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**Union or slavery: Metropolitan New York and the secession
crisis**

Osborn, David, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1993

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Union or Slavery: Metropolitan New York and the Secession Crisis

by

David Osborn

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

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Abstract

Union Or Slavery: Metropolitan New York And The Secession Crisis

by David Osborn

Adviser: Professor Hans L. Trefousse

This dissertation examines the response of metropolitan New York to the secession crisis of 1860-61. Early chapters cover material from the 1840s and 1850s necessary for an understanding of the reaction to rupture of the Union. An epilogue traces key themes of the secession period through the war years.

On the eve of the Civil War, metropolitan New York was the nation's leading urban center. A watershed of political action and opinion, the metropolis was disproportionately important in national affairs and sectional disputes. Home to one of the largest and most loyal Democratic constituencies in the North, New York also had some of the leading Republican spokesmen and organs in the country.

A major emphasis of this study is making sense of Northern reaction to secession. In discussing the response of the free states to disunion, most leading works on the Civil War characterize the climate of opinion as awkward and difficult to fathom. A careful study of attitudes in metropolitan New York, which contained significant and animated representations of most positions, sheds light on that subject.

As local history, a key concern is incorporating the city of Brooklyn and county of Queens into a history of the metropolitan area. To a considerable degree, the metropolis reacted to

secession as a unit, but there were also important local distinctions.

Further, this study makes extensive use of public opinion. The gravity of a break in the Union broadened political dialogue beyond newspapers and elected officials. Many individuals and organizations which usually paid little attention to public events were moved to express opinions and take actions. An important result was the mobilization of a large Unionist constituency. It eclipsed the normally influential and representative Democratic press, which accepted Southern departure.

The central argument concerns the interplay between slavery and the Union. Given Gotham's Southern sympathies, there was potential during the era of schism for various forms of pro-secession demonstrations. For an array of reasons, that capacity never significantly materialized. Foremost among these were the nature of withdrawal in the lower South and local assurances from moderate Republicans to conservatives that the Union, and not emancipation, was the issue of the hour.

Preface

In 1860 metropolitan New York was the nation's leading urban center. A watershed of political action and opinion, the metropolis was disproportionately important in national affairs and sectional disputes. Home to one of the largest and most loyal Democratic constituencies in the North, New York also had some of the leading Republican spokesmen and organs in the country.

This mixed climate created a charged political atmosphere which both reflected and influenced events throughout the United States.¹ It was also a city accustomed to large public demonstrations and involvement with events of local, national and international consequence.² Decades as the nation's leading port had produced by 1860 a powerful economy based on a variety of sources. Foremost among these was commerce with the South, the interior of the Union and with Europe.³ Those transactions made New York sensitive and potentially vulnerable to developments in other parts of the country.

This study examines the reaction of lower New York to the rupture of the Union in 1860-61. New York City, limited at the time to Manhattan, was the focal point of the metropolis. Brooklyn was the nation's third largest city on the eve of the Civil War. To include a peripheral, semi-rural part of the metropolitan area, the county of Queens is also discussed.

While the historical literature on secession is extensive, most leading local studies focus on the South.⁴ Outstanding

works on the North and disunion by David M. Potter and Kenneth M. Stampp have necessarily limited portraits of the situation in the metropolis.⁵

Scholars have explored many aspects of life in New York at midcentury, although there has not been a study highlighting secession.⁶ The leading area of recent inquiry has been labor and the working class. Sean Wilentz's Chants Democratic: New York City And The Rise of The American Working Class, written in 1984, has been very influential.

With different emphases, several scholars have picked up on Wilentz's focus. These include Christine Stansell's City Of Women: Sex And Class in New York, 1789-1860, Iver Bernstein's The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance For American Society And Politics In The Age Of The Civil War, and Richard B. Stott's Workers In The Metropolis: Class, Ethnicity And Youth In Antebellum New York City.⁷

My study sees the local working class, in the secession era, as an influential conservative constituency within the framework of the Democratic outlook.

Another important book is Edward K. Spann's The New Metropolis: New York City, 1840-1857. He focuses on the strains of growth in the metropolitan area and argues the city was, on balance, successful in handling the expansion of that period.⁸ In that light, he sees the metropolis as influenced more by urbanism than by sectionalism. My study traces the influence of both, but places greater emphasis on sectional factors. However,

Spann's depiction of the metropolis as a unit is germane to my dissertation.

A recent trend in studies of political life in antebellum New York has emphasized class, ethnicity and the decline of deference. Amy Bridges's A City In The Republic: Antebellum New York And The Origins Of Machine Politics is a good example. She argues that New York developed, in the decade before the war, a distinct politics which turned on local and not national issues. According to Bridges, the city also spawned a new breed of professional politicians, as wealthy men withdrew from public life.⁹ While my study argues metropolitan area politics was heavily influenced by sectional affairs, Bridges's point about professional politicians is valid and relevant.

Broadly speaking, my study is political history. It approximates such works as Jerome Mushkat's The Reconstruction Of The New York Democracy, 1861-1874, which views party identification as a "way of life" which was "articulated by leaders and broadly shared by members."¹⁰ My approach is that New Yorkers used the process to take actions and express attitudes. But the political climate was shaped by an active public debate and other means transcending the casting of votes.

This study has several major emphases. One is making sense of Northern reaction to secession. In discussing the response of the free states to disunion, most leading works on the Civil War characterize the climate of opinion as awkward and difficult to comprehend.¹¹ A careful study of attitudes in metropolitan New

York, which contained significant and animated representations of most positions, sheds light on that subject.

In addition, as local history, an important area of inquiry is the degree to which opinions and actions were shaped by regional or institutional concerns. In other words, I will show how individuals and organizations used the crisis of the Union as a context within which they could maneuver for gains in the metropolis. From that perspective, this study is both sectional conflict history and urban history.

I begin with an overview of metropolitan New York in 1860, including material from the 1840s and 1850s necessary for an understanding of the eventual response to secession. This includes general introductions to Brooklyn and Queens, often overlooked in literature on mid 19th century New York. The election of 1860 is examined as a prelude to the metropolis' response to rupture of the Union. After that, I cover New York and the secession crisis through the initial fighting at Fort Sumter in April 1861. An epilogue traces key themes of secession through the war.

My central argument concerns the interplay between slavery and the Union. Given Gotham's Southern sympathies, there was potential, during the era of schism, for various forms of pro-secession demonstrations. For an array of reasons, that capacity never materialized. Foremost among these were the importance of the republic to the metropolis, the nature of departure in the deep South, and assurances from moderate Republicans to

conservatives that the Union, and not emancipation, was the issue at hand.

Dissertations are daunting undertakings. Writers of them require support on many levels. Foremost, I wish to thank my adviser, Hans L. Trefousse, Distinguished Professor of History at the Graduate Center. He suggested the subject matter, and provided enormous help in the research, writing and revision stages of this project. His encouragement was heartening and his interest in the Civil War era inspiring. Other Graduate Center faculty who helped me along the way include Richard C. Wade, Thomas Kessner, Ari A. Hoogenboom, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Edward Pessen, Irwin Yellowitz and Jacob Judd.

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Research can be intimidating, although navigating historical collections is eased by helpful and able staff. I wish to thank archivists and librarians at New York Public Library, New-York

Historical Society, the New York State Library in Albany, Library of Congress, Queens Borough Public Library in Jamaica, and the Henry E. Huntington Library in San Marino, California. Graduate students who share the obstacles of preparing dissertations are a great source of support. Among the many who helped me are Glenn Speer, Jeffrey Kroessler and Peter Consenstein.

Finally, I thank my father, Murray S. Osborn, who spawned in me an early interest in American history, and my best friend, Cynthia Thompson, who shared all the toil and satisfaction.

Abbreviations Used In Footnotes & Bibliography

BHS	Brooklyn Historical Society, Brooklyn, NY
CU	Columbia University, New York, NY
HEHL	Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA
HSOP	Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
JAH	<u>Journal of American History</u>
JSH	<u>Journal of Southern History</u>
LC	Library of Congress, Washington, DC
MA	Municipal Archives, New York, NY
MVHR	<u>Mississippi Valley Historical Review</u>
NYHS	New-York Historical Society, New York, NY
NYHSQ	<u>New York Historical Society Quarterly</u>
NYH	<u>New York History</u>
NYPL	New York Public Library, New York, NY
NYSL	New York State Library, Albany, NY
NYU	New York University, New York, NY
QC	Queens College, Flushing, NY
QPL	Queens Public Library, Jamaica, NY
STL	St. Lawrence University Library, NY
UNC	University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, NC
UC	University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL
UR	University of Rochester Library, Rochester, NY

Notes

1. See, for example, Sunday Times & Noah's Weekly Messenger, 9 December 1860, p. 2.

2. See, for example, New York Herald, 17 June 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 12 October 1860, p. 3; Thomas Low Nichols, Forty Years Of American Life, 1821-1861, (New York, 1937), pp. 183-87; Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, 20 October 1860, p. 333.

3. The classic treatment of this topic remains, Robert Albion, The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860, (New York, 1939); also see, Nichols, Forty Years Of American Life, p. 370; Egal Feldman, Fit For Men: A Study Of New York's Clothing Trade, (Washington, DC, 1960), p. 35.

4. Some recent examples are, Walter L. Buenger, Secession and the Union in Texas, (Austin, 1984); Michael P. Johnson, Toward a Patriarchal Republic: The Secession of Georgia, (Baton Rouge, 1977); William L. Barney, The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860, (Princeton, 1974), Steven A. Channing, A Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina, (New York, 1970); an

older study is, Mary Scragham, The Peaceable Americans of 1860-1861, (New York, 1921).

5. Kenneth M. Stamp, And The War Came: The North And The Secession Crisis, 1860-61, (Chicago, 1964), reprint of, (Baton Rouge, 1950); David M. Potter, Lincoln And His Party In The Secession Crisis, (New Haven, 1962), reprint of (New Haven, 1942); a more recent work on this subject is, William C. Wright, The Secession Movement In The Middle Atlantic States, (Rutherford, NJ, 1973).

6. Many works fall into this category. I refer to several in the notes that follow. A good recently published bibliographical essay is in, Iver Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance For American Society And Politics In The Age Of The Civil War, (New York, 1990), pp. 341-47. A slightly older yet exhaustive bibliography is in, Edward K. Spann, The New Metropolis: New York City, 1841-1857, (New York, 1981), pp. 514-534.

7. Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City And The Rise Of The American Working Class, 1788-1850, (New York, 1984); Christine Stansell, City Of Women: Sex And Class in New York, 1789-1860 (New York, 1986); Bernstein, New York City Draft Riots; Richard B. Stott; Workers In The Metropolis: Class, Ethnicity And Youth In Antebellum New York City, (Ithaca, 1990).

8. Spann, The New Metropolis.

9. Amy Bridges, A City In The Republic: Antebellum New York And The Origins Of Machine Politics, (Cambridge, 1984; Stott, Workers In The Metropolis, p. 237, also sees politics in immigrant wards as shaped around local issues, neighborhood control and patronage.

10. Jerome Mushkat, The Reconstruction Of The New York Democracy, 1861-1874, (Rutherford, NJ, 1981), pp. 10-11.

11. See, for example, James M. McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom: The Civil War Era, (New York, 1988), pp. 248-9; David H. Donald, Liberty And Union, (Boston, 1978), pp. 77-8; Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861, (New York, 1976), p. 514; Peter J. Parish, The American Civil War, (New York, 1975), pp. 70-71; Allan Nevins, The Emergence Of Lincoln: Prologue To Civil War, (New York, 1950), pp. 335-6.

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Chapter 1: The Democracy on the Eve of the Crisis

While it never held a monopoly on power in the antebellum era, the Democratic Party was the most powerful political institution in the metropolitan area.¹ The ferment of the mid 1850s which saw the birth of the Republican Party weakened the Democrats in New York State. But local party defections were insignificant.²

In 1854, for example, despite large Democratic losses across the state, the party's gubernatorial nominee, Horatio Seymour, took more than 60-percent of the vote in the city.³ Two years later, New York gave James Buchanan roughly the same proportion of votes in the Presidential election, even though Charles Fremont carried the state's electoral votes. Domination of local races was even more impressive. Democrats took 14 of the 16 city seats in the State Assembly and all races for the United States House of Representatives.⁴ In 1858 the Democrats continued to hold sway in New York City, although Republican gubernatorial nominee Edwin D. Morgan, a city businessman, was successful.⁵

On the eve of the Civil War, downstate Democrats were the party's center of strength.⁶ The basis of that strength, in an electoral sense, was the immigrant vote, especially that of the Irish and Germans. Democratic leaders recognized this and worked to cultivate the allegiance of those citizens. This included public support for immigration and toleration. Democrats attacked earlier episodes of exclusion in American history, portraying themselves as guardians of the tradition of openness.

A top Democrat speaking at Tammany Hall in September 1855 said: "The colony at Plymouth was a religious association who wished to enjoy their own peculiar views and to exclude all who did not agree with them. They made no pretensions to religious toleration."⁷

The opposition, which, by 1860, was the Republicans, expressed scorn and jealousy over the Democratic hold on the immigrants. The New York Tribune, for instance, complained that "the Irish emigration to this country is said to be settling in again -- probably owing to the demand for free and enlightened Democratic voters next Autumn."⁸

On one level, the Democrats were a diverse entity, with many factions and divisions. Some of these were based on ideology; others on personal rivalries, while many centered on quarrels over access to patronage. The leading components of the party locally were the long established Tammany Hall and Mozart Hall, founded in 1858 as the personal machine of Fernando Wood.⁹ Despite these splits and rivalries, the groups, and other elements of the Democracy in New York, shared common features at a time when party identification was in large part a way of life.¹⁰

The most important component of the Democratic outlook by 1860 was opposition to antislavery agitation and the Republican party. This thrust in the Democratic agenda, which included many elements, had been taking shape and increasing in importance since the mid 1850s in response to the growing strength of the

other side. For an understanding of the eventual Democratic response to secession, a major part of what might be termed an anti-antislavery outlook was the attitude towards the South.

The party's center of strength since 1854 had clearly shifted to the South.¹¹ By 1860 local Democrats were aware that success on the national level depended on votes from the cotton states, which, as one party leader wrote, "must elect the candidate." In that light, many held that pleasing the South should be a key goal. Major figures such as William D. Kennedy, grand sagem of Tammany Hall in 1860, and ex-Senator John A. Dix, stressed the need to placate Dixie.¹²

Pro-Democratic organs also called for helping the South in any way possible, especially by advocating a "war against this eternal quarter of a century nigger agitation -- this treasonable abolition raid upon the institution of the South. That is the only real issue."¹³ With few exceptions, factions took a pro-South stand on national issues. In 1858, for instance, both Tammany and Mozart backed the Administration on the Lecompton controversy.¹⁴

Yet, there was an undercurrent of unease with blind support of the South, particularly the extreme position in Dixie. A journal close to the party and supportive of the cotton states, for example, accepted the Dred Scott decision but insisted that "further than this the South has no right to ask us to go."¹⁵ Tammany felt compelled to justify support for the pro-slavery Kansas constitution as a function of expediency and not as a case

of pandering to the planters.¹⁶ The secession crisis would test the depth of New York Democratic allegiance to the South.

Another part of the Democrat's pro-South, anti-Republican position dealt with localism. In part, this was a continuation of earlier opposition to what was perceived as meddling in local and private affairs by reformers linked to the Whig or Know Nothing parties. A New York Irish periodical had argued in the early 1850's that: "If you cannot make an impression on the conviction and judgment of the mind by moral suasion, all the coercion in the world will not suffice to make a man temperate or moral."¹⁷ Much of that aversion to meddling focused on the Republicans by 1860.

Beyond that, party spokesmen lauded self-government and non-interference with social and economic institutions as republican virtues which placed faith in the ability of residents to govern their lives. Speaking at a Brooklyn Democratic rally in 1856, a prominent party figure explained:

The Democratic principle seeks to preserve power in the hands of the people; that they may themselves exercise it in every department of government, in the choice of rulers (not rulers, either, in the proper signification of the word, for the people themselves are the rulers) whether it relate to those who are to make or those who are to administer the laws. It intends that the people shall reserve that power to themselves, and exercise it according to their own good sense and pleasure. It asserts the capacity of the people for self government, but as they are engaged in the various pursuits of life, taking thought what they shall eat, what they shall drink and wherewithal they shall be clothed.¹⁸ They also used the concept as a political tool attractive to

constituents, notably the Irish.¹⁹

Democratic thought linked antislavery agitation,

sabbatarianism, temperance and other reform crusades as unwarranted intrusions into private and regional matters. These initiatives, Democrats feared, unfairly established firm moral yardsticks which could serve as a first step towards intruding into the lives of individuals in a variety of ways. Tammany, in 1858, protested against rumored Sunday restrictions in New York, which would include

orders for the arrest of all newsboys calling aloud the names of the newspapers which they vend, at any hour of the Sabbath. Next we have no doubt that the milkman will have the same grand denunciation hurled against him, and at no distant day the fireman will lay himself liable to the wrath of the same official if he presumes to cry 'fire, turn out' (on Saturday night or Sunday).²⁰

The Republicans' attack on slavery and the South was, by 1860, the most glaring case of that meddling pursuit, Democrats argued.²¹

In that light, area Democrats compared their position of subservience to the state legislature with the South's fears of an active antislavery zeal in the North. Since 1857, Republican governors and a Republican-dominated legislature had taken several moves to limit the home rule of the metropolis. The most obvious was the creation of an Albany-controlled police force to replace local officers. Democrats, seizing on an angle to forge common cause with the South, cried the police issue was the opening wedge for an overreaching majority seeking to destroy local prerogatives.²²

Moreover, party faithful feared Republican free soil efforts jeopardized the Union. One thrust in the agenda here claimed the

Republicans were cynically and dangerously using the emotional appeals of antislavery as a tool to win elections. A Brooklyn Democrat, for instance, described the opposition as "crafty enemies of peaceful progress" and "demagogues who to serve their ambitions would" tear "our Union into shreds."²³ At public meetings in the late 1850', Republicans were regularly cast as "enemies of the American Union."²⁴

Democrats who communicated with Southern leaders frequently heard threats to leave the Union if the Republicans gained control of the national government. I will discuss later the degree to which party faithful were troubled by these warnings. For now, it is worth noting, for example, that a major local figure in March 1860 feared "the election of a sectional President, with all its fatal, unavoidable consequences, affecting the very existence of our Union."²⁵ At the very least, metropolitan area Democrats dreaded the consequences of disunion to the extent that they held such talk of departure could not be ignored.²⁶

Still, local Democratic positioning included relatively little of what could be termed a pro-slavery outlook along the lines of Southern thought on this topic. While some spokesmen and organs touted human bondage,²⁷ there was no public support for such extreme planks as reopening the international slave trade or reintroducing bondage in the North.²⁸ The metropolitan Democracy focused on refuting parts of the Republican free soil ideology, including the claim the founding fathers were

antislavery.²⁹ They saw bondage as an acceptable local institution, with some rights in the territories, and insisted antislavery agitation was not worth risking a rupture of the Union.

Part of that argument maintained that those held in servitude did not deserve the attention or sympathy of the nation's political energies. That brings the discussion to another element of Democratic opposition to the antislavery crusade, which was an intense racism. As Republican strength grew, local Democrats revealed a more devastating prejudice.

Some of this was opposition to potential economic competition with ex-slaves.³⁰ Just as often, though, the emphasis was on the slaves as members of a degraded, inferior race. An open letter from a Long Islander in February 1860 revealed much of this racist sentiment:

What has any colored race, rather what have all the colored races that have ever had an existence, ever done to sustain the human family, in comfort, or to furnish the necessaries of life -- Africa is now, to this day, the same unredeemed savage wilderness, that she was four thousand years ago, except what the white man has done.³¹

The specter of social integration with freedmen was depicted with horror. In urging voters to reject the Republicans, a Democratic periodical asked whether they wanted "to emancipate the negroes, that they may amalgamate with the white blood of this continent, and drag it down to their level?"³² An intense hatred of black people was a key unifying force among downstate Democrats.³³

Another and ultimately bizarre aspect of Democratic prejudice was holding those in servitude responsible for sectional hostilities. Party adherents charged that the residence of large numbers of black slaves in the South stirred misguided moralists in the North to kick up a crusade which had taken over public life. While they seethed against Republicans, local Democrats raged more zealously against the presence in the republic of those of African descent.

An additional common ingredient in the Democratic outlook was devotion to the Union and nationalism. If Democratic nationalism was conservative, in contrast to the Republicans' progressive nationalism, it was no less powerful and important. Seymour, for instance, was saluted for his "national, conservative, patriotic spirit."³⁴ The major party organ in Queens county thundered in early 1860 with this zeal:

And let every patriotic American this year sincerely and heartily seek to promote peace and union throughout our land, for the preservation of the most sublime constitution known to the world -- a character which, if we live under its blessed influence, are faithful to ourselves, and to the cause of Truth and Civil Liberty, must ultimately triumph wherever civilized man can be found.³⁵

In addition, on the eve of the crisis, a continued Union of the states was an important component of the Democracy's nationalism. Andrew Jackson was the most often acknowledged hero, and much of this focused on the famed Unionist stance of the 1830s.³⁶ For reasons of prosperity, shared traditions and emotional connection, metropolitan Democrats ascribed to the belief that the Union should be held together. That view would

cause consternation in the secession era when it conflicted with sympathy for the South as an injured party.

Before turning to differences between the Democratic factions, a final common element was important links to New York's financial and commercial community. While not officially connected to the party, the Journal of Commerce was harshly anti-Republican and followed or shaped Democratic policy.³⁷ Of the businessmen who took an active role, most dealt with Tammany Hall. Among these were the banker August Belmont and dry goods merchant Joshua J. Henry, both involved in the Southern trade.³⁸ But Mozart Hall, the upstart faction, also had ties to men of commerce.³⁹

Sectors of the business community which worked with the Democracy did so as conservatives opposed to perceived Union-threatening postures of the Republicans. Those men of commerce organized such developments as the massive demonstration of December 1859 denouncing the John Brown raid and the anti-Lincoln fusion ticket in the 1860 Presidential race.⁴⁰ The position of these merchants, caught between loyalty to Southern customers and attachment to the Union, would be pivotal in the secession months.

Differences among local Democrats in 1860 were based more on degree than absolutes. In other words, certain quarters more vigorously espoused the pro-South, anti-antislavery agenda than others. The broad outlines of the split flowed from the 1840s

and the division between Barnburner free soil Democrats and the Hunkers, who supported bondage.⁴¹ An important demarcation was the 1848 Presidential race. In that contest former President Martin Van Buren ran on the Free Soil ticket, supported by many elements of the state's Democracy. Among those were Issac Fowler, John A. Dix, John Cochrane and Samuel J. Tilden, all still key figures on the eve of the war.⁴² Other New Yorkers stayed with the regular party nominee.

As an outgrowth of that campaign, the state Democracy split between a free soil, or Soft group, and a Hard faction, which backed the rights of slavery in the territories.⁴³ With varying degrees of intensity, and many shifts in position, the Hard-Soft rivalry remained a major defining point in the party through 1860. Daniel S. Dickinson, an upstate former Senator, was the Hard chief, while the Softs, who for the most part controlled the regular organization of the Democracy, accepted Horatio Seymour's leadership.⁴⁴ By 1858, Tammany Hall was seen as the Soft element, while Mozart Hall continued the Hard tradition in the city.

It is difficult to decipher the importance of the division. For one thing, the Softs had by 1860 lost their antislavery component. Leading free Soil Democrats of the late 1840s such as John A. Kennedy, Preston King and William C. Bryant and his Evening Post had become Republicans in the realignment of the mid 1850s.⁴⁵ The Soft position moved from free soil to popular sovereignty. Since the New York's Democracy's outlook was

increasingly based on opposition to antislavery, the brand of local prerogative advocated by the Softs was hardly aimed at keeping slavery out of the territories. In that context, the ideological division seems insignificant; some Southerners felt equally comfortable with Dickinson and Seymour.⁴⁶

Further, shifts between the camps were common, and considerations of merger created additional rifts. In 1859-60, for instance, Dickinson and other Hards co-operated with Soft leaders, while Wood insisted on maintaining the separation.⁴⁷ Cochrane, a Congressman who would become very influential in the schism crisis, was a Free Soiler in 1848, and a leading Tammany figure in the 1850s before becoming chairman of Mozart's general committee in early 1861.⁴⁸ Wood, too, worked with the Soft leadership of Tammany in the 1850s.⁴⁹

But contemporaries took the split seriously. Throughout the 1850s, the factions ran competing candidates in elections and sent rival delegations to conventions.⁵⁰ The Tammany-Mozart rift manifested itself in routine disputes over which was the true Democratic party in New York City. Even in the midst of secession, Tammany made the question of legitimacy more important than producing a response to the crisis.⁵¹

The dispute took on a life of its own, but there were also matters of access to patronage, status and prestige. In the late 1850s, for example, the Hard were buttressed in competition for appointive offices because they had backed Buchanan for the nomination more vigorously than the Softs. Augustus Schell, head

of the New York customhouse, was the most obvious example of this.⁵²

In the secession period, Tammany and Mozart took different stances, which corresponded to the Soft-Hard division. For that reason, the distinction cannot be dismissed and warrants some exploration.

Until 1858, the local Soft-Hard division was in many ways an internal Tammany Hall dispute. Factions maneuvered for leadership within the organization, with the Softs usually controlling the general committee. Before forming his own party, Wood attempted to take over the Tammany hierarchy with a slate of his own. When that effort collapsed, he formally withdrew and established Mozart Hall as a rival Democratic group which claimed to represent the Hard view.⁵³

Tammany stalwarts belittled Wood's move as an attempt to establish a personal machine that would survive by luring members through the promise of federal patronage. A key point here was Wood's link to Schell, the Collector, and the Administration's inclination at the time to favor Hards in appointments to office.⁵⁴ The charge, of course, cannot be easily dismissed. Patronage was a driving force in party affairs and disputes. To many activists, disposition of available public offices was the mainstay of political life.⁵⁵ The New York Democracy's split in the election of 1860 between Douglas and Breckinridge supporters, for example, led to many threats and dismissals from office.⁵⁶

Even so, Wood's claim to portraying Mozart as the Hard group

and the split with Tammany as a function of ideology contained a good deal of validity. Southerners lauded the Wood faction as the section which more ardently supported the rights of slaveholders and of the cotton states.⁵⁷ Elements of the party which supported Mozart Hall were more rabid in their pro-South stances. These included Charles O'Connor, an attorney prominent in Democratic affairs, former secretary of state Gideon J. Tucker the Daily News and The New York Herald. Wood was accepted as the Hard leader in other parts of the metropolis. Most importantly, he had been an outspoken supporter of Dixie's aspirations since entering Congress in the early 1840s.⁵⁸

In that light, despite Daniel Dickinson's opinion of Wood, who he described as "distrustful of wisdom, fidelity and moral sense,"⁵⁹ Mozart had valid claims to recognition as the Hard Democracy in New York.⁶⁰ The timing of Wood's creation of Mozart as the Hard faction was also historically accurate. While always important, the slavery issue became the clear focus of political life in the late 1850s. Intensity of support for the South, in other words, was more of a defining point among New York Democrats in 1859 than in, say, 1855.

Even so, Mozart Hall did not immediately garner the allegiance of all Democrats who inclined toward the Hard position. The grave mistrust of Wood and desire to remain with the regular wing of the party kept many in Tammany. In that light, while the Wood group was clearly Hard in outlook, it did not represent all rabidly pro-South Democrats in New York.

Tammany, at least through August 1860, had the advantage of acceptance by the state organization, called the Regency, as the official component of the party in New York City.⁶¹ One reason for this was that the Regency leaders, railroad barons Dean Richmond and Peter Caggar, were Softs. But more urgently, they needed close co-operation with party elements in lower New York, the only section of the state yielding significant levels of Democratic votes and financial contributions. A Regency chief writing to a prominent Tammany Democrat in 1860 about the need for campaign funds asked: "Can the money be raised? It can only come from your city."⁶²

As long as Tammany controlled the party apparatus, the Regency needed good relations with the Hall.

Tammany, further, remained an organization of considerable strength and influence. Notwithstanding defections to Mozart, most well known Democrats who identified with a faction were Tammany men. Among these were Congressmen Daniel Sickles and Cochrane, Samuel Tilden, Elijah J. Purdy, August Belmont, William Kennedy and John Dix, an example of the Hard-leaning figures who refused to countenance Wood's creation of Mozart. Despite siding with the Administration on Lecompton, Tammany saw Stephen Douglas as the Democratic leader, part of the qualification of support for the Southern-dominated party. That endorsement was still important enough to place Tammany backing at the forefront of the Little Giant's bid to secure the nomination.⁶³

In addition, some of the patronage bonanzas were Tammany

controlled. The local Post Office, for instance, was directed by Grand Sachem Issac Fowler until May 1860 when he fled to Cuba in the wake of a \$155,000 embezzlement scandal. A businessman who supported the party lamented that the episode "has cast a gloom over the Democratic ranks, and is a disgrace to our government."⁶⁴ While the event spotlighted Tammany's reputation for corruption, the President installed as new Postmaster John Dix, a sachem.⁶⁵

In the secession era, Tammany and Mozart ran competing slates of candidates in local, state and federal elections, with some cross endorsements. Tammany held more seats in the City Council and state legislature, but Mozart was competitive, given its youth.⁶⁶ Most importantly, it held the city's highest elective post through Mayor Fernando Wood.

By 1860, Wood, a veteran of 25 years of Democratic politics, was a nationally known figure who inspired powerful reactions, both positive and negative.⁶⁷ His rabid Hard position on slavery in the territories and denunciations of Republican rule from Albany made him popular in the South, where he had both business and political connections. Wood's emphases on the dangers of social and economic competition with blacks if slavery ended were calculated to appeal to and instill fear in both local voters and Southern opinion. Some sectors in the cotton states touted the Mayor for a spot on the 1860 Democratic Presidential ticket.⁶⁸

A major figure in New York's political life in the mid 19th

century, Wood combined good political instincts, fierce anti-Republicanism, devotion to the metropolis and a willingness to do almost anything to gain and hold elective office. In a more profound way than other contemporaries, he realized the political benefit of championing the cause of the city's growing immigrant community, especially the Irish. He used the powers at his disposal to help those citizens, tried to identify with them, and publicly espoused their cause. Wood was rewarded with their overwhelming support.⁶⁹

In that light, many scholars have viewed Weed as forerunner to, if not mentor of, William M. Tweed.⁷⁰

Assessments of Wood as a public figure can come on several levels. Many of his acts were cynical and opportunistic. Despite heralding immigration, he flirted briefly with Know Nothingism in the mid 1850s when it seemed nativism might become an important political force. Shifts between Hard and Soft factions led many Democrats to a grave mistrust of Wood. The extent of the Mayor's abuse of power and subversion of elections was alarming at a time when such practices were common.⁷¹

On the other hand, he navigated the political waters of the era with remarkable skill. His only major miscalculation occurred in the secession era when he pushed his pro-South agenda too far at a time of rampant unionism.

Wood made his first successful run for the Mayoralty in 1854. Typically, he tried to appear as the champion of all factions of the bifurcated Democracy. The key to his triumph, as

would be the case constantly, was huge margins in the immigrant wards.⁷² While accusations of gross corruption would later surface, Wood's first term was smooth enough that even reformers backed his re-election in 1856.⁷³

One area in which Wood overstepped the limits of power was with the Police department. For instance, to reward favorites, he sanctioned frequent high cash bonuses for normal acts of duty.⁷⁴ Some charges along those lines surfaced in the canvass of 1856,⁷⁵ but the cries became louder after he was re-elected. As an outgrowth of those allegations, the Republican-controlled state legislature, under the leadership of the new Republican Governor John A. King, of Queens, moved to take over police functions in lower New York.⁷⁶

Without question, political motivation played a part in the move. Police were important in a variety of ways. These included supervising elections and protecting campaign rallies. Looking ahead to the canvasses of 1858 and 1860, Republicans wanted to take the Police out of the control of the downstate Democratic mayors. That was probably the prime motivation. But the measure also had valid weight as an anti-corruption device.⁷⁷

The police legislation, passed in April 1857, created a metropolitan district encompassing New York City, Brooklyn, Westchester and Staten Island. The Board overseeing the force consisted of the Mayors of Brooklyn and New York, and five members appointed by the governor. Simultaneously the legislature enacted a tough temperance law, severely curtailing

liquor sales. Irish and German residents, the Democrats' prime constituents, reacted angrily to the intrusion into their lives. Worse yet, the law would be enforced by unfamiliar police under the aegis of state authorities.⁷⁸

Taken together, the acts and response captured the core of the downstate Democracy. Even party figures who opposed Wood supported the Mayor's determination to resist the threat to local prerogative symbolized by the police legislation. Isiah Rynders, local federal marshall, reported that

the Democracy of the City as far as I know were animated in this quarrel with but one general feeling and that was against the usurpations of the Black Republicans and a desire to uphold the City authority in their just and legal resistance to the unconstitutional laws passed by the late legislature.

On several fronts, New York approached serious levels of civil unrest in battling the extension of state power. Scuffles broke out between the old city police and new metropolitan officers. Residents of immigrant wards clashed with the metropolitans in the spring and summer of 1857. On those occasions, "Three cheers were given for Fernando Wood" by the residents. The most serious episodes were riots in July in Irish and German wards as newly formed and unprepared units of metropolitan police attempted to put teeth into the excise regulations.⁷⁹

Wood distanced himself from the worst outbreaks of violence, but in other ways welcomed the chance to stand with his supporters in opposition to Republican policies. The Mayor bemoaned that the city had "fallen to such a feeble state of

vassalage." Refusing to recognize the new system, in mid June Wood and defunct city police barricaded themselves in City Hall. They threatened a confrontation before a militia regiment defused the dispute.¹⁰

Those episodes were important in several ways. First, they enhanced the link of the Irish and German voters to the Democrats, who more clearly stood as defenders of local rights against meddling Republicans. Second, the confrontations of 1857 furthered the pro-South orientation of the local Democracy. Parallels could be drawn between the cotton states' fears of Northern interference with Dixie's social institutions and the upstate Republicans' assumptions of control of aspects of city life. Third, the showdown at City Hall established Wood as the leading symbol of the metropolis' search for greater autonomy.

The legislature also amended the city charter and shortened the Mayor's term by a year. Forced to stand for re-election in December 1857, Wood retained the official support of Tammany Hall.¹¹ Yet, a coalition of disaffected Democrats, Republicans and Americans rallied around the candidacy of Daniel F. Tiemann, managing to defeat the incumbent by a slight margin. While the outgoing Mayor carried the immigrant wards, he suffered reductions in votes in those sections. One reason was that, as an officeholder, he was held partly responsible for the panic of 1857, which hit the city's workers hard.¹²

Wood's comeback in 1858-9 was, in the context of Democratic politics of the day, remarkable. He successfully challenged

Tammany's lock on local party affairs with a self-styled consortium of immigrant voters and merchants. Efforts to cultivate support among city workers, however opportunistic they were, paid off politically. The degree to which those citizens flocked to Mozart demonstrated that Wood had developed a personal following which transcended the normal allegiance of the newcomers to Tammany Hall. When Wood left Tammany, he took along thousands of Irish and German residents of New York City, at least as they related to Mayoral elections. Wood also held the allegiance of many of the quasi-street gangs, helpful in the rough world of ward politics.¹³

Since the Mayor had both local and national aspirations, it is hard and misleading to separate those desires in explaining Wood's decision to found Mozart Hall. By operating independently, he would both seek to reclaim City Hall and improve his chances at the 1860 Democratic national convention.¹⁴

But before that, he had to regain the top post in New York. In 1859, Tammany ran William F. Havemeyer. A former Mayor, he was identified as a Soft with a reform streak, a move designed to spotlight Wood's corruptionist image.¹⁵ Wood, of course, was the Mozart Democracy's nominee, while the Republicans nominated George Opdyke. Efforts to produce an anti-Wood fusion collapsed, even though the Republicans viewed Fernando's election as "A serious public calamity." Despite the opposition of almost the entire city political establishment, including Democrats, Wood won the mayoralty for a third time.¹⁶

Wood's extreme pro-South reputation and the bleak state of sectional relations played roles in the contest. The Brown raid of October and subsequent threats to secede were potent campaign issues, eclipsing local concerns. Fernando's stance as a friend of Dixie probably helped him gain votes in a city heavily reliant on harmony between the North and South.

Beyond the Tammany-Mozart rift, there were other sectors of the local Democracy. Peter Cooper, for example, the wealthy industrialist, was part of a group of independent Democrats identifying themselves as reformers. A conservative mix of Hard and Soft men, opposing both Halls, coalesced around the Stuyvesant Institute.⁸⁷ Belmont, Tilden and Samuel Barlow, a prominent attorney, formed in October 1859 the Democratic Vigilant Association to support Southern rights.⁸⁸

In assessing the downstate Democracy on the eve of the war, several points should be stressed. First, they were a self-conscious group of people who shared certain beliefs and ways of looking at both public and private life. This was even more true in 1860 than in 1850, since the free soil element had abandoned the party in the middle of the decade. It is significant that despite the upheavals of secession and war, the Democratic vote in New York remained consistent from 1854 to 1864.

The central uniting issue for Democrats was opposition to the Republicans' antislavery stance; they identified themselves in relation to the opposition. Differences between Hard and Soft

outlooks, between Mozart and Tammany, were usually overcome by a greater sense of antipathy toward the Republican party. In that light, internal divisions would be bridged and the Democracy would unite behind an anti-Lincoln fusion ticket in the Presidential election of 1860.

But the pressures of a rupture of the Union beginning in November 1860 presented a different set of circumstances. At that time, with greater stakes and without the Republicans as a common enemy, the pressures of secession would magnify the significance of what till then had been relatively minor disputes over the degree of adherence to certain party planks.

Before the schism of 1860-61, Democratic emphases on nationalism and opposition to Republican antislavery seemed compatible. That was no longer the case in the disunion era. Much of the response would break down between focuses on the Union or on emancipation as the key issue.

One final point involves a basic dilemma of local power and wider weakness. Democrats held sway in metropolitan New York but increasingly faced the prospect of being overruled in the state, region, and even their own party. The loss of national leadership in 1860 would confound that quandary and produce a variety of reactions.

Notes

1. Alexander B. Callow, Jr., The Tweed Ring, (Westport, CT, 1981), p. 7; first published in 1966.

2. Joel Silby, A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party In The Civil War Era, 1860-68, (New York, 1977), chap. 1; Hendrik Booraem V, The Formation Of The Republican Party In New York: Politics And Conscience In The Antebellum North, (New York 1983), p. 196; Dale Baum, Dale T. Knubel, "Anatomy Of A Realignment: New York Presidential Politics, 1848-1860," NYH, vol. 65, January 1984, pp. 74-75, argue that Democratic defections to the Republicans in New York State went beyond the Free Soilers of 1848, but my sense is that in lower New York movement occurred mostly among antislavery Democrats. Democrats, as Baum and Knubel point out, p. 73, were compensated by attracting new voters. This was especially true in the metropolis, where the newly arriving immigrants voted overwhelmingly Democratic; Judah B. Ginsberg, "Barnburners, Free Soilers, And The New York Republican Party," NYH, vol. 57, October 1976, pp. 496-99, also shows most Democratic defections to the new party came in upstate counties.

3. New York Times, 9 November 1854, p. 1.

4. New York Times, 5 November 1856, p. 1; New York Times, 6 November 1856, p. 1; New York Times, 7 November 1856, p. 1.

5. New York Times, 4 November 1858, p. 1.

6. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 24 July 1860, p. 2; Stanford E. Church to Samuel J. Tilden, 22 October 1860, Tilden Papers, NYPL.

7. Quote from, Speech Of Horatio Seymour, At Tammany Hall, 28 September 1855, pamphlet, NYPL; also see, New York Times, 29 October 1856, p. 1; New York Times, 10 November 1857, p. 1; Carl N. Degler, Labor In The Economy And Politics Of New York City, 1850-60: A Study Of The Impact Of Early Industrialism, (PhD diss., CU, 1952), pp. 283-90; W.R. Rorabaugh, "Rising Democratic Spirits: Immigrants, Temperance And Tammany Hall, 1854-60," CWH, vol. 22, June 1976, pp. 144-45 points out that while Irish and German immigrants were the base of the party's strength, Democrats received some support from native Protestants.

8. New York Tribune, 3 May 1860, p. 2.

9. New York Leader, 20 November 1858, p. 4; Jerome Mushkat, Fernando Wood: A Political Biography, (Kent, OH, 1990), p. 85.

10. Jean Baker, Affairs Of Party: The Political Culture Of Northern Democrats In The Mid Nineteenth Century, (Ithaca, 1983), is an excellent study of the common features of Northern Democrats in this era. Many of her insights are applicable to the lower New York Democracy.

11. Among the many sources that trace this process, see Roy F. Nicholls, The Disruption Of American Democracy, (New York, 1967); first published in 1948; Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 174-6.

12. Quote from, John A. Dix to James Buchanan, 9 May 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; also see, New York Times, 13 April 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 20 December 1859, p. 3.
13. Quote from, New York Herald, 1 March 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Herald, 2 December 1859, p. 4; New York Herald, 23 March 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 2 May 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 May 1860, p. 2.
14. New York Leader, 6 March 1858, p. 4.
15. Quote from, Irish-American, 7 July 1860, p. 2; also see, New York Leader, 4 August 1860, p. 4.
16. New York Leader, 3 April 1858, p. 4.
17. quote from, Irish-American, 2 February 1852, p. 2; also see, New York Times, 2 November 1854, p. 1; Speech Of Horatio Seymour, At Tammany Hall, pamphlet, NYPL; for an excellent recent treatment of the conflict between evangelical forces and Democrats, see, Daniel Walker Howe, "The Evangelical Movement And Political Culture In The North During The Second Party System," JAH, vol. 77, May 1991, pp. 1216-1239.
18. Quote from, Daniel S. Dickinson speech, at Brooklyn Democratic meeting, 21 October 1856, in, John B. Dickinson, ed., Speeches, Correspondence, Etc., Of The Late Daniel S. Dickinson Of New York, 2 vols., (New York, 1867), I:528-9; also see, Thomas M. Cook and Thomas W. Knox, ed., Public Record Of Horatio Seymour From 1856 to 1868, (New York, 1868), p. 3; New York Times, 16 May 1860, p. 8; Long Island Democrat, 11 September 1860, p. 2.
19. New York Daily News, 13 October 1860, p. 4.
20. Quote from, New York Leader, 20 March 1858, p. 4; also see, New York Times, 1 November 1856, p. 1.
21. See, for example, New York Herald, 4 April 1860, p. 4.
22. The police issue will be dealt with in more detail later, for now see, New York Times, 28 November 1857, p. 1; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 28 March 1860, p. 2; Tammany Pamphlets, 6 October 1857, no. 2, p. 6, NYPL.
23. Quote from, Ira B. Davis to James Buchanan, 15 June 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; also see, Daily News, 10 November 1860, p. 4.
24. Quote from, Tammany Pamphlets, 6 October 1857, no. 2, p. 4; also see, Long Island Democrat, 10 July 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 11 March 1860, p. 4; Brother Jonathan, 24 December 1859, p. 2.

25. August Belmont to Samuel L. M. Barlow, 16 March 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.

26. August Belmont to Samuel J. Tilden, 2 August 1860, Tilden Papers, NYPL.

27. Official Report Of The Great Union Meeting, Academy Of Music, New York City, December 19, 1859, (New York, 1859); Gustavus Myers, History Of Tammany Hall, (New York, 1917), p. 194; Evening Post, 23 May 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 14 April 1860, p. 10.

28. Even the Herald, the most rabid of the Democratic, pro-South journals, opposed the international slave trade, see, New York Herald, 4 June 1860, p. 4; also see, Howard C. Perkins, "The Defense Of Slavery In The Northern Press On The Eve Of The Civil War," JSH, vol. IX, Nov. 1943, p. 530; Ira David to James Buchanan, 15 June 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; Daniel Dickinson speech in Brooklyn, 21 October 1856, in, Dickinson, ed., Speeches, Correspondence, I:537.

29. New York Herald, 29 February 1860, p. 4; for an interesting statement of Democratic anti-antislavery views, see, Irish-American, 30 October 1858, p. 2.

30. New York Times, 28 March 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 31 October 1860, p. 4.

31. Quote from, Long Island Democrat, 21 February 1860, p. 2; also see, Long Island Democrat, 27 March 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 2 March 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 1 April 1860, p. 4; New York Journal Of Commerce, 26 October 1860, p. 2.

32. Quote from, New York Herald, 24 March 1860, p. 6; also see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 27 February 1860, p. 2; New York Leader, 18 August 1860, p. 1; David F. Long, The New York "News", 1855-1906: Spokesmen For The Underprivileged, (PhD diss., CU, 1950), p. 21.

33. Baker, Affairs Of Party, shows that racism was an integral part of the outlook of all Northern Democrats, see especially chaps. 5-6.

34. Quote from, W. McClung to Horatio Seymour, 22 August 1859, Fairchild Collection, NYHS; also see, Samuel L. M. Barlow to Joseph W. Alsop, 9 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Irish-American, 27 October 1860, p. 2; Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology Of The Republican Party Before The Civil War, (New York, 1970), p. 225, tends to see Republican nationalism as progressive.

35. Quote from, Long Island Democrat, 3 January 1860, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1 May 1860, p. 2; New York Leader, 29 December 1860, p. 4; Irish-American, 7 January 1860, p. 2; Paul C.

Nagel, One Nation Indivisible: The Union In American Thought, (New York, 1964), argues that the concept of the Union provided, for many antebellum Americans, for different reasons, a reassuring symbol in efforts to avoid national peril.

36. Daily News, 6 October 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 4 April 1860, p. 4; Irish-American, 10 November 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 9 January 1861, p. 1; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, p. 32. John A. Dix, former Senator and Tammany sachem, composed the most famous line of the secession era, see, Dix to unknown correspondent, 29 January 1861, Dix Papers, NYPL.

37. Journal Of Commerce, 18 September 1860, p. 2.

38. Irving Katz, August Belmont: A Political Biography, (New York, 1968), p. 64; New York Tribune, 18 September 1860, p. 5; New York Herald, 31 January 1861, p. 8.

39. New York Times, 24 December 1860, p. 4.

40. Text Of The Union Meeting At New York Academy Of Music, 19 December 1859, in Papers of Richard Lathers, LC; letter, 7 September 1860, Lathers Papers, LC; Daily News, 4 October 1860, p. 4.

41. Evening Post, 5 June 1848, p. 2; New York Herald, 7 June 1848, p. 1.

42. New York Herald, 10 August 1848, p. 2; Evening Post, 2 June 1848, p. 2; Evening Post, 6 June 1848, p. 2; Evening Post 7 June 1848, p. 2; Evening Post, 15 June 1848. p. 3; Evening Post, 23 June 1848, p. 3; Evening Post, 3 July 1848, p. 1; Evening Post, 8 July 1848, p. 3; Evening Post, 28 July 1848, p. 2; Oliver Dyer's Phonographic Report Of The Proceedings Of The National Free Soil Convention At Buffalo, New York, August 9th & 10th, 1848, p. 6.

43. See, for example, Daniel S. Dickinson to Theo N. Corn, 21 October 1860, Dickinson Papers, NYHS; New York Tribune, 4 July 1860, p. 4; Jerome Mushkat, The Reconstruction Of The New York Democracy, 1861-1874, (Rutherford, NJ, 1981), p. 17. Much of the rancor between Hards and Softs was over whether to allow the Free Soilers of 1848 back into the party, with the Hards seeking to bar re-entry.

44. See, for example, William Cassidy to Horatio Seymour, 18 August 1853, Seymour Collection, NYSL; Robert Kelly to Seymour, 15 November 1854, Seymour Collection, NYSL; Peter Cagger to Seymour, 24 October 1856, Seymour Collection, NYSL; Daniel S. Dickinson to Thomas A. Osborne, 8 July 1860, Dickinson Papers, NYPL; New York Times, 2 November 1854, p. 1; Daniel Dickinson to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 17 December 1859, in, Speeches, Correspondence, I:526-530.

45. H.B. Stanton to Salmon P. Chase, 13 November 1860, Chase Papers, LC; Evening Post, 1 June 1848, p. 2; Evening Post, 7 July 1848, p. 3; Evening Post, 11 August 1848, p. 2; New York Herald, 12 August 1848, p. 1.
46. R.F.W. Allston to Henry S. Randall, 12 March 1860, Randall Papers, NYHS.
47. New York Times, 15 September 1859, p. 1; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 31 May 1860, p. 2; Daniel S. Dickinson to Henry S. Randall, 12 March 1860, Randall Papers, NYHS,
48. Evening Post, 28 July 1848, p. 2; New York Leader, 10 April 1858, p. 5; New York Herald, 7 February 1861, p. 4.
49. Daniel E. DeLarow to Horatio Seymour, 6 May 1856, Seymour Collection, NYSL; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 28, 32.
50. see, for example, New York Times, 2 November 1854, p. 2; New York Herald, 11 April 1860, p. 6; Alexander C. Flick, Samuel Jones Tilden: A Study In Political Sagacity, (New York, 1939), pp. 95-97.
51. New York Times, 1 February 1861, p. 4.
52. Francis Schell, Memoir Of The Honorable August Schell, (New York, 1885), pp. 11-19; Stewart Mitchell, Horatio Seymour Of New York, (Cambridge, MA, 1938), p. 203; New York Times, 30 June 1860, p. 2; for an interesting account of the power and importance of the New York Customs House in local politics, see, William Hartman, "The New York Customs House: Seats Of Spoils Politics," NYH, vol. 34, April 1953, pp. 149-163.
53. New York Leader, 20 March 1858, p. 5; New York Leader, 24 April 1848, p. 5; New York Leader, 20 November 1858, p. 4; New York Times, 12 November 1858, p. 5; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 84-85.
54. New York Leader, 13 March 1858, pp. 4-5; New York Leader, 3 April 1858, p. 5; New York Times, 22 April 1857, p. 4; Katz, August Belmont, p. 63; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 75-76; Albert C. Ramsey to Issac V. Fowler, 6 November 1858, Ramsey Papers, NYHS.
55. See, for example, George N. Sanders to James Buchanan, 1 January 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; Horatio Seymour to Samuel L. M. Barlow, 15 May 1860, Fairchild Collection, NYHS; New York Leader, 20 March 1858, p. 4; William Whitney to Barlow, 12 February 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Barlow to Peter Cagger, August 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; New York Herald, 19 March 1860, p. 6.
56. Isaiah Rynders to James Buchanan, 11 May 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; John Green to Buchanan, 5 September 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; Long Island Times, 2 August 1860, p. 2; dismissals of Douglas Democrats had been going on since 1858, mostly due to Lecompton,

see, Albert C. Ramsey to Issac F. Fowler, 10 November 1858, Ramsey Papers, NYHS.

57. See, for example, Samuel F. Butterworth to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 14 February 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Fred A. Aiker to Fernando Wood, 8 May 1860, Wood Papers, NYPL.

58. Ibid; Official Report Of The Great Union Meeting, Academy Of Music, New York City, December 19, 1859, (New York, 1859); New York Herald, 3 March 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 13 April 1860, p. 8; New York Times, 3 April 1860, p. 8; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 15, 83; Long, The New York "News", i; Jefferson Davis to Fernando Wood, 16 January 1860, in Lynda L. Crist, Mary S. Dix, eds., The Papers Of Jefferson Davis, (Baton Rouge, 1971-), VI:628.

59. Quote from, Daniel S. Dickinson to Edmund Burke, 26 January 1860, Burke Papers, LC; also see, Dickinson to James Buchanan, 30 June 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP.

60. Callow, The Tweed Ring, pp. 24-5; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 July 1860, p. 2.

61. on the prominence of slavery in internal political maneuvering of the Democracy, see, for example, Albert C. Ramsey to Issac V. Fowler, 10 November 1858, Ramsey Papers, NYHS; also see, New York Times, 16 September 1859, p. 1; New York Herald, 15 May 1860, p. 6; Mushkat, The Reconstruction Of The New York Democracy, pp. 9-10;

62. Quote from, George Comstock to Samuel J. Tilden, 13 October 1860, Tilden Papers, NYPL; also see, Peter Cagger to Samuel L.M. Barlow, Barlow Collection, HEHL; New York Herald, 6 March 1860, p. 4.

63. New York Leader, 10 April 1858, p. 5; New York Leader, 11 December 1858, p. 4; W.A. Swanberg, Sickles The Incredible, (New York, 1956), pp. 88, 104; Katz, August Belmont, pp. 58-70; Flick, Samuel Jones Tilden, p. 118; New York Times, 5 December 1859, p. 1; New York Times, 17 August 1860, p. 8. An odd figure in Democratic ranks, Dix was a supporter of the Wilmot Proviso and a Free Soiler in 1848. He quickly returned to the regular Democratic fold. Although he publicly acted as a Hard on the eve of the war, he was never fully trusted in the ranks of the extreme pro-South Democracy, largely because of his earlier foray as a Free Soiler, see, Martin Lichterman, John Adams Dix, 1798-1879, (PhD diss., CU, 1952), pp. 169, 185, 188-89, 193.

64. Quote from, Edward N. Tailer, Jr., Diary, 14 May 1860, NYHS; also see, Issac Fowler to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 21 June 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; New York Herald, 15 May 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 16 May 1860, p. 6; New York Times, 16 May 1860, p. 5; Evening Post, 16 May 1860, p. 2.

65. John A. Dix to James Buchanan, 4 June 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; New York Times, 18 May 1860, p. 4.
66. See, for example, New York Times, 6 December 1860, pp. 4-5.
67. For Wood's early years, see, Pleasants, Fernando Wood Of New York, pp. 17-49; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 1-30; Mitchell, Horatio Seymour Of New York, p. 209; Fernando Wood to E.M. Lawson, 5 July 1845, Wood Papers, NYPL; New York Herald, 4 April 1860, p. 4.
68. New York Tribune, 24 March 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 2 March 1860, p. 4; Alfred Conable, Edward Silberfarb, Tigers Of Tammany, (New York, 1967), chap. 4; William B. Hesseltine, ed., Three Against Lincoln: William Halstead Reports The Caucuses Of 1860, (Baton Rouge, 1960), pp. 5-6; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 20; Leonard Chalmers, "Tammany Hall, Fernando Wood, And The Struggle To Control New York City, 1857-59," NYHSQ, vol. 53, 1969, p. 31.
69. Graham R. Hodges, New York City Cartmen, 1667-1850, (New York, 1986), p. 170; New York Tribune, 3 March 1860, p. 7; New York Times, 1 March 1860, p. 8; New York Times, 7 March 1860, p. 4; Degler, Labor In The Economy And Politics Of New York City, pp. 287-90; Florence E. Gibson, The Attitudes Of The New York Irish Toward State And National Affairs, 1848-1892, (New York, 1951), pp. 91-2; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, p. 18, 58.
70. See, for example, Callow, The Tweed Ring, p. 18; Leo Herschkowitz, Tweed's New York: Another Look, (Garden City, NY, 1977), pp. 52-78.
71. New York Times, 7 November 1854, p. 4; Gibson, The Attitudes Of The New York Irish, pp. 94-5; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 28, 32, 34, 58.
72. New York Times, 1 November 1854, p. 1; New York Times, 4 November 1854, p. 4; New York Times, 7 November 1854, p. 4; New York Times, 9 November 1854, p. 1.
73. New York Times, 16 October 1856, p. 4; New York Times, 3 November 1856, p. 4; New York Times, 5 November 1856, p. 1.
74. Records Of Police Department, January-April 1857, Fernando Wood Papers, MA.
75. See, for example, Abijah Ingraham (pseud.), A Biography Of Fernando Wood: A History Of The Forgeries, Perjuries And Other Crimes Of Our Model Mayor, (New York, 1856); New York Times, 30 October 1856, p. 1.
76. New York Times, 13 April 1857, p. 4.

77. Hershkowitz, Tweed's New York, p. 57, for instance, tends to see the move as more political than anti-corruption, as does, Tyler G. Anbinder, "Fernando Wood And New York City's Secession From The Union: A Political Reappraisal, NYH, vol. 68, January 1987, pp. 67-92, and Paul O. Weinbaum, "Temperance, Politics And The New York City Riots of 1857," NYHSQ, vol. 59, July 1975, p. 246; while contemporary reformers like The New York Times, 14 April 1857, p. 4, accepted the move as necessary to halt widespread fraud and abuse in the Police department.

78. New York Times, 15 April 1857, p. 1; New York Times, 18 April 1857, pp. 4, 8; Weinbaum, "Temperance, Politics And The New York City Riots Of 1857," p. 246; W.R. Rorabaugh, "Rising Democratic Spirits"; James F. Richardson, "Mayor Fernando Wood And The New York Police Force, 1855-57," NYHSQ, vol. 50, January 1966, p. 20.

79. Rynders quote from Isaiah Rynders to James Buchanan, 19 June 1857, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; quote about Wood from, New York Times, 15 June 1857, p. 1; also see, New York Times, 16 June 1857, pp. 1, 4; Weinbaum, "Temperance, Politics And The New York City Riots Of 1857," pp. 258-64; Stanley Nadel, Little Germany: Ethnicity, Religion and Class in New York City, 1845-1880, (Urbana, Ill., 1990), pp. 133-135.

80. For Wood quote, see, Message Of Mayor Wood To Common Council, 4 May 1857, pamphlet, NYPL; one of the more notorious episodes in antebellum New York, the showdown at City Hall is covered extensively in, New York Times, from June 17-22, 1857; good journal articles on the episode include, Richardson, "Mayor Fernando Wood And The New York Police Force," and Weinbaum, "Temperance, Politics And The New York City Riots Of 1857"; Charles L. Barrows, William M. Evarts: Lawyer, Diplomat, Statesman, (Chapel Hill, 1941), p. 78, covers the trial on the legality of the Police Act, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals.

81. New York Times, 5 November 1857, p. 4; New York Times, 10 November 1857, p. 4; New York Times, 16 November 1857, p. 1; New York Times, 25 November 1857, p. 1; New York Times, 28 November 1857, p. 1; Pleasants, Fernando Wood Of New York, p. 87.

82. New York Times, 2 December 1857, p. 1; New York Times, 10 November 1857, p. 1; New York Times, 21 November 1857, p. 5; William Darnley to family, 25 October 1857, Darnley Family Letters, NYPL.

83. Gangs of toughs, volunteer fire companies and saloons, which served as centers of organizing, were extremely important parts of Democratic politics in the immigrant wards, see for example, Virgil W. Paterson, The Mob: 200 Years Of Organized Crime In New York, (Ottawa, IL, 1983), p. 45; Callow, The Tweed Ring, pp. 24-5; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp., 58, 75, 86; Stott, Workers In The Metropolis, p. 238; Matthew P. Breen, Thirty Years Of New York

Politics Up To Date, (New York, 1899), pp. 46-49; J. Frank Kernan, Reminiscences Of The Old Fire Laddies And Volunteer Fire Departments Of New York And Brooklyn, (New York, 1885), pp. 47-77; James D. Burn, Three Years Among The Working Classes In The United States During The War, (London, 1865), p. 19; Nichols, Forty Years Of American Life, p. 288.

84. See, for example, Evening Post, 26 April 1860, p. 2; Pleasants, Fernando Wood Of New York, p. 94.

85. Howard B. Furer, The Public Career Of William F. Havemeyer, (PhD diss., NYU, 1966), p. 197; New York Times, 5 December 1859. p. 1.

86. Quote from, New York Times, 3 December 1859, p. 4; also see, New York Times, 16 November 1859, p. 8; New York Times, 5 December 1859, supplement; New York Herald, 7 December 1859, p. 1.

87. Edward C. Mack, Peter Cooper: Citizen Of New York, (New York, 1949), pp. 187-91; Mushkat, The Reconstruction Of The New York Democracy, p. 17; New York Times, 16 November 1857, p. 1.

88. New York Times, 24 October 1859, p. 1; Katz, August Belmont, p. 62.

Chapter 2: The Metropolis In 1860

Rupture of the Union was a dramatic experience for people and institutions in metropolitan New York. It challenged some of their most basic assumptions about the metropolis, the republic and about themselves. For that reason, other aspects of political, social economic and intellectual life, beyond the leadership and outlook of the Democracy, are pivotal for an understanding of the response to secession.

One of these is newspapers. They were a major form of political expression and source of organization in mid-19th century America. In New York, many dailies were partisan and identified as organs of either the Democrats or Republicans. Among other things, they openly planned campaign strategies and urged attendance at party events.¹

Leading journals also responded to each others' editorials, often in the name of the party they supported, helping to create a rich public debate. Further, selection of news items corresponded with the party's outlook. This was most obvious in reports on the South. While Republican papers printed stories which put the slave states in a negative light, organs loyal to the Democrats ran pieces emphasizing positive aspects of Dixie.²

Democratic and conservative forces relied heavily on newspapers. Some periodicals were recognized organs of specific groups. Of these, the most important was the New York Daily News, owned principally by Fernando Wood and his brother

Benjamin. It functioned as Mozart Hall's voice, and was greatly aided by carrying official city advertising. The New York Leader, edited by John Clancy, was Tammany's organ. These papers used much of their space to criticize the other camp.³

The most important Democratic expression in metropolitan New York, and perhaps the nation, was not officially associated with the party. It was The New York Herald, operated by Scottish immigrant James Gordon Bennett. Boasting the largest circulation in the country, the Herald was closer to the Hard faction of the Democracy. It generally supported the Buchanan Administration and Wood, though on occasion criticized the Mayor. The Herald's prominence as the Democratic paper consisted more of its tirades against the Republicans and their antislavery ideology than boosterism of party policies and candidates. It sold widely in the South, too.⁴

Bennett's paper, one of the few to print seven days a week, carved out a few major themes and emphasized them in relation to all events. They included a devotion to slavery as an acceptable status for those of African descent and a depiction of the South as a content and prosperous region. In addition, the Herald regularly attacked the Republicans as a cynical party using the antislavery issue as a tool to gain power. The daily also argued conservative concerns of stability and commerce should be the focus of government and politics, contending moral impulses had no place in public life. Yet, the Herald had a powerful Unionist streak.⁵

While it had limited circulation, the Day-Book was even more extreme than the Herald in backing the agenda of the slave states.⁶

The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, which supported John C. Breckinridge in the 1860 Presidential race, was another leading local Democratic organ. It leaned towards the Hard side of the Democracy, as did Brooklyn Mayor Samuel S. Powell.⁷ The party in Brooklyn more or less mirrored the New York City Democrats in terms of outlook and constituency. Powell, for instance, much like Manhattan figures, sought Irish favor.⁸

Kings County Democrats were also divided into Soft, or regular, and Hard camps, with the Softs holding most local offices.⁹ But, as across the river, differences were based more on degrees than absolutes. State Senator Francis B. Spinola, for example, a leading regular and key figure in the secession period, applauded Fernando Wood's efforts to combat overreaching Republicans.¹⁰ Teunis G. Bergen, a former Congressman who returned to the House in 1862, was perhaps the most influential Democrat, and he pressed for unity among the factions. On the eve of the crisis, he was New Utrecht's representative on the County Board of Supervisors. Board of Alderman President Martin Kalbfleisch, a regular, also sought to bridge gaps between the wings.¹¹

For a variety of reasons, the split in the Brooklyn Democracy was not as significant as in New York City. One of these was that the Hards lacked the pugnacious leadership and

national reputation Wood gave to Mozart Hall. In addition, Brooklyn was smaller and less central to the national party struggle; there did not seem to be as much at stake. While elections were serious business, party politics, like many other things in Kings County, were not as bitter as in Manhattan.¹² The pressures of secession would have a different impact on the party than in New York.

Brooklyn's immigrant population, though large, was proportionately smaller than Manhattan's. That was one reason why Democratic margins were lower in Kings County, although the Democracy was still the stronger party. In 1856, for instance, Buchanan carried the Presidential vote, but the combined tally of Charles Fremont and Milliard Fillmore surpassed the Democratic total.¹³

With the Americans eliminated, the Democrats were receiving about 55-percent of the vote in direct, citywide confrontations with the Republicans in the late 1850's. The party was strongest in the wards of downtown and southern Brooklyn, called the western district, and ran weaker in the eastern district sections of Williamsburg, Bushwick, Greenpoint and Ridgewood.¹⁴

In that light, the Kings County Democracy faced more stiff competition in local elections. Based on voting in April 1860, Democrats controlled the city's Board of Aldermen by 11 seats to eight.¹⁵ The parties were at even strength on the county Board of Supervisors. This made precarious the situation of Albert H. Osborne, a Hard Democrat and the Board's clerk. Always

suspicious of Republicans plots to oust him, Osborne became a highly controversial figure in the secession months.¹⁶ In Congressional elections of 1858, Republicans took both House seats which included all or parts of Brooklyn and the city's state assembly delegation was evenly divided between the parties.¹⁷

Brooklyn grew tremendously in the 1850's, and by the eve of sectional conflict was the nation's third largest city with 266,661 people. After consolidation in 1855, Brooklyn included almost all of Kings County. But there were still five small county towns with a population of about 12,000 which had not been incorporated into the city.¹⁸ About 40-percent of Brooklyn's population was foreign born, with the Irish accounting for most of that and Germans the next highest amount.¹⁹

Brooklyn's economy consisted of a mixture of local industries and services as a backwater to the commercial giant across the water. A prime example of the latter type of activity was warehousing of goods along the Brooklyn waterfront. According to one report, 48 such facilities existed on the shore. Holding that business, and preventing the New Jersey coast from becoming the normal site to store imports, was a prime concern of many in Brooklyn.²⁰

There was also a healthy shipbuilding industry along the waterfront in the eastern district, which grew as an offshoot of the Navy Yard.²¹ Downtown Brooklyn boasted one of the country's largest hat factories and one of the more substantial dry goods

establishments outside of Manhattan.²² Other top industries were brewing, foundries and rope making. Farming was still common, especially in Bushwick.²³

Contemporaries debated whether Brooklyn was a suburb of New York, or a valid urban center with its own resources and character. A member of the Board of Supervisors, for instance, depicted Brooklyn as a lodging house, stressing that 100,000 people crossed the river each day to work in Manhattan. Others disagreed.²⁴ Consolidation was openly discussed. The Brooklyn Evening Star noted in February 1860: "A majority of people in Brooklyn have heretofore opposed this movement, but they are gradually becoming convinced that such a union would result in a positive benefit to this city."²⁵

While that issue would not be settled until the end of the century, many were aware of Brooklyn's place in the metropolis. A dozen ferries linked the city to Manhattan; supervision and maintenance of those lines was a constant topic of public discussion.²⁶ Another concern was linking the rest of Long Island to Brooklyn.²⁷ In other words, there was ample understanding that metropolitan New York, led by but consisting of more than New York City, was a unit.

Still, pride in the expansion and nature of Brooklyn life was widespread. Boosterism in the Civil War era was tremendous. Some of this was satisfaction with the startling growth of the 1850s; the fact, as a Brooklyn paper put it, that the city was

increasing at a faster pace than any other. The conclusion is self evident that she will soon by the second, and

ultimate the first, city on this continent, if not the whole world."²⁸

But another and perhaps more significant impulse was an emphasis on Brooklyn as morally superior to what was depicted as a decadent, corrupt city on the other side of the river. Brooklyn, according to this aspect of boosterism, was more devout, patriotic, healthy and decent than New York City. A daily chronicle, for instance, emphasized the city was "one of the most moral and healthy cities to be found anywhere." It was proud Brooklyn did not follow, "socially, more of the character of New York. That we do not, we think may be attributed, more than anything else, to the christian influence that is exerted by our people."²⁹

The opening of the Academy of Music in downtown Brooklyn in January 1861 symbolized the emergence of the city as cultural center. Observers claimed the audience watching the first opera performed at the facility consisted of those who "really enjoy the refining influence of music, and love it for its own sake," in contrast to the "overdressed, fashionable audience" at similar events in Manhattan.³⁰

Internally, rivalry between the eastern and western districts was at times serious, although most who considered such issues probably thought more in terms of Brooklyn-New York City competition. The western zone, which consisted of about two-thirds of the city's population, naturally argued contention was counter-productive, and called for unity.³¹ The division might interfere with party loyalties and pit, for instance, eastern

Republicans against western district Republicans on such issues as public spending and the location of municipal facilities.³²

On other occasions, it was a more fundamental dispute over economic growth and power. The Brooklyn Daily Times, chief defender of the eastern section, hoped that, "in twenty years or sooner, if the one cent ferries last, this end will by the city of Brooklyn proper and the present Fulton and Atlantic Streets (western district) will be a suburb."³³

This rivalry made Brooklyn familiar with divisions within a whole. It would surface in the secession era, especially over questions of the districts' relative loyalty to the Union.

Brooklyn, then, on the eve of sectional conflict, was a city of rising expectations, aware of its inclusion in the metropolis, but working to carve out a separate identity. The sense of the city emerging from the shadow of New York would be challenged in the secession period over, among other episodes, the effort to get Abraham Lincoln to include a stop in Brooklyn on his trip from Springfield to Washington.³⁴ More importantly, the eventual response to the rupture of the Union would be influenced by casting an eye across the water.

The Long Island Democrat, published in Jamaica by James J. Brenton, was the source of rabid Democracy in Queens, while the Flushing-based Long Island Times had more of a soft Democratic outlook.³⁵ By and large, the county was a political backwater to New York and Brooklyn, borrowing platforms and strategies from

party organizations in the cities.³⁶ But because of a dispersed, largely rural and native-born population, it lacked the unity of urban interests which enabled Democrats to hold sway in the other places.

Revivalism and temperance, for instance, were strong in Queens, as was nativism.³⁷ The Know Nothing gubernatorial nominee, Daniel Ullmann, carried the county in 1854, as did Milliard Fillmore in 1856.³⁸ Luther C. Carter of Flushing, a conservative Republican and ex-American, won Queens' Congressional seat in 1858. Yet, as nativism disintegrated as a movement, the county was conservative enough that most sentiment broke towards the Democrats as opposed to the Republicans.³⁹

The Flushing Journal, a weekly, was perhaps the leading Republican organ in Queens. It favored the conservative brand of Republicanism, and lauded in October 1859 the "perfect union among the Republicans and Americans of Suffolk and Queens."⁴⁰ That picture, while reflecting the vision of the county's party faithful, proved to be illusory, as most Know Nothings went the other way by 1860, influenced by fears that the Republicans jeopardized the Union.

Geographically, the Republicans were strongest in eastern Queens towns of Hempstead and North Hempstead, areas further away from the heart of the metropolis.⁴¹ John A. King of Jamaica, New York's first Republican governor, and William C. Bryant of Roslyn gave the county two well-known Republicans. Both were active locally.⁴² But prominent party members from New York City were

usually needed at Queens events.⁴³

The population of Queens in 1860 was 57,391, an increase of about 60-percent over 1850.⁴⁴ It consisted of the towns of Flushing, Jamaica, Newtown, Hempstead, North Hempstead and Oyster Bay. The latter three are today part of Nassau County. Newtown, which comprised much of western Queens, the part closest to New York City, had a considerable Irish population. Yet, especially in comparison with Manhattan and Brooklyn, the county was overwhelmingly native born.⁴⁵

Eastern Queens contained many boatmen, and all towns had the usual scattering of tradesmen and artisans. Jamaica contained shoe and clothing manufacturers. But farming was the mainstay of the economy.⁴⁶ Political life on Long Island was carried on largely in discussions among farmers at general stores. Post-election scrambles for office, especially after a transfer of party power, were no less intense among Republican potato growers on the island than among Democrats on the East Side of Manhattan.⁴⁷

Still, many realized the connection of Queens and Suffolk counties to the metropolis. Transportation and communication links to New York City were emphasized by newspapers boosters and farmers. The completion of the Long Island Railroad in the 1840s, and its expansion in the 1850s, changed the nature of agricultural life in Queens. Farmers turned to dairy production specifically for the New York and Brooklyn markets. One of them described the process on the eve of the war:

Our milking is done with reference to the trains running to the city; usually at night and morning, however, except some three months in the Summer season, when milking is done at noon. The milk cans, after filling, are placed in tubs of cold water, and well cooled before leaving our farms. The milk is conveyed to the city twice a day in the summer, and once in the winter, from this Station, 30 miles from the City. The freight is now 50 cents per 100 quarts, or 2 cents per gallon. We receive 3 1/8 cents per quart, for six Summer months, and 4 1/8 cents during the Winter, delivered in the city.⁴⁸

Boosters sought to improve the links to the cities in order to increase the value of real estate in such places as Flushing. Others recognized that Long Island's economic health was based on serving as a producer for Brooklyn and New York City, and the more secure the connection the better.⁴⁹

Those ties, which included the circulation of Manhattan newspapers, made Queens different from other agricultural-based communities in the North. In other words, the county was a mix of the provincial and the cosmopolitan, which made national issues, including the sectional crisis, a part of local life. Debating societies in Queens regularly considered such topics as whether slavery could expand into the territories.⁵⁰ Queens was enough a part of the metropolis that it reacted to secession as both a Northern community and a cog in a metropolitan area which depended on the Union and sectional peace.

The strength of the Republicans in lower New York, even more than among Democrats, rested on newspapers. Some of the party's leading organs were published in the city.⁵¹ Foremost among these was Horace Greeley's New York Tribune, which was very

influential throughout the free states.⁵² Other top dailies included The Evening Post, run by William Bryant, and The New York Times. The Times' editor, Henry Raymond, a former lieutenant governor, was a close associate of Senator William H. Seward, the state's dominant Republican figure, and Thurlow Weed, an Albany-based Seward strategist and master backstage party operator.⁵³

These papers defined and stressed common Republican principles, although they differed in degree of intensity. The common principles centered on the immorality of slavery and opposition to its extension, as well as grave distrust of Southern planters. The dailies felt the cotton growers dominated the Democratic party and the republic, subverting the direction of the federal government. They also shared a vision of the South as an economic and moral wasteland ruled by an oligarchy of slave owners.

The Post, for instance, citing the lack of free schools in Dixie, charged: "All accounts, accordingly, agree in representing the non-slaveholding whites, excepting the large towns and cities, as the most miserable specimens of humanity in this country." It added that the poor whites "appear to have lost nearly all power of resistance to their aristocracy."⁵⁴

Editorials and news reports depicted the cotton states as a region of brutality, rash action, random violence, lawlessness and a lack of civil liberties. Commenting on a bizarre episode of domestic shooting violence in June 1860, the Times offered

this interpretation:

The beauty of the story lies in the manner in which it illustrates the place which the revolver has taken in Mississippi families as a domestic utensil. Hosts and guests carry it in their bosoms at all hours of the day and night. ... If anything goes wrong, out it comes and a few bangs remove differences, quench animosities, and put an end to strife and heart-burnings, and restore calm to everybody.⁵⁵

When the events of the secession period seemed to confirm those themes, the papers' view of the South became more widely accepted.

The Republicans, like the Democrats, were nationalists and devoted to the Union. But they, obviously, had a different vision of the Union than their political foes. That outlook, even in the Democratic-dominated metropolis, became more important in the secession era after the Republicans had won the national election.

Republican vision of the future of the republic was based on free labor, economic growth and a national moral climate that at least guaranteed minimal human rights to black persons.⁵⁶ A key element here was confronting and if necessary destroying planters who local Republicans insisted had long held back that view of the Union. Part of that thrust depicted Southern threats to leave the nation as bluffs which could be dismissed.⁵⁷

Divisions among Republicans had some historical roots. Colleagues as Whigs and as founders of the state's Republican party, Greeley had broken with Raymond of the Times, Seward and Weed in a rift which developed in the mid 1850s.⁵⁸ It began as a personal rivalry, but by 1860 included political differences.

Greeley, for one thing, wanted to broaden the base of the party beyond ex-Whigs, a move which troubled Weed. That split basically defined metropolitan area Republicans on the eve of the war. Most party faithful were moderates and backed Seward for the Presidential nomination.⁵⁹

While he was a top party figure nationally, Greeley, on the local level, led a smaller but more radical group, which included Bryant and the Post.⁶⁰ The Greeley-Bryant set led the effort to find an alternative Presidential nominee, mostly because they doubted Seward could win a general election. They engineered a forum for prominent Republican speakers in the city in early 1860. It was really a search for a candidate; Lincoln's famed Cooper Union address was part of that series.⁶¹

In 1860, the wedge between these Republicans, though lurking, seemed insignificant.⁶² But the pressures of a split in the Union would make the division more glaring and important, another example of how the crisis would test local political principles.

At any rate, the Republican organization in the metropolis consisted of more than influential newspapers. As in most areas of the North, the party rested largely on the foundations of the old Whigs and free soil Democrats; it picked up American support in the late 1850s.⁶³ They had several solid central clubs as well as committees in each ward. All groups conducted affairs on the basis of the party's antislavery planks.⁶⁴

While the minority party locally, the centrality of New York

City to the national political struggle, and the likelihood of Presidential triumph in 1860, gave the Republicans a surprisingly active corps in Manhattan and Brooklyn. Governor Morgan was national chairman and the party executive committee was located in New York City.⁶⁵

Unable or unwilling to make inroads into the Irish community, the Republicans had more appeal among Germans and other non-Irish workers, largely on the basis of free labor and homestead planks.⁶⁶ They also ran better in middle and upper class wards; their nominees for office came from a broader spectrum of the population than did Democratic candidates.⁶⁷ While not an electoral factor, women were much more apparent at Republican functions than at Democratic affairs.⁶⁸ That was one factor which gave Republican efforts a more moral and staid tone; their politics lacked a degree of rowdiness which characterized the course of the Democracy.

For the purposes of secession, certain local Republicans warrant attention. John A. Kennedy, former free soil Democrat, was a party stalwart and installed as Metropolitan Police chief in May 1860.⁶⁹ Hamilton Fish, a governor and Senator in the 1850s, was an influential conservative Republican.⁷⁰ George Opdyke, who gave Germans a sense of connection, was the party's unsuccessful Mayoral candidate in 1859, while William M. Evarts, a lawyer, was unofficial leader of the Seward forces.⁷¹ Famed diarist George T. Strong, although not a party leader, uncannily expressed the core of the Republican outlook on many fronts.⁷²

Significantly, Governor Morgan came from the city. An ex-Whig, he had made a fortune as a merchant, specializing in coffee and sugar.⁷³ An ally of Seward and Weed, Morgan in 1856 was a leader of the Fremont campaign. But at the time, the Republicans were seen as a dangerous force, and few Wall Street men were willing to contribute funds to the effort.⁷⁴

But that situation changed by 1860, and the Republicans had developed ties to elements of the mercantile community. The Chamber of Commerce, headed by Peletiah S. Perit, had a conservative Republican orientation. George Opdyke was also a Chamber member.⁷⁵

Republicans support on the Chamber of Commerce, and from others in commercial circles, came from those not connected with the Southern dry goods trade or the cotton market. More importantly, they were conservative businessmen who felt Republican control of the federal government was inevitable. They argued that protracted political struggles to forestall that result, such as the vicious battle over the House speakership in early 1860, created an unstable climate which affected business. These figures also dismissed Southern threats to secede if the Republicans won the White House.⁷⁶

On the eve of secession, the Republicans electorally were stronger in Brooklyn than in New York. Kings County's House representative was Republican James Humphrey.⁷⁷ Other leading figures included Alderman Frederick Scholes, Mayoral nominee in 1861, and S.B. Chittenden, key link to the mercantile side of the

party in New York City.⁷⁸

The Brooklyn Evening Star, in the eastern district, and the Brooklyn Daily Times gave the city a pair of solid Republican papers. Partly because the Times had an additional concern as booster of the smaller western district, the Star was more consistently radical.⁷⁹

While much of the platform and strategy came from the other side of the river, noted Congregationalist preacher Henry Ward Beecher gave Brooklyn its own important component in the Republican apparatus. His Plymouth Church was located in Brooklyn Heights, part of the eastern district.⁸⁰ Beecher's efforts to raise funds to purchase the freedom of fugitive slaves were famous; he appealed to Brooklyn's substantial middle-class, New England-bred population.⁸¹

The other major political organization in the metropolis in 1860 was the Union party. While it depicted itself as a conservative middle ground between the Republicans and Democrats, the Unionists were much closer to the Democracy. The party was comprised largely of ex-Know Nothings who refused to follow most Americans into Republican ranks after nativism disintegrated in the late 1850s. Weak in officeholding, the Unionists were organizationally active and could, in close elections, affect the balance between the major parties.⁸²

Leaders of the local Union group were merchant James De Peyster Ogden and publishers James and Erastus Brooks.⁸³ The

Brooks brothers' paper, The New York Express, was the chief organ of the movement.⁸⁴ They organized the New York campaign for the Constitutional Union ticket of John Bell and Edward Everett in 1860, and co-operated with other anti-Republican forces in seeking to forge a united front of all those opposed to Lincoln.⁸⁵

The Union party attacked both the antislavery agitation of the Republicans and the Southern fire eaters for jeopardizing the Union, although they held the Republicans more responsible. The Express, for instance, argued: "The country would be blessed if all such extremists were politically pitched into the sea or hung as high as Haman."⁸⁶ In that context, the Unionists shared many parts of the Democratic outlook, including racism and the insistence that efforts to help black slaves were not worth rupturing the republic. The Union organ advocated "ignoring the subject of slavery in party politics."⁸⁷

But a few factors prevented them from formally joining the Democrats. Foremost among these was the nativism of most Unionists, compared with the Democracy's reliance on immigrant votes.

Certain aspects of civic affairs are relevant as background to understanding the metropolitan area's response to the schism of the Union. The most important deals with police. In early 1860 the Metropolitan Police District was supervised by a five-member board, which included the Mayors of both Brooklyn and New York.

As a consequence, Fernando Wood, despite criticism of the system, had a say in local law enforcement affairs. But in April the legislature created a new three-person board, all appointed by the governor.⁸⁸

With an important election approaching, and police expected to play key roles in such activities as rallies and parades, it was a largely political move by Republican leaders in Albany. It eliminated the two downstate Democratic mayors from control over police matters. In addition, Governor Morgan and others genuinely thought the system created in 1857 had not gone far enough in limiting local control of law enforcement as a way to reduce corruption in public safety affairs. The new panel consisted of three Republicans. Kennedy's appointment as Police chief, and Republican control of law enforcement in general, became enormously important in the secession period.⁸⁹

Local Republicans were by and large enthusiastic about the changes, especially the removal of Wood from the board.⁹⁰ Democrats saw the shifts as another indication of Republican interference in area affairs.⁹¹

Fernando Wood was not the only downstate resident who felt the metropolis was being mistreated by the state. Most sectors of opinion criticized the extent to which Albany tried to shape lower New York. In that regard, home rule meant more to the metropolis than simple political partisanship. There were serious concerns that upstate legislators, with little knowledge or care for the well being of downstate counties, were

engineering the condition of the area."²

Complaints focused on a host of state moves. These included laying of gas or water pipes without local approval, interference with the commission overseeing construction of Central Park, and bypassing the Common Council in consideration of erecting a new City hall.³ Even so, the most heinous intrusion was the granting by the legislature, over Governor Morgan's veto, of exclusive railroad franchises in the city to George Law, a leading transportation baron.⁴

Criticism of the franchises came from such diverse quarters as the French Republican Club and the Herald; some charged Republican legislative leaders took bribes to push the bills through. A businessman diarist called the legislature "one of the most corrupt which has ever governed us, we are saddled with five city railroads given to interested parties."⁵ Even Republican U.S. Senator Preston King hoped to "never see another such a legislature."⁶ Those charges tainted the image of New York Republicans and contributed to the failure of William Seward to secure the Presidential nomination.⁷

Select elements of the metropolis's social landscape are connected to a study of the reaction to secession. One of them is immigration and the role of the newcomers in public life. Aside from the small Union party, nativism had disappeared as an open political movement by the eve of the war. Sectors of the Democracy competed in praising the immigrants. Republicans, at

times, looked favorably on the foreign born, who comprised 47-percent of New York City's population in 1860.⁹⁸

Arrivals of Irish Catholics had been large in the three decades before the sectional clash. In 1860, New York's population included 203,740, or about 25-percent, of Irish descent. Brooklyn was home to 56,710 Irish people. A contemporary observer noted: "There are portions of New York, and of nearly every large city, where the population is as thoroughly Irish as in Dublin or Cork."⁹⁹

Those numbers translated into such developments as the reluctance of the New York Board of Aldermen to welcome the Prince of Wales in October 1860.¹⁰⁰ Archbishop John Hughes, a powerful ecumenical figure, became an important Irish voice in the secession crisis.¹⁰¹ The Irish-American was an influential journal, but it competed with Democratic organs in claiming to speak for the newcomers from the Emerald isle.¹⁰² Both Tammany and Mozart had sons of Erin in top positions.¹⁰³

Irish immigrants in 19th-century New York have received considerable scholarly attention. Much of that literature has focused on such topics as the role of the church, patterns of assimilation, degree of class consciousness and the function of the Irish as the core of the city's working class.¹⁰⁴ Of special concern for this study is the participation of those newcomers in public life as the electoral base of the Democracy.¹⁰⁵

To a considerable extent, Irish support of the Democrats was based on acceptance and participation in the formulation of the

party's anti-Republican outlook. An additional factor was the perception of abolitionism as British-bred doctrine. For Irish laborers, especially the unskilled, fears of economic and social competition with ex-slaves were also paramount. Archbishop Hughes's was one of the more pronounced racist voices in the area.¹⁰⁶

Other historical, cultural and transactional factors caused immigrants to vote Democratic. Historically, many saw the Republicans as inheritors of the anti-immigrant, pro-British tradition of the Federalists, Whigs and Know Nothings. Tammany and Mozart used municipal resources to help Irishmen gain employment. There was also some class resentment of the Republicans as the party of the wealthy.¹⁰⁷

But a good deal of Irish backing of the Democracy dealt with patriotism and the Union. While some returned in the mid 1850s, most sectors of the community felt life in the United States was decent. Part of that was attributed to national unity and strength. In that light, fears that Republican antislavery appeals threatened the Union was a powerful component in Irish support of the South and the Democrats. Seeking to reassure the South in 1860, an Irish organ declared:

The Union is yours as it is ours; it's greatness, it's prosperity, it's stability are our mutual glory. Do not be driven from it by the measures of your enemies or seduced from it by the false representations of pretended friends, that your rights are endangered.¹⁰⁸

American nationalism would also be critical in shaping the response to secession when the Union, and not emancipation, was

seen by most as the prime issue.

Metropolitan area Germans were the other important part of the Democratic constituency. The major German-language paper in New York, Staats Zeitung, adhered to the precepts of the party. Oswald Ottendorfer, editor of the paper, was an important figure in intra-Democratic struggles. He shifted between Tammany and Mozart, taking many German voters with him. Most German Democratic clubs and political leaders like William F. Havemeyer and C. Godfrey Gunther worked with Tammany Hall, but Mozart also had a large German following. In terms of rationale, those of German descent, even more than the Irish, were attracted by Democratic opposition to Republican sabbatarianism and temperance.¹⁰⁹

Still, for a variety of reasons, German newcomers were, as a group, less consistent in backing the Democracy and more open to the opposition. These included Republican emphases on free homesteads in the territories, a favorite of local labor leaders, who were often German. The New York Demokrat was a German-language paper which backed Republicans.¹¹⁰

Further, in Carl Schurz Germans had a fellow immigrant in high Republican circles with whom they could identify.¹¹¹ They were also more politically independent and liberal, especially those who reached America as exiles from the Revolution of 1848.¹¹²

The African American community in the metropolis was, in an electoral sense, weak. The black population of New York, Kings

and Queens counties in 1860 was 20,960, or about two-percent of the total.¹¹³ Moreover, they struggled with the ballot discrimination which burdened blacks throughout the state. New York had a \$250 property qualification for the franchise for men of color, while no such requirement existed for white males. In fact, a major area of political activism for those of African descent was campaigning for a state constitutional amendment, on the November 1860 ballot, to eliminate the barrier to suffrage.¹¹⁴

The Weekly Anglo African, published in New York, helped in the amendment campaign, as did prominent black clergymen like Henry Highland Garnet of Manhattan and William S. Hodges of Brooklyn.¹¹⁵ Yet, the more pivotal topic among blacks was the debate over emigration, although they opposed white-sponsored colonization efforts. This included the question of whether departure was prudent, and, if so, was Haiti or Africa the preferred destination.¹¹⁶ The secession crisis would have an impact on this controversy.

Like most black communities in the North, New York's citizens of African ancestry were besieged by an array of prejudicial and exclusionary laws and customs. With limited resources, they maintained schools, churches, orphanages and other facilities, and protested segregation in transportation, education, and other areas. The anniversary of emancipation in the British empire was an annual celebration.¹¹⁷

This study, though, is more concerned with black opinion on

sectional strains and rupture of the Union. The Anglo African was the strongest abolitionist voice in the area. An August 1859 editorial provided a good example:

Now, we ask, who is not tired of remonstrating, pleading and begging the American people to act justly and cease oppressing us because of our complexion. Cease agitation? Yes, when you repeal the Fugitive Slave Law, and reverse the Dred Scott decision, and give us the right of citizenship in the free states, abolish Slavery in the District of Columbia, break up the internal slave trade between the slave states and guarantee unto us the privileges which the federal Constitution guarantees to all men. Then, and not till then, may you expect us to be silent.

It was also alternately encouraged by and infuriated with the Republican antislavery position.¹¹⁸ In the secession era the paper focused on the underlying issue when most people stressed that the continuity of the republic, and not bondage, was the key concern.

The abolitionist movement in the metropolis, as distinct from the Republican party, was small on the eve of schism. To the degree it existed, abolitionism drew on the same evangelical thrust which spurred the impulse in New England. The Woolsey sisters, who became prominent nurses in the war, are good examples of members of the local abolitionism orbit, which included attending Beecher sermons in Brooklyn and addresses by such figures as Wendell Phillips. It was an active and emotional sphere. Abby H. Woolsey, for instance, noted that on one occasion here sister Jane

has been out for a little air and exercise, to see if her head would feel better. She is in a highly nervous state and says she feels as if she had brain fever, the over excitement being the result of last night's meeting at the Cooper Institute, with speeches from Dr. Cheever and Wendell

Phillips.¹¹⁹

The American Anti-Slavery Society held its national meeting in New York in 1860.¹²⁰

As in other parts of the free states, local Republican organs made efforts to distinguish between the party's antislavery stand and abolitionist doctrines.¹²¹ On the other hand, the National Anti-Slavery Standard, a Garrisonian paper published in New York, had a paternalistic attitude towards the Republicans, who they viewed as the child of the crusade they had started. Obviously, the Standard, which was associated with the American Anti-Slavery Society, and other local immediatist elements tried to push the party to a more vigorous stand than merely opposing the extension of slavery into the territories. The Republicans were even called "obnoxious."¹²² There were also religious papers which took strong antislavery positions.¹²³

In a study of opinion, local abolitionists, like the black community, are important as a minority sentiment which became more central in secession. One reason for this was that the climate of public debate grew increasingly pointed at a time of unprecedented crisis; public speakers and editorial columns addressed each other with unusual frankness. In addition, abolitionists' long emphasis on slavery as a more vital issue than the Union would become a central question in the North's response to disunion.

Organized labor in the metropolis was just getting back on its feet after the devastating effects of the panic of 1857.¹²⁴ Meetings expressing sympathy with the shoe strikers of Lynn, Massachusetts in March 1860 galvanized workers in some industries.¹²⁵ The local unit of the Typographical Union was perhaps the area's most substantial group of skilled workers. Beyond that, laborers in such trades as house painting, cigar making, stone cutting, iron molding and bricklaying struggled to organize their sectors, and staged brief strikes.¹²⁶

The emphasis of most of these contingents was on concrete issues, usually wages and hours. In the 1850s, certain artisan leaders had raised general objections to the nature and consequences of industrialization.¹²⁷ On the eve of Lincoln's election, a few workingmen's organizations pushed for specific political goals like federal homestead legislation.¹²⁸ William O. Bourne, an independent labor leader, stressed themes of national class solidarity, and made the unusual move of reaching out to the black community.¹²⁹ He was active in the disunion period, stressing common interests of Northern workers and Southern yeomen.

But unions were not significant forces in public life. With the exception of Bourne's sporadically published The Iron Platform, the metropolis had no labor journals at the time of secession.¹³⁰ Workers, to be sure, influenced political life. Yet, that impact came largely as the bedrock of the Democracy, which seemed to satisfy any class or trade-based impulses those

laborers held, at least through 1863.¹³¹

Commerce was perhaps the most important part of the metropolitan area's economy. For one thing, it created a crucial connection to the South. Since the 1820s New York had been a vital link in the cotton triangle. Boats with bales from Charleston, Savannah, Mobile and New Orleans reached the metropolis year round, but especially in the fall. The fiber was then sold on the New York market and shipped to Liverpool, London and other European ports. Thousands of bales were sold daily in this manner; cotton was the New York's top export in value.¹³² Even in the crisis of schism, 750 bales of fiber were enroute to Liverpool from New York City on a single day.¹³³

In return, much of the local dry goods trade was based on Southern orders. Merchants from Dixie visited the metropolis, usually in the spring, and purchased garments, textiles, shoes boots and other items from New York houses. Those goods were sent to the South, often in ships which had brought cotton to the North. As a result, dry goods merchants kept a steady stock of materials on hand. They received those goods from both foreign and domestic sources, keeping them in close contact with other parts of the nation.¹³⁴

This nexus of cotton and dry goods created an array of local conditions that would be challenged in the secession period. Among these were the large number of people dependent on those transactions. Banks such as Brown Brothers and Duncan, Sherman &

Company dealt with Southerners. Gotham merchants owned sometimes sizable tracts of land in Gulf states.¹³⁵

Estimates of the total owed by individuals and organization in Dixie to New York firms at the time of Lincoln's triumph range from \$150 to \$200 million.¹³⁶ Local insurers covered much of the shipping between the metropolis and Southern ports. One of these, Richard Lathers, a native of South Carolina, played a major role in the rupture of 1860-61.¹³⁷ In addition, clerks at dry goods shops and banks, laborers at shoe factories and stevedores relied on the Southern trade.

Moreover, the commercial situation helped give New York a Southern flavor. Enough businessmen visited the dry goods stores that certain hotels, especially the Fifth Avenue, and parts of Manhattan became designated Dixie enclaves.¹³⁸ The manners and outward charm of these visitors impressed local residents and gave the metropolis a reputation as the most Southern city in the North.¹³⁹ During the crisis, Republicans attacked that idealization of Southern customs as an impediment to dealing firmly with disunion.¹⁴⁰

Trade links with Dixie established social connections. Offspring of owners of city commercial houses married into plantation families.¹⁴¹ But for the most part, the rapport took on economic and political overtones. Joshua Henry was perhaps the best known dry goods merchants reliant on the Southern trade who took an active role in Democratic anti-antislavery politics.¹⁴² Less prominent businessmen who shared that outlook

included Edward N. Tailer.¹⁴³

A Whig seeking to raise money for the 1852 Presidential campaign cited New York as a place where "all our rich men (are) steeped in cotton to the core."¹⁴⁴ By 1860 men of commerce competed in efforts to appear more supportive of the South. This included compiling and circulating a list of dry goods houses which, in the opinion of competitors, had not been forceful enough in denouncing the Republicans.¹⁴⁵ Or, it might entail such efforts as forging the anti-Lincoln fusion ticket in the election of 1860.¹⁴⁶

The metropolitan area's commercial status was, however, built on more than the Southern trade. New York was the nation's leading site of imports and exports, handling about two-thirds of arriving and one-third of departing merchandise.¹⁴⁷ Even before the completion of the Erie Canal, the metropolis was a focal point for the hinterland trade.¹⁴⁸ The opening of the famed waterway cemented that link. In the late 1850s the combined value and volume of Western agricultural products -- corn, wheat and flour -- accounted for more of the export business than cotton.¹⁴⁹

Domestic dry goods houses also shipped garments, shoes and textiles to such sites. In the secession period, those merchants would try to compensate for the loss of Southern markets by increasing sales to Westerners.¹⁵⁰

Clearly, the health of the commercial sector of greater New York was dependent on national unity and peace, as well as decent

relations with other regions. Like most businessmen, merchants and bankers were disturbed by events which jeopardized that stable climate necessary for the smooth flow of trade.¹⁵¹ Still, they were not simply economic animals. The pressures of schism would challenge those traders, as it would most conservatives, to weigh proclivities towards the South against a more general vision of what the Union meant to them.

In 1860, New York's commercial situation was sound. Early in the year, some businessmen feared Southern merchants would boycott the spring dry goods season, in response to the Brown raid. Such retaliation was considered by the Virginia legislature. One Dixieite active in the Gotham trade noted most of his colleagues, in the immediate aftermath of Harper's Ferry, favored secession, But that fervor subsided, and the spring trade was solid.¹⁵²

Metropolitan New York on the eve of the Civil War was a diverse community which contained, in varying degrees, representative portions of most political, social and economic impulses in the North. The metropolis was linked to and dependent on much of the republic. It also faced an array of local-based concerns that would be affected by the split in the Union. In this light, studying the area in the context of the events of 1860-61 is viable both as a measure of Northern responses to the onset of sectional strife and as an important chapter in the history of the municipality.

Notes

1. See, for example, Evening Post, 27 February 1860, p. 2; Journal Of Commerce, 18 September 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 5 October 1860, p. 6; for a thorough survey of technological, distributional and political aspects of antebellum newspaper, see Raymond A. Ross, Slavery And The New York City Newspapers, 1850-1860, (PhD diss., NYU, 1966), early chapters.

2. See, among many instances, New York Tribune, 22 March 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 9 March 1860, p. 4.

3. New York Times, 11 April 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 15 August 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 16 August 1860, p. 4; New York Leader, 4 August 1860, p. 4; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, p. 84; Long, The New York "News", pp. 13, 30.

4. Douglas Fremer, James Gordon Bennett And The New York Herald: A Study Of Editorial Opinion In The Civil War Era, 1854-1867, (New York, 1986), pp. 1-3; Samuel F. Butterworth to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 14 February 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; George G. Fogg to Abraham Lincoln, 23 August 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; James Buchanan to James Gordon Bennett, 20 December 1860, in, John Bassett Moore, ed., The Works Of James Buchanan, 12 vols., (New York, 1960), II:69-70; New York Herald, 7 December 1859, p. 4; New York Herald, 28 February 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 1 May 1860, p. 6; Ross, Slavery And The New York City Newspapers, p. 52; Perkins, "The Defense Of Slavery In The Northern Press On The Eve Of The Civil War," p. 506; Albert C. Ramsey to Issac V. Fowler, 20 November 1858, Ramsey Papers, NYHS.

5. Of many examples, see, New York Herald, 7 June 1848, p. 2; New York Herald, 9 August 1848, p. 2; New York Herald, 2 December 1859, p. 4; New York Herald, 1 April 1860, p. 4.

6. The Weekly Day-Book, 16 March 1861, p. 4; Perkins, "The Defense Of Slavery In The Northern Press On The Eve Of The Civil War," pp. 503-05; Jefferson Davis to John H. Van Evrie, 5 November 1860, The Papers Of Jefferson Davis, VI:668; John Cowden to Davis, 17 December 1860, Papers Of Jefferson Davis, VI:672.

7. Samuel S. Powell to Fernando Wood, 30 January 1860, Wood Papers, NYPL; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 27 February 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 22 March 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 19 May 1860, p.

- 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 31 May 1860, p. 2.
8. Brooklyn Daily Times, 14 January 1861, p. 2; for information on Mayor Powell, see, Scrapbook, Mayors Of Brooklyn, BHS.
9. See, for example, New York Times, 15 March 1860, p. 5; New York Times, 2 April 1860, p. 5; New York Times, 3 April 1860, p. 8; Evening Post, 23 March 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 31 March 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 4 April 1860, p. 4.
10. Francis B. Spinola to Fernando Wood, 8 March 1859, Wood Papers, NYPL; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 17 August 1860, p. 2.
11. On Kalbfleisch, see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 23 March 1861, p. 2'; Scrapbook, Mayors Of Brooklyn, BHS; on Bergen, see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 5 February 1861, p. 2; Issac Badeau to Teunis G. Bergen, 9 March 1860, Bergen Papers, BHS; John Cortelyou to Bergen, 30 December 1846, Cortelyou Family Papers, BHS.
12. Even the Eagle, a Hard advocate, favored union of local Democrats, see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 28 March 1860, p. 3.
13. New York Times, 5 November 1856, p. 1; according to the 1860 federal census, Brooklyn's population was 39.22-percent foreign born, while New York's was 47.62-percent, see, Population Of The United States In 1860, (Washington, 1864), xxxi-xxxii.
14. For a closer look at the level of Democratic strength, see Records, Town Of Flatbush, BHS, which shows Democrats winning the town's 1860 gubernatorial vote by 164-125, or with 57-percent of the tally. Part of Kings County, but not the city of Brooklyn, Flatbush, politically, tended to mirror the composition of the western district; also see, New York Times, 4 November 1857, p. 1; New York Times, 4 November 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 6 November 1858, p. 1.
15. New York Times, 4 April 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 5 April 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 8 May 1860, p. 7.
16. Albert H. Osborne to Teunis G. Bergen, 1860, Bergen Papers, BHS; Osborne to Bergen, 3 September 1860, Bergen papers, BHS.
17. New York Times, 4 November 1858, p. 1.
18. Population Of The United States In 1860, p. 335; Map Of The Consolidated City Of Brooklyn, 1859, at BHS.
19. Population Of The United States In 1860, xxxi.
20. Henry E. Pierpont to unidentified, 4 March 1861, Pierpont Family Papers, BHS; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 5 February 1861, p. 2.

21. Brooklyn Daily Times, 14 March 1861, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Times, 4 January 1859, p. 3.
22. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 12 November 1860, p. 1; Brooklyn Daily Times, 4 January 1859, p. 3.
23. Peter Wyckoff to Teunis G. Bergen, 3 September 1865, Wyckoff Family Letters, BHS; Brooklyn Daily Times, 8 March 1861, p. 2; David W. McCullough, Brooklyn: And How It Got That Way, (New York, 1983), p. 32; Alter F. Landesman, A History Of New Lots, Brooklyn To 1877, Including The Villages Of East New York, Cypress Hills And Brownsville, (Port Washington, NY, 1977), p. 115.
24. Brooklyn Daily Times, 11 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 14 January 1861, p. 2.
25. Brooklyn Evening Star, 27 February 1860, p. 2.
26. Map Of The Consolidated City Of Brooklyn, BHS, shows the ferry links; also see, Brooklyn Evening Star, 20 January 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 15 April 1859, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 8 June 1859, p. 2; "Description Of Brooklyn-New York Ferry," in, James E. Bunce, Richard P. Harmond, eds., Long Island As America: A Documentary History, (Port Washington, NY, 1977), p. 109.
27. Brooklyn Evening Star, 16 July 1860, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Times, 14 April 1859, p. 2.
28. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Times, 3 January 1861, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Evening Star, 23 February 1860, p. 2.
29. Brooklyn Evening Star, 6 January 1860, p. 2.
30. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 23 January 1861, p. 3; also see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 15 January 1861, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Times, 16 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 23 January 1861, p. 2.
31. Brooklyn Daily Times, 11 March 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 12 June 1860, p. 2.
32. Brooklyn Evening Star, 17 May 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 15 March 1861, p. 2.
33. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Times, 15 April 1859, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 15 March 1861, p. 2.
34. Brooklyn Daily Times, 20 February 1861, p. 2.
35. Undated document in Brenton family Papers, QPL; Long Island Democrat, 10 January 1860, p. 2; Long Island Democrat, 21 February 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 1 March 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 6 September 1860, p. 2.

Times, 6 September 1860, p. 2.

36. Diary Of E.A. Smith, September-November 1860, QPL, offers a good sense of Long Island politics, and the many similarities to the party struggle in the cities.

37. Undated document in Brenton family Papers, QPL; Flushing Journal, 20 March 1858, p. 2; Long Island Times, 29 March 1860, p. 2; "The Millerites On Long Island," in, Bunce, Harmond, eds., Long Island As America, pp. 124-25; Long Island Times, 3 May 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 9 August 1860, p. 2.

38. New York Times, 9 November 1854, p. 1; New York Times, 7 November 1856, p. 1.

39. New York Times, 4 November 1858. p. 1; Flushing Journal, 16 October 1858, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 13 November 1858, p. 2; Long Island Times, 12 April 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 19 July 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 2 August 1860. p. 2.

40. Quote from, Flushing Journal, 15 October 1859, p. 2; also see, Flushing Journal, 9 October 1858, p. 2.

41. Long Island Times, 3 May 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 8 November 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 7 April 1860, p. 3.

42. Brooklyn Evening Star, 29 June 1860, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 3 January 1857, p. 2; New York Times, 8 November 1856, p. 1; Evening Post, 24 April 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 26 April 1860, p. 4.

43. See, for example, Evening Post, 29 June 1860, p. 1.

44. Population Of The United States In 1860, pp. 322-23; John L. Andriot, ed., Population Abstract Of The United States, (McLean, VA, 1983), pp. 543-49.

45. Federal Census Returns, 1860, Queens County.

46. Ibid; Long Island Democrat, 1 January 1861, p. 2.

47. Diary of John Hallock, 5 March 1861, QPL; Diary of E.A. Smith, entries of 13 March and December 1860, QPL; Long Island Times, 1 November 1860, p. 2.

48. Quote from, "Long Island Farming Before The Civil War," in, Bunce, Harmond, Long Island As America, p. 115; also see, "The Coming Of The Long Island Railroad," in, Ibid, pp. 111-14; Long Island Times, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 5 November 1859, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 16 February 1861, p. 2.

49. Flushing Journal, 1 December 1860, p. 1; Flushing Journal, 26 January 1861, p. 2; Diary Of E.A. Smith, 13 August 1860, QPL.

50. Diary of John Hallock, 4 February 1861, QPL; Long Island Times, 1 March 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 10 January 1861, p. 2. Flushing Journal, 16 March 1861, p. 2.

51. Ross, Slavery And The New York City Newspapers, p. 3.

52. New York Tribune, 27 February 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 7 March 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 10 April 1860, p. 4; unknown correspondent to Horace Greeley, 16 July 1860, Greeley papers, NYPL.

53. W.A. Royce to Thurlow Weed, 7 June 1859, Weed Papers, UR; Cornelius Vanderbilt to Weed, 15 March 1860, Weed Papers, UR; Evening Post, 28 February 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 29 February 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 13 March 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 16 March 1860, p. 4; Francis Brown, Raymond Of The Times, (New York, 1951), pp. 137-141.

54. Quote from, Evening Post, 20 March 1860, p. 2; also see, among many examples of this, William H. Fry to Abraham Lincoln, 4 August 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; New York Times, 30 October 1856, p. 4; New York Times, 2 March 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 28 April 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 24 March 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 29 May 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 12 March 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 9 July 1860, p. 4; the best treatment of prewar Republican antislavery thinking, which includes many references to New York periodicals, is, Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men.

55. Quote from, New York Times, 6 June 1860, p. 4; among the many other examples of this, see, New York Times, 20 March 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 23 March 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 27 April 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 28 February 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 10 March 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 10 April 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 22 March 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 23 March 1860, p.4; New York Tribune, 3 April 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 19 April 1860, p. 6; New York Tribune, 28 April 1860, p. 6.

56. New York Times, 9 April 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 17 April 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 2 March 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 15 March 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 25 April 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 9 March 1860, p. 8; New York Tribune, 13 March 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 16 March 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 30 March 1860, p. 4.

57. New York Times, 3 March 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 8 March 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 14 March 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 7 May 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 30 May 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 25 February 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 1 March 1860, p. 4.

58. Glyndon G. Van Deusen, Horace Greeley: Nineteenth-Century Crusader, (Philadelphia, 1953), pp. 194-95, 223; New York Times, 1 March 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 1 June 1860, p. 4; Van Deusen,

Thurlow Weed: Wizard Of The Lobby, (Boston, 1947), pp. 201-03; Brown, Raymond Of The Times, pp. 185-86.

59. Edwin D. Morgan to Abraham Lincoln, 4 June 1860, Lincoln papers, LC; New York Times, 23 March 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 17 April 1860, p. 4; John Bigelow, Retrospections Of An Active Life, (New York, 1909), 3 volumes, I:290; Joseph F. Ryan, Abraham Lincoln And New York City, 1861-1865: War And Politics, (PhD diss., St. John's University, 1969). pp. 4-5; Carl F. Krummel, "Henry J. Raymond And The New York Times In The Secession Crisis, 1860-61," NYH, vol. 32, October 1951, p. 377.

60. Van Deusen, Horace Greeley, p. 194; Le Maria Child to Horace Greeley, 18 December 1859, Greeley papers, NYPL; Edward Bates to Greeley, 26 May 1860, Greeley Papers, NYPL; Hinton R. Helper to Horace Greeley, 23 October 1860, Greeley papers, NYPL; Elliott F. Shepard to Abraham Lincoln, 15 October 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; Ryan, Abraham Lincoln And New York City, pp. 4-5.

61. William C. Bryant to John Bigelow, 20 February 1860, in, William C. Bryant II, Thomas G. Voss, ed., The Letters Of William Cullen Bryant, 4 vols., (New York, 1976-84), IV: 139-40; Bryant to Abraham Lincoln, 16 June 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; New York Times, 28 February 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 14 April 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 28 February 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 3 March 1860, p. 6; New York Tribune, 22 May 1860, p. 4.

62. John Bigelow to William Hargreaves, 30 July 1860, Bigelow Papers, NYPL.

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Chapter 3: New York And The Election Of 1860

The election of 1860 served as a prelude to rupture of the Union. Threats from the South to leave if the Republicans captured the White House were common in the summer and fall. The split of the Democracy on the national level made Lincoln a strong favorite to win, leading to a focus on what might follow his triumph. Opinions revealed provide sound, though not complete, clues to the eventual response to departure of the Southern states.

After much infighting, local Democrats and conservatives recognized enough common cause to run a single, anti-Republican electoral ticket. It swept the metropolis, but failed to carry the state. Confidence about the results of the Presidential race eclipsed the disappointment of New York Republicans over the defeat of William Seward's candidacy for the nomination. The campaign also confirmed New York's central role in national elections.

Responses to early state elections in New England indicated the tone of the campaign season in the metropolis. Fernando Wood spoke for Democrats in Connecticut in March and early April. Citing the Republican as abolitionists, he warned of horrors of social and economic competition following emancipation. Further, the Mayor claimed Republican success would lead to disruption of trade with the South, a blow to the Nutmeg state's economy. Democratic journals cast the significance of the race in the same light.¹

Wood's extreme tone in Connecticut was part of an effort to curry favor in the cotton states to aid his chances for recognition at the upcoming Democratic convention in Charleston.² He was, at the time, a pariah in local Democratic circles; his presence on the Nutmeg stump scared off other top New York party figures like Horatio Seymour and John Dix. Those squabbles among Democrats hindered the party throughout the canvass, and almost blocked the formation of an anti-Lincoln fusion.³

The New England races also previewed the pattern of merchants active in the Southern trade contributing money to anti-Republican efforts. Following Republican triumphs in New Hampshire, for example, August Belmont wrote to a party leader in mid March that it was

absolutely necessary that we should make a vigorous effort in order to prevent a similar result in Connecticut, as far as lays in our power. If that State should also elect a Republican ticket, then the election of a sectional President, with all its fatal, unavoidable consequences, affecting the very existence of our Union, will be certain.⁴

The focus on the Presidential election gave abolitionist audiences in New York City the chance to hear speakers advocate a Democratic triumph to bring sectional issues to a point of confrontation.⁵ Republicans hammered out certain themes in relation to the Connecticut race which held throughout 1860. These included dismissing the possibility of secession if their nominee won the Presidency and urging electors to ignore scare tactics and vote their consciences. They refuted the claim that Nutmeg state dry goods sold through New York houses went mostly

to Southern customers, urging residents to resist "the bugaboo of Old Brown and the withdrawal of Southern trade."⁶

Many area Democrats looked with trepidation upon the election. The prospects of a smooth convention at Charleston seemed slim, and while Stephen Douglas was the choice of most local delegates for the nomination,⁷ elements of the Hard side of the party opposed the Little Giant. They favored such figures as Daniel Dickinson of New York or Joseph Lane of Oregon.⁸ The dominant impression before the parley was expressed by Seymour, occasionally touted as a contender:

The Charleston Convention becomes more obscure the closer we get to it. I do not look with much confidence (on) our proceedings or results. I may take a gloomy view of affairs, but I think we are to be beaten in 1860.⁹

In some ways, New York Democrats headed to South Carolina more united than for several years. Dickinson, the Hard leader, had agreed in September 1859 to co-operate with the Regency in fielding a delegation. Dean Richmond, state Democratic chairman, appealed to unity and Dickinson's ego, mentioning the possibility of the joint delegation seeking the nomination for Dickinson. At a convention in Syracuse, a contingent was named for Charleston which seemed to satisfy both wings of the party. Dickinson later called it the "last grand experiment to unite and consolidate the Democratic masses of this state under one organization."¹⁰

But the alliance was an uneasy one. Even while going along, claiming "I must have faith," Dickinson had grave doubts about the Regency and Tammany leaders heading the delegation.¹¹

The regular delegation to South Carolina was composed of an

array of sentiments. While many stood behind Douglas, other had hopes of choosing, at various stages, a Southerner, Seymour or Dickinson. The Richmond-led delegation turned out to be one of the most influential at both Charleston and Baltimore. If some members of the contingent had separate ideas about nominees and the platform, the Regency chiefs maintained discipline and unity. But that coherence disintegrated once the convention season was over.¹²

Wood failed to disrupt the September 1859 state convention, but hoped for recognition at Charleston. The Mayoral victory of December 1859 boosted the claims of Mozart Hall to represent city Democrats.¹³ Ignoring Dickinson's co-operation with the Regency, Wood led other recalcitrant Hards such as Gideon Tucker in February 1860 in naming a delegation which vied for legitimacy at the national parley.¹⁴

They counted on a variety of factors. Among these were admissions of split Hard and Soft delegations from New York at the 1852 and 1856 Democratic conferences and support for Wood in the deep South. As a New York Democrat who spent much time in Washington reported privately in February: "All the Southern men read the Herald and they believe that Wood and his delegation are the only true National (Hard) Democrats."¹⁵

Even so, it is difficult to see the Wood-led delegation as more than a personal effort to assert his power and possible candidacy.¹⁶

The dispute over the New York delegations contained elements

of the major confrontation at the Charleston convention. This involved the South's efforts to undercut Douglas and insert in the platform a plank calling for a federal slave code for the territories. The Wood set was likely to sustain the cotton states' position, while the Regency-led group supported the Douglas agenda. This rift, which ultimately destroyed the Convention, had been building since the Lecompton controversy of 1858.¹⁷

The Hard delegates were treated courteously by the Southerners and the local population. They also received a fair hearing by the credentials committee. That panel issued a majority report favoring the Richmond contingent and a minority opinion calling for splitting New York's seats between the groups. The full convention on April 25 accepted the majority report by a vote of 210 to 55, a clear defeat for the Mayor. While the 55 votes came from Dixie, the Hards did not receive full support from the cotton states. South Carolina, for instance, voted for the Richmond-led delegation.¹⁸

Depending on the perspective, such an outcome of the delegation dispute could seem routine or momentous. New York's representation was the largest. If admitted, the Hards might have allowed the South to carry the all-important platform vote.¹⁹ On the other hand, the Wood group had no valid claims of legitimacy. The Richmond set had the backing of Dickinson, the South's favorite New York Democrat, and contained such figures as attorney Samuel L.M. Barlow and Collector Augustus Schell, with

whom the cotton states were familiar and comfortable. The Buchanan Administration, through Schell, supported the regular contingent. In that context, the Wood challenge was ultimately feeble.²⁰

Back in New York, Tammany Hall celebrated the defeat of Wood's convention aspirations, firing 100 guns at the Battery. Still reeling from the results of the Mayoral election of December 1859, Tammany needed vindication of its claims as the official representative of the Democracy in the city.²¹

Wood remained in Charleston. Weakened in the short run, the Mayor displayed his usual instincts for knowing how far to press political gambles. He gravitated towards the Southern delegates who had supported his quest and would soon bolt the convention. But he was careful not to identify formally with the seceders' conference, and pledged to support the party's regular nominee for President.²²

On a broader political front, New York Democrats saw the platform and nomination battles as more important than the delegation issue. A city dry goods merchant wrote in his diary the day after the Richmond group was confirmed: "The important issues at stake, which involve both the success of the party at the coming election, and the future safety of the nation, have not been brought to the final test of a vote."²³

The Empire State delegation voted unanimously for the moderate popular sovereignty-based platform, rejecting the South's guarantee of slavery in the territories. In caucus, they

voted for the Northern platform by a 46-24 tally, a reflection of some support for the extreme position. But it was not strong enough to resist the demand by delegation chiefs for unity of action on the convention floor, despite clear signs Dixieites would leave if popular sovereignty prevailed. Led by the Alabama delegation, 50 Southern delegates walked out of the hall once the tally was announced, marking the beginning of the split of the Democracy and perhaps the country.²⁴

The majority vote of New York for the popular sovereignty plank was partly a statement of discomfort with Southern domination of party policy. Equally, it was a show of support for Douglas and a realization Democrats would not carry Northern states with open advocacy of extending slavery. It fit a common pattern of 1860-61, of a brief, partial statement among local Democrats of the rabid pro-South posture -- the 24 votes, or one-third of the delegation -- followed by retreat in the face of sectional and political pressures.

Much has been written about the attitude of the Empire State's delegation on the vote to nominate a Presidential candidate. Dickinson soon claimed half of the group backed his aspirations.²⁵ Others asserted the New Yorkers really wanted James Guthrie of Kentucky or Robert Hunter of Virginia.²⁶ A common theory, with some plausibility, was that Richmond's contingent secretly sought to select Seymour.²⁷

Even so, through 57 ballots, without a dissenting voice, the delegation voted for Douglas. This was led by the persuasions of

Richmond and August Belmont, holding to a pre-convention pledge to act in concert.²⁸ They also backed the requirement that the nominee get votes of two-thirds of the original delegates, which could be seen as an anti-Douglas step.²⁹ Actually, it was in line with precedent. Waving the two-thirds stipulation would have de-legitimized the Douglas nomination. The New York representatives favored selection of Douglas under normal procedures and, if possible, by the united Democracy.

While predicted in many quarters, the split at Charleston and failure to nominate a standard-bearer was rightly seen as pivotal. George T. Strong wrote: "So the great National Democratic party is disintegrated and dead; broken up, like so many other organizations, by these pernicious niggers. It is a bad sign."³⁰ Democrats called the break of "overwhelming importance," and dramatically predicted a Republican Presidential victory followed by disunion.³¹ A Republican organ was pleased that the slavery issue had proven critical enough to drive a wedge between sections of the Democracy.³²

In the period between adjournment and reassembly at Baltimore in mid June, local Democrats were active, both privately and publicly, in a variety of ways. The major area of tension was between those, led by Belmont, seeking to retain support for Douglas and others interested in uniting behind another candidate who might reunite the party at the second convention.³³ Tammany Hall stood by the Little Giant in the interim period.³⁴ Wood's Democratic group blamed the Hall and

Regency for the breakup at Charleston, but showed no intentions of again competing for recognition.³⁵

The anti-Douglas movement focused on Dickinson, Seymour, or anybody amenable to Southern Democrats. Seymour, who reluctantly accepted the nomination in 1868, was interested in helping the party, but had no personal desire to run. Between the conventions he told a political friend he was willing "to aid if possible in getting the democratic party out of its troubles. While I do not suppose there was any probability of my nomination in any event, I found many supposed I wished to be placed upon (the) ticket. The misapprehension weakened my influence with the delegation."³⁶ Two weeks before the Baltimore parley, the former governor publicly declared he was not a candidate.³⁷

John Dix best represented the anti-Douglas, pro-South position of metropolitan area Democrats between the conventions. He claimed the Illinois Senator "is not the choice of the democracy of this State." Dix added that the New York delegation at Charleston should have sustained the Southern platform, since it represented "the general feeling in this state." The goal at Baltimore, he asserted, was a nominee acceptable to the South, and that "no effort will be spared to bring about such a result."³⁸

But this was another instance of the bold thrust followed by withdrawal of the extreme pro-South position within Democratic ranks.

While party entities hoped for smooth sessions in Maryland.

The major Democratic voice in Queens had to reach this far for a positive outlook: "Let not the opposition indulge in the vain and delusive hope that warm and excited discussions in the Democratic convention, betoken a spirit of dissension and weakness."³⁹ The dominant impression was futility. Few expected a united effort to emerge from the convention, realizing the situation had moved beyond the ability of party insiders to forge an alliance of the sections.⁴⁰

Samuel Barlow, leading backstage operator, expressed this confused, desperate sentiment. Groping for an approach, he wrote to Dean Richmond in mid May: "I do not know that we are any more likely to agree at Baltimore than we did at Charleston, but there is no harm in trying."⁴¹ Six days earlier, he felt "matters here look well for a nomination at Baltimore."⁴² He also alternately supported Douglas and called for dumping the Little Giant.⁴³

When the convention opened June 18, the New York delegation was supportive of Douglas, but not uncompromisingly. This was evident in their stance on the crucial issue of which Southerners to admit. The bolters from Charleston competed with newly formed slates of supporters of the Little Giant from Dixie.⁴⁴

The Empire State had a pivotal voice on the credentials committee. In a caucus vote, the delegation voted by about 60-percent to seat the Douglas delegates. Tallies against representatives pledged to the Little Giant were part of a final effort to shape a peaceful convention by splitting the seats between bolters and new men.⁴⁵

Of Brooklyn's four delegates, for instance, three, including Teunis G. Bergen and Edmund Driggs, voted to split the seats while State Senator Francis Spinola sided with the Little Giant.⁴⁶ This was a fair statement of Kings County's midway position between Hard and Soft wings of the Democracy. It was also a metropolis-based desire to avoid a rupture of the party and Republican victory.

Still, following the unity agreement, New Yorkers voted unanimously in full convention to admit the pro-Douglas delegates.⁴⁷ With that issue decided, the Little Giant's nomination was assured. But some of the anti-Douglas men, notably Augustus Schell, abstained in the balloting to select the nominee, and joined Southern Democrats across town where they selected John C. Breckinridge for President.⁴⁸ That was the beginning of the Breckinridge/Douglas break among state party members, which would be repaired before the November election.

Local Republican confidence about the Presidential election was strong in the months before the Chicago convention. The split at Charleston only added to this sense of pending success.⁴⁹ Campaign activity started relatively early in the season. Central clubs to plan strategy and local groups to appeal to particular constituencies formed in March.⁵⁰

The major pre-conference issue was whether Seward could secure the nomination. Almost the entire party apparatus supported his bid; the state's delegation to Chicago was

unanimously pledged to the Senator. Yet, it was never a zealous backing willing to, for instance, bolt the party if the nod went to someone else.⁵¹ The anti-Seward movement, led by Horace Greeley and William Bryant, gained momentum from a forum of Republican speeches at Cooper Institute, especially Lincoln's famed address of late February.⁵²

The defeat of Seward at Chicago was a shock to New York Republicans. Governor Edwin Morgan, who was also national party chairman, cabled the Senator the evening before the balloting for President: "We have no doubt of a favorable result tomorrow."⁵³

Contemporaries and historians have advanced a variety of explanations for Lincoln's nomination and the bypassing of Seward. These include fears of the Senator's radicalism and his anti-nativist background, a barrier to building support among ex-Americans in key lower North states.⁵⁴ Other reasons offered are Seward's link to the state legislative leaders who were accused of malfeasance in the recently concluded session, and the efforts of Greeley, who went to Chicago as an Oregon delegate.⁵⁵

Lincoln's greatness as wartime President makes the denial of the nomination to Seward seem of monumental importance. But for this study, the key concern is the response of New York Republicans. There was some extreme disillusionment which verged on rejecting the ticket or presenting the Senator as an independent nominee. This came from rank and file loyalists, not from party leaders. A Long Island man, for instance, hesitated "to longer identify myself with a party thus ungrateful. My

interest in its success is gone. Demoralized, self-incriminating, divided and cowardly -- it scarcely awakens a sentiment of interest in its fate."⁵⁶

By and large, however, the correct assumption that the nomination was a winning one overcame the sense of disappointment. Lincoln was inoffensive, and accepted as a valid representative of Republican principles.⁵⁷ The city's central Republican club sanctimoniously praised itself for sacrificing local preference for the cause.⁵⁸ The key point was that local Republicans realized the electibility of the nominee. Morgan wrote to Lincoln of the Democrats: "We can whip their best man."⁵⁹

Greeley's efforts to crush Seward had been important. They were both personal and political.⁶⁰ Supporters of the Senator held the Tribune editor responsible, bringing back into the open a rivalry between Greeley and Raymond of the Times.⁶¹ In part, this was another version of the editorial wars of the day, as well as preliminary jockeying in the race to replace Seward in the Senate in February 1861.⁶²

But it was also a continuation of the division between moderate Republicans of the Seward/Raymond stripe and the more radical group aligned with Greeley. The division was not strong enough to block a common effort in support of Lincoln, although it resurfaced with significant implications in the secession period.

Local conservatives both hoped the nomination would make

Seward forces in the Empire state apathetic, and chided Republicans for ingratitude toward their natural leader.⁶³ George Strong, more a conservative than a Republican at this time, took an initially negative view of Lincoln, and predicted the ticket's defeat.⁶⁴ A Democratic organ admitted the choice was a "strong one,"⁶⁵ a view that would expand with time.

The local Constitutional Union effort was a curious affair. Led by the Brooks brothers and ex-Governor Washington Hunt, the group went through the steps of establishing a legitimate political organization, and had support among Fillmore loyalists of 1856.⁶⁶ Even so, it was largely an anti-Republican movement. James Brooks tried to meet with President Buchanan in March to discuss defeat of the antislavery party.⁶⁷

The New York representation at the party's national convention in Baltimore in May backed the candidacy of ex-Democrat Sam Houston. The general had been a member of Tammany Hall since 1858. In that context, support of the Texan was part of a strategy to fuse the Union ticket with the Democracy.⁶⁸

While the delegates voted for Houston, they accepted the selection of John Bell and Edward Everett.⁶⁹ The Tennessean was taken seriously as a national Unionist by some in the metropolis. A labor leader praised Bell as someone who would "absolutely paralyze the National Democracy."⁷⁰ But back in New York, the chiefs of the Union effort sought merger with anti-Lincoln forces, a move sanctioned by the Tennessean.⁷¹

The Houston movement continued, led by the head of the barely surviving city American committee. Meetings favoring the candidacy of the military hero were held, and such nativist organs as the Long Island Times favored the idea of an independent Houston bid.⁷² Plans to run an electoral slate pledged to the Texan were not scrapped until early September, when an anti-Lincoln ticket was clearly in sight.⁷³

Meanwhile, local Republican reaction to the fielding of two Democratic Presidential tickets was euphoric. Within days of the Baltimore conventions, the term "morally certain" became a standard phrase in describing Lincoln's prospects of victory.⁷⁴ The possibility of a conservative fusion effort in some states, including New York, was dismissed.⁷⁵ Even when the coalition took shape in the fall, Republicans never altered the overwhelming sense of confidence expressed following the convention season.

In tracing steps towards an anti-Lincoln alliance, which lasted from late June through October, a few key points emerge. First, the initial reaction included much saber rattling, with both Breckinridge and Douglas supporters asserting legitimacy and boasting they would not join.⁷⁶ Much of this positioning followed the customary Hard-Soft split. With the notable exception of Fernando Wood, for example, rabidly pro-South Democrats backed the Vice President.⁷⁷ In that light, the division was ideological.

Second, political considerations abounded. A major factor was a quiet concession that Lincoln might win, and that Democrats were jockeying for post-November advantages. In other words, there was an interest in running Douglas and Breckinridge tickets head to head. Even if Lincoln defeated both, the Softs, for example, could stake a stronger claim to controlling the state party machinery if Douglas electors whipped those pledged to the Vice President. Many also looked ahead to the Presidential canvass of 1864.⁷⁸

In the long run, differences among Democrats proved minor enough to take a back seat to common desire to deny the Republicans the White House. Ultimately, the New York fusion movement was a Union-saving enterprise. Formulation and outlook of the movement was similar to the manner in which conservatives reacted to secession, including an eventual coalescing around a common position. For that reason, building of the anti-Republican alliance deserves considerable attention.

Since the Regency and Tammany had backed the Little Giant through the conventions, both ratified his nomination and set about running a Douglas campaign in New York. Horatio Seymour trusted Breckinridge "will not suffer his friends to be guilty of the extreme folly of running an electoral ticket in New York." August Belmont was elected at Baltimore to chair the national initiative for the Illinois Senator; he also started field operations in the Empire State.⁷⁹

The odd development was Wood's endorsement of Douglas. An

array of factors were at work. Foremost, it is difficult to dismiss the Mayor's publicly stated reason for his decision. Wood argued his purpose was to defeat Lincoln. The best way to do that was by denying the Republican a majority in the electoral college, forcing the House of Representatives to make the choice. The way to accomplish that was for Democrats to unite behind the nominee with the strongest chance of winning in each state. In New York, the Mayor asserted, Douglas stood taller than Breckinridge.⁴⁰

Beyond that, Wood hoped cooperating with state party leaders in backing the Little Giant would help Mozart Hall's bid for recognition as the official Democratic arm in New York City. He turned out to be correct.⁴¹ The Mayor was also a friend of Douglas, and had loaned him money to finance the 1858 Senatorial race against Lincoln.⁴² Wood proved his hold on Mozart. Despite the Hard orientation of most members, he engineered an endorsement of Douglas by the general committee.⁴³

Augustus Schell, the Buchanan Administration's chief spokesman in Gotham, organized one section of the Breckinridge campaign during the saber rattling period. His contingent included such well known Hards as Charles O'Connor, James Brady, John A. Dix and merchants active in the Southern trade. Yet, in a good example of Democratic flux, Dix appeared publicly at Breckinridge affairs, while noting privately that fusion was necessary to have any chance of defeating Lincoln.⁴⁴

Daniel Dickinson, fuming about deception by the Regency,

attended local rallies supporting the Vice President.⁶⁵ The other element of the Vice President's organization was the Hard state committee discarded by the Mayor. It was led by John A. Greene, and locally by Gideon Tucker, member of the Wood delegation to Charleston. Traders who dealt with the cotton states also worked with the Greene expedition.⁶⁶

Several Democratic entities talked of fusion as soon as the Baltimore conventions broke. These included the New York Herald and Samuel Barlow.⁶⁷ The latter eventually played a major role in shaping the alliance in the fall. Barlow and other conciliators like Samuel Tilden were waiting for the extremists to flex muscles before agreeing to subsume local rivalries under the need to defeat the Republican nominee.

Efforts to achieve a conservative fusion stumbled into early September. The only significant development was the nominal merger of Douglas and Bell efforts at a Democratic state convention in mid August. Constitutional Union leaders organized the placement of ten ex-Americans on the electoral ticket and claimed they would vote for the Tennessean in the electoral college. The convention, though, endorsed the Little Giant outright.⁶⁸

A dispute over whether the ten, including James Ogden of New York City, were valid Bell electors was later eclipsed by the formation of a full fusion. Much of the rancor was due to the nativist background of the Americans on the slate. German Democrats in Flushing, for example, vowed to vote against the

ticket if it was not a pure Douglas campaign.⁸⁹

Still, the ten were Bell men in sentiment and not legally bound to vote for the Illinois Senator.⁹⁰ The dispute highlighted the difficulties in merging all anti-Lincoln forces. On the other hand, it showed such barriers could be overcome, especially in light of constant threats emerging from the South to secede if the Republican won.

Another major outcome of that Democratic parley, under the control of the Regency, was the equal admission of delegates from Tammany and Mozart as official arms of the party in New York City.⁹¹ The decision was a consummation of Wood's crusade to gain the label of legitimacy for his faction. Tammany rightly took the motion by the convention on joint seating as a defeat and withdrew.⁹² Notwithstanding, it endorsed the electoral ticket, claiming the slate was pledged to Douglas.⁹³

Publicly, many Democrats called for fusion in August. The Breckinridge camp named an electoral ticket, but issued a call welcoming co-operation with others opposed to the election of a Republican President.⁹⁴ Local groups, especially in Kings County, urged merger.⁹⁵

Some rabid Hards like the Brooklyn Daily Eagle held out for a separate canvass for Breckinridge. More than those interested in fusion, the Eagle continued to stress racism and opposition to emancipation over Union saving, a trend which continued in the secession era. In mid August the daily argued:

The African and Caucasian elements cannot mix in physiology or in politics. The negro is a prolific race, its numbers

will laugh and grow fat while incendiaries are ready to fire the pile of the Republic in their behalf, and they will also increase and multiply in strict accordance with the primeval injunction to that effect.⁹⁶

Private steps to achieve fusion were undertaken mostly by Democrats with reputations as neutrals in the Hard-Soft dispute. Among these were Barlow, Tilden and August Belmont.⁹⁷ Also involved were Regency men confident they could shape a ticket of mostly Douglas electors, including Peter Cagger and Calvert Comstock. Though recognizing party rivalries made building the joint ticket difficult, Barlow was certain the sentiment for union existed. In late August he wrote to Comstock:

I know that nearly all of the supporters of Mr. Breckinridge desire a union on both the state and electoral tickets. This because they believe that they can (thus) prevent the election of Lincoln, (an) object of much more consequence to them than the (rivalry between Douglas and Breckinridge.)⁹⁸

Fusionists tended to be the experienced party figures who saw the folly of running competing slates. Many of the official Breckinridge chiefs, such as John Greene, were concerned with engineering dismissals of pro-Douglas federal officeholders in New York.⁹⁹ This showed both their amateurism and the continued importance of patronage.

Mayor Wood was notably absent in the councils of the formulation of the anti-Lincoln front. His brother, Benjamin, was involved to a degree, but unsuccessfully.¹⁰⁰ One reason was the grave mistrust of the Mayor, even among people accustomed to political intrigue.¹⁰¹ More importantly, it confirmed Wood as a maverick figure, which left room for maneuver.¹⁰² That free-

wheeling tendency would have its greatest expression in the secession period.

Local Republicans, meanwhile, publicly scoffed at the fusion of Douglas and Bell in the Empire State, and privately expressed little concern. Party organs took delight in showing the inconsistency of merging entities with different professed outlooks, claiming only the Republicans took principles seriously.¹⁰³ Communications from the metropolis to Springfield assured the nominee that opposition combinations would not prevent victory in the state. An official informed Lincoln: "I cannot be mistaken in saying that in spite of all 'coalitions' New York will choose the Republicans electoral ticket by an overwhelming vote."¹⁰⁴

The possibility of disunion if Lincoln won was the major undercurrent of the election. Farmers on Long Island debated the issue.¹⁰⁵ Threats to secede had been a constant part of America political life since the Mexican War. In 1860, talk of departure came mostly in open letters printed in Southern papers and picked up by local periodicals. Lawrence M. Keitt of South Carolina was among those who wrote of Dixie's need to leave the Union if the Republican was triumphant.¹⁰⁶

Metropolitan area Republicans viewed the talk of secession as a nuisance; they were preparing to elect the party's first chief executive and chatter about disunion undercut their momentum.¹⁰⁷ Conservatives focused on showing they understood

Southern fears, and used the threat of departure as an effective tool in the fusion campaign.¹⁰⁸ Even so, the general view of most local residents was to dismiss secession. A businessman recalled that anybody who spoke seriously of Southern withdrawal before the election was ridiculed to the point of social ostracism.¹⁰⁹

Republican posture on the question shifted during the canvass; at one point or another it covered most of the opinions that emerged later. While the more radical Republicans were tougher in anti-secessionist tone than moderates, the differences were mild. Talk of disunion was not significant enough to produce the divisions actual secession would. All elements of the party, while denouncing withdrawal, focused on the upcoming election.

A common attitude of the summer was to mock the chances of secession and attack the fire eaters. A leading New York Republican noted "threats to dissolve the Union have lost their power to alarm anybody."¹¹⁰ Victories by moderates in the South in August elections added to the conviction that Unionism was sufficient in Dixie to stifle the extremists.¹¹¹

Party organs also stressed that majority rule must be accepted. Warnings that schism would be resisted emerged in the Post and Tribune, the more militant Republican voices. Yet, since the prospect of departure was viewed as extremely remote, these views were more occasional abstract reminders of Northern sentiment than coherent policies on dealing with rupture of the

Union.¹¹²

A shift occurred in the six weeks prior to the election. Those supporting Lincoln began taking threats of departure more seriously, and altered their responses. The emphasis became showing the impracticality of secession and of a separate Southern nation.¹¹³ In addition, along with abolitionists, party faithful warned voters not to be frightened into abandoning the Springfield lawyer.¹¹⁴ Conservatives like Hamilton Fish privately suggested Lincoln issue a statement to calm Southern fears.¹¹⁵

Fusionists faced a quandary. None advocated withdrawal from the nation if the Republican took the election. In fact, Unionism was a focal point of the anti-Lincoln campaign, and Democrats, too, lauded signs of moderation in the cotton states. This was partly influenced by the pro-Douglas stance of many party quarters. Responding to the Little Giant's perceived popularity on the Southern stump, Tammany Hall's organ asserted in late August: "It is to them, to their simple honesty and their patriotic power of pacifying justice, that the people of these gallant states have rallied, in the first open conflict with the secessionist treason."¹¹⁶

Sectors of the Democracy which later looked favorably on withdrawal withheld positive comments on disunion during the election. However, well known lawyers like Charles O'Connor and Tilden upheld, in legal terms, the Constitutional validity of secession.¹¹⁷

Conservatives viciously used the possibility of schism, accepting the South had good reason to fear for the future of slavery.¹¹⁸ Beyond political expediency, leading Democrats, especially those who had been at the conventions, realized the warnings could not be dismissed. That attitude eventually overcome the obstacles to fielding a full fusion slate.

The drive to unite conservatives seemed stalled in mid September. Leaders of the state Douglas campaign rejected a package giving ten slots on the 35-person electoral ticket to supporters of Breckinridge. The committee organizing the Kentuckian's effort would have accepted the deal.¹¹⁹ Additional stumbling blocks for the Douglas committee were a leerness about dealing with the Vice President's official committee and the creation of a formal Democratic merger, as well as the reluctance of the Little Giant himself to join with Breckinridge.¹²⁰ This deadlock caused some Republicans to call fusion a dead letter.¹²¹

But the desire for a union of anti-Lincoln forces, especially in the metropolis, was too strong. Richmond, head of the Little Giant's canvass in the Empire State, left open the possibility of adding pro-Breckinridge electors to the existing Bell-Douglas ticket, as long as they were not named by the Green committee.¹²² That stance opened the way for merchants like Josuha Henry of the National Democratic Volunteers, a group backing the Vice President, to shape a combined effort. Richard Lathers, an insurer active in that movement, wrote: "If any

effectual concerted action is to be inaugurated for that purpose, there is now no time to be lost."¹²³

Beyond the technical side and the intrigue of political appearances, the imperative of denying New York's electoral votes to Lincoln drove the process forward. A respected Democrat wrote in late September: "As to politics, we are in chaos -- all noise and confusion. We could have defeated the enemy, but preferred conquering ourselves." He added: "We may join hands still -- it is possible. I fear, however, that the union is in danger. Small leaders seem to have forgotten that 'united we stand -- divided we fall.'"¹²⁴

Henry chaired a mass conservative meeting at Cooper Union September 17 designed to revive the fusion crusade. Mayor Wood made an important speech stressing the connection between sectional peace and New York's commercial health. Others delivering addresses were Alexander Stephens of Georgia, John J. Crittenden of Kentucky and ex-President Fillmore. A 15-member committee was formed to assemble a combined Douglas-Breckinridge-Bell ticket. Key figures on the panel included Barlow, Tilden, ex-Mayor Havemeyer and Samuel Butterworth, who was close to the President.¹²⁵

They named a slate a week later of 18 Douglas electors, 10 Bell representatives and seven pledged to Breckinridge. Another large assemblage of October 8, chaired by John Dix, ratified the ticket. The meeting had the tone of a Union-saving passion play. Dix opened proceedings by imploring the throngs they must not

"let that party triumph who has done so much to weaken the ties between the States."¹²⁶

It took a few more weeks of disputes, forced resignations of Douglas electors, and eventually pressure from the Buchanan Administration. While many were unhappy with the terms of fusion, and the exact makeup was only finalized one week before the election, the single anti-Lincoln slate -- 18/10/7 -- went to the polls November 6.¹²⁷ Of the seven Breckinridge slots, six represented metropolitan area districts, showing the perceived strength of rabid Democracy in lower New York.¹²⁸

The 11th hour jump start of the fusion canvass shows the disorganization of Democratic forces in the Empire State. On the other hand, the local success of a ticket engineered days before voters cast ballots demonstrated the depth of anti-Republican feeling in the metropolis, especially in New York City. In the few weeks it existed, the coalition shaped a respectable campaign, including the array of fundraising, meetings and torchlight parades typical of canvasses in late antebellum New York. The theme of defeating Lincoln to forestall the possibility of disunion pervaded all fusion activities. A local Douglas supporter characterized the fusion feeling days before the election:

I have played my last card for the country -- our city is now at white heat, the result doubtful. We are gaining so rapidly it is impossible to forestall the result. Three weeks ago, that's immediately after the Penn. and Ohio elections we would have lost this state by from fifty to one hundred thousand votes, and I myself believe that if we had three weeks more upon them we would beat them (by) fifty thousand.¹²⁹

The conservative electoral effort was even more of a mess at the sub-Presidential level. While Republicans fielded one nominee in all races, the opposition ran as many as six in some local races. In the crowded contests, Tammany and Mozart, as well as the Bell, Breckinridge and Douglas campaigns put forth separate hopefuls.¹³⁰ Eventually, a fusion committee, probably using payments to induce withdrawals, achieved single anti-Republican candidacies in most of the metropolis's eight Congressional districts.¹³¹ This was accomplished in the same vein as the Presidential merger -- to elect a Democratic House of Representatives which might thwart a Republican chief executive.

The question remains whether the fusion campaign really was a Union-saving movement. If Lincoln had not received New York's 35 electoral votes, he would not have achieved a majority in the electoral college, perhaps delaying the crisis. That was the result local conservatives sought; they realized the only way to effect such an outcome was through merger of anti-Republican slates.

Those involved with the alliance saw their labors as attempts to avert catastrophe. Fusionists knew the pulse of the cotton states, and wanted to preserve the Union in the shape favored by Northern Democrats. This included sectional peace, inter-regional trade, localism, white ethnic toleration, racism and acceptance of slavery. In fact, anti-Republicans acknowledged, to a greater extent than in other recent elections,

that slavery was the chief political issue. For that reason, the final fusion drive was marked by cries lauding bondage for blacks.¹³²

The canvass stressed Union-saving more than sympathy for the South, although at the time the themes were linked. Rupture of the republic would force conservatives in the metropolis to choose.

Republicans claimed, both publicly and privately, that the forging of a single anti-Lincoln ticket was no cause for concern.¹³³ It is easy to understand those assertions. First, they never counted on carrying the metropolis, where the conservative alliance was most effective. Republicans correctly reasoned the coalition would have little impact on Lincoln's success in the rest of the state. Second, the national election was seen as settled by the time fusion was christened. The day after the October 8 ratification meeting, Pennsylvania's state elections went to the Republicans, which virtually guaranteed the Presidential outcome.¹³⁴

Certain other developments of the campaign warrant attention because of their relation to secession. One of these concerns clothing workers, mostly of German descent, in the eastern district of Brooklyn. They were the targets of strong pressure from the fusion camp. Conservatives and owners of garment shops warned the workers that Lincoln's election would lead to an immediate suspension of trade with the South, recipient of a

significant proportion of New York's ready-made clothes.¹³⁵

The eastern district was the citadel of Republican electoral strength in the metropolis; fusionists used the scare tactics as a campaign tool. But the threats had some legitimacy. Orders from the cotton states for men's garments had been declining since the Brown raid, causing economic problems for the industry. Sewing work was also drying up for Long Islanders who normally did stitching for New York firms.¹³⁶ That situation created a dilemma for the tailors, who debated the issue of political preference against job security.¹³⁷ Since the wards of the eastern district voted for Lincoln, many chose the former.

The garment workers were also part of a larger question of party and sectional struggle in Brooklyn. Republicans waged a solid local effort in the eastern district. They also scheduled prominent national party figures to speak in the area, and sent Carl Schurz to appeal to the Germans.¹³⁸

While comments at rallies stressed standard antislavery and free soil themes,¹³⁹ eastern district Republicanism was also a statement of opposition to the western district, where the Democracy was stronger. The districts' rivalry flared during the canvass.¹⁴⁰ In that light, to the degree Williamsburg tailors voted Republican, it was as much a function of joining neighbors as ethnicity or snubbing the South.¹⁴¹

Brooklyn Republicans also sought to de-emphasize links to black Republicans. Rev. Hodges and other organized meetings both boosting Lincoln and seeking support for the equal suffrage

amendment, but official party sources virtually ignored those activities.¹⁴² As James M. McPherson has recently pointed out, Republicans across the North were fleeing from issues of abolition and racial equality in the election of 1860.¹⁴³ Such a stance, at least in the metropolis, helped give credence to the secession-era Republican claim that they were concerned with the Union and not emancipation.

Democrats in Kings County were more receptive, at an earlier time, to fusion than counterparts across the river. Partly owing to the weakness of the Hards in Brooklyn, the division had never been as keen. Top figures like Bergen and Kalbfleisch were centrists on the Democratic split, and urged co-operation. Local committees endorsed an anti-Lincoln fusion in the summer and fall.¹⁴⁴

This created some awkwardness. The party's leading organ, the Eagle, favored a separate slate pledged to Breckinridge,¹⁴⁵ and State Senator Spinola was the city's major Douglas supporter.¹⁴⁶ Yet, the Brooklyn Democracy easily fell in behind the alliance. This included Mayor Powell's withdrawal as the Breckinridge nominee in the 2nd Congressional District, leaving Moses F. Odell as the sole Democrat to face James Humphrey.¹⁴⁷

The key electoral issue in Queens was the distribution of the Fillmore vote of 1856. Ex-nativists, such as the Long Island Times, tried to depict Douglas as the inheritor of the ex-President's mantle. The paper claimed the Little Giant ran on the "true national conservative platform on which Fillmore so

proudly stood four years ago."¹⁴⁸

In that context, the merger of the Bell and Douglas campaigns in August was the important fusion.¹⁴⁹ While Bell was preferable, the Americans of 1856 argued Douglas was the stronger candidate. The union of the Tennessean and the Illinois Senator tied things up neatly. Supporters of the Little Giant also pointed out the anti-nativist plank in the Republican platform.¹⁵⁰

German Democrats in Flushing were disturbed by the alliance of Douglas with the forces of Know Nothingism.¹⁵¹ But results of the election would show enough Fillmore voters accepted the merger that it was more helpful than harmful to the conservatives. The loss of ex-Americans to the Democratic side especially hurt Republican Congressman Luther C. Carter, who had relied on nativist support in the 1st Congressional District election of 1858.¹⁵² In 1860 he faced a single fusion nominee, Edward H. Smith, a Douglas man. While Smith was seen by some Democrats as a poor choice,¹⁵³ he benefitted from nativist backing of fusion.

Conservatives in Queens supported the three-man fusion achieved in the fall, although Breckinridge had little support on Long Island and the Douglas-Bell joining remained the focus.¹⁵⁴ Beyond the mechanics of ticket building, the campaign for fusion in Queens contained much of the Union-saving theme the movement displayed in the cities.¹⁵⁵ While largely agricultural, the county was sufficiently linked to the metropolis to see great

harm in a sectional clash which would follow Lincoln's victory and bring, at the very least, a disruption of trade.¹⁵⁶

Beyond the party-based political struggle, the election of 1860 featured developments both typical and atypical of local antebellum canvasses. These included the mass rallies and demonstrations many expected from politics, which a recent commentator has likened to the emotional release Northerners received from various aspects of the second Great Awakening.¹⁵⁷

The major Republican march was staged October 3 by the Wide Awakes, a North-wide, semi-military organization of mostly young men. The event was significant in many ways. First, to make the spectacle impressive in turnout, many units from other states participated.¹⁵⁸ This showed the Lincoln party grasped the importance of New York City to the national campaign; it also showed the Republicans' lack of strength in the metropolis. Second, women participated in the rally, which was consistent with a pattern of greater female presence than at fusion events.¹⁵⁹

Third, the potential combative role of the Wide Awakes was clear. Local Republicans cited the militia as powerful enough to guard and guarantee Lincoln's inauguration in March 1861. This contingency did not develop in a vacuum; Southerners complained during the election about the Wide Awakes as a potential abolitionist vanguard for an invasion of Dixie.¹⁶⁰

The torchlight procession of early October was best

representative of Republican obliviousness to pending disaster. The nighttime parade of 7500 to 17,600 bearers,¹⁶¹ highlight of the local Lincoln campaign, was a supreme statement of confidence about the results of the Presidential canvass. It was lauded by party organs and faithful in language which surpassed the level of rhetoric common for the day.¹⁶² Caught up in the euphoria of the occasion, they displayed no sense of the horrors which would follow the development the procession celebrated.

Held partly as a response to the Wide Awake romp, fusion paraded on October 23. Even pro-Lincoln sources acknowledged the conservative event drew a larger turnout, both in participants and onlookers.¹⁶³ Since the torch carriers were from the metropolis, the demonstration was a more genuine reflection of area sentiment. It also lacked the extensive planning of the Wide Awake effort, making the size of the march even more impressive.¹⁶⁴ The tone of the procession was marked by consensus fusion planks of the Union and acceptance of slavery.¹⁶⁵

Physical confrontations between political rivals were almost standard in midcentury New York elections. Altercations erupted between Bell supporters and Lincolnites at Republican headquarters, which was near a hotel frequented by Southerners.¹⁶⁶ A Wide Awake unit from Brooklyn was attacked upon reaching Manhattan via ferry for the big rally.¹⁶⁷

On the whole, though, violence was less common than in recent canvasses, including an unusually quiet election day. The

metropolitan police, led by Republican Chief John Kennedy, contributed to the decrease in such quarrels.¹⁶⁸ Street rhuarbs were primarily a Democratic tactic, and a desire to curb such practices had been a key reason the Republican-controlled state legislature took over police functions in the city. The election of 1860 showed the success of that initiative, and served as practice for the task of halting pro-Southern lawlessness in the secession period.

Treasury Secretary Howell Cobb created a major scandal in the final weeks of the campaign. On a trip to Gotham, he warned Wall Street investors and brokers of Southern secession and financial disaster if Lincoln won. This caused a temporary fall in stock prices, which was likely part of the strategy.¹⁶⁹ If Cobb intended to aid fusion and stress the urgency of Southern fears, his strategy backfired. When stock prices quickly recovered, the secretary's ploy seemed like idle threats from an unscrupulous cabinet minister, instead of a genuine foretelling of threats to the republic and the economy.

A brief morning rain on November 6 gave way to good conditions for most of election day.¹⁷⁰ Fusion's brand of Union-saving politics in the Presidential race produced impressive results. The three-man electoral ticket defeated Lincoln in Manhattan by 61,684 to 32,797 votes, or about 65-percent to 35-percent. It took all 22 wards and only lost six of 199 election districts. Republican support in the immigrant-dominated wards of lower

Manhattan was virtually non-existent. Fusion, for instance, swept the sixth ward by 2836 to 397.¹⁷¹ While Lincoln's proportion was slightly more than Fremont's in 1856, it was lower than that received by Governor Morgan in 1858.¹⁷² New York remained a citadel of the Northern Democracy.

The conservatives carried Kings County by 20,499 (57-percent) to 15,770 votes, which was a smaller margin than expected and a disappointment to Democrats.¹⁷³ Lincoln carried four wards in the eastern district, a great source of pride to Republicans.¹⁷⁴ In Queens, fusion won by 608 votes, taking four of the six towns. Significantly, Lincoln triumphed in the eastern county towns of Hempstead and North Hempstead, further away from the metropolis. Suffolk County, on the eastern edge of Long Island, went for the Republican.¹⁷⁵

Congressional races revealed the advantages of fusion. Conservatives took Republican seats gained in 1858 in the 1st and 2nd districts on Long Island. Parts of Brooklyn's eastern zone lay in the 1st district, which helped Carter, the Republican. But Smith ran strongly in Queens, which accounted for most of the district, and won by 1200 votes.¹⁷⁶ Odell defeated Humphrey in Brooklyn's 2nd district by 12,887 to 10,823 votes.¹⁷⁷ Those verdicts created controversy in the coming months as the lameduck Republican House members participated in Congressional activities on secession. In all, the anti-Republicans carried seven of the nine metropolitan area seats.¹⁷⁸

Despite local setbacks, Lincoln had a firm grip on the

state. He swept New York's 35 electoral votes, accumulating 40,000 more votes than the fusion ticket.¹⁷⁹ This was a larger victory than Fremont recorded four years earlier. It was achieved through upstate Republican gains, confirming lower New York's role as the state's bastion of Democracy. Aside from New York, Kings and Queens, the only other counties that fell in the conservative column were Richmond, Rockland and Westchester, all in southeastern New York.¹⁸⁰

Voters soundly defeated the state constitutional amendment that would have removed the discriminatory property qualification for black men seeking to exercise the franchise. The tally for the plank ran well behind the Lincoln vote. In New York City, for example, while 32,797 favored Lincoln, only 1640 voted for the change in the state constitution.¹⁸¹ A local Republican voice boasted the result showed the party was concerned about human and not civil rights for those of African descent.¹⁸² The Anglo-African consoled that the vote was closer than in 1846, when the same amendment was proposed.¹⁸³

Days after Lincoln's triumph, New Yorkers got a taste of the disunion question. Southern medical students in the city met to decide on appropriate action. After debate which included arguments mirroring the co-operationist and immediate secessionist positions, they concluded the results were an insult to their native region. The students resolved to depart as their respective states left the Union.¹⁸⁴ The daily press followed the story closely, interested in gauging the content of the

dispute over Southern withdrawal.

Immediate reaction to the verdict was understandable.

Conservatives were pleased the metropolis had rallied to the fusion banner, interpreting the local result as a testament to the area's support of the Union and the South. They also accepted Lincoln as the validly elected chief executive of the republic.¹⁵⁵ Republicans were euphoric, and abolitionists, who avoided endorsement of Lincoln, hailed the Presidential decision as an anti-slavery triumph.¹⁵⁶

Attitudes towards the secession movements in the South will be the focus of the next chapter, But for now, it should be noted that in the days after the canvass, most observers of all shades of opinion were confident the disunion impulse would quickly fizzle. The rabidly pro-South Herald asserted that even if South Carolina went through the motion of leaving, it would shortly "come in like a spoiled child from a sharp fast to a hot supper at the good old family table."¹⁵⁷

The election of 1860, in some ways, prepared metropolitan New York for the tumultuous months of the secession controversy. Trade with the South was impaired and stock prices fell due to fears of a disruption of the Union. The possibility of departure was a central theme of the canvass, and it produced preliminary debate on a Northern response.

On the other hand, a split in the republic was too momentous and awful to fully contemplate. For that reason, reactions were

not hashed out in any degree of detail; this was especially true of fusionites. Perhaps mid 19th century New Yorkers were less certain of their ability to control the future than people in the 20th century. While rarely discussed, contingencies for the horrible and unthinkable, such as a Soviet-American nuclear exchange in the Cold War era, have existed in this century.

Individuals and organizations in the metropolis were not completely set to face the catastrophe of disunion. Prior attitudes and political persuasion, of course, provide clues to eventual stances. Even so, schism of the Union would generate unprecedented pressures and push positions and ideas past the abstract to pivotal, concrete choices.

Notes

1. New York Times, 28 March 1860, p. 4; D.M. Chauncey to Fernando Wood, 29 March 1860, Wood Papers, NYPL; Evening Post, 22 March 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 16 March 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 19 March 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 22 March 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 24 March 1860, p. 6.
2. Evening Post, 24 March 1860. p. 2.
3. New York Herald, 6 March 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 20 March 1860, p. 4.
4. Quote from August Belmont to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 16 March 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; also see, Evening Post, 23 March 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 20 March 1860, p. 4.
5. New York Times, 23 March 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 21 March 1860, p. 6.
6. Quote from New York Tribune, 21 March 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Tribune, 15 March 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 29 March 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 31 March 1860, p. 6; New York Times, 4 April 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 3 April 1860, p. 2.

7. William O. Bartlett to James Buchanan, 24 February 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; New York Herald, 28 February 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 3 March 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 28 March 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 9 April 1860, p. 4; Katz, August Belmont, p. 65; Flick, Samuel Jones Tilden, p. 118.
8. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 22 March 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 28 March 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 14 March 1860, p. 6.
9. Horatio Seymour to Samuel J. Tilden, 23 March 1860, Tilden papers, NYPL.
10. Quote from Daniel S. Dickinson to James Buchanan, 30 June 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; also see, George N. Sanders to Buchanan, 1 January 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; New York Times, 15 September 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 16 September 1860, p. 1; Mitchell, Horatio Seymour, p. 210; William Fletcher Johnson, vol. II, in, Ray B. Smith, ed., History Of The State Of New York: Political And Governmental, 6 vols, (Syracuse, 1922), II: 433-434.
11. Daniel S. Dickinson to Henry Stephens Randall, 29 March 1860, Randall Papers, NYHS.
12. Peter Cagger to Sidney Thomas Fairchild, 10 March 1860, Fairchild Papers, NYPL; Cagger to Teunis G. Bergen, 9 March 1860, Bergen Papers, BHS; G.G. Herrendren to Bergen, 11 April 1860, Bergen Papers, BHS; New York Times, 13 April 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 9 March 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 17 April 1860, p. 2; George N. Sanders to James Buchanan, 6 March 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; New York Tribune, 14 April 1860, p. 10.
13. New York Times, 15 September 1859, p. 1; New York Times, 7 December 1859, p. 1; New York Times 6 March 1860, p. 4.; New York Herald, 7 December 1859, p. 4
14. Pleasants, Fernando Wood Of New York, p. 99; New York Times, 13 April 1860, p. 4; Fernando Wood to Robert Tyler, 8 March 1860, Wood Papers, NYHS; Evening Post, 13 April 1860, p. 1.
15. Quote from, Samuel F. Butterworth to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 14 February 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; also see, New York Herald, 2 March 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 11 April 1860, p. 6; New York Tribune, 24 March 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 28 March 1860, p. 2.
16. Long Island Times, 29 March 1860, p. 2.
17. Johnson, History Of The State Of New York, p. 439; New York Herald, 23 April 1860, p. 3; Evening Post, 23 April 1860, p. 1; Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 407-09; McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, pp. 213-14; Hesseltine, ed., Three Against Lincoln, p. 34.

18. New York Times, 21 April 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 24 April 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 25 April 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 26 April 1860, p. 1, 4; New York Times, 27 April 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 20 April 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 21 April 1860, p. 3; New York Herald, 22 April 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 24 April 1860, p. 3; New York Herald, 26 April 1860, p. 3; Evening Post, 24 April 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 25 April 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 26 April 1860, pp. 1, 2; New York Tribune, 24 April 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 24 April 1860, p. 4; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, p. 102, says Southerners at Charleston were willing to use but didn't trust Wood. They were also annoyed with his associations with Stephen Douglas.

19. Dwight L. Dumond, The Secession Movement, 1860-61, (Westport, CT, 1968), pp. 38-44, and Milledge L. Bonham, "New York And The Election Of 1860," NYH, vol. 15, April 1934, p. 129, both take this view.

20. New York Times, 3 May 1860, p. 1; Schell, Memoirs Of The Honorable Augustus Schell, p. 11; James K. McGuire, The Democratic Party Of The State Of New York, (New York, 1905), p. 345; New York Herald, 19 March 1860, p. 6; New York Tribune, 19 March 1860, p. 5; it is interesting that neither McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, or Potter, The Impending Crisis, mention the New York delegation dispute, indicating that in the larger context they saw the issue as insignificant.

21. New York Times, 27 April 1860, p. 8; New York Tribune, 28 April 1860, p. 10.

22. New York Herald, 30 April 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 27 April 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 30 April 1860, p. 1.

23. Tailer, Jr., Diary, 27 April 1860, NYHS.

24. New York Times, 28 April 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 1 May 1860, p. 3; New York Tribune, 27 April 1860, p. 5; New York Tribune, 4 May 1860, p. 4; Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 410-411; McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, p. 215.

25. Daniel S. Dickinson to James Buchanan, 30 June 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; also see, New York Herald, 2 May 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 19 May 1860, p. 4.

26. William M. Browne to James Buchanan, 22 April 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; James Guthrie to Samuel J. Tilden, 21 May 1860, Tilden papers, NYPL.

27. New York Times, 21 April 1860, p. 4; Flick, Samuel Jones Tilden, p. 118.

28. New York Times, 16 September 1859, p. 4; New York Times, 3 May 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 22 April 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 2 May 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 3 May 1860, p. 1.
29. New York Times, 2 May 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 3 May 1860, p. 6; New York Tribune, 4 May 1860, p. 5; Hesseltine, ed., Three Against Lincoln, p. 98.
30. Nevins, Thames, eds., The Diary Of George Templeton Strong, III:25.
31. Quote from Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1 May 1860, p. 2; also see, New York Herald, 7 May 1860, p. 4.
32. New York Tribune, 7 May 1860, p. 4; also see, Brooklyn Evening Star, 1 May 1860, p. 2.
33. New York Times, 23 May 1860, p. 1; Katz, August Belmont, p. 70; New York Herald, 23 May 1860, p. 3; Gideon J. Tucker to James Buchanan, 25 May 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; New York Tribune, 23 May 1860, p. 8; Irish-American, 23 June 1860, p. 2.
34. John Clancy to Samuel J. Tilden, 19 May 1860, Tilden Papers, NYPL; Evening Post, 16 May 1860, p. 2.
35. New York Times, 11 May 1860, p. 8; New York Times, 12 June 1860, p. 4.
36. Horatio Seymour to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 8 June 1860, Fairchild Collection, NYHS.
37. New York Times, 6 June 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 22 May 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 6 June 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 6 June 1860, p. 1.
38. Quote from, John A. Dix to James Buchanan, 9 May 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; also see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 31 May 1860, p. 2.
39. Long Island Democrat, 8 May 1860, p. 2.
40. New York Herald, 26 May 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 8 June 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 11 June 1860, p. 4; Horatio Seymour to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 15 May 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 May 1860, p. 2.
41. Samuel L.M. Barlow to Dean Richmond, 17 May 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.
42. Samuel L.M. Barlow to John Cochrane, 11 May 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.

43. Samuel L.M. Barlow to Horatio Seymour, 2 May 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Barlow to Samuel J. Tilden, June 1860, Tilden papers, NYPL.

44. New York Times, 19 June 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 23 June 1860, p. 1; Flick, Samuel Jones Tilden, p. 119; Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 412.

45. New York Herald, 22 June 1860, p. 6, lists the caucus vote in favor of exclusive seating of the Douglas delegates as 40-29, while New York Tribune, 22 June 1860, p. 4, puts it at 41-27; also see, Three Against Lincoln, pp. 186, 193, 210; New York Herald, 20 June 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 21 June 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 20 June 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 22 June 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 20 June 1860, p. 1; for information on the anti-Douglas delegates feeling among New York Democrats during the Baltimore convention, see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 21 June 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 19 June 1860, p. 1.

46. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 25 June 1860, p. 2; Edmund Driggs to Teunis G. Bergen, 14 June 1860, Bergen Papers, BHS.

47. New York Herald, 23 June 1860, p. 10.

48. New York Times, 25 June 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 29 June 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 24 June 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 25 June 1860, p. 1; Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 413; Hesseltine, ed., Three Against Lincoln, p. 267.

49. Preston King to Hamilton Fish, 7 April 1860, Fish Papers, LC; New York Times, 4 May 1860, p. 8; New York Times, 7 May 1860, p. 4.

50. Evening Post, 3 March 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 20 March 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 1 March 1860, p. 8; New York Times, 10 April 1860, p. 5.

51. Preston King to William H. Seward, 11 May 1860, Seward Papers, UR; New York Tribune, 17 April 1860, p. 5; New York Times, 16 March 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 28 March 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 19 April 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 21 April 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 8 May 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 19 April 1860, p. 6.

52. Evening Post, 28 February 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 1 March 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 28 February 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 14 April 1860, p. 4; Ryan, Abraham Lincoln And New York City, pp. 4-5.

53. Quote from, Edwin S. Morgan to William H. Seward, 17 May 1860, Seward Papers, UR; also see, E. Gerry Spaulding to Seward, 16 May 1860, Seward Papers, UR; New York Times, 17 May 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 18 May 1860, p. 1.

54. William E. Gienapp, "Who Voted For Lincoln?" in, John L. Thomas, ed., Abraham Lincoln And The American Political Tradition, (Amherst, MA, 1986), p. 57; Gibson, Attitudes Of The New York Irish, pp. 106-07; E. Gerry Spaulding to William H. Seward, 18 May 1860, Seward Papers, UR; Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 424-25; McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, pp. 216-17.

55. New York Times, 16 May 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 17 May 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 23 May 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 15 May 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 16 May 1860, p. 5; Van Deusen, Horace Greeley, pp. 239-45; Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 425-26; McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, p. 217; Summers, 'A Band Of Brigands', pp. 101-119.

56. Quote from, Charles E. Cady to William H. Seward, 11 June 1860, Seward Papers, UR; also see, Alfred Coffin to Seward, 19 May 1860, Seward Papers, UR; M. Langenschwartz to Seward, 20 May 1860, Seward Papers, UR; C. Hatch Smith to Seward, 24 May 1860, Seward Papers, UR.

57. New York Times, 19 May 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 24 May 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 29 May 1860, p. 4.

58. Evening Post, 25 May 1860, p. 2; also see, Evening Post, 29 May 1860, p. 2; Charles Gould to William H. Seward, 21 May 1860, Seward Papers, UR; New York Times, 25 May 1860, p. 8.

59. Quote from, Edwin S. Morgan to Abraham Lincoln, 4 June 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; also see, John Bigelow to William Hargreaves, 30 July 1860, Bigelow Papers, NYPL; William C. Bryant to Lincoln, 16 June 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; Preston King to Hamilton Fish, 13 July 1860, Fish Papers, LC; Evening Post, 8 June 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 8 June 1860, p. 1.

60. In a signed editorial, New York Tribune, 22 May 1860, p. 4, Greeley acknowledged his role in defeating Seward, calling the selection of the New Yorker "unadvisable and unsafe." There had been, though, a long-standing feud between Greeley and Seward. A Pennsylvania delegate to the convention who had backed Seward wrote to Greeley in mid June that, in retrospect, he appreciated the editor's steps to defeat the Senator, James G. Saint to Horace Greeley, 18 June 1860, Greeley Papers, NYPL.

61. See, for example, New York Times, 26 May 1860 p. 4; New York Times, 29 May 1860, p. 5; New York Times, 31 May 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 1 June 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 15 June 1860, p. 4; Brown, Raymond Of The Times, pp. 185-89; Robert Bowen to Horace Greeley, 25 May 1860, Greeley papers, NYPL; New York Tribune, 25 May 1860, p. 4.

62. New York Times, 28 May 1860, p. 4.

63. Tailer, Jr., Diary, 19 May 1860, NYHS; New York Herald, 19 May 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 21 May 1860, p. 4.
64. Nevins, Thomas, eds., The Diary Of George Templeton Strong, III:28.
65. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 19 May 1860, p. 2.
66. Brooklyn Evening Star, 20 April 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 29 March 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 3 May 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 29 February 1860, p. 8; New York Times, 5 April 1860, p. 8.
67. Ann S. Stephens to James Buchanan, 4 March 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; also see, Tailer, Jr., Diary, 21 February 1860, NYHS; Evening Post, 27 March 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 7 May 1860, p. 4.
68. New York Tribune, 9 May 1860, p. 5; Evening Post, 9 May 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 6 May 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 9 May 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 10 May 1860, p. 5; Llerna Friend, Sam Houston: The Great Designer, (Austin, 1954), p. 217.
69. James DePeyster Ogden to John J. Crittenden, 25 May 1860, Crittenden Papers, LC; New York Times, 11 May 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 9 June 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 9 June 1860, p. 6.
70. William O. Bourne to Tho. Corwin, 14 May 1860, Bourne papers, NYHS.
71. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 24 July 1860, p. 3; New York Express, 1 August 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 14 July 1860, p. 7; Evening Post, 14 May 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 21 July 1860, p. 4; Joseph Howard Parks, John Bell Of Tennessee, (Baton Rouge, 1950), pp. 366, 370.
72. Long Island Times, 28 June 1860, p. 2; S.P. Lyman to William H. Seward, 12 May 1860, Seward Papers, UR; Evening Post, 30 May 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 27 June 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 10 July 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 25 July 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 28 July 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 31 July 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 30 May 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 6 June 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 30 May 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 27 June 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 12 June 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 18 May 1860, p. 4.
73. Long Island Times, 6 September 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 3 September 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 3 September 1860, p. 2; Friend, Sam Houston, pp. 317-320.
74. Quote from, New York Times, 26 June 1860, p. 4; also see, Truman Smith to Abraham Lincoln, 24 July 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; David Davis to Lincoln, 14 August 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; New

York Tribune, 25 June 1860, p. 4.

75. Edwin S. Morgan to Abraham Lincoln, 10 July 1860, Lincoln papers, LC: New York Tribune, 27 June 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 28 June 1860, p. 2.

76. New York Times, 27 June 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 3 July 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 18 July 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 24 July 1860, p. 2; Miles Taylor to Sidney T. Fairchild, 30 June 1860, Fairchild Papers, NYPL; John C. Breckinridge to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 12 July 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.

77. New York Times, 12 July 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 19 July 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 29 June 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 2 July 1860, p. 5; New York Herald, 19 July 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 12 July 1860, p. 2.

78. New York Herald, 3 July 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 18 August 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 6 July 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 14 July 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 23 July 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 14 August 1860, p. 4; Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 437, stresses the Douglas-Buchanan feud as an impediment to fusion in many states.

79. Quote from, Horatio Seymour to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 26 July 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; also see, New York Times, 27 June 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 3 July 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 17 July 1860, p. 1; Irish-American, 30 June 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 27 June 1860, p. 2.

80. New York Times, 30 June 1860, p. 8; New York Times, 7 July 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 12 July 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 7 July 1860, p. 3; New York Herald, 13 July 1860, p. 4; also see, Isiah Rynders to James Buchanan, 26 June 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP.

81. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 30 June 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 July 1860, p. 2; August Belmont to Samuel J. Tilden, August 1860, Tilden papers, NYPL; Daily News, 16 August 1860, p. 4.

82. Mushkat, Fernando Wood, p. 87.

83. New York Herald, 30 June 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 2 July 1860, p. 5; Evening Post, 7 July 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 7 July 1860, p. 7.

84. John A. Dix to James Buchanan, 17 July 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; William Bigger to Buchanan, 23 July 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; New York Times, 28 June 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 19 July 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 29 June 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 7 July 1860, p. 3; New York Herald, 19 July 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 20 July 1860, p. 4; New York Express, 1 August 1860, p. 1;

Lichterman, John Adams Dix, p. 308, calls Dix's public support of Breckinridge part of making concessions to the South to avoid disunion.

85. Daniel S. Dickinson to Thomas A. Osborn, 8 July 1860, Dickinson Papers, NYPL; Dickinson to James Buchanan, 30 June 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; New York Herald, 2 July 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 19 July 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 4 July 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 1 August 1860, p. 4.

86. New York Times, 4 July 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 28 July 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 27 July 1860, p. 4; Gideon J. Tucker to James Buchanan, 29 June 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; Evening Post, 18 July 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 26 July 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 28 July 1860, p. 2.

87. New York Herald, 26 June 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 10 July 1860, p. 4; William M. Browne to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 27 June 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; New York Times, 27 June 1860, p. 4.

88. New York Herald, 17 August 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 18 August 1860, p. 4; New York Express, 1 August 1860, p. 1; New York Express, 13 August 1860, p. 1; New York Express, 17 August 1860, p. 3.

89. Long Island Times, 30 August 1860, p. 2; New York Leader, 25 August 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 18 August 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 18 August 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 21 August 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 18 August 1860, p. 4.

90. New York Express, 18 August 1860, pp. 1-2; New York Express, 20 August 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 25 August 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 29 August 1860, p. 4.

91. New York Times, 16 August 1860, p. 5; New York Herald, 16 August 1860, p. 4; New York Leader, 11 August 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 16 August 1860, p. 1.

92. New York Times, 17 August 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 18 August 1860, p. 4; New York Leader, 18 August 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 16 August 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 16 August 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 16 August 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 20 August 1860, p. 5.

93. New York Leader, 1 September 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 24 August 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 24 August 1860, p. 4.

94. New York Times, 7 August 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 9 August 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 13 August 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 22 August 1860, p. 4; Gerard Hallock to James Buchanan, 6 August 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; Evening Post, 9 August 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 9 August 1860, p. 4.

95. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 17 August 1860, p. 3; New York Times, 2 August 1860, p. 5.
96. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 14 August 1860, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 22 August 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 31 August 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 4 September 1860, p. 2.
97. Samuel L.M. Barlow to Dean Richmond, 24 August 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; August Belmont to Samuel J. Tilden, 2 August 1860, Tilden Papers, NYPL; William Kelly to Tilden, 16 August 1860, Tilden papers, NYPL.
98. Quote from, Samuel L.M. Barlow to Calvert Comstock, 24 August 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; also see, Peter Cagger to Barlow, 6 September 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Barlow to Comstock, 18 August 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.
99. Isaiah Rynders to James Buchanan, 13 August 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; John Greene to Buchanan, 5 September 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; Long Island Times, 2 August 1860, p. 2.
100. New York Herald, 28 August 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 31 August 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 2 September 1860, p. 4.
101. August Belmont to Samuel J. Tilden, August 1860, Tilden papers, NYPL; Mushkat, Fernando Wood, p. 106.
102. Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 108-110, calls Wood "the father of fusion," and sees the mayor as central to the alliance. My research does not support that contention.
103. New York Times, 20 August 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 17 August 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 22 August 1860, p. 2.
104. Quote from, George G. Fogg to Abraham Lincoln, 23 August 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; also see, Fogg to Lincoln, 18 August 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; Benjamin Welch, Jr. to Lincoln, 17 August 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; George T.M. Davis to Lincoln, 30 August 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC.
105. Smith, Diary, 17 October 1860, QPL.
106. New York Times, 24 July 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 24 July 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 24 July 1860, p. 2.
107. New York Times, 3 August 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 11 July 1860, p. 4.
108. New York Herald, 25 July 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 3 October 1860, p. 6; Long Island Times, 25 October 1860, p. 2; Daily News, 13 October 1860, p. 4.

109. Charles H. Haswell, Reminiscences Of An Octogenarian Of The City Of New York, 1816-1860, (New York, 1897), p. 526; also see, Tailer, Jr., Diary, 25 October 1860, NYHS.

110. Quote from, Preston King to Hamilton Fish, 30 July 1860, Fish Papers, LC; also see, New York Times, 26 July 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 11 August 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 23 August 1860, p. 4; Krummel, Henry J. Raymond And The New York Times, p. 380; Bigelow, Retrospections Of An Active Life, p. 290; Evening Post, 28 July 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 7 August 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 13 August 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 25 July 1860, p. 4. The tendency to dismiss secession threats as humbug was the rule among Republicans in 1860, see, for example, Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 431-33; McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, pp. 230-31.

111. New York Times, 10 August 1860, p. 4.

112. Evening Post, 20 September 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 28 September 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 28 July 1860, p. 4.

113. New York Times, 20 September 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 22 October 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 24 October 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 29 October 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 20 October 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 22 October 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 27 October 1860, p. 4.

114. National Anti-Slavery Standard, 27 October 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 23 October 1860, p. 2.

115. Hamilton Fish to Sidney Laurua, 21 September 1860, Fish Papers, LC; also see, George T. M. Davis to Abraham Lincoln, 20 October 1860, Lincoln papers, LC; Davis to Lincoln, 31 October 1860, Lincoln papers, LC.

116. Quote from, New York Leader, 25 August 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Herald, 23 August 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 31 August 1860, p. 4.

117. New York Herald, 28 October 1860, p. 4, for instance, comes close to accepting the legitimacy of secession, but continued to object to Southern departure, Herald, 4 November 1860, p. 4; for the Tilden and O'Connor statements on secession, see, The Union, pamphlet, 26 October 1860, in Tilden Papers, NYPL; Edward Everett to Tilden, 6 November 1860, Tilden papers, NYPL; New York Herald, 3 November 1860, p. 6.

118. New York Leader, 6 October 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 15 August 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 27 October 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 20 September 1860, p. 7; New York Herald, 29 September 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 8 October 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 16 October 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 3 November 1860, p. 10.

119. New York Times, 31 August 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 8 September 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 12 September 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 11 September 1860, pp. 4, 8; New York Times, 12 September 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 15 September 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 11 September 1860, p. 3; New York Herald, 12 September 1860, p. 7; New York Herald, 15 September 1860, p. 7; Evening Post, 8 September 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 10 September 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 15 September 1860, p. 2.

120. Peter Cagger to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 6 September 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; New York Herald, 16 September 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 17 September 1860, p. 1; Douglas accepted fusion with the Bell party, but held out against merger with Breckinridge, because, among other reasons, he feared such a recognition of the Vice President's candidacy would disturb his quest for Democratic leadership, see, Robert W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, (New York, 1973), pp. 781, 787, 793; Damon Wells, Stephen Douglas: The Last Years, 1857-1861, (Austin, 1971), p. 245.

121. New York Times, 17 September 1860, p. 4.

122. New York Times, 15 September 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 19 September 1860, p. 8; Katz, August Belmont, pp. 78-79; New York Herald, 17 September 1860, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 18 September 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 5 September 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 12 September 1860, p. 4.

123. Quote from, Richard Lathers to unknown correspondent, 7 September 1860, Lathers Papers, LC; also see, Daily News, 29 September 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 4 October 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 15 September 1860, p. 7; New York Tribune, 20 September 1860, p. 4; Foner, Business And Slavery, chap. 8, portrays New York merchants as sluggish on the campaign, at least through August.

124. James J. Roosevelt to James Buchanan, 30 September 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP.

125. New York Times, 18 September 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 4 October 1860, p. 8; Furer, The Public Career Of William F. Havemeyer, pp. 225-26; Myers, History Of Tammany Hall, p. 195; New York Herald, 18 September 1860, p. 3; New York Leader, 22 September 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 18 September 1860, p. 1; Daily News, 28 September 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 29 September 1860, p. 4; New York Express, 18 September 1860, pp. 1, 4; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 17 September 1860, NYHS; Joshua J. Henry to Samuel J. Tilden, 19 September 1860, Tilden Papers, NYPL; New York Tribune, 18 September 1860, p. 5.

126. Quote from, New York Tribune, 9 October 1860, p. 5; also see, New York Times, 21 September 1860, p. ___?; New York Times, 25 September 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 9 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 10 October 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 21 September

1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 25 September 1860, p. 3; New York Herald, 9 October 1860, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 25 September 1860, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 9 October 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 9 October 1860, p. 1; New York Express, 10 October 1860, p. 2; James T. Brady to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 20 September 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Brady to Barlow, 24 September 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Peter Cagger to Barlow, 20 September 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Cagger to Barlow, 18 September 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Evening Post, 9 October 1860, p. 1.

127. New York Times, 7 September 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 27 September 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 2 October 1860, p. 3; New York Times, 3 October 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 6 October 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 4 October 1860, p. 7; New York Herald, 5 October 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 8 October 1860, p. 4; Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 437; McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, p. 232; Journal of Commerce, 11 October 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 31 October 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 1 November 1860, p. 2; Daniel S. Dickinson to Theo N. Corn, (must find/add date), Dickinson Papers, NYHS; Evening Post, 3 October 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 4 October 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 6 October 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 9 October 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 10 October 1860, p. 2.

128. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 18 September 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 5 November 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 20 October 1860, p. 6; New York Tribune, 5 November 1860, p. 6.

129. Quote from, George N. Sanders to Stephen A. Douglas, 2 November 1860, Douglas Papers, University of Chicago Library; for the fusion campaign of October-November, see, New York Times, 20 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 25 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 27 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 29 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 30 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 3 November 1860, p. 8; Flick, Samuel Jones Tilden, p. 124; New York Herald, 24 October 1860, p. 3; New York Herald, 25 October 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 28 October 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 3 November 1860, p. 10; New York Leader, 6 October 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 1 October 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 6 October 1860, p. 4; Peter Cagger to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 8 October 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Barlow to W.S. Church, 1 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Joshua J. Henry to Richard Lathers, 15 October 1860, Lathers Papers, LC; August Belmont to Samuel J. Tilden, 5 October 1860, Tilden Papers, NYPL; W.H. Swayne to Tilden, 10 October 1860, NYPL; Calvert Comstock to Tilden, 13 October 1860, Tilden Papers, NYPL; Peter Cagger to Tilden, 24 October 1860, Tilden papers, NYPL; Cagger to Sidney T. Fairchild, 9 October 1860, Fairchild Papers, NYPL; Diary of A. H. Satterlee, 23 October 1860, NYPL; Evening Post, 27 October 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 3 November 1860, p. 5.

130. New York Times, 22 September 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 17 October 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 14 October 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 19 October 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 22 October 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 1 November 1860, p. 2; Irish-American, 27 October 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 18 October 1860, p. 2.

131. New York Times, 16 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 26 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 27 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 29 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 31 October 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 20 October 1860, p. 6; Long Island Times, 1 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 22 October 1860, p. 2; New York Leader, 8 December 1860, p. 4.

132. New York Herald, 27 September 1860, p. 6; New York Tribune, 25 October 1860, p. 8; New York Tribune, 29 October 1860, p. 5.

133. New York Times, 25 September 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 18 September 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 9 October 1860, p. 2; Thomas C. Thornell to Abraham Lincoln, 4 October 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; Clark B. Wheeler to Lincoln, 19 October 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC.

134. The Diary Of George T. Strong, II:45; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 10 October 1860, NYHS; S.E. Church to Samuel J. Tilden, 22 October 1860, Tilden Papers, NYPL.

135. New York Herald, 2 November 1860, p. 1 Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 31 October 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 31 October 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 31 October 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 1 November 1860, p. 4; Feldman, Fit For Men, p. 50.

136. Smith, Diary, 30 October 1860, QPL; Feldman, Fit For Men, p. 49.

137. New York Tribune, 1 November 1860, p. 5.

138. New York Times, 18 October 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 30 October 1860, p. 1; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 6 July 1860, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 20 July 1860, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 15 October 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 26 June 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 9 August 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 1 June 1860, p. 5; New York Tribune, 20 July 1860, p. 8; New York Tribune, 13 August 1860, p. 8.

139. Brooklyn Evening Star, 2 October 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 9 August 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 30 October 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 24 October 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 20 July 1860, p. 8.

140. Brooklyn Evening Star, 30 August 1860, p. 2.

141. Much has been written about the German vote and the election of Lincoln. The best volume on the subject is, Frederick C. Luebke, ed., Ethnic Voters And The Election Of Lincoln, (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1971). Also see, William E. Gienapp, "Who Voted For Lincoln?", in, John L. Thomas, ed., Abraham Lincoln And The American Political Tradition, (Amherst, 1986), pp. 50-97. My view that Germans of Brooklyn's eastern district voted Republican as a function of locality and not of ethnicity corresponds with the findings of Andrea Dorpalen, "The German Element And The Issues Of The Civil War," in, Ethnic Voters And The Election Of Lincoln, pp. 68-91.

142. On black Republican activity, see, Anglo African, 30 June 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 2 August 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 27 June 1860, p. 2. Typical of Republican sentiment, the Evening Post, 19 October 1860, p. 2, endorsed the equal suffrage amendment, but stressed the insignificance of the issue. Earlier, the New York Tribune, 7 August 1860, p. 4, called the discriminatory property qualification for black men "simply atrocious," and advocated repeal, but ignored the issue the rest of the campaign season.

143. McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, pp. 224-25.

144. New York Times, 2 August 1860, p. 5; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 22 August 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 30 June 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 5 September 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 30 June 1860, p. 10.

145. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 12 July 1860, p. 2.

146. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 25 June 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 17 August 1860, p. 2.

147. Satterlee, Diary, 1 November 1860, NYPL; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 4 October 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 18 October 1860, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 2 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 22 October 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 3 November 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 20 September 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 13 October 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 26 October 1860, p. 3.

148. Quote from, Long Island Times, 9 August 1860, p. 2; also see, Long Island Times, 16 August 1860, p. 2.

149. Long Island Times, 2 August 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 23 August 1860, p. 2.

150. Long Island Times, 9 August 1860, p. 2.

151. New York Tribune, 5 September 1860, p. 4; Long Island Times, 30 August 1860, p. 2.

152. On Carter's earlier support among Republicans and American, see, Flushing Journal, 16 October 1858, p. 2; on the election of 1860, see, Long Island Times, 12 April 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 27 September 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 1 November 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 10 October 186-0, p. 2; Gienapp, "Who Voted For Lincoln?", pp. 50-97, argues that Lincoln's inheritance of most of the Fillmore vote of 1856 was the major factor in his election. This scenario did not hold true for Queens County.

153. William Ludlow to Samuel J. Tilden, 26 October 1860, Tilden papers, NYPL; Evening Post, 23 October 1860, p. 2.

154. Flushing Journal, 8 September 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 20 October 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 18 October 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 25 October 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 1 November 1860, p. 1.

155. Long Island Democrat, 11 September 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 25 October 1860, p. 2.

156. Long Island Times, 18 October 1860, p. 2.

157. Howe, "The Evangelical Movement And Political Culture In The North During The Second Party System"; also see, Diary Of William C. Meade, 13 October 1860, NYHS; Evening Post, 26 July 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 30 August 1860, p. 1.

158. New York Times, 25 August 1860, p. 5; New York Times, 27 August 1860, p. 8; New York Times, 29 September 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 30 September 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 10 September 1860, p. 4; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 2 October 1860, NYHS.

159. Evening Post, 12 July 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 2 October 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 4 October 1860, p. 2.

160. On Republican willingness to use the Wide Awakes for military purposes, see, New York Times, 3 October 1860, p. 4; on Southern fears of the group, see New York Herald, 21 October 1860, p. 8.

161. Estimates of the size of the march varied with, of course, Democratic sources giving lower figures and Republican sources offering higher turnout numbers, see, New York Times, 4 October 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 4 October 1860, p. 3; Diary of A. H. Satterlee, 3 October 1860, NYPL; New York Leader, 6 October 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 4 October 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 6 October 1860, p. 4.

162. Diary Of Julia Anna Hartress Lay, 3 October 1860, NY??; George Fogg to Abraham Lincoln, 4 October 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; New York Tribune, 4 October 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 4 October 1860, pp. 1-2.

163. New York Times, 24 October 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 24 October 1860, p. 3; Diary Of Satterlee, 23 October 1860, NYPL.
164. New York Herald, 2 October 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 7 October 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 25 October 1860, p. 6.
165. Evening Post, 24 October 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 25 October 1860, p. 6.
166. New York Times, 26 September 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 27 September 1860, p. 6.
167. Evening Post, 5 October 1860, p. 2.
168. New York Times, 4 October 1860, p. 1.
169. George T.M. Davis to Abraham Lincoln, 31 October 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; Thurlow Weed to William H. Seward, 25 October 1860, Seward Papers, UR; New York Times, 27 October 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 27 October 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 27 October 1860, p. 4; Nicholls, The Disruption Of American Democracy, pp. 364-65.
170. New York Tribune, 7 November 1860, p. 3.
171. New York Times, 8 November 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 7 November 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 8 November 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 9 November 1860, p. 5; Evening Post, 8 November 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 7 November 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 8 November 1860, pp. 4-5.
172. New York Times, 7 November 1856, p. 1; New York Times, 4 November 1858, p. 1.
173. New York Herald, 9 November 1860, p. 5; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 7 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 7 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 8 November 1860, p. 2.
174. New York Herald, 7 November 1860, p. 1; Brooklyn Evening Star, 7 November 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 7 November 1860, p. 4.
175. Long Island Times, 8 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 8 November 1860, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 10 November 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 8 November 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 8 November 1860, p. 4; Smith, Diary, 6 November 1860, QPL.
176. New York Times, 8 November 1860, p. 1; Brooklyn Evening Star, 8 November 1860, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 10 November 1860, p. 2; Long Island Democrat, 13 November 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 8 November 1860, p. 2.

177. New York Times, 7 November 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 8 November 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 8 November 1860, p. 1; Brooklyn Evening Star, 8 November 1860, p. 2.
178. New York Times, 8 November 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 8 November 1860, p. 5; New York Herald, 8 November 1860, p. 1.
179. New York Times, 8 November 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 8 November 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 8 November 1860, p. 1.
180. Evening Post, 8 November 1860, p. 2.
181. New York Times, 7 November 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 8 November 1860, p. 1; Daily News, 9 November 1860, p. 4.
182. Brooklyn Evening Star, 10 November 1860, p. 2.
183. Weekly Anglo-African, 24 November 1860, p. 2.
184. New York Times, 10 November 1860, p. 1; Daily News, 10 November 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 9 November 1860, p. 8; New York Tribune, 10 November 1860, p. 5.
185. New York Herald, 7 November 1860, p. 1; New York Leader, 10 November 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 7 November 1860, p. 2; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 7 November 1860, NYHS.
186. New York Times, 7 November 1860, pp. 4, 8; James A. Briggs to Abraham Lincoln, 7 November 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; Smith, Diary, 8 November 1860, QPL; Evening Post, 7 November 1860, p. 2; on abolitionist response, see, National Anti Slavery Standard, 24 November 1860, p. 2; Jane E. Woolsey to friend, 5 December 1860, in, Letters Of A Family During The War For The Union, II:19-23.
187. Quote from, New York Herald, 8 November 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Times, 7 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 9 November 1860, p. 4; Irish-American, 10 November 1860, p. 2; New York Leader, 10 November 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 9 November 1860, p. 2; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 8 November 1860, NYHS; John Bigelow to William Hargreaves, 10 November 1860, Bigelow Papers, NYPL.

Chapter 4: The Crisis Begins

The opening phase of the crisis lasted from the election of Lincoln to the initial response to South Carolina's withdrawal on December 20. Few in the metropolis were prepared for disunion. As a result, most sectors of opinion considered a wide array of responses.

Positions took shape slowly, formed both by the course of secession and previously held convictions. Major disputes in the public debate included the conception of peaceful secession and whether a departed state could be forced to remain in the republic. By Christmas, the major area of contention was possible terms of compromise with Southern states to induce them to remain in the Union.

In a maelstrom of outlooks, one common thread was that severing the Union was tragic and should, if possible, be averted. Even considerations of peaceable withdrawal were, at base, strategies for ultimately preserving the nation. New York City Aldermen, local clergy and Greeley's Tribune were among those who hoped separation could be avoided.¹ Techniques of achieving that goal, of course, varied; they will be the focus of much of this chapter. But the deeper importance was the cross section of opinion believing disunion could be stalled.

Daily newspapers were the prime source of information on developments in the South. Cable reports, pieces from correspondents and reprints from other journals filled the pages

of metropolitan area papers. Selectivity and interpretation of these accounts was a fine example of the partisanship of New York's periodicals; they presented and read into the information in ways which corresponded to previous outlook. The press was part of the political process, and secession was far too critical an issue to adopt suddenly impartial stances.

Among organs which had supported the fusion ticket, a breakdown emerged paralleling the Hard-Soft division in the Democracy. The Herald and Daily News, rabidly pro-South, printed items emphasizing resolute moves towards departure. These included pro-secession rallies and speeches, as well as scheduling of elections of delegates to conventions.² Editorials in those Hard dailies told readers the South was in earnest.³

The Tammany paper, in contrast, read the dispatches as showing "that the first fury of Secession fervor is rapidly abating. It was, in its first moments, a wild and almost delirious malady." But the Soft Democratic voice, used to such excitement, was confident that "all danger of any serious attempt to break up the Confederacy may now be regarded as at an end."⁴

Republican dailies ran stories showing the moderate impulse held sway in Dixie; commentators were relieved in noting the disunion craze was sputtering. A typical headline of mid-November read: "Secession Sentiment Rapidly Losing Ground."⁵ This was an early indication of the pressures of schism undercutting normal lines of opinion. Less zealous Democrats were moving closer to elements of the Lincoln party, while the

Hards held to the more extreme pro-South stance.

One reason for the discrepancy was a failure to fully distinguish between the Gulf states and the upper South. In mid November Republicans asserted evidence of conservative spirit, in, say, Virginia, meant all of Dixie was firmly wedded to the republic. When the line between immediatist cotton states and conditional Unionist tobacco states became more clear, pro-Lincoln organs began groping for anti-secession news from the lower South.⁶

Yet, the split in interpretation was due more to prior persuasion. Many local conservatives took pride in asserting the cornerstone of the fusion message had been accurate. Further, they insisted it was the obligation of the opposition to take steps to prevent a disaster which was rapidly unfolding. The News, Mozart Hall's organ, demanded "they must give up every jot and tittle of their unconstitutional Anti-Slavery platform."⁷

This was part of an acceptance of a shift in power. While Democratic papers were pleased with fusion's local showing, they realized that meant little in a national crisis. Attitudes of the pro-Lincoln dailies were suddenly crucial, especially since New York's Republican periodicals were important in shaping party policy. The conservatives challenged the others to shape a response to rupture of the Union.

Republicans believed disunion was a passing fad. They had asserted separation was a bluff in the canvass, and genuinely thought so. Party organs also had other concerns in the early

secession period, including self congratulations and heralding a brighter future based on the free soil outlook.⁸

An additional irritation was that if secession was perceived as an earnest movement, pressure might build on the President-elect to issue a conciliatory statement. Republican opinion on that point broke down in a way which became more consistent as the crisis continued. The Times, which was close to Senator Seward and party leader Thurlow Weed, argued reassurance from the Illinoisian was proper. More radical voices in the Tribune and Post said such gestures were unnecessary and might weaken the President-elect, showing the South could manipulate the free states.⁹

Beyond influencing editors like Bennett, Greeley, Bryant and Raymond, reports in the daily press were the general public's link to events in the South. Diarists, letter writers and ministers relied on those columns in formulating opinions. Local residents were as confused about the developments as the papers, although they followed the movements closely. Keepers of journals who rarely commented on public affairs noted news and comments. Religious figures avoided specifics, but issued constant prayers for resolution of the conflict.¹⁰

A coin collector from Brooklyn penned a common opinion days after the election: "If South Carolina would only go alone out of the Union, it would be good riddance."¹¹ Since the papers had carried the Palmetto State's formal call for election of delegates to a convention, that attitude was plausible.

Depending on which daily a New Yorker read, the situation might have seemed either stabilizing or worsening. Those who gleaned news from a variety of sources would have been perplexed. A week later, a woman was confused that South Carolina was "still talking of secession."¹²

For various reasons, many had access to Southern sentiment beyond the gazettes. Backstage Democratic lawyer Samuel Barlow corresponded with such prominent cotton states figures as Senators John Slidell and Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana. These sources alerted him to the sincerity of secession. Barlow also communicated with local Republicans. By mid December he noted: "Men of all sides talk freely of civil war; which may reasonably be expected by April."¹³

Family members living in the Gulf states were another source of information. Bernice Van Der Weyde, a young woman teaching in the Deep South, told her parents fears of slave revolts due to Lincoln's election was the chief cause of the separationist impulse.¹⁴ At the outset of the crisis, Bernice admired Southern life and accepted slavery, although she had not been forced to choose between Dixie and the Union.¹⁵

Dutch immigrants, the Van Der Weydes in New York were staunch Unionists. Peter Henri Van Der Weyde, a doctor, was a noted lecturer and professor of science and technology. He was deeply committed to education, a trait his daughter picked up.¹⁶

Bernice also informed her family of the scathing criticism of the Union she had to endure and the pressures from locals to

accept the Southern position. The situation troubled her, and probably confirmed for her family the Republican papers' reports of the unpatriotic, anti-democratic nature of disunionism.

Bernice confided:

I am so home sick. I am actually sick at heart, and so disgusted with everybody and everything in this place. I don't know what to make of it. The pupils are discontented; I am discontented.¹⁷

The economic impact of the early stages of the crisis was measured in nerves and eroding confidence as well as direct financial losses. Markets most sensitive to breaking news, such as stocks, were directly affected by dispatches on departure in the South and Washington. Reports of moderation in Dixie or possible compromise in Congress could produce solid trading at higher prices.

In contrast, cable items on the spread of secession and hostility in the capital numbed brokers. In mid November, one observer noted: "Exciting news from the South, relative to the secession of the cotton growing states, has caused almost a panic in New York and stocks have fallen twenty or thirty percent." The market had recovered somewhat by late December, but buying was light and prices lower.¹⁸

Sectors of the economy most reliant on Southern orders immediately felt the pinch. While November-December was normally slow, firms in dry goods, clothing, shoes and hats suffered more than usual. Part of this was due to a poor harvest in the cotton states, giving those in the Gulf fewer resources with which to

bargain.¹⁹

Workers in those industries were laid off. A late November report estimated 15,000 laborers in New York and Brooklyn had been discharged, with shoe factories dismissing as many as three-fourths of their hands.²⁰ An unemployed tailor said in mid December: "They say it is all caused by the trouble between the North and the South, but for my own part I don't know much about it. All I know is that we can't get work, and if we don't get it ourselves, our families will starve and we are not far from that now."²¹ Trade groups met to discuss the ramifications of the crisis; Democrats urged workers to rally in support of the South.²²

Dry goods houses reduced business, though few collapsed. They withdrew into hibernation and hoped the crisis would pass. One merchant "trust(ed) that the present crisis will not hold on long enough to break us all up, as we were in '57 -- and to ruin business for the ensuing year." But decreased efforts to sell led to cutbacks on orders from suppliers, hurting those manufacturers.²³ Western and country business increased slightly, although not nearly enough to compensate for stagnation of trade with the South.²⁴

In the uncertain climate, few wished to undertake new ventures. Considerations of buying stock were postponed.²⁵ Fears that Southerners would repudiate millions in debts to local firms were strong. On a smaller scale, the Jewish Messenger worried Southern readers were using the crisis as an excuse to

revoke on subscription dues.²⁶ The uncertainty of payments and shipping, which boosted insurance rates, forced merchants to suspend trade even with Southern houses which might have continued to deal.²⁷

After Lincoln's election, banks sharply contracted the money supply and nearly halted specie payments. That practice was customary in antebellum financial crunches, most recently in 1857. But wealthy depositors threatened to withdraw funds if the flow of currency ceased. As a result, local banks agreed on November 21 to create a common stock of money. Any participating institution could draw from the fund to honor notes until all resources were exhausted. That arrangement was a welcome sign of co-operation in a crisis, and stabilized the financial situation, even though interest rates remained high.²⁸

International commerce was stable. Import and export figures for November and December compared favorably with those of late 1859. The cotton trade, most visible sign of the metropolis's economic link to Dixie, was not seriously affected. Two thousand bales were sold on December 23, three days after South Carolina seceded.²⁹ Enough cotton was in transit to New York that fears of a cutback in supply of the top export was more a future than an immediate concern.

The dominant theme in distraught commercial circles was that the crisis was political and could be dealt with. Damage was not irreparable, but might be if confidence dwindled further and disruption of trade persisted.³⁰ In that context, merchants,

clerks and workers in commercial firms were among the loudest voices calling for conciliation with the Southern states. Those who took the Democratic view of the situation also had political justification for urging compromise, but the salient point is that a large proportion of Republican-oriented businessmen also advocated concessions to Dixie.

Responses to disunion movements revolved around a variety of interconnected issues. They were the Constitutional validity of secession, possibility of peaceful withdrawal, coercion and compromise. In the early stages of the crisis, for instance, it was possible to argue that while the Constitution forbade departure, the use of force against Americans was too horrible to contemplate, and concessions should be made to keep the Gulf states in the Union.

These topics were complex. The stresses of a schism of the nation were too profound to produce consistent responses. While fluctuating, those raw responses are pivotal to this study. They show, on one level, the metropolis was unprepared for the rupture, and represent early, stumbling stances which crystallized into valid positions as schism went forward.

Calling of conventions in the South forced New Yorkers to consider if the nation's governing document permitted withdrawal. Most active in the public debate were long familiar with the compact theory, and had already expressed opinions on it. Some conservatives declared the question moot, asserting that if the

North dismissed the theory it had no function. A lawyer likened the argument of legal departure to "the position of the Slave owner who seeks to reclaim his chattel in New England."³¹

Yet, in the weeks before the Southern conferences and the initial military movements at Charleston, the Constitution's posture on secession mattered. Debating societies in Queens argued the merits of Constitutional secession, deciding against legal separation.³²

The Herald accepted the Southern argument of sovereign states and the right to leave the compact. Strategically, this was part of applying pressure on the Republicans to make concessions on slavery.³³ The Journal of Commerce also saw "a union of separate and independent states; each possessing the attributes of sovereignty and absolute power over its own territory and people."³⁴ This line argument supported the paper's anti-coercion posture. Congressman Dan Sickles backed a right of departure in his House speech on New York City's separation from the state.³⁵

The use of the compact theory as a tactic to achieve other goals does not invalidate those opinions. The papers and lawmaker did not approach the issue as Constitutional scholars, but as active participants in an unfolding crisis. They saw the Southern states as injured parties with ultimate rights of independence as means of self defense. Their attitudes show that some of the cotton states' defenders in the metropolis were willing, at this stage, to support in principal the South's legal

ability to go its own way.

However, those opinions cut against the grain. A woman yelling about the validity of withdrawal in lower Manhattan was sent to an asylum.³⁶ The President's rejection of the concept in early December gave most Democrats cover in dismissing a right of departure.³⁷ With a personal and domestic twist, a woman captured the absurdity New Yorkers saw in unilateral, unprovoked separation:

If secession is right and lawful, why can't I secede from my husband. He has always been kind and indulgent (even to my faults), but he may abuse me, and wouldn't it be well to separate now, before any 'overt act' shall be committed?³⁸

While Tammany cited disunion as treason,³⁹ most Democratic sources countered talk of Constitutional secession with specific refutations. Even Hard organs denied the framers opened the way for schism, and argued the idea of a perpetual Union in the Articles of Confederation carried over to the document written in 1787. One stressed the drafters "thought it unnecessary to stipulate pro or con with reference to a contingency which they could hardly contemplate as even among the remote possibilities of the far distant future."⁴⁰ Mozart Hall's paper, The Daily News, took the issue seriously enough to show secession was considered and rejected in the ratification process.⁴¹

These analyses were another example of the merger of the metropolis under the pressures of disunion. Republicans attacked secession with similar historical evidence.⁴² Lacking the sympathy with Dixie of fusionites, supporters of Lincoln also dismissed the concept ruefully. The Tribune, in mid November,

wrote that anybody who believed the cotton states could "take themselves off in a huff, whenever and however inclined to do so, must be in a frame of mind on which arguments or expostulation would be wasted."⁴³ Republicans accepted consideration of a Constitutional amendment on procedures for secession,⁴⁴ but that was largely a stalling tactic.

Nationalism and the importance of the Union to the metropolis contributed to the local rejection of Constitutional secession. Even most of those who backed the South could not accept the anarchy implied in acknowledging that a single procedural motion at a convention split the republic on which New York depended so heavily. For that reason, the passage of the ordinance in Charleston, while troubling, was not taken seriously as a move which sliced up the nation.⁴⁵

Beyond Constitutional interpretation, the more pressing concerns were peaceful secession and coercion. Dismissal of the compact theory was not the same thing as fully denying the rights of the Gulf states to leave. For a variety of reasons, voices which balked at legal departure upheld peaceable withdrawal. Among these were the concept of self-determination as embodied in the Declaration of Independence, an abhorrence of civil strife and confidence the States, if permitted to depart without opposition, would soon return on their own volition.

Contemporaries and historians have focused on Horace Greeley's go-in-peace editorial of November 9 as the cornerstone

of this debate.⁴⁶ Indeed, the evolution of the Tribune's position through late December is a good lense through which to survey the scope of opinion on these subjects.

The simplest way to characterize Greeley's go-in-peace stance is conditional and insincere. The oft-cited November 9 piece added that withdrawal would have to be gradual, reflective and clearly sanctioned by a state's citizenry. In other words: "Admitting the existence of the right of secession it certainly is a right of a most extreme character, and not one to be exercised except with every possible guarantee that the consent of the people goes heartily with it." At the time, the Tribune felt secession in the Gulf was not following that course.⁴⁷

Subsequent editorials put further qualifications on acceptance of departure. Among these were abstention from violence by a seceding state, arrangements on federal property, and finally the requirement that only the unanimous sentiment of seven or eight contiguous states could sanction a split.⁴⁸

George M. Frederickson, in an insightful assessment, has criticized Greeley for setting down conditions on peaceful separation. Discussing the Tribune chief and others who advocated letting the cotton states go in peace, Frederickson writes: "They were captives of the same naive hope of some of the transcendentalists -- the faith that the great abstract ideals of human liberty could be completely embodied in practical instruments."⁴⁹

Greeley's use of peaceable secession is best understood as

part of an overall strategy aimed at averting a compromise on slavery issues. Privately he wrote: "I fear nothing, care for nothing, but another disgraceful back-down of the Free States."⁵⁰ Public talk of unhindered schism, he reasoned, would derail considerations of concessions on sectional matters. Meanwhile, Southern unionism, in which Greeley placed great faith, would gradually, democratically counter the secession craze, keeping the states in the Union.⁵¹

When it became clear disunion was not following the simplistic framework Greeley envisioned, the editor became one of the strongest local voices for resistance to secession.⁵² Undoubtedly, pressure from Republican officials moved Greeley to harden his stance.⁵³ But the rapid qualification of early go-in-peace sentiment was shaped largely by the nature of secession. Violence against the moderate voices in the Gulf, and other strong-arm acts dismayed the ex-Whig.⁵⁴ Talk of peaceful separation vanished from the Tribune's columns before the first ordinance was passed.

In using peaceable departure as a means to achieving the end of no compromise, Greeley had a good deal of company among radical Republicans and abolitionists. Those who took antislavery principles seriously were hounded by memories of 1850. In that context, the first impulse was to establish a position from which they could oppose the inevitable call for concessions to the South in Congress. Greeley's go-in-peace posture temporarily served that purpose. A young city

abolitionist woman also preferred to

let them go. We are told we 'mustn't buy too many dresses this winter', but still I say no matter -- no compromises. Millions for defense, not one cent for tribute. I can live on a straw a day.⁵⁵

The focus on Greeley has obscured the more sincere, less conditional, support of departure among conservatives. They were not willing at this stage to countenance a rupture of the Union. Yet, these voices insisted that if schism could not be avoided through sectional compromise, it must be peacefully permitted. The Express captured this approach: "If the door of reconciliation between North and South is indeed closed -- without the possibility of reopening it -- then, by all means, let the parting be in peace."⁵⁶

Elements of the Hard side of the Democracy understood the secession movements were in earnest, and sympathized and identified with Southerners. In that context, go-in-peace among them was more genuinely a call for avoiding fratricidal strife. The Herald pleaded in early December: "Disunion is our destiny, and our only hope now is that disunion may not involve us in a civil war."⁵⁷

At this juncture, before the public was aroused by action at Charleston, the Hards plausibly claimed Northern Democrats would never fight fellow countrymen in Dixie. Another Democratic daily paper asserted the free states showed no "readiness to assail the South or arm the general government with power to carry fire and sword among our brethren in that quarter."⁵⁸

The distinction between Constitutional secession and

peaceful departure seems silly, and it ultimately was. At this stage, though, Hard voices like the Brooklyn Daily Eagle denied legal withdrawal as a way to assert the integrity of the document of 1787 and prevent anarchy. But the paper foreshadowed the eventual concern that attempts to coerce the South would become entwined with a program of emancipation. In other words, the leading Democratic organ in Brooklyn accepted peaceful departure to forestall an invasion of Dixie which could include an attack on slavery.⁵⁹

This concern was the underlying impulse for conservatives who really okayed unopposed departure. While most sectors of opinion focused on the Union, enough voices expressed the fears of rabid, pro-South Democrats about the future of slavery. The Herald, for instance, said debates "have come down to the real issue of the wisdom or wickedness of African slavery," and upheld the rights of "States which retain it as a wise and necessary part of their social system." In such a context, conservatives emphasized the usual defenses of slavery, including infusion of black laborers, racism and localism.⁶⁰

The President's statement about Southern fears of servile revolts was echoed locally.⁶¹ Presbyterian Reverend Henry J. Van Dyke of Brooklyn, in a December sermon, denounced the claim the Bible sanctioned abolitionism. That stance was part of an ongoing antebellum debate, but the timing of Van Dyke's diatribe was important. Hard Democrats like the Journal Of Commerce, Herald, Brooklyn Daily Eagle and Charles O'Connor praised the

message.⁶² Such voices also looked positively on peaceful separation as a device for circumventing a coercive policy which, they feared, would become linked with an emancipationist scheme.

Still, the consensus in the metropolis was that non-violent departure was unlikely. The Long Island Democrat lamented: "Peaceful secession is an utter impossibility. Separation can only be achieved through revolution, and that we all know can never be attempted without resort to arms."⁶³ A woman writing in a Republican paper, boldly digesting the likely challenge, praised Northerners as "a people who will not submit to this great confederation of States being broken up by a fretful, disappointed State or States."⁶⁴ Those of a Democratic persuasion predicted a less enthusiastic, more dutiful, response.⁶⁵ In the main, though, disinclination to meet the probable Southern action was depicted as tantamount to national suicide.⁶⁶

The matter of coercion, closely related to peaceful secession, centered around considerations of under what circumstances might the federal government use force against a seceding state. The Journal Of Commerce, for example, while accepting departure in general, warned South Carolina about confiscating national property.⁶⁷ But the business daily shied away from calls for federal action in case Charleston zealots grabbed buildings, forts or ships.

The position of the Journal and others holding the Hard mantle at this time was opposition to coercion of any form. The

local Breckinridge group passed generally worded anti-force resolutions and Congressman Cochrane introduced bills in the House barring federal actions against Southern states.⁶⁸ Still, these vague and ill-defined policies functioned mostly as statements of sympathy with the cotton states. The first confrontations at Charleston in late December would more sharply define the meaning of anti-coercion among those conservative entities.

Outside the Hard spectrum, a major response was that the government should use enough force to continue the collection of import fees.⁶⁹ Such an approach would be an implicit denial of the expected South Carolina secession ordinance, without having to use arms to compel the state to rescind the document. By and large, that was the Republican strategy, but was also held by supporters of John Bell. It included the confidence that secession would soon disintegrate.⁷⁰

While nobody called for an invasion of Dixie to teach the rebels a lesson, some war voices emerged. They were a reaction against gradualist schemes for preserving the republic. Considerations of the content of possible compromises and of peaceful secession dominated the public debate. But the call for war to keep the Union intact demonstrated impatience with perceived appeasement and stalling tactics.

Tammany pleaded that "if dissolution be the threatened fate of the Union, let us rather try the knife as a remedy, than submit to the roughing process of passive decay and

mortification." Republican Wide Awakes continued weekly meetings.⁷¹ A woman urged the challenge of war be met "even to the death for the preservation of a government that will be a benefit to mankind for ages to come."⁷² Beyond general call for armed struggle to save the nation, specific goals such as control of the Mississippi River were cast as warranting a fight.⁷³

Compromise was the key issue. On a simple level, attitudes toward political settlement depended on the content of the proposals under consideration.⁷⁴ Yet, in terms of the response of metropolitan New York to the crisis, the important point is that the turf of concessions was taken as the major playing field. To be sure, some voices fretted that talk of compromise was a waste.⁷⁵ But the stronger impulse held that the proper conditions, if approved, could preserve the Union. If this showed a misunderstanding of the South, it also represented the power of hope that the republic was indivisible.

Debates and action on a settlement had to center around tangible planks. Thurlow Weed obliged in mid November. The master backstage operator proposed the restoration and extension to the Pacific of the 36-30 line. Beyond that, various packages tossed around Congress shaped the public discourse in New York. These came together in the proposals of Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden.⁷⁶

The gradual coalescing of opinion in the metropolis is most evident on the subject of compromise. Moderate Republican

leaders symbolized the conciliatory stance. The New York Times, Governor Morgan, Hamilton Fish, Flushing Journal, Long Island Congressman Luther Carter and others saw a need and possible function for Republican magnanimity. They stressed a willingness to "render the most full and complete justice to the South." This might include modifying Northern personal liberty laws and compromise on the territorial issue along the lines of Weed's proposal.⁷⁷

There were, of course, limits to the conciliatory posture of those Republicans. They rejected the sweeping nature of the Crittenden proposals. In fact, those sectors shied away from specifics. They tried to present a generally lenient front in the hope that would satisfy the conservative element in the South.⁷⁸

The magnanimous posture of those moderates was important for several reasons. It was part of a strategy to halt secession movements in the upper South and confine disunion to the Gulf.⁷⁹ In addition, it was a metropolitan position. Republicans who took that course mirrored the common calls in lower New York for settlement through concession. Support for conciliation by the Chamber of Commerce, dominated by backers of Lincoln, was a good example of this.⁸⁰

It is difficult to categorize the outlook of rank and file Republicans. Resolutions passed by the general committee in Brooklyn and the German committee in Manhattan opposed any budging from the Chicago platform, eliminating Weed's proposal on

the territories. Kings County Congressman James Humphrey, New York's representative on the House panel formed to consider the crisis, held that view.⁸¹ Based on other evidence, it seems the magnanimous face did not extend into the ranks of party faithful, perhaps influenced by the President elect's no compromise assertion. A city Republican caught the spirit:

We shall never have a better time to settle that question than now, if we all stand firm on the Chicago Platform. If a Geographical line is again adopted, I shall feel we have fought the recent battle in vain. The South will be continually hankering after more territory in which to plant their favorite institution, and, the consequence will be, in a few years, the acquisition of Mexico and Cuba.⁸²

Two observations are relevant here. First, the conciliatory stance of Weed and Seward's lean towards concession influenced party officials. The Senator's likely inclusion in the cabinet and Weed's probable role in dispensing federal patronage in the Empire State contributed to those posturings.⁸³ Republican concerns with public offices at a time of national crisis were irresponsible but pervasive. Anybody seeking an appointive post could hardly afford to alienate the Seward-Weed team. Second, ordinary local backers of Lincoln took antislavery planks more seriously than those in the party's inner circles.

Moreover, the issue of compromise magnified the split between moderate and radical Republicans. The Post and Tribune, organs of the anti-Seward set, adamantly opposed any concession. They asserted majority rule and the need to uphold the results of the election. But the major difference was their continuing emphasis on slavery, while the moderates drew back and shaped an

outlook based on the metropolis and the Union. The Greeley paper, for instance, still howled about federal grabbings of those who had fled from bondage.⁴⁴

Pleas for concessions to the South was the mainstay of the platform of individuals and organizations which had backed fusion in the election. It was pressed on many fronts. These included calls for yielding by New York's Council, compromise maneuvers by John Cochrane and other local Congressmen, meetings advocating leniency and editorials in conservative organs.⁴⁵ The conclusion of an exhaustive election made it difficult immediately to spur another public crusade, but the efforts of the compromise set were impressive nonetheless.

In some quarters, concern was expressed about the content of proposed solutions. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle argued it was unreasonable to expect Republicans to accept the complete opening of the territories to slavery. Instead, the Democratic paper said the restoration and extension of the Missouri line should be the foundation of Congressional dialogue.⁴⁶

However, most calls for conciliation lacked such moderation. They were prefaced with blistering attacks on Lincoln's party as the source of all troubles. Mozart Hall advised: "We have to comprehend that the South has been embittered-nauseated-poisoned-by the reckless, unscrupulous aggressions of Northern fanatics."⁴⁷ Area Democrats hardly meant compromise in the sense of mutual concession. They saw Dixie as the injured party which must be reassured through abandonment of antislavery principles

and statements by the North 's dominant party. A Brooklynite declared: "The South shall have her Rights -- her whole Rights, and nothing but her Rights -- So help us God."⁸⁸

Still, conservatives were frustrated. August Belmont charged that "Republican leaders seem utterly blind to the dangers which they have begirt us all with, and though a few of the more conservative ones held out fair promises, I do not believe that the party intends making any concessions."⁸⁹

The November canvass expressed the metropolis's anti-Republicanism, but that meant little in the halls of the national legislature. The success of compromise rested on the willingness of Lincoln's party to make meaningful concessions. Despite local mite, Democrats were thwarted in pressing their eagerness to yield all Dixie wanted. They could only plead with the Republicans for a conciliatory posture, as did Queens's major Democratic voice:

In the name of our common country -- by the glorious recollections of the past and by the recollection of the memory of those noble and pure men who achieved our National Independence, we call upon these gentlemen not to allow a spirit of fanaticism to destroy our country.⁹⁰

The selection of James Humphrey as the Empire State's man on the House committee of 33 was indicative of this. Democratic Congressmen, led by Cochrane, protested in vein that the lameduck Brooklynite did not represent the sentiment of the metropolitan area. Republican domination of the state's delegation to Washington allowed them to select the member. Perhaps they chose Humphrey as a swipe at the Democracy's downstate power.⁹¹

That sense of frustration over the inability to shape a settlement also served as an underpinning of the most important facet of the conservative response. Beyond sympathy with the South and advocacy of concessions, Democrats implored those in Dixie to slow down and permit Northern allies to argue their case. They tried, ultimately in vain, to show the cotton states that non-Republicans could check Lincoln in Congress and that most free state residents upheld Southern rights.

A city backer of Dixie went so far as to claim the section's "rights and their interests were never on stronger and safer grounds than at present." He added that "if our Southern brethren will only keep the peace -- keep cool," then, "all this Northern and Eastern fanaticism will die a natural death, and be no longer of any influence, fear or consideration."⁹²

From all quarters of the fusion camp came pleas that the secessionists pause in their course of action. They could not comprehend the need for hasty moves prior to Lincoln's inauguration or overt thrusts against slavery.⁹³ Editorials, letters and statements at meetings also expressed a sense of abandonment. Samuel Barlow pressed the case with a Louisiana Senator:

Is it patriotic, is it statesmanlike, to withdraw from a contest in which your friends as well as yourselves are involved, with interests as dear as you are, -- friends, too, who have stood by your rights and have battled on almost forlorn hope against the worst fearful odds? Is it right or just to forsake them, when a joint victory for the future is within your grasp and doom them either to an everlasting minority or place them in the list of your enemies.⁹⁴

A December 15 meeting at offices on Pine Street is cited by historians as an expression of this pro-South, slow-down impulse.⁹⁵ Indeed, the parley of top merchants and conservative public figures captured the ethos of the Unionist apparatus of metropolitan New York. Participants included John Dix, Charles O'Connor, William F. Havemeyer, Erastus Brooks, Augustus Schell and Richard Lathers. Resolutions expressed the core of attitudes outlined above; a panel was named to visit the national and Southern capitals and induce "our Southern friends to pause in their secession movement till we can do something to restore harmony."⁹⁶

Elements of that apparatus buttressed their general calls for moderation with specifics. Among these were a hope that conservative forces in the Gulf would be allowed to participate significantly in a calm, reflective system of elections and conventions to consider departure. The realization they were not led to criticism that the process was unfair. A local Democrat regretted that "the unreasonable haste of the South is driving many of their best friends from them."⁹⁷

In addition, Democratic voices tried to point out the impracticality of schism. This included references to the weakness of an independent South, the greater security of slavery in the Union, and the harm secession was causing to metropolitan area workers who had voted fusion.⁹⁸

Yet, as with compromise, efforts to get the lower South to pause and work with Northern friends faced frustrating obstacles,

a point usually overlooked in historical literature. Richard Lathers, Samuel Barlow and others in touch with Southerners heard that the stands of conservative merchants and Democrats meeting in lower Manhattan did not assure the Gulf. Even a reader of reports and dispatches from Dixie picked up the emphasis on Republican control of the free states. Democrats, after all, had been trounced in most non-slave states in November. As a result, guarantees from John Dix and Charles O'Connor of respect for Southern rights held little consolation. The Herald lamented that the Pine Street meeting should more wisely send emissaries to Springfield than to Charleston in seeking a solution."

Annoyance among fusionists that the Gulf states were proceeding too swiftly, coupled with the realization they could do little to halt secession, generated a strange set of circumstances. Claims that Southerners were reasonable, patriotic people trying to protect property had run their course for many Democrats. Faced with a dead end on their normal outlook, conservatives borrowed certain aspects of the Republican response.

The most important dealt with majoritarianism and lawlessness, which were connected. In the short run at least, even school girls saw departure as a reaction to Lincoln's triumph.¹⁰⁰ Democrats viewed such a response to a Constitutionally valid election as a dangerous precedent. Republicans, naturally, asserted the legal victory of the Illinoisian must be upheld, but fusionites, too, feared the

anarchy implicit in rupturing the Union because the results of the canvass were unfavorable.¹⁰¹

Latin America served as an excellent whipping post for commentators of all shades of opinion. They bemoaned the Central American practice of losers rarely accepting the results of elections peacefully, leading to a series of conflicts. The perceived chaos south of the border had given Americans a sense of pride over smoother functioning United States republicanism. The recognition that the Union was going the same way stirred distress among both backers of Lincoln and conservatives.

The moderate Republican voice in Queens, for instance, attacked designs by secessionists "to re-enact on our virgin soil the internecine strife which humbled and destroyed the glorious states of ancient Greece -- which have distracted beautiful Italy for a thousand years, and have made Mexico the prey of contending factions and oppressors to this day." Mozart Hall, predicting dissolution would lead to militarism and monarchy, also noted "the example of Mexico and the South American states is before us."¹⁰²

Perhaps more importantly, voices of many persuasions wailed that inability to solve the crisis would make a laughing stock of popular government. The local British-oriented organ, Albion, criticized excessive democracy for putting "power into utterly unworthy hands, hence the corruption and comparative downfall."¹⁰³ A common concern was that European monarchies and other skeptics were gloating over the demise of representative

government.

The Journal of Commerce, which accepted peaceful separation, regretted: "In the dreary prospect, there is not a citizen who does not feel personally humiliated. The tyrants of the old world will take courage."¹⁰⁴ An Irish weekly paper saw self government on trial:

sooner or later reason will resume her throne and the sober second thought will ensure the execution of such measures alone as wisdom and justice demand. Were it otherwise, self government would be a myth, and a confederation of independent commonwealths like ours a moral impossibility.¹⁰⁵

Long before secession, Republicans and abolitionists focused on lawlessness and uncivilized behavior in the South. That concentration continued in the schism period.¹⁰⁶ In late 1860, Democrats were compelled to take a similar view. Hasty, revolutionary steps towards departure, and intimidation of the moderate element, corresponded to the prior picture of Dixie painted by backers of Lincoln. As a result, conservatives reacted to the anarchy with perhaps more shock than antislavery forces. Objections to the chaos of rupture of the Union was a major component in the common ground of the metropolis's outlook.

At this early stage, fusionists did not share other elements of the Republican stance. One of these was an effort to assure the South that Lincoln's supporters were not abolitionists. The Times bragged that most who voted for the Illinoisian rejected equal black suffrage. Abolitionists obliged by bemoaning the lack of true anti-bondage sentiment in the party.¹⁰⁷

Antislavery voices blamed Democrats for misrepresenting

Republican free soil doctrines as immediatist in nature. That misapprehension, gleaned from conservative sources read in the Gulf, was a key factor producing Southern flight, backers of Lincoln charged. Republicans urged fusionites to tell Dixieites they, too, rejected emancipation.¹⁰⁸ While little happened on that front, important seeds had been planted. Later, many local Democrats accepted that for Republicans the issue was the Union and not elimination of slavery.

Another component of the Republican response was delving into Southern motives behind secession. The major citation was hidden desire to reopen the international slave trade.¹⁰⁹ With the exception of the Tammany organ, the Leader, fusion sectors did not share that opinion.¹¹⁰ For that reason, charges that an independent South was a means to an end of increasing the importation of Africans dissipated as the crisis wore on. Forging a united metropolis to face likely strife became important, and attitudes which conflicted with that unity were discarded.

Until now, this chapter has focused on opinion. The other part of the metropolis's response to schism was action, or preparations for activities. In November-December an array of developments testified to New York's reputation as the North's most Southern city. Among these was local manufacturing of Palmetto State secession flags.¹¹¹

One of the more confounding was transport of arms to the

South through New York. Munitions from Connecticut were loaded on boats active in the coastal trade with Savannah and other ports. Since the cotton states were not formally in rebellion, these transactions were legal, although disturbing. They focused attention both on the metropolis's trade links with Dixie and the potential implications of a break in the Union.¹¹²

Evidence of New York's capacity for anti-Republican action abounded. Federal Marshall Isaiah Rynders and Congressman-elect James Kerrigan pondered raising military companies. Such forces might act to defend the South against invasion, or fight to resist further Albany intrusion into local affairs.¹¹³ Rumors of assaults on Henry Beecher's church in Brooklyn drew a police guard. Court martial trial of the commander of the Irish-dominated 69th Regiment for refusing to parade for the Prince of Wales in October was another reminder of the potential of local armed units to take independent political stands.¹¹⁴

Lurking fear of lawlessness was a major underpinning of the period. Antebellum anti-abolition riots and street clashes of 1857 had demonstrated the realities of such concerns. While some voices defended New York against charges of mob violence,¹¹⁵ others, especially Police chief John Kennedy, were alarmed about possible disturbances at a time of general unraveling of authority. He complained about the inadequacy of the force to combat exigencies, including a probable pro-South act by the Mayor.¹¹⁶ Mozart Hall continued to blast the state-controlled police, but other Democrats and Republicans saw Kennedy's corps

as necessary in an uncertain climate.¹¹⁷

Talk of new federal arrangements, which could eventually entail action, were common. These included a separate middle states confederacy, or a link of the non-New England states with the South. Lower New York, symbol of opposition to Lincoln's party in the North, was the focal point of most considerations. Discussion of such transformations was followed and encouraged in the cotton states.¹¹⁸

The new arrangement receiving the most attention was southeastern New York as a free city. Behind the anti-draft riots of 1863, the proposal to separate New York City and surrounding counties from the state is the best known aspect of the metropolis's history in the war years. In the next chapter, we will consider the context and specific content of the Mayor's infamous proposal of January 7. For now, the discussion will focus on a series of events in November-December pivotal to understanding the reaction to Wood's plan.

In the first place, the rivalry with Tammany Hall, temporarily subsumed in the fusion campaign, remained a central feature of local Democratic life. Tammany defeated Mozart in early December municipal elections, weakening the mayor.¹¹⁹ In addition to a Republican-controlled state legislature, he faced a more hostile Common Council. A dramatic move to regain the initiative seemed in order.

While Wood took time out from public life to wed in late December,¹²⁰ he continued to proclaim the evils of Albany's

usurpations of local prerogatives. He told Governor Morgan in late November, referring to state authority:

The government itself is about as bad as it can be. There is little restraint upon evil doers and the general dissemination of executive power dissipates all responsibility and ignores all essential elements of government. The Mayor is really without executive authority. He cannot direct or control any of the so-called departments. He has no power over them whatever. They do what they please and as they please without accountability or responsibility. Now in my judgment the great necessity for the City is a remedy for this serious evil.¹²¹

Mozart's chronicle and others in the Democratic orbit also hammered away at misrule from Republicans in the state capital.¹²² Further, Wood's public statements on the crisis were filled with doom and foreboding,¹²³ in line with his claim the city must fend for itself in the midst of chaos.

Representative Daniel Sickles revealed to a national audience the local debate over New York City's independence. The lameduck House member was alternately an associate and foe of Wood. His Congressional speech of December 10 contained elements of the Mayor's thoughts on the matter. Rather than acting in concert with the city's chief executive, Sickles was discussing a subject common in the public debate in the metropolis; it had been tossed around since 1857. He reaffirmed the city's loyalty to the Union, hoping for settlement, but warned that if the republic split, Gotham would not remain

an appendage and a slave of a Puritan province. She will assert her own independence. The North will then see and feel that secession, although it may begin at the South, will not end at the South. Sir, there is no sympathy now between the city and the state of New York -- not the least -- nor has there been for years.¹²⁴

Before departing for marriage and honeymoon, Wood held a couple of private meetings at City Hall in mid December on the free city idea. Turnout was disappointing. Hoping to broaden the scope of the movement, he invited such figures as Hamilton Fish, Horatio Seymour, Samuel Tilden, August Belmont and William B. Astor under the guise of a Union meeting. But the parley only drew six people and little was discussed.

The daily press was aware of the gatherings, as was Police chief Kennedy. Leery of the Mayor, Kennedy was disturbed, planning to shadow the scheme. Pro-compromise Republicans like Weed hoped to put the impetus to their own use, but withdrew when they realized what Wood had in mind.¹²⁵

While the Mayor's office issued no statements about local secession, Mozart's printed voice, the News, trumpeted the advantages and importance of taking the city out of the Empire State. In defending the concept, the paper struck a balance between sympathizing with the South, criticizing overreaching authority from Albany, and the commercial opportunities of free city status: "Her (the city's) attitude will be that of a mediator and a neutral, and she will demand to be left independent, if the Union is to be severed."¹²⁶

The crucial point normally overlooked in writing on Wood's January message is that the concept had been unearthed and publicly debated before he proposed separation. Transportation baron George Law and Congressman Cochrane, soon to join Mozart Hall, expressed some interest.¹²⁷ James Brooks, attender at the

City Hall session on the move, and his Express also lauded the idea, pointing out the city had more to fear from Albany and Massachusetts than from South Carolina. It wistfully advocated fleeing into the comfort of "a free city, with free goods, free ships, no duties, no Customs House, etc."¹²⁸

However, the overwhelming response before Wood's proclamation was rejection. Republicans derided the concept. The protectionist Tribune, for instance, chuckled: "It may be very good for the city to 'do business free,' but with whom will she do it? There will, of course, be a customhouse just across Harlem River, and another in Jersey City."¹²⁹ Tammany attacked the move in a manner consistent with opposition to all Wood programs.¹³⁰

Moreover, most pro-South Democratic entities rejected the notion. In fact, preliminary debate on the free city initiative marked the beginning of the definition of a Copperhead group. Hard quarters which were part of the wartime loyal dissenting faction disdained the scheme, while Mozart and the News, the Peace Democrats, pushed the idea.

Reasons for attacking separation included a reluctance to see "the great commercial emporium of the New World degraded to the ranks of the free cities of Germany."¹³¹ The Herald feared the instability of the concept, predicting subsequent departures of Blackwell Island or Five Points, the working class area near City Hall. It castigated separation as designed to increase spoils and patronage, and as a horror for residents thrown back

on rule solely by local politicians.¹³²

Privately, too, the secession of the metropolis was considered and dismissed before Christmas. President Buchanan emphasized his opposition, noting New York would lose and not improve commercial relations with the rest of the Union.¹³³ Samuel Barlow caught the focal point of Democratic rejection, inquiring, "is this the proper time to make this suggestion? I think not, for the reason that it will" hurt compromise efforts "at the North and encourage those of the South who are anxious for secession."¹³⁴

Rebuttals would get more personal and biting in January when the newlywed publicly stated the case. Still, the widespread airing and defeat of the concept in December is crucial. When most believed national schism could be avoided, a radical proposal accepting dissolution offended pro-Union sensibilities. Timing of the Mayor's plan was all wrong; events in late December and early January would make it even worse.

Part of the rejection of the secession of lower New York was due to the conviction the metropolis needed the Union for stability and prosperity. The free city status, it was widely felt, would disrupt rather than enhance such links. In that context, nationalism rested heavily on commercial connections, a point continuously made in this period.¹³⁵

Metropolitan area nationalism, though, took in much more. The flag was used for many purposes. Among these were urging

Republicans to make concessions and trying to persuade Florida's lone House member to join the Committee of 33.¹³⁶ The Irish-American added an interesting twist to the efforts of newcomers to assert loyalty in time of crisis, claiming immigrants, who were above sectionalism, were the logical bases of national conservatism.¹³⁷

Moreover, the lure of the cult of the Union was immense. Romantic nationalism -- the belief in the spiritual transcendence of the nation -- was in high gear.¹³⁸ The best example was local conservatives' interest in and support of Giuseppe Garibaldi and the campaign to unite Italy, which overlapped with the secession crisis. As ordinances of secession were passed in the Gulf, New Yorkers were enthralled with distant efforts to repair a fragmented nation. The Journal of Commerce noted:

The man who has united Italy by his prowess and military skill, built up the separated provinces into a great nation, and returned to his modest home on a quiet Island, without seeking for recompense or honor, is a hero and a patriot in the highest sense of these words.¹³⁹

Two days before the South Carolina ordinance was passed, a massive public meeting hailed Garibaldi and Italian nationality. John Dix, who chaired the pro-South session at Pine Street, presided at the rally. Participants included August Belmont, Erastus Brooks, William Bryant, Horace Greeley and Tammany's Elijah Purdy. In the lead address, Dix praised the general as the

chief instrument in restoring a great people divided into a multitude of feeble states, and degraded and debased by

centuries of isolation from each other to a nationality which holds out to them the assurance of taking rank among the most powerful nations of the world.¹⁴⁰

Several key points stand out in reviewing the metropolis's initial response to the crisis. First, it is misleading to say, as do some scholars, there was a slow awakening to the severity of the situation.¹⁴¹ In a 19th century context, local response was rapid. Late 20th century visual images of secession parades in Charleston might have stirred a quicker outcry. But in contemporary terms, public opinion and commercial activities were immediately infused with a sense of urgency, due largely to the importance of the Union to the metropolitan area.

Advocacy of compromise to keep the republic intact was the cornerstone of lower New York's stand. Settlement meant different things to say, moderate Republicans and Democrats, although they found common ground on the plank of concessions. A desperate search for an avenue leading to solution and historical awareness of previous successful sectional compromises drove this position. Attempts to prevent schism through political negotiation would increase in the next phase.

Perhaps the most important issue, in terms of subsequent implications, was the interplay between slavery and the Union. Moderate Republicans took the lead in asserting continuity of the nation, and not emancipation or racial equality, was the topic of the moment. The recent vote on the equal suffrage amendment to the state constitution buttressed this appeal, and helped backers

of Lincoln bring many conservatives on board.

On the other hand, certain voices continued to emphasize bondage. In more honest fashion, they realized slavery had brought the country to the precipice. From different perspectives, Hard fusionistes who accepted peaceful withdrawal and radical Republicans and abolitionists, who balked at compromise, based their stances on human bondage.

Most of the prevalent concerns of the war years were expressed, in varying degrees, in those first seven weeks after Lincoln's election. Still, the first jolt of confrontations at Charleston in late December/early January would have important implications. They hardened some positions, redefined others, and demonstrated the dynamic, galvanizing potential of armed assaults on symbols of the Union.

Notes

1. Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, 13 December 1860, vol. 80, pp. 663-64; The Jewish Messenger, 7 December 17860, p. 172; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1 December 1860, p. 3; New York Tribune, 16 November 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Herald, 16 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 23 November 1860, p. 4; Long Island Democrat, 20 November 1860, p. 2; Daily News, 10 November 1860, p. 4; Diary Of George Lewis Prentiss, 8 December 1860, NYPL; New York Express, 10 November 17860, p. 1.

2. New York Herald, 9 November 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 10 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 12 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 16 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 1 December 1860, p. 6; Daily News, 12 November 1860, p. 1.

3. Daily News, 13 November 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 14 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 12 November 1860, p. 4.

4. New York Leader, 17 November 1860, p. 4.

5. Quote from, New York Times, 13 November 1860, p. 1; also see, New York Times, 11 November 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 15 November 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 19 November 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 22 November 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 10 December 1860, p. 1; New York Tribune, 10 November 1860, p. 5.

6. New York Times, 11 November 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 27 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 10 December 1860, p. 4.

7. Quote from, Daily News, 7 December 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Herald, 11 November 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 15 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 3 December 1860, p. 4; New York Express, 12 November 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 19 November 1860, p. 2.

8. Evening Post, 9 November 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 3 December 1860, p. 2.

9. New York Tribune, 21 November 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 8 November 1860, p. 2; New York Times, 21 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 23 November 1860, p. 4.

10. See, for example, Diary, John Ward, Jr., December entries 1860, NYHS; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 29 November 1860, NYHS; New York Times, 19 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 30 November 1860, p. 1.

11. Quote from, Diary Of Satterlee, 9 November 1860, NYPL; also see, New York Times, 13 November 1860, p. 4.

12. Diary, Caroline Dunstan, 15 November 1860, NYPL. A note here on incorporation of the statements and actions of women. Most material in this regard comes from diaries and correspondence of literate, middle class, native-born women. While that hardly delegitimizes them, they are not fully representative of women in the metropolis. I am generally not using the material in a gender-specific way. Reactions of women to various stages of the crisis were more personal than those of men; they framed responses in domestic and familial contexts more often than men. I point that out when it seems important. By and large, though, I am using the reaction of females in the sense that they were residents of the metropolis. The gravity of secession broadened the political debate beyond normal spheres. Women, like men, took positions on such issues as compromise, coercion and unprovoked departure. Literature on women in New York at midcentury is extensive. Some good examples are Stansell, City of Women, which treats working class women, and Mary P. Ryan, Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825-1880, (Baltimore, 1990), a study of women's roles in public life in New York, New Orleans and San Francisco.

13. Samuel L.M. Barlow to Sylvester Mowry, 11 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.

14. Bernice Van Der Weyde to mother, 12 November 1860, Van Der Weyde Papers, NYPL; Bernice Van Der Weyde to brother, 10 December 1860, NYPL.
15. See, first letter in note #14; Bernice Van Der Weyde to mother, 15 October 1860, Van Der Weyde Papers, NYPL.
16. General information in Van Der Weyde Papers, NYPL; Peter Henri Van Der Weyde, Education Of The Past, And Education Of The Future, (Philadelphia, 1864), pamphlet, NYPL, pp. 5-15.
17. Bernice Van Der Weyde to parents, November 1860, Van Der Weyde Papers, NYPL.
18. Quote from, Diary Of Satterlee, 13 November 1860, NYPL; also see, New York Times, 19 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 11 November 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 1 December 1860, p. 1; Daily News, 13 December 1860, p. 2; Journal Of Commerce, 14 November 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 4 December 1860, p. 4; Diary Of Satterlee, 20 November 1860.
19. New York Herald, 27 November 1860, p. 10; Journal Of Commerce, 17 November 1860, p. 1; Journal Of Commerce, 24 November 1860, p. 1; New York Express, 28 November 1860, p. 4; Feldman, Fit For Men, p. 50; Nicholls, The Disruption Of American Democracy, p. 410; J.H. Pringle to Charles Leverich, 14 December 1860, Leverich Papers, NYHS.
20. Specific figure from, New York Herald, 27 November 1860, p. 10; also see, Journal Of Commerce, 8 December 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 3 December 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 8 December 1860, p. 3; James R. Van Zandt to William H. Seward, 19 December 1860, Seward Papers, UR.
21. Quote from, New York Herald, 15 December 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Leader, 22 December 1860, p. 4.
22. New York Express, 22 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 14 November 1860, p. 4.
23. Quote from, Tailer, Jr., Diary, 21 November 1860, NYHS; also see, Journal Of Commerce, 1 December 1860, p. 1; Journal Of Commerce, 8 December 1860, p. 1; Jane Stuart Woolsey to friend, 5 December 1860, in, Letters Of A Family During The War For The Union, I:19-23; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 30 November 1860, NYHS.
24. Journal Of Commerce, 15 December 1860, p. 1; Journal Of Commerce, 22 December 1860, p. 1; New York Express, 14 November 1860, p. 4; New York Express, 21 December 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 10 November 1860, p. 4.

25. Samuel L.M. Barlow to H.D. Bacon, 19 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.
26. Journal Of Commerce, 3 December 1860, p. 3; Jewish Messenger, 14 December 1860, p. 131.
27. August Belmont to William Marten, 30 November 1860, in Letters, Speeches And Addresses Of August Belmont, (New York, 1890), p. 29; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 26 December 1860, NYHS; Stamp, And The War Came, p. 228.
28. New York Herald, 22 November 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 23 November 1860, p. 7; Daily News, 19 November 1860, p. 8; Daily News, 12 December 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 22 November 1860, p. 4; New York Express, 26 November 1860, p. 4; George D. Morgan to Edwin D. Morgan, 24 November 1860, Edwin Morgan Papers, NYSL; George Morgan to Edwin Morgan, 27 November 1860, Morgan Papers, NYSL.
29. Specific cotton figure from, New York Express, 24 December 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Express, 27 December 1860, p. 4; New York Express, 13 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 20 December 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 12 November 1860, p. 7; Daily News, 12 December 1860, p. 2; Daily News, 24 December 1860, p. 7; Journal Of Commerce, 6 December 1860, p. 2.
30. New York Times, 7 December 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 8 December 1860, p. 3; Daily News, 7 December 1860, p. 8; Shoe And Leather Reporter, 27 December 1860, p. 1.
31. Quote from, Samuel L.M. Barlow to H.D. Bacon, 5 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; also see, Barlow to William M. Browne, 19 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; New York Express, 14 November 1860, p. 2.
32. Flushing Journal, 22 December 1860, p. 2.
33. New York Herald, 8 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 10 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 11 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 27 November 1860, p. 6.
34. Journal Of Commerce, 28 November 1860, p. 2.
35. Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, 10 December 1860, pp. 40-41.
36. New York Times, 19 November 1860, p. 8; institutionalizing the woman was probably also due to prevailing notions about females taking strong stands in public, see, Ryan, Women in Public, pp. 134-35.

37. Long Island Democrat, 11 December 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 5 December 1860, p. 2.
38. Quote from, Brooklyn Evening Star, 17 December 1860, p. 2; also see New York Times, 13 December 1860, p. 4.
39. New York Leader, 10 November 1860, p. 4.
40. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 November 1860, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 10 November 1860, . 2; Daily News, 16 November 1860, p. 4; Brother Jonathan, 17 November 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 14 November 1860, p. 3.
41. Daily News, 24 November 1860, p. 1.
42. New York Times, 10 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 15 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 26 November 1860, p. 4; Horace Greeley to Abraham Lincoln, 22 December 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; Moses H. Grinnell to William H. Seward, 24 December 1860, Seward Papers, UR; Evening Post, 20 November 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 28 November 1860, p. 2; letter of Joseph Breck, New York Tribune, 28 November 1860, p. 5.
43. Quote from, New York Tribune, 16 November 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Times, 17 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 28 November 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 12 November 1860, p. 2.
44. New York Times, 30 November 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 4 December 1860, p. 2.
45. Brooklyn Evening Star, 21 December 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 24 December 1860, p. 2; New York Leader, 22 December 1860, p. 4; Flushing Journal, 22 December 1860, p. 2; The Albion, 22 December 1860, p. 607.
46. See, for example, Potter, "Horace Greeley And Peaceable Secession," JSH, vol. vii, May 1941, pp. 145-59; Thomas Bonner, "Horace Greeley And The Secession Movement, 1860-61," MVHR, vol. 38, December 1951, pp. 425-44.
47. Quote from, New York Tribune, 13 November 1860, p. 4; the famed go-in-peace editorial, which has similar qualifiers, is, New York Tribune, 9 November 1860, p. 4.
48. New York Tribune, 26 November 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 3 December 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 7 December 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 10 December 1860, p. 4.
49. George M. Frederickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals And The Crisis Of The Union, (New York, 1965), p. 59.

50. Horace Greeley to Abraham Lincoln, 22 December 1860, Lincoln papers, LC.
51. New York Tribune, 30 November 1860, p. 4; Van Dausen, Horace Greeley, pp. 263-68.
52. New York Tribune, 22 December 1860, pp. 4-5; New York Tribune, 24 December 1860, p. 4.
53. George G. Fogg to Abraham Lincoln, 22 December 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC.
54. New York Tribune, 12 November 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 13 November 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 26 November 1860, p. 4.
55. Quote from, Jane S. Woolsey to friend, 5 December 1860, in Letters Of A Family During The War For The Union, I:19-23; also see, National Anti-Slavery Standard, 8 December 1860, p. 2; George Noyes to William H. Seward, 28 November 1860, Seward Papers, UR; Hans L. Trefousse, The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard For Racial Justice, (New York, 1969), chap. 4; Donald, Charles Sumner And The Coming Of The Civil War, (New York, 1965), pp. 366-68.
56. Quote from, New York Express, 17 December 1860, p. 2; also see, New York Herald, 1 December 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 22 December 1860, p. 6; Journal of Commerce, 6 December 1860, p. 2.
57. Quote from, New York Herald, 7 December 1860, p. 4; also see, Morgan Dix, ed., Memoirs Of John Adams Dix, 2 volumes, (New York, 1883), I: 343.
58. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 December 1860, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 15 December 1860, p. 2.
59. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 12 December 1860, p. 2.
60. Quote from, New York Herald, 20 November 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Herald, 18 November 1860, p. 1; New York Express, 3 December 1860, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 4 December 1860, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 8 December 1860, p. 2; speech of Charles O'Connor, quoted in, Reminiscences Of Richard Lathers, pp. 92-101.
61. New York Herald, 17 November 1860, p. 6; Daily News, 14 November 1860, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 5 December 1860, p. 2.
62. Journal of Commerce, 17 December 1860, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 20 December 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 10 December 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 14 December 1860, p. 2; New York Herald, 10 December 1860, p. 1.
63. Long Island Democrat, 4 December 1860, p. 2.

64. Brooklyn Evening Star, 22 December 1860, p. 2.
65. August Belmont to William Marten, 30 November 1860, Letters, Speeches And Addresses Of August Belmont, p. 29; Samuel L.M. Barlow to Samuel Butterworth, 3 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.
66. New York Times, 13 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 1 December 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 13 December 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 12 November 1860, p. 1.
67. Journal Of Commerce, 21 December 1860, p. 2.
68. New York Herald, 22 December 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 25 December 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 15 November 1860, p. 2.
69. New York Times, 13 December 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 22 December 1860, p. 4; James De Peyster Ogden to John J. Crittenden, 22 December 1860, Crittenden Papers, LC.
70. Henry C. Bowen to William H. Seward, 10 December 1860, Seward Papers, UR; see Ogden to Crittenden letter in #69; New York Times, 21 December 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 24 December 1860, p. 4; Krummel, "Henry J. Raymond And The New York Times," p. 379.
71. Quote from, New York Leader, 15 December 1860, p. 2; also see, New York Leader, 22 December 1860. p. 4; New York Times, 17 November 1860, p. 8.
72. Quote from, Brooklyn Evening Star, 22 December 1860, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Evening Star, 12 December 1860, p. 2; William C. Russell to William H. Seward, 3 December 1860, Seward Papers, UR.
73. Samuel L.M. Barlow to William M. Browne, 16 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Barlow to Browne, 19 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.
74. Parish, The American Civil War, p. 71.
75. Samuel F. Butterworth to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 6 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.
76. Thurlow Weed to Hamilton Fish, 16 December 1860, Weed Papers, UR; August Belmont to Weed, 19 December 1860, in, Letters, Speeches And Addresses Of August Belmont, p. 35; Preston King to John Bigelow, 3 December 1860, in Bigelow, Retrospections Of An Active Life, pp. 316-17; Potter, Lincoln And His Party In The Secession Crisis, p. 165; New York Herald, 22 December 1860, p. 6.
77. Quote from, New York Times, 4 December 1860, p. 4, also see; New York Times, 14 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 23 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 26 November 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 3 December 1860, p. 4; Flushing Journal, 1 December 1860, p. 2;

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80. Journal of Commerce, 13 December 1860, p. 2; Van Deusen, Thurlow Weed, pp. 266-67.

81. New York Times, 20 December 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 14 December 1860, p. 1; Brooklyn Evening Star, 19 December 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 20 December 1860, p. 3; Evening Post, 20 December 1860, p. 2.

82. Quote from, C.R. Roberts to Edwin S. Morgan, 26 December 1860, Morgan Papers, NYSL; also see, Brooklyn Evening Star, 26 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 28 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 30 November 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 20 November 1860, p. 2; Clark, Henry Ward Beecher, pp. 147-50; William C. Bryant to Abraham Lincoln, 25 December 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; A.P. Hayden to William H. Seward, 1 December 1860, Seward Papers, UR; J.S.M. to Seward, 3 December 1860, Seward Papers, UR; William C. Russell to Seward, 3 December 1860, Seward Papers, UR; Alexander G. Johnson to Seward, 6 December 1860, Seward Papers, UR; Oates, With Malice Toward None, pp. 204-05; McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, p. 253.

83. See, for example, A. Oakey Hall to Abraham Lincoln, 29 November 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC.

84. Evening Post, 30 November 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 3 December 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 23 November 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 26 November 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 28 November 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 4 December 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 5 December 1860, p. 6; New York Tribune, 20 December 1860, p. 4.

85. New York Times, 14 December 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 18 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 12 December 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 14 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 16 December 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 18 December 1860, p. 8; New York Herald, 25 December 1860, p. 4; Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol. 80, 13 December 1860, p. 663; New York Express, 12 November 1860, p. 2.

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88. Quote from, "A Northerner" to Andrew Johnson, 20 December 1860, in, Leroy P. Graf, Ralph W. Haskins, eds., The Papers Of Andrew Johnson, 9 vols., (Knoxville, 1967-91), IV:63; also see, New York Herald, 19 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 29 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 3 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 4 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 17 December 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 7 December 1860, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 4 December 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 16 November 1860, p. 2; Robert L. De Corn to James Buchanan, 6 December 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; Congressional Globe, 36th Cong, 2nd sess., 10 December 1860, pp. 40-41.

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91. New York Herald, 12 December 1860, p. 1; New York Herald, 15 November 1860, p. 5.

92. Quote from, Charles Davis to James Buchanan, 10 November 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; also see, Daily News, 24 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 11 November 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 15 November 1860, p. 5; New York Herald, 17 November 1860, p. 5; New York Leader, 10 November 1860, p. 4; New York Leader, 17 November 1860, p. 4; Long Island Democrat, 13 November 1860, p. 2; Long Island Times, 8 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 12 November 1860, p. 2; Journal Of Commerce, 17 November 1860, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 21 December 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 8 December 1860, p. 2; August Belmont to John Forsyth, 22 November 1860, Letters, Speeches And Addresses, p. 23; Richard Lathers to C. Memminger, et al, 28 November 1860, Lathers Papers, LC.

93. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 7 November 1860, p. 2; Daily News, 19 November 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 5 December 1860, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 27 November 1860, p. 2.

94. Quote from, Samuel L.M. Barlow to John Slidell, 28 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; also see, Daily News, 23 November 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 25 December 1860, p. 4; Irish American, 8 December 1860, p. 2; Irish American, 17 November 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 12 November 1860, p. 2; August Belmont to John Forsyth, 19 December 1860, Letters, Speeches And Addresses, pp. 36-39.

95. See, for example, Stamp, And The War Came, p. 127; Nichols, The Disruption Of American Democracy, p. 413; Foner, Business And Slavery, chap. 10; Potter, Lincoln And His Party In The Secession Crisis, p. 122.

96. Quote from, John A. Dix to Horatio Seymour, 26 December 1860, Fairchild Collection, NYHS; the Pine Street gathering can be studied from a wide variety of sources, see, for example, New York Times, 17 December 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 18 December 1860, pp. 4, 8; New York Herald, 16 December 1860, p. 1; Long Island Democrat, 18 December 1860, p. 2; Daily News, 17 December 1860, pp. 1, 4; Journal of Commerce, 17 December 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 17 December 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 20 December 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 24 December 1860, p. 4; Furer, The Public Career Of William F. Havemeyer, pp. 227-28; letter of invitation to meeting from Erastus Brooks, et al, 10 December 1860, Lathers Papers, LC; Evening Post, 15 December 1860, p. 3; Evening Post, 17 December 1860, pp. 1-2.

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98. Irish-American, 15 December 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 17 November 1860, p. 2; New York Express, 13 December 1860, p. 2; Daily News, 6 December 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 14 December 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 15 December 1860, p. 4; New York Leader, 15 December 1860, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 17 November 1860, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 20 November 1860, p. 2; Samuel L.M. Barlow to John Cochrane, 8 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.

99. New York Herald, 26 December 1860, p. 4; also see, A.G. Magrath, H. Gourdin to Richard Lathers, 8 December 1860, in, Reminiscences Of Richard Lathers, pp. 83-91; James A. Bayard to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 18 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Judah P. Benjamin to Barlow, 9 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; John Slidell to Barlow, 20 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; William M. Browne to Barlow, 18 December 1860, Barlow Collection.

100. Composition Book, in Euphemia M. Olcott Papers, NYPL.

101. Open letter of John A. Dix in, New York Times, 21 December 1860, p. 3; Tammany resolution, in, New York Times, 21 December 1860, p. 8; Brooklyn Evening Star, 16 November 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 19 December 1860, p. 2; New York Leader, 17 November 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 3 December 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 6 December 1860, p. 2; New York Tribune, 9 November 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 19 November 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 20 November 1860, p. 4.

102. Quotes from, in order, Flushing Journal, 1 December 1860, p. 2, and Daily News, 12 December 1860, p. 4; also see, New York Times, 25 December 1860, p. 4; William H. Seward speech in, Brooklyn Evening Star, 24 December 1860, p. 2; Samuel L.M. Barlow to Junius T. Morgan, 20 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.

103. The Albion, 8 December 1860, p. 583.

104. Quote from, Journal of Commerce, 11 December 1860, p. 2; also see, Long Island Democrat, 18 December 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 3 December 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 7 December 1860, p. 2; William D. Hart to Edwin D. Morgan, 13 November 1860, Morgan Papers, NYSL; Preston King to Thurlow Weed, 23 December 1860, King Papers, St. Lawrence University; Samuel L.M. Barlow to H.D. Bacon, 24 November 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; August Belmont to Herschel v. Johnson, 22 November 1860, Letters, Speeches And Addresses, p. 26.

105. Irish-American, 1 December 1860, p. 2.

106. New York Times, 29 November 1860, p. 8; New York Times, 4 December 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 30 November 1860, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 22 December 1860, p. 2; Weekly Anglo African, 22 December 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 16 November 1860, p. 1; Evening Post, 17 November 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 22 November 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 26 November 1860, p. 1.

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117. Daily News, 13 December 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 26 November 1860, p. 2; New York Leader, 1 December 1860, p. 4.

118. New York Leader, 22 December 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 7 December 1860, p. 2; Judah P. Benjamin to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 9 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; John Cochrane to Barlow, 5 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.

119. New York Leader, 17 November 1860, p. 4; New York Leader, 8 December 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 5 December 1860, p. 2; John Kennedy to Edwin D. Morgan, 9 December 1860, Morgan Papers, NYSL.
120. New York Times, 24 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 23 December 1860, p. 4.
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123. New York Times, 27 November 1860, p. 4; Evening Post, 26 November 1860, p. 2.
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128. Quote from, New York Express, 21 November 1860, p. 2; also see, New York Tribune, 17 December 1860, p. 8.
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130. New York Leader, 15 December 1860, p. 4.
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132. New York Herald, 21 December 1860, p. 4.

133. James Buchanan to Royal Phelps, 22 December 1860, in, Moore, ed., The Works Of James Buchanan, XI: 73-74.

134. Samuel L.M. Barlow to John Cochrane, 10 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.

135. New York Times, 7 December 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 14 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 8 December 1860, p. 7; New York Herald, 25 December 1860, p. 4; Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol. 80, 13 December 1860, p. 663; Journal of Commerce, 11 December 1860, p. 2.

136. Long Island Democrat, 25 December 1860, p. 2; Evening Post, 10 December 1860, p. 2.

137. Irish-American, 1 December 1860, p. 2; also see, letter in, New York Times, 17 December 1860, p. 4.

138. Union prayer meeting, in, New York Times, 7 December 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 10 December 1860, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 24 December 1860, p. 2; Bishop Horatio Potter's pastoral letter, in, The Church Journal, 19 December 1860, p. 1; J.E.M. to Abraham Lincoln, 11 December 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; Thomas C. Dorneus to Lincoln, 20 December 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; Preston King to Thurlow Weed, 23 December 1860, King Papers, St. Lawrence University; Nagel, 'One Nation Indivisible,' is a good overall discussion of the antebellum "lore of Union as spirit," p. 267.

139. Quote from, Journal of Commerce, 18 December 1860, p. 2; also see, Journal of Commerce, 3 December 1860, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 15 December 1860, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 28 November 1860, p. 2; Brother Jonathan, 3 November 1860, p. 2; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 7 August 1860, 13 September, 24 November, 1860, NYHS; Jewish Messenger, 26 October 1860, p. 125. After failure of the attempted Italian revolution of 1848-9, Garibaldi took refuge in New York, working as a candlemaker on Staten Island for five years, see, Priscilla Robertson, Revolutions Of 1848: A Social History, (Princeton, 1967), p. 378, first published in 1952; Arnold Whitridge, Men In Crisis: The Revolutions Of 1848, (New York, 1949), p. 191.

140. Quote from, New York Express, 20 December 1860, p. 1; also see, New York Herald, 19 December 1860, p. 6; Daily News, 19 December 1860, p. 4.

141. Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 514, makes the point about Northern reaction.

Chapter 5: Of Anderson, Wood and Lincoln

While the passage of South Carolina's ordinance stirred little local response, the military movements at Charleston harbor of late December and early January evoked considerable excitement. Robert Anderson's move from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter December 26 generated satisfaction that something had been done about disunion. When Southern batteries fired January 9 on the Star of the West, sent to resupply Anderson's troops, many in the metropolis took the action as the start of sectional armed conflict.¹

The metropolitan area's central role in the rupture of the Union was confirmed, even in small ways, on the basis of those episodes. Anderson's wife, a Georgia native, was living in the city. The wounded Star returned to New York harbor after the unsuccessful mission along the Atlantic coast.²

Those two engagements began the next phase in the crisis, which lasted until the President-elect's visit to Gotham February 19-21.³ Major developments of that period included the dramatic shift of non-Republicans to a tougher anti-secession posture. Ironically, this was also the time of much planning and consideration of pro-South movements. Terms and possibility of compromise to halt schism remained the focus of political attention, complicated but encouraged by the apparent defeat of departure in the upper South.

Those who had backed the fusion campaign led the metropolis's

response to the action off the coast of Charleston. Democrats organized firing of 100 guns at the Battery in support of Anderson's move. Resolutions backing the transfer were approved by the New York City Council, local Democratic Congressmen, and several meetings of conservatives, notably the annual Tammany Hall celebration of Andrew Jackson's victory at New Orleans.

Daniel Sickles, booster of the free city idea a month earlier, said on the House floor that while no New York regiments would fight a state exercising legitimate rights, several could be mustered to defend Union and flag. He cited the firing on the Star as acts of war against both. State Senator Stephen Spinola, Brooklyn's leading Douglas Democrat, sponsored legislation to appropriate \$10 million for military purposes to sustain the federal government.⁴

The most salient development was the manner in which sectors which had supported the South in late 1860, usually Hard fusionites, were stirred to respond. Entities which normally prided themselves on backing Dixie condemned the provocative stance of the Palmetto state and took strong Unionist stands. These included German Democratic clubs, the Irish-dominated Spartan Association, Brooklyn volunteer fire companies, Daily News, Journal of Commerce and New York Herald.⁵

Observers who sifted views in conservative circles reported the alteration in attitudes. Some of these surveyors were alarmed by the hardening of stances. A Unionist informed Senator Crittenden that opinion in Gotham "is rapidly undergoing a change

in consequence of the" belligerency of South Carolina, "to the great satisfaction of the black Republicans." He added that the Palmetto state was "destroying the influence of all her friends here."⁶

Others were pleased that area Democrats had coalesced around a rejection of permitting the government to "be whipped by a handful of traitors and rebels." Supporters urged the President to attempt another reinforcement in wake of the Star failure.⁷

In accounting for the shift, several points stand out. First, seizure of federal facilities and firing on the Star confirmed fears of anarchy expressed earlier by those who sympathized with the South. While secession ordinances did not disturb public peace, armed attacks against authority and property, or "mobocracy" as one source called them, were instances of lawlessness which, if not addressed, could undermine stability. A woman who sided with the cotton states agreed that if secessionists took

forceful measures to separate upon the point of the bayonet, you will unite us as one in defense of the government.⁸

Along with calling for retention of forts, arsenals and post offices, the Herald demanded Northern militia protect Lincoln's inauguration. This was a prime example of conservative concerns about the unraveling of authority. Suddenly, it was important to uphold even unsavory pieces of order, such as the installation of a Republican President, to assert the durability of vested institutions. A mass fusionite meeting of late January, proud of the metropolis's tally against Lincoln, acknowledged

that the President-elect has been elevated to his high office by the fair suffrages of the people; and having been so elevated, it becomes the duty of all portions of the people of this Union, without regard to party, to sustain him as the chief Executive of this Government.'

Second, local Democrats digested the Palmetto state's moves as a direct challenge. The constant idealization of Andrew Jackson and more immediately of Garibaldi created an image of nationalism as confrontational masculinity. Lower New York Democrats had been a combative lot -- politically and physically -- for decades. Samuel Barlow, among others, linked manhood and the Union, both of which had been insulted at Charleston. The attorney told the President that Northern Democrats "will be compelled" in the interests "of our manhood and to preserve our Government to fight our Southern friends whom we like and with whom we have no real quarrel."¹⁰

A few weeks after presiding at a Garibaldi rally, John Dix on January 11 became Secretary of Treasury. The appointment was welcomed locally, mostly because of Dix's Unionism. The chairman of the pro-South Pine Street meeting was the best representation of how the clashes at Charleston shifted conservative outlook.

In addition, he embodied most elements which accounted for the change -- leeriness of anarchy, fear that a divided Union would lead to feeble sections, need to uphold order to guarantee the integrity of commerce, and a clash-based nationalism. His late January directive, seeking to hold a federal cutter in the Gulf, emerged as a Northern rallying cry: "If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot."¹¹

Fusionites also responded with frustration and sense of abandonment. All their pleadings that the Gulf states pause while Northern allies sought solidification of Southern rights in Congress had proven futile. A conservative voice took secessionist lawlessness in South Carolina as a personal rebuke: "How cruelly unjust to us, the Union men of the North, is conduct so calculated to initiate a civil war and compel those who abhor such a calamity most to justify, with a sorrowing spirit, its necessity."¹²

Finally, the episodes surrounding the New Year changed the dynamics, temporarily at least, of the slavery or Union issue. The threat to the integrity of the flag eclipsed debate over bondage. In a crucial trend of the period, the response to Anderson and the Star showed that when, for a variety of reasons, the dispute over servitude was relegated to the back burner, non-Republicans stood up for the Union.

Still, fusionites retained much of their previous emphases. These included blaming Republicans for the crisis and demanding surrender of antislavery principles. They also avoided calls for invasion of the cotton states, limiting resolves to denial of secession, defense of federal installations and enforcement of laws.¹³

Certain Hard Democratic voices, particularly the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, never wavered in a pro-South outlook. The paper criticized Anderson for exacerbating tensions and seeking glory, and scorned Spinola's war measure.¹⁴ By late January, other Hard

quarters returned to acceptance of peaceful secession and opposition to coercion.¹⁵

Even so, the galvanizing effect on conservatives of armed attacks on symbols of the Union had been registered. It is plausible to view the response to events of late December and early January as a preparation for reaction to the attack on Sumter, a point often overlooked in studies of the period.

January, though, was not April. The lack of followup by President Buchanan, and reintroduction of debate over slavery in Congress, allowed Democrats and Unionists to drift back into a stance centered on sympathy for the South. A state Democratic convention of January 30-31 captured the posture of fusionites on the eve of the launching of the Confederacy. Under the aegis of Horatio Seymour and Regency chiefs, the parley disavowed disunion, but stressed opposition to the use of force and endorsed the Crittenden Compromise as the basis of settlement.¹⁶

The Tammany-Mozart rift continued. Each sent delegations to the conference, claiming to represent city Democrats. The convention, bored with the rivalry, voted to seat both contingents, bypassing the issue of legitimacy. Tammany's impressive group, including August Belmont, Samuel Tilden and grand sagem William Kennedy, withdrew in protest.¹⁷ While statewide Democrats were concerned about the crisis, the local factions continued the intra-party dispute even in the face of a rupture of the Union.

Beyond the inner circles of the Democracy, residents of metropolitan New York were also galvanized by the episodes of late December and early January. Attention focused on the scene at Charleston. Maps showing the location of the harbor forts, and facilities at Pensacola, Florida, gave a new dimension to the normally dull front pages of daily papers. A local sports weekly presented the situation in graphic, combative terms. Unscrupulous sources sought to capitalize on public interest by printing bogus sheets reporting clashes at Fort Sumter.¹⁸

Through these and other forums, the public participated vicariously in both the standoff at Charleston and the political dialogue at Washington. Discussion of the crisis was common on New Year's social rounds, especially in wealthy homes. Given Gotham's many citizens with Southern sympathies, those conversations mirrored the compromise debates in Congress. Mostly, the talk reinforced the gravity of the crisis. After receiving 40 well-wishers, one woman noted: "Our beautiful country is threatened with war and disunion and a very unhappy state of affairs exists."¹⁹

Publicly, too, New Yorkers participated in the dilemma of the Union in a variety of ways. Debating societies in Brooklyn and Queens considered the prudence of Buchanan's secession policy and the spread of slavery into the territories.²⁰ Attendance was heavy at religious services January 4 to pray for settlement.²¹ Posters with messages of rabid Southern backing were pasted up near City Hall with strong glue to thwart the removal efforts of

Republican Police chief Kennedy.²²

Moreover, perhaps due to impatience with lawmakers, citizens registered specific suggestions for resolving the sectional dispute. Elizabeth Elliott, a Southern-born Republican, directly urged Lincoln to reassure her native region.²³ William Bourne pressed his Unionist labor response, stressing common interests of Northern workers and Southern yeomen, and the removal of slavery from public discourse.²⁴

Refugees reaching the metropolis from the South heightened the sense of pending conflict. Evacuated, and destitute, families of Sumter soldiers were housed temporarily at Governor's Island and Fort Hamilton. Raising funds for their support, especially at Beecher's church in Brooklyn, offered further opportunity for public involvement.²⁵ Fearful of their status in an independent South Carolina, many free black artisans from Charleston came to New York in January. Northern teachers who had been working in Dixie returned through Gotham.²⁶

Bernice Van Der Weyde was not among the refugee instructors. By January, she had sided with the South. In growing tension with her family in New York, she wrote of her participation, along with other women, in Georgia's preparations for war, including daily shooting practice. Seeking to prevent in her family the rupture overtaking the Union, Bernice asked her father in February for a truce, using the societal prohibition against female political participation:

I'll not say any more my dear Papa about politics, it is not womanly, besides, it is very happy for both of

us, that you should say, 'The glorious North, and I, the glorious, gallant South.'²⁷

Ecumenical figures expressed religious-based views of the crisis. The Presbyterian organ called it "retribution" for past sins and public corruption, a common outlook in Protestant circles. In a more extreme opinion, a Mormon cleric in Williamsburg claimed the Book of Mormon predicted disunion. The only solution, he asserted, was conversion to the Latter Day Saints and removal to Utah.²⁸

But the most common form of public participation at this stage was registering, in many ways at various times, patriotism and devotion to the Union. At school ceremonies, plays, concerts, balls and other functions, national songs and hymns were sung, repeated and applauded. Union tunes arose at private parties. Mere mention of Major Anderson, quickly worked into ongoing plays, brought a response of cheers and of hats and handkerchief wavings, temporarily halting performances. A line from a Longfellow poem -- "Sail on, O Union strong and great" -- at a meeting of a women's association generated a similar response.²⁹

For one thing, these developments showed a readiness to respond and participate if the situation could be defined as a Union crusade. They also demonstrated that secession greatly broadened the sphere of political expression. More importantly, in the short run, they created a tough climate for Mayor Wood and others seeking to express New York's sympathy with secession through words and deeds.

Another impediment to pro-disunion actions was the array of steps underway in preparation for a war to sustain the republic. Regiments of Union volunteers, claiming the tag of political neutrality, were formed in January in Manhattan and Brooklyn. They enrolled scores of members.³⁰ On a more partisan level, the German Republicans laid plans for regiments and the Wide-Awakes continued to meet.³¹

Official units were also active. Brooklyn's 13th Regiment was on a war footing. While not up to full strength, Queens's 15th was reported as ready for action.³² The chief of the state militia, Governor Morgan and the legislature all offered the Empire State's military capacity to the federal government.³³

War maneuvers were, in this period, primarily a Republican provenance, although Tammany's gearing for conflict lent a sense of bipartisanship to such preparations.³⁴ These initiatives were not the sweeping mobilization of April and May. Yet, they were well publicized and evident enough to provide a crucial counter weight to plans to organize actions in support of secession.

The economic stress deepened in this period, marked by contraction and unemployment. Mostly it was a continuation of trends which emerged in late 1860. Stocks remained sluggish but remarkably sensitive to crisis-related developments. Anti-secession votes in the upper South in February led to a flurry of confidence. Lincoln's lunching with conservative Republicans, instead of a radical set, on his visit to Gotham also stirred a

surge in trading and higher prices.³⁵

Sectors reliant on sales to the South were the hardest hit. A trade journal reported utter stagnation in the New York shoe business, while hat and clothing industries continued to look dismal.³⁶ Dry goods activity was off by 70 to 85-percent from early 1860. Many houses failed, and one veteran merchant regretted postponing plans to retire in late 1859. He noted in early February:

We are doing nothing, waiting for something to turn up. Should no compromise be decided upon, we are afraid that there will be a general smash up in March, which will entail ruin upon many of us merchants.³⁷

While Republicans tried to minimize the fallout, the toll in human suffering increased. The city almshouse admitted nearly twice as many people the first week of February as in the same period a year earlier. One report estimated 15,000 were out of work due to the crisis. In a two-week stretch, 10,000 residents applied for handouts of free coal. One of them attributed the problem to "the troubles in the South, and there will be little to be got until it is settled."³⁸

Advertisers used disunion in their messages. These included a hair restorative and a cement which "even South Carolina could not resist the influence of."³⁹ Some aspects of economic activity remained healthy. The most surprising was the cotton trade, partly in an effort to get as many bales as possible to New York before March 4. Boats from Charleston and Savannah continued to reach Gotham laden with fiber, rice and other goods. Yet, trade the other way was nil.⁴⁰

International commerce was still solid. Hinterland agricultural products left the port at roughly the same pace as early 1860. Yet, in an indication of general stagnation and uncertainty, imports backlogged in local warehouses. This system permitted holding goods for up to three years without registering them at customs for payment of duties. The value of stock in such facilities as of February was \$24 million, compared with \$11 million at the same date in 1860.⁴¹

The important point, though, was the impact of the recession on the metropolis's response to rupture of the Union. It came in broad support for compromise to settle the crisis. New York's memorials to Congress in support of the Crittenden proposals contained 63,000 signatures, the largest such petition of the period.⁴² Contrary to the hopes of rabid Southern sympathizers, the economic stress did not help a potential local pro-secession movement. But it remained an open question whether, if compromise failed, business would be best sustained by accepting and trading with a Southern Confederacy or backing use of force to sustain the Union.⁴³

The Mayor's free city proposal was contained in the annual message of January 7. It kicked off and highlighted a series of plans, meetings and rumors on possible pro-secession actions in the metropolis. Goals of such designs included severing parts of lower New York from the state, disrupting federal operations in the area or simply expressing approval of schism and the

Confederacy.

The dramatic message was expected; it elaborated on arguments raised in November and December by Mozart's organ.⁴⁴ The Mayor began by casting a "dissolution" of the Union as "inevitable." He added the usual pro-South themes of a compact of states and strong opposition to coercion.⁴⁵ Wood then justified the separation of Gotham, focusing on the city's tradition of home rule, advantages enjoyed by European free cities and state usurpations of local prerogatives since 1857. Yet, he was "not prepared to recommend the violence implied in these views."⁴⁶

It is difficult to locate a work on the history of New York City or secession which does not mention this remarkable proposal.⁴⁷ Wood's leading biographer calls the idea the epitome of his public life, linking devotion to the South and fear of Republican threats to localism.⁴⁸ Others have depicted the initiative as a test of public opinion.⁴⁹ A recent study placed the episode in the context of a 200-year search by the city for autonomy.⁵⁰

Among contemporaries, the most important response came from fusionists. Backers of Lincoln, of course, blasted the message and messenger.⁵¹ But rejection by elements of the Hard side of the Democracy showed how the normally astute Mayor had miscalculated. In the heat of the nationalist response to Anderson's shift, such voices balked at Wood's localism. The Journal of Commerce, which saw the scheme as narrowing, not

expanding, Gotham's trade reach and influence, added:

We have no idea of imitating the hasty idea of South Carolina, by separating ourselves summarily from our oppressors, but rather let our policy be to stick by until we conquer them, and not only teach them to let us alone, but compel them, under the inexorable laws of trade, to contribute to our prosperity and promote our material interests.⁵²

Beyond that, most objections mirrored those registered in late 1860.⁵³ Given the atrocious timing of the proposal, it is difficult to account for the move. Perhaps Wood's frustration over state-imposed limitations on the Mayoralty, coupled with devotion to the South, caused him to disregard normally shrewd political instincts. Or, he might have assumed the message would cause Governor Morgan to remove him, allowing the chief magistrate to resurrect a political life as a martyr toppled by overreaching Republicans.⁵⁴ Wood's actions at City Hall in 1857 show disposition to act along those lines. At any rate, the address was a staggering blunder, and it cost the Mayor his job later in the year.

Support came from a few obvious sources. The Daily News lauded the enterprise, linking the defense of the city and the South from meddlesome Republicans.⁵⁵ A few merchants active in the Southern trade were supportive, but the Unionist climate of January-February kept such interest private and quiet. Advocacy in the South was probably stronger than in Gotham.⁵⁶

The Wood scheme contributed to the whirl of rumors of obstructionist plots in January and February. Some foes of the Mayor claimed the message was designed to stir lawlessness by his

working class followers.⁵⁷ Most of the alleged plots involved Marshal Rynders, Congressmen-elect Kerrigan or others associated with Wood's Mozart Hall.

Kerrigan and Rynders were products of the ward-level world of gangs, factions and Democratic politics, and likely leaders of acts to disrupt federal or state authority in the metropolis. Kerrigan had controlled the Molly Maguire Boys and Rynders was linked to other such groups. They were also devout Dixie sympathizers.

Rynders boasted in late January that if civil war erupted he would fight with the Confederacy, while Kerrigan remained part of the effort to recruit soldiers. Given Gotham's proclivities towards the South, raising regiments was plausible. While there is no evidence of complicity with Kerrigan or Rynders, such Confederates as Texas Senator Louis T. Wigfall claimed they could muster up to 10,000 city troops for the Davis government.⁵⁸

The rumors of local impact warned of seizures of arsenals, forts or other vital facilities. One claimed 10,000 volunteer firemen from Brooklyn and New York, under the aegis of Wood and Kerrigan, were prepared to grab a fort in Queens.⁵⁹ Another report indicated thousands were set to take New York City if civil war broke out. Correspondents of Southern newspapers covering Gotham noted that Democratic officeholders, Collector Schell and Sub-Treasurer John Cisco, planned to abscond with federal funds if the Union dissolved.⁶⁰

The most sensational was a rumored plot to seize the

Brooklyn Navy Yard January 21. It stirred Mayor Powell and local militia chiefs to call our four regiments. A fire at the facility the previous week put authorities on edge. The alleged assault of 20,000 was to be led by Rynders and Kerrigan. In that light, the source of the fright may have been Kerrigan's recent visit to the yard. On that occasion, he accompanied a constituent seeking employment, who exclaimed, upon being turned away, "the place should be burned."⁶¹

Western district spokesmen were peeved that the rumor was taken seriously, calling the episode a smear on the city's patriotism. The Williamsburg-based Daily Times complained:

It is an outrageous slander on Brooklyn to use the phrase. There was no such attempt. There could be none. Brooklyn is law-abiding and Union-loving to the core. Not ten men live in this city that would sympathize with an attack on the Navy Yard, much less join in one.⁶²

Even so, the response by officials shows the fears of pro-South outbreaks. Police chief Kennedy, who saw Mozart chiefs behind the network of plotters, monitored the situation closely. Democratic sources also expressed concern. Governor Morgan, because of his distance, was not as alarmed, although he warned downstate militia officers that "there are in the City of New York evil, disposed persons significantly formidable in numbers to steal the arms of the State from the arsenals and drill rooms."⁶³

Additional elements of the apparatus of possible obstructionism were inflammatory posters and workers' meetings. Rynders, Gideon Tucker and various Wood lieutenants were

prominent figures at such gatherings. Resolutions at the parleys and messages on the handbills reveal the content and motivation of the movement.

The most striking feature is the continued emphasis on Hard Democratic planks. These included Republican abuse of lower New York, depiction of antislavery as a subversive British-based impulse, threats of freedmen to local workers and white supremacy. One pin up asked: "Shall The Union Be Dissolved For The Negro?" Continued friction between Irish and black laborers served as a backdrop to such appeals.⁶⁴

These emphases provide important clues to why the most serious disturbance of the period was disruption of planned lectures by Hinton R. Helper.⁶⁵ Since obstructionists focused on issues of race and consequences of emancipation, their following was, at least in the short run, diminished. For most Democratic voices, including Irish and Germans, secession had changed the focus from the future of slavery to the viability of the United States.⁶⁶

Something like the disturbance feared in 1861 broke out in 1863, without leadership from Democratic chiefs. At that time, emancipation and the draft brought those other concerns to the forefront for many working class New Yorkers. Rumors of pending assault in the secession era were largely empty, mostly because the likely participants did not share the outlook of Hard leaders who wanted to use threats or actions as political levers.

Disputes over the definition of treason and the flow of arms

to the South through New York overlapped with the web of obstructionist intrigue. It began with a ruling to a grand jury in mid January by Federal Judge William A. Smalley. He defined treason as rebellion against the federal government or "giving aid and comfort" to those in revolt. Police chief Kennedy had sought such a ruling to buttress efforts to curb local pro-secession movements.⁶⁷

The first target of the grand jury was Kerrigan. Questioned about raising troops for South Carolina, the Congressman-elect denied the allegations.⁶⁸ While he was not indicted, Kerrigan scaled down attempts to recruit soldiers.

Smalley's charge was more pivotal in the area of ammunition heading to the warmer states. The flow of arms from the North to Dixie was heavy in early 1861. South Carolina, Georgia and other states were assembling and equipping regiments. Much of that traffic in munitions came through Gotham.⁶⁹ The Anglo-African alleged the muskets were intended to prevent slave revolts.⁷⁰ Kennedy viewed the caseloads of rifles as instruments of the rebellion against the central government, and moved to intercept them.

Police were ordered to survey ships bound for Southern ports. On several occasions, they confiscated arms. The usual procedure was for an officer assigned to a peer patrol to spot suspicious cases, get Kennedy's permission to investigate, seize the muskets and hold them in the city arsenal.⁷¹

Republicans applauded both the Smalley ruling and Kennedy's

vigilance.⁷² Tammany's organ, the Leader, argued "that even the assumption of 'doubtful powers' on behalf of the Union, is not an offense to be too rigidly scrutinized or censured at such a crisis as the present."⁷³ Hard fusionites condemned the moves as illegal and provocative. They accepted the retaliatory seizures of New York vessels at Savannah harbor.⁷⁴ Those detainments were ordered by Georgia Governor Joseph Brown.⁷⁵

Wood's response to the controversy was revealing. Contacted by Senator Robert Toombs, the Mayor acknowledged and condemned the arms seizures. He also alerted the Georgian to state control of police operations, regretting his inability to order release of the goods.⁷⁶

That exchange indicated, further, the outlook and weakness of the extreme pro-South forces. Kennedy's policy was only partially effective. Due to faulty procedures, some firearms continued to depart for the South. One evasive technique was to rush goods on board South-bound ships minutes before departure, bribe stevedores, and leave while police headed to the precinct seeking orders.⁷⁷

But much war material was stalled. The episodes demonstrated that anti-secession forces were in control. Republican-directed police, taking bold steps to thwart disunion, were another crucial impediment to pro-secession plans and possible actions.

The action at Charleston and activities in the metropolis also affected the course of public debate on the major issues of late 1860. These were Constitutional validity of secession, coercion, peaceful departure and compromise. Considerations of whether the document of 1787 allowed withdrawal was a major casualty of the events surrounding the New Year. Military moves, secession ordinances in six more Gulf states and the creation of a Southern Confederacy made the question moot.⁷⁸

When addressed, the matter evoked reactions in line with overall outlook. The Rynders-led network accepted legal withdrawal,⁷⁹ while most of the conservative consortium, aroused by Anderson and firing on the Star, rejected it.⁸⁰ Republicans continued to dismiss the concept with disdain. The Lincolnite organ in Queens said: "Were it true that any State, or any number of States, might at pleasure renounce allegiance to the Constitution, our federal Union would be a rope of sand and the Government powerless."⁸¹

But the subject had been eclipsed by more concrete concerns, and it surfaced less often.

The compromise movement of early 1861 was powerful. It brought in most elements of the metropolis, and certainly the entire fusionite apparatus. Along with Unionism, the conciliatory campaign expressed the collective will of lower New York. A public vote on the Crittenden proposals, or similar Border State resolves, would have carried overwhelmingly.

The effort to achieve settlement gathered momentum for

several reasons. Among these were effective leadership and a sense of purpose and definition. Compromisers focused on garnering signatures for memorials to Congress advocating Border State and Crittenden resolves. The goal was to placate the upper South and confine secession to the Gulf. Refusal to consider what planks might satisfy rebels in the cotton states made the compromise initiative consistent with the rampant Unionism of the period.⁸²

Anti-secession votes in Virginia and Tennessee in February strengthened the impetus. Based on those results, the compromise set thought the upper South could be held. The Mayor of Richmond, on a visit to Gotham, assured the 7th Regiment that Virginia was eager to remain in the republic, as long as her rights were assured.⁸³ The Unionist stand of the tobacco states deserved reciprocation in the forms of concessions on slavery.⁸⁴

The drive for compromise was pressed on many fronts. These included endorsements of the Crittenden measures at meetings of Unionists in Oyster Bay, of German Democrats in Manhattan and dozens of other rallies across the metropolis.⁸⁵ Women circulated petitions on conciliation in Brooklyn and a committee of the Chamber of Commerce, and other groups of prominent citizens, lobbied lawmakers in Washington on settlement.⁸⁶

The most concerted effort was the petition campaign of the Chamber in support of the Border State planks. William Astor dispatched an aide to work on collecting signatures. Names were gathered at commercial firms, floor of the merchants' exchange

and offices of conservative papers.⁸⁷ Since the Chamber included several conservative Republicans, notably President Perit, the movement had important claims of bipartisanship.

Seward presented the 38,000-signature memorial in the Senate on February 1. While not endorsing the message, he boasted the petitions would, if laid out, cross the chamber 18 times. In mid-January had presented a request for compromise containing 25,000 metropolitan area signers.⁸⁸

Moderate Republicans shared important aspects of the outlook of compromisers. They, too, wanted to achieve an agreement satisfactory to upper South Unionists, but found the proposals of the Kentucky Senator and Border State package too generous. One noted privately: "The trouble is to know just how far to go to satisfy the minds of Virginia statesmen without any important sacrifice of principle."

Seward was the major influence on entities holding this position. Broadly speaking, this camp included the party's central club in New York City, and such leaders as Governor Morgan, Thurlow Weed, Moses Grinnell, Hamilton Fish, William Evarts and S.B. Chittenden.⁸⁹ Also holding that position were the New York Times, Brooklyn Daily Times and Flushing Journal.⁹⁰

These moderates were intentionally vague. They accepted a federal guarantee of slavery in the states, tighter enforcement of fugitive laws and, typically, "some adjustment of the rights of all the states of the Union in the new territory." A rare gesture of specificity was modifying the Crittenden proposals on

a Missouri line to include only present territory, and not future acquisitions as the Kentuckian proposed.⁹¹

The goal of these Republicans was to present a reasonable posture, keep the focus on preserving the Union and distance themselves from abolitionists.⁹² The Governor clearly saw the magnanimous front as a way to unite the North in case of war.⁹³ While most other moderates were not as prescient, they served that function in the metropolis.

The radical Republicans remained adamantly opposed to concessions. Continued focus on the sanction of party principles in the election set these elements apart from the moderates. They included the Tribune, Evening Post, Brooklyn Evening Star, Henry Beecher, Senator Preston King,⁹⁴ and most ward-level, countywide and ethnic Republican organizations. Many rank-and-file party faithful also opposed steps to conciliate the slave states.⁹⁵

This leads to consideration of the significance of the division in the party. Numerically, it was of minor importance. Since Lincoln only took 35-percent of New York City's vote, if the split was, say, 20-percent radical and 15-percent moderate, the former were electorally ineffective as a distinct body. Beyond that, the separation was not wholly consistent. The Brooklyn Daily Times, for instance, moderate on most issues, favored Horace Greeley for election to the Senate seat held by Seward, whose term expired in March.⁹⁶

For several reasons, though, the wedge was critical. Among

these were Republican control of Albany, shaping the state's response to the crisis. In addition, Lincoln's triumph and secession spotlighted lines in the antislavery party. Many conservatives in the metropolis looked to local Republicans as barometers of how the Administration would handle schism. In that context, it was important that they saw two types of backers of Lincoln.

On many issues, the moderate/radical split was identifiable in early 1861, with the less zealous set holding the upper hand. Weed's candidate, DeWitt C. Littlejohn, defeated a Bryant-Greeley-backed aspirant for the Assembly speakership.⁹⁷ The moderates selected Ira J. Harris, an upstate judge, to fill the Senate seat. Seward's preliminary selection for a cabinet post also placed the moderates in better position to secure pieces of federal patronage.⁹⁸

Anger among regulars over Greeley's part in denying Seward the Presidential nomination added a new element to the rivalry.⁹⁹ Yet, the magnification of the split was due more to differing views of the crisis. As a result, most of the intra-party rancor came in approaches to secession, especially on compromise.¹⁰⁰

The radicals argued rupture of the Union was about slavery. They stressed the human injustices of bondage and opposed concessions on slavery as matters of principle. The Tribune reasserted Jefferson meant all men in the Declaration. A Long Island minister wrote:

We here feel that no compromise can be made that will recognize the right of property in man. They are repugnant

to our very natures and can never receive the approval of any party in this sector.¹⁰¹

Moderates, on the other hand, attempted to take the debate away from the morality of slavery. They boasted of Lincoln's rejection of racial equality and told the South slavery was safer in the Union than a separate confederacy.¹⁰²

From different ends, abolitionists and rabid fusionites agreed with the radical Republicans on the centrality of slavery. Abolitionists were pleased the dispute over bondage had reached a point of confrontation. They saw an emancipationist settlement on the horizon, and were buoyed over approaching a long sought goal. With the usual paternalistic tone, the immediatists implored the Republicans to hold firm.¹⁰³

The Church Anti-Slavery Society called for universal emancipation as a way to defuse the crisis.¹⁰⁴ Abolitionists continued such practices as lauding the courage of those in servitude, of John Brown, and various slave rebels. They also held what would be the final acts of the movement's greatest passion plays -- raising funds to purchase the freedom of runaways.¹⁰⁵

Black opinion contained elements of white abolitionist sentiment. Among these were the conviction the storm overtaking the Union was owing to slavery and urging Republicans not to yield. Clergy set a date of fast and prayer for peaceful settlement.¹⁰⁶

The Anglo-African, however, expressed skepticism over the North's concern for those in slavery and blacks in the free

states.¹⁰⁷ Meetings on disunion at black churches turned to discussion of general conditions of those of African descent.¹⁰⁸ Publicly, emigration remained a more prominent subject than secession, a sign that for the moment few thought the crisis would produce better lives for black Americans. Spokesmen continued to respond to race-based attacks.¹⁰⁹

In broader terms, a key development was the way in which non-Republicans viewed divisions in the anti-slavery camp. They were, after all, the majority and prime shapers of the metropolis's response to rupture of the Union. Conservatives applauded and took seriously the split between moderate and radical Republicans, obviously favoring the more conciliatory group.¹¹⁰

The array of significant papers and figures -- Seward, Weed, Morgan, Fish, Perit, Evarts -- which appeared magnanimous was impressive. They gave many Democrats enough evidence that the issue was the Union and not slavery. This led to a dismissal of Greeleyites and abolitionists as fringe entities which would not have major influence in the Lincoln Administration. Such an outlook was another factor working against the rabid pro-South forces.

Views on the centrality of slavery also affected opinion on the inter-connected topics of peaceful withdrawal and coercion. Secession of six more cotton states and creation of the Confederacy made these subjects more pressing than at the end of

1860. Beginning in late January, a growing chorus of editorials in Hard fusionite papers advocated acceptance of Southern independence.¹¹¹

These voices saw bondage as the underlying issue of the crisis. They increased the volume of defending slavery, attacking Africans as inferior and blaming sectional animosities on blacks. The Express, for instance, alleged the "negro overtaps the white man, and the Caucasian bows down before the African. In ordinary contests, the Almighty Dollar is omnipotent -- but the Almighty Negro, as yet, carries all before him."¹¹²

In that context, the general opinion of late 1860 of opposing coercion to forestall emancipation was more fully articulated. Hard dailies now accepted the Confederacy to prevent federal invasion of the South leading to the end of slavery. Mozart's organ charged: "To found a military despotism here in order to conquer the states of the South, and thus work out the abolition of slavery, is what is meant by coercion."¹¹³

A further concern was that the federal government, expanded in power through subduing the rebellion, would crack down on various local rights in the North.¹¹⁴

Picking up on a theme of later 1860, those papers used ethnic arguments to buttress calls for accepting departure. These came mostly in comparing the Anglo Saxons of the United States to Central Americans. They claimed coercion and civil war would make North Americans as bad as those south of the border. Peaceful separation was cast as a more civilized way to settle

disputes.¹¹⁵ While it would be simple to dismiss these claims as mere cover for a political position, those Hard sources used racial thinking as a basis of much of their outlook.

At the time, peaceful separation meant recognition of the Confederacy. This included no retaking federal property or forced revenue collection at Southern ports. Not yet clear was whether they really accepted permanent confederacies.

The movement to sanction Dixie's independence seemed powerful, but it did not extend beyond editorial columns of Hard periodicals. Much more central to the conservative stance was opposition to coercion. Resolves decrying use of force against Southern states were passed at almost every assemblage of fusionites.¹¹⁶ Anti-coercion was also a mainstay of private communications between anti-Republicans.¹¹⁷

This stand served the purposes of upholding the Union, giving compromise a chance and sympathizing with Southerners as injured partners. It also appealed to those leery of the centralization implied in federal intervention in Dixie. William Bourne, free soil labor leader, also opposed coercion, arguing it would spawn "a permanent military organization on a large scale and by a natural transition eventually pass into a centralized form of government."¹¹⁸

Exceptions to this stance among Democrats were Congressmen Sickles and Cochrane. They introduced such coercive measures in the House as closing rebel ports.¹¹⁹ Their presence in Washington, where the drift to anarchy was more evident,

contributed to the tougher approach.

Republican divisions generally held up on the question of force and separation, mostly in tone. Radicals favored immediate steps to regain federal property, collect imposts, and prepare military forces for action in the cotton states. Beyond concern for uniformity in duties, the Post, Tribune and various Republican clubs and individuals stressed a need to invalidate treason and lawlessness.¹²⁰

The dailies, too, reversed the Hards' ethnic rationale for accepting the Confederacy, claiming North Americans had to show superiority by upholding majority rule and established law. Citing secession as a Central American symptom, the Tribune claimed:

Our Southern brethren share the passionate heats engendered by tropical influences, and which flow forth in these never-ending revolutionary efforts.¹²¹

Moderates balked at accepting the Confederacy, but sought less confrontations steps for dealing with secession. They were more concerned with durability of the federal government than use of force against disunion. Advocating "gradual coercion," the Brooklyn Daily Times noted: "Killing men does not establish the truth of a principle, nor make their descendants more subservient."¹²²

Given his overwhelming rejection at the polls 3 1/2 months earlier, Abraham Lincoln received a surprising reception on his stop in New York City February 19-21. The metropolis had hardly

become a Republican center. The Board of Aldermen was reluctant to extend an official invitation to the President-elect¹²³

Gotham, though, was a Union city. While that meant supporting the fusion ticket in November, by February it produced respect for Lincoln as the prime instrument through which the republic could be sustained. Due to fears of disturbances, security for the visit was heavy. But no outbreaks or pro-South demonstrations occurred, and the President-elect was well received.¹²⁴

Lincoln symbolized the crisis. His presence and remarks prompted interest in everything from his physical appearance to ability to handle disunion.¹²⁵ Certain Republicans, especially those close to Seward, doubted the President-elect's competence, though most seemed impressed.¹²⁶ Conservatives were pleased he witnessed a corner of the North hurt economically by the crisis and anxious for a compromise, Unionist settlement.¹²⁷

The highlight of that impetus was meeting the Mayor at City Hall. In a brief exchange, Wood, trying to back his guest into a pro-compromise, anti-coercion corner, displayed his usual skills at political tact. While he made no allusions to free city or obstructionism, the Mayor stressed the gravity of the crisis and the reality of secession, adding that Gotham

is the child of the American Union. She has grown up under its maternal care and been fostered by its paternal bounty, and we fear that if the Union dies, the present supremacy of New York may perish with it.

Lincoln pledged to maintain the Union on which the city depended. He was also pleased with the agreement on basic

concepts of maintaining the republic in a locality which thoroughly rejected his candidacy. Among those in the line of citizens waiting to meet the President-elect was a South Carolinian. Upon introducing the man, Wood noted he was out of Lincoln's jurisdiction. The Republican ignored the implication and shook hands with the Charlestonian.¹²⁸

Just as the Springfield lawyer came through lower New York, Brooklyn was experiencing a sense of pride. This was influenced by the 1860 census figures showing the city was America's third largest. In addition, the Academy of Music had just opened and Mary Lincoln had visited the Navy Yard and Academy in January. Boosterism was strong enough that the Republican press applauded State Senator Spinola's second place finish in the recent Democratic caucus for the Senate nomination.¹²⁹

But spokesmen still saw a need for fuller recognition of Brooklyn's arrival as a distinct entity beyond the shadow of the city across the river.¹³⁰ The recent rumor of an attack on the Navy Yard wounded patriotic pride. Many felt Lincoln's inclusion of a stop in Brooklyn was the answer to these various needs.

A major effort was undertaken to induce him to visit the Academy of Music. Mayor Powell and a Council committee, which included prominent Republican Frederick Scholes, called on the President-elect at Astor House in Manhattan and extended invitations. Lincoln's decision to depart without going to Brooklyn was due mostly to the need to reach Washington quickly. Yet, it was taken by locals as a rebuff of the nation's third

largest city, a sign of continued backwater status. A city paper reported: "A good deal of disappointment is felt in Brooklyn," since "preparations were being made to give the President-elect a good reception."¹³¹

By late February, a consensus outlook had emerged. It was based on continuation of the Union, opposition to use of force and advocacy of compromise to achieve peaceful settlement. New Yorkers were eager for a solution, and most thought an accord to re-establish sectional harmony was possible. But impatience had not yet surfaced. A sense of frustration with the uncertainty of the Union's future would be a prime characteristic of the next period.

Still critical was the dynamics of the Union or slavery question. Hard pro-South forces, convinced bondage was the key issue, were willing to let the Union perish to prevent emancipation. But a larger segment of the conservative constituency focused on a priority of maintaining the republic. They created a powerful, public Unionist sentiment, countering pro-secession elements.

The anti-antislavery views of the conservative Unionists were not as strong. They accepted the moderate Republicans' assurance of no hostility to slavery, that the issue was the nation and not abolition. Since that was the sole possible obstacle to standing up for the Union, many of a Democratic persuasion were anxious to be told they could back anti-secession

moves and still oppose emancipation. In other words, conservatives embraced moderate Republican assurances because they wanted to believe that was the case.

Notes

1. New York Times, 28 December 1860, p. 1; New York Times, 10 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 11 January 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 10 January 1861, p. 2.
2. Mrs. Robert Anderson to James Buchanan, 6 December 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; New York Times, 14 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 3 January 1861, p. 6; New York Herald, 13 January 1861, p. 1.
3. New York Times, 20 February 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 20 February 1861, p. 1.
4. New York Times, 3 January 1861, pp. 4, 8; New York Times, 9 January 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 26 January 1861, p. 8; New York Herald, 3 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 4 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 11 January 1861, p. 8; New York Herald, 18 January 1861, p. 8; New York Express, 4 January 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 8 January 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 9 January 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 29 December 1860, p. 4; Daily News, 3 January 1861, p. 4; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 27 December 1860, NYHS; Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol. 80, 4 January 1861, pp. 873-76; Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 January 1861, p. 281; 12 January 1861, p. 350; Diary Of Oren R. Gross, 3 January 1861, NYPL; Swanberg, Sickles The Incredible, p. 110.
5. New York Herald, 29 December 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 17 January 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Times, 2 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 28 January 1861, p. 3; Daily News, 1 January 1861, pp. 1, 2; Daily News, 17 January 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 5 January 1861, p. 2; James A. Bayard to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 26 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Bayard to Barlow, 28 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Phillip J. Joachmsen to William H. Seward, 10 January 1861, Seward Papers, UR.
6. Quote from, Charles A. Cain to John J. Crittenden, 7 January 1861, Crittenden Papers, LC; also see, James D. P. Ogden to Crittenden, 29 December 1860, Crittenden Papers, LC; Ogden to Crittenden, 12 January 1861, Crittenden Papers, LC; James A. Bayard to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 3 January 1861, Barlow Collection, HEHL; James C. Merriott to Jefferson Davis, 11 January 1861, The Papers Of Jefferson Davis, VII:10.

7. Quote from, William Bartlett to James Buchanan, 15 January 1861, Buchanan Papers, HSOP; James H. Van Alen to Abraham Lincoln, 1 January 1861, Lincoln Papers, LC; Truman Smith to Lincoln, 10 January 1861, Lincoln Papers, LC; David Lord to John J. Crittenden, 29 December 1860, Crittenden Papers, LC; J.R. Murray to Crittenden, 5 January 1861, Crittenden Papers, LC; New York Leader, 5 January 1861, p. 4; Moses Grinnell to Edwin D. Morgan, 3 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL.

8. "Mobocracy" from, New York Express, 11 January 1861, p. 2; women's quote from, Diary Of Maria L. Daly, vol. 25, January 1861, NYPL; also see, New York Herald, 3 January 1861, p. 6; New York Herald, 4 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 6 February 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 29 December 1860, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 9 January 1861, p. 2; Henry C. Bowen to William H. Seward, 28 January 1861, Seward Papers, UR; New York Leader, 12 January 1861, p. 3.

9. Quote from, Journal of Commerce, 29 January 1861, p. 2; for Herald on Lincoln, see, New York Herald, 1 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 15 January 1861, p. 4.

10. Quote from, Samuel L.M. Barlow to James Buchanan, 31 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; also see, Barlow to James Bayard, 29 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 27 December 1860, NYHS; Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 January 1861, p. 281; New York Express, 30 January 1861, p. 2.

11. Quote from, John A. Dix to unknown correspondent, 29 January 1861, Dix Papers, NYPL; also see, John Cisco to Dix, 21 January 1861, Dix Papers, CU; George Davis to Dix, 21 January 1861, Dix Papers, CU; New York Times, 12 January 1861, p. 4; New York Leader, 19 January 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 12 January 1861, p. 3; Evening Post, 6 February 1861, p. 2; Johnson, volume II, of, Smith, ed., History Of The State Of New York, p. 450; Lichterman, John Adams Dix, p. 316, cites Southern seizures of and attacks against Government property as the reason Dix moved to a tougher position.

12. Quote from, Sunday Times and Noah's Weekly Messenger, 30 December 1860, p. 2; also see, New York Herald, 3 January 1861, p. 6; New York Herald, 9 January 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 4 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 7 January 1861, p. 2; August Belmont to Herschel V. Johnson, 30 December 1860, in, Letters, Speeches And Addresses, pp. 42-44.

13. New York Herald, 4 January 1861, p. 5; New York Herald, 29 January 1861, p. 8; New York Express, 8 January 1861, pp. 1-2, New York Express, 9 January 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 1 January 1861, p. 1; Daily News, 16 January 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 2 January 1861, NYHS; Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol. 80, 4

January 1861, p. 874.

14. See, for example, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 3 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 7 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 9 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 18 January 1861, p. 2.

15. New York Herald, 28 January 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 29 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 19 January 1861, p. 2.

16. New York Times, 19 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 1 February 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 4 February 1861, p. 8; Brooklyn Evening Star, 1 February 1861, p. 2; Horatio Seymour to Samuel J. Tilden, Tilden Papers, NYPL; New York Herald, 2 February 1861, p. 6; Mitchell, Horatio Seymour Of New York, p. 224; New York Leader, 19 January 1861, p. 4; Silbey, A Respectable Minority, p. 36, notes that in many Northern states, Democrats held emergency meetings on the crisis in early 1861.

17. New York Times, 24 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 1 February 1861, pp. 4-5; New York Times, 4 February 1861, p. 8; New York Leader, 2 February 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 31 January 1861, p. 8; New York Herald, 1 February 1861, pp. 4, 8; New York Herald, 2 February 1861, p. 6.

18. See, for example, New York Herald, 12 January 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 4 January 1861, p. 1; The Spirit Of The Times, 5 January 1861, p. 573; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 14 February 1861, p. 2, notes one of the printings of sheets with false reports of attacks on Sumter.

19. Quote from, Diary of Julia Hartress Lay, 1 January 1861, NYHS; also see, Tailer, Jr., Diary, 1 January 1861, NYHS; Diary Of John Halleck, 1 January 1861, QPL; Diary Of John Ward, 1 January 1861, NYHS.

20. Long Island Times, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Long Island Times, 17 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 24 January 1861, p. 3.

21. Flushing Journal, 5 January 1861, p. 2; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 4 January 1861, NYHS; Caroline Dunstan Diary, 4 January 1861, QPL; New York Herald, 5 January 1861, p. 1.

22. John A. Kennedy to Edwin D. Morgan, 13 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; New York Herald, 10 January 1861, p. 8.

23. Elizabeth Elliott to Abraham Lincoln, 31 December 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; also see, William Rowe to William H. Seward, 19 February 1861, Seward Papers, UR.

24. William O. Bourne to Preston King, 14 February 1861, Bourne Papers, NYHS; Bourne to Andrew Johnson, 7 February 1861, Johnson Papers, LC; Bourne to Johnson, 9 February 1861, Johnson Papers, LC; New York Tribune, 22 January 1861, p. 7.
25. Evening Post, 11 February 1861, p. 3; New York Tribune, 7 February 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 13 February 1861, p. 5.
26. Weekly Anglo-African, 26 January 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 9 February 1861, p. 8.
27. Quote from, Bernice Van Der Weyde to Peter H. Van Der Weyde, 4 February 1861, Van Der Weyde Papers, NYPL; also see, Bernice to mother, 8 January 1861, Van Der Weyde Papers.
28. Quote from, The Evangelist, 10 January 1861, p. 1; for the Mormon cleric, see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 4 February 1861, p. 2, and, New York Tribune, 6 February 1861, p. 3
29. Quote from, New York Tribune, 10 January 1861, p. 8; also see, New York Tribune, 15 February 1861, p. 5; New York Leader, 12 January 1861, p. 3; New York Express, 14 January 1861, pp. 1-2; New York Express, 30 January 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 14 February 1861, p. 4; Diary of William C. Meade, 12 January 1861, NYHS; Brooklyn Daily Times, 21 February 1861, p. 3; Brooklyn Evening Star, 6 February 1861, p. 3; Irish-American, 26 January 1861, p. 2.
30. New York Times, 28 January 1861, p. 8; New York Times, 31 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 17 January 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 4 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 31 January 1861, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 4 February 1861, p. 3; New York Express, 4 February 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 11 January 1861, p. 3.
31. New York Herald, 27 January 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 28 January 1861, p. 4; Thomas H. Thornell to William H. Seward, 18 February 1861, Seward Papers, UR.
32. Flushing Journal, 12 January 1861, p. 2; Long Island Times, 7 January 1861, p. 2.
33. New York Times, 12 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 16 January 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 9 February 1861, p. 4; Edwin D. Morgan to Winfield Scott, 15 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; Preston King to Morgan, 21 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; Morgan to James Buchanan, 11 January 1861, Buchanan Papers, HSOP;
34. New York Leader, 5 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 4 January 1861, p. 5; Brooklyn Daily Times, 9 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 11 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening

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35. New York Times, 28 December 1860, p. 4; New York Express, 3 January 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 9 January 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 6 February 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 12 February 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 13 February 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 21 February 1861, p. 1.

36. Long Island Times, 3 January 1861, p. 2; Shoe And Leather Reporter, 27 December 1860, p. 1; New York Leader, 29 December 1860, p. 4;

37. Quote from, Tailer, Jr., Diary, 4 February 1861, NYHS; also see, New York Herald, 15 February 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 7 February 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 12 January 1861, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 19 January 1861, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 26 January 1861, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 31 January 1861, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 2 February 1861, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 9 February 1861, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 16 February 1861, p. 1; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 31 December 1860, 11, 15, 21 February 1861, NYHS.

38. Quote from, New York Herald, 19 January 1861, p. 4; also see, Admission records, 1857-61, Almshouse Collection, MA; William Darnley to wife, 18 February 1861, Darnley Family Letters, NYPL; Daniel S. Dickinson to Daniel S. Dickinson, Jr., 9 January 1861, in, John Dickinson, ed, Speeches, Correspondence, II:544; New York Times, 16 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 16 January 1861, p. 4; Flushing Journal, 19 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 19 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 23 February 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 4 February 1861, p. 2.

39. Quote from, Sunday Times and Noah's Weekly Messenger, 30 December 1860, p. 2; also see, New York Express, 28 January 1861, p. 2.

40. New York Herald, 30 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 26 January 1861, p. 6; New York Herald, 1 February 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 14 February 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 3 January 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 7 January 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 4 February 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 4 January 1861, p. 7; Daily News, 29 January 1861, p. 7; Journal of Commerce, 28 December 1860, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 9 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 15 February 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 9 January 1861, p. 2.

41. Specific figures from, Journal of Commerce, 13 February 1861, p. 1; also see, John Cisco to John A. Dix, 2 February 1861, Dix Papers, CU; New York Herald, 22 January 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 5 February 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 12 January 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 28 January 1861, p. 4; Journal of

Commerce, 28 December 1860, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 1 February 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 15 February 1861, p. 3; New York Tribune, 19 February 1861, p. 3.

42. Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 February 1861, p. 657.

43. New York Times, 16 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 12 February 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Times, 12 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 23 January 1861, p. 2; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 21 February 1861, NYHS; S. Hice to Charles Leverich, 21 February 1861, Leverich Papers, NYHS.

44. On telegraphing/expectations of Wood's call, see, New York Times, 4 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 5 January 1861, p. 8; Long Island Times, 3 January 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 5 January 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 7 January 1861, p. 8.

45. Message of Mayor, Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol. 81, 7 January 1861, p. 11.

46. Quote from, Message of Mayor, p. 26; see full message, pp. 10-26.

47. See, for example, Gibson, The Attitudes Of The New York Irish, p. 116; David M. Ellis, New York City And State, (Ithaca, 1979), p. 192; Martha J. Lamb and Burton Harrison, History Of The City Of New York: Its Origins, Rise And Progress, 3 volumes, (New York, 1896), III:772; Bruce Catton, The Coming Fury, (Garden City, 1961), p. 199; Nevins, The Emergence Of Lincoln, p. 363.

48. Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 111-13.

49. James J. Heslin, "Peaceful Compromise In New York City, 1860-61," NYHSQ, vol. 44, October 1960, pp. 375-78; Pleasants, Fernando Wood Of New York, p. 115.

50. Anbinder, "Fernando Wood And New York City's Secession," pp. 88-90.

51. Brooklyn Daily Times, 8 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 11 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 15 February 1861, p. 2; Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol. 81, 10 January 1861, pp. 34-35; Evening Post, 7 January 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 18 January 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 8 January 1861, p. 4.

52. Quote from, Journal of Commerce, 8 January 1861, p. 2; also see, New York Herald, 8 January 1861, p. 4.

53. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 8 January 1861, p. 4; New York Leader, 12 January 1861, p. 4.

54. See, Leader citation from note #53; Samuel Smith to Edwin D. Morgan, 10 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL.
55. Daily News, 8 January 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 9 January 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 12 January 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 7 February 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 14 February 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 8 January 1861, p. 2, which supported the concept in late 1860, gave the message mild approval.
56. Wright, The Secession Movement In The Middle Atlantic States, pp. 178-79; Foner, Business And Slavery, p. 290, says talk of free city lingered among some commercial men through April; Nichols, The Disruption Of American Democracy, p. 434, says August Belmont opposed the concept; Stamp, And The War Came, pp. 235-36, argues the movement only appealed to extreme pro-South merchants and was widely dismissed, partly because it would not enhance the Western trade; Bernstein, Draft Riots, pp. 143-44; says the idea had some following; Evening Post, 22 January 1861, p. 2.
57. New York Leader, 19 January 1861, p. 4; Samuel Smith to Edwin Morgan, 10 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL.
58. Louis T. Wigfall to Jefferson Davis, 16 February 1861, The Papers Of Jefferson Davis, VII:43; New York Times, 11 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 16 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 25 January 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 7 January 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 8 January 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 29 January 1861, p. 4; Phillip J. Joachmsen to William H. Seward, 10 January 1861, Seward Papers, UR; Weinbaum, "Temperance, Politics And The New York City Riots Of 1857," p. 254; Evening Post, 25 January 1861, p. 2; New York Herald, 31 January 1861, pp., 4, 8.
59. Long Island Times, 31 January 1861, p. 2; also see, Long Island Times, 24 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 10 January 1861, p. 3; McCullough, Brooklyn, p. 34.
60. New York Herald, 29 December 1860, p. 6; New York Herald, 18 January 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 28 December 1860, p. 3; Diary Of George T. Strong, 15 January 1861, pp. 89-90.
61. Quote from, New York Herald, 26 January 1861, p. 10; also see, New York Times, 22 January 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 23 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 22 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 23 January 1861, p. 1; Brooklyn Daily Times, 15 January 1861, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 22 January 1861, p. 3; New York Express, 22 January 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 23 January 1861, p. 5; New York Tribune, 22 January 1861, p. 4.
62. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Times, 28 January 1861, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 23 January 1861, p. 2.

63. Quote from, Edwin D. Morgan to Benjamin Welch, 7 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; also see, New York Herald, 12 January 1861, p. 6; Morgan to John A. Kennedy, 15 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL.
64. Quote from, John Kennedy to Edwin D. Morgan, 13 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; also see, New York Herald, 16 January 1861, p. 8; New York Herald, 5 February 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 26 January 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 16 January 1861, p. 8; Bernstein, Draft Riots, pp. 99-100; Evening Post, 16 January 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 16 January 1861, p. 8; New York Herald, 10 January 1861, p. 8; Journal of Commerce, 19 January 1861, p. 2; on black-Irish friction, see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 12 January 1861, p. 3.
65. New York Herald, 15 January 1861, p. 8; Evening Post, 10 January 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 10 January 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 15 January 1861, p. 4.
66. Irish-American, 26 January 1861, p. 2; Phillip J. Joachmsen to William H. Seward, 10 January 1861, Seward Papers, UR.
67. New York Times, 18 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 15 January 1861, p. 4; Flushing Journal, 19 January 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 15 January 1861, p. 2; John A. Kennedy to Edwin D. Morgan, 13 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL.
68. New York Times, 19 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 17 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 18 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 31 January 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 18 January 1861, p. 4; also see, New York Tribune, 12 February 1861, p. 7.
69. New York Times, 11 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 14 January 1861, p. 4; James Warren to William H. Seward, 20 February 1861, Seward Papers, UR; Evening Post, 21 January 1861, p. 1; on Southern military preparations, see, Edmund C. Whaley to Francis Pickens, 25 December 1860, vol. 121, The Records Of the Confederates States of America, LC; Joseph Brown to Pickens, 8 January 1861, in Ibid; J.P. Girandy to Brown, 23 January 1861, in Ibid.
70. Weekly Anglo-African, 16 February 1861, p. 2.
71. New York Times, 23 January 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 24 January 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 14 February 1861, p. 8; New York Herald, 14 February 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 24 January 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 23 January 1861, p. 4.
72. New York Tribune, 16 January 1861, p. 4; Evening Post, 23 January 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 26 January 1861, p. 2.
73. New York Leader, 26 January 1861, p. 4.

74. New York Herald, 24 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 10 February 1861, p. 1; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 24 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 February 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 18 January 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 24 January 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 11 February 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 16 February 1861, p. 2.

75. Joseph Brown to Edwin D. Morgan, 8 February 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; Brown to Morgan, 25 February 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL.

76. Daily News, 26 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 26 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 28 January 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 28 January 1861, p. 2.

77. New York Times, 25 January 1861, p. 1; Brooklyn Evening Star, 25 January 1861, p. 2.

78. Daily News, 11 February 1861, p. 4, for example, makes this point.

79. New York Times, 16 January 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 25 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 16 January 1861, p. 8.

80. Union meeting, in, New York Times, 29 January 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 27 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 29 January 1861, p. 8; Long Island Times, 31 January 1861, p. 2; Irish-American, 26 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 8 February 1861, p. 2; Samuel Barlow to Judah P. Benjamin, 28 December 1860, Barlow Collection, HEHL.

81. Quote from, Flushing Journal, 16 February 1861, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Evening Star, 7 January 1861, p. 2; James Humphrey speech, in, Brooklyn Evening Star, 22 February 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 31 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 13 February 1861, p. 4.

82. New York Herald, 30 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 29 January 1860, p. 4; Long Island Times, 3 January 1861, p. 2; Long Island Times, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Long Island Democrat, 1 January 1861, p. 1; Long Island Democrat, 15 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 12 January 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 9 February 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 5 February 1861, p. 2; J.R. Murray to John J. Crittenden, 5 January 1861, Crittenden Papers, LC; A.B. Allen to Crittenden, 19 January 1861, Crittenden Papers, LC; Samuel J. Tilden to The World, 29 January 1861, Tilden Papers, NYPL.

83. New York Herald, 7 February 1861, p. 4; Long Island Democrat, 26 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 11 February 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 12 February 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 8 February 1861, p. 4; on visit of Mayor of Richmond, see, New York

Tribune, 18 February 1861, p. 3.

84. New York Herald, 7 February 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 6 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 15 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 20 February 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 13 February 1861, p. 2; New York Leader, 16 February 1861, p. 4.

85. Union meeting, in, New York Times, 29 January 1861, p. 1; meeting of Union volunteer militia, in, New York Times, 31 January 1861, p. 1; State Democratic convention, in, New York Times, 2 February 1861, p. 4; workers' meeting, in, New York Herald, 5 February 1861, p. 4; Long Island Times, 17 January 1861, p. 2; meeting of Jamaica Democrats, in, Long Island Democrat, 29 January 1861, p. 3; Oyster Bay meeting, in, Long Island Democrat, 19 February 1861, p. 3; meeting of John Bell supporters, in, Brooklyn Daily Times, 24 January 1861, p. 3; New York Express, 19 January 1861, p. 2; meeting of German Democratic Central Club, in, New York Express, 23 January 1861, p. 4; meeting of Southerners living in city, in, New York Express, 26 January 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 1 February 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 20 February 1861, p. 1.

86. New York Times, 8 February 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 22 February 1861, p. 3; Journal of Commerce, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 19 February 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 22 February 1861, p. 2; Daniel Lord to John J. Crittenden, 26 January 1861, Crittenden Papers, LC.

87. New York Express, 19 January 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 30 January 1861, p. 2; S. Baldwin to John J. Crittenden, 11 January 1861, Crittenden Papers, LC; Evening Post, 25 January 1861, p. 2.

88. New York Times, 19 January 1861, p. 8; New York Times, 1 February 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 23 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 30 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 9 February 1861, p. 2; Daniel Lord to John J. Crittenden, 29 December 1860, Crittenden Papers, LC; Congressional Globe, 36th Cong, 2nd sess., 1 February 1861, p. 657; Evening Post, 6 February 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 22 January 1861, p. 4.

89. Quote from, William H. Aspinwall to Edwin D. Morgan, 26 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; also see, Seward speech, in, New York Times, 14 January 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 20 February 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Times, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 23 February 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 10 January 1861, p. 2; Moses Grinnell, Hamilton Fish, et al, to Abraham Lincoln, 29 January 1861, Lincoln Papers, LC; George Davis to Lincoln, 7 February 1861, Lincoln Papers; James Murray to Edwin D. Morgan, 2

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90. New York Times, 28 January 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 6 February 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 8 February 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 12 February 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 14 February 1861, p. 4; Flushing Journal, 29 December 1860, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 19 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 14 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 9 February 1861, p. 2.

91. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Times, 10 January 1861, p. 2; also see, Grinnell, Fish, et al, to Abraham Lincoln, cited in footnote #89; E. Yanaken to John J. Crittenden, 19 January 1861, Crittenden Papers, LC; James De Peyster Ogden to Crittenden, 19 January 1861, Crittenden Papers; A.S. Fish to Crittenden, 21 January 1861, Crittenden Papers; R. Elliott to Crittenden, 6 February 1861, Crittenden Papers; D. Lord to Hamilton Fish, 31 December 1860, Fish Papers, LC.

92. Flushing Journal, 12 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 15 January 1861, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Times, 6 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 25 February 1861, p. 2; George Davis to Abraham Lincoln, 7 February 1861, Lincoln Papers, LC; Hamilton Fish to unidentified, 2 January 1861, Fish Papers, LC.

93. Edwin D. Morgan to Erastus Fairbanks, 12 January 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; also see, Autobiography of Thurlow Weed, p. 604.

94. Beecher reports in, Brooklyn Daily Times, 9 February 1861, p. 2, and, Brooklyn Evening Star, 5 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 14 January 1861, p. 2; letter in, Brooklyn Evening Star, 16 January 1861, p. 2; letter, in, Brooklyn Evening Star, 18 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 21 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 30 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 1 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 8 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 13 February 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 16 January 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 9 January 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 17 January 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 1 February 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 7 February 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 13 February 1861, p. 5; Preston King to George Ashlery, 22 January 1861, King Papers, St. Lawrence University.

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97. New York Herald, 26 December 1860, p. 4; New York Herald, 1 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 3 January 1861, p. 1; Daily News, 3 January 1861, p. 4.

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101. Quote from, Thomas M. McCauley to William H. Seward, 12 February 1861, Seward Papers, UR; Jefferson allusion in, New York Tribune, 12 January 1861, p. 5; also see, Brooklyn Evening Star, 31 December 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 30 January 1861, p. 2; German-language Republican paper, Demokrat, cited in, New York Express, 20 February 1861, p. 1; Preston King to John Bigelow, 30 January 1861, in Bigelow, Retrospections Of An Active Life, I: 354-55; Van Deusen, Horace Greeley, p. 270; New York Tribune, 27 December 1860, p. 4; New York Tribune, 29 January 1861, p. 4.

102. New York Times, 28 December 1860, p. 4; New York Times, 17 January 1861, p. 4; Flushing Journal, 23 February 1861, p. 2.

103. National Anti-Slavery Standard, 12 January 1861, p. 2; National Anti-Slavery Standard, 23 February 1861, p. 2; also see, Jane S. Woolsey to Margaret Hodge, 7 February 1861, in, Letters Of A Family, I: 32-34.

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105. Letter of Miss P. Davison, in, Brooklyn Daily Times, 15 February 1861, p. 2; Abby H. Woolsey, in, Letters Of A Family, 1 February 1861, I:31-32; Diary Of Samuel Edgerley, 31 January 1861, NYPL.

106. Brooklyn Daily Times, 18 January 1861, p. 2; Weekly Anglo-African, 29 December 1860, p. 2; Weekly Anglo-African, 12 January 1861, p. 2; Weekly Anglo-African, 19 January 1861, p. 2; Weekly Anglo-African, 16 February 1861, p. 2.

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110. Appleton Oaksmith to William H. Seward, 4 January 1861, Seward Papers, UR; Alexander T. Stewart to Seward, 14 January 1861, Seward Papers; Long Island Times, 3 January 1861, p. 2; Long Island Times, 24 January 1861, p. 2; Long Island Democrat, 12 February 1861, p. 2.

111. New York Herald, 28 January 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 3 February 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 11 February 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 12 February 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 4 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 February 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 19 February 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 14 February 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 19 February 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 20 February 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 25 January 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 7 February 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 12 February 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 14 February 1861, p. 2.

112. Quote from, New York Express, 5 February 1861, p. 1; also see, New York Herald, 2 February 1861, p. 7; Long Island Democrat, 1 January 1861, p. 1; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 10 January 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 7 January 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 10 January 1861, p. 1; Daily News, 8 January 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 14 January 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 16 January 1861, p. 2.

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114. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 11 January 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 21 January, p. 4; Daily News, 11 February 1861, p. 4.
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116. Andrew Jackson dinner, in, New York Times, 9 January 1861, p. 1; Democratic State Convention, in, New York Times, 2 February 1861, p. 4; workers' meeting, in, New York Herald, 16 January 1861, p. 4; Union meeting, in, New York Herald, 29 January 1861, p. 8; Long Island Times, 7 February 1861, p. 2; Resolves of Spartan Association, in, Brooklyn Daily Times, 2 January 1861, p. 2.
117. See, for example, August Belmont to Samuel J. Tilden, 25 January 1861, Tilden Papers, NYPL; D. Boswell to Tilden, 29 January 1861, Tilden Papers.
118. William O. Bourne to John J. Crittenden, 22 February 1861, Crittenden Papers, LC.
119. New York Herald, 6 February 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 10 February 1861, p. 4.
120. Republican Young Men's Central Committee, in, New York Times, 15 February 1861, p. 4; Senator Preston King's resolution, in, New York Herald, 30 January 1861, p. 4; King on strengthening navy, in, Flushing Journal, 16 February 1861, p. 2; letter, in, Brooklyn Evening Star, 7 January 1861, p. 2; Kings County Republican Committee, in, Brooklyn Evening Star, 9 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 4 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 11 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 15 February 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 5 January 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 14 January 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 24 January 1861, p. 2; poem, in, Evening Post, 6 February 1861, p. 1; New York Tribune, 12 January 1861, p. 4; ward-level Republican Association, in, New York Tribune, 1861, p. 3; New York Tribune, 13 February 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 14 February 1861, p. 4.
121. Quote from, New York Tribune, 14 February 1861, p. 4; also see, New York Tribune, 1 January 1861, p. 1; New York Tribune, 7 January 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 15 January 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 21 January 1861, p. 4; Evening Post, 29 January 1861, p. 2.
122. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Times, 6 February 1861, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 1 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 8 February 1861, p. 2; New York Times, 3 January

1861, p. 4; New York Times, 2 February 1861, p. 4.

123. Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol. 81, 24 January 1861, pp. 123-24; 4 February 1861, pp. 179-80; 11 February 1861, p. 312.

124. Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, 2 March 1861, pp. 232-3; New York Tribune, 20 February 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 20 February 1861, pp. 1, 4; New York Herald, 20 February 1861, p. 1; on fears about the visit, see, Henry C. Bowen to Abraham Lincoln, 5 February 1861, Lincoln Papers, LC; on security preparations, see, Evening Post, 18 February 1861, p. 2; Herschkowitz, Tweed's New York, p. 79, also sees Lincoln's reception as surprisingly positive.

125. Caroline Dunstan Diary, 19 February 1861, NYPL; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 19 February 1861, NYHS; Diary Of George T. Strong, 20 February 1861, III:101.

126. New York Times, 20 February 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Times, 19 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 21 February 1861, p. 2; George W. Hunt to William H. Seward, 19 February 1861, Seward Papers, UR; for misgivings about Lincoln, see, John Bigelow to William Hargreaves, 21 February 1861, Bigelow Papers, NYPL.

127. New York Herald, 21 February 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 19 February 1861, p. 2.

128. Quote from, Evening Post, 20 February 1861, p. 3; episode with South Carolinian, in, New York Tribune, 21 February 1861, p. 6; also see, New York Times, 21 February 1861, p. 1; Daily News, 21 February 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 21 February 1861, p. 1; William E. Barringer, A House Dividing: Lincoln As President Elect, (Springfield, 1945), thinks Wood tried to lure Lincoln into a pro-compromise stance at the meeting.

129. New York Times, 23 January 1861, p. 8; Brooklyn Daily Times, 14 January 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 5 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 15 February 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 23 January 1861, p. 3.

130. Brooklyn Daily Times, 21 January 1861, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 15 January 1861, p. 3.

131. Quote from, Brooklyn Evening Star, 20 February 1861, p. 3; also see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 20 February 1861, p. 2; New York Times, 20 February 1861, p. 8.

Chapter 6: Impatience

The next period of the crisis was late February to the eve of the decision to attempt to resupply Fort Sumter. The most obvious change on the national level was the assumption of responsibility for the disunion question by the Lincoln Administration. That gave local Republicans both a sense of pride and vexation over whether to criticize the President's Southern policy.¹

Major issues included growing concern over commercial competition with a Southern confederacy, especially in the area of imports.² The Brooklyn Mayoral contest, and other local elections of early April, were, in part, barometers of opinion on secession.³

The course of public debate shifted and narrowed in emphasis. Disputes over the Constitutional validity of departure in November, and over compromise in January, gave way to arguments about the use of force to hold federal property and enforce laws in the South. Besieged Sumter was the focal point of this dialogue, revealing impatience with the uncertainty of the future of the Union.

At private homes in Manhattan and general stores on Long Island, residents of the metropolis continued to discuss schism.⁴ This dialogue was agitated by constantly changing reports in the daily press of whether the Administration would order the evacuation of Fort Sumter.⁵ This led to widespread confusion. A group of young men who had voted for John Bell, conceding the matter was

"too weighty for our heads," asked Senator Crittenden for guidance.⁶

The focus on the military complex in Charleston harbor produced more than opinions. Southern isolation of the Union troops evoked concern, and New Yorkers sent supplies ranging from milk to cigars.⁷ While these gifts were more humanitarian than political, they reinforced identification with units stationed at the fort. This included vicariously sharing the situation of facing thousands of hostile rebels. Closer to home, Anderson wrote to Henry Beecher, thanking his efforts in aiding the evacuated families of Sumter soldiers.⁸

Wives and children of those troops were not alone in needing help as an outgrowth of secession. Locals appealed to Lincoln seeking relief from harsh conditions fostered by the crisis, adding to the climate of impatience with the open question of the Union. A young woman whose brother voted for the Republican sought a position as governess to the Lincoln children. She claimed the economic flux stirred by disunion hurt his business, making it unfair to look to her sibling for help.⁹

Hostilities seemed close enough that inter-sectional relationships became a more serious matter than in the early stages of schism. Archbishop Hughes worried about dividing Catholics. While stressing unity, the cleric accepted that Catholic sectional allegiance was necessary to show they could act from a basis of regional loyalty, and not simply religious motivation. In a St. Patrick's Day sermon, he said:

Every man North or South is a brother in the faith, yet there is but one rule for a Catholic anywhere. That is to do his duty as a citizen. If he thinks, being South of Mason and Dixon's line, that he ought to fight there let him fight, but if we think the other way, we will fight too.¹⁰

Judah Benjamin and other Southern friends of Samuel Barlow, the influential Democrat, tried to assure the attorney rappers could remain cordial. This was a tactical-based gesture, contingent upon the North accepting the Confederacy. Leading Confederates urged Barlow to use his prominence in conservative circles to lobby for a peaceful policy.¹¹

Bernice Van Der Weyde also wrote from the deep South advising against the use of force in order to preserve good relations. The teacher living in Georgia maintained contact with her Unionist family in Gotham, even though she embraced Dixie with vigor. To relieve the pressure of family disputes, and of being a Yankee on the Southern side, Bernice's early March letter to the family was written in poetry, a trait not revealed before:

I see by your last, that you still hold fast, to a thing that of late, grieves every Southern state. I thought after what I so often have said, you would all have coercion out of your head, and all the North might, let alone a good fight.¹²

In contrast, Abby Woolsey, a local abolitionist, implored a cousin in Alabama to give up secession. She opposed disunion, but welcomed a "race with your Republic," if separate confederacies emerged. Predicting a confrontation if Southerners attacked Sumter, Woolsey reported New Yorkers were calm "in the face of great events."¹³

While those in Woolsey's circle may have been tranquil, the

general outlook in the metropolis was growing impatience. Some seamen offered specific recommendations for reprovision of Anderson,¹⁴ but many more just wanted clear indication of direction. A woman related to famed diarist George Strong captured this feeling:

We are here awaiting with the greatest anxiety some exposition of the policy of the administration(,) feeling that any decision would be preferable to this uncertainty, but all look forward to an ultimate reconstruction."¹⁵

That sense of frustration may seem unwarranted. Many examples can be cited in American history of slow movement on events of great significance. The colonists, for instance, fought the British for nearly 15 months before declaring independence in July 1776. Yet, contemporaries lived for five months -- from the election of Lincoln to the Sumter episode - with the status of the Union in doubt. The issue was momentous and the decision of the Administration and the North would have a great impact on many lives.

The installation of the Republican chief executive was presumed to mark the beginning of a definitive stance by the federal government. For that reason, New Yorkers crowded newspaper row on March 4 waiting for copies of the inaugural address.¹⁶ Locals expected prompt resolution of the Sumter drama. In that context, only three weeks later, people of most political persuasions were moved to intolerance with the delay in public declaration of policy.¹⁷

The state of commerce added to the sense of impatience in the

metropolis. Shipments to the South of dry goods and foodstuffs surged in late February and early March to beat the imposition of Confederate duties March 4. Until then, the little produce reaching Charleston and Savannah from New York had been received as trade within the United States.¹⁸

But by mid March the flow of goods to the cotton states had again dwindled. The domestic dry good business and Southern-based industries were in a fifth consecutive month of stagnation. The usual March beginning of the spring season, with Southern customers visiting local houses and staying at hotels, was disastrous. A further disappointment was the failure of Western order to substitute for the loss of sales to the South.¹⁹

Republicans, primarily, had claimed more business with the old Northwest would fill the gap left by cessation of trade with Dixie. Many merchants had hoped such predictions would materialize. But the volume of commerce with the Gulf states was too great to be replaced, at least in the short run.

The cotton business remained healthy. All phases of the trade -- shipments from the South, sales in the city and exports to Europe -- held up under the strains of secession. According to one report, 32,797 bales were exported in March, a slight increase over the figure for March 1860.²⁰

A few factors account for this persistence. These include the simplicity and lucrativeness of the endeavor, Southern sympathies of Gotham's cotton merchants, the planters' need to market their cash crop, and the absence of armed conflict along

the Atlantic coast. Only the onset of hostilities, Union blockade and the Confederate decision to use cotton strategically would cut the flow of fiber.

Agricultural exports also held up. Wheat, flour, corn and bacon left the port in substantial amounts, mostly because of poor European harvests.²¹ Other sectors of commerce, though, suffered. Notable in this regard was imports of dry goods.²²

That leads to considerations of the major developments feeding commercial-based impatience. They revolved around concerns that the Confederacy would be a free trade zone, or that duties would be collected irregularly. At best, the South would enforce the 1857 level duties, while the North put into effect on April 1 the higher Morill tariff rates.²³

Under any of those scenarios, commerce would be redirected from the metropolitan area to Southern ports. The fear of such a sequence was widespread. It reached beyond the captains of trade and finance in lower Manhattan, extending to Queens and Brooklyn. As much as any impulse in the secession period, the worry of losing trade to the Confederacy showed the metropolis was a unit which saw commerce as a source of strength and wealth.²⁴

These fears were not theoretical. By late March papers were reporting the arrival of duty-free goods at St. Louis. They had entered untaxed at New Orleans and been shipped up the river. Such news led to the frightening possibility of cheap foreign goods flooding the North from the Confederacy through railroad and steamboat-based smuggling operations.²⁵

Editors and concerned residents of lower New York offered possible solutions to the problem. One dry goods dealer was already taking hosiery orders from houses in Charleston and arranging for direct shipment from Germany, through Liverpool, to South Carolina. This enabled him to avoid the Morrill duty and still make a commission for engineering the transaction.²⁶ Other suggestions were closing rebel ports, collecting money from cutters stationed off the coast or temporarily lowering Northern duties.

A more dominant outcry was that the present situation was intolerable -- something had to be done. The conservative commercial mouthpiece warned: "The horn of this dilemma must be seized hold of without delay, or the resources of the national treasury will evaporate."²⁷ A radical Republican voice feared: "Let this order of things proceed awhile and New York will become another Tyre -- a place for fisherman to dry their nets on."²⁸

Financiers and investors responded enthusiastically to the federal government's call for bids on \$8 million in notes in early April.²⁹ This indicated strong support for the Union and for action to deal with the commercial quandary.

Local elections of late March and early April revealed impatience with the Administration's secession policy. Republicans suffered setbacks across the metropolis. Suffolk County, carried by Lincoln in November, elected Democrats to the post of Supervisor in seven of nine towns. Conservatives also maintained solid

control in Queens.³⁰

Brooklyn's Mayoral contest of April 2 was lower New York's most significant political test of the schism period. The two wings of the Kings County Democracy considered formal merger, but the Hards balked over the terms proposed by the Softs.³¹ As a result, the camps held separate mayoral nominating conventions. Both selected Martin Kalbfleisch, President of the Board of Aldermen, representing Bushwick, part of the eastern district.³²

The Unionists held two raucous sessions before endorsing Kalbfleisch, the favorite of the eastern district backers of John Bell.³³ The nominee was a regular Democrat, or Soft, but popular in all conservative quarters. His selection as the sole anti-Republican aspirant showed the fusion coalition of November holding steady.

Kalbfleisch's reputation as an eastern district spokesman, as well as his ethnicity, presented a dilemma for Republicans. Their strength usually lay in Greenpoint, Bushwick, and Williamsburg, including the many voters of German ancestry in those wards. While Kalbfleisch was born in the Netherlands, he was publicly regarded as a German lawmaker. After a Bay Ridge figure declined the nomination, eastern district Republicans secured the selection of Williamsburg Alderman Frederick Scholes.³⁴

It is difficult, of course, to decipher how average voters saw the race. Yet, based on rallies and editorial comments, the contest was a referendum on Lincoln's Southern policy. The

city's chief Democratic organ cited a vote for Scholes as an endorsement of the Republican' no compromise stance to "perpetuate disunion and leave the Border States no alternative but to go with the rest of the South."³⁵ Scholes and the Brooklyn Daily Times, sensing the Republicans' vulnerability in that regard, tried, at times, to cast the canvass as a debate on local issues,³⁶ but disunion dominated the brief campaign.

Pleased that both contenders were from the eastern district, the Daily Times was satisfied with the election of either, although it favored Scholes. That stance drew criticism from the Brooklyn Evening Star, which claimed it was unworthy of a Republican paper to show even mild approval of Kalbfleisch. The western district Star saw the canvass in partisan terms. It attacked the Democrat from a nativist perspective, and claimed a triumph by the Bushwickite would "cause a shout of joy throughout all ranks of the secessionists and traitors, whether they reside in Brooklyn or in Jeff Davis's dominions."³⁷

The Daily Times probably hurt the Scholes candidacy among eastern district Germans. The paper argued against giving Carl Schurz a diplomatic post, claiming while domestic patronage was proper, German-Americans could not viably represent the Union overseas.³⁸ The Republicans made efforts to repair that damage among those voters, but Germans felt alienated,³⁹ and Kalbfleisch carried the Williamsburg wards.

Police chief Kennedy was in Brooklyn to supervise election-day security;⁴⁰ no disturbances occurred. The Democrat won by

5200 votes, an increase of about 500 over the fusion margin of November. The most important development was Kalbfleisch's triumph in the eastern district wards carried by Lincoln five months earlier.⁴¹

The better showing by Kalbfleisch than the fusion Presidential ticket was partly due to personal popularity, ethnicity and status as leader of the city's legislature. But it also fit a metropolitan area trend of registering, in various ways, impatience with the President's sluggish response to rupture of the Union. The result buttressed calls for some clear direction.⁴²

Impatience with the Sumter standoff and with the uncertainty of the Union accurately describes the outlook of the metropolis in this period. Unity of opinion broke down over how the Administration should end the impasse. Fluctuating reports of March and early April were exasperating, but they revealed, on balance, New Yorkers were prepared to accept federal evacuation of the Charleston fort.⁴³

Hard fusionite organs welcomed such a move in a political context; it was part of their scheme for recognition of the Confederacy.⁴⁴ A more common view was that withdrawal was a way to ease tensions. Edward Tailer, a dry goods merchant, was "in favor of peace, and trust(ed) that the fort will be evacuated without a collision." Those Unionists argued an armed clash precipitated by attempts to reprovision the facility would make

reconstruction impossible. Tammany asked: "What benefits can we expect from a coercive policy? In there any substantial hope that we can bring the seven seceded States into the Union as conquered provinces?"⁴⁵

The ranks of voices calling for holding federal property and enforcing laws were diverse. They included quarters concerned about the evasion of duties and commercial implications of an independent South.⁴⁶ Beyond that, nationalists bemoaned any surrender to rebels. A woman regretted that "Fort Sumter (is) to be given up" by the United States "to the traitors of South Carolina." The focus on the facility made it synonymous with the integrity of the Union. Evacuation would be a national disgrace and sanction of lawlessness.⁴⁷ War preparation continued in the metropolis, ranging from mobilization of the militia of Jericho, Long Island to the urging of the 7th Regiment that Lincoln confront the Southern "ruffians."⁴⁸

Republicans combined all of those impulses along with political concerns in arguing for holding installations in Dixie. Political motives included seeing the standoff as a continuation of antebellum struggles with the Slave Power to fear of having the party preside over a shattering of the Union.⁴⁹

For a while, the Republican Central Club, in which Henry Raymond had great influence, and the New York Times held the Seward position of accepting the evacuation of Sumter.⁵⁰ By late March, though, commercial considerations moved the Times to advocacy of use of force.⁵¹ With that shift, expressions of

Republican sentiment in the metropolis were unanimous in calling for confrontation with secession.

A plebiscite in the metropolitan area in early April would have produced a majority in favor of abandoning the fort. Even so, such an outcome would have depended on the wording of the motion. A proposal termed: "Do you favor a federal retreat from Fort Sumter and handing the facility over to Confederate authorities" would have been defeated. A referendum reading: "Do you accept the withdrawal of Government troops from Fort Sumter as a temporary step to more effectively facilitate the peaceful renormalization of the state of the Union" would have passed.

In other words, attitudes on the specific disposition of the stalemate were soft; the much stronger opinion was that the standoff was unacceptable. The metropolis was infuriated with Southerners for stirring the dispute and angry with the President for failing to deal with the crisis. Ultimate reaction would heavily depend on the nature of efforts to break the deadlock.

It is difficult to characterize the posture of Hard fusionites towards the Confederacy. In fact, it is misleading to press for a definitive stance from Mozart Hall meetings and Hard editorial columns in March-April; the picture was changing too rapidly. Yet, this was a pivotal ingredient in the metropolis's response to secession and some understanding is essential.

Those quarters accepted recognition of the Southern republic, at least on a temporary basis. Mozart said "that the

rapid developments of the last five months have rendered the existence of the Southern confederacy a historical fact." Such a policy, Hards argued, was preferable to coercion and war. They advised schemes of dividing property and resuming trade between separate nations. The Express counseled

a candid, straightforward recognition of the Revolution, with an expressed willingness to settle the delicate and difficult questions growing out of it, as speedily as circumstances will permit.⁵²

By then, such Hard sources were satisfied that departure was the majority sentiment of Gulf state residents. They buttressed such pronouncements with cries of self determination and ethnic superiority; or, "once more, (to) demonstrate Anglo Saxon common sense, over the Mexican and Central American nonsense of civil war."⁵³ Confederate leadership and policies also drew great praise.⁵⁴

Formalization of authority, and halt in seizures of property, affected the Hard position. These developments eased fears of mob rule, which had shaped anti-secession feeling in January. The Confederate constitution was a special focus of approval. Even Tammany, which remained Unionist, saw it as superior to the document of 1787 and a credible basis of compromise and reunification.⁵⁵

Still, besides the extreme Day-Book, which circulated mostly in the South,⁵⁶ no Hard source welcomed a permanent division of the Union. Mozart held out "the hope of a future reconstruction of the Union, and of final rescue from the perils that encompass the country."⁵⁷

The motives behind advocating recognition of the Confederacy remained opposition to emancipation. Acceptance of Southern independence would afford time to stifle the initiative to subjugate Dixie and end bondage. According to a Hard weekly paper, "whatever their professions and disguises," those were the goals of Republicans pressing for use of force.⁵⁸

To the extent they had a coherent plan, Hards thought the next step was to work towards reunification on the basis of such planks as those advocated by Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens. In a speech widely reported in New York, the Georgian made racial inferiority and enslavement of Africans the cornerstone of the new republic. One organ chided that the North's treatment of black citizens showed the Stephens agenda was appropriate national policy.⁵⁹

Part of that orientation was continued presentation of the standard pro-slavery themes. These included alleged contentment of those in bondage and the Bible's support of servitude.⁶⁰ A minstrel show in late March parodied a childish explanation of the crisis.⁶¹

One new twist on this front was the creation in mid March of the American Society for Promoting National Unity. Headed by Samuel Morse, the group sought to solve the sectional dilemma by spreading information on scripture's sanction of slavery. The outfit's charter proclaimed: "Four millions of immortal beings, incapable of self care and indisposed to industry and foresight, are providentially committed to the hands of our Southern

friends."⁶²

Inquiries and disclosures in March revealed the extent of Police chief Kennedy's efforts to thwart pro-secession forces. The Republican had dispatched detectives to Charleston, Baltimore and other Southern cities to investigate networks that might have affected the metropolis. Mostly, this involved rumors of obstructionist plots and of assassination threats against Lincoln.⁶³

The former free soil Democrat was widely criticized for these activities. Conservatives cited them as another example of overreaching abuse of the Metropolitan force.⁶⁴ Republicans saw a need for national intelligence gathering at a time of rebellion, but were disturbed New York police had assumed such responsibilities.⁶⁵

Kennedy was an alarmist. Given his predicament of overseeing law enforcement in a hostile locale, that was inevitable and even healthy. His inquiries showed the rumored Southern connection to metropolitan area obstructionism was not serious, although they traced some people leaving Gotham with intentions of joining the Confederate army.⁶⁶ More importantly, they demonstrated his vigilance in combatting pro-secession zeal in lower New York, which remained a crucial impediment to open actions in support of the Confederacy.

On the other hand, examples of possible obstructionism surfaced continuously. These included posting at City Hall of a

circular seeking 2000 troops to fight for Georgia and the hanging of effigies of Lincoln and Hamlin on a boat in the harbor. A city lawmaker allegedly received a contract to build Southern ships at Greenpoint. An intoxicated man of Irish ancestry claimed in a Brooklyn court he was a Confederate citizen and could not be tried by a federal judge.⁶⁷

Taken separately, these episodes were harmless and silly. Yet, together, they represented repeated reminders of Gotham's pro-South leanings and kept the metropolis on edge. Albert H. Osborne, clerk of Kings County's Board of Supervisors, discovered how sensitive Unionists were to hints of lower New York's sympathy with Dixie.

Drawing on reports that the Louisiana legislature invited southern Indiana and southern Illinois to join the Confederacy, Osborne cabled the lawmakers, suggesting a similar request be issued to the metropolis. The Bayou state response, sent through open telegram to Brooklyn, said the idea was under consideration.⁶⁸

When publicized, the episode created an uproar, and Osborne stayed away from official duties.⁶⁹ In addition, effigies of the Democrat were hung across the city of churches. The Osborne dolls were incorrectly labeled "Irish"; the clerk was a native Protestant. They showed that anti-obstructionists, probably members of Republican clubs,⁷⁰ saw sons of Erin as the base of Confederate support.

Osborne maintained it was not a serious initiative;⁷¹ later,

he joked about his alleged "treason."⁷² Since the suggestion to Louisiana was not intended as a public proclamation, the message may have been genuine. As the news broke, the clerk covered himself by trivializing the episode as a farce.

The Bayou legislature took it seriously. Beyond that, Osborne was on the Hard side of the Brooklyn Democracy, and his inquiry paralleled other pro-secession proposals, notably the free city scheme. In that light, few accepted his explanation.⁷³ At the very least, the case showed both the level of anxiety over obstructionism and that certain forces were set to oppose any such attempts.

Notwithstanding the Brooklyn clerk, Isaiah Rynders remained the focus of fears of disturbances. Republicans claimed he was still raising troops for the South.⁷⁴ The real reason for the concern about the marshal was his office and unrepentant claims that disunion was all the fault of Lincoln's party.⁷⁵ Mirroring the vigilance of Kennedy, top Republicans envisioned Rynders leading thousands in an assault on the sub-treasury in lower Manhattan.⁷⁶

Democrats, seeking to forestall coercion, fed Republican fears by warning them privately that mobs would grab installations if war broke out. There was some link to rebel leaders in this context. Judah Benjamin, for instance, told Samuel Barlow the South looked forward to a Northern uprising to prevent sectional hostilities. Barlow was one of those who informed Lincolmites of possible local attacks.⁷⁷

The free city initiative made a mild comeback in late March and early April. Other than vague references in the Mozart organ, the concept had received little attention since mid January.⁷⁸ Renewed interest was generated by realizations of how the Morrill tariff would hurt metropolis commerce if Southern independence was secured.⁷⁹

The idea was debated at a Chamber of Commerce meeting in early April. A private letter circulated urging acceptance of the Wood plan.⁸⁰ But the movement was weak. Few merchants saw it as a realistic option and even the Journal of Commerce dismissed the concept.⁸¹

The intra-Democracy rivalry intensified,⁸² due largely to the obstructionist issue. Mozart was the focal point of free city dialogue and of warnings of seizures of facilities.⁸³ Tammany distanced itself from such plans. It also attacked the Mayor's claim his proposals were designed to benefit local workers.⁸⁴

Beyond demonstrating the validity of the Hard-Soft division, Tammany's more loyal image helped the wing in other ways. Mozart's identification as a Confederate ally made state Republicans eager to recognize Tammany as the legitimate faction. This was both a reward for Democratic Unionism and part of the drive to unify the North. The legislature selected six Tammany men to join an equal number of Republicans on a panel charged with considering changes in the city charter.⁸⁵

Tammany was also the cornerstone of the considerable level

of fusionite loyalism in the metropolis. This apparatus took in the entire Soft Democratic network, including the Hall's Leader and Long Island Times. Those sources stressed the usual themes of need to uphold the durability of republican government, faith in latent Southern nationalism, and in the Union as transcendent.⁶⁶

In addition, many quarters which normally leaned towards the Hard orientation upheld the Unionist position. John Dix remained the most potent symbol of this impulse. His experiences as Treasury Secretary in the final weeks of the Buchanan Administration, confronting seizures of federal property in the South, were very influential. In March-April, he was a pillar of Democratic Unionism, equating secession with anarchy and lawlessness.

Dix berated Secretary of State Seward for considering surrendering more federal holdings in the South, claiming in its final days the Buchanan Administration tried

to maintain the credit and the authority of the Government against a criminal combination without example in the history of any country.⁶⁷

For many other conservatives, that point of lawlessness was the key component in opposing separation.⁶⁸ One of these was Richard Lathers, an organizer of the December Pine Street meeting of Southern sympathizers. As an outgrowth of that parley, Lathers was sent to Dixie to counsel moderation. The culmination of that tour showed the Unionism of much of the conservative community of New York. Speaking to the Confederate Congress in

Montgomery a week before the Sumter episode, the insurer cited secession as a "revolutionary expedient to rupture a government." Lathers also told the legislators the doctrines of states rights and slavery were viable only in the Union.⁹⁰

James Brady was another example of Hard fusionites who shunned the Mozart Hall position of embracing the Confederacy. The nominee of the Breckinridge wing for governor in 1860, Brady was among the city's most popular speakers at Irish political and social functions.⁹⁰ At a St. Patrick's Day celebration, he denied "the right of any set of Americans to destroy a home which under God's providence belonged to all mankind."⁹¹ Prominent Irish leaders spoke unanimously for the Union at such events.⁹²

The most salient point emerging here is that the pro-secession stance of Wood and other Hard fusionites, mostly periodicals, did not extend very far in upper Democratic ranks. Even certain Mozart figures, notably John Cochrane, held to Unionism.⁹³ John Crittenden and Andrew Johnson, not Fernando Wood or Jefferson Davis, were the heroes of the solid majority of local conservative leaders.⁹⁴

In that context, lack of leadership and of participation of top party figures was a major shortcoming of the pro-South camp. Part of this was owing to Wood's prominence in the secession movement. That scared off Tammany figures and independent Democrats, alienated by the Mayor's reputation for recklessness and unscrupulous political behavior.

Beyond that, the traditional nationalist streak in the

Democratic outlook, and the taint of treason in the Mozart position, combined to make the pro-Confederate position untenable for leading figures. Lacking public support and prominent advocates, obstructionists were left with rumors as political tools and with rank-and-file party faithful as the base of their alleged strength.

In that light, Queens was out of the orbit of the movement. Pro-Confederates forces counted on groups with a tradition of combative Democratic political activity, centered in the immigrant wards of lower Manhattan. Parts of Brooklyn mirrored that environment, and could plausibly be depicted as originating point for seizures or other obstructionist moves. Yet, largely native-born and rural Queens, while tied to the metropolis and conservative, had no context for such initiatives. As a result, the county was firmly Democratic Unionist. Even the Jamaica-based Long Island Democrat, a Hard organ, shied away from the Mozart position.

In a sense, the debate over compromise progressed along the lines already established. Fusionites such as State Senator Edward A. Lawrence of Flushing insisted Republicans make concessions to satisfy the South.⁹⁵ The proposals of the Washington Peace Conference were supported by the conservative apparatus.⁹⁶ Groping for bases of settlement, many Democratic quarters, including a party committee in Westchester County, advocated adoption of the Confederate constitution.⁹⁷

Hard fusionites expressed futility on the compromise front. They charged the conciliatory posture of the Sewardian Republicans was "a fraud and cheat from beginning to end," designed solely to placate Northern Democrats and border Unionists. These sources maintained the Administration had no intention of making serious concessions."

In fact, moderate Republicans revealed, both publicly and privately, that a magnanimous stance was intended to stall for time. In that way, the Unionist reaction would assert itself in Dixie." Those backers of Lincoln rejected the Peace Conference proposals.¹⁰⁰ Acceptance of statehood for New Mexico on the basis of popular sovereignty was a prime example of the token gesture the moderates thought was sufficient to hold the upper South and lure back the Gulf.¹⁰¹

Even so, the significant development in the area of compromise was a marked decline in activity and volume. Public meetings and private maneuvering on settlement faded. Newspapers ceased serious discussion of fine points of arbitration of sectional issues. Conciliation was a serious matter early in the year, but by March the ranks of those who thought the crisis could be solved politically had dissipated.

Local abolitionists were distressed over Lincoln's inaugural. They sought more emphasis on slavery as the root cause of the troubles. The President's pledge to respect fugitive slave laws was especially disheartening. Beyond being a moral scourge to

abolitionists, capture and escape of people fleeing from servitude was still a regular occurrence in Gotham.¹⁰²

The black periodical was thrown back by that guarantee. From previous doubts about the level of conscience in the Republican position, the Anglo-African had moved to seeing sincerity in the party's antislavery principles:

It is because of that belief that our sorrow is the more profound, our hope the more shattered, and our gloom the more assured. ... The Republican party is for the white man. We must rely on ourselves.¹⁰³

As a result, the weekly recommended that blacks shun the Lincoln Administration. It also called for guarantees of improvements in conditions of free blacks before fighting for the Union.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, the President received from New Yorkers of African descent some private, indirect expressions of praise and eagerness to volunteer if war erupted.¹⁰⁵

Notwithstanding Lincoln's public posture, abolitionists were pleased with various signals that the crisis was about slavery. The Garrisonian organ welcomed Alexander Stephens's frank statements. Immediatists were confident wider perception that schism was due to bondage would lead to emancipation. Weakening of the colonization movement in early April showed a glimmer of optimism for the future of black life in the republic.¹⁰⁶

Abolitionists were certain the Confederacy could not survive, because, as one woman wrote,

in the heart of Christian America and in the middle of the Nineteenth Century, (it) lays down slavery as its cornerstone, and finds its allies in Spain, Dahomey and Mohammedan Turkey.¹⁰⁷

Republicans shared the immediatists' belief in the Confederacy's inviability. That confidence transcended the moderate/radical division, and served as a unifying principle for backers of Lincoln. While abolitionists focused on slavery as the South's source of weakness, Republicans stressed an array of practical difficulties facing Dixie.¹⁰⁸

Among these were lack of financial depth, inability to provide basic services and over-reliance on cotton.¹⁰⁹ In addition, Republican saw problems of instability in the Southern nation, due mostly to the Unionist element they thought would soon assert itself.¹¹⁰ This picture of a wobbling rebel confederation drove the impatience with the President's lack of a clear policy. Lincoln's local supporters, like many across the North, felt by April the Davis government would collapse under the stress of a brief confrontation.

Internally, Republicans were enmeshed in a scramble over federal patronage. Aspirants spent considerable time and money seeking appointive office, and then waited to discover whether they would receive a position. A Long Island observer noted: "I suppose they are all watching with fear and trembling, expecting every moment to hear their doom."¹¹¹

Moderates claimed most posts, due to Seward's influence. The radicals, however, obtained a decent share of the spoils. Hiram Barney, selected as Collector, was closer to the Greeley wing.¹¹² The Tribune chief said he wanted to keep a critical distance from the Administration, but was involved in backstage

maneuvers for jobs.¹¹³ Former Democrats in the Republican coalition complained of being snubbed in distribution of offices.¹¹⁴

Jockeying for posts overshadowed the radical-moderate debate on response to secession. To the degree the dialogue continued, it followed earlier patterns. The anti-compromise forces opposed the New Mexico proposal, while the moderates found it acceptable.¹¹⁵

Radicals also moved close to the abolitionist vision of interpreting the course of the crisis as moving towards emancipation. Firmness, they felt, would effectively overcome both rebels and bondage.¹¹⁶ Privately, moderates also thought armed conflict would lead to the end of slavery, although they did not relish that outcome.¹¹⁷

Since the time for compromise had passed, the degree of rancor in the intra-party debate subsided. Other impulses surfaced which confirmed a more basic common approach of Republicans. These included advocacy of confrontation with secession and belief in the fragility of the Confederacy. The Republican split had already served the purpose of showing that most influential party figures saw the Union, and not abolition, as the issue at hand.

By early April the metropolis was ready for a major shift from deadlock at Fort Sumter and uncertainty over the status of the Union. On balance, residents would have swallowed the evacuation

of the Charleston facility, if accompanied by a careful explanation affirming the ultimate indivisibility of the republic.

Local Republicans were prepared for a tougher policy, but the stance of conservatives would be crucial. Publicly, most settled on a Unionist, anti-coercion platform. This was a vague, inconsistent outlook which could be influenced, if not manipulated, by the terms of resolution of the Sumter impasse.

Reaction of the pro-secession forces was more uncertain, but unlikely to be affected by the disposition of the standoff. Their picture of the situation -- use of force was a means to emancipation -- would shape the response. But the key questions would be materialization of obstructionist threats.

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4. Caroline Dunstan Diary, 1 March 1861, NYPL; Diary of John Hallock, 5 March 1861, QPL.
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16. New York Times, 5 March 1861, pp. 4, 8; New York Express, 5 March 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 5 March 1861, p. 2.
17. Flushing Journal, 23 March 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 21 March 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 25 March 1861, p. 2.
18. E.D. Morgan & Co. to William H. Seward, 26 February 1861, Seward Papers, UR; New York Express, 28 February 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 27 February 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 2 March 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 26 February 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 1 March 1861, p. 2; Acts and Resolutions of First Session of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States of America, 18 February 1861, p. 41, in, Records of the Confederate States of America, LC.
19. New York Express, 28 March 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 29 March 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 9 March 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 7 March 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 9 March 1861, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 16 March 1861, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 23 March 1861, p. 1; Journal of Commerce, 6 April 1861, p. 1;

Tailer, Jr., Diary, 23 March 1861; New York Tribune, 7 March 1861, p. 7.

20. Specific figures from, Daily News, 4 April 1861, p. 7; also see, New York Times, 2 March 1861, p. 8; New York Herald, 22 March 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 22 February 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 13 March 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 21 March 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 5 April 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 19 March 1861, p. 8.

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22. New York Herald, 30 March 1861, p. 8; New York Express, 2 March 1861, p. 3.

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York Times, 27 March 1861, p. 4, Republican Central Club meeting, p. 8.

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Chapter 7: Sumter & War

Most works on the period mention metropolitan New York's reaction to the brief battle at Fort Sumter and the onset of civil war. The response is depicted as an abrupt change from Southern sympathy to support of the Union. New York's outpouring of loyalty is presented as the most dramatic example of the North's upholding of the Government. Major focuses are the sendoff of the 7th Regiment and the massive Union rally of April 20.¹

In fact, the reaction was consistent with earlier expressions, particularly in relation to the engagements at Charleston in late December and early January. It showed the limits of the anti-coercion outlook, the dominant stance of conservatives by late March. The uprising in the aftermath of the Confederate leveling of Sumter also confirmed a key development of the period. The marshaling for the Union of public opinion and human resources, including an imposing street presence, was sufficient to nullify extreme pro-South forces.

The metropolis was a center of east coast military installations. Within a day of Lincoln's decision to attempt to resupply Fort Sumter, preparations and activities were underway at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Fort Hamilton and Governor's Island, among other sites. The Powhatan, given the principal reprovision task, departed from the navy yard.²

Since the daily press assigned reporters to those facilities, the public knew of the stirrings. Observers wagered

on where the ships were headed. A lawyer visited the navy yard to witness the mobilization.³

While only a week elapsed between the change in Administration direction and the clash at Charleston, opinions on the tougher approach emerged. They followed previous attitudes. Hard periodicals issued last minute calls for peace rallies and warned of a calamitous civil war.⁴ One Southern sympathizer, physician Thomas Low Nichols, claimed later he saw the reprovision flotilla

steam down New York harbor, and out of the Narrows. Crowds looked on with a gloomy curiosity, foreboding evil. Not a cheer was raised -- not a gun fired. The fleet steamed away in silence, and no voice said, God speed.⁵

Notwithstanding Nichols's tendentious memory, Republicans and most Unionists were overjoyed. The new policy ended the suspense and impasse which had become unbearable. Lincolnite organs said the South was responsible for bringing the nation to the precipice. Part of that outlook was a concession, among moderates and radicals alike, that peaceful resupply was unlikely.⁶ Law school professors "were jubilant over this indication that our great Union, so bragged of for so many years, is not to perish without a struggle."⁷

In a pre-electronic age, news of the battle of Charleston harbor reached and spread throughout the metropolis with great speed. Morning papers of Friday, April 12 reported that Anderson had rejected P.G.T. Beauregard's demand for surrender and fighting was imminent. Despite a brief disruption of the cable wires from the South, news of the clash reached Gotham that

evening and circulated promptly. A Long Island farmer noted in his diary April 13 that a battle over Sumter was underway.⁹

Thousands of people crowded newspaper row Friday afternoon into Saturday. The latest cable report or extra edition of a daily paper was grabbed and read aloud to pockets of anxious citizens.⁹ Newsboys, "crying till after midnight with hoarse voice," spread the information in Manhattan and Brooklyn.¹⁰ Walt Whitman, emerging from the opera in New York City Friday night, remembered

was walking down Broadway around twelve o'clock on my way to Brooklyn, when I heard in the distance the loud cries of the newsboys, who came presently tearing and yelling up the street, rushing from side to side more furiously than usual.

I bought an extra and crossed to the Metropolitan Hotel (Niblo's), where the great lamps were still brightly blazing, and, with a crowd of others who gathered impromptu, read the news -- which was evidently authentic.

For the benefit of some who had no papers, one of us read the telegram aloud, while all listened silently and intently.

No remark was made by any of the crowd, which increased to thirty or forty, but all stood a moment or two, I remember, before they dispersed. I can almost see them there now, under the lamps of midnight again.¹¹

Many were disappointed or confused over Anderson's surrender. But news that the Sumter garrison would be coming to Gotham reinforced the metropolis's central role in the crisis.¹² Editors and observers used such terms as "surpassed description," "indescribable" and "intense excitement" to characterize the fervor of New York that weekend. Newspaper sales reached record levels.¹³

It was an emotional and psychological release from months of uncertainty over the future of the Union. In addition, the 2 1/2

days of stimulation created a receptive climate for Lincoln's proclamation and call for troops, published on Monday, April 15.¹⁴

The reaction in Queens and western Suffolk county was similar to the response in the cities. Political orientations on the periphery of the metropolitan area took leads from the centers of opinion in New York City and Brooklyn. Beyond that, the pressures and expectations on Long Island, though not as concentrated as in the urban sectors, were analogous.

A prime example was the Jamaica-based Long Island Democrat. Through the secession period, the weekly agreed with the Hard dailies on most issues. These included emphasizing slavery and race, and acceptance of peaceful withdrawal as preferable to war. The paper opposed reprovision of Sumter.¹⁵

Days after the battle, it was tentative. The Democrat still argued for peace, and mocked the abilities of local militia. The county's State Senator, Edward Lawrence, also opposed the charge towards war.¹⁶ But Queens Hards were awaiting indications of public stance before fully committing to a policy.

A week later, the organ was behind the Government. Editorials called on readers to forget party lines and rally to support the Union. They also attacked the Confederate Constitution for lacking a clause allowing peaceful reunion.¹⁷ That criticism was genuine; the Democrat had never advocated permanent separate confederacies. Yet, the clear statement of

the general population backing the Administration was the main factor which caused the weekly's shift in outlook.

Even in the scattered, thinly settled towns of Long Island, the mobilization of opinion and resources was impressive. Union rallies were held in Jamaica, Whitestone, Flushing, Hempstead and Moriches.¹⁸ Women in Flushing organized fundraising efforts to support families of volunteers.¹⁹

While not the overwhelming enterprise of the cities, recruitment was considerable. Rifle companies drilled in April while the 15th Regiment was brought up to fighting strength; it also toured the county. Once pledged to the Government, the Democrat joined in urging enlistment, partly to assure Jamaica would be proportionately represented in Union ranks.²⁰

Soft Democrats, such as the Long Island Times, were leery of the decision to resupply Sumter, but did not oppose the operation.²¹ They immediately accepted the situation. In a posture typical of Northern Democrats, they stressed defense of the capital. The Flushing-based paper digested the resort to arms as a

stern, painful, melancholy duty, which every good man, however willing and ready in its performance, will pray Heaven to avert or militate.²²

Republicans cheered the reprovision effort, and at first the Lincolnite voice in Flushing hinted at a possible move on slavery in conjunction with use of force against seceded states.²³ While that orientation was soon dismissed in the rush to cement Northern unity, Long Island antislavery forces welcomed the

conflict more readily than the Democrats. This included advocating a crackdown on local pro-South elements:

Should any citizen seem to connive at treason and to encourage rebellion it would be wrong to disregard it; but should one openly encourage and defend the assailant's of his country's flag and Capitol, no wonder if the patriotic breast swells at him for an enemy of his country.²⁴

That warning was misplaced. While a threat by pro-South forces to seize a Flushing fort emerged during secession, Queens lacked the history and social setting which could have made outbreaks a real possibility. Few factors on Long Island interfered with a Unionist reaction. Disturbances in support of the Confederacy or against Lincoln's policy were more conceivable in the nation's first and third largest cities.

Based on the experiences of the secession era, the cities on the East River seemed to have a solid corps of Southern sympathizers. Through Mayor Wood, Mozart Hall, paper such as the Daily News, free city advocates and obstructionists, pro-Confederate forces maintained networks.²⁵ Their actions and words upon the outbreak of sectional conflict were unpredictable but pivotal in determining the metropolis's overall response to war.

In the days following bombardment of Sumter, authorities and residents were on edge over possible disturbances. Wood issued a carefully worded proclamation calling for local peace, but acknowledging constituents had good reason for rising in opposition to Administration war policy. Urging residents to "avoid excitement and turbulence," the chief magistrate said the

country "trembles upon the brink of a precipice, and that it requires a patriotic and honest effort to prevent its final destruction." He also called upon New Yorkers to

rally to the restoration of the constitution and the Union as they existed in the days and in the spirit of our fathers. Whether this is to be accomplished by fratricidal warfare or by concession, conciliation and sacrifice, men may differ.²⁶

Kennedy prepared for an assault on the Customs house and established a home guard.²⁷ Brooklynites were alarmed when hundreds of Irish-American soldiers crossed the river and seemed prepared for combat. In fact, it was the 69th Regiment drilling in anticipation of federal service,²⁸ but the fright showed the public's weariness of obstructionist moves.

In explaining why no outbreaks materialized, one factor was the considerable amount of Unionist intimidation. The most obvious manifestation was large groups forcing pro-South periodicals to fly the flag.²⁹ These actions were well publicized. Privately, residents noted and approved of them. One woman, easing the strain of sanctioning rowdiness, called those involved a "good natured mob."³⁰ Republican spokesmen hoped to avoid violence, but could not hide their satisfaction.³¹ Democrats, especially the targeted papers, complained of violation of free speech, but succumbed to the pressures.³²

Participants created a powerful street presence which could have been used to thwart other forms of anti-Government dissent. While the Republican Wide -Awakes were probably involved,³³ the groups were non-partisan. They drew strength and borrowed

tactics from the Democratic wards of lower Manhattan. As a result, control of public space, an important component of the city's political life, belonged to those backing the Government.

Moreover, the daily press reported numerous cases of silencing of critics of the Administration's approach. In Brooklyn, a liquor store patron who amusingly ordered "secession gin" was compelled to retract his sentiments. A secession flag raised from a Williamsburg window was torn down, and the person responsible chastised. These and other episodes, whether in jest or sincerity, showed the power of interpersonal restraints on pro-South behavior.³⁴

In addition, immigrants in the cities, the supposed source of obstructionist strength, rallied to the Government's call. Their Southern sympathies had never included anti-Unionism. Lincoln's simplistic picture of national honor at stake, with no reference to slavery, was hard to resist. Irish and German men volunteered in numbers proportionate to other New Yorkers. Archbishop Hughes took interest and pride in the 69th's part "in this melancholy war"; the regiment received a farewell equal to that given the 7th.³⁵

While Republicans may have breathed a private sigh of relief, publicly they argued they had never doubted the loyalty of the newcomers. They and most conservatives asserted the South had been wrong in counting on local support.³⁶ Tammany claimed Wood was the sole volunteer the Confederates should have expected from Gotham. Sensing the great opportunity for political gain

against the intra-party foe, the Hall asserted the Mayor "should be watched with a jealous eye and in no case whatever be restored to places of honor or trust."³⁷

Confederates and a few New York Democrats continued urging acquiescence and support of the South. A Georgian living in Gotham claimed he could raise up to 2000 troops for Dixie.³⁸ Other observers reported the extent of Southern miscalculation. Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell told Jefferson Davis New York and other cities

would pour out its capital even for subjugation. The impression that we had from staunch friends north who would fight for us is a delusion(,) oh, I pray you, do not rest upon it.³⁹

Among Hard Democrats, an important division emerged. Most leaders moved with the rhythms of public opinion. Wood's recent biographer correctly says the Mayor was "swept along" with the Unionist tide. Looking ahead to the fall elections, he took several steps designed to synchronize with the city's pulse. Among these were speaking at the major Union rally, asking the Council for \$1 million for troops and sponsoring a Mozart Hall regiment.⁴⁰

Beyond that, James Kerrigan, Daniel Sickles, John Cochrane and other prominent Hard figures moved to support of the Government.⁴¹

But the Daily News and some Mozart Hall members, notably Ben Wood and Gideon Tucker, clung to peaceful separation, even in the rabid Union days of April. That development marked the emergence of a Copperhead movement. For that entity, use of force against

the Confederacy remained synonymous with emancipation:

If this war is waged against the institutions of the South, let its advocates avow that object and not, under a plausible cloak, cover up the design of negro emancipation. We believe that the Administration do not prosecute the war to punish traitors, but to destroy slaveholders.⁴²

As the News became the mouthpiece of stubborn Southern sympathizers, the paper underwent internal reorganization. Ben Wood took direct responsibility for editorial policy, especially on war issues. Tucker, editor in the late 1850's, resumed part control, and Mayor Wood apparently severed official ties to the daily.⁴³ The organ's anti-war position was based on both opposition to emancipation and fear that armed conflict would destroy chances of peaceful reunification. In that light, the embryonic Copperhead impulse retained a Unionist vision.⁴⁴

Political viability helps to explain the split among Hard chiefs. Given the overwhelming public allegiance to the Government's policy, there seemed little elective future in April for figures who held to a go-in-peace stance. The Mayor, Cochrane, Kerrigan and Sickels fit that scenario. Most members of the early Copperhead movement were not governmental officials. Congressman-elect Ben Wood was the key exception, due to his novice lawmaker status and genuine belief in peaceful separation.

Other recalcitrant friends of the South left the metropolis in the spring of 1861.⁴⁵

By late April the News stood alone among Hard periodicals in

opposing the war. Within ten days of Anderson's surrender, the other dailies moved to public support of the Government's policy.

The shift was dramatic. Works which claim Sumter induced a sudden change in the metropolis's outlook find justification in the editorial columns of Hard papers.⁴⁶ From the time the Administration's policy became evident through the first few days after the battle at Charleston, the papers paralleled the News in focus and emphasis. This included slavery as the underlying issue and advocacy of peaceful separation and antiwar rallies.⁴⁷

The alteration can be broken down into several categories. The vicissitudes of the Herald and Express were abrupt and, in the former case, complete. Those mass-circulation dailies, like the Long Island Democrat and many Hard politicians, underwent mutation as the public pulse was registered powerfully for the Union.

With some plausibility, Bennett's paper said it had advocated use of force against secession months ago. Sanctioning Lincoln's policy because "it is better, however, late than never," the daily argued:

The time has passed for such public peace meetings, in the North, as were advocated and might have effected some beneficial results, a few weeks since. War will make the Northern people a unit.⁴⁸

That comment was printed the day after mobs forced the Herald to fly the national colors. Over the next few days, the daily asserted other reasons for backing the Government. These included the importance to the metropolis of the Union and need to vindicate laws over anarchy.⁴⁹ While such topics had emerged

in response to actions surrounding the New Year, the organ's shift was due mostly to public outcry, an indication that Bennett underestimated the importance to locals of the Union. Also, the famed molder of opinion was directed by the attitudes of others.⁵⁰

The Express, also visited by contingents of angry Unionists, noted "it is not wise, or patriotic even, to speak the truth in the midst of civil war." While this was less than the full retreat of the Herald, the Brooks' paper agreed the emphases on slavery and race were no longer relevant. In that, the organ differed from the emerging Copperhead set, and backed the Administration in a hopefully brief conflict.⁵¹

The Journal of Commerce and Brooklyn Daily Eagle reversed positions, but not as completely. They continued to disagree, in opinion, with the Administration's approach, chastising, for instance, Lincoln's view of an unbroken Union.⁵² Even so, the publications accepted the existence of armed sectional conflict. As part of qualified support, they heralded defense of the capital and looked forward to a prompt end to the fighting. Brooklyn's chief Democratic organ wrote:

The war which is impending we still consider will be one of the most calamitous episodes in the annals of mankind, but to shrink from carrying it through now would be to invite National destruction (and) if the appeal to arms cannot be averted then the conflict should be made as short, sharp and decisive, and the end reached as speedily as possible.⁵³

Beyond the mobs of newspaper row, the pace of military

mobilization gave the metropolis a Union complexion which overwhelmed pro-South leanings. Recruiting offices opened throughout Manhattan and Brooklyn. At a meeting at Steuben House on the Bowery, 120 men of German descent enrolled. Police stations and armories became part of the volunteer apparatus. Charles Sandford, military commander of lower New York, reported four days after Lincoln's call for troops: "The numbers pressing for service of all ranks is immense. My office has been crowded all day with officers and men -- and our Regiments are filling up."⁵⁴

The Randall's Island Light Infantry organized and drilled before receiving weapons. It and other companies, awaiting muster and marching orders, made the area a garrison town in April. According to one account, about 6000 volunteers were reading and able to depart, awaiting official instructions.⁵⁵

All sectors of Gotham responded. Cubans and Poles established fighting units.⁵⁶ Journeymen painters in Brooklyn regretted the war as an interruption of business, but established a company. Volunteer firemen, bases of Democratic ward politics, mobilized.⁵⁷ Young men from the abolitionist orbit joined regiments.⁵⁸ An elderly man asked "what I can do to be of use." Another sought money from the city to develop a canon capable of firing up to three miles.⁵⁹

Governor Morgan sought to rush as many regiments as possible to defense of the capital.⁶⁰ Sandford, anticipating a brief conflict, requested a field command. He was also impatient with

the bureaucratic burdens of establishing and preparing the new regiments. Yet, the general boasted of having sent 5400 troops to Washington only ten days after Beauregard opened fire on Sumter.⁶¹

Opinion underlying mobilization encompassed several elements, but it can be simplified as a basic support of the Union. Exhortation by Lincoln or other officials was unnecessary. A music teacher too old for combat boasted: "No sentiment but for the Union allowed to be uttered."⁶² One organ noted the public was so solidly behind the Government that editorial clamor was superfluous.⁶³

To a greater extent than men, women mixed patriotism with sadness. They showed a more mature understanding that enlistments and parades for departing soldiers meant death and grief would follow. One woman confided:

There was great sorrow in many hearts for the 7th Regiment left for the defense of our beautiful union. The public streets were packed with human beings to witness the departure of this gallant company. With sadness they marched through Broadway, perhaps where many will never step again. I am thankful that my husband is not a soldier or my children old enough to be shot down by traitors.⁶⁴

Abby Woolsey hoped the rate of Northern mobilization would overawe the South, rendering fighting unnecessary.⁶⁵

Women offered a domestic twist to other features of the local reaction. One was anger at the Southerners as traitors who had forsaken the Union, likened to turning backs on family and faith. Women in Greenpoint rewrote "Dixie" in this vein: "Away down South in the land of cotton, Good old times they have

forgotten. Forgetful of our nation's glories, listening to the words of Tories. Their talk is all about secession, Another name for rank oppression."⁶⁶ Much like men of non-military age, women sought any means of aiding the Union effort.⁶⁷

In addition, they agreed with the core Unionist beliefs of protecting the country's existence and preventing anarchy, pushing aside prior political persuasion. Maria Daly, a Southern sympathizer, saying "party is forgotten," added that

our very nationality is at stake and to save the country from anarchy(,) from becoming what South American and Mexico are (,) that every man must do his best to sustain the government, whoever or whatever the president may be.⁶⁸

Brooklyn's reaction mirrored New York City's in many ways. These included movements towards unity across party lines, Council funding of war needs and impressive levels of enlistment in Democratic wards.⁶⁹ The city of churches's most prominent Democrats -- State Senator Spinola,⁷⁰ outgoing Mayor Powell and Mayor-elect Kalbfleisch -- all took strong Unionist stands. A massive pro-Government rally was held at Fort Greene April 23.⁷¹ By the end of the month, the city had given three regiments departing parades.⁷²

Kings County's response differed in a couple of important ways. First, no public Copperhead movement emerged. The Hards had always been weaker than in Manhattan. Mayor Powell moved more swiftly and genuinely to support of the Government than Gotham's chief magistrate. The Brooklyn Democrat, usually identified as a Hard, proclaimed it was "important in the highest

degree that no disturbing element should exist in our midst, but that all should unite and cast aside former differences, and stand up in defense of the county and the flag."⁷³

When the Eagle also moved to support of the Administration,⁷⁴ Southern sympathizers were left without the rallying point the Daily News offered Gotham's peace advocates.

Second, marshaling of resources in the weeks after Fort Sumter demonstrated, in yet another context, that Brooklyn lagged behind the city across the river. On paper, Kings County had four regiments, although none was up to combat strength the day of Lincoln's proclamation. Many Brooklyn residents belonged to the more prestigious, better financed and equipped units in Manhattan, such as the 7th. Boosters lamented the disparity and pleaded for funding of local companies.⁷⁵

The trade implications of an independent South had moved many in the merchant and manufacturing sector to a tougher stance by late March. Even so, given the ties of commercial men to Dixie, the reaction of New York's business community was uncertain. The day fighting began at Charleston harbor, the Journal of Commerce predicted Gotham's capitalists would not aid a Government war policy.⁷⁶

Overwhelming support of the Administration was partly attributable to factors particular to business concerns. Among these were Davis's call for piratical attacks on Northern shipping and expectations the war would stir economic activity.⁷⁷

Given the resources of financial and commercial establishments, they also contributed to mobilization in distinct ways. These included maintaining salaries of employees who enlisted and donating considerable amounts of money to the war effort.⁷⁸

On a more fundamental level, the reactions of manufacturers, commercial capitalists, financiers and bankers was identical to that of the rest of the metropolis. They were moved by a sense of nationalism and Union.⁷⁹

At a Chamber of Commerce meeting a week after Sumter, Royal Phelps, merchant and prominent Democrat, repeated anti-Republican sentiment, including casting the South as an injured party. Yet, he said armed aggression against the Union had changed the picture, and he backed the Government without restraint.⁸⁰ That outlook, common in the aftermath of Sumter, provided a legitimate, comfortable basis for Democratic Unionism. It permitted local Democrats to maintain a sense of party identity and oppose treason. Brooklyn State Senator Spinola told Republicans:

You of the majority have precipitated this war upon us, but we shall fight it to the end. We shall fight it side by side with every loyal citizen, so long as fighting may be necessary, but ever praying that, by equitable compromise, peace may be restored to our unhappy country.⁸¹

At this stage, the division between War Democrats and anti-Administration Democrats, as distinct from Copperheads, did not emerge, although signs of that distinction were evident. Once disputes over emancipation and Lincoln's centralization of power surfaced, sectors of the Democracy which had been slower to

embrace war in April 1861 were identified as anti-Administration Unionists. In the weeks after Sumter, though, the break was between the peace advocates, led by Ben Wood and Daily News, and the solid majority of Democrats in agreement with the President.

John Dix was the most visible symbol of the pro-Administration Democracy. He chaired the massive Union rally of April 20, claiming the Buchanan Southern policy foreshadowed Lincoln's.⁶² The former Treasury Secretary also headed the Union Defense Committee.⁶³ Tammany Hall, taking every opportunity to spotlight Mozart's pro-Confederate proclivities, immediately backed Lincoln's policy. The entire Soft Democratic network supported war. This included New York's Common Council and such figures as Belmont, Tilden and Elijah Purdy.⁶⁴

In a sign of continuity with the reaction to engagements surrounding the New Year, themes of masculinity and accepting a challenge were sprouted as reasons for war. Tammany's voice proclaimed:

We have been willing for the sake of peace to submit to indignities that, under other circumstances, would have aroused a just resentment. The issue is now one of manhood and personal courage.⁶⁵

The response of abolitionists also revealed continuity. They welcomed the struggle, repeating that slavery was the cause of the conflict. Emancipation was depicted as the key war goal; Union-saving was de-emphasized. The Weekly Anglo African advised:

The American flag is our flag; for we are Americans.

But the usual interpretation of it, now so popular, but so full of prejudice -- 'the Constitution and the Enforcement of the laws' -- is not ours, alas(,) but that of our bitterest and most malignant enemies. Withered forever be the hand, and paralyzed the arm of the colored American who lifts up either in support of the American flag; Our duty, we again repeat, is to aid in making the slave free. Our policy will be dictated by that object. It certainly is not to fight for the Government.⁴⁶

Anglo-African and abolitionist organs acknowledged the Administration's limited agenda. But they relied on the momentum of process. Such voices were confident that forces set in motion to conquer a secession movement based on slavery would inevitably confront the root cause:

This is but another step in the drama of American Progress. We say Progress, for we know that no matter what may be the desires of the men of Expediency who rule, or seem to, the affairs of the North -- the tendencies are for liberty.⁴⁷

From that perspective, abolitionists and peace Democrats both accepted that bondage was the key variable and shaped their responses accordingly. That showed greater political honesty and insight than most sectors of the metropolis, which insisted the war was solely about preserving the republic.

African American visions that the "tendencies are for liberty" and the dominant view in the metropolis of limited war aims clashed over the issue of black soldiers. Tammany specified that "the broad foot of the white man is moving rapidly toward the South."⁴⁸ The metropolitan police, under Republican aegis, violently dispersed a meeting in lower Manhattan to explore opportunities for nearly 500 black volunteers. That meeting revealed that, despite the message of the Anglo-African, many New

Yorkers of African descent were eager to fight. It also showed that omission of racial progress was a crucial ingredient in Gotham's unified support of the Government.⁸⁹

In addition, disruption of the meeting on Prince Street confirmed the Anglo-African's perspective. That is why predictions the war would produce better conditions for black Americans rested on the force of circumstance, not attitudes and conditions of April 1861.

Radical Republicans, who had shared much of the abolitionist agenda in the secession months, broke with the immediatists in the wake of Sumter and war. They backed the Administration's view of the sectional conflict. Notable in this regard was dropping an earlier emphasis on slavery as the base of the troubles.⁹⁰

The Tribune maintained a degree of the antislavery outlook. This came in depiction of the struggle as a "second Revolutionary War which is to free us forever from the hateful domination of the Slaveholding Aristocracy."⁹¹ But even Greeley's paper omitted discussion of the moral side of bondage and de-emphasized emancipation as a war aim.

Such concerns were eclipsed by more tangible issues. These included combatting local Southern sympathizers and entering the debate over military strategy.⁹² Reaction of the radicals showed they were part of ongoing public life, and members of a mainstream party. Participation in conventional affairs required flexibility and adaption, which, at least in the short run, led

to dismissal of the steady moral appeals of abolitionists.

A few important themes characterized the position of moderate Republicans, who controlled the local party apparatus. First, they boasted of and took steps to foster a unified metropolis. This included making sure Democrats held key posts at rallies and on war committees.⁹³ In the area of omissions, they fully ignored slavery as an element of the struggle.

Second, Republicans of the Seward stripe abandoned the need to hold the upper South. Given the earlier priority assigned to preventing secession of the tobacco states, this was a striking development. Virginia's withdrawal induced this response:

A treacherous enemy has deserted our ranks, who, while she remained, was incessant in her efforts to encourage the rebellion. (It has) elected to make her soil the battlefield. She could not have done us a better service.⁹⁴

Such statements revealed moderates had never been comfortable with trying to assuage Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina and Arkansas. The policy had a taint of appeasement of parties nearly as guilty as the Gulf. Movements toward departure in the upper South following Lincoln's proclamation clarified the issue for moderate Republicans, allowing them to see all 11 states as the enemy.

That outlook enabled moderates to be the most hawkish entity in the metropolitan area. They lacked sympathy with the South of the Democrats and lingering attention to bondage of the radicals and abolitionists. In that context, such forces concentrated on punishing rebels guilty of treason. The Brooklyn Daily Times

urged

that the stand which the government is compelled to take shall be taken in such majesty and plentitude of power, as will from the first make resistance hopeless. ... The Seceding forces must not be matched, or held in check -- but crushed by overwhelming numbers and superior strength."

The parade on April 19 for the departing 7th Regiment and massive pro-Government rally the next day in Union Square were the major public demonstrations of the metropolis's response."

Outpourings of people and emotions showed a welcome release from five months of frustration and uncertainty. The sendoff and rally symbolized the clarity of the Union cause. Ambiguities and options of the secession period were removed; the proper course and direction was clear, leading to an unhindered reaction.

Women attended the Union demonstration in greater proportion than most public events." A young Brooklyn man studying in Troy returned to participate in bidding farewell to the 7th Regiment. In a statement of support and some naivete about the duration of the conflict, women gave food to the soldiers. Young men ascended rooftops to witness the crowds of the Union rally."

Editors and others competed in assigning superlative terms to the events. The rally was called "one of the greatest meetings held on Union Square that has ever assembled in America." The city "has never before presented a spectacle which would compare with the scenes witnessed in our streets," was a typical description of the salute to the regiment." A standard impulse was pleasure at the way the response to war united

Gotham. One woman added a domestic, melancholy twist to the situation:

New York, at any rate, is all on one side now -- all ready to forget lesser differences, like the household into which grief has entered.¹⁰⁰

Mayor Wood served as a vice president at the gathering of April 20. Facing re-election in eight months, the chief magistrate said: "I am willing to give up all sympathies and, if you please, all errors of judgment upon all national questions."¹⁰¹ The Daily News was the lone entity which refrained from the pro-Union zeal of those days. It bemoaned the circumstances under which the 7th departed, and the presence of leading Democrats at the rally, directing its harshest criticism at Dix.¹⁰²

In reviewing the metropolis's response to Sumter and war, one point which stands out is the rapid disintegration of the anti-coercion stance. On the surface, opposition to use of force against the South was the consensus Democratic position by late March. The most common public reason given for the shift was the method the Confederacy chose to express its desire for independence, firing on the federal troops of Fort Sumter.

It was absurd to think secession could be pursued without some resort to arms. The battle at Charleston harbor was a mild affair -- brief, no fatalities, decent treatment of surrendered Union soldiers. Since it was enough to destroy anti-coercion among most local Democrats, the impulse was proven to be shallow

and conditional, almost as simplistic as Greeley's go-in-peace stand of November 1860.

Notes

1. See, for example, Bernstein, New York City Draft Riots, pp. 144-45; McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, p. 274; Baker, Affairs Of Party, p. 330; Heslin, "Peaceful Compromise in New York City," p. 362; George L. Lankevich, Howard B. Furer, A Brief History Of New York City, (Port Washington, NY, 1984), p. 164; Nichols, Forty Years Of American Life, p. 370.
2. New York Times, 5 April 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 6 April 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 8 April 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 10 April 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 12 April 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 6 April 1861, p. 3; New York Herald, 8 April 1861, p. 1; Brooklyn Daily Times, 6 April 1861, p. 3; Daily News, 8 April 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 8 April 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 6 April 1861, p. 4.
3. Diary Of George T. Strong, 8 April 1861, IV:116-17; Tailer. Diary, 8 April 1861; New York Times, 9 April 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 6 April 1861, p. 2; citations in note #2 show the daily press immediately observed and reported the military movements.
4. New York Herald, 7 April 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 12 April 1861, p. 4; Long Island Democrat, 9 April 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 11 April 1861, p. 4.
5. Nichols, Forty Years Of American Life, p. 370.
6. New York Times, 5 April 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 8 April 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 9 April 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 11 April 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 8 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 10 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 10 April 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 10 April 1861, p. 4.
7. Diary Of George T. Strong, 9 April 1861, IV:117.
8. On Long Island farmer, see, Diary Of Hallock, 13 April 1861; also see, New York Times, 13 April 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 12 April 1861, p. 2; Diary Of Meade, 12 April 1861; Evening Post, 13 April 1861, p. 1; New York Tribune, 12 April 1861, p. 4.
9. New York Times, 15 April 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 13 April 1861, p. 2; Tailer. Diary, 12 April 1861; Evening Post, 13 April 1861, p. 2.

10. Quote from, Abby H. Woolsey to Eliza W. Howland, 14 April 1861, in, Letters Of A Family, pp. 37-8; also see, New York Express, 15 April 1861, p. 4.
11. Quote from, Walter Lowenfels, ed., Walt Whitman's Civil War, (New York, 1971), p. 21; also see, Jacob Lindeman, ed., The Conflict Of convictions: American Writers Report The Civil War, (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 6.
12. New York Times, 15 April 1861, pp. 1, 4; New York Express, 15 April 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 16 April 1861, p. 5.
13. Quotes from, in order, Evening Post, 15 April 1861, p. 2; New York Herald, 14 April 1861, p. 1; Diary Of Gross, 15 April 1861; also see, Tailer, Diary, 13 April 1861, New York Herald, 15 April 1861, p. 4.
14. New York Times, 15 April 1861, p. 1; Diary Of Meade, 15 April 1861.
15. Long Island Democrat, 9 April 1861, p. 2.
16. Long Island Democrat, 16 April 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 19 April 1861, p. 4.
17. Long Island Democrat, 23 April 1861, p. 2; Long Island Democrat, 30 April 1861, p. 2.
18. Long Island Democrat, 23 April 1861, p. 2; Long Island Times, 25 April 1861, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 27 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 19 April 1861, p. 2; Diary Of Hallock, 2 May 1861.
19. Long Island Times, 25 April 1861, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 27 April 1861, p. 2.
20. Long Island Democrat, 23 April 1861, p. 2; Long Island Democrat, 30 April 1861, p. 2; Long Island Times, 18 April 1861, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 27 April 1861, p. 2; Flushing Journal, 4 May 1861, p. 2.
21. Long Island Times, 11 April 1861, p. 2.
22. Quote from, Long Island Times, 25 April 1861, p. 2; also see, Long Island Times, 18 April 1861, p. 2.
23. Flushing Journal, 13 April 1861, p. 2.
24. Quote from, Flushing Journal, 27 April 1861, p. 2; also see, The Long-Islander, 19 April 1861, p. 2.

25. There was, at the time, no formal Copperhead movement, largely since the war had not started. The exact number of those supporting the extreme pro-South position is difficult to determine. Yet, the number of genuine free city enthusiasts, for instance, was small, probably less than 100, see, Wright, The Secession Movement In The Middle Atlantic States, pp. 178-79; Foner, Business And Slavery, p. 290; Stamp, And The War Came, pp. 235-36.

26. Quote from, Evening Post, 16 April 1861, p. 1; also see, New York Times, 16 April 1861, p. 8; New York Herald, 16 April 1861, p. 3; Daily News, 16 April 1861, p. 4.

27. John A. Kennedy to Hiram Barney, 16 April 1861, Chase Papers, LC; Kennedy to Thurlow Weed, 26 April 1861, Weed Papers, UR; New York Express, 17 April 1861, p. 4; also see, Joshua Leavitt to Salmon P. Chase, 16 April 1861, Chase Papers, LC.

28. Brooklyn Daily Times, 15 April 1861, p. 3.

29. New York Times, 18 April 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 18 April 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 18 April 1861, p. 2.

30. Quote from, Dunstan, Diary, 17 April 1861; also see, Diary of Gross, 14 April 1861; R. Mitchell to Salmon P. Chase, 18 April 1861, Chase Papers, LC; Tailer, Diary, 17 April 1861; Diary of Meade, 18 April 1861.

31. Brooklyn Evening Star, 18 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 15 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 17 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 18 April 1861, p. 2; some Lincolnite voices condemned the activity, see, New York Tribune, 18 April 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Times, 18 April 1861, p. 2.

32. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 19 April 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 18 April 1861, p. 2; Daily News, 17 April 1861, p. 4.

33. Daily News, 18 April 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 18 April 1861, p. 2.

34. Gin episode in, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 20 April 1861, p. 2; flag incident in, Brooklyn Daily Times, 20 April 1861, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 18 April 1861, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Times, 24 April 1861, p. 3; Evening Post, 15 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 17 April 1861, p. 2; Dunstan, Diary, 13 April 1861.

35. Quote from, John Hughes to Thurlow Weed, 21 April 1861, Weed Papers, UR; also see, New York Herald, 16 April 1861, p. 3; New York Herald, 19 April 1861, p. 6; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 19 April 1861, p. 2; Papers Of Jefferson Davis, VII:377-78; James Butler, Diary, 23 April 1861, NYPL.

36. New York Times, 16 April 1861, p. 4; New York Leader, 20 April 1861, p. 3.
37. New York Leader, 20 April 1861, p. 4.
38. John L. Taylor to Jefferson Davis, 2 May 1861, Papers Of Jefferson Davis, VII:144; New York Times, 16 April 1861, pp. 1, 8; Judah Benjamin to Samuel L.M. Barlow, 17 April 1861, Barlow Collection, HEHL.
39. Quote from, John A. Campbell to Jefferson Davis, 28 April 1861, Papers Of Jefferson Davis, VII:138; also see, Edward Jackson to Davis, 15 April 1861, Papers Of Davis, VII:103; New York Express, 22 April 1861, p. 2.
40. Quote from, Mushkat, Fernando Wood, p. 116; also see, New York Times, 21 April 1861, p. 1; Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol. 81, 22 April 1861, pp. 67-68; Fernando Wood to Edward Riley, 2 July 1861, Wood Papers, NYHS.
41. New York Herald, 20 April 1861, p. 8, shows prominent Hards, Greene Bronson and Issac Delaplaine, on the committee organizing the Union rally; on Cochrane, see, Daily News, 20 April 1861, p. 4; Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol 81, 25 April 1861, pp. 122-25, shows Kerrigan raising a regiment; Ibid, 13 May 1861, pp. 295-96, shows Sickles raising a brigade; also see, Cochrane, American Civil War, pp. 7-10.
42. Quote from, Daily News, 20 April 1861, p. 4; also see, Daily News, 10 April 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 18 April 1861, p. 4; New York Leader, 27 April 1861, p. 4.
43. William A. Seaver to William H. Hulbert, 22 April 1861, Samuel L.M. Barlow Collection, HEHL; Daily News, 16 April 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 17 April 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 18 April 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 19 April 1861, p. 4; Long, New York "News", p. 11.
44. Daily News, 17 April 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 20 April 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 22 April 1861, p. 4; as a result of that position, the News encountered major problems. The Council moved to eliminate official city advertising in the paper, and in September the federal government banned the daily, a suspension which lasted until May 1863, see, Proceedings Of The Board of Aldermen, vol. 81, 20 May 1861, p. 365, 21 June 1861, p. 530; Long, New York "News", pp. 59-65, 72.
45. Nichols, Forty Years Of American Life; Thomas A. Emmet, Incidents Of My Life: Personal, Literary, Social, With Service In The Cause Of Ireland, (New York, 1911), pp. 177-182.

46. As noted previously, my position is that the policy of Hard editorials by late March -- continuing emphasis on slavery and race, acceptance of peaceful separation as preferable to war -- did not accurately reflect the consensus vision of New York's conservative constituency. Yet, those editors were important components of the political landscape and their opinions reflected or influenced the extreme pro-South forces.

47. See, for example, New York Herald, 10 April 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 April 1861, p. 2; Journal Of Commerce, 8 April 1861, p. 2; Journal Of Commerce, 12 April 1861, p. 2; Journal Of Commerce, 15 April 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 9 April 1861, pp. 1, 2; New York Express, 14 April 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 16 April 1861, p. 2.

48. New York Herald, 16 April 1861, p. 6.

49. New York Herald, 17 April 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 18 April 1861, p. 4; New York Herald 19 April 1861, p. 6; New York Herald, 20 April 1861, p. 4.

50. Fremer, James Gordon Bennett, p. 198, agrees that the public's expression of overwhelming Union sentiment was the prime factor causing the shift.

51. Quote from, New York Express, 17 April 1861, p. 2; also see, New York Express, 18 April 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 19 April 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 22 April 1861, p. 2.

52. Journal of Commerce, 15 April 1861, p. 2.

53. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 18 April 1861, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 19 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 22 April 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 18 April 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 20 April 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 22 April 1861, p. 2.

54. Quote from, Charles Sandford to Edwin D. Morgan, 19 April 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; on Steuben House meeting, see, New York Times, 17 April 1861 p. 8; also see, New York Times, 18 April 1861, p. 4; New York Leader, 20 April 1861, p. 5; Diary of Gross, 16 April 1861; Evening Post, 16 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 17 April 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 17 April 1861, p. 6.

55. 6000 figure from, Evening Post, 20 April 1861, p. 2; Randall's Island contingent noted in, New York Tribune, 16 April 1861, p. 3; also see, New York Herald, 18 April 1861, p. 4; Charles W. Sandford to Edwin D. Morgan, 26 April 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL.

56. Brooklyn Evening Star, 19 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 19 April 1861, p. 2.

57. New York Herald, 18 April 1861, p. 8; Brooklyn Evening Star, 19 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 18 April 1861, p. 2.
58. Abby H. Woolsey to Eliza W. Howland, 19 April 1861, Letters Of A Family, pp. 39-44.
59. Quote from, J.W. Edmonds to Salmon P. Chase, 18 April 1861, Chase Papers, LC; on canon, see, Proceedings Of The Board Of Aldermen, vol. 81, 6 June 1861, pp. 454-55.
60. Edwin D. Morgan to Charles Sandford, April 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; Morgan to Simon Cameron, 19 April 1861, Morgan Papers.
61. Specific figure from, Charles Sandford to Edwin D. Morgan, 22 April 1861, Morgan Papers, NYSL; also see, Sandford to Morgan, 19 April 1861, Morgan Papers, Sandford to Morgan, 26 April 1861, Morgan Papers, Sandford to Morgan, 28 April 1861, Morgan Papers.
62. Quote from, Diary Of Gross, 15 April 1861; also see, James Cromwell to mother, 24 April 1861, Smith Family Papers, BHS; Dunstan, Diary, 15 April 1861.
63. Brooklyn Daily Times, 18 April 1861, p. 2.
64. Quote from, Diary Of Lay, 19 April 1861; also see, Diary Of Lay, 21 April 1861; Diary Of Helen Lansing Grinnell, 18 May 1861, NYPL; Jane S. Woolsey to Margaret Hodge, 20 April 1861, Letters Of A Family.
65. Abby H. Woolsey to Eliza W. Howland, 19 April 1861, Letters Of A Family, pp. 37-38.
66. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Times, 19 April 1861, p. 2; Dunstan, Diary, 13 April 1861; Diary Of Lay, 19 April 1861.
67. Evening Post, 22 April 1861, p. 2; Ryan, Women in Public, p. 142, says female support was "more public than ever, in both style and organization, but still domestic in substance."
68. Diary of Maria Daly, April 1861.
69. New York Herald, 17 April 1861, p. 1; Brooklyn Evening Star, 19 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 22 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 24 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 16 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 20 April 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 20 April 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 20 April 1861, p. 4.
70. Brooklyn Daily Times, 19 April 1861, p. 2.

71. Brooklyn Evening Star, 24 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 24 April 1861, p. 2.
72. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 22 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 24 April 1861, p. 2; McCullough, Brooklyn, p. 34.
73. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 20 April 1861, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Evening Star, 24 April 1861, p. 2.
74. Brooklyn Daily Eagle. 18 April 1861, p. 2.
75. Brooklyn Daily Times, 16 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 19 April 1861, p. 3; Brooklyn Daily Times, 22 April 1861, p. 2.
76. Journal of Commerce, 12 April 1861, p. 1.
77. Journal of Commerce, 18 April 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 20 April 1861, p. 1; C.R. Roberts to Salmon P. Chase, 17 April 1861, Chase Papers, LC; Stamp, And The War Came, pp. 290, 295-96, places great emphasis on such developments in accounting for mercantile backing of the Government.
78. Unanimous stock market resolve backing the Government, New York Times, 18 April 1861, p. 4; Chamber of Commerce meeting, New York Times, 20 April 1861, p. 8; merchants planning Union rally, New York Herald, 18 April 1861, p. 1; also see, Brooklyn Evening Star, 19 April 1861, p. 2; New York Leader, 20 April 1861, p. 3; New York Leader, 27 April 1861, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 20 April 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 15 April 1861, p. 4; New York Express, 20 April 1861, p. 4; Evening Post, 20 April 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 20 April 1861, p. 4.
79. For a sense of that sentiment, see, New York Times, 20 April 1861, p. 8; New York Herald, 20 April 1861, p. 4.
80. New York Times, 20 April 1861, p. 8.
81. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Times, 19 April 1861, p. 2; also see, New York Leader, 13 April 1861, p. 3; New York Leader, 20 April 1861, p. 4; Evening Post, 17 April 1861, p. 1; Silbey, A Respectable Minority, p. 39, sees a similar Democratic reaction across the North.
82. Evening Post, 22 April 1861, p. 2.
83. Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, vol, 82, 25 April 1861, p. 122-25; John Dix to James Buchanan, 24 April 1861, Works of James Buchanan, 11:184.

84. New York Herald, 19 April 1861, p. 6; New York Herald, 20 April 1861, p. 8; New York Leader, 27 April 1861, p. 5; Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, vol. 82, 22 April 1861, pp. 56-64; J. Smith Homans to Samuel J. Tilden, 16 April 1861, Tilden Papers; Katz, August Belmont, pp. 89-91; Evening Post, 19 April 1861, p. 2.

85. Quote from, New York Leader, 20 April 1861, p. 4; also see, New York Leader, 13 April 1861, p. 4; New York Leader, 27 April 1861, p. 4; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 15 April 1861, 18 April 1861.

86. Quote from, Weekly Anglo-African, 27 April 1861, p. 2; also see, National Anti-Slavery Standard, 20 April 1861, p. 2; National Anti-Slavery Standard, 27 April 1861, p. 2.

87. Quote from, Weekly Anglo-African, 20 April 1861, p. 2; also see, National Anti-Slavery Standard, citations from note #85.

88. New York Leader, 27 April 1861, p. 4.

89. Weekly Anglo-African, 27 April 1861, p. 2; eagerness of black men to fight and hostile reactions by the Administration and vast majority of white citizens were the rules in the North, see, among many examples, Benjamin Quarles, The Negro In The Civil War, (New York, 1968), pp. 26-29, first published in 1953; Freeman, The Free Negro, p. 170, argues the war offered black New Yorkers "no possibility for improvement in their status."

90. Evening Post, 12 April 1861, p. 2.

91. Quote from, New York Tribune, 19 April 1861, p. 4; also see, New York Tribune, 16 April 1861, p. 5.

92. Republican Central Committee meeting, New York Herald, 20 April 1861, p. 4; Brooklyn Evening Star, 15 April 1861, p. 2; Brooklyn Evening Star, 17 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 15 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 19 April 1861, p. 2; Evening Post, 20 April 1861, p. 2; New York Tribune, 19 April 1861, p. 4; New York Tribune, 20 April 1861, p. 4.

93. New York Times, 15 April 1861, p. 4; Moses H. Grinnell to Abraham Lincoln, 15 April 1861, Lincoln Papers; John Dix to James Buchanan, 24 April 1861, Works Of James Buchanan, 11:184.

94. New York Times, 20 April 1861, p. 4.

95. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Times, 15 April 1861, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 13 April 1861, p. 2; New York Times, 16 April 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 18 April 1861, p. 4.

96. For news reports on the events, see, New York Times, 20 April 1861, p. 1; New York Times, 21 April 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 20 April 1861, p. 1; New York Herald, 21 April 1861, p. 1; New York Leader, 20 April 1861, p. 4; Journal of Commerce, 20 April 1861, p. 2.
97. Dunstan, Diary, 20 April 1861.
98. Rooftop perch, in, Diary of Meade, 20 April 1861; food offerings in, Jane S. Woolsey to Margaret Hodge, 20 April 1861, Letters Of A Family; on student, see, James Cromwell to Smith, 24 April 1861, Smith Family Papers, BHS.
99. Union Square quote from, Diary of Lay, 20 April 1861; other quote from, Evening Post, 20 April 1861, p. 2; also see, New York Herald, 21 April 1861, p. 1; New York Express, 20 April 1861, p. 2; Diary of Gross, 20 April 1861; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 19 April 1861.
100. Quote from, Jane Woolsey to Margaret Hodge, 20 April 1861, Letters Of A Family; also see, Diary of Gross, 20 April 1861; Tailer, Jr., Diary, 20 April 1861.
101. New York Times, 21 April 1861, p. 1.
102. Daily News, 20 April 1861, p. 4; Daily News, 22 April 1861, p. 4.

Epilogue: War Years

While the secession months are a self-contained period, key developments of 1860-61 also structured the fabric of lower New York's wartime experience. This epilogue will discuss the metropolitan area during the Civil War,¹ following themes which shaped the response to schism of the Union. Broadly political, the focus is on wartime elections as barometers of opinion on both sectional and local issues.

The major public event of 1861 was the New York City Mayoral election of December 3. Before that, several developments clarified the metropolis's reaction to sectional conflict. The response to Bull Run in July showed the consequences of reliance on the daily press for war news. Initial reports of federal success were followed by accounts of Confederate victory. One woman expressed this abrupt change:

This morning we (are) full flushed with victory and I began dictating terms to the rebels. ... This afternoon came disturbing accounts of the sequel of the capture of the batteries of Bull Run, namely that a panic had seized our troops.²

This generated a sobering sense of a longer struggle.³ It also created skepticism over war coverage that held through 1865. That doubt led to important delays in public responses to news of battles.

A good deal of lower New York's support of the Government was based on maintaining separation between the Union and slavery. For that reason, emancipation was a more sensitive

issue in the metropolis than other Northern areas. A key movement in that regard was Colonel John Cochrane's endorsement of abolition as a war measure. In a November address to his regiment, the former Democratic Congressman and Mozart chairman said:

But to take the slave and make him an implement of war in overcoming your enemy, that is a military scheme. It is a military necessity, and the commander who does not do this, or something equivalent to it, is unworthy of the position he holds and equally unworthy of your confidence.⁴

The sentiments of Cochrane, eventually a War Democrat, were lauded by local Garrisonians, and condemned by conservatives.⁵ Most Republicans were also leery, fearing such a war goal could destroy Northern, and especially local, unity.⁶ Hard Democrats, further, applauded Lincoln's rescinding of the emancipation edict of Charles Fremont, casting the President as a bulwark against radicalism.⁷

The Administration's anti-emancipation policy was the main reason the peace Democratic impulse remained insignificant through the year. Another was the closing by the Government of the Daily News in September.⁸ The Journal of Commerce was forced by federal authorities to suspend its pro-South editor.⁹ Those moves left little room for expression of Confederate sympathies.

Beyond that, the Mayor's public war stance deprived the peace movement of prestigious leadership, leaving lesser figures, Gideon Tucker and Ben Wood, at the helm.¹⁰ Finally, victories off the South Carolina coast in late fall, among others, provided sufficient evidence the Union cause was progressing.¹¹ Northern

defeats, heavy casualties and emancipation in 1862-3 would be the building blocks of Copperheadism.

The fall Mayoral canvass turned on the war and sectional issues. Behind nominee George Opdyke,¹² the Republican campaign focused almost exclusively on Wood's secession-era acts. All Republican speeches, rallies, editorials and broadsides emphasized the Mayor's free city proposal, letter to Senator Toombs, and other expressions of sympathy with the Confederacy. A typical address at an Opdyke meeting advised voters not to "elect a man to take this City out of the Union and deluge our streets in blood."¹³ The party also avoided the potentially unsettling area of emancipation, though black voters supported the nominee.¹⁴

The incumbent ran as a conservative Unionist. Backing the war, he urged quick restoration and steps in addition to military expeditions to reunite the republic. Or, "that while the sword is carried in one hand, the olive branch should be carried in the other." Wood avoided a full capitulation to the public's post-Sumter war zeal. But supporters of the Mozart candidate, especially the Herald, tried to completely reverse his image on the conflict. This included boasting of Wood's war record since mid April.¹⁵

Realizing his vulnerability on the war, Wood tried to shape the canvass on municipal issues, such as the need for greater home rule. This dialogue brought the Mayor dangerously close to reminding voters of the infamous January proposal. But,

politically, he had little choice. The presence in the race of two German foes -- Opdyke and Tammany's C. Godfrey Gunther -- forced Wood to push harder for support of voters of German descent, who resented state sabbatarian restrictions. The incumbent explained at a rally for those electors that when government proscribes

what we shall eat and drink and wear -- how we shall live in ordinary days and how we shall worship God upon the Sabbath, it is no just Government, but a despotism of the most tyrannical character.¹⁶

After collapse of a possible anti-Wood fusion with the Republicans, Tammany ran Gunther, posturing the merchant as a conservative Unionist between the incumbent's support of secession and Opdyke's alleged abolitionism. Astride Tammany in that light, the Mozart campaign also tried to depict a vote for the Republican as a tally for emancipation.¹⁷

But the election was a referendum on Fernando Wood. The key question was whether his loyalists of 1859 would accept the public conversion to a conservative Unionist, pro-war stand, which was Gotham's composite outlook by late 1861. Or, would they rebuke him for the extreme stance of January-April.

In a close contest, enough voters decided Wood had to be dismissed and the city's Unionism affirmed. Opdyke's surprise victory came by surpassing 1859 totals at the expense of Wood in several wards. That represented a major leap from a Southern sympathizer to the party of the Government. Perhaps the more modest move to Gunther was not a sufficient rejection of the incumbent's Confederate proclivities.

Opdyke's margin was narrow. Of about 74,000 votes, he received 34-percent, edging the Tammanyite by 600 ballots and Wood by 1200. But less than a third of those participating voted for the incumbent,¹⁸ a powerful rebuke.

If some abolitionists thought the verdict was a pro-emancipation statement,¹⁹ most felt the ousting of "Fernando the First" was the significant outcome.²⁰ Beyond ending Democratic control of the party's Northern citadel, the results fit a metropolis pattern of reduced conservative totals, a swipe at the faction of Southern sympathies. In Queens, the Democratic tally in November state elections fell below the numbers given to fusion the previous year.²¹

The campaign season of 1862 began with the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation following Antietam in late September. Republican support of the measure was complete. Reluctant on that front in late 1861, local party opinion on ending slavery moved in step with the Administration. Some voices expressed relief the President had finally taken the initiative.²² Black citizens meeting in Queens opposed the rejection from their "native country" implied in the colonization agenda Lincoln proposed in accordance with abolition.²³

But the overwhelming response was a ringing endorsement of the proclamation as a moral triumph certain to shorten the rebellion. A common sentiment was that the edict marked a giant step in the progress of human development, and a vindication of

the country. A Long Island organ proclaimed:

The great step at last has been taken. ... We can really hold our heads among the nations of the earth with the consciousness that our practices do not so wickedly belie our professions. The world believes the honesty of our intentions and purposes. The rebels will begin to believe we are in earnest and mean to use the means God has placed in our hands to subdue them and restore the Union.²⁴

Rejection of Lincoln's scheme was a defining stance for conservatives. It separated them from Republicans, and produced a break in local unity on key war issues which had held since Fort Sumter. Soon to spawn a peace movement, the document initially united all Democrats in opposition to its message. Among the complaints was that the proclamation was useless, would prolong the war, and that it violated due process. Yet, racist-based objections led the onslaught, calling the plan, among other things, "the enslavement of the white race for the freedom of the black."²⁵

Confident Lincoln was the reluctant captive of radicals, Democrats believed a solid defeat of Republicans in the fall elections on emancipation would force, or allow, the President to rescind the order. They planned a spirited canvass on that basis across the metropolitan area.²⁶ Abolitionists, naturally, welcomed the initiative, but were disturbed by the 100-day waiting period until the proclamation took effect. Reluctantly, they, too, accepted the upcoming canvass as a referendum on the plan, and urged people to vote Republican, dropping the antebellum abstention from politics.²⁷

The Democratic campaign centered on the conduct of the war. Opposition to emancipation was the focal point, but criticism of the lack of military progress was also important. Led by gubernatorial nominee Horatio Seymour, the conservative campaign remained committed to the war to preserve the Union, seeking to reaffirm the limited objectives of July 1861. As a party voice in Brooklyn complained: "Hundreds of millions have been spent, hundreds of thousands of lives have been laid down, and for all(,) what is there today to show."²⁸

Democratic unity was striking, showing the power of the slavery issue to unite the factions.²⁹ Tammany and Mozart fielded a joint slate of candidates for city Congressional seats. Tammany even praised Fernando Wood, Democratic aspirant in the 5th House district, as someone "earnestly and honestly opposed to the damnable and destroying heresies of the Abolitionists, and in favor of maintaining the Union at every hazard and every sacrifice."³⁰

Hard and Soft groups also united on nominations in Brooklyn. Martin Kalbfleisch was the nominee in the 2nd Congressional District, which included the county towns, Greenpoint, Bushwick, and most of the western district. Very popular, the Mayor had little need to reach for extreme positions. In that light, his emphasis on emancipation showed the issue's centrality to the Democratic canvass. He cited the edict as "inexpedient, unwise and wrong en toto," merely permitting those in bondage to free themselves at "any cost, even if it be the cutting of your

master's throat."

James Humphrey was the antislavery party's hopeful in the 3rd district, encompassing the Republican wards of Williamsburg, leaving him a chance of success. Redistricting following the 1860 census resulted in a second House seat for the city. Given public sentiment against emancipation, the ex-Congressman courageously stressed support of the edict in contrast to his Democratic foe Moses Odell's position on abolition.³¹

The Hard side of the Democracy tacitly accepted the war stance of the Seymour-led ticket. The publicly recognized Hard sector consisted of Mozart Hall and the Express. It was distinguishable through more racially-charged anti-emancipation stances, and, in comparison to regular Democrats, fewer pledges of support for the armed effort to suppress the rebellion.³² The need in downtown Brooklyn for police to guard tin boxes with rolls for potential draftees in mid October was a sign of a potential anti-war backlash. Recruitment and enlistment were stalled in Jamaica, Flushing, and other areas.³³

Republicans received little help from the political Union concept. War Democrats opposed Fernando Wood in the 5th district and Ben Wood in the 4th.³⁴ John Dix, away in the field, issued a public letter supporting a Union ticket.³⁵ Southern loyalists living in New York, including Texas's Andrew Hamilton, urged support of such a front.

But the refugees from Dixie evoked only pity among Gotham conservatives. Democrats ignored appeals to fuse in a Union

party in Flushing, infuriating Republicans.³⁶ The conservative constituency across the metropolis was too intent on registering displeasure with progress of the war to accept the call for unity in light of the national crisis.

As the public's anger over emancipation became evident, backers of Republican gubernatorial nominee James Wadsworth muted defenses of the edict. When they did address the plan, a moderate Republican voice in Brooklyn's eastern district defended emancipation in Dixie as preferable to forcing slaves to flee

to the North to fill our Navy Yards and thereby forcing our laboring men, by want of employment, to take their place in the South.³⁷

Lincolnite forces were further reduced to such cries as the unfairness of defeating Republican candidates because Democratic generals refused to attack the rebels.³⁸ Mostly, they fell back on labeling the Democratic apparatus as sympathetic to the Confederates. Residents of the metropolis, they argued, could not afford "to give aid and comfort to the enemies of their constitution and their country," by electing Democrats.³⁹

Before the New York vote, the trend of conservative gains in the North was clear. One woman in Gotham who sided with the Democrats wrote: "I almost feel sorry for the Republicans(,) struggling twenty years for power and losing it after one year's position."⁴⁰ Along those lines, results in the southeastern part of the Empire State should have generated an immense outpouring of pity.

Normally reliable Suffolk yielded a slim 200-vote margin for

Wadsworth, and Seymour carried three of five county towns.⁴¹ In Queens, Flushing recorded its largest Democratic vote ever, and Seymour took Newtown by a 5 to 2 majority. Overall, the Democratic ticket swept the county by more than twice the fusion margin of 1860.⁴²

Across the metropolis, Democrats took all Congressional seats. Odell's triumph over Humphrey in Brooklyn was the only close contest. In the 2nd district, Kalbfleisch received about three-quarters of the vote. Other victors included the Wood brothers and James Brooks, who would soon lead the peace movement. Gideon Tucker, already espousing Copperhead sentiments, was easily elected Surrogate.⁴³ Democrats carried all Assembly races in the area.⁴⁴

Seymour's margins in New York City and Brooklyn were impressive. In Manhattan, he took 70-percent of the ballots, carrying all wards. The former governor amassed 9000 more votes than the combined Gunther-Wood Democratic tally in the 1861 Mayoral race. Seymour garnered 60-percent of the city of churches' vote. Those margins represented significant gains over the fusion levels of 1860. They also overcame upstate Republican tallies and allowed the Democrat to reclaim the governorship.⁴⁵ The metropolis had spoken overwhelmingly for a return to the conservative war resolutions of July 1861.

Perhaps wistfully, Democrats publicly argued the returns required Lincoln to reconsider the proclamation.⁴⁶ Privately, too, conservatives presumed "abolitionism as a popular democratic

(movement) has died before it was born." But, the electorate had reaffirmed a war "policy which will lead to the restoration of the Union."⁴⁷ Republicans digested the numbers as more disgust with the slow pace of Union military progress.⁴⁸

The peace movement grew steadily in the first half of 1863 for an array of reasons. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into local and national factors. In New York, the re-emergence of the Daily News in May gave the Copperheads an organ. Moreover, inflation and the squeeze on laborers and artisans,⁴⁹ along with the approaching draft, galvanized the working class in opposing the war. Just as important were developments beyond the metropolis. These included federal defeat and heavy casualties at Chancellorsville, the arrest of Clement Vallandigham and emancipation.⁵⁰

Mozart Hall was the chief expression of the peace initiative. All three peace Congressmen -- Fernando Wood, Ben Wood, James Brooks -- worked with the Hard Democratic camp. In meetings of the general committee and larger rallies for the public, Mozart shaped a peace program.

It called for suspension of hostilities and the proposal of grievances by a Southern convention. If such a convention sought Confederate independence, the North would conduct a plebiscite on the question of recognizing the Southern republic or continuing the war, according to the Mozart scheme. The public vote on that subject would determine the Administration's policy. While Wood

insisted the plan was designed to achieve restoration, the main message rejected coercion of the South and accepted the right of secession.⁵¹

The Wood-led faction also planned a state Democratic peace convention for New York City.⁵²

Before that parley, the May 18 rally in sympathy with Vallandigham energized the Copperhead impulse. While not avowedly a peace gathering, the demonstration expressed the gamut of opposition to the Administration's war policy. Some voices called for peace and resistance to the draft. Chaired by 1861 Mayoral candidate Gunther, the meeting at Union Square drew a large turnout. New Yorkers disillusioned with the war used the occasion publicly to register their frustration. Speakers included Isaiah Rynders, who addressed the throng as "fellow subjects of King Abraham the First."⁵³

Most prominent Democratic sources objected to the Ohioan's arrest as part of consistent opposition to the Government's suspension of the writ of habeus corpus and other crackdowns on civil liberties.⁵⁴ But appearance at the rally could have been interpreted as endorsement of Vallandigham's message. Such a stance had the taint of treason, offending both the sensibilities and political viability of public officials. For that reason, leading figures like Samuel Tilden, Elijah Purdy and August Belmont, while invited and listed as meeting officers, did not attend.

Yet, in an indication that the line between an anti-

Administration stance and Copperheadism was not yet clear, the Tammany paper and other non-peace Democrats endorsed the gathering.⁵⁵

Republicans cast the former Congressman as a traitor and the sympathy meeting as a gathering of disloyalists. Even so, many were troubled by the arrest. They feared, correctly, the Vallandigham situation would serve as a rallying point for those interested in more than freedom of speech. A Brooklyn source charged Ambrose Burnside, the arresting officer, had

unsealed the mouth of every traitor in the free states. Every one of them, under the pretext of 'constitutional rights' and 'free speech' will assail the Government and seek to exasperate the people against the power at Washington. They have been laying in wait for this opportunity for some time.⁵⁶

The peace movement peaked in June. Advocates rallied at Riverhead, Long Island,⁵⁷ among other places. The major assemblage was at Cooper Union on June 3. Attendance was nearly 30,000, making it the largest demonstration in Gotham since the Union rally days after Fort Sumter.

Billed as a state Democratic convention, it included representatives of each of the Empire State's Congressional districts. Edward Lawrence of Queens was chair, but Fernando Wood and the Mozart apparatus were the driving forces behind the event. Tammany chieftains stayed away, although the Hall's rank-and-file constituency turned out in force.

In resolutions and speeches, the meeting heralded the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves of 1798 as the cornerstone of Democratic localism. It also repeated much of the Mozart peace

agenda, adding the vague clause that separate Northern and Southern conventions would determine how "the contending sections shall be reconciled."⁵⁸

The most significant response came from prominent Democratic quarters. They rejected the message of the rally, largely from a Unionist perspective. Agreeing with nearly all criticisms of the Administration, these voices broke with the Copperheads over strategy and process. They chastised the peace initiative's ill-defined agenda of cessation of hostilities and sectional conventions leading to restoration. Arguing the Confederacy only wanted peace with independence, a Queens organ asserted: "So far as the question of peace is concerned, the Democracy will favor none that does not embrace the whole Union under the protection of one Constitution."⁵⁹

The rally eroded the Tammany-Mozart alliance on war outlook. Clarifying the position of the camps, Wood's group was the peace element while Tammany emerged as the pro-war Democratic faction. The Hall's mouthpiece favored, "Peace when Peace can be obtained without degradation and dishonor. Wood's peace means disunion and that only."⁶⁰

In addition, the peace season showed that most prominent conservative expressions chose the Union over slavery. The Copperhead agenda was aimed largely at preserving bondage, even at the price of separate confederacies. That was too much for most Democrats, whose devotion to sustaining the whole republic was proven stronger than a desire to maintain black slavery.

In an important turnout point, they balked when the tone and message of the peace drive showed they might have to surrender the Union if they pushed the anti-emancipation agenda fully. For the next two years, those quarters still attacked abolition and mused about retaining slavery in part of the South. But the emphasis was never again as strong as it had been prior to June 1863.

In the short run, the Confederate invasion of the North undercut the peace current just as it reached a pinnacle of strength.⁶¹ The presence of rebels in Pennsylvania reinforced the need for sectional unity and defense, a response similar to that which followed the Fort Sumter episode. In that light, the July riots were more a final, angered outrage than the highwater mark of local Copperheadism.

The riots of July have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. The most recent account studies the outbreak in the context of changing class relations and economic conditions in midcentury New York.⁶² Another student has examined the significance of the sizable proportion of women engaged in the disturbances.⁶³

The emphasis here is the impact of the riots on the metropolis, both in activity and opinion on war issues. Queens, for instance, experienced, in milder doses, most aspects of the disturbances which gripped Gotham for several days, a common patterns for the county on the edge of the metropolitan area. A

crowd of about 300 men in Jamaica destroyed army uniforms meant for draftees, forcing the Provost to cancel the 1st Congressional District lottery and flee.⁶⁴

Flushing was swept by rumors of disturbances by mobs from Hunter's Point and College Point. Authorities prepared for an invasion, ordering early closure of stores. But a small anti-draft rally by Irish residents was the only occurrence.⁶⁵ Black refugees from the onslaught in the cities camped on Long Island, evoking a pledge of moral superiority not to "renew upon the colored race here the barbarities perpetrated in New York."⁶⁶

Brooklyn saw a more concentrated outburst. Grain elevators on the waterfront were torched by a contingent of 200 people.⁶⁷ Mobs beat black residents on the streets and attacked dwellings of black homeowners.⁶⁸ Citizens of African descent took refuge at police precinct offices and with ward patrols created to deter outbreaks.⁶⁹

Regular law enforcement was depleted since many Metropolitan officers were dispatched to Manhattan to help subdue the riots. The shortage left the city vulnerable; precautionary steps were taken. These included stationing a canon at the Navy Yard and withdrawing all arms from the arsenal.

Yet, no major outbreaks materialized. A few spontaneous assemblages of artisans and laborers to consider action dispersed with pledges to fight the draft in the courts. Brooklynites seeking to observe or participate in the uprising crossed the river,⁷⁰ confirming Gotham's magnet role in local developments.

Brooklyn was accustomed to lagging behind New York City in symbolic -- Lincoln's visit in February 1861 -- and such clear areas of competition as wealth and population. But the riots were a reassuring reminder of the advantages of being part, but not the center, of the metropolis. Boosters were proud of the relative clam of the nation's third largest city, attributing it "to the fact that this community is, to so great an extent, composed of property holders, who know their duties as citizens."⁷¹

The uprising had an important effect on Manhattan residents of a Democratic persuasion. Eyewitnesses to the destruction and violence, they drew back in horror at the implications of the racist, Southern sympathizing ethos of the conservative stance.

One Irish Catholic woman who opposed the draft, Maria Daly, feared proximity to a row of tenements with black dwellers placed the family in peril. She "ordered the doors to be shut and no gas lighted in front of the house." Daly was especially shocked at women "stimulating the men to greater ferocity." These realizations of personal vulnerability in the wake of rampant racism, and of the impact of riot-related rage on normal expectations of female behavior, caused Daly fully to reject the Copperhead message, strengthening her devotion to the war.⁷²

For Edward Tailer, a dry goods merchant, the episode also marked a turning point. As recently as November 1862, he supported the Democracy, largely on the anti-emancipation issue. A businessman, Tailer was distressed over the destruction of

property, but also concerned with the rioters' design to "maltreat and murder the poor blacks wherever they can find them."⁷³ That reaction stirred a shift in Taiter's political orientation.

In terms of party opinion, the peace Democratic voices of the Express and Daily News came close to condoning the outburst. While they refrained from sanctioning looting and terror, the greater stress was on the injustices of the draft and emancipation, which spawned the disturbances. Ben Wood's organ explained:

Goaded beyond endurance by the attempt to impress them into an emancipation crusade, the workingmen have given vent to their resentment and are seeking to meet extremes by extremes and to retaliate upon injustice by wild and disorderly resistance.⁷⁴

Democratic Unionist sources issued more forceful denunciations. They strove to distinguish between opposition to such Administration policies as the draft and the Copperhead ethos, a separation difficult to fathom in July. One method was to praise Governor Seymour's handling of the situation, affirming a Democratic loyalist who opposed conscription.⁷⁵ Mostly, the riots widened the gap between peace and Unionist Democrats; it had already emerged in June over the possibility of recognizing the Confederacy.

Republicans and abolitionists expressed simplistic, even opportunistic, opinions. They defended the draft and condemned the rioters as part of a Democratic-inspired plot, in partnership with Jefferson Davis's government, to subvert the Union.

Greeley's paper said the riots were "originated and fomented by Northern traitors, in aid of the falling fortunes of the Rebellion at the South." Without any understanding of such intervening issues as the draft, emancipation or inflation, the Garrisonians characterized the mob as

but the adjournment of the one which Fernando Wood had promised the rebels in advance would be ready to help them and which they fully expected would break out as soon as Sumter was fired on.⁷⁶

When finally subdued, the riots produced two more important results. One was a concession by conservatives that inequities of the draft were a cause of the troubles across the metropolis. Town meetings in Flushing and Jamaica, the Queens County Board of Supervisors, and councils in Brooklyn and New York moved quickly to allocate funds to pay fees for draftees who chose not to serve.⁷⁷

The other was a surprising outpouring of sympathy for black New Yorkers. Collections were raised to provide relief for the victims and dispossessed. A normally Hard Democratic voice in Queens advised:

Let us have no outrages upon the persons and property of the colored population. ... They are helpless; and suffer enough for the inequality of their condition to deserve the protection of the masses.⁷⁸

They recognized the human, if not civil, rights of those of African descent, which gradually translated into acceptance of emancipation.

The fall 1863 elections demonstrated the fallout from the peace

movement and riots. While the Democratic state platform affirmed the war, the party suffered major setbacks across the metropolis; voters punished the Democracy for the element of disloyalty displayed earlier in the year. The canvass also spawned the emergence of a War Democratic group. Among these were John Dix, Francis Spinola and Alfred M. Wood (no relation to Fernando and Ben), who won the Brooklyn Mayoral contest.⁷⁹

In the state-level elections of November, the Democratic margin in Queens was cut by half from the levels of 1862. Flushing, for instance, returned the lowest Democratic tally in years. A conservative organ, the Long Island Times, acknowledged

it is well known that many of the present leaders of the party, instead of co-operating in the war are doing all they can to hinder it. The people have discovered this fact and repudiated the policy.⁸⁰

In Brooklyn, Democratic totals fell to 52-percent from 60-percent a year earlier.⁸¹ Conservative strength in New York city was also greatly reduced.⁸²

John Cochrane became the most prominent elective symbol of the War Democracy. The former Congressman and Mozart chair, who had backed emancipation in the fall of 1861, was elected state Attorney General on the Union ticket.⁸³ Edward Tailer, for one, voted Republican for the first time.⁸⁴ In an odd twist, peace forces claimed that since the state platform upheld the war, the returns proved the Democracy "cannot triumph as a War party."⁸⁵

Brooklyn's political attention was focused on the Mayoral race. The incumbent, Martin Kalbfleisch, had been elected to the

House in November 1862, but was remaining at the helm of the city until Congress met in December 1863. His decision to seek another Mayoral term surprised and confused Democrats.⁶⁶

The Brooklyn Daily Eagle was particularly chagrined. Given the paper's previous championing of Kalbfleisch, the daily's stated anger at the attempted monopolization of posts seems genuine. It asked: "Are we so poor in men that we must place in the hands of one man two or more offices?" Influential in Democratic quarters, the Eagle's opposition to Kalbfleisch's renomination was pivotal. It backed Benjamin Prince, a member of one of Brooklyn's wealthiest families and former county treasurer.⁶⁷

In a bitter convention, with contested delegations from several wards, Prince defeated the incumbent for the nomination.⁶⁸ Heads of German Democratic clubs refused to back the regular nominee.

After consideration of running on the Union slate as a War Democrat, Kalbfleisch launched an independent candidacy to retain the Mayoralty, counting on the disaffected Germans as his base of support. Relying on his record and notoriety, the Mayor's sole explanation of the unorthodox move was that "circumstances of a private nature" led to the abandonment of the House seat. He also charged fraud in the Democratic primary process cost him the regular nomination.⁶⁹

Alfred Wood, a federal treasury agent, was captured at First Bull Run while leading Brooklyn's celebrated 14th Regiment. In

accepting the Union nod, he said:

I need not remind you that I am a War Democrat, fully impressed with the conviction that this war must be vigorously prosecuted and efficiently out worked to the very end, and that I have determined since the very commencement of the contest to know no party save the party of the Union.⁹⁰

With barely a mention of local issues, the Republican campaign focused on Colonel Wood's war experience and the need for political unity in the face of rebellion. Campaign speeches noted Wood's "political opinions had been molded while suffering as a prisoner in rebel dungeons." The nominee advised:

Every vote for this ticket is a vote against the Rebellion. I know what I say, for I have been with the soldiers and I know their feelings and I say that every vote for the Union ticket strengthens every Union soldier in the field.⁹¹

Prince was the forgotten man of the contest. He made few appearances and Democratic rallies rarely alluded to the nominee. Since the popular incumbent was in the field, references to the advantages of Democratic administration of the city would not help Prince. His campaign counted on the base of regular Democratic votes, and stressed a conservative, pro-war outlook.⁹²

In a competitive three-way race, Wood carried 12 of 20 wards and 45-percent of the total to win the election. He ran well in the usually Republican eastern district wards, and also picked up several western wards where the War Democratic label proved effective. It enabled voters to reject the peace-tainted Democracy and uphold the war without endorsing Republicanism. Kalbfleisch only carried his home ward of Bushwick and 15-percent of city tallies,⁹³ a resounding defeat for a man who had won

impressive victories in 1861 and 1862. It was a condemnation of his weak explanation of forsaking the House and of an apparent arrogant drive for offices.

The New York battle for chief magistrate was held in early December. Partly for that reason, it received special attention and addressed local issues more than the other Mayoral canvass, which coincided with November voting for state officers.

Seeking to follow the War Democratic path to victory, a contingent of Manhattan Republicans maneuvered to draft John Dix. The well-known general and former Senator had taken military command in Gotham after the riots. A delegation obtained approval from Lincoln that Dix could retain the army post if elected, but the general seemed reluctant."

The Union Mayoral convention considered making no selection and urging direct public endorsement of Dix. That brought to the surface the frustration of regulars that the party was betraying Republican principles and figures in the expedient search for electable War Democrats. In that climate, they tapped Orison Blunt, a county Supervisor." The canvass stressed both Democratic corruption and the need, "in the present critical period," to have firm Unionists in all posts."

Tammany and Mozart agreed to avoid sectional issues and unite behind a sole Democratic nominee. The choice was Francis Boole, who was City Inspector." Boole was from the Tammany, or war, side of the Democracy.

But in the context of the coalition, his tongue was tied on

the military struggle, stunting his candidacy. Further, the peace forces worked for the Boole campaign. While they muted the Copperhead message in the framework of the Mayoral race, Fernando Wood, the Express and other elements of the apparatus continued their crusade in the fall of 1863, ultimately harming Boole.⁹⁸

With the war off limits, the campaign focused with satisfaction on the achievement of a Tammany-Mozart fusion. They claimed such a joining made Boole the regular nominee and expected success on that basis in the overwhelmingly Democratic town.⁹⁹ Given the public's anti-corruption, anti-machine mood, fueled partly by the inflationary squeeze on wages, that emphasis was a tactical error. Boole's British birth also hurt the aspirant among Irish electors.¹⁰⁰

Tammany's standard-bearer in 1861, C. Godfrey Gunther ran as an independent Democrat. His chairing of the Vallandigham sympathy meeting in May created a false image as a Copperhead. Peace voices helped by disavowing him in the fall. While he didn't emphasize the war, Gunther's independent status left him free to make some sectional statements, all of which affirmed the maintenance of the Union. His canvass mostly stressed machine and corruption charges against the Boole candidacy. Unlike in 1861 when he had to deal with George Opdyke, Gunther had the advantage of being the lone German candidate, troubling the Boole forces.¹⁰¹

The independent's victory was surprising. It was buoyed by gains over 1861 totals in several wards carried by Opdyke in

1861, and by impressive margins in the heavily German districts. On the whole, Gunther took half of the city's 22 wards and 40-percent of the vote. Boole ran second with 32-percent.¹⁰²

Maria Daly saw the result as a "moral victory" over the Halls.¹⁰³ Beyond that, the verdict showed many New Yorkers rejected Boole's silence on the war. In light of the peace program and riots, they insisted on, even from local officials, a clear pro-Union stand.

The election of 1864 was marked by a few central developments. One was the Democrats' nomination in August of George McClellan on a peace platform, and his repudiation of that message in September following the fall of Atlanta.¹⁰⁴ Another was the Republican effort, through the political Union concept, to attract War Democratic voters.

A key dispute among conservatives in the election was over the nature of the McClellan candidacy. Before the Democratic convention, rallies for the general contained both peace voices and those asserting he would continue the war.¹⁰⁵ Shortly after the Chicago gathering, a McClellan ratification meeting still hailed the nominee as representing both elements of the Democracy. August Belmont, party national chairman, put the general in a war context, while Isaiah Rynders implored: "The war should be stopped right away."¹⁰⁶

Peace forces defended the Chicago platform and insisted McClellan had to honor it. They argued the election of the

general on such planks would "encourage and strengthen" peace sentiment in Dixie, leading to cessation of hostilities and negotiations. Copperheads were active in the local McClellan campaign.¹⁰⁷

Regular Democrats were satisfied the nominee had distanced himself from peace planks of the platform. But they acknowledged the damaging Copperhead taint on the Democratic canvass, calling those paragraphs "the most stupid and suicidal and yet the most impudent and detestable declarations ever made." In that context, such voices urged dismissal of Vice Presidential nominee George Pendleton, representative of the peace wing.¹⁰⁸

Based on the tone of the campaign, the local McClellan effort was overwhelmingly dedicated to the military struggle. It stressed that only through war could the Union be preserved, an understanding spawned at the height of peace strength in the spring of 1863. Speaking at a Brooklyn rally, a top Democrat advised:

Put George McClellan in the Presidential chair, make him the head of your armies, and in thirty days you will see indications of returning into the Union among the Southern people, whatever may be the feelings of their leaders.

The general's canvass also expressed the continued leeriness of emancipation among the great majority of the metropolitan area Democracy.¹⁰⁹

War Democrats were active; they included several prominent antebellum conservatives. John Cochrane was slated to run with Charles Fremont on an independent Unionist ticket for national offices. That drive ended when supporters endorsed Lincoln,

arguing the Democratic platform required all Unionists to unite behind the incumbent. Cochrane campaigned for the Lincoln-Johnson tandem.¹¹⁰

John Dix and Daniel Sickles endorsed the President and held rallies for his re-election. Conservatives such as Edward Tailer supported the officeholder, "not deeming it prudent to change the administration in the present crisis of our affairs."¹¹¹ But McClellan's popularity, along with the Unionist, war emphases of his canvass, made the War Democratic concept insignificant in an electoral sense.

Unlike in 1862 when the looming Emancipation Proclamation forged a conservative phalanx, the peace issue destroyed Democratic unity at the sub-presidential level. The Herald and other regular party voices insisted that the Copperhead Congressmen, the Woods and James Brooks, be omitted from a House slate.¹¹² For that reason, Tammany's Congressional ticket consisted of aspirants pledged to the war.¹¹³ The peace lawmakers ran on separate slates. Democratic rivalry and confusion on the war and other issues was intense enough that as many as eight factions endorsed candidates for a single House seat.¹¹⁴

Republicans highlighted peace lines in the Chicago platform for full political gain. They depicted the entire Democratic canvass as a Copperhead movement. This approach was shaped by New York Times editor Henry Raymond, national chair of the Union party and a Congressional candidate. A speaker at a gathering of

German Republicans in Brooklyn's eastern district insisted:

The peace platform was intended to promote an object, that object to reconstruct the Union on the basis of slavery, and if McClellan is elected, all the blood and treasure sacrificed will be for naught.¹¹⁵

While peace-baiting was the chief campaign tactic, Republicans also felt more comfortable lauding emancipation than in 1863, a major change across the North. The emphases were on the consummation of an effort undertaken in 1854, fulfillment of war gains and the triumph of free labor, still especially important to Germans.¹¹⁶

Yet, most of the spirited pro-emancipation ethos emerged outside the formal republican campaign. Black activists in Brooklyn, endorsing the party, stressed themes of freedom and equal rights. Women meeting at Cooper Union claimed: "There is no use in trying to heal the wounds of the Union without extracting the bullet that made them -- slavery."¹¹⁷

Unionists in Queens based their efforts on appealing to possible War Democrats. Elected in 1862, Long Island Congressman Henry Stebbins had functioned as a War Democrat in the House, giving the appearance of a strong Union arm in Queens and Suffolk. But Stebbins was selected in the anti-emancipation, conservative landslide.

His post-election shift to a pro-Administration stance, probably a reaction to the peace movement of 1863, angered constituents. Partly for that reason, Stebbins was resigning. In addition to the regular biennial election, the 1st Congressional District was holding a special canvass to choose a

lawmaker to complete the Stebbins term.

Still, Republicans believed in a potentially sizable War Democratic vote. They held events designed to entice conservatives. One example was featuring an Irish officer from Manhattan at a rally.¹¹⁸ Such tactics yielded some results. A normally non-partisan organ in eastern Queens endorsed Lincoln to "complete what we have begun."¹¹⁹

Democrats on Long Island responded. They staged as many as four demonstrations per night, and resorted to such techniques as stealing the Lincoln banner from Union headquarters in Flushing.¹²⁰ They also implored supporters to remain loyal to the party, claiming defections would mean "the triumph of abolitionism has been secured."¹²¹

Presidential elections in midcentury New York were tense occasions due to use of intimidation and ballot fraud as political tools. The canvass of 1864 had additional points of concern. Plots to manipulate the soldiers' vote were uncovered.¹²² Rumors of Confederate strategies to undermine the process were given credence by rebel raids from Canada into upstate New York. The presence in the metropolis of many Southern refugees, especially in Brooklyn, was an added cause for worry. As a precaution local military commander Dix ordered registration of such persons. Federal troops under Major General Benjamin F. Butler were present to insure a peaceful canvass.¹²³

The election results demonstrated that the McClellan message of war, Union and social conservatism reflected the composite

view of the metropolis. Democratic totals were lower than in 1862, but higher than 1863 and similar to fusion levels of 1860.

In Queens, for instance, the general carried the four western towns comfortably and took the county by about 1100 votes. That compared with a Democratic margin of 1400 in 1862 and a 700 in 1863. Typical of the metropolis, soldiers of the Flushing Battery voted solidly for the Democrat on absentee ballots. As in 1860, Lincoln triumphed in the eastern Queens towns of Hempstead and North Hempstead, and prevailed in Suffolk.¹²⁴

While Lincoln surpassed his 1860 showing in Gotham by carrying one ward, McClellan took a commanding 66-percent of the city vote.¹²⁵ The President confirmed Republican strength in Brooklyn's eastern district, carrying five wards in the Williamsburg-Greenpoint-Bushwick area. But McClellan's military service undercut the possible War Democratic vote for the Union ticket in the western district, where Lincoln ran behind Alfred Wood's 1863 levels.¹²⁶

Statewide returns indicated the metropolis remained the citadel of Democratic strength. The general took Westchester, Rockland and Richmond counties, all in southeastern New York. Lincoln's margins in the rest of the Empire State were sufficient to give the Republican the largest block of electoral votes in the Union. In addition, reductions in the local Democratic margins from record levels of 1862, which had elected Seymour as governor, allowed Reuben Fenton to defeat the incumbent,

reclaiming the state's highest post for the Republicans.¹²⁷

A final note of importance was the defeat of Fernando Wood's bid for re-election to Congress. In a close contest, he lost the 9th District race to Union candidate William Darling, much to the delight of such War Democrats as Edward Tailer. Since McClellan easily carried that section of the city, many Democrats made a deliberate decision to rebuff Wood.¹²⁸ Much as in the Mayoral race of 1861, Wood's extreme pro-South stand on the sectional conflict, this time in a peace context, was rejected.

Overall, Republicans won three of nine area House races,¹²⁹ their best showing since 1858. Yet, James Brooks's narrow win in a House race showed lingering toleration for peace sentiment.¹³⁰

Patterns of the war years persisted. One of these was the gradual acceptance of the war and its results by former Hard Democrats. James Brenton, editor of the Long Island Democrat, strongly anti-coercion in the secession period, looked back on the war in 1867 as a noble struggle for the Union.¹³¹

Political conservatism on sectional issues held up in Reconstruction. In the election of 1866, while Republicans swept to record victories across the North, Democrats won commanding margins in New York City, Brooklyn and Queens. Fernando Wood and James Brooks were returned to Congress.¹³²

Gotham's search for various degrees of separation from the Empire State continued, both in the short and long runs. In

1875, Congressman Wood was still formulating plans for home rule.¹³³ As recently as 1991, a prominent public figure recommended city-state status, similar to Hong Kong's, as a way to help New York City.¹³⁴

Notes

1. A recent work devoted to this subject, is Ernest McKay, The Civil War And New York City, (Syracuse, 1990).
2. Quote from, Maria Daly, Diary, vol. 25, 22 July 1861; also see, Diary of Satterlee, 22 July 1861.
3. Diary of Gross, 22 July 1861; Diary of Daly, 23 July 1861.
4. Quote from, Cochrane, American Civil War, p. 9; also see, National Anti-Slavery Standard, 23 November 1861, p. 1.
5. National Anti-Slavery Standard, 16 November 1861, p. 2; National Anti-Slavery Standard, 23 November 1861, p. 2; New York Herald, 20 November 1861, p. 4; New York Leader, 16 November 1861, p. 4.
6. New York Times, 29 November 1861, p. 4.
7. New York Express, 2 December 1861, p. 2; New York Express, 4 December 1861, p. 2.
8. Long, New York "News," pp. 59-65.
9. McClain, The New York Express, p. 253.
10. Gibson, Attitudes Of The New York Irish, p. 129.
11. Tailer, Jr. Diary, 13 November 1861; Diary of Daly, 16 November 1861.
12. New York Times, 25 November 1861, p. 4.
13. Quote from, speech of James Gallatin, Opdyke rally, in, New York Times, 27 November 1861, p. 4; also see, New York Times, 29 November 1861, p. 4; Opdyke rally, New York Times, 30 November 1861, p. 8; New York Times, 1 December 1861, p. 4; Opdyke rally, p. 8; Brooklyn Evening Star, 2 December 1861, p. 2; The People's Bulletin, 25 November 1861, p. 2; The People's Bulletin, 2 December 1861, p. 2.
14. New York Leader, 30 November 1861, p. 4.

15. Quote from, Wood speech, Mozart rally, in, New York Times, 30 November 1861, p. 8; also see, Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 117-118; New York Herald, 20 November 1861, p. 4; New York Herald, 30 November 1861, p. 6.
16. Quote from, Wood speech, in, New York Times, 28 November 1861, p. 8; also see, on Wood's problem with the German vote, New York Times, 23 November 1861, p. 4; New York Times, 25 November 1861, pp. 4-5; Nadel, Little Germany, p. 149. George Opdyke was actually of Dutch ancestry, but usually regarded as a German American public figure, see, explanation, footnote #71, chapter 2.
17. On failed movement to achieve an anti-Wood fusion, see, New York Times, 21 October 1861, p. 4; New York Leader, 16 November 1861, p. 4; on Tammany and Gunther, see, New York Times, 1 December 1861, p. 8; New York Leader, 23 November 1861, p. 4; New York Leader, 30 November 1861, p. 4; on anti-abolitionism in the Wood campaign, see, New York Times, 30 November 1861, p. 8.
18. New York Times, 4 December 1861, p. 5; New York Express, 4 December 1861, p. 3; Diary of Gross, 3 December 1861.
19. National Anti-Slavery Standard, 7 December 1861, p. 2.
20. Tailer, Diary, 3 December 1861.
21. Long Island Democrat, 12 November 1861, p. 2; Mushkat, Reconstruction Of the New York Democracy, p. 31.
22. Brooklyn Daily Times, 23 September 1862, p. 2.
23. Documentary History Of The Negro People, I:471-473.
24. Quote from, The Long Islander, 26 September 1862, p. 2; also see, Brooklyn Daily Times, 16 October 1862, p. 2; New York Tribune, 23 September 1862, p. 4; New York Tribune, 24 September 1862, p. 4.
25. Quote from, New York Leader, 4 October 1862, p. 2; also see, New York Express, 23 September 1862, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 23 September 1862, p. 2; Long Island Democrat, 30 September 1862, p. 2; Tailer, Diary, 25 September 1862.
26. Long Island Democrat, 30 September 1862, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 17 October 1862, p. 2; also see, Express and Tailer citations, note #25.
27. National Anti-Slavery Standard, 27 September 1862, p. 2; National Anti-Slavery Standard, 4 October 1862, p. 2.

28. Quote from, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 3 November 1862, p. 2; also see, Tailer, Diary, 1, 10, 13 October 1862; Brooklyn Evening Star, 1 November 1862, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 23 October 1862, p. 2; Long Island Times, 23 October 1862, p. 2; Long Island Times, 30 October 1862, p. 2; Democratic rally, in, Long Island Democrat, 4 November 1862, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 24 October 1862, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 28 October 1862, p. 2.
29. Long Island Democrat, 23 September 1862, p. 2; Long Island Democrat, 30 September 1862, p. 2; New York Leader, 11 October 1862, p. 2; New York Leader, 25 October 1862, p. 2; Journal of Commerce, 25 October 1862, p. 2.
30. Quote from, New York Leader, 18 October 1862, p. 4; also see, New York Leader, 11 October 1862, p. 4; New York Times, 18 October 1862, p. 8; New York Times, 20 October 1862, p. 8; New York Times 2 November 1862, p. 5.
31. Quote from, German Democratic rally, in, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 31 October 1862, p. 2; also see, New York Times, 15 October 1862, p. 8; New York Times, 16 October 1862, p. 8; New York Times, 20 October 1862, p. 8; Brooklyn Evening Star, 25 October 1862, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Times, 24 October 1862, p. 2; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 17 October 1862, p. 2; New York Leader, 18 October 1862, p. 4; New York Tribune, 4 November 1862, p. 3; New York Herald, 4 November 1862, p. 1.
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Conclusion

Several major points emerge from this study. Some of these are germane to the history of the metropolis, while others relate to Northern reaction to secession and civil war.

One of the former concerns the nature of working class resentment in mid 19th century New York. It was local and concrete. Frustrations were based on shortcomings in jobs, wages and living conditions, as well as threats to lifestyle. Clear opposition only surfaced in the face of immediate peril in one of those areas, as with the police and excise laws of 1857.¹

During the secession period, the economic slump did not ignite an outbreak. That was because the reasons for the recession and suspension of trade were sectional and national, not local. There was also no imminent danger. Laborers and artisans, like most residents of the metropolis, hoped for a political compromise to end the crisis. In addition, the metropolitan area focus on the Union over emancipation was shared by most working class New Yorkers.

By 1863, the effects of the war on Gothamites of meager means was local and direct. It came in the forms of the failure of wages to keep pace with inflation, large numbers of battlefield casualties, emancipation and the draft. The only avenue of viable protest was voting against Republicans. The failure of state Democratic officials to halt implementation of the lottery by federal Republican officers seemed to eliminate a final safeguard of autonomy,² leading to a ghastly outburst of

rage and hatred.

Moreover, the sectional crisis furthered the sense that the metropolis was a unit led by, but not limited to, New York City. The metropolitan area as a whole suffered economically during secession due to a halt in trade and most business activity. Young men from either side of the East River marched off to war in the spring of 1861 in the same regiments. Riots of July 1863 in Gotham had ripple effects on Long Island.³ The experiences of the war years made the links of Brooklyn and Queens to New York City more evident and consolidation more likely.

Politically, the Civil War had an important impact on the intra-Democracy rivalry. Secession showed the division between Tammany and Mozart was genuine, based on degree of support of the South and slavery. That recognizable split continued during the military conflict, especially after 1862 as Mozart emerged as the peace wing.⁴

Nevertheless, developments of 1861 to 1865 gradually made the wedge meaningless and worked towards consolidation of the party under the aegis of Tammany. From the First Confiscation Act to the 13th Amendment, the process of eliminating slavery undercut the chief issue on which Mozart based its separate identity. After the war, the split between Hard Mozart and Soft Tammany was irrelevant.

The era of schism also confirmed the significance of public debate in Gotham. It was a serious dialogue carried on in formal settings like meetings and newspapers columns. The debate also

transpired in less official ways, including private correspondence and discussions at homes and general stores. While certain sectors dominated the discourse, diverse voices participated and played crucial roles.

The best example of this process was the assurance of moderate Republicans to conservatives that the Union, and not slavery, was the issue of the hour. That guarantee was hammered out and largely accepted through the various public and private, official and unofficial, channels through which New Yorkers debated political issues.⁵ Even the emphasis of abolitionists and radical Republicans on bondage contributed to this development. Their focus on servitude gave moderates something to attack and marginalize, showing conservatives most prominent Republicans rejected a slavery-based view of the crisis.

On a broader plane, a couple of important findings warrant attention. One is the strong influence of sectional topics on elections in the secession and Civil War eras. Most recent studies of New York and of Northern politics in the period stress the impact of temperance, nativism and other regional issues.⁶

However, beginning in the late 1850s, political life and especially elections in the metropolis actually pivoted on sectional issues. As friction between the regions reached the point of confrontation, concerns about slavery and the Union eclipsed local matters. From Fernando Wood's triumph in the Mayoral race of 1859 through the election of 1864, those national

themes determined the alignment of factions and the outcome of canvasses.

In addition, the experiences of the secession period confirmed the extent to which New York functioned politically as a Southern city. The metropolitan area's overwhelming vote against Lincoln in 1860 was a statement of conservatism on sectional issues. Similarly, Breckinridge, the extreme candidate in the South, was solidly defeated by Bell and Douglas in urban areas of the slave states.⁷

During the secession months, residents of Gotham favored a compromise settlement of the crisis. Given the chance, they would have voted for the Crittenden or Border State packages. Likewise, in elections of delegates to conventions, Dixie's cities, especially in the upper South, supported co-operationists.⁸

In terms of reaction to secession, a key factor was the intensity of the six-month period. The stakes were high, with the status of the Union seemingly in jeopardy each day. This pressured, condensed climate exaggerated previously minor political differences between radical and moderate Republicans, and Hard and Soft Democrats. It also forced many to travel farther in opinion and actions than they might have in years.

Further, the brief span is best understood as three separate sections, each defined by a major question. The issue of November 1860 to mid December was the Constitutional validity of

secession, with the composite decision rejecting legal withdrawal. From mid December to late February 1861, compromise was the topic, and the metropolis solidly favored a political settlement. Coercion was the subject of late February to mid April; lower New York tacitly opposed use of force against the South.

The weakest positions of the period were Horace Greeley's go-in-peace of November and the anti-coercion outlook of most conservatives by March 1861. They came from different quarters and sought varied political ends. But both were based on the simplistic notion that the South could undertake revolution without resorting to use of arms.

Advocacy of compromise to settle the crisis was the most genuine position. Awareness of settlements in 1787, 1820, 1833 and 1850 gave the arbitration stance a historical anchor. The metropolis's overwhelming vote for fusion in the election of 1860 smoothly translated into support of a solution expressing sympathy with the South, acceptance of slavery and a desire to maintain the Union.⁹

Historians usually scoff at the chances of a successful Congressional response to rupture of the Union.¹⁰ In retrospect, House and Senate efforts in the secession winter look feeble and hopeless. But that was not so apparent to New Yorkers in early 1861. By backing compromise packages, residents of the metropolis, to the extent of their influence, tried to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Acceptance of Confederate independence had legitimate appeal in Hard Democratic quarters. That stance was designed to forestall a federal invasion of the South which would become entwined with an emancipationist agenda.¹¹ Looking at the fabric of opinion in lower New York on the eve of the war, it would seem a peaceful separation stance based on opposition to abolition should have had a larger constituency. Two interconnected and decisive developments curtailed such an audience.

The first was the nature of secession in the Gulf states. New Yorkers were horrified by hasty, undemocratic conventions, intimidation of conservatives, seizures of federal property and attacks on symbols of the Union.¹² A more deliberative process in Dixie, or a Southern effort in Congress to achieve reasonable terms of separation, would have changed the picture. Such a scenario would probably have produced a local majority in favor on independence.

But the course of departure was unacceptable. That course also made it natural to focus on the maintenance of the republic over slavery. The viability of the Union and all it symbolized -- representative government, commerce, romantic nationalism, stability -- was under attack in the South, not black bondage.

The local message of moderate Republicans, coupled with events in the South, gave area residents confidence they could oppose secession without supporting emancipation. That was the outlook with which New Yorkers went to war in April 1861. But their marshaling and mobilization were the beginning of a great

advance in human freedom.

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7. Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 443; Ollinger Crenshaw, "Urban And Rural Voting," in, Eric F. Goldman, ed., Historiography And Urbanization: Essays In American History In Honor Of W. Stull Holt, (Port Washington, 1968), pp. 51-52, 58-60, 66; first published in 1941.
8. In general, areas of the South which voted for Breckinridge in November 1860 were the stronger supporters of secession. The cities had rejected Breckinridge, and they usually voted for co-operationists or moderates in the secession delegate elections, see, among many examples, Peyton McCrary, Clark Miller, Dale Baum, "Class and Party in the Secession Crisis: Voting Behavior In The Deep South, 1856-1861," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 8, 1978, pp. 446, 457. Certain Gulf cities, especially New Orleans and Mobile, were curious exceptions to the trend of Southern cities supporting moderation in the secession months. While they'd both voted overwhelmingly against Breckinridge, the two cities backed secession months later. In New Orleans, a greatly diminished turnout from November hurt Unionists, while in Mobile the co-operationists were outmaneuvered politically, see, Barney, The Secessionist Impulse, p. 253. By and large, though, and especially in the upper South, urban centers in Dixie supported co-operation in late 1860 and early 1861, see, Ralph A. Wooster, The Secession Conventions Of The South, (Princeton, 1962). Barney, The Secessionist Impulse, map, pp. 272-73, shows other Alabama and Mississippi cities going co-operationist; also see, Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate State Of Richmond: A

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 Charles P. Daly Papers, NYPL
 Darnley Family Letters, NYPL
 Daniel S. Dickinson Papers, NYHS
 Papers of Daniel S. Dickinson, NYPL
 John Adams Dix Papers, NYPL
 John Adams Dix Papers, CU
 Stephen A. Douglas Papers, UC
 Papers of Sidney Thomas Fairchild, NYPL
 The Papers of Hamilton Fish, LC
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 Horace Greeley Papers, NYPL
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