The Bright Flash of Peace: Hiroshima in the World, 1945-1995

By

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Abstract

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This dissertation is a history of commemoration of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima in the context of the global development of Holocaust and WW II memory. Using the history of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park as a platform, it examines the role of architecture, psychiatry, emotions, tourism, economics and politics to trace the process by which commemoration was used to normalize and domesticate the memory of the bombing within the discursive space of the Cold War. The "bright flash of peace," as a Hiroshima journalist – oxymoronically – referred to the A-bomb on its first anniversary, was conceptualized not as a cataclysmic horror but as a rebirth and a transformation that allowed its victims to find meaning in the quest for a future world without wars. The bombing, this manuscript argues, was thought to have bequeathed Hiroshima's victims with a global mission and importance. This was synchronous with, and influenced by, a similar view of the place of the victim/witness in Holocaust discourse. This development was not least a direct consequence of the unprecedented nature of the tragedies and of the failure of conventional means to represent and explain them. Hiroshima victims and the peace movement that surrounded these were the first to publically use and disseminate testimonies as a way of tackling the complex and pressing issues of nuclear victimization. Thus, this manuscript uses the experience of commemoration of the Holocaust and its survivors, mostly in Israel but also elsewhere in the West as well as the East, not only as a point of comparison and contrast but also as an opportunity to trace the many links that ultimately emerged between Holocaust and A-

bomb discourses. It traces the convergence of these discourses, the way the survivor was eventually elevated to be the ultimate bearer of moral authority, and the consequences of this development for commemoration and politics in Japan and elsewhere.

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Note on the text

With the exceptions of names widely known in the West, such as Akira Kurosawa, in rendering East Asian names in the body of the text I follow the conventional ordering of the region, with surnames followed by given names. Thus, Hamai Shinzō appears in the Japanese order; the surname Hamai precedes the given name Shinzō. Furthermore, in Japanese, the term *hibakusha,* can be rendered in two different ways in writing. When the character for *Baku* is written as "bomb," it refers to victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When *Baku* is written with the character for "exposure," the meaning of *hibakusha* is widened to include all victims of radiation from nuclear material (for example Marshall Islands residents who were exposed to

radiation during the 1955 Bikini nuclear tests, or workers at the Fukushima nuclear plant who were exposed to radiation in March 2011). In here, unless otherwise noted, I use *hibakusha*, in its narrower, historical definition to refer to victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When possible I have used available English translations of Japanese, Hebrew and other texts; unless otherwise noted, all other translations are mine.

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Introduction

I. Hiroshima (Nagasaki) and the politics of commemoration

"On the 6th of August 1945, Hiroshima in Japan gained itself a permanent place in history as the first city to be destroyed by a nuclear bomb. As a result of that attack 250,000 people are known to have died. Three days later, on August the nine, Nagasaki suffered the same fate. Accounting for 60,000 deaths."[1] These words, narrated in both English and Japanese by the English band *Crass* as a prologue to their song, "Nagasaki nightmare," were probably the first time I ever heard in any detail the facts about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a teenage boy just entering, what then seemed to me, the forbidden world of anarchism, anti-nuclear activities and punk music, I was captivated by the way *Crass* brought together those horrible facts with Japanese Kabuki sounds and roaring, incoherent guitars. I was most impressed by their anger. Indeed, I was angry myself. After a trip to the library and leafing through books and photos of the bomb's aftermath, I got even angrier. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, were a foreign and somewhat exotic threat to be excited about in the Israel of 1989. No one taught us about Hiroshima in school; World War II was about the Holocaust, and the never-ending conflict with the Palestinians was much more important for most than abstract nuclear arms races. But that made me even more angry and righteous and left me feeling, as in the words of another *Crass* song, that all those around me, by force of their complicity "were already dead."[2] I thought that unless we do something, unless we shout and get angry, the horror of Hiroshima would return. Twenty odd years later, although much calmer, I still think I was basically correct. This project,

[1] Crass, "Nagasaki Nightmare," *Best Before* (Crass Records, 1986).
[2] Crass, "You're already dead," *Best Before* (Crass Records, 1986).

in a way, is a continuation of that first impulse, of that first moment when I looked again and again at the horrible pictures while listening to that song, refusing to believe my eyes.

Little did I know that much of my reactions to and understanding of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were shaped by my own culture of commemoration: that of the Holocaust and its victims. My victim stance, righteous anger and aggression had much to do with Israeli commemoration culture (and probably raging hormones) than with anything that ever happened in Hiroshima. This understanding started to dawn on me when I first visited Hiroshima, years later, and experienced a strong feeling of *déjà vu.* Everything about Hiroshima was eerily familiar, from the halls of the memorial and the solemn rituals of August sixth, down to the guilt and disbelief one felt when listening to testimonies. The *hibakuhsa* (A-bomb survivors – in Japanese a person who was exposed to the atomic bomb), the way they told their stories, even their old fashioned dress all seemed instantly understandable and familiar. There was no apparent reason for this familiarity, no explanation. Everything was foreign and exotic – the cranes, the Buddhist chants - yet so familiar at the same time. What I understood then, intuitively, was that although separated by thousands of kilometers and a huge cultural gap, Hiroshima and Holocaust commemoration were part of the same global culture of commemoration, a response to the same sort of impulse to make sense of horror, to understand what was impossible to understand: how did this happen and the world kept turning. This was true on both the personal and the global level. Unknowingly, when "discovering" Hiroshima in terms of my own people's loss, I made a similar journey many of the protagonists of this dissertation, who somehow, their many misunderstandings and bungles notwithstanding, created a global culture of memory.

Another thing I discovered when visiting Hiroshima, or rather rediscovered, was my anger. I just could not understand the serenity and passivity of the memorial that begins right at

the entrance to the museum, where a film opened with the words, "on the sixth of August, 1945, a nuclear bomb *was dropped* on Hiroshima and vast numbers of its citizens died."[3] There was no mention or way of knowing who dropped the bomb or what had led to the event. These words embodied in them the entirety of the message of the memorial: Hiroshima is presented like the scene of a natural disaster, separated from any historical chain of events. Carol Gluck called this kind of narrative, "history in the passive voice."[4] This was very different history from the one I tried to practice. It was also very different from the commemoration culture I grew up in, which, whether in my alternative political circles or at the state sponsored events, was much angrier and never shirked from pointing fingers. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial's passivity stood in sharp contrast, for me, to the shocking photos and evidence of destruction of that day. The words that framed the images seemed to be a part of an effort to contain the shock and anger I felt. The memorial message seemed as an effort to counter the subversive potential of Hiroshima. Indeed, this was the case not just with the memorial. The survivors themselves seemed much more restrained then I expected them to be; their stories almost always ending with a plea for understanding and world peace.

What I came to understand over the course of this research is that the entire edifice of remembrance in and around Hiroshima was, consciously or not, built around containment. The very shape of the city and the spatial division between the island of Nakajima, where the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park is located, and the rest of the city, suggest a much deeper division between the past and the present; as if Hiroshima wished to demarcate and distance itself from the past. It seemed to me that, as a visiting journalist once remarked, "People built

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[3] See Daniel Seltz, "Remembering the War and the Atomic Bombs: New Museums, New Approaches," *Radical History Review*, No. 75, (Fall 1999), p. 95.

[4] Carol Gluck, "The Idea of Showa," *Deadalus*, Vol. 119, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 12-13.

this city to forget."[5] Hiroshima's memory, I realized, however, was never, with the possible exception of the late forties, actively suppressed. Rather, the principal argument of this work is that Hiroshima's tragedy was rendered harmless to the status quo by the particular way it was remembered. Commemorative work in Hiroshima was largely used to normalize and domesticate the memory of the bombing. The bomb was presented not as a probable result of our reliance on science and technology but – in the words of the epitaph of the central memorial cenotaph - a mistake; a sort of temporal slippage into a darker time. Furthermore, Hiroshima's sacrifice was supposed to somehow rectify this error, set history right and put progress back onto its "normal" course. The bomb therefore was presented as a transforming baptism, on one hand, and a rupture which must be healed, on the other. This phenomenon was not limited to Hiroshima. The effort to contain the bomb's memory was profoundly shaped by the larger efforts of elites in the East and West to rebuild a postwar order and to reaffirm, the bomb and the concentration camps notwithstanding, belief in modernity and science.

Because of the nature of the tragedy and the enormous importance given to the efforts to formulate a proper reply to it, the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki came to possess important symbolic power. The bombing was thought to have bequeathed Hiroshima's victims with a global mission and importance. This was synchronous with and influenced by a similar view of the place of the victim/witness in Holocaust discourse. In both discourses, the survivor was eventually elevated as the ultimate bearer of moral authority; what Avishai Margalit called "a moral witness."[6] This development was a direct consequence of the unprecedented nature of the tragedies and the failure of conventional means to represent and explain them. This had

[5] The quote is from a visting Nigerian Journalist named James Boon told a Japanese colleauge, "People built this city in order to forget about the bomb…[they] are trying really hard to live just like people in other cities." Cited in the *Yumiyuri Shinbun*, 18 June 1962.

[6] Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 182.

important implications for commemoration and politics in Japan and elsewhere, a phenomenon that went well beyond the confines of one nation or culture. Thus, this work has two main goals: first, to the trace the way the A-bomb and the Holocaust were interpreted, contained and integrated into the national and international narratives and ideologies which came before them and second, to look at the way that survivors reacted to (and sometimes produced) these discourses, leading to the emergence of the figure of the survivor in postwar Japan and the West.

I do not intend to produce here an exhaustive survey of the emergence of victims and commemoration in both East Asia and the Cold War West. A great deal has already been written about the Holocaust and the A-bomb (though surprisingly little in English or Japanese about Hiroshima when compared to the corpus of works on Holocaust memory). Thus, this project is limited primarily to Hiroshima and Israel, making only brief forays elsewhere. The nature and scope of my sources left little room for a further look into Nagasaki and its uniqueness as a Catholic city. Hiroshima also had a much greater international profile and symbolic significance. In addition, my sources further complicated the picture by introducing locations such as Singapore and Poland as significant sites. What began as a localized project about Hiroshima and its survivors became a global one which sent me to Auschwitz, Ramallah, Los Angeles, Salzburg and Kyoto in search of documents and leads. Thus, this project examines Hiroshima principally through its entanglement with the "world." Throughout the writing of this work, I constantly struggled with the tension between comparing and connecting, between using Holocaust discourse and other discourses as a lens for viewing global developments or remaining on a more strictly comparative level.

Indeed, a traditional comparison is almost impossible given the large number and flows of ideas and people between Hiroshima and Holocaust discourse. Consequentially, the main

methodology this work seeks to employ is that of entangled histories or *histoire croisée*. Jürgen Kocka succinctly summed up this kind of history as one that is "much less interested in similarities and differences [of different historical settings]…but rather in the processes of mutual influencing, in reciprocal or asymmetric perceptions, in entangled processes of constituting one another." [7] This is not to say that similarities and differences, as noted by more traditional comparative historians, are not important. Yet, traditional comparative history does not acknowledge the fluidity of categories and the way these develop through cross influences and circulation of ideas. Furthermore, such comparisons, especially in the realm of memory studies, usually use the nation as prime site and ignore global exchanges. Despite its rising importance, the global has been, until recently, something of a lacuna in memory studies. While many historians seek to displace the dominance of the "nation" in their work, studies of the history of memory tend to cling to the nation with peculiar stubbornness. The familiar effort to interpret the past as part of a national culture has led us to what Sebastian Conrad aptly named "a tunnel vision of the past," which marginalizes entanglement with other national memories as well as the influence of the counter-memories of minorities and others.[8] No place is isolated from transnational and transregional influences. Cross-influence and entanglements are an intrinsic part of how ideas and movements emerge; ideas about commemoration and witnessing are no exception.

Both in terms of content and the fields involved in this investigation, entanglement is, indeed, an apt term. While memory studies are the main "target" of this work, my project aims at more than one field; looking to contribute to memory studies, Japanese studies, and the emerging

[7] Jürgen Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," *History and Theory*, No. 42 (February 2003), p. 6

[8] Sebastian Conrad, *The Quest for the Lost Nation: Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American Century* (University of California Press, 2010), p. 245.

literature on victim discourse. Other sub-categories are, of course, the history of Hiroshima itself, as well as the history of emotions, psychiatry (more specifically the creation/ discovery of PTSD), and the history of the peace movement in the Cold War and beyond.

Within Japanese Studies, my project is connected to work on Hiroshima in particular and to Japanese war memory in general. The most well-known study that explored Japanese war memories in their diversity is Franziska Seraphim's *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan.* Seraphim however, explicitly excluded Hiroshima and Nagasaki from her study.[9] Other major works are Yoshida Yutaka's *Nihonjin no Sensōkan* and Igarashi Yoshikuni's *Bodies of Memory*. Both works aim at exploring how discourses of power historically shaped Japanese views on World War II and its meaning.[10] A similar thrust can be found in writings on Hiroshima which often regard themselves as critiques of hegemonic memory discourse, i.e. as critiques of attempts to deny or hide Japan's imperial past by exclusively remembering Japanese victims.[11]

This project aims to supplement and complicate the work done by these scholars; looking at the ways different actors, both within and outside of the establishment, pushed different agendas and how "truth" about the meaning of the bombing (in the Foucauldian sense) was created.[12] That is, truth not as a top-down elite imposition of a commemorative narrative, although there was much imposition and suppression, but truth as a product of multiple agents

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[9] Seraphim excluded Hiroshima for reasons similar to my own exclusion of Nagasaki. As including atomic issues would have extend the scope of the research well beyond its original goal. Furthermore, Seraphim argued, Hiroshima's memory was separated from the larger issue of the war until at least the 1980's. I disagree with her on that last issue but have relied on her work extensively throughout this work. Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005* (Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), p. 25

[10] Yutaka Yoshida, *Nihonjin No Sensōkan: Sengoshi No Naka No Hen'y* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory* (Princeton University Press, 2000).

[11] Kiichi Fujiwara, *Senso o kiokusuru : Hiroshima horokosuto to genzai* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2001); Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (University of California Press, 1999).

[12] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (Vintage, 1990), pp. 92-98.

working in all levels of society, sometimes at cross-purposes, to produce a common sense view of the past and its meaning. Indeed, one of the main points I am arguing is that one can hardly separate the "survivors" from the "establishment" that produced the hegemonic discourses of commemoration. Many within the elites were survivors themselves and competing interpretations existed within survivor groups as well as within the various bodies that engaged in commemoration. Though I do not necessarily wish to contest Lisa Yoneyama's and other scholars' interpretations of how these discourses operate at the present, I do wish, following on the work of John Dower and James Orr, to look into the origin and history of these discourses and to examine how they emerged and were eventually transformed.[13]

Indeed, what is lacking in Yoneyama's and Fujiwara's work is history. Fujiwara, a political scientist, and Yoneyama, a cultural anthropologist, do not supply us with the nitty-gritty details of how and why Hiroshima's dominant narratievs developed the way they did. Fujiwara's work, despite its promising title (*Holocaust, Hiroshima and the Present*), mostly deals with events beyond Hiroshima, whereas Yoneyama's *Hiroshima Traces* is dedicated wholly to Hiroshima. Yoneyama seeks, by using a methodology borrowed from Walter Benjamin's version of Marxist historiography, to reclaim "missing" elements of Hiroshima's history in order to construct a critical view of the present.[14] The book, accordingly, is highly polemical and theoretical. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Yoneyama does a brilliant job of identifying the various agendas behind the facade of nuclear universalism and Hiroshima's message of peace, whether about the silencing of the narratives of Korean *hibakusha* or the way a capitalist-driven

[13] James Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); John W. Dower, "Triumphal and Tragic Narratives of the War in Asia," *The Journal of American History* 82, no. 3 (December 1, 1995): 1124–1135.
[14] Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (University of California Press, 1999), pp. 29-30.

developmental agenda influenced the design and content of Hiroshima's memorial and general reconstruction. Urban space, argues Yoneyama, was manipulated and used by Hiroshima's power elite in its efforts to create a vision of a consumer-friendly, globalized and cosmopolitan Hiroshima that transcended, by way of exclusion, the city role as a memory site. [15] Nevertheless, Yoneyama, an anthropologist, did not go into the archives. Her book remains at the discursive level and relies mostly on published sources. Most importantly, it does not supply us with anything like a history of how and why Hiroshima's message developed the way it did.

An older work which does seek to supply such history is a 1984 official history of Hiroshima, the *Hiroshima shin shi (*A new history of Hiroshima).[16] The *shinshi* is extremely detailed and read together with works by excellent local historians such as Ubuki Satoru and Ishimaru Norioki, it is indispensable to any student of Hiroshima's history.[17] Much of this work, however, with the exception of Ubuki's, is almost bereft of any attempt at interpretation and is completely uncritical towards the official "peace" ideology of Hiroshima city. It presents the city's history as a heroic struggle for peace and glosses over many of the counter-narratives, disagreements and controversies that were a part of Hiroshima's postwar history. It does not ask many of the important questions that drive my own study. How come the ideology of passivity and "flowers and pigeons" peace came to hold sway? How did it defeat the radical challenges from the left and why there was no thirst for revenge or any challenge from the right? In what ways was this ideology used or abused, and then why did it elevate victims to be the peace movement's martyr-heroes? The *shinshi* takes all these developments for granted and presents history as seamless progress. Hiroshima's story, however, is not one of the linear rise of the

[15] Ibid., p. 46.
[16] Hiroshima shi.hen, *Hiroshima Shinshi.* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima shi, 1984).
[17] Satoru Ubuki, *Heiwa kinen shikitan no ayumi* (Hiroshima-shi: Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Senta, 1992). Is the most notable work by Ubuki. Ishimaru's many articles are cited throughout this work.

"victim-hero," but of multiple coalitions which rose and fell, a story of contradictions and ambiguities. The history of Hiroshima's commemoration and its attendant development of the trope of the victim was messy, multi-directional and open to many interpretations. Hiroshima's "history in the passive voice" has its own history, and it is that history which this study wishes to trace.

The phrase "hero victims" comes from James Orr's work *The Victim as Hero* (2001), which seeks to critically examine the history of victim movements in Japan. Although not without some shortcomings, most notably its overemphasis on US-Japan relations, Orr's work is an astute history of the way different groups of victims pushed their agenda as victims for the purpose of compensation and political advantage and thus led to the early creation of the cultural trope of the "victim-hero" in Japan. This work follows Orr's model, as well as the insightful work done by John Dower in a number of articles on the topic.[18] But, I also seek to reintegrate this history with global developments and to examine its impact beyond the Japanese and even East-Asian contexts. Hiroshima was the center of an international network of peace and anti-nuclear movement activism and shared much with other discourses of commemoration all over the world, in particular, with that of the Holocaust. In the mind of many contemporaries, Hiroshima and Auschwitz were intrinsically connected. Up to the nineteen eighties it was quite common to refer to them as the twin horrors of the war.[19] Hiroshima, however, following 1989 and the end of the cold war, has fallen by the wayside. Indeed, Hiroshima's relative marginality is reflected in the huge gap between the number of historical works on Holocaust memory and

[18] Among other works already mentioned Dower's article *the Bombed,* was exceptionally important for me. See John W. Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory," *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 2 (1995), pp 275–295.

[19] For a particulary late example of this see participants responses in John E. Mack, "Discussion: Psychoanalysis in Germany 1933-1945: Are There Lessons for the Nuclear Age?," *Political Psychology* 10, no. 1 (March 1, 1989): 53–61.

those on Hiroshima. What struck me as I began this project is how much more has been written on the Holocaust than on Hiroshima. This is partially because of the timing of memory studies' rise, in the 1990s, as Hiroshima was receding from view and Bosnia and Rwanda were thought to make the Holocaust more relevant than ever. Another reason is simple, if unintentional, Eurocentrism. The Holocaust, for the West, happened at the heart of civilization, while Hiroshima and other non-western sites of mass-killing were on the periphery. Hiroshima was always somewhat foreign, somewhat removed, and even, as I saw it in the eighties, exotic. There were times though when Hiroshima stood at the center of world attention. When nuclear issues mattered. When we realized that Hiroshima is not just the past but might also be relevant to the future. It is the main object of this work to bring Hiroshima back into conversations about tragedy and mass killings; to explore the ways we dealt with these as a global community and not as the isolated nations that we never were.

II. The Holocaust and Hiroshima in Israel and the Cold War West

Bringing the histories of the Holocaust and Hiroshima back together is not, of course, a zero sum game. Bringing back Hiroshima does not diminish the importance of the Holocaust. This is not how many of my compatriots see that. For many in Israel, and among Jews especially in the U.S., the Holocaust was a unique event that cannot be compared or tied to any other tragedy. This view is the lynchpin of a peculiar form of Jewish nationalism that centers on victimization and precludes any wider view of the tragedy. In the many presentations and talks I have given on the topic, not once have I not been confronted by some version of that view. In some cases, even the possibility of comparison is frowned upon. Many Israelis and Jews seem to fear even the suggestion of looking at the Holocaust in the context of postwar history in general;

fearing context might lead to relativization and downgrading of the horror (as I am never tired of pointing out, it is the *postwar* history which I compare and not the tragedies themselves).[20]

This was not always the case as demonstrated by a fascinating exchange that took place in 1973. Just months before the Yom Kippur War, Muki Tzur, an Israeli historian, wrote in the introduction of the German translation of "*siach lokhamim*" (*A Soldiers' Conversation*), "[this book] was written by Jewish youths of the 20th century. This century was shaped by two colossal events, two earthquakes in modern civilization: Hiroshima and Auschwitz. It seems that there is no young man in this world who is free from relating to these two events…we (young Israelis) are looking for meaning between these two extremities."[21] Haim Guri, one of Israel's leading publicists at the time, took offense at Tzur's linking up of the two tragedies. In a biting critique entitled "Al ha-hevdel" (On the Difference), Guri dismissed any attempt at comparison or connection between Hiroshima and Auschwitz. Guri presented Hiroshima as a tragedy, but one that was conducted as part of a war in which the Japanese were the aggressors, while the Jews were not in anyway conducting warfare against the Germans. Furthermore, accepting the prevailing American interpretation of the bombing, Guri presented Hiroshima as "evil with a purpose," meaning as a lesser evil that prevented many more casualties (in the event of an American Invasion of Japan). Auschwitz was different. "It had no purpose…it was a crime." Implicitly (and a-historically) condemning the allies, Guri added, "If the A-bomb was dropped on Auschwitz millions would have been saved." Guri hinted at what was really at stake when he concluded, "the Germans would be pleased at this false confluence of Hiroshima and

[20] This is of course, not limited to Israelis. Germans and Americans are as sensitive. Indeed, Even the word contextualization itself is suspect after the *Historikerstreit* of the nineties.
[21] Davar, 29 January 1973.

Auschwitz," thus, implying that the very comparison served to undermine German guilt.[22] In a forceful reply, Tzur responded, "I cannot forget Hiroshima… not because I could identify with its victims to the same degree I could with my own people. Not, also, because I attribute to Truman and his advisers the same motives I attribute to Eichmann or Heidrich. But because Hiroshima has put us under the threat of a total weapon…we must understand the horrible absurdity [which is Hiroshima], even I as an Israeli cannot release myself from that shadow."[23]

That such a conversation could even take place in 1973 demonstrates how much discourse has changed since. It also shows, first, how nuanced and complicated the connection between Hiroshima and the Holocaust is, second, how unacceptable the connection was for some, and third, what strong emotions both elicited. Emotion is a key term here as what I call the emotionalization of memory that occurred during the Eichmann trial in 1961 and the 1955 anti-nuclear conferences in Hiroshima played a huge role in bringing the tragedies together. Both Japanese and international peace organizations in 1955 and the Israeli government in 1962 put survivors in the center of their ideological efforts to use the memory of the tragedies to further their causes. In both cases, the first broad use of survivors' testimonies galvanized audiences in an act of emotional mobilization that transcended boundaries and divisions and empowered both survivors and their supporters. It played a key role in making the "survivor" into what he or she is now. Much of this project revolves around this key turning point. It was in 1962 that Japanese peace activists and *hibakusha* reached out to Holocaust survivors and went on a pilgrimage to Auschwitz, discussed in chapter four. It was also at this moment, as we will see in chapter three, that Robert J. Lifton, in a move which would transform the meaning of the very word survivor,

[22] Ibid.

[23] Davar, 25 July 1973. Tzur was no pacifist. He was disgusted by a group on Jewish-American students who told him that the "Jewish people chose justice over the politics of force." Tzur argued that, in the face of destruction, "not to be strong is immoral."

started to bring together the experiences of Hiroshima and Holocaust survivors in his work on trauma.

Indeed, survivor, in its current meaning, carries connotations that were not associated with the term in the fifties. It took time for both narratives to take shape and acquire meaning. Even the Holocaust was not called by that name until much later.[24] As Svenja Goltermann argued in relation to PTSD, much of the application of terms like survivor, trauma, *hibakusha,* or indeed, the Holocaust, within current literature ignores the fact that these are constructed historical categories. Many of these terms were not available or (in the case of trauma) were understood very differently up to the 1960s.[25] This does not mean that people did not talk about the Holocaust at all. Indeed, recently many scholars have been revising our understanding of the early years after the Holocaust (incidentally, the fact that no such conversation exists in relation to Hiroshima attests to its relative marginality). What many of these scholars challenge is the notion of a conspiracy of silence. It was long understood that survivors mostly kept their experiences to themselves in the first years after the war. Historians like Tom Segev and Idith Zertal in Israel, or Peter Novick and Jeffrey Alexander in the U.S., maintain that individual survivor narratives were mostly silenced before 1962. While in the U.S. survivors simply wanted to assimilate, in Europe survivor stories were marginalized in favor of those of political prisoners and partisans, and in Israel the makers of the grand heroic Zionist narrative of resurrection and similar patriotic tales had no need, and indeed were even ashamed, of survivors' victimhood.

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[24] Jon Petrie, ″The Secular Word Holocaust*:* scholarly myths*,* history, and 20th century meanings*″, Journal of Genocide Research*, Volume 2, Number 1*,* 1 (March 2000), pp. 31–63.

[25] Svenja Goltermann, "The imagination of Disaster: Death and Survival in Postwar West Germany." In Alon Confino, Paul Betts, and Dirk Schumann, *Between Mass Death and Individual Loss: The Place of the Dead in the Twentieth-Century Germany* (Berghahn Books, 2011), pp.262-263.

Hence the "great silence," or in Segev's dramatic narration, a "barrier of blood and silence," that characterized Israel in the fifties.[26]

The issue is one of periodization. When did people start talking? The consensus so far is that survivors did not start talking until after Eichmann and the 1967 war when the Holocaust started to emerge as a global phenomenon. If one wishes to talk, like Jeffery Alexander does, about the universalization of the Holocaust or the spectacle of witnessing after Eichmann, as Annette Wieviorka does, one has to posit a period which preceded this change.[27] The work of, among others, Hanna Yablonka for Israel, Michael Staub and Kirsten Fermaglich for the U.S, and Samuel Moyn for France, has challenged this view. [28]What these historians demonstrated is that people did indeed talk about the Holocaust earlier, but in different ways than after 1962-67. The Holocaust was the subject of public debate throughout the forties and fifties, but the debate had different parameters and used different language than it would in the sixties. As Kirsten Fermaglich has argued, the Holocaust was freely used to compare, contextualize and explain

[26] Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: HiIl & Wang. 1993) p. 11. Zerthal used similar wording when she said, Ben Gurion acted, "as if he meant to erect a wall of silence around the event and separate Israel from this chapter in recent history by an act of unequivocal demarcation" See Idith Zertal, "From the People's Hall to the Wailing Wall: A Study in Memory, Fear, and War," *Representations*, no. 69 (January 1, 2000), p.103

[27]See Jeffery Alexander essay, " On the Global and Local Representations of the Holocaust tragedy," at his Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), *Remembering the Holocaust: A Debate* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), pp. ,173-192; Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2000).

[28] Hanna Yablonka, *Achim Zarim: Nitsolei Shoa Be-medinat Yisrael 1948-1952* [Foreign Brethren: Holocaust Survivors in the State of Israel 1948-1952] (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1994); Samuel Moyn, *A Holocaust Controversy: The Treblinka Affair in Postwar France*, I. (Brandeis, 2005); Michael E. Staub, *Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America* (Columbia University Press, 2004). A recent anthology edited by David Cesarani and Eric J. Sundquist directly deals with the issue, *After the Holocaust: Challenging the Myth of Silence*, (New York: Routledge, 2012)

diverse issues such as feminism, slavery and the psychology of authoritarianism.[29] This was true, as indicated by the debate recounted above, even up to the seventies in Israel.

What I argue and what this project will demonstrate is that, beginning in 1945, the Holocaust was frequently and routinely talked about in conjunction with Hiroshima and with nuclear issues more generally. Before the sixties positions such as Tzur's were much more common and there was much exchange between the two discourses. As we will shortly see, comparisons and connections were drawn as early as the day after the bomb when some Americans questioned whether such an act had made them closer to the "Beasts of Majdanek" than to their self appointed image as the camps' liberators.[30] Connections were made from the Jewish side as well. Ernst Simmel, in his introduction to his 1946 treatise on *antisemitism*, refernced *atomic energy and the danger of another Hiroshima* as a way to demonstrate the importance of his work on the psychological factors that led to the Holocaust.[31]As the threat of an all-out nuclear war progressed, moreover, the idea that the new "Auschwitz" would come in the form of nuclear warfare waged on civilian populations gained much credence. As Jon Petrie has shown, the very word Holocaust was first used in the context in which we understand it today in connection with a possible nuclear holocaust.[32] Nuclear anxiety was one of the most

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[29] Kirsten Lise Fermaglich and Koret Foundation, *American dreams and Nazi nightmares : early Holocaust consciousness and liberal America, 1957-1965* (Waltham, Mass.; Hanover: Brandeis University Press ; University Press of New England, 2006).

[30] The quote is by Dwight MacDonald. Quoted in Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1985). p. 232.

[31]"Right now," Simmel wrote, "statemen are concentrating upon finding a way to transform the realeased *destructive enrgy of the astom* into a constructive agent the will serve the ends of world peace. It is important t6hat those leaders know that the most powerful energy thretening civilization with destruction lies *within* man himself. This energy is the human instinct of destruction hidden within the unconcious and emanting hatred from there. Ultimate ecurity against destruction by atomic energy can be attained only through the study, treatmnet and domestication of this human destructive instinct.." Ernst Simmel, (ed.) *Anti-Semitism: A social disease*, (New York: International Universities Press, 1946), p. xxiii. I thank Dagmar Herzog for directing me to this quote.

[32] Jon Petrie, *"*The Secular Word Holocaust*:* scholarly myths*,* history, and 20th century meanings*", Journal of Genocide Research*, Volume 2, Number 1*,* (March 2000), p. 48

prominent features of the later forties and fifties, and the (Jewish) Holocaust was very much a part of this discussion, included by both Jewish and non-Jewish liberals in their fight against nuclear armament.[33] Hiroshima was very much a part of this discourse; prominent on the minds of contemporaries it was seen as much more relevant and immediate than the Jewish tragedy.

The existence of public discourse on the Holocaust and Hiroshima does not mean that most survivors themselves were not silent. The "barrier of silence" argument is not without credence. What I would like to argue is that there was a separation between public discourse and survivors' private ability and will to talk about their experiences. The years after the war were indeed years of grand myth-making. Commemoration in Hiroshima exemplified this trend. Hiroshima city, which was "born anew on 6 August" according its own mayor at the time, pushed forward a narrative of transformation and renewal which stood at the center of its commemoration activities and city planning. In this retelling of Hiroshima's story the city was a phoenix rising up, transformed from the ashes of war into the prosperity of peace. [34] This was a narrative which American occupiers encouraged. Their support made the narrative very attractive for Hiroshima elites who were in dire need of funds for reconstruction and had to seek American approval for their plans. In any case, almost immediately, censorship and the social stigma survivors suffered from, discouraged talking about the bomb in any other way. Tellingly, when funds did come they went overwhelmingly to rebuilding infrastructure and a grand commemoration complex at the center of the city. Up to 1956, when the A-bomb hospital was opened and survivors started to receive compensation, *hibakusha* saw very little of this money.

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[33] In one example among many, in Fran Schreiberg, a Jewish activist, combined a service to the memory of the Holocaust with protest against funding for A.B.M missiles. See Staub, *Torn at the Roots*, p. 170.

[34] Hamai Shinzō et. al. to President of Carroll College, 30 June 1950, letter to: Hiroshima Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Committee., *Hiroshima* (Hiroshima City Japan: The Committee c/o Hiroshima Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1948). Carroll University Library, Waukesha, Wisconsin.

Thus, although people talked about the bomb, it was in a very peculiar way; focusing on the transformative aspect of the experience. The focus was not on past suffering but on hope for the future. The "bright flash of peace," as a Hiroshima journalist - seemingly oxymoronically - referred to the A-bomb on its first anniversary, was conceptualized not as a cataclysmic horror but as a rebirth that allowed its victims to find meaning in the quest for a future world without wars. Furthermore, outside of Hiroshima, very few survivors recognized themselves as *hibakusha.* This only started to change in 1955. When people did come out openly as *hibakusha*, they started to talk about their experiences in public using language that was laden with emotions and, although still basically optimistic, was much grimmer and that conveyed much of the angst and suffering they had undergone. It was this act of bringing together private pain and public speech in order to work towards a goal that was the turning point in the making of the *hibakusha.*

With the Holocaust as well, it is possible to separate the personal history of survivors from the public usage of the Holocaust. As Jeremy Varon, Yael Danieli and Christian Pross, among others, have shown, survivors often (but not always) did not want to talk.[35] There was also a time, as Atina Grossmann shows, when survivors wished to forget and turned to building of families and rebuilding their lives.[36] In addition, the literature shows that there was much variation between France, the US and Israel. Some survivors embraced Zionism, others focused on commemoration and the writing of *Yizkhor* books for their lost communities.[37] As Jean-

[35] Yael Danieli, "Factors contributing to varying levels of adjustment among children of Holocaust survivors"Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Indiana (1981);Christian Pross, *Paying for the Past: The Struggle Over Reparations for Surviving Victims of the Nazi Terror* (JHU Press, 1998).;Jeremey Varon. "From Camps to Camps and Beyond: Holocaust Survivors and the Poetics of Displacement," presented in *On Camps: History, Violence and Trauma* in the New School, New York, 14 October 2010.

[36] Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton University Press, 2009).

[37] Gabriel Finder, "Yizkor! Commemorations of the Dead by Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar History," in Alon Confino, Paul Betts, and Dirk Schumann, *Between Mass Death and Individual Loss: The Place of the Dead in the Twentieth-Century Germany* (Berghahn Books, 2011). p. 240. Wieviorka, *The Era of the Witness,* p. 25.

Michel Chaumont urged scholars, we should not treat survivors as a unified community as they themselves did not see themselves as survivors and lacked the purpose and coherence of, for instance, political prisoners.[38] People did talk and used the Holocaust in various contexts. It was rare, however, for people to openly and proudly identify themselves as survivors.[39] Indeed, the word did not acquire caché until later.

What changed with the Eichmann trial was, just as in Hiroshima, that the personal and the public came together and were tied to a political goal. It was then that the survivor-witness we know today first appeared, broadcast on national television around the world, with all the emotional appeal and rawness of the experience. As Annette Wieviorka argued, Eichmann opened an era in which memory of genocide became central to identity, when the Holocaust for the first time was tied to pedagogy, when history and memory merged. It was, as Wieviorka calls it, the "advent of the witness."[40] The trial was supposedly about Eichmann but he quickly disappeared as the witnesses took center stage. The witness stand gave them a political and social prominence that no book or other medium could; it freed the victims to speak and created a social demand for testimony.[41] Indeed, the Eichmann trial started a transformation, which Jean-Michel Chaumont and Samuel Moyn have documented for France, from shame to pride in being a survivor. If before 1962 active resistance was a point of pride, it was now enough to champion a different sort of heroism. Thus, by merely having been in the death camps, survivors acquired a standing and moral authority that they had not possessed before. Many political entities, from the state of Israel to the anti-Vietnam movement, now sought to use this authority.

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[38] Jean-Michel Chaumont, *La Concurrence Des Victimes : Génocide, Identité, Reconnaissance* (Paris: La Découverte, 2002), p. 9.
[39] Wieviorka, *The Era of the Witness,* p. 88.
[40] Ibid., 57.
[41] Ibid., pp. 84-87.

In Hiroshima, where no heroism could even have been possible, such a process happened earlier. It was in the sixties that these strands came together. Survivors could and did use their prestige in the service of the state of Israel or against the war in Vietnam and also connected it to the fight against nuclear weapons. But when figures like Elie Wiesel started to use their survivor status to protest My Lai and other atrocities, the experience was, ironically, both universalized and made into a unique event.[42] Wiesel claimed that the uniqueness of the Holocaust was its defining trait. [43] The victimhood of the Jews was elevated to a paradigmatic crime. As such, however, it became the measuring rod for all other crimes. The Holocaust was transformed from an object of shame to that of pride, giving survivors a privileged position with respect to a special kind of knowledge; the knowledge of the horror and extremities of what man could do to man. With May Lai, Cambodia and other genocides and acts of horror, this knowledge was in demand.

Psychiatry and the transformation of the discourse of trauma played a huge role in the transformation of witnessing and commemoration. Here as well there was a convergence of sorts between Hiroshima, the Holocaust and Vietnam through the work of Robert J. Lifton and many psychiatrists' commitments to both anti-war and anti-nuclear goals and to the forwarding of survivor rights and treatment. Hiroshima and anti-nuclear activists played a very important role in the developments, examined in chapter three, that led to the making of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Most literature on the topic, as with general literature on commemoration and witnessing as whole, treat Hiroshima as a footnote at best. The fact that one of the main protagonists of this drama, Robert J. Lifton, came to trauma studies through the study of Hiroshima, is only mentioned in passing by authors such as Allan Young or Ruth Leys

[42] Author Interview with Robert Lifton, 9 June 2011.
[43] Chaumont, *La Concurrence Des Victimes,* p. 148.

in their otherwise insightful histories.[44] Robert Lifton connected Hiroshima with Vietnam and the Holocaust and thus enabled a universalization of psychiatric categories beyond a particular disaster. Nuclear fears and anxieties were an important engine of change in the field in general, before Vietnam and again in the eighties. Indeed, the reason that these tragedies were so important to psychiatry is because of their larger impact on society and the failure of witnesses to transmit their experience, a failure and a task which psychiatry was deemed especially equipped to deal with. The psychologization of memory discourse owes much to these developments, which in turn can be traced the rise of the survivor and the merging of Holocaust and Hiroshima discourses.

III. A different form of knowledge: the rupture of war and the rise of experience and trauma as universal paradigms

Fascination with both Hiroshima and Holocaust testimonies was, not least, a direct consequence of the unprecedented nature of the tragedies and of the failure of conventional means to represent and explain them. Indeed, much of the phenomenon of the rise of the witness and all the efforts at commemoration and remembrance since can be explained in light of our inability to integrate and make peace with what happened. Mary McCarthy called Hiroshima "a hole in human history."[45] In a way, both individual survivors and society as a whole have been trying to fill this hole ever since. There were two issues to contend with. One was the extremities to which the survivors had been subjected, which were so far outside of normal experience that most people could not comprehend, even refused to believe, the survivors. It did

[44] Allan Young, *The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder* (Princeton University Press, 1997); Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (University of Chicago Press, 2000); Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, *The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood*, 1st ed. (Princeton University Press, 2009).
[45] Quoted in John Whittier Treat, *Writing Ground Zero: Japanese Literature and the Atomic Bomb* (University Of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 27.

not matter how many statistics of death were calculated or how many photographs of crematoriums and mushroom clouds were shown. People still could not comprehend. And survivors could not find the words to make people understand. As Kyo McLear argued, the more people hear and see horror, the more "retinal fatigue" and overexposure to horror render the efforts of representation meaningless.[46] In this context, both the people and the objects which "were there" gain an aura of authority. Seeing a shoe from Auschwitz, a lunch box from Hiroshima or listening to a survivor, regardless even of the actual words included in the testimony provide a tactile and concrete connection with what happened. Hence the enormous importance of Holocaust and Hiroshima objects, explored throughout this project.

But why can't we simply forget? Let it go? Continued interest in both tragedies, and here we come to the second issue, stems from the fact that the Holocaust and the A-bomb were perpetrated by modern societies, by people with PhDs and by advanced bureaucratic systems with all the might of science at their disposal. This makes putting the tragedies behind us difficult. Indeed, nuclear anxiety and radiation fears, what Ota Yoko called "modernity's angst," make dispensing with Hiroshima difficult.[47] Both Hiroshima and the Holocaust are tied to greater issue of progress and debates over modernity and its costs. Modernity's angst is indeed a fitting name for our fascination with the horror of the bomb and the camps. What is at stake here is our very belief in progress, in the ability and will to live with the possibility of annihilation. Hiroshima made progress suspect. If this is what modernity and science could lead to, the whole edifice of progress that had patiently been built since the enlightenment was in danger.

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[46]Kyo Maclear, *Beclouded Visions: Hiroshima-Nagasaki and the Art of Witness,* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999): p. 4.

[47] Quoted in Fujiwara Osamu, "Hibakusha no seiki," in Narita Ryuichi et al. (ed.), *Ajia taiheiyō sensō / nijuseiki no naka no ajia taiheiyō sensō,* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), p. 246.

These issues are far from being solved. What is failing us is not only our lack of capacity to live in peace with the past, but what this past means for the present and future. Hiroshima and Auschwitz shattered more than the lives of their victims; they shattered and shook paradigms of knowledge and understanding. The rising importance of testimony in the postwar could be tied to the rise of a different paradigm of knowledge, one which privileged experience over reason. As Anson Rabinbach demonstrated in his survey of German intellectuals' responses to the World Wars, a significant number of thinkers saw the wars as a rupture in civilization. With the exception of Karl Jaspers almost all major German thinkers after WWII rejected reason and humanism, and all, Jaspers included, set out to examine Western intellectual tradition's complicity in the catastrophe.[48] What Rabinbach called the "burdened traditions of modernity" made thinkers weary of the sort of totalizing epistemological schemes that came out of the enlightenment.[49] Indeed enlightenment tradition as a whole was made suspect. For many, after the war it still seemed that a great evil was hissing beneath the floorboards of Western civilization. After the war, existentialism, the Frankfurt school and the postmodern successors of Heidegger built on this anxiety to produce a devastating critique of progress. The fort of enlightenment eventually held, but the doubts persisted.

It was in this intellectual context, and especially with the flowering of new philosophies of doubt in the sixties, that witnessing emerged to supply new truths and insights. To use Primo Levi's oft-quoted phrase, witnessing has brought us face to face with the gorgon.[50] It gave us access, however limited, to the snake under the floorboards, to the evil within us. Indeed, this

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[48] Anson Rabinbach, *In the Shadow of Catastrophe German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
[49] Ibid., p. 4.
[50] the quote is from his "Shame" in *The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), pp. 83-84.

explains why Hiroshima and Holocaust witnessing became important while other catastrophes, like natural disasters or "regular" wars, since and before, failed to produce similar phenomena. "To become a moral witness," wrote Avishai Margalit, "one has to witness the combination of evil and the suffering it produces: witnessing only evil or only suffering is not enough."[51] This, coupled with the failure of reason and normal means of representation to explain and gain us access to the tragedies, created the conditions under which witnessing rose to become a new kind of episteme.[52] As Samuel Moyn demonstrated, witnessing has challenged established notions of how we practice history and law. According to Moyn, the rise of witnessing is not quite a rise of a new episteme but the return of an old one, which he traces back to theology. In both history and law, witnessing as a way of knowing had to be overcome and a move was made to rely on documents. Eyewitnesses pervaded medieval and ancient history while modern history has relied mostly on documents, dismissing or downgrading oral accounts. The same process happened with modern evidence law.[53] What changed in the postwar was the rise of witnessing as a moral imperative and the making of witnessing into "a cultural phenomenon at the heart of ethical responses to violence."[54] That connection was established through the unique nature of the atrocities of WWII. It was exactly this connection to morality and the problems of modernity that made witnessing flourish. Witnessing entered into the gaping hole that Auschwitz and Hiroshima blew in our paradigms of knowledge and our self-confidence as a civilization.

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[51] Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 148.

[52] This insight came out of long conversations I had with my coleauge in the Graduate Center, Chris Lore. I suspect that he, indeed, was the first to raise the issue of epistemology. I thank him for this and other insightful comments on this section.

[53] Samuel Moyn, Bearing Witness: Theological Roots of a New Secular Morality," in Dan Stone (ed.) *The Holocaust and Historical Methodology* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), p.162. I thank Professor Moyn for sharing this article with me.

[54] Ibid, p. 161

Japan, as a non-western country might seem an odd inclusion to "our civilization." But Japan as well, from the 1860s on, embraced the logic of enlightenment. Japanese were, indeed, more skeptical than Westerners about modernization. Modernity was something that came from outside and was questioned and measured against Japanese traditions. At the height of Japan's war or what some termed its rebellion against the West, Western words and jazz were expunged from the public sphere and Japanese intellectuals engaged in astute debates about "overcoming modernity."[55] However, as many authors have demonstrated, the fact of modernity's fundamental foreignness did not stop the Japanese from embracing it with vigor and enthusiasm. In a way, there was nothing more modern about debating modernity's character and reaching out to a (re-invented or assembled) tradition in contrast to modernity's many ills.[56] The failure of fascist challenges to modernity, however, besmirched subsequent challenges. If anything, as John Dower has shown, with the American occupation the Japanese embraced modernity with renewed vigor.[57] Following its economic rise in the sixties, Japan became indispensable and surprisingly similar to the rest of capitalist modernity, following and even foreshadowing many of the historical developments that the rest of the West experienced (from the 1968 student riots to an aging society and its own never-ending recession). Although Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for obvious reasons, were much more important to Japan than the West, the ghosts of the Second World War have haunted Japan as well. Countless postwar examples, from the eternal dispute

[55] Harry Harootunian, "Japanese revolt against the West: political and cultural criticism in the twentieth century," John Whitney Hall, *The Cambridge history of Japan* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.xxxiii; Harry D. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton University Press, 2001).

[56] Stephen Vlastos, ed., *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 1998); Kim Brandt, *Kingdom of Beauty: Mingei and the Politics of Folk Art in Imperial Japan* (Duke University Press Books, 2007).

[57] John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 1st ed. (W. W. Norton & Company, 1999).

over memory with its neighbors to Godzilla's fictional roaming of the streets of Tokyo attest to it. [58]

In what follows, I document Hiroshima's and others' attempts to fill up the hole in history that the bomb created and the effects this endeavor had on Japan and the rest of the world. Progressing more or less chronologically through the process of Hiroshima's turbulent postwar history, this work examines Hiroshima's commemoration history and the rise of the survivor. These themes are, of course, not mutually exclusive. And indeed the portions that deal with the "rise of the survivor" are intermixed with others that deal with the production of commemorative frameworks. Thus, while chapter one focuses on commemoration as it was done from "above" by the elites who held the financial and political power to create commemorative apparatuses, the second chapter examines how it was accepted and interpreted "from below" by A-bomb survivors. Both chapters cover roughly the same period but from different angles. Together they show how meaning was produced on various levels of society, from different motives and for different purposes but with a surprisingly coherent result. Both chapters also compare and contrast Hiroshima's development with that of Holocaust discourse in Israel and elsewhere.

Chapter three, which examines psychiatry's response to the A-bomb and the Holocaust, continues with this methodology, but also examines the convergence of the discourses in the production of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, a development which had an enormous impact on our understanding of the tragedies. At the center of the work, tying together its many themes, is the untold history of the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Committee and its failed (yet impressive) efforts

[58] Susan J. Napier, "Panic Sites: The Japanese Imagination of Disaster from Godzilla to Akira," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 19, no. 2 (July 1, 1993): 327–351. Yinan He, "Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006," *History and Memory* 19, no. 2 (October 1, 2007): 43–74.

to unite the memory of Hiroshima and the Holocaust. Both chapters four and chapter six deal with the Committee and its predecessors the Hiroshima Auschwitz Peace March, looking at these as both agents of the transmission of ideas and as lenses through which to examine larger developments. In between these chapters, chapter five takes us back to the locale of Hiroshima, examining issues about tourism and commoditization of the Hiroshima brand and the way these intersected with the process of sanctification of the Peace Park as a "sacred grounds for peace." The chapter examines Hiroshima and its survivors' turn to the language of the sacred as a response to the challenges of consumerism, political strife and generational change. The last chapter, chapter six, returns to these themes and many others, further examining the globalization of commemoration by looking at the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Committee's failed attempts to set up a Holocaust memorial in Hiroshima during the eighties and nineties. This, in turn, is tied to the rising phenomena of competing victimization and the rise of the victim-witness influence on the politics of both Hiroshima and the Middle East.

This last chapter demonstrates how politically charged the category of the victim has become by the 1990s. As Alyson Cole has demonstrated, this discourse reached its peak following 9/11 and America's entrance into the rank of history's victims.[59] The proliferation of victim voices, of course, is not necessarily a negative development. As demonstrated throughout this work, witnessing empowered survivors of both tragedies and helped them heal their shattered lives. Furthermore, across the world, survivors of genocide and oppression have been inspired from and have drawn on Holocaust and Hiroshima survivors' experience in their pursuit of justice. Nevertheless, others have sought to capitalize on and benefit from the unassailable aura of the victim. As we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, testimonies are

[59] Alyson Cole, *The Cult of True Victimhood: From the War on Welfare to the War on Terror*, 1st ed. (Stanford University Press, 2006).

increasingly used in memory wars as survivors' pain is often mobilized for nationalist purposes in an ever-escalating competition of suffering. At the heart of the problem lies the issue of uniqueness. The survivor has been endowed with authority by virtue of his or her unique suffering. The logic that endowed the sufferers of Holocaust and Hiroshima with moral standing required each to be a unique event. Indeed, some, like Ellie Wiesel or Claude Lanzmann, have treated the Holocaust as an event so unique, it stood outside of history.[60] The dangers of this line of thinking, as Michael Rothberg argues is that it, "Potentially create a hierarchy of suffering (a morally offensive result) and removes suffering from the field of historical agency (a morally and intellectually suspect result)."[61] The other extreme, as we will see throughout this work, is the tendency toward relativizing, universalizing and abstracting the tragedies beyond any historical specificity, blurring the lines between fact and fiction and victims and perpetrators. Both camps, of course, have some truth on their side. What is lacking in both is historical accuracy and balance. This work is ultimately an attempt to supply such balance and to think through, using the history of Hiroshima and the Holocaust, the problems of these tragedies' legacies. Whether we look today at East Asia or at the Middle East, we can scarcely hope to achieve any kind of reconciliation in current conflicts if we do not begin by untangling the discourses of the pas

[60] Michael Rothberg, "The Work of Testimony in the Age of Decolonization: "Chronicle of a Summer," Cinema Verité, and the Emergence of the Holocaust Survivor," *PMLA,* Vol. 119, No. 5, (Oct., 2004), p. 1232.
[61] Ibid., 1233.

Chapter 1: "The most Modern City in the World": Remaking Hiroshima, 1945-1955

During a 1951 press conference upon his arrival in Hiroshima, the Japanese-American artist Isamu Noguchi startled Japanese reporters with the comment, "Hiroshima is probably the most modern city in the world."[62] Noguchi's statement expressed the ambivalence many in Japan and beyond felt towards Hiroshima in the aftermath of the bomb. Hiroshima was an expression of a modern nightmare, a failure of the enlightenment narrative of science and progress, but Hiroshima was also a tabula rasa, an urban space open for a complete reconstruction of the city, and "[for] clearing the blinders of convention to enable a bold modernity."[63] With only a few exceptions, Hiroshima fully embraced the second interpretation of Noguchi's declaration in its reconstruction plans and the way it presented itself. By the late forties, the equation of Hiroshima's meaning with a quest for peace and, furthermore, the equation of the pursuit of peace with a pursuit of modernity, was fast becoming a dominant official interpretation of the bombing and its meaning.

This was, of course, not a foregone conclusion. Almost immediately after the bomb, competing interpretations of the bombing and its meaning surfaced. Reactions to the bomb varied from very early on. While many on the allied side reacted positively, others were shocked. Dwight MacDonald said of Hiroshima, "This atrocious action places 'us', the defenders of civilization, on a moral level with 'them', the beasts of Majdanek. And 'we', the American people, are just as much and as little responsible for this horror as 'they', the German people."[64] This was as radical a statement then as it is now. MacDonald, a Trotskyist, was certainly not

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[62] Funatō Hiroshi, Musshu noguchi, *Geijutsu Shincho*, Vol. 10 (July, 1965), p 125.

[63] Bert Winther, "The Rejection of Isamu Noguchi's Hiroshima Cenotaph: A Japanese American Artist in Occupied Japan", *Art Journal,* Vol. 53, 1994. p. 23.

[64] Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1985). p. 232.

representative, but the implications of the bomb and the cruelty of killing hundreds of thousands with the flick of a button did cast many doubts on who exactly was good in this last "good war." As Paul Boyer has noted, for many on both sides of the ideological divide, the bomb forever shook their faith in progress and the whole structure of liberal and socialist theory.[65] This was true in Japan, as it was everywhere. Soon, however, elites moved fast to reestablish order and faith in progress. Commemoration of the bomb, this chapter argues, largely followed that path; commemorating the bomb primarily not in terms of grief and loss but, instead, emphasizing transformation, rebirth and, ultimately, progress.

Implanting the transformation narrative was by no means a smooth process. In explaining the bomb, the city of Hiroshima and its residents tried to navigate the complex symbolic field of the bomb's meaning while coming to terms themselves with the enormous loss and suffering brought about by the bomb and the lost war. Throughout this process, Hiroshima was torn between grieving and mourning and a forward-looking narrative which celebrated the supposed transformation of the city from a military capital to a city of peace. While in no way ignoring residents' needs for a place of mourning, when planning for commemoration, city elites, facing severe financial difficulties, by and large tried to exploit the symbolic capital their city now possessed for acquiring funds, thus emphasizing the transformation narrative over other explanations.

The effort to contain and explain the bomb took many forms. This chapter will examine the emergence of this discourse through the way commemoration, tourism, law, and architecture were used to further it. These elements were selected in order to examine the rise of the transformation narrative as it was shaped by those in power, but in no way do they represent a

[65] Ibid, p. 235.

complete list, literature and film being the most glaring omissions. [66] This chapter is primarily about the way the bomb was explained by the elites who controlled the funds and political power necessary to influence commemoration. It is about discourse as it emerged largely "from above," whether it was from GHQ, the emperor, intellectuals or politicians. Chapter two will deal with survivors and the way individuals dealt with the bomb from "below." In a way this is an artificial separation. Many elites were survivors themselves, and the bomb and peace activities propelled many survivors into a position of authority. Much of what follows, both in this and the next chapter, challenges much recent talk on "counter-memories" and individual survivors' power to subvert hegemonies.[67] This might have been true in some cases. However, in Hiroshima, more often than not, survivors were part and parcel of the making of a hegemonic memory.

Comparing Hiroshima to other commemorative sites reinforces this conclusion. By looking at the very different case of the making of Yad Vashem and Holocaust commemoration at the same time in Israel, one can see many parallels in the relationship of both communities to the horrible disasters that befell them. In both cases the tragedy and its subversive potential were, from very early on, contained and explained through existing narratives; in both cases the tragedy became a touchstone for national reinvention and, finally, in both Israel and Hiroshima, survivors were an essential part of this process. This does not mean that there were not significant differences, or that the process was seamless. What the evidence shows is that in both

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[66] These themes were, of course, also extensively explored elsewhere, most notably by John Treat and James Orr. See James Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); John Whittier Treat, *Writing Ground Zero: Japanese Literature and the Atomic Bomb* (University Of Chicago Press, 1996).

[67] See for instance, among many others, James Young "Memory, Counter-memory, and the End of the Monument", in: *Image and Remembrance. Representation of the Holocaust,* ed. by Shelley Hornstein and Florence Jacobowitz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. Ewa Domanska, "'Let the Dead Bury the Living'. Daniel Libeskind's Monumental Counter-History," in: *History of Historiography Reconsidered*, ed. by Edward Wang and Franz L. Fillafer. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), and Reuben Rose-Redwood, Derek Alderman, and Maoz Azaryahu, "Collective Memory and the Politics of Urban Space: An Introduction," *Geo Journal* 73, no. 3 (September 19, 2008): 161–164.

cases, the process was rife with ambiguities and contradictions. Nevertheless, explaining the tragedies of WW II was an urgent task for elites all over the world. This effort started right after the end of the war and it is to these early reactions that we now turn.

I. Commemorations: "The bomb has brought us peace."

Shortly after the bombing of Hiroshima, the Japanese high command issued the following statement:

> 1) On the 6th of August the city of Hiroshima sustained considerable damage from a raid by a small number of enemy B29s. 2) The enemy's use in the raid of something resembling a new type of bomb is currently under detailed investigation.[68]

The understatements and ambiguous language in the Japanese report was matched by the somewhat overblown words uttered around the same time, on the evening of August 6th, in Washington, D.C. President Truman's presidential communiqué proclaimed the bomb to be the culmination of human science, and Hiroshima to be a military base rather than a city.

> "Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of TNT. ...The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many folds. ...It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe."[69]

Truman's pronouncement caught most Americans and, indeed, the world, quite by surprise. Initially, however, the Japanese government tried to minimize and obscure the bomb's devastating effect for fear of hurting morale. Echoing the later American military and Civil Defense propaganda of the 1950s, the bomb was described as something one could definitely "deal with" and still win a war in a conventional sense.

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[68] Quoted in Treat, *Writing Ground Zero*. p. 82.

[69] Statement issued by U.S. President Harry S. Truman on August 6, 1945, Public Papers of the Presidents (Harry S. Truman, 1946, p. 197-200) http://www.h-net.org/~hst203/documents/TRUMAN1.html accessed January 17, 2012.

Soon, however, Japanese rhetoric caught up with the Americans, proclaiming the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as world-shattering events. In the "shattered Jewel**"** speech of August 15th, the Showa emperor's decision to surrender was portrayed as a magnanimous act. The emperor acted to save the world and civilization from this "new type of bomb." This alignment of rhetoric was, as James Orr and others have pointed out, the result of a peculiar overlapping of interests between the soon-to-be American occupiers and the Japanese elites.[70] The bomb and American scientific mastery were what brought about the end of the war, not some failure on the part of elites or the utter falseness of talk of *Yamato damashi* (spirit of Yamato or of the Japanese race). In what would become a staple of certain elements of the later peace movement, Japan, by being A-bombed, actually won morally by losing materially as it acquired the peculiar merit of being the only country to have experienced the bomb.[71] Thus, even before the Americans had set foot in Hiroshima, the bombing was made part of a complex symbolic field.

Initially, however, no one was sure what would become of Hiroshima. The Americans certainly did not know what to expect. When the first troops entered Hiroshima, they did so in full battle gear and with drawn bayonets. They were greeted, however, by a mostly indifferent and still shocked population, who, if anything, greeted the arrival of the occupation forces with relief as it put an end to the looting and general breakdown of order which had accompanied the defeat.[72] The Japanese did not know what to expect either. One of the first acts of Hiroshima's police and military was, as in other parts of Japan, to set up brothels for the Americans in order

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[70] Orr, *The Victim as Hero*. p. 12.

[71] The emperor himself would reiterate this when he visited Hiroshima on the very significant date of December 7th 1946, affirming the very American equation of Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima, albeit from the stance of a victimized Japan that had paid dearly for its sins.

[72] See John Dower introduction to Michihiko Hachiya, *Hiroshima Diary: The Journal of a Japanese Physician, August 6-September 30, 1945*, 1St ed. (University of N. Carolina Press, 1995).

to prevent "misunderstandings."[73] Rumors and misinformation about American intent complicated the picture. Many Japanese feared the Americans would treat Hiroshima as their army did Chinese and Philippine cities. Women were told not to wear flashy clothes, men not to wear watches and some even escaped to the countryside.[74] These "conventional" fears were exacerbated by the nature of the devastation already meted out by the Americans. An August 23rd article in the *Mainichi Shinbun* quoted an American scientist who claimed "nothing will grow in Hiroshima for the next seventy five years."[75] This mistaken prediction, coupled with the very real effects of radiation, which started to manifest themselves in Hiroshima, produced much anxiety.

In addition to these immediate anxieties was the power the bomb had to shatter not only the physical infrastructure of Hiroshima but, together with the defeat, to destroy the value systems and beliefs of the Japanese. The bomb was a challenge to the very idea of progress and science, which the Japanese had embraced since Meiji. The emperor-centered system (*tennōsei*), in place until 1945, was based on the twin ideological poles of modernization and (invented) tradition.[76] The shock of the bomb and the defeat presented a challenge to both. Both the Japanese elite and the American occupation, however, moved fast to re-establish order both physically and discursively. In this they were helped, ironically, by the multifaceted and ambiguous nature of the bomb. As John Dower has argued, the bomb was Janus-faced; it was both a reminder of the folly of war and, also, a symbol of the new omnipotence of science.[77] This certainly fit into the

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[73] Hiroshima shi.hen, *Hiroshima Shinshi.* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima shi, 1984). p. 17.
[74] Robert Jungk, *Children of the Ashes: The People of Hiroshima, the Story of a Rebirth* (Paladin, 1985), p. 54; Hachiya, *Hiroshima Diary*. p. 16.
[75] Ibid. p. 2.
[76] For more on the tension between the two see Stephen Vlastos, ed., *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 1998).
[77] John W. Dower, *"The Bombed: Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese Memory" in Michael J. Hogan, ed.*

optimistic message of renewal and the emphasis on peace promoted by the Americans. The phrase "Building a nation of science and culture" (*kagaku to bunka no kokka wo kensetsu*) was ubiquitous all over Japanese media. The word *heiwa* and the prefix *shin* (new) suddenly appeared everywhere.[78] The discourse on transformation and modernization was nothing new for the Japanese. From Meiji onward, the Japanese were taught to accept change and transformation and discard much of their old way of life. Building on this history, from the end of the war onward, American and Japanese elites actively tried to direct Japan's gaze towards the future.

This discourse also reflected a certain view of the war as a sort of slip or mistake in what was, basically, a positive modern progression of Japanese society from feudalism to modernity. This view was the result of another peculiar alignment between liberal and Marxist intellectuals that explained fascism and the war as the result of remnants of feudalist and militarist thinking. The problem with the Japanese was that they were not "modern" enough, by lacking subjective individuality and engaging in group thinking.[79] The only way to avoid a return to fascism and war was to be even more modern and rational. The bomb, although the result of science and progress, was ultimately explained along the same lines as fascis: as being an aberration and a slip back to barbarity.

In Hiroshima itself, just devastated from the latest advance of science, the very first mention of plans for commemoration in September 1945 was a call by Hiroshima's governor for building a new Hiroshima and a scientific Japan. Significantly, the governor also went on to say, a day later, that he wanted to push Hiroshima as, "a major inner sea tourist point and for getting funds and resources from the world to create a peace memorial city" (*Heiwa e no kinen toshi to*

Hiroshima in History and Memory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.123.

[78] John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 1st ed. (W. W. Norton & Company, 1999). p. 173.

[79] For more on these debates see Victor Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) and Dower, *Embracing Defeat,* pp. 155-161.

naru tame ni sekai no yushi ga fukko kikin o eru). This was a moment of great change and enormous transformation; when paradigms were shifting and many were trying to adopt them.[80] The new optimistic message, after years of war, was very much welcome in Japan.

Furthermore, looking backwards was suspect and the Japanese were made to learn from early on that doing so carried a price. When it came to the bombing, the Americans exercised severe censorship. The censorship was arbitrary. It was unclear at times what the agenda of the occupation was. As Monica Brow has pointed out, the Americans themselves were not clear about this.[81] But broad themes did emerge. Critiques of the occupying power and its way of life (i.e. capitalism) were severely curtailed.[82] This included, interestingly, up to 1949, even criticism of the USSR.[83] The borders of the permitted shifted, but one theme was strictly forbidden: discussion of the atomic bomb. Testimonies, pictures, reports on the extent of the damage, and even medical knowledge were severely curtailed. Grief was suspect. Ubuki Satoro counted only three testimonies published in 1946, all by local and little known publishers.[84] Indeed, it was on the local level where American censorship was most inhumane, as survivors of the bomb, "could not grieve publicly, could not share their experiences through the written word, could not be offered public counsel."[85] This did not mean complete silence. People could speak about the bomb, but only on the lines of approved discourse (i.e. equating the bomb with peace). Any steps outside of it were curtailed. In 1946, in one incident among many, Kurihara Sadako and her

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[80] John Dower masterfully captured this mood in his first and second chapters of *Embracing Defeat.*

[81] Monica Braw, *The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occupied Japan* (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991) especially Ch. 2.

[82] Ubuki Satoro (ed.), *Doku GHQ/CCD (minkan kenetu shitai) ni yoru kenetu no jittai- burange bunso hiroshima ken zashi 255 zatsu no baai* (Hiroshima: Asahi, 2008), p. 2.

[83] Braw, Atomic, p. 52.

[84] Ubuki Satoru and Uchida Emiko: "Kako 45 nenkan no genbaku shuki no shuppan jōkyō." *Hiroshima igaku* 45, no. 3 (March 1992): pp. 373-75.

[85] Dower, "The Bombed", p. 127.

husband tried to publish a collection of local writers and residents in the Hiroshima literary magazine *Chūgoku Bunka.* The magazine, however, was so severely censored (censors cutting 30 lines out of a poem of 40 lines) as to make it impossible to publish.[86]

The emphasis on renewal and transformation not withstanding, what concerned most in Hiroshima, at least initially, was keeping the traditional order of things. The dead should be cremated and given proper ceremony according to Buddhist and Shinto traditions. Hachiya Michihiko, a doctor who operated in the Red Cross Hospital in Hiroshima and was wounded in the blast, reported in his *Hiroshima Diary*, which chronicled the first weeks after the bombing, that he was disturbed not so much by the sight of thousands of bodies being cremated, but that there was no priest presence at the cremations.[87] Authorities moved fast to rectify this, calling on surviving priests and priests from temples and shrines from outside of Hiroshima to come into the city. These cremation ceremonies continued for weeks as the city dealt with the enormous number of bodies.[88] The first official commemoration ceremonies, which took place in a wrecked girls' school from the 7th to the 14th of August, were conducted mostly by priests (those were also conducted side by side with efforts to find relatives and ascertain the scope of the tragedy).[89] When the first calls for a more permanent commemoration came in December 1945, they came in the form of an appeal to the city to build a memorial tower (*kuyōtō* – a Buddhist term). This was initiated by Mochizuki Haruhiko, a journalist who proposed to build a place "for registering the names of the dead and for the gathering of [victims'] ashes." Although the emphasis was on mourning and giving the many dead a proper resting place, Mochizuki also

[86] Even a poem depicting American and Japanese shaking hands was censored. Kurihara later recalled that 'she could not depict the losers and winners [shaking hands] being on the same level.' See Hiroshima shi, *rekishi hen*, pp. 21-22.
[87] Hachiya, p. 61.
[88] Hiroshima Shi, Hiroshima Shinshi: Rekishi hen, p. 62.
[89] Ubuki Satoru, *Heiwa Kinen Shikitan No Ayumi* (Hiroshima-shi: Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Senta, 1992). p. 5.

called for the city to act, as it was "the city that suffered the world's first nuclear bomb." The victims should be commemorated as "those who were the victims for recovery of peace" (*heiwa wo fukko no tame no giseisha toshite*).[90]

It was hard to separate mourning from forward-looking peace discourse. If one wished to talk of the dead, it had to be in the terms that were permissible. With censorship, the only safe way to mourn was by connecting Hiroshima's destruction to peace. Accordingly, the victims, almost immediately, were made victims for peace (rather than victims of war). As early as August 30, 1945, Kawabata Yasunari, a Hiroshima based author, called on survivors, "based on their experience of being bombed (*hibaku taiken o moto ni*) to… [Work] for the establishment of eternal peace."[91] This dual emphasis continued through the 1946 first year anniversary. In May 1946, a number of organizations appealed to the city to erect the memorial tower. After the petition was granted, a ceremony was held on Nakajima Island on the former grounds of the Jisenji temple. The ashes of a couple of thousands of unknown victims, gathered by neighborhood associations all over Hiroshima, were deposited there.[92] In August, construction also began on a charnel house and a name registry.[93] The tower, which was nothing more than a simple wooden pole, became a focal point for the many families who lost loved ones. It was also the center of the first August 6th ceremony.

In contrast to later ceremonies, the first ceremony in 1946 was much more somber. The ceremony was organized largely by survivors' and religious organizations in cooperation with

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[90] *Chūgoku shinbun,* 25 December 1945; Also quoted in Hiroshima Shi, Hiroshima Shinshi: Rekishi hen, p. 64 and
[91] Ubuki, *Heiwa Kinen Shikitan No Ayumi*, p. 3.
[92] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 21 April 1946.
[93] Ubuki Satoro, "Genbaku taiken to heiwa undo," in Masanori Nakamura, *Sengo minshu shugi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); pp. 95-6.

the city.[94] Hiroshima residents came out in unprecedented numbers to attend Buddhist mass and mourn the dead. On Nakajima Island, from early in the morning until late at night, Buddhist, Shinto and Christian services were held in front of the memorial tower and a mass was held in the ruins of the Nagarekawa church.[95] A message was read by Mayor Kihara Shichirō and another from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. The ceremony was also broadcast on national radio. In their messages, the politicians emphasized the theme of sacrifice. Both Kihara and Yoshida spoke at length about how Hiroshima's sacrifice would open the way for peace and of how Hiroshima would be rebuilt as a city of peace. This theme was even stronger in a ceremony held a day earlier on the grounds of the former *gokoku* shrine (a place where the war dead were worshipped under state Shinto), which was part of what the city called the "Hiroshima people's great peace and reconstruction assembly" (*Hiroshima shimin heiwa fukkō daikai*). There, Kihara extorted citizens of Hiroshima "together with one heart, one mind and one body, we the citizens of Hiroshima, will build the world-peace symbol peace city."[96] Both Yoshida and Kihara, in equating Hiroshima with peace, were basically rehearsing the already familiar American equation of the bomb with peace. Instead of the bomb itself, however, it was the sacrifice of Hiroshima that was now responsible for ending the war.

These words and images contrasted sharply with what the journalists could not talk about (because of censorship), but images of the first ceremonies tell us that their tone was intensely emotional and centered on grief, not on a celebration of future peace. The few images that survive show tearful residents holding prayer bids and lighting incense in front of the tower. The

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[94] Ibid., p. 96.
[95] Hiroshima-ken, *Genbaku Sanjūnen: Hiroshima-ken No Sengoshi*, Dai 1-han. (Hiroshima-shi: Hiroshima-ken, 1976), pp.186.
[96] Naono Akiko, *Embracing the Dead in the Bomb's Shadow: Journey Through the Hiroshima Memoryscape*, University of California Unpublished PhD dissertation (2002). 50; Chūgoku Shinbun sha, *honoe no hi kara ni ju nen (1966 nen),* (Hiroshima: Miraisha, 1966), p. 88.

majority of those attending were relatives of the dead and most seemed to be concerned more with prayer and communal mourning than with the city of peace. As we will see in the next chapter, some openly expressed their anger at the political manipulation of their grief. This does not preclude the possibility that both attitudes co-existed.

Officially, however, and in the media, the transformation narrative was paramount. Supporting the official message, which followed the American line, an editorial talked about how the "sacrifice [of Hiroshima] saved numerous precious lives."[97] Other articles, however, went to great length to talk about how "the bomb has brought us peace." Some of the articles bore Orwellian titles referring to the bomb as "the bright flash of peace," (*heiwa no senkō*) or to the "prelude to peace [which] descended from above" (*ama kudaru, heiwa no jokyoku*). To press the point, the latter title was accompanied by a picture of the mushroom cloud.[98] The campaign to direct the gaze of Hiroshima into a future of "bright peace" (*akarui heiwa*) and to explain the bomb as a sacrifice to peace intensified as efforts for reconstruction, and the search for funds for it, gathered momentum. American and British reconstruction advisers assigned to Hiroshima played a crucial role in this campaign. A further impetus for the greater emphasis on peace was the American campaign of demilitarization (culminating in the 1947 "peace constitution") and the growing international attention given to Hiroshima.

In mid-May 1946, at Hiroshima city's request, Lt. John D. Montgomery from the U.S. Army and Major Harvey Stein from the Australian forces, were stationed as official reconstruction advisers in Hiroshima.[99] Montgomery played a crucial role in transforming

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[97] Ibid,p. 52.

[98] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 1 August (prelude for peace) and 6 August 1946 (bright flash).

[99] According to Hamai Shinzō, who became Hiroshima's mayor after Kihara was purged on GHQ orders, the advisers were assigned on the orders of Horace Robertson, then commander of the British Commonwealth forces (BCOF) in Kure. If indeed it was Robertson, as we will shortly see, he was acting without any official SCAP

Hiroshima's commemoration. In a June 1946 interview, Montgomery called on residents to "make Hiroshima a symbol of international peace." Montgomery went on to say: "the memorial tower is for me, not for commemoration…but should stand for the baptism of the first dropping of the A-bomb, ending of WW II and creation of eternal peace."[100] Montgomery was also the first one to propose building a museum on ground zero (*bakushinchi*) and infrastructure for visitors to the site.[101] Similar calls were made a few months later by Miles W. Vaughn, an influential Japan-based American journalist. In 1946 and again in 1947, Vaughn called on Hiroshima residents, in a letter that was published in the press, to build a "peace memorial city," and a "*pika don* memorial museum where artifacts and pictures will be shown for the visitors" (*Pika don*, as the bombing was sometimes called, referred to its loud sound and bright flash). Both Vaughn and Montgomery promised they would appeal for reconstruction funds in the U.S.[102] Montgomery in particular mentioned the Rotary Club and religious organizations and promised: "Hiroshima can count on the world's sympathy."[103]

In 1947, Hiroshima indeed looked to the world for help. Frustrated by its failure to achieve reconstruction funds from the government, Hiroshima city turned to fundraising as a possible source of revenue. Hiroshima first turned to former residents who had emigrated to Hawaii and the American West Coast. Later, however, Hiroshima would widen its appeal and turn to pacifist

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sanction. See Shinzo Hamai, *A-Bomb Mayor: Warnings and Hope from Hiroshima*, Trans. by Elizabeth W. Baldwin, (Hiroshima, 2010), p. 86.

[100] Ishimaru Norioki, "Hiroshima no sensai fukko keikaku toki ni okeru fukko mondai no keikaku, John d. Montgomery no keikaku shisōto sono hatashita yakuwarini kan suru kenkyū," toshi keikaku ronbun shū, No. 44 Vol. 3 (October 2009), p. 833. See also Chūgoku Shinbun, 6 June 1946.

[101] Ibid, p. 831.

[102] For Vaughn, see *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 2 August 1946 and 7 July 1947; for Montgomery, see *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 22 May 1946.

[103] Ibid.

and other organizations.[104] Internationally, as cold war divisions were emerging, Hiroshima was receiving more and more attention, as demonstrated by the huge success of John Hersey's *Hiroshima*, published worldwide in August 1946. Most of this attention, and most initiatives for charity work for Hiroshima, initially came from Christian pacifists. One of the heroes of Hersey's book, the reverend Tanimoto Kyoshi, was invited by a Methodist organization to the U.S. and was one of the first to convey Hiroshima's experience in the United States. Tanimoto and his American sponsors also solicited donations for reconstruction. This was an extremely rare trip, as Japanese citizens were normally not allowed to travel overseas in the first few years of the occupation. Furthermore, initially, Christian missionaries were almost the only civilians allowed to travel freely to and from Hiroshima (Hersey was an exception).[105] Tanimoto's campaign was immediate success. In August 1947, Tanimoto, together with American representatives from Georgia's Emory University, presented the city with their plan to supply aid to Hiroshima and rebuild its ruined churches.[106] Another successful campaign was the building of a Peace Memorial Cathedral, with donations from (mostly German) Catholic organizations which was initiated with papal blessing in 1946.[107] Also in 1946, the Quaker Floyd Schmoe, who eventually settled in Hiroshima, started to gather funds for constructing homes for survivors.[108] Consequently, Hiroshima's appeals to the world became more and more laden with Christian language and metaphors. This kind of religious pacifist-inspired language intensified after the

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[104] A useful review of overseas help can be found at http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/exhibit_e/exh0708_e/exh070805_e.html accessed 9 February 2012.

[105] MacArthur encouraged missionary work and even hoped the occupation would be an opportunity to convert the Japanese to Christianity. See Lawrence S. Wittner, "MacArthur and the Missionaries: God and Man in Occupied Japan," *Pacific Historical Review* 40, no. 1 (1 February 1971): pp. 77–98.

[106] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 25 August 1947.

[107] German Catholics were undoubtedly more comfortable with commemorating Hiroshima than the Holocaust. See http://hiroshima.catholic.jp/~pcaph/cathedral/?page_id=2 accessed 20 February 2012.

[108] http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/exhibit_e/exh0708_e/exh070807_e.html accessed 20 February 2012.

proclamation of the 1947 Peace Constitution and General MacArthur's message to Hiroshima of the same year. The second August 6th ceremony in 1947 demonstrated all of those trends and more.

Significantly, the 1947 ceremony was held not in front of the memorial tower but at the other side of Nakajima Island, in front of the newly constructed peace tower, which was built by the city specifically for the ceremony.[109] It featured the first "peace declaration," where the new Mayor, Hamai Shinzō, called for the people to "look to the future" and "help the rebuilding of Hiroshima as Peace City." Emphasizing Hiroshima's uniqueness, Hamai continued, "Only those who experienced the misery of the bomb can see truly the need for peace… [And] save mankind from extinction."[110] Hamai's sentiment was shared by Prime Minister Katayama and General MacArthur. Katayama called Hiroshima, using another trope of uniqueness: "a Mecca of world peace, which is the pride of the world."[111] MacArthur, in a somber message, reminded the residents and the world, in a sermon-like manner, that the "agonies of that fateful day serve as a warning to all men of all races, that the harnessing of nature's forces in furtherance of war's destructiveness will progress until the means are at hand to exterminate the human race and destroy the material structure of the modern world…*This is the lesson of Hiroshima*. *God grant that it will not be not ignored*" [emphasis added].[112]

Nevertheless, what 1947 is mostly remembered for in Hiroshima is not the grand talk of peace but the festive way in which the day was marked. If religious solemnity and talk of peace was one way to talk about the bomb, another was to use bomb-related events in order to revive Hiroshima's economy. Just as with commemoration, however, it was hard to separate the peace

[109] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 7 August 1947.
[110] Ibid.
[111] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 6 August 1947.
[112] Ibid.

discourse from its commercial usages. The idea of a "peace festival" was brought up first by Ishijima Harushi from the local broadcasting company who told the mayor, "now that people's consciousness of peace has grown, why don't we hold a big peace festival each August 6th... That will convey to the world that the A-bombed city wants peace." Ishijima received an enthusiastic response when he repeated this message in a June 1947 meeting of Hiroshima's tourism board. "We *hibakusha,*" he told the board, "Have a responsibility to tell the world our stories... to prevent recurrence."[113] Significantly, in a sentiment we shall return to in following chapters, Mayor Hamai recalled that he and his colleagues "saw the festival as a way to console the dead."[114]

According to Hamai, the chamber of commerce and tourist association also wanted a "festival to inject energy into our moribund retail sector."[115] The organizing committee planned a total of fifty programs, and private citizens and companies sponsored other events. Portable shrines, floats and costume parades marched around town. A boat race to the A-bomb dome was held on the Motoyasu River. Many shops had a special "Atomic sale," and a lottery was held. Apparently, this was too much for some, as the next day the *Chūgoku Shinbun* featured angry responses from survivors who asked "why is all this ruckus happening?"[116] The committee soon apologized, yet the tension between the commercialization of Hiroshima and some residents' (mostly survivors) wish for respect, as we shall see in chapter five, never really went away.

What the 1947 ceremony (and the much larger 1948 ceremony) demonstrated was that the discourse of peace and transformation was now the dominant way Hiroshima City chose to explain the bomb. This was not a smooth move and was not without many contradictions and

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[113] Hamai, *A-Bomb Mayor*, p. 94.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ubuki, Heiwa Kinen Shikitan No Ayumi. p. 13.

ambiguities. The 1948 August 6th ceremony featured an almost cordial atmosphere between Hiroshima and American officials. Not everybody shared this feeling of reconciliation and good will. The BCOF (British Commonwealth Occupation Forces – the Hiroshima region was under their command) commander, General Robertson, told the audience "in the past your country received so much from the allied nations. Japan was once an ally of Great Britain, but you betrayed that trust. I must remind you that you are responsible for what happened here... The destructive ways of war and aggression brought this upon your city."[117] Robertson was harshly criticized by *Time* magazine. "He scrapped the U.S. plans for the ceremony, sent American subordinate officers to the rear of the platform, [and] ruled out friendly U.S. messages to the people of Hiroshima."[118] To add insult to injury, Robertson ordered a RAF squadron to buzz the ceremony. Americans and Japanese alike were incensed by Robertson's "rudeness."[119]

What this incident illustrates, however, was not so much Australian vindictiveness but how far understanding between American and Japanese elites regarding Hiroshima's "proper" meaning had progressed in the three years since the bombing. The combination of censorship, Japanese and American elites' shared interests and Hiroshima's wish to capitalize on its uniqueness to achieve funds made the transformation narrative the mainstay of Hiroshima's commemoration. The bomb and peace were now connected. We must also remember that there was much genuine passion for peace in Hiroshima. The trope of "bright peace," much denigrated by later radicals, was attractive for a people who had just been through fifteen years of war and oppression and, as one survivor reminded this author, literal darkness as civil defense regulations barred all bright lights from the streets. Peace was universally welcomed and garnered real

[117] Hamai, *A-Bomb Mayor*, p. 102. The BCOF had the responsibility of day-to-day policing and garrison duty while political issues and overall command was with the US forces. Both commands were stationed in Kure, a port city south of Hiroshima.
[118] *Time Magazine,* 16 August 1948.
[119] Hamai, *A-Bomb Mayor*, p. 103.

support across the political spectrum. When in 1948-1949, Hiroshima, facing huge economic difficulties, sought a way to secure funds for reconstruction from the Japanese government, it was that exact sentiment which it sought to bank on.

II. Selling Hiroshima I: Tourism, fund raising and the beginning of A-bomb artefacts

On 1 December 1948, Ito Yutaka, the chairman of Hiroshima's newly created reconstruction committee, sent a letter to potential U.S. donors appealing for funds for Hiroshima's reconstruction. The letter, and an accompanying one by Mayor Hamai and others, provide a succinct statement of the way Hiroshima presented itself to the world in the late forties. "We desire to express our profound respect," Ito wrote to his American readers, "for your efforts for the peace and liberty of mankind. On 6 August 1945 our native city was destroyed in a flash…and turned into an atomic desert… we, citizens of Hiroshima, [however] pledged to build on the ruins of our old city, a metropolis of peace and culture symbolizing the new Japan. With the pledge of 'No more Hiroshimas' we are facing the future with hope and determination." After assuring his readers of Hiroshima's new and modern character – all thanks to America's efforts, Ito now turned to recruit the sympathy of his readers, betraying not a little paternalism, "… In addition it is our desire to provide comfortable homes for working class people who are suffering from the want of dwelling houses, warm schools for school children who are shivering from cold in rough barrack classrooms… [and] women's establishments for those women who were wounded or lost their husbands." Ito ended his letter with an affirmation of Hiroshima's place in the world, "the goal is still distant, however, as Hiroshima has been accorded a historical significance and is known throughout the world as the center of the dropping of the atomic bomb, one of the main causes contributing to the termination of the Second World War, we

consider it a duty given to us by Providence to reconstruct Hiroshima…as a city of peace and culture."[120] Going even further along these lines, Hamai Shinzō, in a more targeted letter to the president of Carroll College in Wisconsin, pronounced, "On August 6th 1945 our city of Hiroshima was *born anew*" [emphasis added].[121]

This statement of the transformation narrative turned the flash of the bomb into a purifying baptism. Out of the sins of its militarist past a new Hiroshima was born, and now, thanks to America's efforts for its little brethren "who are shivering in the cold," Hiroshima was ready to join the new bright world of *pax* Americana. As we will see in the next chapter, empathy, paternalism and emotional mobilization played an enormous role in the way America related to its new cold war Japanese ally. Hiroshima sought to capitalize on American sympathy. This was, to an extent, a political maneuver. Although some, like Tanimoto Kiyoshi, undoubtedly felt the bomb could bring about a spiritual renewal, many others were cynical.[122] The particular narrative that came out of these efforts, however, had a decisive influence on the way Hiroshima commemorated the bomb and, indeed, turned into official ideology with the 1949 Peace City law.

Tourism played an important role in this development. Hiroshima lost almost eighty percent of its tax base due to the bomb and the disbanding of the military, on which many of its industries were based.[123] Indeed, Hiroshima prided itself on being *guntō* (military capital), having served as the headquarters of Emperor Meiji in the first Sino-Japanese war. It had a long and very profitable relationship with the military and the empire. Now, with both gone and

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[120] Ito Yukata, "letter to donors," 1 December 1948. Letter attached to Hiroshima Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Committee., *Hiroshima* (Hiroshima City Japan: The Committee c/o Hiroshima Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1948). Carroll University Library, Waukesha, Wisconsin.
[121] Hamai Shinzō et. al. to President of Carroll College, 30 June 1950, letter attached to ibid.
[122] See for instance Dower's examination of the cartoons drawn by Kato Etsuro in *Embracing Defeat*, p. 68.
[123] For details, see Hiroshima Shi, *Hiroshima shinshi Rekishi hen,* pp. 29-41.

facing mounting financial challenges, the city looked to tourism to fill some of the resultant gap. As early as March 1946, author Shokoku Haruo called on city officials to recognize "the connection between peace and tourism, which will hasten the recovery of our city, the capital of the inner sea."[124] This was part of a debate over the character of the city, examined below, in which Hiroshima's tourist potential was discussed extensively. In this debate and in associated publications, Hiroshima's tourist industry did not frown upon using Hiroshima's dark appeal. Indeed, many recognized the A-bomb "ruins of Hiroshima" (English in original) to be "a tourist resource" (*kankō no shigen*).[125]

This was a sentiment widely shared in Hiroshima. countless businesses in the city started selling "atomic" souvenirs, putting the prefix "atomic" before their names and, even selling postcards showing a *hibakusha* keloid scarred back (some *hibakusha* actually posed for tourists showing their scars).[126] A number of tourist brochures called the city itself "Atom Hiroshima". A 1948 pamphlet published by Hiroshima prefecture called on visitors to see, in very similar terms to the above-mentioned letters, "the sacred ground for peace…Atom Hiroshima, which the peace loving people of the world…shall never forget." The brochure then presented the visitor with a number of pictures of "Atomic sites," which included the A-bomb dome and other surviving buildings and imprints of the bomb such as the famous human shadow on the steps of a local bank. A picture of the kimono-clad contestants of Miss Hiroshima followed these images.[127]

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[124] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 21 March 1946.

[125] Morisuke Sukeji, "Hiroshima no kankō shigen," in *Shin Toshi* (hiroshima heiwa toshi kensetu toku shū go), No. 4, Vol. 8, 1950), p. 44.

[126] The postcards were of Kikawa Kiyoshi, who also posed for the *Life* article discussed in chapter two. Some of these postcards can be found at the Kikawa collection, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park Archive (HPMA), Folder 9.

[127] Motogi Bunsen, *Kanko Hiroshima ken*, (Hiroshima: yukan minsei shinbunsha hakō , 1948) The Miss Hiroshima contest was one of a number of initiatives by the Hiroshima tourist board, examined below, which starting in 1947 were designed to promote the city's bright image.

Another tourist guide went even further in combining public relations with horror. The guide opened with the words, "on [that] fateful day [in] 1945, Hiroshima was wiped out in one second... The imagination would not suffice to describe the scenes of horror and the charred hell." Not a typical opening for a tourist brochure. Photos of burned victims and scenes of bomb destruction followed this statement. "This photo album," the author concluded alongside pictures of new buildings and the peace tower, "would give the visitor a vivid impression of both the scars of war and the rebirth of the city… as a city of peace and culture."[128]

English language guides were even more Orwellian. One significant feature which the English language guides lack are photos of wounded victims and explicit language of horror. Suffering was only implied. Indeed, the guides were nothing but optimistic. A 1949 guide, "Living Hiroshima," tells the "uniformed visitor," that "without knowing this is THE CITY, no one can tell there is a special significance [to the place]" (uppercase in the original). If one wonders why, the author explains it is because "the last days of the war had wiped out the traces of the old and had created the field for resurrection."[129] Indeed, continued the author, "Japan owes much to Hiroshima for having freed the country from war forever... Hiroshima wants to show its new self to the world. The newborn city of Hiroshima is today a city of peace."[130] The author assured visitors the city has forgotten. "It is only with great difficulty," he wrote, "that people who were in Hiroshima that day can be found. Even if met, they are unwilling to relate their experiences. All of them feel a sort of religious reverence. Their experiences and their tragedy are connected with the dead –the dead Hiroshima. Today it is a newly built Hiroshima

[128] Sasaki Ichirō (henshusha), *Hiorshima foto arubomu,* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima kankō bussan kumiai, 1948), p. 1.
[129] Nakajima kenzo (ed.) *Living Hiroshima* (Tokyo: dai-Nippon 1948), p. 1.
[130] Ibid, p. 5.

that is alive."[131] Another 1949 guide, "Hiroshima yesterday and today," utilized this same theme, conveying General MacArthur's "lesson from God" message in full and promising the visitor: "This lesson the citizens of Hiroshima did not ignore, and started to reconstruct 'a peaceful city' as a forerunner of a new Japan and to hold the 'peace festival' on the 'peace plaza' where the bomb was dropped."[132] Both guides bristled with pictures of A-bomb orphans and "Japanese beauties." The orphans' section displayed much of the same language that Ito did when talking about shivering school children.

This exhibition of suffering, together with the use of religious language and calls for peace for the purposes of tourism, may seem especially crass. Commercialization, however, also prompted the preservation of many A-bomb sites and materials and had a very strong connection to the future shape of Hiroshima as "peace city." The same pamphlet that featured the Miss Hiroshima photos also showed A-bomb materials like twisted metal and glass objects, which now reside in museums but were initially regarded as just debris. *Living Hiroshima* told foreign visitors, "Some Hiroshima residents are even discussing the preservation of the industrial promotion building [the A-bomb dome] and other ruins in order not to disappoint visitors who wish to see remains of the bomb."[133] Tourist officials, such as Morisuke Sukeji, who wrote the aforementioned "Hiroshima tourist resources" article (and who later became the director of the peace memorial museum), played a very important role in preservation.

As early as 1948, the Hiroshima tourist association launched a sightseeing bus to tour "atomic sights in the atom city" (*genbaku toshi*). The association explained: "Many visitors, both domestic and foreign, have shown an interest in Hiroshima after the bomb and its recovery, to

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[131] Ibid, p. 2.
[132] Miyoji Okazaki, *Hiroshima : Yesterday and Today* (Hiroshima-shi: Hiroshima Tetsudokyoku Ryokakuka, 1949). p. 15.
[133] Nakajima kenzo, *Living Hiroshima,* p. 3.

supply the tourists, especially the many foreigners, with a true and correct sightseeing [experience] of Hiroshima." The association promised also to recruit attractive "guide girls" (*Guido garu*). If one wanted to capitalize on A-bomb ruins one, of course, had to make sure they were preserved. And, indeed, in August of that year the Tourism Association put up signs and fenced off thirteen bomb sites.[134] S.A. Jarvey, an Australian reconstruction adviser who served alongside Lt. Montgomery, encouraged these efforts. In July 1948, Jarvey told the local papers he would like the city to build a museum, and proposed launching a movement to preserve Atomic articles (*genbku* mono), "since there is no tourist infrastructure [for] tourists who come to see Hiroshima, the site of the world's first atomic bomb."[135]

Unbeknownst to Jarvey, this movement was already in existence. Initiated by a Hiroshima University geologist, Nagaoka Shogō, who entered Hiroshima right after the bomb and participated in the Japanese government's first surveys of the city, the movement of *hibakusha* collected thousands of A-bomb artifacts, most of which were deposited in Nagaoka's home.[136] Nagaoka was obsessed with collecting the objects, believing them to have an enormous importance in telling the story of Hiroshima. "These articles that cannot talk," he told a reporter, "will one day serve as a warning to humanity."[137] When the city learned of Nagaoka's work, the first official exhibit of A-bomb materials was arranged, together with the tourist board, in a small hall next to Nakajima Island. This, reported an official 1949 city document, was part of a plan to "attract domestic tourism to the main city and not just Miyajima and the suburbs…" To promote this, in 1947, the tourist association formed to produce events like Miss Hiroshima, to establish

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[134] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 1 August 1948.
[135] Ibid, 27 July 1948.
[136] For details on Nagaoka's role in the geological surveys, see Tokuhei Tagai, *Ishi No Kioku : Hiroshima, Nagasaki* (Tokyo: Tomo Shobo : Hatsubai Seiunsha, 2007).
[137] The quote is in his obituary. August 9 1962. Chapters five and six deal extensively with the transformation of these objects into relics and compare these to Holocaust objects.

tourist routes and the A-bomb exhibit."[138] Reflecting this line, the press reported on the A-bomb artifacts as the "wonders and miracles of Hiroshima, [which] both scientific researchers and tourists come to see." Although, "the room is small and inadequate, it has many objects… [and] the organizers pride themselves on the fact that this is the only place in the world to have them."[139] In this first exhibit, tourism, commemoration (both by institutions and committed individuals) and the discourse of peace all came together.

The first A-bomb exhibit was just one of a number of initiatives which tied tourism to commemoration. Significantly, these ties were not seen as problematic in Hiroshima in the late forties. Using the memory of the bomb and Hiroshima's notoriousness to promote the city had a huge influence on commemoration. Tourism officials were part of the city's various committees for reconstruction and commemoration and, as we just saw, were some of the first to promote preservation of A-bomb materials and sites. But their upbeat message, though not without some ambiguities as in the use of pictures of victims, peppered over Hiroshima's problematic place in the new Japan and affirmed the transformation narrative. This would happen on a much larger scale with the efforts to transform Hiroshima into a peace memorial city and supply the city with funds for reconstruction.

III. Selling Hiroshima II: the 1949 Hiroshima Peace City Memorial Law

The 1949 Peace City Memorial Law marks the high water mark of the campaign to transform Hiroshima from a place of apocalyptic destruction into a place of hope and "bright peace." This was certainly how the drafters of the law saw it: as legislation that would allow Hiroshima to move forward and leave the past behind. In crafting the law they achieved a remarkable fit, commemorating Hiroshima without mentioning at all who caused its destruction

[138] Hiroshima Shi, "Shisei Yoran," (1949), p.189 in the Hiroshima Municipal Archives.
[139] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 24 September 1949.

or the war of aggression in which its residents had participated. The past was erased; the bomb became akin to a natural disaster or, at most, a warning, and the military capital was transformed into a "symbol of the world's hope for peace." The success of this law could be attributed to the peculiar alignment of interests between American and Japanese elites. Both sides had a need to put the past behind them and to cooperate as allies in the new cold war. As the law was drafted, the Chinese Civil War was drawing to a close and Japan's old foe was now taking the role of America's new "Yellow peril." The Hiroshima law was a way to give both sides what they wanted and to turn Hiroshima's gaze into the future. This, however, does not mean that cooperation was overt. SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, referring to MacArthur or his immediate HQ – GHQ being the more general name) did not negotiate over or directly intervened in commemoration or in the drafting of the law. If anything, it was a combination of the spirit of SCAP's message about Hiroshima as shown in MacArthur's speech and a local allied initiative that "showed the way," as well as the acts of reconstruction advisers on the ground, which pushed Hiroshima into commemorating the bomb in a way that managed to sit perfectly with American sensibilities.

Judging from SCAP records and the account of Justin Williams, a former senior official in GHQ who played a crucial role in the process leading to the approval of the law, the city of Hiroshima appealed twice to SCAP for help with reconstruction; first in 1946 and then in late 1948.[140] Williams, relying on SCAP documents, maintains that the first request was denied. Indeed, a memorandum from August 1946 indicates that General Horace Robertson's Tokyo representative told SCAP that the General would like, based on a recent discussion with MacArthur, to assign two reconstruction advisers to Hiroshima. Robertson further stated he "has

[140] Justin Williams Sr., "*GHQ and the Hiroshima Memorial Reconstruction Act,*" (1978) in Hiroshima City Archive, Williams Collection (the collection has no further sub divisions), p. 1.

cabled to a friend in Australia…[who] can bring two town planners. They would come and lay down the general principles for the rebuilding of Hiroshima and advise and further would be of help to BCOF in other matters."[141] SCAP, however, categorically denied Robertson's request, stating that MacArthur would like to see reconstruction progress. "In view, however, of the precedent that would be established with bringing to Japan the two experts on town planning which would have wide ramifications…and lead to many requests from other communities…the General feels that such an action would be unwise."[142]

There were two possible ramifications. One was the clear issue of precedent. SCAP, for obvious reasons, did not want to treat Hiroshima any differently than other cities, which was the same argument made by the Japanese government when Hiroshima applied for funds. If Hiroshima was helped, other cities would also plead for special assistance.[143] The second ramification concerned the issue of responsibility. Any special help to Hiroshima could be easily interpreted as an admission of guilt. As Susan Lindee has demonstrated, the same logic led another American institution, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC), to refrain from supplying any treatment to *hibakusha* while conducting wide-ranging medical research in Hiroshima.[144] Hiroshima had to find a way around this dilemma, and the peace as a transformation narrative supplied the city with such a way. Nonetheless, it is still not clear why American and Australian advisers (though not Robertson's friends) were serving in Hiroshima

[141] Colonel D.T. Maxwell commanding British Commonwealth Sub Section Tokyo to Colonel L.E Bunker or Col. H.B Wheeler, (18/8/46) Diet Library, GHQ/SCAP records Box no. 785-21.
[142] Colonel Lawrence E. Bunker to Commandant British Commonwealth Sub Area, Tokyo (22/8/46), Diet Library, GHQ/SCAP records Box no. 785-21.
[143] Hiroshima-shi and Sensai Fukko Jigyoshi Henshu Kenkyukai, *Sensai Fukko Jigyoshi* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima-shi Toshi Seibikyoku Toshi Seibebu Kukaku Seirika, 1995),p. 45.
[144] Susan Lindee, *Suffering Made Real: American Science and the Survivors at Hiroshima*, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 117-118.

despite the rejection of the petition by SCAP. Whatever the answer to this question may be, the fact remains that SCAP was not directly involved in Hiroshima's reconstruction.

It was the Japanese themselves (more precisely, Hiroshima city) that pushed for commemorating Hiroshima as eternal peace city. The origin of the 1949 law can be found in early efforts by Mayor Kihara to get the former extensive military land holdings transferred free of charge to the city so that their sale could provide funds for reconstruction. Tokyo's reception to this idea was initially favorable. In a meeting with Kihara, the finance minister at the time, Ishibashi Tanzan was quite supportive of the idea. GHQ, however, soon purged both Ishibashi and Kihara for their connections with the former militarists and the plan fell through.[145] The new mayor, Hamai Shinzō, who was elected in 1947 and was a committed peace activist, took up the matter again with Tokyo only to get it rejected on the same grounds that Robertson's was. Various schemes were proposed, but Tokyo was steadfast in its refusal of special aid for Hiroshima. The reasons for refusal were both financial and political. The Japanese national reconstruction office was strapped for funds and the government feared that giving funds for Hiroshima would create a precedent. Also, unlike in other countries, the office kept to purely technical design and building matters and its work lacked any symbolic elements. This was not surprising. The state, as Franziska Seraphim argued, largely refrained from dealing with commemoration and memory politics.[146] Hiroshima was "hot potato," which many in Tokyo did not quite know how to deal with. And, censorship prevented any open discussion of the city. As a result, Hiroshima was kept as a local rather than a national issue and its commemoration plans, until 1949, were rarely discussed on the national level.

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[145] Hamai, A Bomb Mayor, p. 73

[146] See Franziska Seraphim introduction to *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005* (Harvard University Press, 2008).

In 1948, however, Hiroshima was thrust into the international limelight with the "no more Hiroshima" movement that vitalized the anti-nuclear movement worldwide. This movement and the wide international attention it gave to Hiroshima, examined in the next chapter, injected the campaign for reconstruction funds with new energy and purpose. On 20 August, two weeks after the much publicized 1948 ceremony, Hiroshima city came together with the prefecture and leading Diet members from the region to form a committee that would officially lobby for a special law for reconstruction funds.[147] Hamai and his colleagues decided on four guidelines aimed at persuading the Diet: 1) emphasizing Hiroshima's world-historical significance as a "Mecca for world peace." 2) Building Hiroshima as a symbol for Japan's renunciation of war and the new constitution. 3) Hiroshima offered Japan the best opportunity to build a model modern city. 4) Hiroshima would be a tourist site that would attract foreign currency.[148] Hamai turned to a group of Hiroshima Diet members that promised to promote the law. A young parliamentarian named Teramitsu Tadashi (Chū) was entrusted with the drafting of the law.

After a December 1948 appeal failed, the city decided to go to GHQ and bypass the Diet. In an unfortunate turn of phrase, Hamai explained: "We were prepared, for political expediency, to borrow the occupier clout [to achieve our goal]."[149] Thus, the law, which was celebrated in Hiroshima as a popular victory and, to use Hamai's own words, "[was a] gift that sprang from the Japanese people's compassion and desire to compensate in some measure for the huge numbers who died from atomic bombing," was in the end an imposition on the elected Diet.[150] The Japanese government, facing economic retrenchment and the tough impositions of the Dodge line, was much less enthusiastic about the law. The bill faced opposition from the Finance

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[147] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 20 August 1948
[148] Hiroshima-shi (Japan) and Sensai Fukko Jigyoshi Henshu Kenkyukai., *Sensai fukko jigyoshi*. p. 47.
[149] Hamai, *A-bomb mayor*, p. 124.
[150] Ibid, p.134.

ministry and some at the ruling Liberal party (*Jyutō*) who were concerned about its financial implications, as well as Nagasaki MP's who felt that the law left them out. Even in the Hiroshima assembly there was some opposition to the law as it had no provisions for survivors. It got so bad that assembly chairman Nitoguri threatened to resign. Thanks to Williams however, GHQ approval trumped all of those worries and assured cooperation from all sides. Hiroshima's astute political maneuvering had finally succeseded.[151]

The Americans, again, did not initiate this move. According to all involved, including Justin Williams himself, when Hamai and Nitoguri walked into his home, they presented him with an already complete draft (in both English and Japanese).[152] Hiroshima city officials put enormous effort into crafting this law. In doing so they were, again, highly sensitive to the attitudes of the Americans. Teramitsu struggled with the right wording in order to get the Americans' approval. As Jacqueline Kestenbaum has noted, two competing meanings of Hiroshima's bombing emerged from the various drafts of the law.[153] Besides issues of translation (Teramitsu struggled – as the handwritten notes on the draft indicate –with the word *kinen*- - memorialization or commemoration, which does not carry the same meaning as in English),

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[151] Ishimaru Norieki, "'Hiroshima heiwa kinen toshi kensetsu hō no settei kattei to sono tokushitsu," *Kiyō* (Hiroshima shi kōbunshokan no zasshi), No. 11 (1988), p.35. Beside Williams personal involvement, There is some indication that Hiroshima struck some sort of deal with the Americans regarding the construction of the headquarters of the ABCC on a site of a shrine which included an Imperial Army War Cemetery. The proposal to build the ABCC HQ on the proposed site was initially resisted by the city. On January 4th 1949, the head of the Hiroshima assembly chairman Nitoguri met with Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams, who was the head of GHQ Public Health Section. He assured Sams that there is no criticism of the U.S. in the proposed peace law. He then went on to discuss ABCC and Hiroshima relations. After the law passed, in September, Hiroshima City Council unanimously approved the ABCC request to move the graves of the war dead and agree to cooperate with the ABCC. It seems reasonable to assume that the two events were related. Ishimaru Norieki. The only Japanese historian to write on the topic concluded that Williams consent was the result of the meeting. Sams himself did not mention the meeting in his memoirs. See Crawford F. Sams and Zabelle Zakarian, *Medic: The Mission of an American Military Doctor in Occupied Japan and Wartorn Korea* (M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 130-152; Ishimaru, "'Hiroshima heiwa kinen toshi kensetsu hō," p. 21. For Nitoguri and ABCC meeting see Internal memo drafted by Lt. Col Carl Tessmer (February 15 1949) Slide No. 775024 GHQ/SCAP Records, the National Diet Library. GHQ/SCAP records Box no. 9354

[152] Justin Williams Sr., "GHQ and the Hiroshima Memorial Reconstruction Act," p. 3; Hamai, A-bomb mayor, p. 128; Hiroshima-shi (Japan) and Sensai Fukko Jigyoshi Henshu Kenkyukai, *Sensai fukko jigyoshi*. p. 46.

[153] Jacqueline Kestenbaum, "Modernism and tradition in Japanese architectural ideology, 1931-1955," (Columbia University Dissertation, 1996), p. 282.

Teramitsu also grappled with the question of whether to present Hiroshima as a Japanese or an international peace city.[154] While the first draft of the law presented Hiroshima as a symbol of "the sincere desire of the Japanese nation for everlasting peace," the final draft read, "to construct the city of Hiroshima as the Eternal Peace Commemorating City, the symbol of human ideal for eternal peace, as well as the symbol for renunciation of war, is to answer the world's hope for the reconstruction of HIROSHIMA..." (Upper case in original).[155] To ensure that they did not deviate from the script, later authors, who wrote the more detailed proposals for implementation of the law, used American documents. Tucked within the pages of one of the later proposals for the law was a mimeographed copy of Truman's speech of 6 August 1945, which called Hiroshima "an important military base".[156]

After the law was presented to GHQ, Justin Williams presented it to Major General Courtney Whitney, showing a surprisingly pragmatic attitude. "The proposed bill," Williams wrote, "calls for no allocation of material or funds... the only question is whether or not it is fitting and proper for Hiroshima to be permitted… [To] take a step in the name of world peace with the design of attracting national and international support and attention. High-level policy decision would seem to be all that is needed."[157] SCAP cleared the bill right away. GHQ approval cleared the way for Diet approval and had the added value of persuading Nagasaki representatives who were initially against singling out Hiroshima as a peace city to support the law.[158] The law passed the Diet on 11 May 1949 and went into effect, after an approval by

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[154] Ibid. The drafts for Teramitsu's proposals are at Hiroshima Municipal Archive, Teramitsu Collection, C1993-917 to C1993-920.
[155] Kestenbaum, p. 283.
[156] Hiroshima Shi, "*Hiroshima Heiwa toshi kensetu kōsō an,*" (1949), Hiroshima Municipal Archive, Fujimoto Collection, C1993- 797.
[157] Justin William Sr., "Memo for General Whitney," (3 May 1949), in Diet Library, GHQ/SCAP records, Justin Williams collection: reel no.10/ 104-20-21.
[158] Hiroshima-shi (Japan) and Sensai Fukko Jigyoshi Henshu Kenkyukai., *Sensai fukko jigyoshi*., p. 49.

Hiroshima residents in a special referendum, on 6 August 1949. With the passing of the law, Hiroshima finally got the funds it needed to rebuild itself as a modern city.

The law and its wording served as a guideline for future official commemoration. Even after the occupation was over, Hiroshima stuck with the wording and spirit of the law. The law was an expression of and a further impetus to the hegemonic role of the peace narrative. It was very much responsible for what Carol Gluck later called the telling of "history in the passive voice" in Hiroshima, with Japan playing the role of the victim and the context of both its own war crimes on the continent and the horrors inflicted on it by the Americans conveniently ignored.[159] Indeed, as funds were made available and larger commemoration projects were becoming possible, this whole narrative was becoming part of a shape of the city itself, as architects and city planners sought to remake Hiroshima as a city of peace.

IV. Tange Kenzō and the making of the Hiroshima Peace memorial Park

The 1949 law gave Hiroshima the funds to carry out what was already a very ambitious city plan. The law's emphasis on building a "model modern city," had its roots in debates about the city's character that began right after the war. Taken together, these debates and the eventual design of the city plan and its centerpiece, the Peace Memorial Park, demonstrate a very peculiar view of history and commemoration. Consistent with the way Hiroshima represented itself elsewhere, the city design equated the peace city with a modern city and designed a forward-looking memorial recounting to visitors a story of resurrection and promise; leading one from the destroyed A-bomb dome into the modern building of the museum, which Tange Kenzō, the architect responsible for this design, called a "factory for peace." Tange's plan had ordered the

[159] Carol Gluck, "The Idea of Showa," *Daedalus* 119, no. 3 (1 July 1990): pp. 12-13.

physical space of the Peace Park and the city and had huge implications for future commemoration.

Tange and other participants in the reconstruction debates were very aware of the importance of their decisions. Hiroshima's unique status was on the minds of many of the participations in the debate from the very beginning. In 1946, when Hiroshima's governor convened a special conference for reconstruction, a Vice Mayor of Kure City (a port city next to Hiroshima) remarked: "I wish that you keep the ruined area swept by flames as the commemorating graveyard for the maintenance of eternal world peace. I wonder if it is appropriate to construct a town on the land where so many people were killed. New Hiroshima will not necessarily come back to the original Hiroshima."[160] The Vice Mayor was not alone in this sentiment. As early as 5 September 1945, a *Chūgoku Shinbun* editorial condemned those "who are not ashamed to proclaim such an irresponsible opinion that the ruined city of Hiroshima is a war memorial and ought to be preserved eternally as a complete ruin. Who are you trying to impress?" the editorial asked, "the cameras of the foreign press?"[161]

These proposals and others, such as industrialist Kuwabara Ichio's, which proposed to leave the area around ground zero in ruins as a "sacred ground," were rejected.[162] As with the general transition from mourning to future-oriented peace discourse, Hiroshima's reconstruction plans were more about reinventing Hiroshima as a modern city than about commemoration and loss. Ishikawa Hideaki, one of Japan's leading architects, took this sentiment to extremes. Invited by Hiroshima to advise its reconstruction committee, he told its members: "Hiroshima has a resource which cannot be easily obtained even in hundreds of years and which must be

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[160] Hiroshima Shi, *Rekishi hen,* p. 45.
[161] Quoted in Ibid, p.146.
[162] Carola Hein, "Visionary Plans and Planners Japanese Traditions and Western Influences," in Paul Waley, *Japanese Capitals in Historical Perspective: Place, Power and Memory in Kyoto, Edo and Tokyo* (Routledge, 2003), p. 329.

utilized for the future, and it is vast open land."[163] Mayor Hamai and others shared this vision: "the disappearance of the old city gave us a chance of creating a fine new one if we do not let it slip through our fingers."[164] To be fair to Hamai, at times he also had reservations about the extreme measures that reconstruction required, such as the forced removal of residents on Nakajima. But, Hamai argued, "Hiroshima's pre-war visage had to be transformed. Rather than vainly clinging to the old downtown structure...we should plan for redevelopment."[165]

The opportunities afforded by the "disappearance of the old city," were not ignored. In an early form of what Naomi Klein calls "disaster capitalism," the destruction of the bomb served as stimulus for innovation and growth.[166] The disaster created an opportunity for the kind of redevelopment project and redistribution of real estate and wealth that favored big business and big planning. Hiroshima's pre-bomb downtown, dominated by small businesses, temples and residencies, was transformed in the city plan into a landscape of large department stores, wide avenues –some as wide as a hundred meters– and strict zoning that transformed Hiroshima into, what the planners thought, was a proper modern city. This was done against the backdrop of another kind of "disaster capitalism," that of small time traders and criminal Yakuza gangs who were competing over control of the shantytowns and extensive black markets that the bomb and post-war chaos created. Competition turned to real battle and a full-scale gang war in 1948-1949.[167] Some commentators even started commenting sarcastically that instead of "peace city,"

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[163] Ibid, p. 318.
[164] Hamai, *A-bomb mayor,* p. 59.
[165] Ibid, p. 65.
[166] Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (Knopf Canada, 2008).
[167] There was another war between the Morie Gumi (faction) and Oka gumi in 1952-53. For details see Ishimaru Norieki, "Hiroshima eki mae yami ichi no henkō to sono tokushu," *Kiyō* (Hiroshima shi kōbunshokan no zasshi), No. 18 (1996), p. 24.

the city should be called "violent gang city," (*boryoku dan toshi* – or Yakuza city).[168] Much of the planning for arcades and shopping malls was a way to literally impose order on what became an out-of-control black market.[169]

What both Ishikawa and the Yakuza saw as "resource vast open land," of course, meant that most of the land at city center was now completely destroyed and its residents mostly dead. This grim fact imbued much of the debates over Hiroshima with an unreal, even grotesque, feeling, as reflected in the protocols of Hiroshima's reconstruction committee. The committee, which included bureaucrats and professionals as well as members of the public, media and business circles, first convened in February 1946.[170] The mood in the committee seemed to swing violently between promise and despair. Along with proposals to leave the city as it was, there was talk (such as in a prize-winning essay on reconstruction) of "utopia Hiroshima," where bullet trains and telegraphic television radiophones would connect people instantly.[171]

The committee invited leading experts on town planning as well as the general public to submit their plans for reconstruction. After a number of largely technical deliberations, it invited Lt. Montgomery. Members of the committee told the Lieutenant, following the by now well-established narrative of transformation, "Hiroshima used to boast of itself as a military city but now it is destroyed…we want people from abroad to come to Hiroshima and see the change…Now, as militarism is stamped out, Hiroshima has a chance to move towards peace."[172] Montgomery replied by encouraging the committee members and assuring them of his intentions to turn to GHQ for help. Montgomery was slightly condescending, as he promised the committee

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[168] Hiroshima-ken (Japan), *Genbaku Sanjūnen*. p.150.
[169] For details of the plan to turn the space in front of the station into a department store, see Ishimaru, "Hiroshima eki mae," pp. 22-23.
[170] Nagashima Satoshi, Director of the City's Department for Reconstruction, headed the committee.
[171] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 1 August and 2 August 1946.
[172] Hiroshima-shi (Japan), *Hiroshima Shinshi. Shiryohen* (Hiroshima-shi: Hiroshima-shi, 1981), p. 49.

"superior expertise," in dealing with town planning –U.S. technological superiority being a given. Needless to say, these declarations, in retrospect, seem hollow. In what is now read as a bitter historical irony, when asked about flooding, Montgomery replied, "we had a similar flooding problem and we solved it in New Orleans."[173] The committee's next guest, the aforementioned Ishikawa Hideaki, was as upbeat as Montgomery. Ishikawa's expertise and the topic of his talk were shopping arcades (*shoten gai*) and their potential for commercial development. Talking about arcades in almost Benjaminian terms, Ishikawa wanted arcades to lead to department stores and tourist attractions. Ishikawa was enthusiastic about Hiroshima's potential for tourism, "we can make Hiroshima look like Venice…Japan's first water city."[174] Nowhere did Ishikawa talk of the death that made the construction of these grand arcades and tourist attractions possible.

Similarly, the representative of the Hondori (Hiroshima's main shopping street) merchant association wanted a zoo constructed on Nakajima Island rather than a memorial.[175] Interestingly, however, a majority of the plans adhered to ideas about zoning, separation of industry and residence, grid road networks, etc., that were then espoused by modernist town planning. Most do not concentrate on commemoration. Commemoration was almost always mentioned, usually in the form of a museum or a park on Nakajima Island. But it was always in terms of the transformation narrative.[176] Watanabe Shigeru's influential plan, submitted at the second reconstruction committee meeting, was typical. Watanabe spoke of creating a modern

[173] Ibid, p. 52.
[174] Ibid, p.54.
[175] Ibid, p. 56.
[176] Ishimaru norieki, hiroshima no fukko katei, in Hiroshima shi (ed.) *hiroshima shinsh: toshi bungaku hen* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima-shi, 1984), p. 15.

city of tourism and commerce, and, at its center, "monuments for world peace." We must, he concluded, "build Hiroshima on the basis of friendship with America."[177]

The proposal that was eventually adopted was by a young Tokyo architect named Tange Kenzō, who already gained some experience in large scale planning for the government during the war. It was unusual for such a young architect to be granted such a large project. This also, as Carola Hein noted, was due to Japan's "moment of experimentation," and, more conventionally, to the disorganization of the town planning procedures which were formerly based in the now defunct home ministry.[178] Tange created a city of wide avenues, riverside parks and with clear a separation between commerce, industry and residential areas that was not common in Japanese cities. At the center of the city, following the sentiments of the reconstruction committee and many of the plans submitted, Tange created a memorial park on Nakajima Island. Tange and his team also won a separate competition to design this memorial park, thus making him one of the most influential people in the remaking of Hiroshima as a peace city.[179]

Tange's design was in line with Hiroshima city's campaign to reconstruct the atomic bombed city as a "peace memorial city." Tange arranged the memorial on an axis perpendicular to the one hundred meter roads he designed for the city. The axis connects in one line the Atomic Bomb Dome, an arch (later to be the cenotaph, which was supposed to be designed by Isamu Noguchi), a square for 20,000 people (later to grow to a larger one for 50,000) and the memorial hall. The square is enclosed by three monumental modernist buildings, built in bare concrete with standing pillars. A long pool with roads and trees on both sides leads from the bridges to the

[177] Ibid, p. 17.
[178] Hein, "Visionary plans," p. 321.
[179] The Hiroshima memorial park competition (launched on 20 May 1949) used very similar language to the Diet legislation then underway. The competition brief called the bombing: "a siren call for the establishment of world peace…to respond to this world trust we should create a commemorative peace park and hall." See "Hiroshima shi heiwa kinen kōen oyobi kinennkan sekkei kenshō boshū yōkō," *Kenchiku zasshi,* (May 1949), p. 32.

island and on to the arch. The Atomic Bomb Dome preserved across the river represents the suffering of the war, while the gardens represents the healing of the land. While the three main buildings (the museum, library and assembly halls) were built in a bold monumental style, the pillars evoke traditional Japanese rice granaries. Another reference to traditional Japanese forms is the *haniwa* shaped arch, which is based on Heian architectural style. Visitors enter the Park from the Dome and are led into the three modern buildings, thus going through a ceremonial axis that represents Hiroshima's resurrection as a modern city.

Both the forward-looking design and law campaigns hid a much less benign past. Tange achieved fame as an architect by winning a 1942 competition to design a memorial commemorating the "holy mission of Japan" on the continent (which included a cenotaph very similar to the one in Hiroshima). As Inoue Shōichi pointed out, the Peace Museum's design displays many parallels to Tange's early design, which was once hailed as "the vision best representing the sublime objective of establishing the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity sphere."[180] Following Inoue, Lisa Yoneyama condemned his design as a mere replica of his earlier wartime designs.[181] As early as 1958, Kawazoe Noboru called Tange a war criminal.[182] What is missing from these condemnations is the fact that Tange himself left an opening for a more problematic retelling of Japan's past in his design by making the A-bomb Dome and its preservation a central piece of his design; one of the main reasons for the preservation campaign's success.[183] This is not to say that there are no troubling, even dangerous continuities

[180] Quoted in Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time Space and the Dialectics of Memory.* (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1999), p. 3.
[181] Ibid, p. 23; Inoue Shōichi. *Ato, kicchu, japanesuku: daitōa no posuto modan*, (Tokyo: Seidosha, 1987): p. 267.
[182] Kestenbaum , p. 295.
[183] The story of resurrection could be read in two ways: leading from the modernist buildings backwards into the ruin [and the past], or the other way around; a hidden irony in Tange's design. Furthermore, in an unintentional ironic history, the destroyed Atomic Bomb Dome, now an object of veneration, used to house displays of colonial

between Tange's past fascist monuments and his efforts of transforming monumentality into "architecture for the people." Tange's design, like much of Hiroshima's greater project, relied on unreflective, even triumphant modernism, which, Tange's efforts notwithstanding, made incorporating the past difficult.

What Tange and Japanese modernist architects tried to do was to rewrite Japan's modern history as basically a positive project, within which Japanese fascism was but an aberration. This was in line with the way many other intellectuals in Japan and Germany represented the war.[184] This message was couched in terms of transformation where the defeat was presented as a new beginning. In the essay accompanying his design, Tange argued that Nakajima Island was not just a memorial but also the "center of people's lives."[185] In his essay, Tange declared his belief that a spiritual renewal of Hiroshima was as urgent a task as physical reconstruction. This spiritual renewal would come through "the making of Hiroshima into a factory for peace" (*heiwa wo tsukuri dasu no tame kogyo de aritai).*[186] The choice of the imagery of a "factory" was significant, as the factory was the ideal metaphor for internationalism and modernity. While other modernists like Le Corbusier used the language of a "machine for living," Tange presented his design as a machine for peace.

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goods - introducing a reminder of Hiroshima's colonial past. The ambiguity represented by the scorched ruin of the dome is magnified by the design of the three main buildings. Although in terms of scale the buildings are arguably monumental, they lack the grand entrance that usually (in Nazi or Soviet architecture) a ceremonial axis would lead into. One enters the buildings through the side or through a small staircase underneath the buildings. In addition, the pilotis the buildings stand on give them a sort of fragile air. The three main buildings are certainly monumental but they contain some surprising ambiguities. I think some of this should be in the chapter rather than a footnote, especially the first point.

[184] As Jeffrey Herf has demonstrated, in both Germanies, most of the political establishment, for different ideological reasons, preferred to have the Nazi past presented as an aberration in what was basically the positive development of German *Kultur* (whether it was presented in terms of German Christian values or progressive social –democracy). The churches in particular were adamant in portraying the Nazis as a barbaric anti-Christian, even anti-German phenomenon, which was out of step with German history. See Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Harvard University Press, 1997). Dagmar Herzog, *Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-century Germany* (Princeton University Press, 2005), especially chapters 2 and 3.

[185] Tange Kenzō, "Hiroshima heiwakinentōshi ni kankei shite," in *Kenchiku zasshi,* (October, 1949), p. 40.

[186] Ibid, p. 31.

Tange's design was implemented in stages. Financial problems and the resistance of many residents of Nakajima who refused to evacuate forced the city to endlessly delay the project. Others, especially survivor organizations, wondered why the city had the resources to build such a huge building –money that could be better spent on housing and treatment for *hibakusha*.[187] The city, actually, did not have enough funds to complete the memorial.[188] When the memorial museum, the main element of Tange's design, opened in 1955, it lacked the third building. Against Tange's wishes but with money from Hiroshima business circles and the city's support, the third building was finally built as a hotel only in 1957.[189] In the newly built memorial museum, Nagaoka Shogō's ramshackle collection found a majestic new home. His artifacts formed the basis of the collection and Nagaoka himself became the director of the museum, thus bringing together two very different stories of Hiroshima's reconstruction. Like the dome, the artifacts stood in sharp contrast to the gleaming concrete buildings of the museum. This final act, as with the whole story of the rebuilding of Hiroshima and the making of the Peace Memorial Park and Museum, manifested the ambiguities and contradictions inherent in Hiroshima's modern project. The architects' and city authorities' plans to impose order and set the path for "utopia Hiroshima," could not leave the past entirely behind. Nevertheless, Tange's design and the gradual completion of the city plan – including the forced evacuation of hundreds of dwellings –reordered the city and literally cast in stone –or, rather, concrete – Hiroshima's vision of itself as a reborn modern city. The city was, indeed, transformed.

Conclusion: Yad Vashem, Hiroshima and the forties' moment

[187] Chūgoku Shinbun sha, *Honō no hi kara ni jū nen(1966 nen),* (Hiroshima: Miraisha, 1966), pp. 260-262.
[188] This was due to ballooning costs and the fact that the financial bureaucracy in Tokyo was, to say the least, not thrilled with the project.
[189] Hamai, *A-bomb Mayor*, p. 78. The hotel proposal faced much criticism. See, for instance, *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 26 October 1948, and 17 November 1956. There was a campaign in the early seventies that resulted in the tearing down of the hotel. See *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 1 February and 23 March 1972.

When, in 1954, Hiroshima's Peace Memorial Park and Museum were officially opened, Hiroshima was a transformed place. Much of the physical evidence of destruction was out of sight; the city regained its prewar population and economic activity was flourishing. Furthermore, Hiroshima was now the center of a nationwide, even international, peace movement. As Japan gained independence, restrictions on peace activity were lifted. The result was an outpouring of activity and publications in connection with the bomb. Significantly, most of this discourse, with a few exceptions to be examined in the following chapters, continued to follow the narratives established under the occupation. The enduring influence of Hiroshima's peace narrative attests to the importance of the forties moment and humanity's "first encounters" with the bomb.

This was true in the American case as well. As Paul Boyer has demonstrated, most of the narratives about the bomb in American discourse were already present in the first few months after the bombing.[190] As early as 7 August 1945, some warned of the weapon's apocalyptic implications. On that evening, a New York daily, the *PM Times*, had a feature entitled, "here's what could happen to New York in an Atomic bombing."[191] Post-Hiroshima racist vindictiveness, pointed to by many commentaries, was ugly but surprisingly short-lived and soon overshadowed by anxiety. Many were certain that if humanity did not learn to live together, it would soon perish. This made the question of explaining humanity's entrance into the nuclear age an urgent question not only in Hiroshima, but also in the U.S. and beyond. The shock of the bomb ushered in the scientists' movement, World Federalists and World Government movement. The premise behind most of these movements was that the only way to tackle the situation was

[190] Boyer, pp. 8-10.

[191] The citation is from an exhibit called *Nuke York*, which took place at Cornell University in September 2011. I am grateful to Robert Jacobs for this citation.

by a measured rational debate. Norman Cousins' influential, "*Modern Man is Obsolete*," or the scientists' movement's *"One World or None,"* relentlessly pushed this point.[192] What these publications implied was that the bomb was not the product of rational planning but some sort of barbarism; a slip into an earlier time. The problem was not the bomb, but the man who controlled it who was not advanced enough to handle its consequences. The solution, like in Japan, was to be even more modern and rational. Americans should not be exempt from this soul searching. This is why people like MacDonald and others made connections to the Beast of Majdanek. A.J. Muste and Edward Lang, for instance, paralleled the Manhattan Project scientists with Nazi functionaries. Miste called it "large scale organized evil." [193] This was not unique to the U.S. The bomb and the Holocaust were part of a worldwide shock to the very idea of progress. Commemoration of tragedies, whether it was by the left or the right, was part of the effort to bridge this gap.

Although, for obvious reasons, no one at the time made these connections within the stricken communities themselves (most were naturally preoccupied with their own pain), there were many parallels in reactions to both tragedies. In July 1954, less than a month before the Memorial Museum opened, on the other side of Asia, a very similar institution to the Hiroshima Memorial Museum was inaugurated. *Rashut ha-zikaron la-Shoah vela-gevurah Yad va-shem* or in its English name, Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority (hence, Yad Vashem) was, similarly to the Peace Museum, the product of almost a decade of debates over commemoration. Like in Hiroshima, these debates involved a lot of high-flying rhetoric and much political wrangling.

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[192] See: Norman Cousins, *Modern Man Is Obsolete* (The Viking press, 1945); Dexter Masters and Katharine Way, *One World Or None: A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb* (New Press, 2007).
[193] Boyer, p. 232.

The instigator of the Yad Vashem idea was Mordechai Shenhabi, a small-time functionary and a left wing kibbutz member. The first proposal by Shenhabi came already in September 1942. As Tom Segev noted, this proposal to commemorate the victims of what was then called the *hurban* (the destruction) – most of whom were still alive at the time of the proposal, was an early attempt to incorporate (what would become) the Holocaust into the Zionist past.[194] Just like with Hiroshima, however, initial grand proposals for commemoration which were overtly focused on mourning were rejected. Shenhabi submitted his 1942 plan to the Jewish National Fund (JNF). The JNF board rejected it on the grounds that the money would be better spent on building Jewish settlements. "Better to have a living monument," they told Shenhabi, "than monuments of stone."[195] Others claimed Shenhabi's proposals were inspired more by monumental Soviet commemoration than by Jewish tradition.[196] Like Nagaoka Shogō, however, Shenhabi was a one-man commemoration organization. He spent the next couple of years bombarding various institutions of the *Yishuv* (the pre-state name of the Jewish community in Palestine) with his plans. A major spur for Shenhabi and others who worked with him, like Ben-Zion Yisraeli, the head of the Jewish veterans' organization, was their wish to make amends with the dead. "What we will do [in creating Yad vashem]," said Yisraeli, "is to redeem the souls of these saints from the chaos [of the *hurban*]." Similarly, Shenhabi said he was driven by the question of "how to right [the wrong of] a man who has no tombstone."[197]

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[194] Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: the Israelis and the Holocaust,* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), p. 428.
[195] Ibid, p. 429.
[196] Boaz Cohen, "How to Remember." In Peter Hayes and John K Roth, *The Oxford Handbook of Holocaust Studies* (Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 581.
[197] Mooli Brug, "Yad la'hayalim ve'shem lachalalim: nisyonot ha'vaad ha'leumi lahakim et yad vashem: 1946-1949," in *Katedra*, No. 199 (September, 2005), p. 118.

Not much was done about Shenhabi and other commemoration schemes, however, until 1945.[198] In terms of concrete action the project was stalled. That changed in August of that year, when the World Zionist General Council (ZGC) decided to entrust the Jewish National Council (JNC) with the responsibility of commemorating the *hurban*. The JNC chose Shenhabi's plan.[199] This initiated a year or so of intense debates over Holocaust commemoration. As Mooli Brog has argued, what brought about this change was a conscious decision by the political elites of the *Yishuv* to bring to the fore issues of national identity. *Yishuv* elites chose to represent the *hurban* as a "hegemonic memory story and a national myth that would represent the complex reality [of the genocide] as part of a meta-historical process, which would make the [Jewish] public feel… a part of a unique communal identity and a shared future."[200]

This did not mean that elites were successful in that effort or, for that matter, that they were unified on exactly how it would be done. Just like in Hiroshima, various camps clashed over meaning and interpretation. The very reason for the decision to move forward with commemoration was the multiple interpretations and fierce, often very emotional, debates between various factions within Zionist and Jewish circles. What stood at the center of these debates was the question of the relative weight that commemoration of the genocide's "martyrs" (*shoa*) would have vis-à-vis the heroism of the resisters (*gvurah*). The dominant sentiment in the *Yishuv* was to emphasize active Jewish resistance over the "passive" death of those who went "like sheep to the slaughter." Many, however, were uncomfortable with this idea. Indeed, initially, commemoration was to concentrate on the *Shoa* alone. But in order for major *Yishuv*

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[198] A major exception was the debate between secular and religious authorities regarding which day would be set as Remembrance Day: the traditional day of mourning for the destruction of the first temple or the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, which appealed more to *Yishuv* secular self-image. See Ibid, 582.

[199] The JNC, which was responsible for *Yishuv* communal affairs vis-à-vis the British. In theory, it was the top decision-making body in the *Yishuv*. In practice, however, it competed with the JNF, the ZGC, the Jewish Agency and other bodies which had independent sources of funds.

[200] Brog, "Yad la'hayalim," p. 91.

players like veteran groups and the JNC, who favoured the activist interpretation, resistance was also emphasized.[201]

The Yad Vashem scheme, however, did not materialize in the early forties. The war with the Arabs, financial considerations and a general shift in focus in *Yishuv* priorities made implementation impossible. The plan was revived in 1952 with the arrival of German reparation money, some of which was earmarked for commemoration. Survivor MPs, chief among them Zorach Warhaftig, who became the institution's first director– were instrumental in this development.[202] The result of this was the establishment of Yad Vashem by force of a Knesset law in 1953. Significantly, the Claims Conference and diaspora organizations underwrote much of the financing for the project, which gave them much influence over the character of Yad Vashem. As Roni Stauber has demonstrated, the resistance element was toned down considerably because of diaspora resistance. And as they were holding the checkbook, Israelis had to swallow their pride and comply.[203] Religious elements were also stronger than initially proposed. Architect Munio Weinrub's design was very much modeled on the Temple Mount and aimed at creating a feeling of "sacred ground."[204] All of this made the transformation narrative much weaker than Shenhabi and others initially planned. These contradictions and ambiguities notwithstanding, Yad vashem was still very much built to tell a story of a forward-looking

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[201] For more on these debates see Brog, Yad la'hayalim," pp. 97-100 and Dalia Ofer, "Victims, Fighters, Survivors: Quietism and Activism in Israeli Historical Consciousness," *Common Knowledge* 16, no. 3 (2010), pp. 494-495. Significantly, when the organizing committee turned to architect Munio Weinraub for a design they asked for two distinct halls: one for Holocaust martyrs and another for Jewish soldiers and resisters. Like Tange, Weinrub based his design on foreign commemoration. Incidentally, here as well there was a fascist connection as, according to Brog, Weinrub based part of his design on the Vale De los Caidos built by Franco to commemorate Spain's fascist war dead. Another major feature of Yad Vashem was the various religious symbols employed.

[202] Cohen, p. 583.

[203] Roni Stauber, *The Holocaust in Israeli Public Debate in the 1950s: Ideology and Memory* (Vallentine Mitchell, 2007). p. 26.

[204] Mooli Brog, "Nof Zikaron ve'zehut leumit: hanzakhat ha'shoa be'yisrael, 1943-1993," unpublished PhD dissertation, Hebrew University (2007), p. 115. The site chosen, Mt. Herzl, was part of a whole sacred compound that also included separate monuments for the war dead and important Zionist personalities (first and foremost Theodore Herzl himself).

transformation, which led from the *shoa* to the creation of the state; from *shoa* (Holocaust) to *tkuma* (revival). Like Tange, Weinrub structured the path of the pilgrim (*ole laregel*) from the underground halls of commemoration and up into "the light of the hall of heroism."[205] The path was clear. The Holocaust was to be incorporated into a narrative of national progress and resurrection. Thus, although the lessons drawn and circumstances were very different, elites in both Japan and Israel chose to explain their tragedies through a narrative of transformation. Narratives in both places were very much the product of elite efforts to contain and explain the tragedies of the bomb and the Holocaust. Both had a very strong religious overtone in discourse and architecture and, finally, in both Israel and Hiroshima, survivors were part of this process.

Eventually, however, grand plans and reality clashed in both Hiroshima and Israel. Weinrub's design was not implemented for quite some time. Political infighting and financial difficulties left much of the mountain empty with the first major monument, *Ohel Yizkhor* (tent of remembrance) going up only in 1961. In Hiroshima itself as well, events made implementation of plans for unified commemoration hard. Furthermore, Hiroshima's potential for subversion and ambivalence kept resurfacing. In 1950, with the Korean War and the threat of World War III, the peace narrative received a whole new meaning. That year, Hiroshima's newly founded Public Safety Committee banned the ceremony on GHQ orders.[206] These tensions flared again after the Lucky Dragon Five Incident in 1954, when Japanese fishermen became irradiated as a result of American nuclear tests. In Hiroshima as in Israel and elsewhere, explaining the bomb (and the greater tragedy of the war) was very much a work in progress. Such setbacks

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[205] Ibid.

[206] "This day [6 August]," went the committee's declaration, "should be a day for silent prayer and not as the peace movement tries to make it as a cover for anti-occupation activities." The committee further called on residents, "not to participate in these anti-Japanese criminal activities." See Hiroshima Shi, "Shimin no mina sama he," Hiroshima Memorial Museum Archive, Kawamoto Collection, Folder 37. See also Hiroshima-ken (Japan), *Genbaku Sanjūnen,* p. 198.

prompted renewed efforts on the side of elites and new campaigns. These campaigns, examined in the following chapters, built on the early efforts of the forties moment. The ideas that came out of that moment - that the bomb represented not only a morbid threat to our existence but also an opportunity, that it could be explained as a mistake or a slip into barbarity and that the solution for dealing with this product of science was to be even more modern and scientific - remained the mainstay of discourse. This was a global development but it had specific local and personal implications for the people affected by these tragedies on the ground. It is to them that we must now turn.

Chapter 2: Survivors: Between Shame and Pride, 1945-1960

One of the main tropes prevalent in early reporting on Hiroshima identified the city as a phoenix. Foreign and domestic headlines read: "The city of peace rising from the ashes"; "Phoenix Hiroshima fourteen years after," and "Slowly but surely Hiroshima is rebuilding from the shattered ruins left by the atomic bombing ten years ago." In both Japanese and American narratives, the destruction brought about a better city and ushered in a bright modern future. As a 1960s Associated Press article put it, "from a sleepy city with winding streets, Hiroshima has become a well laid metropolis."[207] As David Serlin points out, talking about modern architecture and the future-oriented city was also a way of not talking about the survivors.[208] While the city was rebuilding, well into the sixties, many *hibakusha* still lived in the A-bomb slum (*genbaku*

[207] The *Chūgoku Shinbun*, for the fourteenth anniversary, for instance, had a series of articles titled, Phoenix: [Hiroshima] after fourteen years (*fushichō ju yon nengo*). The title is taken from the 23 July 1959 edition. For the rest of the headlines, see David Serlin, *Replaceable You: Engineering the Body in Postwar America*, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 67.
[208] Ibid.

slum) opposite the Peace Park.[209] This glaring contrast between the "peace" park and the "A-bomb" slum symbolized the contradictions inherent in Hiroshima's modernization project. While the city looked into the future, the *hibakusha*, in whose name peace was proclaimed, were left behind with the bomb that had destroyed their bodies, killed their families and taken their livelihoods.[210]

However, many *hibakusha* also embraced the city's peace ideology. The support of the *hibakusha* and the use of their testimonies in the service of peace galvanized the movement; it endowed the peace message with power and infused it with emotions that are still evident today. The main question this chapter tackles is "why?" Why did the *hibakusha* embrace the peace discourse and what were the effects of this choice on the *hibakusha* themselves and on commemorative culture? Economic, ideological and political considerations might explain why a certain discourse emerged, but they do not explain why people came to identify with it.

The answer to this question lies in the power of the transformation narrative. Just as with the city of Hiroshima itself, within the peace movement, survivors found the emotional means and language with which they could rebuild their lives and find meaning and pride. From being ashamed, guilty, confused and angry, survivors were transformed into proud symbols of an emerging movement. *Hibakusha*'s choices had a profound impact on Hiroshima's history and beyond. The main tool for survivors' emotional mobilization (their own and that of others) was the emerging practice of bearing witness. Survivors' testimony and their self-presentation as

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[209] For the place of the *genbaku* slum in the Hiroshima memoryscape through the prism of literature see: Tomoko Ichitani, "Town of Evening Calm, Country of Cherry Blossoms: The Renarrativation of Hiroshima Memories," *Journal of Narrative Theory,* Volume 40, Number 3, (Fall 2010), pp. 364-390.

[210] As Robert J. Lifton pointed out in his monumental study of the *hibakusha*, the park was not the "A-bomb" but rather the "peace" park. This reflected, for Lifton, a desire to equate the bomb with peace. See Robert Jay Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 271.

victims in the service of peace became important tools in the global rise of the anti-nuclear movement.

The choices *hibakusha* made, however, were shaped by the culture around them. Although survivors' reactions were varied, survivor- activists learned a certain narrative, a certain emotional style, which emphasized dignity and restraint and discouraged anger. This was the result of the nexus of developments in survivors' circles and the peace movement, both within Japan and beyond it, and it had important implications for Hiroshima's commemorative culture and global war memory. Indeed, one could see a similar process and mobilization of survivors' testimony within Holocaust discourse as well. Together those two histories produced, globally, a new cultural trope: that of the survivor-witness. Although at this early stage they developed separately, both movements introduced the idea that an experience of mass death made the survivor into what Avishai Margalit has called "a moral witness."[211] This chapter examines the beginning of this process and how it was shaped by the survivors' own emotional and other choices.

I. Transitions: Emotional regimes and reactions

It is impossible to understand the emotional state of people in Hiroshima immediately after the dropping of the bomb. One of the main problems facing scholars who deal with the experience is our lack of ability to comprehend, to understand, or even imagine what it was like on the ground in these fateful days after 6 August. Even the survivors' contemporaries could not comprehend the nature of the experience. Indeed, survivors of the bomb, in the same manner of some concentration camp survivors, complained about feeling isolated and that no one believed

[211] Avishai Margalit, *The ethics of memory* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 182.

or could understand what they had gone through. Furthermore, in the case of Hiroshima, unlike with Holocaust survivors, Japanese and American censorship prevented survivors' stories from being published or discussed publicly. Hence, most accounts we have of the experience are told through either an American intermediary or were written years after the fact. By that time they were already constrained by powerful narratives and the emotional regimes that emerged during the occupation.

Keeping these disclaimers in mind, it is still possible to sketch a general pattern of survivors' emotional responses and how those led them to embrace the transformation narrative. The transformation narrative provided both the city and its inhabitants with meaning. It introduced symbolic order into a life shattered by the bomb and taught survivors how to feel. Initially, the bombing produced a whole range of emotional reactions among survivors, yet survivors shared an inability to articulate them. There was, wrote John Treat, "an emotional surplus in Hiroshima, which made expressing the experience difficult."[212] Hachiya Michihiko, a doctor who operated in the Red Cross Hospital in Hiroshima and was wounded in the blast, wrote in his *Hiroshima Diary*, "outsiders could not grasp the fact that they were witnessing the exodus of a people who walked in the realm of dreams. …What words can we now use, and to what ends? Even: what are words?"[213] Takenishi Hirosoko, an A-bomb writer, talked about a gap between language and the "words that the bomb makes her speak."[214] The whole edifice of A-bomb literature was a struggle to represent, to find the words. Again and again A-bomb writers faced the quandary of trying to describe the unrepresentable.[215] Many *hibakusha* were struck

[212] John Whittier Treat, *Writing Ground Zero: Japanese Literature and the Atomic Bomb* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 26.
[213] Quoted in Ibid., p 27.
[214] Treat, p. 27.
[215] See Ibid, especially chapter 3.

with an inability to speak. Many remembered, "...being stunned by indescribable and undistinguishable feelings and not being able to express them."[216] This experience was compounded by the collapse of the survivors' system of values and meaning following the defeat, and the disappearance of even the visible markers of urban geography. Ogura Toyofumi, a university lecturer, reported that the biggest shock for him was that the landmarks were gone "...the temples in Teramachi and the Honganji sect building which was visible from everywhere... Gone... Then also the castle itself. All gone."[217]

The confrontation with the death and horror wrought by the bomb left many survivors feeling deep guilt. A teacher recalled, "I went to look for my family. Somehow I became a pitiless person, because if I had pity I would not have been able to walk through the city, to walk over these dead bodies… [The wounded] were looking for someone to help them…The eyes - the emptiness –the helpless expression were something I will never forget…It was hard to be stared at by those eyes." Twenty years after the bomb, he was still haunted by these eyes.[218] In the years following the bomb, radiation sickness and the stigma of pollution further isolated *hibakusha* and made coming to terms with their loss even harder.[219] Ogura Keiko, who became a leading anti-nuke activist, spoke of giving water to the wounded immediately after the bomb. The wounded –their bodies too traumatized to handle water– died immediately after drinking. Ogura remembered being overwhelmed with guilt, feeling she was to blame for these deaths.

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[216] Aiko Sawada, Julia Chaitin & Dan Bar-On, "*Surviving Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Experiences and Psycho-social Meanings*," www.bgu.ac.il/~danbaron/...Dan/Surviving_Hiroshima_and_Nagasak_-_march_24.doc, p. 7.

[217] Ogura Toyofumi, S*etugo no kiroku* (Hiroshima: chousha 1948), p. 84. The castle is Hiroshima Castle which was the symbolic center of the city from its foundation in the 16th century. Hiroshima was known as a military capital, serving as staging ground for Japanese imperial incursion to Asia. The castle housed the Western Japan military headquarters.

[218] Quoted in Robert Jay Lifton, "Psychological Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima: The Theme of Death," *Daedalus* 92, no. 3 (July 1, 1963), p. 269.

[219] On the experience of isolation see Maya Todeschini, "Illegitimate sufferers : A-bomb victims, medical science, and the Government," *Daedalus (Boston, Mass.)* 128, no. 2 (1999), pp. 67-100.

This guilt was mixed with shame and magnified by anxiety over radiation disease and discrimination. She recalled that one of the first causes *hibakusha* worked for was to build a *hibakusha* communal bath. Being ashamed of their scars, they could not mix with other residents.

Soon after the war, *hibakusha* became a "minority, like the *burakumin* (the old untouchable class), we did not belong."[220] This sense of rejection, especially in a society which emphasizes group cohesion and belonging, was for some *hibakusha* too much to bear. Many chose to remain silent, to do their best to return to life and not to talk about their experiences. Others were angry. One outlet for, mostly masculine, anger, was the emerging left wing and labor movement. Even there, however, *hibakusha* were shunned and so often did not identify themselves as survivors.[221] After the *Lucky Dragon Five* incident, to which we will return shortly, when *hibakusha* suddenly became the center of national attention some *hibakusha* started to openly express their anger. Ota Yoko, a poet and an activist, recalled,

> After the [Bikini] Hydrogen bomb incident, radioactive fallout has arrived to Tokyo. [Then] I thought to my self 'it serves [them] right.' Covered with the lethal radiation… [They] could now truly comprehend how the human soul is tormented by modernity's angst, [now] their heart will be truly shaken."[222]

Ota and her expressed anger, however, were an exception. Contrary to the reconciliatory and forward-looking attitude in the city, Ota was angry and unforgiving. "The bomb," she wrote, "is a disgrace for the side that used it. ...If the sight [of the flattened city] is an ugly one, it is their ugliness, not ours."[223] This had appeared in the 30 August *Asahi* newspaper edition before the

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[220] Author's interview with Ogura Keiko, 28 January 2010.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Quoted in Fujiwara Osamu, "Hibakusha no seiki," in Narita Ryuichi et al. (ed.), *Ajia taiheiyō sensō / nijuseiki no naka no ajia taiheiyō sensō,* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), p. 246.
[223] See Ota Yoko, "Kaitei no yo na hikari," reprinted in *Ota Yoko shu*, Vol. 2, p. 280. After the bomb, Ota, already an established author, felt compelled to write. She finished her first draft of her book in 1946, written on pieces of

censorship operation was in place. For many, this kind of attitude was not acceptable, and, in any case, could no longer be openly expressed because of censorship. [224] Anger and excessive grief were discouraged in postwar Hiroshima, which, as we have seen, emphasized future-oriented "bright peace." *Hibakusha*, who were variously identified as either too "self-centered" or too "leftist," simply did not fit in.

Unable and not knowing how to articulate the constellation of contradictory and unsettling feelings they had about the bombing and the subsequent discrimination and isolation they experienced, *hibakusha* activists found meaning through action. The peace movement, especially after 1954, as we will shortly see, offered them a way to talk about and turn their experiences into something worthwhile. This pattern of emotional mobilization was observed by Deborah Gould in her work on AIDS activists.[225] Similarly to AIDS activists, *hibakusha* were told: "do not mourn, organize" and in so doing, they found a way to channel their grief and confusion into what they saw as positive aims.[226] The movement offered *hibakusha,* "a resolution of sorts to…ambivalence. [And] It emphasized self-love and self-respect over shame and doubt."[227] Although the emotional accents were different (no one talked of love in *hidankyo*), the results were the same.

Hibakusha, however, were taught to behave in a very particular way, as dignified and positive victims. The emphasis on restraint had several sources. One, as previously mentioned,

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shoji (screen door) and newspapers. But, after completing her draft, she realized that not only would the Americans not allow her to publish, but that many, both Americans and Japanese, would not listen at all.

[224] Shijo Miyoko, another writer and a survivor herself, showed her considerable irritation with Oto and her fellow A-bomb writers: "why do they have to obsess about death... we all die anyway... literature should be about life itself... about happiness. The bomb is science and politics, it is not art." See Treat, p. 18

[225] Deborah B. Gould, Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP's Fight against AIDS (University Of Chicago Press, 2009).

[226] Ibid., p. 8.

[227] Ibid., p. 215.

was the existence of a strong external censorship system that discouraged, even suppressed, open grief and hostility. The whole edifice of commemoration, as discussed in chapter one, was built on a reconciliatory and forward looking narrative: an emotional regime that discouraged sorrow, anger or revenge. Furthermore, in survivors' immediate past, harmony had been very much stressed under fascism. A re-invented or borrowed neo-Confucian value, harmony was presented to the Japanese as a time-honored tradition and is still seen as such by many in Japan.[228] Excessive expression of grief was discouraged during the war as being bad for morale. A similar reaction was seen after the 2011 Fukushima disasters when both Japanese and foreign media were full of admiring accounts of Japanese forbearance and restraint; in effect describing to survivors how they should feel and behave rather than reporting how they might actually be feeling and behaving.

In the *hibakusha* movement itself, religion and Christian activists, who, as we saw, were very important to Hiroshima's recovery, also played a significant role in emphasizing restraint. The reverend Tanimoto Kyoshi, who became famous worldwide through John Hersey's *Hiroshima,* actually found dignity and majesty in overcoming anger:

> ...The bomb completely revolutionized our thinking. During the war there was much hatred on both sides but after the bomb the reaction of people in Hiroshima was *shoganai* [it cannot be helped] nothing we can do about this]. A third party could not understand this; it is completely beyond the understanding of Americans. It is really a majestic fact. Since the bombing, I live with *hibakusha* among the ruins and rarely heard voices of deep resentment or [anyone] cursing the bomb. Of course, there were those among us who felt the bomb to be cruel and inhuman; [of course] there was anger. But no one said anything (cursed) against the Americans. [Because] We reflected on our participation in this war and understood our mistake. As we understood that it was *shoganai*, we reached a peace of mind.[229]

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[228] Ito Kumi, "The Invention of Wa and the Transformation of the Image of Prince Shotoku in Modern Japan," in Stephen Vlastos, ed., *Mirror of Modernity: The Invention of Traditions in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 37-48.

[229] Tanimoto Kyoshi, Hiroshima genbaku to amerikajin- arukyouji no heiwa kogo, (Tokyo: nihonhosokyokai, 1976), p.42.

Tanimoto transformed the act of overcoming anger into a tool of empowerment, as noble victims rescued a moral truth from the clutches of hatred and anger. Examples of this attitude are legion.[230] The editor of one of the earliest collections of testimonies, for instance, wrote in his introduction, using a typical turn of phrase, "having overcome their anger, the [survivors] become the pure messengers of peace."[231] Kikawa Kiyoshi, another major figure in *hibakusha* activism who was known as "*genbaku* number one" took this logic a step further by offering himself as a sacrificial lamb to science. Kikawa told a *Life* reporter, "something good must come out of this. I now want to be sent to the U.S. so doctors can experiment with my body. It does not matter if I die as a result, as long as I can be of some use to the world of peace."[232] A photo of a shirtless Kikawa, badly disfigured by keloids, accompanied the article. Tanimoto's A-bomb maidens' project, which we will discuss shortly, also embraced this logic. In this narrative, the noble victim of destructive science is reconciled not only with America, but indeed with modern science itself.

This reconciliation, of course, did not occur for everyone. The angst that many felt led them more often to silence. Although as scholars we deal with words and written records, when it comes to survivors of these World War II horrors, we must reach beyond what was documented and recognize the silence that the records conceal. How many spoke and how many

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[230] In Nagasaki, a city already marginalized for its Christian identity, victimization was even more extreme, where perhaps the most famous proponent of this kind of thinking was Nagai Takashi's memoir *The Bells of Nagasaki*. Takashi wrote: "Nagasaki, the only holy place in all Japan – was it not chosen as a victim, a pure lamb, to be slaughtered and burned on the altar of sacrifice to expiate the sins committed by humanity in the Second World War?" For Nagai, the bombing of Nagasaki was providence and the necessary penance that finally brought peace to the world. This could lead to grotesque rhetoric, "How noble, how splendid was that holocaust of 9 August, when flames soared up from the cathedral, dispelling the darkness of war and bringing the light of peace! …Let us give thanks that Nagasaki was chosen for the sacrifice. Let us give thanks that, through this sacrifice, peace was given to the world and freedom of religion to Japan." Quoted in Yuki Miyamoto, *Beyond the Mushroom Cloud: Commemoration, Religion, and Responsibility After Hiroshima* (Fordham University Press, 2011),pp. 131-132

[231] Quoted in Naono Akiko, "Embracing the dead in the bomb's shadow: journey through the Hiroshima memoryscape," Unpublished PhD dissertation University of California, Santa Cruz, (2002), p. 232.

[232] "The Peace City," *Life Magazine*, 1 September 1947.

chose not to is, of course, impossible to determine. Those who speak out are always more conspicuous, but many did not identify as *hibakusha* and even concealed their experiences from their own families.[233] For others, however, their survival started to become a source of pride. Survivors became martyrs for a cause. The peace movement supplied survivors with a meaningful outlet and a means to articulate their rage and frustration. According to Deborah Gould, social movements provide "a language for people's affective states, as well as pedagogy of sorts, regarding what and how to feel and what to do in light of those feelings."[234] Indeed, that was precisely what the peace movement did in Hiroshima, which helps explain why it was so powerful. The movement gave survivors the option and choice to feel pride. As one *hibakusha* told an American reporter, "I asked myself: why was I saved? I thought that there must be some mission for which I had survived." This shift in what it meant to be a survivor had implications beyond the survivors' community itself, which became readily apparent following the Lucky Dragon Five incidents.

II. Making choices- Hiroshima

Up until the mid-fifties Hiroshima remained, for many, mostly a factional issue. As Ota Yoko's outburst attests, Hiroshima was not often discussed on the national level beyond left-wing circles, which increasingly used it in the service of anti-Americanism.[235] A typical example of this discourse was Yagi Yasutaro's 1953 movie *Hiroshima*, which was sponsored by the leftist Japan Teachers Union (JTU). The movie portrayed the bombing as an outrageous case of American racism. Told through war orphans' stories, it depicted those orphans as surviving by

[233] This continues to occur today. A survivor told me of her grandson, who does not tell his family or peers that he is from Hiroshima. This continued silence has much to do with anxiety over pollution and genetic mutations. See also Todeschini, "Illegitimate sufferers."
[234] Gould, p. 28.
[235] James Orr, *The victim as hero: ideologies of peace and national identity in postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), p. 42.

selling skulls of the bomb's dead that they had unearthed to American tourists, and by being used as guinea pigs by the ABCC.[236] This crass instrumentalization of the bomb did not help the cause of the *hibakusha*, whose efforts for medical and financial relief were continuously blocked by conservatives who saw any bomb-related matter as a leftist ploy. The U.S. was still sensitive about Hiroshima and the government could not afford to alienate its closest ally. Furthermore, although the conservative government awarded veterans with pensions in 1953, they saw any compensation to civilian victims as a dangerous opening, which could pave the way for claims by the millions of Japanese victims of the fire bombings.[237] *Hibakusha*, like other groups who were vying for compensation at the time – and like the city of Hiroshima before them, had to position themselves as unique national (and non-leftist) victims, separate from other war victims, and thus deserving of compensation from the national government. The creation of the unique trope of the victim was a direct result of this maneuver and the parallel development of the anti-bomb movement in Japan and worldwide. Thus, the needs of the peace movement were perfectly aligned with many survivors' emotional needs as well as with the transformation narrative. This move was welcomed by many *hibakusha* who became the movement's most dedicated advocates.

The *hibakusha* movement was, at first, not political, concentrating mostly on relief for the victims. The first *hibakusha* associations were formed at the end of 1945. These were active within the broader context of associations of war victims that had begun to organize all over Japan. A representative of the Osaka chapter of the all-Japan War Victim Association was invited to the first meeting of the Hiroshima chapter in December 1945, where it urged participants to engage in self-help. "As the government does nothing for us," he argued, "we

[236] Ibid. ABCC stood for the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, mentioned in chapter one.
[237] Ibid, p. 141.

must unite and help ourselves."[238] In this spirit of unity, the Tokyo chapter of the association helped Hiroshima construct a clinic and others helped with temporary housing. Soon, however, just like Hiroshima city itself, the *hibakusha* started to see themselves as separate from other victims. In the September 1946 general meeting of the all-Japan war victim association, Hiroshima representative Shimotsu Utao declared, "the situation of Hiroshima is unique, the city has been destroyed to its foundations (roots), even now we have people bleeding from their gums and are dying, people from other cities just do not understand this." Accordingly, Shimotsu asked the government for special help and consideration.[239]

In 1946, with millions of Japanese homeless and on the verge of starvation, Shimotsu's call did not receive much attention. Even within Hiroshima, survivors found it difficult to organize because of American censorship. In 1948, for example, Kobayashi Toshiko of the Ministry of Labor's Women and Minors' Bureau, conducted a survey of female survivors, but GHQ suppressed the report. A subsequent meeting of female survivors, which came out of Kobayashi's and other women activists' efforts, petitioned Prime Minister Ashida Hitoshi to "restor[e] economic and spiritual stability for victims," and urged Ashida to work for the "foundation for world peace." Yet, nowhere in the petition were the words "atom bomb" (*genbaku*) or "A-bomb survivors" mentioned.[240] Organization in Hiroshima remained very small-scale. Relief efforts were taken on primarily by city and religious organizations, and did not amount to much.[241] Again, the city and the national government were more concerned with

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[238] Chūgoku Shinbun sha, *honoe no hi kara ni ju nen (1966 nen),* (Hiroshima: Miraisha, 1966), p. 8.
[239] Ibid, p. 9.
[240] Hiroshima-shi Nagasaki-shi Genbaku Saigaishi Henshū Iinkai, *Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the physical, medical, and social effects of the atomic bombings* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 564.
[241] According to this report, local government assistance, with the exception of Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto, was never sufficient, and was "limited and hardly met the needs of A-bomb survivors." Ibid., p. 563. For further details on city relief efforts, see: Ibid 560-563.

rebuilding the city than with relief for victims, and even the special help that the city received from the government did not include any measures for *hibakusha* relief.

Outside Japan, however, the *hibakusha* did start to receive the attention they were seeking as unique victims of the world's first Atomic bombing. As Ohmuta Minobu argued, visiting foreigners, who were not limited by censorship, had a crucial role in bringing out *hibakusha* stories and greatly influenced the way that *hibakusha* eventually organized.[242] In May 1946, John Hersey came to Hiroshima and interviewed *hibakusha*. His *New Yorker* piece, which was published in August 1946, initiated a huge wave of sympathy for *hibakusha*. [243]Hersey, Norman Cousins and others connected this humanitarian impulse to anti-nuclear sentiment and the burgeoning peace movement.[244] Hiroshima and its message were central to this movement. Initiated by reverend Tanimoto Kyoshi, whom we already met, and an Austrian immigrant by the name of Alfred Parker, who fled the Nazis to San Francisco, the "Hiroshima day" movement became a worldwide phenomenon.[245] On 6 August 1948 there were Hiroshima gatherings in twenty-six countries with tens of thousands of participants.[246] Baptists and other religious organizations were instrumental in organizing this movement. They were building on a general sense of unease and even moral abhorrence regarding the act of dropping the bomb. In contrast

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[242] Ohmuta Minobu, "gaikokujin ga mita Hiroshima: sono bungeisakuhin ni tuwareta shisō," in *Kiyō,* No. 2 (1979), p. 14.
[243] John Hersey, "Hiroshima," *New Yorker*, 31August, 1946.
[244] On Hersey's book see Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early light : American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1985), pp. 205-210. Mary McCarthy saw the book as an apology. She accused Hersey of treating the bomb as a natural disaster and making it familiar and human. Boyer argues that the book did not have any political effect as "the very act of reading made many feel like they 'did their share.' It certainly helped that the Japanese were resigned and not angry in the book." Ruth Benedict, in another critique, also assures readers such "behavior [is] in their nature." See ibid, pp. 209, 210.
[245] See Rieko Asai, "Hiroshima and the U.S. Peace Movement: Commemoration of August 6, 1948–1960," in Kurt Piehler, *The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front* (Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 334.
[246] Hiroshima-ken, *Genbaku sanjūnen Hiroshima-ken no sengoshi*, Dai ichi-han. (Hiroshima-shi: Hiroshima-ken, 1976), pp. 190-192.

to McArthur's talk of a sinful Japan punished by the bomb, Christian pacifist organizations like FOR (Fellowship of Reconciliation) saw the Americans as those who had committed the sin by dropping the bomb. Thus, Hiroshima day became, for them, a day of repentance.[247]

"Moral repentance" went hand in hand with charity. This was true for both religious and secular elements of the peace movement. John Hersey, Norman Cousins, Pearl Buck and other American intellectuals who were involved with the movement also called for "moral adoption" of A-bomb orphans by Americans and gathered donations for *hibakusha* relief.[248] The *hibakusha* were grateful for this help, and some enthusiastically supported the peace movement. This, as we will shortly see with the A-bomb maidens, changed the *hibakusha* image and status in Japan and beyond. The connection between peace and the bomb was made, as we already saw in the first chapter, almost immediately by Japanese and American elites. But what was happening in the late forties was slightly different. *Hibakusha* began perceiving the experience of the bombing (*hibaku taiken*) themselves as a transformative experience and connecting it to their participation in the emerging activities for peace. As Ubuki Satoro pointed out, this connection existed in fact from very early on, but could not be openly expressed because of censorship.[249] Some A-bomb writers published in spite of censorship. The Hiroshima magazine *Chūgoku Bunka* featured such stories and its editorial line frequently made the link between the experience of being bombed and peace.[250] Similar magazines and testimonies were published privately and circulated in Hiroshima on a small scale.[251] All that was done mostly locally, but from 1949 on, as censorship gradually began to be eased, the *hibakusha* started to speak out about their experiences in various

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[247] Asai, p. 338.
[248] Wittner, p. 50.
[249] Ubuki Satoro, "Genbaku taiken to heiwa undo," in Masanori Nakamura, *Sengo minshu shugi* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), p. 98.
[250] See Treat, p. 91.
[251] Hiroshima shi.hen, *Hiroshima shinshi.* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima shi, 1984), pp. 19-22.

forums beyond Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A-bomb writers and poets were at the forefront of these discussions. In May 1951, in the first large scale gathering of its kind, a group of *hibakusha* was part of a student conference organized by the liberal group *wadatsumi no koe* in Hiroshima. The group, which included Ota Yoko, Kurihara Sadako and others, participated in a debate on the experience of the bombing and its meaning. The event also featured an exhibit on the bomb and included lectures from doctors. [252]

This kind of activity was almost always connected to peace. As seen with the 1948 women's gathering and Hiroshima city's own efforts, under the occupation the only way one could talk about the bomb was in connection with peace. The first drive to collect testimonies in Hiroshima was in April 1947 by Toshio Suekane, a Christian activist, and sought to make "the suffering and experience of Hiroshima the foundation of peace."[253] This collection of testimonies was supported by American pacifist organizations and included an introduction by Russell Duggins, a Christian peace activist who visited Hiroshima three times in 1946-47. Duggins congratulated the *hibakusha* for their courage and contributions to peace.[254] This late forties publication represented the convergence of international with local peace efforts, and both groups' sympathy to *hibakusha* and understanding of their symbolic role. Occupation authorities allowed this kind of activity as it was mostly conducted through American-based Christian organizations which were seen by GHQ as useful tools against the spread of left wing ideology.[255]

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[252] Hiroshima Ken, *Genbaku sanjūnen ,* p.126.

[253] Chūgoku Shinbun sha, *honoe no hi kara*, p.68.

[254] Following this initiative, Nakao Kazuma, Head of the YMCA in Hiroshima, started collecting testimonies. Out of over a hundred testimonies, sixteen were chosen for the manuscript. See Ibid.

[255] Toshio Suekane (henshusha), Ten yori no ōinaru koe: Hiroshima genbaku taikenki (Tokyo: Nihon Toribyūnsha, 1949), pp. 7-8. As we saw in chapter one, McArthur was partial to missionaries, and parts of GHQ allowed extensive activity by Christian organizations that would otherwise not be allowed.

The connection between the experience of the bombing and activity for peace was almost immediately used by the left in pursuit of what were still banned anti-nuclear activities. What was significant in this move was the fact that the left also made the experience a *national* experience. Already in 1949, a JCP declaration stated, "We Japanese, who experienced the suffering brought upon us by the nuclear bomb, call upon the world to abolish [the bomb]. *It is our sacred duty* for all mankind [emphasis added]."[256] The left –and especially the communists' embrace of the *hibakusha* cause– and the peace movement complicated matters for the *hibakusha*. Survivors, in general, if they were not left-leaning already, kept some distance from these activities. The red purge of left wing sympathizers by the occupation and efforts by conservatives and others to curb "red influence," which culminated in the cancelation of the 6 August 1950 ceremony, alienated many from leftists' policies. Many of the original backers of the Hiroshima cause, like Alfred Parker, Hiroshima's mayor Hamai Shinzō and Tanimoto Kiyoshi, tried to shield the movement from communist influence.[257] The result was much conflict between different groups and a general decline of the peace movement in Japan and worldwide in the first half of the fifties. This did not bode well for the *hibakusha* activists who were working for survivors' relief. The movement did not see any significant aid extended to *hibakusha* outside the stricken cities themselves and did not even manage to coordinate national action by *hibakusha* from different prefectures. All of this changed in March 1954.

On 1 March 1954, a small Japanese fishing vessel, the ill-named *Daigo Fukuryū Maru* (Lucky Dragon five) was inadvertently exposed to nuclear fallout from the United States' Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test on the Bikini Atoll. The explosion, which was twice the size expected

[256] Hiroshima ken, *Genbaku sanjūnen,* p. 193.
[257] Asai, p. 340. Hiroshima city excluded the JCP and other groups (but allowed Korean representatives) from a number of large peace assemblies and conferences. See Hiroshima shi, *Hiroshima shin shi*, pp. 77-78.

by U.S. scientists, contaminated the vessel and its crew with radioactive ash even though they were well outside the test zone. As the fishermen returned to their home port of Yazu, all twenty-three began to exhibit signs of acute radiation sickness. Before anyone realized what had happened, the ship's tuna catch was sold and transported to markets around Japan. Once the cause of the fishermen's sickness was determined, panic ensued. Fish markets were closed all over Japan and concerned housewives asked the authorities to use Geiger counters to determine if food was safe. Rain containing unusually high levels of radiation fell on Kyoto and Tokyo, adding to the panic.[258] By the end of March, the Japanese and American governments, which initially denied responsibility, were engaged in frantic efforts to contain growing public anger.[259]

The left immediately added this to a long list of American incidents victimizing the Japanese (and Asians more broadly) by the Americans. The JCP accused Americans, in what would become a slogan of the peace movement, of victimizing Japanese for the third time. However, this was not the left's moment. Far from taking on the Americans or supporting left wing causes, the movement to stop the hydrogen and atomic bombs that was triggered by the Lucky Dragon Five incident, tried very hard to be apolitical. Such a stance was consistent with the way Hiroshima had established itself. As we saw, the city's approach was non-militant and non-antagonistic, harkening back to the days of the occupation. Nagaoka Shogō, who in addition to being the director of the Peace Museum was also a radiation expert, was sent to Yazu to show solidarity with the victims of the Lucky Dragon Five. When he returned, he brought

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[258] The rain which fell on Kyoto had 80,000 counts of radiation. Sasamoto Yukuo, "The Bikini incident and Radiation surveys," in Hitoshi Yoshioka, *A social history of science and technology in contemporary Japan: Road to Self-reliance 1952 - 1959* (Trans Pacific Press, 2005), p. 131.

[259] The first articles reporting on the incident appeared in *Yomiuri Shinbun* on 16 March. By the 18th, the government had set up a special scientific survey, promised to pay for the fishermen's care, and had a special meeting with the Americans on the 24th. The Americans tried to play down Japanese fear of radiation contamination, but, nonetheless, banned tuna exports to the U.S. The US was willing to help but was "deeply interested in confidentiality of this incident." Needless to say, that was a lost cause. See Sasamoto, p. 129.

back what he termed "tragic souvenirs, including photographs and other evidence of contamination. "As I bring back these materials," Nagaoka told a reporter, "I would like to cry to the world: 'no more Hiroshimas.'"[260] Not a word was said about the Americans.

This pattern continued as the movement expanded beyond the left. What became the World Congress against Hydrogen and Atomic Bombs or, in its Japanese abbreviation *gensuikyō*, started as a spontaneous movement of mostly housewives in Suginami ward in Tokyo. The movement was headed by Yasui Kaoru, an academic and peace activist. Yasui campaign gathered millions of signatures and turned into a nation-wide campaign. It was the first mass movement in the postwar era that was able to include people from all political parties and all walks of life. Although, as James Orr pointed out, the quotidian reality of being the victims of the world's only use of nuclear weapons helped to explain popular support for the movement, there is little doubt that Yasui's style of "contestation-free" advocacy had a strong role in the movement's success.[261] Yasui wanted the petition effort to be a "purely national people's movement."[262] As the title of his first pamphlet, "The Masses and Peace" (*Minshū to Heiwa*) indicates, belief in the redemptive power of the masses was fundamental for Yasui. He had a clear vision of the Japanese people united as a pacifist nation, and cared much less for Japan's past aggression or present political concerns. Yasui consciously sought to depoliticize the movement and to wrench the anti-nuclear cause from its association with left wing politics. This goal was a good match for the ethnic mass-ism and Asian solidarity that was popular in Japan's progressive circles at the time. This was the time of decolonization and many Japanese were excited about the ideas about Asian solidarity and independence that were coming out of what

[260] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 2 April 1954.
[261] Orr, p. 48.
[262] Ibid, p. 50.

would soon become the non-aligned movement.[263] These ideas, however, were dangerously close to wartime talk of anti-colonialism and Asian co-prosperity used by Japan's militarists against the West.[264] Indeed, conservatives, to whom this language was very familiar, now also tried to capitalize on popular nuclear exceptionalism. The movement's explicit rejection of politics made it possible for the right to support it, but also to take advantage of it for its own goals. Those goals included, as I explored elsewhere, the promotion of nuclear energy.[265] After 1954, *Yuitsu no hibakoku* (the only nation to suffer a nuclear attack), became a watchword and a slogan used by both the left and the right.

When *Gensuikyō* gathered for its first world congress in Hiroshima in August 1955, the turnout was enormous. Hiroshima was now at the center of national and international attention as anti-nuclear sentiment gathered momentum all across Japan and beyond. Over twenty five thousand people gathered in Hiroshima for the 6 August ceremony that year.[266] Among the crowd were representatives from the People's Republic of China, the USSR and former U.S. congressmen. Also in the limelight, for the first time at national level, were the *hibakusha* themselves. The conference organizing committee asked a number of *hibakusha* to tell their stories and to "let the world know about their suffering."[267] And tell they did. In a highly unusual public display of emotions, Yamaguchi Sasako from Nagasaki cried as she gave her testimony,

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[263] When India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Hiroshima in 1957, he received a hero's welcome as the "peace maker." Over 30,000 people lined the streets and Nehru was showered with gifts and honors by the city and the peace movement (one of the gifts was, awkwardly, a Japanese sword). See *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 9 October 1957.

[264] A *Chūgoku Shinbun*, editorial welcoming Nehru noted, "Japan and India share a long Asian history. And that cooperation would lead to bright development." Words that could have easily been taken from a Japanese wartime propaganda pamphlet. On Japanese anti-colonial propaganda, see John W. Dower, *War without mercy: race and power in the Pacific war*, (Pantheon Books, 1993).

[265] See Ran Zwigenberg, "The Coming of a Second Sun": The 1956 Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan's Embrace of Nuclear Power,' *The Asia-Pacific Journal* Vol. 10, Issue 6 No 1, February 6, 2012.

[266] *New York Times,* 7 August 1955; *Asahi Shinbun*, 7 August 1955.

[267] Funahashi Yoshie, "Showa 30 nendai shotō no hibakusha undo," in *Hiroshima heiwa kagaku, no.* 13 (1990), p.26.

"war is horrible, we are all against the bomb but [you] could not know the reality [truth] of it… I am crying as it is an open wound inside of me even now. The dead are in front of my eyes through my everyday life. War is indeed terrible (*iya da).*" The Hiroshima representative, a survivor and widow herself, added: "we the *hibakusha* know that war is terrible. Now it is our duty to tell you this [as well]."[268]

The 1955 testimonies represented a transitional moment. It was then that the anti-nuclear movement discovered the power of the *hibakusha* to galvanize and unite its members. In these testimonies, the guilt, debts owed the dead and emotional intensity were all transformed into a powerful political plea. But there was something else as well: the claim for special knowledge; the idea that by virtue of their brush with mass death and horror, the *hibakusha* possessed a special authority and duty to work for peace.[269] Thus, by 1955, the *hibakusha* as witness and her testimony emerged as powerful tools of emotional mobilization for the peace movement. The *hibakusha* became the symbol of victimization that could overcome any factional squabbles and which could unite all Japanese in their quest for peace.

Hibakusha, of course, were not just passive tools. In 1955 the *hibakusha* movement moved head-on into politics. The movement shifted from relief efforts to testimonies for (an abstract) peace into combining the two goals in order to achieve concrete benefits. Following the Lucky Dragon incident, when the anti-nuclear movement became national, many *hibakusha* saw an opportunity of their need for compensation money and medical treatment to finally be acknowledged. The move to politicize the plight of the *hibakusha* was certainly not without its

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[268] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 7 August 1955.

[269] As we saw, this idea was already "in the air" within Hiroshima and among left wing circles. A *Chūgoku Shinbun* editorial a day before these testimonies were given warned, "we must remind anew to all citizens of the world the memory of Hiroshima. We must use this memory to warn the world…for the residents of Hiroshima especially, the victims this problem is of outmost importance." *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 6 August 1955.

critics. Some *hibakusha* were not comfortable with exposure, but others argued: "we must tell the world about the true [sorry] state of *hibakusha*. We must start a worldwide movement to provide relief for the *hibakusha.* This is the true foundation (*kiso*) of the movement to ban nuclear weapons. [Only] the banning of nuclear weapons could truly supply *hibakusha* with relief."[270] Linking relief to anti-nuclear sentiment was to become a staple of the *hibakusha* movement. In 1955, the *hibakusha* suffering became a political tool. "By having nuclear tests," *hibakusha* activists told the world, "you are adding to our misery."[271] This was the move that ennobled *hibakusha* suffering. Now the *hibakusha*, simply by virtue of their suffering, were making a contribution to peace. According to this logic, only the achievement of peace would end their suffering.

The *hibakusha* were quick to capitalize on this sentiment and began to organize nationally. The first initiative for a compensation movement started with *hibakusha* from Hyogo prefecture, who sought to address the issue through legal action and were helped by lawyers from the Osaka bar association.[272] After the first *gensuikyō* meeting in 1955, Hiroshima-based organizations started organizing for a united front, an effort that bore fruit in a joint meeting of all Hiroshima organizations on 18 March 1956. The March meeting produced a declaration that called on the world to "acknowledge the huge human loss of the 300,000 dead in Hiroshima and Nagasaki."[273] The declaration also called on the Japanese government to compensate *hibakusha* and asked *hibakusha* to consider further steps to consolidate the movement at the national level. The *hibakusha* were also urged, in a call that evoked the strong emotional mechanism at play, to "come together with the 300,000 souls and act in concert to stop the U.S. and U.S.S.R nuclear

[270] Funahashi, p. 19.
[271] Ibid.
[272] Hiroshima-shi Nagasaki-shi Genbaku Saigaishi Henshū Iinkai, p. 566.
[273] Funahashi, p. 20.

tests."[274] A second meeting in May resulted in a similar declaration. The May meeting also produced a liaison committee for the four main prefectural associations. This liaison committee led an effort, following the second *gensuikyō* conference, where many *hibakusha* activists converged, which resulted in the founding in August 1956 of *hidankyo*.

The *Hidankyō* message was one of empowerment, "Up until now we have kept our silence, hid our faces, scattered ourselves and led our lives that were left to us, but now, unable to keep our mouths shut, we are rising up, joining our hands and convened here."[275] Articulating the emotional move discussed above, the declaration went on, "We have, at today's gathering, commemorated the dead and talked of the inexpressible sentiments piled up in these long years. But unending talks of sorrow and anger, of torture and distress accumulated deep in our hearts were not for getting a consolation or relief for the time being. They had the purpose of setting ourselves up, holding hands in hands, resolutely."[276] This was an emotionally powerful argument that had broad appeal both within and outside Japan. Preventing and alleviating the *hibakusha*'s suffering and working for peace became synonymous for many across political and national divides. Indeed, *hibakusha* relief soon became the only common ground among the different competing factions of the anti-nuclear movement. And, as will be demonstrated in chapter four, as the anti-nuclear movement fractured, the status of the *hibakusha*, ironically, rose.

This development was worrying for the U.S. and its conservative allies in Japan who were wary of the rise of anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. The American *Atoms for Peace* campaign was launched as a direct response to this challenge. However, as this author has demonstrated

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[274] Ibid.
[275] *Hidankyō*, "*Message to the world*," 10 August 1956. http://www.ne.jp/asahi/hidankyo/nihon/rn_page/english/message.html, accessed 29 October 2011.
[276] Ibid.

elsewhere, *hidankyo* was supportive of atomic power. In their declaration, using very emotional language, the organizers stated that "Atomic power…must absolutely be converted to a servant for the happiness and prosperity of humankind. This is the only desire we hold as long as we live."[277] Neither *Hidankyo* nor large sections of the anti-nuclear movement were necessarily anti-American. Nor were they very radical. Although it certainly had more radical elements, and, by its very existence was a continuous reminder of the bomb's terrible toll, beyond the call for banning nuclear weapons, *hibakusha* activists rarely confronted the economic and intellectual structures that supported the nuclear order. If anything, most of the movement accepted and embraced science and progress. A mid-fifties illustrated pamphlet found in the files of Kikawa Kiyoshi, A-bomb victim no. 1 whom we already met, allegorically described future astronauts finding a post-nuclear "dead planet." "The people of our earth," continued the story, "also have the power to turn it into a death planet…but it is still not too late. We can still destroy these annihilating weapons and banish all danger to our green and fruitful world so that mankind can live without fear." The pamphlet continued over a background of futuristic and hopeful illustrations, "Science will conquer hunger and want, ignorance and illiteracy. [And] the dreams of architects and engineers will come true."[278] Although they were victims of science, some in the *hibakusha* movement seemed to have made peace with it.

III. The Atomic bomb maidens and the logic of emotional inclusion

Nowhere did this embrace of modernity and *hibakusha* victimization come together as seamlessly as in the figure of the A-bomb maidens. The A-bomb maidens were a group of young female victims chosen by Norman Cousins and Tanomoto Kiyoshi to undergo plastic

[277] Ibid.
[278] Vienna organizing committee, "*The Mysterious Planet*," Kikawa Kiyoshi Collection, folder 32. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park Archive, Hiroshima, Japan

surgery in the United States to remove keloids and other scars caused by the bomb. [279] Tanimoto, who had great hopes for the maidens, was the one who initiated the project. The women were named (A-bomb maidens –*genbaku otome*– a phrase that carries the same association with innocence in Japanese) by a *Yomiuri Shinbun* reporter who was covering Tanimoto's charity work.[280] Tanimoto thought that "personal tragedies should be used for great spiritual ends," and that the mission would provide the maidens "with a new dignity and meaning as message bearers of the Atomic truth."[281] The maidens were already something of a celebrity cause in Japan, but they achieved an almost mythical status when they were chosen by Cousins to go to the U.S. For the United States government, which supported the endeavor, this was a part of the damage control campaign that was launched after the Lucky Dragon incident. For Cousins and Tanimoto, this was an opportunity both to do good and to promote reconciliation between Japan and the U.S. But, of course, there was more to it than simple charity.

Together with Sadako Sasaki, the child victim we will discuss in chapter four, the maidens were the ultimate expression of Japanese victimhood. The maidens' ordeal supplied the movement with a gendered image of defiled innocence that was very appealing to sensitivities at the time. The maidens' respectable and quiet manner, totally devoid of any expressed resentment towards the Americans coupled with their quest for normalcy, mirrored the ideology of hopeful (and abstract) peace promoted by the city of Hiroshima and the Christian backers of the initiative. Furthermore, the turn to American science and charity had the effect of erasing and domesticating the experience of the bombing. As David Serlin has pointed out, the project organizers sought not only to normalize the maidens' life but also to normalize the terms under

[279] The women were mostly chosen from the groups attending classes at Tanimoto's church. It is unclear what the actual criteria for choosing them were.
[280] Barker, p. 61.
[281] Ibid, p. 59.

which "modern science could absorb its capacity for recklessness and turn trauma into opportunity."[282] This was, again, the very manner in which Hiroshima, the city of peace as it was reborn on 6 August, chose to present itself. The maidens' trip carried the victim trope beyond Japan and served to further solidify witness practices and testimony's usage as unifying and inclusive emotional tools.

The American state department was quite anxious about the maidens' trip and its subversive potential. In an internal memo, American diplomats warned that the maiden episode "can generate publicity harmful not only [to] our relation with Japan but particular [to] our worldwide efforts to avoid playing up the destructive effects [of] nuclear weapons."[283] In light of the maidens' general apolitical attitude these fears seem somewhat exaggerated. In November 1952, when four maidens attended the World Federalist Asia chapter meeting in Hiroshima, they delivered an emotional plea. The *Fujin Koron*, a popular women's magazine, described Sako Michiko as "choking with tears, and calling on the people of the world: "We suffered greatly because of the damage inflicted on our bodies by the bomb. This is, for a long time –even life, the cross we must bear (*kono jujikai nagaku ishō mochinakerebanarimasen*). *But now we do not bear a grudge.* Our only request is that this kind of suffering of war shall not be repeated. If there is another war it would mean the end of humanity [my italics]."[284] Foreign representatives at the meeting were duly impressed; the English participant commented: "we as well suffered in the war but no sacrifice is precious like the one of these women."[285]

[282] Serlin, *Replaceable You*, p. 182.
[283] Ibid, 74.
[284] *Fujin Koron*, 1 January 1953.
[285] Ibid.

The reception of Sako's testimony by the foreign delegations and the Maidens' episode as a whole were examples of what Christina Klein called "cold war orientalism." [286] Klein argued that unlike classic orientalism examined by Edward Said, the orientalism practiced by Americans in the fifties was not quite about the "production of difference" but about sameness and inclusion. Cold war ideologues mobilized ideas about racial equality in the service of anti-communism as America, an "empire in denial," sought to convince newly emerging states of its difference from the old colonial empires.[287] If US media and cultural production demonized China, Japan was now included within the west as a partner, albeit as John Dower has masterfully demonstrated, as a feminized and "domesticated" one.[288] Containment was not only about who was "out," but also who was included. Eisenhower's "people to people" initiative and state department support of the maidens' project were a part of this move. But this was not only a state led campaign, quite the contrary. What Klein called "middlebrow publications" like *Saturday Review* and the *Readers Digest,* on both the left and right, were heavily engaged in promoting American humanitarianism and partnership with Asia. The *Saturday Review* and Cousins himself were central to the maidens' project and had extensive links with the Hiroshima peace movement dating back to 1946. Norman Cousins was quite left of center, a passionate humanitarian, thoroughly anti-imperialist and a committed opponent of nuclear weapons. Cousins, however, unwittingly promoted the American expansionist agenda with his outreach projects in Japan and elsewhere.

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[286] Christina Klein, *Cold War orientalism Asia in the middlebrow imagination, 1945-1961* (Berkeley :: University of California Press,, 2003).

[287] Ibid, p. 12 The phrase "an empire in denial" is from Kenneth B. Pyle review of George R. Packard, *Edwin O. Reischauer and the American discovery of Japan*: "Japan and the United States: An Unnatural Intimacy" The *Journal of Japanese Studies,* Volume 37, Number 2,(Summer 2011), p. 384

[288] John W. Dower, *War without mercy: race and power in the Pacific war* (New York: Random House, 1986). P. 302.

What the logic of inclusion did was, to use Marry Pratt's words, "[to] use sentimentalism in the service of conquest."[289] Cousins and other middlebrow intellectuals had a unique emotional style. They generally avoided structural explanations and instead opted for the personal. They produced texts in which complex "social and historical issues are explained by the experience of a single individual…texts [which] strived to produce an emotional and empathetic response. They encouraged their readers to feel intensely about other people."[290] Emotional pleas to garner American sympathy for less fortunate Asians was an important element of the logic of inclusion, which sought to use sentimentalism to overcome and transcend cultural boundaries. Cousins, for instance, declared: "I want Americans to identify ourselves sympathetically, no the word is not strong enough - compassionately with the mainstream of humanity."[291] The agenda behind this was humanitarian, but it was also about anti-communism. Cousins' agenda and style corresponded to the Japanese anti-nuclear movement's own contestation free and inclusive agenda as promoted by figures like Yasui and Tanimoto.

Indeed, within the maidens' project these two discourses came together to produce a sentimental storm. Tanimoto also shared with the Americans a commitment to anti-communism. Tanimoto's agenda was right-of-center. And if not right wing, he definitely took his reconciliation agenda quite far. Tanimoto declared the Hiroshima maidens enterprise to be a tool for slowing down the "left wing surge in Japan that was attempting to make the H-bomb a rallying point against the American militarization of Japan."[292] And indeed, American generosity and charity generated much goodwill for America in Hiroshima and Japan. This sentiment, however, could not undo the subversive potential the maidens possessed by their very presence

[289] Cited by Klein, p.15
[290] The quote is by Janice Radway. Cited in Ibid, p.65
[291] Ibid, p. 81
[292] Serlin, *Replaceable You*, p. 82.

in the U.S. Cousins' agenda, or the maidens' project as a whole, did not fit perfectly into the American expansionist agenda. Serlin, again, is right in pointing out that the visible presence of the maidens opened the door to debates about the United States military's atomic weapons program.[293] The maidens received intense media coverage, which culminated in the bizarre scene, broadcast on live television, of Enola Gay pilot, Robert Lewis, tearfully apologizing to a bewildered Tanimoto, for the suffering he had caused..[294]

But in the 1950s, even some in the peace movement went out of their way to mollify and smooth over these tensions. In 1957, a National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) protest in front of the United Nations featured Hiroshima maiden Nimoto Shigeko as the main speaker.[295] Nimoto's speech focused on American benevolence: "I belong to both countries," declared Nimoto, "I am a citizen of the world." Nimoto, and most other speakers, hardly touched on the bombing.[296] The main focus of the speakers and of the extensive media coverage that followed (The *New York Times* featured an interview with Nimoto) was on the future and the need to prevent a nuclear war. The past was to be forgotten, or at least not to be spoken of. Not everybody on the left, however, was so reconciliatory. In 1956, after one of the maidens, Nakabayashi Tomoko, died from complications following a surgery, left wing commentators in

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[293] Ibid, p. 79.

[294] According to Barker, Lewis was completely inebriated when he appeared on the show. The show, *This is your life*, was organized by Tanimoto's colleague Marvin Green, and featured, besides Lewis, two of the maidens, who were kept behind a screen. Rodney Barker, *The Hiroshima Maidens: a Story of Courage, Compassion, and Survival* (Viking, 1985),pp.235-246. For further analysis, see Sarlin, pp. 88-90, 107-109 and Boyer, by the *Bomb's Early Light*, 334-51. For a popular culture analysis and a clip from the show, see: http://conelrad.blogspot.com/2010/08/hiroshima-this-is-your-life.html Accessed 1 November 2011.

[295] SANE was founded in 1957 by Lenore Marshall, Norman Cousins and others in response to the nuclear arms race.

[296] Asai, p. 354.

Japan accused the Americans of "killing Tomoko twice." This provoked concern in Hiroshima city and among the project organizers regarding the project's a-political image.[297]

Whatever cause the maidens were used for, the fact that they and the *hibakusha* in general were powerful symbols, was not disputed. By 1959, with the ANPO Treaty crisis (over the renewal of the US-Japan Security – briefly explored in chapter four) deeply dividing Japanese society, it was possible for *hibakusha* to take sides *as hibakusha*. In a December 1959 meeting to protest the signing of the treaty, a leading activist declared, "As a *hibakusha* (*hibakusha toshite*) I feel anxious about the treaty."[298] After a decade of *hibakusha* activism for compensation and relief, the tying of relief to peace activism and the extensive use of the movement of the *hibakusha* for emotional mobilization created a figure of the *hibakusha* as a victim-martyr for peace. This figure was, by virtue of the particular circumstances of its creation, prone more to work for reconciliation and to be forward- rather than backward-looking-this sentence needs some clarification. Indeed, the personalization and de-politicization of the anti-nuclear message was internalized by the bringing together of the personal and the abstract - skipping over messy politics - and was reflected in the emotional style of the maidens' appeals. In the decades that followed, neither the peace movement nor the city of Hiroshima hesitated to use the power of testimonies in the service of their cause. Many *hibakusha* welcomed this move and identified being a *hibakusha* with peace activism. Others were not so inclined. One *hibakusha* told Ōe Kenzaburō:

> People in Hiroshima prefer to remain silent until they face death. They want to have their own life and death. They do not like to display their misery for use as "data" in the movement against atomic bombs or in other political struggles. Nor do they like to be regarded as beggars, even though they were in fact victimized by the atomic bomb ... Almost all thinkers and writers have said that it is not good for the A-

[297] Barker, 138. On Nakabayashi's story, see: http://www2.wilmington.edu/prc/Stories-of-Hope-Hiroshima-Maidens-N1.cfm accessed 5 February 2012

[298] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 26 December 1959.

bomb victims to remain silent; they encourage us to speak out. I detest those who fail to appreciate our feeling about silence. We cannot celebrate 6 August; we can only let it pass away with the dead.[299]

Among the ruins of their lives not all could find redemption in noble causes.

IV. Making choices II: Israel and the Cold War West

The story of Holocaust survivors is vastly more complex and varied than the story of Hiroshima survivors. First, there is the issue of scale. Second, Jews differed from each other in geography, age, gender, class, cultural outlook and, of course, emotional regimes. The reactions of a Bulgarian or Greek working class Jewish male from his peers in Salonica would have been very different from those of an upper class bourgeois German Jewish intellectual female.[300] As Nadav Davidovitch and Rakefet Zalashik point out, after the Holocaust these divisions became, if anything, even more significant for survivors.[301] Besides the Korean and possibly outcast minorities who were discriminated against by other *hibakusha*, no such phenomenon occurred in Hiroshima. Although this makes the drawing of general conclusions quite tricky, one can see some striking similarities in Holocaust survivors and *hibakusha* in the way emotional regimes alternatively constrained, channeled and liberated their emotional reactions.

Hana Yablonka divides the early history of Holocaust survivors in Israel into six different eras: 1) 1945-1948, the struggle for a state; 2) 1948-1949, the war of independence; 3) 1950-1959, stabilization; 4) 1960-1962, the Eichmann trial; 5) 1962-1966, post Eichmann; 6) 1967, the

[299] Cited by Monica Braw, "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Voluntary Silence," in Laura Elizabeth Hein and Mark Selden, *Living with the bomb: American and Japanese cultural conflicts in the Nuclear Age* (M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 157.

[300] In my own family, certainly, a generation old battle was fought between the German urban side of the family and Polish *shtetel* side regarding what was proper and right. Emotional behavior was at the center of these debates. Raised on an ethos of strict emotional control, hard work and the like, my grandmother never quite understood the physical and mental indulgence that came with the "warm Jewish heart" of my other grandmother. For a more sustained (and less personal) look at the attitudes of German Jews to Ost Juden see: Yifaat Weiss, *etniut ve-ezrachut: yehudei germani ve-yehudei polin; 1933-1940,* (Jerusalem: Magnus, 2000).

[301] Nadav Davidovitch and Rakefet Zalashik, "Recalling the Survivors: Between Memory and Forgetfulness of Hospitalized Holocaust Survivors in Israel," I*srael Studies*, Volume 12, Number 2, (Summer 2007), pp. 145-163.

Six-Day War. The demography of those who came to Israel, the kind of information people had, and the attitudes and needs of more veteran Israelis dominated the first two periods, which spanned a time of intense tension and conflict, with the Jewish population in Palestine engaging in a brutal struggle with the British and the Arabs over statehood.[302] Many Israelis were not sympathetic to stories of passive resistance, cooperation and the many moral compromises and gray zones that the Holocaust produced. The ruling ideology (but by no means the reality) was of creating a new man; a new Jew who would stand up to the gentiles and, unlike his relatives, would arm and defend himself. Zionist ideology and imagery were very much influenced by interwar European left politics of antifascism and strong muscular workers. This kind of ideology, as Eric Weitz has demonstrated, had a striking similarity to the fascist right's, which it battled in the streets and which was conducive to violence and an "us vs. them" mentality.[303] Fighting for Zionism provided an immediate outlet for survivors' anger and frustration. This move was made easier because the overwhelming majority of those who came to Israel during those early years were either already members of former partisan groups or otherwise young survivors.[304] For them, the emergence of Jewish nationalism gave a sense of purpose and meaning to lives torn apart by the Holocaust.

The Holocaust, like the bomb, destroyed not just human lives but communities, values, the very structure of meaning for survivors, and their very sense of being human. In his autobiography, Primo Levi wrote of "the shame we knew so well, the shame that drowned us

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[302] Hana Yablonka, Ha-Hok Le-Asiyat Dih Ba-Natzim Ve-Ozreihem: Heibet Nosaf Le-She'e-lat Ha-Yisraelim, Ha-Nitzolim Ve-Ha-Shoah," Cathedra 82(1996), pp. 135–36

[303] Eric D. Weitz, *Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State,* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[304] In those years there was a priority for young-age military immigrants, what some called good "human material," over the sick, infirm and other bad "human material" that emerged from the camps and who the young state could not, so the argument went, absorb. See Davidovitch and Zalashik, p. 147.

after the selections, and every time we had to watch, or submit to some outrage: the shame that the Germans did not know, that the just man experiences at another man's crime; the feeling of guilt that such a crime should exist…"[305] As with bomb survivors' guilt, here one can also see frustration channeled into an effort to "get it right", to "make amends", to give some meaning to the experience.[306] For Primo Levi and others, such as Elie Wiesel (who we will discuss shortly), this effort turned into a lifelong mission to ensure that a crime such as the Holocaust should never be allowed to reoccur. Others, mostly in Israel, found different meaning in their experience.

In the displaced persons (DP) camps and in Israel, rituals of nationalism and the discourse of revenge gave that meaning to young survivors. Beni Weirzberg, who joined the Jewish military forces after their arrival, recalled:

"...We entered one by one through the mysterious door, we stood by the table, with our right hand on a gun and a bible and the second raised up and swore allegiance...in these few seconds when I stood at attention, my hand on the gun, I was overwhelmed by memories –the many moments of panic when I stood in front of Nazi commanders, for whom my life was of no value. They were armed [but] my hands were empty. So, I felt that I am not just swearing allegiance to the Haganah [pre-state military force], but swearing a few other oaths as well: an oath to revenge the blood of my murdered parents and poisoned relatives; an oath to revenge the honor of my oppressed and humiliated people; an oath to revenge the blood of Jews...and then for the first time I felt I was not wrong for having struggled to stay alive; it was worth it, even in the face of my father lying in a pool of blood, just to have reached this day...I felt like a boy who reached adulthood [Weirzberg uses higia lemitzvot, a religious phrase] someone with national responsibility which I would bear with honor...[307]

Thousands like Weirzberg went through these initiation ceremonies while still in Europe. Most of those who came to Israel arrived from the DP camps in Germany. Occupied Germany was home to almost a quarter million Jews in 1945, which included survivors of camps but also

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[305] Primo Levi, *The Reawakening (La Tregua): A Liberated Prisoner's Long March Home Through East Europe*, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 12.

[306] There are numerous works on survivor guilt among Holocaust survivors. For one among many see: Aaron Has, *The Aftermath: Living with the Holocaust* (Cambridge, 1995).

[307] Hanna Yablonka,"olei eropa ve-toda'at ha'shoa," http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=12799.

German, Soviet and other Jews. The camps were the setting for a huge struggle for the allegiance of survivors, a struggle that Zionism won through a combination of ideology, welfare and not without some force.[308] Once established, the camps became a hotbed of emerging Jewish nationalism. The very disparate communities of European Jewry were broken down by the Nazis into a single Jewish people. Jews now (some reluctantly, others more enthusiastically) embraced Israel as their own.

This allegiance to Zionism did not, however, rule out a separate identity. Many survivors stuck to the few people from their own communities or regions that had also survived, forming *Landsmanshaften* in the camps and organizing what Gabriel Finder called "assemblies of bereavement."[309] These functioned as mini-emotional communities in which one could return to the familiar. Also supplying a return to the familiar and a refuge was the new emphasis on family. The baby carriage, as Atina Grossman has shown, was ubiquitous in the DP camps.[310] Survivors rushed to get married, have sex and celebrate life.[311] The overwhelming force motivating survivors, however, was nationalism.

Survivors' nationalism shared an ethos of masculine revenge and anger with the partisans and resisters in the liberated countries of Europe at the time. One could find many similarities between DP's Zionist ethos and the postwar resistance image of a masculine new man redeeming

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[308] See Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 137; also Hagit Lavsky, *New beginnings: Holocaust survivors in Bergen-Belsen and the British zone in Germany, 1945-1950,* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002).

[309] Gabriel Finder, "Yizkor! Commemorations of the Dead by Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar History," in Confino, Betts, and Schumann, *Between Mass Death and Individual Loss*. p. 240.

[310] Grossmann, p. 194.

[311] I have seen no such reports in Hiroshima. Ogura Keiko told of the *hibakusha's* will to live "and forget about what happened." No historical study of *hibakusha* day-to-day life after the war has been done so far. This is partially because so much academic attention has been given to how hibakusha *suffered* rather than how they lived. It is also the result of lack of historical evidence and of the fact that the DP's, unlike the hibakusha, were relatively well cared for in the camps.

the nation's honor after defeat and humiliation. This led to the categorization of survivors arriving in Israel into "resisters," "collaborators" (*judenrat* and the old leadership mostly) and the mass of "pure" martyrs. Most of the young who immigrated to Israel chose to be resisters. While for most this meant fighting and building the state, some took steps in the direction of actual revenge against Germany. Both veterans of the British Army's Jewish Brigade who had lost relatives and former survivors planned and executed revenge on individual Nazis and some even planned for mass poisoning of Germans. One of the former partisans said: "We did not feel the urge to build, rather, we felt the desire to destroy."[312]

This attitude was ultimately not endorsed by the greater public or by Israeli leadership. *Ha'aretz*, one of the leading papers in the *Yishuv* (the pre-state name for the Jewish entity in Palestine), wrote: "the desire for revenge is natural but considered base by European Jewish ethics."[313] This European-Jewish ethic, though, was what many at the time sought to distance themselves from. Yet, it would be simplistic to assume that there was only one emotional regime, only one community. Palestine and the DP camps, unlike Japan, were not subject to censorship, and showed much greater plurality than existed in Hiroshima (and even in Hiroshima, as discussed, it would be a mistake to talk about a single regime). The world the Jews came from was diverse and included both Old Testament calls for an "eye for an eye" and righteous anger, and other, more restrained attitudes which, after a millennia of persecution, tended to repress anger and turn more towards acceptance of faith, not unlike the Japanese *shoganai*. A desire to distance oneself from politics and to restrict oneself to "loving family" was another approach. Many could express desire for revenge and anger at one point, and exclusive care for family at another, seamlessly moving from one sphere to another. As Hagit Lavsky argues, "functional

[312] Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: HiIl & Wang. 1993), p. 141.
[313] Ibid, p. 142.

Zionism", or public Zionism was well separated, for instance, from many DP's private desire to go to America.[314]

If in Europe more choices were available, in Israel –with a brutal ethnic war raging– the harder ethos, which channeled anger into the fight for Israel, became the dominant emotional regime. It was actually the survivors themselves or, rather, the former partisans, who were the main instigators of this ethos. First to arrive in Israel was the Zionist youth leadership, people like Aba Kovner and Rosa Korchak, whose experiences of resistance was welcomed by many in the *Yishuv* who yearned for a heroic narrative. Partisans had a tendency to distance themselves from the majority of survivors and from the old Jewish leadership in the *Judenrats*. The partisans were revolutionaries whose fellow Jews had failed them and they were not above expressing contempt. The phrase "Lambs to the slaughter," we must remember, was coined by Aba Kovner in Vilna, not by anyone in the *Yishuv*. During the 1948 war, Israelis contrasted their "heroic" behavior with the "shameful death" that characterized the Holocaust.[315]

This situation put survivors under considerable emotional strain. Hela Gleinberger, who fought in the war, told a researcher:

> "Remember I told you about the sensitive scar of the Holocaust; on the image of "lambs to the slaughter" I was haunted by? That was not just an outside whip [hetz tzolef –a whipping arrow]. It lived within me; inside, in a permanent struggle: yes, it was true we did go like "lambs to the slaughter" but there in the pits of hell, could we do otherwise? Dealing with such loneliness? Facing these gallows… So to tell you honestly, I had a strong urge to be here in Israel. To prove I am different, that I was not a "lamb" and that when there is a need I could fight."[316]

Hela's anguish is apparent. Her anger was directed not so much against the Nazis or even the Arabs, but against those who did not believe, who did not understand the impossible "choiceless

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[314] Lavsky, p. 216.
[315] Hanna Yablonka, "Nitsolei Ha-Shoa be-Yisrael: Sikumim Rishonim" [Holocaust survivors in Israel; preliminary summary] *Bishvil Ha-Zikaro,* no. 27 (1998) p. 3.
[316] Yablonka, *olei europa,* p.44.

choices" faced by those in the camps.[317] Her guilt and anger was translated into a resolve to fight, to belong. This lack of comprehension; the accusatory questions that seemed to be asking, "how did you stay alive," led many young survivors to a strong belief in their ability to be normal; to be like the ideal of the young warrior society they imagined Israel to be.

Furthermore, the first few post-Holocaust years corresponded to what Christian Pross called a "latent period," a few years when no symptoms of severe mental trauma appeared. [318]During those years survivors usually tried to resume normal life and to find their place in society. Only later, a failure to find relatives (most spent the early years frantically looking for living family members), the end of marriage or any other failure, triggered the end of this period and severe psychological problems began to emerge among survivors. This brief psychological respite was the period during which people tried hardest to be normal again. But, "normal" was defined by what was an acceptable emotional response. Focusing on suffering and victimhood, which had become redeeming in the case of Hiroshima, was not yet acceptable in Israel.

After the 1948 war and with the temporary stabilization of Israel's situation, survivors could retreat into the home. With a different demographic of immigrants, with more diverse age groups, the emotional space for domesticity opened considerably. Many of the survivors now concentrated on making and raising a family. Their plight was not yet politicized on the national level and most activities regarding the Holocaust were now contained within the still very relevant *landsmanshaften.*[319] These supplied solace and a much needed cultural, linguistic and

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[317] The phrase "choiceless choicers" is from Lawrence Langer, 'The Dilemma of Choice in the Death Camps', in J. K. Roth and M. Berenbaum (eds), *Holocaust: Religious and Philosophical Implications*, (New York : Paragon House, 1989), pp. 222-233.

[318] Christian Pross, *Paying for the Past; the Struggle for Reparations for Victims of Nazi Terror, (*Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 92.

[319] These are still very relevant. See the *Haa'retz* article from October 2007 on the participation of younger generations in these organizations' activities. http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/in-their-grandparents-

emotional space which let many maintain contact with the life they had lost.[320] With all ties to the past smashed by the Nazis, people hung on to these remnants of their former communities. Tom Segev tells of a full house meeting of the survivors from Lodz in Poland, held in Tel Aviv in 1990, in which the survivors were still talking and arguing in Yiddish.[321] Much talk about the Holocaust was initially done through these community organizations. Furthermore, as Judith Baumel shows, these were international, with American members of the *landsmanshaften* playing a very active role in commemoration and other activities.[322] One of the most publicized Holocaust causes in the 1950s, the Kapo trials, was almost exclusively a community affair. These trials generated an enormous amount of debate within the communities.

These years, however, are remembered by many as the "great silence." This is misleading. There was never much of a silence. People did talk. Especially during the debates over restitution from the Federal Republic (FRG) and the trials. Nevertheless, for most, these were years when they wished only to forget.[323] There were many reports of new survivor communities flourishing.[324] Many *Kibutzim* were exclusively formed by members of the same former community or linguistic group. One could certainly call this period, as Yablonka did, the era of stability.[325] Many did recover. Hilel Klein cited family as one of the factors that led to a "psychological renewal" among survivors.[326] But for many the wounds remained open.

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footsteps-1.231862, accessed 28 June 2010.

[320] There is not –at least as far as I know– nearly enough research done on the activities of these organizations in Israel.

[321] Segev, p. 458. In my own family, my grandparents were almost religiously devoted to their association.

[322] Judith Baumel, "Le-Zikaron Olam: hantzachat ha-shoa be-yedei ha-prat ve-hakehila be-medinat yisrael" in Rappael, Yoel. ed. *Zikaron galui – Zikaron Samui: Todaat ha-shoa be medinat yisrael* (Tel-Aviv: Massuah, 1998).

[323] Yablonka, "olei europa," p. 52.

[324] Ibid, p. 54.

[325] Ibid.

[326] Hilel Klein, "ha-hipus achar zehut ve-mashmaut bekerev nitzolei ha-shoa," in Yisrael Gutman and Rachel Menber (ed.), *mahanot ha-rikuz harzaot ve-diyunim ba-kinus ha ben-leumi ha-revii shel hokrei ha-shoa,* (Jerusalem: Yad Va-shem, 1984), p.84.

Survivors had to deal with nightmares, anxiety attacks and a constant resurgence of the past, which could be triggered by the most banal events and objects. Survivors had unexplained attacks from the sight of uniforms or striped clothes, dog barks, sirens, screams, the smell of smoke or even almonds (Zyklon B smelled of almonds).[327] In the same manner that the bomb never really left the life of the *hibakusha*, many Holocaust survivors were still living within trauma.

The inability of others to understand and the return of traumatic memories caused many to turn to silence. It is important to separate, however, regarding both *hibakusha* and Holocaust survivors, the private silence of the many from the public discourse of the few. Survivors did talk and were visible in public discourse. This was especially true, as we will see, in Israel after the Eichmann trial. The trial gave many survivors, for the first time, a national stage. The hundreds of testimonies shocked the world and opened a floodgate of testimonies and talk about the Holocaust. These stories, as in Hiroshima, mostly remained framed within accepted narratives. Survivors now had national importance as martyrs. They could incorporate themselves into the national myth of Holocaust and bravery. Many found solace (to return to our discussion of guilt) in being a proud survivor. After Eichmann, survivors in Israel started to identify themselves as such. The effects, for reasons we will examine in later chapters, were much more varied-compared to Hiroshima - in terms of discourses and goals chosen. Still, after Eichmann, some Holocaust survivors chose a surprisingly similar path to the *hibakusha*; a choice that led Annette Wieviorka to call the post-Eichmann era leading up through our own, the "era of the witness."[328]

[327] Pross, *Paying for the Past*, p. 93.
[328] Annette Wieviorka, *The Era of the Witness,* (Cornell University Press, 2006).

This turn is exemplified by a speech given by Elie Wiesel in a 1967 forum entitled, "Jewish Values in the Post-Holocaust Future." The time has come, Wiesel argued, to start being proud survivors.

"We should not be ashamed... Why don't we claim [the Holocaust] as the most glorious chapter in our eternal history...it is still the greatest event in our time. Why then are we ashamed of it? In its power, it even influenced language. Negro quarters are called ghettos; Hiroshima is explained by Auschwitz; Vietnam is described in terms which were used one generation ago...perhaps this should be the task of Jewish educators and philosophers: to reopen the event as a source of pride, to take it back into our history.... I do not like to think of the Jew as suffering...I prefer thinking of him as someone who can defeat suffering his own and others'. For his is a messianic dimension: he can save the world from a new Auschwitz."[329]

Thus, just as the Hiroshima survivors chose and embraced their mission to save the world, choosing the same template, Wiesel elevated the Holocaust survivor into a savior. Wiesel here echoes Primo Levy who talked about "the awful privilege of our generation and of my people, [as] no one better than us has ever been able to grasp the incurable nature of the offence that spreads like contagion."[330] But if Levi's mission was a tortured one, Wiesel, at least here, was triumphant. In his words: "messianic." Wiesel's speech also demonstrates how global this moment of transition was. The Holocaust, in Wiesel's understandably Euro-centric eyes, was everywhere, but the influence also went the other way. The survivor-witness template already existed in the form of the Hiroshima survivor. In both places survivors saw themselves as moving from shame to pride. It was in this move that the figure of the survivor-witness was born.

This was a significant move. However, it is important to remember that, as with the *hibakusha,* most survivors in Israel also chose silence. Most still felt horrible angst and uncertainty. As with *Hibakusha* testimonies, their stories did not fit, they were bursting through

[329] Emil L. Fackenheim et. Al., "Jewish Values in the Post-Holocaust Future: A Symposium," Judaism No. 16 (Summer 1967), pp. 288, 290; Wieviorka, also quote parts of this statement in Ibid, p. 103.
[330] Primo Levi, *The Reawakening (La Tregua): A Liberated Prisoner's Long March Home Through East Europe*, 1st American ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p.13.

the seams of the narratives, they could not express, could not talk. The guilt was too much. As Primo Levi wrote:

"A religious friend had told me that I survived so that I could bear witness. … I must repeat: we the survivors are not the true witnesses. … We survivors are not only an exiguous but also an anomalous minority: we are those who by their prevarications or abilities or good luck did not touch bottom. Those who did so, those who saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute, but they are the 'Muslims,' the submerged, the complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition would have a general significance. … We speak in their stead, by proxy."[331]

Among the deluge of words, silence still rang the loudest.

Conclusion: between shame and pride

The Eichmann trial publicized the survivors' plight. But as with the *hibakusha* in 1955, giving nation-wide stage to their voices resulted in the nationalization of their stories/experiences/testimonies. During the 1960s, both Japan and Israel experienced a nationalization of victimhood. In Israel, this process sped up in the period of national isolation leading up to the 1967 war, when fear of annihilation, of another Holocaust, brought victimhood to the fore of the nation's attention. Some survivors protested and some went along with this process, but most remained quiet. They still could not find the words. This would change later. In post-67 Israel, with the rising influence of consumerism and individuality, survivors transitioned into a new phase, which is generally referred to as the "privatization of the Holocaust." This shift was seen by many as part of the democratization of Israeli memory and the decline of the more restrictive emotional regime that had prevailed during the early years.[332] This development occurred in tandem with the increasing politicization of the Holocaust.

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[331] Primo Levi, "Shame" in *The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), pp. 83-84.

[332] See Daniel Gutwein, "Ha-Hafrata shel ha-Shoah: Politika, zikaron, ve-historiographya" [The Privatization of the Holocaust: Politics, Memory, and Historiography]. *DapimLeH´eker HaShoah*. Vol. 15(1998); Gulie Ne'eman Arad, "Israel and the Shoah: A Tale of Multifarious Taboos," in *New German Critique,* No. 90, Taboo, Trauma, Holocaust, (Autumn, 2003), pp. 5-26

Holocaust testimony and the particularist message of Zionist redemption reinforced this move. Thus, when Holocaust and Hiroshima survivors met, as we will see in chapter four, the result was a strange combination of shared format (testimony) and divergent content. Regardless of what the experience of victimization was used for, in both places, the victim ethos emerged as political tool.

The Eichmann trial, justifiably, was seen as a turning point for these developments. But the trial and the deluge of testimonies that followed reveal something further. As Marian Hirsch and Leo Spitzer argue, K. Tzetnik's famous collapse at the trial "becomes a paradigm for the aporia of Holocaust testimony - the necessity and the impossibility of bearing witness to the "Planet Auschwitz."[333] There was never a simple move from silence to testimony. Whether survivors chose to speak or to remain silent depended on the confluence of emotional and other factors examined above. The process was varied, meant different things for different survivors, and involved a complex dialectic between experience, emotion, and the survivor's politics, Trauma, which will be discussed in the next chapter, and the evolving understanding of the term, also had a significant influence on the way testimony was expressed and understood.

These difficulties meant that, in terms of both Hiroshima and the Holocaust, the survivors who spoke out were relatively few. But their decision to come forward has made them into a symbol and benefited their cause. Maya Todeschini called women *hibakusha* "illegitimate sufferers," but at least in our context, this was hardly the case.[334] Far from being illegitimate, the suffering of the *hibakusha* was what legitimated and supported their cause. Suffering became not only a political tool, but, in effect, a particular knowledge that conferred on the *hibakusha* an

[333]Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer, "The Witness in the Archive," *Memory Studies*, May 2009, p. 5

[334] Maya Todeschini, "Illegitimate Sufferers: A-bomb Victims, Medical Science, and the Government," Daedalus, Vol. 128, (1999) pp. 67-100.

authority and a messianic mission. This in turn made *hibakusha* into "moral witnesses," a move that had implications well beyond the realm of commemorative politics and the *hibakusha* movement itself. The shift occurred due to particularities internal to the *hibakusha* and survivor experience and due to the way the meaning of being survivors evolved over time. Both trajectories were dialectically related to and shaped by external emotional styles and structures of power. In Hiroshima, this resulted in a very peculiar victim-hero who directed her anger into activism, and who not only refrained from challenging the existing structures of power and knowledge, but who actually supported them. The emotional logic of inclusion and sentimentality, by its very nature, served to forward universalism. The maidens (and in a similar yet much more bizarre fashion Kikawa's wish to become a guinea pig), were the ultimate symbol of the move by which science could redeem, via their bodies, its past mistakes.

Science and American benevolence were supposed to contain, protect and alleviate the damage done by the bomb and testimony's subversive potential. This was the case not only with medical science and Atomic energy, but also up to the 1960s with psychiatry. The task of all of these disciplines was to return the *hibakusha* and the survivors, and society as a whole, to normalcy after the trauma of the bomb and the Holocaust. Even scientists within the peace movement shared this belief. In the mid-fifties and early sixties, however, a new breed of scientists and activists began to develop a critique of the earlier postwar discourse on victims and trauma and, by doing so, brought together the victims of Hiroshima and the Holocaust. It is to these developments that we now must turn.

Chapter 3: Healing a Sick World: Robert Lifton, PTSD, and the psychiatric reassessment of survivors and trauma

It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of trauma to recent public discourse and historical studies. Within this discourse the Holocaust stands out as the defining traumatic event

of the twentieth century. The discourse of trauma, Andreas Huyssen wrote, "radiates out from a multi-national, ever more ubiquitous Holocaust discourse, [and] is energized…by the intense interest in witness and survivor testimonies, and then merges with the discourses about AIDS, slavery, family violence and so on."[335] What is missing from Huyssen and the legion of similar observations, though, is that the Holocaust was only a part of a larger constellation which brought about PTSD and trauma studies. This included work on Vietnam vets, Hiroshima survivors and rape victims. The over-concentration on the Holocaust serves to undermine enquiries into the historical trajectory which led to the establishment of PTSD and the trauma paradigm's rise to prominence. What this chapter aims to do is re-position the Holocaust as part of this constellation and trace the interconnected global and local histories, whose intersection helped propel trauma "forward" into the establishment of PTSD. Scholars of trauma, their excellent research notwithstanding, tend to focus on the West. [336] They ignore developments in the "periphery," tend to focus on the big names, and generally ignore the importance of other trajectories and the larger history of the way societies dealt with the tragedies of WW II. This chapter aims to fill this gap and incorporate the history of trauma in Hiroshima and Israel into the larger history of trauma.

This is important, as it would be impossible to tell the story of Hiroshima and Holocaust commemoration and survivors without the history of trauma. What partially explains trauma's power was that it gave us the ability and the language with which it could speak about the

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[335] Quoted in Svenja Goltermann, "The imagination of Disaster: Death and Survival in Postwar West Germany." In Alon Confino, Paul Betts, and Dirk Schumann, *Between Mass Death and Individual Loss: The Place of the Dead in the Twentieth-Century Germany* (Berghahn Books, 2011), p. 261.

[336] See among others: Fassin and Rechtman, *The Empire of Trauma*. Leys, *Trauma*; Young, *The Harmony of Illusions*; Jolande Withuis and Annet Mooij, *The Politics of War Trauma: The Aftermath of World War II in Eleven European Countries* (Amsterdam University Press, 2011). Jo Stanley, "Involuntary Commemorations: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Relation to Commemoration," in Timothy Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, *Commemorating War: The Politics of Memory* (Transaction Publishers, 2004), pp. 240-261.

unspeakable. In so doing, the reach of what could be included in the category of trauma was greatly expanded. As Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman argued, "Whereas previously trauma related to the individual and subjective experience, the concept was now enlarged to represent a universal human experience. It became locus of a particular kind of knowledge."[337] This knowledge, as we saw in the last chapter, was knowledge of the extreme; of the horror of the past and the unspeakable and horrible possibilities of the future. And it is exactly this "particular kind of knowledge" that survivors possessed. Trauma legitimized survivors. It conferred on survivors' testimonies medical and scientific authority. It made it into acceptable truth. One could not explain the rise of the survivors without the rise of trauma. The two developments were interconnected and both were entangled with the larger historical shifts in the meaning of the tragedy of WW II examined in this study.

This is, again, not the first time the two phenomena were linked. The category of trauma has been widely used in the context of historical memory. As Svenja Goltermann noted however, much of the application of trauma within the field ignores the fact that trauma and PTSD are constructed historical categories. Neither of them were available or (with trauma) were understood very differently up to the 1960s. [338] Social scientists', and especially memory studies', tendency to explain collective tragedy through the prism of trauma is far-fetched and ahistorical at best. One could not explain, as Ruth Amir did for instance in her recent study on the politics of victimhood in Israel, the rise of the Holocaust importance in the seventies (and the thirty years delay in its rise) with the "latent period of trauma."[339]

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[337] Fassin and Rechtman, *The Empire of Trauma,* p. 72.
[338] Goltermann, pp. 262-263.
[339] Ruth Amir, Ha-politika shel ha-korbanut: tikun avalot historiyot be-yisrael (Tel-Aviv: Resling, 2012), p. 63

This is not to say that trauma is unusable as a paradigm, or, although constructed, it is in any way less real. What histories of trauma demonstrate is that, especially with a mental category, developments in science reflect and, at times, even cause developments in the way survivors perceived themselves and explained their experience. What this chapter seeks to capture is the complex dynamics between survivors, especially the politically committed ones who stepped forward as witnesses, and medical professionals. This dialectic of science and politics helped propel trauma from being a relatively obscure category to its current state. This is not to say that progress was linear and that "forward" was the only direction in which events unfolded. As with commemoration, the dynamics of change were multifaceted and causality is, at times, very hard to trace. As Robert Lifton, one of the principle actors in this drama, told the author, when talking about the move from trauma to PTSD, one could not talk about "a specific event or specific action [that caused it] as much as an evolving consciousness."[340]

Some patterns, however, do emerge. The response of psychiatry to the tragedy of WW II largely reflected and was a part of larger developments in the postwar history of Hiroshima and the Holocaust. As with the larger history, one could see a move from domestication and control of the subversive effects of the bomb and the camps (which also meant a dismissal and minimizing of the long term psychological damage of both - i.e. trauma), to a rise in the status of survivors and interest in trauma. As with the history of survivors and commemoration, this history changed in the sixties following the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials and the intense debates over restitution. Although primarily driven by developments in the study of the Holocaust, Hiroshima research, which was brought to the West largely through the work of Robert J. Lifton, played an important role in this transformation. What Lifton did was to transmit

[340] Author Interview with Robert Lifton, 9 June 2011.

and translate Hiroshima survivors' political usage of their experience into a universal scientific knowledge. Hiroshima's largely overlooked contribution allowed for the "enlargement of the human consciousness" and universalization of the category in the seventies beyond the relatively narrow confines of "survivor syndrome," which made the survivor paradigm applicable to other groups from feminists to minorities; the first step in the making of the category of trauma into the powerful explanatory paradigm which it is today.[341]

I. Healing a sick world: The WHO, atomic energy and the globalization of psychiatry after WW II

Following World War II, psychiatrists and other mental health experts the world over had to deal with an unprecedented number of refugees, veterans, bombing victims, concentration camp prisoners and others who were suffering from the consequences of the global conflict. This moment was also a moment of unprecedented institutionalization and globalization of the world health system. The IRO (International Refugee Organization the predecessor of UNHCR), WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF and other global bodies were formed (or greatly expanded) at the time and served as both the principal providers of medical and other aid to refugees and others and as a forum for exchange of ideas and standardization of the profession. Given the enormous suffering brought about by the war, one would think that the issue of trauma would be in the center of these debates. But in the immediate postwar that was far from being the case. Trauma and its ramification were not high on the priority lists of these organizations. Quite the contrary, the prevailing attitude among psychiatrists was to minimize long-term psychological damage and emphasize victims' and society's ability to recover. Furthermore, psychiatrists in the WHO and other organizations, rather than treating victims of the war and of oppression, sought to protect

[341] Fassin and Rechtman, *The Empire of Trauma,* p. 72.

society as a whole from what they saw as the greater threat of "irrational anxieties," which might lead to another conflict. This move allowed them, this section argues, to repackage the bomb and fascism not as political problems but as psychological ones, further deflecting the hard questions brought about by modernity's worst war.

In 1946, George Brock Chisholm, a Canadian psychiatrist, one of the founders of the World Federation for Mental Health (WFMH -formed in 1948), and first director of the WHO, wrote "The world was sick, and the ills from which it was suffering were mainly due to the perversion of man...his inability to live at peace with himself."[342] Chisholm and others set out to cure this world, through a campaign to educate the world (and the field of psychiatry) and create "healthy" citizens and society. What was at stake for Chisholm and his colleagues was humans' apparent inability to deal with the new threatening possibilities of technology. Abe Fortas, the US under Secretary of the Interior enthusiastically embraced Chisholm's ideas in his foreword to Chisholm's article in the February 1946 issue of *Psychiatry*, "the human past is no longer suitable to the material present…we have now reached a point where drastic readjustment for human personality and conduct appears necessary for survival." In the article Chisholm wrote, after noting the possibilities brought about by atomic warfare, "Unless we can remake ourselves – unless in every country there are large numbers of mature, reasonable people, free of guilt and inferiorities, there may be none of us left, not even to bury the dead."[343] Other psychiatrists agreed, as Franz Alexander wrote in *Mental Hygiene*: "The central psychological problem of our time is the need for rapid adjustment to our ever changing conditions."[344] In order to remake

[342] See WFMH website http://www.wfmh.org/03Briefhistory.htm accessed March 21, 2012.
[343] G. Brock Chisholm and Henry A. Wallace, *The reestablishment of peacetime society: responsibility of psychiatry, responsibility of psychiatrists; panel discussion of the first lecture,* (Baltimore: William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1946), p. 1.
[344] Franz Alexander, "Mental Hygiene in the Atomic Age," *Mental Hygiene,* XXX, (1946), p. 531.

humans Chisholm and the WHO called for a dramatic increase in the number of psychiatrists and for a larger role for psychiatry in society.[345]

This grand scheme for curing society did not leave much space for treating the victims themselves. Furthermore, in some cases, drawing on the theory of "mental hygiene," psychiatrists even treated victims of the war, who suffered from plenty of "guilt and inferiorities" as a consequence of it, as a threat and a liability to their project of building a "normal" and "healthy" postwar society. This was in line with a long tradition in psychiatry which viewed trauma victims suspiciously. From psychiatry's first encounters with trauma, in train and industrial accidents and then in the First World War, sufferers were seen as malignant, lazy and desiring of pension. [346] Chisholm himself, as a mental health officer in the Canadian army during the war, blamed the high percentage of breakdowns on mental defects caused by bad upbringing.[347] Trauma, for him, was not the effect of the dehumanizing experience of war, but of previous childhood experiences. Those soldiers were for him not treatable and posed a risk to society. Chisholm understood fascism and twentieth century violence more generally, to

[345] In a 1949 conference the WHO adopted Chisholm's recommendations and decided to focus on prevention and promoting mental health of the community as a whole through the application of mental hygiene and expansion of psychiatric services as part of the rebuilding of postwar society. See World Health Organization, *The World Health Organization: the first Ten Years* (Geneva: WHO, 1958), p. 325.

[346] Doctors throughout this history mostly put society's defense in front of treating the victims. At the end of WW I, a Belgian doctor wrote in atypical remark, ""It is time for us to revise our ideas about traumatic neurosis and shell shock. The end of the war will probably leave us in deep economic disarray. It is essential that at this time the state's fragile budget is not endangered by thousands of parasites leaching money from it" if we are not careful…we will see a legion of false war invalids. Our duty as doctors is to defend the community against such abuses." Fassin and Rechtman, *The Empire of Trauma*., p. 64 As Paul Lerner, Ruth Leys and others have shown this attitude was persistent through most armies and among civilian doctors at least up to WW II, when Military psychiatrists in the U.K. and U.S. had more humane attitudes towards battlefield shell shock. The issue of long-term affects however was a different one and in here compensation was almost always out of the question. See Paul Lerner, *Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry, and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 1890-1930.* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003) and Leys' introduction to *Trauma*.

[347] Ian R. Dowbiggin, "Prescription for Survival: Brock Chisholm, Sterilization and Mental Health in the Cold War era," In: David Wright and James E. Moran, (Eds.) *Mental health and Canadian Society: Historical Perspectives* (Montreal; Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), p. 179, p. 182. Chisholm also blamed Santa Claus and Canadian mothers' indulgence of their kids for making Canadian soldiers soft and unfit for trench warfare and thus prone for traumatic neurosis.

be at least a partial consequence of the prevalence of mental defects in prewar society. Those he attributed, in a peculiar mix of progressive critique of modernity's disruptions, tradition's anachronistic hold on humanity and contempt for mental patients, to bad education by parents who are "making a thousand neurotics for every one that psychiatrists can hope to help with."[348] "The psychiatrist knows," wrote Chisholm, "that individuals who have emotional disabilities of their own guilt, fears, inferiorities, are certain to project their hates on others, on groups, communities, or nations…they are the people who must believe the worst of all foreigners and who react emotionally and irrationally to these beliefs."[349] Thus, society, Chisholm concluded, should act to protect itself.

One principal field where survivors' anxieties were seen as a threat was in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Mental health professionals in the WHO and other international bodies, on both sides of the cold war divide, enthusiastically cooperated with "Atoms for Peace" campaigns. The main thrust of these efforts was to argue that critics of the atom were emotional and irrational. This was standard fare at the time. Oceanographer Roger Revelle wrote in 1956 that "ignorance and emotionalism" characterized those who resisted dumping radioactive wastes at sea. Nuclear physicist Edward Teller deplored the fact that plans to use nuclear explosions for construction purposes (Plowshare projects) were abandoned

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[348] Chisholm and Wallace, *The Reestablishment of Peacetime society,* p. 17. On one hand Chisholm wrote, "It is easy to find excuses for the bewilderment of this generation. In the beginning of this century many values and certainties which have since come a drift were well anchored in community sanction." "Then," Chisholm argued, "cars and movies and the stock exchange," ruined age-old certainties, " there was nothing for reason to hold on to. Wealth, power, and prestige seemed to have no relationship to personal integrity." Chisholm solution though was not to go back to old certainties but to completely get rid of traditions and established a rational world government. To achieve this, "it is necessary," wrote Chisholm, "to remove from the minds of men their individualism, loyalty to family tradition, national patriotism, and religious dogmas. We have swallowed all manner of poisonous certainties fed us by our parents, our Sunday and day school teachers, our politicians, our priests. The reinterpretation and eventual eradication of the concept of right and wrong which has been the basis of child training, the substitution of intelligent and rational thinking for faith in the certainties of old people, these are the belated objectives for charting the changes in human behavior." Ibid., pp. 17, 7.

[349] Ibid., p.16.

because "ignorance and prejudice prevailed."[350] UNESCO, the WHO and other UN bodies, as well as the WMFH all embraced the American agenda and did all they could to tackle these fears, thus characterizing opponents of nuclear energy, which included many *hibakusha,* as paranoid and of possessing "irrational pathological fear."[351] In a rare demonstration of early Cold War cooperation between the powers, Soviet representatives fully supported this particular U.S. agenda.[352]

This effort was in line with the wider effort to minimize publicity of the effects of the bomb. As Susan Lindee has demonstrated, the ABCC, both in Japan and the US, actively concealed and distorted the effects of radiation in its reports.[353] In the UN Atomic Energy conference in Geneva in 1955, the American Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) canceled a paper on genetics because it mentioned Hiroshima.[354] The U.S actively campaigned to get assessment of atomic energy out of the hands of scientists and doctors in the UN who were critical of its programs. In the WHO, where it was paying most of the bills, it received the cooperation of Chisholm and others who enthusiastically supported its agenda. With the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) fast approaching, the WFMH met in 1956 and 1957 to brainstorm ways in which it could help control public fear about atomic energy. Chisholm and anthropologist Margaret Mead led these meetings.[355] The WHO and

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[350] Jacob Darwin. Hamblin, "Exorcising Ghosts in the Age of Automation: United Nations Experts and Atoms for Peace," *Technology and Culture* 47, no. 4 (2006): pp. 734-735.
[351] Hans Hoff, "Mental Health Implications in the Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy," in Otto Klinberg (ed.), *Social Implications of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy*, (Paris: UNESCO, 1964), p. 100.
[352] See "Expert Meeting on the Social and Moral Implications of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," (UNESCO House 15-19 September 1958), Folder 620.992/ 3 A 06 (44) UNESCO Archives, Paris and A. Zvorkine, "Social and Moral Problems of the Scientific and Technical Revolution of our Time," in Otto Klineberg, *Social Implications of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy* (UNESCO, 1964).
[353] Susan Lindee, *Suffering Made Real: American Science and the Survivors at Hiroshima*, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1994).
[354] Hamblin, Hamblin, and Darwin, "Exorcising Ghosts in the Age of Automation," p. 738.
[355] Ibid, pp.745, 748.

UNESCO, adopted much of the WFMH position when they launched an extensive investigation into the mental health, social and other effects of nuclear energy.[356]

Encapsulating the UN position, a UNESCO report stated, "There are dangers in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but they should not be exaggerated, nor it should be forgotten that many other useful developments, in transportation, industrial production, medicine etc., have also their drawbacks…[these fears] are rational…a psychiatrist sees other, deeper fears and anxieties, not easily allayed by providing scientific information, because they are unconscious fantasies, and give rise to irrational reactions."[357] The argument was that atomic energy was not different from other industrial developments and that fearing it was irrational. Psychiatry's role, as it was with other developments in modern capitalism, was to help these who could not adapt to the modern world. The WHO 1957 report on Atomic energy defined its objective as examining atomic energy's, "effects on mental health [which] can come either directly from influence of radiation on the nervous system or strong psychological reactions [i.e. non-somatic]… that will have to be considered more or less pathological," and which are "caused by "man's encounter… [With the] shattering possibilities of atomic power."[358] Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors' experience however was hardly mentioned in these deliberations. Both UNESCO and WMFH/WHO action came after the October 1957 nuclear accident at Windscale plant in Cumberland, England. Rather than alarming scientists to the dangers of nuclear energy the accident spurred the UN to further combat what they saw as the prejudices and panic, which was exhibited by local populations. The accident, pointed out WMFH director Frank Fermon-

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[356] World Health Organization, "Mental Health Aspects of the Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy: a Report of a Study group," (Geneva 21-26 October 1957) in WHO/ MH/ AE 1-2 (1957-1958), WHO archives, Geneva, p. 3. I thank Harry Wu for this reference.
[357] Otto Klineberg introduction to , *Social Implications of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,* pp. 10-11..
[358] World Health Organization, "Mental Health Aspects of the Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy," p. 4.

Smith (citing local papers), "produced something approaching panic among the local population."[359] This "panic" had wide impacts on local resistance to nuclear plants. "Although," decried the WHO report, "[they] have been presented with evidence that atomic energy has no health risk to population around the plant," local communities irrationally oppose Atomic plants. The resistance of the population, according to the WHO report was, "an expression of fear which is displaced and irrational."[360] Anxieties about atomic energy were connected to, "thoughts and fantasies about the danger of nuclear bomb." These "fantasies" included "irrational fears" following nuclear tests which "conflict with many official pronouncements put out about risks and safety measures," taken by authorities. [361] Similar language was employed by the ABCC and Japanese scientists when *hibakusha* and others resisted nuclear tests and atomic energy in Hiroshima. When the US sent an "Atoms for Peace" exhibit to Hiroshima, *hibakusha* who were against it were accused of being "over anxious" and "against progress." [362]

WHO and UNESCO efforts were very much in line with domestic U.S research that sought to minimize and control public reaction to the bomb and atomic energy. The central enterprise for these efforts was the project "East River." The project involved government-sponsored research undertaken by a consortium of Ivy League universities known as "Associated Universities, Inc." The resulting report from this project became a blueprint for civil defense "emotion management" for the early Cold War.[363] The main idea was that mass panic was worse

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[359] Frank Fermont-Smith, "The mental health aspects of the peaceful use of atomic energy.," *The American journal of orthopsychiatry* 28, no. 3 (1958),p. 456.
[360] World Health Organization, "Study Group on Mental Health Aspects of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." p. 21.
[361] Ibid.,p. 16.
[362] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, March 22 1956. For the story of Atomic Energy in Hiroshima see: Ran Zwigenberg, "The Coming of a Second Sun": The 1956 Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan's Embrace of Nuclear Power," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* Vol. 10, Issue 6 No 1, (February 6, 2012).
[363] Guy Oakes, "The Cold War System of Emotion Management: Mobilizing the Home Front for World War III," in Robert Jackall, ed., *The Age of Propaganda* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 275.

than the bomb itself. As Edward C. Adams told the California Medical association in 1954, "terrible as an atomic bomb is, it is probable that unless the public were adequately prepared, the terror and fear would exceed the facts in the event of attack." [364] As Guy Oaks and Andrew Grossman argued, American planners' logic was that preventing public panic and controlling anxiety would enable America to fight and win a nuclear war. So the administration embarked on a plan "for the administration and control of public emotions about nuclear war."[365] Social scientists in general and psychiatrists in particular had a special place in "defending" America from this threat. This was very much in line with Chisholm's ideas for the WHO. In order to protect US citizens from what they called "unwarranted panic," psychiatrists and psychologists turned to the experience of WW II and the psychological effects of mass bombing and the A-bomb. This started as early as 1946 when the Social Science Research Council established a committee to study the social effects of the bomb.[366] This heralded an onslaught of research on the bomb's social effect, prompting some to call for, "a second Manhattan project," this time for the social sciences, to deal with the bomb's supposedly revolutionary impact on society.[367]

Research on Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors in the US was almost exclusively done as part of these projects. Here as well there was a tendency to minimize the effects of the bomb while at the same time insisting on the need for more psychiatrists to deal with these effects. Much of this was about budgets and affirming the place of psychiatry in the vast expansion of American social science after the war. This expansion was, as Robert Jacobs pointed out,

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[364] Edward C. Adams, "Psychological Aspects of Atomic Disaster," in *California Medicine,* Vol. 81, No. 1 (July 1954), p. 54; Guy Oakes and Andrew Grossman, "Managing Nuclear Terror: The Genesis of American Civil Defense Strategy," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 5, no. 3 (1992): 361–403.
[365] Ibid., p. 361.
[366] Ibid., p. 368.
[367] Robert A Jacobs, *The dragon's tail : Americans face the atomic age* (Amherst, Mass: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010), p. 45.

"intimately tied to the growth of American power."[368] Irving L. Janis, a Yale psychologist and a Rand Corporation adviser, defined the new mission of psychiatry, in a much cited article, telling readers that he set out to find out "what can psychiatry and its allied professions, psychology and sociology, contribute to the prevention of untoward mass reactions and to the prevention of individual personality disorders."[369] In line with this mission of reducing panic, Janis actively worked to minimize the psychological effects of the bomb. He assured readers, drawing on WW II experiences, that, "chronic psychological reactions (such as traumatic neurosis) occurred very rarely as result of bombing."[370] This did not mean there were no effects at all. Aerial Bombings, argued Janis drawing on Hiroshima research done by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), "have the effect of temporarily shattering the individual's psychological defenses… in Hiroshima and Nagasaki intense emotional reactions were linked with subjective awareness of personal vulnerability."[371] The emphasis in Janis argument was, however, that these effects were temporary and could easily be relieved with proper and immediate psychiatric attention; a sort of psychiatric triage which would be set up close to the stricken cities.[372] The USSBS research, as well as related ABCC research however, which Janis and other relied on, persistently minimized the hazardous effects of the bomb (and with it American responsibility for it). This effort meshed up nicely with the effort by Janis and other social scientists to minimize the fear of the bomb and its effects and make it "manageable."

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[368] Ibid., p.54.
[369] Ibid., p. 55.
[370] Irving L. Janis, "*Psychological Problems of A-Bomb Defense*," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 6, No. 8-9 (August-September 1950), p. 256. Janis was specific about this at the moment there are insufficient numbers of trained psychiatrists, psychotherapists, and psychiatric social workers…in fact, this is one of the most critical shortages of skilled personal we face." Ibid., pp. 258-259.
[371] Ibid, p. 257.
[372] Ibid, p. 258.

Cultural stereotypes and wishful thinking often mixed in researchers' thinking. Dwight Chapman assured his readers that "there was no panic in Hiroshima."[373] Chapman, who also drew on the USSBS research, attributed this to "Japanese stoicism," and implied, in the same manner the USSBS was prone of doing, that the American people could learn a thing or two from the Japanese in matters of fighting spirit.[374] Indeed, the real target of psychiatrists and others seemed to be the American people. Americans were, "corrupted by mass consumption... [were] addicted to pleasure and…had become morally decadent."[375] Americans needed to be educated, informed and managed. The alternative was panic and mayhem. As Chapman argued, "the outright psychiatric effects of air attack observed during the last war are not alarming. On the other hand, however, some rather small disasters in American communities have produced some psychosomatic complaints among survivors and put extra strain on doctors and hospitals."[376] In order to educate Americans and prevent "panic and irrational reactions," it became necessary to minimize any lasting psychological effects.

Together with the effort to minimize American culpability in the bomb's destruction, the campaign looked to make atomic energy acceptable and attractive, and the WHO and others' quest of curing humanity's psychiatric ills (rather than individual humans), these different histories represented a trial at repackaging the bomb as a problem of psychology, and abstract one as such, rather than a political problem. This environment was not conducive for doing research on the very real psychological effects of the bomb, and the war in general, on survivors. This changed in the late fifties and sixties when another generation of younger, more

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[373] Dwight Chapman, "Some Psychological Problems in Civil defense, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* vol. 9 no 7. (Sep 1953), p. 280.
[374] Ibid.
[375] Oakes and Grossman, "Managing Nuclear Terror," p. 364.
[376] Chapman, p. 282.

sympathetic psychologists started to question and challenge old assumptions about social sciences' role in society. Before we turn to those however, we need to step back and take a closer look at how psychiatry and psychology were done "on the ground" in communities affected by the bomb, and how global trends influenced the very local issue of how to treat what was becoming clearly the growing problem of "A-bomb neurosis" in Japan.

II. Psychiatry and the Bomb II – Japan

Japanese psychiatry has a poor record in regards to trauma. In spite of massive dislocations, an intense urban bombing campaign and the deployment of atomic weapons, Japanese psychiatry paid only scant attention to the topic. This was especially evident when it came to the victims of the A-Bomb. Japanese psychiatrists between 1945 and 1970 undertook only a dozen or so researches of *hibakusha*. It was only in the 1970s that mental health professionals, followings Robert Lifton's work, started to confront the "wounds of the heart" (*kokoro no kizu* – as trauma was called in Japan before PTSD) of the survivors, and it would take another major disaster in the 1990s (the Kobe Earthquake – an effort in which Lifton was also involved), to integrate PTSD into the jargon.[377] Trauma was just not available for Japanese doctors, who, in any case, mostly chose to shun the subject. Some doctors, following their colleagues' pioneering and politically committed work on radiation sickness did conduct research. Nevertheless, they consistently avoided drawing any definite conclusions or offering any methodological insights as to treatment or further research. Much of this can be attributed to the messiness of their findings. Like their counterparts in Europe, who dealt with Holocaust survivors, Japanese psychiatrists found it hard to draw straight lines between cause and effect,

[377] Nishimoto Minaao and Matsumoto Kazuo, "saigai no shinshi hoken gakuteki kenkyu: hanshin daijishinsai 6 nen ato ni okeru," in *Jinbun ronkyu* Vol 52. No. 3 (2002); Joshua Breslau, "Globalizing disaster trauma : psychiatry, science and culture after the Kobe Earthquake," *Ethos Society for Psychological Anthropology* (2000). Lifton interview.

between the experience of being bombed and the symptoms of traumatic neurosis. Time and again, they referred to countless other factors and variables and conclude with a "perhaps" or a "probability of" connection between the two phenomena. Most of the times they just refused to draw conclusions. It is easy to understand Robert Lifton, who, frustrated with his Japanese colleagues, commented after meeting Kubo Yoshitoshi of Hiroshima University, "as in the case of so many contacts with Japanese psychologists, I found our talk curiously unsatisfying, and it was hard to tell exactly what he was after in his studies."[378]

There was more than just the messiness of the evidence or the meekness of Japanese psychiatrists in the failure to deal with the victims. The situation in which doctors were operating (or rather not operating) was not conducive to research. This was the result of a number of factors. First, severe censorship in the early years after the war curtailed any research related to the bomb. Second, cultural stereotypes and social taboos prevented many survivors from seeking help or even openly taking about their suffering. Third, Japanese psychiatry, which was heavily influenced by German psychiatric culture, was traditionally hostile to trauma. Fourth, the peculiar nature of radiation and its unknown character made it hard to distinguish between physical and mental affects. Fifth, and as a result of the above, no compensation schemes were set for mental injuries, hence – in stark contrast to the Holocaust case - there was no institutional incentive to work for (or against) compensation for survivors, And, finally, as discussed above, medical science as a whole was not open to the idea of trauma at the time.

The first to encounter and write about trauma in Japan were, as in the West, doctors who dealt with military casualties and industrial accidents. Not much is known about the industrial aspect but the military's attitude is telling. The Japanese military reliance on its superior "spirit"

[378] Robert Lifton to David Riesman, 10 April 1962. Box 15, Folder 8 (1962) The Robert J. Lifton Papers, The New York Public Library: the Manuscripts and Archives Division (NYPL- MSA), p. 14.

made it even harder than it was in the West to accept psychiatric suffering.[379] Doctors stressed their roles in preventing these casualties from influencing the fighting spirit of other troops. Similarly to German doctors, who during WW I dismissed combat trauma as hysteria, Japanese military doctors tended to downplay symptoms and tried to return shell-shocked soldiers to their units as far as possible.[380] This was no coincidence, as Japanese psychiatry was heavily influenced by Germany.[381] The German psychiatric establishment was, as Paul Lerner and others showed, quite allergic to trauma. After WW I psychiatrists dismissed trauma as a category for receiving pension and categorized soldiers as having a "pension neurosis."[382] Japanese doctors used the exact same language as German doctors to dismiss traumatized soldiers' claims for compensation. Soldiers who claimed to be mentally hurt during their service suffered from a "compensation neurosis" (*hoshō shinkeishō*). [383]

The first mental health professionals who went to Hiroshima and Nagasaki displayed a similar bias. Immediately after the bombing the Japanese military sent a delegation to the two cities to ascertain the medical needs and effects of the new weapon. This delegation included two psychiatrists sent by Tokyo Imperial University's Uchimura Yūshi, one of the founders of Japanese psychiatry: Okada Key and Shimizano Yasuo. The two were sent to perform autopsies and collect samples of brains, for the purpose of ascertaining radiation damage, rather than

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[379] Janice Matsumura "State Propaganda and Mental Disorders: The Issue of Psychiatric Casualties among Japanese Soldiers during the Asia-Pacific War," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (Winter 2004), p. 808.
[380] Ibid, p 807. For Germany see: Paul Lerner, *Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry, and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 1890-1930.* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
[381] See George Blowers, "Freud's Deshi: the Coming of Psychoanalysis to Japan" Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 33 (2) (2001), pp. 115-126.
[382] Christian Pross, *Paying for the Past; the Struggle for Reparations for Victims of Nazi Terror, (*Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 93.
[383] Matsumura," State Propaganda," p. 828.

questioning survivors.[384] This was not surprising as Uchimura, who shortly thereafter went to Hiroshima himself, was quite dismissive of trauma. Though he experienced the fire-bombing personally, he admitted only "some anxiety for my family," and was actually "thrilled by the danger of bombings."[385] Very similarly to contemporary American attitudes to trauma, Uchimura, "expected that numbness and despair would last only a short time."[386] He, "have heard that refugees from bombed out London had suffer from emotional paralysis and depersonalization," but expected Japanese to react differently.[387]

Uchimura's implied racial bias reflected his, and Japanese psychiatry's, long relationship with colonial psychiatry. Uchimura himself worked in New Guinea and did extensive research on native Ainu psychology in Hokkaido. Like his counterparts in Taiwan and other colonial settings, Uchimura found Ainu to be "child-like," and "prone to rage."[388] The same racial attitude also hindered previous research into trauma. Naka Shyuzu, in Taiwan, did extensive study on reactions to earthquakes and found many to suffer from 'Emotionslähmung' (emotional paralysis), which is characterized by an empty expression of the face and the inability to think.[389] Naka compared these findings with shellshock among European soldiers but concluded that these

[384] This preference for physical over psychological inquiry was typical of Japanese psychiatry at the time, which, again, following the German tradition was heavily biased towards somatic explanations and keen to connect psychological to physical phenomenon. Beside Uchimura students there were no other psychologists or psychiatrists at the Japanese team or later Japanese-America medical teams who went to the two cities. Consequentially, with the exception of the (heavily biased and delayed) USSBS surveys, there were no psychological surveys of survivors done immediately after the war.
[385] Yushi Uchimura, *Waga ayumishi seishin igaku no michi* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1968), p. 251.
[386] Ibid., p. 252.
[387] Ibid., p. 251.
[388] Fujiwara Shigeru who worked in Taiwan spoke of natives: "child-like' and 'emotionally centered' character. See Harry Yi-Jui Wu, "Vicissitudes of Trauma: Three Case Studies in 20th Taiwan" presented in "Emotional styles – Communities and Spaces" Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, (July 2010), p. 4.
[389] Ibid., p. 5.

symptoms among Taiwanese "were associated with altered autonomic nervous systems, influenced by tropical weather."[390]

Even if Japanese researchers were inclined towards trauma research, American censorship and their own self-censorship kept many away from bomb related research.[391] Uchimura told of a rumor that an American psychiatrist with the occupation forces came to Tokyo University and threatened anyone who did research on the bomb with immediate arrest.[392] Uchimura and his team however soon started to collaborate with the Americans. The way this research was initiated demonstrated how global research networks were at the time. Uchimura, who studied in Germany, received a letter from a colleague in Munich who asked him to contact a fellow researcher named Webb Heimekar from a Washington D.C. institute then in Japan with the army. Heimekar worked with Uchimura in Tokyo and took many documents with him back to the U.S. (Uchimura was worried that other American would not be able to use them as these were all in German). This initiated a long cooperation between Uchimura and his American colleagues in researching the effects of radiation on the brain.[393] This relationship reflected the emerging strong relationship between American and Japanese medicine and the move from German to American models.

Whether they were following German or American models, Japanese researchers were still quite hostile to psychogenic explanations of trauma. While Uchimura was collecting brains, other researchers, especially in Hiroshima and Nagasaki itself, started to campaign for more research on *hibakusha.* In 1949 as the censorship hold was weakening, Okumura Nikichi and Hitsuda Heizaburō published an article at the *Kyushu Journal of Psychology* which called for

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[390] Ibid.
[391] Monica Braw, *The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occupied Japan* (M E Sharpe Inc, 1997).
[392] Uchimura, p. 255.
[393] Ibid, p. 257.

more research on the psychological impact on survivors and going beyond "merely the physical aspects." [394]Okumura and Hitsuda conducted research on 50 survivors of Nagasaki, who were admitted to the Omura hospital in Nagasaki. They found several cases of emotional turmoil, nervous disease and depression. They attributed these cases however not directly to the trauma or exposure to the bomb but to "worsening physical health because of radiation from the bomb."[395] There was very little follow up on this research. In 1958 Matsuda Shizuo could still complain that there are, "almost no case works and information about the connection between mental problems and the bomb." [396]But Matsuda's study as well did not go far from somatic explanations. In his study, Matsuda examined 15 *hibakusha* who were patients in a mental hospital. He questioned them as to their cognitive and other abilities and examined their blood samples.[397] Matsuda concluded that there was a connection between low white cell count and mental and cognitive problems.

Matsuda's complaint notwithstanding, there was some work done, which Matsuda was unaware of (he cited no other work). In 1952, Kubo Yasuhiro, the psychologist who met with Lifton, conducted a survey of fifty-four *hibakusha*, trying to ascertain the psychological impact of the bomb. Kubo was the only one among Japanese researchers who stuck to psychological explanations and did not connect damage to radiation or other aspects of *hibakusha* health. Kubo's research however is extremely basic. Kubo was concentrating, like his American colleagues, on the issue of panic and individual and mass nervous breakdown (he cites Gitlin and the SSRC research as well as, oddly enough, an article on the psychological impacts of Orson Welles' famous *War of the Worlds* scare). Kubo divided survivors' reactions to five stages, in

[394]Okumura Nikichi and Hitsuda Heizabur. "genbakudan hisai kanja seishinkei byōgakuteki chōsa seisek," *Kyushu shinkeiseishin igaku* Vol. 1 No. 50 (1949), pp. 50-52.
[395] Nishimoto Minaao and Matsumoto Kazuo, "saigai," p. 66.
[396] Matsuda Shizuo, "genbaku hibakusha no seshin shōgai ni tuite," *Hiroshima igaku,* Vol. 11, No. 9 (1958), p. 38.
[397] Ibid. p. 40.

which they went from "instinctive action," to "panic," "quasi panic" and a "blank" (stupefied) stage. None of these stages however went beyond a week or two after the bomb.[398] "We can hardly estimate the next stage," concluded Kubo, "but perhaps some time after, every respondent succeeded in slowly adjusting to their circumstances."[399] Survivors however, were not adjusting. In 1956, Yuzuki Takeshi observed, "ten years after the bomb although there were no surgical or other medical problems *hibakusha* still complain of fatigue, memory and other subjective issues." But his research as well remained on the level of diagnosis. Conducting research on both *hibakusha* and non-hibakusha group he found that indeed *hibakusha*, especially laborers, suffered disproportionally more than non-*hibakusha* but no significant difference was found in urine samples or other physical measures. Yuzuki however offered no explanation to this.[400] Starting in 1953, a year after Kubo, Konuma Masuo, in the largest survey of its time, examined 132 cases of *hibakusha.* He found autonomic ataxia (lack of muscle coordination), dizziness, headaches, sleep disorders, amnesia etc. Konuma noted that that these symptoms are usually the result of brain injury. However, he could detect no such injury. Konuma concluded that these were in "high probably because of changes in the brain and nervous system which were caused by radiation damage."[401] There is no explanation why these are attributed to radiation rather than other factors. Yet, given how little was known about radiation, and how closely guarded much of its information was, it is not surprising that cognitive issues as well were also regarded as a result of radiation damage.

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[398] Yoshiroshi Kubo, "Hiroshima hibaku choku go no ningen Hiroshima hibaku choku go no ningen kōdō no kenkyu," *The Japanese journal of psychology* 22, no. 2 (1951), pp. 103–110.
[399] Ibid., p.109.
[400] Yuzuki Takeshi, "genbaku hibakusha no jikakuteki hirōshōjō chōsa narabi ni nyū do hannō ni yoru hirō chōsa sesaki ni tuite," *Hiroshima igaku,* Vol. 9, No. 2 (1956), pp. 78-80.
[401] Nishimoto Minaao and Matsumoto Kazuo, "saigai," p. 66.

1956, the year where awareness to the plight of *hibakusha* peaked – following the establishment of *hidankyo,* saw a number of other studies. That year a medical survey by a *hibakusha* organization found 7.3 percent of hibakusha suffering from nervous disorder, and an "overwhelming number of people who suffered from neurasthenia." The survey prompted at least two different research schemes.[402] One of these groups, led by Kondō Toshiyuki and Yoshioka Ichirō did research in Hiroshima and concluded that *hibakusha* indeed have higher rates of memory problems, excitability and other symptoms than prevalent in general population. Kondō et al. as well did not progress beyond that conclusion.[403] Neither the Kondō groups'nor any of the other studies examined here cite each other (Konuma et al. have only four citations for their eight-year study - one of these is a 1910 German study).[404] Whatever Japanese research on *hibakusha* they do refer to is from radiation and related studies. None mentioned research done at the time on survivors of the camps or other traumatic experiences.

This failure can be partly attributed to *hibakusha's* reluctance to come forward. Also in 1956, a survey conducted by *hidankyo* reported, somewhat cryptically, on many *hibakusha* who "suffer from problems of the heart, which lead to family problems and a-social behavior."[405] The report did not go beyond this observation. This was not surprising as the subject was taboo at the time. Many *hibakusha* did not even raise the issue within the *hibakusha* community, let alone publicly speak of their mental issues, preferring to complain, like Holocaust survivors, of more "normal" physical ailments instead.[406] Significantly, *hidankyo* did not even raise the issue of

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[402] Ibid, Nishimoto and Matsumoto however, do not bring a citation for the survey and I could not locate it.
[403] Kondō Toshiyuki et al., " genbaku higaish no shinriteki chōsa," *Hiroshima igaku,* Vol. 9. No. 2 (1956), pp. 59-64.
[404] Konuma Toshio et al., "seishin keika no matome," *Nagasaki igaku ka zashi* vol. 36 (1961), p. 101.
[405] Gensuibakuikinshi Hiroshima kyōgikai genbaku higaisha kyūen iinkai, "genbaku higaisha jitai chōsa hōkoku," (Hiroshima, 1956) p. 6.
[406] Author interview with a group of *hibakusha* from the HIP (Hiroshima Interpreters for Peace) group, 23 January 2012 Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, See also Monica Braw, "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Voluntary

treatment for mental damages when it campaigned for a medical law with the government. Compensation from the Americans was, of course, out of the question. Consequentially, unlike in the German case, there was no incentive for *hibakusha* to come forward, nor was there a movement among Japanese mental health professionals to fight for such measures.

In retrospect, *hibakusha* recalled many occurrences which were now be classified as symptoms of PTSD. A survivor recalled feeling nauseous when she saw cut hair at the barbershop and having flashback to "that day" when she smelled and saw burned sausage.[407] As Svenja Goltermann argued for the German case, it would be wrong for a historian to conclude that these were actually cases of PTSD as this category, which was not available at the time, is also a historical construction. It is also unclear to what extent popular conceptions of trauma and PTSD "filtered down" to the current survivor population and influenced their own recollection of symptoms. The historical record is patchy. Researchers did report of many symptoms that together constituted what came to be called "A-bomb neurosis," but time and again they failed to connect disparate research and come together with an agreed definition of the problem or any sort of methodology to deal with it. Researchers were acutely aware of the untidy and confusing nature of their findings and struggled to connect and make sense of it. In what they did find there was an overwhelming preference for somatic explanations and aversion to psychological ones. This was perhaps due to the stigma attached to mental issues among both patients and doctors. Again we must remember that up until 1950 mental patients were still locked up in cages, and that most of these researchers grew up in a system where racial thinking, which saw mental defects as a sign of racial inferiority, was the norm. Unlike in the European case, which we will discuss shortly, there was no incentive to break this taboo. And, thus, it was only with the

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Silence," in Laura Elizabeth Hein and Mark Selden, *Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age* (M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 157.

[407] Author interview with a group of *hibakusha.*

intervention of Robert Lifton that thinking about trauma started to change in Japan. And it is to Lifton and the history of trauma in the West which we now must turn.

III. Israeli and Western psychiatry and the restituon debates

In Israel, as in Japan, the forties and the fifties saw almost no efforts on the side of psychiatry and psychology in dealing with survivors of the Holocaust. Not only survivors' mental issues were neglected, as Rakefet Zalashik and Nadav Davidovitch demonstrated, survivors of the Holocaust and mental patients were actually seen as a potential burden and a threat to society.[408] After the war, the Jewish Agency and Jewish American aid organizations sent teams of psychiatrists to displaced persons (DP) camps in Cyprus and Europe. The broad ideology of the delegations stemmed from the mental hygiene movement. Palestine had a branch of the movement from 1919, but due to the strength of German models and neuro-psychiatry it had only limited influence. But as in Japan, Israel also experienced, in the late forties, a shift to a more American-centered approach to mental health as a result of American financing and its growing prestige.[409] Authoritarian streaks in both the German and American models however still remained dominant. Doctors saw their mission not only in treating the survivors but also in showing that survivors could return to "normalcy" in the "healthy" environment of Israel.[410] If they couldn't, it was, somehow, their fault.

Obsessive individualism was frowned upon, and doctors spent much time trying to show that survivors should and could adapt to the communitarian models of the kibbutzim. The whole process of mental evaluation and treatment was geared towards immigration and selection of

[408] Nadav Davidovitch and Rakefet Zalashik, "Recalling the Survivors: Between Memory and Forgetfulness of Hospitalized Holocaust Survivors in Israel," Israel Studies - Volume 12, Number 2, (Summer 2007), pp. 145-163
[409] Zalashik and Davidovitch argue that the involvement of Jewish aid agencies was crucial in making Israeli psychiatry turn to a more American model. See their "*Measuring Adaptability*: *Psychological Examinations of Jewish Detainees in Cyprus Internment Camps*", *Science in Context*, No. 19 (2006), p. 440.
[410] Ibid, p. 439.

able-bodied survivors. This was also the case in Germany, where in displaced people camps, as Paul Weindling demonstrated, the whole process of recovery of the inmates, including mental testament by Jewish and international aid organizations, revolved around the question of immigration qualifications.[411] US immigration authorities considered bad health as much of a black mark as collaboration with the Nazis, while Zionist organizations, again, favored fit men and women. Mental disorders barred people from receiving certificates and leaving the camps. There was no solution for mental patients in the camp and hospitalization in German hospitals was the only resource, something that the inmates, given very recent experience with German medicine, were understandably terrified of.[412]

Doctors were aware of the horrors of the Holocaust, and some like Fishel Shneerson or Leo Srole, who worked in the DP camps, were quite sympathetic. Srole was exceptional for identifying that the survivors' symptoms were identical to those of shell shock. Srole recommended similar treatment for the DP's, but he was ignored, and it took more than twenty years for psychiatry to appreciate his work. Shneerson was much more typical in advocating an optimistic theory, which emphasized survivors' ability to overcome their sufferings. Shneerson saw some survivors' behaviors (their eagerness to learn and return to life being primary) as a sign of "immunization from trauma." Shneerson, like other Israeli doctors, was part of a social milieu that had an almost religious belief in the power of the Zionist transformation narrative; a belief which also many survivors embraced. The gaze of both veteran Palestinian Jews and survivors was towards the future and the past was something better not talked about. Hillel Klein in 1963 explained that Israeli psychiatry's delay in reacting to survivors " may be seen in the desire of psychologists, social workers, and authorities…to help them to adjust in their new

[411] Paul Weindling "Belsenitis": Liberating Belsen, Its Hospitals, UNRRA, and Selection for Re-emigration, 1945–1948," *Science in Context*, No. 19 (2006), p. 414.
[412] Author's Interview with Tani Dreilnger, a former inmate in Bergen-Belsen. 23 August 2010.

homeland, rather than to delve into the immediate traumatic past, which contained so much horror and destruction not only for the direct victims, but for the Jewish population of Israel, too."[413] Klein's remark is telling in it pointed out to what Judith Stern rightly termed "an unspoken agreement between the therapist and the survivor [which] held that the best way to cope was to leave the hellish period behind and deal only with current problems.[414]

Furthermore, Israel, according to prevailing views, was an especially favorable place for survivors to recover in. H.Z. Winnik, an Israeli psychiatrist, remarked, "it appeared that the local atmosphere had a beneficial socio-therapeutic effect on a large proportion of the survivors." According to Winnik, this was because survivors could share their experience with fellow survivors and that "craving of dependency was not encouraged."[415]Doctors knew that some psychiatrists abroad had a different opinion as to the state of DP's but they were dismissive. A typical remark in a patient file read, "we don't find too many similar cases [of accumulated trauma] among victims in Israel, due to the transcendental strength of Israel which is exercised upon the Jew."[416] One finds almost no direct references to survivors in Israeli psychiatry literature at the time (Stern found only one article up to 1961 – by Gerda Barag in 1956, this author had no such luck) and no institutional arrangements were made to accommodate them after the first wave of work with DP's.

Thus, not very differently from Japan, the combination of survivors' reluctance to talk, social aversion of survivors, and a psychiatric establishment which was not favorable to survivors kept research and treatment of trauma to a minimum. This impasse was broken due to

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[413] Hilel Klein et al., "Former Concentration Camp Inmates on a Psychiatric Ward: Observations," *Archives of General Psychiatry Archives of General Psychiatry* 8, no. 4 (1963), p. 334.
[414] Judith Stern, "The Eichmann Trial and Its Influence on Psychiatry and Psychology," *Theoretical inquiries in Law* Vol. 1, no. 2 (2000), p. 400.
[415] H Z Winnik, "Further Comments Concerning Problems of Late Psychopathological Effects of Nazi-persecution and Their Therapy," *The Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Disciplines* 5, no. 1 (1967) p. 1.
[416] Stern, p. 401.

a combination of a number of historical developments. First there was the work done by former prisoner doctors like Bruno Bettelheim, Leo Eitinger and others like Eugène Minkowski, mostly in connection with political prisoners. Second, there was the issue of compensation of survivors and the struggle with the German institutions, and lastly there was the Eichmann trial and the changing political and social atmosphere.

The fact that Eitinger and others were former prisoners themselves was crucial for this development. Traditionally, the European medical establishment, with only a few exceptions, looked at trauma suspiciously. Military doctors and examiners of laborers hurt in accidents were reluctant to award soldiers and workers compensation for psychological damages. However, this changed at the end of the war. As Fassin and Rechtman argued, "the notions of malingering, cowardice, selfishness, overdeveloped narcissism, secondary gains, class interest – all the stigmas attached to traumatic neurosis, could not be applied to these with the striped pajamas who were emerging directly from hell. An entirely different paradigm was called for." [417] Although basically right, this is somewhat reductive as not all these in the striped pajamas were treated equally. While attitudes to political prisoners changed it took much more time for this change to be applied to Jewish survivors. Fassin and Rechtman, as well as Ruth Leys and others who wrote on trauma's history overlook this fact. The process by which the category of trauma was expanded to Jewish prisoners (and beyond) was much more fraught with tensions and difficulties than these authors present it to be. Many German doctors who were responsible for evaluating prisoners' claims – some of whom were former Nazis, were more than ready to imply or even openly accuse Jewish survivors of "malingering, cowardice, selfishness, [and] and

[417] Fassin and Rechtman, *The Empire of Trauma,*p. 71.

overdeveloped narcissism."[418] As Dagmar Herzog demonstrated, it took a persistent effort on the side of sympathetic doctors, who confronted German doctors' biases and contempt for the victims, to change this.[419]

Change did start with the political prisoners. At the war's end, across liberated Europe, prisoners returning from the camp were received with open arms. The deportees and resistance fighters were the new national heroes of many countries both east and west of the rising iron curtain.[420] They held a special place in the newly constructed (re-) foundation myths of resurgent European nationalisms, as those who fought for the nation while states and national armies collapsed. Thus, when doctors in Belgium, France, Norway and other liberated countries were confronted with demands by political prisoners' associations to research complaints of trauma like symptoms they treated prisoners very differently than they did their compatriots after the First World War.[421] Jews were a different matter. In places like Austria or France, political prisoners organizations, like the KZ-Verband/ VdA Österreich (The Austrian Association of Concentration Camps Prisoners), excluded Jews and actively campaigned to receive preferential treatment.[422] Once compensation laws were in place however, it was easier to expand them to other types of prisoners. Ex-prisoner doctors were the first who answered the call and, furthermore, worked actively to expand this category to all prisoners.

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[418] Helga Embacher and Maria Ecker, "A Nation of Victims: How Austria dealt with the victims of the authoritarian Ständestaat and national socialism," in Withuis and Mooij, *The Politics of War Trauma,* p. 47.

[419] Dagmar Herzog, "A Psychiatric Mass Experiment': Death-Camp Trauma and Epistemological Impasse," Conference on Operative Catastrophes, held at Columbia University, (March 2, 2012), p. 1. I thank Dagmar Herzog for generously agreeing to share with me this paper.

[420] Pieter Lagrou, "The Politics of Memory. Resistance as a Collective Myth in Post-war France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1945–1965," *European Review* 11, no. 04 (2003): 527–549.

[421] These symptoms included, according to Leo Eitinger, restlessness, fatigue, increased smoking, irratibality, complaints of defective memory and vegetative nervous systems." See Leo Eitinger, "Pathology of the Concentration Camp Syndrome," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, Vol.5, No. 79 (1961), p. 79.

[422] Embacher and Ecker, p. 33. For France and Belgium see Maria Teresa Brancaccio[s and Sonja van 't Hof's essays in Withuis and Mooij, *The Politics of War Trauma,* pp. 74, 80.

In Scandinavia, Norwegian and Danish researches undertook extensive studies of ex-prisoners. Leo Eitinger, a Jewish survivor of Auschwitz and a trained Psychiatrist, was among the first to publish on the subject. Eitinger and other Scandinavian doctors recognized a "repatriation neurosis, which consisted of, "restlessness, fatigue, increased smoking, irritability, complaints of defective memory and vegetative nervous systems."[423] Eitinger and his peers however were not convinced that research undertaken so far was scientific enough. Furthermore, some doctors were convinced that this could no longer be related only to repatriation. In a series of conference on the medical consequences of the camps, which took place in Paris, Brussels and Copenhagen in 1954-1955, researchers came out with a new definition: "concentration camp syndrome."[424] One major concern for Eitinger was that the syndrome, "being of a rather general neurasthenic nature made it difficult to have the condition recognized as a consequence of concentration camp suffering."[425] Thus, when the Norwegian Association of Disabled War Veterans approached Eitinger he formed a team in Oslo University which tackled the problem directly. Eitinger and his team were very cautious. They were especially careful not to open their research to accusations that patients complaints were due to problems they had before the war. The researchers were "very strict in demand for a clean bill of health," trying to ascertain beyond any doubt the importance of the camps for trauma.[426] Like their Japanese counterparts, the Eitinger team found the symptoms to be the result of physical rather than psychological damage. The symptoms, write Eitinger, "Seem to be the result of organic changes in the brain caused by mechanical and toxic injuries as well as by starvation and exhaustion."[427] However, very

[423] Eitinger, "Concentration Camp Syndrome," p. 79.
[424] Ibid., p. 80. For a list of conferences and time line of the restitution laws see Pross, *Paying for the Past*. Appendix c (no page number).
[425] Eitinger, p. 80.
[426] Ibid., 85.
[427] Ibid.

differently from their Japanese peers, Eitinger and his colleagues continued to publish and reach out to fellow doctors across Europe and the States.

What drove much of this effort was German doctors' resistance to awarding former prisoners compensation. As Christian Pross noted, it is largely forgotten today that most Germans were quite hostile to reparations. Only a few Germans saw it as a moral duty.[428] Jews were seen as privileged and greedy. When controversy broke over the issue, one letter to *Der Spiegel* stated, "Once again, the 'Chosen People' are, each and every one, dancing around the 'golden calf.'"[429] This was not just residual popular anti-Semitism. The head of the finance ministry, Ernst Féaux de la Croix, complained about "supervision from Jerusalem," the problems of "world Jewry," and Jews who "manipulate world opinion."[430] In spite of this, reparations were finally instituted in the mid-fifties. This was the result of a number of factors. Primary among these was the work a number of Germans who fought bravely and relentlessly for compensation. Internationally, West Germany was under pressure from other West European countries, the U.S. and Israel to pass restitution laws.[431] The causal connection between the camp experience and mental damage was hard to prove, however, and the authorities suspected the work which came out of former partisans' conferences of being "communist" and worked to exclude German doctors, like the Cologne working group, who supported more generous treatment inside Germany.[432]

Continuing their profession's long-time tradition of suspicion of trauma, "rejectionist" German doctors dismissed the idea that survivors' long-term suffering had anything to do with

[428] Pross, *Paying for the Past,* p. 2
[429] Herzog, "A Psychiatric Mass Experiment," p. 5.
[430] Ibid., p. 4.
[431] Pross, *Paying for the Past,* p. 25.
[432] Ibid., pp. 88, 101.

their persecution and did whatever they could to delay and dismiss Jewish claims. Trauma, remarked one doctor, was like "falling in love" and one could easily overcome it.[433] Other doctors talked about the "organism's unlimited ability to compensate," for psychic damage.[434] Doctors often dismissed trauma altogether. They diagnosed survivors with "anxiety neurosis" that was "caused by constitutional factors," which meant the patient had mental problems before the camps and thus was not eligible for a pension.[435] In one example among many, German doctors who examined a Jewish man who spent time in various camps and saw all of his family killed, concluded, that there is "a psychic maldevelopment in Mr. H…We see, however, no possibility of assuming a causal connection or possibility of such a connection between this maldevelopment and the persecution undergone by him until 1945." [436] Another German doctor wrote on a woman who spent three years in Auschwitz, "[she has] abnormal processing of experience and an inability to deal with life." But, he declared, a "normal person" would have recovered six months after liberation at the latest."[437] A typical conclusion of rejectionists was that the patients were "pension-neurotics" (Rentenneurotiker) and suffered from "hypochondriac attitude."[438]

Doctors in Israel, the U.S. and across Europe responded to this state of affairs with outrage. It was these doctors' mobilization that enabled the breaking of taboos and ended indifference to survivors. Although there was work done on camp survivors beforehand, the compensation debates expanded the fight beyond political prisoners and forced sympathizers to

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[433] Pross, *Paying for the Past,* p. 97.
[434] Ibid., p. 87.
[435] Herzog, "A Psychiatric Mass Experiment," p. 7.
[436] William G. Niederland, "The Problem of the Survivor. Part I: Some Remarks on the Psychiatric Evaluation of Emotional Disorders in *Survivors* of Nazi Camps," in Henry Krystal, ed., *Massive Psychic Trauma* (Intl Universities Print Inc, 1969), p.10.
[437] Herzog, "A Psychiatric Mass Experiment," p. 6.
[438] Ibid, pp. 2-3.

confront the issue of trauma and Jewish suffering head on. [439] German sympathizer Ernst Kluge emphasized the unique features of Jewish survivors, who were completely guiltless (as opposed to political prisoners who had a "reason" for their suffering), as well as, "the complete powerlessness and continual vulnerability to the most primitive cruelty and sadism, the arbitrariness, the inversion of values in the camps and "diabolization" of the community caused by privileging some prisoners over others and making them co-responsible for the suffering of their fellows."[440] American Paul Choddof, countering German claims that the prisoners were "abnormal," wrote, "Any man can break if the stress is severe enough… [Nowhere have the world] in the course of its bloody centuries, seen conditions which could rival in stringency and duration [to] those endured by the Jews' of Europe under Hitler's Germany."[441] Perhaps the most forceful critique came from Kurt Eissler, an émigré psychiatrist in New York who wrote an article in 1963 titled, "The murder of how many of one's children must one be able to survive asymptomatically in order to be deemed to have a normal constitution?," in which he surveyed rejecters' tactics and accused them of being un-objective.[442]

The objectivity argument was used, with some success, by the rejecters against the sympathizers. This was an easy accusation to make as the sympathizers themselves were the first to acknowledge the messiness and contradictory character of their evidence (unlike their counterparts who took their objectivity for granted).[443] Just like in Japan, sympathizers like Eitinger or William Niederland, who was sat at the forefront of American opposition, were extremely cautious in their response and often sought evidence of "objective" physical damage

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[439] Niederland, "The Problem of the Survivor," p. 11.
[440] Herzog, "A Psychiatric Mass Experiment," pp. 11-12.
[441] Paul Chodoff, "Late effects of the concentration camp syndrome," *Archives of general psychiatry Archives of General Psychiatry* 8 (1963), p. 327.
[442] Herzog, "A Psychiatric Mass Experiment," p.14.
[443] Ibid.

to justify their claims. Using very restrained prose, Niederland wrote on the German doctors that; "in light of such negative attitudes on the part of so-called experts…it appears essential to familiarize ourselves…with those psychiatric disorders."[444] Others, like Paul Chodoff, who wrote a controversial piece comparing Nazi concentration camps and American inner city ghettos, did not hide their sympathies. Chodoff wrote on survivors, "…there is an ancient Talmudic legend of the *Lamed-vov*, *the thirty six just men who take upon themselves the suffering of the world.* Perhaps those concentration camp survivors who ceaselessly lament the past are performing a similar function and their suffering can be thought of both as a memorial to their dead and as an act of existential expiation for a species capable of such an outrage upon common humanness" (my italics).[445]

Indeed, Chodoff belonged to a new breed of politically committed physicians. For Chodoff and his peers, survivors were beginning to assume a very different role than the one they had previously as passive objects of German or other doctors. Their very "sickness" was the result of a "sick" world and was a mark not only of their normality but even their righteousness. These righteous witnesses had a special duty in this world: to tell of the horror they saw. Chodoff wrote that with survivors, one feels, "He has been transported in time back…to the gray inferno of Auschwitz, so vivid and compelling is the wealth of detail with which they describe the events which befall them and which they witnessed."[446] Indeed, in 1970, when Chodoff wrote these lines, survivors, as we saw in the previous chapter, were already occupying a special place in society. As a result of the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials, as well as the 1967 war and other developments (surveyed in the next chapter), Holocaust survivors were starting to fulfill the

[444] Niederland, "The Problem of the Survivor," p. 11.
[445] Paul Chodoff, "The German Concentration Camp as a Psychological Stress," *Archives of General Psychiatry* 22/1970 (1970), p. 87.
[446] Ibid.

same role that *hibakusha* were already filling for the Hiroshima peace movement, that of witnesses to the worst that humans can inflict on each other. The compensation debates, and the rise of Holocaust witnessing, completely transformed the state of the survivor in Israel and, to a lesser extent, in Japan. In the 1960s and 1970s, Israeli psychiatrists not only started to pay proper attention to survivors (the first main conference on the topic took place in 1966), but also took a leading role in advocating for their rights. It was at this crucial juncture that Hiroshima entered the debate. In 1963, Robert J. Lifton, who had close contacts with many of the American sympathizers, returned from Japan with insights that would transform the trauma debates. Lifton's work expanded "traumatic neurosis" beyond the Holocaust context and made it into a universal category which war veterans, feminists and others could use and that would eventually lead to the creation of PTSD.

IV. Robert Lifton's Hiroshima and the making of PTSD

Robert Lifton first came to Hiroshima in April 1962. The city made a huge impression on him. In a letter to David Riesman, a longtime friend and a fellow activist, he wrote, "I was moved, horrified and shocked beyond any words I can express. But I was also greatly stimulated by the need to know more about what has really happened to the victims of the bomb-- in a psychological and human sense." Lifton decided to stay in Hiroshima and conduct research there. Lifton was amazed that no one so far had conducted psychological research in Hiroshima. Significantly, Lifton's motivation had as much to do with his politics as with his science, "The project is as much directed at preventable future as at the irrevocle (sic.) past… [this is] one of the most fundamental events of our age…and nobody has really probed it with direct study and

psychological depth."[447] Lifton, who was then in Japan to study Japanese youth, decided to postpone his appointment in Yale and arranged to stay in Hiroshima. This decision, as he acknowledged years later, had a momentous impact on his life. The Hiroshima study, "affected all my work," he wrote, "It was the shock that permanently changed my ways of relating to the world." [448] Lifton's decision, and subsequent career, also contributed immensely to a change in the understanding of the impact of Hiroshima and other mass killings on our society and culture.

As Kirsten Fermaglich noted, there was a whole constellation of factors in Lifton's upbringing and background which led Lifton to Hiroshima. Fermaglich mentioned Lifton's Jewish background, his radical politics, and his break with Freudianism as the most notable of these. [449] Lifton's Jewish heritage, although he was not religious, and his youth growing up in the U.S. at the time of the Holocaust left a deep imprint on him and was a big part of what led him to connect Hiroshima and the Holocaust[450] His upbringing also led him to suspect and feel ambivalent towards, what he called, "totalism" and orthodoxy.[451] This suspicion, and his friendship with and interest in Erik Erikson, significantly, made Lifton wary of Freud's insistence on the importance and finality of childhood on personality formation and, consequently, made it easier for him to accept that trauma could alter adult personality. What led him to trauma and "the psychology of extreme situations," was his politics.[452] Lifton's exposure to and embracing of the radical politics of his parents and friends (and David Riesman's

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[447] Robert Lifton to David Riesman April 9th 1962, Box 15, Folder 8 (1962) The Robert J. Lifton Papers, The New York Public Library: the Manuscripts and Archives Division (NYPL- MSA).
[448] Robert Lifton, *Witness to an Extreme Century : a Memoir*, 1st Free Press hardcover ed. (New York: Free Press, 2011), pp. 388-89.
[449] Kirsten Fermaglich, *American dreams and Nazi nightmares : early Holocaust consciousness and liberal America, 1957-1965* (Waltham, Mass.; Hanover: Brandeis University Press ; University Press of New England, 2006), p.128
[450] Lifton interview. "The Holocaust," Lifton said, "was always on my mind as a Jew."
[451] Lifton, *Witness to an Extreme Century,* p.17.
[452] Fermaglich, *American dreams and Nazi nightmares,* p.132.

influence on Lifton's anti-nuclear position is notable here), and his activities as part of a group of New York intellectuals, many of whom were blacklisted during the McCarthy years, made him feel especially close to the cause of Hiroshima.

Lifton came to Japan in 1960, following his service in the Air Force, which first brought him to Asia, and his work on POW's and other victims of Chinese "thought reform" in Hong Kong. Lifton and his wife Betty Jean, who was an author in her own right and a reporter, were already making a name for themselves as researchers and committed activists. They had a strong interest and passion for Asia in general and Japan in particular. Lifton made many friends with Japanese academics and activists, who were then in the midst of the struggle against the security treaties. It was through those activities that Lifton was first drawn to Hiroshima. In January 1962, Lifton wrote a short article in which he criticized Japanese conservatives' labeling of leftist students as "irrational." Directly challenging the whole edifice, examined above, of labeling resistance to nuclear power and weapons as somehow unreasonable and the supposed link to irrational anxieties, Lifton argued the very real fear of personal annihilation in a nuclear world in neither "unreasonable nor irrational." Japanese conservatives' position was Lifton argued, an, "expression of a general tendency, in political and military thinking throughout the world, to distort the fundamental concept of reason."[453]

Thus, when he visited Hiroshima and met with survivors and activists it was only natural for him to take, once he decided to undergo research, a fundamentally different approach from Japanese psychologists and other academics who until then had mostly shunned politically committed research. Lifton was aware of the limitations facing Japanese academics and saw himself as uniquely situated to overcome these. After his aforementioned meeting with Kubo

[453] Robert J. Lifton, "Reason, Rearmament, and Peace: Japan's Struggles with a Universal Dilemma," *Asian Survey* 1, no. 11 (January 1, 1962), p.15.

Yoshitoshi, Lifton wrote, "It was after leaving Kubo that I felt rather definite about going ahead. He seemed to have, whatever the limitations of his research, entered into a psychological-moral-historical sphere at the very center of mankind's critical dilemma, but for various reasons…he did not seem to have the perspective to deal with problems in this spheres." Lifton acknowledged that perhaps no one could do justice to this topic but also that he was fortunate to be in the right place with the right qualities for this kind of work, "I felt, while aware of my own limitations, that my particular combination of moral concern, depth-psychological background, research experience, and knowledge and arrangements in Japan had brought me to a point where I could make a worthwhile effort at learning and communicating something about these ultimately unknowable and perhaps insolvable issues."[454]

Lifton's connections enabled him to get excellent help in Hiroshima. He worked closely with Ogura Kaoru, whom he met through Robert Jungk, an Austrian Jewish émigré author based in New York who wrote on Hiroshima and was very active in the peace movement. Ogura, who did enormous amount of research on Hiroshima and its survivors for Jungk, was instrumental in facilitating Lifton's research and served as a translator, go between and contact person with possible interviewees.[455] Another important person was Watanabe Shoji, a social worker and a devout Christian who was "very committed to survivors." Lifton called him "almost saint-like."[456] It was Ogura and Watanabe who were responsible for choosing and explaining to survivors Lifton's work. Unlike his Japanese colleagues who mostly worked in the university or in hospitals, Lifton came to *hibakusha* homes and was very careful to show himself as sympathetic and understanding as possible to interviewees. This enabled him to overcome the

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[454] Robert Lifton to David Riesman, 10 April 1962. Box 15, Folder 8 (1962) The Robert J. Lifton Papers, NYPL-MSA, p. 15.
[455] Kaoru Ogura, *Hiroshima ni naze : kaigai yori no manazashi.* (Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 1979), pp. 106-107
[456] Lifton interview.

usual suspicion form the side of *hibakusha*.[457] He worked with a large group of survivors dividing them to two groups: a group of forty-three survivors who were politically or otherwise active as *hibakusha* and a "normal" group of thirty-three, who were chosen at random.[458] Both groups answered more or less a similar set of questions which dealt with their experience of the bombing and its long term impact on their life.[459] The fact of Lifton being an outsider was important. "The survivors," he recalled, "for the most part were very motivated to talk to me. To convey it [their experience] to me. They saw in me somebody who could tell it [their experience] to the world."[460]

Especially important for Lifton and his team was to distance themselves from the work of the ABCC, which, with its reputation for "treating survivors like guinea pigs," symbolized for survivors "objective" science in its cruelest form. [461]Lifton was also careful to position himself above the usual fray of Hiroshima politics. Although he presented himself as a committed anti-nuclearist, a fact that was clear form his recent articles, which were received favorably in Hiroshima, on Ogura's advice Lifton, not without some struggle, kept himself out of any formal peace activities. "My goal in Hiroshima," he said, "was to uncover [the] psychological and broadly human impact of the bomb and I stepped back from political currents of others and my own in order to do that."[462] Lifton's careful balance of objectivity and politics became a unique style, what he later called "advocacy research." Advocacy research was accurately defined by August G. Lageman as a "dialectic of advocacy and detachment," by which the researcher was trying to balance both. Lifton himself called it a "scholarly investigation combined with open

[457] Most interviews though took place in his small office; the home visits being mainly preliminary interviews.
[458] R.J Lifton, "Psychological effects of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima : the theme of death," *Daedalus : journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Daedalus* 92, no. 3 (1963), pp. 462-463.
[459] Ogura, *Hiroshima ni naze*, p. 103.
[460]Lifton Interview.
[461] Ogura, *Hiroshima ni naze*, p. 102.
[462] Lifton interview.

commitment to social or political ideals."[463] This style of research freed him from the many limitations that stopped other researchers from making the connections and conclusions, which would enable a breakthrough in the study of *hibakusha* and camp survivors.

In 1963, Lifton published an article in *Daedalus* summarizing his findings so far. At this stage Lifton still did not connect his research directly to Holocaust survivors but was "[seeking to] evaluate to what degree exposure to the atomic bomb in Hiroshima resembles psychological and social patterns common to all disasters."[464] The *hibakusha* and what they represented left a strong impression on Lifton. He found Hiroshima survivors "not only to have experienced the atomic disaster, but to have inhabited it and incorporated it into their beings, including all of its elements of horror, evil, and particularly of death."[465] The encounter with death and its persistent present casted a dark shadow over the victims' lives. Lifton noted that that survivors experienced "psychic closure" (although in this stage he still did not emphasize this), strong feeling of shame and guilt towards the dying and for being alive, and a feeling of being marked by death – being contaminated and possessing "an inner sense of being doomed for posterity."[466]All of this and especially the persistence of the little understood A-bomb disease (which Lifton saw "as much a spiritual as a physical condition") caused even seemingly healthy *hibakusha* to be "plagued by underlying anxieties."[467]

Lifton's preliminary conclusions were fairly close to those of his peers who were working on "survivor syndrome," but it was not until 1964 that he made the first gesture towards relating his work to the Holocaust. In this article on "Death and Death Symbolism," Lifton noted,

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[463] Fermaglich, *American dreams and Nazi nightmares,* p. 138.
[464] Lifton, "Psychological Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima,"pp. 463-464.
[465] Ibid., p. 482.
[466] Ibid., p. 476.
[467] Ibid., pp. 476,478.

in a long footnote, the fact that *hibakusha* psychology "strikingly resemble [d] that of Nazi camp victims, particularly as both groups displayed depression, withdrawal, apathy, anger, and self deprecation that might, at it greatest extremes, lead an individual to take on the appearance of a 'living corpse'."[468] This footnote turned by the time the Hiroshima study was published, in 1967 - under the title *Death in Life,* into a full chapter in the end of the book which systematically compared the two groups. Relying extensively on works by Niederland, Chodoff, and Bettelheim among others, Lifton identified five themes which he believed were shared by both groups, "death imprint, death guilt, psychic numbing, nurturance and contagion and formulation." Together these traits helped, "to make up a general psychology of the survivor."[469]

Formulation, the last trait, was especially important as it was the way by which survivors could make sense of their tragedy and work to overcome it. As Kirsten Fermaglich argued, Lifton's portrayal of survivors was very different from the dehumanizing and despairing portraits of survival given by Bettelheim. They were "grim but not without hope." [470] And hope came in the role survivors possessed as witnesses to tragedy. Survivors could rebuild their world through the process of formulation and actively working for a cause. Whether peace in Hiroshima, human rights or Zionism, survivors who found a cause were better off. This was very similar to the role given for survivors by *gensuikyō* in Hiroshima and Wiesel and others in the West. In here Lifton was both reflecting the growing importance of witnessing and contributing to it the legitimacy of medical science; making it not just politically desirable but indeed a sign of a healthy recovery. Like Chodoff's "righteous man," survivors had a special role in our world. They could "break out of the numbing and stasis of unmastered survivorhood and contribute to the enlargement of

[468] Quoted in Fermaglich, *American dreams and Nazi nightmares,* p.125.
[469] I have followed here Fermaglich's summery. Ibid., pp. 124-125.
[470] Ibid.

human consciousness." Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for Lifton, represented a "last chance…from which humanity may still learn."[471] It was the survivors' role to teach us.

Even before *Death in Life*'s publication, following his *Psychiatry* article, Lifton started to immerse himself in Holocaust work. He also started meeting with psychiatrists like Henry Krystal, Emanuel Tanay, Martin Wangh and others, whom we already mentioned, who were working on the topic.[472] Lifton first presented his ideas on the general psychology of the survivor in a workshop on "massive psychic trauma" which took place at Wayne State University in Detroit. Lifton recollected that it was in the airport on the way to the meeting when he first "came to the idea of the survivor principles."[473] The meeting, some of its proceedings we already mentioned in relation to the reparations debates, brought together almost all major figures in the field. In his presentation Lifton was careful to outline the many differences between the survivors. He called the emerging consciousness of similarities between Hiroshima and Holocaust survivors "an understanding of perhaps a humble kind, a limited kind."[474]After this qualification, Lifton elaborated on the five themes mentioned above which he saw as shared between survivors (they did not seem to change much between 1965 and 1967 when *Death in Life* was published – the only difference was the much more restrained rhetoric in Detroit). The reaction to Lifton's talk was quite favorable. One participant, Dr. Szatmari, said, "I might sit here for 10 hours and discuss Dr. Lifton's paper."[475] Many participants were eager to expand on his findings. Henry Krystal, for instance, mentioned Gulag prisoners and German POW as similar examples. Emanuel Tanay talked of his work with victims of industrial accidents as another

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[471] Robert Jay Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (University of N. Carolina Press, 1991), p. 540.
[472] Lifton, *Witness to an Extreme Century,* p. 241.
[473] Lifton interview.
[474] Robert Lifton, "Survivors of the Hiroshima Disaster," in Krystal, *Massive Psychic Trauma,* p.169. For differences between survivors see pp. 181-182.
[475] Ibid., p. 194.

example.[476] These examples suggested for participants the existence of a universal human reaction to trauma, beyond the narrow confines of Holocaust research.

Lifton's Hiroshima work had a special place in this development. In his introduction to the volume which came out of the workshop, Henry Krystal wrote, "when we discover that the survivors of as desperate a situation as the Nazi persecution show some problems identical with those experienced by the survivors if the Hiroshima disaster, we can be certain that these are the aftereffects of massive destruction." Krystal included "survivor guilt, identification with death, [and] shift of cathexes from people to indestructible 'nature'" as such phenomena, all parallel to Lifton's own findings. What Lifton's work did for "survivor syndrome" was to propel it, and its practitioners, beyond the confines of Holocaust research and make the syndrome universal. Holocaust work served, as we just saw, a similar purpose for Lifton. It confirmed to him that "Hiroshima and the Holocaust were bound up together in their dimensions and in their threat to the human future."[477]

With the Vietnam War and the anti-war movement that followed, Lifton, Krystal and others, like Chaim Shatan, who had a similar interest in issues of trauma and Holocaust work, expanded their findings beyond victims of WW II to include Vietnam veterans. From the mid sixties onward, Lifton, who was very active in the anti-war movement, started to employ his survivor analogies and insights in the service of the movement. In his work and speeches, especially after the My Lai massacre, Lifton compared veterans to Holocaust survivors and *hibakusha.* Returning veterans were "soldier survivors who experienced death imprint of being in war and thus surrounded by death daily, as well as the guilt of having survived friends." This

[476] Ibid., pp. 195-196.
[477] Lifton interview.

led to "psychic numbing [which then] led to extreme brutalization."[478] The war for Lifton turned American soldiers into both executioners and victims.

One particular aspect of Lifton's approach to the topic was especially interesting for veteran groups. Lifton warned that upon returning home soldiers might experience delayed psychological reaction. This time lapse was a problem for veterans as U.S law at the time, like the German laws, required that symptoms would be present continuously and limited compensation for effects that arose in excess of two years after discharge.[479] This led Jan Barry of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War to contact Lifton and invite him to work with the group. Lifton went to meet with Barry in December 1970. Chaim Shatan, another anti-war Jewish intellectual, also went with Lifton. Together with the veterans they instituted rap groups which sought to help veterans deal with their trauma. Based on this work Chaim Shatan came up in 1972 with the concept of Post-Vietnam syndrome, which had distinct similarities to survivor syndrome and echoed Lifton's work. [480] What was at stake for both Shatan and Lifton was not simply an intellectual but a political commitment and understanding of the importance of Vietnam veterans as witnesses to the horror of war and witnesses of the unspeakable. Just like in Hiroshima this was beneficial both for them and society as large as "veterans were able to formulate their Vietnam experiences in an active way that allowed them to transcend their guilt and become reconnected to the world."[481]

Into this debate now came feminist and other groups who were also starting to use the figure of the survivor to promote their own struggle. Feminist groups began raising the many parallels between the oppression and enforced silence of Holocaust and other survivors' and the

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[478] Fermaglich, *American dreams and Nazi nightmares,* p. 143.
[479] Ibid.
[480] New York Times 6 May, 1972.
[481] Fermaglich, *American dreams and Nazi nightmares,* p.152.

plight of sexually abused girls. In April 1971 Florence Rush, a noted activist, called victims of abuse "incest survivors."[482] The shift in psychoanalytic discourse and assertion of the importance of "bearing witness" gave feminists and others "a new perspective from which to assert that the suffering of women who had been subjected to sexual violence has been comparable, at least in some respects, to that of the survivors of the Nazi concentration camps."[483] Just like with the Vietnam vets and Holocaust debates, here as well, in what became an established pattern, clinicians came forward to help the cause of the sexually abused. At around the same time the American Psychiatric Association (APA), which was then reeling from its clash with the rising anti-psychiatry movement, sought to revamp and revise its classification of mental disorders known as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).[484] It seemed that in this stage both feminists and Vietnam veterans then approached the APA's Robert Spitzer who was in charge of the revision, and lobbied for the inclusion of what would become PTSD into the DSM. It is not clear who was "first" in raising this issue.[485] What is clear however is that this nexus led to the task force which eventually produced PTSD. In here, as Fassin and Rechtman argued, an embattled profession found a shared cause with the social movements that pressed for recognition of trauma victims.[486] While psychiatrists gained a newfound social legitimacy, victims received a scientific legitimization of their grievances. This, of course, was not such a clear-cut deal. Clinicians, like Lifton who was part of the PTSD working group, were convinced

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[482] Fassin and Rechtman, *The Empire of Trauma,* p. 80.

[483] Ibid., p. 81.

[484] Michael E. Staub, Madness Is Civilization: When the Diagnosis Was Social, 1948-1980 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011), p. 10-11.

[485] Fermaglich, *American dreams and Nazi nightmares,* p. 154. Fassin and Rechtman claimed that it was woman organization that initiated the move, while Allan Young and Ruth Leys, like Fermaglich emphasized Vietnam veteran groups' role. See Leys, *Trauma,* pp. 224-225 and Young, *The Harmony of Illusions,* pp. 110-112. For our purposes it is enough to note that the universalization of the category was initially made possible by the inclusion of Hiroshima, after which it was expanded to other categories of victims.

[486] Fassin and Rechtman, *The Empire of Trauma,* p. 86.

of the dual benefit of their findings. As Dagmar Herzog noted for the reperations debates it is hard to separate the politics from the science.[487] Both acted in a sort of dialectic that propelled the field "forward" towards the creation of PTSD.

When PTSD finally became a part of DSM-III in 1980, Lifton, again, played a crucial role in expanding it. Lifton was instrumental in bringing in Niederland and Krystal to the discussions of the APA task force.[488] After it entered the lexicon PTSD quickly became an accepted legal and medical category. With its universal application PTSD soon "migrated" back to Israel and other Western countries. It took some more time for it to come to Japan. It was only in 1995, following the Kobe earthquake, when Japanese psychiatrists finally incorporated it into their lexicon.[489] *Hibakusha* however did not benefit from this research until at least 2000. It is only at the turn of the millennium that Japanese psychiatrists first started to apply this category in seeking compensation for *hibakusha*.[490] This is ironic (and tragic) as these developments would not have come about without Robert Lifton's work on Hiroshima.

Robert Lifton's Hiroshima research enabled, in conjunction with the research done on "survivor syndrome," a universalization of the categories of trauma and "the survivor." Lifton's unique position made it possible for him to make the connections between European work on survivors, his own work in Hiroshima, and later efforts by groups like Vietnam vets, feminists and others. Much of the power of PTSD came from the fact that it was rooted in the culturally powerful images of the Hiroshima and the concentration camp survivors. Of course it was not only Lifton's work or even advances in psychiatry that achieved it. PTSD and trauma's prominence came, and were a part of a historically significant moment when the image of the

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[487] Herzog, "A Psychiatric Mass Experiment," p. 16.
[488] Fermaglich, *American dreams and Nazi nightmares,* p. 155.
[489] Breslau, "Globalizing disaster trauma."
[490] Naono Akiko, genbaku higaisha to 'kokoro no kizi,' torauma kenkyu to taiwateki no shiron," in Takashi Mitani, *Senso to minshu : senso taiken o toinaosu.* (Tokyo: Junposha, 2008), p. 88.

survivor was transformed. Psychiatric developments had a critical role in legitimizing and transforming the whole practice of witnessing and victim politics and, thus, made the survivor one of the prominent figures of our age.

Conclusion Nuclear anxiety, survivors and Hiroshima's forgotten role

The importance of psychiatry and psychiatric categories to our current understanding of WW II collective memory in general and witnessing in particular was far from being a foregone conclusion. Psychiatry had a very different attitude in the first decade after the war. Psychiatry played a crucial role in domesticating and neutralizing the subversive meanings of the bomb and atomic energy. A similar pattern could be seen with the reaction to the Holocaust. Far from concentrating on healing the victims of the bomb and the Holocaust, psychiatrists, largely as a result of the postwar prominence of mental hygiene, sought instead to protect society from "mental defects" and mostly denied the existence of trauma. This was very much in line with psychiatry's general suspicion of trauma and overall conservatism. What Robert Lifton and his peers were challenging was not just the ideas other psychiatrist and psychologists held about trauma but the profession's very role in society. Psychiatry, for Lifton, was becoming too strictly professional. That is, by narrowing its focus to the technical and supposedly non-ideological science, psychiatry, "ends up manipulating people to serve the institutions that they are rebelling against."[491]

Theodor Adorno, in a similar critique, attacked psychology's privileging of the individual over the structures which subjugate him or her. Adorno argued that much of what Freud took to be innate psychological structure derived, instead, from the violence of socialization into capitalist society. Mental disorders were the results of scars inflicted by the ego on itself when,

[491] Quoted in August G Lageman, "Encounter with Death: The Thought of Robert Jay Lifton," *Journal of Religion and Health* 26, no. 4 (1987), p. 305.

confronted with its own powerlessness in face of the system, responds by repressing conscious awareness of potentials for transformation, and driving emancipatory impulses into the unconscious realm. "The cult of psychology that mankind is being talked into," Adorno wrote, "and that in America has meanwhile made of Freud an insipid item of the staple diet is the necessary accompaniment to a process of dehumanization, the illusion of the helpless that their fate lies in their own hands."[492] In short, psychology translated the irrationality and madness of the outside world into the subject's own psyche. Psychiatry in the immediate aftermath of the war served a similar role for the domestication and neutralization of nuclear anxiety. But blaming the victims of systematic violence for being overindulgent and irrational did not make the world less mad or more rational. Treating the victim in isolation of the context of structural violence of which he or she was a victim led to a distortion of science itself. What Lifton and his peers did was to bring back the context. This had positive benefits both for their profession and the survivors. The entry of trauma into the lexicon gave victims of systematic violence everywhere a language and legitimacy which enabled them to seek redress and opened a whole new field not only in mental health but in the social sciences as a whole.

In some ways however the discourse has been perhaps too successful. One way the category transformed understanding of cases on the ground was the privileging of survivors who were politically active as being in some way "healthier" and more normal than others. For some, in Japan, *hibakusha* who chose not to take part in political activities (and therefor did not go through the process of "formulation") were hurting both themselves and the cause of peace. As Yamate Shigeru, from the Tokyo Metropolitan institute for Neurosciences, explained to a *Hidankyo* gathering in 1977, citing Lifton's finding and his own research, "drifting in the

[492] Theodor Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," (part I), in *New Left Review*, No. 1., Vol. 46, (November-December 1967), p. 72.

conditions stated above [i.e. long term PTSD damage] *hibakusha* are unable to find meaning in in life and death nor in family life, and the purpose of living is lost…but many *hibakusha* have rehabilitated themselves…and they therefore seized this aim for life: a world without nuclear weapons, human solidarity for peace…The principle of sacrifice for peace…brought some consolation to both the victim and bereaved…*hibakusha* who joined the movement [and who] were able to appeal based on their suffering received great encouragement , and felt for the first time 'it is good to have survived.' They resolved to turn their suffering into a 'sacrifice for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.'"[493] Thus, Yamate divided *hibakusha* into "drifters" and "resisters," the former, he implied were somehow hurting the "cause of peace." Thus, PTSD not only legitimized witnessing but also elevated witnesses and those who were politically active into somehow being better than others. It turned suffering into a badge of political honor.

A similar development happened in the context of the Holocaust, as Jewish victims groups and others started to press their claims for suffering in promoting various political causes. This process and the general development of trauma studies caused the Holocaust to be seen mostly in terms of trauma and its victims. This had negative effects on our understanding of both trauma and the Holocaust. As Ruth Leys observed, "the Holocaust now appears, retroactively so to speak not only to have been the crucial trauma of the century, but also one that can be fully understood only in light of our knowledge of PTSD."[494] The intense focus on the Holocaust as trauma has obscured our view of the Holocaust and how it was understood before the prominence of PTSD. We came to see the Holocaust in terms of victims and victimizers, delayed

[493] Yamate Shigeru," Distruption of People's lives by the Atomic Bombs," in International Symposium on the Damage and After-Effects of the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Shoichirō Kawasaki, *A Call from Hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki : Proceedings International Symposium on the Damage and After-Effects of the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, July 21-August 9, 1977, Tokyo,* (Tokyo: Published for Japan National Preparatory Committee by Asahi Evening News, 1978), pp. 119-120.
[494] Quoted in Ibid., p. 262.

effects and "formulations." This was not how it was understood historically. Furthermore, this process distorts our understanding of the way trauma itself developed obfuscating the role of Hiroshima and other discourses in this history. The Holocaust was but one of a number of strands that led to the rise of our current understanding of trauma. Nuclear issues were as more if not even more important for contemporaries. This is not to belittle the Holocaust importance. It was, after all, the restitution debates which broke the taboos over trauma in Hiroshima as well (though it took these insights some time to get there) as in other places.

The Holocaust's prominence obscures the historical importance of Hiroshima in the fifties and sixties. The year 1962, when the Eichmann trial finished is cited by many as the turning point in the history of Holocaust memory; it was also the year of the Cuban Missile Crisis. There was a reason why Robert Lifton felt the urgency he felt when coming to Hiroshima. What its victims had to say felt immediate and important. 1962, however, was also the year when this began to change. With the onset of the sixties and the Vietnam War, the Holocaust, whose lessons seemed much more applicable than Hiroshima's, started to gain importance while Hiroshima receded. Watching the Eichmann trial from Hiroshima, a number of anti-nuclear activists, feeling the shift in the historical winds and seeking to reinvigorate their cause, sought to connect Hiroshima with the Holocaust and, thus, set out on a pilgrimage to Auschwitz to "unite the victims of the world's places of horror." It is to their incredible story that we now turn.

Chapter 4: The Hiroshima-Auschwitz Peace March and the Globalization of Victimhood

On January 27, 1963, a particularly cold and snowy day, a mile-long march to commemorate the eighteenth anniversary of liberation made its way from the city of Auschwitz to the site of the death camp. The march was headed by four young Japanese men, among them a Buddhist monk and a veteran of the Japanese imperial army, Satō Gyōtsū. These men had traveled over 3000 kilometers, mostly by land, from Hiroshima. During their march they crossed paths with numerous sites of World War II death and memory and met with scores of survivors. Indeed, one of the main goals of these four men, who had left Hiroshima about ten months earlier, was "to unite the victims and places of tragedy of the Second World War."[495] In a remarkable document issued by the organizing committee in Tokyo, the march's organizers declared:

> "We Japanese, as both aggressors and victims of the war, should have a special duty in calling for world peace... we, who are of young age, went through the bomb and occupation...but at the same time must reflect on the sin of aggression that we committed... thus we decide to set up on this march and : 1) to tell... as many people as possible about the horrors of Hiroshima and Auschwitz; 2) Record the suffering of different people we witness in various countries; and 3) to tell people about [Hiroshima and others'] suffering and hold peaceful gathering in all paces we will be; 4) to make international connections based on the world religious conventions in Prague and Tokyo."[496]

This was lofty sentiment; nevertheless, when the marchers set out on their journey they encountered cultures of commemoration very different from their own, with very different ethos and very different lessons from WW II. Some of those lessons, as in Israel, were almost diametrically opposed to Hiroshima's. This caused not a little anxiety and confusion for the marchers. At times, the Hiroshima Auschwitz Peace March (hereafter HAP) members found it

[495] "Hiroshima- Auschwitzu Heiwa Koshin," Newsletter No. 1, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park Archive, Kawamato Collection, Box 38, folder 1, No. 911.
[496] Ibid.,p. 1.

hard to reconcile their own ideas, which developed in the context of Hiroshima's commemoration culture, with what they experienced in other places. At other times, however, there was a remarkable understanding and surprisingly smooth exchange between HAP and other groups. What the HAP march illustrates is that the basic format of commemoration was quite similar around the world. Although the idea of a global "cosmopolitan memory culture" is of relatively recent vintage, and it is usually related to the "rise" of the Holocaust as a paradigm for commemoration, the HAP march show that the globalization of WW II memory and the interplay of different war memories date as far back as the sixties.[497] Indeed, it is doubtful if it was ever only local. The histories of war and commemoration are, to use Sebastian Conrad's words, "entangled histories."[498] The HAP march serves as a lens through which we can examine these entanglements and connections between these different places of memory.

What was common to all these different war memories was the figure of the survivor-witness. As we saw, the development of the survivor-witness was the result of a convergence of factors both internal to the victims' experience and external developments that turned the shame of being a victim into the pride of being a survivor. The idea of the survivor, which developed mostly separately in different places, was in the 1960s in the process of convergence. The HAP and groups it worked with, similarly to Robert Lifton and the discourse of trauma, were one of the agents of this convergence. The HAP members again and again emphasized their will to tell and hear testimonies. They had an almost magical belief in the duty of the witnesses to war crimes to tell their story, and testimony's transformative power. Again, this was not limited to the HAP. The rise of witnessing was a global phenomenon and has been examined by a number

[497] Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, "Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory," *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2002), pp. 1063-1087.
[498] Conrad. Sebastian," Entangled Memories: Versions of the Past in Germany and Japan, 1945-2001,"*Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 38, No. 1, Redesigning the Past (Jan., 2003), pp. 86.

of scholars, most notably Annette Wieviorka and Jean-Michel Chaumont.[499] Just like with trauma studies, however, Chaumont, Wieviorka and others, their excellent scholarship notwithstanding, do not look beyond the Cold War West and Israel, and they write exclusively on victims of the Holocaust. This is understandable given the focus of their work, but what the HAP story demonstrates is that this focus is not sufficient. The war was a worldwide traumatic event. The forced silence that many victims encountered, the lack of judicial and other recourse and the unresolved trauma pushed many to talk. In the face of what was impossible to fathom there was a need to tell one's story or, to use Shoshana Felman's words (drawing on Walter Benjamin), "in face of the abyss… the expressionless turn to storytelling."[500]

This did not mean that the experience of survival and witnessing meant the same thing everywhere. What the HAP encounters with survivors in Poland, Singapore, Japan and Israel show is that along with much convergence of narratives and practices, there was also much divergence in meaning, leading to confusion and contradictions. One major difference was the fact that the Japanese had not just been victims but also victimizers in the war. The HAP marchers were aware of this and even tried to make it a point of unique strength, as the declaration quoted above shows, but nevertheless, continually struggled with this contradiction. Furthermore, the HAP solution to this problem was to use extreme abstraction and universalization of the experience of victimization. This was particularly evident in the way that not only Japanese but also Poles and others abstracted and idealized the real victims of genocide out of existence; replacing the Jewish victims of genocide with more noble sacrificial lambs for peace or the struggle against fascism. By their actions, however, the HAP and similar groups

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[499] Jean-Michel Chaumont, *La Concurrence des Victimes: Génocide, Identité, Reconnaissance* (Paris : La Découverte, 2002); Annett Annette Wieviorka, *The era of the witness* (Cornell University Press, 2006).

[500] Shoshana Felman, *The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century,* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002). p. 14.

created a concrete connection between disparate but similar discourses. This globalization of the figure of the victim-witness enabled a convergence of the narratives and contributed, in conjunction with the Eichmann trials and other developments, to a process which would eventually lead to the "the era of the witness."[501] In the pages that follow this story is told through the unusual encounters HAP marchers had with local memory cultures in Singapore, Poland and Israel, as well as the experiences of the marchers themselves in Japan; examining the interactions and entanglement of war memories that this unique peace march event produced.

I. Uniting the victims of the world's places of atrocity

The idea to organize a pilgrimage to Auschwitz first came up in discussions during the sixth annual All-Japan Gensuikyō (the main anti-nuclear coalition) meeting in Tokyo in August 1960. As part of this gathering, the representative of the Nihonzan-Miyohoji temple -a Nichiren sect temple in Chiyoda, Tokyo- Satō Gyōtsū, proposed an international peace march. [502] Auschwitz was not yet proposed as a destination and nothing much came out of his proposal until another major gathering in Kyoto in July 1961, which brought together religious activists to discuss ways to reach reconciliation and world peace. [503] The 1961 congress met amidst rising tensions between the powers over Berlin. Father Jan Frankowski, a Roman-Catholic Polish priest, was among those present at the conference and he, in conjunction with Satō and a journalist from the *Osaka Yomiuri*, Satō Yuki, seem to have been the first to initiate a specific call for forming a Peace Pilgrimage to Auschwitz.[504] During the conference they were introduced

[501] The phrase is, of course, from Annette Wieviorka's *The Era of the Witness*.
[502] HAP Newsletter I, P 3.
[503] Ibid.,p. 2.
[504] Interview with Kuwahara Hideki, Hiroshima, 2 July 2010. Kuwahra was the head of the Hiroshima Auschwitz committee from its founding in 1962 and was involved in the HAP as well. Kato Yuzo and Kajimura Shingo, *Hiroshima-Auschwitz Heiwa Koshin: seinen no kiroku,* (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1965), p 168; Jan Frankowski and others who were involved in organizing the march (like Satō,Yoshida and Kuwahara) were also involved in the World

to the other future members of the peace march: Kajimura Shinjo (a Protestant), Yamazaki Tomichiro (a Catholic) and Katō Yuzo, by YMCA Hiroshima General Secretary Wakao Ayuhara. Wakao, a bomb survivor and peace activist, also connected Satō Gyōtsū and Satō Yuki, and made the suggestion to start the march in Hiroshima.[505] Besides Satō, all other participants in the the march were students in their twenties from various Tokyo universities who were active in student circles.[506]

The student connection is important as 1960 saw some of the most violent mass demonstrations and riots opposing the ratification of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (or ANPO in Japanese) that shocked the nation. The violence prevented a scheduled visit to Japan by President Eisenhower and precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (a former war criminal and a figure particularly hated by students). The students and the unions brought hundreds of thousands into the streets but, despite their efforts, the treaty was (literally) rammed through the house of councilors and ratified on June 19, 1960.[507] The violence was traumatic for many both inside and outside the political system, including in the non-nuclear and peace movements. The anti-nuclear movement, once a place where different groups could come together, was increasingly torn by ideological strife. In 1961, the center-right camp, associated

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Federalist Movement through which they achieved most of their institutional support. See Yamada and Kuwahara's recollections in Sekai renbō undō hiroshima niju go nen shi iinkai (ed.), *Sekai renbō undō hiroshima niju go nen shi,* (Hiroshima: Kawamato, 1973) pp. 138,162 .

505 Interview with Morishita Mineko, Hiroshima, 2 July 2010. Morishita is the acting secretary general of the Hiroshima Auschwitz Committee.

506 Katō, who later became a Professor of Chinese History, denies in his memoirs any political involvement in the student movement. Katō, although he wrote a book about the march in 1965, which appears in his resume, also completely whitewashed the peace march from his autobiography. He presented it as his student trip (or poor trip-*bimbo na ryoko*), on which he went with three friends. He does not acknowledge any connection to the peace march or any political activities. Katō also refused to speak to me about the subject. It is not clear to me why this is. In his 1965 work, however, co-written with Kajimura (whom he also does not give credit to in his list of publications) is quite specific about his involvement in demonstrations and other activities. See his, *shiken to taiken wo megutte*, in *Yokohama shiritu daigaku ronsō jinbun gakukeiretu,* Vol. 54 No. 123 (2003), p. 54.

507 The socialists and communist mp's physically blocked the house chairman from reaching the podium and conducting the vote and he had to be carried on officers hands through the crowd.

with the LDP, left the movement and tensions between remaining Socialists and the JCP over Soviet nuclear testing would split the movement even further in the following year.[508] While the rifts and violence led people like Satō and other religious leaders to look for reconciliation and avenues of non-violent protest, for the students, a feeling of depression and confusion ensued.[509] Despite enormous counter-efforts, the conservatives passed the treaty and, as they saw it, opened the way to a return of imperialism, which, with rising cold war tensions, seemed imminent. We felt, wrote march participants, "that something had to be done [to stop the rise of reaction] but we did not know how to proceed."[510] The solution found by both religious activists and students was to look outside of Japan.

As Hiraoka Takashi, a leading Hiroshima journalist (and future mayor) noted, the peace march was only part of a growing trend of international initiatives. In 1961, Earle Reynolds, an American peace activist residing in Hiroshima, in one of the first of these endeavors, organized a group of *hibakusha* that traveled around the world and gave testimonies. Reynolds's Hiroshima peace pilgrimage was launched in March 1962, and, in the same year, anti-nuclear activists formed a joint group that went to Accra and Moscow to attend international peace gatherings. These initiatives and the march, wrote Hiraoka, looking back on 1962, were making "the experience of bombing the base (root) from which we could lead the peace movement out of the strife ridden desert (*fumō)*."[511] Hiraoka was not alone in attributing the experience of the bombing a special place in politics. As we saw in chapter two, this kind of thinking was, by

[508] Anthony DiFilippo, "The Politics of Japanese Nuclear Disarmament Initiatives: Where Government Policies and Civil Society Converge and Diverge," a conference paper for *Arms Control and Disarmament: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects International Studies Association,* Portland, Oregon, 27 February 2003. pp. 9-10.
[509] Satō was very bitter and pessimistic about the peace movement. He rightly saw a split in the movement as imminent and decried the mindless rush to violence and sloganeering among his colleagues who had "violence, recklessness and rioting as their three sacred regalia," referring ironically to the emperor's regalia. Katō and Kajimura, p.13.
[510] HAP Newsletter I, p. 5.
[511] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 22 December 1962.

1962, almost orthodox in Hiroshima and Japan as a whole. And indeed not only in Japan. Similar to the way Hiroshima reached out to Auschwitz, the mayor of Dresden, Hans Bonn, sent in June 1961 a letter to Hiroshima's mayor calling for a partnership in the fight for peace and against rising militarism to transcend the divisions of east and west."[512] Dresden, however, was denied membership in the victim club. Hiroshima, probably for political reasons, never answered their letter (Dresden tried again in 1963) and it was not until the nineties when Germans as well could claim victim status.

This game of competing victimization took a bizarre twist when, as the peace march organizers were applying for passports, they were denied help by what they called, "pre-modern feudalist bureaucrats," on the grounds that they "show unfair discrimination by going to a site of genocide by German soldiers in Auschwitz but not for the one committed by Soviet soldiers in the Katyn forest" (site of a massacre of Polish officers in 1940).[513] Then as now, the right in Japan and elsewhere was not above playing these sort of victim games. As Alyson Cole pointed out in relation to "Anti-victim" discourse in the States, conservatives often claim for themselves the status of "true victims" by pointing out that their own victimization is forgotten and obscured by the leftist media.[514] German conservative historians would also play this game of "contextualization" during the *Historikerstreit* in the nineties, and Israeli rightists even more recently brought forward the plight of Arab Jews forced to flee their homes in 1948 as a

[512] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 15 June 1961. Dresden sent another message on 6 August. Coventry in the U.K. as well sent a message to Hiroshima, "wishing to become one of 15 'world peace cities.'" See *Chūgoku Shinbun* 6 August and 21 September 1961.
[513] HAP Newsletter I. p. 10: Until 1964 Japanese were not permitted to travel freely abroad; the government wary of foreign currency leaving the country. Thus, the marchers had to get a special permission to leave Japan.
[514] Alyson M. Cole, *The Cult of True Victimhood: From the War on Welfare to the War on Terror (*Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 8-9.

"counterweight" to the Palestinian "nakba."[515] The Katyn episode shows a similar inclination on the part of Japanese conservatives, and is quite remarkable given the time and the context of Japanese political infighting. It demonstrates that the counter-victim discourse was there with the victim discourse from the very beginning.

By January 1962, everything was ready for departure. In an interview to *Chugoku Shinbun*, Satō declared, in what became a mantra, his desire "to deepen the connection between these two places of utmost suffering and tragedy in World War II." [516] Before the departure ceremony, Satō and the students visited the A-Bomb hospital and met with hibakusha representatives. From a sick girl at the A-Bomb hospital they received 3000 paper cranes, a symbol (through the martyrdom of Sadako Sasaki) of Hiroshima's ultimate sacrifice and innocence, and they vowed to "spread the voice of Hiroshima and unite it with this of Auschwitz where untold numbers of Jews were murdered by the hand of the Nazis."[517] They left these cranes everywhere they went.[518]

This kind of rhetoric seems to be completely natural by then, yet until 1962 there is almost no reference to Jews or Auschwitz in the Hiroshima discourse. Besides the isolated figure of Anne Frank, whose diary was a hit in Japan in the mid-fifties, there were only a few other references to the Holocaust in Hiroshima or Japan. So, why Auschwitz? Why now? The

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[515] The Nakhba is a general name given by Palestinians to the expulsions and flight from Palestine in 1948 which resulted in the loss of hundreds of villages and created the Palestinian refugee diaspora.

[516] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 6 February 1962. While Japanese names are usually spelled with family names first, Sadako Sasaki, being a symbol, is an exception. Sadako Sasaki was a child victim of the A-bomb. She famously tried to fold a thousand origami cranes before her death but failed. Children from her class were joined by thousands throughout the world after Sadako's story was popularized worldwide through the work of Austrian writer Karl Bruckner in his work *Sadako will leben.* Later, Sadako's story would be connected to that of Anne Frank, both figures of popularity, as David Goodman and Miyazawa Masanori point out, served to de-historicize and de-politicize the Holocaust and Hiroshima. For a comparison, see Roni Sarig, "Sadako Sasaki and Anne Frank: Myths in the Japanese and Israeli Memory of WW II," in *War and Militarism in Modern Japan :Issues of History and Identity*, edited by Guy Podoler and Ben-Ami Shillony (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2009).

[517] Ibid; *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 7 February 1962.

[518] The *Yomiuri* (English edition), 5 August 1963.

frustration after ANPO, rising cold war tensions and anxiety, and the need of Satō and others of his generation for atonement all played a role, yet neither Satō nor any other figure seem to doubt this "natural" connection between Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The participation of Father Frankowski does supply us with a concrete connection, but there were plenty of other Poles, Germans and Austrians present in Hiroshima. What brought Auschwitz to Hiroshima's consciousness in 1961 was what also brought it to the rest of the world, the Eichmann trial. As circumstantial evidence points to(the idea for the march being conceived at the same time as the trial) and as Kuwhara Hideki, the head of the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Committee, confirmed to this author, it was the enormous publicity of the trial which first brought Auschwitz to Hiroshima's activists' attention.[519] Yet, the Eichmann trial in Japan, indeed the Holocaust as a whole, was not quite what it was in Israel, Germany or the United States. This had important implications to the way the pilgrims and Japanese as a whole would view Auschwitz and the Holocaust. It is to this trial and its interpretation that we now must turn.

II. Eichmann in Hiroshima: the Holocaust through Japanese eyes

The Eichmann trial was front-page news in Hiroshima and Japan as a whole.[520] Eichmann's capture in Argentina in a daring Mossad operation was, of course, international news in itself. The *Asahi Shinbun* called it "thrilling", and a "suspense story."[521] The first reactions to the story expressed fascination with the "man in the glass cage," and the "man responsible for the killing of millions."[522] Much of the trial coverage remained on this level, a sort of a-historical, human-interest drama with interesting characters and dramatic turns. Nevertheless, as the trial

[519] Kuwahara interview. 2 July 2010.
[520] The *Yomiuri Shinbun* had 192 stories concerning Eichmann in 1962 alone. The *Chūgoku Shinbun*, had around fifty.There were as many references as there were in the *Chūgoku Shinbun*, for the whole fifties' decade.
[521] *Asahi Shinbun* 14 June 1960.
[522] See for instance *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 24 March 1961 and *Yomiuri* 7 March 1961

progressed, the fundamental issues the trial touched upon: the Israelis' right to judge Eichmann, the place of war responsibility and remorse, the issue of genocide, the plight of its victims and its contemporary importance, came to the fore. Rarely mentioned but always in the background was Japan's own war. Discussions about the trial, in many ways, were more about Japan's own guilt and own self- perception than about Adolf Eichmann or the Holocaust. As David Goodman and Miyazawa Masanori argued, the Jews in Japan, a country with almost no Jews but with a developed discourse about them, often are used as a foil for domestic contestation, different players abstracting the figure of the Jew and using it for their own agenda.[523] The way that Eichmann was perceived, and, in our case, the way that the marchers perceived Jewish survivors, was no different.

Although rarely mentioned in Hiroshima itself, the Holocaust was not completely unknown in Japan prior to 1961. The Eichmann trial or the march were not the first Japanese engagement with the Holocaust. Under the occupation, according to Meron Medzini, the Americans actively discouraged disseminating information on the Holocaust in order to prevent comparisons to Hiroshima.[524] It is arguable whether this was an active policy, but the fact is that no publication about the Holocaust appears in Japan until the 1952 translation of *Anne Frank Diary.* The diary was a runaway best seller; it is doubtful, though, how much information on the Holocaust or the Jews it conveyed to its Japanese readers. Frank's Jewishness is not emphasized and she is portrayed, more or less, as a victim of war in general rather than of racism and persecution or of the Germans. As Goodman and Miyazawa argued, *Anne Frank*'s *Diary* was popular in Japan precisely because it allowed the Japanese to relate to the Holocaust and WW II without tackling

[523] David G. Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype*, (New York: Lexington Books, 2000), pp. 18-19.
[524] Meron Medzini *Yapan ve'hayehudim be'milkhemet ha'olam ha'shnia,* unpunished paper, p. 53. I thank Professor Medzini for letting me use this reference.

the hard historical realities.[525] This was consistent with how the Japanese treated their war as a whole. The Hiroshima figure of Sasaki Sadako, the child victim of the bomb, was also portrayed and conceptualized as the epitome of victimization by an abstract war and "the bomb."[526]

This was not the case across the board. In 1956, the anonymous editors of a translation of Viktor Frankl's *Man's Search for Meaning* directly connected the Holocaust and Japanese crimes on the continent. In a very different pairing than our pilgrims' coupling of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, the editors commented, "there are two events that are so monstrous that they make one ashamed of being human... the first is the rape of Nanking in 1937... The second was the organized mass slaughter perpetrated in the concentration camps."[527] They went on to argue that knowledge of the Holocaust was absolutely essential in order for the Japanese to comprehend their own war guilt.[528] Similar intellectual work on the Holocaust, like Jean Paul Sartre's *The Jew and the Anti-Semite* or Eli Cohen's *Human Behavior in the Concentration Camps*, appeared in 1957. Films such as the German *Thirteen Steps* or Alain Resnais' *Night and Fog* also had some impact. These works were important but, as was typical with Western works on the Holocaust during these years, they concentrated mostly on the plight of political prisoners rather than specifically on the Jews qua Jews, and tended to blur the distinction between the concentration and extermination camps, as illustrated by Frankel's editors' reference to crimes in concentration camps. The Holocaust was not seen as a separate phenomenon but was subsumed under the rubric of Nazi crimes. These crimes were, in turn, in more conservative publications,

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[525] Goodman and Miyazawa, pp. 139-140.

[526] American responsibility for Sasaki's death was not mentioned. In the case of Anne Frank, it was not only in Japan, but also in the U.S. and Europe that Anne Frank's Jewishness was obscured. For marketing and other reasons, Otto Frank, Anne's father, was eager to promote her image as (an almost American) "every-girl." The universalization and de-Judaization of Anne Frank was particularly noticeable in Germany. See Sarig, "Anne Frank" and Goodman and Miyazawa, p. 172.

[527] Goodman and Miyazawa, p. 140.

[528] Ibid. 141.

connected to Soviet crimes and the fight against totalitarianism. On the left, anti-fascist martyrs replaced the Jews, and Nazi crimes were portrayed as a "logical" continuation of capitalism's crimes (a topic we will return to below). Racism, anti-Semitism and the historical peculiarity of the Holocaust were victims of this attitude.

This kind of Cold War logic can also be seen in many Japanese accounts of the Eichmann trial. The *Yomiuri Shinbun*, a right-of-center daily, argued in an April 1961 editorial that Eichmann was the product of totalitarianism: "... [One] can find Eichmann-like fanaticism in other dictatorships... this is the result of the same kind of group thinking when one person thinks like ten thousand."[529] Takeyama Michio, a liberal humanist (anti-communist), made a more nuanced argument regarding Eichmann's defense, stating that he was just following orders, "Khrushchev answered [Eichmann's] complaint (in his speech denouncing Stalin)... first, one says 'I was just following orders' ... [then] he claims the nation was deceived."[530] Both Takeyama and the *Yomiuri* editor were basically restating arguments from the immediate postwar era. These "subjectivity debates" (*shutaisei ron*) basically revolved around the question of Japanese individual culpability in fascism. The major argument of progressive intellectuals was that Japanese were not "modern" enough because they lacked subjective individuality and engaged in group thinking.[531] Another mid-forties trope, made here by Takayama, was that of deception. Takyama mocks both Eichmann and many Japanese who claimed to have been deceived (*damasareta*) by the militarists, thus feigning ignorance and innocence.

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[529] *Yomiuri Shinbun,* 26 April 1961.
[530] *Asahi Shinbun,* 16 December 1961.
[531] For these debates see Victor Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) and Dower, *Embracing Defeat,* pp.155-161.

Takeyama, the celebrated author of the anti-war novel *The Harp of Burma,* had a distinguished track record in tackling Japanese war crimes. Furthermore, Takeyama was one of the earliest commentators on the Holocaust in Japan. But Takeyama had a peculiar view on the Final Solution. Seeing it as a clearly "irrational endeavor", he traced it to theology and the scriptures; Hitler was basically fulfilling the anti-Semitism embedded in Western civilization and Christianity.[532] Takeyama, like many other Japanese intellectuals, saw in fascism a sort of group madness. He saw the same madness taking place in Germany and in Japan. While, "Japanese had dementia, Germans became devils."[533] The disease of Nazism had pre-modern roots in religion. This view depoliticized Nazism and made it a sort of aberration. Like similar discourse that described the A-bomb as a mistake, it took its subject out of history and placed it into theology and psychology. "The Germans and the World, "wrote Takayama, "lost their mental balance after WW I."[534] Unlike most commentators on the bomb, however, Takeyama did acknowledge the problem was deeper than a momentary slip into darker times. Irrationality, which for him was the religious foundation of Western culture, was hidden within the very foundations of culture. "The foundations of Civilization," Takeyama argued, "were shown to have been built on fragile foundations and were destroyed by this one push of fanaticism."[535] The implications for Japan's own modernization and postwar embrace of Western culture are clear.

Unlike Takeyama, who acknowledged Japan's own war crimes, other commentators seemed to treat WW II as a morality play in which Japan was nothing but a spectator, or, even worse, employed the Jews' postwar "vindictiveness" towards the Nazis (as opposed to Japanese "humanity" in forgiving the Americans) to extol their moral position. The aforementioned

[532] Goodman and Miyazawa, p. 146.
[533] *Asahi Shinbun*, 16 December 1961.
[534] Ibid.
[535] *Asahi Shinbun*, 6 April 1961.

Yomiuri editorial called on Jews to use the trial for "constructive purposes." "We understand the feeling of the Jews," the editors wrote, "but the memory of the cruelty … should end with this trial [as] we humans are trying to forget the cruelty of the war… eye for an eye is a Jewish tradition, but the world has to give up on it, to forget revenge and the past in order to establish a new peace for society. We should not throw stone after stone into the lake that tries to recover its serenity."[536] The writer's clear implication was that Japan's own lake had recovered its serenity via its re-invention as a nation of peace; a notion given concrete substance by Hiroshima's "sacrifice for peace."

"The eye for an eye" theme was repeated by many other commentators, especially after it became clear that Eichmann would be executed. Inukai Michiko wrote that she wanted a more universal solution. "I am not trying to save his life but I'm against this punishment." Referring to Martin Buber, who opposed the death penalty, she wrote, "Israel should be one step above Nazis. We should refrain from killing Eichmann."[537] A Vox Populi column in the *Asahi* argued on the same lines: "Israel should not kill him for revenge. If he is guilty of crimes against humanity, a death sentence is inhuman as well."[538] Another columnist wrote that the trial left him with the "aftertaste of public lynching," and that, "Israel usurped the right to kill Eichmann."[539] Inoue Makoto went perhaps to the furthest extreme, equating the Israeli court with Nazi crimes: "I can find no more words to defend the Israeli court than I can for [Eichmann's crimes]. The

[536] *Yomiuri Shinbun* , 14 April 1961.
[537] *Asahi Shinbun,* 16 December 1961.
[538] *Asahi Shinbun,* 17 December 1961.
[539] *Asahi Shinbun,* 2 June 1962.

psychology in this Kangaroo court is the psychology that makes war possible… [and] will lead humankind to destruction."[540]

Also linking the trial to larger issues of war and peace, the *Asahi* wrote in a similar fashion as the *Yumiuri*: "The trial should not be used for simple revenge but for constructive causes... [it] should be used to establish internationally recognized laws and determine, across cultures, standards of cruelty... Beheading by samurai sword was cruel for Westerners but it was not [for us]... [Now] the entire world should recognize the use of nuclear weapons as cruel."[541] Another implied criticism of the Western Allies was a caricature published the same week showing the four nuclear powers marching in Nazi uniforms, goose-stepping in a Nazi salute and casting a shadow in the form of a swastika, with the caption "Eichmann's replacements."[542] The *Asahi*'s complaint over Western "cultural misunderstanding" of Japan's own war conduct, coupled with Japanese liberals' admonishments of Israel for holding an "eye for an eye" mentality and for failing to live up to ideals of international peace and justice are, to say the least, hypocritical. This is not to say that familiar and painful issues regarding Japan were not debated here. But it seems that many felt superior to the Jews insofar as they themselves "overcame" their hatred to the Americans.

If assertions of superiority were mostly implied in the papers, non-intellectuals had no scruples in making such statements outright. Robert Lifton conducted an interview with a technician and Hiroshima resident who reported that during the Eichmann trial, "a Japanese from Hiroshima went to Jerusalem [this would be Shikiba Ryuzaburō – a volleyball coach who went with a Japanese team to Israel], people there asked him why the Japanese don't hate the people

[540] Quoted in Goodman and Mizawa, p. 152.
[541] *Asahi Shinbun,* 12 April 1961 .
[542] *Yomiuri Shinbun,* 11 April 1961.

who dropped the A-bomb as they did, all their lives, hate Eichmann… Jewish people maintain that hatred and the wish to put their hands on the enemy. Now they tell the people of Hiroshima that we should have the same feeling."[543] With Eichmann and the A-bomb, the technician argued, [this] could not be avoided, as "they did these things on orders from superiors."[544] The technician then went on to chide Koreans, using racist and derogatory language, over their supposedly inflated thirst for revenge and inability to forgive [Japan]. [545] Thus, both Koreans and Jews' vindictiveness served here to highlight Hiroshima's higher moral standards. As we saw in chapter one, this was not a new phenomenon in Hiroshima, but rather a well-established line of thinking.

However, this again did not apply to everybody. Some Eichmann related articles show a pretty detailed knowledge of the Holocaust and Israel. Reports discussed in length, though unfortunately did not comment on, K. Tzetnik and others' testimonies, included international (especially German) reactions, described the mood on the street and examined the judges' backgrounds.[546] However, most articles did not dwell on the complexities of the trial, the Holocaust or the Middle East conflict (the Palestinians are completely absent). Jews, as well as Germans, are used as abstractions against which Japanese commentators hold their own discussions about war responsibility, memory and history. This kind of attitude is consistent with the way many Hiroshima intellectuals used the Holocaust during the postwar years. Hiroshima and Auschwitz were seen as symbols, and rightly so, of a break within the project of modernity. Kurihara Sadako, perhaps one of the most philosophically-minded of the *hibakusha* writers,

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[543] Robert Jay Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (University of N. Carolina Press, 1991) pp. 321-322.
[544] Ibid., p. 322.
[545] Ibid.,pp. 322-323.
[546] See for instance, *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 11 April 1961. The last discussion included a fascinating and nuanced account of Judge Landau's involvement in an earlier case, the Kfar Qasim massacre, where Landau established the judicial principal of disobeying immoral orders.

wrote that Hiroshima and Auschwitz were the culmination of "progress," as "mankind has stopped being mankind and completely became a machine."[547] For Ōe Kenzaburō as well, Hiroshima and Auschwitz represented a "decisive turn in civilization."[548] These writers and others were right to point to similarities and the shared logic of extermination and bureaucratically organized killing, but that was a fine line to walk. Hiroshima writers were much more inclined to see their own predicament as worse or, like some did, to voice frustrations with the way Auschwitz has distracted attention from "their holocaust" or even suppressed it. Kurihara wrote that while many wrote about the Holocaust, "facts about Hiroshima were suppressed by the occupation," which was true but, as seen in chapter one, only to a point.[549] Kanai Toshihiko, a well-known journalist, wrote in 1962, "The Hiroshima experience is not so well known…even though the scope of misery far exceeds that of Auschwitz."[550] Again, one would also need to qualify this and point out that there were also many compelling works of art and literature, such as the Maruki's Auschwitz murals, which came out of Hiroshima.

Furthermore, not only Japanese but Jewish intellectuals as well connected Auschwitz and Hiroshima. Elie Wiesel, Nelly Sachs, and Primo Levi made these connections. Levi, in a 1978 poem, *The Girl-Child of Pompei,* speaks of "Anne Frank and the Hiroshima schoolgirl/ a shadow printed on the wall by the light of a thousand suns/ a victim on the altar of fear."[551] The connection between the sites is undeniable. Industrial killings, genocide and the nuclear menace are linked not just temporally, in that they all originated during WW II, but also through the very

[547] John Treat, *Writing Ground Zero: Japanese Literature and the Atomic Bomb (*Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) p. 10.
[548] Ibid.,p. 19.
[549] Kurihara Sadako, "Hiroshima no bungaku wo megutte: aushiwitzu to hiroshima," in Oda Makoto and Takeda Taijun (ed.) *nihon no genbaku bungaku* (Tokyo, 1983), p. 258.
[550] Goodman and Miyazawa, p. 177.
[551] Ibid.

mind frames which reduced populations to equations of killings. Nevertheless, making these connections without proper contextualization also runs the risk of simplifying and abstracting these two tragedies beyond recognition. Especially in Hiroshima's case, this could have troubling consequences as equating the carnage of Hiroshima and Auschwitz obfuscates the fact that Hiroshima was a major military center of a nation at war (which was also the Nazis' ally and committed atrocities of its own), while the Jews did not do anything to the Germans. The pilgrims were actually confronted with this very question by an Israeli on the French vessel that carried them to Vietnam who pointed out that "in Auschwitz there were no combatants… [And] all were killed indiscriminately." The pilgrims' answer is not recorded. [552] The pilgrims, however, were soon confronted with the reality of Japan's war in Asia when they continued, after a brief stop in Saigon, to Singapore, where they were literally brought face to face with the results of Japanese terror on the continent.

II. Singapore: The "Blood Debt"

The four members of HAP arrived in Singapore in mid-May 1962. Upon arrival, they were immediately confronted with quite an unexpected event. In the fall and spring of 1962, construction workers on Siglap beach found mass graves containing hundreds of bodies of local Chinese residents murdered by the Japanese in 1942. This was not the first mass grave exposed at the time. A number of these graves had already been found, most of them also as a result of construction work. The discoveries prompted an angry response from local residents and a demand from Japan to acknowledge its "blood debt" to Singapore residents.[553] The "blood debt"

[552] Katō and Kajimura, p. 9.

[553] Ran Shauli, "Massacres and Political Amnesia: On the Political Value of Memory of Massacres in the Chinese Communities of Malasaya, Indonesia, and Singapore (1941-1998)," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Haifa (2008), p. 58.

episode was a relatively rare occurrence in Singapore. As brutal and traumatic as it was, the Japanese interlude was only part of Singapore's recent bloody history. The geography of memory in this small city-state (then still a self-governing territory under British rule) is very complex. War memories in Singapore, as Takashi Fujitani commented for the region, "are not seamless [but] multiple, contradictory, unsettled and unsettling."[554]

Massacres and counter-massacres, expulsions, occupation and communist insurgency had left a deep mark on this small territory. The HAP members, although oblivious to that history, had stumbled upon one of the rare times when this history was aired and discussed. Their message of unity and solidarity of victims, applauded and warmly received in other parts of the world, was challenged by the local community. They were seen as Japanese, and not as messengers of peace or representatives of some abstract community of war victims. This caused the HAP members not little anxiety. It was one thing to declare having a "unique" perspective by virtue of being both a victim and a victimizer, it was quite another to actually face the reality of Japan's war. This did not mean that Singapore as well could not be appropriated as a "place of tragedy." The complexity of Singapore's memory politics more often than not led to silence rather than debate or reflection. This made abstraction and talk of peace, the kind practiced by the HAP, actually quite attractive for many, and made a convergence with Hiroshima's message possible. Furthermore, the HAP's message of uniting victims was not very different from Singapore's government's own mission of "nationalizing" Chinese war memory and making

[554] Takashi Fujitani et. al. (ed.), *Perilous Memories*. *The Asia-Pacific War(s) (*Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2001), p.4.

victims of all ethnicities equal victims of Japanese aggression.[555] The HAP mission unwittingly and unknowingly played right into the hands of Singapore's elites.

In Singapore, the HAP encountered a complex history where, since the 1942 "fall" of the city, Japanese and British conquerors, Chinese, Malay and Indian communities suffered and inflicted multiple harms on one another. The bitter conflict between groups, complicated by World War II and the Malayan "emergency," led to competing narratives of war suffering. The Japanese era was only a part of a conflict that lasted well into the sixties. Memorializing or discussing it had very strong contemporary political implications. The British, the official rulers, did as little as possible to commemorate the war, not wanting to draw attention to their failure to protect Singapore.[556] Commemorating the Chinese communist struggle was anathema to most non-Chinese, and even for many in the Chinese community, which was either nationalist –now bitter enemies of the PRC- or, for its own reasons, loyal colonial subjects. Commemorating Siglap was problematic as it could make one suspect of sympathizing with the communists or at least of alienating oneself from the nascent nation of Malaysia.[557] Indeed, history itself was suspect. As a Singaporean academic explained: "Until very recently, Singapore's past was a matter of supreme indifference for most Singaporeans simply because they believed this island never really had a history worth remembering... because all of that history was British colonial history... Patriotism required that we performed some sort of collective lobotomy to wipe out all

[555] This was a very similar to what happened in Yugoslavia and Belgium where a similar ethos of resistance and victimization hid a much less pleasant history of conflict and cross-ethnic massacres. See Jolande Withuis and Annet Mooij, eds., *The Politics of War Trauma: The Aftermath of World War II in Eleven European Countries*, 1st ed. (Amsterdam University Press, 2011).
[556] Ken Lunn, "War Memorialisation and Public Heritage in Southeast Asia: Some Case Studies and Comparative Reflections," in *International Journal of Heritage Studies* Volume 13 Number 1 (January 2007), p. 88.
[557] Shauli, p. 62.

traces of 146 years of shame."[558] And indeed in 1972, a few years after Singapore became independent, history was removed from school curriculum.[559]

This "lobotomy" was consistent with larger trends in Singaporean memory politics. When it comes to the Chinese community, which dominates Singapore, political use of past suffering was extremely rare. As Ran Shauli argued, despite having suffered repeated violence and persecution, the Chinese diaspora is unique in that it lacks a victim narrative and suffers from what he aptly calls, "political amnesia."[560] This amnesia was, furthermore, strengthened by the forces of redevelopment and global capitalism which washed away the physical reminders of the past. Singapore's re-emergence as a financial and business hub spurred development and construction on a massive scale. Singapore was in the early sixties , and still is, in "a state of *perpetuum mobile."*[561] As Paul Connerton argues*,* our modern lifestyles -especially the fast pace of life in a megalopolis like Singapore- consumerism, standardization, emphasis on newness, and the forward looking mentality make memory precarious, at times even impossible.[562] The constant changing of landscapes and physical markers made the memory of the past weaker and more vulnerable to manipulation and silencing.

The irony in Singapore was that it was precisely development work that uncovered this past, previously unspoken of for political reasons. The Siglap site was, at the time, on the outskirts of the city and was discovered by construction workers. The HAP members had to

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[558] Diana Wong, "Memory Suppression and Memory Production: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore," *in* Fujitani et al. *Perilous Memories,* p. 230.
[559] Ibid.
[560] Shauli, p. 1.
[561] Ibid.
[562] Paul Connerton, *How Modernity Forgets,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p. 2 Shauli also argued that in Singapore restrictions on land ownership and the incredible prices of real estate were impediments of commemoration. One has to own the land in order to set up a memorial and land was simply too expensive for the community to purchase for this purpose. The sites of the mass graves were mostly used for development.

travel there by jeep and remembered having to leave the vehicle when it was stuck in the mud and puddles of the monsoon season. The HAP were taken there by an official of the Chinese chamber of commerce, Mr. Huang, who was responsible for the excavation. The chamber of commerce and Chinese clan organizations were the main sponsors of this and most commemoration activities, and they usually maintained them as a private (and non-political) enterprises.[563] The discovery of the bodies led many family members to demand re-burial as the lack of grave markers prevented the families from presenting offerings for the hungry and destitute ghosts.[564] Unusually, however, this anger also translated to a demand for Japan to repay what became known its blood debt. This was due to two main factors: the Chinese community's sense of being betrayed by Allied justice and Singaporean domestic political developments.

In the 1947 trial that saw seven of the perpetrators of the massacre stand trial, only two of the defendants were executed, while the others received lesser sentences. The Nuremberg defense of "obeying orders" was accepted by the court. This defense, however, was not accepted when Japanese were accused of killing white POWs. One of the defendants, Nishimura Takuma, was hanged in 1951 for shooting Australian prisoners. This, understandably, led the Chinese community to feel disappointed and angry; anger one could still see in 1958 when a Japanese police commissioner visited Singapore and was met with banners reading: "the blood of the Singapore civilians still cries for vengeance."[565] Politically, the (mostly Chinese) Socialist party was then challenging the governing party (the PAP which would become the center of a one-party system after independence), which then tried to join Malaysia and maintain a cross-ethnic

[563] Wong, p. 231.
[564] Kevin Blackburn, "The Collective Memory of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Creation of the Civilian War Memorial of Singapore," in *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 73, 2 (December 2000), p. 76.
[565] Blackburn, pp. 79-80.

front. Playing the ethnic card was a part of this strategy. Feeling frustrated by the government's inaction, the Chinese press drew, erroneously, on the Israeli example as a possible way to bypass the government as in Israel, "the demand for compensation had not been raised by the Israeli government but by the Jews who formed a body for that purpose."[566] Based on this and other precedents, the Chinese chamber of commerce demanded compensation from Japan, which was flatly refused.

Anti-Japanese feelings were still strong among the Chinese community and when the HAP landed they were confronted with rather direct questions as to their war responsibility by journalists and others. Their answer was, to say the least, very general. Speaking in the name of the group, Satō said: "I would like to mourn and perform a Buddhist (memorial) service (*ekō*) for all victims of war, especially the victims of Japanese imperialism. This was one of the reasons for me, as a person who experienced and participated in the war, to embark on this peace march..."[567] The following day, the *Straits Times*, apparently satisfied with Satō's reply, wrote," [the HAP] expressed deep concern and interest in the massacres of Chinese by the Japanese Army."[568] The Times' leniency is not surprising as it supported the government, which had little interest in conflict. The morning after the press conference, the HAP were taken to Siglap where they were confronted with the actual mass graves. These were ghastly sights. Katō reported that some of the bodies did not decompose completely, which made the excavation quite unpleasant as far as smell was concerned. While the younger members were mostly silent, Satō kept chanting repeatedly and said nothing else. Members of the chamber of commerce, one of them a survivor who escaped the massacre, explained the details of the killings to the HAP members.

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[566] Ibid.,p. 82.
[567] Katō and Kajimura, p. 29.
[568] The Straits Times, May 5, 1962.

Soon they participated themselves in the digging and excavating of the bones. This quite shocked the HAP members.[569]

Katō reported on discussions among the younger members about war responsibility following this episode:

"....these were their [the Chinese] relatives. These were crimes committed by our brothers and our fathers. We are not unrelated to this. We felt we need to reflect on this, we have to make amends. But in our hearts we felt conflicted (contrary feelings) since, as young Japanese, we know that Japan was a defeated country, with a ruined landscape and people, a country that suffered hunger and, even worse, was humiliated by the occupation. We felt it [feeling shame] was just wrong as we, as well, are victims. We remembered that as youngsters... we read a letter by German youth who felt a dilemma between guilt and their own sense of detachment, the letter was titled 'pardon us' [for washing our hands on it] ....And we, as well felt like them and wanted to say sorry but... We wanted to say something, at least, to our brothers, to our fathers... This is why we resisted ANPO and joined in the movement [and] in this peace march. But, although you can't deny the blood relation we have [with the perpetuators], if you think rationally... Wasn't it the responsibility of the system, of the economic structure?[570]

It is hard to know where the HAP members really stood. Katō and Kajimura here were especially incoherent: apologizing on one hand, but then explaining their guilt through their suffering or quasi-Marxist explanations, on the other. They concluded with an equivocal question, left unanswered, "Does this mean that we do not bear responsibility towards these victims?" One detail from their deliberations is quite surprising: The German youth's letter. This reference and the Chinese press' earlier reference to Israel, demonstrate the transnational nature of these exchanges. Postwar memory here was not developed in a vacuum but with references and cross-references from Asia and Europe.

The HAP's abstractions and confusion and even more so their desire to avoid politics played into the hands of Prime Minister's Lee Kuan Yew's conservatives, who wished to de-

[569] Katō and Kajimura, pp. 31-22.
[570] Ibid. pp. 35-36.

emphasize the Chinese, and even more so the communist affiliation of the victims.[571] Thus, the government blocked the creation of a Chinese-style monument on the site and was less than enthusiastic about the Chinese compensation bid.[572] The HAP, following the reburial ceremony in which Satō, along with Catholic and Protestant priests, took part, released a statement expressing sorrow and support for the friendship treaty between Japan and Singapore, but also stating that they "absolutely have no standing regarding the compensation issue."[573] This was exactly the kind of unspecific and ambiguous wording that the Singaporean government would use to de-historicize and bury the issue, while asking Chinese to "relinquish the demand...to seek the truth, and support the false story of collective suffering."[574] The HAP would render (albeit, like in Singapore, unintentionally) a similar service in Auschwitz for the Polish Communist Party but, before Auschwitz, they would encounter a very different geography of memory in Israel.

III. Israel: The land of survivors

The HAP arrived in Israel on October 26, 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile crisis. A small article in the *Ha'aretz* newspaper reflected the levels of anxiety around the world at the time. "The City of Zurich," it wrote," reported food had run out in local stores. Switzerland, which represents American interests in Cuba, just announced a 25 million-franc increase in military spending, fearing that the Soviets will answer the Cuban blockade with another blockade and even hostilities in Berlin. With this announcement, anxious citizens have emptied local stores."[575] This bizarre little piece was not so unusual at a time when, perhaps more than ever

[571] Blackburn, p. 85. The government was desperate to appease the Malays and was fearful of expressions of Chinese ethnic domination of the island. Thus, Lee insisted that the nation had suffered collectively.
[572]The government was trying to take over the bid and present it as a "national" and not a Chinese issue. The claim was finally settled in 1966 after Japan, seeing the issue as an impediment to investment and growth, agreed to pay 50$ million (but with no apology), after which the government saw the issue as closed. See Ibid.,86; Shauli 99
[573] Katō and Kajimura, p. 40.
[574]Shauli, p. 100.
[575] *Ha'aretz,* 25 October 1962.

before or after, the superpowers were close to military confrontation. This was also one of the only times that the nuclear issue dominated public discourse in Israel. The bomb, whether Israel's acquiring of it or the risk of a general nuclear war, never stood at the center of public debates. This changed during those ten days. In this context one would think that a delegation from Hiroshima would attract considerable attention. Yet this was not the case.

Although Katō reported enthusiasm and much interest in the HAP from journalists and others ("the phone did not stop ringing," as he put it), there are only a couple of pieces concerning the HAP in the Israeli press.[576] The first one from *Ma'ariv*, a center–right daily, which more or less dryly reported on the arrival of the delegation of "peace lovers" (quotation marks in original). The HAP were reported as stating that they "try to awaken the consciousness of the world to prevent another war which would be more horrible than the horrors of Hiroshima and Auschwitz put together."[577] The *Jerusalem Post* dedicated a slightly longer and more sympathetic piece where it reported that "more than ten million Japanese have joined the [marchers'] cause." Satō is reported as saying, in a very telling remark, "we are not against Russia or against the USA, and have no Communist or other affiliation, we are against war." Satō added, "We call on Holocaust survivors to join our march to prevent the recurrence of another Auschwitz and Hiroshima." Then, in a rather embarrassing fashion, he added, "but they will have to pay their own way, as we have hardly enough funds to pay ourselves."[578] The general tone of both the newspaper and other Israeli sources is of slight amusement or bewilderment. *Davar*, a left wing daily, called HAP a "bizarre peace delegation" (*mishlachat*

[576] Katō and Kajimura, p. 124.
[577] *Ma'ariv,* 29 October 1962.
[578] *Jerusalem Post*, 29 October 1962.

shalom timhonit).[579] Israelis just did not know what to make of the idealistic young men and their talk of peace and brotherhood of victims. The HAP as well, it seems, did not quite know what to do with the Israel of 1962. Indeed, initially the HAP did not even plan to go to Israel.[580] It was only after the Israeli ambassador in Japan, Daniel Levine, suggested it to them that they added it as a stop.[581] Levine also equipped them with a recommendation letter and connection with the foreign office. Their trip was mostly organized through the Israeli Student Union and survivor groups.[582] The marchers were polite. They met with different people, went to Yad Vashem and Lohamei Hagetaot (the two main Holocaust memorials), and even met with a group of Arab Israelis. But, although they did not say so directly, they did not like what they saw.

This is not surprising as it would be hard to think of two more different lessons than the one drawn from WW II by majority opinion in Israel and in Hiroshima. Although Israeli society was not in any way monolithic in its response to the Holocaust, the consensus by most Israelis was that Israel should be strong militarily. Furthermore, any efforts to point to similarities or to solidarity with other victims were anathema. The Holocaust was unique and stood above all other horrors. Hiroshima, however, was constantly trying to reach out to others, and most Japanese, as was demonstrated by the wide resistance to the conservatives' effort to amend it, were firmly behind Japan's pacifist constitution. This stark difference was demonstrated by the rationale for Israel's nuclear program, then at the center of a diplomatic row with the Kennedy administration.[583]

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[579] *Davar,* 31 October 1962.
[580] See maps and schedule at the HAP Newsletter I, pp. 14-15.
[581] *Jerusalem Post,* 29 October 1962.
[582] *Davar*, 31 October 1962.
[583] Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 14

The main reason Israel's leadership was pushing for the bomb was existential anxiety. "They [the Arabs]," wrote David Ben Gurion to a survivor, "could slaughter us tomorrow in this country . . . We don't want to reach again the situation that you were in. We do not want the Arab Nazis to come and slaughter us."[584] The same logic was used when Ernst Bergman, Ben Gurion's chief scientist and a German Jew, wrote in a letter to Meir Yaairi from MAPAM party, who opposed the nuclear program, "I was surprised that a man like you... is prepared to close his eyes …we are not permitted to exchange precise knowledge and realistic evaluations for hopes and illusions. I cannot forget that the Holocaust came on the Jewish people as a surprise. The Jewish people cannot allow themselves such an illusion for a second time."[585] Ben Gurion and others in the founding fathers generation lived through the Holocaust in Palestine, seeing and hearing of the slaughter of their people but completely helpless to prevent it. The feeling of helplessness and even shame, especially in a society which prided itself on its activism and masculine character, was translated after the war into the common-sense understanding that "never again," meant being strong. Furthermore, given the feeble response of the allies to Hitler's extermination of the Jews, so the argument went, Israel would have to be self-reliant.[586] When the HAP members met with students in the Hebrew University they heard, "We, Jews, did not have any power, had no weapons [to defend ourselves] and so the Nazis [could] put women and children into the gas chambers and murder us. We called on the nations of the world to help us but no one did …this happened only twenty years ago. We could only rely on our own power, on ourselves."[587]

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[584] Tom Segev, *Ha'milion ha'shviai: yisraelim veha'shoaa,* (Tel Aviv: Domino Publishing, 1991), p. 369.
[585] Cohen, p. 16.
[586] See ibid. Also,Yoel. Rappael (ed.) *Zikaron galui – Zikaron Samui: Todaat ha-shoa be medinat yisrael,* (Tel-Aviv: Massuah, 1998); Idith Zertal, *Ha'auma vehamavet: historia, zicharon, politika*. (Tel Aviv: Dvir Press, 2002).
[587] Katō and Kajimura, p. 136.

This kind of language came as quite a surprise for the HAP members; coming as they were from a completely different historical trajectory they could not possibly understand the centrality of "never again," to Israeli narratives. 1962, in particular, was a year when the Holocaust came to dominate the public sphere. Adolf Eichmann was executed in May and the country was still very much under the impression of his trial. The trial, as Hanna Yablonka pointed out, was the ultimate proof of the Jewish sovereign state's ability and even duty to represent the whole of the Jewish people.[588] The trial saw the Israelis avenging the deaths of Jews; fulfilling Zionism's promise to transform the weak and dependent Jew into a new Israeli man.

Before the trial, however, in the 1950s, Israelis' relation to the Holocaust was far from unified. Although the "never again" lesson was certainly hegemonic, religious groups, camp survivors, right and left partisans and others all had their own peculiar lessons. In the fifties, different groups held different memorials telling "their stories."[589] It was only following the trial that a more unified view of the Holocaust emerged. This was still very much underway in 1962. Yad Vashem, which the HAP members visited on their second day, stood almost empty with only one significant memorial (Ohel Yizkhor – Tent of Remembrance – erected in 1957) and functioned mostly as a research and documentation center while the memorials in the Kibbutzim had a more Zionist, even militant, focus.[590] The HAP members, although unaware of the context, experienced this division of labor when they visited Lohamei Hagetaot, a Kibbutz founded by former partisans. There they heard praise for the Israeli project which was making the desert

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[588] Hanna Yablonka, "Mishpat Eichmann ve'ha'yisraelim: me'ketz 40 shana." in http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=16244&author=1916. Accessed 4 February 2011

[589] Only in 1959 was a unified day of remembrance agreed on, and even that was contested; a unified curriculum on the Holocaust was not decided on until after the Eichmann trial. Muli Brog, " Nof Zikaron ve'zehut leumit: hanzakhat ha'shoa be'yisrael, 1943-1993" unpublished PhD dissertation Hebrew University (2007), pp. 157-159, 181.

[590] Ibid.,p. 180.

bloom and heard stories of heroism from the Warsaw ghetto.[591] The HAP members were completely taken by the experience, describing the "lively children, small well-kept houses and green grasses," of the Kibbutz, "all created by the Ghetto warriors (*geto no tōshi*)… who challenged the Nazis."[592] They were quite impressed by the Kibbutz and used much of the same language of *shoa* (destruction) and *tkuma* (resurrection) that most Israelis used when talking about the Holocaust. Also, strangely enough, these messengers of peace seemed completely enamored by the militant charm of young Israelis, describing young female soldiers in admiring, almost erotic, language.

But the HAP members were also exposed to quite different views about the Holocaust. The divided memorial landscape of Israel comes out quite clearly in the HAP account. The HAP members were exposed not only to the particularistic nationalized memory of the Holocaust, but also, in a meeting with the chairman of the Czechoslovakian immigrant association, Mr. Kufter, with a universalistic lesson, one that emphasized the Jews special moral obligation to protect human rights worldwide. "We Jews," said Kufter, "suffered much discrimination and prosecution. We should work to wipe out [this phenomenon] from the face of the earth [and] make a world where no people suffer from persecution...this is, I think, the mission given to the Jews."[593] This was a language the HAP could understand, but it was in short supply in Israel in these years.

The HAP members found even more marginalized voices when they went to Nazareth and met with an Arab Israeli leader (judging on his language probably a communist, Katō does not give his name) who sharply criticized Zionists "for taking our land using imperialist weapons

[591] Katō and Kajimura, p.134.
[592] Ibid.,p.133.
[593] Ibid,p. 137.

and with imperialist money... in addition, [since then] they harshly discriminate against and oppress us." Another scathing criticism of the Jewish state came from a Mrs. Schneider, a recent immigrant from West Germany, who belittled Israel for "not contributing anything but militarism to the world...The Jews contributed greatly in science, literature, economy... [And now] they gathered on this small piece of land and concentrate all their efforts and talents on subjecting their environment militarily." German-Jews' civic acheivmnets were clearly not appreciarted. "In Israel," Schneider in a bitter tone, "famous German intellectuals had to work as butchers, cobblers, farmers... a famous legal scholar had to work making sausages."[594] The HAP members approved of this sentiment, "she raised a correct (point)... it is good that a Jewish person said it. It must be said"[595]. The HAP members seemed to be relieved to leave this small and complicated place. Israel did not fit in with their worldview and they did not fit in Israel. Tellingly, the HAP dropped their report on Israel completely from their fifth official newsletter, which covered their travels from India westward. They do mention they were in Israel but then continue to discuss their experiences in Greece, where they spent a few days.[596] Ironically, "Uniting the victims of the world" turned out to be a much harder enterprise in a place where all -Palestinians, Sephardi Jews, German Jews - were victims.

V. Auschwitz: Exchanging mementos of death

The HAP left Israel on November 6, 1962, with tensions over Cuba subsiding and the world returning to a somewhat more normal state. They traveled by boat to Greece where they met with the head of the local Salonica- Auschwitz Committee, Mr. Pinkhas. In Salonica, the

[594] Ibid.,p. 138.
[595] Ibid.
[596] "Hiroshima- Auschwitz Heiwa Kōshin," Newsletter No. 5, Box 1(the Kanai collection has only one box and no further subdivisions), Kanai Collection, Hiroshima University Archive, Saijo Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan.

HAP members met with survivors and learned from them about the deportations and suffering of Greek Jews in Salonica, whose Jewish past was in the process of being eradicated by urban development and Greek nationalism. Pinkhas learned about the HAP member's arrival from the International Auschwitz Committee (hereafter IAC) headquarters in Warsaw. The IAC and Jewish partisan organizations were also responsible for the warm welcome the marchers received in Yugoslavia and Hungary where they were received as semi-official guests. The connection with the IAC seems to have been made through Father Frankowski, back in 1961. The IAC, founded in 1954 by representatives of various survivor organizations, was the principal international organization that dealt with commemoration in Auschwitz.

Unlike Yad Vashem or Hiroshima, there was an active international component to commemoration activities in Auschwitz. Understanding this context is crucial for understanding why the Poles cooperated so readily with the HAP march and later with the commemoration of Auschwitz in Hiroshima. The Auschwitz site that the HAP would reach in January 1962 was already the third incarnation of the memorial. Founded in 1946, Auschwitz went through a Polish national phase in which it was presented as a site of Polish martyrdom, a Stalinist phase and then, in the early sixties, shifted back to a Polish national emphasis but with an international component to it.[597] This was part of the general post-Stalinist thaw and the move to a slightly more open "national communism" in Poland. The government sought to use international organizations to forward its ideological aims. But this was not a one-way street. The IAC lent its prestige to the government but also got a voice in the design of the Birkenau monument and Auschwitz's character. The HAP mission fit in with the Polish government's commemoration strategy and ideology. By connecting Hiroshima and Auschwitz, the HAP was highlighting the

[597]See Jonathan Huener's introduction to Auschwitz, *Poland, and the Politics of Commemoration, 1945-1979*, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003).

crimes of the American imperialists and connecting it with those of the German Nazis, exactly the kind of ideological connection which, although much less hyperbolic than during Stalinist times, still dominated Auschwitz's message.[598] As in Singapore, the HAP was once again becoming a tool in local memory politics.

Like in Hiroshima and other places, in Poland as well there was a well-established victim-narrative. This was mostly about Polish victimization. The fact of Auschwizt-Birkenau being the "largest Jewish cemetery in the world," with over a million Jewish dead in its soil, was completely marginalized.[599] As Irwin Zarecka pointed out, Auschwitz for Poles "was not a symbol of Jewish suffering but a symbol of man's inhumanity to man and a place of Polish tragedy."[600] In a similar way to Hiroshima, the Auschwitz museum sought to make it to a place of international tragedy but with an emphasis on a very specific Polish victimization. Like in Hiroshima, which discriminated against the Korean dead, Auschwitz as well was used as a tool for marginalization of the dead Jews. In Auschwitz, however, the Jews were an absolute majority of victims with about a million dead, in comparison to the still horrendous but much smaller number of 75,000 Polish victims.[601] In the immediate postwar and up to the nineties, Poles would speak of six million Poles who died in World War II; incorporating the Jewish dead as their own. That was also the number that was conveyed to the HAP while they were in Warsaw.[602] Even in 1995, Kazimierz Smolen, the former director of Auschwitz who played a key role in negotiations

[598] Huener, Auschwitz, p. 92.
[599] Ibid., p. 34.
[600] Iwona Irwin-Zerecka, "Poland after the Holocaust," in *Remembering for the Future: Jews and Christians During and After the Holocaust,* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), p. 145.
[601] Jonathan Webber, "Personal Reflections on *Auschwitz* Today," in Teresa Swiebocka and Jonathan Webber (ed.), *Auschwitz: A History in Photographs* (Bloomington:University of Indiana Press, 1993), p. 283.
[602] Katō and Kajimura, p. 174; HAP Newsletter 5, p. 15.

with Japan, stated, **"**half of the Poles killed in Auschwitz were Jews and half ethnic Poles.[603] The Jews, however, mostly did not survive and if they did, they did not stay in Poland. Poland was a harsh place for Jews in 1945-46, with returning Jews facing pogroms, stolen and destroyed property and much political mayhem besides.[604] Commemoration was left for the Polish political prisoners, the church and the fledging communist regime, all of which could agree at this point on only one theme: Polish suffering.

Polish martyrdom, a loaded term connected to 19th century romantic nationalism and Catholicism, dominated Auschwitz's message in the first few years, and would return in many forms since. Polish victims' consciousness came out of Poland's unique history of national failures and suffering. Poland, in the nineteenth century and after, saw itself as the "Christ of nations"; holding off the Russian hordes with its sacred mission to redeem the nations of Europe through its suffering and example.[605] This idea was strengthened after the war. As in Hiroshima, Poles as well sought to rescue moral victory out of the jaws of defeat and humiliation. Poles saw themselves as having a postwar mission to serve as a beacon of warning against fascism under the slogan: "never again Auschwitz." Creating a Polish martyrology made it essential to blur distinctions between Jews and Poles. One could not be the "Christ of nations" while being "only" victim number two. In addition, Poles saw themselves, with some justification, as being the next

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[603] Kazimierz Smolen, "Auschwitz Today: The Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum," in *Auschwitz: a History at Photographs*, p. 261. Smolen makes this outrageous remark just a page or so before emphasizing the solidarity of Poles and Jews. The incorporation of the Jewish dead as Polish citizens is not unique to Poland. Israel as well annexed their memory and claimed the Jewish dead as its own. There were even serious discussions of giving Israeli citizenship ex post facto to Holocaust victims, most of whom were certainly not Zionists. Israel, however, where most survivors lived, had some claim to the Holocaust, whereas in Poland, where Jews were killed in the thousands *after* the war and enormous amounts of Jewish property were expropriated with no compensation whatsoever, this usage of the dead is particularly disturbing.

[604] See Jan T. Gross, *Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz*. (New York: Random House, 2006).

[605] Huener, Auschwitz. p. 49.

in line for the gas chambers, their "difference [from Jews] only in timing."[606] Whether the Nazis meant to exterminate the Slavs or not is rather beside the point. The Poles did suffer horribly and in their eyes, the gas chambers were a logical extension of that suffering. Polish prisoners of Auschwitz had a special place in this scheme as the ultimate bearers of the Polish cross. This cross, however, became increasingly an "antifascist and socialist" cross with increasing Stalinization in the late forties.

Former prisoners became especially important in Stalinist propaganda as having "a special right in criticizing Anglo-American Capitalism."[607] Like their partisan counterparts in Israel and *hibakusha* in Hiroshima, they too enlisted in or were conscripted to serve the cause. Many former prisoners, however, were not comfortable with the crude instrumentalization of the camp and the state encountered much opposition from former prisoners whose "saint" status afforded them some leeway even within the Stalinist system. Auschwitz, commented one of them, "has become a peddler booth of cheap anti-imperialist propaganda."[608] This, together with the general "thaw" after the death of Stalin, enabled a change in Auschwitz, with much more autonomy for the staff and greater reliance on historical research and artifacts. This also meant, with the "national Communism" of Wladyslaw Gomulka, the return of the Polish victim narrative albeit in a modified form.

This narrative was clearly visible when the HAP came to Poland, where the HAP were treated as state guests and were taken around with their official minders to a whole array of commemorative and other events. The anti-fascism was spiced up with a good dose of Polish suffering. Father Frankowski, who met them at the station together with IAC representatives,

[606] Ibid., 54.
[607] Ibid., p. 80.
[608] Ibid., p. 112.

gave the HAP a long speech, duly recorded by Katō, about Polish suffering through the ages, recounting how "during the last war, one in every five Poles died in the hands of the Germans," thus appropriating Jewish victimhood.[609] The HAP were taken to an exhibit of "survivors' art" and met Poles from all walks of life who all seemed to speak in one voice, recounting the Nazis' brutal treatment of Poland, its heroic resistance, and the wonderful job of reconstruction done in Warsaw, all under the banner of "never forget" and for the sake of "all of humanity."[610] "Out of the suffering," declared one survivor artist, "we will create future. We feel that the experience of those who were in the camps… could lead to the creation of a culture for all humanity."[611] This was language the HAP could definitely understand. The Poles' lofty idealistic talk of peace, of course, was standard discourse in the Eastern Block. The HAP, however, seemed to take it at face value when it came from survivors.

There was a strange reciprocity between the sides. In the art event where survivors' drawings were shown, the HAP presented a painting done by school children of the bombing; upon hearing survivors' stories, "they reciprocated with stories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," and when they received artifacts and human remains from the Auschwitz memorial "they presented a charred roof tile from the ruins of Hiroshima [in return] to be placed in the cenotaph in Auschwitz."[612] The matter-of-factness of these exchanges and the way they are reported on as natural and desirable, demonstrate the common language of commemoration both places of death shared. The fact that this language – the testimonies, use of art, enshrining of ashes in cenotaphs, and the relic-like status of remains- evolved separately, without cross-reference and in completely different cultural and historical settings, is quite astonishing. This convergence points

[609] Katō and Kajimura, p.175.
[610] Ibid. pp. 169-174.
[611] Ibid., 175.
[612] *The Yomiuri* (English edition), 5 August 1963.

to the emergence during these years, out of separate strands, of a common victim-witness or survivor narrative. The HAP were the first organized group who went from Hiroshima to Auschwitz and, in any case, these narratives developed much earlier. The common frame of reference for both sites, as discussed earlier, was of course commemoration of soldiers in general and WW I in particular. As James Young, Harold Marcuse and others have demonstrated, within interwar Europe, commemoration developed as a genre of sorts.[613] The HAP demonstrates the globalization of this language and was one of its agents; it literally carried elements of commemoration – in the forms of Auschwitz and Hiroshima remains- from East to West.

The most bizarre part of this exchange came after the marchers' arrival to Auschwitz, when, following the ceremony, they received from Hołuj, a "present of human hair, cloth, shoes, and a tin of Cyclon B" to be taken to Hiroshima.[614] Following this, Satō received "the remains (bone ash – *ikotu*) of the 4,000.000 (sic)… so the tragedy of Hiroshima and Auschwitz will never return (repeat)."[615] The ashes were supposed to be taken back to Hiroshima and be buried together with the ashes of the Hiroshima survivors "forever uniting the victims." [616] This final act of "exchanging mementos of death," as the *Chugoku Shinbun* called it, sealed the pact between Auschwitz and the HAP.[617] This was neither the first nor the last time the dead were physically enlisted in the service of politics in Auschwitz. During the April 1955 ceremony ashes from camps across Europe were brought by different delegations of survivors, uniting the ashes of

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[613] Harold Marcuse, "Holocaust Memorials: The Emergence of a Genre," in *American Historical Review* (Feb. 2010): James E.Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (*Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993) I include Israel in this genre. Although Young and others look at memorials through a national prism, as Marcuse points out there are transnational trends (for instance towards abstraction from the sixties on) which defied national and ideological boundaries.

[614] The Yomiuri (English edition), August 5, 1963. These were to be the basis of an exhibition in the Peace Park.

[615] Katō and Kajimura, p. 190, the figure of four million was the accepted figure in Poland.

[616] The Yomiuri (English edition), August 5, 1963. The quote is from the *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 6 February 1963; HAP Newsletter 5 and Katō and Kajimura also discuss the Auschwitz ceremony in length .

[617] Ibid.

victims across Europe in a highly liturgical act.[618] Ashes from Auschwitz and other camps were also sent to Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, in another highly symbolic act, which, this time returned the Jewish victims "home" to Zion.[619] The Auschwitz Museum would, on at least one other occasion, use ashes to cement ties with other organizations. In another act of "death diplomacy," a 1972 delegation to Bologna, which attended a ceremony to commemorate the Nazi massacres of Italian civilians in Marzabotto, also brought with it a can of ashes to be buried together with the Italian victims.[620] The fact of (the very probable) remains' Jewish identity was not highlighted. On the contrary, these remains were now universalized and robbed of any personal or other identity. In order to become the quintessential symbol of an alliance of victims, they had to be abstracted and taken out of any context. This was much the same trajectory that the whole of the HAP enterprise had to follow, from the particular to the universal, from the concrete to the ideal. This also allowed for various local interest groups to use the HAP mission for their own needs. The result was that, for all its lofty and good intentions, far from being an alliance of victims, the HAP journey actually participated in marginalizing and obscuring the experiences of other, less powerful groups of victims.

VI. Conclusion – the Founding of the Hiroshima Auschwitz Committee

[618] Huener, *Auschwitz,* p. 117.

[619] Mooli Brog," Yad la'hayalim ve'shem lachalalim: nisyonot ha'vaad ha'leumi lahakim et yad vashem: 1946-1949, *Katedra*, No. 199 (September, 2005), pp. 116-117.

[620] I thank Marta Petrusewicz, a Professor at the CUNY Graduate Center in New York, who was then working as an Italian interpreter for the delegation, for this reference. According to Harold Marcuse, there were quite a lot of ashes circulating around Europe at the time. The origin of this custom is obscure but it seems that it started right after the war. Survivors leaving Buchenwald in mid-1945 took eighteen urns of human ash with them to create memorials around the world. The 1949 Hamburg-Ohlsdorf memorial has 105 urns of ashes in it. See Harold Marcuse, "Das Gedenken an die Ver- folgten des Nationalsozialismus, exemplarisch analysiert anhand des Hamburger 'Denkmals fu¨r die Opfer nationalsozialistischer Verfolgung und des Widerstandskampfes' " (M.A. thesis, University of Hamburg, 1985), 59 (citing Hamburger Volkszeitung, May 3, 1949), 96–98; Some took the use of ashes a step too far. There were a couple of incidents involving victims' ashes in Dachau and Flossenbuerg. In Dachau, the curator of the exhibition in the crematorium was accused of selling human ashes to visitors and was fired. (Private correspondence with Marcuse, November 7, 2010).

Even in Hiroshima, from which the HAP derived its rhetoric and message, abstraction of victimization on the level practiced by the HAP proved impossible in the face of local memory politics. Upon their return to Hiroshima in August 1963, Satō presented the ashes and other remains to mayor Hamai, requesting that they be interned in the Peace Park. The mayor, in the presence of a representative of the Polish embassy and other dignitaries, respectfully received them, only to return them the following week.[621] Hiroshima City argued they had "no space" for the remains and that, for now, it would not be possible to erect any kind of new memorials in the Peace Park.[622] Following the storming of the stage by student radicals in 1962, other disturbances the following year, and much unease among survivors and others in light of growing discord within the peace movement, the Gensuikyō (or any other political movement) was barred from using the Peace Park in early August 1964.[623] Commemoration in Hiroshima was moving away from anti-nuclear activities and into an emphasis on solemnity and "silent prayer." This will be discussed in greater length in the next chapter. As far as the HAP were concerned, the city, already accused by conservatives of being sympathetic to radicals, was wary of receiving these "mementos" from a communist country. Although Satō and the rest of the HAP desperately tried not to be associated with communism or any other kind of politics, eventually they could not escape it; their abstract victim turned back into a socialist hero which Hiroshima, in its current political mood, could not accept.

This led to the rather awkward question of what to do with the remains. Yoshida and Satō contacted Kuwahara Hideki, who headed the Hiroshima Religious Association and together they issued a call for men of faith to help them deal with the situation. Satō Tetsuro from the

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621 *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 8 August 1963; Kuwhara Interview.
622 Ibid.
623 *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 6 June1964.

Hiroshima Mitaki temple then stepped forward and offered to keep the remains. The following month Satō Tetsuro, Kuwahara, Yoshida and others conferred and decided to set up a permanent body which would raise funds to erect a monument at the temple for the victims' ashes.[624] In October, representatives from the Religious Association, hibakusha organizations and other peace groups, in the presence of Polish officials, met at the Prefectural Medical Association Hall in downtown Hiroshima and created the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Committee. The committee's goals were: "1) to introduce [to the world] the true state of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Auschwitz victims; 2) To erect a final resting place for the ashes of Auschwitz victims brought back by the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Peace March; 3) To uphold (promote) the current goals of the international peace appeal movement."[625]

In this act, the Hiroshima Auschwitz Committee (HAC) institutionalized the "victim diplomacy" of the HAP. The HAC, as we will see, now embarked on a grand scheme to develop and expand these connections. This was part of a much larger, worldwide trend in which victims of WW II came to hold a special place in global moral discourse as witnesses of the unspeakable. The idea that survivors had special insight or moral authority should not be taken for granted; it has a complex, non-linear and transnational history. Much of it can be traced to the Eichmann and other trials but they do not tell the whole story. The HAC represents a significant piece of this puzzle. In the HAC and the HAP journey, one could see a convergence of sorts, of different local memory strands in which the victim/survivor came to hold a special role. Whether it was the *hibakusha* in Hiroshima and their role in uniting a fractured peace movement; the national (multi-ethnic) victims in Singapore, or anonymous victims of fascism in Auschwitz, all had survivors stepping up and using their victimization as a tool and, more crucially, abstracting and

[624] Kuwahara interview.
[625] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 18 October 1963.

turning the experience of mass death into a unifying experience. In both Hiroshima and Auschwitz this was also an experience that would have international significance and implications. The exception was the particular and peculiar victim discourse in Israel, which did not seek an international role for itself. The Jews' emphasis on the ethnic character and anti-Semitism of Nazi persecution did not fit in with either Hiroshima or Auschwitz. They were left out, even their dead were now instrumentalized and carried as a "memento of death" between the "places of tragedy." This was consistent with the way Japanese commentators saw the Jews and the whole drama of WW II and genocide outside of Asia during the Eichmann trial, and will be evident in the way the HAC and Hiroshima in general dealt with others' tragedies in the next three decades of its existence.

The HAC, however, was the tail end of a great wave of enthusiasm for universal and grand ideals. The young student radicals that were its immediate successors had very different ideas about Japanese claims of victimization. Furthermore, many Japanese were increasingly indifferent to the grand ideas pushed by the HAC and their colleagues in the peace movement. As Ogura Kaoro remarked, "the Hiroshima they [the HAP] brought forward was different from the Hiroshima of the every day... of watching baseball, or shopping."[626] Indeed, not only would the great ideals of the fifties' peace movement start to seem irrelevant in the world of 1968; consumerism and the new prosperity made the HAC and its enterprise almost instantaneously irrelevant. In 1964, when the city blocked the Gensuikyō from using the Peace Park, it cited the "peak in the tourist season" as a reason.[627] This was not completely dishonest on the side of the city as tourism by 1963, with Japanese growth picking up, became a serious source of income.

[626] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 23 May 1963. Ogura, who would become the director of the Peace Park was actually, like Hiraoka, quite supportive of the HAP.
[627] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 6 June 1964.

Radical students were simply bad for business and peace was fast becoming a business. How Hiroshima city responded to commercialization, and how the HAC and Hiroshima survivors tried to adapt to this new world, will be the subjects of the next chapter.

Chapter 5: A Sacred Ground for Peace: Violence, Tourism, and the Sanctification of the Peace Park, 1963-1975

"Each time I get near the Peace Park," wrote Kenzaburō Ōe in 1963, "I get the strong odor of politics."[628] Indeed the Park in 1963 was a controversial and contested place. With Gensuikyō split over the partial nuclear test ban treaty issue between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet, liberal, radical and conservative factions and with negotiations over a possible solution

[628] Kenzaburo Ōe, *Hiroshima Notes*, 1st ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1996), p. 45.

stalled, the anti-nuclear movement was on the verge of collapse. Many *hibakusha* and other activists were disgusted by the splits and factionalism. Then, on the eve of August 6, the Park saw some of the worst violence in its history when radical students from *zengakuren* (the all Japan student union) stormed the stage of the 9th World Conference against Nuclear Weapons. The students were protesting JCP resistance to the test ban treaty.[629] The *zengakuren* called for an occupation of the conference of the "bankrupted Gensuikyō and the continuation of the struggle against nuclear weapons."[630] The Communist delegates, in an act seen by the students as the ultimate hypocrisy, called in the "bourgeois" police to clear the students. The result was complete mayhem, with hundreds of students battling with police in front of the cenotaph and the conference organizers' hopes for unity in tatters.[631] The following morning Hiroshima's newspapers were full of rage. The student violence was seen as a defilement of the Park and as "treading on Hiroshima's prayer." Hiroshima's citizens were "burning with anger." The anger, however, was not directed only against the students, but against politics as a whole. "This kind of political conference," argued one Hiroshima resident, "should not be here, it should be in Tokyo." The mayor, claimed another respondent," should have never given permission [for gensuikyō] to use the Park."[632] And indeed, from 1964 on the city denied political parties use of the park. The city cited its wish to protect "the sacred nature" of the Park as a "silent place of prayer," and as a key site during the "peak in the tourist season."[633]

The 1963 violence marked the beginning of a process by which the city aimed at clearing the Park from the "stink of politics." The main tools employed by the city to do so were prayer

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[629] In the inverted logic of the cold war, the Chinese-backed JCP saw the ban as a way to keep nuclear weapons in the hands of the imperialists (i.e. Russia and the U.S) while denying it from "true" socialist countries like China.
[630] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 7 August 1963.
[631] Ibid.
[632] Ibid.
[633] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 6 June 1964.

and the language of the sacred, used to contrast with the violence and disruption of politics. The delegitimization of politics, especially of the leftist kind, has a long history in Japan.[634] But as the city's reference to the tourist season indicates, there was much more to the city's sanctification campaign, as it came to be called, than just aversion to politics. The 1960s were a time of enormous economic growth in Japan. That meant that many more Japanese (and foreigners – the 1960s were also a time of growing international travel) could now travel to Hiroshima. The city wished to capitalize on this by coupling sanctification with commercialization. However, the continuing treatment of the Park as a tourist resource during the decade, which as we have seen, was not as controversial as it had been in the past, was fast becoming problematic. It was not only the increasing number of tourists that elicited unease, but also the growing notion that there was something inherently wrong with tourism to Hiroshima. However, this chapter argues, it was exactly this unease and tension that attracted tourists to Hiroshima in the first place. Hiroshima was, and still is, a "dark tourist site" by virtue of its problematic relation to modernity; a relationship that the city constantly tries to mask and avoid but also, at the same time, to capitalize on. Hiroshima, like other sites of mass death, exists "in the edge of the territory in which the internal nature of the terms of modernity's own demise are graphically interpreted and commodified as tourist products." [635] It is exactly the self-doubt and unease that these sites elicit, the possibility of modernity's failure that they represent, and the opportunity to look into the abyss, that draws people to Hiroshima.

It was this paradox which underlined the tensions between sanctification, commoditization and politics in the sixties. These debates, however, did not see a simple division

[634] The classic account of how politics were delegitimized in Japan is by Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
[635] John J. Lennon, and Malcolm Foley, *Dark tourism; the Attraction of Death and Disasters*, (London: Cengage Learning , 2000), p. 165.

between a politically committed "memory camp" on one hand and a "forgetting camp" of the powers to be the other. Befitting of the contradictory and ambivalent nature of the place, Hiroshima's memory wars were far more complex and saw strange alliances and shifting commitments among the various forces that were vying for influence over the character of the Peace Park. These debates touched on many of the topics and controversies surrounding Japan's troubled relations with its past. Issues of victims' and victimizers' consciousness, Japan's relation to modernity, the place of the victims in society and who could speak for them, and — what lies at the heart of the memory wars — the very possibility of representing what was unrepresentable and "beyond the real," were vigorously debated and fought over in Hiroshima during these years.

This chapter will examine how the Japanese dealt with these issues through a review of four main debates: the censorship of A-bomb photos at the 1970 Expo, the campaign to preserve the A-Bomb dome, the campaign to sanctify (*seiichika)* the Park, and the debates over representation and the remaking of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. These debates illustrate, I will argue, not only what different factions in Hiroshima and beyond disagreed upon, but also what they shared, namely (with the exception of radical students), a commitment to "progress" and "modernity" as the proper path for Hiroshima's struggle for peace, and the central place accorded to *hibakusha* within this enterprise. Thus, whether they agreed with each other or not, all ultimately contributed to the Park's transition from a political place to a "sacred ground," and to the making of Hiroshima as a "dark" tourist site.

I. The Wall of Contradictions: Expo 70's Hiroshima Controversy

In October 1967, in a meeting of Expo 70's steering committee, two members, a CEO named Gotō Noboru and the artist Ariyoshi Sawako, brought forward a proposal to incorporate an A-bomb exhibit in the exposition, which was to take place in Osaka.[636] The 1970 exhibit was planned as a celebration of Japan's recovery from the ruins of war and its emergence as a world power. It was to be a pageant of "space age" modernity, with the strong support and participation of emerging Japanese economic giants like Sony and Mitsubishi, and was planned by the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry.[637] The head of the design committee for the expo was none other than Tange Kenzo, who designed the Hiroshima Peace Park. His forward-looking designs, though offering some ambiguity, had no use for the past or, at least, not for the immediate concrete past.[638] Just as in Hiroshima, in Osaka the war was to be left behind and the visitor's gaze was to be firmly turned toward the distant future and the mythical past. In the *cliché* wording of the Expo official guide: "…While Expo '70 celebrates the history, culture and achievements of the past, it attempts to achieve a new milieu. A milieu in which people from all over the world can meet face to face, talk heart to heart and share the joy of peace and harmony."[639]

Given this view, it was not surprising that the proposal for an A-bomb exhibit met immediate resistance. Nevertheless, the exhibition, as well as a number of other art pieces and a movie, were initially incorporated into plans for the Expo. After all, the late sixties were the time

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[636] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 29 October 1967.

[637] MITI was the main government agency responsible for Japan's emergence as an economic powerhouse. On MITI see: Chalmers A. Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, (Berkeley, Stanford University Press 1982). There is an uncanny resemblance between China's recent emergence and Japan's mid-century recovery and the place of international events in the development of Asian modernity. For both countries, successive Olympic Games and Expos seem to have represented a certain rite of passage and an exercise in pageantry, which confirmed their place as modern economic and technological powers.

[638] In addition, and not unlike Tange's intended use of Isamu Noguchi's primitive forms, the Expo as well would have a similar area: the subterranean "world of mystery."

[639] Nihon Bankoku Hakurankai Kyōkai, *Expo'70 Official Guide*, (Osaka: Nihon Bankoku Hakurankai Kyōkai, 1970), p. 18.

when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and the governing LDP formally endorsed Japan's "three non-nuclear principles" and touted Japan's unique place in peace diplomacy as the "only country to ever suffer a nuclear attack."[640] Japanese "pacifist nationalism" was becoming mainstream opinion and it seemed only proper for some to incorporate this message in the Expo. However, as we will shortly see, this was not to be. After initial acceptance, the exhibit and almost all references to the bomb were censored and removed from the exposition as "too depressing" and "inappropriate".by the Expo organizers.

In Hiroshima City's official history, this act of censorship would eventually be incorporated into a heroic history of *hibakusha* and Hiroshima's resistance to censorship and silencing by the powers-to-be.[641] This view is not without some credence. The exhibit was indeed cut from the Expo and there was indeed resistance to the notion that Hiroshima's past could be "spoiling" the "joy of peace and harmony" the Expo aimed at. Nevertheless, the censoring was part of a much more complicated story; a story which domesticated and repackaged the bomb in acceptable ways and as part of a narrative of progress in which Hiroshima and its progressive elites played a central role. As in Hiroshima itself, any view of the bomb or Hiroshima's experience which contradicted and "spoiled" the presentation of that progressive narrative was pushed aside or incorporated into Hiroshima's comforting story of selfless sacrifice for peace and progress.

Indeed, the city did not object to the removal of the exhibition nor try to support the artists and others who pushed for it to stay; quite the opposite. When Gotō and Ariyoshi first

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[640] Satō Eisaku was to win a Noble Prize in 1974 for his anti-nuclear policies.

[641] See for instance Hiroshima Kokusai Bunka Zaidan and Chūgoku shinbhunsha, *The Meaning of survival : Hiroshima's 36 year commitment to peace (*Hiroshima: The Chūgoku Shinbun and the Hiroshima International Cultural Foundation, 1983), p. 208.

proposed to incorporate an A-bomb exhibit, the mayor's first reaction was quite negative. In a press conference on October 19, Mayor Yamada Setsuo, whom we already met in the context of The Hiroshima-Auschwitz committee, rejected outright the idea of incorporating an A-bomb exhibit into the Expo: "I do not like the idea [of the exhibit]. If you think of this from the point of view of the slogan of 'progress and harmony,' Hiroshima and Nagasaki do not go well with it (*chōwa shinai* -do not harmonize)." The mayor went on to present the interesting argument that raising the issue of Hiroshima might hurt Asian feelings: "[In the] Philippines or Indonesia there are those who dislike Hiroshima claiming for itself the place of the only Peace Mecca." Yamada went on to argue that foreigners should continue their visits from Osaka to Hiroshima and properly pay their respects in the Peace Park and learn about the bomb at the museum (thus, of course, also contributing to Hiroshima's tourism industry).[642] Yamada's arguments were mostly based on the common sense notion that there is a time and place for everything and that the Expo was just neither the time nor place to talk about the war. In the "division of labor" still evident in today's tourism industry, Tokyo and Osaka are places of ultra-modern urbanity and Kyoto of the serene past; Hiroshima was the "appropriate" place for commemoration whereas Indonesia and the Philippines were not a part of the story and the bomb was safely confined within the peace and progress narrative. Inserting the bomb into the context of the Expo would upset this order.

The past was, of course, and still is, a very sensitive topic in East Asia and the Expo raising a contentious issue like the war would have hurt the presentation of Osaka as a celebration of international harmony. Yamada's anxiety in this regard is obvious.[643] Still,

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[642] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 20 October 1967.

[643] Yamada, even more than Hamai, was a typical member of the Japanese elite. An Oxford and Tokyo University graduate, he came back to Japan and joined the military administration in northern Borneo during the war. Yamada also served as an attorney for C-class war criminals in local trials held by the British. After being repatriated in 1946, Yamada served as member of the Upper House of Diet in the early years after the war for the liberal party. He

Yamada's utterance, buried between two different arguments, is an indication that Yamada -and other old liberals- were well aware of the problematic nature of their claim, as victims, to the peace crown. Having served as he did in Japanese-occupied Malaysia and as a lawyer in war crime trials, Yamada was well acquainted with the catalogue of Japanese atrocities on the continent. Unlike more radical activists like Satō Gyotsu, Yamada and other dons of the peace camp rarely acknowledged or tried to engage with the *problématique* of the victimizer/victim issue. Here one can see a rare instance of frankness as to the fragile and problematic place of Hiroshima as "Peace city," a place and an ethos which its imperialist past might endanger. Seen in this light, one could see why some in Hiroshima wanted to stay out of controversy. Yamada's earlier move, to be discussed below, of turning the Peace Park into "sacred grounds" (*seichi)*, was consistent with such an attitude.

Even without Hiroshima City's active campaigning, citizen groups and artists succeeded in inserting three A-bomb exhibits into the Expo; the "tower of sorrow," an abstract tapestry created by Kyoto University's Fine Arts department, an A-bomb movie and exhibit in the Japanese Local Government Pavilion, and a part of a joint project by UN agencies, environmental groups and other organizations called "the Wall of Contradictions" (*mujun no kabe)*. The latter included pictures of bomb damage as well as of suffering *hibakusha* and was organized in cooperation with the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. The Wall of Contradictions, located in the central "symbol area," was quite literally a contradiction to the spirit of the Expo.[644] While the Expo was future-oriented and emphasized optimism and harmony

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was also active with the World Federalists and other organizations. For more details see the introduction to Yamada Setsuo tuisoroku kanko iinkai hen, *Yamda Setsuo Tsuisoroku,* (Hiroshima: Yamada Setsuo tuisoroku kanko iinkai, 1976).

[644] The Expo had an underground world of mystery; a central Festival plaza and symbol area – where various artworks were displayed including the monumental "tower of the sun" by Akamoto Taro, and an aboveground, "space roof" where futuristic and technology related exhibits were displayed. In addition, 65 countries and a dozen

(to the point of banal sentimentality), the information and images offered at the "Wall" were intended to show, according to one of the artists involved, the contradictions modernity has to overcome to achieve true progress.[645] None of these exhibits (all of them relatively small in comparison with the giant "Tower of the Sun," space roof, monorail and other elements in the Expo), were slated for removal until pretty late in the game. It was only in the advanced planning stages, and only after some of them were actually installed, that prominent members of the steering committee and the government got involved.

The first sign of serious trouble came in March 1968. A Socialist MP from Hiroshima, Ohara Akira, raised the subject of the A-bomb exhibit at the Diet Budget Committee. Ohara said that he had raised the issue with the government but did not "receive a positive reply." The government representative answered that in light of the "not too positive" response to the exhibit at the Brussels Expo, they would "like to seriously reconsider" the necessity of the [A-bomb] exhibit." "We would like," the government representative continued, "to think of it from the point of view of the exhibit as a whole... as [the exhibit] might surprise visitors and hurt harmony." Demonstrating the prevailing thinking among bureaucrats, Hashimoto Koichi from the Welfare ministry, added, "we already have an exhibit about Atomic Energy… but we need to think it carefully." The chairman than added that there might be a space limitation issue as well (the Expo area was around 33 square kilometers).[646] Regardless of these objections, the various projects went ahead, with the tapestry starting in September 1969 and both other exhibits being installed shortly thereafter. After installation, however, and with only one month to the start of

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companies had their own pavilions.

[645] See the artist's website: http://www2.dokidoki.ne.jp/bellrose/museum/part36/part36.html, accessed February 9, 2011.

[646] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 16 March 1968. For the Expo size, see Nihon Bankoku,,*Official Guide*, p. 2. I did not find any negative reaction to the Brussels Expo exhibit in Japanese or foreign papers.

the Expo, the government interdepartmental expert committee responsible for the Expo decided to withdraw the A-bomb exhibits from the "symbol area" where the Wall of Contradictions was supposed to be, saying it was "inappropriate for the Expo." The Minister of Trade and Investment, Miyazawa Kiichi, remarked that the pictures were "too shocking" and "too severe" for the Expo. Okamoto Taro, the main art director for the "symbol area," objected," if we want to create a positive [rosy] future we need a vivid image of our own past. Imaeda (no first name is given), the chairman of the steering committee, also objected, saying that the exhibit is [merely] showing "the real face of humanity."[647]

A few days after this meeting, the local government pavilion also decided to remove its own Hiroshima and Nagasaki exhibit and the "tower of sorrow" was attacked as "being too abstract" and unnecessary by the exhibit committee.[648] The "Wall of Contradictions" did not have all of the A-bomb related material removed; one image each from Nagasaki and Hiroshima were retained, of the destroyed Catholic Church and the mushroom cloud, respectively. Pictures of A-bomb casualties and other damage in all four panels were removed.[649] The curators responsible for the local government exhibit decided to protest the arbitrary removal of the exhibit and went on a public campaign against it. On April 9, the four curators submitted a public letter of protest to Miyauchi Wataru, head of the local government section, asking him to respect freedom of speech and to restore the exhibit. In a press conference, Miyauchi answered that, with all due respect, the war and the bomb did not have anything to do with the work of the local government and were contrary to his goals. "I want to show," Miyuichi wrote, "a fun and prosperous local government." The curators answered, "your prosperity is [built] on top of war

[647] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 6 February 1970.
[648] Ibid, 4 March 1970.
[649] *Asahi Shinbun,* 13 March 1970.

and suffering (*senso to hisan no ue*)," and vowed to continue the struggle.[650] Next on Miyauchi's list was a film which showed scenes of medical treatment of *hibakusha* and a quiet prayer scene on August 6. Miyauchi ruled it as too depressing and too dark. Sakaeda Seiichirou, of the artist group opposed to Miyauchi, said in response: "the local government bureau would like to erase the event from history… it does not want to deal with humanity's problems." The artists then decided to have an alternative protest exhibit outside of the Expo. Throughout all of this, Hiroshima City did not intervene officially or otherwise in the controversy. Yamada and the governor of Hiroshima prefecture did, however, attend the ceremony for the donation of six pieces of evidence of the bomb's destruction, including a roof tile, a picture of the A-bomb Dome, and melted ceramics, which were inserted into a time capsule under the heading: "evidence of the bomb."[651]

In the political climate of 1970, inserting this evidence into a 5000-year capsule was acceptable, but displaying it in the present was certainly not. The Expo was supposed to be a celebration of Japan's reemergence as a modern world power and an affirmation of the postwar social order; as such it had no place for "contradictions" or potentially disruptive elements that would remind Expo visitors of the fragility of the modern order. The organizers did, in passing, make the pretense of reflecting on the price of progress but that was immediately subsumed under flowery rhetoric. The first of only two references to the war included in the Expo's official English brochure stated, "…A new era must dawn on the world. The twentieth century is a period of great progress, but at the same time it has been far from free of suffering and disorder. We desire to leave this world to the next generations an abode ruled by peace and as a temple fit

[650] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 9 April 1970.

[651] The Time Capsule had about 2600 items and was supposed to be opened 5000 years into the future. Making these was quite a favorite of World Expo organizers at the time. The Brussels' and Montreal Expos also had them.

for the dignity and well- being of mankind." The second reference referred to the A-bomb and the dangers of technology as "discordant misfortunes and troubles."[652]

The way the expo was envisioned required total emotional immersion in the project and precluded any potential distractions. Tange was actually quite up-front about his vision. Arguing that technological progress made it no longer necessary to express progress through buildings alone, Tange and his colleagues aimed at creating:

> a place where people can gather, link hands and share each other's' happiness... instead of creating a physical monument, like the Eiffel tower or the crystal palace, we intend to create a sensually perceptible environment with which the visitors to the fair could mutually act to develop a consciousness of emotional involvement that they will never forget... a reservoir of information and communication.[653]

What Tange was aiming at here was an experience along the lines of Walt Disney's vision for Epcot or Disneyworld. According to Josef Chytry, Disney was one of the first companies to launch the "experience economy," built on consuming not a material object but an experience, specifically, happiness. Disney built his wonderlands as emotional spaces of happiness where people would behave and feel differently than they did elsewhere. This would be achieved through the experience of total immersion in a "magical environment."[654] An emotional space, however, requires clear demarcation and separation from the outside world and cannot allow for any disruptions.[655] The need for such strict demarcation made officials even more nervous about

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[652] "We who live in this epoch following World War Two cannot ignore the fact that developments and troubles in technological civilization, while undeniably improving our conditions, introduced discordant misfortunes." Both quotes are from the "Theme" magazine in Japan Association for the 1970 World Exposition, *Japan World Exposition*, (Osaka, 1970), p. 5-6.

[653] Editorial Committee of the Second Architectural Convention of Japan, *Structure, Space, Mankind; Expo '70* (Osaka, Second Architectural Convention of Japan, 1970), p. 14.

[654] Josef Chytry, "*Emotional Communities and Immersive Environments*,**"** unpublished paper. Presented at the conference "Emotional styles – communities and spaces," Max Planck Institute, Berlin (June 2010). I thank Professor Chytry for letting me use this reference.

[655] Whether one is in a court of law, which requires certain behavior, or a football stadium, the range of allowed and expected emotional reaction is very different. In both cases, architecture, customs and language combine to create an emotional space.

the A-bomb exhibit. The position of Tange himself in regards to the Hiroshima exhibit is unknown, but the lack of comment by him or most of the design staff is telling.

The division of labor between the optimistic and future-oriented Expo on one hand, and solemn Hiroshima on the other (or rather the solemn Peace Park – City Hall had other ideas for the rest of the city), had to be maintained. In a way, these projects were not so different. Yamada certainly shared much in his attitude toward the Park with Tange Kenzo and the organizers of the Expo. Both wanted to create a space that would serve to enhance what they saw as the appropriate emotional attitudes for visitors at the site, whether reverence and quiet solemnity in Hiroshima or festivity and joy in Osaka. The debates over the A-bomb exhibit showed in the clearest terms the clash between a future-looking and amnesiac modernity and the constant disruption and reminder of the price of this modernity that the lesson of Hiroshima offered. But that was not all. Miyauchi and other government officials' attempts at intervening were actually quite crude. Yamada and his administration, consciously or not, were looking for a much more sophisticated solution for the "disruption" of A-bomb materials than simple removal and suppression. Yamada's 1967 call for a sanctification of the Park and the various projects the city pursued in and around it sought to domesticate, re-package and actually profit from the dark allure of ground zero. This project was not without tensions and certainly did not progress linearly. It is to the first of these fierce debates within Hiroshima, on commoditization, remembrance, forgetting and sanctification, which we must now turn.

II. **A Shrine for Peace: Preserving the A-Bomb Dome**

The Atomic Bomb Dome, located at the north side of the Peace Park in Hiroshima, is one of the few surviving buildings from the time of the bomb. It is the only one which was

specifically preserved as a reminder of the bombing.[656] The building's original name was the Industrial Promotion Hall. It was built in 1915 as a place to promote the sale of goods produced in Hiroshima Prefecture. The building was designed by Czech architect Jan Letzel and, with its imposing, European-style design, was already quite famous before the war. As Lisa Yoneyama has noted, the building in its current form serves as an ambiguous reminder to the failure of Japan's (first) quest for modernization. The building, conspicuous in its European features within the Japanese city, was a symbol of civilization and enlightenment (*bunmei kaika)* and of Japan's embrace of a European inspired modernity; a quest which, along with science and modern architecture, also included scientific racism and imperialism**.**[657] The bomb ended this phase in Japan's modernity, but the building itself was left stranded, torn out of time, while the city around it embarked on its exercise in new, American-inspired, highly modernist city planning in the fifties. This process, as discussed in chapter one, was future-oriented and sought to completely erase all traces of the *modern* past which the bomb had spared. The 1960s, with the twenty-year anniversary of the bomb in 1965 and the Meiji centennial in 1968, brought this past back to center stage.

After 1945, the dome instantly became one of the symbols of the ruined city. It featured on countless posters, brochures, leaflets and books and still is marketed, alongside the temple in Miyajima, as one of the two main symbols (and prominent tourist sites) of the city.[658] In 1966, the city declared its intention to preserve the dome "for all eternity… as symbol of [Hiroshima's] vow to pursue the abolition of nuclear weapons and enduring peace" and it campaigned

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[656] Shono Naomi, "Mute Reminders of Hiroshima's Atomic Bombing," Japan Quarterly 40, no. 3 (July-September 1993): p. 267.

[657] Lisa Yoneyama gives a brilliant analysis of the building of a multi-layered history. See her *Hiroshima Traces: Time Space and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkley: University Of California Press, 1999).

[658] The dome's silhouette is everywhere in Hiroshima. It is prominent in posters, guides and tourist literature. Its image greets visitors right when they get off the train in Hiroshima station and is posted on the city tram lines.

vigorously to make it a world heritage site, which it became in 1996.[659] In the forties and fifties, however, the dome only narrowly escaped demolition. A 1949 survey found that most residents (sixty-five percent) wanted to see it destroyed as it was "a reminder of the war and its destruction."[660] A 1951 round-table discussion with Mayor Hamai Shinzo, the president of Hiroshima University**,** and other prominent figures was in complete agreement as to the need to destroy the dome.[661] Those who called for its preservation were very much a minority in the fifties. Lisa Yoneyama's assertion that the "Survivors were known to be generally less supportive of retaining this painful visual reminder of the bomb, while the city administration clearly recognized its symbolic capital," is simply not true, as the issue split the *hibakusha* camp and city elites alike.[662] The debate saw strange alliances between peace groups and tourism officials and tour companies on one hand, and real estate interests (coveting the prime downtown spot) and other *hibakusha* who wanted it torn down, on the other. The debates over the dome were far from a simple memory versus forgetting conflict. These debates illustrate the complexity of the dome's preservation and how, like the broader debate about the Peace Park and remembrance of the bomb as a whole, all -whether they were for or against preservation- were caught in a dialectic process which domesticated and sanitized the memory of the bomb.

The dome's image was prominent in early peace movement literature but in fact it was not the movement but rather the Hiroshima Tourist Board which was the first to call for its preservation. As discussed in chapter one, the dome's touristic value was immediately

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659 http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/tour_e/ireihi/tour_38_e.html accessed 1 January 2001

660 Nemoto Masaya, "Hiroshima no sengo san ju nenkan ni miru genbakuhibakusha no hyoshō to jissen: chi, kenryoko to kukan," unbulished master thesis submitted to Hitotsubashi University (January, 2006), p.68. I thank Nemoto Masaya for his generosity in sharing his thesis with me.

661 Ibid.

662 Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces,* p. 70.

recognized by the cash-strapped city and steps were taken, such as setting up an explanatory plaque, fencing, etc., to regulate access and use.[663] The 1949 city plan recognized it as a historical site and called for further steps to preserve it "for its tourist and historical value."[664] As early as 1947 a Hiroshima guide book featured the Industrial Promotion Hall, as the dome was originally called, as one of the attractions of the city, shown next to a drawing of an "Atomic bomb cloud."[665] The dome, until around 1955, seems to have been discussed exclusively in these terms and mostly in relation to tourism. Reacting to calls for demolition of the dome (most prominent was the 1953 statement made by Mayor Hamai), *hibakusha* groups came together in 1954 with the Hiroshima Prefectural Tourist Association in a new organization: The A-Bomb Dome Preservation Association (*genbaku dome hozōn kiseidōmei*). The Association declared the dome to be a "symbol of Hiroshima's citizens' quest for peace" and that "it was needed for Hiroshima both as a historical site and as a tourist resource for a city with inadequate tourist resources."[666] As discussed earlier, there was nothing too controversial in calling the dome a resource at the time. The first reference defining it as such appear in city council records, during a 1956 exchange in the city assembly's budget committee, when a committee member questioned then Mayor Watanabe as to the city's intentions regarding the dome. Watanabe responded that he would like to "preserve it for A-bomb tourism…as it became a symbol of Hiroshima and people come here to see it."[667] Watanabe's emphasis is understandable given his record. Unlike Hamai, who was mayor before and after him and who built a career on being the

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[663] I thank *Chgoku Shinbun's* reporter Nishimoto Masami for informing me about these late forties efforts to preserve the dome. See his article in the *Chūgoku Shinbun*, April 30, 2007.

[664] Hiorshima shiyakushō shichō shitu, "Hiroshima heiwa toshi kensetsu kōsōan," (October 1950), Hiroshima City Archive, Fujimoto Collection, C-1993-800.

[665] Sasaki Yuichiro (henshu), *Hiroshima foto arubumu,* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima kenko busan kumiai, 1948).

[666] Nemoto, p. 69.

[667] The exchange took place at the Hiroshima City Assembly Budget committee **on** March 15, 1956. See the Assembly's protocols in: Hiroshima shi, *Hiroshima shi shigikaishi*: kiji shiryō *hen*, (Hiroshima: 1988): p. 815.

"A-bomb Mayor" (*genbaku no shicho*), as his autobiography is titled, as well as a peace activist, Watanabe was much more business and development-oriented.[668]

But, again, the fact that Hamai, who took over again from Watanabe in 1960, was more peace-oriented did not mean that he was committed to preservation. [669] In an August 1960 interview, shortly after his reelection, Hamai presented his vision for the Peace Park and the dome area, "… in order to explain the disaster of the bomb [better] we need to renew the materials we preserve, open the A-bomb museum (*genbaku shiryōkan*) to the public, and better convey the painful thoughts and experiences of the *hibakusha* and families' thoughts [to visitors]." What this meant for Hamai was a complete reorientation of the Park and Hiroshima's commemoration infrastructure. Hamai aimed at turning the *shiryōkan* into an art museum and the Peace Park into a regular park. This was, in his view, part of turning Hiroshima into a more normal city as "all cities have art museums but we have an A-bomb museum. This, however," Hamai continued, "does not mean I am against the continuation of anti-nuclear and peace activities, or am arguing for the demolition of the museum, which has its own value as a wonderful modern building designed by Tange Kenzō." Still, the ceremonial heart of the city needed to be normalized and the building's function changed into a more positive one. Thus, Hamai argued, the city needed to build a number of smaller museums south of the dome, which would be better equipped to present the issue. As for the dome itself, Hamai argued for its removal. He was aware, he said, of the debates concerning the dome. He knew some wanted to keep it as a tourist asset, "but others see it as opening old wounds." According to Hamai,

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[668] Watanabe put a large emphasis on promoting tourism and was responsible, besides the dome, for other big tourist ventures like the rebuilding of Hiroshima Castle, a baseball stadium, the Hiroshima Bus Center and Department store complex, as well as the Hiroshima Reconstruction Expo.

[669] Hamai declared his position against preservation twice: In 1950 and 1953. See Yagi Yoshihiro, " 1965 nen mae no'Hiroshima'," in Arisue Ken (henshu) sengo nihon no shakai to shimin ishiki, (Tokyo: Keio daigaku shupan sha, 2005): pp. 60-61.

Hiroshima citizens mostly "want a park which they can enjoy and the dome, and having this reminder of death and tragedy, darkens their heart."[670] It is hard to know whether most citizens really wanted to remove the dome. By 1960 most citizens -and we must remember this- were not *hibakusha* at all (by 1955, hibakusha were less than a quarter of the population) and did not possess any dark memories of the bomb. In any case, even among *hibakusha* it was obvious that Hamai's position was far from representing a consensus. Replying to the above-mentioned interview, Nagaoka Shogō, director of the shiryōkan, as well as other well-known *hibakusha* and activists, stated they were firmly against Hamai's plan.[671]

Hamai constantly connected his opposition to the dome to his own experience and suffering (he was a *hibakusha* himself). Yet there is reason to believe his motives were far from being purely personal. The immediate reason for the issue of the dome preservation coming up for discussion around 1960 was the controversial move of the Hiroshima Chamber of Commerce to a lot opposite the dome.[672] The Chamber of Commerce's shiny, new, modern building overshadowed the dome and it was feared that the construction process itself, with the use of heavy machinery and accompanying infrastructure work, put the dome in danger of collapse.[673] The Chamber's move to this new spot, formerly occupied by the prefectural police HQ, also sparked worries over land prices and land use in the downtown area. During the early 1960s or whenever, Hiroshima was experiencing a period of growth and a construction boom downtown caused land prices to rise sharply.[674] It seems safe to suggest that Hamai, who was supported by

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[670] *Chūgoku Shinbun* , August 13, 1960.
[671] Ibid.
[672] The Chamber of Commerce moved into its new headquarters in October 1966. The move, the Chamber advocated, "represented their commitment to Hiroshima's progress and development." See Hiroshima Shōkō Kaigisho., *Hiroshima Shōkō Kaigisho kyūjūnenshi* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Shōkō Kaigisho, 1982). pp. 569-570.
[673] *Asahi Grafu,* 25 August 1967.
[674] Hirohisma's Chamber of Commerce was quite alarmed by the rapid rise in real estate prices in the city center.

major business interests and had important allies in the Chamber of Commerce itself, probably also had the dome's potential real-estate value and the redevelopment of the downtown area in mind when he called for a major remake of the city center and the dome's removal.[675] Hamai, however, was far from being the only one arguing for a removal. A week after Hamai's interview, the *Chugoku Shimbun* hosted a forum about the dome's preservation, which saw some quite emotional pleas to remove the dome. One *hibakusha*, said, "Until when will we have this horrible reminder (memory) of [the bomb] among us?" Another, using even stronger language, wrote, "This is simply selling our tragedy (*higeki wo uru mono ni suru*). It is plain wrong." Other respondents argued for the dome's removal as it was "plain ugly" and "destroys the beauty of our city." Others, including both *hibakusha* and *n*on-*hibakusha* residents, defended the dome, using the familiar language of it being "a symbol for peace," a "reminder of the calamity" and the like.[676]

The preservation debates seem to have died down after 1960. The revision of the security treaty and other issues seem to have completely captured the attention of the left, leaving little room for any other campaigns and, with the completion of the chamber of commerce building ending fears of its imminent collapse, the dome issue receded to the background. But in 1964, with the twenty-year anniversary looming and with general preparations for the influx of foreign tourists expected for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the issue came up again. Another cause for renewed interest was the aforementioned debate over the supposedly sacred nature of the Peace Park and its use by political groups. As previously mentioned, in April 1964 the city banned

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The Chamber was also facing criticism over the use of what was formerly public land to build its headquarters building. With the support of Mayor Hamai they formed a joined committee to examine the issue. See Hiroshima Shōkō Kaigisho, p. 575.

[675] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 21 August 1960.

[676] Ibid*,* 28 August 1960; Yagi, p. 61.

political groups from using the park around August 6, calling for "making it a place for silent prayer." The city based its decision on appeals by (unnamed) *hibakusha* groups who protested the "inappropriate nature" and "confusion" that followed the clash of zengakuren students with police in the park. The Socialists, Communists and others, for their part, did not ask to use the Park in 1964.[677] References to the Park's "sacred" nature abounded during these years. The same week that the city banned political gatherings, a visiting Soviet group called the Park and the dome "sacred ground for mankind."[678] As we will shortly see, some activists rightly saw the "sacred ground" maneuver by the city as a cynical ploy by conservatives to coopt *hibakusha's* legitimate requests to respect their feelings and expel the left from the ceremonial heart of the city. This issue however, like the dome preservation, divided *hibakusha* between those who emphasized commemoration and respect for the dead and those who sought to harness the tragedy for the cause of peace. Alliances and strategies shifted constantly as tourism officials, city planners, *hibakusha* groups and politicians worked, sometimes together (as with the case of tourism and *hibakusha* groups) and at other moments at cross purposes. Leftist groups within the pro-preservation camp sometimes used the "sacred ground" language argument in regards to the dome, while rejecting it at other times.

At the forefront of this campaign to preserve the dome, and a particularly good example of these contradictions, was the *Orizuru no kai* or Folded (Paper) Crane Society. The Crane Society was unique in its particularly neutral (one might even call it sterile) language and use of children and women as the ultimate symbols of Hiroshima's victimization. Founded by a *hibakusha* named Kawamoto Ichiro and his wife, the society was inspired by the death of Sasaki Sadako and the burst of activity for A-bomb children that followed and, as its name indicates, the

[677] Ibid, 16 April 1960.
[678] Ibid, 20 April 1960.

millions of paper origami cranes folded by children worldwide for Sadako.[679] The Society was instrumental in the making of the Children's Memorial (1958) and was particularly active among school children. Kawamoto's own career represents much of the turbulence and ideological twists and turns of the peace movement. An uneducated laborer, Kawamoto was particularly influenced by Christian missionaries and their peculiar language of moral superiority through sacrifice, humility and overcoming hate in crafting his early message.[680] In the mid-fifties he went through a more militant phase but, together with many in the anti-bomb movement, receded into a more apolitical and abstract anti-war stance as the movement split in the early sixties.[681]

The Crane Society's stance and the anti-bomb movement as a whole are best exemplified by their rich use of images. Images of children and mothers were all over Crane Society literature. As discussed in earlier chapters, this kind of imagery was a natural extension of the peace movement's reflexive focus on popular victimization. The posters of the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, for instance, featured a Madonna and a child motif with children dancing around them.[682] In that literature, the notions of violation of purity and representations of *hibakusha* as being primarily women and children were ubiquitous. From

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[679] Kawamoto was born in Lima in 1929 to parents who had emigrated from Hiroshima. After his father's death he returned to Japan with his mother. He was exposed to the bomb in Hiroshima. After the war he helped with the founding of a hibakusha self-help organization. He became the leading figure in the campaign to erect the A-Bomb Children Memorial, founded after Sadako's death, after which he founded the Crane Society. He worked mostly, from 1960 on, as a common janitor at Hiroshima University. Although many encouraged him to do so, he refused to take any appointment in the various peace organizations. He died in 2001.

[680] Kawamoto nikki, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park Archive (HPMA), Kawamato Collection, Folder 9, No. 8.2.03. Kawamoto was an avid participant in an early Christian peace organization: the Fellowship For Reconciliation (F.O.R). Like Kawamoto, many activists such as Yoshikawa Kyoshi, were part of this group.

[681] Kawamoto's political development can be nicely illustrated by the nature of the many, somewhat juvenile but lovely, illustrations in his diary. Late forties' images show hibakusha falling on their knees in the rubble praying to a shiny cross while after the Lucky Dragon Incident Kawamoto drew a masculine Japanese fisherman sticking a large tuna fish down Eisenhower's throat. This militant image is replaced by doves, smiling children and cranes by the late fifties and early sixties. See Kawamoto nikki. Folder 9 No. 8.2.04.

[682] See images in Hiroshima shi.hen, *Hiroshima shinshi.* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima shi, 1984).

the outset, the iconography of women and children was transposed in antinuclear propaganda into a symbol of what John Dower called "the broken life bond - [with portrayals of] mothers trying to nurse dead babies and infants clinging to dead mothers."[683] This feminization of memory, as Iris Rogoff has called it in connection to Germany, proved irresistible in the context of this kind of victimization discourse.[684]

Reflecting this kind of thinking, Kawamoto constantly placed an emphasis on the selfless work of A-bomb victims as the way to bring peace and urged the society's high school student members "…to talk for peace, to advise others for peace…attend funerals (of victims) and ask after A-Bomb patients and survivors, [and] meet Japanese and foreigners earnestly and warmly."[685] It is easy to see why Kawamoto, by presenting an inoffensive, non-militant Hiroshima peace movement composed of smiling children who "earnestly and warmly" greet foreign tourists, would have been a perfect ally for the city's tourism industry. . His message paralleled and fed into the city's "silent prayer" argument and its construction of politics as "disruptive" and "inappropriate" within the space of the Park.

The Crane Society launched its own campaign for the preservation of the dome in August 1960. A pamphlet from that year emphasized suffering and victimization, calling the dome, "A pitiful thing… the dome is a forgotten monument, the only [place] in which our suffering is etched."[686] The Society kept their campaign going through 1964, but did not seem to garner much support among officials. That would change in March 1964 when, following the building

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[683] John Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese Memory," in Michael J. Hogan, ed. *Hiroshima in History and Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 134.
[684] Irit Rogoff, "From Ruins to Debris: The Feminization of Fascism in German-History Museums," in *Museum Culture: Histories, Discourses, Spectacles*, Daniel J Sherman and Irit Rogoff ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). See also Elizabeth Heineman, "The Hour of the Women: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and West German National Identity," *American Historical Review* No.1 vol. 2 (1994): pp. 354-395.
[685] The Crane Society, "Next Who," (May, 1964) HPMA, Kawamato Collection, Folder 39, No. 9.1.99.
[686] Nemoto, p. 71.

of a rest house in the park as part of preparations for the Olympics, and with the twentieth anniversary of the bombing approaching, the Hiroshima Tourist Board again called for funds for preservation and reawakened the debate.[687] The tourist board was then joined by a group of eleven peace groups and a group of well-known intellectuals.

The Peace Groups' appeal called to preserve the dome "not just as a memorial for Hiroshima, but for the whole world entering into the nuclear era... It is a world historical place... and a monument for the crimes of modern warfare just like the *Auschwitz concentration-camp."*[688] The mention of Auschwitz was not accidental, as one of the eleven groups involved was the Hiroshima Religions Organization, headed by Kuwahara Hideki, who was also the head of the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Committee. This was not the first nor the last time that Auschwitz would be mentioned in the debate.[689] The groups' appeal was followed by a visit to the dome by Kondō Yasuo, a well-known architect, and an appeal by a group of eight famous intellectuals, a group which in addition to Kondō, included Tange, Kenzō and Nobel Prize laureate and peace activist Yukawa Hideki. Their appeal used the familiar "sacred" language, calling the dome, "a memorial temple [*kinen seidō* –usually a term used for a Confucian temple]," crucial for saving the world from the bomb.[690] Following these appeals, the city decided to commission an inquiry into the dome's structural weaknesses and the feasibility of preservation.[691]

All of this activity came amid vociferous debates in the media over the preservation issue. At the end of April 1965, Kondō Yasuo appealed on the pages of the *Chugoku shinbun* for the

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[687] Ibid; Yagi, p.60. As Yagi noticed, Hamai himself credited the Crane Society for changing his mind.
[688] Hiroshima shi, *Hiroshima shi shigikaishi*, p. 818.
[689] In an editorial the *Chūgoku Shinbun* argued," The same way they are preserving Auschwitz as an important site for mankind so we have to preserve the dome." See the paper's editorial on August 2, 1967.
For the declaration see: Hiroshima shi, *Hiroshima shi shigikaishi*, p. 819**;** *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 30 April 1965 for a visit to the dome**.** All these who signed had been involved in nuclear issues in the past; Tange and Yukawa especially.
[691] Ibid.

preservation of the dome.[692] Kondō's appeal followed a similar line of argument and used similar language to previous appeals, calling the dome "an obstacle for nuclear war and a symbol of peace," as well as a tourist asset. Kondō, as an architect, also put the focus on the importance of the dome to Tange's plan for the Peace Park as well as its own value as an example of modern architecture. [693]

Kondō's appeal ignited a fierce debate in local newspaper readers' columns. Four days after his appeal, Sasamoto Takeshi, a Hiroshima resident, replied to Kondō's appeal. Sasamoto doubted the dome was really a deterrent to nuclear war, mentioning the recent French nuclear tests and the futility of the protest campaign as evidence. "Rather than inspiring a commitment for peace," Sasamoto continued, "the dome could be seen as a reminder of the enemy's cruelty," and could be "a center for feelings of revenge." The preservationist camp also put too much emphasis on the tourist value of the dome, which, Sasamoto implied, using the same "sacred" language the preservationists used against his position, was not proper. As an alternative he extolled the floating lanterns ceremony (*Tōrō nagashi*– a ceremony in which residents float lanterns down the river with victims' names on the evening of August 6th) which "is a dignified and sensible way to give name to the nameless masses [of the dead]." [694] On May 7th, another resident, Himatsu Motohiro, replied to Sasamoto: "if the argument for the dome preventing war is 'nonsense' [as Sasamoto called it], would not the same apply to the lantern ceremony?"[695] On the 10th, another pro-dome resident, this time a *hibakusha*, replied to Sasamoto. The latter's reply to Motohiro was also published in the same column. The (anonymous) *hibakusha*, in a very emotional plea (at one point he started reminiscing about the "blackened buildings and the dead

[692] Ibid.
[693] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 1 April 1965.
[694] Ibid, 4 May 1965. Also cited by Nemoto, p.72 Note 15.
[695] Ibid, 7 May 1965.

students' bodies [his classmates presumably]"), called for preserving the dome as "a testimony for the next generations of the suffering caused by the bomb." Those who argue for demolition, he claimed, "have nothing to do (*fukankei*) with the *hibakusha*". Sasamoto, for his part, replied that, "there is no contradiction between the wish for peace and destroying the dome from Japanese morality's perspective… as a farmer I have a hard life, and this building is not something that brings happiness and beauty [to the lives of hardworking people]."[696] In reply to Sasamoto, Motsuhito wrote on the 12th, "yes, [the dome] is not the only thing that will prevent war but [it is] still important… as for Japanese tradition and 'beautiful costumes, you are not the only one who can define [what tradition means]." Pointing to Sasamoto's ideological standing, Motsuhito called his stance "a revival of wartime ideology."[697] Motsuhito was joined on the 13th by a number of other readers who agreed with him and with Kondō's original appeal. The pro-dome camp seemed to be triumphant in this debate, yet we should remember the *Chugoku Shinbun's* liberal leanings. Most readers were left-of-center and Sasamoto was a lone right-wing voice.

By 1966, with no decision in sight, the debate intensified. Some commentators began voicing allegations that previously had only been implied. In an editorial in the magazine *Hiroshima no kawa*, Konishi Noboku, wrote, "[the demolition camp] point out that the Peace Park has been put in order, and now the dome matter should be dealt with concretely. Land in the vicinity of the dome is valued at 200,000 yen per tsubo (3.3 sq meters), so it would be better to erect a commercial building that would bring revenue to the city. The A-Bomb has become well-known throughout the world, so it is best to tear the dome now. It only reminds us of dead people, anyway, and so on." Konishi vehemently rejected these arguments, "To those who say,

[696] Ibid, 10 May 1965.
[697] Ibid, 12 May 1965.

'tear it down' I feel like thundering: 'nonsense!' *We surviving victims have made a solemn pledge* that the same terrible disaster must never be repeated, and we should retain the dome as a monument dedicated to peace for all mankind... the preservation of the dome therefore must be considered from a worldwide point of view (my italics)."[698]

What was underlining the debate, as we can see from the *hibakusha* reply to Sasamoto of the 10th and in Konishi's assertion, was the question of who would speak in the name of the *hibakusha*. What the *hibakusha* wanted and how they "really" felt became the real sticking point. Both sides claimed they were speaking in the name of the survivors. The fact that some *hibakusha* were against the preservation cannot be disputed. Hamai himself was a survivor and, again, he was not alone in his opposition. A survivor talking to an *Asahi Grafu* reporter visiting Hiroshima argued that the money, instead of going toward preservation, should be given to the A-Bomb hospital; others repeated the oft-cited argument of the dome bringing back unwanted memories. This was not limited to *hibakusha*. A veteran of the Burma campaign complained that it reminded him of the family and friends he had lost; and added that, as a LDP member of the city assembly he had to recognize the symbolic meaning of the dome and the fact that "it is a tourist asset and brings us a lot of money."[699] By mid-1965, as we can see, even conservatives and Hamai (an independent liberal) had gone over to the preservation side. According to Hamai this shift occurred after appeals from the Crane Society children.[700] The rest of the political map in Hiroshima followed suit and after a number of revisions, a decision was passed in July1966 to

[698] Ōe, *Hirohima Notes* , p. 105.
[699] *Asahi grafu*, 5 August 1965.
[700] Yagi, p. 60.

"preserve the dome for all times... as a barrier against the resumption of nuclear war and *in the name of the hibakusha and the spirits of the 200,000 that died* (my italics)." [701]

The decision, though, did not include any funding for preservation and it was understood that a fundraising campaign would follow. While some called for the city to take responsibility for the fundraising, others, mostly conservatives, sought only a formal declaration, and the city administration was seen as dragging its feet on the subject.[702] The city was reluctant to partner with peace groups, which were the obvious candidates to launch such a campaign. This is not surprising given the cold shoulder the Hamai administration had been giving the left since the 1963 riots and the breakup of gensuikyō. Hamai was challenged on the issue in a debate on the floor of the City Assembly in September 1965 by Yoshida Jihei, a Socialist and former labor organizer. Hamai answered rather evasively, claiming that there were "some disagreements" in negotiations (with the left) and that the "movement [to preserve the dome] is a peace movement by itself." Thus, there was no need to consult with existing groups.[703] Yoshida's reply is not recorded. Yonezawa Susumu, another Socialist, challenged the mayor using much harsher language and alluding to his connections with the chamber of commerce. Yonezawa, like almost all other speakers, asserted that the "*hibakusha* want the dome preserved." The dome, Yonezawa continued, "is the true proof of Hiroshima and the incredible cruelty committed so calmly by the Americans…the building of the chamber of commerce dwarfed the dome and diluted its impact. Hamai has been in power for all but four years since the bombing… isn't he responsible [for this]?" Hamai answered, again using the emotional argument that the dome evoked suffering and

[701]Hiroshima shi, *Hiroshima shi shigikaishi*, p. 819.
[702]*Chūgoku Shinbun*, 29 October 1965.
[703]Hiroshima shi, *Hiroshima shi shigikaishi*, p. 824.

that he, like many other *hibakusha*, wanted it out of sight.[704] At the end of this exchange, the assembly moved to vote and called for a fundraising campaign to be headed by the city. Media outlets like Asahi Newspaper and NHK television joined in and by December the budget committee reported that a third of the money needed (40,000,000 Yen) had been collected. By February 1967, the total amount had been secured and work on the dome started in May of that year.

The dome debates illustrate how fragile the status of the Peace Park was in the mid-sixties. Very powerful interests and politicians were able to coopt *hibakusha* suffering in their quest to remove the dome and "normalize" the city center. The left had done this before when the anti-bomb movement used *hibakusha* suffering to further its own goals. This time, both sides claimed to speak in the name of *hibakusha* and *hibakusha* themselves were split on the issue. What was not in dispute, and was by this time taken for granted, was the sacred status of the victims themselves. As with the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Committee and the Peace March, their victim status gave *hibakusha* unchallenged moral authority; a coveted position both sides claimed for themselves. The language of the sacred, of the *hibakusha's* "martyrdom for peace," of the dome as "a temple" and a place of (holy) suffering played an enormous role in this elevating of the Peace Park as a place and the *hibakusha* as a group beyond politics and into the sacred. Both sides used that language. The right, however, proved much more adept in this game and, as we will shortly see, was more successful in using *hibakusha's* sorrow in depoliticizing the Peace Park and expelling the left from the ceremonial heart of the city; leaving it for tourists and well-organized and smooth, if somewhat sterile, peace ceremonies. Still, this was the sixties,

[704] Ibid, pp. 825-826.

and the left and others, especially the student movement, did not concede the Park without a fight.

III. **Army marches, Riotous Students, and Bike Gangs**

On May 24, 1967, Mayor Yamada Setsuo reported to the city assembly on the progress, or rather lack therof, of efforts to preserve the dome. Yamada, who had replaced Hamai in February 1967, campaigned on a platform for "restoring the peace city."[705] Just like Hamai, Yamada had to confront criticism over supposed hidden motives and stalling by the city administration. Yoshida Jihei, again, was the one who pressed the mayor hardest on the issue. Yamada's reply concentrated mostly on administrative details. In his conclusion, however, Yamada's comments went much further than the dome issue. "Today's Peace Park, the Nakajima Peace Memorial Park, is one unit (body), I believe it should be made into one sacred area, a sanctuary (*seiichi* - a sacred or holy territory), and I would like to ask the assembly to consider what concrete steps we could take [to achieve that purpose]."[706] In a matter of months, Yoshida's statement turned into official city policy. When a new monument and memorial tower were proposed, the committee responsible for the Peace Park (the oddly named Peace Infrastructure Committee) rejected it because, according to Committee Chairman Tanaka Koichi, "the Park is flooded (congested) with monuments... this is harmful for its character as a sacred space... and not proper for its atmosphere of sacred ground (or sacred area park -*seichi koen no fuinkini fusawashi kunai*).[707] Yoshida's plan for the sanctification of the Peace Park (*seichika*) met with immediate opposition. Opponents of Yoshida in the peace camp (Yoshida was initially backed

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[705] Yamada Setsuo tuisoroku kanko iinkai hen, *Yamda Setsuo Tsuisoroku,*. Yamada was, as a Diet member, instrumental in the passing of the law in 1949.
[706] Hiroshima shi, *Hiroshima shi shigikaishi*, p. 836.
[707] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 12 September 1967.

by the Socialists but moved more to the right after his election) accused him of hypocrisy and of "trying to throw out the Peace movement" from the Park. Yamada, although portraying himself as a man of peace, did not necessarily deny these allegations. "The Park," Yamada said, "is a place for silent prayer… it should not be [a place] for waving red flags and screaming in pitched voices." Indeed, one of Yoshida's very first acts was to revoke permits for the annual May Day demonstration at the Park.[708] By 1969, the "sacred" argument had come full circle. The language once used as a rallying cry for the left over the dome was now used against them. Yet this did not mean they completely ceded this language to the right.

What accentuated the left's frustration and accusations of hypocrisy was the city's decision to allow the Japan Defense Forces' (JDF) 13th Division, based in Hiroshima prefecture, to conduct their annual march through Peace Boulevard. The sight of tanks on Hiroshima's streets galvanized opposition to Yoshida. Just as with the dome debates, however, both sides were using the discourse of the sacred and notions of propriety to further their claims. The result, again, was the solidification of notions of sacred space; a development which led to further sanitization of the Park, with youth "gangs," souvenir shops, concerts and ball games banned from the Park's sacred ground. The only ones which did not participate in the "sacred" discourse were the radical students who came out in force against the "old" peace discourse in favor of a much more militant stand against nuclear weapons and U.S. imperialism. The students' violence, however, was their undoing as in the end their violation of the "sacred space" of the Park led to further strengthening of the very notions the students opposed.

In 1965, as the dome debates were raging, the JDF 13th division announced its plan to move its annual parade to Hiroshima in celebration of its 15th anniversary. The Parade was to

[708] Ibid.

include about 180 military vehicles, including tanks and Howitzers, a flyover by F-86 jets and around 1500 troops marching along Peace Boulevard. The parade was to end in front of the A-bomb cenotaph with the Division commanders paying respect to the dead. The announcement led to a storm of protest. The Socialists, Communists, *hidankyo* and student groups all sent protest letters to the city. The city, and Mayor Hamai in particular, seemed to be caught by surprise. Hamai managed to make the JDF slightly modify their plans to make them less offensive (such as not carrying weapons into the Park itself), but claimed that "legally, we cannot revoke permit for use of [Peace Boulevard and the Park]." In a further show of semantic virtuosity, Hamai argued that "since the JDF is not an 'aggressive' army there should be no problem for them to march on Peace Boulevard."[709] Hamai's argument did not convince anyone on the left. The fact that the city had revoked the permit for leftist groups to hold their meetings in the park just one year before, while claiming it could not do the same for the JDF, enraged activists.

The prefectural Socialists, the Labor Unions Council and thirteen other organizations appealed to JDF directly to cancel the march, while six activists started a sit-in in front of the cenotaph claiming that, "the people of the bombed city do not want weapon-carrying soldiers in the Peace Park... they will not allow it."[710] In another case of linguistic acrobatics, so common in Japan, where the army cannot constitutionally be called an army, Watanabe Yoshie, the Division's Commander, replied, "as the army division of the peace city we want to respect the feelings of the residents."[711] The storm of protests continued, with students in Hiroshima University signing a petition and organizing a counter march. Unlike the more cautious JSP and JCP, the students tied the march to the wider issues of "US. imperialism in South East Asia and

[709] Ibid, 21 October 1965.
[710] Ibid, 24 October and 25 October 1965.
[711] Ibid, 26 October 1965.

the security treaty then negotiated with South-Korea." The students' involvement unnerved many older residents. The fear of demonstrations, violent confrontations and "disturbance" (*konran*) permeated the whole debate. The students and new left, whose presence on campuses was growing together with anti-Vietnam war sentiment, were the wild card everybody was afraid of. The Socialists themselves "threatened" that "although we do not want to see an anti-Vietnam [war] demonstration in the Park, it will happen [if the march goes on].[712] In the assembly, Hamai appealed to the JDF not to pass too close to the Peace Park so as to avoid "disorder" and for the army to respect the feelings of the citizens.[713]

Nevertheless, not all citizens' feelings were hurt. Far from it. The pages of the *Chūgoku Shinbun,* were full of readers' letters supporting the parade. Most of these letters were from older residents, one of whom wrote, "This is really a parade for peace…we are for the march. As a former soldier, [I can say] there are no soldiers who like war." The reader dismissed the opponents of the march as "Koreans… and anti-Korean treaty demonstrators who are just making too much noise."[714] Other readers were more sophisticated. Illustrating some of the larger issues behind the parade debates, some dismissed the left's worries, "If Switzerland has an army, why can't we? It is childish to think that having a self-defense force [automatically] leads

[712] Ibid*,* 21 October 1965.
[713] Ibid*,* 27 October 1965.
[714] Ibid*,* 22 October 1965. This was the time of negotiations between Japan and South Korea to conclude a peace treaty. Many on the left opposed the treaty with the authoritarian and fiercely anti-communist Park Chung-hee regime. It was seen as both a tool of U.S containment policy in East Asi, and as insufficient in terms of addressing past Japanese aggression towards Korea. The treaty, for instance, did not allow for any compensation claims by former Korean forced laborers (or who later became known as comfort women - those who were pressed into service as military sex workers). Opposition was even more vehement in South Korea where the lack of an official apology from the Japanese government infuriated public opinion. Student protests forced negotiations to be suspended in April 1964. For an overview see: Oda Shigeru, "The Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea," *The American Journal of International Law,* Vol. 61, No. 1, (Jan., 1967). For the left reaction in Japan see Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan,* 1945-2005 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006).

to imperialism."[715] Leftists answered this by claiming that, especially given Japan's imperial past and especially in Hiroshima "the sight of tanks… brings back the specter of the military city [Hiroshima once was].[716] Others accused the left of being ungrateful to the military "which always helped [Japan]… in a case of natural disaster, they would run to the JDF for help." Apparently very hostile to the left, he continued, "you march down the street with your placards disturbing the traffic and regular citizens… and you have the nerve to protest [the march]"[717]

Both sides immediately, almost reflexively, resorted to using the bomb's victims. The same reader who made the Swiss analogy wrote, "Those who died [by the bomb] believed in Japan's mission, [they] saved Japan with their sacrifice and would be pleased to see a peaceful and prosperous Japan."[718] The left, as usual, talked about Hiroshima's "sacrifice for peace." An editorial in the *Chugoku Shinbun* talked about the "insult" of seeing "military boots on this sacred ground, under which 200,000 are buried."[719] Once again, the "sacred ground" language was used by all sides. The same editorial repeatedly referred to Hiroshima as the "world Peace Mecca" (an old phrase, as we have seen, used since the forties) and the Peace Park as "a sacred ground for the idea of peace."[720] A young protester was quoted as saying "we must protect the sacred space of the Park," while a Christian association said that "from a Christian point of view, using the park is prohibited."[721]

As with the dome, however, using the sacred ground argument was a double-edged sword for the left. In a press conference, Mayor Hamai argued that the debate was basically all for the

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[715] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 26 October 1965.
[716] Ibid.
[717] Ibid, 27 October 1965.
[718] Ibid, 26 October 1965.
[719] Ibid, 23 October 1965.
[720] Ibid.
[721] Ibid, 22, 27, and 28 October 1965.

best as "bringing in weapons to the Park stimulated peoples' feelings and promoted the idea that it is a sacred site for Hiroshima citizens (*shimin no seichi no kanjō shigeki*)." The left would have agreed with Hamai on that statement if it had not been for his next move. "The issue," Hamai continued, "was not the legitimacy of the JDF but the [status] of the Park. In the same way that people were angry with the demonstrators in 1963 [they are angry now]. One should not enter the Park with weapons and violence." Hamai then proceeded to confirm that he would attend the parade.[722] As it turned out, Hamai was using the controversy strategically to create an equivalence between the peace camp and the army. Approving of Hamai's declaration, the aforementioned columnist wrote about the real danger of counter demonstrations and left-wing violence and the need to prevent the "progressive camp from using the Park as a tool."[723] Turning the peace camp argument on its head, the right was using the left's own rhetoric to expel it from the ceremonial heart of the city while allowing the military to claim it.

The fears that Hamai and others had regarding the students and the left, however, did not materialize as the march went through relatively peacefully. The residents of the peace city did not seem very distressed. Quite the opposite. The march saw only a few hundred demonstrators in the Peace Park, but over 30,000 flag-waving spectators. The left's concerns, however, were justified. Revealing precisely what the ideological agenda of the JDF and its backers was, Watanabe said, in a post-parade interview, "The current Japanese think about the world, or about themselves as individuals. In between, there are, the family and the nation, and I want people to appreciate this and teach more patriotism."[724]

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[722] Ibid, 28 October 1965.
[723] Ibid, 29 October 1965.
[724] Ibid, 1 November 1965. Furthermore, the ceremony was held in Hiroshima's local Defense-of-the-Nation Shrine (*gokoku jinja)*. These shrines which were set up during imperial times to honor those who died in Japan's wars were

It was in this context that Yamada declared, shortly after his election, his plan for the sanctification of the Park. Yamada, however, was not very much concerned with patriotism and the nation. Rather than tanks and demonstrators, the city's move was aimed at accommodating the increasing numbers of foreign and domestic tourists. The city was moving away from politics and into more "normal" preoccupations with consumerism and development. An *Asahi Grafu* reporter nicely caught the irony of the peace city, depicting an anti-Vietnam war sign hosted right next to a sign promoting "Peace Cola" (*heiwa kora*).[725] The past was fast becoming abstract, politicized and overused. Curiously, sanctification and forgetting (and the attendant "normalization" of the city) went hand in hand as the city confined the bomb and its memory into a sacred ground in the middle of city. An *Asahi Grafu* reporter who visited the city in 1967, with debate over the dome and the Park still raging, echoed the prevailing rhetoric in the opening to his article, "Just like Mecca is for Islam, Jerusalem for Christians, Hiroshima is now a holy site for people who pray for peace worldwide: sacred ground of humanity." Immediately after this proclamation, however, the reporter watched in amazement as scores of people simply ignored the August 6th moment of silence, marked by sirens, and continued with their daily business. The reporter engaged in conversation with groups of young hippies, "Yankees" (Japanese slang for bike gangs and other young semi-criminal youth), and other youngsters on Hon Dori, the main shopping street, none of which showed much interest in the August 6th

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officially separated from state control in 1965 to be run by a supposedly private body The Shrine Shinto Association, formed after the war. The Association, however, retained powerful connections with the ruling LDP and continuously promoted conservative and nationalist values. Like the JDF as a whole, the Association, and especially the National Defense Shrine connection to the military, is constitutionally suspect of having a history of covert right-wing agenda. For an overview of the issue see Norma Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor,* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992). For a history of the Association see Seraphim, *War Memory.* In Hiroshima itself, as discussed above the issue was even more sensitive as the site of the shrine was also the site of the former Imperial Headquarters which served Emperor Meiji in the first Sino-Japanese War.

[725] *Asahi Grafu,* 19 August 1965.

ceremonies going on nearby.[726] James Boon, a Nigerian journalist who visited Hiroshima in 1962, remarked, " People built this city in order to forget about the bomb…[they] are trying really hard to live just like people in other cities."[727] In 1965, a *New York Times* reporter found teenagers using the strips of road surrounding the Peace Museum as a drag strip for car racing.[728] These bikers, complained a local resident in 1969, "ride around with flowing scarves, shouting at the top of their lungs, get drunk and make the residents' lives unbearable."[729]

As part of its sanctification campaign, the city decided to crack down on these bike gangs and to deal with other "improper" phenomena in the Park. In June 1969, a major police operation was launched to stop "bike hooligans" (*bozoku*). The following month the city ordered all souvenir shops, most run by poor *hibakusha*, to close, as "it was not appropriate [to have these shops] according to the policy [idea] of sanctification."[730] The *hibakusha* owners of these booths, who sold books, snacks, etc., complained bitterly to the city. Both the souvenir shops and the bikers returned almost immediately and it was not until September -the bikers proving particularly confrontational, it took 120 policemen to dislodge them- that they were finally evicted.[731] Other steps that the Yamada administration took included banning entrance to cars, banning stepping or playing on the grass (no ball games), new clover flower beds and a replacement of the concrete of the cenotaph with granite. Yamada also planned to get rid of the

[726] Asahi Grafu, 25 August 1967.
[727] *Yumiyuri Shinbun,* 18 June 1962.
[728] *New York Times Magazine*, 1 August 1965.
[729] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 21 June 1969.
[730] Ibid*,* 28 July 1969.
[731] Ibid*,* 28 September 1969.

rest house and change the parking rules. The city plan for sanctification was supposed to be completed on August 6, 1970.[732]

Student radicals at Hiroshima University, however, had very different ideas for the 1970 ceremony. Anticipating trouble, the city called for all parties to display unity. The city focused the ceremony on the plight of the *hibakusha*, using "We put the *hibakusha* in our heart" as its main slogan. *Hibakusha* compensation was one issue that all could rally around. In another conciliatory move, the city also, for the first time, invited a *Zainichi* (Japanese of Korean descent) representative to lay a wreath at the cenotaph. [733] This was done in order to reduce tensions with the *zainichi* community. In April 1970, the memorial for the Korean victims of the bomb was forbidden from being located inside the peace park. The city pointed to other memorials it had also banned, but Koreans and the left saw this as part of a decades-old history of discrimination and as a conscious move to deny Koreans' separate ethnic identity and memory.[734] The city's refusal to allow their memorial sculpture to enter the park and its insistence on the universal and "sacred" nature of the Park message "which cannot allow for ideological issues" was seen as a case of ethnic nationalism.[735]

The inadequacy of such a reply and the problematic nature of Japan's peace movement were obvious especially to those in the new left who now sought to emphasize Japanese status as victimizers (*Kagaisha*) rather than as victims (*Higaisha*). Oda Makoto, the leader of *Beheiren*

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[732] Ibid*,* 30 July 1969.
[733] *Asahi Shinbun,* 6 August 1970.
[734] Lisa Yoneyama, "Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity," in Hein, *Living with the Bomb*, p. 207.
[735] Ibid. p. 210. As Lisa Yoneyama has argued, as with any national narrative, Japanese victimization was exclusive; it left out all but pure Japanese victims. The creation of the Peace Park meant also the creation of silences. The stories of Chinese and Koreans forced laborers, American POWs, Japanese-Americans stranded in the city and all others who perished in the bombing were not mentioned. The entry of the Koreans would have been a reminder of Japan's wartime and imperial aggression and exploitation of Koreans; a reminder which would be detrimental to the dogmatic "positive" message of the Park.

(*Betonamu ni Heiwa o Shimin Rengo* — Citizen's League for Peace in Vietnam) was one of the first major public figures to confront the fallacy of victim consciousness and to publicize the discovery that it blinded Japanese to their own responsibility for past victimizing.[736] The Vietnam War demonstrated with force Japan's complicity in aggressions on the continent. *Beheiren* and other student groups vehemently opposed blanketing these historical and political realities under the usual abstraction. Directly challenging the Yamada administration and his newly instituted "tradition" of silent prayer, the students called for "a day of [moving] from prayer into struggle." Around 1500 helmeted students marched from Hiroshima University campus to the Peace Park. Shouting slogans against U.S. [737]Imperialism, discrimination against Koreans and the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the students blocked traffic, snake danced and engaged in running fights with the police. The end of the day saw eleven arrests, countless windows smashed and a city in shock.[738] Many *hibakusha* could not understand the students. A Washington Post journalist pointed out the "generation gap" between the students and the older survivors.[739] Already disillusioned by the politics of the old left, the new wave of radicalism and violence of the new student movement shocked many survivors even within the left, who could not stomach the student use of *geba* (political violence - from the German *gewalt*). [740]

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[736] James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Japan Press, 2001): p..6.
[737] *Asahi Shinbun,* 7 August 1970 .
[738] *Washington Post,* 7 August 1970.
[739] Ibid.
[740] By the late sixties, with cooperation and compromise becoming the norm at the increasingly affluent workplace, union and old left demonstrators who were also physically older, apologized to citizens for the disturbance caused by strikes or demonstrations and tried to work in cooperation with the authorities. The new left was openly contemptuous of these unions' tactics.

The new left would have none of it. As briefly noted above, it saw the JCP and JSP as too cautious, too complacent, and as opportunists who rejected the cause.[741] Its brochures and pamphlets showed much more animosity toward the old left than toward the right.[742] Although it shared much with its May '68 counterparts in the West, the Japanese new left emerged earlier than its Western counterparts. Student radicals battled police regularly from the late fifties on in their struggle against the security treaty. It was on the background of these struggles that the *zengakuren* split from the JCP and, subsequently, into smaller factions. The most violent of these sub-factions, the *Chūkaku-ha* or "middle core faction," led the demonstrations in Hiroshima. [743]

In Hiroshima, as in the rest of Japan, and, indeed, in France, the U.S and other places which saw student unrest, the causes for student activism were a mixture of educational and political issues. The student movement, which lost momentum in the early- to mid-sixties, regained momentum in mid-1967 and early-1968 with the worsening international situation in Asia. With the Vietnam War raging and rising tensions with North Korea (the North Koreans captured the US navy ship Pueblo in January 1968), student demonstrations increased in scope and frequency. Campus-related issues, however, were the main catalyst for their expansion and for the numerous campus occupations in the late sixties.[744] Exemplifying what was initially the

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[741] Fuse Toyomasa, "Student Radicalism in Japan: A 'Cultural Revolution'?" Comparative Education Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, (Oct., 1969): pp. 326-327.

[742] This can still be seen to this day. A Zengakuren history provided on their website states, among many other examples, "In contrast to the militant mass struggles of Zengakuren, the leadership of Japan Communist Party was, at that moment, miserably scared by the legislation of Anti-Subversive Activities Law and made a desperate attempt of suppressing militant mass struggle of Zengakuren" see: www.zengakuren.jp/wp/wp.../No.1_Report__History_of_Zengakuren2.pdf, accessed 1 February 2011

[743] *Zengakuren* split into three major factions: (1) *Minsei*, composed of pro-JCP groups, which has re-established ties with the Communist Party; (2) *Sampa Rengo*, or the Three Faction Alliance, anti-JCP, which calls for a militant struggle against imperialism and war; and (3) *Marugaku*, or Japan Marxist Student League, which is anti-JCP.

[744] Shimbori Michiya, "Student Radicals in Japan" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 395 no. 1 (May 1971): p. 151. At Tokyo University, for instance, issues of student union autonomy, high dorm expenses, students' freedom to choose roommates, and the rigidity of the entrance exam, etc., moved the main student factions into conflict with the university.

non-political nature of these demonstrations was the fact that it was not humanities but medical students, whose exams and conditions were the harshest, who led many of these demonstrations. In January and May 1968, the Tokyo and Nihon University campuses exploded in protest over issues of entrance exam regulation and funding issues.[745] Similarly, at Hiroshima University, engineering and medical students protesting exams were prominent among the demonstrators.[746] In a pattern which was repeated all over Japanese campuses, when the university administration called in the police to tackle student demonstrations, non-political students and outsiders joined the more radical students.[747] After the initial clashes in 1968, Hiroshima University was subsequently occupied up to 1969. Hiroshima was one of over a hundred and fifty campuses which were occupied at the time and there, as in Tokyo, Kyoto and other places, the campus occupation ended violently with riot police storming the campus and dozens of students wounded and arrested.

Beyond the campuses as well, the lines between "political" students and "non-political" citizens blurred as the new left repeatedly fought the security forces in the streets. As William Marotti pointed out, the blurring of these lines caused much anxiety for authorities. As on the campuses, state violence led many *nanpori* (from the English non-political) into activism and, indeed, transformed the very meaning of the word to suggest a "potential instability...and the possibility of political engagement."[748] "The apparent paradox of *nanpori* politics," Marotti argues, "should actually alert us to an expansion of politics in practice that simply outpaced the

[745] Tsurumi Kazuko, "The Japanese Student Movement: Its Milieu," *Japan Quarterly* 15 (October- December 1968): 430-455.
[746] Hiroshima daigaku bunshokan., *Shōgen daigaku funsō : kikiteki jōkyō ni taisuru hiroshima daigaku kyōshokuin no kiroku* (Tōkyō: Gendaishiryōshuppan, 2008). p. 10.
[747] Shimbori, p. 153.
[748] William Marotti, "Japan 1968: The Performance of Violence and the Theater of Protest," American Historical Review (February 2009): p. 98.

conventional definitions of the term 'political'."[749] The "political" in Japan came to be seen as the domain of government, parties, or simply, "the system." Both students and "citizens" (*shimin*- another loaded term) were seen by radicals to be outside of it. Wesley Makoto Sasaki-Uemura argued that student and citizen groups, contrary to Habermas' narrow definition of the bourgeois public sphere, were responsible for a broadening of the public sphere and what counted as political.[750] Marotti made a similar argument. But the new left was not only expanding the political, but also excluding and demarcating what kind of politics were acceptable.

The old parties and the old peace movement were definitely outside of the new left definition of accepted politics. The students saw themselves as completely separate from the older peace movement and the style of politics of their parents' generations. As briefly noted above, the issue of victim consciousness (*higaisha ishiki*) was one of the main reasons for this breach. While victimization and a feeling of betrayal by the state, as Oda Makoto and other intellectuals saw it, played a significant role in separating citizen and state and inserting a healthy measure of suspicion into their relations with state institutions, by the 1960s the experience had been usurped by the state and made into a collective victim consciousness.[751] The purest expression of this move occurred in Hiroshima when the peace movement, seeking to expand its base following the Bikini incident, nationalized the hibakusha experience and turned all of Japan into *yuitsu no hibaku koku* (the only nation to have ever been bombed by nuclear [weapons]). But being victims also meant forgetting the fact of being victimizers. Although some Japanese, as we saw with HAP, sought to base their appeal for peace on the unique position of being both

[749] Ibid.
[750] Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, "Competing Publics: Citizens' Groups, Mass Media, and the State in the 1960," Positions: East Asia cultures Critique Vol. 10. No. 1 (2002):p. 81.
[751] Orr, *Victim as Hero,* p. 8.

victims and victimizers (Sakamoto Yoshikazu made a similar appeal in *Sekai* in 1961), by the 1960s only notions of victimhood remained. Whenever notions of agency were articulated, they were divorced from "the people" or the "working class," who for the old left were beyond reproach and were as much victims of the "militarists" as other Asians were.[752] In part of a wider move to establish an autonomous self, capable of resisting state authority and manipulation, Oda and others sought to go beyond such notions. In 1967, in a typical statement, Shima Shigeru, a student leader, declared: "We believe there is a clear line of demarcation between ourselves and the communists of the prewar days. Their primary motivation was the spirit of martyrdom. In contrast, our primary concern is the emancipation of ourselves as human beings."[753]

Shima's use of the term "martyrdom" to denote the old left's attitude was no accident. Many of the first postwar generation of peace activists, but by al means not all, simply exchanged one form of radicalism (right-wing emperor worship) for another (peace activism). The gestures, language and emotional intensity stayed the same. Highlighting victimization and abstracting guilt beyond any concrete historic specificity was essential in facilitating this move. This however, did not mean that the students parents' generation was wholly complicit. What Oda, Shima, and indeed their whole generation forgot was that their concern with autonomy and "emancipation" had its roots in the *shutaisei* [subjectivity] debates which raged in the late forties among left wing intellectuals' "communities of contrition."[754] The reason for this blindness, in Japan as in Germany where students also blamed their parents for their complicity and silence, was generational. Oda was thirteen when the war was over and did not experience the postwar intellectual moment. The generational difference was felt also from the other side of the divide

[752] Ibid, pp. 8-9.
[753] Tsuromi,"Student Movement," p. 436.
[754]Orr, *Victim as Hero,* p. 6.

when older activists were dismayed by the violence displayed by the students, forgetting their own generation's violent confrontations with the police before the Korean War.

Violence indeed played a special role in generational conflict. The students' style was very different from earlier movements. They wore helmets and came to demonstrations armed with long wooden staves, used to battle police. The students mythologized violence and its ability to transform individuals and society. Students saw violence as a tool to unmask the violence and injustice of the state. As with other aspects of this debate, in Hiroshima, violence had an even more symbolic significance. In a fascinating document, Teraoka Shōgo, a Hiroshima University student leader, writes of postwar Hiroshima as a "tourist city," which "fabricates its history" and buries its past. The rubble of the bomb was buried under the new shiny buildings and memorials and with it the memory of the bomb. "What is rubble?" asks Teroka:

> *"rubble* - the destruction of Hiroshima by the bomb
>
> *rubble* -an ugliness
>
> *rubble* - Where our history began
>
> *rubble* - it exists in the now"[755]

It was the duty of students to pick up this rubble; to dig it out and hurl it (at the police)., This act, by metaphorically smashing the ignorance and indifference of the non-political masses and uncovering the true nature of Hiroshima "not as a mistake but as a deliberate act," meant

[755] Teraoka Shōgo, " gareki wo hori okose," in Hiroshima daigaku bunshokan., Shōgen daigaku funsō, p.11.

uncovering the true nature of the system and the way Hiroshima's memory was buried through the machinations of imperialism and capitalism.[756]

This -for lack of a better word- fetishism of the hurled brick and aestheticization of violence was very similar to the language employed by students worldwide.[757] But just like in May 1968 in France, the violent language notwithstanding, this revolution was one in which nobody died.[758] The students' violence was a part of what Moratti rightly called "the theatre of protest." Snake dances, flying banners, masks and costumes were part of a street theater of violence. "Students," a contemporary Western journalist wrote in 1968, "opted for street dance and flamboyant melodrama... but [the feeling was] that the students and the police will perform and society will go on."[759]

But if in Tokyo or Sasebo (where students clashed with police after a visit by the USS Enterprise) citizens could be onlookers, in Hiroshima they could not. The very term "citizens of Hiroshima" was politically loaded and was repeatedly used by the left to denote the fundamentally "peace loving" character of the transformed Hiroshima. The left or peace movement figures, rather than the LDP, were in control of the city and thus the clash between the old peace movement and the citizenry (conceived as one and the same by the former) and the new left was much more pronounced. This resulted in head-on conflict and widespread hostility to the movement during the visit by Prime Minister Satō in August 1971 - the first ever by a

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[756] Ibid

[757] See, among many others, Kristin Ross, *May '68 and its Afterlives*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Jeremy Varon. Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

[758] Later on some did die. In the 70s the movement experienced an extremely violent stage. Student factions fought each other and among themselves. In the most famous incident, in 1972, the United Red Army faction – a Maoist splinter group, "purged" itself of traitors by killing fourteen out of twenty-five members. This faction and others also turned to terrorism and engaged in plane hijacking and other activities.

[759] Lawrence W. Beer, "Japan, 1969: 'My Homeism' and Political Struggle," Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 1, (Jan., 1970): p.44.

Japanese Prime Minister at the peace ceremony. Although the violence did lead to some positive developments for the left (for instance, the final withdrawal of the JDF parades), its most significant development of the students' involvement was the intensified solidification of the notion of sacred space and the end of the peace park as a political space.

Nuclear issues were a major ground for confrontation between the Satō administration and the students.[760] As mentioned above, Satō endorsed Japan's three non-nuclear principles in December 1967.[761] The students saw it as a cynical ploy and rightly suspected foul play on the part of the government and the Americans, accusing the Americans of introducing nuclear weapons to Japan aboard U.S. Navy ships.[762] Most of the old left and the *hibakusha* movement, however, welcomed the LDP's endorsement of anti-nuclearism. Their support was not clear of interests either. One of the main goals of the *hibakusha* organizations, if not the main goal, was getting compensation and special medical treatment from the Japanese government. The LDP endorsement also meant an increase in chances of a better deal for *hibakusha*. Many *hibakusha* were content with achieving compensation and worried far less about the political objectives of the movement. In fact, with the students declaring their intention in early August to block Satō's visit, which many in the *hibakusha* movement saw as a historic victory and a step forward for their movement, many in Hiroshima were alarmed.[763] The Crane Society, for instance, staged a

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[760] Other reasons were his support for Vietnam and use of police order to disband a faction of zengakuren.

[761] On 11 December 1967, in a speech at the Diet, Satō introduced the Three Non-Nuclear Principles: vowing non-production, non-possession, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan. This was an astute move on the part of the conservatives. With the anti-nuclear movement increasingly split and dysfunctional, the LDP aligned itself with the center-right factions and began to formulate its opposition to nuclear weapons, thus, benefiting from popular anti-nuclear feelings in the wider public and making it a mainstream goal. Soon after the 67' declaration, Japan entered the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Diet passed a resolution formally adopting the principles in 1971. Lisa Yoneyama and others rightly criticized this "nationalization of victimhood," seeing it as a cynical maneuver in deploying victim consciousness in the service of nationalist goals. As discussed above, being a nation of victims conventionally helped avoiding Japanese victimizations of others.

[762] Marotti, "Japan 1968," p. 130.

[763] Interview with Yokohara Yukio (former chair of the gensuikin organization), Hiroshima June 25, 2010.

vigil and spread paper cranes in front of the A-Bomb Children monument "hoping to prevent disturbances in the ceremony."[764] The *chukoku ha* was taking little notice of these concerns. In an uncompromising statement, the faction called for the establishment of a nationwide organization to stop the PM's visit and called his stated concern with survivors' and attendance of the ceremony "a pose, a transparent trial at evading war responsibility, and… part of [the PM's] support for the re-invasion of Asia (i.e. Japan's support of the Vietnam war)."[765]

As the date of the PM's visit drew near, the new left delivered on its promises of resistance. An organization called "The Hibakusha Youth League" (*hibakusha seinen renmei*), which had some support, tried to stage a sit-in in front of the cenotaph in late July. The city called in the police to remove them.[766] As more and more students from *zenkyoto*, the *chukoku ha and* other organizations gathered in Hiroshima, tensions mounted. In preparation, Mayor Yamada declared the Park a "sacred zone" and deployed police to stop demonstrations, and the prefectural and municipal police set up a special HQ.[767] On the day of the visit, about fifteen hundred students converged on Hiroshima Station, where Satō was supposed to arrive. Luckily for the police, that same morning, a typhoon from Kyushu descended on Hiroshima. Battered by strong winds and rain and facing an overwhelming force of riot police, the students could not prevent the PM from arriving at Hiroshima. At the ceremony itself, when the PM tried to lay a wreath at the cenotaph, four students burst into his route, threw firecrackers and tried to accost the PM. They were stopped by plainclothes policeman.[768] Outside the Park, hundreds of students chanted for Satō "go home" and other anti-war slogans. Even after the ceremony, during the fire

[764] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 5 August 1971.
[765] Nemoto, p. 161.
[766] *Asahi Shinbun,* 29 July 1971.
[767] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 6 August 1971.
[768] *Mainichi Shinbun,* 6 August 1971.

lantern ritual, usually the most dignified and family oriented part of the day, students played loud rock music and tried to interfere with ceremonies.[769]

The response from Hiroshima citizens was almost overwhelmingly negative. Some *hibakusha* actually confronted the students calling, "this is a place for prayer…you do not have the right to disturb our prayer [for the dead]." Others commented that they were saddened by the violence.[770] The papers on the following days were full of anti-student sentiment. One reader commented, "They only come here once a year...they do not know anything about [our suffering]." Another reader wrote, "I lost my wife and daughter that day… no one has the right to disturb [my mourning]." Another called the students "animals."[771] The old left, especially Socialists and Communist members of the assembly, also condemned the violence.[772] There were some sympathetic voices pointing out that "prayer alone will not bring peace" and that the student anger was justified given that the government did nothing for the *hibakusha*, but they were lone voices in a sea of condemnation. [773]

The student violence was seen as inappropriate for a "place of prayer," and as "defilement" of the sacred space of the Park. Clearly, by 1971, the Yamada campaign for sanctification succeeded in turning the Park in popular consciousness into a sacred space in need of protection from the violence of politics. The students played right into his hands. In his work on student violence, Moratti wrote, "violence played an ambiguous role in uncovering state violence and bringing down the gap between regular *shimin* (citizens) and students… [and]

[769] Nemoto, p. 164.
[770] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 7 August 1971.
[771] Nemoto, p. 167.
[772] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 7 August 1971.
[773] Nemoto, p.167.

created the conditions for non-violence."[774] Moratti argues that violence opened up space for different kinds of political groups and contributed to a restraining of police violence, which allowed citizen groups to reclaim the streets as political space. This was clearly not the case in Hiroshima. Far from condemning police violence, most accused the student of both physical and symbolic violence (defilement). The violence led to an affirmation of the Park's sacred status and made any notion of the left reclaiming it as a political space unthinkable, thus closing off rather than expanding important political space. However, there are some signs that student violence had positive effects. The JDF parades through Hiroshima came under heavy criticism and legal challenges from the left in 1972 and 1973. These were rejected by the courts but what did bring the governor of Hiroshima Prefecture and JDF to cancel the parades was the fear of student violence. "I do not want," stated the governor, "to see the parade conducted [while] surrounded by riot police."[775] The notion of sacred space was still being mobilized by the left to fight that other pernicious danger: commercialization and tourism. The hotel that had stood within Park the grounds from its beginning was torn down in 1972 as being "inappropriate" and as "violating the Peace Park law."[776] These were some of the last victories of the left in the seventies as factionalism tore through the new left and prosperity and cooption into the conservative system took the edge of the older union and party-based left. The city not only did not fight the campaign to tear down the hotel, but actually encouraged it as part of its plan to redo the A-bomb museum and Park. With its campaign for sanctification of the Park basically successful, the city moved to revamp the museum to make it befitting of "an international center

[774] Marotti, "Japan 1968," p. 128.
[775] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 26 May 1974. The JDF cited its wish to preserve fuel (the oil crisis had just hit Japan at the time). It was, however, widely acknowledged that the parades had become too controversial.
[776] The city auditor decided that, " the presence of the Hiroshima Hotel within the Peace Park grounds is inappropriate and unlawful" and asked the mayor to remove it as fast as possible. See *Chūgoku Shinbun*, February 1, 1972.

of Peace and Culture."[777] This, however, sparked new conflicts and new debates as notions of the sacred and inviolable were used yet again against the city, which was seen as manipulating Hiroshima's tragedy for the sake of tourism.

IV. Sacred Objects: the Hiroshima Peace Museum's The Realism debate

In January 1969, the *Chugoku Shinbun* reported the number of foreign tourists to Hiroshima had peaked in 1968 with 155,000 tourists from 40 countries visiting the city. The paper set up to interview some of those in the Peace Park, where one could be sure to find foreigners, in order to find out more about their "idea of Hiroshima."[778] The foreign tourists almost uniformly spoke of their deep-felt sympathy for Hiroshima and their appreciation of the work the city did for peace. Similar articles abounded in Hiroshima during those years. A 1968 article, for instance, by the well-known photographer and activist Yamazaki Shasaburo, talked about the way tourists were transformed by their experience and how impressed they were by the city's "sacrifice and the way it carries an enormous burden for all of humanity."[779] What emanates from Yamazaki's piece and what is evident in much contemporary writings about the Hiroshima peace tourism, is a deep unease. Far from seeing the Park or the Dome un-problematically, as a "tourist resource," as they had been seen just a few years previously, Yamazaki called on the Yamada administration "[to] not make Hiroshima into a tourist city." Yamazaki wanted the city to be "a pilgrimage site" and "a mecca of world peace," and he condemned the "making the A-bomb survivors into a tourism resource."[780] The city's sanctification plan built on this sentiment, expelling trouble teenagers, radical students and

[777] Hiroshima City, *Hiroshima, 1970* (Kyoto: Dai-Nippon publishing, 1970) .
[778] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 15 January 1969.
[779] Ibid, 2 March 1968.
[780] Ibid.

souvenir stands – where some *hibakusha* still posed with their keloids for pictures in exchange for cash, to create "an oasis where people could reflect on peace."[781] But, contrary to Yamazaki's wishes, the city also aimed at capitalizing on the growing number of tourists. This was especially important in the early seventies, as ship building and other industries were declining due to the oil crisis and the start of deindustrialization, and tourism became a more important source of revenue. In addition, with anti-nuclearism and Hiroshima moving more into the mainstream, growing numbers of Japanese school groups came to Hiroshima.[782] Both of these groups grew in number every year. Yet, not surprisingly, the city found it hard to maintain both the Park's newfound status as a sacred place and, at the same time, to develop the growing domestic and foreign tourist trade. Nowhere were the tensions between sanctification and commercialization as visible as in the debates over the plans to redo the museum to accommodate the growing number of tourists and students visiting Hiroshima.

As we saw, earlier talk about redoing the museum went back to the late fifties dome debates and Hamai's plans for "normalizing" the Park. No concrete plans were drawn, however, until December 1966, when the city decided to establish the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall Exhibit Committee (*Hiroshima heiwa kinen kan tenji kyogikai*). The committee met for four months and concluded its first round of debates in April of 1967.[783] The committee continued to work through 1970. In its second meeting, the committee agreed on a statement of principles that defined the goal of the museum renovation: "The museum should be the custodian of and collect

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[781] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 2 July 1971.

[782] In his article examining Japanese tourist guide books, Peter Siegenthaler point out that Peace as a tourism theme became mainstream starting in the late sixties with more and more school groups visiting the city, the city efforts in showing itself to be a city of fun and culture notwithstanding. "In most books," wrote Siegenthaler, "Hiroshima was almost completely identified with bomb." See his Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese guidebooks". *Annals of Tourism Research.* No. 29 Vol. 4 (2002): p. 1127.

[783] Hiroshima heiwa kinen shiryokan no rekishi memo, HPMA (this collection of testimonies and documents from former museum directors can be accessed in the Mueseum Curating Department. It has no special classifying reference).

materials related to the damage [caused by] the A-bomb; should make visitors -both domestic and foreign- understand, the true conditions (or reality - *jitsujo*) of the experience of bombing; and promote an appreciation of the importance of peace." "The basis of this activity", the statement continued, "should be to introduce the great sacrifice (*daigisei*) of Hiroshima and the experience of the bombing (*hibakutaiken*)." The insistence on Hiroshima's sacrifice was very much in line with the same victim consciousness (*higaisha ishiki*) that students attacked so vehemently, and was considered the common sense position in Hiroshima at the time. What was new was the insistence on the truth or actuality of the experience the exhibit should convey. This became a recurring theme in Hiroshima discourse at the time. A few months after the committee concluded its work, Mayor Yamada said, "the current arrangement (of the museum) is not in accordance with the actual situation after the bombing; I want to bring it as close as possible to reality and the truth."[784] Both Yamada and the committee were responding to growing anxiety in Hiroshima over the disappearing past, as *hibakusha* were beginning to pass away and physical reminders of the bomb, all but the dome, were erased.

Many inside and outside Hiroshima engaged this issue in debates over what form the renovation would take. A significant portion of these debates ran along the familiar lines of commemoration versus politics and commercialization. Yamazaki Sasaburo called on the city, "not to mix politics and lofty thought… so we [*hibakusha*] could use our experience and evidence [of the bombing] for peace," and "not waste the sacrifice of the 200,000." Especially with *hibakusha* getting old, argued Yamazaki, collecting materials became more important. Thus, the city should renovate the museum and spread the words, art and testimony of

[784] Stefanie Schäfer, "The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and its Exhibition." In The Power of Memory in Modern Japan, Sven Saaler und Wolfgang Schwentker (ed.) (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008): p. 158.

hibakusha.[785] Imahori Seiji, one of the most prominent left-wing historians of the peace movement, argued that just collecting materials (*shiryō*: historical sources - physical objects and testimonies) was not enough. "We need to establish a scientific research center to collect data about destruction caused by the bomb," he argued, "and use all means necessary to disseminate this information… and those collected by survivors' organizations."[786] A similar argument was advanced by Tahara Tukasa, a member of the A-Bomb Materials Preservation Committee (*genbaku shiryō hozon kai)*, who also called for a research center and concentration of all the material in one place. With growing criticism over improper use of the Park (the museum and adjacent halls were used for trade conferences, weddings and even dance parties), an editorial in the *Chugoku Shinbun* called for the creation of a Peace Culture Center which would restore the museum and the Park for their original purpose. The paper endorsed Yamada's plan to redo the museum and promote "peace research."[787]

The emphasis on research was significant. All participants in the debate at this stage used the word *shiryō*, which has historical and scientific connotations, and not the more specific word normally/generally used for A-bomb materials in later debates, *ihin*, which means "articles of the deceased or remnants" and carries with it a religious connotation. As Stefanie Schäfer pointed out, in the ensuing debate over the remaking of the museum, *ihin* was contrasted with *saigen* (recreation) and designated an almost mythical belief in the power of articles exposed to the bomb to convey the experience of the bomb and sway people to support peace. A pilgrimage site needed its martyrs and relics. As Schäfer argued, A-bomb materials and *hibakusha* testimony were seen as equivalent and as opposed to the museum administration's "shallow tourist

[785] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 8 March 1968.
[786] Ibid, 7 March 1968.
[787] Ibid, 22 June 1968; November 7, 1968.

consciousness."[788] These debates revolved around the city's efforts to recreate, through the use of wax figures, the experience of the bombing. Between the two oppositions of re-creation and mystification, and entangled with both, was belief in the power of scientific research and data to convey the "truth" of the bombing. Nagaoka Shogō was motivated by that belief, as were all the countless activists who collected photos, materials, statistics and testimonies. These activists were responsible for creating "white books" and enormous compendiums of statistics of destruction, sickness and loss.[789] Similar to the efforts of the Auschwitz pilgrims at disseminating testimony, Imahori Tahara and many others believed that if only people knew and were exposed to the empirical certainty of the data, they could achieve knowledge and understanding of the experience of being bombed by nuclear weapons and, hence, would arrive at the logical conclusion of supporting the peace movement. This attitude is similar to the mystical belief in the power of the silent and fragmented object – the object as is - yet distinct from it.

As Kyo Maclear argued in regards to the use of A-Bomb photographs, this enlightenment derived quest for "total knowledge" was impossible in face of the horror of the bomb. While pictures of the A-Bomb from the Japanese side show how the bomb was experienced on the ground and from the point of view of the victims, American images, for instance at the Smithsonian, show the empty expanses destroyed by the power of the bomb, with no human in sight. The latter celebrates the power of science while the former shows its darker side. Both function as opposite "monologues" that exclude one another but, even if brought together, cannot capture the enormity of the horror. This represents the limits of representation and the "limits of

[788] Schäfer , p. 162.

[789] The city and survivor groups published numerous materials concerning the damage suffered by the bomb. One of the most well-known and exhaustive of these was Hiroshima-shi Nagasaki-shi Genbaku Saigaishi Henshū Iinkai, *Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the physical, medical, and social effects of the atomic bombings* (New York: Basic Books, 1981).

vision as paradigm of knowledge."[790] A similar -perhaps even more pointed- argument can be made regarding statistics. In both cases, "retinal fatigue" and overexposure to horror render the efforts of representation meaningless. Yet, the mystical belief in the power of science persists**.** This was, especially in the case of the material and psychological bomb damage, problematic. As Kanai Toshihiro pointed out, producing white papers and compendiums of data was perhaps politically necessary but, by using the tools of science, one was using the same tools used to produce the bomb itself, hence reproducing and maintaining the same structures which led to the creation of the bomb. [791]

Kanai, however, was a lone voice in Hiroshima. As with the dome debates, the opposing sides in the reconstruction debates rarely paused to consider how they were all trapped within the same dialectic. Seeking a way out of this conundrum, Maclear suggested the use of art as a more appropriate practice for dealing with the horror of the bomb but, as Adorno's famous quip about the impossibility of poetry after Auschwitz shows, in light of the aestheticization of politics by the Nazis, art was seen as suspicious, inappropriate, and even dangerous when dealing with the horror of mass death. "Atrocity," Maclear reminded us, "can be beautiful."[792] Instead of the art of reportage, such as the socialist realism practiced by Communist artists in Japan and elsewhere, which can lead to such aestheticization, MacLear wanted to turn to more abstract art which, again qua Adorno, is supposed to estrange the world and take us away from the dialectics and transcend the "limits of the real."[793] The "realism debates," as the debates about representation were called in the early seventies, revolved around this question of limits but did not transcend

[790]Kyo Maclear, *Beclouded Visions : Hiroshima-Nagasaki and the Art of Witness,* (Albany : State University of New York Press, 1999): p. 4.
[791] For Kanai articles see http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/peacemuseum_d/jp/text/voice018.html. I want to thank Steffanie Schäfer for letting me know of this article.
[792] Kyo Maclear, *Beclouded Visions ,* p. 63.
[793] Ibid, pp.: 65, 103.

them. On one side were those who believed in the power of the object – *ihin*-, while on the other were those who opted for representation; but both claimed to be able to represent the "real."

The "realism" debate began in earnest with the decision of the city, in 1972, to replace six simple wooden display mannequins wearing clothes worn by bomb victims with wax figures which would represent a mother with her child and another woman fleeing the fires that consumed Hiroshima.[794] The wax artist aimed at recreating the wounds and burns suffered by survivors. Their hair and pose was also arranged accordingly, with hands outstretched (the skin having melted), expressions of horror on their faces and a photo of the burning city behind them. The figures were supposed to represent *hibakusha* fleeing, around 1500 meters from the bomb. The wax artist Nishio Tokiichi, who was brought from Kyoto, interviewed a dozen *hibakusha* in order to get details for the creation of the dolls. Nishio told the press: "I worked hard to represent it *as true as possible as it was at that time*. The hardest part was conveying the facial expression, the terror, despair and will to life of the *hibakusha*... I wanted to show the destruction of the bomb to as many people as possible... and to contribute to peace. [my italics]."[795] In another interview Nishio explained, "We have avoided dramatic expression. Wax works have been used for medical preparations for a long time. These dummies are also medical material."[796] Nishio's insistence on the truth of his representation and his claim for the medical-scientific validity of the exhibit were clear efforts to defend his work in light of overwhelming resistance from *hibakusha* and others who resented this trial at representing or recreating (*saigen*) the horror of that day. Although Nishio sought the status of "true representation" akin to the *shiryō* which surrounded it

[794] Schäfer, p. 158.
[795] *Yomiuri Shinbun*, July 31, 1973.
[796] Schäfer, p.159.

in the museum (*shiryōkan)*, his claim was roundly dismissed by detractors who saw it for what it was: a simulacrum.

Moritaki Ichiō, in an op-ed in the *Chugoku Shinbun*, complained that the exhibit was "just fake... it does nothing but producing shock. It does not contribute anything to peace and [just] cheapens the experience.[797] Moritaki and others contrasted the "fake" (*nise mono*), with *ihin* (or *shiryō*), which possessed a truth claim by virtue of having been actually exposed to the bomb. Seeing these fragmented and broken relics was supposed to transform visitors as they "possessed an aura that allowed the spectator... to bridge the gap between their present and the lost past."[798] This transformation could not be achieved by representation. "No matter how much we try," claimed Moritaki, "the situation on that day could never be represented."[799] Yamada and other supporters of the exhibit, for their part, claimed their mode of representation as truthful, realistic and scientific. At the same time, as Schäfer pointed out, Yamada also wanted the exhibit to express suffering and emotions. This was seen as necessary in order to reach out to new crowds of students and tourists that did not experience the war.[800] Yamada, again, aimed at providing a similar experience to the one advocated by Tange for the Osaka expo: creating an emotional space and an emotional experience that would leave its mark on the visitor. Yamada intended the same transformation that the *ihin* camp aimed at, he just did not think the burned remnants at the museum could do the job by themselves. In the end, Yamada's attitude triumphed. After all, he had the city's resources and tourism interests on his side. But the debate left a bitter aftertaste in Hiroshima. There was a sense that times were changing and that with all the talk of sacred place

[797] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, August 1, 1973.
[798] Schäfer, p. 161.
[799] Ibid.
[800] Ibid., p. 162.

and prayer, Hiroshima was turning into a different place, a more normal place, but also one which had lost its way.

Conclusion: Beyond Hiroshima: Tourism, Violence and politics in Yad Vasehm, Auschwitz and Beyond

The tensions and contradictions of Hiroshima were shared by sites of mass death and commemoration worldwide. The artifacts of the camps - the shoes, glasses and hair – were similarly, as we saw in the HAP exchange of mementos with Auschwitz, seen as *ihin* and sacred. However, it would be impossible to imagine a similar exhibit of wax figures in Auschwitz or Bergen-Belsen (just imagine dolls of prisoners in striped uniforms in Birkenau).[801] The very thought of recreation and meddling with the camps is seen as blasphemy for most of us today. The Auschwitz museum has a strict policy of preserving as much as possible from the original building and artifacts.[802] Yet, Auschwitz and other concentration camps, famous battlefields, Cold War bunkers and other sites of mass death share a similar dark attraction with Hiroshima, have seen a steady growth in visitors and increasingly have had to confront the fact of being tourist sites. Many of these opted, with the significant exception of the camps, like Hiroshima, for recreation and reproduction to create a "realistic" experience for their visitors.[803] Indeed, as John J. Lennon and Malcolm Foley have argued, replication and commoditization of events are

[801] Apparently, very early on the use of dolls and other methods, which would now seem to us crass, were considered in Poland and other places as appropriate. The "Holocaust basement" in Jerusalem, which is run by an orthodox organization and predated Yad Vashem, still features blood-soaked Torah scrolls and other artifacts. In Poland, mannequins were used in the first exhibition in the Meidanjk museum. I thank Anna Ziebinska for telling me about this exhibition. Ziebinska discusses the exhibition in her upcoming book *Historia w muzeach. Studium ekspozycji Holokaustu", Wydawnictwo Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej*, (Lublin 2011).

[803] The fact that in Hiroshima nothing was left while the camps are still standing accounts for much of the difference. While a visit to a museum ideally requires, as Lennon and Foley argued, some distance between exhibit and visitor - distance supposed to enable "objective" and empirical analyses, in the camps, one is inside the exhibit and inside history. Recreation is supposed to bridge the reality gap between the visitor and the object through simulacra. This could be done in Hiroshima specifically because the bomb erased, and the city labored to finish covering up, all traces of history.

one of the hallmarks of "dark tourist sites."[804] These sites, which Lennon and Foley associate with "the Postmodern," are usually ones that depend on constant reproduction in the media, global communication technologies and tourist networks, and usually induce some level of anxiety over modernity in the visitors. These are sites of events supposedly inconceivable within modernity, but in it exactly lies their attraction for visitors.[805]

Hiroshima shares all of these characteristics. Yet, as tensions between the twin goals of commoditization and sanctification show, many in Hiroshima exhibited a manifest unease over Hiroshima's role as a tourist site. It is significant that these anxieties hardly existed in the fifties and early sixties when, as we saw in previous chapters, Hiroshima was marketed as "Atom Hiroshima" and *ihin* were presented as curiosities. Indeed, the 1970s debates over the Osaka Expo, the Dome and the museum exhibits marked Hiroshima's entrance into the postmodern; a transition that corresponded to the move from a production-oriented economy to a service and financial industry which David Harvey has seen as marking the greater move from the modern into the postmodern.[806] Hiroshima, however, stubbornly refused to acknowledge the fact of it being a "dark" tourist site. Instead, it constantly opted to represent itself as either a regular tourist site or a "place of prayer." A 1970 tourist brochure for Hiroshima repeatedly made references to its being "a bright city, situated on the Seto Inland Sea, which is known as the Mediterranean of the Orient."[807] The brochure talks of beautiful beaches, girls in bikinis, and the many festivals and gay atmosphere in summertime Hiroshima. When the city's history is mentioned, the brochure calls Hiroshima (in language very similar to that used for the Expo) an "international

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[804] Lennon and Foley, *Dark tourism,* p. 11.
[805] Ibid, p.20.
[806] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity : an Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989): pp. 5-15.
[807] Hiroshima City, *Hiroshima 1970*.

city of peace and culture... where the oneness of the world and unity of mankind can be achieved." The Peace Park is called, "a symbol zone of Peace and culture" and a "place of prayer." Images of crying hibakusha and religious ceremonies (of all faiths) complement the picture. [808] Hiroshima tourist officials seemed at times outright annoyed by what one tourist official called the "dark image" of their city and opted instead to present the "beautiful industrial development and the bright Hiroshima of today." [809] Another official declared: "We do not sell the bomb, but promote peace."[810]

It is not surprising that Hiroshima's officialdom chose to ignore (what was likely) the real reasons that tourists came to their town. There are many more cities in Japan comparable in size to Hiroshima that offer similar attractions. There is no reason but the bomb (and possibly Miyajima Island) for one to visit Hiroshima rather than, let's say, Okayama or Fukuoka. Hiroshima needed a competitive advantage and the bomb supplied it. At the time of the dome debates one could still talk about the dome and the bomb supplying this advantage (or resource – *shigen*); by the 1970s exhibit, debates like this were no longer possible.

The growth in tourism to sites of or memorials of mass death was not limited to Hiroshima. In Yad Vashem as well, the 1960s and 1970s saw growing numbers of foreign tourists visiting the site. If in 1960 seventy-five percent of visitors were Israeli, in 1970 only twenty percent were local and most of those were soldiers and students.[811] Examining the exhibits at the site the new director, Yitzhak Arad, a former education officer at the IDF, expressed unease, "We have a growing number of people from abroad, but our exhibit looks old

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[808] Ibid.
[809] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, April 30, 1971.
[810] *Ibid*, 31 April 1971.
[811] Mooli Brog, " Nof Zikaron ve'zehut leumit: hanzakhat ha'shoa be'yisrael, 1943-1993," unpublished PhD dissertation, Hebrew University (2007), p. 203.

and unkempt, we need more audio-visual and other tools...like directing visitor traffic etc."[812] At Arad's insistence, new plans for Yad Vashem were pushed forward. In the 1970s, the exhibit was revamped, an entrance gate was erected, a guided tour unit was established, and a number of works of art were added.[813] Unlike Hiroshima, however, at Yad Vashem there was never a question about the place, at least not until the renovation in the 2000s, criticized as what an Israeli journalist called "Shoa Disneyland."[814] On the contrary, the original emphasis on sanctity and heavy borrowing from religious architecture and symbolism "paid off" with the site fast becoming a national and international (Jewish) pilgrimage place. This had much to do with changes of interpretation and the growing place of the Holocaust in Israel and U.S. Jewry's identity and culture.[815]

As mentioned in earlier chapters, Yad Vashem initially had to compete with other more traditional religious sites, like Mt. Zion's *Martef Ha-shoa*, for prominence.[816] The site was also challenged by other more ideologically committed sites. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, after the Eichmann trial and following the Six Day and Yom Kippur wars, the Holocaust commemoration became much more unified and Yad Vashem moved to a much more central place in it. After the Eichmann trial brought survivors' stories into every Israeli household, the wars made Israelis feel as though "we were all there."[817] This was the time of what Dany Gutwein has called "national memory," as Israelis saw themselves collectively, just like the

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[812] Ibid.
[813] These new monuments were long in the planning stages but did not get any funding. See Brog,p. 203.
[814] The phrase is from a *Ha'aretz* article titled: "Shoa Disneyland" by Esther Zandberg from January 27, 2009.
[815] Yosef Gorni,*bein Auschwitz le'yerushalaim,* (Tel-Aviv, Am-Oved, 1998), p. 29.
[816] Doron Bar, "Holocaust Commemoration in Israel during the 1950s: The Holocaust Cellar on Mount Zion," *Jewish Social Studies* 12, no. 1 (2005): p. 16.
[817] Brog, p. 200.

Japanese, as victims.[818] During these years, the Holocaust seemed to get out of the closet and take over the national psyche. In the waiting period before the Six Day War or during the 1973 War when the IDF was retreating, Israelis talked about the real possibility of the Arabs exterminating Israel; not about the possibility of conquest or destruction, but extermination.[819] American Jews as well, especially after 1967, began to put much greater emphasis on the Holocaust (and Israel) as part of their ethnic identity and growing numbers of them began to visit Israel to discover their "roots."[820]

This growing "nationalization" of the Holocaust was expressed in calls to emphasize "Jewish resistance" and to show "how the world stood by" as Jews were slaughtered.[821] These calls, however, had little impact. Contrary to recent critiques of Yad Vashem, such as Idith Zerthal's, there was very little emphasis on resistance in Yad Vashem until the late sixties. Partisan organizations, for instance, regularly complained of neglect and artist Nathan Rappaport threatened to pull his *Memorial to Heroes of Warsaw Ghetto* out of Yad Veshem. A copy of the sculpture had been donated to Yad Vashem in the early 1960s (the original is in Warsaw) but its installation was delayed for years.[822] When Yad Vashem started to reorganize in the late sixties and seventies, most money, as well as most visitors, came from abroad.[823] This led to an

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[818] Dany Gutwein, "Hafratat Ha'shoa: politika, zikharon ve'historographia," *Dapim le'kheker Ha'shoa,* No. 7 (1998).

[819] Tom Segev, Ha'milion ha'shviai: yisraelim veha'shoaa, (Tel Aviv: Domino Publishing, 1991), p. 389.

[820] Gorni, p. 30. The post-1967 importance of the Holocaust in regards to relations with Israel does not mean, of course, that there existed a complete silence before 1967 or that there was a simple dichotomy between pre- and post-1967 attitudes among American Jewry. Far from it, the Holocaust was debated and talked about long before 1967. As Micheal Staub pointed out, the Holocaust by the 1960s had already gone through a number of "contested and negotiated stages." Staub ties these developments to relations between Jews and African-Americans and attitudes to justice and the African- American Civil rights movement. See Michael E. Staub, *Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America* (Columbia University Press, 2004). Also see David Cesarani and Eric J. Sundquist, *After the Holocaust: Challenging the Myth of Silence*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2011).

[821] Brog, p. 201.

[822] Ibid 185. A planned memorial for partisans was also delayed for six years and then cancelled. For Rappaport, see Brog, pp. 132-134.

[823] Yad Vashem did not receive any additional budget from the government between 1963 and 1973.

emphasis not on Israeli style heroism, but on Jewish suffering and victimization. In some instances the growing international awareness and connections also lead universalism. Yad Vashem was far from, if it ever had been, a single monolithic body with a clear message. This was true for Israeli society as a whole, which started to have a much more open and diversified view on the Holocaust than it is commonly acknowledged. The heroism narrative was fast being replaced by a number of different competing narratives, the victimization one being the most prominent, but not by any means the only interpretation of the Shoah. The 1973 war and Israelis' renewed feeling of vulnerability, coupled with the liberalization of society (and the economy) and growing religiosity in Israel, reinforced that trend.[824]

However, far from leading to controversy, as they did in Hiroshima, growing numbers of foreign visitors led to growing consensus over the sanctification of Yad Vashem. Yad Vashem's proximity to Mt. Herzel, where soldiers are buried, another "hallowed ground" of the state, and the presence of a synagogue and other religious and quasi-religious elements, led to a relatively smooth transition. Yad Vashem was not "sold" or promoted the way Hiroshima's nuclear sites were, as Jerusalem had no need to rely on it for tourism. The fact that most visitors were Jewish led to a reliance on shared Jewish symbolism and shared discourse. Finally, Yad Vashem was not a site of death but of commemoration; as such, it did not raise the same tensions as other dark tourist sites.

The beginning of internationalization, however, led to a different emphasis on what was sacred and what was to be commemorated. Although one could definitely see the seventies as

[824] The seventies saw the end of the thirty year-old monopoly of the labor party on power, the growing presence and strength of the religious right and growth in the economy (and consumer society). Furthermore, growing contacts with American Jewry and the later move to endorsing Israel led to decreased conflict between the two groups. All these led to changing patterns of commemoration with growing emphasis on individual and communal loss (rather than on national loss) on one hand, and a growing role for religion on the other.

still being "nationalized" era in commemoration, other voices also started to emerge at this time. In 1977, after a number of years of preparation, the "Hall of Names" was erected; a development which was followed by a memorial for Janusz Korczak and for the victims of concentration camps. Also, in 1981, for the first time Yad Vashem started to call for commemoration of Roma and Sinti. This was done for the somewhat self-centered reason of "giving moral validity to our demand to teach the Holocaust abroad."[825] These developments show a much wider, even global, outlook from Yad Vashem, on one hand, and a much more humane and less conscripted view of individual memory on the other. The site was still a national site with strong ideological overtones and emphasis on Jewish national suffering. Just like Hiroshima, multiple views and layered interpretations were represented and the place could have different meanings for different people. Yad Vashem was far from being an institution with one clear ideological voice. Strangely though, unlike Hiroshima, Yad Vashem did not seem to cause even a fraction of controversy that the Peace Park did. A large part of this could be explained by its being one of the only controversy-free places in an Israel that was becoming more and more divided (and indeed, one could see a definite increase in political use of the Holocaust from the seventies on) – indeed it was becoming a national shrine.

The Peace Park, with anti-nuclearism turning into a mainstream stance in Japan, was aspiring to a similar status in Japan. The move to sanctify the Park was part of a campaign to do just that: to try to unify a divided country around the noble cause of peace. Nevertheless, the not-so-noble motives of capitalizing on Hiroshima's heritage as well as the uneasy past, which sanctification was trying to paper over, did not allow the process to go nearly as smoothly as it did in Yad Vashem. Hiroshima's memory wars, with radical students, the old left, independent

[825]Brog, p. 208.

liberals, the conservatives, all fighting over who would speak in the *hibakusha's* name, made the transition of the Park from a political center to a sacred space, fraught with tensions and contradic

Chapter 6 – Peeling Red Apples: The Hiroshima Auschwitz Committee and the building of an Auschwitz museum 1973-1995

In August 1970, as the 25th anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were approaching, the Hiroshima chapter of the World Federalist Association (WFA) was preparing for a major conference entitled: *"A sign post for the space age: reaffirming Hiroshima's original intention.*"[826] The title alluded to two current events: the 1970 Expo, which had a similar space age related theme and, unintentionally perhaps, to the sense of crisis among veterans of the peace movement (and the need to reaffirm the WFA commitment to the peace movement). As we already saw, 1970 was a turbulent year in Hiroshima. As the WFA delegates

[826] Sekai renbō undō Hiroshima ni jū go nen shi henshū iinkai (hen)、*Sekai renbō undo Hiroshima ni jū go nen shi Sekai renbō undō,* (Hiroshima: Sekai renbō kensetu dōmei Hiroshima ken kyōgikai, 1972), p. 135. The original name was *uchūjidai no shihyo*: *Hiroshima no shoshin ni tachite*, literally, "hoisting the intention", as in hoisting a flag.

were assembling, thousands of students clashed with police outside. Activists were also protesting the city's decision to ban the Korean A-bomb monument from the Peace Park. Many at the conference felt unease at these sights, and with good reason, as the World Federalists and the activists who cooperated with them were clearly out of sync with the times. The WFA's liberal-humanist message seemed increasingly irrelevant in light of the strife-ridden late sixties and the new movements that came out of it. However, publicly at least, the organizers and activists were full of hope and did not seem to waver in their optimism

The WFA conference organizers were also the main organizers of the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Committee: Kuwahara Hideki, the head of the HAC, and Yamada Setsuo, Hiroshima's mayor and the head of the Hiroshima World Federalists, Japan-Poland Culture Association and a dozen other groups. Another, more obscure member of the World Federalists who would prove to be of great importance to the HAC was Hanbusa Shosu, the mayor of Kurose, a small town in Hiroshima prefecture. The conference and its speeches offer a glimpse into the intellectual milieu from which the HAC arose. Mayor Yamada's address was typical of many others:

> Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a warning to a mankind which has experienced two world wars…but, even now, the world powers suppress the words of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and close their eyes to their experience. We are committed to the making of a new world and survival of mankind…but as long as there are nuclear weapons, no country will have peace. What will be the way to abolish weapons? Technology has brought us many advances in communication, transport…cultural and thought progress are making us all one people. But economic progress is unequal and wars still rage all over the world. The United Nations and organizations like the ECC show us a way out. Through organizations like these, security and progress can be achieved and humanity could live peacefully.[827]

[827] Ibid, p. 3. The faith in these institutions, together with the need for spiritual progress, was a recurring theme in these kinds of gatherings. In a gathering in Kyoto entitled "World Conference on Religion and Peace," Archbishop Angelo Fernandez of Delhi declared, "EXPO '70, with its central theme "Progress and Harmony for Mankind" was a splendid ideal indeed, but it seemed to equate progress with the scale of industrialization and to promise a golden age based on technology and human wisdom. And, as for harmony, nearly half the budget of the developed and developing countries is meanwhile being spent on armaments of one kind or another for waging war! Technology is

Yamada's message was very much a product of Hiroshima's peace discourse as it developed through the 1970s. It was a future-oriented and (by now, cautiously) optimistic worldview with faith in progress and in humanity's ability to overcome difficulties. It emphasized cooperation and faith in the power of international institutions, like the United Nations, to gradually lead humanity to a safe and distant shore, on one hand, and a sense of mission, based on Hiroshima's victimization (by abstract unnamed forces), on the other. This discourse, which guided the WFA and HAC missions from the fifties on, was severely tested in the very different world of the 1970s and 1980s.

Following his statement, Yamada and Kuwahara reported to the conference on their organizations' joint mission to Poland. Out of this trip came one of the most ambitious plans to connect Hiroshima and the Holocaust: the building of a large Hiroshima-Auschwitz Memorial Museum in Hiroshima prefecture. The museum also was to express a universal, hopeful message of peace. However, as the idea gained ground and as the HAC sought support from groups in Europe and North America, the organization suddenly found itself confronting a very different era of memory politics from the one it was founded in, as its liberal-humanist message encountered an increasingly contentious scene of competing victim groups.

The HAC and its partners' efforts to build the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Memorial Pavilion (hereafter AMP) demonstrate the shift in victim discourse that took place from the seventies through the nineties. The AMP affair, as with the HAP before it, provides a lens through which different local memory settings – and their interactions with each other and the amorphous entity

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good but it is powerless to make men righteous." World Conference on Religion and Peace Proceedings," in *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, Vol. 10, No. 3/4 (Sep. - Dec., 1969), p. 219.

of global memory discourse – can be examined. The HAC ultimately failed in their endeavour, but, it was precisely this failure which demonstrates how much the world had changed since the HAC was founded in 1963. Time and again, the choices AMP promoters made were the cause of conflict, trepidation, and even outright hostility from activists in Japan and abroad. This was not a foregone conclusion. Hiroshima's message as preached by the AMP was, as seen in chapter five, extremely adaptable. In particular, its forward-looking message fit well with the new ways in which commercialization and commemoration converged. If the AMP had navigated the stormy waters of competing victims' discourses better, their proposed memorial could have been built and maintained successfully. If, for instance, the AMP had tailored its message along the lines of the emerging discourses of human rights or multi-culturalism, they may have managed to build their museum. The AMP and Hiroshima's peace movement, however, found it hard to adapt and mostly stuck to their ideological guns, which proved to be their undoing. In a world where competing ethnic claims for victimhood were fast becoming the norm, grand calls like Yamada's for the "making of a new world" of peace, became increasingly obsolete

In what follows, the AMP affair will be examined through its exchanges with various groups and institutions around the world. This chapter examines the HAC's relationship with the Auschwitz Memorial Museum in Poland, both organizations' contacts with the Catholic Church, relations with Israel and the political context of a changing Holocaust discourse, and how the HAC and its partners' failure to deal with conflicting victims groups led to their enterprise's demise. Concluding the chapter is a section situating the AMP affair within the dual contexts of the larger memory wars and shifts in commemoration which were happening in Hiroshima itself, as well as the rising importance of historical memory in East Asia in the late eighties and nineties.

I. **Beginnings: the Launching of the Museum Campaign**

In the years since its formation, the Hiroshima Auschwitz Committee established itself as a permanent fixture in Hiroshima memory politics. As we have seen, it was involved in the A-bomb Dome preservation campaign and other episodes (such as protest against nuclear tests).[828] One of its main claims for authority was its good connection with international organizations of camp survivors, the Polish government and the Auschwitz Museum. In 1969 and again in 1971 the HAC went to Europe to promote these connections and to discuss a possible Auschwitz exhibition and further cooperation with the Poles. The origins of the AMP plan can be found in these discussions, conducted, initially through the World Federalists. The joint HAC-WFA delegations included some of the leading figures in the Hiroshima peace movement and beyond. The HAC aimed to turn these trips into an opportunity to garner support and media attention in Japan. For the 1971 trip, which was accompanied by a full television crew, the HAC tried to gain the support of leading intellectual figures. In a letter to Robert Jungk, Ogura Kaoru - Robert Lifton's colleague, wrote on behalf of the HAC, "[the delegation] wrote to [Gunther] Anders, Sartre and Lifton among others, but they believe that your name, and I do too, has the greatest weight, both in Hiroshima and the world, to conceive the significance of the two cities and also in terms of future warnings to people to easen [sic] international tension."[829] Ogura and the HAC were not successful in that particular endeavor (neither Junk nor the other recipients came to Auschwitz), but otherwise the two HAC trips were a great success; Polish cooperation was

[828] *Chugoko Shinbun*, 17 October 1964, and 2 August 1967.

[829] Ogura Kaoru to Robert Jung, 27 June 1971. The letter is located in Robert-Jungk-Bibliothek für Zukunftsfragen in Salzburg, Austria. Unfortunately, the Foundation that keeps Jungk's papers has yet to catalogue the majority of them. This letter and other documents from this archive were found in a box of unsorted correspondence between Jungk and Japan.

secured and a date was set for a Japan-wide Auschwitz exhibition in 1972.[830]

One member of the HAC delegation was head of the Kurose town assembly and international law professor Kotani Tsuruji. Ogura, in his letter, called him, "the man that will be reliable in this mission… [And] who is quite near to me in many activities."[831] Kotani was indeed a long time peace activist and a respected academic. He was deeply moved by what he saw in Auschwitz. According to Kotani, who was in Hiroshima with the Kurose fire brigade immediately after the bomb, "[he] was shocked to see another Hiroshima in this far away land" and wanted to get involved.[832] When Kuwahara offered to involve Kurose in the enterprise, Kotani agreed.[833] This was the start of the initiative that became the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Peace Memorial.

Not everybody was thrilled by the prospect of cooperation between Kurose and Auschwitz. Upon their return, Kotani and the mayor he had recruited, Hanbusa, were challenged by more conservative members of the assembly asking why they wanted to connect with a Communist country. Others were asking why such a small city needed such a connection. Kotani's answer was as peculiar as it was typical of the language employed by the HAC and the WFA: "Poland," argued Kotani, "is like a red apple: you peel [the red Communist skin] and the inside is white (i.e. human); we have to remember it was liberated by the Soviet army [and hence became

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[830] The WFA Poland Peace and Goodwill Mission), headed by Kuwahara, went to Europe in 1971 to promote international exchanges and to organize for an Auschwitz exhibit in Japan. . They stayed in Europe from the 11th to the 27th of August; in addition to Poland, visited Czechoslovakia, Scandinavia, Turkey, Greece and the Netherlands. The mission was jointly organized by the HAC and JPCA (Japan Poland Culture Association). In Poland, they negotiated for the Auschwitz materials and exhibition to be brought to Hiroshima through the Japan Poland Association.. When in Auschwitz, Nakatani signed a sister city agreement with the mayor of Osweicem. See Sekai renbō undō Hiroshima ni jū go nen shi henshū iinkai, p. 150.

[831] Ogura Kaoru, letter to Robert Junk, 27 June 1971. Robert-Jungk-Bibliothek für Zukunftsfragen.

[832] Kitamura Mitsuaki, kaku jidai no kokusairyō: Kurose chō, in Kazuji Nagasu, *Jichitai no kokusai kōryū : hirakareta chihō o mezashite*, Shohan. (Tōkyō: Gakuyō Shobō, 1983), p. 63.

[833] Ibid.

communist]... Can we just relate to them as human to human?"[834] Kotani and Hanabusa managed to overcome the opposition and Oswiecim and Kurose signed a sister city agreement in August 1973.[835] The agreement stated that "as two cities that were fellow sufferers and witnesses of the horrors of World War II, we would like to utilize the experience for the achievement of world peace and so that the horrors will not be repeated."[836] What certainly helped Kotani's case was the huge success of the HAC and Auschwitz's 1972 exhibit. The Auschwitz Museum invested a significant amount of energy and material into this exhibit, which had over 200 panels and about 150 original items from Auschwitz, including prisoner beds, hair, shoes, prisoner uniforms, etc.[837] The exhibit, which opened in Tokyo, traveled to ten different Japanese cities, including Hiroshima. The Auschwitz exhibit deeply impressed visitors, among them, head of the Peace Memorial Museum, Morihiru Sukeji, whom we already met as the author of a pamphlet on A-bomb tourism. When planning for exhibits, wrote Morihiru, "just like the recent Auschwitz exhibit touched the heart of Hiroshima residents, [*our exhibit*] should get people to want to get to the bottom of the matter and lead visitors to inquire further."[838]

Heading the Polish delegation, which attended to the exhibition, was Emeryka Iwaszka (Director of Exhibitions in the Auschwitz Museum). When coming to Hiroshima, Iwaszka also

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[834] Ibid, p. 64.

[835] As a general rule I used Oswiecim, in Polish, when referring to the town and Auschwitz, in German, when referring to the camp or memorial.

[836] "Act of the Friendship [sic] between Kurose and Osweicm Cities" (9 July 1973) in the Hiroshima Prefectural Archives (HPA), Box: Heiwa Mondai Kurose Machi (HMKM) 01/97/531. Most of the documents pertaining to the Hiroshima-Auschwitz issue are from the prefectural archives in Hiroshima. This particular report on the issue was prepared in 1989. The prefecture, which became involved only in 1983, holds very little documents on the issue before that. Kurose City does not exist anymore. It was incorporated into Higashi-Hiroshima City in what was known as the great Heisei merger in 2005, which saw multiple small municipalities merged into bigger ones. Higashi-Hiroshima city archive claimed not to have documents pertaining to the issue. The archivist suggested these were probably discarded during the merger. Nevertheless, based on my experience such files may turn up in the future.

[837] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, June 3, 1972.

[838] Morihiru Sukeji, kono toshi nara de ha no shigoto ni tazusawari motte," in Hiroshimashi Taishoku Kōmuin Renmei., *Hiroshima no ayumi to tomoni.*, (Hiroshima, 1972). p. 294.

brought an urn of victims' ashes and handful of earth from Auschwitz. This was the second time the Poles gave the Japanese an urn of ashes. This second urn was presented to Mayor Yamada at the beginning of the Hiroshima exhibition, was included in the exhibition and was then entombed in Mitaki temple, where the 1963 ashes were also buried.[839] This was, as already discussed in the case of the 1963 ashes, the ultimate expression of the attitude of the HAC and the Poles to Auschwitz victims. The victims of Auschwitz were nameless. Their ashes were those of the "four million" (an old and grossly inaccurate figure) whose sacrifice could now "be utilized for the achievement of world peace and so that the horrors will not be repeated."[840] The fact of the remains' probable Jewish origin was not highlighted. This was true for the exhibit as a whole. As in the contemporary Auschwitz Museum itself, the impression one would get from the 1972 exhibition was that the victims were mostly Polish.

The HAC was not entirely blind to Jewish suffering. Unlike the Poles, they did not intentionally try to obscure the fact that most victims were Jews. The inscription on the Mitaki memorial, erected for the remains brought by the Poles and the HAP and dedicated in December 1973, read:

> Here lie the souls of those sacrificed at Auschwitz, Poland, caused by the Nazism policy against Jewish people during World War II. Together with that of Hiroshima, this utterly inhumane tragedy shall never again be repeated. We should ponder over ourselves of the avarice, rage and stupidity that are deeply infiltrated in the hearts of each and all and cultivate the integrity that all human shares [sic].[841]

It is hard to find anything objectionable in that statement. But what is most troubling about this inscription is exactly that it is so unobjectionable, so self-evident. It was the HAC's inability to

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[839] Comité International D'auschwitz: informationbulletin. Number 5-6 Issue 138-139 (May-June 1972), September 1972; *Chūgoku Shinbun*, May 30, 1972.
[840] Ibid. As discussed in chapter four, the number of four million held a special ideological significance for the Poles.
[841] Copied from the monument itself by author.

offend, to point fingers, which was arguably its undoing. Like the greater Hiroshima discourse itself and its own unoffending memorial at the heart of the Peace Park, it blamed all people. But although the HAC was perhaps not ready to assign blame, they would soon find out that others were more than happy to do so in the service of their causes.

It is not clear who first raised the idea for a permanent Auschwitz museum in Hiroshima. There is some indication that it was the Poles who made the first move. The HAC had been concentrating on cultural exchange and the erecting of a memorial stone for the ashes it received in 1963 (and for those received in 1972), while the sister-city agreement mentioned only vaguely "cultural and information exchange."[842] In 1977, a Polish delegation headed by the mayor of Oswiecim, Franciszek Konior, and representative Franciszek Piper from the Auschwitz museum, visited Hiroshima. According to the *International Auschwitz Committee Bulletin*, the delegation was there to help initiate a plan, together with the HAC and Kurose, to build a museum and monument for the victims of Auschwitz. The exhibit would be based in Hiroshima but would be portable so that it could be shown in other Japanese cities. "One notices," wrote the anonymous author, "that direct contacts have begun between the museums of martyrs in Auschwitz and Hiroshima. [And so] one can expect that further publications, information materials and work experience will emerge [with the continuation of the project].[843] And indeed, the martyrs in Hiroshima were more than ready to oblige.

This was true for both Kurose and the HAC, as well as for Hiroshima City itself. The Poles managed to secure an agreement of exchange and cooperation with the Hiroshima Peace

[842] "Act of the Friendship [sic] between Kurose and Osweicm Cities."

[843] Comité International D'Auschwitz: information bulletin. Number 5 Issue 194 (May 1977), p. 15. The IAC bulletin reflected the views and opinions of Warsaw as attested to by the fact that almost the exact same wording used in the quoted passage was also used in the official Auschwitz Memorial Museum Bulletin. See "Osweicm wystawa w Japonii," Auschwitz Bulletin Number 4 (1972) Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial Museum Archive (hence AMA) Materialy 107. Sygn. Mat 189a/ nr. Inw.153424. pp. 205-206.

Museum. The Auschwitz Museum agreed to hold an A-bomb exhibit in Poland and there was talk of another Auschwitz exhibit to be held in Hiroshima.[844] For Hiroshima, the agreement was one of a series of similar agreements with peace museums and similar institutions around the world.[845] For the Poles, as discussed in chapter four, connecting the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and the "factory of death" in Auschwitz was an ongoing ideological concern. This explains much of their willingness to accept the Kurose plan, as does their good relationship with HAC, which organized much of their visit to Hiroshima. The HAC received the Poles at the airport and facilitated the agreement with Hiroshima city. When Hanabusa, a close associate of the head of the HAC, Kuwahara from the World Federalist movement and Kurose's Kotani – all of whom had already visited Auschwitz – proposed that the memorial be based in Kurose, the Poles responded quite enthusiastically. [846] Mayor Konior immediately promised to send additional Auschwitz materials to Kurose to supplement the already extensive materials held by the town[847]

There exists some evidence that the idea to construct a memorial went back at least as far as 1972. The materials from the 1972 exhibit, both original artifacts and panels and other printed resources, were not returned to Poland after the exhibit but were kept at an institution for the disabled located in Kurose and operated by the Sun City Cooperative, a Catholic charity with connections to the Vatican.[848] The Catholic connection was important to the venture from the start. It seems safe to assume that religious connections had played a part in the securing of the Auschwitz materials for Kurose as well. Hanabusa was delighted by the Polish endorsement of

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[844] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 27 March 1977.
[845] In 1978 and 1979, for instance, the Hiroshima Museum donated exhibits to the United Nations. See http://www.nhk.or.jp/peace/english/chrono/history/his_p11.html accessed 29 July 2011.
[846] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 25 March 1977.
[847] Ibid, 26 March 1977.
[848] Ibid. For the charity, see http://www7.ocn.ne.jp/~staiyou/kyodo.html, accessed 29 July 2011.

the AMP plan. "Together," he declared, "we could cooperate and deepen our exchange and connections for the realization world of peace." Mayor Konior and Auschwitz Museum representatives answered in kind, and the museum almost immediately sent 122 items from Auschwitz to Kurose. [849]These items were also used for an Anne Frank exhibit in the Hiroshima Peace Museum before being returned to Kurose.[850] The Anne Frank exhibit, promoted jointly with the *Asahi Shinbun* newspaper, proved to be immensely popular and was a further spur to the Auschwitz Memorial idea.

The first plans for the museum were drawn by the HAC and Kurose and were announced to the press in January 1981. The press release was part of a campaign to raise donations for the memorial-museum and its organizers declared their wish "to bring together the two symbols of the inhumanity of war… [And] spreading the message 'no more Hiroshimas, Never Again Auschwitz,' so the civilians who are always victims of war will come to understand the true meaning of peace once again."[851] The same abstraction and talk of anonymous victims (or martyrs for peace) was in evidence from the days of the HAP onward. As in Hiroshima proper, this kind of language was often used to mask doubts and inconsistencies. In this case, the problem was political bickering and lack of consensus in Kurose. Besides the conservatives, whom Kotani appealed to with his "red apple" speech, also unhappy were residents near the proposed construction site who preferred funds go to school construction. Hanbusa replied that it was "hard [for him] to understand this resistance to the noble call for a prayer for world peace…which this campaign represents."[852] Eventually the proposed site had to be abandoned in the face of continued local resistance, the first of many setbacks. This did not bode well for the

[849]*Chūgoku Shinbun*, 26 March 1977.
[850]"*Auschwitz shi to Kurosemachi to koryukeika*," (August 1989), HMKM, 01/97/531, HPA.
[851] Asahi Shinbun, 7 January 1981.
[852] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 13 March 1981.

project but the HAC and Kurose were not deterred.[853] In this episode as in those to come, whenever they encountered resistance the HAC and Kurose would resort to talk of the noble, universal and abstract. This kind of talk enabled them, as it had the HAP, to connect with the Poles and others. It was at the center of a number of very successful enterprises such as the Anne Frank and the Auschwitz exhibitions, and would get a further push when Catholic universalism came (again) to Hiroshima. Their position was, however, fast becoming untenable.

II. Catholic universalism in Hiroshima and Auschwitz

The enthusiasm of the HAC and Hanabusa was very much due to what was seen as the success of their organization's role in the new Polish Pope, John Paul II's, 1982 visit to Hiroshima. Religious contacts and influence played a big role in the initiative's initial success and had tremendous influence on the particular style of commemoration the HAC pushed. This was epitomized by one of the most bizarre episodes of HAC history. In the context of Auschwitz, John Paul II played a highly ambiguous role. The 1979 papal mass in Auschwitz is seen as a turning point in the history of Auschwitz and what it meant for Poles. The Roman Catholic view of Auschwitz as a site of Polish martyrdom, in opposition to Communist interpretations, received a boost in the seventies through the beatification of Maksymilian Kolbe in 1971.[854] The huge mass in his honor – opposed by the authorities – was one of the earliest successful challenges to communist. The papal mass was an opportunity for solidarity and a chance for others to reclaim Auschwitz as a symbol of both Polish suffering and a universal

[853] "Auschwitz shi to Kurosemachi to koryukeika." (August 1989). HMKM, 01/97/531, HPA.

[854] Kolbe was a priest who was tortured and killed in Auschwitz. He was executed after he offered to die instead of another prisoner. He was promoted as a noble and humanistic hero by the Church, and was sometime contrasted with the more active figure of the (often communist) political prisoner.

symbol of human rights in opposition to the regime.[855] The nationalist and universal narratives would diverge soon enough (as the Auschwitz crosses episode demonstrated), but in the late seventies and early eighties, with the formation of solidarity and worldwide sympathy to the Polish movement, they were seen as compatible.[856]

What was of course missing from both narratives was the fact that Auschwitz's victims were mainly Jews. The Pope did mention Jewish suffering in his 1979 address, but his message was mostly a Catholic-universal one. The Pope referred to Auschwitz as a modern day Golgotha, echoing the idea, popular among Catholic thinkers, of Jewish suffering as analogous to Christ's. This idea, as Samuel Moyn points out, was not necessarily a reflection of Christian penance and understanding of the historical role of Christianity in anti-Semitism, but rather, was the product of the Cold War ideology of Judeo-Christianity which sought to erase the troubled past of the two religions in favor of mobilization against the atheist East.[857] The subtlety of this theological position was mostly lost on Poles, as most understood the suffering in Auschwitz as Polish suffering. The conflicting messages in the papal address certainly did not help.[858]

In Hiroshima, the Pope's message of Catholic humanism was accepted with enthusiasm. There was not much ambivalence or conflict regarding his visit; the Pope was warmly received

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[855] Geneviève Zubrzycki, *The crosses of Auschwitz: nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland* (University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 108.

[856] Jonathan Huener, *Auschwitz, Poland, and the politics of commemoration, 1945-1979* (Ohio University Press, 2003), p. 204. For the Crosses episode, which pitted Polish nationalist and Religious organizations against Jewish groups, see Geneviève Zubrzycki, *The Crosses of Auschwitz: nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland* (University of Chicago Press, 2006).

[857] Samuel Moyn, Bearing Witness: Theological Roots of a New Secular Morality," in Dan Stone (ed.) *The Holocaust and Historical Methodology* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), p. 178. I thank Professor Moyn for sharing this article with me. Moyn argues that Christianity treats Jews collectively as witnesses. Moyn demonstrates that for St. Augustine, Jews had a monitory and testimonial role, explaining why Christians should not want their predecessors to disappear, "for they provide, in their blindness, the positive role of bearing witness to the truth of Christianity." Ibid, 168. This idea was refashioned under Cold War ideology of Judeo-Christianity to a vision of the Jew as a suffering Christ; an ultimate victim and a witness to atheist evil. This was coupled with a moratorium on anti-Semitism and helped Catholic thinkers in arguing that Christianity was not a part of the Holocaust.

[858] Huener, p. 208.

and embraced by all. This was especially so with the HAC, which had its roots in intra-religious activism and whose ideas were very similar to those of the supposed Judeo-Christian tradition referred to by the Pope (the HAC and religious associations were similarly a-historical in ignoring past Buddhist-Christian conflict and invoking "shared commitment to peace." The Japan Catholic Association, official host of the papal visit, also had a history of connections with the Kuwahara circle.[859] The HAC, however, did not see any contradiction between their deep connections with the Polish state and their embrace of the papal mission to Hiroshima.

In the religious circles the HAC was a part of, and within the older peace movement in Hiroshima, the papacy was traditionally viewed with affection.[860] The papacy's immediate (and at the time almost only) condemnation of the atomic bombing as "inhumane" was issued on 7 August 1945, and what was seen as its unwavering commitment to nuclear disarmament gained it many admirers in Hiroshima (in contrast, of course, to the papacy's very tense and problematic relation to the Holocaust and the Jews).[861] Affirming its importance, Hiroshima was also made into a diocese by the church in 1951 (despite the fact that within the diocese, Hiroshima was by far the smallest city with an even smaller Catholic population).[862] When he arrived in Hiroshima on 25 February 1982, the Pope was received by a crowd of 25,000 people (significant considering only a tiny fraction of the population was Christian and even fewer were Catholic). From the airport he proceeded to the Peace Park where he visited the museum, conferred with the mayor and other dignitaries and laid a wreath at the cenotaph. John Paul II then delivered what activists and the Church referred to as "the Hiroshima Peace appeal." Like the Auschwitz

[859] Interview with Kuwahara Hideki, Hiroshima, 2 July 2010.
[860] Ibid.
[861] On the papacy and the Jews see: David I. Kertzer, *The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican's Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism*, (London: Random House, 2002)
[862] Diocese of Hiroshima, "History," in http://www.cbcj.catholic.jp/eng/ediocese/hiroshim.htm, accessed 2 August 2011.

appeal, this was an affirmation of Catholic humanism; very different from Auschwitz, though, the Pope here was well within the consensus.

The Pope proclaimed, "To remember the past is to commit oneself to the future…to remember Hiroshima is to abhor nuclear war." He continued on to affirm his commitment to nuclear disarmament using humanist language that Hiroshima peace activists were cozily familiar with: "When I think about the suffering of Hiroshima, my faith in humanity is restored. I see the ruins transformed into new buildings…. And Hiroshima turned into the springboard for peace." The Pope then went on to "assure the prominence of morality over technology [and] of man over matter." Turning to the Bishop of Hiroshima, the Mayor, *hibakusha* and peace activists in the front rows, he said, "I have complete faith in your undertaking for peace."[863] The Pope then conferred on Hiroshima's Bishop the title of "an apostle of peace."[864] Kuwahara and other HAC members felt validated by these words.[865] This version of Catholic humanism exactly matched their vision. The HAC was also among those honored with an audience with the Pope. When they met, the usual courtesies were exchanged– Kuwahara even greeted the Pope in Polish – then the HAC presented the Pope with an unusual gift: ashes from Auschwitz.[866]

The idea to present the Pope with the Auschwitz ashes was initiated by Matsumoto Kaname, a Catholic activist in the HAC. The bones, or bone ashes – Kuwahara would not clarify what they were exactly and, as discussed in chapter four, they were probably a mix– came from Mitaki, where they had been enshrined just nine years earlier. They were unearthed by the HAC,

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[863] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 26 February 1981.
[864] Geneviève Zubrzycki, *The Crosses of Auschwitz: nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland* (University of Chicago Press, 2006).
[865] Kuwahara interview.
[866] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 26 February 1981. Although it conformed that the bones were presented to the pope, the newspaper report, however, does not say that the bones were taken to Rome. As the Vatican archive would not respond to inquiries, Kuwahara's is the only source for this claim.

divided (*bunkotsu* – a Buddhist term) and presented to the Pope by Kuwahara and Satō Tenshun (Mitaki's head priest), as well as by Matsumoto in front of the cenotaph. According to Kuwahara, the ashes are now in the Vatican, "thanks to the sincere and courageous efforts (*kyoushinzō*) of Matsumoto.[867] Thus, the ashes of what were probably Jewish victims traveled once more in the service of diplomacy and peace. The Pope was certainly aware of the contents of the box he received. It is hard to tell why he accepted the gift. For Kuwahara, Matsumoto and Satō though, the notion of digging up and dividing the ashes was well within the acceptable. There is a long history in Japan of dividing the ashes of the deceased so that the person can be memorialized in more than one location. This sometimes happens because the family members do not belong to the same religion or sect.[868] The Pope, however, or at least someone in his entourage, should have been aware of the very complicated Jewish *halakha* demands as regards to human remains and of how offensive this treatment was to Jews. While the HAC would exhibit similar ignorance again, hindering its connections with other groups, at the time all seemed well for Kuwhara and his colleagues. The Catholic connection explains much of their rhetoric and optimism. There was also a feeling of urgency in their efforts. The Pope's visit came amid renewed Cold War tensions and a reinvigorated anti-nuclear movement. These tensions also caused the first major delay for the AMP initiative.

III. The International Context: Israel, Poland and the Jewish turn

[867] Kuwahara interview.

[868] According to Mark Mullins, when the body is cremated, in fact, one can receive a *bun kotsu shomeishō* that identifies the ashes/bones so that they can be interred in more than one location. It is very common, for example, for Christians in Japan to have some ashes interred in the family Buddhist temple gravesite and some placed in a crypt or Church cemetery. Personal communication. 21 August 2010.

The final agreement between the HAC and Poland was supposed to be signed in 1982, but was postponed when negotiations stalled because of the martial law crisis in Poland.[869] The political context of the eighties explains much of the continuing commitment of the Polish state for the initiative. Examining the Polish side of this connection, and especially the increasing status of the Auschwitz site, sheds light on the intersection of global and local politics in the AMP plan. For Polish Communists, the Hiroshima connection was still an ideological gold mine, especially considering renewed hostility towards the West following U.S. imposed sanctions on the Jaruzelski regime. The move could also be seen as part of the Auschwitz Museum's own trajectory. Through the 1970s, Auschwitz's international profile had been growing as the cultural and political atmosphere in Poland became more relaxed and relations were normalized with West Germany and other countries. The Polish state also started to receive diplomats to the camp, including, among others, U.S. President Gerald Ford and French President Valéry Giscard D'Estaing in 1975, which, as Jonathan Huener suggested, showed the increasing importance of Auschwitz as a diplomatic stage in the era of détente.[870]

This coincided with the increasing international profile of the Holocaust in the seventies. But this development also opened the Poles to criticism from the international press over their neglect and instrumentalization of the site and, even more embarrassing for the Poles, the savage anti-Semitism of the late sixties' anti-Zionist campaigns; connecting increasing commercialization with neglect of the camp's importance as a Jewish site.[871] These arguments were strikingly similar to arguments in Hiroshima at the time. A November 1974 article in the *New York Times* spoke of how "the horror of the place [Auschwitz] was diminished by the Pepsi

[869] Ibid, 28 August 1982.
[870] Huener, Auschwitz, 191.
[871] Ibid, p. 189.

Cola signs and the tourist attraction atmosphere," criticizing the availability of souvenirs, a snack bar and hotel and the neglect of Birkenau, which, with its vast area and ruined conditions was less attractive to tourists (hence not preserved).[872] This kind of criticism led to an increasingly public debate about the Auschwitz site's relation to tourism and its proper ideological orientation. An internal Auschwitz Museum Commission suggested a major scaling down of tourist facilities on the camp's grounds and, in a radical change for the museum, shifting emphasis from the martyrdom of political prisoners and Polish nationalists to the mass extermination in Birkenau.

The government did not adopt all of the Commission's recommendations as it sought to pursue a dual effort to emphasize the sanctity of the place as a site of Polish martyrdom (scaling down, like Hiroshima City did, the more egregious signs of commoditization like the hotel on the grounds) on one hand, and pursuing a larger international role for the museum on the other.[873] This led in 1978– a mere decade after the anti-Zionist campaigns of 1968 – to the opening of a new exhibit on the extermination of the Jews, which was welcomed by Israel and Jewish groups around the world. In the opening ceremony, Janusz Wieczorek, head of the Polish Council for the Protection of Monuments of Struggle and Martyrdom, reiterated the current Polish government's attitude to Jews, not quite denying Jewish suffering, but equating it with the Poles', calling the sites of Jewish genocide – Auschwitz, Treblinka, Lodz: "stations of the cross of Poles and Jews." This was, as Jonathan Huener noted, a peculiar metaphor for a communist official to use, but it was also "cloaking the specific Jewish suffering in Auschwitz in the terms and experience of the Polish (Christian) martyr."[874] Wieczorek was also quick to connect the

[872] Ibid, p. 195.
[873] Ibid.
[874] Ibid, p.197.

martyrs to the Polish state's own ideological concerns, accusing the West of failing to help the Jews despite Polish warnings. Significantly, in the context of the Hiroshima connection, he added "in the name of all the murdered Poles, Jews, Russians and others…we join the worldwide protest against the production of the neutron bomb."[875]

Polish state support supplied the HAC with the Holocaust objects and conferred on the prestige that came with an official connection with Auschwitz. What it did not supply the HAC with was funding. The Poles, as were many of the participants, assumed that in a Japan which was flushed with cash and in the height of its economic success that aspect of the project would not be a problem. HAC fundraising efforts in Japan, however, failed to supply the project with necessary funds. Thus, in 1983, the HAC and Kurose decided to turn to Jewish organizations for help with funding. This move made it necessary for them to change their rhetoric and emphasis and also connected them to commemoration of the Holocaust in Israel and to the complicated field of contradictory meanings and competing victimization that is Middle East politics.

The most important connection between the HAC, Kurose and Jewish organizations was the person of Inoue Fumikatsu. Inoue was a complex character with an unusual history. Unlike most of the other people involved, he was young (36 at the time), well-versed in both Holocaust and Hiroshima discourses and thoroughly cosmopolitan (speaking and writing Japanese, Arabic, Hebrew and English). Inoue first became interested in Israel and the Holocaust following the Eichmann trial. The trial "opened my eyes," he said, to tragedies other than the Japanese, "it was a victim parade...I could no longer see Hiroshima [only] as Japanese tragedy, [but] as a human tragedy."[876] After graduating as an architect from Meiji University in 1966, Inoue contacted the

[875] Ibid, p.198.
[876] Author Interview with Inoue Fuminatsu, 13 may 2012.

Israeli embassy which put him in touch with Alfred Mansfled, a renowned Israeli architect. Mansfeld invited Inoue to the Technion University in Haifa. After graduating from the Technion in 1968 (and briefly volunteering for the IDF during the 1967 War), Inoue started to work with architect Munio Gitani and lived in Israel from that point on.[877] He was also a journalist, freelance writer, photographer and peace activist. Unusually, he lived with his family in El-Azzariyah, a Palestinian village next to Jerusalem, and had connections with leading figures in both Israel and the West Bank.[878] From 1970 on, Inoue worked on a plan for a Holocaust memorial to be erected in Berlin, called "Bud of the Earth." Inoue initiated the project on behalf of Gitai, a Berliner. After Gitai's death in 1970, Inoue continued to promote the project using his extensive contacts in Israel, West-Germany and the U.S.[879]

Inoue was part of a number of Holocaust-related activities. Most significantly, he designed the "*Kfar Nitsolim*" (survivor village) for a world congress of Holocaust survivors in Jerusalem in 1981.[880] This led him to participate in the "International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide" held in Tel Aviv in June 1982. It was through these conferences that he made many connections and got involved in the Kurose affair. Many of the protagonists of this and previous episodes examined here were involved in the 1982 conference, including Robert Lifton, Hillel Klein and Elie Wiesel. The gathering also featured many of the themes discussed above, from competing victim discourses to dark tourism. The conference dealt not only with the Holocaust, but also with the Armenian genocide and nuclear issues (with panel titles such as "Theology after

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[877] Ibid.

[878] Mike Katzin, "*A film proposal on Fumikatsu Inoue*," Jerusalem Films, (14 February 1979) and the "about the architect" section in F. Inoue "*introduction to the Bud of the Earth: a monument to commemorate the six million Jewish martyrs of Europe*" (October 1978) in The Robert J. Lifton Papers, Box 13, The New York Public Library: the Manuscripts and Archives Division (NYPL- MSA).

[879] Inoue interview.

[880] Davar, 3 June 1981. The paper was part of the packet Inoue forwarded to Yad Vashem as part of his efforts to promote the memorial plan. The packet is in AM7/510, Yad Vashem Archives (YVA), Jerusalem, Israel.

Auschwitz and Hiroshima").[881] The survivor gathering and Holocaust conference demonstrate how complex, multifaceted and dynamic survivor politics were at the time. Alongside progressive content they offered American survivors tours of Israel, "your land," which included visits to Hebron and the West Bank and were marketed along the lines of a tourist package.[882] Inoue's "Bud of the Earth" model was displayed at the entrance hall of the conference where it attracted the attention of *Asahi* journalist Itoh Masataka. Itoh told Inoue about Kurose's initiative (Inoue also had a shared Nipponzan Miyohanji contact with the HAC). Inoue was impressed and contacted Hanabusa, who asked him to design the memorial. Inoue agreed to do so free of charge.[883] Inoue's motivation was broadly humanistic and connected well with the sentiments of the AMP. He also shared many of the ideals and concerns of progressive intellectuals, many of them Jewish, who participated in the 1982 conference and the resurgent anti-nuclear movement. "Here," he wrote in his introduction to the AMP plan, "we will penetrate the meaning of the Holocaust. It is our hope that the events that will take place here in the very shadow of the Holocaust will inspire dynamic and vital concern for all victims of outrage against human dignity throughout the world today."[884]

The first mention of Inoue in Japanese records is in October 1982; right after the August agreement, which was stalled by events in Poland, was signed.[885] In November, the *Asahi*

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[881] According to Inoue, the inclusion of the Armenian genocide caused a conflict with Wiesel who threatened to walk out, as this would "endanger Jewish lives in Turkey." Personal communication with Inoue, 6 June 2012. Psychiatry was also heavily represented at the conference. For more on the nuclear and psychiatry angles, see the conference brochure "International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide." http://www.asc.upenn.edu/gerbner/Asset.aspx?assetID=2545 accessed 16 May 2012.

[882] "Tour A: complete conference package" in http://www.asc.upenn.edu/gerbner/Asset.aspx?assetID=2406 accessed 5 June 2012.

[883] Personal communication with Inoue, 6 June 2012.

[884] Inoue, "Introduction to the Bud of the Earth," p. 2.

[885] "Auschwitz *heiwa kienn kan kensetsu mondai*" (no date), HMKM 01/97/17 HPA: the document is a detailed outline of the issue prepared in the prefecture. It is similar to "Auschwitz *shi to Kurosemachi to koryukeika*" and other documents, but much more detailed.

Shinbun interviewed Inoue regarding the plan to connect the "city of *hibakusha* Kurose and Auschwitz (Kurose frequently cited that there were 380 or so *hibakusha* in the city)."[886] Inoue presented his design as a gate for peace (in contrast to the gate of death in Auschwitz). The design was conceptually similar to the one for Berlin, but was, in essence, a new plan. When in 1982 it became obvious to the organizers that fundraising in Japan alone would not be sufficient, they asked Inoue to help raise funds with his "rich Jewish contacts."[887] Besides already having a basic plan, it was his Jewish connections and familiarity with the Holocaust that made Inoue attractive to the AMP organizers.[888] Inoue, who was expecting only to be the architect for the project was a bit surprised by the request, but promised to help. Inoue told the *Asahi* he had already contacted Auschwitz survivors' organizations in Israel as well as the IAC and a New York based world organization of Jewish survivors for funding assistance.[889] He also got in touch with noted figures in the Jewish world including Elie Wiesel, Simon Wiesenthal and Walter Chitling, head of the Jewish community in Tokyo, who promised to mobilize the significant Shanghai community. Through Chilting, he got in touch with Michael Blumenthal, who served as Secretary for the Treasury under the Carter Administration. Blumenthal was to represent the AMP in fundraising activities in the US.[890]

In a letter he sent to Itzak Arad, Director of Yad Vashem, Inoue asked that his AMP building model remain for viewing in Yad Vashem for a week "as it's a project related to the

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[886] *Asahi Shinbun*, 22 November 1982.

[887] According to Inoue, " Hanabusa['s] idea was [to have a] big project but that all Japan will donate money. It did not happen. So he started to think he will get Jewish support as Jews supposed to be rich everywhere. So he depended on it...he asked me if we could promote this project through something international." Inoue interview. This is not the first time casual anti-Semitism crept up in the speeches and actions of Hanabusa and other protagonists. This was more often the case with the Poles (see Smolen and the IAC remarks above), but the Japanese as well displayed this attitude sometime.

[888] Around this time the name Auschwitz Memorial Pavilion started to appear on official stationery of the project.

[889] Ibid.

[890] Author communication with Inoue Fumikatsu 7 June, 2012.

Holocaust."[891] This is the first time the word "Holocaust" was used by anyone related to the project. This was also the first time, and understandably so given the audience, that the genocide committed at Auschwitz was referred to as the killing of Jews. Up until then Auschwitz was described, following the Polish narrative, as the "site where four million innocent civilians were killed by the German Nazis."[892] In the AMP's project description, the whole initiative is described as stemming from deep appreciation of the Jewish tragedy: "This march [the 1962 HAP march] was initiated because the citizens of Hiroshima, who experienced the unprecedented horror of the Atomic Bomb, could not ignore the dual tragedy of the Holocaust where six million Jews were massacred. Thus, for the sake of world peace, they sought to establish a dialogue with the survivors of the camps and, in the following year, the Hiroshima-Auschwitz committee was founded."[893] This was very different from the way the project had previously been described . In emphasizing the Holocaust, the AMP organizers, whatever their motives, were joining a much wider worldwide trend that began in the sixties, of seeing the Holocaust as a Jewish event.

This did not mean that the peace discourse disappeared. In the same document the authors wrote, "where a memorial shall be built, only than [sic] it will be apparent that the ideology of peace has been absorbed by the people."[894] Another continuity was the obvious links the authors made between the project and tourism. Much of the document reads like a tourist pamphlet:

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[891] Inoue Fumikatsu to Yitzhak Arad, 9 October 1982, AM7/510, YVA.

[892] Two examples, among numerous others, are Hanbusa's quote in the Chūgoku Shinbun, 17 August 1980, "Auschwitz, where more than 4 million were killed, and Hiroshima, are the symbol of the same calamitous war;" and Takuwa Jun, Head of Hiroshima Peace Association's statement after the materials exchange agreement, in the *Asahi Shinbun,* 17 April 1980, "We would like to deepen the connections between the places of tragedy. Auschwitz, where four million were killed, and Hiroshima, the site of the world's first nuclear bomb."

[893] "Introduction: From Hiroshima to Auschwitz," AM7/510, YVA.

[894] Ibid. The English is in the original.

*"*Upon visiting the Hiroshima Peace Park, which commemorates the fateful dropping of the first atomic bomb, the visitor may start to drive upwards through green shadows of the forest… Suddenly a quaint, red-tiled town comes into view, shining in the sun…however, within this tranquility lies a commitment to one of the most significant and tragic events of history."[895]

Throughout the history of the project, Kurose and the HAC continuously pitched it as a *machitsukuri* (city making – meaning "urban development") project. In a 1980 interview Kuwahara said, "I want people who visit the Hiroshima Peace Memorial museum to also visit the Auschwitz Memorial Pavilion and learn about the importance of peace."[896] A similar argument was used in the city's official newsletter, *Kurose Dayori*, which announced the project.[897] Like in Hiroshima, peace pilgrims meant business, which Kurose definitely wanted a part of; the emphasis on tourism and the universalist and inoffensive messages were complementary.

Although the organizers were not aware of this, this message stood in complete opposition to trends in Holocaust discourse in Israel. In those days, the universalist message (and its relativist implications) would have not gone down well at Yad Vashem. The late seventies and early eighties were a time of increasing politicization of the Holocaust in Israel. This politicization came mostly from the right wing and took the shape of increasingly nationalistic and particularistic views of the Holocaust and its lessons. The new Prime Minister, Menahem Begin, whose victory in 1977 broke the monopoly of the labor party - in place since the early days of Zionism – was the first Premier who was also a Holocaust survivor. Tom Segev called Begin, "the great popularizer of the Holocaust," who "did more than anyone else to politicize

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[895] "Gateway to Kurose" AM7/510, YVA. In the same document, Inoue (probably, the document is not signed) also gave a description of the memorial, "At the corner where the road leads to town, two series of open platforms rise from the Koda Mountainside, crowned by a pair of memorial pylons…these are dedicated to the memory of the two million [sic] people who perished in the Auschwitz concentration camp. The towers express the bond between the towns of Kurose and Auschwitz and also the dual tragedies of Hiroshima and Auschwitz." This was a departure from the original "Bud of the Earth, which had six pylons, but it followed the original plan by having a space between the towers for contemplation and having a library, research rooms and a youth hostel within the grounds.

[896] See note 40.

[897] *Kurose Dayori,* (February 1981), p. 37.

it."[898] The Holocaust was ubiquitous in political debates in Israel. During debates over the peace treaty with Egypt, both its opponents and supporters used the Holocaust. Later on, when Begin ordered the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, he used the words, "we must protect our nation, a million and a half of whose children were murdered by the Nazis in the gas chambers."[899] Right-wing orators compared the PLO convention to Mein Kampf and Yasser Arafat to Hitler. The height of this rhetoric came during the Lebanon war, which deeply divided the Israeli public. In a letter to President Reagan explaining his motives for attacking Beirut, Begin wrote that doing so "had given him the feeling that he had sent the Israeli army into Berlin to destroy Hitler in his bunker."[900]

Begin's use of such rhetoric angered his opponents, some of whom now turned to re-examine the whole historical usage of the Holocaust in Israeli discourse. In 1980, an article by historian Boaz Evron marked a turning point of sorts, when under the headline, "The Holocaust – a danger to the nation," he challenged the notion of the Holocaust's uniqueness and of its usage in advancing the interests of the Zionist movement and of the state of Israel. The Nazis, Evron pointed out, murdered not only Jews but also gypsies, Slavs and others. The thesis that the Nazis murdered Jews while the world remained silent, while basically true, was used by Jewish leaders from Ben Gurion onward to gain political leverage through the mobilization of Western guilt.[901] "Every important non-Jewish visitor who arrives here," wrote Evron, "is taken, as it goes without saying, on a mandatory visit to Yad Vashem…to make clear the proper mood and sense of guilt

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898 Segev, *Seventh Million*, p. 398.
899 Ibid, p. 399.
900 Ibid, p. 400.
901 Boaz Evron, Hashoa –sakanala'auma, Iton 77, No. 22 (May-June 1980), p. 13; the letter is reproduced (in English) in Evron, "The Holocaust: learning the wrong lessons," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, (Spring, 1981), pp. 16-21.

expected of him."[902] This thesis leads to moral isolation and blindness. It leads to disregard of world opinion and could lead "certain Jews to the point where, if they had power, they would relate to non-Jews as subhuman."[903] This was written before the Lebanon war. With the war and domestic Israeli political conflicts (and abuse of the Holocaust) raging, following the bombing of Beirut, author Amos Oz wrote an open letter to Begin under the heading, "Hitler is already dead, Mr. Prime Minister," urging Begin to stop cheapening the Holocaust by constant political use.[904]

Ironically, as in Hiroshima and Auschwitz, the more contentious memory became in Israel, the more memorial sites reverted to the rhetoric of the sacred. The idea of Yad Vashem as a holy site for the nation was solidified in the seventies and eighties under Arad. Arad's vision was, as he recalled in an interview, to turn Yad Vashem into a temple. "I want to believe that, with the years, Jews will make a pilgrimage to Yad Vashem and that the day of remembrance will have the same status as the ninth of Av, the day of the destruction of the temple. And that from this site, the next generation will garner strength and connect to their national and personal roots."[905] This view of Yad Vashem as equivalent to the Temple Mount, as Mooli Brog has argued, was a continuation of trends that went back to the earliest days of the institution.[906] It was also a view that had little place for any correlation of the Holocaust to other genocides. In light of this, it is clear why Arad would pay little notice to Inoue's vision, which was so remote from his. Yad Vashem, however, could not escape controversy. In 1983 a Holocaust survivor named Shlomo

[902] Quoted in Segev, *Seventh million*, p. 402.
[903] Ibid.
[904] David Remnick, "Amos Oz Writes the Story of Israel," *The New Yorker*, November 8, 2004
[905] Quoted in Brog, Nof Zikaron, p. 243.
[906] Ibid, p. 244.

Schmelzman started a hunger strike on the premises in protest both of the war and of the abuse of the Holocaust when used to justify it.[907]

The Lebanon war and increasing politicization of the Holocaust by the right wing in Israel had implications beyond the country and touched on Middle East politics as a whole. In a way, the politics of victimhood, in evidence in Japan and Israel since the fifties, were too successful, as now others also began to claim the role. Furthermore, some of the new groups vying for a place in the increasingly crowded gallery of victim-witnesses were doing so expressly in opposition to the victimhood claims of Israelis and Japanese. As we will discuss shortly, in the 1980s, Koreans and Chinese victims of Japanese aggression started to play an increasing role in East Asia memory wars. In the Middle East as well, Palestinians and Arabs in general began to contest what they saw as Israel's increasing use of the Holocaust. Unfortunately for the AMP group, their turn to Israel and Jewish groups came exactly at a time of increasing tensions in the Middle East and thrust them head-on into Middle East victim politics.

The AMP organizers' ignorance of the complexities and bitter historical rivalries at the root of the victim politics they became entangled with was demonstrated by their rather clumsy use of this discourse. In the official AMP proposal submitted to the prefecture, the newly created Auschwitz Memorial Building Committee stated their wish to "promote peace based on our experience of war…[and] to jointly convey to posterity the tragedy of Hiroshima and the tragedy of Auschwitz and work together for the realization of world peace."[908] After establishing their place as victims, the authors then moved on to link the memorial not only with Auschwitz, but also with countless other victims of war:

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[907] Segev, *Seventh million*, p. 401.
[908] "*Auschwitz heiwa kinenkan iiinkai seturitu no shushi,*", HMKM, 01/97/17, HPA.

> Within the flow of history, [humanity] have repeated its mistakes many times over. In the past, one could point to the countless lives lost in a blink of an eye in the tragedy of Hiroshima, the genocide of four millions [sic] which took place in Auschwitz, the Nanking massacre, the massacre at My Lai [Son Mi in original] village during the Vietnam war and, more recently, also to the massacre committed by Israel in the Palestinian refugee camps and the genocidal attack by the Soviet Army on Afghanistan. Thus, there are countless examples of massacres of the general population, including small children, in wars in history.[909]

Not only did the Committee here retreat from its emphasis on the Holocaust as Jewish, it reverted to the old figure of four million killed in Auschwitz and made it but one of a whole chain of events, big and small, (from My Lai, where hundreds were killed, to Auschwitz and Nanking), which simply became examples of "humanity's mistakes." Any sense of historical peculiarity or accountability was completely lost in this grand sweep. Although (for the first time) planners mentioned the Nanking massacre – probably reflecting current debates in Japan over the issue – they did not make any connection between their own status as "those who witnessed war" and the genocidal violence committed in their name. Situating Nanking as just one more incident of "folly" left them, as Japanese and past aggressors, completely off the hook.[910] This move, as we will see, became increasingly controversial in the eighties. In the context of the Holocaust, the authors added insult to injury by robbing the Jews of their identity as victims and (in contrast to how they presented or rather glossed over their own nation's conduct) grossly exaggerating Israeli war crimes by aligning these with Nanking and Auschwitz. To seal their position as objective and unbiased messengers of peace (with no left-wing sympathy), they also cast the USSR as aggressor by adding the Afghans to the gallery of victims.

If Begin represented one extreme of victim-politics, the Committee represented another. Like Begin, it was claiming – as victim – a unique place in history, but its lesson was completely

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[909] Ibid.

[910] On the textbook debates and the general context of the eighties memory debates see Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and social politics in Japan, 1945-2005* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), pp. 226-27.

different. This does not mean they were not sincere in their wish for solidarity with other victims, but they were clearly unprepared for and did not understand the history and politics behind the multiple victimizations and sites they claimed as fellow sufferers. This was particularly clear when opposition to the AMP came from a completely unexpected source: Arab states and the Arab League.

IV. Competing victimizations and Arab protest

Already in August 1978, a year after the plan was declared, Khalil Al-Azhari, the Jordanian ambassador, acting as a representative for the Arab League in Japan (a position held in rotation among Arab ambassadors), appealed to governor Miyazawa Hiroshi (a conservative LDP politician) for work on the AMP to stop.[911] Miyazawa's reply was not recorded and it seems that the issue was not given much thought afterwards. Unlike later exchanges with the Arab League, the prefecture did not contact the Foreign Office or even notify Kurose.[912] This changed in January 1983 when the Arab League summoned the Japanese ambassador in Tunis and handed him a letter of protest, demanding that the construction of the memorial be stopped. To show they were serious, the Arab League threatened a boycott of Hiroshima Prefecture goods if their demand was not met.[913] This started a flurry of communications between the Foreign Office, the prefecture and Kurose. First, the Foreign Office's Africa and Middle East section contacted the prefecture and informed it of the Arab protest. The prefecture passed the information to Kurose,

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911 "*heiwa kinenkan ni kakaru arabu shokoku to no seshōkeii,*" HMKM, 01/97/ 531, HPA. This is a comprehensive report on the exchanges between the prefecture, the Foreign Office and several Arab countries prepared by the International Exchange Department in the prefecture.

912 The meticulous records kept at the prefecture mention the first incident only in passing. A detailed chart of all exchanges between the prefecture, Kurose, the Polish, Hiroshima City, the Foreign Office and the Arab countries does not show any further action regarding the meeting. For the chart, see: "*kore made no shokoku to no seshōkeii,*" HMKM, 01/97/ 531, HPA.

913 The list of demands is from a report on the meeting written later based on the protocol. The same demands are repeated in the Foreign Office and other reports. "*kokoritsu Auschwitz hakubutsukan no shohinmondai,*" (25 December 1989), HMKM, 01/97/ 531, HPA.

which responded with complete bewilderment, "This project has its roots in humanity and it does not follow any ideology or support any state."[914] In May, the Foreign Office informed the prefecture that it had conveyed Kurose's message to the Arab League, but to little effect as the Arab League did not back down from its demands.[915]

At this point, the Arab League decided to send a delegation of six diplomats to Hiroshima, four ambassadors (of Qatar, Kuwait, Syria, Tunis), and PLO and the Arab League representatives).[916] The Foreign Office passed their request to Hiroshima Prefecture and Hiroshima City, noting that the PLO had initiated the request. There was much anxiety in the prefecture as it scrambled to prepare for the visit.[917] The prefecture, it seemed, did not quite know what to do or say to the Arabs. Indeed, the prefecture seemed to be completely at a loss regarding the issue and its diplomatic implications. A large folder in the archive contains historical and political surveys of the Middle East with detailed explanations and question and answer lists, including entries such as, "What is the PLO?" or "What is the position of our country on Jerusalem?"[918] The prefecture also asked for and received a briefing from the Foreign Office on the subject. In it, the Middle East Section Chief, Nakatani Kyo, stressed the importance of the Palestinian refugee issue to the prefecture or to what he called, quoting from the Arab position, "the Arabs' great moral cause" (*arabu no taigi*).[919] Nakatani met with the

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[914] Ibid.
[915] Ibid.
[916] The breakdown was: From Qatar - Mohammad Al al-Ansari; Kuwait - Ahmad Kais Abdallah; Syrian-Arab Republic - Abdul Wadad Al Atas; Tunis - Munsef Jafa; Arab League - Samir Mansuri, and from the PLO: Fatih Abdulhamid. See Japanese Foreign Office, Middle East Africa Division to Hiroshima Prefecture, (2 June 1983), HMKM, 1/97/16 A, HPA.
[917] Japanese Foreign Office, Middle East and Africa Division to Hiroshima Prefecture, (30 May 1983), HMKM, 1/97/16 A, HPA.
[918] "*Arabu renmei taishi ni chigyō chiji hyoukei ni okeru shiyōjigu no chosa kekka ni tsuite,*" (6 June 1983) HMKM, 1/97/16 A, HPA. The list also included explanations about what the main peace plans circulating around the region were at the time, including the Fez and Reagan plans.
[919] Ibid.

Arab representatives on 1 June, two days before their visit to Hiroshima. Samir Manzuri, the Arab League representative in Japan, and the Moroccan ambassador visited Kasumigaseki (where the Foreign Office is located) and reiterated their demands, "1) The Holocaust is not the only genocide [in history]. The term Auschwitz, however, can be easily exploited as "Jewish propaganda." 2) With the current Arab-Israel adversary relationship, we must be sensitive to issues such as this and, thus, 3) cannot accept that the term Auschwitz is emphasized as a symbol of [what happened between] Nazis and Jews. Thus, 4) If our request is not accepted, we're afraid we'll have to boycott products of Hiroshima-prefecture."[920] Nakatani's reply was as curt as it was evasive: "This [the AMP plan] is a civilian-led movement, which the government cannot intervene with. There have been similar movements in the West, so we think it is unfair of you to target such a small city. It is also unfair to threaten [Hiroshima] with a boycott." Nakatani concluded by saying: "[the government of Japan] thinks [the issue] needs to be dealt with political caution. We, the government, would not like it to become a big problem."[921] With this weak objection, Nakatani was basically passing responsibility to Hiroshima prefecture.

The Arab ambassadors arrived in Hiroshima on 3 June 1985. In their public declaration the ambassadors did not mention the reason for their visit, calling it only an "exchange for peace."[922] Going through the usual stops for visitors to Hiroshima, the ambassadors visited the Peace Memorial Museum, laid a wreath at the cenotaph and professed, also somewhat

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[920] "*heiwa kinenkan ni kakaru arabu shokoku to no seshōkeii."* The demands are listed in Japanese in a somewhat awkward translation from the Arabic. The original read, " *1) daigyakusatu ha horokosuto dake de ha nai. Koto sara, aushuwitzu to iu meishō wo tukau koto ha " yudaya jin no sen den" ni tukawareru osore ga aru. 2) genzai, arabu, isuraeru ha tairitu kankei ni ari, kono you na mondaini tuite ha, binkann ni narazaru wo enai. 3) aushuwitzu meishō wo yudaya nazisu no shimboru toshite kyōchō suru koto ha nattoku dekinai. Wareware no mōshiire ga irerarenai baai. Hiroshima ken san bin no boycuto wo sezaru wo enai."*

[921] Ibid.

[922] *Mainichi Shinbun*, 3 June 1983.

ritualistically, their shock at what they saw there.[923] Afterwards, they had a meeting with Hiroshima survivors and activists at the offices of the *Chūgoku Shinbun.* Unlike most visitors however, the Arabs did not limit their comments to general peace. In fact, the ambassadors were quite relentless in pushing their message that the crime of Hiroshima was equal to Israeli crimes in Lebanon. In June 1983, the Israeli Army was just beginning to withdraw from Beirut after expelling the PLO. The Sabra and Shatila massacres of September of 1982 had already taken on symbolic proportions worldwide. There is no doubt, however, that equating the siege of Beirut with Hiroshima was quite hyperbolic (not to discount the possible war crimes and careless use of force by the IDF in Beirut). After visiting the Memorial Museum, the Tunisian ambassador declared, "[what I saw in the museum] is unbelievable…the tragedy of Hiroshima and the tragedy of the massacring of Palestinians by Israel is the same. I want the people of Hiroshima to know that Israel is committing the same (atrocities) even now."[924] The Syrian ambassador, conveniently forgetting his own government's massacre of 10,000 civilians in Hama a year before, also declared that "the slaughter of non-combatants is what brings Hiroshima and Israel's genocide in Lebanon together."[925] The other diplomats on the mission professed similar sentiments.

After their engagement with the public (the ambassadors also met with *hibakusha* representatives), the delegation continued to meet with the governor and the mayor of Hiroshima. The topic and purpose of these meetings were kept secret from the public. The meeting's protocol shows quite an unusual exchange. "We are here," stated Mansuri, the

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[923] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 4 June 1983. Regardless of the visitor, there was a ritualistic quality to the visits of dignitaries to these sites; they always heard the same things and engaged in the same activities. A quick glance at the visitor books in Hiroshima shows that this is not limited to dignitaries. Most people usually profess shock and then proceed to talk about their wish for peace.

[924] Ibid.

[925] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 3 June 1983.

League's representative, "to make sure our friendly relations with Japan are not hurt." What Mansuri meant by "hurt," of course, was the threat of sanctions and a boycott if the AMP plan was not abandoned. Mansuri continued, "There is a problem in Hiroshima which causes us some anxiety. We come here to ensure that the cause of the Arabs is not harmed. We come to ask you to stop this."[926] Perhaps sensing the unease of the Japanese, Manzuri clarified, "We are not against the Jewish people, [but] against racism, Nazism and Zionism… We just want to ensure mutual understanding and good relations between the Arab states and Japan."[927] Thus, Manzuri completed his reverse of victim/victimizer roles, which was, incidentally, the mirror image of Begin's (not less ludicrous) historical parallel, equating the Palestinians with the Jews and the Israelis with the Nazis.

Governor Takeshita's answer was, like the Foreign Office's, polite and evasive. He seemed to take a neutral stand, stating, "I do not think that Kurose has any intention to disturb *(meiwaku*) the Arabs but, as you [Arabs] see it as an act against the Arab cause, I think there is a need for mutual understanding and it is my goal to try to explain this to both sides." After assuming the role of the referee, the governor continued to wash his hands of the issue: "Legally, however, as it is a citizen-led initiative, there is not very much we can do. We cannot force a solution. I could offer my good offices to advise Kurose to reconsider their position."[928] Hiroshima's mayor took a similar position, saying he had very little to do with the issue. Both men were feigning innocence. In fact, they did have considerable influence over Kurose. The HAC was a Hiroshima-based organization and was historically close to the administration. The prefecture had even more influence as it could grant and refuse building and other licenses. The reason for

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926 "*Heiwa kinenkan ni kakaru arabu shokoku to no seshōkeii,*" HMKM, 01/97/ 531, HPA.
927 Ibid. The conversation is also recorded in a report filed by the Hiroshima prefecture Director for Policy Planning and Coordination on 24 June 1988. The report is filed under the date only in folder 1/97/17.
928 "*Heiwa kinenkan ni kakaru arabu shokoku to no seshōkeii.*"

their indecision and evasiveness was not some ideological commitment but, simply, as an adviser to the governor said in a later report: "if we give in to Arab demands, we will have the opposite problem with American Jewry."[929]

Publicly, Governor Takeshita affirmed the importance of a "mutual understanding for peace," while his guests answered in kind with similar generalities about peace. The Syrian ambassador, though, felt the need to add, echoing the conversation inside, "we have nothing against Jews, but Zionism is the same as fascism."[930] The Kuwaiti ambassador then added the quite absurd statement: "Israel has nothing to do with Jews (*kankei de arukoto to de naku*)… the problems are with Zionism and fascism."[931] The Japanese reaction to this was not recorded. Again, the Arabs' agenda was pretty simple and similar to that of the Poles and others who sought to connect with Hiroshima: to elevate their suffering and win the coveted place of victim-sufferer, with its accompanying moral and political advantages. This went hand in hand with their quest to block a similar link with Auschwitz, as together with elevating their "own" suffering, the Arabs also sought to denigrate that of the Jews. Given Begin's own hyperbole, one could definitely see the Arabs' rationale in doing this. Their methods, however, were crude. The Arabs were rehearsing the arguments of Oz and Evron but in a much blunter fashion; taking sophisticated and pained observations to use as a weapon in diplomatic memory wars. A PLO letter from July, a month after the Hiroshima visit, drove the point home: the "real" equivalent to Hiroshima was Beirut, and the "real" equivalents to the *hibakusha* were the Palestinians.[932]

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[929] The quote is in the above-mentioned 24 June 1988 report.
[930] *Asahi Shinbun*, June 5, 1983.
[931] *Mainichi Shinbun*, June 5, 1983.
[932] PLO letter to Hiroshima City, HPA 1/97/17. All following are quotes from the same letter.

The PLO letter is a masterpiece of victim discourse. Not mentioning Palestinian belligerence, it presented Israel's war in Lebanon as genocide committed "using the latest American weapons to slaughter Palestinians."[933] It requested the prefecture and the city's cooperation and support in organizing film screenings and photo exhibitions about Palestinian suffering in Lebanon and the occupied territories. The film,"Why? The Lebanon war," directed by the German Monica Maurer, was purported to "show the horrible damage caused by these horrendous weapons." The PLO was acting in cooperation with local Japanese peace groups that also included local *hibakusha*, one of whom was quoted in the letter as saying, "when I saw the pictures of the Holocaust [Holocaust in original] in Lebanon, I thought to myself 'these look exactly like the pictures of Hiroshima from the time of the Atomic bombing.' This spectacle of genocide…same as the spectacle and suffering wrought by the bomb, should never be repeated." The letter concluded: "What is the connection between 'Hiroshima' and 'Beirut'? Why do the Palestinians have to suffer massacre after massacre?" In the letter, both Hiroshima and Beirut are written using the same *katakana* script, which is often used to denote Hiroshima's connection to the bomb and peace. Much of the language used in the letter and the strategy of including *hibakusha* (and their attended moral authority) is very familiar from Hiroshima discourse.[934] The letter also included standard phrases from Holocaust discourse, first and foremost using the term "Holocaust" itself to refer to Palestinian suffering, and the phrase "never again", which was also used by the Auschwitz campaign. Given that the letter was part of a campaign to deny the connection between Auschwitz and the Jews and to claim for the Palestinians a place equivalent to Hiroshima's, the use of such phrases is significant. It shows how complicated and multi-layered the victim discourse had become by the mid-eighties. Although meant to contest the

[933] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* July 5th 1983

[934] Some of the people mentioned in the letter, like Togawa Haruki, were pretty well-known figures. Togawa was very active in *hibakusha* circles, especially in activities to help Korean-Japanese victims.

centrality of Jews in the global pantheon of suffering, the Palestinians' usage of Holocaust jargon, which by now overlapped with Hiroshima's, in a way affirmed it.

This early attempt by the PLO and others to derail the Auschwitz project did not succeed (according to Inoue, the German Embassy also sent a letter of protest to Kurose regarding the project).[935] Hanbusa and the HAC continued to plan for the memorial and to campaign for funds. The Kurose materials were lent to an exhibit organized by the *Yomiuri* newspaper company entitled "War," and the newspaper gave the campaign ample publicity. In an August 1983 report, Hanabusa indicated that the Memorial would also contain some of the ashes brought from Auschwitz (at least those not sent to the Vatican). Using the well-worn language of the sacred, Hanbusa declared, "This will be a place of prayer…a place for repose of the souls (*chinkon*)." The ashes, the *Yomiuri* reported, would be supplemented by ashes brought by a *Yomiuri* research team that went to Auschwitz and "found bones that lay in a swamp for forty years" and which were brought back to Japan to be enshrined in Kurose as well. The *Yomiuri* ashes were the third such case of ashes brought back from Auschwitz. This time, apparently, without the cooperation of the Poles.[936] According to Inoue, there was supposedly yet another set of ashes which "was scooped from the pond by one of Kurose's delegate when visiting there."[937] The matter-of-fact way in which this act of desecration (at least from a Jewish point of view) of the dead took place, shows, once again, how Japanese peace activists' lofty aspirations led to complete disregard of the dead themselves, in whose name they were purportedly acting. Imposing a Japanese cultural

[935] Inoue Fumikatsu to Barry Spergel, 7 February 1987. Inoue Personal files. I thank Inoue Fumikatsu for giving me access to his correspondence.
[936] *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 16 August 1983.
[937] Author's communication with Inoue Fumikatsu, 13 June 2012.

belief on the Jewish dead, Hanabusa concluded, "the souls of the deceased (*tamashi*) are alive here. All are praying for peace from their heart."[938]

Tucked between all the lofty declarations of peace and prayers was an admission by Hanabusa that the organizers of the campaign were "trying to build this Memorial Pavilion for the last ten years."[939] Indeed, time was passing, but not much progress had been made. This and questions of funds and the overall direction of the project started to cause friction among the organizers. Furthermore, the Poles started to be a little bit uneasy about Kurose's ability to deliver on its promises. In May 1983, the head of the Auschwitz Museum wrote to Kotani Tsujiro, who had been involved with negotiations with Auschwitz since 1969 on the HAC side, and asked him to send a photographer to take photos of the proposed museum site. When Kotani informed Kurose of this, he got no response. [940] In July 1983, a month before the *Yomiuri* article was published, Kotani wrote to Kurose complaining of lack of progress and proper regulations on the Kurose side. Kotani also complained of lack of communications from Hanabusa.[941] When Kotani, again, did not receive any reply, he went a step further and sent letters directly to Kazimierz Smolen, the head of the Auschwitz museum in Poland. On two occasions, 24 February and 20 May 1984, Kotani complained to Smolen that "there has been no communication [between us] and that mistrust started to develop between the HAC and the mayor of Kurose"[942] A later report by the prefecture claimed that the two bodies were now "estranged."[943] In August 1984, with yet another year gone by without any action, Kurose city called a meeting to discuss "changes to the memorial pavilion idea." Kotani and the HAC did not

[938] *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 16 August 1983.
[939] Ibid.
[940] "*Kokoritsu oshwichumu hakubutsu kara no ihin henshu mondai*" (11 August 1989), HMKM, 01/97/ 531, HPA.
[941] Ibid. For the Hanabusa complaint: "*Kurose cho heiw akinekan mondai no keii,*" HMKM, 01/97/ 531, HPA.
[942] "*Kokoritsu oshwichumu hakubutsu kara no ihin henshu mondai*."
[943] "*Kurose cho heiwakinekan mondai no keii,*" HMKM, 01/97/ 531, HPA.

attend the meeting.[944] The city then decided to send two city employees to Poland to get permission from the Poles to change the memorial plan. For the first time, the HAC was not involved in the negotiations. In February 1985, Kurose and Auschwitz decided (it seems that Smolen actually demanded) that the memorial would be built by August 1986 at the latest.

Inoue Fumikatsu, who was not aware of these developments, was in the meantime still trying to push the AMP idea in the US. He got in touch with the Jewish-American violinist and conductor Isaac Stern who agreed to perform at a fundraising event for the AMP in Hiroshima. The concert, " a message for peace," which took place in June 1985, was a huge success and managed to garner much-needed funds and attention for the AMP.[945] Hanabusa and Kurose, although initially a part of the initiative, were in the midst of a re-election campaign and failed to capitalize on Stern's success. Furthermore, in response to Stern's concert, the PLO sent two representatives from its Tokyo office to Hiroshima prefecture. Abdul Nuri Kuri and Ahmed Muni repeated the same accusations and demands and, again, received the same reply from the governor.[946] Not to be discouraged, Kuwahara, who was perhaps unaware of Kotani's maneuvers, announced in December 1985 that the HAC was sending twenty people on a fundraising trip, which it called a pilgrimage for peace, to Europe and Israel. This, together with the Stern concert, was part of a whole array of measures intended to garner international support for the project, as "we still have not reached the target of four hundred million Yen (about four million US dollars at the time)." The HAC had sent requests for cooperation and help with the campaign to Auschwitz committees in eighteen countries.[947] In July 1986, just before they

[944] Ibid.
[945] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 11 June 1985.
[946] A report on the meeting between the PLO representative and the governor (under date only) 36 April 1985 in 1/97/16.
[947] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 26 December 1985.

departed, Kuwahara and Hanabusa (now together), in an interview in *Yomiuri*, said they would try to arrange, through Inoue, for an A-bomb exhibit at Yad Vashem.[948] Departure was set to early August so that the delegation could attend the 6 August "Hiroshima Day" in Jerusalem.[949]

The AMP delegation arrived in Israel on 5 August and visited Yad Vashem in the early morning of the 6th. Once there, they participated in what was – to the best of my knowledge – the only A-bomb commemorative event ever held at Yad Vashem. The ceremony, following what was by the eighties accepted protocol in both Yad Vashem and Hiroshima, a minute of silence (at 8:16 AM), laying of wreaths, speeches and silent prayers.[950] What was unusual and caught the attention of the press, were the Shinto prayers offered by Kuwahara, an Omoto sect priest, which followed the Christian and Jewish services in front of the eternal flame in Yad Vashem's *Ohel Yizkhor* (Tent of Remembrance).[951] In addition to the eighteen Japanese – mostly members of the HAC and almost all academics and religious leaders – the ceremony was attended by the head of Yad Vashem, Yitzhak Arad, and other dignitaries. After the ceremony, the delegation was given a tour of the grounds by Arad. Tadahira Jo, a professor of international law who wrote two extensive articles for the *Chūgoku Shinbun* about the visit, was duly impressed by the "sacred atmosphere" of the place.[952] Tadahira was especially taken by a six-million-piece mosaicwhich named all the concentration camps; Tadahira noted that one of these was Mauthausen, next to Linz. He was shocked by the proximity of the camp to the city where

[948] *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 24 July 1986.
[949] *Asahi Shinbun*, 24 July 1986.
[950] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 28 August 1986
[951] Davar, 7 August 1986. See also *Maariv*, *Jerusalem Post* and Yedioy Aharonot, on the same date.
[952] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 28 August 1986.

Mozart wrote the *36th Symphony* (called the *Linz Symphony*) and contemplated the "contradictions inherent in the proximity of genocide and such sublime music."[953]

Following the tour, the AMP group met with Holocaust survivor Jacob Stromser, who was also an academic and a member of the Israel Auschwitz Committee. Tadahira wrote down his tattooed concentration camp number and commented, "just like in our country where we hear testimony of those who survived the bomb, here as well, many of those who have experienced the tragedy share their story."[954] Tadahira, unfortunately, did not record the testimony or comment on its content, but the synchronicity of commemorative forms and degree of understanding between the two sides is quite impressive. After their visit, the delegation convened a press conference in which Israeli reporters asked them quite aggressive questions;Inoue Fumikatsu did most of the talking. The connection between Yad Vashem and Hiroshima was not clear to most Israelis and some were even offended by the attempt to connect the two. "How can one," Inoue was asked, "[connect] the bombing of Hiroshima, which was the result of Japan's aggressive war against the US, and the German slaughter of Jews who did not attack anyone?"[955] Inoue answered, quoting Ellie Wiesel, "the Holocaust and Hiroshima are linked together in history. Auschwitz made Hiroshima possible – that is why we must remember them both." When pressed further, he added, "I believe that if Japan had the bomb before the U.S., it would have used it, and we want to warn the world – including our own government…We feel that humanity was killed in Auschwitz and we are aware of the huge difference between the tragedies, but we have great sympathy for the victims of the Holocaust.

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[953] Ibid.

[954] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, August 28, 1986. The Japanese are fascinated by survivors' numbers. In all testimonies I read so far, every time an Auschwitz survivor story is conveyed in Japanese, the writers similarly write down the tattooed number.

[955] *Jerusalem Post*, August 7, 1986. Also cited (in Hebrew) by *Maariv*, August 7, 1986.

When we mention Hiroshima, we always caution against forgetting Auschwitz."[956] Inoue and Tadahira also pointed to the West's own hypocrisy, "Japan took in 27,000 Jews, mostly in Shanghai. This figure exceeded the number of Jewish refugees taken in by Canada, New Zealand, Australia and British India." Both also pointed to the work of Sugihara Chinoe, the Japanese consul in Kovno, Lithuania, who issued thousands of Japanese transit visas to Jews and is acknowledged in Yad Vashem as a "Righteous Gentile." Tadahira was quite proud, calling the act "one of the greatest achievements of us Japanese."[957]

The AMP group also used the press conference as an occasion/opportunity to appeal for help with the Kurose memorial construction. Inoue mistakenly (according to Inoue he was not fully informed at the time) declared that the AMP had already collected one million US dollars out of the four needed and that construction would commence soon (as we will shortly see, the AMP did not even have half this amount). One paper even reported that the construction was complete.[958] Inoue continued: "There is opposition to the project in Japan: some people are pro-Arab; some say Auschwitz never happened and some do not want to hurt German feelings."[959] After the press conference, the delegation attended film screenings and an A-bomb exhibit in Jerusalem, as well as a reception held by Jerusalem's mayor, Teddy Kolek. Later on, indicating the importance given to the visit, Kuwahara and Inoue were received by the Israeli Prime Minister (now President) Shimon Peres, who congratulated them on their efforts. [960] The pilgrims left Israel in high spirits. They continued to Greece, the Netherlands and Italy, where they were similarly received by officials and showered with honors. It is safe to assume that

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[956] Ibid.
[957] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 28 August 1986.
[958] Davar, 7 August 1986.
[959] *Jerusalem Post*, 7 August 1986.
[960] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 29 August 1986; Kuwahara interview.

Japan's economic prowess had something to do with their reception. In Italy, they received what Tadahira and Kuwahara considered the highest honor: Pope John Paul II (who, as we saw, already met the HAC in Hiroshima) mentioned the HAC in a mass in St. Peters and gave his blessing to their "holy mission of peace." "As I listened to this," wrote Tadahira, "I thought about our experiences in Israel and wondered if we planted a seed of peace…and felt that I would like to see the Kurose memorial hall be built as fast as possible."[961]

Unfortunately for Tadahira and the rest of the AMP, all these honors did not translate into donations. Furthermore, fundraising efforts in the States also encountered severe difficulties. This time it was not the Jewish but the Japanese angle which brought about conflict. Parallel to the "Pilgrimage for Peace" initiative, the AMP campaign was gathering pace in the US. An elaborate brochure sent by the AMP to potential donors included messages of support from very noted figures such as Elie Wiesel, Israel Charny (who headed the Genocide conference mentioned above), Ernest Michael (Chairman of the World Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors), Robert Lifton and others.[962] Inoue and his supporters' next move was to try to establish a non-profit, "International Friends of the AMP project," to coordinate fundraising.[963] They contacted Barry Spergel, an attorney and activist; it was then that things started to go wrong. Spergel apparently consulted widely with his colleagues before deciding to decline Inoue's offer on the grounds that the project "turned out to be extremely controversial, [As] many people are very offended by the comparison between Auschwitz and Hiroshima."[964]

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[961] Ibid.
[962] Kurose cho*,"aushuwitsu heiwa kinenkan projekuto: heiwa e no mon,*" 58-59, Inoue collection.
[963] Inoue Fumkiatsu to Barry Spergel, 22 October 1986, Inoue Collection. In the letter, Inoue mentioned even contacting Jimmy Carter for the project.
[964] Barry Spergel to Inoue Fumikatsu, 16 January 1987. Inoue Collection.

Spergel's curt refusal drew criticism from Inoue's colleague Paul Mendes-Flohr of the Hebrew University, who was enraged by Spergel's reasoning. Inoue, argued Mendes-Flohr, was not comparing Hiroshima and Auschwitz on a "political or historical level," but, "on the existential level, what he called, "the experienced tragedy of the mass annihilation of civilian population." Mendes-Flohr then more or less proceeded to accuse Spergel of being insensitive to survivors, misrepresenting Inoue as one, "In their inconsolable anguish many Japanese, like Mr. Inoue, reach out to the survivors of Auschwitz; in their attempt to identify a communion that would break the gnawing isolation wrought by mourning. The sadness of the survivors can [not] be alleviated, but it can be spared the degradation of self-pity by acknowledging the common humanity of all who mourn, especially such senseless deaths as Auschwitz and Hiroshima."[965]

Spergel in his reply ignored Medes-Flohr's rather emotional argument and pointed instead to the very real political difficulties that the AMP project entailed. The project, argued Spergel, "may be perceived by many people as an attempt to exonerate the Japanese of responsibility for their own war atrocities." Spergel then added, "Chinese friends of mine have told me that if this project goes forward, they will hold demonstrations in front of Japanese Embassies, and will burn Japanese products." Spergel pointed out that he met strong resistance to the idea from Americans as well, "beginning with my secretary, who was so angered that she virtually refused to do the typing," and other colleagues who "thought this would be a good opportunity to publicly remind people of Japanese treatment of American and British POW's in World War II."[966] Spergel's Chinese friends, including Iris Chang, author of the controversial *Rape of Nanking,* proceeded to contact Inoue and threaten further action against the project.[967] Inoue

[965] Paul Medes- Flohr to Barry Spergel, 21 January 1987. Inoue Collection
[966] Barry Spergel to Paul Medes-Flohr, 29 January 1987, Inoue collection.
[967] Inoue interview.

answered Spergel and Chang by pointing out his own and the AMP's rejection of Japanese revisionism and angrily suggested to Chinese and Americans to start looking at their own treatment of Tibetans and (for Americans) American-Indians and Blacks before pointing fingers at Japan, and asked why a Holocaust Memorial is appropriate in Washington D.C. and not in Hiroshima. Pointing to further appeals by the PLO and the Germans he told Spergel, "You see, there is no end to this and no nation is guiltless." The problem was not with who did what to whom, but "mechanized genocide."[968]

Inoue and company's sparring with Spergel and others mirrored the arguments over war memory that were raging around the same time throughout East Asia and, as we will shortly see, presaged the arguments over the Smithsonian's Enola Gay exhibit a decade later. Adding fuel to the anti-Japanese fire at the time were also tensions over trade and increased anxiety over Japan's rise in the mid-eighties. In a way, both Inoue and Spergel were right to point out the weaknesses of the other's argument. Inoue and the AMP, however, failed to appreciate the intense hostility and rising power of groups such as the Chinese, and of how reluctant Jewish leaders in the US were to side with the AMP in this episode. With the exception of Inoue, the AMP showed similar ignorance when dealing with the Middle Eastern front of the raging global memory wars. These wars had become increasingly intense and partisan, leaving little space for subtleties. This made the kind of solidarity of victims sought by the AMP increasingly tenuous. Eventually, the constant friction the AMP seemed to run into, combined with more "mundane" issues of corruption and incompetence, brought the AMP project to an end.

V. **Collapse of the AMP initiative**

[968] Inoue Fumikatsu to Barry Spergel, 7 February, 1987, Inoue collection.

The AMP delegation returned to Japan with high hopes but very few concrete achievements. Although some donations were promised, overall, the project still lacked a significant amount of funding. The final location and shape of the memorial were also unclear. Furthermore, despite the public face of cooperation, relations between the HAC and Kurose were still strained. In February 1987, the project suffered a further blow when it was discovered that a significant amount of the money that had been raised was missing. No one made direct accusations of corruption (that would come later), but, like Kotani, many were now criticizing Hanabusa's "one man" style of leadership and the lack of transparency and consulting with others in the city leadership; a "sin" far greater in Japan where achieving consensus is usually preferable to personal leadership. The Head of the City Assembly, Suzutō, complained to the press: "We in the assembly were not being told anything about the fundraising by Hanabusa… he runs [the project] as a private business and this money should be deposited with the treasurer." Suzutō then called for Hanabusa to resign from the project.[969] Following an appeal by citizen's groups and others, the prefecture ordered an audit, which eventually resulted in the campaign money being incorporated into the city budget and Hanabusa forced to pay the difference from his own pocket.[970]

Another result of the audit was that Hanabusa moved to create a foundation to separate the project from the city. On 31 March 1987, Hanbusa declared in the Assembly that he would create a NPO to construct the memorial, which he would also head. The memorial was no longer to be an Auschwitz memorial, but a "peace memorial museum."[971] It seems, though, that matters did not really progress beyond that declaration, at least until 1988. In November 1986, a group of

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[969] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 27 February 1987.
[970] *Hiroshima ken kikakubu*, "*Kurose cho Auschwitz heiwa kinenkan mondai ni tuite*," 23 June 1988, HMKM, 1/97/17, HPA; *Asahi Shinbun*, 29 June 1987.
[971] *Auschwitz heiwa kiennkan kensetsu mondai* (no date), HMKM, 1/97/17, HPA.

socialist MPs in the prefecture assembly sent a letter to the governor asking for his intervention to ensure that building would go through. When they got no answer, the MPs brought it up in the general affairs committee of the prefectural assembly. In February 1988, in the assembly committee debate, dissatisfaction with Kurose was widespread. The head of the regional affairs division in the prefecture complained that "although it had been over a year [since the declaration and the financial scandal] we have not heard anything from Kurose."[972] Committee members were alarmed by the implications of Kurose's incompetence. Assemblyman Inudo (socialist) warned, "People abroad do not understand the structure [of local government], it reflects badly on the prefecture and …we also have a moral responsibility to Auschwitz."[973] Although they were not happy with Kurose, the prefectural representatives were also not ready to do much about it. Inudo demanded action from the prefecture, but only got evasive replies. The prefecture's representatives, just as with the Arabs, seemed to wash their hands of the issue and claimed they had no responsibility or authority over the city.

Inudo and others did not give up and brought up the issue again in March. "As the prefecture which was A-bombed (*hibaku no ken*)," warned Inudo, "We must take this international problem seriously."[974] The prefecture's international affairs division head, though, insisted, "This is a delicate matter," and repeated his argument about "respecting the autonomy of the city," pointing out that it would be "highly unusual for the prefecture to take over."[975] The prefecture indeed had played only a minimal role so far. From the outset they wanted as little as possible to do with what was fast becoming an international problem and which indeed reflected badly on the prefecture as a whole. While the governor was a member of the LDP, which

[972] Hiroshima ken kyōgi kai sōmu iinkai, (February 19, 1988), HMKM, 1/97/16A, HPA.
[973] Ibid.
[974] Hiroshima ken kyōgi kai sōmu iinkai, (March 15, 1988), HMKM, 1/97/17, HPA.
[975] Ibid.

opposed the plan in the assembly (the socialists, as just seen, supported it), as the governor of the A-bombed prefecture – as a former administration official told me – he could come out openly against such a venture.[976] Peace was consensus in Hiroshima, and anything with "peace" in its title was very hard to oppose. Indeed, the main reason why Hanabusa changed the title from "Auschwitz" to "peace" museum was to avoid the controversy that the name Auschwitz seemed to generate.

But unlike in the seventies, controversy just would not go away as various victim groups or their advocates demanded acknowledgement of their own war memories. In June 1988, the Arab league representatives again lodged a protest with the Foreign Office against Hiroshima prefecture, this time through the Moroccan ambassador.[977] In the same month the socialists again wrote to the prefecture asking for it to take action "for the sake of the Jewish and Polish victims."[978] "Peace" fell victim to growing competition among victims on one hand, and a growing awareness of global memory culture and the inadequacy of Japan's own memorialization of the war and its culpability as victimizer on the other.

1985 was the year Richard von Weizsäcker gave his famous speech on war responsibility.[979]The speech generated much debate and anxiety among Japanese intellectuals who bemoaned their country's lack of proper remorse and inability to "make good with the past" or conquer it (the German *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* was translated as *kako wo kokufuku:* conquering the past) in the same "honest" way as West Germany. Noticing neither Helmut Kohl's visit to Bitburg nor, until much later, the historians' controversy, Japanese intellectuals

[976] Interview with Morishita Ikuso, 14 May 2010.
[977] "Kurose cho Auschwitz heiwa kinenka nmonda in ituite," (June 23, 1988), HMKM, 1/97/17, HPA.
[978] Ibid.
[979] Seraphim, p. 276.

searched for an explanation for their nation's "inadequate postwar responsibility" in culture, politics and history in relation to the much more "successful" West German response.[980] These debates were the result of growing tensions with Asia following a crisis over textbook revisions in Japan in 1982, and the Prime Minister's 1985 visit to the Yasukuni shrine on one hand, and over media globalization on the other, which brought European and American events directly onto Japanese TV screens.[981]

As the "memorial problem" developed in this context it is not surprising that Inoue Fumikatsu, interviewed by the *Asahi* in Israel, warned, giving a different spin to his earlier Yad Vashem comments, that "many consider the delays in building the memorial as a sign of Japanese anti-Semitism…as they do not understand how come an economic superpower like Japan does not have the money for such a project."[982] Inoue's declaration would not make sense to anyone in Japan before the West German "war responsibility" debates in the mid-eighties, and it played on Japan's newly acquired awareness of its "inadequate" war memory. That Inoue could have used such an accusation was a worrying sign for Japanese readers and an indicator of how global the conversation had become.

The combination of internal incompetence and conflict with the almost constant controversy the project seemed to elicit caused many to doubt the feasibility of the AMP. As another year passed without much progress, the memorial project faced its greatest challenge when Kazimierz Smolen announced he would come to Hiroshima prefecture in late June to assess the project. The result of this announcement was a flurry of debates over the issue in the

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[980] Ibid.
[981] On these controversies see Laura Elizabeth Hein, *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States* (M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
[982] *Asahi Shinbun*, 18 March 1986.

press, near panic among officials in the assembly (almost a third of the documents in the archives dated to this period).[983] Before Smolen's visit was announced, in a somewhat desperate attempt to mollify criticism, Koruse city started to exhibit the Auschwitz materials in a small room in City Hall itself.[984] The exhibit, however, was not widely publicized and the result was even more criticism. One visitor remarked, on what was apparently a very modest exhibit, that this was "just complete rudeness to the Poles."[985] Unfortunately for Koruse and Hiroshima prefecture, not only most of the press but the Poles themselves agreed with this statement. Smolen visited Kurose City Hall on 28 June 1988 and was, to say the least, not satisfied with what he saw. After seeing the artifacts and meeting with Hanabusa, Smolen told the press in a statement which was later repeated countless times, "if these articles had a voice they would let out a scream" (*ihin ni koe ga aru nara sakabu darō)*.[986] Given the vaunted place of *ihin* in Hiroshima discourse and belief in their near mythical ability to transmit experience, this was an especially powerful statement. Later on, however, when visiting the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, Smolen addressed the head of the museum and other *hibakusha* present and assured them that "as we share the same experience, I would like to join forces to prevent war."[987] This expression of solidarity did not

[983] Regardless of all these official deliberations (at least three high level meetings between June 22 and June 24), the prefecture would not intervene. At the June 24th meeting the prefecture summed up its position as followed: "1) this project is a citizen-led project, so the prefecture cannot intervene 2) However, as there was considerable criticism and protest from Arab countries and West Germany [I found no verification for the West German claim] and this has clearly become a complicated international problem...the international section should give advice [as to how best resolve the problem] 3) As to the funds…it is the city finance section which is responsible for the funds and should manage these properly…the Regional section will supervise and report on the issue 4) As to building permits and other issues… in light of the international issue these will be re-examined." See the report of the Hiroshima prefecture policy coordination office (*keikaku chōseika*), 22 June 1988 (under date only), HMKM, 1/97/16A, HPA.

[985] *Chūgoku shinbun* 17 April 1988.

[986] See among others *Chūgoku shinbun* 7 July 1988; *Asahi Shinbun* 4 July and 29 June 1988. Hanabusa refused to answer any inquiries by the press and, according to the Asahi, physically ran away from reporters to his office, and, according to the *Asahi*, "shut the door behind him."

[987] *Chūgoku shinbun*, 28 June 1988.

prevent Smolen from demanding the return of the items if the Japanese did not show serious progress by March 1989.

Smolen's visit ignited a storm of criticism in Hiroshima. An editorial in the *Chūgoku Shinbun* captured the spirit of most of the protest by asking, "who is this memorial for?" The editorial called on all involved, including the mayor of Hiroshima and the governor of the prefecture, to come together and find a solution; it bemoaned the lack of supervision and negligence of Hanabusa and Kurose and claimed it had been "an unpleasant business from the start."[988] Inoue, in an interview from Israel, again warned of the perception of anti-Semitism.[989] Significantly, the journalist who interviewed him referred to the "memorial problem" as the "effort to connect the two Holocausts: Hiroshima and the killing of the Jews (Holocaust in the original)."[990] This kind of language, which one can see increasingly from that time on, was a sign of the rising global status of the Holocaust, as even Hiroshima's tragedy, a world historical event, was now debated in the same terms. The greater visibility of the Holocaust as a Jewish event was also evident in the fact that now all involved referred to the articles as "Jewish articles" and to Auschwitz as the site of the "genocide of the Jews."[991]

With the focus on the Jewish victims came diplomatic problems. The Arab League, in February 1989, with the Polish deadline fast approaching, made a final protest to Hiroshima prefecture, this time through the Kuwaiti ambassador in Japan. The ambassador, Abd Al-Khamis, told the governor that he found the memorial idea weird (*okashi*), so he and two other

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[988] *Chūgoku shinbun,* 4 July 1988. Some of the criticism of Koruse came from abroad. The *Jerusalem Post* and the *Observer* reported on the displeasure of Western donors, among them the Brussels International Auschwitz Committee and a "Jewish organization from New York" (the quotation marks in the original). The papers further reported the intent of an Auschwitz delegation to come to Koruse. See *Jerusalem Post*, 7 July 1988.
[989] *Asahi Shinbun*, 15 August 1988.
[990] Ibid.
[991] See, among others, ibid and *Asahi Shinbun* and *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 8 September 1989.

officials came to Hiroshima to investigate. "We hope that something like this," Al-Khamis said, "will not be constructed, since Israel is using sympathy [it gets from Auschwitz] to promote war. If you really want to make it we want it to introduce the damage done to the Arab side." The governor replied along the same lines he had a year earlier, saying, "[the memorial] is not only about Auschwitz but a memorial hall for world peace… before it will take shape I want to explain to the Arab people about its true goal." The ambassador was not convinced," Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians. Is there a need for a special memorial hall in a foreign country for that? Wouldn't that amount to the city and the prefecture declaring their support for America and Israel? I am sure we would like to avoid this."[992] The Hiroshima side (Hiroshima's mayor was also present), was, as usual, caught somewhat off guard by the combativeness of the ambassador and replied simply by politely reiterating their stand. Again, it seemed that both sides were talking past each other. This time, however, Arab pressure was made public by a citizen's group, *Ihin shiteru kai* (the society for studying [the Auschwitz] articles). The purpose of the re-evaluation was to put pressure on Hiroshima City and prefecture to intervene and keep the articles. The society protested the "politicization" of the issue and declared that "we as victims of Hiroshima have a responsibility [towards those articles] and should keep these them here."[993] The efforts of this group, as well as of the HAC and Kurose, which sent a last minute delegation to Poland to plea with Smolen, did not convince the Poles. The agreement to return the items was signed on 4 September 1989.[994] Significantly, all of this happened on the backgropund of the collapse of communism in Poland and Eastern Europe and the end of the cold War order which animated so much of the HAC endavour. The articles were returned in

[992] See "chūnichitaichi kuwaito taichi rai hiro toki no kaiwa no naiyo," (3 February 1989), HMKM, 1/97/16A, HPA.
[993] *Chūgoku Shinbun,* 27 January 1989. The society wanted the prefecture to not heed to pressure and think of the issue from the "universal point of view…and preserve the Hiroshima-Auschwitz" connection.
[994] The agreement, in English and Polish (and with a Japanese translation), is found in: *Agreement between the state museum of Oswiecim and the Mayor of Kurose*, (September 4, 1989), HMKM, 01/97/ 531, HPA.

December 1989, exactly when the Polish government collapsed, thus effectively ending the Kurose memorial project

Not all of the items, however, were to return to Poland. With Smolen's blessing, some ended up in another exhibition organized by peace activists from Tokyo headed by Aoki Shinshin and the Greenpeace Publishing Company.[995] Aoki, showing how much ego was involved in these endeavors, lost no time in capitalizing on Kurose's loss and organized a Japan-wide exhibit with the Auschwitz objects he had secured from Kurose for an exhibit entitled, "Auschwitz is etched in our heart," which traveled around Japan in 1989.[996]

The 1989 exhibit drew tens of thousands of visitors and was considered a great success. Greenpeace went to great lengths to emphasize the comparative and international contexts of their endeavor. At the entrance to the exhibit was a quote from von Weizsäcker's speech, "those who turn their eyes away from the past are blind to the present," and the organizers brought together Auschwitz and Hiroshima survivors.[997] As with former exhibits, however, the language used in the exhibit was very local and mirrored that of Hiroshima, with exclamations about "humanity's duty" and the "quest for peace."[998] The Holocaust's heightened global presence was definitely felt in Hiroshima, but in Japan, as with the Kurose affair as a whole, it had a very local accent.[999] Although the AMP initiative failed, the cultural and political factors that drove it continued to resonate.

Conclusion- The Auschwitz Memorial and Hiroshima's Memory Wars

[995] Aoki and Greenpeace Publishing had also organized, in 1988, a symposium comparing Japanese and German memory cultures. *Asahi Shinbun*, 8 April 1990.
[996] For more about the soap, see *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 29 May 1990. Aoki sent a number of damning letters to the prefecture.
[997] *Chūgoku Shinbun*, 20 May 1990.
[998] *Ibid*, 22 May 1990.
[999] A similar attitude can be seen with Holocaust initiatives in Japan that are still active today.

At the tail end of the Kurose affair, the issue once again became entangled with bigger debates. 1989 was a watershed year in Japan. The death of the Showa emperor Hirohito and the end of the Cold War, together with the subsequent bursting of Japan's economic bubble, caused widespread and unprecedented debates in Japan over war memory. Most of these debates revolved around the issue of the emperor's war responsibility, but it was also a starting point for many of the issues which would dominate the nineties' memory wars over comfort women and Nanking.[1000] In February 1990, Kai Hitoshi, a prominent film director and left-wing activist, wrote a piece for the *Asahi Shinbun*, reviewing the Kurose Memorial issue. Kai's analysis was conventional until about halfway through the article when he wrote, "there is something that bothers me [in this affair]. Why does Hiroshima qualify for a connection with Auschwitz? If you look at history, don't Nanking or Seoul have better qualifications for connections with Auschwitz? After all, there is something no one said so far: Hiroshima was on the side of the aggressor." And indeed, this is something that no one had said up to that point. Such a crass denial of Hiroshima's victim status was unprecedented. Such language reflected the deep dissatisfaction of the left with Hiroshima's victim status; something that was arguably evident, at least beneath the surface, since the sixties. As Naono Akiko pointed out, progressive commentators (such as Kai), following the death of Hirohito and the debates that followed, exhibited increasing annoyance with victim discourse, to the point of denying Hiroshima's suffering. This caused many to "disregard the humanity of Japanese victims by turning them into aggressors and to treat veneration of loved ones [and mourning] as amnesia."[1001]

[1000] Sheraphim, p. 278.

[1001] Naono Akiko, *Embracing the dead in the bomb's shadow : journey through the Hiroshima memoryscape*. Unpublished dissertation (University of Santa Cruz 2002), p. 21.

Kai made a further – and similar – controversial move when he took on Jewish victims of the Holocaust, admonishing them for their "moral blindness." As an illustration, Kai mentioned the case of an Israeli woman who said: "I lost almost all of my family to the atrocious bad treatment (*hiuchi*) by the Nazis...but now we Jews, who more than anyone should abhor the Nazi atrocities, treat the Palestinians in the same exact horrible way (*parestina jin ni taishite onajiyo ni shiuchi wo shite iru*). As a Jewish person, I cannot forgive this. It is an affront to Jewish consciousness." Kai concluded that the Kurose memorial should also promote Jewish consciousness and awareness of the Jews' own crimes.[1002] Kai's analysis was a reflection of the bitter debates over war memory in Japan as a whole and in Hiroshima in particular. Kai's feelings were shared with many activists who sought to find the "true" victims of war, whose suffering was obscured by a focus on certain "privileged" victims and lessons of the war. This kind of thinking infected much of the progressive debate on memory in the nineties, when commentators wrote countless manuscripts and initiated many campaigns in the name of "forgotten victims." Many of those, like the comfort women, were indeed forgotten. However, what these commentators forgot was that the issue was not so black and white. What critics like Kai were annoyed by was what they saw as the "surfeit of memory" and its abuses. As Carolyn Dean, Alyson Cole and others document, Kai was certainly not alone in this as, since the seventies and parallel to the "advent of the victim," there had always been critics of victim discourse and of what they saw as Jewish (and others – blacks and other minorities in the case of the West) indulgence of victimization. There were certainly excesses in both Hiroshima and Holocaust discourse. But by bringing in another group of victims, critics did little to address the complexity of war memory. They simply, as with all the conflicting claims of victimhood

[1002] *Asahi Shinbun*, 16 February 1990.

examined so far, replaced one group of victims with another, as if victimization was a zero sum game where one could strive for some position of "pure victimhood" without the taint of aggression.

Such debates continued throughout the nineties in Hiroshima. These debates were parallel to the Kurose affair and entangled with it. They mostly centered on the renewal of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and the installment of an "aggressor corner" to address what activists saw as an over-concentration on Japanese victimization in the Peace Park. These debates were taking place against the background of plans for urban renewal and commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the war, global debates on war memory and the huge geo-political and economic changes that followed the end of the Cold War and the rise of China. Although breaking new ground in terms of engaging with Japan's past crimes, all sides in these debates displayed the same zeal and commitment to affirm a hierarchy of real and faux victims as evident in the Kurose affair.

Unlike some who were involved in the Kurose affair, many sought to look beyond the limitation of the victim viewpoint and to engage with the problem of victimization. Hanabusa et al (there were no significant differences between him and the HAC ideologically) made some gestures in this direction when they wrote, for instance, in their first declaration of intent, "Do we know when the victims of war turn into victimizers?" That was, however, the extent of their engagement as the question was left unanswered.[1003] These gestures, as Kai and other pundits pointed out, were not sufficient. In 1987, in parallel to the mid-eighties' debates about German and Japanese war memory, a number of citizen's groups in Hiroshima appealed to the city to

[1003] Hanabusa Shosō to Toranosuke Takeshita (governor of Hiroshima prefecture), (28 February 1986) HMKM, 01/97/17, HPA.

install "an aggressor corner" in the Peace Memorial Museum. The director of the mayor's office told these groups the city would consider the suggestion and, indeed, in December 1987 the city decided to create a *kagaisha* (aggressor) corner which would "interrogate issues of Japan's war responsibility and represent the socio-historical conditions of Korean *hibakusha*."[1004] What strengthened the petitioners' case was the fact that a number of schools from Osaka (where there is a significant Korean population) had made a similar plea a year earlier.[1005] As before, issues of tourism and commemoration intervened in the decision. School groups make up more than half the visitors to Hiroshima; many of these often stay a couple of days, thus contributing to Hiroshima's economy.

The decision caused a significant backlash with *hibakusha* and right-wing groups protesting it. Many *hibakusha*, including long time activists, called on the city to "not politicize the museum, as it is a sacred site for the victims," while right-wingers challenged the very term "aggressor," as they saw Japan's war as "a holy war to liberate Asia."[1006] Nishimura Toshizo, a conservative member of the city council, argued, "the conspiracy to classify our fellow countrymen as victimizers would leave a deep scar on Japanese children."[1007] The city surrendered to this pressure and promised to reconsider its plans in 1988. In the 1990s though, another push, this time from within the Hiroshima administration, came with the election of Mayor Hiraoka Takeshi, a long-time liberal. Although the product of much compromise and still, as critics like Daniel Seltz and others pointed out, a very passive and pale recognition of Japan's aggression and Hiroshima's militarist past, the new exhibit, which opened in time for the 1995

[1004] Akiko Naono, "Hiroshima' as a contested memorial site: analysis of the making of the Peace Museum," Hiroshima Journal of International Studies, Vol. 11 (2005), pp. 233- 234.
[1005] Ibid, p. 33.
[1006] Ibid, p. 234.
[1007] Ibid.

anniversary, represented a significant shift in the museum.[1008] For the first time, the museum examined the bombing beyond August sixth and within the context of the war as a whole, including Japanese aggression and atrocities in Asia.

Significantly, the move did not meet much resistance, either from within or outside of the museum and the city administration. One significant factor for the change was generational. Hiraoka, who as a journalist did much to publicize the plight of Korean victims, was part of a cohort of new leaders, academics and journalists who came out of the sixties' struggles.[1009] Together, they constituted a powerful block that could take on both older peace movement notions of the sacred and right-wing intransigence.[1010] Similar to the 1968ers in Germany, many former radicals in Japan were engaged in their own "long march through the institutions."[1011] Just like in Germany, with self-destructive violence and factionalism leading to a dead end in the seventies, many one-time radicals started to enter the academy, NGOs and alternative politics. In the late eighties and the nineties, those who had entered positions of influence and, especially with the temporary end of LDP rule, had a chance to effect change.

Another significant factor that led to change was attributed by one official to "the change in public opinion."[1012] What this meant was a greater acceptance of the need to acknowledge Japan's past crimes. As Harry Harootunian noted, the 1990s were a time of general malaise in Japan as the unstoppable growth and economic chauvinism of the 1980s gave way to despair and

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[1008] See Daniel Seltz, "Remembering the War and the Atomic Bombs: New Museums, New Approaches," *Radical history review* no. 75 (1999), p. 92.
[1009] Hiraoka was older but was very sympathetic to the students' struggle and saw their efforts as connected. Author's Interview with Hiraoka, 13 April 2010.
[1010] Ibid.
[1011] Rudi Dutschke, *Mein langer Marsch: Reden, Schriften und Tagebücherauszwanzig Jahren* (Rowohlt, Hamburg 1980) The "*long march through the institutions*" became synonymous with Rudi Dutschke's name, as well as the strategy of the West German left long after the student movement's demise.
[1012] Naono, "Hiroshima," p. 236.

decline, not unlike the atmosphere in the 1930s. In light of the crisis, there was a greater need to explain the present by looking to the past, which enhanced the significance of the memory wars.[1013] The end of the cold war and the death of Hirohito freed the discursive space by causing Japanese, at least tentatively, to turn away from an exclusive focus on Japan-US relations and to turn their gaze into Asia and their nation's past engagement (and crimes committed) on the continent, a development enhanced by the growing economic significance of China (and Korea). As Sebastian Conrad argued and as many Japanese commentators (who mostly spoke in terms of cultural differences) did not understand, one of the main reasons for West Germany's "better" ability to cope with the past was due to its geo-political situation. Germans had to deal with the U.S. on one hand and East German Communism on the other, while at the same time contending with trying to become Europeans. The Japanese, on the other hand, remained locked into a single reference point, the U.S., which left out Asia and accounts of the war in Asia. The European Union project, and especially French-German reconciliation, would not have been possible without West German tackling of its Nazi past.[1014] In the 1990s, Japan had to deal with a similar situation in Asia. This, and the temporary break in LDP rule, explains why in 1993 (Socialist) Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro issued Japan's first apology to its Asian victims.

Furthermore, and more relevant to Hiroshima itself, with growing affluence in Asian countries, the number of Asian tourists to Hiroshima (and to Japan as a whole) rose significantly in the nineties. Part of the reason for Hiroshima city's greater progressivism, which included the relocation of the Korean memorial that had been denied entry in 1970 into the Peace Park itself, was its hosting of the 1994 Asia Games and the growing number of Asian and especially Korean

[1013] Harry Harootunian, *Japan's Long Postwar: The Trick of Memory and the Ruse of History*, in *The South Atlantic Quarterly,* Volume 99, Number 4, (Fall 2000), p. 732.
[1014] Sebastian Conrad, *Entangled Memories: Versions of the Past in Germany and Japan*, 1945-2001," in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 38, Number 1 (2003), pp. 85-89. See also Sheraphim, p. 318.

visitors.[1015] With more and more Asian tourists supplementing the mostly Western foreign visitors, Hiroshima could not afford to refrain from recognizing Japan's Asian neighbors' memory claims. This was, however, only a temporary progressive victory. In Hiroshima, as in Japan as a whole, the right wing strengthened considerably as tensions with China and the economic crisis continued unabated. Asia was not Europe. If the French could reach out to the West Germans and "reward" German penance for their crimes, Chinese nationalism was much more vindictive. As in the Middle East, a much more apt parallel to Japan's situation than Europe, right wing factions in East Asian countries fed each other, as Chinese, Korean and Japanese nationalists lambasted each other and competed over the "top-victim" spot.

In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this complex situation had a number of even more complicated layers. This was made clear when the mayor of Nagasaki (a well-known critic of Japanese crimes) referred to the A-bomb as "a crime comparable to the Holocaust." This created a storm of criticism in the U.S. In an angry letter to the press, one U.S. Army veteran, after enumerating Japanese atrocities, including "the sexual enslavement of legions of Korean girls," wrote, "these are just a few seeds of Japanese brutality, which ultimately bore fruit in the form of mushroom clouds blossoming over Hiroshima and Nagasaki."[1016] This kind of rhetoric, which was evident in the exchanges regarding Kurose's failed American initiatives, could also be seen through the Enola Gay controversy in the mid-nineties.[1017] Thus, WWII atrocities, by the mid-nineties, became a common political weapon in the hands of competing victim groups. The Japanese left's

[1015] Lisa Yoneyama, "Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity," in Laura Elizabeth Hein and Mark Selden, *Living with the bomb: American and Japanese cultural conflicts in the Nuclear Age* (M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 202.
[1016] Naono, "Hiroshima," p. 230.
[1017] On Enola Gay see, among others, Martin Harwit, *An Exhibit Denied: Lobbying the History of the Enola Gay* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1996); Edward T. Linenthal (ed.), *Hiroshima's Shadow: Writing on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy* (Stony Creek, Conn.: The Pamphleteer's Press, 1997). A full list of materials and resources could be found at http://digital.lib.lehigh.edu/trial/enola/resources/web/ accessed 26 June 2012.

appropriation of the Holocaust was, in turn, met by the America right's appropriation of feminist and left-wing rage over mass rape and vice-versa. These kinds of exchanges over victimhood, as with the Kurose affair, demonstrated the limitations inherent in the victim discourse. Eventually, the tragic irony of this discourse was that the basic empathy and noble feelings that led men and women to aspire to create a community of suffering through the solidarity of victims of war could be used and abused by almost anyone. Suffering was made to have meaning, but what would be the "correct" meaning attributed to it was completely open to interpretation as competing groups worldwide claimed the throne of real victimhood for themselves.

These contradictions and limitations are still not resolved. The same impulses that led the HAC and Auschwitz on their quest also drive the thousands of activists who, from the nineties on, have nobly worked to provide justice to victims of genocide worldwide. The 1940s liberalism of the World Federalists and its ilk has fused with new movements - the same sixties-inspired movements partially responsible for the failure of earlier universalist endeavors - to produce what would become transnational justice. The main reference point of transnational justice, though, was not Hiroshima but the Holocaust. One might argue that Hiroshima's very success contributed to its demise, as genocide kept happening, but Hiroshima and Nagasaki lost their relevance. As Daniel Levy argues, the Holocaust and Hiroshima have changed places through the years. Cold War nuclear anxieties made Hiroshima into one of the main lessons of the 20th century, but by the nineties, with the greater emphasis on genocide and human rights issues, the Holocaust had "usurped" that role and activists in Hiroshima, as we saw – much like activists in Rwanda, Argentina, Palestine and elsewhere – were referring to their own tragedies as

Holocausts in order to gain greater international legitimacy.[1018] The HAC and Hiroshima were victims of this change as their discourse became more and more irrelevant outside of their local contexts. Even within Hiroshima, as Koreans and other victims became more vocal, universalism became untenable by the nineties. But this change of discourse (and the prominence of the Holocaust) does not mean that the Jewish victims achieved the uncontested position of the "universal victim." In Hiroshima and other places, victimhood had to be dressed up in local garb, taken out of context, used and abused for political agendas. What the Kurose affair demonstrates is how early this move was made and how entangled the Holocaust was with Hiroshima and other commemorative projects worldwide.

[1018] Daniel Levy, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), p. 51.

Conclusion

On 4 May 2010, Pace University and John Jay College, both located in the lower Manhattan district of New York City, held an extraordinary public symposium titled: "The Wisdom of the Survivor." The event sought to bring together *hibakusha* and survivors of 9/11. Significantly, Robert J. Lifton was the keynote speaker and members of *hidankyo* and *gensuikyo* who were central to the history of the survivor in Hiroshima and abroad and who figured prominently in the preceding chapters, were also featured as notable speakers. Pacifists and groups working for reconciliation, such as the FOR (Fellowship for Reconciliation), were also present. Although the Jewish Holocaust was not specifically mentioned in the program, Jewish groups and figures had a strong presence and many participants referred to the Holocaust.[1019] Indeed, the survivor ethos that came out of the convergence of Holocaust and Hiroshima commemorations dominated the conference. "We believe," wrote the organizers, " that bringing together these two groups [*hibakusha and* 9/11 survivors] for a day of testimony and

[1019] See, for instance, Ian Burma's and Robert Lifton's comments in the conference video at http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/wisdomconf/video/survivor_conference.mp4 Accessed July 30, 2012

conversation will provide an understanding of the unique political, psychological, and spiritual contributions that survivors of atrocity and their families can make towards a peaceful future."[1020] The premise of the whole event was the same one which animated the AMP and many other ventures examined in these pages: that the survivor of mass atrocity by virtue of that unique experience holds a special form of knowledge and that it is his or her privilege, indeed duty, to use it in the promotion of noble causes.

Following 9/11, survivors of the event and the ruins of the World Trade Center site itself assumed, with surprising speed, many features associated with the survivor community and Hiroshima. Indeed, even the name, Ground Zero, which has been used to refer to Hiroshima and Nagasaki since 1945, was being used within hours of the attack.[1021] Much of what was examined here as a process that took decades, happened much faster in lower Manhattan. The immediate sanctification of the site, tensions over commodification, development of emotional appeal, and veneration of survivors, all happened almost instantly. Commercialization of the site, in particular, was a defining feature of the instant rise of Manhattan's Ground Zero as a *lieu de mémoire.* Within weeks, vendors selling commemorative memorabilia sprang up around the site. When tourists started to return to New York, Ground Zero had become an essential part of the Manhattan tourist circuit.[1022] Religiosity was another defining feature, with the "ground zero cross" and other articles, like fireman's helmets, instantly attaining relic-like status. As in Hiroshima, private loss and communal commemoration fused to produce an emotional appeal many sought, literally, to capitalize on.

[1020] http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/wisdomconf/index.html accessed July 26, 2012

[1021] In a Fox News interview, about two hours after the second tower went down, the building was referred to as Ground Zero by both witness and presenter. See the interview in: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07hJhmiWZSY accessed 26 July 2012.

[1022] On this see Marita Sturken, *Tourists of History: Memory, Kitsch, and Consumerism from Oklahoma City to Ground Zero* (Duke University Press, 2007).

Furthermore, very soon after the 9/11 disaster, the tragedy and its survivors were mobilized in the service of America's feuding political and cultural factions. Not all survivors shared a wish to extend the "wisdom of the survivor" in the service of peace. A few months after the lower Manhattan survivor symposium, survivor prestige was used in the service of a much more controversial agenda. When Muslim groups announced their plan to build a mosque a few blocks from ground zero in November 2010, the issue became a hotbed of controversy. As the issue became entangled with the 2010 midterm elections, many pundits claimed that building a mosque so close to the site would be an affront to the memory of 9/11, while others claimed it would be a victory for free speech and tolerance. Families of victims and survivors were enlisted on both sides of the controversy.[1023] The idea that survivors should have a say in this as in other political issues and that they possessed a certain cultural authority was a given to all involved. Just as with the seventies' controversies in Hiroshima over the JDF parades and student violence, whether one was for or against a particular issue became irrelevant as the debate further solidified the sanctity of both the survivors and the locale of 9/11.

9/11 survivors, as well as survivors of the Rwanda genocide or Bosnian ethnic cleansing, were, of course, heirs to the history of survivors of the Holocaust and the A-bomb. In all places a familiar and established pattern of commemoration, testimony and survivorhood followed much of the same path that was laid by commemoration of the Second World War. Significantly, as discussed in chapter three, the discourse of trauma was the default prism through which tragedy was viewed in all places. The speed and matter-of-fact nature of these cultural developments demonstrates how conventional these notions had become all over the world. However, as discussed in previous chapters, the paradigmatic event for commemoration was seen as the

[1023] http://www.citylimits.org/conversations/111/mosque-debate-religious-intolerance accessed 26 July 2012.

Holocaust. Hiroshima by the nineties has largely disappeared as an urgent concern.[1024] The nature of the 9/11 attacks, however, especially the apocalyptic scenes of downtown Manhattan in ruins, did bring back, for some, Hiroshima's shadow. Antoine Bousquet argued that both events were seen as "major points of rupture in the historical consciousness and chronological narratives of the Western world," where time stopped and another era began.[1025] As Bousquet put it, "Ground Zero is Time Zero." [1026] There is, of course, something uncanny in comparing 9/11, which, as tragic as it was, was limited in scope, with the atomic destruction of a whole city and the radiation poisoning of many more. The fact that 9/11 happened in New York, at the symbolic center of the Western world, has much to do with the disproportionality of the comparison. The fact that both events, however, were points of rupture is undeniable. Both in the 1940s and 2000s, contemporaries divided the world into pre- and post- Hiroshima and 9/11. Fears of Nuclear 9/11, stroked by the American government and others in their effort to mobilize Americans for war, further strengthened the links between the two ground zeros. Following the March 2011 tsunami and nuclear disaster in Japan (commonly referred to as 3/11), Hiroshima seemed to gain even more relevance. With nuclear issues dominating the political agenda in both the Middle East and East Asia, and with 3/11 dramatically demonstrating the relevance of nuclear issues to current affairs, it seemed that Hiroshima might still stage a sort of "return."

The issue of "return" and the changing applicability of historical tragedies were discussed extensively within the context of the Holocaust and its larger relevance to the history of the twentieth century. Eric Hobsbawm wrote in his *Age of Extremes* of a short twentieth century that started in 1914 and ended with the fall of communism. Writing after 9/11, Omer Bartov argued

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[1024] This changed since see for instance Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9/11 In the context of 9/11, Pearl Harbor, rather than Hiroshima, was the initial historical analogy many turned to.
[1025] Antoine Bousquet , "Time Zero: Hiroshima, September 11 and Apocalyptic Revelations in Historical Consciousness'," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.* 34.3 (2006), p. 739.
[1026] ibid.

for a longer view of the twentieth century that started with the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans before WWI and ended with 9/11. While Hobsbawm, as Moishe Postone pointed out, hardly treats the Holocaust as a significant event in his short twentieth century, Bartov puts genocide and mass-violence at the center of his own treatment of the period.[1027] The Holocaust, argued Bartov, is now seen as the "Leitmotif of the Twentieth Century."[1028] Significantly, neither historian treats Hiroshima as a central event. This is hardly surprising as the late twentieth century was characterized more by the quandaries of "intimate killing" (i.e. killings between neighboring communities) rather than by fears of nuclear annihilation. The "discovery of the Holocaust," wrote Bartov, "is, in fact, closely linked to the 'discovery' of genocide."[1029] Indeed, Hobsbawm and Bartov's different emphases and periodization stems from very different understandings of the importance of genocide and the Holocaust to our modern age. Hobsbawm's book is of a different age; it was published in 1994, in the midst of the crisis in Rwanda and Bosnia, before these events as well as the post-1989 opening of Eastern European archives, led to a "re-discovery" of the Holocaust.[1030] Up to the mid-nineties, Bartov argued, the Holocaust was not seen as a crucial event even in the history of WWII, let alone the whole century. The return of the Holocaust can be attributed to the return of genocide, which, looking back, we can now see dominated the long twentieth century. But can we even speak of a "return"? And what does this "return" mean in the context of other events like Hiroshima?

[1027] Moishe Postone, "The Holocaust and the Trajectory of the Twentieth Century," in Moishe Postone and Eric Santner, *Catastrophe and Meaning: The Holocaust and the Twentieth Century* (University of Chicago Press, 2003), p.81.

[1028] Omer Bartov, "The Holocaust as Leitmotif of the Twentieth Century," in Dagmar Herzog, *Lessons and Legacies: The Holocaust in International Perspective* (Northwestern University Press, 2006), p. 3.

[1029] Ibid., p. 4.

[1030] Ibid., p. 16.

Bartov seems wary of seeing the greater focus on the Holocaust as a "return" and keeps the term within quotation marks. Indeed, as shown throughout these pages, the Holocaust and genocide have never gone away. To be sure, the Holocaust that "returned" was a different one than the Holocaust that was discussed in the public sphere to varying degrees up to the 1980s. The links between intimacy and murder and the connections to other genocides were highlighted by the debates of the 1990s and 2000s. These emphases did not exist in the fifties, sixties, and seventies, when the emphasis in scholarship and activism was on drawing lessons from Nazism and the Holocaust in order to understand issues of anti-Semitism and racism - and later the brutality of the Vietnam war.[1031] But the Holocaust as such, although it had different names and usages, never really went away. In Germany, for instance, the Holocaust was talked about constantly but was referred to as the *Judenmord*; it was only in 1978, following the American TV series, "Holocaust," that the terminology started to change.[1032] Similarly, as the HAC journey to Auschwitz demonstrated, the Holocaust was seen as a world historical event already in 1962. What was different then from current discourse, especially in our context, is the tying of the Holocaust to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the dangers of nuclear warfare. It was those ties that drove the HAC and HAP to embark on their worldwide commemoration ventures and that inspired Robert Lifton to come up with his universal psychology of the survivor.

The Holocaust and Hiroshima are, of course, completely different events and it is not a surprise they produced very different discourses. As became clear in the 1990s, the Holocaust was not just about the industrialized killing at Auschwitz but also, perhaps even more so, the

[1031] On the changing discourse see Michael E. Staub, *Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America* (Columbia University Press, 2004).

[1032] See for instance the following two articles published in *Der Spiegel* in 1960 and 1978. In both instances the word Holocaust is not used but the genocide is discussed and condemned in no uncertain terms. In 1978, the word Holocaust is not mentioned and, as Dagmar Herzog who kindly shared this with me pointed out, editors felt compelled to translate the word Holocaust for their readers as *Massenmord* - i.e. "mass murder." See Ibid. for 1960 and http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-40615491.html for 1978. Accessed July 26 2012.

intimate killing of the *Einsatzgruppen* and neighbors slaughtering neighbors. What is notable is not the fact that Hiroshima had little to "offer" in terms of lessons for the 1990s and 2000s, a single atomic horror being very different from those perpetrated by machete wielding murderers, but that most commentators prior to the nineties did not see that difference. The Holocaust and Hiroshima were treated as commensurable and part of a general challenge to modernity. Pairing the genocide of the Jews and Hiroshima was commonplace before the 1970s, when the two discourses started to diverge. Indeed it is telling that Eric Hobsbawm, a historian that came of age in a very different era, uses the word "holocaust" to refer to "nuclear holocaust."[1033] This is how many intellectuals used it up to the nineteen nineties. Masud R. Khan, a Pakistani psychoanalyst, wrote for instance in 1982, "After the Nazi-German holocaust bit the frosted snows of Stalingrad, and the atomic mushroom of American parentage obliterated Hiroshima, the age of heroic wars and universal catastrophes ended, along with myth-making."[1034] In another example, Heinrich Vogel, a German Evangelical minister and peace activist wrote - in a self-serving turn of phrase characteristic for many gentiles in the West German peace movement - "Hiroshima is more than a gas chamber, it is Hell!"[1035] Similar examples were given throughout the preceding chapters. The Holocaust, even up to 1980, was seen as part of a larger rupture and was often spoken of in conjunction with Hiroshima. Our current failure to see these connections or to see Hiroshima's importance for preceding generations obscures Hiroshima's importance for postwar global commemoration culture, including Holocaust commemoration, and its

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[1033] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (Vintage, 1996), p. 229.

[1034] Masud R. Khan review of, "Europe's Inner Demons. An Inquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-Hunt: By Norman Cohn. London: Chatto-Heinemann. 1975," *International Review of Psycho-Analysis,* Vol. 9 (1982), p. 242.

[1035] Quoted in Andrew Oppenheimer, "Extraparliamentary Entanglements: Framing Peace in the Federal Republic of Germany 1945-1974," in Hara Kouki and Eduardo Romanos, *Protest Beyond Borders: Contentious Politics in Europe Since 1945* (Berghahn Books, 2011),p. 29. I thank Chris Lore for directing me to this quote. For more on the metaphorical diminishment of the Holocaust, see Dagmar Herzog, "Pleasure, Sex, and Politics Belong Together":

contribution to the development of the discourses of trauma, witnessing and progressive politics before the 1970s.

The end of the AMP affair signified not just the end of that particular venture, but also, with the end of the Cold War and the "return" of the Holocaust, the un-pairing of the two events. The divergence of the discourses also meant the relative decline in interest in Hiroshima. This was tragic as Hiroshima, throughout the postwar, offered an immanent critique of modernity and especially of our relation to science and technology. Hiroshima, like 9/11, the 2008 financial crisis and 3/11, exposed the shaky foundations of our modernity and exposed the security of late capitalism to be an illusion. It showed that we are living permanently on a brink. As argued above, there are some signs that 9/11 and 3/11, with their uncanny resemblance to Hiroshima and its apocalyptic nightmarish qualities, might signal a sort of "return" of Hiroshima. This does not necessary mean that Hiroshima is about to make headlines again. Hiroshima is still a non-Western tragedy, and as such much less likely to attract intellectual and public attention. It was partially because of that fact that intellectuals in both Japan and the West sought to tie it with the Holocaust: a Western tragedy, which happened in the heart of Europe. The Holocaust case suggests that if Hiroshima was to "return" it would have to revamp its message and make itself relevant to current affairs. As in the case of the Holocaust, we should not speak or strive for a "return" but seek a different configuration and different understanding of the tragedy. This requires a new look at the history of Hiroshima's commemoration and its relative decline.

Hiroshima's disappearance cannot be explained only by shifting intellectual currents. What contributed to Hiroshima's growing (perceived) irrelevance were the weaknesses inherent

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Post-Holocaust Memory and the Sexual Revolution in West Germany," in *Critical Inquiry* Vol. 24, No. 2, Intimacy (Winter, 1998), pp. 393-444

in the dual structure on which Hiroshima's commemoration is based: nuclear universalism and the victim-witness ethos. As demonstrated in these pages, much of the commemoration effort in Hiroshima and beyond resulted in dilution of Hiroshima's subversive potential. Commemoration in the city turned the tragedy into a natural disaster-like affair where both perpetrators and victims disappeared under a mythical mushroom cloud. What Hiroshima liberals and others did was to reconfigure Hiroshima not as a problem of modernity but as a mistake. The bomb was portrayed as a sort of temporary diversion in what was basically a positive, modern, and progressive Japanese story of overcoming hardship and becoming a nation of peace. Whether it was in the HAP statements or Hamai's peace declarations, Hiroshima touted this message of hope. Much of that weakness comes from the inherent difficulty of commemorating an event as a universal and human catastrophe. In his *Ethics of Memory,* Avishai Margalit criticized the Berlin Holocaust Memorial that was built, according to its creators, "by humanity, [and] for humanity."[1036] Germans as perpetrators, Margalit argued, cannot represent the tragedy objectively for humanity, and, furthermore, Jews cannot be reduced to mere "humans," especially as their identity as Jews was the main reason for their murder. Germans, Margalit argued, should establish "an ethical community" by incorporating their crimes into their communal memory as Germans.[1037] Margalit further incorporates the Japanese in his argument, calling on them to recognize the suffering of Asians in their own national memory.[1038] As the HAC and the Peace Museum Curators discovered in the 1980s, it is precisely the difficulty of

[1036] Cited in Yuki Miyamoto, *Beyond the Mushroom Cloud: Commemoration, Religion, and Responsibility After Hiroshima* (Fordham University Press, 2011), p. 27. Miyamoto's thoughtful examination of the ethical consequences and religious background of *hibakusha* praxis came out, unfortunately, too late to be included in this manuscript.
[1037] Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Harvard University Press, 2002), p.81. Miyamoto rightly pointed out that Margalit's critique of the German memorial, though basically correct, also affirms the idea that communal memory is national and should be analyzed and practiced on the nation-state level. See, Miyamoto, p. 28.
[1038] Ibid.

acting in the name of humanity that made it hard for Hiroshima victims to promote their universal message on the international level where they had to increasingly "compete" with others. No matter how much they proclaimed otherwise, victims of the Japanese could not accept commemoration of Japanese victims in the name of humanity.

Hiroshima's message is still a powerful one. Much of its emotional power and persuasiveness comes from the victim-ethos it espouses. It is no accident that the "wisdom of the survivor" conference's statement of purpose started with the morning of August 6 and the story of "Sadako Sasaki, a two-year old girl living a mile from ground zero, [who] was filled with radiation from the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima."[1039] Sadako, the exemplary victim, and her cranes, which the HAC members took on their journeys, symbolize the tragic loss but also the hope of Hiroshima to achieve its goal of attaining peace. It is a story that galvanized the Hiroshima movement and gave meaning to many survivors who dedicated their lives to it, believing that their suffering and efforts would contribute to the fight for peace. Unfortunately, this is also a story that managed to neutralize Hiroshima's political relevance. The bringing together of the personal and the abstract lift Hiroshima out of current politics and concerns and make it into a good universal story. Victim narratives remove Hiroshima from being an immanent concern and plant it firmly in the past. As the case of the AMP project demonstrated, the universalization and abstraction of the victim experience and the making of it into an experience relevant to all, beyond its particular historical circumstances, have turned victimhood into an empty vessel, a trope which all victims of all places could claim. The Hiroshima ethos, as Yuki Miyamoto argued, might have been uniquely inclusive in its rhetoric and, although this

[1039] http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/wisdomconf/ One of Sadako's cranes was also given in 2009 http://articles.cnn.com/2009-12-17/living/origami.gift_1_origami-cranes-sadako-sasaki-lee-ielpi?_s=PM:LIVING

author seriously doubts it, in its praxis.[1040] Nevertheless, other victim groups were not so universally inclined and pressed their unique exclusive claim for redress. Thus, ironically, the success of victims in attaining a moral standing drew others to aspire to a similar position and, thus, ultimately undermined Hiroshima's appeal. Coupled with the changing geo-political map and scholars and activists' changing focus, this development made Hiroshima into a distant concern.

Of course, neutralizing Hiroshima's subversive meaning was an unintended result that stands in complete opposition to the wishes of activists throughout the years. Furthermore, the proliferation of victim voices, of course, is not necessarily a negative development. Across the world survivors of genocide and oppression have been inspired from and have drawn on Holocaust and Hiroshima survivors' experience in their pursuit of justice. As Ruth Amir argued, transnational justice, the heir of victim politics, has changed the nature of political negotiation and postwar settlements worldwide.[1041] Nevertheless, others have sought to capitalize on and benefit from the unassailable aura of the victim. Far too often victims' pain and rightful claims have been mobilized in the service of goals detrimental to their original intent. In some cases this mobilization has led to a vicious cycle of victimization and counter-victimization. The Middle East is a particular example of this. Historian Benny Morris rightly called his definitive account of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict *Righteous Victims*.[1042] With the Holocaust and Nakba mobilized on a daily basis in the service of right-wing politics on both sides, and with historical wounds constantly exacerbated, there is no end in sight for the conflict. A similar cycle can be seen in East Asia where, in nations that were victims of Japanese crimes, nationalist groups have

[1040] Miyamoto, p. 3.
[1041] Amir, p.3
[1042] Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*, Updated. (Vintage, 2001).

nurtured a vehement and often violent and wounded victim ethos that no Japanese apology could ever satisfy. A true Japanese reckoning with the past, in any case, does not seem to be in the cards.

That Hiroshima and progressive politics of redress seem to be part of the problem, rather than the solution, is tragic**.** It is not easy for this author to criticize people who had the most noble of objectives. It is even harder when one sympathizes with their plight and admires their determination. However, throughout much of the history outlined in these pages, individual survivors and organizations were caught inside of forces they could neither understand nor influence. Many of the historical actors in the Hiroshima story, whether Mayor Hamai or the members of the HAC, had only, or at least mostly, the best of intentions. But the road to hell is often paved with good intentions. And with over 20,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, nuclear tensions in both the Middle East and East Asia, and the nuclear power crisis in Japan, hell might still be just around the corner. Hiroshima and Nagasaki still are and should be as relevant as ever. It is crucial we retrace our steps and examine the road we have taken to remake Hiroshima's lesson relevant for our current age.

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