticias Secretas. Whatever the manner of contact, Álvarez's performance as intendant of Arequipa comes into more meaningful perspective when considered in the light of the criticisms leveled by these two young officers against the colonial administration of Peru.

The Intendancy Ordinance required that all intendants make visitas or inspection tours of their provinces.[14] These aimed to extend the visitation made on the viceregal level by Areche and his successor, Jorge Escobedo, to reach the most isolated and remote villages in the hinterland. Although the demands of the law were impossible to fulfill, Álvarez made a heavy investment of time, resources and personal energy to comply to the best of his ability.

The law required intendants to systematically inventory local resources which could be useful to developing the imperial economy. Álvarez collected copious data on local geography, agricultural production, industrial and commercial activities and labor force. The material he gathered was so extensive that the colonial ministry in Madrid found it impossible

to digest.[15] It is likely that it was more useful to provincial businessmen than to imperial planners.

A more important objective of these visitations was assertion of control by the central government over remote pueblos and doctrinas[16] previously beyond the orbit of its influence. Since most doctrinas in the province of Arequipa had a mixed population of Spanish and Indians, Álvarez was required to investigate how the government of each of the two communities operated and how the local ecclesiastical establishment met the area's spiritual needs. He checked carefully to insure that the Spanish alcalde kept the peace, administered justice impartially, and supervised the meetings of the local Indian cabildo or council. He inquired as to whether the cura was physically present to assist parishioners in need of his ministrations, whether he spent the required time instructing the parishioners in Christian doctrine, whether he charged excessive fees for his services, and whether he maintained church property in good condition. He investigated whether or not any local official was using his position for personal profit rather than in the public interest.

The visitation also concerned itself with the sensitive matter of collection of tribute, the tax to which all adult, male Indians were liable. Álvarez attempted to insure that Indians could and did pay their tribute, that they were not overcharged by local collectors, and that the money taken from them ultimately found its way into the royal treasury, and not into the pockets of dishonest officials. Over-collection of tribute had been a major grievance of the rebellious Indians. The mechanisms devised by the general visitation and administered by the intendants did much to increase government revenue and eliminate exploita-

tion of the Indians.[17]

Álvarez also made a thorough-going attempt to hispanize the operation of the Indian communities as required by law. Some of its provisions, like that requiring all Indians who held office to be Spanish-speaking, were largely unenforceable. The intendant was more successful in organizing the erection or repair of the facilities which the law mandated for Indian communities. These were a cabildo room, a securely locked cabinet to house the records of its deliberations and the funds at its disposal, a prison,[18] and a school, of which more will be said below. When these basics had been attended to, he also issued regulations for the upkeep of the central plaza, streets, the water system and private dwellings. The overall purpose of the legislation and Álvarez's implementation of it was to make the Indian communities supervisable and functioning entities in the Spanish political and economic system.

Since the bulk of the revenues which would finance education and public works for the Indian communities came from the rent derived from communal land, Álvarez was forced to confront the touchy problem of establishing the validity of land titles. During the immediate post-conquest period, land grants were made to reward Spaniards who had participated in the conquest of the Inca Empire. At this same time, lands were also specifically reserved for the Indian communities. In subsequent years, continued Spanish immigration and undiminished land hunger put constant pressure on the acreage allotted to the numerically diminished Indian population. Many choice plots came to be illegally held by Spaniards. The crown's periodic fiscal crises and its desire to regularize titles led to a series of legalizations of de facto possession, called composiciones de tierras, whereby upon payment of a fee to the royal exche-

quer, title was issued to those who applied for it.[19] Landholders without proper title usually took advantage of the procedure since it removed the threat of expropriation.

The composiciones de tierras did not keep pace with the usurpation of lands. Disputed claims caused continual problems of many sorts. To respond to this situation, Álvarez proposed a comprehensive resurvey throughout the province and petitioned the superior government to allocate funds to pay the salaries of personnel to do the necessary field and legal work.[20] Viceroy Croix commended Álvarez's zeal but rejected the proposal out of hand. Although he admitted both the existence of the abuses detailed by Álvarez and their relation to continued Indian unrest, he stated that the problem was beyond solution with the means at hand. Croix ordered Álvarez to confine himself to remedying those abuses which his present means empowered him to handle and told him firmly to leave the rest alone.[21] This meant that Álvarez was free to redistribute land within the Indian community by reclaiming those lands held without title or under glaringly fraudulent pretexts. All disputed titles likely to involve the state in protracted litigation were to be left unchallenged.

Among the Indian lands most vulnerable to Spanish greed were those originally allotted to the Indian communities to guarantee each tribute-paying Indian acreage sufficient to support his family and to enable him to pay his taxes.[22] This total amount of land remained fixed, while the population, and hence the demand for it, might either rise or fall. In the event of a land surplus, excess acreage was not divided as a bonus among individual members of the community. It was, rather, rented for a fixed annual sum, the amount varying in proportion to the land's

usefulness. Income from such transactions became bienes de comunidad, the property of the Indian community as a whole. The law set the uses to which this money might or might not be put. More often than not, if the rent had actually been collected, the funds were misappropriated, frequently by the Indian caciques, who treated them as personal property.

Lessees of such land were usually either local Spaniards or members of the power structure of the Indian community. The average Indian found it difficult to raise sufficient cash to pay his tribute and would almost never have been able to amass enough extra to allow him to make a capital investment.[23] Tenants frequently acquired control of such Indian lands by nonpayment of rent coupled with continued possession. The Indian community, if it tried at all, was usually unable either to obtain payment, evict a tenant in arrears, or enlist the support of the judicial system on its behalf. It was likewise unable to repossess itself of lands thus alienated, even when the number of tribute-paying Indians had increased beyond the number of parcels for distribution.

There was hardly a district visited by Álvarez in which lands effectively alienated from the Indian community were not "discovered" in the course of judicial inquiry. Although culprits frequently came forward with a tale of woe or hardship, Álvarez usually gave them no choice but to pay at least some of the back rent and promise punctual fulfillment of their obligations in the future. In this manner, Álvarez restored to the Indian community the rent produced by lands which would otherwise have been completely lost to it. Almost never, however, did he evict a tenant from the land he occupied.

Álvarez's diligence on behalf of the Indian community was tempered by compassion for the Spaniards unsettled by the investigation, whom he

frequently depicted as poor and honest and as productive users of the land they occupied. The Indian lands most vulnerable to Spanish take-over were in areas where the climate was benign, or where fertility or the availability of water or transportation made them attractive. Spaniards were not yet to the point of contesting with the Indians for possession of the cold, windy, sterile heights of the sierras unless drawn to such areas by mining prospects. The intendant seemed somewhat oblivious to such considerations when he compared Indian productivity unfavorably with Spanish and then implicitly used the argument to favor continued Spanish control of lands initially allotted to the Indian communities.

Croix's orders and the productivity advantage of leaving Indian lands in the hands of Spanish tenants only partially explain Álvarez's willingness to overlook the legal right of Indian tribute payers to hold a specified amount of land. Álvarez regularly dispossessed individual Indians of parcels they had obtained in excess of their quota if they could not show title. He sympathized with Indians who did not receive plots and expressed concern for making tribute payment less burdensome. What was certain, before and after the implantation of the intendancy system, was that the Indians would be made to pay their taxes, at whatever cost to themselves. Given the option of easing the burden of tributaries by making available to each the land to which he was entitled or of leaving Indian lands in the possession of Spaniards who would pay rent to the Indian treasuries, Álvarez unhesitatingly chose the latter.

Álvarez's efforts to establish the bienes de comunidad dated from the earliest days of his administration.[25] Since there were many other pressing political and economic problems facing the province, it is at

first glance surprising that he attached so much importance to the project. His reasons become clearer on consideration of the purposes for which the funds were used, and in the light of the trauma of the Indian rebellion of the early 1780's.

The rebellion was convincing evidence of the need to reforge the theoretical bonds of vassalage between the Spanish monarch and the Indians he had pledged to Christianize and civilize. In the sentence which condemned Túpac Amaru to brutal execution, the government announced its intention to wipe out all memory of the Inca past, and to use education in Spanish culture and religion as the preferred means of achieving this objective. As it banned the reading of Garcilaso de la Vega's Royal Commentaries of the Incas, the performance of traditional Indian ceremonials and the use of Indian costume, it also reiterated its determination that the Indians learn Spanish.[26]

No clearer statement of its reasons for so doing can be found than in the decree of May 10, 1770. This specified that the Indians be taught the language of their monarchs and conquerors so that they could receive religious instruction, learn to read and write, so that administration and spiritual care of them would be easier, and so that they would come to love the conquering nation, abandon idolatry, and be civilized for trade and commerce.[27] With all memory of the Inca past obliterated, Spain would have less reason to fear rebellion.

While Álvarez regularly made the necessary provisions for both cabildo room and prison, he almost always, with the agreement of the Indian leaders, allocated the bulk, if not the totality, of the community funds for a schoolbuilding and a salary for a schoolmaster. The teacher was required by law to be a Spaniard who was religious, upright in con-

duct, and a lay person rather than a cleric. He was obliged to promise punctual and devoted fulfillment of his duties and to provide all necessary school supplies at no charge to the parents of the children attending. His stipend varied in proportion to the means of the Indian community and took the form either of payment in cash or the grant of topos from the "surplus" of the Indian commons. The latter involved a real sacrifice in any community where land was in short supply since it transferred yet another parcel of land to a non-member.[28]

Álvarez's success in recovering property which the Indians could identify as having been usurped was, certainly, a victory for justice, whatever the use to which the funds it generated was put. His mention of the gratitude with which the Indians received his program is, no doubt, reasonably accurate, given the treatment to which they had been accustomed. This should not obscure the hardship such alienation of land entailed for the Indians, their inability to reject the intendant's allocation of their funds, or the government's overriding interest in promoting Indian subservience.

The program amounted to forced allocation of almost the entire budget of any given Indian community to funding its education in submission to the Spanish government. The curriculum which the law required was designed to mold the community into loyal and Christian vassals of the Spanish king and can properly be called indoctrination. The use of laymen rather than religious to staff the schools reflects the government's suspicion that the regular orders had not always fulfilled their missionary obligations in a way that insured their converts' ability to use the Spanish language or guaranteed their subservience to the crown.

The role education was expected to play in improvement of the condition of the Indian was a very limited one. In a hierarchical society such as Spain, the Indians, like every other group, were assigned a series of privileges and concomitant restrictions which defined them as a legal entity. Eighteenth century Spanish reform offered no real challenge to the definition arrived at shortly after the conquest.[29] What today would be called upward mobility was achieved more frequently by marriage into a superior group than by means of an education which would enable the Indian to rival the Spaniard. Although there were attempts made to educate some members of the Indian elite for the priesthood and subsequent service in Indian communities, very few Indians took orders during the colonial period.[30] The government did not intend that the education to be provided in the community-funded schools would be a means of opening the doors of the Spanish world to the Indian community, which, like the Negro and mulatto, was effectively barred from holding prestigious positions and from professional careers in law and medicine.[31] While Álvarez observed with pleasure that certain Indians were completely "Castilianized", his satisfaction came principally from being able to conduct the <u>visita</u> without an interpreter. This was the type of achievement, an increased governability, that the schools for Indians were designed to produce.

Álvarez's concern for establishing and safeguarding the Indian <u>bienes de comunidad</u> did not, thus, devolve from a plan formulated by Spanish reformers to insure the financial solvency and political effectiveness of the Indian communities. Such a policy would have been unthinkable in the wake of a massive Indian rebellion. The efforts to establish community treasuries and the decision to leave Indian lands

in the possession of Spaniards who would pay rent for them were dictated by government determination to enforce its hundred-year-old policy of hispanizing the Indian population. The urgency with which Spain worked to provide village schools for every district in the viceroyalty was clearly derived from a keen sense of the need to eliminate resistance to the theory and practice of Spanish imperialism.

In the aftermath of the Túpac Amaru rebellion the government had not only to cope with the Indian challenge to its political administration, it had to face the underlying economic dilemmas as well. Here the Indian protest of gross exploitation had to be weighed against the colonists' continued demand for labor and markets, and the government's own desire to draw greater revenue from the viceroyalty and to enlarge its market for peninsular goods. Spain's desire to regain effective political control over the viceroyalty was closely related to its goal of integrating all the economic resources under its jurisdiction into a more rational and profitable imperial system.

Neither the Spanish government nor the colonists had ever been willing to rest content with voluntary Indian participation in the imperial economy. The desire to insure maximum profitability had expressed itself in systems of forced labor and forced consumption, the mita and the repartimiento. Although the latter had been abolished in December of 1780, and the largest and most oppressive mitas suspended, the systems were too ingrained to be terminated by decree. The inadequate salaries paid to subdelegates, those officials of the intendancy system whose jurisdiction most closely paralleled that of the corregidores, insured that they would attempt to use their positions for personal advantage as their predecessors had done.[32] Álvarez encountered

several such instances in the course of his administration. Miners in the districts of Condesuyos and Moquegua, whose works were isolated from supplies of necessary food and clothing, also monopolized sales and marketed goods to workers at prices which Álvarez felt compelled to lower.[33] Such reappearances of repartimientos made the system seem irrepressible. Anxiety both about the possibility of renewed rebellion and about the state of the viceregal economy prompted Escobedo, the principal architect of the Peruvian intendancy system, to propose a modified, controlled reintroduction of repartimientos under the name socorros.[34]

Escobedo's plan encountered obstacles and was finally rejected by the crown. Seven years later, despite this rejection, Álvarez proposed a system of socorros for the province of Arequipa, limited, in the types of goods to be supplied, to iron, mules, and clothing. He then stated that the Indians should be obliged to satisfy the debts so contracted by work in the mines or in industries which lacked the necessary laborers. This, he projected, would bring the Indians "advantages and greater commodities" and promote the prosperity of the entire provincial economy.[35]

Since Álvarez had commented earlier in his Noticia on the prosperity of agriculture and the domestic textile industry,[36] and since he regularly described the Indians in the various doctrinas he visited as industrious, his motivation cannot have been simple stimulation of Indian productivity. We must look to the section of his plan which prescribed that Indians satisfy their debts by work in the mines or other industries in need of labor for explanation. This suggests that Álvarez had decided to use the mechanism of debt to transfer Indians from their preferred occupations to areas of greater interest to Spanish entrepreneurs. It

is also possible that organization of a provincial system of *socorros* would redirect trade in the three commodities from sources it had found in a free-market situation to merchants that provincial interests wished to favor. Álvarez's plan, like Escobedo's, failed to win approval.

In his visitations, Álvarez encountered numerous instances of misuse of Indian labor by local officials. It was common practice for *alcaldes*, *curas*, and caciques to have individuals and groups, called *pongos*, *mitayos*, or *faenas*, perform agricultural tasks and domestic, messenger or transport service. If the officials paid at all, they gave only some scanty rations of food, drink and coca. The Indian workers, however, were expected to supply their own tools and beasts of burden, and to work at the time determined by the official served, even if this meant neglecting their own crops at crucial times.

There was no *doctrina* visited by Álvarez in which some of these exactions of unpaid labor were not practiced despite their illegality. He left behind him a trail of injunctions ordering officials to pay the workers employed the going daily wage. There was no move whatever to allow the Indian community to unconditionally refuse the labor demands made on it by such officials.[37] The assumption remained that the *alcalde* or the *cura*, by virtue of their status, had a right to have their labor needs met without any question of the liberty or convenience of the individual Indian being raised. This is in no way surprising, given the labor system to which the Indians had been accustomed under Inca rule, a system which the Spaniards had been only too willing to continue.

Other factors opposed to change were the Spaniards' image, often contrary to fact, of the Indian as lazy, unwilling to work unless com-

pelled, and the presumption that it was the Indian's obligation, as an Indian, to perform the types of labor considered proper to him. Less apparent, but nonetheless real, was the unwillingness of officials to compete for labor in a situation of labor shortage resulting from the decline of the Indian population. Contemporary abhorence of idleness was born of the demand for an increased population of workers and consumers. The drive to stimulate provincial and imperial prosperity reinforced any defensible or quasi-defensible means of compelling the supposedly unindustrious Indian to work.

One of the institutions considered most oppressive by the Indians and acknowledged as such by the Spanish was the mita, especially the mita for mines. This most dreaded form took the Indians far from their homes to work from which they emerged in broken health if at all, or bound by debt to mine operators and thus unable to leave when their legal term of service had been completed. The Spanish government had been unable to overcome the resistance of the mining establishment to abolition of the mita, and had let the institution stand while reiterating century-old promises to the Indians to enforce the safeguards long built into the corpus of mita legislation. Although mining activity was widespread in the province of Arequipa, and the total production was of some significance, the works never achieved the size or importance of Huancavelica or Potosi, and the mita did not play a major role in supplying labor for Arequipeñan mines.[38]

The most common mitas in the Inca period had been those which provided labor for public works projects. Such levies were also continued after the Spanish conquest. Indian labor thus organized was used in the construction of many if not most of the post-conquest public buildings

and in the provision of other services that were considered public. Given the vehement protest of the mining mita made by the Indians during the Túpac Amaru rebellion, it might be expected that the colonial administration, at a time when its relations with the Indian community were still sensitive, would not wish to risk reawakening the resentment by establishing new mitas, even in areas outside of mining.

Surprisingly, and perhaps because the mita does not seem to have been previously operative in the district of Moquegua, Álvarez did not hesitate to institute one there in the course of his visitation of the town of Moquegua, the urban center of the wealthy wineproducers of the area and of the outlying doctrinas of Torata and Carumas. Situated in a seasonally hot river valley, the town's demand for cooling drinks and refrigeration was considerable. Whether to win favor with the local elite or for whatever other reason, Álvarez committed himself to make arrangements with the sierra Indians to supply snow to the town of Moquegua in amounts to be determined by the Moqueguan subdelegate, at the price the market would bear. True to mita tradition, the responsibility for supply of the snow was to be rotated between the two doctrinas, which were to make whatever arrangements they saw fit with individual Indians.[39]

Álvarez's own description of travel between Moquegua and the two doctrinas describes the journey as burdensome.[40] It would be even more so for an Indian with a perishable load of snow to transport. It may be surmised that the Indians had not previously taken up the snow trade because they had not wished to, and not because they did not recognize its commercial possibilities. The willingness of the Indian cabildos to agree to the arrangements proposed by Álvarez cannot be taken for

anything more than their inability to refuse. Álvarez had also underscored the mitigating effect of rotation, the attractiveness of sale at market price and the possibility of income from which tribute could be paid and families supported.

While the agreement may have had something advantageous in it for both the Spanish town and the sierra Indians, it cannot be doubted that it would work out in a way disporportionally favorable to the former at the expense of the latter. Market price was more likely to be set by the Spaniard with time on his hands than determined by the Indian who had made it. If this consideration escaped Álvarez, it ought not to have. It is also difficult to believe that Álvarez thought his subdelegate would be willing or able to insure fair price to the Indian suppliers of snow. In the event that the Indian communities had complaints which the subdelegate was unwilling or unable to rectify, they could petition Álvarez for redress of grievances. Such a procedure would only be worth the time, expense and energy involved if grave abuses were the issue.

The advantages which the arrangement appeared to offer no doubt seemed considerable to Álvarez. One of his abiding preoccupations was to insure that the Indians paid their tribute. To enable poor doctrinas to make payment in cash was, thus, a certain gain for both the intendant and, in his mind, for the Indians as well. The additional attraction of making the Indians "productive" by Spanish standards accorded with the wishes of the government, the dictates of eighteenth-century economists, and traditional Spanish aspirations.

In the balance, Álvarez's determination to attend to the well-being and comfort of the Moqueguan aristocracy is more apparent than his con-

cern for the Indian. Hierarchical and colonial society insisted that men be both enabled and required to live in a manner befitting their state. It was legal to coerce Indians to do "Indian" work, and this is precisely what Álvarez did, surrounding his arrangement with the traditional legal safeguards for the Indians which had been traditionally ineffective. Where the Indian community had a clear grievance and law on its side, Álvarez took judicial action to provide redress. What Spanish law granted to Spaniards, Álvarez protected with equal or greater force. He was empowered to do no differently and gave no evidence of desire to do so.

Álvarez's arrangement of the snow mita is not an isolated instance of his initiation of projects to be carried out by labor levies. He also ordered various faenas, or temporary labor conscriptions, for various public works projects. These included the building or repair of the cabildo room, the school or prison, and the maintenance of the province's roads.[41] Although he ordered Spaniards to share the work on roads and bridges with the Indians, it is unlikely that they did so. This burden, if Álvarez's orders were complied with at all, would have been especially heavy on the Indian community because of the difficulty of the terrain over which passage had to be maintained. While these facilities benefitted both the Indian and Spanish sectors of the population, the manner in which they were erected violated the Indians' economic liberty and constituted yet another form of taxation on an already overtaxed group. Spanish commerce certainly derived more benefit from improved communications than did the Indians whose labor was conscripted.

In conclusion, it becomes apparent that, in bargaining for the reintegration of the Indian community into the Spanish Empire, Álvarez made

the smallest possible offers to the Indian community. He strove to eliminate only those gross abuses whose continued presence would be likely to provoke renewed rebellion. Through his program of establishing village schools, he made an agressive attempt to eradicate Indian languages and culture and to inculcate an attitude of submission to authority. Spanish priorities continued to set the limits of the Indian's freedom to choose employment and disburse income. Neither the Indian rebellion nor the establishment of the intendancy system had effected any basic change in the Indian's status within the Spanish Empire.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. See D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru," HAHR 52 (November, 1972): 563-569, and Arthur Preston Whitaker, The Huancavelica Mercury Mine (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), pp. 57-69.

2. The history of the Gálvez visitation is traced by Herbert Ingram Priestley in his José de Gálvez, Visitor General of New Spain (Berkeley, 1916).

3. Guillermo Cespedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, Repercusiones económicas y políticas de la creación del Virreinato del Plata (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1947), pp. 118-119.

4. Boleslao Lewin, La Rebelión de Tupac Amaru y los Origines de la Emancipácion Americana (Buenos Aires, 1957), pp. 156-166, and J. R. Fisher, Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System, 1784-1814 (London: The Athlone Press, 1970), pp. 18-19.

5. The system typically worked in the following way. The appointee to a corregimiento in the New World was obliged to pay the cost of his transatlantic journey and to post a large bond for the crown revenues it was his duty to collect. He usually lacked the personal means to fulfill these obligations and frequently turned to a merchant for a loan of the necessary amount. In return for the loan made, the merchant obtained a monopoly on the supply of all goods to the Indian population of the corregimiento. The corregidor used his powers of office to collect payment from the Indians at a rate high enough to recoup his indebtedness to his merchant partner and to insure both parties a handsome profit on the commercial transactions. Salaries paid by the crown to the corregidores were grossly inadequate and the entire attractiveness of the appointment was based on the possibility of earning huge profits from the repartimiento trade by exploitation of the Indian population. For a detailed and masterful treatment of the operation of the system, see Brian Hamnett, Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico, 1750-1821 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

6. Lewin, pp. 596-597.

7. J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 26-28.

8. Jorge Escobedo, Areche's successor as Visitor General of Peru, had named him intendant of Arequipa, but the appointment was not confirmed by the crown. See ibid., pp. 37, 38, 245.

9. Santiago Martínez, Gobernadores de Arequipa colonial (Arequipa: Tip. Cuadros, 1930), pp. 192-193.

10. Antonio was not the only member of his family resident in Peru. His brother, Raimundo, is known to have lived in Lima with a maternal uncle. Both brother and uncle were merchants trading in the goods of Castile. Raimundo served the province of Arequipa in the subdelegacies

of Arica and Moquegua. See the "Informe" on Raimundo Álvarez y Jiménez, Interim Subdelegate of Arica, April 5, 1787, and Álvarez to Gálvez, April 21, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 646.

11. Álvarez to the King, February 21, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 646.

12. Ibid.

13. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South America, with an Introduction by Irving A. Leonard (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 12.

14. Lillian E. Fisher, The Intendant System in Spanish America (New York: Gordian Press, 1969), pp. 117-118.

15. See Escobedo to Menéndez Escalada, October 4, 1784, AGI, Lima, leg. 1098, and Álvarez to Escobedo, May 8, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 646. Records of Álvarez's visitations fill the first three volumes of Victor M. Barriga's Memorias para la historia de Arequipa, vols. 1-3: Relaciones de la visita del intendente de Arequipa don Antonio Álvarez y Jiménez. Vol. 4 of this series contains the Memoria de la Santa Iglesia de Arequipa de D. D. Francisco Xavier Echeverría y Morales, Documentos, Memoria del Monasterio de Carmelitas de D. D. Francisco Xavier Echeverría y Morales (Arequipa: La Colmena, 1941-1952). See also J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 161-163.

16. The province was divided into seven partidos or districts, and subdivided into approximately sixty-eight doctrinas. The doctrina was a parish in the extended sense of the term, a unit often the size of a county. Many doctrinas were far too large to be adequately served by one or two priests. Álvarez visited the principal village in the doctrina and summoned all residents of outlying pueblos to come there to give testimony or make complaints about matters pertinent to the visitation.

17. J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 111-114, 256.

18. The prison, even in villages of mixed Spanish and Indian population, seems to have been considered a responsibility of the Indian sector. Spaniards who were imprisoned were given separate quarters but paid an extra tax. See Lillian Fisher, pp. 110, 111, 122, 128-129, 144, and Álvarez, Visita of Torata, "Causa de Justicia", November 5, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 and Barriga, Memorias, 2: 194-195.

19. For a discussion of the history of composiciones de tierras in Peru, see Thomas R. Ford, Man and Land in Peru (Florida, 1955), pp. 36-38.

20. Álvarez to Escobedo, May 8, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 646.

21. See ibid., Croix to Escobedo, July 11, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 646; Álvarez to Escobedo, January 30, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 806, Álvarez, Noticia, AGI, Libros Manuscritos 44, 25r-26r (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 33-34),

and Manuel A. Fuentes, (ed.) Memorias de los virreyes que han gobernado el Perú, 6 vols. (Lima: F. Bailly, 1859), vol. 5, Croix, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 91-95.

Álvarez did not give a title to the document contained in AGI, Lib. Mss. 44, although he refers to it as a "noticia". Its form is that of a relación or memoria de gobierno. It will hereafter be referred to as Álvarez, Noticia. Barriga published much, but not all, of this document in Memorias, 1. Since this is more accessible than the manuscript version, references to the manuscript will be followed, when possible, by references to the printed version.

22. Although three topos of land was the usual allotment, more or less might be given depending on the land's productivity. No satisfactory equivalent of the Arequipeñan topo has been found.

23. If land rent is an indication of the land's ability to produce beyond the requirements of subsistence, it seems likely than an Indian would be unable to make his tribute payment from three topos let alone save for an additional investment in more acreage. Lands in the district of Condesuyos were usually rented for slightly less than three pesos per topo annually and never more. Indians in the district paid a tribute of nine pesos annually. Figures for land rent in the district of Condesuyos can be found in the various "Causas de Hacienda" in Álvarez's relaciones de visita. AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2).

24. The total amount of land was not redivided equally among the total number of tribute payers. See Álvarez, Visita of Torata, "Causa de Hacienda," November 7, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 198-204).

25. See Álvarez, Noticia, Charts "Manifiestanse los fondos de Bienes de Comunidad" 35v; and "Demuestranse las Escuelas establecidas para enseñanza de los Jobenes Españoles, y Naturales: sus dotaciones..." 39r, and 36r-38v (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 45-48; and Escobedo to Álvarez, December 31, 1785, AGI, Lima, leg. 646.

26. See Manuel de Odriozola, (ed.), Documentos Historicos del Peru en las Epocas del Coloniaje Despues de la Conquista y de la Independencia hasta la presente, 10 vols. (Lima, 1863-1879), 1: 158-159, and Richard Konetzke, Coleccion de Documentos para la Historia de la Formacion social de Hispanoamerica, 1493-1810, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1958-1962), 3: 364-368, 752-753.

27. Konetzke, 3: 364.

28. In Torata, where Indian lands were insufficient to provide tributaries with the allotment to which they were legally entitled, Álvarez granted five topos of land to the schoolmaster. See Álvarez, Visita of Torata, "Causa de Real Hacienda", November 7, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 199-200), and Álvarez to the Alcalde Ordinario of Torata (Antonio Marcelino Cornejo) and the Cabildo of Indians, November 12, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805.

29. See Jean Sarrailh, L'Espagne Eclairée de la second moitié du XVIII^e siécle. (Paris: Klincksieck, 1964), pp. 508-512, and Leon G. Campbell, "Racism without Race: Ethnic Group Relations in Late Colonial Peru" Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 3 (Cleveland and London: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973), 323-333.

30. See Ruben Vargas Ugarte, Historia de la Iglesia en el Peru, 4 vols. (Lima, 1953-1966) 4: 218-219, and Konetzke, 3: 64-66.

31. The history of the issue of race versus social and occupational mobility is discussed at length in Konetzke, 3: 247, 265-266, 576-578, 821-829 among others. Pedro José Chávez de la Rosa, Bishop of Arequipa, mentioned that the material poverty of aspirants was as much of an impediment to an honorable career as were legal barriers. See Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32.

32. See Croix to Álvarez, March 18, 1786 and Escobedo to Álvarez, March 21, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 646; Álvarez, Visita of Torata, "Causa de Real Patronato," November 4, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 189), and J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 88-90.

33. Álvarez, Visita of Ubinas, Ychuña, Lloque, Querala, "Causa de Hacienda," December 16, 1791, and "Bando a las doctrinas de Ubinas, Ychuña, Lloque, Querala," December 17, 1791, and Account of the visita in the asiento of Orcopampa, July 26, 1790, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 82-87, 240, 245).

34. See Jorge Escobedo to Menéndez Escalada, "Instrucción Practica que para adoptar la Nueva Real Ordenanza de Intendencias," Items 50 and 54, October 4, 1784, AGI, Lima, leg. 1098, and J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 88-90.

35. Álvarez, Noticia, 90r-91r (Barriga, 1: 107-108).

36. Ibid., 43v-47v (Barriga, 1: 53-58).

37. This despite crown policy, or at least aspirations, to the contrary. In 1697, the city council of Arequipa had petitioned the crown for confirmation of several mitas, including one of two Indians per councilmember. The crown refused unconditionally on grounds that the mitas were hateful and opposed to the liberty of the Indians. See Konetzke, 3: 82-83.

38. The Cailloma mines were the only mines in the province to which mita labor was assigned. The district of Condesuyos was assessed for 29 men annually; the remainder came from the district of Cailloma. The deaths of more than 30 tribute payers (males) in Pampacolca, noted by Álvarez in his report of the visita, may possibly be related to this exaction. In Orcopampa, district of Condesuyos, Álvarez suspended an apparently spurious mita in favor of Martín de Vera Portocarrero on grounds that none of the Spaniards using the mita of three Indians per semester could produce title. Guantajaya was worked entirely by jornaleros as were the mines in Ychuña, Lloque, and Querala.
See Álvarez, Noticia, "Real Asiento de Guantajaya", 93r-95r, and

"Real Asiento de Caylloma", 95r-96v (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 110-111; 113-114), Álvarez, Visita of Pampacolca, "Causa de Hacienda, July 8, 1790, Account of the visita of Orcopampa, July 26, 1790, and Visita of Ubinas, Ychuña, Lloque, Querala, "Causa de Hacienda", December 16, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 37-43, 82-87, 234-242).

39. See Álvarez, Reglamentación de los pulperias para evitar abusos", October 5, 1791; Visita of Torata, "Causa de Policia", November 5, 1791; Visita of Carumas, "Causa de Policia", November 26, 1791 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 170-175, 195-198, 213), Álvarez to the Alcalde Ordinario de Españoles of Torata (A. M. Cornejo) and to the Indian Cabildo, November 8, 1791, and Álvarez to the Alcalde Ordinario of Carumas (T. Quintanilla) and to the Indian Cabildo, November 26, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805.

40. See Álvarez, Visita of Carumas, "Causa de Patronato," November 24, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 206). The journey from Moquegua to Carumas took two full days.

41. See, for instance, Álvarez, Visita of Chachas, "Causa de Policia", July 19, 1790 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 78-80), Álvarez to the doctrinas of Omate, Ubinas and Carumas, December 7, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805; and Álvarez to the Cura Vicario of Chiguata (Pablo Gomez), December 5, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 806.

CHAPTER II

THE AREQUIPEÑAN CAMPAIGN FOR PROSPERITY

The Indians of Arequipa were not the only ones who had reason for discontent with the peninsular government. The creole upper classes felt equally victimized by the dismal economic state of the viceroyalty and by their exclusion from a meaningful share in appointments to desirable bureaucratic positions. The establishment of the intendancy system in Peru in 1784 responded to the needs of both sectors of the population. To the Indians it offered at least a policy of separation of government from commerce. To the creoles, it held out the opportunity for placement in the new governmental hierarchy, usually at the rank of subdelegate, and promise of more efficient administration.

The Intendancy Ordinance was designed not only to reform the colonial bureaucracy but also to stimulate imperial prosperity.[1] Although Arequipa was geographically poised to take advantage of the new direction taken by imperial policy, it had first to recover from a major earthquake which struck on May 4, 1784. Tremors from the quake destroyed buildings in almost every population center in the province. Its aftershocks persisted for over a month.[2] In the time which elapsed between this event and the arrival of Intendant Álvarez late in 1785, little progress had been made in cleaning up the rubble and restoring normal life to the demolished city of Arequipa. Recovery from the catastrophe was complicated by two changes of civil government in the interlude. Government and church officials exacerbated the problem by disputing over management of relief and reconstruction efforts. These conflicts rapidly dissipated the initial surge of energy with which some had

responded to the crisis.[3]

Arequipa welcomed its new governor at a time when there was urgent and compelling need to rebuild the province at all levels. Álvarez was a man of intense energy and determination and apparently of some imagination as well. He had a vision of Arequipa's potential prosperity, a vision he shared with or derived from the Arequipeñan governing classes, whose support and cooperation he was most successful in enlisting.

Álvarez clearly understood the economic purposes behind the intendancy legislation. He went beyond this to a belief that promotion of the prosperity of his province was essential to rather than a threat to the prosperity of the empire as a whole. This belief was not shared by his superiors. The viceregal bureaucracy favored centralism and monopoly as basic approaches to solving the problems of colonial administration. There were inherent contradictions between this conceptual structure and the operation of the intendancy system that were never completely resolved.

The prosperity which Álvarez and the enterprising elements of the Arequipeñan population envisioned for the province went beyond the bounds of a good growth rate to the type of expansion which occurred in Buenos Aires after 1776. It is impossible to say where the perception of Arequipeñan potential originated. Álvarez had had the opportunity to witness the growth of Buenos Aires. He also had relatives in the Lima import trade who may have wished to shift their base of operations to Arequipa now that its major port, the city of Arica, was opened to direct trade with the peninsula. Creoles, of course, were as capable of interpreting the changed fortunes of the La Plata region as any peninsular

official. They were well aware that access to the Altiplano markets had been the oasis of Arica's early prosperity, and that loss of these markets was one reason for its present decay.[4] It is of more importance to realize that both the governor and the governed shared the conviction. While Álvarez managed the proposals and projects undertaken in the provincial interest, he enjoyed the continued and hearty support of the creole community.

No formal blueprint of a comprehensive plan has been discovered. Every major program sponsored by the intendant was consistent with aggressive development of Arequipeñan potential and was resisted by Lima as such. The scope of the plan is attested to by the proportions of the projects undertaken and the support they received from the creole population. The size of the government office complex planned for the provincial capital, actual removal of the city of Arica to a more advantageous site, and the establishment of a joint stock company to promote mining were major elements of the program. The willingness of towns and cities to tax themselves to pay for local improvements and to put pressure on religious establishments to invest the resources under their control in a manner consonant with promotion of provincial prosperity point clearly to general willingness to cooperate.[5]

The first step which had to be taken to set Arequipa on the road to recovery and prosperity was to bring it out from under the rubble which had been almost undisturbed since the earthquake of May, 1784. This Álvarez did with dispatch. He opened streets to normal traffic, ordered repair of the pipes which carried the water supply and set in motion the move to tear down what could not be salvaged and to rebuild what could.[6] One of the principal casualties of the quake was the public office "com-

plex" which housed the town hall and the royal treasury with its various departments. Álvarez proposed to rebuild it on a grand scale so that the municipal government, all treasury, mint and state monopoly offices located in the city, the post office, the prison, and the intendancy headquarters and residence, would be accomodated under one roof. He also planned to repair the main bridge which connected the city with its suburbs and to construct an alameda or public promenade along the river bank.[7]

In order to win Lima's approval for these projects, Álvarez had to explain how he planned to finance them. The viceregal government permitted the construction of the alameda, which the citizenry paid for by voluntary contributions. Álvarez proposed to raise the money needed for the two more costly projects, repair of the bridge and construction of government offices, by a one real increase on the half-real tax imposed on each fanega of guiñapo, the type of maize fermented to produce chicha, a beer-like beverage consumed in quantity by the lower classes.[8]

Both the tax and the construction project had to pass the Junta Superior de Real Hacienda, headed by Jorge Escobedo, formerly Visitador General and now Superintendent of the viceroyalty. Álvarez went to some lengths to justify the means chosen to finance the projects he obviously had very much at heart. The current imposition on guiñapo was farmed out annually for 3120 pesos, which made it the most productive of the city's three taxes. Álvarez described the proposed increase as a tax on vice, and expressed the hope that it would help control the excessive consumption of alcohol among the lower classes. He was probably certain, however, that consumption would not be greatly affected and that the increase would produce an excellent yield.

The moral advantage was not the only one Álvarez held out to his bureaucratic superiors. He proposed that the funds be used to build not only the facilities needed as headquarters for the city government, but also the many royal offices mentioned above. Álvarez had no doubt obtained the consent of the city government to pay for what was traditionally a royal responsibility because the town fathers hoped to rebuild on a scale capable of handling the increased volume of business projected for the provincial capital. The intendant portrayed this burst of municipal generosity as a return of a "loan" of funds made by the crown to the city for its defense during the Túpac Amaru rebellion, when city revenues were inadequate to meet the need. He held out the further possibility that the city would use any surplus which resulted from the increase to rebuild the churches damaged by the quake.[10] This, too, would have been commonly understood as municipal assumption of a royal responsibility.

Lines between royal and municipal obligations to pay for office space, defense, and repair of church property were frequently blurred.[11] Álvarez's plan unmistakably suggested that the city of Arequipa be allowed to assume royal responsibilities in return for increased financial independence. The time was not right for such a barter. The intendant's proposal was left pending by the authorities in Lima throughout his entire term of office. Municipal and royal offices continued to function in improvised and inadequate quarters. The bridge was finally repaired with funds obtained from investment of the city's small budget surplus.[12] Álvarez's successor in office completed a modest office complex, more in proportion with Lima's perception of Arequipa's importance.

Álvarez's record in managing the city's basic budget was more respec-

table. By dint of thorough investigation and much hard work he was aole to reestablish the city's claim to revenues and rents collected to the amount of 5642.5 pesos, a sum which was adequate, if barely so, to meet the city's ordinary needs. This was no mean achievement. The total budget controlled by all cabildos in the viceroyalty in 1787 was 54,491 pesos, and Arequipa's municipal revenue ranked second only to Lima's.[13]

Both Álvarez and the prominent creoles with whom he met in the course of his visitations recognized that active and effective municipal governments would be needed to direct and support the drive for a greater share of the profits from trade with the interior. When Álvarez visited the district capital of Moquegua, he stirred its previously ineffective council into meaningful activity. In his efforts to revitalize the once-bustling port of Arica, an important part of his program was reconstitution of its town council. When he found Chuquibamba, the capital of the district of Condesuyos, without a cabildo, he attempted to provide it with a municipal government proportioned to its size, but still capable of supervising the region's mining operations and the transport of goods to the densely populated neighboring province of Cuzco.

The town of Moquegua was the urban nucleus for the valley of the same name, which produced not only the wines and brandies for which it was famous, but also grains for fodder and human consumption. Álvarez conducted his usual exhaustive investigation of municipal finances, and was unable to unearth any evidence whatever that its government had ever had title to collect a public revenue. There was some explanation for this otherwise astounding result. Fire had destroyed the building which had housed the municipal archives. Those papers which survived the conflagration were in complete disarray because all three positions of

escribano or notary were effectively or actually vacant. The appearance of the town mirrored the reality. Its streets were disorderly, its principal church reduced to rubble by the earthquake, the prison was in serious disrepair, and the town hall nonexistant.[14] Everything seemed to suggest that the landed aristocracy who lived on the town's perimeter and moved with the season from one to another of their country holdings had no need for the services it might have offered.

Álvarez found it necessary to start at the very beginning. He called all of the prominent officials and citizens of Moquegua to meet in cabildo abierto to establish a revenue for the town. In the course of the meeting, he proposed that an arrangement whereby the local wine producers taxed themselves on an alternating basis to provide funds for the celebration of one of the local feasts be used as a formula for producing a public revenue. Accordingly, for that year only, every jug of wine produced was to be assessed one-half real, which, on the basis of available statistics, would generate an income of 15,607.6 pesos. He suggested that, from this total, 12,000 pesos be deducted and invested to provide an annual revenue of 600 pesos to meet the town's operating expenses. The remaining 3607 pesos were to be used to finance the immediate construction of badly needed public buildings, such as the town hall, prison, and offices for the scribes.

The winegrowers readily agreed to the proposal on condition that the wealthy grain growers of the area be made to contribute as well, also on a one-time basis, at the rate of four pesos for each topo of land used to raise alfalfa or grain. This money was to be added to the building fund and any surplus invested to produce additional annual revenue for the town. In the course of the meeting, various town properties and

funds lent at interest were also identified and provisions made to insure that the revenues they generated would be collected and incorporated into the municipal treasury.

The total revenue approved by the cabildo abierto shows not only the wealth at the disposal of the local landed aristocracy but their eagerness to put the town back on its feet, their expectation of deriving benefit from it and their optimism about the future. Those who attended the meeting expressed great satisfaction with the results achieved. Álvarez closed his account with a note of the repeated expressions of gratitude which poured in from the citizenry as a whole.[15]

Álvarez also endeavored to come to grips with what he regarded as another obstacle to the development of municipal life and economic progress: the church. Prior to the establishment of the intendancy system, bishops had exercised significant political power on the provincial level by virtue of the remoteness of the viceroys and the corruption of the corregidores. Furthermore, the well-defined system of promotion within the church and the relatively greater permanence of ecclesiastical personnel over civil officials gave the church additional advantages in exercising influence over the non-spiritual aspects of colonial life.[16] Finally, the church, through its various orders and institutions, traditionally provided many public and social services in return for which it had acquired great wealth in the form of both real property and investment capital. Álvarez, with the cooperation of the creole governing classes, decided to challenge this complex of ecclesiastical power.[17]

The intendant and his supporters intended to insure that church institutions did in fact provide the services to which they had obligated themselves by accepting royal grants and pious bequests. Ecclesiastical

institutions frequently failed to fulfill the conditions on which pious legacies had been entrusted to them. Conversely, they were sometimes unable to collect revenues to support services which they had rendered. The realm of bequests was, thus, a confusing tangle in which perpetual obligations clashed with the vicissitudes of temporal history and gave ample scope for abuse, misunderstanding and hardship. The overall impression was, however, that powerful religious institutions and establishments used pious bequests to finance monastic corruption and moral turpitude while Masses went unsaid, the sick died without care, and children grew up in ignorance for lack of teachers.[18]

This stereotype apparently fit several religious institutions in Moquegua. Álvarez received complaints from the town fathers that the Dominican monastery lacked a sufficient number of priests to celebrate the required number of public and endowed Masses, although its revenues were more than adequate to maintain more clerics. Neither the Dominicans nor the Bethlemite Fathers were providing the educational services to which they were bound. Conditions in the hospital run by the latter group were cause for public outcry.

In response to these situations, Álvarez orchestrated a protest by the town government to both religious superiors and the viceregal administration, currently actively working to eliminate such abuses. He was hampered in his effort to exercise direct supervision over the operations of the Bethlemites because the group held a royal charter exempting it from visitation by officials other than those of the Order. Wherever possible, however, the intendant made the provision for periodic inspection and report by members of the municipal government. He also set in motion a drive to track down all deeds of endowments and the funds they

generated so that the people of Moquegua actually received the assistance intended for them by pious benefactors.[19]

Considering, he said that it might be "useful" to the Treasury and to the local planters, Álvarez also undertook, in conjunction with a select few members of the Moqueguan governing class, a secretive investigation of the validity of the title held by the Mercedarian convent in Cuzco to almost the totality of the land under vines in the valley. The Great Convent of La Merced in Cuzco was one of the wealthiest corporations in Peru, and its prosperity was based to no small degree on title to this choice land.

Ownership of the land, of course, gave the monastery substantial control over the area's prime economic resource, over the fortunes of the creole aristocracy who were its tenants, and over the single most valuable source of revenue to the royal treasury, the impost paid on the wines and brandies produced in the region. Álvarez not only investigated the title's validity, he collected data on the value of the land held by La Merced, and the probable amount of rent it collected on its leases. While the scrutiny seems to have produced no lessening of the monastery's hold on this prime land, it was, nevertheless, an explicit statement of the direction in which Álvarez was moving and the interests he represented.[20]

Álvarez encountered more and different obstacles to the development of urban vitality in the course of his visitation of the city of Arica. Once a prosperous port which deserved the rank of "ciudad", it had been reduced to a ghost town by rerouting of the mercury shipments destined for the mines of the Altiplano, by malaria, by its vulnerability to attack by sea, and by the transfer of government functions to the

nearby inland town of Tacna. The cabildo which, in the city's heyday, had numbered eleven or twelve, was now reduced to two, with one of these, the regidor decano, a resident of Tacna. The budget was in comparable condition. The total annual income amounted to sixty-five pesos, fifty-seven of which were spent on celebration of the patronal feast and the remaining eight illegally used by local magistrates to defray office expenses.[22] No population center in the province suffered more serious disabilities.

The energy which Álvarez put into redevelopment shows clearly how crucial the port was to realization of his plans. The intendant explored possibilities from every angle. Labelling selection of its original site a mistake born of ignorance, he proposed moving it to a nearby, more healthy location. He minimized the magnitude of this task by stating that there was really not much left to move, since the quake of 1784 had leveled most buildings which had not already collapsed from neglect. He planned not only the layout of the new city, but also the defenses of its port which he intended to have built by conscript criminals and vagabonds. In four additional maps, he detailed coastal configurations and soundings, of obvious relevance to navigation and the security of the province's entire southern coast. He proposed relocation in Arica of some of the government offices previously transferred to Tacna. Finally, he made a heroic effort to sell some of the vacant positions on the town council, no doubt hoping to create an adequately manned municipal government to carry forward these plans after conclusion of his visitation.[23]

His efforts must be described as having achieved moderate success and overall failure. Viceregal reaction to the proposals to move the

city and build an impregnable fortress for its harbor was similar to its response to the previous plan to construct an impressive government office complex for the city of Arequipa. Neither was allowed to go forward in any way during Álvarez's intendancy and both were at least partially realized on a smaller scale during the administration of his successor.

The two effective refusals are linked and explained by Viceroy Gil, who set them in context in his Memoria de Gobierno. The context was, of course, the resentment felt by the Lima merchant consulado to destruction of its monopoly of Pacific trade. The association presented Gil with a lengthy discussion of the impact of the Free Trade Reglamento of 1778 on the wellbeing of the viceroyalty. Its position was that, while free trade might have brought benefit to some areas of the empire, in America it had generally wrought nothing but havoc. It argued that the express purpose of the ordinance was the development of agriculture, industry and population. According to these standards, the consulado stated, Arica should never have been opened to trade at all, since the surrounding area produced no commodities which could be exchanged for peninsular imports. Thus, the only purpose that was served was to facilitate the entrance of European goods at some small savings in the cost of transport.

While the Lima merchants obviously felt the pinch, they chose to dwell more heavily on the sufferings of muleteers who had been deprived of a livelihood or forced to relocate to find employment. This was not their only argument against Arica, however. Not only muleteers, but the Royal Treasury also suffered, they said. Arica was like a free port, with no official, not even the zealous intendant, capable of pre-

venting evasion of import duties or the introduction of prohibited goods except at huge cost to the Treasury. Without hesitation, the consulado reached the conclusion that development of the port and commerce of Arica served no good purpose whatever.

Gil saw the situation through the eyes of his viceregal capital and its merchant association. He recognized that the trade was clearly advantageous for Arica, and frankly admitted that its new prosperity had caused a proportional setback for Lima. He then asked whether it was better to allow trade to take its natural course and accept the results, or to prevent the capital's ruin by preserving its monopoly. He answered his own question by stating that the survival of Lima, which he described as the viceroyalty's bastion against internal and external enemies, was a precondition for the survival of the realm. Monopoly, simple, familiar, and convenient, was again allowed to prevail.[24]

Álvarez visited one other district capital in the course of his intendental visitations. This was the town of Chuquibamba, capital of the district of Condesuyos, along whose routes trade with the province of Cuzco was conducted. Condesuyos shared with the neighboring district of Cailloma or Collaguas a susceptibility to Indian rebellion, both because of the proximity of the province of Cuzco and because its Indians were subject to the spectrum of exactions common where a harsh environment made Indian labor the principal exploitable resource.

The government of the district was in the hands of the very capable, aggressive and enterprising subdelegate, José Vásquez Franco de la Parra y Santamarína, whose appointment dated from the early days of the intendancy system. Vásquez had dedicated himself to development of the district's defensive capabilities and economic resources during his long

and active career as a political and military leader. His services were much needed since Chuquibamba had no cabildo, despite the fact that the population of its doctrina numbered about ten thousand.

Álvarez recommended the establishment of a council of six regidores to the crown. This, with the creation of several other municipal positions, would have given the area a competent government and meant additional income for the royal treasury. To provide a budget for this prospective body to administer, he proposed that a tax of one peso be imposed on each voyage made by the one hundred fifty mules engaged in the aguardiente traffic. This tax on the town's major economic activity and the support shown for Vásquez de la Parra's efforts to develop and defend the district by the city council of Arequipa suggest that more than local issues were at stake. Álvarez's program for Chuquibamba, no doubt undertaken with the support of both Vásquez and businessmen from the provincial capital, indicates that commercial interests wanted active town government and perceived it as a requisite for commercial development.[25]

Álvarez's approach to the promotion of prosperity within the province was not limited to revitalization of local governing councils. He also paid keen attention to the development and maintenance of a communications system, to the operation of the judicial apparatus, and to provision of needed support for the mining industry. One of the responsibilities with which Álvarez regularly charged cabildos was the maintenance of all roads, bridges and ferries within the jurisdiction of the doctrina. This was no small task, and the intendant commanded no funds whatever to allocate to needed construction or repair of such facilities. Thus, his efforts to improve travel conditions were limited to recommending expenditure

of local revenues if such existed, and, if they did not, donations of sustenance for workers by local elites, and donation of labor by those of lesser social standing.[26]

It is impossible to measure the success or permanence of the results Álvarez achieved. The devastation and death occasioned by the Túpac Amaru rebellion and the economic disruption resulting from the European wars left the province short of both manpower and development capital. Álvarez's alternatives, then, were limited to recommendation of lightly disguised local taxation, or the granting or licensing of concessions for the provision of certain services to private operators.

Ferry service was, typically, provided by a concessionaire who posted bond, paid a small fee to the royal government for a long-term license, and agreed to provide the necessary services at a fair rate. Both royal and local governments proved uninterested or incapable of providing needed waystations on the principal overland routes which led from the city of Arequipa to the coast, to the mines of Cailloma and the markets of Cuzco, the Lake Titicaca region and the Altiplano. Álvarez, despite the obstacles, worked actively to see that such facilities were established, served the public adequately, and returned a small revenue to the royal government.[27]

Another very important aspect of Álvarez's program to promote Arequipeñan prosperity was his attempt to improve the quality of judicial service available to litigants. Speedy resolution of many cases was virtually impossible because records were missing or destroyed or because archival positions were inadequately staffed. Álvarez worked to remedy such defects in every population center he visited. He also made some attempt to regulate the activity of lawyers, who were underemployed and

adept at prolonging litigation. There is no record either of his success in this regard or of official encouragement of the effort.[28]

Álvarez suffered two major defeats in his campaign. The first came in his attempt to transfer the province of Arequipa from the jurisdiction of the Lima Audiencia to the newly established Audiencia of Cuzco. The second was his inability to persuade Lima to grant him the right to summon appeals made at the subdelegacy level to the courts of the intendancy before sending them to Lima for processing. Both these defeats were related directly to the Audiencia's reaction to the establishment of the Audiencia of Cuzco in 1787, which diminished the prestige, the case load and the income of the Lima Tribunal. The crown disregarded Lima's opposition to bringing justice closer to Cuzco. Despite the fact that this interior city was significantly closer to Arequipa than was Lima, and perhaps because the volume of commerce between Arequipa and Cuzco was greater than Lima wished to allow, Arequipa was not reassigned to the jurisdiction of the new court.[29]

The intendant was likewise unable to win consent for two other proposals which aimed at transferring doctrinas out of a district from whose capital they were distant to one to which they were geographically closer. He argued that current arrangements allowed criminals easy escape from the jurisdiction in which they had committed their crime to one where justice could not easily overtake them. He noted that residents of each of the two doctrinas were forced to conduct their judicial business in towns from which they were far removed. He mentioned that this often increased the cost of litigation to the point where justice was so expensive in proportion to the means of the parties and the matters at stake that they were obliged to forego their rights.[30] Although Álva-

rez did appoint an asesor de juzgados or judicial assistant whose job was to expedite the processing of cases heard in the city of Arequipa, 31) legal interests succeeded in frustrating all other reforms made to decrease the cost or the time required to obtain final decision.

Another major area which engaged Álvarez's attention was mining. Here his activities were supplemented by an extremely creative effort undertaken by over fifty prominent citizens to mobilize the financial resources necessary to bring Arequipeñan mining to a new level of prosperity. This effort took the form of establishment of the Sociedad Mineralogica de Arequipa, an organization which combined the functions of a joint stock company and an economic society. It committed itself to collecting both the necessary seed capital and the exact knowledge required for successful exploitation of resources known to exist in the province, particularly those in the district of Tarapacá. Item Three of the Society's Reglamento stated plainly its basic purpose: to promote the prosperity of Arequipa's seven districts and their citizens of whatever state and condition. In the sale of stock, preference was given to Arequipeñans who alone were allowed to suoscribe in the first four months, after which any qualified person in the viceroyalties of Lima and Buenos Aires might purchase shares.

The covering letter sent by the Society's members to the viceroy when they submitted its constitution to him for approval describes the process by which it had decided to use association as a basis for the drive to prosperity. It identifies the various groups which served as sources for the formulation of the final proposal, groups as diverse as the Basque Society, the National Bank of San Carlos, the Royal Company of the Philippines and the Company of the Cinco Gremios de Madrid.

The letter underlined the contribution made by each of these to national and imperial prosperity. It then emphasized in a very forceful way that the key to their success had been informed understanding and intelligent exploitation of the resources and possibilities of the local situations in which they operated. The authors of the letter seemed convinced of the need to persuade the viceroy and the Lima Mining Tribunal, who would ultimately grant or withhold approval of the proposed establishment, that the prosperity of Arequipeñan mining would benefit the realm without threatening rival interests.

After making some revisions, the Royal Mining Tribunal of Lima recommended viceregal approval of the constitution. It noted that the establishment was conformable to the Intendancy Ordinance, which wished to prosper the Kingdom. As a manifestation of good will, it stated its intention to buy five shares of stock. Gil accepted the recommendations both for modifications and for approval, which he gave on March 18, 1792.[32] Apparently, Arequipeñan interests had received permission for a major attempt to bring prosperity to provincial mining by planned exploitation of resources and by accumulation of much needed investment capital. Álvarez played no obvious role in the establishment of the Mineralogical Society. He worked actively, however, to give miners access to needed supplies whose distribution was controlled by state-run monopolies.

One of the crippling handicaps faced by Peruvian mining was the scarcity of mercury which resulted from declining production at the Huancavelica mine. Works in the Arequipeñan district of Cailloma suffered acutely from this shortage. They were long past their prime and the cost of extracting silver from their ores was four times that of Guantajaya.[33] This situation was compounded by the superior govern-

ment's decision not to reopen the Cailloma subtreasury, which had sold mercury directly to local miners before its destruction during the Túpac Amaru rebellion. Without this natural outlet, Huancavelica mercury was forced to travel past Cailloma on its way to the treasury in the city of Arequipa, where it was purchased by the miners and retransported back to Cailloma. Although this produced a sharp increase in transportation costs, there was no move to reestablish the Cailloma subtreasury or to provide the mines with a banco de rescate.[34] The only concession made by the viceregal administration to the Cailloma mines was Croix's restoration of the mita, in 1787, at an annual total of 106.5 Indians.[35]

During the intendancy of Álvarez, the province's most prosperous mines were those of the Real Asiento of Guantajaya, in the southern district of Tarapacá, today part of Chile. Although the existence of the deposits had long been known, the mines were "new" in terms of the type of ore they yielded. Escobedo was more interested in these works than in those in Cailloma, and, after the Túpac Amaru rebellion, had transferred the personnel formerly assigned to the Cailloma subtreasury to Tacna. This town was a difficult ninety league journey from the Guantajaya works, but still nearer than the city of Arequipa. Since there was at first no banco de rescate in Tacna, however, the Tarapacá miners continued for a time to bring their silver to Potosi for redemption and to purchase mercury and other needed supplies there as well.[36]

Guantajaya faced another and equally serious shortage. Its veins were encased in hard rock, and thus blasting powder was essential to the mining process. Although the area abounded in natural materials used to make powder, manufacture was illegal, since production and sale of this commodity was then being made into a royal monopoly. This created

not only an artificial shortage of a vital material, but raised the price significantly on the inadequate amount supplied by the monopoly. Álvarez came to an agreement with a potential manufacturer who offered to supply Guantajaya with all the powder it needed at a reasonable price, and to make a return to the royal treasury equivalent to what it would have received from the state agency. Escobedo rejected the proposal out of hand, however, and ordered that the edict establishing the monopoly be published and enforced with great firmness.[37]

Thus, what the viceregal government gave to Arequipeñan mining on the one hand by approving the establishment of the Mineralogical Society, it took away on the other, by curtailing the availability of vital supplies. Although the government could have increased its own revenues by a small investment of bureaucratic flexibility, the only concession it made, apart from the establishment of the Society, came at the expense of Indian labor. The hold of monopoly on the minds of the upper eschelon of colonial administrators appeared again even in the absence of any direct threat to a vested interest like the Lima Merchant Consulado.

Despite intelligent and imaginative planning by Álvarez and the Arequipeñan elite, well-conceived programs to promote provincial prosperity were obstructed both by colonial bureaucrats unwilling to abandon familiar ways and by rival interests in Lima unwilling to abandon outmoded privileges. On the local level, the Intendant also clashed with the church whose control of property, wealth, and the provision of vital public services impeded the drive toward greater political and economic power mounted by those elements of the Arequipeñan population not wealthy or well-connected enough to rise beyond the provincial sphere of action. Several major conflicts of this nature, which cast further light on the

stakes for which the overall struggle was being waged, will be studied in the chapters which follow.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 82-83, 125-127.

2. See Jorge Bernales Ballesteros, "Informes de los Daños en la Ciudad de Arequipa con el Terremoto de 1784" Anuario de Estudios Americanos 29 (1972), 294-314.

3. The last corregidor, Baltasar Sematnat, was replaced by José Menéndez Escalada, who temporarily held office as intendant, on October 24, 1784. In the course of the year in which he served the province, Menéndez made a visitation of the district of Tarapacá and was, thus, absent from the city. See ibid., pp. 296-298. On Menéndez Escalada, see Martínez, Gobernadores, p. 189, and Arequipa 1796-1811. La relación del gobierno del Intendente Salamanca, trans. and ed. J. R. Fisher (Lima: Seminario de Historia Rural Andina, 1968), Prologue, pp. ix-x.

4. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 145-146.

5. Álvarez and the Arequipeñan governing classes maintained a harmony that was little short of remarkable. This further supports the supposition that the intendant was working closely with local leaders on common objectives. See Cabildo of Arequipa to the King, May 9, 1787, and Álvarez to Antonio Porlier, June 20, 1790, AGI, Lima, leg. 763; and Álvarez to the Cabildo of Arequipa, December 17, 1795; Cathedral Chapter of Arequipa to Álvarez, December 22, 1795; and Cabildo of Arequipa to Álvarez, December 29, 1795, BNL, C 4288.

6. Álvarez's efforts are summarized in his Noticia, 53v (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 65).

7. See Álvarez to Escobedo, May 29, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 763; Álvarez to Gálvez, March 13, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 1111; and Álvarez, Noticia, 52v-53r (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 70-72); Álvarez and Francisco Vélez, "Plan que manifiesta el Edificio que se consulta lebantar... para toda Oficina de Real Hacienda, Casa de Intendencia, Cabildo y Carcel, and "Prespectiva de la Casa de Real Hacienda, è Intendencia de Arequipa en el Reino del Peru que se consulta fabricar", AGI, Mapas y Planes, Peru y Chile, Nos. 87 and 88.

8. See Croix to Álvarez, June 3, 1786 and Álvarez to Gálvez, January 5, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 646; "Álvarez al Ayuntamiento de Arequipa," January 10, 1788, in Barriga, Memorias, 3: 299-301; and Álvarez, Noticia, 57v-59r (Barriga, ibid., 1: 70-72).

9. See Álvarez to Escobedo, February 14, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 1111, and Álvarez, Noticia, ibid.

10. Álvarez to Escobedo, February 14, 1787, ibid.

11. In 1802, when the crown was under greater pressure, it accepted a financial contribution from the Lima cabildo and granted the council increased control over municipal finances in return. See J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 191-192.

12. John Preston Moore, in The Cabildo in Peru under the Bourbons, mistakenly asserts that the tax increase was approved on December 12, 1787. The bridge was finally repaired with funds derived from investment of the city's small budget surplus, and by direct assessment on the citizenry agreed upon by a cabildo abierto. See Álvarez, Noticia, 34r, 52v-53r (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 44, 64-65), Cabildo of Arequipa to the King, October 27, 1788, AGI, Lima, leg. 763, and John Preston Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the Bourbons (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 166.

13. Subsequent to the submission of the budget to the superior government on February 12, 1787, Álvarez increased the city's total income from the 5642.5 pesos described in the reglamento to 6793.7 pesos by arranging that the 535 pesos not committed to fixed expenses be invested in properties which yielded an increasingly good rate of return. See Álvarez, Noticia, 30r-35v (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 39-45), and Moore, 164-165.

14. See Álvarez, Visita of Moquegua, "Causa de Justicia", October 12, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 143-154).

15. Ibid. (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 150).

16. For instance, pastors or curas were appointed in propriety while alcaldes were elected annually. The former, of course, might seek a promotion while the latter could be continually reelected.

17. See below, Chapters III-VI.

18. This is the dominant image of religious painted by Juan and Ulloa in their Noticias Secretas. Eighteenth-century viceregal Memorias de Gobierno also testify to a pattern of such abuses.

19. See, for instance, Álvarez, Visita of Moquegua, "Causa de Patronato", September 22, 1791; Álvarez to the Cabildo of Moquegua, September 14, 17, and 19, 1791; Álvarez to the Dominican Provincial (Mariano Luján), September 19, October 14, and December 11, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 135-136, and 3: 140-143, 150, 159-160, 163), and Croix, Memoria de Gobierno, in Fuentes, 5: 5-16.

20. See Álvarez, Visita of Moquegua, "Causa de Hacienda," October 26, 1791; and Álvarez to the Subdelegate of Moquegua (Manuel Modesto de Artieda), the Alcalde Ordinario (Juan Antonio del Pielago), and the Regidor Decano (Conde de Alastaya), September 23, 1791 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 173-176, and 3: 159-160).

21. An English Armada bombarded the city in 1680 and a French force attacked in 1686. Anson's activities off the Peruvian coast in the early

1740's occasioned the removal of royal treasury offices from Arica to Tacna. See Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 147, and Álvarez, Visita of Arica, "Causa de Hacienda", September 8, 1793, in Barriga, Memorias, 3: 72.

22. Maximum membership on the Arica cabildo is variously given as eight, eleven, and twelve. No doubt this confusion is rooted in the destruction of the city's archives. Álvarez's efforts to induce bidding for positions on the cabildo were relatively unsuccessful. See Álvarez, Visita of Arica, "Causa de Justicia", September 6, 1793, and "Causa de Hacienda", September 8, 1793, in Barriga, Memorias, 3: 62-63, 76-77, and Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in ibid., 4: 145-146, 148.

23. See Álvarez, Visita of Arica, "Causa de Policia", September 7, 1793, and "Causa de Hacienda", September 8, 1793, in Barriga, Memorias, 3: 65-77. See also AGI, Mapas y Planes, Peru y Chile, Nos. 122, 132-137.

24. See Gil, Memoria de Gobierno, in Fuentes, 6: 120-122. This represents the continuation of the "nonsettlement" policy for defense of the Pacific coast which took shape in the 1620's. See John Leddy Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 12-20.

25. Álvarez, Visita of Chuquibamba, "Causa de Justicia", and "Causa de Hacienda", June 11 and 14, 1790, AGI, Lima, leg. 805 (Barriga, Memorias, 2: 15-16, 25).

26. See, for example, Álvarez to the Alcalde of Viraco (Vicente Castroviejo), and to the Alcalde of Pampacolca (José Mendoza), July 6, 1790, AGI, Lima, leg. 805.

27. See Álvarez to the Treasury Ministers of Arequipa, June 10, 1790; and Visita of Moquegua, Causa de Justicia", October 12, 1791, AGI, Lima, leg. 805; and Álvarez, "Establecimiento de Tambo en Canagua", November 17, 1787; and "Establecimientos de Tambos en Apo Jaguey, y Pati; Barriga, Memorias, 1: 124, and 3: 296-298.

28. See Croix to Álvarez, January 2, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 646.

29. See Álvarez to Gálvez, June 14, 1786; to Escobedo, June 19, 1786; to Gálvez, August 29, 1786; and "Auto" Junta Superior de la Real Hacienda to Álvarez, August 9, 1786; AGI, Lima, leg. 646; and Carmen Fanny Torero Gomero, "Establecimiento de la Audiencia del Cuzco" Boletín del Instituto Riva-Aguero 8 (1969-1971): 475-484.

30. See Álvarez to Gil, October 12, 1791, and "Relacion puntualisada del reconocimiento del Valle y Puerto de Ylo", AGI, Lima, leg. 805.

31. See Álvarez to Escobedo, February 14, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 805.

32. Proyecto y Ordenanzas de la Sociedad Mineralogica de Arequipa (Lima: Imprenta Real Casa de Niños Expositos, 1792), pp. 2-3, 42-46, 54-56, 59-65.

33. "Estado que manifiesta el actual que tienen las Minas de esta Provincia...", Álvarez, Noticia, 92v.

34. A banco de rescate was a government institution which bought unminted silver directly from the miners at a fair price. Without such an establishment, the miners were forced to sell unminted, and hence unevaluated silver to their merchant suppliers, often for less than it was worth. This situation made it possible for the merchants to make a profit on the goods sold and also on the medium in which payment was made. Finally, the merchant, although obliged by law to sell the silver to the mint, often used it in its unminted form to pay for contraband goods purchased for foreign entrepreneurs. This drew off much or all of the profit from the mines to the merchants and contrabandists, to the disadvantage of the miner and the government, which lost considerable tax revenue by the evasions.

35. The Cailloma mines originally enjoyed a mita of 800 Indians, which had been reduced to 125.5 annually after the 1720 plague and abolished in the wake of the Túpac Amaru rebellion. Escobedo felt that without the mita the mines could not be maintained in operation, but admitted that the miners paid the Indians poorly and in kind, and rivalled the abusiveness of the repartimientos made by corregidores. He also acknowledged that they sometimes received the mita in money rather than in labor, which frustrated the purpose of the grant. See Álvarez, Noticia, 95r-96v, and Escobedo, "Instrucción Practica..." October 4, 1784, AGI, Lima, leg. 1098, Item 54.

36. Lack of funds prevented Escobedo from opening a banco in Guantajaya until 1794. See Escobedo, ibid.,Items 51 and 52, and Cespedes del Castillo, p. 166.

37. See Escobedo, ibid., Item 57, and Álvarez, Noticia, 94v-95r (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 112-113).

CHAPTER III

THE CONCURSO CONFLICT

Beginning in 1789, Álvarez and the dynamic element of the Arequipeñan population became involved in four major struggles with the newly appointed bishop of Arequipa. These struggles were over the appointment of parish clergy, the reform of the convent of Santa Catalina, the establishment of a foundling home, and the proper form of higher education in the province. The conflicts shared common origins: the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish Empire in 1767; the Gálvez policy of limiting the number of creoles appointed to office in the colonies; the precipitous economic decline which followed the Túpac Amaru rebellion; and the Arequipeñan drive to seize upon the opportunities presented by the Free Trade Reglamento of 1778 to substantially increase its volume of trade with the Altiplano.

The intendant, Álvarez, and the new bishop, Pedro José Chávez de la Rosa, were the central protagonists around whom much of the controversy revolved. Pedro José Chávez de la Rosa Galván y Amado was born June 24, 1740. His parents were Salvador Chávez de la Rosa, native of Cádiz, and Doña Rosa Violante y Galván y Amado, from the nearby town of Chiclana. Chávez took his preparatory studies in Cádiz, and then attended the nearby University of Osuña, where he ootained his doctorate in Theology. There he subsequently held several chairs, and then the rectorship of the Colegio de la Purisima Concepción. During this period, he competed for chancery positions in various dioceses and obtained, first, a prebendary at Cádiz, and then a canonry at Córdoba. In 1786, he was named bishop of Arequipa. His pre-episcopal career was,

thus, confined in locale to the southern part of the Spanish peninsula, and, in the type of position held, to the academic and administrative. He had no prolonged or meaningful experience in the pastoral ministry.[1]

On September 7, 1787, Chávez sailed from Cádiz for the New World. He came equipped with thirty-two large boxes of books, sixteen boxes of catechisms and several trunks filled with clothing, ecclesiastical paraphenalia and personal effects.[2] He arrived in Callao on January 7, 1788, and on January 23 was consecrated bishop by Juan Domingo Gonzales de la Reguera, Archbishop of Lima. By early June, Chávez was on his way to Arequipa. He began his episcopal visitation of his diocese as he progressed through it to the provincial capital. He reached the city of Arequipa on September 6, 1788, about two years after his appointment had been made, and one year after his departure from Spain.[3] The ceremonies of welcome, not without hint of difficulties to come,[4] were hardly over before Chávez was embroiled in controversy.

Chávez found himself heir to many problems which could be traced to the long-term effective vacancy of the bishopric, to the disruption of political and administrative normalcy caused by the establishment of the intendancy system, and to the social and economic turmoil which had been the background against which the changes had occurred. Manuel Abad y Llana, in personal possession of the see of Arequipa from May 13, 1771 until his death on February 10, 1780, had been the last bishop to govern under "normal" conditions.[5] His successor, Miguel de Pamplona, did not arrive in Arequipa until March 9, 1783.

Son of a marqués and heir to his title, Miguel had resigned from an active and promising military career to become a Capuchin friar, declining out of humility the promotion to Brigadier General which he

received while a novice. Although no doubt an able man, Pamplona carried his taste for dramatic gestures from the realm of his own personal life into his handling of public crises. Soon after his arrival, he set off on a visita of his diocese. He was in Moquegua on May 13, 1784, when almost the entire province was shaken by the massive earthquake of that date. He departed immediately for the city of Arequipa, where he ordered that a penitential procession be held. Barefoot, clothed in a hair-shirt, with a crown of thorns on his head and a cross on his shoulders, the bishop went through the streets, calling the inhabitants to placate the divine justice so obviously offended by the sins of men. To allay fears caused by the continual smoking of the volcano, Misti, Pamplona later ascended the mountain, had an iron cross erected near the summit, and celebrated Mass at the site.[6]

Pamplona proved more capable of coping with earthquakes and volcanos than with the establishment of the intendancy system, which ultimately caused him to wander out of his diocese and resign from the episcopacy after a government of about three years.[7] The interregnum which followed was, perhaps, even more fraught than usual with conflict and administrative paralysis. This invited the intervention of the intendant. As the controvery evolved, Álvarez's determined defense of his rights and privileges as vicepatron and his willingness to accomodate the interests of the creole clergy brought him into bitter conflict with the cathedral chapter, or cabildo ecclesiastico, and later with Chávez.

Pamplona had left the city of Arequipa early in 1786 on pretext of continuing the visitation of his diocese. Before so doing, he had followed the usual practice of appointing a governor to administer the diocese during his absence from his seat of government. He chose the

dean of the cathedral chapter, Pedro de Santa María, for the office. This arrangement continued in effect and was not contested until Pamplona informed Santa María, in December of 1786, that he had received both royal and papal admission of his resignation. He coupled this unofficial announcement with instructions that the dean continue to govern the diocese in fulfillment of the king's will.[8]

Pamplona's instructions were not left unchallenged. Legally, once a bishop's resignation had been accepted by both the crown and the papacy, it became completely effective - the bishop lost all right to govern the diocese personally or to appoint an administrator for the interval until his successor assumed control. Normal procedure for the interregnum was to proclaim a state of sede vacante by a specified formula of ringing of the cathedral bells, after which the cathedral chapter as a whole assumed responsibility for governing the diocese. After it received a letter from the king addressed to the cabildo in sede vacante, the chapter took matters into its own hands. On January 5, 1787, it rang the bells to proclaim the sede vacante and then met and elected one of its members, Dr. D. José Ric-Corvi, vicar-general of the diocese.[9]

There was one dissenting vote, that of the dean, Pedro de Santa María. Outraged by the publication of the vacancy without his consent, he found a staunch ally in the intendant, Álvarez, who had not been asked to approve the proclamation in his capacity as royal vicepatron. According to the chapter, the Intendant complained bitterly, pretending that he had been violently deposed from his government, and threatening the capitulars with imprisonment in a public jail if they did not accept the dean and obey him.

The chapter in turn protested the scandal caused by the intendant's

reaction. It noted the fatal consequences of such outrageous posturing in a land where God's ministers were traditionally respected. It reminded the intendant of the loss the royal treasury would suffer if the proclamation of the vacancy were delayed. Finally, the chapter offered to name the dean ecclesiastical governor while it appealed its case to the Audiencia in Lima.

Álvarez, with equal speed, complained to the viceroy that the chapter's actions implied that there could be no exercise of vicepatronage in sede vacante. He asserted that the chapter had proclaimed the vacancy before the documents required by law had arrived. He added that the chapter was publicly and falsely accusing him of misdeeds and causing public scandal by its behavior.[10]

The superior government in Lima stepped in quickly. On February 12, 1787, the Audiencia informed the viceroy that the chapter's actions deserved a severe and public reprimand. It recommended suspending this in view of other, unmentioned considerations, and in the expectation that it would mend its ways. This report was sent to Arequipa along with viceregal authorization for the proclamation of the sede vacante, and instructions to Álvarez to be on the watch for future violations of the real patronato. The situation remained relatively unchanged until, on April 5, 1788, Chávez, from Lima, empowered the dean to take possession of the government in his name, and authorized the chapter to elect an interim vicar-general. The chapter again chose José Ricci Corvi, and Chávez subsequently gave his approval.[11] This resolution of the dispute was merely a prelude to a more important struggle which developed alongside it. The second conflict began soon after Chávez took possession of his see and ended by depriving the intendant of his

key powers as vicepatron, his right to select the appointees to royal benefices from the list of qualified candidates proposed by the bishop.

The procedures by which royal ecclesiastical benefices were to be filled was strictly regulated by law in the Spanish Empire. At periodic intervals, bishops listed positions currently vacant and invited all interested in appointment as cura, or head of a doctrina, to present themselves at a concurso. At this competition, a special board of ecclesiastics, including an asistente real, or representative of the king, carefully examined all the candidates in person, studied their qualifications and records, and identified those who were and were not legally, morally, intellectually and politically suitable for appointment. The results of this process were then presented to the bishop, who selected three candidates to fill each vacant position, and forwarded his proposals to the vicepatron. The king's delegate, whether viceroy or intendant, then chose one of the three names suggested by the bishop for appointment to each vacancy, usually, but not necessarily the first. He then issued the title of office which made the appointee legal proprietor of the position. The system was designed to insure proper consideration of the interests of both church and state, and selection of the man most qualified to hold office.

The procedure was not without its practical flaws, however, nor did it serve to allay the suspicions of the civil government that at least some members of the hierarchy were prepared to create or to use the opportunity to "defraud" the secular power of its legal right to decide on ecclesiastical appointments.[12] Some of its shortcomings, which arose from conditions peculiar to the Indies, were more than apparent in the diocese of Arequipa.

It was impractical to hold a concurso for every vacancy which occurred. In the New World, dioceses were large and travel so difficult that a candidate might spend weeks travelling to and from his station in the hinterlands to present himself at the examinations. Concursos were relatively lengthy procedures, especially if a large number of candidates presented themselves. It was also difficult to isolate a block of time in which they could conveniently be held. They could not take place, for instance, during Lent or Eastertide, when all priests were strictly required to be on duty to handle the large number of confessions and communions and officiate at the devotional practices which were a part of the preparation for this period of intense sacramental activity. The physical hazards which attended the natural seasons, rains, floods and the onset of fevers prevented attendance at other times during the year. In addition, it was frequently necessary for the candidates to find substitutes to carry on their pastoral ministry, since there were some doctrinas served by only one priest, or since all priests in a given doctrina might aspire to a change of assignment. For these reasons, in the Indies, it became common practice to hold concursos only at three year intervals, to fill all vacancies which had occurred since the closing of the last concurso as well as the "secondary" vacancies, called "resultas" caused by the promotions given in the current one. In the interval between concursos, vacancies were staffed by temporary appointees, a practice which was tolerated despite its illegality.[13]

One of the corollaries of the long de facto vacancy in the episcopacy of Arequipa was the diocese's failure, for an extended period of time dating from June 23, 1779, to fill vacancies with proprietary curas.

In the years of upheaval between June of 1779 and the resignation of Miguel de Pamplona as bishop in 1786, more and more vacancies accumulated under circumstances which made them increasingly intolerable from a religious, political and administrative point of view. By the end of the 1780's, one third of the sixty-seven doctrinas in the diocese had no titular head. It seemed, further, that no one had any serious intention of dealing with the situation. The vacancies continued to be filled by interim appointments made by the bishop or ecclesiastical governor of the diocese without the intervention of the royal vicepatron, as was the customary procedure for appointments which were legally considered merely provisional and transitory.[14]

The dire consequences of such a makeshift arrangement were many. Seemingly most effected were the secular ecclesiastics themselves, those men who expected to make a career and, if possible, a good living out of the pastoral ministry. These found themselves relegated to the rank of substitute, at substitute's pay, with opportunity for promotion, transfer to more favorable circumstances, or proprietary possession of an ecclesiastical position an endlessly remote possibility.

Some diocesan priests, finding the situation intolerable, banded together in 1787 under the leadership of Felipe Ascencio Delgado.[15] They petitioned Álvarez to compel competent ecclesiastical authority[16] to issue edicts announcing the holding of a concurso, thus setting the appointments process in motion. To give force to their plea, they set forth in sharp detail some of the disturbing consequences of the current arrangement. They noted that old, sickly priests, who deserved consideration for their long years of devoted service, were left in doctrinas where the climate and conditions endangered their health, or where they

were isolated and unable to obtain medical care. They called attention to the fact that interim appointees were not assessed the tax to support the diocesan seminary which proprietary curas paid, and linked the present sorry state of the seminary to the fact that its revenues were grossly inadequate.

The petitioners also mentioned the personal poverty and hardship they suffered from being forced to work at less than full pay. This, they said, made it necessary for some to make irritating demands on their parishioners, or to charge the Indians high fees for the administration of the sacraments. These were especially sensitive issues at the time, since the Indians had vigorously protested them in the course of the rebellion, and the government was currently if belatedly making some efforts to rectify the abuse.[17] They also voiced concern for their personal safety, since many had been threatened with violence in the course of the rebellion and had still not been transferred.

The disgruntled clerics pointed out that more than their careers and the eternal salvation of the king's Indian vassals was at stake. They noted that laws on the books which required speedy filling of vacancies with proprietors were being set aside at will.[18] They reminded Álvarez that the proper functioning of the church was one of the weightiest concerns of the Spanish monarch. They depicted the horror with which pope and king would react when they learned that so many flocks were being cared for by "mercenaries and hirelings". They argued that only proprietary curas could be trusted to insure that souls were properly cared for, even at risk of the shepherd's very life.[19]

The clergy in the doctrinas were not, of course, always the heroic ministers of the Gospel depicted in this letter. In the not-too-distant

past they had been ranked with the corregidores as principal oppressors of the Indians. More than one account deals with the way in which parish clergy used the central events of birth, marriage and death to drain off the last peso of wealth their Indian charges could produce.[20] In the more immediate present, Álvarez's visitation of his province revealed a consistent pattern of continued abuse of the Indians by the clergy, although he gives evidence that some of the grosser forms of exploitation may have disappeared.

Lower level ecclesiastical benefices were the highest offices to which the vast majority of creole ecclesiastics could aspire. Many of the men who sought these positions had no doubt turned to the church because of their inability to find a suitable niche in the civil bureaucracy. Gálvez's policy of reserving only a third of American chancery positions for creoles had limited even further the already inadequate opportunities on that level.[21] Many if not most of the creoles who made their way to the episcopacy attained their rank as much by judicious donations of money or service as by talent or virtue or any other similar aptitude.[22]

Having secured an appointment to a benefice in the serranía, the successful creole aspirant may well have asked himself why he had ever wanted one in the first place. The pay may or may not have been adequate. His position gave him some status in the Spanish community, some hope of promotion to a richer or better situated benefice, and the opportunity to work for the Indian community or have it work for him. If he chose a more cynical course and profited from his position, he still had to contend with boredom and isolation from his social and cultural peers. Drunkenness or violations of the sexual code were the

logical next step down the ethical ladder. Such excesses increased the likelihood that the offender would come to the attention of civil or ecclesiastical authorities who were more anxious to protect the honor of the priestly state from allegations of misconduct in these areas than in any other. Despite such circumstances, titles to benefices were eagerly sought after, and the political jousting for the limited number of positions available was engaged in earnest.

The attractiveness of the issue raised and the opportunities it presented were not lost on Álvarez. Petitioned by a group of clergy to involve himself in the appointment of one-third of the positions in one of the largest and most important departments under his jurisdiction, the intendant could hardly have been anything but eager to comply. If he could manage to have the concurso held before the arrival of the recently named bishop, whose character and politics were still unknown, he might find it easier to set aside the first preferences of the chapter if he so chose. Thus he would have a freer-than-normal hand in a number of appointments sufficient to give him control over the secular clergy. Even if he lost the battle of time in this regard, he would still have built up important support among the men whose aspirations he had backed. Álvarez had also been instructed by the viceroy to watch for further violations of the patronato,[23] and so could expect support from this level of government. Since the clergy itself had apparently taken the initiative and invited his participation, he would be less vulnerable to charges of undue interference. All factors seemed to indicate that, for an official with the prerogative of vicepatronage, the time for decisive action had come.

Soon after the attorney retained by the priests had presented their

petition to Álvarez, the intendant formally requested the chapter to hold a concurso. When three days had passed without an answer, Álvarez, at the request of the priests' attorney, asked the chapter for its answer. The intendant was careful to mention that both his communications had been courteous. Two days later, the chapter succinctly informed him that it would have to refer the entire matter to the viceroy, then Teodoro de Croix. It linked its refusal to take action to the still unresolved contest over proclamation of sede vacante. Álvarez also appealed to Lima, insisting that many of the vacancies in question had persisted far longer than the law allowed. He further argued that the confusion of powers within the chapter was, or would be, no obstacle whatever, since the body as a whole could start the proceedings and, if the Audiencia decided in favor of the dean, he could continue on with what had been begun.[24] Close to the surface of Álvarez's letter was his resentment of the chapter's second rejection of his attempts to exercise his prerogatives of vicepatronage.

A week later, Álvarez sent another letter to Croix covering the remission of all documents relative to the case, including a detailed history of many of the vacancies. He also cited precedents in which the king had formally rebuked bishops who had postponed concursos for long periods of time, or who had named replacements lacking proper qualifications. He expressed his resentment of the chapter's course of action explicitly describing it as an embezzlement of the attribute of vicepatronage and an attempt at its effectual abolition. He repeated this theme when he reported on the affair to José de Gálvez, Minister of the Indies.[25]

Lima took up the case in October of 1787. By this time, the chap-

ter was legally governing the diocese of Arequipa. Gorvea, the fiscal or crown attorney whose opinion the viceroy had solicited, was well familiar with the problems of church-state relations in Arequipa. While he joined Álvarez in censuring the chapter's attempt to bypass royal patronage, he also kept one eye on the future. Remarking on the already "sufficient" disruption of harmony in Arequipa, he argued against attempting to remedy the situation before peace had been reestablished. His final word on the matter was, that since the new prelate was expected to arrive in the near future, it was only fitting to leave to him the task of knowing and choosing the workers who would assist him. Croix accepted his fiscal's opinion, and Álvarez was compelled to do the same. As the intendant remarked, however, he had not accepted the postponement in any manner which might prejudice his exercise of vicepatronage.[26]

Chávez reached Arequipa in September of 1788. One month later he had already issued two pastoral letters and undertaken a variety of other business, including commencement of his visitation of the city of Arequipa and its suburbs. At the end of January of 1789, Chávez was still in or near the city, still "visiting" and had still not given any indication that he was about to announce a concurso. While there is no evidence that Álvarez had taken up the question with the bishop, he described the prelate as having maintained a "profound silence" on the matter.[27]

In mid-January, Álvarez put the matter of ecclesiastical appointments at the head of his agenda. His first move was to send his teniente asesor or deputy and legal advisor, José de la Iglesia, to call the bishop's attention to a real cedula of August 25, 1768, which dealt with the subject of temporary appointments. Chávez showed no animosity. He pro-

tested that he had not been aware of it previously, but promised to observe it in the future. On this same day, January 15, Chávez informed Álvarez that he had appointed the Cura of Tambo to assist him in the visitation of the diocese. Subsequently both he and Chávez pursued the inspection actively. In other letters he discussed with the intendant charges against the curas of Ylo and Guancarqui, and mentioned his appointment of an assistant to Ylo. He described his attempts to deal with the notoriously recalcitrant cura of Chala, and informed Álvarez of shifts in parish personnel related to the handling of this problem.[29] All of these matters were regulated by the cedula or decree of August 25, 1768. There was no hint of hostility in Chávez correspondence of this date.

A week later, on January 22, Álvarez again sent Iglesia to Chávez, this time to inform him that the intendant wished to have a concurso held in the near, if not the immediate future. At this point, the scope of Álvarez's program must have come into clear focus for Chávez, although the situation had not yet taken on the character of open confrontation. He proceeded with arrangements for the transfer of Gaspar Nuñez del Prado, one of those priests who had petitioned Álvarez to arrange a concurso, and sent the appointment to Álvarez so that he might make the royal presentation.[30] The next day, however, Chávez answered the two serious issues raised the preceding week by Álvarez through Iglesia: the timing of the concurso, and the suggestion that Álvarez had rights in the presentation to all interim appointments.

Chávez challenged Álvarez's interpretation of the law on both points. Legal stipulations for the appointment of diocesan clergy had never been completely observed in all their fine details prior to the establish-

ment of the intendancy system. Álvarez's first priority was speedy replacement of proprietor with proprietor, selected by means of competition in a concurso and presented by the vicepatron. He was, however, realistic enough to acknowledge that vacancies would exist for longer than the legal four months, and was determined to assert intendental prerogatives when they did. As the precedents he cited showed, he was not the first to try.[31] His dim prospects did not seem to dissuade him from making a personal attempt to "prevent fraud" of the patronage system and to defend or extend the minor role assigned to him in the filling of vacancies by temporary appointees.

Real cedulas or decrees, while they often served as broadly applicable precedents for the resolution of similar problems, usually embodied decisions reached by the king and Council of the Indies on particular cases. Since decisions were tailored to the specific circumstances of the original case, their applicability to other situations could easily be disputed, and frequently was. Chávez pointed out that the decision in question favored the pretensions of a vicepatron to exercise some form of discretion regarding the appointment of a replacement for a proprietary cura only when the cura had illegally absented himself from his doctrina and not in the event of his death or legal absence.[32] Apparently this decree had become for Álvarez the basis of a hope that, if he could not succeed in filling vacancies promptly, he could at least gain control of the appointment of temporary replacements.

Chávez rejected his pretension outright. He stated that he had ordered all priests named to administer sacraments in vacant doctrinas to present themselves personally to the intendant if they were in the city or its vicinity, or to write to him if they were not. He under-

scored that this was to be understood as a courtesy and nothing more. Chávez stated unequivocably that, in his opinion, to ask the intendant's consent for temporary appointments would involve innovation in normal procedure. He protested his willingness to obey any law, decree or order from Lima requiring him to seek such consent, but stated that for the present he would confine himself to observing traditional practice.[33] Although uncompromising, Chávez's response was not rancorous. Álvarez does not seem to have pressed the issue any further. He did not surrender the point completely, however.

A few months later, Álvarez raised the question of interim appointments with the viceroy. Graphically recalling the evil machinations practiced by bishops to gain "possession" of the curacies for themselves, the intendant argued his case on the basis of two other decrees treating the subject of interim appointments. The first of these, dated March 16, 1733, required that the same form and order be used to name temporary replacements as was used to name proprietors. Admitting that a concurso could not be held for temporary appointments, Álvarez stated that the obvious interpretation of the decree was to allow the vicepatron the same intervention in the one as in the other. He stated that this ruling was further clarified by a second decree, dated May 30, 1740, in which the crown rejected a vicepatron's demand for such control over temporary appointments, but required that both the bishop and vicepatron agree about the selection made.[34]

Álvarez found in this pair of decisions strong rhetorical support for his assertion of his right to have the deciding role in interim appointments. It seems rather obvious, however, that, while the crown

was certainly interested in maintaining the principle of vicepatronage, it was quite willing to allow bishops to name men to fill vacancies which were truly temporary. Croix's answer to Álvarez has not been found. He may never have seen fit to reply, since he was unenthusiastic about allowing intendants to exercise vicepatronage in any appointments to curacies. He would hardly have supported a proposal so fraught with potential for creating massive disturbances over what was essentially a trivial matter. The interests of viceroys and bishops clearly conspired against the pretensions of the intendants to exercise vicepatronage. The intendancy was not long able to withstand the pressure.

Chávez responded to Álvarez's request for a concurso by stating that he had not thought that the intendant would have expected one so soon. He noted that Álvarez had advanced just reasons in support of his position, but said simply that he was unable to comply. As justification for his refusal, he mentioned the recentness of his arrival, the demanding tasks of the extensive visitation he was conducting, the proximity of the Lenten season, and the fact that he did not yet know the clergy or the condition and needs of the doctrinas. He concluded by voicing his conviction that neither God, the King, nor the faithful would be served by holding a concurso in the near future.[35] He thus established his recognition of his obligation and his commitment to holding a concurso as soon as he thought advisable. This did not satisfy the intendant.

At the bishop's invitation, Álvarez and Iglesia visited Chávez on the night of January 25. In the course of the visit, as recollected by Iglesia, Chávez again admitted the need for a concurso and his obligation to hold one. He agreed further, Iglesia said, that he would

issue edicts announcing a concurso at the end of Lent, even if his visitation had not been completed. He promised that the competition would take its normal course, concluding with the nomination and presentation of all vacant curacies projected for September or October of 1789. A "certification" containing Iglesia's recollection of the meeting was signed by the teniente asesor at Álvarez's instruction and included in the file on the case subsequently submitted to Madrid.[36] Chávez's signature does not appear on the document, nor is there any other record of such an agreement which included his signature present in the file.

Slightly more than two weeks after Easter Sunday, on April 21, Álvarez again sent Iglesia to visit Chávez, intending that he should remind the bishop of the agreement supposedly reached on January 25. In the course of the conversation, Iglesia mentioned his presumption that the bishop would by now have posted the edicts announcing the concurso. Chávez replied that he had not, but informed the asesor that he had sent out a circular advising the priests of regulations governing participation in the concurso. Pressed further, the bishop stated that edicts could not be posted until July or August, since it was traditional that one hundred days elapse between the posting of the edicts and the opening of the competition. He argued further that to post them sooner would be to risk that priests would prematurely abandon their doctrinas in order to arrive at the gathering in good time. In the account of the meeting which Iglesia gave to Álvarez, he remarked that, while he had found this reasoning strange, he had said nothing more to the bishop, since he had been convinced he could do nothing to change his mind.[37]

The next day, Álvarez sent the bishop a one-line summons

to fulfill the January agreement as understood by the intendancy. Álvarez later described the missive as "lleno de atención" but it was not so perceived by the bishop. The day following, Chávez sent Álvarez a stinging reply. He complained about the cloud of misunderstanding created by Iglesia and affirmed that his position had been stated clearly in his letter of January 23 to the intendant, and that it had never varied. He stated further that he intended to post the edicts on July 1, corresponding to an October 1 opening date for the competition. He insisted that they could not have been posted sooner, since this would have contravened laws which prohibited holding concursos during the time allowed for fulfillment of the Easter duty (an additional fifty-eight days after the feast of Easter), and which prescribed an interval of approximately three months between the posting of the edicts and the opening of the convocation.

Chávez's closing statement left no doubt that the era of diplomacy was at an end. He informed Álvarez that his letter of the previous day had convinced him that it would be necessary to consult Lima in order to resolve the matter definitively, satisfy the intendant and safeguard the honor owed to the episcopacy.[38] The turning-point had been reached and war declared.

In assessing the situation, the evidence thus far suggests that Chávez had been moving in good faith, if deliberately, to proclamation of a concurso. His refusal to make precipitous appointments before becoming adequately informed about the personnel and conditions involved was defensible in light of the dire consequences of a mistake. Once appointed, a cura could be nearly impossible to remove. Chávez had already been called to handle several cases involving proprietary curas

whose conduct was flagrantly immoral, abusive of parishioners, and a cause for public scandal. These men had successfully defied all attempts to dislodge them from their positions, blocked appointments of permanent successors, and continued to collect all or part of their salaries whether present or absent from their posts.[39] It also seems obvious that Álvarez mistrusted Chávez's expressions of good will and intent to act responsibly, and that he hoped to keep the bishop honest by continual pressure. At best he appears to have been unaware of the sensitivity of the issue, and at worst to have been improperly interested in its resolution for some reason not confined to fulfillment of his duty under the law. This, Chávez did not hesitate to suggest.[40]

Chávez's letter of April 23 drew an immediate answering blast from Álvarez. On the morning of April 24, the intendant summoned to his office a group of four prominent lawyers.[41] He charged them with "responsibility to the king", and ordered them to give their opinions on a series of six questions drawn up in the judicial form used to produce evidence in Spanish courts. The questions were clearly designed to show that Chávez, by refusing to accede to Álvarez's request for immediate convocation of a concurso, had been guilty of violation of the law. The intendant also hoped to prove that his attempts to coerce the bishop had been prudent, legal, within the bounds of official decorum, and that they were supported by informed legal opinion. Chávez described the procedure as a residencia.

The choice of tactic was, from the intendant's point of view, unfortunate. At the very least, it would be suspected that the opinions, mildly supportive of him, had been given under pressure. At worst, it might be thought that the lawyers were cooperating with Álvarez to sup-

port political interests beyond the scope of fulfillment of the law. Chávez's questioning of Álvarez's motivation for pushing the issue was hardly required to make Lima sensitive to these and other possibilities. At the conclusion of its deliberations, the superior government censured Álvarez and Iglesia for a procedure which it described as inappropriate and inflamatory.

Chávez defended himself forcefully. He explained and enlarged upon his reasons for postponing the concurso beyond the time desired by Álvarez. He pointed out that of the twenty-three vacancies which existed to date, only two had occurred since he had assumed the government of the diocese. He described the high-handed manner which had characterized the intendant's dealings with him. More significantly, Chávez asked to be excused from making nominations to any vacant curacy which he had not visited. He also requested that the viceroy and not the intendant should exercise the functions of patron in all the nominations which were made as a result of the forthcoming and all future concursos.

Croix wrote to Chávez on July 3, 1789, acknowledging receipt of all the documentation on the case. He then followed the usual procedure of submitting the material to his fiscales. They held that Chávez's reasons for delaying the opening of the concurso were valid under law, but recommended that it be convoked without further delay and that Álvarez be allowed to make the appointments unless he was manifestly incapable of impartiality. The viceroy then asked the Audiencia for a consultative opinion. Of the seven judges who considered the case, four favored censuring Álvarez for his provocative behavior, but advocated allowing him to make the appointments. The remaining three described the situation as a "new" case for which the law did not clearly provide a remedy

and recommended that it be sent on to Madrid for a final decision.[43]

On January 26, 1790, Croix proclaimed his agreement with the minority report, sent the case to Madrid, and suspended the concurso until the indefinite future. Two months later the new viceroy, Francisco Gil, took office. He inherited his predecessor's job, problems, and hostility toward the intendancy system in general, and his annoyance with disputes over patronage in particular.[44] The final outcome was a complete, resounding defeat for Álvarez.[45] In fulfillment of a royal order of June 10, 1791, a concurso was finally held in the diocese of Arequipa. In accord with this same order, with its stipulation of "for one time only", Chávez, on July 20, 1792, sent to the viceroy his nominations for twenty-seven of the thirty-one curacies then vacant.[46] Three years later, a decree dated May 9, 1795, extended to the entire empire the regulations which had been in force in Mexico since 1786. This took from the intendant the prerogative of presentation to ecclesiastical benefices, thus depriving him of his most effective means of exercising supervision over the affairs of the church.[47] A month after the decree of May 9, 1795, was issued, Álvarez's successor was named. At the end of the year, Álvarez said his farewells to the intendancy he had served for over ten years without ever having made a presentation resulting from a concurso.

One question which must be asked about Álvarez's role in precipitating the controversy is one of motivation. The intendant might well have achieved his objective, if not with the cathedral chapter, at least with Chávez, had he not pressured the bishop so tactlessly. There are several possible reasons why he may have felt the need to push desperately, even recklessly, to have a competition held so soon after Chávez's

arrival. None of them are completely satisfying. Moreover, there is no hard evidence to indicate clearly which was the most important in shaping his course of action.

The first and only reason advanced by Álvarez was his interest in upholding the law, his conviction that any further delay, even if justifiable, was intolerable. He undermined his credibility on this score, however, when he ignored clear indications that Chávez was in earnest about fulfilling his obligations. He might more plausibly have pointed to the important role played by the parish clergy in monitoring Indian behavior and molding it to conform with the ideological and economic expectations of the Spanish government. Álvarez included in every visitation he made an investigation of the relationship of the cura with the Indian community. He attempted both to discover any abusive behavior on the part of the pastor, [48] and to obtain his support for the establishment of a school and for all other public works projects. The intendancy system had clearly been designed to maximize the control exercised by the secular government over the operation of the church on the local level and Álvarez was consistent in his efforts to achieve this objective.

Government control over the secular clergy took on increased importance in the wake of its decision to withdraw religious orders from doctrinas which were no longer truly mission territory. Diocesan priests were expected to step into the vacuum thus created and to administer the parishes with greater sensitivity to the plans and programs of the central government. Álvarez had been involved in implementing this legislation and gave every indication that he understood the rationale behind it.

Álvarez had received his appointment to the intendancy at a time when increased government control over the church as an institution had been a key element in government planning. What he had perhaps failed to appreciate was the strength of the opposition to intendental exercise of vicepatronage on the part of both bishops and viceroys, and the degree to which it would be supported by the conservative forces which came to power in the Indies Ministry after the death of José de Gálvez in June of 1787.[49] His efforts to establish government control over the church failed to win support from either Lima or Madrid. His expectation that support would be forthcoming may, however, have led him to overplay his hand to the extent that he lost even what he might reasonably have expected to gain.

Álvarez may also have been pushed by political necessity to attempt to mitigate some of the frustration with which the creole community reacted to Gálvez's appointment policy. Perceptive creoles, both lay and cleric, had been quick to understand that the intendancy was far more susceptible to its pressure than the episcopacy, which naturally aligned itself with Lima to oppose intendental exercise of vicepatronage. Chávez's suggestion that Álvarez was improperly interested in appointments to royal benefices was certainly linked to his belief that the intendant was pressing to secure positions for his partisans among the clergy. It would have been a logical move, and may well have been true. It does not, by itself, explain the intensity of his drive to have a <u>concurso</u> held without delay, however.

Strong and compelling reasons urged regularization of the process by which clerics were appointed to <u>doctrinas</u>. An interval of ten years between <u>concursos</u> created a serious vacuum of government control over

a highly sensitive area. It is, therefore, easy to defend what the intendant wished to do, but not the manner in which he did it. Álvarez failed to achieve his objective and left a residue of ill feeling between himself and his allies on the one hand, and the bishop on the other.

It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that Álvarez chose to play upon a hostility toward the church or the episcopacy which preexisted the current dispute and went far beyond it. It seems that the Arequipeñan upper class had identified the church as an obstacle to goals which it had set for itself. Three other specific instances of conflict which illustrate this tendency are described in succeeding chapters. The long-term impact of these disputes, which manifested itself during the administration of Álvarez's successor, is discussed in those which follow.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 215; Juan Domingo Zamacola y Jauregui, Serie cronológica de los Illmos. obispos que han governado la santa Iglesia Cathedral de Arequipa, BNL, D 8150; and Santiago Martínez, La diócesis de Arequipa y sus obispos (Arequipa: Tip. Cuadros, 1933), pp. 213-222.

2. See"Relación de los efectos pertecenientes al equipaje del Obispo Pedro José Chávez" and "Nota del contenido de seis baules", 1785, ANL, Superior Gobierno, Legajo 19, Cuaderno 499.

3. Martínez, Obispos, pp. 214-216.

4. See below, p. 181.

5. Martínez, Obispos, pp. 198, 203-204. The creole rebellion protesting the establishment of the customs house in the city of Arequipa broke out in January of 1780. The Túpac Amaru rebellion, whose effects were much more long-lasting, broke out at the year's end. On the January movement, see Lewin, pp. 156-166.

6. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 214-215; Zamacola, Obispos, and Martínez, Obispos, pp. 208-210.

7. See Álvarez to Gálvez, March 29, April 30, and June 22, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 646.

8. Cathedral Chapter to the King, n.d. (ca. January, 1788), AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

9. Ibid., and Gorvea to Croix, September 12 and October 24, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

10. Álvarez to Croix, January 14, 1788 and Cathedral Chapter to the King, n.d. (ca. January, 1788), AGI, Lima, leg. 695; and Álvarez, Noticia, "Causa de Real Patronato", 104r-105r.

11. Sede vacante was reproclaimed effective March 12, 1787, and Antonio Ventura Valcárcel was elected vicar-general in place of José Ric-Corvi. See Álvarez, Noticia, 104r-v, and Martínez, Obispos, pp. 210, 216. For further discussion of this conflict, see below,

12. See Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, in Fuentes 4: 359ff for a lengthy discussion of the means used by bishops to keep the choice of parish clergy in their own hands while observing the formalities prescribed by law.

13. This description of the concurso system is based on the explanation of the "legitimate customs" which governed its operation as given by Chávez to the new viceroy, Osorno. Chávez to Osorno, February 28,

1797, AAA, Reserved Letters.

14. Pamplona seems to have held a concurso some time in the course of his episcopacy, but apparently refused to propose candidates to Álvarez. See Gorvea and Viderique to Croix, June 10, 1789; Ayluardo to Croix, June 4, 1789, Armendáriz to Croix, July 6, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695, and Chávez to Gil, July, 1792, AAA, Reserved Letters. On the vacancies, see Álvarez to Croix, April 29, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

15. Felipe Ascensio Delgado had been one of the unsuccessful candidates for the position of chancellor vacated by the death of Luis Telaya y Santiso, and filled by the peninsular Simon Ximénez Villalva on February 4, 1788. Whether Delgado knew of Villalva's appointment at the time he assumed leadership of the priests' movement is not known. Delgado was a descendant of the first conquerors and settlers of Arequipa. This traditionally entitled a candidate to consideration, if not preferment from the crown. See "Relación de méritos y servicios del Dr. D. Phelipe Ascensio Delgado, formado de varios Documentos..." , January 9, 1786; Álvarez to the King, August 30, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 646, and below,

16. The bishop or cabildo in sede vacante, or, if these failed to act, the archbishop of Lima.

17. Gil attempted to reactivate in the diocese of Cuzco a viceregal edict issued in 1684 which abolished all fees for the administration of the sacraments. Bartolomé de las Heras, Bishop of Cuzco, wrote Gil that the edict had been a dead letter from the time it was issued and that, since the king had sustained protests made against it, the viceroy had no power to reactivate it. Heras stated further that parish clergy did not have sufficient income as things stood, and that to decrease it further would be to risk loss of all qualified personnel. Chávez supported Heras's position. See Heras to Gil, August 21, 1791, AMA-CG, 7: 188r-193v, and Chávez to Heras, August 16, 1791, AAA. On the original decree, see Margaret E. Crahan, "Church-State Conflict in Colonial Peru: Bourbon Regalism Under the Last of the Hapsburgs," The Catholic Historical Review LXII, No. 2 (April, 1976):224-244.

18. The legal term for a vacancy was four months.

19. Priests of the Diocese of Arequipa to Álvarez, June 11, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

20. Among the more famous accounts are the Noticias Secretas of Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, and the "Representación de la Ciudad de Cuzco, en el año de 1768, sobre excesos de Corregidores y Curas" in Sebastian Lorente, Relaciones de los virreyes y audiencias que han gobernado el Peru (Lima and Madrid, 1867-1872), pp. 211-306.

21. See Brading, pp. 35-37, Konetzke, 3: 405-406, and Mark A. Burkholder, "From Creole to Peninsular: The Transformation of the Audiencia of Lima," HAHR 52 (August, 1972): 400-401.

22. For a graphic description of one of many examples of "purchase" of an episcopacy by a creole, see Travada's biography of Juan de Otálora Bravo de Lagunas, bishop of Arequipa from 1717 to 1723. Manuel de Odriozola, (ed.), Colección de Documentos Literarios del Perú, 11 vols. (Lima, 1863-1877), Ventura Travada, El suelo de Arequipa convertido en cielo, 10: 172-174.

23. See above, p. 59.

24. Cathedral Chapter to Álvarez, June 20, 1787, and Álvarez to Croix, July 16, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

25. Álvarez to Gálvez, July 29, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

26. Gorvea to Croix, September 12 and October 24, 1787, and Álvarez to Croix, May 8, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

27. Chávez, Pastoral to his Clergy, September 28, 1788, CVU, Vol. 11, and Pastoral to the Faithful, October 8, 1788, BNL, C 4058; Chávez to Álvarez, January 23, 1789, and Álvarez to Croix, May 8, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

28. The teniente asesor exercised jurisdiction over civil and criminal litigation in the capital of the province for the intendant, and was first in line to replace him during absence or indisposition. See John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782-1810: The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 81-82.

29. Chávez to Álvarez, January 15, 1789 (5 letters), AAA, Letterbook.

30. Chávez to Álvarez, January 22, 1789 (2 letters), AAA, Letterbook.

31. Álvarez to Croix, May 8, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

32. Chávez to Álvarez, January 23, 1789 (second letter), AAA, Letterbook.

33. Ibid.

34. Álvarez to Croix, July 23, 1787, and May 8, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

35. Chávez to Álvarez, January 23, 1789 (first letter), AAA, Letterbook.

36. Iglesia, Certificación, January 28, 1789; Álvarez to Chávez, April 22, and Chávez to Álvarez, April 23, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

37. Iglesia to Álvarez, April 22, and Álvarez to Croix, May 8, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

38. Álvarez to Chávez, April 22; Chávez to Álvarez, April 23, and Álvarez to Croix, May 8, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

39. See, for instance, Chávez to Domingo Pacheco, January 28; to Álvarez, January 30; and to Croix, April 8, 1789, AAA, Letterbook.

40. Chávez to Álvarez, April 23, 1789, AAA, Letterbook and AGI, Lima, leg. 695; and Chávez to Croix, May 15, 1789, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

41. The men were Dr. D. Diego Aldave y Salamanca, Dr. D. Blas de Quiros, Dr. D. Tadeo Fernández Córdova, and Dr. D. Baltazar de Herrera. On Aldave and Quiros, see below, p. 113, n. 27.

42. Chávez to Croix, May 14, 15, and 16 (three letters on this latter date), AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

43. See Croix to Chávez, July 3; Viderique to Croix, July 23; Gorvea to Croix, August 2, 1789; and Audiencia to Croix, January 14, 1790, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

44. See Croix, Decree, January 26, 1790, AGI, Lima, leg. 695, and Memoria de Gobierno in Fuentes, 5: 66-67.

45. Álvarez made one last attempt to turn catastrophe into victory. He attempted to have the concurso, finally under way, suspended until a redivision of territory among certain curacies was made. He was not successful. See Chávez to the King, February 10, 1795, AAA, Reserved Letters.

46. Chávez made a detailed report of the results of the concurso to Gil, and described the procedures he had followed to Gil's successor, Osorno. He noted, in his letter to Osorno, that while the secondary vacancies caused by promotions were being filled, another vacancy was created by the death of Felipe Ascencio Delgado, leader of the priests' movement and recently named proprietary cura of Tio. Chávez to Gil, July, 1792 (no. 73), and to Osorno, February 28, 1797, AAA, Reserved Letters. See also Gil, Memoria de Gobierno, in Fuentes, 6:22.

47. The deliberations which preceded the decree show clearly the trend toward curtailment of the intendant's authority. Causes given for the retraction of the liberal grant of patronage powers made to the intendant in the Buenos Aires Ordinance of 1782 are not sufficient to justify so radical a reversal. Of the two major cases around which the decision was woven, one arose from unique circumstances in which the territory of an archdiocese extended into four different intendancies and the other involved a challenge by a cathedral chapter to the exercise of vicepatronage by an interim intendant. See Bajamar to the Governor of the Council of the Indies, October 11, 1792, Council of Indies to Collar, June 5, 1792, Gil to the King, December 20, 1791, Minutes of the Meeting of the Council of the Indies, February 21, 1795, Resolution, March 10, 1795, and King to the Viceroy of Peru, May 9, 1795, AGI, Lima, leg. 1562. See also Lynch, p. 87, and J. R. Fisher, pp. 33, 43, 67-68, and 104.

48. Some curas had been threatened by the Indians in the course of the recent rebellion, presumably for harsh treatment of the Indians. See above, p. 63.

49. See J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 60-61.

CHAPTER IV

SANTA CATALINA

Bishop Chávez's attempt to reform Santa Catalina, a convent of cloistered Dominican nuns, brought issues raised in the struggle over the appointment of parish clergy into even sharper focus. Santa Catalina's problems were typical of those experienced by many large, older conventual institutions throughout the New World in the course of the eighteenth century. They reached a crisis point in the early 1780's.

Agitation for the establishment of a convent in Arequipa began as early as 1559, only twenty-seven years after the city's site was first visited by Spanish conquistadores. It did not, however, achieve its objective until 1580, when its foundress, a wealthy widow, her daughter, and one other woman made religious profession. Nature was not kind to the new foundation. In 1582 and 1604, earthquakes caused heavy damage to the convent facilities. The cost of repairs exhaused the foundress's fortune, and the earliest nuns lived a life of poverty. Prosperity came with time. The number of nuns increased and the convent flourished. It accumulated property by donation, became one of the wealthiest institutions in the city and ranked with the most important establishments of religious women in the viceroyalty.[1]

As the eighteenth century progressed, the convent began to experience economic decline. Its causes were over-expansion of the convent population, unsound management of its resources and the general depression felt throughout the viceroyalty. Typically, attempts to solve these ever more acute financial problems brought in their wake an erosion of its spiritual and moral fiber, and set the stage for a com-

plex struggle to determine the level on which the convent was to survive. The hardship which had brought the sixteenth-century nuns to the heights of spiritual achievement served, in the eighteenth century, as a pretext for relaxation of rules designed to insure that all shared a common poverty. Place was made for arrangements which allowed individual nuns to maintain themselves from private income in a "decency befitting their status".

The convent was brought to the brink of economic catastrophe by the destruction caused by the Túpac Amaru rebellion and its suppression. The upheaval drastically reduced the income realized by the convent from its properties and occasioned numerous defaults on loans made from its funds or arrears in payment of interest by its debtors. Shortly thereafter, the 1784 earthquake caused 10,000 pesos worth of damage to the convent's church. Spanish participation in the war against Great Britain during these same years brought predictable and very sharp increases in the prices paid by the nuns for imported commodities. This in turn created shortages and comparable price increases for goods and services supplied locally. The total strain on the budget was so great that the monastery was unable to subsist without a yearly grant of 10,400 pesos made by Bishop Pamplona from his episcopal revenue.[3)]

This sizeable annual deficit and similar but smaller financial problems experienced by Arequipa's other two convents prompted Pamplona to make a thoroughgoing scrutiny of the three establishments. With the program of reforms proposed for the five great convents of Lima as guide, and with the results of his own investigation in hand, Pamplona drew up a lengthy list of articles adapted to the needs and shortcomings of the three institutions.[4)] He paid special attention to Santa Catalina.

Pamplona's proposals echo the concerns expressed by reformers of monastic establishments throughout the Spanish world. They raised some very basic issues. Management of monastic finances came under universally heavy fire. Proponents of enlightened government committed to increasing the population, production and wealth of the Empire regarded monasteries inhabited by celibates dedicated to the celebration of elaborate rituals and the production of a few luxury goods as dubious blessings. They argued vigorously for limitation of the percentage of land and wealth under the control of convent-corporations or their individual members. At the very least, they insisted that careful accounts be kept of income and expenditures, and that monastic populations be limited to numbers the institutions' resources could support.

Badly managed wealth was only the most tangible evidence of a more pervasive decay which was of equal concern to the reformers, who called attention to the outright violations of canon law, religious constitutions and obligations assumed by solemn vow. Not far beneath the surface ran a current of reaction against the flexible interpretation of these obligations supposedly sanctioned by the Jesuit Order.[5] Those sympathetic to current practice argued that it was a reasonable adaptation of systems conceived centuries before, that it had gone unchallenged by religious authorities for many years and could, thus, be described as universally accepted custom. The reformers were not moved. They insisted on a return to the simplicity of primitive Christianity, the asceticism of its early cenobites, and strict observance of vows and constitutions.

Reform of convent living was made complex by this perennial problem of interpreting rules made long ago to fit changed times and circumstances. An even greater obstacle to spiritual renovation came from the inevitable

penetration within the walls of the hierarchical society which existed without. This was, in turn, related to the fact that many of those who entered monastic institutions lacked what their founders would have described as a "true" vocation to the life of poverty, chastity, obedience, prayer, seclusion and unworldliness to which they were supposedly dedicated.

Only the well-off, unless by virtue of very exceptional circumstances, could afford to pay the sizeable dowry demanded of those who were to be professed in the great convents as nuns of the black veil, that is, nuns with solemn vows.[6] The primary obligation of these religious was to perform for the Christian community those liturgies which could not, because of their demanding nature, be performed by the average layman, such as recitation of the Divine Office at the appropriate canonical hours. Good breeding and education were required to develop the sensitivity of candidates to the values of liturgical celebration. They also brought with them a taste for the good life which was destructive of monastic asceticism.

The reforms Pamplona prescribed for Santa Catalina indicate clearly that the quasi-liturgical or ceremonial aspect of its religious life had achieved an unhealthy domination over observance of the obligations assumed under vow and over the abnegation to which the nuns were equally pledged. Celebration of solemn liturgies had become little more than occasions for the staging of spectacles which were only peripherally religious. Expenses for the ostentatious productions common on big feasts were often paid for by the convent in the same way as seculars purchased luxuries, by borrowing from its capital.[7] The spiritual and financial evils which resulted from these excesses pervaded every aspect of con-

vent life.

Some of the great convents, Santa Catalina among them, permitted each of its nuns to have her own personal maid or slave, whose services freed the religious from all the menial chores connected with daily life. The maids' free time was devoted either to service of the community at large or to producing a variety of goods which would be sold for the benefit of the religious mistresses. The nuns, freed from all earthly concerns, were supposedly more able to devote themselves to public prayer and private contemplation. Maids often continued to live on in the convent after the death of their mistresses, swelling its population even further. The two other convents in Arequipa, while they supported a number of service personnel equal to or in excess of the number of nuns, did not allow the direct personal service permitted in Santa Catalina.[8] This recognized in principle that the nun's calling demanded that she be freed from at least some menial chores, but denied the most offensive aristocratic or elitist implications of dominion over one's own maid.

It was also common for nuns to have a private income, called a peculio, given them by parents, relatives or benefactors. They were allowed to use this money, with pro forma approval of their religious superiors, to provide for themselves whatever they felt necessary to maintain themselves in "the decency befitting their status".[9] They were also allowed to make donations to deserving causes or individuals, lay or religious. In this manner, necessities and nicities of food and clothing not supplied from the common fund were procured for the nuns as individuals by the domestic staff. Both the abbess and individual nuns were permitted to make donations to religious whose resources were

TABLE I: PROFESSED POPULATION OF CONVENTS IN AREQUIPA

	SANTA CATALINA (est. 1580)			SANTA TERESA (est. 1710)			SANTA ROSA (est. 1747)		
Date	Black Vl.	White Vl.	Total	Black Vl.	White Vl.	Total	Black Vl.	White Vl.	Total
1750[1]	57	18	75						
1786[2]	64	32	96	18	3	21	33	5	38
1792[3]			88			21			37
1802[4]	49	22	71						
1804[5]	40[6]					21	33[6]		

1. All data for the year 1750 is based on Travada, El Suelo de Arequipa, in Odriozola, Documentos Literarios, 10: 238.

2. All data for the year 1786 is based on Pamplona, "Descripción de los conventos".

3. All data for the year 1792 is based on Álvarez, "Plan que manifiesta los curatos..."included in Noticia, AGI, Lib. Mss. 44.

4. All data for the year 1802 is based on Chávez to the Prioress Sor Petronila de las Mercedes y Moscoso, October 27, 1802, AAA, Reserved Letters.

5. All data for the year 1804 is based on Echeverría, Santa Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: between pp. 79-80.

6. Echeverrías figures for the two Dominican convents seem to include only nuns of the black veil. It would otherwise be necessary to believe that the professed population of Santa Catalina declined by 30 nuns between 1802 and 1804. Santa Teresa, a Carmelite establishment, was allowed no more than 21 professed, at the ration of 18 of the black veil to 3 of the white.

TABLE II: NON-PROFESSED POPULATION OF CONVENTS OF AREQUIPA

	SANTA CATALINA (est. 1580)		SANTA TERESA (est. 1710)	SANTA ROSA (est. 1747)
	1750[1]	1786[2]	1786	1786
Donadas	51	20		1
Maids		147	15	30
Mandaderas		7	12	6
Sacristan		1		1
Gardner		1	2	1
Other Seculars, Educandas	200			2
	251	176	29	41
Total Convent Population	326	272[3]	50	79

1. All data for the year 1750 is based on Travada, El Suelo de Arequipa, in Odriozola, Documentos Literarios, 10: 238.

2. All data for the year 1786 is based on Pamplona, "Descripción de los conventos".

3. This figure does not include educandas and recogidas, whereas the 1750 figure does.

insuf .cient to cover needs not met from the common treasury.[10] The abuses which commonly resulted from this practice are not difficult to imagine. Perhaps more than any other single factor they perpetuated within the convent walls the social caste system which prevailed without. They also enabled ambitious nuns to buy influence or votes from fellow religious at election time.

Nor did the nuns limit their giving and spending to persons within the monastery walls. They sent out money or delicacies prepared in the private kitchens to confessors, advisors and other persons whose services deserved recognition, and were, in this manner, able to buy whatever theological and legal expertise was required to bolster their positions. It was, of course, quite possible for parents to add to the peculios of their religious daughters when extra money was required to support a cause of interest to the family as a whole. The peculios put the nuns who had them into the mainstream of worldly political and economic activity. For this reason, they were a prime target of reformers.

Reformers also criticized the many breaches of monastic cloister. Fear that monks and nuns would engage in illicit sexual activity remained in the background of at least some of the expression of concern for the maintenance of strict canonical cloister.[11] The Arequipeñan nuns of the 1780's and later do not appear to have been guilty of such excesses. At least some of the reformers' emphasis on the physical protection of seclusion must be explained by their desire to promote the spiritual gains and aids to contemplation which monastic cloister was designed to foster. Chastity was only one of many values threatened.

A significant obstacle to this removal from the world was the large number of secular women who lived within convent walls.[12] Students,

TABLE III: THE ECONOMY OF THE CONVENTS OF AREQUIPA

	SANTA CATALINA (est. 1580)	SANTA TERESA (est. 1710)	SANTA ROSA (est. 1747)	TOTAL
		REVENUES FROM PRINCIPAL[1]		
Date[2]				
1786[3]	21,434 pesos	10,892 pesos	8,100	40,426
1792[4]	25,910	9,922	8,332	44,164
1802[5]	23,525			
1804[6]	25,525	10,592	8,606	44,723
		OTHER ECONOMIC DATA - 1786		
Peculios	8,532 pesos	1,152[7] pesos	3,808 pesos	
Salaries paid out	3,906	1,278	725	
Av. income per nun, '86	223	518	213	
Av. peculio	89	55	100	
Av. income per nun, '02	331			

1. Capellania revenue, for which no reliable figures have come to hand, is not included in these figures for convent revenue. Capellania revenue had to be spent for the purposes indicated in the bequests, which were usually the celebration of feasts, Masses, etc., and not the support of the convent population.

2. All data for the year 1786 is based on Pamplona, "Descripción de los conventos".

3. It is interesting to compare these figures with some other church revenues. Álvarez in his "Plan que manifiesta los curatos..." Noticia, AGI, Lib. Mss. 44, states that the principal of the fourteen establishments of male religious in the province totaled 977,373, and that the income resulting from this principal was 42,040, a return of less than 4.5%. Santa Catalina's income for 1792 was 25,910, 61% of the total enjoyed by all fourteen establishments of male religious combined. Santa Catalina's principal

may be estimated to have been in the neighborhood of 450,000 pesos. Probably only the Jesuits, before their expulsion, could have rivalled the wealth of Santa Catalina.

Álvarez states further that the average annual yield of the tithe in the years 1785-1789 was 87,509 pesos, of which the king received 9,485 pesos, and the bishop, 19,504 pesos. Santa Catalina's income in those years was roughly 25% of the total annual tithe revenue. Pamplona's yearly contribution of 10,400 pesos to the convent was, thus, in excess of 50% of his net income from the tithe. It must be noted that the bishop derived a substantial income from other sources.

4. All data for the year 1792 is based on Álvarez, "Plan que manifiesta los curatos...", included in Noticia, AGI, Lib. Mss. 44.

5. All data for the year 1802 is based on Chávez to the Prioress Sor Petronila de las Mercedes y Moscoso, October 27, 1802, AAA, Reserved Letters.

6. All data for the year 1804 is based on Echeverría, Santa Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: between pp. 79-80.

7. The peculio income from Santa Teresa was put in the hands of the abbess. Although a nun could request that her needs be met out of this income, her peculio essentially became common property. Pamplona, "Descripción de los conventos".

recogidas, and maids were forbidden contacts with the world outside the walls. Given their ambivalent state, however, it was inevitable that these secular women would serve as a conduit which kept the convent abreast of the latest news, gossip, and fashions. Attempts to regulate their dress and correspondence operated under even greater handicaps than those directed at the nuns, whose violations of these types were frequent despite their solemn vows of cloister and poverty.[13] Of even greater concern to reformers were the nuns' unregulated meetings with family and friends. These served to perpetuate familial ties and involvement in political and economic concerns.

The numerous and explicit rules on cloister found in various programs for reform show to what degree monastic institutions like Santa Catalina had, in fact, become little more than associations of unmarried, upper-class women who were often more dedicated to advancing family interests, providing for their own comfort and producing spectacles on religious themes than to pursuing a life of prayer, contemplation, and authentic liturgical celebration. The resources controlled by convents as institutions and by its nuns as individuals were substantial and hence of interest to entrepreneurs outside its walls. The financial distress they experienced in the late eighteenth century cast doubt on their capacity for economic survival and on their ability to continue on as prime sources of investment capital for local business interests. This made the peculios more defensible, contributed substantially to the increased attention given to secular rather than spiritual concerns, and intensified the political conflicts which arose within convent walls. Breaches of cloister provided further fuel for these developments. The means chosen by reformers to take the monastery out of the secular world

show with unusual clarity the degree to which it was, in fact, intrinsically linked to external political and economic interests and the degree to which its ideals of monastic perfection suffered from the bond.

Miguel de Pamplona had been compelled by Santa Catalina's financial collapse to become directly involved in its affairs. He wasted no time in appointing an aggressive financial administrator for the convent, who succeeded in collecting some of the arrears owed as well as its current revenues. The bishop also imposed a limitation on the number of candidates allowed to enter the convent. His policy here was motivated by a desire to ensure that the convent would not continue to admit more nuns than its revenues would support.[14] While this restriction perhaps caused some disappointment among the nuns there is no record of protest. The sizeable subsidy Pamplona contributed no doubt restrained any tendency to grumbling.

Presumably things went along as best they might without the bishop's generous assistance during the interregnum which followed Pamplona's resignation. Chávez, as noted above, arrived in the city in September of 1788, and within a month had begun to make a visitation of its religious establishments, among them the three convents of nuns. Early in 1789, he sent a circular decree to each of the convents forbidding various excesses in the celebration of feasts, entertainments within convent walls, and specifying the type of dress allowed to seculars resident within. All three convents signed the circular, indicating their intention to conform to its precepts.[15]

In December of 1789, the canonically elected prioress of Santa Catalina, Madre María de la Visitación y Villegas, resigned from office and then died. She was replaced, as prescribed by the constitution of the

order, by the subprioress, Madre María Josefa de San Francisco de Paula y Benavides. An election was scheduled for January 1, 1790. It was preceded by a "scrutiny" which predicted who would be chosen as prioress.[16] Chávez did not approve of the selection, and postponed the election. On January 9, the bishop, accompanied by a retinue of ecclesiastical officials and notaries, visited the convent, convoked the nuns in a solemn assembly, and announced that he was indefinitely suspending canonical election of a new prioress.[17]

At this same time, Chávez named Madre María de Jesús y Ubalde as "presidenta" to govern the monastery until the next canonical election. He ordered the nuns to obey her under formal precept of holy obedience, and threatened them with excommunication if they refused. The new presidenta, as Chávez described her, was endowed with all the qualities required by the law and the constitution of the order. As the nuns later asserted, she was also completely addicted to the ideas of the bishop and was little more than his tool. She lacked any real basis of power in the community, was obviously unaccustomed to wielding authority over her equals, and was probably the social inferior of those nuns who usually monopolized officeholding. She proved to be politically inept in a situation which called for consumate skill.[18]

Chávez's audacity may have taken the nuns by surprise, for there was no immediate protest. Within a week, however, the group of nuns who had been turned out of power marshalled their forces and petitioned authorities in Lima for a redress of their grievances. As the days passed, their letters and lists of complaints against the bishop's measures grew longer and longer.[19]

In the three months which passed between her appointment as presi-

denta and Chávez's departure on April 12 for visitation of the districts of Cailloma and Condesuyos, Madre Ubalde attempted wholesale implementation of a comprehensive reform program devised by the bishop. The most striking features of this, in addition to the suspended election, were revocation of the nuns' powers to administer their peculios, a rigorous schedule of canonical religious exercises, and insistance that they live a common life.[20]

Chávez was hardly well out of the city when, after a bizarre occurrence in the convent church on the evening of April 26, he found himself forced to impose on the convent what amounted to a state of martial law to maintain Madre Ubalde in office and keep his program in operation. It is difficult to get a coherent and accurate impression from the accounts of the participants of what actually did occur that April night. According to Madre Ubalde, some of the nuns of lesser rank had expressed their fear of going to the dark church for evening prayers. Wishing to show compassion, the presidenta ordered the candle which lit the church moved from its usual location to a place where it would cast a direct light over the praying community. This gesture, seemingly reasonable enough, was made without prior consultation with any member of the convent council.[21] It served to set off the strange reaction described below.

Two of the mothers of the council, both former canonical prioresses, publicly asked the presidenta why the light had been moved to a position where it would cause discomfort to several ailing members of the community. She replied that she had been "inspired" to move the light by compassion for the fears of other members. Her response seems to have been construed to mean that she was proclaiming herself divinely inspired to

make the change so as to put the dissenters to some sort of test by ordeal. Then there began a general protest encompassing the entire range of the nuns' dissatisfaction. If the presidenta's few supporters can be believed, the protest verged on being a riot. The dissenters described it as a reasonable confrontation. Whichever description is correct, when it was over the presidenta had been effectively stripped of any hold on the government of the community.[22]

Seven nuns, among the approximately sixty nuns professed to solemn vows, supported the reform. Soon after the outbreak described above, these nuns wrote to Chávez recommending that the leaders of the resistance movement be deprived of their right to vote on all matters of concern to the community. Chávez accepted this suggestion. He further denied the five nuns considered most responsible the right to receive the Eucharist unless they were in immediate danger of death. He deprived Madres Paula Barreda and Mariano Olaguivel of the double ration of food they enjoyed as former prioresses, and left Madre Ubalde free to impose on them a further penance of her choice. This she was indiscreet enought to attempt. She ordered them to submit to a public scourging in front of the assembled community. Although Mariano de Rivero, Chávez's vicar-general, who was governing the diocese in his absence, was wise enought to dispense the nuns from this penance, the damage had already been done. The intended victims were elevated to the status of martyrs, while the presidenta gained a reputation for brutality. The retraction was taken as evidence that the imposition had been illegal, and that the entire procedure had been irrationally and hastily conceived.[23]

Chávez refused to lift the other penances. He tried by a combination of promises and threats to persuade the nuns to repent, and to abandon

their attempts to bring suit in Lima. In this he was unsuccessful. The nuns' appeals to the viceroy and Audiencia went forward. In February of 1791 the Audiencia ordered the penances completely repealed, the nuns' voting rights restored, and elections held. By fall of 1791 they had been. Madre Paula Barreda, one of the two former prioresses slated for public scourging by the presidenta, very probably the nun whose election Chávez had initially attempted to prevent, was elected to her second term as prioress.[24]

This was a stunning setback for Chávez. Some of the reforms initiated by Madre Ubalde seem, however, to have survived. The number of flagrant violations of the rules of cloister and silence was diminished, and some degree of asceticism in matters of food and clothing restored. Little progress seems to have been made in correcting violations of the vow of poverty, since only the eight nuns of the reform faction had ever agreed to deposit their peculios in the common treasury.

The reaction of the nuns to the reforms attempted by Chávez can best be described as the defense of a threatened aristocracy. The nuns asserted that they had entered the monastery under certain conditions and with certain customs in observance, and that these conditions and customs could not be changed without their consent.[25] They argued that benefactors had contributed specifically to the peculios of individual nuns and would be defrauded if these individuals were deprived of the benefit of the contribution so defined. They insisted that tacit toleration of abuses by those responsible for enforcing the law constituted tacit approval of relaxation in observance made over the course of time. They cited a "consensus" of opinion among legal experts that

reform, if not an outright danger to general wellbeing, was at the very least a serious inconvenience. They described a kind of circumstantial pressure which brought every ideal to a level of practice that was widely tolerable.[26] Presented in eminently reasonable terms, it was a truly remarkable moral stance for a group of nuns. It came close to asserting that those powerful enough to get their way ought not to be troubled by attempts to enforce legislation which ran counter to their interests. It amounted to a universal and absolute rejection of the very possibility of reform.

Chávez's attempts to regain control of the situation were not limited to the devices previously described, He also tried to isolate the dissenters from external sources of moral support or legal advice. He was forced to agree with the nuns that at least some ecclesiastical authorities made no objection to the violations of vows and monastic discipline against which he was waging war. Certain priests, among them the nuns' confessors, had a vested interest in their continuance. Confessors, selected by the convent on the basis of their compatibility with the nuns' spiritual aspirations, were traditionally rewarded for their sympathetic understanding of the nuns' problems by tips financed from the nuns' peculios. Under such circumstances, they were hardly likely to be demanding of their penitents, and the potential for outright corruption was certainly present. Chávez, while he could not seem to get a hold on the peculios of nuns unwilling to cooperate, could and did make a clean sweep of the confessors. He replaced them with men of his own choosing who were not at all to the nuns' liking.[27]

This gave the bishop a virtual spiritual stranglehold. The dissenters were quick to complain to the viceroy that the new confessors har-

rassed them beyond their ability to bear by requiring blind obedience to the bishop's commands under pain of mortal sin. They threatened to seek exclaustration unless their right to exercise human reason was respected. The matter of confessors continued to be disputed until November of 1802, when it was finally resolved in favor of the nuns.[28]

Chávez had also attempted to gain control of the monastery's finances in ways which, if not completely clear, were certainly controversial. As early as July of 1790, the bishop's persistant enemy, the teniente asesor José de la Iglesia, complained to the viceroy that Chávez had borrowed 42,000 pesos from the monastery's funds and put them to his own uses. He remarked parenthetically that it was amazing that the bishop had to do this, since his episcopal revenues were quite ample and he maintained only a small household. Four years later, the cathedral chapter protested that the bishop, at an unspecified date, had taken 20,000 pesos from Santa Catalina, pretending that they were a loan. It then stated that, when ordered to repay the sum by the Audiencia, he had returned most of the amount in the form of bad wheat whose value he had estimated at exhorbitantly inflated prices. The chapter further claimed that the bishop had made himself the real administrator of the finances of Santa Catalina, the other two convents of religious women and the seminary of San Geronimo by appointing as their collector and fiscal manager his personal steward and confidant, Juan Antonio Bustamante. Finally, Juan de Dios López del Castillo, in his capacity as provisor sindico or city attorney, complained that Chávez prevented the monasteries, brotherhoods, and other religious institutions from making loans to the laity.[29]

It is in this last statement of grievance that one of the principal

issues involved in the reform of Santa Catalina is brought to the fore. Santa Catalina's financial resources, though poorly managed and thus barely able to maintain the convent's population, were substantial. Figures compiled by Álvarez show that the total income derived by the fourteen institutions of male religious in the province was 42,040 pesos. At this same time, Santa Catalina alone collected an annual 25,910 pesos on its investments and loans, which, if they returned at a rate equivalent to those of the fourteen convents of religious men, must have totaled about 450,000 pesos of principal.[30]

The degree to which local interests were capital-hungry and the sources which they expected to tap for investment funds is highlighted by the establishment of the Mineralogical Society of Arequipa, approved by Viceroy Gil in March of 1792. Item 3 of the Society's bylaws stated explicitly that one of its principal objectives was to bring prosperity to Arequipa and its citizens of whatever state and condition they might be, <u>without excepting ecclesiastics in common or in particular</u>.[31] Little data on the Society's operation and actual shareholders has come to light, and it is not possible to say whether the convent as an institution or any of its nuns as individuals invested in its stock. Whatever the case, funds derived not only from Santa Catalina, but also from other religious corporations under the bishop's control would almost certainly have found their way through the hands of borrowers to the Mineralogical Society's pool of investment funds. That Chávez would attempt to take control of the city's major source of capital at such a time, however honorable his intentions, was understandably a cause for public outrage.

In all probability, Chávez was sincerely interested in restoring

economic stability through sound management for the sake of restoring conventual observance to an acceptable level of spiritual respectability. If he did, in fact, borrow a large sum of money from Santa Catalina he no doubt applied these funds to support the foundling home he established or to finance renovation of the diocesan seminary.[32] This would at least partially explain the opposition to both projects which he encountered. The creole aristocracy of Arequipa, by actively supporting the nuns' attempts to overturn the reforms, was defending its own financial priorities as well as its daughters' ease, comfort and convenience.

Santa Catalina was, more than any other institution in the city, a symbol of creole power. It had been founded in the immediate post-conquest period, and it had continued to be populated by the descendants of the conquistadores. It was, after the expulsion of the Jesuits and the expropriation of their property, the city's wealthiest institution. More than that, it was not, like the establishments of religious men tended to be, controlled from Spain and staffed partially by peninsulares. It was both the bastion and the preserve of the local aristocracy, which united to defend it. The Barredas, the Benavides, the Moscosos, the Viscardos and the Corzos would simply not allow control of an institution such as this to pass unchallenged to a peninsular bishop under any pretext whatever, including that of obligations assumed by religious profession.

The struggle between the bishop and the nuns continued until, in November of 1802, Charles IV suspended all "innovations" made by Chávez in the government and financial management of the monastery until they could be reviewed and approved by the king. He specifically ordered an audit of the accounts of the financial administrator appointed by Chávez

"with the intervention of the community", and an end to "novelty" in financial management.[33] After 1800, the need to shore up a shaky monarchy made the crown more sensitive to the aspirations and demands of Spanish-Americans. Prompted by such political considerations, the crown reviewed its own program for monastic reform and in effect decided that Chávez's attempt to implement it had been unadvisable. By 1802, the Bourbon monarchy had discovered that its will and ability to "finance" reform was severely limited by time and circumstances.

Charles's order of November, 1802, did not ignore the impact that the reform had had on the internal politics of the convent. The political struggle which erupted in the wake of Chávez's imposition of a presidenta in 1790 was in many ways a forecast of the conflict in civil politics which erupted after Napoleon seized control of the Spanish monarchy in 1808, in terms of the families involved and their attitudes toward democarcy and enforcement of legislation.[34]

Both groups of nuns within the convent quite naturally discussed the conflict over the reform in terms of rivalry over control of the priorate. While it is difficult to fully document and prove conclusively, two elements which seem to stand out as those that held the groups together are family ties and position on the social hierarchy. The aristocracy of Arequipa was interrelated to a very high degree. Perusal of Martínez's genealogies shows that almost every prominent family had managed at one time or another to marry into every other. Some strong patterns emerge, however.

The ten members of the convent council in the year 1790 were a relatively tight little group. There were two Barredas, two Ermosillas, one of the two Viscardos, a Moscoso, Olaguivel, Corzo, Benavides and

Mantilla.[35] Five of these nuns had been or would be prioress by the time Chávez resigned from his bishopric in 1804.[36] The families represented were, for the most part, intermarried with at least one of the other families on the list. The group had controlled the priorate for a number of years, and in the period of strife under discussion, monopolized the important offices of the convent, such as mistress of novices, mistress of lay sisters, disciplinarian, and treasury receivers almost completely. Understandably, they resented the interference of the bishop in the running of convent affairs, and led the opposition to Madre Ubalde and the reform. All of the five nuns upon whom Chávez imposed severe penances came from this group.

The name Ubalde does not appear prominently in Martínez's genealogies, and it has been difficult to place the presidenta in any family context whatever. The group took its real leadership, not from her but from the Araníbar family, which accounted for three of the seven nuns who supported the reform. They were also the only nuns to hold offices of any importance in the community, these being vicar of the house, procuradora, and convent secretary. The four other nuns in the group were from the families Cornejo, Angulo, Bedoya, and Bellido. Of these, Sor Angulo did not hold a listed position in 1790, Sor Cornejo was portress of the main door, and the other two were lesser infirmarians.[37]

When Chávez went to Santa Catalina on January 9, 1790 and announced suspension of elections, he was accompanied by Mariano de Rivero y Araníbar, his vicar-general; Doctores Antonio González de Rivero and José Portu, copastors of the cathedral; and Doctores Tadeo de la Llosa and Antonio Paez Zapata, both of whom he later appointed to the cathedral chapter. The Rivero family was related not only with the Araníbar

family so prominently represented among the reform nuns, but with the Portu family as well. This family grouping casts light not only on the political struggle within the convent, but also on the nature of some of Chávez's other political difficulties. It suggests questions about the motives for which the Riveros and Araníbars supported the reform and the degree to which Chávez suffered from his alliance with this group.[38]

If the list of convent officers is one index of local wealth and political clout, the list of founders of the Mineralogical Society is another. Prominent here were the interrelated and closely-knit Moscoso, Fuente y Loayza, Tristán, Goyeneche, and Barreda families. Of almost equal prominence, however, was the Rivero group. The Mineralogical Society was, thus, supported by both rival factions. Too little is known about the history of the foundation and operation of the Society to be able to answer the question which readily suggests itself: did the factions which developed in the convent of Santa Catalina take their existence directly from the struggle to gain access to investment capital for mining ventures, or was the ideological and political struggle of equal or greater importance? The question, though it cannot be answered now, is an important one.[39]

It is possible to describe the ideological discussion which provided the framework for the political and economic contest as a struggle of the amoral aristocratic group against the democratizing impact of the rule of law. The Barreda faction was consciously concerned with perpetrating its privileges and distinctions, where the Rivero faction supported a return to strict observance which eliminated all of the advantages of the first-runners in the field. Some indication of how the reform program fared in the latter part of the decade can be gleaned

from the letter written by the Madre Josefa de San Cayetano y Corzo to Chávez in March of 1800 upon conclusion of her term as prioress. It was an amazing valedictory which testified both to the intensity of the strife which the convent had experienced and to the persistance of the original problems.

After offering her opinion that the greater part of the community of Santa Catalina was spiritually healthy, the Madre Corzo blamed the continued disharmony on younger religious whose judgment was not yet "perfected", and who spared no effort to foster dissension at election time. These younger religious were no doubt members of the Aranĺbar faction, who continued to resist pressure for unanimous opposition to Chávez's efforts to impose the reform, and who seem to have continued their struggle to gain control of the priorate as well.

Madre Corzo described reforms attempted in the course of the two centuries since the convent's foundation as futile because the means chosen to foster spiritual renewal and exact observance had been dictated by the "flesh". She added that, when a few changes of appearance had been achieved, the reform had been considered to be complete and therefore no attempt to consolidate the gains had been made. Referring to current circumstances, she argued that, when force was used rather than persuasion, charity and modesty, true reform was simply impossible. She commented further that the nuns had to be provided with physical necessities before they would work to attain spiritual perfection. She closed by emphasizing the need to end the discord and return to a state of tranquility which both supported and rewarded monastic existence.[40] Coupled with her reiterated rejection of the possibility of spiritual renewal, there was a measure of sensible interpretation of the present

situation and a willingness to discuss it in a spiritual or moral framework. The ex-prioress was, in fact, correct in assuming that the time was not conducive for reform.

A year and a half after her letter was written, Charles's decree of November, 1802, put a definitive end to the bishop's program. Something seems to have been salvaged, however, for, in May of 1814, Chávez's successor wrote to inform the subprioress of Santa Catalina that he would not grant a dispensation allowing each nun to administer her own peculio.[41] By whatever miracle, this most sensitive aspect of Chávez's reform had evidently managed to take hold and survive the debacle of 1802 and his resignation in 1804.

The Aranívars and Riveros had made little apparent progress in their drive to obtain the priorate during the last decade of the eighteenth century. Their fortunes changed, however, in the early years of the nineteenth, when Sor Faustina de Nuestra Señora del Carmen y Aranívar, one of the dominant figures in the reform group, was elected to at least two terms as prioress. During this same period, Nicolás de Aranívar, her brother, and Mariano de Rivero y Bezoaín, a cousin, were elected to represent Arequipa in the Spanish Cortes.[42] There is no evidence yet available to suggest what, if any economic developments supported this rise to political power, or how their success at the polls was related to the election of the Madre Faustina to the priorate.

Because Santa Catalina was what it was, a depository of creole wealth, a source of badly needed investment capital and a theater for creole power plays, it was inevitable that any attempt to revise its mode of operations would provoke a strong reaction. Creoles perceived that control of the priorate and of the convent's economic resources

were vital to the success of their public and private undertakings. Canon law and crown-sponsored programs of reform administered by a peninsular bishop could not take Santa Catalina out of the hands of that sector of the creole population which contributed its wealth and its daughters to perpetuate the symbol of its aspirations.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 35-38; Asunción Lavrín, "The Role of the nunneries in the Economy of New Spain in the Eighteenth Century," HAHR xlvi, no. 4 (November 1966): 372-378, and Tables I-III, pp. 90, 91, and 93-94 below.

2. Lavrín, 382-388; Superunda, and Amat, Memorias de Gobierno, in Fuentes, 4: 57, 442ff.

3. Miguel de Pamplona noted that the convent had about 100,000 pesos in bad debts and had also lost about 14,500 pesos of its principal and many deeds. He stated that clothing which in normal times cost the convent 3,000 to 4,000 pesos cost 10,000 pesos during his episcopacy. See Miguel de Pamplona, "Descripción de los Conventos de Arequipa", n.d. (ca. 1786), CVU, vol. 32; and Ballesteros, 310.

4. Pamplona, "Articles which the king approved for the reform of the five great convents of Lima and which the bishop wishes to have observed in these convents", n.d. (ca 1786), CVU, vol. 32. See also Bernard E. Bobb, The Viceregency of Antonio María Bucareli in New Spain, 1771-1779, The Texas Pan-American Series (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), Chapter III, "The Vida Comun Controversy", pp. 63-84. On the reform program developed for conventual establishments in Spain, see Sarrailh, pp. 636-653.

5. See Richard Herr, The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), Chapter II, "Regalism and Jansenism in Spain", pp. 11-36.

6. Three or four thousand pesos was the usual dowry in Mexican convents. Peruvian convents probably demand a comparable amount. Cofradías sometimes assigned a portion of their funds to provide dowries to enable girls either to marry or enter a convent. See Lavrín, 375, and below, pp. 131-132.

7. Chávez stated that in the ten and one-half years between March 21, 1792 and September 20, 1802, sacristy outlay had exceeded income by 9,980.6 pesos. Chávez to the Prioress of Santa Catalina, Petronila de las Mercedes y Moscoso, October 27, 1802, AAA, Reserved Letters.

8. See Table II, p. 91.

9. See Pamplona, "Descripción de los Conventos", CVU, vol. 32, and Lavrín, 374-375.

10. See the Madres Paula Barreda, Mariana Olaguivel, Narcisa Viscardo, Bernardina Viscardo, María Josefa Benavides, and María Pittay to the King, n.d. (ca. July, 1790), AMA-CG, 1: 16r-26v, hereafter referred to as Resisting nuns to the King, July, 1790. For an example of the extravagance of dress not uncommon among wealthy nuns, see Pál Kelemen, Baroque and Rococo in Latin America, 2 vols., (New York: Dover, 1967),

1: 223-224, and 2: Plate 150, "Portrait of a Nun", by José de Alcíbar.

11. The Noticias Secretas of Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa is, perhaps, the most famous source of accounts of such excesses.

12. Recogidas were women who either chose or were assigned by the authorities to live within convent walls when they had been deprived of male supervision by death, separation, or divorce. See Table II, p. 91.

13. See Pamplona, Articles, for instances of rules, and by implication, abuses. See also Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, in Fuentes, 4: 440ff.

14. See Pamplona,"Descripción de los Conventos". Pamplona's desire to limit the number of religious entering the convent seems to be related only to his desire to reduce the total number of nuns to a number which the convent's revenues could support. The Mexican reform restricted entrance to those women willing to accept the common life. While this may also have been a consideration with Pamplona, he does not mention it explicity. See Bobb, p. 70.

15. Chávez, Decree, February 14, 1789, BNL, C 4173.

16. Madres Antonia de Jesús, María, Joseph y Mantilla, Petronilla de Sta. Getrudis y Moscoso, Lucia de Santa Rita y Barreda, and María de la Corona y Pittay to the King, n.d. (ca. February, 1790), AAL, leg. 26, hereafter referred to as Resisting nuns to the King, February, 1790.
It is possible that these signatures reflect a copyist's error or omission. No nun by the name of Petronilla de Sta. Getrudis y Moscoso appears on the list of convent officials for the year 1790 (BNL,C 1179). While this list does not include every nun in the convent, it includes most of those important enought to be allwed to sign such letters. It is probable that the name Petronila de Sta. Getrudis y Moscoso is a combination of the names Petronila de las Mercedes y Moscoso and Bernardina de Sta. Getrudis y Vixcardo, both of whom signed other documents of the resistance.

17. Chávez to the Convent of Santa Catalina, January 9, 1790. BNL, C 1179. This was consistant with implementation of the reform as practiced in Mexico, where officers of the convents were required to be elected from among those nuns who accepted the common life. See Bobb, p. 70.

18. Chávez to the Convent of Santa Catalina, January 9, 1790, BNL, C 1179; Resisting nuns to the King, February, 1790, AAL, leg. 26, and above, pp. 98-99.

19. Nuns of Santa Catalina to the Viceroy, January 20, 1790, BNL, C 1179; Resisting nuns to the King, February, 1790, AAL, leg. 26; Madres Antonia de Jesús, María, Josef y Mantilla, Petronila de Sta. Getrudis y Moscoso, Lucia de Santa Rita y Barreda, Josefa de San Cayetano y Corzo to the Viceroy, n.d. (between April 12 and April 26, 1790), AAL, leg. 26, hereafter referred to as Resisting nuns to the Viceroy, April, 1790; Madres Paula del Transito Barreda, Mariana de la Madre de Dios Olaguivel

y Loaiza, Narcisa de N. Sa. del Pilar Viscardo, María de la Corona y Pittay, Bernardina de Sta. Getrudis y Viscardo, Petronila de las Mercedes y Moscoso, Antonia de Jesús, María y Josef y Mantilla, María de la Soledad y Hermosilla, Tomasa de San Francisco de Sales y Otasu, Lucia de Sta. Rita y Barreda, and Josefa de San Cayetano y Corzo to the King, n.d. (ca. June, 1790), AAL, leg. 26, hereafter referred to as Resisting nuns to the King, June, 1790; and Resisting nuns to the King, July, 1790, AMA-CG, 1: 16r-26v.

20. Resisting nuns to the King, February, 1790, AAL, leg. 26.

21. Presidenta Madre María Josefa de Jesús y Ubalde to Chávez, April 27, 1790, BNL, C 1179.

22. Ibid., Resisting nuns to the King, June, 1790, AAL, leg. 26, and Madres Faustina de Nuestra Señora del Carmen y Aranívar, María Rosa del Patrocinio y Cornejo, Rosa de Sta. María y Angulo, María Mercedes de la Concepción Bedoya, Josefa de los Dolores y Bellido to Chávez, April 27, 1790, BNL, C 1179, hereafter referred to as Reform nuns to Chávez, April 27, 1790.

23. Reform nuns to Chávez, April 27, 1790, BNL, C 1179; Chávez, Decree regarding the five punished religious, May 28, 1790, BNL, C 1179; Resisting nuns to the King, June, 1790, AAL, leg. 26, and Resisting nuns to the King, July, 1790, AMA-CG, 1: 16r-26v. For the geneahogies of the families involved see Santiago Martínez, La Catedral de Arequipa y sus capitulares (Arequipa: Tipografía Cuadros, 1931): Aranívar, pp. 449-460; Barreda, pp. 39-51, 378-391; Benavides, pp. 246-262; Goyeneche, pp. 378-391; La Fuente, pp. 416-427; Moscoso, pp. 183-192; Portu, pp. 482-485; Rivero, pp. 92-110, 125-133, 276-278; and Viscardo, pp. 260-262.

24. See Mariano de Rivero to Chávez, August 13, 1790, and Audiencia of Lima, Decree, February 4, 1791, BNL, C 1179; and Chávez to the Prioress of Santa Catalina, Paula Barreda, October 26, 1791, AAA. Mexican precedent was again set aside. See Bobb, pp. 67-68.

25. Here the nuns may have been attempting to use Mexican precedent to support their position. See Bobb, p. 70.

26. Resisting nuns to the King, July, 1790, AMA-CG, 1: 16r-26v.

27. Charles III, in his decree ordering convent reform for Mexico, had mandated that all officials involved in its implementation put any appeals made against it in a closed file, thus preventing interested parties from blocking the reform by instigating lengthy court suits. Chávez no doubt had this provision in mind when he attempted to frustrate the nuns' attempts to appeal by confiscating convent papers and threatening to excommunicate Blas de Quiros and Diego de Aldave y Salamanca if they continued to furnish legal services to the group opposed to reform. See Resisting nuns to the King, February, 1790, AAL, leg. 26; Resisting nuns to the King, July, 1790, AMA-CG, 1: 16r-26v; Juan de la Cruz Errasquin, Statement of Chávez's position, January 13, 1792, and Madres Paula Barreda, Catalina de Sena, Mariana Olaguivel, María Josefa

Benavides, Josefa Corzo, María Clara Arismendi to Rafael Hurtado, March 8, 1792, AMA-CG, 1: 16r-26v, 30r-31r, 32r-33r; and Bobb, 70-71, 74-75, 83.

Chávez's methods of dealing with uncooperative confessors had been previously used by the bishop of Puebla, Mexico. He was still complaining about the nuns' gifts to confessors in 1797. See Chávez to the Prioress of Santa Catalina, July 21, 1797, AAA, Reserved Letters.

28. Resisting nuns to the King, June, 1790, AAL, leg. 26; and King to Chávez, November 10, 1802, AMA-CG, 1: 93r-94r.

29. The 20,000 pesos mentioned by the cathedral chapter may have been included in the 42,000 pesos mentioned by José de la Iglesia. Iglesia to Gil, July 24, 1790, BNL, C 1179, and Summary of the Fiscal of New Spain, Representation of the Cathedral Chapter (July 20, 1794), Item #2; Representation of Juan López del Castillo, December 9, 1794, AMA-CG, 7: 316r, 317r.

30. See Table III, pp. 93-94.

31. Proyecto y Ordenanzas de la Sociedad Mineralogica de Arequipa, pp. 38-40, ANA.

32. See below, Chapters V and VI.

33. King to Chávez, November 10, 1802, AMA-CG, 1: 93r-94r.

34. See below, Chapters VIII and IX.

35. List of convent officials for the year 1790, BNL, C 1179.

36. The Madres Barreda and Olaguivel had served prior to Chávez's arrival. The prioresses subsequently elected were the Madres Benavides, 1794; Corzo, 1797; Barreda, third term, 1800; and Moscoso, in 1802, the Madre Barreda having died before her term of office was completed. As Chávez later noted in his response to subsequent charges that he had interfered with the nuns' right to elect freely, all the prioresses were chosen from among those resisting the reform. Chávez to Silvestre Collar, August 9, 1800, AAA, Reserved Letters.

37. List of convent officials for the year 1790, BNL, C 1179.

38. See Martínez, Capitulares, pp. 92-110, 125-133, 276-278, and 449-460, and below,

39. It is possible that Peruvian miners may have looked primarily to religious establishments for investment capital, where Mexican miners supplied their needs primarily from merchants. See Proyecto y Ordenanzas de la Sociedad Mineralogica de Arequipa, pp. 38-40, ANA; and D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru," HAHR 52, no. 4 (November, 1972), 566-568.

40. Dissident nuns alleged that Chávez used the letter as pretext for initiating a new round of "oppressions". See (Madre Corzo) to

Chávez, March 26, 1800, and Cataline religious of the city of Arequipa or the largest and healthiest part of the community united to its current prioress to the King, n.d. (1800), AMA-CG, 1: 55r-59r and 270r-277r (order scrambled).

41. Encina to Madre Justina de San Rafael y Febres, May 22, 1814, BNL, D 11884.

42. Encina to Madre Faustina de Nuestra Señora del Carmen y Araníbar, December 12, 1814, BNL, D 11884, and below, pp. 243-244.

CHAPTER V

THE FOUNDLING HOME

The city of Arequipa faced, in common with almost every sizeable urban center of the time, the need to provide for numbers of orphaned, abandoned, or otherwise uncared-for children. This was a problem which, by virtue of its magnitude and by reason of its social and moral implications, demanded to be dealt with. The cities and towns which made a serious attempt to do so found, without exception, that the solution was both costly and controversial.

In the eighteenth century, Spanish national interests harmonized with the teaching of the Church that the purpose of marriage was the procreation of children.[1] Spain was hoping to repair population damage caused by war, epidemic disease, unfavorable economic conditions and large numbers of vocations to the religious life. Population growth was seen as a necessary precondition to restored imperial vitality.[2] Government interest in increased population did not, however, provide an answer to problems which arose from orphanage and the procreation of offspring outside the bonds of legitimate marriage or in excess of a family's will or ability to support. Since contraceptive techniques then employed were ineffective and since there was a high incidence of illicit sexual activity, especially in the colonies, the problem of orphaned and abandoned children reached a dimension which it was impossible for government and society to ignore.[3]

Before and during the eighteenth century, such social problems were usually handled at the local level. Most municipalities experienced chronic and severe inability to pay even for the most basic services. The church, however, was both wealthy and interested, so solutions were

usually attempted either under its direct auspices, or by cofradías, voluntary fraternal organizations with religious orientation. The brotherhoods provided for the social and religious needs of their members and undertook works of charity for the benefit of non-members as well. Public spirited citizens were sources of additional aid for the needy. Their contributions were often given in the form of bequests which were usually administered by the diocese or by one of the many religious orders. Such bequests also came under the supervision of the state, which attempted to insure that the testator's wishes for the disbursement of his money were honored. It was a common assumption that the poor had a claim on the surplus wealth in the hands of both the church and private citizens, since the state's resources were not yet capable of meeting the needs of less fortunate individuals or classes.

Enlightened bureaucrats of the eighteenth century, however, found much to criticize in the church's management of functions related to charity. They blamed the indiscriminate liberality with which the church dispensed alms for the creation of a sizeable, permanent and obnoxious population of professional beggars who, assured of a minimum supply of food, lived a life of idleness and crime when they might have been making a contribution to national prosperity. The reformers' conviction that the able poor should not be allowed to be idle gave rise to a rash of proposals to create institutions which would teach them useful trades to enable them to support themselves, lead orderly lives in the future, and cease being a burden and nuisance to society.[4)]

The reformers not only campaigned to prevent the distribution of food and money to all who came begging at cathedral and convent doors, they also attempted to enlist secular institutions, economic societies

and municipalities, to aid in the development, management and operation of social welfare projects. It was, however, clear that the crown viewed its municipal partners as its agents and not as bodies entitled to independent interests and viewpoints. Because of this attitude, and because the municipalities were financially unable to assume new burdens and responsibilities, the crown often found that it derived greatest support for the new policies of enlightened charity from educated ecclesiastics rather than from the municipal or local institutions which it appeared to have endowed with new functions and powers. The municipalities, for their part, often preferred to have the problem handled by the church in the traditional, stop-gap way.[5]

It is not known whether the city of Arequipa made any organized effort to care for foundlings and orphans prior to the 1780's. The crises of 1780-1784 no doubt increased the number of such children over customary levels. It is probable that orphans survived the best they could if they were not fortunate enough to be absorbed into a family of relatives of friends. Children whose birth was considered shameful, or beyond the ability of parents to support were either abandoned in circumstances equivalent to infanticide, or left on doorsteps where it was hoped that the piety of those within would see to the rearing of the child. Numerous incidences of infanticide made the situation impossible to ignore.[6] The interests of both church and state coalesced and demanded that more adequate arrangements be made to deal with the surplus population of unwanted infants of both legitimate and illegitimate birth.

Who were the foundlings of Arequipa and what was their number? Statistics from the home which opened its doors there in December of

1788 make it possible for us to estimate the seriousness of the problem which the city faced. While the data is far from ample, there is enough material to suggest some conclusions. In a letter to Viceroy Avilés written in July of 1804, Chávez told him that, from the admission of its first charges to the date of the letter, 1431 children had been received. This was an average of 91 per year or 7.6 per month in a period of slightly in excess of fifteen and one-half years. At this time, the population of the city of Arequipa and its suburbs probably numbered between 17,000 and 18,000 people. Thus, it is likely that foundlings and orphans approximated .4 - .5% of the area's total population.[7]

All the foundlings and orphans were not necessarily native to the city and its suburbs. The home was instructed to receive any children who were sent and survived the journey from any of the districts of the province.[8] The difficulties of travel over long stretches of desert or treacherous mountain roads made it likely, however, that the majority of the children received came from areas relatively close by. Furthermore, the areas removed from the city were populated by a greater percentage of Indians not yet fully absorbed into Spanish culture and mores. There, despite the strictures of the church, regularized marriages were not necessarily the norm. Illegitimacy was not the stigma among the Indians that it was among the urban Spanish. This factor, coupled with the harsh geography, made it likely that the home drew most of its population from a more limited area than European foundling homes located in more hospitable terrain and uniform culture.[9]

Chávez stated that, in 1804, 28 of the 40 residents, or 70% of those then living in the home were presumed illegitimate. He also stated

that the home was, at the time, paying seventy-two extern wet nurses, or amas for the care of as many infants or young children. It is probable that the proportion of illegitimate to legitimate was about the same or greater among these younger children.[10]

It is startling to note that of the 1,431 children who were received in the home from the time of its opening in 1778, only 40 were resident in 1804. This suggests that the mortality rate among the infants and children may have reached as high as 75 - 80%. If the average child stayed in the home until the age of eleven or twelve, a 50% mortality rate may be presumed. If the average stay extended until the child reached the age of fourteen or fifteen, a rate of 75 - 80% is more likely.[11] Chávez, however, stated in this same letter that there were then in the casa fourteen girls, or 35% of its population, who were fourteen to twenty-two years of age. This, of course, drives the presumed mortality rate even higher.[12]

Such mortality figures are very much in line with those available for European foundling homes, and can be accounted for by the trauma of exposure and by the poverty of the surroundings in which the child subsequently lived with its ama. Strict regulations provided that an ama might not be paid her three pesos monthly wage for care of her charge unless she appeared with him to collect, or presented a certificate, signed by the pastor of her parish, that the child was still alive. Such a provision further underlines the presumption that the mortality rate of foundlings was expected to be high.[13]

Chávez also stated that more than thirty of the forty children resident in the casa were girls. Why the male population was only in the neighborhood of 20% cannot be determined with certainty. It is

possible that fewer boys than girls were exposed, that the mortality rate of male infants was greater, that more boys than girls were adopted by childless couples, or that the boys were sent out to work sooner. These factors probably combine to explain the lop-sided percentages. The 35% of the total population represented by the females aged fourteen to twenty-two is rather clearly attributable to the fact that these girls had had neither dowries nor marriages arranged for them. As seen below, Chávez petitioned Avilés to award dowries to several of the young ladies so that they could marry or enter religion and thus relieve the home of the increased expenses of providing for their needs. 14)

With this perspective of the relative significance of the problem in Arequipa, it is now time to consider the steps taken to solve it. The foundling home may be said to have had its beginnings with the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish Empire in 1767. This drastic move on the part of the royal government not only created a vacuum of educational manpower, it left vacant all of the Jesuits' real property. The assets of the numerous pious foundations administered by the Order were likewise unassigned. From this Pandora's Box, after twenty years of vacillation and uncertainty, the Casa de Niños Expósitos emerged.

In the Pragmatic Sanction which ordered the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from Spain and its empire, the royal government decreed that Jesuit properties be applied to religious causes including conciliar seminaries, hospices for the poor and foundling homes. 15) In Arequipa, the first disposition of La Compañía, as the Jesuit Colegio was called, was made in favor of the diocesan seminary, at a time when the episcopacy was vacant. Neither the chapter, which governed during vacancies, nor successive bishops took any action to appropriate the property for

the use of the seminary which already functioned in a marginal way on a site on the plaza mayor. During these same years, the city council initiated a series of unsuccessful attempts to establish a preparatory school and university in the two cloisters of La Compañía. The property, however, remained vacant until 1780, when troops sent from Lima to quell the tax uprising of January, 1780, were lodged within its walls. The troops, first resented and then welcomed by the populace, remained in the city on a permanent basis.[16]

In 1783, Miguel de Pamplona, then bishop, received authorization from the Lima Junta Superior de Temporalidades, charged with the administration of Jesuit property, to establish a hospice for the poor in at least one of the two cloisters of the Colegio.[17] The earthquake which devastated the city in 1784 did its share to add to the pressure on La Compañía. Because of damage sustained by the building which housed the government office complex, the armory, mint, and mercury monopoly were moved into the Colegio as well. They remained there while Álvarez's plans to rebuild the office complex on a grander scale gathered dust on the desks of his superiors in Lima.[18] Thus, in the twenty-year period from the Jesuit expulsion to the arrival of Chávez, competition had arisen for possession of La Compañía, with the episcopacy and the intendancy as leading rivals for control of the facility, and the municipality's plans for a university standing in the wings.

It must be remembered that the Jesuit properties as well as the pious funds formerly administered by the Order were derived from donations from the local gentry, whose original intentions for the use of the monies had been frustrated by the expulsion of the Society. It is not surprising that royal approval of plans to convert the Colegio into

a foundling home, despite the clearly indicated wishes of the city council that it be used for a university, should generate bad feeling. Nor is it surprising that the city fathers, habitually strapped for public and personal funds, preferred to arrange a low-cost education for their legitimate sons rather than a relatively costly establishment to benefit children who were either their own illegitimate offspring or castoffs of the lower, disreputable classes. Royal plans for improved social welfare were, in this instance, in direct conflict with the aspirations and ambitions of the creole aristocracy.

The brevity of Pamplona's episcopacy (1783-1786), was at least one of the factors which explain his failure to complete the establishment of a hospice for the poor in the Jesuit Colegio. The episcopal interregnum which followed his resignation allowed Álvarez, with the cooperation and support of the city council, to assume a lead position in the development of a program to care for the poor and the orphaned, and an opportunity to steer it along lines more acceptable to themselves.

On April 27, 1787, Juan de Dios López del Castillo, a member of the city council, presented to Álvarez a plan to build a foundling home. He proposed to support the establishment by various means including a lottery like that established in Lima and an endowment valued at 40,000 pesos left by Don Manuel Priego specifically to support orphans and foundlings. Revenues from this legacy were, however, to be available only after the death of his widow, Doña Juana. His bequest carried the additional condition that, if a foundling home were not established in Arequipa, the endowment should pass to benefit the already functioning home in Lima.[19]

Several things may be noted about López del Castillo's plan. First,

a house was to be built, thus freeing the Colegio for other uses. Second, the establishment was to be financed by lotteries and the Priego-Peralta bequest and not from legacies formerly administered by the Jesuits which might be converted to other uses. Third, the city of Arequipa stood to lose a sizeable endowment to Lima if it did not make some provision for the care of orphans and foundlings by the time of the death of Señora de Peralta.

This proposal was sent to the viceroy, who, after consultation with the Audiencia, approved it in principle in April of 1788, and informed Álvarez that work might be begun. Since there were not sufficient funds on hand, Álvarez found it necessary to consult with the city government. Together, they decided to raise the necessary monies by staging a bullfight, obtaining the commutation of some unspecified pious funds to benefit the home, and reassigning to it the revenues designated to support a proposed hospice for the aged. The most probable source of money was, however, Señora de Peralta. When asked by the committee if she would be willing to advance some funds for the project, the lady, apparently a prudent investor, replied that, when the home was finished, she would make whatever donation appeared appropriate to her. Because of her effective refusal to contribute, and the inadequacy of the other means, Álvarez chose, or was forced, to let matters rest until Chávez arrived on September 6, 1788.[20]

The bishop, when presented with the proposal for the establishment of a home for orphaned and abandoned children, perhaps as early as September 17, responded enthusiastically. He commented that there was no need to postpone reception of such children beyond the present, since they might be housed in the portion of the Colegio reserved for them by

the Lima Junta in 1783. While the civil government was, no doubt, displeased by this suggestion, there is no mention of overt opposition to it, and the first children were admitted in December of 1788.[21] In this same month Chávez sent to the viceroy a constitution for the institution which he had drawn up by October 24 of that year.[22] This gives reason to suspect that the bishop had learned about both the project and the politics surrounding it during his stay in Lima, and had come to Arequipa prepared to recover the lead position for the episcopacy and to champion the type of approach in favor in Madrid.

Some time after Chávez had submitted the first version of a constitution for the home, a royal decree dated January 17, 1790 arrived. It contained orders that a junta be formed in Arequipa for the purpose of examining this constitution. The junta, composed of an equal number of ecclesiastical and secular officials, was established. It met, formulated opinions, and squabbled over questions of precedence. During this period, Chávez separated himself completely from its work, refusing to attend its sessions when in the city or to supply his opinions on time to meet the deadline for the departure of mail for Europe. When pressed to cooperate by López del Castillo, a member of the committee, Chávez answered, in effect, that the junta might do whatever it pleased. He asserted that his delay in complying with its requests was detrimental neither to the royal treasury nor to the public, since episcopal revenues provided the total support for the casa.

After a delay of several years, Chávez sent the junta a new and expanded constitution and instructed that body to regard the document as his final opinion and vote. He suggested that both his proposals and the junta's be submitted to the Consejo de Indias for final resolution.[23]

This, in fact, occurred. The inability of the intendancy and its municipal allies on the one hand and the bishop on the other to come to accord stemmed both from resentments between the two parties related to the concurrent concurso and convent-reform controversies and from their inherently incompatible interests regarding the disposition of Jesuit properties and assets.

The areas of controversy to be resolved were three: first, the question as to whether secular or ecclesiastical members of the present junta and future governing board of the home should take precedence; second, questions which concerned management of the children to be cared for; and third, the means of financing the institution's operations. Although the issue of precedence was theoretically resolved in Madrid in favor of the secular officials, actual power over the institution remained in the hands of Bishop Chávez for the duration of his episcopacy. With one exception, disagreements over the management of the orphans and foundlings involved minor matters of scheduling and routine and were also resolved in Madrid.

The third disagreement between the proposals made by Chávez and those made by the junta concerned the support of the home. While the junta had recommended a weekly lottery as the easiest means of raising at least some of the necessary money, Chávez had opposed it on grounds that in Arequipa a lottery would not be productive enough, and might well prove prejudicial to a public whose addiction to gambling was already excessive. Since Chávez had offered to continue supporting the home from funds at his disposal, Madrid denied permission for the lottery and effectively assigned financial responsibility and control of the home to the bishop.[24]

This and the continued presence of troops in the Colegio remained focal points for tension far into the future. In 1797, Chávez's attorney in Lima, Uceda, authored a lengthy complaint about the civil government's refusal to remove troops from La Compañía and the devious rationales to which it resorted to explain away its disobedience to royal orders to that effect. In the course of this protest, the attorney insinuated that, should there have been question of establishing a university in the Colegio, the intendant would immediately have recognized the need to evacuate the troops, whereas he refused to acknowledge this same need when the beneficiaries of the move would be orphans and foundlings.

Uceda's appeal was a partisan but effective accusation of bad faith. It aimed to depict the intendancy and the municipality as callous to the needs of poor, defenseless children, and unadvisedly determined to establish a university despite the fact that the project was financially unrealistic in order to satisfy the demands and ambitions of the influential. He skillfully contrasted the concerns of a charitable bishop, sensitive to the wishes of the king and the needs of his entire flock, with the concerns of the intendant, who favored the pretensions of the municipal government and those it represented at the expense of the common good.[25]

In 1788, Chávez had applied to the casa all the pious foundations formerly administered by the Jesuits and put at the disposal of the episcopacy by the Junta Superior de Temporalidades. These funds constituted one element in the financial structure which supported the casa. In his 1804 letter to Viceroy Avilés, Chávez put the total principle at the disposition of the home at 48,558.2 pesos, and said that the sum was return-

ing an annual 2301.6 pesos, a rate of about 4.75% According to Uceda's account to the viceroy in 1797, the principle was comprised as follows: 18,000 pesos in a hacienda in Majes owned by José Joaquin Tristán; 2,000 pesos loaned to Antonio Alvízuri; two fields and a house donated by Manuel Priego y Cano and his widow, Señora de Peralta, valued at 3,000 pesos; 14,000 pesos in pious foundations which Chávez had either considered applicable to the home, or which he had commuted to that purpose; and a fund of 10,000 pesos left by the former bishop of Arequipa, Juan Cavero, for the benefit of the poor. The product of this fund, customarily distributed to the needy on the vespers of the feast of Saint Joseph, had obviously been redirected by Chávez to the benefit of the home.[26]

Uceda's figures total 47,000 pesos. They were, no doubt, given in round numbers. The attorney claimed that the sum produced about 4,000 pesos a year, which would have amounted to a return of 8.5%. This seems extravagant at a time when the Peruvian economy was hardly in a better condition than when, seven years later, Chávez had put the return on 48,558 pesos at 4.75%. Uceda's overestimate was probably a result of his desire to contrast a bright financial outlook for the foundling home with the dim prospects to be faced by the university which the municipality was still attempting to establish in the quarters occupied by the foundling home. Chávez, in 1804, was forced to be more accurate.

The bishop estimated yearly expenses for running the home at about 6,000 pesos, but stated that the budget deficit amounted to about 36,000 pesos.[27] How he obtained this figure is not completely clear. Income from the institution's capital, 2301.6 pesos per year, would have pro-

duced an average annual deficit in the neighborhood of 3700 pesos which, over a sixteen year period, would have amounted to about 59,000 pesos. He then noted that, in an attempt to deserve the royal confidence and to fulfill his responsibility to the foundling home, he had made donations and distributions amounting to over 58,926 pesos. It is possible that Chávez had been able to commute or "distribute" funds amounting to 23,000 pesos to the home and that he had covered the remaining 36,000 pesos by donations from his episcopal revenues, perhaps with the help of a loan from the convent of Santa Catalina.

However he managed, it is clear that Chávez was experiencing serious difficulty in finding funds with which to pay the institution's bills. The bishop had explained his failure to obtain contributions from the local population as a "lack of enlightenment" on its part. It was more probably creole refusal to agree with the bishop on the priorities to be followed in the allocation of scarce funds.

Chávez was, at the time, contemplating resignation from his bishopric. In the face of local unwillingness to support the foundling home and uncertainty about the generosity of his unknown successor, the bishop was endeavoring to insure as far as possible that the project on which he had expended such effort would not fail for monetary reasons.[28] Chávez informed the viceroy that the home would come into an additional 1,248 pesos annual revenue from the fund established by Manuel Priego and his wife, Doña Juana, at her death. He remarked somewhat ruefully, however, that this lady was still living at the age of eighty-four. Chávez then appealed to the viceroy to use his authority to assign funds from two other sources to the benefit of the foundling home, the first being an endowment of unspecified intent formerly

administered by the Jesuits but not put at his disposition by the Junta de Temporalidades, and the second, two dowry funds.

The bishop informed the viceroy that the first of the two, a donation made by Juan Gómez Chacón, had a capital of 3,333 pesos, which was invested in the hacienda owned by Juan Antonio Pielago in the Valley of Vitor and returned 100 pesos annually. He stated further that no disbursement of this annual product had been made since the expulsion; that 900 pesos of the total income remained in the Cajas Reales de Arequipa while the remainder had been sent to Lima. Chávez reminded Avilés that, since the dissolution of the municipal juntas de temporalidades in October of 1789, the viceroy had held complete jurisdiction over funds formerly administered by the Jesuits. He asked him to make the home the beneficiary of this endowment on grounds that care of foundlings and orphans was the most pious of all works and most recommended by the king.[29]

Chávez also petitioned the viceroy to assign the two annual dowry grants, 500 pesos on the endowment established by Juan Ordónez Villaguirán, and 400 pesos on that established by Juan Gómez Chacón, also under the jurisdiction of the Junta de Temporalidades, to two of several girls then resident in the home. He described the candidates as deserving because they were Spanish, attractive, well-behaved and efficient workers. This disposition, the bishop pointed out, would allow the girls to follow their vocations, spare the home the increased expenses of maintaining them, and give the public the benefit of good mothers of families or good religious.[30]

Chávez had come into conflict previously over the matter of dowries. A brief look at his former difficulties may shed some light on the signi-

ficance of this issue in its current context. Dowry funds were a relatively common form of almsgiving in the Spanish world, and the deeds of donation often specified that the dowry be awarded so as to provide an opportunity for a poor girl of good birth to marry at or at least near her station. While dowry funds were often administered by religious establishments, as the Gómez Chacón fund described above had been, they were also often part of the operations of cofradías or religious brotherhoods.

One such brotherhood in Arequipa was the Cofradía de la Concepción. Information on its history and activities is scarce, but the following is known. Royal confirmation for its establishment had been granted on May 26, 1788, only months before Chávez arrived in Arequipa, but after the city council had begun planning to establish a foundling home. Its chaplain was the dean of the cathedral chapter, Pedro de Santa María, about whom the squabbles for precedence on the foundling home junta had centered. At least some of the brotherhood's funds were used to provide funeral benefits for its members. It also supplied dowries for poor girls.[31] In the early 1790's, after the death of Santa María, Chávez consolidated his control over the foundling home, which was dedicated to the virgin under the title of the Immaculate Conception. At this same time, the Cofradía of the Concepción became a source of strife between the bishop, the intendant, and the city council.

The first conflict was on a relatively personal level. Álvarez, habitually short of money to meet the extra expenses of office and the needs of a large family, perhaps despaired of his ability to provide for his seven or eight children in a manner commensurate with their status. He applied to the Cofradía de la Concepción for dowries for two of his

daughters, asking that the funds be advanced to him under bond. Either the request would have been a humiliating one for Álvarez to make, or it was an indication that dowry funds had routinely been awarded somewhat corruptly, or without due attention to the fact that the recipients were supposed to be poor. Chávez, under whose control the dowry funds were, refused to agree to the grant on grounds that the daughters of the intendant were not, by his standards poor girls, and also because the oldest of them had barely reached the age of six. He later remarked that his refusal embittered relations between himself and the intendant for some time to come.[32]

Álvarez's request may be indicative of a pattern whereby the brotherhood's dowries had come to be reserved for those members of the upper class whose resources did not quite match their pretensions. Such men, if members of the cofradía, may well have used the funds awarded to their daughters as an added attraction to be offered to immigrant peninsulares of lesser social status who sought to complement their success in commerce with marriage into an established family whose fortune was on the decline. Whatever the case, Chávez's determination to restrict access to them to poor girls no doubt had overtones which were very irritating to an aristocracy which was less wealthy than it desired to be and not at all in a paternalistic frame of mind. That Chávez might regularly award the cofradía's dowries to girls from the foundling home no doubt caused even deeper resentment. For whatever reason, the city council took advantage of the existence of what seems to have been an unforeseeable surplus in the brotherhood's dowry fund to complain to the crown about the bishop's "disordered" investment of them.[33]

Although no information has come to hand on the matter, it must be asked whether the brotherhood had been one element in the city council's plan to cope with the problem of foundlings and orphans in a manner which was not costly and which did not involve use of the facilities of the Jesuit Colegio. In 1794, Chávez's constitution for the foundling home received royal approval. In that same year, the intendant, city council and cathedral chapter launched a campaign to drive Chávez out of Arequipa. Prominent among the charges leveled were allegations that Chávez's policies and programs were an intolerable financial burden and were designed, not to meet the modest needs of Arequipa, but to call attention to the bishop as an enterprising reformer and zealous servant of the king. Chávez was also accused of having usurped the presidency of the Cofradía de la Concepción at a meeting held to elect its officers.[34]

Chávez's establishment of the foundling home in the Jesuit Colegio caused acute tension between himself and the local aristocracy on both the personal and the public level. Local leaders regarded the home as excessively expensive and directly or indirectly threatening to the well-being and advancement of their own children. In complete disregard of the wishes of those whose ancestors had donated wealth and property to the Jesuit Order, the bishop had ignored the demand that pious legacies be invested in the education of the city's better-situated young men. Instead, he had committed these resources to care for the rejects of Arequipeñan society, rejects who were preponderantly female and likely to die at a very early age.

The bishop had attempted to implement royal policy which ordained that Jesuit wealth be used to care for orphans and foundlings. In so

doing, he had overridden municipal preference for a much more modest approach to handling this problem in order to facilitate establishment of a university in the Jesuit Colegio. Chávez had interfered with the education of the daughters of the elite by forbidding the convent of Santa Catalina to accept student boarders. By gaining control of La Compañía he had deprived the middle and upper classes of a desired and inexpensive alternative in the education of their sons. He forced fathers to choose either to pay the costs of schooling them in a distant city or to send them to the seminary of Arequipa. There, while the curriculum was projected along advanced lines and the education was excellent, it was under the immediate control of the bishop and lacked the prestige which the title "university" would have brought with it.

At a time when money was scarce and the demand for investment capital extraordinarily high, Chávez had seized control of two of its principal sources in Arequipa, the convent of Santa Catalina and the Jesuit temporalidades. Although this made the Arequipeñan governing class extremely angry, and although the position of this group was defensible, Chávez's political connections in Lima and Madrid had enabled him to establish the foundling home according to his own design. The local population refused to support the home. The intendant and the city council forced the bishop to maneuver continually to defend the space it occupied, and to finance its operation. The institution survived the pressure and made its contribution to provincial wellbeing. Chávez was less fortunate, however.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), Chapter XII, "The Rule Preserved", especially pp. 341-358.

2. Numerous laments over unpopulated villages fill the writings of the Spanish reformers. See Sarrailh, pp. 9, 18, 326-329, and Herr, pp. 115-116.

3. In a decree of February 19, 1794, the king granted civil legitimacy to all foundlings of either sex, whether brought to a foundling home or abandoned in any other place whatever. It thus became an advantage to expose an illegitimate child, since, if his parents were known, he did not receive the benefit of this civil legitimacy. See Konetzke, 3: 723-725.

4. See, for instance, Sarrailh, pp. 68-73, and for Peru, Carlos A. Romero (ed.), Memoria del virrey del Perú, marqués de Avilés (Lima, 1901), pp. 37-41.

5. See Sarrailh, pp. 262-264, 534-535; Herr, 31, 33-34; and Robert Jones Shafer, The Economic Societies in the Spanish World (1763-1821) (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1958), pp. 88-93.
The city council of Arequipa complained to the king that the bishop's residence was so far from the center of town that the poor could not be properly assisted. See Resumé of the points of the twelve representations, Representation of the City Council, January 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 6: 150v-151r. Chávez bought a house near the cathedral in 1796 in response to this complaint. Martínez, Obispos, pp. 219-221.

6. On the prevalence of infanticide in eighteenth-century Europe, see George Rosen, "A Slaughter of Innocents: Aspects of Child Health in the Eighteenth-Century City" Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 5 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 303. On the incidence of infanticide in Bahia, Brazil, see A. J. R. Russell-Wood, Fidalgos and Philanthropists: The Santa Casa da Misericórdia of Bahia, 1550-1755 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 301-303. On the incidence of infanticide in the Spanish world, see Konetzke, 3: 723-725. On the problems in Arequipa, see Álvarez, Noticia, 54v (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 66-67, and Chávez, Proposal for the establishment of a foundling home, October 24, 1788, AGI, Lima, leg. 946.

7. Chávez to Avilés, July, 1804, AAA, Reserved Letters. For some figures on the numerical incidence of foundlings in European cities, see Carlo M. Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000-1700 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1976) pp. 67-69. Cipolla states that foundlings may have comprised between one and two percent of the population of some European cities, and notes that a foundling rate of one to two percent is the equivalent of three to seven percent of the total population of children under age fourteen. For

figures on Bahia, Brazil, a colonial city with a racially mixed population, see Russell-Wood, pp. 313-314.

8. Chávez's constitution for the foundling home charged the institution's governing junta with responsibility for making arrangements for all foundlings and orphans in the diocese to be brought quickly to the foundling home. No record of how the junta complied has been found. See Chávez, Constitution for the Foundling Home, Title 2, Item 12, AGI, Lima, leg. 946.

9. For discussion of a comparable situation, see Russell-Wood, pp. 314-315.

10. Chávez to Avilés, July, 1804, AAA, Reserved Letters.

11. The age to which children were to be kept in the home was determined according to their sex and social status. The rules were not strictly adhered to, however, and were bent in favor of keeping at least the girls for a longer period of time. See Chávez, Constitution, Title 4, Items 4-6; Title 5, Items 5, 7; and Title 6, Item 5, AGI, Lima, leg. 946.

12. Chávez to Avilés, July, 1804, AAA, Reserved Letters.

13. Chávez, Constitution, Title 3, Items 14 and 16. On the relationship of the amas to the high mortality rate of their charges, see also Konetzke, 3: 723.

14. Chávez to Avilés, July 1804, AAA, Reserved Letters; Chávez, Constitution, Title 5, and below,

15. W. E. Shiels, S. J., King and Church, the Rise and Fall of the Patronato Real (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1961), pp. 249, 373. The Lima hospice was established in property formerly owned by the Jesuit Order. See Avilés, Memoria, p. 40.

16. Chávez de la Rosa, Reales Cedulas en favor del Seminario Consiliar de San Geronimo de Arequipa y aprobacion de los reglamentos de visita, ereccion Constituciones y metodo de estudios, dispuestos, por el Illmo. Sr. D. Pedro José Chávez de la Rosa Obispo de aquella Diocesis (Lima: Real Casa de Niños Expositos, 1808), p. 161; and Chávez, Proposals for...a foundling home, October 24, 1788, AGI, Lima, leg. 946. On the attempts made by the city of Arequipa to get control of the Colegio for a university, see Victor M. Barriga, Documentos para la Historia de la Universidad de Arequipa, 1765-1828 (Arequipa, 1953), pp. 26-47, 60-73, and below, Chapter VI. On the presence of troops in the Colegio, see Uceda to Osorno, June 16, 1797, BNL, C 2876.

17. Chávez, Proposals...for a foundling home; and Constitution, AGI, Lima, leg. 946. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 215.

18. Uceda to Osorno, June 16, 1797, BNL, C 2876, and above, p. 34.

19. Fiscal to the Council of the Indies, June, 1793, AGI, Lima, leg. 946.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. The Proposal of October 24, 1788 served the immediate need. It was in no way comparable in length or detail to the fully developed Constitution which Chávez submitted in 1792 and which was approved by the king in 1794.

23. Fiscal to the Council of the Indies, June, 1793, AGI, Lima, leg. 946.

24. Chávez's Constitution provided that frequent solicitations of contributions be made for the benefit of the home by two children, clothed in the garb of foundlings and accompanied by one respectable adult. Chávez, Constitution, Title 2, Items 9-10. See also Fiscal to the Council of the Indies, June, 1793, AGI, Lima, leg. 946.

25. Uceda to Osorno, June 16, 1797, BNL, C 2876.

26. Ibid., and Chávez, Proposals for...a foundling home, October 24, 1788, AGI, Lima, 946, Chávez to Avilés, July, 1804, AAA, Reserved Letters, and Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4:211. The Cavero fund produced 500 pesos annually. Attempts had been made to have eleven years revenue, or 5500 pesos, applied to the Lima Foundling Home. Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, p. 46.

27. Chávez to Avilés, July, 1804, AAA, Reserved Letters. About half of this 6,000 pesos probably went to pay the salaries of the amas who were employed by the home. The deficit may have partially accounted for his need to borrow funds from Santa Catalina. See above, pp. 102-104.

28. Chávez, in a will written in 1792, had left 3,000 pesos to support the foundling home until the arrival of his successor. Martínez, Obispos, 218.

29. Chávez to Avilés, July, 1804, AAA, Reserved Letters. Income from these endowments may also have been assigned to the Lima Foundling Home. See Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, p. 46.

30. Ibid. At least two of the girls, Doña María Nicolasa and Doña María Josefa Bejarano y Zuñiga, natives of the valley of Majes, were orphans and not foundlings. The fact that they were referred to as "Doña" and the other girls were not implies some degree of respectable birth.

31. Summary of the Fiscal of New Spain, Representations of Chávez, January 10 and February 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 318r-321r, and Martínez, Capitulares, 62-63.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., and Resumé of the points of the twelve representations, Representations of Chávez, January 10 and February 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 6: 153r. The surplus resulted when a girl to whom a dowry for religious profession had been awarded changed her mind at the last minute and did not take vows.

34. Summary of the Fiscal of New Spain, Representation of the City Council, January 9 (10), 1795, Item 8, AMA-CG, 7: 317v-318r, and below,

CHAPTER VI

SEMINARY AND UNIVERSITY

By the second half of the eighteenth century, Arequipeñan prosperity and pretensions had advanced sufficiently to create among the city's upper classes a demand for the establishment of a university. Before permission to proceed could be obtained, the city was compelled to demonstrate both the need for such an institution and its ability to support it. While higher authorities were initially agreeable to the city's proposals, opposition generated in Lima in the course of the 1780's successfully frustrated the establishment until after independence.

In the course of time, Chávez de la Rosa also took a leading role in the debate and resulting stalemate. Once the bishop became actively involved in the discussion, the choice to be made became not simply one of whether or not to establish a university. Chávez planned to reform the skeletal diocesan seminary already in existence, and to pattern it after the most progressive peninsular institutions of higher education. He projected expansion of course offerings so as to prepare students to embark on secular as well as ecclesiastical careers. His perception that his seminary could serve as a more useful and realizable alternative to a full-fledged university may well have been based on an accurate reading of the city's needs and financial resources. His plan to revitalize and expand the seminary, like his plan to establish the foundling home, superceded plans which the city had been formulating for several decades before his arrival in a manner inevitably wounding to municipal pride.

Again like the establishment of the foundling home, the new seminary adversely affected local financial interests. It involved not only

additional struggle for control of Jesuit property, but also taxation of the diocesan clergy and cofradías in accord with legislation which, although long on the books, had never been systematically enforced in the diocese before. The debate which ensued in the closing decade of the eighteenth century on the merits of the various proposals shows with great clarity the incompatibilities between the crown's enlightened but imperialistic policies interpreted and championed by Chávez, and the creole aspirations for self advancement if not for self determination.

Both Chávez and the city council attempted to give the institutions they supported historical precedence over the other. When Chávez published the seminary's constitution and the decrees which were central to its history, he included a chapter entitled "Memorias del Seminario Conciliar de San Geronimo de Arequipa erigido por el primer Obispo que tomó posesión de la Santa Iglesia y Gobierno el Sr. D. Fr. Pedro de Perea, el año de 1616, y reducido á la forma del Santa Concilo de Trento por el S. D. Pedro Joséf Chavez de la Rosa en 1791". Perea's contributions to the foundation of the seminary were the selection of its titular patron and the purchase of property for the chapel and college facilities. Chávez added, however, that a reading of the ecclesiastical history of Arequipa written by Ventura Travada y Córdoba (El suelo de Arequipa), created the impression that the establishment had not been "perfected".[1]

After these tentative beginnings, Chávez was able to produce only sketchy evidence of episcopal activity on behalf of the seminary, such as attempts to collect its rents, episcopal subsidy of the advanced studies of some candidates for the priesthood in the diocesan seminary of Cuzco, repairs and the mounting of an episcopal coat of arms on a

pillar on the seminary grounds. Chávez was forced to conclude that other pressing concerns such as the making of visitations, attempted reform of the convent of Santa Catalina or construction of the controversial episcopal palace had perhaps prevented prior bishops from doing what they had no doubt wanted to do in behalf of the seminary.[2]

It is quite possible that some of Chávez's predecessors had endeavored to put the diocesan seminary on a respectable footing, although no evidence of their labors survived. It is equally possible that they did not, that they contented themselves with ordaining whatever candidates presented themselves for the secular priesthood and counted on the religious orders to staff the remaining doctrinas with men trained in their respective novitiates.[3] One of Chávez's relatively recent predecessors was alleged to have ordained many men without verifying whether or not they were called to the ecclesiastical state and without examination of their qualifications for it. The cathedral chapter, in concert with Bishop Abad Illana, underscored both the problem and the need to upgrade training of the clergy when they supported opening a colegio staffed by Oratorian Fathers on grounds that it would produce youth of good conduct and improve the depraved customs of many prospective ecclesiastics.[4]

Bishops frequently attempted to compensate for the faulty training of priests under their jurisdiction by holding conferences on moral and liturgical topics which the priests were induced to attend by the offering of free refreshments or the reassignment of Mass stipends. Royal decrees of June 23, 1757 and November 7, 1766 designed to limit the number of parishes administered by the regular clergy to mission territories created many additional vacancies to be filled by the diocesan clergy

as the decrees were gradually implemented.[5] This, coupled with the general outcry against ignorant and immoral priests, made proper training of the diocesan clergy a concern of both the ecclesiastical and civil administrations and underscored the need for revitalization of Arequipa's diocesan seminary.[6]

The city council also attempted to use historical arguments to buttress its drive to expand the scant facilities for higher education currently functioning in the city's monasteries. Chávez was acutely aware of what he described as the council's "repeated insinuations" that it had received a royal beneplacito and pontifical bulls for the erection of a university in the Dominican monastery in Arequipa. While the bishop conceded that the Dominicans had been authorized to establish a program of studies in philosophy and theology, he directly challenged the assumption that the authorization constituted the establishment of a university. It is clear from subsequent discussion that, while the city council had obviously hoped that the grant of powers published in 1719 might eventually have led to the establishment of a university, and while it may have attempted to use the grant to underline and fortify its demand for a university, the council was as aware as the bishop that it did not already have a university in any sense of the term.[7]

After about forty years of patient waiting for the Dominican Order to capitalize on the authorization to expand its program of studies, the city council sought out and seemed to have found a more dynamic partner to the endeavor. This was the Jesuit Order. Negotiations with the Society's Visitador General, Manuel de Vergara, were begun in 1763, and were favorably resolved.[8] The year following, the council petitioned

the king to consent to the establishment of a university in Arequipa under Jesuit auspices. The timing of the agreement, however, unfortunately coincided with the rising tide of anti-Jesuitism, which resulted in the Order's expulsion from the Spanish world in 1767. The king did not dignify the request by an explicit refusal. As Chávez remarked, its outcome was "unknown". In 1773, local authorities put forth a variation on the original accord with the Jesuits by requesting the Junta Superior de Temporalidades to designate La Compañía as the site on which the university would be established.[9]

Several years after the seemingly promising initiative with the Jesuits had gotten under way, but before the expulsion of the Order, Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, then chancellor of the cathedral chapter, entered into an agreement with the Mercedarian Order, which also had a monastery in Arequipa. In it, he agreed to donate 20,000 pesos to endow four chairs for a university to be located on property owned by those religious. The Mercedarians also agreed to make over a chapel to the university, and to endow three additional chairs. The projected institution was to be patterned after Alcalá de Henares, and it was hoped that it would be granted the same privileges enjoyed by Alcalá and the University of San Marcos in Lima. Mercedarians were to serve as Rector and Prefect of the proposed foundation. For reasons unknown, nothing seems to have come of these arrangements, and no evidence of any further action on the project has come to light.[10]

In 1773, a third series of initiatives was undertaken. In this year, Manuel Abad Illana,[11] then bishop of Arequipa, in conjunction with the cathedral chapter, petitioned the viceroy to allocate the first cloister of La Compañía for use as a university, and to make the second

cloister available for a colegio to be established by the Oratorian Fathers of St. Philip Neri. At this same time, the city council verified with Moscoso, by then bishop of Córdoba del Tucumán, the continuing availability of his 20,000 peso donation for the endowment of four chairs if the locale obtained for the projected university were La Compañía rather than La Merced. In November of that year, the council also formally petitioned the viceroy for assignment of the Jesuit property for both the university and the colegio under the auspices of the Oratorians who had agreed to staff it.[12]

The city's civil and religious authorities were, thus, in apparent agreement on the need for a colegio-university and on the site on which it should be established. Furthermore, the bishop and the cathedral chapter had agreed on the university as the institution best suited to remedy deficiencies in the training available to candidates for the priesthood. They made no effort to claim any of the Jesuit assets for the diocesan seminary despite the admitted inadequacies of that institution. With such general agreement, prospects for realizing the foundation must have appeared good.

After an interval of four years, in 1778, the Dirección General de Temporalidades in Lima agreed to permit the establishment of both the colegio and the university. The Protector General de Temporalidades, José Baquijano, after a careful examination of the terms of various pious works, cleared the way for all bequests formerly administered by the Jesuits which did not have a fixed object to be assigned to the proposed educational institutions. He also authorized an investigation to determine whether some of the grants made to support Jesuit efforts to evan-

gelize certain groups of Indians might not also be applied to the university on grounds that the Indians were either already converted or extinct. Specific instructions were also given to preserve the Jesuit library for the university should the king approve its establishment.[13] Despite such promising developments, however, affairs again ground to a halt short of full approval by Lima and Madrid.

Limeñan reaction to the trade reglamento of 1778, which opened Arica to peninsular trade and the political disruptions of the years 1780 to 1783 may well have persuaded higher authorities to review the matter one more time.[14] The city council of Arequipa made a determined attempt to head off reprisal for Arequipa's 1789 protest of the establishment of a customs house there by contrasting upper class loyalty during the Túpac Amaru rebellion with the subversiveness of the "pleve" during the tax uprising. The nobility's loyalty had, in fact, been seriously compromised during the tax riots. This may well have been the reason why the council was careful to point out that Arequipeñans had donated 24,680 pesos for defense against the Indian rebels.[15] There was also reason to reconsider the city's ability to finance the university in the wake of the economic disruption which followed upon Spanish participation in the war against Britain and the Indian rebellion in Peru.

In 1783, the Junta Superior de Temporalidades dealt the project a severe blow by responding affirmatively to Pamplona's request to convert the Jesuit property into a hospice for the poor. It justified this reversal of its own decisions by asserting that the investigation on the university ordered by the king had not produced the desired effect. The Junta then stated that no alternative plan for the use of the property more worthy or useful than Pamplona's proposed hospice had been

presented. It then "temporarily" turned La Compañía over to the bishop. It was this allocation which served as basis for Chávez's decision to open the foundling home in one cloister of the Jesuit complex and for his subsequent successful appeal to the king for permanent allocation of the entire facility for the use of the foundling home.

The earthquake of 1784 occasioned a further setback in plans to establish the university. Because it caused heavy damage to the government offices, the treasury and monopoly headquarters were added to the list of tenants in the Jesuit facility. The quake also wrought havoc with the Mercedarian chapel previously set aside for the university in the 1760's. All properties pivotal to the establishment were, thus, suddenly unavailable for its use.[16]

This was hardly the end of the tale. In 1784, Domingo Orrantia, a judge on the Lima Audiencia, identified two major obstacles to the establishment of a university in Arequipa. He offered the opinion that the revenue necessary to support its operations was not assured, and stated that, since no constitution for the university had been submitted by the city, it would be "adventurous" to approve its formal erection. In 1787, Antonio Porcel, the Director of Temporalidades in Madrid, upheld Orrantia's objections to the foundation and refused permission for the establishment.[17]

In 1788, when Chávez arrived on the scene, both seminary and university were more chimerical than real, although the need for some institution of higher education for Arequipa seemed beyond dispute. Since the size of its population and resources were both limited, it soon became equally apparent that the two institutions would be rivals competing for funds and for the assets formerly under the control of the

expelled Jesuits.

The immediate advantage in the struggle, as in the establishment of the foundling home, again lay with Chávez. The bishop was, as has been mentioned above, an educator by career. He had left Spain at a time when its most progressive plans for education had recently been formulated, and he showed himself well aware of subsequent developments in the field.[18] He was more than capable of shaping a curriculum for the seminary based on books by leading scholars and not on long-outmoded tracts. His program of studies went beyond sterile recitation of traditional philosophy and theology to include physics, mathematics, and oriental languages.[19] In short, Chávez devised a curriculum which incorporated all the latest advances approved by the king and his ministers.

Chávez, in projecting a seminary along these lines, reflected royal annoyance with some Spanish universities which had been known to resist royally sanctioned modernization and which the king suspected of preserving the anti-regalist doctrines associated with the Jesuits.[20] This is not to imply that the bishop's program was devised out of expediency and not out of conviction. The rigorous demands Chávez made on his students left no doubt that he was deeply in earnest about their education. They can properly be compared to the demands made by Jovellanos on the students of Calatrava and Gijon.[21] Chávez proposed a seminary that was modern, dynamic and exacting. It won unstinting praise for educational excellence from the otherwise begrudging Cura of Caima, Juan Domingo Zamacola y Jauregui, member of the Basque Society and one of the most respected intellectuals in contemporary Arequipa.[22]

The state in which Chávez found the seminary on his arrival must

have been disheartening. Chávez initial residence in the city was close to the seminary and he took advantage of the proximity to acquaint himself with its operations by a series of informal and unannounced visits. He was soon forced by a protest lodged by the students to take more formal cognizance of its problems. In the course of his official visitation of the city, begun soon thereafter, he systematically solicited the views of the cathedral chapter and clergy as well as the seminarians, and soon reached the conclusion that the establishment needed reform in both the "material" and "formal" realms.[23]

Chávez found the institution reduced to a rector, vicerector, professors of logic and Latin, twenty-six students and two servants. More depressing than the lack of instructional staff, although no doubt closely related to this shortcoming, was the motley nature of the student body. Many of the seminarians were not qualified for admittance in the first place. Chávez noted that a number of them were illegitimate or had other defects of birth for which no dispensations had been obtained. Others who had begun the study of logic in the year of his arrival were eighteen to twenty years of age, far older than was customary for beginning students in a colegio. In the complaints lodged by the seminarians Chávez saw further evidence of disorder, insubordination, and disrespect to the person, office, and generosity of the rector.[24]

The bishop was also displeased to note that several seminarians were crowded into the same dormitory room, a situation to which he objected on academic grounds and perhaps for sexual reasons as well. Contrary to the Law of the Indies, the seminarians spent long hours in assistance at various liturgical functions both at the cathedral and elsewhere. Their record of academic achievement showed the ill effects of both the

lack of a quiet place to study and the excessive amount of time consumed in ceremonial functions. Chávez remarked that, although some had been in residence at the seminary for as long as twelve years, they hardly knew their Latin, the language in which most courses were conducted.

On the administrative level, affairs were in equally bad shape. Seminary revenues had gone uncollected. Records had not been kept. The seminary had no constitution, formal erection, or book of customs and etiquette. There was neither library, archives nor treasury. The plant was in a state of disorder and disrepair. Earthquake damage and insufficient maintenance had made an already barely adequate facility only marginally useful.[25]

With all the evidence in, there was no disputing the conclusion that the seminary needed reform and revitalization. Chávez brought to the project a commitment which equalled if it did not surpass his determination to establish the foundling home. As in the former instance, there was a period of time in which his plans for the seminary and the plans of the city council for the establishment of a university were tested for compatibility, a period when mutual cooperation with the designs of the other seemed possible and potentially beneficial. Unfortunately, in both cases, cooperation gave way to hostility and to obstruction. By virtue of the conceptual superiority of the bishop's plan, or his connections with authorities in Lima and Madrid, or because of his sheer forcefulness, Chávez's establishment of the diocesan seminary smothered the city council's plans for the establishment of a university until after independence had been achieved. This left in its wake a paralyzing bitterness between the bishop and the city fathers which never dissipated.

Chávez decided, quite logically, to begin setting the seminary's

affairs straight by making repairs to its plant. To facilitate the work, he dismissed all of the seminarians then in residence, and closed the facility for a period of two years. He was, no doubt, relieved to have a pretext for ridding himself of those colegiales he considered undesirable. The bishop extended his consultation on the affairs of the seminary to include the city council, which he petitioned for assistance in carrying out the renovation. The municipal government seems to have responded generously to the appeal, since Chávez remarked that the repair was completed under the supervision of one of the caballeros of that illustrious body.[26]

The seminary reopened on August 14, 1791. Chávez was careful to note that the students admitted had been carefully screened for legitimacy, age, personal habits and other conditions required by the Council of Trent. During this same period of repair and reopening, Chávez had drawn up provisional constitutions to govern the establishment while he was preparing those to be submitted for royal approval. He chose as models those written for the Seminary of Salamanca (Spain) by Bishop Beltrán and approved by Charles III, those of the Seminary of Córdoba de Andalucía, and those which governed the Seminary of Cádiz.[27]

Chávez had also selected new personnel to serve the revitalized establishment. He chose for the position of rector Cipriano Santiago Villota, former professor of Latin and Rhetoric at the Seminary of San Carlos de Buenos Aires, presently prebend of the cathedral of Arequipa and one of the few peninsulares on the chapter. Villota replaced the Arequipeñan Antonio Ventura Valcarcél, who had voluntarily resigned from the rectorship soon after Chávez's arrival, in the wake of the student protest.[28] Whether this appointment touched on the sensibilities of

the creole capitulars is not apparent. Villota, in later years, had obviously been completely accepted by the Arequipeñan chapter.

Chávez also had the services and advice of his vicar-general, Mariano de Rivero. Prior to his return to Arequipa, Rivero had served as vice-rector and regent of the Colegio de San Carlos of Lima at the time when that institution was under the direction of Rodríguez de Mendoza. There he had been the first to teach Newtonian physics and natural law and the law of nations. Carrión Ordóñez describes him as the man who realized the bishop's plans for raising the intellectual level of the seminary, although he does not specify the capacity in which he served. It is probable that Rivero taught in Arequipa the courses for which he had become famous at the Colegio de San Carlos.[29]

While Chávez was engaged in repairing and reforming the seminary, the city council was attempting to win approval for the projected university. In 1789 it asked the newly crowned Charles IV to permit the establishment.[30] In December of 1791, the king responded by issuing a series of decrees requesting various officials in Lima and Arequipa to give detailed information on how the university would be funded. This generated another flurry of activity on the part of the city council and gave the bishop, whose opinion had been solicited by the king, if not the leverage, at least the opportunity to suggest that the diocesan seminary be relocated in La Compañía.[31]

The city council, supported by Álvarez, frankly asked those whose opinions had been solicited by the crown to express their support for the project and their confidence that it could be financed. Chávez was among those who received such a communication from the council. Before he complied with its request, he wrote the council asking its opinion

about whether the foundling home should continue to be located in the Jesuit facility or if it wished the Colegio to be devoted solely to the use of the seminary-university complex. Chávez also informed the council that the diocesan seminary's facilities were inadequate for its needs, and that he had purchased a house which could be used by the foundling home. He then proposed a series of moves which would have left La Compañía vacant for occupation by the diocesan seminary and university, the foundling home relocated in the newly acquired property, and the troops then lodged in the Jesuit Colegio transferred either to the old diocesan seminary or another Jesuit property.[32]

The council was more than eager to have the foundling home moved out of La Compañía, and willing to have the troops transferred as well. It did not, however, unequivocably agree to the relocation of the diocesan seminary in the Jesuit Colegio, even though it provided courses for and admitted both secular students and those destined for an ecclesiastical career.[33]

Chávez's attempt to secure La Compañía for the seminary was definitively blocked by the cathedral chapter, under the leadership of the precentor, José Ric-Corvi, and the doctoral canon and one-time rector of the seminary, Francisco Xavier Echeverría, both of whom were natives of the province of Arequipa. The bishop assigned no motive for the chapter's opposition in his history of the seminary's reestablishment. Echeverría was a strong supporter of the city council's plans to establish the university, however. He was invited to personally endow a chair and, as co-executor of the will of Diego Pastor, he made available 3,650 pesos from funds at his disposal to benefit the proposed university. As a convinced supporter of the university, Echeverría no doubt feared that Chávez

would use the diocesan seminary as a stepping stone to episcopal control of the future university, as Mariano de Rivero later actually proposed.[34] Overtones of peninsular-creole antagonisms can be detected throughout the history of the two men's relationship. This factor may also have dictated his opposition to Chávez's maneuvers to secure La Compañía for the seminary.

By May of 1794, several years had passed since the council had sent on to Chávez the king's request for his opinion on the projected establishment of a university. There was no evidence that Chávez had complied with the request. No doubt remembering the delaying tactics which he had employed when asked to give his opinion regarding the establishment of the foundling home, the council asked Mariano de Rivero, governing the diocese while the bishop was off on visitation, whether or not Chávez had formulated a reply. Again, impending departure of the mail made it a matter of urgency. Again, the bishop's reply was the only one outstanding.[35]

Rivero, who enthusiastically supported the proposed university, informed the council that Chávez had instructed him to draft a reply, which he had done and had presented to the bishop the preceding April 26. The vicar-general had undertaken in his draft to lay to rest once and for all the objections voiced the decade before by Domingo Orrantia. He had stated that the area was capable of generating a student population large enough to fill the university, that financial resources to support it were at hand, and that the need for it was clear both from the advantages it would bring and the disadvantages it would avoid. The disadvantages he specified were the dissipation of youth who were unsupervised in universities far from their homes, the export of funds

to pay tuition and board, and waste of ability for lack of educational opportunities near at hand. This much of the draft, it was later made clear, reflected Rivero's personal enthusiasm and sentiments, but not the bishop's.

Rivero had then gone on to suggest annexing the diocesan seminary to the university, presumably to insure a ready supply of superbly prepared students to fill the courses taught on the university level, or to avoid unnecessary duplication of course offerings. Finally, he proposed that the bishop serve as chancellor of the university. This portion of the communique may have represented an alternative under discussion by Chávez and Rivero, whereby the bishop would proffer his support for the plan in return for control of the institution when established. With Chávez at its head, the crown would be assured that a properly qualified dignitary would preside over the fledgling institution. However recommended, the arrangement was very probably unacceptable to the city council, and perhaps known to be so by Chávez.[36]

Significant in the light of past experience was Rivero's statement that, while he knew that Chávez intended to honor the king's request for information, he did not believe that the bishop had done so yet. He suggested that "natural forgetfulness" might be the explanation for his omission. It was fully a year later before the bishop supplied the king with his opinion. The delay may have been occasioned by bargaining over the arrangement suggested by Rivero, or by obstructionism resulting from its rejection by the city council. Whatever the case, after a protracted interval, Chávez rendered an opinion absolutely opposed to the establishment of a university on grounds that it was neither needed nor would it be supported by adequate financing and a sufficiently large student popu-

lation. Whether or not the city council ever saw the text of the opinion is not known. If it did, the terms in which it was cast would have produced a fury not limited to the fact that the bishop had decided to oppose a very popular cause.

Chávez urged the king not to be misled by the population figures cited by the pro-university faction. Stating that the city and its suburbs comprised a total of 17,579 people, he asserted that it was necessary to subtract three parts (13,184) women, children, and married men. This would have left 4,395 potential students for the university from the immediate area. He added that the total population of the diocese was 111,687, about half of whom were Indians who could almost never afford to finish a primary education, let alone a university degree. Chávez then asserted that, of the white population, a large proportion was illegitimate, and hence legally unqualified for university studies.

Sheer numbers were not the whole story. The bishop noted that the few elementary schools which existed produced only a small number of students adequately prepared for higher studies. He stated that students from the outer limits of the province would continue to find it more convenient to attend the universities at Chuquisaca and Cuzco than to come to Arequipa. He then commented that poor and rich alike had abandoned the diocesan seminary, and predicted that the same fate awaited the university which the city council wished to see established.[37]

Having insulted the generality of Arequipeñans by describing them as illiterate and illegitimate, Chávez deepened the wound even further by asserting that Arequipa had no need of higher degrees. He supported this conclusion by stating that the city already had such a superabundance of lawyers and doctors that prominent men in these fields moved

out of town. He mentioned that only two positions on the cathedral chapter, the doctoral and magistral canonries, required doctorates of candidates for the positions. He then inferred that to make higher degrees readily available to Arequipeñans would be to provide an incentive for talented youth to abandon productive careers in mining and agriculture where their abilities would benefit the entire economy. Chávez's opinion may have reflected contemporary preference for productivity over academic degrees. It also showed, however, the bishop's complete disregard for creole ambitions and aspirations. Restricting Arequipeñans to careers in farming or mining may have harmonized with the good of the area and the empire, but it did not take into consideration the fierce desire for office, status, and the respect customarily attached to such attainments. Chávez's posture, then, would certainly have been considered inflammatory.

A comparison of Chávez's evaluation of the financial situation of the proposed establishment with the analysis made by the pro-university faction gives some hint as to which of the parties in the debate was being realistic in this regard. When the bishop wrote his position paper in April of 1795, he stated that the university could claim a principal of 25,650 pesos, projected to yield at a rate of 5%.[38] A year earlier, in the dossier compiled for presentation to the crown, the city council had itemized donations totaling 30,350 pesos, 20,000 of which was accounted for by Moscoso's long-standing pledge. The remainder of the total included a donation of 3,650 pesos from the will of Diego Pastor which Echeverría and a co-executor had applied to the project, and a donation of 2,500 pesos from Francisco Rivero, Mariano's half-brother and one of the council's two commissioners for the university. There

were fourteen other contributions ranging in amount from 100 to 500 pesos.[39]

According to the pro-university faction, there were many additional promises to contribute once the university was a reality. There were also eleven offers to fill a chair or administrative position on the staff gratis. Some of these offers came from the various religious orders with establishments in the city. Others came from members of the aristocracy who perhaps saw in the device an opportunity to obtain a university position and the good will of the city council without having to make an actual cash outlay.[40] It is worthy of note, however, that the council was able to obtain only seventeen reasonably firm pledges of financial support despite its very determined efforts to establish the financial feasibility of the university.

Chávez estimated that the operating expenses of a university would reach 6,000 pesos per year. He noted that revenues from the principal would provide 1282.4 pesos per year if the rate of return were 5%, which he considered unlikely. This amount, he stated, was less than half of what was required to support five chairs at the rate of 500 pesos per chair, a stipend he considered equitable in view of the high cost of living in Arequipa. He professed to be paying holders of the two chairs at the seminary at this rate in the form of 200 pesos in cash and 300 pesos in board and lodging.

The bishop reminded his readers that the university could no longer claim that it had a building, since the Jesuit Colegio had been assigned to the foundling home by the king, and the chapel offered by the Mercedarians ruined by the quake of 1784. Chávez had further arranged for the

transfer of both the Jesuit library and the library left by Antonio de Leon, ninth bishop of Arequipa, to the diocesan seminary, thus depriving the prospective university of these resources as well. Citing the foundling home as an example, he concluded his grim picture by stating that institutions more necessary than a university were experiencing economic difficulties and predicting that the future would bring little improvement.[42]

By contrast, Chávez was able to assert that the seminary collected 2,498 pesos actual income per year, and that there was reason to hope that the sum could be increased to 3,000 or more. This income was derived from three main sources, the tithe, the 3% imposition on ecclesiastical incomes or synods, and the 3% imposition on capellanías, or endowed chaplaincies, which yielded respectively 867, 672, and 959 pesos per year. While each of these sources was subject to the same vicissitudes suffered by the donations which would produce the university's endowment, Chávez was justified in pointing out that the seminary's statement dealt with monies acutally collected irrespective of what percentage of return on the principal the total represented.[43] The university's figures, on the other hand, were not only for a sum lower than Chávez considered desirable for running the less ambitious seminary, but also represented expectation rather than experience of what the various donations would, in fact, produce.

Chávez's rejection of the optimistic projections of the university's financial situation seems warranted, even though it was certainly prejudiced. Reallocation of some of the resources cornered by the seminary to the university would have altered the picture somewhat. The council's position that it was better to begin on a small scale, with

few chairs, poorly paid or staffed gratis was, certainly, understandable in light of what it perceived to be the city's needs and, more important, perhaps, its aspirations. Once again, peninsular "enlightenment" and nascent creole nationalism conflicted, and once again the bishop won a temporary, costly victory.

Chávez reaffirmed his position that a university for Arequipa would be neither necessary nor viable. He impugned the legality of the manner in which the city council's most recent petition for its establishment had been formulated. He asserted that the advantages Rivero had predicted would be derived from the establishment of a university could all be attained more cheaply if the municipal government would agree to contribute some of the funds it had accumulated for the university to improve both the studies at the seminary and the courses of philosophy and theology already being given in the monasteries. Chávez expressed the hope that Archbishop Moscoso would transfer his donation of 20,000 pesos from the university to the seminary. He may also have obtained some income from the Diego Pastor bequest which was ultimately destined to support the university as well. The bishop concluded his position-paper by restating his desire to establish a colegio patterned on the Reales Estudios de Madrid after the Order's expulsion, and on several other progressive educational institutions.[44]

To what degree the bishop's depreciation of the city council's proposal for a university was motivated by his desire to corral its potential resources for the seminary cannot be determined from his official correspondence. Chávez was explicit about his wish to locate the seminary in La Compañía, and equally blunt about securing the transfer of endowments currently destined for the university. How much of his oppo-

sition to the proposed foundation was purely tactical and how much based on correct perception of Arequipa's needs and the best means of advancing its interests is difficult to say.

How great a role was played by competing educational theories and rival ideologies is also undetermined. Chávez's opposition to the city council's proposals for foundation of the university may have been rooted in unwillingness to leave higher education in the hands of men who were both seculars and creoles, men whom he may have regarded as morally reprehensible and socially reactionary. He may also have feared that the university would come to be controlled by one of the religious orders whose educational philosophy did not embrace recent advances in the field.

Chávez's seminary educated more than one youth who later came to prominence as a leader in the movement toward independence. His succesor, Encina, found more evidence of liberalism and independence of thought in the institution than he could easily tolerate. Chávez's long-time critic, Zamacola y Jauregui, while he made no comment on the bishop's position with regard to the establishment of a university, gave wholehearted approval to Chávez as an educator.[45] It is quite possible that Chávez championed the most economical and efficient means of producing the type of education that Arequipa needed most. It is certain, however, that his manner of so doing was needlessly offensive to creole sensibilities.

Chávez's opinion against the establishment of the university was not simply a forceful presentation of what may have been the right decision. It was a condescending document, heavily laced with paternalism, if not with intellectual arrogance. It did not hesitate to make an occasional odious comparison between Arequipa and peninsular cities,

comparable in size and resources, which would not have pretended to the establishment of a university on the basis of such limited assets.[46] Chávez could not bring himself to consider the factors which argued in favor of a university for Arequipa, factors not equally valid in peninsular cities. He took it upon himslef to decide what was best for the creoles in light of the resources at their disposal and the functions assigned to them by enlightened thinkers. However right he may have been, he failed, if indeed he attempted, to persuade the local aristocracy of the correctness of his position.

Chávez's dilatory rendering of his contrary opinion was not the only instance of obstructionism experienced by the pro-university faction. Some idea of the forces ranged against upstart provincial capitals may be gained from following the history of the dosier prepared by the city council in response to another decree, dated November 27, 1796, which ordered the council to present, once again, its data on the financing and operation of the proposed establishment. By March of 1797, the fiscal in Lima acknowledged receipt of the documentation from the council, and stated that he found all chairs provided for except Law. Slightly less than one year later, another official sent to search for these same documents indicated that he could find neither the documents nor any record that they had been received.

Five years from that date, in August of 1803, the lawyer representing the city council of Arequipa re-initiated with a new rector an attempt made three years previously to elicit an opinion from the University of San Marcos in Lima on the utility of the establishment of a university in Arequipa. The original request had been made, he was careful to state, in proper form, to the now-deceased former rector, Miguel de Vill-

alta. Found, finally, among the papers of his will, it had figuratively, if not literally, been buried with him.

These occurrences suggest more than happenstance. It must be conjectured that Lima was considering more than the academic utility of the establishment of a university in Arequipa. It may well have feared Arequipeñan assertiveness, driving to capitalize on the province's resources and on whatever advantage had been conferred on it by the opening of the port of Arica to peninsular and intra-colonial trade. The City of Kings had successfully countered the proposal to remove Arequipa from the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Lima to that of the newly established Audiencia of Cuzco, to which it was more closely related by distance and economic interests. Lima no doubt also feared that a local university would provide Arequipa with an even greater edge in securing the favorable realignment of commerce and development which the province believed possible and the capital feared as an aftershock of the upheaval in trade patterns. It was at least one possible interpretation of Limeñan obstructionism which occurred to the city fathers of Arequipa.[48]

While the university was floundering, Chávez was actively working to set the seminary on the firmest possible footing. With the building repaired and a group of new and qualified students admitted under provisional statutes, the bishop prepared a final constitution for royal approval and solicited several financial concessions to set the institution on a solid basis. His efforts to unscramble the seminary's finances had been hampered from the beginning by missing records. He also found that, although the Laws of the Indies provided specific means of subsidizing diocesan seminaries, enforcement of the law and collection of revenues had been spotty. Taxes had never been imposed on the total

income of the parish clergy, even though it was legal to do so. Whether because of obstinacy or impoverishment, some curas had, over long periods of time, simply refused to make the contribution to which they were bound. Many of the chaplaincies which accounted for a sizeable proportion of clerical income had either lapsed because of the vicissitudes of time or had otherwise resisted collection of the seminary assessment. Seminary finances were justifiably one of Chávez's preoccupations.

Chávez exerted every effort possible to collect the revenues to which the seminary was entitled. The cuarta episcopal or portion of the tithe assigned to the bishop was, according to the Laws of the Indies, subject to a 3% levy in favor of the seminary. For reasons unknown, the imposition had never been made at this rate in the diocese, and a flat fee of 250 pesos had been substituted in its stead. The portion of the tithe assigned to the cathedral chapter had been similarly taxed at a rate less than 3%. Chávez, as early as 1791, after prolix investigation to shed light on the reason for the discrepancies had failed to turn up any documentation which accounted for the variation, petitioned the crown to reestablish the tax formally at 3%. His request was favorably received in Madrid, if not in Arequipa. He further obtained a 3% levy on all clerical income held liable by the Council of Trent, on the income of cofradías, and on episcopal and capitular income during vacancies. Chaplaincies attached to curacies were also assessed. As final evidence of royal munificence and interest in the seminary, the king agreed to assign to its benefit an additional annual 76.5 pesos from the tribute revenue.[49]

Chávez did not submit the final draft of his constitution and plan of studies until August of 1803. When royal approval, with a few modi-

fications dictated by the political turmoil of the times came in July of 1807, the bishop had already left Arequipa.[50] Approval brought with it incorporation of the seminary into the universities of the realm, so that courses taken by its students on the university level were accredited toward degrees as though taken in the universities themselves.[51] With this grant of status, and with a measure of financial security, Chávez's essential aims appear to have been realized. Arequipa had, at last, a properly erected and constituted seminary which, to a limited extent, served in the place of the university which the municipal government had endeavored to establish for almost one hundred years.

Chávez's victory was of short duration. His politically conservative successor, worried about the liberal students and ideas it harbored, significantly curtailed the freedom of thought which seems to have been customary in Chávez's day. Soon after independence had been achieved, alumni of the seminary were prominent among those who cooperated to secure the establishment of the university so long desired by the municipality and so consistently opposed by the bishop and the metropolis. However it was financed, and however well attended, the plans of the city council were finally realized.

The passage of time thus vindicated in some measure both the bishop and the municipal government. Each could look with satisfaction on the institution of higher education its efforts had brought to being. The contest for control of higher education in Arequipa had been fought to a stalemate, and the day would come when the Jesuits returned to reclaim La Compañía as the property of the Order. Both the bishop and the city, however tarnished by the struggle, ended by providing Arequipa with necessary educational institutions whose graduates assumed positions of

importance, not only in the city and province, but in the central government of the independent republic.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, pp. 155-156.

2. Ibid., pp. 158-161. Most recent construction on the seminary property had come during the episcopacy of Bishop Manuel Abad Illana (1771-1780), who rebuilt the ten shops in front of the seminary in stone and mortar. See Martínez, Obispos, p. 198.

3. When the diocese of Arequipa was erected, early in the seventeenth century, eighteen of the fifty-eight doctrinas were staffed by regulars. See Travada, El suelo de Arequipa, in Odriozola, Documentos Literarios, 10: 60.

4. See Martínez, Obispos, p. 189, and Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, pp. 26-28. Secular clergy in both Spain and the New World were commonly both poorly paid and poorly trained.

5. The orders did not always accede graciously to the implementation of this policy. For a history of Álvarez's struggle to replace the defunct Mercedarian pastor of the doctrina of Characato with a secular priest, see Álvarez to the King, October 24, 1788, AGI, Lima, leg. 763.

6. Samples of such protests may be found in Juan and Ulloa's Noticias Secretas and the "Representación de la Ciudad de Cuzco en el Año de 1768, sobre Excesos de Corregidores y Curas", Lorente, pp. 211-306, in the writings of Túpac Amaru, and in the Memorias of the viceroys.

7. Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32; Travada, El suelo de Arequipa, in Odriozola, Documentos Literarios, 10:63-64; and (Mariano de Rivero),On the Utility of a University for Arequipa, April 23, 1794, CVU, vol. 11, hereafter referred to as (Rivero), April 23, 1794.

Rivero's "informe", as found in the Vargas Collection, is unsigned. Vargas Ugarte, owner of the collection, in his Historia General del Peru, 5: 127-128, attributes its authorship to Rivero. In his letter to the city council of Arequipa of May 19, 1794, Rivero stated that he had been ordered by Chávez to draw up a list of points to be discussed by the bishop in response to the king's request for his opinion. Rivero also stated that he had presented Chávez with the material requested in Characato on April 26, 1794. The summary of his position which Rivero gave the city council in his letter of May 19 agrees with the position expressed in the document of April 23, 1794. The content and dating thus both support Vargas's attribution of authorship to Rivero.

8. Chávez's interpretation of this event was that Vergara "incited" the city council to propose a colegio de nobles and university under the direction of the Jesuit Order, a remark no doubt designed to prejudice the authorities against what was, by implication, a "Jesuit plot". Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32.

9. Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, pp. 26-31.

10. Ibid., pp. 13-25.

11. Abad was successor to Salguero. It was during the vacancy between these two bishops that Aranda donated La Compañía to serve as a diocesan seminary at the request of the cathedral chapter. The chapter apparently modified its position to favor establishment of a seminary-university during the episcopacy of Abad Illana. This amounted to continuation of a long-standing previous arrangement whereby seminarians had taken theology courses at the Jesuit Colegio before the Order was expelled. See Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, p. 161, Echeverría, Santa Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 198-199, and above, p. 166, n. 2.

12. Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, pp. 26-35.

13. Ibid., pp. 96-102, 39-47, 60-73.

14. See above, pp. 41-42.

15. See Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, pp. 103-108, and Lewin, pp. 156-166. The "pleve" had rioted in response to rumors that zambos, cholos, and mestizos were to be made subject to the tribute as well as because of the establishment of the customs house. Numerous literate lampoons and the presence of armed men on horseback in the course of the attack on the customs house indicated that men high on the social scale were also involved.

16. On the foundling home, see above, pp. 121-122. See also Barriag, Universidad de Arequipa, pp. 116-116, and Ballesteros, 301.

17. (Rivero), April 23, 1794, CVU, vol. 11, and Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32.

18. See above, pp. 55-56. For a summary of progress made in Spanish education, see Herr, pp. 164-183.

19. Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, pp. 100-101, 179. It is unlikely that the seminary was ever able to finance the courses in Hebrew, Greek, and Arabic. Chávez knew that he could not afford to offer them when he presented his plan of studies, but wished to underline the importance he attached to them by including them in his projections for the future.

20. See Herr, pp. 24-27, and Sarrailh, pp. 199-201.

21. Sarrailh, pp. 147-148, 213-217.

22. Zamacola, Obispos, BNL, D 8150. Echeverría praised the level of achievement of students at the seminary, but attributed it more to the native ability of Arequipeñans given a chance than to Chávez's prowess as an educator. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 199.

23. Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, p. 164.

24. Ibid., p. 165. Chávez was, perhaps, struck by what appears to have been student ingratitude toward the rector, who had been financing the course of studies out of his own pocket. See Curas to Álvarez, June 9, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 695.

25. Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, pp. 166-167.

26. Ibid., p. 167, and Chávez to the City Council of Arequipa, March 5, 1789, AAA, Letterbook.

27. Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, pp. 169-170. Bishop Beltrán of Salamanca was one of the members of the Spanish episcopacy most intensely opposed to the Jesuit Order. Whether this prejudice was reflected in his constitutions and plan of study for the seminary of Salamanca is not known. See Sarrailh, p. 131.

28. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 243; Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, pp. 165-166.

29. Enrique Carrión Ordóñez, "pereira y el Perú", Boletín del Instituto Riva-Aguero 8 (1969-1971): 52-53.

30. Barriga, Memorias, 3: 318-325.

31. Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, pp. 141-144.

32. Ibid.,pp. 145-146, 148-149, 179.

33. Ibid., pp. 184-186.

34. Ibid., pp. 156, 174-178; Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, p. 168; (Rivero),April 23, 1794, CVU, vol. 11. Echeverría also blocked a later attempt made by Chávez in 1802 to transfer the seminary to another location. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 200.

35. Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, pp. 208-209.

36. Ibid., pp. 213-215; and (Rivero), April 23, 1794, CVU, vol. 11.

37) Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32. John Fisher gives the 1795 population of the province of Arequipa as 138,186, of whome 68,941 were Indians. J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, p. 253. On the one-out-of-four ration established by Chávez, this would have left the potential student population of the province somewhere between 14,000 and 17,000 young men.

Echeverría estimated that the seminary alone would easily have attracted one hundred students if it could have found funds to support them and an adequate location to house the institution. He further estimated that 20,000 pesos annually left the province to pay for the education of its sons in neighboring universities. He stated that the province thus lost not only the benefits it could have derived from the

circulation of this very large sum of money within its own borders, but also was deprived of the services of many of those educated, since they frequently found jobs outside the province. He complained, finally, about further drains on provincial resources occasioned by the crown's failure to establish an audiencia close to Arequipa. See Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 199-200.

38. Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32.

39. Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, 163, 174-178, 188-190, 198, 199, 201, 023, 204, 206, 210-211, 212, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222.

40. Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, 165-166, 193, 200, 202, 205, 210-211, 221, 222. Mariano de Rivero was one of those who offered to fill a chair without salary.

41. Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32. A total endowment of 30,350 pesos, returning at a rate of 5% would have produced 1517.4 pesos. Álvarez, in discussing the rate of return produced by capellanías, estimated earnings of two-thirds of 5% or 3.3%. If this rate held for the university endowment, as it is likely it would have, the annual income would have been 1001 pesos. See Álvarez, "Plan que demuestra la Gruesa Decimal que ha producido en un Quinquenio el Obispado de Arequipa" (covering the years 1785-1789), included in Álvarez, Noticia.

42. Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32.

43. Chávez to the King, August 13, 1791, AAA, Letterbook. A combination of data from this letter with data from Álvarez, "Plan que demuestra la Gruesa Decimal" indicates that the sum of 2,498 pesos was made up as follows: 250 pesos on the cuarta episcopal, 218 pesos on the cathedral chapter's tithe revenue, 206 pesos on the portion of the tithe assigned to the cathedral fabrica, 206 pesos on the tithe revenue assigned to the Hospital of Juan de Dios, 959 pesos from the imposition on 161 paying, active capellanías, all of which totalled 1,839 pesos. This left 671 pesos as the amount currently produced by the 3% imposition on synods perceived by proprietary curas of the various doctrinas. Since the total synod income of the diocese was 30,056, a further 231 pesos was being lost to the seminary, either because of the numerous vacancies in the doctrinas or because of simple tax evasion. With this additional 231 pesos, and with the cuarta episcopal paying 670 pesos (the rate of 3% rather than the flat rate of 250 pesos), the seminary would have realized a total income of 3,149 pesos. The king later added additional revenue to the seminary. See Chávez to the King, August 13, 1791, AAA, Letterbook, and Álvarez Noticia. See also above, p. 163.

44. Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32. On the Colegio Imperial de Madrid, see Herr, pp. 163-164. On the seminary's Diego Pastor scholarship, see Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, p. 174.

45. Carrión Ordóñez, 53, 74; and Zamacola, Obispos, BNL, D 8150.

46. Chávez to the King, April, 1795, CVU, vol. 32.

47. Barriga, Universidad de Arequipa, 234-235, 225-227, 229.

48. Echeverría specifically made this link in his discussion of the seminary-university conflict, and commented that the interests of more powerful places had prevented the just request of the diocese from being granted. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 199.

49. Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, pp. 9-13, 5-8; Chávez to the King, August 13, 1791, AAA, Letterbook.

50. The major modification suppressed Chapter 8 of the constitution, which provided for the teaching of derecho natural, de gentes. Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, p. 15. See also Herr, pp. 173-180, 371, 373.

51. Chávez, Seminario Consiliar, pp. 14-18.

CHAPTER VII

THE TIDE TURNS

In the years 1794 and 1795, affairs reached the crisis point in the government of the province of Arequipa. Perhaps at no time since the arrival of Chávez de la Rosa had there been real peace and cooperation between the bishop and the intendant. Besides the major confrontations already discussed, there had been many minor disagreements and squabbles over policy, procedure and ceremony. While there had been truces, attempts to restore working relations, there had been no genuine reconciliation. The lulls in fighting had been shorter and shorter as disagreement followed disagreement.

Some time early in 1794, Álvarez and the creole governing class seem to have opted for decisive confrontation with Chávez. The struggle was to determine who, in fact, would determine the course of development in the province. While the bishop went to the lists alone, Álvarez had been careful to accept or secure the support of both the city council and the cathedral chapter. The Álvarez coalition represented, not only the interests of the intendancy, but those of the municipality as an institution and the creole population at large. Chávez championed not only the powers, prerogatives and privileges of the episcopacy, but seems to have seen himself as the representative of the king, the most trustworthy interpreter of his policies, and staunch defender of his rights against all opposition to projects favored by enlightened monarchical government.

The intendant and the bishop entered a contest the nature and stakes of which was clearly understood by both. Such a test of strength, whose

purpose was the removal of one of two rivals from his position of power, was standard procedure for resolving an administrative deadlock. The aggressor launched a series of attacks in the form of accusations sent to the throne, whose content ranged from the serious to the trivial, was true when possible, reconstrued to suit the needs of the complaintant if necessary, and at times outright calumnious. The official under attack defended himself as best he might. He summoned witnesses and gathered testimony to prove his innocence. He impugned his attackers' position by portraying them as unscrupulous, dishonest men working for their own private interests, and indifferent to the king's good service and the public wellbeing.

This scenario had been many times rehearsed, and it was played almost without variation in Arequipa. To Álvarez, a military man more fond of action than an interminable state of siege, it may well have seemed the only course likely to result in decisive "implantation" of the intendancy system, a goal he had been pursuing against episcopal opposition for almost a full ten years. His creole allies may well have liked the thought of riding on the intendant's coattails to greater control of their local institutions or, if their hand were played with sufficient force, of having gained significant leverage on him by their contribution to his victory. However arranged and balanced, the alliance was firmly in place and operative by 1794.

The cathedral chapter sent the first of a series of ten representations to the king made by itself, the city council, several council members in their individual official capacities, and the intendant.[1] The contents of the chapter's complaints, which were generally confined to the disputes discussed in the preceding chapters, are most interesting.

A major point made by the capitulars was that the bishop, from the time of his arrival, had been engaged in a futile attempt to reform the diocese which had left neither themselves *nor* the lesser clergy and faithful any respite from the resulting turmoil. They further accused him of embarking on an overly ambitious series of projects in excess both of the area's needs and its ability to support. They insinuated that Chávez's program had been motivated by his desire to add to his reputation as a dynamic leader and to increase his chances for personal advancement.

The chapter substantiated these sweeping and revealing allegations with several specific examples. It mentioned first that Chávez had closed the diocesan seminary for two years on pretext of lack of funds, and then reopened it on a grander scale which involved imposing intolerable economic burdens on non-proprietary curas. In the chapter's opinion, it would have been sufficient to have maintained the seminary at its former level of operation with the rate of taxation of clerical income also unaltered. Inadvertently, perhaps, it pointed to its own unwillingness and that of the diocesan clergy at large to finance a better education for prospective new members of the ecclesiastical "guild" who would also be Chávez's protégés, and who would one day compete for prize assignments on a more advantageous footing than men already in the field.

As the chapter well knew but chose not to mention directly, Chávez's program for revitalization of the seminary included his determination to secure La Compañía, currently occupied by the foundling home, for its location. The chapter attacked the foundling home in terms similar to those it had used to describe the reformed seminary. Criticizing the foundation as a "fecund spring of applications for funds from the tem-

poralidades, and "designed to recommend his piety far and wide", it charged that Arequipa's needs did not warrant so elaborate an establishment and could have been met at much less cost. The chapter also accused the bishop of assigning to the foundling home funds from the portion of the tithe reserved for the upkeep of the cathedral, and of making contribution to the home a necessary precondition for the granting of certain dispensations.

The chapter added to its accusation of financial irresponsibility the charge of financial irregularity. It complained that Chávez had made himself master of the revenues of the seminary and of the convents of religious women, whose nuns were thereby reduced to a life of dire need. The use to which Chávez put this financial control was left to the king's imagination.

Next, the chapter made itself the spokesman for the position taken by the diocesan clergy and the intendant in the concurso controversy. Neglecting to mention its own obstruction of Álvarez's attempts to hold a concurso in 1787 before Chávez's arrival in the city, it complained that the bishop had taken four years to inform himself on the merits of the clergy, and insulted the intendant by refusing to take his word on who was and who was not deserving of appointment or promotion. The chapter then alleged that, in this four year interval, Chávez had shown partiality to favorites whose only merit was their ability to ingratiate themselves with him. Finally, contradicting a point made later by another of Chávez's accusers, the chapter charged the bishop with responsibility for a decrease in the number of Masses offered for the deceased, upon which an impoverished clergy depended for its subsistence.

The chapter then enumerated its personal and political grievances.

It asserted that the bishop had treated its members at best with condescension and at worst with harshness, scorn and depreciation. It implied that he had offended the sensitivities of the institution as a whole by selecting as his vicar-general a man who was not a capitular. The chapter took further offense when Chávez named his vicar-general, and not the dean, to serve as juez de diezmos or ecclesiastical administrator of the tithe. Finally, it complained that Chávez had arranged the distribution of the tithe so that the episcopal share came from better and more secure haciendas than the chapter's share.[2]

On the basis of the fiscal's summary, it seems clear that the chapter had decided to portray Chávez to the king as one who was forcing his impoverished vassals to finance his personal advancement.[3] The allegation may well have described the effect achieved, if not the motivation which inspired it. Chávez had, certainly, compiled a record which cannot have worked against his selection as Primate of the Indies during the brief reign of the Constitutional Cortes.[4] That Chávez's only motive for reform and the establishment of progressive institutions had been personal political advancement is far from certain, however. The chapter's vindictiveness, its frank statement of its financial objections to needed reforms, and its sudden change of heart on several matters suggest that it, too responded to the dictates of political expediency. It cannot be considered an impartial judge of the bishop's full range of intentions.

The chapter's case had been cleverly made. Even if only partially believed by the crown, it would cast a shadow on Chávez's reputation in an area of supreme sensitivity. The financial oppression practiced by curas had been one of the causes of the Túpac Amaru rebellion. Are-

quipa had already had one creole tax riot. The threat of renewed tensions along economic lines at a time when the crown was soliciting new donations for the support of its war effort might well make authorities unwilling to take the chance that Chávez's program would jeopardize the interests of the monarchy. The chapter's representation was, then, a good position from which to negotiate with the crown. It was plausible, difficult to prove or disprove, and must be considered the most effective of the ten representations protesting the episcopacy of Chávez. It covered explicitly or implicitly all the major areas of conflict between the bishop and the creole faction struggling to work for the advancement of local interests and deeply threatened by Chávez's control of local resources.

There was a six months' lull after the chapter's representation to the crown. This was followed by a flurry of activity which lasted from December of 1794 to March of 1795. The city council, which sent off three separate representations in the period indicated, was the next body to complain. With several exceptions, the issues it raised were ceremonial or diplomatic. The council alleged that the bishop showed disdain for it by sending men of lesser rather than equal dignity to meet with its delegates, that he did not dress properly when he attended its official functions, that he came late or not at all to affairs for which he had accepted invitations, and that he denied the town fathers certain privileged postures in the conduct of cathedral ceremonies.[5] On the basis of Chávez's own correspondence, in which he occasionally made disparaging remarks about the council and its individual members, it is possible to accept these complaints about his arrogant or condescending attitude.

That the council's complaints centered on matters of ceremony and protocol should be no surprise. Except in the competition for the assets of the expelled Jesuit Order, the city fathers and the bishop had had few substantive official dealings with each other not contained under the ceremonial rubric. For a creole institution which hoped to rise to new power and relevance, and to play a role of supervision over the church's provision of services and management of resources, diplomatic recognition was no small consideration. Chávez's slights, born of malice or of a desire to revenge himself, were keenly felt and long remembered by the council members whom Chávez described as "mostly impecunious caballeros".[6] These they may or may not have been, but as councilmembers they had been summoned by the intendant to share in a new distribution of power whereby he as vicepatron supervised local religious institutions with the assistance of duly constituted municipal officials. As such, they were deeply involved in the intendant's struggle, and in this context the ceremonial conflict takes on its true significance.

The council's attack was also made from another angle, one touched upon by the cathedral chapter as well. This involved depicting the bishop as guilty of attitudes unbecoming to his office. In this context, Chávez was portrayed as one who could not even be bothered to attend functions to which he had accepted invitations. Rendering to each his ceremonial due was very much a part of the Spanish system of government. If the bishop could be convicted of failing in this aspect of his duties as shepherd of the flock of Arequipa, he would be guilty of a serious sin in the political if not the moral order and, as he himself asserted, the value of his episcopacy would be seriously compromised.[7]

A few days after the first of the three representations made by the council, Juan de Dios López del Castillo, its attorney for the year 1794, supposedly completed the first of the two representations against the bishop which bear his name. López del Castillo had several obvious reasons for disliking the bishop. It was he who, before Chávez had made his appearance in Arequipa, had proposed the establishment of a foundling home. He, with Francisco de Rivero, his successor as city attorney who also wrote a representation against the bishop, were the two members of the city council commissioned to manage the university project to what was hoped would be a successful conclusion. At the time the representations were being written both foundling home and university were, if not under the control of, at least at the mercy of the bishop.

The two city attorneys dealt, in their representations, with the bishop's purported economic and administrative shortcomings. They complained that he had charged and permitted his curas to charge excessive fees for the administration of the sacraments of baptism, matrimony, and the dispensations which might be required for them. They added that corpses had been left unburied for several days until funeral expenses had been paid. Contradicting the cathedral chapter, the men alleged that the bishop had urged his curas to require the faithful to have an unusually high number of Masses said for the repose of the departed at a stipend exceeding the usual offering. They also complained that Chávez had reduced the number of notaries who dispatched the business of the curia to one, which they considered inadequate in a diocese of over 100,000 souls. They charged that the cost of seals affixed to certificates, dispensations, and other such documents was excessive. 8)

These complaints again situated Chávez squarely in the center of

the pattern of abuses abhorent to the crown because of their role in precipitating the Túpac Amaru rebellion, a pattern of fee-gouging and administrative harassment. How effective the tactic was this time can be doubted. In the second summary of the representation of Francisco de Rivero, the official commented: "It is reduced to complain in terms sufficiently strong of the proceedings of the bishop, but without being accompanied by any documents whatever nor specifying more cases than that this prelate has reduced his curia to only one notary with prejudice to the public.[9]

The same sort of problem seems to have held with the representation originally made by López del Castillo. Both summaries of his second representation depict it as a covering letter for the bishop's instruction to his curas on the responsibility of the living to have Masses said on behalf of the dead. With this document in hand, the Fiscal of New Spain commented that it was noteworthy that while the bishop instructed his curas to have Masses offered for the souls of the departed, he made no mention whatever of how many were needed to fulfill this commonly accepted duty. How significant these three representations were in determining the outcome of the struggle to remove Chávez cannot be assessed with certainty.[10] The nature of the fiscal's comment coupled with the final results indicate that they might well have been an element in shaping the crown's decision, if that had not already been made before the representations came to its hands.[11] Chávez, for his part, took the accusations with utmost seriousness.

Álvarez did not let his associates do all the talking. Three representations bearing his name formed a part of the campaign now well under way. The first of these, dated January 3, 1795, confined itself

to attempting to repair some of the damage done by his unsuccessful attempt to prevent a member of Chávez's household from attaining the position of magistral canon on the cathedral chapter.[12] Although Chávez may have exceeded the customary limits dictated by propriety in smoothing his protégé's path to the appointment as the intendant had accused him of doing, Álvarez could in turn be faulted for his selection of the asistente real to supervise the election.

The man he chose, whose appointment was protested by Chávez, was Manuel Beloachaga, one-time prior of the Augustinian monastery in Arequipa. While perhaps able, he was also publicly reputed to be overly fond of gambling and women of ill repute.[13] Beloachaga was later reproved by higher authorities for having written a calumnious attack against Chávez's candidate, Antonio Paez (Perez) de Zapata. Álvarez's first representation, the intendant said, was meant to guard against the possibility that, when Chávez had complained to the king about the asistente real, he had not also calumniated the intendant in the process.[14] More probably, it called attention to one of Chávez's reasons for resenting the intendant and alerted the king to interpret the bishop's future protests atainst him with this in mind.

Álvarez's next representation centered around a rather simple but symbolic matter, the refusal of the bishop to permit the alférez real to locate the royal standard in its proper place during ceremonies at the cathedral. Although several appeals to competent authorities had resulted in the bishop's compliance with the decree, the intendant seemed intent on suggesting that the bishop was not properly deferential to royal power.[15]

Álvarez's final representation was of a completely different cast.

As described by the Fiscal of New Spain, it was an apologia for his government. It entered twenty-five different complaints with forty different pieces of evidenciary material to support them, including, of course, matters already mentioned by the chapter and the city council. The intendant protested his unflagging good will toward the bishop and maintained that his only purpose was to give an idea of his conduct in just defense of what might have been informed against him. This concern for self defense was, no doubt, a reflection of Álvarez's knowledge that Chávez had discovered the charges made against him and had written two representations in response. The intendant may also, in his final representation, have been expressing awareness that insubstantial and unsubstantiated charges, coupled with some questionable tactics, may have lessened the force of the merits the case did have, and made his own position extremely vulnerable.[16] If so, he was probably correct.

Not only the summary of Chávez's two letters, but the full text of one of them has come to hand. In his first representation, of which we have only the summaries, Chávez described for the king the events surrounding his reception upon his arrival in the city. He stated that, as he was about to make his formal entry, the city council members had indicated their intention to refuse to bear the palium or canopy under which the bishop customarily processed on that occasion. Chávez remarked that they had changed their minds when he protested vigorously, but added that he had never been able to forget the impression the gesture had made on him. He also rehearsed several other ceremonial slights he had received from that body. He rebutted the charges related to his residence in the episcopal palace of Buen Retiro, which the city council felt too far from the center of the city, the charge that he wore riding clothes

rather than full episcopal regalia in making the trip between the palace and the cathedral, and the charge that the distance served as a barrier between the poor and the episcopacy as a source of alms.

Chávez then moved on to discuss his relations with the intendant. He charged Álvarez with excesses connected with the concurso controversy, with support of priests whom the bishop was attempting to discipline, and with having obliged clerics to testify in secular courts without license from the bishop. He also accused Álvarez of despoiling many churches of lands they had held since the conquest because the titles had been lost, and with public denigration of projects undertaken by the bishop for the public good. He mentioned Álvarez's ceremonial slights to him, his rebuffs of special attentions shown him in the interests of making peace, and the entire controversy over the Cofradía de la Concepción and the disbursement of its dowry funds. By implication, Chávez portrayed both the intendant and the city council as noteably irreligious and lacking in the respect owed to the office of the episcopacy, which the bishop made some attempt to keep separate from his person.

A month later, Chávez responded to the attack made on him by Juan de Dios López del Castillo. He began his counterattack by laying the real blame for all the representations made against him at the intendant's door. Álvarez, Chávez said, had seduced the individuals of the city council, taking advantage of the weakness of some and the unchristian character of others, to manipulate it into complaining about him. Chávez accused the intendant of direct responsibility for the representation made by López del Castillo, stating that it could not have been written in December of 1794, and that it must have been backdated so as

to appear to have been written during López del Castillo's term as city attorney. The bishop concluded his case against Álvarez by stating that, if the intendant had processed the document with this obvious falsity, it was proof enough that the one-time city attorney was a tool of Álvarez's hatred.[17]

Although he laid such heavy responsibility on Álvarez for Castillo's 1794 representation, Chávez by no means absolved the latter. The bishop reported that Castillo was known as "unrestrained", the "Arequipeñan Frenchman", and reputed to have forced his way onto the council despite its opposition to his membership. He related that Castillo's annual attempts to be selected alcalde ordinario were annually rebuffed because he had been sued for attempted forgery. Chávez refused to discuss Castillo's motivation for attacking him. He concluded by asking that he himself be made an example of if he were convicted of the charges brought by Castillo. He recommended that, if the charges were disproven, his detractor be pardoned for his sin, but admonished to be a good Christian in the future.[18]

The last four of the twelve representations made were written in the early days of March, 1795. In Spain, developments were under way which soon resulted in a settlement of the issue in advance of consideration of the documents by the ministry. The Council of the Indies had been concurrently debating intendental exercise of vicepatronage and the problems which arose in the holding of concursos under the new system.[19] On May 7, 1795, a letter from the king informed the viceroy of the appointment of Bartolomé Salamanca as intendant of Arequipa. Two days later, on May 9, 1795, the decree was issued which removed from the intendant and returned to the viceroy patronage over all

appointments to ecclesiastical benefices. On June 10, 1795, Álvarez was promoted from teniente coronel to coronel. On November 21, 1795, the Peruvian Viceroy, Gil, gave his cumplase to Salamanca's appointment and to Álvarez's promotion.[20]

Whether there is any direct connection between the decision against intendental exercise of complete vicepatronage and the termination of Álvarez's career as intendant governor of Arequipa is not known. It is possible that there was, since the problems experienced in Arequipa were part of the record studied by the Council. If there were not, it would almost be immaterial. As things stood, Álvarez left the province at the point at which it would have been painfully embarrassing for him to stay.

Álvarez's removal did not prevent the charges and countercharges related to Chávez from coming before the Council. The Fiscal of New Spain had the matter under consideration in August of 1796. In concluding his summary of the bishop's two representations and making his recommendations to the Council, he said that the bishop's letters gave ample testimony to his regulated and religious bearing. Admitting the possibility that he had been guilty of some minor indiscretions, he pronounced himself convined that the bishop had generally acted in a spirit of rectitude, and from holy and pure intentions. Finally, the fiscal urged the king to support Chávez. Thus assured of crown protection and trust, he said, the bishop would continue to fulfill his ministry, reform his diocese, and persist in his efforts to insure the endowment and subsistence of the seminary and the foundling home.[21]

Chávez did, in fact, seem to need support and encouragement. In response to the insults offered by the creole faction, he had already

offered to resign, a gesture in all likelihood intended more to dramatize the problem than to be taken seriously. In reaching this public position, Chávez had reasoned that, even if the accusations were clearly libellous, they indicated that he was opposed by the principal citizens of the province and that he was, thus, incapable of carrying out his ministry.

After a review of the entire matter by the Council of Indies, the king accepted the fiscal's recommendation. He informed the bishop of his formal disapproval of the conduct of both the intendant and the city council. He ordered the council and the chapter to cease their harassment of the bishop, and to make no further representations to the crown on "frivolous"points, or on matters already before the authorities in Lima. He left open the normal channels of appeal only if the decisions of the government in the colony left the Arequipeñan corporations with still unsatisfied and genuine grievances.[22]

Again as recommended by the fiscal, the king concluded by urging Chávez to remain at his post, to continue his work in service of the king for the spiritual perfection of his diocese, and for the firm establishment of the seminary and foundling home. His specific references to the two institutions in whose foundation or reestablishment Chávez had played so crucial a role testifies to royal interest in projects of this type. It also suggests royal recognition that tensions generated by the bishop's aggressive determination to realize the foundations were the essential, if seldom overtly mentioned substructure of much of the dispute.[23]

Chávez had again, apparently if temporarily, won the field. This may be attributed as much to his continued good connections with the Indies Ministry, to the fact that his position on one important matter

had recently been adopted by the Council, and to the blundering, sometimes disreputable maneuvers of his opposition as to the actual merits of his own case. Further, his most easily identifiable antagonist, Álvarez, had already been removed from the scene, perhaps at the bishop's request, perhaps for other reasons. The bishop's intellectual and socially conscious enlightenment seems to have triumphed over the political, secularizing, pro-creole enlightenment of Álvarez.

The chapter and the council had been handed a set-back which neither sat well with them nor taught them to mend their ways. Any lesson they may have learned was in the direction of improved readiness for combat when next the occasion should arise. In the short generation which intervened between the king's letter to Chávez of November 26, 1796 and April of 1810, the cathedral chapter succeeded in forcing Chávez's withdrawal from active participation in certain of its important functions and finally in making life so difficult for him that he again sought release from his bishopric. This second time the bishop's resignation, seriously offered, was accepted. Nor did the chapter limit its aggressive assertiveness to Chávez. Álvarez's successor, Bartolomé Salamanca, was likewise to suffer both at the hands of the chapter and of the city council.[24]

Bartolomé María de Salamanca was an Andalucian of noble parentage. At the time of his appointment as intendant of Arequipa, he was a career naval officer, thirty-three years old, and recently disabled by the loss of an arm while on active duty. Salamanca resembled Álvarez in many ways. Both men had military backgrounds; both were firmly convinced that the intendancy system marked a substantial advance in colonial government. Both were devoted and apparently uncorrupted public servants,

and were vindicated of all serious wrongdoing by residencias at the end of their terms in office. Finally, both left long accounts summarizing and commenting on the major issues which had arisen in the course of their long administrations. In his role as successor, Salamanca was clearly concerned with carrying on or bringing to fruition policies and projects initiated by Álvarez, whose achievements he several times praised specifically in the course of his own relación.[25]

In contrast with his predecessor, Salamanca was from the south and not the north of Spain. He was probably considerably higher on the social scale and wealthier than Álvarez.[26] His relación shows evidence of an education which put him in contact with both classical and modern authors of note, and the reflections contained therein suggest that he had given serious thought to government as an art.[27] Salamanca was, at the very least, capable of expressing himself in theoretical as well as practical terms, and his manner of addressing issues was far more confident than was ever characteristic of Álvarez. The new intendant seems to have felt neither that he was indebted to anyone for his appointment as intendant, nor that he continually needed to prove himself in order to maintain a tenuous hold on his position, nor a compelling need to advance himself to a higher rank.

Salamanca was also more realistic and less legalistic than Álvarez. He was, hence, somewhat less prone to stir up hornets' nests where the gains did not clearly outweigh the risks and difficulties. He recognized the importance of official visitations as instruments of reform, but seems to have confined his endeavors to a more modest scale than his predecessor had, partially because he saw no need to re-do work already adequately handled by Álvarez. He made official visitations only in the three dis-

tricts in which there were operative mines, and one of these was visited by his delegate rather than his person. He also made an exhaustive inspection of coastal defenses necessitated by a resumption of a state of war with Great Britain.[28] While he recognized the importance of attending to the complaints of even the humblest of men, he never seems to have gotten quite so tied up in details and trivialities as Álvarez sometimes appeared. This, of course, may possibly reflect a difference between the style and nature of Salamanca's relación and the profuse documentation available to us from the pen of Álvarez rather than a difference in actual mode of operation. We can at least say that where Salamanca was content to summarize, Álvarez preferred to give a full account.

Whether for reasons of temperament and character, or because both men were from the south of Spain, or because of Salamanca's manifestly noble birth, after some initial disagreements, Salamanca seems to have been far more capable of remaining on amicable terms with Chávez than his predecessor had been.[29] A principal source of tension, presentation to royal benefices by the intendant vicepatron, had, of course, been removed. Many of the other issues which had exacerbated relations between Álvarez and Chávez had diminished in intensity with the passage of time. Furthermore, Salamanca seems to have been far less prone to involve himself on behalf of the interests and positions of the dominant groups in Arequipeñan society than had Álvarez. This lessened considerably the total forces involved in working out any tensions which arose.

As stated above, Salamanca effectively carried forward many programs which Álvarez had begun, issues which he had raised, and procedures which

he had developed. Both men prided themselves on a devoted, efficient staff, and well-organized, up-to-date archives. Each bore some of the cost of financing these improved services because salaries and compensatory stipends failed to cover expenses. Both men expressed deep concern for the speedy administration of justice and for an equitable system of tax assessment which insured that the government received the dues owed to it and simultaneously protected citizens in the enjoyment of their property.[30] In sum, efficiency and fairness were professed hallmarks of the two administrations.

While Salamanca, by virtue of Álvarez's prior successes, was not required to undertake major endeavors to regulate the city's almacén or grain bank, to establish or straighten out municipal finances, or to fill an excessive number of vacancies on the four municipal councils in the province, he was, nevertheless, determined to hold advances already won by his predecessor. After a careful review of the almacén's accounts, Salamanca firmly insisted on the reintegration of the small amount of missing grain uncollected because of administrative negligence. He prided himself on having raised the total revenue the city derived from the leasing of concessions and from the proceeds of funds applicable to the municipal treasury, but previously unentered. While unable to fill all positions on the council of the distressed city of Arica, Salamanca had at least some progress to report in this regard as well.[31]

Salamanca brought to completion several important projects, one of which had remained completely stalled in the administration of his predecessor, and the second of which had never really gathered sufficient momentum to bring it to conclusion. The first was the erection of the government and municipal office complex, which had been heavily damaged

by the earthquake of 1784, and whose facilities had deteriorated even further in the dozen years since then. The second was the city's public cemetery, left in the planning stages by Álvarez and managed to a successful conclusion by city commissioners during the administration of Salamanca. The cemetery was officially opened by the burial of two paupers, an event made both solemn and festive by the attendance of civil and ecclesiastical dignitaries as well as by the populace at large. There was, in fact, true reason for rejoicing given the significance of the cemetery as a measure for curbing the spread of contagious disease.[32]

Salamanca's achievements in the field of public health were outstanding. He, like Álvarez, had several epidemics to contend with. His relación mentions specifically a serious outbreak of illness in the district of Tarapacá, which struck Spaniards and Indians alike. The means he used to cope with the unidentified disease were selection of a doctor to be sent to the stricken area, and the dispatch of appropriate medication at little or no cost to those afflicted. Salamanca also arranged a revision of the schedule of tribute collection for the district so as to provide financial relief to the stricken while insuring that normal payments would be resumed as soon as recovery from the effects of the disease would permit.[33]

The district of Tarapacá was not the only area to experience tribulation. The city of Arequipa suffered an outbreak of hydrophobia which caused several deaths. Uncertain at its outset of the true cause of the fatalities, Salamanca enlisted the assistance of the doctor charged with supervision of the vaccine program, José Salvany, and of the teniente protomedico of Arequipa, José Antonio Toldi y Rosas, in reaching a definitive diagnosis and in caring for the victims. Once it had been agreed

that the cause of the deaths was, in fact, hydrophobia, the intendant lost no time in ordering the extermination of all dogs and cats in the vicinity. He made his own personal contribution to curtailing the spread of the disease by himself dispatching any stray animal which crossed his path. This radical approach to the problem succeeded in preventing additional deaths caused by bites from rabid animals.[34]

Salamanca also undertook a major expansion of the hospital facilities in the city. He had erected, out of his own personal funds, a room spacious enough to accomodate fifteen beds, which he also furnished. This he reckoned a spiritual as well as a physical improvement, since the new room enabled the hospital to put men and women in separate wards. By allocating funds from hospital revenues, from donations, and from his own personal contributions, he financed the installation of a fountain on the hospital grounds to provide the institution with a private and convenient source of water.[35]

As mentioned above, it was during Salamanca's term as intendant that the empire-wide program for vaccination against small pox was undertaken. Salamanca did not wait for the vaccine to arrive in Arequipa according to the predetermined schedule for its distribution. He sent requests for innoculation material both to Lima and to Buenos Aires, and when he succeeded in obtaining some, arranged for the innoculation of a small group of Arequipeñan children, one of whom successfully reproduced the vaccine material. With this child serving as first link of a new chain, medical personnel and local officials donated their services and cooperated to extend the program throughout the province, at no cost whatever to the royal treasury. When one of the vice-directors of the imperial program arrived in Arequipa a year later, he was left

with little to do but wholeheartedly approve what had already been accomplished, complete to the compilation of records of those vaccinated.[36]

In his endeavors to protect and improve public health, Salamanca gives the impression that his principal consideration was the alleviation of human suffering. Whether, again, it is simply a matter of nobility of style, or whether his own personal experience with pain and physical disability made him more sympathetic, Salamanca appears much less legalistic and calculating than Álvarez in his approach to public health needs and problems.

Salamanca gave a forthright and expansive account of the addition of new hospital facilities, his handling of epidemic disease and the vaccination program. He was, by contrast much more discreet in describing his management of the city's poor, its facilities for public education, and the foundling home. He mentioned his own personal generosity in contributing to the relief of the beggars' needs and stated that most of them could be said to be truly impeded from work by reason of physical disability or age. He remarked that it had been impossible to gather them into hospices, and pronounced himself fully informed about the unsuccessful efforts of Miguel de Pamplona to establish one. He praised the bishop and closed the discussion.[37]

When speaking of education, Salamanca avoided explicit mention of either the university or the conciliar seminary. He noted that, as a necessary economy, he had temporarily eliminated the municipally funded position of public Latin teacher, since revenues were scarcely adequate to cover more basic needs and since the monasteries of San Francisco, Santo Domingo and La Merced offered courses in Latin, philosophy and theology. There was no further mention in his <u>relación</u> of higher educa-

tion in the province. As for primary education, Salamanca affirmed his commitment to providing schools where the Indians could learn the fear of God and love and fidelity to the king. As Álvarez had done, he charged parents, pastors and local officials of both the Spanish and Indian communities with strict responsibility for seeing that the schools were well attended and the lessons properly taught.[38]

While Salamanca may have chosen to avoid controversy on these topics, he did not always opt for such a course. One of the major concerns of his administration, amply reflected in his relación, was that of curtailing the contraband trade for which the province of Arequipa was so well suited by virtue of its many good and isolated anchorages. An abundance of harbors was not the only factor which seemed to predispose the province to illicit trade. Its southern reaches included the mountain passes which led to the silver mines of the Altiplano, and it had, of course, silver mines of its own to provide the wherewithall to pay for the illicit goods which were landed in its many covers and bays. Goods supplied by legal trade were often in short supply, whether in time of peace or time of war, and their prices were almost invariably higher than those which evaded taxation and entered illegally. In many instances, goods produced outside the Spanish world were superior in quality to those produced by Spanish industry.

Contraband was an old and persistent factor in Peruvian life. Spanish inability to supply her colonies and to defend their coasts, coupled with British and American seapower and drive for markets made it so. It may possibly have been less a problem during the administration of Álvarez, and more an issue during the government of Salamanca than at any time in recent history. Álvarez governed during the few

years of peace with Britain which the final quarter of the century held. During this same period, which followed upon the 1778 lifting of trade restrictions within the Empire, Lima was flooded with Spanish goods and the province of Arequipa was able to receive shipments directly at the now-open port of Arica. The surplus was soon liquidated, and by the time Salamanca took office, Spain was once again at war with Britain, the Peruvian coasts still afforded easy penetration by contrabandists, and Peruvian markets were again starved for goods.[39]

In striking contrast with Salamanca, Álvarez's concerns were almost exclusively focused on the expansion of trade rather than on the curtailment of contraband. His Noticia devoted considerable space to a description of Arequipeñan textile production, and contained a truly remarkable insertion, pages long, quoting high, low, and average prices for all goods imported into the province at each of its various ports.[40] Did only circumstances of international peace and imperial free trade explain this difference? Did Álvarez content himself with collecting the taxes on an increased volume of legitimate trade while asking no questions about the possible illegitimate sources which may also have fed Arequipeñan commerce? Did he, realizing that he could not prevent contraband, buttress his relationship with the local creole community by letting sleeping dogs lie? There are no sure answers to these questions which naturally suggest themselves.

It is also possible that the change in orientation from one intendant to the other indicates a recapture by Limeñan interests of control of some of the trade lost to the viceregal capital by the opening of the port of Arica. Of further interest is the fact that Salamanca's removal from office came as a result of complaints from two sources, the first,

a convicted contrabandist, and the second, the city council of Arequipa. However Álvarez may have harmonized the interests of government with those of the governed, it is clear that his successor was under intense pressure from local entrepreneurs, and that the issue of contraband played no small role in the development of the tension.

Salamanca was an inveterate opponent of the contraband trade, but he was also, more often than he would have liked to have been, unable to prevent its occurrence. Despite his unrelenting efforts to detect and apprehend its perpetrators, he admitted that, while he had had some success in capturing the goods of the trade, he was rarely able to apprehend and bring to justice those who were its principal agents. The punishments meted out to the few who were captured were, he conceded, deterrents inadequate to prevent even those sentenced from returning to their former pursuits as soon as they were set at liberty. While confiscated goods were sold to the benefit of the royal treasury, the proceeds by no means compensated for the extensive losses of tax revenues and for the precious metals illegally exported from the country.

Despite his dim prospects for success, Salamanca constantly urged customs officials, all other members of the bureaucracy and local justices to unceasing vigilance against illegal trade. He took the added precaution of ordering frequent changes of assignment for minor officials in the customs service and coast guard. These, he feared, might become agents of the abuse they were appointed to prevent if allowed to remain for a long while in any given location.

Salamanca did not content himself with issuing orders from headquarters. At least on one occasion, he personally gave chase himself. While in the vicinity of Tambo taking baths to restore his impaired

health, the intendant received word that an illegal sale of a shipment of cascarilla (quinine), was soon to be consumated by several Spaniards with two American vessels currently anchored in the port of Ilo. Salamanca alerted customs officials in Moquegua and in Ilo. He made every possible effort to learn the route over which the cascarilla would be shipped and which of the many isolated covers in the vicinity would be the one used for loading it onto the small boats which would transport it to the foreign vessels anchored in the harbor at Ilo. Despite intense efforts to obtain this information, the intendant was unable to learn either the identity of the Spaniards involved or the route the merchandize would take.

Thus handicapped, he decided that his presence at the scene was necessary. Despite his poor health, he made the thirty league journey through the desert from Tambo to Ilo, only to discover on his arrival that some of the shipment had already been loaded in the cove of Tancona, about five leagues south of Ilo. The intendant's efforts netted him only underlings and information. Patrols he had ordered out apprehended the muleteers and the accomplices of the major criminals, two Spaniards without fixed residence named Udaeta and Anunzarri. He learned further that the cascarilla had been purchased in the province of Puno and transported by back roads to the coast. The two principals were tried, condemned, and sentenced in absentia. The American vessels were told to leave. The Spanish officials were left with the scant satisfaction of having refused to cooperate with one of the American captains who sought their assistance in obtaining the return of three deserters from his vessel.[41]

With reason, then Salamanca was completely discouraged about the

prospects of eliminating the contraband trade in his province. He simply had no means of patrolling the extensive, hospitable coast or the vast stretches of unpopulated territory over which goods could be shipped to and from the interior. Forces were inadequate both on land and on sea. Even vessels which were privately owned and engaged in the legitimate coastal trade or the transport of guano from the offshore islands had fallen prey to destruction or capture by pirates and could not be called to the special service of patrol or pursuit of contraband.[42]

The intendant was fully aware of the seriousness of the implications of this situation. Reflecting upon it, he described the abuse as capable of bringing about the destruction of the kingdom.[43] While his statement was made in the context of a rather impassioned defense of his conduct against the accusations of maladministration and tyranny leveled against him by a contrabandist he had convicted, it is convincing not merely as a piece of rhetoric but as a cold and logical evaluation of damage done. On the Arequipeñan coast, and over much of her trade, Spanish power had effectively been abolished. Salamanca had staged a dramatic demonstration, but he knew he had come nowhere near turning the tide. At best, his efforts only proved the vulnerability and limitations of the empire.

Closely related to his battle against illegal trade were his efforts to improve the defensive capabilities of his province. By 1812, when his relación was written, Salamanca was capable of constructing a clear composite of the many angles from which attacks had threatened his province. The threats were not nebulous. The intendant recounted with pathos the suddenness with which joy was followed by sadness as the province learned in 1808, first that Ferdinand VII had succeeded to the throne

upon his father's abdication, and then by "correo extraordinario" from the Mariscal de Campo José Manuel de Goyeneche in Buenos Aires, that Ferdinand was a captive of Napoleon. This major blow, he noted, had been preceded by continued arrivals of foreign vessels along the coast which made repeated incursions into the ports of Arica and Ilo. The labor and uneasiness caused by the menacing foreigners, he stated, had hardly been relieved by the solemn joy of swearing fidelity and love to a new monarch, when came that dreadful weight, the terrible news of the capture.[44]

Well before this blow had been absorbed, rebellion broke out in La Paz. The news elicited from Salamanca even more than his usual activity. Unlike his predecessor, he had been named military intendant as well as political governor of the province, a designation which gave him a direct role and responsibility for the defense of the area.[45] By this time, Salamanca had a trusted, experienced elder-statesman and warrior at his side. Gabriel de Avilés, who had succeeded to the command of the military forces which had quelled the Túpac Amaru rebellion in the 1780's and had recently been replaced as viceroy of Peru, was resident in Arequipa, attempting to repair some of the damage done to his health by advancing age and the cares of office. Salamanca's every reference to his former superior shows his respect and reverence for the older man. The two worked together harmoniously in gathering forces to meet the threat from within. When Salamanca briefly left the city as commander of the forces sent to counter the insurgents, it was to the hands of Avilés that he handed the governance of his province.[46]

This arrangement was of brief duration, and Salamanca was soon recalled by Lima to resume direct command of his province.[47] His troops

went forward under the leadership of Mateo de Cossio y La Pedrueza, Coronel de Exercito y del Regimiento de Caballería de Arequipa, to join the army commanded by José Manuel Goyeneche, now Interim President of the province of Cuzco, and another Arequipeñan. Six hundred and fifty men from Arequipa joined the effort to pacify La Paz, and, upon royalist occupation of the city, a third Arequipeñan, Domingo Tristán y Moscoso, was named interim governor intendant of the troubled province.[48]

Hardly had the rebellion in La Paz been suppressed when word of the overthrow of viceregal government in Buenos Aires reached Arequipa. Several provinces in the Altiplano, which had been, until the establishment of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, a part of the viceroyalty of Peru, refused to accept the rebel government and sought readmission to the jurisdiction of the viceroyalty of Lima. This reopened the area around La Paz to renewed struggle between the forces of royalism and the forces of independence. Once again, a contingent of troops left Arequipa, this time twice as large as before, again under the command of José Manuel de Goyeneche. Once again, Salamanca supervised the exhausting effort to supply the army's needs. He also quickly suppressed a popular uprising in Tacna, whose importance he minimized.[49] The total effort left him prostrate with fatigue and, perhaps, grateful to be relieved of his duties.

Salamanca's fifteen years, nine months as governor of Arequipa had been difficult ones. He records, in his relación, the full measure of his problems. He was as fully aware of the reasons for which he might take pride in his achievement. This pride he coupled with a sensitivity to the fragility of Spanish power on the South American continent in his statement of what he considered to be his greatest claim to the gratitude

of his king. He underlined that, in handing power to his successor, the Arequipeñan José Gabriel Moscoso, he had handed over to him the government of a province which had several times demonstrated in an unmistakable way its loyalty to its captive sovereign, a province which was as "whole" as he had received it.[50] Nevertheless, the tide of rebellion would soon wash over Arequipa, and the administration of his successor was to end on an even more tragic note than his own.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. These representations, with one exception noted below, have come down to us only in the form of summaries, one set made by the Fiscal of New Spain for the use of the Council of the Indies, and the second made by an unidentified author, possibly an assistant to the Fiscal, for use in preparing his opinion. Both men express themselves in favor of the bishop, interpreting the attacks made against him as opposition to reform. The first of these documents will be referred to as "Summary of the Fiscal", and the second as "Resumé".

2. Summary of the Fiscal: Representation of the Cathedral Chapter (July 20, 1794), AMA-CG, 7: 316r-316v. On the vicar-general, see below, p. 211. On the distribution of the tithe, see, ibid., p. 212.

3. Resumé: Representation of the Cathedral Chapter, July 20, 1794, AMA-CG, 6: 148r. In this second, much briefer summary, the chapter's representation was described as an attempt to frustrate the bishop's plans for increasing the number of prebends on the chapter. No note to this effect is contained in the Summary of the Fiscal. If the interpretation is accurate, it may well represent the beginnings of the controversy over "diaconos cantores" described below.

4. Chávez's appointment to the Primacy of the Indies was apparently never confirmed, no doubt because of the return to the throne of the absolutist Ferdinand VII. See Encina to the Cathedral Chapter of Arequipa, October 27, 1814, BNL, D 11884; Martínez, Obispos, p. 222; and José Domingo del Carpio Neira, "Chávez de la Rosa en el Proceso de la Educación Peruana" (Ph. D. dissertation, Universidad Nacional de San Augustin, Arequipa, 1972), pp. 139-141.

5. See Summary of the Fiscal: Representations of the City Council of December 6, 1794, January 9 and March 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 316v; 317v-318r. See also Resumé: Representations of the City Council of these dates, AMA-CG, 6: 148r, 150v-151r, 152r.

6. Summary of the Fiscal: Representations of Chávez, January 10 and February 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 318r.

7. Bartolomé Salamanca, who succeeded Álvarez as intendant of Arequipa, expressed clearly his sensitivity to the demands of office in this regard. Salamanca, Relación, p. 15.

8. See Summary of the Fiscal: Representation of Juan López del Castillo, December 9, 1795, and Representation of Francisco Rivero of March 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 317r-317v; and Resumé: Representation of Juan de Dios Lopez del Castillo of December 9, 1794, and Representation of Francisco de Rivero of March 3 (March 10), 1795, AMA-CG, 6: 148v, 150r-150v. Rivero also complained about Chávez's refusal to allow the convent of Santa Catalina to admit student boarders.

9. Resumé: Representation of Francisco de Rivero of March 3, 1795, AMA-CG, 6: 150r.

10. See Summary of the Fiscal: Representation of López del Castillo of March 8, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 317r; and Resumé: Representation of López del Castillo of March 8, 1795, AMA-CG, 6: 149r-149v.

11. Summary of the Fiscal: Representations of Chávez, January 10 and February 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 320r.

12. Resumé: Representation of Álvarez of January 3, 1795, AMA-CG, 6: 149v.

13. See Chávez to Gil, June 19, 1793, AAA, Reserved Letters, in which Chávez described Belaochaga as unfit for reelection to the post of prior of the Augustinian monastery of Arequipa.

14. Resumé: Representation of Álvarez of January 3, 1795, AMA-CG, 6: 149v, 150r.

15. Summary of the Fiscal: Representation of Álvarez of February 9, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 317r, and Resumé: Representation of Álvarez of February 9, AMA-CG, 6: 150r.

16. Summary of the Fiscal of New Spain: Representation of Álvarez of March 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 318r.

17. See Summary of the Fiscal: Representation of Chávez of January 10 and February 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 318r-319r; Chávez to the King, February 10, 1795, AAA, Reserved Letters (the full text of the bishop's second representation); and Chávez to Eugenio Llaguno y Amirola, January 10, 1795, AAA, in which Chávez proffered his resignation on grounds that his inability to achieve peace and harmony with the intendant made his ministry useless.

18. Chávez to the King, February 10, 1795, AAA, Reserved Letters.

19. Council of the Indies, Minutes of the Meeting, February 21, 1795, AGI, Lima, leg. 1562.

20. The King to the Viceroy of Peru, May 7, 1795, and Gardoqui to the Viceroy of Peru, June 10, 1795, BNL, C 4288.

21. Summary of the Fiscal: AMA-CG, 7, 321r.

22. The King to Chávez, November 26, 1796, CUV, vol. 20.

23. Ibid.

24. See below, pp. 225-226.

25. See J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 248-249, his introduction to Salamanca, Relación, pp. xv, xxv, and the Relación, pp. 1, 19.

26. J. R. Fisher, ibid., and ibid., p. xvi, in which he notes that Salamanca left an estate valued at 118,000 pesos to his widow, the Arequipeñan Petronila Ofelan.

27. See, for instance, Salamanca, Relación, pp. 8-9. The tone of the intendant's Relación is very similar to that of Avilés in his Memoria de Gobierno. Whether this sharing of sentiments is derived from the time the two men were companions in the government of Arequipa is not known. See below, p. 198.

28. See Salamanca, Relación, pp. 29-30, 36, 89-91.

29. Chávez was angered by the report sent to the superior government by Salamanca after his inspection of the Jesuit Colegio. The inspection had been made to determine whether or not the troops occupied space needed by the foundling home. Four years later, in a letter to Osorno of January 20, 1801, Chávez criticized Salamanca for refusing to support his campaign to reform the habits of prominent citizens guilty of public flaunting of the sexual code. With these exceptions, the general impression formed is that they had been able to get along passibly with each other. See Uceda to Osorno, June 16, 1797, BNL, C 2876; Chávez to Salamanca, September 28, 1797, AAA, Reserved Letters; and Chávez to Osorno, January 20, 1801, BNL, D 11643.

30. Salamanca, Relación, pp. 50-52, 72-73, and 7, 34-35, 67.

31. Ibid., pp. 68-69, 20-24.

32. Ibid., pp. 12-14. Records of work on the cemetery are preserved in AMA-CG, 4.

33. Salamanca, Relación, p. 54.

34. Ibid., pp. 45-46. Hipólito Unánue was also in correspondence with Toldi y Rosas on the rabies problem. See Unánue to Toldi y Rosas, June 5, 1808, BNL, D 11684.

35. Salamanca, Relación, p. 13.

36. Ibid., pp. 43-44. See also Salamanca to Toldi y Rosas, May 12, 1806, and Toldi y Rosas to Salamanca, May 13, 1806. BNL, D 11684.

37. Salamanca, Relación, pp. 14, 35, and 37.

38. Ibid., p. 40.

39. Ibid., p. 55. See also Carlos A. Romero, ed., Memoria del virrey del Perú, marqués de Avilés (Lima, 1901), p. 71.

40. See Álvarez, Noticia, 79r-88v (Barriga, Memorias, 1: 96-105).

41. Salamanca, Relación, pp. 54-60.

42. Ibid., p. 57.

43. Ibid., p. 63.

44. Ibid., pp. 94, 46-47.

45. Salamanca had been named Commander General of the Southern Department (Nasca to the Atacama) by Viceroy Osorno in 1797. Ibid., p. 87.

46. Ibid., pp. 95-96, 98.

47. Salamanca says that he was relieved on the basis of a representation made to Abascal by Avilés, who felt unable to continue governing because of his delicate health. Salamanca also noted that command of the army had previously been conferred on the Arequipeñan José Manuel Goyeneche. Ibid., pp. 98-99.

48. Ibid., p. 100.

49. On the rebellion in Tacna, see below, pp. 241-242.

50. Arequipeñans had not only served in the armed forces, but had contributed with sufficient generosity to several donativos. See Salamanca, Relación, pp. 106-107, 48, 78-80, 97, 112-113.

CHAPTER VIII

CREOLE POWER

Chávez's victory over Álvarez, the city council and the cathedral chapter was the last major victory won against the will of local political leadership by a representative of Bourbon reform. The bishop's triumph had been, in fact, more a signal of impending defeat than a victory at all. It brought about a series of attempts by the council and the chapter to diminish the authority and prestige of both the bishop and the new intendant. In the context of the unforseeable difficulties which were so soon to bring the monarchy and empire to crisis, Arequipeñan unwillingness to accept the bishop and the governor took on a significance beyond what was immediately apparent.

Not surprisingly, Chávez was among the first to sense the direction in which the current was running, and perhaps his inability to reverse it as well. Very soon in the course of his government, and certainly by the time five years had past, he was writing to viceroys and ministers in Madrid not only to describe his difficulties with Álvarez, but also to bemoan his unsatisfactory relationship with members of the cathedral chapter, and to comment on the attitude of members of the city council toward his exercise of his pastoral ministry. It was only in 1795 and the years following that he discussed fully the pressures to which his episcopacy had been subject since the day of his arrival in Arequipa.

Álvarez, at the beginning of his administration, had experienced some rather significant difficulties with the cathedral chapter himself. These difficulties almost certainly had a wider context than is clearly demonstrable from the known facts of the controversy which arose about the proclamation of the vacancy following the resignation of Miguel de

Pamplona. It will be recalled that the chapter, on a seemingly flimsy pretext, had flagrantly violated Álvarez's rights as vicepatron by ignoring them in the ringing of the sede vacante. Shortly thereafter, it used the resulting legal uncertainty about where ecclesiastical jurisdiction resided as a pretext for refusing to act on the request for a concurso made by Álvarez at the urging of a group of clergy headed by Felipe Ascencio Delgado, an ecclesiastic who was, at the very least, well thought of by the intendant.[1]

One must question what provoked the chapter to behavior which struck Álvarez as so defiant and outrageous that he threatened it with imprisonment in a civil jail if it did not recognize his authority over the proclamation of the vacancy. Two factors suggest themselves in answer. The first is capitular reaction to what may have been implementation of the Gálvez policy which stipulated that two of every three members of American chapters be peninsulares.[2] The second is animosity aimed directly at the intendant as a result of the role he and his predecessor may have attempted to play in filling several of the vacancies which arose during this period. While the chapter may or may not have been directly affected by the Gálvez policy, and while the intendancy's candidates for the vacancies were not appointed, the chapter would have reacted instinctively to both as attempts to interfere with its management of its own internal politics.

Arequipa had, by the middle of the eighteenth century, demonstrated sufficient demographic, economic, and political strength to educate its noble sons for professional careers. Some few succeeded in obtaining appointments to the episcopacy, and many others were given positions on its own and neighboring cathedral chapters.[3] In the third quarter

of the eighteenth century, the Arequipeñan chapter was dominated by men from the city and province, although creoles from elsewhere in the Empire and peninsulares were also represented. In the course of the 1780's however, there was at least one new appointment in which an anti-creole candidate was imposed from without. This, no doubt, set aside the result of the concurso held to fill the vacancy and frustrated the hopes of some of its members for promotion. It almost certainly raised fears that the chapter's hold over its own affairs would be challenged as well.

The chapter was divided into three ranks, from highest to lowest, of dignity, canon, and prebend.[4] Of the five dignities in 1786, the dean, Pedro de Santa María, who had served on the chapter since 1754, was a peninsular Spaniard.[5] A vacancy had recently been created by the death of the chancellor, Luis de Telaya,[6] also a peninsular, and a second by the death of the Arequipeñan archdeacon, Jorge Medrano.[7] This left as the two remaining dignities the Arequipeñans Antonio Ventura Valcárcel, precentor,[8] and José Ric-Corvi Zegarra, treasurer.[9] Of the three canons, the magistral was held by Saturnino García de Arázuri,[10] who had come to Arequipa in the household of Miguel de Pamplona and received title to his position in 1785; and the doctoral by Francisco Javier Echeverría,[11] even more recently appointed. Echeverría was from the Arequipeñan district of Tarapacá. The canonry of mercy was held by another native son, Francisco Javier Pacheco.[12] By the end of 1786 there were, thus, four Arequipeñans in positions of power on the chapter, and only two peninsulares, one, the dean, and the second, the magistral canon, whose recent appointment came at a time when the Gálvez policy was fully operative. This policy, of course, made it quite easy for peninsular bishops to obtain positions on the cathedral chapters for

members of their households.

The year 1786 was a complicated one for the chapter. It had to deal with the episcopal vacancy resulting from Miguel de Pamplona's exodus from the diocese and subsequent resignation.[13] The positions of archdeacon, chancellor, and doctoral canon were likewise also unoccupied.[14] The first step toward filling such positions was the holding of a concurso. As in the case of lesser royal benefices, candidates declared themselves, were examined and then voted upon by current chapter members with voting power, the dignities and canons, who constituted the cabildo in sacris. An account of the election, specific as to how many votes each candidate had received in each place on the terna, was sent to the vicepatron, who forwarded the list to Lima and Madrid.[15] At these levels, selection of the appointee was made and royal title conferred. Frequently vacancies in the higher ranks were filled by promotion of capitulars of lower rank, with newest members brought in at the level of prebend or canon, much as faculty positions in a university are filled. It was, however, completely within the power of the royal patron to set aside the preferences of the capitulars and confer the position on the candidate of his choice.

Of the three positions vacant on the chapter in 1786, that of archdeacon was filled by the uncontroversial promotion of Antonio Ventura Valcárcel from the next ranking position of precentor. In the remaining two vacancies, however, the intendant seems to have attempted to exercise some influence in the selection process, first through appointment of the asistente real, designated to observe concurso proceedings in protection of the king's interests, and secondly through recommendation of a candidate to the king.

Notable among the contenders who entered the concurso held to fill the position of doctoral canon, vacated by the promotion of José Ric-Corvi to the position of treasurer, were Francisco Javier Echeverría, Felipe Ascencio Delgado, Tadeo de la Llosa, and José Escobar.[16] Of these, Delgado withdrew because he had been appointed asistente real to the concurso by José Menéndez Escalada, Álvarez's non-proprietary predecessor. Delgado's withdrawal did not leave the intendancy without a candidate sympathetic to its interests, since José Escobar, who took first place on the terna submitted to the royal patron, had previously served the intendant in the capacity of teniente asesor. Second place on the terna went to Tadeo de la Llosa, who was forced to wait another ten years before attaining the rank of canon. Third place went to Francisco Javier Echeverría, who was given title to the position in preference to the two candidates who placed above him.[17]

No information has come to light on the voting in the concurso held to fill the vacant chancellorship. One element of continuity between the two concursos was, however, the candidacy of Felipe Ascencio Delgado. This time, he had the recommendation of the intendant, now Álvarez, in his dossier of application for the position.

The candidacies of Escobar and Delgado may have alerted the chapter to Álvarez's threat to assert control over its operations as he was so soon to attempt to gain control over appointment of parish clergy. Such an assumption provides the most likely explanation of the chapter's lively defense of its right to exercise power during the sede vacante. This defense included virtual deposition of the peninsular dean from the governorship conferred upon him by Pamplona, whose resignation the chapter knew to have been accepted. The chapter then elected first, José

Ric-Corvi and then Antonio Ventura Valcárcel, both Arequipeñans, as the body's titular heads during the episcopal vacancy. It also refused to accede to the demand for a concurso to fill vacant curacies made by the group of disgruntled parish clergy led by Delgado and championed by the intendant.[19]

Neither Álvarez nor the chapter had its way in filling the vacant chancellorship. The king gave title to Simon Jiménez Villalba, a peninsular of rabid anti-creole sentiments whose accusations against the Arequipeñan bishop of Cuzco, Juan Manuel Moscoso, had resulted in the bishop's removal to Spain and Villalba's demotion from archdeacon to chancellor of Cuzco.[20] Villalba's career in Arequipa was no more tranquil. A short four years after taking possession of his new position, having antagonized Chávez, most of his fellow capitulars, and more than a few prominent citizens, he was summoned to Lima by the viceroy. There he remained until his death in 1818, still in possession of the chancellorship of Arequipa, which remained to all practical purposes vacant for nearly twenty years.[21]

These tensions of the years 1786-1787 provide some measure of explanation for the otherwise seemingly gratuitous affront offered to Chávez upon his reception into the city.[22] The bishop, in his account to the king, made no mention of what, if any other, justification for the slight may have existed. He implied that he had been completely taken by surprise. While it is possible that Chávez had angered the city fathers in some way before his arrival, it is equally possible that the council, under the presidency of Álvarez, aimed not only to impress the new prelate with the superiority of the secular power, but also to take revenge on the chapter in the person of its new head.

Whatever the case, by the last decade of the eighteenth century, the cathedral chapter of Arequipa was extremely sensitive to threats from whatever quarter, and combative in defense of its interests. By 1791, when the dean, Pedro de Santa María, died, Álvarez had effected a reconciliation with it, perhaps because the chapter had begun to see itself even more threatened by the new bishop than by the intendant. By this same time, of course, the intendants' ability to control ecclesiastical institutions was being progressively neutralized by a change of policy in Madrid. These developments had prepared the way for the chapter's cooperation, in the years 1794 and 1795, with the attempt by the intendant and city council to have Chávez removed from the episcopacy of Arequipa.

This shift in allegiance came about not only as a result of decisions made in the distant peninsula, but also because of Chávez's exercise of his powers of appointment. Especially important in this regard were his nominations to the office of vicar-general. The bishop's first designation to this position was his controversial choice of Mariano de Rivero. While Rivero was an Arequipeñan, he was not a member of the cathedral chapter, and this struck rudely on the capitulars' sensitivities. The wound was dug even deeper when, "in despoliation of the dean", Chávez seated Rivero on the <u>junta de diezmos</u>, which administered the tithe revenue. This, Chávez informed the viceroy, the chapter had interpreted as a step taken by him to insure enforcement of the decree of August 23, 1786, which revised the method of distributing the tithe revenue to the economic detriment of the capitulars.[23] Creole and capitular concern over control of scarce revenues was, thus, once again aroused.

Chávez blamed much of the chapter's discontent on the machinations

of Simon Jiménez Villalba, whose efforts to stir up trouble he believed to have been seconded by another enemy, Álvarez's teniente asesor, José de la Iglesia. Given Villalba's propensity for involving himself in conflicts of every sort, he may well have been a catalyst of the chapter's protest. If the figures provided by the chapter accurately described the situation to the king, that body had genuine grievances about tithe distribution which it would have protested even without the instigation of Villalba. Its appeals persisted long after the chancellor had taken up residence in Lima, and ultimately won revision of the unfavorable arrangement.[24]

There is no indication that Chávez attempted to secure a position on the chapter for Rivero. As his successor in the vicar-generalship, the bishop named Tadeo de la Llosa, another Arequipeñan whom he had employed in capacities of trust from the inception of his episcopacy. Llosa was named vicar-general by March of 1796, six months before he obtained title to the doctoral canonry, a position he held for only three months before he followed Rivero to the grave in January of 1797.[25] His appointment may or may not have been an attempt by Chávez to make amends for the unpopular appointment of Rivero. Though obviously sympathetic to the bishop, he was a cousin by the maternal line of José Ric-Corvi, then dean. That he was well accepted by the chapter may be deduced from the closing line of Echeverría's brief biography: "His conduct was most exemplary."[26]

The bishop's next choice for vicar-general was protested, if not by the capitulars, then certainly by Viceroy Osorno, who initially refused to approve it. Chávez had selected Juan José Manrique y Maldonado, a Moqueguan who was, when nominated to the position on March 10, 1797,

again not a member of the chapter, but cura del sagrario, co-pastor of the cathedral. Osorno grounded his opposition to Manrique on a decree, issued August 10, 1796, which made curas ineligible for appointment to the vicar-generalship, no doubt because both were considered full-time positions.

Chávez protested that his first knowledge of the decree of August, 1796 had come from the viceroy's letter rejecting Manrique's nomination. This he respectfully, if very temporarily, withdrew. He then proceeded to explain why, despite the regulation, he had little choice but to continue Manrique in the position. His reason was directly stated. There were in the city, he said, only four priests who were lawyers and not curas. Of the four, one was able but young and inexperienced, the second was older but not well regarded for either character or ability and the third and fourth were the archdeacon, José Ric-Corvi, chronically ill, and the treasurer, Francisco Javier Echeverría, both of whom had played leading roles in generating and directing opposition to Chávez's episcopal administration.

The prelate's solution to the dilemma was equally straightforward. He reminded the viceroy of powers granted him by a decree of June 12, 1752, to permit a cura to serve as interim vicar-general. He then mentioned another circumstance "not worthy of being omitted", that edicts had been issued three months ago for the concurso to fill the doctoral canonry vacated by Llosa's death. Remarking that the election might fall on someone who could then be named titular vicar-general, he closed his letter with a protestation of his willingness to make another nomination to the vicar-generalship should the viceroy still feel unable to allow Manrique to serve the position in a temporary capacity. 27)

Osorno seems to have been content to await the results of the concurso to fill the doctoral canonry, which did in fact solve the dilemma, since Manrique emerged with title to the position. The outcome goes a long way toward explaining some of the animosities between Chávez and the chapter which ripened in the middle years of the 1790's and culminated in an appeal to the king by the chapter to regulate Chávez's participation in concursos to fill positions vacant on the chapter.

If the vacancies and promotions of the 1780's show the imprint of the Gálvez policy or of intendental interference, the vacancies filled in the 1790's clearly show the hand of Chávez. Three positions had opened up on the chapter during the earlier part of that decade as a result of the deaths of the dean, Pedro de Santa María, and of the precentor, Francisco Javier Pacheco. These vacancies were filled by promotion which opened up positions in the doctoral and magistral canonries, which were filled by new men. Llosa's accession to the doctoral canonry and his subsequent death have been discussed above, as has his replacement by Manrique. The man who obtained title to the magistral canonry was Antonio Paez Zapata, who had come to the New World in the household of Chávez, and who, like Llosa, had accompanied the bishop to the convent of Santa Catalina on the day that Chávez fired the controversy over convent reform by suspending the elections for prioress.[28]

Paez's candidacy was obviously not looked upon with favor by Álvarez. He reacted to it by appointing Manuel Belaochaga, prior of the Augustinian monastery in Arequipa, to serve as asistente real of the concurso held to fill the position. Belaochaga overplayed his hand by attacking Paez personally and probably calumniously, and laid both himself and Álvarez open to charges of unfair play. Once again, the bishop's candi-

date emerged with title, but, unfortunately for Chávez, Paez died in July of 1797, having held the canonry for scarcely more than two and one-half years.[29]

Up to this point, Chávez had clearly had the controlling hand in determining which candidates would receive title to positions on the cathedral chapter. That the capitulars resented this and had determined to curtail his power is clear from statements made by the bishop in his letter to the king of August 10, 1802, when the issue was again relevant. Chávez informed the king that he had been made aware that the chapter had initiated proceedings to prevent him from voting in any concursos for the election of capitulars in which a member of his household was a candidate. The chapter had called attention to the fact that individual capitulars were not allowed to vote in concursos where their relatives were candidates. They then, according to the bishop, had asked the king to regulate the bishop's participation in a concurso where his familiar was a candidate in a comparable manner. Chávez was able to see no justice in the chapter's petition. He suggested that a bishop's sensitivity to the duties of office would insure episcopal responsibility and impartiality, and argued further that, since he had only one vote, the capitulars could always outvote him anyway. His success in obtaining canonries for his vicar-generals indicates that he had been able to overcome capitular opposition to his candidates by one means or another.[30]

It is also evident from the bishop's letter that his ability to control the chapter had been effectively diminished. Chávez informed the king that, in order to avoid the public disagreements and embarrassments which he had suffered in the last, bitterly contested election to fill the magistral canonry, he intended to abstain from all direct participa-

tion in the forthcoming concurso to fill the doctoral canonry vacated by the promotion of Juan José Manrique to the dignity of treasurer. This abstention, the bishop explained, was predicated on the presupposition that the king's decision on the chapter's petition would not have arrived before the concurso was held. It was also designed, he said, to show the lack of "compulsion" he had in voting, to contribute to maintenance of the peace, and to avoid the unhappy consequences of a capitular act in which the chapter might unite against him and prevail against justice. Chávez salvaged as much of his dignity as possible by explicitly reserving his right to be informed of the merits and qualifications of the candidates who placed on the consulta and on the chapter's "management" of the election. He designated Juan José Manrique as his legal representative to these ends. Chávez's strategic retreat was unable to cover the fact that he had been forced to a position of abdication, however.[31]

A survey of the situation in which the chapter found itself in the first few years of the nineteenth century illuminates not only the motivation behind its recourse to the crown but also Chávez's increasing determination to resign from his position. The death of Tadeo de la Llosa in January of 1797 was soon followed by the death of Chávez's familiar, Antonio Paez Zapata, the magistral canon, on July 11, 1797. On March 12, 1798, José Lecaros, canon of mercy, died at age ninety,[32] and a month later the dean, Antonio Ventura Valcárcel, also died. His successor, the ailing José Ric-Corvi, named to replace him on June 15, 1799, died a year and a half later on December 3, 1800. This string of deaths and resulting vacancies set up the opportunity for either the chapter or the bishop to determine the allegiance, ideology and political leanings of

the chapter for years to come by seating a group of candidates committed in advance to support the one or the other.

Chávez had been able to fill the first vacancy which occurred with Juan José Manrique. He lost dramatically, as he mentioned in his letter to the king of August 10, 1802, in the concurso held to fill the magistral canonry, from which Francisco de Borja Toranzo emerged with title. Toranzo, a creole from Argentina, had been a member of the households of both Bishops Juan Manuel Moscoso, and Manuel Abad Yllana, predecessor of Miguel de Pamplona in the see of Arequipa. He had taught philosophy at the Seminary of San Geronimo, and served the Arequipeñan curacies of Caylloma and Ilavaya. More significantly, he had served as chaplain to the convent of Santa Catalina until removed from this position by Chávez for what the bishop regarded as an improper relationship with its nuns. Toranzo was given title to a prebendary on October 18, 1800, and obtained possession of the magistral canonry on February 27, 1802, having made two previous, unsuccessful attempts to obtain the position. Chávez was, no doubt, chagrined to see a man who had opposed him on so sensitive an issue as Santa Catalina, if not on many other counts as well, in a voting position on the cathedral chapter.[33]

Toranzo was not the only professed opponent of Chávez to be seated on the chapter during this epoch. Another was Cipriano Santiago Villota, a peninsular who had received a prebendary on May 28, 1790, perhaps with Chávez's approval, since Villota at some unspecified time supposedly served as Chávez's vicar-general. He had also been the bishop's first choice for rector of the reformed Seminary of San Geronimo. For whatever reason, perhaps because his advancement on the chapter had been blocked by the bishop's decision to favor other candidates, relations between the two

men deteriorated. Villota was forced to wait a decade for promotion to a canonry, but once he obtained it he rapidly rose to the rank of preceptor, to which he obtained title on November 6, 1802.[34] This ascent meant that, of the five dignities, three were Chávez's confirmed enemies, one his vicar-general, Juan José Manrique, and the other the absent Simon Jiménez Villalba.[35]

Chávez had previously taken the position before the throne that he could not properly exercise his pastoral ministry and work for the spiritual good of his diocese if he did not have the esteem and respect of its leading citizens.[36] This was, no doubt, an accurate assessment of the situation. Reaching through this same period, which concluded with the chapter's breaking his hold on its internal politics, was a dispute with several of its members which amounted to a public demonstration that Chávez did not have the esteem of his capitulars.

In a lengthy letter to the king of June 8, 1803, Chávez reviewed with the monarch the history of a protracted liturgical controversy begun in 1795 by Francisco Javier Echeverría and Saturnino García de Arázuri with the support of Antonio Ventura Valcárcel and José Ric-Corvi. The professed object of the capitulars' campaign was to remodel the assignment of liturgical services performed by members of the chapter for the bishop along lines followed in the metropolitan church of Seville. What this amounted to in practical terms was the refusal of the dignities on the chapter to serve as deacons in Masses celebrated by the bishop in the cathedral. The dignities, according to Chávez, first enunciated their intention to cease assisting him as deacons in November of 1794, and first carried it into effect on February 2, 1795, the day when the highly popular feast of Candlemas was celebrated. Not surprisingly,

Chávez linked this show of insubordination with the concerted campaign currently being waged against him not only by the chapter, but also by Álvarez and the city council.

The chapter argued that service in the role of deacon was demeaning to the rank of dignity, despite long-standing custom to the contrary in all the churches of Peru and the other New World viceroyalties. Chávez saw the situation in a very different light. For him, it was a clear-cut case of despoliation, of depriving the episcopacy of services to which it had a right demonstrable not only from law, but also from common practice in the cathedral of Arequipa by the very capitulars now attempting to overturn it.

After the chapter's suit had been rejected in Lima, by means which Chávez either could not or chose not to explain, Francisco Javier Echeverría had persuaded Madrid of the justice of his case. He obtained issuance of a decree dated February 17, 1799, which ordered that the ceremonial of pontifical masses in Arequipa be regulated by the practice of the metropolitan church of Seville in all that pertained to "diaconos cantores". This was a double victory for Echeverría, since the small size of the chapter in Arequipa meant that both dignities and also canons exercised this function and were equally exempted from serving the bishop in the future. Chávez, "for the sake of his successors", appealed to the king to reverse his decision and revoke the exemption.[37]

The bishop advanced some very suggestive reasons to the king to obtain reversal. He described the chapter's attitude as illegal and irreverent. So that the king would not miss his point, he noted that the chapter's bad example had reached as far as La Paz, whence the Arequipeñan prebend Juan de Urizar had sent a copy of the decree. As a

result of this communication, Chávez said, the chapter there had surprised its bishop by suddenly announcing its intention to refuse to diaconate for him while all were vesting for the pontifical mass of Holy Thursday. Chávez underlined the impact of the chapter's insubservience by comparing his generous contributions to the support of the war effort with the chapter's parsimonious contributions to these same donativos. He again and again described the chapter's behavior toward him as purposeful, deliberate, and public insult. He extended its significance by implying that such behavior worked not only to the detriment of his own personal ministry, but to that of the office and dignity of the episcopacy, and hence undermined both secular and ecclesiastical authority.[38]

Chávez mentioned, without lengthy comment, his personal reaction to the decree of February 17, 1799,[39] a reaction which is significant when seen in conjunction with the response of the new intendant, Bartolomé Salamanca, to a similar situation.[40] The bishop protested that he had demonstrated his obedience to the decree for four years. He also remarked that from the time that the chapter had put into effect its policy of refusing to diaconate, he had abstained from pontificating in the cathedral except on the occasion of the Holy Thursday ceremony of the Washing of the Feet, since this liturgy did not permit the use of gremial deacons.[41] The bishop thus admitted to having been effectively excluded by the chapter's assertion of its independent dignity from participation in the liturgy of his own cathedral church.

To make his case even more effective, Chávez recounted several instances on which the chapter had publicly humiliated him by its policy of nonparticipation. The bishop was clearly hoping that such stories might give rise to sufficient royal outrage to win reversal of the

offending decree. In fact, his presentation amounted to admission that, in all matters liturgical, he had been checkmated, could play no role whatever in the ceremonial life of his episcopal see without being humiliated by the men who were supposed to be his highest, most important, and most trusted assistants.[42] In light of this development, and in conjunction with the promotion of Chávez's professed adversaries to the top-ranking positions on the chapter and the replacement of his partisans with other opponents at the lower level, the bishop's decision to resign his episcopacy takes on its true significance. In the early years of the nineteenth century, his proferred resignation was not what it may have been in the mid-1790's, a rhetorical device designed to elicit support and concessions from the king. It was a frank statement of his inability to govern, verified by the fact that Chávez had already left the diocese before permission to resign arrived from Madrid.[43]

The prelate, despite the defeats he had suffered, did not simply abandon his diocese. His resignation had been predicated on an unusual arrangement which continued to vex the chapter until the arrival of his successor. This arrival was, as Chávez had foreseen, delayed by the circumstances of war with Britain which once again gripped the Spanish Empire and disrupted its vital operations. The agreement Chávez reached with the authorities in Lima indicates either that his connections with them continued to be exceptionally good or that the viceregal government shared some of his conviction that the chapter was indeed too assertive and insubordinate to be entrusted with the government of the diocese during a long interregnum at a time of political uncertainty.

Chávez resigned his episcopate and vacated his see on condition that he would continue to hold power until he himself could hand it over to

his successor, who had been proclaimed on the same day that his resignation had been admitted. Not only did he continue in the government of his diocese by virtue of this agreement, publicly exhibiting his power by signing edicts to announce a forthcoming concurso, he also continued to draw a revenue from the bishopric in excess of the pension assigned to him by the king. Predictably, Chávez named Juan José Manrique to govern the diocese in his name.[44]

The device was, of course, directly aimed at depriving the chapter of its opportunity to govern the see in sede vacante. The resulting furor reduced to insignificance the controversy which had surrounded the vacancy of Miguel de Pamplona and the governorship of Pedro de Santa María.[45] In the eyes of the capitulars, it was both outrageous and humiliating. The chapter besieged Lima with its protests, insisting that a true vacancy existed, as in the case of death, and that it should not be prevented from governing. Several juntas, convoked to consider the issue, decided in favor of the chapter. Abascal, wary because of previous shows of insubordination, simply set aside the commissioners' decisions. He transferred power from Chávez to Bartolomé de las Heras, who had been consecrated to the episcopacy by Chávez, who had remained his friend over the years, and who was now archbishop of Lima. Heras, no doubt with Abascal's consent, reappointed Manrique to govern the diocese, and thus reconfirmed Chávez's implicit and continuing control.[46]

The first indication that the chapter had decided to establish its relationship with the intendancy on a footing distinct from that it had as a body presided over by the bishop had come early in the 1790's and had been elicited by Chávez's appointment of Mariano de Rivero to the junta de diezmos. In 1794-1795, the chapter reactivated its alliance

with the intendancy when it contributed its share of complaints against Chávez to the series sent off by Álvarez and the city council.[47] During this same period, the chapter bypassed the bishop and attempted to secure viceregal consent for its own plan for revision of the ceremonial of reception of the intendant at solemn functions in the cathedral while refusing all invitations from the bishop to confer on the proposed changes.[48]

No such cooperation with the intendant characterized its second reworking of the etiquette of reception of the intendant. For reasons unknown the chapter, on the feast of Corpus Christi in 1802, publicly and without warning affronted the intendant by refusing to send a dignity and a canon to administer holy water to him at the door of the cathedral. When the time came to incense the governor at the offertory, and later to proffer him the sign of peace, the chapter drove home its point yet further by sending a seminarian instead of a priest to perform these liturgical courtesies.

Salamanca noted that the procedures altered the inveterate custom observed since the establishment of the intendancy system. Unwilling to give opportunity for further public insult to his office, he joined Chávez in boycotting services at the cathedral, leaving the chapter to manage the liturgy as it saw fit. He quickly protested the violent despoliation not only to the chapter and to the bishop, but also to the viceroy and the throne itself. From Chávez, he no doubt received sympathy, but it was certainly beyond the bishop's power to alter the chapter's behavior in this regard. Neither the viceroy nor the crown reacted by compelling the capitulars to revert to the former mode of reception. Salamanca remarked later that the categorical resolution which the situation demanded had not been taken. He concluded his one-paragraph treat-

ment of the "Causa de Real Patronato", totally devoted to the controversy, with the assertion that, by refusing to attend cathedral functions, he had maintained the intendancy's claim to its ceremonial perquisites.[49] Again, the gesture served more to call attention to a major defeat than to resolve the basic problem. What had been lost by peninsular power was real, not merely symbolic. What had been salvaged was a hollow title.

The chapter may or may not have been hospitable to Salamanca's successor, José Gabriel Moscoso. It was, no doubt, pleased by his appointment, since he was a native son and member of an illustrious family which had placed several other members within its ranks.[50] The fact that an Arequipeñan had been named governor hardly diminished the chapter's interests in furthering its own pretensions to dignity and power, however. At about the same time that Salamanca was writing his relación, the chapter had convinced the obliging new bishop, with whom it maintained generally cordial relations, to support its appeal to be granted "tratimiento de señoría". This the bishop gladly did, arguing that it had been given to the Lima chapter, which was in his opinion in no way superior to its Arequipeñan counterpart. The Regency acquiesced, and title was awarded by a decree of May, 1813.[51]

The chapter was apparently more aggressive and more successful in asserting its rights than was the city council, which did not, however, fail to move in the same direction. During the intendancy of Álvarez, the council was largely content to accept his leadership and to direct its energies in concert with the governor toward asserting control over ecclesiastical institutions and increasing local prosperity. This limited exercise of power was sufficiently enervating to entice the council to attempt one small venture on its own during the administration of Álva-

rez, and to strive for more ambitious goals during that of his successor.[52]

Álvarez's stimulation of the initiative of the municipal government may have accomplished more than the royalist governor had intended. Shortly before the end of his administration, Chávez, in response to the charges leveled against him by the intendant and the council, complained to the king that some of its members displayed an appetite for distinctions which did not pertain to them and which were contrary to law.[53] Chávez had clearly become aware that a new spirit, if not a new strength, had taken hold of at least some of the city's leading citizens and threatened, however remotely, the maintenance of Spanish power in the province.

Salamanca's record of his relations with the city council, although not extensive, is generally positive in tone. The governor praised the study of the province's agriculture and commerce made by the council in compliance with a royal decree. He also lauded its efforts to erect the public cemetery, rebuild the government office complex, organize the municipal archives, avert a potential grain shortage, and exterminate the local population of rabid quadripeds. He seemed satisfied with the council's expression of loyalty to the newly proclaimed but captive monarch, and he expressed approval of its support for the military expedition launched against the Buenos Aires rebels.[54]

Either Salamanca missed something of the council members' real feelings or he suppressed evidence contrary to his assertion that he had left the province as "whole" as he had found it. While Arequipeñan governments were not overtly rebellious, and while it was possible to pretend that business was going on as usual, Salamanca had encountered serious opposition to his government. This was expressed, finally, in

the council's willingness to imitate the convicted contrabandist, Santiago Aguirre, in petitioning the central government for his removal. With a dramatic flourish, the council protested that it had been forced to take this action by the strength of popular sentiment against the intendant, which would have erupted against itself had it refused to move to obtain redress of popular grievances. Soon after Salamanca's removal had been effected, it became obvious that more than one Arequipeñan in the governing class entertained sentiments incompatible with complete loyalty to the Spanish crown.[55]

In the quarter-century between the arrival of the first proprietary intendant and the removal of the second, the city council of Arequipa, which had been unable to clean up the city after the earthquake of 1784, had found sufficient strength and initiative to attempt coups to overthrow first, its bishop, and then its governor and president. It had, to be sure, gained more advantage from the general crisis which weakened the Spanish monarchy than it had increased in strength in its own right, but it had demonstrated itself capable at least of taking advantage of the situations in which it found itself. Álvarez, in attempting to create of the municipal government an ally for his struggle against ecclesiastical dominance in local politics and social welfare, had developed an institution capable of recognizing its own interests and of taking negative action to protect them.

The cathedral chapter had been even more effective politically than its secular counterpart. By a series of direct frontal attacks it refused to render its bishop the liturgical service its predecessors had provided for several centuries, forcing Chávez to publicly accept the defeat or absent himself from his own cathedral. It won reversal of a

decision on tithe distribution originally rendered in Lima and economically favorable to the bishop. It was likewise successful in frustrating the bishop's influence on the selection of candidates to fill the vacancies which occurred on the chapter. This combination of victories convinced the bishop of the futility of continuing to attempt to administer the diocese, and he proffered his resignation in earnest.

Neither the city council nor the cathedral chapter ever emerged to a position of primary power held and exercised in its own right. Both were most effective at creating and temporarily filling vacuums. This was the essence of the movement toward Peruvian independence in its early days. Truly dynamic men, in the Spanish tradition, rose from the committees and councils to positions of solitary power. It cannot be denied that the city council and the cathedral chapter, especially the latter, were successful agents in defending local interests by frustrating unwelcome changes initiated in Spain for the sake of bolstering Spanish power in the empire and in the European struggle for control of the American colonies.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. See above, p. 62.

2. Ibid., p. 64; Brading, pp. 34-37; and Burkholder, 400-407, esp. 400-401.

3. Echeverría's Iglesia de Arequipa includes two short chapters entitled "Señores Obispos Patricios de esta ciudad", which omits Juan Manuel Moscoso (who is listed as an archdeacon of the cathedral of Arequipa), and "Sujetos del Obispado que han servido otras iglesias". See Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 221-222, 238-239; and 257-261.

4. The five capitulars on the Arequipeñan chapter with the rank of dignidad (dignity) were, in descending order, the dean (dean) who received 4,399.5 pesos annually from the tithe, the arcediano (archdeacon), chantre (precentor), maestrescuela (chancellor), and tesorero (treasurer) who each received 3,861.3 pesos annually from the tithe. The next ranking canonigos doctoral, magistral, y de merced (doctoral, magistral, and mercy canons) each received 2,966.3 pesos annually from the tithe. The lowest ranking racioneros (prebends), two in number, were each paid 2,046 pesos annually from the tithe. All the capitulars also received an additional 292 pesos annually from chaplaincies and fees. See Álvarez, "Plan que demuestra la Gruesa Decimal que ha producido en un Quinquenio el Obispado de Arequipa", included in Álvarez, Noticia.

5. For biographical material on Santa María, see Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4:233-234; D. Jacinto Aguado y Chacón (Obispo de Arequipa, 1757-1762), "El Clero Secular del Obispado de Arequipa en 1758", in Barriga, ibid., 4: 264-265; and Martínez, Capitulares, pp. 62-64.

6. For Telaya's biography, see Echeverría, ibid., 4: 247, and Martínez, ibid., pp. 336-338.

7. For Medrano's biography, see ibid., 4: 239; and ibid., pp. 192-196.

8. For Valcárcel's biography, see ibid., 4: 234; and ibid., pp. 64-68.

9. For Ric-Corvi's biography, see ibid., 4: 234; and ibid., pp. 68-73.

10. For Arázuri's biography, see ibid., 4: 235; and ibid., pp. 74-76.

11. For Echeverría's biography, see ibid., 4: "Prologo"; and ibid., pp. 196-201.

12. For Pacheco's biography, see ibid., 4: 243, 271 (Aguado y Chacón); and ibid., pp. 263-268.

13. See above, pp. 56-58.

14. Medrano, the archdeacon, and Telaya, the chancellor, had died in June and July of 1786 respectively. The doctoral canonry had been vacant since the promotion of José Ric-Corvi to the dignity of treasurer in 1783. See above, p. 209.

15. For an example of such, see Chávez to Salamanca, August 8, 1799, AAA; and below, p. 230, n. 3.

16. A concurso to fill this vacancy was proclaimed by Pamplona on October 30, 1783, but it was not actually held until some time in 1785. The earthquake of May, 1784, and the establishment of the intendancy regime no doubt played some role in delaying the proceedings. See Martínez, Capitulares, p. 197, and "Relatio de meritos de Felipe Ascencio Delgado", January 9, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 646.

17. Martínez, Capitulares, pp. 196-199.

18. It is not known whether Álvarez wrote similar letters in support of other candidates as well. His endorsement of one or several could certainly be construed as a legitimate exercise of vicepatronage. It is easy to see, however, that Chávez might have interpreted any legitimate support by Álvarez as improper, and that Álvarez would perceive any criticism of his relationship with Delgado as an attempt to call into question the integrity of his position on the larger issue. See Álvarez to the King, August 30, 1786, and "Relatio de meritos de Felipe Ascencio Delgado", January 9, 1786, AGI, Lima, leg. 646, and Álvarez, Noticia, ff. 111v, 112v.

19. See Fiscal (Gorvea) to the Viceroy (Croix), October 24, 1787, AGI, Lima, leg. 695, and above, pp. 62, 65-67.

20. Chávez to Gil, December 9, 1791, AAA, Reserved Letters.

21. For Villalva's biography, see ibid.; Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 247; and Martínez, Capitulares, pp. 338-339.

22. See above, p. 181, and Summary of the Fiscal: Representation of Chávez, January 10 and February 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 7: 318r-318v.

23. See above, pp. 175, 201. Chávez told Gil that the election of the juez hacedor de diezmos held in 1790 "fell" on his vicar-general, Mariano de Rivero. He added that Villalva and his associates believed that Chávez intended to insist, through Rivero, on fulfillment of the decree of August 23, 1786, in which the king applied to obras pias (pious funds) money previously allocated to other ends. One beneficiary of this revision may well have been the foundling home. The chapter had other serious complaints about the new distribution of the tithe which Chávez did not mention. See Chávez to Gil, December 9, 1791, AAA Reserved Letters.

24. See ibid; Iglesia to Gil, July 24, 1790, BNL, C 4288; Cathedral Chapter of Arequipa to the King n.d. (ca. 1792), and Cathedral Chapter of Arequipa to the King, August 27, 1807, AMA-CG, 6: 180r-183r.

25. See Chávez to Silvestre Collar, March 10, 1796, AAA, Reserved Letters. Mariano de Rivero died on January 5, 1796.

26. Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 252, and Martínez, Capitulares, p. 410.

27. Chávez to Osorno, April 8, 1797, AAA, Reserved Letters.

28. For Paez Zapata's biography, see Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 251, and Martínez, Capitulares, p. 448 bis. See also Chávez to the Convent of Santa Catalina, January 9, 1790, BNL, C 1179.

29. Echeverría, ibid. See also Resumé: Representations of Álvarez, January 3 and March 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 6: 149v, 154r; Chávez to Gil, June 19, 1793, AAA, Reserved Letters; and Chávez to Gil, December 9, 1791, AAA, Reserved Letters, in which the bishop identified Belaochaga as coparticipant in tertulias with Ximénez Villalva and Diego Aldave y Salamanca, one of the lawyers who participated in the "residencia" of Chávez and an adviser to the nuns of Santa Catalina in their campaign to frustrate the bishop's reform program.

30. Chávez to the King, August 10, 1802, AAA, Reserved Letters; Resumé: Representation of Álvarez, March 10, 1795, AMA-CG, 6: 154r.

31. Chávez to the King, August 10, 1802, AAA, Reserved Letters. The election results were as follows. For first place: Francisco Borja Toranzo, 3 votes; Juan de la Cruz Errasquin, 2 votes. For second place: Errazquin, 2 votes; Nicolás Aranívar, 2 votes; and Francisco Pantaleon Ustariz, 1 vote. For third place: Errazquin, 2 votes; Juan José Arce, 1 vote; Ustariz, 1 vote; and Aranívar, 1 vote. Chávez to Salamanca, August 8, 1799, AAA.

Of the candidates, Toranzo is identifed below, p.217 and notes. Juan de la Cruz Errazquin was, in 1799, a Cura. Born in Guipúzcoa, he had come to Arequipa in 1788 as Chávez's secretario de cámara y gobierno. He was elected magistral canon in 1814, and from this position, he rose to that of dean in September of 1820. Arce, another of the bishop's partisans, was, at the time, copastor of the cathedral. Nicolás Aranívar, then a cleric of first tonsure, was brother of Faustina Aranívar, one of the nuns who led the pro-reform faction in the convent of Santa Catalina. On Errazquin, see Martínez, Capitulares, pp. 77-78; on Arce, see Vladimiro Bermejo, "El Iltmo Señor Luis Gonzaga de la Encina XVIII Obispo de Arequipa y el fidelismo del clero arequipeño" in La Causa de la emancipación del Perú. Testimonios de la época precursora. Instituto Riva Aguero (Lima, 1960), 359-361. On Aranívar, see below, pp. 242-243.

32. For biographical material on Lecaros, see Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 252, and Martínez, Capitulares, pp. 375-376.

33. Chávez suspended Toranzo's licence to preach at the convent in July of 1797, considering that the number and quality of the gifts which were sent daily from the convent to the chaplain were a cause of public scandal. See Chávez to the prioress of Santa Catalina, July 21, 1797, AAA, Reserved Letters. Toranzo was buried in the convent. For biographical material, see Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 252-253, and Martínez, Capitulares, pp. 448-449.

34. Villota's unpleasant relationship with Chávez did not prevent him from leaving a sizeable portion of his earthly goods to benefit the foundling home. He died in May, 1826. For biographical material, see ibid., 4: 243-244 and ibid., pp. 268-269.

35. Saturnino García de Arázuri was dean Francisco Javier Echeverría was archdeacon, and Cipriano Santiago Villota was preceptor.

36. The King to Chávez, November 26, 1796, CVU, Vol. 20.

37. Chávez to the King, June 8, 1803, AAA, Reserved Letters.

38. Ibid. Urizar, a native of Chile, had previously held a prebendary in La Paz. For biographical material, see Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 256, and Martínez, Capitulares, pp. 357-358.

39. Chávez to the King, June 8, 1803, AAA, Reserved Letters.

40. See below, pp. 223-224.

41. Chávez to the King, June 8, 1803, AAA, Reserved Letters.

42. Ibid.

43. See Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 215; and Martínez, Obispos, p. 221.

44. Cathedral Chapter of Arequipa to the King, August 27, 1807, AMA-CG, 6: 180r-183r.

45. See above, pp. 57-59.

46. See Cathedral Chapter to the King, August 27, 1807, AMA-CG, 6: 180r-183r. See also Abascal to the Cathedral Chapter, March 14, 1808; Bartolomé de las Heras to the Cathedral Chapter, March 23, 1808, Cathedral Chapter to the King, May 10, 1808, and Cathedral Chapter to the King, May 10, 1808, AMA-CG, 4: 20r-22r; 23r-26r.

47. See above, pp. 171-176.

48. Chávez reported that, while Álvarez was governor, his allies on the chapter had blocked all attempts to set up a conference. At issue was the rank of the capitulars who went to receive the intendant as he entered the cathedral in his official capacity. Escobedo's cere-

monial had originally prescribed that the intendant be received by a dignity and a canon. A decree issued May 9, 1795 had rescinded the original ceremonial and ordered prelates to form a new one. The withdrawal of the original was no doubt a corollary of the curtailment of the intendant's powers as vicepatron. Chávez favored having two canons, or, in their absence, two prebends, receive the intendant. His plan evidently failed to win approval, since Salamanca noted in his relación that a dignity and a canon had exercised this function since the arrival of the first intendant. See Chávez to Gil, February 28, 1796, AAA, Reserved Letters; Escobedo, "Ceremonial", October 23, 1784, AGI, Lima, leg. 1098, and Salamanca, Relación, p. 108.

49. Salamanca, ibid., pp. 108-109; Salamanca to Chávez, March 4, 1803, AAA.

50. José Gabriel Moscoso was nephew to both Juan Manuel Moscoso, who had ascended throught the Arequipeñan chapter to the episcopacy, and to Mariano Angel Moscoso, who, like Juan Manuel, served as bishop of Tucumán. He was the cousin of Juan Pío de Tristán y Moscoso, who succeeded him in office after his untimely death.

51. Encina to the King, March 4, 1812, CVU, vol. 22; Martínez, Obispos, pp. 227-228.

52. J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 189-190. The council sought to gain control over appointments to municipal posts created by Álvarez, and filled by him. It based its claim on grounds that salaries for these positions were paid from municipal tax revenues.

53. Chávez to the King, February 10, 1795, AAA, Reserved Letters.

54. Salamanca, Relación, pp. 144, 25, 36, 39, 62, 73, 75-76.

55. J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 210-211, 224-225, and below, pp. 241-244.

CHAPTER IX

REBELLION AND A ROYALIST BISHOP

On September 9, 1805, the same day on which Chávez's resignation was officially accepted in Rome, the crown obtained the appointment of Luis Gonzaga de la Encina Dias y Perla to succeed to the episcopacy of Arequipa. Luis's parents were Simon de la Encina, a Basque who had come to the Canaries as mayordomo of Bishop Valentín Morán, and Doña Aguedo Dias y Perla, a native of the Islands. As a young boy, Encina became a familiar of a later bishop of the Canaries, Don Fran Juan Bautista Cervera. He followed the usual course of studies leading to the priesthood, took Orders in May of 1777, and soon thereafter accompanied Bishop Cervera to his new see at Cádiz. There Cervera reformed the diocesan seminary and appointed Encina professor of Latin and Rhetoric.[1]

From Cádiz, Encina travelled to Osuña where, like Chávez, he received his higher degrees. He then returned to the Canaries, accepted a position in the diocesan seminary, and rapidly obtained a prebendary and a canonry on the cathedral chapter. He was later named rector of the seminary and rose to the position of Vice Director of the Real Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais, an office he filled with distinction.[2]

Recognized both as a scholar and teacher, Encina was popular as an orator as well. He was selected to give various important funeral orations, including that for the bishop and for Charles III. On the strength of these services and the general esteem in which he was held, Encina rose from canon to chancellor and then to archdeacon. His climb up the ladder of ecclesiastical preeminence culminated when, upon the refusal of the Cura of Yepes, Vicente Robles, to accept the bishopric of Arequipa,

a royal minister drew Encina'a name at random from a file of those considered qualified for promotion to the episcopacy. The royal announcement of his promotion reached Encina on the feast of San Vidal, his baptismal day, in apparent confirmation of a prophetic gift made to him by Bishop Morán.[3]

Zamacola portrayed Encina as a man whose nobility, ability, and services were all recognized from their earliest manifestations and rewarded by promotion from one office to another irrespective of the fact that he was born in the way-station Canaries rather than in peninsular Spain. He remarked that through all his successes, Encina had repressed vanity and cultivated virtue. He noted that, to his apparent predestination to the episcopacy by divine will and parental connections, Encina added qualities which go further to explain his selection as bishop than random extraction of his name from a file. These were his ability to speak forcefully and persuasively, and his gift of being able to get along with almost anyone, even those whose positions differed radically from his own. The account is significant not only as a reflection of creole-peninsular tensions and challenges to political and episcopal authority, but also as a subtle criticism of the episcopacy of Chávez, whom Zamacola saw as the source of much current dissention.

For Encina, appointment to the bishopric of Arequipa came far easier than taking possession of his diocese. English control of the sea after Trafalgar prevented him from leaving the Canaries. Consecrated bishop on September 28, 1806, it was not until October of 1808 that he was able to find passage from the Canaries to the Spanish mainland.[4] He arrived at his destination at about the same time that Napoleon's crack forces were sweeping over the peninsula. Caught up in the struggle around

Madrid, Encina fled south disguised as a muleteer. Along the way he gave final absolution to more than one ecclesiastic butchered by bandits and left to die along the wayside. Encina was not to forget these sights. He himself was personally menaced, but managed to escape.[5] His direct experience of the horrors of the war and the sufferings of the Spanish people gave deep emotional substance to his later endeavors to preserve his diocese and the American colonies in loyal adherence to the person of the captive monarch and in acceptance of the government of European Spain.

His mission on the peninsula accomplished, Encina somewhat unexpectedly secured passage to Callao on the warship San Pedro de Alcantara, which set sail on October 16, 1809, and reached its destination on March 7, 1810. By the time he set foot on Peruvian soil, Spanish America was already in serious political turmoil. Before he took possession of his diocese on July 10, 1810, Arequipeñan troops had departed from the city to assist in the "pacification" of La Paz. Within a month of the bishop's reception, a second and larger contingent of Arequipeñan soldiers departed to meet the threat posed by the forces of the independent Junta of Buenos Aires. As Zamacola tersely said, Encina had the misfortune to arrive at a time when the seed of war was springing up throughout the kingdom.[6]

Scarcely had Encina settled into his new position when Viceroy Abascal issued a manifesto publicizing the fact that Napoleon had sent agents to the New World. Their mission, as Encina put it, was to "introduce schism" into the politics of the American colonies and to divide them from "our Spain". It is not difficult to imagine either the spectres which must have arisen in the bishop's mind as he considered the situation, or the

surge of loyal and heroic emotion with which he responded. By February of 1811, he had prepared a lengthy document of his own, a pastoral letter to his flock, to reinforce and extend the impact of the viceregal pronouncement with all the props religion could bring to a beleaguered monarchy and empire.

Encina's letter was an attempt to totally discredit any response to the universal political upheaval that did not include complete loyalty to the captured king and complete submission to the Spanish Council of Regency. The bishop had been forced by the disastrous political circumstances of the time and his unquestioning monarchism to support the spontaneous governmental arrangements made in Spain. Nevertheless, he simultaneously insisted that no Spanish-American of right intentions ought to consider similar arrangements in the New World to be a legitimate option. For Encina, all possible political postures other than total submission to the Regency had their origin in Napoleonic deception or the base wickedness of those who held them and were degrading in the eyes of honest men everywhere, and criminal in the eyes of God.[7]

Honor played a key role in Encina's rhetorical strategy. While it was certainly not difficult to establish that Napoleon was an unprincipled man, the bishop made the point in every possible way, describing him as a scoundrel in both his personal and public capacity. He aroused his audience to imagine the villany of an emperor who abandoned his wife and his army, and scandalized the Christian world by assaults against the papacy. From his recital of Napoleon's misdeeds outside Spain, Encina moved quickly to call attention to his abduction of Ferdinand while pretending friendship and alliance. He emphasized his disregard for Spanish constitutional law by imposing his brother as king. By evidence

presented and evidence alluded to, Encina found it easy to convict Napoleon of obvious guilt, horrendous sacrilege, and most unjust oppression.[8]

Of more interest is the use to which Encina put his verdict. Napoleon, the bishop said, expected Spain to receive him with open arms. He thus set up a contrast between the capitulation of the rest of Europe and Spanish resistance to conquest by his forces. Marvelling at Spain's ability to resist, Encina asserted that the Spanish nation would not tolerate the felony by which Napoleon deprived it of its legitimate monarch, and would not be enslaved at his caprice.

Encina saw the struggle in terms of heroism, martyrdom, and the Spanish crusading tradition. He sounded the famous "Deus vult", stating that Spanish ability to resist was proof that God had chosen Spain to halt the progress of the Napoleonic horde. Spanish honor was the wellspring of a prodigious effort undertaken in the name of God and king, who were frequently, in Encina's mind and rhetoric, melded into a single entity worthy of the ultimate sacrifice. There was unquestionably an epic quality in Spanish resistance, and the bishop took full advantage of it.[9]

Since Napoleon could not conquer Spain by force, according to Encina, he then decided to conquer by deceit and by dividing the nation against itself. He described Napoleon's attempts to persuade the English people that the British campaign in Spain would threaten Britain's future ability to resist an invasion of the island. He stressed, in reference to the colonies, that Napoleon was the origin of the rumor that Spain was virtually conquered and that the best course for the Americas was to seek their own independence and accomodation with France.

Encina insisted that Spain was alive, never more alive, never more gloriously alive. He described the peninsula as England's best defense and the only hope of peace, happiness and prosperity for the American colonies. If Spain fell, the bishop said, England and the Americas would succumb in short order. He asserted that American independence, if achieved, would be fatal to Spain, and in short order to the colonies themselves. He grieved that Napoleon had been more able to deceive the colonies with the false notice of the total ruin of the motherland and with a specious promise of an independence which would prove prejudicial, imaginary, and ignominious.

Encina spent considerable time and effort elaborating on the notion that European and American Spaniards were adoptive sons of the same Heavenly Father and co-vassals of the same political father. Having established the sacred nature of this dual bond in tones approaching mystic fervor, Encina had a firm base from which to reject all alternative governments in Spain and in the colonies. He implied that Americans should not be moved by their grievances with the colonial administration to consider independence.[10] He chose to ignore the political impact of the formation of the juntas which governed Spain in the heroic days between September of 1808 and January of 1810. He refused to discuss the peculiar organization of the Spanish Empire which linked the colonies to the motherland as separate kingdoms, and which gave some constitutional basis to the formation of independent juntas in the Americas.

The bishop was a firm believer in monarchy as the divinely ordained optimum form of government for men. He argued that, while it had been necessary for the Spanish people to form juntas which both governed and directed the war effort, Spanish Americans must accept these peninsular

decisions as it accepted the Spanish monarchy, since the sole purpose of the juntas was to work for its restoration. The colonies, he insisted, were obliged to continue to recognize Spanish leadership, and to wait patiently until their limited membership in Cortes gave them some voice in the running of the Empire. Encina assured his audience that Americans had not been excluded from the interim government of Spain either by malice or from contempt, but by sheer necessity, which dictated that the vacuum be filled by a group small enough to take speedy action in a crisis situation.[11] In the bishop's opinion, the formation of juntas was acceptable in Spain only as an emergency function, and in the colonies not at all.

Encina's approach was neither original nor remarkable.[12] It called on a long tradition of political and religious conviction. Compelled to address the issue of rampant antagonism between creole and peninsular Spaniards, the bishop made the best of it, stressing sacred bonds and promising happier, more prosperous days to come. Oratorically, at least, he did the job he set out to do. He ruled out all possibility of independence being considered legitimate. With whatever force he derived from his episcopacy, he repeatedly condemned it as immoral and offensive to the code of manly honor, brotherhood, and divine law. He rejected it on grounds that its origin was not the accurate perception of rights and possibilities by men of political intelligence and rectitude, but rather the deceptive machinations of a greedy tyrant. Four years later, under vastly different circumstances, he was still saying the same thing.[13]

An important indication of how Encina's pastoral was received is a letter written to him on February 28, 1811 by his cathedral chapter, subsequently published with the pastoral. The letter was most flattering

to Encina, whose government the chapter described as "sweet" and "pacific", and whose oratory it compared to that of Ambrose, Bernard and Augustine.[14] These niceties aside, and despite the royalist persuasions of many of the capitulars, there is evidence that the chapter's political concerns did not always coincide with those of the bishop.

While the chapter made several references to the need for loyalty to the sovereign, it mentioned the agony of peninsular Spain only in passing. Its emphasis on the need for submission to legitimate authority was based as heavily on experience of Indian rebellion as on Spanish resistance to Napoleonic usurpation. What the chapter really opposed was political turmoil and domestic rebellion, and what it strongly supported was the rule of religion, peace, and legitimate authority, of which the sovereign was one aspect and itself another. The chapter, in short, saw a community of interest between itself and all others who stood to be adversely affected by imperial political disorder.

The chapter supported the king and the struggle to free the peninsula of French domination, but not at undue expense to the Americas. It praised the bishop for teaching and preaching truth, love of God, fidelity to the king and legitimate government established by the laws of the nation. It emphasized, however, that law was the foundation of monarchy and peace among all Christians and all vassals of the same king. It emphasized further that these vassals were governed by the same laws and sustained by equal rights, live where they might live. It demanded equal rights, equal protection under the law as a return for American political and financial investment in the Spanish monarch.[15]

Both the peninsular government and the viceregal government recognized the need to be responsive to local interests and pressures. When

with little apparent justification, the Council of Regency removed Bartolomé Salamanca from the intendancy of Arequipa, he was replaced by a native Arequipeñan, José Gabriel Moscoso. In a discussion of related Arequipeñan affairs, the Consejo de Indias plainly expressed its hope that his arrival in the city would insure the restitution of harmony there.[16] This willingness to please colonial councils was a rather new characteristic of the peninsular colonial administration. No less remarkable was its decision to hand over the strategically located province to a close relative of both Bishop Juan Moscoso y Peralta and of Domingo Tristán, each of whom had been under suspicion of disloyalty to Spain.[17] As events proved, the crown had had good reason to be sure of its man, but it must be emphasized that only a few years previous to the crisis of the early nineteenth century, a man with such relations would have had little chance to be chosen governor of any province, let alone his own.

Moscoso came to the intendancy of Arequipa after a military career which included service in the Túpac Amaru rebellion and in Spain. He was given title to the governorship of Arequipa on October 15, 1810, but did not take office until a full year later.[18] Once he assumed the position, he had hardly a chance to function under what might be termed normal circumstances. He missed by several months the outbreak of rebellion in Tacna on June 20, 1811, which aimed at cooperation with the porteño army under General Castelli, roundly defeated that same day at the battle of Guaqui by royalist forces under the Arequipeñan José Manuel de Goyeneche. Moscoso was in full command during the second rebellion which broke out in Tacna in 1813, in conjunction with the advance of porteño troops under General Belgrano. The Tacna uprising was supposed to have

been coordinated with a similar outbreak in the city of Arequipa, described below.[19]

Moscoso was, thus, thrown into the middle of a confusing and potentially dangerous political situation whose implications are best perceived when seen in the light of the four elections held in the province to choose participants in the various Spanish governments which replaced the absent Ferdinand. These elections were held on June 30, 1809, to select a candidate for Peru's delegate to the Junta Central; in early 1811 to select a delegate to what became the 1810-1813 session of Cortes; on October 5, 1813, to choose two delegates to the first regular session of Cortes held 1813-1814; and finally on April 18, 1814, in anticipation of an 1815-1816 session of Cortes. In the first two of these elections, the Junta Central and the Regency restricted voting to the members of the city councils of capital cities of provinces. The 1813 and 1814 elections were the only ones in which citizens participated in the selection of electors, who then chose the delegates.

In 1809, the Arequipeñan city council named three candidates, José Manuel de Goyeneche, Saturnino García de Arázuri, and Domingo Tristán as qualified by talent and integrity to represent the viceroyalty at the Junta Central.[20] The council's first choice for delegate to the 1810-1813 session of Cortes was Nicolás Araníbar y Fernandez Cornejo, who resigned and was replaced by Mariano de Rivero y Bezoaín.[21] In the election of October 5, 1813, Arequipa selected as its two delegates Hipólito Unánue and Domingo Tristán, and designated Francisco de Luna Pizarro as alternate.[22] In 1814, Nicolás Araníbar was once again elected delegate, in company with Francisco Pantáleon Ustariz y Zuñiga, Bishop Encina having declined to serve as one of the province's two representatives.[23]

Arázuri, Goyeneche, and Encina were certainly the candidates of the more conservative and loyalist-oriented sector of the Arequipeñan population, with Unánue and Ustariz representing what might be termed the middle of the road. Rivero, Tristán, and probably Aranívar, however, represent more radical sentiments. The Riveros, while they had not come to full revolutionary prominence in 1810, were no doubt generally recognized as being quite critical of traditional Spanish colonial government. Manuel de Rivero, father of Mariano and brother of Antonio, subdelegate of Arica during the 1811 and 1813 uprisings there, had been one of those members of the Arequipeñan city council who worked actively to remove Salamanca from office.[24] In 1813, Moscoso arrested him and sent him to Lima for trial as principal conspirator and prime mover of the plot to seize the barracks of Arequipa and cooperate with insurgent troops under Belgrano. Implicated with him on this occasion was Estanislao Aranívar, his nephew and son-in-law, who was also related to Nicolás de Aranívar.[25]

As remarkable as the election of Aranívar and Rivero was the choice of Domingo Tristán to serve as Arequipeñan delegate to the 1813-1814 session of Cortes. His selection in 1809 was less worthy of note as he had, so to speak, recently come to prominence on the coattails of Juan Manuel de Goyeneche through his service in the royalist army combatting the rebels in Alto Peru. By virtue of this, Abascal had consented to his nomination as interim intendant of La Paz. Several years prior to the election of 1813, however, Tristán had surrendered La Paz to rebel forces under Castelli without a struggle. There was evidence to suggest that he had willingly accepted a rebel appointment to continue on as the city's intendant and had vigorously supported the rebel cause in this

capacity. When royalist forces defeated the rebels, it was only by virtue of Goyeneche's intercession that Tristán escaped severe punishment at the hands of Abascal for both his military and political conduct.[26]

Rivero, Aranívar, and Tristán were, thus, strongly identified with what might be described as a movement or movements to open Arequipa to penetration by the forces and ideology of separatism. Moscoso took the threat they posed seriously. He reported that political disturbances were widespread and factional intrigue a commonplace throughout the province during the spring of 1813, the first time when an electorate larger than the city council became active in the process of delegate selection. The fact that several of the men selected to represent the province came from one prominent, interrelated and suspect group easily explains Moscoso's discomfort. Furthermore, however much or little this group represented majority opinion in Arequipeñan politics, it had been quite successful in gaining the right to represent Arequipa in the public forum.[27]

Moscoso was involved in strengthening provincial defenses from the first day of his administration. As in almost every area outside Lima, these were completely inadequate to meet any substantial challenge. His pleas for military assistance were, unfortunately for himself, answered too late. In August and September of 1814, political rioting turned to open rebellion in Cuzco. Rebel forces were soon marching in the direction of Arequipa, and, on November 9, 1814, an army led by Mateo Pumacahua and Vicente Angulo defeated the numerically inferior and inadequately armed troops led by Moscoso, Francisco Picoaga, Pío Tristán and Luis del Valle. The rebels entered the city and forced the city council and cathedral chapter to cooperate in forming a new government which held[28]

power for the few weeks before the rebels were driven out by a royalist army under the leadership of General Ramírez. On their departure from Arequipa, the rebel forces took with them as prisoners Moscoso and Picoaga. The two men, having refused to join the rebel cause, were executed in Cuzco on February 1, 1815. Their deaths were revenged soon after when the rebel leaders fell prisoner to royalist forces.[29]

Pumacahua, who had temporarily held office as President of the Audiencia of Cuzco, had been one of the highest ranking members of his race in colonial administration. Encina began an address to the Indian chieftain by recalling his long career of service to the king, a service which had included very active participation in the suppression of the Túpac Amaru rebellion some thirty-five years previous, and a struggle against insurrection in Alto Peru only a few years before.[30] The bishop expressed disbelief that a man who had stood by his captive king would now, after the colonies had been incorporated into unity and equality with peninsular Spain, take up the sword against him. Encina found only two possible explanations for such a reversal, the first that Pumacahua had been deceived into thinking his rebellion was consistent with the interests of Ferdinand VII, and the second, that frustrated ambition or avaricious desire for office had poisoned his spirit of loyalty to the king.[31]

Encina stressed the new horizons opened to Spanish America since the Constitution had abolished its colonial status and incorporated it into the Spanish nation on an equal footing with the motherland. He emphasized that all individuals of this continent, Europeans, creoles and natives of the American kingdoms, had been made equal in rights with citizens of the peninsular kingdoms, had been given equal title to gov-

ernmental positions in their own territories and equal say in the formulation of the laws. He concluded this portion of his argument with the statement that the desire to disunite America from Spain now was not to seek independence but a disunion which would give America nothing.

Encina then addressed the one episode in Pumacahua's previous career which he suspected above all else as being responsible for reversing the Indian's lifelong loyalty to Spain, his removal from the presidency of the Audiencia of Cuzco. The bishop insisted that Abascal, in replacing him, was merely recognizing the inappropriateness of having a committee of lawyers presided over by a military man. He asserted that those entrusted with high government office always ruled with rectitude of intention and only did what was convenient for better order and government. The bishop begged the Indian to put aside his personal interests, to return to his former loyalty and thus to make himself worthy of greater rewards, which Encina personally guaranteed would come his way.[32]

There is no certain record of how Pumacahua reacted to the bishop's letter,[33] which underlined so forcefully creole resentment of peninsular refusal to accede to demands for appointment to political office. Encina admitted the "justice" of these demands, and came close to admitting that Americans had been barred from office because of their status as colonials. Whether this returned to trouble him after Ferdinand abolished both the Constitution and the Cortes is not known. Encina was extremely responsive to the need to support whatever position the government might take, and accomodated himself to changed circumstances with apparent ease and little obvious discomfort. He was, it seems, a trusting man, and could only explain the refusal of others to follow his path by insisting that they were guided only by fallible human reason and rejected

the idea that current events were under the control of a benevolent deity.

Scarcely a month after his first letter had been written, on learning that Pumacahua had captured the city of Arequipa, the bishop again wrote the rebel chieftain, expressing his sorrow at the news of his victory. Nevertheless, he asserted his willingness to reach an accomodation with the new regime in all matters which did not offend his conscience, in the interest of maintaining public order. He also devoted a major part of his letter to a moving plea that Pumacahua behave as a Christian victor, that he treat those he had conquered with sweetness and humanity, and that he respect rather than retaliate against the leaders of the royalist forces and government. With the exception of the executions of Moscoso and Picoaga after the rebels had abandoned the city, his request seems to have been granted.[34]

The need to choose between Pumacahua's government over Arequipa or no government at all was a real dilemma for Encina. The degree to which maintenance of order was a priority for him and rebellion with its corollary anarchy an unthinkable horror is striking. While Encina's personal experience of war had no doubt left him with vivid recollections of death and destruction, it is not these recollections but his religious convictions which best explain his position. For the bishop, governmental power came from the Lord, Who, in the normal course of events, entrusted it to legitimate monarchs, although He sometimes chose to chastize nations by giving them tyrannical usurpers as rulers. God, in the bishop's mind, had clearly manifested His will that Spain resist Napoleon. His will with regard to Pumacahua seemed less obvious. Until the message of deliverance came, and unless Pumacahua's commands contradicted God's law, the

bishop would accept his rule and preach obedience to him despite his natural repugnance.

For Encina, order had to be maintained at all costs. Those not chosen by God to rule must constantly be reminded of their fundamental obligation to obey. While political realism and an instinct for self-preservation may have played some part in bringing the bishop to the conclusion he reached, it was neither his dominant nor characteristic approach to the interpretation of life's vicissitudes. When confronted with reverses, Encina coped by means of faith in an Old Testament God who had left a record of His dealings with Israel for men of all ages to study. It was to the Bible and not to common sense or reason that the bishop turned for guidance. In his thinking, creation was not a dynamic process but a static, hierarchical reality in which each type of being had been defined by God's will once and for all time. There was no room for evolution in this system and little room for any progress which elevated men from a humble to a more exalted position.[35]

In a few short weeks, royalist forces under General Ramírez drove the insurgents out of Arequipa. If, for Encina, Ramírez's victory represented a return to a divinely ordained order and showed God's tender mercy toward His children, for other Arequipeñans there were different lessons to be drawn from the rebel victory and the execution of José Gabriel Moscoso. The native son who had come to govern his own province had been shot by a group of insurgents who were, for the most part, Indians and mestizos. Men of means and royalist convictions had been forced to make sizeable contributions to the rebel cause.[36] Forty years earlier Arequipa had sheltered men of similar wealth and social standing who had been forced to flee from cities in the Altiplano during

the Túpac Amaru rebellion. Against these memories and recent experiences, continued rule by Spain, even by an absolutist Ferdinand, may have seemed a safer and more predictable alternative to the majority of the substantial citizens of Arequipa.

Encina returned to the liberated city in late December of 1814. Within a month he had completed another major letter on political matters. The occasion for this last and longest of his efforts was his desire to publicize Ferdinand's annullment of the Cortes and Constitution, and to persuade his diocese of the justice of the King's motives and the propriety of his course of action. The letter, dated January 28, 1815, began with a most uncharacteristic, acerbic denunciation of the falsely wise who abused their God-given talents and arrogantly scorned the simple maxims of the Gospel, which directed man to spend all his energies striving for eternal happiness, his true and only goal.

With the dichotomy between heavenly and earthly wisdom established as his basic frame of reference, Encina moved on to discuss the royal decrees of May, 1814, by which Ferdinand had nullified the Cortes and the Constitution. The bishop recalled the attitude with which he had received the Constitution when it was first promulgated in Peru several years before. He reminded his audience that, despite his serious reservations about both institutions, he had preached the obligation to recognize the Cortes and obey its provisions, confident that their defects would be remedied in time. He stated that he had supported Cortes and Constitution because the alternative was disunion and anarchy, the worst of all political evils, since they imperilled both spiritual and temporal wellbeing.[37]

Encina was, thus, firmly convinced that his accomodation with a

Constitution whose fatal defects, as identified by Ferdinand, he listed in great detail, had been necessary, proper, and based on principle. Neither he nor the king gave any consideration whatever to the circumstances in which the Cortes was organized and the Constitution written, circumstances which would certainly have gone far to excuse its supposed shortcomings to more impartial consideration. The degree to which he equated monarchy with divine will and the degree to which the interests of church and state were interpenetrated in Spanish history spared him any concern that his actions might be interpreted by honest men as derived from expediency or opportunism. His opening denunciation of the falsely wise, however, suggests that there were some men in Arequipa whom the bishop feared had been won over to modern theories which were inherently hostile to Spanish interests and traditions.

The bishop then engaged in a lengthy defense of monarchical government, a government which he described as modelled on the divine ordering of the universe. Obliged to take up the question of whether or not the king was superior to his nation, he stated with no hesitation whatsoever that, once a monarch was established as such, he was superior to the nation he governed, since God and not the nation, had put the government in his hands. Comparing the king to the father of a family, he asserted that the father did not receive his rights over his sons by virtue of their concession, but rather by virtue of his paternity. In short, Encina found no political or philosophical problems which threatened to invalidate his system of divine monarchy. He perceived no weakness in his analogy which might undermine his conclusions.

Whether the prelate anticipated the degree of ill-considered absolutism which Ferdinand was so soon to display or whether, more probably,

he addressed himself to the resentment felt by those who had supported Spain because of the liberal and pro-American positions taken by the Cortes, he turned to Scripture for what might well be described as a defense of monarchical tyranny. Discussing the establishment of the Old Testament Israelite monarchy, the bishop quoted at length a biblical enumeration of the many onerous burdens and obligations kings were entitled to impose on their subjects, who had, according to Encina's interpretation, no right to protest.[38] God and only God, he said, was entitled to judge whether or not the monarch abused his power. Speaking further on the limited rights of man, Encina stated that, since he came from nothing, he had no right to protest his state or condition, however humble that might be, whatever hardship his existence entailed.

Having thus established the rights of kings and disposed of those of their subjects, the bishop next discussed whether Cortes might modify the powers of the monarch. Here Encina made some limited concessions to the social contract theory. Nations without kings, he said, were free to establish whatever government they believed best suited to their needs. Once established, no alteration was permissible while the throne was occupied by a member of a legitimate dynasty. Each king was entitled to govern with the same powers and prerogatives as had his predecessors, especially if, as in the case of Ferdinand, the nation had already accepted him as king under the traditional arrangement. Thus, the bishop concluded, Cortes had no right whatever to attempt to remake the Spanish monarchy. While Encina admitted its breakdown under Napoleonic pressure, he denied the legitimacy of the abdications and asserted that they had no power whatever to alter Ferdinand's claim to the throne of his fathers. The oath, once taken, bound the vassal irrevocably to im-

mutable obligations. Failure or inability of the monarch to function adequately was irrelevant, since the relationship between king and vassal was not a contract between equals.

In support of his position, Encina invoked a pronouncement made by the Spanish bishops assembled at the Sixth National Council of Toledo which condemned absolutely any conspiracy to deprive the king of his government or his life.[39] He warned his flock to keep this "Spanish" position in mind as it considered whether or not to accept the false reasonings of a Voltaire or a Rousseau. Should there by any lingering doubt about the choice, he called to mind the disasters suffered by France in the wake of its attempt to form a republic, an attempt which produced Napoleon, a regression, not a positive evolution.

The prelate obviously did not wish to end his letter on so bleak a note. For relief, he turned to a discussion of what might be expected from the government of Ferdinand VII, restored to his throne by a patent miracle of the Omnipotent. As if oblivious to all unflattering aspects of Ferdinand's prior conduct, Encina painted a portrait of the restored king drawn entirely from hagiography. What Encina could not explain to himself was how, with such a king, the germ of rebellion, first planted in the colonies by Napoleon and nourished by foreign philosophy, could continue to grow. He pleaded with his flock to close its ears to false doctrine and rumors of catastrophe spread by the insurgents. He beseeched it to believe only himself, who had never engaged in deception, whom past events had proven correct. He assured his audience that Ferdinand had not come to govern as a despot, but as one sensitive to the true needs of his subjects and disposed to rule under the ancient, wise, and just laws of Spain. He insisted that peace, harmony, healing, and eternal

salvation would come only through obedience to the legitimate king.[40]

Thus ended Encina's political testament, which can only be described as a peculiar mixture of Aristotelian philosophy, simple faith, and opportunism born of political naiveté. The bishop spent most of the remaining year of his life in a fierce attempt to root out political heresy and convert political dissidents. Against these, he employed not only his persuasive oratory, but the anathemas prescribed by the Sixth National Council of Toledo. All priests in the diocese were ordered to take public oaths of loyalty to the restored king.[41] Those who refused were barred from exercise of their priestly functions. Confessors were required to denounce all penitents who admitted to sympathy with the insurgents, and penitents were ordered to report confessors who used the sacrament to advocate sedition.[42] Failure to comply with these regulations brought with it automatic major excommunication. The seminary was closed to all candidates whose royalism was not beyond question.[43] As effectively as was in his power, Encina cordoned off his diocese from the plague of rebellion against the legitimate monarchy of the "Desired One".

How many of the uncommitted were swayed by his oratory or the threat of ecclesiastical censure cannot be determined. The powerful hold which the Church continued to have over the minds of many Spaniards no doubt meant that the bishop's words would be seriously considered and the threat of excommunication respected. There were, however, men in Arequipa who were politically more sophisticated than Encina, who saw their interests differently, and whose convictions were not altered. For the most part, during the years of indecision which followed, they chose to remain silent or to move to areas where neither ecclesiastical pressure

nor the presence of royalist troops weighed so heavily upon them.

In the years before the Pumacahua rebellion, Arequipeñans had shown themselves interested enough in decisions which affected their careers or prosperity to risk a certain amount of political instability. After Pumacahua, some became more interested in reestablishing the static but comforting organization of society which Encina linked to the system of absolutist monarchy. The situation was complex and the choices far from clear. As Carrión Ordóñez so wisely reminds us, royalists were also patriots.[44] The province, after its experience of the distressing consequences of a power vacuum, weighed Ferdinand VII's return to absolutism, with its retrogressive implications for the Americas, against the known hazards of Indian rebellion. Pumacahua, Encina and Abascal combined to give both royalists and revolutionaries time to reconsider or develop their positions and to prepare for the crises of the 1820's. Another full decade of confusion passed before a Hispanic alternative to both Ferdinand VII and Pumacahua appeared on the scene and the decision was finally made.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Zamacola, Obispos, BNL, D 8150; Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 216-217; Appointment of Luis Gonzaga de la Encina to the Chair of Latin at the Colegio de San Bartolomé, October 10, 1777, BNL, D 8162.

2. Certification of the degrees granted to Luis Gonzaga de la Encina by the University of Osuña, June 21, 1779; Joaquin de Herrera to Encina, December 29, 1781, and March 21, 1782; Pedro Russell to Encina, June 1, 1790; and Testimonial of Esteban Fernández Salazar on Encina's contributions to the Real Sociedad, BNL, D 8162, and Echeverría, ibid.

3. His appointment was dated September 10, 1805. Echeverría, ibid.

4. Encina went to the mainland as a political emissary for the island of Las Palmas. Enrique Carrión Ordóñez, "Pereira y el Perú", Boletín del Instituto Riva-Aguero 8 (1969-1971): 26-27.

5. Padre Fray Mateo Camplá, "Oracion Funebre por Gonzaga de la Encina", February 1, 1861, BNL, X252.1/E56.

6. See Carrión Ordóñez, 28; Echeverría, Iglesia de Arequipa, in Barriga, Memorias, 4: 217; Salamanca, Relación, pp. 112-113; and Zamacola.

7. Luis Gonzaga de la Encina, Carta Pastoral con Motivo de la Instrucción Dada por Napoleon Emperador de los Franceses a sus Emisarios para las Americas. (Lima, Impresa en la Casa Real de Niños Expositos, 1811), pp. 12-17.

8. Ibid., pp. 23, 29-30.

9. Ibid., pp. 4-7.

10. Ibid., pp. 7-14.

11. Ibid., pp. 39-42.

12. See Armando Nieto Velez, "La campaña literaria fidelista y antinapoleónica en el Perú", in La Causa de la emancipación del Perú. Testimonios de la época precursora. Instituto Riva Aguero (Lima, 1960), pp. 339-354.

13. By 1813, Encina had clearly been rejected by "the partisans of disorder". See Carrión Ordóñez, pp. 63, 73, n. 110.

14. "Oficio del Venerable Dean y Cabildo al Illmo. Señor D. D. Luis Gonzaga de la Encina dignisimo Obispo de esta Diocesi, del Consejo de S.M. etc. en contestacion a el que paso con su Pastoral", appended to Encina, Carta Pastoral...Napoleon, pp. 54-58.

15. Ibid., pp. 53-56.

16. Material on the removal of Salamanca from office may be found in AGI, Lima, legs. 600, 601, and 627. See also J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 210-211, and his introduction to Salamanca's Relación, pp. xiv-xv.

17. On Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, see above, p. 210. On Domingo Tristán, see Fisher, Government and Society, pp. 224-225. For genealogical background, see Martínez, Gobernadores, pp. 158-159, 198, and Capitulares, p. 126.

18. See Fisher, ibid., p. 245.

19. On the Tacna rebellions, see R. Cúneo-Vidal, Historia de las Insurrecciones de Tacna por la Independencia del Perú, 1810, 1811, 1813, 1815, 1818, 1821 (Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1921), pp. 153ff, 189-239, and Ruben Vargas Ugarte, S.J., Historia del Perú. Emancipación (1809-1825). (Buenos Aires: Imprenta López, 1958), pp. 22-28. On the sedition in Arequipa, which Moscoso suppressed before its plans could be put into effect, see José Gabriel Moscoso to Abascal, October 1 (two letters), 5, and 16, 1813, AGI, Lima, leg. 745.

20. See Vicente Rodríguez Casado and J. A. Calderón Quijano, eds. Memoria de Gobierno del Virrey Abascal, 2 vols. (Sevilla, 1944), 2: cxiii-cxxiv. Fisher, in his introduction to Salamanca's Relación (p. xv), notes that the intendant was accused of having attempted to force the council to select him as one of the three candidates from Arequipa. The man finally chosen by lot to represent Peru was José Silva y Olave.

21. James Larry Odom mistakenly asserts that Aranívar was present at the 1810-1813 session, and denies Rivero's presence there. See James Larry Odom, "Viceroy Abascal Versus the Cortes of Cádiz" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1968), p. 54, ns. 36 and 38. See rather Carrión Ordóñez, 62; Abascal to the Cortes Generales, Nov. 30, 1813, AGI, Lima, leg. 745; and Fisher, Government and Society, p. 225.

22. See John E. Woodham, "Hipólito Unánue and the Enlightenment in Peru" (Ph. D. dissertation, Duke University, 1964), pp. 252-255. Unánue arrived in Spain after Ferdinand had abolished the Cortes. There is some doubt as to whether Tristán ever reached the peninsula. See Carrión Ordóñez, p. 62, n. 78; and Fisher, ibid., pp. 224-225.

23. Encina declined on grounds that his first responsibility was to remain with his flock. Ustariz and Aranívar probably went no farther than Lima before learning of the abolition of Cortes. See Encina to Ustariz, August 27, 1814, and to Aranívar, August 16, 1814, both in BNL, D 11884.

24. Francisco José de Rivero y Benavente, Mariano de Ureta y Rivero and Mariano García Rivero, all related to Manuel de Rivero y Aranívar, were members of the Arequipeñan city council during this period. See

Cúneo-Vidal, pp. 166-167. The Riveros were related by marriage to the Aranívars, the Tristáns, and to Francisco Pantaleon de Ustariz.

25. Moscoso to Abascal, October 1, 5, and 16, 1813, AGI, Lima, leg. 745.

26. There is abundant material on Domingo Tristán's conduct as Intendant of La Paz in AGI, Lima, leg. 804. Vargas Ugarte notes that Tristán was also suspected of being the author of subversive pamphlets prior to 1811. See Ruben Vargas Ugarte, "Suplemento a la Biblioteca Peruana" Boletín Bibliograpfiço, Vol. 30 (1960), p. 28. See also J. R. Fisher, Government and Society, p. 224.

27. The only man elected by Arequipa to actually function as a delegate was Mariano de Rivero. His attacks on Abascal caused the viceroy no little embarrassment. See J. R. Fisher, ibid., p. 225. On the disturbances in the province of Arequipa, see Moscoso to Abascal, April 13, 1813. CVU, vol. 21.

28. See the "Plan de Gobierno" signed on November 12, 1814, by members of both the city council and the cathedral chapter. CVU, vol. 21.

29. Pumacahua was executed on March 12, 1815. See Vargas Ugarte, Emancipación, pp. 57-60, Martínez, Gobernadores, pp. 199-202, and Frederick Pike, The Modern History of Peru (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967), p. 46.

30. For an unfavorable summary of Pumacahua's career, see Vargas Ugarte, Emancipación, pp. 48, 70, or Historia General, 5: 249-250.

31. Encina to Pumacahua, October 19, 1814, BNL, D 11884.

32. Ibid.

33. Encina wrote a pair of letters on November 19, 1814, politely declining an invitation to join the revolution. This may well have been the Indian's response to the bishop's exhortation. See Encina to Genuario Torres, and to Mariano Gonzales, November 19, 1814, BNL, D 11884.

34. Encina to Pumacahua, November 18, 1814, BNL, D 11884. Vargas Ugarte asserts that the request was, in fact, granted, since Arequipa was spared the excesses which Pumacahua committed in other places. See Ruben Vargas Ugarte, S.J., El Episcopado en los tiempos de la Emancipación Sudamericana (Buenos Aires: Editorial "Huarpes" S. A., 1945), p. 127, and the same author's Emancipación, p. 46.

35. See Encina, Carta Pastoral, January 28, 1815, BNL, D 11887.

36. On Pumacahua's exactions, see Carrión Ordóñez, p. 67, n. 93.

37. Encina, Carta Pastoral, January 28, 1815, BNL, D 11887.

38. His source was i Kings. 8: 11, 12, 17 (Vulgate).

39. This Council was celebrated in the year 638 at a time when the Spanish bishops were attempting to put an end to the frequent rebellions which occurred during the period of the Visigothic monarchy.

40. Encina, Carta Pastoral, January 28, 1815, BNL, D 11887.

41. See Encina, "Formulario de Juramento de fidelidad al Rey hecho por el clero", February 7, 1815, BNL, D 11816.

42. See Encina to His Flock, March 11, 1815, AAA. These measures devised by the bishop received the wholehearted support of the government in Lima. For a contrary reaction, see José Pérez Armendáriz, May 31, 1815, CVU, vol. 21. Pérez Armendáriz was bishop of Cuzco.

43. Encina also put heavy pressure on the clergy to contribute financially to the support of the royalist cuase. See Encina to Abascal, January 10, 1815; to the Vicar of Moquegua, Luis Prieto (January, 1815); to General Juan Ramírez, February 3 and 9, 1815; to Hermenegildo Viscardo, March 6, 1815; to Miguel Lardizabal y Orive, March 17, 1815; to the Vicar of Yanque, Faustino Vera Portocarrero, March 29, 1815; to Intendant Pío Tristán, April 21, 1815; and to the Vicar of Caraveli, Mariano Ypólito Paredes, May 20, 1815 in BNL, D 11885.

On his use of appointment to support royalism, see Encina to the Cura of Tiabaya, Agustin Romero de la Cuba (January, 1815); to D. Miguel Zeballos, February 13, 1815; to Doña Maria del Carmen of the same date; and to the Cura of Maca, Andres Barreda, April 4, 1815, BNL, D 11885. See also Carrión Ordóñez, pp. 64 and 67, n. 95.

44. Carrión Ordóñez, pp. 55.

CONCLUSION

This study has documented how church-state tensions fostered a strong sense of regional self-awareness and a determination to promote provincial prosperity. Bourbon reforms subdivided the political administration of the South American continent, broke up long-standing commercial monopolies, and challenged the hegemonies long enjoyed by religious orders. This combination of factors provided a powerful impetus for the province of Arequipa to seek to develop its resources independent of Limeñan control and contrary to its economic interests.

Provincial leaders planned to utilize the wealth controlled by religious orders, especially those of the now-exiled Jesuits, to support the expansion they envisioned. They also expected to enlist the aid of the diocesan clergy in obtaining the participation of the Indian community in the effort mounted to realize their objectives. Church assets were, thus, crucial to the success of the program.

The newly established intendancy system was also most important in giving impulse to the drive for provincial self-determination. It put a high-level official of the colonial administration, endowed with competent powers, in immediate contact with local pressures. From this point on, it was much easier for the creole establishment to make its wishes known, and much more difficult for the central government to ignore them.

The intendental attribute of vicepatronage was a prime instrument for stimulating the growth of creole power. It offered the possibility that the church and its many establishments could be made sensitive to creole needs and aspirations in both the financial and the ideological

orders. As was seen in the disputes over Santa Catalina and the Jesuit temporalidades, it made it possible to hope that wealth deposited in the hands of ecclesiastical institutions by former generations might be retrieved to fuel provincial development. The intendant's right to inspect the manner in which religious orders administered wealth and provided services breached the de facto immunity from public scrutiny which the orders had long enjoyed. The possibility that the civil government might establish and control educational or charitable institutions rivaling those operated under religious auspices threatened to further weaken the church's claim to public esteem and its role as trustee of funds donated to promote public wellbeing.

The facet of vicepatronage which gave the intendant the right to make appointments to ecclesiastical benefices or royal presentation was also important. It was part of a more general attempt to insure that wealth produced by the Indians would be redirected to public rather than ecclesiastical channels. It was a corollary to the state's attempt to retract the tutelage over the Indians which it had granted to the religious orders since the days of conquest and evangelization.

This program implied an effort to upgrade the secular clergy, who would replace the regulars in many parishes, so that they would be both theologically competent and politically willing to instill an attitude of submission to government authority. It demanded that those assigned to provide for the spiritual needs of the Indian population exercise their authority in conformity with the objectives determined by the secular power. Control of the education of the diocesan clergy was, thus, a politically sensitive issue. It was disputed for this reason, and also because it brought the episcopacy, the intendancy, and the

creole elite into competition for resources once the property of the Jesuit Order. The various conflicts between Álvarez and Chávez pointedly illustrate these trends.

Arequipeñan creoles, both clerical and lay, were extremely sensitive to the tensions which arose between the intendancy and the episcopacy as a result of intendental exercise of vicepatronage. They perceived the possibility of exploiting them to the advantage of the creole councils which shared the responsibility for civil and ecclesiastical government of the province. In the struggle to the death in which Álvarez and Chávez finally engaged, victory went to neither, and the power to reject both the intendant and the bishop was left in the hands of the city council and the cathedral chapter.

It was this latter institution which seemed most adept at manipulating the immediate situation to its own advantage and in setting goals and providing leadership for the future. As we have seen, the cathedral chapter succeeded in overturning an arrangement for tithe distribution which worked against its own interests and in favor of the bishop's. It frustrated episcopal attempts to change the location of the foundling home and the diocesan seminary. It used control of cathedral ceremony to exclude both the bishop and the intendant from participation in cathedral services.

By lessening the bishop's ability to control appointments to capitular positions, the chapter finally succeeded in forcing Chávez's resignation. This, he offered on grounds that he was no longer able to govern. None of these victories represented a major gain of positive power for the chapter. Nevertheless, they were of great symbolic importance, and forecast even more serious challenges to peninsular rule in the

future.

Chávez's successor, Encina, was an ardent royalist. Although circumstances compelled him to recognize the justice of creole aspirations to hold office within the imperial structure, he steadfastly rejected any proposals for increased self-government or colonial autonomy. After a short episcopacy he was succeeded by a wealthy Arequipeñan royalist, José Sebastian de Goyeneche. At the time he received his appointment, Goyeneche was a member of the cathedral chapter of Arequipa. He presided capably if reluctantly over the transition to national independence, served his diocese for many years, and ended his distinguished career as Archbishop of Lima.

The city council also made its display of independence. It engineered a comparable challenge to imperial power by accusing Arequipa's second intendant of despotism and petitioning successfully for his removal. Although Salamanca had been both competent and dedicated, he had never managed to convince the local population that he represented its interests to the degree which his predecessor had. The modest programs which he had undertaken had responded, not to dreams of grandeur or to the desire for dramatic economic expansion, but to very basic needs.

By 1810, the creole elite of Arequipa had come to expect more than public works and competence of its intendants and bishops. It demanded that they identify themselves closely with local aspirations and that they aggressively sponsor programs desired by the Arequipeñan governing class. The Regency responded to the charges against Salamanca by removing him and appointing José Gabriel Moscoso, a member of another prominent Arequipeñan family, to succeed him. As in the case of the episcopacy, the peninsular government clearly hoped to satisfy the demand for home

rule in a manner consonant with continued affiliation with the Spanish Empire. Within a decade, Arequipeñans had obtained appointments to both the intendancy and the episcopacy.

The city council also elected known opponents of the colonial regime to represent the province in the provisional governments which ruled the empire during the captivity of Ferdinand VII. Mariano de Rivero, the one delegate who actually reached the peninsula and participated in the deliberations of Cortes as a representative of Arequipa voiced strident criticisms of the administration of Viceroy Abascal. While he was thus engaged, men related to him and also to several members of the city council planned a coup designed to seize control of the city of Arequipa and to pave the way for cooperation with a porteño army campaigning in the southeast.

After the Pumacahua rebellion and the return of Ferdinand VII to the throne, royalism reasserted itself and prevailed for a while longer over the tendency to self-determination. It is my opinion that the capture of the city by the Indian rebels forced the creole governing class to weigh the potential for regional development which looked toward the Altiplano against continued submission to the viceregal government in Lima, which still commanded sufficient force to suppress domestic insurrection. Although recent experience tipped the scales to favor the latter alternative, provincial desire for self-determination remained constant.

While the Pumacahua rebellion almost certainly prolonged the period before Arequipeñans were ready to risk independence, it did not wipe out the gains made after the Túpac Amaru rebellion. One of the most important survivors was a growing self-conscious appreciation of Arequipa's

vitality and potential. This had flowered first during the intendancy of Álvarez and continued to inform the decisions made by creole politicians during the Napoleonic period. Such awareness was not in itself hostile to affiliation with Spain. It neither presupposed nor effected a consensus of opinion on the question of independence. It rather served as the background against which provincial leaders assessed the potential hazards and gains of choosing one course or the other. It nurtured a new generation of leaders, many of them educated in Chávez's seminary, who were capable of accepting full-blown national independence once a Hispanic alternative to peninsular rule came into view.

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