

## INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

**The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.** Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.



University Microfilms International  
A Bell & Howell Information Company  
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA  
313/761-4700 800/521-0600



**Order Number 9130349**

**'How do you tell how the story was told?': An examination  
of conceptions of inquiry, language and narrative used to  
understand people from the stories they tell**

**Massey, Carla Amanda, Ph.D.**

**City University of New York, 1991**

**Copyright ©1991 by Massey, Carla Amanda. All rights reserved.**

**U·M·I**  
300 N. Zeeb Rd.  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106





A

**'HOW DO YOU TELL HOW THE STORY WAS TOLD?':  
AN EXAMINATION OF CONCEPTIONS OF INQUIRY, LANGUAGE AND  
NARRATIVE USED TO UNDERSTAND PEOPLE  
FROM THE STORIES THEY TELL**

by  
**CARLA MASSEY**

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in  
Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
The City University of New York

1991

© 1991

**CARLA AMANDA MASSEY**

**All Rights Reserved**

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

4-29-91  
Date

  
Professor Steven Tuber, Chairman

4/30/91  
Date

Herbert D. Saltzstein  
Professor Saltzstein, Executive  
Officer

Professor Joseph Glick

Assistant Professor Lissa Weinstein

Doctor Steven Goldstein

Professor John Dore

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

## **Abstract**

**'HOW DO YOU TELL HOW THE STORY WAS TOLD?':**

**AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF INQUIRY, LANGUAGE, AND  
NARRATIVE USED TO UNDERSTAND PEOPLE FROM THE STORIES THEY TELL**

by

Carla Massey

Advisor: Professor Steven Tuber

This study concerns the methods we use to understand people from the stories they tell. It claims implicit or explicit in these methods are certain assumptions about and conceptions of inquiry, language and narrative. It shows that the very assumptions and words we choose create and shape the use we make of stories and the understanding of people we reach. It demonstrates the importance different assumptions and vocabularies play in shaping our understanding in a comparative investigation of an empirical and a dialogic approach to narrative analysis. This investigation makes explicit and examines some of the empirical and dialogic approaches we use in daily clinical practice to understand people. It uses both these approaches to analyze the same sample of stories. These stories were spontaneously told by two eleven-year-old children in psychotherapeutic treatment at urban outpatient clinics during a therapy session. These approaches are found to lead to distinctively different understandings of the patients, but also to share some common ground.

**TO**

**My father for asking, "How do you know?",  
My mother for asking me to tell her my stories,  
My brothers, Joshua, Joseph and Jonathan, for their  
generous and steady support,  
And my sister, Sydney,  
for asking,  
"What happens next?"**

**v**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have contributed to making this dissertation possible. First I would like to express my gratitude to Steve Tuber, the chairman of my committee, who has fostered my development, not only as a writer and researcher, but also as a clinician and human being. His capacity to create mutuality in relationships has never ceased to astound me. He affirmed and challenged my work at a respectful distance as it progressed. He kept things simple as I made them complex. He gave me a creative space.

Lissa Weinstein helped with the planting and germination of the ideas for this dissertation. The range and depth of her thinking and our many conversations through the years have stimulated and deeply informed my writing and clinical work. I have been privileged to be the supervisee of one who is so well traveled across multiple disciplines and I thank her for showing me the commuter routes.

This dissertation would not have been possible without someone who would argue with me. Joseph Glick not only argued with me, but also asked questions that sustained inquiry and led to clarity. Some questions I'm still trying to answer. He made learning into serious fun and has generously mentored me during this apprenticeship to a writing-life.

Steve Goldstein and John Dore have been much much more

than outside readers. They both closely read and provided thoughtful and thought-provoking criticism of early drafts. I am deeply grateful for their sustained interest and generosity with their time. Steve Goldstein was "unnnnbelievable, ammmazing, innncredible and..... pretty good." John Dore introduced me to Bakhtin. His intellectual integrity has provided me with constant challenges. These challenges I think will inspire me for years to come.

Special thanks go to a crucial network of friends. I wish to thank my dear dissertation-mate Sandra Sebris, for her companionship, her constant, loving, spirited support, and for believing I could before I did. In addition, I thank her for coding, reading and editing of early drafts, sharing her dissertation, giving me a god-daughter and a home away from home. I wish to thank Adam Price for making the investigation in chapter five and six possible with his contribution of a story and his participation in a dialogue, and for the warmth of his friendship. I am indebted to Elissa Weinstein and Laura Benkov for reading early drafts, offering invaluable criticism and encouragement, and sharing their writing and thinking with me. I am especially grateful to Max Kirsch for providing professional editorial and grant-writing consultation services, and lots of no nonsense advice.

My colleagues and buddies at Morrisania Neighborhood

Family Care Center have been my team players in an everyday kind of way. They cheered this engine up the dissertation mountain. Special thanks go to Cecily Dell, Steve Mendel, Robert Grossmark and Mary Segarra for their interest, support and stimulating discussions.

I would also like to thank Phebe Cramer, Anne Thompson, Drew Westen and Timothy Bogen for the use of their coding systems and manuals. Special thanks go to Timothy Bogen for being available to answer questions and making available to me a sample of childrens stories, which initially were going to be used as the sample for this study and eventually were used for training purposes.

Last of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my family to whom this dissertation is dedicated. My parents have nurtured and steadily supported an inquiring spirit in me. My brother Josh subsidized writing-retreats at his house on the marshes, my brother Joseph supplied emergency loans, my brother Jonathan generously provided his professional computer consultation services, and my sister Sydney provided the best in rest and recreation during writing breaks.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                                                                                                          |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| ABSTRACT.....                                                                                                            | iv   |
| DEDICATION.....                                                                                                          | v    |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....                                                                                                    | vi   |
| LIST OF TABLES.....                                                                                                      | xii  |
| LIST OF APPENDICES.....                                                                                                  | xiii |
| CHAPTER                                                                                                                  |      |
| I. INTRODUCTION: 'SO WHAT'S THE STORY?'.....                                                                             | 1    |
| Statement of Problem                                                                                                     |      |
| The Empirical and Dialogic Approach                                                                                      |      |
| Significance of Problem                                                                                                  |      |
| A Synopsis                                                                                                               |      |
| II. 'HOW DO YOU TELL?': EMPIRICAL AND DIALOGIC<br>APPROACHES OF INQUIRING INTO MEANINGFUL<br>BEHAVIOR.....               | 15   |
| The Empirical and Logical Positivist Method                                                                              |      |
| 'How can the Empirical/Positivist Method Tell<br>Us How The Story Was Told?'                                             |      |
| The Dialogic Approach                                                                                                    |      |
| Vygotsky's Dialectical Method: An Example of<br>a Psychological Method Developed on the<br>Basis of Hermeneutic Premises |      |
| 'How Can the Dialogic Approach Tell How<br>the Story Was Told?'                                                          |      |
| Empiricism and Dialogism Two Modes of<br>Knowing                                                                         |      |
| III. CONCEPTIONS OF LANGUAGE<br>AND NARRATIVE ANALYSIS.....                                                              | 39   |
| Language as Referential and Representational:<br>Freudian and Object Relational Perspectives                             |      |
| The Developmental Turn:                                                                                                  |      |
| The Integration of Object Relations                                                                                      |      |
| Theories With Cognitive and Developmental<br>Theories                                                                    |      |
| Piaget and Werner                                                                                                        |      |
| Bakhtin/Volosinov's Conception of Language                                                                               |      |
| Conclusion: Conceptions of Language and<br>their Implications for Narrative Analysis                                     |      |

|     |                                                                                                                                                       |     |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| IV. | WEAVING A PATH BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND LITERARY THEORY: A study of Narrative Analysis in Clinical Psychology and Bordering Disciplines.....            | 112 |
|     | Narrative as data: What is narrative?                                                                                                                 |     |
|     | Narrative analysis and two sources of its theoretical codes: literary theory and psychology                                                           |     |
|     | Narrative analysis with referential and representational conceptions of narrative                                                                     |     |
|     | Early Thematic Approaches                                                                                                                             |     |
|     | Ego Psychology and the introduction of structural or formal analysis: Rapaport, Gill Schafer and Holt                                                 |     |
|     | Psychoanalytic empirical narrative studies: Cramer, Thompson, Bogen, Westen et al.                                                                    |     |
|     | Narrative analysis with contextual, dialogic and symbolic-action conceptions of narratives:                                                           |     |
|     | Views of personhood in the context of the history of the narrative form: "A Literary Postscript: Character, Selves, Persons, Individuals" by A. Rorty |     |
|     | Dialogic conceptions: V.Crapanzano, D.Cohn, M. Bakhtin, and T Todorov                                                                                 |     |
|     | Narrative as symbolic action:                                                                                                                         |     |
|     | Theoretical perspectives: N. Goodman and K. Burke                                                                                                     |     |
|     | Narrative studies: K. Nelson, J.Bruner and J. Lucariello, C. Feldman, J.Dore                                                                          |     |
|     | Conclusion                                                                                                                                            |     |

|    |                                                                                                                        |     |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| V. | A COMPARISON OF AN EMPIRICAL AND DIALOGIC APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF TWO STORIES TOLD BY TWO CHILDREN IN THERAPY..... | 220 |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|

|  |                                                                                                               |
|--|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  | An empirical approach: An analysis of the object relations and social cognition of two eleven-year-old girls. |
|  | Hypothesis; Methods                                                                                           |
|  | Results and Discussion                                                                                        |
|  | A comparison between the coding analysis of each story                                                        |
|  | A dialogic approach: 'How was the story told and read?'                                                       |
|  | A variation an a methods section                                                                              |
|  | The analysis of Indigo's story                                                                                |
|  | The analysis of Lani's story                                                                                  |
|  | A comparison of the dialogic analysis of each story                                                           |

|    |                                                                                               |     |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| VI | A COMPARISON OF THE EMPIRICAL AND DIALOGIC<br>APPROACH:.....                                  | 302 |
|    | The consequences of initial assumptions of<br>the understanding reached with each<br>analysis |     |
|    | The assumptions                                                                               |     |
|    | The differences and resemblances between the<br>understandings reached with each analysis     |     |
|    | How does each analysis construe the<br>relationship between story and<br>storyteller?         |     |
|    | Significance of the different understandings<br>to clinical practice                          |     |
|    | The Therapists Respond                                                                        |     |
|    | Conclusion: What does each approach tell?                                                     |     |
|    | APPENDICES.....                                                                               | 340 |
|    | BIBLIOGRAPHY.....                                                                             | 401 |

## LIST OF TABLES

| Table                                                                                       | Page |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1 Pre-and Post-Consensus Scores for Each Story<br>According to Westen et al's Measures..... | 253  |
| 2 The Effect of Coders' Involvement With Storyteller<br>on Coding Scores.....               | 254  |
| 3 Measurement of Story Length, and Plot and Character<br>Complexity.....                    | 256  |
| 4 Range of Scores Each Story Attained in the Process<br>of Score Selection .....            | 257  |

## LIST OF APPENDICES

| Appendix                                                                                | Page |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| A Phebe Cramer's (1987) Scoring Categories for Defense.....                             | 341  |
| B Anne Thompson's (1981) Revised Affect Maturity Scale.....                             | 345  |
| C Timothy Bogen's (1982) Categories for Coding Complexity of Plot Structure.....        | 351  |
| D Westen et al.'s (1988) Object Relations and Social Cognition: TAT Scoring Manual..... | 352  |
| E A Story 'Indigo' Told.....                                                            | 397  |
| F A Story 'Lani' Told.....                                                              | 399  |

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION:

#### 'SO WHAT'S THE STORY?'

Almost as soon as I began to study philosophy, I was impressed by the way in which philosophical problems appeared, disappeared, changed shape, as a result of new assumptions or vocabularies.

Richard Rorty,  
Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature

### STATEMENT OF PROBLEM:

Michelangelo in his painting "The Creation of Adam" depicts a moment of creation. He shows God and Adam each with an arm outstretched toward the other. The tips of their fingers almost meet; there is a space between. The relationship between creator and creation has been an enigmatic topic through the ages. Unlike those literary studies whose focus is on the story, or those psychological narrative studies whose focus is on the storyteller, the focus of this dissertation is on the kinds of thinking that posit a relationship between story and storyteller, on that space, if you will, between creator and creation.

This dissertation concerns the methods we use to understand people from the stories they tell. Implicit or explicit in these methods are certain assumptions about and

conceptions of inquiry, language, and narrative. The investigation that follows shows that the very assumptions and words we choose create and shape the use we make of stories and the understanding of people we reach. I will demonstrate the importance different assumptions and vocabularies play in shaping our understanding in a comparative study of an empirical and a dialogic approach. I will enact this comparison using both these approaches to analyze the same sample of stories. These stories were spontaneously told by two eleven-year-old children in psychotherapeutic treatment at urban outpatient clinics during a therapy session. For this study the central problem is: What are the consequences of employing an empirical in contrast to a dialogic approach?

To answer the question 'how was the story told?' we can begin with a psychological theory that assumes that language is a projection of unconscious fantasies, character structure, or representations. According to this approach, in order to tell how a story was told we must find a way to objectively and reliably observe the intrapsychic processes or structures which determined the production of the story. We can observe them indirectly with the use of measures or coding systems. These coding systems define certain quantifiable features of stories (eg. plot complexity, level

of differentiation character representations) and make explicit the correspondence between these features to those internal psychological constructs which explain how a story was told.

Alternatively, we can begin as readers reading, and speaking in response to the story. As these readers, we begin with a dialogic conception of language and inquiry and proceed with a consideration of the interactive process among the reader, storyteller and story. We construct the storyteller, and in turn, the reader the storyteller constructs. As these readers we tell how the story was told differently depending on the purpose(s) with which we read and who we are. For example, we answer the question differently depending upon whether we are the storyteller's mother, therapist, journalist, literary agent or critic, and depending upon our responses (i.e. delight, fear, compassion, repulsion) to the story.

However we proceed in answering the question, we use certain assumptions and vocabularies. We construct relationships both explicitly and implicitly among story, storyteller and reader. How we tell how the story is told depends upon our assumptions and vocabularies.



**THE EMPIRICAL AND DIALOGIC APPROACH:**

The empirical approach is formulated according to the following assumptions and procedures: Hypotheses are verified on the basis of observations made, using procedures and measures that assure reliability, validity and objectivity. The measures I will use provide a formal set of rules which defines quantifiable features of stories and makes explicit their correspondence to the storyteller's interpersonal, cognitive and affective capacities. The use of such measures is based on a logical positivist theory of meaning. This theory of meaning attempts to make explicit and to formalize the rules by which meaningful phenomena could be analyzed and verified with empirical evidence. This approach is commonly used in much research of stories in clinical psychology (Thompson, 1981; Cramer, 1983, 1986 1987; Bogen, 1981; Westen et al., 1990).

The dialogic approach is formulated within a hermeneutic perspective. The term hermeneutics is used here to refer to the examination of interpretive activity. This approach draws from the work of phenomenological and language philosophers (Heidegger, 1962; Gadamer, 1988; Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1969; Wittgenstein, 1968; and Rorty, 1979). It proposes that understanding is reached through a

dialogic process - that we know something through our conversations and interactions with it. Gadamer (1988) suggests that the communication of meaning occurs in conversation where the "fundamental procedure is always question and answer" (p.331). While the empirical approach emphasizes the referential functions, this hermeneutic approach emphasizes the social, pragmatic or indexical (Crapanzano, 1981) functions of language. It assumes that what we know is defined by the context in which and the process by which we know it. Interpretation cannot be objectively verified. Verification is reached through negotiations, transactions and consensus with others.

The move from the approach to the dialogic approach will entail a shift in methodology and the underlying assumptions inherent in that methodology. This shift is exemplary of a redefinition of the locus of psychology from an understanding of people in the internal realm of covert structures and processes, to the contexts of social interaction proposed by philosophers such as Wittgenstein (1968), Rorty (1979) and Taylor (1985, 1988). It is only beginning to be proposed by psychologists such as Gergen (1986, 1988), Wakefield (1988) and Shannon (1988).

**SIGNIFICANCE OF PROBLEM:**

Clinical psychology since its inception has been a self questioning discipline concerned with both establishing its legitimacy in the form of scientific proof and with finding interpretive methods effective as a means of understanding and curing people. It's self consciousness has developed both in the context of the scientific and the interpretive tradition. Its search for both scientific proof and effective interpretive methods has led to an ongoing controversy concerning: the nature of knowledge, the definition of the kind of fact, evidence, and methods, best suited to, and even the necessity of an epistemology for practice and research.

This controversy began in the early days of psychoanalytic theory. Freud struggled with the issues involved in this controversy. Describing his struggle in his discussion of his case history of Elizabeth von R, he wrote that

I was not always a psychotherapist, but was trained in local and electrical diagnosis like other neuropathologist, and I still find it a very strange thing that the case histories I describe read like short stories and lack, so to speak, the serious imprint of science. I must console myself with the thought that it is obviously the nature of the material itself that is responsible for this, rather than my own choice. In the study of hysteria local diagnosis and electrical reaction do not come into the picture, while an exhaustive account of mental processes, of the kind we are accustomed to having from imaginative writers, enables me, by the application of a few psychological

formulas, to obtain a kind of insight into the origin of hysteria, (Breuer and Freud, 1955, pp. 160-161).

Striving to meet scientific standards, Freud was perturbed, early in his career, by the way in which his work fell short. Is "the nature of the material itself" responsible for the form a study should take? Is an objective, scientific inquiry of meaningful human behavior possible? Why do his analyses take a narrative form?

As the discipline matured and sought to be included as part of academic psychology it had to meet the methodological standards of academic psychology as it was and is ruled by the powers that be -- the empiricists. "Thus," Glick (1990) argues, "at a critical point in the development of psychoanalysis it entered into a domain of discourse that became more and more restrictive as the empiricists held sway." Klein (1976) claims academic psychology had restricted inquiry into the meaning of human experience, particularly from the perspective of the "acting person." Currently within academic clinical psychology logical empirical standards govern decisions regarding accreditation of graduate programs, publication of journal articles, and hiring and tenure of professors. Not many graduate programs even allow non-empirical or non-logical positivist dissertations.

Meanwhile, there have been significant advances outside

academic psychology within the interpretive tradition (in hermeneutics, semiotics, literary theory, philosophy of language, family systems theories etc). Social scientists began to consider alternative methods as legitimate investigative activity. Discussions concerning the assumptions used in the practice and research of therapy began in the advanced clinical training institutes, their journals and conferences and a handful of books (Klein, 1976; Schafer, 1976; Spence, 1982, 1988; Grunbaum, 1984, 1988; Levinson, 1988; Bruner, 1986; Woolfolk, Messer and Sass, 1988). In these forums questions concerning the validity of interpretations, the existence of an objective reality, knowledge as an accurate representation of that reality, and the value of searching for correspondences among thought, language and the objective world are hotly debated.

Even though these debates could richly inform the field, they remain locked outside of academic psychology. Alternative interpretive approaches do not command the same respect, legitimacy and funds that an empiricist approach does. They are ignored or simply not known by clinical psychologists. As a result, the discipline has become increasingly disconnected from its interpretive roots.

The discipline is at a critical moment in its development. It is split between empirical academic stance and alternative hermeneutic stances taken outside of academia. This dissertation explores the consequences of this split as it concerns the use of the narrative form in theoretical and clinical practice.

The narrative form has had a central role in this controversy in the history of clinical psychology. It has been conceived of and used as a means of understanding people in several ways: as data and evidence for theory and practice, as a therapeutic mode and as a theoretical medium. In academic psychology narratives have been primarily used as data and evidence for theoretical constructs. Outside academia the narrative form is considered otherwise in terms of clinical and theoretical practice. This dissertation reengages the empirical academic research with the interpretive investigative activity occurring outside academia in the institutes and other disciplines. It takes as a particularly significant case in point the contrast between empirical and dialogic approaches to narrative productions.

**A SYNOPSIS:**

The next three chapters are concerned with the assumptions and vocabularies that shape our understanding of stories and their tellers. I articulate three sets of assumptions and vocabularies. I start most broadly with those concerning inquiry. I then focus on those concerning language and, finally, most specifically, on those concerning narrative.

The discussion begins in chapter II with the question 'how do you tell?'. This chapter makes explicit the assumptions of methods used to inquire into and present research about meaningful behavior such as storytelling. It examines empirical and certain hermeneutic methods. It discusses their respective definitions of truth and knowledge, procedures for verification, methods of attaining knowledge, and methods for studying change, development and process.

Chapter III explicates the conceptions of language implied in empirical and dialogic approaches to narrative research. It explores a spectrum of conceptions of language, characterized in terms of where and when the meaning of linguistic phenomena is located and to what extent it is fixed specifiable and definitive. This

spectrum provides a view of certain psychoanalytic (i.e. Freud), object relational (i.e. Jacobson, Sandler and Rosenblatt), developmental (Schimek, Blatt, Werner) and literary and philosophical perspectives (i.e. Wittgenstein, Bakhtin, Crapanzano) perspectives on language in relation to one another. This spectrum is presented with the arguments that

1) psychologists with an empirical perspective tend to use a referential and representational conception of language and mind because it renders linguistic phenomena and covert psychological theoretical constructs suitable for empirical study (by logical positivist standards), and that 2) referential and representational conception of language, which attempt to reduce and fix meaning to definitive internal entities or mental states that exist before language is used, inadequately account for the meaning of language.

Chapter IV through an examination of the literature of narrative research shows that the 'results' 'findings,' or theories that psychological narrative research generates are shaped by their conceptions of inquiry, language and narrative. It examines the discipline's evolving understanding of narratives and their tellers in the historical context of the development of psychoanalytic



theory. This chapter tells the story of the use of the narrative form as data and evidence for theory and practice within clinical psychology. It surveys narrative analysis in terms of two sources of its theoretical codes: literary theory and psychology. We discover that some tell how the story was told in terms of psychological constructs, that others tell how the story was told in terms of linguistic metalinguistic processes and yet others skip that question and investigate what the stories do.

Chapter V demonstrates the consequences of employing an empirical approach in contrast to a dialogic approach with a comparative methodological study. It contrasts these two approaches' analyses of the same sample of stories. These stories were spontaneously told by two eleven-year-old children in psychotherapeutic treatment at urban outpatient clinics during a therapy session to their therapists. Both studies attempt to reach an understanding of the two patients' interpersonal experience through the stories they tell. But each approach begins with different assumptions concerning inquiry, language and narrative and proceeds with different methods. The empirical approach employs Westen et al.'s (1988) object relations measures and the dialogic a question and answer procedure which draws upon, amongst others, Bakhtin's (1981, 1984, 1986) and Cohn's (1978) work.

Chapter VI compares the understanding of each storyteller reached by means of the empirical analysis with that reached by means of the dialogic analysis. It examines how each analysis construes the relationship between story and teller. It then considers the significance of the different understandings to clinical practice. It takes the storytellers' therapists' response to the analyses and discusses their views concerning the purposes for which each analysis is best suited.

This investigation is based on the premise that 1) The use of language is of primary importance in the establishment of understanding and meaning; 2) Language is primarily a social phenomenon; and, 3) Understanding is created by a dialogic process. Asking and telling are intertwined with knowing. The title 'How do you tell how the story was told?' is telling of the bias towards the dialogic mode of inquiry. The word 'tell' is of particular importance. Telling implies there is a speaker and a listener. Telling engages two. To tell is to relate, alert, or inform another. To tell is to let someone know. When something is "telling", it makes an impression; it speaks. The word "tell" speaks of the dialogic mode of understanding.

This investigation is designed to open a discussion, rather than prove any hypotheses. It is written with a bias for a pragmatic and dialogic approach to language and inquiry in response to the empirical bias in academic psychology. This bias hopefully provides a new perspective on empirical accounts of narratives within clinical and developmental psychology. It is meant to question the usefulness of the empirical method and to establish the relevance and legitimacy of the dialogic approach to clinical and theoretical practice. It carries on the discipline's tradition of self questioning **within** academia.

**CHAPTER 2**  
**HOW DO YOU TELL?**  
**Empirical and Dialogic Approaches of**  
**Inquiring into Meaningful Behavior**

How and if stories tell us about their tellers is a question that is part of larger questions concerning the relation of conceptions of inquiry to language and consciousness. In this study I define these questions in two sets: 1) How do you tell? and 2) How was the story told? The first set concerns the inquiry of the relationship of language to truth, reality and knowledge, and the second concerns conceptions of the relationship between language and consciousness. For some the two sets are not so separate, and for those, like Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson (1981) who do not conceive of language and consciousness as separate entities with intrinsic natures, the second set doesn't exist at all. How we conceive of how what we say and write is related to who we are, and what we know, how we conceive of inquiry and language, will influence what we think stories can tell us and what questions we ask of them. How we conceive language, in general, and stories in particular, convey meaning will influence what methodology we consider appropriate to conduct our inquiry. In this chapter we examine the differences between the assumptions of an empirical and a hermeneutic/dialogic approach concerning inquiry. In the

next we will examine the assumptions of different conceptions of language.

#### **THE EMPIRICAL AND LOGICAL POSITIVIST METHOD:**

How can we gain empirical knowledge of meaningful behavior? Logical positivism evolved partially in response to this question. It is a problematic question. The problems involved in answering it in part concern the very premises of empiricism. For example, according to empiricism, knowledge is based on objective observations of sensory data. In order to gain empirical knowledge of meaningful behavior, we must formulate an objective means of observing it. If we would like to gain empirical knowledge about how a story is told, we are faced with the problem of devising a method to objectively observe or tell how a story is told. We would have to formulate some idea of what knowledge and meaning is, and how knowledge is attained and meaning understood. These are some of the problems logical positivism was created to solve. In the following discussion I will describe the emergence of logical positivism, the empirical premises which underlie it, and describe its methods and procedures. We, then, will be able to return and begin to answer the question: How can the empirical approach tell how the story was told?

Twentieth century empiricism, alternately called logical positivism or logical empiricism, arose in reaction

to the then prevailing metaphysical speculation -- to the concern with formulating propositions or systems of thought to explain the essence or origin of things. The logical positivist redefined the philosopher's task from that of the construction systems of thought to the activity of clearing up problems created by the imprecise and ambiguous use of language through rigorous linguistic analysis.

Logical positivism, as its name in part connotes, conceives of knowledge as the striving for certainty. The word "positivism" was coined by Auguste Comte in the 1820's. He conceived of knowledge as the precise, systemic rendering of the real, that is, as representation. According to this conception of knowledge as representation, the mind is conceived of as a mirror that must be polished and carefully inspected to behold - know - the reality out there. Logical positivists are not so much interested in the variation of particular cases as they are in the discovery of universal laws. Truth is about timeless, universal, certainties. "Significance" for empiricists is a measure for probability - a kind of certainty.

Empiricism assumes all knowledge is derived from the senses or from experience through the senses. It is based on the Cartesian dualistic view of reality, which presumes that knowledge is obtained by a subject who perceives an object. In order for this subject to know his object with certainty he must maintain an objective stance. According

to the empirical paradigm this objective stance is established and maintained with the use of sampling procedures, controlled variation of objects of study, standard quantitative measures and eventually by experimentation that can be replicated.

According to empiricism, all claims of knowledge are verifiable by observation or experimentation. Observations are communicable, measurable, perceptual experiences. Empiricists believe that all of philosophies unsolvable problems rest on the misuses of language. They use logic and empirical evidence as their standards. They let their premises and hypothesis stand or fall in light of observational evidence.

According to the empiricist dualistic conception of reality perception is a passive process. Perceptual processes merely mirror the physical phenomena of this world. As such the division between subject/object and the objectivity of the subject can be maintained. Knowledge consists of the piecing together of our sensory perceptions, like a jigsaw puzzle in the mind. The world can be broken into observable "facts". This, the atomistic conception of knowledge, is inherent to the empirical perspective.

In order to validate an idea one must find sense impressions or observations that relate to it. Truth is established by matching physical phenomena with the ideas that correctly represent them. This conception of truth is

known as the correspondence theory or representation theory of truth. This making ideas correspond to physical phenomena is also called reductionism. Concepts are reducible to an observational basis in data of direct experience.

Logical positivism at its most ambitious stance claims a radical reductionism, asserting that a unitary explanation for all phenomena is possible. Carnap suggests that all the regularities of mind might well become explainable and reduced to neurophysiology. According to this physicalism, there is the possibility of a unitary set of explanatory assumptions from which empirical laws can be derived. In this way logical positivism is seen as a method that can build the foundation for all knowledge. The goal of logical positivism is to establish a foundation for knowledge - an epistemology.

#### **HOW CAN THE EMPIRICAL METHOD TELL HOW A STORY WAS TOLD?:**

Can meaningful phenomena be investigated with empirical methods? How is the empirical method suited to the task of understanding how a story is told? An empirical approach to this question would seek to observe, identify and quantify those conditions or determinants that caused the story to be told in the particular manner in which it was told. It would understand the word 'how' in the question 'how was the story told?' to mean the conditions, processes, or



determinants that caused the story to be told. In contrast the word 'how' could also be understood to ask for a description of the literary style or techniques used to tell the story without concern for causal determinants outside the story. An empirical approach would seek to identify patterns in the relationship between features of the stories and the conditions (such as features of the storyteller) that determined its production.

How do we devise a method to objectively observe or tell how a story is told? Freud was faced with this question when he considered a question similar to the question how was the story told. He wondered "how that strange being the poet comes by his material," (1908, 1958 rpt, p. 44). As he searched for his answer, he encountered problems. When he asked poets he said, "they give us no explanation of the matter, at least no satisfactory explanation." Then he suggests we look into ourselves and look for any activity akin to the writing of imaginative works. Not immediately finding a readily observable adult activity, he suggests,

We ought surely to look in the child for the first traces of imaginative activity. The child's best loved and most absorbing occupation is play. Perhaps we may say that every child at play behaves like an imaginative writer, in that he creates a world of his own, or more truly, he rearranges the things of his world and orders it in a new way that pleases him better. ("Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming," pp. 44-45)

And so Freud proceeds by analogy to some observable data -

child's play - to seek verification for his ideas about unconscious processes. Freud devises a mode of answering this question in this particular example, within an empirical view of inquiry. He begins to formulate the correspondence between the subject in question and observable phenomena.

But how can the meaning of a story be objectively ascertained? Some would argue that the understanding of stories requires involvement - a relinquishment of one's objectivity. Certainty of a story's meaning some would believe is not possible, because stories' meanings are intrinsically ambiguous. But others argue that logical positivism offers us the means to objectively ascertain a story's meaning.

The possibility of an empirical investigation of meaningful phenomena depends upon one's conception of meaning. Meaning as construed within the Cartesian dualistic world is something separate from language, something between the self and reality, which we use language to express and represent. This is in contrast to the "post-positivistic" notion of meaning as the result of the sheer contingencies of our use of language.

A group of mathematically oriented philosophers and philosophically oriented scientists and mathematicians in the early part of this century (Wittgenstein, 1922, Ayer, 1936, Russell, 1960, 1962, and Carnap, 1967), set out to

find a way to investigate meaningful phenomena with empirical methods. They strove to make explicit and formalize the rules according to which symbols and the words of a language are meaningful. Attempting to establish rules by which meaning could be analyzed and verified with empirical evidence, they defined two kinds of propositions: analytic and synthetic. Analytic propositions are true by definition or rules by which meaning is established. Synthetic propositions are true if validated with empirical evidence. A Viennese group of logical empiricists, based on their reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, claimed that sentences made factual sense only if they were logically conceivable, or only if they could be confirmed by empirical evidence. In chapter four I will show how these ideas about meaning are put to use by psychologists in their construction and use of coding scales in empirical investigations of stories.

According to an empirical or logical positivist perspective, there is a correct answer to the question of how a story is told. The problem is finding a way to represent it with language. Moreover, the answer to this question necessarily entails the construction of some hypothetical mental entities or processes. Once one accepts and works within a Cartesian dualistic conception of reality one thinks of human subjects as having minds in which processes occur. Some of these processes create stories.

If we want to study these unobservable processes, we have to come up with a set of correspondence rules with observable phenomena, for example the plot structure of or the degree of malevolence present in their stories.

The theories of psychoanalysis, object relations, social cognition and some theories of cognition are formulated within the Cartesian conception of the world. Meaning according to these theories is governed by representations. In different ways each suggests that meaningful behavior originates in emotional, cognitive and/or social processes, and is mediated by mental representations. Freud spoke of ideas as representative of instincts and that these ideas influenced all purposeful behavior. Each of the psychological theories listed above see the storyteller having certain representations (or in the case of Freud "ideas") inside the mind that become manifest in and structure the story told. Psychological conceptions of meaning are further elaborated upon in chapters three and four.

#### **THE DIALOGIC APPROACH:**

The dialogic approach used in this study has a radically different view of truth, meaning, knowledge, and reality. It is formulated within a certain hermeneutic perspective. According to this particular hermeneutic perspective, the terms, truth, meaning, knowledge and

reality are defined by the context and process in which they occur. In the following discussion I will describe several aspects of contexts and processes that are thought important in constructing truth, knowledge and reality. Though the term hermeneutics refers to a plurality of points of view, in the discussion below I will focus on the hermeneutic views of phenomenological and language philosophers (Hegel, 1931, Heidegger, 1962; Gadamer, 1988; Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1964, 1969; Wittgenstein, 1968; and Rorty, 1979).

According to some hermeneutic thinkers (not including Dilthey) objective knowledge of facts is not possible. Knowledge is inevitably influenced by the cultural and historical context. Hegel (1931) advanced this view in his Phenomenology of Mind in which he made a critique of Cartesian and Kantian epistemology. His work profoundly influenced such major proponents of hermeneutic philosophy as, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas (1971, 1973) and Merleau-Ponty. Hegel argued that any critique of knowledge itself presupposed knowledge or at the very least is a framework within which knowledge is constituted.

One such framework or context in which knowledge is constituted is time. For Hegel knowledge is a constantly changing, growing, developing state. He suggested that knowledge could be obtained from a phenomenological standpoint, in what does actually happen in our attempt to know, in what he called "becoming". Knowledge, he thought,

is immanent in our experience. It is temporally defined. We know along with the act by which we know. An epistemology - a theory of knowledge - can not precede knowledge. Hegel believed our ideas are our reality, are bound up with truth.

Although both the empirical and this Hegelian phenomenological perspective share the view that truth is discovered through investigations of the phenomenal world, they differ in important ways. Empiricists believe that reality exists separately from the processes by which we know it, while Hegel and many of the hermeneutic thinkers he influenced believed our ideas could not exist separately from our observation of phenomena, but come into existence in the process of observation.

Hermeneutic thinkers, like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Rorty elaborated on Hegel's refutation of Cartesian and Kantian views. According to this refutation, sensory experience, or facts, the very data that science suggests we objectively observe, is implicit in and constituted by our own perspective. Data do not exist separately from the researchers theories, biases, or choice of language. They do not exist apart from an interpretive process. These hermeneutic thinkers, unlike logical positivists, believe that perception is an active process which interprets or constructs what is perceived. Interpretation is the central activity of hermeneutics.

Hermeneutics is even named after an interpreter. The word hermeneutics is derived from the name 'Hermes'. Hermes was a messenger of the Greek gods, who brought the word of the gods to the oracle at Delphi where he attempted to make it intelligible to the people. However, there was always some ambiguity remaining which left the message open to more than one interpretation. The hermeneutic view asserts many interpretations or truths are possible, unlike the empirical view which asserts there is one absolute definable truth. Roland Barthes, a French deconstructionist literary critic, demonstrates the hermeneutic approach in his book S/Z. He shows how Balzac's Sarrasine achieves a fullness of meaning through the interplay of multiple interpretations.

Once one relinquishes the empirical dualistic conception of inquiry and one defines knowledge as the process by which it occurs, the distinctions among investigator, data, observation, and interpretation have to be redefined and the interrelationships become more complex. These terms become tools for understanding rather than realities. Subjects and objects become defined by their relationships and interactions. One knows something by the very conditions of one's interaction with it. This is in great contrast to the empirical view that the conditions for knowledge is one's separateness and disconnection from one's object of study. To use an example of Heidegger's, a hammer is what it is because of what we do with it. Objects exist

in the "human life world". They are known through our interactions with them. According to Gadamer, knowledge involves a kind of dialectic of mutual influences a kind of game playing where neither player completely creates the game or determines what happens.

Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger argue that most human functioning involves a direct relation of the person to the world without mediation of mental representations. They redefined psychology to be the study of the situated-person, the person-world relationship. Heidegger focused on the cultural context of a person's experience, Merleau-Ponty focuses on the bodily context. Merleau-Ponty describes how the potentialities and limits of the human body, the primacy of its perceptual processes, and its position in relation to the world shapes human experience. He argues that the manner of our involvement with life is the source of our consciousness and meaning. Meaning emerges from our interactions. Meaning is created and found in the process of expression. Knowledge is not separate from the language with which one expresses what one knows, and language is not separate from the reality it expresses. According to Merleau-Ponty language is caught in the fabric of lived reality.

Gadamer also argued that understanding requires active involvement rather than detachment. He asserted that we arrive at an understanding through an examination of our



biases, presupposition or pre-understanding. He described the active involvement or interaction by which we understand as a dialogue. He argued that the understanding of a text involved letting a text "have its own say" and speaking in response to it. He conceived of understanding as a kind of conversation. He did not believe in the use of preconceived methods, because he believed they would only render the kind of truths already implicit in them.

Bakhtin along with these hermeneutic thinkers also emphasized the importance of the socio-historical context and of the primary importance of language in the establishment of meaning and understanding. He claimed,

For any individual consciousness living in it, language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the "taste" of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life...(1981, 293).

He, like Gadamer, conceived of understanding and inquiry as a dialogic activity. According to his dialogic perspective, everything means, is understood as a part of a larger whole, and any one meaning is in constant interaction with other meanings. Implicit in this perspective is a holistic orientation to inquiry. His views will be examined in more depth in chapter three.

According to these hermeneutic thinkers, understanding is reached by going from person to context and back again, circling back and forth between the particular and the whole. Interpretation works within, what Ast originally called, the "hermeneutic circle". This conception of inquiry and understanding, along with the dissolution of the dualistic conception of inquiry, speaks of the hermeneutic perspective's holistic orientation. This holistic orientation is in counterpoint to the atomistic orientation of an empirical perspective.

For some hermeneutic philosophers, along with the subject object dichotomy conception of knowing goes the conceptions of human beings as having minds or consciousness with cognitive, emotional or unconscious processes in it. Norman Malcolm in an article entitled "The Myth of Cognitive Processes and Structures" writes,

Thus, it is the facts, the circumstances surrounding the behavior, that give it the property of expressing recognition. This property is not due to something that goes on inside.

It seems to me that if this point were understood by philosophers and psychologists, they would no longer have a motive for constructing theories and models for recognition, memory, thinking, problem solving, understanding and other "cognitive processes (1971, p. 387).

For pragmatically oriented hermeneutic thinkers the logical positivist goal of striving for the certainty of timeless universal truths is worth striving for only if it

serves certain purposes. Some hermeneutic thinkers, like William James, Wittgenstein and Rorty have a much more pragmatic conception of truth and knowledge. The pragmatist's conception does away with the dualistic divisions between contemplation and action, and between representing the world and coping with it. Rorty suggests "the notion of knowledge as the assemblage of accurate representation is 'optional'." (1979, p.11) He claims,

the notion of 'accurate representation' is simply an automatic and empty compliment which we pay to those beliefs which are successful in helping us do what we want to do.

Our knowledge of objects depends upon our everyday transactions with them. Wittgenstein speaks of the context truth occurs in as a "form of life". He speaks of truth as mutual agreement:

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"--It is what human beings say that is true or false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not in opinion but in form of life, (Philosophical Investigations, #241).

Here Wittgenstein presents one view of how verification of truth is reached. According to his view, truth cannot be objectively verified. It is verified through our negotiations and transactions with each other in our daily lives with language. However, this is only one example. Verification, validity and evaluation of competing interpretations is the subject of much heated debate in the

hermeneutic world. This controversy is beyond the scope of this general overview of hermeneutics.

To summarize the hermeneutic view: Truth, meaning reality and knowledge are formed within contexts or processes that can be described historically, culturally and/or pragmatically. They can be described as formed by the kinds of perceptual processes, observations, measurements, and/or interpretations used, and by the kinds of interactions, dialogues, transactions, and negotiations that occur. In the hermeneutic world there are no absolute entities such as subject/object, mind/matter, self, other, or inner mental processes. These are socio-historical constructions.

#### **Vygotsky's Dialectical Method: An Example of a Psychological Method Developed on the Basis of Hermeneutic Premises**

Although the Russian psychologist, Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, has never been considered a hermeneutic thinker, he has much in common with hermeneutic thinkers. His work has in common with their's the proposal that human behavior cannot be understood separate from its social and historical meanings and requires a methodology that reflects on its own interaction with and interpretation of that meaning. Like other hermeneutic thinkers, he was influenced by Hegel. Vygotsky's work is one example of how Hegel's influence was

used to forge a new methodology for psychology.

He attempts to adapt a dialectical conception of knowledge and reality to the study of traditional psychological topics such as development of language and thought. Vygotsky was profoundly influenced by the writing of Marx and Engels, imbedded by his experience of the Russian revolution. His work is of particular significance to this dissertation because it shows an attempt to take certain hermeneutic premises, formulate a methodology, and then proceed with research. Vygotsky recognized that his new approach to the understanding of psychological activity leads to new methods of investigation and analysis. He asserted that "methods have always reflected the ways in which fundamental psychological problems were viewed and solved, (1978, p. 58)." He claimed,

The search for method becomes one of the most important problems of the entire enterprise of understanding the uniquely human forms of psychological activity. In this case, the method is simultaneously prerequisite and product, the tool and the result of the study, (1978, p. 65).

Vygotsky's dialectical view of human beings relation to their environment differs from the prevailing philosophical and psychological views of his day. Unlike John Locke, who argued that our sense of reality was based in the environment, Vygotsky argued that it was formed in the process of our interaction with our environment. He viewed the relationship as bidirectional rather than

unidirectional. "The dialectical approach," he argued, while admitting the influence of nature on man, asserts that man, in turn, affects nature and creates through his changes in nature new natural conditions for his existence. This position is the keystone of our approach to the study and interpretation of man's higher psychological functions and serves as the basis for the new methods of experimentation and analysis that we advocate, (Mind and Society p. 60).

Vygotsky, along with other hermeneutic thinkers conceived of knowledge he sought as temporally defined. He was concerned that human behavior be understood in the context of its development. He called this method along with Heinz Werner the "experimental-genetic" method. His studies focused on process, change and development. He conceived of human behavior, not as an object to study, but as a process. He argued,

Any psychological process whether the development of thought or voluntary behavior, is a process undergoing changes right before one's eyes (Mind and Society p. 61)."

He adamantly insisted that psychologists should concentrate unlike the various stimulus-response learning theorists of his day, not on the products of development, but on the process by which it occurs. This focus on process, change and development also is used as the focus of the dialogic analysis of narratives.

Vygotsky attempted to "provoke" or create a process of development in his experiments. One method was to give children difficult tasks and then carefully observe what

children would do in response to the experimental task. This is in contrast to conventional experiments where the categories or codings of subjects responses is pre-established. Vygotsky was less concerned with creating a controlled environment and more concerned with creating an environment that would facilitate the generation and observation of various processes.

Vygotsky did not call his approach hermeneutic. He called and thought of his method, however different from the empirical method, 'scientific'. His 'scientific experiments' were very different from conventional experiments. The results were presented in the form of detailed descriptions and careful observation. Results were qualitative as well as quantitative in nature. He viewed the scientific task as one of mapping the history of psychological processes. He thought qualitative analysis was indispensable since quantitative analysis often presented two phenomena as the same rather conveying their qualitative difference, or as different rather than conveying their qualitative similarity (eg. egocentric speech and internal speech).

Vygotsky did not develop a method specifically for investigating narratives. His work informs the hermeneutic approach taken in this dissertation. The dialogic approach used in this study, like Vygotsky's approach, focuses on the description of qualitative differences, development, process

and change. Like his research, it involves detailed analysis, and studies spontaneous behavior.

#### **HOW CAN THE DIALOGIC APPROACH TELL HOW THE STORY WAS TOLD?**

The dialogic approach used in this study attends closely to the language by which interpersonal interaction take place within stories and among the multiple perspectives inhabited by teller and listener/reader. It understands the story as an activity. It focuses on process, both the process of storytelling and the process of interpretation. It conceives of the narrative as a form of dialogue - as someone telling someone else what happened. A story is understood as a constellation of responses to experiences, other people, voices and perspectives, rather than as reference to internal representations or ideas. The process of telling is assumed to act upon rather than be a manifestation of previous experiences. This dialogic approach examines dialogues among multiple perspectives within the story, between story and teller and between teller and listener/reader. It is even composed as a dialogue, which initially is guided by a preconceived set of questions. This question-answer procedure is adopted following Gadamer's suggestion that a question and answer procedure is fundamental to any inquiry. The dialogic approach proposed for this study is discussed in greater detail in chapter five.



### **EMPIRICISM AND DIALOGISM: Two Modes of Knowing**

When dialogism and empiricism both are thought of as activities we engage for the purposes of knowing something, the subject is taken out of the 'either/or,' 'right/wrong,' arena. Jerome Bruner in his book *Actual Minds Possible Worlds* distinguishes between a scientific and literary approach to inquiry. He argues,

There are two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality. The two (though complementary) are irreducible to one another. Efforts to reduce one mode to the other or to ignore one at the expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich diversity of thought, (p.11).

Bruner distinguishes "the two modes" in terms of their procedures for verification. Both can be very convincing, but they convince us of different things. A good scientific theory convinces us of its truth through formal systematic description and explanation and empirical proof. A good story convinces us of its lifelikeness. The scientific argument requires logical consistency and noncontradiction, while the story may have contradiction, paradox, nonlogical arbitrariness at its core.

They are both transformations of statements of fact into statements implying causality. However, the two types of causality implied are very different:

The term then functions differently in the logical proposition "if x, then y" and in the narrative recit "The king died, and then the queen died." One leads to a search for universal truth conditions, the other for likely particular

connections between two events -- mortal grief, suicide, foul play, (p.12).

However convincing Bruner's arguments are for an irreducible difference between the two modes, I can't help but think that in practice the two never exist in the pure form and that the difference in actuality is one of degree. I think literary critic and scientist alike formulate their truths and versimilitudes using some combination of theorizing/hypothesis testing and storytelling. How explicit, the use of these modes are is another question. So I would wonder. A scientific investigation usually is represented in two forms, one which appears in professional journals or meetings, and the other which is informally related among colleagues or by historians of science in an anecdotal or narrative form. Bohr, the physicist, told Bruner a story of how he came to hypothesize the idea of complementarity in quantum theory. This story of course was never published in scientific journals, never made explicit, even though, Bohr himself tells Bruner how this story was involved in the very conception of his idea. Bruner recounts, that Bohr told him that the idea of complementarity occurred to him, when

he thought of the impossibility of considering his son simultaneously in the light of love and in the light of justice, the son just having voluntarily confessed that he had stolen a pipe from a local shop. His brooding set him to thinking about the vases and the faces in the trick figure-ground pictures: you can see only one at a time. And then the impossibility of thinking simultaneously about the position and the velocity of a particle

occurred to him, (p. 51).

One moral of this presentation of the tale is that implicit in every theory there's a story, and perhaps, implicit in every story there's a theory. But Bruner would argue,

many scientific and mathematical hypotheses start their lives as little stories or metaphors... they reach their scientific maturity by a process of conversion into verifiability, formal or empirical, and their power at maturity does not rest upon their dramatic origins, (p.12).

He seems to suggest that the two modes exist in a developmental relation to one another. The narrative mode being the precursor of the scientific. But is this really the case? What is the relation between these two modes in an investigation?

Bruner's consideration of empiricism and alternative interpretive approaches allows for the possibility of using either or both in understanding stories. His description of the differences between the two, is suggestive of the present study. What would be the difference between the understanding reached with a empirical approach and the understanding reached with a dialogic approach to the investigation of stories? We are slowly becoming able to answer this question. In this chapter we examined the differences between the assumptions of an empirical and a dialogic approach concerning inquiry. In the next we will examine the assumptions of different conceptions of language.

### CHAPTER 3

#### CONCEPTIONS OF LANGUAGE AND NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

It is an old dream that in time psychology might be able to tell us so much about our minds that we would at last become able to discover with some certainty what we mean by our words, and how we mean it. An opposite or complementary dream is that ... we may in time learn so much about words that they will tell us how our minds work.

I.A. Richards

The Philosophy of Rhetoric

In this chapter I would like to examine certain psychological models of mind, their conceptions of language and the complementary dreams I. A. Richards claims they inspire: the dreams that they will "at last" tell us what we mean by our words, how we mean it and tell us how our minds work. There are those like Freud who use their model of mind to tell us what our words mean. There are others, like the linguist, Chomsky, and psychoanalytic theorists like Rappaport, Holt, and Blatt, who use their analysis of words to tell us about the structures of the mind. And then there are others for whom language and mind are not used as mirrors to gain knowledge of the other. For Werner, Vygotsky and Bakhtin language, mind and world are in continual interaction, each, in turn, transforming the other. For even others (Rorty and Davidson) language and mind are conceptual categories and not actual realities.

I would like to view a spectrum of conceptions of how language means and discuss the consequences such conceptions have for narrative analysis. I characterize this spectrum in terms of where and when the meaning of a linguistic phenomena is located and to what extent it is fixed, specifiable and definitive. According to some conceptions of language, meaning is located inside the mind or body before it is spoken or written and according to others, it is located outside among people and culture, before during and after it is spoken or written. The spectrum I draw provides a view of certain psychoanalytic, object relational, developmental, literary and philosophical perspectives on language in relation to one another. The perspectives I have chosen to discuss are those that inform the methodologies used in the two investigations in chapter five. This discussion is by no means comprehensive of either particular perspectives nor of the literature on language and consciousness as a whole. It serves to highlight the way in which our conceptions of language are involved in our methodologies, and in what we ask stories to tell.

The empirical approach used in this study and in empirical psychodynamically oriented narrative studies, in general, have evolved in the context of psychoanalytic

(Freud), object relations (Jakobson and Kernberg), and developmental and cognitive theories (Piaget and Werner). The dialogic approach has evolved in the context of the psychological theories named above in addition to the work of the literary theorists, Dorrit Cohn and Kenneth Burke and phenomenological and language philosophers reviewed in the preceding chapter (Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Rorty, Gadamer, and Bakhtin). Following this theoretical discussion I shall present a review of empirical and literary narrative studies.

At one end of the spectrum language is conceived of primarily in terms of its referential and representational functions. Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. Meaning is fixed, specifiable and determinate. It is located inside the mind. Outside, linguistic expressions serve as a manifestation, copy, or reflection of a person's internal representations, psychological processes and structures -- mental states and contents.

According to this view, meaning exists in the determinate form of representations or ideas in the mind. They constitute people's knowledge and account for their meaningful behavior. The representational conception of meaning leads to a representational model of mind (Shannon,

1988). According to this model, human behavior is directed or mediated by representations. Knowledge in the form of symbolic mental representations precedes and mediates linguistic expression and action in general. With this conception of language we use a person's words as pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, once pieced together renders some picture of that person's consciousness.

This model is predominante in cognitive psychology. Shannon cites the work of J.R. Anderson and Bower (1973), Newell (1972), and Schank, (1972), as paradigmatic of the representational view in cognitive psychology. Wakefield (1988) considers the "representationalism" view of meaning the predominant view used in positivist/empirical research of meaningful phenomena. Psychoanalytic views of language and mind share certain aspects with the representational view of mind. In psychoanalysis ideas and representations are considered the the latent or hidden forms of meaning that become manifest in behavior. Recently, psychoanalytic researchers have increasingly drawn from the "cognitivist" or "representational" view to investigate meaningful phenomena (Blatt and Lerner, 1983).

At this end of the spectrum of conceptions of language the rule of Cartesian dualities is strong. There is an internal world and an external world; there is mind and

body. Consciousness is an intrapsychic phenomena. There are sharp distinctions made among thought, language, and action. An atomistic view of reality is assumed. The conceptions of language of psychoanalytic, object relations, cognitive and developmental theorists fall toward this end of the spectrum.

At the other end of the spectrum the pragmatic and generative functions of language are considered primary. The conceptions of language proposed by Bakhtin, Merleau-Ponty and in the later work of Wittgenstein fall toward this end. The conceptions of language at this end tend to propose that the meaning of a linguistic expression is created and determined in the course and context of its use. Meaning is not hidden, fixed, or carried in an image or representation in mind. As Wittgenstein says, "If God had looked into our minds. He would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of," (1958, p. 217), or of whom we were thinking. Meaning becomes more determinable within particular contexts. Meaning is not an image or representation, which may accompany meaning or intending. It is created in use in the interactions or multiple dialogues among people, language, and culture. Wittgenstein proposed in his later work that linguistic expressions should not be considered outward tokens of the



real thing that lies within, but as inextricably a part of the very experience expressed. For example, expressing an expectation is part of the process of expecting, as is pacing back and forth, and checking the clock. Rather than trying to get 'behind' linguistic expressions like psychoanalysts in search of latent meaning do, Wittgenstein suggests we view them in a broader setting in the context of their uses.

I would like to convey this conception of language by taking a brief excursion through a reading of a poem by Wallace Stevens. One could read the poem "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" as a series of answers to the question 'How is a poem told?' One interpreter of this poem suggests that the poem is a series of instances of how the imagination works, (Suknick, 1967). In the following excerpts from this poem the many instances in which the blackbird appears gives a sense of the multiple ways we use language to mean.

I  
Among twenty snowy mountains,  
The only moving thing  
Was the eye of the blackbird.

II  
I was of three minds,  
Like a tree  
In which there are three blackbirds.

## III

The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds.  
It was a small part of the pantomime.

## IV

A man and a woman  
Are one.  
A man and a woman and a black bird  
Are one.

## V

I do not know which to prefer,  
The beauty of inflections  
Or the beauty of innuendoes,  
The blackbird whistling  
Or just after.

....

## IX

When the blackbird flew out of sight,  
It marked the edge  
Of one of many circles.

We use language to actively see and create. As we speak or write we experience ourselves as part and whole, as between and of, as specific and multiple, as definite and indefinite, as before during and after... The meaning of the 'blackbird' is constantly changing. There isn't any one to one correspondence between the word 'blackbird' and its meaning, even in any one instance. The 'blackbird(s)' give and gain meaning in different stanzas or contexts in the poem. Their meaning belongs to context not to word. The word blackbird eludes a referential analysis.

The study of the meaning of linguistic phenomena for the purpose of gaining an understanding of people in

psychology has been shaped and guided by a number of theoretical tendencies. These tendencies are closely related to the degree to which an investigator holds to empirical or various hermeneutic stances discussed in the previous chapter. Those who are influenced by empiricism tend to make their formulations meet certain criteria. They tend to try to explain the complex in terms of the simple, the particular in terms of the universal, and fluid change in terms of fixed principles, and to essentialize multiple interrelationships in terms of causal determinants. They assume there is an order and meaning to phenomena and it is up to the investigator to discover the hidden conditions and rules by which that order's existence is determined.

In this chapter I will make the following interrelated arguments: 1. A referential and representational conceptions of language and mind tends to be used by empirical oriented psychologists (as described in the preceding chapter), because it renders linguistic phenomena and covert psychological theoretical constructs suitable for empirical study. 2. While referential and representational conceptions of language are suited to empirical and positivist methods, dialogic and holistic-process-oriented conceptions of language are better suited to a dialogic approach (as described in the preceding chapter). 3. Those

conceptions of language that attempt to reduce and fix meaning to definitive internal entities or mental states that exist before the language is used convey a limited account of the meaning of language.

#### **LANGUAGE AS REFERENTIAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL: Freudian and Object Relations Perspectives**

Freud is exemplary of those theorists who struggle to take their understanding of the complexity of human experience in relation to language, and formulate it to meet scientific standards. Freud early in his career strove to explain the complexity of the meaning of speech and language phenomena with formulations of their essential underlying causal determinants. His conception of language and its involvement in meaning and understanding is defined by his determinist and associationist model of mind. This view is most evident in his early work when he was looking for a linguistic route to understanding psychopathology. Although his views may have been different in latter years, he never formally revised his early views. In his view, meaning is determined by innate forces and its show (manifest form) is determined by those chains of associations, which are ultimately connected to drive energy. For Freud language represents, however indirectly, with however much distortion

and disguises hidden meanings that lie within us. An understanding of his conception of language is of particular importance because language is both the medium of clinical activity and the data of research, and because his conception of language shaped his theoretical and clinical formulations.

Language for Freud was an absolutely indispensable tool to the investigation and understanding of the real meaning of our experience. Unconscious phenomena are not readily apprehensible nor observable. The unobservability of the very object of study initially posed an obstacle to the advancement of psychoanalysis as a science, until Freud made language the object of study. For Freud words are necessary to restore and apprehend the original meaning and motive of psychical phenomena. Dreams for him are not simply images that tell. Spoken and written dream reports, associations to and interpretations of the dream with words are what tell about dreams.

Not only do words tell, but they serve as evidence of unconscious phenomena. For Freud speech and language phenomena ranging from speech errors to great poems are pieces of evidence of their author's inner psychic life. They are revised and distorted reproductions of some original experience. Freud attempts to give interpretation

certainty by grounding it in the material reality of the written word. He often refers to the spoken and written dream reports, associations and interpretations as 'material'. A written verbal account of an experience has a certain materiality because it is fixed in time. It has a beginning, middle, and end that gives the impression that its subject is able to be located in time. In addition one can continually refer back to it. This fixity gives the illusion of a fixed meaning. "In literate cultures," Walter Ong writes (quoted in Crapanzano, 1981, p. 129), "the illusion is widespread that if one has the exact words someone has uttered one has by that very fact his exact meaning." Freud not only imbued the report of verbalization with objective validity, but also interpretations. "The virtue of psychoanalytic interpretation," Edward Said writes,

is that it confers upon even the most absurd and trivial dream experiences the materiality of a scientific object. Words are the means of doing this, and it is the materiality of language that further objectifies dreams, draws them out from the recesses of subjectivity, where they guard sleep, and admits them into discourse. Freud's argument is that a bringing to light, such a materialization, increases the analytic value of a dream by putting it into words; yet paradoxically, from the point of view of psychical reality, the verbal dream has lost still more of the reality which in the experienced dream took the form of distortion displacement, and so on (1975, p. 178).

Freud was not the first to search for certainty in the

written text. His was preceded by the philological and hermeneutic tradition which is rooted in biblical textual analysis. "The remarkable irony," Crapanzano comments, "in Freud's search for certainty -- the text, the written word or its possibility -- was in fact responsible for the very uncertainty he sought to escape, (1981, p. 129)."

In his attempt to meet scientific standards Freud chose what Kenneth Burke calls "an essentializing mode of interpretation." Freud repeatedly explains the meaning of dream reports, every day speech errors, and poems as the essential motivating wish. "Dreams," he claims "are psychical acts of as much significance as any other; their motive force is in every instance a wish seeking fulfillment; (1965, p. 571)." After reporting and interpreting one of his own dreams and his associations to it in great detail he states,

Thus much leapt to the eyes. But many of the details of the dreams also became intelligible to me from the point of view of wish fulfillment. (p.152)

While he acknowledges that the interpretive process can go on and on, he considers it finished when the essential meaning -- the motivating wish has been discovered:

I will not pretend I have completely uncovered the meaning of this dream or that its interpretation is without a gap. I could spend much more time over it, derive further information from it and discuss fresh problems raised by it...For the moment I am satisfied with the achievement of this

one fresh piece of knowledge... When the work of interpretation has been completed, we perceive that a dream is the fulfillment of a wish (p. 153-4).

Burke distinguished between this essentializing mode of understanding from a mode that stresses proportion of ingredients. He argues that a literary form

should be discussed as a recipe, a synthesis of several motives rather than in terms of one essential motive, with all others treated as derivative from it. (1964, p.114)

He further argues that the attempt of the essentializing mode to explain the complex in terms of the simple is simply impossible, because the "simple is precisely what the complex is not." Freud's approach to linguistic forms of expression in general was analogous to his approach to dreams. Burke criticizes Freud's approach to poems in particular as overly stressing "the poem as dream" and under stressing

the poem as communication structure and as a realistic gauging of human situations. Communication rather than wish fulfillment, is the key term for literary analysis.

Freud emphasized language in terms of its role in and reference to intrapsychic events. He chose the individual as the unit of study and believed the individual could be studied separate from his environment. He did not investigate linguistic phenomena for their social, and pragmatic meanings.



Freud defined his conception of how language means within his determinist-associationist model of mind. He believed that the meaning of human behavior was determined by and referred back to the intrapsychic processes that produced them. He assumed that dreams were meaningful and that their meaning could be understood through an interpretive process that reconstructed the chain of associations which produced it. He claimed,

Every dream reveals itself as a psychical structure which has a meaning and which can be inserted at an assignable point in the mental activities of waking life (p. 35).

Interpreting a dream," Freud explains,

implies assigning to it -- that is 'replacing it by something which fits into the chain of our mental acts as a link having a validity and importance equal to the rest, (1965, p. 128).

His assertion of the deterministic nature of meaning distinguished his views on the interpretation of dreams from others. He claims,

The only mistake made by previous writers has been in supposing that the modification of the dream in the course of being remembered and put into words is an arbitrary one and cannot be further resolved and that it is therefore calculated to give us a misleading picture of the dream. They have underestimated the extent to which psychical events are determined. There is nothing arbitrary about them, (1965, p. 552-3).

Ultimately, he believed, they could be explained as motivated by drive derivatives.

According to Freud's model associations are the means by which language phenomena are determined. Freud conceives of meaning as an associative network composed of discrete discontinuous psychical elements such as ideas and percepts. Associations are bonds between psychical elements. Permanent records of associative chains are established in the 'mnem. systems' (memory) according to simultaneity in time, similarity, causation and other relations. These associative chains Freud speculates acted as facilitating paths for neuronal excitations:

We must therefore assume the basis of association lies in the mnemonic systems. Association would thus consist in the fact that, as a result of diminution in resistances and of the laying down of facilitating paths an excitation is transmitted from a given Mnem. element more readily to one Mnem. element than to another, (1965, p. 577).

They regulate the particular route a given excitation takes. The interplay among associations depends upon economic factors. Drive energy provides the motivating force for activating associative chains. Meaning is determined by the vicissitudes of drives and the associative networks they activate. The origin of meaning is ultimately in the body.<sup>1</sup>

Associations are the means by which words are linked to their meaning. Linguistic phenomena are distorted and

---

<sup>1</sup>For a more elaborate description of the process by which association pathways are established and activated refer to Project for a Scientific Psychology.

disguised -- the manifest forms of the original -- latent meaning. The original meaning lies in the unconscious which holds permanent records of the networks of associations. The unconscious does not store meaning in a linguistic form. In fact, the absence of linguistic forms (verbal ideas) in the unconscious is what distinguishes it from the conscious. The difference between unconscious and conscious phenomena, Freud states is, that "the conscious idea comprises the concrete idea plus the verbal idea corresponding to it, whilst the unconscious idea is that of the thing alone, (1963, p. 147)." The connecting of unconscious ideas with their corresponding verbal form occurs in the preconscious.

Freud explains:

The system Ucs contains the thing-cathexes of the objects, the first and true object-cathexes; the system Pcs originate in a hyper-cathexis of this concrete idea by a linking up of it with the verbal ideas of the words corresponding to it. It is such hyper-cathexis, we may suppose, that bring about higher organization in the mind and make it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which dominates Pcs, (1963 p. 147).

The manifest form is a revised copy of the latent form. It serves to conceal the latent meaning and allows for the indirect expression of wishes and drive induced impulses.

The importance of language for Freud was that it serves to refer to and make intelligible nonlinguistic unconscious

psychical process. He conceives of meaning as referentially linked to linguistic forms and of understanding as the decoding of those links. He emphasizes the referential function of language. His emphasis on the referential function characterizes both his mode of inquiry (his interpretive method) and his conception of the meaning of his objects of study, (linguistic phenomena in particular, and psychological phenomena in general. He thought the meaning of a phenomena could be ascertained through an interpretive process in which referential relationships are drawn. He claimed,

every dream has a meaning, though a hidden one, that dreams are designed to take the place of some other process of thought, and that we have only to undo the substitution correctly in order to arrive at this hidden meaning.(p.129)

For him language is referential: It substitutes, replaces, denotes, or represents already formed meanings retained in mind. Reference is made by means of associations.

Verbalized dream thoughts, Freud asserts "are associatively linked to the material which they replace and serve to show us the way to that material, which may in its turn be a substitute for something else, (1965, p. 553)."

Meaning for Freud exists before its expression.

Language does not play a role in creating meaning. Freud assumes these meanings reside unchanged in the unconscious.

While manifest forms like multiple revisions of a text proliferate on the surface the latent form lies buried below. He refers to unknown meanings as 'behind' or 'beneath', 'hidden' or 'concealed'. They are never above, in front of one's nose, or in the very process of becoming. The meaning of a psychical process exists prior to its verbal manifestation and subjugation to defensive procedures, in the logical form of thoughts, although it can be traced further to its instinctual source. He describes "the essential dream-thoughts" as

a complex of thoughts and memories of the most intricate possible structure...The different portions of this complicated structure stand of course, in the most manifold logical relations to one another. They can represent foreground and background, digressions and illustrations, conditions, chains of evidence and counter arguments. When the whole mass of these dream thoughts is brought under the pressure of the dream-work, and its elements are turned about, broken into fragments and jammed together--almost like pack-ice-- the question arises of what happens to the logical connections which have hitherto formed its framework, (1965, pp. 346-7).

Dreams do not have the means to represent logical relations.

Interpretation is necessary to restore the original logical relations which the dream-work has destroyed.

Interpretation for Freud is an act of restoration, unburial, and discovery.

In the preceding discussion I emphasized the scientific aspects of Freud's conception of language. I do not mean to

claim that Freud did not appreciate the often ambiguous meaning of language and the importance of understanding language in context. He was "prepared," as he himself wrote, "to find that the same piece of content may conceal a different meaning when it occurs in various people or in various contexts, (1965, p. 137)." He repeatedly states in The Interpretation of Dreams that dreams cannot be understood separate from the context of the person's utterance, their associations, and more generally their character, and life events. But his notion of context stopped short of consideration of the interpersonal context in which the language was used. In an examination of the Dora case Crapanzano shows how Freud's emphasis on the referential functions of language blinded him to the meaning of Dora's dream reports and associations and Freud's interpretations as used in the context of their relationship -- the pragmatic functions.

Freud attempted to put an interpretive methodology to empirical uses. He attempted to formulate causal explanations based on the evidence of inferential interpretations. In a similar vein Greenberg and Mitchell argue that

stressing Freud's biological metaphor can obscure the acute psychological vision, the very theory of meaning which gave rise to it. We suggest, that the distinction between psychoanalysis as a natural science and as an interpretive discipline

is spurious. The very principles Freud thought explanatory in the mechanistic sense also provide an interpretive thrust; his theory of mechanisms is a theory of meaning. The drives in this sense embody Freud's understanding of our elemental passions; they represent the fundamental human urges. (p. 23)

Freud held a particular kind of hermeneutic stance, one which is called epistemological hermeneutics by some (Wakefield, 1988), and methodological hermeneutics by others (Woolfolk and Messer, 1988). It is akin to that taken by some biblical scholars who believe it necessary to go beyond the literal meaning of the text to discover the additional meanings God intended. It is based on the assumption that there exist certain internal mental states or contents such as intentions, wishes, impulses that cause something to be said or written as it was. Since there are certain mental states or contents that precipitate the verbal act, interpretations can be correct or incorrect. This stance not only assumes that there are intentions, wishes and impulses, but it also assumes that the meaning of the text is identified with the originating mental state or contents. Because these intentions or wishes are not directly observable (especially if the author is dead, the intentions are unconscious or if they were God's), interpretation is necessary to fully understand the meaning of a text.

The meaning Freud seeks to discover is the origin of the psychical process. He identifies meaning with origin. As Crapanzano comments, "much of what transpires during psychoanalysis -- and ethnographic research -- is an attempt to reproduce the original, the real, the individual (even where there was no "original," "real," or "individual")..." For Freud meaning exists in the past. The origin by virtue of it being unchanging can be continually referred back to for explanation. The identification of the origin as the 'real' meaning provides meaning with a determinate, specifiable, and fixed quality. Freud and literary critics, such as Burke and Said, however divergent their views, have an interest in the beginning intention or motive of a speaker or writer. The act of speaking and writing fascinates them. They all describe the verbal act with some reference to mental states or contents, such as intentions, motives or wishes. They all tell how the story was told with reference to intentional states. Their answers to questions concerning how stories, poems, utterances were produced assume the existence of some kind of intention. Literary critics, like psychologists, actively question the epistemological foundations of their interpretive activity. Some, like Paisley Livingston argue,

explanations of the creation and use of symbolic artefacts require reference to agents and to their intentional attitudes -- and hence to such items



as desires, actions, and beliefs. In short, explanations of literary phenomena... require assumptions about agency. Whatever foundations literary criticism could eventually be given would have to do with agency (1989, p. 51).

Freud and Burke differ as to how they define this 'intentional attitude', in terms of what constitutes it and whether it precedes, and/or causes verbal acts. Freud defined it in terms of drive derivatives. Burke defines it terms of a 'grammar of motives'. According to Freud intention (as drive derivative) precedes and exists in a causal relation with the verbal act. Burke locates the motives with the act itself. He claims we can understand the meaning of a text by investigating the multiple contexts within it. He writes,

One obviously cannot invite an author especially a dead author, to oblige him by telling what the author thinks of when the critic isolates some detail or other for improvisation. But what he can do is to note the context of imagery and ideas in which an image takes its place. He can also note, by such analysis, the kinds of evaluations surrounding this image ... Until finally, by noting ... what subsidiary image accompanies it, what kind of event grow out of it, what altered rhythmic and tonal effects characterize it, and so on one grasps its significance as motivation. And there is no essential motive offered here. The motive of the work is equated with the structure of interrelationships within the work itself, (p. 121).

For Burke, unlike Freud the, verbal act is the intentional attitude. In his view human intention is inseparable from its scene or situation, and language. It is at one with the

raw material, the facticity, the data it is in the process of organizing.

An alternative view to that of the reduction of meaning to origin, suggests that the meaning of a verbal expression is not constituted by its origin, although its eventual meaning will bear some relation to it. While Freud identifies origin and meaning others, like Said and Nietzsche distinguish between the origin and its eventual meanings--utility, employment, or purpose. According to Nietzsche,

The cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposed, lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured or even obliterated...the entire history of a "thing," an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one another but, on the contrary in some cases succeed and alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion...The form is fluid, but the "meaning" is even more so (The Genealogy of Morals, quoted in Said, p. 175).

Beginnings in retrospect are continually reinterpreted. There are, though, cases when interpretations as beliefs or delusions are rigidly held over time. Freud's understanding of meaning is both enriched and limited by the contexts

within which he made interpretations--the contexts of the body and the past.

#### **OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES' CONCEPTIONS OF LANGUAGE**

Object relations theorists, as Freud did, venture to create psychological theory to describe and explain a previously unattended realm of experience. They attempt to create a theory which is phenomenologically closer to experience. To varying degrees they move away from Freud's quantitative mechanistic account of drive energy to qualitative descriptions of internalized relationships. The realm of relational experiences becomes the hub of their theory. Despite the many differences among object relations theorists, the term object relations can be broadly defined as referring to theories concerned with the interaction between peoples' relationships with others and their internal images or representations of these relationships, (Mitchell and Greenberg, 1983).

In examining object relations theory we become aware of how language and theory are intertwined. Object relations theorists' do not explicitly define their conception of language. It is ambiguously and vaguely implied in both the language of their theories and in their study of language phenomena. In the process of developing their theories they

invent a vocabulary, using old terms in new ways. They define relational experiences in terms of 'objects' and its many forms (residues, introjects, images, representations) and qualities (good, bad, persecutory, comforting, stable etc.). The language that object relations theorists use defines experience in Cartesian terms. Their language divides the relational realm into an internal and external world, and into the self and other, subjective and objective, although the difference between is less distinct than in Freudian psychoanalysis. Consciousness for them is a world within, a world populated by internal objects, by some called a representational world (Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1962). I often think that the strangeness, of the very experience of describing and theorizing about this newly discovered realm, and the allusive but alive and tangible quality of this realm of experience is conveyed in their use of words such as object, part object, introject, projection, projective identification to communicate about everyday experiences. The sense of the relational realm as both allusive but real is also conveyed in way these terms' use wavers between the metaphoric and the reified. They are terms whose metaphoric quality is often lost with their repeated use, and then are used as if they actually exist or happen.

To the extent that the theorists focus on representations or internal objects as referring to some original experience, and to the extent that representations or internal objects are considered to precede and define the meaning of linguistic phenomena, they emphasize, as Freud did, the referential functions of language in psychic functioning and the formation of meaning. They differ, though, in that they use the referential function of language to refer to, different realms of experience. Different theorists' use of language in their theorizing sometimes betrays another more implicit conception of language. Winnicott, for example, is well known for his poetic and allusive use of language. He understands how to use language not only to refer, but also to evoke, elucidate, and create meaning. He is not as concerned with creating referential causal explanatory chains.

Object relations theorists, like Freud are concerned with what essentially constitutes experience, but they differ in how they conceive of and name it. When an object relations oriented therapist listens to a person describe their daily lives, report their dreams, fantasies or symptoms, they infer the presence of some internal image or representation of others, in addition to or rather than of drives. They view the quality and pattern of our

relationships with others as essential to understanding the development of personality structures and interpersonal functioning. Some (Klein, Jacobson, 1964; Mahler, 1975; Kernberg, 1976), conceive of experience as not only contained within the intrapsychic realm and constituted by drives, affects and ideas, but also in relation to interactions with situations, people and things in the world, and constituted by a whole array of objects and internal objects or representations. They extend the focus of psychoanalysis from an interest in innate biological forces to include an interest in the role of significant people in the child life in shaping psychological development. They conceptualize development not only in terms of drive states and the evolution of ego and superego, but also in terms of the evolution of representations of self and others. Other theorists like Fairbairn and Guntrip eliminate the concept of drive and focus on the relational world.

Object relations theorists shift the psychoanalytic context in which the understanding of meaning occurs to include the external world. But they tend to maintain the focus on the internal world by examining how the external world becomes internal--the process of internalization. The process of internalization was originally described by Freud

to account for the formation of the superego. He described how

a portion of the external world, has, at least partially, been abandoned as an object and has instead by identification, been taken into the ego and thus become an integral part of the internal world. This new psychical agency continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the people (the abandoned objects) in the external world...

Object relations theorists elaborate upon Freud's conceptualization of the process of internalization beyond the superego formation to include all processes in which interactions with the environment are transformed into inner representations of the self and other.

This "portion of the external world" which is acted upon and becomes significant is referred to as an 'object'. The term object in Freud's language refers to both a thing and a goal or target of a drive. In its original usage, the concept of object was intertwined with and contingent upon the concept of drive. Some object relations theorists maintain this connection with drive theory in their use of the word while others don't. In a general sense the word 'object' in object relations theory refers to external and internal, real and imagined other people. They can have many qualities ranging on dimensions such as, malignant/benign and alive/dead. The use of the term

internal object varies greatly among these theorists. The relationship between the internal form and its external counter part often remains problematical.

Theorists use of the term object ranges from a purely descriptive phenomenological use, to the use of it to refer to entities in the mind. Internal objects to varying degrees have a fixed and definitive quality. Their meaning is at perhaps its most indefinite as residues and their most definite as well differentiated representations.

But however definite the internal object, object relations theory attributes with the very word 'object' a certain materiality or tangibility that theoretically speaking serves both phenomenological and empirical uses. The word's sense of tangibility conveys the aliveness, and realness that interactions with objects (others) have even when they are not physically present. The words sense of materiality implies that this not physically present presence is apprehensible by the senses, observable, and therefore can be studied with empirical or positivist methods. Like drives, internal presences are often studied indirectly. A persons verbal responses to questions, Rorschach ink blots, and pictures, are taken to be representative of internal objects or representations in the mind.



The concepts of internal objects, object representations and mental representation are extremely problematic. These terms have been used in vague and ambiguous ways within psychoanalysis. Jean Schimek notes that the term mental representation,

can mean memory image, idea, concept and sometimes even perception --any content of subjective experience, whether immediate and concrete or general and abstract (1975, p. 172).

An attempt to understand these terms involves answering difficult questions like: What is a representation? Are they images, and if images, are they pictures? Is the meaning of an object its representation? Is it that definitive? Or is it only one of several means of understanding an objects meaning? What is the relationship between internal and external objects? Are they abstractions, reflections, resemblances, pictures, or best estimates of real people? (How much is this theoretical language of representation and imagery about what's in the minds of people and how much of it is about the act of inquiry: the attempt to picture, sense, calculate and understand?) Or are representations, to consider a more elaborated notion of representation, (Burke, 1945, 507-8)), kinds of relations established between a symbolic form and its counter part: parts for whole people or relationships, wholes for parts, containers for things contained, things

contained for containers, causes for effects, effects for causes, species for genus, or genus for species, etc.? Greenberg and Mitchell raise some of these questions in their review of the field and noting that the problems these questions raise have not been resolved.

Object relations theorists conception of language in particular and of human experience more generally is defined to varying degrees in terms of the representational view of mind. These theories suggest this model of mind to the degree that they suggest meanings are determinate entities, organized in the form of representations "in the head" of the individual, that precede and direct behavior. Representations according to object relations theory refer to patterns of relationships, and to important aspects of people, and for some theorists they also refer to the drives, affect and the body. According to Sandler and Rosenblatt,

A representation can be considered to have a more or less enduring existence as an organization or schema which is constructed out of a multitude of impressions. A child experiences many images of his mother--mother feeding, mother talking, mother sitting down, mother standing up, mother preparing food, etc.--and on the basis of these gradually creates a mother representation which encompasses a whole range of mother images, all of which bear the label "mother." (p. 133)

They do not discuss what form this organization of multiple mother images takes--how many mothers become one. They do

not address the question of how the meaning of mother is formulated. For other theorists the representation may take the form of an image or a sentence. Some object relations theorists describe representations in the language of cognitive psychology with qualitative terms such as how realistic, separate, differentiated and articulated they are. Those object relation theorists that attempt to integrate their formulation with drive theory, like Jacobson and Kernberg, describe how object representations become invested with aggressive or libidinal energy, and in turn affect the development of those representations.

Like the representational model of mind object relations theories view thought as preceding action. Representations trigger reactions, direct, mediate and regulate behavior, and play an important role in the formation of future relationships. They account for how a person is directed to the world. A person is directed at the world in the way that they are because of the kinds of representations they have of it. The representational world, Sandler and Rosenblatt write, is

a set of indications which guides the ego to appropriate adaptive or defensive activity... The representational world provides the material for the ego's perceptual structuring of sensory impulses for imagination and fantasy, for direct and modified action, for language, symbols, and for trial action in thought.

In Sandler's and Rosenblatt's synthesis of object relations theory with ego psychology representations guide and provide the material for the ego's structuring of linguistic and symbolic activity.<sup>2</sup>

The argument against the idea, that internal representations account for the meaning of linguistic expressions, is proposed by Wittgenstein in his later work.

He shows how word meanings could not correspond to any one representation. He argues that the representational view of language is inadequate to account for the wide variety of ways we use language. A representation or some form of a mental picture, he claims, is not needed to give meaning to a word. If a representation were needed to give meaning to a word then an actual picture could be used instead. For example a man, who has been asked to get a red apple could use a color chart that gave the specimen of the color red opposite the word red. He could then compare apples with this sample until he found one that matched. Wittgenstein writes,

as if recognizing always consisted in comparing

---

<sup>2</sup>The suggestion that linguistic expressions are reflections or manifestations of inner psychic structures processes or representations has been made in one form or another more explicitly by Rappaport, Holt, Blatt, and others. See the review of psychoanalytic narrative analysis for a presentation of their views in chapter 4.

two impressions with one another. It is as if I carried a picture of an object with me and used it to perform an identification of an object as the one represented by the picture. Our memory seems to us to be the agent of such a comparison, by preserving a picture of what has been seen before, or by allowing us to look into the past (as if down a spy glass), (1958, sec. 604).

The idea that representations mediate our use of language or even our behavior in general is like saying we carry around such charts in our heads. The problem with this account of the attribution of meaning becomes even more obvious when you consider being given the command, "Imagine a red patch." Then of what use is a mental representation? The idea that we need mental representations to mediate even our thoughts leads to an infinite regress: For if we have a mental representation of this image of a red patch, do we also have a representation of that representation, etc. Wittgenstein claims that just as the image of a red patch can itself be recognized without the use of any intermediary, so too can a specimen of a red apple be recognized without either a color chart or a representation. With this brief critique on the representation view we turn to psychological theories which begin to conceive of how language means in other than purely representational terms.

As we move along this spectrum of conceptions of language from Freud to object relations theories to their

integration with cognitive and developmental theories, meaning is conceived of in a less reductive manner, in a wider variety of ways (as instinctual, representational, pictorial, functional and/or relational), as not only fixed in the past, but also present and fluid, and as outside the mind, between people, in relation to a social world. When we finally reach the other end of the spectrum, the meaning of language is conceived of in the context of its use in the world.

#### **THE DEVELOPMENTAL TURN:**

Object relation theorists beginning with Winnicott (1971) and Mahler (1975) began to observe children as they developed and integrated their observations with psychoanalytic theory. Several theorists and researchers (Blatt and Lerner, 1983; Bogen, 1982; Gouin Decarie, 1965; Schimek, 1975; Stern, 1985; Thompson, 1981; Westen, 198 ) have suggested that psychoanalytic theory would have much to gain from an integration with the contributions of cognitive and developmental psychology of Piaget and Werner. This integration involves the abandonment of some of Freud's theoretical positions and major shifts in the context in which the meaning of psychological phenomena are defined.

While Winnicott and Mahler tended to emphasize the continuities, between their observations and Freud's theory,

recently psychoanalytic thinkers, like Schimek, have emphasized the divergences between developmental and the Freudian perspectives. In the section on Freud I discussed some of the same arguments Schimek presents against Freud's determinist, associative, reductive account of the meaning of linguistic expressions from the literary perspective.

Developmental theory and research, Schimek claims contradicts Freud's concept of 'mental representation' (ideas) and his theory of cognition and motivation upon which he bases it. Schimek rejects Freud's "hypothesis that the primary and original form of the unconscious is an ideational one, (p. 182)." He takes the developmental perspective that ideas or symbolic thought emerges from perceptual and motor activity. In the course of development action precedes ideas. (In terms of western philosophy since Descartes this is a notable turning of the tables.) Ideas do not exist preformed in the unconscious from the beginning of existence. Freud's view of cognition cannot account for how these ideas are formed. According to his view perception is the passive, veridical, objective registration of an external object. An infant from birth is able to recall an original perception of a differentiated object. The observations of developmental psychologists show to the contrary that an infant's ability to perceive

and recall objects in a differentiated manner develops gradually. Developmental psychologists view perception and memory as active constructive processes that are shaped by past experience and subject to developmental and learning process.

An integration with developmental perspective shifts the context in which behavior is understood from inside the head to between the person and the world. The meaning of a phenomena is not reduced to the intrapsychic realm but understood in relation to the external world. Werner and Kaplan, (1963), and Vygotsky, (1967), and subsequently many others (Bates, et al. 1979; Bruner, 1965; Drucker, 1975; and Slade, 1985 a,b) view symbolic thought as emerging in the context mother-child relationship. Rather than reducing the motivational source of linguistic phenomena to instinctual impulses, these psychologists tend to think of linguistic expression as enhanced and limited by developmental capacities and constraints, and by the kind of "scaffolding," "security" or "availability" provided by the caretaker. Linguistic phenomena are no longer seen as only determined by biological forces. They are also seen as constructive, generative and creative activities. The constructivist view, unlike the determinist, provides psychoanalysis with a means for accounting for the diverse



manifestations of universal motives, such as the choice of neurosis or defence.

Language is understood not so much for its defensive and distorting functions, as for its adaptive and communicative functions. Language from the developmental and cognitive perspective is viewed as an organized form of expression or communications. Its capacity to enhance meaning is emphasized over its capacity to distort it. Schimek argues against Freud's notion of symbolic processes as regressed primitive patterns of thought. Symbolic phenomena he asserts once understood from a developmental and cognitive perspective can be understood in terms of developmental levels of organization. He writes,

Each level of symbolic representation changes the experience of the object represented, its meaning, function, and relationship to other objects. It is an organizing abstracting process, the construction of a 'higher level of mental organization', which cannot be reduced to the distortion or disguise of the contents of a lower level, (p. 185).

The meaning of a phenomena is conceived of in terms of the developmental level. The manner in which objects are related to and given meaning depends upon the developmental stage.

**THE INTEGRATION OF OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY WITH COGNITIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES:**

Several researchers (Blatt et al. 1983; Bogen, 1982; Cramer, 1983, 1987; Gouin Decarie, 1965; Thompson, 1981; Westen, 1988, 1990) integrate to varying degrees aspects of Jacobson's conception of a persons's "object world", Sandler's and Rosenblatt's "representational world" and Kernberg's self and object representations with Piaget's and Werner's conceptualization of development. They refer to developmental research to inform and support their view of the structural and formal aspects of the development of object representations. They select certain aspects of the developmental theories and omit others. They emphasize the very general structural aspects of Piaget's and Werner's description of the development of symbolic processes and omit integral aspects of their theories and points of divergence. Like certain developmental psychologists, these object relations theorists view representations as cognitive schemata that give organization and direction to behavior. They claim the development of representations is characterized by increasing differentiation. At first representations are undifferentiated from sensorimotor sequences. They gradually become associated with functional

features and then symbolic and conceptual features of the object. As children mature they are progressively able to differentiate their own from other's perspectives. Westen et al. (1990) refer to the literature on egocentrism and perspective taking to support this view. Though other research which questions this view is noted by Westen. In the course of development, self and object representations become more complex and integrated. Children develop the capacity to integrate positive and negative representations of others. They are able to integrate rather than split ambivalent representations of others.

They draw from the work of object relations theorists like Jacobson, Kernberg and Mahler to describe the content or thematic aspects of the development of object representations. Unlike the development of object representations of inanimate objects, the development of representations of self and other occurs in drive or affectively charged states. They are based on pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences of frustration and gratification. These representations are initially vague and variable and only develop gradually to become consistent, relatively realistic representations. They serve to mediate between the drives and external reality. In the course of development children move from valuing

relationships on a need-gratification basis to valuing relationships for the experience of mutual concern and respect. Blatt and Lerner emphasize the importance of the relationship over cognitive aspects: "But it is the basic caring relationship that provided the primary experiences in reality that are internalized as the earliest and most fundamental principles of cognitive organization. The relatively predictable sequences of frustration and gratification in the caring relationship provides the child with the foundations for a sense of organization and coherence (p. 194)."

Blatt and Lerner (1983) and Westen (1990) present the integration of object relations theory with developmental and cognitive psychology with great ease, as if it were not problematic in the least. They make no mention of the multiple points of major theoretical differences referred to by Schimek,<sup>3</sup> between the developmental and psychoanalytic perspective of Freud, Mahler et al., Jacobson etc., and gloss over the differences between Piaget and Werner. Blatt and Lerner express their aspirations to integrate aspects of psychoanalytic drive theory, with concepts of developmental

---

<sup>3</sup>Refer back to the discussion in the preceding section of Schimek's argument that developmental theory and research contradict Freud's concept of mental representation and his theory of cognition and motivation.

and cognitive psychology and develop a more phenomenological clinical theory in a sweeping cross-theory redefinition of the term object representations. They define it in general terms as

the conscious and unconscious mental schemata--including cognitive, affective and experiential components--of objects encountered in reality. Beginning as vague, diffuse variable sensorimotor experiences of pleasures and unpleasure, these schemata gradually expand and develop into differentiated, consistent, relatively realistic representations of the self and the object world.

Whether or not these investigators achieve an integration of these theories is quite questionable. While they view representations as constructed in the context of relationships, they research them as if they are static forms in minds of their subjects, not still in process of construction and interaction with the person to whom they are addressed, with the language with which they are addressed at the very moment of their expression. Their conceptualization of structural dimensions of representations as latent internal schema "that can be considered independent of their contents, (p. 236)" allows for the division between internal and external, latent and manifest, the disconnection from the interactional realm between, and provides them with a definable empirical object

not riddled by the ambiguity of meaning and content.'

Their conception of symbolic processes, language and meaning is reminiscent of Freud's reduction of meaning to drive impulses.

Blatt and Lerner view meaning as the drive derivative content of the linguistic expression. They refer at times to content as the "meaning" of a representation: "The content provides meaning that can be viewed as appetitive. Thus, the content of the individual's experiences are partly a function of the drives that color experience ((Mayman, 1968)), (Blatt and Lerner)." It is unclear exactly how Blatt and his colleagues think language means. The notions that meaning is only related to content and that structure and content can be understood independently of each other are extremely limited. This view of meaning has been criticized most notably by Schafer (1958) among psychoanalysts, and a profusion of literary critics, (egs.: Matthew Arnold, Wimsatt, I.A. Richards).<sup>5</sup> The issue of the

---

<sup>4</sup>The concept of internalization has many theoretical functions, but for some object relations theorists one certainly is its function as a grand compromise formation for object relations theorists who have to maintain loyalty to Freud's intrapsychic realm.

<sup>5</sup>Cardinal Newman once stated very emphatically: "Thought and speech are inseparable from each other. Matter and expression are parts of one: style is the thinking out into language... When we can separate light and illumination, life and motion, the convex and the concave of a curve... then will it be conceivable that the intellect should renounce its own double.

relationship between form and content goes unaddressed, by Blatt and Lerner. The formulations made between form and content are simple pairings together: psychoanalytic content terms like pleasure and unpleasure are paired with developmental structural terms like differentiated and integrated.

These investigators' conception of symbolic processes is within keeping with the representational view of mind. They conceptualize object representations both as "structures that mediate between the drives and specific experiences of reality". Representations are a "template that determine the nature of the experience of the self and the object world, (p. 195)." They maintain the psychoanalytic latent/manifest division of phenomena. They conceive of representational structures as "latent" or hidden, which direct and mediate manifest behavior. They assume structure "constitute(s) a substrate of manifest behavior and content, (p. 212)." The structure of the latent representations is expressed in all its manifest forms of behavior. The meaning of the manifest form of the representation is identical to the internal representation. The latent and manifest form have an isomorphic

---

(as quoted by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, 1949, p.501).

relationship. In their view nothing happens to the structure in the process of expression.

This integration of object relations theory and developmental and cognitive psychology has led to extensive research. Blatt, Lerner, and their colleagues have focused on the formal and structural aspects of representation, while Mayman and his research group have focused on the thematic content related aspects. The coding systems that will be presented following this discussion are products of various types of integrations of object relations theory with cognitive and developmental theory. The coding system designed by Westen et. al that will be used in the empirical investigation included in this study, is a product of the kind of integration described above.

#### **PIAGET AND WERNER:**

If Blatt, Lerner and Westen and their colleagues had followed developmental turn through, beyond the general notions about the structure and organization of development, they would have hit a fork in the road. Piaget and Werner as much as both are interested in patterns of change choose very different topics ("conceptual objects") and methods of



study. <sup>6</sup>

Piaget is interested in accounting for the growing transcendent properties of logical thought. Werner is concerned with how the form is lived or in process, how the many aspects of a phenomena are interrelated in a whole organism. Piaget aspires to make specific generalizations about developmental phenomena. He limits the developmental phenomena he studies to the development of logical thought. He makes specific generalizations about the kind of structural changes that will occur in the course of development. Werner aspires to describe particular phenomena in a richly contextual holistic manner. His work suggests we approach developmental phenomena with certain tools-- questions about the particular kind and interrelationship among: the movement, direction, process, and function of a phenomena. He used the notions of differentiation and integration in a contextual relativistic manner. He did not, as Blatt and his research group, construct and impose hierarchical scales separate from the particular phenomena studied. Werner's invention of a physiognomic, vectorial language and provides us with the tools to gain a rich vision of human development. Glick

---

<sup>6</sup>The views presented here have been much influenced by an article by Joseph Glick (1982), "Piaget, Vygotsky, and Werner.

suggests Werner's theory is not as much a theory as it is a heuristic stance towards phenomena.

These researchers who attempt to integrate object relations theory with Piaget and Werner's theory are interested in defining an object that can be objectively observed. Their concern with objectivity constrains what they can study. The more loosely we define that objectivity, as Mayman and his research cohorts have, the wider the range of phenomena we can study. Blatt and his colleagues constrain their study to the study of structural dimensions. They, as Piaget does, seem to be interested in identifying transcendent forms--forms that can be studied separately from content and context. This is where Blatt and his colleagues research clearly diverges from Werner's organismic holistic approach.

If we continue to take the developmental turn, taking the Werner side at the fork, we come to a conception of language that describes meaning not as fixed, but as a process, and not in objective terms but as contextually defined. This conception of language integrates notions of the alive, fluid and dynamic qualities of language, with notions of its structural and systematic qualities. Werner in collaboration with Kaplan elaborates on his views about language in the book Symbol Formation. They claim that even

at advanced levels of development, when language is relatively autonomous from its context, it maintains a connection to its physiognomic and affective basis. The dynamic and structural aspects of language are intertwined and become one in the process of expression. Werner and Kaplan along with Vygotsky are the first psychologists to begin to describe in other than structural, systematic and purely referential terms--as other than copies of what is inside the head. They begin to describe the interrelationships language and other psychological phenomena in terms of processes. Language becomes alive in their theories.

Werner's conception of language emerges in the context of his 'organismic-holistic' orientation. This orientation assumes that any activity is dependent on the context, or whole of which it is a constitutive part for its meaning:

The holistic assumption is opposed to any view that would treat (for example, a movement, a momentary experience as if it possessed a fixed structure and meaning, irrespective of the whole or context of which it is a part (p. 4).

This orientation brings us off the rim of the Cartesian world where we faltered with object relations theory into a different paradigm. Here meaning exists neither inside nor outside but in constant flux between. Here language is not a fixed entity separate from other functions such as

perception and cognition, located in either the internal or external world.

Language is an activity, we live, feel and do in the world. Language involves us in reciprocal interactions with our environment. Meaning does not await preformed for language to represent it. It is constructed. It is produced by an intentional act that establishes semantic correspondence between a referent and its vehicle. Werner regards "futile...all attempts to treat meaning as a static external connection between (objects, ideas) and responses (sounds, linguistic forms) (p. 22)". They write, the

expressive similarity of two entities does not suffice to establish one of the entities as a symbolic vehicle for the other...In order for a symbolic relationship to be established an intentional act of denotative reference is required...(p. 21)

They describe the significance of the relation between a referent and a vehicle not as an entity but as a genetic process. Taking the Humboldtian distinction between language as "ergon"-- as objective product or structure and language as "energeia" as energy and activity, Werner highlights the "energia" aspects of language. Werner, like Burke, identifies the creation of meaning with the symbolic act. They bring language into action with their vectorial physiognomic dynamic theoretical language. They are interested in capturing the phenomenology of human activity,

not fixing it in structures, representations or diagnostic categories.

Language is grounded in a rich organismic experiential base. It emerges, from a "primordial matrix composed of affective interoceptive, postural, imaginal elements, etc. that is directed or channelized into a full perceptual articulation by the schematizing activity (p. 18)." Meaning is established in the form of symbols. Symbols are formed in a "dynamic schematizing process," a process in which representational relations are established between a vehicle (a word) and a referent (a concept or object). In Werner and Kaplan's view symbolic vehicles have certain properties and referents have "connotational structures". These connotational structures, as best I understand it, are the experience of expressive features of things. A dialectical process occurs between vehicle and referent in which a mutual fitting of vehicular and connotative features occurs. Through this process a reciprocal influence occurs between connotational and vehicular patterning ("reciprocal rotation"). The correspondence between vehicle and referent is not "given objectively." It is established through an intentional act and this continual movement back and forth between symbolic medium and the world. Symbolic forms unify the rich organismic base of experience in the form of a

meaningful whole. Symbols are a indissoluble unity of form and meaning. The dynamic schematizing process is characterized by both structural and dynamic qualities: It is "directive, regulative and form-building," mobile ...sensuous-postural-imaginal...(p. 19)." The correspondence between a word and its referent always exists as a multimodal relational process not an entity in mind.

In Werner and Kaplan's view language is a representational activity. In their view the terms language, symbol, and representation are closely interrelated. Language is one form of symbolic activity. The constitutive function of symbolic activity is representation. Language is the medium of representation par excellence...(p. 16)," because it is built on complex systematic principles that allow it to articulate meaningful expressive patterns objects or concepts.

Werner and Kaplan call the context in which this dynamic schematizing process occurs "the symbolic situation." The symbolic situation is characterized by four components: the people--an addressor and an addressee, and the symbol--the referent and the symbolic vehicle. Referential relationships are created in an intimate interpersonal context which Werner calls the "primordial sharing situation." In the course of development both the

distance between addressor and addressee and the distance between referent and vehicle increases through an interdependent process. The child becomes able to address an increasingly wider range of people in more impersonal contexts, and use increasingly complex and abstract referents in a more conventional manner.

Werner and Kaplan can not stress enough that language is a activity and not an entity. They do not locate meaning in fixed representations. They claim that

no matter how rapidly and automatically the verbal utterance takes place, the forms are still rooted in the expressive act and retain their organismically embedded expressive meaning. Once they lose this tie to the organismic matrix and to the form-building process, they become empty and meaningless (pp. 22-3).

Werner and Kaplan begin to diverge from the representational view of mind in the very way they conceive of representation as the interactive process between referent and vehicle. They conceive of representation as a fluid process between symbolic vehicles and the world, which is inextricably connected to experience, rather than as fixed entity inside the mind preceding and directing action. Yet they, like all the psychological perspectives reviewed up to this point emphasize the referential and representational functions. In defining language they assert the "distinguishing mark of language is its function of symbolic representation (p.

17)". In the book Symbol Formation they develop the most elaborate analysis of representational processes, and leave less developed their ideas about how meaning evolves in the interpersonal context in the relations of the 'addressor' and the 'addressee,' the relationship of each person to the other's words. Their conception of language is somewhat unevenly developed. While they stress the importance of the interpersonal context they have little to say beyond their comments on the increasing distance between addressor and addressee through development. The difference between Werner and Kaplan's emphasis on the referential function of language to those previously discussed is they describe representational or referential activity in phenomenological terms as an intentional, dynamic, reciprocal, process which occurs in a social context.

#### **BAKHTIN/VOLOSINOV:**

Bakhtin's and Volosinov's conception of language takes off where Werner and Kaplan leave off. They focus on and elaborate upon the interpersonal and cultural context in which the meaning of language emerges. They conceive of language as primarily a social and generative phenomena--as a living dialogue. From their perspective meaning is not isolated within the individual consciousness in any fixed



form. It is established through dialogical interaction. Meaning is context bound. It is defined by the particular participants in the dialogue and the particular time and place in which they interact. Volosinov, in particular, stressed the primacy of social factors in ideological terms in determining the meaning of language.

Their perspective defines an end of the spectrum as does Freud's due to this stressing of the primacy of some factor. While they emphasize the primacy of the social, as Freud emphasized the primacy of instinctual forces in determining meaning, they do not conceive of meaning as determined by causative sequentially organized associative chains. Their conception of the generation of meaning is more in line with Werner and Kaplan's holistic orientation. Instead of the term holistic, Bakhtin uses the term "dialogism" to refer to the notion that everything means and is understood as part of a greater whole and that different meanings are constantly in interaction with each other. For them meaning is about relation. Any meaning always exists in relation to some other meaning.

Bakhtin and Volosinov broadly define language as "any communication system employing signs that are ordered in a particular manner (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 430)." Language as a system of signs is a kind of semiotic system. "Meaning,"

Volosinov writes, "is a function of the sign and is therefore inconceivable (since meaning is pure relation, or function) outside the sign as some particular, independently existing thing (p. 28)." He defines meaning as the expression of a semiotic relationship between different aspects of reality or realities.

They stress, as Werner Kaplan do, that language is an open on-going process rather than a static system, within a more general conception of language as both changing and continuous, both fluid and structured. They too were strongly influenced by Humboldt's conception of language as *energia* and *ergon*. Bakhtin speaks of these aspects of language in terms of 'centripetal' and 'centrifugal' forces. The centripetal force of language is that which serves to centralize or unify language, such as the implementation of a standard set of grammar rules in a certain cultural group. The centrifugal force is that by which language becomes more decentralized or diversified according to social and professional groups and roles, generational differences, family idioms and styles and finally at the level of the individual personality. Utterances "taste" of their particular social and historical contexts. At the level of the individual personality every cultural linguist form is "shot through with intentions and accents".

Bakhtin's conceives of language as the struggle between centripetal and centrifugal forces. He asserts,

"Every concrete utterance," of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear...It is possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis of any utterance, once having exposed it as a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of language (p. 272).

His conception of language is based on this sense that there is opposition and struggle at the core of our lives between these forces that strive for unification and diversification, much as Werner conceived of development in terms the coexisting tendencies of integration and differentiation. Both Bakhtin and Volosinov think of this struggle as evident at every level: in culture, social groups, the individual consciousness and even in any particular utterance.

Bakhtin's and Volosinov's views are particularly suited to represent this end of the spectrum because their view of language as primarily social and of the constructs of mind, psyche or consciousness as social and semiotic constructs fully shifts the locus of psychology from the internal realm of covert structures and processes to the contexts of social interaction. I have chosen their work rather than other language philosophers like Merleau Ponty, Wittgenstein, Rorty because they explore in depth narrative forms in

relation to consciousness. I go outside the discipline of Western psychology and bring Bakhtin and Volosinov in to represent this end of the spectrum because their conception of language and consciousness and the relationship between them has as of yet not been formulated in any elaborated form within the field. Their work is well known among those familiar with Soviet psychology, but has been referred to by only a few psychologists in American publications (Zivin, 1979, Dore, 1989; Wertch, 1985, 1990). In America Bakhtin has recently gained much prominence within and between the fields of literary criticism, linguistics, philosophy and sociology, but not as yet within psychology. Some respond to Bakhtin as a philosopher of language, others, as a literary critic and still others as a social thinker. I suggest that Bakhtin's and Volosinov's work challenges and provides a viable alternative to traditional psychological conceptions of language and consciousness.

Bakhtin and Volosinov wrote from 1920 to 1970 in Russia. Their writing remained obscure in this country until recently because political factors hindered the publication and translation of their work. Their obscurity also in part may be due to the way some readers find their abstract Russian scholarly prose slow-going reading. Volosinov's books and articles, unlike Bakhtin's explicitly

proclaim and implement a Marxist perspective. The political climate regarding Marxism in and outside the Soviet Union has been so controversial that there is much disagreement as to whether or not Bakhtin and Volosinov are really one person writing under two pen names. Some have highlighted and acclaimed Volosinov's proclamation of a Marxist perspective and others have down played it as "editorial retouches" to assure publication. As there has been no resolution to this controversy I will use their pen names and leave the question of authorship up for posterity. However, I find this controversy about authorship--the relationship between the teller and the texts--particularly befitting not only of the issues their books raise, but also of this dissertation's topic.

Volosinov's conception of language and Bakhtin's, less explicitly so, have in contrast to previously reviewed psychological perspectives radically different implications for narrative analysis. Volosinov does not think of a story or any utterance for that matter as a manifestation of inner psychic forces, structures or processes. His conception of consciousness in relation to language is radically different from previously reviewed psychological conceptions.

His conception of language interlocks with his conception of ideology and consciousness. He views

language, ideology and consciousness all as aspects of meaningful social phenomena. Like Bakhtin, he views meaning as necessarily social and bound to the human conditions and perspectives by which it is generated. But he takes this a step further and argues that meaning is therefore necessarily ideological. He claims,

The word as the ideological phenomenon par excellence exists in continuous generation and change; it sensitively reflects all social shifts and alterations. In the vicissitudes of the word are the vicissitudes of the society of word-users (p. 157-8).

Thus linguistic phenomena, such as narratives, in his view must be understood in their ideological context.

According to Freudian and object relation conceptions of language, language is a manifestation of individual psychic forces, process, structures and or intentions. Volosinov turns the conceptual table and claims the reverse is the case: The individual psyche or consciousness is a manifestation of language. The individual psyche or consciousness is a linguistic phenomena.<sup>7</sup> "Language," he declares,

lights up the inner personality and its consciousness; language creates them and endows them with intricacy and profundity--and it does not work the other way. Personality, from the standpoint of its inner, subjective content, is a

---

<sup>7</sup>Linguistic as in the more general sense of the word semiotic as a system of signs.

theme of language, and this theme undergoes development and variation within the channel of the more stable constructions of language. Consequently, a word is not an expression of inner personality; rather, inner personality is an expressed or inwardly impelled word.

According to his view consciousness evolves in the process of interactions among people. The use of signs and their meaning evolve in the course of these interactions.

Consciousness arises when the meaning of an interaction is turned inward. Speech is in Volosinov's view one of the most important constituents of consciousness. He writes,

the semiotic material of the psyche is preeminently the word--inner speech...it is the word that constitutes the foundation, the skeleton of inner life. Were it to be deprived of the word, the psyche would shrink to an extreme degree; deprived of all other expressive activities, it would die out altogether (p. 29).

Volosinov defines psychic experience as "the semiotic expression of the contact between the organism and the outside environment (p.26)." He believed the psyche should be understood and interpreted as a semiotic phenomena instead of in terms of processes or structures inside the person.

Volosinov insists that just as language must be understood in ideological terms so too must consciousness as a semiotic phenomena. In contrast to psychological modes of explaining the consciousness, Volosinov does not use psychological constructs as explanatory devices. He argues,

The individual consciousness not only cannot be used to explain anything, but, on the contrary, is itself in need of explanation from the vantage point of the social, ideological medium.  
The individual consciousness is a social-ideological fact (p. 12).

The interconnection of the terms language, ideology and consciousness is evident in his description of ideology as "chains of signs" that connect one consciousness to another.

Volosinov takes issue with the fundamental premises of traditional psychological approaches to the study of meaningful phenomena. He asserts that the study of meaningful phenomena as inherently ideological must take place outside psychology. Ideology is primary. The study of ideologies he argues,

does not depend on psychology to any extent and need not be grounded in it ... it is rather the reverse: objective psychology must be grounded in the study of ideologies. The reality of ideological phenomena is the objective reality of social signs (p. 13).

The meaning of psychological life and of language in particular must be understood in terms of the social context. He strongly criticizes traditional psychological conceptions of consciousness as obscuring rather than clarifying matters.

It is precisely the problem of consciousness that has created the major difficulties and generated the formidable confusion encountered in all issues associated with psychology and the study of



ideologies alike. By and large, consciousness has become the *asylum ignorantiae* for all philosophical constructs. It has been made the place where all unresolved problems, all objectively irreducible residues are stored away. Instead of trying to find an objective definition of consciousness, thinkers have begun using it as a means for rendering all hard and fast objective definitions subjective and fluid (p. 13).

This view not only argues against Freudian and object relation perspectives, but also against those literary perspective that explain the meaning of narratives in terms of an author's "intentions," or "motivations". In Volosinov's view these ideas themselves are cultural or ideological constructs. "The inner personality," he claims, "with all its subjective intentions and all its inner depths, is nothing but an ideolgame (a manifestation of a system of ideas). (p. 152-3)."

Volosinov's work implies that linguistic phenomena such as narratives should be studied not in psychological terms, but instead in terms of the interplay between inner signs and larger social forms. Bakhtin's and Volosinov's work articulates a way of understanding linguistic phenomena in a social context. In contrast to abstract, formalist linguistic approaches of their time they conceive of language primarily as a medium of communication. A verbal sign in their view is a speech act whose meaning is inextricably bound to social relations. An individual's use

of a word is regulated by social relations. Volosinov write, "The immediate social situation and the broader social milieu wholly determine--and determine from within, so to speak--the structure of an utterance."

Bakhtin and Volosinov create a vocabulary to convey their particular conception of language, as the other psychological perspectives presented prior to this do. They use the words 'utterance' and 'speech' to emphasize the social immediacy of the meaning of language. An utterance is particular to a specific context in time, place and among people. Its meaning, in part, is defined by the particular person who speaks it and the person to whom its spoken. When language means it is always one person talking to another. In the absence of an actual person some addressee is presupposed.

Bakhtin uses's the word 'heteroglossia' to emphasize the contextual basis of meaning of an utterance. An utterance or text always exists in some context. The meaning of an utterance varies as the multiple conditions that define that context--historical, cultural, geographical, interpersonal, physiological etc.--vary. So that any word or utterance may have multiple meanings which become more specifiabile within a context.

According to Bakhtin, an utterance is constituted by 'voices'. A voice is a "semantic position," a point of view on the world, "one personality positioning itself among other personalities" (Emerson, 1984, p. xxxvi). Meaning is created in the interweaving of voices, that constitutes an utterance. Voices are defined by linguistic and metalinguistic characteristics such as tone, style, idiom, situation, spatial markers, metaphors, field of vision, and the field of responses it evokes. Bakhtin is particularly interested in the embedding of two voices ('double voicedness'), or multiple voices ('polyphony') in one utterance. Volosinov describes how the narrator's and characters' voices are interwoven with the use of directly, indirectly and 'quasidirectly' reported speech of characters.

The shadowing, overlapping, opposition or weaving of voices in an utterance or a narrative speaks of the authors and characters relations to others. Emerson, an editor and translator of Bakhtin's, claims the notion of voice

lies at the base of Bakhtin's non-referential-- that is, responsive-- theory of language. An utterance responds both to others without, and others embedded within itself (pp. xxxvi-xxxvii).

The meaning of our words exist in the context of our relationships with others. Our language speaks of how our

selves are inextricably woven with others. Bakhtin describes the way in which we are always using another's words:

Our practical every day speech is full of other people's words: with some of them we completely merge our own voice forgetting whose they are; others, which we take as authoritative, we use to reinforce our own words: still others... we populate with our own aspirations, alien or hostile to them. (1984, p.195)

We make other's words our own by saying them with our own intonations, accent, and intentions. Word choice, rhythm, tone, and idiom can convey the relation between the voices, or between the author and characters, whether it be admiration, irony or sympathy.

In Bakhtin's view the utterance is not the articulation of the intention of a single personality; it is not monologic. He claims that human speech, "requires the transmission and re-processing of another's word (p. 355)." In contrast to the object relations notion that linguistic phenomena are representations that refer to internal representations of relationships with others, Bakhtin conceives of linguistic phenomena as having an interpersonal life of its own:

Within the arena of almost every utterance an intense interaction and struggle between one's own and another's word is being waged, a process in which they oppose or dialogically interanimate each other. The utterance so conceived is a considerably more complex and dynamic organism that it appears when construed simply as a thing

that articulates the intention of the person uttering it, which is to see the utterance as a direct, single-voiced vehicle for expression (pp. 354-355).

Bakhtin argues that the inherently dialogic quality of human speech and the philosophical ramifications of that "fact" have not been fully appreciated. He asserts that this dialogue is the subject of any utterance as much as its thematic content.

The term 'genre' in Bakhtin's vocabulary provides the most comprehensive unit of analysis for capturing the relations among the voices that populate a conversation or narrative. Bakhtin defines speech genre's as "relatively stable types" of utterances (oral or written) that "reflect the specific conditions and goals" of a particular human activity through "thematic content, style and compositional structure" using the "lexical, phraseological, and grammatical resources of the language (1986, p. 60)." Genre's can be routines and/or ritualistic forms of communication. Scientific papers, family dinner-table talk, legal documents, and baby-talk are all examples of genres. Genre's are as varied as are human activities. They are determined by the particular expectations and the assumptions speakers have of each other and the particular activity or scene in which they are engaged. The meanings any one genre takes varies as scene, speakers, expectations,

and assumptions vary. Dore (1989) likens the genre to Wittgenstein's "language game":

It [the genre] is Wittgenstein's "language game" writ large. The features of genre performance will be partly determined by the particulars of the social scene and the scenario in which it occurs. Each performance is actualized with a different set of features. This accords with Wittgenstein's point that the applications of word uses to new situation will continually vary. And it meets Bakhtin's sense of the "live utterance" as ever renewing itself. Genre attempts to describe the experience of speaking, not knowledge of language (p. 255).

In narratives genre is a form in which the meaning of the social relations between narrator and characters, speaker and listener, author and reader are realized.

Dore (1989) extends a Bakhtinian analysis to the development of language in children. He describes the emergence of speech genres in the speech of one child during her second year. The nightly scenario of this girl's going to sleep, he claims, is "enacted through several genres". He describes the dialogues, which occur between this child and her father as he puts her to bed each night, in relation to the monologues she speaks as she falls asleep. Word meaning in children's language, he argues, emerges in dialogue with parents. He asks us to reconsider one of the basic premises of language development:

We all readily believe that "children acquire language" in some sense. We are less ready to believe that "language acquires children." Yet the genre conceptualization of what language is

requires some such principle: that the agency that enables a child to speak ever more appropriately must extend beyond the child's cognitive capacity; genre meanings and functions are first coconstructed with more fully socialized agents of language (parents). The voices of others in close coproduction and coarticulation are involved not only in the child's social talk but in her thinking itself (p.256).

Dore argues for "a more deeply interactionist view of language development," and for a "theory of what happens between speakers... (p. 256)."

Bakhtin's and Volosinov's vocabulary--the terms: heteroglossia, voice, reenvoicing, double-voice, indirect discourse, genre, etc.--offers a mode of narrative analysis that is attuned to the linguistic forms of the relational realm, and to the process that constitutes the nexus of language and consciousness. It offers us a set of notions that fit the forms language, and narratives, in particular, present to us. Their terms are phenomenologically closer to the "data". They have the potential to facilitate a rich and textured textual analysis. The notion of representations does not adequately describe the relational realm of narrative. The narrative is a more complex form than the term representation can describe. While the term representation does have its uses in narrative analysis, it is not sufficient in and of itself. A narrative as a whole is defined by moving constellations of relations that terms

like voices and genres help us hear and understand.



**CONCLUSION: Conceptions of Language and their Implications  
for Narrative Analysis**

With this discussion of Volosinov's and Bakhtin's work we come to the end of our survey of a spectrum of conceptions of language. This spectrum provides a view of certain psychoanalytic, object relations, developmental, literary and philosophical perspectives on language in relation to one another. The consideration of this spectrum brings into focus the formative influence the assumptions and vocabularies of conceptions of language have on narrative analysis.

In this chapter I have argued that the assumptions and vocabularies of different conceptions of language imply different modes of narrative analysis in the following interrelated ways: 1. Different conceptions of language have different definitions of language as an object of and tool for inquiry. Referential and representational conceptions of language define language as an objectively definable tangible object, while dialogic conceptions define it as a fluid communicative interactive process. These definitions lead to the use of different methods and the generation of different kinds of understanding.

2. According to different conceptions of language, the generation of meaning is conceptualized spatially and

. . .

temporally very differently in relation to the moment of expression, the speaker or writer and the context (scene) in which it is expressed. Modes of narrative analysis can be differentiated in terms of where and when they locate meaning and the extent to which they conceive of it as fixed, specifiable and definitive. Those conceptions that conceive of meaning as located inside the mind or body before it is expressed are suited to the requirements of empirical and positivist procedures, because then the meaning of a linguistic phenomenon can be objectively and reliably defined by a set of rules or code and the attribution of meaning replicated. While those conceptions of meaning that conceive of it as located outside among people, before, during and after, it is expressed, as generated in dialogue, in a communication process between people in the context of the culture and particular activity in which they are engaged are suited to dialogic modes of understanding.

3. Different conceptions of language involve different assumptions concerning the relationship between language and consciousness and story and storyteller, in particular. Referential and representational conceptions of language conceive of language as a manifestation of internal processes, entities and structures that can be investigated

with empirical logical positivist methods. According to these conceptions of language, linguistic phenomena and stories in particular can tell us about inner psychic lives. The representational conception of language leads to a representational view of mind. Dialogic or social-process-oriented conceptions of language conceive of consciousness as evolving in the context of meaningful communicative interactions with others. Consciousness, then, to varying degrees, depending on the theorist, also is conceived as a manifestation of language. Volosinov takes the most extreme position in this regard. He considers consciousness as a manifestation of language instead of in terms of intrapsychic processes or structures. The dialogic conception of language leads to a dialectical conception of consciousness.

Different conceptions of language have different implications concerning the mode of inquiry and the generation of narratives. They have different answers to this study's guiding questions : How do you tell? and How was the story told? Depending on the conception of language the meaning of narratives are inquired after and articulated differently. According to referential and representational conceptions of language, words tell. They refer back to, reveal the already formed meanings of hidden,

imperceptible, unconscious instinctual drives, representations, memories etc. Meaning is generated and understood through reference and representation. According to process and context oriented dialogic conceptions, understanding is generated through dialogue with and within stories.

The field of psychology is just beginning to consider dialogic conceptions of language. This integration requires a consideration of the suitability of empirical and dialogic methods to different conceptions of language. I propose that referential and representational conceptions of language are better suited to empirical approaches, while holistic-process-oriented conceptions (Werner and Kaplan), dialogic or "responsive" conceptions (Bakhtin and Volosinov), and communicative conceptions (Burke) of language are better suited to dialogic methods of narrative analysis.

## CHAPTER 4

### **WEAVING A PATH BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND LITERARY THEORY: A study of narrative analysis in clinical psychology and bordering disciplines**

In the preceding chapter I discussed the different conceptions of inquiry used in psychology to reach an understanding of people. We now arrive at the doorstep of the narrative form. In the history of clinical psychology the narrative form has been conceived of and used as a means of understanding people in several ways: as data and evidence for theory and practice, as a therapeutic mode, and as a theoretical medium. It has been conceived of as both the object of and tool for inquiry. An examination of the literature makes it clear that the 'results,' 'findings,' or 'theories,' that psychological narrative research generates are shaped by their conceptions of inquiry, language, and narrative.

This chapter investigates the history of the use of the narrative form as a means of understanding people, in the form of data and/or evidence for theories. This historical perspective makes evident the manner in which theoretical ideologies influence the kind conceptions of inquiry, language and narrative assumed and the kind of understanding of stories and storytellers reached. In the course of tracing the history of the use of the narrative form to its

present influx state, I will note some of the literary, linguistic and philosophical influences and present alternative approaches to narrative analysis that are as of yet not influential.

The narrative form has become increasingly appealing to researchers, theoreticians and clinicians as a certain conception of human beings as intentional agents has taken hold. Increasingly psychoanalytic theoreticians (Klein, 1976; Schafer 1983) have urged that the focus of psychology be the study of the meaning of human action. Textual accounts are a means of facilitating a rich and subtle understanding of the meaning of human action. The narrative, in particular, provides the context and terms for the examination of human action. Taylor (1988) argues that any description of action can only make sense in a particular relational scenario. However, as this textual approach to the study of human action has been implemented it has been found to be beset by interpretive problems (Gergen, 1988; Taylor, 1988). An examination of different interpretive approaches to narrative analysis has become increasingly important as these interpretive problems have become the focus of discussion among clinical practitioners and researchers.

#### **NARRATIVE AS DATA:**

In order to use narratives as an object of inquiry - as

data - one has to assume some definition of it, and describe what has to be done to obtain and analyze narrative. The definition of narrative and the methods used mutually inform each other and shape the kind of understanding of stories finally reached.

The methodology used significantly constrains what kind of data -- stories are studied, and the measures or modes of interpretation used to analyze them. For example, empirical narrative studies within clinical psychology tend to use certain work with the stimulus-response paradigm to the extent that they use a stimulus (a picture or sentence stems) and story-eliciting procedures such as the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). These stimuli and procedures are used because they establish controlled conditions and are replicable. The advantage of these controlled conditions is that the results can be used as proof for or against causal explanations concerning the relationship between storyteller and story. Other more naturalistic observational studies (Nelson, 1989; Pitcher and Prelinger, 1963) record childrens's spontaneously told stories in their actual contexts (i.e. in the crib at bedtime, in the nursery school during playtime). While these studies have the advantage of having stories told in real-life situations, they do not meet empirical criteria for proof and remain suggestive. The conditions under which and the person(s) to whom a story is told, as I will discuss in more detail, has significant

effects on the kind of story told (length, complexity, affective tone etc.) and therefore the kind of results found.

This review of the narrative research within clinical and developmental psychology focuses on the two general kinds of data sets which are predominantly used within academia: Those collected under controlled experimental conditions and those stories collected in natural settings which are spontaneously told. While psychology has had a profound influence on both the writing and interpretation of great literature, in academic psychology psychological studies of great literature have become increasingly marginal area of inquiry since Freud's time. A comprehensive review of such studies falls beyond the limits of this discussion.

In the following section I will discuss the problem of defining narrative as data and the use of literary and psychological theoretical codes to solve that problem in the history of narrative analysis in clinical psychology. The definition of narrative used influences the kind of analysis done: the kind of questions thought important to ask, and the kinds of category or coding systems formulated.



### WHAT IS NARRATIVE?

nar'r^a-tive, n. 1. a story, account, tale. 2. the art or practice of relating stories or accounts; narration.

nar'ra-tive, a. [L. narrativus, suitable for relation, from narrare, to relate, make known.]  
...

narration, the act or process of narrating; the telling of a story, or the giving of an account of a happening, etc., in writing or speech.

Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary  
of the English Language, Unabridged  
New York: The World Publishing Co., 1966

What is narrative?<sup>1</sup> Is it simply an account of a happening? Is there more to it than that? Do these definitions say enough? More is not said in the dictionary. There is difficulty in saying more, because, as Barthes explains in the following passage, narratives are not easily confined within any one definition's boundaries:

Numberless are the world's narratives. First of all in a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed among different substances, as if any material were appropriate for man to entrust his stories to it: narrative can be supported by articulated speech, oral or written, by image, fixed or moving, by gesture, and by the organized mixture of all these substances; it is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, tragedy, comedy, epic, history, pantomime, painting (think of Carpaccio's Saint Ursula) stained-glass window, cinema, comic book, news item, conversation. Further, in these almost infinite forms, narrative occurs in all periods, all places, all societies; narrative

---

<sup>1</sup> The words narrative and story will be used interchangeably. The theorists and researchers discussed in this chapter do not make any distinction between them.

begins with the very history of humanity; there is not, there has never been, any people anywhere without narrative; all classes, all human groups have their narratives, and very often these are enjoyed by men of different, even opposing culture: narrative never prefers good to bad literature: international, transhistorical, transcultural, narrative is there, like life (1988, p. 95).

Having said this Barthes asks, "What are we to say of narrative analysis confronting millions of narratives?" To say any more we must enter some theoretical domain and declare our assumptions, conceive of a hypothetical model of narrative and descend from this model to its species exemplars. Barthes asserts that "it is impossible to combine (produce) a narrative without reference to an implicit system of units and rules (1988, p. 97)." It is also impossible to proceed to interpret and understand without making reference to and use of theoretical codes.

### **Narrative analysis and two sources of its theoretical codes: literary theory and psychology**

Narrative analysis varies greatly depending on the definition of narrative used and the theoretical codes used to interpret them. This chapter is a survey of narrative studies deriving from two theoretical codes clinical/developmental psychology and literary theory. Narrative analysis occurs in the overlap between these disciplines' two terrains. The diversity of perspectives

that inhabit the shared territory between the two provides the contrasts necessary to see the consequences different assumptions about narrative and inquiry have on the kind of understanding of narrative and author reached.

Literary theorists have conceptualized narratives and narrative analysis in terms of its basic elements and different levels of inquiry. At a minimum a happening, change of state or event is generally agreed to be fundamental to narrative. Literary theorists, though, go much further and examine just what constitutes a happening.

Propp views narrative as a text in which there is a change from one state to a modified state. He presents in his seminal book The Morphology of the Folktale (1968 [1928]) an inventory of the fundamental events (or functions as he calls them) and a method of structural narrative analysis which has become highly influential. Propp claims that a story begins with an initial state of equilibrium, then is disturbed by various forces of turbulence, which results in an upheaval. The story comes to a conclusion when through a course of action a modified version of the original equilibrium is restored.

Propp's definition of narrative alludes to the kind of organization or relationship among the events that is characteristic of narrative accounts. Aristotle was the first to draw attention to this feature of narrative. He defined narratives as having beginnings, middles and ends.

Narratives are composed within the context of time. Narrative is not merely the presentation of a group of events. It is an account of a sequence of meaningfully related events. If a king dies and then a queen dies the sequence of the two events must be significantly related in order for it to become a narrative.

But this is still not enough of a definition for many. Barbara Smith defines narration as "someone telling someone else that something happened" (1980, p. 232). Narratives are not merely accounts of happenings. They are accounts with both a teller and a listener (whether present or imagined). The existence of a narrative is dependent on the relationship between storyteller and listener. In order for a set of events to be construed as a narrative the teller must provide enough cues for the events to be construed as connected and significant, and the listener must take these cues and perceive these events as connected and significant.

This definition has methodological implications. It implies that the relation(s) between the storyteller and listener(s) and the activity of the investigator as a listener or reader deserves consideration. Moreover, it implies that the existence of a story is not an independent fact, but is dependent on the communicative process between two. The implications this dialogic aspect of narrative has for therapeutic practice, specifically in terms of transference and countertransference issues, will be

discussed in chapter six.

Narrative making involves the creation of meaningful relations. It transforms any set of elements into a connective tissue. There are multiple relations necessary for the existence of a narrative. A narrative begins with a storyteller and a listener or reader (whether physically present or imagined), and evolves in the relations created between the two. In addition, it evolves in the relations among action, character, scene, and events.

Rather than analyze particular elements of narrative in isolation, literary theorists of the structuralist and formalist schools have chosen to organize their analysis according to levels of meaning on which elements form meaningful units. The first level of analysis, according to the Russian formalists, and others like Propp and Todorov, is the story or fabula. This level concerns the relations among basic elements of the narrative such as the plot, the characters and their situations. The fabula answers the question 'what was the story about'. The relations among basic elements of the narrative are functions of what the story is about. Any one fabula can be realized with different configurations of character plot and scene or in other words have different versions. The fabula constitutes what structuralists call the syntagmatic dimension of analysis, that is, the linear presentation of events and characters. French literary theorists, such as Barthes

(1988) and Benveniste (1966), call this level the 'histoire'. Bruner says the fabula "bespeaks a timeless gist or moral (1989, p.77)."

The Russian formalists call the second level the sjuzhet or discourse (or discours according to the French theorists). This level concerns the particular techniques used to present the basic story: the distinctive style, voice or manner the author uses. This level of analysis involves attending to the rhythm, pacing, choice of word, image, and detail of a story. It constitutes what structuralists call the paradigmatic dimension of analysis, that is the relation of a particular choice of word or genre to the paradigm, class or set from which it is drawn. The sjuzhet answers the question 'how was the story told?' in linguistic terms.

In more recent years a third level of analysis, 'narration' has been identified (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983; Toolan, 1988). This level examines the relationship between the narrator (as not necessarily identical with storyteller and the person who is the storyteller) and the narrative told. Different kinds of narration, like first person, first person retrospective, or third person (also known as direct and indirect discourse) are examined at this level. Bakhtin's (1981, 1984, 1986) and Cohn's (1978) studies are examples of some studies at this level.

### **The Relationship Between Storyteller and Story**

Psychologists examine the relationship between the story and the storyteller. From a postmodern perspective this is yet another level analysis, while from the psychological perspective it is identical with the third level of analysis --the relationship between narrator and story. Psychologists often do not question the identity or distinction between a story's narrator and a story's teller. In addition, they assume a storyteller is identical with a person. MacFarlane and Tuddenham (1951, p. 34) claim that psychologists' projective techniques, such as storytelling tasks, like the Thematic Apperception Test (discussed in greater detail in later sections), assume an "isomorphic" relationship between person and response (i.e. story). Postmodernist literary criticism has brought into question this identity or unity among narrator, author and person. One author can create many different kinds of narrators and many aspects of a person may not be represented in the stories they tell. The relationship between story and storyteller is questionable and open to interpretation.

As much as the methods and conclusions of narrative analysis within psychology vary, all studies have in common the assumption that there is a significant relationship between story and storyteller. They all are based on the inference that features of the stories are determined by features of the storyteller. Holt claims this "inference is

our principal (theoretical) tool" in interpreting stories (1978, p.63). This inference plays a remarkably powerful role in narrative analysis within psychology. It serves as the rationale for using stories as the means for investigating psychological personality functioning and as evidence of psychological entities or processes. Rapaport, Gill and Schafer (1968) claimed

a rationale of the TAT [a storytelling task known as the Thematic Apperception Test] lies in the cloudiest and least explored realm of present-day psychology (p. 477-8).

This rationale which lies at the foundation of narrative research warrants examination. The questions are 'How do stories tell us about the storyteller?' 'Do stories tell?' If you assume they do: 'What is it they tell?'

### **INTENTIONALITY And the Relationship Between Story and Storyteller**

Intention is the most common term used to tell how the story was told. We assume a storyteller intends, wants, needs to whether consciously or unconsciously to communicate something. The assumption that speaker or writer has the intention to communicate something is seemingly irresistible. According to the research of Sperber and Wilson (1977, in Bruner, 1986) listeners to language usually assume that the speaker is intending to communicate something. Even in our first encounter in this world our



sounds are interpreted as if we has the intention to communicate something meaningful. Macfarlane (1977, in Bruner, 1986) reports that when mothers' speak to their babies for the first time after delivery they speak as if the baby as the intention to communicate to them. In his recordings mothers say things like, "What's that frown for? The world a little surprising, you trying to tell me? (p. 114)." In our culture the notion of intentionality seems to acquire children as much as children may acquire intentionality through their social interactions.

Those that ask after the author's intention as a way of ascertaining the meaning of an utterance or text assume that contained in the beginning intention is its meaning. Many psychologists locate the meaning of stories as inside their tellers. They view mental entities, contents or processes such as unconscious wishes, internal representations and defenses as determinants of the character, plot and style of a story. The question of the relation between then beginning intention and subsequent verbal expression was also of issue for Lewis Carroll's characters. It comes to the fore at the "Mad Tea-Party" in Alice in Wonderland (1960) in a conversation between Alice and the March Hare:

"I'm glad they've begun asking riddles--I believe I can guess that," she added aloud.  
 "Do you mean you think you can find out the answer to it?" said the March Hare .  
 "Exactly so," said Alice.  
 "Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare went on.

"I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least--at least I mean what I say-- that's the same thing, you know."

"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter.

Even though a speaker or writer may believe they mean what they say and say what they mean, the eventual meanings of their speech or texts may be very different from the supposed beginning intentions. The international crisis that arose upon the publication of Salmon Rushdie's book The Satanic Verses in the fall of 1988 is exemplary of Nietzsche's claim that the beginning intentions do not match the eventual meanings of a text (for further discussion of this claim refer to chapter 3). The Ayotolah Khomeini condemned the book as blasphemous to the Muslim religion and threatened to have Rushdie killed. Bookstores selling the book received bomb threats. Rushdie went into hiding. Despite the popular view that the book was religiously and politically contentious Rushdie exclaimed in an interview that it wasn't meant to be in the least:

I may seem fantastically naive to say so, but I thought The Satanic Verses a personal, inward and spiritual novel, not a historical or political one as the previous ones had been. It's a novel about whether people can live without God, about how people change when they move across the planet. It's about how people come to terms with dying, and how they fail to learn about love. It's not a novel about religion: the subject is not faith but the loss of faith. So it seemed to me that I had already in this book moved away from politics. Obviously, that's not how it turned out [laughs]--some mistake surely--but that's what I thought I was doing. Writers can sit in a room for five years and think their processes will be understood, and most of the time they are, but

sometimes, spectacularly, they're not. The idea that I planned all this is bizarre (1990, p. 120-121).

The meaning the author intends and the meaning understood are often different. The relationship among the author, narrative and the interpreter is essential to understanding how we understand people through the stories they tell. I argue that this understanding of storyteller is never simply a referential, one to one correspondence relationship among story and teller, or even among story, teller and interpreter. Theories in striving for clarity and legitimacy often construct referential explanations of the relationship between story and teller. But the understanding of storyteller is a process, a dialogic process. As Bakhtin claims,

To see and comprehend the author of a work means to see and comprehend another, alien consciousness and its world, that is, another subject (Du). With explanation there is only one consciousness, one subject; with comprehension there are two consciousness and two subjects. There can be no dialogic relationship with an object, and therefore explanation has no dialogical aspects (except formal, rhetorical ones). Understanding is always dialogic to some degree (1986, p. 111).

In my view the problem of using stories as a means of understanding others is not one of validating interpretations, as much as it is one of finding a way to talk about understanding. The formal presentation of inquiry in academia has for too long been ruled by the correspondence theory of truth, as if our understanding is

separate from what is understood and has to be in a relationship of identity, reflection or representation. Although understanding may at times seem like a mirror, it is also from a wider angle view one wavelength of light among a spectrum of others. Understanding requires dialogue, involvement and engagement. The problem is to articulate the conditions of our understanding, the context in which and means by which we construct, choose and use one interpretation rather than another.

In the survey of psychological approaches to narrative analysis that follows I characterize each analysis according to the level(s) outlined above of literary analysis used. All psychological studies examine focus on the fourth level--the relationship between story-teller and story--in addition to one or more of the other levels. In addition to these psychological narrative studies I will examine studies outside psychology that present alternative modes of analysis. I consider the narrative studies according to their conceptions of narrative along a spectrum ranging from those that think of it as primarily representational, referential or mimetic and those that think of it as primarily a constructive or creative activity. According to the latter conception of narrative the story and particularly the telling of the story serves multiple functions, while according to the former stories are a

projective screen for the authors personality.

#### THE NARRATIVE AS REFERENTIAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL

And God created man in his own image, in the image  
of God created he him...

Genesis 1:27

Psychoanalytic thinkers, beginning with Freud have conceived of narrative and the relationship between story and storyteller primarily in referential terms. According to the referential view, stories refer to psychological states, entities or processes in the storyteller. This conception of narrative assumes there is something definitive in the storyteller prior to the storytelling that determines the kind of story told. As I will relate in the following account psychoanalytic investigators have struggled to formulate methods to ascertain or validate their referential interpretations of the relationship between story and storyteller in the course of the history of psychoanalysis.

Freud was both a great storyteller and reader. His writing is engaging, compelling and at times spellbinding. He won the Goethe prize for literature. Literature informed his understanding of psychological phenomena, as much as psychoanalytic theory informed his understanding of literature. Such papers as "The Occurrence in Dreams of Material from Fairy-Tales (1913)", "The Uncanny (1919),"

"Some Character Types Met in Psychoanalytic Work (1915)" are testament to his ongoing dialogue with stories in his attempt to articulate an understanding of human experience. In later works, like Civilization and Its Discontents, he drew upon great myths to present his ideas. The relationship between Freud's theorizing, reading, writing and the narrative form is enormously complex and deserving of a paper of its own. The focus here, however, is on his formulation of the relationship between story and storyteller.

Freud (1908) considered stories within the same spectrum of psychological phenomena as dreams and daydreams. He viewed them as forms of wish fulfillment or fantasies. He thought that stories were determined by the needs and drives of the id. Writers, he claimed, "personify the conflicting trends in their own mental life in many heros (1908, p. 41)". Thus stories, were thought of as a means of revealing the unconscious, as dreams had before them.

#### **Early Thematic Approaches:**

The narrative form as a means of understanding people became of particular interest to psychologists in the 1930's. Morgan and Murray created a storytelling task called the Thematic Apperception Test. They thought of the task, along with the use of content analyses of the stories, as a method for investigating fantasy (Morgan and Murray 1935). They focused on the first level of analysis -the

fabula or story- outlined above. They thought the TAT provided a means of understanding the motivational aspects of personality. They developed a scoring method that focused on content--needs, press and themas. The majority of TAT researchers that followed emphasized the analysis of content, as is evident in Schneidman's (1951) collection of articles on the TAT. A few, however (Henry, 1956; Wyatt 1947; reviewed in Holt, 1978), began to explore the analysis of formal aspects.

#### **Ego Psychology and the Introduction of Structural or Formal Analysis:**

As the focus in psychoanalytic theory shifted from the id to the ego, so too did the conception of what narrative could tell shift from narrative as fantasy to narrative as the regulation of fantasy. Rapaport, Gill and Schafer (1968) suggested that the conception of stories as fantasy was too narrow. They thought stories were not only a manifestation of fantasy, but also of the defense of fantasy. As such, stories could provide a means for understanding not only the id, but also the ego and superego, and personality organization in general. Robert Holt proposed that stories could

contain an inexhaustible wealth of materials for various kinds of insights about him, permitting an extensive description and analysis of personality to be written, covering diagnostic considerations, personality traits and structure, developmental trends, relations with important persons in his

life, motives and defenses, sentiments, qualities of intellect, vocational adjustment, and other areas (1951, rpt 1978, p. 51).

The inference that a story told about a picture is related to the major themes of a storyteller's life, and to his personality traits and structure is an inference embedded in the assumptions that there exists such entities as structures and traits and that they are somehow "reflected" by stories. MacFarlane and Tuddenham explain, that analysis of the responses to projective tests, such as the TAT, as a means of understanding personality organization

involves the implicit assumption that since it offers the subject wide latitude to reveal himself, the particular sample of responses supplied by the protocol mirrors the subject's basic personality organization (1951, p. 33).

Storytelling according to this view is considered an act of imitation rather than creation. This view is drawn from the Aristotlean notion that literature immitates life.

Psychoanalytic theorists and researchers have taken this notion and elaborated it specifically in terms of how literature reflects the author's psyche. The narrative according to this psychoanalytic view is a reproduction of structural and dynamic features of the personality. Because the story is believed to be determined by personality content, processes and structures, it is believed it will reflect these processes and structures. T.S. Eliot (1919, reprinted 1975) took great exception to this view. He



called it the "biographical fallacy" and argued with the help of a letter of Keats' (on the artists "negative capability"), that the writer annihilates his own personality through his imaginative identification with the subject of his writing. This view is the extreme opposite of the psychoanalytic notion of narrative as projective screen. Other literary critics of the intentionalist school, like Empson argue that the author's life experience is an important context to consider in the attempt to understand a literary text. Most approaches to narrative analysis acknowledge some kind of relation between an author and his work. I will discuss more fully the view that the narrative is a creation that is not entirely determined by the author's personality or past life in the section of narrative as a dialogic and constructive activity.

Rapaport, Gill and Schafer emphasize the storyteller's psychological structure as the most powerful determinant of a story and only note as an aside the influence such factors as the storytelling situation, relationship to examiner etc., might play. They explain, "It is assumed that the psychological structure of the person is a principle governing all his behavior...(p. 225)". They claim,

the tonal characteristics are never incidental to the stories--never forms in which the patient dressed up his essential ideational content--but are always inherent in (emphasis mine) the experiencing, thinking and verbalizing of the subject (p. 500).

According to this view the determinants of a story pre-exist inside the head of the storyteller. As Rapaport, Gill and Schafer claim, "every reaction of a subject is a reflection or projection of his private world (p. 52)." The meaning of the story refers back to personality of the storyteller. The meaning is assumed to be determinant in the psychological structure of the person. The belief in the validity of the TAT as a personality measurement is based on the sole emphasis on the similarity -- the synonymous and/or isomorphic relationship -- between story and storyteller. The emphasis on similarity is rooted in traditional literary theory. In contrast modern and postmodern literary theory the emphasis is on difference. Their approach does not take into the consideration the possibility that there are differences between the author's personality and the story told. The inference that a story is related to the major themes of a storyteller's life, and to his personality traits and structure assumes a referential conception of narrative.

Rapaport, Gill and Schafer shifted the interpretation of narrative from the deterministic realm of the id to the autonomous-free-will realm of the ego. They inferred that a "choice process" was involved in the telling of a story. Rapaport articulated some ideas involved in the assumption that a TAT story refers to its storyteller in his "projective hypothesis":

A choice process is involved in deciding with whom to identify the picture's figures, and a choice selects from all actions allowed for by the pictures those actions which then, organizing the person's striving and obstacles chosen, create the sequence of events and the outcome of the story. (1942, p. 215)

While Freud's explanation for how the story was told required the assumption of the existence of the unconscious, Rapaport's explanation requires the assumption of a "choice process". If we assume a choice process is involved in the telling of a story -- a choice process that includes the existence of some agency that identifies, selects actions and organizes strivings -- then 'How the Story Was Told?' involves describing that choice process.

Rapaport, Gill and Schafer describe this choice process as influenced by two sources: "memory" and "convention" or "cliche". They define convention or cliches as reproductions of cultural products, such as movies books and jokes. The distinction between memory and convention was an especially important one to make to support their claim that stories are determined by the psychological structure of the storyteller rather than of the culture. But it is unclear how distinct cliche and memory ever are. They note the difficulty with defining the difference between cliches and past experience as two distinct sources of stories:

It is important to note that cliches too must be considered as past experiences which are remembered. They differ from actual life experiences in that they are usually movie, fiction, funny-paper, or joke stereotypes--that is, not specific reproductions--which the subject

has encountered in a finished form and retained as units in his thought and memory organizations; while what we consider here actual life experiences are those which have occurred step by step in the person's past. This distinction, however, is by no means sharp. On the one hand, we have cliches of a very different origin: happenings and ideas which we once experienced quite vividly may progressively lose their affect and details, and finally boil down to skeletal sketches hardly differing from the cliches just described. On the other hand, there are literary works of fiction which we "lived" while reading them; they are great stories ...which become for us far more than adopted cliches (p. 484).

This footnote quoted above is more clarifying than the main body of their discussion which assumes a distinction. One of the problems with their approach is they do not note that the distinction is more obscuring than clarifying, that stories or parts of stories can not be assigned to either convention or memory. They are always both. They are a synthesis par excellence. Rapaport, Gill and Schafer assume our experience and memory of our experience can be separated from cultural modes of symbolic processing.

Henry (1951), elaborated upon the projective hypothesis to include cultural aspects as determinants of responses to projective tasks. He claimed,

the data from the projective instrument are in part determined by the idiosyncratic psychologic aspects of the individual. Second, it means that projective data are in part determined by the emotional counterparts of cultural communalities. Since this is the case, analysis of the end-product - the projective data - will reveal both idiosyncratic and cultural elements (1951, p. 234).

He reviewed research of differences between stories told by children from various cultural groups including American and Mexican Indians, Micronesians, and South West Africans.

Rapaport's projective hypothesis becomes less easy to accept without hesitation when it is considered within a wider context. 'How was the story told?' is a question that can be answered without reference to a choice process or agency especially if you are not operating within 20th century western cultural world. In another place or age others would explain the story was told by divine inspiration, demonic possession, or say how it was told is an unknowable mystery (Jung). In the 20th century another approach to answering this question has been developed within literary theory and linguistics. This approach focuses on the linguistic forms of the narrative and the interactive process involved in reading or listening to stories. This approach also can lead to an understanding of the relationship between story and storyteller, but with acknowledgment of the role of the listener or reader and their interpretive activity in the process. The relationship is understood in dialogic rather than in referential terms. This approach will be discussed in the next section.

Rapaport, Gill and Schafer assume stories will have "clear-cut representations" that "directly [emphasis mine] represent the real or fantasied personalities" in the

storytellers world. They aren't sure how to account for the storyteller who tells stories that have

figures without depth of characterization, unity, or continuity of interrelationships; [and in which] much of the happening will appear to be extraneous to the figures, and not explained or understandable from their characterization (p. 486).

They consider stories that do not offer clearly recognizable representations of the subject (the storyteller) extreme cases. However they do not maintain this position. They go further, and open up the discussion by questioning the relationship between teller and story they question the relationship between storyteller and the figures in his narrative:

Are they all representative of an aspect of the subject himself, or do only some of them represent him while others are figures who have loomed large in his life? (p. 485)

The relationship they conclude is not clear-cut and requires further interpretation. The question becomes 'how are the figures related to the storyteller?. The interpreter must keep in mind the projective hypothesis as a question not an assumption.

The third level of narrative analysis outlined earlier in the chapter--the analysis of the relationship between the narrator and the characters--goes unrecognized and unexamined in their mode of interpretation. They assume that narrator and author are one. The modern literary

perspective is founded on this questioning of the identity of author, narrator and characters and the unity of person and consciousness. The modern novel a form that permits to some extent the articulation of the multi-faceted, voiced understanding of consciousness.

In conclusion, Rapaport, Gill and Schafer recommend a set of assumptions as the foundation for the analysis of TAT stories: Summing up, we may state that the characteristics, attitudes, and strivings of the figures in the TAT stories are all products of memory; as such, they are subject to the laws of memory organization which order single experiences into patterns conforming with the emotional constellations of the subject's life. This is our theoretical basis for assuming that TAT stories may allow for inferences concerning the make-up of the subject and his world (p. 485).

These assumptions if at least stated as a set of questions would allow for some of the subtleties involved in psychological narrative analysis. Interpretation necessitates going beyond the story. Their mode of interpretation draws heavily upon psychoanalysis and ego psychology. Just as they consider storytelling a projective task, we could go one step beyond and consider the extent to which interpretation is a projective task or at least generates rather than uncovers meaning. Their approach does not adequately account for the role of the interpreter in the understanding of storytellers through their stories. Rapaport, Gill and Schafer's claim that "a rationale of the

TAT [still] lies in the cloudiest and least explored realm (p. 477-8)", made in 1968, still holds true today, despite the numbers of studies and discussions published since.

The assumption of Rapaport's projective hypothesis and a referential conception of narrative forms the basis for a number of recent empirical studies which I will review (Cramer (1981), Thompson (1981), Bogen (1982), and Westen et. al. (1989)). Each of these studies highlight the influence different psychological factors, such as development, object relations, affect maturity, have on the "choice process". Each in their elaboration of Rapaport, Gill and Schafer's approach address some of its inadequacies.

One of the inadequacies of psychoanalytic narrative analysis was its disregard for the forms and structures of narratives. As psychoanalysis expanded its focus to include the study of the ego, psychoanalytic narrative analysis expanded its focus from content analysis to include the analysis of the process of storytelling. This involved approaching narratives not only with the question 'what was the story about?', but also with 'How was the story told?' 'How' became an important question because the answer involved describing, organizing, and choice-making activities associated with the ego. This expansion of narrative analysis was suggested by Schafer (1958) in his seminal article, "How was the story told?". He argued that



an understanding of the story as communication could significantly enrich content analysis. He suggested that psychologists

undertake a kind of psychological literary criticism, seeking in the choice of language, image and sequence of development, as well as in the narrative detail, cues about the storyteller's inner experience, of his creative effort and his creation. We listen especially for ambiguities that is, multiple connotations, especially those not consciously intended, and for disruptions of the storytelling orientation, such as may become evident in hastening to a conclusion, abruptly altering a story's mood, becoming preoccupied with verbalizations, or shifting the focus of attention from fantasy to the relationship with the tester...(p. 181).

This was the first that a psychologist emphasized the importance of noting linguistic or literary aspects of storytelling and interpretation. In this way the second level of narrative analysis--sjuzhet or discourse analysis (the study of style, rhythm, tone) -- entered the practice of psychoanalytic narrative analysis. This was also the first time a theorist emphasized storytelling and interpretation as a dialogic activity.

Schafer's seminal article represents a pivotal point in the history of narrative analysis. His suggestion was taken by clinical psychologists in two directions. One led to empirical studies in which narratives were treated as a static objects and the formal linguistic or representational aspects of narratives were examined. Another led to further theoretical investigation of the quaking epistemological

foundation of psychoanalysis. This was the direction Schafer himself took.

Holt following Schafer's suggestion to consider the story in terms of the action--the telling--that created it described the story as a kind of "hieroglyphic" of a psychological process signifying a person. Holt explains his understanding of the relationship between story and storyteller:

A good way to approach a rationale for the TAT is to try to understand what takes place, psychologically, as a story comes into being. To unravel a knot, it is helpful to know how it was tied; to decipher hieroglyphic traces of the unique person in his stories, it helps if one can get some clarity about the ways in which stories come about. Unfortunately we do not have much empirical knowledge about this kind of problem. We have a number of insightful hypotheses, however, and it is worth while to review them remembering always that what follows is not as well established as one should like for proper scientific rigor. pp.34-35.

Holt did not fully follow up on Schafer's suggestion to consider the story as a communication. While he acknowledged certain communicative aspects of the story, he was more concerned with creating coding systems and establishing empirical validation for the inference that a story was representative of its tellers personality functioning. He and most psychologists then and even still conceive of TAT narratives, as Freud did the dream report, as referential to the psyche.

Holt suggests that we can understand a storyteller if we try to understand "what takes place" as the story is told. If we follow this suggestion, we become involved in telling yet another story -- a theoretical story. In the telling of this story the use of psychological constructs, like personality structures, defenses, or internal representations, involves the creation of a cast of characters (i.e. object representations, ego defenses) with purposes (i.e. organize relational world, keep unacceptable fantasies out of awareness) and plots (expectations of abandonment leads to avoidant behavior in relationships and replication of original trauma, defenses fail, there is a slip of the tongue, a confrontation of a conflict...). When this theoretical story is used as explanation rather than description the constructs of psychic structure, developmental trends, motives, and defenses become reified. The telling of "what takes place" as a story is told is understanding in process; it is an emanation of understanding. The referential conception of narrative confuses the process of understanding -- the telling of "what takes place" -- with what actually happened or exists.

One of the problems with using the theoretical story as evidence for the theoretical constructs in empirical research is that these constructs of mind never can be directly observed. All indirect observations involve theory

laden methods of interpretation/observation. Observation is inherently interpretive and biased. This method of validating constructs becomes tautological because the very proof the (coding of stories) consists of interpretations.

Holt suggests that a veridical account can be reconstructed on the basis of a narrative. He suggests that it not only can be reconstructed, but that somehow the story or more precisely the interpretations of the stories are empirical evidence for psychological constructs. The problem with this use of narratives for understanding people is that the explanation given for how a person told a story is itself a construction, perhaps a very useful construction, but an account, a history, not a replication, not what actually did happen during the telling of the story. The use in therapy of different accounts will have different effects. Each account in its attention to and responses to nuances brings into presence a new interpretation one that could be of particular importance to a patient who had never been recognized for or acknowledged for a particular kind of experience. This line of criticism would not be fully articulated within the discipline of clinical psychology for another twenty five years until Spence published Narrative Truth and Historical Truth.

For Holt and many psychologists the problem was one of obtaining "empirical knowledge" of storytelling and establishing narrative analysis with "scientific rigor".

The aim of projective tests such as the TAT was to render observable and to record the psychological structure of a person without knowing his history. The empirical approach to narrative analysis entails making operational psychological constructs in terms of the narrative form. Coding systems have since been developed for important theoretical constructs like defense mechanisms and object relations. As the clinical psychologists strove for professional legitimacy a sense of necessity to establish empirical proof seized the discipline. But not without ambivalence.

Holt's ambivalence is marked. He urges clinicians both to develop systematic methods to seek empirical proof for clinical phenomena and to interpret in a nonsystematic, intuitive, and holistic manner drawing upon clinical and personal experience. He considered clinical and personal experience a "treacherous but indispensable crutch (19 p. 161-2)" and hoped one day they could be given up once research methods were developed for validating intuitions. He attempted to develop systematic coding systems and encouraged his students to also do so. Yet his approach to TAT interpretation was hermeneutic-like in his insistence on noting multiple contexts, situational factors, on taking any one feature of a story into consideration in terms of the whole storytelling situation (the hermeneutic circle), and on taking into consideration the relationship between the

storyteller (the patient) and the listener (the examiner). He viewed systematic coding systems as useful tools for certain purposes. He viewed them as a means of establishing norms, and developing clinical sensitivity, but not to be used for clinical use:

There is a great deal to be said for a set of fixed variables to be scored for each story, after the model of the insightful formulae of Rorschach, but there are many difficulties in applying such a plan to the TAT. A number of systems have been worked out; almost all of them are useful for some purposes, chiefly for research and for training in sensitivity to easily over-looked aspects of stories...[ no scoring system] is more than an aid to systematic observation, and none can be recommended for routine clinical use, though they are very helpful in research (1978 p. 58-59).

His approach to narrative analysis is oriented by a number of lists of principles and rules, what he calls "open schemes," but not rule bound. He claimed,

there are scarcely any generally applicable rules for analysis and interpretation of TAT. One general statement can be made however: one's skill in interpreting the TAT is greatly enhanced by, and can proceed no further than, his thorough understanding of personology. Specifically, many TAT workers have found their insightfulness in interpretations has been enriched most by a knowledge of psychoanalysis.

Holt was theory bound with his mode of interpretation: He was determined to bring narrative analysis into psychoanalytic theory and to secure within the boundaries of psychoanalytic theory an understanding of people through the stories they tell.

In a similar manner Rapaport, Gill and Schafer suggested a number of systematic interpretive techniques for the TAT. They too were careful not to present them as the one and only key to an understanding of storytellers:

These techniques are not hard and fast rules like those of scoring on other tests, they are rather **viewpoints** [emphasis mine] for looking upon the TAT stories which must become ingrained in the examiner so that he can use them flexibly and judiciously (p. 490).

Holt, Rapaport, Gill, and Schafer have in common a certain ambivalence and hesitation towards completely reducing the interpretation of stories to empirical methods. They thought of systematic methods such as coding systems useful not as the source of understanding, but rather as a means of developing "open schemes," "sensitivities," or "viewpoints"--modes of inquiry. While they considered rules useful and at times necessary, they did not in the final analysis consider interpretation reducible to a set of rules.

In the following section we will examine the empirical methodologies in terms of this question of the nature of their usefulness, and the question of relationship between story and storyteller. Prompted by the encouragement of Rapaport, Gill, Schafer and Holt a generation of empirical narrative research followed. In the effort to establish solid empirical proof for clinical constructs these studies set aside the cautions of Rapaport, Gill, Schafer and Holt and use sets of coding rules to gain an understanding of the

storyteller.

#### **EMPIRICAL STUDIES:**

In the following section I will examine empirical studies in clinical psychology with a developmental orientation which use stories as their data and evidence. I use the word 'empirical' to refer to the way in which each of the studies reviewed devise a measure, a formal code or scale to facilitate a systematic, objective, reliable interpretation of the sample of stories. They all assume that systematic and objective interpretation of stories is possible. According to their form of empiricism objective, reliable measurements are necessary to validate theoretical constructs. In each of the studies different scales or coding systems are developed as a measurement tool. Each of the researchers assume the meaning of stories is definitive and formed prior to its expression and interpretation. The scales and coding systems serve as a means of translating stories into theoretical terms.

Perhaps more importantly, the measurements provide the clinician with a means of doing clinical assessment. They provide the clinician with ways to read the stories to help him or her make decisions regarding a persons diagnosis and treatment. Each of the studies spring from a concern that clinicians will notice and attend to difficulties and abilities people have relating to others and the events in



their world.

The empirical studies presented in this chapter have all used stories to validate hypothesis concerning various clinical psychological constructs such as developmental level of a child's object relations representations of self and others, defenses and affect maturity. Each of the studies are groundbreaking in the territory of establishing an objective measurement of a particular clinical construct or dimension. They make these constructs operational as particular aspects of the narrative form. They understand stories as symbolic or illustrative of psychological principles or patterns. In this way in the context of literary theory implicit in these narrative studies is an allegorical conception of narrative. Descriptions of characters qualities and actions are understood in terms of representations of self and other; the number and kind of characters present, the kinds of interactions among them, and reference to internal states are understood in terms of developmental level and pathology of object relations. All the researchers presented here believe that the self and relations to others exists along a hierarchical continuum. This type of analysis is prone to cultural biases (Rosaldo, 1980, 1984). Other descriptions of personhood particularly in narratives (A. Rorty, 1976) are not organized along a hierarchy. I will discuss alternative literary and philosophical views of narrative analysis particularly in

terms of how characters, plot and setting are spun together to present alternative views of personhood.

#### NARRATIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY:

I have chosen to focus on those psychological narrative studies that have a developmental orientation because the consideration of the narrative form is particularly relevant to developmental theories. Both narratives and developmental theories are concerned with communicating and understanding change, particularly in terms of the interactions and relationships of the individual with the environment, life events, etc. Developmental theorists like storytellers work with the question 'How do you tell what happened?'. Each study invents or borrows theoretical terms to tell how the story was told. All assume some model of mind that contains such entities as the ego, internal representations cognitive and affective processes etc.

Children's stories raise special questions that I think are most useful in the examination of the conceptualization of the relationship between story-teller and story. Studies of children's stories raise questions concerning: the nature of children's motives in telling stories (if motives is a useful notion for children), the evaluation of children's ability to represent and/or to tell narrative, and the nature of children's narratives as representations of their internal psychological structures and processes

(ie: How accurate or representative are they? What are narratives representative of?).

The discussion of each researcher's studies will be guided by the following questions:

1. What is the psychological construct they choose to study? How do they conceptualize this construct?
2. What is the rationale for the relationship between the story and the theoretical construct?
3. What is the rationale for using stories as a means of understanding people?
4. What are the conceptions of language and narrative implicit or explicit in their research?

#### **PHEBE CRAMER: Measuring the Developmental Level of Defense Using the TAT**

Phebe Cramer is particularly interested in one aspect of emotional processing - namely, how children protect themselves from unwanted emotions with the use of defense mechanisms.

Her conception of defence draws upon psychoanalytic theory, ego and developmental psychology. She views defenses as mental mechanisms that the individual uses in conflictual situations to mediate between his internal and external world. She believes each defense involves different types of cognitive processes that are related to specific stages of development. For example, the defense of denial she

believes involves a withdrawal of attention from a stimulus, while the defense of projection is related the ability to differentiate between internal and external stimuli. She traces the development of each defense from its origin in physiological, then motor and later symbolic responses and expressions. As symbolic expressions she claims defenses are defined by the form of the thought process rather than by the presence of any specific content.

Cramer developed a manual to assess three defenses: denial, projection, and identification (refer to appendix A). She characterizes these defenses in terms of types of statements, perceptions additions and omissions of characters or objects, types of expectations, story themes, attributions of qualities to characters, attitudes towards self and others and moral relections.. Her manual cannot be used on any stories told by children. It is particular to stories told in response to a pictorial stimulus, such as the TAT. Her scoring manual uses a wide range of aspects of the TAT task including, linguistic, perceptual, object relational, social and cognitive, to characterize this aspect of emotional processing. Despite her claim that defenses are defined by the form of the thought process rather than the presence of any specific content, she cites both aspects of form and content as scoring criteria throughout all defense categories (refer to Appendix A). This synthesis of form and content in her analysis I think

allows for a richer more meaningful analysis.

Cramer's conceptualization of defense and her rationale for using the TAT as a means for assessing defense mechanisms depend upon the assumption of a referential conception of language and narrative, and a representational view of mind, (for a more elaborate discussion of these views refer to chapter three). She thinks of defenses as mental processes that cannot be viewed directly, but can only be inferred from verbal behavior. According to her conceptualization, speaking or telling a story is separate from the mental processes which exist behind it. Defense mechanisms are latent processes while verbal behavior is manifest. She claims, "These defenses are manifest in the subjects' immediate behavior--i.e. in the stories they tell (p. 21)." While her conception of defense is strongly influenced by developmental research and theory her conception of language is not. She emphasizes past experience and intrapsychic processes as the determinants of verbal expression. In line with both the perspectives of developmental and ego psychology she looks for the adaptive aspects of storytelling. She focuses on one in particular--how defenses that manifest in stories modulate anxiety and protect the individual from unwanted feelings.

Cramer believes the TAT storytelling task is particularly well suited to provide information about "characteristic" defensive functioning because it "creates a

moderate amount of anxiety in most individuals (1987, p. 21)." She explains, it evokes this anxiety because it presents a novel situation in which a stranger asks to be told stories in a certain way. She claims as an individual responds his defense mechanisms protect him from experiencing excessive anxiety. She and her colleagues assume that the individual's response will be characteristic of their use of defense mechanisms

because we know that current perception is influenced by past experience... The way in which we respond to a TAT picture is based on our previous experience in responding to similar situations, including our characteristic response to anxiety arousing situations.

Her explanation for her rationale for using the TAT as a measure for defensive functioning becomes more questionable as she elaborates. While the following description of the individual's experience of the TAT is very plausible, it is not necessarily the only one nor the most common one:

To not comply with the task demand has the implication of failure or inadequacy. The individual responds in order to avoid that experience, as well as to please the examiner.

Cramer's project strives for the generalization from particulars. She rationalizes that,

complying with the examiner's storytelling request has some similarities to the requirements of an ordinary social interaction situation; the reaction of subjects to the storytelling task will be an indication of their usual manner of responding to similar real life events. For these reasons we assume that subjects' responses to the TAT tell us something about their use of defenses in real life situations (1986, pp. 20-21).

We could also make just as plausible an argument that the examiner's storytelling request has some differences to the requirements of ordinary social interaction situations and that the reaction of subjects to the storytelling task will be particular to the TAT situation. The understanding Cramer reaches of the storyteller through the stories they tell is shaped by this process of rationalization of generalization.

Cramer's focus on defensive functioning in relation to stories is very suggestive of a conception of narration as an emotionally protective activity. In this respect her perspective on storytelling is related to Bruner's notion of narrative as an activity that settles an emotional upset (I discuss his work in a later section). Cramer, however was more concerned with developing a diagnostic and developmental assessment tool, and empirical validation for a conceptualization of a developmental hierarchy of defense than with inquiring into the functions of and nature of narrative.

Cramer (1987) found her scoring of children's TAT stories did provide support for a developmental hierarchy of defense in a study of four age groups ranging in age from preschool to late adolescent. The use of identification, a higher level defense increased with age, and use of denial, a lower level defense decreased with age. In another study she and her colleagues (Blatt and Ford, unpublished

manuscript) established the TAT as a valid measure of level of defense and degree of pathology.

However, in this study the TAT and her scoring of it were not successful at differentiating two object relational diagnostic categories: anaclitic and introjective personality configuration. Her explanation for this is particularly interesting, especially as it concerns the use of the TAT, or any storytelling task as an objective measure. Cramer and her colleagues found that the TAT measure clearly established a correlation between level of defense and psychological functioning with the anaclitic diagnostic group, but not with the introjective diagnostic group. Cramer sees this outcome as due to the difference between the way patients of the two diagnostic groups took to the TAT task. She views the TAT as a task that emphasizes interpersonal relations, because it asks a person to tell a story about people's thoughts feelings and actions. This task, Cramer reasons, is of most interest to anaclitic patients, for whom establishing interpersonal relationships is of utmost concern. While it is of much less interest to introjective patients, for whom relationships with others is of little concern relative to their major preoccupations with establishing a sense of self. Storytelling of the kind elicited with TAT procedures, then is not the best means to understand all people. It is best for understanding people who have



organized themselves in terms of the relations among people and events and are able to articulate these relations in narrative form. However, there are those who, like the introjective patients, who organize themselves otherwise. The TAT, thus, may not be valid measure for understanding the defensive functioning of those who are not organized in terms of relationships to other and preoccupied with establishing a sense of self.

Although Cramer found problems with the TAT as a diagnostic assessment tool, she was successful at establishing the TAT as a developmental assessment tool for defenses, and at finding empirical validation of a conceptualization of a developmental hierarchy of defense using the TAT.

**ANNE THOMPSON: Measuring Affect Development and Maturity  
Using the TAT**

Thompson presents a view of affect, its development and the nature of affective maturity that she believes will be clinically useful. She develops a sets of scales for the TAT for three reasons: to validate her conceptualization of affect, to provide a clinical tool that facilitates a new understanding of the TAT and other clinical material (an understanding that brings to light "a dimension of personality that is possibly central to functioning and of prognostic significance p. 109."), and third to provide a

research instrument for further clinical studies of affect development and maturity.

Thompson conceptualizes affect in cognitive and intensional terms. She claims affect is a way of "taking," "apprehending" or "evaluating" some object. She views cognition as intrinsic to affect. By intensional she means affects are "of" something, or directed "to" objects. She further suggests that affect can be conceived of as a system comprised of various elements including cognition, representations of self and other, action, expression, and somatic aspects. She formulates her view of affect drawing upon the arguments of the philosophers Brentano, Kenny, and Pitcher, and the psychologists Averill, and Werner.

Thompson describes her view of affect as constructivist-realist. According to this view the objects of affect are not intrapsychic objects. They exist out there independently of the observer; they are objects of the "real" world. How we "take" or "appraise" them, though, "is a construction out of our subjective representations and the real qualities of the object (p. 29)." In articulating her conceptualization of affect she goes to much trouble to reconnect and integrate affect with cognition and the internal with the external world, which according to traditional Cartesian and psychoanalytic modes have been assumed distinct and separate.

She proposes that this affect system has a

developmental line of its own, according to which it evolves gradually becoming more differentiated and integrated on higher and higher levels. These levels of affect development exist along a continuum and do not represent separate qualitatively different stages. This system operates independently of particular affects, so that a particular affect may be experienced by different people in various ways depending on their level of affect maturity. A person's level of affect maturity refers to their capacity to experience emotions, tolerate contradictory emotions, reflect on and monitor his/her emotions and to integrate affects on a temporal basis.

Thompson delineates five levels on her Affect Maturity Scale, ranging from emotions that have an "atmospheric quality and are not differentiated from the bodily sensations, actions, circumstances, and among the people with whom they occur, to emotions that are differentiated. At the fifth level:

people are perceived as individuated affective beings with enduring inner dispositions and capabilities that affect their emotional responsiveness. Thus self and other are assigned affects in terms of their uniqueness as persons, and are individuated uniquely even when they react in terms of their roles (p. 105-106).

The methodology that Thompson uses to measure affect maturity does not fully integrate her constructivist-realist perspective. While she views affect as constructions she does not view stories as constructions. She conceives of

them as referential to the affective processes that produced them. She uses Rapaport's projective hypothesis as the rationale for using stories to "reflect" the affect maturity of the storyteller. She thinks the TAT is particularly well suited to the assessment of affect maturity because subjects are asked to tell stories that involve description of the characters' affective states. Subjects are asked 'What are the characters thinking and feeling?'. She believes these descriptions of the characters' affective states will provide information about the subjects affective functioning. Thompson follows Rapaport in assuming that processes of choice and organization are inherent in the telling of TAT stories. This assumption, she claims allows us to make inferences about the storyteller from the "material" in the story. Thompson makes a formal rather than a thematic analysis of the stories. She assumes that the affective abilities of the teller are reflected in the story. The subject may perform below his ability occasionally, but he cannot by definition perform beyond his ability.

**TIMOTHY BOGEN: Patterns of Developmental Change in Formal  
Characteristics of Stories Children Tell**

Bogen's studies represent the first attempt to establish a measure of plot complexity and story integration as techniques to assess the child's ability to think in an

organized manner. He assumes that the level of plot complexity and story integration is indicative of the organization of the child's thought. The child, he explains, must organize an array of interrelationships among the narrative elements in order to tell a coherent story. The plot relationships are one kind of these interrelationships. The plot relationships include such relationships as those between goal and attainment, problem and solution, instrumentality and goal attainment etc.

Bogen is interested in assessing a particular kind of thinking, the kind of thinking which involves other people, and which is likely to be emotionally evocative. He considers the TAT as a task which requests individuals to tell a story involving people as a good means of eliciting data about this kind of thinking. In psychological terms this kind of thinking is referred as a form of object relations. Bogen believes that a child's object relations or knowledge about relationships will guide his interactions with people. Implicit in this belief is an assumption of the representational view of mind.

Bogen's work has in common with the rest of the empirical studies presented in this section the goal of developing an objective or standard way of evaluating TAT stories for a specific dimension of psychological functioning for the purpose of comparing and differentiating the performance of various age and diagnostic groups. Bogen

claims his scales, like Thompson's, are techniques for assessing "formal" aspects of narrative separate from thematic content. They both have been influenced by Werner's notion that development tends toward higher levels of differentiation and integration. In contrast to Werner they do not embed their investigation in holistic orientation; they do not fully consider the formal aspects of stories in the context of their content, not to mention many other contexts significant to the understanding of stories. Unlike Thompson, Bogen integrates certain notions about narrative analysis from literary theory (Propp) in developing his scale.

Bogen's conception of formal aspects deserves some consideration. I maintain that it is impossible to do a formal analysis completely separate from a thematic one. A complexity of plot structure analysis of the kind he describes is not possible without an understanding of the content. To begin with the definition of an episode involves thematic issues such as determining whether there is one or more of the following dyadic relationship between states or events: problem/resolution, tension/resolution (eg. bad behavior punishment), or goal/attainment. The coder must define, or characterize two events or states and the relationship between to decide whether or not they qualify as an episode. Such an assessment requires the interpretation of the content, of the story. Understanding

the causal relations of a plot structure involves an understanding and interpretation of social practices and relations. This kind of thematic analysis differs from the kind previously done in psychological studies. It is formulated on the basis of a literary theory (Propp's analysis of plot structure) rather than some psychological theory. The notion of a formal analysis seems, as far as I can tell, means the abstraction of patterns, the generalization across subjects of this pattern without integration with the details of particular cases. These patterns though have certain contents or meaning. The distinction between form and content seems to be an ever shifting one.

**DREW WESTEN ET AL.: Measuring Object Relations and Social Cognition Using the TAT**

Drew Westen et al. (1985, 1988) developed four measures for exploring the psychological processes underlying interpersonal functioning. These measures are derived from psychoanalytic clinical observation, object relations theory and research, and research in developmental social cognition. He designed the measures to identify aspects of object relations and social cognition using the T.A.T.<sup>2</sup>:

---

<sup>2</sup> Westen defines his terms as follows: 'Object relations' refers to enduring patterns of interpersonal behavior and to the cognitive and affective processes or structures underlying interpersonal functioning. 'Object representation' refers to the (usually affect-laden) cognitive representation of a person ( or an object endowed with aspects of

- 1) affect-tone of relationship paradigms (affective quality of interpersonal expectations, from malevolent to benevolent);
- 2) complexity and differentiation of object representations (people) (tendency to represent people in complex ways and to distinguish clearly their subjective experience and points of view),
- 3) social causality (tendency to attribute causes of behaviors, thoughts, and emotions in a complex accurate, and psychologically-minded way); and
- 4) quality of emotional investment and moral development (need gratifying orientation to the social world versus investment in values, ideals, and committed relationships).

The last three scales are purported to identify developmental patterns of change and one borderline pathology. Research with normal and pathological populations has begun validating this measure (Westen, 1988; Klepser, Westen, and Ruffins, in preparation). The measure has been used to predict social adjustment, interpersonal functioning, and developmental changes, and reliably diagnose patients with Borderline Personality Disorder. However, the measure has not as of yet been validated on a normal population of pre-adolescent children. Westen's research group uses a referential conception of language and of the narrative form as do all the researchers reviewed here. They conceive of narrative as a manifestation of "underlying" representations of others and processes. According to this conceptualization the telling of the story refers to these processes, and is separate from them. In

---

personhood, such as a pet..., much like the concept of "person" scheme" in cognitive social psychology. 'Social cognition' refers to patterns of thought regarding social phenomena."



contrast according to a Wittgensteinian perspective, telling the story is part of these processes. Wittgenstein seeks an understanding of the expressed emotion in the context of the situation in which its expressed rather than as originating from a mental state. Wittgenstein asserts, (as I've noted earlier in chapter three) that the verbal expression of an emotions is part of the behavior that constitutes having that emotion. Saying "I expect..." according to Wittgenstein is "part of the process of expecting" (1967, #65).

Westen's rationale for using the TAT leaves implicit the assumptions that verbal expression specifically narratives told within the parameters of a TAT task are separate from, but isomorphic with interpersonal functioning. He asserts that

The TAT is an excellent test for assessing object relations and social cognition because, unlike the Rorschach blots, the stimulus is unambiguously social, and subjects are likely to provide enough detail in describing characters and relationships as to provide considerable access to cognitive-affective patterns related to interpersonal functioning.

He cites other TAT research (Klepser, Westen, Ruffins, in preparation) to support the that there are significant correlations between the TAT measures and other "validated" scales measuring social adjustment and object relations and representations

The focus of the narrative analysis that Westen's object relations and social cognition scales offer is on the story's characters and their actions and psychological states. The assumption of and esteem for a certain conception of personhood is implicit in these scales. The conception of personhood is particular to twentieth century, educated, middle class westerners. According to this view people are viewed "as psychological beings with complex motives and subjective experiences". Westen assumes and highly values the representational view of mind. In the "Understanding of Social Causality" this theoretical bias is strong. The highest score on this scale is for

Complex appreciation of the role of mental processes in generating thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and interpersonal interactions; understanding of unconscious motivational processes.

His scales, along with the other scales reviewed here are not objective; they are shaped by the theories, culture and time in which the researchers work and live.

This review of the empirical studies within clinical psychology brings us up to date on the history of the use of narrative as evidence and data for theoretical constructs in clinical psychology. The studies presented in the preceding section all have in common a top down approach to narrative

analysis. They begin with a theory and look for validation in particular phenomena. This approach differs from a bottom up approach which seeks to elucidate the meaning of a particular phenomenon. Each approach has its assets and problems. The top down approach, while it may validate theories and offer far reaching applications to clinical practice, does so at the risk of only finding what it is looking for, and imposing interpretations that are insensitive to their contexts. The bottom up approach, while it may capture the richness of meaning of a particular phenomena, does not offer generalizations with which other phenomena can be understood. In the following chapter these two general approaches will be compared in the analysis of the same sample of stories. This comparative study of methodology may help us further understand the implications different modes of narrative analysis have for narrative analysis within clinical psychology.

The empirical studies within clinical psychology presented here all make headway in validating psychological theoretical constructs. They enrich narrative analysis by offering new ways of understanding people in relation to each other and the events of their lives. They are, to varying degrees, useful as training tools. They sensitize us to different ways of understanding stories in psychological terms. But their claims that their measurements and techniques are objective are highly

questionable. These measurements are shaped by theoretical assumptions, cultural values and historically located concepts of personhood. In addition, these measurements are to varying degrees insensitive to their data. They are too quick to impose their theories on stories. They do not attend to the linguistic and metalinguistic forms and processes by which significant interpersonal relations occur in and with stories. In the following section we will consider contextual, dialogic and constructive (symbolic action) approaches to narrative which attend to the linguistic processes by which notions about the storyteller are borne.

#### **CONTEXTUAL, DIALOGIC, AND SYMBOLIC ACTION**

##### **CONCEPTIONS OF NARRATIVE:**

Schafer in his article "How Was the Story Told?" (1958) suggested that clinicians understand stories as communication. In this way, he introduced a new conception of narrative and a new dimension of the generation of meaning in narratives to psychologists. When the narrative is conceived of as a mode of communication, the question of who is speaking to whom, when, where, and why, as the narrative is told, becomes important. In addition, the reader or listener and the act of listening or reading can

become included as important aspects of the narrative analysis. The narrative with this conception ceases to be an empirical object (by logical positivist standards) distinct from the process of analysis. The act of analysis changes into an contextual interactive process. While clinical psychologists have begun to consider linguistic and metalinguistic features of narrative, by in large, they have not yet responded to this suggestion in their formal research.<sup>1</sup> Studies which conceive of the narrative as a form of communication have begun to spring up in developmental psychology. In the next section I will discuss a few examples of approaches outside the field (A. Rorty, Crapanzano, Todorov, Cohn, and Bakhtin) that emphasize the contextual, communicative or dialogic aspects of narrative. I then will turn to the developmental studies (Nelson, Bruner and Lucariello, Feldman, Dore and Stern) that conceive of narratives not only as communications, but also as constructions or symbolic activity that serve important purposes in everyday living.

---

<sup>1</sup> Much narrative analysis of this kind, though, does go on informally in discussion and practice among clinical psychologists. There also are some theoretical and case history articles, like those of Levinson (1988, 1989), concerning the stories told in therapy, which approach stories as forms of communication. The lack of formal research which regards stories as forms of communication may be partially due to the pressure clinical psychologists have felt under to validate psychoanalytic theory and practice with empirical studies.

**AMELIE RORTY: "A Literary Postscript: Characters, Selves, Persons, Individuals"**

From literary point of view Amelie Rorty (1976) suggests that there is a spectrum of views of personhood in narratives which is related to the historical cultural context of the author. Rorty's spectrum, unlike the scales reviewed in the preceding section, does not organize conceptions of personhood within a hierarchy. She draws her spectrum based on a historical survey of literature. She distinguishes characters, figures, persons, selves, and individuals. She claims,

we are different entities as we conceive ourselves enlightened by these various views. Our powers of actions are different, our relations to one another, our properties and proprieties, our characteristic successes and defeats, our conceptions of society's proper strictures and freedoms will vary with our conceptions of ourselves as characters, persons, selves, individuals (p. 302).

Characters "are delineate; their traits are sketched; they are not presumed to be strictly unified." "They are known by their deeds." Conflicts among their traits results in problems in their actions not their selfhood. To know a person's character is to know what set of circumstances suits him best. A character becomes tragic when the circumstances no longer suit him. They appear in novels by Dickens, not those by Kafka.

Figures "are defined by their place in an unfolding

drama; they are not assigned roles because of their traits, but rather have the traits of their prototypes in myth or sacred script. Figures are characters writ large, become figureheads...Both their roles and their traits emerge from their place in an ancient narrative. The narration, the plot comes first..." "The figure neither is formed by nor owns experience." They simply fill roles. Westen's conception of a story's characters in relation to the storyteller is best described by Rorty's "figures". In Westen's view a story's characters are prototypes of internal object representations. They play in the larger script or drama of the storytellers personality configuration.

Persons: "A person's roles and his place in the narrative evolve from the choices that place him in a structural system, related to others." "Central to it is the idea of a unified center of action and choice - the unit of both legal and theological responsibility. Interest in persons, then, center upon locating liability. The scope of a person lies in his powers to affect those around him, a scope for which he bears responsibility."

Selves: Selves possess rights and powers. "When a society has changed so that individuals acquire their rights by virtue of their powers, rather than having their powers defined by their rights, the concept of person has been transformed to a concept of self." "Jane Austen describes a

world of persons on the verge of becoming selves, Trollope one that has already become a world of selves, one in which the property required for stature is no longer land, but an assured income due one by virtue of one's qualities."

Thompson, Bogen and Westen use in the construction of their scales (as distinct from their use of the scale to interpret the relationship between story and storyteller) a conception of personhood that is best described as the "individual" in Rorty's spectrum. "Individuality," Rorty claims, "begins with conscience and ends with consciousness." Individuals "are centers of integrity; their rights are inalienable." The individual not only has the right to protection of life and property but also the pursuit of happiness. Rorty explains,

A society of individuals is quite different from one composed of selves. Individuals contract to assure the basic rights to the development of moral and intellectual gifts, as well as legal protection of self and property (p. 315).

Individuals quest for uniqueness. They are a historical phenomena that made their appearance in literature only in the last century or so. The characters of Henry James, Virginia Woolf, and Samuel Beckett are exemplary of individuals.



**VINCENT CRAPANZANO: "On Self Characterization"**

Crapanzano (1988) begins with completely different assumptions about and conceptions of inquiry, language and personhood (self and other) from the psychologists examined in the preceding section. He does not think of his own or other's verbal expressions descriptions -- "characterizations" as reflective of a reality out there, such as the self. In his view a self does not exist completely independently from its linguistic designation; it is bound to the pragmatic features of the context in which a self is characterized. He suggests that,

the criteria upon which typifications or characterizations of self and other are based refer less to inherent, referentially describable and essentialized features, or traits, of the individual to be typified than to pragmatic features of the verbal transactions (and their accompanying behavior) in which the typifier, if not as an actual participant than as a witness, is engaged with the typified. In other words typifications and characterizations are essentializations of pragmatic features or Gestalten, of the encounter that are ascribed to the individual to be typified (1988, p. 4).

In his view the referential view of self and other (used in the psychoanalytic and object relations research reviewed in the previous section) "ignore" or "deny" the pragmatic basis of characterizations, diagnoses etc. They also ignore or deny the 'creative' dimension of the word (p. 5)."

In terms of storytelling we can understand this as the ways in which stories and interpretations, 1. relate to the

situation in which and the person to whom they are told and  
2. produce new or perpetuate old conditions or meanings.

Storytelling can have multiple creative or pragmatic purposes: It can help someone gain approval, gain entry into a job, a relationship, a school, establish status, intimacy, identity, calm down, fall asleep, etc. The telling of a story may disrupt a previously stable self characterization or create coherence for one previously in disarray.

The situation in which and the person to whom children tell stories has been found to have a significant effect on the kind of stories told. Bogen (1982) found that the instructions as well as stimulus type had important effects on the stories told. Stories told in response to sentences tended to have higher plot complexity and to be more causally coherent than stories told to TAT cards. Stories told to TAT cards tended to be more descriptive, incomplete and take place in the present tense. These findings were confirmed by a study of situational constraints on children's storytelling (Petersen, 1976). Bogen also compared two samples of stories, one told by elementary school children to their classmates in their own classroom and the other told by elementary school children to an unfamiliar graduate student. He found that the children who told stories to their classmates were on the whole much longer than those told to the graduate student. Pitcher's

and Prelinger's (1963) sample also consists of unusually long and elaborate stories. (This is only in part explained by the skewed nature of their upper middle class high I.Q. sample, since other samples of similar socioeconomic status and I.Q. have shorter simpler stories.) Their stories are told by 2-5 year-old children to their own classroom teacher or mother. These children told these stories spontaneously at some point during the school day and were prompted with expressions of enthusiasm ("That's a very good thing to tell a story about") and requests for elaboration ("What happened next?"). As a result Pitcher and Prelinger could not claim they had controlled conditions necessary for objective scoring. Bogen claims these findings suggest that children in the experimental situations used in much narrative research do not put much effort into engaging the experimenter who is a stranger they will never see again with their stories.

For the clinical psychologist the interpretation of stories also has its purposes. The dialogue between psychologist and story occurs in some pragmatic context. For example, stories are often interpreted as part of evaluations. These evaluations can serve the purpose of determining treatment, engaging the future therapist, or helping a therapist out of a therapeutic impasse. These purposes should and do shape the kind of characterization of the storytelling patient. These purposes should determine

the criteria for choosing one interpretation over another. For example, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, Westen's scales in many cases seem better suited to the purposes of distinguishing diagnostic categories and validating theoretical constructs than to engaging a therapist with a patient.

In Crapanzano's view psychological approaches to linguistic phenomena "mask rather more complex linguistic processes". He approaches the analysis of texts from a "prepsychological" position. He claims to try "to look at those processes embedded in verbal transactions that are articulated--or masked--in current (folk) psychologies in the West (p. 4)". He shows us the pragmatic features and the complex linguistic processes involved in psychological referencing in the dialogues of three texts: a conversation between Alice and The Frog Footman in Lewis Carroll's Alice and Wonderland, a conversation between two teenage girls, and a conversation between Emma and Frank Churchill in Jane Austen's Emma. Crapanzano demonstrates how speakers constitute self and other in conversation. The derivation of the word 'conversation' speaks of this "drama of self constitution": Conversation, Crapanzano reminds us, comes from versari 'to be situated or occupied' and cum 'with'.

Let's take for an example, Crapanzano's analysis of Alice's conversation with the Frog Footman. Alice timidly approaches the door of the Duchess' house and knocks. The

Frog Footman, who is sitting at the door, tells her there's no sense in knocking because there is too much noise inside for anyone to hear. "Please, then," said Alice, "how am I to get in?" The Frog Footman's gets caught up in the logic of knocking and entering:

"There might be some sense in your knocking," the Footman went on, without attending to her, "if we had the door between us. For instance, if you were inside, you might knock, and I could let you out, you know."

He doesn't look at Alice. He doesn't engage with her as a person. He doesn't make any characterizations of her. His responses to Alice are exemplary of a kind of decontextualized use of language, a use of language which is oblivious to its pragmatic and social context, but completely logical. Alice, as she goes unacknowledged by the Frog Footman begins to refer to him in the third person characterizing him as "uncivil," and "dreadful," as if there were someone else present whom she could engage in conversation. Alice's use of language is particularly social and pragmatic. When she can't engage the Footman in conversation, she begins to silently speak to some unnamed other. The scene ends when she finally gives up and says in desperation, "'Oh there's no use in talking to him,' ... 'He's perfectly idiotic!' And she opened the door and went in."

This passage is a good play on the use of language to engage (Alice's "how am I to get in'") and disengage (The

Frog Footman's, "Are you to get in at all?...That's the first question, you know.")). The pragmatic features of Alice's verbalization fail to engage the Frog Footman. She turns to speaking to herself, referring to him in third person, creating her own dialogue with an imaginary other (the reader perhaps), as if to restore a necessary relational context.

The analysis of texts from a dialogic and pragmatic perspective has implications for the administration and interpretation of storytelling tasks such as the TAT and stories told in other clinical situations. As examiners, we respond to our subjects by repeating our instructions, or supposed assurances like 'there are no right or wrong answers'.<sup>2</sup> We walk a fine line between engagement and disengagement. We must engage enough that the child will speak to us and disengage enough that the child will turn to engaging with the telling of his or her stories. We, as interpreters, need to attend to the dialogue between the storytelling subject and the examiner, between the subject and his or her story, and the multiple dialogue within their

---

<sup>2</sup> One patient of mine while being tested in an attempt to be transferred from a special education classroom to a mainstream classroom was assured by his examiner 'there are no right or wrong answers'. This made the patient even more anxious. He reported to me in exasperation, "Of course there are: There are the kind that make you stay in special education and the kind that get you out, and I want to get out." Attending to the context in which and the purpose for which stories are told is very important for us to take into consideration either as examiners or as interpreters of test data stories.

stories: how does the subject attempt to engage or disengage the examiner, his or her story? How then does the examiner respond and the story unfold? What is the process? What is the importance or functions of this kind of engaging for this storytelling subject? This is the kind of analysis that was to some extent present in the prescriptions of Rapaport, Gill, Schafer and Holt, but lost in the empirical research that followed. The act of interpretation can also be conceived of as a dialogue. We need to look at how we engage or disengage with the stories and storytellers we imagine, in the process of interpreting them. We need to join the patient in a dialogue. This is how I think we can use stories as a means of understanding a person.

**TZVETAN TODOROV:**

Todorov focuses on linguistic aspects of the story that express and evoke psychological experiences. He is more concerned with describing those aspects of the text that convey psychological meanings to the reader than he is with describing the psychological aspects of the storyteller that structure the text. He suggests there are six simple transformations that transform the action of a verb from a completed act to being a psychological process. Bruner refers to this transformation of action as "subjunctivizing" or "subjectifying" reality. To subjunctivize or subjectify reality is to designate a mood by conveying the attitude

towards an action, rather than conveying it as a fact.

These verb transformations convey a wish, command, exhortation, or a contingent, hypothetical, or prospective event. His six transformations are as follows:

1. Mode: The use of the modal auxiliary for verbs, such as must, might, could, and would. This use of the verb "subjectifies" action by conveying a perspective on the possibility, necessity, and/or value obligation. It implies a reason or context for its possibility, necessity etc. For example: "x should commit a crime; x might commit a crime; x must commit a crime" because...

2. Intention: The use of verbs like hope, plan, or intend to convey intention.

3. Result: The use of verbs to convey the completion of an action. This use of the verb presupposes an original intent and leaves open the question of how it all came about. For example: "x succeeded in committing a crime."

4. Manner: The use of verbs to create an attitude that modifies the action's intention. For example, "x is keen to commit a crime."

5. Aspect: The use of a time marking to mark the progress of the task in which the action is occurring. For example: "x is beginning to commit a crime. Paul Ricoeur in his book Time and Narrative argues that the writer must embody time in a concrete and progressing activity in order for it to constitute narrative time. Aspect transformation as the effect of giving time concreteness.

6. Status: is a transformation that opens the possibility that there was a wish to, a set of circumstances that, a possibility that, an accusation that could have led to a crime, as in the statement, "x is not committing a crime" or " x does not commit crimes". Such a statement triggers presuppositions about the possibilities.

Todorov also proposes a set of complex transformations that add a verb phrase that modifies the original or main verb phrase adding a state of mental activity to accompany the main verb phrase. Bruner claims, "They place the



activity in a landscape of consciousness (p. 30)." They are:

|                   |                                     |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Appearance:       | x pretends he has committed a crime |
| Knowledge:        | x learns he has committed...        |
| Supposition       | x foresees he will commit...        |
| Description:      | x reports he has committed...       |
| Subjectification: | x thinks he has committed...        |
| Attitude:         | x enjoys committing...              |

These transformations imply a relationship between action and consciousness, creating, according to Bruner, "the connective web that holds a narrative together (p. 30)". They construct indirectly, through implication the psyche of the characters. This challenges Rapaport's, Schafer's and Gill's claim that stories have "clear-cut representations" that "directly represent the real or fantasied of personalities" in the storytellers world (p. 486).

#### **DORRIT COHN AND MIKHAIL BAKHTIN:**

Both Cohn and Bakhtin are interested in the interplay among multiple perspectives in narrative. Bakhtin's<sup>3</sup> describes how meaning is created in the interweaving of voices, that constitutes an utterance. According to Bakhtin a voice is a "semantic position," a point of view on the world, one personality positioning itself among other personalities. It is defined by linguistic and metalinguistic characteristics such as tone, style, idiom,

---

<sup>3</sup>For a more elaborate presentation of Bakhtin's conception of language and narrative analysis refer to chapter three.

situation, spatial markers, metaphors, field of vision, and the field of responses it evokes. He is particularly interested in the embedding of two voices (double voicedness), or multiple voices (polyphony) in one utterance. He describes how the narrator's and characters' voices are interwoven with the use of direct, indirect and quasidirect speech of characters.

Cohn is also interested in the shading, overlapping, and embedding of narrative voices. She is particularly interested in the use of grammatical forms of tense and person to portray multiple points of view. She describes these as narrative modes of rendering consciousness. She identifies the following six narrative techniques, of which, the first three are presented in third person and the second three in first person:

1. Psycho-narration: the narrator's discourse about a character's consciousness.
2. Quoted monologue: the presentation of a character's mental discourse within quotations.
3. Narrated monologue: the presentation of a character's discourse in the guise of the narrator's discourse.
4. First person retrospective monologues: the presentation of past thoughts and feelings as remembered, as well as, once expressed by the narrator.
5. Transitional variations between autonomous and retrospective monologues: a combination of narration and monologue in which a not physically present 'you' may be addressed.
6. Autonomous monologue: text in which the authorial narrative voice is entirely absent and the "silent self-communion of a fictional mind" is presented directly without a narrative context.

Cohn describes how the narrative "climate" profoundly changes as the narrative techniques change. She believes these changes indicate the shifts that occur in the

relationship between narrator and character, and the relationship between language and consciousness. Each conveys a qualitatively different aspect of experience.

The theorists presented in this section all pay close attention to the use and shifts in the use of various linguistic forms or techniques, such as person, tense (Crapanzano, Cohn, and Bakhtin), idiom (Bakhtin and Crapanzano) and verb forms (Todorov). Each theorist describes the kinds of linguistic cues pragmatic contexts which trigger responses from the reader, and for the purposes of this study the potential clinical psychologist. They sensitize us to the way we interact with, read, dialogue with another's language. Crapanzano attends to how each participant in a dialogue creates the 'other'. His analysis has implications for how the storyteller is created in the dialogue between reader and text. Bakhtin outrightly states that an understanding of the author involves such a dialogue. Cohn asserts that the unconscious in narrative is shown not told. She notes that the most complex forms of consciousness in fiction are not those that seek to verbally imitate the inner states of their characters. This is contrary to the assumption implicit in Westen's and Bogen's scales which construe increased reference to mental states as indicative of higher levels of development.

### NARRATIVE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION

In addition to, or in contradistinction to the referential conception of narrative others conceive of narrative as a constructive or symbolic action, an action by which the storyteller creates the very world or reality in which he proceeds to live and act. Some (K. Nelson, 1989) think that people tell stories with the aim of organizing, categorizing, constructing and recreating the world.

Katherine Nelson claims one of the purposes of story telling is to construct a representational model of the world that enables one to act in the world. She conceives of language as constructive but only in representational terms. There are those that take the constructive view of narratives further, emphasizing its pragmatic functions. Narrative then is not only a representational object for analysis, but a method, a method all of us use in the course of our everyday lives. This view of narrative is within keeping with the view of language as social practice. The conception of narrative as world-making was first introduced by the philosopher Nelson Goodman and has now been popularized within psychology by Bruner, amongst others.

The conception of narrative as a constructive action is not merely about narrative. It opens upon a much broader understanding of the relationship of symbolic activity to human experience. The conception of narrative as symbolic

action has also been elaborated by Kenneth Burke in terms of his dramatist theory. More recently, Burke's view has begun to influence psychologists such as Kaplan (1981) and Bruner (1989). Burke approaches narrative analysis with a "dramatist's" perspective. He calls his method of literary analysis dramatism. Dramatism is a critical and self-critical method for making us aware not only of the remarkable range of "world's" we inhabit, but also of the symbolic ways in which we constitute such "worlds" and ourselves within these worlds. Dramatism focuses on the way narratives provide us with a way of viewing ourselves as actors acting with certain purposes in a drama of human relations in the various scenes in which we live.

Kaplan, elaborating upon Burke's view, describes storytelling as a kind of symbolic action that facilitates many processes. He claims, it is a symbolic action that

enables us to "store information", fix the flux along certain lines rather than others; remember and generalize a transient episode; define, identify ourselves with and disidentify ourselves with individuals, groups, nations, causes, movements; define the scenes in which we live; alter and try to persuade others to alter conceptions of what there is what is happening, what has happened what will happen."

He views symbolic action as involved in our attempts to regulate, and direct ourselves and others.

The narrative form in my view appears to be both expression of and vehicle for our grappling with the notion of agency, our attempts to understand ourselves as 'actors'

in the plots of our lives. It is a notion with which storyteller as well as interpreter grapple. Some narrative studies, like those of the ego psychologists, elevate the notion of agency to an ontological level -- that agency and actions is an essential aspect of the nature of our being or existence. Others (C. Taylor, 1985; A. Rorty, 1976) see it as one possible construction of human nature, one that has become a central focus during the twentieth century in the western world.

#### **NARRATIVES FROM THE CRIB:**

The book Narratives From the Crib (1989) represents the results of an unusual collaborative project, a project focusing on what a 2-year-old child Emily, said to herself when she was alone in her crib at nap-time or at night. The authors of the chapters that compose this book, have reflected on and written about the significance of Emily's talk to herself when alone, each from a different perspective. Together they consider the copresence of multiple functions of this speech.

Previous studies focused on primarily grammatical features. In contrast their study focuses on the development of discourse forms and functions over a fifteen-month period. Unlike a previous study of crib speech, the contributors of this book did not take on the job of a complete formal syntactic description of the Emily tapes.

Instead they chose to focus on the purposes of Emily's talk. This focus Nelson claims is in part related to each of their theoretical interests and in part related to Emily's focused interest in using language for various purposes while she was alone.

This book presents a new way of doing 'scientific' research. Often at conferences panel discussions are organized to present alternate views on a single issue. But rarely do a group of researchers come together to share and investigate a common set of data. This book is a testimony to the multiple perspective approach to inquiry. It succeeds in creating a forum for the presentation of multiple perspectives. Each conceives of Emily's speech differently: for example, Nelson conceives of Emily's monologue as "representation of real-life experience", Bruner and Lucariello as "narrative recreation of the world", Feldman, as problem-solving narrative, and Dore, as Reenvoicement of Dialogue.

Each analysis of Emily's talk works with certain conceptions of mind, language and narrative. These conceptions influence the selection and description of her talk. Each selects different segments of her talk as exemplary of certain activities or psychological constructs depending on their conceptions of language and narrative. This book makes evident the constraints different theoretical orientations impose on narrative investigations.

I have chosen to examine those studies that venture to integrate certain psychological with linguistic and or literary notions in their narrative analysis.

**Nelson: Monologue as Representation of Real-Life Experience**

For Nelson, Emily's storytelling is a representational activity. The representational view of mind and language shapes Nelson's view of Emily's talk. According to this view, meaning exists in the determinate form of representations or ideas in the mind. They constitute people's knowledge and account for their meaningful behavior. Behavior is directed or mediated by representations. Nelson goes a little beyond these views to describe some of the pragmatic aspects of Emily's talk.

Nelson proposes that "Emily talks as she does because she is attempting to construct a representation of events in language (p.63)." Nelson acknowledges that "implicit" in her discussion is

the assumption that she [Emily] has a nonlinguistic representation of her own direct experience, and that through her monologues she translates that experience, as it were, into verbal -- specifically sequential narrative -- form (p. 63).

Emily's narrative monologues in Nelson's view are exemplary of her "capacity to represent her knowledge linguistically."



Nelson does not as many theorists working within a representational view of mind think that language simply reflects knowledge. She imparts to it a more transactional role. She claims that Emily's language "structures" her understanding of everyday experience. Nelson conceives of language and specifically narrative as a "device" a "framework" which is involved in the construction of "a mental model of the world." She proposes that

Emily talks about events in different ways at different ages because different narrative forms and linguistic devices enable her to represent the relations within events more accurately, and that accurate representations are important to her for her growing understanding of how the world is and should be, this understanding in turn enables her to gain some control over her own activities and to take part competently in interactions with others (p. 63).

Implicit in the above statement are a number of assumptions concerning language and narrative. One is that the purpose of language and narrative is to provide us with "accurate" representations of reality. But what is an accurate narrative? To assume that the purpose of narrative is to provide us with accurate representations is to assume that there are correct versions of reality and incorrect ones by which the accuracy of representations can be judged. What Nelson calls accuracy may really be a matter of effectiveness. Perhaps what makes one narrative seem more accurate than another is its effectiveness as a communication, its effectiveness accomplishing purposes, its

conforming enough to convention to be understood. Nelson's representational view of mind leads to the conception of language development as the increasing capacity to represent the world with accuracy.

Nelson also assumes that the purpose of Emily's talk, particularly the accuracy of her representations is to help her "control" and "direct" her activities. For example, Emily sorts out what she does and doesn't do when she wears pajamas. Nelson examines and attaches value to Emily's narratives solely in terms of their accuracy and facilitation of control. This focus on accuracy and control derives from Nelson's representational view of mind. This conception of mind shapes Nelson's understanding of Emily and her narratives. It is the theoretical bias that has prevailed in America over cognitive and developmental psychology. Nelson's view is one possible interpretation of Emily's talk in the realm of the representational view of mind.

#### **BRUNER AND LUCARIELLO: Narrative Recreation of the World**

For Bruner and Lucariello Emily is an avid inventor: she creates worlds with her narratives. Most importantly from their point of view, she creates, a cool, calm, and orderly world. They portray Emily as a storyteller, in the thick of her life, sorting out and connecting the sequences of events: the expectable and the strange, the certain and

the uncertain; the stances of the people in her life, their actions, belongings, locations, and feelings. Their understanding of Emily's talk to herself, or "soliloquies" as they prefer to call it, is strongly shaped by their cognitive perspective, and their conceptions of language and narrative. Their analysis, like Bogen's and Dore's, is distinguished by the use they make of the insights and tools provided by certain literary theorists and/or language philosophers. (Each of their analyses though differs according to whose work they use.)

They propose that storytelling provides children with the means to differentiate and reintegrate action, affect and cognition. This hypothesis derives from their conceptions of language and narrative. Their conception of language draws from the writing of Dewey, Humboldt, Peirce, and Vygotsky. According to Dewey language is a vehicle for ordering our thoughts. It provides the means to segment, order, predict about, categorize and organize our experience. According to Peirce's, language is a symbolic interpretation that organizes knowledge, and according to Humboldt and Vygotsky language is constitutive of thought. Vygotsky's understanding of speech to the self is of particular significance for their analysis of Emily's talk. Vygotsky conceives of overt speech to the self as an early developmental form of inner speech. He claims we talk to ourselves as a way of searching for the solution to

perplexing problems. In his view speech mediates our actions and thoughts. More generally, he claims that affect is central to higher mental functioning, but does not greatly elaborate upon the nature of its interaction with speech, action and thought. Bruner and Lucariello derive from these conceptions of language the hypothesis that language in general provides the means for differentiating and reintegrating experience.

They assert that inherent in the structure of narrative discourse, in particular, are the means for facilitating the differentiation and reintegration of action, cognition, and affect. This assertion is derived from their conception of narrative. They conceive of narratives as a discourse on human action. Following Burke's Grammar of Motives (1945), they describe the narrative as requiring an Actor, Action, Goal or Intention, a Scene and an Instrumentality. These elements compose the dramatic pentad of narrative. According to Bruner and Lucariello, they provide the means for differentiating action, affect and cognition.

Imbalances among the elements in the pentad create the drama of a narrative. Bruner and Lucariello speak of these imbalances as the "trouble" that drives narrative. Trouble occurs when "actions do not reach goals, scenes and agents do not match, instruments and goals are out of kilter, and so on." Narrative, according to Bruner and Lucariello,

is a vehicle for characterizing, exploring,  
preventing brooding about redressing, or

recounting the consequences of "trouble." (p. 77)

They define more specifically five dimensions of narrative that they believe are involved in sorting out and formulating some troublesome experience: sequencing, canonicalization, perspective or stance marking, intentionalism, and metacommentary.

These dimensions of narrative take part in conveying affect both explicitly and implicitly in narrative. Canonicalization and stance marking often convey affect. The canonical status of action refers to the characterization of an action as ordinary, expectable or appropriate or as extraordinary, surprising or strange. The trouble they consider central to narrative is often something that has a canonical marking -- that is unexpected, inappropriate or strange. Emily sorts out the reliable recurrent events from the rare and strange ones with frequency expressions like "once," "one time," and "sometimes," She notes expectable variation with the words "or," and "but," as in the statement, "Her daddy and mommy will stay the whole time, but my mommy and daddy don't." She uses expression like "supposed to," "usually" to note the appropriateness of action as in, "He's not supposed to have desert." Finally she also notes the canonicity of an event with necessity markings like "If ever we go to the airport, we have to get some luggage."

Stance marking expresses the perspective taken towards

some aspect of the narrative. Stances can be stated in terms of uncertainty about ("maybe, perhaps"), epistemic position towards ("I don't know"), feelings about ("Danny wasn't frightened") and emphasis with the repetition of words or phrases. Emily becomes increasingly able to express how she thinks and feels about her own and others actions both directly with affective verbs and indirectly with repetition, emphasis and tense.

As Emily approaches her third birthday she is able to tell what caused what, when, whether it was appropriate or necessary, and even what she thinks and feels about it. She does not note, except once, anyone's intentions. The linguistic expression of intentionality has been noted to emerge later in development (Astington, 1988). In the following excerpt of Emily's talk at 32 months we have an example of Emily constructing a sequenced account of her life marked with causal relations, canonicity and stance:

Tomorrow when we wake up from bed, first me and daddy and Mommy, you, eat breakfast eat breakfast, like we usually do, and then we're going to p-l-a-y, and then soon as Daddy comes, Carl's going to come over, and then we're going to play a little while. And the Car and Emily are both going down the car with somebody, and we're going to ride to nursery school [whispered], and then we when we get there, we're all going to get out of the car, go into nursery school and Daddy's going to give us kisses, then go, and then say, and then we will say goodbye, then he's going to work, and we're going to play at nursery school. Won't that be funny? Because sometimes I go to nursery school cause its a nursery school day. Sometimes I stay with Tanta all wee,. And sometime we play mom and dad. But usually, sometimes, I um, oh go to nursery school. But today I'm going to nursery

school in the morning. In the morning, Daddy in the, when, and usual, we're going to eat breakfast like we usually do, and then we're going to ... and then we're going to ... play. And then we're, then the doorbell's going to ring, and her comes Carl in her, and then Carl, and then we are all going to play, and then wha... And then go in the car with somebody and drive to nursery. When we get to nursery school, we're to, all going to get out of the car... and then we're going to ummm, I think then we're going to ... they're going to give us kisses. And t-h-e-n she's [probably her mother] going to go to work, with somebody with her, and meet her new students, and then she's going to pick us up, and, and Daddy's going to bring us, and Mommy's going to pick us up, and work, a-n-d then sh's going home, and we're going to go to nap. And t-h-e-n when you awake, then we are goin t-o-o school. Uh, uh.

Bruner and Lucariello suggest that a child's narrative account of their experience can take us down from the heights of our theoretical accounts to an account which is in their terms, in the very language with which the child has experiences:

What she accomplished can almost be called a triumph of ordinariness, a kind of routinization in story. For the fact is that most of her narrative elaborations are not directly about the great dramas in her life: coping with the arrival of a baby brother, or learning how to get on with a new acquaintances at nursery school. They are, rather about the actual process of living noted above. She is concerned about her bed and changing table, about her prerogatives at mealtime, about when she will be picked up at school and by whom, about what friends she can count on for a visit (p. 96).

With such commentary Bruner and Lucariello intone Emily's talk of the mundane with a poetic dignity.

Elaborating upon the conceptions of language noted earlier and Vygotsky's notion of the centrality of affect

they describe a certain affective function of storytelling.

They claim that the narrative form helps organize and reduce some of the uncertainty in a child's world. Narrative-making places the child's world at a distance from immediate action and commitment. This reduction of uncertainty and distancing from immediate action they believe helps to "cool" or reduce emotionality in a child's world.

Bruner and Lucariello choose to analyze Emily's talk in terms of the development of her mastery and control over affectively charged experiences. They claim this task is resolved

through the creation of well-wrought accounts of the events through which one has passed-- particularly those events which are likely to arouse some affect, such as the birth of a younger sibling or entry into nursery school. It is not these events per se that must be mastered, but the routine life into which these events intrude-- meals, transportation arrangements, babysitters, friends. Emily is greatly concerned to get ordinary life under control while "all hell is breaking loose" around her.

Their account of Emily's talk highlights the affective importance that establishment of routine, changes in routine, and mastery and control of routine has for Emily. But it omits mention of the possibility of conceiving of other affective developmental tasks, such as the capacity to experience and integrate a wide range of affective states. They consider narrative not for its ability to evoke, communicate, or transform affective experiences, but only



for its ability to "cool off" and control them. They are more concerned with the establishment of Emily's autonomy than they are with her establishment of relationship. Other accounts of Emily's talk, such as Dore's, speaks of Emily's establishment of a unique perspective through interactions with others. Bruner and Lucariello assert that Emily's storytelling accomplishes

a cooling of events. She manages not only to convert her world into manageable narrative, but also to do so on her own terms--alone, in her crib, and without intervention by adults or anybody else. She has begun not only to master her developmental task but to master it on her own.

This selective focus on autonomy and control is telling of their cognitive stance and values. They may open the cognitive point of view a crack to begin to consider the affective functions of narrative, but they maintain their value for cognition by subordinating affect to it.

**FELDMAN: Monologue as Problem-Solving Narrative**

For Feldman Emily is an avid problem solver. She lies awake at night passionately involved in talking out solutions to problems in narrative form. She claims, "Emily is driven by a need to explain or interpret those putative facts which she feels to be unclear." "Emily's principal purpose," she argues "is to formulate more clearly a disturbingly unclear idea (p. 98)."

Feldman selects those segments of Emily's talk that she

finds to be particularly ideational and that serve the function of solving puzzles. But she places this in the context of other functions of talk and events in Emily's life. She notes that not all of Emily's language is qualitatively or functionally ideational. Some language is more significant for its play with sounds its practice of phonology or for its replay of conversations with her parents for the purpose of maintaining their presence. Feldman contextualizes her inquiry. She acknowledges the influence her interests have on her data selection, data analysis and results.

Feldman selects those segment of Emily's talk when she becomes heavily engaged in problem solving talk from the age of 22 months until about 28 months. This kind of talk fades as fantasy talk becomes more prominent. Feldman suggests that this burst of problem solving talk is triggered by Emily's discovery of her emerging linguistic ability and her distress and confusion concerning the birth of her younger brother Steven.

Feldman notes Emily is strikingly "duller" in her dialogues with her parents than she is in her monologues. This contrast suggest that the research on child language development may have underrated the language abilities of the young child, since it has depended on data of children speaking in the presence of another.

Following Burke, Feldman conceives of the narrative as

consisting of a pentad composed of an Actor, an Action, an Instrument, a Setting, and a Goal. She follows Bruner in adding to this conception "the essential narrative trigger" -- "trouble". Feldman considers a particular kind of trouble -- logical problems: problems of correspondence, identity, explanation and contradiction, problems of who with which what when where and why.

Feldman characterizes problem solving narratives as those that have distinctive linguistic features such as the language of logical inference ('but', 'so', 'not', 'because') and qualifications of knowledge states (maybe, probably, certainly). At the beginning of problems solving narratives Emily poses a "disturbingly unclear idea" with an I don't know. For example

At 32 months Emily says,

Today Daddy went, trying to get into the race but the people said no so he, he has to watch it on television. I don't know why that is, maybe cause there's too many people. I think that why, why he couldn't go in it...So he has to watch it on television.. on Halloween day, then he can run a race and I can watch him. I wish I could watch him. But they said no no no. Daddy Daddy Daddy!...No no, no no. Have to have to watch on television. But on Halloween Day he can run, run a race. Tomorrow (he'll) run (???) he says yes. Hooray! My mom and dad and a man says "you can run in the footrace," and I said "that nice of you. I want to." So next week I'm going to... run to the footrace and, and run in the footrace cause they said I could (Its nice) a week or so, Sunday and Saturday...(p. 112-3)

This is a particularly good problem solving narrative.

Emily makes skillful use of all the linguistic features

listed above.

She is able to coordinate time frame sequencing (eg. "Today... Tomorrow...so next week..."), with reported speech of her own and other with problem solving language (I don't know why, maybe.. cause...). As Feldman claims

she develops linguistic procedures for framing matters that she doesn't know something crucial about -- how, when, who, what, or even why. These linguistic procedures organize the unknown by giving it one or another kind of narrative pattern, placing it into one or another kind of narrative frame (p. 98).

The patterned linguist phrases of so-but-maybe-because help organize and support the construction of both problem and solution.

Feldman's major concern is to describe Emily's growth of logical thought. She is interested in the linguistic tools Emily uses to reach higher levels of problem solving. She writes,

Problem-solving procedures arise in a crucible of narrative. The narrative is at first a problem-solving tool that makes puzzles approachable by providing a means for interpretation and analysis. Later the same narratives provide a locus for play and invention as their scope is extended beyond the exigencies of the here and now. Narrative form frames then may offer a distancing device, an analytic tool in the service of both logical and playful reflection (p. 107).

She suggests that two activities that are usually viewed as separate -- problem solving and fantasy -- have a common origin in story forms. Feldman's work has strong implications for clinical practice. Narrative's can also

concern other kinds of trouble other than that of logical problems. Her work suggests that the narrative form, particularly the telling of stories to oneself, facilitates reflective activities of analysis and invention, activities central to therapeutic work.

Feldman thinks of narratives as one means of development of logical thought. She does not construct referential or representational relationships between story and storyteller. In her view language is not a projective screen, but a mediational tool. Feldman leaves the matter of why Emily tells stories as a matter of conjecture. She does not broach the topic of how Emily tells stories in terms of internal psychological structures and processes. She answers the question of how Emily tells stories in terms of the linguistic tools she uses, and what they help her do.

#### **JOHN DORE: Monologue as Reenvoicement of Dialogue**

For Dore, Emily's storytelling is a weaving of voices. His understanding of her talk is shaped in part by a dialogic conception of language. This conception of language leads to a different selection and analysis of the data.

Dore, as do all the researchers in this book selects and focuses on that portion of the Emily data which is best suited to the chosen mode of analysis. He examines Emily's talk in relation to others rather than in isolation. He

describes the dialogues, which occur between this child and her father as he puts her to bed each night, in relation to the monologues she speaks as she falls asleep. This selection and analysis of the data allows Dore to argue that word meaning in children's language emerges in dialogue with parents. It allows for a new view of Emmy's speech, one that places the emergence her speech competence and autonomy in the context of her dialogues with others.

Dore claims that concepts of Bakhtin's such as genre and reenvoicement provide "some reliable tools for examining the functional organization of talk (1989, p. 255). The topic of his study are the usefulness of these linguistic or metalinguistic notions in describing the development of Emily's speech in relationship to her parent's speech. Unlike the constructs of concern in other studies (i.e. defense, affect, object representations), genres are not concerned with the internal states of the individual, nor the pragmatic explanations of the participants purposes (i.e. for Emily to sleep alone).

Genres are formed by the interweaving of themes, styles and compositional or discourse structures. They are composed in interactions. They are fundamentally social. Prior to their internalization they require repeated social performances. As Dore states, they require "uptake and collaboration in order to be sustained."

Dore proposes that genre is what most deeply organizes

Emily's speech. He describes the emergence of speech genres in her speech. The nightly bedtime scenario he claims, is "enacted through several genres". He identifies two major themes that occur in Emily's speech during the period examined: "buying" and "crying". The father tells and Emily revoices narratives about what they will buy at Child World, and about who are the little kids that cry and who are the big kids that don't. He identifies two major styles of talk: baby talk (BT) and adult talk (AT). These styles are characterized primarily by their prosody, but also by the words and syntax used. When speaking baby talk the father uses a slow rhythm of speech, and a sustained cadence; he pauses, repeats phrases, exaggerates pitch, and elongates the intonation of words. When speaking adult talk, he speaks more rapidly with more complex syntax and vocabulary. Dore describes two kinds of discourse structures: narrative and exchange structures. Narrative structures are those relations which make causal, temporal and locative connections among clauses and form the plots or story lines. For the purposes of his analysis Dore defines narrative as any stretch of words that contains two or more semantically related clauses. A narrative then can be as simple as: "When Emmy wakes up, Carl come." and far more complex as seen in prior examples. The exchange structures are those found in conversation such as question-answer, summons-response, command compliance, and statement-

acknowledgement.

Traditionally the study of speech has kept structural and functional analysis separate. But, Dore argues,

structural properties alone tell us little about how utterances express emotions, motives, attitudes, and social stances. Yet since speech works simultaneously as both structural knowledge and social function, we need a unit of analysis that captures both structure and function simultaneously (p. 236).

He suggests that genre is that unit of analysis because it helps articulate the modes used for synthesizing content, style, structure and function in narratives and conversation. It may also be well suited to the analysis of the narratives told and speech that occurs in therapy.

Dore emphasizes the fluid quality of genres. The set of features that constitute any particular genre vary widely from one occasion to the next. A speaker can remain in the same genre while varying the content, structure and style. The meaning of any particular genre cannot be defined by an exclusive set of conceptual criteria. Each actualization is unique, although it may borrow or repeat features used before. There are no perfect realizations of a genre. This view of the definition of genre is in synch with Wittgenstein's claim that the meaning of any word used in different contexts cannot be designated by a finite set of criteria. The definition of any genre is composed by a family of resemblances. The notion of genre provides a comprehensive enough unit for narrative that allows for an



understanding of how a narrative becomes a unique whole.

Dore identifies two examples of genre in the data: the "promissory" and the "explanatory". The promissory genre is composed of the theme about what is to be bought. It is delivered predominantly in baby talk with a brief appearance of adult talk with the mention of "intercom system" and with five kinds of discourse categories: question, statement, list, explain, and evaluate. The explanatory genre has a more complex content, structure and style than the promissory genre. This genre is composed around the theme of who cries. The style rapidly alternates between baby and adult talk. In addition to the discourse structures used in the promissory genre, others like categorization, contrast and argument are used. Please refer to appendix x for examples of these genres.

A genre analysis brings into focus the relationship between Emily's speech to herself and her speech with her father. Dore claims that a comparison of Emily's monologue with her dialogues with her father shows that Emily speaks "reenvoicing" many of the features of the genres used by her father. Reenvoicement is neither imitation and creation; it lies between . For example, Emily takes her father's line "we're gonna buy some diapers for Stephen and some diapers for Emily and we're going buy an intercom system..." and reenvoices it as "e-D-a-ddy said buy diapers for Stephen and Emmy and buy sokething.." Emily reenvoices the theme of

buying diapers, the structural feature of listing names and the stylistic features of his rhythm intonations emphasis on names of people and objects. But she transforms it by introducing it with an indirect quotation, "Daddy said," and by her own word, "sokething" for the complex word "intercom".

Dore allows us with a Bakhtinian analysis to hear previously unheard aspects of Emmy's speech. His analysis with such notions as voice, reenvoicement and genre, articulates the relational realm of Emmy's narratives. He introduces Bakhtin's dialogic conception of language to the study of the development of language. This introduction is occasion for a reconsideration of one of the basic premises of language development:

We all readily believe that "children acquire language" in some sense. We are less ready to believe that "language acquires children." Yet the genre conceptualization of what language is requires some such principle: that the agency that enables a child to speak ever more appropriately must extend beyond the child's cognitive capacity; genre meanings and functions are first coconstructed with more fully socialized agents of language (parents). The voices of others in close coproduction and coarticulation are involved not only in the child's social talk but in her thinking itself (p.256).

Dore argues for "a more deeply interactionist view of language development," and for a "theory of what happens between speakers... (p. 256)."

**CONCLUSION:**

This historical survey of narrative analysis within clinical psychology and bordering disciplines makes evident that conceptions of narrative, language and inquiry shape the understanding of story and storyteller we reach. It informs us of the conditions that constrain and create our understanding of storytellers. Any particular storyteller will not be able to tell certain kinds of story. Any particular researcher or interpreter will not reach certain understandings. There are theoretical and methodological constraints. By the same token these theoretical and methodological conditions allow for the creation of new understandings.

In this chapter these constraining and creative conditions have been articulated in terms of the methodology, conceptions of narrative and literary and psychological theories used to formulate modes of data collection and analysis. In addition to these methodological and theoretical factors we discovered through an examination of the literature that features of stories and storytellers also constrain and create understanding. Psychological studies tend to emphasize the features of the storyteller that constrain or create the kind of story told. These studies focus on the relationship between story and teller. Certain literary studies emphasize the linguistic and metalinguistic features of the text or story that

constrain and create the understanding of story and teller. Some of these studies focus on the relationship between reader and text (Todorov, Barthes, and Propp). Others focus on the multiple relations among text, storyteller and reader (Crapanzano, Bakhtin, and Cohn). They further differentiate the points of relation in terms of narrator, characters, voices, and perspectives.

Conceptions of narrative are described in terms of whether the relationships between story, storyteller, and interpreter are construed predominantly in referential or representational terms, or in dialogic, contextual, or symbolic action terms. According to the former the concern is with relationships of reference, reflection and similarity between story and teller and according to the latter the concern is with the activity, interactive process, or dialogue among story and teller, interpreter and story. The book Narratives From the Crib with its multiple studies of the same data demonstrates the difference different measures and conceptions of language and narrative make in the understanding of story and teller. In chapter five we will examine the difference an empirical and dialogic methodology and conception of narrative makes in the understanding of stories told by children in therapy. To summarize, I describe below the way our understanding of story and teller shifts as methodology and theoretical orientation shifts.

**METHODOLOGY: Narrative as Data****1. Data Collection Procedures:**

Methodologies constrain and create the data -- the kind of stories that are studied. The use of elicitation stimuli and procedures and other controlled replicable conditions significantly effect what kind of stories are told. In other words, the kind of story told varies widely depending upon to what (instructions, picture, and/or sentence stem) and to whom (teacher, unfamiliar researcher) a story is told, in what context (home, unfamiliar situation) for what purpose on the part of storyteller and listener (evaluation, research, establishing intimacy or control etc.) and with what responses from the listener (spontaneous, standardized procedure responses).

The data each methodology studies is different. Data collected for empirical studies is designed to allow for clear cut comparisons and generalizations concerning the correspondence between essential features of stories and their tellers. They are designed to limit the effect of extraneous contextual factors. The effect of context on storytelling is minimized with standardized procedures. An atomist approach is used to organize the collection and analysis of stories. The essential conditions or features thought important to the understanding sought are identified separate from the particular contexts in which they occur

prior to collection and analysis. Formal features of stories are studied as if separate from content. Certain kinds of data are studied tend not to be studied with empirical methods because they do not meet methodological standards or pose an unwieldy task of data collection and analysis. Data such as spontaneously told stories in response to naturally occurring and responding contexts tends not to be used. For example, the data used for the book Narratives From the Crib does not meet empirical standards with its uncontrolled conditions and its sample of one. But it offers rarely studied data: the spontaneous speech of a child to herself. Different data allow for different understandings. This data suggests children's linguistic capacities may be higher than developmental psychologist have thought based on their studies of children's speech in the presence of another. Yet, because this data does not meet empirical standards generalizations are not possible and the 'findings' remain suggestive.

## 2. Data analysis and measures or interpretive tools:

The empirical studies (using positivist means) strive to formulate interpretive systems or coding scales which provide clear rules for the interpretation of stories. They seek to establish with scientific rigor narrative analysis as a means of investigating the psychological functioning of people. As also discussed in chapter three, these empirical accounts attempt with coding systems to explain the complex

in terms of the simple, the particular in terms of the universal and fluid change in terms of fixed principles. They attempt to identify causal determinants of the meaning of stories. I argue that these coding systems can be valuable clinical tools if they are used with the recommendations and cautions of Rapaport, Schafer and Gill: Such systematic methods of interpreting stories facilitate a rich and full understanding when considered as a means of developing "open schemes," "sensitivities" and "viewpoints" as one evolves an understanding of a person rather than as hard and fast rules. The information a coding scale provides is never to be taken as conclusive, but held in question and reconsidered as a whole within the contexts it occurs. Coding scales may help articulate patterns in and attribute certain meaning to the data, but qualitative, holistic, contextual studies are necessary to fully understand the particular meaning of the patterns and alternative interpretations. I will argue further in the next chapter that in clinical work an essentializing mode of inquiry and its attempt to explain the complex in terms of the simple, the particular in terms of the general must be balanced with its hermeneutic contextual particularizing converse.

3. The relationship between data and researcher/interpreter:

Methodologies implicitly or explicitly construe the relationship between data and researcher/interpreter differently. According to the empirical approach the meaning of the story and the identity of the storyteller exist separately from the researcher's investigation and articulation of them. It assumes that the story has a fixed, definitive meaning which refers to fixed and definitive mental processes, structures or contents in the storyteller and precede its telling. The researcher can gain objective knowledge of the story and teller with the use of procedures and measures that assure reliability and validity. The very conception of narrative as an object of inquiry is implicit in an empirical orientation to inquiry. The empirical approach seeks essential generalizable structures or patterns in the relationship between story and teller that transcend the particular contexts in which and people by whom and to whom they are told and interpreted.

In contrast, according to a dialogic approach the researcher is inevitably biased. The researcher knows or understands narratives and their teller by these biases -- through his/her the kind of involvement, interaction or dialogue with them. The act of inquiry is not separate from the object of inquiry. Both narrative and researcher are involved in the construction of an understanding. The



dialogic method articulates the interaction between narrative and reader. It seeks an understanding of the story in the particular contexts in which and people by whom and to whom its told, heard and interpreted.

#### 4. The relationship between story and storyteller:

##### Conceptions of language and narrative:

Exactly how the relationship between story and storyteller is construed and then investigated varies depending on the conception of language and narrative implicit or explicit in the methodology used. Referential and representational conceptions of narrative tend to be implicit in the empirical and positivist methodologies used. Empirical and positivist methodologies tend to use this conception because it conceives of narratives as having definitive meanings which precede their expression and can be objectively and reliably interpreted. Other conceptions of narratives tend to be used with a variety of empirical and interpretive methodologies which value the opportunity to study data gathered in the context of the storytellers life over conditions which allow for replication.

##### THEORETICAL FACTORS:

1. The referential and representational conceptions of narrative: This conception is the one predominantly used by psychologists. It focuses on those features or conditions associated with the storyteller that constrain or

determine the kind of story told. According to the this conception of narrative the story refers to and is determined by mental states, entities or processes inside the storyteller. The form and/or content of the story refers to or represents mental states entities or processes of the teller. This view assumes that these mental states, processes or structures exist separately from the act of telling the story. It considers the relationship between story and storyteller in terms of identity, reflection or representation.

The narrative research that use a referential and representational conception of narrative draws primarily upon psychoanalytic, cognitive and developmental theories to formulate their interpretive codes. This historical review of narrative research shows that as the conceptions of mind, language, and inquiry shifted within psychoanalysis, so too did the understanding of stories and their tellers. Initially stories were a means of understanding fantasies, then organizational and defensive processes, and more recently relational patterns of the storyteller. At first studies focused on story content (themes) and then on story forms (levels of differentiation and integration of plot and character). There was great ambivalence among theoreticians and researchers as to what interpretive methods and conceptions of language and narrative were appropriate for narrative research. A split developed in the field as those

concerned with legitimizing theoretical constructs engaged in empirical research and those concerned with questioning the methodological and epistemological assumptions of psychoanalysis engaged in theoretical inquiry.

In general, the empirical researchers all conceive of language in referential and representational terms. Cramer conceives of language as a manifestation of defensive processes which distort or disguise latent unconscious contents. Bogen conceives of the plot complexity of narratives as a manifestation of ego functioning. Westen views the narrative as a manifestation of internal representations, and Thompson as a manifestation of affect maturity. These researchers are interested in understanding the story in the context of established modes of psychological functioning.

The empirical studies suggest certain features of the storyteller constrain or shape the kind of story told. Cramer, Bogen and Thompson suggest that age significantly effects the kind of story told. Cramer suggests in addition to age the degree of pathology effects the developmental level of defense manifested in the story. Thompson suggests that the level of affect maturity of the storyteller is significantly related to the extent to which emotions are differentiated from or among situations, actions, characters, and their thoughts within the narrative. Bogen suggests that age is significantly related to the level of

plot complexity, proportion of unconnected clauses (story integration), reference to internal states, and differentiated interaction among characters. Westen suggests that the diagnosis (in particular borderline personality diagnosis), interpersonal functioning, and social adjustment of the storyteller is significantly related to the "affect tone," and social causality of their narratives, and the complexity, differentiation, quality of emotional investment, and moral development of their characters. They all agree that stories provide a means for understanding the psychological functioning of their tellers. However, Bogen and Cramer point out the limitations of stories as a means of understanding people. Stories, or at least stories alone, are not the best way to gain a full understanding of the interpersonal functioning of those who do not have the abilities (such as very young children), according to Bogen or the interest (such as those with introjective personalities) to engage in storytelling, according to Cramer.

The empirical studies' focus on storyteller inform us of ways of identifying features or patterns of storytellers in relationship to the stories they tell. We now turn to alternative conceptions of narrative whose focus informs us of still other conditions which constrain and create our understanding.

## 2. Contextual, Dialogic and Symbolic Action Conceptions of Narrative:

Schafer most explicitly introduced the dialogic conception of narrative to psychoanalysis. He spoke of the narrative as a form of communication. Because this conception of narrative has as yet not been fully developed within psychological research the discussion broadened to include the work of literary critics and philosophers where it is more fully developed. The narrative with this conception ceases to be an empirical object (by logical positivist standards). The existence of a story according to these conceptions of narrative is not an independent fact but is dependent on communicative processes among (at the least) the storyteller, listener, and story.

Alternative contextual, dialogic, symbolic action conceptions of narrative focuses on those linguistic and metalinguistic processes by which notions about the storyteller are borne. They examine the narrative modes by which significant interpersonal relations occur in and with stories.

They sensitize us to the way we interact with, read and dialogue with another's language. Studies using these conceptions examine the linguistic cues and pragmatic contexts which trigger responses from the reader.

Crapanzano claims his approach is "prepsychological".

Bakhtin claims understanding of the author requires that we

engage in a dialogue with the text. Cohn asserts that there is no one to one correspondence between narrative mode and psychological structure. She claims unconscious meaning is shown indirectly with a variety of literary means.

Increased reference to psychological states in her view does not necessarily indicate that the author has increased psychological complexity. They do not conceive of either or both the form and content of narratives as having a one to one correspondence with psychological internal representations, unconscious contents or structures. Form and content are inseparable in their view. The meanings of forms are understood in the context of their contents and vice versa. They do not presuppose a dichotomy in language of manifest and latent content. They define units of meaning in linguistic, literary, and/or psychological terms and understand how they become whole in an understanding of the relationship between story and teller. The conception of narrative as a form of symbolic action is the most recent one to emerge in narrative research in clinical and developmental psychology. It is a conception that emerges along with a certain vision of human nature, of human beings as agents defined by their actions, in the plots of their lives. The narrative is appealing in part because it provides us with terms that make our actions, thoughts and feelings intelligible and communicable. The researchers of Narrative from the Crib are concerned with the very issues

with which storytellers and listeners also are concerned: How accurate or real is the story? Did we understand it correctly? Which interpretation of it do we choose? How do stories help us organize, gain control of, manage and communicate our experience? How do stories serve as a means of positioning our self in relation to others, facilitate our belonging to and continue our participation in the world. Emmy does not talk about sibling rivalry, and loss per se. She talks about which room she sleeps in, who puts her to bed... the particulars through which the meaning of these experiences take shape. I have argued along with those who take a dialogic and symbolic action approach to narrative analysis that the particular language used to communicate an experience is integral to the consequent form and meaning the experience has. The closer we stay to the particular language in its particular contexts the closer we will be with another's experience. Narrative with this notion of symbolic action narrative is considered in a new light. It is examined as an activity which serves certain functions and practices. It is considered in experiential terms in terms of the contexts in which it occurs. A narrative's meaning is understood as embedded in context not person. This notion of narrative as symbolic action brings us to questions concerning its use and meaning in clinical practice. Questions we now turn to in the following chapters.

We have spent this chapter examining methods of inquiring about narrative. I would like to conclude by suggesting that narrative is a mode of inquiry in its own right. It asks and attempts to answer the questions concerning the who, what, where, when and why, of our experience. It is an inherently dialogic mode of inquiry. It is a form of communication. In the next chapters I would like to examine the use of the narrative form in particular as a therapeutic mode of inquiry.



CHAPTER 5  
A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF  
AN EMPIRICAL AND A DIALOGIC APPROACH TO THE  
ANALYSIS OF TWO STORIES TOLD IN THERAPY

Sometimes you overhear them discussing it:  
the truth--that thing I thought I was telling.  
What could it have been that I said?  
To be more or less like other men and women  
and then to not be at all--it's

like writing a book that is both beautiful and disgusting.  
Because we can't do it now. Yet this space  
between me and what I had to say  
is inspiring: There's a freshness  
to the air; the crowds on Fifth Avenue  
are pertinent, and the days up ahead  
still formless and unseen.

To be more or less unravelling  
one's own kindness, noting  
the look on others' faces, why  
that's the ticket. It is all the expression  
of today. It left on a speeding ship.

--John Ashbery

## INTRODUCTION

The goal of this comparative investigation is to make explicit and examine some of the empirical and dialogic aspects of the clinical endeavor. Clinicians in their everyday work use aspects of both an empirical and a dialogic approach. We informally hypothesize, predict and analyze our 'data'. We seek evidence for our interpretations and seek to attain certainty about our

formulations before making interventions. We also allow for ambiguity, multiple perspectives and multiple interpretations. We make interventions without knowing what will happen and observe and show uncertainty.

In our everyday practice we attempt to understand people through the stories they tell. This investigation contrasts and compares the kinds of understanding reached with an empirical and a dialogic approach of two patients who each tell a story. The goal of the empirical analysis of the stories is to demonstrate the use of a coding system as an interpretive tool and examine the kinds of understanding of the storyteller reached and not reached with it. The dialogic approach demonstrates a question-answer approach to the analysis of the multiple dialogues of these storytelling events. Its goal is not so much concerned with who the storyteller actually is, but what they do in telling their story and what I do in interpreting the story. It is concerned with describing and showing the dialogic activity in and with the stories. The empirical analysis is done first and the dialogic second. The effect of this order of analysis will be examined. The presentation of each approach begins with a description of the methods assumed at the start of each analysis. A comparative analysis of the two approaches will follow the presentation of two approaches in chapter six.

In an important sense a formal comparative study of an

empirical and a dialogic study is almost impossible because the methodologies are formulated within incommensurable world views (Pepper 1942/1970, Rorty 1979). It is almost impossible to meet the methodological standards of both approaches at once. If I wanted to do a typical clinical psychology empirical study, I would have to select a large enough sample to permit significant statistical computations. I would have to use standardized story elicitation procedures to assure replicability and validity. These procedures and the definition of the "data" -- what the stories are -- would have to be prescribed prior to the investigation of the stories. If I want to do a dialogic study, I would have to select a small enough sample to allow for detailed analyses of the multiple meanings and levels of symbolic interchanges. I would have to include in data selection information concerning the social context in which the stories (as they may appear in transitional, co-constructed or fragmentary forms), naturally occur. I would be prepared to forfeit preconceived definitions of what a story is and how it should be analyzed as I respond to the stories. If I attempt to do a comparative methodological study, on the same sample of stories, I quickly realize that it is almost impossible -- I cannot meet the methodological standards of both approaches at once. The procedures for sample selection and data collection for each approach are simply different. But certain aspects of each methodology

can be compared. For example, I can compare the usefulness of a preconceived psychological coding system to the usefulness of a detailed analysis and unprescribed question-answer discussion. Each approach, perhaps, can inform the other. The comparative investigation presented here may seem to lose value because it does not meet the standards of either methodological model. It regains value when it is considered to be informative to future research and considered as the kind of analysis that naturally occurs in therapists' everyday work, when the ideal conditions the methodologies prescribe are difficult to meet.

The comparative investigation does not meet all empirical standards. However, these very limitations can be informative if addressed. There is a limited sample size of coders, interpreters, and storytellers. In this way the comparative investigation is biased toward the dialogic approach. The stories are analyzed first from the empirical approach and second from the dialogic. It is assumed that an order effect does come into play in the interpretation of the stories. An attempt to control this order effect could be made by having another coder/interpreter analyze the stories in the reverse order. But one reverse order analysis would not be enough. The significance of the order effect could be determined only if the sample of coder/interpreters were large enough. While this kind of study is possible, it is unwieldy. In the present

investigation, although an attempt to control for an order effect is not made, an attempt to examine and explicate what the effect is, is made. In addition to the question of the order effect there are other important questions the empirical approach raises. One such question concerns the "blindness" of coders to information concerning the purpose of the investigation, concerning the storytellers and their therapists. This information may also influence the kind of understanding reached, as does the order in which the stories are analyzed. Optimally an empirical study would control for the effect of these confounding variables. The best this investigation can do, because of its limited sample of coders (2), interpreter (1), and stories (2), is examine the nature of the effect these factors may have.

**AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF TWO STORIES TOLD  
IN THERAPY: The object relations and social cognition  
of two eleven-year-old girls**

This approach examines the nature of four dimensions of the cognitive-affective processes underlying interpersonal functioning of two eleven-year-old patients with psychological disorders by means of an analysis of a story each tells in a therapy session. It examines the relationship between these dimensions and the patients' therapists' diagnosis and formulations of these patients. The investigation of the nature of these cognitive-affective aspects can facilitate our understanding and ability to treat disorders of interpersonal functioning. This is an exploratory investigation due to the unavailability of norms and limitations of sample size. Its objective is to raise questions and make suggestions for future research.

These cognitive-affective dimensions are studied by means of the Object Relations and Social Cognition measures developed by Westen et al. (1988). These measures are claimed to offer an objective, reliable and valid method for quantifying aspects of object relations (Westen, 1990). They have been used to predict social adjustment, interpersonal functioning, developmental changes and reliably diagnose Borderline Personality Disorder and Depression (Westen, et al. 1990; Klepser, et al. in press).

They have not as of yet been validated on a normal population of preadolescent children. Originally these measures were developed for use with TAT responses, but since have been used to code stories told during interviews. This is the first that these measure have been used on stories told during therapy sessions.

Four distinct, but interrelated dimensions of the cognitive-affective processes underlying interpersonal functioning are examined: affect-tone of relationship, complexity and differentiation of object representations/person schema, social causality, and capacity for emotional investment and moral development. A summary description of each of these dimensions is presented in Figure 1. These cognitive-affective processes are assumed to mediate interpersonal functioning. They are conceptualized as aspects of object relations and social cognition. The term object relations is used here to refer to "enduring patterns of interpersonal behavior and to the cognitive and affective processes or structures underlying interpersonal functioning (Westen 1988, p. 2)."

These measures are derived from psychoanalytic clinical observation, object relations theory and research, and research in developmental and social cognition. Although object relations theory and social cognition derive from different intellectual traditions both theories conceive of interpersonal behavior as mediated by representational

processes (Westen et. al, 1990). Storytelling as one form of interpersonal behavior is assumed also to be mediated by representational processes. These representational processes mediate how a story is told. They are assumed to be manifest in the stories people tell. The following informal hypotheses are based on these assumptions. These informal hypotheses are meant to resemble the kind of formulations and guesses made in everyday clinical practice. Due to limitations in sample size of storytellers, and the coders' lack of blindness to this investigations concerns, these hypotheses cannot be formally tested.

**Hypotheses:**

1) Low scores of 1 and 2 on all four measures for each story will correspond with pathological interpersonal functioning as indicated by therapists' diagnoses of subjects with behavioral or personality disorders, and by therapists' Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores which assess the severity of symptomatology, interpersonal functioning (family and peer relations) on a scale of 0-100. DSM III-R diagnoses such as conduct disorder, oppositional disorder, identity or borderline personality disorders will correspond with lower scores because these four dimensions indicate malevolent expectations of relationships, poorly differentiated and elaborated representations of others, low emotional investment in relationships, and a tendency to attribute causality to external circumstances in an



apsychological manner. Storytellers with lower scores on these four measures will tend to have behavioral or certain personality disorders, because they tend to experience social situations as threatening, respond to them by taking immediate action rather than thinking or speaking first, and tend to behave self protectively at the expense of others' well being. This may manifest in harmful verbal or physical acts and chronic rule-breaking behavior (i.e. lying, stealing, truancy).

2) Each subjects' therapist will confirm the results of the coding. The therapists will confirm the measures' articulation of a) the quality of the child's relationships with others, b) the complexity of their representations of others, c) the tendency to attribute causality to psychological states, and d) the capacity for emotional investment in relationships.

3) The following set of informal hypotheses will be evaluated in semantic and conceptual terms:

a) The affect tone of relationship scale will describe the "affect" and "tone" of the subjects' experience of others.

This will include descriptions of the emotional quality, mood, or pitch of their experience of relationships.

b) The Complexity and Differentiation of Object Representations Measure will assess levels of differentiation and complexity of representations of people.

c) The Social Causality measure will assess the logical

consistency of the attribution of the causality of socially relevant aspects of a story.

## **METHODS**

### **Subjects:**

The subjects are two 11 year old girls. Both were psychotherapy patients in urban hospital outpatient clinics. Both were seen in once a week psychodynamically oriented psychotherapy.

### **The Data:**

The data are two stories (appendix E and F) one of which each of these girls spontaneously told to her therapist in the course of her treatment. Both girls had been in therapy for less than 6 months when they told this story. Neither therapist nor patient knew prior to the telling of the story that it would be used for this investigation. One story was transcribed by the therapist as it was told. The second story was transcribed from a video tape. Video taping was routinely done in this therapy.

**Procedures (Data Selection):**

One story (appendix F) was chosen from the collection of child therapy session transcripts of this researcher. The other story (appendix E) was selected from the responses of seven child therapists working in urban outpatient clinics in New York City and New Jersey to a request for a story told by a latency age child patient during his/her session. There were no formally prescribed elicitation procedures. For the purposes of this investigation a story is defined as more than two semantically related clauses in which two or more of the following narrative elements are accounted for: actor(s), action(s), scene(s), purpose(s), instrument(s). The two stories chosen are stories that I and the other therapist independently of each other, spontaneously selected because we thought it central to our understanding of our patient.

**A Context of This Selection: The Subjects and Data Not Selected**

The majority of patients seen in urban clinics by those therapists asked to participate in this investigation reportedly did not tend to spontaneously and verbally tell stories. Many if not a majority of children seen by these therapists do not spontaneously tell elaborate stories concerning the central difficulties in their life. This, however, does not mean they don't communicate their central

difficulties, nor does it mean they don't tell stories. They often tell stories in fragments with frequent disruptions. One can understand this as a lack of experience in storytelling, a communication of the fragmentary quality of their experience, and/or a communication of what they experience as disruptive. They may tell elaborate narratives in nonverbal modes such as play. Many stories reported were co-constructed with the active participation of the therapist. This data could be studied in terms of the meaning of the appearances and disappearances of these different kinds of stories (co-constructed, fragmentary, verbal, nonverbal etc.) have in relation to the course of a treatment.

#### **Measures:**

The stories were scored according to the Object Relations and Social Cognition: TAT Scoring Manual (Westen et al., 1988). Each story was coded on the four dimensions described in synopsis form at the beginning of appendix D: Affect Tone of Relationship, Complexity and Differentiation of Character Representation, Understanding of Social Causality, and Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships and Morals. Each measure has five levels. Level one represents the lowest level and response and level 5 the highest level. A brief description of the levels of each measure is provided in appendix D. A copy of the scoring manual is presented in appendix D. Stories were

scored at the highest level attained during the response, unless expressly stated otherwise in the scoring rules for particular measure.

**Coding:**

The coders were trained according to the training manual (Westen, 1988) designed for these measures. They were trained on a sample of stories told by adults in response to TAT cards, and on a sample of stories told by children in response to TAT cards and sentence stems. The coders achieved 88% agreement by the end of training. The coders were two advanced graduate psychology students, one in clinical psychology and one in developmental psychology. The coders coded the stories independently of each other and then met to reach a consensus about any differences in coding scores. Both coders were not blind to the issues of the larger comparative study. Both coders noted that while coding they alternated between attempting to achieve reliability, and questioning and diverging from the established coding system. The interchange each coder carried on with themselves and the interchange between coders during the coding procedure will be examined in a discussion at the end of the empirical analysis.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Each of the scores reported next to the name of each measure below is the score that both coders agreed upon. When coders initially, independently of each other gave different scores, they discussed the differences until they reached a consensus. Independently of each other the coders gave Indigo's story different scores on each measure and gave Lani's story the same scores on each measure. The coders then met and were able to reach a consensus on all scores for Indigo's story. These are the scores reported below. This notable discrepancy between coders' pre-consensus scores is examined following the discussion of hypothesis three. Because reliability was not achieved the evaluation and discussion of each of the hypotheses that follows the presentation of the results of coding is tentative.

### "INDIGO'S" OBJECT RELATIONS AND SOCIAL COGNITION

#### ACCORDING TO WESTEN ET AL.'S MEASURES:

##### Affect Tone of Relationship Paradigm (Score 2):

According to this measure this storyteller views the caretakers in her life as tremendously neglectful, abusive and threatening. But she is capable with the help of others to both escape and overcome their threat. In the story the main character the princess makes repeated escapes from

malevolent forces. The story almost received a level 1 score because all the animals died in the beginning and the girl's life was "tremendously threatened" by the witch, but receives a score of two because she is able to escape. This is not a typical level 2 story because the girl does not feel alone or profoundly lonely in the story. At the start she has the animals as friends, the birds look after in the course of the story, and the step-brother/Prince repeatedly saves and collaborates with her.

Complexity and Differentiation of Representations of People:

(Score: 2)

Indigo is able to represent a range of characters. There are four main human characters: the girl/princess, the father/king, the step-brother and/or prince, and the step-mother/witch. There are also two main animal roles: the tiger, and the birds. There are a few instances when the characters are not clearly differentiated. One is when the tiger is stabbed. It is unclear how the knife gets into the tiger's stomach and how the girl and the witch are each involved with this event. Another is when the step-brother and prince who were presented as two separate characters, become one at the end. Neither narrator nor characters ever consider it a problem that the prince and princess are both step/foster siblings and married. Another kind of instance of blurring of boundaries -- the blurring of the distinction between alive and dead -- occurs at the end at the end when

one moment the witch/step-mother is dead and the next we know she remarries.

Except for a few instances people are clearly bounded and presented with simple unelaborated intentions and feeling states. They have stable enduring qualities: the witch wants to kill the princess, the prince likes to save people, and the king doesn't love the princess. The focus is largely on behavior and momentary actions rather than the thoughts feelings or psychological processes that motivate or influence behavior.

Understanding Social Causality (Score 2):

Overall, Indigo understands people's actions as caused by events or actions external to themselves. At times, she attributes simple intentions or feeling states as the causes of people's actions, but for the most part she does not understand behavior as significantly mediated by psychological states or processes (level two). On this measure her story receives scores ranging from level one to three with an overall of two. It receives its lowest score for its lack of explanation for behaviors, feelings and situations and two instances of illogical representations of event sequences, such as when the witch dies and then remarries. There are many unexplained transitions or transformations in the story: Why is the child a foster child? Why does the princess like and save the tiger even though he hates and tries to kill her? Why does the

...



witch/stepmother want to kill the Princess? Why does she need to make a deal with the king in order to do it? Why does the witch/stepmother die and then remarry? How is the tiger stabbed and saved?

The story attains its highest level of understanding of social causality for its interaction sequence between the prince and the princess when they become engaged to be married.

Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships and Morals (Score 1):

This measure characterizes the storyteller as a person whose own needs are clearly central. Other people's needs are taken into consideration only in so far as they serve her own ends. This is indicated by the story's focus on the princess' needs. In the story all action is directed to helping the princess. Characters, except for the prince and the birds, consider other characters's needs only in so far as they serve their own ends. The witch considers the king's wish to kill the prince because it serves her own wish to kill the princess. The princess agrees to marry only when the prince agrees to help her get rid of the witch. The princess does not consider the prince's need to be protected against the king until after the king is dead.

Indigo makes perhaps what comes closest to a moral statement at the end when she responds to her therapist's question with the condemnation, "She died from an accident

that was the father's fault because he never loved anybody". Other than that the total lack of morality in the story is most striking: No one has any remorse or second thoughts about killing. The only instances that distantly approach a moral stricture against killing are the prince's attempts to save the princess, the princess's attempt to save the animals and her refraining from killing the tiger after its tried to kill her.

#### **"LANI'S" OBJECT RELATIONS AND SOCIAL COGNITION**

##### **ACCORDING TO WESTEN ET AL.'S MEASURES:**

##### **Affect Tone of Relationship Paradigm (Score 4):**

According to one (a strict) coding of the story this storyteller experiences people in a vague, distant and benign way. People are vaguely represented with little affective charge. Her mother is there "minding her" in a distant way and there are repair men fixing things. She has playmates and is not alone. Even though she breaks rules, she doesn't get caught or punished. In fact she emphatically denies feeling punished: "They ain't scream at us." But is this affect or defense? This question and alternative interpretations will be discussed in the discussion of hypothesis three.

Complexity and Differentiation of Representations of People

(Score 2):

She represents people as clearly bounded and separate from herself, but without any elaborate sense of their subjective states, motives or enduring characteristics. There are many people present: cousins, friends, brothers, her mother, and the people fixing the house. But they are barely described. When describing people her focus is largely on their behaviors and momentary actions especially in relation to her own.

Understanding of Social Causality (Score 2):

This storyteller has a "rudimentary" understanding of social causality. Actions are explained as responses to external circumstances or simple subjective states. The explanations of behaviors, feelings and interactions are somewhat inconsistent or omitted. For example, she explains "no one moved in because me and my cousin were there playing." This explanation could be interpreted in several ways and explain things about this storyteller, but as it stands it does not explain why no one moved in. There are other kinds of inconsistencies present in the telling of this story that this measure drew attention to, but were not represented by the score on this or any of the other measures. These inconsistencies will be examined in the discussion section.

Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships and  
Morals (Score 2):

This storyteller follows moral demands to avoid punishment. Rules are minimally or only implicitly recognized. She never acknowledges that she was breaking rules when she sneaked out of the house, or played in the abandoned house without asking permission. Neither her own nor other people's needs are explicitly depicted.

**HYPOTHESIS 1:** Low scores of 1 and 2 on all four measures will correspond with pathological interpersonal functioning as indicated by each therapist's diagnosis of their patient with behavioral or personality disorders, and by each therapist's Global Assessment of Functioning scores.

**"Indigo":**

The scores on Indigo's story do not seem to correlate with the therapist's diagnosis and assessment of her functioning. Indigo scored a 2 on all measures except for the Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationship and Moral measure on which she scored a 1. The therapist gave Indigo the DSM III-R diagnosis of Atypical Depression with complicated bereavement (311.00) and a GAF score of 50 because she had suicidal ideation. Indigo, according to the therapist's assessment, did not show a behavioral or personality disorder. He understood her difficulties as a response to multiple losses and changes in her family and environment. Indigo's mother had died several years before the beginning of treatment. Indigo's bereavement was

prolonged and complicated by several factors including her loss of her home country, friends and language when she immigrated from Turkey to the U.S., and her loss of her father's attention once he remarried. The therapist's assessment of Indigo's capacity for emotional investment in relationships was not in complete agreement with the measure's assessment. The therapist reports that while Indigo is at times overwhelmed with her own needs, she is a very "personable" and empathic girl, who "had many friends at school," showed "great care about the needs of various family members," and "who easily engaged in the therapeutic relationship".

"Lani":

This hypothesis is partially confirmed with regard to Lani's therapist's diagnosis and assessment. Lani scored a two on all measures, except for the Affect Tone of Relationship measure, on which she scored a 4. Lani was diagnosed as having Oppositional Defiant Disorder and a GAF score of 40. She tended to violate minor rules, fight, argue and behave provocatively. In the course of the year in which she told the story presented here she maintained a cycle of behavior at home and at school which fluctuated between oppositional/defiant behavior and cooperative/compliant behavior. While her scores of two seem related to her diagnosis and assessment of her

interpersonal functioning, her score of four on the Affect Tone Of Relationship measure is surprising in the context of her oppositional and defiant behavior alone. This score becomes more comprehensible in the context of the cycle she maintained between exhibiting oppositional and defiant behavior and sterling "good" behavior at the time she told the story analyzed here. This profile perhaps suggests that to the extent that she was able to experience people in a distant benign manner she was able to abide by rules and cooperatively participate in activities at home and at school and to the extent she experienced others in a threatening immediate manner she was oppositional and defiant.

What is particularly curious about the results concerning hypothesis one is that while Lani's story overall scored higher on the measures than did Indigo's, Lani functioned interpersonally at a lower level, than did Indigo. It appears that Lani's interpersonal difficulties showed in rule breaking behavior while Indigo's showed in her ideation or symbolic expressions. This suggests that symbolic behavior such as storytelling may not positively correlate with other assessments of other kinds of interpersonal behavior.

**HYPOTHESIS 2:** Each subjects' therapist will confirm the summary statement of each subject's object relations and social cognition based on the results of the coding. The therapists will confirm the measures' articulation of a) the quality of the child's relationships with others, b) the complexity of their representations of others, c) the tendency to attribute causality to psychological states, and d) the capacity for their emotional investment in relationships.

A summary statement of each subject's object relations and social cognition based on the coding of each story is presented below. Each therapist's response to this summary follows the summary statement.

**"INDIGO": Summary Statement**

Indigo represents the caretaker's in her life as tremendously neglectful abusive and threatening. However, she expects she will be able to find safety with the help of her own ingenuity and the help of others.<sup>1</sup> Her representations of her interpersonal experience indicate she is most concerned with her own needs and only takes into consideration other's needs in so far as they serve her own ends. She is capable of representing and experiencing people in a differentiated manner to a limited degree. She understands her own and other's actions as caused by

---

<sup>1</sup> This comment regarding Indigo's ingenuity was not derived directly from the Affect Tone of Relationship measure. However the measure did lead the way to this characterization by asking if the character was able to escape. Then I asked and provided the answer to the question of 'how?'.

predominantly external circumstances and to some extent by simple internal motivations.

#### INDIGO'S THERAPIST'S RESPONSE TO SUMMARY STATEMENT:

Indigo's therapist confirms certain aspects of the description of Indigo's object relations and social cognition and disconfirms others:

It is accurate to say that Indigo experiences the caretaker's in her life as neglectful, abusive and threatening. Both her father and older brother (who had a strong caretaker role) are rigid and rejecting. Her father especially sees little value in emotional expression and had no tolerance for Indigo's depression... [In session Indigo] talked a great deal about various needs she had that the father could not acknowledge; some for nurturance, such as wanting a puppy, and others for more functional purposes, such as needing glasses.

...[In the course of treatment her] father was fortunately able to make gains in accepting Indigo's difficulty, to acknowledge the need to make a place for her in the family, and even to help her mourn the loss of her mother. ...In the transference Indigo had to first work through disbelief that I wanted to be helpful, and then that I could be helpful. At first she feared that I would betray her to her father and brother, and with them, would join in rejecting and humiliating her further.

I also agree that Indigo believed in her own ingenuity. She had a great deal of it little else in the way of external support. She was marvelously creative and had some sense of her own strength. She also, with some work, felt that others would be helpful and offer safety. In the family her brother, although rejecting was also a source of support and nurturance. As noted above, with some support, but more so as a way of unlocking and using her own potential. During one segment, for example, she brought in problems that a child might bring to a teacher. First she asked me to solve the problems, but accepted an



invitation for her to do so.

It does not appear accurate to say that she focused only on others need to the extent that they served her own. Although Indigo had narcissistic issues, she demonstrated empathy in a variety of situations. She was, however, quite overwhelmed with her own needs and may have been unable to focus on others until she was able to resolve issues of mourning. Perhaps had the therapy extended beyond six months, it would have focused on narcissistic issues.

I do not believe that Indigo used externalization [understanding things as predominantly caused by external circumstances] as a major defense. She did, however, rely a great deal on magical thinking. She talked, for instance, about putting spells on people, communicating with the dead through a Ouija board, and bringing people back from the dead. Some of Indigo's problems stemmed from external sources that were very much beyond her control and she came to see many of her problems as unsolvable (thus magical thinking seemed useful). Feeling that things are beyond her control, in my opinion is different than externalization...She was, however, ultimately able to identify her own feeling and the role they played in her troubles.

#### **"LANI": Summary Statement**

Lani experiences people in a vague, distant and benign way. She represents people vaguely with little affective charge. She represents them as clearly bounded and separate from herself, but without any elaborate sense of their subjective states, motives or enduring characteristics. She represents them primarily in terms of their behaviors and momentary actions. She understands her own and other's actions as responses to external circumstances or simple subjective states. She is not explicitly concerned with

anyone's needs. She focuses on and represents most elaborately her own actions. She implicitly acknowledges the existence of rules but follows them only to avoid punishment.

LANI'S THERAPIST'S RESPONSE TO SUMMARY STATEMENT:

In general, I would confirm with important qualifications the description of Lani's object relations and social cognition. While Lani at times (especially at the beginning of treatment or to strangers) represented her experience of people in a distant and benign way with little affective charge, she at other times both represented and experienced others in a much more intense affectively charged manner. The distant and benign manner of representing her experience was hinged to a more threatening, intense and immediate experience of others. This kind of representation seemed an attempt to preserve her benign experiences of others and protect herself from a much more intense, experience of abandonment and condemnation in relation to others. This coding of the story only captures one side of her experience of people.

In general, Lani as the coding suggests, tended to represent others as clearly bounded, but without any elaborate sense of their subjective states, motives or enduring characteristics. She tended to represent others primarily in terms of their behaviors and momentary actions.

Lani is very aware of and sensitive to rules and does have the tendency not to follow them if she can avoid punishment and if breaking the rule means she can do something she wants or needs to do.

Both therapists seem to agree that while the coding accurately describes certain aspects of each girl's object relations and social cognition, the summary description is insufficient and even inaccurate if not understood in the

context of other aspects of their interpersonal life. For both therapists the summary of the coding only captured certain facets of their patients' experience of people.

The response of both therapists suggests that if these measures are to be used for stories told in therapy, certain aspects of the therapeutic context would need to be taken into consideration. The description the coding provides often is not accurate until it is further interpreted in terms of the context in which its told. For example, Lani's therapist found the Affect Tone of Relationship measure inaccurate and Indigo's therapist found the Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationship measure inaccurate. This inaccuracy in both cases was due to the generalization of one aspect of the storyteller's experience over all others and no consideration of whether or not this was a habitual response or a response specific to a particular experience. In Indigo's case the measure generalized a certain aspect of the story as a her preoccupation with her main character's needs as a pattern of object relations. In Lani's case the measure generalized her distant, bland and neutral experience over all other aspects. Both therapists responded to the measure's characterizations of their patient by offering further formulations. Their response suggests that further formulation is required to come to an accurate generalization.

Lower scores on these measures may not indicate lower

adaptation or lower interpersonal functioning particularly when considering stories told in therapy. The scores must be taken into consideration in terms of the content and context of the story and the therapeutic situation. In terms of the Affect Tone of Relationship Scale, not only may the patient have a preoccupation with their own needs, but the therapist may support and encourage the patient's preoccupation, especially when it regards experiences in which their needs went unmet. Scores on all measures may be much lower when the story's content and context is particularly distressing, disturbing and emotionally charged. Stories told in therapy may tend to have such contents and contexts. Each of the scores on each of the measures for Indigo's story represents a range of scores. The scores tended to be lower when the content of the story was particularly disturbing, aggressive and emotionally charged. (This fluctuation is further discussed in terms of the coders' reliability.) But they are not necessarily lower with such contents and contexts if the storyteller is defending against experiencing their distress, as was particularly evident in Lani's story.

In the case of both storytellers they were responding to traumatic separations from their mothers and the loss of their childhood homes. Both, at the time story was told, were overwhelmed by and preoccupied with their own needs relative to other times in their lives. But this

preoccupation was not necessarily an ingrained pattern of interpersonal functioning that pervaded all their relationships all the time. The measure emphasizes the maladaptive aspects of self preoccupation. Further interpretation beyond these measures is necessary to credit the adaptive functions a person's preoccupation with their own needs can serve following a trauma.

**Hypothesis 3:** The following set of informal hypotheses will be evaluated in semantic and conceptual terms:

- a) The affect tone of relationship scale will describe the "affect" and "tone" of the subjects' experience of others. This will include descriptions of the emotional quality, mood, or pitch of their experience of relationships.
- b) The Complexity and Differentiation of Object Representations Measure will assess levels of differentiation and complexity of representations of people.
- c) The Social Causality measure will assess the logical consistency of the attribution of the causality of socially relevant aspects of a story.

a) The Affect Tone of Relationship measure was found to be less about the affect tone and more about defense. Its scoring rules appraise representations of what actually happens in the story, what the storyteller makes explicit, and what actions, thoughts and feelings narrator and character acknowledges and articulates. The scale disregards the implicit, and unacknowledged. It does not attend to many of the narrative elements that are commonly thought to create the "tone" of a story, such as pacing of action, rhythm of prose, word choice, symbols, connotations, innuendoes, repetition, omission etc. The characterization

of affective tone is a subtle matter not suited to a linear positive-negative or benign/malign scale. However, this scale may be useful as an assessment tool of defensive functioning in interpersonal interactions.

According to another interpretation of the coding of Lani's story, the affect tone is conflicted rather than bland and neutral. The storyteller expects both bad and good things of people, but focuses on the good. There is no code on Westen's measure for this kind of formulation. None of the measures describe the quality of conflictual interpersonal experience such as this in which what is wished for is made explicit and what is feared is implicit or omitted. This coding stretches the coding rules to allow for the interpretation that the houses in the story are symbolic of Lani's experience of people. That she expresses this experience in terms of houses can be taken to indicate several things. It could mean that the feelings that she experiences in relation to significant others are so painful or dangerous that they have to be defended against -- deanimated and distanced -- as much as possible. That it is a house that she chooses for a symbol could be taken to mean that the relationships in which she feels abandoned/abandoning is one of the most basic ones, the one that provides her sense of safety, stability, and nurturance. In the story there is an abandoned house that remains empty even though it has been renovated. One could

take this to mean that she experiences people as being capable of both abandoning her and attempting to restore relations with her. She's both doubtful and hopeful that relations will be restored. She does not know what's behind the locked door and upstairs: She doesn't know what to expect.

b) The measure succeeds in assessing the complexity and differentiation of a certain range of representations of people. But this range of representations especially when storyteller subjects are children, needs to be broadened. The measure should include instructions for coding and assessing representations of non-human beings or objects. In this way the houses in Lani's story could be included in an assessment.

c) The Social Causality measure assesses the logical consistency of the attribution of the causality of those socially relevant aspects of a story that are explicit and that concern people. It can become a more effective scale for children's story's, in particular, if it were to also include implicit inconsistencies and inconsistencies that concerned the narrative structure (i.e. development of plot and theme). It can be made even more effective if further inquiry were made into the meaning of these inconsistencies.

For example there are sets of inconsistencies in Lani's story that appear not to be represented by scores on the social causality measure, nor on any of the other measures.

There are two causes of her putting the cat outside the window one which is explicit and the other which is implicit: explicitly because the cat wants to go out, implicitly to deceive her mother and successfully sneak out of the house. But what does this inconsistency mean? The measures are helpful in pointing out potentially meaningful aspects of the story such as this inconsistency. However, one must go beyond these measures and make further interpretation as to what the meaning could be. This inconsistency may concern her thoughts about and experience of her own actions as wrong and punishable.

There are other important inconsistencies which are also not coded by any of the measures. These inconsistencies are inconsistencies in the story structure. The storyteller begins the story by stating that the spookiness of the upstairs of her foster relative's house reminds her of the upstairs of her aunt's house and then proceeds to tell a story about an abandoned house next door to the building in which her aunt and her own family have apartments. At the end of her story she denies that the abandoned house is scary. The relationship among the three houses is unclear.

These inconsistencies concern more literary rather than explicitly psychological aspects of the story. They are prepsychological. They are not verbalized in the psychological language from which these measures were



formulated. They exist in the story structure and storytelling interaction rather than within the story in the representation of a characters' feelings, behaviors and interactions. Although they concern an affect -- the spookiness of these houses or the fears of this girl -- they are not really represented by the affect tone of relationship measure either, because that measure is not concerned with the inconsistencies with which the affect tone of the story is presented. There are different kinds of inconsistencies. These inconsistencies can become comprehensible only with further interpretation beyond these measures.

Although the therapist's diagnosis, GAF assessment and response to summary object relations statement provide partial support for the validity of these measures, a conclusive evaluation of hypotheses one and two is not possible because coders did not achieve reliability independently of each other on one of the stories. Reliability must be achieved before the external validity of the measure is evaluated. One of the most important results of this investigation surprisingly turns out to concern the discrepancy of reliability between stories. The issues involved in this are further examined in the next section.

An evaluation of hypothesis three in the context of the results presented in the preceding section suggests that the Affect Tone of Relationship measure needs to be renamed,

and all measures need to be further refined with rules that address the implicit meanings, and literary and linguistic aspects of stories in order to be applicable to children's stories.

#### COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CODING ANALYSIS OF EACH STORY

A comparison of the coders' reliability pattern between stories shows a remarkable difference. The pre- and post-consensus scores are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1**  
**Pre and Post-Consensus Scores**  
**for Each Story According to Westen et al.'s Measures**

| <u>MEASURE</u>                                           | <u>PRE-CONSENSUS SCORES</u> |           |               |   | <u>POST-CONSENSUS</u> |               |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|---------------|---|-----------------------|---------------|
|                                                          | <u>STORY</u>                |           |               |   |                       |               |
|                                                          | <u>Indigo's</u>             |           | <u>Lani's</u> |   | <u>Indigo's</u>       | <u>Lani's</u> |
|                                                          | <u>Coders</u>               |           | <u>Coders</u> |   |                       |               |
|                                                          | A                           | B         | A             | B |                       |               |
| Affect Tone of Relationship                              | 1-2                         | 3         | 4             | 4 | 2                     | 4             |
| Complexity and Differentiation of Object Representations | 1-3                         | 3         | 2             | 2 | 2                     | 2             |
| Social Causality                                         | 1-3                         | 2-3       | 2             | 2 | 2                     | 2             |
| Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships       | 1-2                         | N/A*<br>4 | 2             | 2 | 1                     | 2             |

\*During the pre-consensus meeting Coder B stated this measure was "nonapplicable" to this story, because the story was "not about breaking or keeping rules." She didn't "think the story fit any of the [measure's] levels."

While both coders were able to reach a consensus score for each measure for each story, their scoring, pre-consensus was completely reliable for one story and completely unreliable for the other. Why is there this difference? What accounts for it?

Does the coder's involvement or lack of involvement in a therapeutic relationship with the storyteller account for it? The complete agreement between the scores of the coder with and the coder without involvement with the child (Table 2) strongly suggests that the coder's involvement did not effect the coding of these stories.

---

**Table 2**  
**The Effect of Coder's Involvement**  
**With Storyteller on Coding Scores**

| Measure                                                        | Coder               |                        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
|                                                                | with<br>involvement | without<br>involvement |
| Affect Tone<br>of Relationship                                 | 4                   | 4                      |
| Complexity<br>and Differentiation<br>of Object Reps.           | 2                   | 2                      |
| Social Causality                                               | 2                   | 2                      |
| Capacity for<br>Emotional Invest-<br>ment in Relation-<br>ship | 2                   | 2                      |

---

Perhaps the difference in reliability is related to differences between the stories. Each of the stories was transcribed by a different method. Indigo's was written down by her therapist during the session and Lani's was transcribed from videotape. The coders both viewed Indigo's story as more coherent. But this difference in the transcription methods (handwritten during session versus transcriptions from videotape) also does not offer any explanation for the difference in reliability.

An analysis of the linguistic, literary and developmental level aspects of the stories shows that Indigo's story is more complex in a number of respects. In Table 3 measurements of each story's complexity of plot structure (Bogen, 1982; See appendix C), word count, highest attained scores on the Westen's developmental measures complexity and differentiation of object representations, are presented.

**Table 3**  
**Measurements of Story Length, and**  
**Plot and Character Complexity**

|                                                                                                    | Indigo's                         | Lani's                                   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Bogen's Complexity of plot structure                                                               | Multiple sequential episodes (8) | Single episode with non-episode segments |
| Story length: Word Count                                                                           | 803                              | 336                                      |
| Highest score attained on Westen's Complexity and differentiation of object representation measure | 3                                | 2                                        |
| Social Causality measure                                                                           | 3                                | 2                                        |
| Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships measure                                         | 4                                | 2                                        |

In comparison to Lani's story, Indigo's story is more than double the length, has many more (7) episodes that are more complex (have several intervening steps), and, in addition, sequentially related to one another.

This increased length, plot and character complexity and higher developmental level of the stories is significantly related to the complexity of the coding process. An analysis of each coder's process notes and tape

of coders' pre-consensus discussion reveals that each coder gave the more complex story, Indigo's story a range of scores on each measure before deciding on one score, while on Lani's story each coder gave one score on each measure. The range of scores that represents the combined range of scores both coders gave the stories on each measure in the process of selecting one score is presented in Table 4.

---



---

**Table 4**  
**Range of Scores Each Story Attained in the**  
**Process of Score Selection**

| Measure                                                        | Story    |        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------|--------|
|                                                                | Indigo's | Lani's |
| Affect Tone<br>of Relationship                                 | 1-3      | 4      |
| Complexity<br>and Differentiation<br>of Object Reps.           | 1-3      | 2      |
| Social Causality                                               | 1-3      | 2      |
| Capacity for<br>Emotional Invest-<br>ment in Relation-<br>ship | 1-4      | 2      |

---



---

While both coders did not initially agree about which score to select, they did agree that the choice of any one score for each measure (for Indigo's story especially) omitted important meaningful aspects of the story. Although there are coding rules for deciding which score to select

when a range of scores are present, these rules involve making interpretive judgments as to whether a story is "defensively positive (refer to appendix E coding manual, 1988 p. 11)," as to how "minor (p. 25)" of logic errors are, as to how "brief (p. 14)" a remark is, and as to what the "bulk (p. 14)" of the story is. These ambiguous rules that require interpretive judgments are more subject to the coder's biases than other less interpretive clear-cut coding rules.

Each coder chose to emphasize different aspects of the story. For example, on the Affect Tone of Relationship Measure Coder A in her score selection chose to emphasize Indigo's experience of relationships in which she feels her life is threatened, while Coder B chose to emphasize the storyteller experience of relationships in which she feels cared about and cares about others. Coder A was influenced by her knowledge prior to coding the story that Indigo had at some point had suicidal potential. She initially chose scores of 1 and 2 because she was concerned about the storyteller's well-being and wanted the coding to represent the danger in which she might be. Coder B emphasized the most positive and hopeful aspects of this child's representations of interpersonal functioning.

Both coders' choice of emphasis are equally important from a clinical perspective. One focuses on immediate concerns for patient's safety and the other highlights the

patients strengths and could lead to the enhancement and development of them. If the clinician takes both aspects into consideration he/she is better able to help the patient use his/her strengths to work through and overcome difficulties. Consideration of both aspects of this patients experience would be necessary for treatment to be successful. This discussion regarding the variance present in score selection suggests that, while consensus is necessary to produce a reliable coding procedure, formulation of an understanding of coder differences is necessary for clinical practice.

The analysis of linguistic, structural and developmental features of the stories reveals that the more complex story that attained higher developmental scores and a wider range of scores was the one that generated the most discrepancy between coders. The coders had previously attained reliability on much shorter stories told in response to TAT cards and sentence stems to strangers. This empirical analysis leads to the conclusion that the linguistically more complex story is the one that does not yield reliable codings. It suggests that Westen et. al's Object Relations and Social Cognition measures may only be reliable for stories within some specifiable range of complexity (i.e. plot complexity, story length, complexity of character representation etc.). Future research could examine variation of coder reliability over a sample of



stories that ranged in plot complexity, length and developmental level in order to specify the range in which this measure is applicable.

**DIALOGIC APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF TWO STORIES TOLD  
IN THERAPY: How Was the Story Told and Read?**

**AN APPROACH: A VARIATION ON A METHODS SECTION:**

**Assumptions and Objectives:**

This approach is shaped by the following interrelated assumptions and objectives:

1) The use of language is of primary importance in the establishment of understanding and meaning.

2) Language is primarily a social and generative phenomenon -- a living dialogue. It is a form of communication that creates and is created by a social context. It exists in its use, in one person talking or writing to another. An addressee is always presupposed.

3) Meaning is generated and understood through dialogues. We understand something through our conversations and interactions with it.

4) Meaning is not isolated within the individual consciousness in any fixed form. It is context bound. It is generated by the particular participants in the dialogue and the particular situation in which they interact. These multiple contexts from which an utterance garners its meaning is what Bakhtin calls heteroglossia.

5) Narrative is a form of dialogue. It is someone telling someone else that something happened. It implies the presence of tellers/writers and listeners/readers. The

meanings of the stories are created by dialogic activity. For this analysis the speakers in these dialogues may include the narrator, characters, this reader, the "voices" of the storyteller that this reader "hears" or constructs, and the listener/therapist the storyteller hears or constructs. The dialogic approach to narrative analysis this analysis takes facilitates an understanding of the relational realm of storytelling. It is further described below.

6) Narratives are a form of symbolic activity. The focus of this analysis is on the activities of telling, listening, reading and interpreting. The goal is to describe the movement and aliveness of these activities. Once considered as a form of activity the purposes with which each teller and listener engage with each other and the functions their telling and listening serve become important to examine. In this study I often may describe the functions of storytelling in therapeutic terms, in terms of the contexts in which these particular stories were told. For example, storytelling will be considered as a mode of communication, expression, inquiry, affective modulation, protection, and problem solving among others. The purpose of this particular analysis of stories is to become more able to use the interpretation of dialogic activity to facilitate the understanding and practice of therapy.

This analysis pays close attention to the language by

which interpersonal interactions take place within the stories and between the story and its listener or reader. It is informed by the work of literary and linguistically oriented theorists, such as that of Dorrit Cohn (1978) Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986), Dore (1989), and Crapanzano (1988), who examine dialogic aspects of texts, by the work of psychologists, such as Schafer (1958, 1981, 1983) Bruner and Lucariello, and Feldman, who examine stories as a form of symbolic activity which concerns certain purposes and functions, and by the work of psychologists, such as Cramer (198) Bogen (1982) and Thompson (1981), who while working with different conceptions of inquiry, language and narrative, also claim or imply that narrative serves important functions. For reviews of the work of this interdisciplinary group of writers and researchers refer to the preceding chapter. Of this group I am primarily concerned with the usefulness of Cohn's and Bakhtin's modes of analysis to therapeutic practice. Both Cohn and Bakhtin are interested in the interplay among multiple perspectives in narrative. Their linguistic and metalinguistic techniques are some of the 'investigative tools'.

#### **This Dialogic Analysis:**

There are many dialogues embedded in this analysis: those within the story, those between the storyteller and her therapist, those between the storyteller and other

people in her life, those between the interpreter and the story, and those between you the reader and this text. I chose to focus on the dialogues within each story, and, in addition, the dialogue: 1. between the storyteller and the therapist and 2. between the storyteller and myself the interpreter/therapist. The latter two dialogues occur in terms of the larger context of the storyteller's therapeutic relationship and life. Once beyond the frame of the story for Indigo's story there is less context to ground interpretations and my stance becomes more suggestive and questioning, but for Lani's story, I as her therapist can ground my interpretations in terms of the context of our interaction and her life history. There are other contexts in which these stories could be understood. I do not analyze the stories in all possible historical, cultural, and class contexts -- I do not fully analyze what Bakhtin called a texts heteroglossia. I limit the analysis to the examination of the stories in these three dialogic contexts.

Although both these stories were told by children to their therapists, we can also understand them as stories told to themselves. My experience of reading both these stories was of coming in on the middle of a conversation each storyteller was having with themselves, in which I'm not sure whose speaking to whom and what they are talking about. I understand each of these storytelling's as a kind of conversing among various stances the storyteller holds, a

kind of composing of the self in conversation. This kind of understanding is a kind of listening stance some therapists (Schafer, 1981) find useful in doing therapy.

Procedure: Question and Answer

Following Gadamer's (1988) suggestion that "the fundamental procedure is always question and answer (p 331)" in understanding and communicating meaning, I will compose the analysis of the stories as a dialogue, opening and guiding it with following questions:

I The Construction of perspective(s):

1. Within the story who speaks, to whom, when, and how (tone, style, idiom etc.)? What do they say? What is the response?
2. What narrative modes are used to present speech? Do Bakhtin's terms such as, direct, quasi direct and indirect speech, help describe and understand the meaning of the presentation of speech? How do the storytellers use Cohn's narrative techniques, if at all? b) Are variations of those techniques identified by Cohn, such as quoted or narrated dialogues used? c) What do these modes or techniques convey?
3. Is it possible to characterize different voices, or "semantic positions" in terms of linguistic and metalinguistic characteristics such as tone, style, idiom, theme and character? Do any instances of the embedding or overlapping of two voices (reinvoicement and double voicedness), or multiple voices (polyphony) in one utterance occur? How are the narrator's and characters' voices interwoven with the use of direct, indirect and quasi-direct speech of characters (Bakhtin, 1984)? What is the meaning of these interactions between voices or reinvoicing of one voice by another in the context of the story?
4. In what genre(s) is the story composed? What themes, style, idioms is characterize the genre(s)? What does the use of this genre convey? What purposes does it serve?
5. a) What does this reader imagine the storyteller is doing in the course of telling this story? What purposes or functions are being served? The answer to this question

will draw from the variety of studies reviewed in the preceding chapter. b) What response does the storyteller seem to expect from her listener/therapist? What responses does it evoke in this reader? In what ways does the storyteller engage or distance the listener? c) What linguistic or metalinguistic cues did the reader use to formulate answers to these questions?

6. Are other modes of narrative analysis helpful in understanding the dialogic activity? For example, are negation, ambiguity, nuance, absence, or omission telling? (These features of narrative are commonly noted by literary critics. Of the psychological narrative studies reviewed, Cramer's make use of them in her defense coding scale.)

(The influence the analysis in the preceding empirical investigation which used Westen et. al's Object Relations and Social Cognition Scale has on this analysis will be examined in the comparative analysis of the empirical and dialogic approach.)

## II The interrelationship among perspectives:

- 1) What does the use of each of different points of view, tones, style, techniques, characters etc. in contrast to one another convey?
- 2) When do shifts, overlaps, ambiguities, blurring, disruptions and/or omissions in perspective, voice (Bakhtin), or technique (Cohn) occur? What do they mean?
- 3) How do each of the perspectives within one story relate to meanings of the story as a whole?
- 4) How may each story relate to that child's therapy?

The objective of the analysis is not to rigorously address each and every one of the questions listed above. Rather it is to formulate, through the linguistic and metalinguistic analysis these questions initiate, an understanding of the dialogic activity that occurs in the telling and interpreting of the stories. Although this analysis begins with a certain dialogic orientation, and uses certain literary and psychological terms and questions, it is not a systematic analysis. I pick and choose from a

wide variety of interpretive approaches reviewed in the preceding chapter as I formulate an understanding of the multiple dialogues. I attempt to be more loyal to story than method. I use interpretive terms, tools, and lines of questioning as I find them meaningful and purposeful within the dialogues described above. This analysis embraces eclecticism in the hopes that out of a variety of approaches a method can be tailored to fit each story. The method and goal of this dialogic investigation is not to prove the validity of a particular analytic mode, but show the ways in which certain modes of analysis render these stories particularly meaningful to the practice of therapy.

One of the objectives of this interpretive methodology is to show how the issues concerning the practice of theory, therapy and research become interrelated in the course of a narrative analysis. I have chosen to present the analysis of these stories in the form in which they occurred rather than reorganize them into separate sections on theoretical, therapeutic and research issues.

The investigation moves towards a response to the question 'How do you tell how the story was told?' with a discussion of these children's storytelling in the context of my reading and retelling of the stories. These 'tellings' and 'retellings' compose the dialogue through which these stories were created and understood.



#### DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF INDIGO'S STORY:

True to Bruner's and Lucariello's conception of narrative, this story is driven by a kind of trouble: Indigo informs us of it within the first line of the story: "This story is about a six year old girl who ran away because she was in trouble with her father." Indigo's story, as Bruner and Lucariello claim, is characteristic of narratives in general, a "vehicle for characterizing exploring, preventing, brooding about, redressing, or recounting the consequences of "'trouble' (Bruner and Lucariello, 1989)." From a dialogic perspective, we could view this story as a conversation concerning this trouble among a set of stances that compose this girl's world.

Before beginning this analysis I knew certain things about the girl who tells the story. I knew that the girl's mother had died prior to the start of treatment and that the therapist periodically met with the girl's father. I note the influence this information has on my interpretation. Upon reading the first line of this story immediately I believe that the trouble within the story is related to some trouble of Indigo's. I wonder if this is a trouble this storyteller has with some father figure. Or some trouble she has with a father figure because of the death of her mother. I am hesitant about attributing the trouble to any one person because there is more to this story as we soon

find out, and more to the storyteller's story than this story. Her trouble may not be best understood as caused by one specific person as it may be also a family trouble or a trouble she has when her expectations of a person are disappointed or betrayed.

Initially, storytelling provides Indigo with a means of distancing. She places her trouble at a distance into a fantasy story. This initial distancing perhaps provides her with a sense of safety which allows her to articulate the danger she experiences. The story she composes draws from what might be called the fairy tale genre. It has a cast of royalty and an almost royal (Cinderella-, or Snow-White-like foster child) heroine who struggles to survive against a life-threatening-step-mother. It includes a savior-prince and a happy ending. This fantasy genre relinquishes claims to realism and, perhaps one could argue, morality. It provides this storyteller with the liberty to express extremely aggressive fantasies (as displaced as they may be) in a safe symbolic form.<sup>2</sup>

She tells us a story about a girl who was in trouble with her father. But she never tells us what this original trouble was. Was this girl guilty of some wrong doing? As a therapist, I would want to later ask: Why is this trouble

---

<sup>2</sup> Refer to Bruno Bettelheim's The Uses of Enchantment (1977) for further elaboration on the important role fairy tales play in the lives of children.

never mentioned? What was this trouble? Instead she draws her listener into the subsequent adventures of her main character, the girl. She creates a quality of depth, density and complexity with the narration of long passages of time, changes of scene and multiple episodes. The story gains an epic quality.

This quality speaks to me of the storyteller's brooding, of a long mulling over, of tellings and retellings, of an ongoing experience. It tells me she has often heard and had practice telling stories. Not only that, but she likes and seeks to tell stories. She likes to invent and recreate. I wonder with whom she has had storytelling relationships. Although prior to reading this story I know her mother has died, I don't know when she died and I don't know how Indigo has been responding to her death. This story's complexity and its concern with death suggests to me that storytelling is an integral part of her response to her mother's death and all its subsequent dilemmas. Considering the pronounced theme of death in the story and the absence of the heroine's biological mother, the omission of any explanation is notable and perhaps meaningful. Does the omission speak of the unspeakable threat with which she experiences her mother's death. I question whether Indigo feels as unloved by her mother as she does by her father. I wonder what this secret of the heroine's identity as a foster child means in the context of

Indigo's life. Is this story also a communication of Indigo's experience of her mother's death as a threat to her own loveliness, and even life?

Taking Feldman's conception of narrative, I understand this storytelling to be a kind of vehicle for problem solving. The problems or dilemmas here, though are not ones of logic, but of her experience of others in relation to herself. There seems to be a number of dilemmas that the storyteller works with in telling the story: One concerns surviving, managing and responding to the threat of death. In the course of the story the threat of death is presented from many perspectives in many interpersonal contexts: the girl tries to save the animals whose lives are threatened, she feels her own life threatened by others, she is saved, she becomes a threat to her own life, she saves herself, and causes the death of others. Another dilemma concerns her experience of loving someone by whom she feels hated and hurt: "The tiger hated her. She liked the tiger". The other dilemma concerns the split between and integration of two interpersonal experiences: one of love and safety with a prince-like savior and the other of hatred and rejection with a father figure. These dilemmas are kinds of interpersonal disputes. There are undoubtedly others. These are the ones that will be examined here.

A metalinguistic analysis enables us to describe the working through of these dilemmas in the course of the

telling of the story. This analysis attends to the creation and juxtaposition of perspectives. These perspectives are conveyed in the stances of narrator and characters, the manner in which speech is presented and in other aspects of narrative such as genre, plot structure and word choice. This analysis is particularly helpful in depicting the narrative thread that concerns the evolution of relationships in the story. Within the frame of the story this evolution concerns the relationship with the father is worked out as it evolves into relationships with a tiger, prince and step-mother. Outside the story it seems to be part of an ongoing conversation Indigo is holding with her therapist concerning her relationship with her parents. One possible interpretation of the story is that it is the story of her therapy which began, when she got in trouble with her father. As such therapy, at least in part, is the working through of her relationship with her father.

In the course of this analysis I discovered speech occurs at key moments, moments in which important interpersonal transactions take place, in which affect and conflict are expressed, and in which the heroine was either put in danger or her safety assured. For example, each of the following events occur in dialogue: the girl gives away to her father her location and becomes vulnerable to his attack, the father and step-mother make a deal to kill, and the prince and princess become engaged.

The narrator presents the speech of her characters haltingly, at first at a distance. She creates distance between herself and her characters by narrating their speech in the third person and past tense, in the narrative mode which Cohn calls psychonarration and Bakhtin, indirect discourse. The father "asks to see her house..." This speech occurs at a moment of betrayal. The narrator also creates distance between characters by having the father and daughter not recognize each other as family, and by remarking the girl mistakenly "thought" of him as a "nice" man. The narrator takes on the role of the knowing one, of informing, of being aware of the deception of appearances. While the narrator creates distance with and between characters she draws the listener closer with the appeal of her knowing confidences. The narrator also draws the listener into taking a compassionate position toward her heroine. The narration of a young girl's hunger, victimization, and homelessness calls for a compassionate response.

If we differentiate storyteller, narrator, and characters from each other, we can see how storytelling facilitates the articulation and holding of multiple perspectives. The narrator thinks the father is mean; the character, the girl, at this point in the story thinks he's nice; and the storyteller tells of both at once. The storyteller articulates in the narrative form of

psychonarration the experience of having two different perspectives of this man's niceness, at once knowing and not knowing about it. She also articulates this dual perspective or ambivalence about someone in the juxtaposition of the girl's response to the father's and the tiger's hatred of her. The girl gladly partakes in the death of her father, but likes the tiger even though it hates and tries to kill her.

The next presentation of a speech act is curiously the negation of one. The narrator says, "She met a boy before she went to prison. She never told her father." Negations silently speak their opposites. Lights go on in the interpretive anteroom. That the narrator bothers to comment that the girl didn't tell indicates that the narrator thought she should tell him and felt it even more important not to. Why should she tell him? Why doesn't she tell him? Is she betraying her father in some way? At instances of unexplained negation like this I tend to identify the main character's perspective with the narrator's and storyteller's. I take this negation as an indication of an important point of conflict for the storyteller that deserves further inquiry.

The narrator tells us this boy is a prince. His identity is ambiguous. He later also is identified as the step-brother. The ambiguity of his identity may be in part due to the strong positive affective charge the storyteller

feels towards him. The prince is ushered in on the eve of another event in which the girl is saved. The storyteller creates in the prince a character to take a savior stance which counterbalances the threats of other character's. This can be also described as use of the defense of splitting to separate her threatening negative feelings from her idealization and love for her parent(s) in an attempt to sustain this love and idealization. With this introduction of a prince we move more into the fairy tale genre where the fantastical becomes possible. In this case the girl's survival and vanquishing over threatening forces becomes possible. Adaptively speaking, the fairy tale genre provides the means to admit the possibility of what previously seemed impossible, and cathartically express the unallowable anger and aggression. Unadaptively speaking, it may perpetuate painful unwanted feelings or thoughts by providing further defense against them.

The distance between characters diminishes and the drama of the narrative becomes more immediate. Speech is narrated in quotations. "Build!" the father commands to no one in particular. Yet it almost seems not to be spoken by him. The order to "build" is incongruent with all his former actions (i.e. imprisoning her, knocking down her house). It is forced speech. It is in response to having gotten bitten by insects or birds -- friends of his daughter. The command to build seems to be more the



daughter's word and wish. But it is said with the powerful commanding tone of the father who had imprisoned her. The command "Build!" seems to belong both to the daughter and her father. In Bakhtinian terms this is perhaps an example of reinvoicement. The daughter is able to elicit from her father a response to her need for a house with the help of her friends the birds/insects. This is the first she is able to benefit from a communication to him. The storyteller finds a way through the birds for the girl to speak to him as indirect and hostile as the insect's/bird's bite is. This utterance marks the first instance in the story that the girl seems to not have to run away from her father. She is able to maintain a stance. In the story this stance is literally a house. Curiously in this first instance of speech occurs through an interaction among three parties: the father, daughter and birds.

The birds seem to make communication and engagement with the father possible. In this first instance of speech we witness the creation of their mediating voice. The first word marks a moment of transformation in the estranged relations of a father and daughter. Animals in this story seem to serve an important mediating, transitional and creative role. The animals are the first to be saved. They seem to be the initial form through which new relations are established or previously unexpressed feelings are expressed in the story. The birds seem to emerge from the animal

friends. They are at first indefinite "insects or birds" and then take on a more definite identity with protective, perhaps therapeutic purpose ("The birds wanted the princess to live in a normal house"<sup>3</sup>).

The storyteller in the course of the story is becoming able to manage through displacement the threat first expressed through the father character. She introduces another character the step-mother/witch. Curiously it this witch -- a mother figure -- who takes over the father's position of being the most powerful destructive and threatening figure. This shift in position is accompanied by a narrated dialogue between him and the witch. The father is still a threat, but only indirectly. He says, "If I don't kill the prince you won't kill my daughter." His wish to harm her becomes more ambiguous. Perhaps what remains most threatening is the estrangement between him and his daughter: He still has not shown recognition of her.

---

<sup>3</sup> The word normal I find very curious here. Where and by whom did the storyteller hear this word used before? What is abnormal in the story? Do the storyteller and her therapist have a common understanding of what is a normal and abnormal house? Is the storyteller telling us something about her own life? In the story what is abnormal perhaps is that this girl has trouble with her father the father does mean things to his daughter, things that are unheard of for a father to do to his own daughter. And/Or perhaps what is abnormal is that the father is not in some fashion providing a home for her? Does she wish he could have prevented her mother's death? In addition to thinking that he actually caused her death? Or is there something else? How is what is abnormal in the story related to what the storyteller experiences as abnormal in her life?

The plot thickens outside the story. If we were to assume the prince is in part symbolic of the therapist and the girl symbolic of the storyteller, is the storyteller, by informing her listener, the therapist, that the father wants to kill the prince, asking the therapist to join her in feeling threatened? Is she asking him to form an alliance with her? Or has she already felt an alliance between them against the father and this is just a narrating of that alliance?

The storytelling becomes more compelling and disturbing: The witch casts a spell. The narrator reveals to her listener the daughter was really a foster daughter. The placement of this revelation seems arbitrary. What are the connections that would make it sensible? It is suspiciously close to the description of how the spell will make the girl cut herself. Is there some relation between her thoughts of hurting herself and the question of her identity as a biological versus a foster child (i.e. a wanted or unwanted child)?

As the storyteller comes closer to telling of aggressive acts the pace of the narration slows and the tense shifts to the past present. The story began with the narration of the passing of years and now slows to narrate the passage of minutes. Narrative time becomes almost synchronous with speaking time. The narrator tells us "...she was using a knife". We have reached a charged

moment. The tiger is mysteriously stabbed and saved. The girl for the first time is in conflict with her savior the prince. Now the girl is more concerned about saving the tiger she likes than she is of being saved. She can allow the prince to save her from her father but not from the tiger. The distance between story and storyteller has much diminished.

As a therapist I take this shift in verb tense, this magic spell which allows the witch to transgress the girl's psychic boundaries and make her hurt herself, and this confusion of how the tiger gets stabbed all as disturbing indications that Indigo is having a very difficult time knowing what is and isn't due to her own aggressive impulses. She seems to be feeling very threatened. It may be a particularly vulnerable moment because she doesn't feel she can both hold on to her love for someone and remain unhurt, that she can have her therapist's help to work through both an experience of rejection and a wish to continue loving the person by whom she feels rejected (mother and/or father?). This spell may be her disavowal of suicidal thoughts. There are many questions I would need to ask her and her caretakers to address my concerns for her immediate safety regarding her suicidal ideation, aggressive impulses, and the source of the threats she feels.

The character of the girl in the story is disturbed by conflict between her concern for the tiger and concern for

her own safety. She turns to her mediators: "The princess was talking to the birds." It is a vividly poignant moment. It is presented in a narrative form that approaches that of an interior monologue. In this moment this character is able to openly experience herself in conflict in relation to the tiger. This is the first character with whom she is able to experience herself in conflict. This shift back to the past progressive tense suggests that there is an immediacy and novelty to this talking to the birds, that Indigo as she tells the story is mediating a conflictual experience. The birds agree to go and talk to the tiger. But we never know what comes of this. What happens to her lingering affection for the tiger? What happens to this narrative line? The birds and the tiger are minor characters in some respects. They drop out of the plot into the background. In my interpretation here I have given them center stage because they seem to provide the means for expressing and resolving the emotional problems that so threaten her. As a therapist I would want to return in some way to these emerging mediating voices.

For the storyteller the threats to the girl's life and her need to survive -- "get rid of" the source of danger -- is the most compelling. The girl agrees to marry if the prince helps her to get rid of the witch. The statement of this condition is made in quotes while the prior proposal and response to it more coolly conveyed in third person.

The sense of danger is conveyed with more emotional charge than that of romance.

In the course of this story the father's power and threat over his daughter diminishes and the girl becomes able to directly speak to her father. The narrator presents her characters speech directly in quotations and the characters are able to sustain dialogues for up to four or five turns. All in all there is an increase in the dialogic activity within the story. At the stories end when a measure of safety has been gained with the death of the step-mother, and the marriage to her savior and protector the girl finally faces her father and reveals her identity. She spouts what seem bottled up words: "I'm your daughter daddy, your foster daughter who you always hated and who mommy loved". Again an affectively charged moment occurs with the narration of speech. It gains its affective charge from its style, content and consequent effect: The narrator presents it within quotes; she uses the intimate and familiar terms of address "mommy" and "daddy"; it is the first she directly speaks of her feelings to her father; and it is the first she perhaps is recognized by him. The tiger, as the one who hates, perhaps reemerges here, now integrated with the father. With this affectively charged speech the distance between storyteller, narrator and character diminishes. It's as if the heroine's voice and a voice of Indigo's become one. This is perhaps an example of

a character's reinvoicement of its author. The time and long succession of events it takes for these words to be said suggests the impulse to speak these words was as threatening to the girl until this moment as they subsequently are in deed to her father. These words curiously enough are powerful enough to make her father die. There is much that this storyteller still has to tell for us to understand why these words -- this informing of and recognizing of her identity and this communication of feeling loved by "mommy" and hated by him are powerful enough to kill him.

This analysis suggests that storytelling serves the purpose of facilitating the storyteller's unspoken feelings and thoughts for people in her own life. Her speech to the father at the end may well be the beginning of one she wishes she could make to her own father and/or mother. As a reader I felt drawn with compassion and concern by the narrator to the character of the little girl. My concern for the storyteller was evoked by the contrast between her ability to create a relatively complex and coherent narrative and the lapses of this ability (the occurrence of confusions, omissions, and discontinuities). The story kept me and left me in suspense about the storyteller's safety. The story presented both the possibility of her becoming disorganized and the possibility of her being able to resolve her difficulties using relational symbolic modes,

like storytelling. Many aspects of the narrative, including its theme, plot, characterization, and presentation of speech together evoked this concern.

In the course of this analysis I have described how the difference among storyteller, narrator, character expands and diminishes like accordion pleats as the story is told. The differences among them were more distinct when events and speech were narrated in the distance of the past tense or third person (psychonarration or indirect discourse). This form of narration narrated events in summary with less detail. It conveyed events with less intense affect. Those events that were narrated as unfinished in the past progressive with direct speech in quotation conveyed more affective intensity. Then, the difference between storyteller narrator and character diminished. Then it seemed the storyteller was speaking directly to her therapist unmediated by the stances of character and narrator. This is not to say that psychonarration or indirect discourse will always convey less intense affect for every storyteller. But for this storytelling the shifts from indirect to direct narration of speech communicated to this reader an immediacy: the presence and movement of the storyteller's affective state.



## DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF "LANI'S" STORY

"Your abode is your act itself."

--Antoine de Saint-Exupery

This story is as mystifying as it is about mysteries. The mystery of what's inside the abandoned house is the initial mystery. What is upstairs remains a mystery at the story's end. At a literal level these mysteries are the trouble that drives this story. But there are also other mysteries. Her story leaves much unelaborated and unarticulated, such as the relationship between actions, interactions between characters and thoughts and feelings within characters. It is somewhat incoherent and incomplete. It's incoherence, lack of elaboration and differentiation of character and action becomes more comprehensible when one begins to hear the silenced voices, the unarticulated, implied and denied. An analysis of the dialogic activity of this story in the context of her interactions with her therapist and the storyteller's life facilitates an understanding of these mysteries, an understanding that I suggest is informative to the therapeutic process.

This dialogic approach to understanding the story entails hearing her story as responses to other voices, perspectives or experiences. It involves an examination of how Lani hears and responds to my questions and how I

respond to her story -- the dialogue between therapist and patient. Fundamentally a dialogic-action is a response. In the discussion that follows I will first discuss what the language within the story and our dialogue tells us, then, what an analysis of the story in the larger context of our relationship and her life tells us.

At first glance a dialogic analysis of the story may seem useless because there is little or no speech, emotion or thought narrated within the story. But upon further consideration, this absence (in the context of the story and its telling) is quite revealing of what I believe is the central dilemma (trouble) of this story and the therapeutic process.

In the narration of the story there are only two instances which make explicit reference to speech. Both are concerned with the prevention or denial of a spoken reprimand. In one instance Lani explains she and her cousin threw the cat out the window "cause my mother wouldn't say nothing cause if we had to go for the cat." In the other instance in response to the question, "Did you think that was a scary place?", she says "They ain't scream at us, the people fixing up the house. They ain't scream at us." Both instances are claims that her actions are not punishable.

In the second instance Lani hears my question as if its an accusation that she was doing something wrong. There are many things that could make that place scary, but she

immediately understands "scary" as meaning she is culpable. While both references to speech imply that she is scared that she will be punished, she doesn't explicitly say so. Why? It is as if, if she were to say she was scared of being punished, she would be admitting she had done something wrong, and be immediately punished. So she denies it. It is as if she is testifying against some unspoken charge. Lani uses speech and keeps silence as a mode of protection. She seems to conceive of speech as an act that can either endanger or assure her safety.

The narrator never narrates any of the characters' speech, thought or emotions. The absence of narrated speech and thoughts from the story as a whole together with the concern with rules speaks of a kind of prohibition against speech. The telling of the story seems to have been inhibited and stunted by this prohibitive condition. There are omissions and non sequiturs. It is as if, the belief that Lani did or will do something wrong is so threateningly present that if anybody were to say anything it would be reprimanded or be a reprimand. Perhaps there is an absence of narrated speech, and a lack of coherence and elaboration because there is little distinction between speaking of something and it happening.

There is also little distinction between the narrator's and Lani-of-the-past's perspective. The distinction between past and present is blurred with abrupt shifts in tense. We

can understand the story as a whole as a kind of response to an ever present reprimand or the expectation of a reprimand. It is a refutation of that reprimand. The act of storytelling seems an attempt to clear herself of some charge.

The story can be understood as one side of a dispute about her culpability. It does not contain within itself this dispute or any other kinds of dialogues. This lack of containment speaks of the unmanageable intensity of this dispute. The central dilemma of the story concerns this dispute. The two instances of the narration of the absence of speech mark and call the reader's attention to this dilemma. The meaning and importance this dilemma has for Lani will become more compelling once we examine it in the context of her relationship with me and her life. The analysis of the absence of the narration of speech in the story brings to light this dispute concerning her culpability, but it does not tell us what she feels she is being punished for the context of the story and what that punishment could be. To understand this we must attend to other aspects of the narration (i.e. word choice, repetition, emphasis, the use of tense and person) and ask to what else the story may be a response.

**Storytelling as a Response to Sudden Loss:**

Lani attempts by telling a story to definitively locate and make present something as hers. She attempts to make something real and have that something recognized and felt as real by me, her listener. She does this with "this's," "that's" "MY's" and simultaneous pointing's to her sketches. She repossesses and makes real and present the houses and events of her past for me her listener. She makes it real for herself by making it real for me.

The telling of the story serves the functions of remedying disorientation and of restoring what was lost. She makes the past present using the present tense. She makes the invisible seemingly visible both with her words and blackboard sketches. She even makes the past's temporal qualities present by slowing down the narration of events so that the time that it takes to narrate the event coincides with the time it took to happen. For example, she says, pointing to the board "This is us coming out right here."

Lani uses storytelling genres that are well suited to the purposes of making the story compelling and real to the listener. She tells the story in a first person retrospective narrative mode (Cohn, 1978) and uses visual aids. The story belongs to the autobiography genre and has a cinema verite. In some respect it resembles an action-suspense film. Lani takes her listener "back to the videotapes". She replays the past in slow motion, making

visible on the blackboard where and when things happened.

This concern with where and when things happened also can be understood as an orienting response to a shocking and disorienting experience. This repetitive and emphatic claiming of possession to a house that is no longer hers can be understood as a response to loss. Lani begins telling her story in the past tense. I interrupt her with a question that is formed from the perspective that she no longer has this house. She responds with an even more emphatic claim to her possession with a shift to the present tense. "This is MY HOUSE!," she exclaims. She intensifies her claim with each interruption. For her the house is not yet lost. She has not accepted its loss. She outrightly denies it. She slips to the present tense and makes the house even more present.

Not only has she not come to an acceptance of the loss of the house, but also of the people who lived in it and nearby with her. Her lack of separation and differentiation from these people is shown with her use of the pronoun "we" and the lack of any description or elaboration of other people as individuals. The storyteller does not differentiate herself in any manner from the girl in the story. The storyteller's sense of herself seems merged with her family.

What makes the experience of loss especially problematic for this storyteller is that she isn't sure if

it is her punishment. But the question is punishment for what? In the story she repeatedly claims she neither did anything worthy of reprimand nor was she reprimanded. Has her experience of punishment been so arbitrary that she has a pervasive expectation of punishment? And/Or is there something she did outside the frame of the story that she thinks may be punishable?

**The Story in the Context of the Interaction Between  
Therapist and Patient During the Telling of the Story:**

Throughout this storytelling Lani relates to me, her therapist and listener, from a dual stance. She both relates to me as an authority who can confirm her or whom she must refute, and as her student who is ignorant or misinformed. She seeks confirmation repeatedly with the question "Right?", as if I could say she were wrong. Simultaneously by appealing to me as an authority she takes an authoritative stance as a teacher. Previously in the session we played a game of school in which she was the teacher and I her student. In this storytelling she maintains her stance as teacher at the blackboard. She attempts to teach and convince me of her innocence, goodness, and safety from punishment. I too simultaneously hold and take a dual stance. I am both the therapist who has established certain rules and limits in previous sessions and her student within our play. The dual stance

we each take brings to life the uncertainty and conflict with which she regards her own and my authority. She is concerned about authority especially in terms of who has the power to determine what is punishable.

At the start of this storytelling there is a struggle between us as to what she includes in her story. I interrupt her story with questions, historical, fact-seeking questions, which are attempts on my part to elicit from her a certain story line concerning where she lived, when, with whom, and why. She at first responds by answering and then by insisting on her story line over mine with definitively possessive "MY'S". I give up asking these questions, and she tells her story.

She continues setting the scene for her story and then introduces its central point of interest, the abandoned house. "It was an abandoned house?" I ask, in a fearful tone of voice. She responds "No, it was good. On the inside it was good and um on the inside it was good like and upstairs of the door had a lock on it." This appears to be a series of non sequiturs.

The gap between question and answer is bridged by connotation and ambiguity. I ask about the abandoned house partly because I wasn't sure I had heard her, partly because I consider the abandoned state of the house as analogous to her own abandoned state and want to know more about how she considers abandonment. Through its implications her



response tells me. She responds as if I had claimed the house's abandoned state meant it was bad. She responds to one possible connotation of my question. But it is ambiguous what she thinks (if she does at all) is the connection between the state of abandonment and badness. Is something abandoned because it was bad or bad because it was abandoned? She doesn't merely claim that the house is good. She goes on to elaborate and reiterate that the inside was good and add the upstairs door was locked. Why is it important for her to make this elaboration and addition? What is "upstairs"?

Lani states before beginning her story that she is scared of upstairs. I then take this position and attempt as she tells the story to find out what's scary. Once I take this position she responds to my expression of fear or direct inquiry about her fear in the course of telling the story with an immediate denial that there's anything to be scared of: the abandoned house is good, the upstairs in process of getting fixed up, and she is not culpable. If the story is considered as one side of a dispute, the other side of the dispute becomes more intelligible once the story is examined in the context of our dialogue and interaction.

In the story we know that upstairs is a place she has never seen, a place that is scary and not scary, and a place that is in the process of getting fixed up. There is a certain timelessness to this prospect of restoration. She

says,

the man kept going in there trying to fix it up so people could move in, but no one move in cause me my cousin were there playing.

It is an action that is left ongoing at the story's end. It is what remains present, incomplete and uncertain. In the context of this session, the course of treatment and of her life does this have any meaning? Is she experiencing some kind of ongoing incomplete, and uncertain restoration in any of these contexts?

#### **The Story in the Context of the Session:**

In terms of the therapist's and patient's experience of the treatment the context of the session is, perhaps, the most compelling context. It is the context in which the past and future become present.

Upon arriving in session Lani creates a classroom. She is the teacher standing at the blackboard teaching me, her student to do division. This teacher student interaction carries over into the story presented here. She continues to be my teacher but this time the subject is "When she lived in 'Z'..." As the storyteller she is also the teacher, the one who knows what is right and wrong and I the one who doesn't know. This initial taking the position of teacher, of an authority, I believe critical to her telling one of the most sustained series of autobiographical stories in the course of her year long treatment.

In the middle of correcting the mistakes I've made in

the arithmetic problems in this arithmetic lesson she asks permission to go upstairs to the bathroom. At the beginning of this treatment I had established a rule that she use the bathroom before we begin our session. I give her permission asking her next time to try to remember to go before the session. When she returns she tells me a story about how scary the upstairs of her foster relatives house is, then a dream about her mother not showing up for a planned meeting at the prison where she was confined, and then the story presented here. I did not understand during the session but now in retrospect understand this story as a response to the experience of asking permission to break a rule, and going upstairs and returning. In retrospect I believe she was very concerned about the consequences of breaking a rule. Would I say something, scream at her, or think she is bad? Once we consider the story in the context of the course of treatment and her life we will see there are also other consequences she may have feared, such as, would I still be there?

**The Story in the Context of the Treatment:**

At the time this story is told Lani and I have had a total of seven sessions in the course of ten weeks. During these first ten weeks Lani changed foster homes three times for various reasons. While she changed foster homes she did not come to sessions and for a few weeks it was uncertain whether our sessions could continue. This session is the

second after her return to treatment. Upon her return she and her new foster mother informed me that the reason she was removed from the first foster home was she had given false testimony in court against her first foster mother in the hopes she would be reunited and placed in a home with her brothers. As a result of giving this false testimony she is separated from her first foster mother and from me. She repeatedly expresses in stories she tells following her return to treatment the concern that separation from a significant other is the consequence of being bad. We talk about how unfairly punished she feels. She is extremely conflicted about whether or not she did in deed do something wrong. She lied in court in order to take care of a basic need to be united with her brothers. In this session she also breaks a rule (with permission) in order to take care of a basic need. What I don't know at this point in the treatment is what she thinks she did wrong that caused her separation from her mother.

**The Story in the Context of Lani's Life:**

Lani was referred by her foster agency to the outpatient clinic in which I was a therapist. At the point this story is told I know that Lani is a foster child but I know little about how she became one. I know her mother is in prison, but not why. I know her mother used drugs. I know her father died when she was five and that she is now separated from her three younger brothers who live in other

foster homes. My outside sources of information are a brief report from a psychiatrist at her agency, reports from her teachers and foster mother about her current behavior. They are not able to tell me much about her history. I am curious. Lani and my interactions with her are my main source.

Lani has told me of her hopes that her mother will be rehabilitated -- become her "old self" -- once she gets out of jail and that then their family will be reunited. She denies any immediate fears that they will not be reunited, but is able to speak about her fears in the past tense. When she goes to visit her mother, sometimes her mother is there and sometimes she isn't. In the face of the uncertainty of their reunion she attempts to maintain a confident certainty. She has told me it was her mother's boyfriend's fault that her mother is in jail. She has denied that her mother has done anything wrong. When I hear about the upstairs of this abandoned house that is getting fixed up I think of Lani's hopes for her mother. Although the story is about a past event in Lani's life, what remains present at the story's end thematically coincides with what is the emotional focal point in Lani's present life -- her playing in a large room while she waits for the completion of a restoration.

The narrative thread that weaves through all these contexts: the context of the telling of this story, this

session, the treatment and this girls life concerns a girl that may or may not have broken a rule and may or may not be punished for it with separation from a significant other. The upstairs at this point in treatment was locked. What is upstairs was a mystery. These mysteries concerned her hopes and fears about whether she was culpable in the events that led to her separation from her family and whether or not in the future she will be reunited with them. These mysteries were what the subsequent treatment addressed.

### COMPARISON OF THE DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF EACH STORY

One of the most important and basic aspects of the dialogic approach that proved useful for both dialogic analyses was the question and answer procedure. While certain questions were more useful than others, the latitude to pick and choose questions that this general dialogic approach allowed for, enabled me to create a custom fit analysis for each story. In each case the analysis was idiosyncratic to this particular interpreter. It was considerably influenced by my background and training in clinical psychology and literary analysis. It is unlikely that such an analysis would be replicated by another interpreter, although there may be points of agreement and resemblance.

Those questions that were useful for both stories were those that concerned the most basic elements of the narrative such as: 1) the definition of initial dilemmas and subsequent resolutions, 2) the manner in which the storyteller presented and omitted characters and their mental states and speech, 3) shifts in person, tense, and pacing of events, and those questions that concerned the story as a whole, that characterized the story in Bakhtinian terms, asking to define the story's genre and to define it as a dialogic act -- as a response -- that had purposes, functions and effects. But these questions were not sufficient in themselves. The analysis of ambiguity,

connotations and inconsistencies were found to be necessary to provide the fullest understanding.

The presentation, denial or omission of speech for both stories was revealing of their central dilemmas. Both storytellers used speech as if it were an act that could endanger or assure their characters' or their own safety. In Indigo's story speech was the means by which betrayal, reconciliation, plans to attack or pacts to protect occurred. Lani reported characters didn't speak at moments when reprimand or punishment could have, but didn't occur. I found Bakhtin's terms of reinvoicement, and direct and indirect speech useful for Indigo's but not for Lani's story. The interpretation of the dialogic activity of Lani's story took place in a broader context. Cohn's narrative modes had limited application to these stories. Indigo's story primarily used psychonarration, and Lani's story primarily used retrospective monologue. But when Cohn's spectrum of narrative modes is extended, other modes could be defined, such as narrated and quoted dialogue, that were more applicable to these stories. These narrative modes were particularly useful in analyzing Indigo's story. Narrated and quoted dialogue may be more generally typical of preadolescent children's stories, than Cohn's other modes.

Affect was conveyed to me by shifts in pacing, tense, person, narrative mode and emphasis. In both stories the



events that were narrated in the present or as unfinished in the past progressive tense were the most vivid and immediate. This kind of narration marked the moments in the narration that seemed most resonate with the storyteller's present experience. Noting the shifts in the kind of language used helped mark how the communication of affect occurred -- how affect was conveyed through the telling and reading of the story.

Questions concerning genre facilitated my understanding of the multiple functions storytelling served for each girl. Storytelling provided both girls with a compelling means of engaging their therapist in their dilemmas. Indigo seemed familiar enough with storytelling and able enough as a storyteller to use storytelling as a safe symbolic form in which she could express for the first time previously forbidden thoughts and feelings. Storytelling facilitated her articulation and holding of multiple perspectives. In contrast, Lani, perhaps because she was not as experienced a storyteller, and perhaps because her separation from her mother was more recent did not experience storytelling as a safe enough means to express both her wishes and fears. Lani used storytelling to orient and defend herself and to begin a restorative process.

There were significant differences between the stories and their analyses. There were two major conditions that produced these differences. One concerned my previous

relationship with Lani and absence of any previous relationship with Indigo, and the other concerned the higher level of internal coherence and complexity of Indigo's story over Lani's. These differences led to two very different dialogic analyses. The analysis of Indigo's story focused on the language of the story and my response to it. This analysis was possible and necessary because of the presence of dialogues and interactions among characters within the story and the lack of much information about the contexts outside the story of Indigo's life, treatment, and interaction with therapist. The analysis of Lani's story focused on the story in a set of nested contexts: her interaction within the session, the treatment and her life. This was possible and necessary because of the minimal amount of dialogue and interaction among characters within the story and the presence of much information about the contexts outside the story.

## CHAPTER 6

### COMPARISON OF THE EMPIRICAL TO THE DIALOGIC INVESTIGATION

Mr. Palomar thinks that every translation requires another translation, and so on.... Yet he knows he could never suppress in himself the need to translate, to move from one language to another, from concrete figures to abstract words, to weave and reweave a network of analogies. Not to interpret is impossible, as refraining from thinking is impossible.

--Italo Calvino, Mr. Palomar

#### **The Consequences Of Initial Assumptions On The Understanding Reached With Each Analysis:**

What is the difference between the kind of understanding we reach of the storytellers with the object relations/social cognition measures' analysis in comparison to the kind of understanding we reach with the dialogic analysis? Both the empirical and dialogic approach presented in the preceding chapter attempt to reach an understanding of two girls' interpersonal experience through the stories they tell. Each approach begins with different assumptions concerning inquiry, language and narrative and proceeds with different methods. They result in two distinctively different, but related kinds of understandings.

#### **The Assumptions:**

The empirical approach used in the preceding chapter is formulated according to empirical and logical positivist

assumptions and procedures. It assumes a referential view of language, which conceives of the narrative as a manifestation of the internal representations and processes "underlying" interpersonal functioning (Westen et. al, 1990). These internal representations are separate from and precede their manifestation in narrative form. Structural and qualitative aspects of a narrative's representations are assumed to be either isomorphic or synonymous with these internal representations. It also assumes these internal object representations direct or mediate the storytellers behavior in interpersonal situations (Westen et al, 1990. The validity of these measures has been judged in terms of how well its scores of stories correlate with other measurements of interpersonal functioning, such as diagnosis (Westen et. al, 1990). Westen's measures characterize the narrative's representations according to four dimensions of object relations. Each of these dimensions are conceptualized to be on a continuum. For three of the four measures (Complexity and Differentiation of Object Representations, Understanding of Social Causality, and Capacity for Investment in Relationship) this continuum refers to a developmental levels.

In contrast the dialogic approach assumes a dialogic conception of inquiry and language. According to this conception of inquiry, we know something through our conversations or interactions with it. According to this

conception of language, meaning does not exist separately from its expression and use. Meaning is not isolated within the individual consciousness in any fixed form, such as a representation. It is context bound. It is generated by the particular participants in a dialogue and the particular situation in which they interact. Language is assumed to be primarily a social and generative phenomenon; it is a living dialogue. The meaning of stories are created by dialogic activity. The dialogic approach claims to facilitate an understanding of the interpersonal realm of the storyteller by attending closely to the language by which interpersonal interactions take place within the stories and between the story and its listener or reader. It claims that the interpretation of dialogic activity can facilitate the understanding and practice of therapy.

**The Differences And The Resemblances Between The  
Understandings Reached With Each Analysis:**

It was evening all afternoon.  
It was snowing  
And it was going to snow.  
The blackbird sat  
In the cedar limbs.

--Wallace Stevens,  
"Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird"

These differences between the initial assumptions of conceptions of inquiry, language and narrative that each approach took were found to make a significant difference in the kinds of understanding each analysis of the storytellers reached. The differences between the understandings reached with the two analyses are summarized below and contrasting examples of them are offered in the discussion of each storyteller that follows:

1. Each analysis offers different kinds of formulations: Westen's measures emphasize stasis and the dialogic, flux. The measures describe how things are, while the dialogic analysis describes how things change. Westen's measures described how things are for each storyteller in terms of the qualitative and developmental level of the internal representations of the storyteller, while the dialogic approach described how things change in terms of the multiple dialogues in which the storyteller partakes.

The empirical analysis tells us in the language of object relations and social cognition theory who the storyteller is, while the dialogic analysis tells us what the storyteller does in telling the story and what the interpreter does in interpreting it. The superimposition of the quality of stasis and change is conveyed by the passage from Wallace Steven's poem quoted above.

Westen's measures facilitate the formulation of the typical manner in which the storyteller experiences and relates to people. The coding rules facilitate the selection of one facet of the meaning of the storyteller's experience and one level of their narrative representations as most characteristic. The dialogic analysis formulates the meaning of the range and fluctuation in the narrative language as a process. It tells a kind of meta-narrative about these processes in terms of dialogic activity, responsive interplay, and dilemmas and their resolutions. It considers the occurrence of any particular change in level of malevolence, differentiation, complexity or coherence in terms of its meaning in the context in which it occurs.

2. The two analyses consider the action of the storytelling situation very differently. Westen's measures only focus on the action that is explicitly narrated within the story. The dialogic analysis also considers the telling listening, reading and interpreting of the story all as

important forms of action, which, in part, determine its eventual meanings and use. The empirical analysis claims to present objective measurements of the stories' structure and meaning as representative of the storyteller. This is based on the assumption that the self can be objectively observed. In contrast the dialogic analysis conceives of the self or subjectivity as created in the act of speaking. It inquires and describes the phenomenology of the act of telling and interpreting. This analysis is based on Maurice Merleau Ponty's claim that,

expression is not one of the curiosities that the mind may propose to examine, but is its existence in act (1964, p. 79).

Stories in the analyses presented here are considered forms of symbolic action told in response to dilemma's, experiences, other voices or perspectives. Storytellers in the very manner in which they tell their story, with the very kind of language they use and don't use, act upon their relations to others. They protect, preserve and transform their interpersonal relations through the stories they tell.

Westen's measure emphasizes the importance of the boundary between the narration of internal (psychological) and external (physical) action while the dialogic emphasizes the boundary between what is said and not said. Westen's measure focuses on the logic of the relationship between the narration of action and narration of psychological states, while the dialogic analysis focuses on the relationship



between the narration of action and the narration of speech. The dialogic analysis of both Indigo's and Lani's stories suggests that the interpersonal experience of children, in particular, as it occurs in narrative form, may best be understood by attending to the language in which they present, omit, or deny speech.

5. Westen's measures note the presence of certain kinds of narrative features and rates them on a linear scale according to degree to which representations are malevolent/benevolent or to their developmental level. The dialogic analysis, takes what the presence of certain narrative features imply; it takes the absence, omission, and denial of characters, responses, causal connections, feelings, explanations etc., to be of particular clinical significance. Westen's measures focus more on what is made explicit in psychological language, while the dialogic analysis focuses more on what is implicit in the use of language, in linguistic and prepsychological terms. Its the difference between

The beauty of inflections  
Or the beauty of innuendos,  
The blackbird whistling  
Or just after.

(Wallace Stevens, "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird")

Despite the many differences between the kinds of understanding each analysis provided for each of the girls,

there were certain thematic resemblances in the views each presents. Both analyses note the degree to which the girl's may have felt or feel cared for, abandoned, neglected, or rejected. Both note the degree to which people and animals are differentiated and elaborated. These resemblances can, in part, be explained as due to an order effect, and, in part, due to the fact that both approaches were implemented and written up by the same person. These two factors hinge the two analyses together.

The empirical investigation taken as a whole has even more in common with the dialogic approach, than the coding system analysis taken by itself. In its second stage of analysis the empirical approach invites the therapists of the storytellers to respond to the analysis the measures provided. The empirical investigation's design in this way includes a kind of dialogue. This dialogue between, or comparison of therapists views with the analyses by the measures leads to views more contextually and subtly formulated view of the storytellers. The contextual interpretations, and attention to dialogic interaction which the final discussion of the empirical investigation has in common with the dialogic investigation speaks of the overriding power person plays over method. It is testimony to Ralph Waldo Emerson's statement that "every man is a new method and distributes things anew (1929, quoted in S. Meyer, 1990, p. 102)."

The empirical analysis was done first and greatly informed the dialogic analysis. It informed the dialogic analysis by calling attention to the following aspects of the narrative: the inconsistencies in the narration of interaction among characters, the degree to which storytellers represented characters as caring for each other, and the degree to which storytellers differentiated and elaborated upon their representations of people. The dialogic analysis inquires further as to the meaning of these aspects of the narratives. It, in turn, informs the empirical analysis by suggesting further lines of inquiry and possible interpretations. The question of the meaning of a storytelling is central to the dialogic analysis. Below I contrast the different kinds of understanding of each storytellers each analysis offers.

**INDIGO:**

According to Westen's Affect Tone of Relationship measure, Indigo represents the caretaker's in her life as tremendously neglectful, abusive and threatening. However, she expects she will be able to find safety with her own ingenuity and the help of others. In contrast, the dialogic analysis emphasizes how she is able to use a symbolic mode of expression such as storytelling to diminish the threats of neglect and abuse. It narrates the process by which she, in the act of telling the story, diminishes what is threatening to her in her relationship to her father, enough

so that she no longer has to escape or retaliate and can (at least indirectly) speak to him directly of her feelings. It tells of the transitional characters -- the insects, birds and tiger -- she creates in this process, that make change possible. It tells of how this process can be understood by attending to her language.

Both analyses consider rejection and neglect to be important themes both in Indigo's story and in her life. The difference is that Westen's measures, unlike the dialogic analysis, assume the direction, source and object of this experience as represented in the story doesn't necessarily directly correspond to the storyteller's life. While Westen's analysis focuses on only that rejection, abuse and neglect which is directed from other characters towards the main character, the dialogic analysis examines the theme of rejection neglect and abuse in a broader fashion.

The dialogic analysis takes into consideration not only that rejection, neglect and abuse directed toward the main character, but also that which is directed from the main character towards herself and other characters. It suggests that the Princess in the story is not only very upset about being rejected and betrayed by her father, but also very upset that she may be betraying and rejecting him by allowing the prince to save her. If all Indigo's problem was that she felt rejected and neglected by her father, the

story of the Princess and the King and of Indigo and her father would have come to an end when the Princess met her Prince and Indigo met and was saved by her prince-like therapist. Her problem is not only that she feels rejected and neglected, but also that she loves the very people by whom she feels rejected and neglected, and feels she will lose that love if she allows the prince to save her. In addition, and perhaps most disturbingly she appears to have internalized this sense of rejection to the point that she thinks of directing it upon herself repeatedly. The dialogic analysis because it considers the experience of rejection in terms of all its alternative sources, objects and directions, is able to pick up on those cues of Indigo's suicidal potential (which the therapist confirmed) that the measures missed.

In addition, the dialogic analysis takes into consideration not only the characters present, but also the characters who are absent. The dialogic analysis suggests that the storyteller not only feels rejected by her father and step-mother as is directly represented in the story, but also by her dead mother, a character whose presence is only implied in the story. It suggests that her mother's very death was experienced by Indigo as a rejection and threat to her lovableness.

The Complexity and Differentiation of Representation of People measure claims that Indigo is capable of representing

and experiencing people in a differentiated manner to a limited degree. The dialogic analysis examines and interprets the meaning of the fluctuation of the complexity and differentiation of her characters. It suggests the limited differentiation is indicative of the movement and change occurring in her relationships. It examines the lack of differentiation to the point of merging and omitting characters. It suggests that the blurring of characters' identities conveys the presence of strong positive feelings and/or destructive impulses, such as towards her father and her therapist.

It also considers characters in relationship to one another as aspects or parts of each other. The tiger is considered as that aspect of her father that she loves and is in conflict with and the insects and birds as a newly differentiated ready-to-communicate aspects of herself.

According to the Understanding of Social Causality measure, Indigo understands her own and other's action as caused by predominantly external circumstances and to some extent by simple internal motivations. The measure notes the inconsistencies and mild logic errors in her narration. Again the dialogic analysis is informed by the observations made with the measures and again takes these observations and interprets their possible meanings. For example, the dialogic analysis suggests that inconsistencies with which Indigo narrates the scene in which she and the tiger scuffle

with a knife are very important to inquire into. It suggests they may be indicative of Indigo's difficulty managing her own aggressive impulses and confusion about the nature of her pain.

While Westen's measures focuses on the action that is explicitly narrated within the story, the dialogic analysis also conceives of the telling and reading of the story as important forms of action to consider. It describes Indigo's attempt and success at engaging her listener's compassion and concern and her working through of her conflictual relationship with her father, and therapist. While Westen's measures emphasize on the distinction between the narration internal and external action the dialogic analysis discovers that in Indigo's story speech occurred at key moments, moments in which important interpersonal transaction take place, in which affect and conflict are expressed and in which the heroine was either put in danger or her safety assured. It found that what created the danger for Indigo was the lack of communication between herself and her father and what diminished it finally was speaking to him.

The Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationship measure claims that her representations of her interpersonal experience indicate she is most concerned with her own needs and only takes into consideration other's need in so far as they serve her own ends. This measure locates this self

preoccupation at the lowest level on its developmental scale. While Westen's measure highly values the development of concern and commitment to others the dialogic analysis also gives value to investment in oneself. The dialogic analysis describes this self preoccupation as an adaptive response to a traumatic dilemma, one that is supported within the therapeutic context. Again the dialogic analysis is to some extent informed by a measure's observation and again it interprets its possible meanings. While the measure collapses the range of Indigo's representations of involvement with others to one level, the dialogic analysis examines the range and fluctuation in the girl's self preoccupation and takes that fluctuation to be indicative of the process by which she is able to emerge from her preoccupation.

**LANI:**

According to Westen's measures, Lani experiences people in a vague, distant and benign manner with little affective charge. In contrast the dialogic analysis describes this manner of narrating interactions with others as Lani's attempt to protect herself from the ever-pervasive threats of reprimand and punishment that she keenly experienced.

According to the Complexity and Differentiation of Representations of People measure she represents people as clearly bounded and separate from herself, but without any elaborate sense of their subjective states motives or



enduring characteristics. She represents people primarily in terms of their behaviors and momentary actions. In contrast, the dialogic analysis focuses on the meaning of this lack of elaboration and differentiation of character and action. This meaning becomes apparent with the use of contextual and linguistic cues. These cues make it possible to hear unarticulated, implied and denied voices, thoughts or feelings of Lani and her characters. The dialogic analysis interprets this absence of narration of the subjective psychological states of the people. It suggests that this absence is related to Lani's concern for rules, and speaks of her intense concern that she has been punished and of her fear of impending reprimands and punishments.

According to the 'Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships measure, Lani is not explicitly concerned with anyone's needs'. She implicitly acknowledges the existence of rules, but follows them only to avoid punishment. According to the dialogic analysis, Lani does not merely acknowledge the existence of rules, but experiences them in a cruelly arbitrary manner as depriving her of her basic relational needs for her family. She does not merely follow them to avoid punishment, but refutes that there are any grounds for punishment. The dialogic analysis claims she is very involved in responding to her own needs and concerns and that this self involvement has adaptive purposes. It suggests her storytelling can be understood as an orienting

response to a shocking and disorienting experience and a reparative response to loss.

**How Does Each Analysis Construe The Relationship  
Between Storyteller And Story?:**

One of the most interesting hinge-swinging experiences I had in doing this comparative investigation occurred when I was in the midst of doing the dialogic investigation. I found myself, upon reading each story, compelled to make reference to the storyteller's life and past experience. With great dismay I thought, here I am making the kind of referential interpretations I have so ardently argued against in previous chapters. I realized that, indeed, I was positing, there in the dialogic investigation, a relationship between the story and the storyteller, just as I had posited a relationship between story and storyteller in the empirical investigation. I realized this assumption of a relationship between story and storyteller is yet another resemblance between the two studies -- that this, too, hinges the studies together. Upon further reflection, I realized the dialogic investigation also crosses into referential territory at the point where the distinction between who the storyteller is and what the storyteller does becomes blurred. Simply by naming and using the names of each of the storytellers in the dialogic investigation declares there is a whole person -- a 'who' out there somewhere. No where in the dialogic investigation do I

question that there is a unity of person related to the story no matter how many subject positions (i.e. of storyteller, narrator, character, voice, perspective) I proceed to attribute to that person.

But the difference between the two studies is how the relationship between story and storyteller is construed. In the empirical investigation the story is construed as 'references to' or 'representations of' the storyteller , while the dialogic investigation construes the story both as the storyteller's 'responses to' certain experiences, dilemma etc. According to the empirical investigation, features of the narrative are isomorphic, identical or synonymous with features of the storytellers internal object representations. The story is a kind of mirror or projection screen. According to the dialogic investigation features of the story are meaningfully related to the storyteller in terms of the context and activity by which they came into being.

For example, Westen's measures assume that the heroine of Indigo's story is a representation of Indigo and considers the other characters as 'others'. In the empirical investigation, based on the assumption that stories are referential to the teller's object representations, and the assumption that these representations direct the interpersonal behavior of the teller, the hypothesis that the level of the story's scores

would correspond to other independent assessments of the level of the teller's interpersonal functioning was informally formulated. But according to the results, overall Lani scored higher on the object relations measures than Indigo, but had more pervasive interpersonal difficulties than Indigo did. Lani's GAF score was 40 while Indigo's was 50. Indigo's interpersonal difficulties were not as generalized or as behavioral as Lani's. They were specifically in relation to herself and to family members, who were in caretaking roles. She had sustained friendships with peers and sustained caring relations with a younger child and other family members. Lani frequently was in trouble at home and at school with both peers and adults. She did not sustain (at time story was told) friendships or caretaking roles to others. However, it is difficult to say which girl had "more" interpersonal difficulties considering Indigo had previously made a suicide attempt and continued to have suicidal ideation, while Lani daily got into arguments, was frequently suspended from school and couldn't sustain friendships. The presence of low scores on the object relations measures of the stories did not correspond with lower interpersonal functioning. The level and quality of each girl's narrative representations of relationships were neither synonymous with, nor in direct correspondence with the quality and level of their interpersonal behavior (or at least others' representations of it). Therefore the

tentative results of the empirical investigation puts into question the very assumption of a synonymous or isomorphic relationship between story and storyteller.

The dialogic investigation posits a relationship between the storyteller and story, but not one of identity. It describes their relationship in terms of meaningful activity. One is the creator and the other is the creation. There are similarities and differences. The creator by virtue of being the creator is different from her creation. Once the creator creates, his creation in turn effects its creator. The character of the Princess may be involved in very malevolent interpersonal situations throughout the story, but the person Indigo, by virtue of the fact that she can symbolize this malevolence, that she tells this story, may not have to be so pervasively the subject or object of malevolence in her life. Indigo does not simply represent or refer to her malevolent experiences of her relationships with others, she acts upon them and so changes them. By telling this story she diminishes the intensity of her experience of the threat of rejection. The dialogic analysis claims that the activity by which the two come into relation, the telling of the story, the act of creation, is necessary to the understanding of the relationship between the two.

The narrator of Lani's story symbolically restores her lost home and neighborhood. This narrator establishes the

position that there are no grounds for punishment by this loss, in refutation of another voice of Lani's that says she is deserving of punishment. The relationship of a storyteller to their characters may be conceived as a whole to its parts. But this, according to the dialogic analysis, is not adequate enough description because these parts are created and changed in the act of expression.

### **Significance Of The Different Understandings To Clinical Practice:**

In the preceding sections I discussed the differences between the two kinds of understanding reached of the storytellers. The question now is what is the significance or use of these different understandings to clinical practice. To answer this question I questioned both Indigo's therapist and myself about our responses to these analyses.

#### **The Therapists Respond:**

##### **1. Is either analysis accurate or right?**

In chapter five the question of the accuracy of the measures' analysis of each story was addressed by both therapists. Now we can compare that response to our response concerning the accuracy or rightness of the dialogic analysis. But first, I'd like to consider the question, how do we judge the accuracy or rightness of each of the analyses in comparison to each other? Nelson Goodman

(1978, p. 131) describes the problems with the question of the rightness of representations (in case of this investigation the representations are the two analyses of each story) with the following example:

The picture of a huge yellow wrecked antique car, like the description "the huge yellow wrecked antique car", does not commit itself to any of the following statements:

The huge yellow wrecked car is antique  
 The huge yellow antique car is wrecked  
 The huge wrecked antique car is yellow  
 The yellow wrecked antique car is huge

The accuracy or rightness of each of the above statements cannot be evaluated without more of a context. Each of the following two statements is correct from different perspectives: 'The sun moves, while the earth is motionless.' The earth moves while the sun is motionless.' From which perspective do we determine accuracy or rightness? Within the world of object relations theory and Westen's coding system, the rendering of the storytellers according to the coding analysis of their stories has a certain accuracy, as does the dialogic analysis within the world of my interaction with the stories and in Lani's case, my interaction with Lani. But do these analyses have rightness for the storytellers and the therapists? We do not have the response of the storytellers available. (The stories can't speak for themselves.) But we do have the therapists' responses.

Both Indigo's therapist and I thought the empirical analysis was neither right nor wrong. Its statements were detached from any context. They could be true and they could not be true depending on the context. In response to all statements made by the empirical analysis Indigo's therapist made qualifications. He thought it problematic that the empirical analysis didn't take into consideration his patient's capacity to symbolize her aggression. He thought the low level scores she received could be misleading if her high level of symbolic functioning were not taken into consideration. In general, we both found it did not accurately render our patients' typical level of functioning.

Indigo's therapist found the dialogic rendering matched his sense of Indigo what his therapeutic work with her was about. It articulated this sense more than he had yet articulated it for himself, and hence heightened his awareness. He claimed it rendered Indigo's dilemmas accurately. But these were dilemmas with which he already felt familiar.

## **2. Does either analysis of the stories sensitize the therapists to their patient's?**

Both Indigo's therapist and I, Lani's therapist, thought both analyses led us to be sensitive to some aspect of our patients's functioning or experience of which we were

..



previously unaware or to which we were not attending. Indigo's therapist thought both analyses helped him become aware of Indigo's fear of others' and her own aggressive impulses. He found the empirical approach particularly effective at creating this awareness, because it was accessible, short, succinct and easier to keep in mind. He found the dialogic analysis less accessible and its methodological commentary distracting. But, he claimed, "it made me think." He claimed it made him sensitive to the powerful role the activity of storytelling played in managing her aggression. He found the terms in which the dialogic analysis articulated Indigo's experience of her own and others' aggression novel and cogent. In particular he found informative the way it described her experience of aggression in terms of her experience of her mother's death as a threat to her own loveliness.

I found Westen's measurements helped me realize that Lani's experience of her relationship with others at the time she was telling the story was so overwhelming relative to her storytelling abilities that much of its intensity was expressed indirectly through implication, denial and omission, in the gaps between what was sensible. In the treatment I attended more to the intensity of what she did not say than the bland neutrality of what she did say. The empirical analysis brought to my attention the bland and neutral side of her experience and led me to have increased

awareness of the split way in which she experienced things.

The dialogic analysis made me aware of how Lani's story was related to what was happening in that session between us. It brought me to understand her storytelling as an expression of her most immediate concerns of being reprimanded, punished or abandoned by me in the session. This understanding of the relation between her storytelling and the immediate context of our interaction could have helped me address her concerns in the terms in which she experienced them. In this way the dialogic analysis provided me with the means of reaching her in a possibly more compelling and effective manner.

We both found the commentary on the coding process with Westen's measures and the pre-consensus scores was most informative. It informed us of our patients' range and shifts or fluctuations. Indigo's therapist especially appreciated how Westen's measures' in the process of coding charted how her characters traversed the boundary between life and death.

We found the dialogic analysis was informative in the way it inquired into the meaning of these inconsistencies and provided the clinician with some questions and some possible answers. In both Lani's and Indigo's case the meaning of inconsistencies in their narratives were found to be of particular clinical significance. The Understanding of Social Causality measure notes the inconsistencies with

which Indigo narrates the scene in which the princess and the tiger scuffle with a knife. Upon further inquiry and consideration of the conflictual feelings present the dialogic analysis suggests that Indigo is struggling with suicidal ideation. Such inquiry, thus, is critically important in assessing the patient's well being. The dialogic analysis articulates the particular dilemma in which Indigo becomes suicidal. It suggests Indigo blurs the boundaries in highly conflictual situations when she feels she can't both hold on to her love for someone and remain unhurt, that she can't both have her therapist's help to recover from an experience of profound rejection and to continue loving the very person by whom she feels rejected. The dialogic analysis considers the articulation of these particular understandings of great importance, because they suggest how the clinician can speak to and reach their patient in a way that they can respond. Simply knowing that a patient is suicidal is not enough for a clinician. Indigo's therapist spoke of his struggle to articulate his understanding with words to which Indigo could respond. He claimed the dialogic analysis helped him articulate previously unarticulated thoughts he had about her treatment with words he wished he had while he was treating her.

The Understanding of Social Causality measure scored only the inconsistencies in the narration of the causality explicit "social" interactions, but inadvertently helps call

attention to other kinds of meaningful inconsistencies, which was particularly useful in Lani's case. In Lani's story it is not explicitly clear why she puts the cat out the window. Her explicit explanation, "Because it wanted to go out," is inconsistent with or unrelated to its context in the plot. The dialogic analysis makes explicit the implicit meaning of this inconsistency. She puts the cat out the window so she can also go outside on the pretext of retrieving the cat and thereby successfully evade her mother's reprimand. The dialogic analysis attributes great clinical significance to this incidental evasion of reprimand, this implicit inconsistency. It claims this inconsistency conveys with its very lack of coherence and directness how troublesome the expectation and evasion of reprimand is to Lani. While Westen's measures highlight the presence of inconsistencies, the dialogic analysis elucidates their meaning.

### **3. Does either analysis facilitate the therapists' engagement with their patient?**

Indigo's therapist felt both analyses offered a "deep" analysis of Indigo's story that addressed issues she didn't readily or explicitly speak about. He wondered whether she was ready to address such issues as her experience of her mother's death directly. He felt the dialogic analysis offered some suggestions for how to speak to her about these issues in the very metaphoric language in which she was

working on them. He claimed it helped him understand the metaphoric dimension of her language and how to use her storytelling as a therapeutic modality. He felt that the use of this metaphoric understanding could potentially lead to "powerful" therapeutic interventions. He found the empirical analysis more difficult to translate into practice because its description of the storyteller remains at the theoretical level. He claimed both analyses made him wish the treatment had been longer so that he could have worked with Indigo with what he had learned from both analyses.

I thought the dialogic analysis provided the therapist with suggestions of the kinds of lines of inquiry that may be therapeutic to pursue. It helped me learn to use the linguistic and meta-linguist aspects of storytelling that would alert me to the stories possible meanings and enable me to converse with the storyteller in their own language.

**4. At which stage in the therapeutic process does each analysis seem most useful for making clinical decisions (initial intake evaluation, during therapy, termination)?**

Both therapists thought the dialogic analysis would be especially useful during treatment for formulating an understanding of the patient and the treatment. We both thought it would be useful in formulating interpretations, questions, interventions and the style of interaction. Indigo's therapist said that during treatment he thought it

would be useful to go back and forth between dialogic analysis and therapy sessions.

I thought the empirical analysis, if it was further interpreted in terms of the dialogic analysis, could provide some useful information for decisions regarding diagnosis, choice of treatment and readiness for termination, but would not be at all sufficient in and of itself. The object relations measures' scores of Lani's story were not sufficient to make decisions regarding diagnosis or treatment. These scores only became useful after further interpretation and consideration of the story in its multiple contexts.

Indigo's therapist thought the succinctness of the empirical analysis would be especially helpful at times of initial intake evaluation and when making decisions regarding diagnosis and choice of treatment. He suggested that the dialogic analysis would become more useful once presented in a more concise manner. He thought, while the empirical analysis alerted him to her difficulties, it did not note her adaptive capacities. The dialogic analysis because it also noted Indigo's adaptive capacities (her ability to tolerate ambivalence, resolve conflicts, and engage others), was helpful in understanding her prognosis.

# CONCLUSION:

## WHAT DOES EACH INVESTIGATION TELL?

Now if we rid our minds of the idea that our language is translation, or cipher of an original text, we shall see that the idea of complete expression is nonsensical, that all language is indirect or allusive -- that is, if you wish, silence.

--Maurice Merleau Ponty  
"Indirect Language and Voices"

Each analysis is embedded in a larger investigation. Each of these studies are self reflective. The understanding each investigation offers goes beyond the particular understandings of each storyteller to the means by which they reached that understanding. Each investigation through various kinds of comparisons examines its assumptions and methods. Each investigation examines the relationship among story, storyteller and interpreter. This dissertation began with the claim that different assumptions and different vocabularies lead to different understandings. While the empirical analysis was found to be distinctively different from the dialogic analysis, the empirical investigation taken as a whole, was found to share some common ground with the dialogic investigation. This common ground may be due to the capacity both the empirical and dialogic approach had to be self-reflective, and, to some extent, due to the influence this researcher had on method.

The findings of the empirical investigation tentatively suggest that the relationship between a story's structural or qualitative features are not necessarily positively correlated with the storyteller's interpersonal behavior. For example, if a child explicitly represents malevolent poorly differentiated relationships in her story she does not necessarily behave in a destructive or poorly differentiated manner in relation to others. Conversely, if a child explicitly represents benign differentiated relationships, it does not mean her behavior in relation to others is benign and well differentiated. The empirical investigation found therapists assessments (diagnosis and GAF scores) of storytellers did not correspond with their scores on Westen's measures. This finding suggests that stories are not merely representational copies of 'internal' representations or 'external' actions. It suggests that measures of symbolic expressions such as storytelling need to take into consideration the meaning of the symbolic acts by which they come into being and the contexts in which they are told in order to understand the relationship between story and storyteller.

Paradoxically enough, the tentative findings of the empirical investigation support the dialogic approach's assumptions that a story is related to a storyteller by the act by which the story comes into being. For example, if the measures had taken into consideration how Indigo through



the very act of storytelling diminishes what is threatening to her in relation to others, it would have better correlated with assessments of her then present functioning and better predicted for her prognosis in treatment. The results of the empirical investigation also supports the assumption that the significance of a story in relation to its teller's interpersonal functioning cannot be accurately assessed without consideration of the context in which its told.

The particular measures used in this investigation did not adequately account for either storyteller's interpersonal functioning. However, other measures of stories perhaps could account for interpersonal behavior. This tentative finding is in great contrast to other studies using this measure, (Westen et al, 1990; Klepser, Westen, Ruffins, in preparation) which validated the measures based upon the correlations found between stories' scores and other assessments of interpersonal behavior (diagnosis, scales measuring social adjustment and object relations). The stories in this investigation, unlike the stories in those studies, were spontaneously told in the context of a therapy session to their therapist. Perhaps, Westen's measures account less well for the relationship between assessments of interpersonal behavior and those stories spontaneously told in therapy, than for elicited stories told in other situations. It could be that the kinds of

stories a child spontaneously tells in therapy tend to vary more than those stories that teller tells in other situations. Future research could examine the differences between samples of stories spontaneously told in therapy to other samples of stories.

#### THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPARATIVE STUDY

##### TO CLINICAL PRACTICE:

We are voices in a chorus that transforms lived life into narrated life and then return narrative to life, not in order to reflect life, but rather to add something else, not a copy but a new measure of life; to add, with each novel, something new, something more, to life.

--Carlos Fuentes

"The Novel Always Says: the World is Unfinished"

This comparative study suggests that there are aspects of both the empirical and the dialogic approach that 'add something else' - contribute - to our clinical work. Neither approach rendered a comprehensive representation or perfect likeness of the storyteller. However, each approach in different respects did enhance the therapist's understanding and was found to be applicable to the therapeutic work.

For the empirical approach the procedure of informally making and evaluating hypotheses greatly enriched the understanding of the problems of measurement and conceptualization involved in the interpretation of stories

told in therapy. This procedure facilitated further interpretations and formulations of the initial analyses made according to the coding system. The process of making and evaluating hypotheses facilitated the articulation and examination of theoretical assumptions (such as those concerning the relationship of story and storyteller) in relation to clinical data. The empirical investigation found there was a distinct difference in the reliability between stories. This result was considered useful because it suggested that Westen's measures only may be reliable for stories within a specifiable range of complexity. However, in terms of clinical practice this very variability in reliability was found to be most informative. Both therapists thought the pre-consensus coding process notes were more informative than the final scores. This suggests that what's useful to clinicians is not necessarily coder reliability, but formulations regarding coders' reliability or differences in interpretation. This approach to clinical inquiry is exemplified in team approaches to treatment, such as is often practiced in family treatment. According to this approach to treatment, the team aspires to formulate an understanding of the differences and similarities among their perspectives rather than strive for consensus.

While Westen's measurements were found to have certain limitations, they were found to be useful in certain respects. Both therapists found it informed them of aspects

of their patient's experience of which they were either previously unaware, or to which they were not attending. This suggests that coding systems can be useful for informing clinicians of their biases and blind spots. A coding system can facilitate the asking of questions the clinician would not have thought of asking on his own. The coding system is also an effective training tool and a heuristic device. This investigation found the coding system sensitizes the clinician to some (although not all) potentially meaningful clinical phenomena. The examination of the use of the coding system facilitated the examination of theoretical assumptions regarding the relationship between patients and the stories they tell in therapy, and assumptions regarding interpretations of stories.

The comparative study suggests that the dialogic mode of inquiry is particularly useful to clinicians as a means of facilitating their understanding and engagement in the therapeutic process. It facilitates an understanding of the activity of which the patient and therapist are in the midst. It helps therapists communicate with their patients. It helps them articulate what was previously unthought, unsaid or unknown. This approach marks moments of transformation. It attends to the creative aspects of storytelling, such as the initial symbolic forms novel ways

of relating to others take.<sup>1</sup> The dialogic approach shows the therapist how they can follow and respond to their patient from moment to moment by attending to the language by which interpersonal interactions are enacted and activated. It provides the therapist with the cues with which they can follow and be with their patient as they speak. Its basic open-ended question and answer procedure can bring the therapist and patient to the edge of where things are happening -- to where they are most alive.

Recently, hermeneutic, dialogic, and narrative approaches to inquiry, are becoming increasingly popular within psychology as modes of understanding and investigating human experience. The empirical world view has come into question. Bruner (1990) in his most recent book, Acts of Meaning, argues that psychology needs to return to an understanding of the mind as a creator of meanings. He even suggests that there are limits to objective inquiry,

scientific psychology will fare better when it recognized that its truths about the human condition, are relative to the point of view that it takes toward that condition.

---

<sup>1</sup> In Indigo's case these relations and feelings take the form of interactions and conversations with animals in her story. In her story the characters of 'the birds' make communication and engagement with the father possible. In Lani's case these new relations within her story take the form of the exploration of an abandoned house which in part can be played in without reprimand and in part remains locked and unknown. Outside her story they take place in the form of a dialogue with her therapist.

Daniel Stern (1985) claims that,

one of the major tasks of the therapist is to help the patient find a narrative point of origin, even as a working heuristic (p. 262).

Most recently Howard (1991) from a more cultural perspective claims,

Therapy might be seen as a cross-cultural experience wherein two life stories come together and each life trajectory is altered by the meeting (p. 196).

The psychotherapeutic values of telling and listening to stories are many. Telling stories places a person as an agent in the plot of his/her life. Telling and listening to stories creates curiosity, continuity, and meaning. Stories are a form of life, and storytelling a way of going on being in relation to others.

This dissertation demonstrated and compared the use of a empirical and a dialogic analysis of stories told in therapy as a means of understanding the patients. It examined the differences between each approach's assumptions concerning inquiry, language and narrative. These differences initially led to distinctively different understandings of the patients. Eventually, however, both the empirical and the dialogic investigation came to share some common ground. Each investigation came to this common ground guided by this researcher's perspective and through an examination of its own assumptions and method.

Ultimately, what was found to be most informative throughout was the act of telling: the asking and answering of questions, the translating from one language to another, and the moving from one world view to another.

## **APPENDICES**



**PLEASE NOTE**

**Copyrighted materials in this document have  
not been filmed at the request of the author.  
They are available for consultation, however,  
in the author's university library.**

**341-344**

**University Microfilms International**

## APPENDIX B

AFFECT MATURITY SCALE  
(ANNE THOMPSON, 1981)Level One

1. Emotions are event-like. They are attributed in a global fashion, more to the situation as a whole (which includes self, object, the surround, bodily sensations, etc.) than to an individuated self or object. Emotions may have an "atmospheric" or a mood-like quality.

Exception: If the only affect expression in the story is a brief comment of the type "this is a sad picture," the story should be given a secondary "one" rating only, and given a primary "four" by default" rating.

2. Emotions come over the experiencing subject and pass away, perhaps to be replaced by a different affect-event. While the person is "in" the emotion, it may seem timelessly endless, but as it is also ephemeral, it passes away leaving little trace, and its occurrence is not integrated as part of the self's history.

3. Actions are not differentiated from the emotion, so that the action is felt to follow irrevocably from the event and to be forced by it, so that the self seems help-less in the face of it. (It may seem, for example, that the situation "gives rise" to the action.) The person may "regret" the happening of the emotion, the action, or its consequences, but only as one might regret the occurrence of a storm or accident.

4. Affects may be confused with somatic manifestation, which are experienced globally.

Level Two

1. There is rudimentary attribution of the emotion to the self and other, such that the emotion may be attributed indiscriminately to humans, their "looks," non-humans, part-objects, etc. How people look, or what they express, or how they appear, is not well differentiated from how they feel, so that the story teller may "read" cues from appearances or state there is no affect or that it is impossible to tell what it is, because the relevant cues are not available or are missing.

2. There may be rapid alternation of affects,

attributed to part-selves or part-objects (so that the storyteller may switch the subject's emotion several times in succession without recognition of this and without integration into a single scheme).

3. The affect may be seen as emanating from the outside toward the self, such that it exists as a kind of substance between the self and object (or the situation), perhaps moving toward or away from the self, etc. There may be the implication that the affect can be expelled, or eliminated, in some way. The person may be said to "have" the emotion, rather than "being" happy, etc.

4. The action is still seen as being part of (and so as being "forced" by) the affect-event, although now it may be felt after an action has occurred that it could have been inhibited (as opposed to "prevented" -- if the situation had not occurred, or the object had behaved differently, as in Level 1.) After the action-affect consequent event, there may be early shame or early guilt, focused on a sense that the consequences should have been avoided, and that this has something to do with self, though there is little developed sense of the self's genuine choice bringing them about. Aside from this, the affect-event is still ephemeral and does not become integrated as part of the self's history.

5. Affects may not be well-differentiated from other mental states, such as "he's thinking," and physical sensations, which are now attributed to a person or a part-self or part-object, rather than being experienced globally. If only somatic sensations are described, these should be rated at level four "by default," and "physical description only" should be indicated on the protocol.

6. If the emotion is inferred from outer appearances, but seems clearly attributed to persons, only a secondary rating of two should be assigned, and a primary rating of three.

### Level Three

1. Emotions are attributed to persons, but not in a fully independent way. Self and other may be enveloped in the same (or not very well differentiated) emotions, with no understanding to the effect that two people may experience the same emotion but for their own individual reasons. If some explanation is given, it is the same for both, or is rather trite.

2. For the single subject, feelings are attributed to the self, but rationalizing feelings is done in a very simple way or in terms of the more or less immediate

situation. Contradictory feelings are not attributed to a unified self.

3. While the affect is no longer seen as "emanating" from the outside, it may be seen as caused (i.e., induced in the self) rather directly by some outside object, happening, etc. This causal object is coordinate to the emotion (for example, good feelings are caused by a good object), with no recognition of its independent existence, complex characteristics, own motives, and so forth.

4. There may be some hint that affects have to be dealt with by the self, rather than their simply passing away. However, this is often done through a magical, even Pollyannaish resolution ("he'll be happy again"). This suggests strongly the substitution of another affect-event, which is attributed to the self but not integrated with the previous affect-event. Nevertheless, it seems as if this new event is being evoked in order to counterpose the original feeling, so that there is some relationship between the two rather than there being simple replacement of one event by another.

5. Affect terms may seem vague or simplistic.

#### Level Four

1. Emotions are attributed to persons, and self and object may be assigned complementary affects, not rationalized in terms of their individual internal states or situation. Or, the affects of self and other may be differentiated in some other simple way, such as by intensity.

2. For the single subject, contradictory emotions may now exist side by side (i.e., they are now simultaneously attributed to the self, rather than alternations of part-self--affect combinations), but the contradiction is not recognized, and the affects are not integrated into a single scheme.

3. The causal object is still coordinate to the emotion. If it causes different feelings (which it now may), this is because it may have different features, but these reactions remain basically coordinate to these different features of the object, rather than being based on real, integrated complexity of the object or on different people's individualized responses to it.

4. The self may now be seen as having some choice about whether or not to act before the action takes place.

The action, however, is still seen as stemming from one's words, if one is angry, one hits, or performs some other typical action, or one may inhibit this action, but there is no sense that other intention, stemming from other motives or affects, may interact with the intention to which the affect gives rise. In addition to an awareness that an action or expression may be inhibited, there may also be an awareness that people may feign, or pretend to feel something they do not.

5. There may be a hint that the person has to do something about a feeling other than replace it with a new feeling (though it may not be at all clear what that should be).

6. There may be confusion among affects, indecision about which affect is being experienced, and/or lack of precision in the use of affect terms (e.g., he's feeling despair or guilt or sadness).

7. Stories with no explicit affect expression should be rated at this level by default, but with a clear indication that this is being done. If only physical sensations are described, indicate this also.

#### Level Five

1. Affects are now clearly attributed to individual persons, and the affect is a more individualized expression of the person's characteristics. However, the attribution of individualized affects tends not to be in terms of the subject's full uniqueness as a person (as compared with all other persons), so much as in terms of relatively superficial, "external" or somewhat stereotypical ways of individuating a person, such as his role, sex occupation, etc. To the extent that the emotion is attributed in terms of an individual's internal state or individual situation (such as his motives, desires, fantasies, or something that happens, etc.) these also tend to be confined to relatively immediate features of the person or situations, which do not capture his full uniqueness as an individual, as distinct from other individual persons.

2. Contradictory emotions are attributed to the subject, but now there is some recognition of the contradiction and conflict, and there may be an attempt to resolve it, or to provide a justification for the opposing feelings. However, the contradictory for the opposing feelings. However, the contradictory affects are not really successfully resolved or placed on a wider dimension. One or the other of the opposing feelings may end up being

minimized or suppressed; in other words, the continuing conflict may not be well tolerated.

3. Affects (and their consequences no longer "pass away without a "trace" -- there is a sense that they may change the self or be tolerated for some time.

4. Affects may be elicited by an external happening or object; however, emotions do not follow directly from it, but the situation (cause) is interpreted (modified) by the person as an individual( at least as far as he is individuated, as discussed in 1). The cause or objects of the emotion now may be seen as having complex, contradictory feature, which are dealt with along similar lines to contradictory affects (2).

5. The self is seen as having a wider choice of action than merely inhibiting it-- for example, he may take time to make a decision, or choose from a number of different actions with a number of different consequences, so that consideration of these may enter into the decision. If a person does act impulsively in the face of an affect, the remorse afterwards is for having allowed this to happen-- it is a responsibility of the self not to do so.

6. Affective terms are no longer confused with each other, and are used in a fairly individuated and accurate way.

#### Level Six

1. The self and other are perceived as individuated affective being with enduring inner dispositions and capabilities that affect their emotional responsiveness. This does not mean that any specific reference to a person's enduring character structure has to be made, but rather that the affects he experiences clearly is modified by and stems from his uniqueness as a person (as compared to other persons). Thus self and other are assigned affects in terms of their uniqueness as persons, and are individuated uniquely even when they react in terms of their roles (or sex, etc.).

2. Conflict about contradictory feelings may still be experience, but there is not more tolerance of the contradiction, and a recognition that such contradictions exist and may even continue to do so. The conflicting emotions do modify each other, and the conflict may be placed in more than the immediate perspective, ore related to complex aspects of the self, the object or the situation.

3. The cause or object of the emotion--if it is seen as something outside the self--is evaluated independently of the emotion it causes. For example, the object may have unintentionally caused the affect, or may have motives that have nothing to do with the self, or may be complex so that it has good and bad aspects which modify each other or are seen as being in relationship to each other.

4. The self is seen as contributing to the affect, and if the cause is outside the self, the effect is different, in terms of the affects generated or their nuances, depending on the person's internal states or character.

5. Actions are now seen as stemming from the subject's intentions, which may interact with the emotions but do not follow in a one-to-one fashion from it. The person takes responsibility for the action, and also for failure to act as one should, or for not experiencing or showing affect as one should.

6. Affects are clearly seen as needing to be integrated into the self's history, rather than passing away, being repalced by other affects, or being "undone" through forgetting or action. There is a sense that the person can tolerate this, and that the emotion will be integrated, and some realistic sense of how long this will take and how it will take place, and that the self may be modified by the feeling (especially if it is a very important one).

7. Affects are subtly and conditionally verbalized with contradictions mixed and complex emotions. There may be subtle (and accurate) nuances of meaning.

8. In general, a much longer time span may be evident in the attribution of the cause of the emotion (although this is not necessarily the case). The emotions of self and other may be evaluated in terms of his or her general life situation as well as the more-or-less immediate situation (or, the two may be set in relationship to each other).

9. The person may show evidence or reflective awareness concerning his affects. However, this need not be an explicit self-reflective statement. Rather, he may, for example, experience a reaction to his feeling, or show awareness of how he is reacting, or what effect he may have on others.

## APPENDIX C

CATEGORIES FOR CODING COMPLEXITY OF PLOT STRUCTURE  
Timothy Bogen, 1982

## I. Non-episode.

- 1) Naming of things in picture or description of picture.
- 2) Event or action sequences without plot (movement in a direction) or with ambiguous plot; minimally plotted responses (representing two time points, without complete tension/resolution structure).
- 3) Sequences with direction, representing three or more time points, but lacking complete tension/resolution structure. In a directed sequence, there is an orderly progression of events toward the end state. Events do not seem arbitrary in their selection.

## II. Single episode.

- 4) Abbreviated Episode--Story with problem and resolution, but without description of any events which bring the initial state closer to the final state.
- 5) Complete Episode--Story with problem, resolution and at least one intermediary step between beginning and end.
- 6) Complex Episode--Story with problem, resolution and several intervening steps, which include some explicit complication (e.g., a shift in goal, failed attempt and subsequent attempt).

## III. Multiple episode responses.

- 7) Sequential segment response: one episode and one or more non-episodes in sequence.
- 8) Sequential episode response: two or more episodes in sequence.
- 9) Parallel episode response: two or more episodes with temporal simultaneity. Component segments must be organized around initiating tensions that are distinct and different from each other.



**OBJECT RELATIONS AND SOCIAL COGNITION: TAT SCORING MANUAL**

**Draw Westen**

**In collaboration with Kenneth Silk, Naomi  
Lohr, Kevin Kerber, and Sonya Goodrich**

**University of Michigan**

**July, 1985**

**Revised, April, 1987; October, 1988**

This manual provides guidelines for scoring several aspects<sup>353</sup> of object relations and social cognition<sup>1</sup> using the TAT: affect-tone of relationship paradigms, complexity and differentiation of object representations/person schemas, social causality, and quality of emotional investment and moral development.<sup>2</sup> These different dimensions are conceptualized as interrelated but distinct aspects of object relations and social cognition (i.e., as cognitive and affective processes mediating interpersonal functioning) that can be measured independently of each other.

Although these aspects of object relations and social cognition are interdependent, for purposes of research they have been operationalized as orthogonal. While at times this limits the capacity of a given scale to capture aspects of the phenomenon it is designed to measure, this was necessary to avoid artificial inflation of correlations between scales stemming from overlapping scoring criteria. For example, a subject who redefines characters in a card as himself or his family may be responding both egocentrically (having difficulty separating his own perspective from the objective stimulus), which could be viewed as low-level differentiation of object representations/person-schemas, and narcissistically (defining and showing interest in others only as they

---

<sup>1</sup>"Object relations" refers to enduring patterns of interpersonal behavior and to the cognitive and affective processes or structures underlying interpersonal functioning. "Object representation" refers to the (usually affect-laden) cognitive representation of a person (or an object endowed with aspects of personhood, such as a pet or transitional object), much like the concept of "person schema" in cognitive social psychology. "Social cognition" refers to patterns of thought regarding social phenomena.

<sup>2</sup>Three scales, complexity and integration of social episodes, social perception, and dominant interpersonal concerns, have been deleted from the first manual, pending further revision.

pertain to one's own wishes and preoccupations, denying them independent status), which could be viewed as low-level emotional investment. In such cases we made a choice, based on a variety of factors, as to which category should encompass the particular scoring rule.

With the exception of affect-tone of relationship paradigms, these scales are viewed as measuring developmental aspects of object relations and social cognition. Given that the TAT evokes only a limited subset of a person's enduring repertoire of interpersonal schemas, expectancies, affects, wishes, fantasies, conflicts, and knowledge, and that the purpose of these scales is to measure object-relational/social-cognitive processes or structures the subject typically brings to bear interpersonally, stories should be scored at the highest level attained during the response, unless expressly stated otherwise in the scoring rules for particular scales.

What follows is a synopsis of the four scales, followed by scoring rules for each scale.<sup>3</sup> A manual for training coders and establishing interrater reliability is available upon request from Drew Westen, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.

---

<sup>3</sup>We would like to extend our appreciation to Margaret Buttenheim, Laura Gold, Sonya Goodrich, Alfred Kellam, Janet Leigh, Karen Saakvitne, and Jennifer Stuart for help in refining the scoring rules. Scale construction drew heavily from a variety of coding schemes designed by object-relations and developmental social cognition researchers, particularly Blatt et al. (1981), Bogen (1982), Damon (1977), Loevinger et al. (1970), Mayman (1967), Selman (1980), Thompson (1981), and Urist (1977).

Affect-tone of Relationship Paradigms

Principle: scale measures affective quality of representations of people and relationships. It attempts to assess the extent to which the person expects from the world, and particularly from the world of people, profound malevolence or overwhelming pain, or views social interaction as basically benign and enriching.

Level 1: at Level 1 the person views the social world as tremendously threatening and/or experiences life as overwhelmingly capricious and painful. People are seen as abandoning, abusing, or destroying others and oneself with no reason, other than perhaps maliciousness or unconcern. People are often classified as victims and victimizers.

Level 2: at Level 2 the person views the world, and particularly the world of people, as hostile, capricious, empty, or distant, but not overwhelming. The person may feel tremendously alone. People may be experienced as unpleasant or uncaring, but not primarily as threats to one's existence.

Level 3: at Level 3 the person has a range of affectively charged object representations/person schemas and interpersonal expectancies, though these are not primarily positive. People are seen as capable of loving and being loved, of caring and being cared for, but on balance social interaction is evaluated as mildly negative.

Level 4: at Level 4 the person has a range of affectively charged object representations/person schemas and interpersonal expectancies. People are seen as capable of loving and being loved, of caring and being cared for, but on balance social relations are evaluated as neutral or mixed.

Level 5: at Level 5 the person has a range of affectively charged object representations/person schemas and interpersonal expectancies, but on balance relations with others are seen as positive. The person generally expects to like or enjoy other people, to be liked by them, and to be able to count on them with some consistency.

Principle: scale measures the extent to which the subject clearly differentiates the perspectives of self and others; sees the self and others as having stable, enduring, multidimensional dispositions; and sees the self and others as psychological beings with complex motives and subjective experience.

Level 1: at Level 1 the person does not see others as clearly differentiated or bounded, and/or does not differentiate his own thoughts and feelings from those of others. Basic boundaries relating to the social world (e.g., animate/inanimate) may be blurred.

Level 2: at Level 2 the person sees people as clearly bounded, separate from self and from each other, but without an elaborate sense of people's subjective states, motives, or enduring characteristics. The focus is largely on behaviors and momentary actions, rather than on the thoughts, feelings, or psychological processes that motivate or influence behavior. People are seen as primarily unidimensional, existing in situations rather than across situations. Where people are understood as having enduring qualities, these are generally global, evaluative traits like "nice" or "mean."

Level 3: at Level 3 the person makes inferences about subjective states in addition to focusing on behavior. Understanding of other people's psychological processes and subjective experience does not, however, delve far beneath the surface. The person has ideas or "theories" about others' enduring characteristics, but these intuitive theories are either unidimensional, overly general, or lacking in subtlety. There is little sense that people could do things "out of character" or experience psychological conflicts.

Level 4: at Level 4 the person has an appreciation for the complexity of the subjective states of others and has a relatively differentiated view of personality dispositions. Component parts of personality are not yet understood as aspects of an interacting system, in which enduring dispositions can come into conflict or be brought to bear in different ways in different situations. While the person recognizes the potential for disparities between actions, self-presentations, and internal states, he or she has minimal awareness of disparities between conscious and unconscious mental events.

Level 5: at Level 5 the person sees people in complex ways, making elaborate inferences about their mental states, motivations, points of view, and unconscious processes. People are seen as having conflicting feelings and impulses, and as expressing different aspects of their personalities in different situations.

Principle: scale measures the extent to which attributions of the causes of people's actions, thoughts, and feelings are logical, accurate, complex, and psychologically-minded.

Level 1: at Level 1 the person does not understand the concept of causality in the social realm. There is either no sense of necessity to understand why behaviors, feelings, or situations emerge, or explanations that are advanced are grossly illogical.

Level 2: at Level 2 the person has a rudimentary understanding of social causality. Actions are explained as responses to environmental stimuli or as resulting from simple feelings or intentions. Explanations of behaviors, feelings, or interactions frequently have mild logic errors or inconsistencies.

Level 3: at Level 3 the person understands multidirectional causality, although behaviors, feelings, and their causes are still conceived largely in stimulus-response terms. The person recognizes that psychological processes may influence action, though causality is primarily external to the person.

Level 4: at Level 4 the person has a basic understanding of the role of psychological events in motivating action. There is considerable recognition of the importance of people's thoughts and perceptions in mediating between stimulus and response, though understanding of psychological causality is incomplete or applied only irregularly.

Level 5: at Level 5 the person understands feelings and behaviors as caused by psychological processes, which may or may not be elicited by environmental stimuli. Complex thoughts, feelings, and conflicts are seen as mediating action. At Level 5 the person makes complex inferences about the psychological processes of others, attempts to influence others' perceptions, and has an interest in examining his or her own mental processes.

Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships and Morals

Principle: scale measures the extent to which others are treated as ends rather than means, events are regarded in terms other than need-gratification, moral standards are developed and considered, and relationships are experienced as meaningful and committed.

Level 1: at Level 1 the person is primarily concerned with, and views good and evil in terms of, his or her own gratification (and expects that others do the same). People are seen as existing only in relation to oneself. To the extent that other people are experienced as separate from self, they are treated as tools for the achievement of one's desires; as mirrors or audience for one's displays; or as impediments to one's gratification. People may be seen as useful or comforting at the moment but are not invested in emotionally for their unique characteristics. Rules and authorities are seen as obstacles unless momentarily useful.

Level 2: at Level 2 the person has a clear sense of potential conflicts between the needs or desires of self and others, though the primary aim remains the satisfaction of one's own wishes. There is a rudimentary sense of right and wrong, characterized by an equation of prudence and morality (i.e., bad actions are bad because they lead to punishment), and the person experiences some remorse following impulsive action. Moral injunctions that exist may be primitive and harsh. Although the person may clearly have attachments, investment in other people (i.e., concern for, and pursuit of the good of significant others) remains clearly secondary to self-interest. Friends are valued but in many respects remain interchangeable; the basis for friendship tends to be shared activity.

Level 3: at level 3 the person considers the needs and wishes of significant others in making decisions. Pleasing other people, being liked, and behaving in accord with the standards of respected authorities are salient aims which often override self-interest. The person is concerned with being good and experiences guilt when his or her thoughts, feelings, or action conflict with internalized standards. Rules are respected because they are rules; manners and conventions are seen as important and even natural. Moral rules are relatively rigid and concrete, and there is a pronounced sense of duty, particularly to certain people. Relationships are valued but are not very deep.

Level 4: at Level 4 the person is able to invest maturely in other people emotionally, so that s/he consistently weighs others' wishes and needs when choosing a course of action. Obligation to others often overrides personal desires. Moral judgments, values, and modes of conflict-resolution remain relatively conventional. The person is concerned with doing the right thing, as defined by

society or respected authorities, which is frequently expressed in more abstract terms and is often self-abnegatory. Relationships are seen as lasting over time and involving considerable commitment and intimacy.

Level 5: at Level 5 the person treats self and others as ends rather than means. The person is interested in the development and happiness of both self and others, and attempts to achieve autonomous selfhood within the context of real involvement with, and investment in others. Conflicts between people with conflicting legitimate interests are understood as requiring compromise. Authorities and rules are not taken to be absolute; the person has a sense of the conventional nature of social rules and believes that at times these must be overridden or changed because they conflict with self-generated or carefully considered standards, or when they do significant harm to people in concrete circumstances.



## SCORING RULES

Affect-tone of Relationship Paradigms

Principle: scale measures affective quality of representations of people and relationships. It attempts to assess the extent to which the person expects from the world, and particularly from the world of people, profound malevolence or overwhelming pain, or views social interaction as basically benign and enriching.

Level 1: unambiguously malevolent or overwhelmingly painful; grossly negligent caretakers or significant others

Level 2: predominantly hostile but not overwhelming; empty; profound disappointment or loneliness; negligence and indifference

Level 3: mixed representations, mildly negative tone

Level 4: mixed representations, neutral tone

Level 5: predominantly positive; sense of benign interdependence

General scoring rules: (1) consider transitional objects (pets, teddy-bears, etc.) as human objects; (2) score primarily for affect tone of relationship paradigms and only secondarily for optimism or pessimism of story. For example, if relationships are seen as eventuating in pain or disappointment but the character adapts by finding a way to be content in isolation, score primarily for the experience of relationships as negative. (3) If subject describes characters as happy in the face of others' misfortunes, do not score up for mixed affects; score for unambiguously negatively-toned interpersonal schemata.

Level 1

Principle: at Level 1 the person views the social world as tremendously threatening and/or experiences life as overwhelmingly capricious and painful. People are seen as abandoning, abusing, or destroying others and oneself with no reason, other than perhaps maliciousness or unconcern. People are often classified as victims and victimizers.

(1) Score for unambiguously malevolent representations of people or interaction, or for grossly negligent caretakers or significant others. If character escapes malevolence through his own efforts or those of someone else, score Level 2. If the story is overwhelmingly about evil and malevolence, and a savior theme is tacked on at the end and is not integral to the real action of the story, score Level 1.

(2) Score for gratuitous violence or aggression where not common (e.g., 3BM, "she got beaten up"; or 4, "he's gonna slap her across the face"), or violence toward animals, unless focus is on succorance from someone who prevents the violence.

(3) Do not score for ordinary malevolent responses to cards 15, 18GF, or 13MF; subject must add idiosyncratic malevolent elaboration to score Level 1 on these cards. If character is seen as hostile with minimal idiosyncratic elaboration, score Level 2. Do not score for fistfights on Card 4 unless idiosyncratically malevolent; score Level 2.

Principle: at Level 2 the person views the world, and particularly the world of people, as hostile, capricious, empty, or distant, but not overwhelming. The person may feel tremendously alone. People may be experienced as unpleasant or uncaring, but not primarily as threats to one's existence.

- (1) Score for predominantly hostile images which are not overwhelming.<sup>362</sup> People may be seen as capricious, the world may be experienced as very threatening but without significant violence, or life may be seen as offering character/s a very unpleasant existence.
- (2) Score for sense of people as unempathic or as passing strangers (e.g., "in their own worlds"), where this is upsetting to the characters or subject. For example, "she's either very asleep or doesn't care either way that he's standing there or not--not paying him any attention at all. That could be what's upsetting him." People may be seen as pushing others into doing things, with minimal interaction or consideration on either part. If characters are bland and unelaborated but not bland and indifferent toward each other, score Level 4.
- (3) Score for profound loneliness or sense of aloneness. If the story manifests an overwhelming sense of loss or loneliness with only one small "bright spot," score Level 2.
- (4) Score for character running from someone, even with implication of running for life, where there is no elaboration of general malevolence.
- (5) Score for victimization, where victimization is seen as partly self-generated, not only the result of malevolent or impersonal forces.
- (6) Score for failed ministrations by well-intending others, or escape from malevolent forces.
- (7) Score for escape from a very unpleasant existence through one's own efforts, where there is no help from others and no clear sense of relatedness to others.
- (8) Score for implied compassion of one character for another.

(9) Score for defensively positive stories or for inability to produce<sup>363</sup> a story where it is clear that the subject is warding off aggressive or highly unpleasant content. Score only where it is clear that the subject is disturbed by the material (e.g., "I'm not going to tell that story. Let's make this about two lovers"). If defensive affect-tone is strongly suspected but not clear, or the subject is more obsessional in indecision about which affect-tone to choose, score Level 3.

### Level 3

Principle: at Level 3 the person has a range of affectively charged object representations/person schemas and interpersonal expectancies, though these are not primarily positive. People are seen as capable of loving and being loved, of caring and being cared for, but on balance social interaction is evaluated as mildly negative.

(1) Score for mildly negative representations. Score for arguments between characters without malevolence.

(2) Score for affectively mixed representations where the tone is largely negative or where a character was saved by another from an interpersonally-inflicted (though non-lethal) harm (e.g., an unfair accusation). Different characters may represent different affect-tones of the object world<sup>4</sup>; e.g., a man is falsely accused of a crime but is saved by a wise lawyer. Any explicit sense of real compassion by a character brings the response at least to Level 3.

---

<sup>4</sup>"Object world" refers to the person's entire ensemble of generalized and specific representations of people (i.e., cognitive-affective interpersonal schemas).

(3) Score for character being comforted after a loss unless relatedness between living characters is clearly an afterthought tacked onto a story about overwhelming loneliness (in which case, score Level 2).

(4) Score for escape from danger effected through the help of benevolent others, where the danger is not the result of malevolent or abusive forces (e.g., a boy is saved from death by a surgeon). Where escape from malevolence (i.e., real danger resulting from an intentional force) occurs with help from others, score Level 2.

#### Level 4

Principle: at Level 4 the person has a range of affectively charged object representations/person schemas and interpersonal expectancies. People are seen as capable of loving and being loved, of caring and being cared for, but on balance social relations are evaluated as neutral or mixed.

(1) Score for affectively mixed interactions where there is no real danger to characters. Characters may be in conflict, but the outcome of their conflicts or decisions is not calamitous (e.g., man and woman who love each other in conflict about whether he should go to war, and he eventually does so but returns unharmed).

(2) Score if characters are somewhat bland and unelaborated but do not appear averse to relating to each other.

(3) Score for minimal affect involved in the story, where the affect tone is relatively neutral.

(4) Score for giving or sharing, where this seems more to be an expectation or social obligation than an act of good will, love, or generosity.

Principle: at Level 5 the person has a range of affectively charged object representations/person schemas and interpersonal expectancies, but on balance relations with others are seen as positive. The person generally expects to like or enjoy other people, to be liked by them, and to be able to count on them with some consistency.

(1) Score for predominantly positive characters and interactions. People may be seen as doing things for each other or responding to each others' wishes. Do not score if the story includes a loss of a significant other (score Levels 1-3, or 4 in rare cases if loss is largely a backdrop to a story with positive affect tone of relationships).

(2) Score where there is a mix of affects with predominantly positive feeling tone.

(3) Score for people being successful and happy in their endeavors.

Complexity and Differentiation of Representations of People 366

Principle: scale measures the extent to which the subject clearly differentiates the perspectives of self and others; sees the self and others as having stable, enduring, multidimensional dispositions; and sees the self and others as psychological beings with complex motives and subjective experience.

Level 1: lack of clear differentiation between characters; boundary confusion; confusion of points of view

Level 2: characters separate but unidimensional; emphasis on momentary actions or physical descriptions of characters; fluid characterization

Level 3: characters described as having some, though relatively simple, enduring qualities; some elaboration of psychological processes or internal life; some sense of continuity over time of attitudes or simple dispositions

Level 4: characters recognized as having complex subjective states, enduring characteristics, or mixed emotions or attributes

Level 5: characters recognized as possessing enduring and momentary traits and states, complex motives or conflicts, or mixed feelings or attributes with complex subjective experience

General scoring rules: (1) Where the bulk of a story is clearly one level but some brief remark is two or more levels above or below, score the intermediate level. (2) Any intrusion of undifferentiation, boundary confusion, or confusion of characters' points of view "spoils" an otherwise high-level response and automatically brings the score to Level 1.

Level 1

Principle: at Level 1 the person does not see others as clearly differentiated or bounded, and/or does not differentiate his own thoughts and feelings from those of others. Basic boundaries relating to the social world (e.g., animate/inanimate) may be blurred.

(1) Score for characters who are "twinning," i.e., seen as sharing <sup>367</sup> the same situation, thoughts, or feelings. Characters represented in the picture may be described as an undifferentiated "they." Characters seen as in conflict may be described as sharing the same thoughts or worrying about one of the characters' plight; e.g., "they're both worried about her being alone." Emotions may be attributed to situations or to the story as a whole, or subject may not clearly differentiate whose emotion is whose. Score for unreferenced pronouns that are not corrected and do not appear simply to reflect grammatical errors; e.g., in a story about a mother and a son (with no father mentioned) arguing, the subject states in the midst of describing their argument that "they might feel helpless, that they don't know what to do to help their son" (where the first "they" clearly referred to mother and son, but the second is indeterminate). If main characters are described in an undifferentiated way, score Level 1 even if other, more peripheral characters are bounded. Score undifferentiated characters on Card 10 as Level 2.

(2) Score if one character represented in the card is seen as a thought in the mind of another, where lack of elaboration or the literal (as opposed to metaphorical) quality of the response suggests that this is not a playful, symbolic response but instead represents a failure to recognize the independence and basic separateness of characters.

(4) Score for response that suggests boundary confusion or the confusion of the physical and the psychological. For example, "For some reason I don't think the father's gonna make it, because of the way the doctor looks--kind of fuzzy, not definite. When I think of things as clear or definite, I think of them as confident or sure. ['is the doctor fuzzy



about it, or is the picture fuzzy?'] The picture is fuzzy." 368.

"There's another really faded out impression in the corner of a woman sitting near his brain, so maybe she wants him to be with her and not with someone else."

(5) Score for turning humans into nonhumans (e.g., a character becomes a mannequin), where the result is that only one character remains in the story who has thoughts and feelings. Do not score where the subject invents and describes additional human characters who have separate subjectivities.

(6) Score for failure to define any character at all (e.g., "there's a violin in this picture, and it's going to be played").

## Level 2

Principle: at Level 2 the person sees people as clearly bounded, separate from self and from each other, but without an elaborate sense of people's subjective states, motives, or enduring characteristics. The focus is largely on behaviors and momentary actions, rather than on the thoughts, feelings, or psychological processes that motivate or influence behavior. People are seen as primarily unidimensional, existing in situations rather than across situations. Where people are understood as having enduring qualities, these are generally global, evaluative traits like "nice" or "mean."

(1) Score for lack of complexity of characterization. Characters are minimally elaborated or unidimensional. Subject's emphasis may be on physical description of characters, with no elaboration of their internal lives. Any traits used to describe them are global, evaluative, and univalent; e.g., "he's an evil person," or "she is nice."

(2) Score for characters who seem to have a momentary existence, with<sup>369</sup> no sense of continuity, enduring dispositions, or life history, except perhaps unelaborated recent history grafted on. For example, someone stole the money of two characters, and "I think they're gonna look for it, and before, they thought they were stealing their money." People may be defined in terms of momentary actions; e.g., "he saw a house and wanted to go in it, and it was real scary and he got scared when he went in the door so he ran out..."

(3) Score for fluidity of characterization, even where the character is complex; e.g., "she's either very asleep or she doesn't care either way that he's standing there or not." Do not score for fluidity when the character changes because the subject changes the story. Only score where the subject clearly does not seem to keep one relatively coherent representation of the character in mind while presenting the story.

(4) Score for primitive understanding of feeling-states and intentions. Judgments of feeling may involve simple reading off of facial expressions, with no elaboration of psychic life; e.g., "the one on top seems really calm, the other seems really frightened, or concentrating on one thing; the one by the tree seems to be concentrating only on her." Feelings may be described with terms such as "sick" or "tired," or with relatively simple and unelaborated emotion words; e.g., "she is very upset." If the subject imagines a character experiencing two emotions, she or he cannot see how to integrate them and thus offers the two emotions as alternative versions of the story.

Principle: at Level 3 the person makes inferences about subjective states in addition to focusing on behavior. Understanding of other people's psychological processes and subjective experience does not, however, delve far beneath the surface. The person has ideas or "theories" about others' enduring characteristics, but these intuitive theories are either unidimensional, overly general, or lacking in subtlety. There is little sense that people could do things "out of character" or experience psychological conflicts.

(1) Score for minor elaboration of characters' mental lives, beyond description of simple feeling states or intentions, where characters remain stereotypic or not well developed.

(2) Score for some minimal sense of trait continuity over time or some mention of enduring attitudes, where characters remain unidimensional; e.g., "this is a little boy who usually likes to play music." Do not score for continuity of actions when implications are not explicitly drawn about the character's disposition; e.g., "he normally does that," or, "he practices everyday." Do not score for statements like, "this is a boy who likes to play the violin " when these are essentially extensions of the current scene, unless specifically qualified by a statement implying a longer-term disposition (e.g., "this is a boy who has wanted to play the violin for many years").

(3) Score where a character experiences one relatively simple emotion which is ascribed to multiple causes, at least one of which is described in terms of its subjective components (e.g., "she is upset because she is afraid he will die and also because she does not want to be alone").

(4) Score for minor fluidity of characters where the coder has a clear<sup>371</sup> sense after reading the story what the character is like.

(5) Score for recognition of a difference between reality and appearance with respect to emotions; e.g., "he's acting like he hates the violin because he wants them to think he hates it so he can really surprise them when he plays the song."

(6) Score where the subject provides a relatively rich or elaborate picture of the character which says little about the character's enduring personality or mental life; in other words, provide for elaborations on the context of the person or the social roles he or she plays where there is minimal psychological description of the person (e.g., "this is an immigrant child in the 1920s"). Do not score for elaborate physical descriptions.

(7) Score for elaborate descriptions of a character's personality where the elaborations are starkly univalent and affect-driven; e.g., score where the subject provides a detailed elaboration of the psychological life of someone who is, at bottom, nothing but a witch. Only score where confident that the representation is an elaboration of an affectively dominated representation.

#### Level 4

Principle: at Level 4 the person has an appreciation for the complexity of the subjective states of others and has a relatively differentiated view of personality dispositions. Component parts of personality are not yet understood as aspects of an interacting system, in which enduring dispositions can come into conflict or be brought to bear in

different ways in different situations. While the person recognizes<sup>372</sup> the potential for disparities between actions, self-presentations, and internal states, he or she has minimal awareness of disparities between conscious and unconscious mental events.

(1) Score for detailed elaboration of subjective states in the specific situation of the story, where there is minimal sense of what the character is like in other situations and where there is minimal sense of enduring qualities.

(2) Score for some sense of enduring qualities (other than simple likes and dislikes) ascribed to a character without much elaboration of subjectivity.

(3) Score where two global, relatively simple traits with opposite affective valence are ascribed to the same character (e.g., "she's nice but dumb").

(4) Score for explicit recognition that characters have mental conflicts, when such conflicts are either unelaborated or elaborated only during inquiry and do not appear to have been central in shaping the action of the story. Score for detailed elaboration of characters' psychic lives when such elaboration has no relation to the character's current actions or to the plot; e.g., subject tells a story about a man rationally discussing a business deal with his father, and then proceeds in the inquiry to provide a detailed sketch of the character's longstanding fears of sexuality. Score for some sense of extended time-frame for a character's psychological predicament or dilemma.

(5) Score where characters experience mixed emotions, where there is little sense of what the character is like outside of the particular situation.

(6) Score for characters whose enduring personality dispositions<sup>373</sup> are described with qualification; e.g., "she's sometimes quick to get angry, but not always."

#### Level 5

Principle: at Level 5 the person sees people in complex ways, making elaborate inferences about their mental states, motivations, points of view, and unconscious processes. People are seen as having conflicting feelings and impulses, and as expressing different aspects of their personalities in different situations.

(1) Score for characters who are not only elaborated but also either multidimensional or seen in extended temporal context (i.e., in the context of enduring dispositions). Score for characters who are described as having both enduring and momentary traits and states (which need not be conflicting or discrepant). Do not score for ornate elaborations of a character's momentary dilemma or experience in one dimension (e.g., lengthy description of a boy as a violin player without extended temporal dimension to his psychological attributes); score Level 4.

(2) Score for explicit contrasts between the way the character is in the picture and the way s/he usually is, where the character's qualities are well developed.

(3) Score for characters who are described as experiencing ambivalent feelings simultaneously, where there is some sense of what the character is like out of the particular situation.

(4) Score for characters who have extremely complex motives or elaborated mental conflicts. Do not score for momentary situational conflicts between characters; e.g., "she wants him to stay, and he's considering it but will leave."

(5) Score where characteristics or traits with opposite affective valence are ascribed to the same character, where at least one such trait is not global or is qualified (e.g., "she's nice, but sometimes she doesn't think things out"; "she's smart, but she's thoughtless").

Understanding of Social Causality

Principle: scale measures the extent to which attributions of the causes of people's actions, thoughts, and feelings are logical, accurate, complex, and psychologically-minded.\*

Level 1: noncausal; grossly illogical; causally disconnected major sequences

Level 2: environmental and behavioral causes; minor logic errors; simple intentions

Level 3: multidirectional behavioral causes; simple psychologically mediated causes

Level 4: unidirectional internal causes; cognitive mediation of action

Level 5: actions and interactions result from complex psychological processes; characters respond to, and seek to influence, inferred mental states of other characters; unconscious motivational processes

General scoring rules: (1) If the subject provides multiple responses, score the highest level response unless one or more of the responses has logic errors, in which case score 1 or 2 (depending on the severity of the error). (2) Score material obtained through up to three inquiries by the tester. (3) Faulty logic "spoils" an otherwise high-level response, bringing the score automatically to Level 1. (4) In scoring stories with this scale, the coder should first ask, "Is the action in this story logical?" If so, s/he should then ask, "What is causal?" Finally, if there are implicit or explicit causal statements, the coder should then ask, "Is it internal? And is it complex?"

---

\*In constructing this scale we made considerable use of measures devised for coding children's stories by Bogen (1982).



Principle: at Level 1 the person does not understand the concept of causality in the social realm. There is either no sense of necessity to understand why behaviors, feelings, or situations emerge, or explanations that are advanced are grossly illogical.

(1) Score for noncausal or grossly illogical stories, or for large unexplained transitions or transformations (e.g., "this boy wanted to play the violin, and he went to the store and bought some candy, and he didn't play the violin"). Score for use of magic to explain actions or results, except where it is clearly playful or in jest. Score where the only causality is physical, not social; e.g., a man slides down a rope and burns his hands, or a boy stays up late at night and gets tired.

(2) Score for unexplained affects, which simply seem to come and go, or for absence of any indication of how characters came to conclusions in order to act. Score for isolated affects leading up to a situation, where the action would only make sense if the subject first explained the affect; e.g., "what led up to it was grief." Do not score where the cause of the affect can be readily inferred.

(3) Score if subject explains actions or motives on the basis of peculiar reading of signs, such as interpreting a picture on the wall as an indication of a character's mental state; do not score if the rest of the response is rich, playful, and elaborated, suggesting creative use of symbolism.

(4) Score for bizarre scenes, where the scene or the character's placement in it is not explained; e.g., "I think this is a madwoman talking to a mannequin, in an old Southern mansion."

Level 2

Principle: at Level 2 the person has a rudimentary understanding of social causality. Actions are explained as responses to environmental stimuli or as resulting from simple feelings or intentions. Explanations of behaviors, feelings, or interactions frequently have mild logic errors or inconsistencies.

(1) Score for actions or feelings viewed as caused by environmental stimuli. Characters behave in response to impersonal forces or behaviors of other characters, without significant mediation by their psychological states or processes; e.g., "he fell down and hurt his hand and went home to tell his mother and she put a bandaid on it." Impersonal events may evoke simple affects, which in turn influence action (e.g., a boy walks into a scary house, so he runs away; or a death causes a person to be despondent and to go into a cemetery to place flowers on the grave). If behavioral interaction between characters is more than bidirectional, score Level 3. If character B responds to something character A has done, that is unidirectional; if character A in turn responds to the actions of character B, that is bidirectional, and still scored Level 2; if character B responds to this action, that is multidirectional (i.e., causality runs in multiple directions), and is scored Level 3. If the subject had explicitly described the causality for character A's initial action, then character B's first reaction to character A would represent bidirectional causality.

(2) Score for minor logic errors or minor unexplained events or transitions in a set of otherwise clear causal relationships. Score for incongruity between thoughts, feelings, and actions. Affect does not fit action (e.g., a child hanging his head after misdeeds feels

"tired"), a feeling is incongruent with what the character is thinking, or thoughts and emotions are momentary and unintegrated with the plot or enduring characteristics. To score for minor logic errors, the coder must be confident that an error in logic occurred; do not score if ambiguous. To score for minor unexplained transitions, score if an explanation could be inferred, but many other explanations could equally be entertained.

(3) Score for sense of causality where only minimally elaborated or implied but readily inferred.

(4) Score for thoughts producing action, but without causal mechanisms explaining the thoughts; e.g., "they're thinking very hard. The man is going to have an idea to go on a surprise trip." Score for people planning and intending but not carrying out their intentions, unless there is an explanation of inaction, in which case treat inaction as an action.

(5) Score for action seen as stemming from simple intentions; e.g., "he wanted to play the violin, so he went out and bought one"; "she wanted to know what had happened, so she asked"; "he liked to climb ropes so he could see things across the river." Score for people responding appropriately to simple emotions; e.g., "he got scared, so he ran."

(6) Score for people seen as having complex motives or traits without these dispositions having any apparent causal impact on depicted action; e.g., "this is a man visiting a graveyard weeping for a friend. And he's a weird, evil-type man who likes to hurt people."

(7) Score for near-magic abilities of seemingly omnipotent authorities to achieve desired states.

Level 3

Principle: at Level 3 the person understands multidirectional causality where behaviors, feelings, and their causes are still conceived largely in stimulus-response terms. The person recognizes that psychological processes may influence action, though causality is primarily external to the person.

(1) Score for multidirectional behavioral causes. Multidirectional causality must be explicit and unambiguous. Do not score dialogue as multidirectional unless the interaction involves at least three lines of dialogue which have psychological impact on the characters (i.e., lead to more than a simple verbal retort) or are accompanied by an action.

(2) Score where interaction between two characters leads to action by another, where the causality is direct and the action is temporally contiguous.

(3) Score for unidirectional behavioral causes where the subject points to the influence of the broader social system on thought, behavior, or consequences for actors.

(4) Score for complex emotional states elicited by environmental or behavioral events which do not eventuate in behavior. If the complex emotional state itself causes some action, score Level 4 or 5.

(5) Score for some elaboration of psychological causes in an account that it primarily focused on environmental or behavioral causes. Score where the psychological statement is practically superfluous to the account. Elaboration of psychological causes must go beyond description of the causal impact of relatively simple feeling-states or intentions.

(6) Score where the subject makes a generalized statement that indicates sophisticated understanding of causal processes even where this sophistication is not reflected in the story; e.g., "they became friendly because they went through an awful situation together--you know how bonding experiences like that can cement a friendship.

#### Level 4

Principle: at Level 4 the person has a basic understanding of the role of psychological events in motivating action. There is considerable recognition of the importance of people's thoughts and perceptions in mediating between stimulus and response, though understanding of psychological causality is incomplete or applied only irregularly.

(1) Score for unidirectional internal causes; i.e., one character's actions stem from elaborated psychological causes. For example, "he is getting out of the relationship because he is feeling stifled and wants autonomy." A single character's actions may stem from psychic conflict. Actions are not perceived as simply reactive to behavior without much thought or feeling. Do not score for emotions elicited by environmental or behavioral causes which do not in turn eventuate in action. Mental states must themselves be causal, not just caused. Do not score for simple intentions. If unclear whether the psychological cause is elaborate or is a simple intention, score Level 3. If only one character is depicted in the card, score complex internal causes Level 5.

(2) Score for recognition that behaviors are influenced by people's construal of the situation. Characters' actions result in part from their perspective on, or understanding of the situation, where the subject indicates a recognition that this is likely to differ from the perspective of others in the same situation.

(3) Score for characters who respond to the perceived wishes of others. If any character has complex understanding of others' wishes, score Level 5.

#### Level 5

Principle: at Level 5 the person understands feelings and behaviors as caused by psychological processes, which may or may not be elicited by environmental stimuli. Complex thoughts, feelings, and conflicts are seen as mediating action. At Level 5 the person makes complex inferences about the psychological processes of others, attempts to influence others' perceptions, and has an interest in examining his or her own mental processes.

(1) Score for bidirectional or multidirectional internal causes; i.e., multiple actors in an interaction act on the basis of elaborated perceptions, thoughts, wishes, or conflicts. Action of more than one character is seen as stemming from complex motives. If only one character is depicted in the card, score if that character acts on the basis of complex internal processes; if the motives are internal but not complex, score Level 3 or 4, depending on degree of complexity.

(2) Score if one or more characters respond to their perception of other people's thoughts or perceptions. Do not score for actions based on perception of others' wishes, except where these are complexly elaborated; score perception of wishes Level 4. Do not score Level 5 if

thoughts, perceptions, or expectations of others that influence action are shared by the actor or have been internalized as ideals; e.g., score level 4 for, "he is feeling that his father has always set standards for his life." Score for one or more characters trying to influence other characters' thought.

(3) Score for actions based on introspection or character's examination of her/his own mental processes.

(4) Score for unconscious motivational processes.

(5) Score for complex unidirectional internal causality where the subject also elaborates a generalized causal statement (e.g., referring to a "bonding experience" or "mutual growth experience" that typically accompanies such interactions as occurred in the story).

Principle: scale measures the extent to which others are treated as ends rather than means, events are regarded in terms other than need-gratification, moral standards are developed and considered, and relationships are experienced as meaningful and committed.

Level 1: need-gratification is primary aim, even in interpersonal relations; characters self-preoccupied; people seen as tools for character's gratification without consideration of conflicting needs or wishes

Level 2: moral conflict or conflicting interests recognized, but single character's needs are clearly central; moral demands followed to avoid punishment; harsh and primitive moral injunctions; friendships interchangeable

Level 3: stereotypic compassion or mutuality; obedience to internalized, conventional moral standards or duty; orientation to pleasing others

Level 4: longterm, committed relationships; mature empathy; commitment to abstract ideals

Level 5: compromise between autonomous actors; concern for conflicting interests; adherence to moral principles despite unconvencionality or unpopularity; pursuit of self-development in context of meaningful relationships

General scoring rule: Score Level 1 for evidence of profound self-preoccupation or need-gratifying orientation to object relations in an otherwise conventional-sounding story. Because subjects' responses on this scale are biased by social desirability, evidence of low level emotional investment on the part of the subject that slips through "spoils" an otherwise higher-level response. Otherwise, score highest level attained.



Level 1

Principle: at Level 1 the person is primarily concerned with, and views good and evil in terms of, his or her own gratification (and expects that others do the same). People are seen as existing only in relation to oneself. To the extent that other people are experienced as separate from self, they are treated as tools for the achievement of one's desires; as mirrors or audience for one's displays; or as impediments to one's gratification. People may be seen as useful or comforting at the moment but are not invested in emotionally for their unique characteristics. Rules and authorities are seen as obstacles unless momentarily useful.

(1) Score for wanton trickery or pursuit of self-interest without any concern for others. Subject portrays characters carrying out proscribed or clearly deleterious acts (e.g., killing, raping) without any sense of remorse, or feeling primarily happy in the face of their own bad deeds or someone else's misery. If this response occurs on Card 15, score as Level 2, unless it is idiosyncratically elaborated or subject clearly identifies with the character. Score Level 2 or 3 if subject uses morally evaluative terms to describe the event, such as "these people are really bad."

(2) Score for focus on only one character's point of view in a conflict, or lack of recognition of conflict between characters where conflict is clear from the story. Score for people pursuing their own needs without regard for each other or each other's perspective, or pursuit of need-satisfaction as a response to failures of significant others. Score where a character takes an action with major impact on significant others without apparent concern or interest in their wishes or their

actual viewpoint. Do not score for parents imposing their wishes<sup>385</sup> on children (e.g., violin lessons) unless the action is clearly against the child's interests. Where characters pursue their own needs without heed of the other on Card 4, score Level 2 or 3. Where burglary scenes are depicted on Card 5 with no mention of any other issues or relationships, score Level 2. Score for sense of people as important only to be used.

(3) Score if subject focuses on a single character and leaves characters out of his/her story who are depicted in the card. Score if no other characters are even alluded to on cards depicting a single character, if focus is entirely on the momentary actions of the character (e.g., "this is a man who is thinking about climbing a rope, and he does"), and if there are no indications of higher-level functioning, such as capacity for delayed gratification, persistence, or any sense of impulse control or internalized values, which suggest precursors or prerequisites for greater object-relatedness. If any of these are present, score at least Level 2.

(4) Score for people depicted as mirrors, tools for gratification, or transitional objects. Score where all action is directed toward helping one character. Score where people seem to exist for the person or are valued as someone to be there for the person or to tell things to, but not in a mutually interactive way (e.g., "he climbed a rope and went home to tell his mother"). Score if a character is brought into the story only as someone to whom the main character can run for safety. Others may be valued only for protection from loneliness; e.g., "she's pretty annoyed, and worried that she should leave, which would be problematic because she doesn't want to live alone." Focus may be entirely on the gratification or succorance of one character; e.g., "I

think he feels sick and wants his mom. He's gonna have some medicine and feel better." Do not score if the subject elaborates the helper's perspective, if the helper seems to be a character in his/her own right who exists for reasons other than helping the protagonist, or if the helper seems motivated by the desire to fulfill a social role or obligation; score Level 2 or 3. Where ambiguous, score Level 2.

(5) Score for profoundly self-preoccupied characters, or for primary focus on characters' bodily sensations; e.g., "maybe he's gonna draw a picture of himself"; or "he's thinking and feeling his muscles." Score for characters preoccupied with their own images or reflections.

(6) Score if subject responds egocentrically, putting himself or someone he knows into the story, putting in gratuitous self-serving theme (e.g., "they're thinking of giving some toys to their kids"), or is unable to keep the stories separate from himself and significant others in his own life. Do not score for storybook or movie characters (e.g., Cary Grant, Ebenezer Scrooge) or for simple mention of similarity between a story and one's life (e.g., "that reminds me of what happened to my sister"), except where the story becomes about the real-life person or event (e.g., "and what's gonna happen in this card is that my sister is going to leave her husband").

(7) Score for need-gratifying conception of friendship, where friends who are momentarily not gratifying are easily dismissed (e.g., because of a single conflict or argument). Do not score if character is described as experiencing a sense of loss when a friendship ends; score Level 2 or 3.

(8) Score for loners or for sense of schizoid unrelatedness of characters to each other. Score for two characters in the same card without any sense of psychological relatedness, where neither is involved with the other. Score for insane people when there are no other autonomous characters. Score for sense of people as unreal or dehumanized; e.g., "this is a madwoman talking to a mannequin."

(9) Score when the primary theme of the story is need-gratification, even without apparent harm to someone, when there is minimal sense of relationship between people.

(10) Score for lack of response to a major interpersonal event, such as a death.

## Level 2

Principle: at Level 2 the person has a clear sense of potential conflicts between the needs or desires of self and others, though the primary aim remains the satisfaction of one's own wishes. There is a rudimentary sense of right and wrong, characterized by an equation of prudence and morality (i.e., bad actions are bad because they lead to punishment), and the person experiences some remorse following impulsive action. Moral injunctions that exist may be primitive and harsh. Although the person may clearly have attachments, investment in other people (i.e., concern for, and pursuit of the good of significant others) remains clearly secondary to self-interest. Friends are valued but in many respects remain interchangeable; the basis for friendship tends to be shared activity.

(1) Score for trickery or self-serving actions with some recognition of the impact on others.

(2) Score for conflict between characters who clearly know what the other wants but do not heed their wishes; score when it is ambiguous whether they are heeding at all. Score for two people arguing, with no mediation, no resolution, or total conflict. Score for persistence of an interpersonal problem with no resolution.

(3) Score for characters who avoid disobedience only to escape punishment. Score for themes of punishment (e.g., going to jail) or for characters getting apprehended, without mention of guilt or remorse. Score for parents punishing children for impulsive acts where the parents seem to exist only as punishers; if they are characters in their own right, score Level 3, particularly if the subject explicitly views them as teaching a moral lesson in a nonabusive way; if abusive in their punishment, score Level 2. If subject raises the issue of guilt, score Level 3, even if portrays character as beyond remorse.

(4) Score for hints of grandiosity; e.g., "he was not good enough for her." Do not score for grandiose outcomes on Card 1 such as, "he will grow up and be one of the greatest violin players ever," unless elaborated significantly. Where grandiosity is allied with self-servingness or a need-gratifying orientation to relationships, score Level 1.

(5) Score for impulsive aggression with some remorse. If this occurs in the context of a committed relationship, score Level 3. Score for characters who experience an aversive affect other than guilt (such as "worry") when performing clearly immoral actions, unless that affect stems from hedonistic concerns rather than remorse, in which case score Level 1. In order to score Level 3 for guilt for immoral actions, the

coder must be absolutely certain that the affect is guilt; comments such as "he felt bad" are not specific enough to bring the score to Level 3 unless the coder is confident from the context that guilt is the intended affect.

(6) Score for interchangeable friends, where there is some sense of attachment or sadness at friendship ending. Score for loss themes where there is a lack of depth to the attachment (e.g., character mourns the loss of another person with an unspecified relation, such as "he's upset because this lady has died"). Where friendships are represented, score Level 2 if basis of relationship could be proximity or simple participation in mutual activity, unless there are indications of higher-level relatedness or moral development. Score for engagement in conversation unless there are indications of higher-level relatedness. Score for superficial relationships indicative of the subject's knowledge of, but not particular investment in relationships. Score for friendships which seem primarily to reflect mutual self-interest.

(7) Score for responses that seem overwhelmingly to be categorized as Level 1 but have some hint of real moral concern or conventionality. Score for responses which lack the profound self-preoccupation of Level 1 but do not demonstrate the social conventionality or sense of interpersonal connectedness of Level 3. Score where all action is directed toward helping one character, where it is unclear to what extent the helper is a character with his/her own identity. Score for hint of characters wishing to please others, where this is ambiguous or their motives seem primarily self-serving.

(8) Score for sense of impulse control, frustration tolerance, or perseverance, where not in the service of moral or clearly interpersonal ends (e.g., a boy persevering at the violin even though he would like to go out and play). Perseverance must be explicit, not inferred.

(9) Score for arbitrary authority, where the authority appears to have power but is not viewed as fair or is not invested with legitimacy. Score for false accusations, suggestive of a tendency toward externalization to avoid punishment. Where the person is saved by a wise or benevolent elder, score Level 3; where the arbitrariness of power is described in a broader social context with a clear sense of moral issues or relatedness between characters, score Level 4 or 5.

(10) Score for profound masochism, or for characters acquiescing in severe or chronic abuse. If subject explicitly states that people do not deserve to be treated this way, score Level 3.

### Level 3

Principle: at level 3 the person considers the needs and wishes of significant others in making decisions. Pleasing other people, being liked, and behaving in accord with the standards of respected authorities are salient aims which often override self-interest. The person is concerned with being good and experiences guilt when his or her thoughts, feelings, or action conflict with internalized standards. Rules are respected because they are rules; manners and conventions are seen as important and even natural. Moral rules are relatively rigid and concrete, and there is a pronounced sense of duty, particularly to certain people. Relationships are valued but are not very deep.

(1) Score for characters who obey moral standards because these are valued rules or edicts of respected authorities, not just to avoid unpleasant consequences. Characters express concern for others and dislike of bad actions because they are wrong. Score for a rigid, moralistic sense of rules or duty. Score for concern for conventions, social norms, manners, and being nice. Characters may be described as chivalrous, protecting someone else's honor, or fulfilling social obligations (e.g., going to war). Characters may perform prosocial or expected behaviors because of role expectations.

(2) Score for relatively unelaborated, stereotypic displays of concern or good feeling, such as enjoyment of others' company or "mutual love." Score for characters who are clearly attached, but where there is minimal sense of history to their relationship, or love for one another as particular people, or where the description is so stereotypic that little inference can be drawn about the subject's capacity to invest emotionally (as opposed to his/her knowledge that some people like or love each other).

(3) Score for pronounced sense of duty to help specific others or to carry out specific internalized rules. Where duty is expressed in explicitly abstract form (i.e., duty to abstract ideals which leads to action, rather than duty to particular rules or relationships), score Level 4.

(4) Score for experience of guilt for immoral or harmful actions. If guilt is extremely primitive or provokes extreme retribution, score Level 2.



(5) Score for people appropriately carrying out relatively selfless duties, such as caretaking responsibilities. Score for a helping orientation. Score for people doing things to make others happy unless there is a real sense of commitment or compassion, in which case score Level 4. Score for superficial altruism or consolation of someone who is suffering or grieving. Score for performance of social roles or obligations (e.g., taking an injured person to a hospital). Score for generosity or magnanimity (e.g., willingness to make up after an argument). Where the person doing the helping has an unspecified identity or relationship to the person being helped, score Level 1 or 2 (e.g., "someone comes and helps her").

(6) Score for omnipotent authorities or wise older figures. Characters may happily obey authorities with little or no protest. Score for internalization of parental wishes or values. Where there is a real sense of compassion or empathy for the parents' perspective beyond simple identification, score Level 4.

(7) Score for unconventionality or rejection of social roles where there is minimal sense of relatedness to others. Where unconventionality is principled and occurs in the context of relatedness to others, score Level 4 or 5. Score for disobedience of parental authority or the authority of concrete individuals where there are no principles involved. If rejection of authority or social roles seems to be motivated primarily by a need-gratifying orientation, score Level 1; if defiance or disregard of authority seems to stem from a simple desire to assert autonomy, score Level 2.

Level 4

Principle: at Level 4 the person is able to invest maturely in other people emotionally, so that s/he consistently weighs others' wishes and needs when choosing a course of action. Obligation to others often overrides personal desires. Moral judgments, values, and modes of conflict-resolution remain relatively conventional. The person is concerned with doing the right thing, as defined by society or respected authorities, which is frequently expressed in more abstract terms and is often self-abnegatory. Relationships are seen as lasting over time and involving considerable commitment and intimacy.

(1) Score for longterm, committed relationships which are relatively elaborated affectively. Do not score for stereotypic portrayal of longterm, committed relationships (e.g., "these are two old people who have lived together for many years and love each other very much"); score Level 3. Score for depth of attachments.

(2) Score for mature empathy. Do not score for simple compassion for a person's obvious pain (e.g., sadness for a person experiencing a loss); score Level 2 or 3.

(3) Score for clear, nonstereotypic enjoyment of another's qualities.

(4) Score for commitment to relatively abstract ideals, where there is at least some suggestion of investment in people rather than in empty ideals.

(5) Score for conflicts between people where at least one of the antagonists clearly expresses concern for the other despite their current animosity.

(6) Score for obedience or compliance stemming from concern for others, not primarily from unilateral respect for authority.

Level 5

Principle: at Level 5 the person treats self and others as ends rather than means. The person is interested in the development and happiness of both self and others, and attempts to achieve autonomous selfhood within the context of real involvement with, and investment in others. Conflicts between people with conflicting legitimate interests are understood as requiring compromise. Authorities and rules are not taken to be absolute; the person has a sense of the conventional nature of social rules and believes that at times these must be overridden or changed because they conflict with self-generated or carefully considered standards, or when they do significant harm to people in concrete circumstances.

(1) Score for creative compromise or mediation of conflict suggestive of a recognition of the legitimacy of competing interests and/or the inadequacy of rigid application of conventional solutions. Do not score for children growing to like what their parents want for them; score Level 3 or 4.

(2) Score for sense of conflict between social norms and characters' own considered standards, or recognition of relativity of social norms and values. Characters may be seen as standing up for their principles (especially those that involve the welfare of others) despite adversity, social disapproval, unpopularity, or contrary laws. Do not score if clear indications of Level 1 patterns of investment, with need-gratifying standard opposed to social standards; in that case, score Level 1. If unclear whether a seemingly "postconventional" standard is

motivated by a mature sense of relativity of tradition or a self-serving disregard of community standards, score Level 3. If subject describes a clearly "postconventional" moral stance, but there is no clear sense of committed relationships, score Level 3 or 4.

(3) Score for integration of elaborated depiction of pursuit of self-definition, self-development, or mastery within the context of description of mature, committed relationships.

## REFERENCES

- Blatt, S.J., Brenneis, L.B., Schimek, J., and Glick, M. (1976). Normal development and the psychopathological impairment of the concept of the object on the Rorschach. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 85, 364-73.
- Blatt, S.J., Chevron, E.S., Quinlan, D.M., and Wein, S. (1981). The assessment of qualitative and structural dimensions of object representations. Unpublished manual.
- Bogen, T.M. (1982). Patterns of developmental change in formal characteristics of stories children tell. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan.
- Damon, W. (1977). The social world of the child. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Kernberg, O. (1975). Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism. N.Y.: Jason Aronson.
- Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self: a systematic approach to the treatment of narcissistic personality disorders. N.Y.: International Universities Press.
- Loevinger, J., Wessler, R., and Redmore, C. (1970). Measuring ego development, Vol.II, Scoring manual for women and girls. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Mayman, M. (1967). Object-representations and object-relationships in Rorschach responses. Journal of Projective Techniques, 31, 17-24.
- Selman, R.L. (1980). The growth of interpersonal understanding. N.Y.: Academic Press.
- Shantz, C.U. (1983). Social cognition. In P.H. Mussen (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology, Vol.III, Cognitive development, J.H. Flavell and E.M. Markman (Eds.). N.Y.: Wiley.
- Thompson, A.E. (1981). The theory of affect development and maturity: applications to the TAT. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan.
- Urist, J. (1977). The Rorschach test and the assessment of object relations. Journal of Personality Assessment, 41, 3-9.
- Urist, J. (1980). Object relations. In R.W. Woody (Ed.), Encyclopedia of clinical assessment, Vol.2. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Westen, D. (1985). Self and society: Narcissism, collectivism, and the development of morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## APPENDIX E

## A STORY "INDIGO" TOLD

- ( ) Parenthesis enclose therapists comments.  
 [ ] Brackets enclose patient's asides

This story is about a six year old girl who ran away because she was in trouble with her father. Ten years past. She lived in the forest and was friends with every animal but the tiger. The tiger hated her. She liked the tiger. People came to cut down the trees in the forest. She tried to save the animals but they died. Twelve years later she tried to get food in the village. She saw her father who she thought was a nice man, but she did not recognize him [as her father]. He gave her extra money and asked to see her house so that he could send her more food. He came with soldiers to her house and locked her in prison. She has a step-brother who also ran away. He treated them meanly. If someone died in the village he made the step-brother touch the bodies to scare them. He saved his step-sister. They ran away to a house at the top of a mountain.

It snowed there so much that they had to leave. They went looking for houses. They went back to the woods. She met a boy before she went to prison. She never told her father. He was a prince. He like saving things, he liked saving people. He started to build a house for her. The father came and knocked it down. Build, knock down,...build, knock down. Then something bit the father, like a bird or an insect. He [father] said "Build!" The birds wanted the princess to live in a normal house.

More time passed and she lived in the house -- until she was 24. She met the Prince and fell in love. But there was a witch named ...Stacey. Stacey loved the Prince more than the Princess. She made a deal with the King. He wanted a magic sword so he could kill the Prince. She said "If I give you the sword to kill the Prince can I have your daughter to kill her? The witch thought and gave him the sword. The king said "If I don't kill the Prince you won't kill my daughter." So he said He'd kill the Prince who was making his life miserable.

The witch put a spell on her. The daughter was really a foster daughter but the King did not know this. The spell was everytime she holds a knife she will either cut herself or poke herself. She was using a knife to cut a potato. The Prince came in and said "Let it go!" She listened to him once in his lifetime. One day she picked up a knife again to scare away the tiger [the King's tiger]. The tiger jumped on her, made her drop the knife. The knife went into the tiger's stomach. The witch tried to kill the tiger. The knife went into the tiger's stomach. The tried to kill the tiger. The Princess saved the

tiger. The Prince came in and said "Why did you do that? The tiger was trying to kill you. If you hadn't done that he might have not hurt you." She said "I liked the tiger, goodbye." The Tiger followed her and said "I am going to get you and if I do Stacey will give me food and money." The princess said the witch was lying and promised her the same thing, but the Tiger said "I believe her and if she doesn't give it to me I will bite off her leg and feet and all that will be left of her is her head."

The Princess was talking to the birds. She said she felt horrible that she saved the Tiger who was trying to kill her. The birds said they'd talk to the tiger.

The Prince asked the princess to marry her. She said she'd think about it and the other day passed. He asked again. She said "yes, but we have to get rid of the witch." They made a robot of her and a robot of him. If the robot is stabbed with a knife it pops. The robot picked up the knife and cut itself and popped. The Witch said "I've got her, I've got her and she's finally dead."

When the witch saw the real Princess she died. The Prince and Princess married. The King said "Who is this?" "I'm your daughter daddy, your foster daughter who you always hated and who mommy loved" and the King fainted and died of a heart attack. And the foster brother said "You made my father die." She said "Aren't you happy?" and he said "Yes." The step-mother [who was the witch] got married again.

(What happened to the Princess's real mother?) She died from an accident that was the father's fault because he never loved anybody.

## APPENDIX F

## A STORY "LANI" TOLD

( ) Parenthesis enclose therapists comments and indicate descriptive remarks added by therapist during transcription from video tape.

(The scene: In a large playroom in the basement of a building a therapist sits in a small chair by a table. 'Lani', the patient, alternates between sitting with therapist at table and standing by a large standing blackboard a few feet away. Lani, as she tells her story draws on the blackboard. She is sitting down at the start of this excerpt)

I'm not scared about seeing my Mom again because I got a letter from her and I know I'm going to see her again. But I'm still scared of UP-STAIRS!. That house is spooky! The house of foster relatives where she was temporarily living. Its just like my aunt's house. (Its just like your aunt's house? Which aunt?)

(Stands up and starts drawing on board.) When we were living in Z right? We had a house like that As speaks draws on standing blackboard and there was another house and another house and down here like um we had a yard (Where in Z did you live?) We lived by J. And we had a yard. That was MY YARD. This is MY HOUSE! Right? (ahh) and then (Did you always live in that house or did you move?) And this is my house and this is my yard. (That was the last house that you live in?) Uhuh (oh) And this is my house and this is my yard. And this is the umm projects. Its like another house project houses. (I know projects.) Yea, but its not like that its like its like my house but their house and then there's another house. These are them. And this house was abandoned. Its like up and came like this. (It was an abandoned house?) No, it was good. On the inside it was good and um on the inside it was good like and upstairs the door had a lock on it.

So me and my cousin we used to always go inside this house. We could never go upstairs because the door was always locked. So we went into my backyard and we looked from the other side from my backyard and we looked from the other side from my yard by the windows cause my mother wouldn't say nothing cause if we had to go for the cat. So we went out the window and we came... (Wait wait, You did not tell your mother nothing? I didn't get that)

My mother was minding my cousin and me inside my house and my cat we threw my cat out the window.

(You threw your cat out the window?)

Yea

(You and your cousin?)

Yea



(How come?)

Because it wanted to go out. It was only the first floor. We had to go for the cat so we climbed out the window and we went we had to go a-l-l the way outside and come round the.. So we went out the window right? ...got my cat and went back inside the house and the... we're over here (points at board). This is us coming out right here. Right? and this the...look inside of the house and we went back up here.

So... that same day me and my brother me my brother D and my cousin K and my cousin N and all my friends, right? (Right...your aunt R's children) And all of us came out of the house and all my friends and everything came and went out of the house and went went to this house... and we went upstairs and we opened the door and there was a BIG ROOM, Right? So and there was like a window (marks on board) here and there was this big room where we used to play and we never went we never opened that door and went upstairs.

(so being upstairs in your foster grandmothers's house...)

No "G's" (foster mother's)

(...was like...)

THIS HOUSE

(-- in the upstairs of this house where you never were -- in the upstairs of the abandoned house?)

No cause it was always locked. My cousin went up there once, but I never did.

(Did you think that was a scary place?)

(Sits down at table with therapist.) Nu uh cause the man kept going in there trying to fix it up so people could move in, but no one moved in cause me my cousin were there playing. They ain't scream at us, the people fixing up the house. They ain't scream at us.

### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aristotle. Aristotle's Poetics. (trans. S.H. Butcher). New York: Hill and Wang, 1961.
- Ashberry, J. A Sedentary Existence. The New York Review of Books. 38, no.5, March 7, 1991.
- Ayer, A.J. Language, Truth, and Logic. New York: Dover, 1936, 2nd ed., 1946.
- Bachrach, Henry M. On Specifying the Scientific Methodology of Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 9, no. 2, 1989, 283-304.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination. (ed. Michael Holquist; trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist). Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.
- Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. (ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
- Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. (eds. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist; trans. Vern W. McGee). Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.
- Barthes, Roland. The Semiotic Challenge, (trans by R. Howard). New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux Inc., 1988.
- Bates, E, Benigni, L., Bretherton, I., Camaioni, L., and Volterra, V. The Emergence of Symbols. New York: Academic Press, 1980.
- Bettelheim, B. The Uses of Enchantment. New York: Vintage Books, 1977.
- Blatt, S.J., Chevron, E.S., Quinlan, D.M. & Wein, S. The Assessment of Qualitative and Structural Dimensions of Object Representations. Unpublished manuscript, 1981.
- Blatt, S. J., & Lerner, H.L. Investigations in the psychoanalytic theory of object relations and object representations. In J. Masling (Ed.), Empirical Studies of Psychoanalytical Theories, 1983, 189-249. Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press.
- Bogen, Timothy. Patterns of Developmental Change in Formal Characteristics of Stories Children Tell. Unpublished

- doctoral dissertaion, University of Michegan, 1982.
- Breur, Josef; and Freud, Sigmund. Studies on Hysteria. New York: Basic Books Inc. (Reprint of Volume II of the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Hogarth Press, 1955).
- Brooks, Cleanth & Warren, Robert Penn. Modern Rhetoric. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1949.
- Bruner, J. The Ontogenesis of Speech Acts. Journal of child Language, 1975, 2, 1-19
- Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
- & Lucariello, J. Monologue as Narrative Recreation of the World. In Narratives from the Crib. (ed. K Nelson.) Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Acts of Meaning. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Burke, K. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1945, 1962 rpt.
- Freud and the Analysis of Poetry. In Psychoanalysis and Literature, Ed. H. Ruitenbeek. New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1964.
- Carrol, Lewis. The Annotated Alice: Alice's Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass. (ed. M Gardner). New York: Bramhall House, 1960.
- Carnap, Rudolf. The Logical Structure of the World. R. George, trans. Berkely: University of California Press, 1967.
- Cattell, RB. Principles of Design, in "Projective" or Misperception Tests of Personality. In An Introduction Projective Techniques and Other Devices for Understanding the Dynamics of Human Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.
- Cohn, Dorrit. Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Cramer, Phebe. Defense Mechanisms: A Developmental Study. Paper presented at A.P.A. Symposium, August 1983.

The Development of Defense Mechanisms. Journal of Personality, 1987.

Blatt, S., Ford; Richard. Defense Mechanisms in the Anaclitic and Introjective Personality Configuration. Unpublished Manuscript.

Crapanzano, Vincent. On Self Characterization. In Working Papers and Proceedings of the Center for Psychosocial Studies. No. 24, 1988.

Text, Transference, and Indexicality. Ethos 9, no. 2, 1981, pp. 122-148.

Davidson, D. Truth and Interpretation. New York: Basil Blackwell Inc. 1986.

Dore, J. Monologue as Reenforcement of Dialogue. In Narratives from the Crib. (ed. K Nelson.) Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Drucker, J. The Affective Context and Psychodynamics of First Symbolization. In Symbolic Functioning in Childhood, N Smith and M Franklin eds. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1979.

Toddler Play: Some Comments on its Function in the Developmental Process. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Science, 1979, 4 479-527.

Eliot, TS. Tradition and the Individual Talent. In Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot. (ed. F Kermode). New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1975.

Feldman, CF. Monologue as Problem-Solving Narrative. In Narratives from the Crib. (ed. K Nelson.) Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Freud, S. (1895) Project for a Scientific Psychology. In The Origins of Psychoanalysis. (trans. E. Mosbacher and J Strachey.) New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1954.

(1900) The Interpretation of Dreams. New York: Avon Books, 1965.

(1908) The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming. In Character and Culture. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1963.

(1913) The Occurrence in Dreams of Material from Fairy-Tales. In On Creativity and the Unconscious. New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1958.

- (1915) Some Character-Types met with in Psycho-Analytic Work. In On Creativity and the Unconscious. New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1958.
- (1919) The Uncanny. In On Creativity and the Unconscious. New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1958.
- (1930) Civilization and Its Discontents. (trans, & ed. J Strachey). New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1961.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method, trans. G. Burden and J. Cumming. New York: Crossroad Press, 1988.
- Glick, J. Piaget, Vygotsky and Werner. In Toward A Holistic Developmental Psychology, S. Wapner, B. Kaplan. (Eds.). Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associate, Publishers, 1983.
- Personal communication, September 28, 1990.
- Gergen, Kenneth. If Person's Are Texts. In Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1988, pp. 28-51.
- Goodman, N. & Elgin, C. Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1988.
- Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978.
- Gouin-Decarie, T. Intelligence and Affectivity in Early Childhood. New York: International Universities Press, 1965.
- Greenberg, J. and Mitchell, S. Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- Grunbaum, Adolf. Are Hidden Motives in Psychoanalysis Reasons. In Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1988, pp. 149-167.
- Grunbaum, Adolf. The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Henry, William. The Thematic Apperception Technique in the Study of Group and Cultural Problems. In An

- Introduction Projective Techniques and Other Devices for Understanding the Dynamics of Human Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.
- Habermas, J. Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. JJ. Shapiro. Boston Beacon Press, 1971.
- Theory and Practice, trans J. Viertel. Boston : Beacon Press, 1973.
- Hegel, G. W. F. The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie. New York: Macmillan, 1931.
- Heidegger, M. Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, London: SCM Press, 1962.
- Holt, Robert. The Thematic Apperception Test: Rationale, Administration, and Interpretation. In Methods in Clinical Psychology: Vol. I Projective Assessment. New York: Plenum Press, 1978, (orig. pub. 1951).
- Howard, G. Culture Tales: A Narrative Approach to Thinking, Cross-Cultural Psychology, and Psychotherapy. American Psychologist. 46, no. 3, 1991, 187-197.
- Kaplan, B. Genetic-Dramatism: Old Wine in New Bottles. In Toward A Holistic Developmental Psychology, 1983, 53-69.
- Kernberg, O. Structural Derivative of Object Relations. In Object Relations Theory in Clinical Psychoanalysis. New York: Aronson, 1976.
- Klein, George. Psychoanalytic Theory: An exploration of essentials. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1976.
- Klepser, J.; Westen, D.; Ruffins, S. Object Relations and Social Cognition in Early and Late Adolescents: The Development of Working Representations. (In preparation).
- Levinson, Edgar. The Pursuit of the Particular. Contemporary Psychoanalysis. 24, no. 1, 1988, 1-16.
- Whatever Happened to the Cat? Interpersonal Perspectives on the Self. Contemporary Psychoanalysis. 25, no. 4, 1989.
- Livingston, P. Why Realism Matters: Literary Knowledge and the Philosophy of Science. Unpublished paper presented at Realism and Representation, a conference sponsored

by The Center for the Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture, Rutgers University, November, 1989.

- MacFarlane, JW; Tuddenham, RD. Problems in the Validation of Projective Techniques. In An Introduction Projective Techniques and Other Devices for Understanding the Dynamics of Human Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.
- Mahler, M., Pine F., and Bergman, A.: The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant. New York: Basic Books, 1975.
- Malcolm, Norman. The Myth of Cognitive Processes, 1971, cited in R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979.
- Mayman, M. Early Memories and Character Structure. Journal of Projective Techniques and Personality Assessment, 1968, 32 303-316.
- Morgan, C.; Murray, H. A Method for Investigating Fantasies: The Thematic Apperception Test. Archives for Neurology and Psychiatry, 1935, 34, 289-306.
- Meichenbaum, Donald. What Happens When the "Brute Data" of Psychological Inquiry are Meanings: Nurturing a Dialogue between Hermeneutics and Empiricism. In Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1988, pp. 116-131.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.
- Signs. (trans. R. McCleary.) IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964.
- The Primacy of Perception. Northwestern University Press, 1962.
- Meyer, S. Stein and Emerson. Raritan, 2, Fall 1990.
- Nelson, K. Monologue as Representatin of Real-Life Experience. In Narratives from the Crib. (ed. K Nelson.) Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Pepper, S.C. World Hypothesis: A Study in Evidence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1942/1972.
- Pitcher, Evelyn Goodenough & Prelinger, Ernst. Children Tell



- Stories. New York: International Universities Press, 1963.
- Propp, V. (1928) Morphology of the folktale. Austin Texas: University of Texas Press, 1968.
- Rapaport, D. Principles Underlying Projective Techniques. Character and Personality, 10, 1942, pp.218-219.
- Gill, M; & Schafer, R. Diagnostic Psychological Testing. (ed. R Holt.) Madison, CN: International Universities Press, 1968.
- Rorty, A. A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves and Individuals., ed. The Identities of Persons. Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1976.
- Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Rosaldo, M. Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling. In Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. (eds. R Shweder and R Levine.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self & Social Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Rushdie, S. Is Nothing Sacred? Granta, Spring 1990.
- An Interview with Salman Rushdie. (interviewer, Blake Morrison.) Granta, Spring 1990.
- Russell, B. Human Knowledge, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962.
- Our Knowledge of the External World. New York: New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1960.
- Said, E. Beginnings: Intention and Method. Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.
- Sandler, J and Rosenblatt, B. The Concept of the Representational World. Psychoanalytic Study Of The Child, 1962, 17, pp. 128-145.

- and Sandler, A. On the development of Object Relations and Affects. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1978, 59, pp. 285-296.
- Schimek, Jean. A Critical Re-examination of Freud's Concept of Unconscious Mental Representation. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 2, 1975, 171-181.
- Schafer, R. How Was The Story Told? Journal of Projective Techniques, 1958, 22, 181-210.
- A New Language for Psychoanalysis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Narrative Actions in Psychoanalysis. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, 1981.
- The Analytic Attitude. New York: Basic Books, 1983.
- Shannon, Benny. Semantic Representation of Meaning: A Critique. Psychological Bulletin, 104, no. 1, 1988, 70-83.
- Slade, A. Symbolic Play and Separation-Individuation: A naturalistic study. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 1985.
- Smith, B. Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories. Critical Inquiry, 1980 7, 213-236.
- Spence, Donald. Narrative truth and historical truth: Meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982.
- Stern, Daniel. The Interpersonal World of the Infant. New York: Basic Books, 1985.
- Stevens, W. The Palm at the End of the Mind. (ed. H Stevens). New York: Vintage Books, 1967.
- Sukenick, R. Wallace Stevens: Musing the Obscure. New York: New York University Press, 1967.
- Taylor, Charles. Wittgensteing, Empiricism, and the Question of the "Inner": Commentary on Kenneth Gergen. In Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory. New Jersey: Rutger's University Press, 1988, pp. 52-59.
- Interpretation and the sciences of man. In Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge University Press, 1985.

- Thompson, Anne. A Theory of Affect Development and Maturity: Applications to the Thematic Apperception Test. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1981.
- Todorov, T. Introduction to Poetics. (trans. R Howard). Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.
- Toolan, M. A Critical Linguistic Introduction. New York: Routledge, 1988.
- Volosinov, VN. Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. (trans. L Matejka and IR Titunik. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1973.
- Vygotsky, Lev Semenovitch. Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Vygotsky, Lev Semenovitch. Thought and Language. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986.
- Wakefield, Jerome. Hermeneutics and Empiricism: Commentary on Donald Meichenbaum. In Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1988, pp. 131-139
- Werner, H. & Kaplan, B. Symbol Formation. New York: Wiley, 1963.
- Westen, D.; Lohr, N.; Silk, K.; and Kerber, K. Measuring Object relations and Social Cognition Using the TAT: Scoring Manual. Unpublished manuscript. University of Michigan, 1985, revised 1988.
- Westen, D., Lohr, N., Silk, K., Gold, L., and Kerber, K. Object Relations and Cognition in Borderlines, Major Depressives, and Normals: TAT Analysis. Psychological Assessment, 2, no. 4, 1990, 355-364.
- Winnicott, D.W. Maturation Process and the Facilitating Environment. New York: International Universities Press, 1965.
- Play and Reality. New York: Basic, 1971.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical investigations, trans., G.E.M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968.
- Woolfolk, Robert, Sass, Louis, Messer, Stanley. Introduction to Hermeneutics. In Hermeneutics and

Psychological Theory. New Jersey: Rutger's University Press, 1988, pp. 2-26.

Wurmser, Leon. Either -Or: Some Comments on Professor Grunbaum's Critique of Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 9, no.2, 1989.