

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI[®]

A

**The Politics of School Vouchers:
Entrepreneurs, Opportunities, and Ideas**

By

Laura McKenna

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New
York**

2001

UMI Number: 3008851

Copyright 2001 by
McKenna, Laura Anne

All rights reserved.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform 3008851

Copyright 2001 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

© 2001

LAURA MCKENNA

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

April 30, 2001
Date

Harlyn Cottell
Chair of Examining Committee

April 18th 2001
Date

W.B. H. Kopf
Executive Officer

Andrew Polsky

Christa Altenstetter

Fred Lane

John Mollenkopf
Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS: ENTREPRENEURS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND IDEAS

By

Laura McKenna

Advisor: Marilyn Gittell

School vouchers are a hotly debated topic at the turn of this new century. Some critics believe that vouchers will destroy our public education system; others believe they will provide city students with the necessary tools to survive in the New Economy. This paper investigates how proponents placed vouchers on the agenda and why certain state legislatures have succeeded in passing legislation. By interviewing key participants in Ohio and Pennsylvania and by reviewing other primary material, I found that ideas, entrepreneurs, and opportunities were critical in explaining the origins and outcome of this policy. The idea of vouchers, originally popularized by Milton Friedman in the early 1960s, intrigued both liberals and conservatives who have put forward various proposals since 1972. The idea of choice has proved so successful because it is based on a basic American value of Lockean liberalism and because it exposes certain long-standing problems with the public education system. Two political developments provided opportunities for voucher advocates in the 1990s: the rise of Republican Governors who prioritized school choice reforms and the demand by urban leaders for educational alternatives. Voucher entrepreneurs did much to raise attention to the issue and put

forward legislation in the states. But winning legislation, as entrepreneurs did in Ohio, requires coordination and skill to combat the strategies of the anti-voucher forces.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my advisor, Marilyn Gittel, for mentoring me over the years. She pointed me in new directions, forced me to ask the hard questions, and provided me with valuable experience. My sponsor, Andy Polsky, went beyond the call of duty. I thank him for his sage advice and unflagging support.

I especially would like to thank my family and friends who helped me through 60 credits, two sets of written exams, an oral exam, a proposal defense, and the dissertation itself. I could not have completed this program without my solid support system. My parents read rough drafts and helped out when times were rough. My husband, Steve, endured panic attacks without complaint and celebrated my victories. My son, Jonah, showed me what was most important in life.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	1
WHAT ARE SCHOOL VOUCHERS?	2
AN INTRODUCTION TO VOUCHER POLITICS	3
WHY STUDY THE POLITICS OF VOUCHERS.....	5
METHODOLOGY	7
FINDINGS	11
CHAPTER ORGANIZATION	13
CHAPTER 1 IDEAS, ENTREPRENEURS, AND OPPORTUNITIES	15
WHAT IS INNOVATIVE POLICY?	15
<i>Vouchers as Innovative Policy-Making</i>	17
SOURCE OF CHANGE	29
<i>Ideas</i>	30
<i>Opportunities</i>	33
<i>Entrepreneurs</i>	35
<i>States as Laboratories</i>	40
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES	43
THE ORIGINS OF SCHOOL CHOICE.....	44
CHAPTER 2 RAISING THE DEBATE: THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS 1962-1990	47
ORIGINS OF AN IDEA	48
LIBERALS AND THE 1960s	53
<i>Vouchers and Equity</i>	56
<i>Vouchers and Funding</i>	58
<i>Liberals and Libertarians</i>	59
<i>Alum Rock, California</i>	60
THE DORMANT YEARS.....	63
PUTTING VOUCHERS BACK ON THE AGENDA.....	65
THE REAGAN DEMOCRATS AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.....	66
<i>The Superiority of Catholic Schools</i>	68
<i>Tax Credit Proposals</i>	69
REAGAN'S FIRST TERM.....	70
<i>The Crisis: 1983-1986</i>	71
<i>The 1983 Voucher Proposal: Chapter I</i>	73
REAGAN'S SECOND TERM.....	75
<i>Bennett, the Pit Bull in the Bully Pulpit</i>	75
<i>Anguilar v. Felton</i> - July 1985	76
<i>The 1985 proposal: A Response to Anguilar</i>	78
<i>The 1986 Proposal: Vouchers for Remedial Instruction</i>	79
THE RETREAT - PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE.....	80

THE TURNING POINT.....	83
<u>POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICAN SCHOOLS.....</u>	<u>85</u>
<i>Opportunities in State Education Politics: New Actors and New Policies.....</i>	<i>88</i>
IDEAS, ENTREPRENEURS, AND OPPORTUNITIES	99
CHAPTER 3 OHIO'S URBAN STRATEGY	107
OHIO'S POLITICAL CULTURE.....	108
THE ENTREPRENEURS	108
THE OPPOSITION.....	114
REPUBLICAN DIVISIONS	116
THE SILENCE OF THE CHURCH.....	118
THE DIVIDED BUSINESS COMMUNITY	123
THE SEARCH FOR NEW SOLUTIONS FOR URBAN SCHOOLS	125
<i>Cleveland's Crisis</i>	<i>131</i>
THE URBAN OPPORTUNITY	136
INCLUDED IN THE BUDGET	139
THE END-RUN AROUND THE UNIONS	140
SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATION.....	145
ENTREPRENEURS AND THE URBAN OPPORTUNITY	146
CHAPTER 4 PITFALLS IN PENNSYLVANIA.....	149
PENNSYLVANIA'S POLITICAL CULTURE	150
GOVERNOR TOM RIDGE.....	151
<i>Early Efforts: KIDS 1 and KIDS 2</i>	<i>153</i>
CATHOLIC CHURCH	155
THE PHILADELPHIA DELEGATION AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY.....	159
<i>The State of Philadelphia Schools.....</i>	<i>160</i>
<i>Conspiracy?</i>	<i>164</i>
BUSINESS COMMUNITY	165
CATHOLICS DEMOCRATS, WORKING CLASS SUBURBS - PRO-VOUCHERS.....	166
PRO-CHOICE ALLIANCES.....	168
TEACHERS' UNIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.....	169
ALLIANCES AND STRATEGIES	172
EDUCATION COMMITTEE LEADERS.....	174
DEMOCRATS, RURAL AND SUBURBAN AREAS, AND RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES.....	174
VOUCHERS IN 1998-1999.....	176
WHAT WENT WRONG	182
<i>Gain One, Lose Two</i>	<i>185</i>
<i>Strength of the Teachers' Union</i>	<i>187</i>
CONCLUSION.....	188
CHAPTER 5 THE ORIGINS OF INNOVATION.....	192
INNOVATION THEORY	192
<i>Ideas Matter</i>	<i>193</i>
<i>Policy Champions.....</i>	<i>196</i>

<i>Opportunities</i>	200
<i>Bringing it All Together</i>	201
A CLOSER LOOK AT OHIO AND PENNSYLVANIA	202
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES.....	204
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.....	210
SOME CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.....	211
APPENDIX A OTHER CHOICE AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS	216
APPENDIX B INTERVIEWS IN OHIO AND PENNSYLVANIA.....	219
BIBLIOGRAPHY	220

Introduction

Vouchers are going to destroy public education. Vouchers are a way of overcoming the public school monopoly. Vouchers will increase inequality. Vouchers are a way out for poor kids. Vouchers are being pushed by the Catholic Church to siphon off tax money for public schools. Vouchers will improve equality. Vouchers are part of the right-wing agenda. Vouchers are a progressive idea. Vouchers are undemocratic.

All of the above statements have been said about school vouchers. It is an issue that has captured public attention and has stirred up intense emotions all across the political spectrum. School vouchers were debated in at least twenty-five state legislatures in 2000, they were an issue in the 2000 presidential campaign, and their constitutionality may be argued before the Supreme Court in 2001. They have garnered so much attention because they call into question the traditional delivery of education in our country. They expose weaknesses in institutions that we take for granted.

This dissertation hopes to add some balance to the debate. It does not answer the basic questions of whether or not vouchers will improve academic performance or alleviate inequality among schools. Others are hard at work examining test scores and demographic material to find answers to those questions. My work takes another route. It seeks answers to more political questions: Where did the idea of vouchers originate? Who is responsible for pushing these plans? What strategies are they using? Who is opposing them and what counter strategies are they using? What factors explain the rise of this controversial policy? By examining the historic development of this policy and recent politics in two particular states, I have sought to answer these questions.

What Are School Vouchers?

School vouchers are public funds for children to use for admission to the private or public schools of their choice. There are two forms of vouchers, private and public. Private vouchers derive their funding from the private sector, while public voucher programs are funded through taxes. Public voucher programs are now available in three states, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Florida, and are an issue across the country. Milwaukee's program began in 1990. Its program is now providing vouchers worth up to \$2,250 to 7,996 low-income student to attend private religious or nonsectarian schools. Requirements for and restrictions upon the program have changed over the years, including the addition of religious schools and a substantial increase in the allowable number of students. The Cleveland program began in 1996. There are 3,700 students currently receiving vouchers worth up to \$2,250 to attend private religious or nonsectarian schools. In 1999, Florida established a state-wide voucher program. If schools fail performance tests in two of four years, students in those schools will receive vouchers of about \$3,400 to attend any private or public school. Only two schools in the state have failed the tests; their students are eligible for vouchers. 53 students are now in the program, but as many as 60,000 could be eligible. Ohio's and Florida's voucher programs are currently under court review (Wilgoren 2000).

School vouchers bear some similarities to other recent school reforms. They have grown out of common concerns with failing schools and a need for new solutions. Some reformers propose setting up alternative public schools called charter schools. Other reformers propose the privatization of administrative services, state takeovers, home schooling, tuition tax credits or intra-district choice. Diane Ravitch and Joseph Viteritti

say, “not since the beginning of the twentieth century has there been such a burst of bold experimentation in the organization and governance of schools as there has been in just the last half decade” (Ravitch and Viteritti 1996). Appendix A provides definitions and examples of other choice and governance reforms that are being considered by the states.

Although other reforms involve changes in the delivery of public education, vouchers stand out as the most radical or the most innovative of these plans. They depart to the greatest degree from the traditional delivery of public education. Vouchers enable parents to choose a school for their child, rather than require the child to attend one mandated school. Parents might even choose a religious school. Schools in the voucher programs are not required to follow state mandates or union regulations. A system of competition is set up among schools that vie for dollars and students. This reform does not compel any changes in pedagogical practices, assuming that the schools with the best results will win out. Their proponents question whether public schools are really able to provide a decent education to all children. The radical nature of this reform helps explain the explosive politics that have arisen in its wake.

An Introduction to Voucher Politics

Since Milton Friedman first wrote about the voucher idea in 1962, the issue has gradually grown in popularity. At first it gained little attention, but it now animates a wide range of individuals and groups. The benefits and evils of school choice are emotionally argued at cocktail parties, over the dinner table, in congressional committees, in presidential campaigns, and in court rooms. No one involved in voucher politics can discuss this issue without predicting a revolution.

Union leaders speak of this policy as leading to rampant segregation and the impoverishment of public schools. They fear that a voucher system will skim off the best students from struggling public schools, leaving behind the toughest students and the least involved parents, and it will enable white kids to leave integrated schools more easily. To combat this measure, the teachers' unions, one of the most powerful interest groups in every state, have made fighting vouchers their number one priority.

Civil libertarians fear the encroachment of religion into the public sector. Groups such as the ACLU and Americans United for the Separation of Church and State have joined forces with the teachers' unions. Their influence is most felt during the legal battles that follow the enactment of voucher legislation.

On the other side, economic libertarians believe that vouchers are a way of undermining the public school monopoly, which they maintain is responsible for the failure of public schools. They believe that if people have a choice among schools, the system will become more efficient. Schools will be forced to improve or lose their funding. A number of voucher proponents have been motivated by this belief, including Milton Friedman and Bill Bennett.

Catholics demand some fairness to parents who choose a parochial education for their kids. They believe it is unfair that parents should have the double burden of tuition and taxes. Though they are latecomers to the voucher battle, they have become strong supporters in several cases.

Many liberals believe that vouchers will bring some equality and fairness to a system that has failed city kids. School choice can be a way out of poor public schools,

and a means to the same opportunities of private schools that the wealthy enjoy. Social analyst Christopher Jencks in the 1960s and former Congressman Floyd Flake more recently have advanced this argument. Their support has given the voucher movement new strength and legitimacy.

This issue cannot easily be characterized as a suburban, conservative, or Republican issue. In fact, most people living in the suburbs and rural areas do not favor vouchers, while those in cities do. A majority of urban minorities, traditional Democrats, would like to have a system of choice for their schools. This dissertation expands on this surprising development and maps out the voucher battlefield more fully.

This dissertation also looks more specifically at the origins and the development of vouchers. It examines the role that a number of independent variables played in the rise of voucher policy. It identifies the individuals with an interest and the power to affect education politics and determines the extent of their involvement. These interested parties include: business organizations, the Catholic church, party officials, city leaders, state politicians, teachers' unions, administrative organizations, religious organizations, and national leaders. It also examines the impact of state political dynamics, the idea of vouchers, and changes in the political context.

Why Study the Politics of Vouchers

The study of the politics of school vouchers is important for theoretical, political, and evaluative reasons. Within the field of American politics and public policy, a growing body of theoretical literature examines the nature and origins of innovative policy. Innovative policy, unlike incremental policy, is a great leap from the status quo.

These unusual events have been examined by Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk, Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, Mark Landy and Martin Levin, John Kingdon, and others. Collectively, they point to three primary sources for such major changes -- ideas born from the work of academics and experts, changes in the political context that create windows of opportunity, and policy entrepreneurs who utilize successful strategies and create a policy rhetoric that captures the attention of other elites and the public. Since vouchers are clearly an example of innovative change, a study of their development can provide much needed empirical research to expand on the theory.

There are important political reasons for studying the politics of school vouchers. The contextual changes that led to voucher policy have broader implications for American politics. A power shift has occurred in state politics with Republican governors taking a leadership role in directing policy. There has also been a defection of many minorities from their alliance with the unions and the Democratic Party. These findings have implications outside of education policy, and all students of American politics should have an interest in these developments.

To date, there has been very little analysis of the politics of school vouchers. Most research on school choice has instead consisted of implementation studies or polemical arguments. The implementation studies measure differing test scores, the demographics of those who choose vouchers, its impact on segregation, and the costs of such programs (Levin 1998)¹. The most current research by Paul Peterson of Harvard

¹ A plethora of studies on the effects of school vouchers have been conducted in the past five years (see e.g. Howell and Peterson 2000; Rouse 1998; Witte 1996).

maintains that blacks in voucher programs did eight points better on tests than their counterparts in public schools (Howell and others 2000). This finding has received much attention, although his methodology has been questioned (Zernike 2000). The evaluation process itself has been fraught with politics and it may be years before a clear answer is found about the impact of this policy.²

While this dissertation takes no position on whether, on balance, vouchers are beneficial or not, a study of the politics of vouchers provides information that can help shape opinion on the topic. How we evaluate this program must rest on more than statistical studies of test scores; it requires some understanding of the motivations of its supporters and opponents, the composition of the alliances on both sides, and its historical context. For example, we would view vouchers differently if they were initiated by city parents suffering from poor schools rather than by middle-class suburbanites. Although I have sought to avoid taking sides in the debate on vouchers, my hope is that this dissertation will supply readers on both sides with a more complete factual background for their arguments.

Methodology

To learn how the idea of school vouchers gained prominence in this country, I studied contemporary newspaper articles, congressional reports, and scholarly articles. I focused on events from the early 1960s when the issue was first popularized by Milton Friedman, the late 1960s when the idea was briefly adopted by liberals, and the 1980s

² Several articles document the politicization of the implementation studies (see e.g. Metcalf 1998; Muir 1999; Greene and Peterson 2000).

when it was championed by the Reagan administration. I also tracked other political events that set the ground for future action, including public funding for Catholic schools, a growing dissatisfaction with student performance, and changes in state politics. My research on the changes in state politics was drawn from original research done with Howard Samuels State Policy and Management Center. Findings on state networks were drawn from interviews conducted with participants in Ohio and Pennsylvania.

To better understand the forces that led to voucher proposals within the states, I studied the evolution of this policy and its outcome in Ohio and Pennsylvania. Ohio is significant because it was the first state to include parochial schools, as it did in its Cleveland program in 1995. At the beginning of research for this dissertation, it was only one of two voucher programs in operation in the country. It was also the more recent of the two programs, enabling me to interview participants while events were still fresh in their minds. Pennsylvania was chosen as the second state in this study in part, because its legislature was considering a school voucher plan in the spring of 1999. Most observers felt that a final vote on this policy would be close, although in the end it failed.

In addition to such practical considerations, Ohio and Pennsylvania were chosen because of their many institutional and cultural similarities. They both have strong executives and professional legislatures. Republicans controlled the executive and legislative branches during the time period being considered. Elazar determined that both states share a similar political culture based on the historic patterns of immigration (Elazar 1984). Both states are traditionally strong union states. Catholics and the religious right are prominent in both. They have post-industrial cities with similar social

conditions. These commonalities enabled me to control for a number of variables in comparing the legislative failure of Pennsylvania's voucher program with the success of Ohio's. I was able to focus on the issues of entrepreneurial strategies and other state political conditions.

Information was first gained about voucher politics in Ohio and Pennsylvania by reviewing local newspapers. These sources provided information about the details of the bills in question and a preliminary look at the politics in the state. After conducting reputational analysis of the key players in education politics in the states, I interviewed many of them about their role in the politics of school choice, the involvement of their opponents, and the involvement of outside organizations. Interviewees included policy advisors to governors; a state superintendent; key members of the legislature; legislative assistants in the education committees; union leaders; directors of liberal advocacy groups; directors of conservative think tanks; representatives from the Catholic Church; city school administrators; and members of the business community.

Elite interviews were the most appropriate form of research for this project. Information about the role of various interest groups and individuals could only be gathered through qualitative methods. A survey could have determined the presence of such groups in the process. Michael Mintrom conducted such a survey and found that entrepreneurs were a significant factor in explaining the rise of school choice (Mintrom 1994). Elite interviews are the best method for obtaining rich information about strategies and counter-strategies of actors and the context in which action takes place.

Thirty-four interviews were conducted with twenty-seven individuals. Thirteen interviewees were from Ohio, and fourteen were from Pennsylvania. Eleven opposed vouchers, and sixteen were in favor of this measure. Slightly more pro-voucher interviews were needed because of the diversity of members in the voucher coalition. Among those interviewed were David Brennan, the chief policy entrepreneur for Ohio's voucher legislation; Ron Marec, President of the Ohio Federation of Teachers; Christine Link, Executive Director, ACLU- Ohio Chapter; Eugene Hickok, Secretary Of Education in Pennsylvania; and Charles Zogby, Policy Director for Governor Ridge of Pennsylvania. Appendix B provides a complete list of interviewees.

Interviews were conducted by phone and in person. The in person interviews took place in Columbus, Cleveland, Akron, Philadelphia, and Harrisburg. The interview was open-ended, and included questions about the role of the interviewee and others in the reform process from inception to implementation, prior school choice legislative proposals, the means used to secure or frustrate this reform (i.e. coalition building, media coverage, public rallies), and end goals (i.e. abolition of public schools, increased participation by parents, better education for minorities, funding for private or religious schools, freedom from bureaucratic regulations, increased efficiency). An interview guide was created and included questions about the involvement of the Catholic Church, Christian groups, Jewish schools, governors, liberal and conservative policy think tanks, business groups, key legislators, mayors, coalitions, policy networks, interest groups in other states, political parties, state political culture, the media, and suburban, rural, and urban areas of the state. Interviews ranged from one to three hours.

Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn explain that open-ended interviews are the best method for questioning elites. One reason is that the researcher may not want to constrain the interviewee to a structured format and lose valuable information. Johnson and Joslyn also point out that elite interviewees may resent being asked a standardized set of questions. In addition, I found that the elite interviewees in this study had their own area of expertise which required a different set of questions (Johnson and Joslyn 1991). For example, a legislative aide might be able to provide rich information about backroom dealings of politicians but could not describe the grass-roots activities of the Catholic Church. Flexibility is required when conducting research at this level.

Findings

The central theoretical question, on which this empirical study is intended to shed light, concerns the causes and patterns of change in America. What circumstances bring about major innovations in policy? Why and how do the changes come about? By examining the origins and development of school voucher policy, I found that three primary independent variables were significant.

First, the concept of enabling students to choose their schools, even private ones, has proven to be very powerful. This idea, rather than profit or power, had a significant impact on the politics. It has withstood some stunning defeats and survived even without the support of large powerful interest groups or the benefit of any real-life examples. Milton Friedman's idea has had remarkable staying power, perhaps because it is based upon values that Americans hold dear -- liberty, efficiency, and equity. The liberals and conservatives who have adopted this policy at different points in history have framed it in

different ways to serve different ends. The most successful framing device has been that vouchers are an answer to the education crisis in American cities. The power of ideas explains why vouchers have remained a popular subject for the past three decades.

Second, two primary changes in the political context provided the opportunity for entrepreneurs to promote these ideas. These opportunities put the issue on the agenda from the periphery where it had been for thirty years. The first change was the growth in power of Republican governors who positioned themselves as the education leaders in their states and pursued school choice programs. The governors benefited from powerful networks were formed that helped spread information and resources among the states.

Another opportunity arose in the 1990s, when many minorities began support this issue as a result of the failure of other urban school reform efforts, including desegregation and the reforms that followed “A Nation at Risk.” Minority leaders, such as former Congressman Floyd Flake in New York and State Senator Polly Williams in Milwaukee, began to speak out for school choice, but support was demonstrated most forcefully in public opinion polls. The presence of select minority leaders in the voucher coalition gave the movement a new direction and a new rhetoric, one that was more easily accepted by the public at-large.

Third, several policy entrepreneurs have championed vouchers over time. Entrepreneurs have included academics, presidents, national administrators, governors, and individual business leaders. The most successful effected compromises among diverse interests, articulated a clear message, and formulated a winning strategy. They also were willing to put forward a moderate plan setting aside extremist demands. The

presence of diverse coalitions was less important than how they were managed by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs benefited from examples in other states and inter-state networks of advocates.

Entrepreneurship not only explains why vouchers remained on the agenda, but it also explains why vouchers were successful in Ohio and not in Pennsylvania. Voucher champions in Ohio were better coordinated than those in Pennsylvania. Entrepreneurs in Pennsylvania were not able to agree upon a common legislation and failed to combat the skillful opponents to vouchers. The unions exploited popular fears about vouchers grounded in anti-urban bias, and vouchers went down to defeat. The nitty-gritty world of politics – timing, tactics, bargaining – tips the balance in closely-contested political battles.

Chapter Organization

Chapter One presents the scholarly literature on policy innovation. This chapter shows how vouchers depart from traditional education practices and differ from education reforms of the past. It provides a theory of the origins of innovation based on the work of John Kingdon, Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk, Nelson Polsby, Robert Reich, and others. Lastly, this chapter shows how the theory applies to the case of vouchers.

Chapter Two describes the development of voucher policy over three decades. It begins with a summary and analysis of Friedman's original idea. Its adoption by liberals in the 1960s and their creation of a pilot program is explained. Then it shows how Reagan and his administration succeeded in publicizing the issue by putting forward

proposals that had no chance of winning congressional approval. Events in state politics in the early 1990s and the publication of John Chubb's and Terry Moe's Politics, Markets, and America's Schools led to a turning point in voucher politics.

The following two chapters examine voucher politics in two states, one of which adopted a voucher program while the other rejected such a approach. Chapter Three describes the politics that surrounded Ohio's 1995 voucher program. It shows how important key entrepreneurs were to this policy and the marginal role of business organizations and religious groups. Entrepreneurs benefited from the strong interest among minorities in school choice and a general despair with city schools. Chapter Four looks at the politics of this issue in Pennsylvania. Supporters and opponents in this state mirror Ohio's. However, vouchers narrowly lost in Pennsylvania due to state political dynamics and to indecisive entrepreneurial tactics.

Chapter Five brings together the key variables that explain the development of vouchers. It expands on the policy theory of innovation based on the research into voucher politics. It dismisses alternative hypotheses that would focus on the role of state political culture and organized interest groups. Lastly, it provides some insight into the future of vouchers derived from an understanding of the politics.

Chapter 1

Ideas, Entrepreneurs, and Opportunities

The study of innovative policy is one of the most interesting areas of political science. The notion that we can consciously improve our political and social condition, not by small incremental measures, but by great leaps stirs the imagination. Of course, these innovative policies are not common place, and their origins differ from the origins of typical incremental policies. This chapter presents the factors identified by the literature as necessary in innovative policy-making: ideas, entrepreneurs, and opportunities. Innovative policies also benefit from our federalist governmental structure, which can foster rich networks of entrepreneurs. I have brought these factors, which are usually examined singularly by theorists, into one comprehensive model. I hypothesize that these variables help explain the rise of school vouchers, an example of innovative policy.

What is Innovative Policy?

The study of innovative policy-making is relatively new to the field of American political science. During the 1950s and 1960s, James MacGregor Burns, Charles Lindblom, and Robert Dahl wrote that pluralism leads to incremental policy-making and left little hope for bold new changes (Burns 1963; Dahl 1956; Lindblom 1999). In more recent years, the New Institutionalists maintain that change is hampered by the historical development of institutions. Rules and customs shape a range of institutions, and inhibit comprehensive change (Orren and Skowronek 1994).

Another group of scholars notes that American policy-making has shifted from the incremental model to one where innovation occurs relatively quickly (i.e. Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Derthick and Quirk 1985; Jones 1995; Landy and Levin 1995). Radical change is “characterized by a discontinuity and a jump from an initial system to a new one, and thus, represents a qualitative rather than a quantitative shift in the way things are done” (Roberts and King 1996). It involves “unexpected policy outcomes that are broad in scope and that carry large price tags” (Landy and Levin 1995 p. ix). Giant leaps in policy making are being documented in the areas of tax policy (Salisbury 1990), environmental policy (Bosso 1987; Jones 1975; Landy 1995), tobacco (Fritschler 1989), deregulation (Derthick and Quirk 1985), and nuclear power (Campbell 1988). These leaps in the policy process are described as innovations or radical changes.

Though the word “innovative” has positive connotations, the policy term does not always describe an advancement or a progressive reform. An example of a dramatic conservative change is Rodney Hero’s description of a new “populist backlash” toward minorities among whites in the 1990s (Hero 1995). For a change to be considered innovative, it must mark a great change in present conditions regardless of ideological or partisan direction.

Some writers talk about change in American politics as occurring cyclically. Bryan Jones maintains that major change occurs episodically and happens with considerable frequency (Jones 1995). Frank Baumgartner and Jones speak of periodical “waves of enthusiasm” that lead to major political decisions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Other writers believe that rapid change represents a new era in American public policy. Mark Landy and Martin Levin say that new conditions of American political life

have set the foundation for rapid change. These conditions include the development of the mass media, decline of party identification, the professionalization of the workforce, and the rights revolution (Landy and Levin 1995). John Kingdon says that incrementalism does not explain agenda setting well. Instead, ideas seem to take off suddenly, while incrementalism may well describe the later process of generating policies that respond to those ideas (Kingdon 1984).

Vouchers as Innovative Policy-Making

Vouchers are an example of a radical proposal for reform, a marked leap from the incremental reforms of the past. Nelson Polsby provides three characteristics of policy innovations. First, innovations are large-scale phenomena, highly visible to political actors and observers. Second, they embody a break with preceding governmental responses to the range of problems to which they are addressed. Third, unlike major crises with which they share the preceding traits, innovations have institutional or societal effects that are lasting (Polsby 1984). Vouchers meet at least two of those criteria.

Polsby's first characteristic of innovative public policy is that it must be a large-scale phenomena and highly visible to political actors and observers. All those involved with education politics agree that vouchers represent a major change. Depending on their political outlook, education and political leaders either view this change as the beginning of the end of public education or the beginning of a glorious revolution. Consider the following comments about school vouchers:

Changes in education are coming as surely as the Berlin Wall went down.
- William F. Weld, the former governor of Massachusetts (Wyatt 1999)

Vouchers represent a fundamental change in the way public schools are governed and financed, and people who stand to lose power aren't ever going to say, 'Oh, fine.'

- Howard Fuller, Milwaukee's former superintendent and voucher supporter (Lewin 1999)

A bigger threat than any kid walking into a school with a gun is the Republican legislature putting all the schools under siege with vouchers.

- Les Miller, minority leader of the Florida House (Carlson 1999)

The vouchers in this bill are the lynchings of the civil rights movement.

- Betty Holzendorf, Democratic State Senator from Jacksonville, Florida (Carlson 1999)

It's a revolutionary time in Florida.

- Representative Alex Diaz de la Portilla, Republican sponsor of Florida's voucher bill (Sandham 1999)

We can also witness the impact of this policy by the pieces of legislation and court cases involving vouchers, the amount of media coverage, and the energy spent fighting the battle by both sides.

As mentioned earlier, twenty-five states are considering voucher proposals. In the spring of 2000, Democrats and Republican presidential candidates debated about the value of school choice policy. Though the Supreme Court declined to hear Wisconsin's voucher case, there is considerable pressure on the justices to decide on the constitutionality of Ohio's voucher measure later in 2001.

The fact that vouchers are a large-scale phenomenon is also demonstrated by the amount of media coverage they have received. Between March 1999 and March 2000, the New York Times had 429 articles on school vouchers. In contrast, during the same period, it had 312 articles on charter schools, 255 articles on professional development,

158 articles on teachers' wages, 70 articles on bilingual education, and 9 articles on systemic reform.

Further evidence of the intensity of the debate is provided by the level of energy that unions and administrators are devoting to fighting vouchers. Formal coalitions between teacher and administrative unions have been created to increase their political strength. They have helped defeat pro-voucher state politicians in state elections. The teachers' unions have declared fighting vouchers their number one issue, according to many interviewees. In addition, they have supported issues that they fought in the past, like standards and tougher certification requirements, in order to seem more moderate and less obstructionist towards change.

Advocates have also mustered a great deal of political capital to support voucher plans. Great political differences have been overcome to assemble their coalitions. African-American leaders are shaking hands with conservative Republicans and distancing themselves from old Democratic allies. The level of commitment of both sides to this issue is documented in greater depth in Chapters Three and Four.

Polsby's second criterion for innovative policy is that it must break with preceding governmental responses to a range of problems. Vouchers depart greatly from the traditional practice and values of public education established by the Progressives at the turn of the century. Previous reform efforts have been minor in scope, ineffective, or thwarted by political obstacles. To fully understand the scope of changes that are being proposed, it is necessary to describe the origins of the current educational system and examine the limitations of several other reforms.

Tyack and Cuban (1995) explain that the Progressives built the institutions and formed the values of our current education system. Drawing upon the Protestant belief that a proper education could bring about a secular millennium and a newly discovered commitment to scientific expertise, the Progressives shared a conviction that education was the prime means of directing the course of social evolution. Political influences should be limited, and professionals could best steer the system. Faced with millions of new immigrants in overcrowded cities, they needed to educate these masses adequately to absorb American values and to take part in the industrial revolution. It was “a vast humanitarian effort to apply the promise of American life -- the ideal of government by, of, and for the people -- to the puzzling new urban-industrial civilization that came into being during the latter half of the nineteenth century” (Cremin 1961).

To achieve these goals, state departments of education were established to provide examples of the best practices, and state legislators carried out these plans by passing legislation to standardize schools (Tyack and Cuban 1995). Across the country, a uniform system began to develop marked by hierarchy, efficiency, and professional control.

Borrowing from Tayloristic factory practices, the Progressives established a hierarchical model of education administration led by the superintendent. The old system of diffuse supervision by hundreds of lay people gave way to a system led by a small school board and a full-time central administration. Such a system would assure supervision and departmentalization, the Progressives believed. “Schoolmen pointed out that a professionally supervised school system based on the division of labor should be based on an elaborate hierarchy and explicit chain of command necessary to keep each

member working at his or her particular task in a responsible and coordinated fashion” (Katz 1987). As a result, education bureaucracies grew rapidly in the early part of the century. In 1889, the average city had only four employees who spent most of their time on supervision; by 1920, the large cities counted them in the hundreds (New York had 1,310) (Tyack 1993).

To increase professionalism, men assumed positions of leadership. They were attracted to these positions by newly established systems of tenure and promotion (Katz 1987, p.69). Teachers had to take formal examinations and become certified before entering the classroom.

The Progressives attempted to limit political influences over decision-making by removing lay control of the school boards, which were seen as corrupt and composed of ignorant meddlers. They eliminated ward school committees, cut the size of central school boards, and increased the number of prosperous and well-educated members of the school board (Tyack and Cuban 1995). These new smaller boards were expected to decide policy and delegate administration to the superintendents and the specialists.

Policy elites often claimed to be “taking the schools out of politics.” They sought to do this by centralizing control of schools and delegating decisions about education, wherever possible, to “experts.” In the process they did not, of course, eliminate politics, but they acquired formidable powers: to set the agenda of reform, to diagnose problems, to prescribe solutions, and often to influence what should not be on the agenda of reform (Tyack and Cuban 1995, p.8).

Change also took place within schools. Pedagogical principles were derived from new scientific research. Schools were made larger and access was increased. The program and function of schools were broadened to include direct concern for health,

vocation, and the quality of family and community life. Instruction was divided by grade and ability, which was measured according to IQ (Cremin 1961). In their classic study of education in Indiana, Robert and Helen Lynd describe how uniform and structured education had become by the mid 1920s,

The school, like the factory, is a thoroughly regimented world. Immovable seats in orderly rows fix the sphere of activity for each child. For all, from the timid six-year-old entering for the first time to the most assured high school senior, the general routine is much the same. Bells divide the day into periods. For the six-year-olds the periods are short (fifteen to twenty-five minutes) and varied; in some they leave their seats, play games, and act out make-believe stories, although in "recitation periods" all movement is prohibited. As they grow older the taboo upon physical activity becomes stricter, until by the third or fourth year practically all movement is forbidden except the marching from one set of seats to another between periods, a brief interval of prescribed exercise daily, and periods of manual training or home economics once or twice a week (Lynd and Lynd 1987 p.87-89).

At the same time, teachers began to organize in unions to protect themselves from the vast new changes. Margaret Haley, the charismatic leader of the Chicago Teachers Federation, organized women teachers in the most militant union in the country beginning in the early 1900s. Haley fought against the bureaucratization that she said was undermining professionalism and autonomy (Lazerson 1987, p.6). The more moderate National Education Association (NEA) which was closely allied with administrators soon eclipsed Haley's union. Despite the early co-optation of Haley's movement, the teachers' union was a sleeping giant that would awaken later in the 1960s to become one of the most powerful interest groups in state politics.

The elite-controlled bureaucracy established by the Progressives has proved to be remarkably resilient and impervious to change. The original structures and values of

public education have remained intact for decades. Schools are still led by superintendents and small school boards who delegate decisions to principals who in turn delegate decisions to department chairs and individual teachers. Professionals dominate the decision-making processes and claim to be taking the politics out of education. And the classroom routines described by the Lynds in the 20s closely resemble the education of children today.

These institutions, and the professionals and teachers who staff them, are protected by powerful interest groups. The National Education Association, the American Federation of Teachers, the Schools Board Association, the Superintendents Association, the Association of Secondary Schools, and many other organizations have arisen and now dominate education politics at the state and local level. In most cases, they are the most powerful interest groups in the state. The idealists of the Progressive era were unable to create a system isolated from politics.

Over the years, reformers attempting to introduce new pedagogical methods, new procedures for participation, or new means of financing the system have met with failure. As educational historians Tyack and Cuban put it, “some innovations seem to die on contact with the institutional reality of the school” (Tyack and Cuban 1995p.60). While reform-talk swings between concerns for increased equity and access and the seemingly contradictory concern for increased standards, change happens only incrementally in education (Tyack and Cuban 1995). Reformers point to small school-based achievement, but attempts to “scale-up” these programs into city-wide initiatives inevitably meet with failure (Henig 1995). “Within many cities there are effective classrooms, ‘beacon schools’, even clusters of such schools, but there are few if any places one can point to as

examples of a successful model being expanded to the scope of an entire district. How to achieve this sort of expansion, known variously as ‘going to scale’ or ‘scaling up,’ has become a major question for scholars and practitioners of urban school reform” (McDermott 1997).

The inability to scale-up reforms has much to do with sprawling bureaucracies that have grown up over the years. It is difficult to impose reform over such a broad bureaucracy with its elaborate rules and red tape (Fantini, Gittell, and Magat 1970; Gittell 1967). Reform can be frustrated at many points down to the classroom. The rules and practice of instruction have persisted for the past century, because teachers resist implementing new methods. “Because teachers retained a fair degree of autonomy once the classroom door was closed, they could, if they chose, comply only symbolically or fitfully or not at all with the mandates for change pressed on them by platoons of outside reformers” (Tyack and Cuban 1995, p.8).

In part, failure can be blamed on the hubris of the reformers. These idealists pay little attention to reforms of the past, and instead layer programs upon one another¹. “Educational reformers may have wanted to wipe the institutional slate clean and start again, but that has rarely happened” (Tyack and Cuban 1995, p.76). Often, urban school districts are undertaking multiple initiatives simultaneously, which lack central control or any comprehensive rationale (Henig 1995). Bryk et al point out that schools have become “Christmas trees”, bedecked with multiple programs ranging widely in content, purpose, and methods (Bryk and others 1993; Henig 1995, p.15). In addition, reformers

tend to either overstate the weakness of education or propose over confident solutions.

This hyperbole has contributed to cynicism in the public and among teachers (Tyack and Cuban 1995, p.134).

The system is also slow to change because it is not in the interest of bureaucracies to change. Chubb and Moe state that most fundamental causes of poor educational performance “are, in fact, the very institutions that are supposed to be solving the problem...” (Chubb and Moe 1990, p.2). Like professionals in other fields such as medicine or law, education professionals resist interference in their internal operations by outsiders. They carefully guard their policy monopoly. Baumgartner and Jones describe a policy monopoly as “a monopoly on political understandings concerning the policy of interest, and an institutional arrangement that reinforces that understanding” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, p.6). Outsiders who dare question the judgment of professionals are confronted with hostility and indignation.

The interest that all professionals have in monopolizing policy decisions is perhaps even greater in the field of education, because education professionals have control over so many careers and public funds or resources. In some areas, boards of education are the largest employers for miles around. Stone describes the education bureaucracy as an “employment regime” (Stone 1998). Marion Orr says that the Baltimore school system continues to fail because reforms often conflict with the need to provide jobs.

¹ Similar arguments are made by other political scientists. This phenomenon is not isolated to education policy, but is also true of other episodes of reform in American politics (see e.g. Mollenkopf 1983; Orren and Skowronek 1994; Polsky 1991).

The Baltimore case suggests that for many teachers, administrators, and other school system employees, concerns about improving education for children may co-exist and even compete with concerns about the viability of the school system as a source of wages, professional development, and economic advancement. In an atmosphere of corporate downsizing, mergers, and acquisitions, the thousands of positions in the school system are vital to Baltimore's economy. School employees' concerns about job security, as well as elected officials' desires to provide services and patronage to their constituents, put an extra burden on school reformers in Baltimore (Orr 1998, p.113).

Thus, reform is checked again and again because of bureaucratic resistance, job protection, reformer hubris, and the scope of education administration. Reforms that have lasted, according to Tyack and Cuban, were structural add-ons and non-controversial, sponsored by influential constituencies, required by law, or proposed by administrators or teachers (Tyack and Cuban 1995, p.58). Brown v. Board of Education (1954) is an example of change mandated by law. This landmark decision brought greater access to the system for minorities. Still, Tyack and Cuban would describe this change as incremental. Though it seems like a radical change, it took years for de jure segregation to end. "This attention to equality in the two decades following the Brown decision produced progress that looked rapid and impressive if compared with the glacial pace of equalization in previous decades" (Tyack and Cuban 1995, p.27).

The community control movement in New York City in the late sixties is an example of a failed attempt to bring major and long-lasting change to the system. Frustrated by the pace of integration, civil rights groups in the mid-1960s demanded more accountability of the school system to the community. As a result of pressure from the Governor and the Mayor, three school districts were chosen by the New York City Board of Education to participate in an experiment in school decentralization. Later, a blue-

ribbon committee headed by Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy proposed that the system be subdivided into 30-60 autonomous school districts, each with elected school boards having assigned powers over budget, personnel, and curriculum. It also recommended amending certification laws to allow for the inclusion of more minority teachers. The teachers' union, which was not represented in this panel, was outraged at this proposal. It threatened professional control over jobs and contracts, as well as union control over membership. The unions were able to out maneuver the less powerful decentralization groups and a watered down version was passed by the state legislature in 1969. Though the law established locally elected governing boards, centralization was actually increased by the creation of local districts, new powers were given to the chancellor, restrictions were placed on the transfer of personnel, and there was a failure to allocate significant control of resources to the local districts (Gittell 1971).

Gittell says that the undermining of the community control movement has much to do with the strength of the teachers' unions and their interest in protecting their power in the system. Their enormous political and financial resources and their willingness to use any tactics led to the defeat of community control. In a later work, Gittell hypothesizes that greater involvement of the business community and a stronger tradition of community participation in New York City might have been able to temper union power (Gittell 1994).

Vouchers mark an innovative departure from the current practice of education because they allow parents to choose a school rather than have their children attend one local school. They provide public funds for private schools, including religious schools. This policy undermines the hierarchical structure of education established by the

Progressives years ago. Tyack writes, “The current debate about school choice has raised the most basic questions about the structure of education since the nineteenth century” (Tyack 1999).

Voucher advocates also propose more serious changes to the system of education than do other reformers. Unlike many previous reforms, this change comes not from the professionals, but from outsiders. This reform does not involve reforming curriculum or teaching methods, as other reforms did in the past. Instead, its remedy is political and market-oriented. It also differs from governance reforms of the 1960s, which tried to remedy the political structure of public school administration by increasing participation of parents or decentralizing decision-making. School choice does not attempt directly to improve the public school system, though competition could lead indirectly to changes. It can be debated whether school choice is as radical as the reforms that followed Brown v. Board of Education. Interestingly, the repeated failures and the weakness of other education measures have become a driving force behind the choice movement, which is explained in further detail in Chapter 3.

The final test of innovation, according to Polsby, is that the policy must be long lasting. The permanence of this reform will not be completely determined until ten or twenty years from now, after a long incubation period and many court decisions. This dissertation documents how vouchers got on the agenda, how voucher advocates formed coalitions and framed the debate, how opponents fought these measures, and how voucher legislation passed in Ohio and failed in Pennsylvania, but stops short of an examination of its implementation. Thus, it cannot completely determine the impact of this reform. Future scholars examining the implementation of vouchers should benefit

from information gathered while participants were still in the field and while their memory was fresh. Even faulty implementation or negative court decisions will certainly not stop the voucher movement. Its passion will be redirected to closely related programs such as private scholarship initiatives, tax-credit measures, or stronger charter schools. Its impact is already being felt as the teachers' unions rush to redefine their mission and find alternative policies, as pro-voucher coalitions gather in strength, and as political parties adjust their message. These developments are certain to be long lived.

Source of Change

This dissertation examines the source of innovative policy. By looking closely at vouchers as an example of innovation, several factors emerge which explain why voucher legislation is on the agenda in so many states and school choice legislation has passed in several cases. First, entrepreneurs have been instrumental in raising the issue, putting forth different strategies, forming coalitions, and framing the rhetoric. Second, the idea itself has been remarkably powerful, because it touches on several core American values, including choice, freedom, efficiency, and equity. Entrepreneurs have emphasized different values over time, but the idea that vouchers will provide a way-out for poor, urban children trapped in failing schools has proven to be the most successful. Third, changes in the political context have provided entrepreneurs with opportunities to push their ideas. The two most important opportunities were the transition of vouchers to a state-level policy and the growing interest of minorities in new education reforms.

Two alternative hypotheses might pose a challenge to this dissertation's findings. The first is that conservative interests, such Republicans, the religious right, business groups, or the Catholic Church, have driven this reform. The second is that state political

culture could explain why vouchers have been considered in some states over others. I seek to evaluate and eliminate these alternatives through my research.

The dissertation's hypotheses were derived from the public policy theory on innovation and the literature on American politics. The literature seems to consistently discuss three factors that lead to innovation: ideas, opportunities, and entrepreneurs. A smaller body of literature examines the role of federalism. Most studies focus on only one variable, such as entrepreneurs or ideas. John Kingdon's model of political streams is perhaps closest to the one I'm proposing. Rather than list individual research, I have synthesized the various bodies of literature and highlighted commonalities. These commonalities serve as the theoretical model for this dissertation.

Ideas

Visions of a more perfect world dreamed up by experts and academics are an important driving force of change. Policy papers presented in dingy conference rooms, books of economic graphs, and even doctoral dissertations have moved leaders to defy self-interest and to pursue bold new policies. These ideas have contributed to the development of regulatory policy (Wilson 1980), deregulation of the trucking, airline, and telecommunication industries (Derthick and Quirk 1985), civil rights laws, environment regulation, the establishment of OSHA, tax reform in 1986 (Reich 1988), consumer protection, drunk driving laws, anti-smoking laws (Orren 1988), and drug enforcement (Moore 1988).

Ideas are at the heart of political action. Deborah Stone argues that "ideas are the very stuff of politics. People fight about ideas, fight for them, and fight against them... Moreover, people fight with ideas as well as about them" (Stone 1997, p.32). They

motivate and direct action for organizations, the public, and leaders. They set the context for policy debates (Moore 1988). “Like a spotlight, an idea illuminates and animates the particular parts of the world on which it focuses. When attention is directed to some possibilities for action, other possible modes are inevitably left in the shadows” (Moore 1988). Ideas have a certain power because they are thought to be good for society, rather than matters of selfish, private interest (Reich 1988).

The power of ideas can overcome strong, organized interests (Conlan, Beam, and Wrightson 1995). Derthick and Quirk (1985) discuss the impact that a “few lonely economists” had in deregulating the trucking, airline, and telecommunication industries in the late 1970s. These economists showed that governmental commissions established to fix prices and prevent monopolies also led to serious industrial inefficiency. They amassed evidence that the social costs of regulation outweighed its benefits. Surprisingly, these policy papers ended up influencing policy-makers who reformed the system. “No one seems to have anticipated that these criticisms of regulatory policy would actually result in substantial reform” (Derthick and Quirk 1985, p.8).

New beliefs can originate from various sources. Government leaders, administrators or public managers, and academics have set the direction of political action. President Ronald Reagan painted a picture of a decentralized America and helped set into motion of a series of policies (Reich 1988). William Ruckelshaus, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, helped launch a national debate over environmental policy (Reich 1988). Some believe that scholars selected by the Brookings Institute and funded by the Ford Foundation to investigate the effects of

regulation helped set in motion the deregulation reforms of the 1980s (Derthick and Quirk 1985).

David Schon focuses on the notion of “ideas in good currency” (Schon 1971). Schon maintains that there are a great number of ideas being discussed by the policy elite. Ideas can only affect policy-making if they get on the public agenda or become “ideas in good currency.” This can happen through a triggering device or a sequence of events. Once on the agenda, individuals can rally resources towards a particular solution and create legitimacy for the ideas; only a small number of ideas become the basis of policies.

Deborah Stone argues that there are multiple and competing ideas embedded in every policy issue. The best ideas are those that identify goals, problems, and solutions. Manipulating ideas so that they respond to the needs of the community is an important strategic device. Individuals and interest groups construct stories to relate these ideas in a compelling and dramatic manner (Stone 1997).

The difficulty in pinpointing the exact moment when an idea “emerged from the primordial ooze” has led many to abandon this effort (Polsby 1984, p.13). John Kingdon states that when we try to track down the origins of an idea, we become involved in an “infinite regress.” There are no wholly new ideas. Ideas have a history, and there is no logical place to stop the process (Kingdon 1984). However, the absolute origin of an idea does not have to be identified while studying the impact of a particular idea. The difficulty involved in studying ideas should not deter political scientists from examining them.

This dissertation maintains that the voucher idea has been enormously powerful. It speaks to certain core American values such as liberalism and efficiency. Liberals

have framed the voucher debate in terms of equity. Conservatives have framed the debate in terms of the market and freedom. Vouchers have touched some of the deepest nerves of Americans, from concerns about the relationship of church and state to the increasing anguish about the poor performance of American school children, especially in inner-city areas. It addresses certain problems with public education, in ways that other reforms do not. This topic is being debated over the kitchen table, on the New York Times editorial page, in the halls of state legislatures, and before the Supreme Court bench. The voucher idea has remained a subject of debate for thirty years, moved entrepreneurs to action despite many political obstacles, and evoked the strongest response from opponents.

Opportunities

Windows of opportunity are a second variable identified by the literature as a necessary condition for innovation. Opportunities can express themselves as a change in the public's priorities and pressures. A shift in the climate of the times, also called the political stream, the political environment, or the zeitgeist, can affect the success of an idea (Milward and Laird 1996). The public must be ready for these new plans, new political conditions must be in place, and these plans should appear to offer a remedy for a current pressing problem. As Moore says, "the contextual properties of an idea have to do with how it fits within an ongoing historical discussion of a particular problem and how it accommodates or challenges the current politics of a given issue and the new interests that are advanced or retarded by the idea" (Moore 1988, p.78-79). Milward writes that "ideas often travel in packs because they are a response to the sentiment of the times (Milward and Laird 1996).

Kingdon calls this factor “the political stream.” It is composed of things such as public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of administration. Developments in the political stream can lead to windows of opportunity for advocates and their policy proposals (Kingdon 1984).

Many studies describe the impact of shifts in the political stream. Robert Salisbury claims that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 happened because of a change in the context of American politics, which has limited the power of interest groups. These changes include expanded group participation, greater electoral security, increased congressional staff, a reduction in congressional specialization, and more centralized control of the executive branch (Salisbury 1990, p.229). Baumgartner and Jones give three contextual shifts in American politics that have affected policy-making in our country: changes in the interest group system, changes in the structures of congressional behavior, and changes in the relations among the levels of government within the federal system (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

One particular form of political opportunity is a trigger device, a sudden disruptive change in the world. It may include a natural catastrophe, unanticipated human event, technological change, bias in distribution of resources, or demographic change. For example, two hot summers in a row contributed to new attention paid to the Greenhouse Effect which led to many environmental reforms (Cobb and Elder 1983; Milward and Laird 1996). All windows of opportunity need not be so dramatic as this. A change in party control of government or greater media attention to an issue can be just as effective.

Much less theoretical work has been done on the role of windows of opportunity than on the role of ideas and entrepreneurs. It is a broad concept encompassing many subvariables -- media attention, party control, public opinion, and various trigger devices. The conditions that create a favorable climate for innovation will be different for every policy issue. It is also difficult to assign it some predictive quality, since one can only know if the context is ripe by looking back.

Despite these difficulties, explaining the rise of voucher policy cannot be understood without identifying two major changes in political context. During the early 1990s, state governors gained new control over education policy by positioning themselves as champions of new policies. These governors were primarily Republican and had a strong interest in school vouchers. Another opportunity arose in the 1990s, when the failure of urban school reform efforts, including desegregation and the reforms that followed "A Nation at Risk", led many minorities to support a voucher alternative. These developments are discussed throughout this dissertation.

Entrepreneurs

In addition to the necessity of new ideas and opportunities in the political context, policy entrepreneurs are needed to set ideas into motion. Policy entrepreneurs are politicians, bureaucrats, or independent advocates, who adapt ideas to real situations. They are not necessarily the originators of these plans, but instead are able to "simplify and distill these complex ideas and link them to values accepted by and familiar to the broader public" (Conlan, Beam, and Wrightson 1995). They are willing to invest time, energy, reputation, and money to promote a policy. Motivations may be personal conviction, satisfaction from participation, or more selfish goods (job promotion,

financial gain, or publicity). Entrepreneurs are motivated by personal interests rather than by the interests of an organized interest group (Kingdon 1984).

Wilson suggests that entrepreneurial politics is more likely to occur when the benefits of a policy are dispursed widely and the costs are borne by a small politically weak or vulnerable segment of society. The opponents have a strong incentive to organize, and the beneficiaries have a weak incentive. Therefore, entrepreneurs are needed to mobilize public opinion, put the opponents on the defense, and associate the legislation with widely shared values (Wilson 1980).

An entrepreneur must construct a strategy for achieving a policy, especially when there is not a clear majority that supports it. In The Art of Political Manipulation (1986), William Riker provides case studies of such action by political leaders, but can not offer an overarching theory since “heresthetics is an art rather than a science.” In one case study, Riker examines the political strategy that Abraham Lincoln employed during his 1858 campaign for Senate. Lincoln was able to change the terms of the debate over slavery in such a way that Stephen Douglas would either lose the Senate election or lose the nomination for president two years later. Lincoln was able to divide the majority with a new alternative.

Entrepreneurs can also mobilize public sentiment by revealing a scandal or capitalizing on a crisis, thereby putting their opponent’s plan on the defensive. Policy entrepreneurs also rely heavily on what Wilson described as “third parties,” of which the media may be the most important, to build support (Wilson 1980). One successful strategy is to pursue policy proposals in a more favorable venue. For example, if a policy cannot be passed in Congress, a resourceful entrepreneur will find a way for it to be

considered by the courts (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). Entrepreneurs also build coalitions, drawing support from elites who are effective in persuading other interests to participate (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). As Riker observes:

It is true that people win politically because they have induced other people to join them in alliances and coalitions. But the winners induce by more than rhetorical attraction. Typically they win because they have set up the situation in such a way that other people will want to join them - or will feel forced by circumstances to join them - even without any persuasion at all. And this is what heresthetic is about: structuring the world so you can win (Riker 1986, p.ix).

Kingdon describes policy entrepreneurs as having three important tasks. First, they must “soften up” policy communities and the public at large, getting them used to particular ideas and building acceptance for their programs. For example, presidential speeches are useful for drumming up public support. Second, while they lie in wait for a window of opportunities to open, they must fine tune their expertise in order to take better advantage of opportunities. Third, after the window is open and a problem is identified, they must couple this problem with their solution (Kingdon 1984).

In Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice, Michael Mintrom maintains that entrepreneurial strategies can be broken into macro- and micro-level action.

Entrepreneurs practice six different macro-level strategies: they scan the policy/political context and fashion ideas to fit that context, they frame a problem so that their desired policy solution will be seen as most appropriate, they use crises or perceptions of crises, they reframe issues so that people look at them anew, they couple solutions with a problem, and they carry over an idea from one policy area into another. At the micro level, they work incrementally, stake extreme positions but are prepared to compromise,

manipulate the agenda, pre-test the value of the innovation, collect evidence, build support for ideas, and work with teams and networks (Mintrom 1994; Mintrom 2000).

As important as forming coalitions or using the media, an entrepreneur must shape the rhetoric around his policy solution. He must call up certain values or symbols that Americans hold dear -- choice, liberty, equality, efficiency, safety. He must frame the issue in such a way that "it succinctly states what the problem is, in plausible terms and embodies an easily understood solution" (Milward and Laird 1996). These frameworks provide control and explanations for random events. "Rather than responding to pre-existing public wants, the art of policy making has lain primarily in giving voice to these half-articulated fears and hopes, and embodying them in convincing stories about their sources and the choices they represent" (Reich 1988, p.5).

These values or symbols are flexible and can be used to promote a wide range of proposals. Stone points out that there are multiple understandings of a single concept that can be manipulated to serve different policy solutions (Stone 1997). For example, the concept of liberty can be employed by those that would impose stiff drunk driving laws (freedom from the fear of getting hit by a drunk driver) or those that would oppose them (freedom from restrictive government regulation). Regardless of how these symbols are used, rhetoric manipulation is a key aspect of an entrepreneur's strategy.

The problem with examining the role of entrepreneurs is that often it leads to the creation of hero stories (Schneider and Teske 1992). Some scholars write of one strong and determined individual who does everything from advancing an original idea to casting the winning vote in the legislature. These tales of the policy knights-in-shining-armor typically omit discussions of where the idea came from, the timeframe it takes for

an idea to work its way into the political mainstream, and the myriad of other influences that create opportunities for the entrepreneur.

Two previous studies highlight the role of policy entrepreneurs in school choice politics. Roberts and King provide an excellent account of the entrepreneurs who worked to pass Minnesota's cross-district public school choice program. They show how coalitions of policy specialists or entrepreneurs created change through manipulating images, mobilizing grassroots support, seeking more favorable venues for action, and using political opportunities (Roberts and King 1996). Michael Mintrom found that the presence of entrepreneurs was critical to explaining the presence of policies around school choice. Entrepreneurs developed policy ideas and proposals that they believed would address the problems they saw in the current institutional arrangements. They saw a problem, sold their ideas and organized others. Entrepreneurs reported in a survey that they were motivated by a frustration with the current system, by a desire to empower parents, improve school performance, help ailing parochial schools, and avoid desegregation plans. They were influenced by Milton Friedman, Polly Williams, Chubb's and Moe's book Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, the Heritage Foundation, the Business Roundtable, and President Bush (Mintrom 1994).

However, both studies rely too heavily on the self-reporting of entrepreneurs. The evidence is one-sided and lacks information about the obstacles that entrepreneurs face while trying to win passage of their legislation. They do not present the larger political environment in which entrepreneurs must navigate. As a result, entrepreneurs appear overly rational and completely selfless in their motives.

My project is more comprehensive than these two studies. It looks at a series of entrepreneurs over time from various backgrounds. These entrepreneurs operate both at the national level and at the state level. They are academics, politicians, and other individuals. Some are liberal, while others are conservative. It also considers the larger political environment in which they operate. Since my research includes information gained from both sides of the issue, I am able to pursue questions about entrepreneurial behavior that are not discussed by the literature, such as what are the limits of entrepreneurs and when are they not successful. By comparing a range of entrepreneurs, I hope to gain a more complete picture of their role in policy-making.

States as Laboratories

Baumgartner and Jones explain that switching venues is one strategy that entrepreneurs may use to improve their chances of getting their policy passed. If an impasse is reached at the national level, then moving action to the courts or to the states may create new opportunities (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). They also point out that states and localities have ample authority and resources to pursue independent policy and are excellent venues to push policies that are unpopular at the national level. This is precisely what happened in the case of voucher politics. The chances of passing school choice legislation were improved when the political action for vouchers was moved from the national level to the state level. Although, the venue change to the states does not seem to have been a self-conscious strategy employed by entrepreneurs, it was clearly an opportunity from which entrepreneurs benefited.

Innovative policy, in some cases, is more likely to happen at the state level than at the national level. This advantage enables states to act as “laboratories of democracy.”

That expression was coined by Associate Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who thought that the beauty of federalism was that new ideas could be tested on a limited scale within the states. Innovation can spread to other states or give inspiration for federal policy. David Osborne explains that many innovative policies arose first within the states before the national government picked up on them. For example, the groundwork for the New Deal social agenda lay in the states during the Progressive era. In addition, while the Reagan administration was denouncing government intervention in the marketplace, governors of both parties embraced the role as economic activists (Osborne 1988). State legislatures have fewer interests to accommodate than the federal government, enabling them at times to put forward a more radical policy.

Innovation at the state level is also facilitated by the discussion of ideas among policy actors. Entrepreneurs are members of inter-state networks. Strategies and ideas developed in one state by entrepreneurs can be communicated to entrepreneurs in other states. Innovations are more easily replicated in this way (Gray 1973; Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Mossberger and Hale 1999; Rogers 1995; Walker 1969; Walker 1981).

In a quantitative study of school choice decisions in state legislatures, Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari (1998) examined several factors which could explain which states are considering school choice legislation: the presence of policy entrepreneurs and their involvement in inter-state networks, the strength of the teachers union, relative change in test scores, percentage of education funding provided by the state, statehouse election year, regional influence, and the fact that legislatures would be more likely to consider such a policy over time. They found that the presence of policy entrepreneurs and their involvement in inter-state networks was most important in explaining why such

legislation was being considered in certain states, but other factors explained whether or not these entrepreneurs were successful. Their study is significant because it highlights the concept of inter-state networks that has been neglected by the literature. But like other quantitative studies, their work does not illuminate how networks facilitate action by entrepreneurs, what information is transferred by networks, and the limitations of networks (Mintrom and Vergari 1998).

In other work, Mintrom points out that inter-state networks were only useful up to a point in the passage of school choice legislation. The information gained through networking can be useful in building credibility for an issue and by placing it on the agenda. But networks cannot assist entrepreneurs to negotiate local conditions to win passage of the legislation (Mintrom 1994, p.241). My research finds that school-choice networks have grown increasingly sophisticated and are benefiting from some coordination by national-level interest groups, foundations, and think tanks.

Idea diffusion can benefit from political coordination by national-level groups. Milward points out that ideas sponsored by think tanks, foundations, and natural associations have a much better chance of getting on the agenda than others. It is so difficult to get an idea on the agenda that their support is helpful. However, little work has been done on this important aspect of public policy making (Milward and Laird 1996).

There is some evidence that in later stages of voucher politics, state entrepreneurs were assisted by national-level organizations. These groups include the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, and the Hudson Institute. Voucher opponents also had a number of national level think tanks and associations that assisted them,

including People for the American Way and the ACLU. Both liberal and conservative groups provided assistance to state actors by setting up forums for networking, such as conferences and web sites. In recent years, they have taken a stronger role in shaping state politics by providing legal assistance and crafting sample legislation.

Vouchers have benefited from the fact that most action for vouchers has been conducted at the state level since the 1990s. Chapter 2 discusses the failures of federal level voucher plans, and why the states were able to assume the lead. This chapter also discusses the role that inter-state networks played in voucher politics, and how national-level foundations and think tanks helped diffuse ideas and provide technical assistance to state entrepreneurs.

Alternative Hypotheses

Two alternative hypotheses might explain the rise of school choice policy. The first alternative is that organized interest groups, such as the religious right, business groups, or the Catholic Church, and the Republican Party were behind the voucher reform. Several scholars studying education politics have put forward this hypothesis. In his most recent book on the implementation of school vouchers in Wisconsin, Witte writes that voucher politics has been heavily influenced by the Catholic Church, business organizations, and the Republican Party. As evidence, he points to the financially troubled parochial schools, the presence of business groups in the voucher coalition in Wisconsin, and the support of Republican leaders for vouchers (Witte 2000). My interviews and research show that organized interests were secondary in importance to other independent variables.

The second alternative hypothesis focuses on state political culture. Though it cannot explain events at the national level, state culture may explain why certain states have considered school choice over others during the nineties. State political culture can be a powerful tool for explaining why action happens in one state and not in another. Daniel Elazar divided up the states into three subcultures: individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic. Individualistic states tend to embrace the ideas of limited government and the free market. Moralistic cultures emphasize the role of government in advancing the common good and the benefits of bureaucracy. Traditionalistic states believe that government should maintain the existing social and economic hierarchy and that politics are personal (Elazar 1984). According to theories of state political culture, individualistic states should be more interested in vouchers than moralistic or traditional states, since individualistic states tend to prefer smaller government and laissez-faire economic policies.

Scholars have also identified states that have characteristics that make them more likely to adopt innovative policy. Studies conducted by Jack Walker and Virginia Gray conclude that larger, wealthier states are more likely to act on a new idea than others (Gray 1973; Walker 1969). Henig maintains that states that rank highly on innovation indexes are more likely to consider school vouchers (Henig 1994, p.160-161). Later in this dissertation, I will show that states that have considered vouchers do not fit the state typologies developed by Elazar or by Walker and Gray.

The Origins of School Choice

The study of policy innovation is in its infancy. Much of the work described in this chapter is theoretical. Empirical studies need to be done to test the theories and

expand upon them. The politics of school vouchers provides an excellent laboratory for examining the theories, since vouchers are clearly an example of innovative policy.

Vouchers have captured the attention of a broad spectrum of political actors and observers, they represent a break with preceding governmental responses to education reform, and they could have enormous institutional or societal effects. Other studies of the politics of school vouchers have been biased, dated, or less comprehensive than this dissertation. By examining the development of school vouchers over time and within two particular states, three factors prove to be significant: ideas, entrepreneurs, and opportunities.

The idea of vouchers motivated a range of policy entrepreneurs over time. The concept of enabling students to choose their schools, even private ones, proved to be very powerful. This idea, rather than profit or power, had a significant impact on the politics. Liberals and conservatives adopted the idea, though they framed it in different ways to serve different ends.

Policy entrepreneurs championed school vouchers. Individuals, both in and out government, framed the policy debate using symbols of freedom, equality, and efficiency. They put together various strategies, including putting forward proposals they knew would fail just to increase visibility for the issue and crafting proposals that were limited to urban areas which helped neutralize opposition. They created diverse coalitions that in later years included leaders from the minority community. They negotiated the intricacies of state politics. They, rather than organized interests, have been responsible for getting vouchers on the agenda in so many states.

Changes in the political context created windows of opportunity that enabled entrepreneurs to put forward policies that in the past would have been unthinkable. One of the most important changes in the political context is that in the beginning of the 1990s, action for school vouchers shifted to the state-level where newly strengthened Republican governors championed the cause. The federal system of government, functioning as “a laboratory of democracy,” enabled entrepreneurs to share information among the states through informal and formal networks. The other critical development was the defection of certain minority leaders from their alliance with the teachers’ unions in opposition to vouchers and the widespread support for school choice among minority parents in the late 1990s. Other political opportunities also arose, including a change in party control of state legislatures, a growing interest among the public for education reform, and media attention to problems in urban schools. Though these windows are difficult to measure or to predict, they are significant when explaining the rise of school choice politics.

Chapter 2

Raising the Debate: The History of School Vouchers 1962-1990

Like a bright, shiny, quick-moving lizard running over a rotting log, the voucher scheme diverts our attention from the decay underneath. But what will we do if Mr. Jencks's entertaining little lizard grows up to be a fire-breathing dragon?

- David Seldon, former UFT president (House Committee on Education and Labor 1972)

When I started talking about choice a couple of years ago it was still regarded as somewhat heretical. Now it seems to be the conventional wisdom.

- William Bennett, 1987 (Henig 1994, p.73)

I remember that [the Chubb and Moe book] having a great impact on White House officials. Suddenly, it was very safe to talk about it. Not only did we have Brookings writing about it, but there was this slew of activity around the country that wasn't identified with one political party.

- Jeanne Allen, Director of the Center for Education Reform (Miller 1992)

This chapter presents an account of how vouchers came to be considered as a serious policy option. It is a long story that takes us from Milton Friedman's original idea in 1962 through its brief adoption by liberals in the 1960s to President Reagan's various Chapter I voucher plans. For thirty years, vouchers have been on the agenda in various guises. Several times vouchers reached the stage of policy initiation. In one case, the OEO implemented a minor voucher plan. These efforts set the stage for action in Ohio and Pennsylvania later in the nineties.

Vouchers became a widely discussed policy option due to the cumulative work of whole cast of entrepreneurs tinkering with Friedman's idea to fit the social mood of the country and respond to various political pressures. These academics, politicians, and

administrators had individual goals and strategies for school choice. Some valued vouchers because they believed they would lead to greater freedom. Others pursued goals of equity. The voucher rhetoric changed depending on the motivations of the entrepreneurs and their strategies. Changes in the political environment opened windows for entrepreneurs. Legislative defeats still furthered their goals, by keeping the idea in the headlines. All this began with a 1962 book on laissez-faire economics.

Origins of an Idea

As discussed in Chapter One, it is difficult if not impossible to point to the absolute origin of an idea. Every idea has roots in older ideas. Politics can also distort intellectual history. In the case of vouchers, some advocates credit the idea of school choice to Adam Smith, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson (Kirkpatrick 1990, p.25). By associating it with Paine and Jefferson, proponents attempt to attribute original intent to the concept. Some opponents, on the other hand, find its origins in ill-disguised segregationist Southern laws established after Brown v. Board of Education. This association brands vouchers as racist. Both accounts tend to reflect the agenda of those advancing them.

Most scholars credit Milton Friedman, the former University of Chicago economist, with the modern idea of school vouchers. Friedman first discusses the merits of vouchers in his 1955 essay, "The Role of Government in Education." His seminal book, Capitalism and Freedom (1962), expanded on these ideas and other proposals for fostering laissez-faire economics. It is worth spending some time detailing his arguments, since they are so widely misrepresented today.

In his chapter on schooling, Friedman asserts that the system of public education represents “an indiscriminate extension of governmental responsibility” (p.85). In his view, government should be limited and power dispersed to prevent it from destroying freedom, that “rare and delicate plant” (p.2). However, governmental involvement in education is necessary to a certain extent, because of the “neighborhood effects” that result from having a literate public with a common set of values. An educated citizenry leads to a more stable democracy, and this benefits everyone. The neighborhood effect is greater from elementary and secondary education, than from college or vocational education.

Some writers accuse Friedman of having no interest in education as a “public good.” Seeking to discredit school choice, Henig neglects Friedman’s discussion of the positive social effects that arise out of universal education (Henig 1994, p.60). This creates the false impression that Friedman intended to establish a caste system with only the wealthy having access to an education. Though Friedman never used the term “public good,” his concept of neighborhood effects is a close synonym.

Neighborhood effects, in his view, require that each child have a minimum amount of schooling. In a perfect world, parents would be entirely responsible for their children’s education. Since not all are able to afford the costs, government should finance education, Friedman maintains. It should also regulate schools by setting certain curriculum standards; analogous to the way it inspects restaurants for minimum sanitary conditions. Though it should regulate and finance education, government should not be

in the business of administering schools. The public administration of schools has led to widespread inefficiency, inequity, and conformity.

To achieve this goal of “denationalizing” education administration, he proposes a system of vouchers, similar to the G.I. Bill, which provided college tuition and living expenses for veterans. Friedman writes, “governments could require a minimum level of schooling financed by giving parents vouchers redeemable for a specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on ‘approved’ educational services” (p.89). Parents could spend this sum, and any additional sum, on an approved institution of their choice¹. The private sector or non-profit institutions could set up schools. A combination of private and public schools would most likely result. “Parents who choose to send their children to private schools would be paid a sum equal to the estimated cost of educating a child in a public school, provided that at least this sum was spent on education in an approved school” (p.93). Competition would lead to the improvement of all schools, increase the diversity of schools, promote flexibility, and make teacher salaries responsive to the market.

Friedman does not believe that his system would lead to multiple and competing values taught at various schools or would greatly strengthen Catholic schools. Besides, he said, to have one set of values taught everywhere would mean that everyone would be forced to attend public schools. That would be an enormous restriction of freedom of thought and belief. His voucher system, he believes, would also lead to a decline in the

¹ The fact that Friedman allows parents to supplement the voucher has led many to believe that his system would not lead to further equity. Chubb and Moe do not permit these supplements in their proposal (Chubb and Moe 1990).

importance of parochial schools. Denationalizing schools would lead to a wider range of schools available to parents. Most parents can only choose between public schools and parochial schools that subsidize the cost of tuition. With a voucher system, more private schools would arise, and parochial schools would become only one option among many.

Friedman also offers a progressive argument for vouchers that reviewers often over-look (see i.e., Henig 1994). He insists that his system of vouchers would not lead to elitism and create class stratification. Friedman points out that the present system already fosters class divisions. Rich and poor are divided into different residential areas with their own school systems. Poor black parents cannot send their children to good schools, because good public schools are concentrated in high-income neighborhoods and because they cannot afford exclusive private schools. The equality promised by public education is a myth. In the past, schools may have equalized opportunity, but with the growth of urban and suburban areas, this is no longer the case. Friedman explains, "our present system, far from equalizing opportunity, very likely does the opposite" (p.93). Vouchers, he maintains, would lead to greater equality, by enabling the poor access to schools formerly reserved for the rich.

Friedman also asserts that vouchers could work in small towns and rural areas. Many believe that there is a technical monopoly in these areas since they cannot support more than one school. Friedman said that improvements in transportation and the concentration of the public in urban areas have removed this obstacle. (The obstacles to instituting a system of choice in rural areas continue to be a problem for voucher proponents to this day.)

He does not believe that spending more on school facilities and teacher salaries would have any affect on test scores, but he allows that some people might want fancier buildings and a more diverse curriculum. With a voucher system, those who “prefer to see money used for better teachers and texts rather than coaches or corridors” could do so, and those who wished to spend more money for frills could also do so (p.94). He adds that the problem was not that teacher salaries were too low, but that the rates were too uniform and rigid. The system has done much to repel imaginative and daring instruction. He proposes a system of merit pay, which would give parents more control over salaries and encourage better teachers. The debate over merit raises for teachers has not abated.

Friedman concludes that the public education system developed when there were few schools and when the mass of immigration required the creation of a common set of values during the turn of the century. With the increase in the number of schools and the stemming tide of immigrants, there was less of a need for a public education system. “Our problem today is not to enforce conformity; it is rather that we are threatened with an excess of conformity. Our problem is to foster diversity, and the alternative would do this far more effectively than a nationalized school system” (p.97).

At the time of the book’s publication, Friedman’s voucher proposal drew little attention. According to Henig, book reviewers for Capitalism and Freedom did not discuss his ideas for education (Henig 1994). Peterson theorizes that the arcane economic language of Friedman’s work might have initially turned off people. In addition, the launching of the Soviet’s Sputnik caused Americans to focus on improving

math and science curriculum, rather than entertaining radical new ideas (Peterson 1995). Gradually vouchers began to be discussed among liberal academics, Catholic Church leaders, and conservative think tanks. By 1971, one observer concluded, “on the intellectual circuit ...vouchers are the hottest thing going” (Henig 1994).

Liberals and the 1960s

By the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Friedman’s voucher proposal was revisited, not by fellow free-market economists, but by liberals who were interested in remedying the problems with urban schools. Poor test scores of minority children, racial tension in the inner city, bureaucratic inertia, and stubborn segregation led many to endorse new solutions for education. Some feared the growing unrest of the inner cities and believed that education reform could stave off violence. One writer spoke of the condition of urban education in 1971:

... Imagine the plight of destitute parents in places such as New York or Newark, where ghetto schools are daily torn by violence, where white unionized teachers, quite obviously more concerned with paychecks than teaching, strike at will, where children seldom reach the eighth grade able to read. Such schools have given up even the pretence of attempting to educate. Yet, when frustrated parents try to act, as they did in New York in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, for instance, they are crushed by the self-serving educationalist bureaucracy. And so ghetto-school parents have no options. They are denied a voice in running their schools and because they are poor they are unable to vote with their feet. The result? A generation of sub-literate black children. And violence. The brutal beating of a striking group of white Newark teachers by a crew of blacks should surprise no one familiar with the frustrations of ghetto parents (Coyne 1972, p.81).

Studies showed that school systems were rigidly hierarchical, hostile to change, and opposed to opening up decision-making to the community. This system, many

believed, was responsible for the decline of urban schools, and a host of reforms were put forward. Some endorsed expanding access to decision-making as a solution (Fantini, Gittell, and Magat 1970; Gittell 1967b). New groups, blacks, Hispanics, women, and the handicapped, demanded a say in decision-making (Tyack and Cuban 1995, p.53). Others called for changes in school finance, student rights, segregation, bilingual education, and entitlements for the handicapped. The Ford Foundation sponsored a comprehensive school improvement reform that sought to foster innovation (Tyack and Cuban 1995, p.133).

School vouchers were also considered. Activists and academics, including Christopher Jencks, Jack Coons, Stephen Sugarman, William Clune, and TheodoreSizer, were convinced that vouchers could solve these problems. Studies such as James Coleman's research on the impact of environment on academic performance and experience with vouchers in housing and higher education added fuel to the school choice movement.

Vouchers were becoming a means for providing other social-welfare services. Food stamps, starting in the early 1960s, enabled lower-income Americans to purchase groceries at any local supermarket. Initiated in 1974, Section 8 provided certificates to some lower-income families to supplement their ability to afford to rent in the private housing market. Programs like Medicaid and Medicare are similar to vouchers in that they enable beneficiaries to meet their needs in the private sector (Henig 1994). These programs contributed to the growing acceptance of a voucher program for educational services.

A much-publicized study for the United States Office of Education in 1966 contributed to the interest in school vouchers. In this report, James S. Coleman, the University of Chicago sociologist, found that socio-economic background, not school funding, was the significant factor in explaining the achievement gap between black and white students. The final report, Equality of Educational Opportunity, showed that a low socio-economic status could be overcome by attending a school with wealthier students. Achievement was strongly related to the educational backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in the school. If such children could be helped to leapfrog out of the city and into suburban schools, they would receive intrinsically better educational services on the one hand and a more supportive learning environment on the other. His study ended with the proposal that the city of Washington operate a system of competing public schools (Coleman 1966).

Coleman's report had a large impact on education politics. It undermined those who said that increasing funding alone would improve failing schools, and it influenced a great number of liberals who wished to reduce segregation and improve performance by black students. Though many questioned his methodology, it did not detract attention from his central message. His findings were often cited by voucher proponents in the following years.

In this climate, vouchers moved from abstract theory to a viable policy option. Still, reformers recognized at the time that they were endorsing initiatives that were quite radical. One observer said, "the proposals for alternatives to the existing public schools would have been considered quasi-subversive a decade ago" (Schrag 1972).

Vouchers and Equity

Christopher Jencks was one of the most prominent supporters of school vouchers at this time. Jencks was the editor of the liberal New Republic and President of the Center for the Study of Public Policy at Harvard. In a 1966 article for Public Interest, he wrote that the two main problems with the politics of education in the slums were inadequate funding, and bureaucratic timidity and defeatism (Jencks 1971). Vouchers, he believed, would remedy both of these problems.

Jencks maintained that America's school system was vastly unequal; the poor had far fewer educational services than the rich. This situation had resulted from basing school funding on the local property tax, and funding had a major impact on performance, despite Coleman's findings. However, Jencks believed that reforming this system would be exceedingly difficult, because in reality most people were not interested in having a more equal society. "Almost nobody really wants to make America an egalitarian society. Ours is a competitive society, in which some people do extremely well and others do equally badly, and most people are willing to keep it that way.... And despite a lot of pious rhetoric about equality of opportunity in this competition, most parents want their children to have a more than equal chance of success" (p.237-238).

Given the political difficulties in equalizing education funding, money alone could not solve the problems with inner-city schools. In fact, those schools should not be given more money; instead they should be closed. They were more like penal institutions than places of learning, Jencks said.

Public control of schools and inadequate funding were at the root of the problem. The lack of funding created a system where all were assumed incompetent, and a system

of rigid centralization was established to correct that. “Distrust is the order of the day, symbolized by the elaborate accounting system, the endless forms to be filled out for the central office, the time clocks, and the two-way radios for monitoring classrooms from the front office, the constant tests and elaborate regulations for students” (p.241). This sort of structure made innovation impossible, because teachers and administrators “are frozen into defensive postures based on years of standpattism” (p. 242). The public control of schools removed this system from scrutiny, and individuals just aimed to survive, rather than improve. There were no incentives to improve. If a system of vouchers were put in place, these failing schools would close, and a system of private schools would arise.

Some might worry, Jencks said, that vouchers would subsidize Catholic education. Instinctively most non-Catholics, including himself, believed that a parochial education promoted alternative values. Catholic and other private schools were assumed to be divisive, while public schools were more democratic. Jencks questioned this belief. “Educators have taught us to use ‘public’ as a synonym for ‘democratic’ or just plain ‘good,’ and to associate ‘private’ with ‘elitist’ and ‘inequality’” (p.243). He challenged this modality by pointing out that a public school in Harlem was hardly responsive to its community, and there was much evidence that Catholic schools provided a good education. If the poor were given money to spend on education as the rich do, then private schools would expand to accommodate them.

A system of competing private schools would enable reform to happen in “manageable bites.” Schools could be improved one by one, instead the whole system at

once. A system of vouchers also could be a means of achieving integration. Learning from Coleman, Jencks said that school environment was a powerful predictor of success, so diversity in schools must be increased. With a system of choice, middle-class parents might chose to send their children to schools in poorer neighborhoods if those schools had a special objectives and methods. Poor students might have access to schools in wealthier areas, and have a wider choice of type of instruction.

He believed that a system of competition would “destroy the public school system as we know it” (p.247). However, this could be healthy, given the state of public education today. “And if, as some fear, the public schools could not survive in open competition with private ones, then perhaps they should not survive” (p.247). He called for the end of socialized education, and the establishment of a capitalist system.

Vouchers and Funding

Other liberals endorsed school vouchers. While studying desegregation in Chicago in the 1960s, John “Jack” Coons began investigating the impact of the property tax based education system on education. He found that disparities in local wealth had a great impact on schools. This Northwestern law professor was joined by Stephen Sugarman and William Clune on a mission to reduce these disparities. In 1970 they wrote Private Wealth and Public Education, which denounced the funding system, and in 1971 they argued the landmark school funding case in California, Serrano v. Priest. They cited vouchers as a potential remedy to the status quo. They believed that the courts should instruct legislatures to improve equality, with vouchers if necessary. With a court mandate, legislatures could avoid the political difficulties of interfering with local control

and centralizing school funding. With a voucher system, the state could supplement education spending in poorer districts to come closer to spending levels in better-off districts. And what could be more “local,” they reasoned, than giving families direct control over the cash to use at schools they chose (Coons, Sugarman, and Clune III 1972; Miller 1999)? ²

Liberals and Libertarians

Though 60s liberals picked up Friedman’s concept of vouchers, they had different motivations and goals. While both Jencks and Friedman discussed how a system of competition among schools would improve efficiency, this was clearly Friedman’s primary consideration. Reducing the size of the public sector and promoting laissez-faire economics was Friedman’s *modus operandi*. In contrast, the extent of the government bureaucracy did not trouble Jencks. He had no criticism of the public administration over housing, social security, or medical licensing, as Friedman did. Jencks did not even fault the government for providing a system of public education. Suburban public schools worked well. Presumably if city schools worked as well as suburban schools, Jencks would not have endorsed vouchers. He envisioned competition forcing ossified urban bureaucracies, rather than suburban systems, to innovate or close down. It was laissez-faire as a last resort and primarily for city schools.

Both Jencks and Friedman felt that a system of vouchers would improve the inequalities and segregation endemic in public education. Both believed it would provide options for the poor, who have none now. For Jencks, this is his prime objective. His

² Coons, Sugarman, and Clune followed up on these ideas in “School Choice as Simple Justice”

1966 essay on vouchers, "Is the Public School Obsolete?", began with an analysis of schools in the "slums." A system of choice would expand diversity, which as Coleman demonstrated, would improve school performance. Diversity for its own sake was not important to Friedman.

Alum Rock, California

In 1972, Jencks was funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the federal anti-poverty agency, to set up a model voucher program³. This five million-dollar, five-year pilot program was based in Alum Rock, a suburb of San Diego. The idea was also considered in Seattle, San Francisco, Rochester, Gary, and East Hartford, but local teachers and administrators adamantly opposed it. Alum Rock was chosen largely because the local superintendent saw it as an opportunity to implement his own plans for decentralization (Peterson 1995).

This program was much less radical than Jencks's original proposal in 1966. Because Jencks attempted to ease the fears of the teachers' unions and administrators, he only permitted public schools to participate. Private schools were excluded. The Alum Rock experiment was highly regulated by the Education Voucher Agency (EVA). The EVA required that schools had to accept all voucher students, space permitting; voucher students could not be expelled without undue cause; book-keeping would be open to all; schools could not discriminate by race or religion; and schools could not charge parents

(1992).

³ Also in 1970, OEO sponsored a performance-contracting experiment in which thirty-one companies competed for performance contracts in eighteen selected school districts (Tyack and Cuban 1995, p.119). Peterson suggested that OEO conducted the voucher and privatization experiments, because OEO was struggling to find a purpose within the Nixon administration (Peterson 1995).

additional fees (Jencks 1972). Other aspects of the program were more troubling for voucher purists: poor teachers could not be fired; few new schools could enter the voucher market; no one school could grow at the expense of the others; and schools had to first accept neighborhood students before voucher students (Peterson 1995, p.232).

Polls showed that most people, especially minority parents, were also in favor of vouchers at this time. A survey of Seattle residents in 1972 prepared by the University of Washington demonstrates this development. The following questions were asked of all residents including parents and non-parents:

Question	Agree	Undecided	Disagree
The voucher plan would increase chances for parents to be involved in school affairs.	51.4%	3.7%	24.9%
Parents should be able to choose schools for their children.	75.1%	13.6%	11.3%
I would like to see Seattle test the voucher plan at the high school level (University of Washington 1972).	40.0 %	28.1%	31.9%

Though polls showed that parents in Washington favored vouchers, teachers' unions and administrators strongly opposed them. One poll conducted in early 1971 found that 71% of school administrators didn't like vouchers. 79% said they didn't like :paroch-aid (public funding for parochial schools), 81% didn't like busing, and 55% didn't like long haired boys and men (University of Washington 1972).

These education groups came out forcefully against Jencks's proposal. Much vitriol was aimed at "non-educators" who were attempting to impose "unscientific" changes, such as vouchers. The education professionals felt that the Office of Education, not the OEO, should be in charge of implementing education reform, though they had no problem with OEO administering Head Start. Education professionals, they said, knew best how to improve schools (House Committee on Education and Labor 1972). Additional funding was needed to foster experimental public schools and proven educational programs, instead of giving money to Jencks's "subversive" plan (National Association of State Boards of Education 1972, p.66). David Seldon, president of UFT, said, "...we think that this is what happens when you have people who really don't understand anything about education coming along and putting some money into it" (House Committee on Education and Labor 1972, p.105). They insisted that they were not against innovation and pointed to work done by the NEA to disseminate the findings of experimental research. In the end, this plan would destroy OEO, which, they thought, was Jencks's hidden agenda.

They also said that vouchers would "lead to racial, economic, and social isolation of children" (House Committee on Education and Labor 1972, p.96). The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) cautioned against vouchers as promoting racial separation. The American Jewish Congress feared a breakdown of church-state (Berube 1988, #83, p.103). This system would also enable "hucksters" or shady private companies to take advantage of the public and establish bad schools. The union leaders often said, as they do now, that vouchers would "weaken or

destroy public education.” Seldon, one of the colorful leaders of the UFT, described vouchers as “a bright, shiny, quick-moving lizard running over a rotting log” which would distract people, and like “a virus” would grow into a larger program, and ultimately undermine the great progress that public education has made (House Committee on Education and Labor 1972).

Note that even as voucher entrepreneurs worked to frame vouchers in appealing rhetoric, opponents sought to frame the debate with their own terms. As Jencks and other liberals described vouchers as promoting equality and diversity, union leaders called vouchers “a scheme”, “a virus”, and “subversive.” “Hucksters” would take advantage of an unwitting public. Vouchers would destroy public education. These images were very powerful and are still being employed, as related in the case studies of Ohio and Pennsylvania.

In the end, the evaluations of the Alum Rock experiment were inconclusive. The program was so weak that evaluators had trouble extrapolating what the results of a broader program would be. Even while the pilot was still operating, it pretty well dropped from the public view. Since it did not include private schools, the media and academics lost interest. It has mostly survived as a lesson for what happens when the unions get involved -- a weak program (Berube 1988, p.103; Henig 1994, p.119; Jones 1988).

The Dormant Years

After the Alum Rock experiment, vouchers were not widely discussed during the 1970s. Nixon, Ford, and Carter did not bring up the issue in national speeches, and there

was little interest at the state and local levels. In *Public Schools of Choice* (1973), Mario Fantini, a liberal who had promoted community control in the 1960s, argued for a system of public school choice to foster competition, but his work gained little attention (Berube 1988, p.103; Henig 1994, p.71).

Why was so little attention paid to school choice at this time? Henig argued that the intellectual challenges to the Jencks plan were enormously successful. "These challenges -- not simple lethargy or bureaucratic intransigence -- explain why the initial spark of enthusiasm for vouchers so quickly was dampened." Henig said that there were four main criticisms of school choice: it would tear down the separation of church and state; it would foster inequality; it would be administratively unfeasible; and it would destroy public schools (Henig 1994, p.67-68). However, Henig provides no evidence to show how these arguments swayed the public. In fact, public opinion polls show no decline in support for vouchers between the 1960s and 1970s.

Though ideas can be enormously powerful, it was not the ideas of opponents that succeeded in stalling the voucher movement at this time. Other education reform efforts of the 1960s were also beginning to slow down. The teachers' unions and administrators had overwhelmed all opposition. Certain concessions had been made to inner city schools, and liberals moved on to other causes. No action would come from the White House either; President Carter was a close ally of the teachers' unions.

In addition, the 1970s were a time of lethargy in education policy in general. There was little activity towards reforming schools during this decade. The conventional wisdom of the time was that "schools don't make a difference." Coleman's study

inadvertently created an indifference to education reform. If family background was more important than school funding in predicting success, why do anything to improve schools? Also, many studies in those years debunked the ambitious reform programs of the 60s. As a result of this indifference, school curricula were deconstructed, and standards were lowered. The public did not seem to care about this dumbing-down of course work, and the media largely ignored the issue (Ravitch 1990). Thus, vouchers received little attention until President Ronald Reagan's election in 1980.

Putting Vouchers Back on the Agenda

A new era in voucher politics was ushered in with the election of President Ronald Reagan in November 1980. His vision of a smaller federal government, an unregulated economy, and a religious people, affected all aspects of public policy, including education. From the beginning of his first term, Reagan railed against "the public school monopoly", spoke out in favor of school prayer, and supported school choice options.

Liberals still advocated for vouchers in the early 1980s. Coleman publicly supported them (1981). Coons and Sugarman led two initiative efforts for vouchers in California to stimulate voluntary integration, but faced massive opposition by the teachers unions and were unsuccessful (1979; Lindsey 1979). Apart from a few scattered efforts by liberals, conservatives dominated the fight for vouchers during the 1980s.

School choice was a good match with Reagan's overall philosophy. He believed that the private sector could out-perform the public sector. Supporting private schools, through school choice, could reduce the importance of the large education bureaucracy.

He also had a vision of a more religious America. School choice would mean supporting parochial and evangelical schools. Laissez-faire economics, which allowed for maximum competition and minimum government regulation, was another Reagan belief. Recall that Friedman, a leader in laissez-faire economics, had been the modern originator of school vouchers.

During the course of his administration, Reagan proposed vouchers for other governmental services, including health insurance, jobs, and housing. In this way the size of the federal government could be reduced and the private sector could provide those services. He believed that the open market could more efficiently provide services for the elderly, the poor and the unemployed. He proposed a voluntary voucher program for Medicare whereby the elderly could purchase private health insurance or enroll in prepaid group health organizations. Reagan also proposed giving the unemployed vouchers that would be given to employers. In addition, housing vouchers would be given to the poor, who could redeem them anywhere instead of only having government housing (Kurtz 1983; Pear 1983).

The Reagan Democrats and the Catholic Church

An important part of the Reagan constituency was Democrats from working class, Catholic areas. "The Reagan Democrats" were taken with Reagan's conservative and populist message. Many switched tickets to vote for him; some permanently identified with Republicans.⁴ The Reagan Democrats also appreciated his support of tax credits. Often his early proposals for such measures were announced before Catholic audiences.

The public school system in working-class areas was weak, and their parochial schools needed help.

Declining enrollments since 1965 and higher costs heightened interest in federal funding of parochial schools. Since the 40s, 10-12% of all students have attended private school with the majority going to Catholic schools. At their peak in 1965-66, 90 percent of the students in private schools attended a parochial school. After 1965, enrollment in Catholic schools began to decline precipitously, though in the 1980s it began to level off. In the 1990s, only 50 percent of private school students attended Catholic schools. Enrollment declined in part because the nation-wide population of school age children dropped and because many parochial schools were forced to close when Catholics moved from the older parishes to the suburbs. In addition, the cost of parochial education began to rise when religious teachers had to be replaced by lay faculty who required higher salaries (Witte 2000, p.30). These developments put a great deal of stress on the parochial school system.

Funding for Catholic schools had also been drastically retrenched during the 1970s as a result of an era of strict church-state separatism in the Supreme Court. In 1971, Lemon v. Kurtzman struck down state laws that provided salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in Catholic and other faith-based schools, because the court said these laws led to the advancement of religion. This case triggered a series of cases that cut funding and limited religious expression on public grounds. In 1984, the Federal Appeals Court of Philadelphia held that students in a public high school could not form a

⁴ In the 1980 election, Reagan received 48 percent of the Catholic vote, compared with 40 percent

nondenominational prayer group because the spectacle of students praying might send a message to nonbelievers that the school was somehow endorsing religion. In 1972, a Federal District Court ruled that the University of Missouri at Kansas City did not have to allow religious worship though it allowed a variety of other groups to congregate.⁵ These decisions angered Catholics and religious conservatives and forced them to seek new avenues for federal support (Rosen 2000).

The Superiority of Catholic Schools

Another study by James Coleman provided a new rationale for funding private schools, in particular Catholic schools. In High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared (1982), James Coleman, Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore found that private school students did better on standardized tests than public school students, even controlling for student background. The differences in achievement were explained by certain characteristics of private schools: more homework, fewer absences, less cutting of classes, and a more orderly environment in the school. They also concluded that a voucher system would provide poor children with a better education and promote racial integration. Though later studies showed that the difference in test scores was miniscule, the impact of this study was enormous. Its findings were widely quoted. Catholic leaders were quick to point to this study as a reason for funding their schools (Cookson 1994, p.80; Jones 1988).⁶

for Carter (Morgan 1980).

⁵ This decision was overturned by the Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent (1982).

⁶ Chubb and Moe point out that this study, in some ways, contradicts Coleman's earlier report which found that a community's socio-economic status was more important in predicting student success than the quality of the school. In his later study, he found that schools did make a

Tax Credit Proposals

As a result of the pressures on their schools and armed with the Coleman study, church leaders pressed hard for tuition tax credits during the 1970s and early 1980s. When President Reagan first entered office, tax credits were more widely discussed than vouchers. Tax credits are federal tax reimbursements for parents who send their children to private schools. During the late seventies and early 1980s, several tax credit proposals were entertained. In 1978, one plan which have provided \$50-100 credit to parents who sent their children to private school was passed in the House, but was narrowly defeated in the Senate because of President Carter's promised veto. In 1981, legislation introduced by Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) and Bob Packwood (R-Ore.) would have provided tax credits of up to \$500. This program would have totaled \$2 billion to \$3 billion (Morgan 1980). In April 1982 before 4,000 Roman Catholic educators in Chicago, Reagan proposed legislation, later called the Educational Opportunity and Equity Act, to give income tax credits to families that pay tuition to private schools. In November 1983, Reagan proposed another tax credit bill of up to \$300 per year for students attending private or parochial schools (Babcock 1982). None of these plans passed.

Though both tax credits and vouchers would benefit private school students, there are some important differences between the two programs. Voucher money is meant to be reimbursed at schools, and tax credit money goes directly to the parents. Unlike voucher advocates, those favoring tax credits usually emphasized that it was unfair that

difference. Catholic schools had a better success rate than public schools with students of the same background (Chubb and Moe 1990, p.16).

private school parents had a “double burden” of paying taxes to support public schools and tuition to the private schools. Also, tax credits were clearly aimed at working class Catholics, the Reagan Democrats, not the city students that Jencks had worried about. The credits were too small for poor parents to switch from public to private schools. In the 1982 plan, the credit was only for \$100 to \$500. When selling his plan, Reagan said that it would provide more equity for “overtaxed and underappreciated” working families (Babcock 1982; Wright and Herron 1982).⁷ Opponents criticized tax credits for the same reasons that they criticized vouchers: it would destroy public education, lead to further segregation, fund religious schools, and siphon off the best students (Mouat 1980).

At first, after the election of Reagan, tax credit supporters were very optimistic about the passage of a bill. The 1980 election also brought a major turnover of Senators and Republicans now controlled the Senate. The new Republican Senators seemed more sympathetic to the issue than the previous members (Hunter 1980). However, the country was also absorbed with worries over the budget deficit. Even Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole said that it was not the right time for the government to give out tax credits.

Reagan’s First Term

During his first term, Reagan proposed a constitutional amendment for school prayer and became ensnared in a debate over the tax-exempt status for private schools that practiced discriminatory admission policies. He also focused on local control of

⁷ Families making under \$50,000 would get full credit. Those making under \$75,000 would get some (Babcock 1982).

education, the gradual elimination of the Department of Education, the withdrawal of bilingual education, and tax credits. Vouchers received less attention, though he did put forward one proposal in 1983. His first secretary of education, Terrel Bell, was not a strong supporter of vouchers. Bell was more instrumental in steering the national dialogue towards highlighting the deficiencies in American education and advocating for increased excellence in education (Ravitch 1990). These issues dominated education politics for the rest of the decade.

The Crisis: 1983-1986

Between 1983 and 1986, a series of books and governmental commissions began calling attention to falling test scores and the weakness of America's schools compared to other countries, including Japan and Germany. The Business Higher Education Forum (1983), the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1983), the Twentieth Century Fund (1983), the College Board (1983), and the National Governors Association (1986) all agreed that major change was needed. Books by academics Mortimer Adler (1982), John Goodlad (1984), and TheodoreSizer (1984) confirmed their findings (Cookson 1994; Ravitch 1990).

The most influential report of this time was "A Nation at Risk" (1983) written by the National Commission on Excellence in Education, appointed by Education Secretary Bell in 1981. This report found that America was fast becoming a second-class industrial power. Several indicators pointed to academic deterioration: academic scores were lower than scores in other advanced countries, a decline in SAT scores between 1963 and 1980, the fact that many seventeen year olds could not register strong intellectual and

inferential skills, a decline in science achievement among those seventeen year olds, and the growing tide of illiteracy. It predicted a national catastrophe resulting from a “rising tide of mediocrity” (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1987). In the midst of a period of stagflation, the public responded eagerly to those findings.

If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves. We have even squandered the gains in student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge. Moreover, we have dismantled essential support systems which helped make those gains possible. We have, in effect, been committing an act of unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament... (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1987, p.198).

Though there have been many challenges to the finding of an educational crisis (i.e. Henig 1994; Tyack and Cuban 1995), the impact of “A Nation at Risk” was enormous. With talk of the coming crisis, this document captured headlines from coast to coast. It shook Americans out of their complacency and indifference to the state of schools. Polls suddenly reflected a new concern about the education crisis among Americans. It connected economic prosperity with education and, by doing so, brought business leaders and new civic agencies into the educational debate. These new reformers, fired up with a mission to improve test scores, put together proposals that would increase “excellence” in education.⁸ These included tighter standards, more homework, a new emphasis on basics, higher teacher pay, and curriculum reform.

⁸ A concern with “excellence” in education is a cyclical phenomenon. Education reform movements have swung between emphasizing excellence and equity. For a more complete discussion of this, see Ann Bastian, et. al. Choosing Equality: The Case for Democratic Schooling, San Francisco: Public Media Center, 1985.

Reagan supported the excellence movement and backed away from his vow to abolish the Department of Education (Hoffman 1983; Ravitch 1990).

The new attention to education both helped and hurt the voucher movement. The report called attention to the deficiencies in public education, just as choice proponents had been doing for years. The report gave them the opportunity to claim that the route to excellence was through competition. However, most of the talk about excellence in the following years was reserved for public schools. Reformers concentrated their efforts on standards and curriculum, and many conservatives and business leaders became distracted from the issue of choice. Not until these reforms were instituted and test scores failed to markedly improve did attention begin to return a decade later to school choice (Bennett 2000).

The 1983 Voucher Proposal: Chapter I

In 1983, Reagan proposed giving parents of poor children vouchers worth up to \$520 a year to be used at any public or private school. School districts would decide whether or not they wanted to participate in the program. (Even Bell thought that few would opt for it.) In those that did, the vouchers would be awarded to parents only on a case-by-case basis with the approval of the school district (House Committee on Education and Labor 1983).

Reagan planned to distribute these funds through Chapter I (formerly called Title I) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, a \$3.2 billion program. This program, established in 1965, provided money to five million disadvantaged children mainly for remedial reading and mathematics (Peterson 1983). The Federal Government

distributed Chapter I funds to the states, and the states distributed the money to school districts on the basis of child poverty figures. Pupils became eligible for the added instruction if they were below average in school performance, regardless of their parents' income. It was the Department of Education's largest program, and thus a likely place to begin a voucher experiment.

Reagan, Bell, and other voucher proponents advanced several arguments for their program. First, by tying it to Chapter 1, they were able to say that their legislation would increase equity. Bell said an optional voucher program would "expand opportunities" for poor children, permitting their parents to select schools that "best meet their needs" (Pear 1983). Second, they emphasized that the program heightened competition between public and private schools would lead to excellence, the current emphasis among education reformers. Reagan said, "these proposals will expand opportunities by allowing parents to keep more of their money rather than taxing it away to finance bigger educational bureaucracies. They will also increase healthy competition among schools. Without a race, there can be no champion, no records broken, no excellence in education or any other walk of life" (Williams 1983).

Many educators felt the plan would create an "administrative nightmare." Even the Catholic Conference and the Council for American Private Education did not endorse it, since they said it might interfere with the Chapter 1 benefits they had fought hard to win. They also feared that it would disrupt the passage of future tuition tax credit legislation (1985; House Committee on Education and Labor 1983). The NAACP and the Urban League feared that it would worsen urban schools and increase segregation.

The House Committee on Education and Labor questioned why the administration would fix a program that was already working well and suspected that ideology, rather than an interest in improving schools, was driving the proposal (House Committee on Education and Labor 1983). Legislative leaders informed the White House that regardless of its language, it would not go anywhere (Peterson 1983). The legislation died in committee.

Reagan's Second Term

The beginning of President Reagan's second term promised much for the prospects of vouchers. The appointment of William Bennett, the avid school choice proponent, and the pressures of the Supreme Court case Anguilar v. Felton were favorable developments. Three pieces of voucher legislation were introduced in 1985, 1986, and 1988 each increasingly moderate, but they all failed. However, even these failures did much to inform the public and raise the debate about school choice.

Bennett, the Pit Bull in the Bully Pulpit

The school choice movement gained a major victory with the appointment of William J. Bennett as Secretary of Education in late 1984. Bennett vigorously attacked the educational interest groups and bureaucrats whom he called "the blob" (Ravitch 1990). He believed strongly in "three C's": content, character, and choice. He intended to promote these goals through improved teacher training, higher standards for promoting students to the next grades, a return to "basics" in the classroom, a reconsideration of the place of religion in public education, a rethinking of the tenets of bilingual education, and school choice (Reich 1988).

His appointment brought education policy to the forefront of American politics. Diane Ravitch called him the “pit bull in the bully pulpit.” He brought his agenda national attention as he barnstormed the country and brought research findings to the general public in readable prose (Ravitch 1990). He put forward detailed position papers and proposals for change in various department regulations. Those papers raised issues, and served as the basis of upcoming policy proposals. He generated ideas among the public and politicians. Bennett saw himself in the business of raising issues (Reich 1988).

Due to Bennett’s highly visible presence, vouchers suddenly became a widely discussed topic. Two of his high level staff members, Chester Finn and William Kristol, were also very visible champions of school choice. Bennett and his staff coupled the idea of the benefits of a religious education with vouchers. They touted the idea that vouchers could remedy the education crisis described in “A Nation at Risk”; excellence and choice were linked in this way. They attacked the teachers’ unions for creating a monopoly that prevented children from choosing their schools and stymied innovation. Bennett put forward three choice proposals in the next four years.

Anguilar v. Felton - July 1985

Supporters of school vouchers were aided by the Supreme Court case, Anguilar v. Felton (1985). In July 1985, the Court ruled that public schools could not assign teachers to nonpublic classrooms for remedial instruction. This decision reaffirmed and extended Meek v. Pittenger (1975) which had severely limited compensatory education programs for private schools, although it permitted reimbursements for textbooks used in private

schools (Peterson 1995). Anguilar angered the administration, which felt strongly about religious education. Bennett said, “our values as a free people and the central values of the Judeo-Christian tradition are flesh of the flesh and blood of the blood” (Review and Outlook (Editorial) 1985).

This court decision put the federal government in a quandary. The decision conflicted with a law that required all public schools to provide remedial instruction to all students, including those in private and parochial schools. Private schools were forced to look to another avenue to receive government support for their schools. Many believed that vouchers could answer that problem (Review and Outlook (Editorial) 1985).

Advocates turned to the court case, Mueller v. Allen (1983), which permitted public dollars to follow the child even if that child attended a private school. In 1955, Minnesota enacted a statute permitting state income tax-payers to claim a deduction from gross income for expenses, such as “tuition, textbooks and transportation,” incurred in educating their children. The deductible amount was raised in 1976 and again in 1978. It applied to expenses for all children, even those in private schools (Jones 1988). Although most of the benefits of the tax deduction went to families sending their children to sectarian schools, such statistical considerations were regarded as irrelevant to a determination of a statute’s constitutionality. The court decision seemed to permit vouchers that gave families a choice between public and sectarian schools -- even if most families preferred education in a religious setting (Peterson 1995). Though Anguilar was overturned a few years later, at the time it provided an opportunity for voucher proponents.

The 1985 proposal: A Response to Anguilar

A new voucher program in late 1985 seemed to respond to this conflict between the law mandating remedial education for private school students and the court decision. In November, Bennett unveiled a plan that would provide poor parents vouchers worth up to \$1,133 from federal funds dispersed to school systems through the Charter 1 program. This legislation, known as the “The Equity and Choice Act of 1985” stated that funds could be redeemed at any public or private school. Using Mueller v. Allen as a model, the money would go to parents, rather than schools. Since Anguilar barred parochial schools from accepting Chapter 1 money, the Catholic Church began more vigorously supporting vouchers (1985). Under this legislation, vouchers could be used for private school tuition, even if the school did not offer special remedial classes.

Bennett increasingly argued that vouchers would improve equity. He said, “the poor do not now have that choice, yet it is their children for whom education may represent the best opportunity for success in later life” (Review and Outlook (Editorial) 1985). Conservatives still touted its benefits for improving efficiency. The Wall Street Journal wrote in its editorial column, “perhaps the most important benefit of a voucher system is that it would promote competition among public schools, and between public and private schools... Teachers trapped by bad administration, red tape and indiscipline would have their grievances aired in the best way possible, by students voting with their feet. When that happens, school boards would know that something is wrong. In many cases, such notice is long overdue” (Review and Outlook (Editorial) 1985).

This program faced much opposition by the unions. NEA President Mary Futrell called it “cruel hoax” for the poor that “signals further retreat” from successfully

educating the poor. NEA secretary-treasurer Roxanne Brastar feared that the Reagan plan might create a two-tracked segregated school system that raised the “frightening specter of a return to segregated schools ... and the eventual demise of our system of universal public education” (Berube 1988, p.103). The House Committee on Education and Labor issued a report denouncing vouchers for a long list of reasons: vouchers would reduce funds for public education, a market-model was not appropriate for education, it did not provide the poor with a meaningful choice since the voucher would not cover the costs of private schools, and they could lead to further racial segregation (Committee on Education and Labor 1986). Finally after much protest, Secretary of Education Bennett withdrew the voucher bill in the summer of 1986 (Berube 1988, p.103).

The 1986 Proposal: Vouchers for Remedial Instruction

In 1986, Reagan and Bennett offered a scaled back version of vouchers, their third attempt. Local school districts would have the option of allowing parents to use their Chapter I money, approximately \$600, at the school of their choice. Vouchers or “compensatory education certificates” could also be mandated by the state if the localities were determined to have ineffective remedial programs. Unlike the previous two proposals, this program would only cover remedial instruction, not tuition (Berube 1988, p.103; Werner 1986a; Werner 1986b). These compromises were necessary because the previous two proposals had received so much criticism, even from fellow Republicans.

Bennett and his staff were fully conscious that they were provoking a national debate about these issues. They must have realized that there was little political will at that time to pass these measures, but continued to advocate for them anyway.

According to William Kristol, Bennett's chief of staff, the department's proposed changes in the remedial program were intended "to foster a broad debate about accountability, rewarding results and educational effectiveness," in addition to promoting parental choice through vouchers. He said, "we're trying to get the principle on the table; the details will be negotiable" (Werner 1986a).

Like the other two proposals, this one also failed to gain much support in Congress. It was fought vigorously by the teachers' unions, and proponents were not well organized. Its more modest scope did little to assuage opposition. Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski (D-Md.) said, "You're coming up with something people are calling a closet voucher, a backdoor voucher, a side door voucher" (Associated Press 1987).

The Retreat - Public School Choice

In 1988, Reagan began endorsing school choice only among public schools. This time he linked vouchers with magnet schools which are regional schools offering special programs to attract a diversity of students. As part of an omnibus initiative, he proposed federal grants for magnet schools (Henig 1994, p.80). This proposal signaled a failure of the voucher movement at the federal level. Magnet schools provoked little controversy, and were far from the broad school choice program that he had originally envisioned. Other voucher proponents were not impressed with Reagan's new emphasis on public school choice. James Kirkpatrick, a long time voucher advocate, called it "a halfhearted gesture" and added that "it does nothing to encourage the kind of fundamental changes that are urgently needed in American education" (Kirkpatrick 1990). Despite these

criticisms, Reagan's and Bennett's continued attention to choice did much to keep the issue in the national spotlight.

When George Bush first came to office in 1988, he showed little interest in vouchers. He spoke only of choice among public schools and had many other education proposals that took precedence. In January 1989, Bush spoke at a White House conference on choice, where he called expanding choice "a national imperative," but scarcely mentioned private schools and referred repeatedly to "public school choice." President Reagan also spoke at the meeting, and he, too, avoided mention of private school choice, despite his earlier support for vouchers. In 1989, Bush said that the federal government could not afford tuition tax credits for private schools (Bradley 1989; Miller 1992).

What brought about this retreat on vouchers during the later 1980s? When Reagan first came into office, school choice had a powerful ally. Many things pointed to the success of a voucher package: the pressures of Angular v. Felton, the appointment of Bennett, Coleman's second study, and the attention on educational failures driven by "A Nation at Risk." Certainly the teachers' unions and other professional groups did not take these developments lightly and threw a great deal of energy into fighting school choice (Jones 1988). Yet, voucher legislation never got very far in Congress. By the end of his second term, Reagan had backed down from his earlier broad plan, and Bush refused to consider it. One education analyst wrote at the time, "Far from being a 1980s *zeitgeist*, choice will turn out to be an historical footnote to education in the 1980s" (Jones 1988, p. 153). Several reasons contributed to the failure to introduce a real

voucher policy. First, vouchers seemed to contradict other aspects of Reagan's philosophy. The concept of vouchers conflicted with Reagan's message of lowering the national debt. In addition, a new federal program, such as tax credits or vouchers, would also create a new federal bureaucracy or at least maintain the old one, just as he was trying to downsize the federal government (Jones 1988).

Second, the federal government could not really create a broad voucher program. School finance policy is primarily a state function (Jones 1988). The federal government has contributed at most 9% of state education funding. To create any serious voucher program, the federal budget for education would have to increase a hundred fold.

Third, voucher advocates at this time were primarily private school organizations. Ten percent of students attend private schools; this is potentially a large and influential interest group. However, these private school groups were poorly organized and divided about the benefits of a voucher program, just as they are now (Jones 1988). Although the Catholic school constituency was well organized, it was not initially supportive of vouchers. These weak forces were no match for the highly organized education groups.

Fourth, voucher advocates did a very poor job advocating for equity. While advocates did a good job of equating vouchers with liberty and efficiency, they missed the opportunity of really demonstrating how inequitable the current system is. Bennett did discuss the lack of choice the poor had, but he did not elaborate on the level of disparities between rich and poor (Jones 1988). Jones wrote, "it is entirely possible that some future generation may look upon failure to address the issue of spending equity for children in private schools as a colossal oversight of contemporary reform movements,


one indicative of an anti-religious bias in education in our time” (Jones 1988, p.160).

Subsequent chapters of this dissertation discuss how entrepreneurs in the 1990s honed their rhetoric about voucher and equity with enormous success.

The Turning Point

Vouchers were not a complete political failure during the 1980s. They became a matter of public discussion. The idea that originated in 1955 finally became a widely talked about issue. In 1987, Bennett said, “When I started talking about choice a couple of years ago it was still regarded as somewhat heretical. Now it seems to be the conventional wisdom” (Henig 1994, p.73). Vouchers were barely mentioned in newspapers in the 1970s. In 1986, the New York Times had 47 articles on the issue. The failures of the 1980s set the stage for the rapid acceleration of voucher action in the 1990s. Chart A shows how the voucher debate took off in the 1990s with over 100 hundred articles a year suddenly appearing in the New York Times. In 2000, 364 articles addressed the issue in the same paper.

Chart A. The Number of Articles Appearing in the New York Times that Discuss School Vouchers from 1970-2000



1990 was a turning point in voucher politics, which led to greater press coverage later in that decade. Two developments were responsible for reenergizing the voucher movement. The first was the publication of Chubb's and Moe's Politics, Markets, and American Schools. This book stimulated a re-examination of the issue by a broad audience. The second development was a shift in power relations and policy agendas in state education politics. With new found powers, Republican governors positioned themselves as formidable voucher entrepreneurs. They championed charter schools and other choice measures that helped form new coalitions and demonstrated the popularity of school innovation. When vouchers became more of a state issue than a national issue, networks of state entrepreneurs were formed, spreading information and strategies. These developments set the stage for state action later in the decade.

Politics, Markets, and American Schools

In 1990, John E. Chubb, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Terry M. Moe, a professor of political science at Stanford University, published Politics, Markets, and American Schools. They began by pointing out that “A Nation at Risk” had fueled much policy action around education, but it had led to meager results. They blamed this on the democratic institutions that govern education policy-making, which have resulted in unresponsive bureaucracies that stifle innovation. They believed that a market-based system would foster decentralization, competition, and choice. Private schools were more autonomous and had a clear mission, strong leadership, professional teachers, and team cooperation. The greatest differences between public and private schools were the institutions that governed them. They did not advocate eliminating democratic control over education, but instead proposed one where parents could participate in a more direct manner -- through the market (Chubb and Moe 1990).

To remedy this situation, they put forward a system of vouchers or “scholarships.” They claimed that a system of choice was “a panacea” which “has the capacity *all by itself* to bring about the kind of transformation that, for years, reformers have been seeking to engineer in myriad ways” (Chubb and Moe 1990, p.217 - italics in the original). The state should withdraw authority from the existing school institutions and vest power directly in the schools, parents, and students. This would be done by freeing the existing public schools from most regulations, allowing new schools to operate through charters, and enabling private schools, including religious ones that meet certain minimum requirements, to operate as public schools. Students could attend any one of these schools using scholarships made up of local, state, and federal dollars. Schools

would have great flexibility in whom they admitted, how much they charged, teacher certification requirements, and curriculum. Committees composed of principals, teachers, parents, students, and members of the community would govern schools. Statewide tenure laws would be abolished. Although scholarships were not only for the poor, they suggested that students who could demonstrate special economic or educational needs would get additional funding (Chubb and Moe 1990).

By all accounts this book had a tremendous impact on the voucher movement. In the following chapter, Pennsylvania's Governor Tom Ridge's top policy advisor recounts how this book influenced Ridge and himself. Jeanne Allen, Director of the Center for Education Reform, a pro-voucher group based in Washington, said, "I remember that [the Chubb and Moe book] having a great impact on White House officials. Suddenly, it was very safe to talk about it. Not only did we have Brookings writing about it, but there was this slew of activity around the country that wasn't identified with one political party." Until this book came out, administration officials "weren't disbelievers exactly, but they needed political cover," she said. "They were afraid it would be seen as a 'rich Republican' issue. They didn't see it as a winning issue" (Miller 1992). This book produced new voucher entrepreneurs, such as Ridge, and put a new spin on a policy that had reached a dead-end.

Politics, Markets, and America's Schools had such a big impact because, as Allen pointed out, it gave vouchers an appearance of being bi-partisan, since the liberal-to-moderate Brookings Institute published it. Also Chubb and Moe had strong academic credentials; they were well-regarded political scientists. In addition, the book presented

new twists on the rationale for vouchers backed up by important research. Chubb and Moe linked their proposal to a broader theory of politics and democracy, instead of repeating the old arguments for competition and choice. They put forward analysis of the political and institutional obstacles to innovation. They spelled out their model in specific details (Henig 1994, p.87; Viteritti 1999, p.86). Though their findings were quickly questioned (see for example, Bryk and Lee 1992; Liebman 1991; Wells 1991; Witte 1996), few paid attention to these subsequent studies (Viteritti 1999).

Chubb's and Moe's book is often cited as the reason for Bush's support of vouchers later in his term. In 1992, Bush and his new Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander proposed a G.I. Bill for Children, the flagship of his educational agenda. Adopting Chubb's and Moe's terminology, it would award \$1000 scholarships to poor and middle-income children to be used at any accredited public, private, or parochial school. Up to half the scholarship could be used to pay for supplementary academic services and after-school programs. Given the minimal amount of the scholarship and the middle-income cut-off for eligibility, Bush's plan was targeted to middle-class constituents. It would give \$500 million in new federal dollars to states and local school districts that supported this program (Viteritti 1999, p.88). Bush and Alexander wagered that the unions would not oppose new cash for schools even if it went to private schools. They were wrong. The G.I. Bill faced much opposition, and, like Reagan's voucher proposals, was defeated (Miller 1992).

Opportunities in State Education Politics: New Actors and New Policies

After 1990, most efforts for school vouchers moved from the federal level to the state level.⁹ Efforts by Presidents Reagan and Bush raised the voucher debate, but their failures proved that action had to be conducted elsewhere. In addition, proponents knew Democrat Bill Clinton would not be the poster-boy for school vouchers (Henig 1994, p.22).¹⁰ Voucher advocates benefited in four main ways from the move of voucher politics to the state level. The first advantage of state voucher legislation was that more significant school choice legislation could occur in that venue, since education is primarily a function of state government.

The second advantage of the states developing voucher legislation was that governors could provide leadership. Beginning in the late 1980s, governors gradually became more involved in education and more capable of steering policy action. By the 1990s, they had become education entrepreneurs extraordinaire. This is a new development. Until recently, state executives lacked the time and the staff to have much leadership over any policies, especially education. Education policy decisions were controlled by legislative committee leaders and professional unions (Kirst 1984; Rosenthal and Fuhrman 1981).

Governors have gradually grown in strength since the 1970s. The states professionalized their executive offices with larger staff and cabinets, longer terms of office, consecutive terms, and veto powers. Governors also gained more control over the state budget and state agencies, and received larger areas of budgetary discretion

⁹ There were several proposals in the U.S. Congress to introduce vouchers in Washington, DC during the 1990s.

(Renshon and Gittell 1992; Van Horn 1989). In response to Reagan's New Federalism, governors gained additional control over public policy. The devolution of power from the federal government opened up new responsibilities.

One of the first policy concerns for the new governors in the 1990s was education. Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, Bill Clinton of Arkansas, Richard Riley of South Carolina, and Thomas H. Kean of New Jersey rushed to assume the mantle of "the education governor" (Ravitch 1990). They were spurred on by Bush's National Governor Summit in 1989 where Bush vested governors and their states with policy-making responsibilities while excluding professional educators from involvement in framing the issues (Gittell and McKenna 1999; Martin 1994). This attention to education at the state level was noted by the teachers' unions, which began adding lobbying resources to state capitals in 1985 (Currence 1985). Martin writes that governors first got involved in education reform to bolster their states' failing economies and to attract new investors (Martin 1994). Public opinion polls also gained their attention. Polls conducted in 1996 by the Democratic and Republic parties and by other polling organizations indicated that education was a key issue of concern to voters (Gittell and McKenna 1999).

The state education department has the responsibility of overseeing education policy and has traditionally been independent from the governor. In many states, the commissioner of the department has been independently elected. During the mid-1990s, governors began undermining the department's authority or dissolving the department

¹⁰ Clinton later became a strong proponent of charter schools.

altogether. For example, in 1995 Governor Carlson of Minnesota abolished the State Department of Education and created a new agency, the Department of Children, Families, and Learning under his aegis. Governor Miller of Georgia assumed direct control of the implementation over his education reforms rather than let the education department administer them (Gittell and McKenna 1999). Over a course of years, Governor Voinovich of Ohio gradually removed responsibilities from the Department of Education, and program by program assumed control over it. Voinovich said he was frustrated with the slow and unresponsive bureaucracy that cost \$15 million a year and had 500 employees (Lane 1997).

Not only were governors poised to play a major role in steering education policy, they shared a particular perspective on education reform. The 1994 election resulted in a majority of Republican governors. These new governors formed alliances with business groups, and, in some states, with conservative religious groups. They often blamed the unions and professionals for the problems with education, and proposed changes in teacher certification and tenure requirements. School finance reform, an important issue in the early 1990s, began to wane. Instead, governors led the charge for school choice (Gittell and McKenna 1999).

A third advantage of the states developing voucher policy is that the states had already considered other school choice legislation; voucher advocates had learned much from the politics around those policies. Throughout the early 1990s, states began to experiment with other school choice policies: inter-district choice, charter schools,

privatization, and private voucher programs.¹¹ In 1990, Minnesota offered open enrollment for the entire state; students could attend any public school in any district across the state, if the district agreed to participate in the program. Minnesota was also the first state to authorize charter schools in 1991, though they quickly spread to other states. The fear of vouchers may have forced the unions to reluctantly accept charter schools. States began experimenting with contracting out to private companies to provide administrative services and develop curriculum for school systems. Voucher programs sponsored by private corporations such as CEO America and the Educational Choice Charitable Trust gained headlines. These events did much to “soften up” state legislatures to consider voucher programs, as Henig points out (Henig 1994).

In 1990, Wisconsin passed the country’s first voucher initiative. This program allowed a limited number of low-income students to attend private, nonsectarian schools at public expense. It was the first program in the country to approve public funds for private schools. This program was very modest at first, but was later expanded to include parochial schools. Wisconsin’s voucher program demonstrated that states could pass comprehensive voucher legislation. It also demonstrated that Democratic minority leaders had a strong interest in school choice. The legislation was sponsored by State Assemblywoman Polly Williams, a black Democrat, and was supported by Dr. Howard Fuller, the black Superintendent of the Milwaukee school system.¹² The support of black

¹¹ Appendix A provides a summary of these programs.

¹² Much has been written about the politics of Milwaukee voucher program. See for example John F. Witte, The Market Approach to Education: An Analysis of America’s First Voucher Program (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1999), and James C. Carl, The Politics of Education in

activists and the connection between vouchers and failing urban schools was a major development in school choice politics. The following chapters on Ohio and Pennsylvania discuss in more depth this transition in voucher politics.

Fourthly, voucher advocates benefited from the innovative character of state politics. States, acting as “laboratories of democracy,” can put forward innovative policies that trigger innovation in other states. Scholars have long noted that activity in one state can influence action in another. Aspects of the legislation may be replicated, such as targeting vouchers to poor, urban children. Political strategies may also be replicated, such as expanding voucher coalitions to include black social activists. State politics is inevitably influenced by activities in other states.

Events in other states clearly impacted on vouchers politics in Ohio and Pennsylvania. For example, the chapter on Pennsylvania relates how Governor Ridge in Pennsylvania was influenced by the development of charter schools in Minnesota and the U.S. Supreme Court decision on Wisconsin’s voucher program. In Ohio, entrepreneurs were also influenced by actions in Wisconsin.

Many scholars have studied the process of idea diffusion. Everett M. Rogers defined diffusion as “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers 1995, p.5). Some have focused on the rate that ideas are diffused among the states (Gray 1973; Walker 1969). More recently, scholars have begun to look at how ideas are diffused and

a New Key: The 1988 Chicago School Reform Act and the 1990 Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (The University of Wisconsin, Madison, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1995).

become legislation. Sally Covington found that conservative think tanks play an important role in distributing right-wing ideas (Covington 1997). In contrast, Gray and Lowery found that think tanks played a minor role in providing ideas to Minnesota state legislators (Gray and Lowery 2000). However, idea diffusion is a subconscious and invisible process, and deserves much more attention. While my dissertation did not concentrate on this issue, my interviews did provide some interesting information about the transfer of information among entrepreneurs and how it was facilitated by the federal structure.

Information about politics in other states travels through networks. I found that information seems to travel among entrepreneurs and organized interest groups in two ways, through informal and formal channels. Informal networks are not centrally organized by anyone. Connections are made by contacting friends in other states, reading national newspapers, or chatting on Internet listserves. Often the participants of information networks may not even be conscious of the power of these sources of information. Networks provide information about politics in other states, enable individual entrepreneurs to share strategies, and offer opponents counter-strategies.

The world of education politics is small. Certain individuals dominate political action and are well known to all. Most voucher proponents in this study could identify leaders in other states by name. For example, David Brennan, the voucher entrepreneur from Ohio, was mentioned in several interviews in Pennsylvania. Other individuals also have a national reputation, including: Theodore J. Forstmann, a leader of a private voucher program; Lisa Keegan, the State Superintendent in Arizona; Jeanne Allen from

the Center for Education Reform in Washington, DC, a pro-charter school organization; and Clint Bolick, the chief legal representative from the Institute for Justice in Washington, DC. In some cases, voucher proponents had worked together in the past. Murray Dickman, a voucher proponent from Pennsylvania, had served on a political campaign for Governor Voinovich of Ohio years before.

This close circle of voucher proponents contacts each other from time to time. It may be during small social gatherings or through personal phone calls. During these informal contacts, individuals may share strategies, discuss events in their states, or arrange for more formal meetings to expand their contacts. For example, Polly Williams, a principal architect of Wisconsin's voucher program, met with entrepreneurs in Ohio and Pennsylvania to discuss her program.

Several examples of these networks came up during my interviews with state actors. One voucher proponent in Pennsylvania explained that he had been to Milwaukee five times to see the schools and to meet with other voucher proponents. In 1998, he also brought twenty Pennsylvania political leaders to see the voucher schools in Cleveland and Milwaukee. When asked about his contacts with entrepreneurs in other states, he said,

People pretty much know each other. Four organizations have been very active: CEO America, the Heritage Foundation, the Children's Scholarship Fund, and the Friedman Foundation. We're all fairly friendly and keep in contact. CEO America has a conference every year. I'm on the board of CEO America. Which is how I went to Milwaukee for the first time. [Have you talked to Floridians for School Choice?] We all know each other. We all talk to each other. Pat Heffernan runs Floridians for School Choice. He's a very smart guy. [How about David Brennan?] With almost no exception, everybody in this movement is in this for all the right reason. No one has any intention of making a buck, of making a cause, of

making everybody Roman Catholics. Absolutely none. John Walton [the president of CEO America] is understated, easy going, caring, laid back person. He's a terrific guy. He's not a religious nut. He's not a right wing nut. To the contrary (Dickman 1999).

Not only was Dickman able to name other proponents outside of Pennsylvania, but he was able to describe their personality and the conversations they had had.

It was less apparent that voucher opponents had such personal connections with others in other states. The state teachers' unions organized the opposition. The leaders of the teachers' unions were well known within the state, but were not generally known outside of the state.

Information is also gained by reading national newspapers and television news. Because vouchers have captured the interest of the public, even local papers carried wire pieces about developments in other states. Newspaper coverage about Wisconsin's Supreme Court decision was widely followed by both sides of the voucher battles. Other closely related issues, such as charter schools and tax credits, have also received much attention by the media. The media can be an important vehicle for informal idea diffusion when it chooses to highlight an issue.

In the modern age, the Internet is becoming a popular medium for informal networks. Discussion groups or listserves are similar to bulletin boards where like-minded individuals post information that is distributed to its members. Unlike websites, the information is not centrally organized. Anyone is free to post a message with few restrictions. Several school choice listserves have attracted a wide following and even have prominent members who regularly post and respond to messages. Joe Nathan, one

of the most widely recognized figures in the charter school movement, is a participant of a charter school listserve. There are also several with a specific orientation to vouchers on both sides of the issue.

These different methods of informal networking overlap. Information gained through listserves or through Internet newspapers is easily forwarded via e-mail to others. Paper versions of articles are exchanged in person. Several interviewees gave me books and articles about vouchers during our interviews. Personal relationships are built up within listserve conversations. Newspaper writers may share information with their interviewees in order to gain their trust. The flurry of information passed through informal networks is powerful, incestuous, and often invisible. We can witness how important these informal networks are by seeing a similarity in strategies and rhetoric across the country.

There are also more formal methods of networking. Think tanks, foundations, or interest groups organize these formal networks. Although voucher politics has primarily been located at the state level, networks are often orchestrated by national-level organizations. Groups of voucher proponents and opponents help facilitate state action by distributing information through websites and newsletters, holding conferences, and producing reports. Chart B is a list of the primary national-level groups involved with voucher politics.

Chart B

National-Level Organizations Involved in Voucher Politics

Pro - Voucher

Heritage Foundation
National Catholic Conference
American Legislative Exchange Council
Milton Friedman Foundation
Center for Education Reform
Manhattan Institute
Institute for Justice
Americans for Tax Reform
CEO America
Children Scholarship Fund
Alexis de Tocqueville Institute
American Enterprise Institute
Cato Institute
Education Policy Institute
Hudson Institute
“I Have a Dream” Foundation

Anti-Voucher

People for the American Way
ACLU - national branch
AFT - national branch
NEA - national branch
Americans United for the Separation
of Church and State

These DC-based groups are useful in creating networks of entrepreneurs. They convene conferences and provide lists of names and numbers of key people in the states. They also directly disseminate information through websites, newsletters, and journals. They provide information on the latest research on school choice, on the latest developments across the states, and even on political strategies. The Heritage Foundation, for example, has an extensive website that provides facts on school choice and phone numbers of contacts in every state. People for the American Way sends out a monthly newsletter on school choice with facts on vouchers across the country. The Center for Education Reform has useful charts on the status of charter school laws in all fifty states. In a recent article in American Educator, the AFT journal, the negative effects of New Zealand’s voucher program were described providing state union affiliates with facts to fight vouchers (Fiske and Ladd 2000).

The list of groups and individuals that presented amicus briefs in Ohio's Supreme Court case is a who's who of voucher proponents across the country and shows evidence of an inter-state network of voucher entrepreneurs. State Representative William Adolph and the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association, discussed in Chapter 4's case study of Pennsylvania, gave briefs. Other state-based groups include the Arkansas Policy Foundation, Floridians for Educational Choice, North Carolina Education Reform Foundation, Putting Children First, Texas Justice Foundation, Maine School Choice Coalition, Texas Coalition for Parental Choice in Education, and United New Yorkers for Choice in Education. The national organizations include the Center for Education Reform, the American Legislative Exchange Council, CEO America, and the Friedman Foundation.

At least one national-level group may have supported state voucher proponents beyond creating networking opportunities and sharing information. The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) crafts model legislation that state advocates can use. It tends to support libertarian causes, including vouchers. Several interviewees in Ohio maintained that the wording of a significant state governmental report on vouchers was taken from this group (Charney 1998). Additional research is needed to confirm the extent of its influence.

Legal assistance in the states was also supplied by at least two of these national-level groups. The Institute for Justice, a pro-voucher group, represents voucher advocates in most states, including Ohio and Florida. In Pennsylvania, the Institute reviewed Governor Ridge's legislation "for the nitty gritty stuff" (Zogby 1999). Its lead

representative, Clint Bolick, is a well-known presence at state capitals across the country where voucher cases have reached the courts. His counterpart is Bob Chanin, the general counsel of the NEA, who has argued against vouchers in the same cases.

My preliminary research in this area shows that national-level interest groups and foundations played a vital role in inter-state idea diffusion, and they also are beginning to provide legal muscle in state politics. Still their involvement in state politics prior to the court cases was relatively minor. At this stage, the national-level groups are not coordinating state action in any way. Interviewees reported that politics differed too greatly from state to state for action to be orchestrated by outside groups. Mintrom's work on entrepreneurs and school choice confirms these findings (Mintrom 2000), but there is still much more research is needed on the role of national-level groups in state politics.

The process of idea diffusion is different at the state level than at the national level. Fifty states can use fifty different strategies to pass a piece of legislation. At the national level, there may be only one chance to push a proposal. With the multiple state-level strategies, there is much more information to be exchanged among entrepreneurs across the country. Again, this is an area of political science that deserves additional study.

Ideas, Entrepreneurs, and Opportunities

The process of agenda setting for vouchers took over three decades and has not been an easy battle. Though Friedman developed the idea of vouchers in the late 1950s, it was not really picked up until the late 1960s. Then for most of the 1970s the idea was

dormant. When Reagan came into office, he gradually paid more attention to the notion of school choice, especially after the appointment of Bill Bennett. After several legislative failures, there was a retreat, until Chubb's and Moe's book breathed new life into the policy. These efforts placed vouchers on the agenda and set the stage for action in 1990s.

Some have argued that the vouchers were put on the agenda because of growing cynicism of the public. Tyack wrote, "... it is clear that the older visions of education in democracy and democracy in education - expressed by Jefferson, Mann, and Dewey, for example - have faded" (Tyack 1999). Cookson said that there no longer is a consensus that schools are the cradle of democracy (Cookson 1994). Proponents argue that the public had finally matured and realized the negative effects of the education monopoly. This chapter takes another view. Vouchers became an important state political issue during the nineties because of the power of the original idea, the efforts of various entrepreneurs, and windows of opportunity.

The power of the idea of a competitive market place for education has withstood some stunning defeats and survived even without the support of powerful interest groups or the benefit of any real-life examples¹³. Friedman's idea has had remarkable staying power, perhaps because it is based upon values that Americans hold dear. The notion of choice has its roots in Lockean liberalism. Liberalism is the belief that government's sole purpose is protect life, liberty, and property and that any use of power beyond those

¹³ The fact that there were no real examples of a voucher program may have added to its appeal. Its advocates could claim anything for vouchers, and there is no contrary evidence. Of course, opponents also have the liberty to make exaggerated claims about its faults.

functions is wrong. Louis Hartz maintained that American political culture is liberal and this culture has affected the direction of our public policy. Freedom of choice is an extension of liberalism. Individuals should have the freedom to choose their own destiny without government making decisions for them. The term “choice” has been adopted by pro-abortion groups with remarkable success.¹⁴

A strong belief in liberty has also lead Americans to value free-market competition. Without state control, businesses can operate more efficiently and more profitably. Just as individuals should be able to choose their own fate, so should business and industry. Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1800s and Max Weber in the 1900s both remarked on the competitive nature of American capitalism. The recent decision to break up Microsoft reaffirmed that belief that competition among businesses leads to cheaper costs for consumers and superior products. Those who despise big government will always note how poorly public administration works in comparison to the private sector. American pride in capitalism is evident in the popular tales of the self-made millionaire who makes his way from rags to riches through frugality and ingenuity.

Jencks and other liberals in the 1960s brought out the notion that vouchers would increase diversity and equality. Urban activists in the 1990s returned to these themes. While many Americans theoretically embrace these ideals, self-interest often interferes with enacting broad policies to correct inequality. Still, a belief in equality and diversity has driven many important public policies and court decisions, including Brown v. Board

¹⁴ Jeff Henig asserts that the idea of choice resonates with American political culture. "The archetypal American hero in history and fiction is the lone pioneer who scoffs at the pretensions of formal authority -- Daniel Boone, Henry Ford, Paul Newman's character in *Cool Hand Luke*,

of Education, social security, social welfare programs, and affirmative action. Americans will embrace equality when it can be achieved through choice and voluntary market mechanisms rather than state command.

During the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, the idea of vouchers was intriguing to academics and policy elites who championed the issue for different reasons. However, the idea did not catch on among the public at large until later in the 1990s. The following chapter shows how the idea took on new meaning as entrepreneurs tied vouchers to the crisis in city schools.

In addition to the power of the idea, entrepreneurs were integral in putting this policy on the agenda. Entrepreneurs, as defined in the previous chapter, are individuals who have the ability and the will to push certain policy ideas. The entrepreneurs include Friedman himself.¹⁵ This chapter also highlights the role of Christopher Jencks, James Coleman, Ronald Reagan, Bill Bennett and his staff, John Chubb, and Terry Moe. George Bush and Lamar Alexander played a somewhat lesser role. Entrepreneurs have been academics (Friedman, Jencks, Coleman, Chubb, and Moe), office holders (Reagan and Bush), and high-level administrators (Bennett and his staff, and Alexander). The academics with their ivy-covered universities and statistical models had the benefit of seeming objectivity and scholarly rigor. Many hesitated to question their motives or their findings. In addition, Coleman's provocative findings generated much media coverage. Reagan and Bush had the "bully pulpit" which guaranteed public attention to their chosen

Jack Nicholson's character in *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, *Catch 22's* Yossarian" (Henig 1994, p.67).

¹⁵ Friedman has done much to foster political activity around vouchers through his foundation.

policy goals. The high-level administrators with the charisma and the energy used their position to be supremely effective entrepreneurs.

Entrepreneurs modified the idea to adjust to their own values and other political demands of the time. In the late sixties, concerns over the plight of cities led liberals to promote vouchers because they would foster equity and diversity. Entrepreneurs linked school choice with notions of local control and desegregation. In the eighties, Reagan claimed that vouchers would increase excellence by funding the effective Catholic schools and increasing competition. He linked vouchers with laissez-faire economics and New Federalism. In the early nineties, Chubb and Moe explained that the excellence movement had been a failure because it did not address the institutional obstacles to change. And in the mid-1990s, voucher entrepreneurs coupled vouchers with the notion of rescuing urban schools returning to themes from the 1960s. Henig said that vouchers “are the idea that won’t die,” precisely because of these timely linkages (Henig 1994).

It is interesting to note that the school choice entrepreneurs did not coordinate their efforts. There was too big of a gulf between liberal and conservative activists for that to occur. In addition, the efforts by the two camps were spread out over many years, the liberals preaching the voucher gospel in the 1960s and the conservatives in the 1980s. In more recent years, liberals and conservatives have worked more closely to achieve school choice legislation with mixed results.

Entrepreneurs faced enormous opposition by the powerful teachers’ and professional unions, which sought to frame the debate in terms more favorable for them. At least three separate strategies to overcome this opposition were employed over time by

entrepreneurs. Jencks hoped to mitigate their hostility by including them in the process. As a result, private schools were not included in his voucher pilot, which resulted in a weak program. Reagan put forward three increasingly moderate proposals. Unions resisted even the mildest program, and said that Reagan was trying to sneak in “backdoor” vouchers. No voucher program was implemented during his administration. Another self-conscious strategy was to put forward plans that were doomed to fail in order to gain exposure for the issue. This final strategy was effective. The media reported on the heated exchanges between the unions and the administration during the 1980s. The repeated failures succeeded in raising the visibility of vouchers.

Entrepreneurial strategies depend on the position of the entrepreneur. Academics put forward studies backed by publicity or pilot programs. National administrators work the Sunday morning talk show circuit and help write legislation. Presidents mention the policy in public addresses, pressure legislators, and direct their administrators to prioritize the issue.

What are missing in this story are powerful interest groups that backed the voucher idea. Private school organizations, including the Catholic Conference, did not support vouchers until late in 1980s. They worried that a new program would interfere with benefits they already were receiving. Minority-led organizations, such as the NAACP and the Urban League, opposed school choice at that time. Entrepreneurs, rather than organized interests, led the fight for vouchers.

But idea manipulation and entrepreneurial strategies alone cannot explain how vouchers were placed on the agenda. Political developments provided windows of

opportunity. Jencks' voucher proposal was considered because of widespread concern over city schools, experimentation with other voucher programs, and the findings from Coleman's first study. Later, Reagan benefited in some ways from "A Nation at Risk," Coleman's second study, and the Anguilar ruling. The entrepreneurs in Ohio and Pennsylvania benefited from the "softening up" process of charter schools and private voucher programs. These events and developments provided windows of opportunity for entrepreneurial efforts.

The most important opportunity that arose during this period was the shift of vouchers to a state-level policy. Not only did vouchers make more sense as a state policy, since education is primarily a state function, but voucher proponents were able to learn from each other and experiment with different proposals. Several years of charter school reform provided a base of information for state-level advocates. Information traveled through formal and informal inter-state networks. National-level foundations, think tanks, and interest groups organized some of these networks. In some cases, these groups provided legal assistance and model legislation. With political action occurring at the state-level, the newly empowered governors became the chief entrepreneurs for vouchers.

The literature on agenda setting often points to a trigger event or crisis that puts an issue on the agenda (Cobb and Elder 1983, p.85). A crisis can provide an opportunity for entrepreneurs to push their ideas. This chapter does not point to one trigger event that put vouchers on the agenda. Poor school test scores, particularly in urban schools, is a recurring issue in education politics. It periodically becomes a matter of crisis when

reports, such as “A Nation at Risk,” focus national attention to this problem. However, in the case of vouchers, this crisis did not immediately lead to a voucher proposal. In fact, “A Nation at Risk” distracted potential voucher allies who first attempted to reform the system in other ways. Only after the “excellence movement” failed to produce major improvements in school performance did discouraged reformers turn to school choice.

The history of a policy development is not always tidy. Finding the origins of an idea can be complicated by ideology. Also, it may be impossible to point to a single variable that moves a policy from theory, to agenda consideration, to legislation. In the case of school vouchers, three important variables stand out as critical in its development: the compelling nature of the original idea, the efforts of many different policy champions over time, and windows of opportunity. Three decades of groundwork led up to the voucher proposals in Ohio in 1995 and Pennsylvania in 1999.

Chapter 3

Ohio's Urban Strategy

No one can overcome the power of the unions. We did an end run around them.... The political bar is so high. It takes fools like us to challenge them.

- David Brennan (Brennan 1998)

Voinovich just wants to help the cute, black kids, but when they become African-American men, he wants nothing to do with them. This is evident by the high penalties he supports for petty crimes.

- Michael Charney, Professional-Issues Director, Cleveland Teachers Union (Charney 1998)

My question to him [a local congressman who tried to convince her to oppose vouchers] was with the education system the way that it is, ... what else do you have to offer? He didn't have anything else to offer. In the light of that, you go for the vouchers.

- Fanny Lewis, Cleveland Councilwoman from Hough (Lewis 1999)

In 1995, Ohio passed the first voucher program in the country to include religious schools. Up to \$2,500 in vouchers were given to 3,700 students for use at the public, private, and religious schools of their choice. This program was the subject of an enormous battle, one that continues to be fought in the courtroom today. All participants in this battle know that vouchers are a dramatic change in the practice of education and have invested much political capital in the fight.

The story behind this legislative triumph provides us with useful information on the sources of innovative change. Ohio's success was primarily due to the efforts of two policy entrepreneurs, rather than to organized action by conservative interest groups. The Catholic Church and the business community played a marginal role. To overcome

divisions within the Republican Party and strong union opposition, the governor and his political confidant, David Brennan, put together a voucher program limited to Cleveland's poorest families. Voucher proponents were aided by a growing support among minorities for school vouchers and a need for urban school reform. Responding to this opportunity, new voucher rhetoric was crafted that tapped into the dissatisfaction among urban parents with the quality of their education and appealed to those who wanted a relatively inexpensive urban reform. Minority support for this issue gave the issue legitimacy and served to divide Democrats and unite Republicans.

Ohio's Political Culture

Ohio was originally colonized by New Englanders. Later, Germans settled in large numbers in this state (Gargan and Coke 1986). These groups were responsible for shaping Ohio's individualistic political culture, according to Daniel Elazar. People tend to believe that government should come secondary to the marketplace, and that the role of government should be sharply limited (Elazar 1984). Gargan and Coke also claim that the Yankee influence has led to moralistic tendencies that resulted in the state's temperance movement and the second Ku Klux Klan (Gargan and Coke 1986).

Urbanization patterns in Ohio are unusual. It has several medium sized cities, instead of one major city like Detroit or Chicago. Not only did this development lead to a strong progressive reform movement, but it also meant that Ohio does not have the same rural-urban conflict as other states. City voters tend to adopt the political traditions of the surrounding countryside (Gargan and Coke 1986).

Since World War Two, Ohio voters tend to vote Republican, but Democrats usually narrow lose. There is strong two-party competition in this state (Gargan and Coke 1986). The governor has been granted strong institutional powers (Beyle 1996). The unions, particularly public-sector unions, are very strong. The banking, insurance, and manufacturing interest groups are also powerful (Funderburk and Adams 1994). Finally, Ohio is known as a bell-weather state for presidential elections, since voters in this state seem to reflect national preferences.

The Entrepreneurs

By most accounts, David Brennan, an industrialist and lawyer from Akron, was the main architect of the voucher bill in Ohio. As the chair of the Ohio Republican fund-raising committee, his connections and power are significant. Brennan's signature cowboy hat and six-foot and five-inch frame are a common sight in the state capitol. Motivated by a passion to improve education through competition, all interviewees reported that Brennan was an important factor in the successful passage of Ohio's voucher legislation. The Director of the Catholic Conference in Ohio said this about Brennan:

David's passion was really behind it. He went into the lion's den. He went before the union and school boards. He tried to get their support for it. I have to admire him for doing that. He spoke to anyone who would listen to him (Luckhaupt 1998).

Brennan's interest in education grew out of his experience as a factory owner. After working as a lawyer for many years, he turned his energies to business, buying his first factory in 1975. He said that in the early 1980s, business owners began requiring more of their workers and treating them less like robots in part because of competition

with Japanese companies. However, workers were not capable of meeting these new challenges, because not much had been required of them in the past. New hires, he said, were even less educated. After testing his workers, he found that one third of his present employees and half of all new job applicants were illiterate, and two-thirds of present employees and 90 percent of all new applicants could not perform simple math functions. Management was forced to offer expensive remedial classes. This is when the business community first realized the current education system was not preparing students for the work world (Brennan 1998).

Between late 1987 and 1990, he became involved in a public school, the Akron Robinson Academy, where reforms were instituted, including uniforms and computer-aided instruction. Much progress was made in test scores, and Brennan credited the new computer-aided instruction. Brennan said that the three schools that he was involved in became the highest ranked in the city (Brennan 1998).

He reported that he first became interested in vouchers in the 1980s after his wife went to a Heritage Foundation meeting. She came back with a book that contained an anecdote about a car monopoly. If you had to buy a Buick and pay a tax on it every three years whether you wanted one or not, the quality of Buicks would go down. He believes that monopolies make the quality of the product go down. This is true of the government monopoly over education (Brennan 1998).

Brennan's support for vouchers stems from his belief in the free market and the limitations to government solutions. He explained that government dominates education,

and that government-run programs don't work. Sounding like Milton Friedman, Brennan said,

What government doesn't ruin, it makes worse. Well meaning people can't make the system work. Public education is state socialism at its best. The Eastern European system failed because it didn't work... When there is a choice, you'll get better schools. Suburban areas are a classic example of choice. People can move. Where there's choice, there are good schools. Because we elect our school boards, we think it's a democracy and benevolent. Government, no matter how it's formed, is not. The answer is to experiment (Brennan 1998).

Brennan also believes that vouchers are the answer to inner-city problems. Equity would be achieved with a vouchers system, since all students would receive equal funding for education regardless of income. He said everyone is entitled to an education, but it does not have to be through a public school.

His views on education are not limited to vouchers. For example, Brennan feels that computers are the answer to many educational problems. He said that researchers found scores on the TCAT, Texas's statewide teacher examination, were directly related to student scores. If computer programs can provide most of the instruction, then teachers do not have a major impact on children's success and do not need to be "superstars." He believes that in ten years, big university campuses will disappear and be replaced by computers. Computer programs could also enable each student to have individual learning plans instead a class of thirty students all receiving the same lesson.

Some opponents charged that Brennan's interest in school vouchers was derived from his interest in starting his own schools. After the voucher bill was enacted he opened two schools in Cleveland that accepted voucher students and later opened several

charter schools. However, most opponents agree that Brennan's interest in vouchers did not stem from the potential for profit. No one could become rich on \$2,250 vouchers.¹ In addition, Brennan was already wealthy through his law practice and business dealings. Instead, opponents claimed that his interest came from the power and prestige gained by championing this policy. A union representative discussed Brennan's interest in voucher policy:

Brennan sees himself as the self-conscious voucher organizer for the country.... He gives to every Republican legislator. He's connected, motivated, and focused. I don't think his goal is to make money. His motivation is to be a national leader, the power, the prestige, with the context of helping poor people (Charney 1998).

Governor George Voinovich was another key individual in voucher politics in Ohio. One interviewee said, "Nothing would have gone on without the Governor" (Sweeney 1998). He proposed vouchers in 1994, spoke publicly about the advantages of such a program, and swayed legislators.

Voinovich won the 1990 Ohio gubernatorial election over Democrat Anthony Celebrezze. Brennan raised a great deal of money for Voinovich's campaign. Brennan gave at least \$126,000 to his 1990 campaign and \$30,000 to the governor's 1994 campaign. He also held two 1990 fund-raisers in Akron for Voinovich, which generated \$625,000 for his campaign (Cleveland Teachers Union 1995c). Heavily influenced by David Brennan, financially and ideologically, Voinovich campaigned for vouchers, but

¹ Several years later, Brennan was forced to close his schools that accepted voucher students since funding was insufficient. Instead he opened charters schools which provided him with more public funding. Vouchers were only \$2,250 per student, but as a charter school, they got \$4,500

emphasized other issues in 1990. During his campaign, the Governor promised the teachers' unions that he would not propose school choice legislation in his first term (Charney 1998). But after his second election in November 1994 in which he won 76% of the vote, Voinovich made vouchers a priority (Confidential 1998).

Voinovich is not a hard-line free-market Republican. Unlike other Republican Governors such Christine Whitman or Tom Ridge, he even suggested raising taxes to increase funding for education. In 1998, he proposed a \$1.1 billion tax increase to meet a court order demand for equity in school spending. He would have raised the state sales tax from 5% to 6%. Free-market Republicans have called him an enigma, because he has not made lower taxes and smaller government a priority (Damask 1998).

Voinovich's interest in schools vouchers was not solely grounded in a belief in the free-market. One possible reason for his interest in this issue could be that as a former mayor of Cleveland between 1979 and 1989, he was aware of the needs of urban schools and the local interest in vouchers. His Catholicism may have also influenced him. In addition, as a Republican seeking higher office, championing this issue would give him national exposure. His political connections to Brennan may have been enough to sway him. It is impossible to know definitively what pointed the governor towards championing this policy, but his impact was great.

During his first term, Voinovich promised the unions that he would not propose voucher legislation. He kept his word, but other actions helped set the stage for the

per student. His voucher schools could not compete with religious schools that could pay their teachers less (Brennan 2000).

future. In 1992, he formed the Commission on School Choice, chaired by Brennan. The members of the committee were primarily business leaders such as the CEOs of Krugers and the National Cash Register, but some educators were included. Brennan said, "It was a substantial group of people. All thought the issue was important. All thought that education was in a ditch" (Brennan 1998). Not surprisingly, the committee concluded that a pilot program for vouchers would be beneficial. Its final report found that the state would save millions by implementing a limited program of opportunity scholarships for low-income students. According to one spokesman for the teachers' union, the final wording of the report came from the American Legislative Exchange Counsel (ALEC)², a Washington interest group which provides legislative assistance to conservatives around the country (Charney 1998). The findings from this commission received much media attention and helped organize voucher proponents.

Vouchers were also championed by several key legislators, including Representative Mike Fox (Republican- Hamilton), Representative Cooper Snyder (Republican- Hillsboro), and Senator Patrick Sweeney (Democrat - Cleveland). They had all proposed voucher legislation at one time during the early nineties. But prior to 1994, the Democrats controlled the leadership of the House, and the voucher proposals were assigned to unfriendly committees.

The Opposition

Entrepreneurs in Ohio, like elsewhere, faced a significant barrier in achieving voucher legislation -- the opposition of the teachers' unions and the administrative

² See Chapter 2 for more information about the American Legislative Exchange Counsel (ALEC).

associations. The two major teachers' unions are the Ohio Education Association (OEO) and the Ohio Federation of Teachers (OFT). The strongest opposition came from the Cleveland branch of the OFT, the Cleveland Teachers Union (CTU). The administrative groups that lent support to the teachers unions included the Ohio School Board Association and the Ohio Secondary School Administrators Association.

Union opposition is significant, because, like other states, the teachers' union is a powerful lobbying and electoral force. The OEA, with more than 80,000 members, has been ranked as the second most important interest group in the state after consultants and private lobbyists (Funderburk and Adams 1994, p.329). The OEA employed thirteen lobbyists and collected \$27.4 million in dues in 1997 (Damask and Kozar 1998).

Both unions opposed the voucher program because they felt it would lead to the destruction of public education. Private schools, they claimed, would pick and choose which students to accept, which would leave only the worst students in public schools (Cleveland Teachers Union 1995b). Public education would also suffer because voucher funds would mean less money for public schools. The unions argued that if vouchers were allowed in Cleveland, it would trigger other American cities to follow suit, and public education across the country would crumble (Cleveland Teachers Union 1995b). They also argued that it is unconstitutional to distribute public funds to religious schools. In addition, private schools funded with public dollars could also promote intolerant and discriminatory beliefs without proper state oversight (Cleveland Teachers Union 1995a).

Others claimed that the union had alternative motivations for its opposition, including anti-Catholicism and job protection. Senator Patrick Sweeney, a voucher proponent, said,

The OEA, AFL-CIO, AFT are the lead anti-Catholic organizations. No one is saying that we should end Head Start even though it is the hands of private black churches. We're spending millions on re-training programs. Much of it is done by the private sector. Nobody is questioning that. Just when its K-12. Their passions are turf (Sweeney 1998).

The Buckeye Institute, a libertarian think tank in Ohio, said this about the teachers' unions:

The OFT and the OEA had no interest in diverting money away from the public school trough at which they fed. To them, the public schools' monopoly on public school children was inviolable. The only "reforms" to receive the unions' blessing were those which simply sent more money to the union-dominated public school system. As one legislator put it, "These people would die on the barricades to prevent competition" (Damask and Kozar, 1998).

Republican Divisions

Another barrier that entrepreneurs faced was the lack of full Republican support for vouchers. Ideologically, school choice seems to be a natural for the party. Many have characterized vouchers as a Republican issue. The promotion of the free market, the liberation from government control, and the subsidization of private schools have long been goals for Republicans. Yet in Ohio and elsewhere, the Republican constituency is not solidly supportive of school choice. The rural areas in Ohio are heavily Republican, and rural areas have never embraced vouchers, because private and religious schools are not located there. Rural Republicans have little incentive to advocate for choice when local children have no opportunity to increase their choice in schools (Boas 1998).

While rural Republicans may have been apathetic about vouchers, Democrats and Republican suburbanites were more actively opposed. A research director at an Ohio think tank said, "Suburban voters are the single most significant group that can stop vouchers" (Damask 1998). Interviewees gave three main reasons for suburban opposition. One reason was that suburban parents are afraid that vouchers will bring city students to their schools. These students, they fear, will bring with them all the problems associated with urban areas, like safety, discipline, and disruptive behavior. Metal detectors and security guards will be needed to combat the influx of gangs and guns. In the past, Ohio had experimented with cross-district choice of public schools, but the suburban districts would not open their schools to Cleveland students. Several interviewees made reference to the racism of suburbanites.

Another reason that suburbanites oppose school choice may be that it would interfere with property value. Property value is partially determined by the quality of local schools. Better schools make even modest homes more desirable. If non-residents can attend the better schools, then buying a home in that community becomes less competitive.

A third reason that suburbanites oppose vouchers is that they have little reason to institute school choice. Their schools are good. Suburban areas have the resources to provide their children with the latest technology, highly trained staff, and green playing fields. They are satisfied with their schools and have no interest in disrupting the status quo.

While the Republican constituency was divided and even opposed to vouchers, a change in party control in the legislature did provide some opportunity for school choice activists. During the November 1994 election, fourteen legislative seats were targeted by voucher supporters, and voucher-friendly candidates won ten. Now, not only was the Governor Republican, but Republicans had gained control of both houses of the legislature. The old leadership that had obstructed voucher legislation was replaced. Former House Speaker Vern Riffe was strongly opposed to vouchers, while the new Speaker, Jo Ann Davidson, was much more supportive. Sweeney, the pro-voucher Democrat, became the House minority leader. C.J. Prentiss, the leading Democratic opponent to vouchers, was removed from the House Education Committee and put on the House Insurance Committee for 1995-1996 (Damask 1998).

The change in legislative leadership opened another policy window for voucher entrepreneurs. A voucher bill could be introduced in the legislature and not immediately die in an unfriendly committee as it had in the past. However, party control alone cannot explain the later success of vouchers. There were too many divisions within the Republican Party about school choice. The change in party control is a facilitating condition for explaining Ohio's voucher policy.

The Silence of the Church

The Catholic Church would seem to be a likely leader of school voucher policy. Its city schools are in financial trouble, and Ohio has a tradition of supporting Catholic schools. Some have said that the Church is the driving force behind this voucher policy

in other states. John Witte said that it was instrumental in the passage of Wisconsin's voucher bill (Witte 2000).

Funding for religious schools has long been an issue in Ohio. Since the late 1960s, the state has funded busing, textbooks, and guidance counselors for Catholic schools. In 1996, Ohio spent on average \$599 pupil on private schools, \$197 more than any other state. \$15 million was spent on transportation, \$35 million on administrative expenses, and \$85 million on textbooks, science equipment, and remedial services. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Minnesota, and Louisiana also provide significant state support for private and Catholic schools, but Ohio spends the most (American Atheists 1997).

Since the mid-1960s, the Ohio legislature has discussed subsidizing the cost of tuition, not only these auxiliary services. As far back as 1967, Republican Governor James Rhodes initiated a tax credit program that would give each non-public school \$30 for each student. The courts ruled it unconstitutional, but it led to the Auxiliary Service Program that provided transportation money to private schools. In the early 1970s, Democratic Governor Jack Gillian proposed a tuition tax credit. It also failed, but later led to additional funding for auxiliary services. In 1977 and 1981, there were proposals for private school tuition reimbursement. Vouchers were again proposed in 1989 and 1992. These bills either died in legislative committees or were ruled unconstitutional by the state supreme court (Sweeney 1998).

Many point out that the Church has a direct financial interest in school choice. Catholic schools all over the country have had fiscal difficulties and many have been

forced to shut down, as discussed in Chapter 2. Declining enrollment and rising costs have contributed to these problems (Hicks 1996). Critics charge that Cleveland's parochial schools could use the additional revenue that vouchers provide.

Despite this tradition of state funding of parochial schools and their financial interest in increased public support, there is some evidence that the Church in Ohio was divided about the benefits of school vouchers. Most of the state's bishops were not supportive of voucher legislation. They were more interested in increased funding for auxiliary services than in a voucher plan. Only Bishop Pilla from Cleveland backed the governor's plan. He was committed to revitalizing city parochial schools, unlike other church leaders in this country who have decided to close their city schools and open more profitable schools in the suburbs (Newman 2000). The president of the Ohio Federation of Teachers related a story that he heard:

There was a meeting in the Governor's mansion of the bishops. They talked about school funding. They said they didn't want vouchers, but wanted more auxiliary funding. Ohio is already number one in the nation about funding for auxiliary services. But they said nothing about vouchers. All of the bishops, except Pilla, were against vouchers. He is trying to rescue the inner city parishes (Marec 1999).

Part of the lack of enthusiasm from some Church officials for this policy comes from the fact that vouchers do not provide them with significant funding. The Catholic Conference of Ohio explained that vouchers are not a "cash cow," and that it is not interested in seeing the public schools close. In addition, he said that they actually lose money through the voucher program. He said, "We take in less than we spend." Parochial school tuition is \$1200, and vouchers would cover most of those costs, but the

actual cost of educating each pupil is \$2400-2500. He said, "This program is a loser. The schools are taking in the voucher students because they feel it is the right thing to do. That's pretty noble" (Luckhaupt 1998).

This lack of enthusiasm of most of Ohio's bishops meant that the church kept a low profile about the voucher issue. The Catholic Church never took an active position in the voucher battle. In an interview with the Catholic Conference, the director said, "Our role has been pretty much behind the scenes. We have taken a backseat on this" (Luckhaupt 1998). Even those who fought against vouchers maintained this. Church leaders did not serve on the Governor's Commission on Choice. They did not organize parishioners. They also were not in the legislature during the hearing of the bill and did not testify before the education committee.

Church leaders also may have hung back as a conscious strategy. The director of the Catholic Conference said that did not get involved, because "we didn't want it to appear that it was a Catholic issue" (Luckhaupt 1998). They had faced failures in the past trying to achieve a tuition-tax credit policy. Realizing that there was little public support for using public funds to pay for Catholic school tuition, they may have purposely let others lead the fight.

The Church may have had some indirect influence over voucher politics in Ohio, but assessing its influence is always difficult. Their political activity is not easy to measure and is often not noted by the press. There was some speculation among interviewees that Bishop Pilla, the most supportive bishop of vouchers, played a behind-the-scenes role in voucher politics. One interviewee said, "Pilla got black businessmen to

front the issue. His fingerprints are everywhere.... Cincinnati has a stronger parochial base, but their bishops weren't into this. Pilla made a difference in terms of how Cleveland was chosen" (Marec 1999). Another interviewee noted friendship between Pilla and Voinovich and said that while mayor, Voinovich had encouraged the Bishop to keep the parochial schools open in Cleveland (Luckhaupt 1998). Also, the fact that Brennan, Voinovich, and Sweeney are Catholic adds further speculation about the indirect influence of the church.³

After the legislation was won, Tim Luckhaupt, Director of the Catholic Conference, explained that the Church supported choice because "parents are the primary educators of their children. We should provide them with the necessary funds to make that decision. Government may need to help. As a justice issue, they should get a return on their investment. Kids are our future leaders, and we need to provide them with a good education" (Luckhaupt 1998). At this later date, the Church took a more aggressive role in implementing and protecting the legislation. It employed someone in Cleveland to work with the schools and parents that chose to participate in the voucher program. After the challenge to the statute was filed, their legal council became an intervening party in the case (Luckhaupt 1998).

³ A Plain Dealer story about the governor described his devotion to Catholicism:

Still, Voinovich's Catholic faith runs deep. He attends Mass every Sunday morning no matter where in the world he may be, and he also tries to fit in noontime service a couple times a week. When he arrives at work each day, he is surrounded by reminders of God. Icons of the Virgin Mary and St. George watch over him from the cherry cabinet behind his desk. On the windowsill to his right are two rosaries, a psalm, an Irish prayer and a medallion or two. And on the wall to his left are pictures of him and his mother with the pope (Goel and Marrison 1994).

Other religious groups also played a minor role in Ohio's voucher politics. Though Ohio has a sizable population of Christian groups, they did not support vouchers. As in other parts of the country, these groups prefer to home school their children or set up their own schools. They fear that if they accept voucher money, then their schools will be regulated by the government in some ways.

Some have also noted that conservative Jewish organizations have become supportive of vouchers (Beinart 1999). One interviewee said that Jewish leaders in Ohio stepped away from their coalition with the teachers' union after 1995, because of their interest in using public funds to support their growing schools (Link 1999). However, there was no evidence that that they had a major impact in affecting the passage of vouchers in Ohio. This may change in the future.

The Divided Business Community

The business community would seem to be a likely participant in school voucher politics. Business leaders have played a prominent role in school politics since the 1980s when a "Nation at Risk" fueled enthusiasm for reform. With their substantial political influence, their support of a policy can be important (see i.e. Stone 1989). In addition, a market-style reform like vouchers would seem to be a natural issue for them. However, my research shows that they did not solidly back the issue and only played a peripheral role.

The Ohio Business Roundtable (OBR) is the main mechanism for business leaders to speak out on policy issues. It comprises the CEOs of the largest corporations in Ohio. The President of the OBR said, "We work closely with the political leaders of

the state, mainly the governor and the legislative leaders, to craft an agenda that the business community can mobilize around to create a better business climate” (Stoff 1998). Education has been a top priority for the OBR since its founding in 1992.

The OBR reported that its membership was divided about the voucher issue. On the one hand, the organization did seem to respond to a need for major educational change. The Director explained that business groups in Ohio first looked to institute systemic education reform in the 1980s, but soon became dissatisfied at the pace of change.

There was frustration with the slow pace in general at the local level. There are so many layers -- the school board, PTA, teacher unions. 1000 vested interests.... Things in education move glacially slow because of the vested interests. Part of the frustration leads to the need to build the voucher program (Stoff 1998).

They became interested in trying something new for education in the early 1990s. “We wanted to metaphorically blow up the schools and start over,” Stoff said (Stoff 1998).

As a prominent member of the business community, David Brennan spoke to the members of the OBR about school choice and attempted to galvanize their support.

The OBR mobilized members and wrote letters to legislators in support of vouchers, but divisions within the organization meant that it was late to the issue, less influential, and only offered weak support. Many business leaders shied away from the controversy associated with vouchers, fearing repercussions to their bottom line. Instead, they advocated systemic change of public schools, charter schools, and a limited voucher program followed by serious evaluation. The president of the OBR described the

cleavages within the business community on this issue and explained the reasons for the lack of full support from the business community as a whole.

Voucher policy is a radioactive issue. It brings out the screechers.... Let the pilot happen, if you can show that vouchers have improved scores, then take it on the road.... Cleavages exist in the OBR.... Some business leaders are more pro-vouchers than others. Businesses that are more consumer product-oriented are more supportive. The service industry is more leery of highly contentious issues. Manufacturing is more of a buffer and is more removed from the issue (Stoff 1998).

Due to these divisions, the business community played a minor role in voucher politics in Ohio. Though David Brennan was a prominent business leader in the state, he was unable to win the enthusiastic support of his peers. Because of the diversity of interests in the business community, it is difficult to win universal support for a controversial policy.

The Search for New Solutions for Urban Schools

As entrepreneurs in Ohio were beginning to prepare new voucher legislation in the mid-1990s, parents in poor city schools, in this state and across the country, began showing an interest in alternative methods of improving schools. These parents had grown tired of the failing schools in their neighborhoods. The promise of new educational reforms by the professionals, years of desegregation programs, and the growing presence of minorities at the Board of Education had not led to educational improvement.

The performance of students in city schools has long lagged behind students in other areas. In fact, a recent study found that there is a widening disparity of test scores between blacks and whites (Zernike 2000). Though some question whether overall

public education is in decline, no one ever disputes that city schools are in trouble. In 1998, Education Week conducted a study of the state of the city schools in our country. The study highlights the disparities in test scores that exist between city and suburban schools, the problems with absenteeism in city schools, and the insufficient instruction that city students receive. Some of its findings include:

- Between 1990 and 1994, high school enrollment in 74 urban districts grew by 5 percent. But the graduating class of 1994 was less than half the size of the freshman class four years earlier, suggesting that half of urban students don't graduate on time.
- In Pennsylvania, 27% of 4th graders in urban high poverty areas could read at grade level, compared to 56% in non-urban high poverty areas.
- In Wisconsin, 28% of 8th graders in urban high poverty areas could complete math problems at grade level, compared to 84% in non-urban high poverty areas.
- Nearly three-fourths of Illinois 3rd graders in 1996 were rated "proficient" on the state reading test, but fewer than half the 3rd graders in East St. Louis and Chicago met the standard.
- More than a third of Baltimore's students were absent more than 20 days in 1996.
- The average Chicago 10th grader is absent six weeks of instructional time per year.
- The average urban superintendent serves less than three years.
- High school students in the 74 big-city districts examined by Quality Counts are 25 percent more likely than the average U.S. teenager to attend a school with more than 900 students (Quality Counts Special Report 1998).

As I discussed in Chapter 1, reforming education has never been easy. In that chapter, I touched on some of the difficulties with reforming education, including bureaucratic resistance, job protection, reformer hubris, and the strength of city administration. Those who have attempted to improve urban education have faced those same barriers and additional ones. Years of failed reform efforts have fueled frustration.

Desegregation was for many years the best hope to improve education for minorities. In a series of court cases and legislation following Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the federal government forced localities to integrate schools, if necessary, by busing children from one area to another. Schools in cities such as Boston, Charlotte, Cleveland, and Detroit were expected to have a balance of races if they had been guilty of deliberate segregation in the past. However, desegregation did not always achieve its goals; white families moved to the suburbs and put their children in private schools. Minority children faced the burden of travelling to schools outside of their neighborhood, and the racial composition of their schools did not significantly change. Since the early 1970s, these programs have been in decline, and the federal government instead focused on compensatory programs and magnet schools.

Even blacks no longer believed that desegregation would improve school performance by the early 1990s. In 1998, Public Agenda, a nonpartisan public-opinion research firm in New York City, found that when asked what the bigger priority for schools should be, 80 percent of black parents chose raising academic standards and achievement. Only nine percent chose achieving diversity and integration, and eleven percent said both (Bradley 1998).

Other reform efforts aimed at poor and minorities followed the publication of “A Nation at Risk” in the mid-1980s. One attempt to improve education for the needy included state court challenges to the distribution of school funding. These reformers sought to show that funding based on local property tax led to a system of unequal funding of education, which violated state constitutional requirements for a fair and equal

education. A couple of states did restructure their finance and curriculum as a result of these court cases. Kentucky is often looked to as an example of the benefits of financial equity reform (Gittell 1998). However, wealthier communities were resistant to the transfer of their tax money to schools in poorer communities or to placing a cap on their spending. More often than not, the courts failed to address the issue or the legislature and the governor responded to the court half-heartedly (Gittell and others Forthcoming). Pennsylvania and Ohio each have a checkered history of finance equity cases. By the mid-1990s, finance equity cases seemed to be abandoned by reformers after a string of losses and stalemates.

During the 1970s and 1980s, white school administrators and mayors in cities were replaced with blacks. Harold Washington became the mayor of Chicago in 1983, David Dinkins took the helm in New York City in 1989, and Wilson Goode became mayor of Philadelphia in 1983. Many minorities hoped that city schools would improve with the change in leadership. This proved not to be the case; test scores went down and dropout rates went up. Wilbur Rich explains that the leadership change had no impact on schools because school systems are often the major employers in the city and any changes in personnel or services could threaten the local economy. Rich also writes that the teachers' unions, administrators, and school activists control the system and have little interest in disrupting their routine. Mayors have not been able to reform the city schools because of their political dependence on the unions (Rich 1996).

With the end of desegregation, the faltering of reforms of the 1980s, and disappointment in the new black leadership, minorities began looking toward other

reforms. Black leaders began to speak out against the educational system and even against their traditional allies, Democrats and union leaders, who defend the system. They forged alliances with white Republicans because of disgust with the status quo in urban areas and desperation to try new solutions. Partnerships include Governor Pataki and Reverend Floyd Flake in New York; Representative Dwight Evans and Governor Tom Ridge in Pennsylvania; and Representative Polly Williams and Governor Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin. Consider the following statement from Reverend Flake,

The current political order is unwilling to rock the boat. Co-conspiring politicians remain wedded to a system of waste and mediocrity because of the fundraising prowess of teachers unions and interest groups. Inner city politicians, whose children more often than not attend private schools or the best public schools, are protecting a system that discourages reform, chokes choice, and ultimately condemns children to a life of social and economic dysfunction.

I am not against public schools. I am against unresponsive and irresponsible public schools where educational mediocrity goes unchallenged. I am against public schools that only expect the least from our children. I am against public schools where improvement is stifled by strict union rules and regulations. I am against public school that imitate the despair of their surrounding neighborhoods and fail to conquer that despair with the tools of learning and the virtue of hope (Flake 1999).

This disgust with the status quo has led blacks and other minorities to embrace the idea of school vouchers. In 1997, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies found that 65 percent of Latinos/as and 56 percent of African Americans supported vouchers for private school choice as compared to 47 percent of Whites. This poll data also indicated strong support (70%) for choice and vouchers among African Americans earning less than \$15,000 per year and even stronger support (86%) from African Americans aged 26-35 (Brooke 1997).

Vouchers appear to offer minorities a way out of the failing school system. For many, this means entry to a Catholic school. Even non-Catholics wish to send their children to the parochial schools for academic, discipline, and safety reasons. Catholic schools are also conveniently located in their neighborhood. A voucher will also cover the low cost of tuition for these schools.

Some hope that vouchers will succeed where desegregation and the equity cases failed. Vouchers could give minorities access to schools with more diverse populations. Later in this chapter, we will see that one black school administrator from Cleveland calls vouchers the civil rights movement of the 1990s. A voucher could also enable the poor to afford a school just out of their reach giving them the same opportunities as the middle class.

Some minority leaders also wish to set up their own local schools using voucher money. Vouchers and charter schools can be a means to a community-controlled school. Two local minority leaders from Philadelphia, Veronica Joyner and Rep. Dwight Evans, already have their own charter schools. Rev. Floyd Flake has his own school, the Allen Christian School in Jamaica, Queens. Fannie Lewis from Cleveland also wishes to establish her own school that would accept voucher students.

In addition to vouchers, African-Americans have also shown an interest in other governance reforms including decentralization and charter schools (Bryk, Hill, and Shipps 1997; Hernandez 1998). "Many black and Hispanic groups have lost faith in the traditional education system and are building these new alliances," said Joe Nathan, the director for the Center for School Change at the University of Minnesota's Humphrey

Institute. “They believe that charter schools will make a difference for their youngsters” (Hernandez 1998). Jim Carl found that the failure of school desegregation led to both the Chicago School Reform Act and the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (Carl 1995, p.153). These reforms also put them at cross-purposes with union leaders and other Democrats and demonstrate their dissatisfaction with their schools.

Cleveland’s Crisis

There is much frustration in Cleveland with the inner-city schools and with stalled efforts to improve them. A Cleveland Plain Dealer poll showed that Clevelanders had less confidence in their schools than people in the rest of Northeast Ohio. More than half of city residents gave their city schools a “D” or an “F.” Only 12 percent of people living in suburban or rural areas gave their districts such low marks. More than a third of Clevelanders polled said their district “rarely” or “never” spends money wisely. Three-fifths said the district was worse than it was 10 years ago. At least three-quarters listed violence, poor academic performance, lack of money and lack of parental involvement as major problems. Chart A shows the grade given to schools by Clevelanders and by those living in the rest of the region (Stevens 1998).

Chart A.

1998 Poll of School Satisfaction by Region Conducted by The Plain Dealer What Grade Would You Give Your Local Public Schools?

	Clevelanders	Rest of Region
A	4%	17%
B	12%	40%
C	28%	27%
D	27%	7%
F	27%	5%
Don’t Know	2%	4%

Clevelanders have good reason for this dissatisfaction. Their schools are among the worst in the country. The dropout rate is twice the state average. In 1994, only 9 percent of its ninth graders passed a state proficiency test. Roughly 15 percent of the district's 4th and 9th graders passed the 1996-97 state proficiency tests. Only 4 percent of 8th graders passed algebra, and less than 1 percent of the high school students took Advanced Placement courses. On any given day, nearly one in six students won't show up for school. The district spends \$6,195 per student, 16 percent above the state average in Ohio (Viteritti, 1999; Quality Counts Special Report 1998). In 1995, an outgoing superintendent told the city that, "Only radical change and a civic rebirth can save the district" (Marrison 1995). In that same year, a federal judge overseeing a desegregation case found the overall management of the district to be so inept that he ordered the state superintendent of education to take it over (Stephens and Funk 1998).

Efforts to improve the city schools had floundered. Like many areas of the country, Cleveland had a twenty-five year history with desegregation and busing that led to massive white flight and increased segregation. Forced busing ended in 1996, and in March 1998, all desegregation efforts were terminated by the U.S. District Court which found that the state had ended segregation as much as possible and that the differences in test scores was due to socio-economic status, not race. School equity cases also failed to improve performance in city schools.

As a result of failed reforms and low satisfaction with city schools, support for vouchers increased. The support of African-Americans for vouchers was clearly demonstrated in public opinion polls conducted by local papers at that time. By April

1997, 81% of Ohio African-Americans favored education tax credits or vouchers (Institute for Policy Research 1997). Blacks favor school choice more strongly than the rest of the population. The highest support comes from women, parents, and younger respondents, because they believe there will be more of an emphasis on standards, discipline, and parental involvement in private schools. With a majority of students in Cleveland schools of minority background, it helps explain their support of vouchers. Of the 75,000 students in the Cleveland school district, 70 percent are black and 7 percent are Hispanic.

Cleveland City Councilwoman Fanny Lewis, described by many as an old-fashioned ward leader, was one of the minority leaders who supported vouchers. She first became interested in vouchers in 1991 when she began looking at community-based education. She was looking for alternatives because she was disgusted with Cleveland's public school system. She explained,

We got interested in vouchers because Cleveland public schools were not doing nothing. We needed an alternative education. When we lose 50% children every year out the school system, that's bad. We've got to stop this hemorrhage.... I've worked in the school system all my life, because all of my children went through the public school system. I was the PTA president in Hough for many years. I'm still involved with schools. It's just that education is political business. Children get caught up in the system. When you think they spend \$9,000 per child, that is a lot of money for the children to not be getting educated (Lewis 1999).

Later, she became interested in starting her own school. She said that parents should have more of a choice, and that if poor people could spend their welfare checks where they liked, they should also be able to spend their educational dollars in the school of their choice (Lewis, 1999).

Her views on vouchers and her position in the black community brought her much attention by the press and by other voucher proponents. She said that David Brennan came to talk with her, but that she had been interested in vouchers before this meeting. She invited Polly Williams from Wisconsin, a minority legislator who had introduced that state's voucher legislation, to speak to her community. People from all over the country came to talk to them, even Joe Clark, the nationally known principal who turned around an inner city school by emphasizing discipline (Lewis 1999). On the other side, opponents tried to convince her to change her mind, including her local congressman. "My question to him was with the education system the way that it is, ... what else do you have to offer? He didn't have anything else to offer. In the light of that, you go for the vouchers" (Lewis 1999).

Other black leaders in the city supported the voucher cause. Cleveland's chapter of the NAACP dropped out of the anti-voucher alliance. Bert Holt, the African-American woman currently running the voucher program in Cleveland, explained in an interview that school choice was the civil rights issue of the 1990s; it is a battle between the haves and the have-nots. She had previously worked for the school district implementing its desegregation program. She said, "The same barriers we faced in desegregation, we're facing in vouchers. But the people I worked with when I was working for desegregation like teachers unions have turned against me" (Holt 1998).

Despite the polls showing the numbers of blacks dissatisfied with the public schools and interested in school vouchers, most black leaders were not like Lewis and Holt. All eighteen members of the Black Legislative Caucus opposed the measure. One

white union leader said, “The plan is to exploit the fact that 18-25 year old African-American parents support vouchers” (Charney, 1998). He explained that this demographic group supports vouchers “because they didn’t go through the civil rights movement. They didn’t go through a time when blacks weren’t in a position of power” (Charney, 1998). He believed that state Republicans who claim to have an interest in cities are really still racist. “Voinovich just wants to help the cute, black kids, but when they become African-American men, he wants nothing to do with them. This is evident by the high penalties he supports for petty crimes” (Charney, 1998).

Representative C. J. Prentiss (D-Cleveland)⁴, an African-American woman from Cleveland married to a teachers’ union leader, Michael Charney, was instrumental in rallying the support of other Democrats and some Cleveland leaders. She spoke out forcibly against vouchers on the floor of the House. She was also the ranking minority member of the education committee before 1994. “Let’s ‘experiment’ by fully funding education. ...The most draconian and dangerous idea of all is to take the taxpayers’ dollars and educate a handful of children in private schools,” Prentiss said (Suddes, 1995).

It is odd that more black leaders from Cleveland did not publicly support vouchers given the feelings of their constituencies. This disjunction can be explained by the historic political ties that exist among the Democratic leadership, the teachers’ unions, and black politicians. With the pressure of the community, more legislators, mayors, and minority interest groups may begin to drift from this alliance.

The Urban Opportunity

The growing support for vouchers among urban minorities created an opportunity for entrepreneurs to put forward a new kind of voucher bill. In the past, vouchers or private tuition credit had been proposed, but failed. Those proposals were too large in scope. Republican Representative Mike Fox's 1993 voucher bill gave special preference to children in low-income families or families in problem districts, but was not limited to this population. The final report of the Urban Commission in 1992 was another broad package. Such programs carried too high a price tag, opposition by the teachers' union was fierce, and Republicans were not supportive of such large programs. The tuition tax credit proposals of the late 1960s and 1970s were specifically aimed at Ohio's Catholic population, and they were overturned in the court. From these past failures, voucher entrepreneurs realized that they needed to put together a different type of plan. David Brennan said that they learned much from past mistakes.

The point of the Commission was to create a pilot method of testing the issue. The plan that the commission decided on was unrealistic. If we had passed that, not one school district would have implemented it. The legislative plan was better. It was simpler. It was clear that it was just for Cleveland. That's why the rest of the state approved it. It took the monkey off their back. We tried a siege or a frontal assault, and that hadn't worked (Brennan 1998).

Brennan emphasized the strong union opposition that these earlier bills had faced. He explained, "No one can overcome the power of the unions. We did an end run around them.... The political bar is so high that it takes people and fools like us to challenge them.... Education is like so many vested monopolies" (Brennan 1998). One element of

⁴ She became a state senator in the November 1998 elections.

their political “end run around the unions” was the voucher leaders’ creation of an urban-only plan for vouchers. Instead of attempting to bring choice to all schools, policy entrepreneurs put forward an argument that urban schools needed reform immediately, and vouchers were the answer.

At this time, entrepreneurs began to talk about vouchers in a new way. They toned down the free-market, Milton Friedman argument for vouchers and instead spoke of the benefits of a voucher program for city children. George Voinovich’s education aide Thomas F.X. Needles said the following about the administration’s interest in city schools:

There will be an increased focus on the challenges of urban schools, as evidenced by the Cleveland takeover and financial problems in Columbus and Cincinnati... We’re very involved in the discussions about the future strategic plan in Cleveland. And we’re going to step up this involvement. We can’t ignore inner-city youth (Lane, 1995).

Voinovich was uniquely able to articulate the needs of Cleveland kids, because he had been the mayor of Cleveland between 1979-1989.

The opposition has called this rhetoric change opportunistic. How genuine was this concern for city students? Was the change in message a crass attempt to take advantage of the plight of city students, and later expand the program to serve white, middle-class interests? Or did the entrepreneurs really have an interest in improving schools for the disadvantaged? It is difficult to tell. In an interview in late 1998, David Brennan in late 1998, made both arguments for vouchers simultaneously and with equal vigor. Not only would vouchers make the system more efficient, but it would also

improve schools for inner city students, he explained. Since the passage of Ohio's 1995 voucher legislation, there have been no attempts to expand it.

Along with changing their rhetoric, Brennan and Voinovich began collaborating with Lewis. They put on joint conferences, and she appeared with them at public events. In addition, Lewis organized a bus trip to Columbus composed of parents from her district. She also ran a conference on vouchers that included a libertarian think tank, the Buckeye Institute. Her involvement in the voucher bill was not in the crafting of the legislation, but in galvanizing public support. Lewis's activities attracted much press coverage, both locally and nationally. As one Ohio state representative said, "Fannie Lewis legitimized the school choice program because of her status" (Van Dunk 1998). The Research Director of the Buckeye Institute said,

She [Lewis] played an important role. She brought a busload of people from Cleveland. They stormed the statehouse. They demanded to know, "why are you holding this up?" They got wide press in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. Parents also brought in Polly Williams from Milwaukee (Damask 1998).

Lewis and Bert Holt, the administrator of Cleveland's voucher program, also spent a great deal of time convincing their community that vouchers were a good idea. They spoke at local churches and debated other black leaders. Holt said she met with the NAACP and LINKS, a group of affluent black women. She said that she was able to convince both groups that vouchers were the only way to improve education.

I met with the NAACP. They voted against vouchers. But during a meeting, they said let Bert Holt have her pilot. When I appealed to LINKS, they looked at me jaundicely. I talked to them as a mother and [as a member of the community]. I asked them, "Is it fair to become an oppressor"? They changed their minds (Holt 1998).

Though Lewis played an important role in the politics of vouchers in Ohio, her role should not be overstated. In a recent book on school equity and vouchers, Joseph Viteritti briefly addresses the politics in this state and writes that Lewis led the fight for vouchers. He wrote that she was joined by Brennan and together they brought in Voinovich. He also minimizes the lack of support by other black leaders (Viteritti 1999). Clearly, Lewis had no role in crafting the legislation and making deals with legislators. Brennan and Voinovich saw to that. Lewis's principal impact was indirect in the form of legitimizing the policy.

Included in the Budget

Another aspect of the school choice strategy was to include vouchers within the yearly budget. Many believe that vouchers would not have passed as a stand-only bill. Because it was included in the budget, the bill went to the House finance committee, which was more supportive of school choice than the education committee. Even though the House education committee had a 6 to 3 Republican majority, some speculate that seven members of the committee would have rejected vouchers. The Republican chair of the education committee was opposed to school choice. This is not unusual, since most education committee members have ties with the schools regardless of party affiliation. In addition, by putting it in a \$30 billion budget, members did not want to reject the whole package for just one item (Boas 1998)⁵.

⁵ Interestingly, the Milwaukee voucher bill was also included in the budget. For more information, see John F. Witte, The Market Approach to Education: An Analysis of America's First Voucher Program, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Republican control over the legislature enabled Voinovich and Brennan to have their friends in the legislature steer the bill to a friendlier committee. However, party control was not the most important variable in explaining the outcome of this bill. Clearly, Republicans in the education committee were not supportive. In addition, Pennsylvania also had a Republican controlled legislature and a Republican governor, but they were unable to win passage of the legislation. This is discussed in more depth in Chapter 4.

The End-Run Around the Unions

The strategy of putting forward an urban-only voucher program and including it in a budget bill was enormously successful. It resulted in dividing the states' two teachers unions, the OEA and the CTU. Initially, both unions fought against this policy. In February 1994, the CTU and the OEA formed a lobbying group, "Citizens Against Vouchers," whose members included the PTA, the NAACP, the ACLU, the League of Women Voters, Americans for Religious Freedom, and the American Jewish Committee. The OEA had an anti-voucher member lobby day on February 8, 1994. But many pointed out that the OEA did not fight this measure as vigorously as the CTU after it became clear that vouchers were only going to be used in Cleveland. The more powerful union, the OEA, is based in rural and suburban areas. It backed down from the fight since the program would not affect its districts. The CTU was left alone in its opposition. Different constituencies thus led to different political outlooks. The ACLU and the CTU were left alone in opposition to vouchers (Boas 1998; Charney 1998). Since then, the

OEA has continued to support Voinovich, endorsing him for his second term as Governor and later for his campaign for the U.S. Senate, while the OFT did not.

The CTU fought this measure in several ways. There were several anti-voucher rallies in Columbus, including one in April 4, 1995 that had 200 attendees. 1500 letters from members of the unions were sent to legislators. They testified before the Senate (Charney 1998). They also targeted legislators who supported vouchers. The CTU successfully blocked Sen. Patrick Sweeney's (D-Cleveland) endorsement by the state AFL as retribution for supporting vouchers, and he lost the 1998 election. One legislative aide said, "Pat Sweeney is now road kill" (Boas 1998).

Democratic resolve was also shaken by African-American support of the program. The highly publicized polls of African-Americans who supported vouchers and the support of some black leaders clearly swayed some Democratic representatives. Although the bill was not crafted by African-American legislators or leaders, leaders such as Fannie Lewis certainly gained visibility and legitimacy for the issue.

Democrats with Catholic, working class constituencies were supportive of an urban-specific voucher program, because it also provided some assistance to the Catholic schools. Within Cleveland, there are still a number of white working class or ethnic neighborhoods with a large Catholic population. While their representatives are Democrats, some are in favor of vouchers, such as Senator Sweeney. The support of working class Catholics and minorities added to this policy's bipartisan character.

Viteritti points out that the framing of vouchers as a means to equity exposes a conflict of interest in the Democratic Party. On the one hand, Democrats espouse a

concern for the needy and a need to improve public education in cities. On the other, they are closely connected with the teachers' unions. "The National Education Association had fielded 405 delegates at the 1996 Democratic national convention -- more than any state in the nation except California. The same year the union invested \$186 million to have its voice heard in national political contests" (Viteritti 1999, p. 90). It is impossible to reconcile the tension between minority support for school vouchers and union opposition of such a program.

Meanwhile, the teachers' union in Ohio also faced other battles that may have distracted them from this fight. Since the early 1990s, Ohio's teachers' unions and administrative organizations have been occupied with more than just battling vouchers. While Governor Voinovich was not as openly antagonistic to the unions as other governors, such as Ridge in Pennsylvania or Engler in Michigan, he did support several policies that put him at cross-purposes with the unions. Other issues that occupied the unions in the 1990s include standards, the school equity court decision in 1997, Voinovich's changes on the state board of education, charter schools, layoffs of Cleveland teachers in 1996, the state takeover of Cleveland schools in 1995, and the mayoral takeover of Cleveland schools in 1997. Union leaders admitted in interviews that they felt besieged (Charney 1998). These issues occupied both unions' legal calendar, absorbed the attention of leaders, and divided their forces.

Another advantage of confining the program to Cleveland was that it helped unify Republicans, many of whom had no interest in a broad voucher program. The Cleveland-only policy was small in scope, geographically limited, and an inexpensive reform of

urban education. Suburban Republicans did not have to worry about city kids showing up in their schools or interfering with a system that was working for them. A provision in the law granted local schools the option to accept voucher students. None did.

Rural Republicans did not have to support a much bigger and costlier program with few payoffs for them. The current program only affects Cleveland schools and in fact was smaller than Voinovich's original proposal that would have been implemented in eight cities. This plan was viewed as an experiment or a pilot. According to one Democratic legislative aide, "The Republicans thought [after the voucher proposal was limited], Cleveland is so screwed up, it can't do any harm. Then the Democrats didn't have the votes to get rid of it" (Boas 1998).

In addition, this plan gave the appearance of being an urban reform without a large expenditure. Both parties were under pressure to put forward some form of urban education reform. For years, the press had been writing articles about the failure of city schools. Bad test scores and corrupt administrators were a constant front-page story in Ohio papers like Cleveland's Plain Dealer. These stories convinced the public that vouchers, while unnecessary in suburban areas, could be the cure for city schools.

However, the public was unwilling to spend a great deal of money on urban school reform. People had grown tired of what they saw as "throwing good money after bad" in providing more money for the public schools. In 1996, Ohio voters rejected a \$1.1 billion education proposal that would have raised taxes to satisfy a court equity ruling. This plan lost in all 88 of Ohio's counties, and got only 20% of the vote ("School Shell Games", 1998). The many stories of corrupt administrators had the public leery of

writing any more blank checks to Cleveland schools. A Cleveland voucher program, in contrast, was seen as a bargain. It cost only \$5.25 million, and the funds would go to private schools, which were perceived to be honest and frugal. One union leader said,

Cleveland is the big, bad city to the North. They see it as the Chicago of Ohio. They feel that they have given Cleveland a lot of money, and there have been no results. Cleveland has gotten a good share of money. The elected Board of Education of Cleveland wrote a letter to the legislature, which said they did not want vouchers. When the letter was read before the House, there were gales of laughter. Which meant too bad or tough shit (Marec 1999).

An urban-only voucher program provided a reform that the public felt was needed for city schools, but without the high price tag.

Legislative Outcome

In 1995, an appropriation for a Cleveland voucher program was put into the state budget. It received approval by the House Finance committee by a 19 to 10 margin. The House passed the budget with the voucher appropriation by a vote of 57 to 41 with seven Democrats voting in favor of the program. The Senate's budget, however, did not include a voucher proposal. Voinovich influenced the conference committee to include the voucher appropriation perhaps by offering various inducements to individual members (Boas 1998; Damask and Kozar 1998). Both houses passed the revised bill on June 29. It passed the House in an 82-16 roll call. Casting yes votes were 52 of 56 House Republicans and 30 of 43 Democrats. Similarly, the 33-member Senate voted 29-3 for the compromise, with yes votes from nine of 13 Senate Democrats. Representative Wayne Jones, who represented his party in the conference committee, explained that Democrats approved of many aspects of the budget. Although he didn't like the

vouchers, he said, "if we're going to have them, it makes sense to have them in Cleveland" (Suddes 1995).

Summary of the Legislation

Cleveland's voucher program, which was implemented in September 1996, allowed parents of 2,000 Cleveland elementary students to use public funds for tuition at private, public, or religious school of their choice. It was the first voucher program in the country passed by a state legislature to include religious schools. The program now includes 3,700 children, who receive up to \$2,500 each and attend 55 private and parochial schools (Staples, 1998). Other noteworthy features of the voucher bill include:

- Broad eligibility for any students residing in the Cleveland City district and enrolled in Kindergarten through 3rd grade. The program could be expanded later to include students through 8th grade. Each year after the first, one grade level will be added to the eligibility rolls, up to and including the 8th grade.
- Broad eligibility for any state-chartered private school, whether religiously affiliated or non-religious. Participating schools may not practice or promote illegal discrimination.
- A scholarship of up to \$2,500 or 90% of a \$2,500 tuition bill; low-income students would receive vouchers worth 90 percent of private school tuition costs; all others would receive vouchers worth 75 percent of tuition.
- Cleveland's public schools can keep up to 55 percent of state aid per pupil (an average of \$5,600) even if parents accept the maximum voucher amount (worth 45 percent of state aid, or \$2,500) to spend on private school tuition.
- Private schools may give priority in admissions to present students and their siblings, but no more than half the vouchers can go to these students.
- Second priority to students from low-income families until 20 percent of any given class meets that description.
- Vouchers are redeemed by parents themselves directly rather than by the schools.
- If the program is terminated, the students who are in the program will still get reimbursed for their tuition until 8th grade.

Entrepreneurs and the Urban Opportunity

The success of Ohio's voucher program has much to do with the efforts of policy entrepreneurs. David Brennan used his connections in the Republican Party to convince other leaders to support this policy. He also attempted to convince the business community of the merits of this program, put together the first state report on vouchers, networked with voucher proponents in other states, and reached out to pro-voucher minority leaders. Voinovich used his visibility as governor to publicize the issue and convinced Republicans on the fence to support the issue. Together they crafted a new rhetoric for school vouchers and put together a winning strategy.

This policy was not the work of organized interests or the Republican Party. The business community only offered weak support of the bill. The religious right was not involved in this battle. The Catholic Church stayed out of the spotlight, and only became involved later during the legal battle. Republicans showed deep divisions about the issue, although their control over the legislature enabled entrepreneurs to place the bill in a friendly committee.

The idea of vouchers clearly appealed to these entrepreneurs. Brennan learned of the concept after his wife attended a Heritage Foundation meeting. Neither Brennan nor Voinovich stood to gain much financially from this program. In addition, this program did not benefit Voinovich's base of supporters. The main beneficiaries of the program were minorities, who do not usually vote Republican.

Brennan and Voinovich benefited enormously from the interest in Cleveland for vouchers. They were able to put forward a new rationale for vouchers. They argued that vouchers would offer a way-out for inner city children. It would be the means to achieve

urban education reform by bypassing the current administrators. It would be much cheaper than other reforms. It also would be confined to the cities, so that it would not interfere with schools in suburban areas. This idea clearly had wider public support than the pure market model and a broad statewide plan, as they had learned from prior failures.

The change to an urban-only plan also served to weaken the opposition and to overcome Republican resistance. It divided Democrats as working class Catholics and minorities favored this issue. The larger teachers' union failed to combat this city program that did not affect its members. Proponents also were able to shore up support among Republicans in suburban and rural areas by promising them that their schools would not be affected.

By changing the voucher rhetoric from the free-market to an urban-school bail out, entrepreneurs made a conscious attempt to change the debate. Kingdon and Stone note that this is common political tactic. Kingdon writes that entrepreneurs couple their ideas with opportunities as they arise (Kingdon 1984). In the process, the problem may have to be redefined. Stone explains that there are multiple understandings of a single concept and that political strategies involve creating understandings and manipulating them (Stone 1997).

The legislative win did not end the voucher battle. Funding the transportation of voucher students was an immediate problem. There have been conflicting evaluations conducted by academics hired by both sides. Brennan brought in Paul Peterson from Harvard to evaluate its implementation, a study that found that parents of children who

participated in the program were very satisfied with it. The teachers' union hired others to study the program, and they found no improvement in performance. Legal challenges to vouchers are ongoing, with the case currently on appeal before U.S. Supreme Court. And old allies have parted ways. Though still very much in favor of vouchers, Lewis said that she is "no longer enthused" with David Brennan. She is still struggling to get funding for her schools, while he has already set up schools in Cleveland using voucher money (Lewis 1999).

Chapter 4

Pitfalls in Pennsylvania

This is the most fundamental education policy change in 100 years.

- Wythe Kever, spokesman for the Pennsylvania State Education Association (Justice and Singer 1999b)

The suburbs want to help out the church schools, which are closing. They don't want to help little black kids. Nobody in the suburbs around Harrisburg wants vouchers.

- Paula Hess, Executive Director for the House Education Committee (Hess 1999)

It's a steep climb, but it's not Everest, and I'm not done climbing.

- Governor Tom Ridge, June 1999 (Justice, Singer, and Dilanian 1999a)

This chapter examines the unsuccessful attempt to pass school choice legislation in Pennsylvania during the spring of 1999. Governor Ridge proposed several different voucher plans that spring, but no one program could satisfy all. At a press conference held at 4:00 AM on June 17, 1999, an exhausted Ridge admitted defeat. This chapter relates the policy narrative of vouchers in Pennsylvania. It defines the battle lines of this issue, describes the 1999 voucher proposal, and explains why it failed.

The politics of school vouchers in Pennsylvania bears many similarities to the politics in Ohio. Policy entrepreneurs championed the issue and benefited from the support of minorities in Philadelphia. Yet, they narrowly lost the passage of legislation in a Republican controlled legislature. The story of the politics in Pennsylvania demonstrates the problems that arise when there are multiple entrepreneurs with divergent goals and how difficult it is combat a strong opponent, such as the teachers' unions.

Pennsylvania's Political Culture

Pennsylvania shares with Ohio a similar political culture and institutional characteristics. Pennsylvania has an individualistic political culture, according to Elazar (Elazar 1984); it has a corporate-friendly tradition of attracting jobs and development. Like Ohio, it has strong party competition, a strong governor, and strong unions (Beyle 1996; Cooke and Janosik 1965). It also shares a history of cultural conservatism as evident by former Democratic Governor Casey's pro-life stance and its support of Catholic schools (Gittell and others Forthcoming). Two U.S. Supreme Courts cases that involved state funding of private school originated in Pennsylvania, Lemon v. Kurtzman and Meek v. Pittenger (Kirkpatrick 1990).

Unlike Ohio, Pennsylvania has two large urban areas on the east and west of the state. The north and center of the state is primarily rural. Party identification is largely associated with place of residence. The cities are primarily Democratic, and the rural areas tend to vote Republican (Cooke and Janosik 1965). The tension between urban and rural areas certainly affected entrepreneurial strategies in this state.

Governor Tom Ridge

Governor Tom Ridge was the architect of school choice reform in Pennsylvania, according to all interviewees. He proposed vouchers not only in 1999, but also in 1995 and 1996. Although many individuals had an interest in school choice legislation, it was Ridge's use of the bully pulpit and his behind-the-scenes negotiations that brought a voucher proposal to life. One pro-voucher interviewee said,

Ridge, without his active participation, we would all be nowhere. He set the agenda in 1994 when he ran. He pushed it in 1995. At the end of the day, the governor is the most powerful figure in the state (Dickman 1999).

According to Ridge's policy director, Charles Zogby, Ridge first became interested in school choice while he was a US Congressman from Erie. The development of charter schools in Minnesota in 1991 interested him. Zogby said, "it popped up on my radar screen." Later, Ridge was one of the first co-sponsors of a charter school bill in Congress in the early nineties. Vouchers were not discussed in Congress at that time, since it was under Democratic control. Zogby said that while he was doing the groundwork for a 1995 gubernatorial campaign for Ridge in Pennsylvania in 1991, they began talking about vouchers. It was clear from his discussions with state leaders that education policy was going to be a major issue. He discussed vouchers with many groups and individuals, including some school business groups; Ed Donnelly, a private citizen with business background who was interested in this issue; and Don Eberley, the head of the conservative Commonwealth Foundation.

As discussed in Chapter Two, ideas had an impact on the governor and his advisor. They both read Chubb's and Moe's Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, which shaped their views on the subject.

The book that both of us read was Politics, Markets, and America's Schools by Chubb and Moe, which is really, in my mind, the seminal book on the topic. I still have my dog-eared copy with about fifty sticky tabs pasted in important places. This book had the biggest impact for me on why this was the right policy. The governor not only read the book and digested it, but it had the same impact on him (Zogby 1999).

Through their discussions with the school choice community and their reading of this book, they decided that vouchers would be included in his campaign platform when he announced in 1993.

During the Casey administration, vouchers had been proposed (and defeated) twice, in 1991 and 1993. At that time, vouchers were promoted on the basis that it was unfair that parents should have the double burden of taxes and private school tuition. Although some interviewees said that there was “little institutional memory” of those measures (Hess 1999), Zogby said that an active grassroots movement for vouchers had been assembled which later proved useful. The governor was not working with a blank slate in 1995 when he first proposed vouchers. Nonetheless, until the governor brought up the issue again after he was elected, school choice was “a little moribund” between the early 90s and mid 90s (Hess 1999).

Governor Ridge was took office in January 1995. To bring in a pro-voucher education commissioner, he went outside the education community. He approached Eugene Hickok, a professor at Dickinson College. Hickok said he first became interested in vouchers while teaching public policy and reading Milton Friedman. Like Ridge, ideas had an impact on him.

I was teaching a seminar on public policy. After reading Milton Friedman, I became interested in vouchers. It became more of an issue when I was being interviewed by the governor for my job as Secretary of Education. He asked me two questions. The first was, “could I afford it.” And I laughed just as you are now. I mean I was a college professor. And the second question was, “do I believe in school choice.” I had a theoretical interest, and I had the opportunity to turn it into a political reality (Hickok 1999).

Appointing Hickok had some drawbacks, since he had no political experience or connections in a state that values both. But his commitment on the subject of choice reflected Ridge's own.

According to Zogby, Ridge has three reasons for supporting school choice. First, Ridge believes in an educational system where parents come first. In the current system, parents are one voice that competes with a whole range of interest groups. Secondly, he believes choice is a way of getting greater accountability. Thirdly, school choice is a matter of social justice. Government has the responsibility to make choice available in order to help the kids that are being the least served. "Wealthy people can move. The poor don't have a choice" (Zogby 1999).

Early Efforts: KIDS 1 and KIDS 2

November 1994 was a good year for Republicans. Ridge won the governorship, and Republicans seized control of the Pennsylvania House. This gave Ridge a political opportunity. Soon after taking office in March of 1995, he proposed a large voucher program -- larger than even his supporters expected (Lindsay 1995b). Ridge's position on vouchers surprised many since, while in Congress, he had been a moderate Republican with strong union ties (Gentzel 1999). The Keystone Initiative for a Difference in Our Schools (KIDS) included provisions for vouchers, charter schools, and local control. \$38.5 million were reserved for vouchers that could be used at private, public, or parochial schools. The plan was targeted initially at the poor, but would be expanded over five years to include all families with an income of \$70,000 or less. Most of the funds would be used for children already in private school. On June 16, after

several postponed votes, the House rejected the plan, 106 to 95. To avoid embarrassment, Republican leaders nullified the vote tally, saying that the electronic tote board that registers votes malfunctioned (Ferguson 1999).

Later that year, Ridge proposed school vouchers again as part of his KIDS2 plan. This plan would provide stipends for income-eligible families in targeted areas on a pilot program basis, to be “sunsetting” in five years. Although this plan was scaled back, it included other controversial education policies such as charter schools, and Ridge was not able to line up enough votes. In January 1996, the vote count remained between two and six votes short of the needed 102, and it was not brought to the floor.

Ridge’s administration blamed these failures on the strength of the unions.

Ridge’s press secretary said,

Education reform in Pennsylvania has always been the education establishment suggesting tinkering with the system. Governor Ridge was proposing an overhaul of the system itself. In doing so, he had to take on virtually every acronym in the state -- all the education groups organized to oppose him (Lindsay 1995a).

His opponents said that Ridge’s strong-arm tactics were to blame. He earned the nickname “Tom Thumb” because of his ineptness in getting his programs through the legislature (Reeves 1998). Tom Gentzel, Director of the Pennsylvania School Board Association, said,

The Governor brought in a lot of people who had no Harrisburg experience. They used a lot of terminology. They called themselves “change agents.” They were like an occupying force. They saw themselves as being surrounded by the enemy. They saw everyone as the enemy. It was a very rough start. In 1995, the governor and his people thought that if he pushed hard enough it would happen, because he was the governor. That’s not the way that things work around here. He brought in

a lot of outsiders, who talked about legislators like they were backwoods hicks. They had no respect, and they got burned (Gentzel 1999).

As in Ohio, Republican control of the legislature does not guarantee that vouchers legislation will pass. Whether it was because of political clumsiness or union strength, Ridge was not able to pass his first two voucher programs.

Catholic Church

Political action by the Catholic Church in Pennsylvania comes from two sources: the office of Cardinal Bevilacqua in Philadelphia and the Catholic Conference. The Catholic Conference is not a political action committee, but with four million Catholics and ten bishops in the state, it is one of Pennsylvania's most influential interest groups (Martin 1997). Though the Catholic Conference supports vouchers, Cardinal Bevilacqua has been even more vocal on this issue. He has publicly promoted the issue since the early 1990s. Some say that the Cardinal was the second most influential person in the state on the voucher issue.

Cardinal Bevilacqua's office explained that it supports vouchers because parents, especially poor parents, should not have to pay both taxes for public education and tuition for Catholic schools. It also said that parents should have a choice of which type of school they attend. The Cardinal said the following about vouchers:

The primary responsibility of parents is to educate their children. School choice will bring it back to them (Archdiocese of Philadelphia 1999).

Tuition is beyond the reach of too many parents who cannot afford the twin costs of taxes and tuition. School vouchers would ensure that parents, especially the poor, have a choice. I fervently believe that school choice is a matter of justice (Justice 1999).

Other interviewees said that bailing out the Catholic schools in Philadelphia and supporting the middle class parents of the Catholic suburban schools were the real motivation of Bevilacqua and Governor Ridge. Philadelphia parochial schools have suffered a great drop in enrollment in recent years. The archdiocese educates 121,000 children in the Philadelphia area, but they have as many as 26,000 - 35,000 empty seats (Justice 1999). In addition, the Cardinal has been forced to close numerous schools and churches, many in their poorer parishes (Cipriano and Langland 1992). Randy Wenhold, Director of the Public Education Coalition to Oppose Tuition Vouchers, said,

Vouchers are a money issue for the Catholic schools. Vouchers are a contrived movement from the Philadelphia Archdiocese. It is in severe financial difficulties. They have empty seats. Bevilacqua wants to put kids in seats.... Only one in twenty could get a voucher. The momentum is from the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference. They're footing the bill for the pro-voucher movement (Wenhold 1999).

John Fitzpatrick, Legislative Director for the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers said,

The driving force in Pennsylvania is Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia. I think he is a great honest person. He has *admitted* that religious schools need help. I respect him for that. Catholic education is essential to the survival of the Catholic Church. Ridge's voucher plan, six counties and nine urban centers, all of those urban centers have strong Catholic communities and at least Catholic elementary schools. Every single one of them. It's just by coincidence. (Laughs) (FitzPatrick 1999).

Opponents often point out that Ridge has close ties to the church, like Governor Voinovich. He and his children are a product of a parochial education. Vouchers could provide some funds for the Catholic schools with which Ridge has obvious affinities. Zogby responded to these claims and said that while saving the Catholic schools is not a

motivation for supporting vouchers, it is not a bad public policy goal to keep the Catholic schools in business. There are a good number of religious schools that are doing a better job than public schools. "Vouchers are about putting money in the hands of parents. If they give it to a Jewish school or a Muslim school or an Evangelical school, it's all the same to us," Zogby said (Zogby 1999).

Cardinal Bevilacqua's office also denies that vouchers are a bailout of Catholic schools. It admits the struggling Catholic schools need help, but said that Ridge's program does not mean much money. "Vouchers are not a windfall," said one diocese spokesman. He pointed out that the annual tuition for Catholic high school is \$2,950, and that tuition for elementary school students ranged from \$700 to \$1,700. In addition, he estimated that Catholic schools are saving the public schools \$949 million. He said that the Cardinal supported vouchers more as a matter of justice than financial gain (Gongon 1999).

Whether motivated by a moral commitment, financial interest, or both, Cardinal Bevilacqua's office actively put together a grassroots following for vouchers. It put on TV and radio ads, sent information to parents with children in Catholic schools, and brought its parishioners to Harrisburg for lobbying days. It also worked closely with state leaders as a member of the REACH alliance, and through the Cardinal's connections with the governor (Gongon 1999). It especially targeted suburban Catholics. In a letter that went to parents at the St. Mary of the Assumption Church in Philadelphia, the principal of a Catholic school wrote,

We have also been informed that in an attempt to pass school choice, some legislative leaders are advocating that the legislation apply only to poor

students attending “distressed” public schools (i.e. Philadelphia). IN OTHER WORDS, SCHOOL CHOICE MIGHT BE PASSED, BUT SUBURBAN CHILDREN AND PHILADELPHIA CATHOLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS (THAT MEANS US) MAY NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR VOUCHERS [their emphasis] (Ritchie 1998).

Representatives for the Cardinal also actively reached out to the urban, black community. They regularly met with Dr. Walter Palmer, the director of the Philadelphia Coalition for Education Reform and School Choice, an African-American organization. Palmer is a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania who founded his own schools for black youth during the early civil rights movement (Roddy 1995). Television ads promoting vouchers were targeted at black parents. One ad featured a black woman who said that she had to work in a bar to afford to send her two kids to a good school. There was a close-up of an ugly cigarette and beer. She said, “even with two jobs I can’t afford to send them to a good high school. I heard there is a plan to give money to kids to send them to a high school of choice, just like they do college. Now that’s good news (Archdiocese of Philadelphia 1999).

The Cardinal took a very public stand on the voucher issue. He appeared in the papers quite often and made overtures to black leaders, the mayor, and the superintendent. In March 1998, the Cardinal hosted a breakfast with several members of the Pennsylvania Legislative Black Caucus to gather support for vouchers (Baer and Haney 1998). Later that year in May, he sent a letter to Mayor Rendell and Superintendent Hornbeck proposing a voucher plan to help alleviate several problems that currently face the school district. In his letter, Cardinal Bevilacqua said that his proposal could help relieve the overcrowding of city schools and alleviate the district’s

financial problems. It would also help the diocese fill the 20,650 vacancies in its schools (Jones 1998). In June, he broadened his request for school choice in Philadelphia by sending similar letters to officials in ten suburban school districts that suffer from overcrowding or money problems (Heritage Foundation 1999).

The Philadelphia Delegation and the Black Community

As in Ohio, African-American support for vouchers became an important issue in the 1999 bid for school choice. Two black legislators from Philadelphia who once had opposed vouchers, Anthony Williams and Dwight Evans, became very vocal supporters in the previous two years. Dr. Palmer, as already discussed, was another black leader from Philadelphia involved in promoting school choice. Opponents downplayed this support, saying that black support for vouchers is largely an exception to the rule. Randy Wenhold, the Director of the Public Education Coalition to Oppose Tuition Vouchers, said that Evans's and Williams's support does not represent "a leak in the dike." He pointed out that many members of the black caucus held the line (Wenhold 1999).

Other city leaders were divided on this issue. John Prezel, the majority leader in the State Senate, was very supportive. Representative Alison Schwartz, Mayor Rendell, and Superintendent Hornbeck were opposed.

Support among Philadelphians, in particular African-Americans, was very strong. A survey conducted in 1999 by the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania found that 68.8 percent of Philadelphia residents polled supported school choice. The question asked of 1,820 residents was: "Do you favor or oppose the use of vouchers that allow a parent to send children to any school of their choice, whether public

or private and receive a discount for tuition at that school?" Only 25 percent of respondents opposed vouchers, and 5.8 percent were undecided (Byers 1999).

View of Vouchers by Parents with School Age Children in Philadelphia

	In Favor	Opposed
Protestants	82%	15%
Other Christian and Non-Christian	75	25
Jewish	50	42
Blacks	72	22
White	65	28
Hispanic	79	16

These findings were duplicated by a poll commissioned by the Democratic caucus in the state legislature. This poll also found that 80 percent of Philadelphians believe the system needs dramatic change (Staples 1997).

The State of Philadelphia Schools

Support for vouchers among blacks stems from their dissatisfaction with the status quo. 80 percent of the student body in Philadelphia schools are minorities, and 65 percent are African-Americans (Wenhold 1999). The Educational Testing Service (ETS) found that parents in Philadelphia are the fourth most dissatisfied urban parents in the country behind Cleveland, Oakland, and Cincinnati. With skyrocketing dropout rates and low test scores, it is hardly surprising (Olson 1999). In 1998, only 8.5% of 11th graders scored proficient or higher in reading, 6% scored proficient or higher in mathematics, and 1.6% scored proficient or higher in science (School District of Philadelphia 1999). Nearly half of ninth graders fail that grade. More than one in every four high school students is absent on any given day. A minimum of 30 percent of ninth graders drop out

before graduation (Legislative Commission on Restructuring Pennsylvania's Urban Schools 1997). These failures have been highly publicized by the two city newspapers.

In response to the sad state of Philadelphia schools, the mayor and the business community brought in David Hornbeck in 1994 to run the schools and gave him a mandate to make massive changes. Superintendent Hornbeck implemented his Children Achieving Program which included such reforms as full day kindergarten, accountability measures, and professional development. His program has been very expensive, and his demands for additional funding have led to much conflict with state leaders. The unions have also resisted efforts to make teachers responsible for class attendance and fought his reconstitution of two poorly performing schools. Despite Hornbeck's efforts, change is happening too slowly for many parents. Many believe that the system is too corrupt to ever change. One voucher advocate said,

Dwight Evans was the most pro-teacher, pro-union member of the general assembly. Now he is the strongest backer of vouchers. Why? Because he thinks that this is the only way that you can essentially bring change to the system. It's the only way. If there were other ways, we would do it (Dickman 1999).

Compounding these problems are political battles over education in the city. The Philadelphia Federation of Teachers (PFT) is often at the center of this conflict. Some said that Evans was pushed to embrace vouchers because the union is unwilling to do anything new. "He is by default in the voucher camp" (Potts 1999).

Philadelphia parents demonstrated their dissatisfaction for city schools by applying in huge numbers for the Children's Scholarship Program, a private voucher program, in the spring of 1999. The program was being held nationally in 41 cities. The

Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association (PMA) helped sponsor it for Philadelphia. The PMA sent applications to low income areas, and ran ads on MTV and black entertainment media. They had a huge response in Philadelphia. 39,373 children's parents asked for scholarships. A sixth of the 200,000 kids in Philadelphia schools filled out applications. The president of the PMA said,

I was told this morning that Philadelphia has the highest percentage of the eligible population of the all the cities who called [for an application]. That tells you how desperate the situation is.... In the end, the consumers will speak. In the end, 39,373 kids say they want out of the public schools (Dickman 1999).

Parents also demonstrated their dissatisfaction by moving out of the city. Especially in districts like Dwight Evans's, there has been a gradual migration of middle class blacks to the suburbs in recent years, despite on going economic development. They are looking for better schools. A legislative aide for Evans said, "In some cases, they were paying for private schools and paying pretty high city taxes and not seeing much for it. It made more sense to move to the suburbs and go to good public schools and save yourself some tuition" (Ferguson 1999). As a result, Evans started looking at governance changes in the Philadelphia school district, and later proposed his own voucher program in April 1997.

Evans and other black leaders in the city also supported other school choice measures. Many have opened their own charter schools. Like Fanny Lewis in Ohio and Floyd Flake in New York, the possibility of running their own schools free from public school bureaucracy is attractive to black leaders in Pennsylvania.

The first public sign that African-Americans and urban Democrats were interested in school vouchers was in December 1997 through January 1998. At that time, House Democratic leaders put together a commission to study urban school districts in Pennsylvania. The Legislative Commission on Restructuring Pennsylvania's Urban Schools was a bipartisan panel of seventeen government, business, education, and African-American leaders. Ten members were appointed by Republicans, and seven were appointed by Democrats. Evans and Prezel spearheaded it. After a series of public hearings around the state, they recommended the adoption of a limited school choice pilot program for 3,000 children statewide and a program of "opportunity scholarships" for children from "academically distressed" school districts. Among the thirteen who voted for this measure were several educators. This commission was a signal that there was a shift in the African-American community for vouchers. It showed that there was bipartisan interest in the issue, and that cities were desperate for something new (Ferguson 1999). A legislative aide to Dwight Evans said,

I didn't understand the depth of frustration with public schools. I saw that when the Urban Education Commission had its hearings in Philadelphia. There were parents there - black, white, Catholic, not Catholic. They had no confidence that the public school system would do anything for their kids (Ferguson 1999).

African-American leaders had an impact on the politics of vouchers by giving the legislation further diversity. As in Ohio, they were not directly involved in crafting the legislation, but the fact that the public knew they were on board was significant (Gongon 1999). Their involvement made vouchers about more than just bailing out the Catholic schools. It created a crack in the urban caucus and in the minority caucus.

Conspiracy?

Voucher opponents have charged that African-Americans have been manipulated by Republicans; their support for vouchers is part of a conspiracy. As in Ohio, Republicans in Pennsylvania started emphasizing the social justice aspect of vouchers only in the mid-90s. Some say that conservatives are using blacks to divide liberals and to cover up their real motivation for promoting vouchers. Wenhold said it was a conscious attempt to change the debate, and their motives were disingenuous (Wenhold 1999). Also, they point to the fact that not all black leaders are supportive of vouchers.

Many school choice advocates said they did reach out to the black community. They recognized the political importance of including blacks in their coalition. However, they maintained that black leaders were not pushed in that direction. As discussed, minorities have their own reasons for supporting vouchers and came to this conclusion apart from white, Republican pressure. For example, Evans became interested in school choice after seeing the limitations of economic development in his district. In fact, Murray Dickman, the president of the Pennsylvania Manufacturing Association (PMA), said that it was Evans who approached him to bring together a meeting with Republicans on this issue (Dickman 1999). Fanny Lewis in Ohio said she was looking at vouchers long before Brennan approached her. In addition, the huge response to the private scholarship program and the poll data could not have been manufactured.

Zogby said that over the past five years, Republicans have learned to change their rhetorical approach, but helping poor kids was always a motivating force. Five years ago, they were more likely to advocate a market rationale, but that is because Republicans are “poor at connecting a policy with how it affects real people”. He said

Republicans are learning how to be more relevant to people (Zogby 1999). One advocate said it was a change in emphasis, not in fact (Dickman 1999).

Business Community

A segment of the business community in Pennsylvania supported school choice. The most vocal support came from the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association (PMA). The director, Murray Dickman, is an enthusiastic participant in school choice politics and considers himself one of the state's prime players. The PMA represents manufacturers' interests, but it acts more as a foundation since it has a healthy endowment. It became involved in vouchers after Ridge was elected because its members viewed vouchers as a pro-competition issue and were dissatisfied with the education level of their work force. Also, public education is failing their own kids; many business leaders are unhappy with their own suburban schools.

Like Ohio, the business community was not universally supportive of this issue. Dickman said that many business leaders wish to stay clear of political controversy. It is easier for them to leave the city for better schools for their families and workers. In his view,

Business is not uniform on this issue. To be perfectly honest, I think most of them are morons. Business leadership historically has not been one to rock the boat. They have the option to leave the city. It's not a coincident that as schools have gotten worse, business has left the city. It's not a coincident that a lot of companies have left Pennsylvania. Basic education is a real problem (Dickman 1999).

Though Governor Ridge and the Catholic Church had an interest in using vouchers for parochial schools, this was not important to the PMA. The Director of the

PMA pointed out that he's Jewish. He also said that he was not against public money going to Catholic schools, since those schools are the only option for children in urban areas.

I'm Jewish. I could care less about propping up the Catholic schools. I've no interest in that.... I don't view this as a Catholic issue, because my objective would be if choice were to happen, anybody could open a school.... As an observing Jew, I saw that a little religion is a good thing. Faith is a good thing. But I'm not promoting religion (Dickman 1999).

Dickman said that vouchers began as a Catholic issue ten years ago in Pennsylvania, but the involvement of the business community and urban leaders in the voucher coalition had diversified the issue (Dickman 1999).

The PMA's involvement in voucher politics is multi-faceted. It started a private scholarship program in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, which serves 140 poor kids in Philadelphia. It also runs the Children's Scholarship Program that was previously discussed, actively participate in the pro-voucher coalition, and submitted an amicus brief in Ohio's court defense of vouchers. Dickman's networking talents have enabled him to coordinate city voucher advocates, inform the business community about this issue, and contact voucher entrepreneurs in other states. He is friends with David Brennan from Ohio and has brought groups of legislators to Milwaukee and Cleveland to look at their programs.

Catholics Democrats, Working Class Suburbs - Pro-Vouchers

Unlike Ohio where the suburbs have shown very little interest in vouchers, in Pennsylvania some of its most fervent supporters come from the suburbs. These areas

are Democratic, Catholic, blue-collar, and suffering from over-crowded, faltering public schools. Democrats from Philadelphia and the working-class suburbs made this a bipartisan issue.

Delaware County, which is in southeastern Pennsylvania, contains a great many of these Catholic, working-class suburbs. Almost all of the eleven legislators from this county, all Democrats, have been closely allied with Governor on this issue. One of their delegation, Representative Bill Adolph, has been one of the most active school choice leaders in the state.

The county's 20,000 Catholic students certainly had an impact on the views of their legislators. It has about the same number per capita of Catholic students as Philadelphia (Justice and Singer 1999a). Cardinal Bevilacqua's office organized the parents of children in Delaware County's parochial schools to exert political pressure on legislators.

The demand for vouchers has also been fueled by the overcrowded public schools in this county. During 1998, the Southeast Delco school board approved of a program of tax benefits for families with children in private schools or public schools in other districts. The school board felt it was cheaper to provide vouchers than to build new school buildings for the quickly growing public school population. Residents were also resistant to paying higher taxes for new construction. On October 15, 1999, a federal judge ruled this plan unconstitutional. Offering local school districts the option of adopting school choice was an element of Governor Ridge school choice proposal in 1999. It was meant to satisfy the needs of these voucher proponents.

Pro-Choice Alliances

The Road to Educational Achievement through Choice in Schools Alliance (REACH) brought together a number of non-profit, religious, civic, and business groups all committed to school choice. Started in 1991, the ten to fifteen members include the Catholic Conference, PMA, Fundamentalist and Christian schools, the Family Institute, and Dr. Walter Palmer from Philadelphia. The group received funding from individuals, businesses, and churches. REACH had a moderate influence over voucher politics in Harrisburg. Some interviewees said that in the early years, REACH was viewed as a Catholic organization, which limited its influence and its ability to attract a diverse membership. The PMA did a great deal of REACH's fund raising in recent years (Dickman 1999).

School choice groups also met informally. The leaders of these groups were regularly in touch with each other. The Governor's office, in particular, was responsible for coordinating all these interests as Ridge attempted to broker a compromise for his 1999 bill.

Although few would admit it, there were differences among these many interests that made compromise sometimes difficult. As discussed later, it was impossible to get a program that would make everyone happy in Spring 1999. Clearly, urban needs differed from the interests of the working class suburbs. And putting forward one clear message for vouchers was also difficult. Jeff Trimbath of the REACH alliance said,

Some groups are concerned with interference in private education, like the Fundamentalist groups. On the other side, some are saying that \$700 isn't enough per pupil. Some say that we should pay the whole cost. The key is to always focus on why we're here. Yes, we all have different agendas, but we are here for these kids (Trimbath 1999).

Dickman of the PMA also said that their major difference with the Catholic church is that the Church prefers a state-wide voucher plan, while he believes an urban-only plan would bring in more of the rural and suburban Republicans, as it had in Ohio. These differences became more evident during the final negotiations for the 1999 bill.

Teachers' Unions and Administrative Organizations

Pennsylvania has historically been a very strong union state -- the teachers' unions are no exception. Like Ohio, there are two major teachers' unions: the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA), a branch of the NEA, and the Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers (PFT), which is a branch of the AFT. The PSEA is larger in size with 140,000 members, while the PFT has 38,000 members. In general, the PFT is located in urban areas and the PSEA is located in suburban areas. However, union membership is not as sharply divided between city and suburb as it is in Ohio. There are many mid-sized urban areas in the PSEA, such as Allentown and Scranton. In terms of policy issues, the teachers' unions have similar positions on most issues, including on vouchers. However, the two unions differ on the issue of collective bargaining. The PFT is protective of collective bargaining, while the PSEA would be willing to exchange the right to strike for binding arbitration.

Pennsylvania's teachers' unions and other professional associations oppose vouchers for many reasons. First, they said that vouchers would not help all children. "What's going to happen to the students who are left behind? For most, there are no alternatives" (Wenhold 1999). Second, Ridge's plan would mostly help the middle class.

A poor child could not attend a private school with only a \$1000 tuition grant. Third, Catholic schools in cities would be the major benefactors. This is a violation of the state constitution. Fourth, vouchers would drain funds from the public schools that are already deprived (Wenhold 1999).

Detractors of the teachers' unions say that their opposition is based on self-interest. The unions do not want competition in a system that benefits them. Competition might lead to reduced benefits and increased accountability. Dickman said,

We have most difficult teachers' union in the country. Al Fondy [President of the PFT] is a tough guy. This is all about the unions wanting to keep power, to keep their contract. They have a good thing, and they don't want to change it. And I don't blame them. ... Fondy says, "It took me 25 years to get my teachers prescription drugs and the best medical plan in the state, and I'll be god-damned if you and your buddies are going to take it away from me". I'd say, "Al you're right. Your people are the best paid and the best taken care of. That's terrific. You fought very hard. You deserve what you got. How about now getting away and letting some kids get an education?" And then he gets even madder at me. And we've actually had this fight in public. This is about protecting what they've had. That's just all it is (Dickman 1999).

In Pennsylvania and across the country, there have been continued attacks on the unions in recent years. In addition to vouchers, Governor Ridge proposed other reforms that the unions fought, including charter schools, reforms that increase the time before teachers receive tenure, and sabbatical leave reductions. These measures all eventually won approval in the legislature. He has not been reticent about stating that the unions were the main stumbling block for reform. Others pointed to the Religious Right as leading the anti-union battle. Randy Wenhold said, "It's a battlefield" (Wenhold 1999).

Vouchers have been brought up so many times and have required such a Herculean effort to mobilize the opposition that many said they were exhausted. They were forced to support charter schools to stave off school choice. Some said they were worried that voucher advocates would win by sheer persistence. Two anti-voucher activists said,

We will never win the voucher issue. We'll just defer the issue to another day. In 1995, we defeated vouchers.... A few months later they were back again. It is never final. They just reorganize, repackage it, talk to a few more people, and try again. It is starting to get to the people in opposition.... Members still feel passionate about it, but it is just people are getting a little tired too. It's hard to keep the troops rallied when it has been the fourth time in four years (Gentzel 1999).

People like me are getting tired. It's the Thirty Years War. It's endless. (FitzPatrick 1999).

These attacks certainly contributed to putting vouchers on the agenda. Although still quite strong, the unions have been weakened and distracted. Political entrepreneurs have taken advantage of this weakness to propose a number of changes to public education, including vouchers. As discussed in Chapter Three, this phenomenon is not restricted to Pennsylvania, although perhaps this state's case is one of the most extreme.

Other education professionals are allied with the teachers' unions, including the Pennsylvania School Board Association (PSBA), the Pennsylvania Association of School Administrators, the Pennsylvania Association of School Business Officials, and the Pennsylvania Association of Elementary and Secondary School Principals. The PSBA is very strong in Pennsylvania, reflecting this state's tradition of localism. The members of this organization were torn over the Southeast Delco situation, since it was a local school board that had voted for vouchers. In all other respects, they were strongly committed to

the opposition to school vouchers for many of the same reasons as the unions. They added that they opposed vouchers because they would lead to the development of a new state government agency (Gentzel 1999).

Alliances and Strategies

The unions and the other professional groups formed a coalition called Public Education Coalition to Oppose Tuition Vouchers (PECOTV) in response to the Senate's voucher measure in 1990. Its 44 members include the PSEA, PSBA, PFT, Pennsylvania Council of Churches, AFL-CIO, NAACP, League of Women Voters, ACLU, and the American Jewish Congress.

These groups have not always seen eye to eye in terms of education policy. For example, the PSBA and the PSEA found it difficult to come to an agreement about charter schools in 1998. However, on the issue of school voucher, there are far fewer differences among voucher opponents than among voucher proponents. Defense is easier than offense, since they only have to agree to just say no.

Voucher opponents concentrated their efforts on influencing legislators. In addition to talking to legislators whose vote they counted on, they also targeted legislators who were "swayable" -- rural, fiscal conservative, and religious conservative Republicans. They aggravated anti-urban sentiment among rural Republicans who were not anxious for any additional funds to go to the cities, even in the form of vouchers (Wenhold 1999). They pointed out to Fundamentalists that there would be increased accountability for their schools. To senior citizen groups and fiscal conservatives they said vouchers would lead to the development of a new expensive government program

and would raise local property taxes (Gentzel 1999; Hess 1999).¹ The director of PECOTV said,

They changed their strategy to an urban-rural debate. So, we changed our strategy. We talked to rural areas. We told them that this was an attempt to siphon money away from rural areas and to give it to the urban areas. The anti-urban bias in the state made it possible. There is resentment from rural areas. They feel that Philadelphia gets too much. Rural conservatives recently blocked legislation from the cities to sue gun manufacturers. Pennsylvania is the largest NRA supporter after Texas (Wenhold 1999).

The unions' hefty campaign chest is also an important weapon on their side. The PSEA has been identified as the most powerful interest group in the state (Crotty 1993). In 1998, the PSEA gave \$180,000 to the House Democratic Campaign Committee and \$70,000 to the Republicans. They said they gave to the Republicans since many cast no votes for vouchers in 1995 (Shelly 1998).

Other measures included an article on the PSEA web site in March 1999 that summarized Martin Carnoy's study of vouchers in Chile during Pinochet's rule. It displayed a large picture of Pinochet with the caption of "Who supports vouchers? How about the former military dictator of Chile, August Pinochet?" (Pennsylvania State Education Association 1999). Voucher opponents laughed at this heavy-handed tactic. "I just think that is a riot. Yeah, you know who was for public education? That was Stalin. Uncle Joe" (Trimbath 1999).

¹ Pennsylvania has the second largest elderly population in the country [Madonna, 1995 #213]

Education Committee Leaders

Voucher opponents also included the Republican chairs of both the House and Education Committees. This situation had also existed in Ohio. It is not unusual, according to Dickman, that “in any state, education commissions of every state will not be for this issue. Education committee leaders are part of this blob” (Dickman 1999). His observation is corroborated by the literature. Rosenthal and Fuhrman found that most legislative leaders in education were former school teachers and thus unlikely to favor school choice policy regardless of party affiliation (Rosenthal and Fuhrman 1981).

In Pennsylvania, the Republican education committee leaders were not only supportive of vouchers because of the ties to education groups that Rosenthal and Fuhrman describe. In addition, the committee leaders are based in rural areas that lack private schools and have no interest in vouchers. In the past, conflict over the KIDS program and charter schools has been so severe that the Republican chair of the Senate Education Committee and the Governor were not on speaking terms (Gittel and McKenna 1999). Since tension exists between the Governor and the education chairs, vouchers could not be introduced through regular means early in the legislative session. Instead any voucher legislation would have to be attached to another bill and brought up later in the session.

Democrats, Rural and Suburban Areas, and Religious Conservatives

Although some Democratic legislators support vouchers, most oppose them, because of their traditional alliance with the teachers’ unions and their party’s position on vouchers. They said that Governor Ridge’s voucher plan was a “scheme to bail out nonpublic schools and an abandonment of public education” (Pennsylvania House

Democratic Party 1999a). Among Democratic opponents was Rep. Jim Roebuck (D-Philadelphia) chairman of the Pennsylvania Legislative Black Caucus. He said,

The Academic Recovery Act is a shell game designed to advance vouchers and abandon, not improve, public education.... This so-called choice is no choice at all. Voucher supporters are attempting a major scam on people who cannot afford false hope. If this were to pass, the people we represent in Philadelphia and other distressed school districts would be left holding the bag.... Private schools and neighboring public schools would be free to turn down any voucher student (Pennsylvania House Democratic Party 1999b).

As in the case of Ohio, many rural and suburban areas in Pennsylvania with large Republican constituencies oppose school vouchers. Although Delaware County suburbanites favored vouchers, this is not true of most suburban areas. In Pennsylvania, rural and suburban areas are called the “T” since they are located in the northern and central parts of the state. The “T” is well known for its conservative beliefs; James Carville, a Democratic consultant, once said of Pennsylvania that it is Philadelphia on one side, Pittsburgh on the other, and Alabama in the middle (Gittell and others Forthcoming). Despite this conservatism, the “T” has opposed vouchers for many of the same reasons as Ohio’s suburban and rural areas -- lack of religious or private schools in the country, fear of “creeping Catholicism, creeping busing” (Dickman 1999), and satisfaction with schools in suburban areas. They also have no interest in paying for a new educational program that has no benefit for them. The president of the PSBA said,

It’s a new government program if you will. For a conservative taxpayer legislator that has got to be a tough pill to swallow. You may be not be fan of the public school system, but how you can justify spending 5-6 million dollars on a new entitlement program, and it’s clearly an entitlement program that can only grow from there. That has got to give you a little pause I think (Gentzel 1999).

Voucher proponents, including Hickok, tried to court the “T” saying that once vouchers were approved, there would be more choices for them. Private education companies, like Sylvan, would open up schools in their areas (Hickok 1999). They also tried to win over these Republicans by calling upon their loyalty to the Governor and their animosity to the unions (Ferguson 1999). On the other side, unions and other voucher opponents aggravated anti-urban sentiment in the “T”, telling rural legislators that vouchers were only going to help the cities that were getting enough money already.

Lastly, religious conservatives in Pennsylvania oppose school vouchers, as they do in Ohio and in other states. They fear the “nose under the tent” of government intervention in their schools (Wenhold 1999). While they have not actively allied with the teachers’ unions, they also have not stood by their traditional Republican allies on this issue. In a state with such an active religious conservative population, their lack of support is significant.²

Vouchers in 1998-1999

Governor Ridge reintroduced school vouchers in November of 1998. The Educational Opportunity Grant (EOG) program, also known as “the pilot program,” was a broad package that provided public funds for private and religious schools and would eventually be offered to most parents in Pennsylvania. At first, only parents making less than \$15,000 would be eligible, but it would be phased in over five years to include

² In some states, Jewish groups have become interested in choice because of their plans to expand their religious schools. According to one interviewee, this was not the case in Pennsylvania. Jewish groups in this state were more concerned about governmental interference. In addition, their schools are already at capacity (Hess 1999).

parents making up to \$75,000. Most grants amounted to \$700-\$1000, but in academically distressed areas, grants would be as high as \$7000.

Two main factors emboldened voucher entrepreneurs to act at this time. The first was that the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to hear Wisconsin's voucher case in November 1998, which meant that the state's program was constitutional as ruled by the last appeals court (Reeves 1998). As discussed in Chapter 2, state entrepreneurs were keeping a close eye on events in other states and were influenced by those outcomes. The second factor was the growing support for vouchers in the city and the increased frustration with urban schools. The success of the private voucher program demonstrated that there was a great deal of interest for something new in Pennsylvania's cities. As in Ohio, the support of minority leaders such as Dwight Evans added diversity and legitimacy to their cause.

However, entrepreneurs were too optimistic. Ridge's pilot program generated little support because of its scope. It collapsed under its own weight in the Senate, according to one legislative aide. He said, "They thought it was going to be easy in the Senate, but it never even came to vote. The Governor then made a commitment to it" (Ferguson 1999). The spring of 1999 was seen as the last chance for the Governor to pass a voucher bill because in the following November, Republicans could lose control of the House and the Governor could be seen as a lame duck.

During his 1999-00 Budget Address on February 2nd, Ridge scaled back November's EOG or pilot program for vouchers. His new plan, which would cost \$587 million over five years, would provide \$350-1,400 tuition vouchers at private or religious

schools. It would apply to kindergarten through 8th grade, rather than through 12th. It would encompass six counties rather than the fifteen counties in November's plan. There was also no provision in this version for parents of children in academically distressed schools to use their vouchers outside the program area, which upset many urban and minority leaders (Justice 1999).

To meet the demands of urban and minority leaders, Ridge quickly introduced the Academic Recovery Act on March 11. Smaller in size than the EOG program, it identified eight troubled school districts in the state and offered educators in those districts greater flexibility in the management of their districts. It would cost \$63 million. Those districts could then create charter schools, privatize services, and hire teachers without certification. The state would have the option to take over the failing school districts. Parents in the struggling districts would also receive a "super-voucher" to send their children to public, private, or religious schools of choice (Heritage Foundation 1999). This plan won the support of African-American leaders, such as Tony Williams and Dwight Evans, and legislators from urban areas including the House and Senate majority leaders (Office of the Governor of Pennsylvania 1999a). Governor Ridge spoke about the needs of city children:

In situations such as this, where students clearly and unequivocally are not getting the education they need, then we must put their interests first. And we must do so right away. We will do so by giving dramatic, new choices to Pennsylvania's public school students who need them the most (Office of the Governor of Pennsylvania 1999a).

This plan, however, drew much criticism from the wealthier suburbs. The suburbanites were unhappy with the idea that city kids could use their super-vouchers to

attend their schools and claimed that these students would require much costly remedial work. In addition, the tuition voucher would not cover their typical out-of-district fees; the voucher would amount to \$2,914 while high school tuition could be as high as \$10,335. Whether because of concerns about cost or because of racism, the wealthy suburbs were highly resistant to accepting city students. To satisfy these complaints, the administration said that localities would decide for themselves how many, if any, voucher students to accept (Langland 1999). This would effectively mean, as it had in Cleveland, that no suburban schools would be open to voucher students and that they would attend Catholic schools in the city. Paula Hess, Executive Director for the House Education Committee, said that there was much confusion about where super-vouchers could be used.

In Philadelphia, black parents think they can go anywhere. But the bills all say that the suburbs can decide who to accept. It's not going to be the city kids. So the city kids will have to choose between other public schools and the Catholic schools. The suburbs want to help out the church schools, which are closing. They don't want to help little, black kids. Nobody in the suburbs around Harrisburg wants vouchers (Hess 1999).

Just days later on March 30th, Ridge unveiled additional details of his Educational Opportunity Grant pilot program. Explaining why vouchers were beneficial, he said that parents had a right to choose the best school for their children.

One of the most important decisions that every parent makes is choosing the school that is best for their children. And state government should support their decision and facilitate their choice - whether it is the local public school, another public school, a private school or a parochial school.... Pennsylvania's parents work hard to pay taxes to finance our education system, and it's only fair that government support them in doing what they think is best for their children's education (Office of the Governor of Pennsylvania 1999b).

In the early spring, there were two separate voucher bills. The Governor was making two arguments for vouchers simultaneously: they would improve urban areas, and parents have the right to choose and not pay tuition twice. One bill was aimed at the city supporters and the other at suburban, Catholic supporters.

At this time, pro-voucher advocates were feeling very optimistic about their chances for passing some form of a school choice program. On May 12th, Ridge signed a \$19 billion state budget that included \$63 million for a statewide voucher pilot program (Johnston 1999). Though money was earmarked for a voucher program, additional legislation was required to put such a program into effect. Key players in the voucher battle felt that chances for passage of a super-voucher plan were about even, though it was becoming clear that there was not enough support for the larger pilot program.

But by early June, Governor Ridge and his supporters were unable to put together a voucher bill that pleased everybody. The administration was under pressure to have a vote on the program by June 15th, the day before summer recess. On June 14, Ridge and legislative leaders agreed to a watered-down voucher bill based on Ridge's Academic Recovery Act that would allow super-vouchers only in the Chester-Upland School District. Chester-Upland is located in Delaware County, the working class Catholic area of Pennsylvania that was discussed earlier. Philadelphia and other areas with the poorest performing schools would be targeted for academic recovery. For two years, they would be monitored and given the opportunity to privatize or hire uncertified teachers. If test scores didn't improve, vouchers would be offered. Chester-Upland had the lowest

standardized test scores in the state and was already under a state takeover order. In this city, public school students would have the option to take the state share of education funding - \$3,500 per student in that district - to attend any school they chose in September. With only 7,657 students in Chester-Upland, vouchers would be offered to much fewer students than Ridge had originally (Baer 1999c).

The final bill also included a “local option” for individual school boards to choose a local vouchers program even if they were not designated as academically distressed. Any of Pennsylvania’s 501 districts were eligible. This measure appeared aimed at the growing school districts, such as those in Delaware County, that might choose to offer vouchers rather than erect new buildings for their overcrowded schools. It would also satisfy their large Catholic constituency (Baer 1999c; Justice and Singer 1999a; Justice and Singer 1999b).

The details of this plan were, however, sketchy. On the 15th, the bill was not in final form, and details of the bill were still being negotiated. Many complained that the bill changed every day (Baer 1999a).

During the 15th and the 16th, both sides lobbied legislators relentlessly. Deals were cut on the side, and national party leaders were brought in to cajole and twist arms. Both sides predicted a very tight vote. At the last minute, six suburban legislators from Delaware County walked away saying the plan would not help enough of their students, and the Governor spent several hours convincing them that the program would later be expanded (Justice, Singer, and Dilanian 1999b). The national significance of this bill increased the pressure on both sides (Baer 1999a; Justice and Singer 1999b; Justice,

Singer, and Dilanian 1999b). “This is the most fundamental education policy change in 100 years,” said Wythe Keever, spokesman for the PSEA (Justice and Singer 1999b). “There’s no plan B around here,” said a spokesman for Ridge (Justice and Singer 1999b).

After a marathon session, nineteen hours long, the Governor admitted defeat at a news conference on June 17th at 4 am. Immediately after, the legislature recessed for summer. Ridge’s people estimated that although they had the 26 votes needed in the Senate, but they were between 4-10 votes shy in the House. Legislative leaders chose not to run the bill for an official vote. The Governor said he ran out of time and would reintroduce it when he had more votes. Ridge promised to keep fighting for what he has always called his top priority. He said, “It’s a steep climb, but it’s not Everest, and I’m not done climbing” (Justice, Singer, and Dilanian 1999a).

What Went Wrong

Supporters and opponents gave many reasons for why the bill didn’t pass. Some blame lies with Ridge’s political mistakes, some with the complexity of finding a winning coalition, and some with the tactics of the teachers’ union. Having an entrepreneur champion a policy is a necessary component when seeking radical change, but it is not sufficient. How the entrepreneur organizes supporters, what rhetoric he or she uses to promote the policy, and the strength of his or her opposition is also significant.

Many said that Ridge altered the voucher bills too often for legislators to have a firm grasp of what was being considered. The Director of the House Education Committee, Paula Hess, said that by the end, the bill changed every four or five hours,

and that her secretary nearly quit in frustration in attempting to keep tabs on all the amendments. In fact, a final bill was never put in print. Legislators only had a brochure version of their bill to look at. Ridge was constantly shopping his proposals around in order to assure that he could get the most possible votes and was unwilling to become committed to one final bill. Legislators were suspicious of a bill they could not see in their hands. And it also showed a certain amount of desperation on the Governor's part (Gongon 1999; Hess 1999; Potts 1999; Wenhold 1999). One school activist said,

The June 14th bill was never put in print. It was a big problem. They put together a brochure version of their bill. It was part of the strategy while negotiating votes. There was desperation in the end. People couldn't trust him. The legislature felt like they had been jerked around before. There was a high level of skepticism about the Governor's bill (Potts 1999).

By the end, his bill was so watered down that he even lost his base. His credibility was damaged because he would not make a stand. It hurt his ability to broker any compromise (Ferguson 1999).

Adding to this problem was the complexity of the final bill. Since it was an academic recovery bill, other controversial measures were included, such as privatizing the administration of the city schools. Also, identifying which districts were distressed was thoroughly entangled in politics (Hess 1999).

Some said that Ridge did not sell vouchers in the most advantageous manner. Until the end, vouchers were not described as a plan to save urban schools. Instead, it was promoted as a private school bailout or tuition relief for Catholics. There was no crisis to respond to, and there was no public support for giving money to Catholic schools. Although his Academic Recovery plan in March was aimed at courting urban

voucher supporters, it was competing with another plan that was clearly aimed at helping the middle-class, Catholics, and suburbanites. Ridge may have been slow to promote an urban voucher program, because he does not have a track record of urban reform. He had repeatedly denied Superintendent Hornbeck's requests for more money and resisted equalizing education funds. Unlike Governor Voinovich of Ohio, he had no ties to the city. Cardinal Bevilacqua was more interested in the suburbs and was not willing to settle for urban reform like Bishop Pilla. Many supporters now suspect that an urban-only bill might have passed and that a state-wide plan was not realistic (Gongon 1999; Hess 1999). Even opponents felt that a voucher bill might have passed if it was limited to Philadelphia and benefits for the Catholic Church were down played. Two voucher opponents said,

I don't think the advisors for the Governor did a good job. They were privatizers in its purest form. They were free market types. The Governor pushed too hard. He should have been more incremental (Wenhold 1999).

The voucher bill was seen as a Catholic bill. Catholic schools are having a decline in enrollment. Down by 12%. Other schools are gaining in enrollment. It was seen as a bail out of Catholic schools. It was a mistake by making it a Catholic program. The church sent a busload of Catholic kids, out of uniform, to Harrisburg to rally. They tried to pretend they weren't. It was a stealth measure. It was heavy-handed and self-righteous (Potts 1999).

The Legislative Director for the House Education committee agreed with their assessment.

If we had been starting fresh, the argument would have been, "This is for poor kids". It would have worked, but we can't go back. It would have offset the union's arguments. Once you've got numbers ... you win public sympathy. We would say we're saving kids by putting them in non-public schools (Hess 1999).

On the other hand, an urban plan like Ohio's might not have passed. There is a strong anti-urban bias in this state. Most rural and suburban voters resent any funds going to the city, and this has been aggravated by years of school finance litigation. Superintendent Hornbeck repeatedly alienated the legislature. In early 1999, he publicly accused the legislature of being racist. And the teachers' unions were admittedly playing up this anti-urban sentiments among rural legislators to derail an urban voucher program (Wenhold 1999).

Ridge may not have recognized soon enough that he did not have enough votes. He was too optimistic about the Catholic suburban and Philadelphia legislators (Gongon 1999). Some said that Ridge thought had more of a mandate than he did (Wenhold 1999).

Gain One, Lose Two

Interviewees also said the failure to pass the voucher bill was just a matter of math. There were not enough legislators who could agree on any one bill. By making a change in his voucher bill, Ridge might gain one legislator, but then lose two more. One legislative aide said that the core number of voucher supporters in the house was 95, and they needed 102. No matter how the governor modified it, he never had the 102 votes (Ferguson 1999). "It was like picking up a bucket of snakes without a bucket", said one

Ridge lobbyist, “they kept slithering out of our hands.”³ In the end, Evans did not push as hard as he could, perhaps distracted by his mayoral primary defeat in early 1999 (Baer 1999b). Wenhold recalled,

If we look at the legislature, if we counted noses for vouchers, there are more yeses for vouchers, but the governor can’t come up with a program that would bring together all the yes votes. He tried the pilot program, the city program, a state-wide program, and a program for only distressed districts outside of Philadelphia (Wenhold 1999).

Suburban legislators, who were often referred to as the “core supporters”, were queasy about voting for a plan that would not have helped them. Many even wanted to oppose Ridge’s watered down bill. Legislators such as Bill Adolph had a difficult time accepting this compromise. They would have ended up voting for it, but Ridge had to spend a lot of time garnering their support. He was then unable to spend as much time working on swing votes. Instead, voucher opponents worked on these individuals. For example, Mayor Rendell from Philadelphia called a few swing legislators from his city at 11 or 12 on the final night to convince them to vote against it (Gongon 1999).

Compromise among voucher supporters may have been difficult because many legislators resented the fact that Ridge was being groomed as a Republican vice-presidential candidate. They felt that he was using this issue for national exposure, rather than to help the children of Pennsylvania. People in the legislature did not owe anything to Ridge (Wenhold 1999). A voucher activist said,

³ Kenneth Arrow describes the situation where legislators each prefer a different outcome as “cycling.” No one policy alternative can command majority support absent some equilibrium mechanism, such as a strong party (Aldrich 1995; Arrow 1951).

There was also resistance from the legislature because of his personal ambitions to be vice-president. Legislators thought, “why should I help you? After you gain higher office, I’m going to have to live with the consequences”. They resented being used. Legislators in Pennsylvania always resent those seeking higher office. Ridge was trying to get a state-wide voucher bill would make him more appealing of a vice-presidential candidate. But he doesn’t know much about public schools. He didn’t attend public schools. His kids don’t attend public schools (Potts 1999).

Some said that if he had offered something to the public schools, he might have brought in some swing votes. The rural legislators might have voted along party lines, if he had promised them more money for their schools. He also would have seemed less interested in destroying public education. Two voucher opponents said,

Ridge made it a zero sum policy. Never tried to address the needs of public schools.... He never articulated a vision for where education should go. Education has been the soft spot of his administration. He has a weak education commissioner. Ridge is not good at articulating a vision. He has put forward mixed signals. He says that wants stronger standards for public schools, but promotes charter schools that don’t have to have certified teachers.... He never said how it was going to help public education (Wenhold 1999).

They could have done it. If they had put more money into public education in the past. Governor has been the worst governor in recent history in providing state support for education. In order for Bush [Governor of Florida, Jeb Bush] to get vouchers, he had put \$750 million into public education. People said they couldn’t support this bill, if you’re not going to support public education. Across the board dissatisfaction. The rural Republicans stood to gain nothing (Potts 1999).

Strength of the Teachers’ Union

Backdoor politicking by the teachers’ unions was extremely effective (Gongon 1999; Wenhold 1999). The PSEA had as many as fifty members a day visiting the legislature to lobby and six full-time lobbyists. As discussed, they influenced swing votes among Republicans and pressure was put on Democrats to hold the line (Justice,

Singer, and Dilanian 1999a). Many legislators were told if they supported vouchers, the PSEA would make sure they had a primary opponent next year (Baer 1999b).

While voucher opponents focused on influencing legislators, proponents concentrated on mobilizing local parishes and television ads. Grassroots politics proved to be less effective. Wenhold said,

The success of our group is that we were more adept politically than the other side. We had experienced lobbyists, while they were focused in the beginning on public opinion which they were somewhat successful at. We heard from legislators who said that after abortion, they got the most calls for about vouchers. But it never got overwhelming support (Wenhold 1999).

Conclusion

Vouchers first interested entrepreneurs in Pennsylvania as a theoretical idea. Hickok became intrigued with the idea while teaching a class on Milton Friedman. Zogby and Ridge's interest was piqued after reading Chubb and Moe's Politics, Markets, and America's Schools. Others were taken with the notion that vouchers could provide a means for children stuck in poor city schools to receive a better education in a private school. The promise of efficiency and equity resulting from such a program was appealing to many. Although there was no major evidence of success from such a program and no potential for financial profit, entrepreneurs pursued this policy.

The literature on policy entrepreneurs highlights their role in achieving innovative policies. The previous chapter on Ohio does much to corroborate that work. By contrast, the policy narrative of voucher in Pennsylvania demonstrates the limits of policy entrepreneurs. Governor Ridge was clearly the chief voucher entrepreneur in this state. Murray Dickman, Cardinal Bevilacqua, Dwight Evans, and Bill Adolph from Delaware

County were also entrepreneurs, each with their own visions for vouchers. Like the entrepreneurs in the previous chapter, they framed the voucher debate, put forward strategies, and created coalitions. However, their efforts were unsuccessful.

Though Ridge had the benefit of a Republican legislature, this factor was not sufficient to gain passage of his bill. As in Ohio, Republicans do not solidly support vouchers, especially those in rural and suburban areas. Also, Republicans on the education committees are more likely to side with the teachers' unions on such issues.

The failure was due in part to the fact that there were too many entrepreneurs in Pennsylvania. These multiple and competing entrepreneurs did much to undermine Ridge's work. Ridge was not able to coordinate these strong willed individuals and the groups that they represented. Ohio's team of Brennan and Voinovich spoke with one voice. They were able to concentrate their efforts on combating the teachers unions, rather than negotiating with other interests. At the last minutes before the vote, Ridge had to convince voucher advocates from Delaware County to support his plan. These dealings kept him from working with swing votes in the legislature. Too many entrepreneurs with multiple goals can undermine achieving innovative policy.

Another factor that hampered voucher proponents in this state was the involvement of the Catholic Church. Though church leaders were obviously interested in vouchers in Ohio, they purposely refrained from taking a public stance on this issue until it had passed through the legislature. In Pennsylvania, church officials were very visible. This fostered the image of vouchers as a Catholic school subsidy. Though both states have a high percentage of Catholics, there is little support for public funding of parochial

school tuition. Ohio's voucher rhetoric that called for helping urban students was much more successful.

Ridge also made several political errors. The first was that he never put forward one convincing argument for vouchers. He tried to put forward two messages simultaneously; one that emphasized the needs of Catholics and the other that focused on the needs of city children. These two goals led to divergent plans, which hampered his credibility within the legislature. In addition, Ridge never seemed truly committed to an urban-only plan. His conflictual history with the city and his ties to the Catholic Church brought into question his commitment to city schools.

The governor also showed a certain lack of finesse in dealing with the legislature. He was too optimistic about the prospect of his bill and did not court individual legislators. He did not offer rural and suburban legislators anything for their support, such as additional funding for their public schools. Legislators felt that this plan only served Ridge's vice-presidential ambitions. Perhaps a savvier politician could have managed these difficulties differently, but he faced additional obstacles that did not plague entrepreneurs in Ohio.

One obstacle that Ridge could not overcome was the powerful teachers' unions in this state. Unlike in Ohio, these unions were well coordinated. They were strengthened by the inclusion of the strong School Board Association and by the formation of a well-organized coalition. The unions did not become divided by a limited voucher program, as they did in Ohio, perhaps because Ridge's plan was never clearly aimed at Philadelphia.

The teachers' unions in Pennsylvania also had a strategy to combat an urban-only voucher program. They stirred up anti-urban resentments in the central area of Pennsylvania. There is no evidence that the unions employed a similar strategy in Ohio. Ridge did not seem to have a plan to counter the unions' actions, such as exposing the mean-spiritedness of their methods. Not only must entrepreneurs have their own strategies, but they must also be able to recognize and respond to their opponents.

The story of vouchers in Pennsylvania is not over. Proponents said that they were still committed to school choice, and that the issue would be brought up again in the legislature soon. A spokesman for the Catholic Church said it was going to continue to influence suburban and urban parents (Gongon 1999). Hess said that she felt that voucher legislation would only come up again when minorities and the religious community took the lead (Hess 1999). Both sides felt that school choice would be a major issue in the next election.

Chapter 5 The Origins of Innovation

It is amazing that school voucher policy has as much political punch as it does today. It represents a major change in the system of education, but one that has faced enormous obstacles. It has earned the hatred of the powerful teachers' unions. Its own supporters are sometimes divided by a conflict of ideas and interests; many Republicans are theoretically supportive, but see no need for a change in their schools. It is not backed by any strong interest groups, such as the business community. The voter-rich suburbs are ambivalent towards such a program. Yet, school voucher policy has been put on the policy agenda. In some cases, it has overcome the barriers and passed in state legislatures. We can understand the rise of this policy only by a detailed look at the historical development of the issue and case studies, here involving the politics of Ohio's 1995 voucher program and Pennsylvania's 1999 voucher legislation. The study of voucher politics helps expand the theory of innovative policy making and sheds light on a new era of American politics.

Innovation Theory

As discussed in Chapter 1, policy theory suggests three factors that can explain the origins of innovation: ideas, entrepreneurs, and political opportunities. Proposals for improvements in the present conditions capture the attention of the policy elite and the public at-large and motivate action. Individuals, both in and out of government, champion the policy, put forward winning strategies, and frame the debate. Changes in the political context arise, which enable the entrepreneurs to push their ideas. Though not

usually examined together, these three factors can explain why major changes in American politics can occur.

Ideas Matter

Ideas have the power to influence political action, as Deborah Stone and Robert Reich maintain. The theoretical concept of introducing competition into public education certainly influenced the political actors described in this dissertation. Individuals such as David Brennan from Ohio, Governor Tom Ridge from Pennsylvania, and Bill Bennett from the Reagan administration embraced the idea. Many remember when they first learned about the concept. They pursued this theoretical concept despite the lack of real life examples or the potential for profit or political gain. It would be much easier to advance less controversial education reforms, such as hooking up schools to the Internet.

The voucher idea was appealing enough to simmer slowly on the policy back burner for years even though there were no major demands for such a policy. Milton Friedman put forward his recommendations for education in the early 1960s. The idea remained in the realm of academics and policy elite for decades before it trickled down to the general public and a greater interest developed in the program.

The notion of competition in education is simple enough, but there are many differences of opinion about the ultimate ends of school choice. Libertarians support a broad voucher program applicable to all students regardless of geography or income. They believe a market-style system of education would bring greater efficiency. The much hated “education monopoly” would be broken up. Those who are concerned with equity and the condition of city schools envision a more limited program that would benefit the poor. A few with an interest in supporting parochial education feel that

vouchers would end the injustice of parents paying taxes for a public education they do not use.

The complexity of the voucher idea has had some benefits. It has enabled diverse coalitions to form around the issue. Minority leaders and white Republicans have joined together and insured the success of the policy in states like Ohio. However, complexity also results in some problems, since it is more difficult to strike compromises when there are different interests at stake. Pennsylvania's entrepreneurs faced this problem.

It is interesting to note that the element of the voucher concept that seems to have the most public support and the best chance of success is the limited voucher program. In Ohio, entrepreneurs clearly focused on an urban-only voucher program that was targeted at the poor. They spoke of the crisis of urban education and the need for immediate solutions. A more subtle idea was that it was more inexpensive to offer such a program than to reform the entire system. Non-urban dwellers felt they could save minority students while preserving their own schools.

While bringing competition into education clearly motivated most of the political leaders who initially promoted school choice, the free market ideal seems to hold limited appeal for the public at large. The broad voucher programs that were introduced during the Reagan administration and in the early 1990s in Ohio and Pennsylvania had little support. Perhaps laissez-faire economics is too abstract or perhaps there is not enough support for radically changing public education except in cities. Whatever the reason, a full-scale voucher program has never become a reality.

There is even less interest in the idea of vouchers as a means to save parochial education. This is evident in Reagan's failure to pass tuition tax credit legislation in his

first term and the failure of other voucher advocates to pass voucher legislation that was framed in terms of Catholic school assistance. Though many states do provide funds for transportation and schoolbooks for children in parochial schools, outright payments for tuition have never been widely accepted. This may be because the rationale for public payments to Catholic schools is weak. Some church officials claim that it is unfair for parents to pay for private school tuition and for taxes for public schools that they don't use. However, childless individuals still must pay taxes for schools. Anti-Catholicism also may explain the unwillingness to directly support Catholic schools, as some in the Ohio and Pennsylvania case studies suggest. Further, many feel strongly that such payments would interfere with the separation of church and state. Regardless of the reason, the notion of using public funds to support religious education is unpopular.

Why is the idea of vouchers so appealing? Perhaps because it calls upon certain long-standing American values. In Chapter 2 it was seen that vouchers resonate with American beliefs in choice, efficiency, and equity. Vouchers may also have captured the public's attention because they expose certain problems with American education that are rarely addressed by more incremental reforms. Our newspapers are filled with stories of administrative corruption, duplication of services, failing test scores, illiterate graduates, and top heavy city bureaucracies. The promise of public education has not been fulfilled in our country. Educational benefits are not equally distributed, and many students are receiving an inferior education. It is not unusual for those who have experienced the Kafka-esque bureaucracy that plagues city school systems to exclaim, "the only way to change the system is to blow it up." The belief that government can solve social ills has dissipated. Voucher advocates address these problems and offer a solution.

Policy Champions

Throughout this dissertation, I have shown that individuals have led the fight for vouchers. They have worked both inside and outside of government without representing an organized interest. With a fierce attachment to voucher policy, they pursued it relentlessly even in the face of certain failure. In the earlier years of voucher politics related in Chapter Three, these individuals included Christopher Jencks, James Coleman, Ronald Reagan, Bill Bennett and his staff, John Chubb, and Terry Moe. Within Ohio, David Brennan and Governor George Voinovich led the fight with assistance from Fanny Lewis, the city councilwoman from Cleveland. In Pennsylvania, Governor Ridge, Cardinal Bevilacqua, Murray Dickman, Dwight Evans, and Bill Adolph championed school vouchers.

Depending on their position, these entrepreneurs had different arsenals of political weapons to push their policy. The academics with their ivy-covered universities and statistical models had the benefit of seeming objectivity and scholarly rigor. Many hesitated to question their motives or their findings. In addition, Coleman's provocative findings generated much media coverage. Presidents Reagan and Bush had the "bully pulpit" which guaranteed public attention to their chosen policy goals. The high-level administrators with charisma and energy used their position to be supremely effective entrepreneurs; Bill Bennett is a classic example of an administrative entrepreneur.

The most successful entrepreneurs in this study were the governors. Like Presidents Reagan and Bush, they could use their visibility to gain support for an issue. However, the governors were able to put forward more serious voucher proposals than national leaders, since the states are the center of education decisions. They made

education a priority, calling themselves “Education Governors.” Powers and experience gained in the 1980s served them well. They put forward many other education reforms that may have exhausted union opposition. The unique role of governors in steering the direction of education policy deserves much more attention.

One lesson learned from the story of voucher politics in Pennsylvania is that there can be too many entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are by definition leaders, and too many leaders can interfere with presenting a unified message. In Ohio, Governor Voinovich and David Brennan worked as a team. Their message and efforts were highly coordinated. In Pennsylvania, there were multiple entrepreneurs, each with their own agenda, interests, and message -- Governor Ridge, Cardinal Bevilacqua, Murray Dickman, Dwight Evans, and Bill Adolph. A coalition attempted to mediate their differences, but the coalition of unions and administrative groups was much more successful since defense is easier than offense.

Entrepreneurs faced enormous obstacles to their pet project. Opposition from the unions was great, and interest in it among the public was divided. Over time, voucher proponents tested eight different strategies:

1. In the 1960s, Jencks included the unions in the decision-making process to lessen their attacks. He gave in to many of their demands, such as not including private schools in his program. As a result, his pilot program at Alum Rock was weak and uninteresting.

2. Reagan and Bennett promoted plans that had no hope of passage. Examples of this include their Chapter 1 voucher programs of 1983, 1985, and 1986, which never left committee in Congress. However, these efforts succeeded in gaining public attention to

the issue as the media reported on the heated exchanges between the unions and the administration.

3. Reagan and Bennett also linked vouchers to an existing program that was widely accepted. Chapter 1 was a popular program that provided money to five million disadvantaged children mainly for remedial reading and mathematics. In addition, Chapter 1 was a large component of the federal government expenditure on education; it was the easiest way to introduce a national voucher program.

4. Voucher proponents in Ohio and in Pennsylvania put forward large statewide programs with few limits on family income or geography. An example of this was Governor Ridge's KIDS legislation in 1994, which sought to distribute vouchers across the state with few caps on income. Broad packages garnered little support though they were useful in gaining attention to the issue. Entrepreneurs also learned from these mistakes.

5. Another strategy was to start off very small by proposing other plans that had elements of choice, but were not called vouchers since they did not include private schools. The hope was to gradually build demand for the issue or to create a slippery slope for vouchers. Reagan promoted magnet schools later in second term after his voucher proposals failed. Some have said that charter schools are a similar ploy, though my research did not find that entrepreneurs self-consciously promoted charter schools as means for achieving vouchers.

6. One strategy employed by the Ridge administration was to put forward multiple programs with the hope that one would succeed. In 1999, he had several

different measures before the legislature. Some were broader in scope than others. This tactic served to confuse legislators and undermine his credibility.

7. The use of a ballot initiative was another strategy employed by voucher supporters. Initiatives were not discussed in this dissertation, since entrepreneurs in Ohio or Pennsylvania did not attempt them. Entrepreneurs in California and Michigan have sought to bypass the complicated politics of the state legislature in this manner; however, their efforts have repeatedly failed. Some speculate that the teachers' unions possess greater resources to wage large scale public relations efforts to vote down any voucher initiative (Damask and Kozar 1998).

8. The final strategy employed by entrepreneurs in this dissertation was a targeted program. Entrepreneurs in Ohio limited the scope of vouchers to low income, city children. In Florida's program, vouchers were targeted to children in failing schools (Wilgoren 2000). The limited programs in Ohio and Florida included private schools, and thus satisfied the true believers. They were targeted at a group that clearly desired the policy and did not interfere with those who had no interest in it. Liberals hesitated to strongly oppose programs that benefited disadvantaged children.

Another element of entrepreneurial strategy is framing the debate. The literature says that successful entrepreneurs will control the image of a policy by putting forward positive symbols or constructing stories to relate these ideas in a compelling and dramatic manner (Stone 1997). Voucher entrepreneurs struggled with how to frame the voucher debate for years. They used different elements of the voucher idea at different times. Sometimes they framed vouchers in terms of its benefits for choice and efficiency. At other times, vouchers were promoted in terms of promoting equity.

The final framing device was the portrayal of the crisis in city schools.

Entrepreneurs argued that desperate times call for desperate measures, that vouchers provide a way out for children trapped in the system. Images of poor but hard-working mothers struggling to take care of their children were conjured up, the message being that these women could not afford private schools for their children. This message differed from the 1960s's emphasis on equity: they did not try to suggest, as Jencks did then, that poor children deserve the same opportunities as the rich or that vouchers will improve segregation. The approach was more moderate.

By framing vouchers in these terms, ideas and interest were also brought together. Choice would be offered to some, but it would not interfere with the public education programs in the suburbs. It would be extended only to those in cities where the demand for school choice was the highest. An idea may be theoretically attractive, but if it conflicts with self-interest, it has little hope of gaining popular approval.

Entrepreneurs are not the only ones who use symbolism. Opponents also sought to frame the policy debate. Union leaders called vouchers "a scheme", "a virus", and "subversive." "Hucksters" would take advantage of an unwitting public. They talked about public education as the basis of American democracy and claimed that vouchers would destroy this way of life.

Opportunities

Changes in the political context can create windows of opportunity that enable entrepreneurs to put forward policies that had faced defeat in the past. These changes can take the form of a shift in party control, a swing in the political mood, or a change in the composition of interest groups. Though this variable is difficult to predict or reduce, it is

an important factor that can explain the rise of innovative policy. Two opportunities produced favorable conditions for school voucher advocates.

The first opportunity was the shift of voucher politics from the national level to the state level in the beginning of the 1990s. Here, the newly empowered Republican governors championed the cause. The federal system of government functioning as “a laboratory of democracy” enabled entrepreneurs to share information among the states through informal and formal networks.

The other critical development was the increased frustration among minorities with the failure of city schools. Some minority leaders defected from their alliance with the teachers’ unions and the Democratic Party, and began to support school choice. Public opinion polls demonstrating widespread support for school choice among minority parents bolstered the voucher cause. Entrepreneurs responded to the urban demand for change by crafting a new message for school choice.

Bringing it All Together

Ideas, entrepreneurs, and opportunities worked in concert to put the issue of vouchers on the agenda. Each factor alone could not have achieved this end. The idea of vouchers had been known among the education policy elite since the 1960s, but was not translated into policy until certain individuals rallied behind it. Throughout the 1980s, the idea was vigorously promoted by the Reagan administration, but conditions were not ripe for gaining broad public acceptance. When the political context changed in the early 1990s, then the possibilities of passing a voucher bill became real.

The necessity of combining these factors means that innovation does not necessarily happen suddenly. In the case of voucher policy, it required years of work.

The idea of vouchers first gained attention in 1962, but it was not until the mid-1990s that policy entrepreneurs in the states were able to win passage of a voucher program. Change required a slow assimilation of the idea, the leadership of motivated individuals, and the development of other political events. Once these conditions were in place, then it was possible for innovation to occur and to spread rapidly throughout the states.

Though it took many years to put vouchers on the agenda and the final programs are limited in scope, they still cannot be considered an incremental reform. Even the limited programs, as proponents and opponents agree, mark a large jump from previous education reforms. In Kingdon's terms, it is a matter of "establishing a principle" (Kingdon 1984). Perhaps radical change can best be effected by not appearing to be radical.

A Closer Look at Ohio and Pennsylvania

To learn more about the factors that lead to the successful passage of school choice legislation I focused on events in Ohio and Pennsylvania, two states that share many structural and cultural conditions. Both states have strong executives, professional legislatures, Republican governors, Republican legislatures, strong unions, large numbers of Catholics and Christian fundamentalists, and at least one post-industrial city with similar social conditions. These commonalities enabled me to control for a number of variables in comparing the legislative failure of Pennsylvania's voucher program with the success of Ohio's.

Voucher politics unfolded in similar ways in Ohio and Pennsylvania. In both cases, entrepreneurs championed the cause of school vouchers. They were committed to promoting Friedman's idea of competition among schools. Entrepreneurs included

governors who used a great deal of political capital to promote the cause. They benefited from the support from city leaders, a Republican controlled legislature, and the knowledge gained from previous voucher attempts. They also faced strong union opposition, divided support in suburban and rural areas, and weak business support.

Despite the similarities in these political conditions, entrepreneurs in Ohio were able to pass legislation, while those in Pennsylvania were not. Three overlapping factors explain the different outcomes. First, although both states had strong teachers' unions, union opposition in Pennsylvania was more coordinated and ruthless. The unions fought Ridge's urban-only plan by stirring up anti-city sentiments in rural areas of the state. There is no evidence that the unions employed a similar strategy in Ohio, perhaps because the unions were unprepared for Voinovich's plan or perhaps because there was less anti-city sentiment to manipulate. The unions in Pennsylvania had the benefit of observing Ohio's voucher strategy and had time to formulate a counter-strategy. In addition, the two major Pennsylvania unions were unified in their opposition to vouchers, while in Ohio the OEA did not strongly oppose the urban-only plan. Perhaps if Ridge had clearly championed a similar program, the unions in Pennsylvania would have also become divided.

Second, the different outcomes in the two states can be explained by the coordination of entrepreneurs and their strategies. Multiple entrepreneurs existed in Pennsylvania, and they sometimes acted at cross purposes. Action in Ohio was tightly coordinated by the Voinovich-Brennan team. In addition, the highly visible presence of Cardinal Bevilacqua in Pennsylvania may have given the voucher legislation a Catholic flavor that turned off some representatives. Brennan said that "if the Catholic Church

had [lobbied for vouchers], we would have lost. There are enough anti-Catholics in Ohio, that we would have lost” (Brennan 1998). Due to the presence of these conflicting entrepreneurs and their conflicting interests, Ridge put forward multiple voucher proposals in the spring of 1999, which confused legislators and diluted his message.

Third, differences in state political dynamics in Pennsylvania and Ohio shaped the legislative outcome in the two states. Pennsylvania’s working-class suburbs had a strong interest in school vouchers; this was not apparent in Ohio. Ironically, the working-class suburban interest in school choice undermined efforts to pass legislation. Working-class suburban demands, articulated by their representatives, led to multiple and conflicting voucher proposals. In addition, there was significant resentment in Pennsylvania toward Philadelphia, on which the unions capitalized. Ohio, with its multiple medium-sized cities, does not have the history of rural-urban tension that Pennsylvania has. Entrepreneurs in Ohio had an easier time putting forward their urban-only voucher legislation, because of these features of state politics.

Alternative Hypotheses

Two alternative hypotheses might explain the rise of school choice policy. The first alternative is that organized groups, such as the Republican Party, the religious right, business groups, or the Catholic Church, were behind this reform. Several scholars studying education politics have put forward this hypothesis. In his most recent book on school vouchers, Witte writes that voucher politics have been heavily influenced by the Catholic Church, business organizations, and the Republican party (Witte 2000). My research shows, however, that these interest groups have played a secondary role in voucher politics.

The Catholic Church would seem to be a likely leader of voucher politics. Witte wrote, “in six of the ten states with the largest enrollment of Catholic school students, the movement for school choice has been significant (California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin). The remaining states have been mixed politically or are controlled by Democratic Governors (New York, Illinois, Missouri, and Louisiana)” (Witte 2000). Indeed, the Catholic Church would have much to gain by a full voucher program that provided substantial vouchers to the entire state population. Parochial schools have suffered a sharp decline in enrollment since the 1960s, and the cost of educating students has risen, while tuition has remained constant. A state-wide voucher program that provided all children with a voucher of at least \$4,000 would assuage the financial difficulties of parochial schools. However, most realize that setting up such a large program is politically unfeasible. The voucher program in Ohio only provides \$2,000 for about 3,700 students. The final proposal in Pennsylvania was only for \$3,500 for 7,657 students. The Church does not benefit financially significantly from these smaller plans, though they might become footholds for larger programs.

The state-level Catholic Conferences and local Church leaders have not been of one voice on this issue, perhaps due to the relatively small profit margin of the proposed voucher programs. The Church is not a monolithic institution; church policies differ from state to state. These policies are influenced by local traditions and state culture, as well as by personal political preferences of the Catholic leaders in the state (Newman 2000). For example, Cleveland’s Bishop Pilla much less actively pursued school vouchers than Cardinal Bevilacqua of Philadelphia. Other church leaders in their states were silent on the issue. The differences in state-level responses to vouchers by Church

leaders in Ohio and Pennsylvania were described in Chapters 3 and 4. In addition, leaders in the Catholic Church only recently became voucher supporters. Until the mid-1980s, they feared that vouchers would interfere with benefits they were already receiving from the federal government, as I related in Chapter 2.

Other religious groups have largely stayed away from the voucher battle. As is seen in the Ohio and Pennsylvania case studies, most religious right groups oppose vouchers since they fear any government interference in their schools. Some Jewish leaders have begun supporting vouchers since they have been putting more resources into their private schools in recent years, but their influence has been relatively minor.

Many observers have characterized vouchers as a partisan issue. In this view, Democrats are likely to be against them, because of their alliance with the teachers' unions, and Republicans tend to support them for ideological reasons. These divisions have largely been true at the national level. Presidents Carter and Clinton were against vouchers, though Clinton is a strong supporter of charter schools. Presidents Reagan and Bush were in favor of vouchers. Vouchers were part of Bob Dole's 1996 presidential platform. The 2000 presidential election largely reflected these divisions: Gore was against them, Bush supported them. On the whole, most members of Congress support their party's position on vouchers.

There have been some exceptions. Within Congress, several prominent Democrats have strayed from their party's position on vouchers, including Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and former Representative Floyd Flake from New

York.¹ Some predict further defections among national-level Democrats. Nevertheless, broad party divisions exist in Washington on the issue.

However, the party division on school choice does not hold up at the state and local level. Republican state legislators are not necessarily in favor of vouchers, because often their constituencies are less interested in vouchers than Democratic constituencies. This is reflected in a 1998 Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll, which showed that slightly more than half the nation's registered Democrats endorsed vouchers (51 percent for/43 percent against), whereas Republicans were almost evenly split over the issue (48 percent for, 47 percent against) (Viteritti 1999). Republican constituencies are concentrated in suburban and rural areas that have little use for school choice.

Since education is a state and local issue, state Republican leaders have to be more responsive to their constituency than do national Republicans. At the national level, Republicans can afford to support choice without any real danger of offending their voters. Perhaps Republican Governors favor school choice because many aspire to later enter national politics. Both Governors Ridge and Voinovich showed an interest in national office. Governor Voinovich has gone on to be one of the state's U.S. Senators.

Though much has been made of business's involvement in voucher politics (e.g. Witte 2000), its influence has been minor. Business organizations became more involved in education reform in the 1980s, but they do not necessarily embrace vouchers.

Individuals within the business community did have an impact on state politics, including

¹ In spring 1997, Flake and Lieberman cosponsored a bill that would have offered scholarships to two thousand economically disadvantaged children in the District of Columbia school system. During the same session, Flake and Lieberman also cosponsored the American Community Renewal Act, in which school choice experiments would be piloted in 100 low-income areas as part of a larger developmental effort. This program was defeated (Viteritti 1999, p.88-89).

David Brennan from Ohio and Murray Dickman from Pennsylvania, but most state-level business organizations were either neutral or offered only qualified support of school choice. One voucher supporter in Pennsylvania said that most business leaders did not take a strong stance on this issue, because it was so controversial and they feared repercussions to their bottom line.

The second alternative hypothesis focuses on state political culture. Though it cannot explain events at the national level, state culture may explain why certain states and not others have considered vouchers during the nineties. State political culture can be a powerful tool for explaining why action happens in one state and not in another. Daniel Elazar divided up the states into three subcultures: individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic. Individualistic states tend to embrace the ideas of limited government and the free market. Moralistic cultures emphasize the role of government in advancing the common good and the benefits of bureaucracy. Traditionalistic states believe that government should maintain the existing social and economic hierarchy and that politics are personal (Elazar 1984)².

According to theories of state political culture, individualistic states should be more interested in vouchers than moralistic or traditional states, since individualistic states tend to prefer smaller government and laissez-faire economic policies. Many individualistic states have considered vouchers, specifically the two states examined in this dissertation -- Ohio and Pennsylvania. However, Wisconsin, the first state in the country to have a voucher program, has a moralistic culture. More recently, Florida, a

² Some question whether Elazar's typology is still useful, since new immigration and mortality patterns may have affected some states' political cultures.

traditionalistic state, passed a voucher law. In addition, charter schools, a moderate choice program, have been considered in almost every state. Clearly, Elazar's scheme is not useful in explaining which states consider school choice and which do not.

Scholars have also identified states that have characteristics that make them more likely to adopt innovative policy. Some studies show that larger, wealthier states are more likely to act on a new idea than others are (Gray 1973; Walker 1969). Henig maintains that states that rank highly on innovation indexes are more likely to consider school vouchers (Henig 1994, p.160-161). Like Elazar's political culture theory, innovation indexes are of limited use in explaining which states consider school vouchers. The three states that have passed voucher legislation, Wisconsin, Florida, and Ohio, are ranked tenth, eleventh, and thirty-first respectively on Walker's scale. Three states that have considered voucher legislation, New Mexico, California, Pennsylvania, are ranked fifty-first, third, and ninth.

However, state traditions and political characteristics should not be discounted. Entrepreneurs operate in an environment that is shaped in part by state political culture. An entrepreneur might frame the voucher debate in slightly different terms in a moralistic culture than in a traditional state culture. A state with traditionally strong unions might force an entrepreneur to create a different strategy than an entrepreneur in a state with weak unions.

As previously discussed, differences in state political patterns in Pennsylvania and Ohio did affect entrepreneurial strategies. Pennsylvania's working-class suburbs had a strong interest in school vouchers, and the state had a significant level of anti-city

tension. These features of state politics shaped the outcome of their legislation. Thus, state political culture has some explanatory value if it is considered in conjunction with other factors. It can constrain action or provide opportunities for entrepreneurs.

Directions for Future Research

The story of school vouchers expands our knowledge of education politics. It focuses attention on the role of the teachers' union, governors, business groups, city leaders, and religious groups, but there is still much to be done. Most of the existing work in this area is dated or minor in scope. Further study of these participants is needed.

A study of the implementation of voucher programs, their evaluation, and the subsequent court battles would take us beyond the scope of this dissertation. What can be noted here is that the process has been highly political. Each side of the issue sponsored their own studies, used different methodologies, and asked different questions. The findings have been used to promote or vilify vouchers. A study of the later stages of vouchers would shed further light on the role of academics and national-level interest groups in the politics of school vouchers.

This dissertation has touched on a number of developments in American politics that help explain the rise of school vouchers, including the frustration that minority parents feel towards their schools, the role of governors in education, and the diffusion of the voucher idea among the states. It would be useful to expand these findings in future research. A number of questions arise. How large a role do national-level interest groups and think tanks play in state politics? Why are black city leaders not reflecting the demands of their community? How is the Democratic Party able to reconcile the

divisions among its minority and working-class constituency on this issue? Has the new strength of governors translated into other policy areas?

Some Concluding Reflections

The study of the politics of school vouchers assists us assess the policy and predict its future. Though I have not examined its effectiveness, my research does provide other information about the sources of vouchers. For instance, we can see how little evidence there is to show a “right-wing conspiracy” was behind this plan. Religious groups played a secondary role in promoting school choice. Business organizations were even more silent, though individuals within the business community were supportive. Republican leadership was torn by the conflicting interests of its constituency.

School choice cannot always be characterized as a conservative issue. It depends on how the program is framed and who benefits from it. Conservatives frame the issue in terms of the free-market and individual choice. In their eyes, all students, regardless of income, should be eligible for a voucher. Liberals highlight the benefits of a voucher program for increasing equity and desegregation. Their ideal program would be limited to disadvantaged children who would have access to suburban schools.

Though many accuse voucher proponents of racism, racism could also be a reason why some are resistant to school choice. As seen in the two case studies, many suburbanites do not wish vouchers because they do not want black children attending their schools. The final voucher program does not apply to Cleveland’s white suburbs because of their reluctance to accept inner-city students. Union officials in Pennsylvania were able to stir up anti-city sentiments in rural areas to overturn Ridge’s plan.

The study of voucher politics also reveals how minority interest in this issue was genuine. Minority leaders were not steered into supporting it by white conservatives. Their motivation stems from the bankruptcy of the existing system and the failure of other reform efforts. In fact, the very suggestion that white conservatives have manipulated blacks has the ring of condescension.

While a majority of black parents support vouchers, the black leadership is divided on the issue. This disjunction may at some point produce widespread challenges to their legitimacy. It seems to validate Wilbur Rich's finding, discussed in Chapter 3, that minority mayors, legislators, school activists, and administrators are too closely aligned with the teachers' union. However, we also witnessed how rogue black leaders, such as Polly Williams, Fanny Lewis, Dwight Evans, and Floyd Flake, are grabbing headlines and gaining national reputations by questioning the establishment. They are forming alliances with white Republican leaders to further their goals.

It is unclear how long this alliance will hold. It may truly be a marriage of convenience that breaks up during implementation. Polly William of Wisconsin has spoken out against the Wisconsin voucher plan now that white Republicans want to expand the program to include more middle-class students. Fannie Lewis felt that her connections with Brennan and other voucher advocates did not further her goal to establish her own school.

Research on voucher politics also gives us some clues about the future of this policy. There is much evidence to show that vouchers have little chance of being expanded outside of small urban programs because of the limited interest in such a

policy.³ Vouchers will not entirely destroy public education as the unions suggest, since there is so little demand for the policy outside of cities. Suburbanites don't need vouchers, and those in rural areas can't use them. There has also been little demand for them from other constituencies. Religious conservatives fear the strings attached to government money for their schools. Wealthy private schools have never been supportive of this policy. In its widest possible application, vouchers of \$2,000-\$4,000 would be given to poor and working-class families suffering from the worst public schools who would use them primarily at local parochial schools. Given the limited space in these schools, only a small percentage of eligible children would attend.

It is, however, highly likely that urban voucher programs will increase in cities across the country. Some may be funded with public funds; others will be funded by private sources. They also may be disguised under a new name, such as opportunity scholarships. Urban programs satisfy the demands of minority parents for a way out of weak city schools. They satisfy suburbanites who feel pressure to do something about city schools, but who stop short of allowing black children attend their schools. It satisfies Republicans who wish to say they support vouchers, but don't want to offend their constituencies. It is a relatively low cost program. It also pleases Catholic officials who need additional funds for their city schools. With these demands and interests, unions may not be able to fight off urban-only programs.

5

³ Witte suggests that these limited programs represent a slippery slope towards broader programs and points to the incremental expansion of the Milwaukee program to include more middle-class students (Witte 2000).

It is difficult to predict the outcome of the legal battle that has followed the passage of voucher legislation. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the challenge to Wisconsin's voucher program in 1998, and thereby leaving Wisconsin's voucher program safe from further legal challenges. However, many speculate that it will be forced to rule on Ohio's and Florida's programs. Judge L. Ralph Smith, Jr. of the Circuit court of Florida, found on March 14, 2000 that Florida's voucher program is unconstitutional because vouchers supplants the system of free public schools mandated by the constitution (Wilgoren 2000b). On December 11, 2000, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a federal District Court ruling that the Cleveland program violates constitutional requirements separating church and state ("Voucher Case: Going Up" 2000). Voucher advocates have challenged both decisions. The outcome is uncertain, since the Supreme Court justices appear to be equally divided on the issue. Their decision may ultimately decide its fate.

Clearly there is a momentum towards increasing choice in education. Though public vouchers may end at the city limits or be found unconstitutional, it seems likely that charter schools and private voucher programs will increase in popularity. The widespread discussion of the issue has opened Pandora's box. The problems with the current system of education have been exposed and the feeling is widespread that they must be addressed, even if vouchers are struck down by the courts. The networks of advocates that have formed around this issue have learned much from this fight and are well positioned to advocate similar programs.

The politics of school vouchers is ultimately a struggle for the control of decision-making in education. Educational outsiders, not the professionals, have put forward

vouchers. A voucher program permits students to attend private schools, which are not bound by their rules and oversight. The unions may have some good reasons for opposing vouchers. Vouchers may indeed help only a select few students and do little to improve education for all. But the unions also have their own self-interested reasons for their hatred of school choice. Vouchers threaten their monopolistic control over education, and the unions have spared no expense to fight off this menace. This fight for control over the decision-making of education is not over, and will continue to be an issue for years to come.

Perhaps the most positive aspect of the politics of school vouchers is that it has focused attention on the problem of city schools. There is some evidence that Florida's voucher policy led to the improvement of public schools because the schools feared being placed in the program (Wilgoren 2000a). The threat posed by vouchers has led to the unions' retreat from their strong opposition to charter schools across the country. It has forced Democratic leaders to not take for granted the support of the poor and the working class. Some minority leaders have also begun to take closer account of the interests of their community.

Even voucher opponents can gain much from the study of voucher politics since it reveals the dynamics of political changes and can alert them to the nature of the challenge they must counter in their defense of the current system. School choice opponents, those pushing for sweeping change like the voucher entrepreneurs in this study, can suggest different ideas and seize new opportunities. It will not be an easy or a quick process, but some sort of new adjustments will probably emerge from the struggle. It may have to await a new set of activists to take the stage and demand innovation in education.

Appendix A.

Other Choice and Governance Reforms for Education

Reform	Definition	Examples
Intradistrict choice	Intradistrict choice provides children with school options other than their neighborhood school, but within the school district. The basic short coming of this program is that those jurisdictions that have the greatest need for expanding opportunities usually offer the fewest number of satisfactory options (Ravitch and Viteritti 1996).	District 4 in Harlem, New York City
Interdistrict choice	Interdistrict choice allows children to cross school district boundaries to attend a public school in another district.	Maine and Vermont have had statewide choice programs for many years aimed at accommodating students in rural areas without access to public high schools. In 1988, Minnesota adopted a statewide choice program (Portz 1999).
Charter Schools	Charter schools are "... semi-autonomous, public entities that are freed from most bureaucratic rules and regulations by state and local authorities in return for a commitment to meet explicit performance goals. They are established under a contract between a group that manages a school and a sponsoring authority that oversees it"(Ravitch and Viteritti 1996, p.6). A private firm, a group of teachers, a teachers union, or a college may set up schools. The state education department, a local school board, or a university usually monitors them. These schools may be centered around a particular type of instruction, a mode of discipline, or style of parental involvement (Manno, Finn Jr., and Vanourek 1999). Charter schools vary from state to state in levels of autonomy. Strong charter school laws are characterized as having the most independence from state and district regulations. These laws enable all teachers in charter schools to be uncertified, not place a cap on the number of	The first charter schools were authorized in Minnesota in 1991. Since then their numbers have multiplied. Today, 37 states have charter laws. Some 1,700 charter schools now serve at least a quarter-million students in the United States. President Clinton has been a strong supporter. He has requested a \$30 million increase in federal funding of charter schools for 2001, for a total of \$175 million (Bowman 2000). For example, the Boston Renaissance Charter School provides each family with its own Macintosh computer, extends the school day by an hour, and adds an extra month of

	schools, and enable many types of groups to apply for the contract. Weak charter schools laws are much more restrictive of who works in these schools, the number of charter schools, and how groups may apply for contracts (Finn and others 1997).	instruction onto the school year (Farber 1998).
Home schooling	Parents educate their children at home, rather than have them attend any formal schools. In the past, home schoolers were primarily Christian conservatives, but now they include those who have concerns about the quality and the safety of public education.	The number of those being educated at home is uncertain, since many such children have never been accounted for by the school system, but it is clear that their numbers are growing. The consensus among those who study home schooling is that at least 1 million U.S. children were educated at home in 1999 (about 2 percent of the total K-12 population). Some estimates go as high as 1.8 million (Education Week 2000).
Privatization	Private firms are contracted by local school boards to conduct administrative duties or provide educational instruction for schools. Authors Paul T. Hill, Lawrence C. Pierce, and James W. Guthrie say that the private sphere can conduct these functions more efficiently and even more equitably (Hill, Pierce, and Guthrie 1997).	Education Alternatives, Inc. (EAI) has run schools in Baltimore and Hartford. The Edison Project operates 79 new and existing elementary schools in 16 states. This movement also continues to gather steam, and Wall Street has taken a big interest in these companies (Wyatt 1999).
Tuition tax credits	Tax credits are given to parents who send their children to private schools. A tax credit directly reduces a person's tax liability, as opposed to a tax deduction, which reduces a person's taxable income.	In 1997, Arizona passed legislation that allowed residents to claim an income tax credit of up to \$500 for donations to charitable organizations providing scholarships to children to attend private or religious schools. Arizona's teachers union mounted a lawsuit against this program, and it currently is under

		consideration by the Supreme Court (Heritage Foundation 1999).
Private voucher program	The funding for private voucher programs is derived from the private sector, while public voucher programs are funded with state taxes. The Children Scholarship Fund and CEO America are the two biggest sources of private vouchers.	In 1999, the Children's Scholarship Fund was established by millionaires Theodore Forstmann and John Walton to provide \$100 million for scholarships worth \$1700 annually to 40,000 students to attend private school. The vouchers are targeted to low-income families in urban areas and the average income of participating parents is \$21,000. In 1999, the parents of 1.25 million children applied in the first lottery for these 40,000 scholarships. The fund has awarded \$160 million in scholarships since its inception (Wilgoren 2000).
Takeovers	Mayors and Governors are increasingly acquiring power over school administration. They maintain that the role played by chancellors and superintendents should be given to those most accountable to the people. Eleven states have initiated state takeovers over failing schools. In addition, governors have been assuming more control over state education departments, which is discussed in Chapter Two. Mayors are also reclaiming control over urban education, which was removed from their aegis by the Progressives.	In New Jersey, three cities had their school districts taken over between 1989 and 1995. The superintendent, top administrators, and school board members were replaced by state appointed officials. In 1995, the Illinois state legislature granted Mayor Daley the authority to appoint elected school board members, the board president, and the district's chief executive office. In 1997, Cleveland's mayor was given power to appoint the school board (Portz 1999).

Appendix B.

Interviews in Ohio and Pennsylvania

Ohio Interviews

George Boas, Legislative Aide to State Representative, C.J. Prentiss
David Brennan, lawyer
Michael Charney, Cleveland Teachers' Union, Professional-Issues Director
Jim Damask, Research Director, Buckeye Institute
A representative from Governor Voinovich's office
Bert Holt, Director, Cleveland Scholarship And Tutoring Program
Fanny Lewis, Councilwoman, Cleveland City Council
Christine Link, Executive Director, ACLU- Ohio Chapter
Tim Luckhault, Director of the Catholic Conference of Ohio
Ron Marec, President of the Ohio Federation of Teachers
Sue Robbins, Research Director, Ohio Roundtable And The Freedom Forum
Robert Stoff, President, Ohio Business Roundtable
Patrick Sweeney, Ohio State Senator

Pennsylvania Interviews

Murray Dickman, President, Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association
William Epstein, Executive Director Of Communications And Governmental Relations, Philadelphia School District
Al Ferguson, Assistant Executive Director, House Of Representatives
John FitzPatrick, Legislative Director, Pennsylvania Federation Of Teachers
Tom Gentzel, President, Pennsylvania School Board Association
Manuel Gongon, Jr., Associate Director, Archdiocese Of Philadelphia
Paula Hess, Executive Director, Pennsylvania House
Eugene Hickok, Secretary Of Education, Pennsylvania Department Of Education
Wythe Kever, Assistant Communications Director, Pennsylvania State Education Association
Timothy Potts, Director, Pennsylvania School Reform Network
Charles Zogby, Policy Director for Governor Ridge
Andrew Sislo, Special Assistant To The Superintendent, The School District Of Philadelphia
Jeff Trimbath, Executive Director, the REACH Coalition
Randy Wenholt, Director, Public Education Coalition To Oppose Tuition Vouchers

Bibliography

"California Campaign for 'Voucher' System of Education is Dropped." *The New York Times*, December 31 1979, p. 8.

"American Education: Ready for Ronald Reagan." *The Washington Post*, January 11 1981, Book World; Spring Education Review; p. 11.

"A Policy Shift on Vouchers." *Education Week*, December 11 1985.

Emerging Urban School District Governance Models. Policy Brief. Denver, Colo: Education Commission of the States, 1997.

"School Shell Games." *The Wall Street Journal*, May 21 1998, p.A16, Editorial.

"Voucher Case: Going Up." *The Plain Dealer*, December 12, 2000, p.8B, Editorial.

American Atheists. *Court Rules Ohio Vouchers For Religious Schools Unconstitutional.* American Atheist News, 1997. Accessed May 5
<http://atheists.org/flash.line/crtohvch.htm>.

Anhalt, Bari E., Alan DiGaetano, Luis Ricardo Fraga, and Jeffrey Henig. "Systemic Reform and Policy Effort in Urban Education." A paper delivered at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 1995.

Archdiocese of Philadelphia. *School Choice*. Video. 1999.

Archer, Jeff. "More Oversight Sought for Ohio School Choice." *Education Week*, January 10 2000, p.5.

Associated Press. "Bennett Offers Revised School Voucher Plan." *The Los Angeles Times*, March 6 1987, p.17A.

Babcock, Charles R. "Reagan Sends Tuition Tax-Credit Bill to Hill." *The Washington Post*, June 23 1982, First Section; p.A5.

Baer, John M. "Guv Scrambles for Support as Voucher Vote is Delayed." *Philadelphia Daily News*, June 16 1999a.

Baer, John M. "Ridge to Continue Voucher Fight." *Philadelphia Daily News*, June 18 1999b.

Baer, John M. "School Vouchers Are in Trouble." *Philadelphia Daily News*, July 15 1999c.

Baer, John M., and Kevin Haney. "Archdiocese Enters Battle on Philadelphia School Vouchers." *Philadelphia Daily News*, March 24 1998.

Bastian, Ann et. al. *Choosing Equality: The Case for Democratic Schooling*. San Francisco: Public Media Center, 1985.

Baumgartner, Frank, and Byran D. Jones. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. "Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems." *The Journal of Politics* 53, November, no. 4 (1991).

Beinart, Peter. "The Rise of Jewish Schools." *The Atlantic Monthly* 1999, pg. 21-22.

Bennett, William J. "The State, and Future, of American Education." A paper delivered at the Heritage Foundation's Leadership for America Lecture Series, Washington, D.C., 2000.

Berube, Maurice R. *Teacher Politics: The Influence of Unions*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988.

Beyle, Thad. "Governors: The Middlemen and Women in Our Political System." In *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis*, ed. Virginia Gray and Herbert Jacob, p.207-252. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1996.

Boas, George, interview with the Legislative Assistant to C.J. Prentiss by author, Cleveland, Ohio, November 18, 1998

Bosso, Christopher. *Pesticides and Politics*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987.

Bowman, Darcia Harris. "Charter School Movement Growing Rapidly, Study Shows." *Education Week*, February 16 2000, p.5.

Bradley, Ann. "Tax Credits Are Too Expensive, Bush Asserts." *Education Week*, April 5 1989.

Bradley, Ann. "Black Parents Want Focus on Academics." *Education Week*, August 5 1998.

Brennan, David, interview with the Chairman of The Brennan Industrial Group, Inc. by author, Cleveland, Ohio, November 17, 1998.

Brennan, David, interview with David Brennan, PBS, "Frontline: The Battle Over School Choice", 2000.

Brooke, James. "Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for Schools." *The New York Times*, December 27 1997, pp. A1, A7.

Bryk, Anthony, Paul Hill, and Dorothy Shipps. *Decentralization in Practice: Toward a System of Schools*. : A joint report of The Consortium of Chicago School Research and the Institute of Public Policy and Management, 1997.

Bryk, Anthony, and Valerie E. Lee. "Is Politics the Problem and Markets the Answer?" *Economics of Education Review* vol. 11 (1992).

Bryk, Anthony S., John Q. Easton, David Kerbow, Sharon G. Rollow, and Penny A. Sebring. *A View From the Elementary Schools: The State of Reform in Chicago*. : The Consortium on Chicago School Research, 1993.

Burns, James MacGregor. *The Deadlock of Democracy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentiss Hall, 1963.

Byers, Russel G. "Solid Poll Position for School Vouchers in City." *Philadelphia Daily News*, April 22, 1999.

Campbell, John. *Collapse of an Industry*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.

Carl, James C. "The Politics of Education in a New Key: The 1988 Chicago School Reform Act and the 1990 Milwaukee Parental Choice Program." Ph.D Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1995.

Carlson, Tucker. "Bush Beats the Blob." *The Weekly Standard*, May 17 1999, p.21-24.

Charney, Michael, interview with the Professional-Issues Director for the Cleveland Teachers Union by author, Cleveland, Ohio, November 16, 1998.

Chubb, John E., and Terry M. Moe. *Politics, Markets and America's Schools*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990.

Cipriano, Ralph, and Connie Langland. "Archdiocese May Be Closing Some of Its Poorer Parishes." *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 21 1992, Section A; Page 1.

Cleveland Teachers Union. "How a Pilot Private School Voucher Project Will Eventually Destroy Urban Education." *Critique: The Official Publication of the Cleveland Teachers Union*, April 1 1995a, p.2.

Cleveland Teachers Union. "The Real Danger." *Critique: The Official Publication of the Cleveland Teachers Union*, April 1 1995b, p. 2.

Cleveland Teachers Union. "Who Profits: Is David Brennan Buying a Private School Voucher Plan?" *Critique: The Official Publication of the Cleveland Teachers Union*, April 1 1995c, p.4.

Cleveland Teachers Union. "Voucher Program Will Fund Religious Instruction and Worship." *Community Critique: The Official Publication of the Cleveland Teachers' Union*, January, Vol. xxix 1996, p.8.

Cobb, Roger W., and Charles D. Elder. *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1983.

Coleman, James S. *Equality of Educational Opportunity*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.

Committee on Education and Labor. *Problems with the Administration's Voucher Proposal for Chapter I: The Equity and Choice Act.* : U.S. House of Representatives, 1986. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.

Confidential, interview with the Special Assistant to the Governor of Ohio by author, July 2, 1998.

Conlan, Timothy J., David R. Beam, and Margaret T. Wrightson. "Policy Models and Political Change: Insights from the Passage of Tax Reform." In *The New Politics of Public Policy*, ed. Mark K. Landy and Martin Levin, p. 121-142. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Cooke, Edward F., and Edward G. Janosik. *Pennsylvania Politics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1965.

Cookson, Peter W. *School Choice: The Struggle for the Soul of American Education*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.

Coons, John E., Stephen D. Sugarman, and William H. Clune III. "Reslicing the School Pie." In *Educational Vouchers: Concepts and Controversies*, ed. George R. La Noue, p.59-67. New York: Teachers College Press, 1972.

Covington, Sally. *Moving A Public Policy Agenda: The Strategic Philanthropy of Conservative Foundations*. Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 1997.

Coyne, Jr., John R. "Slates and Hamsters - 1971." In *Education Vouchers: From Theory to Alum Rock*, ed. James A. Mecklenburger and Richard W. Hostrop, p.79-85. Homewood, IL: An ETC Publication, 1972.

Cremin, Lawrence A. *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education 1876-1957*. Vintage Books: New York, NY, 1961.

Crotty, Patricia McGee. "Pennsylvania: Individualism Writ Large." In *Interest Groups in the Northeastern States*, ed. Ronald Hrebenar and Clive Thomas Thomas. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1993.

Currence, Cindy. "Education Lobbies Shift Focus to States." *Education Week*, October 2 1985.

Dahl, Robert. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (Pheonix Books), 1956.

Damask, James, interview with the Research Director for the Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions by author, May 29, July 2, September 14, 1998.

Damask, Jim, and Ronald Kozar. *Giving Choice a Chance: Cleveland and the Future of School Reform*. : Buckeye Institute, 1998.

Dawson, Michael C. "Globalization, the Racial Divide, and a New Citizenship." In *The New Majority: Toward a Popular Progressive Politics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.

Derthick, Martha, and Paul J. Quirk. *The Politics of Deregulation*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985.

Dickman, Murray, interview with the President of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association by author, Philadelphia, PA, March 24, 1999.

Education Week. *Home Schooling, Glossary*. 2000. Accessed March 3 <http://www.edweek.org/context/topics/home.htm>.

Elazar, Daniel. *American Federalism: A View from the States*. Third ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1984.

Epstein, William, interview with the Executive Director of Communications for the Philadelphia School District by author, March 12, 1999.

Fantini, Mario, Marilyn Gittell, and Richard Magat. *Community Control and Urban Schools*. New York: Praegar, 1970.

Farber, Peggy. "Boston: Renaissance Charter School." *The American Prospect*, July-August 1998, p.48-50.

Ferguson, Al, interview with the Assistant Executive Director for the Pennsylvania House Committee on Appropriations by author, Harrisburg, PA, March 16, June 2, November 8 and, 1999.

Finn, Chester, Bruno Manno, L. Bielein, and Gregg Vanourek. *The Policy Perils of Charter Schools, In Charter Schools in Action: A Hudson Institute Project*. : Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, 1997. Final Report, Part III, pp.1-12.

Fiske, Edward B., and Helen F. Ladd. "A Level Playing Field? What We Can Learn From the New Zealand School Reform." *American Educator* Fall, Vol. 24, no. 3 (2000).

FitzPatrick, John, interview with the Legislative Director for the Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers by author, Harrisburg, PA, March 16, 1999.

Flake, Rev. Floyd H. "No Excuses for Failing Our Children." *Policy Review* 1999, p.48.

Fritschler, A. Lee. *Smoking and Politics*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989.

Frolik, Joe. "Parents Want the Right to Choose Schools." *The Plain Dealer*, September 28 1997, p. A1.

Funderburk, Charles, and Robert W. Adams. "Interest Groups in Ohio Politics." In *Ohio Politics*, ed. Alexander P. Lamis. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994.

Gargan, John J., and James G. Coke. "Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio." In *State Politics and the New Federalism*, ed. Marilyn Gittell. New York, NY: Longman, 1986.

Gentzel, Tom, interview with the Director of the Pennsylvania School Board Association by author, Harrisburg, PA, March 16, 1999.

Gittell, Marilyn. "Decision-Making in the Schools." In *Educating an Urban Population*, ed. Marilyn Gittell. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1967a.

Gittell, Marilyn. *Participants and Participation: A Study of School Policy in New York City*. New York, NY: Praeger, 1967b.

Gittell, Marilyn. "Education: The Decentralization-Community Control Controversy." In *Race and Politics in New York City*, ed. Jewel Bellush and Stephen David, pp.134-163. New York: Praeger, 1971.

Gittell, Marilyn. "School Reform in New York and Chicago: Revisiting the Ecology of Local Games." *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 30, September, no. 1 (1994): p. 136-151.

Gittell, Marilyn, ed. *Strategies for School Equity: Creating Productive Schools in a Just Society*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.

Gittell, Marilyn, and Laura McKenna. "Redefining Education Regimes and Reform: The Political Role of Governors." *Urban Education* 34, September, no. 3 (1999): p.268-291.

Gittell, Marilyn, Laura McKenna, Dan Cook, and Sarah Gardner. *The New Politics of Education* The Howard Samuels State Management and Policy Center, Forthcoming.

Goel, Vindu P., and Benjamin Marrison. "What's Next for Voinovich?" *The Plain Dealer*, September 25 1994, p.1A.

Gongon, Manuel, Jr., interview with the Associate Director for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia by author, Philadelphia, PA, March 24, 1999.

Gray, Virginia. "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study." *American Political Science Review* vol. 57 (1973): p.1174-85.

Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. "Where Do Policy Ideas Come From? A Study of Minnesota Legislators and Staffers." *Journal of Public Administration and Theory* vol.10, July (2000): p.573.

Greene, Jay P., William G. Howell, and Paul E. Peterson. *An Evaluation of the Cleveland Scholarship Program*. The Program on Education Policy and Governance, Jointly sponsored by the Taubman Center on State and Local Government Kennedy School of Government and the Center for American Political Studies Department of Government Harvard University, 1997.

Greene, Jay P., and Paul E. Peterson. "If the Peer Review Attack Fails, Attack Something Else." *PS: Political Science and Politics* June (2000): p. 229-231.

Greenstone, J. David. *The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Hanson, Gayle M.B. "Options to Expand GOP's Big Tent." *World News Communications*, April 26 1999, Insight on the News.

Hendrie, Caroline. "Panel Proposes Breaking Up Phila. District." *Education Week*, January 14 1998.

Henig, Jeffrey. "Civic Capacity and the Problem of Ephemeral Education Reform." A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, Portland, Oregon, 1995.

Henig, Jeffrey R. *Rethinking School Choice: Limits of the Market Metaphor*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Heritage Foundation. *Arizona*. 1999a. Accessed September 3
<http://www.heritage.org/schools/arizona.html>.

Heritage Foundation. *School Choice 1999 -- Pennsylvania*. 1999b. Accessed September 24
<http://www.heritage.org/schools/pennsylvania.html>.

Hernandez, Raymond. "Pressure Grows for Schools Led by Minority Parents." *The New York Times*, February 28 1998.

Hero, Rodney. "The 1992 Elections and "Minority" Politics: A Perspective." In *The New American Politics: Reflections on Political Change and the Clinton Administration*, ed. Bryan D. Jones. San Francisco, CA: Westview Press, 1995.

Hess, Paula, interview with the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania House Education Committee by author, March 29, 1999.

Hickok, Eugene, interview with the Secretary of Education for Pennsylvania by author, April 1, 1999.

Hicks, Desiree F. "Parents' Fears Run Deeper Than Busing; Court Order Doesn't Change Minds of Voucher Holders." *The Plain Dealer*, May 20 1996, p.1B.

Hill, Paul T., Lawrence C. Pierce, and James W. Guthrie. *Reinventing Public Education: How Contracting Can Transform America's Schools*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Hoffman, David. "President Pledges National Agenda To Achieve Excellence in Education." *The Washington Post*, June 4 1983, p.A4.

Holt, Bert, interview with the Director of the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program by author, Cleveland, Ohio, November 20, 1998.

House Committee on Education and Labor. "Anti-Voucher House Testimony (Excerpted) (April 2, 1971)." In *Education Vouchers: From Theory to Alum Rock*, ed. James A. Mecklenburger and Richard W. Hostrop, p.93-106. Homewood, IL: An ETC Publication, 1972.

House Committee on Education and Labor. *Hearing on the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1983, H.R.2397*. : U.S. House of Representatives, 1983, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Howell, William G. , and Paul E. Peterson. "School Choice in Dayton, Ohio: An Evaluation After One Year." A paper delivered at the Conference on Charters, Vouchers and Public Education, Program on Education Policy and Governance, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2000.

Howell, William G., Patrick J. Wolf, Paul E. Peterson, and David E. Campbell. "Test-Score Effects of School Vouchers in Dayton, Ohio, New York City, and Washington, D.C.: Evidence from Randomized Field Trials." A paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2000.

Hunter, Marjorie. "Proponents of Tuition Tax Credits Optimistic as a Result of Election." *The New York Times*, November 17 1980, p.11D.

Institute for Policy Research. *The Ohio Poll.* : University of Cincinnati and The Cincinnati Enquirer, 1997. Press Release.

Jencks, Christopher. "Privately Controlled Education, 1966." In *School Reform: Past and Present*, ed. Michael B. Katz. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.

Jencks, Christopher. "Pro Voucher Senate Testimony - 1971 (Excerpted)." In *Education Vouchers: From Theory to Alum Rock*, ed. James A. Mecklenburger and Richard W. Hostrop, p.106-124. Homewood, IL: An ETC Publication, 1972.

Johnson, Janet Buttolph and Richard A. Joslyn. *Political Science Research Methods, Second Edition*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991.

Johnston, Robert C. "Pa. Adopts Budget With Funding for Vouchers." *Education Week*, April 12 1999, p. 20.

Jones, Bryan, ed. *The New American Politics: Reflections on Political Change and the Clinton Administration*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

Jones, C. *Clean Air*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975.

Jones, Richard. "Cardinal Offers a Voucher Proposal." *Philadelphia Daily News*, May 28 1998, City Section.

Jones, Thomas H. "Politics Against Choice: School Finance and School Reform in the 1980s." In *The Politics of Excellence and Choice in Education: 1987 Yearbook of the Politics of Education Association*, ed. William Lowe Boyd and Charles Taylor Kerchner, p. 153-163. New York: The Falmer Press, 1988.

Justice, Glen. "Ridge Proposes Plan for Vouchers." *Philadelphia Inquirer* 1999, February 3.

Justice, Glen, and Rena Singer. "Districts Could Craft Their Own Vouchers." *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 15 1999a, p.1.

Justice, Glen, and Rena Singer. "In Pa., a Mad Dash for Vouchers." *Philadelphia Inquirer* 1999b, p.A1.

Justice, Glen, Rena Singer, and Ken Dilanian. "How a Divided GOP Killed School Vouchers." *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 18 1999a, p.A1.

Justice, Glen, Rena Singer, and Ken Dilanian. "Ridge's Final Appeal Fails to Move School-Voucher Measure." *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 17 1999b, p.A1.

Katz, Michael B., ed. *School Reform: Past and Present*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.

Katz, Michael B. *Reconstructing American Education*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.

Keever, Wythe, interview with the Assistant Communications Director for the Pennsylvania State Education Association by author, Harrisburg, PA, November 18, 1999.

Kingdon, John. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy*. New York: Harper Collins, 1984.

Kirkpatrick, David W. *Choice in Schooling: A Case for Tuition Vouchers*. Chicago, IL: Loyola University Press, 1990.

Kirst, Michael. *Who Controls Our Schools?* New York: Freeman, 1984.

Kurtz, Howard. "Decade-Old Idea Dusted Off; 'Vouchers' Sought for Housing, Education, Health." *The Washington Post*, December 23 1983, p. A13.

Lamis, Alexander P., ed. *Ohio Politics*. Kent Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1994.

Landy, Mark. "The New Politics of Environmental Policy." In *The New Politics of Public Policy*, ed. Mark K. Landy and Martin Levin. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Landy, Mark K., and Martin Levin, eds. *The New Politics of Public Policy*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Lane, Mary Beth. "Experiments in Education; With Two Bills in Legislature, It's Likely Ohio Will Try Community Schools." *The Plain Dealer*, July 25 1995a, p. 4B.

Lane, Mary Beth. "Voucher Program in Cleveland Delayed." *The Plain Dealer*, August 12 1995b, p. 5B.

Lane, Mary Beth. "Defense of Vouchers Pledged; State Officials Vow to Fight Union Lawsuit Against Cleveland's Experiment." *The Plain Dealer*, January 11 1996a, p. 1B.

Lane, Mary Beth. "Voucher Backers Rally For Plan; But Expected Appeal Makes Start Uncertain." *The Plain Dealer*, June 22 1996b, p.1B.

Lane, Mary Beth. "Education Board Upset by Changes." *The Plain Dealer*, November 30 1997, p.B1.

Langland, Connie. "Suburban Districts Troubled by Ridge's Voucher Plan." *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 18 1999, p.A1.

Lazerson, Marvin, ed. *American Education in the Twentieth Century*. New York, NY: Teachers College, 1987.

Legislative Commission on Restructuring Pennsylvania's Urban Schools. *Findings and Recommendations*. Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 1997, Volume 1.

Lemann, Nicholas. "The New American Consensus, Government Of, By and For the Comfortable: The Smallness of Centrism." *The New York Times* 1998, p. 37-70.

Levin, Henry M. "Educational Vouchers: Effectiveness, Choice, and Costs." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* vol. 17, no. 3 (1998): p. 373-392.

Lewin, Tamar. "Few Clear Lessons From Nation's First School-Choice Program." *The New York Times*, March 27 1999, p.A10.

Lewis, Fannie, interview with the Cleveland Councilwoman by author, October 27, 1999.

Liebman, James S. "Voice, Not Choice." *Yale Law Journal* vol. 101, October (1991): p.259-314.

Lindblom, Charles. "The Science of Muddling Through." In *Classic Readings in American Politics*, ed. Pietros Nivola and David H. Rosenbloom, Third Edition, p.545. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 1999.

Lindsay, Drew. "In Wake of Defeat, Pa. Governor Vows to Revive Education Plan." *Education Week*, July 12 1995a, p. 14.

Lindsay, Drew. "Ridge Proposes 1st State Voucher Program for Pa." *Education Week*, March 15 1995b, p.1.

Lindsey, Robert. "Man Behind Voucher Debate." *The New York Times*, December 4 1979, p. C1.

Link, Christine, interview with the Executive Director of the ACLU of Ohio by author, February 4, 1999.

Luckhaupt, Tim, interview with the Director of the Catholic Conference of Ohio by author, Ohio Columbus, November 18, 1998

Lynd, Robert S., and Helen Merrell Lynd. "Schools in Middletown (1929)." In *American Education in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Marvin Lazerson. New York, NY: Teachers College, 1987.

Madonna, G. Terry, and Berwood A. Yost. *Pennsylvania Voters at the Polls, 1994: Why Rick Santorum is U.S. Senator*. Millersville, University of Pennsylvania: Center for Politics and Public Affairs, 1995.

Manno, Bruno, Chester Finn Jr., and Gregg Vanourek. "Charter School Accountability: Problems and Prospects." A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta Marriott Marquis and Atlanta Hilton and Towers, 1999.

Marec, Ron, interview with the President of the Ohio Federation of Teachers by author, January 19, 1999.

Marrison, Benjamin. "Sanders Leaves Dire Message For Cleveland." *The Plain Dealer*, July 2 1995, p. 1A.

Martin, John P. "Head of Catholic Conference Named." *The Morning Call*, January 18 1997, p. B15.

Martin, Susan R. "The 1989 Education Summit as a Defining Moment in the Politics of Education." In *Changing American Education: Recapturing the Past or Inventing the Future*, ed. Katherine Borman and Nancy P. Greenman, p.133-159. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994.

McDermott, Katherine A. "Barriers to Large-Scale Success of Models for Urban School Reform." A paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1997.

Metcalf, Kim. "Advocacy in the Guise of Science: How Preliminary Research on the Cleveland Voucher Program was 'Reanalyzed' to Fit a Preconception." *Education Week*, September 23 1998, p.34.

- Milbank, Dana. "Party Crashers." *The New Republic*, June 15 1998, p.21-25.
- Miller, Julie A. "Bush Stand on School Choice Is Seen Bolder." *Education Week*, September 9 1992.
- Miller, Matthew. "A Bold Experiment to Fix City Schools." *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1999, p.15-31.
- Milward, H. Brinton, and Wendy Laird. "Where Does Policy Come From?" In *Agenda for Excellence: Administering the State*, ed. B. Guy Peters and Bert A. Rockman. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1996.
- Mintrom, Michael. "Policy Entrepreneurship in Theory and Practice: A Comparative State Analysis of the Rise of School Choice as a Policy Idea." Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1994.
- Mintrom, Michael. *Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000.
- Mintrom, Michael, and Sandra Vergari. "Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of State Education Reforms." *The Journal of Politics* Vol. 60, February, no. 1 (1998): p.126-48.
- Mollenkopf, John. *The Contested City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- Moore, Mark H. "What Sorts of Ideas Become Public Ideas." In *The Power of Public Ideas*, ed. Robert Reich. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988.
- Morgan, Dan. "GOP Victory Greatly Aids Chances of Enacting Tuition Tax Credits." *The Washington Post*, November 9 1980, p. A5.
- Mossberger, Karen, and Kathleen Hale. "Information Diffusion in An Intergovernmental Network: The Implementation of School-to-Work Programs." A paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1999.
- Mouat, Lucia. "Reagan and Tax Credits -- Changes Ahead for Schools?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 29 1980, p. 1.
- Muir, Edward. "They Blinded Me with Political Science: On the Use of Nonpeer-Reviewed Research in Education Policy." *PS: Political Science and Politics* vol. 32, December (1999): p. 762-64.
- National Association of State Boards of Education. "Viewpoints (1971)." In *Education Vouchers: From Theory to Alum Rock*, ed. James A. Mecklenburger and Richard W. Hostrop, p.65-70. Homewood, IL: An ETC Publication, 1972.

National Commission on Excellence in Education. "A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Excellence (1983)." In *American Education in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Marvin Lazerson, p.197-201. New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 1987.

Newman, Kathe. "The Archdiocese of Chicago as a Urban Political Institution." PhD. dissertation, CUNY Graduate School, 2000.

Office of the Governor of Pennsylvania, Gov. Ridge Unveils Details of Proposed Academic Recovery Act, Press Release, March 11, 1999a.

Office of the Governor of Pennsylvania, Gov. Ridge Unveils School Choice Legislation, Press Release, March 30, 1999b.

Olson, Lynn. "ETS Analysis Tracks Parents Dissatisfaction." *Education Week*, October 27 1999, p.1.

Orr, Marion. "The Challenge of School Reform in Baltimore: Race, Jobs, and Politics." In *Changing Urban Education*, ed. Clarence N. Stone, p.93-117. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1998.

Orren, Gary R. "Beyond Self-Interest." In *The Power of Public Opinions*, ed. Robert Reich. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988.

Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a New Institutionalism." In *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations*, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

Osborne, David. *Laboratories Of Democracy*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1988.

Pear, Robert. "Vouchers, Emerging As a Theme, Provoke Debate." *The New York Times*, February 8 1983, p.A18.

Pedescleux, D., J. Ruiz-de-Velasco, L. Stein, and Clarence Stone. "Urban Education as an Arena of Reform." A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, 1994.

Pennsylvania House Democratic Party, Ridge Voucher Scheme Abandons Public Schools, Press Release, 4/7, 1999a.

Pennsylvania House Democratic Party, Stealth School Voucher Proposal Draws Fire, Press Release, 6/24, 1999b.

Pennsylvania State Education Association. *PSEA Home Page*. 1999. Accessed March www.psea.org.

Peterson, Bill. "Education Department Vouchers..." *The Washington Post*, February 14 1983, p. A9.

Peterson, Paul. *City Limits*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Peterson, Paul E. "The New Politics of Choice." In *Learning From the Past*, ed. Diane Ravitch and Maris A. Vinovskis. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1995.

Polsby, Nelson W. *Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984.

Polsky, Andrew. *The Rise of the Therapeutic State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Portz, John. "School Reform and Policy Choice." A paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1999.

Potts, Timothy, interview with the Director of the Pennsylvania School Reform Network by author, November 20, 1999.

Quality Counts Special Report. "The Urban Challenge." *Education Week*, January 8 1998.

Ravitch, Diane. "Education in the 1980's: A Concern for 'Quality'." *Education Week*, January 10 1990.

Ravitch, Diane, and Joseph Viteritti. "A New Vision for City Schools." *The Public Interest* Winter (1996).

Reeves, Frank. "School Choice Lines Form: Legislative Fight Over Vouchers Expected After Election Day." *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, October 26 1998, P. C1.

Reich, Robert. "Policy Making in a Democracy." In *The Power of Public Opinions*, ed. Robert Reich. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988a.

Reich, Robert, ed. *The Power of Public Opinions*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988b.

Renshon, Stanley, and Marilyn Gittell. "American Governors: Political Leadership and Policy Innovation." A paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 1992.

Review and Outlook (Editorial). "The Ticket for Schools." *The Wall Street Journal*, August 9 1985, p.1.

Rich, Wilbur. *Black Mayors and School Politics: The Failure of Reform in Detroit, Gary, and Newark*. New York: Garland, 1996.

Riker, William. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.

Ritchie, Sr. Rosemary, letter to parishioners, St. Mary of the Assumption, PA Philadelphia, May 28, 1998.

Robbins, Sue, interview with the Research Director to the Ohio Roundtable and The Freedom Forum by author, January 19, 1999.

Roberts, Nancy C., and Paula King. *Transforming Public Policy: Dynamics of Policy Entrepreneurship and Innovation*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996.

Roddy, Dennis B. "School Choice Backers Cram for the Big Test." *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, June 4 1995, p. A1.

Rogers, Everett M. *Diffusion of Innovations*. 4th ed. New York: The Free Press, 1995.

Rosen, Jeffrey. "Is Nothing Secular?" *The New York Times Magazine*, January 30 2000, p.41-45.

Rosenthal, A., and Susan Fuhrman. *Legislative Education Leadership in the States*. Washington, DC: Institute for Educational Leadership, 1981.

Rouse, Cecelia. "Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* vol. 113, May (1998): p.553-602.

Salisbury, Robert H. "The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington -- More Groups, Less Clout." In *The New American Political System*, ed. Anthony King, pp.203-229. Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1990.

Sandham, Jessica L. "Fla. House Approves Bush's Voucher Plan; Senate Action Likely." *Education Week*, April 7 1999, p.22.

Schneider, Mark, and Paul Teske. "Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence From Local Government." *American Political Science Review* vol. 86, no. 3 (1992): p.737-747.

Schon, Donald A. *Beyond the Stable Society*. New York: Norton, 1971.

School District of Philadelphia. *Tell Them We are Rising: Philadelphia's Achievement Results: SAT-9 Results; School Years 1995-1996 through 1997-1998*. The School District of Philadelphia, 1999.

Schrag, Peter. "Voices in the Classroom (1967)." In *Education Vouchers: From Theory to Alum Rock*, ed. James A. Mecklenburger and Richard W. Hostrop, p.7-9. Homewood, IL: An ETC Publication, 1972.

Shelly, Peter J. "PACs Emptying Pockets at Greater Rate; State House, Senate Receive Record-Level Contributions." *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, November 1 1998, p. B5.

Silbey, Joel. "Beyond Realignment and Realignment Theory: American Political Eras, 1789-1989." In *The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras*, ed. Byron E. Shafer, p.3-35. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.

Silva, Mark. "Bush Team Outlines Controversial School Plan." *Miami Herald*, July 28 1998.

Sislo, Andrew, interview with the Special Assistant to the Superintendent of the School Director of Philadelphia by author, Philadelphia, PA, March 24, 1999.

Staples, Brent. "Philadelphia School Wars: Are Vouchers the Next Strategy." *New York Times*, April 6 1997, p.A18.

Staples, Brent. "Schoolyard Brawl." *The New York Times*, January 4 1998, Section: Education Life, p. 35.

Stephens, Scott, and John Funk. "Judge OKs Mayoral Takeover of Schools." *The Plain Dealer*, March 7 1998.

Stevens, Scott. "City Split on School Takeover: Poll Finds." *The Plain Dealer*, August 31 1998, p.1A.

Stoff, Robert, interview with the President of the Ohio Business Roundtable by author, Columbus, OH, November 19, 1998.

Stone, Clarence. *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1989.

Stone, Clarence N., ed. *Changing Urban Education*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1998.

Stone, Deborah. *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.

Suddes, Thomas. "Top Democrats Find Fault with Proposals." *The Plain Dealer*, January 27 1995, p. 10A.

Suddes, Tom, and Benjamin Marrison. "Widely Supported Budget Goes to Voinovich." *The Plain Dealer*, June 29 1995, p. 5B.

Sweeney, Patrick, interview with the Ohio State Senator by author, Cleveland, OH, November 16, 1998.

Theiss, Evelyn. "Dole Backs Vouchers; Parents Should Pick Schools, Local Voters Told." *The Plain Dealer*, July 20 1996, p. 1B.

Trimbath, Jeff, interview with the Executive Director of REACH by author, Harrisburg, PA, March 12, March 16, 1999.

Tyack, David. "School Governance in the United States: Historical Puzzles and Anomalies." In *Decentralization and School Improvement*, ed. Jane Hannaway and Martin Carnoy, p.1-32. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1993.

Tyack, David. "Choice Options: School Choice, Yes-But What Kind?" *American Prospect* January-February, no. 42 (1999).

Tyack, David, and Larry Cuban. *Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Center of Public School Reform*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.

University of Washington. "Four Opinion Polls - 1971." In *Education Vouchers: From Theory to Alum Rock*, ed. James A. Mecklenburger and Richard W. Hostrop, p.54-65. Homewood, IL: An ETC Publication, 1972.

Van Dunk, Emily. "Exploring the Market for School Choice." *Education Week*, September 16 1998.

Van Horn, Carl E. *The State of the States*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989.

Viteritti, Joseph P. *Choosing Equality*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1999.

Walker, Jack L. "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States." *American Political Science Review* vol. 67 (1969): p. 880-99.

Walker, Jack L. "The Diffusion of Knowledge, Policy Communities, and Agenda Setting: The Relationship of Knowledge and Power." In *New Strategic Perspectives on Social Policy*, ed. John E. Tropman, Milan J. Dluhy, and Roger M. Lind. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.

Walsh, Mark. "Battle Waged Over Vouchers in Cleveland." *Education Week*, February 19 1997.

Wells, Amy Stuart. "Choice in Education: Examining the Evidence on Equity." *Teachers College Record* vol. 93 (1991).

Wenhold, Randy, interview with the Director of the Public Education Coalition to Oppose Tuition Vouchers by author, November 18 and 19, 1999.

Werner, Leslie Maitland. "Administration Drafts 3D Plan For School Vouchers." *The New York Times*, December 1 1986a, p. A15.

Werner, Leslie Maitland. "Reagan to Seek Remedial Education Vouchers." *The New York Times*, December 30 1986b, p. A12.

Wilgoren, Jodi. "Florida's Vouchers a Spur to 2 Schools Left Behind." *New York Times*, March 14 2000, p. A1.

Wilgoren, Jodi. "School Vouchers Are Ruled Unconstitutional In Florida." *New York Times*, March 15, 2000. p.A20.

Williams, Juan. "Reagan Proposals Direct Education Aid to Parents." *The New York Times*, March 13 1983, p.A2.

Wilson, James Q. *The Politics of Regulation*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1980.

Witte, John. "A Reply to Greene, Peterson and Du: The Effectiveness of School Choice in Milwaukee: A Secondary Analysis of Data from the Program's Evaluation." A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996.

Witte, John F. *The Market Approach to Education: An Analysis of America's First Voucher Program*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Wright, Michael, and Caroline Rand Herron. "Reagan's Bow to Private Schools." *The New York Times*, April 18 1982, p. D4.

Wyatt, Edward. "Investors See Room for Profit In the Demand for Education." *The New York Times*, November 4 1999, p.A1.

Zernike, Kate. "Gap Widens Again on Tests Given to Blacks and Whites." *The New York Times*, September 15 2000a, p.26A.

Zernike, Kate. "New Doubt is Cast on Study That Backs Voucher Efforts." *The New York Times*, September 15 2000b, p.A26.

Zogby, Charles, interview with the Policy Director to Governor Ridge of Pennsylvania by author, December 7, 1999.